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ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan, respondents. This case involves declaration of ownership. Andrea Tabuso claims to be the owner of a parcel land which she inherited by her mother evidence by tax declaration. However, the property has been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad, although the house standing thereon appears to have been constructed by Marcelo Tabuso, father of Andrea Tabuso. Heirs allegation that the property was sold to Esteban by Isabel elaban evidence bby tax dec. TRIAL: declared the defendant the lawful owners of the land in question that even if tabuso had built a house thereon, such action was only tolerated by the heirs, who had originally allowed one Marcelo Tabuso to construct a house on the same lot. Besides, Tabuso is not a compulsory heir of Ignacio Montes, from whom she claims to have inherited the lot, subject of this litigation. In addition, the tax declaration in his name has long been revised. CA: affirmed. Hence this petition. Ownership of the Property: Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of the coowners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership. ROSARIO GACOS, ARNULFO PRIETO, and RENITA PRIETO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SOLOMON BRIONES, LEONOR BRIONES and TEODULFO MENDONES, respondents. Eladio Gacos owned a unregistered land. During the time he was ill he verbally adjudicated to his three (3) daughters, their respective inheritance shares the northernmost portion to Fortunata, the middle portion to Lucia, and the southernmost portion to Petrona. Petrona immediately took possession and occupied her 1/3 share of the land while her two sisters took possession of their shares only upon the death of their father. Petrona sell to her nephew-in-law, Marcial Olaybal a part of her share. when Petrona Gacos died. She was survived by her four (4) minor children, who were left to the care and custody of her sister Lucia. She's married to Constantino Briones, Sr. who predeceased her. Before her death, Petrona instructed her sister Lucia, who administered the remaining portion of her property, to sell the small area on the east for her funeral expenses and novena. Lucia Gacos, sold the remaining property to Teodolfo Mendones.Lucia and fortunata executed an "Agreement of Partition of Real Property" to wit: Petrona, 2,242 square meters; Lucia, 2,148 square meters; and Fortunata, 2,194 square meters. meanwhile Marcial Olaybal offered to sell to Encarnacion Gacos the parcel of land he bought from Petrona but what was appeared as vendee on the deed of sale is Rosario Gacos, sister of Encarnacion, containing an area of 2,025 square meters. Rosario Gacos sold the land to Arnulfo Prieto. Arnulfo Prieto entered into a 15-year lease contract with his sister Vivencia Prieto allowing her to use the land for her own purposes. A ricemill was constructed thereon by Vivencia Prieto. the children of Petrona Gacos, executed a "Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement" of their mother's share of inheritance. CIVIL CASE NO. 1008: legitimate heirs of the late Petrona Gacos, filed a complaint seeking to recover their inheritance from the Rosario Gacos and Arnulfo Prieto, which they alleged to be the remnant of a 2,242 square meter land. That Petrona sold a portion therefrom consisting of 866 square meters to Marcial Olaybal. That the property was administered by their aunt, Lucia Gacos, in the concept of negotiorum gestio as they were then minors. despite demands by briones, Rosario refused to return the same to the Brioneses.IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1008: Declaring the Brioneses the owners of the 1,292-square meter portion of the land segregating the 1,292 square meters unsold portion of land from the property measuring 866 square meters sold to the Prietos. CIVIL CASE NO. 1049: spouses Arnulfo Prieto and Renita Chua Prieto filed a complaint with the then CFI of Sorsogon, seeking to recover from Teodolfo Mendones the 84-square meter portion of hereditary share of Petrona Gacos which.IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1049: Declaring the Gabitos the owners and entitled to the possession of the land.Prietos appealed to the Court of Appeals : affirmed.Hence, the instant petition for review.. Petitioners then argued that their continued possession in good faith and in the concept of an owner with just title over the disputed property which includes that of their predecessors-in-interest, Rosario Gacos, for 27 years ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno) or it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the

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owner are clearly not "en concepto de dueno," and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription Even under ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights through adverse possession of 10 years, the possession of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest of the unsold portion of 1,159 square meters cannot be characterized as adverse possession in good faith (Art. 1134, Civil Code; Negrete vs. CFI of Marinduque, L-31267, November 24, 1972, 48 SCRA 113). As found by the trial court and the appellate court, as early as April 26, 1949, petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, Rosario Gacos, knew and recognized the sale on February 22, 1949 by Lucia Gacos to Teodolfo Mendones of the eastern portion (Lot No. 2452) of the hereditary estate of Petrona Gacos reportedly containing an area of 84 square meters. In the "Escritura de Venta con Pacto de Retro" dated April 26, 1949 between Lucia Gacos and Rosario Gacos involving the share of Lucia Gacos, Teodolfo Mendones is mentioned as the boundary owner on the south. In fact, Encarnacion Prieto, mother of petitioners, signed as a witness in the said pacto de retro sale, thus impliedly recognizing the ownership of the lot involved in Civil Case No. 1049. If the entire hereditary share of Petrona was sold on March 13, 1948, as asserted by petitioners, the eastern portion (Lot 2452) of her hereditary estate involved in Civil Case No. 1049 could not have been sold to Teodolfo Mendones on February 22, 1949. Petitioners never raised any objection on the exercise of Teodolfo Mendones of his dominical rights over the said eastern portion when the latter mortgaged the land as a collateral for a loan with the Rural Bank of Bulan, Inc. which was discharged and released on April 15, 1975. Earlier, or on July 7, 1972, Teadolfo Mendones even leased the 84 square meter land to Jesus Gabito who, on May 21, 1975, bought the same from Teodolfo Mendones. For their part, the spouses Gabito constructed a residential house thereon and declared the land under Tax Declaration No. 7371. There was even a fence constructed by Marcial Olaybal separating the property he bought from that of Petrona Gacos GABRIEL ELANE, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents. Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry for the eviction of Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private respondent by the Bureau of Forestry. Chua alleges that while visiting the property, he discovered that elane was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent. chua order elane to desist therefrom was ignored by Elaine. Chua then filed an action for forcible entry. MTC: dismissing the complaint and which, on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. chua-ca elevated-reversed ordering Elane to remove or demolish the residential house or building that he constructed on that part of the land in question, to vacate and return possession of said parcel of land. Hence this petition. chua has priority of possession over elane whose entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. There is no merit in the suggestion that elane was authorized by the Bureau of Forest Development to occupy the land by virtue of an alleged permit issued by said bureau. It shows that it is a mere certification that the lot claimed by elane is part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Nowhere is it stated therein that elane is allowed to take possession of the subject lot. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that chua was issued a residence permit way back in 1961 which entitled him to possession of the disputed land starting in the same year. It can be observed that while chua permit to occupy the land may have expired in 1969, he remained in physical possession thereof. Since the decisive issue is priority of possession and chua had been in actual and continuous possession of the land since August 16, 1961, his material possession must be protected in this ejectment case until a competent court in an appropriate case determines which of the contending parties has the better right of possession. In sum, chua was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As provided by the Civil Code - Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land. . MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE CARILLO, respondents. Manotok is the registered owner of a parcel of land. It acquired the aforementioned property from the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, being the highest bidder in a sale conducted by the Probate Court. After having acquired said property, manotok subdivided it, but could not take possession thereof because the whole area is occupied by several houses among which is the one belonging to Felipe Carillo. Manotok demands felipe to vacate and to surrender possession of the property verbally and by publication. In spite of such demands, the felipe continued to occupy the disputed lot and refused to surrender possession.Felipe evidence tends to show that he acquired the lot in dispute from a certain Delfin Dayrit pursuant to a deed of assignment. that Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from the late Carla Tambunting by virtue of a Contract of Sale on Installment Basis. Failure to to take possession of the land he filed the reivindicatory action against the respondent. Trial: Ordering Felipe Carino to vacate and/or surrender possession to Manotok Realty Inc. of the parcel of land. WON Felipe is a possessor in good faith. NO.

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A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. The records show that when Dayrit executed the deed of' assignment in favor of the felipe, the disputed lot was already registered and titled in the name of manotok. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to the whole world and the title issued in favor of felipe made his ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit and Felipe. Therefore, the presumption of good faith in favor of the respondent cannot apply because as far as the law is concerned, he had notice of the ownership by the petitioner over said lot. Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof, despite the fact that his transferor, Dayrit, never showed him any title thereto; a circumstance which should have put him upon such inquiry or investigation. His failure to exercise that measure of precaution which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him from claiming possession in good faith. LORNA A. MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), represented by the Audit Team of EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN PALLERNA, and MA. DOLORES TEPORA, Respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on the cash and accounts handled by medina in her official capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. all state auditors of the Provincial Auditors Office of Cavite, they all stated that they had examined medinas financial records and discovered a total cash shortage in the aggregate amount of P4,080,631.36. They thus directed medina to immediately restitute the shortage within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but medina allegedly failed to comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditors Office and recommended the relief of medina from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal charges against her. COA, represented by the aforementioned state auditors, filed an administrative case before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, charging petitioner with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Decision Deputy Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez approved the recommendation of the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner from service based on the existence of substantial evidence of a discrepancy in petitioners account totaling P4,080,631.36. The said decision noted petitioners supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and position paper despite due notice. medina filed an urgent motion before the deputy ombudsman stating that she complied with the directive to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and praying that the defenses therein be considered in reversing the deputy ombudsman decision. The motion was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But was denied ruled that petitioners Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper did not present exculpatory arguments that would negate the allegation of discrepancy on petitioners accounts. He also held that petitioners concerns relating to the conduct of the audit should have been raised at the time of the audit or immediately thereafter, and that petitioners failure to produce the amount of cash shortage despite demand created a presumption that she appropriated public funds under her custody for her own personal use. medina sought reconsideration on grounds of newly discovered and material evidence and grave errors of fact and/or law prejudicial to her own interest. The purported newly discovered evidence consisted of petitioners request for reconsideration of the audit report filed and still pending before the office of the audit team head, herein respondent Mawak, and letters sent by petitioners counsel to the provincial auditor of Cavite questioning the audit and requesting a re-audit of petitioners accounts. In the second assailed Joint Order Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. He reiterated that petitioners allegations as regards the incompetence of the audit team and the errors in the audit report were matters which may be properly ventilated during trial. He explained that petitioner failed to produce the missing funds despite notice thereof creating a presumption that the same were appropriated for personal use and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, such findings warranted the filing of criminal charges against petitioner. The deputy ombudsman held that petitioners belated request for re-audit could not be considered newly discovered evidence and denied the request for a formal investigation on the ground that petitioner was afforded due process when she filed her counteraffidavit and position paper. Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review questioning the denial of her request for a formal investigation, the penalty of dismissal, and the sufficiency of the evidence against her. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition It held that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation and it affirmed the deputy ombudsmans factual finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 January 2007. Issue: Evidence required in proceedings against public officer.

Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, particularly governs the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was issued pursuant to the authority vested in the Office of the Ombudsman under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency

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by law, partake of the nature of a statute.

On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern. And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner. And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case. Thus, as between the Administrative Code of 1987 and Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, the latter governs in this case which involves an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and which raises the question of whether petitioner is entitled to a formal investigation as a matter of right. Even assuming the Administrative Code is applicable, still there is a formidable hindrance to petitioners prayer for a formal investigation. The records show that petitioner sought a reinvestigation only as an afterthought, that is, after the deputy ombudsman had already rendered a decision on the administrative complaint. The reinvestigation should have been requested at the first opportunity but definitely before the rendition of a decision. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of petitioners request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. The rule is that the findings of fact in administrative decisions must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. It is not for the reviewing court to weight the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. It has been consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government. the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.