People vs jalosjos Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary

while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despitehis having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. Theprovision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Liban v. Gordon G.R. 175352 July 15, 2009 FACTS Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an employment. ISSUE By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat?

HELD No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit. Ladlad vs. Velasco 16072010 LADLAD vs. VELASCO G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007 Facts: Beltran Petition: On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a State of National Emergency. Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause. BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors. The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, et al as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause. Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void. Ladlad and Maza petitions: Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion. Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest. During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings. Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3. Issues: 1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO. 2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO. 3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES. Held:

1) The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. 2) Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. 3) The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112. Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall issue a subpoena to the respondents. Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments. During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI. PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acerogroup, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning theelection. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares. Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholderof IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before anadministrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. AVELINO VS CUENCO FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case. 2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the

constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. 2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt. SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with theagreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senatorsbelonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who

could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a SenatePresident and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. ARROYO VS ET AL VS DE VENECIA GR L2821 MAR 4 1949 Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal RevenueCode. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. OSMENA VS PENDATUN Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech

Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of theHouse of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom ofexpression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Presidentconstitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government. PAREDES, JR VS SANDIGANBAYAN On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment

and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled: x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.