III

Acknowledgements

IV

Chinese Abstract

(the liar sentence)(paradox)

(the simple liar)(the

strengthened liar)

(Tarski) 1933

1975 (Kripke)
(fixed point theory)
(Burge)(Gaifman)
(context)
(pathological)

(type)(token)
(self-referential)(GAP)

(the super liar paradox)

___________________________
_
_______________________________________________________________
________ ___________________________

_______________________________________________________________
________ ___________________________

VI

Thesis Synopsis in Chinese

(the liar paradox)

(Burge)
(Gaifman)

(semantic paradox)
(semantic)

(Epimenides paradox)

(the
simple liar)(the strengthened liar)

VII

(neither true nor false)

(truth bearer)

(Kirkham)

(Currys paradox)
PP(arbitrary)

(the truth teller)

VIII

(pathological)

(Yablos paradox)

(Gdel Diagonal Lemma)

(contingent fact)

(form)(syntactic)
T()
F()T() T()T() T()
(the law of non-contradiction)

(dialetheism)

(T-schema)

IX

(correspond to)

(justification)

(Tarski)
(semantic theory of truth)

T (T-schema)(semantic closed)

(object language)(meta-language)

(Kripke)(fixed-point
theory)
(grounded)

i i
(pathological) i
k
i k i

i k
k i

(compound sentence)
P i 12
12 5 1

XI

4 2 i
k k i
i i
i
i i (is rooted)
13 13
6 1 4
2 i k
k i

P i P i i

(pragmatic)
(Principle of Justice)
(Principle of Verity)(Principle of Minimalization)

(Pointer Semantics)

(type)
(two-line puzzle)

XII

(token)(referring)
(pointer)
(point to)
(call)

(Standard rule)

(Gap rule)
(Closed-loop rule)
(closed loop)
(Jump rule) P
P P
(suprevaluation)

T
T

i k

XIII

i i
i i

(indexical term)
(deindexicalized)

XIV

(valid)
T
T
i i
k i
i i i i

(consistency)
(ad hoc)

T P
P
P
(conceive)P P
P P
P P P
P

(the super liar paradox)

XV

(the super liar)

P
P P P
P P
P

(reference)
i i
k
k

XVI

P
P
P P
P
P

(infinite dissenting chain)

P P
P P

(rank)

1
2

XVII

XVIII

English Abstract

The liar sentence can lead to a paradox. The liar is a sentence which states
itself false or states itself untrue. More specifically, a sentence which states itself
false is called the simple liar; and a sentence which states itself untrue is called
the strengthened liar. The liar sentence seems acceptable, or at least
well-formed and meaningful. On the other hand, the liar and some likely
acceptable inferences jointly lead to a contradiction. That is why it is called the
liar paradox.
The liar paradox has been discussed for a long time. In 1933, Taski proposed
a definition of truth in a formal language and pointed out that the natural
language contains the liar paradox. Therefore, when Tarski proposed the
definition of truth, he precluded the natural language. However, some
philosophers think that we can deal with the liar paradox and a theory of truth for
the natural language is possible. A well-known theory is the fixed point theory
proposed by Kripke in 1975. But the fixed point theory is not satisfactory for
philosophers.
In this paper, the subjects are Burges and Gaifmans theories of truth.
According to Burge, the truth value of the liar sentence is context-dependent.
Burge thinks that since the liar can lead to a contradiction, it is pathological. But
the liar sentence can have a truth value in a broader context. Therefore, we can
talk about the truth value of the liar sentence. When we say the liar is not true,
what we say is true. According to Gaifman, the truth value of a sentence does
not only depend on its type, but also depends on the relations among sentence
tokens. The liar sentence is a self-referential sentence and thus is GAP. When

XIX

we say the liar is not true, what we say is not self-referential. And since the liar
is not true, what we say is true.
I have four suspects to Burges and Gaifmans theories. First, Burges theory
does not provide enough rules to determine which sentence a given sentence is
in. Second, Burge and Gaifman do not provide enough reasons to explain why
the liar is pathological or GAP. However, it seems that we intuitively think that if
the liar is pathological or GAP, it is true. It seems that Burge and Gaifman do not
explain why the above reasoning is not valid. Third, the theories by Burge and
Gaifman have a difficulty with the super liar paradox. Burge and Gaifman think
that the liar is pathological or GAP in a context but can be true in another context.
I provide two versions of the super liar. One is a sentence which states itself
untrue in all contexts; another is a sentence which states itself untrue in the
present context. It seems that the two theories do not deal with the two versions
of the super liar well. Fourth, we discuss infinite sequences constituted by
sentences. Sentences of some infinite sequences have truth values; sentences
of some are uncertain; and sentences of some lead to contradictions. It seems
that the two theories cannot distinguish the three kinds of infinite sequences.
In sum, it seems that there are some problems in Burges and Gaifmans
theories. I am not very sure whether we should accept these two theories of
truth.

___________________________
_

XX

_______________________________________________________________
________ ___________________________

_______________________________________________________________
________ ___________________________

XXI
Contents
Signature Page -------------------------------------------------------------------------- I
Thesis Approval Form ------------------------------------------------------------------- II
Acknowledgments ------------------------------------------------------------------------ III
Chinese Abstract -------------------------------------------------------------------------- IV
Thesis Synopsis in Chinese ------------------------------------------------------------ VI
English Abstract --------------------------------------------------------------------------- XVIII
Contents ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ XXI
Chapter 1 The problem: the liar paradox -------------------------------------------1
1.1 Truths lead to paradoxes ---------------------------------------------------1
1.2 The liar paradox, what is that? --------------------------------------------3
1.3 Truth bearers and a try to escape the liar paradox ------------------7
1.4 Self-reference and other relative paradoxes --------------------------10
1.5 Must we reject contradictions? --------------------------------------------15
1.6 The T-schema -----------------------------------------------------------------18
Chapter 2 Theories of truth: a short introduction----------------------------------22
2.1 What is What is truth? -----------------------------------------------------22
2.2 Tarskis solution to the liar paradox --------------------------------------26
2.3 Kripkes fixed-point theory--------------------------------------------------29
Chapter 3 Burges and Gaifmans theories -----------------------------------------31
3.1 An overview --------------------------------------------------------------------31
3.2 Burges theory of truth-------------------------------------------------------33
3.3 Gaifmans theory: the Pointer Semantics ------------------------------41
3.3.1 The two-line puzzle and Gaifmans solution ------------------------41
3.3.2 The formalism of the Pointer Semantics -----------------------------46

XXII
3.3.3 A consideration for suprevaluation-------------------------------------48
3.4 Comparisons between Burges and Gaifmans views ---------------51
Chapter 4 Problems of Burges and Gaifmans theories ------------------------55
4.1 Is is true context-dependent? -------------------------------------------55
4.2 Why the strengthened liar is pathological/GAP -----------------------61
4.3 The problem of the super liar ----------------------------------------------64
4.4 Infinite sequences of sentences ------------------------------------------70
Chapter 5 Conclusion --------------------------------------------------------------------79
References ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------81