The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes was first published in 1936 by The Clarendon Press, Oxford, England. Acknowledgment is gratefully extended for permission to issue this reprinting in the United States.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, LTD., LONDON

Published 1952. Paperback edition 1963

Printed in the United States of America

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eISBN-13: 978-0-226-23181-5

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The Political Philosophy of Hobbes

Its Basis and Its Genesis

Leo Strauss

Translated from the German Manuscript

by Elsa M. Sinclair

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO & LONDON

TO

MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE intention of the present study is to prepare an analysis of the principles of Hobbes’s political philosophy and of that of his successors. A new analysis of those principles has become necessary as a consequence of the deepened knowledge, which has been gained during the last decades, of the tradition of political thought. The time is now past when one could safely without any further qualifications characterize the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the hey-day of natural law theories. This characterization was tacitly based on a comparison of the political theories of the age of rationalism with those of the nineteenth century, and within the limits of such a comparison it still holds true; but it can no longer be maintained when the medieval and classical tradition is duly taken into account. The effect of this change of orientation on the interpretation of Hobbes’s political philosophy is obvious. J. Laird in his recent book on Hobbes could try to establish the view that in ethical and political theory Hobbes’s ‘voice and hands are both mediaeval’. Though this statement is hardly justified, it clearly proves that the older opinion, according to which Hobbes’s originality was beyond question, is somewhat shaken and now needs some qualifications which were not required at an earlier stage of research. Generally speaking, if theories of natural law, far from being a feature peculiar to the age of rationalism, are almost a matter of course in the medieval and classical tradition, we cannot avoid asking why the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gained the reputation of being the period par excellence of natural law theories. And, to exclude from the outset the inadequate answer that for well-known political reasons the practical bearing of natural law theories was greater during that period than in any other age, we must raise the more precise question, whether there is not a difference of principle between the modern and the traditional view of natural law. Such a difference does in fact exist. Traditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective ‘rule and measure’, a binding order prior to, and independent of, the human will, while modern natural law is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of ‘rights’, of subjective claims, originating in the human will. I have tried to establish this view in the present study by comparing the political doctrine of Hobbes, as the founder of modern political philosophy, with that of Plato and Aristotle, as the founders of traditional political philosophy. Essentially the same result is reached if one compares the doctrines of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau with those of, e.g., Hooker, Suarez, and Grotius. Even Leibniz’s doctrine, which at first sight seems to be the most important exception to the afore-mentioned rule, confirms that rule, as is seen if one takes into account not only the content but also the form—the conditional character—which he attributes to the propositions of natural law.¹ However, although Hobbes attaches much less practical importance to the ‘rights of men’ than do most exponents of natural law, the essence of modern natural law and all its essential implications are nowhere more clearly seen than in his doctrine. For Hobbes obviously starts, not, as the great tradition did, from natural ‘law’, i.e. from an objective order, but from natural ‘right’, i.e. from an absolutely justified subjective claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order, or obligation, is itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation. It is by this conception of ‘right’ as the principle of morals and politics that the originality of Hobbes’s political philosophy (which includes his moral philosophy) is least ambiguously evinced. For, by starting from ‘right’ and thus denying the primacy of ‘law’ (or, what amounts fundamentally to the same, of ‘virtue’), Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic tradition. On the other hand, by basing morals and politics on ‘right’, and not on purely natural inclinations or appetites, Hobbes makes a stand against the naturalistic tradition. That is to say, the principle of ‘right’ stands midway between strictly moral principles (such as those of the traditional natural law) on the one hand, and purely natural principles (such as pleasure, appetite, or even utility) on the other. ‘Right’, we may say, is a specifically juridical conception. Some of the assumptions underlying the philosophical application of that conception are indicated in the last chapter of the present study. A full analysis of the significance of that philosophical application had, however, to be postponed; for before such an analysis could be made, it was necessary to remove the obstacles which stand in the way of even a mere recognition of the obvious fact that Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from natural ‘right’, as distinguished from both natural ‘law’ and natural inclinations or appetites.

These obstacles are mainly due to the fact that Hobbes tried to base his political philosophy on modern natural science. The temptation to take this way could hardly be resisted. As traditional moral and political philosophy was, to some extent, based on traditional metaphysics, it seemed necessary, when traditional metaphysics were replaced by modern natural science, to base the new moral and political philosophy on the new science. Attempts of this kind could never succeed: traditional metaphysics were, to use the language of Hobbes’s successors, ‘anthropomorphistic’ and, therefore, a proper basis for a philosophy of things human; modern science, on the other hand, which tried to interpret nature by renouncing all ‘anthropomorphisms’, all conceptions of purpose and perfection, could, therefore, to say the least, contribute nothing to the understanding of things human, to the foundation of morals and politics. In the case of Hobbes, the attempt to base political philosophy on modern science led to the consequence that the fundamental difference between natural ‘right’ and natural appetite could not be consistently maintained. If the significance of Hobbes’s principle of ‘right’ was to be duly recognized, it had, therefore, first to be shown that the real basis of his political philosophy is not modern science. To show this, is the particular object of the present study.

As G. C. Robertson observed in his Hobbes, fifty years ago, ‘the whole of (Hobbes’s) political doctrine … doubtless had its main lines fixed when he was still a mere observer of men and manners, and not yet a mechanical philosopher’ (p. 57). It is, therefore, only natural to attempt a coherent exposition of Hobbes’s ‘pre-scientific’ thought on ‘men and manners’, of his original view, not yet distorted by scientific ‘explanations’, of human life. I hope to have shown by the present study that such an exposition is possible, and even necessary, if we desire any coherent understanding of Hobbes’s thought. Such an understanding is not so easy to gain as it seems at first sight. It is true that every reader of Hobbes is struck by the clarity, rigour, and decision of his thought. But every student of Hobbes is also amazed by the numerous contradictions which occur in his writings. There are but few of his most important and most characteristic assertions which are not contradicted, either directly or by the denial of their obvious consequences, somewhere in his works. In order to find out which of the contradictory statements express his real opinion, we have to hold fast to our first impression of the rigour and unity of his thought. For that impression is nothing other than the perception of Hobbes’s fundamental view of human life, and that view is not contradictory, but one and indivisible. It is this view, and not modern science, which is the real basis of his political philosophy. That view has its origin not so much in any learned or scientific preoccupation, but in actual experience of how men behave in daily life and in ‘public conversation’. The experience, underlying Hobbes’s view of human life, must, in its turn, be traced back to a specific moral attitude which compels its holder to experience and see man in Hobbes’s particular way. Thus that view might find an adequate expression, e.g. in maxims and reflections, in the style of Hobbes’s contemporary La Rochefoucauld (whose opinions about the importance of amour-propre are, by the way, very much akin to Hobbes’s opinions about the importance of ‘glory’ or ‘pride’), rather than in a philosophic system. And in Hobbes’s works there are important parts which are written in such a style. However, Hobbes’s intention is not only to expound his view of human life as the expression of his own experience, but above all to justify this view as the only true and universally valid view. It is by starting from this intention that we can grasp the ultimate reason for the contradictions which are to be found in his writings. For, as he has at his disposal no method suitable to the demands of such a view of human life as he holds, he has no choice but to borrow the methods and conceptions supplied either by the philosophical tradition or by modern science. But neither corresponds to those demands. The traditional conceptions are not appropriate to a fundamentally untraditional view, and the conceptions provided by modern science are not congenial to a view of human life originating in a moral attitude. The basic difference between Hobbes’s original view of human life on the one hand, and the conceptions provided by tradition or modern science on the other, explains all the contradictions of any consequence which occur in his works. The establishment of this fact is the necessary condition not only for any coherent interpretation of Hobbes’s political philosophy, but even, as I have already indicated, for recognition of the principle of that philosophy.

In order to see that Hobbes’s original view is independent both of tradition and modern science, we must study the genesis of his moral and political ideas. For by studying Hobbes’s early thought, we are enabled to perceive that his original conception of human life was present in his mind before he was acquainted with modern science, and thus to establish the fact that that conception is independent of modern science; and by studying his later development we can arrive at a further corroboration of that finding, for there we witness the actual conflict between his original view and the demands of modern science. On the other hand, by studying Hobbes’s development as a whole, which is a gradual emancipation from tradition, we are enabled to realize that at least the presuppositions and consequences of his original view became clearer to him, the more he freed himself from the shackles of tradition, and thus to show that his original conception, understood in its full meaning, is not only independent of tradition, but even contrary to it. Now, while it is one and the same reason—an interest in Hobbes’s original view of human life—which leads us to study his development with regard both to the (in the main) increasing influence of modern science and to the (in the main) decreasing power of tradition, the method to be followed in the two cases is different. In the first case, we are particularly interested in Hobbes’s early thought, in the views he held before he studied exact science. In the second case, we particularly want to see the working of the tendency, which is revealed most clearly in Hobbes’s later period, towards emancipation from tradition. It is, however, impossible to separate those two lines of research completely. For as the early writings of Hobbes are very sparse, we have in some cases to complete the insufficient materials by construing Hobbes’s early view as the hypothetical starting-point of his later development, which in itself is clearly evinced. This point must be stressed because the interdependence of the two lines of investigation justifies the otherwise hardly defensible composition of the present study.

The term ‘early writings’ has in Hobbes’s case a somewhat unusual meaning. If we understand by early writings all those which he composed before his first systematic treatment of political philosophy (The Elements of Law, finished in 1640), they comprise all he had written up to the time he was fifty. In this sense, the ‘early writings’ are: (1) his introduction to his translation of Thucydides (not later than 1628); (2) the poem De mirabilibus Pecci (c. 1627); (3) the little treatise discovered and edited by Tönnies, called by its editor A Short Tract on First Principles (perhaps 1630); (4) two English digests of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (c. 1635). The second and the third of the writings mentioned are of no great interest for our purpose. On the other hand, one must add the autobiographical and biographical accounts of Hobbes’s early period, as well as some letters from and to Hobbes. This very sparse material does not permit of a definite answer to the question of Hobbes’s early thought in all its aspects. The case would be different if a Chatsworth MS., not indeed belonging to the Hobbes papers, but, as far as I can judge, written in Hobbes’s hand, could be used as a source for Hobbes’s early thought. There is reason for assuming that if this manuscript is not the earliest writing of Hobbes himself, his was the decisive influence in its composition.²

With the exceptions immediately to be mentioned, I have followed the edition of Hobbes’s writings by Molesworth (quoted as English Works or Opera latina). For the Elements of Law and Behemoth, I have used Tönnies’s editions, and for the Leviathan the edition by A. D. Lindsay.

I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire for his generosity in permitting me to examine the Hobbes papers at Chatsworth, and to quote some passages from them. I am also very much indebted to Mr. Francis Thompson, Librarian at Chatsworth, whose help and advice were invaluable to me when I was studying the Hobbes papers.

I have to thank Professor Ernest Barker, who read the manuscript of the present study and made very helpful suggestions, and to whose kindness and interest it is primarily due that I was able to continue my work.

I wish further to express my gratitude to Professor R. H. Tawney, to the Master of Balliol, to Professor N. F. Hall, and to Mr. E. J. Passant for the help and encouragement they have given me.

I am very much indebted to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Academic Assistance Council, and the Master and Governing Body of Sidney Sussex College for financial help.

Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. E. M. Sinclair, who generously undertook the difficult task of translating the present study.

L.S.

PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

FOR various reasons this study is here reissued in its original form. It is, no doubt, in need of considerable revision. But it still seems to me that the way in which I approached Hobbes is preferable to the available alternatives. Hobbes appeared to me as the originator of modern political philosophy. This was an error: not Hobbes, but Machiavelli, deserves this honor. But I still prefer that easily corrected error, or rather its characteristic premises, to the more generally accepted views which I was forced to oppose and which are less easily corrected.

I had seen that the modern mind had lost its self-confidence or its certainty of having made decisive progress beyond pre-modern thought; and I saw that it was turning into nihilism, or what is in practice the same thing, fanatical obscurantism. I concluded that the case of the moderns against the ancients must be reopened, without any regard to cherished opinions or convictions, sine ira et studio. I concluded in other words that we must learn to consider seriously, i.e. detachedly, the possibility that Swift was right when he compared the modern world to Lilliput and the ancient world to Brobdingnag. I assumed that political philosophy as quest for the final truth regarding the political fundamentals is possible and necessary: I regarded Hobbes as a political philosopher and not as an ideologist or mythologist. I assumed that political philosophy, as an essentially non-historical pursuit, is today in need of a critical study of its history; that such a critical history presupposes that one understand the great thinkers of the past as they understood themselves; that the history of political philosophy requires an adequate division into periods; and that only such a division can be considered adequate as corresponds to the self-consciousness of the actors, i.e. of the great political philosophers. I concluded that Hobbes was the founder of modern political philosophy because he had expressed the conviction that he had effected, in his capacity as a political philosopher, a radical break with all earlier political philosophy much more clearly than Zeno of Citium, Marsilius of Padua, Machiavelli, Bodin, and even Bacon had done. I was confirmed in this view by the judgment of competent men, of Bayle and Rousseau.

The immediate and perhaps sufficient cause of my error was inadequate reflection on the opening of Machiavelli’s Discorsi. I had learned from Spinoza to appreciate the clarion call of the Fifteenth Chapter of the Principe. But I had been told by all authorities that the magnum opus of Machiavelli is not the Principe but the Discorsi; and the Discorsi present themselves at first glance as an attempt to restore something lost or forgotten rather than as an attempt to open an entirely new vista. I did not consider the possibility that Machiavelli still exercised a kind of reserve which Hobbes disdained to exercise: that the difference in degree to which Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ claims to originality are audible is due to a difference in degree not of clarity of thought but of outspokenness. The reason for this failure was that I was not sufficiently attentive to the question whether wisdom can be divorced from moderation or to the sacrifices which we must make so that our minds may be free.

L.S.    

CONTENTS

I.INTRODUCTION

II.THE MORAL BASIS

III.ARISTOTELIANISM

IV.ARISTOCRATIC VIRTUE

V.THE STATE AND RELIGION

VI.HISTORY

VII.THE NEW MORALITY

VIII.THE NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE

INDEX

NOTES

I

INTRODUCTION

HOBBES’S political philosophy is the first peculiarly modern attempt to give a coherent and exhaustive answer to the question of man’s right life, which is at the same time the question of the right order of society. There is perhaps no element of Hobbes’s teaching which cannot be traced back to one or other of his predecessors; and it may be that one or other of them was in some respects less bound by tradition than was Hobbes. But such elements as had emerged separately before his time find their specifically modern unity only in Hobbes; and none of Hobbes’s forerunners attempted that definite break with tradition in its entirety which the modern answer to the question of man’s right life implies. Hobbes was the first who felt the necessity of seeking, and succeeded in finding, a nuova scienza of man and State. On this new doctrine all later moral and political thought is expressly or tacitly based. To indicate its political importance one might stress the fact that the ideal of civilization in its modern form, the ideal both of the bourgeois-capitalist development and of the socialist movement, was founded and expounded by Hobbes with a depth, clarity, and sincerity never rivalled before or since. To give an indication of its philosophical bearing one might point out that the moral philosophy, not merely of eighteenth-century rationalism, but also of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, would not have been possible without Hobbes’s work. But above all, as a fundamental answer to the question of man’s right life, Hobbes’s political philosophy is of supreme importance not only for political philosophy as such, i.e. for one branch of knowledge among others, but for modern philosophy altogether, if the discussion and elucidation of the ideal of life is indeed the primary and decisive task of philosophy.

It is almost universally admitted that Hobbes marks an epoch in the history of natural law and of the theory of the State. That the importance of his achievement is far greater, that it is truly universal, is usually not even considered. This lack of recognition is partly due—paradoxical as it may sound —to the influence of Hobbes himself. According to his own statements, his achievement in political philosophy was made possible by the application of a new method, the method by which Galileo raised physics to the rank of a science.¹ In conformity with this method, which is called the ‘resolutive-compositive’, the given political facts (the disputable justice or injustice of any particular action, or the current conception of justice in general, or the State itself, which as the primary condition of justice is the political fact par excellence) are analysed, reduced to their elements (the ‘individual wills’), and then, converso itinere, starting from those elements, the necessity and possibility of a ‘collective will’ is developed evidentissimâ connexione, by a completely lucid deduction, and what was at first an ‘irrational’ whole is ‘rationalised’.² It would thus seem that the characteristic contents of Hobbes’s political philosophy—the absolute priority of the individual to the State, the conceptions of the individual as asocial, of the relation between the state of nature and the State as an absolute antithesis, and finally of the State itself as Leviathan—is determined by and, as it were, implied in the method. As this method, however, was