rule 71 G.R. No.

138660

February 5, 2004

HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. The Case This is a petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation ("Meycauayan") for defying the final and executory Decision and Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 118436 entitled "Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Maguesun Management & Development Corporation" ("G.R. No. 118436").1 The Antecedents This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management and Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the Regional Trial Court on the ground of actual fraud. The trial court dismissed the petition to set aside the decree of registration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. On 21 March 1997, this Court reversed the appellate court's decision in G.R. No. 118436. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.2 On 22 May 1997, Meycauayan filed a Petition for Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. Meycauayan alleged that on 14 May 1992, it purchased three parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the property awarded to the heirs of

Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas ("Roxas heirs"). Meycauayan contended that since it is a purchaser in good faith and for value, the Court should afford it the opportunity to be heard. Meycauayan contends that the adverse decision in G.R. No. 118436 cannot impair its rights as a purchaser in good faith and for value. On 25 June 1997, this Court denied the Petition for Intervention. This Court also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Maguesun. Thus, on 21 August 1997, the Decision dated 21 March 1997 in G.R. No. 118436 became final and executory. On 13 April 1998, the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") submitted a Report to the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 ("land registration court"), in LR Case No. TG-373, praying that the land registration court: a) Order the LRA to cancel Decree No. N-197092 in the name of Maguesun to enable it to issue another decree in favor of the heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas; b) Order the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles; and c) Order the issuance of the Decree with respect to the decision of the Supreme Court dated 21 March 1997. Meycauayan filed with the land registration court a "Motion For Leave To Intervene And For Period Of Time To File Opposition To The Report Dated March 25, 1998 Filed By The LRA And To File Complaint-in-Intervention." On 4 June 1998, the Roxas heirs filed a Motion for Clarification with this Court raising the following issues: a) Whether it is necessary for the trial court to first order the LRA "to cancel Decree No. N-197092 in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation to enable (the LRA) to issue another decree in favor of the Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas"? Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA "to issue with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title" in favor of the Roxas heirs? Please note that this necessary implication is a consequence of the Supreme Court finding that the decree in favor of Maguesun was wrongfully issued because it was "not entitled to the registration decree" as it had no registrable title, since "Zenaida Melliza (from whom Maguesun supposedly

bought the lots) conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof." b) Whether an order from the trial court is necessary for "the Register of Deeds concerned to cancel OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles"? Or is that order necessarily included in the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title in favor of the Roxas heirs, considering that the original certificate of title issued to Maguesun was based on an illegal decree of registration as found by this Honorable Court. Further, the unconditional order of the Supreme Court to LRA to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the Roxas heirs necessarily implies that the OCT issued to Maguesun and its derivative titles shall be canceled, for it cannot [be] assumed that the Supreme Court intended that the same parcel of land shall be covered by more than one certificate of title. c) Whether an order from the trial court is necessary before the LRA can comply with the Supreme Court decision directing the LRA "to issue with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title" in favor of the Roxas heirs? On 23 June 1998, the Roxas heirs filed a Supplement to Motion for Clarification, the pertinent portions of which are: 1. In petitioners' Motion for Clarification, one of the items sought to be clarified is whether the derivative titles (i.e., the titles derived from Maguesun Management and Development Corporation's ["Maguesun"] Original Certificate of Title No. 0-515 and issued to Meycauayan Central Realty Corp.) should be canceled, together with Maguesun's certificates of title, so that new decree of registration and certificate of title can be issued to petitioners, as ordered in the decision of this Honorable Court dated 21 March 1997, which has become final and executory? 2. From the Petition for Intervention filed by Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation ("Meycauayan") with this Honorable Court on 22 May 1997, the following statements, among others, are alleged: a. "That on May 14, 1992, the intervenor purchased for value several parcels of real property from private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corp. covered by TCT Nos. 24294, 24295 and 24296 containing an area of 2,019 square meters each, more or less." b. "That prior to paying the agreed purchase price in full to respondent

Maguesun, an investigation with the Tagaytay City Office of the Register of Deeds was made to determine and ascertain the authenticity, status and condition of the titles of Maguesun over the aforesaid properties." c. "That investigation made by the intervenor with the Office of Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City showed that in all the certified true copies of the titles to the properties above-mentioned which were registered in the name of Maguesun, the last entry which appeared was the following, to wit: x x x". d. "Appearing that the properties to be purchased by the herein intervenor from respondent Maguesun have no existing liens and/or encumbrances and considering that the properties do not appear to be the subject of a pending case which would affect the titles of those who may subsequently purchase the same, the herein intervenor proceeded to pay, in full, the total amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) to Maguesun. Immediately thereafter, Maguesun, through its duly authorized officer, executed the corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale." e. "That after the corresponding taxes and/or fees were paid by herein intervenor, the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-24294, 24295 and 24296, were canceled and in lieu thereof, new titles in the name of intervenor were issued by the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City." f. "That on March 25, 1997, an officer of the intervenor corporation was informed of a newspaper report stating, in big bold letters, the following subheadline, to wit: SC RULES ON ROXAS FAMILY LAND ROW IN TAGAYTAY". g. "The President of herein intervenor right after secured from the Tagaytay City Office of the Register of Deeds certified true copies of torrens titles over its Tagaytay City properties." h. "That only then, after it secured certified true copies of the titles mentioned in the preceding paragraph from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, did intervenor come to know of the existence of a case involving the properties sold to it by respondent Maguesun on May 14, 1992." 3. Meycauayan's Petition for Intervention was denied by this Honorable Court in its Resolution dated 25 June 1997, a denial that has since become final and executory. However, as stated in petitioners' Motion for Clarification,

Meycauayan committed the proscribed act of forum-shopping by filing with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene raising again the issue of its alleged ownership of portions of the land. 4. In order to settle once and for all Meycauayan's allegation that it was a buyer in good faith, and to show that its derivative titles should be declared void and canceled by this Honorable Court, petitioners will show herein that the sale to Meycauayan was spurious or, at the very least, it was a buyer in bad faith. In a Resolution dated 29 July 1998, this Court acted favorably on the Roxas heirs' Motion for Clarification and its Supplement. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read: Upon careful consideration of the points made by petitioners in their motions, this Court finds the same meritorious and, hence, a clarification is in order. We, therefore, declare that our directive on the LRA to issue with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title also includes, as part thereof, the cancellation, without need of an order of the land registration court, of Decree No. N-197092, as well as OCT No. 0-515, and all its derivative titles. This is a necessary consequence of the Court's earlier finding that the foregoing documents were illegally issued in the name of respondent. But in light of Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the "Property Registration Decree"), Decree No. N-197092 which originated from the LRA must be cancelled by the LRA itself. On account of this cancellation, it is now incumbent upon the LRA to issue in lieu of the cancelled decree a new one in the name of petitioners as well as the corresponding original certificate of title. Cancellation of OCT No. 0-515, on the other hand, properly devolves upon the Register of Deeds who, under Section 40 of P.D. No. 1529, has earlier entered a copy thereof in his record book. OCT No. 0-515 having been nullified, all titles derived therefrom must also be considered void it appearing that there had been no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolves to GRANT petitioners' Motion for Clarification together with the Supplement thereto. For this reason, the dispositive portion of our decision dated March 21, 1997 is clarified, thus: First, the Register of Deeds shall CANCEL OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles, namely, TCT Nos. T-25625, T-25626, T-25627, T-25628, T25688, T-25689, and T-25690, the latter three being already in the name of Meycauayan Realty and Development Corporation (also designated as "Meycauayan Central Realty, Inc." and "Meycauayan Realty Corporation").

Thereafter, the Land Registration Authority shall: (a) CANCEL Decree No. N-197092 originally issued in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation without need of an order from the land registration court; and (b) ISSUE with reasonable dispatch a new decree of registration and a new original certificate of title (OCT) in favor of petitioners pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. (Emphasis added) On 11 December 1998, the land registration court issued an order denying the LRA Report dated 25 March 1998 and the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Meycauayan since the Supreme Court Resolution of 29 July 1998 had rendered them moot. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City then canceled TCT Nos. T-25626, T25627, T-25628, T-25688, T-25689, T-25690 and T-27390.3 TCT Nos. T-25688, T-25689, T-25690 and T-27390 were derivative titles already in the name of Meycauayan. On 5 April 1999, the Roxas heirs filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession with the land registration court. On 20 April 1999, Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title with the trial court entitled "Meycauayan Central Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, Maguesun Management and Development Corp., Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, City Assessor of Tagaytay City and Land Registration Authority."4 The Complaint is almost an exact reproduction of the Petition for Intervention filed by Meycauayan before this Court. The Complaint prayed for judgment: 1. Ordering the defendants Land Registration Authority and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the titles and decree of registration they issued in lieu of TCT Nos. 25688, 25689, 25690 and 27390 registered in the name of plaintiff Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation and reconvey said properties to the plaintiff corporation by reinstating the said cancelled titles or if the same not be possible, cause the issuance of new decrees and titles thereto; 2. Ordering the defendant City Assessor of Tagaytay City to reinstate the Assessments for real estate taxes it previously cancelled covering the properties of plaintiff;

3. Ordering the defendants Roxas and Maguesun to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiff actual and/or compensatory damages in the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00); 4. Ordering the defendants Roxas and Maguesun to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiff the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as and by way of nominal damages; 5. Ordering the defendants Roxas and Maguesun to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00); 6. Ordering the defendants Roxas and Maguesun to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiff Attorney's fees in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00); and 7. Ordering the defendants Roxas and Maguesun to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiff the costs of suit.5 On 6 May 1999, Meycauayan filed a "Special Appearance Questioning Court Jurisdiction and Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession Against Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation" with the land registration court. On 2 September 1999, the land registration court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, let a Writ of Possession be issued against Maguesun Management and Development Corporation in these cases. However, insofar as Meycauayan Central Realty is concerned, let a resolution of the motion filed by the movants herein be deferred until the Supreme Court had resolved with finality the petition for contempt of herein movant in G.R. No. 138660. On 7 March 2000, the trial court dismissed for lack of merit Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title. The trial court held that (1) the nullity of OCT No. 0-515, which is the source of Meycauayan's titles, is now res judicata; (2) the complaint's prayer for the trial court to annul the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118436 is beyond the trial court's jurisdiction; and (3) Meycauayan is guilty of forum shopping.6 The trial court likewise denied Meycauayan's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 June 2000.7 On 24 August 2000, Meycauayan filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals

assailing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. Meanwhile, the Roxas heirs filed on 2 June 1999 this petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan. The Issues The parties raised the following issues: 1. Whether this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 bind Meycauayan; 2. Whether Meycauayan's act of filing with the trial court a complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title involving parcels of land, which were the subject of this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436, constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and 3. Whether Meycauayan is guilty of forum shopping. The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. We find Meycauayan's Executive Vice-President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt. We also find that Meycauayan committed forum shopping, and thus Meycauayan and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are guilty of direct contempt. The Roxas heirs allege that the following acts of Meycauayan constitute indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: (1)Meycauayan's defiance of the final and executory Decision and Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 118436; (2) its act of filing pleadings before the land registration court to prevent execution of the Decision and Resolution; (3) its act of filing a Complaint raising the same issues in its Petition for Intervention which this Court had already denied and urging the trial court to ignore and countermand the orders of this Court. On the other hand, Meycauayan alleges that the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 does not bind Meycauayan because it was not a party in the case. According to Meycauayan, the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 may be enforced against Maguesun but not against Meycauayan which is a stranger to the case. Meycauayan insists that as a purchaser in good faith and for value its rights cannot be prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent acquisition by Maguesun of the subject properties. Meycauayan, therefore, is not liable for contempt of court

for filing an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages. The issue of whether the Decision in G.R. No. 118436 binds Meycauayan was already addressed by this Court when it denied Meycauayan's Petition for Intervention. Furthermore, this Court's Resolution dated 29 July 1998 clarified the Decision dated 21 March 1997 by ordering the Register of Deeds to CANCEL OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles, namely, TCT Nos. T25625, T-25626, T-25627, T-25628, T-25688, T-25689, and T-25690, the latter three already in the name of Meycauayan Realty and Development Corporation (also designated as "Meycauayan Central Realty, Inc." and "Meycauayan Realty Corporation"). This Court also found that there had been no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute. Indirect Contempt Meycauayan's obstinate refusal to abide by the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 118436 has no basis in view of this Court's clear pronouncement to the contrary. The fact that this Court specifically ordered the cancelation of Meycauayan's titles to the disputed parcels of land in the Resolution dated 29 July 1998 should have laid to rest the issue of whether the Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 is binding on Meycauayan. Clearly, Meycauayan's defiance of this Court's Decision and Resolution by filing an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages involving the same parcels of land which this Court already decided with finality constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(d) of Rule 71 reads: SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxx (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; In Halili, et al. v. CIR, et al.,8 this Court explained the concept of contempt of court: Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into

disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. Jur. 389, cited in 14 SCRA 813). Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4). This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). Meycauayan's continuing resistance to this Court's judgment is an affront to the Court and to the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.9 Meycauayan's persistent attempts to raise issues long since laid to rest by a final and executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitute contumacious defiance of the authority of this Court and impede the speedy administration of justice.10 Well-settled is the rule that when a court of competent jurisdiction has tried and decided a right or fact, so long as the decision remains unreversed, it is conclusive on the parties and those in privity with them.11 More so where the Supreme Court has already decided the issue since the Court is the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies properly brought before it.12 As held in Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc.:13 x x x An existing final judgment or decree - rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority - is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit. xxx Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate

sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.14 The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties.15 There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in the second case even if the first case did not implead the latter.16 The Court ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that Meycauayan's predecessor-in-interest, Maguesun, committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration of the subject properties. The Decision in G.R. No. 118436 binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest" since it was a successor-in-interest of Maguesun. Meycauayan, however, insists that it was a purchaser in good faith because it had no knowledge of any pending case involving the lots. Meycauayan claims that the trial court had already canceled the notice of lis pendens on the titles when it purchased the lots from Maguesun. In its Memorandum, Meycauayan stresses that to ensure the authenticity of the titles and the annotations appearing on the titles, particularly the cancelation of the notice of lis pendens, Meycauayan checked with the Register of Deeds and the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.17 Since Meycauayan checked with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Meycauayan then had actual knowledge, before it purchased the lots, of the pending case involving the lots despite the cancelation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles. Furthermore, as found by this Court in G.R. No. 118436, the Roxas family has been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez, who resided on the property.18 Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor.19 Meycauayan therefore cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith and could not have acquired a better right than its predecessor-ininterest. This Court has already rejected Meycauayan's claim that it was a purchaser in good faith when it ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that there had been no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute. As held in Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals:20

In the case of Santiago Land Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106194, 276 SCRA 674 [1997]), petitioner maintained that as a purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation, it had a right to intervene under Rule 12, Section 2. We rejected this position and said that "since petitioner is not a stranger to the action between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having stepped into the shoes of PNB in a manner of speaking, it follows that it cannot claim any further right to intervene in the action." As in the instant Petition, it was argued that the denial of the Motion to Intervene would be a denial likewise of due process. But this, too, was struck down in Santiago Land where we held that "petitioner is not really denied protection. It is represented in the action by its predecessor in interest." Indeed, since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Reyes and private respondent Carreon, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of Reyes and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the latter. Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and of a pending litigation over the property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference.21 A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.22 For the penalty for indirect contempt, Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. x x x In this case, Meycauayan Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. caused the preparation and the filing of the Petition for Intervention in G.R. No. 118436 and the Complaint for Reconveyance, Damages and Quieting of Title with the trial court.23 Juan M. Lamson, Jr. signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for the Petition for Intervention and the Complaint for Reconveyance, Damages and Quieting of Title. "Even though a judgment, decree, or order is addressed to the corporation only, the officers, as well as the corporation itself, may be punished for contempt for disobedience to its terms, at least if they knowingly disobey the court's mandate, since a lawful judicial command to a corporation is in effect a command to the officers."24 Thus, for improper conduct tending to impede the orderly administration of justice, Meycauayan Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. should be

fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000).25 Direct Contempt Meycauayan's act of filing a Complaint for Reconveyance, Quieting of Title and Damages raising the same issues in its Petition for Intervention, which this Court had already denied, also constitutes forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more actions based on the same cause on the expectation that one or the other court might look with favor on the party.26 In this case, the Court had already rejected Meycauayan's claim on the subject lots when the Court denied Meycauayan's Petition for Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. The Court ruled that there had been no intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118436 is already final and executory. The filing by Meycauayan of an action to re-litigate the title to the same property, which this Court had already adjudicated with finality, is an abuse of the court's processes and constitutes direct contempt. Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that "if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions." The fact that Meycauayan did mention in its certification of non-forum shopping its attempt to intervene in G.R. No. 118436, which this Court denied,27 does not negate the existence of forum shopping. This disclosure does not exculpate Meycauayan for deliberately seeking a friendlier forum for its case and relitigating an issue which this Court had already decided with finality.28 The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.29 Under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, direct contempt is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos (P2,000) or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank. Hence, Meycauayan30 and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are each fined P2,000 for direct contempt of court for forum shopping. WHEREFORE, we find Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation's Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and FINE him TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000). Furthermore, we find Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation and its Executive Vice President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. GUILTY of DIRECT CONTEMPT for forum shopping and FINE them TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) each. The Court warns them that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall merit a more severe penalty.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 June 30, 2009 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2255-RTJ) VALERIANO F. NUEZ, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, Respondent. Before this Court is a Sinumpaang Salaysay1 dated April 22, 2005 filed by complainant Valeriano F. Nuez with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging the latter with grave abuse of authority. Complainant alleged the following in his complaint: Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005, at around five oclock in the afternoon, he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L-300 van with plate number SFN-767, at the basement of the Makati City Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles home. After the flag ceremony on April 4, 2005, complainant went to the Office of the Engineering Department where he received an Order2 from respondent Judge, directing the former to appear before the latter on that same day at ten oclock in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for respondent Judge. When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer. Although complainant replied in the negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the complainant. Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judges space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for respondent Judge. However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainants apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt of court for using the formers parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).3 Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration4 and paying the fine of P1,000.00. In his Comment5 dated June 27, 2005, respondent Judge alleged that judges were assigned their respective parking spaces in the basement of the City Hall

of Makati City. Respondent Judge, in particular, placed a marker with his name at the space allotted to him, facilitating the orderly parking which allowed him to work as early as seven oclock in the morning, almost daily. He stated that he already programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking judge for the year 2004 among the RTC judges of Makati City. Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time in question, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases. In addition, respondent Judge recounted that there were similar incidents which happened to him. Sometime in August 2002, Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales, and Redeem Ongtinco caused an overflow of water into the chambers of respondent Judge, damaging his computer system at the old RTC. On March 18, 2005, Venancio P. Inonog, security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Section of Makati City, also parked his vehicle at respondents parking slot. On April 12, 2005, John Panaligan, electrician of the Makati City Hall, erroneously switched off the electrical outlets of respondent Judges sala. Respondent Judge cited Macrohon, Gonzales, Ongtinco, Inonog, and Panaligan in contempt on the ground that they disrupted respondent Judges performance of official duties. In turn, Macrohon et al., Inonog, and Panaligan all filed their respective administrative complaints6 against respondent Judge. On November 25, 2005, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative matter, and that respondent Judge be fined ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for grave abuse of authority.7 In its Resolution8 dated March 15, 2006, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate Justice Renato Dacudao of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. On June 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice issued an Order setting the said case for hearing. The Investigating Justice submitted a Partial Report on September 6, 2006 in which he stated that he had just finished receiving the evidence for the parties and required them to submit their respective memorandum. He also asked for an extension of two months from September 20, 2006, or until November 20, 2006, within which to submit his Final Investigation, Report and

Recommendation. In his Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated September 22, 2006, the Investigating Justice concluded: Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned Investigating Justice believes that the complainant was not the person who parked the van on respondent judges parking slot, but rather that it was Oscar de los Reyes. Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L300 van in the middle, and not on the side, which was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although the witness, Oscar de los Reyes testified that, after buying "merienda" (on April 2, 2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to explain where exactly he parked the van. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have parked the van at the same place, meaning the basement parking, but not necessarily on the very same spot or slot. But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van, it would not change or alter the fact that respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot. Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who parked the van he would not have asked complainant to explain, but instead De los Reyes. x x x In addition, why still subject complainant to further humiliation by having him handcuffed, like a common criminal, after citing him for contempt of court? Obviously, respondent judge was really bent on citing for contempt of court the person responsible for doing the parking in the parking slot which he believed, (perhaps erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondent judges character, as it would seem that he could not refrain from exhibiting such excesses as causing the manacling (apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional offender like the complainant herein, who had the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as a judge. xxxx In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why complainants act of parking on the parking slot of respondent judge would constitute contempt of court. It may have caused respondent judge some delay in immediately parking his car that morning of April 4, 2005, but to say that the "one-hour disruption" delayed the administration of justice would be stretching the logic of the situation too much. According to respondent judge, "time is of the essence" in his decision-making program. But the irony of it is that the

amount of time respondent judge allotted in hearing the explanation as well as the motion for reconsideration of complainant in this case must have cost him more than the one hour he claimed he lost. As justification for his actions, respondent judge said that because of the "prior or previous incidents" he was convinced that the particular incident was intentional and deliberate. Such reasoning is unacceptable. There was no showing that complainant or Oscar de los Reyes intentionally or deliberately parked the van on respondent judges slot in order to purposely annoy or irk him. And, even if it did annoy or irk respondent judge, he should remember that, the power to cite persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are strictly impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the official functions that they exercise or perform. Besides, it was unfair for respondent judge to assume that complainant knew of the prior or previous incident, where respondent judge cited a driver for contempt of court for parking on his parking slot, just because both drivers are employees of the Makati City Hall; this is clearly a non-sequitur. And, assuming that complainant knew of the said incident, this alone would not prove that what he did was intentional or deliberate. Neither would respondent judges allegation, that someone, "an unknown person inside," is orchestrating the filing of these cases against him for the chief or sole purpose of harassing him, exonerate him of the charge. To begin with, he failed to present any proof to substantiate this allegation. All he could point to are mere coincidences or speculations. What is more, respondent judge seemed to have taken some kind of pleasurable satisfaction in citing these complainants in contempt of court simply for parking on the slot which he assumed was allot(t)ed to him; or for switching the lights off in his office; or for accidentally drenching his computers. He, in fact, even admitted having issued all these Orders to punish the complainants in these cases for disrupting or disturbing him in performing his duties; hence, he cannot blame these persons for filing a case or cases against him, as these persons must have felt aggrieved by his actuations in precipitately citing them for contempt. Nor can he accuse "an unknown person" of orchestrating all of these. All the cases or incidents he mentioned only strengthened the undersigned Investigating Justices perception that respondent judge has an unseemly propensity for abusing the power granted to him by law. Respondent judge ought to be reminded that as a member of the bench, he is expected to take recourse to the contempt power only as a last resort, when all other alternative courses of action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining

respect for the court and its processes; and that when a less harsh remedy can be availed of by the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy. Thus, if respondent judge wanted to "teach complainant a lesson," he could have done so by merely reprimanding or admonishing him considering that when complainant appeared before respondent judge he immediately begged for forgiveness. Respondent judges act of citing complainant in contempt of court for parking on his slot is a violation of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." xxxx For the reasons heretofore stated, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure aggravated in this case by a streak of cruel sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondents character, as elsewhere indicated. RECOMMENDATIONS Notwithstanding the finding of guilt of the respondent judge, the undersigned Investigating Justice deems that certain circumstances must be considered in imposing the proper penalty. It must be noted that respondent judge has a very good performance record. His strong adherence to the Supreme Courts reminder that, "members of the judicial branch judges and judicial personnel alike to be conscientious, diligent and thorough in the performance of their functions. At all time(s) they must observe the high standard of public service required of them." is quite admirable and commendable. Also, he already admitted his error in declaring complainant in contempt of court. All these may be taken as mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his culpability. UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the undersigned Investigating Justice hereby recommends that the respondent Judge be fined in the amount of PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (Php5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. In a Resolution dated February 7, 2007, the Court referred the administrative

matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation, within thirty (30) days from notice, on the propriety of consolidating the instant case with the other administrative cases filed against respondent Judge. In its Memorandum dated March 30, 2007, the OCA observed that: After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office agrees with the Investigating Justices findings that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in citing complainant in contempt of court. Respondent wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the van on respondents assigned slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondents reaction to the complainants mistake is exaggerated. The complainants act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it could not delay the administration of justice. There is no evidence to show that complainant Nuez parked the van at respondents slot purposely to annoy him or he was aware of the previous similar incident which involved Venancio Inonog. In fact, complainant explained that his mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondents forgiveness. Respondent likewise failed to substantiate his allegation that someone is orchestrating the filing of administrative cases against him for the sole purpose of harassing him. The other complainants cannot be faulted for filing the said cases as they may have felt aggrieved by respondents actuations in citing them for contempt for flimsy and personal reasons. xxxx Respondents order dated April 4, 2005 citing complainant Nuez in contempt of court betrays not only his ignorance as regards the Rule on Contempt of Court, but it also shows his despotic nature. The fact that respondent had also declared Inonog, Panaligan, Macrohon and two others in contempt of court shows that he does not possess the judicial temperament which a judge should possess. x x x The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and its proceedings. In the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner and for purposes that are purely personal. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. After a cautious evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, this Office finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to respondents offense. This is not respondents first offense. He had been administratively sanctioned for grave abuse of authority and was ordered by the Court to pay a fine on June 21, 2006 in the case of Panaligan v. Ibay docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972. In the case filed by Allan Macrohon, et al., docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970, respondent was ordered by the Court to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority and was also warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent has another pending case filed by Venancio Inonog for the same charge. In the said case of Allan Macrohon, et al. against respondent, the Court stated that "the similarity of the charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a deplorable proclivity for the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation." Taking into consideration that the instant complaint is a third transgression of a similar offense, this Office recommends that respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay be SUSPENDED for FOUR (4) MONTHS with STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar act shall be dealt with more severely. In its Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted within 30 days from notice. In its Resolution dated November 21, 2007, the Court deemed as served upon the complainant the copy of the Resolution dated July 25, 2007 which was sent to complainant, but was returned unserved with postmans notation "RTSUnknown." In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, after failure of respondent Judge to manifest whether he was willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted as required in the Resolution dated July 25, 2007, the Court deemed the case for decision. The issue which lies before this Court is whether respondent Judge can be held administratively liable for grave abuse of authority in citing complainant for contempt of court. The power to hold a person in direct contempt is provided for under Section 1,

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day or both, if it be a lower court. In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,9 the Court held that the power to declare a person in contempt of court, however plenary as it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties. Respondent Judge averred that someone was out to harass and embarrass him, which was why six different complaints were simultaneously filed against him, prompting him to cite the complainants for contempt of court. He explained that the individual acts of the complainants were contemptuous, including herein complainants improper parking, because they disrupted the speedy administration of justice. The Court disagrees. Aside from the fact that respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see how the improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest manner, disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the aforementioned acts for which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the records, nor from the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake.1avvphi1 In Oclarit v. Paderanga,10 the Court held that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindicative, principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise.

By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons for contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, cited as follows: SEC.2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.11 In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary12 state that: SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.1avvphi1 SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. "Gross" has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while "misconduct" means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.13 Under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is classified as a serious offense punishable under the sanctions enumerated under the same Rule, Section 11 of which provides that: SEC. 11. Sanctions. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00. In previous cases wherein judges cited persons for contempt without legal basis, the Court has found respondents guilty of grave abuse of authority and usually imposed a penalty of reprimand with a warning, or a fine of P5,000.00 with a warning.14 However, respondent Judge has been twice administratively sanctioned by the Court for the same offense. In Panaligan v. Ibay,15 respondent Judge was found to have abused his authority in citing a person for contempt without sufficient legal basis, for which he was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Macrohon v. Ibay,16 he was again found liable for the same offense and sentenced to pay a fine of P25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. In view of respondent Judges penchant for citing persons for contempt even without legal basis, the Investigating Justice recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning, while the OCA recommended that he be suspended for four (4) months with a stern warning. Considering that respondent Judge had opted to avail himself of the Optional Retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1438, effective at the close of office hours of August 18, 2007, which was approved by the Court (First Division) per Resolution dated November 14, 2007,17 provided that the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos shall be retained/withheld from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may later impose upon him in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (herein case) and OCA IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ, the Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P40,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuez for contempt without legal basis, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits, which in this case shall be deductible from the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) withheld from his retirement benefits, per Resolution dated November 14, 2007.

with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The imposed fine should be paid to this Court upon finality hereof. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant (sic), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for investigation and possible administrative sanction.3 The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. In a Decision4 dated 29 December 2000, the Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] guilty of illegal dismissal; 2. Considering that reinstatement would not be feasible because of strained relations, [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] are ordered to pay [herein respondent Go] backwages in the amount of Php900,000.00 (Php60,000 x 15 months), separation pay of Php180,000.00 (one month pay for every year of service = Php60,000 x 3 years); 3. Ordering [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] to pay [respondent Go] Php500,000.00 as moral damages; G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007 4. Ordering [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] to pay [respondent Go] Php300,000 as exemplary damages; 5. Ordering the payment of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees in the sum of Php188,000.00. All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), EHSI, Kunack and Barin employed the legal services of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate.5 MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Resolution1 dated 30 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals, finding petitioner Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado (Atty. Regalado) guilty of indirect contempt. Likewise assailed in this petition is the Resolution2 denying her Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices is declared GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000),

On 11 June 2001, the NLRC rendered a Decision6 reversing the Labor Arbiters decision and declaring that respondent Gos separation from employment was legal for it was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and Barin. The dispositive part of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside. The complaint below is dismissed for being without merit. For lack of patent or palpable error, the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by respondent Go was denied by the NLRC in an Order7 dated 20 December 2001. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69909 entitled, Antonio S. Go v. National Labor Relations Commission, Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc., Lutz Kunack and Jose Barin. On 9 July 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision8 setting aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal. The appellate court thus ordered EHSI, Kunack and Barin to pay respondent Go full backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the NLRC promulgated on July 30, 2001 and its Order dated December 20, 2001 are SET ASIDE while the decision of Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson R. Gan dated December 29, 2000 declaring the dismissal of [herein respondent Go] as illegal is hereby REINSTATED with the modification that [EHSI] is hereby Ordered to pay [respondent Go]: 1. His full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until the finality of this decision; 2. Separation pay equal to one month pay for every year of service; 3. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and 4. Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 The award of attorneys fees is DELETED. EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through registered mail on 17 July 2003 while respondent Go received his copy on 21

July 2003.9 On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim10 with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order11 dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. The order thus reads: In view of the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim voluntarily executed by the [herein respondent] Antonio S. Go, let the instant case be as it is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for EHSI, Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence and without the knowledge of respondent Gos lawyer.12 After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on 29 July 2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion13 seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July 2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel. The motion thus prays: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed for the Honorable Court to declare Null and Void the dismissal of the instant (sic), with prejudice, by Labor (sic) Waldo Emerson Gan, as well as the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated July 16, 2003 signed by [herein respondent Go] for having been obtained through mistake, fraud or undue influence committed by [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] and their counsels (sic). It is likewise prayed for [EHSI, Kunack and Barins] counsel, particularly Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado, to be required to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them (sic) for their (sic), unethical conduct of directly negotiating with [respondent Go] without the presence of undersigned counsel, and for submitting the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim before Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson Gan knowing fully well that the controversy between [respondent Go] and [EHSI] is still pending before this Honorable Court. [Respondent Go] likewise prays for such other relief [as may be] just and equitable under the premises.14

For their part, EHSI, Kunack and Barin submitted a Manifestation and Motion with Leave of Court15 praying that CA-G.R. SP No. 69909 be considered settled with finality in view of the amicable settlement among the parties which resulted in the dismissal of respondent Gos complaint with prejudice in the Labor Arbiters Order dated 16 July 2003. In addition, EHSI, Kunack and Barin also filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 with an ad cautelam that in case of unfavorable action on their foregoing Manifestation and Motion, the appellate court should reconsider its decision dated 9 July 2003. Acting on the motions, the appellate court issued a Resolution17 on 19 November 2003 annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of jurisdiction. It also denied for lack of merit EHSI, Kunack and Barins Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. In the same resolution, petitioner Atty. Regalado was ordered to explain why she should not be cited for contempt of court for violating Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Manifestation with Omnibus Motion is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The order of Labor Arbiter Gan dismissing the case with prejudice is hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. [EHSI, Kunack and Barins] counsel, [herein petitioner] Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why she should not be cited for contempt of court for directly negotiating with [herein respondent Go] in violation of Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. On the other hand, the Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam is hereby denied for lack of merit. EHSI, Kunack and Barin thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals decision promulgated on 9 July 2003 and its Resolution dated 19 November 2003, denying their Motion for Reconsideration. The case is cognized by another division of this Court. For her part, petitioner Atty. Regalado submitted a Compliance18 and explained that she never took part in the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the illegal dismissal case with respondent Go which led to the execution of a compromise agreement by the parties on 16 July 2003. EHSI, Kunack and Barin, through a Mr. Ragay, a former EHSI employee and a close ally of respondent Go, were the ones who negotiated the settlement. Further, petitioner Atty. Regalado maintained that she never met personally respondent Go, not until 16 July 2003, when the latter appeared before the

Labor Arbiter for the execution of the Release Waiver and Quitclaim. Petitioner Atty. Regalado claimed that she was in fact apprehensive to release the money to respondent Go because the latter cannot present any valid identification card to prove his identity. It was only upon the assurance of Labor Arbiter Gan that Antonio S. Go and the person representing himself as such were one and the same, that the execution of the agreement was consummated. Considering the circumstances, petitioner Atty. Regalado firmly stood that there was no way that she had directly dealt with respondent Go, to the latters damage and prejudice, and misled him to enter into an amicable settlement with her client. On 30 August 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution19 disregarding petitioner Atty. Regalados defenses and adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. As declared by the appellate court, even granting arguendo that petitioner Atty. Regalado did not participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless under the obligation to restrain her clients from doing acts that she herself was prohibited to perform as mandated by Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. However, instead of preventing her clients from negotiating with respondent Go who was unassisted by his counsel, Atty. Regalado actively participated in the consummation of the compromise agreement by dealing directly with respondent Go and allowing him to sign the Release Waiver and Quitclaim without his lawyer. Undaunted, petitioner Atty. Regalado filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the appellate court for lack of merit.20 Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,21 raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY VIOLATED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF RULE 71 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE CONTEMPT CHARGES AGAINST HER. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO EFFECT THAT PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT. V. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT ON THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICTING, UNCORROBORATED, AND UNVERIFIED ASSERTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT. Considering that the issues raised herein are both questions of law and fact, and consistent with our policy that this Court is not a trier of facts, we shall address only the pure questions of law and leave the factual issues, which are supported by evidence, as found by the appellate court. It is an oft-repeated principle that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.1awphi1.net22 Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.23 It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.24 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the

preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.25 Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the Court.26 In our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely direct contempt and indirect contempt. 27 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.28 On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)29 Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect contempt should be commenced, thus: SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.) As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with. There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty of indirect contempt. But were the proceedings conducted in convicting petitioner done in accordance with law? In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.30 It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued a Resolution31 dated 19 November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Gos Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all. Indeed, the appellate court itself, in its Resolution dated 30 August 2004, made categorical findings as to how the contempt charge was initiated, to wit: In the present case, [respondents Go] Manifestation With Omnibus Motion which led to our 19 November 2003 Resolution requiring Atty. Regalado to explain why she should not be cited for contempt, x x x.32 We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which rendered the questioned resolution. It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet,33 this Court ruled that the contempt proceedings was considered commenced by the court motu proprio even if the show cause order came after the filing of the motions to cite for contempt filed by the adverse party. The Decision thus reads: Thus, independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt are initiated in this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not affect the procedure adopted. It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court, dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading they prayed that Union Bank be declared in indirect contempt of court for its disobedience to the Pasay MTCs Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order dated May 9, 2000 specifically directed Union Bank to "return immediately to the defendants the replevied motor vehicle." However, the Tamondong Spouses unverified motion dated May 17, 2000 cannot invalidate the contempt proceedings because these proceedings were initiated by respondent judge motu proprio in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This above-cited case, however, has no application in the case at bar for the factual milieu of the cases are different from each other. In Leonidas, there was an order of the court that was utterly violated by Union Bank. Thus, even in the absence of the motion of spouses Tamondong to cite Union Bank in contempt,

the court a quo on its own can verily initiate the action. In the present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalados misbehavior without respondent Gos Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former. Having painstakingly laid down that the instant case was not initiated by the court motu proprio necessitates us to look into the second mode of filing indirect contempt proceedings. In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed. The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalados compliance with the appellate courts directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of the indirect contempt action. It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. 34 The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are delineated by the procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with such procedural guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against person alleged to be guilty of contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature.35 As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado,36 the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory, and thus states: 1. This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice

tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section. xxxx Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. Time and again we rule that the use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.37 In Enriquez v. Enriquez,38 this Court applied the word "shall" by giving it mandatory and imperative import and ruled that non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Rules goes into the very authority of the court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, thus: "However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997, now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the same rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees." xxxx Time and again, this Court has consistently held that payment of docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.39 (Emphases supplied.) In United States v. de la Santa,40 which bears parallelism in the instant case, we held: The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency of the

complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime with which the accused was charged. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the Rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.41 We now proceed to the issue of estoppel raised by the Court of Appeals. When petitioner Atty. Regalado brought to the attention of the appellate court through a Motion for Reconsideration the remedial defect attendant to her conviction, the Court of Appeals, instead of rectifying the palpable and patent procedural error it earlier committed, altogether disregarded the glaring mistake by interposing the doctrine of estoppel. The appellate court ruled that having actively participated in the contempt proceedings, petitioner Atty. Regalado is now barred from impugning the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over her contempt case citing the case of People v. Regalario.42 We do not agree. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."43 The ruling in People v. Regalario44 that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy45 on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.46 In Sibonghanoy,47 the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety48 almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered.49 At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was

rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.50 Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts.51 At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced. Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated. The other issues raised on the merits of the contempt case have become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The indirect contempt proceedings before the Court of Appeals is DECLARED null and void.

Sorsogon, Branch 51.2 Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land. On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided for by law. SO ORDERED.4 Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law.5 On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB. G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003 Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL.6 On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent. This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001,1 which annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998. SO ORDERED.7 Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,8 which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000.9 Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.10 On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied. In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent.11 On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.12 Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest.13 The case was raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank. SO ORDERED.14 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001.15 Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,16 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the

Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENTS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT: A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL. C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS THE PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER. D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND

EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.17 As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.18 Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of ones substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.19 Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. Therefore, respondents special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20 The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.21 On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part: Section 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides: Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. xxx xxx xxx

The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement: 1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section. xxx xxx xxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.22 Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal

charge initiated by the court motu proprio. In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides: Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied) The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit: 1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.23 (emphasis in the original) Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:24 First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a

verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1875 November 9, 2005 (formerly OCA II No. 03-1916-RTJ) SILAS Y. CAADA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ILDEFONSO B. SUERTE, Respondent. In a verified letter-complaint dated November 8, 2003, Silas Y. Caada administratively charged respondent Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, of arbitrary detention punished under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code and the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 entitled "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" as well as the Canons of Judicial Ethics for having issued an order citing complainant in direct contempt of court and for having ordered his arrest and subsequent detention without affording him the opportunity to post bail. In a sworn affidavit attached to his letter-complaint, complainant alleges: That on the strength of an illegal contempt order dated August 5, 2003 and issued by Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Barili, Cebu, I was arrested on that same date by elements of the Badian PNP and Alcantara PNP, represented by SPO3 Rufino Tabaag, SPO3 Rolando Caballero, SPO3 Felipe Dinolan, Marcelino Cenarlo, and PO2 Vincent Aguanta. That despite efforts of my counsels to have me released, Judge Suerte refused to give me my freedom until and unless I withdraw an affidavit that I executed on May 2, 2003 before Prosecutor Jesus P. Feliciano, upon which was based a petition I filed on July 25, 2003 before the Court of Appeals for Certiorari and Prohibition With a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order docketed as CAG.R. No. 78210. This petition sought the prohibition of Judge Suerte from hearing and trying Crim. Cases No. CEB-BRL 900, 906, and 907 pending before said Judge Suerte; That because of my illegal detention, my counsels filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals and it was only when Judge Suerte received the wire from the Court of Appeals that a Writ of Habeas Corpus had been issued in my favor on August 19, 2003 that he released me, but by that time, I had already spent a total of fourteen (14) days at the Barili Municipal Jail; That this Affidavit is being executed to support a charge of ARBITRARY DETENTION against Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, SPO3 Rufino Tabaag, SPO3 Rolando Caballero, SPO3 Felipe Dinolan, SPO3 Marcelino Cenarlo, and PO2 Vincent Aguanta, whose addresses are in the letter complaint which covers this Affidavit.1 In his Comment dated February 2, 2004, respondent alleged: The accused, Silas Y. Caada and now the petitioner in the present complaint OCA IPI No. 03-1916-RTJ, before his arrest was one of the most wanted DRUG PUSHER and ILLEGAL POSSESSOR of short and long firearms, was LEGALLY ARRESTED and LAWFULLY DETAINED. The instant issue was already resolved and decided by CA, Former Twelve Division on October 29,

2003. No illegal arrest and no arbitrary detention. I am enclosing herewith certified Xerox copy in nine pages of the decision of the CA, marked as ANNEX A.2 In his report dated June 18, 2004, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. made the following findings, to wit: The warrant of arrest was issued on the basis of the direct contempt order issued by the respondent against the complainant. As a result, complainant was detained for fourteen (14) days and only the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court of Appeals saved her (sic) from further detention. Within her (sic) 14-day stay in jail, she (sic) was not able to post bond for temporary liberty apparently because the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge indicated that she (sic) is not entitled to such a privilege. The words NO BAIL RECOMMENDED were written on the face of the warrant of arrest. This is a clear case of gross ignorance of the procedural rule. Section 2, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the governing authority on the matter. Its pertinent provision reads as follows, to wit: SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. xxx SECTION 2. Remedy therefrom The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Clearly, the rule allows the person subject of a direct contempt judgment to file a bond to be fixed by the court as a remedy for the imposition of the judgment. In making it appear that complainant is not entitled to post a bond, respondent has gone beyond his authority as provided under the above-cited procedural rule. What is involved here is a fundamental procedural rule and well-known judicial norm. If the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Luz vs. Yanesa, March 9, 1999).3 Accordingly, Court Administrator Velasco recommended that respondent judge

be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and procedure and that he be sternly warned that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.4 In a Resolution dated September 20, 2004, we required the parties to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.5 In his Manifestation dated October 15, 2004, complainant indicated his willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.6 Despite due notice, respondent judge failed to comply with our directive. Hence, the Court concludes that he had waived his right to a full-blown investigation and that he is willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the October 29, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78506 which was cited by respondent in his Comment to the instant complaint did not tackle the issue of whether or not complainants arrest and detention were lawful. In fact, the CA, in said case ruled: An incident of this case that was raised but is outside our jurisdiction to consider under the present petition, is the illegal confinement of the petitioner [referring to herein complainant]. He was confined for fourteen (14) days, or four (4) days in excess of what the Rules of Court allow. Similarly, counsel for petitioner was fined P3,000, or P1,000 in excess of what the Rules allow. The appropriate redress lies outside the present petition and is for the petitioner and his counsel to avail of under other existing laws and provisions of the Rules, and may take the form, among others, of an administrative complaint directly filed with the Honorable Supreme Court.7 Hence, it is wrong for respondent to claim that the CA, in its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 78506, has already resolved the issue of the legality of complainants arrest and detention based on the order issued by the respondent on August 5, 2003. Coming to the main issue in the present case, granting that there is a valid ground for respondent judge to cite complainant in direct contempt of court, he should have known that under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court if the penalty of imprisonment is imposed upon the contemnor by a Regional Trial

Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, the same should not exceed ten days. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: Section 1. Direct contempt, punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court. In the instant case, the order of respondent judge directing the arrest of complainant did not specify the period within which the latter should be imprisoned. Worse, it is not disputed that complainant was detained for 14 days, 4 days beyond what the above-cited Rule allows. Were it not for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court of Appeals, complainant would not have been released from detention. We also note that respondent judge had likewise cited complainants counsel in direct contempt for having attached complainants affidavit in a motion for inhibition filed with the trial court. She was assessed a fine of P3,000.00. Again, this is erroneous because it is clear under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court that a penalty of fine imposed by a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank should not exceed P2,000.00. As to respondents denial of complainants right to post bail, we agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that under Section 2 of the same Rule, the execution of a judgment finding a person in direct contempt of court may be suspended if such person avails of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition, provided he files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. In the present case, respondent effectively prevented complainant from resorting to his right to post a bond as provided for under the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court by indicating in the arrest warrant he issued that complainant is not entitled to bail. In doing so, respondent unduly deprived the latter of his prized and fundamental right to liberty, a right which is protected and guaranteed by our Constitution. On the liability of judges in administrative cases filed against them, we held in Dantes vs. Caguioa8 that:

Not every error bespeaks ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does not warrant administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in judgment. Good faith, however, in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. Thus, where the law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides the scope of a judges authority to punish for contempt and the procedure to be followed, for a judge not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance. In the present case, respondents patent and gross violations of the provisions of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof, cannot be denied nor justified. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics prescribes that: The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Canon 31 of the same Canons also provides: A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office. (emphasis ours) In exhibiting gross ignorance of the law and procedure, respondent likewise violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We do not agree with the OCA recommendation that respondent judge be meted out a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC,9 gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, as amended, if the respondent is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. However, in two consolidated cases docketed as Administrative Matter Nos. 04-7-373-RTC10 and 04-7-374-RTC,11 we found herein respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. We dismissed him from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, and with prejudice to being reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned and controlled agencies and corporations.12 In the present case, respondent would have merited the penalty of dismissal due to the seriousness of his offense and because of the fact that this is his second time to be found guilty of a similar infraction. Nonetheless, per Leonidas vs. Supnet13 while respondent judge has earlier been dismissed from the service, he can still be fined for gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics committed while in office. Thus, we deem it proper to impose on him the maximum fine of P40,000.00. Finally, we note that the dispositive portion of this Courts Resolution in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374-RTC, providing for respondents dismissal from government service as well as forfeiture of his retirement benefits and privileges, did not expressly state that his accrued leave credits are exempted from being forfeited. Nonetheless, it is clear under the amended provisions of Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as quoted above, as well as under Section 58,14 Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service15 that even when the penalty of dismissal from the government service is imposed, accrued leave credits shall not be forfeited.16 Furthermore, Sections 37 and 65 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41 -- Series of 1998 as amended by MC No. 14, Series of 1999

--provide: Section 37. Payment of terminal leave.- Any official/employee of the government who retires, voluntarily resigns, or is separated from the service and who is not otherwise covered by special law, shall be entitled to the commutation of his leave credits exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned. Section 65. Effect of decision in administrative case. An official or employee who has been penalized with dismissal from the service is likewise not barred from entitlement to his terminal leave benefits.17 Hence, the penalty of fine imposed on respondent shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits. WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits; and, in the event that his leave credits be found insufficient to answer for the said fine, the respondent shall pay the amount or the balance thereof, as the case may be, to the Court within ten (10) days from the date of finality of herein Resolution. SO ORDERED. rule 70 G.R. No. 176995 July 30, 2008

the lawful possessor thereof. In its assailed Resolution dated 30 January 2007, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier Resolution of 28 July 2006. The subject property is a parcel of land designated as Lot 741-B-1 situated in Tolon, Potungan, Dapitan City, with an area of 30,000 square meters, described and bounded as follows: Lot 741-B-1 of the Sketch Plan, situated at Tolon, Potungan, Dapitan City, containing an area of 30,000 square meters, bounded on the N., by Tolon River; on the South by Lot 741-A; on the E by Lot 741-B-2; and on the West by the Municipal Road, and embraced in OCT No. (P-14969)-1119.4 In his Complaint filed with the MTCC, and docketed as Civil Case No. 622, respondent alleged that he acquired the subject property from the spouses Pablo Acaylar, Sr., and Zoila Dangcalan Acaylar (the spouses Acaylar) by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on 14 September 2004. On the same day, respondent took possession of the subject property. On 19 September 2004, one of the spouses Acaylars sons, the petitioner, using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject property, cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen coconuts and other fruits, and pastured his cows and other animals thereon.5 In his Answer, petitioner countered that the subject property claimed by respondent is a portion of the entire property owned by petitioners parents, the spouses Acaylar, with a total area of 59,775 square meters. Petitioner is in possession of his parents entire property since 1979 as administrator thereof. He built his house on the property and farmed the land. Respondent cannot definitively claim which portion of the entire property he was able to buy from the spouses Acaylar since the same was not clearly delineated.6 In addition, petitioner, together with his sisters, Rosario Acaylar Herrera and Asteria Acaylar, already filed against respondent and his spouse Beatriz Harayo a case for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated 14 September 2004, with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages, presently pending before the RTC, Branch 6. During the Pre-Trial Conference held before the MTCC on 17 February 2005, the parties stipulated that the spouses Acaylar sold to respondent only a 30,000square-meter portion of their entire property; and that there is a pending civil case before the RTC on the validity of the sale of the subject property. Among the pieces of evidence presented by respondent before the MTCC was an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar (First Affidavit) attesting that she sold the subject

PABLO D. ACAYLAR, JR., Petitioner, vs. DANILO G. HARAYO, Respondent. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Pablo D. Acaylar, Jr., seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Resolutions2 dated 28 July 2006 and 30 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN. The appellate court, in its assailed Resolution dated 28 July 2006, dismissed petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari therein on technical grounds; thus, it affirmed the Decision dated 20 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. 6087, which, in turn, affirmed the Decision3 dated 28 March 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dapitan City, in Civil Case No. 622, awarding possession of the subject property to respondent Danilo G. Harayo on the ground that he is

property to respondent for consideration and she did not give petitioner authority to either administer or remain on her and her husbands property. After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision7 on 28 March 2005, awarding to respondent the possession of the subject property. The MTCC gave credence to respondents claim that he took immediate possession of the subject property after the execution of the Deed of Sale but was ousted therefrom by petitioner who invoked the alleged authority granted to him by Zoila Acaylar as the administrator of the unsold portion of her and her husbands property. The MTCC referred to the First Affidavit executed by Zoila Acaylar wherein she refuted that she gave petitioner authority or designated him as the administrator of her and her husbands property. Zoila Acaylar further admitted therein that the subject property was already sold to respondent. For lack of any legal right to remain on the subject property, the MTCC adjudged that petitioners possession of the same was illegal. The dispositive portion of the MTCC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, by preponderance of evidence in favor of the [herein respondent] as against the [herein petitioner], and hereby orders: (1) For [petitioner] and all other persons who may have derived rights from him to vacate lot 741-B-1 containing an area of 30,000 square meters as shown in the sketch plan prepared by Christopher Palpagan and turn over peaceful possession thereof to [herein respondent]; (2) For [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and P 1,591.25 as costs of the suit. All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.8 On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6087, the RTC promulgated its Decision9 dated 20 January 2006 affirming the award of possession in favor of respondent after finding that the appealed MTCC Decision was based on facts and law on the matter. The RTC declared that the sale of the subject property by the spouses Acaylar to respondent vested ownership and possession of said property in the latter. Thus, petitioners acts of entering the subject property, cutting the tall grasses and gathering the agricultural products therein, constitute forcible entry, which gave rise to an action for ejectment. The RTC decreed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the RTC] finds by preponderance of evidence that [herein respondent] is in physical possession of the [subject

property] that is on September 14, 2004 prior to the [herein petitioner] on September 19, 2004 and therefore affirms the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dapitan without modification.10 Banking on another Affidavit (Second Affidavit) executed by Zoila Acaylar, in which she recanted the statements she made in her First Affidavit denying that she designated petitioner as the administrator of her and her husbands property, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 20 January 2006 Decision of the RTC. The RTC, however, issued a Resolution11 dated 18 April 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari12 with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN. Petitioner argued in his Petition that the RTC gravely erred in ruling that respondent was in prior possession of the subject property based solely on the Deed of Sale executed by the spouses Acaylar in respondents favor. Petitioner also asserted therein that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it did not give credence to the Second Affidavit executed by Zoila Acaylar.13 On 28 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution14 dismissing outright CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN for failure of petitioner to avail himself of the correct remedy under the law. Petitioner should have filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, the proper remedy to appeal the adverse decisions rendered by the RTC in its appellate capacity. Instead, petitioner erroneously filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari15 to assail the 20 January 2006 Decision and 8 April 2006 Resolution of the RTC in Civil Case No. 6087. The Court of Appeals also noted non-compliance by petitioner and his counsel with several more requirements for filing a petition with the Court of Appeals, namely: (a) shortage in the payment of the docket fees; (b) failure of petitioners counsel to indicate the place of issue of his Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) number and his complete address; (3) failure of petitioner to furnish the appellate court which rendered the assailed decision, in this case the RTC, a copy of the Petition; and (4) failure of the Petition to state the material dates. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution16 dated 30 January 2007, denied for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner. The appellate court, however, excused the mistake of petitioner in the designation of the pleading as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, since it was clear from petitioners Motion for Extension to file Petition for Review that he wished to avail himself of the remedy provided under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner is now before this Court via the Petition at bar, making the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION DESPITE ADEQUATE EXPLANATION SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER ON THE TECHNICALITIES ASSIGNED TO THE PETITIONER; II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN READING SHORT THE GIST OF THE PETITION WHEN IT RULED THAT SPECIFIC MATTERS INVOLVED IN THE CASE WERE INDICATED IN THE PETITION; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT ANNEXES WERE NOT ATTACHED WHEN THEY ARE DULY ATTACHED; IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO EVALUATE THE PROPRIETY (SIC) FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHICH IS THE ORIGINAL ACTION INVOLVED IN THIS CASE VIS--VIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER.17 The Court first addresses the procedural issues involved in the present case. The Court of Appeals pointed several procedural defects of petitioners Petition for Review therein. Petitioners payment of docket fees was short of P500.00. It is also evident after a perusal of the records that petitioner failed to indicate in his Petition with the Court of Appeals the material dates to establish when he received notice of the assailed RTC Decision and when he filed his motion for reconsideration thereof with the RTC, as required by Section 2, Rule 4218 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner further failed to set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved in the case in accordance with the same provision. Finally, petitioner did not furnish the RTC, the court which rendered the assailed decision, a copy of the Petition he filed with the Court of Appeals.19

Petitioner, however, submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition with the Court of Appeals and, thus, the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality would cause a miscarriage of justice. The petitioner invokes considerations of substantial justice and prays that this Court give his Petition due course and set aside the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 28 July 2006 and 30 January 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN. Respondent counters that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN and adopted the discussion of the appellate court in his Memorandum. In appealed cases, failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal; the dismissal is discretionary on the part of the appellate court.20 Section 5, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action until they are paid and may dismiss the appeal or the action or proceedings." Petitioner explained in his Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals that he relied in good faith on the computation provided by the Clerk of Court of Zamboanga with whom he inquired as regards the amount of docket fees due. He had previously paid P4,030.00 and was short of only P500.00, which he also immediately paid upon being informed of the deficiency. Given the circumstances, petitioner should have been granted leniency by the Court of Appeals on this matter. We also agree with the petitioner that failure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of the RTC Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition.21 In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua,22 we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying the motion for reconsideration.23 The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.24 Likewise excusable is petitioners failure to strictly follow the required form for presenting the facts and law of his case before the Court of Appeals. His Petition before the appellate court consists of only five pages, presenting concisely enough the facts and law supporting his case. With respect to petitioners failure to furnish the RTC a copy of his Petition with the Court of Appeals, this Court found upon examination of the records

that petitioner had already complied with such requirement.25 Accordingly, the parties are now given the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and defenses brushing aside technicalities in order to truly ascertain the merits of this case. Indeed, judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of technicalities.26 Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case. In Aguam v. Court of Appeals,27 we ruled that: The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. In this case, the Court finds that petitioners procedural lapses are forgivable and opts to dispose the instant Petition on its merits rather than remand the case to the appellate court, a remand not being necessary where, as in the instant case, the ends of justice would not be served thereby and we are already in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before us. We now proceed to discuss the merits of the case. Relevant in the case at bar is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.28 The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.29 The above distinctions, more importantly the nature of defendants entry into the property, are material to the present case in order to ascertain the propriety of respondents action for forcible entry filed before the MTCC. It bears to stress that it is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible

entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.30 In the case at bar, respondent filed an action for forcible entry before the MTCC. Respondent alleged that he took possession of the subject property immediately after the spouses Acaylar executed a Deed of Sale thereof in his favor on 14 September 2004, but was forcibly deprived thereof by petitioner. A case for forcible entry, therefore, is proper since petitioners entry into the subject property is already illegal at its incipience. Petitioner, on the other hand, harps on the fact that he was in possession of the subject property since 1979, having built his house thereon and farmed the land, and it was impossible for him to wrest possession of the subject property from respondent, for he was already occupying the same way before its alleged sale to respondent. Petitioner, thus, maintains that his possession over the subject property is lawful from the start, as he was authorized by Zoila Acaylar to administer the same, making respondents suit for forcible entry before the MTCC the wrong remedy. In a long line of cases,31 this Court reiterated that the fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases. The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises long before he was deprived thereof by the defendant.32 It must be stressed that plaintiff cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own. To ascertain this, it is proper to look at the situation as it existed long before the first act of spoliation occurred in order to intelligibly determine whose position is more in accord with the surrounding circumstances of the case and the applicable legal principles. Such determination in this case requires a review of factual evidence, generally proscribed in a petition like this. However, where the factual findings of the courts a quo are contrary to each other, this Court may intervene to resolve the conflict and settle the factual issues raised by the parties.33 In the instant Petition, the MTCC cited Zoila Acaylars First Affidavit in which she attested that she did not appoint or designate petitioner as administrator of her and her husbands property, and that she gathered the coconuts and harvested other crops from the property by employing farm workers. Since petitioner was never in possession of the subject property, then the MTCC concluded that respondent had taken possession of the same from the spouses Acaylar right after its purchase. The RTC, on the other hand, expressly recognized that petitioner possessed the subject property, but his possession was merely tolerated by his parents, and that respondent, as purchaser of the subject property from the parents, the spouses Acaylar, had better right to the

possession of the same. Thus, as to whether petitioner had actual or physical possession of the subject property prior to respondent is a factual issue which we are called upon to resolve, considering that the courts below had contradicting findings. After careful and thorough recalibration and re-examination of the evidence available on record, we find that petitioner had physical possession of the subject property prior to and at the time of its sale by the spouses Acaylar to respondent. It is actually irrelevant whether petitioner possessed the subject property as the administrator thereof. As the son of the spouses Acaylar, he could very well enter into possession of the subject property either with the express permission or at the tolerance of his parents who owned the property. Petitioner alleged, and respondent did not dispute, that petitioner had entered into possession of his parents property as early as 1979, and he even built his house thereon. Although Zoila Acaylar may have attested in her First Affidavit that she did not appoint or designate petitioner as the administrator of her and her husbands property, she never claimed that petitioner unlawfully or illegally entered her property when he built his house thereon. We are not persuaded by respondents assertion that after he took possession of the subject property from the Zoila spouses, petitioner entered the subject property on a whim, for not only does such postulation lack clear, positive, and convincing evidentiary support, but also because it is illogical and contrary to common human experience. A person would not, for a reason so shallow as a whim, encroach upon anothers property and gather fruits and other agricultural products therefrom, thereby risking criminal prosecution and civil liabilities. The more plausible and logical scenario would be that petitioner was already occupying the subject property prior to the sale. Petitioner, in gathering the coconut fruits and other crops, cutting grasses, and domesticating animals on the subject property, even after its sale to respondent on 14 September 2004, was only continuing to exercise acts of possession over the subject property as he had done in years before. Moreover, we note that the subject property was sold to respondent and he supposedly took possession thereof on 14 September 2004; and that petitioner allegedly forced his way into the property on 19 September 2004. This would mean that respondent, after taking over possession of the subject property from petitioners parents, possessed the subject property for only five days before being deprived thereof by the petitioner. The very short period when respondent purportedly possessed the subject property renders said possession suspect. It is not clear to us how petitioner took actual possession of the subject property on 14 September 2004. Neither are we enlightened on the manner in which respondent exercised or demonstrated his physical or material possession over

the subject property for the five days before he was reputedly ousted therefrom by petitioner. Both the MTCC and the RTC decided in favor of petitioner since they considered him to have been vested with possession of the subject property by virtue of the execution of the Deed of Sale on 14 September 2004. However, such a ruling violates one of the most basic doctrines in resolving ejectment cases. We had long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, that is, possession de facto; and they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.34 As we elucidated in the recent case of Sudaria v. Quiambao35: Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.1avvphil Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession. Hence, the Deed of Sale conferring ownership of the subject property upon respondent is clearly irrelevant in the case presently before us. The Deed of Sale did not automatically place respondent in physical possession of the subject property. It is thus incumbent upon respondent to establish by evidence that he took physical possession of the subject property from the spouses Acaylar on 14 September 2004 and he was in actual possession of the said property when petitioner forcibly entered the same five days later. The conflicting Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, notwithstanding, we find that petitioner was in peaceful possession of the subject property prior to its sale to respondent. Even if petitioner was not authorized by Zoila Acaylar to possess the subject property as administrator, his possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents. As we ruled in Arcal v. Court of Appeals36: The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to comply with such demand. A person who occupies the land

of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. In the instant case, there is no showing that either Zoila Acaylar or respondent made an express demand upon petitioner to vacate the subject property. In the absence of an oral or written demand, petitioners possession of the subject property has yet to become unlawful. The absence of demand to vacate precludes us from treating this case, originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer.37 In conclusion, since petitioner was in prior physical possession of the subject property, respondent has no cause of action against petitioner for forcible entry. Neither can we treat respondents case against petitioner as one for unlawful detainer absent the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate made upon petitioner. However, our dismissal of respondents Complaint herein against petitioner is without prejudice to respondents filing of the appropriate remedy under the law to acquire possession of the subject property, as well as to the resolution of the civil case pending with the RTC, Branch 6, for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated 14 September 2004. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 30 January 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Complaint of respondent Danilo G. Harayo against petitioner Pablo D. Acaylar before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dapitan City, in Civil Case No. 622, is DISMISSED, without prejudice. No costs.

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90381, which reversed the Decision2 dated March 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, in Civil Case No. 04-111243. The facts are as follows: This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondent, his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them before Branch 28 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. In their complaint,3 the petitioners alleged among others that (1) they are owners of the lot described and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. 2622374 of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila; (2) the respondent constructed a shanty thereon without their consent; (3) the respondent and his co-defendants have not been paying any rent to the petitioners for their occupation thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-defendants refused the formal demand made by the petitioners for them to vacate the subject lot; and (5) the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay 464, Zone 46, 4th District, Manila issued the necessary Certification to File Action.5 In his answer, the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and essentially claimed that (1) his construction of the temporary makeshift house on the lot was tolerated by the petitioners, considering that he acted as the caretaker thereof; and (2) he does not remember receiving any demand letter and summons from the barangay and so he was surprised to know that an ejectment complaint was filed against him.6 In its Decision7 dated September 27, 2004, the MeTC found in favor of the petitioners. It held that the respondent, his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them, being possessors by tolerance, can be validly ejected from the lot at any time and after due notice. It then directed them to vacate the lot, pay P5,000 a month from January 2004 up to such time that the lot is actually turned over to the petitioners, and pay P10,000 as attorneys fees. The respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the assailed MeTC decision. G.R. No. 171678 December 10, 2008 Unfazed by the decision of the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. After finding the complaint to be substantially lacking in the requisite allegations that would make out a case either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer,8 the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and accordingly dismissed the petitioners complaint. The dispositive portion of the

ROSA J. SALES, EARL RYAN CHENG and EMIL RALPH CHENG, petitioners, vs. WILLIAM BARRO, respondent.

Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition on the basis of the lower tribunals lack of jurisdiction, and accordingly DISMISS respondents ejectment complaint. SO ORDERED.9 The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this petition on the following grounds: I. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS EJECTMENT COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE THE JURISDICTIONAL FACT OF PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION. II. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT.10 Simply put, we are asked to resolve: (1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint; and (2) whether the respondent was already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Anent the first issue, the petitioners argue that the complaint was for unlawful detainer, and hence, there was no need for them to allege prior physical possession of the lot. They further contend that their position that the complaint was for unlawful detainer is supported by the claim of the respondent in his answer that "he made a temporary makeshift structure on the lot to serve as his living place and that the same was tolerated by the petitioners considering that he acted as caretaker of the property."11 For his part, the respondent insists that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the complaint.12 After carefully examining the averments of the petitioners complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein,13 we hold that the Court of Appeals did

not err in finding that the complaint was for forcible entry, and that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed it. There are two reasons why we could not subscribe to the petitioners submission that their complaint was for unlawful detainer. Firstly, the petitioners own averment in the complaint "that the defendant constructed a shanty in the lot of the plaintiffs without their consent,"14 and the relief asked for by the petitioners that the respondent and his wife "pay the amount of P10,000 a month beginning January 2004 as for reasonable rent of the subject premises,"15 clearly contradict their claim. It must be highlighted that as admitted by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration16 before the appellate court, and as evidenced by the TCT No. 262237 annexed to the complaint, the petitioners became owners of the property only on January 6, 2004. By averring that the respondent constructed his shanty on the lot without their consent and then praying that the MeTC direct the respondent to pay them rent from January 2004, or from the inception of the respondents occupation of the lot, no other conclusion can be made except that the petitioners had always considered respondents occupation of the same to be unlawful from the very beginning. Hence, the complaint can never support a case for unlawful detainer. "It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession."17 Secondly, the nature of the complaint is neither changed nor dependent upon the allegations and/or defenses made in the answer. As we had previously stated in Caiza v. Court of Appeals,18 "it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought." As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, what the petitioners actually filed was a fatally defective complaint for forcible entry, considering that there was no allegation therein regarding the petitioners prior physical possession of the lot.19 In Tirona v. Alejo, we held that "in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property; and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,20 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth." 21 The petitioners allegation that they are the registered owners of the lot miserably falls short of satisfying the required averment of prior physical possession. As we had clarified and stressed in Tirona, "the word possession as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical

possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."22 Finally, was the respondent already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC to try the petitioners complaint? The petitioners argue that the respondent is already estopped because the respondent failed to assail the jurisdiction of the MeTC at the earliest opportunity and actively participated in the proceedings before it.23 The respondent counters that he could not be held guilty of estoppel because he questioned in his answer and pleadings petitioners allegation that he was served a demand letter. By questioning the veracity of the allegation of the existence of a jurisdictional requirement, he, in effect, questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC in trying the case.24 It is well-settled that a courts jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.25 The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.26 In any event, even if respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. In this sense, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may even be ordered by the court motu proprio.27 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153791

August 24, 2007

and when respondent no longer wanted to renew the lease, petitioner, in a desperate attempt to keep the property, surreptitiously executed an Affidavit of Ownership/Possession claiming ownership over a portion of the leased property;6 respondent subsequently filed a case for Illegal Detainer against petitioner in March 1998 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 6285, and judgment was rendered on September 30, 1998, ordering petitioner to vacate the property and demolish the building therein; the RTC affirmed the said decision and a writ of execution was issued on March 16, 2000.7 In moving for the dismissal of the complaint, respondent also pointed out that there is another action for quieting of title and cancellation of tax declaration pending between the parties.8 The MTCC conducted a hearing on the prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, and on July 16, 2001, granted the same.9 The MTCC then directed the parties to file their briefs; and later, affidavits of witnesses, documents, exhibits and position papers.10 On April 1, 2002, the MTCC rendered the herein assailed decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating thus: In the above-entitled case, the issue involved is not merely on question of actual or material possession but also the validity and nullity of the affidavit of ownership and possession of the disputed property. The present case is thus converted from a forcible entry suit to one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation and this only be addressed to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court [sic]. x x x In fact, defendant Mariano Chan had filed an action against the plaintiff Go Ke Chong, Jr. for Quieting of Title and cancellation of tax declaration pending before the Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch 29 entitled Mariano Chan vs. Go Ke Chong, Jr. and docketed as Civil Case No. 6453. (citations omitted) IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this case for lack of jurisdiction. No moral or exemplary damages is hereby awarded to both of the parties. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in this case is hereby revoked. No costs. SO ORDERED.11

GO KE CHONG, JR., Petitioner, vs. MARIANO M. CHAN, Respondent. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the Decision1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, San Fernando, La Union, dated April 1, 2002, which dismissed petitioners complaint for forcible entry with damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the Order2 dated May 22, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The facts are as follows: Petitioner Go Ke Chong, Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondent Mariano M. Chan on February 20, 2001 before the MTCC of San Fernando, La Union, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 3720, claiming that on March 21 to 22, 2000, respondents men illegally fenced off Lot No. 553, located along the National Road of Brgy. IV San Fernando City, covering an area of 110 sq m, and demolished the building and improvements constructed by petitioner thereon, depriving him of lawful physical possession thereof.3 He claims that he is the lawfully declared owner and possessor of Lot No. 553 by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership/Possession dated January 15, 1998 and an Affidavit of Declaration of Facts dated February 23 1998 which he executed and registered with the Register of Deeds. He also asserts that he has been actually and physically occupying -- in continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, open and public possession -- Lot No. 553 in the concept of a prescriptive owner, having constructed a building thereon in good faith and with just title, knowing that said land was an idle, abandoned, vacant and undeveloped public land at the time that he entered and started developing the same.4 Respondent on the other hand asserts in his Answer that he inherited from his father, Leoncio Chan, the 538-sq m lot, of which the herein disputed property is part;5 in 1987 he and petitioner entered into a lease contract over the property;

Petitioners Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the MTCC on May 22, 2002.12

Petitioner now comes before this Court claiming that the assailed Decision and Order of the MTCC "present questions of law and the issue of misapprehension of facts;"13 thus: I IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN SIMPLY ADOPTING THE BASELESS AND MISLEADING ALLEGATION OF RESPONDENT THAT PETITIONER'S AFFIDAVIT OF OWNERSHIP/POSSESSIONSHIP [sic] DATED JANUARY 15, 1998 OVER LOT 553 IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, AND UPON WHICH BASIS THE COURT A QUO CONVERTED THE INSTANT FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE TO ONE THAT IS NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION AND, THUS, DISMISSED THE SAID CASE FOR "LACK OF JURISDICTION". RESPONDENT'S SAID ALLEGATION IS UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. II. IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE RELEVANT AND SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITIONER'S POSITION PAPER WHICH, WHEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE UNEQUIVOCABLY CONVINCED THE COURT A QUO TO RENDER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. III. IN THE APPEALED ORDER DATED MAY 22, 2002, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "PLAINTIFF (PETITIONER) WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE PRIOR POSSESSION DE FACTO" OF LOT 553 IN ITS DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (OF THE DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002) AND PETITIONER'S REPLY (TO DEFENDANT'S COMMENT DATED MAY 10, 2002) FOR "LACK OF MERIT." IV. IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002 AND ORDER DATED MAY 22, 2002, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DELVING INTO ISSUES OF RESPONDENT'S OWNERSHIP OVER HIS INHERITED PROPERTY (LOT 555-A) WHICH ARE LEFT TO BE BETTER

APPRECIATED AND CONSIDERED BY THE PROPER COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OVER IT, PARTICULARLY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 29 OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL REGION UNDER CIVIL CASE NO. 6453 ENTITLED "MARIANO CHAN VS. GO KE CHONG, JR. ET AL." FOR QUIETING OF TITLE, ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF TAX DECLARATION, DAMAGES." V. IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002 AND ORDER DATED MAY 22, 2002, THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN: A) JUDICIALLY DECLARING THAT "THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSIONSHIP [sic] OF PETITIONER OVER LOT 553 STARTED ONLY ON JANUARY 15, 1998 WHILE RESPONDENT AND HIS FAMILY WAS ALREADY THE OWNER AND POSSESSOR OF BOTH LOT 555-A AND LOT 553 SINCE 1947." B) JUDICIALLY DECLARING THAT LOT 553 IS NOT OF UNKNOWN OWNERSHIP AND THAT PETITIONER HAS MISREPRESENTED SUCH FACT IN HIS AFFIDAVIT OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSIONSHIP DATED JANUARY 15, 1998. C) FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT AND IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT PETITIONER'S PROPERTY (LOT 553) IS DISTINCT AND SEPARATED [sic] FROM RESPONDENT'S LOT (LOT 555-A).14 Essentially, petitioner claims that his complaint before the MTCC only concerns Lot No. 553 and does not involve Lot No. 555-A owned by respondent located at the north portion thereof; that on March 21 to 22, 2000, respondent in bad faith extended the fencing of Lot No. 555-A beyond its southern boundary and by force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered Lot No. 553 and demolished petitioners building thereon.15 He also avers that the MTCC erred in dismissing his complaint for forcible entry for "lack of jurisdiction" based on respondents unsubstantiated and unproven claim of ownership over Lot No. 553.16 He then prays that the Decision dated April 1, 2002 and Order dated May 22, 2002 of the MTCC be reversed and set aside; that a decision be rendered upholding his prior possession de facto over Lot No. 553 and declaring the same to be distinct and separate from respondents property, Lot No. 555-A; and that the instant case be remanded to the MTCC for a proper trial and hearing on the merits.17

Respondent for his part avers that: the issues raised by petitioner do not involve questions of law which are proper for appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;18 the lot being claimed by petitioner is actually located within the property owned by respondent;19 respondent previously filed an action for quieting of title and cancellation of tax declaration involving Lot No. 553 against petitioner, and considering that the issue of ownership of the property is already subject of the case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the MTCC divested itself of jurisdiction to resolve the same;20 petitioners claim of just title started only in 1998 and his possession over the subject property has from the outset been in the concept of lessee and thereafter been contested judicially.21 Petitioner filed a Reply.22 Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their claims.23 Herein petition should have been outrightly dismissed. As the present petition delves not only into the correctness of MTCCs dismissal of petitioners forcible entry case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but also into the veracity of the respective factual claims of both parties, the same clearly does not present pure questions of law that may be directly appealed to this Court. This Court may only take cognizance of appeals from decisions, final orders or resolutions of trial courts which involve pure questions of law. Under Sec. 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court has the power to: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: xxxx

review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), the Sandiganbayan, the RTC or similar courts, may be appealed to this Court, which appeal must involve only questions of law and not of fact.24 Under the Rules of Court, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former.25 RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions meanwhile are appealable to the CA either through an ordinary appeal, if the case was originally decided by the RTC,26 or a petition for review under Rule 42 if the case was decided under the RTCs appellate jurisdiction.27 In view however of the lapse of time since the case was instituted and considering that orderly administration of justice demands that the Court settle whatever legal error was committed below, the Court shall settle the legal issue raised in the present case, petitioners procedural faux pas notwithstanding. Petitioner is correct in claiming that the MTCC erred in dismissing his complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court has already settled that even when the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven, such fact will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer based on jurisdictional grounds.28 In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, nonetheless, has the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.29 As the Court explained in Refugia v. Court of Appeals,30

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis supplied) Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court also provides that: SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. --- A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for

[P]rior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on

Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. x x x.31 (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, the MTCC held in its April 1, 2002 Decision that since "the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, (then) the case should be dismissed, for the inferior court loses jurisdiction over the same."32 In support thereof, it cited several decisions to wit: Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,33 Consignado v. Court of Appeals,34 and Santiago v. Cloribel.35 Indeed, these cases support the above-mentioned pronouncement. However, at the time that herein assailed MTCC Decision and Order were issued, said decisions had been abandoned by more recent decisions.1avvphi1 As explained by the Court in Refugia v. Court of Appeals,36 the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper interpretation and application thereof; i.e., there were several cases which held that the jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the ejectment case should be dismissed where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without determining the issue of ownership, while there were also cases in which the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership pursuant to determining the issue of possession.37 To settle the matter, the Court then expressly ruled that: [B]y virtue of the express mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession.38 As it now stands, therefore, the MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on forcible entry and unlawful detainer regardless of whether said cases involve questions of ownership or even if the issue of possession cannot be determined without resolving the question of ownership.39 This ruling however is subject to the condition that the lower courts adjudication of ownership in the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is merely provisional and the Courts affirmance of the lower courts decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.40

Finding that the MTCC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the MTCC for it to rule on the merits of the complaint for forcible entry. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 1, 2002 and the Order dated May 22, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, San Fernando, La Union are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be remanded to said court for proper resolution of Civil Case No. 3720 on the merits. G.R. No. 176413 November 25, 2009

SPOUSES DANILO T. SAMONTE and ROSALINDA N. SAMONTE, Petitioners, vs. CENTURY SAVINGS BANK, Respondent. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 27, 2006 and Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86875. The assailed decision affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC)3 Decision4 dated September 17, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04913, which in turn affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)5 Decision6 dated May 6, 2004 in Civil Case No. 79002 for Ejectment. The facts are as follows: Petitioners Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda N. Samonte obtained a loan amounting to P1,500,000.00 from respondent Century Savings Bank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage7 over a property located at 7142 M. Ocampo Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati City. For petitioners failure to pay the obligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed on December 9, 1999 and the property was sold at public auction and was eventually awarded to respondent as the highest bidder.8 Having failed to redeem the property, petitioners entered into a Contract of Lease9 with respondent, wherein the former agreed to pay the latter a monthly rental of P10,000.00 for and in consideration of their continuing occupation of the subject property from January 16, 2001-January 16, 2002. Petitioners further acknowledged respondents valid and legal title to enter into the contract as absolute owner of the property in question.10 On March 28, 2001, respondent consolidated its ownership over the property, which led to the cancellation of petitioners title and the issuance of a new one in respondents name.11

hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO with costs against the defendants-appellants. Of the agreed monthly rentals, petitioners only paid a total amount of P40,000.00. On April 4, 2002, respondent sent a letter12 to petitioners demanding that the latter pay their unpaid rentals and vacate the leased premises. Petitioners, however, refused to heed the demand. Hence, the complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 79002. In their Answer,13 petitioners admitted having entered into the contract of lease but claimed that it was void, since their consent was vitiated by mistake and they were made to believe that it was a requirement for the loan-restructuring agreement with the bank. To justify their failure to pay the rents and to vacate the premises, petitioners insisted on the nullity of the foreclosure proceedings. Petitioners had, in fact, commenced an action for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1564.14 On May 6, 2004, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Century Savings Bank Corporation. Defendants spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda N. Samonte and all persons unlawfully withholding subject property located at 7142 M. Ocampo Street, Pio Del Pilar, Makati City, and/or claiming rights under them are directed, as follows: 1. To immediately vacate subject property and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff; 2. To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, P80,000.00 as monthly rental in arrears plus P10,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for their continued use and occupancy of subject premises starting 16 January 2002 until they actually vacate and surrender possession to it; 3. To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and 4. To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the cost of suits. SO ORDERED.15 On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 67, Makati City in Civil Case No. 79002 dated May 6, 2004 is 2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]). 3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of SO ORDERED.16 Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA. They insisted that the ejectment case should await the result of the separate action they instituted for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. They likewise contended that should the court declare respondent entitled to the possession of the subject property, the same should be provisional and subject to the courts decision in the nullification case. Lastly, they questioned the award of back rentals as they were allegedly awarded based on incorrect computation.17 On September 27, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC decision. The appellate court concluded that the nullification of foreclosure proceedings is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment. The CA also refused to make a declaration that respondents right to possess the subject property would depend on the outcome of the nullification case as it would be in the nature of a conditional judgment which is void. The CA thus upheld respondents better right to possess the property subject matter of this controversy. Hence, the instant petition. The only issue for determination is whether the instant ejectment case should be suspended pending the resolution of the action for nullity of foreclosure. We answer in the negative. As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue.18 The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in the following precedents: 1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).

the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]). 4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]). 5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]). 6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]). 7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991). 8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).19 Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao,20 and Amagan v. Marayag,21 we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.22 Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and

probably irreparable.23 In the present case, petitioners were the previous owners of the subject property. However, they lost their right over the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage wherein respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Petitioners, however, remained in possession thereof as lessees in a contract of lease executed after the expiration of the redemption period. For failure to pay the stipulated rents, respondent commenced an action for ejectment. Petitioners, in turn, instituted a case for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings involving the same property. When the ejectment case reached the CA, petitioners sought the suspension of the proceedings solely by reason of the pendency of the nullification case. Given these factual antecedents, the instant case hardly falls within the exception cited in Vda. de Legaspi and Amagan as the resolution of the ejectment suit will not result in the demolition of the leased premises.24 Verily, petitioners failed to show "strong reasons of equity" to sustain the suspension or dismissal of the ejectment case. Faced with the same scenario on which the general rule is founded, and finding no reason to deviate therefrom, the Court adheres to settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment.25 This rule is not without good reason. If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated through the simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over the property subject of the controversy. This would render nugatory the underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment which is to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.26 We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that will be suffered by petitioners if the ejectment is ordered, only to be reinstated later if they eventually win the nullification of the foreclosure case. However, respondent will also suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of ejectment, resort to which is not only allowed but, in fact, encouraged by law.27 We would like to stress that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.28 These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of

possession.29 In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.30 The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.31 In any case, we sustain the finding that respondent has the better right to possess the subject property. The Contract of Lease executed by petitioners and respondent remains valid. It is undisputed that petitioners failed to comply with the terms thereof by their failure to pay the stipulated rent. As lessor of the subject property, respondent has the right to demand that petitioners pay their unpaid obligations and, in case of their failure, that they vacate the premises. Considering that the lease contract has long expired, with more reason should respondent be allowed to recover the subject property. There is also no doubt that the plaintiff in the ejectment case (respondent herein) is entitled to damages caused by the loss of the use and possession of the premises.32 We quote with approval the appellate courts findings, viz.: On the matter of whether the court a quo erred in the computation of the amounts awarded, representing back rentals and reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, We rule in the negative. The award of back rentals amounting to Php80,000.00 and Php10,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the continued use and occupation of the property is proper. As stated in the decision of the court a quo, to which We agree, the monthly rentals in arrears amounted to Php80,000.00 as of 16 January 2002, the date of expiration of the contract of lease. Petitioners were only able to pay Php40,000.00, equivalent to four-month rentals at the rate of Php10,000.00 per month. It would not be in accord with the law if petitioners are not also made to pay Php10,000.00 commencing 16 January 2002 until they finally vacate and surrender possession of the property to respondent. The latter amount represents the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the property after the lease contract has expired. Inevitably, no error can be imputed to the court a quo when it ordered petitioners to pay respondent jointly and severally the amount of Php80,000.00 as monthly rental in arrears plus Php10,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the continued use and occupancy of the property starting January 16, 2002 until they actually vacate and surrender possession of the property to respondent.33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 27, 2006 and Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86875 are AFFIRMED.

Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution. Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners. On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTCs decision in its entirety. On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration. G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005 ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Respondent. In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision. The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged. Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,3 and granted petitioners motion for immediate execution pending appeal. In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside. Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises. We resolve the first argument to be without merit. The following sequence of events is undisputed: (1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC. (2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision. (3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.

(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision. (5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration. (6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order. (7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review. (8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review. Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.4 Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997. Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated: On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.

Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration. Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED.6 (Emphasis in the original.) Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of respondents position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was? Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellees brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for

Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time. Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed. Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer. We disagree with the Court of Appeals. The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations: .... 3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue

City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof; 4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots; 5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots; 6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an integral part thereof; 7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; 8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month . . . .8 Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.9 Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.11

the nature of the action in this case. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;14 is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus: . . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.18 Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment,19 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude. This contention is not tenable. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.20 Neither the allegation in petitioners complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.21 This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356

will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.24 In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled: We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action

expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.28 With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the August 24, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79495 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 affirming with modification the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, as well as the January 17, 2007 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner leased a commercial building known as "Carmen Building" located at Sampaloc, Manila to respondents for the period September 1, 2000 to August 31, 2005. The contract contained a stipulation prohibiting respondents from subleasing any portion of the building. Thereafter, respondents failed to pay the rentals for the months of January, February, March and April 2001 totaling P450,000.00. After several demands, respondents paid petitioner P150,000.00 in April 2001, P150,000.00 on May 7, 2001 and P150,000.00 on May 9, 2001. However, respondents again failed to pay the rentals for the succeeding months. Petitioner also discovered that respondents subleased a portion of the building to a computer gaming entity without its consent. Hence, on July 30, 2001, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondents to pay the arrearages, electricity and water bills in the amount of P531,069.50 and to terminate the sublease. Respondents made payments in August and September, 2001. However, they again reneged on their obligation to pay the rents due and to terminate the sublease contract which compelled petitioner to send another demand letter dated October 22, 2001. Petitioner categorically demanded payment of the balance due and for respondents to vacate the premises. Respondents made partial payments in November and December, 2001. However, with the accrual of rentals, interest, and electricity bill, respondents obligation amounted to P352,232.70. Finally, on January 2, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against respondents for non-payment of rentals and illegal subleasing before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 171849-CV. G.R. No. 176324 April 16, 2008 Respondents admitted that as of December 10, 2001, it owed petitioner P352,232.70 but denied subleasing a portion of the premises to another entity and repudiated petitioner's right to damages. It also assailed petitioners personality to file the Complaint for ejectment stating that Ms. Abaya was not duly authorized to file the same.

ABAYA INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MERIT PHILIPPINES and SERVULO C. DOMINISE, respondents.

During the pendency of the case, respondents paid petitioner P300,000.00 and vacated the premises in May, 2002. Petitioner however claimed that respondents left the premises stealthily sometime in June 2002 without paying the rentals due for the period January to May 2002. On December 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them, ordering them to immediately vacate the premises located at Carmen Building, 886 Espana corner Cataluna Street, Sampaloc Manila and to solidarily pay herein plaintiff: 1. Php 482,885.02 - As earlier indicated; and 2. Php 20,000.00 - Representing reasonable reimbursement of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. SO ORDERED.4 Respondents appealed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila arguing that petitioner is not properly clothed with authority to file the ejectment case; that the case was considered moot since it vacated the premises; and that the award of damages is not proper. On July 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, rendered a Decision5 sustaining the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court but deleted the award of damages. Thus, respondents filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision reversing the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial Court. The dispostive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, dated July 28, 2003, affirming with modification the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court was without jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint filed before it. It held that the issue was not one of possession but rather rescission of contracts over which the Metropolitan Trial Court is without jurisdiction, thus: Evidently, under those circumstances, ejectment is not the proper remedy. This is because proof of any violation is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission of the contract. It is only when the violation has been established that the contract can be declared rescinded. Hence, it is only upon such rescission that there can be a pronouncement that possession of the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession but one of rescission of a contract, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine. In the case of Nera vs. Vacante, the Supreme Court said that: "A violation by a party of any of the stipulations of a contract on agreement to sell real property would entitle the other party to resolve or rescind it. An allegation of such violation in a detainer suit may be proved by competent evidence. And if proved a justice of the peace court might make a finding to that effect, but it certainly cannot declare and hold that the contract is resolved or rescinded. It is beyond its power so to do. And as the illegality of the possession of realty by a party to a contract to sell is premised upon the resolution of the contract, it follows that an allegation and proof of such violation, a condition precedent to such resolution or rescission, to render unlawful the possession of the land or building erected thereon by the party who has violated the contract, cannot be taken cognizance of by a justice of the peace court..." Hence, where the unlawful possession of the property by a party to a contract is premised upon the rescission of the contract, an allegation and proof of such violation is a condition precedent to such rescission to render unlawful the possession of the property by the party who has violated the contract which cannot be taken cognizance of by a Metropolitan Trial Court. The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty. Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building in case the other party violates the contract cannot confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to.

In the instant case, the ejectment case filed by respondent before the trial court will not prosper. This is because the proof of violation is a condition precedent to rescission of the contract. Since violation has not been established, the pronouncement by the trial court that the possession by the petitioners of the building has become unlawful is premature. While it is true that the contract between the parties provided for extrajudicial rescission, nevertheless, a judicial determination is necessary where it is objected to by the other party. As said by the Supreme Court in the case of JOSE ZULUETA vs. HON. HERMINIANO MARIANO, "A stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building if the other party violates the contract does not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof if objected to without judicial intervention and determination."7 (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following errors: 1. The MTC and the RTC saw the Complaint as one for ejectment, but the Court of Appeals erroneously read it out of context and saw it as one for rescission, contrary to the very allegations of said Complaint; 2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is contrary to Art. 1673 of the New Civil Code, among others, existing Rules, opinions of experts and jurisprudence. It even encourages multiplicity of suit, and it is based on inapplicable decisions with totally different factual milieu; 3. The Court of Appeals went beyond its jurisdiction over the case and the issue raised in the petition for review; and it deprived herein petitioner of due process of law.8 Petitioner argues that the subject Complaint is one for unlawful detainer and not rescission of contract; that the Complaint alleged the existence of the lease of land and building evidenced by a lease contract; that the lessee was in arrears for several months; and that the lessee, without any right, subleased part of the building in violation of the lease contract; that the legal bases of the ejectment case were violation of law and contract, specifically, Articles 1673, 1650, 1159, and 1315 of the Civil Code; that the reliefs prayed for in the Complaint are constitutive of those in an ejectment suit: vacate the subject premises, to pay the unpaid rentals and attorneys fees and other damages. On the other hand, respondents contend that the filing of a complaint for

rescission is a condition sine qua non before the ejectment; that in unilaterally terminating the lease contract without first rescinding the same, the respondents right to address the alleged violation was effectively foreclosed. This Court has consistently held that jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not admitting the facts alleged therein, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.9 In a complaint for unlawful detainer an allegation that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law is sufficient.10 A review of the averments of the Complaint reveals that there is an allegation that respondents occupancy of the premises was by virtue of a lease contract and that infractions were committed which served as basis for terminating the same and for respondents to vacate the premises. Clearly, the complaint avers ultimate facts required for a cause of action in an unlawful detainer case which is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The ruling of the Court of Appeals requiring prior rescission of the subject lease contract is misplaced. Nera v. Vacante11 and Zulueta v. Mariano12 are inapplicable to the instant case. In the cases cited, the basis for the occupation of the parties thereon are contracts to sell the premises on installment. Thus, the contractual relations between the parties are more than that of a lessor-lessee. They involved violations of contracts to sell in installments the validity of which was the basis of the defendants possession of the subject premises. The instant case however involves a contract of lease. Article 1673 of the Civil Code13 provides that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for non-payment of the price stipulated and violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. In instituting an action for unlawful detainer, Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court14 requires the lessor to make a demand upon the lessee to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises. It is the owners demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the tenant's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal violates the owner's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.15 The availability of the action for rescission does not preclude the lessor to avail of the remedy of ejectment. In Dayao v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.,16 where a complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground of violation of contract was filed, the Court held that a lessor is not required to bring first an action for rescission but could ask the Court to do so and simultaneously seek

to eject the lessee in a single action for illegal detainer.17 Respondents next claim that the Complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila was instituted by Ofelia C. Abaya, petitioners Chairman and President, who signed the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping without however proof of authority to sign for plaintiff-corporation. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires the plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping simultaneous with the filing of the complaint. In Fuentebella v. Castro,18 the Court ruled that, if, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. Where such party is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors and a certification which had been signed without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.19 However, in Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court ruled that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, and not frustrate justice. While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping. The Court also held that on several occasions, it has excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping and with more reason should it allow the petition submitted therein since petitioner did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show that the signatory was authorized.21 In view of the merits of the case and to avoid a re-litigation of the issues and further delay in the administration of justice, we find it more in accord with substantial justice to relax the application of procedural rules and sustain the validity of the proceedings before the trial courts in the present case. In any event, we note that Ms. Abayas authority to sign the certification was ratified by the Board.22 In Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc,23 the Court gave due course to the petition considering that the signatorys authority to sign the certification was ratified by the Board and the purpose of the certification, which is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping, was not circumvented.24 Likewise, in China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled that the complaint be decided on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, because the board resolution subsequently attached recognized the signatorys

preexisting status as an authorized signatory.26 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court Appeals dated August 24, 2006 and January 17, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79495 setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, affirming with modification the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 152992 July 28, 2005 LEONARDO DAVID, Petitioner, vs. NELSON and DANNY CORDOVA, Respondents.

In this Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Leonardo A. David (David) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Fifteenth Division, and the Resolution3 of the same division denying his Motion for Reconsideration4 and Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.5 The Court of Appeals declared null and void the Decision6 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (FMCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan and the Order7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5. The antecedents are as follows: Petitioner David filed a Complaint8 for forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 1067, with the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan against respondents Nelson and Danny Cordova (the Cordovas). The Complaint alleged these material facts: .... 3. That plaintiff is the co-owner of Lot 774, with an area of 14,000 square meters, situated in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009087, xerox copy of which is hereto attached, marked as ANNEX "A", and made part hereof. 4. That on April 26, 1997, plaintiff passed by said Lot 774 on his way to Dinalupihan Public Market and he noticed persons who forcibly entered said Lot 774 by destroying the fence and started erecting a structure thereon. 5. That when plaintiff got near said Lot 774, defendants and their workers threatened him with harm should he interfere with their work. 6. That plaintiff requested defendants and their workers to stop the construction of a structure inside said Lot 774, but defendants and their workers refused to stop their said construction. 7. That plaintiff reported the matter to the Government Authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan and requested assistance in stopping said construction undertaken by defendants inside said Lot 774 of plaintiff. 8. That the Municipal Engineer together with some policemen of Dinalupihan, Bataan, went to the place where said Lot 774 is situated and they stopped the construction undertaken by defendants. 9. However, on the succeeding days, defendants continued with construction of the structure inside plaintiffs Lot 774, despite plaintiffs vehement protest.

10. That this construction undertaken by defendants inside plaintiffs said Lot 774 is without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff nor his co-owners. 11. That plaintiff brought the matter before the Barangay Authorities for conciliation, but no settlement was arrived at the Barangay Authorities, xerox copy of the Barangay Certification is hereto attached, marked as ANNEX "B", and made part hereof. 12. That plaintiff has been compelled by defendants to litigate to enforce his rights and to engage the services of counsel for the sum of P20,000.00 13. That the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation by defendants of plaintiffs said Lot 774 is P15,000.00 per month. ALLEGATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION 14. That plaintiff hereby reproduced all the allegations of the preceding paragraphs insofar as they are material to issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. 15. That under the provisions of Article 539 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 3, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff should be restored to the possession of said Lot 774. 16. That plaintiff is ready, able and willing to post a bond to be fixed by this Honorable Court to answer for any and all damages in the event that the Honorable Court finally adjudge that plaintiff is entitled thereto.9 and incorporated the followingP RAY E R WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after the filing of the case and upon posting of the bond to be fixed by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue to restore plaintiff in possession of said Lot 774, . . . . 10 Before filing their Answer,11 respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and not the FMCTC that has jurisdiction over the case. Said motion was denied in an Order of the lower court dated 24 November 1997.12

In their Answer, the Cordovas contended that David "is not a co-owner of the subject property, it being owned by the Government as said property forms part and parcel of the Dinalupihan Landed Estate . . . . "13 The Cordovas questioned the jurisdiction of the FMCTC to take cognizance of the case as allegedly the subject property is under the disposition and administration of DAR which will award it to qualified beneficiaries such as respondents. The Cordovas prayed that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. 14 Based on the position papers submitted by the parties to the case, the inferior court rendered a Decision on 20 January 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the landholdings in suit; 2. Ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property; 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3,000.00 as attorneys fees; and 4. To pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.15 The Cordovas thereafter filed with the RTC, Branch 5 of Dinalupihan, Bataan, a petition16 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the Decision of the lower court, docketed as Civil Case No. DH-456-98. The Cordovas contended that the inferior court had no jurisdiction over the forcible entry case as the property, being an agricultural land, is within the administration and disposition of the DAR. Hence, they argued that the Decision dated 20 January 1998 was null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction.17 On 26 May 1998, the RTC issued an order18 dismissing the petition. Apart from the petition being filed out of time, the RTC ruled that the findings of facts of the lower court is given due respect and at times treated with finality.

On 8 September 1998, the Cordovas filed another petition19 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC of Bataan to annul the Decision dated 20 January 1998 of the lower court, docketed as Civil Case No. DH-492-98. Again, the Cordovas put forward that the assailed Decision was null and void as the inferior court had no jurisdiction to entertain the forcible entry case considering that subject property is government-owned and falls within the administration and disposition of the DAR.20 The Cordovas petition was dismissed by the RTC, this time on the ground of res judicata.21 The Cordovas then filed a petition22 for certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that the Decision dated 20 January 1998 of the lower court be nullified. They restated before the Court of Appeals their previous assertion that the Decision rendered by the lower court was null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction, the subject property being under the administration and disposition of the DAR. And for the first time they raised the argument that the Complaint for forcible entry suffers from a fatal flaw as it failed to allege prior physical possession of the property by David. 23 For his part, David contended that the petition should be dismissed for having resorted to in lieu of the lost remedy of appeal and for having been filed out of time at that.24 On 8 April 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision25 granting the Cordovas petition. It agreed with the Cordovas allegation that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the property in litigation as this was supported by a certification26 dated 12 January 1999 issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office in Dinalupihan, Bataan to the effect that the land in suit is situated within the Dinalupihan Landed Estate; and that Danilo Cordova had filed an application dated 10 January 1997 to purchase the said lot.27 The Court of Appeals likewise considered a statement in the Order28 dated 14 May 1992 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which pointed out that(r)egarding Lot No. 774, it was not included in the Order of Partition and based on the report of the Chief of Landed Estate Division of DAR Region III, the said lot is not identifiable at the moment for lack of approved reference map.29 in its finding that David fell short of proving that he has a better right to the subject property as he failed to prove ownership of the same and the identity thereof.30

The Court of Appeals also observed that the Complaint for forcible entry suffers from a major flaw as it failed to allege, much less prove, prior physical possession over the property. It held that such allegation is indispensable in actions for forcible entry.31 In the instant Petition, David insists that the Cordovas petition before the Court of Appeals should not have been given due course as it was filed out of time and in lieu of a timely appeal. David also maintains that the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan has jurisdiction over the forcible entry case he filed against the Cordovas. We grant the petition. Petition before Court of Appeals was a wrong remedy that was even filed out of time At the outset, the petition must be upheld on procedural grounds. We find, as David has repeatedly posited, the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the Cordovas petition for certiorari as it was filed in lieu of appeal which is the prescribed remedy, and far beyond the reglementary period to boot. Quite lamentably, the appellate court did not accord the fundamental grounds raised by David even with a perfunctory acknowledgment, totally ignoring said grounds and opting to rule on the petition solely on the basis of the arguments raised therein. Instead of filing an appeal, the Cordovas filed two petitions for certiorari32 under Rule 65 before the RTC and a petition for certiorari also under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals on 16 November 1998, notably almost nine (9) months after the lower court had rendered its assailed Decision on 20 January 1998. It bears stressing that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution"33 sought to be annulled. Presumably the Cordovas received a copy of the assailed Decision of the lower court when they first filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC on 5 May 1998. Even if we were to begin counting the period from such date or from 26 May 1998, when the RTC issued an order denying the Cordovas petition, the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals would still have been filed out of time. In addition, a petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the

action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.34 As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.35 As the Cordovas failed to file a timely appeal, the lower courts Decision had long become final and executory in favor of David. The Court of Appeals should have denied outright the Cordovas petition for certiorari. Complaint recites facts essential to a forcible entry suit falling within the jurisdiction of the inferior court Now to the substantive aspect of the case. The issue for our resolution is whether or not the FMCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan had jurisdiction over the Complaint for forcible entry filed by David against the Cordovas. According to the Court of Appeals, the inferior court was bereft of jurisdiction because: (1) its Complaint allegedly failed to allege Davids prior physical possession and his dispossession by any modes on which an action for forcible entry is based; and (2) the lot in question is allegedly a public agricultural land.

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined by the allegations in the complaint.36 An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the first time on appeal.37 Contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling, a careful reading of the facts averred in the Complaint filed by David reveals that his action is indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the FMCTC. The facts upon which an action for forcible entry can be brought are specially mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Said section likewise defines an action for unlawful detainer. In forcible entry (desahucio), one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer (detentacion), one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.38 In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. In actions for forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.39 It is not necessary that the complaint allege, in the language of the statute, that the person has been deprived of his possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. However, the plaintiff in an action of desahucio must set up in his complaint facts which show that he had prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of such possession by reason of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.40 To effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.41

The Complaint filed by David alleged these material facts: .... 3. That plaintiff is the co-owner of Lot 774, with an area of 14,000 square meters, situated in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009087, xerox copy of which is hereto attached, marked as ANNEX "A", and made part hereof. 4. That on April 26, 1997, plaintiff passed by said Lot 774 on his way to Dinalupihan Public Market and he noticed persons who forcibly entered said Lot 774 by destroying the fence and started erecting a structure thereon. 5. That when plaintiff got near said Lot 774, defendants and their workers threatened him with harm should he interfere with their work. .... 13. That the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation by defendants of plaintiffs said Lot 774 is P15,000.00 per month. ALLEGATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION .... 15. That under the provisions of Article 539 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 3, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court, plaintiff should be restored to the possession of said Lot 774.42 (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, David alleged that he is the co-owner of the subject property, evidenced by a tax declaration receipt, and therefore entitled to possession thereof; that the Cordovas illegally and forcibly entered the premises without his consent and started erecting a structure thereon; and despite the request to vacate the premises, the Cordovas refused to leave the property thus David prayed for restoration of possession thereof. On the face of the Complaint, it also appears that David was seeking to recover merely the physical possession or possession de facto of the subject property. In fine, the allegations in the Complaint make out a case for forcible entry. Davids prior physical possession of the subject property and deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that he is the owner of the subject property which the Cordovas forcibly entered, of which he was unlawfully turned out of

possession and for which he prays to be restored in possession.43 The acts of the Cordovas in unlawfully entering the land, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would also imply the use of force.44 In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property and this is all that is necessary.45 Thus, the foregoing averments are sufficient to show that the action is based upon the proviso of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have previously held that the foundation of a possessory action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.46 The foregoing establish that indeed David averred the necessary jurisdictional facts and should therefore quell the Cordovas assertion that Davids Complaint suffered from a major flaw. Respondents are estopped from assailing jurisdiction of the inferior court In any event, the Cordovas are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that the Complaint filed by David lacked the material averments sufficient to make out a case for forcible entry. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. In the case at bar, the respondents are estopped by laches. This we defined in the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:47 Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right

within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. . Furthermore, it has been held that after voluntary submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc. 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). 48 It is too late in the day for the Cordovas to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that the Complaint failed to assert the necessary jurisdictional facts. The Cordovas first raised the issue in its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. After participating in all stages of the case before the lower court, the Cordovas are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the lower courts jurisdiction. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised any time, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.49 Participation in all stages of a case before the lower court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against ones opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.50 Alleged public character of land does not deprive court of jurisdiction over forcible entry case Next, the point that the property in dispute is public land. The matter is of no moment and does not operate to divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such property. Indeed, the public character

of the land does not preclude inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases. We have ruled in the case of Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al.,51 that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.52 Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.53 Our ruling in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals54 illustrates this point, thus: The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is-who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.55 Also worth noting is the case of Pitargue v. Sevilla,56 wherein, as in this case, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the forcible entry case to occupy the land. Both parties were in effect squatting on government property. Yet we upheld the courts jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if title remained with the government. Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the

law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.57 Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.58 In addition, the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter59 nor an agrarian dispute60 falling within the jurisdiction of DAR. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the FMCTC. On this point, the following pronouncements we made in Pitargue are enlightening: The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts. Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the common law action of forcible entry (Section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to be "to prevent breaches of the peace and

criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the courts herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C.J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective rights of rival

claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession of occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule. It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession. (Section 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at the use of the remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or award.61 Forum-shopping A final note. We observe that the Cordovas in their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals were not completely forthright about the pleadings they filed previously before the RTC. They only disclosed the petition for certiorari62 they last filed on 8 September 1998 before the RTC of Bataan, thus concealing the fact that they had previously filed a petition for certiorari on 5 May 1998 also under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC, Branch 5

of Dinalupihan, Bataan. Such failure to declare may constitute forum-shopping under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.63 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 8 April 1999 and Resolution dated 15 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 20 January 1998 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan is REINSTATED. Atty. Jaime G. Mena, counsel for herein respondents in their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, is given ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision to show cause why he should not be held liable for forum-shopping. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158687

January 27, 2006

FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JUANITO VALENCIANO and AMALIA VALENCIANO, Respondents. Before Us is a petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69415 dated 20 August 2002 which reversed and set aside the decision2 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 01-CV-1582(150) dated 23

January 2002, which affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tuba-Sablan, Tuba, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 150 dated 20 November 2000, declaring petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin the actual possessor of the lot in dispute and ordering, inter alia, respondent spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano to vacate and deliver the physical possession thereof to the former, and its Resolution4 dated 20 May 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respective allegations of the parties as contained in the complaint and answer are substantially summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: The property subject of this action for forcible entry is a parcel of land located at sitio Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. Respondent Frisco B. Domalsin claims to be the lawful owner and possessor of said parcel of land since 1979 up to the present. He declared it for taxation purposes in 1983 as (per) Tax Declaration No. 9540 issued on September 12, 1983 by the Municipal Assessor of Tuba Benguet. He allegedly introduced improvements consisting of levelling, excavation, riprapping of the earth and a private road to the river, fruitbearing trees and other agricultural plants of economic value. He was in continuous, adverse possession and in the concept of an owner for the past nineteen (19) years. On August 1, 1998, petitioners Spouses Juanito Valenciano and Amalia Valenciano (Sps. Valenciano, for brevity) allegedly entered the premises to construct a building made of cement and strong materials, without the authority and consent of respondent, by means of force and strategy, and without a building permit from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH, for brevity). Respondent protested and demanded that petitioners Sps. Valenciano halt construction of said building, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, he filed the instant case. Petitioners Sps. Valenciano, on the other hand, claimed that the ongoing construction was with the consent and conformity of the DPWH and in fact the improvements found in the property were introduced by the residents thereof, including its first residents, William and Gloria Banuca, and not by respondent. The premises on which petitioners Sps. Valenciano are constructing their house were leveled after the earthquake in 1990 by the Banuca spouses. Petitioners Sps. Valenciano are just starting the construction because the permission was only given now by Gloria Banuca.5 On 18 August 1998, petitioner filed before the MCTC of Tuba, Benguet, a complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order plus

Damages.6 The complaint was amended on 27 August 1998.7 Per Order dated 19 August 1998, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued ordering respondents to desist and cease and refrain from continuing the construction of a house on the land in question.8 On 27 August 1998, respondent spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano filed their Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction.9 On 07 September 1998, they filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint10 to which petitioner filed a Reply.11 On 15 September 1998, the MCTC issued another TRO.12 The pre-trial order dated 6 November 1998 contained, among other things, petitioners admission that he was temporarily not operating any business in the area, and respondents admission regarding the issuance of Tax Declarations on the property in dispute in petitioners name.13 Trial ensued. Petitioner presented Mariano Suyam and Tonsing Binay-an, two of his former truck drivers from 1981 to 1985 in his business of hauling sand, gravel and other aggregates at Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. Mariano Suyam testified that sometime in 1981, petitioner caused the construction of a private road leading to the Bued River from Kennon Road. He added that petitioner constructed two houses, the first was located along the road-right-of-way of Kennon Road where respondents are now constructing their house, while the second was located below the private road around 40 to 60 meters down from Kennon Road. He explained that the first house was used for sleeping quarters and resting center for laborers, while petitioner used the second one as his quarters. He said William Banuca was hired as foreman in 1983 and that the latter and his family stayed in the second house. Tonsing Binay-an corroborated the testimony of Suyam as regards the two houses constructed by petitioner and added that petitioner was the manager of Salamander Enterprises and had a concession permit from the Bureau of Mines to haul gravel and sand. Petitioner testified that he is a lawyer-businessman formerly engaged in trucking business, hauling sand and gravel, and operated under the name Salamander Enterprises.14 He narrated that while he was passing Kennon Road, he discovered that a portion of the Bued River, Camp 3, Tuba Benguet, can be a potential source of supplies for his business. Though the area was steep and deep, he scouted a place where he can construct a road from Kennon Road to the Bued River. In the course of cleaning the area, his workers noticed

that the place had been tilled. A certain Castillo Binay-an appeared informing him that he was the occupant of the site of the proposed private road. After agreeing on the consideration, the former executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim15 over the land in his favor. Thereafter, the Office of the Highway District Engineer of Baguio, Ministry of Public Highways (now Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH]) issued a permit in favor of petitioner to extract construction materials at Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet,16 which was followed by the issuance on 1 October 1981 of Commercial Permit No. 147 by the Office of the Mines Regional Officer, Mineral Region No. 1, Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (Bureau of Mines).17 The Commercial Permit, which was renewable every year, was last renewed in 1987.18 Based on the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by Castillo Binay-an, petitioner was able to apply for, and was issued, a tax declaration over the land covering one hectare. Tax Declaration No. 954019 dated 12 September 1983 was issued to petitioner describing the land bounded on the North by Bued River, on the South by Kennon Road, on the East by Kennon Road, and on the West by a Creek. With the revision of the fair market value and assessed value of lands, Tax Declaration No. 94-004-00327 dated 12 November 1994 was issued to him.20 From 1983 up to 1998, petitioner has been regularly paying real property taxes over the land. Petitioner disclosed that in 1983, William Banuca applied for, and was accepted, as foreman.21 Due to the nature of his job, Banuca was permitted to stay in the second house beside the private road.22 Banuca now lives permanently in said house after petitioner gave it to him. Petitioner revealed that the houses his former laborers constructed were awarded to them as a kind gesture to them. As to the land he occupied along the Kennon Road where the first house was erected, he claims that same still belongs to him. This house, which his laborers and drivers used as a resting area, was cannibalized and leveled, and the land over which it once stood was taken possession by respondents who are now building their house thereon. Gloria Banuca testified for respondents. She disclosed that it was she who invited respondents to come and reside at Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. She said she knew petitioner to be engaged in the sand and gravel business in Tuba, Benguet, from 1981 to 1985, and that the latter stopped in 1985 and never returned to haul sand and gravel at the Bued River. She claimed she never saw petitioner introduce any improvements on the land he claimed he bought from Castillo Binay-an, and that it was she and the other residents who introduced the existing improvements.

She narrated that in 1983, she planted fruit-bearing trees in the area where respondents were constructing their house which is located along the Kennon Roads road-right-of-way, fronting petitioners property. After the earthquake of 1990, the private road constructed by petitioner became impassable and it was she who hired the equipment used to clear the same. She even leveled the area where respondents were building their home. Based on the ocular inspection, she said this area is within the 15-meter radius from the center of the road. This area, she claims, was sold to her by the Spouses Jularbal. However, the agreement between them shows that what was sold to her were the improvements near her house which was 40 meters down from Kennon Road and the improvements along Kennon Road.23 Agustin Domingo next testified for respondents. He testified that in 1986, upon the invitation of Gloria Banuca, he transferred his residence to sitio Riverside because of its proximity to his place of work. He stayed there for good and even buried his father near his house. He said that in 1990, the private road constructed by petitioner was covered by boulders, soil and rocks, and it was Mrs. Banuca who initiated the clearing of the road. Finally, he declared that since 1986, he never saw petitioner introduce any improvement in the area. Respondent Juanito Valenciano revealed that he is the cousin of Gloria Banuca. He narrated that in 1984, he went to Riverside to see the latter whose husband, William Banuca, was working as foreman of petitioner. At that time, the lot under litigation was still a hill. It was Gloria Banuca who leveled the hill and told him to construct his house there. Finding the place to be an ideal place to build his house, he paid the Banucas P10,000.00 for the improvements. He explained that before he started building his house, he sought the permission of the Benguet District Engineer, DPWH, which the latter granted. In August 1998, he received a notice24 to stop and desist from continuing the construction of a permanent one-storey house made of hollow blocks and cement since the condition was only to utilize light materials. Thereafter, a letter dated 22 January 1999 was sent to him informing him that the temporary permit issued to him for the improvement/utilization of a portion of the national road along Kennon Road had been revoked for non-submission of the waiver as required by the Office of the District Engineer and his non-compliance with the condition that no permanent structures are to be constructed within the roadright-of-way. He, however, denied receiving said letter. Juan de Vera, a retired DPWH foreman, testified last for the respondents. He claimed he witnessed the execution of the document25 regarding the sale by Adriano Jularbal to Gloria Banuca of improvements found near the house of the

latter in the amount of P1,000.00. The MCTC found that what is being contested is the possession of a portion of the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is located in front of a parcel of land that petitioner bought by way of Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo Binay-an. It held that petitioner had prior material possession over the subject land. It ruled that the destruction of his house built thereon by the earthquake in 1990, and later cannibalized without being reconstructed was not tantamount to abandonment of the site by the petitioner because it was destroyed by a fortuitous event which was beyond his control. It explained that his possession over the land must be recognized by respondents who came later after the earthquake. It brushed aside respondents allegation that the land in dispute was abandoned by the latter after he stopped operating his sand and gravel business in 1985 and never returned anymore, and when the house erected on it was destroyed during the 1990 earthquake, it was no longer reconstructed and was subsequently leveled or demolished by Gloria Banuca. However, it pronounced that respondents action to occupy the land was done in good faith considering that their occupation of the land was with the assurance of the seller (Gloria Banuca) and that they were armed with the permit issued by the DPWH for him to construct his house thereon. On 20 November 2000, the MCTC came out with its decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, FRISCO DOMALSIN, and against defendants, JUANITO VALENCIANO and AMALIA VALENCIANO, with the following: 1. Order to declare the injunction permanent. 2. Order the plaintiff as the actual possessor of the lot in question. 3. Order the defendant(s) to vacate and deliver the physical possession voluntarily of the disputed land to plaintiff within 60 days from receipt of this decision. 4. Order defendant(s) to remove his structure within from receipt of this decision. 5. Order the defendant(s) to (sic) plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00, as litigation expenses. 6. Order defendant(s) to pay the cost of suit26 Respondents appealed the decision to the RTC.27 In affirming the decision in toto the RTC ratiocinated: It may be well to consider that even after plaintiffs business ceased operation, he religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Appellants theory that the plaintiff-appellee abandoned the property does not sit well and finds no support in the record. Notice that since 1985 up to mid1990, the Banucas never laid claim over the property taking into consideration that they were already residents of the place. This only goes to show that they acknowledged and respected the prior possession of the plaintiff-appellee. Besides, what right has Gloria to cause the leveling of the property destroying the natural contour thereof, to presume that plaintiff-appellee abandoned it and to invite and allow other persons to settle thereat? Absolutely none. Knowing fully well that the plaintiff-appellee has prior possession of the property, Glorias actions are unjustified, to say the least. Her consummated act of leveling the property without the knowledge of the plaintiff-appellee is viewed as a test to determine whether or not the latter is still interested in the property. From then on until 1998 (but before the construction), the Banucas still recognize the plaintiffs possession. But as Gloria claims to have heard no word from the plaintiff, she unilaterally declared that the place is now abandoned as she "invited and allowed" the defendants to live and construct their house thereat. Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, there was no abandonment simply because plaintiff-appellee continuously paid the corresponding taxes due thereon and that he promptly objected to the construction of the defendantsappellants house. These are clear manifestations of his intention not to abandon the property. Sad to say though that here is a former employer. By passing off such property to be hers is so unkind, unfair and against social order. It is very clear that the Banucas knew of the prior possession of the plaintiff way back then so that they themselves never personally build construction over the property. If they honestly believe that they now "own" the land, why will they still have to invite other people who are not their relatives to settle thereat? Why the preference of strangers over relatives? The Court does not believe that they did not receive any compensation for having "allowed" strangers, the defendants included, to settle on the land. From all the foregoing, Gloria is clearly in bad faith. And her being in bad faith must be corrected and if warranted, must be meted appropriate penalty. If the Banucas are in bad faith, then the appellants cannot have better rights either. The Banucas transferred nothing to them. Defendants-appellants cannot even

be considered as builders in good faith. It must be noted that they were prohibited by the plaintiff from going further but they ignored it. They shall lose what was built (Art. 449, Civil Code). Again, if the Banucas believe that they have an action or a right to deprive the plaintiffs possession, why did they not invoke judicial interference as required under Art. 536 of the same code? Nonetheless, notwithstanding the fact of leveling without the knowledge of the plaintiff-appellee, the same did not affect his possession (Art. 537, Civil Code).28 Via a petition for review, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals made a sudden turn-around and reversed the decision under review. Its decision dated 20 August 2002 reads in part: [T]here is a need to clarify a few things. What is undisputed are the identity and nature of the property subject of the action for forcible entry. The subject of the action concerns a portion of the road-right-of-way along Kennon Road just above the private road constructed by respondent. The problem, however, is that petitioners Sps. Valenciano started constructing a house on the same spot where a house belonging to respondent once stood. Both parties are now asserting that they are entitled to the possession of said lot. But the decision of the lower court seems to imply that respondents right to possess the subject property stems from his acquisition of the one-hectare property below it. That is not the case. We must emphasize that the subject of the deed of quitclaim and waiver of rights of Castillo Binay-an was not the road-right-of-way but the sloping terrain below it. This was the property acquired by the respondent to have access to the sand and gravel on the Bued River. It did not include the road-right-of-way. As regards Gloria Banucass claims, the evidence show that her agreement with Jularbal involved only the improvements near her residence down the private road and not the road-right-of-way. Since the subject property is a road-rightof-way, it forms part of the public dominion. It is not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership. Prolonged occupation thereof, improvements introduced thereat or payment of the realty taxes thereon will never ripen into ownership of said parcel of land. Thus, what We have are two parties, neither of which can be owners, only possessors of the subject property. Beyond these two, only the government has a better right to the subject property which right it may exercise at any time. This bears emphasizing because if either party has possessory rights to the subject property, it is not predicated on ownership but only on their actual possession of the subject property. xxxx

There is no doubt that respondent had prior physical possession of the subject property. He entered and acquired possession of the subject property when he built his house thereon. The house was destroyed during the 1990 earthquake and respondent did not rebuild it. The mound on which it stood was later leveled by Gloria Banuca and in 1998 petitioners Sps. Valenciano began construction thereat. Petitioners Sps. Valenciano claim there was abandonment, but the lower court ruled that respondent did not abandon the subject property as he continued to pay the realty taxes thereon and objected to petitioners Sps. Valencianos construction. We believe, and so hold, that at this point in time, it is immaterial whether or not there was abandonment by respondent. The fact remains that Gloria Banuca took possession of the subject property soon after the earthquake. She leveled the mound and the ruins of respondents house, yet respondent remained silent. Respondent objected only after petitioners Sps. Valenciano started construction of the house on the subject property. Respondent cannot now interpose an action for forcible entry against petitioners Sps. Valenciano, which he should have filed against Gloria Banuca, petitioners Sps. Valencianos predecessor-in-interest. But more than a year had passed and his right to do so lapsed. Thus, respondents prior possession is material only as against Gloria Banuca and only within a period of one year from the time she wrested possession of the property from respondent. We view with distate Gloria Banucas ingratitude toward her husbands former employer. Her actions smack of the proverbial hand being offered in aid but the person to whom it is offered would rather have the whole arm instead. This is an instance where it is the employees who commit injustice against their employer. Nonetheless, petitioners Sps. Valenciano should not suffer because of Gloria Banucas ingratitude for the former came across the property in good faith. But respondent is also reminded that he only has himself to blame. His failure to assert his right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time allowed Gloria Banuca to wrest possession from him. Especially in this case where they do not and cannot own the subject property, actual possession becomes particularly important.29 The case was disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of tuba-Sablan dated November 20, 2000 as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court on January 23, 2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.30 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution31

dated 20 May 2003. Petitioner is now before us seeking redress. He assigns the following as the errors committed by the Court of Appeals: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT (NOW PETITIONER) FRISCO DOMALSIN ABANDONED THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET, BRANCH 63 WHICH AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF TUBASABLAN. At the outset, it must be made clear that the property subject of this case is a portion of the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is located in front of a parcel of land that petitioner bought by way of Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo Binay-an.32 The admission33 of petitioner in his Amended Complaint that respondents started constructing a building within the Kennon Road road-right-of-way belies his claim that the lot in question is his. In light of this exposition, it is clear that neither the petitioner nor the respondents can own nor possess the subject property the same being part of the public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows: ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character. (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public.34 Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public."35 As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for

the use of the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public dominion. This being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is proper to discuss the position of the Court of Appeals for comprehensive understanding of the facts and the law involved. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that he abandoned the land being disputed contrary to the rulings of the MCTC and RTC. The MCTC found there was no abandonment of the land because the house erected thereon was destroyed by a fortuitous event (earthquake), while the RTC ruled there was no abandonment because petitioner paid taxes due on the land and that he promptly objected to the construction of respondents house which are clear manifestations of his intention not to abandon the property. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals shows that it did not reverse the two lower courts on the issue of abandonment. It merely declared that such issue is not material in the resolution of the case at bar. It faulted petitioner for not asserting his right for a long time allowing Gloria Banuca to wrest the possession of the land in question from petitioner by leveling the house he built thereon and pronounced that actual possession becomes important in a case where parties do not and cannot own the land in question. From the foregoing it appears that the Court of Appeals did not give weight or importance to the fact that petitioner had prior physical possession over the subject land. It anchored its decision on the fact that the parties do not and cannot own the land and that respondents now have actual possession over it. Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.36 The Court of Appeals erred when it preferred the present and actual possession of respondents vis--vis the prior possession of petitioner on the ground that the parties do not and cannot own the lot in question. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the

unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.37 The fact that the parties do not and cannot own the property under litigation does not mean that the issue to be resolved is no longer priority of possession. The determining factor for one to be entitled to possession will be prior physical possession and not actual physical possession. Since title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.38 Inasmuch as prior physical possession must be respected, the Court of Appeals should have ruled squarely on the issue of abandonment because it gave precedence to the actual present possession of respondents. If, indeed, there was abandonment of the land under consideration by petitioner, only then should respondents be given the possession of the same since abandonment is one way by which a possessor may lose his possession.39 Abandonment of a thing is the voluntary renunciation of all rights which a person may have in a thing, with the intent to lose such thing.40 A thing is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi (the intention of returning) is finally given up.41 In the case before us, we find that petitioner never abandoned the subject land. His opposition to the construction of respondents house upon learning of the same and the subsequent filing of the instant case are clear indicia of nonabandonment; otherwise, he could have just allowed the latter to continue with the construction. Moreover, the fact that the house petitioner built was destroyed by the earthquake in 1990, was never rebuilt nor repaired and that same was leveled to the ground by Gloria Banuca do not signify abandonment. Although his house was damaged by the earthquake, Gloria Banuca, the person who supposedly demolished said house, had no right to do the same. Her act of removing the house and depriving petitioner of possession of the land was an act of forcible entry. The entry of respondents in 1998 was likewise an act of forcible entry.

The next question is: Was the action filed the correct one and was it timely filed? Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.42 In actions for forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.43 To effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.44 A look at the Amended Complaint filed by petitioner clearly shows a case for forcible entry. Petitioner alleged therein that he has been in possession of the subject land for the last nineteen years and that respondents, in the first week of August 1998, without his permission and consent, entered the land by means of force, strategy and stealth and started the construction of a building thereon; and upon being informed thereof, he requested them to stop their construction but respondents refused to vacate the land forcing him to file the instant case to recover possession thereof. The Court of Appeals pronounced that petitioner cannot interpose an action for forcible entry against respondents and that the same should have been filed against Gloria Banuca. It added that the right to file against the latter had already lapsed because more than a year had passed by from the time she wrestled possession of the property from the petitioner. We find such pronouncement to be flawed. An action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not in fact hold the land.45 Under Section 1,46 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action may be filed against persons unlawfully withholding or depriving possession or any person claiming under them. Considering that respondents are the ones in present actual possession and are depriving petitioner of the possession of the land in question, it is proper that they be the ones to be named defendants in the case. The fact that Gloria Banuca was supposedly the one who first committed forcible entry when she allegedly demolished the house of petitioner does not make her the proper party to be sued because she is no longer in possession or control of the land in controversy.

As regards the timeliness of the filing of the case for forcible entry, we find that same was filed within the one-year prescriptive period. We have ruled that where forcible entry was made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof.47 As alleged by petitioner in the Amended Complaint, he was deprived of his possession over the land by force, strategy and stealth. Considering that one of the means employed was stealth because the intrusion was done by respondents without his knowledge and consent, the one-year period should be counted from the time he made the demand to respondents to vacate the land upon learning of such dispossession. The record shows that upon being informed that respondents were constructing a building in the subject land sometime in the first week of August 1998, petitioner immediately protested and advised the former to stop; but to no avail. The one-year period within which to file the forcible entry case had not yet expired when the ejectment suit was filed on 18 August 1998 with the MCTC. Despite the foregoing findings, this Court finds that the MCTC and the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, to be in error when they respectively declared that petitioner and respondents to be entitled to the possession of the land in dispute. The parties should not be permitted to take possession of the land, much more, claim ownership thereof as said lot is part of the public dominion. WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Nonetheless, there being a finding that the subject property is a part of the public dominion, of which neither party is entitled to own nor possess, the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 20 August 2002, the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, dated 23 January 2002, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tuba-Sablan, Tuba, Benguet, dated 20 November 2000 are SET ASIDE. Respondents Juanito and Amalia Valenciano are ordered to remove their structure on the subject land within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision, and to vacate and deliver the physical possession thereof to the Office of the District Engineer, Benguet Engineering District, Department of Public Works and Highways.

G.R. No. 172547

June 30, 2009

PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners, vs FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution2 dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397, which had affirmed the Decision3 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 198 in Civil Case No. LP-04-0160. The antecedent facts are as follows: Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza, Las Pias City. The ownership of the land originated from respondents paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura MayugaFactor who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land even before 1906.4 On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura MayugaFactor filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu-253567, before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71.5 On December 8, 1994, the trial court granted the petition in LRC Case No. N-9049 and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor as co-owners of the property. 6 The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of the Factor family property during the same year. The siblings, except Enrique Factor, respondents father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, with the agreement that Enrique would have as his share the portion of the property located in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Pias City, known as the Factor compound. Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound including the subject property, a rest house, where members of the Factor family stayed during get-togethers and visits.7 Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound, particularly in No. 8 Antioch St., Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Pias City since 1999.8 When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound including the subject rest house and other residential houses for lease was transferred and entrusted to Enriques eldest child, Gloria FactorLabao. Gloria Factor-Labao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house because Gloria collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and management of the Factor compound

including the subject rest house, passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as coowner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family. On May 31, 2002, Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10, 2002, Ruben Labao died. At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the subject propertys lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on September 12, 2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint9 for forcible entry against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi. Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fes claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property, while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy, remained in No. 8 Antioch St. On July 13, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79 ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to: 1. To immediately vacate the subject premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff. 2. To pay the monthly rental of P2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the premises. 3. To pay attorneys fee of Php 10,000.00. The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10 Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 198, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC and later denied their motion for reconsideration.11 Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but it was denied also. Hence, the instant petition before us. Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration: I. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION AND STEALTH HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT RESIDENTIAL HOUSE; II. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY; III. [WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY THE MONTHLY RENTAL OF P2,000.00 FROM DECEMBER 1, 2002 UP TO THE TIME THEY FINALLY VACATE PREMISES.12 The resolution of the first issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated holding that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.13 The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in the instant petition.14 Noteworthy, in this case, the cited findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

As to the second issue, the resolution thereof boils down to a determination of who, between petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of the subject property. Both parties anchor their right of material possession of the disputed property on their respective claims of ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a better right of possession over the subject property since she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property before his death. Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property as early as 1975. After careful consideration, we find in favor of the respondent. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself.15 Possession de facto is the physical possession of real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case.16 This rule holds true regardless of the character of a partys possession, provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.17 Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession of the subject property since the latter never occupied the same. They claim that they have been in actual possession of the disputed property from the time petitioner Precy married Ruben Labao in 2002. In this instance, however, petitioners contention is unconvincing. For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles.20

While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject property. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject property whenever they visit the same.21 Likewise, as pointed out by the MeTC and the RTC, Ruben and petitioner Precys marriage certificate revealed that at the time of their marriage, Ruben was residing at 123 A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Even Rubens death certificate showed that his place of death and residence was at #4 Labao St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Considering that her husband was never a resident of the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain convincingly how she was able to move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during their marriage. On the other hand, it was established that respondents grandparents, Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor, had been the occupants and in possession of various agricultural parcel of lands situated in Almanza, Las Pias City, in the concept of owners, for more than thirty years prior to 1975. In fact, the RTC in its Decision dated December 8, 1994 in LRC Case No. N-9049 has confirmed the rights of respondents predecessors over the subject property and ordered the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in their favor.22 The right of respondents predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to uphold respondents right to possession over the same. Respondents right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their fathers death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.24 After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took over the administration of the subject property. And as a consequence of co-ownership,25 soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and management of the subject property. As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners unsupported claim of possession must yield to that of the respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her predecessors-in-interest who have always been in possession of the subject property. Even assuming that respondent was never a resident of the subject property, she could legally continue possessing the property. Visiting

the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession.26 The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine. All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the extent and character of her possession over the disputed property. As a consequence of her ownership thereof, respondent is entitled to its possession, considering petitioners failure to prove prior possession. The Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject property.29 As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation threat, strategy or stealth. The Supreme Court, in Baes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines,30 explained: In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.31 As expressly stated in David v. Cordova:32 The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.33 Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she

does not stay in it. So when petitioners entered said property without the consent and permission of the respondent and the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession. Moreover, the presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1,34 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1 As to the last issue, we have previously ruled that while the courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property, they could not simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. The reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting evidence.35 In the instant case, we find no evidence on record to support the MeTCs award of rent. On the matter of attorneys fees awarded to the respondent, we are in agreement to delete it. It is a well-settled rule that where attorneys fees are granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award.36 Again, nothing in the body of both decisions of RTC and MeTC explicitly stated the reasons for the award of attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of rentals and attorneys fees are DELETED.

NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 dated April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition2 dated May 9, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 77. Petitioners had applied for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) but the Court in a resolution3 dated May 15, 2003 denied the application. The facts in this case, culled from the record, are as follows. The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 11799, filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision4 dated February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals. Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 while private respondents moved for execution pending appeal. On January 8, 2003, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision with the modification that petitioners must start paying rentals from the date of the appealed decision. On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. In an order dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied the motion and granted private respondents motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003, petitioners were served with the writ and notice to vacate. On March 11, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. On March 14, 2003, private respondents filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since petitioners refused to vacate the premises. The RTC deferred action on the motions to allow petitioners to exhaust legal remedies available to them.

G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005 ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners, vs. CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T. Petitioners thereafter filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of Republic Act No. 72795 was not complied with.

On April 4, 2003, private respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. In an order dated April 11, 2003, the RTC declared the decision denying petitioners appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. However, on April 10, 2003, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before the Court of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent Vigorous Opposition and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on respondents Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition before the MeTC. The MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special Order of Demolition for hearing. The court granted said motion on April 30, 2003, but gave petitioners five (5) days from receipt of its order to voluntarily vacate the premises and remove all structures and improvements made thereon. On May 6, 2003, MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno reported that petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners instead filed a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated April 30, 2003 and/or Special Order of Demolition. The MeTC denied the motion and issued the Special Order of Demolition on May 9, 2003. Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the lone error that THE COURT A QUO, IN BRUSHING ASIDE REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 7279 IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE AGAINST THESE UNDERPRIVILEGED PETITIONERS, HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, AND/OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.6 Simply, the issue is, are the Orders of the MeTC proper? Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the mandatory requirements of Section 287 of Rep. Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of resettlement. They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.8 Private respondents for their part argue that Rep. Act No. 7279 is not

applicable. They aver that there was no proof that petitioners are registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries in accordance with procedure set forth in the Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. They aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law had already been complied with. According to them, petitioners were already notified on March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition, when the writ of execution was served.9 We find for respondents. Under Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.11 The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.12 Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under Section 21,13 Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.14 However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. In said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that "there should be no appeal."15 Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost

through fault or negligence.16 Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.17 The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.18 Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment. Both orders were issued after the requisite notice and hearing. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not issue any writ of preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the judgment. Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order of demolition by filing a petition for review with prayer for TRO before us. We earlier denied said prayer for TRO. We also find petitioners contention that the said orders violated Rep. Act No. 7279, particularly Section 28(c),19 totally without merit. Under the provision, eviction or demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is shown on record that petitioners are underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined in Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279.20 The procedure for the execution of the eviction or demolition order under Section 28(c) is, in our view, not applicable. It also appears that the order of demolition had already been executed. Petitioners had already vacated the area and private respondents now possess the properties free from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of possession dated May 19, 2003. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the Order dated April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition dated May 9, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77, is DENIED for mootness and lack of merit.

turn over possession of said property and required him to remit not later than March 15, 2001 the amount of P400,000.00 representing two months security deposit. However, the Land Management Bureau (LMB)8 denied on August 31, 2001 and December 5, 2001 petitioners request to sublease said portion of the property to DKS.9 Hence, the sublease was not implemented. G.R. No. 179161 January 22, 2010 Prior to DKS application for sublease, petitioner signified its intention to renew the lease for another 25 years through a letter dated August 24, 2000 to the LMB as the original lease was about to expire. In a Memorandum dated May 6, 2002, then Secretary Heherson Alvarez (Sec. Alvarez) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the recommendation of the LMB to renew the contract of lease for another 25 years effective August 1, 2003 or until August 1, 2028 with several conditions on the sublease, among which were: (1) that petitioner shall sublease the 9,500-square meter area in favor of DKS for the same period of 25 years and, (2) that DKS shall start its development of the portion of the property within two years from May 6, 2002 and complete its development as proposed within seven years.10 On August 6, 2002, however, Sec. Alvarez ordered the recall of his May 6, 2002 Memorandum until such time that the terms and conditions of the lease and the capability of the sub-lessees are re-evaluated and approved.111avvphi1 Petitioner alleged that during the period recited above, it was in continuous and peaceful possession of the property including the subject 9,500-square meter portion which it operated as a car park until DKS, through force, intimidation, stealth and threat, forcibly and unlawfully took over possession on October 9, 2002. According to petitioner, Dy and two men in civilian clothes arrived at the car park at around 6:30 p.m. on October 9, 2002. When the three requested the security guard on duty to let them enter the premises, the latter initially refused but was eventually prevailed upon. Dy thereafter instructed the two men to wear their complete security guard uniform and start their tour of duty in the area. The two, thus, respectively positioned themselves inside and outside the gate of the area and prevented the paying car park tenants from entering the premises. Two days later, 12 more security personnel from the Frontliner Security Agency arrived. The following day, the Operations Officer of Frontliner Security Agency posted at the car parks main gate a notice which read, "This place is operated by DKS, No trespassing". From then on, DKS had possession and control of the car park in violation of petitioners right as lessee of said premises.12 Hence, petitioner filed a case for forcible entry against DKS and Dy docketed

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. Respondents. Considering that the sub-lessee which was ordered by the court to surrender possession of the disputed property in a case for forcible entry no longer possessed the same, having already surrendered possession thereof to the lessor and not to the prevailing party which is the lessee, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open it earlier issued. The question which now confronts this Court is: Was the recall proper? This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated March 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88098 which denied petitioners Petition for Certiorari2 as well as the Resolution3 dated August 6, 2007 which likewise denied its Motion for Reconsideration thereto. Factual Antecedents On June 9, 1978, the Philippine Government (through the now defunct Department of General Services) and petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into a Contract of Lease4 where the former leased in favor of the latter its 21,727-square meter land located at Numancia St., Binondo, Manila. The contract was effective from August 1, 1978 to July 31, 2003 and renewable for a similar period upon agreement of the parties. It also stipulated that except for its subsidiary corporations, petitioner shall not directly or indirectly sublease, assign or encumber its leasehold rights in whole or in part on the leased area to any person or corporation without the prior written approval of the government.5 On October 12, 2000, respondent DKS International Inc. (DKS) applied for the sublease of a 9,500-square meter portion of the aforesaid property with petitioner. In a letter6 dated February 1, 2001, petitioner informed Mr. Andres S. Dy (Dy) of DKS that petitioners Executive Committee had already approved the amendments on the terms and conditions of the sublease. In another letter7 dated March 5, 2001, petitioner advised Dy that it was ready to

as Civil Case No. 174024 which was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 27.13 While said case was pending, the DENR came up with a Final Endorsement14 signed by Sec. Alvarez on November 29, 2002, informing petitioners president, Lorenzo V. Tan, of the DENRs approval of petitioners request for renewal of the lease contract. In said endorsement, the DENR endorsed three sub-lessees excluding DKS. Finding in favor of petitioner, the MeTC rendered its Decision15 dated August 20, 2003 in this wise: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants DKS International, Inc., Michael Dy and all persons claiming rights and interest under them: 1. To vacate the property covering 9,500 square meters located at Numancia Street, Binondo, Manila, specifically designated as Lot No. 1, Block 1862 of the Manila Cadastre No. 13 and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff PNB; 2. To pay plaintiff PNB reasonable compensation in the amount of P200,000.00 per month starting October 2002, until completely vacated and fully surrendered; 3. To pay attorneys fees fixed in the reasonable amount of P10,000.00; and, 4. To pay the costs of the suit. SO ORDERED.16 Upon motion17 of petitioner, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution18 dated October 3, 2003 which, however, was not implemented because of the timely appeal of respondents to the RTC. On March 10, 2004, the RTC-Manila, Branch 40 rendered its Decision19 affirming the Decision of the MeTC and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution with break open order, viz: WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated August 20, 2003, is AFFIRMED. Let the writ of execution be issued without prejudice to an appeal that may be taken by defendants-appellants. Likewise, let a break open order be issued authorizing this Courts Sheriff to break open the gate or any other facility for the ingress

[to] and/or egress [from] of the subject premises and to employ all necessary means to carry out the writ of execution. The Branch Sheriff is authorized to secure the assistance and/or to deputize the Philippine National Police (PNP) in order to ensure effective enforcement of the Writ of Execution. SO ORDERED.20 Accordingly, a Writ of Execution with Break Open Order was issued on March 29, 2004.21 On March 30, 2004, respondents appealed to the CA by way of Petition for Review which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83129. Meanwhile, before the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order could be implemented, respondents filed before the RTC an Urgent Motion to Recall Writ and the Command to Sheriff With Comment22 alleging that during the previous hearings of the case, they have proven that petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages23 against the government, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0368-CFM and raffled to Branch 118 of RTC-Pasay City (Pasay case). Apparently, the Final Endorsement approving petitioners request for renewal of lease contract earlier issued by Sec. Alvarez was withdrawn by his successor, Sec. Elisea G. Gozun (Sec. Gozun), on grounds that same was contrary to law and public policy and that the issuance thereof was without factual and legal bases.24 In view of said withdrawal, a repossession and take-over team was created by virtue of LMB Special Order No. 2003-91.25 In a Memorandum dated May 27, 2003, Sec. Gozun directed the LMB to immediately repossess and take over the subject property upon the expiration of the lease on July 31, 2003 thus, prompting petitioner to file the Pasay case. Unfortunately for petitioner, its application for TRO was denied by said court.26 Respondents further alleged that when the RTC Pasays denial of the TRO was affirmed by the CA in its Decision27 dated October 30, 2003 in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78980, the government had taken over the premises by August 31, 2003. Thus, respondents manifested that they cannot anymore surrender possession of the premises to petitioner as they are no longer in possession thereof. The government, through the LMB, also filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene on the Incident Involving the Enforcement of the Writ of Execution and to Treat this Motion as The Intervention.28 It manifested therein that although it has nothing to do with the ejectment case, it vehemently objects to

the notice of the sheriff, particularly on the matter of surrendering possession of the premises to petitioner. It pointed out that since the government was already in possession of the premises following petitioners loss of any right of possession therein, it will be an abuse of discretion on the part of the court to order that the property be taken from the government and to have the same delivered to petitioner, under the guise of enforcing a writ of execution in the ejectment case. LMB likewise sought permission to intervene in the incident involving the enforcement of the writ. To these two motions, petitioner filed an Opposition with Manifestation29 asserting that the two motions are both pro forma, patently unmeritorious and serve no other purpose but to unduly delay the implementation of the Writ of Execution and therefore, should be denied. The RTC did not find merit in LMBs prayer to intervene in the issue of the implementation of the writ. In its Order30 dated July 14, 2004, it held that (1) the governments intervention will unduly delay the mandated immediate execution of the decision in the ejectment case to the prejudice of petitioner; (2) the governments rights may still be fully protected in a separate proceeding (particularly in the Pasay case); and, (3) the intervention preempts the decision in the Pasay case. The RTC also did not give credence to the claim of LMB that the government was already in possession of the property subject of the writ of execution saying that same was a mere general claim. Said court, thus, accordingly denied the two motions for lack of merit and again ordered the Branch Sheriff of the MeTC to immediately implement the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order it earlier issued. Upon motion for reconsideration of the government however, the RTC recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order. It considered the Sheriffs Partial Return dated May 5, 2004 signed by the Deputy Sheriff of MeTC-Manila, Br. 27, which reads: This is to certify that on May 5, 2004 at around 10:50 in the morning, after the lapse of (the) five (5)-day period given by the undersigned to the Defendants to voluntarily vacate the place which they failed to do so, the undersigned, together with the representative of the Philippine National Bank, assisted by police officers, went back [to] the premises in question at Numancia St., Binondo, Manila to implement the Writ of Execution with a Break Open Order issued by Hon. Placido C. Marquez. Thereat, Mr. Matusalem Ruperto, Commander of Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective Services informed us that DKS has already turned over the premises to Land Management Bureau. Mr. Matusalem Ruperto further informed the undersigned that Judge Marquez issued an order [preventing us] from implementing the Writ. Our attention was

caught by the phrase posted in the premises that the same is government property. And upon further inquiry, said property is already guarded by Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective Services.31 Thus, the RTC issued the Order dated July 29, 2004,32 the pertinent portions of which read: Considering that Land Management Bureau is now in physical possession of the subject property and not defendants-appellants DKS International Inc. and Michael Dy, it would be a blunt error for this Court to order the transfer of the physical possession of the government which is admittedly the owner of the subject property to plaintiff-appellee Philippine National Bank. The [W]rit of [E]xecution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order] dated March 29, 2001 issued by this Court can no longer be implemented and the same must be recalled. The Sheriff is ordered to desist from implementing the same. This renders movant Republics reply (to plaintiff-appellees opposition with manifestation dated April 30, 2004) dated June 1, 2004, with attached verification and certificate against forum shopping, with prayer that LMBS urgent motion for leave to intervene etc., dated April 28, 2004 and related pleadings moot and academic. On the question of damages or monetary judgment referred to in the Writ of Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated March 29, 2004, plaintiffappellee and defendants-appellants, thru counsel, agreed that same should be left [for resolution to] the Honorable Court of Appeals which has taken jurisdiction over the same. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Writ of Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated March 29, 2004, is recalled and the Deputy Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Br. 27, is directed to desist from implementing the same. The question of damages or monetary judgment earlier referred to in this Order is left for resolution by the Honorable Court of Appeals. Consistent with this Order, movant Republics reply (to plaintiffappellees opposition with manifestation dated April 30, 2004) dated June 1, 2004, and related pleadings, are now moot and academic. SO ORDERED. Expectedly, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration33 of said Order but said motion was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2004.34 Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 88098 imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or

in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in recalling the writ of execution with break open order. In the meantime, the CA rendered its Decision35 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83129 on June 28, 2005 denying the petition and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC in the forcible entry case. In said Decision, the CA declared that the issue of the expiration of the lease and the take over of the property by the government will not prevent the execution of the decision pending appeal, it being a basic rule that decisions against the defendants in ejectment cases are immediately executory.36 Respondents appeal37 from said Decision was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated December 12, 2005 and same has attained finality on March 23, 2006.38 On March 16, 2007, the CA promulgated its Decision39 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88098 denying the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order. It held that the expiration of the lease contract between petitioner and the government and the latters take-over and/or repossession of the premises from respondents were supervening events. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied through a Resolution dated August 6, 2007. Hence, this petition. Issues In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues: THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED ITS ASSAILED DECISION DATED MARCH 16, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 6, 2007 NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, MORE SPECIFICALLY: (i) In passing upon an issue not submitted to it for resolution; (ii) In declaring that petitioner PNB has no right of possession over the subject property; (iii) In disregarding the uncontroverted findings of facts and the unassailed Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 174024-CV, which was later affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 03-108416; and (iv) In allowing the stay of the execution and recall of the break open order even in the absence of the required supersedeas bond.40 Petitioners Arguments In its assailed Decision, the CA made the following pronouncement: It is undisputed that the property in dispute is owned by the Republic of the Philippines and that PNBs lease having expired on 31 July 2003, there being no renewal of the lease, the latter has no right of possession over the subject property. As such, the right of possession of the subject property belongs to the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the DENR and the LMB.41 By the above-quoted portion of the CA Decision, petitioner claims that said court sweepingly ruled on the issue of ownership and on the basis thereof granted possession of the disputed property to the government. Petitioner contends that as the petition is an offshoot of a forcible entry case, the CA should not have discussed the issue of ownership, because the only question that courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises. Petitioner further imputes error on the part of the CA when it passed upon the issue of the expiration of the lease contract, which petitioner claims to be irrelevant to this case and is already subject of a full-blown trial in RTC-Pasay. Respondents Arguments On the other hand, respondents posit that the CA must necessarily take notice of the facts that the government is the owner of the subject property, that it is now in possession of the same and that the lease contract between the government and the petitioner has already expired, since these same facts constitute the supervening events which rendered the writ of execution with break open moot and academic. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. It is well to remind petitioner that the sole issue raised before the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 88098, is whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.42 The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.43 Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.44 It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been gross misapprehension of facts.45 We find that the CA correctly took notice of the governments take-over and repossession of the subject property, as these are the very same facts which the RTC considered to be the reasons why the writ of execution with break open order it earlier issued cannot anymore be implemented. Without discussing these issues, the CA would not be able to make a determination whether the recall of the writ of execution was proper under the circumstances. Such an assessment is imperative because the resolution of the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on it. However, we deem it proper to pronounce to be without binding effect the pronouncement of the CA that there was no renewal of the lease contract between the government and petitioner. The authority of the CA was confined only to ruling upon the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order recalling the writ of execution. The determination of whether there was a renewal or non-renewal of the contract of lease between petitioner and the government is beyond the competence of the CA to pass upon, since it is already the subject of litigation in the Pasay case. In fact, petitioner, in its Reply,46 alleges that a Decision has already been rendered in the Pasay case on August 29, 2008 wherein it was held that the Contract of Lease between petitioner and the government has been validly and effectively renewed on July 31, 2003 for another period of 25 years. Thus, to avoid any confusion on the matter, we should defer to the decision of the RTC in the Pasay case with respect to the issue of the renewal of the contract of lease between the government and herein petitioner, without prejudice to the outcome of any appeal in relation to said case. This, notwithstanding a review of the record, nevertheless shows that the CA was correct in holding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the order which recalled the writ of execution with break open order.

By virtue of the Decisions of the MeTC and the RTC which both ruled in favor of petitioner in the subject forcible entry case, petitioner was indeed, as a matter of right, entitled to a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.47 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution with break open in the dispositive portion of its March 10, 2004 Decision. But before said writ could be implemented, inescapable material facts and circumstances were brought to the attention of the RTC. The respondents had already surrendered possession of the subject premises to the government. Clearly, the portion of the Decision ordering respondents to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender possession thereof to petitioner has become impossible to implement. For how can respondents surrender possession of the premises when they were no longer in possession? And, as correctly observed by the RTC, it would be a misstep if the government which is admittedly the owner of the subject property and which was not a party to the ejectment case, would be ordered to vacate the same in order that possession thereof may be delivered to petitioner. We thus hold that under these circumstances, the recall of the writ of execution with break open order was warranted. It is well to emphasize for purposes of clarity, however, that the portion of the Decision that has become impossible to implement is only that portion respecting the order to vacate and surrender possession of the property. Conversely, the portions which provide for the payment of reasonable compensation and attorneys fees in favor of petitioner remain enforceable. We note that this was perceived by the parties themselves but they nevertheless agreed that the issue on the monetary award be left to the discretion of the CA as shown by the following portions of the RTCs July 29, 2004 Order: On the question of damages or monetary judgment referred to in the Writ of Execution with break open, dated March 29, 2004, plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants, thru counsel, agreed that same should be left [for resolution to] the Honorable Court of Appeals which has taken jurisdiction over the same. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Writ of Execution with [B]reak [O]pen [Order], dated March 29, 2004, is recalled and the Deputy Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Br. 27, is directed to desist from implementing the same. The question of damages or monetary judgment earlier referred to in this Order is left for resolution [to] the Honorable Court of Appeals. Consistent with this Order, movant Republics reply (to plaintiffappellees opposition with manifestation dated April 30, 2004) dated June 1, 2004, and related pleadings, are now moot and academic. And, in view of the finality of the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.

83129 which as earlier stated, affirmed the Decision of the RTC, it is now up to petitioner to seek the execution of the portion of the Decision respecting the monetary awards in the main case, if same has not yet been enforced. Petitioner next contends that the writ of execution with break open order was abruptly recalled without respondents complying with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner stresses that in order to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case while an appeal is pending, the defendant must perfect his appeal, file a supersedeas bond and periodically deposit the rentals which became due during the pendency of the appeal. But despite the failure of respondents to post the required supersedeas bond, the CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance of the writ of execution with break open order. Petitioners contention fails to persuade us. Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in this case. In Uy v. Santiago,48 we held that it is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the requisites provided in Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This can be deduced from the wordings of the subject provision, to wit: Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.- If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during

the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits. After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the Court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. This is not the situation here. Respondents are not staying the execution of the judgment of the MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court, in fact, had already rendered its judgment on the appeal. Clearly, the above-quoted provision does not find any application in the present petition. Petitioner likewise faults the CA in giving full credence to the Sheriffs Partial Return dated May 5, 2004 stating that respondent DKS had already turned over possession of subject premises to the government. Suffice it to state, though, that this matter is factual in nature and is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition.49 This is especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case. Lastly, petitioner prays in the alternative that respondents be ordered to pay the monetary award as contained in the RTC decision. We cannot, however, grant such relief as again, this is beyond our competence in this petition. To reiterate, we are only confined here to reviewing errors of law allegedly committed by the CA in its assailed Decision. Such relief should have been sought in the appeal from the main case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.