SOCIAL LEGISLATION

G.R. No. 165482 July 23, 2008 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and APOLONIO LAMBOSO, Petitioners, Vs. FAR S. ALBA, Respondent. FACTS: Sometime in 1991, petitioner Apolonio Lamboso (Lamboso) filed a claim for retirement benefit before the Social Security System (SSS). However, his claim was denied on the ground that he could not qualify for monthly pension under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11615 (the Social Security Act of 1954) as he then had only thirty-nine (39) paid contributions. On 11 December 1996, Lamboso appealed the denial of his claim by filing a petition before the Commission wherein he alleged that he should be entitled to monthly retirement pension. He prayed for the adjustment of the date of his Social Security (SS) coverage and for the remittance of his delinquent monthly contributions.6 Petitioner (Apolonio Lamboso) herein alleged that he worked in Hda. La Roca (owned by Far Alba) from 1960 to 1973 as cabo, in Hda. Alibasao from 1973 to 1979 as overseer and in Hda. Kamandag from 1979 to 1984; that the latter two (2) haciendas are both owned by Ramon S. Benedicto; and that when he filed a claim for retirement pension benefit with the SSS, however, the same was denied on the ground that he had 39 monthly contributions to his credit. Private respondent Ramon S. Benedicto alleged that he was only a lessee of Hdas. Albasao and Kamandag; that when he took over as lessee thereof, there was no available records to support the petitioners claim of employment; and that he, therefore, prays that the petition be dismissed for lack of cause of action. Respondent Far Alba (Hda. La Roca) was motu propio declared in default on November 14, 1997 for failure to file his answer. The petitioner reiterated the averments in his pleading in the Position Paper which he filed on November 20, 1998. He further averred that he received from Far Alba a monthly salary of P45.00 from 1960 to 1965 and P180.00 from 1965 to 1973 and from employer Ramon S. Benedicto, a monthly salary of P500.00 from 1973 to 1984; and that he was reported to the SSS for coverage in 1973 and only a total of 39 monthly contributions were remitted in his name. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside both the resolution and the order of the Commission. It held that Far Alba cannot be considered as an employer of Lamboso prior to 1970 because as administrator of the family-owned hacienda, he is not an employer under Section 8(c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 who carries on a "trade or business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment,"12 unlike under Article 212(e) of the Labor Code which

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrator could be considered an employer within the scope of the Social Security Act of 1954. DECISION: We answer in the affirmative. First, the Court observes that Far Alba was no ordinary administrator. He was no less than the son of the haciendas owner and as such he was an owner-in-waiting prior to his fathers death. He was a member of the owners family assigned to actively manage the operations of the hacienda. As he stood to benefit from the haciendas successful operation, he ineluctably took his job and his fathers wishes to heart. As emphasized by the Commission his and the owners interests in the business were plainly and inextricably linked by filial bond. He more than just acted in the interests of his father as employer, and could himself pass off as the employer, the one carrying on the undertaking. Second, nomenclature aside, Far Alba was not merely an administrator of the hacienda. Applying the control test which is used to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship for purposes of compulsory coverage under the SSS law, Far Alba is technically Lambosos employer. 26 Third, not to be forgotten is the definition of an employer under Article 167(f) of the Labor Code which deals with employees compensation and state insurance fund. The said provision of the law defines an employer as "any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee." It also defines a person as "any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal representative thereof." Plainly, Far Alba, as the hacienda administrator, acts as the legal representative of the employer and is thus an employer within the meaning of the law liable to pay the SS contributions. Finally, the Court believes that Section 8(c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 is broad enough to include those persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72607 and its Resolution dated 30 September 2004 insofar as they absolved respondent Far Alba from liability to remit to the Social Security System petitioner Apolonio Lambosos monthly contributions prior to January 1970, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated 28 November 2001 of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. 12-14618-96 is REINSTATED. SO ORDEREd. GR No. 162837 July 28, 2008 Rodrin v GSIS Facts: On October 23, 2000, petitioner Marlene L. Rodrin filed a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended, relative to the death of her husband SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin before the GSIS. Marlene and her daughter Jhoanne Rodrin submitted their Sinumpaang Salaysay Rodrin, which stated that the deceased informed them that he was going to Bian to arrest a certain wanted person. Another document that was submitted was the Investigation Report containing the incident wherein the deceased and his companions were stopped at the gate of Las Villas de Manila by the security guards of said subdivision whose shotguns were pointed at them, and that in the course of the altercation the deceased was shot by one of the guards. In a letter dated December 20, 2000, the Government Service Insurance System denied petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended, on the ground that the death of SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin did not arise out nor was it in the course of his employment. Upon appeal to the ECC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Petitioner's basic contention is that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) erred in denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of her husband, considering that she was able to submit various documents evidencing that SPO1 Rodrin died in the line of duty or that his death arose from or happened during the course of his employment. Petitioner avers that this Court has ruled that P.D. No. 626 should be liberally interpreted in favor of the employee because it is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in society. GSIS, on the other hand, argues that the issue raised by petitioner entails a factual determination of the circumstances surrounding the death of SPO1 Rodrin. It contends that there is a unanimous finding on the part of GSIS, ECC and the CA that SPO1 Rodrin was not in the performance of his official duty when he got killed. The OSG also questions the veracity of the mission order dated July 10, 2000 issued by the Chief of Police of Silang, Cavite which supposedly required SPO1 Rodrin to go to Carmona, Cavite and Bian, Laguna to conduct surveillance and monitoring activities and, if possible, arrest the persons named in said order. The OSG claims that there was no evidence to show that the Chief of Police of Silang notified or coordinated with the highest PNP or military commander in the area where the mission was to be accomplished in accordance with the policy of the PNP as contained in Circular No. 2000-016 dated December 11, 2000. The OSG concludes that the mission order was issued as an afterthought simply to support petitioner's claim for her husband's death. The OSG further contends that the failure of the Bian Police to state in their Report dated July 17, 2001 that SPO1 Rodrin was on official mission when he was killed puts in serious doubt petitioner's claim that her husband was killed in the line of duty. Moreover, the OSG avers that there is also nothing in the statements of the brothers-in-law of SPO1 Rodrin, who were his companions at the time that he was gunned down, that he was then on official mission. In fact, the said brothers-in-law simply asserted that they were going to Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna. HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious. For the compensability of an injury to an employee which results in his disability or death, Section 1(a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation imposes the following conditions: 1. 2. 3. The employee must have been injured at the place where his work required him to be; The employee must have been performing his official functions; and If the injury was sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order of the employer.

Respondents cite Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, in arguing that SPO1 Rodrin's death is not compensable. However, the factual circumstances of the said case are not the same as the present one before the Court. In GSIS, the police officer was shot to death while he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers for a fee. The Court, in denying the grant of death compensation benefits to the widow of the slain policeman, ruled that the latter did not meet the requirements set forth in the ECC guidelines, as it was obvious that the matter he was attending to when he was killed, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature. In other words, in said case, evidence clearly shows that at the time of his death the police officer was performing acts which could not in any way be considered as police service in character. The same may not be said in the present case. There is no evidence to prove the claims of respondents that the matter SPO1 Rodrin was attending to when he was shot to death was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature. The fact remains that he died at a place and within the time specified in his Letter-Orders. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, PO1 Rodrin is presumed to be in the performance of his official duties at the time of his death.

Finally it is well to echo the Court's ruling in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that: x x x in case of doubt, the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. For this reason, this Court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and orphans of police officers. If we must demand - as we ought to strict accountability from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night, we must also to the same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left without any means of supporting themselves. GR No. 173430 July 28, 2008 GSIS v. Casco Facts: Felomino Casco, petitioner herein, was employed as a teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). He joined the government service on August 14, 1978 on a provisional status and was assigned at the Quezon City Division. On July 1, 1989, he was promoted to Teacher I. On January 1, 1994, he was assigned at DECS-Mandaluyong. In 1998- up to 1999, he was assigned at the Mandaluyong East High School wherein he taught Filipino. Sometime in 1994, Casco was diagnosed to be hypertensive. On December 7, 1995, he was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital where he was diagnosed of CVA, Right Middle Cerebral Artery, Thrombotic. On October 14, 1999, he suffered another attack and was confined at the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. This forced him to retire from the government service at an early age. Casco then applied for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On October 14, 1999, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) granted him thirty-eight (38) months of permanent partial disability (PPDI). On December 10, 2000 up to December 19, 2000, Casco was again confined at the Potenciano Hospital due to his ailments. His confinement within the specified period was likewise paid by the System. Cascos latest physical examination reveals that he still experiences chest pain, which is pricking, in character, limping accompanied by lapse of memory and vertigo. Thus, he requested the System to convert his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability (PTD) pursuant to P.D. 626, as amended, but the same was denied. Casco then appealed to ECC but was denied. Respondent appealed the ECC decision to the Court of Appeals, which resolved the case in his favor. In the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 9 August 2006, GSIS defends its position that respondent failed to adduce proof that his ailment is categorized as a PTD under the law or that it is attributable to his former occupation. According to GSIS, respondents physical condition at the time of his retirement was not of such nature as to satisfy the criteria for a PTD. Respondent, in his Comment dated 30 November 2006, insists that he is entitled to PTD benefits because his illness, which developed during his employment, persisted even after his retirement and rendered him incapable of continuing his employment. The only issue to be resolved is whether respondents claim for conversion of his PPD benefits to PTD benefits should be granted. HELD: The respondents claim should be granted. We shall preface our ruling by repeating the Courts pronouncement in Austria v. Court of Appeals that there is nothing in the law which prohibits the conversion of PPD benefit to PTD benefit if it is shown that the employees ailment qualifies as such. The grant of PTD benefit to an employee who was initially compensated for PPD but is found to be suffering from PTD would not be prejudicial to the government to give it reason to deny the claim. The Court has in fact allowed in the past the conversion of PPD benefit to PTD benefit. These rulings are consistent with the primary purpose of P.D. No. 626, that is, to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in loss of income, as well as the Constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that he cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. A persons disability might not emerge at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent, or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled by reason of the same cause. Thus, while respondent had been awarded 38 months of PPD benefits commensurate to his physical condition at the time of his

retirement, this does not preclude the conversion of the benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the fact that he later on became permanently and totally disabled. When an employee is constrained to retire at an early age due to his illness and the illness persists even after retirement, resulting in his continued unemployment, as in this case, such a condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits allowed by law. Indeed, denying respondent, who had rendered more than 21 years of service but was forced to retire due to his ailment, the PTD benefits to which he is indisputably entitled would be contrary to the spirit of P.D. No. 626 and the social justice principle enshrined in our Constitution. SSS v. de los Santos GR No. 164790 August 29, 2008 Facts: AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to be his beneficiary. Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children. In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8, 1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was granted on November 5, 1986. On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US. On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS). He changed his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos. Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began receiving monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999. On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonios death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1, 2000 stated that they received documents showing that Gloria have remarried in the United States to one Larry T. Constant, and that she was also the one who filed for petition for dissolution of your marriage with the deceased member, which was in fact granted by the Superior Court of California, County of Orange. The SSS believed that these circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law specifically defines beneficiaries as the dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who shall be the primary beneficiary. x x x On appeal to the Social Security Commission, the latter deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce against him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her personal profit. Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as the legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary to Antonios death benefits. The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and Antonio subsisted until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified Gloria to be a dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in the US, or Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS. HELD: The reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be the time of his death. There is no need to look into the time of his retirement, as was the course followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent. As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a

Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio. However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio. Social Security System v. Aguas is instructive in determining the extent of the required dependency under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period. Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen. In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.

G.R. Nos. 182978-79

April 7, 2009

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon Services, Inc.), Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. Nos. 184298-99 April 7, 2009

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners, vs. WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Respondents. Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. 2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that, Jasmin was found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of poison. 3 Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning. Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.7 Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement. The Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death.8 The Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having occurred at the employers premises;9 that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled to "iqama insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages. The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious circumstances, they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has been committed against them and their daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to "iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" not insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmins case. While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed. ISSUE: Whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin. HELD: The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. The agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages. However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make Jasmins employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered into. Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and thus compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory room. We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. While the "employers premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses,20 we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employers premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions, 21 but they do not appear to apply here. But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so. The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason. The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence. On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal injuries. The NBI toxicology report came up negative on the presence of poison. All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.

Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly responsible therefor. We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body yet they have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide, without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in the business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped. Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of conveniently avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life. Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmins case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date, no follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmins death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to restore honor to her name. Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins remains were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make personal representations with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany Jasmins body home. Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs; and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression. Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmins death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her death. Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.23 The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmins case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature. We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to actively pursue a just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in accordance with Section 2327 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmins case on their own. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.

 more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals, recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed OFWs abroad? Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.36 Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.37 If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.38 White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in Becmens freedom or release from liability. Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid.40 Wherefore, Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts: 1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages; 2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages; 3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and, 4) Costs of suit. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. SALVADOR A. DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 185035

July 15, 2009

FACTS: De Castro rendered service in the Philippine Air Force from 1974 until his retirement on 2006. On 2004, De Castro was hospitalized due to chest pains. His full diagnosis consisted of hypertensive cardiovascular disease, dilated atrium, eccentric left ventricular hypertrophy and left ventricular dysfunction, and old anterior wall myocardial infarction. He also had significant simple vessel coronary artery disease (CAD). In 2005, De Castro was again hospitalized and was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary artery disease and Hypertensive cardiovascular disease.

De Castro retired from the service in 2006 with a "Certificate of Disability Discharge." On this basis, he filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits with the GSIS. However, the GSIS denied De Castros claim based on the finding that De Castro's illnesses were non-occupational.

GSIS posits that it is incumbent on De Castro to prove that there was an unusual and extraordinary strain in his work when his chest pain developed, or that there was causal connection between his working condition and heart ailments. The GSIS then submits that De Castro failed to discharge the burden of presenting evidence that his heart ailments were caused by his work.

De Castro posits that substantial evidence exists to prove that his ailments were caused by his employment with the PAF. He reiterates that the duties he performed at the PAF as non-commissioned officer-in-charge for operational security, Asst. First Sergeant, and ultimately, as First Sergeant, contributed to the progress of his ailments and, eventually, led to his separation from the service.

HELD: We consider it significant that De Castro entered military service as a fit and healthy new soldier. We note, too, De Castros service record and the medals, awards, and commendations he earned, all attesting to 32 years of very active and productive service in the military. Thus, the CAD and the hypertension came while he was engaged in these endeavors. To say that his ailments are conclusively non-work related because he smoked and drank, is to close our eyes to the rigors of military service and to the demands of De Castros specific positions in the military service, and to single out factors that would deny the respondents claim. This is far from the balancing that the GSIS invokes between sympathy for the workingman and the equally vital interest of denying underserving claims. Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding De Castros case, we are convinced that his long years of military service, with its attendant stresses and pressures, contributed in no small measure to the ailments that led to his disability retirement. We, therefore, agree that De Castro's "illness was contracted during and by reason of his employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial."

What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt on the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in favor of labor.

Accordingly, we hold that De Castro's ailments CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease are workconnected under the circumstances of the present case and are, therefore, compensable. GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. and IMC SHIPPING CO., PTE. LTD. vs. LEONILA SURIGAO for Herself and In Behalf of Her Minor Children, Namely KAYE ANGELI and MIRIAM, Both Surnamed SURIGAO

G.R. No. 183646

September 18, 2009

FACTS: Leonila Surigaos husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation, for and in behalf of IMC Shipping Co. Pte., Ltd. (Singapore) for a period of ten (10) months. In his pre-employment medical examination, he was found fit for sea duty. Barely four months after he

commenced his work aboard MV Selendang Nilam, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend to Salvador due to complaints of extensive neuro dermatitis, neck region viral, aetiology, urticaria, maculo popular, rash extending to the face, chest and abdomen. After examination, Salvador was advised to take a blood test. His condition having worsened, he was confined at a hospital. Not long thereafter, the Ship Master decided to sign him off from the vessel for treatment in the hospital and for repatriation upon certification of the doctor that he was fit to travel.

Prior to his repatriation, though, Salvador was found dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room. The Post-Mortem Certificate stated that the cause of death of Salvador was asphyxia due to hanging.

As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the petitioners.

HELD: The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove that the seafarers death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In sum, respondents entitlement to any death benefits depends on whether the evidence of the petitioners suffices to prove that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.

We find the circumstances as constituting substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that Salvadors death was attributable to himself.

Indeed, we are not unaware of our ruling in Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. v. Cuaresma, where we held that Jasmin Cuaresma, also an overseas Filipino worker, did not commit suicide; that Filipinos are resilient people, willing to take on sacrifices for the good of their family; and that we do not easily succumb to hardships and difficulties. Nevertheless, the circumstances prevailing in said case are totally different from this case. In Becmen, the postmortem examination and the police report did not state with specificity that poisoning or suicide was the cause of Jasmins death. In fact, both reports mentioned that the cause of death of Jasmin was still under investigation. In contrast, the postmortem examination and the police report in this case, categorically mentioned that Salvador died of asphyxia due to hanging. It was also shown that no other individual could have caused the death of Salvador because the bathroom door was locked or bolted from the inside and could not be opened from outside.

In Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that the death of a seaman even during the term of employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and the seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

It is true that the beneficent provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are liberally construed in favor of Filipino seafarers and their dependents. We commiserate with respondents for the unfortunate fate that befell their loved one; however, we find that the factual circumstances in this case do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by them as beneficiaries of Salvador.