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ISBN 0-321 - 43603-2

ATI:~NAL I T P: , ITI .__.. ._

Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues
EIGHTH EDITION

ROBERT ]. ART
Brandeis University

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

ala

PEARSON

Longman
:\ew York San Fr.mcisco Boston London Toronto )-dne~ Tok:o Singapore ~ladrid ~ l cxi"'O Cttv ~I much Paris Cape T0\\11 Hong Kong ~l ontreal ,

BRIEF CONTENTS
Editor-in-Chief: Eric St:mo Senior ~larkt>ting ~lanagC'r: Elizabeth Fog~ Production ~lanager: Denise Phillip Pro_iect Coordination. Tt>.\1 Design. and Electronic Paue ~lakcup: tratford Publishing
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Detailed Contents Preface PART 1

VII

Con'r 1mages: Left image rottrtesy of Planet Art. Right image courtesy of PhotoDi c Senior Manufacturing Bu~-er: Dennis J. Para Printer and Binder: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Cover Printer: Phoenix Color Graphics

XIII

...

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Power and Principle in Statecraft The Consequences of Anarchy The Mitigation of Anarchy

1
7

For pemliSl ion to use cop~Tighted material. grateful acknowledgment is made to the cop~Tight holders on the first page of each selection. which are be re b~ made part of this cop}Tight page.

29

69
137
I4I

ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Intemational politics: enduring concepts and conte mpor.uy i ues I [edited bv] , Robert J. :\ rt, Robert Jenis. -8tb ed. p. cm. locludes bibliographical references.
I SB~ 0-321~2 , alk. paper

PART2

THE USES OF FORCE

The Political Uses of Force The Political Utility of Force Today The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

205

239

l. International relations. 2. World politics-1989- 3. Globalization. I. Art, Robert J.

PART3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOMY

Perspectives on Political Economy The Meaning of Globalization

261
267
309 347

11. Jenis, Robert. 1940JZ1242.15i4 200i 327.1-<k:22 20060 1543-S

The Pros and Cons of Globalization

PART4

~'Tight C 200"i ~- Pearson Education. Jnc.

So All rights reserved. part 0 f this publi may be reproduced. stored in a retrieval anon _ . . system . ar- banstuitted. m anv form or b-. anv _means, e1 ec.tromc, mechanical. photocop~mg. _. . recocd; 1 ~orotber.vise ithout the pnor written permission of the publisher. Printed in ~ the United Sbtes.

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

Conflict, War, and Terrorism The Uses of, and Reactions to, American Power Failed States, CiviJ Wars, and Nation-Building The Environment and Climate Change New Actors and New Forces

369
375 417 451 495 517

ISBH0-3!t~2

345178SHG--Doc-.oe 08

07

"

DETAILED CONTENTS

PREFACE
PART

XIII

Anarchy and Its Consequences

1
7

POWER AND PRINCIPLE IN STATECRAFT

HANS ). MORGENTHAU

Six Principles ofPolitical Realism

]. ANN TICKNER

A Critique ofMorgenthau's Principles ofPolitical Realism

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANARCHY
KENNE.TH N. WALTZ

I5

29

The Anarchic Structure of World Politics 29

JOHN). MEARSHEIMER

Anarchy and the Strugglefor Power 50

ALEXANDER WENDT

Anarchy Is What States Make ofIt 61

THE MITIGATION OF ANARCHY
KENNETH A. OYE

69

The Conditionsfor Cooperation in World Politics 69

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

Kant Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 83

STEPHEN M. WALT

Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning 96

HANS ]. MORGENTHAU

The Future ofDiplomacy

104

vu

, iii

DETAILED CONTENTS

STt\ LEY HOFFMANN

The uses and Umits ojlntemational Law

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

114
PART 3

DETAILED CONTENTS

llll

The International Political Economy

ROBERT GJLPIN

tnten?ational Institutions: can Interdependence Work?

ADAM ROBERTS

261
267

119

PERSPECTNES ON POUTlCAL ECONOMY

The United Nations and International Security 12?

PART 2

The Nature ofPolitical Economv 267 -'

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

The Uses of Force

Hegemony in lhe World Political Economy 283

137
141
141 149

BRUCE R. SCOTT

THE POLITICAL USES OF FORCE

ROBERT ). ART

The Great Divide in the Global Village 296

THE MEANING OF GLOBALIZATION
JEFFREY FRANKEL

309

The Four Functions ofForce

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

Globalization ofthe Economy 309

MARTIN WOLF

The Diplomacy ofViolence

ROBERT ). ART

Will Globalization Swvive? 325

Coercive Diplomacy
ROBERT jERVIS

163 177

KENNETH N. WALTZ

Globalization and Governance 335

THE PROS AND CONS OF GLOBAUZATION
DANI RODRIK

O.ffense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma

BRUCE HOFFMAN

347

What Is Terrorism?

198
205

Tradjng in Illusions 34 7
GEOFFREY GARRETI

THE POUTICAL UTIUTY OF FORCE TODAY

ROBERT). ART

Globalization's Missing Middle 355

JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE

The FUngibility ofForce 205

ROBERT A. PAPE

Why the GlobaJjzation Backlash is Stupid 361

The Strategic Logic ofSuicide TeJTorism

11iE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SCOTI D. SAGAN

221 239

PART 4

Contemporary World Politics

ROBERT JERVIS

369
375

CONFUCT, WAR, AND TERRORISM

Nuclear Instability in South Asia 239

KENNETH N. WALTZ

The Era ofLeading Power Peace 375

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Nuclear StabiliOJ in South Asia 250

The Clash ofCMlizations? 391

OETAu..ED CONTENTS

FAREED ZAKARIA

Why Do They Hate Us? 406

NEW ACTORS AND NEW FORCES

DETAILED CONTENTS

XI

517

THE USES OF, AND REACTIONS TO, AMERICAN POWER

ROBERT JERVIS

417

RICHARD K. BETTS AND THOMAS J. CHRJSTENSEN ANDREW MORAVCSJK

Explaining the Bush Doctnne 417

.
::>

The Rise ofChina: GetUng the Questions Right

517

F. GREGORY GAUSE Ill STEPHEN M. WALT

Europe Without llfusions 526 432

MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK

can Democracy Stop Teaonsm.

Transnalional Activist Networks

532

Taming American Power 44 I

FAILED STATES, CML WARS, AND NATION-BUILDING
ROBERT I. ROTBERG

SEBASTIAN MALLABY

NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor 539

451
RHODA E. HOWARD AND JACK DONNELLY

Human Rights in World Politics

MOISJ:S NAJM

546 558

Failed States, Collapsed States, weak States: Causes and Indicators

CHAIM KAUFMANN

451

The Five War.s ofGlobalization

DANIEL W. DREZ NER

Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil wars 459

JAMES OOBBINS

The Global Governance ofthe Internet: Bringing the State Back In 567
STEVEN R. RATNER

IntemaUonal Lallv: The Trials ofGlobal Norms

58 I

Nation -Building: UN Surpasses u.s. on Learning Curve 481

JAMES L. PAYNE

Deconstructing Nation Building 490

THE ENVIRONMENT AND CUMATE CHANGE
GARRETT HARDIN

495

The Iragedy ofthe Commons

THOMAS HOMER-DIXON

495

Environmental Changes as causes ofAcute Conflict 50 I

JOHN BROWNE

Beyond Kyoto 508

PREFACE

T he Hrst ctli tion of Jnten wtional Politics appeared in 1973. Since then. the field of international relations hac; expe rienc.:cd a dramatic.: enric hme nt in the subje ct:, st11 dicd and the qmJi ty of works pu blisiJ ed. Poli tical economy c.:ame into its own as an itnportant subfi eld in the l 970s. New and itnportant works in the fiekl of security studi es appeared . The li terature on cooperation among states Aourished in the early 1980s, and impo rtant studi es about the environment began to appear in the mid-l 980s. Feminist, post-modernist, and constructivist critiques of the mainstrea m made their appearanc.:e also. w ith the end of the Cold War, these new issues came to the fore: hum an rights, the tension between state sovereignty and the obligations of the international communi ty, the global environm ent, chil wars, failed states, and nation-buildin g. The growing dive rsity of the field has closely mirrored the actual developm ents in international relations. As for the previous editions, in fashi oning the eigh th, we have kept in mind both the new developm ents in world politics and the }jterature that has accompanied them. Central to this ec.lition, though, as for the othe r seve n, is our belie f that the realm of internatjo nal politics diffe rs fundame ntall y from that of dom estic politks. Therefore, we have continuec.l to put both the developm ents anc.l the literature in the context of the patterns that stiJJ remain valid for unde rstanding the differences between politics in an anarchjc environment and politics that takes place under a government. As in the previous seven, the theme for thjs edition continues to revolve around enduring concepts and contemp orary issues in world politics. The eighth edition retai ns the four major subdivisi.ons of the seventh edition. We have leA: Part One as it appears in the seve nth edition. Part Two retai ns the three subsections of the seventh editi on, but has a new selection by Bruce Hoffman on teiTorism. Part Thre e has two new selections on globalization -on e by Martin Wolf and another by GeofTrey Garrett. Most of the changes in the eigh th edition come in Part Fou r. We have retained the four subdivisions of the seve nth edition but have added eleven new selec tions: articles by Fare ed Zakaria, Gregory Cause.' Stephen Walt, James Dobbins, James Payne, Thomas Hom er-Dixon, John Browne, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen, Andrew Moravcsik, Sebastian Mallaby, and Daniel Drezner. The eighth edition of International Politics has fourt een new selections and is a little over 25 percen t new, but it continues to follow the four principles that have guided us thro ughout all previous editions: I . A selection of subjects that, while not exhaustively <.."'ve ring the field of intematiomJ politics, neverthe less encompasses most of the esse ntial topi<:s that we teach in our introductory courses.

:(1\'

pREfACE

. gs tlnt are mainh- anahtical in ton lt'nt tl nt hke 1 ssuc \' h '" 2 1ndh;dua1reldm the tudent to tht fun dame a1 'lt . d th;lt t11ereb, introduce nt . 1 6 Id u?r. one anot 1 ,tn . debates and point ohiew in t 1' Je . . . . troductions to each [)art that summan'le tlw <:vntral <.:once t P s the , . . 1tors Lll 3. E<I ., "'ter that oraamze the centr .u the me.!> ol t'<lC:h })ut , .. nd t1 0 1a1 < St stucIen t mu. lll ...., . . relate the readings to one another. _ :\reader that ran be used eithe~ a the core around" luc:~1 to dc.'sign an 4 . t od ,.t ... . course or as the }JI1111aJY supplemc' nl to ennch .tn as icrned text ~ m r lh. 0 : Finally. in putting togetl1er thi. and predous editiOJ.lS. \\'C n'cei\'ed exeellent achice frol1l the tollo,,inl1 colleagues. whom we would like to thank for the ti llle I . . Ge01:get o"-n. U n~,er ~: r 11not 1y McKeown ,md cart> they took: AneIrew Ben nett. Unh-ersity of ~orth Carolina at Chap~ I H ~: Roshn Suno\\'117., V n hersity or Tex~ at Arlington: Robert J. GJiffiths. Um,ersity of North Carolina at Greensbor . Linda s. Adam~. Baylor Unhersity: Timoth~ M. C~le. Unive rsity of i\ laine: Robe~ c. Gray, Fmnkun & \lar hail College: j<UJleS A. M1tc.: hell, California State University. t\ortluidge: ~l argaret E. Scranton. UniYersity of Arkansas at Little Rock ecker. Dartmouth College: James A. Caporaso, University of \Vashin ~ Da,;d G. B ton: Ken \ \'ise. Creighton {;nj,ersity: Sonia Gardenas. Trinity College: Philf p Schrodt. lJnhersity of Kansas: and Jane Cramer. Unher i~ of Oregon.

INTE ATIONAL POLITICS

ROBERT ). ART ROBERT JERVIS

Consequences

U nlike dom estic politics, international politics takes place in an aren a that has no central gove rning body. From this central fact Row impo rtant cons eque nces for the behavior of states. In Part One, we explo re three of them: the role that principle and morality can and shou ld play in state craft; the effects that anarchy has on how state s view and relate to one anot her; and the ways th at the harsh er edge s of anarchy can be mitigated, even if not wholly re moved.

POWER AND PRINCIPLE IN STATECRAFT

Citizens, students , and scholars ahke often take up the stud y of inter natio nal politics because they want their coun try to behave in as princ ipled a way as possible. But they soon discover that principle and powe r, morality and state craft do not easily mLx. \Vhy shou ld this be? Is it inevitable? Can and shouJd state s seek to do good in tl1e world? Will they e ndan ger them selves and ham 1 othe rs if tl1ey try? Thes e are timeless ques tions , having been asked by obse rvers of inte mati onal politics in nearly ever y previous era. They there fore mak e a good start ing poin t for thinking about the natu re of international politics and the choices states face in our era. Hans J. Mor gent hau, one of the leading prop onen ts of the appr oach know n as Real ism (also known as Powe r Politics), takes the classic Realist position: unhersal stand ards of morality cann ot be an invariable guid e to state craft because there is an 'ineluctable tension between the moral com man d and the requ irem ents of successful political actio n." Rath er than base state craft on morality, Mor gent hau argues that state acto rs must think and act in te m1s of powe r and must do what ever it takes to de fe nd the national inter ests of their state . J. Ann Tickne r, com men ting on the primacy of pow er in Morgent hau's writings. explains tl1at "vhat he cons ide rs to be a reali stic desc ripti on of inte rnational politics is only a pictu re of the past and there fore not a prediction abou t the futu re, and prop oses what she cons iders to be a fe minist alter native. A world in which state actor s think of pow er in te rms of collective e mpo werm ent, not in te rms of leverage over one anot her, coul d prod uoo more cooperatjve outc ome s and pose fewe r conflicts be tween the dicta tes of morality and the pow er of self-interest.

PART 1 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANARCHY

E,en those who argue that. 1:10r~ity sh~uJd play a. large role in statecraft a , edge that in ternational po!J hcs IS not like dom esttc politics. rn the latt, cknowl. ao~ernme nt: in the forme r, the re is none. As a <..:onsec1uenc;c no . er, there i.~ " 'th . ' agency e . abo"e the individual states "~ authonty ~n cl .PO'-'''er to make laws and settleXt~ts . dt~. [Jute . States can make comrmtments and tr eaties. but no sO\ereign po\ . . . s. T1 . compliance and pumshes deVIaoon 11s-t I1e a b sence of a supremever eusu res . . . . power--i wl1at is meant by tI1e anarc h1c env:u onmen t o f mte rnationaI politics A h ~ . . narc therefore said to constitute a state of wctr: \vhen all else lails, fo rce is the tl.)' ts ratio-th e final and legitimate arbiter of wsputes among states. l tuna The state of war does not mean that every nation is constantly at the bri k war or actuaUy at ,.var with otbe_r nations. Most countJies, though , do feel th~ea~: ened b~ some _stat~s at some .hme, and evet) ' state has exp e ri enced periotls of intense msecunty. 1\o two contiguo us states, moreove r, have had a history of dos friendly relations uninterru pted by severe te nsion if not outright war. Becausee~ nation cannot look to a supreme body to enforce laws, nor coun t on other nations for constant aid and support, it must rely on its own eff01t s, particularly for defense agail1St attack. Coexiste nce in an anarchic environm ent thus requires self-help. The psychological outlook that self-help breeds is best describe d by a sayi ng common among British statesme n since Palme rston: "Great Britain has no pe rm anent enemies or permane nt friends, she has only permane nt inte rests." Although states must provide the wherewi thal to achieve their own ends, they do not always reach their foreign policy goals. The goals may be grandiose; the means available , meage r. The goals may be attainable; the means selected, inappropriate . But even if the goals are realistic and the means both available and appropriate, a state can be frustrate d in pursuit of its e nds. The reason is simple but fundame ntal to an understanding of inte rnational politics: what one state does will ine..,itably impinge on some othe r states-o n some be neficially, but on others adve rsely. What one state desires, anothe r may covet. What one thinks its just due, anotl1e r may find threate ning. Steps that a state takes to achieve its goals may be rende red useless by the countersteps others take. No state, there fore, can afford to disregard the effects its actions will have on other nations' behavior. In this sense state behavior is continge nt: what one state does is dep ende nt in part upon what othe rs do. Mutual depende nce means that each must take the othe rs into account. Mutual depende nce affects nothing more powerfully than it does securitythe meast_res states take to protect their ter ritory. Like othe r foreign-policy goal_, I s ~e secunty of one state is contingent upon the behavior of other states. HereiJ) lies the se:unty dilemTYUJ to which eac:h state is subject: in its e fforts to preserve or enhance Its own security, one state can take measure s that decrease the secwity of other states and cause them to take counterm easures that ne utralize the actions of the first sta~ and that ~ay even menace it. The first state may feel impeJled to take ~rth~r actions, provoking additional counte nneasures . . . and so fortl1 . The secunty dilemma means that an action-reaction spiral can occur between two states or among several of the m ~ h orcmg eac to spend ever larger sums on arms to be no more secure than befo All will c re. run 1aster me rely to stay where they are.
r\l the hf:'<~rt of the

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

security dilem ma are these two constraints: the inherent dil fit ultv in dtstingub hing betwe<:n offensive and defe:nsi,e postures. and the 111 abil:t: >f one .;t<ltC: to believe or trust that another state's present pacific intentiom ..;;11 remaiu so . The capability to defend eau also provide the capability to attack In addiug to its arms. state A may know that its aim is defensi\'e . that its intf'ntions are pcac:c:J'ul. and therefore that it has no aggressive designs on state B. 1n a world whe re states must Jc,ok to themselves for protection , however, B will e:-xamine A's a<:tions c:arehdly ami snspi<:iously. B may th ink that A will attack him when 1\s arms beeorne powerful enough and that Ns protestations of friendship are designed to lull him into lowering his guard. But even if B believes A's actions are not directed against him, B cannot assume that Ns intentions \\ill remain peacefuL Anan;hy makes it ilnpossibl e for A to bind itself to eontinuing to respect B's interests in the F uture. B must allow for the possibility that what A can do to hi m, A sometime might do. The need to assess capabilities along with intentions , or, the equivalent, to allow for a change in intentions, makes state actors profoundly conservative. They prefer to err on the side of safety. to have too much rather than too Httle. Because security is the basis of existence and the prerequisite for the achievement of all oth~r goals, state actors must be acutely sensitive to the security adions of others. The security dilem ma th us means that state actors cannot risk not reacting to the security actions of other states, but that in so reacting they can produce circumstances that leave them worse off than before. The anarchic environment of international politics, then, allows every state to be the fi nal judge of its 0\\111 interests, but requires that each provide the means to attain them. Because the absence of a central authority permits wars to occur. secu rity considerations become paramount. Because of the effects of the secwity dilemma, efforts of state leaders to protect their peoples can lead to severe tension and war even when all parties sincerely desire peace. Two states. or two groups of states, each satisfied with the status quo and seeking only security, may not be able to achieve it. Conflicts and wars \vith no economic or ideological basis can occur. The outbreak of war, therefore, does not necessarily mean that some or all states seek expansion , or that humans have an innate drive for power. That states go to war when none of them wants to, however. does not imply that they never seek war. The security dile mma may explain some wars; it does not explain aU wars. States often do e>.perience conB of interest over trade, real estate. ideology, and preskts tige. For example. when someone asked Francis I what differences led to his constant wars \vitl1 Charles V, he replied: '' None whatever. We agree pe rfectly. We both wan t control ofltaly!'' (Cited in Frederick L. Schuman,l nternational Politics. 7th ed. , New York, 1953, p. 283. ) If states cannot obtain what they w;mt by blackmail, bribery, or threats, they may resort to war. Wars can occur when no one wcmts them; wars usually do occur when someone wants them. Reallits argue tl1at even under propitious circumstances, international cooperation is difficult to achieve because in anarchy, states are often more concerned \\ith relative advantages than with absolute gains. That is, because international politics is a self-help system in which each state must be prepared to rely on its own resources and strength to furth er its interests, national leaders often seek to become more powerful than their potential adversari es. Cooperation is then made difficult not only by

1"1\K I 1

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11J

~VI'<Jl ~UL I'I\..C::>

tht lc.\tr th.tt l>llwr:> " ill dt(': tl ~111d luil to liw np lc1 tll<'ir a~e, nwnts . . . . rrl . . . 1 t also I llt l'~~-''''-'h {'d tll't'd to ~tin a sup eno r J~<>stllon . w rv;L, on 1" not that state Ut:tor . 1y th~: l't't1 h'<i \\it h tatu:-. hut that Lite~ kar tktt amm gcments whi th bcn dit ll s lre<:o11, ,idt ~~atl'r hcmfits to othe rs than to thcttl. will n nder their <:oun tr,, vll' btll pr 0 ' nnd coerdon in I r 11 ncr1bl e lo pn'. ~un. t w utttr<. . . 1\ennt'th ~ \\'al tz d<'H 'IO{)S the ubo\'t' pollltS Ill ore full) bv ' ll ll],r . . . . . . ' < ';:t. . le rt>twc between hicrarcl uc (dotnC' ttc:) and <tnarcht.c (tnternational) ptngth c dtf. .. 01 ~ I I. )UtJo t '.", 111 IJ e shows " 'In tl C cJstn1 n o rc::tpa b'l't 'tc>s ( tIlf' n.. Ialive [)Owct ttt<:al sYs. 11 . post :~'tates ) in anarc:hi<: systems is so itnpott<H and lays o ut tlw wa 'S in whic:h. ti of .tl <~~~~ bchado r difle rs in hi<nm:hi<: and anarc:luc s~st<ms. P lhcaJ Thtre is broad agre eme nt at nong Realists on the ~onsequcnc:es of anar<:h t tatt's behc:wior, but not tota l agre ement. On<.> bran t_ of H '<Uists , who are callccLr l "ofl(msive Rt~<ilists ... argu<.' I hat t~te con seque~1ces o~ anarch~ go rar beyo nd protlu1 ~ ing securi~ ilile mm as and m~ ng c:oopt rabo n h<trd to com e by _They asstt't th~t anarchr forces states. and esiJec:tallv the grea t po" ers. to bec ome 'power tn,. . . . . ..,,Jil\tzers" because the only w~y t~ assu re. the sta~e_s sccut~ty ts to he: tl:_e most powerful state in the syst em. Ofle nsJVe reah sm env1s1ons a dog -eat-dog world of internationa l politics in whi ch power and rear uo minate great powe r interactions and in which war, or the threat or war, amo ng the grea t pow ers or amo ng thei r proxies is a constant feat ure of inte mational rela tion s. Joh n J. Mea rs heirner lays out the tenets of tl1js brand or Realism . In an anarchic conditio n, howe,er. the que stio n to a k may not be, ''\Vhy does war occu r?'' but rather ''\Vhy uoes war not occu r mor e rreq ucn tly than it does?'' Instead of asking "\Vh y do state s not coo pera te more to ach ieve common interests? we should ask ''Given ana rchy and the secm i ty dile m ma, how is it that states are able to cooperate at aJJ?'' Ana rchy and tl1e security cWe mma do not produce thei r effects automatically, and it is not selr evid ent that stat es are power maxirnizers. Thus Alexande r \Ven dt argues that \Valtz and oth er Rea lists have missed the exte nt to which the unpleas ant patterns they describe are "soc ially w nstructed''i.e., stem from the actors' beliefs, pe rceptions, and inte rpre tations of others beba,ior. If national lead ers believe that ana rch~ requ ires an asse1tive stance that endangers others. conflict will be gen erated. But if they thin k they have more freedom of action and do not take the hostility of othe rs for gran ted, they may hr able to crea te more peaceful relationships. In this view, stru cture (ana rchy) does not dete rmi ne state actio n; agency (hum an decision ) doe s.

M.:A RCH \ t'.\JD ITS CONSEQUE CES

THE MITIGATION OF ANARCHY

Even Realists note that conflict and warfare is not a constan t cha racteristic of ~temational politics. Most states remain at pea ce with most othe rs most of ~~e ~e . State actors have developed a num ber of ways of cop ing witl1 ana rchy, of g.un mg more than a mcxlicum of security, of regulating thei r com petition with other states, and of developing patt erns that contain , but do not elim inat e, the dangers of

aggression.

~roup th,lll to~t'llt<'r, thcrc:h~ reproducing ~omc of the advantages of ~mall 1111111 hers. The conditions acto rs l'ac:e also in(hwnc:e their fates. The ban iers of anarchy are 111 orc likel v to be O\'Ncomc when actors have long time horizons, when even succcssrt~llv ~xploiti 11g othc rs produces an outcome that is onJy < little better than t mutmJ ' cooperation. wlwn being ex-ploited by others is only slightly worse than mutmtl noncoope ration. nnd vvhe n mutual cooperation is much better than unre stric:ted competition. Und er such circum tances. states are particularly Ukely to unde 1take wntingcnt strategies such a<; tit-for-tat. That is. they will cooperate with others if othe rs do li kewise and refuse to cooperate if' others have refused to cooperate witl1 them. Mos t strikingly. it appears that democracies may never have gone to war agai nst each othe r. This is not to say, as Wood row Wilson did, that democracies are inhe rently peace ful. They seem to fight as many wars as do dict atorships. But. as Michael \11/. Doyle shows, they do not fight ea<.:h othe r. If this is corr ect- and . of course. both d1e evidence and the reasons are ope n to dispute it implies that anarchy and th.e seculity dile mm a do not prevent peaceful and even harmonio us relati.o ns amo ng states that share certain common values and beli efs. Democracies are relatively recent developments . For a longer peri od of time . two specific dev ices -inte rnational law < dipl omacy- have proven useful in lml resolving conflicts among states. Although not enfo rced by a world gove rn ment. international law can provide norms for behavio r and mechanisms for settling disputes. The effective ness of inte rnational law deri ves from the willingness of state s to observe it. Its power exte nds no furth er than the disposition of states 'to agre e to agree."' Whe re less than vital inte rests are at stake, state actors may accept settleme nts that are not entirely satisfactory because the~ think the precede nts or principles jus ti~~ the compromises made. Much of inte rnational law reflects a consensus amo ng states on what is of equal benefit to aU. as, for example. the rules regulating inte mational t'Ommunications. Oiplomac), too, can faciHtate cooperation and resolve disputes . If diplomacy is skillful, and the legitimate inte rests of the parties in disp ute are take n into acco unt, understandings can ofte n be reached on issues that mig ht othe rwise lead to war. These points and othe rs are explored more fully by Stanley I Ioffm ann < H<ms J. Morgenthau . Uld National leaders use these two traditional tools within a balance-of-powe r syste m. Much muligned l~y Presiden t Wilson < his followers and misunde rstood br many md othe rs. balanc:e ol power refers to the way in which stability is achieved through the conflicting efl01ts of .individual states, \vhether or not anv or all of them deliberatelv ' I pursue that goal . Just as Adam Smith argued that if every indhidual pursued his or her
tlwl

tb \ ( ''' .,J,ow' l k .lt, w11 il anardt) .111d tlw ~<.!tnrily dile mm a inhi~)il lOOP r,1t 1011 ltt, t 1 no' pn v 1rl 11 lllllf llll'r of <:ondit.io \ ns an<~ na~ional ~lral~W~!> can m.1kc> it 1 ,1:>it1 Jo1 t.il ..., 11, a< h w-. c com m on tnt k Coo pera tton .'s usual!) easH :r il' tiH'n ,m a :; 111 111lutunhcr of actor~. i\ol onlyc:an (acl1 tnore card sLily ubsen:e th~. otlu r' hut. 111 t< tol' kno '' that tlwir irnpa t:l on tlw s~ste tn is great enough so that t1 tltt') fail to coopcralt with otlwrs. jom l cn tc:rp rir;cs arc likely .to fail. Fu.rth~ml~>rC .. wltt' ll tlw numl>tr or a<:tor!. is IHr~e. there may be mechamsm!. ClOd ltiSh tutto ns
K"t
111

(i

PARi I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

sl'l f:.intt.-rel'\l, the interaction of i ndiviclual C:'gois m~ would t'nhar t<.:c n . \\t'l~lh, S() illtC?nleltiOilal reJatl011S theOriSts have <ll'~(~ lhUl l'V(-'11 if <.: Vel)' Stat;lhOI)aj }X)wer at the expense of the others, no one stat~ '"rdl. lt k?l~ ~~minate. ln hotJ1 C:eck~ sa ueneral good can be tl1e unintendeJ product of selfl"h llldtVtd ual a<:tions M . I Or(!OV(! . tJ \ . t} t h. I. . k - I . . ~ (;'e,en if mo t states desm" otuy to ~ep Wtlat le) ;we...1< 11 own llttc rcsts dictate tl r, the, b~:md togetJ1er in order to resist any state or coaution of states that thre t )at a ens to . dominate them. The balance-of-power system is likely to prevent any one state's a<..:qnitin h mom. It will not, however, benefit all states equally nor maintain the peace~ egc. I Wa 1 nently. Rewards will be unequaI because of mequal'ti es tn power an cl c~:pe ttise.erma. "'rill occur because they are one of ilie means by whkh states can presetve what th rs have or acquire what they covet. ~mall states m.ay even be eliminated by their rno~~ powerfUJ neighbors. The intemational syst~m "'ilJ be ~nstable, however, only if states hat ock A to what they tl1ink is the strongest s1de. \i\T IS called handwagoning or th domino theory argues tl1at the international syste1~ is precarious because successfu~ aggression will attract many followers, either out of fear or out of a desire to share the spoils of victory. Stephen M. Wait disagrees, dra,ving on b<~lance-of-power theory and histOJical evidence to argue that, ratl1er tl1an bandwagonmg, under most conditions states balance against emerging threats. They do not throw in th eir lot "'~th the stronger side. Instead they join witl1 otl1ers to prevent any state from becorniJ)g 50 strong that it could dominate the system. Power balancing is a strategy followed by individual states acting on their own. Oilier ways of coping \vith anarchy, which may supplement or exist alongside this impulse, are more explicitly collective. Regimes and institutions can help overcome anarchy and facilitate cooperation. When states agree on the plinciples, ruJes, and norms that should govern behavior, iliey can often ameliorate the security dilemma and increase the scope for cooperation. Institutions may not only embody common understandings but, as Robert 0 . Keohane argues, they can also help states work toward mutually desired outcomes by providing a framework for long-run agreements, making it easier for each state to see whether oiliers are living up to their promises, and increasing the costs the state will pay if it cheats. . In the .sec~ri~ area, the United Nations has the potential to be an especially t~portant.lOsti~~on. Adam Roberts assesses the United Nations' role in coping with confltct wttlun states through the mechanism of peacekeeping missjons. He finds that the demand for such missions since the end of the Cold War has expanded dramatically, but notes the formidable obstacles that must be overcome if ~e UN is to fulfil! the hopes that so many state leaders and citizens have for it in this area.
O\\ll

t'OWER AND PRINCIPLE

IN STATECRAFT

Six Principles ofPolitical Realism

HANS). MORGENTHAU

1. Politic:al realism believes that politics, like society in general , is governed hy

objective laws that have their roots in human nature. [n order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politic , must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects. however imperfectly and onc-sidedly, these objective laws. 1t believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason. and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and in formed by prejudice and wishful thinking. Hu man nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classic:al philosophies of China, [ndja, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. I Ience, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fat:t that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory. has never been heard of before tends to <:reate a presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed huudreds or even thousands of years ago-as was tJ1e theory of ilie balanc:e of power--does not create a presumption Ulat it must be outmoded and obsolete .... For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving U1em meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained

fro111 .PoliliCII Among Nations, 5th edition hy llans

l9i2 bv Alfred A. Knopf, .a division of Randc,m llou!.e, Inc. Reprinted by pennission of Alfred A. Knopf. a di\ision of Hundom Hou~c. Inc. Portions of the text and some footnotes have been omitted.

J. Morgeuthau. Copyright C

t>ART 1 ANA RC

HY AND ITS CUN:":It.\,lUt:l'l\...t:..:>

MOHGENTHAU 1 .>IX PRJNCIPLCS OF POUTICAL REAUSM

of the politic<tl ads JWrfont <d and of Ll tt' ~< >resPe b! rl IlJ'()tl\! 1 tltc. find oul what ~l. l<sm< 11 hav . a c . t Thus we can tmh t < e U<.:tu ll 1 e ,le !\. . I . . , ''s o1 t tc t'Otl~t qm ne< . I (I eseeable consequences of l lC't r acts '' <' can su rn1 . ~ a y llie what Jom'. and rmm ( le or . . . . . ob~.-cth cs mi"ht ha"e been. . . . t> f the facts is not enough. To gJVc ' neanmg to the fac:t . I thetr. ~ . . ) et e,amul.lhOll o 1 . I rea1. '"''tI1 a kind of na. ra,v th Jc . we must approach po JtJca . . ratJonal . (:f. . . I nrttcrial of foregn po ' ) t . ggests to us the poss1b e meamngs o oretgn poli<:y. 1 . 1 n Ol1er Hl outiJJle a map t 1 su 1 must meet a c . . 10 elves in the position of a state man " cl ' <;rtam . word we put ours . an W<' ask ourselv"s what r pro bJem of .oreJgn policv under certain Circumstance st alten'ltti'ves are from which a statesman may chome who mu 111 eet . . t he rationa1 ' this roblem under these circumstances (presurn~g alv.~ays tl~al he acts in a . p . . . ratJona1 man ner), a11d which of these rational altemahvcs this p<HtJC:u lar statesrnan s acting under these circumstances. is Hkely t~ choose. It 1 the test m~ of this ration~ hypothesis against the. actual [~cts and .U:er consequences that gvcs theoretical . . meaning to the facts of international poh~~s. 2. The main signpost that helps pohtical reaiJsrn. to find ls way through the landscape of intemational politics .is the concept of mte~est cle An ed in terms of power. This concept provides the lmk between reason tJ)'ll~~ to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets pol1tcs as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domesti<.:, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and non political facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systentati c order to the political sphere. We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman-past, present, or future-has taken or will take on the political scene. \Ve look over his shoulder when he writes his ruspatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in te rms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we under stand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself. Tile conc~pt of inter~st defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, mfu~es rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus mak~s the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it fro~des fo.r rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in roreign policy which makes A mencan, Bntis h or Russian fo re ign p olic); appear as . ' an mtelligible rati a} on c:ontinuum, by and large consistent within itself regardless ' cr f the diuerent ti ' ~ o mo ves, prererences, and intellectual and moral qualities of sue . . . . f. cessiVe statesmen A reali t th 0 mtemational politics then will guard agrunst s eory 1 r::..Iac. tw0 I ' ' . es: popu ar cu 1 the eoncem WJ'th motives and the concem with . tdeolo~c:a referen('eS. P li To search for the clue to 1 . or~ gn ~ cy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and d eceptive. It 15 futile because motives are the most illusive of
._. t':~.:untll<h t < 111
J "

.tnd oh"..: I''. ';!f .Jike. Do we real.!~ lo10\\ \\hat our own 111 oti\c~ aH '!Am ' i,at do Wl' kno" oftl lf"' ruoti\es of others~ \<:t t'H'n il ',\1' }J,,rj ,,< ccs" to tlw real moti' es of state~ men, that kno" lcch;e "vcJilld IH'lp us little in understauding fo reigrl policies, and migh t ~veil lead us astra).

p~vrhdu r ,,] ] ,11 rL urtl'cl

intc rt'~tc; 'nd
('I

:t'

L 1 Jc~- ar~. frequc:rttl; he~ond re<.:o~nition, h~ tlw

(I

on' <!

oi<.:ICJl

It is

tnw that the kuflwl<dge of' the statesman's mothes may g1ve us one <~rnong man\' clu(S as trJ what tlw direction of his fo reign policy might be. It cannot (Q''c us, how~vcr. the one cl11c hy which to predict ltis foreign policies. History show no t:::xacl and necessary condation he::tween the quality of motives and the quality of . . foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political tenns. We cannot <:onclude from th e good intentions of a statesman that h1s forc1gn policies will be eith er morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say 11othing about th e probability of their success. If we want t~ know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not h1s motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to impro,e the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither ex-pected nor desired? ... A realist the01y of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporruy conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular et support for them. Y they will distinguish with Lincoln between their "official duty," which is to think and act in tem1s of the national interest, and their "personal .vish," which is to see their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place. It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which Hesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair thE' rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abs.tract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy whtch presents the rational essence to be found in experience. \\ithout the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience .... The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational ived from it is like the difference between a photog~aph and a painted theOJy. de1 po~ratt. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye: the pamted portrait does not show everything that Catl be seen by the naked eye, but jt

10

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Poltttca reaJJsm . . . ement . a1 realitv is replete w1th contingenctcs and svstemic irrati It know. t1 polittc tat , I. . . onali. . d . ts to tJle hpical inAuences they exert upon ore1gn pohc:v. Y it sh et bes an pom , ' ares . a1 sOCJ tl1e00. tlte need for the sake o f.tl1eoretica1unc.1 J a] erstanding' to s ress t ,nth . . . . . . al emen ts of political realih; for 1t 1s t 1 1ese rat1onaJ elements that makt tJte mbon e1 . . . lli bJ f'o. tlleon Political realism presents the theorettcal constru t reallh mte gt e 1 ' . . . c: of : r cy a rationaJ ,oretgn poJ 1 . which exnenence can. ne' er completelv achte,e. r . . . . polic)' to b A t tJ1e sa me time political realism constders a rahonal foretgn k r li . . . e r . poJ1 , , for onl) a rational roreign po c~r mtrumtZes ris s and m.,,. c\'' good wretgn . . aJ . ...lQ. mizes benefits and, hence, compltes both wtth tl1~ mor precept of prudence and tJ political requ irement of success. Political realism wc.mts the photographk pie~~ of the political world to resemble as much ~ pos_sible its pa~nted po1tJait. Aware of tJ1e inevitable gap between good-that IS, rahonaJ-fore1 policy and gn foreign policy as it actually is, political re~sm mai~tains not only that th~ory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality. _but also that foregn policy ought to be rational in 'iew of its O\Vll moral and practical purposes. Hence. it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot li,e up to it. That ~~m_ent misun~er~tands th~ i~tention of tllis book, which is to present not an indiscnmmate descnption of polit1cal realitv, but a rational theot:' of international politics. Far from being invalidated by the f~ct tllat, for instance. a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes tllat reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and e,aluated as an approximation to an ideal S)-stem of balance of power. 3. Realism assumes that its key c-oncept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept "'ith a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thu<:ydides statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in tile nineteenth century by Lord Salisbuxy's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of an clashing interests." It was erected into a general principle of government by George \IVashington:
A small knowledge of human nature will convinc-e us. that, ,vitJl far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less.

. . . Ie:.tSt ~eek to sho" one thing th.tt the nakt d eve cannot see: the ho" . or at ~ d 1 ortra)e . IHunan tsst>nce of t le person p < a1 L tl . . . . . 1 . 1 COtltains not onJv a theoretic r>ut. so a not mative cl

.10rtGf:NTH.:.t- I SX PRJNQP'._ES OF POUflCAL REAUSM

I1

Jt \\a'i

ho d n d t nb.r14~d upou in our century by Ma.x \\'e ber'

0 b!iC rvatJon:

Intt.r< t' ,lf ri:ll .twl ideal no~ ic!eas rlominate direct!} the acbonc; of r:'e>~- Yd ~-tehrt: c t . "imJ't s of th~ ''odd' c.:rcat(-d by t I1e:.e 1deas have very IJ fteT 1 served as .S\\1tces .: mini~e th~:- trach on ,,}, 1(:1, th< dyn:uni~m of inte rests kept action:. m0'-1ng.

Y the kind of interest determining political action in a particular _period.of ct historv depends upon lhc political and cultural context ~'~thi~ whi~h fore~gn pol~c~ is for~ulated. The goals that 1night be pursued by nations m thtlr fore_gn polic! can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or tmght poSSIbly pursue. . t . d ilie The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its conten an manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and mai~tains the control of man o~~r end, from phystcal an - hus j)Ower covers all social relationships whiCh serve that d nlc . T I th violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one min contro s ana er. Power covers the domination of man by man, boili when it is disciplined b~ moral ends and controlle<..l by constitutional safeguards, as in vVestern democrac1es, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its , 0 .. 11 strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement. Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance. is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations. What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While tJ1e realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product ofhistory, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states 'vill be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporan world. .. The realist parts company 'vith other schools of thought before the all-important question of how tile contemporary world is to be transformed. The realist is persuaded tllat this transformation can be achieved only through the \\-'Orkmanlike manipulation of tile perennial forces tllat have shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an abstrnct ideal that refuses to take those L into account. aws

under its ioHuence. ~otives of public "i.rtue may for a time, or in particular instances. actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested: but they are not of ~h-es sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and ~gatiOns of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of~ ~ of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaun agamst the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the e>:perience ~f ~age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the c.'Onsti tution .of man, before we can make it othernise. ~o institution, not built on the pre sumptiVe truth ofthese maxims can succeed. I

PART I -L

J\NARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

MORGENTHAU I SIX PRINCIPLES OF POIJTlCAL REAUSM

l\llitical rC'alis 111 is :.~ware of thC:' moral sigllificattC<-' of political acn 11 is . '\ I.so ' ,~\r. of the ineluctable . tension . between . the moraJ. eo m111 1nc1 an<.) lth . . . t ,1 t e ,..., 111 nts of succcs ful pohtical action. And rt 1s umVJ lhng to aloss . over e, b I I rt'qur.. l ohlitl'r.ttl' 1hat tension and thus to obfuscate ot 1 t _1~ moral and the polHic:al is~d h' making it appear as though the stark facts of pohhc_s we re morally more satisr Y ir~e than the~ actually are, and the moral law less_ex~chng than it actually is. lh>;ilism maintains that universal moral pnncrples can not be applied to t actions of states in their abst~act universal fon~ulation , but that th~y must be~~ tered through the concrete crrcumstances of tim ~ <ll~cl place. The rndividuai ma . say for himself: .. Fiat justitia, ~ereat mundu~s (Let J~Stlcc ~c done, even if the Worl~ perish):' but the state has no n~ht to say~~ m the _name of l_hose \vho are in its care. Both individual and state must JUdg~ p~l~hcal achon by um~'e rsal moral principles, such as that ofliberty. Yet while the mdtVJdual has a moral nght to sacJilke himself in de fen se of such a moral principle, the state has no righ t to let its moral tlisappro. bati.on of the infringemen t of libe1ty get in the way of successful political action itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no poLtical morality without prudence; that is, without conside ration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then , considers prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative poutical actions-to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said:

)' a1 t T -~ purltuing tlw1r r~'>lKdJH' loc)'K tt allllntmnr,, <Jur 0\ ' 11 iu<:ludcu, as po ttJc <'J I .JL . . 11 fth"Jn \ne\ "'<' ' . l''' . )e . Jt<Jcsts rl fwcu in ltrrns of powcr. \v< are a 1 1 t o do JUStrce to a11 o t ~ c <>lhl'r 11 . \ Vc arc a ) c <J JU ...... then 1 a1 '< trc I . t I . ale able to do Jll'-tic:c l o all of them Jn a c ll' sense. cl ~d them in t 11s as 11on . ._.. .I h ther nations. whilt: pronation s as \\( ' .Jlld~t' our own anu. a\1ng Jl' ~e r t t reflect urstring polidc:" that respect tlJe mterests of o (;lp"l>lc ofJ> m o ' , tecting and promoting those of our own. ~1od eratlon po licv cannot at <>

I do the very best I know how, the vel)' best r can. and I mean to keep doing so until the

end. If the end brings me out alJ right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference. 5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe tlteir own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes o f the universe. To know that nations are subje(..'t to the moral Law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one ,vilJs oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is ~orally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblica] prophets have warned rulers and ruJed. That ~uation is al~ poli~cally pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in J~em~nt w~ch, m the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and CJvi.hzations-m the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself. On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we

cl thcr schools or thought t . I a]' the moderation of 11JOraJ judgment. I sm an o c. TJ1c cliffcrcnce then b~twccn po Jtica re 1 .. } J sm may la\'C ' ' \ I. s re-1 and it is J>rofo11 nd. Il owever much the theory o f poUtica re. 1 t I i1.l , 1 I been mi understood and misinterpreted, there rs no grunsaymg ts drstrnc:t1ve m ~ olitic:al . . . lectual and moral attitude to matters politic~. . P. I ntellectu ally the IJolitical realist mamtmns the autonom} of tl 1e h k . ' 1St . 1 e as the ec:onom ist, the lawyer, the mora1 mrun t am tl1errs. He t . rn s m :~r~~ ~f interest ueflned as power, as the econom~t th~nks i~ terms of rn~~rest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conform ity of ac:tion Wlth legal ru_les. t~~ . , t of the conformity of action with moral principles. Th e econom1st as s. f ':>" Tl " lawver moraus , le . . "How does this policv affect the wealth of society, or a segment o rt. . aw. L1e . k . "Is this poUcy in/ accord with the ru les o f 1 ?" Tt mora}j s t asks "Is tins po 1 ~~ ~~ accord with. moral principles?" And the political real ist ac;ks: "How does th1s p;'licy affect the power of the nation?" (Or of the federal government. of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.) The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevanee of stan~ards of thought other than political ones. As political realist. he cannot _but subordinat~ these other standards to those of politics. And he parts company wrth other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the . . . .. poiltical sphere. . . . This realist defense of the autonomy of the poilocal sphere against rts subven.1on by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and im~rtan~ tc; gned 1 of these other modes of thought. It rath.e r implies that each should be ass1 proper sphere and function. Political realism is based_ upon a,p!,w~~tie conc~p-~on of human nature. Real man is a composite of "econom1c man, political man, moral man," "religious man," etc. A man who was nothing but "political man would ~ a beast, for he wouJd be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothrng but 'moral man" would be a fool, for be wouJd be completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but "religious man" wouJd be a saint, for he would be completely lacking in worldly desires. Recognjzing that these different facets of hwnan nature exist, politi~al ~ealis.m also recognizes that in order to understand one of them one has to deal w1th 1t on 1ts own tenns. That is to say, ifl want to understand ''reilgious man,.. I must for the time being abstract from the other aspects of human nature and deal with its religious aspect as if it were the only one. Furthermore, I must apply to the religious sphere the standards of thought appropriate to it, always remaining aware of the existcnt-e of other standards and their actual influence upon the religious qualities of man. What is true of this facet of human nature is true of all the others. ~o modem economist, for instance, would conceive of his science and its relations to other scienet'S of man in any other way. It is exactly through such a process of emancipation from

P ttics is indtt-d the pwvose of poltttcal re<ilism. It i in the nature of things that a theory of politics which is b~s d e upo _ J . . . principles will not meet \VJth unamn~ous ~pprova1-nor does, for that matt n such . forei!lll )olic,. For theory and poUcy ahke run counter to two trend . er, such s Jn our 1. t1: o 1 ,1 cui. ture "'hich are not able to reconcile Jemse ves to the assumptions and results rational. obJective t I1eoJ)' of' politics. 0 ne o f t11ese tren cls disparages the of.a ower in societv on grounds that stem from tl1e experience and phjJos0 . 1 role of P P1Yof the "' nineteenth century; we shall address ourselves to this tendenc)' later . In alist theory and practice of politic .greater detail The other trend, opposed to the re from the vety relationship that exists, and must exist, between the humas, st~ms and the political sphere .. .' . The hum an mind in its day-by-day operations :~~~d bear to look the tmth of politics strrugbt in the face. It must disguise di ot ' stort h belittle, and embelhsh the truth-t .e more so, the more th e individual is acti 1 involved in the processes of politics, and particularly in those of in ternational tics. For only by deceiving himself about the nature of politics and the role he ~~ on the political scene is man able to live contentecUy as a poutical animal with \u~~ self and his fellow men. . T~us it is in~vitable ~1at a theory ~hie~ tries .to ~nd_erstand international politics as It actually IS and as It ought to be m v1ew of Its mtnnsic nature, rather than as ke people would U to see it, must overcome a psychological resistance that most otl1er branches of learning need not face.
j

)prOj)J'J.at . t ..J. rll" of thoucrht. and tlw development of one a1 tl tl't ~ ,111{1. 1 e to its . ' ~ tl ,.,,., . tiJtl ec.:ono 1111 cs has de' eloped as an autonomous theo1) ' of t]1e e .sub1 "'\;' m:t ltt't. m To contribute to a s1milcu develop men t in the (!eld o (' cononr1<:. , .. .L . oJ . n . . .. .tct '',1"-. ol'm .
l

A Criuque ofMorgenthau's

Prjnciples of Political Realism

). ANN TICKNER

/t is 11ol in (l.ivinglife hut ilt risking life that man i.s raised above the animal: tltat is why s11periority lws been accorded in humanity not to t/,e sex that brings fort/, b111 to tltat which kills.
SIMO;\E. DE. BEAUVO IR1

veJ

NOTES
l. The Writings ofGeorge Washington, edited by John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1931-44), Vol. X, p. 363. 2. Marianne Weber, Max Weber (Tuebingen: J.C. B. Mohr, 1926), pp. 347-8. See also Max . s Weber, Gesammelte Auf t:itze zur Religionssociology (Tuebingen: J C. B. Mohr, 1920),

p. 252.

International politics Le; a man's world, a world of power and conflict in wltich warfare is a plivileged adivity. Traditionally, diplomacy, military service and the science of international politics have been largely male domains. In tl1e past women have rarely been included in the ranks of professional diplomats or the military; of the relatively few women who specialize in the academic discipline of international relations, few are security specialists. \Vomen political scientists who do study international relations tend to focus on areas such as international political economy. North-South relations and matters of distributive justice. Today, in the United States. where women are entering the military and the foreign service in greater nu mbers than ever befo re, they are rarely to be found in positions of military leadership or at the top of tl1e foreign policy estabhshment.2 One notable exception, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was U.S. ambassador to t11e United Nations in the early 1980s, has described herself as "a mouse in a man's world" for il1 sp.ite of ~er au~horitative and fo rceful public style and strong conservative 'ere~ denttals, K1rkpatnck maintains that she failed to win the respect or attention of her male colleagues on matters of foreign policy.3 Kirkpatrick's story could serve to illustrate the discrimination that women often encounter \ovhen they rise to ltigh political office. However. the doubts as to wl_1ether a woman ':ould be strong enough to press the nuclear button (an issue ra1sed when a tearful Pahicia Schroeder was pictured sobbina on he r husband's shoulder as she bowed out of the 1988 U.S. presidential race)~suggest that iliere may be ~~~ even more fundamental barrier to womens entry into the highest ranks of the mrlitruy or of foreign policy making. Nuclear strategy, with its vocabularv of power, threat, force and deterrence, has a distinctly masculine ring;"' moreo~'er.
F~m J Ann Tid:ner, "A Critique of .\llorgenthau 's Principles of Political Realism" in Cende d 1 natw~wl Rrlativlls, eds. Hebecca Grant and Kathleen ~t'\vland. Published b} lndiana u . r ~ pnter-

nJVerstv Hetmnted b pcrn11sson o f Kat hi een Newland. Portions of the text and some rootn"'t ha ' Lress --Y 11 ve ~l v es omitted.

15

:\lt.'t\'\lf;Vic,tll~ jud~t>d to he lackiHg in qualit ies which the . ( '\{ 1k, lt IMs .tlso be tn suK_!!PSl<>d th at , alth ough 111 0r c w omen are en s~ tcrrn~ ,, ,rJd of public polic~ . the)' are more comfo1tabli.' dc uling with <.lor tc.rrng thl ! . ~u ch ;t..; :-tx.'htl "~ Ila rL' t I t ar e m t-:bl .1 1 . l<~ ore co ~npau e \\' ll l t 1e rr nurturing skill c i. nestr s. , ssuc5 l:u,:!t' nurnbl'r ol women m th e ra nk of the pe ace m o, e m en t sugges ts that Y the et . n. not uninterestf>d in i sues of w ar an d pe ace, al though th e ir freq uent ~?rnen frollliH\tiouul secUJit; po lic~ has often br an de d th em a. naive, uninform ed tssen t unpahiot ic. 0 r eve n In thi ch ap te r I propose to expl ore th e qu es tion of why in te rnat ional .. pe rce1ved as a m 1 an s worId an d w l1y women 1e mrun so , unc} re presen po1 s er ted . lhc higher eche lo ns of th e fo re ign policy es tablis hm en t, th e military and th e aca~n t~e d~cipline of inte rnational re lations. Sinc e I be ueYe th at th er e is something a~m 1c this field that re nd ers it partic ularly in hosp ita ble an d un at tr ac tive to wome:ut in tend to focus on th e natul'e of th e disc iplin e itsel f ra th er th an on possible stra~e ~ gies to remo,e barrie rs to women's ac cess to hi gh policy positions. As 1 have already suggested, th e issues th at are gi ven p1iorit;: in foreign policy are is ues wi th which men have had a special affinity. Mor eove r. if it is p1i marily men who are describi ng thes e issues and constructin g theori es to explain th e worki ngs of th e international system , might we not e>.'P ect to fin d a masculine pe rspective in the academ ic discipline also? If this w ere so th en it could be argued that the exclusio n of wom en has operated not only at the level of discrimination bu t al so through a pr ocess of self-se lection which begins w ith th e way in which \V C ar e taught abou t in te rn ational relations.
,,,HU<.'Il .n v

TICKNER I A C~lTIQU'"' 01- MORGEN THAU'S PRINCIPLE.S 01- PO Lr riC AL REALISM

17

aboul in teruational politics sinc:fc 19li4.'"'~ Y1 orgcnthau 's principles n po lt<.: reaI'JS .. n be su mmarized as follows: m <.:a .

. f SC'hohrs :-lJIUt pra<.\JtiOI\I.;r:> uf 1nttrrcalislll f:-otn "h id t se ,c ral gcnC'raLJ. On<, . tl 1 l 1St al e'> ha\t:ob~ellltu,un.!> I d \lthollah \l orgcnth au Iat Hm " m te Jf ll et na tional n~ 1c ~-> . l'f1 . . rourt and ambiguou!> U !>C:: o f IJ 't~ l'rcc1ut'lllk be.en t:riti.dz1c:.dhlor his lack of SCJ~n I <: ln~l . . . ,,h ic h the maJor . . .. Jangttc:tg<:, lh<:-'>(; SIX pnn<.:tp (;S et\ .C, Sl~l1l fiCc tlv Iramec t 1e '"a ) m I . the \\ 'es t ha \e th ou gh t il) intemational relations scholars_~nd lO ad . . pr tll on er s 111

or

In or de r to investigate this claim th at th e disciplin e of in te rn atio nal relations, as it has traditionally be en defined by re alism , is ba se d on a masculin e world vie w, I propose to examine the six ptin ciples of political realis m formul at ed by Hail S J. M orge nt hau in his cla'isic work Politics A mong Nations . l shall use so m e ideas fro m feminist theory to show that the way in which Morge nt ba u desc rib es and expla ins in te rn ational politics, an d th e prescriptio ns th at en sue are em bedded in a mascu lin e perspective. Th en I shall suggest so me ways in which fe minis t th eory migh t he lp us begin to conceptualize a world view from a feminine pe rspective and to formulate a fe minist episte mology of in te rnational re la tions. Drawin g on thes e observations I shall conclude with a refo rmulation of Mor gent ha u 's six principles. Male critics of contemporary realism ha ve al re ady raised m any of the same ques tio ns about realism that I shall address. However, in un de rtaking this exercise. I ho~ to make a link between a grow ing critical pe rspe ct ive on intemati?~al relations .th eor~ an ~ fem inist writers inte rested in global issues. Adding a femm!St ~rspective to Its discourse could also he lp to make th e fie ld of in te m ationaJ relations more ac-cessible to women scholars an d practitione rs.

er deveJop t rational theory that reHe<.:ls thes e obJective laws. l fi d . 2 TJ 1e mai~ signpost of poli tical reaHsm is the concept of interest c e nfe 1 ~ . term s of power which in fuses ration al orcl . to the subject matter o po I . ... tics, and thus makes th e theoretical u_ er m 1 ~s possl'blc nd~rstandmg of P? tti Political realism stresses the rational, obJe ctive and unemobon . 3 Real ism assumes that in terest de fi ne d as power an obJe cb ve categorv IS r .1 which is universally valid but not w1t1 a m th t fixed once an d 10-r eanmg a lS all. Power is the control of man over man .. . . 4. Politjcal realism is aware of th e moral . significance of political actlon. I_t IS al so awe:lre of the te nsion between th e m oral command and the re qwre ments of successful political ac tion. . 5. Political realism refuses to identify t) ratio~s f a partic:u lar al 1e more aspt o nation wi th th e moral laws that gove rn th e universe . It IS th e concep t of inte rest defined in te rms of power that saves us from moral excess an d political folly. .. . 6. T he poH tical realist maintains th e auto , nomy of the_roli.?cal ~~~.ere, h~ as ~s "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?' Political realis n~ LS base d on a plur ali stic conception of human nature. A man who was no_tht~g but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be co mpletely lacki~ ~ m moral restraints. But , in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavi our, "political man " must be abstra cted from othe r aspe cts of hu m an nature .6

. 1. Polilicc;, like society in general , ts gove 0 b b' f v Jaws that have their rl roots in !tun 1a11 natu re, which is unc ne _'f o Jtehc 'e~o re it is possible to 1angm~: _

HANS J. MORGENTHAU'S PRINCIPLES OF POUTICAL REAUSM: A MASCUliNE PERSPECTIVE?

= h o s e n to focus on Hans J. Morge nthau's six principles of politic al realisrn they re present one of the most importa nt st ate men ts of co ntemporaiY

I am not going to argue that Morge ntha u is incorrect. in his P?lt_Tayal ~f the inte mational system. I do be lieve, howev er, that it is a partial desc np tio n of m te rnati.onal politics because it is based on as sumptions about human nature_tl:at are pa1tial and that privilege masculinity. Firs t, it is necessary to de~e masc:ulim~.~tl fe mininity. Accordin g to almost all fe min ist theorists, masculiruty an d fenunuuty refe r to a set of sociall y constructed catego ries, which vary in time and place, rather than to biological de te rminants. In the V\T est. conceptual dichot omies such as obje ctivity vs. subjectivity, reason vs . emotion, mind vs. body. cu lture vs. na tu re. self vs . othe r or autonom y vs. relatedness, know ing vs . being and public vs. private have typically been used to describe mal e/fe male differences by feminists and nonfeminists alike. 7 In the Unite d States, psyc hological tests conduc te d across diffe rent socioeconomic grou ps confirm that indivi duals perceive these dich otomies as mas culin e and fe minine and also that the ch ar acte ris tics ass<xiated with masculi.nitv ar . e

lS

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENC':S

mon' luvhh ,~tlued l>' m en and women alikP ." ,. ., . . . . .. . It IS ilJipo rtant t<) st res~ 1 thttt th l'~"e eharnc te m tJc s are stereolyptcal; th e~ do no t nec:cssarily de . ' 10Wevet - Jt 1a ' 11 .tJ m en or women, w I10 can c~11t') c I ntcl ensl JC.:S an<. I rnod es of thouscnbc ind ' ht . 'Vid. "i th th e oppo ite sex. g US!!<x.:iat~;:d Gs.in~ a ,ocabu l<:lf) that contains many of th e w on]s as sociate d wi th ih as I h;n<. identified it, \1 orgenthau asserts th at it is possible to dev . . 1 rnast1Jiin. . . (and unemotional) tJ1eorv of mtem ahon a I po t1ti e cs bw;ecl on ohJect op a rarl()nal , . Jve 1 tl aw have th ei r roots i_n ~1u m~n nature. ~mce ~org enlhau '~rote th e first edi~~ 1at Politics Among .\ atums m 1948, thts search for an obJective science of ~n ()f national politics based on th e model of the natu ral sciences has been an im Inter. part of the realist and neorealist agenda. 1n he r feminist critique of th P~rtant sciences, Evelyn Fox Ke lle r points ou t th at most scienti fic c~mmu nitiec ;a~ral the "assumption that the universe they study is di re ctl y access ibl e rep s are resented bv concepts and sh ap ed not by Ianguage but only bv th e demands of' lo . e~pe rime nt .'.g The laws of nature, accord g1 ing to this view of science, are "becand th e re lativitv of language. " Like most femi nists " , Ke lle r re ie cts this view or (' _.YOnd J ,cJencc whic h, she asserts, imposes a coercive, hier arch ic al and conformist patte rn on _. entinc inqu iry. Fem ini sts in ge neral are sceptic al about th e possi bility of findi:cJ. unjversaJ and obje ctive foundation for know le dg e, which Morgenthau claimsgi: possible. Most share th e belie f that knowledg e is socially constructed: since it is language that transmits knowledge, the use of language an d its claim s to objectivity must continually be qu estioned. Keller argues that objectivity, as it is usually de fined in ou r culture, is associated with masculinity. S_he identifies it as "a ne twork of interactions between gende r development, a behe f system that eq ua te s ob je ctivity wi th masculinjty, and a set of cultural values th at simultaneously (and cojointly) elevates what is defined as scientific and what is defined as mascu lin e." 1 Ke ller links the separation of self from other, an important stage of masculine ge nder deve lopm en t, with th is notion of objectivity. Tran slate d into scie ntifi c in quiry this be co mes th e striving for the se~ ion of subject and objec-t, an impo cd: rtant goal of mode m science and one whic~. Ke lle: asserts, is based on th e ne ed for co nt rol; he nc e objectivity becomes associated With power and domin atio n. . The ne :d f~r control has been an importa nt motivating forc e for modem realIS~. To begm_has search for an objective, ra tional th eory of in ternational politics, which c::ould 1mpo~e ord~r on a chaotic an d conflictual wor ld , Morgenthau con structs an ~straction wluch he calls political man , a beast com plet ely lacking in moral restramts. Morge nthau is de ep ly aware th at re al me n, like real states, are :: m o ra l and ~al bu t, because states do no t live up to the univer sal moral laws doo govern ~e umverse, those who behave moral ly in international poHtics are med to failure because of the immoral aL'tions of ot he rs . To solve th is te nsion 0~~ ~ postulates a realm of in te rnational politics in w hich the amoral beha\' JOUr political man is not only permissible but pr ud en t. It is a H ob besian world. sepats te and disti ra ~ beas . net fJrom th e world of domestic order. In it, states k may act Ue ~ U :a l depends on a maximization of po we r an d a S willingness to fight . the validr argued that ~ personal is political, m ost fe minist theory wo~d reject ty of construc:ting an autonomous political sp he re around whtch

i1CKNER

~ CR

,. UL 0F ~ORGE~THAU'S PRJ':'-'C!PU:.S Of

PO UTIC AL R AU SM

J!J

\~ Kc \1r mainta.il" .' . ic., uf ,c~r li; ,..,m),. rniJ<k-~ of.<;olldlld have 1 en 1 . )0111 1clrl J( < rawn. . . 1 . I cl fi .5 . n' I (lP f'(11( l<; tl It '"t Iw < c11 , r{ 1 ' 0 l . ! "H n punlt<. a11d .m ... at e no t m ~ < fl ( a I . cl 1~ 'I \ lor('< 11 thau .s . n'< c; r,fth< l'oll1<.al bu t c.tl.,o hclp.., nn It\ co fo n< 1J()U Ia n aJ nt en t au ,~~ e. fhumafl natUn' L' .ticallllar i'> a ~.rJc:ial <:omlnld based on a pa , rt1 rcpr(~en ta ton rJ p(' 1 tat !!1t ' " ' 11 a.c;k w} ,e;n the woroen were . JJoI>I . < e of natu re p rcSll rrt cl lJ I' m >e t , 0 ne Jtll . liJSL ha.,c }wen im c e<..l in rep rodu ction au . 1 ss]- ath' r than v.:ar Jiv u cn1 urcann g, r e !1<.)' ' 1 1 . f~ , ifl ifc was lo ~0 on fo r 1110rc th an on e gene 12 v1 ration. orge ntl lau's cmplaSts on <.1 tr~~on Aictu a.l a-,pectc; of the int<mational sy!:.te m contributes to a ten<..lcn ~~ - "h~eh b~eothc r rc ali ~ls , tn <..le-c i(Jpl.:lsi7 elt:m cn tc; of cooperati on an J regene rat1on w IC are abo a\ ptc.:ls of intc: rn ation a.l rdations.13 . Morge nthau s constntction of an ar~oral realm of in~ernatio~al power pol.ltiCS"~ an attempt to resolv t what he sees ac; a fundam en tal te nston betwe~n. th e m~rall~ . tJ at gove rn th e universe and the reguirement'i of successf~l pohb~ action .'n _a 1 wo rld wh ere states use norality as a cloak to justi fy the pursu1t of thetr o"vn national inte rests. Morgenthau's universaHstic mo rality po~ ;tulates the highest form of morality as an abstract ideal, similar to the Golden Rule, to w~ch s~tes seldom _adhere: th e morality of states , hy contrast. is an instrumental morality gw~ed by se lf-mte r~st. Morgenthau's hierarchic-al ordering of morali ty contams parallels w1th th e work oF psychologist Lawrence Kohlbe rg. Base d on a study of th e moral developme nt of 84 America n boys , Kohlberg conclude s that th e highest stage of human moral developm ent (which he calls ~t.age 6) is th e ab ili ty to re cognize abstract ~i ve rsal principles of justice; lower on the scale (st age 2) is an instrum en tal moraltty concerned with serving one's own interests wh ile recognizing that ot hers ha ,e interests too. Be twee n these two is an interper sonal morality which is contextual and characterized by sensitivity to th e needs of others (stage 3).14 In he r critique of Ko hlb erg's stages of moral development, Carol Gilligan argues that th ey are based on a masculine conc eption of morality. On Kohlberg's scale wom en rare ly rise above the third or co ntextual stage. Gilligan claims th at thi s is not a sign of inferiority bu t of diffe rence. Since women are socialized into a mode of thinking which is contex tual and narrative, rather than formal and abstract, they tend to see issues in contextual rather than in ab st ra d te rms. l5 In international relations the tendency to thjnk about morality eithe r in te rm s of abstract, universal and unattai nable standards or as pu re ly instrumen tal. as Morge nthau does, J et racts from our ability to tole ra te cultu ral diffe re nces an d to se ek pote ntial fo r building community in spite of th ese diffe re nces. Using examples from fem injst literature I have suggested th at ~l orge nthau's attempt to construct an obje ctive, universal th eo ry of inte rnational politics is rooted in assumptions about human natu re an d morality that , in m odem \\'este m c~lture, are associated 'v\'ith mascu Hn ity. Fu rth er evidence th at Morgenthau's prin<:lples are not th e basis fo r a universalistic an d objec-tive theory is containe d in his frequ ent re fe rences to th e failure of wh at he ca lls the "le galistic-moralistic" or idealist approach to world politics whic h he claims was largely responsible fo r bo th the wo rld .wars: Having lai d th e blame for the Se cond World War on the misgui de d mo~~lt)' of appeasement, Morge nt ha u's real7>olitik prescriptio ns for successful pohtical ac tion appear as prescriptions fo r av oiding the mistakes of the 1930s rath er than as prescriptions with timeless appl icability.

P:\RT 1 AN,\ROf\' AND 11:, LUN::>t.t.Jt. t.l\ Ll.:!>

m ea contn ution to mtemationa re alion theof\ bv stntcting an altemati,e. feminist perspecthe on intemational politics tl{at help us to earch for more appropriate olution ?

,u1J 0 tJ1er realists. i_ no longer ~bl~ to deal \\1th an mcre~_mgl~ pluralistic arra~au : of Problems ranging from e<'onomc mterdependence to. em1ronmental de(J dation , .b . . I I e-ra Could femini t theory ak
I

If \ltlt--:tntluus world d~" is_t>nbe-ddetl in tla t raumas of the eeo d . a~ \ \ .. r. , f\' hl. nn.'Sl'I1Illi<.>n" :-till ',ilidh " e mo,t:' fu ti her awav fr011 tlll n \\ or}d 1 . ev r . I . .... ,,ith other c..nti<.-s of reali m t e ,,ew t ut. m t rapidh- chanu.; ent? 1 :-1 t .. 1. . .J, .:- na WorJ~ l1iltllt l>e.~u h.> St'<l.n:h Ior mode. of behanour w~~rent Irom tho e pre en ""\\e ~lOn!l'llth.m. Gh en that an~ war between the maJOr powers i likeh- to I bed by .. . . . -'d . cu. ' . n "n-;.Nno ~e<.uri h l,, uK'reasmu [>O"er c:otu l)(':" utCKL '" \l oreQ\""r le nuct,..,~ th '"Clf, l ~ " e nati0 st'.tte. tht> prim~ con. tituti,e element of the _intem~tional _ y. tern for \loreen . n

,S O f POi !TIC AI RLAUSM TICKNER A CRITIQUE OF \lORC,F '\ fH !l.l ~ PRJ~UP .:r

21

I1.1 "LI )ne; )J Ill (.'01 -.idt. r.lblt' \1ICC.'t''' Ill lnll l H I!! liP I l! , t j" t "I }! ;, r \f' ' }, l \\ . '' '"' . I" I . r . ' t.' \\"ll ......, , the wC'I rld "I<.N lw.. to0 \\OIIItl t prf<.Jd ..,,!~ 1 .t cou :- ' ' tn d\!..,t ri\wd in tlu ..,<.
e\

I i.

1 cooJwr.ttloJI

i n .t n ,U!'a

ol

m:

e tint c:c>OI>t.t tttn Ollkt>nll'' m JntL"nt.ttlCin,ll re\alJOI~ . . . r PIuraj t1<' Et\m h. tOllllll\1111..l H'. Il'''''ltl lw . ... . tlthonrh 1-...trl D clll'ch s notum o ,c; " ot tetm . . ' I . I I tt o commulllt\- <lllt n e such l'\,tntple wlwn pO\\ t.:t i~ .'lS~<x:ialec \\lt 1 1UI c IlL,. . . I I t. \S on . . . .. . . uh in mtcm.tlJOna re cl 101 . . ~n,incT that [)0\\r r " dommatlon IS a pen ,\SI\ e re. 1 . . I I1 t 1' U de mm ' . ' r tl-ere m: tlso inst,mcc<: ol cooperatiOn ter tate rdat10ns " HC c . H o" t>' c ' . . Tl ki u . I out 1 )owtr 1n b ob cur<.>d when powtr 1. een solek as dommat10n. 1m nr a 1 . I to e . I . h. k t f,eh- about tlu"' I10tE' ntn\ 1 this multidimensional sen::-t' ma; he p u. tot m cons rue _ all .

A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

If the way in which we describe reali~ has an effect on the wa~ we perceive and
act upon our environment. new perspecti,es might lead us to consider alternative courses of action. \\'ith this in mind I shall first examine h,o important concepts in international relations, power and securi~- from a fe minist perspecthe and then discuss some feminist approaches to conflict resolution. \torgenthau's definition of power, the <..'Ontrol of man o,er man. is ~pical of the way power is usually defined in intemational relation . :\ ancy Hart ock arrues that this type of power-as-domination has alwa~-s been associated ,,; th masculinitY. since the exercise of power has generally been a mascu line a<:thit-y: rclrel~- ha,:e women exercised legitimized power in the public domain. \\" hen women write about power they stress energy, capaci~ and potential. ays Hart ock. She notes that women theorists, e,en when they ha,e little else in common, offer similar clef initions of ~wer which differ substantially from the understanding of power as domination. 11 Hannah Arendt, frequently cited by feminists writing about power, defines power as the human ability to act in conc-ert, or to take action in connection ,,~th others wh~ share_ similar concems. 16 This definition of power is similar to that of psychologist DaVJd McClelland's portrayal of female powe r, which he describes as shared rather than assertive. 19 Jane Jaquette argues that. since women ha,e had less access to the instruments of coercion, they have been more apt to rely on power as . persuaston; she compares women's domestic activities to eoalition building. 20 All"! these writers are portr-a}ing power as a relationship of mutual enable::~z~g~definition of femal~ power to international relations, j aquette sees . een female strateg~es of persuasion and strateoies of small states operating from "ti of eakn o al of a ~ 0~ w ess m the mternational system. There are ~ ~ beha\lOur that contain elements of the female strategy of coali tioo Conference ~eh example_ is ~e Southern African Development Coordina( ADCC), which IS designed to build reoional infrastructu.rf on mutual cooperation and llectiv o ase ~ 011 the South African eo e self-reliance in order to decre. , economy. Another is the European Commurut).

=ing.

for cooperation a<; well as conAict. an aspect of international relat1uns gencr ; plcned do,,,1 b, reali m. . . tl 11 Rerlefl.ning. national sec11 rilY is anothe r wa~ in which femu11 t W00 _cou ' 11 11 1 contribute to 'new thinking about international reIabons. 23 T racl"I tiona ) _ 1 tlc:\\'est. the concept of national sccuti ty has been tied to military strength antl1ts ro1 ~ in the physic< protection of the nation state from external ~h reats._ ~,l orge~1th~u_ U 1 notion of defendina the national interest in terms of power 1s <.:ons1stent v \1th th_ dentlition. But thi~ traditioMI definitio n of national security is partial at best tn toda,'s world.2-1 The technologicall~- advanced states are highly interdependent and reh- on weapons whose effects would be equally devastatina to winners and losers ~ke. For them to defend national secmity b~ relying on ,.,ar as the last resort no loncrer appears ,ery usefw. Moreover, if one thinks of sec~rity in :\orth-Soutl1 rather than East-\\"est terms, for a large portion of the worlds population securin has as much to do with tl1e satisfaction of basic material needs as ";t}1 miJitruv threats. According to Johan Galtungs notion of structural ,;olence. to suffer a low'er life ex'Pectancy by ,;rtue of one's place of birth is a form of ,;olence whose effects can be as devastating a<; war. 25 Basic needs satisfaction has a great deal to do with women. but only recently haYe womens roles as providers of basic needs, and in development more generally, become visible as important components in development strategies.~ 6 Traditionally the de,elopment literature has focused on aspects of the development process that are in the public sphere, are technologically complex and are usually undertaken by men. Thinking about the role of women in development and the way in which we can define development and basic needs satisfaction to be inclusive of women's roles and needs are topics that deserve higher priority on the international agenda. Typically. however, this is an area about which traditional international relations theory, with the priority it gives to order oYer justice, has had very little to say. A further threat to national security, more broadly defined, which has also been missing from the agenda of traditional international relations. concems the environment. Carolyn Merchant argues that a mechanistic '\iew of nature. contained in modern science, has helped to guide an industrial and technological development which has resulted in environmental damage that has now be<.'ome a matter of global concem. In the introduction to her book The Death of Xature, Me~ch_ant suggests that, "'Women and nature have an age-old association-an affihati~n t~at has persisted throughout culture. language. and history. .Zi Hence she mamtams that the ecology movement, which is grov.ing up in response to

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES TICKJI:ER I 1\ CRITIQ UE OF MORGENTHAU'S PRINCIPLES OF POLIT ICAL REALISM
t]w

. d tl1e women's move ment are d~, pt, mtc n:onn ected l'tl\ironmen tal threats, an . 'tl nature ratl1e r than d< m.:1 t'ng it both s 1 uilibnum w1 1 ' Both stres t\1ng m eq_ caJ nt1 in which each part i'> nH tllv det)end"(:et n., . l' . -hterarc1 u e ; ~ r '"n nature <lS c1 t\l.t~g.non. as well as many feminists, are ne" -st~.:.,~. st_mg that on\ , on the whole. Ecologtsts. f Id 11evv will allow the huma n sp<'CJC'S to surv ) 1ve aJ such a (unc1 ament <.:I1 anae o wor . ' o t . . 111A' ti 1 on the en\lronmen . . 10' . the damage 1t lS tc ic and environmen tal se<.:unty in intertle. 10111 Thinking about ~- ~:f)~e=~o~or new methotls of conflict resolution that seck pendent terms suggests aJ ther than zero sum. outcomes. One such method 6 to achieve mutually b~~c~s ~:;.k on maternal thinking.''1'> Ruddick describes comes from Sara R~ d the preservation of life and the growth of children 1 'nki r as 1ocuse on matem al t lJ ng . . t conducive to th ese goals, tranquility must be c . d estic en\llronmen To tostel a om . . fl ' t vhere possible, engaging in it non-violently and con tc prese rve cl by avotding b .t .5 'over In such an environment t h e enc1 for which . s . 00 mmuntt)' w en t t restonng l ..J= t , e foug 1t are su b01w nate to the means by whic:h they are resolved. This dispu es < n11 u 1 tion involves making contex-tual judgements rat11er than metbo? of cob Jclt resot ud ds and thus has much in common with GilLgan's clenappealmg to a so ute ~ an ar rution of female morahty. . l . . 1 t resolution of confli ct in the domestic sp 1ere 1s a w1delv Whi Ie non-vJO en . . ' es1 stance in the public realm IS regarded as deVlant. But, accepted norm , passtve r . .. . . k argue . tl e peacefuJ resolution of con AlCt by mothe1 s does not usually s, 1 as Ru dd1c. 1 1 ne's enem ies an important reason w 1y women 1ave extend to tbe cl1ildre n Of O ' b been ready to suppo rt me n's wars 29 The question. for Rudruck then ecomes how . . . . king, a mode of thinking which she believes can be c d m roun to get ma temaI t1110 . . . . nto t11e public realm. Ruddick beheves that finclmg a men as we l] as women, Out l .. . . common humanity among one's opponents has become a condition of s~rvtvalt~ the nuclear age when tl1e notion of winners and losers has beco me questio~able. Portraying the adversary as less than human has all ~oo of~~n bee~ a techmque .of the nation state to command loyalty and to increase tts legJtimacy 1n t11e eyes of Jts citizens. Such behaviour in an age of weapons of mass destm ction rnay be selfdefeating. . . We might also look to Gilligan's work for a feminist persp ective on confli ct r~solution . Reporting on a study of playground behaviour of American boys and girls, Gilligan argues that girls are less able to tolerate high levels of conAict, and mor~ likely than boys to play games that involve taking turns and in which t11e suctes~ one does not depend on the fail ure of another. 31 \hile Gilligan's study does _not~ ~ into account attitudes toward other groups (racial, ethnic, economic or nationa ), Jt does suggest the validity of investigating whet her girl'i are socialized to use diffe~e~~ modes of problem solving when dealing with conflict, and whet her such behavJO might be useful in thinking about international conflict resolution .

23

J.

gency. KeiiPr argues for a form of knowledge, whkh she calls 'dynamic objectivity." "that gran~s to tlte .world around us its independent intc.:grity, hut does so in a way that remams cogmzant of, indeed relies on, our connectivitv with that work!. ~32 K~ll(;r illustrates this mode of thinking in her study of Barbar~ McCiintock, whose work on gen<:tic: transposition won her a , 'obel prize after many years of marginalization by the scientific communlty.3.1 YlcClintock. Keller argues, was a scientist with a respec t fo r complexity, diversity and individual di!Terence whose methodoloe,ry allowed her data to speak rather than imposing explanations on it. Kelle r's portrayal of McCuntock's science contains parallels with what Sandra Harchng calls an African world view.34 Harding tells us tl1at the \\'estem liberal notion of rational economic: man, an individualist and a welfare max:imizer, similar to the image of rational political man on which realism has based its theoretical investigations, does not make any sense in the African world view where the individual is seen as part of the social order acting \vi thin that order ratl1er than upon it. Hard ing believes that this view of human behaviour has much in common with a fernirtist persp ective . If we combine tllis view of human behaviour \vith Merchant's holistic perspective which stresses the interconnectedness of alJ things, including nature, it may help us to begin to think from a more global perspecthe. Such a perspective appreciates cultural diversity but at the same time recognizes a growing interdependence, which makes anachronistic the exclusionary thinking fosterec..l by the nation state system. Keller's dynamic objectivity. Harding's African world view and .\1erchanfs ecological thinking all point us in the direction of an appreciatio n of the "othe r" as a subject whose views are as legitimate as our 0 \\ll. a way of thinking that has been sadly lacking in the history of international relation . Just as Keller cautions us agai nst the construction of a feminist science which coulc..l perpe tuate similar exclusionary attitudes. Harding warns us against schema that contrast people by race, gende r or c:lass and tl1at originate within projects of social domination. Feminist thinkers generally disuke dichotomization and tl1e distancing of subject from object that goes with abstract thinking, both of which. they believe. encou rage a we/th ey attih1de characteristic of international relations. Instead. feminist literature urges us to construct epistemologies that ,ralue ambiguity and Jifference. These qualities could stand us in good stead as we begin to buiJd a human or ungendered theory of iJ1ternational relations which contai ns elements of both masculine and feminine modes of thought.

~lifT(n11t f(rnini<;t_li~r.; ratu~cs that f have r<:vie\\'cd whicl. could help us to bt'gin to lornnrlat< a fern nmt <:ptstemfJiogy of international relations. \1orgcnthau enw11 rage~ us lo lry to stantl back from the world and to think about theory building in terms of c:onstrllcting a rcttional outline or map that has unjver al applicalions. ln contrast, the fe minist_litcr~ture reviewed here ernph asizcs connection and contin -

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TOWARD A FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

MORGENTHAU'S PRINCIPLES OF POUTICAL REAUSM: A FEMINIST REFORMULATION

The first part of this paper used feminist theo1y to den:lop a critique of .\forgenthaus principles of political realism in onler to demonstrate how the theol) and pr.Ktice of

J am deeply aware that there is no one feminist approach but many, wruch come out es in ....__ _ _ __ _..__v_._._.. discinHnP..s ::m~ inh:ll Prtn<> l .-o,l;. ,;,.

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

TJCKNER I A CRITIQUE OF MORGENTHAU'S PRINCIPLES OF POUTJCAL REALISM 25

. t inten tahomt1re 1 tons rna" exhjbit a masculine bias. Tl1e .second. p<ut sug_ d sornc a ; . , . _1 ~este . t'Ontn.bu t.tons tlllt fPrninist theory m1ght make to 1econc:eptuw iZl11g. some nnportant < ... k. b r . . . t , fonal relations and to tlun mg a out a remmtst epistemo) t>Iements 111 111 ema J : rill . c . . ogy. . on tl tJservations this conclusron "' prese nt c1 remuust refonnuJati D n,,..,ng 1ese 0 L . . alis f , . on 1 c~rl rei~ m this paper, of Morgenth<tU s six ptinciples of po~tical. re m, out rnec. . h . 1t help liS to bemn to tlunk differently about ml<: matio nal relatio wl1rc rmg 1 o . . . h l < ns. shall not use the term realism since fenumsts b~1 ~eve t at t 1cre ~re multiple rea) 1 ities: a truly realistic picture of int~mational pohtr cs r~1~1:t re<:ogmze. ~lcments of cooperation as well as conflict. morality as weU as realpolttLk,. an~ the sbwmgs for justice as well as order.35 This reformulation may help us to tlunk m tl1ese multidirnen. sional tenllS .
1. A femin ist persp ective believes that objectivity, as it is c:ulturaUy defined, is associated with masculinity. Therefore, supposedly "objective" laws of human nature are based on a partial, mascu line view of human natu re. Human nature is both masculine and femin ine; it contain elements of social reproduction and development as well as political domi nation . Dynam ic objectivity offers us a more connected view of objectivity with less potential for domination. 2. A feminist persp ective believes that the national inte rest is multidimensional and contextuall y contingent. Therefore, it cannot be defin ed solely i.n terms of power. In the conte mporary world the national interest demands cooperative rather than zero sum solutions to a set of inte rdepe ndent global problems which include nuclear war, economic well- being and environmentaJ degradation . 3. Power cannot be infused with meaning that is unive rsally valid. Power as domination and control privileges masculinity an cl ignores the possibility of collective empowerment, anoth er aspect of powe r often associated with femininity. 4. A feminist perspective rejects the possibility of separ ating moral command from political action. All political action has moral sign ificance. The realist agenda for maximizing order through powe r and control gives priority to the. moral command of order over those of justice and the satisfaction of bas1c needs necessary to ensure social reproduction. 5. While recognizing that the moral aspirations of partic ular nations cannot be ~quated with unive rsal moral principles, a fe minist persp ective seeks to find co~mon moral elements in human aspirations whic h could become the basiS for de-escalating international confli ct and building international community. 6 A fe~nist ~rs~e denies the autonomy of the political. Since a~ton~ omy 15 associated With masculinity in West ern cultu re, disciplinary efforts ~0 construct a world vi~w which does not rest on a pluralistic conception of :~nature are partial and masculine. Building boun daries around a nar ~ Y efined political realm defin es political in a way that excludes tbe concerns and contributions of women.

goes hcyont1, uotlt masculine and fctninine perspectives. Such indusionary thinking, as Simonc de Beauvoir telb us, values the bringing forth ofLife aS much as the tisking or ]jfe; il is becoming imperative in a world in whjch the technology of war ancl a fragile natmal environment threaten human existence. An ungenderecl, or hu man, cliscourse becomes possible only when women are aclequately represented in the discipline and when there is eyual respect for the contributions of women and men alike.

To <onslru<:t tl11s feminist altemativP i~ not to dcuy the validity of Yforgenlhau\ work. But adding a feminist p<..rspe<:liw: to the epistemology of international relatiom i~ i.t stage through wb ieh we must pass ih"-e are to think abou t u mstrucling an nngendcrcd or ltuman s<:icnet. of inte:mational politics which is sensitive to. hut

NOTES
An earlie r version of this paper was presented at a symposium on Gender and Intemational Relations at the London School of Economics in June 1988. I "voulcl Uke to thank the editors of Millen nium, who organized this symposium , fo r encouraging me to undertake this rewriting. I am also grateful to Hayward Alker Jr. and Susan Okin for their careful readin g of the manu script and helpful suggestions.
Unive rsity Press, 1986), p. 148. 2. In 1987 only 4.8 per cent of the top career Forei<rn Service employees were wome n. Statement of Patrida Schroeder before the Committee on foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, p. 4; Women~~ Perspectives on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Compilation of Views (vVashington. D .C.: U.S. Go,em ment Printing Office, 1988). For an analysis of women's roles i11 the American military. see Cynthia Enloe, Does }\)wki Become )ou? The Militarisation of\Vomen:s Lives (London: Pluto Press, 1983). 3. Euward P. Crapol (ed. ), Women and American F(,.reign Pol cy (Westport. Corm.: i Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 167. 4. For an analysis of the role of masculine language in shaping strategic thinking see Carol Colm, ''Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,' Signs: j ounw l of Women in Culturf and Society (Vol. 12. ~o. 4. Summer 1987). 5. The claim for the dominance of the realist paradigm is suppo rted by John A. Yasquez. .. Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evide nce for an Old Thesis on Quantitative Lnternational Studies," Britislt jounw l of Intentational Studies (Vol. 3, No. 5. October 1979), pp. 210-28. For a critique of ~l o rgent11aus arnbiguous use of language see Inis L. CJaude Jr., Power and Jntenw tional Relations (i\ew Y ork: Random House. 1962). especially pp. 25-37 . 6. These are drawn from Ha11s Morge nthau, Politics Among Nations: The Stm gglc fm Power rmd Petu:e, 5th revised edition (l\ew Y Alfred Knopf. 1973), pp. 4-15. I am ork: aware that these principles embody only a partial statement of Morgenthaus ,ery rich study of intemational politics. a shtdy which desetves a much more detailed analysis than I can give here. 7. This list is a composite of the male/female dichotomies which appear in Evelyn Fox Keller's Reflections on Gender and Science (~ew Il aven. Conn.: Y University Press, ale 1985) and Harcling, op. cif.
l. Quote d in Sandr a Hardin g, The Science Question in Femi11sm (lthaca. N.Y.: Cornell i

26

PART 1 ANARC

HY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

TICKNfR I A Ll{:riQUE OF MORGENTHAU'S PRINCIPLES OF POUTlCAl REAUSM
24.

[$Site (\ ol. 2S. No. . . n hold Anm that these perceptions stl . 9. K eller. ap. cif .. P 130. 10. Ibid.. P 9. 11 . Ibid.. p. 9. ~ male Culture. Woman Culture and Concvptual Change: l2. Sat"'a Ann Ketchum. Fe, . Studies.- Social TheonJ and Pm et ic1 (\"ol. 6. r0 _ 2 To"~ard a Philosophy of \\ omens . ,

V gel Donald M. Bro,ermau, Fnmt :larkson <tnu 0 , K Bnwcrman. Susan H. s A Current Apprni~al. , rwl of Social , . Ing~ . ..5 x-role Stereotype . _ . h". . ~ . l1ost:'nkmn7.. e. _ -g Repltcaoon of t I!' 1es( aH 1 1 t 1 t 980s con. l' P,m 1 . . 2 l9i2), PP ::>9_,

2i

Summer 1980). h H0 bbes's state of nature provides an ate-urate desc1 ip13. OtJ1ers have questi~ned whet er S for example Charles B~:>it~.:, Polit icol Tlteory and tion of the intemaoonal sy~tem. eeN . Princeton Unjversity Pres.. 1979). pp. 3-5-..so 1 R 1 f'0 1s (Pnnceton. 1 -1 0 1 Intemationo e ' n. . Be ond Borders (Syracuse. ;-.l.L Syracusc University and Stanlev HofTmann, vtttws y . Press, 198i). chap. fl. raJ d . 1 pment are described and discussed in Hobert Kegan 1 KoIll>e rgs staaes o mo . eve oPmcess in Human Development (Cant I)ricl ge, Mass.:. 14. c bl . The Evolving Self Pro em ant1 . H d University Press, J982), chap. 2 . _ _ atvar .. an In 0 Different Voice: P sychological Theory and Women_ s. De~elupme 11 t 1"- Carol ~~dllig ~~ _H rvard Universitv Press, 1982). See chap. 1 ror Gtlhgan s critique (Cambn ge. ,v,ass.. a
J

of Koh~ber~d th t toward the end of his life, Morgenthau himselr was aware that 16. There IS e\1 ence a , _. . . . _ his own prescnp t ''ere becoming anachrorustic.. In a semmar presentation m .19t8 1ons . d f. he sugges ted that power politics as the guiding pnnctple for the con uct o - m temational . . f 1 relations had be<,-ome fatally defective. For a descnption o t liS semmar presentation see Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law (Durham , ~.C.: Duke Universitr Press. 1985}, pp. 70-4. 17. Nancv c. M. Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Matetialism (Boston: ~ortl1eastem Unhersity Press, 1983). p. 210. 18. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (~ew York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1969), p. 4-!. Arendt's definition of power, as it relates to international relations, is discussed more extensively in Jean Bethke Elshtaln's "Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just War. and Feminism in a Nuclear Age," Political Theory (Vol. 13, No. 1, February 198.5), pp. 39-57. 19. Da\id McCieUand, "Power and the Feminine Role," in David McClelland, Power: The lntzer Experience (New York: Wiley, 1975). 20. Jane S. Jaquette, "Power as Ideology: A Feminist Analysis," in Judith H. Stiehrn (ed.}, Women$ Views oftlze Political World of Men (Dobbs Ferry, N .Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1984). 21. ~ examples are cited by Christine Sylvester, 'The Emperor's Theories and Transformations: Looking at the Field through Feminist lnses," in Dennis Pi rages and Christine Sylvester (eds.}, Tran.ifonnations in the Global Political Econom.y (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

T_hi:-; IS th( flr~tll ~l-Ilt maur lly Edwarcl Azar and Clmng-in ~loon, ..Third World . atJOnul ~~ runty I 0\\ arc\ a \ cw Conce-ptual F rauwwork.'' I r~tcrnnlioual I 11temctiom 1 \ ol 1 ' 0. 2 19~-1 pp. I 03-.'35. 25. Johan C' tl" 111t! \:iobKl' Pcac.e and Pcace Research.'' in Caltung. Essays in Peace Rc.~carc/1 \ ol I Copcnh.,~cn: Clni-;tian Ejlcrs 1975). 26. See. for C'x.unplc Cita Scu all(! Caren Crown. Development, Cri.'ies and Altcmwtit;e \"i.sion<; Tl11 rd \\'orld \\ (JIIll'lr ~s- Pe~peetiJ;es l :"ew Y ork: \llonthlv Review Pre s. J9S7). This i~ an example of u growing literah1re on v.:omen and dc,el~pment ,, hic:h deserves mor<> attention frou1 tire intcn mlional relations cornmunitv. 2i. Carol)11 ~l<:n:ha.11t. The Death r~{.\1ature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Rewlution (l\ew Y ork: I larper and How, 19&2). p. xv. 28. Sarn Jh u.klic:k, " ~ atcmal Thiuking and ''Preservati' e Love and Militan Destruction: Some R(A ections on Y1othcring and Peace.'' in Jo~ce Treblicot, .\lotl,ering: F:.ssays in Feminist 111eory (Totowa, K J .: Howrnan and Alienhead, 1984). 29. For a 1norc extensive analysis of this issue see Jean Bethke Elshtain, W rmum and War ( i ew York: Basic Book5, 1 987 ). 30. This type of conHitt resolution contains similarities witl1 the problem sohing approach of Eclward Azar, John Burton and Herbert Kelman. See, for example. Edward E. Azar and John \V. Btuton, h1ternational Conflict Re.~olution: Theory and Practice (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986) and Herbert C. Kelman, "interactive Problem Sohing: A SociaiPsychologital Approach to ConAict Resolution,'' in \V. Klassen (ed. ). Dialogue Toward Inter-Faith Understanding (Tantur!Jerusalem: Ecumenical Institute for Theoretical Research. 1986), pp. 293-314. 31. Gilligan, op. cil., pp. 9-10. 32. Keller, op. cit. , p. 117. 33. E,elyn Fox Keller, A Feelingfor the Organism: The Life nnd Work ofBarbora .\ lcClintock (New York: Freeman, 1983). 34. Harding, op. cit., chap. 7. 35. ''Utopia and reality are ... the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both ha,e their place": E. H . Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row. 1964). p. 10.

22. Karl w..Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Pnnoeton University Press, 1957}.
23 New thin.lcin 15

onnulations under Gorbachev. There are indications that the Soviets are to conceptualize security in the multidimensional tenns described here. see p~~~ ~ Theory of lnte1'7UJtWnal Relations {New York: St. Martin's

~g

~.

hat 1s also being used in the Soviet Union . refi g a_ term t to describe foreign

THE CONSEQUENCES
OF ANARCHY
Th e Anarchic Structure oJWorld Politics
KENNETH N. WALTZ

POLITICAL STRUCTURES
Only throu gh some sort of system s theor y can international polities be unde rstood. To be a success, such a theory has to show how international politics can be conceive d of as a doma in distinct from the econo mic, social, and othe r international domains that one may conceive of. To mark international-political systems off from other inte rnational systems, and to distinguish systems-level from unit-level forces, requi res showing how political struc tures are gener ated and how they affect, and are affec ted by, the unHs of the syste m. How can we conceive of international politics as a distin ct syste m? What is it that interv enes betw een intera cting units and the results that their acts and inte ractions produ ce? To answer these questions, this chapt er first examines the conce pt of social struc ture and then defines struct u re as a conce pt appro priate for nation al and for intern ation al politics. A system is comp osed of a struc ture and of intera cting units. The struc ture is the syste m-wide comp onen t that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. The probl em is ... to contrive a definition of struc ture free of the attrib utes and the intera ction s of units. Defin itions of struc ture must leave aside, or abstra ct from , the characteristics of units, their bebavior, and their intera ctions. Why must those obviously impo rtant matte rs be omitted? They must be omitt ed so that we can distinguish be tween variables at the level of the units and variables at the le\'el of the system. The probl em is to devel op theor etically useful conce pts to replac e the vague and varying system ic notions that are customarily empl oyed -noti ons such as envir onment, situat ion, conte~1:. and milieu. Struc ture is a useful conce pt if it gives clear and fixed mean ing to such vague and varying te rms.
From Kenneth N. Waltz. Tlteoi1J of Intenwtional Politics. pp. 79-106. Copyright 19i9 by \I<.Crdw-llill. Inc. Reprinted with permission of The McCraw-Jlill Companies.

. any .. Il,\\.e to omit from . definition d .' t n. if the deRl)JtJon \ r \ know\\ hat W<" I I . l . . ll . Abstmcting Irum t 1e attn H ... v i .ml~ means 1 . 1 ' 1nl J t o I>t ll.st> thcOJ<.'tiC ki Is of political le<K1 ~~ l :. ers. soc:w 1' 'I cconmnic institeaVJng t' 1 ' f n thout t 1e ne u IOns ~t$10l' ques 10 !i . . ts stttes may have. Abstra cti ng from relations 1 l octl com nutme n ' . means antl lt eo 0~1 ' . b t the cultural econom1c. po1 ..1 .tnd mllitary int .ilJCd.l, . . . a ou . . . era<:. lt'a\1ng ,\SIde questwnsI t. to be left out 'does not tm1. 1cate what ts to be put in Th . f t tes To sa, w la IS . . . non. o s a t ertheless becaus e tl1e mstruction to omit attrb e 1 utes . t 1s importan nev . < neg<ttl' e pmn d th . t . 1 . ft . 1 ted ul . e illS n ction to omit interactiOns almost always goes uno). 1 10 IS o en " ~ '.b d interactions are omitte d. what i left? The question . ened. But tf att~dut~s antl double meanincr of the term 'relati on.' AsS. F "adlSJ 0 db 1s 1 enng 1e ' < mswere ~ eo~ . cre obscUIes a distinction that is impor tant in theo e . ts out ordinal) 1 anguao . f. . pom ' d to n lJoth the interaction o 11 m ts arKl tI11':: positions tJ1ry. "R 1 " is use mea ey e abOJ~ , . th t To define a structu re requ ires ignoring how units relat cupv \'ls-a-viS eac1 o .er. 1 . 1 I e CX: ' th (l10 , the)' interact) and concen trating on 10w t 1cy stand in rela. w1th one ano er v. . they are arrangecl or pos1t10ne d). I n t e ractions, as 1 have tion to one anotller (1 lOW . . d . .I . . . k 1 t the level of the umts. How u111ts stan m 1e ation to one IJ1SJSted, ta e p ace a .. . . e arran<Yed or pos1bone d , 1s. not a P'.opert) o r tI1e un1ts. The anothe r the way they ar o . ' ent of units is a property of the syste m. arrange m tl B leaving aside the personali~ o f actors, tl.1e1r be 1 <omc1. ~err t~teractions, 1~\'lOr,_ y. ely positional tJicture of society. Th1 ee propos 1t10ns follow from one arnves at a pur . . . . . . l .. . . . F' tructures ma) endure while personality. behaVIOJ , anc mteractions ,ary th1S. trst, s d f . S d widely. Structure is sharply distinguishe rom ac~ons an d . rac t mte 10ns. econ , a structural definition applies to realms of widely differe nt sub~tance so long.as the arrange ment of parts is similar. z_ Third, be~ use thls is so, :~~~ones d_eveloped for one realm mav with some modification be applica ble to oth e1 1ealms as well .... The ~oncept of structure is based on tlle fact that units diff:re nt1y ju.xtaposed and c:ombined behave differe ntly and in interac ting produ ce diffe rent outcomes. 1 first want to show how internal political structu re can be define d. In a ~ook on international-political theory, domes tic political structu re l~as to be examm~d in order to draw a distinction between expect ations about behav1or and outcomes'" the internal and external realms. Moreover, consid ering domestic political structure now will make the elusive international-politic al structu re easier to catch later 011 Structure defines the arrangement , or the orderi ng, of the parts of a system[ Structure is not a collection of political institu tions but rather the arrangement 0 tl1em. How is the arrangement define d? The consti tution of a state describ es 50~1~ parts of the arrangement, but political structu res as they develo p are not id~nb~ . with formal constitutions. In defining structu res, the first questi on to answer 15 this. \\'hat is the principle by which the parts are arrang ed? . . . nd Domestic politics is ruerarchically ordere d . The units- msti~b ~ns agenc ies-sta nd vis-a-vis each other in relatio ns of super- and subordm~oon. bout ordering principle of a system gives the first, and basic, bit of inform~tlo;;h , of how the parts of a realm are related to each other. In a polity the bier )ela offices is by no means completely articul ated, nor are all ambig uities abou~ rfor tions of super- and subordination removed. Never theless, political acto~s ~e tind mally differentiated according to the degree s of their author ity, and theJrth 5 J and fun<:tions are specif ied By "speci fied" I do not mean that the law of e
I

WALTZ I THE ANARCHlC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POUTICS

31

;he

fully dr .,( ) t ' l~le dulif-'s that <.liffc.:nnt agenci<:!. perform, but on I) thal broad agrt'C'lll C'HI pre,mb o~ the: ta-;ks tlml va1 ious parts or a government are to unclcrtakc and 01.1. tit<. e~tcnt o! the power they legitimately v..ield. Thus Congress :.11pplies th<" 1111~1tary forces; the President co10mands them. Congre.o,s makes the law:.; the e,xcc:ulJ\'C ~J~an~h cn~orccs them: ~genc:ies admini.o,ter laws; judges interpret them. Such spcc.Aic:atJon of r<1les and differentiation of functions is found in any state, the Jllorc full y so_ a~ the ~late is more highly develope<.l. The specifkation of func..:tions of fonnall y clrfferentli:lted parts gives the second IJit of struc:tu ral information. This second p<llt of the definition adds some content to the structure but onlv enoucrh ' ; 0 to say 111ore fully how the units stand in relation to one another. The roles and the functiOJ:s of the British P1ime Ministe r and Parliam ent, for example. differ from those of th e American President and Congress. When offices are juxtaposed and functions are combined in different ways, differe nt behaviors and outcomes result, as I shall shortly show. The placement of units in relation to one another is not fully definec.l by a system s ordering principle and by the fo rmal differentiation of its parts. The stancling of the units also changes with changes in their relative capabilities. In the performance of their functions, agenci es may gain capabilities or lose them. The relation of Prime Minister to Parliam ent and of President to Congress depends on. and varies with, their relative capabilities. The third part of the definiti on of structure acknowledges that even while specified functions remain unchanged, units come to stand in different relation to each other through changes in relative capability. A domestic political structure is thus defined: Brst, according to the principle by which it is ordered; second , by specification of the functions of formall y differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units. Structure is a highly abstract notion, but the definition of structure does not abstract from evel)rthing. To do so would be to leave everything aside and to include nothing at all. The three-prut definition of structure includes only what is require d to show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is omitted. Concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and personality of political actors, consideration of the confli<.:tive and accommodative processes of politics, description of tl1e making and execution of policy -all such matters are left aside. Their omission does not imply their urtimp01tance. They are omitted because we want to figme out the ex-pecte d effects of structure on process and of process on structure. That can be done only if structtue and process are distinctly defined. I defined domes tic political structures first by the ptinciple according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their fu nctions, and d1ird by the distribution of capabilities across units. Let us see how the three terms of the definition apply to international politics.

I . Ordering Principles
Structural questio ns are questions about the arrange ment of the parts of a system. The parts of don1es tic political systems stand in relati.ons of super- and suhordinaion. Some are entitle d to commru1d; otl1ers are require d to obey. Domestic

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PART 1 ANARCHY ANU 11;, '-'vn..,...'< - - .

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC SiRUCTURE O F WORLD POU11CS 33

. hi The parts of intem ati' a li tical ~Yst S\ tt>ms art' rentralized and hJe:arc Fc.nnally each is the equ. ' all the otherns . t' ' stand in relattons o coordi ndation. . o required to obev. Inter n lonal svstemsers . 1d mman . none ts , are ~one is entit e to CO . 'h dering principles of the h'-'O ': 11ctures are dis. decentralized and anard uc. T e otr eh other. Domestic politK.u structures ha .J:rr . deed cont:raf\1 o ea ve tinctk WJ,erent, m d rn ' as tlteir concrete coun terparts. . ternation I In . al . tit tions an o ces . go\'ernment tns u aUed "politics in the a bsence u f' govemment a "1 . m con'"-43 has been c . <+ . politics. u ',' d . t. and in e,er-growtn g nu m I)ers. Supranational . al rgamzattons o e:os . . lntemation o . ;tivel 1 however, either t hemse1 ves acym re some of agents ~ble to act eff~ties ~f states, as did the ~e~eval papacy in the era of the attnbutes and capab . th oon reveal thelf ;,..abilitv to act 10 1mportan t wa\s except With u~ / Innocent Ill, or ey s h . cence of the princ ipal states conc erned with the the support. or at least t e acql wes ts of ~uthoritv emer ge intern ation allv are bare))r t hand Wbate\'er e emen , matters a bility that provides the foun dation ~or tl1e appearance once remo,ed from th~ ca~a . klv reduces to a partic ular expression of capabilof those elements. on~ q~~ system-wide authority, form al re lations of super ity. In the absence o agen WJ devel d su bordi nation fail to tructuop. an f ral definition states the principle by which the S\'SThe first term o a s ' . ed S tu an organizational concept. T 1 prom me nt c haracteris1e tem JS order true re 15 . . a1 l'ti'cs however seems to be th e Iack o f order and of tic of mtemation po 1 ' ' . . H . one think of international politi. cs as b emg any ~.., d of an tun orgamzabon . 0\\ can l' d f rder at all?The anarc-hy ofpolitics internationally is often re rerre .. to. I structure o . ti a1 concept the terms "structure , an d "anarchy seem to be . m IS an orgaruza on , .. . b f contradiction. If international politics is ..politics ~~ the a ~ence o government:,. what are we in the presen<.-e of? In looldng for mtemati~n_al struct~re, one 15 brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable ~ostti on to be m. 1De roblem is this: how to concei\e of an order w1thout an orderer and of ~ effects where formal organization is lacking..Beca~e these ~e difficult questions, I shall answer them through analogy w1th. mJCroec:o~ omtc theory. Reasoning by analogy is helpful wher e one can move from a domam f~r which theol)' is well developed to one where it is not. Reasoning by analogy 15 permissible where different domains are structurally similar. . Classical economic theory, developed by Adam Smith and his followers. 15 microtheory. Political scientists tend to think that micro theor y is theory about small-scale matters, a usage that ill accords with its estab lished mean ing. The tenn ..micro.. in economic theory indicates the way in which the theor y is constru~ted rather than the scope of the matters it pertains to. Micr oecon omic theor y descnbes bow an order is spontaneously fonne d from the self-i ntere sted acts and interac tions of iodi\idual units -in this case, persons and finns. The theor y then ~s upon the two central concepts of the economic units and of the market. Economtc units and erooomic markets are concepts, not descr iptive realities or <.:Oncrete entities. This must be emphasized since from the early eight eenth centu ry to the present. from the sociologist Auguste Com te to the psychologist Geor ge Kato~~ ecooomic theory has been faulted because its assumptions fail to correspond \' 1 . . ~g~ lilies ~. economi~ theorists ~-nceive of an ~'Onomy opera t the ldaboo &oua its SOCiety and polity. Unrealistically, economiSts assume tha
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J

A:

econorn ,. worlJ i. tlw w0rld of the world . UnreaJi<;ti<:allv, ec:onomL'>ts think of thfading udl. the f:uno~:s "<:c:onomic man.- as a sin~le -;nindcd profit maxirnizC'r. They '>i ~JP 0 1 t 'In(' aspect c1f rnan and l<:a... e aside the ,.,.ondrous variet y of human life. A'> aJ) mr>denltely sensibl<: econ01ni~t knows, "economi<.: man" doe~ not exist . Anycm< whl) ask!) businessm(;n how they rnake thei r dedsions \\ill find that the assumption l.hat rncn are c<:onomic maximizerl. grossly di~torts their characters. The assurnptwn tlwt men be:ha'-eas ~onomic men , which is knO\vn to be false as a descripthe statement, turns out to be useful in the const n;c:tion of theory. yfarkets are the second major c<mcept invented by microeconomic U1eorists. T\.\'0 general questions muc;t be aske.d about marke t!>: How are thev formed? How do they work? Tir e answe r to the first question is this: The market of a decentralized economy is individualist in origin , spontaneously generated. and unintended. The market arises out of the acti\ities of separate units -persons and firm~ whose aims and efforts are dire<.:ted not toward creati ng an order but rather toward fulfilling their own intem aJiy defined interests bv whatever means they can muste r. The indi vidual unit acts for itself. From the coa~tion of like units em~rges a structu re that affects and constrains all of them. Once formed , a market be<.:omes a force in itself, and a force that the constituthe units actinO' singlv or in small numo ' bers cannot c:ontrol. Instead, in lesser or greater degree as marke t conditions v;u:. the creato rs become the creatu res of the marke t that their ac:ti\ity ga,e rise to. Adam Smith 's great ac:hiC\ement was to show how self-in terested, greed-drive n action s may produce good social outco mes if only political and social conditions permit free competition. If a laissez-faire economy is harmonious, it is so bec-ause the intentions of actors do not correspond 'dth the outcomes their ac :tions produce. What intervenes behveen the ac:tors and the objects of their action in order to thwar t their purposes? To account for the unexpectedly fa,orabJe outc."O mes of selfish acts, the concept of a market is brought into play. Each unit seeks its O\\ll good; the resuJt of a number of units simultaneously doing so transc:ends the motives and the aims of the separate units. Each would like to work less hard and price his produ ct higher. Taken together, all ha,e to work harde r and price their produ cts lower. Each 6nn seeks to increase its profit; the result of many firms doing so drives the profit rate dow-nward. Each man seeks his own end, and, in doing so, produces a result that was no part ofrus intention. Out of the mean ambition of its members, the greate r good of society is produced. The marke t is a cause interposed between the ec."Onomic ac.tors and the results tl1ey produce. It conditions their calculations, their behaviors, and their interactions. It L not an agent in the sense of A being the agent that produces out("Ome X. e; Rather it is a structural cause . A marke t constrains the units that comprise it from taking certain actions and disposes them toward taking others. The market. created by self-djrected interacting economic; units. selects beha"iors aC(.."Ording to their consequences. The marke t rewards some with high profits and assigns others to bankruptcy. Since a market is not an institution or an agent in any concrete or palpable sense, such statements become impressive only if they can be reliably inferred from a theol) as part of a set of more elaborate expectations. They can be. Microeconomic theory e>.-plains how an ec."Onomy operates and why certain effe<:t:s are to be expected ....

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luternationitl-political s~'Stems, like ~conomi<' tllar~ds , arc. formed b , . . . t-o-achon o1 se'If- 1.eg.udi t w units 1nte rnat1om.tl stru ctu res arL d<'fined in termstht ) . . . tlw ptin ttm politicalunjts of an era, be they Cl~' tatcs: etnpt re~. or nations. St . of . j' . o tun? em erg e 10m tl te c exis tence. of states. l'\0 state' ,mtc.~nds. to r)atticiptte . rue. . . . < m . . . t tur> b, which 1 and others \>\1ll 1 C con~tra.uwd. Inte rn l' tit. t ) e Ionn aho n o1 a s llJC ... _, . cl. 'd . . . . . . a lOnaJ . .. _ like economic markets. are 111 tvl tklJ St 111 ong1n spont-tn 1 1 poIttic~u S\'Stems. . . d . t ded In both systems , struc.1ures are lormE>d 'bv thE' <c eousl) . generate d . an urun en . '. , . . .~ " oachon .... f th . . t \\fhethe r those umts U prospe t, OJ c.he dep end s on thei ve. 0 en Unl S. . , . d . . . r ow11 rt: rts Both svstems are formed and mall1tame on a pl mclple> of sE:" If-h elp tl. euo . , lat applies to the units. . . . . . .. . In a mic rotheo.ry, whether of mternational p_ol~tiCS 01 of e~o nom 1.c . the ll"lo~s "ah.on o f the ac tors 1 assun1ed rather tl1an reahsttcall y clcscnbed. I assun1e tl1at . . . . states seek to ensure their survhal. The assumption IS a radical stmplification mad e for the sake of constructing theo ry The que stw n to as~ of the assumption. as ever . is not whether it is true but whe the r it is the most sens1bl c and use ful one that ea~ be made. Whether it is a useful assumption dep end s on whe the r a them y based on the assumption can be contrived, a theory from _w~ich imp ~rtant consequences not otheiWise obvious can be inferred . Wh eth er 1t ts a sens1ble ass um ption <.;an be directly discussed. Beyond the survival motive, the aims of stat es may be endlessly vari ed; they may r~ge from the ambition to conque r the world to the desi re me rely to be left alone. Survival is a pre requisite to achieving any goals tl1at states may have, othe r than the goal of promoting thei r own disappe aran ce as political entities. The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a worJd whe re the security of state s is not assured, rather than as a real istic description of the imp ulse that lies behind every act of state. The assumption allows for the fact tha t no stat e always acts exclusively to ensure its survival . It allows for the fact tha t som e stat es may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; the y may, for example, pref er amalgamation with other states to the ir own survival in form . It allows for the fact that in pursuit of its security no state will act with per fect kno wle dge and wisdomif indeed we could know what those term s might mean ... . Actors may perceive the structu re tha t constrains the m and understand how it serves to reward some kinds of behavior and to penalize oth ers. But then agai n they either ma)' not see it or, seeing it, may for any of many rea sons fail to conform their actions to the pattern s that are most often reward ed and least ofte n punishe d. To say that "the structure selects" means simply tha t those who conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are like lier to stay ~ere. The game one has to win is defined by the structu re that determ ines the kind of player who is likely to prosper. . ..

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WO RlD POUTlCS

35

2. The Character of the Units

:a

~ sec.:ond ten n in the definition of dom estic political stru ctu re spe cifies the func ~ rrfo~ed by differentiated unite;. llierarchy entails rela tion s of super- and ~ m:;:ron ~ong a system's parts, and tha t implies the ir differe ntiation. r~
)

rung ornestic political structure the sec ond term like the first and third, 15

slat es tl nt are the umts of intemalional-political systems arc not formaUy differentint(d h~ th<.. !unctions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination UJ non g .1 sy.;;ttm \ units. anu that implies their samene ss. The second term is not needed in defining internat ional-political structure, because , so long as anarchy end ures. states remain like units. L natiomJ stru ctures \'ary only through a nter change of organizing principle or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities or lltlit<;. :\(-'VeJtheless I shall discuss thcst:: like un its here, because it is by their in teractions that international-politics structures are generated. Two questions a rise : Why should stat es be taken as the units of the syst ern? Given a wide vadety of states, how <.;an one call them "like units"? Questioning the choice of' states as the primary units of i.ntemational-poH tical systems became popular in the 1960s and 1970s as it was at the turn of the century. Once one understands what is logically involved , the issue is easily resolved. Those who que stion the state-ce ntric view do so for two main reasons . First. states are not the only actors of importance on the international scene. Second , states are declining in importance, and other actors are gaining, or so it is said. Neither reason is cogent , as the following discussion shows. States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that Aourish within them but by the major ones. In defi ning a system's stru cture one chooses one or some of the infinitely many objects comprising the system and defines its structure in terms of them. For inte rnational-political systems, as for any system, one must first decide which units to take as being the parts of the system. Here the economic analogy will help again. The structu re of a market is defined by the number of firms zco mpe ting. If many roughly equal finm con tend, a condition of perfect competition is app roximated. If a few finns dominate the market. competition is said to be oligopoHstic eve n though many smaller firms may also be in the field. But we are told that definitions of this sort cannot be applied to inte rnational politics because of the interpe netratio n of states, because of thei r inability to con trol the emironmen t of their action. and because rising multinational corporations and other nonstate actors are difficult to regulate and may rival some stat es in influence. The importance of nonstate acto rs and the extent of transnational activities are ob, ious. The conclusion that the state-centric conception of inte rnational politics is made obsolete by them does not follow. That economists and economically minded poli tics scie ntists have though t that it does is ironic. The irony lies in the fact that all of the reasons give n for scrapping the stat e-centric concept can be related more strongly and applied to firms. Firm s <.;om peting with numerous others ha,e no hope of <.;Ontrolling their market , and oligopolistic firms constantly struggle with imperfect success to do so. Finns iute11>enetrate. merge, and buy each up at a merry pace. Moreover, firm s are constantly threatened and regulated by. shall we say, "non firm actors. Som e governm ents encourage concentration : others work to prevent it. The market stllJCture of parts of an economy may move from a wider to a nar rower competition or may move in the opposite direction, but whate,er the exte nt and the frequency of change. market stntctures, generat ed by the interaction of firms, are defined in terms of them.

nC'tcled hc<nmt each tem1 points to a po:,sible :,ource of structural vadation. The

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ANARCHY ANU 11 ::>'-Vi' '""'"''< - - .

~\,;ng that the nation-state IS_J~ Id have' to be rcddinpd Th t 1cn the , . . 'f . ti0 11'1) l)OhhCS WOU . a Would b strudure o nttema ' . , . bilities cannot be separated fro m the otl . e . economiC capa 1e1 cap ne-<.--es ~u:' because . . ..; 1 frequently drawnbetwPcnmiltte::rso f higha _, a.l. . 1 b11ties of st;a tes The distmcuOl e economic means c m1 1tary and politicalnu 1O\v ror . . . placed States us f . po l1hcs IS nus . for the achievement o economic interests encJs. t . . 1d polibca1nJean.5 I ld . .. <Hld mili ru: ,u . f Kindleberger's statement may 10 : Some state A 1ded verswn o h s rnav .n amel d u as economic entities. and otl~ers not.~ _at p_ ses no prohle~ o be nearly ' "'d_5be P.. al theorv since internatiOnal pohtlcs 1s mostlv .11 c t mat10nal-po1tic 1 ., . " )Out 1 rnaJor actors, the struc:tu ror 111 e S 1 gas the major states are t 1e . alities amway. o on . mequ . a1' .. . 15 defined in tenns of them. Tl1at t I1eoretical statement is ref . 1 of intemanon po !tiCS actice States set tJ1e scene w Juc1 t1 . m 1 1ey, along '"ith rse home out m pr . . l cl cou tl . dramas or carry on the1r 1um rum a rans. Though the nonstate actors, state letr . . . , . {' . 1 . ) . t e little in the affrurs of non state act01 s 01 ong penods of may choose to m er er . I I -l . ss set the terms of mtercourse, w 1et 1e1 )y passively permittime, states nevertl1ele . . . 1 . ting m f.orma1 ruIes to develop or by activelv mtervemng to c 1ange rules that no " . . th When the crunch comes. states remake the rules b, wh1ch other longer sUit tem deed one mav be struck by t11e abilitv of \\'eak states to impede l. actors opera e. n ' " . I . tile operation of strong international corporations an ))' t 1e attention the latter pay to the wishes of the fonner. . . . States are the units whose interactions form the stmctu re of mternatlonalpolitical systems. They will long remain so. The death rate .~~11ong ~t~:~s is remarkablv low. Few states die; many finns do .. . . To call states hke umts 1s to say that ea~h state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. It is another way of saying that states are sovereign. But sovere ignty is also a bothersome con cept. Many believe, as the anthropologis t~. G. Smith has said, ~at ''in a syst~m of sovereign states no state is sovereign.'>t> The error lies in iden tify1ng the soveretgn~ of states with their abiUty to do as tl1ey wish. To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others' influence, that they are able to get what they want. Sovereign states may be hardp ressed all around, constrained to act in ways they would Hke to avoid, and able to tlo ha~dly anything just as they would Uke to. The sovereignty of states has never enttuled their insulation from the effects of other states' actions. To be sovereign and to be dependent are not contradic.1:ory conditions. Sovereign states have seldom led fr~ and easy lives. What then is sovereignty? To say that a state is sovereign mea.ns th~t it deddes for itself how it will cope with its internal and exte rnal problems, 1nclu whe ther or not to seek assistance t mg from others and in doing so to ,, 1 s free utmt . dom by making COmffiltments to them. States develop their own strategJes ' chart ds their own courses, make their own dedsions about how to meet whatever nee 1 they experience and whatever desires they develop. It is no more contradictory ~ that . . 15 to Sil\ . say soveretgn states are always <."Onstrained and often tightly so than Jt that free individuals often make decisions under the heavy pressure of events. J e Each state, like every other state, is a sovereign political entity. And_)~~~ ~:e differences CK.Toss states, from Costa Rica to the Soviet Union, from Gambia

. l fi ukets in terms finll~ ,,) J d fine int'-'J . . m ts c e 111C nt. '- l'l<ltio 1 just as t'eonor ~ . f states. If Charles P. "-111 1 b<'rger were . na1 . . ' t cturcc: m tellns . o . t about through a..'i .c nght 1 .11 pt) l1hc:u :; n l an P<.ouom1 unit "5 tl

or

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS

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un il(u St,lt.~. m imtnense. ~ tatcs an: alike. and tl.cv ar<. aJso diiTen.:nt. ~o are <:orpor.tlit 11s, rpks, un iw r'> itics, ancl pt:ople::. \\1c~ever wc put two or more objc>Ctl> Ill " 1 .;,urw c.:ategof) . we arc sa)ing that they ar<:; alike not in all respects but in som<'. '\o two obJeC.: ts in this world are i<lentical yet thcv <:an often be usefullv <:Ontp<H'<'d and co n: hined. "YOlt c;m't < apples and oranges" is an old sa}i ng that dd s<;ems lo hv c<;pecmlly popular among salesmen who do not want you to comp< tre their wares with others. But W(; all know that ti le trick of addjng dissimilar objects is to ~xprcss the result in terms of a category that comprises them. Three apples plus four oranges equals seven pieces of fruit. The only interesting question is whe.thcr the category that classiAes objects according to their common qualities is useful. One can add up a large number of widely varied objects and say that one has eight mil lion things, but seldom need one do that. States va1 widely in size, wealth, power, and form. And yet variations in these y and in other respects are variations among like un its. In what way are they like units? How can they be placed in a single categ01y? States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abil itjes to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function. States perform or try to perform tasks. most of which are common to all of them; the ends they aspire to are similar. Each state duplicates the activities of other states at least to a considerable extent. Each state has its agencies for making, executing, and interpreting laws and regulations, for raising revenues, and for defending itself. Each state supp}jes out of its own resources and by its own means most of the food, clothi ng, housing, transportation , and amenities consumed and used by its citizens. All states, except the smallest ones. do much more of their business at home than abroad. One has to be impressed with the functional similarity of states and, nm.v more than ever before, vvith the similar }jnes their development follows. From the rich to the poor states. from the old to the new ones, nearly all of them take a larger hand in matters of economic regulation, of education, health, and housing, of culture and the arts, and so on almost endlessly. The increase of the activities of states is a strong and strikingly unifonn international trend. The functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise principally from their varied capabilities. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another's activities.
' / .I

3. The Distribution of Capabilities

The parts of a hierarchic system are related to one another in ways that are determined both by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are fu nctionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then disti nguished primruily by tl1eir greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. This states fonnally what students of international politics have long noticed. The great powers of an era have always been marked off from others by practitioners and theorists .ilike. Students of national govern ment make such distinctions as that between parliamentary and presidential systems; govern mental systems differ in form. Students of intemational poutks make distinctions between international-political systems only according to the number of their great powers. The structure of a system changes with changes in

---------------------------------~

PART 1 ANARCHY

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

..VALTZ I HiE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS
HSk

. the S)stem's units. And chaHgcc.. iu struct . I" . bilities <t<:Joss . ]] the cUsttibutJOn o c~pa tJ nHs of th e system w1 I>e I1mc aud ahout tlle th . . . bout ho\>V le u . . I I d' rr . ehnnge ex"}>ect<\tJOOS a . ce Domes tlcal y. t w 1. etcnLJuted parts ofe .. I . . t ctions Wl 11 proc1 . u . . outcomes t 1e1r m era . k We know from observmg tl1e .\me ncan go,e a r sinular tas s. ' . . . . rn. ,stem may penonn . leuislate and legts 1 tu 1e :)Qmt>ti mcs cxecul 5 a . h t' ves sometimes e r ... e. mclnt t at execu 1 . imes perform dif,ere nt tas k ... lmt two prohlems s JntemationaUy, like umts somet should be considered. . th" . Ca ability tells us something aboul units. Definin The first pro?lem 15 ISf. tl P distribution of capabilitie seem!-. to violat~ . artlv m tenns o 1e stnctw e P , . tt butes out of structura1 de c s. t \ s. 1 remarked nmtion t ction to keeo umt a n Tl my ~ns JlJ . . a rhi hl , but not entirely abstract concept. 1e maxJJnum ol' 5 earher, structure 1 . ? ) f content and that minimu m is what is needed to b tr tion allows a mmunum o , .1 . a s ac tJ .t stand in relation to one ano tJ1er. States are uifferenth enable one to sav how 1e wu s z 1s . ' . ' And r one mav ...vonder wI1y on Iy capab1 zty . . n1cIuded in et ) ' . cl c l>lae--ed. by thetr power.d fi 111t011 and not such c1 f tJ 1aracte nst1cs as 1 eo1 ogy, rorrn of the tlmd part o 1e e 1 ' . . . . . . c. 1 ss bellicosity or whatever. The ansv.re1 ts th1s.. Power IS estigovemment, peaceru ne ' ' . I the capabilities of a numbe r of umts. At hougI1 capa biJ' . are 1ties matecl by companng 'butes of um'ts, the distri"bution of <:apabilities across umts IS not. T 1 d" ion 1e 1stnbut attn . of capabilities i~ not a unit attribute, but rather~ system.-WJd~ concept. , ._. The second problem is tJUs: Though relations defined m t~nns of mteractions must be excluded from structural definitions, relations defined m tenns of grouping of states do seem to tell us something about how states are placed in the system. Why not speci~' how states stand in relation to one anothe r by consideling the alliances they form? Would doing so not be comparable to defining national political structures partly in terms of how presidents and prime ministers are related to other political agents? It would not be. ~ationally as internationally, structural definiti ons deal with the relation of agents and agencies in terms of tJ1e organization of realms and not in terms of the accommo<i'ltions and conflicts that may occur within them or ilie groupings that may now and then form. Parts of a govern ment may draw together or pull apart, may oppose each other or cooperate in greate r or lesser degree. These are the relations that form and dissolve within a system ratJ1er tJ1an structural alterations tJ1at mark a change from one system to another. This is made clear by the example that runs nicely parallel to the case of alliances. Distinguishing systems of political parties according to their number is common. A multiparty ~tem changes if, say, eight parties become two, but not if hvo groupings of tJ1e ~Ight fo~ merely for the occasion of fighting an election. By the same logic, an ~ntematio~polltical system in which three or more great powers have split mto two alhances remains ul ~ a m tipolar system -struc turally distinct from a bipo)ar ~-ystelm,da sys m which no third power is able to challenge the top two .... fin~em. n e mg mternational l'fca) ditions hab'ts b' . -po 1 1 structures we take states with whatever tra ~ectJves, not ask'\\helth, ostates are desires, and forms of government they may have. We do er 1 ti . ideo)noical . . revo u onary or legitimate, autJ1oritarian or democ ratic, -l:j" or pragmatic We abst t fr capabilities N h' kin rac. om every attribute of states except t betr or m t m g ab t f states their feelings of . dsh~u structur~. do we ask about the relation s 0 alliances they form and ;Jen 1 and hostility, their diplomatic exchanges, cl1 P e ' e extent of the contacts and exchanges among tJ,em- We

39

of CXf>N:latiollS ari'iCS JriCr<:iy from looking at the type of order thal prevail s < 111011~ tlwtn ami at the dio;tribution of capabiJitie~ \vithin that order. We ab~tnwt f: IJOJ an} particular qualities of states and from all of their concrd e connec:ti<Hl' \\ h.tt emerges i~ a positional pic:tur<:' , a general descliption of the ordered O\ erall arrange utc.:nt of a so<.:iety written in tc.:rms of the placement of 1mits rather than in terms of their qualities .... what
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ANARCHIC STRUCTURES AND BALANCES OF POWER

[We must now] examin e the characteristics of anarchy and the expectations about outcomes associated with anarchic realms .... [This] is best accomplished

by drawin g sonte comparisons between behavior and outcomes in anarchic and hierarchic realms.
4. Violen ce at Home and Abroa d

The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadov,, of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their militarily more \igorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that. with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out. Wheth er in the family, the community, or the world at large, contact without at least occasional conflict is inconceivable; anc.l the hope that in the absence of an agent to manage or to manipulate conflicting parties the use of force \vill always be avoided cannot be realisti cally entertained. Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence. The threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish international from national affairs. But in the history of the world surelv most rulers . . have had to bear in minc.l that tJleir subjects might use force to resist or overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated with the threat of violence, so also is its presence. A haphazard list of national tragedies illustrates the point all too well. The most destructive wars of the hundred years following the defeat of :"Japoleon took place not among states but withil'l tJlem. Estimates of deaths in China's Taiping Hebellion, which began in 1851 and lasted 13 years, range as high as 20 million. In the Amelican Civil War some 600 thousand people lost their lives. ln more recent history, forced collect:ivation and Stalin's purges eliminated 5 million Russians, and Hitler exterminated 6 million Jews. In some Latin Amelican counhies, coups d'etats and rebellions have been normal features of national life. Behvee n 1948 and 1957, for example, 200 thousand Colombians were killed in civil sttife. In the middle 1970s most inhabitants of Idi Amin's Uganda must have felt their lives becoming nasty. brutish, and short, guite as in Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. If such cases constitute abenat ions, they are w1comfortably common ones. \ Ve easily lose sight of the f~lCt that Struggles tO achieve and maintai n power, to establish Order. and to COntrive a kind of justice within states may be bloodier than wars among them.

PART I

.. "' 0 ITS CONSEQUENCES ANARCHY Jw

d . ction. and death. t 11<' u d tl clisline:tion . ........ 11.m ... " Jw is identified \\ith ch<lO . s esttrutell us much. \ \'hi c.l is I ()re pree:an. . t doe no . ben,<:>en anarchy and go,emmen or of a govern men t 111 re 1 r le lts :subjects? .tlJO . the life of a state among states. A nu ou. . . cl place. 1110 some . tate s at ~ J'lll ' t1 mes. the . Tl w !\.115\\er ,.anes ,;vith bme an Jence 1S )O'"' Within some ~tates .1t some times f ex'TlP.C'ted occurrence o V . JOf ce is hjgh. The use of f11ru. or the c:on- actual Or .., - # x'l"\f\Cted occurren ce 0 ,,o1en . . . . ds 1101. distingu1sJ1111g mUrna tional from c: t l1e actual Or e "1.'- ffi t groun . t r . r of its use. are not su eten . tual use of force ma rk hot h national and st<lll ,ea bJe lestic affairs. If the poSSJ and the ac 'nction benvee n tJl e n\.0 I' s can he bl distJ l d01 c cum tJ 0 dura e .1 . . t mational orders, 1en n f force. :\o human oruer IS pro o ragainst me . f the use or the non use o drawn m terms o . ole nce '-1 . ali . differences be...,veen internal .and cxtern<li affairs one l . To disc.'Over qu tative h 1 occurrence of vJOlence. T } 1e cl'1stmction . tle c l mus t look fo r a critenon other talan alm s of politics is not roun< . t l1e use or the . m between international and .nati.C: ret tructures. But if the dan ge rs of being 'io nonuse of force but 10 clle1r diJterent s . king an eve ninu stro 11 t Iuou g1 down town 1 0 , ter say Ill a .I JentJy attacked are gr~a .' . alonu tJ1e fre nch and Ge m1an boruer. what Det roit cllan they are 111 plcn~~~cc g f . 0 sb'llcture make? Nat ion all y as. interna. cl wHerence . . ractical difference oes . t d at times issues m ,,ol enc e. The cliiTerenc:e P t erates con6JC an tionally, contac gen . al l'ti'cs lies not jn the use o f r e but m the rorc al d 1 mation po l nte between nation an c: . od 0 f garuzation ror domg something abo ut it. A govern ment. ruldiffe rent m es or f .ti. arrogates to itself the righ t to use force-t hat . b 1 ~~o~m~ . mg )' some 5 . f cti' to control dle use of forc e bv .subjects. If some / 1ts . t0 Jy a vanety o san ons / lS, app th . al to the government. A govern me nt has no se private force, o ers may appe . u tb is all too evident. An effective gove rnm ent , h0\\ ,monopoly on e use o rorce, as '- n1nate use of forc e and legi.ti.ma te l1ere means t1 1at ever has a monopo lYon tbe wgr ' . f [i ubllc a ents are organi7..ed to prevent and to cou nte r the pnvate use o orce.. cttfzens n! d not prepare to defe nd themselves. Public a~encies do that. A nati onal system is not one of self-help. The inte rnational system 1 s.

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORW POLmCS

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5. Interdependence and Integration

The political significance of inte rde penden ce varies depe ndi ng o n wh eth er ~ realm is organized, with relations of authority spe cifie d and establis hed, or rem ams formally unorganized. Insofar as a realm is formally org anized , its uni ts are free to specialize, to pursue their own inte rests without con cer n fo r develo pin g the mea n} of maintaining their identity and preserving the ir sec u rity in the presencetlo others. They are free to speciaJi ze because they have no rea son to fea~ 1 .e increased interdependence that goes with specialization . If tho se who speCJ~ ~~ most benefit most, then competition in specialization ensues . Go ods are man ad tured, grain is produced, law and order are mai nta ine d com me rce is conduct.e ' and financial services are provided by people who ever 'mo re nar rowly special ~~ In simple e<.-onomic ten ns, the cobble r dep end s on the tailor for his pan ts and 1 . tailor on the cobble r for his shoes and each would be ill-clad witho ut the sen'lces of the other. In simple political ;en ns, Kansas dep end s on Washingto n for P7~ tect ion and regulation and \Vashington dep end s on Kansas for beef and whe at.

saying tha i ILL ~illlations inte nle pe11dc#nce is close. one nc.,e d not main tain lhat the one par t <:0 1ld not learn to live: without lhe othe r. One need onl~ sa~ that the cost of bn:a.ki'1~ the interdependent relation would he hjgh . Persons and insti t\Jtions dep e11d laavily on one anoth er because of the differe nt tas h they perform and the different good they produce and exc hange. The parts of a polity bind themselves togctl.e r by the ir differences .; Differen ces betw<::en national and inte rnational tru<;tures are reA d in the ecte ways the units of each system define their ends and de,clop the means for reaching them . Jn anarchic realms, like units <;oact. In hierarchic realms. unlike unjts inte rad. In an ana n.:hic n:alm , the units are funetionaJly similar and tend to rem ain so. Like units work to main tain a measure of inde pendence and may even trive fo r autarchy. In a hierarchic realm , the units are differentiated, and they tend to increase the exte nt of their specialization. Differentiated units become closely interdependent, the more closely so as their specialization proceeds. Because of the differe nce of stm <;tu re, interdependen<;e within and interdependence among nations are hvo distinct concepts. So as to follow the logicians' admonition to kee p a single meaning for a give n term throughout one's discourse, I shall use "integra tion" to describe the condition within nations and "interdependence to describ e the condition among them. Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities . Out of such differe nces something of a division of labor develops. The division of labor across nations, howeve r, is slight in comparison with the highly articulated divi sion of labor witllin the m. Integration draws the parts of a nation closely toge the r. Inte rdepen dence among nations leaves them loosely connected. Although the inte gration of nations is often talked about, it seldom takes plac e. Nations could mutuall y enrich themselves by further dividing not just t11e labo r that goes into the production of goods but also some of the oth er tasks they per form , such as political manage men t and military defmse. why does the ir integration not take place? The structure of inte rnational politics limits the cooperation of states in hvo ways. In a seLf-help system each of the unHs spends a portion of its effort. not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itse Lf against others. Specialization in a system of divided labor works to e,eryones advantage, though not equally so. Ine quality in the ex-pecte d distribution of the increas ed product wor ks strongly against extension of the division of labor inte rnational!~. When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ac;k how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not vvill both of us gain ?" but "'Who "'rill gain more?" If an expect ed gain is to be divided , say, in the rati o of two to one, one state may use its disp roportionate gain to implem ent a pol icy inte nde d to damage or destroy the oth er. Even the prospe ct of large absolu te gains for both parties does not elicit the ir cooperation so long as each fears how the oth er wiJl use its increased capabilities. :\otice t11at the imp ediments to collabo ration may not lie in the character and the imm edi ate inte ntion of either party. Instead , the condition of insecurity- at the least, the uncertainty of each abo ut the otJ1er's futu re inte ntions and actions -wo rks against their cooperatio n ... .

_.!!

PART I

ANAKL.H y
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. ,. oss ibk crain<; that Ill,\~ o1\0 J" Others I ) divistOll () p b r Jlll l J"Jl:ltll"taI pol 1 Ore t\tL' \\"l)nies aIlOU t cl . h" \ s , itics li . ' " . JC Il tl1e . tru ctu rc 0 l11tts ' . I "t ,.]f. Th ,,ti . the firstwayu L 'O s lest it hcc.:on w t J-rie t n.n _, eh P' lcltnt on otl1 . . A tlte <\ o '' . ' ers ~"' s' . t1H' ~""" tx>ration of states. . vors an d excbanges of goods cUt< 'it'n ces. That is th . d . ' ""\l '7 h C:00l)eratlV<' t'J1 ea f . tem ationaJ pO tItiC: t tS. ltW <.:Ooperation e tl11 "' b lllll f . he st1uctu re o Ill . " , . ,..,... d ww in wlu c1 t 1 y . 0""'1 ,' aJizes t1 tnor e it reli es on ouw 1' to ~upp1 the rnate. 'le . . 1. . . t . The more a stat e spec st,'l es. . . t roduc111g. Tl1e larger a states nnp orls anc exports tl1e l . . \ .an d goods that tt ts no P Id's well-beiuo wouk1 ) t' m<.-reased if an eve na s tl Th e wor o r re it depends on o leJS. developed but states wo ulcl there bv plac:e mo .. ' " e elaborate divtston of labo r were. terdependence . Som e states may not resist mor . . . 0 fever c1 r 111 ose . . ,. . . . the mselves u1 sttuabons d t the costs of dom g :so . . cxc,css lvelv lllgh aH' ~at For small and iJl-endowe . sta ese more enmesh ed "vilh oth e rs ordin~rily cl~ , . . "t ev 1 Bu t states that can resls becommcr t s tb<1t are heavilv dep cnclent , or closely ; inter. 5 so in either or boili of two ways: at]~ t eh they depend on. Th e high iltterde. 1a . dependent, worry abou t secunng t tes in question exp enc nce. or are sub jec:t to 1 an sth att 1e sa endence of states me h" 1 . terderJende nce e nta.1 L1t(e ot1 organiza-' s. 1er P biltv that tcr 1 111 1 the common vu 1 a ' ner b tl e , depend 011 or to lessen the extent of their 1at 1 > . tions, states seek to control w1 explains quite a bit o ftJ1e be I Vlor o rs_tat . . thou ht _1a es: their dependency. This Simple th g of their control and the1r autarchtc sttiv ings . perial thrusts to widen e scope
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WA L I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD PO UTI CS TZ

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toward greater self-su clency.rt . behaviors and penaJize those wh o do not 11 Structures encourage ce ~ t. nallv man)' lam ent the ext rem e developm ent tl1 encouragement. l' a to ', respon d to e . d nt that results in the allocation of ever narf th di . . 1 of Jabor a eve1 e o e VJSIOJ. . d ~ And opm ecialization pro cee ds, aml its extent et s i a mearower tasks to mdivJ u f ~ ti. ; In a fOiomally organi:;,ed realm a pre mium is f the development o . socie e . sure o . , . a able to s ecialize in order to increase its va lue to ot hers . m put on each umt s beme, P . . . . em of divided labor. The dom estic Imper_ . e JS "speciahze" l I nternationallv ativ ~. . ,, ~1: lament tlle resources states spend unproductiv_ely ~or the ir own dei~:~~ a:~ the oppo rtunities the)' miss to enhanc e the welfar e of the tr peo ple th roug ~ J an ation with other states. And yet the ways o f states<.:l1an ge l"ttle . In . unorgamzeu t - f realm each unit's incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to_ tak e ea~~~ itself since no one else can be counted on to d o so. Tlle 111 t e m ationt ltmpcrative 1s G l _ 11 "take care of yoursel f'! Some leaders of nations may un de rsta nd tha 1 t t ~ ~v~ being of all of them would increase through the ir participation in a fuller ~1 151011 " oflabor. But to act on the idea would be to act on a dom estic im per ativ e, an unper. . ative that does not run internationally. What one mtg l1t wa nt to d 0 10 the absence '. their of structural constraints is different from what one is e nco ura ged to do tn d . . presence. States do not willingly place tbe ms e1 ves m sttu ah.ons of increase dependence. In a self-help system , considerations of secun.ty su1 cli nlte ec:o)Or ' nomic gain to political interest. .
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6. Structures and Strategies

That motives and outcomes may well be disjoined sho uld now be easl1Yseen-. have
Structures cause nations to have consequences the y we re no t inten~ed to ble to Surely most of the actors will notice that, and at lea st som e of them will be a

thmk (){ othc rs . H ~h~rtage of a commodity is expected, aB are collecti,e ly bet ter off if the y buy less of 1l111 ord er to n:och:~rate ptiCE! increases and to distribute shortages equ itably. But bt'ca_usc so~ne w111 be better off if they lay in extra supplies quickl y. all have a strong m cen t1 to do so. lf one expects oth ers to make vc a run on a bank, one's prudent course _is to ru~1 fast er then they do even while knowing that if few others run, th e bank \VllJ remam solvent, and if many run. it will fail. [n such cases. pursui t of individual in~ercs t produces coll ective results that nobody wants, yel ind ividuals by behaving differently will hurt the mselves without altering outcomes. The se two much used examp les establish the main point. Some courses of action I cannot sensibly follow unless we are pre tty sur e that many others will as well ... . we may well notice tJ1at our behavior produces unwanted outcomes, but we are also Hkely to see that such instances as these are examples of what Alfred E. Kah n descdbes as "large" changes that are brought about by the accumulation of 'small"' decisions. In such situations people are victims of the "tyranny of small decisio ns.' a phrase suggesting tl1at "if one hundred consumers choose option x, and this causes the marke t to make decision X (where X equals lOOx). it is not necessarily b-ue that those same consumers would have voted for that outcome if that large decisio n had ever been presen ted for their explicit consideration."!! If the market does not present the large questi.on for decision. then individuals are doomed to making decisio ns that are sensib le within their nanow con texts even though they know all the while that in making such decisions they are bringing abo ut a result that most of them do not want. Eitl1er that or they organize to ove rcome some of tlle effects of the ma rket by changing its structure for example, by brin ging consum er uni ts roughl y up to the size of the units that are making producers' decisions. This nicely makes the poi nt: So long a~ one leaves the structure unaffected it is not possible for changes in the intentions and the actions of particular actors to produce desirable outcomes or to a\"oid undesirabl e ones .. .. The only remedies for strong structural eflects are stm ctural changes. Structural constraints cannot be vvished away, although many fail to unders tand this. In every age and place, the units of self-help systems-nations, corpor ations, or whatever -are told that the greate r goo <.l , aJong \vith their own , requires the m to act for the sake of the system and not for their own naJTowly defined advantage . In the 1950s, as fear of the world's destruction iu nuc:lear war grew. some c-onclud ed that the alte rnative to wo rld des truction was world disarmament. In the 1970s, with the rapid growth of population, poverty, and pollution, some concluded, as one political scientist put it, that "states must me et the needs of the political ecosystem in its global dimensions or court annihilation.'.g The inte rnational interest must be served ; and if that means anything at all, it means that national interests are subordinate to it. The proble ms are found at tl1e global level. Solutions to the proble ms continue to depend on national policies. \Vhat are the conditions that wo uld make nations more or less willing to obey tl1e injunctions that are so ofte n laid on them?

figu re c~ 1 t v,hv. -~i 11<~ may devdop a pre lty good sense of jmt how struclures work their dk r L~o \\ 11l tl tcy not Lltc.n be ahle to ad licve:: their original ends by app ropriately <tdJust ll~~ tlwJr strategies? U nfort uualcly. they often cannot. To show why Lhi~ is ~o I ., J_t<tll ~tve only a few exa mple!'>: once the poi nt i made. the reader will eac;il)

....

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCt::b

. b ... , e ll pursuing their 0\\11 iJ.t< ' ~o">h anclt<:t e llow l'an the, reso1 t1 e tensJOn el.''sJ,own how that can be< l01 e. tit hough <ll' ng ,e l . ? 1 one 1 No 1<lS tny for tlte s;1ke of the system. r tional behador. The ,e1y prohl<:'tn, lowever . . . ,,1 ;ng tiiCtr hands atl<d I)lead lOr ra al constraints, does not Ieh< I to t I1e want. ts d ' b 1 gven stntctu tc: . f that rational e tavwr, 1 .. ed to take care of itsel . no OI1l' <:an take caree of 1 results. \\'ith each country constrau the system. 10 . nd doom may lead to a clear defit.tition or en us that rnust A strong sense of p~nJ a . ot there b, made poss1hle. ThC' possi bilitv of . ed Th . acluevernent lS n , , be aclue, : elf the ability to provide necess~uy means. It d epends even effective action d~pends 0 ~conditions that pennit nations and othe r organi7.ations to more so on the eXJsten~e_o d trateoies. World-shaking prohlems <:1y for global r U an s o '- .. l ro ow app ropriate pol.icJeSJobal agency to provi detI1em. ,, eces 1ties to not create . solutions, but the~e 15tln 0 al ses were efficient ones does not make them so . .b.uti Wishing lat nn eau poss1 L es. lished onh- b, agents of great <:apab.Li ~- That is wlw 1 t tasks can be accomp , ' . ' Grea ; a]J tl . ones are called on to do what lS neccs ary for the . . d ecr y 1e maJor , . states , an esp h e to clo whatever thev thmk nec:essarv ror their own Id" ival But states av ' wor s s~rv . can be relied on to do it for them .\ \'h~ the' achice to place . Preservation, smce no one >bove national interests IS meanmg1 can he ex1Jlamecl . . a1 t est ess the mtemation tn er "' . . 1 . . 1 ftbe distin.ction between mtcro- and mac rot 1eones .. .. prec1se y tn terms o changes in the awareness and purp o e. th e orgam. m zaSome have hoped tllat . . . . tion and ideology of states would change the quality of 1~tem~bonal l~e. O~er the centuries states have changed in many ways , but the quality of mtem ation al hfe has remained much the same. States may seek reasonable and wort hy ends, but they cannot figure out how to reach them. The problem is ~?t in their .stupidity or ill will. altho ugh one does not want to claim that those qualities are lad.-,ng. The depth of the difficulty is not understood until one realizes that intelligen ce and goochviJJ cannot discover and act on adequate programs. Early in this cent my Winston Churchill observed that the British-German naval race promised disa ster and that Britain had no realistic choice other than to run it. States facing global problems are like individual consumers trapped by the "tyranny of small decisions." States, like consumers, can get out of the trap only by changing the struc ture of their field of activity. The message bears repeating: The only reme dy for a stron g sbl.JCtural effect is a struc:tural change.

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POUTlCS

-15

7. The VIrtues of Anarchy

To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anar chy- be they people, corporations, states, or wha teve r-mu st rely on the means they can_generat~ and the arrangements they can make for them selves. Self-help is n~~ariJy the pnnciple of action in an anarchic order. A self-help situation is one of ~ nsk-ofbankruptcy in the economic realm and of war in a world of free states. It In . IS also. one in which organizationa1 costs are low. Within an economy or w1th. an. mtemation coordin al order' risks may be av01'ded or lessened by moving from a situation of . crate. ac:tion to _one of super- and subordination, that is by erec ting agencieS with euective authonty and ext din ' the fun . en g a system of rules. Governm ent emerges w]1ere ctions of regulation and management themselves beco me distinct and

~vecializerlt;t" h . Th<: c.:<~<;ts of naintainin!; a hierarchic: order are frequent!~ ignored b: thoc;_e " ~ 1 loplore Its_ah~encc. Organizatio11s ha,e at lea.-;t two aims: to get somC"Lhmg do11t and to namtcun themselves as organizations. ~l am of their acli\ilie are dirc'ctt:cl to_warcl the secon d purpo!)e. The leaders of organi7..ations, ancl political leader!) pn:<tulne ntly, are not masters of the matters their organizations deal with. They .ltav~ lwcotoc l~ad~ rs not by being experts on one th ing or another hu t by excelhng m tl~( orgam7ational e:t rts-i n maintaining <:ontrol of a group's memhcrs. in .. elicitin~ predt~t-ahle _satisfacto?' efforts from them . in holding group together. In maki ng pohttcal clet:JSIOns, the first and most important coneem is not to achieve the aims the ncmbers of an organization ma, have but to secure the continuitv and health of the organization itself. 1I ' Along with the adva ntages of hierarchic orders go the costs. In hierarchic orde rs. moreover, the means of control become an object of struggle. Substanti,e issues becon1e enhvined with efforts to influence or control the controllers. The hierarchi c orcle ling of polmcs adds one to the already num erous objects of struggle, and the object added is at a new order of magnitude. If the risks of war are unbearably high, can they be reduced by organizing to manage the affai rs of nations? At a minimum, management requires controlling tl1e miJHary forces that are at the disposal of states. Within nations. organizations have to work to maintain themselves. As organizations, nations, in working to maintain themselves, sometimes have to use force against dissident elements and areas. As hierarchical systems, governments nationally or globally are disrupted b~ the defection of major parts. In a society of states with little cohe rence, attempts at world government would founder on the inabiJity of an emerging central authority to mobilize the resources needed to create and maintain the unih of the svstem bv ' . regulating and managing its parts . The prospect of world gove'mment would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war.... States cannot entrust managerial powers to a central agency u11less that agenc~ is able to protect its client states. The more powerful the <.:lients and the more the power of each of them appears as a threat to the others, the greater the power lodged in tl1e center must be. The greater the power of the center, the stronger the incen tive for states to engage in a struggle to control it. States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted. insecurity must be accepted. Organizations that establish relations of authority and control may increase insecurity as they decrease freedom. If might does not make right, whether among people or states, then some institution or agency has intervene d to lift tl1em out of nature's realm. The more influential the agency, the stronger the desire to control it becomes. In contrast, unlts in an anarchic order act for their own sakes and not for the sake of prese n.i.ng an organization and fmthering their fortunes within it. Force is used for one's own interest. In tl1e absence of organization, people or !>tates are free to lea,e one another alone. Even when they do not do so, they are better able, in the absence of the politics of tl1e organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problem and to aim for a mininmm agre ement that will permit their separate existence rather than a ma.ximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity. If might decides. then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided.

a u?

..&6

PART 1

NO ITS CONSEQUf:NCt:.!:> ANARCHY A

f-1 !tO\ em111l _J. [ C.:<;:. I. :\:1timdlv. the orce o < ~ lo,ed for the S<LKe o 1t!'. own protection .1 d r f. state 1S em P n ...mllionuk the ton.:e o a ents claim to au tl10nty: t1 ( JUestion th W\ l nl" ' . t -'1 r a govern 111 I e . d ''nt<wr. H cbds CL1a.L enhe t tes cannot settle guest1ons o allthorit)' "nd 1 ' ~ ~ \~ " 'rthtfulncss of its rule. l;u-s among 11s a. tion of gains and losses among contendc _ nEd . . .aht tbev C<U1 onlv etermine the <wocaho is the stTonger. N attorl.t!I\: relations rs. f nr . . . .. tl est]on o w I . o1 and settle for a ttme le qu . allv. onlv relations of strengl1 rc.snll. :\ ationallv authoritv are established. lntemation t. clu~tens the political ~:'Stem. Force used b: ed a 1St a aovemmen . . Y rivate force us aoau t> tl ntemational perspective. t 1 pnvate use of 1e P t I' body-is from le 1 - ' a state a puo JC t overthrow and no govemm enla~ apparatus to r force: but "' u1ere . no.govemment 0Id heaemony. the plivate use o f" orce does not rs o . .. . Sl101t of a drive tow-arc1wor litics onlv some of 1t s me m I 1s. \\'ar prts some capture. . 1al 1e threaten the system ofintematio; l:ong ~imtlarly constituted enlilie . The power states againSt others in alstruggak~ rrom assertina their claims. not because the weak t le 1 o . I f the strong may detertful we f 1 le on the pa1t of the strong, 1 o 1ut unp v because . a kind of righ ness o m ak . . .d ~gnv ..e . tan le ,.~,~tJ 1 tJ1em. Conversely, the we may Cll.JO}' cons1 erable tt L~ not sensJb~e t~f th g. f:tr removed in their capabilities from lhe strong that freedom of actiOn I eyboarethsored bY tlleir actions or much concemed by marginal h the latter are not muc e . ' increases in tl1eir capabilities. . . . . strat10n, and of law. lnter:\ational politics IS the realm of authority, of admm1 f .. cl . . national politres the realm of power, of struggle, and o . accommo .ahon. The rs , I a] . intemational realm is preeminently a political one. f he nationa re ~~ IS vanously described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralize d, l~etero~e neous, dJrected,. and contrived tile inten1ational realm, as being anarcluc. honzontaJ. decentrahzed, homogen~us, undirected , and mutually adaptive. The more ~en tralized ~1-e order, tile nearer to tile top tl1e locus of decisions ascends. I nternatJonally, dects1ons are made at tile bottom level. there being scarcely any otJ1er. In the vertical-horizontal dichotomy, international structures assume the prone position. Adjustm ents are made internationally, but they are made without a formaJ or authoritati e adjuster. Adjustment and accommodation proceed by mutual adaptation. 12 Action and reaction, and reaction to the reaction, proceed by a piecemeal process. The parties feel each oilier out, so to speak, and define a situation simuJtaneously v.rith its development. Among coordinate units, adjustment is achieved and accommodations arrived at by the exchange of "<.:onsiderations," in a condition, as Cheste r Barnard put it, which the duty of command and the desire to obey are essentially 1 3 :;ent. \~ere ~e contest is over ~nsidera tions, the parties seek to maintain or anp~e tll.e1r J>OSltions by m.~eu~enng, by bargainjng, or by fighti ng. The manner d .mtenSJty of the competition ts determined by the desires and the abilibes of parties that are at once separate and interacting. ,__. Whethlfe! or ~t by force, each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its uuerests. 10rce IS used by t states . to r one s ate or its use is expected the recourse of other JS use 10rce or be prepared t0 . . I ' can be made hi . use Jt smg y or in <.:o mbinatio n. No appea1 the ability t0 to a .gher entity clothed with the autl1ority and equipped wjth a<.:t foree will be usedon its own initiative. under such conditions the possibility t11at b 0 background. In po~~ or ~notl_ler of the parties looms always as a threat in the cs orce IS said to be the ultima ratio. In inte rnational politiCS

.11t 15. exercised in tlte name of n~ltt < justi . . md

WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POUTICS

41

forc.:e s tJVt ' t ()u)~ as the ultiuw ratio, hut indeed as tht first and c.:omtanl cmc. To li ntit .~<'~l' ,t~.~~t'lll~ ~he u~ti1:w rat.in of politic:s implies, it1 the words of Ortega y Cassct, lit< l H ."ous submiSSion of force to metl10ds of rea~on." 1 1 The constant possibility tlwt lor~C' wi ll he used limits manipulations, moderates demands. and serves as an mc:enttvc for the settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard m~) ~(:'ad to. war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth .the ns~s e.ll<uled. The threat of force internationally is comparable to the rule of the stnke ll1 l~~hor a~1d management bargaining. "The few strikes that take place are n a sense, .as L1vernash has s~id, "the c.:ost of the strike option whi<;h produc.:es settlcme11Ls m the large mass of negotiations.'' 15 Even if workers seldom strik~. their doing so is alwa~s a possibili ty. The possibility of industrial disputes leadi.ng to long and costly stnkes encourages labor and management to face difficult tssues. to try to understand each other's problems, and to work hard to find a<;commodation~. ~he possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long and costly wars has s1 mrl arly sobering effects.

8. Anarch y and Hierarchy

I ha,e described anarchies and hierarchies as tlloucth everv political order were of 0 ' one type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write of struehtres allow for a greater, and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types. Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked bv the , presence of a legitimate and competen t government. International politics is then descJibed as being flecked with particles of government and alloyed ,,~th elements of community-supranational organizat ions whether universal or regional. alliances. multinational corporati ons, networks of trade, and whatnot. International-political systems are thought of as being more or less anarchic. Those who view the world as a modified anarcbv do so it seems for two ' ' reasons. First, anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence 'of government but also the presence of disorder and chaos. Since world politics. although not reliably peaceful, falls short of unrelieved chaos, students are inclined to see a lessening of anarchy in each outbreak of peace. Since world politics, although not formally organized, is not entirely without institutions and orderly procedures, students are inclined to see a lessening of anarchy when alliances form, when transactions across national borders increase, and when internatio nal agencies multiply. Such views confuse structure with process, and I have drawn attention to tJ1at error often enough. Second, the two simple categories of anarchy and hierarchy do not seem to accommodate tJ1e infinite social variety our senses record. Why insist on reducing the types of structure to nvo instead of allowing for a greater variety? Anarchies are ordered by the juxtaposition of similar units, but those similar units are not identical. Some specialization by function develops among them. Hierarchies are ordered by the social division of labor among units specializing in di.fTerent tasks, but the resemblance of units does not vanish. Much duplication of effort continues. All sociE-ties are organized segmentally or hierarchically in greater or lesser degree. Why not then, define additional social types according to the m~ture of organizing principles

:in

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CON

SEQUENCES
WALTZ I THE ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF WORLD POUTlCS

4 . ;!I! the Ptrely ive o f son1e societies apprna' . ,.erarchi<..:. and . of st:t. qtllt:>rs1.re0c:cti g conce l_"" .J,.'l One might . the }Jure1, 11 l ' 11 the, t'lll XJU. 1 . . IHC. 0 f others 30J)I"Oi.1C ung 1oonai 'hn,es Jn anarchtes t 1e1 t 1 tc:l Jkeness 0 f 1 : r t tUU\J'C' , ,(!.ed nuxes of the two org<uliZ<bv captbi]jtv ctlone won <. < <>-.en be a re' l t., .. ,.. . . ' ' f I tions . spt:'Cul , ftl nteradion of LlllJts guh.lPd hy admini. 1 the deten11inat10n o re a . r, I , . , ciJ . . . s . 'tll none o Je J umts .mo 1 c1 entiatJon or :politi'cs and powet Wl h 'hi In 1...... ,..c!Jies the comp et<: lJet<u w h0 ll\'0 l . and conditioned by aut on.r. 1uncti'ons would prod uce. a. .realm wholly of . .. . e1r f t11 ~.: . , . tnttion . .~ I . nteraction of patts ..tOected by pohti<.:s . . p<u '~ an<J the full specification1tl1 none oftl 1e 1 ~ h ure , autl10 n'tv and administration "' orders do 110t exist' to distingLUs 1 realms b" their rand important. and power. Although sue P 0 .,,...;.,..;nu principles iS ne\ertheJess pr. pe'"'OuJd bJinu the clas ification of SOcieties . . o b 0 f categones org<U...... o Increasing the num er ud be to mo'e away from a theory claunmg explanatorv . . . . tlJat wot One who .51ng greater descnpti,e accuracy. Closer to reality. But . . h d . . aJ system proJm. tl1eOJetic Power to a less . ti1er tl1an to descn'be should resist. movmg m t at u cction if . . . ? Wl t does one gain by ms1stmg on two types when wishes to expam ra resistance is reasonable. Is Idt. 'lllba t 0 smpuh boldly? One gain~c; clarity and e<.:on1 'J [!0ur woul sb e 1 or h uld be introduced only to <.:over matters tl1at admitting t 1ree f concepts A new concept s o societies are neither,anarcIu.c or 1. 11erarchic:' omy .o . 1. d0 not reac} If some . fined b some third ordering pti nc:Iple. then we would ha,e ~nsti~g concepts. Y. if thetr structures are de16 All societi'es are mixed. Elements in them represent both third system d6 . . 1 5 That does not mean that some societies are ordered to e ne a . of the .ordenn! ?dnnc~p ~ Us ally one can easily identify the principle by which 1. l . J. I . according to a unr pnnctp e. u es . 1 . . . . sectors w1t 1m uerarc 11 rc oes not a soc1ety IS 01dered. Th e appearance of anarchic . 101 mger . d shouId not 0 bscu re the ordering l)nnc1ple of the 1 b h system, th t 1ose . r e ltllJts r alter an . sectors are anarchic onIy ' VJ' tl1111 limits The attributes and e av10r o . . . . . u populallng th ose sect ors \!VJtlu'n ..t.e larger system differ moreove r, from .what ther should be and how they would behave outside of 1t. F1rms m o!Jgopolrstic markets again are perfect examples of tJ1is. They struggle against one anothe r, but be~m~ e they need not prepare to defend tllemselves physical ly. they c.:an afford to spectal~ze and to participate more fully in ilie division of economic labor than states c~n. :\or do the states that populate an anarchic world find it impossible to work w1t~1 ~ne another, to make agreements limiting their arms, and to coope rate in estabhsh1~g organizations. Hierarchic elements within intemational structures limit and restram the exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly <.'Onditioned by the anarch>' of the larger system. The anarchy of that order strongly affects the like)jh~d of cooperation, the extent of arms agreements, and the jurisdiction of intematiOnal organizations....

~H

4 . .\ fca rnt \ hrti'' ' <tU Tlw Pn~itiu Pl~tlo.~"l'h!J of lw~u\te C11111U: Freely Translated am/ Cmtdf'll'lrl. :3rd l'd. I London Kcgan Paul, Trench. Trllbt.er, 1 !1~3 1 \'ol. l pp. 3 1- '5:J (;rorg1 Katnua... Rational BPlaa"iur and Ec:CJnomic Heha\iC>r." Psyclwlo!!.ical Ret:.iC'u 60 (S('pttm kr HJ.'53,.

Prcss. HX>~ ), p. 207 . 6. S111itl 1slrould know better. Tnmslatcc.l in to ~erms that he hru. IJimsclf so t:fTecti\ely used. tcJ ~ay that l-tates are so,weign is to say that they are sf'gmt:;nb of a plural sO<:iety. S(:>e Ilis "A Strm:tural ;\ pproad, to Cornparathe Politics'' in David Ea<;ton , E'd.. Vaneties of Politic:, Theori~~ ( uglewood Cliffs, 1\.j .: Prcntice HaiL 1966), p. 122: cf. his "On Segmental) I ,ineage S~ stems." jounwl of the Royal Antlmrpolo{!.ical Society of Creat Britain a11d Ireland% (July- Dece mber J956). ork: 7. Emile D urkhcim. T he Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (. ew Y Free Press. 1964), p. 212. 8. Alfred E. Kahn , ''The Tyranny of Small Decision: Market Failure, Imperfections and Lit nits of Econometrics," in Brucc M. Hussett, ed., Economic Theories of International R.elatiuns (Chicago, Ill.: Markham , 1966), p. 23. 9. Richard W Ste rling, Macropolitics: International Re/.(Jtions in a Global Societ y ork: Knopf. 1974), p. 336. (;\e\\' Y 10. Put differenlly, states face a "prisone rs dilemma." If each of two partjes foll ows his 0 \\11 interest, holh end up worse on than if each acted to achieve joint interests. For thorough examination of the logic of such situations, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (P1inceton , '.J.: Princeton Unive rsity Press. 1977): for brie f and suggestive iJ1ternational applications, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the SecUJity Dile mma,'' World Politics 30 (January 1978). 11. Cf. Paul Diesing. Reason in Society (Urbana, Ill.: University of Lllinois Press, 1962). pp. 198-204: Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, BrO\vll. 1967). pp. 262-70. 12. Cf. Chester l. Barnard, "On Planning for World Government.'' in Chester I. Barnard, ed., Organi::.ation and Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Hruvard University Press. 1948), pp. 148-.52: Michael Polanyi. ''The Growth of Thought in Society." Economica 8 (Nove mber 1941), pp. 428-56. 13. Bamard, "On Planning,'' pp. 150-51. 14. Quoted in ChaJmers A. Joh nson, ]~evolutionary Change (Boston: Little, BrO\'vll_ 1966). p. 13. 15. E. R. Livemash, "The Relation of Power to the Structure and Process of Collective Bargaining,.. in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Economic Theories of International Politics (Chicago, Ill.: Markham, 1963), p. 430. 16. Emile D urkheim's depiction of solidary and mechanical societies stiJI pro,ides the best explication of the two ordering principles, and his logic in limiting the types of society to two continues to be compelling despite the e fforts of his many critics to o,erthrow it (see esp. Tlte Division ofLabor in Society ).

ale I 5. Charlcl\ 1~ 1\:indlcbc-:: rgcr. American 13uc;iness Abroad ( ~ cw . Iaven, Ct.: Y Univcr:.it}

NOTES

NadeJ. i ~~'pp. ln~TheoryofSocial Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), PP 8-ll.
3 William ed.
Nnt-

Fo~f -~OX. 'ihe Uses of International Relations Theory" in William T. R.'t\' 0 , A...,.,-., of
-~ p.International Relations (t\otre Dame, Incl.: UniverSJ ' 1959), 35.

V"t-9.

otre Dame Press,

Anarchy and the Strugglefor Po wer

JO HN]. MEARSHEIMER
"'te Great powerS, I ar5' are alwa)IS . searching for oppo1tunities to gain power over . , . their rivals, with hegemony as theu final goal. Thts pers pec~v<.> does not allow for statu s quo powers, except for th~ unusual state th.at ~c~u e_ve~ ?r~po~deran <:e. Instead, the system is populated wJth great powers that h~ve Je~s JonJ st Intentions at their core. This chapter presents a theory th at e.Kplams th1s competition for power. Specifically, 1 attempt to sh?w. that ~ere is a compelling logic behi ntl my claim that grea t powers seek to max1m1ze thetr share of world pm.ver.. . .

Mf ARSH EIMER I ANARCHY AND TilE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

3l

WHY STATES PURSUE POWER

My explanation for why great powers vie with each othe r for powe r and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions about the inte rnational system. ~on e of these assumptions alone mandates that state s beh ave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have conside rable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively. ln particular, the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-a-vis othe r states .... The first assumption is that the international system is ana rchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. B y itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises inde pen den t states that have no central authority above them. Sovereignty, in othe r words, inhe res in states ~ecause there is no higher ruling body in the international system. The re is no government over governments." . . The secon.~ assu~ptio~ is that great powers inherently possess some offe nsive military capability, which giVes them the wherewithal to hur t and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerou s to each other, although some states have more mJnt~ 1 ht th an .. mg others and are therefore more dangerous. A state's military power_ usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal. IS althoug~ even If there were no weapons, the individuals in those stat es could still use theJr feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. tions~e ~?assu mption is that states can never be certain abo ut othe r states' int~n . pec.:ifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive

their offensive capabilities. The fom th assumpt ion is that sUJv ival is the p1i mary goal of great powe rs. Speci Ficallv, states !>eek to main tain their territorial integritv and the autonomv of , , their dom estic political orde r. Survival dominates othe r moti ves beca nsE:, once: a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue othe r ai ms... . States can and do pursue othe r goals, of course, but security is their most important objective . The fi fth assu mption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their exte rna] environm ent and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In parti cular, they consider the preferences of othe r states and how thei r own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those othe r states, and bow the behavior of those othe r states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreove r, states pay attention to the long term as well as the imm ediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of thes e assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each othe r. There is sure ly the possibility that som e state might have hostile inte ntion s, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their prin cipal objective is to survive, which by itsel f is a rather harmless goal. l\' evertheless, when the five ass11mptions are married together, they create powerful ince ntives for great powers to think and act offe nsively with regard to each othe r. In partic:lLiar, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self- help , and power maximization.
~

divine with 100 p<. rc:cnt <:C"'rtaiuty. Tlwr(; arc nrany po!., iblc causcs of aggr<-~!.ion, and no ~ late cr.u1 be sure t l1 another slate ic; not motivated by one of the m. F urthe:rmo al rc' , intentions can change ynic:kly, so a state'!> intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Unccrtainty about inte ntions is unavoidahl<:: , which means that slalcc; can never be sure that othe r stat<.:s do not ltave offe nsive inte ntions to go alon~ \\itlt

rn ilitar~ cap;tbilil\ to attack tit<.. fir<it stale.:. This i'i not to say that slates rrcctssar il} have lto~till intentions. IHdcetl, all of the slates in tlw syste;nl rnay be re:li:~hl: henij4n but it i~ impc,.,!.ibk to be 5u rc of U1at judgmC:'n t bc,cause inle ntiow. arc impossiiJie to
4

STATE BEHAVIOR
Great powers fear each othe r. They regard each othe r with suspicion , and they wony that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust amo ng states. For sure, the leve l. of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power. all other great powers are pote ntial enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunilication at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost fortyfive years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dan gers of a united Gennany. The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers haYe the capabWty to attack each other and might have the motive to do so. any tate bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and relu ctan t to trust them. Add to this the "911 -

~1 by John J. Mearsheimer~se:~r PolJ~U:s_ by John Mearsheimer, pp. 29-40, 46--53. Copyright 0

50
Y permiSSion ofW W Norton & Company, Ine.

EXL-erpts from Tragedy ofG

p,

52

PART I

HY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ANARC

the Con~~ently, states pay close attention to how power is distr ibuted among m, an t ey make a special effort to maximize their share of world power.

war aggressor. Bec-ause 1t IS sometHnt tes and to be prepared for . mtl1 ~ .\.m. th ie reason not to trust o er sa f f: 11' g victim to aggressiOn furLlH amplify the amP The possible consequences 0 . a 10 .' force in world po1. . . c ~ powe rs do Jt1Cs. '' edt . portance of fear as a motv~ftJ~g ly un h as 1 111 temahonal politics were mere. an cconomi<: 1 not compete witl~ ~~c, ot er tition among states is a much more dange rous busimarketplace. Poht1 C~ 111 ?e cal . ,. the form er can lead to .. ,. an d war often war. JC mtercourse ness than mere econom fi ld ell as ma<>s murder o r CJVJ an . I n extreme .. w means mass kiJlmg on the battle e ast'on of states. The horn'b) e <:ons. ences of d E'qu I d to the estruc I , . cases war can even ea . each other not just as <:ompet1tors, but as , . to VIew . d b . war sometimes cause states p )jti al anta<Tonism, m . . short, ten to e mtense, potentially deadly enemies. o c o because the stakes are gr~t. . t 1 also aim to guarantee their own survival th 10 temationa1 svs en . States m e at' tlueats and because there is no h1gh er authorihr tl states are pote nt:J ' 'J Because o .Jer cue wl th ''al 911 states cannot depe nd on othe rs for h 1en ey w , to ~ome to t e~r r~ach state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alon e, and therether own secunty. d r 'ts own survival. In intemational politics, Cod helps fore it aims to proVJ e 10r 1 . This emphasrs on self-he1 does not preclu de states p those who heIp t lJemseIveS. . r . all' . s But alliances are onl)' temporal) ' marn.ages o f converuence: from Iormmg tance. . d , . todays aluance partner might be tomorrow's en~m y, and to ay s en~my m~g ht be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the Umted States fought With Chma and tile Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in \1\Torld V II, but soon therea~ter Var flip-Hopped enem ies and pa1tners and allied ""ith West Germ any and Japan agrunst China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States operating in a self-help worl d almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subo rdinate their interests to the interests of othe r states, or to the interests of the so-called international comm unity. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the shor t term as well as in the long term , because if a state loses in the short run, it migh t not be arou nd for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate inten tions of othe r states, and aware tl1at they operate in a self-help system, states quickly Wlde rstan d that the best way to ensure their survi val is to be the most powerful state in the syste m. The stronger a state ~ relative to its pote ntial rivals, the less likely it is that any of thos e rivals will attack 1 and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluc tant to pick fights "'~th t more powerf~J states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the btgger t11e gap in power between any two states the less likely it is t11at the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor' Mexico, for example, ~oul~ coun tenance attacking the United States, which is far more pow erful than 1ts ne1ghbors The ideal s'tuati 1 I on IS to be the 1 mon in the syste m .... Survwa 1ege would then be almost guarantee d.

an turn fo. 1 . traJ autI1011-1 tl , .,m- the absence o( a ccn . tJ\te to fear eac1 o ler. v .. 'V(r, there is 1 ll'" pro > help -and states have even greater 'ncen nterest ol tl1Lfd partic," . . " I Il ls 1 an bJe self-i ling no mechanism, oth~r _tl1an th~ p':s~fficu lt to deter pote ntial ag,_grc~!i.r , <;tates have

n. to which a threa tened c;t ~

\H ARSHEIMER I ANARCHY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

:5~

varie ty of liiC."Hll\ <:<:onomie, diplomatic, and milita1 v-to shift th<.; halanc:c of power in thr-ir f:t\(>J f'>~l'~l if doing so makes othe r stale~ !>uspicious or even hostile. Because one stat '.' s ~c.u n Ill powe r is anot her states loss, gre::at powers tcnd to have a zero-sum meutaht} whcn ucaling witII eac:h other. The tric:k, or course, is to he the winner in this <:onpPti tion anc.l lo dominate the othe r states in the S}Ste m. Thus , the claim tbat slal~s ma~indze relative power is tantamount tc, arguing that states are disposed to thmk offensively toward othe r states, even though their ultimate motive is simply Lo survi vr. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. Even when <~ gre~t powe r ach ieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues lookmg for chanc:es to gain more powe r. The pursu it of powe r stops only when hege mony is achieved. The idea that a great power might feel secu re withou t dominating th e system, provided it has an "app ropriate amount" of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to assess how muc h relative powe r one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropr~at e threshold? Or is three times as much powe r the magic number? The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not dete rmin e which side wins a war. Clever strategies, for example, some times allov., less powerful states to defe at more powerful foes. Second, dete rmining how much powe r is enough becomes even more complicated when great powe rs contemplate how powe r wiJJ be distribute<.l among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of individual states vary over time, some times markedly, and it is often difficult to predict the direction and scope of change in the balance of povver. Remember, few in the \Vest anticipate d the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first half of the Cold \ Var, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventually generate greater wealth than the Ame rican economy, which would cause a marked power sh ift against the United States and its allies. \Vhat the futur e holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power ,;o,lil] look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee. Give n the difficulty of <.lete nnining how muc h power is enough for today and tomo rrow, grea t powers recognize that the best way to ensu re their secu rity is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opp01tunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thou ght it already had sufficien t powe r to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost ahvays bette r off with more rathe r than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powe rs until they complete ly dom inate the system. All states are influen<:ed by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also ,.,ork to ensu re that othe r states do not take advantage of them. After all, li ,al states are driven by the same logic, and mos t states < e likely to recognize their own motives at play in the W a~tions of othe r states. In short, states ultimately pay atten tion to defense as well as offense. T hey tltin k abou t conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor

Spec i ficall~ tlw: lflok fi >r opportu11 ities to alt(r the balan ce of power h~ acqu iring additional lll('rt 11 tmts ()I power at ll1c expe11sc of p<>l(ntial rivals . States employ a

llll' ur t .tds tu a world of (: n t,\1\t ~ '1.'Uti~ competition. wher<' sl~ttes art. WJ~Im g ,-. at, and use br t\.m'(' tf 11 heiJ l~ thl'lll ,,ain ctdvantagc over tleu mals 1\. Cf' i1 011e de fine !Jle t ~ s lat l't-1lh.'\'pt as,\ st:ttl' of tmnq uili ty or uwtu aI coneorcl . IS not IJ k' 1: to break out in tlhis
h'\Hl\

,t,th''

~,unill!! po,w r

a t their expense.

Tlti~

MI f\RSHEIMER I ANARCHY AND THE STRUGGLE fOR POWER

" wld .... 1t should be apparent from this discussion that sayiu~ tlmt slates are puw nHL mizer s i . t<ltamount to aying th_at _th~y care ahuut rc.>lative pow<' r, n:: \i U absolute powe r. There i an important distinction he1 bccanse states concerned :e. about rclati,e powe r behave differently than do states _nl (..r~~stec~ 111 absolute power State that maxjmize relati ve powe r are concerned pnma nl)' w1th the distrib uuo~ of material capabiBties. In partic ular, they by to_ gam a large a power advantage as po ible 0 ,er potential rivals, be_cause po,~er ~~ the best_ means to survival in a dc mgerous world . Thus, states mot1vat~d by 1ela~ve 1~owc ~ conce rns are likely to for<JO large gains in their own powe r, 1f such gams glVc nval states even greate po,~e r. for small er national gains that n~ve_rtheless provide them with a powe~ ac h-antaae 0 ,-er tJ1eir rivals. States that ma.xtmJ absolute powe r, on the other hand, ze care onlv about the size of their own gains , not those of other stales . They are not motivat~d by balan ce-of-power logic but instead are conc erned 'vid1 amas ing powe r without regard to how much po~e r otl_1er sta~es control. ~hey \\'ould jump at the oppo1 tunity for large gains, even 1f a n val game d more m the deal. Power, according to this logic, is not a means to an end (survival). but an end in itself.

CALCUlATED AGGRESSION
There is obviously little room for status quo powers in a worl d where states are inclined to look for opportunities to gain more powe r. Neve rth eless. great powers cannot always act on their offensive intentions, becau se behavior is in fl uenced not only by what states want, but also by tl1eir capacity to reali ze these desires. ,ery state might want to be king of the hill, but not eve1 state hac; the whe rev.~th al y to compete for d1at lofty position, much less achieve it. Much depe nd on how military might is distributed among tl1e great powers. A great powe r that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggrE-ssively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so. By contrast, great powe rs facing powe rful opponents '"'ill be less inclined to consider offensive action and more conce rned with defen ding the existing balance of power from threats by their more powerful opponents . Let the re be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favo r, however, and they will take advantage of it. In short, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gainin g power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursu e Pyrrhic victories. On the c..'Ontrary. before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about ~e balanc:e of power and about how other states will react to their move s. They weJgh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the bene fits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propi tious moment. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position. States

sometiJO<' lm.:t tit fc l''i< ' 5pcnd111~ (;itlwr lwcau sc.: '-P<nclinl!; 11H1n \\OnlciiJritag tac strategic- acl < nt;1 or h<~C<ll i V.: spencH11g rnon" wq11ld weak<'n tht:- C'<:CJ110III~ aud g< undem lini llw ~tat t ' powe r in the long n111. To paraphrase: Clint Ea<stwood. a '>t<ttl has to know 1ls lirllll tlions to survive in the i11 ternal ional svst<:tn. 1 evcJihr~less, gn-at power~ misc<tkt tlat<:; frotn tim~~ to lin1c lwca:-.t the\ invarjahly 1nake intpnrtant uel:isions on tlte: basis of' intperf(ct inforr nation . Stat~' hardly enr l1avc w111plete information about any situation the;y confront. Then are two dimensions to this probl em. Potentia.! adversaries have incentives to misrepresent thei r own stre ngth or weakness, and to conceal their true:: aims. For example. a "veaker state t1 ing to deter a stronger state is likely to exaggerate its y own pow<'r to discourage the potential aggressor from attacking. On the other hand, a slate bent on aggression is likely to emph asize its peaceful goals while exaggerating its militaty weakness, so that the poten ti al victim does not build up its own arms and thus leaves itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was better at practicing th is kind of deception than Adolf .Hitler. But even if disinformation was not a problem, great powe rs arc often unsure about how their own military fo rces, as welJ as tbe adversary's, \.rill perfonn on the battlefield. For example. it is sometimes difficu lt to determine in advance how new weapons an d untested comb at units will perfo rm in the face of enemy fire. Peacetime maneuvers and war games are helpful but imperfect indica tors of what is likely to happen in actual combat. Fighting wars is a complicated business in which it is often difficult to predict outcomes .... Great powers are also some times unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies . For example, Germany believed that if it went to war aaainst France and Russia in the su mme r of 1914, the United Kingdom would probably stay out of the fight. Saddam Hussein expected the United States to stand aside when he invad ed Kuwait in August 1990. Both aggressors guessed wrong, but each had good reaso n to think that its initial judgment was con-ect. In the 1930s , Adolf Hitler believed that his great-powe r rivals would be easy to e>..'ploit and isolate because each had little interest in fightin g Germ any and instead was determined to get someone else to assume that burde n. He guessed light. In short great powe rs constantly find themselves confronting situations in which they have to make important decisions with incomplete informaUon. Not su1 prisingly, they some times make fauJ ty judgments and end up doing themselves serious harm . Some defensive realists go so far as to suggest that the constraints of the internatio nal system are so powe rful that offense rarely succeeds, and d1at aggressive great powe rs invariably end up being punished . .. . They emphasize that 1) threatened states balan ce against aggressors and ultimately crush them. and 2) there is an offense-de fense balance that is usuall y heavil y tilted toward the defense. thus making conquest especially difficult. Great powe rs, there fore, should be conte nt with tl1e existing balance of powe r and not try to change it by force . ... There is no question d1at systemic factors constrain a&:, uression, especially balancing by threatened states. But de fensive realists exaggerate tho e restraining forces. Indee d, the historical record provides little support for d1eir claim that offense rarely succeeds. One study estim ates that there were 63 wars betwe en 1815 and 1980, and the initiator won 39 times. which translates into about a 60 pen.e nt

!\ti
,H\.'t'\'SS

4RT t Pn

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQU ENl..l:.!>

MI.ARSHEIMER I ANARCHY AND TH STRUGGLE FOR POWER

how~. t k!t oil use someti . 1powt>r rnax.irniz rnes 1 L . _ , 11 t'\.'t't w am1snmct11nes cloes not The trick for a sop mtlcal<'< -er L~ to fi,nrrt' out whl'n to rai e and when to fold. ::-

I rt the historical record r.tll'. . . . l n s ro .

-,., I

HEGEMONY'S UMITS
C. at powers as 1 have emphasized, strive to g~n power over their rivals and 1 e -t lOpe fuIJ L ' v >ecome 1egenlons Once a state achreves that exaJtecl position , r 1 . I ' ecornes a sta tus qu0 power More needs to be sard, however, ahout th e meaning b of hegemony . . . . . . a state tllat 15 so powerful that 1t dommates . 11 t 1 othe1 states in a 1e A I1egemon rs .. . . . . . the S\stem . .\o other state has the mrhtary wherewrthal_ to put up .t senous fight .. / t agamst 1 . In essence, a hegemon is the only great power m the system. A state that . . . . . is substantially more powerful than the other great powers tn t1 s~stem _ not a 1e 's hegemon, because it faces, by defin ition, oth~r great ~owers . The Umted Kmgdom in the mid-nine teenth century. fo r example, IS somettmes calJed a hegemon. But it was not a hegemon, because there were four other great p~wers i~ Europe at the time Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia- and the Umted Krngdom did not uominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, eluting that pe riou , the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balan<.:e of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar. Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world. It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe particuLa r regions, such as Eu rope, N01theast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus, one can distingui sh between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate distinct geographical areas. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No othe r state in the Americas has sufficient military might to challenge it, which is why the United States is widely recognized as the only great power in its region ... .

fear <UTt'lll2: gn<ll pov.ers derive~ fro~rt the fact that thev invariablv ha\l' \ome offensive lltihlaJ') (apahility that ll1 (.;<tO U againSt ea<.:h ~ther, and the r~Ld that ey Se one can never be C'('liHirl that other ~tates do not intend to use tbat power against oneself'. Moreover, because states op<~ratc in an anar<.:hie system, there i!\ no night watc:hmau to \\horn they can turn for help if another great power attacks them. Although anarchy and uncertainty about other states' intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that kads to power-tnaximizing behavior, they cannot ac<.:ounl for why son tetimcs that level of fear is greate r than at other times. The reason is that anarchy and the difficulty of disc:trnin g state intentions are eonstant facts of life, <.tnd constants cannot explain variation. The capability that states have to threaten <::ac:h other, however, varies from c:ase to c:ase, and it is the key faetor that driv<::s fear levels up and down. Specifi<.:ally, the more power a state possesses , the more fear it generates among its rivals. Germany, for example, was much more powerful at the end of the 1930s than it was at the decades beginning, which is why th e Soviets became inc:reasingly fearful of Germany over the course of that decade . ...

THE HIERARCHY OF STATE GOALS

Su1 vival is the number one goal of great powers, according to my theory. In practice, however, states pursue non-sec:urity goals as well. For example, great powers invariably seek greater economic prosperity to enhance the welfare of their c:itizenry. They sometimes seek to promote a particular ideology abroad, as happened during the Cold war when the United States tried to spread democracy around the world anu the Soviet Union tried to sell communism. National unificatio n is another goal that sometimes motivates states, as it did with Prussia and Italy in tJ1e nineteen th century and Germany after the Cold War. Great powers also occasionally try to foster human rights around the globe. States might pursue any of these, as well as a number of other non-secmity goals. Offensive realism ce1 tainly recognizes that great powers might pursue these non-secu rity goals, but it has little to say about th.e m, save for one impmtant point: states can pursue them as long as the requisite behavior does not conBkt with balauce-of-power logic, which is often the case. Indeed, the pursui t of these nonsecurity goals sometimes complements the hunt for relative power. For example, Nazi Germany expanded into eastern Europe for both ideological and realist reasons, and the superpowers competed with each other dming tl1e Cold \Na.r for similar reasons. Fu rtl1ermore, greater economi c prosperity invariably means greater wealth, which has significan t implications for security, because wealth is t_he foundation of military power. Wealthy states can afford powerful military forces, which enJ1emce a states prospects for survival. ... Sometim es the pursuit of non-security goals has hardly any effect on the balance of power, one way or the other. Human rights interventions usually fit this description, hecause they tend to be small-scale operations that cost Little and do not detract fiom a great power's prospects fo r survival. For better or for worse, states are rarely willing to e>q>end blood rutd treasure to protect foreign

POWER AND FEAR

That great powers fear each other is a central aspect of life in the international ~-ystem. But as noted, the level of fear varies from <.:ac;e to case. F or example, the Soviet Union worried much less about Germany in 1930 than it did in 1939. How much states fear each other matters greatly, because the amount of fear between them ~~ely determines the severity of their security competi tion, as well as tl1e ~robab~Jty that th~y will fight a war. The more profound the fear is, tl1e ,~ore mtense 15 the secunty competition, and the more likely is war. The logic is strru~,t ~orw~d:. a scar~d state will look especially hard for ways to enhance its secu~~ :md at will be disposed to pursue risky policies to achieve that end. Therefore, tt 15 ~mportant to understand what causes states to fear each other more or less

mtensely.

. . t'o n:.- from t- "~ "' b. C" ' including 'gcnoeidt> F! r 'lotll<e , despite c:la trro us ~ . fuse d with I' tx)p\11 ,\' . . 11 JliO f<ll St.J ~. J .. ulin (1 992 ) 11'rls m f >cr 11!1 01IC\' lS I . 1 93 l l\,lt :\ mt' nc: Oll t-. dre d year in whi <1t 1 ") soklie . - . ishe t . l . trthep tsto ne 1 lUll . <nth m t.mre ounne . . A'ld in tltl t ea. < the loss of:~. 1ts'' ere klled '. n . . 1 . 1 'tarilll 11'HSSJOI1. I , c et in action on a tumam ~ ~ . Octobe r 1993 so traum,ttizcd Amen e elghteen . . . 1t 111 t'amous fu-eng1 m c:an pol soldiers m ~n . , ulled all U.S. troo ps out o r So malia ll)' m;.tkers that they immediated ~ the spri ng of 199-!. wlw n eth nic Hutu l) and then . d t ene in Rwan a m . re Iuse to tn en . t thetr Tutsj neighbors. Stoppm g tha t genocidwent on e .la} pacre atYru.ns .... ' a genoc1u ram o 0 d 1 ,ould have had drt ualh- no e ffe<:t on the Would 't .. an " . b een re lathelr ec\5)' tl balance of pow . POSttio ha,e . er. Y not hmg was don e. In h n et d 1e f tlle um'te. States m t prescribe human s o d rights inte ne ntio ns. it does not n ort' although realism oes no eces. Sarih -proscribe them. aJ .a 'tl . rsuit of non-securin go s cOILDJC ts \\1 1 balance-of-po But sometimes t1 pu 1e - . th cl' . . h' 1 . tates usuallv act according to e 1ctates of realism. wer F loC11C m w JC 1 cc\Se s .din d . o d . tb U s commitment to sprea g em ocr acy across the globe or .1 e.xample esp1te e 1 I d ~,erthrow democratically elected gO\em me nts a~l d em b :ac ed a number,of he pe . . . during the Cold \Var, "'hen Am e ncan poltcymakers felt that authontanan regtmes . . . Jd help contain the Sov1et Uruon. In \\ rorId \\ ,ar 11, the liberal d1ese actions wou . , . ies ut aside tlteir alltipathy for com murusm and formed an alliance with democrac P . the Soviet Union against Nazi Gertnall)' "1 can 't take comm~rusm , ,. Franklin Roose,elt emphasized, but to defeat Hitler "I would hold ~1a_nds Wl~l the De,il." In the same way, Stalin repeatedly demons trated that wh en hrs rde ologtcal preferences clashed with power c:onsiderations, the latter won out. To tak~ the most_blat~t example of his realism , tl1e Soviet Union form ed a ?on -ag gressiO n p~c t w1th ~azi Gennanv in August 193 9-- the infamous ~~lo lotov-Rrbbentrop Pac t-m hopes that tlte agr~ment would at least temporarily satis~' Hit ler's tenitori~ ambi_tions in eastern Europe and tu m the \Vehrmacht toward Fra nce and the Urute d Kingdom . When great powers confront a serious thre at, in sho rt, they pay littl e attention to ideology as they search for alliance partners. Security also trumps wealth whe n those two goals conflict, because 'defence,~ as Adam Smith wrote in The \Vealth of Nations, 'is of mu ch mo re importance than opulence. Smith provides a good illustration of how states beh ave whe n forced to choose between wealth and relative power. In 1651, Engla nd put into eff~ct the famous Navigation Act, protectionist legislation des ign ed to dam age Hollands ~~ merce and ultimately cripple the Du tch ec'Onomy. Th e legislation ma ndated that goods imported into England be carried either in Ena lish ships or ships owned b~ 0 . mally . the country that ong produc ed the goods. Sin ce the Du tch produced few ~ goods themselves, this measure would badly dam age the ir ship ping, the c:ent n . gredient m therr eco . . m nomic success. Of cou rse the Navigat ion Act wo uld hurtf England's economy as well, mainly because it wo cld rob Eng lan d of the benefit~ : free trade. "The act of navigation ," Smith wro te, "is not favorable to foreJ c~ co~merce, _ to the growth of that opulence tha t can aris e from it." Neve~le]es~f or Smith COilSldered the legislation "th e wisest of all the com mercial regulaoonsli\ h England.. ~ it did more damage to the Du tch eco nom y tha n to the Eng ~r ~ and m the mid-seventeenth cen tury Ho llan d was "tb e only nanll po' which could endanger the security of England." ...
c c

'AEARSHEIM ER I ANARCHY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POW ER

:5!)

CO OPERAJ ION AM ON G STATES

One mh! hl emu:lucJ,. from lhe prc~ceding dist'u sion that my theol) do<>s not allow for any cooperation mno ng the gre at povvers . But this conclusion would be wrong. StHtes can cooperall-. although cooperation is sometim es difficult to achieve and always difficult to S in. Two fa<:tors inhibit cooperati011: con side rations about l!Sta relative gaim. and con<:em about cheatin g. Ultimately, gre at powers live in a fundamentally com peti tive world whe re they view each oth er as real , or at leas t potential, ene mi es. and they therefore look to gain power at each oth er's expen e . Any two states contemplating cooperation must consider how profits or gains will be (lisbibuted between them. They can think about the division in terms of either absolute or relative gains (recall the distinction made earlier between pursuin g either absolute power or relative power; the concept here is the same). \IVith absolute gains. each side is concern ed vvith maximizing its own profits and <:ares Uttle abo ut how much the oth er side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the othe r side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. \Vit:h relative gains, on the other hand, each side considers not only its own individual gain , but also how well it fares compared to the other side. Because great powers care deeply about the balance of power, their thinking focuses on relative gains when they consider cooperating with other states. For sure, each state tries to maximize its absolute gain s; still, it is more important for a state to make sure that it does no worse, and perhaps better, tha n the other state in any agreement. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve, however, when states are attuned to relative gai ns rath er than absolute gains. This is because states con cerned about absolute gains have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, tl1ey are getting at least som e portion of the increase, whereas states that worry about rela tive gains mus t pay careful attention to how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts. Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. Great po,.,ers are often reluctant to ent er into cooperative agreem ents for fear that the otl1er side will che at on the agreement and gain a signjficant ad,antage. This concern is esp ecia lly acute in the military realm, causing a 'special peril of defection, " because the natu re of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balan<:e of power. Such a development couJd cre ate a window of opportunity for the state tl1at cheats to infl ict a decisive defeat on its victim. These ban iers to cooperation notwithstanding, gre at powers do cooperate i n a realist world. Bruanc e-of-po,ver logic often causes great powers to fon n alliance s and cooperate against common ene mies. The United Kingdom, Fran<:e, and Rus sia, for example, were allies against Germany before alld during \\'orld \Va r I. Sta tes sometimes cooperate to gang up on a third stat e, as Ge rmany and the Sov iet Union did against Poland in 1939. More recentl y. Serbia and Croatia agreed to conque r and divide Bosnia between them , although the Uni ted States and its Eur ope an allies prevented the m from executing tl1eir agreement . Rhals as well as allies cooperate. Afte r all, deals can be stmck that rough!~' refl ect the distribution of power and satisfy concerns about cheating. The \'arious arms con trol agr eements signed br the superpowe rs during the Cold \\'ar illustrate this point.

PART l

CHY AND ll~ ~v~ ....... "' ~~ - -ANAR

. s t , howe,.et, 1 that cOOJ')eration takts 1, " m a world that is he estates have poweriul inc '1 11\'C.:S to take 'ld l'hl' l'IOttOIII llll. c van. . . ''--one \V l . .. . t . araphically htghhghted h. tl1 state of Euro '-'nnpl'ltll\'l:' at tt. ('OlC . 15 o pean 'S . t~\ t c Thts pom rore \ Vorld \ Var I. T1te grull powers cooper t . 1_ 1 lCI tl\~1.' ~, f ot 1 a ed f . 1 [!0 .+.. ,ears ue' l)(.'litk~ 111 l te . ".1 . od but that did not stop the m rom going to war frequent!~ dunng thts ~end St, tes and the So-viet Union also coope rated consid on er. 1 . 19 14. The UJUteb t a coor)eration did not pre,ent lte outbreak ofth that IJ :\.U2:\lSt l. e ar , u . du~ng \\orId \ V Germanv and Japan were defeatecl . Per1 1aps most amazing! , .. abl~ . ' and milit~rv cooperation between Nazi Germany Cold \\ ar shortJ~ after Y - 1 . ificant economiC there \\ClS stgn . d . tl1 two years before the \Vehrmac:ht attacked the Red and the Soviet Umonf unng . t~on can eliminate tbe dominating logic of sccurih l) . ~ . ount 0 coopera 1 . or a world in which states do not compete for power is . Am1~ .. o am ' l. tition Genwne peace, ~~~~~ely as iong as the state system remains anarc 1JC.

Anarchy Is What States Make oflt

ALEXANDER WENDT
Classical realists sud1 as Thomas Hobbes, Rein hold ;\iebuhr. and Hans J. Morgenthan attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature. whereas stmctural realists or neorealists emphasize anarchy. The difference stems in part fro m different interpretations of anarchy's causal powers. Kenneth \"faltz's work is important for both. In Man, the State, and War; he defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or "permissive" cause of war, arguing that "wars occur because there is nothing to preve nt them." 1 It is tl1e human nature or domestic politics of predator states, however, that provide the initial impetus or "efficient" cause of conAi<:t which forces other states to respond in kind .. .. But ... In \~altz's Theory of lnternat:ional Politics ... the logic of anarchy seems by itself to constitute self-help and power politics as necessary features of worl.d politics.2 ... Waltz defines political structure in three dimensions: ordering principles (in this case, anarchy), principles of differentiation (which here drop out), and the distribution of capabilities.3 By itself, this definition predicts little about state behavior. It does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each oilier's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, wilJ be revisionist or status quo powers. and so on. These factors, which are fundamentally intersubjective. affect states' security interests and thus the character of their interaction under anarchy.... Put more generally, without assumptions about the stru<:ture of identities and interests in the system, Waltz's definition of structure cannot predict the content or dynamics of anarchy. Self-help is one such intersubjective structure and, as such, does the decisive explanatory work in the theory. The question is whether self-help is a .logical or contingent feature of anarchy. In this section , I develop the concept of a 'structure of identity and interest" and show that no particular one follows logically from anarchy. A fundamental principle of constructivist social tl1eory is that people act toward objects, induding otl1er actors, on the basis of tl1e meanings tl1at the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies tl1an they do toward friends because enemies are tl1reatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the disttibution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite d1eir similar "structural" positions, ju~i as British missiles have a different significance for d1e United States than do Soviet missiles. The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the "disoibution of knowledge," that constitute their conceptions of self and other.'1 If society "forgets'' what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student c:ease
From Alex<mdcr Wcndt ...Anarchy Is \ Vhat States ~lake of Jt: ihe Social Construc:tion of Power Politics." lntemational OrganiUitiun, Vol.. -1.6. No. 2 (Sp1;ng 1992). pp. 391-42.5. @ 1992 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts institute oi'Technologv. Reprintt>tl by permission ofTht MJT Pres:-. Portiom of the text and some footnotes have been omitted.

61

1 . . 1 St t and Sodet Union decide t. \('\ are no I tt1 ~i t if thl' l mtel a es . onoe l ~ .J , ... It is <..'Ollective meam n):;s t ?.t \lllStitute th <:> r e;', Ht:' mh.s, "tlw Colu \\ ar s 0 ' e1. e struc. t ". hi.eh or<l'mize our actions. .f U n.: ~ \\ l:'l" .d ti'ti' -relative)v stable. role-speCilC 1J nuerstanding -\ctors ncqlllre 1 en es . lf' b . rti.cipating io sue1 eo11ecti\ .c me(ltungs. ldennn s and 1 e n'lP('rntions about se - )' pa 1 r es are . Xr- . . . . al "Identity, with its approp.date attac m'lCn ts o psychologkal rea] m.herenth rel.ltiOll ,c ocally const mded world ,. p t B it\' is ah~,ws identity within a specmc, ~ 1 . . . a1 I , e er erger . _ l ,. identities linked to mstitu tion ro cs. such as brat} amues , Each person Jas man. . . ~ .. d .. sJmilarlv a state may I1ave mul bp1 l.clentiti.es as "soverei 1er.: f' son. teacher. an C itizen. J c. ld ,. ... nperial powe r,, and so on. ~11 1 com mitment to andgn, e th < Jeader of the tree wor . u . . .nh . ul .d tities vl:lrv but each identity IS an 1 erent1 social definiti e v salience ofpartic ar 1 en ' _ ,, ll . l h Id . l . d d . . the theories wh.ich actors eo ectwe y o a )OUt themselvon. of the actor groun e m f tl a1 Id es and one another and which c:onstitute the structu;e o ~e SOCl' " wor[l Identities are the basis of interests. Actors o no~ aveda thportdo 10 of interests d inder:>endent of social context; mstea , ey efine their interthat they carry aroun . . . f defining s1tuations. . . . 5 ometimes SLtuations. are unpreceests on tl1e process O . . ence and in these cases we have to construct tl1etr meaning. and dented m our expen ' ft tl .t ts by analogy or inven t them de no\o. More o en 1ey have routine th us our m eres , b . f u d fi qualities in which we assign meanings on the _a~ts o m~titution a y e ned roles. \1\'hen we say that professors have an "interest'. m t~achin.?, resea rc~; or going on leave, we are saying that to function in the .role 1?entity ~f professor, they ha\e to define certain situations as calling for certrun actions. Th1s does not mean that they will necessarily do so (expectations and competence do not equal performance). but if they do not, they will not get tenure. The absence or fail~ re of roles makes ~eEining situations and interests more difficult, and identity confus1on may result. Tl11S seems to be happening today in the United States and the fann er Sovie t Union : \Vithout the cold war's mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their identities, these states seem unsure of what their ..interests" should be. An institution is a relatively stable set or "struc ture" of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in fonnal rules and nonn s, but these hare motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cogn itive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works. This does not mean that institutions are not real or objective, that they are "nothing but" belie fs. As t'Olle~~-e knowledge, they are experienced as having an existence "over and above the in@,d uals who happen to embody them at the moment.'>6 In tlUs way, institutions com~ to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they are still a func:tion of what actors collectively "know." Identities and such collective cognitions do ~01 exist apart from each other; they are "mutually constitutive." On this view, inso~ ~on is ~ proress of internalizing new identities and interests, ~ot sorne~! occumng ~ts1de them and affecting only behav:ior; socialization 15 a cogruti . ~ not J~ a behavioral one. Conceived in this way, institutions may be c<>?r:. ative or conflictual, a point sometimes lost in scholarship on international regun which tends to.equat e in....:tutions W1'th coope . u..,u ration. There are importan t derences . JJI I ble !:hahween.. confli~ and cooperative institutions to be sure, but all relatively sta ~relations even those of"enemies"-are defined intersubjectively.

WENDT I ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF IT

63

i ,

Self-lwlp J~ a11 institution, one of variow. sln1ctnrc~ of idt.:ntitv and int<-r('\l thnt , may exbt umlt-r tnard t). Proccss~s of identity formation under an.m: ll~ art" concerned first and f(mmost v.:ith preservatio n or "security'' of the sdL Concept'> of secu rity there{ow differ in th<: c~xtent lo which and the manner in "vhich th<' s<lf i'> identified cognitivelywith the other, and , l want t<J suggest, it is upon thb wgnitivc variation that the mc:aning of anarchy and the distribution of power dPpc:n<ls. LC'l rne illustralC' with a standard continuum of security systems. At one end is the "cOJn j)Ctitive" security svstem in which states identirv ' , ' negati vely with ea<.:h other's secutity so that ego's gain is seen as alter's loss. ~egative identification under anarchy constitutes systems of "rcaJist" powe r politics: risk-averse actors that infer intentions from capabilities and worry about relative gains and losses. At the limit- in the Hobbesian war of all against all-c ollective action is nearly impossible in such a system because each actor must constantly fear being stabb ed in th e back. In the middl e is the "individualistic" security system , in which states are indifferent to the relati onship between their own and others' security. This constitutes "neoliberal " systems: States are still self-regarding about their security but are concemeu primarily with absolute gains rathe r than relative gains. One's position in the distrib ution of power is less important, and collective action is more possible (though stiJI subject to free riding because states contin ue to be "egoists"). Competitive and individualistic systems are both "self-help" forms of anarchy in the sense that states do not positively identify the security of self with that of others but instead treat security as the individual responsibility of each. Given the lack of a positi ve cognitive identification on the basis of whkh to build security regimes, power politics within such systems wiJJ necessarily consist of efforts to manipulate others to satisfy self-regarding irJterests. This contrasts with the "cooperative" security system, in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsihility of all. This is not self-h elp in any interesting sense, since the ,.selr' in tem1s of which interests are defined is the community; national interests are international interests. In practice, of course, the extent to which states identify v.itb the community varies from tl1e umited fom1 found in "concerts'' to the fuiJ-blown form seen in "collective security" arrangements. Depending on bow well developed the collective self is, it will produce security practices that are in nrrying degrees altruistic or prosocial. This makes collective action less depe ndent on the presence of active threats and less prone to free riding. \'loreover, it restructtues efforts to advance one's objectives, or upower politics," in terms of shared nom1s rather than relative powe r. On this view, the tende ncy in internation al relations scholarship to view power and institutions a'i two opposing explanations of foreign policy is there fore misle ading, since anarchy and the distribution of powe r only have meaning for state action in vi1tue of the unde rstandings and expectation s that constitute institutional identities and interests. Self-help is one such institution, constituting one kind of anarchy but not the only kind. Waltz's three-part defirution of structure there fore seems underspeci fied. In order to go from structure to action , we need to add a fourth: the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the syste1n.

\ \m h,,, .111 . liiiJlt lll .tll t 1111p 1 '.1t'11 >11 f'111 till' \\':1\ 111 \\ Itu l1 ' ' ' <011 ''1\c 0 1\ l : ct t ~ l 1< 11 , "( t h , (,\ 11' t ) I. 11:1l til l' 1 1 ' tl 11'11 !it<!( t'tl('cll tltl tt' wtllt t: wl t otl u I Hcc11 11_., 1 '' ol t 1' \ ti() ll' Ill( ' . 11' I 0 tl 11 ' I 'lttl l ll ttl ' .\1'('11 111 \ IIJIC II'S (\ lll'll( ,. ' "' 1 h,,,, . t-\ HH'' ' PIIIl ll' nl w a ll < 11 ttlldt dH lll l till' \ l.tl l' of ll.tl tttc t1 : \V, l'tlln 1 (0 0 1 pnot hi ttt h'tnd lllll \\t ' 11"''' 1111' ' . ' < o,,,.,,,. 11 ' '"' li kv 1 \\l th \\'alt t thnt , lll \'i l111t' nf' :tlltll't'lt.\', "illll 't'ltlllill ttll l , oltt w:al '\.' p '<'1111tJtr1it \\I .d~q "" ""H II )() 1 I ' t ' ;t l( ' I0 t I 11 I < Il l\ tltc wwt iOIIIII 'lclf-l't'l!,llldtt tg "'"" \\,ll M ' I . I ,. . 1,. j . :111 1 ~l ntt '.' 111 I 11 ' ' l:tl t <d tta ltarc 11 1vv,s "' lt\\ll' I' I 1 \\I ' :11'~1 11 ' I 1!1 1' Ill 11 1 1 0 .111 \ ~I{.. . . . 1 1 . .. .. '\(!I~ 1 t" . ..... 11'1 dlh' tll lttn. II H :-c <l. tllrt:oi' P1<' 11 J>POS' < :1 ltt. sto1ol l y 1v f' I,\l't1 11 11111 1)1 .\( ' I , , ., , " , , , . ' \' () . 1 ' tltlc'l ,ldHlll Ill \\'1 l ' 1 !I(' 1Ill'\ 1'1, .,. 'tt'cJtll,ll'cl stlft.., h t< h ttl tl ll ' .\l tcltttll t1,1v' t,11 Il I , llt'j . , ( 1 t'll 1 .1J,..,t 1 ndio ll lro 111 h 1 ~l :11tcl .\1'( '1111< 1 llll:tg c fal'llll's) tit lllh'l':l('tll)ll :\Ill :) I 11 ' ' . .. ' ~'Y . .l ' Ill )I ll l whiC'It In lutS(' .\11('11 dlrttttl ll l1 c)l' '('" :l lld otiH t .,. 1\ \\'t)ll Ill 1,1\'(' 1\l) C\)Jt' l1t'll( l , . 11 . . 11,1111.11111 11 lo sttl t:-. in ti H .\l!tl c n l ll:tltt n cp a itH '\ tl 11 tl :tl t 1 .l,:o.III IH' ot Iwtwr:.c I' c . , . '}' .. . .,,,,1,.1 ,~ . Stll' hl'll) j.., an ttlslltttll tJ II , 1101 :t t'C III.\It(ttl tvt lv:1t11 n.r ell .,tv t:all 011 Iy posstss 111 ' anan ll\ . ''1 1. tlll,11 . is a co~ts ti lu tiv<" lt:ttl tr'< of. tht ~l :tl t oltt: tt tlr<' 1H ' f'on ittl crat'l iott? ' \ ., m . I I. I 'l\vo tlt in!];S an ll'l'l if w strip awnv tllm t' [H'OJWI'lits oft H S<' ' . "' 1idt pns 11 ppo!lc inltrad i<;ll wi tlt otltcr, . Till' fi rst i~ ti lt' li iHlt' rial ~ ~~ b..,tr: tl <: ol :.'~< t~t v. i 11dud i 11 ~ it:-. t.inl ri tt-"ic t:tpnhilit it's. Fctr httl llll tt bl'i ngs. t.lti:-. i~ tl w l>odv: f~ >r ~t.:t l t~ . it 1; au . Ol'~ltltiltlt lott:tl appanttiiS or ~()V('I'tlall ('(> Ill tflttl. I :11 11 Stl~{ ' \ 111 1~ fm ri H'tOtkal ptupo:-.ts that the mw u~:tl <rial nul of wltic h I ~ H'tt tl >< r!l o l ti H' ~l~tlt ' )-"1<111 :tH tonstit11 ttd i-; tnalld by clonw:-.tic sol'itl l)('lo n ~l n l ts cnlt r tir e t'OII S til ~tliv< pnxt ~~ ofittl l'l'ttalionu l socit'ly. altho ugh th b p ro(T SS illl pl its mitlt<'l" ~tah k l<'rt ilo rialit \ ttor .\IJ\ tni)111 )'. wltidt an intcna:ttiollally ll c'gotiat< d tt 'I'll I ~ of illdi vidt~ ality (as disuu11scd liutlt t r lwlow). Tlw :-;t<'Olld is a dL to pnst tv< thi s II IH sin I('rial suhstmlt', to 'ilm~w. This dot-; not <' lllail "~w l f'-r<'garcl i ii~ H'i~ ... ltm cvc r. 1.im< :ut()J'~ du IIUI lt:t\'(' u wlrplior I0 j n t (' ract ion wi tit :t not her: ho\ tl wy viI '\V tltc Jll( a11 in~ mad l'tquhcuwuts of' this stuv ivalt lttn l(m dl'IH'uds 011 I he prm:l'ssc s I 1 \ovl1 id1 )' ( '(11\('( ptions ~d r( volvt>. This may all SC('ll l V('l) ' IU<'l UIC' , but there is a11 illtpo rl:lnl isstw at stalu : Ar<" ti ll' forti~n poli<.y idtntiti('Sand int Pnsts of' stal<s (">gtnotll> or cndo~<uo us to tl w .\lall' syslt m? Tht l(mtwr i'i tl w auswer of' an individ11al isti<. or tlliO<.' rSn('ialii'.t 'd ~ r:-.ll'lll ic tltPory l(,r whkh rationalism is npproprial t; tlw latte r is t ltc a11swtr of' a r1111 ' sorlnl iZt'<l sys~t:m~<- thlOJ y. Waltz Sl'{'ll IS to on~r tl w Iall< r ami p rop oM s IWO ll Hd l(lllb lil~. <'0111 JM'hhl~H and sodalizat iou. hy wlaith str11t:lnre <:ond itions stal e actio n." Tl w t'(l~lkllt of his argt~mc'n.t uhout tlds r ondilioning, ltowcvn , pn.s uppos< 'S a s<:ll'-lwlp systtm thl~t Is not Jts<>ll a (.t)nstitutiv< fcutu n of' anard ry. As Jant <..s Mo rrow poi nts nut , Waltz~ two lltt<:hanisms <.'ondition hPimvior. not idt.~tt ity and iut corcsl. .. . w If sl'llhtltl is not ''\<.'<)I IS I U t'I V( ('eatttJ 'l' 0 f' t'l .. anun.:II V. it II1 11Sl l ' llH'I'g t' l ';I II S<I llv fnnn nn)('tssts in wlli<:l1 .,,, I 1 ~ 1.tr<.: a P uys 011 1 a JWnuissivcrole. This r<"flc: l'l s a sccwH I y y p~nr~plc orfc:onstmctivism: tlaut tlac lllt!iillill~S in IW'Ili S of whiC'h act ion is orgu niY.I'd llnSC out o mt<rattion . ... tonsid<r two actOI'S- (. , ) . I I . ti 11 F 1 W llllu a t(!f~ n<:ouutcring c 11 s ac:h other for t Iac r. I me. .ne l wants to su1 viw 1mtl l . ~ 11tl' ocior l 11 1 a1 has <.:t.rtam material ('ll]Xlhiliti es, hut 11('1 1 IlL, l 0 t)gic. or domc.sti tht.'n" is uo lai"l f . l IIIIJ>crutJws for powcr, glorv, or COIH (I u si . all< I " orv o 5t><unty or in .1111't 1 1 Realists would 1, II S(.'( Y >etwttn the two . What shou ld t1cy l I0 ? 1 ro Ja) y argue tl.ut tach should ac t on tl< hasis of wors t-case

Wl Nl:rt I ANA RC IIY 1:.-. WIIAI 'J IAr I C., MAKI ()I 11

(t~

or

:' "'""" ' '"''' I 1 1 tl c otlt~l' lall rll rnn ' J""t tl yuw '> He 1. "' .dltt 11d ,,., P"" '' 111 l11 vicW ul tl 11 j 1 1 tLIIth of dc,\11, l111111 tr1:1k 1tt~ ,, tnt,t. ,kc ~11t lt .t ('11\'> t!Hiit~ ,d \.';t', 1xi..; ts. I '\ I 11 '" ( tVII \111' 11 I ) III ,W t'\l' t, " '' "''Y ld lw itt apt 1,,il ,lt t1 jll'tlplr 11 1 o~dt woat dt thlo" ' (>'"' I t/11 llac la.,.j.., 11l Wl> l''tl l'1\t' pn..,,i!Jil ilit..,, lll, l<ad tii0\1 dc< i;,JrJII.., at :1ncl ' ''""I d h lll.dt '"' ll w IJ.t\1\ of p1111 J:tbilitrt \ :tlld tlw.,,. '" '' pc,d1Hr d h) inlt t: H'IIIIII h\ 'lt:al .tl ' (l)l t, r/u . In tlw IJc ~tr11ci 11g i" q~o's ).',1'\111 1<' wlaith 111ay t'lllt\ i\1 lor c.'<:1111pl< qf :lrt a d v:u l<'l ' a 11 111'.11 .11JI:tlld i. . l,iiiJ41lf :u!IJ\ , : t l ayit~g dow ll of :u111\ , n1 '" :1lt:JC'k . F c11' cgo. tl1 i' gt\ ltttl ' n 'jlt'l '\1'111\ t ill' h:l\i.\ otr wltil:l a it j., prvp:t rc d to n... pc111 lo :tltr. d ' J'It i~ l1 > i\ j, tlla krHIW II lo all tr laowcvt r, u11d M> il 11 111\l lll:tk< an inl'c < t o r .11lri :t!' r ut l11tl inn" :.l 1o1tl q~o' iflll'tllio!l s :t lld , in p:ttl k 1tl:u, giw1 Ll tal tl1i., ;, anarchy abo11 t 1 wlrd l cc r q~o ;.., :t t l t~ (: ll . 'I'll(' < l1Jtl < lt i-. ill f'cn:trtl willl a rgc:ly dq><fl d 011 twn '<111 lt <otrs id('l': il ic n t~. Tl w fir-;1 i.\ tltl' gt'iltrlv:, a11d cgo\ phys i< cpml il il'' wl. id t an :al ill I""'' ('Oil l riVI'd hy 1 ' )41) :urd wll idt int'lu d< LIJC dirl' d ic)ll or III()V tr lt:ll l, nobc. t tllttlt l>l'r~ . :111d irt lll r< alt l'IJIIS I'qrtt ~llt'< '.\ ol' ti H' g< slii i'C'. TIIC' " to nd ton<; id<ra l io11 di < 'tlllt'( 'rtl.\ wlt:cl alt er would i11L(1ad l.y o; ud t ll'l:clitil'S W itlo 111akt 'llld t a gt\l ur< <n ils<ll'. Alt11 lll:ty t11ake an all rii HIIiotral "trro r" i11 it.\ in l'tnllc( aho11 t <go'c; i11l< ' 11l, b11ttlw rt' is al so lt< l r<!aSIJII l'o r ill o n.s.S111111' a priori IH.f'orc ti iC g(.'S(II n> - L q~o is I1al tlllcal < llillg , .sii!L it is only tltrougl a prot v~s of' siguali 11g and ill lcrpr<li ng that 't' ti ll' ro~t -" :uul prohabilitic -" o l' lwin g wrottg can I><' d<"ltnnii iL:d. Soc:i al th nat" arc C'O II Slrt I(' (( d, Ill) I ll:t[ll r: d . C:oll ~id<"r all (X:llllpl< vVould \V(' a. 11111<' , a pricJr i, that \V(' W r( abou t to I>< . % L a ll a~; h d if wt an <vc r t ottl a<:t<d l1 ttH'II d l('r~ of' att ali ' 11 c:ivili zal iott ~ I tlaink n ()l. y W<; wo11 ld lw ltigltly :.dvrt , ol' tom sv, b11 t wl1vtl1cr we pla< (J ilt' militat) ' for<.:(:!) nn :cd al<' rl or la1111dlvd att :tlta('k would dqw nd on how w< int ('rpr<'t<d the intpo rt of' thl'ir rirlll ~tslu n: I(H' 0 11 1' st<.:urity- if only to avoid lllak illg an itt lll l('dia l< l: fl my 0111 of' wl1 at lliH IH' a d:tt lgt rotts adve rsary . Ti lt' poss ibility of' erro r. itt olht r word\ . Y do<s not f(m:L tts to act on tl1 assn111pt iu11 tl1al tlw alitns an llt real<'ll ing: Actio n e dqw nds on tiH: pm ltahililic!s w< assign, and tiles(' art i11 key part a ftii H ;t'iott of' what tlw ali< ll~ do; prior to tlwir gcsl11 n , w <. haV<' 110 sy~tc t nic l n.L\i~ 1 assi~ ning proba()1' hiliti('S. If' tl1dr first gcsl11n is to appPar with a thousand spa<.t~l tips and dtst ruy < York, we will d< fitt < tiH si t11ali 011 as tlt r<.at< 11ing and r<.;spo 11J acco rdi11g l '. But 'W ' if' thl'y app< 'ar with Oil( spal't'Slt ip. sayi11g w lt:1t sec.111s lo h<.: "wC> com e in pLaet." Wl' wi ll fctl "nassund'' and will p roh~1 bly n spoud wi th n gcst mc inletu.k d to nass un tlll'lll, cv< n if litis gcs tllrc is not llL't < ssarily intcr prdltl by them as ..;udt. Tllb pr()(.'t'SS or si~llal iug, intcr pr<'ling. aud nspo ndi n~ <:otnpiC'IC'S a "social act" and h< ns tlw proc(ss of' creating iu ters11hjct: tivl' ll ll'at tin~s. It adva nce~ the same gi way. Tht" first social act en at es l 'XJH' <.:l ations on hntl1 sides ahuut each oth(r's fut urc b,.J,avior: pol<nti:tll) nli.sta k<.n and cNtainly tenta tive. but C\pc<.:tation!<l non thckss. Basl'd on this tt ntntiv< knowkdg<, t"go nwkc:s a JWW gestu r<', agajn signil~ving th<! basis 0 11 \vltidl it will respo nd to alt er. and agai n alt <.r r<:spond~. adding to tht pool of kuowlt:dg< cad 1 has ahn11t th(' olhC' r, a11d so un owr lime . The nwc hau is11l he re is niulc>rcL ll; iut cmc tion rewards a<tors lill hold in~ <Ltiaiu ideas about each othe r 'IIIt'l "' and d istou ragt' s tl1c' n1 frotll hold ing othe rs. If' rcpt~tt ed long enough. thes t "rcci protaltypificalions" will (.'r<'at< r('lativd y st:~hl < <:Onl'cpls of S<:lf and otlu.- r regardin~ tlw issttc at stake i11 thl' in1N aclio ll . 1 ~

tnwhil . . . . , thei r secnntY tllll .tlct< ) l 1' ' ' .tten~ these. . C:t ldliCC r !Ilt l rlo1ts of tC.'tOI"$ to en 1 < d a lienation. 1~ he 101 Ill' ol denti tY a '<:urt"' of . . '' , . t tatin{l' chst rust an . nu tnte t1 t)t Ilt rs. pe qJe l ll) e> I , are th emsel\'e ~ o wuinu r.Jo [r rest 1 . ucb dilemmas, lOWe' er. :'"< b "' ec:ts of th.tt con ttute . . t. . identities are prouuc:ed m and through .. t . not , to the tntetac 1on. st ttat d 1 1 l \O~t'l c~.t ~ d our relationship with the aliens ilt a security dil e 1 <Wthitv. '"' \Ve o not uegm . ., emtna : . . t oiven bv anarchy or ll < c... . . . ltuJ ecuntv dilemmas ate no 1::r d f . t1 of' identity formation ts a cru c a<.:count o how the pt The mmor 1eorv . 1 ll ocess . . .d .0. a'n(l interests might v"ork, but 1 c ocs not tc us why a syste t of creating 1 enti es . m . abl)' our own-wouJd have en d ccl up wtt1 self-regarding. of 1 states-sueI1 as, rugu . . ffi lnd . . .d bties In this section, I exammc an c c1 cause, prcdan ent not co11ecb'e 1 en . . on .} . . b'on with anarchY as a pernuss1ve cause, may aenerate a self-h 1' w htc 1, m conJune , . .. . . . ep 1 t 1 structUJ e of 1dentittes d . however I show the key role t 1at 1e S\stem. In so d omg, , ' , . an ~terests plays in mediating ana_rchy s ~xplanat~?' ':le. , . dator arQl.lment 1s strrughtfmwcud ,md compellmg. For v.rhatev, o . . . . The pre . er . ogy, dotrtestic politics or svstem1c victmllzat!O n-some states 1,.. reasons-b101 ' ' . . . ..ay become predisposed toward aggression. The ~ggressivc.l~e haviOr of th~s: predators or "bad apples" fo rces other states to engage m competitive power pohhcs, to meet fire with fire, since failure to do so may degrade or destroy them. One predator will best a hundred pacifists because anarchy provides no gu~rantees. This argument is powerful in part because it is so weak: ~ther th~n making ~he_ strong assumption that all states are inherently power-seekin g (a pU! ely reducborust themy of power politics), it assu mes that just one is power-see~ing and that the others have to follow suit because anarchy permits the one to explmt th em. In making this argument, it is important to reiterate that the possibili ty of predation does not in itself fo rce states to anticipate it a priori vvith competitive power politics of their own. The possibility of predation does not mean that "war may at any moment occur"; it may in fact be extremely unlikely. Once a predator emerges. however, it may condition identity and interest formation in the following manner. In an anarchy of two, if ego is predatory, alter must e ithe r define its security in self-help terms or pay the price .. . . The timing of the eme rgence of predation relative to the history of identity formation in th e co mmun ity is therefore crucial to anarchy's explanatory role as a permissive cause. Predation will always lead victims to defend themselves, but whether defense will be collective or not depends on the history of interaction within the potential collective as much as on the ambitions of the p redator. Will the disappearan ce of the So,~et threat renew old insecurities among the mem bers of the Nort h Atlantic Trea~' Organization ? Pe rhaps, but not if they have reasons independen t of that threat for identifying their security with one anothe r. Ide ntities and interests are relationship-specific, not intrinsic attributes of a "portfolio"; states may be com petitive in some relationships and solida.IJ' in othe rs .... The source of predation also matters. If it stems from unit-level causes that_ ~e immu~e- to s~emic impacts (causes such as hu man nature or don:esti~ ~~: taken m lSOiation), then it func:t:ions in a manner analogous to a "genetic tnut 11 oonstructed world of the state system. Even if successful , this trait does not se e<:t r other pre dators an evolutionary tl1er states 0 or m sense so much as it teaches o

r. ter'1ction are.prone to sec 111 (\Hnlwtilh s, , tcntso 111 1 JI

lt'l~'trt mas ,..

WENOT I A NARCHY lS WHAT STATES MAKE OF fT

67

respond in lnn :1, bHt <;iitee traitc; cannot he unlearnetl. the other state-; \\ill c:onli11ue compelitt 't.; hch t\~Or until lhl: predator is either tlestroycJ or transfonned from withi n. Ho\\ I cr. in the rnore likely event tl1at predation stems at least in part from pdor syo;tc rni' iult'raetion- perhaps as a result of being victi mizcd in the pac;t (one thinks hcH' of ?\azi Germany or the Soviet Union)- then it is more a responsC' to a learn('tl identity and, as ~uc h , might be transformed by future social interaction in the form of appeasement, n:.:assurances that secUJity needs will be met, syste mic effe<.;ts on do1ncslic politics, anti so on. In this case, in other words, there is rnon hope that process can transform a bac.l apple into a good one .. . . This raises anew the guestion of exactly how much and what kind of role hu man nature and domestic politics play in world politics. The greater and more destructive this role, the more significant predation will be, and the less amenable anarchy will b:: to formation of collective identities. Classical realists, of course. assume<l that human nature was possessed by an inherent lust for power or glory. My argument suggests that assumptions such as this were made for a rea<>on: An unchanging Hobbesian man provides tl1e powerful efficient cause necessary for a relentless pessimism about world politics that anarchic structure alone, or e,en structure plus intem1ittent predation, cannot supply. ... Assuming for now that systemic theories of identity formation in world politics are worth pursuing, let me conclude by suggesting that tl1e realist-rationalist alliance "reifies" self-help in the sense of treating it as something separate from the practices by which it is produced and sustained. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann define reification as follows: "[It] is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products-such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies tl1at man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is ... experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opu.s alienu m over which he has no control rather than as the opu.s proprium of his own productive activity. "14 By denying or bracketing states' collective authorship of their identities and interests, in other words, the realist-rationalist alliance denies or brackets the fact that competitive power politics help create a ve1 "problem of order" they are supposed to solve-that realism is a y selffulfilling prophecy. Far from being exogenously given, the intersubjecthe knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes of"social will formation."15 It is what states have made of themseh-es.

NOTES
l. Kenneth waltz, Man, the State, and War (New Y ork: Columbia Uni\'ersity Press. 19.59). p. 232. 2. Kenncth Waltz, Theoi1J of International Politics (Boston: Adclison-\\'eslev. 1979). 3. Waltz, Themyoflnternational Politics, pp. 79-101. . 4. The phrase "distribution of knowledge" is Barry Bames's, as discussed in his work The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); see also Peter Berger and Thomas

Luckmann, The Social Constntction of Reality (~ew Y Anchor Books. 1966' . ork:

:;

a~J)!t.'r. "ldt"ntity as a Problem in UH. Sociolog) or K11()\'.. ltd:.!

I u ropea 11 j

Ottrrl(t{

c if

. 'l<'i(l/o~y. i . 1 t}966). lll. 6. Be1v~r :lnd Ludm1:mn. P " '

ritv Dilemma." \\ (Jiid Politics 30 (Janua0 l; t _:_16 ' - . 9 w:utz. TheonJ aflnternatimwl Politics. PP 14- t t . . , . ee Jawes >.1ono\\, sOCic Choice aud Svstem Structure 111 \\oriel Pohti<:s," \Vo1lt flo/. :~ . u 10. c ifics 41 (October 1988). 89. . . . . . . ~ . . . 1 mctapboncal m wo1 le1 po1 1ttcs. s1nce throughout 11 .. 1 Storv 11 This Sttuaoon 1s not en0 re Y . h . states ba,e "discovered" eaeh other generatinu an mstant anarc ,. as tl were. A 5 , . . o . . )stem. . . ca1 d . f first contacts would be interesting. aoc empm stu ) o k . - ., .. . ___ ,.I ifications ., see Beruer and Luc rnann. pp. :>-r-;)8 . 12. On rectproca.t t)p , I w J ''$'tu t I .t" 13. See C. ~orman Alexander and Mary G enn 1 ey, J a e~ f \ cr1\1 . an d I clentity For. . maoon... . . oms Rosenberg and Ralph Turner. ed .. Socwl Psychology: SociolcJa 1 mM . btca Perspectives (New York: Basic Books, 1981), PP 269-89. 14. See Berger and Luckmann, p. 89. . ... 15. See Richard Ashley, ''Social Will ru1d lntemational Anarchy, 111 Hayward Alker and Richard Ashley, eds., After Realism, work in progress, Massachusetts Institute of Tech. nology, Cambridge, and Arizona State University. Tempe, 1992.

7. Wal~., Tht'0'1J of Jntcnrativunl Politics. P 91. . . .. . .. d \lnr and Robe1t j erv1s. Coopl r,thon Under th S hc State. nn . :t"t.' Waltz. . \lnu. t . -a) - _91-l e E'<:u.

'fHE MITIGATION OF ANARCHY

The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics

KENNETH A. OYE

I. INTRODUCTION
Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. Relations among states are marked by war and concert, arms races and anns control, trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competiti\e devaluation and monetary stabilization. At times, the absence of centralized international authmity precludes attainment of common goals. Because, as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to a supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they ..vi.ll adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize com mon goals through cooperation under anarchy. Despite the absence of any ultimate international authority, govemments often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands ready to enforce the tem1s of agreement, states can realize common interests through tacit cooperation, fonnal bilateral and multi-lateral negotiation, and the creation of intemational regimes. The question is: if international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean evil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?

From ''El(p1aining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies" b)' Kenneth A. Oyt> from World Politics. pp. 1- 22. Reprinted by pemtission ofJohns Hopkins University Press. Portions of tlw text and some footnotes have been omitted.

69

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,

PART l

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

OY

l HE: CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION IN WORLD POLITICS

i)

ar. question. to guarantee adherence> to agrc~c ment . 1 1011 clllj? Gi\'l'll the lack of a centra au )ermit states lo bind lh<?lii S<"'Iv~s to rnut:us. 1 . f . . t' s encourage or .r what features o srtua ron . ? \' 'I t fe'ttures of situations preclud" coope ration? .11 benenc1aJ c .r ;u > cow-ses of action 'v ta t < ~'oster the emergence c~ cooperation b d to o Y Sccond, w I10 1 st1oteuie.(j ca11 states .r. op !> Governments need nol ne<:essarily accept e ..,1 .1' . Ley altenng t7 c1rcu.mstances t1 C01':Jtro, are situational impedi men ts to coope ration te nt . . as <riven To w1 ex e 1at . cm:umstrul<:~s e dul . . ? Through what highe r order stratcgtcs can states eresubject to wt.llful mo cation. . ? .h nditions for cooperatron . . .. ate t e preco . tantial dimensions se1ve both a~ proximalc expla1 submit t11at t1 c1rcums uee . . d t <~ets oflonger-term strategtes to promote coope ranations of cooperation an as aro . . -0 . sections of this piece cle fi nes a cl'1mens10n. explains tion Each of tIle tJ1ree maJ I . . . . . ts for the incidence of cooperahon ancl conf!rct m the how that dtmensJOn accoun . . _ . r . . .. d. thority and exam tnes assoctated str ategt es 101 enhan c:mg absence of centralJZe au the prospects for cooperation. A . In the section entitJed "Payoff Structure: ~tutu al and Co~ 1 ctmg Preferences," I discuss how payoff$ affect tl1e prosp~ts for coo_pe rat1on ami present strategies to improve the prospects for cooperaho~ by alter~ng payoffs. Orthodox game theorists identify optimal ~trategies giv~n or~nally defined. ~lass~s of games. and tJ1eir familiar insigh ts provtde the stmting pomt for the dt scuss1on. Hecent works in security studies, institutional microeconomics, and international political e<:onomy suggest strategies to alter payoff structures and th ereby improve the prospects for cooperation. 1 In the next section , entitled "Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games," I discuss how the prospect of continuing interaction affects the likelih ood of cooperation; examine how strategies of reciprocity can provide direct paths to cooperative outcomes under iterated conditions; and suggest strategies to length en the shadow of the future.2 In addition, this section shows that recognition and control capabi~ties-tbe abiJity to distinguish between cooperation and defection b~ othei'S and to respond in kind- can affect the powe r of reciprocity, and suggests strategies to improve recognition capabilities. In the third section, '!\umber of Players: Two-Person and N-Pe rson Games.' I explain why cooperation becomes more difficult as tl1e numb er of actors in~re.ases; p~esent strategies for promoting cooperation in N-acto r situations; and oJfer strategJes for promoting cooperation by reducing the number of actors necessary to tbe realization of common mterests. G ame theorists and oligopoly t1 ts teons have long noted that coope ti b . . h . . . ra on ecornes more difficult as numbers increase, and t elr~nsJghts provide a starting point for discussion. Recent work in political economy IOCuses on two strateoi {! . t' . r. . . o-es or promotmg cooperation in thorn y N -perso n SJtuarons. mnctionalist analysts of . l'k lib od d b regimes suggest strategies for increasmg t1te 1 e o an ro ustness of coo " ti ad hoc ba . . . . pera on gwen 1 arge numbers of actors, 3 analysts 0 f rgammg m mtemational politi aJ and relrional d .. c economy suggest strategies of b11 al ateJ . o ecompos1tion to reduce th l1.ation of some m t a1 . e nu mber of actors necessary tothe realr cooperation .... 4. u u mterests' at the expense 01 the magnitude of ga111s frOJ11

. 1 "] . d l. both ext> Iana t ory .111 d [)rescrir)tivc aspe<.:l~ of tlris IWrcnn 1 ra lSchom:; ,\t ress fi. <theemergenceofco<> iwn . JJCrtJ
F" 1 / 1circumstances nvo 1 IfS . tc w tJ ty

urulcran

n. PAYO FF STRUCTURE: MUTUAL AND CONFLICTING

pREFERENCES

The stmcture of payoffs in u given round of play- the benefits of mutnal cooperation (CC) relali\(: to mutual defection (DD) and the benefits of unilateral defection (DC) relative ro unrequ ited c:ooperation (CO)- is fundamental to the anal}sis of coope ration . The argum ent proc:ectls in three staaes . First. how does payofT structure affect th<:: significance of c:oopcrahon ? .\~t ore narrowly, when is cooperation, denned in terms of conscious policy coordinatio n. necessary to the realization of muht al interesls? Secon d, how clot!s payoff structure affect the likelihood and robustness of coope ration? Third , tl1rough what strategies can states increase the long-term prospects fo r coope ration by alterin g payoff structures? Before turnin g to these questions, consider briefly some tangible and intangible determinants of payoff structures. The security and political economy literatures examine th e effects of military force structure and doctrine, economic ideology, the size of currency reserves, macroeconomic circum stance, and a host of ot11er factors on national assessments of national interests. In "Cooperation under tJ1e Security Dilemma," Robe rt Jervis has e~:plain ed how the difFusion of offens ive military technology and strategies can increase rewards from defection and thereby reduce the prospects for coope ration. In "International Regimes, Transactions, and Chance: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," John Ruggie has demonstrated how the diffus ion of Liberal economic ideas increased the perceived benefits of mutual economic openness over mutual closure (CC-DD), and diminished t11e perceived rewards from asymmetric defection relative to asymmetric cooperation (DC-CD). In "Firms and Tariff Regime Change, Timothy YlcKe0\\11 has shown how down turns in the busin ess cycle alter national tastes for protection and thereby decrease tl1e perceived benefits of mutual openn ess relative to mutual closure and increase the perceived rewards of asymmetric defection... . 5

A. Payoff Structure and Cooperation

How does payoff structure determine tJ1e significance of cooperation'? Ylore narrowly, when is cooperation, defined in terms of conscious polic} coordination, necessary to the realization of mutual benefits? For a mutual benefit to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD). For coordinatjon to be necessary to the realization of the mutual benefit. actors must prefer unilateral defec tjon (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). These preference orderings are consistent with the familiar games of Prisoners' Dilemma. Stag Hunt, and Chicken. Indeed, tl1ese garnes have attracted a disproportionate share of scholarly attention precisely because cooperation is desirable but not automatic. In the e cases, the capacity of states to coope rate under anarchy. to bind tbemsekes to ll1utually beneficiaJ courses of action '<vithout resort to any ultimate central authority, is vital to the realization of a common good . ... In the class of aame s-inc ludin g Prisoners' Dilemma. Stag Hunt. and Chick en-where coop~ration is necessary to the realization of mutual benefits. how does payoff structure affect the likelihood and robustness of c:ooperation in

I Ill.

\..Vl'' <IUIIIU NS

FOR COOPERATION IN WORLD P0Ul1CS

73

. .11 b less likelv in Prisoners D ilt ll!rn t.m in St 1 tln. , ~ sit mllion ? Cooper.ttion "' le ' de.r each of thes<' g.u tr s in lOTIJ\I11<;.-: ag , . k -r d tand w w cons IJOn I hmt or Clue en. 0 un ers .d t1 . derhe tJ1eir names. . . f om -.vht 1 1e) \\i th the tllustran,e tones r . are susoected of a 11ajcJr <-rime. l'h . . 0 .1 0 . Two J Jnsoners r t Pn onet 1 em m cnon on onh' a minor 1. IJ:tr:.?:c. 1f ne1 tt .. d to secure com 1 )(:r authonttes possess evt ence li ht entence on the minor chargr CC). I f <l s ne al s. botl1 " 'ill draw a g ails the rat will uo free 1 DC and the suckc pru oner sque . a1 cl the other stonew o r pnsoner sque an . (CD). If both squeaL both wilJ dnm a mouerate ,,;n draw a very hea') s~nten~ 'erence ordeJing is: DC > CC > DD > CD I f pre . ( DD). Each Imsoners onlv~ one time, each pnsoner \\1tt I)C better . senten~e . . .. lav" off the pnsoners expect tal P _, matter what his partner chooses to do (DC > CC oJ 1' th tonew mg, no squeaung an s . f the rat payoff and fear of the su(ker payoff will d DD CD) The temptatiOn o . an > . . Dil n'lrnas toward mutual defection. Unfortu nateh if . 1 _ lay Pnsoners e /' d n\e smg e P h' oning they will draw a mode rate sentence on the both prisoners act on t IS reas . ' . . h'l ation could have led to a light se ntence on the minor maJOT charge w I e cooper , iJ . . 1 'd JI . ' DD) 1 sngle-play Prisoners D e mmas. JllUJ V ua ~, rational I charge (CC > n 1 actions roduce a colJectively suboptLmaJ outcome. . St~ Hunt: A group of hunters surround a stag. If all co~perate t? tlap the stag. all will eat well (CC). If one person defects to chase a passmg rahbtt, ~he stag will escape. The defector will eat ~ghtly (DC) and none of th~ ot~ ers ,~JJ eat ~t. all (CD ). If all chase rabbits, all will have some c~anc~ of catchmg a rahb1 t and eatmg li htl (DD). Each hunter's preference ordenng 1 CC > DC > DD > C D. The s: ;ut~ interest in plentiful venison (CC) relative to all other outcomes militates strongly against defec:tion. However, because ~ rabbit in the hand .(D C ) is better than a stag in the bush (CD), c..'Ooperation will be assured only 1f each hunter believes that all hunters will cooperate. In single-play Stag Hun t, the temptation to defec-t to protec-t against tl1e defection of others is balanced by the strong universal preference for stag over rabbit. Chicken: Two drivers race down the center of a road from opposite directions. If one swerves and the other does not, then the first wiJl suffer the stigma of being known as a chicken (CD) while the sec.'Ond will enjoy being known as a hero (DC). If neither swerves, both will suffer grievously in the ensuing collision (DD). H both swerve, damage to the reputation of each wiJJ be Hmited (CC). Each driver's preference ordering is: DC > CC > CD > DD. If each believes that the other will swerve, then each will be tempted to defect by continuing down the cent er of the road. Better to be a live hero than a live chicken. If both succumb to this temptation, however, defection wiU result in C'Ollision. The fear that the othe r driver may n_ot swerve de~Teases the appeal of continuing down the cente r of the road. In smgle-playChicken, the temptations of unilateral defection are balanced by fear of mutual defection.
In ~es that are not repeated, only ordinally defined preferences matter. Under smgle-play. eonclitions, of mteNal-1 evel payoffs in ordinally de fined categones ~:=~ot (m theol)_') affect the ~elihood of cooperation. In the illustra~ions ons of dominant strategies do not hinge on the magnitude of iliffer= o n g~ paJoffs. Yet the magnitude of differences between CC and DD een an CD c be large or small, if not precisely mea~urable, and can :an

increase or c. :t. Changes in the magnitude r clifr . I o 1 <::rences m t 1e value J '>latcd H on outconH ., l Ul n ''en<:c the prospects for coope t' I h . J I I ra ton t 1 rou~ two path F1r"t. c '<ngts 111 t H: \'a ue attached to out<:o1n .. tr r . . . 11 1 1 .1 1 es cc1n an 10rm sttuatton from one ordma ' l'.lll<:u <:ass of vame into anot11e f 1 . "C . under the ~ turit~ Dilemma,'? Hohert Jet'\is ders ?br dexahm~ edi. ffil~ 1 oo~eratto~ .. , . en e ow cu t Pn oncrs Dilemmas ma\ C\ .oh e m to less. chaHenginu Stag H un ts 1 .L uruns from mutu a1 f UJe . . , cooperation t CC mcrea.<>t relat1ve to t11e 11ains from expl0 ta t:i on I DC J. H e re1 cl ate f pm offs to trac.Utional concepts of rre 1 . ilie structure o : (' . 0 11 ns1-.e an d derensl\e domJ nance, and of fensi\'C:: and defensive dominance to techno1 a1 ancl doctnna1 ogtc shifts. Emst 11aas. -"larv Pat \\ 'illiams ' and Don Babai ha'e emphas1zecl t he . ... ' unportance o f cogmtlve congruence as a determinant of technolog a1 C:OOpera0 On. The f . .IC di ffus~on o c~mmon concepti~ns of the nature and effects of technology enhanced percetved gams from cooperatiOn and diminished perceiveu gains from defection. and may have transformed some P1isoners' DiJemmas into Harmonv.6 s.:c~nd, u.n.der .i ~erated conditions, t11e.magnitude of differen;es among payoffs w1 thz.n a g1 ~lass of ga~nes can be an Important determinant of coope ration . ven The mo~e s u bs ta~tt a~ the gams from mutual cooperation (CC-DD) and the less substantial the gams from unilateral defection (DC-CD), the ureater the likelihood of cooperation. In iterated situations, the magnitude of the dJference between CC ~nd anu. between .and CD in present and future rounds of play affects t11e likelihood of cooperation m the present. This point is developed at length in the section on llie shadow of the fu ture.

?D

?C

B. Strategies to Alter Payoff Structure

If payoff structure affects tl1e )jkelihood of cooperation, to what extent can states alter situations by mowfying payoff structures, and thereb\ increase the Ion a-term likehl1ood of cooperation? .\If any of the tangible and int~gible determin~ts of payoff structure, discussed at the outset of this section. are subject to willful modification through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral strategies. In "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,'' Robert Jet'\'i.s has offered specific suggestions for altering payoff structures through unilateral strategies. Procurement policy can affect the prospects for cooperation. If one superpower favors procure ment of defensive over offensive weapons, it can reduce its own gains from exploitation through swprise attack (DC) and reduce its adversary's fear of e:\p loitation (CD). Members of alliances have often resorted to the device of deplo)ing troops on troubled frontiers to increase the likelil10od of cooperation. A states use of troops as hostages is designed to diminish the payoff from its own defection- to reduce its gains from exploitation (DC)-and thereby render defensive defection by its partner less likely. Publicizing an agreement diminishes payoffs associated 'vith defection from the agreement, and thereby lessens gains from exploitation. These observations in international relations are paralleled by recent de,elopments in microeconomics. Oliver \ ViJliamson has identified unilateral and bilateral techniques used by firms to facilitate interfum cooperation by diminishing gains from e~loitation. He distinguishes between specific and nonspecific costs associated With adherence to agreements. Specific <.'Osts, such as specialized training, machine

-..

PART I

1\Nf\ K\...1 11 "- -

b ecovetcd tn the e,e nt ol tlw I f ~do wn of an . c011Stntction, c.:annot e ' nt t'ncur hiuh speci fie.: co;.;t . , pu cliation r to<>Is. Ill cl . . aureeme .::1 nt \\'hen partteS to an c;all Finns can thus reu u n the n gains froo ;tl,!;f('en l . . . . .. ' l'lt.tll'lt'l)tS \\'lU ental 1Stl bSt <1ntr osses. uiJing deLiiC.:ale cl <lSS( t S. tha t Setv m {' acq comt e 1 1iqu e o as ~'f)loitation through the tee 11 . Nonsoecific assets, such as gctte ral- pu '11osc r I hostages to contmumg coOJJeratJOn. fa greements bre ak cown: f ins <:an bl lt rcduc: .. . . salvauea e t f .. e: . . .. , I e ~ . . . nu the use o non spe ctn c.: d<;S t Is, )LJt such t tucl--s and au1)Jan es, are . . . . their fear of bemg expIOtted b)' maxJll11Zl ~ . )alation b) servmg as hostages. - U ntlaterll . . . l . < assets cannot dunuusI1 gains from exp f coor)eration by re ducmg IJot l, t I1e t costs of . . strate<ries can tmp tove the prospec so exploitation (D C). Tl1e new ]tteratu . f OJn re Oll 0' . d (CD ) d tJ,e ga.ms r . being ex.-plmte an . an old questiOn on the c.:os ts of unt.late ra) . 10 direct1 rruses . y interfinn cooperation : . nterna . . 0 Jeration 1 1 tional relations. . 0 . strate~es top~ omote eo lnilateral actions tJ1at limit one ,s gam s from exp loit ation In man y mstances, u . e's vulnerabtlity to expl.oitation bv oth ers . For ffect of increasmg on . al . / . mav l1ave t I1 e e d . . . s f'rom defection from libe r mtem at1onal eco. J t t coul 1 t <Tall'l JJm examp e, as a e . . th expansion of sectors of comparati ve advantage and ~ .. ai nomLc no rms by penmtnngf. e c.ent sectors. Because a spe cr tze d econom . .d . effi 1 y is a b tting liqw ation o m Ypernu . ti. ~'economic cooperation, tllis strategy would uny u esti onablv hostage to mtema onat . al . th dibJty f the nation. commitment to tbe1 tsm. I t . 1 1as the s 1 ,1 so 1 mcrease e ere I I o . . .. . . . easmg the nations vulner abdity to p1 ote ct10n l)y otl1e1s. In effect l1owever, of mer . the tr~ps-as-hostage example, the governme nt that stat10n s ti:o ops m ~y p_ro m_ote . ng cooperatIon b)' dimm LSh1 an ally's fear of abandonm ent , bu t m so domg 1t rruses its own fears of exploitation by the ally. . . . . Unilateral strategies do not exhaust the ran ge of option s tha t sta tes may use to alter payoff structures. Bilateral stra teg ies -m ost signifi~n~ly sti~at~ gi_es of issue Linkage-can be used to alter payoff structu res by com bm mg diss1mtlar games. Because resort to issue linkage generally assumes iteration, ana lysis of bow issue linkage can be used to alter payoffs is presented in the section on th e shadow of the future. Furthermore, bilateral "instructional " strategies can aj m at alte rin g another cou ntry's understanding of cause-and-effect relationships, and res ult in alte red perceptions of interest. For example, American negotiators in SALT I sou ght to instruct their Soviet < nterparts on the logic of mutual assured des tru ctio 8 :ou n. Multilateral strategies, centering on the formation of intemational regimes, can be used_ to alte~ payoff structures in two ways. First, norms gen era ted by reg imes ~y be mtemalized by states, and thereby alte r payoff structure. Sec ond, info rmation generated by regi.mes may alter states' understanding of the ir inte res ts. As Emst Haas argues, new regunes may gather and distribute information tha t can highlight cause-and-effect relationships not previously understood. Changing per cep tions of means-ends hierarchies can tu . . , m m, res uJt m changmg perceptions of interest.1:1
J

THE CONDITIONS FOR COO PERATION lN WORLD POLITICS

75

AND ITERATED GAMES

m. THE SHADoW OF THE FUTURE

influenc.:e de H '.' ' n the P~(sent is fu nda me ntal to the emergence of coo pN alion among cgotP.;b. !\" ll~~ prevtots sc~ tion s~tgg<:.sts. stat es confronting strateg ic \itn ations ~hat re sul lhl l' sm.gl_-play Pnsoners Dil emma and , to a lesser extent e , sin t;kpl~y Stag ''.'~nt _and _Cinc~en , ar~ _consta~t ly tempte d by imll'Wdiatc gains fro m unilate ral de lec_lwr:- ,u~cl fea rf~J of ~ ~m ediate losses from unrequ ited coo peratio n. How doe ~ cc~ntmu~ ng m~~ rachon affe~t prospec.:ts for cooperation? Th e ar ~m cnt proceeds_ l_ou: s_t,lges . ~ tr~t , wh y do 1terated conditions imp rove the prospe m cts [()r cooper ation ~n l .nson ~rs D~l emma and Stag Hu nt while diminishing the prospects 111 Ch, ~ke for cooper~lton n Second , how do strategies of reciproci ty imp rove the prospects for ~oop~r at1~ n under iterated conditions? Third, why does the effec.:tive ness of rectprocrty hmgc on conditions of pla y-the abilitv of acto rs to distinguish reli ably between cooperation and defection by other; and to res pond in kind? FoUJt h. through what stra tegies can states improve conditions of play and length en the shadow of the future? Be fo re turru ng to these questions, c.:onsider the attributes of iterated situatio ns. First, states mu st expect to continue dealing with each otl1 er. This con di tion is, in practic.:e, not pmticularly restrictive . With the possible exception of glo bal the rmonuclear war, inte rnational politics is charac terized by the exp ectation of fu ture interaction. Second, payoff structures must not change sub stantially ove r tim e. In other words , eac h round of play should not alter the structure of the gam e in the future. This condition is, in practice, quite res trictive. For example, states consid ering sUipris e attack when offe nse is dominant are in a situ ation that has ma ny of the characteristics of a single-play game: Attack alte rs options and payoffs in future rounds of interaction . Conversely, nations consid erin g increases or dec reases in their military budgets are in a situation that has many of the charac teri stics of an iterated gam e: Spending options and associated marginal increases or dec reases in military stre ngth are likely to remain fairly stable ove r future rounds of inte raction. In inte rnational monetary affairs, governments considering or fearin g dev alu ation under a gold-exchange standard are in a situation that has many of the cha rac teristics of a single-play game: Devaluation may diminish the value of anothe r state's foreign currency reserves on a one-time basis, while reductions in holdin gs or reserves would diminis h possible losses on a one-tim e basis. Conve rsely, govern me nts considering inte rvention und er a floating system with minimal reserves are in a situation that has many of the characteristics of an iterated game: De pre ciation or appreciation of a cur rency would not produce substantial one-time loss es or gains. Third , the size of the discount rate applied to the future affects the iterati\ en ess of games. If a government places little value on future payoffs , its situation has many of the characteristics of a single-play game. If it places a high \alue on future payoffs, its situ atio n may have many of the characteristics of an iterated game. Fo r example. political lea der s in the ir fina l term are likelv to discount the future mo re substan" tiaJiy than political lea ders running for, or ce1tain of, reelection.

: SINGLE-PLAY
A. The Shadow of the Future and Cooperation
How does the shadow of the fut ure affect the likeliliood of cooperatio n? Under single-play c.:onditions ,~~,~thout a sovereign , adl1erence to agreement s is often

The distincti be on tween cases in h. h 'mil . unlikely to be repeated cl . w 1.c SI ar transactions am ong part1es aJe
an cases m which the expectation of fut ure inte ractjon can

{j

t'tu\ J &

IU ~ t u~ -

. s Dilemma. Eacb p11 t:r t11r is better r . . t! . . . . ~t.,;otnl Con~ader the s111g e -IJlcW Pnsoner. to squeal. In t I1c ,1I>'-lll( .c. u {' con tm,,o I . d ,.5 1n. ~ . . tncr c ect e 1 . .. . . .OYlinl'1 whether or not 1us P<0 . tl domimll1t strategy. Becc\u-;t tl ,e pn:-;onlllg . qu"'" c- .t l e ers . 't"ntclion defection wotuC eme rge <L~ 1 nrorcement of an agrc'enH nt to coopcrat . r lh " ( ' . Jl . . "et'ther rum to a central au thonty..ore 'eter prese nt de reel ton. cooperation,, .e . t can '' . . . f etahation o u l .," 11 nor relv on the anttc tpatiOn o r di . lf the prisoners expect to w plnc:ecl in sitni. un d . 1 plav con tions. . . . . be w 1tikel) er smg e- ' t c0 r coop eration 1mpt.ove E'1)c,ll mental e,,; " Il . . \ar situa6ons in the fu ture, .the prospec sners' Dile mma the JnClcIencc' o r cooperatiodp . dence suggests that under.rterat~b ~~~of centralized authority, tacit agreeme nts . J .,.. rises substantiaJl) to Even 111 tlle a se a are frequent)' reachec1 . I mar.ntamed alli. .m< . . . I cooperate throug1 mu tual stone'vc nootential defector compares t1 nnm ediat 1e . ' Dilemma, a P . e Under iterated Pnsoners 'bl acrifice of future gatns that mny result frorn . th the poss1 e s gain from squeal rng Wl H t each hunter is tempted to defec:t . order to m squealing. In singl~-play Stag .b~~or'defection by othe rs. A reputatio n fi.lr rcliabildefend himself agamst tl.1e pos~ ~stile likelihood of defection. If the hunters are a ity, for resisting tempdtation. ret ul nt together again , the imm edia te gains from unit 0 1I}> an expect o 1u permanen gr ' . t equited cooperation must be halanc:ecl against the t al defection re1 . , 1 en . . . ed ative o unrn the a ti' future. In both Pnsoners Dil em ma and Stag cost of cLmtmsh c:oopera on l f . . c . . tJ esent decreases the likeliJ100d 0 coop erat1011 . tJle futu re Hunt derection m le pr . m . th r t rati'on improves the prospects for coope rabon. In Chrcken In bot1 ere1ore, 1 e 1, . . .. . may d ase the prospects for cooperation. Under smg le-pl ay conditions' iteration ecre .. dle temptation of unilateral defection is ~alan~ed by the fe.ar of the colh sron that fo~lows from mutual defection. How does 1teration affec t this balance? If the game 1 s repeated indefinitely, then each driver may refrain from ~ervi.ng in the preser~t to coerce the other drive r into swerving in the future. Each drive r may seek to acqUire a reputation for not swerving to cause the other driver to swerve. In itera ted Chicken, one drive r:~ defection in the present may decrease the likeilllood of th e othe r driver's defection in the future.

( c Ti lE CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION IN WOR lD POUTICS

77

t:

B. Strategies of Reciprocity and Conditions of Play

?f conti ~uing interaction has varying effects on the likelihood of coope ration in the 1 Uust_rations abov~ , an iterated environme nt perm its resort to shat egies of recipr~lty t~at may rmprove the prospects of cooperation in Chic ke n as well as in Pns~ners Dilemma and Stag Hunt. Robert Axelrod argues that strategies of red~rocrkhave the effect of promoting cooperation by estabLishing a direct connecotnr Til -IOr-ttwteen andi ac.tor's present behavior and anticipate d futu re bene fits. a , or con 'tional coo ti . tion by h th fu pera on, can mcrease the likeliliood ofJ oint cooperas apmg e ture conseq f In iterated p . , . uences o present coop eration or de fection. future consequen~:ne;s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, reciprocity unde rscores tile sented abov... ..L . 0 p~esent cooperation and defection . The argu men t pre.--u w Iteration enhan th game s-rests on the . ces e prospects for coop erati on in t l1ese I: L_ .I assumption that det ti th wwoo of COOperation in the fu 1 ec. on m e present will decr ease the l'kematching stonPU~<~Il:~.... .th ture. Adoption of an implicit or explicit strategy of --~ oouu"b Wt stonewalling alin . . g ' sque g With squealing, rabb1t chasll1
It is at this juncture that strategy enters the explanatio n. Alth ough the expectation

effects of n.-> l.tlJO'M; c.onsJuerations on the prospects fo r cooperation. Recall that in iterated Cl ne~'- n, <- atlt ~riv~ r may ~e:f'rain front swerving in the present to coerce t}1 e other dn\'('r !~le~ swc1v1ng m the futm e. Adoption of an implicit or e>qJiicit strategy of tit- for~tat 1n tterated.gaJ~es of Chi<.:ken alters the failure stream of benefits associated wJth pn:\t 'lll defection . If a strate6'Y of reciproci ty is credible, then the mutual losses <L<isot:iate~ with fuhtre collisions can encourage present swer\ing. In all thrc>e games. a prom1se to respond to present cooperation \vith futurc coop eration and a th reat to respo nd to present defection with future defection can impro,e the prospects for cooperation. The effeetiveness of strategies of reeiprocity hinges on conditions of play- the abili ty of actors to distinguish reliably between cooperation and defection by othe rs and to respond in kind. In th e illustrations provided above, the meaning of "defect" and "cooperate" is unambiguous. Dichotomous choi ces- betw een squeal and stonewall. chase the rabbit or captu re the stag, continue down the road or swe rve- limi t the likelihood of misp erception. Further. the actions of all are transpare nt. Given the definitions of the situations , prisoners, hunters, and drive rs can reliably dete ct defection and cooperation by other acto rs. F inally, the definition of the actors eliminates the poss ibility of control problems. Unitary prisoners , hunters, and dJive rs do not suffer from facti onal, organizational. or bureaucratic dysfunctions that migh t hinder implementation of strategies of reciprocity. In international relations , conditions of play c:an limit the effectiveness of reciprocity. The definition of cooperation and defection may be ambiguous. For example, the Soviet Union and the United States hold to markedly diffe rent definitions of "defection" from the term s of detente as prese nted in the Basic Principles Agre eme nt;J 1 the Eu ropean Community and th e United States differ over whether dom estic sectoral policies complise indirect e>;port subsidies. Furt her, actions may not be transparent. For example, gove rnme nts may not be able to detect one another's violations of arms control agre eme nts or indirect expmt subsidies. If defection cannot be reliably detected , the effect of present cooperation on poss ible future reprisals will erode. Together, ambiguo us definitions and a lack of transparency can limit the ability of states to reco gnize cooperation and defection b, othe rs. Because reciprocity requires flexibility, control is as important as recognition. Internal factional , organizational , and bureaucratic dysfunctions may limit the ability of nations to implement tit-for-tat strategies. It may be easier to sell one unvarying line of policy than to sell a strategy of shifting between Lines of policy in response to the actions of othe rs. For example, arn1s suppHers and defense planners tend to resist the cancellation of weapons systems even if the cancellation is a response to the actions of a rival. Imp mt-competi.ng industries tend to resist the removal ofba.niers to imports, even if trade liberalization is in response to libemlization by another state . At times, national decision makers may be unable to impleme nt strategies of reciprocity. On othe r occasions, they must inves t heavily in selling reciprocity. For these reasons . national decis ion makers may display a bias against conditional strategies: The domestic costs of pursuing such strategies may partially offset the value of the discounted sheam of future benefits that conditional policies are e>:pected to )ield . ...

with rab~Jit c 1 ~n " 11 d cc:o.lwrative hJnling "'ith <.:oopcrativc !tuntin~ \aJicl,ttcs the assumpt1011. fn 1t. r tl r,d ClJ~c:ken , a slrat eey of reciprocity can off<.et the pen er~<:

-s

..

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQ UE

NCES
0 ,E 'TH E CONDITlONS FOR COOPERATION IN WORLD PO UTI CS 79

c. Strategies to Improve Recog

the Shadow of the Fu ture

nition an d Len gthen

. peration hv creating l.t,nrable c:ondi ts oromote coo r To \,l''\t extent can goven1men . the sIladow of the futu., ? 1~I le I' atn re on inte re. tln < .. rtion , of play and by lengtherung . es for creating favornhle <:onditton s of play. rr national regimes ouers 5everal techmqudefinitional am b'tgUJ'tY. Th e ''Cl~' ac.:t f' _ . limit o c:larope rative and unc:oop<ralJ\'e behavior E :\'l)licit codification of not rns can 6 . ""' d f de mng eo . .. ifvin<r standards of con uct, 0 , . t es of reciproctty. l'ur ther. pro,tsJons l'or . . rr . . . . can pemut mo re e11ec ti've resmt to stra egifor verincauon 111 a1.m;;. c..:on tt.o1 . agreele mecharusms .1 surveillan ce- for _exa ~p on on the nature and effects o f uo~11 Csllc: sectoral ments or for shanng tnformati I . . parency. n P1actice ' the goal of enhan c:mg recognition policies--can mc rease trans tiations under anarch y. capabilities is often central to ~eg? . aJ microeconomic lite ratures offer several f . a1 d msrrtu 0 on< 1 The game- th eore 1C I >rac ter of sihtat'ions. Th on1as Sl:helling and . . u the tteraove c 1.... approaches to mcreasmo . f d nposition over tim e to lengt1 t1 sha 1en 1e dow t tactics o ecot Robert AxeIro d sugges taoon to defect in a deal promising thirh bill~ F0 mple t1 temp of the future. - ~ ~x.a . ' I 1e foil may be reduced if the deal is sliced up ' into a lion dollars for a bJIJtodn bdarli:e s Coo peration in arm s reduction or in territorial f . ents an e ven es. s~nes o pa) m . be difficult if the reduction or dis engage me nt must be achieved disengagement mayd . .l: . If a re uction or wsengagement can be sliced up into increments, the 111 one Jum p. . b endered more tractable. Finally, strategies of issue may e r . Problem of cooperation It . .. .1 voff structures and to . t]ect e Iem ents o f Iterativemte linkage can be useu to a er pa; . . 1 1 t ti'ons Relations among states are rar e Iy limite d to one ness mto smg e-p ay SI ua . e of .nw g impmtance \i\T natwn s con front a smgle-p Jay .l=n hen single-p]ay 1ssu ovet _ . . e, esent defiection mav be deterre d by th 1.eats of 1etaliat. on game on one Issu pr JOn other iterated issues. In international monetary affrurs , for mstanc:e, a go~e1 nment fearing one-time reserve losses if another s~at~ deval~ es its cur ren :y may link de,~l uation to an iterated trade game. By establislung a dire ct connection between p_resent behavior in a single-play game and future benefits in an iterate d game, tactt or explicit cross-issue linkage can lengthen the shadow of the future .. ..

Prisone rs Di ' 111 11 1a giws way to the pessilnism of analyses of' cooperation in thC' provision o_f Jl 11 !,lic- ~oods. A~J~lic:ati~>ns of Olsonian th~ory to prohlem<; ranging from cartdv.a Jl1 to the.; proVlSJOn ol pub lic: goods in alli anc:es undcrsc:nr<" the si<rnifi cance of "free-riding" as an impedime nt to cooperation. 13 ln inte rnation al rel; tions, the nu1nbc rs prohl~~ has bee n c:entral to hvo debates. The longst anding controversy on r the stab tltty of bipolar versus multipolar svstcms reduce s to a debate ove r the imp act of the number of significant act~rs on interna tional conflict. l l A more recent <:ontroversy. between proponents of the theory of hegemonic stabiJity and advocates of inte rnational regimes, reduces to a deb ate over the efl'ects of large numbers on the rob ustn ess of cooperation. l5

A. Number of Players and Cooperation

How do numbers affect the likelihood of cooperation? Th ere are at least thre e impor16 tant channels of influence. First, cooperation requires recognition of opportu nities for the advancement of mutual inte rests, as well as policy coordination onc e these opp01tunities have been ide ntined. As the number of players increases, tran sactions and inform ation costs rise . In simple terms. the complexity of ~-person sitl tations militates against ide ntification and realization of common interests. Avoidin g nuclear war dming the Cuban missile crisis called for cooperation by the Soviet Un ion and the United States. The transaction and information c.-osts in this particularly harrowing crisis, though substan tial , did not preclude cooperation. By contrast, the problem of identifying significant actors, defining inte rests. and negotiating agreem ents that em bodied mutual inte rests in theN-actor case of 1914 was far more difficul t. These secondary costs associated vvith attaining cooperative outcomes in :\-acto r cases erode the difference between CC and DD . More significantly. the inbinsic difficulty of anticipating tl1e behavior of other players and of weighing the value of the futme goes up with the number of players. The complexity of solving N-person gam es, eve n in the purely ded uctive sense, has stunted the development of fonnal wo rk on the problem. This complexity is even greate r in real situations, and operate s against multilateral cooperation. Second, as the number of players increases , the likelihood of autono mous defection and of recognition and control proble ms increases . CooperatiYe behavior rests on calculations of expected uti lity -m erging discount rates, pay ofT structures, and anticipated behavior of other players. Discou nt rates and approa ches to calculation are likely to vary across actors , and the prospects fo r mutual cooperation may decline as the number of players and probable heterogeneity of actors inc reases . Th e chances of including a state that discoun ts the future hea ,ily , that is too weak (domestically) to detect, react, or implement a strategy of recipro city, that cannot dis tinguish reliably between cooperation and defection by other states, or tha t depatts fro m even minimal stan dards of rationality increase with the numbe r of states in a game. For example, many pessimistic analyses of the conseq uence of nuclear pro life ration foc us on how breakdowns of deterrence may becom e more ukely as the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases. Third, as the number of players increases, the feasibility of sanctioni ng def ectors diminishes. Strategies of reciprocity become more difficult to implement withou t

IV. NUMBER OF PLAYERS: TWO-PERSON AND N-PERSON GAMES

Up to now, I have discussed the effects of payoff stllJc:tu re and the shadow of Ule future on the prospec.-ts of cooperation in terms of two-person situations. Wh at hap~ns to ~he prospects for cooperation ac; the number of signifi can t actors rise s? In thts s~on, I explain why the prospects for cooperation dim inish as the number of players mcreases; examine the function of inte rnational regimes as a respon se to the toblems cr~ated by Iru:ge n.umbers; and offe r strategies to imp rove the pro spects r cooperntion by altenng Situations to diminish the number of signiflcan t play ers. OlsoT?ethnumbe~ problem is central to many areas of the social sciences. Mancu~ n s eory OJ collective acti c Dile Th . . on IO es on N-person ver sions of- PnsOJ1ers cus mma. e optimiSm of ou . 1 -1=. wscuss1 .ons r ear 1er of cooperation under 1terated

kO

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

., . . . n tmposc. costs on aJI Parties m an. ~"' -per r hJty of sm<:tiOJLIIlg de le< lor'i <:rc:atcs the, ' '' . . d .-d The mreas I ' . po,. re<:rprocrty 1 un ermtnt fwe increase the llltn rhtt nl adors in t1 1e it . 'I' fr w ng. What 1 t ()? Confession by any one oltiH'm c:ould lcatlt 1 lappens I . cr. stbt rty o ,rce-n f o 1 mma rom 2 o 2 atecl Pnsoners J e . h ge therefore the thr<at to rdaliatc a1,.,; o c ar ,.,""ll!\l he c:onVJctron Of a11 on t!Je maJor oon in ,the future 'will impm< tWits on all prist t .th d r~ l f, . the present W1 erec.: me e cct10n 111 J aJ 'ef'ecoon in subsec1 uent round\. f ur exam[Jie llntll: . . d Id lead to w 1 es r u 10 . . ' r ers, an cou f. lu taJiation against one mcrnber ol tlw al hant:e wa') llr tl 1g14 system o a ances. re " le. r a1 ti. g"i ust aJI. In :\-person games, a stratcgy of conditional e(IUJVaJent 0 ret Ja on a "' 1 . h tJ ffi t of spreading ratl1er tJ1an conlam111g, de f'cction.
defection can ave 1e e cc '

111 two-person ga11H " I t1t !t ; -tal work\ w<.:ll 11 e of c:ooperauon. tri~enng a <..'0 ap . r used on onl) or1 ot "' p..t1.\ Jf defet c f defectiOn are ,oc . . . ron bcc:au'i<.' tl1C' costs o . ,1 son game. howcvcJ, tlu po\ 1 r of st rater!i( f . .,.

OYE I THE CONDITIONS FOR COOPERA..,... ON IN WORLD POU:r!CS

J ,., ,., (

fs l

B. Strategies of Institutionalization and Decomposition

. be. ol["layers, what stratemes can states use to increase Lhe likcJvcn <l 1 arge num 1 ' ~::r . . C lihood of cooperation? Hcgimc creation can increa~e the lkel1hood of ~oo.p~ration in ,. arnes first conventions provide ruJes of thumb that can dmm1 transsh 1... -rwrson g . , . . ac.:tion and information c-osts. Sewnd, collective enforcement mechamsms both decrease the likelihood of autonomous defection and permit selective punishmenl of violators of norms. T11ese two func.'tions of intemationaJ regimes directly address prohlems created by large numbers of players. For example.' !ap~n and the members of NATO profess a mutual interest in limiting Hows of md. tanly usefu l goods and 1 technology to the Soviet Union. Obviously, all suppliers of militarily useful goods and technology must cooperate to deny the Soviet Union access to such items. Although governments differ in their assessment of the military val ue of some goods and technologies, there is consenstt~ on a rather lengthy D of prohibited items. By faciJitalst ing agreement of the prohibited list, the Coordinating Committee on the 0Jn!mltative Croup of NATO (CoCom ) provides a relatively d ear definition of what exports would cxmstihJte defection. By defining the scope of de fection, the CoCorn list forestalls the necessity of retaliation against nations that sh ip technoJogy or goods that do not fall within tJ1e~ consensual definition of defection. CeneraiJy, cooperation is a prerequisite of regime c.:reation. The creation of mles of thumb and mechanisms of collective enforcement and tJ1e maintenance and adminL<;tration of regimes can ~em~d an extraordinary degree of cooperation. This problem may limit the range of Situations susooptihle to modification through regimist strategies. What strategies can reduce the number of significant players in a game and thereby render cooperation more likely? When governments are unable to cooperate on a gl~bal scale. they often turn to diseriminatory strategies to encourage bilateral or r~nnaJ cooperatiorl ""ac..,; . . of. decomposttion across actors .. . --oJ i ucs can, at h. mcs 1mprove the prospe<.:ts ~or cooperation. Both the possibilities and the limits o1strat, e. gaes to .reduce the number ofplayers are eVJ'dent the discussions that f.o11ow. F'rst ~ 1 . m ~educt:ions m the numbe f ' I 'tude f . r o actors can usuaiJy be purchased at the expense of llC magm t:lwl th ,o gams from coopcration. The benefits of regional openness are srnaller . & nomicale gamffis om global openness. A bilateral dearing arrangement is less ece>l ye CJent than a m11ltilatc a) 1 r c eanng arrangement. Strategies to reduce the

.t 1111111 llC'r of pi t\'C'r\ in a "arn~ v<.-n<.:rally ] flllll!>rs t h(;; gai r 11 . tlwy' lllf;ro-t~t tlw lik< liltf,Od and robwt . f m rom <;oopcratron while ' nC\\ 0 COOp<.:rati S J red11<"C' t!J, 111Jrrd,cr of players gcn<:rtll)' . b on. C <:On< . .,trategies to .. ' unpos<: su stanti l . t h..1 ThC'SC'C>-tllnailtusm~y motivatetl ' cl . . a CC>ss on t nu parties. ur parttcs to undermine th , t .t d f c:ntt ioll or 111ay '>trvc as art impct 11s for , tl .. 1 e ltnr C:: area o coop1 nru party to cnla . ' th tion. Jn tiiC' IH30s, for example, whoksalc res0 rt t , t . . r~e e zone of <.;oopera , l c:nalion of cx<.:lnsivc :r.onc~ of cotn n . o uL'><.:n mtnatory t ra0 [X>li c1 Jacililatct mg es 1open ne~!! Whf'n eo f t 1b . ' erc.1a a shrinkrng 111arket <;),art, Cno:at Britain .1dopt cl , I l'b 1 er and more n ron e< Y . aJ 1 . ' c a ess discriminatory colltltH'rcr po r<.:y tn order to sc<.:ur(: prer.. tial . '~ren access to tls 1 und('n llim: prc.:fercntial agrcerncnt') between othe . tri th empl~e anc to 1 . . r coun I1an. cIJJrltntS1 ' t1e Lin1tcd States adopted a m 1 ts. As cl 1e Amenc:an markets . . . 1 lCu, 1 . ore J1 . alan more dlscnmma:x:r tury <:01111 n<rc1 po 1cy to mcrease.: it\ access to e rt . k a . . d th _ . xpo mar ets. It 1s not possible howev<.:r, to.rt. uce e ''umber of players in all .ituatons. ["or exarnp1 cor npare the ' . . 1 [;' , e, example o r lnn1ted commerc.:ial openness with the examp1 of a 1 ' strate!llc: , e 1m1teu . emhargo. fn rc<.lllcethcnu mber ofactorsJnatrade"ar, mar ket a<.;cess can s1mp1 ~ y ut: v offt:red to.only one .<.;Ountry and withheld from others By eo t t d r ti b 1 ~ . . .. . . . n ras , e1 on y on y ec one supplu.:r <.:an pcrmrt the target of a strategic embargo to obtain a c.:riticaJ technology. These pro?lems may li mit the range of situations susceptible to moruncation througll strategtcs that reduce the numbE:r or players in games.
al .

NOTES
l. F'or examples, see Robert Jcrvis, "Cooperation under tbe Security Dilemma.," World Politics 30 (January I978), pp. 167- 214; Olivcr E. \Villiamson ...Credible Commitments: Usiug J lostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Rf!1.iieu: (September 19'3.'3},

pp. 5J 9-40; John Cerard Ruggie, "International Regime , Transactions. and Change: Embedded Liberalism in tJte Po twar Economic Order." in tephcn D. Krasner. ed .. ltltenwtion.(l[ Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press. 1 983). 2. For orthodox game-theoretic analysrs of the importance of itemtion, see R. Duncan Luce and ll oward Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New Y Wiley. 1957), Appendix 8, ork: and Oavid M. Kreps, PauJ Milgram, Jo!tn noberts, and nobert Wilson, "Rational Cooperation iu Finitely-Repeated PrisoutJr!> Dilemma.' jollnlal of Ecor wmic Thecry 27 (August 1982), pp. 245-52. For the rC'sult!l of laboratory e>.~rimen~, ce Robert RaJlow, "An Experimental Study of Cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game,~ journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (June J96S). pp. 221-27. On the importance of indefinite iteraliou to I he emergence of c:oopemtion in business t r.tnsactions. see Robert Telsor, ''A Tht'O'Y of Self-Enforcing Agrcc1 ncnts.~ j ournal of Husin e.>s 53 (January 1980). pp. 27-44. 3. Sec HoiJI'rt 0. Keohanc, After Jlegc:mony: Cooperation and Discord in tlte WorUf Politic:all:cmwmy (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press. l984 ), and Krnsuer(ln. 1). 4. S(:( Juhn A. C. Convbeare, "Jnt<rnational Organization and the Theory of Property Bights," J11 ter1wticmdl Orga 11i:::afion 34 (Summer 1980). pp. 307-34, and Kenneth A. Oyc, .. Brlicf Systems. Bargaining, and Breakdow11: lntemational Political Economy 1929- 1936,'' Ph. D. diss. (llarvard Uuiver!lity, L983). clulp. 3. 5. Sec Jcrvio:; (fn. J ); Huggie (fn . l}; 'Jin 1othy J. McK eown, "Firms and Tariff Regime Ch:mgc: Explaining the Demand f(>r Protection ... World Politia 36 (January 1984),

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

I l ."' . f 1) n, s(>t.lhl' cnnduding ections of Jcn1S( n. . I I 11 I if. , 1 'r 0 .. . . ' d B 1. Scientists and \Vorlc 0 w W\ l ecltnica[J<J 6. ll aas. \\ !Ihams. Io a t. l.S (Berkelc\': l' niH'I sil) of ( 'ali l'ornia Press. Hn~l)IV/. ) 101

. r fprefC.nnc<.;' ')) >tS-3~ On the C'lfects o f am lJtgut Y 0

tl e PHl\()C't:l !) of t:ooperatio .

:lll T{!/1111~:(/ !;ll, ed<~e in lntcrllatwruJ

t"'

, .

7. \\'illiamson (fn. 1). Tl1 St0 ry of SAL'/ I ~I'\' York: Holt H' . ee John ~ewhouse, Cold Dawn: e 'ne1 ~ l<trt

Kant. Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

\\lnston, J973). C 9. See Haas, "\.Vords an

'-l t
r 01

Y Or Who Said \ \'hat to\\ hom About ou

'

Hcgime " .

s,

1n

Krasner (fn. l ). d Alb rt Chammah Prisoners' Dilcm11w (Ann Arbor: Univ . 10 s A atol Rapoport an e ' l .re: .IJ ers1~ ee . n . , ) and subsequent essays in Jmmw o; .cntp tct llesolut;011 of~ IC hlgan I ress. J965 . M o i1JU u.s.-socuJt R. l ry.. p n >J l '1)1.~. '~ .n sts p rcuen(' . . 1W If . 11. See Alexander L. George, ' ana>:> o 1 on . 1983). . (Bou IdeJ. Colo... Westview, rfi' t (Cambridge. Mass.: Hanard Un . if C lv<"rstty Press, 19601 12. Schelling, Strt1tegy o on .tc '' PP 43-46 I J .,.1 LocJiC of Collective Action: Pu./;lic Goods and tlte Theorry 0r 13 See Mancur 0 son, r.. 1 ze b 1965) M ~ b .d M . Harvard University Press, , an d . ancm Olson and Groups (Cam n ge. ass .. 11. . 11 , . , .r . . "A11 Economic Theorv or A . lt\JlCCS. n e l.iW W 0; con o ml c.~ 0!1([ Richard Zeckh auser, ' 1 d . . ( 6) PP :266-79. for a recent E' cgant u r111na1y an extension of Stat1sttcs 48 August 196 ' . " . dilemmas or collective actJOI1. see J\U SSe11 ll arc] Collective Ill, the large Itterature on . . 989 ) . (Bal.,; e Jol1ns Hopkins University Press. 1 - ActiOn umor Id .. D l f 93 (S 14 See Kenneth N. Waltz, ''The Stability of a Blpolar \>\:or . d haecF liS '' } u mme 964), a lr~ and Richard N. Rosecrance, "BipoJaritv uJtipolantv. an t e utu re, OII17W o1 Con.,, \11 _ , ict Resolutio11 (September 1966), PP 314-2 ' . . fl 15 On hegemon)'. see Robert Gilpin U S Pou;er and the M11ltwatwnal Corporation . tl l . ( v k B Books 1975) pp. 2.58-59. On duopo1 see Ttmo 1)' 1 y. E vlcKeown, ;'liew , or . as re er .. 1 1 111 urope, ntematrona1 ''Hegemomc Stab'''ty Tlteory and 19th-Centurv Tarin Leve s .m _ Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. /3- 91. . 16. See Keohane (fn. 3), chap. 6, for extensions of these pomts.

re . .

I
What difference do liberal principles and institutions make to the conduct of the forei~n aff:~rs of ~iberal states? A thicket of conflicting judgments suggests that the legacres of hberalrsm have:: not been clearly appreciated. For many citizens of liberal states, l.iheral principles and institutions have so fuiJy absorbed domestic politics that tl1eir inAuence on foreign af-Tairs tends to be either overlooked altogether or, when perceived, exaggerated. Liberalism becomes either unselfconsciouslv patriotic or inherently "peace-loving: For many scholars and diplomats, tl1e r~lations among independent states appear to differ so significantly from domestic politics that influences of liberal principles and domestic liberal institutions are denied or denigrated. They judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions. when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Although liberalism is misinterpreted from both these points of view, a crucial aspect of the liberal legacy is captured by each. Liberalism is a distinct ideology and set of institutions that has shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to la.issez faire. It defines much of the content of the liberal patriot's nationalism. Liberalism does appear to disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Thus its foreign relations cannot be adequately explained (or prescribed) by a sole reliance on the balance of power. But liberalism is not inherently "peace-loving"; nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent. FUJthermore. liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions that a world peace may well require in the nuclear age. Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limjted aspects of its foreign affairs announces the possibility of a world peace this side of the gr~ve or of world conquest. It has strengthened the prospects for a world peace estabhshed by the steady expansion of a separate peace among liberal societies.

From Michael \V. DO)'Ie, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.. P:m L" Philosophy & .Pu~lic Affairs, Vol. J 2, No. 3 (Summer 1983), PP 205-232. Reprinted br penn~"SJOn of Blackwell Publishmg.

83

n
ent 1e LihlraJisrn ha - h<(~n re1 ifi d WJ'tl1 essential j)rin<:il,l , - !. im[)Ortance or the an . . . . 1 'd I.1-et.!t1 o f t1 . d'''1 u al AlJove all thLS ts a L>elr el 111 c 11 lporta ne;e of 1110ra) om 1e 111 I. .ree d f t I1c ngI t to be treated and a dutv to treat oL 1 u~ t t lJ<.:al su biec.:ts . l H I om o ' . 1 pnnclpJe has generated 1 1 t s and 111 nJ . and not a s obiec:ts or means onlv. T 1JS ., . s tutions . J tl eefold set of rights forms the foundanon of liberal .b A_~ommaUttms ~o rt tro n re"e01do1;,, from -arbitra ry autholi t)', ol'lell called "negative r'rsern. L1 e nu1Sll1 C< 11 [ 1f <::.. w I1rch meI udes freedom of conscience, a ree pre s am ree speech, equalty . . d om. h gilt to hold and therefo re to exc ange, property with 1 und er t he Iaw, and th e n . out r f arb'JtraJY serzu re. LJ'beralism also calls for those ng1 necessary to prot . , ear o ' 1ls " .. . ect 1 pos1trve freedorns ., d . t the capacity and opport unity for freedom , t H.: an hpro~alo e d Sue socr an economc nghts as equalitv of opportunitv . in educa tion anti rig!1 1 ' J. . . ' . to health care and employment, necessa?' for_ ef fecti~'e self -expresst.on an~ particiation, are thus among liberal rights. A tlnrd hberal nght, cle mocrati<; participation P repres en t auon, Is necessarv to guaran tee the other two. To ensure that moral! ..: or .1 . f . l . Y autono mous individ uals remain free m those areas o so~1a achon_ ':"here public: authoritv is needed , public legislation has to express the w1ll of the Citizens making ' laws for tl1eir own community. These three sets of rights, taken togeth er, seem to meet th e challenge that Kant identified:
(T.
ts.

DOYLE I KANT LIB

'

ERAL LEGACIES, AND FOREIG N AFFAIRS

85

bv indi''" l d .tr 'Jllisition (fc>r txa1nplc h 1 1 ) h . l rtilit\. "J ill t M:h rdcs state socialism l>',. s~tatae)Or ?tr l y socbJal agreement or SlJ<:ial , c:ap1 a rsm ut 1 't .1rk(-t c..oc ali .. Jn or variou ~ forms of' th" m d ' nee d not exc1 cle u Jn ... rxe econom F rth ~ions ar< l'f'l domina ntly ~haped b)' the force f I Y dodu , eoonomtc <.!eel0 supp Yan s emand d. and intt!flhtiJOtaiJy. <tiiU an: free from strict cant I b b . , omest'rea11y ro Y ureaucracJ<::s....

III
In foreign afl:tirc; )jberalism has show11 as it has in th . d l . .k l'b . , ' t: omestc ream,senousweakncsses. But 1111 Jr c.; 1 erahsm s domes ti<.: realm its rore f h ' . . . ,. . , '' rgn a a~rs ave expenenced startlmg bu t less than fully appreciated successes 'Togeth th h . . . . . 1 er ey s ape an unrecogmzed dilem ma, for both these successes and weaknesses 10 1 rt f .. ~ - tl . " . . . . arge pa spnng rom the same cause. 1e mtematronalunpli<:ations of liberal principles a .t tituti' . tu] f'l b Tl1c .l)ac;J .pos . ate o i eral international theory holcl- that t t nu msth ons. c . .u; s a es have e ng1 to 1t ~e free from. f~re1~1 mterventi_on. Sinc..:e morally autonomous citizens hold rights to lrbert)', the st,ttes that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international Uberal theory. When states respect each other's rights, intlivid uals are free to establish private international ~es withou t state interference. Profitable exchange between merchants and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages ~nd commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect. These conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkably effective kind. Even though lib1

To organize a group of rational beings who demand generai Ja,~s for ~ei r survival , but of whom each inclines toward exempting himself, and to establis h thetr constitu tion in such a way that, in spite of the fact their private attitudes are opposed, these private attitudes mutually impede each other in such a manne r that [their J public behavior is the same as if thev did not have such eviJ attitudes.'
/

But the dile mma within liberalism is how to reconcile the three sets of liberal rights. The right to private property, for examp le, can conflic t with equality of opportunity and both rights can be violate d by democ ratic legislation. During the 180 years since Kant wrote, the liberal traditio n has evolve d two high roads to individual freedom and social order; one is laissez-faire, or "conservative," liberalism and the otl1er is social welfare, or social democratic, or "liberal," libe raHsm. Both rec'Oncile these confucting rights (though in differing ways ) by succes sfully organizing free individuals into a political order. The political orde r of laissez-faire and social we lfare liberal s is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, dtizens possess juridical equality and other fundam ental civil rights such as freedo m of religion and the pre~s: Second, the effective sovere igns of the state are repres entative Jegislatur~s denvmg their authority from the consen t of the electo rate and exe rcising their authority free from all restraint apart from the require me nt that basic civic rights be pr~serv~d. Most pertine ntly for the impac t of liberalism on foreig n affairs, the state 15. subje<.1' t~ neither the externa] authority of other states nor to the intemal authonty.of s~1a) prerogatives held, for example, by monar chs or military cast~s over foreign ~hey. ?flird, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights o~pn vate property mcludmg the ownership of means of produ ction. Prope rty is justified

eral states ltave become involved in numerous wars with nonlibeml states. constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war u.,ith one 01 10ther. 2 No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preli minary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisp osition against warfare between hberal states. Indeed, tl1 reats of war also have been regarded as illegitimate. A liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has ex"Panded despite numerous particular conA.icts of economic and strategic: interest. ... Statistically, war betwee n any two states (i.n any single year or other short period of time) is a low probab Uity event. War between any n.vo adjacent states, conside red over a long pe riod of time, may be somewhat more probab le. The appare nt absence of war among the more dearly liberal states, whethe r adjacen t or not, for almost two hundre d years thus has some significance. Politically more significant, perhaps, is that, when states are forced to decide. by tl1e pressure of an Lmpinging world war. on which side of a world contest they will fight. liberal states wind up all on the same side, despit e the real co mplexity of the historical, econom ic. and political factors that affect their foreign policies. And historically, we should rece:ill that medieval and early modern Europ e we re the warring cockpits of states, wherein France and England and the Low Countries engaged in near constant strife. Then ~ tl1e late eightee nth century there began to emerge liberal regimes. At first hes1ta.nt an.d confused, and later clear and confide nt as liberal regi mes gained deeper domestic founda tions and longer international ex-perie nce, a pacific union of these liberd.l states becam e established.

86

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

OOYLE I

KANT UBERAL
I

f . . tional relation wh ic.. ~;' I J, ., a plau'i'IJ The realist model o . mtem~ty of states offer~ lit tlt ,, J l rl' in cxplai~' <: exvlanation of the genentl 1 ~secu~ Realism .in its dasr,ic<tl I r .&t on. hold~ t:Og 1 the pacification of the Hbe;a "a1 r c ereJgn ' effectivch un b0 dr tl bv indiv.1 I(Jtl 'o .1 1 SO" d h Id b rorm v uua the state lS an S OU e Jl ' f determining itS 0\\1 1 ' op 0 <LU tiJority {'fl . rights nationally and thus c:apda J e ~ ticaiJv oligarcllicall~ . or a llttJ{ ratically.).lnt ~ 1 ' . , . . . < determrnation c:an be. made emocra an ,anarchicall!ocwl~ 111 , . I 11c:I1 1t h radicallr. . . ts in . all the sovereign state ex:Js . na t 1 on y. d d protected by intematlOnaI . Ia\\ .. or tn:ntie~ } independent. neither boun e Jblo er b e of the se,entecntl-crnlll rv foun<ue orf u . d h ce insecure Ho s, on f . r~ o uties, ~ en ' dr~~ the international implicalion'i o rcaJism when he the realist appro~, c.:e of international anarchy. the very independence of statt:s, argued that the eXJsten ti.h. n the fear and the temptation toward preventive . ' . . be5 t acco unts for the .compe 0 relations. Politics among nation~ 1s not a contin. . ahonal var that chara.c..tenze JJltern ' b b . . . thjs view a "state of war ... a tract o f time, w herem the will uous eom . at, ut It IS JO 3 nd b battle is sufficiently knovm . . . . . to con:edin yh t all states including liberal states. do engage m war, the realist Fm g t a ' ( r th Jb I concludes that the effects of differing domestic reg es Jlw e e ' 4era or not} h,~h t~. dele b th nternational anarch, under w JC a states ''e. . .. But the are ovem n v e 1 d c h . ends that shape 'the international state of war are decree ror t e real 1 by the st anarchy of the international order ~d the _fu ndamen_tal q~est fo r ~ower_ that directs the poky of all states, irrespec--tiVe of differences m the1r domestic reg1me:s. As Rousseau argued, internationaJ peace therefore depe nds on the abolition of international relations either by the achievement of a world state or by a rac.lic.:al isolationism (Corsica). Realists judge neither to be possible. Recent additions to game theory spec:ify some of the circumstances under which prudence could lead to peace. Experience; geography;_expectations of c~peratio~ and belief patterns: and the differing payoffs to cooperation (peace) or conflic:t as_soc:lated with wrious types of military technology all appe-ar to inRuence the calculus." But when it oomes to acquiring the techniques of peaceable interaction, nations appear to be slow, or at least erratic, )earners. The b-alance of power (more below) is regarded as a primary lesson in the realist primer, but centuries of experience did not prevent either France (Louis XN, Napoleon I) or Germany (WiJhelm TJ, Hitler) from attempting to conquer Europe, twice each. Y some, very new, black African states et appear to have achieved a twenty-year--old system of impressively effec.:tive standards of mutual toleration. These standards are not completely effective (as in Tanzania's invasion of Uganda); but they have confOunded expectations of a scramble to redivide Africa6 Geography-..insular sec..'llrity" and "continental inse<.'Urity"-m ay affed for eign policy attitudes; but it does not appear to detennine behavior, a~ the beiHoose reoords of England and Japan suggest Beliefs, expectations, and attitudes of leaders and masses should influence strategic behavior.... Nevertheless, it would be diffkult to detern.ine if llbernl leaders have had more peaceable attitudes than leaders who lead nonlibeml states. But even if one did make that discovery, he aJso would have to =~';:~these peareable ~des onJy appear to be effective in relations with (~ wars with nonliberais have not been uniformly defensive).. Seoond, at the level of~ ~etermioants , some might argue that relations among any group of states With s1m1lar social struc.tures or with compatible values

lEGAOES, AND FOREIGN AfFAIRS

87

would l/ " ful. Bu t again , the c:vide . r nee or odetic\ ' ' t <.cx:1etJec;, or s<x:iali!.t <rv.1 ti , d feudal soc1e hes, <:ommunist S " a t .L Feudal " a r'~ .:a'> rrtqu<::nt and verv ''- 1:! es oes ne> support ull"> conclusion. rnuch Ther< lta.:c ,' c. h('en enou~h truly totalitarian, ~~ of tht, monarchs and nobility. long e1101J~ to tesl fai rly their pacific.; ,.,. bJ~ powers (nor havt they lasted vvrnpati 1 ,..., but ft . wider !>CHV ' of nationaiL<>l, capitalist rnilita _,. h; ~ a'i<.:tst powt-rs in tbt . powers ry "" L )930s. Col nlfdHllSl havt engagtd n u.Jt1:ators 1ps fr>u& 1t eac11 Clther . the m 1 wars mC>re rt<:entl E . .l we have uc)l bad enough SO<.ialist societies t 'd th Y10 astAsia. Anu . ''-t ac.:ification. The more aI)stract category<f oJoonsl er- e rtlf:vance of S0<:1am. a1 W}(:S n t ffi P ) p ur ISm Ce . I Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with liht a) 0 ~u ce. . rtam Y well in J94J. But they were not liberal. r states m 1914; Japan as And third, at the level of interstate relatione; 'th nc reg.onal attrib. . a11 . neJ er spec1 utes nor h1 stonc - 1ances or fnendships can -:.''"'>u t c th .d -rh e peace ~ n ror e WJ e reach of the liberal pea.c.:e. extends as far as and no furth th h 1 . . , . . 1 d' . ' re liberal states, not me u mg non Liberal states in an oth er an, t e 1 ations among l'b .. . . . h ,. . eiWise 1 era reg.on (sucb a<; the nortI1 AtJantic m t . e l 930s) nor exc:ludmg liberal states a nontL- a1 . m mer reCilon (such as CentraJ Amenca or Africa). o At this level, Rayrnond. Aron has identified three ...11'\P f t st . . . _ l) r -s o m er ate peac:e: 1 ~mp1re, hegemony, an.u ~uihbnum. An empire generalJy Sllcceeds in creating an mternal peac.:e, but th1s IS not an explanation of peac.-e among independent liberal states. Hegemony can ~reate pea~e by over-awing potential rivals. AJthough far fr~m perfect a~d ce~amly precanous, United States hegemony, as Aron notes, ~mght ac~unt f~r the mterstate pea:e in South America in the postwar period durmg the he1 of the Cold War confliCt. However, the liberal peace c.~.ronot be attribght uted merely to effective international policing by a predominant hegemon-Bri taio in the ninet~enth century, the United States in the postwar period. Even though a hegemon m1ght well have an interest in enforcing a peace for the sake of commerce or investments or as a means of enhancing its prestige or security, hegemons such as seventeenth-century France were not peace-enforcing polic..:e, and the liberal peace persisted in the interwar period when international society lacked a predominant hegemonic power. Moreover, this explanation overestimates hegemonic control in both periodc;. Neither England nor the United States was able to prevent ilired: challenges to its interests (colonial competition in the nineteenth century, ~iddle East diplomacy and conflicts over trading with the enemy in the postwar period). Where then was the capacity to prevent all armed conflicts between liberal regimes, many of which were remote and others strategically or e<.:onomically i:nsignifi<.'ant? Liberal hegemony and leadershjp are important, but they are not suffident to explain a liberal peac:e.... Finally, some realists might suggest that the liberal peace simply reflects the absence of deep conflicts of interest among liberal states. Wars occur outside the liberal wne because conflicts of interest are deeper there. But this argument does nothing more than raise the question of why liberal states have fewer or less fundamental < :onflicts of interest with other liberal states than liberal states have with non~beraJ, or nonliberal states have with other nonliberals. We must therefore examine the workings of liberalism among its own kind-a special pacilication of the ..state of war" resting on liber-alism and nothing either more specific or more general

IV
\lost lilwral theorists haw offered inadequat<' .~ 11 d:tu t it t ~tnderstnndin (''\ct:>ptionalnnturc ofliberal pacification. omc h:t\C' .u,.!;utd that d<mocratic 1-;.tht would be inht'rently peaceful si mply and solely lw cau:w m these stales citi~en:t,ttcs tlw polit' and bea; the costs of wars. Unlike monarch:-. tttizens ar<.' not . rttl~ indulgt> their atTarcs ive passions and have the c:onseqwnev-; suff'crcd h)' so~ > e to ~ . . . . .. 'tl. . . . "lse ... Other Jibenls hwe .umted that I<Ussez- I~,urc, cc1p1't> tsm um tatns an in)neone . . ' ' . o . . ,. . . . . . .. . . . lerent 1 11 tendel1 C\' toward rationahsm. and that, smcc ' ' ell ts 111 .lttont~ , 1>era) capitalis >will be I;acillstic. Others tilL such as Montes(jtticu. claim that eotnmerce is thn~ .J e cure for the most destmctive prejudi ces. ano "Pcac<.' ts Llle nalmal ~:>ffcctt of . trade.''!! While these developments can help account f01: the hb: ral peace. they do not explain the f~K't that libE~raJ states are peac~fu~ onlr m ':c'lat1om with other lib. eral states. France and England fought e)\11anst?mst, col~n 1 aJ W<~s. throughout the nineteenth centllly (in the 1830s and 1840s agamst Algc' na and C hma); the United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1848 <~nJ intervened again in .19 14 under president \ViJson. Liberal states are~ aggr~ss1 ve < war prone as any other ll:d fonn of government or society in their relations w1th nonhbernl states. Immanuel Kant offe rs the best guidance. "Perpetual Pe<\Ce,'' written in 1795, p redicts the ever-widening pacification of the liberal pacific uni on, explains that paciBcation, and at the same time suggests \\'h)' liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states . ... Kant sho,vs how repubHcs, once established, lead to peace ful relations. He argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and once the habit of respect for indhi dual righ ts is engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's \ve lfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this:

OOYLE I KANT LIBERA ' L LEGACIES, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

89

11

Th ' l do JHslit' l'f'[Hihlitan rcstr... 1 I 111 " 1, '1 wo11ld no ht warltkc'. whkh i-; Ftr 1.<> ~tlto not end wa r. 1f L) l<.,Y<utl, 1 wra.l slates 1 ~ t ' m c <:asc 1h <.1 --1 tion' inl'l tt 't' nlmollan:lti<.:al<.:al>ri<:. 1 .1 I t) o tntr~>ull<.:<' Kants .. canw. .I )C Tc\ wan. arc only fm (11 t r I 1 '1 c p11111'N'' fo M't' hl)w this n mo\'c!> tl ral -. . , 1,., 1 orpopu ar. 1 > . lC cx:caston ol wars . 1 n I :llld Jlll, \ar' 1wtwccll libcral <~n<.l noul'l ...1 . at lOng '>rra slat<:'s I )t:r,u slates \V(.> need to sh' fl ll t' from tott.lltllltutml law to int<.matin,nlla K t' . l . I our a en ton 1 , . ' " an S secont source. Colltp <m<. nttng tlw < :OII!>ltlutioual uu t f . . ,., a ran ec o cant ton, mtenwt imwl lmc I ad<s a M'<.'< Ht< I 'i011Tl'C- a guarant<c of resl)e -t r1 . 1 1 1 c 1e (.;paration of naliom that ;\S(K'ta ~()('la )I lt: \.'ll('OIIragc>:-. i!> ninforno h ' th . I> I f . . 1 I . . ~ <: t ~vc opment o scparatt lan~r11age~ ,UH Tr 1g 10ilS. 1 1 ll'l>f' further 0'\larantroe . . jl f o . . . ,., " a wor u o s(~paratc slat ''i-m esscnltaJ eon dttton needed to avoid a "vlohal S Oltl-lc"s ,espot'tsm ." y et, 1 l . . !'> ' " at t le stunc tin 1<.>, tile ab(J lllO rallv tnlcgrah~ lilxral statb "as cult '\' . d d 1 I ure P' ogresse!l an men ~ra . uall)' cOIIl t' t. oser toget t<:'r toward a {"1 crr<"ater agree 111 ~ 11 t 01 1 I' 1 ., 10 . ' 1 p n net p es or p<.:act> ant t111tlersta1H I11111 _ As rc c:,.:.t sutti(;") cu ' n. . p11hhes cmc rae (tle n .., . . .. ., 1cl a cult u rC' prognsses, . . r; an llnclcrstandl n_g of the lcg1htnatc rights of all citizens and of all reptthlics comes into pl ~t~; a11d tl~ 1s, now that tau~ion characterizes policy, sc:ts up the m<>ral founJa-

If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would he very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter woultl be: having to fight, having to pay the costs ofwar from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind. and. to fill up the measure of evi.ls, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated _on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, ill a constitution winch is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not rcqui re of the ruler, who is the proptietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may. therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and wil_ h perfect indifference lea,e the justification which decency requires to the diplotnatJc corps who are ever ready to provide it.9

~ne_ couJd add to Kant's .list another source of pacincation ~~eci.fic to li~~~
constitutions. The regular rotation of office in liberal democratic politJes IS a nontn de\ice that helps ensure that personal animosities among head'i of government provide no lamng, escalating source of tension.

tions for ll~<' . hher~ll pcmx:-. Correspondingly, illtt rnational lnw higl ,1ights the imporl < cc ol ~anltan publl(.:1ty. Domestic:ally, publicity helps <'IISure that the offi_ m cials o~ r('puhl1 cs_ att accor~ing to th e principles the~ profess to hold just and accordtng to tlte mtcr?sts <JI the electors they claim to rf:'prc.: enl. lnt<:rnationally. free spee~l~ and the cl fective communication of a<..curate conceptiou of the politicctllife of loreign peoples is essential to establish and prest'rvc the ttnderstanJing on which the guarantee of respect depends. ln short, domestically just wpublic . which rest on <.:onsent, presume foreign republics to be also consen ual. just. and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experienc-e of coopt:.ration helps engender fu rther cooperathe behavior "'hen the consequences of state polic)' are unclear but (potentiHily) mutually beneficial. 11 Lastly. cosmopolitan law adds material incenthes to moral <...'Ommitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commeree" ~oone r or later to take hold of c,ery nation, thus impC'lling tates to pro111ote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal eC'onomic theorv holds that these eo mopotitan ti<.s tletive from a ' cooperative i11tern:..1tional division of labor and free trade according to <...'OmparativC' advantage. Each economy is sa.id to be better off than it wonld have been undt' r autarky; each thus acquires an iucentive to avoid policie that would lead the other to bre;k these ewno 111 ic ties. Since kE-eping open markets rests npon the assumption that the next srt of transactions will aLo be determined br prices rather than 1 coercton, a scnse o f mutu;t1secunty ts "'t.lI to' vo' tl securitv-moti"ated,searches for . . economic autarkv. Thus. avoiding a challenge to another liberal states sectt_nty or "a enm en hanci ng each ot 1 rs secunt) h~ m" 11s of allia.nte nahtrallv lollows 1r ecot tonti<: interdependence. h . ti J ket 11 A fmt her cosntO )){)lit< source of lihent.l peace is t1 t e th m tat ltem.~ om lmar f . . 'tribution from e wrect ~1> 1ere o rLmmes dillkult dec:b:ions ol produ<1mn an d Jis .,. r h .1 t . nP}lr directh re. ponsiU1 tOr t ese e state pohcy. A fore1 state thus uoes 110 apr~ gn _ t ti . 1 con en ous ..d [ . . d t some demee <l00ve, t lCS<:' outcomes stalt.s can stand <1St e rom. ,m 0 e" . F I . th . to resoh-e cnses. urt 1 ennore, e tnarket rivalries and be ready to step m

90

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES DOYLE I KANT UBE

d tb connections of !>l.ttl o l1t d\ he! mtl"rdep\'lldt>nce of c.-onuucrce an c . . . P <:rtatc . l .., al ..,es that serve as Jobb1es f01 ntutl . tl .trtomrnotlat <.'rosscutt mg ransnauon . u . . . IOn 1 11 1 1ransnationa]. Accordine1 modem liberal scholars, intema~onal fin~u ~ ' ' ' , " oti. d domesoc otganizations create Inte rests m fa, OJ o, tt<ornmouat ' ureaucra c. an . 'On b _ , b th . ~an'ety that no single conflict sours an t Ill r\' r<'lationsl11 12 __ . ~m d I1ave e nsureu y e1r v . . p. ,. f b ti'tutonal international o r cosmopollt.m sour<.;cs is al 1 J' O one o t ese cons . one:: . b th ( nd onkwhere together) t11ev plau tbh con1l<'cl the ell u ffi ctent, ut toge er a , . . '. . cl 11, . . ar. 1 acteristics of libe ral politics and economtes w1~1 s~stame ., H r~l peae:e. LibtraJ r. om the realists' "secunty dilemma, till' m~ecuritv e:a1 d 1 d Lr states have not escape l>e by anarchy in the world political system. considere~ as ~ whole. ~3ul th~ e~fects of international anarchy have been tamed m the relatJO.ns.among slat~s of~ stmilarly liberal character. Alliances of purely mutual strategtc mtere~t among hberal and non liberal states have heen broken, economic ties b~tween .ltbcral an.d non liberal c.raoile states bave prove n ri 0 - , but the political bond of liberal nghts and mte rests J,.,~ . , ....., proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggresswn. A separate peace

'

RAL LEGACIES, AND FOREIGN

AFFMRS

91

'tu

exists among liberal states.

NOTES
1. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace~ {1795), in The Philosophy of Kant. ed. Carl J. Friedrich

(i\ew York: Modem Library. 1949), p. 453. 2. There appear to be some exceptions to the tendenc:y for liberal states not to engage in a war with each other. Peru and Ecuador, for example, entered into conflict. But for each, the war <.-ame within one to three years after the establishment of a liberal regime, that is. before the pacifying effects of liberalism could become deeply ingrained. The Pales tinians and the Israelis clashed frequently along the Lebanese border, which Lebanon c:ouJd not hold secure from either belligerent. But at the beginning of' the 1967 War, Lebanon seems to bave sent a Bight of its own jets into Israel. The jets were repuJsed. Alone among Israel's Arab neighbors, Lebanon engaged in no further hosti lities \\~th Israel. Israel's recent attack on the territory of Lebanon was an attack on a country that had already been O<.'<.:upied by Syria (and the P.L.O. ). Whether lsraeJ actually will with draw (if Syria withdraws) ami restore an independent Lebanon is yet to be determined. 3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New Y Penguin, l980), T <:hap. 13, 62, p. 186. ork: , 4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (l'ew York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 1959), pp. 120-2'3; and see his Theory of Ir~ternational Politics (Reading. Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The classic sources of tbi'i form of Realism are Hobbes and, ~ore particularly, Rousseau's "Essay on St. Pierre's Peace Project" and his "State of\<\'af m A Lasting Peace (London: Constable, 1917), E. H. Carr's The Twerdy )ear s Crisis: 191~1~ (Lond?n: Macmillan & Co., 1951), and the works ofHans Morgenthau . .5. JeMS, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 1 (January 1978), pp. 172-86. 6 Robert H. Jackson and Car! G. Rosberg, "Why West Africa's Weak States Persist," _ World Politics 35, No.l (October 1962). I. ~ Aron, Peace and War (New York: Praeger 1968) pp 1.51-54 8 of JncomnM-ibiJity ~f dernocrdC)' and war is forcefully asserted by Paine ' ' in The Ri.gI'1 . The rf Mon. The connection between Jjber a1 capttal ISm, democracy, and peace is argue d bl' r

as m1t1gattng e secunty 1 emma caused by anarcbr. Also, expectations (including theory and historv) ~ inAuence beh av10r. maki ng u ra1 . ''be . , states expect. (and fulfill ) pacific policies toward each other. These e11ects are exp1 d rr . " . .. . ore at .a the?retical level 10 R. Dacey,. Some Implications of Theory Absorption for Econom1c Theory and the Economtcs Infonnation." in Philosophical Ditn.erl.~iom of Economics, ed. J Pitt {Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1980). 12. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transjonnatio11 (Boston: Beacon Press. 1944), chaps. 1-2 and Samuel Huntington and Z. Bnezinski, Political Pou;er. USAJT.jSSR (:\ew Y Vikina ork: Press, 1963, 1964), chap. 9. And see Richard Neustadt, ALliance Politics (:\ew Y ork: Columbia University Press, 1970) for a detailed case study of interliberal poutics.

ai!JO"" I) Jowpt. Sc:humpctcr . f . .I -d In n,perw/i~ t . Mem. " JJ J' ~~~~ :vl outescuicu s,,. 't he z . . anGbkSocial Cla.s~e" (''' ew york m ,m oft ., is sur ';' ;u1r I analvtkd hy Alhe: t 11 . ~ws 1 . 20, chap. 1 Th'IS l't , . , 1 . ' r lrS<:hman "R I 1 erature: Socwty ',j \ I mng. De~tructivc, or Feeblc":>n . lva lntt;rpretations of \tarkct (D<:c('rn . t t ICJf:>2) . journal of Econorruc Literature 20 1 9. J uliJW. 1J f' Kaul, "Pcrpc:tual Pcact: 'rl . n 1 1 Enlt~ht Silnon & Se Illl~tcr, J!.J74), pp. 790-92. ? enment, ed. Peter Ca} ( ~~;;w York: 10. Kant, Tlw Pldlo.~oplty of Krmt, p. 454 Th ' est fac-tors also L I I lty D eu~c: I'~ "<.CJrnpa t.l) t CJ f values" and u d'b . nave a 1. . u~aring on Karl .g' 1 slytIZ<.'cl vt:rl>tOn of this e:ffc:c.:t c.:anpre rICta dllJ"' ofbeh a"10r." Iy . . I l. A ~n b 1 ., r e . 1 ga1 There:, a 1a11 of rnutual tnJst and th oun m the real'st's "Pmoners Dilcm 1 na~ n<.>. urc e mc:entives t 0 h . produce a non<.:oopcrative solution that m k b ~, en ance one~ own position . . . erat1on , a con llntlm(:;nt to avoid txploiting a es otn parties worse oIT. Contranly, <.'OOp tl 1e ot1 partv p d er . . . nifkance o r tlw garne in this c:ontext is the h . f.'' ro U(;(:s JOtnt gams. The sig ' I r I c o are prcsurncu to Je C on ious unrt:lated apartaracterh . tts participanus. Tl 1 u pnsoners" f c . . , rom t elr partne h'1 . . . II 111g 111 mutual trust-<:ompetitive nation-stat . . r~ P m c:nrne, ant ack. es tn an anarchtc world A 1 benveen 1ratcrnal or sororalnvins-K t'5 bl' 51111 ar game an repu JCs-would be l'k 1 1 ad "f-r 1 ent results. See Hobert Jervis "Hypotheses on~~ . ~ e Yto e, tow crj r . . 1sperception, World Politic.~ 20 ~ 0 3 (Apn l 968). ror an expos1t1on of the role of presum r1005 . d "C . .. o1 .. L P an ooperatwn under the Se<:unty 1emma, Wond Politics 30, ~o. 2 (Janu-ary 1978) 10 1. t1 f r . th d'l 1e ac-tors reahsl\ see

92

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

DOYLE/ KANT

~~~~~~~----------------

TABLE I WARS INVOLVlNG UBERAL REGIMES

Liberal regimes and the pacific union (by date "liberal")a

- ---~
Total

TABLE I

~ootmucd)

, LIBERAL lEGACIES ' AND FOREIGN AF

w~

93

Period

number
period

Liberal regi mes and the pacific union (by date "liberal")a Switzerland, the United S Canada, Australia, Nev~a~:, Great_ Britain, Sweden. Mexico and, Finland, Ireland Uruguay 1973 Chile 1973 Lebanon 1975 Costa Rica 1948, 1953_ Iceland 1944France 1945Denmark 1945Norway 1945Austria 1945Brazil 1945- 1954, 1955_1964 Belgium 1946Luxemburg 1946Netherlands 1946ltaly 1946Philippines 1946-1972 lnd1a 1947-1975, 1977Sri Lanka 1948-1961, 1963_1977, 1978Ecuador1948-1963, 1979lsrael 1949West Germany 1949Peru 1950-1962, 1963-1968, 1980EI Salvador 1950-1961 Turkey 1950-1960, 1966-1971 Japan 1951Bolivia 1956-1969 Colombia 1958Venezuela 1959Nigeria 196 1-1964, 1979Jamaica 1962Trinidad 1962Senegal 1963Malaysia 1963South Korea 1963-1972 Botswana 1966Singapore 1965Greece 1975Portugal 1976Spain 1978Dominican Republic 1978-

18th century

1800-1850

1850-1900

Swiss Cantonsb French Republic 1790-1795 the Un1ted Statesb 1776Swiss Confederation, the United States France 1830-1849 Belgium 1830Great Britain 1832Netherlands 1848Piedmont 1848Denmark 1849Switzerland, the United States, Belgium. Great Bntam, Netherlands Piedmont 1861, Italy 1861Denmark 1866 Sweden 1864Greece 1864Canada 1867France 1871Argentina 1880Chile 1891Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada Greece 1911,1928-1936 Italy 1922 Belgium 1940 Netherlands 1940 Argentina 1943 France 1940 Chile 1924, 1932 Australia 1901Norway 1905-1940 New Zealand 1907Colombia 1910-1949 Denmark 1914-1940 Poland 1917-1935 Latvia 1922-1934 Germany 1918-1932 Austria 1918-1934 Estonia 1919-1934 Finland 1919Uruguay 1919Costa Rica 1919Czechoslovakia 1920-1939 Ireland 1920Mexico 1928Lebanon 1944-

3
1945'

Total number

49

13

1900-1945

29

~ 1 ha~e drawn up ~his approximate list of "UberaJ Regim~ acc~r~ing to the four institutions ~scn~~d as essentral: market and private property econom1es: poht1cs that are extremely soverergn; CJttzens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or monarchical).

~..

PART I

ARCHYANUII;)\...VI '-1'-'<- - - ~

l'\:t't\'St'lll31l\'t> g~we1 nment This latter includes the requireme_ ' tl .. : I t le ~!ali ve branch have n ' potentially or ,\0 ellt"\:'ll\ e tult' m public policy and be formally and compelltl '--

~ t 1~tcJ Ft1rthermore 1have taken into account whether male ~ullru <' vr ... pen to JChH!\ cment by mhabitants (for cxampl~. to poll W' I "

DOYLE I KANT, LIBERA L lEGACrES, AND FOREIGN AF

TABLE 2 a cr.ntlnued) FAJRS Palestine (194&-1949) Hyderabad (194S) ~~adagascan (1947-1948) irst F Kashmir (1 947-1949) Korean (1 950- 1953) Algerian (i 954- 1962) R~sso-Hungarian ( 1956) 1nai S (1956) T~betan (1956- 1959) Smo-lndian (1962) Vietnamese (1965-1975) Second Kashmir (1965) ix S Day ( 1967) Israeli-Egyptian (1969-1970) Football (1 969) Bangladesh (197 1) Philippine-MNLF (1972_) Yom Kippur (1 973) Turco-Cypriot (1 974) Ethiopian-Eritrean ( 197 4-) Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-) Timor (1975-) Saharan (1975-) Ogaden (1976-) Ugandan-Tanzanian (197&-1979) ino-Vietnamese (1979) S Russo-Afghan (1979-1989) lrani-lraqi (1 980-1988)

95

:1: that is, 30 actually, s r national 0 1 metropolitan territory. Female suffrage IS granted V!lh n " S- c ration of it or 1 , demJnded and representative government is internally so_ erelgn f ex .mple. inctu/ be ng lng and .-.mtXiallv over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (111 exste"-e f r ::n least thre e years) . . . ~ - -"" t-There are domesuc \'ariations within these liberal regmes. For exam;;le S\ tzerland wa r liberal only north ?r the 1\tasor. Oixon line only m certain cantons. the Umted States 86s, "hen it became liberal throughout. These hsts also exclude anCient reoubllc<- smce non lil Kant's criteria see stephen Holmes hAristippus in and out of :\thcns AmencaJ'e ~hOc!
l

'.uuseholder~)ercent) ~he ~

w~s

10

un~il~~eral ~PPear

a eview 73. No. I (March 1979). SCience R ' selected list. excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one millton. SOurces: Arthur Banks and w. overstreet, eds.. The Political Han~book ~flhe \Vorld. 1980 (New Yor . o; Foreign and commonwealth Office. A Yea1 Book oj the. Commonwealth 19} McGraw-Hill. 198 1_(LOndon: Europe. 1981 l: \V L. Langer, An Encyclo (London: HMSO. 1980); Europo Yearbook of State, Coumry dia of world History (Boston: Houghton-Miffim. 1968): Human Righrs Practices (\.Vashington. D.C.: u.s. Government Pnntmg Office. 198 1); and

1 9~

Depa~m~nt

Freedom~

~ Reports~

Issue, No. 54 uanuary-February 1980).

TABLE 2 JNTERNATJONAL WARS USTED CHRONOLOGICALLY

British-Maharattan (1817-1 818) Greek {1821- 1828) Franco-Spanish (1823) Ftrst Anglo-Burmese (1823-1 826) Franco-Mexican ( 1862-1 867) Ecuadonan-Colomban ( 1863) Second Poltsh (1863-1864) Spanish-Santo Dom111ican ( 1863-1 865) g-Holste111 (1864) Second Schlesw 1 Lopez ( 1864- 1870) Spanish-Ch1lean ( 1865-1866) Seven Weeks ( 1866) Ten Years (1 868-1878) Franco-Prussan ( 1870-1871) Dutch-Achinese (1873-1 878) Balkan (1875-1 877) Russo-Turkish (1877-1878) Bosnian ( 1878) Second British-Afghan ( 1878-1880) Pacif ic (1879- 1880) British-Zulu {1 879) Franco-lndochinese ( 1882-1884) Mahdist (1882- 1885) Sino-French ( 1884- 1885) Central American ( 1885) Serbo-Bulgarian (1885) Sino-Japanese ( 1894-1895) Franco-Madagascan (1894-1895} Cuban(1895-1896) ltalo-Ethiopian ( 1895- 1896) First Philippine (1896-1898) Greco-Turkish (1897) Spanish-American ( 1898) Second Philippine (1899-1902)

Japanese (1 825-1830) Russo-Persian (1826-1828) urkish (1828-1829) Russo-T First Polish (1831) First Syrian (1831-1832) Texan (1835-1836) First British-Afghan (1838-1842) Second Syrian (1839-1840) Franco-Algerian ( 1839-184 7) Peruvian-Bolivian ( 184 1) First British-Sikh (1845-1846) Mexican-American ( 1846-1848) Austro-Sardinian (1848-1849) First Schleswig-Holstein (1848-1849) Hungarian (1848-1849) Second British-Sikh {1848-1849) Roman Republic (1849) La Plata (1851-1852) First Turco-Montenegran (1852-1853) Crimean (1853-1856) Sepoy (1857-1859) Second Turco-Montenegran (1858-1859) Italian Unification (1859) Spanish-Moroccan (1859-1860)

soer< 1899- 90LJ Boxer Rebe on - 900) Hinden (1903J Russo-Japan~:se ( 1904-1905) Central Amencar (1906) Central Amencan (1907) panish-Morcccan (1909-191 O) S ualo-Turkish ( 1 911-1912) First Balkan ( 1912-191 3) Second Balkan {1 913) world War I (191 4-1918) Russian Nationalities (1917-1921) Russo-Polish (1919-1920) Hungarian-AIIies ( 1919) urkish (191 9-1 922) Greco-T Riffian ( 1921- 1926) Druze (1 925- 1927) Sino-Soviet (1929) Manchurian (1931-1933) Chaco (1932-1935) ltalo-Ethiopian (1935- 1936) Sino-Japanese (1 937-194 1) Changkufeng (1938) Nomohan (1939) World War 11 (1939- 1945) Russo-Finnish ( 1939-1940) Franco-Thai ( 1940-1 941 ) Indonesian (1945-1946) lndochinese (1 945-1954)

. Table 2 is from Melvin Small and J. David Sin er Reso ~s~ PP 79-80. Copynght ~ 1982 by re to . .g Sage Publications, Inc. Re rinted b ~~~~~s~~~~fl Sage Pub~cations. Inc. This is a partial list of international wars fought between Y o .- n Appendices A and B of Reson e Anns. Small . . I and Singer identif largely domestic ~i~~lta aof 575 wars m this penod. but approximately 159 of them appear to be w rs. re defi 'f era!Thisim m IO~ of war ex~ludes co~ert interventions, some of which have been directed b libthe ChiT es laga.mst other liberal regmes. One example is the United States' effort to desta6'mze tions a:an e ectlon and Alle~de's government. Nonetheless, it is significant ... that such intervenpursued pub~lcly as acknowledged policy. The covert destabilization campaign against ~h~lot _ e . 1e .1s recounted m U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Srudy Governmental .espect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile. 1963-73, 94th congress. 0%t ~atl~ns With R 1 ess1on (Washmgton. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

dr

ltalo-Roman (1860)
ltalo-SICilian (1860-1861 )

--- ... ~..c.::,

Alliances: Balancing and Ba11dwagoning

STEPHEN M. WALT

tsALAN

CING AND BANDW AGONlNG 97

. I ' the < 1Jclfl ,. l 'C<liiSe the weaker sid reases the new member' 1 l 1 . the stro11 ,id". bv contnst g e has .. s nAuence , ' . tves t1e n , greater need ~ r a-;s1stanc All . within 1 relativeh 1t ' to the coalition ) an cl eaves member little inA e\\ e. .t I uence (bee ymg v.ith . 1 1 vu nerable to the wh ~~~se 1t adds Joini ng l1 \Waker side should b " h w e t e preferred choice. lms of Jts partners.

Se<c 11

je>i" i"g the w elk"

.' . '" r Slut Jnc

BANDWAGONING BEHAV10R
. f t 1 1 . a srgnificant extemal threat. ~tates lllH) Pitlwr balance < )r 1en . . w \\ 1 con r011 re .,, s de~ned as alhin<T w1th others ag<.un:st t 1 pn.~ varlmgr threat 1 . n . bandwa<Ton.. BaIonclll{!.to aliQ1lment "vith bt11e source of clang 'r. Thus two distir~ct, tr . u:ogow11g rerer!i . . . . .' 0 baudtheses about how states wiJI select the1r ~Jj;;u1ce P<~rtr~c,'1.. .. b<, .rc.lcntinc<l on h' scan .:po . f 1 tl . tll"' --tltes aU against or w1tb the pnncJr)al extcmal threat 1 l th e ><l"ls o '"' 1e 1er , " ' . . . . These nvo hypotheses depict ,ery different worlds. 11 halanc.: mg 1 more coms mon than bandwagon ing, then states are m01:e secure. b_ecause aggressors will face combined opposition. But if l~andwagoning ~~ tl1e dommar~t- tende n.cy, then securitv is scmce, because successful aggressors wJ.JI attract adtlit10nal all res, enhancing their power while reducing that of their opponents . ...
1

BALANCING BEHAVIOR
The belief that states fonn alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them lies at the heart of haditional balance-of-power the01y According to this dew. states join aJliances to protect d1emselves from states or coalitions whose supe rior resources could pose a threat. States choose to balance for two main reasons. First~ they place their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potentiaJ hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one's trust in its c :onti.nued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate t11eir allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can. A5 \Vinston ChurchilJ explained Britain's traditional alliance policy: "For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggres sive, most dominating power on the Continent. . .. [I]t would have been easy .. and tempting to join wid1 the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took th~ harder course, joined with the less strong powers, ... and thus ~~f~ted the Contmental military tyrant whoever he was."2 More recently, Henry K.issmger advocated a rapprochement witl1 China, because he believed that in a tri angular relationship, it was better to align with the weaker side.

ReprintedU f~'_Stephen ~1. Wait. The Origins of Alliances, pp. 17-21 27-32. Copyright t98i by Comell oD'IiHed. l..... . have be-esannemty Press. Used UJ pennJSSJon of t1le publisher. Portions 'of the text and some footJtOtes

The beli<'f .that states will bllance 1s uns . c .. examp Ies1o f slates joining togeth er to resiSt urpnsmg, .given the many 1 .1.ar . a th r aJn1 1 desp1te t .1e powerful evidence tl1 t .h1 reatenmg state or coal't yet a storv p d . I 10n. hypothcs1 th e belief that the 0 pposJte respon es m support of the balancmg . ' rovJ . . ' . s. Accordmg to one scholar "In 1 matiana pol'ti se IS more likelv is ,Vldes)read. nte . . . . I 1 1 Morn enlum accrues to the gainer and . . cs, ~othmg succeeds like success. 1 . .. --1 . of m eve1s1)J'I'rty . I11 g<tins enfeebl acce erates his movement. The appearance rn .s . ' more. 'fl 1e l)ancIwagon collects those.es one stde. and sf rmu Iates lhe other all the th .d .1 1.. .1 . on e sr elines '3 1 1e udnuwagonrng hypothesis is es eciall , . . justifY overseas involvements or incr pd _ popular With statesmen seeking to liY . . ease rnL tarv bud t F admmtl AJ fred van Tirpitz's f.unous n k tl < s 1eol)rrested ge s. or example, German th 15 ing a great battle fleet, Tirpitz argued German coul on type oflogic. By buildor alliance 'vith her by posing a threa~ to En l~d's vi~~orce .~ngland into neutrality . Bandwagoning beliefs have also been recurrin mantime supremacy. War. Soviet e fforts to intimidate both l\ . . d g them.e throughout the Cold reveal the So,iet conviction that state~rw~ an Turke)da not ~oinjng ~ATO . mto alth l tl ' accommo te readih- to threats . oug 1 1ese moves merely encouraged ~orwav and Turke t ali . I I, 'tl tl v1 t o.1 s ffi . . " o gn more c ose ,. Wl 1 le ves . OVJet o CJals made a similar error in b li . th tb . Soviet mili . _ e evmg at e growth of . ta.ry power m the 1960s and 19 tOs would lead to a permanent shift in the correlatiOn of fo rces against the West. Instead. it contributed to a Sino-A 11 in the 1970s and the largest peacetime increase in u.s. power m the 1980s. I) . American officiaJs have been equally fond of bandwagoning notions. Accordm~ to ~SC-68, the ~lassified study that helped justi~r a major U.S. military b~~dup m the 1950s: In the absence of an affim1ative decision [to increase U.S. m~tary capabilities] ... our friends will become more than a liability to us. they w1U become a positive increment to Soviet power.'>5 President John F. Kennedv once claimed that "ir the United States were to falter. the whole world ... would inevitably begin to move toward the Communist bloc. -6 And though Henry Kissinger ofte n argued that dte United States should form balancing alliances t~ contain the Soviet Union, he apparently believed that U.S. allies were likely to bandwagon. As he put it, "If leaders around the world ... assume that the U.S. lacked either the rorces or the will ... thev will accommodate themselves to what they will regard as tl1e dominant trend.''; Ronald Reagans claim ...If we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America] ... then we cannot expect to pre,ail elsewhere. . . . [0 ]ur credibility will collapse and our alliances will crumble.'' reveals the same logic in a familiar role tJ1at of justi~ing overseas interYeotion.~
J

rappro~hement

:eu7t~

'l

96

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

_ 1

d . g are usuaJJy framed solei~ i11 tcrn" <J c.:apahili t', Bthncin,r :md u:ln wagollln aker side. ban d wagonmt:; wt " ' t 1w res. , . ~ .I h o;lrongcr Tl . Ba1 1. lf.,rnmber1t w1t 1d e we a}' " .. . :mcmg . t I ,e,er to account for the otltr l~t tor\ that stat 11~ . esronc..-ept ton s1 uld e rev1se . 10'' 1 t aUy Althouvh l'ow,.r i<; a11 im w 'ti 'd I l deciding wt 1 w lom o . ..., portant men cons1 er " 'ler It s more accurate to ~.tv that stat . art of the equation it is not tile on1 one. ' y . ~ cs tend P . . h ~ . . po"'er that poses the grcatec;t titre at. I or cxampl , to ally \\lth or agrunst ~f OJet~ otiler strona states if a weaker pr)W<'r is morf dare, 1 state may balance by )l n; '~ ~ coalitions iliat defeated German~ in \ Vorl<.l War ; T aerous fo r other reasons. tl . sur)erior in total resource~. 1 l 1 came togethe us 1 o 1ut W\ and \\'orld \\"ar JI were ,as }aggressJ\:e auns of . . ' dJ1c . . Lutd ;\Jaz1s posE:d .. . r . th ti1 the \\ . 1mm~!-. : when rt became c1 ear at e ancing and ban dwagonmg a1.c, mor.c accurately . bal ti1e greater danger. Because ts it is important to cons1der other . factors that will tllrea ' viewed as a response t 0 . h affeet the level of threat that states ma}' P?se: aggregate power, geogJap re; proxiJn-

WALT I ALLIANCES: BALANCN . . . G AND BANDWAGONING

i ' offensive power, and aggressive int~ntJons. . . .

.. , . . ty B defining ti'le basic hypotheses U1 terms of threats rathe r t~an po~ver alone, ~ lete picture of the factors that statesmen w11l consH1er when we gam a more comp . . . . chot'ces One cannot determine a pnon, however, wh1 ch sources of making all 1ance . . . . . threat "'~JJ be most important in any gtven case; one can say on ly th..tt all .o.f them are likely to play a role. And the greater the threat, the greater the probabd1 ty that the "ulnerable state v.ill seek an alliance.

THE IMPliCATIONS OF BAlANCING AND BANDWAGONING

The two general hypotheses of balanci ng and bandwagoning paint starkly contrasting pictures of international politics. Resolving the q uestion of which hypothesis is more accurate is especially important, because each implies very di ffere nt poli<.:y prescriptions. What sort of world does each depict, and what p olicies are implied? If balancing is the dominant tendency, then threatening states wil.l provoke others to align agrunst them . Because those who seek to dominate others will attract widespread opposition, status quo states can take a relatively sanguine view of threats. Credibility is less important in a balancing world , because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest, not because they expect others to do it for them. Thus the fear of allies defecting will de::cline. Moreover, if balancing is the nonn and if statesmen understand this tendency, aggression will be discouraged because those who c."Ontemplate it will anticipate resistance. In a balancing world, policies that convey restraint and be nevoJence are best. Strong states may be valued as allies because they have much to offe r their partners. but th~ must take particular care to avoid appearing aggressive. Foreign and ~ense polic.1es that minimize the threat one poses to others make the most sense m such a world.

world. b(c_ ' .t. < tdd,tJonal defec:tions and f exneded ~.I .rrr>v<"r, i/' ~tah::Smtn b 1 ah urther dtcline in p<><;iti r c ltve t at b 1 on are to h< 1 will be mon 11c 111cd to use fc>rc:t ThIS tcnden an< wagoning is wj-L. .1 , ucspr<:ctU, thcv status quo DO'.\ crs. The former will use r ' ~k wrce b C) IS true for both aau . th ~re~~ors and will be 11111! .l h to balanc:c against them an d be . hey will ~sum th t h ecause ' -:: a <>t ers through bC'Ih~f'fC:nc:e or brinkrn<.~nship Th I . ca~e t ey can attract mor<: all' 1 t atter \VJIJ ~011 11::s fear t I ga111~ t WJ r oppone:nts will mak b 1e . ow suit be<:ause the 1 11 11 e Y appeann r yw F111 a \ , JTII\pcrc:eJvmg the relative . g powenul and resolutE: ,, propens1ty to b 1 gerous, becau\C the policies that are ap . . a ance or bandwagcm is clan. propnate for 0 . )1er. f f ~lat<::S inen follow the baJan . the ot . nE: ~Jtuatton wiJI hackfire in (;]ng prescnpf1 b o their moderate re~ponse:s and relaxel VJew 0 f l h reatc; nn a an<.lwae~cming world In . u ., . defect, leav1ng thetn isolated against an h . \\'I encuurag<; th~:ir alii<::~ l.o overw e1 mmg . 1 . . )owing the banclwaguning prescription in a world of coa Jtlon. Conver e::ly, foland th reats fn::quently) will lead others to 0 balanc.;er (employing power These c:once::rns are not merely theoreJp~s; more and more vigorouslyY' ogn.ize that he r all ies in the Little Entente ea n e 1930s, France failc:d to recwere prone to b d that French mi litary and diplomatic poJ,c::Jes . r d an wagon, a tenoent:}' rem1orce As noted 1 S . attempts to intimidate Turkey and Norway aflte " ' ld W. . ear Jer, OVJet r vvor ar f I reveal the error; they mertly provoke<.! a greater US eomffi.J ment to t11 .t oppostte esc rt:cic n d cemented thei r entry into :\ATO. Likewise' the seIf-enc:1rc1 1 lit;) . an . mg ) t 1 ty of . . . cos1 Wilhelmme Germany and Imperial Japan reflected the ac;sumptJon, prevalent in ' . both states, t hat bandwagonmg was the dominant tendenC\' ternationa1 aff:aJrs. . mm

99

Y:

WHEN DO STATES BALANCE? WHEN DO THEY BANDWAGON?

T.hese examples highlight the importance of identifying whether states are more ~ely to balance or bandwagon and which sources of th reat have the gre-atest 1mpact on the decision . . .. In general, we should expect balancing behavior to be much more common than bandwagoning, and we shou ld expect bandwagoning to occur only under certain identifiable conditions. Although many statesmen fear that potential allies will align with the strongest side, thjs fear receives little support from most of international history. f or example, every attempt to achieve hegemony in Europe since the Thirty Y ears War ha.c; been thwarted by a <.lefEmsive coalition formed precisely for ilie purpose of defeating the potential hegemon. Other examples are equally telling. Although isolated cases of bandwagoning do o<:c.:ur, the great powers have shown a remarkable teudency to ignore other temptations and follow the balancing prescription when ~e<.>eSSaJ). This tendency should not surprise us. Balancing should be preferred f~r the simple reason that no statesman can be completely sure of what another will do. Bandwagoning is <.langerous because it increases the resourc.-es a\'a.ilable to a threatening power anti requires placing trust in its continued forbearance. ~use pe~ ..: cl __ c. to balance agamst potential uons are unreliable and intentions can tange, 1t lS sater . threats than to rely on the hope that a state will remain bene'-~lent.ly ~ . But if balancing is to be expected, bandwagooing remams_a poss,brlit}. S~eral factors may affect the relative propensity for states to select this c.:ourse.

to

a:. ~oning they, those

ascendaoc.y of
more

1::e

Wl

world, by contrast, is much more competitive. If states tend who seem most ~gerous, then great powers will be rewar~ed if both strong ~d potentially aggressive. International rivalries WJ.ll be because a sm~e ~feat may signal the decline of one side and ~e the other. This situation is especially alannjng in a bandwagonL!Ig

1OU

PART 1

A ARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCI:.!>

WALT I ALLIANCES: BA lANCNG AND BANDWAGONING 101

Strong versus Weak States

than tl le 111 ore likch r, . 1e ln 1!\'nt.'t~\L tlw weake r t 1 hatutc.'\.'. Thi ituation occut because weak t ates add httl~ lt th(;; stre ngth of a -''t' . c"'w 1011 lmt.mCUJ' tl~e wr:tth of the n1ore th reat' t un~ states nonethcless 1 < ' ~n ot' 1 1\'l' .ttle to affect tl1e outcome (<mU n.av -;ul fer gtievousIv . . 10 Bl'<'<tu e we~\k states can do ll n t choose tJ1e winning side. On l whe. tltu r decision c:an "' f~ ., (ec:t tl te proc~ss ), t11ev mus c . 1 raaonal Jl01. tJ1em to J'oin tbe weaker alliance. B, contras t.' Sttong . } outcome IS :t t 1e on . r 'ti'on into a wmrunco one . And bee .ms e. lhe 1r dt:c1s1 ,.... ay . g coalJ osm tates can tum a 1 arn p1 y 1,erence beh ''een \'ictorv and defeat the v ar(" l1 kely to be e mean tl1 cun . .. . rewarded for tlleir conhibution. \\'eak states are also likely to be especJally se nsJtJvt, lo ~J ~~Xl mate power. .. . . . ' ere ,,'I1 great powers have both global interesttJ and .global 1,c:apabtlii1es, \\'eak tates . s . \ v , ,1 be concemed pn 111 ariJ. with events m 1eu JI11Jlle<.uate V lC:m tty. Moreove r, \.vu k states can be expected to balance whe n threatenecl hy states with rouah]y wea al capabilities but tlley will be tempted to b~ndwagon \\'~le n ~hre aten ~d by a equ great power. Obviously~ wh~n the gr.e~~ pm~er ts c~~~ ab_J e ~~ rap td ~nd effcc~ve action (i.e. , when its offens1ve capabilttles ar e esp ec.:1all) st10 ng), thts temptation '-'~11 be even greater.
sta te.
l' , " .

it i~ tt h.~ .. ,h, .t<ron r1tJ1er

Tah ,!,, tiHr, these factors hel cxp1 . lte fo t' f 1 grea t powers Altl' p I amt L rma ron o sphe res of B ce s urro 1 mrun ~' ll' m uen oug 1 strong nei II to bala ncf'. ' tall and wea k neighhors of the P g I lors of strong tates are \jkch .g ~at d ers . " bandwagon.. Because they wi ll he th e F'. . vt<:hmspo~v, may be more in<.:lined t'o 1rst . aI)I 1 the cap ttH's to stan d alone, and because a defeJn cxpansron, hec.:ause thtv lack . . all' rate too . o em slowly. to <.1 t I1 much good accom modatrng a th srve . ranee ma)' ope .t rea enrng great power may he temptmg.
Peace and \Va r

The Availability of Allies

es will also be tempted to bandwagon whe n allies are simply una,aiJable. This Stat ement is not simply tautological , because states ma~' balance by mobilizing their stat resources instead of relying on allied support. They are more like ly to do so, own however when thev are confident tllat allied assistance ,..,rill be avai lable. Thus a further prerequisite for balancing behavio r is an effecti, e syste m of diplomatic commwtication. Tbe ability to communicate enables potential allies to recognize their shared interests and coordinate tllei r responses. If weak states sec no possibility of outside assistance, however, they may be forced to accommodate the mosl imminent threat. Thus the first Shah of Iran saw the British withdrawal from Kandahar in 1881 as a signal to bandwagon with Russia. As he told tl1e BJitish rep rese ntati e, all be had 11 -no thi ng else... received from Great Britain was "good advice and honeyed wo rds Finland's policy of partial alignment with the Soviet Union suggests the same lesson. When Finland joined forces with Nazi Gennany dw ing World \Var 11, it alienated the potential allies (the United States and Great Britain ) that mig ht otherwise have helped protect it from Soviet pressure after the war. ~f course: excessive confidence in allied support will encour age weak states to -nde, relymg on the efforts of others to provide secmity. Fre e-riding is the free mal polic.y for a weak state, because its efforts will con trib ute little in any case. opti Among ~e great powers, the belief that allies are readily available encourages k-_ assmg; states that are threaten ed strive to pas s to oth ers the bur dens of buc p :nd ing up to the aggressor. Neither response is a form of ban dwagoning, but th suggest. that effocti.ve balancing behavior is more likely to occw whe n mero al bers of an alliance are not eo ced that the1r par tners are unconditionallYI0Y nvm
' J

Fin al!)', the context in which alliance chot<:es are mad '1 1 f~ c . ance or bantlwagon. States are more like) t bal . . ~ WJ a e~t decic;ions to halstages of a war, as they seek to deter 0 ; d~feat~~= tn pea cetim~ or in the earl y D~wers posm g the greatest tltreat. But once the outcom e appears certain the losing sidE> at an opportune mom ent Th, so: e~; e te.mpted to defect from allie with Nazi German y initially and then aband~s dote umam~ and Bulgaria as thd ne ermany ror the '1\llies bb d f 'd e t1 es o war e e_ and. flowed across Europe in World War Il. . . . The restoration of peace, however' restores th e mcentiv.e to baJance. As man v . . . . . observersf Ila\.e. noted, vtctonous coalitions are like! Yto d'tsmtegrate wtth the con' . ). . 1 . ce. e us1on o peak . I romment exam ples mclude Austria an cl p russra aft er tl1e1r war -..1.. 1 th s u w1u 1 Den ma r m 186 4, Britain and France after World War , e ovtet nton f' ds tL~tes a ter World War II, and China and Vietnam after the u.S. 1e ar~ d t1 Untte \~thdr~'~al from Vte tna_m. ~his recu~ng pattern provides further support for the p10pos tt10n that_ bal.ancmg 1s the dommant tendency in international politics and tllat bandwagomng IS tlle opportunistic exception.

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES ON BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING

Hypotheses on Balancing
I. General form: States facing an external threat wilJ align with others to

2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

oppose the states posing the threat. The greate r the threatening state's agg regate power, the greater the tenden cy for others to align against it. The nearer a powerful state, the greater tJ1e tendency for those nearby to align against it. Therefore, neigh boring states are less likely to be allies than are states separated by at leas t one other power. The greate r a state's offensive capabilities, tlle gre~ ter tl1~ tenden~~~ for others to align against it. Therefore, states \\~t11 offensl\:ely o~ented -~rhtary capabilities are likely to pro"oke other states to form defensi,e ~oahtions. The more aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more hkely others are to align against that state. Alliances formed during wartime \\~11 disintegrate when the enem~ is defeate d.

l 0:!

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENC :::-

Hypotheses on Bandwagoning
Tlw hypotheses on hanth'<\goning are the oppo!'itt of tl u on h\lanci 11 g.

\'

- -

WALT I ALLIANCES B . AlANCING AND BANDWAGONING

103

1. Geueralform: States facing an externalthre..tt will:.'!) \vith the most tl'teat ening power. .. . 2. The greater a state aggregate capabd1ttes, lhe grt.\ter the tendcnc: . 'tl 't y for otJ:1ers to tgn W J 1 1 . al 3 . The nearer a powerful state, the greater th(' tendency for those nearb - 1= 't Yto augn WJ'tl1 J . . .. 4 ' The o <Yreater a state's offensive capabilities. the greater the tendency r lOT

5.

6.

1.

8.

others to align '"~th it. 5 The more aggressive. a state's percei,ed intention . the less like!) tl . o 1er states are to align agamst 1t. 6. Alliances formed to oppose a threat will disintegrate \ovhen the threat becomes serious.

c
tJ.

Hypotheses on the conditions Favoring Balancing or Bandwagoning

1. Balancing is more common than bandwagoning. 2. The stronger the state, the greater its tendency to balance. vVeak states will balance against other weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by

J0.

great powers. 3. The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. w hen adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck-passing increases. 4. The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for others to balance against it. 5. In wartime, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency for others to bandwagon with it.

'ih~')(} ( X ew York, 1970)' . . . . aml t ,f.d \\ ar: l94.'5-1949 ( X p 3BI , andCelrLundestad An . :-._ <;C ( ... L' nitr~ <.l States ObJ fcv. York, 1980), pp. 308-9. ~enca, Scondmat;ilJ, C.a< 11 ar cJ Et;..--nId. ContainmentJve;s 404 Prog ec p and s .rams r,or :\ational l. Se::curitv") r . d . all(l-1 3 ;. ' . . lmilar passages can be founu' . epnnte m Qu(J!('(] in Sevom Browtl "'l F on PP 389.414, . . .' ' te aces of p . Ioretf!.ll :ohr:y from Tnwum to Johnson (~wer:)~okn.stan.cy and Clumge in United Stat Quoted 1 U.S. House Com ln'tt n ew or . 1968). p. 917 e.s I ee on Fo ff: 1 11 World Watershed ill Great Power p . :~ ~ A airs, The Societ (.;11 ion and th Th. d 1 Neu: )'o rk Times , April28 198 Ao rcy . ttb Cong.. 1st scss.. 1971 PP 1- - : :~ rr . . . ' p. 12. ln the sam 3 , . .., h.IO. tra I Amenca r were to fall ' wlaat wou Id t I1e , conseq e speech. Rcagan also said. "lfC enbe -> for E urope an d JOr alliances such as :\ATO'. . . . \\ .u~nces wh' our position in A.sia d ' ?" . . hJch allY 1ch fnend wouJd . an 1cn. t tl y 1 . m~t us t 1s wort 1 h h that Napoleon an d fJlt1 underesti l noting . . .I I assurnmg t at t eir potential ene . -J . er ma eu t 1e costs of aggression b . 1 . 1 . mles wou1 bandw d ,r Y 1t er ulSI111Ssed the possibility of .. agon. J 'lter Munich for example 1r ., . opposition by claim tl B . . ' men were !Jttle worms.'' 1\apoleon a arentl. . ~~g lat ntJsh and French statessonablv make war on us unaided'' dpp ) beueved that England could not "rea' an assumed that th p f 1at Eng1 and had abandoned its 0 . . e eace o Amiens guaranteed cl . d. ppos1tlon to France B H' 1 . e1 !eve m a bandwaO'oning world th . . . ecause lt er and :'\apoleon b 1 This situation is anal;gous to Rob~rt ~!~~~e~x~ess ~el~ eager to go to war. and the spiral model. The fonner calls foro s~ction between the deterrence model 51 for appeasement. Balancing and band P.po onthto a suspected aggressor. the latter wagonmg are e allianc a1 fd an d appeasing. See Robert Jervis p . . ~ eqUJ\' ents o eterring lies (Princeton, N.J. , 1976), chap. '3. erceptron and ~lrsperception ill lntemational Poli-

Col<

11. Quoted in C. J. Lowe, The ReluctaTlt lmperialist.s (!\ew York. 196- )' p. ;). I

NOTES
credits it to Stephen Van Evera) in his Theory of I~ternational Politics {Reading, M ass. 1979). Amold Wolfers uses a similar terminology in his essay "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on Intematimwl P olitics {Baltimore, Md., 1962), pp. 12~24. 2. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vo1. 1: The Gathering Stonn (Boston, 1948}, pp. 207-8. 7 3. W. ScottThompson, "The Communist International System," Orbis 20, no. 4 (197 ). 4. ~or the effects of the Soviet pressure on Turkey, see George Leuczowski, The Midclle ~ rn World Aff irs, 4th ed. {Ithaca, 1980}, pp. 134-38; and Bruce R. Kuniholtn, The Orig~'~ a (If the Cold \Var.in the Near East (Princeton, N.J., 1980), pp. 355-78. For the Nof\\le@; response to SoVIet pressure, see Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of
1. My use of the terms balancing and bandwagonin o follows that of Kenneth Waltz (who

'

The Future ofDiplomacy

HANS ). MORGENTHAU

FOUR TASKS OF DIPLOMACY

... Diplomacy [is] an element of nation~ powe~. T.he .i :nl~o.r~a.nce of diplomac:: for the preserYation of intemational peace lS but a l:artl~ul~n as~cct of that general For a diplomacv that ends in war has failed tn tts p nm ar:- objecthe: th . f unet10n. e I I. I , promotion of the national interest by p~aceful m~aJ:s: T 11 las i'l \vays been so and is particularly so in view of the dest:ructi:~ pote ntialities of total war.. Taken in its widest meaning, compnsmg th e whole range of foretgn policy, the task of diplomacy is fourfold: (1) Diplomacy must de termine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentiaiJ)~ av~able for the pu~suit of these objectives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the obJectives of other nations and t11e power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objecti\es. (3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are com patible \\~th each other. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objecthes. Failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardize the success of foreign policy and with it the peace of the world. A nation that sets itself goals which it has not the power to attain may haYe to fat-e the risk of war on two counts. Such a nation is likely to dissipate its strength and not to be strong enough at all points of friction to deter a hostile nation from challenging it beyond endurance. The failure of its foreign policy may force the nation to retrace its steps and to redefine its objectives in view of its ac-tual strength. Yet it is more likely that, under the pressure of an inflamed public opinion, such a nation will go fmward on the roa~ toward an unattainable goal, strain all its resou rces to achieve it, and finally, confounding the national interest with that goaJ, seek in war tJ1e solution to a problem that cannot be solved by peaceful means. A na?on will also invite war if its diplomacy wrongly assesses th e objectives of ?ther ~~ons and the power at their disposal .... A nation that mistakes a polic~ of ~mpenalis~ for a policy of the status quo ~ be unprepared to meet the threat to tts own eXtStence which the other nation's policy entails. Its weakness will invite . . attack and may make war mevttable. A nation that mistakes a policy of tJ1e statuS r the ..: 11 quo ror a policy of unpenalis m ww evoke through its disproportionate reactiOn r: t of . very clangerB war which 1 15 trying to avoid. For as A mistakes B's policy ror Jtn pe alis h both r mtght mistak A' d 1 . n m, so e s e ens1ve reaction for imperialism. T us d nations each . t m ent upon forestalling imaginary aggression from the other SI e, '
o f. From Politic8 Amo11g Naaom 5th . . . u:tibyon by H.~ J. Morgenthau, oopyright 1972 by Alfred A J{n ~. adi"ision of Random HOUse permJSSton of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random H.ou.se, '

inc

to~ a will n l'>:l l 1 .rm!-.. Similarly, the eo f . . . f. n USton of one tv . I . 1 1 ' . I spl oportionate reaction and th , 'Pe o Impenahsm with another may ea As t r 'Is< assessment of the po . f us e\oke the risk of war. .h v. er o other naf I)e equally fatal to the cause of IOns, eit er to o,errate or to underratC' lt may B, A m a~ prefe r to ~'ield to B's demands until fi pe~ce ..By overrating the power of di~. nall), A 15 forced to fight for its ven. existenc< undN the most unfavorable . h con tions Bv und erratmg t e power of B d A ma, Ilec:ouw overconfident in its as superi tv sume ' . on ' A may advance demands and irnpo e conditions upon B which th I Unsu pectin~ B's actual power of resistan~e a~%~~. ~uppo edl~ too weak to resist. either retreating and conceding defeat 0 0 r' cl . . e faced ''-1th the alternative of r a vancma and riski a , t1 n " ar. d 0 A nation 1at seeks to pursue an intelli li gent an peaceful ~ :y oreign po c cannot f cease compaling its own obiectives and th 1. . e o )jectives 0 othe ti . th li J r na ons m e ght of . bl their cotnpatibiJity. If they are compatible n0 . t pro em anses If thev a , , re no compati. al ble. nation A must determine whether its obiecti to itself tl t th ves are so '-'1t J ey must )a 1 . be pursuec desptte that incompatibility\ 'th th 0 b . e Jectives of B. If it is found that Ns ;\1} ,1 . . . . b . c VJtct mte1ests CUl e safeguarded without the attamment of these obiectives thev ' b' . J 1t )e oug1 to 1 aban doned. On the other hand if A finds th t th a ese o Jectives are essen ' aJ r: 1 tic. tOr tts VJta mterests, A must then ask itself whether B's ob. . mc.:ompat:ible ~ect:ives . . w1th tts own, are essential for B's vital interests If the anS\,.er seem to be the negam . . . a1 ~~ tive, A must try to mduce B to abandon its obiectives, 0 rrenn g B eqw,a~ents not '1.t m J _ to A. In otl1e1 words, through diplomatic baraainina the o;,e and take of compromiSe. oo o . . a way must be sought by wh1ch the mterests of A and B can be rec-onciled. . Fi~ally, if the i~compatible objectives of A and B should pro,e to be ,;taJ to etther st~e. a way m1g~1t still be sought in which the ,;tal interests of A and B might be redefined, reconctled, and their objectiYes thus made compatible \\ith each other. Here, however even pro,ided that both sides pursue inte!Jjaent and peaceful policies-A and Bare moving dangerously close to the brink of war. It is the final task of an intelligent diplomacy, intent upon preserving peace, to choose the appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. The means at the disposal of diplomacy i'Ue three: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. ~o diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intenigent and m peacefuL No diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion c d compromise desetves to be called intelligent. Rarely, if ever, in the conduct of the foreign policy of a great power is there justification for using onJy one method to the exclusion of the others. Generally, the diplomatic representati,e of a great power, in order to be able to serve both the interests of his country and the interests of peace, must at the same time use persuasion, hold out the advantages of a c-ompromise, and impress the other side wit.l1 the military strength of hi~ count:J:. . The art of diplomacy consists in putting the right em~>hasts at any particular moment on each of these three means at its disposal. A diplomacy tltat has been successfully discharO'ed in its ot.ller functions may well fail in advanc~g tbe national 0 f t interest and preservmg peace 1 1 stresses .persuasion when d1e gt' eAand 1 . of di take . 1 P ?ma~ compromise is plimalilr required b\ t.l1e cJJ'cumstances oft1e ~. n'se when the milit~n: m1ght of f , k ' th at r)uts most of its eggs in t11e has et o comprot 1 . -1 ln: 'lit> nught when the 1 1 the nation should be predominantly displayed. or stresse.s ~ -,, . promise will bke\\lse frul. .. d . . .. a] . poIJtlc sttuatton calls for persuasJOn an eon1
TURE OF DIPLOMACY I THE FU

MORGENTHAu

H~i

Pr\RT 1

A ARCHY AND ITS CONSI:.QUE!\CfS

MORGENTH.AU I THE
S'l 1

The Promise of Diplomacy: Its Nine Rules

DiplnnHtl'\' could rt.>dHifit\\ouldpart with [the.~ \ i e. t;l'lt in rc<:ent ye . . . . . cl .f . . I . . l ars ha wll1-m~h destnwcd tts usefulness, an 1 tt ''on <.t r~ vut<..: 1 H. technique .ve . . I' . . . . '. . ; . s whtch haH~ controlled tlw mutual relations o nation c; ~lllet tnh mmernonal. By d . so. howc' er. diplomacy' ould realize onl~ one of th<.' P1 ,..' '' 011 ditions fo r the reOtng vntion of {1C:lct'. The <:ontribution of a re\'jved chplot l! K\ to the cause of ser. t peat-e f 1 - use. . . would depend upon the methods and purpose~ o \\"e have aJ read" formulated the four mam ta k' w1Lh wht ch a foreign oJ must cope successfullv in order to be able to promott the national interest an~ lt)' setYe peace. It remai;s for us now to reformulate those taskc; in the light of the ~re. "t" Id po)1 t c~. con front d"tp lornacy.... spe. cial problems with ,.vhich contemporary ~vor The main reason for [the ] threaterun~ aspect of contemporaty world politics [lies] in the character of modem war, wluch has changed profoun~ly under the impact of nationalistic universalismo and mode~n technology. ~he effe<:ts of mod. ern technology cannot be undone. The on I, van.able L~1at r~n~ams ~ubject to delib. erate manipulation is the new moral force of nat10nal~stJ<: umversalism. The attempt to reverse the trend toward war through the tecl~ntques ~fa revived diplo. macv must strut with this phenomenon. That mean , m negative terms, that a re"i~ed diplomacy wi.U have a chance to preserve peace on I> when it is not used as the instrument of a political religion ai_ ming at universal dominion.

FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY

107

n I tiJstrusc in its ten n~ 1 .. .t . IS metaph)-sical . a1 Cllll .ancI tttalfairsofme n . all condt" I I assertJon. Itisnevertn 1c. bccaus\ . i~ are d 1t

poht ., Jll'>l think what an abommat1on in 1t . lOne and relative x"'" toturn 1 k lo ~ "" >ac any L. I>OhlJ< I u1or editor can ' at moment p ts atecraLt an abstract doc....:n' IIIUS t 11e 1\ n}' " .: in tht doctrine and applaud it hccause t'hev hear extension on it The """pi" u a new . .. . . the 1 . r- '" acqu1esce tht pohh<.1ans and editors repe at '" because the po lti<:Jans and editor.. rcntat t t I . th k . . tI ' anc ma) llll'all anythu1g or nothimr t Y 10 Jt s popular. So it grows . o a anv moment cl Jt actC'd< to 1t now. v..~thin the vague 1 ~ of w iat ' an no one .knows how it will he. you . . 1m1ts 1 have t(J accede to 1! tomorrow wh tl you suppose t to he; thcrcfore )'Oil ,.~11 en 1e same na d ~ ~ou ll<:"cr have heard or thought of. lf ou allow me~. rna e to cover somctJJing whidl you Wl ll awaken some day to find .t st Y_J l a pohtH.:al e:at<:hword to go on aucl grow . I anumg over you th . I . . wh1c 1 V0\1 are powerless a~ men. ear Jlter of your <.lestiny against ' , are power1 a<Y . t cl 1 . ess contrarY to sou nd statesmanship and oru.ns e USions.. .. vVhat can be more . I~ I tJon w 11<: 1has no definite relation to. common sense thaJ1 t o put r0 rt I1 an abstract a~scr. 1 any mterest of ou , k any number of possibilities of prol ,. . . rs now <lt sta e, but which hao; in it uucmg comp1 teation h" I which are sure to be embarrassing \vh th . ~ s w .JC 1 we <:an not foresee, but ' en ey anse!"

Four Fundamental Rules

Diplomacy Must Be Divested of the Crusading Spirit This is the first of the rules that diplomacy can neglect only at the risk of war. l n the words of William
Graham Sumner:
[f you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightfu l tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betrayhim against hiJnself. Civilised men have do11e their fiercest fighting for docttines. The recon quest of the Holy Sepulcher, "the balance of power,'" "no universal dominion.'' "'trade follows tl1e fl.ag,'' "he who holds the land will hold the sea," "the throne and the altar,''.clle revolution, the faith-these are the things for which Jllen have given their lives ... Now when any doctrine arrives at that degree of authority. the name of it is a club whicl1any demagogue may S\ving over you at any time and apropos of anything. In ?rd~r to describe a doctrine, we must have recowse to theologicaJ language. A doctnne tS an article of faith. ft is something which vou are bound to believe, not because )rou ban~ some rational grow1ds for believing it ~ true. but because you belong to such and s_uch: 11 church or denomination .... A policv in a state we can understand; for instance, ' ".1) the polk:y of the United States at the end of the eighteenth century to get ~e: navigation of the Mississippi to its mouth , even at the expense of war with S~~~l. fortll policy had reason and justice in it; it was founded in our interests; it had positive. its and definite sc'Ope. A doctrine is an abstract principle; it is necessarily absolute tn

The Wars of Religion have shown that the attem t . , . gion as the only true one upon the rest of the world is~ ~t~~po~e .ones own rehtury of aJmost unprecedented bl dsh cl, cl . e as tt ts costly. A c.-en. . oo e evastahon, and barbarization was neede d to1convmce the contestants that the tw0 retlgJOns couJd live together in .1 .. mutua to eration.. The two political religions of our nme have taken the place of . t he two great Chnshan denominations of the sixtee th d . ill h 1 1 . . n an seventeenth centunes W t e po ttlca rehg10ns of our time need the lesson of the Tb"m; v \e d tJ 1 . . 1. ., ,ears var, or 'vill t]1ey n 1emse ves m time of the uruversalistic asp1ranons that tablv tssue ' 1 meVI m mconc us1ve war? ' Upon_ the an~ver t~ that question depends the cause of peace. For onl)' if it is answered m the affirmative can a moral c :onsensus, emerging from shared convictions a~d com mo~ values, develop-a moral consensus within which a peace-preserving diplomacy will have a chance to grow. Only then will diplomacy ha,e a chanc-e to fac..-e the ~oncrete political problems that require peaceful solution. If the objectives of fore1gn policy are not to be defined in terms of a world-embracing political religion, how are they to be defined? This is a fundamental problem to be solved once the crusading aspirations of nationalistic universalism have been discarded.

pc-~ and to eac:h nation's claim that its own ethical code would serve as the basiS of
ocmduct for ..JI nations.]

Edito~ ~otc: By this tenn Professor Morgenthau refers to the injection of ideoloro: into ~n:::~
111

The Objectives of Foreign Pol cy Must Be Defined in Terms of the National i Interest and Must Be Supported with Ad.equate Power This is the second rule of a peace-preserving diplomacy. The national interest of a peace-lo,ing nation can only be defined in tenns of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the nationaJ territory and of its institutions. ~ational security, then, is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power 'vithout compromise. But diplomacy must ever be alive to the radical transfonnation tl1at national security has undergone tmder the impact of the nuclear age. Unti.J the advent of that age, a nation could use its diplomacy to purchase its security at the expense of another nation. Today, short of a radical change in the atomic balanc:e of power in favor of a particular nation, diplomacy, in order to ~-ake one ~tion secure from nuclear destruction, must make them all secure. \\ 1tl1 the national

.....~ . I trictive and transcend.'JJl 't r 11 cliplomacy 1 inll"'n.''-t defincu lJl 'IUt 1 re , nu,t oh el"\e the third of its rule T _ ,_ r 1 the Political Scene from the fPoint of Vieu; 0'J Oth er Diplomacy .\lust VJOI\ a ,. . .t.. : . f: .._. to a nation as an extr<:Oit: <1 <if:'1 -partJalitv. and th \ ations - \ ou una IS so aUSJ all I ,. J , e ' . 'd . of what otJlers wiJJ natur ~ sopP Or tear. \\ nat are th o total ""ant of <.'On ' eration [ . I . cl th . f otJ nations in tenns o nationa S(Um~ an are e\ comp tc a 11 ationalwterests o 1er . , ible\\1thonesown.? Tl definition of the national.inte rest 1n t<'m1~ of national ~ec:u1e . . . . d tJ terests of ilie two opposmg nallous arc more likely to h nh IS easJer. an le 1.0 f lh al e ' tibl : . b' 1ar svstern than in anv oilier sy te m o e n ance of powE: compa e m a po ' . r f th . r. . l ..,.,. m as we have seen, is more unsa1 rom E: pomt of view of e The b1 ar S\ ;>Le , po .. th ace than an'. other, when boili blocs are in competitive c:ontac:t . roughout th : . ] f pe ' b'ti'on of botJl is fired b\ ilie CrtU arun~ zea 0 a UntversaJ mission worId an d tbe am I ' . . a1 . .. .. v 'tv or nearness of situation, c'Onsti tutes nations natur enemJes. <~ vJClnl ' ' t11 . et once ey have defined their national in.terests in terms of national seeu. . b ntv. t. ev can dra"' back from their outlvmg positions. located close to, or within . "' th~ sph~re of national security_ o~ th.e oth~r s1de, and ret:reat m~o. the1r respe<.:~ve spheres, each self-contained w1thm 1 ~rb1t. T~1~se outlymg positions ad~ nothmg ts. to national seeurity; iliey are but liabilities, po~1tio~s that cannot held m case of war. Each bloc will be the more secure the w1der 1t makes the distance iliat separates boili spheres of national security. Each side can draw a line far. rustant from each other. making it understood that to touch or even to approach 1t means war. \Vhat tllen about the interjacent spaces, stretching behveen the hvo lines of demarcation? Here the fourth rule of diplomacy appli es.
J

MORGENTHAu
I THE FUTURE OF DIPlOMACY

109

?e

automatic ppl't:dtion. lt i~ onk th gh . t. h , TOUCT a COntin supportc<- .;otts -'' Rrmness and self tr . uous prex:ess of ~\..~tation ' -res runt, that . . '-"'t' issues Ut'l be made to work. It is h01 . . . compromiSe on seconda.t-v . f. j . , Jroa<. he~ \\' . . act 1tate or hamrv-r. th"' \:\er. possible to 10dicate a priori what f arl , . r ..._ success o t : f Fir t (Jf aJ], tt lS worth notjng to what t thpo ctes 1J compromise. is. compliam:e ,,;th the fourth mle-de ex ~t e success ~f compromise-that three rules. which in turn are similarlv intpend ufn comphanc:e with tl1e other . .L " er . . second ru Ie cIepenu.s upon the realization ofepenuent.As the ~mpliance \\lth the th fi its realization from compliance with the sec .de rst. ~ the thJrd rule must await . :on . \iew of . nation al . Its mterests after it has parted . A nation. can on!~. take a ration al a poutical creed. A nation is able to consider thcompan\' ''lth the crusadinu spmt of ti 'a] . ,,~tJl objecti\ity only after it has become secure~ na haton. mt~~ests of the other side . C . mw mterests. omprom1se on am ISsue. howe\'er mino Jt constders its own national 'bl . .L , r. lS 1mposst e so lon(l' as both sides are not secure m UJeir national interests Th ti . r h rul . us na ons cannot hope to G'Om 1, w1tl1 the rourt e 1f they are not '"illina to corn 1. th h h p~ . di o P' ot morahty and expe ency require compliance with the,se"-'1 tfi e da er three, Both r tal 10 ur un ' men ru es CompJj ance makes compromise possible but it does t . no assure tts success T0 give compromise, ~ade possible through compliance \\ith the first three rul~. a chance to succeed, five other rules must be obsened

Five Prerequisites of Compromise

. Give up the Sh~doU: of W~rt~less Rights for the Subst.ance of Real Advantage A ~~p~omacy that thinks m legalistic and propagandist:ic terms is particular~ tempted to ms1st upon the letter of the law, as it interprets the law. and to lose sight ofthe consequences such insistence may have for its own nation and for humanit\. Since there are rights to be defended, tllis kind of diplomacy thinks that the issue ca'nnot be compromised. Y the choic-e that confronts the diplomat is not bet\,een legali~ and illeet gality, but between political wisdom and political folly. !he question ''ith me.~ said Edmund Burke, "is not wheilier you have a right to render your people miserable. but wheilier it is not your interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer teUs me I may do, but what hu manity, reason and justice tell me 1 ought to do.-6 Never Put Yourself in a Position from Which lor1 Camwt Retreat Without Losing Face and from 'Which You Cannot Aduance Without Grot:e llisks The violation of this rule often results from disregard for ilie preceding one. A diplomacy that con founds ilie shadow of legal right with the actuality of political advantage is ukely to find itself in a position where it may have a legal right. but no political business, to be. In other words, a nation may identi~ itself with a position, which it may or may not have a right to hold, ~ardless of the poli~cal consequences. And again rompromise becomes a difficult matter. A ~tion cannot retreat from that position \vithout incurring a se?ous ~~~ of ~restige. It can~ot advance from that position wiiliout ex'}X>Sing itseli to_~litical mks. perha~ :\e~ the risk of war. That heedless rush into untenable pos1tions and, more pamcularl}. the stubborn refusal to extricate oneself from them in time. is ilie earmark of . ~apoleon Ill on the mcompetent diplomacy. Its classic examp1 are Le policv of es m ,

Nations Must Be willing to Compromise on All Issues that Are Not Vital to
Them

All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and e\e~ prudent a<..t, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights. that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants. As we must give away some naturallibe~es. for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great emprre. But, in all fair dealings, the thing bought must hear some proportion to the purchase paid. None will barter away the immediate jewel of his soul.5

Here diplomac:y meets its most difficult task. For minds not beclouded by the c:rusading zeal of a politicaJ religion and capable of vie,Ying the national interests of both sides withobjec:tivity, the delimitation of these vital interests should not pro,~e too difficult. Compromise on secondary issues is a different matter. He re the tas~ not to separate and define interests that by their very n ature already tend to~ separation and definition, but to keep in balance inte rests that touch each oth~r at many points and may be intertwined beyond the possibility of separation. It lS an immense task to allow the other side a certain influence in those inte rjacent spaces wi~t allowing them to be absorbed into the orbit of the other side. It. ha:~: less unmense task to keep the other side's influence as small as poss1ble . r~ .. --- to . . ""'lfr' .., ~ ones own se<..'llnty zone without absorbing those reg10ns 10 to ones [l own orbit For the perfonnance of these tasks, no formula stands readY or

is

llO

PART 1

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUI:.Nl.t:.:> MORGENTHAU I THE FUTURE

. \\' f L870 .111 d the poli<:ic:> ol A u:.t: i:. <UH.i Germ a t ' H ' ol the l nuK -Prnsswn o ar o ' . . . .. .. 1 . . 11)' . . . I I ,, .. . Tl1cse ex<1111l)Jcs also~ 1 n_. .. r- O'l 1 t h~ risk f Hh\ : nn tht' l' ' 'l' of the Fu ~ t \\ ot ( a t. o ".tr is ~tllil'd " i th the violation of this rule.

OF DIPLOMACY

lJ l

hand

hJStOty, and beyond th jncak ulahlc r)u,Sl.Jihties of the future In th e V ds of tomorrcJw it anticipat tl tctory . .. e wor of 13ol b k es w mg ro e:
< 'i L
'
r) ('

a fl

10

k All to Make Decisions f or You S IC .n::!_ 1utions that are \ eve, Allow a ' ea_ _ . ., particularly ~usceptible to vi )l<ttiug th is 0 11 Y es e e. b l' . . to tl1c l)rececltngf I u1. ellb identifying tlt<'i 1 own nation.lI in lcrcsts (;On) 0 l\10US Y "' 1'] . lose the.i r freedom o adJOn Secure in the support of Its powcl{ ll llrienu tl1e .le: I 11 1 1. m tl ose of the wea , a v. . . p ete : W l 1 . the ob'ecti~es and methods of ilS (orel~1 poltC:)' to Stlil itself'. weak ally can cho.ose (i J I that it must support interest!. not it U\-vn and that it 1 The powerful natiOn t_len t~c s s that are , ita I not to itself. hut on I~ to its alJy. . able to comprorruse on rssue < t fi l. ts un . exam )le of the violation of t11is ru le rs to )C oun<. m the way in The classiC di h 1. d of Great Britain and France on tlte eve of the which Turkey force t e Jan d 11 - 1 . . 8 - 3 Tl Conce1 of Europe ha "' rtrt< )' ag1eec upon a comurot l Cnmean\Var m l b l C k 1 T k L . r . tJ fl ' t between Russia and Tur -e~' w 1en ut ey, K nowmg that mise settling l e con l C . I :> d'd . . 11 supr)ort it in a war w1t 1 h uss1a, 1 Its 1 )est to provoke the \Vestern powe1s wou t . . . . . . . . h ._ . . ve that war an d t lms mvo 1 d Great Bntam and France 111 rt a.gamst. t en wtlJ. Th us . . . cJjna 1 Turkev went f:ar Ln dec1 o the issue of war and peace for Gdeat Bntarn and . . ' cJj to ts ,.vn national interests. Great BntaHl an F rance had to France accor ng 1 0 c] an accept tha t decJSI even tJ1ough their. national mterests di not requrre war with . . . . . Russia and d1ey had almost succeeded m preven:mg 1ts O~ttbreak. The) had s_urrendered tJ1eir freedom of action to a weak aLly. wb1ch used Its control over tl1err policies for Hs own purposes.
. \li

11ere ltt u on!~ "ay. that the glory of taki 11recl b\ tl11 Jtility that rcs11l ts frorn tl' o n~ tov,~s. and winning battles is to b . . ' . e arms. u1a\ lmng si mrne to the coun<:ils se vtc:tones v tones that brino, honour tme~. . t<: tL . o1a natron . To . 1, o o ne a W ln glory or a _gc>JJC'ral, anti of an army. . . . ut the gIow of a n c\ ),lttle, to take a town 's the . . . " u she proposc ~s. to Iter mte rcst anu her stre th th ' atlon IS lo proportion the ends , and t 1 VJgour she exerts toboth . ; e means e ng propost"s, 1c si crnp1 to the ends heoys 7

The Armed Forces Are the Instru:num.t of Foreign Poli.cy, Not Its Master No successful and no peaceful foreign policy is possible 'vithout observance of this rule. No nation can pursue a policy of compromise with the military determining the ends and means of foreign policy. The armed forces are instruments of war; foreign policy is an instrument of peace. It is true that the ultimate objectives of the conduct of war and of the conduct of foreign policy are identical: Both serve the national interest. Both, however, differ fundamentally in their im mediate objective, in the means they employ, and in the modes of thought they bri ng to bear upon their respective tasks. The objective of war is simple and unconditionaL to break the -..vill of the enemy. Its methods are equalJy simple and unconditional: to bling the greatest amount of violence to bear upon the most vulnerable spot in the enemy's armor. Consequently, the military leader must think in absolute terms. H e li,es in t11e present and in the immediate future. The sole question before hi m is how to ''~n victories as cheaply and quickly as possible and how to avoid defeat. The objective of foreign policy is relative and conditional: to bend, not to break, the will of the other side as far as necessary in order to safeguard one's own vital interests without hurting those of the other side. The methods of foreign policy are relative and conditional: not to advance by destroying the obstacles in one's way, but to retreat before them, to circumvent them, to maneuver around them, to soften and dissolve them slowly by means of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure. In eo~,. sequence, the mind of the diplomat is complicated and subtle. It sees the issue Ill

To surrender tl1e conduct of foreign affai t .. 'l) .,. rcompronllSe and thus surre rs 0..Lt1 mtlttarv then, .ts to destrov . 1e the poss1 I tty o cl ,, n er ure cause 0 f h , mind knows how to operate bet\veen the ab 1 t f . peace. T e militarv . so u es o v1 ctory a d d ~ , noth ing oJ that patient intricate and su btle m . f n e eat. It knows aneuvenng 0 di 1 , h puq)ose is to avoid th e absolutes of victory and cl f cl P om,tcy, w ose main the middle ground of negotiated comi)romise A f~ e~t an 111 eet the other side on . . JCY tarv men accordina to the ru les of the miJjt . orergn I10 1 c:ond uct ecl 'bYmu J0 ; aryart can on lyendin w f .. h prepare for is what we shall get."S ar. or w at we For nations conscious of the potentialities of m 0 d c . em must be the I . 10re1gn po1. . Foreign policv must be cond war.dpeace h f t 1elr goal o ICies. t . ; uc e m sue a \V as to av make the preservation of peace possible and not make th b ak 'r bl e. 1n a society mev1ta of sovereign nations military r0 . e out re o war . . ' I' rce IS a necessary mstrument of foretgn policy. Y the instrument of forei!m policy should t b ' et c . . . o no ecome th e master of 1 gn pohcy. As war is fought in order to m"ke peace poss1'bl r 0re1 . . " e, rore1 gn p~hcy should be .conducted m _o rd~r to make peace permanent. For the performance of both tasks, the subordination of the military under the civilian authorities which are constitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs is an indispensable prerequisite.

The Government Is the Leader of Public Opinion, Not Us Slave Those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy will not be able to comply v.ritl1 the foregoing principles of diplomacy if they do not keep this principle constantly in mind. As has been pointed out above in greater detail, the rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational. This is bound to be particularly true of a foreign policy whose goaJ is compromise, and which. therefore, must concede some of the objectives of d1e other side and ghe up some of its own. Especially when foreign policy is conducted under conditions of democratic control and is inspired by the crusading zeaJ of a political religion, statesmen are al~ays tempted to sacrifice the requirements of good foreign policy to the applause of the masses. On the other hand, the statesmen who would defend the integrity of tllese requirements against even the slightest contamination 'vith popula: pass~on wo~Jd seal his own doom as a political leader and, witlt it, the door~ o~ Ius foretgn policy, for he would lose the popular support which put and keeps lum 10 ~wer. The statesman then is allowed neitl1er to surrender to popular passwns nor disregard them. H~ m us~ strike a prudent balance bet\.,.een adapting himself to

11 2

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

ea<.:<: JTI II"l

MORGENTHAU I THE FUTURE

I . 1port of his polic:its In "' ''<" d. lH lllu~t 1 them and tll:trshaling tll<' 111 10 1C sl~'l t 1 ttlo!-.llla ll 'iltil> trirnnr11 rg lw. '>ails to tl . . . I . I . rh est ea 0 s . ~ . I( l<.'ad. 1le musl peri O l l htl ug . I t- J ctr rv tlw sl11p lo tl p t o( ~<,od 1( , tll . I . .. whil<' usmg t tCtrl < ' 1 r\\ind!> of poptl ar p.L 'iston I I t. 11,- ' zig'l-<J~' a ccJII nc. " l'ign poIit) , on I10W(~ v._ r rount a >Oil u ,..,

OF DIPLOMACY

CONCLUSION
. irt. . tl peace wIHCI1 w,. havt' outl i11r d <:aJII Int C'll111p!'lc in inc;J> ' The: road to tntem.ttiOilc . I I 1 ci ll'llinr1 fcmn11 lac that lo1 a <c ntnry and a : anc n . I. . . Wl'tl1 the. sunJ'> e f .as veay world. Tll<:'n' J'> so111d I11.11g SJ1t'cta<:utional qua 1t1es . _ f'! 1 1 amna11on o a war ' half11aV<' nrcc l 1c un t; f r . I tllat with one swec M'<ms to dispose' of tk p . I . 11ic.: lty o a tor n" a . I I I1C ra d13 sunJ Jar in t . . . II Tl . 1as bee 11 the- promise of Sll<' 1. . o ut io11s as fre1 . r onC'Cand lm .l . liS 1 I I pro ble n1 of wa t . llm..:ve securi ty, uni v< rsa soeia iSIII, i 11 ter ' to ......~, . . l>JtJ.at 1011 tlisanllamcn I' state The re is nothmg spcdat11lar, !ascinat trade, ar , . ent a c t 1 wor u . 1 . . . 11 1 11 11 nat10na govcllll ' r . t hrge in the busiii< o! <1tplotlla<.:y. 'SS . . , 1t least 1or t 1C peop 1 a < l e ' 111 ng, ' fn g, or lliS P . ,ver th at tl1 solutions, inso far us they deal with esc We have rnade t1 point, 1 te towc , I .."' oms, t I not mere y with some of .its SYl npt11 I presu pposc .,..H'Iexisthe real problclrl ant '. . .. . .. t'10nl soci e~v wh1ch act ua y < ocs not cx1 1 o >ruw st. . . of an integratccI mtPrna ... ; o lcrH C ng, acc:ommodating 1 an .11 tern atoml society andketT>itinbeicl lllc . . . . ' . . into exjstenc.:e sue 1 I I r om<st1c soc1ety .tnd 1ts '. .,. . te<:hnic] IIC of UIP1 S omac.y are re quired. As the Jlltegration. o I . . r tl e spcctacular and al most unnotiecd clay-by-t ay operations peace deve Iop I rom 1 1111. I. . I I r. c of t IIC' teeI1mqut:s o f ac:c"'mt-.-.(>c.l:~tion and chanue. so. the u tun ale 1 ea o lnter'' " < n . . . a11r , . ts nat1on uc--tl 1at rs, I<> trms'end itself in a supranatJon al soecty- must awa1 t 1 ' '" rcali;.-.ation fro 111 the techniques of persuasion. negotiation, and pressure, which are the traditional instruments of diplomacy. . The reac.ler who has followed us to this point may well ask: But has not diplomacy failec.l in preventing war in the pao;;t? To that legitimate question two answers can he given. . . . DipJoma<.:y has failed many times, and it has succecclecl many tun~s, 111 1ts peace-preserving task. It has failed sometimes because nobody wan t~d ~t to sut:ceed. We have seen how different in their objectives an cl me thods the l1 mLteu wars of the past have been from the total war of our time. Whe n war was the normal activity of kings, the task of diplomacy was not to prevent it, but to bring it ahout at the most propitious moment. . On the other hand, when nations have used diplomaey f()r the purpose~ ol preventing war, they have often succeeded. The outstanding example of a successful war-preventing diplomacy in modem times is the Congress of Be rlin of 1878. By the peaceful means of an ac<.:ommodatiug diplomacy, that Congress settled , or at least made susceptible of settle ment, the issues that had separated Great Britain and Russia since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. During the bette r part of the nineteenth century, the conffic:t between Great Britain and Russia over the BaJkans, cl1c Dardanelles, and the Eastern Mediterranean bung li ke a suspended ~word over the ~ ~f the world. Yet, during the fifty years fo11owing the Cri mean War, though hostiUties between Great Britain and Russia threatened to break out time and again, they never attually did break out. The main credit f()r the preservation of
L

gt~l collar l<dn rirjl iC ol' a 11 at:<:Oifllnod-t' d' I :S p tile C lllt)4n '""II lkrli n. Whctr Brili-;1, Pri mc. ,vaJ nt~ler 'P.rOIIIa<:ywltidt c.:uhninat<:d \A~ '.n~ D ~r . . 111 I 1 cnc~s lo I .o11c 011 < clcd~1 rcd with pride: tl . t h - a<.: 1 returned fro1 that n 1 ,., C() I f' I I . la C: W<t\ hrinv t I .. th ho1 a or. In .11'1 w 1ad l>r<)IJght I)cac:e: fc)r lat . l')tng 1omc peace ... 1 1 "" " J a..., !we 1 1111 var 1 JCtw<c Cr<:al Is n r1 . d er generaliCm<;. l O<J; r10 r a centurv " 't , R . 1 t Il er" <I d ll IISSta " \ Vc have J.m, r, cr ntognizcd the precarious , . .f . . ign natio11s .I I 11' co11l . 11 i11 g Sll <:(e~s of dip le ,.. ncss o peace.: tn . s<X;H;ty Cl f sov111 . a c re lt..a<.:y 10 preserving ... , d d . WC' !la"< \rcll "JlOII extrar>rdinarv Jlloral att'J . t 11 ' al pe:acc < n ~. :pc a.'> ' " m t e<.:tu rtualir , t1 11 1 leading part ictpattl!. 1 11 11~l pos~<;sc;. A llli-;lakc in tl e . al . 1 tes tal a l 1 e . . . I cv tnculs 0 f. naliCJII.t I powtr, 111atIt I> one: or tl 1 other of tl uation. of one of the elt-y e I .,. 1 l C: C:a( mg Iif ('I'<'JI(;( >t'I W('(' II pta<.: e: anu war. So ma)' an .... d. 1 . '\ta t C:S in(ll . may SJclllllc ( ) 'I' powe ac.:<.:t tn l sp01 tng a plan or a r ca1 1 o.n. cu at1 . Dij11 omac:y ~~ tiK hcslneatl!'. of p re:scrvincr pea<.:e \''1 I . . . .. . ,.., ' 1lt: l a sot:tety o1sovcretgn nations ha~ to offe r, b11L, espcctally under the <:onditions .,f,.0 t Id _ . . . . ' ... 11 emporary "vor po 1 itics and of conle ~p<>r ary war, .Ills not good enough. It is only when nations lmv<' surrendered L lughe r <.1 11lhonty the means of <.lestru<.:tion whi<:h rMdc techuoloa ;rn ogy h<<; put i11 th eir hands- when they have given up their soverei~nty-lhat inte:rL national p<-> ilC <:an be ~~ t<~Ue <'i sct:ure as domestic peace. Diplomacy <.:an make (; L peace more: secu r: t!.tLn 1t rs today. and the world state can make; peaec: more set:ure than it would be if nutions were to abide by the rules of diploma<.:\'. Yet, as the:re can be no permanent peace without a world state, there:: can he no ,~orld stale without the peace-prcse:rving and community-building prcx:esscs of diplomacy. For tltc world state to be ll1 than a dim vision. the accommodating proce ses of diploorc macy, mitigating anc.l minimizing conflicts, must be revived. \\11atcvcr one's conception of the ultimate state or in ternational affairs may he, in the rcx:ognition of that need a11d in the de mand that it be met all men of good \\.ill can join.

11 3

NOTES
l. We by no mcans intend to give here an exhaustive account of rules of ruplomacy. We propos1 to dis<:uss on ly those which seem to have a special bearing upon thr contempo rary situation. 2. "War." Essays of \Villiam Cralwm Sumner ( 1ew Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
1934), Voi.I.pp. IC:>9fl'. . . . ~ . .. 3. F:dmund 13urk<.!, "H<111arks on the Polic:v of the AI lie!~ w1th Respect to Franee ( l t93 1 Works, Vol. IV (Boston: Little. Brown at~d Compan~' 1889), P 447.

1'he Fedemlist. No. 6. . . .. . \ l 169 0 1 11 ~Edmuud 13urke "Spee;ch on the Conciliation wtth Amenca, loc. cri.. , 1 11 .. , ' ' . ~ Speech 0 11 Conc.:iliation w1th the Co1 . .. ( 1- 7,...) The Wm*~ urclmwul Bu,-,.;e. \ o . omes 1 <> 'J (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1865), P 140 , b . C b d Univcrsitv 1 7. Bolit1gbmke:fi De.fc11se of the 'freaty of Utrecht (Cam ne gc: am n ,ge ' Prtss. 1932). p. 95. 8. William Crahan1 Stumwr, op. cit., p. li3.
4. .S. 6.

OFFM ANN I THE USES AND LIMITS

OF INTERNATIONAL U\W

The uses and Limits of

International Law
STANLEY HOFFMANN

111 ust
mi sp

'

J\\

. a1 I 10 f 111t mation aw " ,1 extmines its . functions in the present dent o e d . . 1 r ern IJolicy' of The stu states \\1ll, unl ess he lakes refu ae in . t ti al system an m tne ,oreib. m em a on . r. a1n. that the pure theorv o{' Iaw once pro,ided be th fortinO' seclusion ,rom re 1' ; e corn b f ...,tu~ s He will becom e a cvnic, il- 1 c1 scs to stress, 'like 1e wo reduced to one o tl ree alll ce 1 '.I , . ~ 1 Gat the waY in wlu.ch leg<u cl,ums. ell.e s1. ed to support 1.1p Cir.mdotLx m1 wer at t le es. 0 . I al . . r . d s seful or necessarv on non eg g10 uncIs. 01 1 I1e gets fas. an)' position a state eem u . . b' ti of cacophony and silence th at<:1 acten. ern ahonal 1ar zes mt 1 comf cinated by t le maldon blic order. He will become a h)pOciite. if he chooses to law as a S)'Stem o wor pu
J

e IlOW convergmg e ffiort destined to lead to some such system end.owed \nt h suffictent . . . stability and solidity, or else if he endorses one pruti~uJ~ constmctto 1 n. (t 1at of his own s~tesmen) as a privileged and enlightened contnbut10n to the ach ievement of such a system . He ,\il l be overcome by cons~e ma~on. if~~ ~ reflects upon ~1e gap between, on the one hand, the ideal of a world 111 wh1ch traditional self-h elp w1ll be at least moderated by procedures and rules made even more indispensab le by ~~ proliferation both of states and oflethaJ weapons, and, on the other hand, the realities of inexpiable conflicts, sacred egoisms, and mutual recriminations... . 1. Some of the functions of international law constitute assets both f or the policy maker and from the viewpoint of world order, i.e ., of providing the international milieu with a fram ework of pre dictability and with pro ced ures for the transaction of interstate business. (a) International law is an instrument of communication. To pre sent one's claims in legal tenns means, 1, to signal to on e's partne r or opp onent which "basic conduct nonns" (to use Professor Scheinman's exp ression) one considers relevant or essential, and 2, to indicate which procedure s one intends to follow and would like the other side to follow. At a tim e when both the size of a highJy heterogeneous international mHieu and the imperatives of prudence in the resort to force make communication essent ial and often turn international relations into a psychological contest, interna tional law provides a kind of common language that does not amom1t to a common c:ode of legitimacy yet can serve as a joint frame of reference . (One
. .

. . . .ona1 e1'tl1er tJ e conflicting inte'lJretations and uses o f 1 bv states as a aw rati 1ze som 1

Reprinted b d . Y~nnJsSJon fJrom lntenwtional Law and Political Crisis edited by Law ~thoa..,,dandWilkinson. eels.. pp. x:i-xix. Copyright 1968 by Uttle. Brown and Companrence Scheinm an y (Inc.). Portions 0 e text all footnotes have been omitted. 114

no guaran tee agaitl\t ndm tl 1 r,tJJCr side's res rJonse to tl cmg comn umc.:ated ntay we I I dcter,e message rr.. .. "th en ,ul un<.l(.m.tandin g of the situat th . we com IOn at t1 atens t~ . mun icate to 1 or goa b- h kc 0 11 r in ternretation of th . S1re l' c war tn outh v t tell )a'>H.: values aggrt'SSiOn-there wi JI be no J t frat n f r .Oin le nam a,<; cas of e o re.ercnce at all d a r e h corrqwlitioi t may be<:om e fiercer. ) an m act l t: (h' Inhmational law affords mems of cl . < . umneL contiu:t r cJ . mg inevitable tensions and clashes from the e rt t r 'J' _--o 1'er tm r so o rorce \\ h 1 g hav e bee n str ong ind epende nt reasons for a .cli . d en~ ver l lere . . 1 . mte rnatJOna svs tem m which the superpowevot ng arme conflict-in an , . r ." ~ . , . rs m parttcu1 1 e excelle nt reasons Ot manag mg them confrontation s eithe b k ar .lav . . . r v eepmg them non\10by usmg proXIes-inte rnational law has pr'o d len t, or cl t tJ1 . 1b r . t . r . e w1 )Oth ,11 IS 01 snunrung LOrce and wtth altematves t vl 1 s atesmen 1 . 1 both the So'1ets and the West shar)ed their moves no \10 ence... . In1Berlin . . ' 1 suc.:h a way as to eave to the other s1de_ f~ll res_pon sibiUty for a first use of force, and to ~void the kind of frontal colhs10n \:vtth the oth er side's legal claim that could have obl iged the opp~n ent t_o reso~ to force in order not to lose power or face . Tl1Us, today as m earlier penods , law can indeed... se1ve as an alternative to confrontation whenever states are eager or forced to look for an altemathe . 2. I nternationallaw also plays various useful roles in the policy proces s, which ho.,.vever do not ipso facto contribute to wo rld order. He re, we are concemed with law as a tool ofpolicy in the competition of state,isions, objectives, and tactics . (a) The establishment of a network of rights and obligations, or the res ort to legal argum ents can be use ful for the protection or enhancement of a position: if one wants to give oneself a full ran ge of means with which to buttres sa threatened status quo (cf. the present position of the \Vest in Berlin; this is also what tre aties of alliance frequently are for ); if one wants to enhanc e ones power in a way that is demonstrably authorized by principles in interna tional law (cf. Nasser's claim vvhen he nationalized tl1e Suez Canal, and Suk arno's invocation of the principle of self-detennination against ~lala~-sia) ; if one wants to restore a political position badly battered by an adversary's mo ,e, so that the resort to legal arguments becomes part of a strategy of restori ng the status quo ante (\iVestem position during the Berlin blockade: Ken nedy's strategy during the Cuban missile crisis; Westem powers attempts during the first phase of the Suez crisis; So. .iet tactics in the US . General Ass embly debates on the flnru1cing of peace-keeping operations). (b) In all those instru1ces, policy makers use law as a wa~r of putting pressu re on an opponent by mobili:ing international support be~lind_ ~e .~egal ~es invoked: law serves as a focal point, as the tool for ..intemationalizing a na~ ~nal interest and as the cement of a political coalition. States that ma~ ha,e_p olitical misgivings about pledging direct support to a certain power 'vhose mt e~ only pattJy coincide wit h theirs, or because they do not want to ant agoruze er tl1ereby, mav find both . 1d l"""ful to rallv to the defense ailO ther pow tt eas1er ai ...... . nciple in ' mamtenan v v of a legal pn whose ce 0 1 promotion the. ma, ha,e a stake.
<

l'H : r rc:me tnh ~r 1 that cor n . . ' ' muntcation 1 Cjtt lOn . and 2. that what is h . ~

115

lH1

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUl:.Nl..~

HOrFMANN I THE USES AND

b0 1 ores international la'' i<~ .-' tl1 e field < f . (C) A polk~ maker w gn gai-rnanipuJation optn t h (lPl)Onents , l t11roug1 e . 1or political-competattOn.d s one of tJ1e nu mer(lls 1 ~shoard.y 0n ri\ctlS. lntemational Jaw pr0\1 e which state contests occur. t 1. tJ1at to the statesmen iut rn aticmal la w IY t1115 10 dicates no on ' a guide for action. l11tl a).,o that tl1is tnol 3. Ob' ious h tb;n 'd nstrument rat er I . prova es an ' J rt to it wou.ld hamper t 1<: slat< s interest as is often not used. w Jen reso de fined b~. the policv maker. . ntemationallaw often serve-~ a' <1 techni<jue of .1 1 . . (. ) One of the reasons w 1~ a .. . .s th appeal of reciprocan.: ) ou mmt suppoti mv invoJj ca1 01obilizahOn a e ; . po ti . vou the be 1 agamst 1,-m. because if , let cl . mle I I .\10lated at mv cation of the ru e a b . . . . . . , be breached at yours; an we ol .l la\ c an mterest e>.'TlPilSC som eda} tt ma} . . ':'- ' . ., B t rermrocity cuts both ways: .\1)' u mg a certam legal m tts presen-atJon. u ~r 1 ,. case auainst him ma, encourage 11m, now or later an!Ument to buttress m, o l r b . ' tooresort to tJ1e same argument against me' I mav t 1ere1ore e umVJse to play f 1u criven on a c hessboard u1 ' vt.'ch , 0- the solemn and.abstract nature o legal rights . . . and obugations. I mar not be able to make the kind of distinction between my { good} case and your (bad) one that can b_es~ be made by resort to ~cl hO<:, litical and circumstantial e,idence that a melenu1t or ruled out m legal s ~mentation. Thus ... during the Cuban crisis, when the united States tried to distinruish between So"iet missiles in Cuba and American ones in Turke, in order to build its c:a.se and get support, America's use of the OAS {Org~ization of American States] Charter as the legal basis for its "quarantine~ established a dangerous pre<:edent which the So,iets could use some dav. against the U.S. or its allies. on behalf of tl1e \\ arsaw Pact. And in the ~gioomedy of the battle over Article 19 of the {..;. ;\. Charter. one reason why the li.S. 6na1Jv climbed down from its high legal horse and ga,e up the attempt to depri,'e the SO\iets of their right to vote. unJess they paid their share, was the growing awareness of the peril which the principle of the exercise of the U.;\. ta\ing power by the General Assembly could constitute some day for the United States if it lost control of the Assembly. (b) One of the things that international law "communicates" is the solemnity of a commitment: a treaty, or a provision of the Charter, serves as a kind of tripwire or burglar alarm. \\7hen it fails to deter, the victim and third parties have a fateful choice between upholding the legal principle by aU means, at the oost of a possible escalation in violence, and choosing to settle the ~~te more peacefully, at the cost offu=.=.ing the Legal issue. For excellent poli~cal reasons, the latter course is frequently adopted ... in the form of droppmg any reference to the legal principle at stake .... {c) The \"ery ambiguity of international law which in manv essential areas ~lays either gaping holes or conflietin~ principles, all~ws poli'?' ~m _ emergency to act as if international law were irrelevant-as tf an it were neather a restraint nor a guide....

UMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

I')

4. Tlw 1 "' L lo le:gal anrurncnts IJy 1 . p<J ICV mak 10 1 b worltI o~n I('r 1/ti(L f hPrehy counterp d ' . t;r<; ~ Y <:; detrirrumttll i f) ro .ur..tH.;e f or th arg111nc Ill\. J' e 'Ylate that ur,(;cl such (a1 j 11 the k:gaJ V(l(;lJ 1J m C>r COn f 1 . I IJ.\ton Wrtt<:h pr<: ,~ .1 . . tates a<; 111trma war or th<: 11 c;e o f c . L ' al s m ~rea.s a.s vital to . J OrC<:. eacn st t . t . . . duct \.tt I1 le~al rationalization., -rh" . . a<: ne~ tr1 JU t tf- it!. con<, . . -- resut iS a)(j cl r . . ') 1 and cmmterrlrmn<>, who!>e: C<JOS"ot1e . n ~c11latwn of clailn.t " 1 nc:e, m turn i botl 1 . 1 r tion of antemattonal law and a "cr\;;Ua 1 atv ga .. ' th a 11rtl,er devalua, ,JbJ 1 statt-!\ \o\ ho ltave de:bar,ed tl ,. P at e expenS<: c,f th(,\f= 1.., <:urren<. . America' y ath . . . resort to higldy de:batahle legal argurle t t !> r er tndascnrninatc: 1 n s supjXJrt 1~ \ .. ~ . . case an pomt. fh e unsuhtle redu<.t iun f . t . s tetnam pok-y ts a o m emationaJ law to house of convenient ex post justifkations (as in the cas . .a. m~rt: storetion at Su<:z, or A merican interventions . S e ?f Bnh<;h mtervt:nan , anto 0 ommgo a11 d v t undermines the w pretensc of contnLl ti to ::.ry Id a namJ e I. u ng wor order w'th h. h 1 these statt:s ltavt tritd to justify thtir unilateral a<.-ts. w ae: (b) \lluch of <:Ontemporarv international law a th . ~ . . .~ .. ~ . u onze~ states to zncrease I 1 t1e1r r>ower. Jn t11s connection. ~asser's naticral fth S ' 1 12a0 on o e . ut:Z Canal Company was probably quatc legal, and those who accc:pt tht rather tortured argument put forth by the State Department legal advisers to ti'fv th . . JUS e Cu ban "quarantmc.. have wncIuded that thio; partial bLv.Jcad thon7.eu " .1 . . u.~ e \\."35 au by the OAS Charter and not in contradiction with the U..:..; . Charter. y,e t t t.S a ob\~Ous that a full exploitation by all states of all permissions granted b> international law would be a perfect recipe for chaos. (c) Attempts to enforce or to strengthen intemational/au;. far from c.:on.sol.idating a ~~tern of desirable restraints on state (mis 1behmior, m~ ac-tua.Uv backfire if the politi(."a] conditions are not ripe. This is tlle central lesson of th~ long story of the financing of u S . peace-keeping operations. American selfintoxication \o\~th the importanc.-e of the rule of law. fed by misleading analogjes between the U.~. Charttr and the u.S. Constitution. resulted u.ltimately in a weakening of the influence of the \Vorld Court 'which largely foUow d .-\.mere ic:a's Hne of reasoning), and in an overplaying of America's hand during the "non-session" of the General Assemblv in the faH of 1964 and \'rinter of 196.?.

Jl7

(J

selected H not mean that one will forgo legal rationalizations of the JnO\ es

m does action. iDtemationallaw does~ in a crisis, really restric-t ones freed~m

~~~ ~there is a legal chessboard for state eompetition.

ere~ come to the last set of considerations about the role of l,a\v:

These are sobering considerations. But what they tell us is not. as so many political scientists seem to believe, that international law is, at best, a farce, and. at worst, even a potential danger; what they tell us is that the nature of the il1ter 1Ultional sy.stem condemns intemationa/lau; to all the u;eoknes.<;es and pen;enions that it is so eas y to deride. International law is merely a magnll)ing mirror that reflec-ts faithfully and crutlly the essenc-e and the logic of international politics. In a ~agmented world, there is no "global perspective- from v.hich anyone c~ a~tbor atatively assess, endorse, or reject the separate national efforts ~ making mternationallaw serve national interests above all. Uke tlle somber umverse of A .lbert Camus' Caligula. this is a judgele s world where no one is innocent.: . The permanent plight of international law is that nO\'' as before, lt shows on.tts body of rules all the ~cars inflicted bv the international state of v.ar. The tragt-d~ of contemporarv international Jaw is that of a doubJe di\"'r<.-e: first. between the old . of libera] dreaJ~ of a world rule of law, and the realities of an international system

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES li S PART I ANARCHY

tl ~, ten to become Jlla,iur <;: mphes; seco d multiple minidramas that always H~eqa uirernents of mode rat 11111 which in the ~ ' <:tr. . .. l cIteam . 1d the new J ggest a down -pla!JIII{!. oJ 1 ormal law in tl aJ bctwe(;'n the ok 1e . rtl1e present system1 su upuraclin{!. ol, more fl e:-.1.11 L' l(e Illll(lues, unrl 1 J . . cumst<ulces o I I! r I . b al d wJr ISsues, anu Tl e interest of internatiOJHt t\\ or t 1e l)O)iti caJ realm o peace-an - ' . . ne . b 1 less 6erce. 1 I1as eco . no better way of grasping the conlllllJJng clifferenc:~;:s tl1e syste1~1 scientist 1s that t~le~e ~ national soci~t')' and the fragile ordC'r of international d h n states use legal language symbols, and tlot:u. between order WJU11ll afTairs than to study how an w e rnents. and with what results.

Jntern(Jtjonal Institutions: can Interdependence Work?

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

ti. J. . . nt To analyze world pol ities in the [current era] is to discuss 1 erna ona 1nstttutJons: . 18 rules that ~~vcrn elements of world poli~~s and the organizations that help ~ 1mplernent tl1ose ndes .... : Under what conditions should China be admitted to the World Trade Orgamzat1on (vvro)? How many billions of dollars does the Jnternational lv!.o~etary Fu.ncl (IMF) need at its disposal to remain an effective "lender of last resort for countnes such a'5 Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand that were threatened in 1997 with financial collapse? Will the tentative Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change be renegotiated, ratified, and implemented effectively? Can future United Nations peacekeeping practices-in contrast to the U~ fiascoes in Bosnia and Somalia-be made more effective? These questions help illustrate the gro\ving importance of international institutions for maintaining world order.... Superpowers need general rules because they seek to influence events around the world. Even an unchallenged superpower such as the United States wou ld be unable to achieve its goals through the bilateral exercise of influence: the costs of such massive "ann-t\,~sting" would be too great. International institutions are increasingly important, but they are not always successful. Ineffective institutions such as the United ~ations Industrial Development Organization or the Organization of African Unity exist alongside effectual ones such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the European Union. In recent years. we have gained insight into what makes some institutions more capable than others-how such institutions best promote cooperation among states and what mechanics of bargaining they use. But our knowledge is incomplete, and as the world moves toward ne\: fom~s o~ gl~bal regulation and governance, the increasing impact of intemat10nal mstltutions has raised new questions about how these institutions themselves are govemed.

THEORY AND REAUTY, 1919-89

Academic "scribblers" did not always haYe to pa~' much attention to intema~on~ institutions. The 1919 Versailles Treat')' constituted an attempt to cons!ru~t an mstitution for multilateral diplomacy-the League of Nations. But the reJection of the
ork?From Hol>crt 0 . Kcohane 1ntemational Instihltions: Can 111t C-dependenre r:W r Foreign PolictJ. ational Pcac:t> l ' pp. 82-94. 1998 by tJ1e Camegte End0\~1mut 10r n1em . ISSue # 110 (Spring 1998). Reprinteu with ptrmission.

119

..
120
PART I ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES J(fOHANE I INiER NATIONAL INSTTTUTIONS: CAN IN TERDEPENOENCE WQov. ,
1"\J\..

US S, . t , ensured that until \\'or!< ' \\ ' fl thl' lllOst L(';\guc Cowu ;lllt by tl~e ,, c:.;Jil~ '(: - f'roln the secret C crriiH \IIS~ia n deals or t . ti l , Ill \\'01' C po l lCS important nego tut Ol . r . I .., ' ~lllluc h cont erenc e-took place on :m ., ! . . basis. On)Y the 1920s tot1 19-> 1e r cJ d. , 45 (', I U . I Ntcn" was tOUJl e Ill 19 ' with strong support lrom the United . , ... ;uter t le 11llt'C t a 1 > f . 1 l 'ge 11 ,. 1 perfonni ng dJII<tcnt tasks 1 ., es d , 1 1 t\' > specw tZec a. '" , States and a mu tJp tCI l . rt'l sttl)stantial intcrnat1ou,1l tllention. u . . a1 n t' s begu1 to <:omm.. " mtemat1on mstl 1 lOll. no t [JO'''e rful state. !came toj 1d) increasin(11 y c. 1945] howe,er even t 1 1 H~ [Atter r-, : . _ ' . F.01 n the lute J960s onward, thC' Treat) on thr Non1 on internationalmst ltutiO\I~S. . U'e chief' vehicle (()r el'fotts to pr<'ve ntthe dan.,. . p ro L eratio f N clear\ eapons was 1 n u e d of nuc1 weapons. ,, \TO was not onlv the most succt>ssflll mu ltilate ral car ,, ge~'OUS spr ~ b .l h eneral, a allrluce m I11Story ul a so t e most hicrhl)' iJ1Stit11 tionalized. with a sec:re tmy-gr. n . l.fT d I b te rules goveming relatiO nS among nw tn1 .s. t' rom its )Ct perm~el~t st<4:..rutl1 e al otlra Urucnla\' Round that concluded in 1993, the General 9 founding ll1 1 I Jroug 1 1e o . r cl I rr -er, . cl Trade (c \Tf) presided over a senes o lra e roun<.s that Agreement on tatlns an ,, . . . ". b ". . JoJt tarifTs amon<r indusb1abzed countnes )' "P to 90 pe1cent, I 1ave reduced 1n 1 t:t . tl . . al t ade Af'ter a shakv start m ilie 1940s. 1e 1M I. 1 .I 1 t11e 1au- Jy boosting mterna 0 on r ust 1960s- become tJ 1 centorp1 ofeffi>1ts bv the maJor cap1ta. clemocrac1 to rege " ece . . . .es . .,rr.,;rs ex1ble 11 I ate tIle JI monetaJ). nllcu . When tl1al function anoph1ed wrtll the .onset of H 't L excIH 0 rates the 1970s. 1 1Jecam e tl1eir leadjng agent for finan<:mg and prom otuwe m . . ,.nt ;,... of mg econonuc de' e1op111"' ... A1iica' Asia and Latin America. The sheer number _ . inter-governmental organizations also rose dramatically -from about 30 m 1910 to rO in 1940 to more tban 1.000 by 1981. The exchange rate and oil crises of the early 1970s helpe d b~ing perce pti?ns in line with reality. Suddenly, both top policymakers and academ1 observers m the c United Stat~s ;ealize d tl1at global issues required systematic poJicy coordination and tl1at such coordination required institutions. In 1974, then se<..: retary of state Henrv Kissinger, who had paid little attention to international institutions, helped estabUsh the International Energy Agency to enable west ern countries to deal cooperative ly with tl1e threat of f11ture oil embargoes like the 1973 OPEC embargo of the Netherlands and United States. And the Ford administration sought to construct a new international mone tary regime based on H exible rathe r than pegged exchange rates. Confronted with complex interdepend ence and the efforts of states to manage it, political scientists began to redefine the study of international institutions, broadening it to encompass what they called ''intem ational regimes"-stru ctures of rules and norms tJ1at oould be more or less informal. The international trade regime. for example, diu not have strong fo rmal rules or integrated, eentralized management; ratl1er, it provided a set of interlockin g institutions, including regular meetings of the GAIT contr acting parties, formal dispute settlement arrangements, and delegation of technical tasks to a secre tariat , which gradually developed a body of case law and practice... . I~ the 1980s, research on intemational regimes moved from attempts to descn?e the phenomena of interdependence and intemational regimes to closer analysis of the conditions under whkh countries cooperate. How does cooperation occur among sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it? From ~e stan.dpoin.t o~ po.litical realism , botJ1 the reliance placed by states on certai n. mtemahonalmsntutions and the explosion in their numbers we re puzzling. Wh)
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I

.1

internatin!l.t! in~t itut inns <::xist tt . 11 ' a a t"S? Tllis qtwo.;ttot l S<.'<'med unanswenblc~ ifIll t'tworld dommated bv sovert:ign . . s t<~ '" .. < 1 . bove the state h11t not tl they were \i~;:wcms d uhons were seen as )osed to as . op1 or a ' . u ev1 to h 1 ces ' their objcc:ll,es. . e p states accomplish The new l"f'"''arc:l t 0 11 mtern aliuna l insft f l ali m- li te vi<'W that law <.:an be effe<.:tiv<:: reg:r~J ~ons f bro~~ decishely v..ith e~ll as with ti1C' id<'alism associ ated with the fi ~~~s 0 .P~Ilhcal c.:onditions- as we: . ted the asslllnpltons of' real ism aceepting th e us ongms 1nst ead, se1 t .1 . 1olars at[op ' a IC ative stat d tin<T interests wen key factors in world politics b t h e power an compe o I . f . ' u at l e same ti d . me rawmg new conclu sions about t 1e m luen<:e of institutions 011 th e proces .. s. Instituti . ,1te tJ1e capabd1ty fo r states to <:ooperate in muhl tlly b fi Cla1 ons <:re< < . . the costs of making mtd enfor<.:ingag reeme nts-w hat ecene .' ways b), lec]u<.:mg I' .. 1 ... 1 . onom1 'lC costs. T 1ey I ell e y engage m centralized enfor<:eme tstsfre er to as "tran s_ tion t f . . . the)' do renHorce pr..a<:t'tces. of re<:1pro<.:1.ty wh1ch provid .n .0 agreements. but .. r . . ' e mcentt..es 1 govern0r ments to keep the1r ovvn com rmtme nts to ensure that othe . 1 . . rs uo so as we U Even . Jowedul states have an mterest, most of the time, in following th 1 f . r 1 . . e ru es o we11 _ establi sI1ed mtern atlon a mstJtutlons, sin<:e general confonn1 to 1 tv ru es makes the behavior of other slates more predictable. This scholarship Jrew heavily on the twin concepts of uncertaintv and credibility. Theo rists incre asi_ngly recognized that the preferences of state~ amount to "private inform ation ''-tha t absent full transparency, states are uncertain about what their parb1ers and rivals value at any given time. They naturally respond to uncertainty by being less willin g to enter into agreem ents. since the, are unsure " how their pa1tners ,viJl later interpret the terms of such agreements. International institutions can reduce this un<:e1tainty by promoting negotjations in which transparency is encouraged ; by dealing "vith a series of issues o,er many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve future reputation; and by systematically monitoring the compliance of governments with their commitments. Even if a government genuinely desires an intemational agreement. it may be unable to persuade its partn ers tl1at it will, in the fuhtre , be "illing and able to implement it. Successful international negoti ations may tJ1erefore require changes in domestic institutions. For instance. without "fast-track" authority on trade. the United States' nego tiating prutn ers have no assurance that Con~ess "~1 re.frain from adding new provisions to trade agree ments as a comlition for .the1r r~tifica tion. Hence, other states are reluctant to enter into trade negotiations ":tl~ the United States since they mav be confronted. at the end of tortuous negotiations. 1 _~__ WJtI a redesigned agree ment less favorable to t1em than tJ1e wa ft tbev ini tialed 1 By the same token vvithout fast-hack authority, no promise by the U.S. g~vemk n1en t 111 to ab'1de bv negotiated tenns has muc1 eredib'l'".''' due to the presidents lac 1 of COntrol over Cong ress. . ili In short this nev., school of thought argued that, rather than unposmb emg 1 ' nd se ves on states, international institutions shoul d responcl t~ tJl e dema..... ;\' states . d the fo uncertrurh r COOperative \Vays to fulnll their own purposes. B~. ~educmgh't t. ns J et anstates al . ' J c .s 0 f' making :ost t ernattt)11' ms u 1o 1 1 . and enforcing agreements, m achteve co11ective gruns. . .
shoU Id

121

rrs coNSEQUENCES

I 22

PART I

ANARCHY AND

YESTERDAY'S coNTROVE

RS[f.S 1989- 95
.

K0 HN :E I i :'TER.'\ATIONAL INSTJTUTio . ~ NS: CA. rNTERo EPENDENq Woov,

fU\.:

thout jts critics. who f(x: :ceJ ei r atta<.:I<Js on . vas not \ \1 . 1 . Th is nev: institunona ISm ' gs F 1 st, the) claimed that mtct. n tJOllal institut1cm, r n three perc:eived shortcomm . . states wield the on.I\' rea 1>0\' t r in world 1-oI. . . . ficant smce feffo rts bv the Li:'\ or Ur..t't, w of .\:ation to k gm art' fu ndamentally msJ .. j wea ness o . I1asr~d thea ainst aggression by . gre~t powc::rs. am. they pointt'd bJ . itk~. They em~ 'b tors in in ternation al econontK organi:t..atic n adueve collective secun~ g J ~. cl ., J of maJor contn u . institutions were attnnute 1nore to tt honal . the dommant roe nt a t5 of these mtema. ., b k than to the institutions them elves. Hen<.:e, any euec at power ac ers . ffiorts ofthe1r gre ated. Of c'Ourse. great powers such as the L; nited e . . al This argument was overst ce ,\ithin intemation . 'tu tions. But t I1e nnlkit msti . fi uen .. 1 ~ . se Statcs exercl enonnous. m ~tutions are different from those that the Cnitecl State~ th b that emerge from ese msu agreement }' man} states IS necessary ed 1, t rall)' . \.Vhere f 1 fi . 1. would have adopt unua e f'~' ....: e even the United States nu.s 1t use u to compromise on . 1 d .. r al I Je for pohc:y to 1 e Je<:'uV . ecJsJcm-making } , tJ1e 'nstitutional seal of approv .. T .1ere10re, t 1e 1 . substance too Jtain - - ..1 . ' affect both pruu;uures and gener.al rules of international rnstitutions matte r. T 1ev fpoliG-v and the degree to which other states accept 1t. f h ,. th b the substan ce o .. ., The second countcrargument focused on anarc ~ : ~ ~ se nc~ ? a world government or effective international legal system to wh1ch VJC~1ms o.f tnj~Jstice c:an appeal. As a result of anarchy, critics ar~ed, states pre fer relatJVe gan~s (Le., doing better tJ 1an other states) to absolute gams. They seek to protect the1r power and status and will resist even mutually beneficial c:ooperation if their partners are likely to benefit more than they are. for instance, throughout the American -So,~et arms race, both sides focused on their relative positions-who was ahead or threatening to gain a decisive advantage-rather than on their own levels of armaments. Similar dynamics appear on c:ertain economic issues, such as the fierce EuroAmeri<:an oompetition {i.e., Airbus Industrie versus Boeing) in the production of large passenger jel~. Sc:holarly disputes about the "relative gains question" were intense but shortlived. ft turned out that the question needed to be reframed: not, "do states seek relative or absolute gains?" but "under what conditions do they forego even mutually b<!nefici.al cooperation to preserve their relative powe r and status?" When ther~ are ~nly two major players, and one side's gai ns may decisively change power relation~~lps, relative gains loom large: in arms races, fo r example, or monopolistic competition (as between Airbus and Boeing). Most issues of potential cooperation. ~owever, from trade l~beralization to climate change, involve multilateral negotia tions that make relatwe gains hard to calculate and e ntail little risk of decisive r)W~r shifts for one side over another. Therefore, states can be expected most of h.e time to seek to enhance their own welfare without being worried that others ~ .also make adv~nc:es. So the relative gains argument merely high1igJ1tS the diffic:u ~es 0 ndecoor<:ration where there is tough bilateral competition it does not by any . means u rmme prospects c ror cooperation in general. . . Th hi . e t rd obection to theones. of cooperation was less radical but more endur J Th . 't . mg. eortsts of C()( ar10 h cl 1 emerges out of W:~ ~ a recognized that cooperation is not harmonious: 'r an takes place through tough bargaining. Nevertheless,

the, daJ d ctt thl p<Jte:ntial Joint u . f -:>runs rom such . ~h . . .<-'OO{>(::ration explained the dramattc 11 r es I!'J e number and S(;()pe of <:oo perah,e multilateral instituti Critics pom tPU rnt, however, that barg . . ons Id a.Jllln u problem 5 . achie,;ng JC . 11~ '!Gt.Jm. f or in tance wh~....L otb e K\'Otc pcou produce obstacles to . ewer . agreemeut '" (~uc:c;tHmable in part he<.~use de\.E:: 1 . J <:rotocol wtll lead to a global . opmg . . h . . .. . :nuntnes refused to accept bincling )umts c,n t c1 r emrss1ons and the {.j S S . . ts . . . not <.:ont<unmg such enate declared 1 un.,,illmgness to . an', . agreement ratlfv . (;{JffimJtments b . cl . I . k d .. . . h' d . ) E:\ e opmg oountries. des Both s1 sld. e out tough bargaining positi ons. m en ne: ef[l0 rts at credible c Ito f these bargaining probl :omth promise. As a resu bt erns, 1' fatt that pos51 deals . cl . could e . produc:e J<>ln~ ~(1Jns oes not assure that cooperative sol . tactic of political actors and the info rmation th . h uti~ns "ill be reachecl The e' ave.available abo ut one another are both ke, aspec.-ts of a process that does not nec:essan ,. ead t . 11 0 tutions rnav help pro,ide "foc.:al points~ on \11h' h <.:ornpetinu cooperation. l nstiIC ' o ne,... issues often lack such institutions. In this <.:a.se, both the ~<:tors may rurree, but pace and the extent of cooperatjon become more problematic.
J

12.3

TODAY'S DEBATES
The general problem of bargaining raises specific issues abo u t ho" . . mstitutlons . . a1 . . c afrect ~nternation . nego~atJ.o ns, which always involve a mixture of discord and ~o~ent1~ coopera~~n. Thmking about bargaining leads to concerns about subjectiVIty, smce bargrumng depends so heavily on the beliefs of the parties involved. And th e most Fundamental question scholars wish to answer concerns effectiveness: \Vhat structures, processes, and practices make international institutions more or less capable of affecting policies~and outcomes-in desired \\<l\ 'S? The impact of institutional arrangements on bargaining remains pu;linu. \\'e plorations of bargainunderstand from observation, from game theor: . and from ex ing in a variety of contexts that outcomes depend on more than the resources aqtiJable to the actors or the pay-offs they receive. Institutions affect bargaining patterns in complex and nuanced ways. Who, for example. has authority over the agenda? In the 1980s, Jacques Delors used his authority as head of the European Commission to struc:ture the agenda of the European Community, thus leading to tJ1e Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. What ,oting or consensus yoto Conference. arrangements are used and who interprets ambiguities? At the K agreement on a rule of "consensus did not prevent the conference chair from ignoring objections as he gaveled through provision after pro\ision in the final session. Can disgruntled participants block implementation of fonnally ratified agreements? In the GATT, unti l 1993, losers could prevent the findings of dispute r~solution panels from being implemented; but in the \\TO, panel reco~menda llons take effect unless there is a consensus not to implement them. Asking such questions svstematical ly about international institutions may well yield significant . ' new insights in fu ture years. Institutional maneuvers take place ''~thin a larger ideological context that helps c., denne which purposes such institutions pursue and w h' h pr.actices the, find accept. . ' JC able. The Mandates System of the League of Nations depended m part on specific

I ~.a

PART I

ANAKl .Hr

NIIV " "" - - .

K0H ANL / 1 I LRNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CAN I 1\ .

, fitnchunenlal wa.-; till' 1 mderstan'' ,11 t hut tne>t"t. 1 institutional :1rmn~ctll< s. 11011 _p: 11 ropcan pcnp t lcceptable.UJng N l t: ut ru 1 uvct c 11 thtt l.ontit lltt'C I ~tlrOJ>L Eu r<>J 1eans c:on L I'C:'I11'\ ' ' ,l ,.nnate after ~I o . l E ,. 1 1c ..,, .tc.m of rult '' ' u ropt. at1~ over Inon- ,cu... following \\ ,orJ< ' ,, r , ... . ' . . , I ; n , t le 15 , , , <:olltjJSt' of that t'Onscnsus < uJ ~ h.011 .11instilulions <:r >nl m 1 'nnationul st ' . .. 1 1 s ol intema ' . . rue. The.' p1'0C'Cdut es .tm ru e . . . are acce Jtabk a~ t11{' b,lsts (or redu,,. 1 .. . . , 1hat [JnllCl p 1 es .. . . '-ltlg IctcJJlllll<.l " h1 rt'S. Thev < .. . . I I . ' cnunc.rtt,u, ~'ctions are legllliH<lt<.' <' r 11 1 ~.tu nate. Conse. , ctmflil'ts ;uld w 1 tet gu . T'S. ex xct-ations. for instan ce. I ra< I< c(n.lltcts arc increas. et tjuent k they help sh<~pt> <tc:to { l. teson (T in the \\1'<>--pronu:-:ing tough action o ' . . itttrly 1itmlhzecl Ill .'t P'oce~;s. o pw. ,,; 1tt1 oin c uasi-Judicial cltsputc resolution pro""n . r- 1 dustnes eug1 c 5' 111 . --c behalf of ones own .bl ."-"tnl)lainint1 about defeat wlwn necess;uy. Ther . . o e Imnung neto" 1fpossl r. 0 1 "v rnstitutionaUzcd prCX:t'!>SC. usually releg tte dure . c ' b. .,.,,, 1 1 d ~1 y ut re!!\1 1 " is much sou ne an ." . ' . 1:' es'51 lustitutions there b' ('rent e di Fk'rentia.t'e,l -011 . 1 1t ramat1c e~v' ' conID et to 1:1 rea 111 0 .. 1< t et t]l"' lanmtat1e directed tow;U'C] ..outsiders.. a d tC . ..I ders cm m erpt 1 1 '" . t- o infom1 ation. nst ~ to. t" T lJt"<Ot or manipulate. others belie(-;. 1derstcu1 1 lll!!S 111 " c use tllelr own uJ I .' ,.. ~ lttional institu tions continue to try to unde rstand Fint.ll v stuc ents o I ll elt < . . . ": . . . much more e ffecbn ' tI1<-tfl otIw rs. \'anatt.on 111 the wlw some mstttuttOns ,lre s0 . r . . . . . . . . 0. ' JOlic, or me 1nbet-s conrorm1t> Wlt I1 mstltutiona1mles is coherenre o1utstitu Oll;u I . I I li t . . d r b . the degree of c'Ommon . mteres t anc t 1e c stn )Uhon of )artiaU accou nte 10r ~ " l .1 l be rs. Institu tions "'hose membe rs s 1are socta 1\"luues and have . powe r mnong mem . . . L n S111ll.klf po1 Ca1 S)'St""tlls- such 'as KATO or the Europe<m Umo n-;u e bkeh-. to be I " . . . . . . stronger thau those such as the Orgamzation . fo: Secu nt: < Co~p e ration m md Europe or the Association of South East Asiat.l Nat~ons, whos e mor~ dtverse met~ bershi p does not necessariJ~ have the sam~ .kind ol deep comm on t~ter~sts . Addi. tional.h-. tht' character of domestic pohtics. . . . has a substantial tmpact on intem ~tional institu tions. The distri bution of powe r is also impo rtant. Institutions dominated b" a small number of members-f or example. the I~I F, with its weighted \'Oti.ng system -can typicaJl~,. take more deci.si,e action than t110se where influe nce is more '"idely difl'used, such as the UN Gene ral Asse mbly.
\C.

OVERCOMINGTHE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

E''en as scholars pursue t11ese areas of inquiry. they are in d<mger of overlooking~
major nomtati"e issue: the democratic defici t" that exists in many of the world s most important international institu tions. As illustrated most recen tlv bv t11 far.. . e reaching interYentions of the LMF in East Asia, the globalization of the "orld econ omy and the expanding role of international institutions are creat ing a powerful foml of globali"E'gUlation. Major international institutions are ill creas inoJy laying do"11 rules and guidelines that goYemments, if they ''ish to attrac t foreigni~,estment and generate growth, must follow. But these international institutions are managed by t~ocrats .and super.ised by high governmental officials. That is, they are run .by ~lites. ~y m the most attenuated sense is democratic control exercised o,er major mlemational ora:mi,.~nons K negoti . . tJ e, atiOilS m 1e \\TO are made in c I osed sessions. The IMF nPCMtl~es in sec t 'th last Cl ~""-' re Wl potential borrowers and it has onlv begu n 111 the ew months to provide the conditi . . ' ons 1t 1IDposes on recipients ....J

:o--.-.u .

central banks , ('aJ I only be effective if it is ig ,entdcafrn he made that the IMF like 11um . l""o. su ate , trol. Ever sJnc<'. _to t , however, practitioners and th om. di. clemocraticconJect authoritati,e d<<.:tSJOn makin g can be combin d . h eonsts have explored how e Wtt 1 indire ct demo crattc.: con trol. The U.S. Constitution isaccountabiJ ty to publics and b ti l . ased onsuchathe orv-t he ldea th at poptd ar sovereignty though es sen through rathe r elaborate institu'tions. An issue tha ' 1s best exerctsed ' :tly, b I mdirec how to de\is c international institutions that are na~ts~~ a~s should now explore is but also accountable, at least ultimately to den . . Y bo l~petent and effective 1 ocratic pu 1 c:s One poss1blc respo nse IS to say that all 15 "ell . ationa are responsible to go,emments- which in turn a smce .mternbl . l titutions e ms r ae:cou to their own peop Ie. International regula simply dd . nta elimkdemocrac:les tion h . l3 I .. . . of delegatiOn. ut ong ch ams. of delegation m whicbatJ s anot erer n to the chain bli . ' le pu c auects action onlv at se,eral removes, re d uce actual public authoritv If tl t f A . . le erms o multilateral cOOJ)erahon are to re ect the mterests of broader democrati . .. . .. c publ'tcs rather than JUSt those Of llal ~ OWelites, l:raditl?naJ patterns of delegation wiJl have to be supplemented by oth~J . means of ensun ng greater accountability to public opinion. . One prom1S111g ap.~ro ach wo~d .b~ to seek to imigo rate transnational society m the form of ne tworks among mdl\'l duals and nongovernmental organizations. The gro\\t h or such netwo rks- of scientists, professionals in \-ariOUS fields. and human rights and emir onme ntal activists-h as been aided greatly by the fax machine and tbe Inter net and by institutional arrangements that incorporate these netwo rks into decision makin g. For example, natural and social scientists developed the scientific conse nsus underlying the Kyoto Protocol through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (JPCC) whose scientific work was organized by scientists ''vho did not ha,e to ans\\'er to anygovemments. The K yoto Protocol was negotiated , but gmernments opposed to effective action on climate change could not hope to re negotiate the scientific guidelines set by the IPCC. . . . Therefore > the future accou ntabilitY of international institutions to their I publics may rest only partly on delegation through forn1al democratic institutions. Its other pillar may be ,-oluntary pluralism under conditions of maximum t~sparencv. Inter national policies maY increasinul)' be monitored b, loose groupmgs b . of scientists or ot11er professionals. or by issue ad,ocacy networks such as Amne~' Intern ational and Greenpeace, whose members, scattered around the wo~l_d be linked even more close ly by mode m inforn1ation technology. :\cc.:ount_abili~ " 111 be enha nced not only by chains of official responsibili~, but b~ the r~c~Uir~m~nt of transparenc,. Official action s, neuotiated among state represent:atnes m mternational org:mizations will be subj~cted to scrutiny by transnational n~tw~rks. ' Such transp arency, howe,er. represents. nongo'emmental orn:amzations and 0 . rks fromelite oet\vo networks more t11an ordinarY people, who ma~. be as excluded . . . be ther - circle h as are from 0 t10vemme nt . T at IS. transnationaJ chilili o' ma' . a 'SOCJet-. . . . necessary but insufficien t condition for democratic accou.ntab t-.. . .emocrnctes . '. __ _: m . a1 0 rQaiuzations mamtam sw1J.Uent sIlould insist that, where,er feasible. intemation. .o
J '

Ad mi ttccll~ dcmoc.:racy does not alw . t ., ays work reguhu:ly eugagt Ill c lntn ~e:>s again st international instiwell.. American politicians ma)' of a ~ocal ~c t;l nen t o I thti r electorates at the ex . tu.hons, playing on the <lisin the U tllted \at tons. More seriously an ar c:esstve number of foreigners

NTERDE PENDENCE WORK?

l 2.5

":ll

126

PART I

ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

tr;msp~1rencv

" . ..I . ., '. cs for transnatlon(U networ k. or advocacy gro11ps , \l "Sli(: lcgisJ at ors, pnt JH l , of demoe:ratir. btcs to e,aJuate their actions. But 1 . ti " <Uld democra . c pu 1 .I so le<.'Ounta bili.tv shouId a1 seek c:ou nterpa1t s to the mec l <m.s 'IS \ tontrol embed . . . ' 'ded in national democratic mstitutions. Governors of the Feu( .J a 1 Reserve Boarcl . 1)\ the Senate, even iftJ 1 . . ' cy . are tfter all nom mated toy the pres1'dent and confirmed cli tl 'ty l ng their tetl'ms of office. lf Ma son. llan11lton, und }ly '' . '. 1 , J<, 1, . z 1 great au 1on c un exerctse n . 1 1arusrns mvent md'1rect mec1, . of popular con tro 1 t H.: ex. c1 a tst Pa ,.-, e~8 could . ev1se comparable . centunes ago, . s] Jd no t be beyond our competence to c1 tt 1ou two mechanisms at the global level in the twenty-first centwy.

rhe UrJI[Cd Nations and International Security

ADAM ROBERTS

of troops deploy~d 111 UN pe.a~e-keepm~ acti~iti~s and by an increase in the types of roles they p~~f01 m. At long la'it, the Urut~d 1 ations seemed to offer the prospect of moving dec~J~ely away fr?m the anarcluc reliance on force, largely on a unilateral gn basis, by indiVldual sovere1 states. _The United l\ations has, and will probably continue to have, a far mor~ centTal _role.m sec~ty issues than it did during the Cold War. However, the Untted NattOns muJtifaceted role in the security field faces a huge array of problems., Almost every difficulty connected with the preparation. deployment, and use of force has re-emerged in a UN context and does not appear to be any easier to address. Excessive demands have been placed on the United Nations, which has been asked to pour the oil of peace-keeping on the troubled waters of a huge number of conflicts, to develop its role in preventing breaches of the peace, and to play a central part in defeating aggression and tackling the aftereffects of war. Arms control, too, is embroiled in controversy, with \-arious statesIraq and North Korea bei ng the clearest examples-challenging what ther see as a discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Above all, the increasing role of the United Nations in international security raises two cenbal questions: First, is there a real coherence in the vast array of security activities undertaken by the United Nations? Second, is the re a danger that the elemental force of ethnic conflict could tlefeat the United Nations' efforts? ... This article advances the following propositions about the United ~ations' post-Cold vVar role in the field of intemational security:
l. The United Nations has become seriously overloaded with security is ue . for good and enduring reasons. The extent to which it can transfer these . . .. responsibilities to regional organizations is debatable. 2. Most conflicts in the contemporary world involve an el~ment of C!Vll w~t or inter-ethnic struggle. They are different in character fr~m those conAtct essentially interstate, that tbe United l\ations ,,..as established to tackle.
ll ~ E .xt'Crpt~ from Adam Hoberts "The United :\ations and lntemation aJ Secunty.- Sun:ivll dTlu . __ ().. . r .., >n 5 " "t:uarterly Vol. , , "'o 9 ($ UllllllCJ. 1993) PP. ..r-JV. Reprinlt:t.~J b'' pc:-nn~:.lon ofthe author an Ta\1 V. F
' raucis Ltd. http://www.tandf.<:o.uk/joumals.

. I n recent years. there l1as been a remarkable growth in dem an cls r tb e serv1ces ol. ror . . ( r) h . UN 111 t e field of mtemational security Th 1g91 h . d the Uruted Nanons aut on:~..e e . kl f' action in Iraq was ~jUJC , y ollowed ~~ 1992 by a fivefold increase in the numbers

127

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PART I

ANARCHY AN U 11:, l..Vt~o:~L'-l"''" -

P.
I
I

J: RTS I

THE UNITED NATIONS

1 ng the major po ' ll ll the bas 3. There i. only limite? agreemen~ an~:ited shared iul . ' Prtsu rin ~~~f international ecunty and onl) a . t d g t at . . ' effectively ttnp 1 emen e . Ultemaooncu nonns are . C il inducuna tlw s t( n of Rve r th e Secuntv ouncin. danaer hof Jo ..mr; Veto. 4. The structure o b. . its legiti m 0 Jd' nent mem ers, lS ac.v. \\1e mg perma f mbership or powers '' 1 ' he ve ry hard t 0 Although a form~ chhang~ ~i~s procedures and prttrticc>s 1nay be bot~ achie,e, changes m t e oun 1 desirable and possible. . the practice whereb\ enforl't'ment ha., take 5 Tl ome ad\antaaes m r' n . 1ere are s . d 0 i]"tarY action by groups o statcc;, rather than corn. the form of.authoU~~e :n~and as a ]iter~ reading of tlte lJ .\" Charter would ing under direct eo

AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

suggest. . d 1 nons role is increasing, basic questions about <.:olN 6 Although the Umte a . . There is no prospect o f a genera1system of <.:olle<:lecbve secunty remam. . . . c 1 nng existing strateg1 aJTangements. twe secunty supp an .. are in no way intended as cliticism of the increased These propositions . . . . h r . ] . f . . tl United Nations and its role m t e 10retgn po tc1 o many es emphasis gJVen to le b fl I I states. Rather, they constitute a plea for tl1e so er asse~smtle1~t k~ Jot 1 t 1e merits b and defects of an increased role, as well as for construcbve 1111 1ng a out some of the difficult issues it poses, and a caution against. the has~ abando~ment of some still-valuable aspects of traditional approaches to mtematwnal relattOns.
THEOVERLOADPROB~

European ' ' ., With responsibilities in th . . . . Conferen<.:C'P.I vcurityandCoop .eratio . E.e secunty field is notorious Th . r. h n m urope (CSCE) 7\ T .. e Comm um~- L t e Western European U . . ' !\ 0 , the European Cooperatior, ( o tncil ( NACC) all play roles f~on .(\V~U ), and the :'\orth AtJantic development" nlargi ng the international o vru!'mg Importance. ... Despite such easier said than done. These organization5secuntyb of regional organi7.ations is h role 1 cl and me mbPrs 11ps, an they often have great ave a. ewildenng.vanety of purposes diffi . 1 taking action . .\I any :c:g~onal bodies are seen as t~u ~n rea<:hing.decisions and in is often far fr01n c;clf-eVJdent whi<;h regional b cl a] to one s1de. Moreover, it addressing a ~iv<:n problem. The United ~a~ Y s houJd ; ave the prin<.:ipal role in bodies to hand le crises only to Rnd that importa o;s as 0 ten encouraged regional withjn its own domain. n aspec.1s of the problems remai ned

129

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT

Many of the conflicts in the contemporary world ha dio h 1 1 . ve a very nerent c: aracter from those t 1at t 1e Umted Nat1ons was designed to address. Above ll h . a t ose who . . framed th~ UN Charter ~ad m mmd the problem of international war, wa ed b well-organ1zed states. Th1s reflected the view, still common today, that aggress1on g y . . . . and mtemahonal war constitute the supreme problem of international relations. Although the pr?blem o~ inte.rstate war has by no means disappeared, for many, civil war-whether mtemabonal1zed or not-has always represented the deadlier threat. Some of the twentieth century's principal political philosophies have underestimated the significance of et.hrticity. however defined, as a powerful political force and source of conflict; this is now changing through the pressure of e\ents.. .. In the overwhelming majority ofU~ Security Council operations today, there is a strong element of civiJ war and communal con.Bict. For the United :l\ations, involvement in such a conflict is hardly new, as the long-standing and continuing problems of Palestine/Israel and Cyprus bear witness. The collapse of large multinational states and empires almost always causes severe dislocations, including the emergence or re-emergence of ethnic, religious, regionaL and other animosities. The absenc-e of fully legitimate poHtical systems, traditions, regimes, and state frontiers all increase the likelihood that a narrowly ethnic definition of"nations" prevai.ls. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that, for the most part. the geographical distribution of popuJations is so messy that the harmonious realization of national self-determination is impossible. Confli<.:t-ridden parts of the fonner Yugoslavia and the fonn~r S<M:et Union are merely the two most conspicuous c'Ontemporruy e~ples of u~perial collapse leading to inter-ethnic war. In both cases, the taboo against <.:hangmg old "c'Olonial" frontiers has been undennined much more quickly and seriously than oc-curred in post-c.'Olonial states in Africa and elsewhere in ~le de<.-ades _following European dec.'Oionization .... It is by no means impossible that mtemal conlhcts could drag the Unjted 1\: ations down; its inability to prevent a resumption ~f war in Angola following the September 1992 elections is an ominous indicator 0~ ~type ~fhazard Internal <.:onflicts, especially those with a communal or ethmc dimension: p~es ent special risks for international engagement. whether in the fonn of mediation,

... Reasons for such a heavy demand to deal with wars, civil strife, and oilier crises are numerous and persuasive. vVhatever difficulties the United ~ations may face in the coming years. these reasons wiUnot suddenly disappear. Three stand out. First, the impressive record of the United Nations in the years 1987-92 has raised ex'Pectations. The United ~ations has contributed to the settlement of nu merous regional conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq War, the South African presence in Namibia, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. It provided a framework for the expul~ion of Iraq from Kuwait. Second, given a choice. states contemplating the use of force beyond their borders often prefer to do it in a multilateral, especially UN, context. A multilateral approach helps neutralize ~omestic po.li~cal opposition, increases the opportunity that operations have limIted and. legJ~ate goals, and reduces the risk of large-scale force being used by adversanes or nval powers. Third, the United i\ations has some notable advantages ove~ regional organizations in tackling security problems: It is uni versal; it has a reputation, even if it is now under threat, for impartiality; and it has a more clear set of arr:mge~ents ~or making decisions on security issues than do most regional organizatio;, mcl~~g even the ~orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ... ~.ogruZing that the United Nations is seriously overloaded much iliought has been gwen to the question of ' 'T'l.. . c1ea th th . cooperation WJth recrional security organizatiOns- 1 'ne at e Umted N ti d o 'bilitv for security he a ons an reg10nal institutions could share respons 'r seems to emergmg aibe hesttantly, in E urope. The proluerati'0 n o . .c It

 """"' ru~u INrt:nu

First internal cc dh t '1. nd lo b . l''-"\ct-'kt'Cping. or lorccful mtlttmy '. , c.: 1' t 1 ~., , 1 <'tl<lllrintr .. t\cl.!.... l>nt l .!>...1. antI lo '\11 .. md thev leave contnHHlltiC~ Wll . l,. , 1 1 t'' 1 . < I 11 . . h 1 . . . . .. rienccs an< con ..:. proxmit mutual susptcions basecl on traurncltiC expe I . . , Y. . . .11' to tay ,. .hat may be a ver; Oil.., ' 11 !>< Second lntl:'rYt'ntlon reqmre.s a"'' llngnesd t I nder the leadership ul nc~n gm<'n~tncntl' nnJica r . ... m tt., m.tl conR ts a re ; 1 . ~ con uc ec u see reat advantagts m tit< degree of tc . or se rni-govemme ntal enotws, whJch may g . s a nu .J .. 1)e ttnwJ!J mg ( )r ~ . . 'th u N' 1epreselltalJv(' ) cl . t mvo l' 'ed u1 negohatJnu wt . tecogm1on ;.., . Tl rd interntl conf l~<::ls h n) .. 11 . unable to carrv out thc tems. of aureements. . . .,, b . 1attons, tJ1t1s. 1 11 1<.;.1 u -' . y .. 1 . l' "' l . ., nst the cvthan pop )Ccorn 111 involve the use of force <.. Jrectec agru I M . . . cliffi lt roblems relatetl to t w protecllon o r d'sperscd espectally bttter ~~-po~tnF g lcu.1 mal confucts are often conducted with small and vulnerable cJVihru1s. ou t 1 n e . d 1 st's match. It i verY dir-e: 1 to cnntro1t 1 use ncu t 'lE: rif1 s kn 1ves an t 1e arsol1l weapons: e ' b b' , 5 embargoes or formal methods of an ns control I1 ,eaponn.r by om m g. arn ' . . 0f 1 sue ' ' t1 '. there is frequentlv no tern tonal status quo ante Finally in cases sue1 as lese, l 11 ' C fi. . nd other agreements are ...,. 1 nera) e to tJ1e charge to which to return. ease- n es a . '11 . .. . . 1 c0 .1 and that tlwy create 11nposs1) y comp 1 -cc 1catecl that t11cy lemomv_..e t1 use o 11 le . b ,. _ .. aJ anangementc; based on ethmc tern tonal un1ts that are . "Ieopard-spot tet nton . . . small and separated and, thus, difficuJt ~o defend .. . .' . .". . ssues ctbout the cntena used m Commun a! and eth nJc c:onBicts nnse awkward 1 . . . . . l'tical no'ties as states and in favonng their admiSSIO to the Umted recogmzmg po 1 e . . . cn c . Nations. When the United \ ations admits member-stat~s, tt_J~ m 1 con ~e.rnng a act pruticuJarly important form of rewgnitio~. and it ~ also nnpbc1tly und~nvnting ~1e inviolabj]jty of their frontiers. Y tl1e Umted Na_ti?ns do~s n?t apperu to _be taki_ng et, sufficient account of trailitional c1iteria for recogmtion, v.rhJch melude careful consideration ofwhetl1er a state really exjsts and coheres a~ a political and social entity. Many European states also forgot these traditional criteria in so~ne of ~eir ~e~ent acts of recognition, many of which did not involve setting up diplomatic miSSions. If tl1e resuJts of recogrution are risky security commitments to purported states that never really attained internal cohesion, public support for UI\ action may be weakened. Such confucts also raise issues about the appropriateness of cettain principles derived from interstate relations, including the principle that changing fronti ers by force can never be accepted. This principle, which is very important in contemporary international relations, has been frequently reiterated by th e international community in c.'Onnection with the Yugoslav crisis. A successful armed grab for territOl)' on largely ethnic grounds would indeed set a deeply worrying precedent. Yet, it must be asked whether it is wise to express this legal principle so forcefully in circumstances in which existing "frontiers" have no physical existence, in which they lack both logic and legitimacy, in which there are such deep-seated ethnic problems, and in which almost any imaginable outcome will involve recognition of the consequences of frontier violations.
. .. ti 11 1nten en . .

I '

remain f ' r. fntm wderenccs of both t there . m erest and be enougl.1 to p .<. the Security CounciJ from reach in r der_<:~ption. These may not they can frustre:t P Jlts to turn decisions into actions ing CCl~ons ~n key issue , but Difference"- of 'nterest amongst states a . fast-changmg situations .... I.tc rundamental natu re of re complem E;nted by differences in rceptions aho 1t t Id .. pe t . . . al . wor ir differen t :usto1 1c expenences some st t pohtJ<:s D ependi ng lar{fely on . I t1 e ] . ' a es VJew col . 1 d . b . ""'perialistn as lle ;nost senous problems in int . ona ommation and .... ] as th e most ( angerous threat to intematio emational relat'ons; others see civil ] . ar w i. . na sec:unty )'et 0 th . ve ers v1 aggresew st conquest. anc mternahonal war as the centra1probl ems. . . . . . . Such se nons diffe1 ences of perception and t .I! r th . m erest are of eo B the proceewngs or e U)1 Security Council 0 } Id ' urse, re ected 11 1 . ne s 10u not ne . ril relations among .maJOr po~vers to he good, and there mav be ces~ _) ~>;pect sons why counb"les perce1ve major sec:uritv probl diN- perfec.tl} vahd rea. lth , ems , China's world-vew, a ough undergoing important h ~t erentlv [For exampIe,] , . . l .1 c ' . . c anges retams disti elements- 111C Uumg a T 0 fore1 subversion, a Stron b )' f'. , ear gn ~Ctive 1 c t' . 1 .1 g e te n state soveretgntv 1 and some Juentlllca 1011 WJt 1 ueve aping states-which could set . . ,' Security Council members. lt agamst other

_t

.I!~

~nATIONAL SEClJRJTy

)31

THE PROBLEMATIC STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

... If the United Nations is indeed to have an enlarged role in securitv affai t .. _, rs, 1 s f deciSlon-maki ng must be seen to be legitimate. system o The powers of the Security Council are, in theory, ve1y extensive: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." In practice. the Security CouncU cannot impose its will on the membership in the way this statement implies and. despite the absence of any system of fonnal constitutional challenge. there is no si211 of the emergence of a doctrine even hinting at the infallibility of U\ Security Council pronouncements. However, these U mitations on the power of tl1e Security Council do not mean that states, having successfully retained considerable sovereign powers in security matters, see the existing aJTangements as satisfactory. The criticisms of the composition of the Secmity Council involve several el~ments: doubt about preserving unaltered, half a century later, the special position_ of those countries that were allies in the Second World War; concern that three of those powers-France, Britain, and the United States-make most of the agendasetting decisions in running the Security Council; irritation, especially on the part of Germany and Japan, about "taxation without representation ," and frustration that the views of the non-perman ent members of the Security Council, and indee? _o~ the great majority of the 181-strong General Assembly, count for uttle. Th~se ~ntic~sms could become much more serious if events take such a tu m that the~ comclde wtth a ~)erception that the SecUJity Council has made serious misjudgments on central
ISSUes...

UMITED HARMONY AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS

: It~ und~Ie, and_ve~ welcome, that there is more agreement among states about mtemational secunty Issues now than there was during the Cold War. However,

In the history of the United Nations much more has been achieved by changes in practice, rather than Charter revision. More thought '"ill have to be ghen to how the Security Council might develop its procedures and practices: for example. by

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PART 1 ANARCIN ANU ''"' -1

. .. . "VI ~;:,

1\NU lNTRNATl

-permanent 1nembers to rdltl't t 11.! ' con LJibtttiOtl\ . . trl'ngthenitw the selection of non ' I ing more regular Scc:u rt) f ) mc:tl cons~tlta. t " U 'tj' Nations' work and de,ede op ....hes Such change<; lit~J .t.gh difficult t to trw m eu . st pcu u o tion ,,;th major state. and. tnter:e way to\\'ards meeting th~ ..t~<n~ conc:em!l of implement. might gn at least so f decisions that affect them \lt, 11) certain states abottt being left out o

ONALSECURITY

133

A~nziNG ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS THE PROBLEM Of ORGf\Ju

tions is central to almost <.'\'Cf}' discussion of The issue of orgafilzmg enforcement . gs out the con H I>etw<::en "Cl1arter lunda. b ac t<:t the United ~ations' future role.,It -~ s to be organized precisely in accord "~tit . .. . ld like sue l acuon .. . . mentalists, \\ho wou . .. mmon Jaw approach. '' ho believe the tnost the UN Charter, and those '~'lt 1 a eo , . important gwde 1S u1\ prachce.. . . miJitarv action authonzecl by the United in the UN era. maJOI . .~ . . . . 95 ; . . I " . Tlree tunes s t u~ command: Ill KOJ ea Ill 1 . 0-53. h aq Ill Nations has been u~~d.er ~ ~~- The~e episodes suggest th e emergence of a sys1 1990-91, and Som~li_a Jn Nl' . authorizes military actions, which are then placed . } c] the umte aeons' . d tem tn w 11 1 f tates There are important a vantages to cl th control of a state or group o s . un er c F' t it reflects the reality tl1e1t not all states feel equally such an arrangement. IT'S ' tary actiOns rcqutre extremeIy . . c nt action Moreover mw invohed in e''ery en1orceme ' .' . . .1 1uy func:.J , _ _ ..; be...veen intelligence-gathenng and operations, a smoot cIose coorwmsuOll '' f ki . decJSJon-maki11g 1nacl1 and forces with some expenence o vvor ng ine nonmg . . ..~: dangerous and c:.-omplex tasks. These tlungs are more likely to togetI1 to penonn er . d ili' 1 be achieved through existing national armed fo~ces, alhances, an _m taty re ah~nships, than they are ~thin the structure of a UN command: As habits of cooperation benveen armed forc.-es develop, and as the United Nations Itself grows, the scope for action under direct Ut\ c'Ommand may increase, but this will inevitably be a slow process.... Experience seems to show that mobilizing for collective security onJy works when one power takes the lead. However, as a result of the e ffort, that same power may be reluctant to continue assuming the entire burden of collective security. After the Korean War, the United States tried to set up regional alliances to reduce its direct military obligation. After tl1e 1991 Gulf War, the United States was mani festly reluctant to get entangled in Iraq and to underwrite all security arrangements in the area. ... The issue of UN versus authorized national command arises in non-enforcement connections as well. As UN-controlled peace-keepi ng forces become involved in more complex missions, in which neat distinctions betweet~ ~~-keeping_ and enforcement are eroded, the adequacy of the United Nation~ ~Xlstin~ machmery for controlling complex operations in distant countries 15 mcreasmgly called into question ....

PROSPECI'S FOR COllECTIVE SECUR11Y

Is it ~~ble to ~y that out of the rubble of the Cold \Var a system of collectl\'(' security JS emergmg? The t .. 11 . enn eo eetive security" nonnally refers to a systetll

in lhe system ac<:epts th t tJ . . a 1e secuntv of 0 . h 1 .,JI anc..l ai!;fl't 1 1n m a coll ective respon t .. ne 1s t e C."Onc:em of " cl 1 . se o aggress1on 1 th nct fro m <:' d 1\ e e ense or alliane;e svstem . b n ts sense, it is dist1 11 . , s. m w t<:1 arou 1 f each other. p_n ."a ~- a?.amst possihle external threats. .., ps o states ally ,,;th "Coli< <"ll' ~ ec:un ty proposals have been : . . m CJrcu 1 ation smce th be f the modern ,.l_ ,, ._ ~- ltc-1~ an d were indetd aired at the ne . . e gmnmo- o ~otlahons that led 1648 Pea<.:(' of \\ e!)tphaba. The attractive theo ry 0 f eoll ectJve securitv h to the . against Olll<' Ims1c c1ueshuns, ofte n reveals som f d . w en tested . . , 11flc'twe secunty~ There is alwa,s e unk amental flaws.' Whose eo a tl. . 11 , ns tem will I)C see11 as protectmg onlv e;ertain counhie lat. a eo ectwe securitv S\"S . . . 1 h .. ' s or mtercsts or as privil cert.Un pnnc:tp e<; at t c ex-pense of others. Some eo t . , r egmg . b . un nes mav. 1 wbate,er rea0r son feel exc Iuc:l e cl from tts enefits or threatened br 1 Th . '. . t ' l cl . 1 e ai1Xleties expressed bv some ~?u'll~riJesl tn tile e' e opmg world reaarding the C"Oncept of the ~:\ ew World Order. w 11 e t 1ev 1a,e not yet crvstallized into definite 0 t ,c:. .d f ppos1 1011 to any specmc Ui\ actton, are en ence o conc:em on this point. Cm~ there .be consistent re~punses to security probleo~~: Although the u~ system_ 1 the fir~t tmly glohal tn~ernational sy tem and although it involves the s. subscnpttot~ of \IJrtually all count~es _in the world to a common set of principles. it is not yet eVIdent _that the same pnnctples and practice could or should be applied consistently to different problems. countries, and regions. Difficultie can arise both from the consistent application of principles to situation that are fundamentally different and from tl1e inconsistent appucation of principles. It is al o not vet apparent that collective securit)1 can operate as effecthely for East Timor or T1bet as for Kuwait. The widespread perception that Israel has successfullv defied U!\ Secmity Council resolutions while other states have not, although arguabl~ faciJe in certain respects, illustrates the explosiYeness of emerging accusations of'double standards" at the United 1\ations. The political price of apparent inconsistency could be high. Against which fljpes of threat is a system of collectiue ecurity intended to operate? There is no agreement that collective security hould appl~ equall~ to the following: massive aggression and annexation; cro -border incursions: emironmental despoliation; acts of terrorism; human rights ,;olations within a tate; communal and ethnic conflict; and the collapse of state stmctures under assault from internal opposition. In 1990-9 L many people anrued that i_t was t~1e p~cul~l~ flagrant nature of the Iraqi invasion. occupation. and annexatto~ _ofKuwcUt that JUStified the coalitions response; even then, the international mihtary respo~se was far from unanimous. The fact that this argument was so \\idely u ed underlines the point that in cases in which aggression i not o blatant. it m~ 11ht be much ~ard~r to secure an intemational military response; a state caught up m such a confuct nu_ght . I1ave to look after its own interests. Smce l 991 ed partlv bv tJ1e establishmsptr ' . edJ ment of "safe havens" in northern Iraq and pattly by a trend of ?pinion, adm~tt ~ . - -~en f:< f'TOm universal in favor of democracv, the1e Jlas 1IJt' some mcreased ad\(>cacy. ll . . . not least in Franc~ and the Unitcd Stat;'i, of a right of intervenhon ~~ stat~s even~~ the absence of a formal invitation. This remains a deep!~ con~entious ~s~uecr:anrts ..ard which collective secunty euo serves as a useful reminder that the ends to\\ 5 might be directed are not fixed.
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134 PART l ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
1111
rm~H.RTS I THE UNITE

Hou; cvllcctive does rmjorceme11t ho1Je to he? Is col1lpJetc ;u;n: I\ i 111pos .1 to ;\ttain' esnt'!ci'\lly n the cu;e of miUtarv action? Is the re still 'ome ss' >le:. tate ,. - s ( ' to he neutral? In practice, there has never been. on the gl:ld J,v. '. a truly "colle .' tive" caS<' (id alone sy,;tcn>) of c'OIIcctive secunty. In the (, ull en'" <>I 1\llJ0- 91 , 1 key UN Security Council resolution .-oided the calllur al l st.al<s tu takt action. Instead, it merely authorir.ed "member~~lat~ eo-operatlll~ '' 1th the Govern'. mcnt of Kuwait'' to use "all necessary means to !lllplemcnt n:lc' .lll t UN r solutions. This implitd that it was stilllegitil1late for~ state t~ haven ~tat u~ of neutrali r or non-belligercncv iu this<<mflict. lt marked an mteresti ng "','d '' ali,tie i tion of some optiu1istic provisions in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. How ca a system of co/Je(,ti~ sccutihJ act~vely deter a particular tlneat to a 11 pmticular coulllt~J? In the wJke of .the 1~] G~.U1 Viar. there was n111ch discussion as to p<>!;sible menns by wlaich, in the fullJre. mva.stons c lcl be deterred he fore disast ;ou struck. ... Following ,,unanimous Council decision of ll December the idea was implt>mcnted by the United Nations for the first time in Macedoni ' lronic.illy, a slate that until April 1993 remained a non-member was cllUs receivi: prolc<:tion from a state. Yugoslavia. tbat was still. for most practical purposes, a mtmbcr. De pite remarkable progress, the idea of "preventive deployment" i fmught ,v;tl, < Ufficui(V. There is tl1e risk that large number.; of states would request its that it would be insutllc:ient to discourage aggression , and that it tniO'ht be used b ' go\'emment <IS an ultemathe to pro'iding for its own defense. It should not, however ya Jx. taken for granted that militan' det)lovrnents are absolute!)' essenti'al Tl1e re mav ' also be some residual deterrent "alue in the lessons of Korea (1950-53) and K : (1990-91); under UN auspices. the United States has led coalitions gone to t~e defestse ~f JO\'aded tates to which the United States was not bound b . fonnill alliance <.'Omnutments and in which it had no troops deplored at t11e ti' Tlus c: r I, l , me. 11nous act ma) not L entire y lost on would-be aggressors. Yet there ar b d le be ~~m w1 1 ~me k' 1 f preventiYe UN deployments, of which Macedonia isto .. uc: 1 ' e oun a me so barbmger, are t'OnStdcred necessary. . t' " rlha pays. for col/('C a tive se~rity ? The question of burden-sharing in iJlterna on rUN NATO secunty matters is notoriousIY comp1 as sbown by the experience of k . ex, crisis ir~ 1992 pctlat-e- eepalmg. and of the US-led operations in the 1990-91 Gulf te annu c.'Ost of UN ... t>\'er-about S2.8 billion. Un . 'd ron . pe.ace-k!eepmg activthes was the highest tions in September 199 sto!fat trib~b?ns towards UN peace-keeping operafigure \\'liS reduced to 2 about $6~ _ million. but bv the beginning of 1993. this increasE'<~ costs of k . 0 mtlliou. States have responded well to the peaceoperations on badJv. th eepmg Howeve r if more Ut\, peace-keeping (or other) Id ""- do not, there are probl o, , ere cou added be d diflicu1 m securing pa)11lent. E\en If ty . . ems . . -' paagn. Bill Clinton while indi to a dressed D unng t l1e US presidenti<u caJll to the United 6ns edlcating that he would ad on pavment of the US debt . . repeat called new agreements for sharing the costs v maotaining peace and or of kEeping costs be reduced :;:,~ed that the US apportionment of UN peacecountry most~... in- L- .l ~ :~% to 25%. The extraordin~rv IJaradox of tht ~J its majo ( milita.v support IOr an mtemational orgamzatt0 ~~m - ' . . ~ iDISbation of the gulf betweer thoughth steadily repa)ing) defaulte r is vet one more . n e theon. 0 f eollectave security and its pr.1ctiCf . . . -J

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35 f{owever, fu1 1 ~ 1 uvtn <.: nt difr., 1 SECURITY . L ' ncu ties m ical of, Scc:un ( <niiH:il decision ay come from stat . \Vhat ;., tlu. plru ,, of disa~ment es not mvolved in, or critsecurity? ~Jo.t proposab for c;o IJ ective and arnlS cont roz tn a y . . . . . . consistent vnth the needs of mtemal sccunty C'all for 1 . y.stem . ower lev J50f of collectit;e However, th<' uutPcl :\ations h secunty and int . e annaments its efforts in the fi<.'ld of u sar mament to d -, as yet work out a , .....heematsonal obligations ' 1 ""'"' rent h'J ''ArmS eontrol'' is ~till s<.:en by m an anns control in th P osophy lo guide develop guidelines fo r c;onvent. a as a suspect, melionst e post-Cold War era. a]ny . n arm t r concept A 10 ing Chsna. The rationale for ar ms reuucf ransrers have man Ysharp <: ' f ttempts to ...1 s r nuclear non-p rolife ration efforts all '?ns, or control of arms trann se:s, mc:ludrefined. This is especially important . vi ' m stiJI need to be ...... 'uIJv exa and for '"'rer f h d control arrangements are discnrJllnatory o t e common . . ew ~ , and s tb at ex1sf Secu ri ty Counci l assumes a mo re central -earsnon couJd be exac:erbated arms ". mgif the ro.le in that J r -pro ~re ration matters.

D NATIONS AND

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W ith the end of both the Cold War and the Soviet uruon , tl1e n1ghtm are of an . all-out nuclear war b~t:vveen. the superpowers that so dominated world politics since 1945 enu?d. It IS not lik~ly that a new danger of the same magnitude will arise, at least for the econom1caUy developed democracies of North America Japan, and Western Europe. Indeed, for the first time since the formation of thes~ nation-states, the <.:itizens of these countries may live out their lives without worrying that they or their children will have to die or kill in a major war. This fact, however, does not mean that we should no longer be concerned ~'ith how states use force. Even if the optimistic prediction is correct, we still need to understand previous eras in which warfare played such a large role. We cannot understand the course of the Cold \Var without studying the role nuclear weapons played in it. Moreover, an understanding of the role that nuclear weapons played in that era is central for determining the role they will play in this era. This is true for no other reason than that national leaders' views of the present are hea,ily influenced by their reading of the past. Furthermore, even within the developed rich world, where a great-power war is unlikely, military power still remains useFul to the conduct of statecraft. If it were not, these states would have already disarmed. They have not because the use of force must always be available, even if it is not always necessary. For much of the rest of the world. unfortunately, circumstances are different. Threats to the security of states remain real, and war among them bas not been aboJisheu. For all states, then-those likely to enjoy peace and those that ,..,iJJ have to endure war-what has changed is not so much the utility of military power as how it can be usefully employed.

THE POUTICAL USES OF FORCE

The use of force almost always represents the partiaJ fail ure of a policv The excep' h . . of course is the case in which figh ting va1ued for its own sake ul en tt 15 15 tion, a d w ' believed that war brings out heroic values and punses . dhiduals anthc . tu res, or m. d .--- l . e mcreasc.:u hen fighting is seen as entertainment. ehanges 1Il 5tates. ,-alues an C""' lo'cts as the w d t0 rs to v ew arme ,vi ru 1 destructiveness of war however have led state ac tual f 1 ' ' di 1 f maneu,ers ac use o ast resort. Threats are a second choice to P onla JC for<.:e follows only if t11e threats fail.
137

l'

PART 2

lliE USES OF FORCE

l1iE us~"' 0~FFORCE L.>

139

. f 101 nee its use is temper .I 1,: ...~traints and Because of the high cost ~ ' e th~' could alway be bloox' t r. Brutalitie bar~ainin g. As bloody as 1110 t "~rs ar~- sba~ed intere t _ if not h\ their scruples t are limited in part b~- the combatantsto ,.., r 1 doe not nece arih- follow that t) ,~ .::\ . . ah to go '' .. dirr . --:h e,en tJlincr that 1S good for one side is hadJ uer enou q~n if two tate . e. ,-" en sts On1 . t ha,-e nu comm~_n m ere ..' . ~tion , do the opponents cram nothmg IJ~ bargaining. 51 for the other .a zero-sum ~ outcomes are clearh bad for both 'ide.: therefore. . . . certaJO h de hares an interest in a,oid.111g them. In most case . ho'e'er. . war eac ' thougl1 th e) are at ftl . . st as Thomas Schelling pomt out. stem from th" e,en " 1e mtere . 1 The_s1 ed_lature otrov ilian to create. Force can be u ed to take or to bargain. d ~ar t need ,-our ach-ersan cooperation and do d fact that 1t 1 eas~er to es . d . -di . If mu can take what ,ou want, ~-ou ono . _th hi -\ COUJltn ma, use force to e1ze pute temton Just t not hrobavebeo ~~ ~n to;; ~-oun,~all~t. \ lo tofthe things people and nations ~"ant. ak 1 r ma~ NU \OU o , as a be -' lO thiswa,..-\ nationnot on)'''(l11tsto t e temtory, Itwants . . . [ID\.en cannot hO\,e-er menacmg 1t; 1t ma,-even ' d 1 t t . nation mar want others to tophi . th ' . to crovem an exp Ol I "' 0 e ts d t 1 -'ues Brute force alone cannot ac e'e h e tl goals. A nation oth fi want ers to a op nu menacincr it ma, not want to g t 1em order to m c... the rs u ,0 m ' o that wants to stop o ~ri- A ~n..,,. 0 that wants others to adopt its ,-aJue cannot impose them cl reffiO\'e the th IC;.cu . II<UIV solelY through conquest \\'here the cooperation o~ an ad,~rs~: lS ~ee e~. b~gaining "ill~nsue. The robber does not need the cooperation of his \1Ctim tfhe kills him to get his wallet. Howe,er_ the thief who must obtain tile combination of a safe from the hostage who carries it only in his bead does need such cooperation. The thief may use force to demonstrate that the hostage can lose his life if he does not surrender the combination. But the thief no more \\ishes to kill the hostage and lose the c-ombination than the hostage ''ishes to die. The hostage may trade the combination for his life. The bargain may be unequal or unfair. but it is still a bargain. The mutual a,oidance of certain outcomes explains why past wars have not been as bloody as they could have been: but an analysis of why wars were not more destructive should not blind us to the factors that made them as destructi ve as ther were. B~- 1914. for example, all the statesmen of Europe belie,ed a war inevitable. and all were ready to eAploit it. ~one, however. imagined the staggering losses that their respective nations would infUct and bear in the field, or the extent to whic:h nonet . combatants would be attacked Y bv the second ,vear of the war the same men were accepting the deaths of hundreds or thousands for a few yards' gain in the front lines; and by the end of the '""-ar, they were planning large-scale aerial gas attacks on each other's major cities. The German bombing of Guernica in 1937 and Rotterdam in 1940 shoc-ked statesmen and dtiz.ens alike, but by the mjddJe of the war both v.'ere accepting as routine tbe total destruction of Gennan and Japanese cities. large? account for the increasing destructiveness of the \\'afS of Three factors _ ~last two centuries. ~trst was the steady technological improvem ent in weapo~ry. \\~~as madline guns, submarines, poison gas. and aircraft made it feasJbl_e to m:am' ~ kiD large numbers of people quickly. The rapidity of destruction that 15 ~:! 0 ~ weapons is only the most recent, albeit biggest, advance. Sec ~ eA~ m the capac..ity, and thus the need, of states to field ever large~ _ the JUR:e5. As states became more industrialized and centralized. tb~ de\.-eloped the administrative apparatus to move men 0 3 acquired wealth and

d scale. c( -col' .itant with the increase t'n mili' tarv pote tiaJ ~ \s soon as one state ex'nanded th. r n ~-as the necessitv to - ~ ..1;'7P this por , . Th us w hen Prussiarinstitutede rorces at tts ,1;....,~-- ' all other r l' ~ """"pu:.cu, .. states had to tCJ ,o\ smt. tl . adunr~ersal COns<:ription and the neral-staff sysJ t:rn and then demonstrated 1eJI vantages 1'th .:r... Cle 0 1 fr.m<.:e, the rest of the contine t . kl S.\' u{ \ic:tories " er Austria ant qut<: v ado t d n . O' '. th ~ e tts methods. An ocrease in the potential power of states led to an in 1 Third was thC: ~adual"' democratization of w~~~ m ~r standing power. e d hence the indi~cri mi nate mass killincr of non eo bat expanslOn of the battlefield an ti m ants. E,eno . fj ghting and dying.oWorld War Il 'th . ' n~, <:1 zens and soldiers alike, began power. marked_not the debut but the zenith of this ~:s ~~>itensJv: us~ of airg. As ''ar changed from the pr0\1nce of the princes to the burden of th e masses_ the distincti on f d \l between combatants an cl noncombatants increasinoh- bl urre . . ost o the v.-ars of o, th . tu . di'd . . . h _,_, tmpmge upon the citizenrv. but ainl . fi the e 1g teen cen ry ,.: nan<:. . ' di' e d m th em. \\1l' th th e '"1clespread use of consc . m .~ th .1a11 few ti chilians np on m e runeteenth h . LL and t\ventiem centunes , . ov.ever, more citizens became soldiers. \\''th th e advent I . . . . . .I'd i ofindustn alJZation and w1th the mcreasmg dh-sion oflabor thectizens who w not 1 . . fight remamed behmd to produce weapons. :\ow a nation not onh- had to conquer . b - '- h cl cl ' its enemys anmes . ut cmo a to estroy the industrial plant that supp~ed their weapons. Graduall). the total ener~ of a country was diverted into waging wars. and as the costs of wars mcreased , so did the justifications gjven for them and the benefits clai~ed to derive from them. The greater tile sacrifices asked. the larger the victory spoils demande d. Because wars became literally wars of. by. and for the people. governme nts depende d increasingly upon the support of their citizens. As '"'<IfS became democratized. so too did they become popularized and propagandized. The readings in the fi rst section explore how forc-e has been and can be used in a changing world. Robert J. Art notes that the threat and use of force has fou r distinct functions and shows how their relati\'e importance varies &om one situation to another. Thomas Sc:helling examines the differences bet\veeo the uses of conventional and nuclear weapons and the links between force and foreign policy goals. Robert Art analyzes the concept of roerche diplomac y-the resort to force short of all-out war-an d demonstrates why it is difficult to execute. Robert Jenis argues that the extent to whic:h states can make themselves mote secure ,..,;thout menacing others depends in large part on whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones and whether the ofTense is believed to be more efficacious than the defense. Terrorism has never been absent from world politics, and Bruce Hoffman discusses its changing forms and purposes. and distinguishes terrorism from guerrilla warfare and criminal actiit).

THE POllTICAL UTIU1Y OF FORCE TODAY

It is a mistake to examine the possible use of force in a vacuum. As Clal&Se\\thitz li ca1 oa1s Its utilitv as well as e cl, st u{e~se force is an instrument for reaching po ti g . ed be ' ' 6 0 f fi hting ~~~: ho~ the elihood of its use, depends not only on the costs and percel' hut on the general political conte~t. the values statesmen and Cl alternative policy instruments available, and the ob,iPrti\'es sought. r--

l .Jtl

PART 2

mE USES OF FORCE

. f'tltl' readi 1ws in P;lrt Oth ' t., . :> 'tht' iJn))or c ~<tnc ~ ) n ' ent('Cl u1 mam o . . this ~sect io n d Llll llns tr ! ~: t h<." conti . > l" di 1 l. m . rq ~ ,c;t . 1 . pO\Vl'l. The two rea ngs .ut Robctt f. Att a rgth '' th.tf milihu) p nu1nu ~:> I nu tt'cU) u is ower . t0 l>OHtical outcomes. r: a . late J'k I . 1111nber of <~o:tk t'' ,r 'nr re lC\"<\m-e o f 101~ (: the be used tO l'C<lC l cl I . Robctt <:>. Pitp, ' mws tit ~ I li . ) . . .t 'bl lun~ e t 1at 1s. ' can c: mJes. 1 t 1 ks strona "tatle cne.. ....e of case of lhic; uni\Htunate [)hpo lll'al . ..J S , t> U uit~ , tatcs tla ac cnorne-. . 11 stnvevs tle un1' e , . f . d . tl . t .. it oa\ 'S because it h<ts fon.td libe ral dem ocI'<\ logtc o s utCt e terronsl I . non from 1980-2001. anc1argues l cl des to compromise. .

- -- -

1 HE POLITICAL USES OF FORCE

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

e . l C ld \ V nuclear weapons. it w;'lS argued , hel.ped makI eompetition Icl o tl1erw1 e l1av e )een. That i ar. Dunna t le o ers safe r than it wou t> . . .. . betw een the two superpow two sup erno,.vers sca re d . not . cuce, ~m d t 111~. restramed tl e J . r e ' nuclear weapons madrr v that if it pushed tJ1e othel. tOO c. ., l11c t.SCU ll l0 get out of ltte r<ll . . them. EacI1 I1a d to wo.. .r ar war Each leam ed, espect,l11 ' . ellctc r tl1e Cu ban M. tssile . c nucle . d hand an f. escaIat e toto push tJ1e othe r to the pomt whe re 1t race d the choice of t .. d 1962 no Cnsts o upping ilie ante and riski ng loss of control , or backing down an n sking humiliation. Rul es of the road between tl1e two superp owe rs graduaU~ develop ed, and tlleir subsequ ent competition prO\ed safe r in the last twe nty -eta ht yea rs o[ the Cold War than it had bee n in the first fifteen. How relevan t for today is the superpower ex-perience witl1 nuc lear weapons? \\ftll states that experience inte nse poutical conflic ts witll one anotlte r be deterred from pushing one another too far? Or \\ill they be less ~estrained than were the supeqx>wers and find themselves in the horror of escalating to the use of nuclear -per pons? How valid a model is the US-Soviet ex ien ce for dyadic conflicts today? wea Scott Sagan and Kennetll Waltz anal.yze what is today the most dangerous politica1 conflict between two nudea r am1ed states- the Pakistani-I ndian conflict over the state of Kas hmir. They look at the 1999 shooting conflict ove r Kargil and draw oppo site con dusions from it. Sagan argues that we should take no comfort from the [act that a large war did not ensue because the re were too many nea r misses and bec-ause time the hvo states might not be so lucky. \\la]tz ar!m es tha t the limited use of next force by both sides in 1999 shows clearly how the mutual possession of nuclear weapons causes states to restrain their ambitions and reign in thei r mili tary. The Kargil case serves as a good exemplar by which to extrapolate the oth er possible con flicts hetween nuclear ann ed adversaries that the world may experience in the future.

The Four Functions ofForce

ROBERT ). ART

In view of wha t is like ly to be before us ' it is Vl'tal t o thmk carefuIlv and l . prec Y about the uses and limits of mi)jtary power. That is th e purpose of.th. essav tse is It IS . c 1 kd dd . .' . mten . e as a )ac ' rop ror pohcy debates ' not a presc npt'ton oI' specfic pohc1es. It t . I . .or consciOusly esc 1ews . elaborate det ail on .the requisite mI'litary trorces 1 scenanos . r a . . . n and rocuses mst ead on what militan pmver has and h not done can and . as , cannot do. Every model of how the world works has polic,, 1mpl.ieat'tons.' But not , . . clre 11 eve i} polic) ts bas ed on a clear \iew of how the world works \\<L.at tl1E'n. . t he uses to w~tch m 1 htar~ power can be put ~ How have nuclear weapons affected these uses. And what IS the futu re of force m a world of nuclear parih and increas ing economic inte rdependence?

WHAT ARE THE USES OF FORCE?

The goals tl1at states pursue range widely and ,,.uy considerably from case to C'ase. Military power is mo re useful for realizing some uoals than others. though it is generally considered of some use by most states for all of the goals that they hold. If we attemp t, howeve r, to be descliptively accu rate, to enumerate all of the purposes for which states use fo rce, we shall simply end up with a bewildering list. Descripthe accu racy is not a virtue per se for analysis. [n fact, descriptive accuracy is genemll~ bought at the cost of analytical utility. (A concept that is descripthely accumte is usually analytically use less .) The refore, rather than compile an exhaustive list of such purposes, 1 have sele cted four categories that themseh-es aual~tically exhaus~ fu nctions that forc e can serve: defense, deterrence, compellence, and "swaggenng.

th:

ng 1980). From ''To What Ends Mili tary Power" by Robert J. Art. in lnt~matianol Security. \'oL4 (Spri pp. 4-35. Portions of the text and the fooh1otes bave be<-n omtted 141

1..12

PART 2

THE USES Of fORe

ART I THE FOUR FU~ . "'-ON $ OF fOo..-r

at ~ posture. In fac.1:.. usu ~- ~-e more than two functions h on ' nn titen ' tL fll.!. . t r- c.~tJ.u ~r~at ones '"M._ militarY forces that can. se aller po'' .ers, not ,;s-a-\"15 . ~ ne L . , Jital' forces must m: 1 .ade relativ"" to . m1 i.s achie\ed onlv ns~li-' 15 sm "' ' bt of a states 1 measure of the capa Jhes th [I nee to some absolute c:calt. \ state that Cln those of another state. not WJ de~=n~:gai nst it and u uall~ d,.~~r .1 . \ state that tcu, t thereb, autom atieaJl~ dc~cr Qr cornpel it A c:ompel another state <.an also defend against another state ~thnnot ha"ing' the abilitv to either ddend again st or ' th state w1 ou er ,is-a~\is another ma~ or ma~ not be abk to per. state can deter ano er _ relative to it. \\her e feasihlc. defense is ttH<: ..h rompel il A state that can 5'\\fun-agg f th 0 ther three \A,on . ~ fi t If defense is not possib le. deter rence is generaJh fonn any o e 0 c.unc;tion mo t difficult to pin d0\\11 analvtic.:all~all states rum ~ ~ the 11 goaJ that , t\ Swaggenng IS the next pnon whose achie,emen t is the most difficult to dewonstrate; corn. nstrate but among the harde st to achie,e. The follow. dete rrenre, the ~ne d c..ill . peUence, the easJest to emo . . develops these pomts more n ~. d.i . mg ~_1n su;e use oft".or-ce iS the depJo\-ment of militarY power SO as tObe abJ(; . . . , da " ,. . The ur-;en. mage to oneself if t vard off an attack and to m1mmtze 1 th r . to do two unngs o ' 0rces ~gam st . ose of a attacked For defenshe purposes. a state will dired 1ts 1 ential or aL-tual attacker, but not against his u~armed population. For defensiq: pot . a state can depJo, its for(.-es in pla<:e pnor to an attack. use them after an ~ o<:eurred to re~J it or strike first if it believes th~t an attack upon it is immjnent or inB'itabJe. The defensive use of force can thus mvolve both peaceful and ph~caJ employment and both _repe~ent 'soc-ond, strikes ~n? ~ffen~he <6_~ strikes. 1f a state ~trikes first when 1t belie,es an attack upon 1t JS 1mmment, 1t JS Jaundring a preemptive b]ow. If it strikes first when_ it believes an a~ack is i.ne\.itable but not momentary, it is launching a preventive blow. Preemptive and pr~ent:i\e blows are undertaken when a state calculates, first, that others plan to attack it and. second, that to delay in striking offensively is against its interests. A. state preempts in order to '-\Test the advantage of the first strike from an opponent. A state launches a preventive attack because it believes that others will attatk it when the balance of forces turns in their favor and there fore attacks while the balance of forces is in its favor. In both cases it is bette r to strike first than to be struck fim:. The major distinc.tion between preemption and prevention is thecalt11ation about when an opponent's attack will o<:cur. For preem ption , it is a matter of hours, days, or even a few weeks at the most; for prevention , months or even li few years. In the rnse of preemption , the state bas almost no control over the timing of its attack; in the case of prevention , the state can in a more leisu rely way con template the timin g of its attack. For both cases it is the belie f in the certainty of war that governs the offensive, defensive attack~ For both cases , the maxim , "dte best defense is a good offense," makes good sense. The deterrent use of forre is the deployment of military powe r so as to be able to pu~ntao adversaty from doing something that one does not want him to do and~ he might Olberwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacreptable puniSh ifbe does it Deterrenoo is thus the threat of retaliation . Its purpose is tD prevent IOIIII!tlliag undesirable from happening. The threat of punis hmen t is direc-ted at the

ntlwe ~ot all four functions are nec.-essa__ / r- rs ha\'e the ,,.J.en.""'' 1al to dev"l c "' 'P 1 all 00 1 the gre<u

ri.], well or equaJI.' ~er t'' :

l:!ive-n rnilita n

e cl"rectiveness d~nds upon <- tat s ahliJ ty to oom1 nee a nr.t......~, . adver~that '--- of the thTeat t~'"""ll4:11 I . . . h"'~" it taS both the\.,iJI and powe r top ; no severe y 1fhe undertakes the un ~! terrenCC thert ,(;rt employs for(;{; nr_.,,.,.l:._uV. Jt . thedesirable action in Cmo:-<tir~ J)e ,-....uu threat to IS l~lU . th . L resort to force in rder to pum~u u-... t 1 ~ e essenc.:e of deterren' If th ~eterrence by drfmil.ion has failed A deter r: thr e ~reat has to bt (;affjed out, intent that it wiJ) not have to be carried out. Threats ar~n: made precise~ .vith the Je to pre<>ent ac:tions f rQm L.mJ<T undertaken. If the threat has to be ,....ple 1 has mented, th "' (JI;"' o ~ready been undertaken. Hence deterrenc-e can be judgoo SU<:ctSsful e .~on or~ If the retahatory threats have not been implemented. Deterrence and defense are alike in that both are mtended to th . pr~t estate or its closest allies from pbysic:aJ attacks. The r~ 0 fboth.ts di.ssuasJOJ\-nP~ ..- .l:.... ~ r~-.1 ~- 'others not to unue rutKe ac:tions harmful to oneself. The deii . .- r-3UCSU1Jlg ens:J\.e use """'not es ----,1 b, (.-Qnvinc.i.no<1 an adversarY that he '......., conquer one's mili of~ force . -' " OJS5w:au , that . lar) or~. i 1be deterrent use of force dhsuades by c:om., ncing the adve population and territory will sufT~r terrible damage if he initiates the und~le di~~ense dissuades by presenting an umanquishable rnilitarv forre. Det bv errenre ting the c-ertaint,v of retaliatory devastation. ' presen bl Defense is possible without. deterrence , and deterrenr... 1S poss1 e \\1thout ...., . defense. A state c::an have the militarv where \\ithal to repel an m'-aswn ''1thout also ~ being able to threaten devastation to the invader's population or teniton. Similark a state can have the wherewithal credibly to threaten an adYersary \\-ith ~c:b ~-~~ tation and yet be unable to repel his invading for<..-e. Defense. therefore, does not necessarily buy deter rence, nor deterrence defense. A state that can defend itself from attack, moreover, will have little need to develop the wherewithal to deter. If physical attacks can be repelled or if the damage from them drasticallv minimized the incentive to develop a retaliatory capability is low. A state that ~not defend itself, however, will try to develop an effe<-1ive deterrent if that be possible. ~o state wiJJ leave its population and territory open to attack if it ~ the means to redress the situation. \\'hether a given state can defend or deter or do both "is-a-\is another depends upon two fac-tors: {1) the quantitative balance of forces between it and its adversary~ and {2) the qualitative balance of for('eS, that is, whether the extant military techn ology favors the offense or the defense. These two factors are situation-specific and there fore require careful analysis of the case at hand. The compellent use of force is the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken ?r to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken . Compelleoce. m Schellings words, "involves initiating an action . .. that can cease. or be<:-ome ~ less, only if the opponent responds.'' Compellence can employ force ~ther ~~ <:ally or peacefully. A state can start actually harming another wtth ph}~ destruc.tion until the latter abides by the fonner's wishes. Or, a ~e can take actiO~ 0 reqwre -~ latter ~ ~ against another that do not cause phy-sica1 hann but ~ bombin~ 0 some type of significant price until it changes its beha-..10r. Amencas ~orth Vietnam in early 1965 was an example of physical oompellenre~ T=tt 's building of a Gem1an Heet aimed against England's in the two ~ uU:~ World \\far I, an example of peaceful compelleoce. In the first case,
G

ad...-ersarys p01 -

an~or industrial infra;trucwrE:

-..c.

14.'3

Th

!m

144

PART 2

11iE USES OF i'UI<l-t.

t'

ART I THE FOUR

\ i<.' tcong force iJ1 outb Yieh1am. ln t11e latter case .cc "'ll:\:t; h ult a battleAc . le Enctland m :JI\.!t~r to compe11 tt ed ~ l<:r to . that in an engagement threaten to cnpp . ~-~- a aene political settlement advantacteous to C.crm<m". !n both case . one m""'e 0 stnte initiated some type of action against another preclsel~: " a.." to ~e able to ~to p it. to bargain it awav for the appropriate response from the P 11 ~ npon state. The distincti~1 between compelleoce and deterrence ~~ ?ne between tht )) r . and passtve use of Il0 rce . The success of a deterrent .threat IS measured I , 1.~ active be usecL The suc:cess of a compellent action IS. measured b" h0\v . . . . not havmg to doselv and quicklv the adversal)' conforms to ones stipul at~d ,,,shes. ln the case of a negative. to show why e'nce / . som . . " succ:essfu1 det erre , one is trving to demonstrate thing did not happen. It can ne,er be clear whether on~ s actions were crucial to. or irrelevant to. why another state chose not to do somet~ung. ln the case of successful compeUence, the clear seque~ce o~ actio~s and r~act10ns lends a _c~mp?Uing plausibility to the centrality of ones ac-tions. F1~re 1 1llustrates the clistincnon. In successful compellence, state B can claim that 1ts pressure deflecte~ state A from its course of action. In suc-cessful deterrence, state B has no change m state A's behavior to point to, but instead must resort to claiming that its thre~ts were ~esponsihle for the continuitv in Ns behavior. State A may ha,e changed 1ts behav10r for reasons other than ~ate B's compeUent action. State A may ha,e continued with its same behavior for reasons other than state B's deterrent threat. "Proving'' the importance of B's influence on A for either case is not easy, but it is more plausible to claim that B influenced A when there is a change in Its behavior than when there is not. Explaining why something did not happen is more difficult than explaining why something did. Compellence may be easier to demonstrate than deterrence, but it is harder ent to achieve. Schelling argues that oompeU ac-tions tend to be vaguer in their
"' ra1

~t.\h..~ . htrted bombing ~orth Vietnam in order to com.t)(l

tt,

"tr~p a-;sisting the

FUNCTIONS OF FORCE

COMPEl I ENCE
(I) A is doing something that Bcannot

DETERRENCE

tolerate
(2) 8 in~ action against A in order to get him to stop his intolerable actions (3) Astops his intolerable actions and Bstops his (Or both cease

simullaneously)

(I) A is presently not dojng anything that .r . B finds intolerabJe (2) B tells A that if A changes h1s behaV1~ 1 and does something intolerable, BWl d5 . punish him (3) A continues not to do anythmg B fin intolerable

objecti\'C::S t It.tn dc:lt:rrent threats and for tl attain If ad,ersan h.t' 'ltard .time un<.lerstan-tln g wlhat reason more <.liffit-ult to an . at it is th u . ''-'1shed him to do h' compHan<.:e wJtlt ones \\1Shes is made more diffi cult. at one . . IS Th I . ere IS, howe\er. no inherent reason " ~~ t compeiJent ac-tion must be v regard to ho"' dear!~ the ad,ersan under ta dsag~ber ~an a deterrent threat \\ith L, s n '' at.IS want d ~ . I . attack me .. 111 11ot any c earer in its ulrlmate meanmg th e "trom njm. "Do not stop attacking mv friend." A state can be as confused or as clear about what tan } " . . 1 wts les to pre,ent as it can be about w I1at tt w1shes to stop The I . . . ~ c anty. or lack of 1 0 f th . , cornpellent act1ons and deterrent threats does not van ac " di e obJeCtives of b oor ng to whether the ~,en action is c:ompeUent or deterrent in nat of particularities associated \\ith the given , ~ti:e, ust rather acc.:ording to a welter ac on. orne ob f . r ~ec . er are inherenth' clearer and hence eas1 to perc:e1.-e t han 0 th 1\es. ror examole. .. ' ers. communicate more clearlv than others Some states have mor Some statesmen b. . . e tu ti o:. C bear for a gi\en objecti,e than others. It is the speCLil CS ora !11ven~\\er to nnCJ to a o intrinsic difference between t:ompeiJence and deterrenc:e thatSldete on. not any th . . . . . rmmes e ' clanty mth whtch an objective is perceived. . \\'e must, therefore, look elsewhere for the reason as to w h\. compellence 1 s . 1 h d : comparative y ar er to ach1eve than deterrence It 1 not m ,,.hat one asks tes, . ethin another to do, b ut tn hou; one asks. With deterrence. state B ks as som ak 0 of . . A tn tl11s f:ash'ton: " D o not t e action X; for if ,ou do 1 "ill b- h . . th state as \ OUO\er e , "' 1 th' 1 b , \\" b head w1t 1 ts c u . " 1t compellence. state B asks something or siate . m this b . . "I f:as h10n: a:n now gomg to ash you 0\er the head with this club and will continue to do so untd you do what I want." In the former case, state A <..'ail easih- denY Rith great plausibility any intention of ha...i ng planned to take action X. 1~ the' latter case, state A cannot deny either that it is engaged in a given course of action or that it i~ being su~jected to pressure by state B. If the~.. are to be successful, compellent actions reqwre a state to alter its beha...ior in a manner quite ,isible to all in response to an equally visible forceful initiathe taken b, another state. In contrast to compeUent actions, deterrent threats are both easie; to appear to ha,e ignored or easier to acquiesce to 'vithout great loss of face. In contrast to deterrent threats, ent compeU actions more directly engage the prestige and the passions of the putupon state. Less prestige is lost in not doing something than in clearly altering behavior clue to pressure from another. In the case of compellence. a state has publicly committed its prestige and resources to a given line of conduct that it is now asked to give up. This is not so for deterrence. Thus. compellence is intrinsicallr harder to attain than deterrence, not because its objectives are '-aguer. but because it demands mere humiliation from the compelled state. The fourth purpose to which military power can be put is the most difficult_~ be precise about. Swaggering is in part a residual category. tl1e deplo~rrnent of m~ tary power for purposes other than defense, deterrence. cornpellen~. Forre 15 not aimed directly at dissuading another state from a~tcki_ng. at repelliJlg ~tta~ks, nor at compelling it to do something specific. The obJectwes ~or swaggermg more cliffuse, ill-defined and problematic than that. Swaggenng almost ah\ays involves only the peacefui use of force and is expressed usually in one of t\~'0 ways: displaying o~es military might at military exercises and national demon~ons an~ t buying or bui1ding the era's most prestigious weapons. The swagg,er use ofti~rrehlS OPOP . al d 0( r- - e or to sa / e th e most egoistic: It aims to enhance the nation pn e a
(1

14~

o:

:re

FIGUIEI

l -Hl

PART 2

THE USES Of FORCE

ART I TH FOUR

. I n 1('1 onw am ll o1l S of lts ru ler A state or states man swagg.;er.., ' ord~r to look anc) 'S I . rtnt to be taken senous1 1 ot 1 1s 111 I 1 eottnc ils . v >' 1l w fe(l more powe rfuI an d unpo a ' 1 : . . . Id . . ._-=no- to enhance the nation s unagc Ill t1I<',' cs of.others ol' .1 L mtemationa eciSIOll l11cuu o ' . 1 11 . ..;on's ticfense deterrent an<. c:o111pt ' nt <:aj)ahiliti . it. imarre IS en1 l:II1Cecl ' tlle nau l . ' . . . E'~ l" 1. . . d l>tlt 5..,vao-celi nu 1 not uncle1taken soleI) r H. < ' t.n p1. s 11nan J 01. vr mav also oe en1 1ance , oo o ' specific Swaggering is pursued because 1l o r1 .. to 1 ng ))restig et-; m ' these puq:>oses. cl . t he cI .. swagge 'ng J s r>ursued becau se of tl iC fll n HIJI('IIlal vean1iJI{T C' on 1eap. n . . /:') 0 f' states and sta tesme n f.OJ' l'"' SI)ect and r)restigc. Swag_g;enn g IS more '>0111Clhing to b~> "" .. -1 .. r ]f.! to 1 e etOI)]O)'CcJ for a S11eclflc. COI1SC !OUS \ l 1 enjoyed 1or 1 tse u 1a.J1 1 . . HJ111!)11 - 0.lll cnd. And vet, the instrumental role of swaggenng CatlnO~ be lc~lally dJs<.:ounted becau se of the fundamental relation between ~orce anti fo:cJgn poll<:~ that it oht ain~ . 1 on m an anarc1 . envtrm111ent Be'"'LISe there JS a connect1 . btlwe en tlte mil ittn 11c ...... . < J . . cht tmght tb at a na no11 15 tllot10 to possess and the success tl1 at Ll achteves. 111 attnini11,g . . ob.1 ecn ves, the enJ1ancement of a states statUI e 111 the e)es ol. othe1 can alwa,s 1ts . . . . . . _ , . ,. be 'ustified on realpolitik lines. If S\.vaggenng eauses other tales to lake ones 1 nterest~ more seriously into account, then the gener.al i~terests of the state \- i ll benefi t. v Even in its instrumental role, however, swaggenng 1S unde ttaken less for any rri,cn end than for all ends. The swaggering [uncti on of militc.uy powe r i thus at one and the same time the most comprehensive and the most diffus e, the most versatile in its effects and t11e least focused in its imme diate aims, the most instrum ental in the long run and the least instrumental in the short run, easy to j~sti fY .on hardheaded groun ds and often undeJtaken on emotional gro~nds. Sv.r~~enng m1 the rational .xes and irrational more than the other three functi ons of m1htruy powe r and, for that reason , remains both pervasive in intern ational relations and elusive to describe. Oefense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering-these are the four general purposes for which force can be employed. Discrimina ting among them analytically, howe ver, is easier than applyi ng them in practice. This is due to t\.vo factors. First, we need to know the motives behind an act in order to judge its purpose: but the probl em Le; tJ1at motives can not be reac:UJy inferred from actions because several motives can be served by the same action . But neither can one readi ly in1er the motives of a state from what it publicly or officially proclaims them to be. Such statements should not necessarily be taken at face value because of the role that bluff and dissimulation play in statecraft. Such statem ents are also often concocted with domestic political, not foreign audie nces in mind , or e lse are deliberate exercises in studied ambiguity. Motives are important in order to inte rpret actions, but neither actions nor words always clearly deline ate motives. It is, moreover, especially difficuJt to distinguish defensive from compeU ent actions and deterrent from swaggering ones unless we know the reasons for which they were undertaken. Peaceful defensive prepa rations often look largely the s~me as peaceful <:.-ompellent ones. Defensive attacks are nearl y indistinguishabl e fro m oompellent ones. Is he who attackli first the defender or the compelle r? Deterrence and swaggering both involve the acquisition and display of an era's prestigious weapons. Are such weapons acquired to enhru1c:e prestige or to dissuade all attack ~ Second, to make matters worse, consider the following exam ple. Germ an~, launched an attack upon France and Russia at the end of July 1914 and there~) began World War I. There are two schools of thought as to why Germany did t]us.

holds that ; . II!Otl\ <:~we re acrrress . 147 . l:'lb vc-ternto . I n ifl and elc,atJ ll .,. the slat us of' a world . . na aggrandizement g... ' . enp1 A th re . economic; e prevc n lJ\'e "11' 1 1 nee c.lcl(;nsive Sh w no er holds that h, . wer , _ .. ._ . e struck first b . <:r motl\es lernent, slo'' slt ,u ):. d.ttJon , and then inevit 11 ecausc he feared ~ . c I 1 I' I a) e attack b . h s foes w wm 'l u e t were daiJy incre - h . ) er two powerf11 t enclr. 1OJ > -<ts1 t e1r l t ng . ne1 1 g 1was. She struck whde !>he had th e chance to 'Win 1111 I ary ll11ght faster than she It is not simpl e to decide which school th 1 e more ne 1 5 1 . can marshalI eVJc en<:(' to budti a powerful cas . ar ycorrect because hoth I 1 .1t the secon (l 1s <.: oser to t 1e truth . There e. th . Assume for tl1C 1nomcnt, tJ 1ough tl1' I en two bJ (1 ) Germany launc 1eti an attack becau se aleWCJ.<; the .poss1 11 to consider:, it ties lanning to attack her ultimately anti Germa h d ~e that htr foes were P ,. ny a t1 \'.d e (2) Germany felt she ),ad reasonable evitie nce of her ~ , .e 1 enc:e to prove it: or tual ly but in fact her evide nce was wrong bee ohes 1 ~tellt to attack her even. aust: s e mtsperc:e , d h . . 1 l e1r mtent from 'their acbons. I f tI1e fi rst was the case the "e . , , . n ask 15 responstble was Germanys cliplomac:y in the fifte we must b r th question.. How en vears . and blundering as it was, i11 breeding hostility in her ~ei b eore 1914 aggress1 ? ve in the knowledge that they would eventually ha,e struc~ orb ~ferm~y attacked s. r di pIomat1 c record was a SlgJ1tfi cant 1actor in c:ausing th er, Iut 1hher fifteen-\ear t ' . em o ay t ese plans must we coneIude t1 Germany m 1914 was merely acting d r . ? \ 1at . d b . e,enstve1 .. lust we confine our JU gmen t a out th e defenstve or aggressive nature ofth y . h 1. . to or even the year m w 11 1t occurred? If not how man)' )ear b ekact hi t e month . .ch s ac storv do we m go m ?rder to make a judgment~ If the second was the case. then we must ask this queshon: If Germany attacked m the belief, mistakenly as it turns out, that she would be attacked, must we conclude that Germany was actino- defen.sin.lv? ~1 ust we confine ~u r ju.d& ment about the defensi\'e or aggressive nature of the a~t simply to Germ anys beliefs abou t others' intent, without reference to their actual intent? It.is not easy to answ er tJ1ese questions. Fmt unately. we do not have to. Asking them IS enough because it illustrates that an asse sment of the legitimacy of a state's motives in using force is integral to the task of determiJting what its motives are. One cannot, that is, specify motives without at the same time making judgments about thei r legitimacy. The root cause of this need lie in the nature of state action . In anarc hy eve1 state is a valid judge of the legitim acy of its goals because y there is no supra national authority to enforce agreed upon ruJes. Because of the lack of unive rsal stand ards, we are forced to examine each case ,,; thin its given context and to make inc:Uvidual judcments about the meaning of the particulars. When individual judgm ent is exer~ised, individuals may well diFfer. Definitive answe rs are more li kely to be the exception rather than the rule. Wher e does all of this leave us? Our four categories tell us what are the four. possible purposes for which states can employ milit;uy power. The attributes of each alert us to the types of evide nce for which to search. But because the c:ont~xt ~.f an action is crucial in order to judge its ultimate purpo~e. these f~ur c~tegones ~anna t be applied mindlessly and ahistorically. Each states purpo ~e ul usmg fo.rc~ 10 a given instan ce must faJJ into one of these fou r categories. We know a p~n what the possibilities are. vVruch ooe it is, is an exercise iH judgn.lent, an exercthlSe that depends as much upon ase the particulars of the gJVen ~- as tt does upon e general featu res of the given category .. . (See Table l).
0 ne

FUNCTIONS OF FORCE

l -t '

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

TABLE 1 THE PURPOSES OF FORCE

1)1e
ve Defens1

Purpose

Mode

Targets

Chat act< ristics

--

--

The Diplomacy ofViolence

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

Fend off attacks Peaceful and physical and/or reduce damage of an attack

Primarily military Secondarily industrial

Defens1ve preoarations ea h n ave . . OISSUa!.IOn value Defens1ve preparations can look aggress1ve; F1rst stnkes can be taken for defense.

Deterrent

Prevent adversary from initiating an action Peaceful and Compellent Get adversary physical to stop doing something or start doing something Peaceful Swaggering Enhance prestige

Peaceful

Primarily civilian Tertiarily military

Threats of retaliation made as not to have to be carried out Second strike preparations can be viewed as first strike preparations. All three with Easy to recognize but hard to achieve; no clear Competent actions can be ranking justified on defensive grounds. None Difficult to describe because of Instrumental and irrational nature, Swaggering can be threatening.

The usual distinction between diplomacv and fo rce . not merelv n th . ts , 1 in the relation between adve , . . h ' 1 e mstntments, words or bullets, )Ut rsanes-m t e i 11t I f . c erp ayo motives . and the role of communic.:ation, understanclings <: ompromt.se. and restra 0 t o1 1 . . . . " macy JS barg<unmg; 1t seek<; outcomes that though not I'deal r ett herparty . P ob ror . arc et1an ter for both t1 some of the alternatives In diP1 1 omacy eac1 party somewh t a . . 1at controls w1 tI1e otl1cr wants, and can get more by comprom1se. exc1 1ange, or col. . . , . , . gn . laborahon than by tctkmg thmgs m h1s own hands and 1 onng the ot1 ,s w1shes 1er . The bargammg can. he pohte or. rude' entail threats as well , oners, assume a status as er . quo or 1gno~e all ~1ghts. and pnvileges, and assume mjstrust rather than trust. But whether pohte or mtpohte, constructive or aggressive, respectful or v1CIOU.S, w het1 1er it occurs among friends or antagonists and whether or not there is a basis for trust and good,vill, there must be some .common interest, if only in the avoidanc-e of mutual damage, and an awareness of the need to make the other partv prefer an out' come acceptable to oneself. With enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Some things a counhy wants it can take, and some things it has it can keep, by sheer strengtJ1, skill, and ingenuity. It can do this forcibly, accommodating only to opposing strength. skill, and ingenuity and without trying to appeal to an enemy's wishes. Forcibly a country can repel and expel, penetrate and occupy, seize. ex1:errninate. disarm and disable, confine, deny access, and directly frustrate intrusion or attack. It can, that is, if it ha<; enough strength. "Enough'' depends on how much an opponent has. There is something else, though, that force can do. It is less military, less heroic, less impersonal, and less unilateral; it is uglier, and has received less attention in ' Westem military strate!:,Y. In addition to seizing and holding, clisarmil1g and confining, penetrating and obstructing, and all that, military force can be used to ~t~rt. In addition to taking and protecting things of value it can d~stroy ~lue. In additiOn to weakening an enemy milit;uily it can cau.se an enemy plam suffenng.

THE CONTRAST OF BRUTE FORCE WITH COERCION

eone o;,e it to ~ulThere is a difference between taking what you want ano llla.J~.ulg som t you, - ~-=~ , }ou, between fending off assault and ma.J(~.ug so111 eont> afraid to assa take it c. d t . h d makinu t em amu o .1. . l b tw 0 e een 1olding what people are tl)'lng to ta.J~.e ai1
.I - 1..: .

,.. Go vriuht 1006 b) Yal~ Uni\'ersi~ . F rom Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. PP l-34. P. e Reprinted by pem1ission of Yale University Press.

149

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- .. O..VI11\\,. y

OF VlQl .,...,

. IJtt smmoue can rorciblv take and gid11g it up t .t\oid risk Ol ~ l'~'[\\ t't.'l"l l0 :->111f; \\ ' ' l (' _utd dCl<.' ITC'llt'P het ' l ' I brute (' . , . I di 11' ,1 , 1we between t e enst: ' . 0 1<:c d.tm;.\~t'. It t, t le c t t . nd blac:kmai I. between ac im 1 tlld L rcats h ] . - . . l t' l ctween congues cl .. 1 .mu tnhtnlt a ron. > . aJ .. 111tdipl omatic" rec:onr'>t h1 c;tnrwtl 1 . t is the diflt'rence between the 11111 1ater: "' ctnd , . ] I . . b s don the power to hurt. t"'t'r{'t\'e c tp onMC) ,t e _ Tl ely "militm) ;' or "uudiplomatic:" recou rse t e,cru1 1e pUI T I1e contn\S ts are s ' ' . t1 encrth no l c n cn l\ inlcnsls; tht . , o . '11 . s e> <.:ot r{orct) e action IS concerned w1th enemythe vel) ' CXJ tJ u]l 15 . 1Ioitation of e nl'l11\' wa nts . , f -} er tO 1 wrt, lOLio ' . . . ' 111 1 C (;' use o t le pow 1\' th . aJiy measured relative to enem.' st rength , tl1r on , r Al cl b te stTeng IS usu e tears. 1 ru ile tl. te power to hurt is t\pi callv not ncl11<:cd bv th" 1 .J: . tl ' O posinutheot1 er,w1 1 - 1 ~ twec ~ P o . turn Opposinu strengths ma) c<mce c~ach olhcr. pain enenws power to 1 m re twt o , l: 'I] ss. to bwt tlte ere dbJ o f a tl1rcat. antl t Iw ahilih, 1 1 rtv . d ef do not T 1e w1 mgne ' " '' an gn . h t . 1 indeed depend on how much lhP achc rsarv <:an u to ex.T'1]01t tl1e power to u1 "' ' . . . -~b l tttJe or nothing about an ac1 ary pam or gncf lhat ,er. hurt m return ut t 1ere rs 1 . d . ,..,n T..vo sides cannot both overcome eac:h otlwr "~th dLrect1 re uces ones 0 . )' . strengtl1; tl1 111 ay both be able to hurt each ot I1er. \\,.1tl1 strc>ngth they c:an supenor ey tl . .n spute ob~ect s of va1 e ; ,t]1sheer violence thev can des trO\' lt>m. u ' ' . di And brute force succeeds when it is used, wh.ereas the pow: r to hmt IS most successful when held in reserve. It is tl1e threat of. dan"lage, ?r o! more dam ..~gc to come, that can make someone yield or comply It 1~ latent ,,~)e~cc that can mAuence someone's choice-viole nce that can still be \\1thheld or ~~Hc~ed or that a ,ictim believes can be .,vithheld or inflicted. The threat of paw tnes to structme someone's motives, while brute force tries to o,ercOJ~e his strength. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some perforrn ance of it. \\ heth er it is sheer tenoristic violence to induce an irrational response, or cool premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it and ma~ do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters. It is the expectation of rrwre violence that gets the wanted behavior. if the power to hurt can get it at all. To exploit a capacity for hurting and i.nfucting damage one needs to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him and one needs the adve rsary to understand what behavior of his wiiJ cause the violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld. The victim has to know what is wanted, and he lll<l)' have to be assured of what is not wanted. The pain and suffering have to appear co11t in gent on his behavior; it is not the threat alone that is effective-th e threat of pain or loss if he fails to comp1y-but the corresponding assu rance, possibly an implicit one. that he can avoid the pain or loss if he does comply. The p rospect of certain death may stun him, but it gives him no choice. Coercion by threat of damage also requires that our interests ancl our oppo ne~t's n?t be. absolutely opposed. If his pain were our greatest delight and our satisfac:ti~n Ius great woe, we would just proceed to hurt and to frustrate each other. It 15 when his pain gives us little or no satisfaction compared 'vith what l~e can do for us, and the action or inaction that satisfies us costs him less than the p<Wl we can. cause, that there is room for coercion. Coercion requires finding a bargain. arrang.ng for him to be better off doing what we want-wors e off not doing what we want-when he takes t he th reatened penalty into account. ..

This cliffcrc.:lt c b( tw<t n e:o(rc:ion and h t . r . 'l ,..strumcnl. .i P In rat cI0\\11 Comancl a and tc- orcc ~ soft<:n In the intcJat . e nl . tl1e 1" their . o cxt<:rmi . t . 1 a\ "' .,;cl V11l<i.!<-" to 111akc th<'m behave na <: ltern was hn1t,- r, to r.... w~ e:oerc:i\. cl' I , ,, >r<<: wer to hutt. The pam and !()ss to the lndians . - I t! 1p c>tnat). based on tlw , po mlg l t la\'( look cl way as tJ ollwt; t1 t ,.rr 1e 11: 1 Nen<.:e was one of e . nuc:h the sanw one cl because l IH?\ \\'C'rt' . I PHlp<.lse and lt r 111 t w way or somebocl <: ec:t. r [nJ jan_o; \\E!rc: kilje . ' . ' Y . clesprured of makmg lhe m behave and <.:o I' wanted th C Ianc1 or the authori. tr , oes u ~ 1 was pure unilateral force u not <.:on fine tlem anc1decided to terrninate them, t 1at lf . . . ex 1 l ther Indians behave. that W<LS coercive violence ~0111e ncl1 11s were killeel to make . cl < o . . Th G , . . . --or 't was effecb\ e. e et mans at Verclun I)erc:e1 . cl lnten ccl to be, wheth er. or not h 1 ' e t em selves t0 b h ndreds of thousands of French soldiers in a gru . .. e c ewmg up l)l1 esome ose was to eHmi.nate a military obstacle-the Fren h. r meatgn ncler.,. lf t he purP C: IOJantnman r tary "asset" rather tl1;m as a warm human being-the ffi " . vie~ecl . a rrn'j1as 1 r ve uniJateral exercise o f 111 1 1tary 1 0rce. If instead the ob O ens1 at \ erdun was a t . " JeC was to make the Jo 0 f oung men-not o f 1mpersonal effectives," but of sons h b' ds r 1 s ) . . , us an , 1athers and the ride ofFrencI1 man I l-so angUtshmg as to be unend 11 1oot k P . f' l .I l . ura) e, to ma e surrendE:r a welcome relre anc to spor t 1e foretaste of an AJlied victory th 1 t . . 1 d 1 en was an exerc1se m coerciOn, 111 app 1e v1o. ence, mtended to offer relief Llpon ac, commadation An cl of . course, since any use of force tends to be brutal' thoughtless vengeC..1 l: b , 1 w, or p run o stinate, the motlVes themselves can be mixed and confused. The fact that heroism and brutal!ty can be ei.th~r ~oerci:e diplomacy or a contest in pure strength does not promise that the distinction WJJI be made, and the strategies enHghtened bv the distinction, every time some vicious enterprise gets launched. . . . War appears to be, or threatens to be, not so much a contest of strength as one of endurance, nerve, obstinacy, and pain. It appears to be, and threatens to be, not so much a contest of milltary strength as a bargaining process-dirty, ext ortionate, and often quite reluctant bargaining on one side or both-nevertheless a baruain mg process. The difference cannot quite be ex'Pressed as one between the use of force and the threat of force. The actions involved in forcible accomplishment, on tl1e one hand, and in fulfilling a threat, on the other, can be quite different. Sometimes the most effective direct action inflicts enough cost or pain on the enemy to serve as a threat, sometimes not. The United States threatens the Soviet Union witb virtual destruction of its society in the event of a surprise attack on the United States; a hundred million deaths are awesome as pure damage, but they are useless in stop~ing the Soviet attack especially if the threat is to do it all afterward ~nyway. So it rs worthwhile to keep the concepts distinct-to distinguish forcibJe action from.the threat of pain-recog nizing that some actions serve as both a means of forcible accomplishment and a means of inRictinu pure damage: some do not. Hostages tend to entail almost pure pain and dam;ge, as do all forms of reprisal after th~ fact. Some modes of self-defense may exact so little in blood or treasure as to ent~J negligible violence; and some forcible actions entail so much dolence that thelr threat can be effective by itself. . . 1 lS The power to hurt though it can usuallv accomp1 1 no tl ung directh' . potenIS " rIaJ1Y more versatile than a straightforward' capacity 1 'bl cromplishment ' for orcl e a . h . By al . orce one we cannot even lead a horse to water-"e ha\e to drag hun-nlUC

L.C.I'ICE

151

. . . tion any collaboration d n ~t anything, Out I . ' .J . . k A . am nnatJve ac . requtres t 1at an opp()nent or a \IJ<;. . less make him wu1 . ll) . or e>.tennu1 a~on ' . u I P h,-sic~u exclusion, expu swn. I)' to stop or get out. The. threat of pru.11 anu dal"' ., age .1 . 1f on d ytlliJ10' he can do IS polenha lv sus<;eptiblc tim do sometlung. even . l) . o . Iurn wruI t to do It ' an . an omplish what requtres nt) eo. aI)Oration 'fhlO !Till)' make e y (I e can on 1 ace inducement. Brute ore ' l . e of unarmed eo m bat: One f'an disable a m . 1c l1l.m lo Jai l one has an . . Ie ts ill us t ra ted b)' a tee uuqu l killing blows, hut to ta . i p1 nc1p or fractunng.'C e along" holds are those t l1at threaten pai o r bv various stunnmg, 1 1 or efwrts om / exploit the ma~ ~own . f j0 n as tile victim complies. giving hi111 the option of' disablement, gMng rehe as g 1 own legs to getto jail. e pain and damage can be use d or threatened t . usmg us o d . al. . ence-pur Th fact that VlO1 to paralyze . t. date and to blackmruJ, to emorc IZe and e ' . l . b coerce and to deter, to m mu f dirty bargaining, does not y any means 1mp y that vio. . in a consctous process o and meaningless or, even w1 purpos1ve, m danger of 1en t 1 ft . "r lence LS not o en wan 1 wars were often qUJ.te "tota1 101. .t he 1 er, the men os f J d A1.1 ent . 01 d tl an getting out o 1 t t d tll the women sold as slaves, the boys castrate , 1e cattle slaugh. bemg pu o ea ' 1 . f tered and the buildings Jeveled, for the sake o ~evenge, JUStice, persona gam, or ,y custorn. If an enemv bombs a city, by .des1gn or by carelessness., we usuallv . , mere1 bomb his if we can. In the excitement and fatigue of warfare, revenge IS one of the few satisfactions that can be savored. . .. Pure violence, like fire, can be harnessed to a purpose; that does not mean that behind every holocaust is a shrewd intention successfully fulfilled But if the occurrence of violence does not always bespeak a shrewd purpose, the absence of pain and destruction is no sign that violence was idle. Violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used. Successful threats are those that do not have to be carried out. ...

152

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

SCHELLING I THE DIPLOM . ACY OF VIOLENCE

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF PAIN AND DAMAGE

Pure violence, non military violence, appears most conspicuously in relations between une~~al c:ountries, where there is no substantial military challenge and the outcome of military engagement is not ill question: Hitler could make his threats contemptuously and brutally against Austria; he could make tl1em, if he wished, in a more refined w~y ~ainst Denmark It is noteworthy that it was Hitler, not his generals, who used this kind of language; proud military establishments do not like to think of themse~~es as extortionists. Their favorite job is to deliver victory, to dispose of opposing ~ilitary force and to leave most of the civilian violence to politics and diplomacy. But ~there is no room for doubt how a contest in strength will come out, it may be pos ible . S to. bypass the mili'tary stage altogether and to proceed at once to the coercive bargammg. A t}pical confrontation of unequal forces occurs at ilie end of a war between '~c ce ' . tor and vanquished Wh was vuln rable aft . ere Austna was vulnerable before a shot was fired, Fran are th ~ wh er Jts military shield had collapsed in 1940. Surrender negotiations fteere the threat of civil violence can come to the fore. Surrender oego~p are o n so one-sided, or the potential violence so unmist'akable, cllat

. ' ctininc stK't'('l'ds ~11 1d tlt(' vi olenc:~: re 111 ains tn resene B l th f: . be:l l o" n r th. cuware ac.:t thatJOost of the . -tual dam<tg(' was dl)lj (' dming the military st . . age o . l . ,tc pnor to \lctorv and r. at re>t does not .rue,m I 1 vrolc uc.c wa'i idJ( m ti IC a, term tl ' I . de r~ " ' 1 a on Ythat it was latent and the th real ~>f it stt<;<;t.><>sflll. . . . l The Hussm11s <;rmhed Budapest in 1956 . d c.:owec Pola d an . n There l'>Odng coun tn es. 1 I was a lag of ten yetrs betwceu m.. ta and other neigh. lll ' , . ry vtc.:tory and this ..)1ow of violcn<;f', Hl t l w prin<:iplc was the one [ t] I . . M'l' llned JUS exp c . 1 cl :> .t . d h r 1 tary v1c.:tory . 5 often th e prC' u e to vJolcn<;c, not the encl of 1 ruJ vto an t c rac:t th t . 1. h a ~uce:ess vc lence is usually held m rese1 should not deceive . b us a out t t role 1t I . . 1 . What about pure v1o en<;e during war itself the . Ht<.tion of pa Pays. f~ . d 111 ' . as a military techn1que? Is the threat of pain involved 1 ..111 h m a~. su enng on) t e poltttc.:al use of victory, or is it a decisive te<;hniq uc of war itself? . Evidently hetween tmequal powers it hac; been part 0 f . r wanare. Colomal con... .. . quest has orten been a matter o1 punitive expeditions" rath er tl 1 uenume mJJ 1tary r tJ tn.b esmen escape into the brush you c,ln anurn thetr villages . . .. b 0 engagements. I .1e . . . ' w1thout them unt1l they assent to re<;eJve what' in strikingly modem language used , .. ' to be knov.rn as tI1e Queens prote<;tion.". . . Pure hurti.ng, as ~ miJitary tactic, appeared in some of the militarv actions agai~st the pl~tns I nc.lran~. In 1868, during the war \vith the Cheyennes.' General Shendan dectded that hrs best hope was to attack the Indians in their winter camps. His reason.ing w~s that the Indians couJd maraud as they pleased during the seasons when ilieu pon1es could subsist on grass, and in the \vinter hide awav in remote places. "To disabuse their minds from the idea that they were secu re f;om punishment, and to strike at a period when they were helpless to mo\e their stock and viJiages, a winter campaign was projected against the large bands hidin(J' awav 0 1 in the Indian tenitory." . These were not military engagements; tlley '"'ere punitive attacks on people. They were an effort to subdue by the use of violence. \vithout a futile attempt to draw the enemy's military forces into decisive battle. They were "massive retaliation" on a diminutive scale, witl1 local effect<; not unlike those of Hiroshima. The Indians themselves totally lacked organization and discipline, and typical ly could not afford enough tary am munitions for target practice and were 110 mW match for the calvary: their own rudimentary strategy was at best one of harassment and reprisal. Half a century of Indian fighting in the West left us a legacy of cavalry tactics; but it is hard to find a serious treatise on American strategy against the Indians or Indian strategy against the whites. The twentieth is not the first century in which retaliation has been part of our strategy, but it is the fixst in which we have systematically recognized it. Making it "terrible beyond endurance" is \Nhat we associate with ~geria ~d Palestine, the crusrung of Budapest, and the tribal warf~r~ in c : ntral Afnca. But 111 ~he great wars of the last hundred years it was usually rmhta:ry victory. not the hurt1~1g of the people, that was decisive; General Sherman's attempt to make war hell for the Southern people did not come to epitomize military strategy .for the ce~t~ry to follow. To seek out and destroy the enemy's military force. to adue\e a cru~hmg Victory over enemy armies, was still the avowed purpose and the central ~m of ras seen as an altemattt:e to t. .1 Ame tary n<;an strategy in both world wars. M11 ac ton " barg ammg, not a process of bargaining.

153

154

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

SCHELLING 1 THE DIPLOMAcY
OF VIOLENCE L5S

The reason is not that chilized ~untries aJe 0 a,er t ;o_lt~ trti n? people Lh r .. I 'lit . wars (:\or were all of the p.u llUIMilt<; m th at tl1ey pre1~r pure y m1 a~ . ese 1 tc<.IlJH> 1 . . geogr wars . u Og\ c1nd enti re I,. Cl\'l zed .) The reason is apparentlv that t 1e " tk ap y 1po\\'ers < uring the<.: 1 of 1 _ ,..r. 1 tc ar between anvthing 1 ~e equa wa1 1 re, at eas ror a w. .a . . . f. b . 1... . . enturv endin(J in \\'orld War Il, kept coerCI\e vtolen~e rom emg < CC: ISI\ c before milita~. 0 . . \1Cton was ac1 ueved . Blockade indeed was rumed.at the ''hole cne mv natic not .li . m. . 1 1 .ts .:l=t'" n l . . concentrated. on 1 nuu cu:' forces' ilie Gennan c1 ans " 10 < ecl of inJluen7.a 10 1 e . tl1e F trst \\'orld ,, .ar"ere ,;ctims directed at thew 10j ('Ountn.. .lt has never l.. . "' . . . x:cn . c1 w he th blockade of the South m the C.v1 \\ ar or ol the Central p qwte ear er .c . B . . ow. ers in both world wars, or submarine wanare agrunst ntmn- was expected to make war unendurable for t]1e people or just to weaken the enem~ forces by uen\. . econonuc su pport- BotJ1 arguments were made. but the re was no need to L.. . lfl<J Je cl~ about the purpose as long as eiilier_p~:rose was re<Jarded as legitimate and either might be sened. "Strategic bo~bmg ~f e~em_y bome~an~ was also <X:<:asionallv rationalized in tenns of ilie pam and pnvation 1t could 1nf- et on people and h the chil damage it could do to the nation, as an effort to displa~ either to tlle population or to the enem, leadership that surrende r was better than persistenc:e in \-iew of the damage th~t could be done. It was also rationalized in more 'military" tenns, as a way of selecti,ely den)ing war material to the troops or as a way of generally weakening the economy on which the military effort rested. But terrorism -as ,;olence intended to coerce the enem~( rather than to weaken him m~itari1y-blockade and strategic bombing b~- themseh-es ,,- not ere quite up to the job in eiilier world war in Europe. (They might ha,e been sufficient in the war with Japan after straightforward military action had brought American aircraft into range. ) Airplanes could not quite make punitive, coercive 'iolen(;e decisive in Europe, at least on a tolerable time schedule , and preclude the need to defeat or to destroy enemy forces as long as they had nothing but comentional explosives and incendiaries to carry. Hitler's \'-1 buzz bomb and his Y-2 rocket are fairly pure cases of weapons whose purpose was to intimidate, to hurt Britain itself rather than Allied military forces. What the V-2 needed was a puniti,e pa~load worth CaTI')ing, and the Germans did not have it. Some of th e expectations in the 1920s and the 1930s that anotller major war would be one of pure civilian ,;olenc:e, of shock and terror from the skies, were not borne out by the a"ailable technol~: The threat_of puniti\e violence kept occupied c.--ountries quiescen t; but the "-ars ~ won m Europe on the basis of brute strength and skill and not by intimida ~ not ~- the threat of ci\ilian "iolenc:e but by the application of military forc.-e. Military "1ctory was still the price of admission. Latent violence against people was reserved for the politics of surrender and occupation. The great exception was the two atomic bombs on Japanese cities. These were weaponstbei of tenor and shock. They hurt, and promise d more hurt, and iliat was u._,;;ull' purpose The few .. mall" ,]: ect 5 -- bu weapons we had were undoubtedly of some wr vcuue t their e ad = :tan sense.a.L~ U .ted nonnous vantage was in pure violence. In a mw . rities u~e a m States could gam a little b}' destruction of two Japanese dustnal in cMiian m . Himduma was tfu; se~, the Japanese could lose much. The bomb that lut DOt the dead ; at all of Ja~an. The political target of the bo~b "':~ or the factones they worked in, but the sUIVJ'ors

TokyO- The tw< hr> s '>~ wtre in the tradition of Sheridan , .. , 1 Sherman iu ( ,('OrAia. Whether in the en-1 th . agamst the Comanches <J ilC sa -ted them. japaHesc t1\'(:;S or American lives u h ose two .bombs ved I'1ves or th . was I r ,w punttive {;()(: . I . uglier th an strah; 1t orward military force or ,.,e er .. . rcvt V!o enc:e L S h .. ore CIV!1 t7.ed ,vhethe t . . ore or less human(" t an military destruction w ' r error IS Ol . I d . . ' e c:an at 1 perceive th t th east ombs on Htros urna an :\agasaki represented viol . _ a e b 1 k nd not mam y an atlac on Japan . material strengthence agrunst the <.'()untrv itself s Th re a . 1 e e 'ect of the bombs and their purpose, Wa!> not rnam y the military destruction they accom lish cl b ' pain and the shock and the promise of more. P e ut the

THE NUCLEAR CONTRIBUTION TO TERROR AND VIOLENCE

Man has, it is sajd, for the first time in hLstory enough military power to eHminate his species from t~e. ea~h, weapons against wbic:h there L'i no conceivable defense. War has become, 1t IS srud, so destructi ve and terrible that it ceases to be an instrument of national power. "For the first time in human history," savs ~ax Lemer in a book whose ~tle, The Age of Overkill. conveys the point, "men' ba,e bottled up a power .. . whtch they have ilius far not dared to use." And Soviet military authorities, whose party dislikes having to accommodate an entire tbeorv of historv to a single technological event, have had to re-examine a set of principles that had been given the embarrassing name of "permanently operating factors" in warfare. Indeed, our era is epitomized by ,.,ords like "the first time in human historv," and by the abdication of what was "permanent. For dramatic impact these statements are splendid. Some of them display a tendency, not at all necessary, to belittle the catastrophe of earner wars. They may exaggerate the historical novelty of deterrence and the balanc-e of terror.2 \fore important, they do not help to identify just what is new about war when so much destructive energy can be packed in warheads at a price that permits advanc:ed countries to have them in large numbers. Nuclear warheads are incomparably more devastating than anything packaged before. What does that imply about war? It is not true that for the first time in history man has the capability to destroy a large fraction, even the major part, of the human race. Japan was defenseless by August 1945. With a combination of bombing and blockade. eventuaU invasion. y and if necessary the deliberate spread of ilisease. the l,;nited States ~uld probab~ have exterminated the population of ilie Japanese islands \\1thout nuclear weapons. . .. It is a grisly thing to talk about. We did not do it and it is not imagin~ble that we would have done it. \Ye had no reason; if we had had a reason. we \\ouJd not have the persisten ce of purpose once the fury of war had been dissipat~ in _victory and we had taken on the task of the executioner. If we and our enemies m1ght do h uung to each other now, an cl to others t SUc a a.1.., as we1J 1 is not be<.-ause nuclear weapons have for the first time made it feasible. . .thin "' ear .-.uc1 weapons can do it qwckJ)'. 1io com press a catastrophic war w1 the Ji . f the span of time that a man can stav awake drastically changes the po tics 0 ~'. " Process of decision , the possibility of c.-entraJ contro1and restraint the moti"'3tiODS
~

uU:::OO

lMl

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

. tl ' k ,.,.,cl reA " h,J r ,<; il1 I) ect t.ll l>l ll)lt' in charge. and the capac1tYto Wl " rogres . ' 2oo 000 000 Huss1ans 11 f tl ' s. lt 0 is imaginablt> that we might destroy I . ' lC prcse: ... . .. . of the past. t 1 no n 1 magi nab! . nt, s thoutrh not 80 000 000 Japanese sn a was ... . c e, 1t is t' . imagined. It is imaginable because Jt couId be done m H mor n 111 the l\;VJn kLmg of m e\'e at the last trumpet... fl -1 ' . ' h 1 . . little discussion o JOW an ;u -out war might b Tlus may be w y t lere IS so "b I . I e . . le do not e.>:pect it to be roug 1t to < c osc, but just t brought to a close. Peop ryth' has been spent. It is also \\'h~ tlw idea of ''lirnt ~ come to an end when eve mg li er wars. 1 k 1 1 c: l 1 \\ oriel \ Va1 eu ecent vears. Ear 1 e 1, 't . war has become so expuCJ m r b . 1 rs 1 .. War were umited y termmatwn , )y an ending th and I I or the Franco- Pruss1 an . . 1 . at 1 negotiation th . d 0 f greatest potential vro en<:c, )}' occurred before the peno c 1 1 cl at . and privation to bear but orten prec U( c the snassh h reat of pa:m brought the t . 'e . f . .. . l e \Vith nuclear weapons avar1 ablc. t1 restramt of 0 1e ,~ exercl.se o CIVI1 v1o enc ran .. . 1. . . . . ~coJne of a contest of miJ1tary str engt 1. 1 estramt, to occu r lence cannot await the OUl
:u

SCHELLING I THE DIPLOM ACY OF VIOLENCE

I 57

at all must occur during war itself. . This is a difference between nude~ weap.ons and bayon~ls. Jt .Is n~t in the b f 1 tl: ev can eventually kill but 1n the speed WJlh wh1 rt can be eh ndum ~r ohpeop eral~.,:tion of decision in the divorce of the war from political t one, m t e cen 1 process, and in computerized programs that threaten to take t 1e war out of human hands once it begins. . That nuclear weapons make it possible to compress the fu I)' of global war into a few hours does not mean that they make it ineaitable. \ Ve ha,e stiU to ask whether that is the way a major nuclear war would be fought, or ought to be fought. Nevertheless, that the whole war might go off ~e one big stri ng of firecrackers makes a critical difference between our conception of nuclear war and the world wars we have experienced .... There is another difference. In the past it has usually been the victors who could do what they pleased to the enemy. \\far has often been "total war" for the loser. With deadly monotony the Persians, Greeks and Romans "put to death all men of military age, and sold the women and children into slavery," leaving the defeated territory nothing but its name untiJ new settlers arrived sometime later. But the defeated could not do the same to their victors. The boys could be castrated and sold only after the war had been won, and only on the side that lost it. The power to hurt could be brought to bear only after military strength had achieved victory. The same sequence characterized the great wars of this century; for reasons of technology and geography, military force has usually had to pene ~te, to exhaust, or to collapse opposing military force to achieve military Vl~ory:-hefore it could be brought to bear on the enemy nation itself. The Allies m World War I could not inflict coercive pain and suffering directly 00 the Germans in a decisive way untiJ they muld defeat the German army; and the Germ~ could not coerce the French people with bayonets unless they first ~at the Allied troops that stood in their way. With two-dimensional warfare, there 15 a tenden? for troops to confront each other, shielding their own lands while attempting to press into each other's. Small penetrations could not do major cia_rn : totheythe people; large penetrati.ons were so destructive of military organizllt!On usually ended the military phase of the war.
u..<& '

l'Juclear W<'P' t~ tnake it possible to cl0 thout first <K 1 vtc.:tory. With nuclcar . monstrous VJo1 11<:\ m~ cnce tu th<: cneny \VI '" eapons and t0 cla , ery, one expects to p< net rate an enemy homeland v.rith . ys me;m~ of dtliv., ..v force. \\'hat nuciC'ar wvapons have don out first <:ollapsing his militw 1 . fi I e, or appear to d0 1 .5 '..:nd of warfar< to ro,t p ace. :\1 lH.:Iear weapons tl to promote this 1 . nd are respoustJ)Ie r t IlC lowered status of" .1.reaten to make war Icss militarv or . m1 1tarv v1 <:torv" 1 '' ~,,.ctory is no l ml!!,c:r n prerequ~sitefior hurting tl " ' at t c prcsE:nt tirnc. ' te enemy An 11 . 't against being terribly hurt. One need not wait til h h < IS no assuran<:e rrfl_icting "unendu rablc damagc::s on his enem uOn e as won the war before t ost the war. There was a time when the assu Y . ne fneed not was't unti1 hc has . l . ran<.:e o I rna k nationa.lleaclers not just willin \lctorv-false or genume assurance coulc c but . . . tic about ,:var. Not now. g somet1mes enthusiasNot only can nuclear weapons hurt the enemy b r1 th . e ore e war has been lec:1 . and perhaps hurt ( stvely enough to make the mlt won, . . 'cl I . . l h . . r 1 ary engagement a<:ademic but 1t rs 'vVI e y assu mec t at m a maJor war that is all tl: d . .' . cl I I . ley can o. \llaJOr war rs often discusse as t 10ug 1 tt would .be only a contest in nati 1 l . ., ona cestruction. If this is indeed the case-d the destruction or cities and their popu1 ti'ons has become . a with nuclear weapons. the pnmary obj'ect in an all-out war th . . . . - e sequence of war' has ,been re\ersed. Instead. of destroyrng enemy forces as a prel d t . . u e o 1mposmg ones "'rill on the ene_my nat1on, one would have to destroy the nation as a means or a prel.ude to destroyr~g the enemy forces. If one cannot disable enemy forces without ~11rtually destroyrng th~ country, the victor does not even ha,e the option of spanng the conquered nation. He has already destroyed it. ,en with blockade and strategic bombing it could be supposed that a country would be defeated before it was destroyed, or would elect surrender before annihilation bad uone far. In the Civil War it could be hoped that the South would become too weak to fight before it became too weak to survive. For "all-out" \var, nuclear weapons threaten to reverse this sequence. So nuclear weapons do make a difference, marking an epoch in warfare. The difference is not just in the amount of destruction that ean be accomp)jshed but in the role of destruction and in the decision process. Nuclear weapons can change the speed of events, the control of events, the sequence of events, the relation of victor to vanquished, and the relation of homeland to fighting front. Deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on tJ1e threat of military defeat. \1\le may argue about the wisdom of announcing ..unconditional surrender" as an ai m in the last major war, but seem to expect unconditional destruction" as a matter of course in another one. Something like the same destruction always could be done. With nuclear ~veapons there is an expectation that it would be done.. . What.is new is the rdea that major war might be just a contest in the killing of countnes, or not e,en a t'Ontest but just two parallel exercises in devastation. . That is the difference nuclear weapons make. At least they nwy make the difference. They also may not. If the weapons themselves are ~~erable to attack. 0,r the machines that carrv them, a successful surprise might ehmmate tJle ?Ppo~ents means of retJibution. ' That an enormous exp1 can be packaged m. a smgle os1on bomb does not hy itself guarantee that the victor will recehe deadly purushment.
)U

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158
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PAIU 2 THE USES Of FORCE

f: .,.,, ,.h <+b.ar in a \Vestem town had ,!Jl nc1Uf;Sticm,d c.~ ~t en acmg ...-; JL "' 11 ( 1.r 1 :!IJnfiul,t>tfY<l.tih -'1 __ _..t.~. .. ._ .J:d uuarantee that both .\ \ CJlJ ( m " lo 'JU .1 one anuu~r. tl"' w not o ~"~ - (Jith L ~ ' - , ... eaw, nerrrnttmg ;t~, l!IJHr,d '"'<: 1,1 \ 1 , tnc sJl1Wer o f the two. u:;,:)s d-- ..lty weannn<;' r r. . ru"Jt back before be dled. .njght have been more concJU(1\ C to a rr rttiiiJJ~ b:.th.usl t ~~~ . Th PrV efficiertc.:\' of nudear wcaprm~ u, d rnala tJu. 1111.1J ~ tenor: or ofcaution. e "'-; ,. '-u 11 t: . 'f h ddcnJ1.eliminatethc encrmc, <:<~pa~Jllv lfJ ,.Iux .. t 1 OT starting war 1 t e)'' can su , ' " " ':t( }' .~.. ~ rl(o.L'"Jt..:Jitv AJtd tm:: re '. a oon ttal)' r """ m , that nudcar '''<:apom arr w Jl. vulrlfraiJJ < tt, IS . ' ~ attac' and prcNe ntA to be tum'bl' effaiive agamst C=ach othtr. J)lJ'>IIlO fi(J nr<cl,,,, .. , ..., . Id r r.....,r the:.v will be ~trO\'Cd before tlH:' ::tre I:JJJndud . .J ~.~ . . at~ 5boot the m qwc y mr '. ..L lab'- vu ""'Stt:matic destnJchon of the (rtc-rm C(Jilnt" < ru1 nfl WJus DO tas,_ avaJ .e L- t the '"J .. ' necessarv r~ to do it fast rather than slowly. Jrnaginc that nudca; dc"\lnll um bad to ;, !:lowly--t}'tat the bornbs oould be drc>p~..d C>nly (~nr~ p<~r d~y. Ilw pn1'>~< 1 would~ Yi different, 50mething like the most terron'>llc ~utnlla warftm: tm it massive stale~t happcms that nuclear W'df doe not have to 7/' slov.rly; bt;t it nt:t} also ntJt have to go ~peedjly. 11ae mere ~Men~ o~ nudear ~:ap<>n'> d<J<;o, not it'o(lf determine that every1hjng mu,&t go ofT m a hlmdmg flas],, an} mcm. tha~, tl.w ,1 must gPslowfy. Su,:le'dTWeaJ)C)OS do not simpHfy thin~ cjuite that rnuc.:h.. .. In \\Orld Wan 1 and 11 one went to worlr on en<-rny military fc>rcc'>. nr,t hil people. becau.se untiJ the enemy~ mi)jtary foroos had been U.ken care of Ul(:f<: wa; typieally not anything dec.ifii\'e that one oould do to the enemy nation il\(-;lf. 'n tr Germans did not, in World War J, refrain frorn bayoneti ng Frendt citizens hy tht milliorLt in the~ that the Allies would abstain from ~hooting up tht Ccrrna11 population. 'fhey could not get at the French c.:iti7.ens untiJ they had brtached tht Allied lines. Hitler tried to terrorize Londcm and did not mak~ if. Thl.: Alli('cl air foroos t.ook the Wdf Hraigbt to Hitler's tt:rritory, with at le-a.o,t some thouglJt of doir.~ in Germany what Sherman r~i7..ed he war~ doing in Georgia; but with th( bombing tedmok~ of World War JJ one could not afford to bypass tl 1C trcKJf>S and tp eu:Jusivcly for enemy populations not, anyway. in Germany. Witl nudc:ar ~one Jw that alternative. To ~mcentrate or the ~my's military ir~tallations while deJlberc:ttdy ltolding M reterve a JruiH.ivecap'd(it')' for d~tmyiug his dti<;S, for <:Xtcrmjnatirtg hi~ fX."~Jpit and elirmoating his society. on oondition that the enemy observE: similar restraint wifh resped to orM:i own society is not the "conventional approach." fn World Wan I aod lJ ttJe fint order of bu.~iness was to dc~troy ene my armed forc.t'S betcMte that was the on~ promising way to rnal: laim surrender. To fight a pure:~ military~ ..aJI-<Jtrt" wbHe h(Jiding in reserve a decisive eapacity for violence, 00 ooodition the enemy doli~. is not the way military (}pc~rations ha\C:

~ .wo gun... t

SCHEJ UNG I ffi DfPI..OM ACr OF ViOi.DfcE

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been Jlf'Pfoacbed. ' In the f'R'Ient era oonwmhatants appear to oo not only delihcratc targtLS ~~targets, In fact, noncombatants appeamd to j,e primary targets al die ends f1f the k'ale ofw-.ufare; thennormclear war threatened 'to be~ a contt)t in Jl o( cities aod ~~; and, at tl1e other end of the scale. insur 4L, terroriltic. We live in au era of dirty war. ...,._, -10P b war properly , military affair among comhatant5, 1 a and 1s r ~ to the twentieth century that we cannot keep it wifhjn de('ent --~dirty?

national Comrr1tttee had m rmnd. ~ raat tue ~~from abtJu l 164Js {{) th(.: ~ ~1\(Jl(;.(mi<.: tra w <>r m rrHJ(..L c.L 'n 11 WE:St E 4 -' . '- .."JTJ urope W' '> SOmt:thing superimJX_,.y;.cJ on SCK...ietv. It was 4 umt.-:-t"' "nza~~ m 11)' "' bi c _._ t,b<' tlaat were:: rnea">urt:cl in territf>rit:.i> anl '""~". ~ Tfi(Jnan.. es J if 1 ~ ' u, ""'-4Slon:ul} rncmfo'\. d:v . cJaims. l11e tnY'P~ were mo\tly rru.. -r<;.E;r.aries and the. ri ..a. ; ... ~ ; - ; or . 'J'laSti<: . '-' I JC, u\ au(Jfl lOT 'A-aT 'l.d,S fined to the anstocratic elite. ~fonarchs foucrht r,,, bi f te . l oon' .. r . !Y' dents of d15puttx.~ terram were more um<:erntd wiLt ~ ''>~~mtvrv. out tht resipr . . . " th, ut c.~~Jnr E:lr <.-r:ops and their daughters from marauding troop\ than with ~tlorn lh . ~ -''- _. . I C) CJ\.. C:C1tU!eUd-Wl{:;E: to. They were, as QUJnc.:y V\ nght rema rked m hlS dasstc StutLJ of War litt1t iJK:eJTJ.ed 00 that the territory in which they lived had a n~ SOVf:Tei'.rn ;; FurtJ >of.. itrroore, as r as rar the Ki~g of Pru~sta and ~e Emperor of Austria Nere c:rm<.-emed. the lo-.~ and enthus1asm of the Bohemtan farmer WC=re not dec:.1sivt Cf.m5!..a . rations. Jt exa_o;r. ~Ut: iS an geration to ref~r to E uropean -~ar duri~g.lhic; period as a sport of kin~. but oot a gross exaggeration. And the rmHtary logJ.stlc.:s of those days <."'nfinf:d mihtasv operatjons to a scale that did not require the enthusiasm of cs rnultitudt. ' Hurting p~le was not a dE:<.isive instnJment in warfare. Hurt:in" people or destroying pmperty only reduced the value of things that were being fou~ 0\er. to the disadvantage of both sides. F urtherrnore. the munarchs who c.:.ond.uctrd wars often rud not want to discredit the sodaJ institutions th~ shared with their ene " mies. Byp~sing an enemy monarch and taking the war straight to his people would have had revolutionary impHcations. D~trO}i.ng the opposing monarchy was often not in the interest of either ~ide; opposing SOYereigns had much more in c.'Omroon with e<U;h other than with thei r own subje<-1:5, and to discrerut the claims of a moruu-chy might have produced a disastrous backlash. It is nut surprising-()T, if it i~ surprising, not altogether astonishing- that on the European continent in that partic.:ular era war was fairly well confined to military ad:ivity. One oould still, in those days and in that part of the world, be con,:erned for the rights of nonc:ombatants and hope to devise rules that both sides in the war rrright ~rve. The rules might weJJ he obSE!rved because both sides had som~ to gam from preserving social order and not destroying the enemy. Rules mJght be a nuisance, but if thcv restrk-ted both sides the disadvantages might cancel oul This was changed during the Napoleonic wars. fn ~apoleon's F~ce. people l"artd about the outcome. The nation was mobilized. The war was a national effort, not Ju"t au ac.tivity of the elite. ft was botra poHtical and military geni_~ 011 the part f'f Napol(;on and his ministers that an entire nation could be mobilized for war. Propaganda became a tool of warfare, and war became "uJgarized. Many writers deplored this popularization ofwar, this involvement of < :rdtic ITtas5es. Jn fad the horrors we attribute to thermonuclear war were after .~ for;eseen oy many commentator L ' it. but s, some before the F:-+ \\'0 rid \Var and more u;x . ~ millions of the new "weapon" to which these terrors were ascribed was r"t'-
-,. <U ' ...J

1io Wl.S\-wr !.11 ::-<!tm it 1~ uv:ful u1 dhtirl?IJlS h t}rf*- ~ I .J. ~-,.nmb-ct~tr:t - ' J' p.<tJn r" t-,nlr and Hwtr nr.., - 1 : . ~ts m mt irr.cA-.tr~ of ' "' ' """' r.JS~~l<Jrt~ 10 th: r ,..,af:S are wort h d.s m;;m ftifl~ Lut dH-'i r "<;.Csw _. ''Jl) rJf'N"<:tf ~ ~ } t ., ... -net: lS rOt$"')v dt--.c . . .r r: rt!TV! during t W p<t-<; htt<-k huocJrE;t)vea.r!> r c L ~' :nptJW <>1 \\'~tern J:.<Uv r , 1 :~ a fl.i5tf1 nt:<J f.fr a)' . rl'>:~tfe is d1 in whir h the fX:tJpll may '' <:t IUJrt ~ . a.t : .1. ..,--'1 ~r' t7~11'JJ1 The fir>t ;>""b"" L, 1., - . 1 t 'Y ~m~JUeT'<tie oomlrr" ......- Th . status tnat pt(JP1 rJau un nn~ tnf!F>rvJirxl "'f .... . .~..l r ao.a.~Ju, ~ tS the . . . ,., r-., t'l\<11 r~A;u 'N'<ttfar tt , L

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PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

o

jt n a C tht 1 " test for I . na0-ona1 w:1rs ' spend ing . 1 . ' pt'Opl ~. passionatelY eugagec m 1 ;'~tha t a small .' total ' ictorv and de~perate to avoid total delee~t. ~oday '~ea;< 111 0 1 )U rn tens of rt l can cany enoug enet gy number ol: highlv trai ned pilots . . I the buildi n s t11ey Hve in; two or t 1ref' ~ t- . lons ago ther . . gfpeople using bayon ets and b,u d wire' man] . e nullions of people an<. f .... lJne ' ce111 tl1at tens o nlL ons 0 ~ I r;.,ord er ki d of destru ction anc " as eon . ns and shrapnel could create the same n . e d t ge in the relation of peopl1 to " ,r. the second tn h' gu rI That was t e secon s a Etlrope since tlle middle of the seven teenth cent~(Yd ~, t ~e lrst star peopl e had been neutral but tlleir welfare might be disre?a.r le ; tn le ~e<.loncdstage people 't . their war. Some Joug lt. ome pt o< uce mate,ials of b . were mvoh'edd ecause Id was some took care of cl''d ren: but tIwy were all part of w d d [4 n tJer attacked Poland in 1939. the Poles had reason t" war, som~ pro ~ce u~ho , aH1 var making nation v \ en When Churchill said the BJitis1 would fight on the 1 ~1.. " care about we outco me. 1e k [I the Btitish and not for a merce nary aml). T 1 war was about l ;~ lehat e er beac~uung t spomattor ed If people would rather fight a dirty war Lhan lose.a dean . b some n gove mments. 1f people between nations and not. JUStd etwee J . one, the .war ' vill be vhether the war IS continue or on t 1e te1 m o[ a h11cc makRuence on ' .' . . . . have an m s h rt eople serves a purpose. It IS a dirty purpose, bul war ttself 1 often . h bg m t e war ~1...~ gpdirtv The Poles and the Norwegians, the Hussians and the British, a out somewm r had reason to believe tllat if they lost tl1e war ilie consequences would be dirty. This is so evident in mode rn civil wars- civil wars that involve popular feelings-that we expect tJ1em to be bloody and violent..To h.ope tb~t tJ1ey wou Id be fo~gh t cleanly with no violence to people would be a little hke hopmg for a clean race not. There is anotller way to put it that helps to bring out ilie seque nce of events. If a modem war were a d ean one, the violence would not be r uled out but merely saved for the postwar period . Once tl1e am1y has been defea ted in the clean war, the victorious enemy can be as brutally coercive as he wishe s. A clean war would determine which side gets to use its powe r to hurt coercively after vict01 y, and it is likely to be worth some violence to avoid being the loser. "Surre nder" is the process follov.ling military hostiuties in which the power to hurt is brought to bear. If surre nder negotiation s are successful and not followed by overt violence, it is because the capacity to inflict pai n and dama ge was successfully used in the bargaining process. On the losing side, prosp ective pai n and dam age were averted by conce ssions; on the winning side, the capacity for inllicting further harm was traded for coneessions. The same is true in a successful kidnap ping. It only reminds us that the purpose of pure pain and da mage is extortion; it is latent violence that can be used to advan tage. A well- beha ved occupied coun~ 5 latent violence 1 is not one in which violence plays no part; it may be one in which used so skillfully that it need not be spent in punis hment. This brings us to the third stage in the relation of civilian viole nce to warfare. If the pain and damage can be inflicted during war itself, they need not wait for the surrender negotiation that succe eds a milita ry decision. If one can coerce people JJ d tbetr governments while war is going on, one does not need to wait untt 1e has an . h' ed VIctory or risk losing that coercive powe r by spend ing it all in a Ioswg"-ar . ac Iev General Shermans march th rough Georgia migh t have made as much sense' possJ d bly more, had the North been losing the war, just as the Ge rman buzz bombs an

I 6L rocke ts can ilf \f-tst umcnts to Kct the war . opped before suffering r:tlitnrv O< feat. . , f a, sm<;c: al least lh<; . Ea!>t-W t In t I1e p resc maJor .1 . . , . .1. :ap es ,...assive cv mn ' ... ' nee u n ng war itself' beyond an rth powers are c .llJ leof . '" cond Wol]' \\'.u I 1 oc:c.:~ . fo r restr . t d available dll rmg tlle ) mg lon u . . le . . ~ Se . an oe~nota . . . . .. JC . . . ilit<~rv V tOJy 01 t1uc:e . T he pnncipal restramt dunng th Wa1t the ac:hitvemen l o1 S cl - 1 "' orld War was a temporal boun a_ry. the d~tc of surrender. In the re e CC:Qnd_ W era dramatically restralllccl cl11nn g war itself' Th K P \sentw we.find the violence .. I' ar e orean V t1 1. . . ltOusly all-out" in the fighttn g. not on ) on le peninsular battle R Id b . as U ut m the e 'd ' 1ough on!} \VJ'th some dr resourccs usec.l b}' s1 es. It WclS ..1II-ou t,., l1 bot11 . . 1n ' . ~matic restrrunts; no nuclear weapons, no Russmns, no Chinese territo ry, . bombing of ships at !)ea or even airfields on the U . ryd n_o Japanese tenito1' no nJte ~ation s sil of th e ne. [t .,. . ue m ta1 was a contest m 1 1 y shcng tb circum scribed b tl1 tl civilian violence. Korea may or may not be a good y d ~ ~ 1reat of u~prec:eden ted war in th e age of nnclc ar violence but it was clramoti e ~rdspeculahon on limited ma c ev1 enc:e that tl ' ty . . le c:apac1 for violence can be consciously restrained even under th ~~~,o~ti~~ 0~ war tl1at measu res its miHta ry dead in tens of thousands and thatel ) P eoccu ptes two of the largest countri es in the world. A conse quence of this third stage is that "victory' inadequate1 expresses what v t f a nation wants rom Its 1111 1tary forces. Mostl'v it wants m th ese 'times, the . mBu' c d 1 Orce. 1at ence t.1 res1 es 111 atent L It wants tlle bargaining po' ve. that comes from . 1ts ' . 1 ct _ capac1ty to nurt, not JU St the Ulre_ consequence of successful military action . ,en :e tot~ Vlctory over an enem~ proVldes at best an opportunity for unopposed ,;olenc ag~ns t the en_emyp op ulat1on. How to use tllat opportunity in the national interest. or m some vVlder mtere st, can be just as important as the achievement of victorv y milita 1 science does not tell us how to use that capacity fdr but ~tse.lf; _ tr~clitiona~ _ mflicting p~m. And 1f ~ nation , victor or potential loser. is goinu to use its capacity for pure VlOlence to Influe nce the enemy, there may be no need to await the achievement of total victory. Actually, this third stage can be ana1yzed into two quite different ,ariants. ln ooe. sheer pain and damage are plimary instru ments of coercive warfare and may actually be applied, to inti mi.date or to deter. In the oilier, pain and destruction in war are expected to serve little or no pu rpose but prior threats of sheer violence, en'n of automatic and uncontrolle d violence, are coupled to military force. The difference is in the all-or- none character of deterrence and intimidation. Two acute dilemmas arise. One is the choice of making prosp ective violence as frighte ning as possible or hed!'ing with some capacity for reciprocated restraint. The otl1er is the choice of making retaliation as a~tom atic a'i possible or keeping delibe rate control over tlle fateful decisi~ns. The ults oth choJces are determine d partly by govemments, partly by technology. B \Glflc are ~haracterized by the coercive role of pain and destruction- of threaten~ (not tnflicted) pain and destruction . But in one the threat either succeeds or fails alto 1e 1er. . . gether, ail< 1any ensw.ng Vlolence ts gratm.tous; m t1 otJ progressive pain and dam. 0 age may actually be used to threaten more. The present era. r COlUltries possessmu ror od nuclear weapons, is a complex and uncertain blend of the two. em .t:. _ _ . W<mare, but rror the United States. m cti\l' , rhe powe r to hurt is nothi ng new m . . . technology has drastically enhanced the strategic imp01t an<.:-e of pUt e. unconstru

SCHELUNG I THE DIPLOMA CV OF VIOLENCE . tllo1 1ghl of ', LS t;O' e; V<;: mstr -.1 'I . .

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PART 2

TKE USES OF FORCE

0111 o.,, 11 1 l t fc 11 ~,. ~n . I1 tJ1er used against tt.s or in I . 11~ . . mMl'tJUi itive pain ami damage, w e Jf . ~of war and t11reats of wa1 as t<< lllHJ IL' < tn fluen"'~ . J . """' 1 1f f lt> m htm Cll laJl<.:C.'> t 1 1mportanc:e not o conqut<,l a11 < l ' t lll.ot-'; uf' bar. . cl -'eterreuce. f . . not of dtStlllction; o c:ocrcJon .Ul u ~ning :md intimidation. .k . t a contest of strengt1 . \ ' 'ar aru 1 t1 1 of w '' mnk 1 ar ks J1 e JUS . \\'ar no Iongcr Ioo _, risk-taking of pa1n and (ndurwc . '>mall w . ar, . .1 . ' are more a contest of nerve anu ..t h I t f . larger war thev are not JUSt rm ll..u; cug.tgcJ11cnt~ hut 1 J ' em houv l e t trea o a ,. Th th t of war has always been c;onu-"" wn underneath . . . ' . I 1 1 e rea s cnsL dip omac:y. b t (!0 r Americans it is now rnuc 1 ncanr t ll' S11rfac:c. l.ik<:: . aJ d' I . r . fdi mlemanon 1p omac:y. u t11e threat o vorce 111 a tamdv dic;p,Jtt 'k . d stnaJ relations ". . ' 1e t h reat of a stn e m m u tl 1 t 1mat of violcnc.:c . th party at a po~ticaJ convent1on, l 1e f I')O ltmg e 1 . . 1 .. or t I1e th reat o er poutics. i\e1t 1 strcngt 1 nor goodWill b s international . . oontJOUOUS 1y CJf<.'Ur11SCn e. Id r . procures immunity. Military strateg)' can no longer be tl1ough~ of, as 1t cou ~c!r some co11ntries in some eras, ao; the science of mjJitary victory. It 1s. now equally, d not mon.:, the art of t 1 u . . . coercJon, of 1n t'm'da:on and deterrence. The mstruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. ~iJi tary strategy, whether we hke 1t or not, has hccnme the diplomacy of violtmce.

coercive tJiplomacy
ROBERT ). ART

NOTES
ork: ~ acr nillan, J934), p. R2. 1. Paul 1. Well man, Death 011 the Prairie (l\ew Y 2. Wjnston Churchill is often credited with tlle term, ''balance of terror," and tlle following quotation succinctly expresses the familiar notion of nuclear tnutual deterrence. This. though, is from a speech in Commons in ~ovember 1934. "The fac:t remains tllat when all is said and donE: as regards defensive methods, pending some new discovery the only dire<.1 measure of defense upon a great scale is the certainty of' being able to inAict simultaneously upon tlle enemy as great damage as be can inRict upon ourselves. Do not let us undervalue the efficiency of this procedure. It may well prove in practiceJ admit I cannot prove it in theory-capable of giving complete immuni ty. If 1:\vo Powers show tltemselves equally capable of inflicting damage upon each other by some partiC.1Jiar process of war, so that neither gains an advantage from its adoption and both suffer the most hideous reciprocal injuries, it is not only possible but it seems probable that neither wiJI employ that means ... " 3. (Chi<:ago: University of Chicago Press), 1942, p. 296.

coercive diplomat} is, in Alexander Ceorge's words "ft . attempt to get a target-a state, a group (or gro ) ' . L~rceful persuasion'": the ups \\'ltum a state hange 1ts o1 or a nonstate 'th h )J<'CtiOnable hehavior throu h 1 actor-to c actual use of li mitcd force. It is a strategy that ~ eks tr t e threat to use force or see to per~uade a ' th cease hjs aggress1on ra er than bludgeon him into sto in : , . ~ op~ment to can include, but need not include, positive induceme~~ ; d~~erc.,~e cJ,pJomacy , can invoJve either a transfer of resou rces to the target th n rr ese 1 ~ducements or e o 'er of thmg~ that d0 . r b . I er not mvo ve resource trans1 ut that are nonetheless of ta 'bl b . ngJ e enefit tohthe tar Coerc1ve cl'1p1 . . mten ded to be an altemati" t omacy IS get. ve o war, even t ough it .. Ioyment of miJ1tary power to adueve a stat d . cl b' . involves some emp eSlre 0 . . r ath.evmg ob. . on the cheap" and e s all be Je<...tive. h . . . h ~ectives 1 It IS a tee n1que or 1t as . ts 'th b'1g resu1 . w1 small costs (to the coercer) J\ext to tri hture 1c-ause 0 u g war, 1owever. Promises . . coerciVe diplom_acy re~rese~ts the most dangerous way to use a state's milltarv power because, 1f coerc1ve cl1plomac.y fails, the state that tries it then faces two stark choices: back down or wag~ war. Th_e_ first risks loss of face and future bargaining ~wer; the second, loss of life and miJ1tary defeat. Because botll outcomes are posSible, a state s~oul~ never undertake coercive diplomacy ~ahtl~ .. we distinguish betwee~ coerc1ve d1plomacy and coercive attempts. The feature t11at dL~tinguishes tlle two IS th~ presence or absence of the employment of force. Coercive diploma~ has as one of its essential features, and often its onJy feature, the threat or tlle limited use of force. Coertive attempts utilize levers over a target. but tllese le\'ers do not involve the threat or use of force. Therefore, we have excluded from our cases of coercive diplomacy those coercive attempts that involve only the use of economic sanctions, only the withholding of benefits to a target, only the cessation of benefits that a target currently enjoys, or more generally any coercive attempt that does not entail some employment of military power. Clearly, all these actions are coercive in ~ature, but they do not constitute coercive diplomacy as we have defined it. In distinguishing between coercive attempts and c:oercive ruplomacy, we follow the convention set by George: coercive diplomacy must involve the threat or li~ited ~of force, even though it can also include some of these other types of coercJve actions. Because it entails coercion, coercive diplomacy is a fonn of compeUenct" a tenn fir~t coined by Thomas Schelling in order to distinguish it fro~ deterr~nce. f or &:heDing, the distinction between oompellenc;e and deterrence IS the difference between an action "intended to make an adversary do something"~mpellenc:e

we

obert J Art and Patrick ~1. Cronin. di d b . R From TJ U . . ~ le rilled States and Coercive DitJlomacr; e te r Peare Used \ \.1'th pcnmSSJOJI b' . the . ' &>-. b . ght '1:1 Ythe Endowment of the United States Insutute 0 UOJted St8 t 1 cs nstrtute of Peace Press, Washingum. D.C

163

I .. .11 starting somel li ng :1 terrcnt:c. Tl k<'el) IlllO ! 0111 ' . . l. . IC 1 cl to ttltl ul nelion "intenc e ll lee can be 111<.1111 Iest<'t 11 ' e o f two way . , I t b ' compe 81 . I ' lum''l' in behnvior soug I .> ~t..:.," it is not now dOJ ng. ot I I,, tH t, t rsa.rv stor) ( ~"" d tna someuw o I , s either the nd\'ers<try sttut s o -:' E'tller wav, the atlver ar~ <: l,ll l'~t., t s hchavior . ' l I doiua ometIltng t s now domg. d . 1ed, to pre,ent ctn acl'< .1.s,t ..., ' t ltn <:I1a ngln . ~"" . t is a stnttePV estgt a g Deterrence. 111 contnLS o.. .ti hr\(1 an action. Oetern:> m (' st <"s to CT(!t th . . . . di it from IOl aw o . .. I .n e ..... behanor bv dissua ng . tl at IS. to continue nol <1 > '' hat tt is n<t mg 1 '" t behaviOr- l ) ad,ers<U)' not to dumge t s_ ms to alter an adversary's behavi~r: dct<~rnn<:e. to keep doina."' Thus, compellenc:e ai all . . . 1es only tlueats to use force '' hen'<lS <:otnpel ~ aener \ mvo \ it tJ1e same. Deterrence o " force and the actual use o f ron.:c:. 1n a deter_ . Ive botl1 tlle threatb use to f' . . lence can JO\'O ed out t]1en bv d P 1111tJ0n, I1 ad"crsarv h"s H' . if 1 tl1 . t has to e cam ' ' ; <" 1 rent situa~on. t ~ ~a d terrence has failed. In contrast, because compellenc:e changed tts behaVJor andd ~ al of force compellence has not nc:<:essarily fallcd can entail botll threats an actu use ' if the threats are carried out. d ellence are analyrt:kally distinct slrategies they ' 1 1 l1oug1 deterrence an comp At .a d d'sputina parties contest the leF, iti ma<.:y of the star b . e connate w1 1en J o usu allY ecom all d The deterrer defends the status quo because of tus quo, which tlle{ genler- t Ygeot. tries to overthrow the status quo be<:ause of the .~... b efits it conrers; t Je ar 1 we en . . } t ews dle deterrer's attempt to mamtam t 1e status quo , 1 mfi1cts. T 1e targe VI 't . . !OJUI) ll "V coercing me (the taro-et) to accept a SituatJOn that beneas compe ence: 10U are o " If the target attempts to alter th e status quo, 1 10wcver, then fits you but not me. . . 11 VIew. tllat attempt as compelJence: 'You are atte mptmg. to. coerce the deterrer \Vl . .. . me {the deterrer) to stop defending the status quo and accept a J evJSIOn 1111t that 1 s less beneficial to me." In such a situation, deterrence and compell~nce become t 1 d sm Jarly deterrent threats can become transformed mto compelm errrung e . 1 1 . , . . . .. . lent actions in situations where deterrence has failed, for m that case the would-be deterrer must decide whether to carry out its threat. If it does so, not for purposes of revenge but to get tl1e adversary to stop its objectionable behavi~r, the~1 , by definition, execution of the deterrent threat becomes a compellent action. Fmally. the deterrer may calculate that deterrence is weakerung, even though it has not totally failed, and may decide to bolster deterrence by engaging in actions that are compellent ill nature. In that case, compellence is exercised to deter. Compellence can come in three doses or forms: (1) diplomatic use-the issuance of tl1reats to use force against an adversary if it does not change its behavior, (2) demonstrative use-the exemplary and limited uses of force, and (3) full-scale use, or war-the use of whatever amount of force it takes to get the adverswy to change its behavior. The first fonn of compellence does not use force physically against the target state but only threatens use. The second form uses "just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one's interests and to establish the credibility of one's detennination to use more force if necessary. The third fonn is to be understood as war-the large-scale use of military power to make the adversary change its behavior. In this volume we follow Alexander George and defin~ coer<.~e diplomacy to encompass only the first two forms of compelleo~ the diplomatic and demonstrative uses of force. The third form-war-is coerCion but not coercive diplomacy, even though diplomacy is never totally absent from war. The meanings of th reat and war are clear. Threat can involve mob'l:....; g and . JJ,U.J.n movmg large amounts of military force to make the coercer's seriousness of purpose
L

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f.

shte lr 't )edible. as po~ 11 lt, .t) tlar target < 1 can simpl , as c . wamings. r he ot . hill g tlmat does not mean is the)~~'' the ~~suance of \'Crbal nif)St the targc.. l \\ ,tr Ill\ O]\'CS SU Stained larg ) a<:tuaJ physl<.:aJ I ISC of r0 ag..... . , < e-sca e eo b '' rc:c taraet, with tlw W': I nl ( 1 ther militarily defeating it b~ a~ operations against tht 0 rt of achic' ing Jtllpielc victory over it E'th or nngmg about its surrenclt;r sJlo I er wav w 1 that is masshe, at le<\~t to the: target. " ar mvo "es the use of force The meaning of demonstrative use is m dif'C! . nc:ult to cle1 nonstrahve should meanore the.. . ~m. down. AJthougl1 George argues tl1at onlv we have used a somc\\'hat broader meaning of dem' ~~lte hmtted~ use of force, . , l onstrath e use H h enouo-h forcc to c.e monstrate resolution and e.stabJ h credibltvow muc is "j'ust o . JS .. tuat1 to another and depe d5 on tl u , can vary enor010 usly from one 1 n on 1e nature 0 f t} oals on the one 1 1 and on the militarv capablti 1anc.. d. 1 coercer's e g , I ' t J es an mtensitv 0 f . tJ1 target, on the ot 1er. We have therefore defin d d e . . mtercst-; of cl e emonstrative use t 1 d Iary ~n cl I. . .. use. Exernpla1 use serves as both a both exemp IIOJle y ~ me ~ e of what can or v.IJII come: 'You did not believe myth t b .model and a wammg rea ; ere LS an exam 1 f, to chew on of what 1 can do to you if you do not cha Pe or.you . nge your ways." Exemnla can encompass a one-t1rne employment of force or a r . . f L' f) use . . I . . ' 'e"' mstances o use but tl major constramt 1 t l<lt 1t ts at tl1e low end of force emplo s t I th ' le ymen , c ose to e boundary between threat ;,m cl use. Exemplcuy use meam movin st b . gju eyon d th e border of threat . mak cIear b)' the actions taken that the coercer IS dead1y senous about to -e . . escalating tl1e use of force 1f tl1e target does not complv. In this vo1 te . , ume li m1 d use can mean anytillng from one to several steps beyond exemplal) use. The f . - '1 meanmg o lim1ted ~e 1 t111s: "V f:'aJJe cl tot~k both my threat and my exemplary tt.Se serioush-; s 10u e you obv10usly need more persuading; let me now give you a better idea of tlle COriS~ quences tl1at your continued noncompliance will bring." More force i.s used but not so much such that the boundcuy to war has been crossed. A central point follows when coercive diplomacy is conceived to encompass o~y threat and demonstrative use, but not full-scale use: coerche diplomac.y has failed when full-scale use occurs. Wherever one draws the line between limited and full-scale use, if the coercer has to cross that line to achieve its objectives. then, by definition, coercive wplom acy has failed. In this case, war. not coercive diplomacy, produced the change. Any employment of force beyond tllreat. exemplary use, or limited use signals the failure of coercive diplomacy, even though the subsequent fuJl-scale use of force may succeed in accomplishing the original objectives. ~sa consequence, exactly where the boundary between limited and full-scale use Is dra\vn becomes crucial for cocling cases in which limited use in,olves escalatory steps that skirt the boundary. Such cases can be coded as either successes or failures of coercive diplomacy, depending on which side of tl1e boundal) it is placed. Categorizing such cases becomes an exercise in qualitati,e judgment.

WHY IS COERCIVE DIPLOMACY DIFFICULT?

There are good theoretical reasons why coercive diplomacy is ~cu~t. In pa~cu lar, four factors which stem from the inherent nature of coerctve diplomac> and which therefor~ operate in every such attempt. explain wh~ this technique is hard to pull 0 ff 1n acldthon , depending on the spec1 c s1ru ti'o11 two oilier Factors can .. . fi a

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" hen t he)..< e present' they r11ak< !hv ~ut ~"<'!isful exercise U m;mi l'c>st thcmsdn:-s. and w nf t'Oerc:h-- diplomacy e,en more difficult.

compellence Is Difficult

Corm of comrJellenc:e an d. as I lton las Sclte!J . . l rng S e1c1 e ditJ omacy 1 a 1 F' t dete rrence I t i\ intri nsi<:aiJy,..., d topulloffthan . trs co " ... ore . 1ar ed compellence 1s 1 er b ts h ge 1 behav:ior than to keep 1ts heha"ior as is C o serv ' orn. . . diffi lt t0 get a target to c an 11 . cu tions reqUJre that tl target alter its behavtor 1 a m:uuwr quite visilJIc to 1e O I 15 'bl 101"tiat:ive taken by th e C <' r<:c r. ln . pe11ent ac contrast, . n all 1 res onse to an equal)' " I e c er 110 r the target to appear to have Ignored or to acquics . . P ce . . . , . t weats ai e eas1 deterrent t1 I . fr. e In deterrent sttuatJOns tne ta1 get c,m c:l;:um IJiausib! . . e f 1 . 1 1 . . . 111 wtthout great oss o .ac . bJ c . t. ng tltat it had 110 intention o c 1cmgmg 1ts11C' 1av1or 111 the first 1 1 l dema _1ty mam am1 . . 1 . pear to ignore the deterrent t 1 reats w 11 e not changing its .' . il' . place or Jt can s1mp Yap ty . 1e . '. Tl1e ta1get llas no such plausible deruab 1 ll1 t 1 case or con1pellence laVJor. e1 b rt brn ss n is required. Greater. face IS thus lost when a target, . . . . . because 1ts ove su 1 10 to wh1 . Jt has co rnrmtted .1ts IJrestige _. " . , . . ch . . un der pressUJe, reverses a course of action , and devoted resources than when It Simply peiststs m the same beh<lVJOr. Fmally compellence more directly engages the ~~s~ons. of. the target _state tl1an does deterrence because of tl1e pain and humiliation ml1ct: d upon It, but passions, once engaged, are dangerous and produce b~omerang e ffects: they cause the government to mobilize domestic opinion agrunst the coercer, and they increase domestic support for the target government. Both effects perversely make the government more popular after it becomes subject to coercive action than it was before, with the ironic result that the target becomes less susceptible to coercive diplomacy. For iliese reasons, compellence is harder than deterrence.

Denial, Punishment, and Risk Strategies Are Hard with Diplomatic and Demonstrative Uses of Force
Coereive diplomacy is a form of coercion, and coercion, as Robert Pape has argued, can be applied in a denial, punishment, or risk fas hion.' Denial strategies seek to change an adversary's behavior by thwarting its military strategy. Denjal takes aim at tl1e target's military forces in order to undercut their e ffectiveness, seeking to stalemate tl1ese forces rather than bring outright military victOiy ov~r the~. A su~s~ful denial strategy is one that prevents the target from achie,~ng ItS poutical obJectives with its military strategy. Punishme nt strategies seek to change adversary's behavior by raising the costs of its continued resistance. Punishment ~poses pain, either directly to the target's population or to those assets tllat are ~rnportant for the population's or the leadership's quality of life. A successful pun IShment strategy 1S one that causes the target to give way not because its militar)' strategy has been thwarted, but because the costs to its ~opulation have betome too~~ Risk strategies seek to change an adversary's behavior by raising the pro I Ih~ that it will suffer ever-greater punishment in the future if it fails to <:omp y. RISk means escalation, and risk threatens more pain to the population or to

:m

. ts valuable as~(' \ 'uc:cessful risk str t et egy 1s one tl1. 1 at causes the t\rg""t t . . . mvinc:ed th -'t th Vay becali'>C st ), cOHl('!-. cc 0 1'11V(;' ' < tt \ 'JI fr e pam '"' V VJ su er from loomintr p '? ment is not wort ' tl < nhjcc:tives it seeks I~ 110 IS1 1 TO the CAL<'llllrtat it is applied to prod . . k 11 o fr l>C<:alt!-.e risk strategieuce ns ' coertivc di PIotnacy is inherent! . p difficult to pu } s, ape tells us . . h 1 ,, ._ f' , are sn crentl) diffitult . The}' fau or scvera rca\ons. For starters r k t . es rateg1 a ' IS s 1 .re successful to the extent tJ1at they create m t te target's mind fear of future punishment sufficicnth costlv . that the target <:hanges its behavior. As Pap ' e pornts out howe . 1 1e from damage clone m t1 present is greate th h ' . . ver, t Jt pain suffered . r antepam magmed from damage . b. 11 done in the fiut11re. T I s happens because h h r uman emgs dis . c~unt t e uture, which means they value the present more. Hisk sh Id b e conceived - ou . .1 r . d un.agmc~ 1 utUJ_'e pain hurts less ilian resent . , ac; f.uh 1rc pun1sh, ment, an poHtical consJcleratwns, mk strateo-ies are gene PU . ~~am: Moreo, er. be<.:ause of ') rayapp ledmcrementll V.'Jt1 the o ay. t d Th coercer gradually ratcheting up tl'le pain inR.i hprodduccs tnore perverse c effects: the target has time to adapt its tactics t e d o re uce . . . h e pam bemg mflic:ted, and time to mobili t de amage d.o~e, f me to . get used to t l the foreign intrude r- all of which make the target b ttze obm estic olpmlon against e er a e to to erate the pain b t1 . d I cl the J tl bemg o e out y 1e coercer. Finall)' wben pam ' . . 1 ]J.m1tec1 w hen mAlcted, as is the case by defi ti IS on y lreatened or 15 . 'tl . severe y nJ on, WJ 1 coercive diplo' . . macy, the~ a_coerc1ve nsk strategy becomes all the more difficult. -~'ffi For stmilar reasons, punishment and denial stratecri.es are w cu1t to execute . . . . 0 w1tl1 coercive diplomacy. After all, it is hard to infuct much pu 1 hment \\1'tl1 coer. 115 . . . . CJ~e dipl~macy: t~e limited use of force produces only limited punishment. Deliv~nng ~ m1.ted punishment is not likely to cause a target iliat cares a great deal ahout Its obJectives to change course. Similarly, the threat to denv is not denial and the li~nited use of force can produce only limited denial. Stri~tly speaking. 'coercive diplomacy cannot employ denial in the sense that it cannot use enough rorce to ~talemate a ..target. Instead, to the extent that coercive c.Uplomacy aim at denial. It employs demonstrative denial." Through limited military action tl1c coercer demonstrates to the target that the coercer can, if it so chooses, undercut the cffec:tiveness of the target's military strategy but without actually undercutting it. . . Whether the coercer intends to employ its mititaty power to manipulate risk, mA1ct punishment, or execute denial, all tl1ree are hard to bring oA when ilie employmen t of military power is severely constricted, as it is with coerche diplomacy. To the coercer, its threats and limited use are intended to signal its firm resolve to es<:alate the use of force for risk, punishment, or denial purpose - unless the target knuckles under, but the target, especially a highly motivated one, can just as easily see threats and limited use as signaling weak resohe. After all. if the c:ce~-er cares that much about its objective, why pull its punche in tl'le first place?." . hat looks to the coercer as steely detennination can appear to ilie target ~ an unwilli~tg ~ess or inability to employ large-scale use of force to attain its goal. Threa~s ~d lunJted use are not unequivocal in tl1eir meaning; they can be int~rpreted to. 51gn1 ~ botl'l firmness and weakness in resolve, depending on the perspective. of the '~ewer. j . Some of these dynamics appear to have been at "'ork m t!le Kosovo \\ ~ Before the war, the NATO allies thought iliat Slobodan .\Jilosevtc would cave m after a few days of bombing, because iliey concluded. incon ectly. tltat he had done

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ber 1995 afte r a period of short ii ttJs\ive hornh 0 _ e ~ orest~ er e~ . 'n Bosni.a In 199 9, howeve r. ~1 JIO'C\ onc kp rovtd tl ln~ stn kes aga.mst elr than bo e~eld that he. could ri de out a fe,, d I\ of hombi ng~e~nl erli~e \\TOng. Appare nt y, e ' . an< al I t d tl at the alliance could not hold togethe r Ir ll engage d lll a sustaineu c cu aboe b~ . . 1 ld heavy m mg camprugn ag.,;1st him. Beli eving he c.:oucl <m tl.t'-t~ th e allianc:e 1 c.u . . 'd NATO to . rt to an extensive a1r camprugn an uJtJn1 .llc lv to t1 rc:'lte 1e 1 forc e reso < " a around campaign in order to win the war. . .. . . o .h . i6'cant punishment nor stgmficant dc111al 1!-. possible witl In sum, nett er stgn . . . di l Tl efore what coercive dip lomacv can mo sl e~L'i dv c..:o1nmun 1 coercive p omacy. 1 er ' ~ ' . th 10 creasing probabiJitv of mo re pums h men t to c:om(! if it faill cate to the target lS e . /. ~ .S nsk, and also som e mdi.cat10n o f the denta] pov.,crs o f' the coerc:cr . to comply, whicl1 1 .

b [!

S t

ART I COERCIVE DIPl.Ql A

Jikel)' to har dc n , nCJt weaken , und tr the im , t f. are l' k . r0 rce are 1 e I\ t o Ic.acl to exe 1 nplary . .paccl u a coerClvc: attempt: threa~~ t use . exer use r' . ~ an . full-scale use of f(r<;e. flacrefo rE:. a'\ Glen S _ nplary use: . likelv to ...., o IS lead 1 to cl . I I k . n , nyuer and P I . ~ non deJ stra te , c.:nscs t tatl oo hke: garnes of c:h1<.:ken haw: a .auL Otesmtt have I r , ~"> ~trd escalatiou >~rorc t 1e:y are resolved htcaus .I n lruaerent dynamic: to-. f I. . t 2 None o L11s . lo arg ue that coe rcive . 1 'pl e ne1t 11::r. party WJ.11 gvc wav at the ~ tse . ou s t .1 only that the odd!> arc not in its favo r when w omac:v 1 ,m.e~. ~bl_Y uoorned to fail. the resultin resolves of the parties . g c:nsJs hardens the initial

~nCY

169

credibility and Power Are at Stake

Fourth, coe rcive diplomacy is diffi cult bt:cause the ta ~t h . rge wor effects of a con f ron tat1 not on Iy on its credibilitv stak as toals n about the on b ' . bl k . " es nt o on 1 power stakes. Cre d1 1 1 sta es concern reputation: power stak .. b'l' . ts . h ty , I I . . involved m t e targ ets ea c:u atJons about whe ther to stanes,ficapa I ltles . Both are d . j d rrn or gwe '-'CiV to t.l-u:: coercer. Credib1 1_ty c:onst eration s _ e compromise difficult enough for 'the: tarmak get because they mvo lve the foJl,o,.vmg sorts of issues if the target . . gJves wav on t b'ts matter, Will th1s ?~ the coe rcer s. last demand, or is it onJy the first in a ~eries of dem ~nds? Eve n If the coerce r w1ll not dem and more, what effects will gl'ing way to thts : oer?er have on. ~th er would-be <.:oe rcers? In this regard a target is in the same s1tu at10 n that Bn tJsh leaders were in when dealinu v.ith Hitler in the late 1930s: will app easeme nt satiate Hitl er, or will it only whe t hi appetite and that of other potential coe rce rs as well? Action s in the present always set precedents for the fu ture, and the targ et can never igno re how its reactions to pressures from others will affe ct its repu tation. Power stakes are equally, if not more, imp01t ant. Giving way to the coercer is usually not cost free for the target's power. For example, when the {;nited \ations began to push for rep rese ntative councils in Somalia in \farch 1993, \1ohammed Farah Aideed , the most powerful of the Somali warlords, understood that he would lose a lot of territory and hence power if rep rese ntati,e council were to emerge in a reconstructed Som alia. He the refo re resisted the establis hment of these councils. Similarly, both Iraq and North Korea would have faced a significant weakening in their military power iJ they had acceded to U.S. demands to give up thei r progra~s to acq uire wea pons of mass destruction . ~orth Korea demanded a gre.at deal_m ~eturn, and Iraq tried to do everytl1ing to thwart U inspectors. Hen ce,_w~e_n gt'mg way mea ns that the target's fu ture capacity to resist is significantly ~ mlS~ed. its ince ntives to stand firm go up dra mat ically. In these si tuatio~ a coercwe di~l o matie demand looks to the target like unil ateral disarmament: actions that are bemg demande d of the target wea ts ken its future power. r~ nus, gi'ing wav represen. . a . , . double wha m my for the target because both its reputation for resoln. <U1d 1 ability t to stand firm ar e un clerc ut . .k . le The inh ere nt rufficulty of both compeU and ns, strategJes: the formidab.ts ent [i taskof estimating resolves. before and during crises, and the target concem hr lcl l o power and cre ar dibility stakes -all make everv attempt . t coe rcive dipt:omacr when a k rth r not e bring off. Two ' 1 asy, to other factors can camp l'cate the tas C'\en u e they are present.

Estimating Resolve Is Difficult

The third reason that coe rcive diplomacy is har d _o ex~c..:u te li~s in the fac~ that estit . 1 both berore and during a coe rc1 dip lomatic atte mp t lS a tricky ve ~n g~ow '' . affair and therefore easy to get wrong. Resolve refe rs to the stre ngth of a partys will to revail, and the balance of resolve refe rs to whose wi ll- the target's or the:; co !cer's-is rhe stronge r. Before the fact, the coe:cer can nev~r ~now for <.:~rtain whose resolve is the stronge r- its own or the target s. Indeed , th1s ts the fu nction of the crisis produced by the resort to coe rcive dip lomacy: to test the reJa tiv~ strength of the two parties' resolves. Coe rcive diplomatic atte mp ts are games of ch1cken that reveal to the target and the coe rcer which one cares more about som cthj ng and just how much more. Afte r all, if the relative stre ngth of the parties' resolves were known before coercive diplomacy began, the n the re would be no reason to begin it. If the target knew, for example, that it cared much less tha n the coe rcer and knew that the coercer was inte nt on getting its way no mat ter wha t, and if the coe rcer also knew that the target cared less than it did , the n the target wo uld mos t like ly relent at the first signs of serious inte nt by the coercer. In seri ous disp ute s, howeve r, this does not happen because each party cares inte nsely about its resp ecti ve goals. Hence, the resuJting crisis serves the function of demonstrating who car es more. Even if the c cer accurately estimates the relative stre ngt h of the two parties' :oer resolves before the crisis gets under way, this is no gua ran tee tha t the ir resolves "~U remain the same once the cris is begins. Indeed , once it begins, resolves can change and usually do~ but generally in the direction of gre ate r firm ness by both parties. Each party digs in, in order to see how strongly the oth er care s . .\ttoreover, when threats are made, and especially whe n some force is used, both sides are likely to harden their initial positions even more, because the use of force engages passions and almost always causes both the target and the coercer to stiffe n their ,...,iJls. As a consequence, both will bear more sacrific e in ord er to justify the pain alre ady suJfered.

~eady unpel them to pour in eve n more resources. The ir motto is, sacnfices illl' borne j"ncr+-if., those ..._.., (,'UJTen tly be' made." As a conseq uence, .. aJ resolves mg LnJh

Economists argue that sunk costs should be ignored whe n making cur rent deci SIOils. ~r motto is, "Never throw good money afte r bad ." Sta tesmen, howev~:: 1 ~ f?lore sunk costs because of political conside rations: the costs ~e.a '

M ul tip le Coercers and M ul tip le Targets C om pl ic at e Coercive Diplomacy . r.v C cw n.: l\'(' c1 1 11ac:y lJeco nC" '"' cn rnore dwna rH ju g in srtuuti(lfl \ i11 whi t}, .J r o1 ' . ~ th an a singl< C.<)Cr<:e r an d a stn gJe target arc prcMJtt. Jf t1H r< ,., ' l <.: . 1 . rru>rt ' < oa ltu ,, of . mav 1 't 1 1 C'\><'r<.'(rs, 1t ll >~ un1 ec 111 1ts c vera goal but more cl lc. n th fl rt II <J t the <.:<> ! . ' . ' a tl11>r1 will be divided over th e means to achi eve .th e goal. Scm Hlnllc tit< ' < li tion will _'" :ou . t<lc: d tl e g< itself If eith er 1 th e c;a.<,e, . lal evcn I> d IV S c on t .. . tlwu actto.us are r<.:(jllin cJ t<1 1 J 1c kee p t 1 nwmb ers. um'te< 111 th eir c:ffort . Tlte rub 1te~ w rc: :J.<.:tJ< ms tak(.;n le) 1 I' .. .. . t n t0 geth er catl degrad e th e rmbtary and dt. 1 0 t Ile (.'()'al I IO pl on1at1e c:fk<.:tlv<.: n(;:ss ,11tt u . . .. ' .ve atte t rf s v"'ral tarcre ts are present, 1t be r1 ; coerc1 mp . e "' <:o1n es rn on diffi cult tc cltc.iu < ~ 1 .ons t hat . n aJ ac;tl coerce tLL. 1 'I So metim es steps th at coerce on e of tl1 parU <:.., ,..1")11 ~~~ e; . . . - 'ly .... n e th.., ott1nrs to resist. Otlw r l11 n ~s 11 may he " ' actua~ encourag ; necessary l<J lav,> v r one of th e targets in order to induce th e othe rs to. coop~rat e. Th e p: es< <.:<: of tw1, :n . regu1 s that th e c:oerce r de v1 act1 1S tit at re or more targets th us .sc . 01 ult1 mately ind 11, . .. all the targets to change th ej r behavior. N e1th ...... ~~ ho ld1~ g toge th er a coal1 t10 n while maintaining its military effecti ve ness nor dev1 smg ac tJO~ s to al t~r th ~ hchavior of all the targets is an easy tas k to acco mp~j sh , an d ~~c~e~s lll .such s.~ ~~Jati~On s rcquirc:s . en fi nesse. d1pJoma"':y pat1 ce , comprom iSe' and, oftcn ti1nes, d uphc1ly. rlw !l, two or ... . more parties at either th e target or th e coerce r end, or bo th , compb <:ate what i5 already an inherently dif6cult task. Five of our cac;e s- Bosnia , Kosovo, Iraq , So mali a, an d even North Kor(;:ainvolved more than two parties, and compl ications ensued as a conscq ucii(:C. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup report that NATO 's bom bing in late Au gust and early September J995, which helped end the Bosn ian War, was a two-edged sword: ll helped bring tile Serbs to the negotiating tabl e, but it al so e~ couraged ~h e Mu sh ~!~ and Croats , who were a1lied at th at tim e, to co ntinue to resiS t and achwve all theu goals through continued battle, using NATO ~L~ th eir air force. As a conscquene;e NATO had to walk a fine lin e hetwcen hombjng th e Se rbs enou gh to bring th em to the negotiating table and bombing them not so much that it pushed th e Croa tia~ Musum alliance away from the negotiating tabl 3 e. T he Kosovo War witn essed senous conflic.1:s among the !\ATO rnembers ov er th e seJection of targets for tl,e bombing campaign. The United States wante d to escalate both th e scope and the intensity of the bombing more quickly than did many of its E uropean allies, an~ these confli<.1:s threatened tl1e cohesiveness of th e coalition and probably th e efficienc,y of the bombing campaign, even if th ey did not ul tim atel y degr ade th e campaign's military effectiveness. The coalition against Jraq . unite d during the ~ar, began to fall apart during the 1990s as members be came more aud more disaffected with the continuing costs of the san<.tions. Th e in tervention in Somalia ha~ to deal with dozens of factions vying for po wer, with two of them , one led by Nl Mahdi Mohammed and the other by Mohammed Farah Aidee d, being the most im~t. Ali M~ cooperated more with the United N ations th an did Aideedd who ~ed the Uru~ Nations and the a<:tions it took as hurting his inte rests an benefiting Ali Mahdi s. This set the stage for th e armed <.:onfrontation that led to tbe ooJlapse of the United Nations' mission in Som alia. Finally even though the United States was the only coercer of North Korea , it could no~ ignore the vieWS

ART I COEROVE DfDI ,.. ..- L.V.MACY 17 J I i nt er c~ t~ of .otl. C., oq t}, Kcm;<s. and Japan ' t I an<. ' ' 1 \ <.: ()~(; aJh.e:s in th . "S vw \-.. rnadf' IJ ~ . :m ~tnt< P\ on ~orth Ko r<; a\ llll I" r .,. . c n:gum. rh<:ir : : the fear th ey ,.,~. id If lc:a<se radi ()a<.1:iv<; mate c car ac1 1t1 s rial that CCJIJt ~ t<:u 1 hoc~.w~ of l n and So u llt Ko1 r: t a.'> wc:ll a~ rt- iunit<; the Ko 0 c p<rc ap \V hs .c fJY'(.:r both ~ J a Tf'an ar.

o n

Belief in "C ount e r- Coe rcion~~ Techniques Can Foil Coercive

Diplomacy

cinally if the target belic.;vc.-. that it has th e ahili ty to <.:o un te tL r .'. . . , h . . ~ . . an d rmhtary pr<:'>'>Urc'> , l en coerc1 dipl oma<." r n (: cr.>Cr(;{:rs diplornatie; ve ~ k r h . .,' O("..<.:Orn<;s s) d'lm t1J 1t tl led . ,...,.J1 gen. ( , l! ally fail. fh c ta.o, or t e <:oerccr IS to convince er tht: taro,.. th t ffi . tl . c {' I SU ffering will emue 1 t 1etarget dc>es not cease itc; at.tiono, ~lth ataStl,. <.:Hntpamand If f.: L r.,.,.., foil or s1 1 cantly mttl.gate the <.:oerce rg= , 1J<:ve~ lua t it rX: gn H r's mea.~ res or in turr1 JX . .._ 1 J~ l1Sl\!> on t he 10 coercer, thro ugh wh at are call<;d c..:o untcr-coerc. :ion" te<:hn icues, which c:an L . . _ . 'I' . ical, ew.nom lc, or, 1n11 ry m. n~tu re, t hc~ the 1 ~~ lt ta . target i~ muc.:h less likely to give:po1). wa ~ilosevtc must have ~ ad e s11 ch caJcul ~ti on s when contemplating ;\: \T O's air ,,ctr again st him ,. because m th e months before th e war, Serbian military fiqures ,isited lraq to see if th ey c:o uld lea ~ how to thwart U. S. ai rpower. One de.ice the 5erbs hit upon was not to fire most of th eir surface-to-ai r mLc;stlt:s (SAM e; ) but instead to hold them back. Trus fo rced ~ ATO pilots to fly at hig h altitudes over K ovo and impede:d os th eir abili ty to kn ock out Serbian arrn or placed there. Th us. believi ng that he had the means to ride out an air war, Milosevic did no t hack down under \ATO's threats. Matters becom e especially vexing in those si tuation~ in wh ich th e targe t \,;u not reveal its co unte r-coe rcio n techniques fo r fear that doina so will negate their effective ness . Not aiJ eounter-coer<:ion tech niques are undermin ed if th e target makes th em known be fo rehand to th e coer cer. In deed. th ere are often strong incentives to make such measures kn own ah ead of tim e if doing so '"ill deter the coercer fro m unde rtaking his actions. For exam pl e, before the on set of th e Persian Gulf War, Sad dam H ussein argued th at Am er icans could not suffer hca,y casualties the way that Iraqis co uld, th ereby attempt ing to make Jraqi "illi ngne!IS ~o uffer mor e th an the Am erican s a w unte r-coerc ion tool for deterrence. ln the ~osovo conflict there is credible evidence that \1 tlose vic belie\'ed his threat to ex-pel large numbers of Albanians from Kosovo to surro d. t t der to destabiHze un mg sa es tn or them wouJd de ter the NATO alliance from lau nching the air war a~ai n ;t him . The counte r-coe rcio n measures that the target m .. . ..a1 are those that the cocrcer usl conce . . can quickly design around once th ey hec:ome kn th ereby enabling 1t to make ovm. . the threat of significant punishment once agrun d'bl In the e C'clSt'S the target ere 1 e. . has no in centive to forew f 1 counter-c:ocrcon techruque t:s arn th e coerce r 0 , . ,.;n bC:cause such foreknowledge wo uld d . cl th target's de1 ses ag... st the en egra e e coercer's at tack no t enhance deterren ce of it. . ' """ teehruques produ....,.,' a pef\'e rse The target's failure to reveal its counter-coerc.1on . di Lo It: not onJy does it make th e coer rt to coerctve p t"'IU'V more likelv~ it resu cers reso .. 1.. ~~ ru riJJ faiJ Ignorant that ~~ 1 ' -1 measures ()a l cm:o ra1ses the probability that the attem~t ~\ ~ive di lomatic 111aneuver. Con6rmght be thwarted, the coer<.-er ,vilJ begin Jts ~r 1 !unter-coercion methods to .ts dent that it can de fe nd itself the target then ap p tes c ' . clermine the <.'Oercer's gambit once 1t 1-wnin The c:oercer then works furiously to un IJ'..fi"''s.
I,.(U . ..

l.la '- .

172

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

to the tugets counter!>; the t an~et 1t''f'On<l., in kind ; h<Jtl, i\( more into tlt<ir n "JX'c.L efT' . < dtvi$l' it$ own coun e_rs arts. In llhort . r IX' t-sist in their respectl\'e achons. pmmng \er. . . b ] . . take O and the COil I ront.t~rnn nscualates frorn tl . . VJ~~ t age of ~ercion-\ntr. TIH I~ '' lwn a target I .;:<'at, the d~'t1anucs of cnSIS tJe l,~ :.tnd exemplary use to. le lrr t s coercion techlliqtres that cmrnot be revcue<)lCI<:v~.:s 1 1 \,,;11 < 1 1 1 ll t 1 J >ssesses effective c:oun er 't ( Ja use o . forC'e>. crec 1 ><'. antl full -se: I use., . . I< l<l of dc . not find t11e coercer's threats o.r exemp 1Y . . . . ed if tire coercer wants to get ItS~v<ty. . .. . r -xpl_,;,1 why coercive d1plomac~ IS Jd'flcul t. TIH f st ou f01 ce will be teguu . r 11 these s1..x ractors e 111 .r whv, . f: ctors'' and explain c C\ Cli. if executed well coertlvc sum, . _1 are "pem1anentJy operating a Jsent esenl _,,_ c TlIe I t two are occasione:u ractors. p1~rl fi or ac1 r dcl)<'ndi ng . . as diplomacy often r~. IC' rst me ractors rn k .t c . J . of the coercive diplomatic attempt.~ ~ I r on the exact nature . diplomacv inherent1 \, hard but not 1mposs1 1 e. I 1 1ek ast. tactor-thc targct's h. I J h . J coerCive . fr . . tt belief that . has eneenve co;nter-coercion tee mgues- ma es Jt lg 1 y likcl)' if 11ot guaranteed, t11at coercive diplomacy will fail.
t
GUJ

ART I COERCIVE DIPLOMAcY

CONCLUSION: WHAT POUCY GUIDEUNES CAN BE OFFERED?

Based on t be Iogtc and evidence IJresented, what guideli nes')can we give to poli<:v, . . . . makers who are contemplating resort to coe rcive diplomacy. SIX seem m order.

First, coercive diplom.acy is difficult and has a relatively low success rate. Second, it is difficult to esti1rwte the likely outcome of any given coercive diplomabic ganwit. Third, possession ofmilitary superiority ovm the target d.oes not guamntee success at coercive diplomacy. Fourth, positive inducements seem to enhance the likelihood of success, but only if they are offered after the threatened or actual use of exemplai1J or limited force. Fifth, derrwnstrative denial worh better than limited punishment f or coercive diplomacy. Sio..th, never resort to coercive diplomacy unless you, are pTepared to go to war should it fail, or unless you have devised a suitable political escape hatch if war is not acceptable.
Because the fourth and fifth guidelines have already been cliscussed at len!rth in the preceding section, I deal here with only the other four.

andu ' 1 ( this 32 pc~n:cnt fi 11urc: I k SL ac s <:ontext b t f,ortunateh- we have ,., I 1 . u Ornc statl'>ll<. on . 1\\ ot 1er instnnnent!. and tr ' s ategtes <:om . . 1 s pare-not as much as to provide some <:ont t .tl . ve would Ilk( mt nou~h ' f coercive cIrp J<>mc.lcy. T IH.:: eviu(~nce conce ex WJ 1111 which l < pIact the record J . . rr11ng economtc o .:!cause li te i111 position of ~- . . s.tncllons provides a useful sl;,ui i n~ point. bc ) an is done to tplomacy: somethi 11 san<:tions IS rough1. . a1 ogous to what ha ppcm 111 cocrcJvc: J. try to for<:~ a change in a t<Hget's bdta,ior without going to war again~t it \I 1 . ms . lllenl o f.ea<:Il ( Jrr (1111ltarv versus eeonom,c) th . ;bt wugl, the pnman . 't ruI JCrs .,. e o ~ ectJves and , Or Procedure of botJ , are roughI) the sarnc Tlle e,,.dence on san genera1method k f C fflons rs remar diplomacv data Garv H n. abl)' simi lar to our coercive d re' < ' ~ tud . uced the most comprehen umauer, Jc da SchotL an_ u.we prot1 Ki mberly E 1 1JOt } ' h Slve . . sanctions. I1avmg revte\\'ed 120 cases in the twentieth cent111 ~ to le of economtc sanctions were w d u imposed. They cone1 dec] that sanc:tions worked 33 percent ''oft! ent 1e 1111e to pro uce . . , . r I d cs .1 modest c 1ange m tne target s polrc1 and 25 percent )f. th t e me to pro uce a < . , b .1to tJ1 e uppe d 1 maJor IJoiicy change. These figures are not identical r an ower oun~ . of the success rate _f~r our coerciv~ diplomac:y cases. but they are <:lose enough to . on support the proposition that coerc1 short of war through either economc 1 0 r eco 1 ilital) ' means Is dicfi cu It and fails more than it succeeds. nomic-m Still, the data on sanctions do not prO\i de sufficient context because it could be tlle case that most other types of diplomatic gambits also fail more than the,succ.-eed. identiary benc:hmark that shows this do~s not have Fortunately, we have one other ev to be the case and t11at helps put into comparative perspective the suttess rate of coercion sho1t of war. It concerns extended deterrence-a diplomatic gambit wherein one state (the defender) tries to protect another (tl1e protege) from attack by a third party (the attacker). Paul Hutl1 and Bruce Russett studied the unherse of cases of e:\tended deterrence-fifty-four such instances-fTOm 1900 to 19 0. They found tJ1at extended deterrence was successful in thirtY , -one of these cases. for a suecess rate of 57 percent. The Hut11-Russett study not on1~ shows that some politicalmilitary uses of force can succeed more than tltey fail but also pro,ides empirical support fo r the proposition that deterrence is eac;ier than compeUence. Table 5 displays the success rates lor these three tlata sets. Taken together, the evidence about economk sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and extended deterrence gives us greater confidence that coercive diplomacy's success rate is not due i mpl~ to flawed execution and, therefore, that coercion short of war is indeed an inherently difficult enterp1ise . . ..

lt3

I. Coercive Diplomacy Is Difficult

As I argued earlier, coercive diplomacy is difficult because coerdon in general is difficult and because coercive diplomacy is the most diHicult form of coercion. Th~ case studies [examined] ... show that coercive diplomacy has a success rate~ 32 percent. Even tl1at figure may be too high because two of our cases (Bosnra 1995 and Haiti 1994) were borderline successes and because one (Iraq 1993) ma)' 0 ~ .be a success at all. A tougher coding could easily rank al] three as faiJures, driving the success rate down significantly.
TABLE 5 COMPARATIVE SUCCESS RATES

'TYPe of Strategy or Instrument

Coercive diplomacy Economic sanctions Extended deterrence

success Rate
32% 25-33% 57%

I i~

PART 2

T HE USES OF FORCE

2. Estimating Outcomes is Difficult

\\'e han! seen that positive inducements and denial ~l ratl'~it" tnhan<:<;: the . 1 lihood of' success at coercive diplomacy, but they alonl. <an not g11arantec: su 'ke. because the size of the disparity in resolve between lh~ C< H n< ' I .md th<: targ~t ~~c~~ a ignificant role in detenni~ing t~e outc?~~e. Then.:~~m dt lt. l:lll. i~1in~ bcfor~ ~~~ ssf11l1s also 1 fact whether an)' given coerc1ve dJplomatiC attempt" 111 be !>lit< c 1'ff' lard (" I I and again the problem derives from the 111 leJcnt tu lCU l) 0 ('Slunating relativ~ resolves. First. before the coercive diplomatic cri~is ~e~ins, tllC' c~><.:~tc~ c~uJnot know the strength of the target~-; resolve compared With lls own. nol cttn Jt lully know I 1ow 1 r .I . . . 111 g to t t'J I'nu . Oltentim . . strongly the target is attached to t l1e interest lt JS tl) such situations, the coercer may not be full~ ce1tain :1l~oul thP ~trength of' its~\\:~ resolve and how firmly it is committed to the mtcres ts 1t 1s clefeuchng. The same ma be true for the target. To complicate matters, the cocr<.:er will finu it dif'R<.:ult / credibly communicate to the target just how strong its resolve is, because only reso~ to war will reveal the full lengths to which it is prepareulo go to prevail. War, how. ever, is generally not desired by. the coercer.since it has chos~n <.;oerc:ive diplomacy in the hope of avoiding war. It 1s therefore mh~rently !1ard.lor th e coerc:er to persuade t11c target that it is prepared to wage war 1f coerc1ve d1plomacy fails when the coercer has chosen a step sh01t of war to sign ifY the seliousness of its intent. Fmthermore, for its part, the target will. more often than not, believe that it has effecvant to hide tive counter-coercion instruments available to it, some of which it will v and some or all of wruch will cause it to believe that it can persevere and ultimately prevail in the test of wills. If the coercer cannot fully reveal its resolve anu if the target believes it can counter the coercer, then accurately predicting the outcome of the encounter is difficult. Finally, under the impact of events, wi lls can change. standing interests can take on different values, and new interests can be formed. All tl1ese factors make ex ante estimation of outcomes extraonlinruily difficult. As a consequence, tl1e United States should be wary of putting high confidence in estimates abo~t the likely ot~tcome any given coercive diplomatic atternpt. This also means tha! Jt, shou~d put llttle ~nfide~ce in the notion that the less clemanding changes in a targets behaVIor are eas1er to bnng about than the more demanding ones.

ART I COERCIVE DfPLOM

o!

3. Military Superiority Is No Guarantee of Success

In ev~ry one of our cases, the United States possessed mil itary capabi lities far sup_tmor to the target's. If military superimity alone guaranteed success, then the I' 1 d 100 percent success rate. The fact that it had on~ Umted a 32 States should have la a , ~rcent ~uccess rate shows that the militari.ly shonger adversary does not nee essan y prevrul at coercive diplomacy. 'f . . , The reason why is clear C 1 u the \\1 s (reso1 and kill ompare coerc1ve diplomatic gambits to war. In war, ves) 5 0 f th e opponents are equally matched, then the _out~ .. C.'O me is decided 1 I ~ strengtJl prev 'Is >~;et]ative mthtary capabilities, and the party with superior milit~ le weaker party hac; the stronger will, it still cannot pre\'ail ru

1 . -' ... ag.,;nst a strOill~tr at ,crsarv unless that adversary ea . res ,ke St" that it ,,,p Iqtlrt tbc Fight ' whic:h is us ua11 v not the .so httl<; about wl'at IS at ' . c:ase After all, stal<,., < 110t. wage war over things .~. ' one 0 b h onc:e the war hc:gms. u1at I1mgs that thcv both <: "'ge b are a great d ra] ot <:arc little aho\tt th e~ , ~ ,..... war onh onr t e a out. In coen..:J'-'"<. tll plomacv, in contrast .11 counts mo h . \VJ ' . Clearly, capal)lht~ counts to a degree. Both artie . re C;:aVJiy than <:apahilitv. hu~ th 5 do make estimates of ea~h other's power, cal<.:ulati~1g how much it can e other, how wtll it can def<:nd itself from th e blows of the other -1nd to wh t 1 a extent it c [! 1 h c. t c othtr's militarv an strategy. The11e power estimates do aftect I ve reso1 esp : 11 believes it possesses effective counter-coer<:ion t h '. ecla )' w 1en the target thwart l e mques that gate the <:oercer's miJitary power. However, mJ_ictary <:ap-btncan'11 k or miti'.! tJ . a 11 S ta es second place to will in coercive diplomacv situations b . military power are dif"fc rent fro~ the actual ecausef. es~l~ates about the efficacv of . '. tary use o mt 1 p . . 1 a coerc1ve diplomatiC gamb1t the coercer employs onlv th . t d . . ower. n IJ / rea s an 1 .,. .. f 1ts m11tmy capabilities. Its purpose is to si al Jmlted force not tl1' r 'u. . panoply o 1 1 is "~lling to go in its use of force v.ithout having to gn tot e ~rget JU~t how far 1t 1 use muc1 Iurce. \ \:ith miJit . 1 I ,.. I d . . aJ) h b . power pa1 t y s 1eat 1e , 1t IS the value tl1at each partv t ' pu s on t e o Jectlves at stak 1 e tbat large Iy determmes 10w many risks each \\'1.11 take and 1 manv costs ea h u 1ow . . c ''1 bear. True, confidence about its military capabilitv can st. gth 1en en a target s resoh-e ' t . but the target must have a strong resolve to begm ""th because 1 can nt\er b. tere . . . . r ta.m that 1ts counter-coerc1on techruques will work as enVIso ned It mu t thererore 1 . . . on ts value the objective h1ghly enough to take the risk that 1 co un ter-coert1 tee h. ises mques may ~veil n?t '"'o:k. A~ their core, then, coercive diplomatic c1 are akin to ch gan_1es of chicken m wh1 wills more than capabilities are being tested. In such situati_ons the more the target values ~ts objectives, the more pain it is ,,;Jiing to bear to acrueve them , and hence the less likely the coercer is to succeed. . l1~ all t!1e cases ':e_s_tudied, the United States faced targets that, although militanly mfenor, were ll1Itially more highly motivated than the United State . After all, in the bulk of ou r cases, the issues at stake between the United States and the target were vital for the target, but not for the United States, with the 1994 ~orth Korean, 1990-91 Iraqi, and 2001 Afghanistan rases being the clear exceptions. How much military power the United States is prepared to commit, and therefore how far it is willing to go in signaling its intent to commit its \ast re ources. depends on how much the United States values the interests at stake. The United States can always militaiily overwhelm such a target, but to win at coerche diplomacy, it must convince the target that the United States cares more about ''inning than does the target, and that tJ1e United States will use a sufficient p01tion of its supelior strength to prevail. This is not easy to accomplish in situations in which the target views the issues at stake as vital. As a consequence. target with strong wil~s but infe1ior military capabilities may well believe that their superior determination will offset their capabilities' deficit. For all these reasons, the United States should never bank on the fact that being militarily stronger automatically brings v1ctory i~ _coerd,e diploma~c encounters the way it can in wars. were that the case. the Cruted States could dispense with war and do only coercive diplomacy.

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4. Do Not Res ort to Coe rcive Dipl oma cy Unk <:~, Sho uld It Fail You Are Prepared to Go Dow n the Path of Vv'ar c)r You Have ' Prep ared a Suit able PoJitical Escape Hatc h This advice does not imply that policymakers should e.;l'hcw coercive d.hlo 1ndel:'d. it is reasonabl e for U.S. national security <ledson make rs lous e it[ it1 mac:y. orde s1 0tt 0 f war. {' t works, is chea r 1 to achieve their objectives beca use coerc.on Per than wa2ing war. Because the odds are ag<unst ~ucces!'. however, the United States o start down the road of' coerC. wp1 ess . ts 1 l\'e .J' omacy un 1 It . wi 1 ing tor , should not esortt 11 t . I strategy tIlat WJn t:na) e . to hack d (} war, or unless it has devised a poUb ca 0 ~vtl "itJ1out too much loss of face, should coercive diplo macy fail. To resort to eoCrCI\'e l L... f. tJ.1e OIJJe cbvc w len coercive diplomac: , diplomacy and then to abandon pursuit o fails, if done too much , weakens tbe techrnqt1 e for future use ancl may well cli > credit it. AJtJ 10ugh it is true tJ1at the obj~ctives at hand d.(te nnine. to a gr~at degr:~ how both the targe t and the coercer v1ew the coercers dete rmmation , repeated use of coercive diplomacy, followed by hasty retreat~ whe n strong resistance is encountered, cannot but have a negative effect on the coer_cer's repu tation and, b extension, on its use of this technique. For tJ1is reason, if for no other, resort t~ coercive diplomacy should be unde rtaken only when the objectives sought are worth going to war for, or can some how be easily discounted politically to the U.S. public and its external audiences, shou ld coercive diplomacy fail. There is ob,~ ously a tension here, however, because if the objective is wortJ1 going to war for, it is more difficult to disco unt politically. Thus, although the temptation to try coercion on the cheap is great, tJ1e United States should not try it unless it is prepared to go the expensive route or can find a suitable escape hatch.

offense, Defense, and the security Dilemma

ROBERT JERVIS

. Another approach sttllts with the central point of th e secun.ty dilemma th t . , . --:- a an increase m one states secunty de<.:reases the security f th the cl .o ~ conditions unde r whi<.:h this proposition holds. Two cruCJaI ers~banles exa~mesved are mvol vana d .. . c . whether clerens1ve we.tpons an pobctes can be distin gwshecl from offensJVe ones h f'I' c .. I1etl1er tI1e derense or t e o en se has the advantage. Th e defu11tions are n0 t' and w . always clear, an cl many cases are difficult to J. udge, but th ese .... . vanables shed a lWO . . .~11 great dealof ltght.on the question of whether status-quo powers \-vu adopt compat. 11 h ] . Ible secunty po teres. A t e vanables discussed so far leave the heart of the rob. lem .untouched. But when .defe nsive weapons differ from 0 cr ve ones p.1t IS nenst . ess ' ossible for a state to make 1tself more secure without making ot11ers 1 secure. < P when the defense has the advaotage over the offiense, a large And , tn mcrease one . . state s secunty only shghtly decreases.tJ1e security of the others, and status-quo pow . . ers can all enJOY a lugh level of secu nty and largely escape from the state of nature.

OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE

NOTES
1. Robert P. Pape, Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion (Ithaca, .Y.: Com ell University Press, 1996), pp. 18-19. 2. Clenn Snyder and Pau] Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargainin g, Decision Alakin~, and System Stmcture in International Crises (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton Univer sity Press, 1977), pp. 118- 122. 3. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Sharp, The Warin Bosnia-Herzegoai:no: Ethnic Ccmflid ami lntemational lnteroention (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 354-355.

When we say that the offense has the advantage. we simply mean tl1at it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold tl1an it is to mo,e forward, destroy, and take. If effective defenses can be erected quickly. an attacker may be able to keep territory he has taken in an initial victory. Thus, tJ1e dominance of the defense made it very hard for Britain and France to push Gennany out of ~ranee in \Vor ld War I. But when supe rior defenses are difficult for an aggressor to improvise on the battlefield and must be constructed durin g peacetime. they provide no direct assistance to him. The secUJity eWe mma is at its most vicious when commitments. strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to secwity lies tluough ex-pansion. Status-quo powers must then act like aggressors: the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the ~pportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security ha'i no implicatio~s for their behavior. Even if expcmsion is not sought as a goal in itself, there will be qUtck and drastic changes in the distribution of tenitory and influence. Cooversel)~
7 F'rom ~Cooperation Under the Securitv Dilemma" from Wvdd Pvlitic.s. \'ol. 30. ~o. 2 (January 19 8). 86-214 by Rober t Jen'is. Reprint~d with permission of Johns Hopkins L'niversity Press. Portions P~ 1 of the text and some footnotes huve been omitted.

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hrus tile advmtaue status-quo stat< ". t '.lil 111: kc th,. 111 1 " 'I n H~ ' o . . . '"' ~e Vt~ 1 1 St'cure \\'1'tl lOU t gravel. endangennu others. fndc~cl. If thC' ' . le 11\V h 'L'> ,.1ougl 1 niJt~< b . .... f . l .. t: < lltt > ac ' un age an d 1 the states are of roughly equal c;m .' or dv will th C!. S<.:c:u . 1 r .J=} ""ase to t11bit status-quo states rrorn coopfratlll f~. 1. wmrc'isr< m Will 1 111( 111 ru cmma C.:.c '"'~") 1 rr lttt\(1 uni 111 . t. next to rmpossll) )e. tllus rendering international anarc '' . . \' Porta11t )(: states cannot conquer each other, t11en the ~ack of so' cnr!!;nh_ altlrcmgh it prc:,e, If e Its pro blems. of collect'I' goods in a number of areas. no .loncrcr forcc11 states to d<.:vot . . . . c: tJ. .r pnmary attention to self-preservation. Although. 1f lorcc "Ne not U\ahlt:, th<:rt 1e1 f Jj . wo uJd he r rewer restr,;nts on the use o nonm1 tan .m ~ln ~t n vntc; ' tltesc arc.: rarl"l . "" ' .-r. } powenu1enough to threaten tbe vital interests of a maJOr :-,tatt. 'r. .awo quesnons of tJ1e offense-defense balance can be ~eparated. F'irstdocs the Jl 1 .CJJ '>J.' '" r.orces to offset Cae:h state have to spend more or less than one do ar on c cf doUar spent by the 0 t]1er side on .for~es tha't ~?u.ld be ltSe<_l to att~c~? ff the state h<i!. one dollar tO spend on increasmg ItS ~eCllllty, shouJd ll p~lt. lt llllO offe~tsive Or defensive forces? Second, with a given mventory of forc: E-:s, IS rt better to attack or to defend? Is there an incentive to strike 61st or to absorb the other's blow? Th c~ . two aspects are often linked: If each dllar spent on o ff ensc ~an o vercome eae:h _o dollar spent on defense, and if both s1des ?av~ the sa~1 e de fense budget~. then both are likely to build offensive forces and find 1t attractive to attack rather than to wait for the adversary to strike. These aspects affect the security diLemma in different ways. The first has its greatest impact on arms races. If the defense has t11e ad\'antage, and if the status-<juo powers have reasonable subjective security requirements, they can probably avoid an anns race. Although an increase in one side's arms and securi ty wi ll stiiJ decrease the other's security, the former's increase will be larger t11an the latter's decrease. So if one side increases its arms, the other can bring its security back up to its previous Je,el by adding a smaller amount to its forces. And if t11e first side reacts to this change, its increase wiJI also be smaller than the stimulus tllat produced it. Thus a stable equiUb riurn will be reached. Shifbng from dynamics to statics, each side can he quite se<..11re with fon::es roughly equal to those of the otller. Indeed, if the def~mse is much more potent than the offense, each side can be willing to have forces m t tch smaller ~1an rle other's, and can be indifferent to a wide range of the other's defense policies. The se<..'Ond aspect-whether it is better to attack or to defend-inliuences short-run stabWty. When the offense has the advantage, a state's reaction to international tension wiiJ increase the chances of war. The incentives for preemption and the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" in this situation have been made clear b~ analyses of the dangers that exist when two countries have first-strike capabilities: There is no way for the state to increase its security without menacing. or .e\:en ~king, the other. Even Bismarck, who once caUed preventive war "comm.tttrng 1 SUJ. de from fear of death," said that "no government, if it regards war as inevitable 1 It 101 even r does not want it, would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the c1 ceof time~ occasion and to wait for the moment which is most convenie~t for~ enemy. In another arena, the same di1emma applies to the policeman m a d ~confronting a suspected criminal who appears to be holding a weapon. Thou~' ~ may_in~ be present, the security dilemma can account for many of the agtc.shootings of mnocent people in the ghettos.
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THE SECURJTY DILEMMA

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difficult. Second, because wars are expected to be~ ~'If ma e this particularly "'~11 be incentives for high levels of arms and qu ~ rdequcnt and s~ort, there , . 'I ' tc an strong reaction to th<: others mcreases m arms. 1 1e state eannot afford to wait til 1 . . 'd 1 L h . ous ev1 ence t 1at tne o t er IS bUJlding new weapons E .un 1 t 1ere ts unamh1gu. . . . .. . ven arge states t1 have 1at fruth rn thetr econom1c strength cannot wart' because the war Wl11 be over be1ore . r their products can reach the army. Third, when wars are quick t t tl h all , d . 4 h . . s a es Wl ave to recruit 1es rn a van<.:e. W1t out tht opporturuty for barg";nrng an cl reaJgnments cu 1 during the openmg stages of hostilities, peacetime diplomacy loses a degr f the fluiru ty that faci litates balance-of-power policies. Because alliances mu:~ secured during peacetime, the international system is more likely to become b~polar: It ~s hard to say ~hether war therefore becomes more or less likely. but this b1polarity mcreases tens1on hetween the two camps and makes it harder for statusquo state~ to gain th e benefil5 of cooperation. Fourth. if wars are frequent, statesmen s perceptual thresholds will be adjusted accordingly and they o,a,i lJ be quick to perceive ambiguous evidence as indicating that others are aggressive. Thus, tllere wiJJ be more cases of status-quo powers arming against each other in the incorrect belief tllat the other is hostile. When the defense has the advantage. a11 the foregoing is reversed. The state that fears attack does not preempt-since that would be a wasteful use of its military resources-bu t rather prepares to receive an attack. Doing so does not decrease t11e secu rity of others, and several states can do it simultaneously: the situation will therefore be stable, and status-quo powers will be able to cooperate. When Herman Kahn argues that ultimatums "'are va5tly too dangerous to give because ... they are quite Hkely to touch off a pre-emptive strike.''5 he incorrectly assumes that it is always advantageous to strike first. More is involved than short-run dynamics. When the defense is dominant, wars are Hkely to become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost. Relatively small and weak states can hold off larger and stronger ones, or can deter attack by raising the costs of conquest to an unacceptable t:vel.. State~ th~n approach equality in what they can do to each other. Like ~he .~-caliber ptSt~l m the American West, fortifications were the "great equalizer m some penods. Changes in the status quo are less frequent and cooperation is more <.-ommon wherever the security dilemma is thereby reduced. . . .. . Many of these arguments can be illustrated by ~e maJOr J>O'~ers polictes m the periods preceding the two world wars. Bismarck s w~ su~nsed st~tes~en by showing that the ofTense had the advantage, and by bemg qUJck, relaovel) cheap.

Beliefs abr11rt tire cou rv of a war 1n wh' h t h<:: off, uc: h c. rther deepen tt c 'tcurity dilem ma. Wh"n tl . ense as the advantage ru k 1 . . 1ere are rncent' . suCcessful attar '-\11 uc;ually !><> wcakt:n the cJth er SI'de that :trves to11 stnke first' a . ck blooJJc<,s ,lfld tlcc.:isive. 1t is in thel>e pe . ds h vrc ory \VJ be relatively qUl ' no w en con ttractive that statt 'I consolitlatc power intern 11 f, . c1uest IS possible and a .1 a y- or mstance h d . reudal baron.s-anu cxpantJ cxternaJJy TI e ' Y e~trOYJng thc '' . ' re are S(::Ver I decrease the chanc.:t of cooperation among status- uo staa co~.sequenccs that profitable for the winner. Th<.; <.:osts will be low and~he be~:sfi FJr~t, war ,..,;JI be losers vvill suffer; the fear of losing cou ld intluce st t t f,ts hrglt. Of course, . "' t I h. . a atiVe arrangemen s, )Ut t c temptat1on of vic.to es o.try to konn ~table cooper11

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'fRV IS I OFFENSE, DEFENSE AND TH

. .. . into a common error, observer ,}.('.: ('ted thL., a and qmte dectstve. Fallmg ti s had several e{f( '<: I trst stat p ttcrn into the future.6 The resulting explecta o~f the Fra nco-Pnt" . n '\ ctr. Napesls ought . t all'e s In the ear y stages . o senu-permanen 1 , of time to recrui t A11 : 1 to ,bis sid eon IJJ .. 1 had thought cllat th.ere wor~d~; sli:nJ~ista ke. Second. def~ns. budgets We~ ~~~w, others we re not gomg to P. ed h I) to mcreases on the ocller sic.le. lt h not surpnsmg thgb and rea ct qmte s arp f fits this period we U Third . mo!!t c.lecision m k at . Ri hards 's theory o anm races c on ar would not cost mucl1 blood and treasure; a ers thought that the next European ~v seen as inevitable and wit; mass opin ion Th .was at reason why war was gener J IS one med likelv there we re strong pressu res to preern so bellicose. Fourth, once war see ~ 'd th .d b lieved that whoeve r move firs t could pen etr ate the oth cl pt. . Bo SI es . e hili' ti' and cllus gain an insurmountable advantage.er .eep (Th enough to disrupt mo za on e use of naval forces. AltJ1oug1 Ch urc I',J made an ere 1 w illwas no sueh be )jef about th . "d vised h sa . that if German slups o not come ou t , d figh t m time of an they~be d: ;u t like rats in a hole,~s everyo ne kne''~ that subm~rines, tnines and coastal forti6cations made this impossible. So at the start of tl1e w~ ~ac h na')' prepared to defend itself rather than attack, and the sho rt- ru ~ des tab Jhzm g forces did that Iaunched the annjes toward each otherh not operate.) Fu rthenn ore, each . . 'd knew that the other saw the situation t e same way, th us mc reasmg th e per~~ed danger that the other would attack, and giving each added reasons to precip itate a war if conditions seemed favorable. In the long and ~he .sho r: run , the re were thus both offensive and defens ive incentives to strike. ThlS Situation casts ~ght on the common question about German motives in 191 4: "D id Ge rm any unl eash the war deliberately to become a world power or did she sup por t Austria merely to defend a weakening ally," the reby protecting her own pos ition ?10 To som e exten~ this question is misleading. Because of the perceived advantage of the offense , war was seen as the best route both to gaining expansion and to avoiding drastic loss of influence. There seemed to be no way for Gennany me rely to ret ain and safe guard her existing position. Of course the war showed these beliefs to have been wrong on all poi nts. Trenches and machine guns gave the defense an overwh elming advant age. The fighting became deadlocked and produc ed horrendous cas ualties. It mad e no sense for the combatants to bleed themselves to death. If the y had kno wn the power of the defense beforehand, they would have rushed for the ir own trenches rather than for the enemy's territory. Each side could have done this ,,;thout increasing the other's incentives to strike. War might have bro ke n out any way; but at least the pressures of time and the fear of allowing the other to get the first blow would not have contributed to this en d And, had both sides known the cos ts of the ~ they~uld have negotiated much more seriously. Th e obviou s question is why the states did not seek a negotiated settlement as soon as the sha pe of the ,var became clear. Schlieffen had said that if his plan failed peace should be sought. 11 Tbe . 1~. ' answer IS compiCA, uncertam, and largely outside of the scope of our concern s But part of the reason was the hope and sometimes the expectation that break ~~-be made and the dominance of the offensive restored. Without ~at L-- - 'be political and psychological pressures to fight to a decisive victor)' 011ght lliiY e ~overcome.

E SECURITY DilEMMA

:!r

The poli tiC'-. ';{ t h( in t<rwar period were sha ed b ous wn lli<.:t. nd till' belief that any Futtrrc.. P mem preVl . . "'war wou Id rY.the bl . ories. of the . ,,:tar'V lessons n:mforced each oth(;r in . ese m e 1t. Pohti<:al and rnw 1 . rating . . . cause it was b( hcwcl that the First Worldarne 1tOh c.l b the ~ecunty d1lemrn \ \T Be. a. 1I . ar a een a . t k h mts a e t at could I1ave bee n avoidc:c J~ skillf~tl conciliation both B . . ntam and t0 1 ..,.,..,ce were highly sensitive to the possihilin, th t . t a esser extent f ~~ 'J a m crwar Ger threat to peace. and ak: rt to the danger that reactin uickJ man y was not a real arm s could create unn ecessary conAic:t. And becauseg q. . Yand, strongly B to her . ti clom the de fense to con n11c to inate, they conc:ludecl nta1 . and f ranee exnected th tn . a 1t was safe to -r t ado more relaxe d. an cl nontI1reatenmg military posture.12 Bri tain als ~ I . P a ntam t'gl1t all't ance hot11. Th ' 11, , )j 1 0 mru e t .less need to ~. e hwes mi 'tarv post th ' sliuht danger to Gennany.; 1 the latter been content ure then constituted onh: a 1ad 1 'tl . o r b t 'cl Wl quo t have been easv ror otn s1 es to have felt secure behr'nd th1 e. status r :fi1 would err 1 of 10rt i cations mes Of cou rse the Ge rmans. were ~ot ~on ten t, so it is not surprising that thev dev oted their n~oney a~1d attention to fio~mg ways out of a defense-dominated ~tal emate. Blitzkn eg tactics were necessary rf they were to use fo rce to cL,. th t .. uan .e s quo The im tial stag~s of the war ~n the Western Front also contrasge withatus Firs. ted the t World War. Only w1th the new atr ann were the re any incentives to strike first , and these forces were too weak to carry out the grandiose plans that had bee n both dream ed and feared. Th e arm ies, stiJl the mai n instrument, rushed to def ensive positio ns. Perhaps the allies could have successfully attacked whjJe the Ger mans 13 were occupi ed in Poland. But belief in the defense was so great that this \vas never seri ously contemplated. Th ree months after the start of the war, the French Prime .\1iniste r summe d up the view held by almost everyone but Hitler: on the We stern Front the re is "de adJ ock. Two Forces of equal strength and the one that attacks seeing such enormous cas ualties that it cannot move with out endangering the con tinu14 ation of the wa r or of the afte nnath." The Allies were caught in a dilemm a they never full y recogn ized , let alone solved. On the one hand, they had very high war aim s; although unconditional surrender had not yet been ado pted, the British had decided from the start that the removal of Hitler was a necessa n conditi on for ' peace. IS On the other hand. the re were no realistic plans or instruments for allo wing the Allies to impose the ir will on the other side. The British Ch ief of the Imp erial General Sta ff noted, "The Fre nch have no inte ntion of carrying out an offe nsiv e for years, if at all"; the British we re only slightly bolder. 16 So the Allies looked to a long war that would we ar the Ge rmans down, cause civilian sufferin g thro ugh sho rtages. and eventually underm ine HitJer. The re was ~ttl e analysis to support this 'iew - and indeed it probably was not supportable but as long as the defense ~~ d~m inant and the number s on each side relatively equal, what else could the Allies do. To summarize, the security dile m;na was much less powerfuJ afte r World Wa r I than it had bee n before . In the late r period, the expected power of the ~efense allowed status-quo states to pursue compatible security policies and a,o ld races. Fur the rm ore, high tension and fear of war did not set off short-run d)n anucs by which each state, hyi ng to increase its security, inadve rtently acted to "_lake war more likely. The expect ed high cos ts of war, howe,er. led the Allies to be~ eve that no sane Ge rman leader would run the risks entailed in an attempt to donuna te the Continent, and discouraged the m from risking war themsel"es.

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; , ,.., tS I OFFENSE, OEFENSE AND TliE S I ECURfrY DILEMMA

Technology and Geography

vo main f~t<:IOr' Lltal <h ..,.. 1 1 an d geog'' 11')h)' are tl1e ,t' As Brodie not<-.. <)t 11Il ,.t'l lw wlrC'! Irt, tl I< ~ aec 1110 ogy . ,,., ica llf'vcl . .I . . . l\ o1icnse or the uetrensc Il as the advantage. kcr hut ntan" r cJ l.I1 cIl'fcHdt... 'f'l a tt a\ 1 r >rs . . ru Ic, rew p1 . al r t< fa vor I tC a a<.: -fk c:1 1amctcn...,tl( 1ll Im-. lro 1J ..J. I(l 1ystc< tac er 111 1 llll( r 1 11 I tl , advantage o1c.:ov I.,. detcncer usua y 1as IC , 1 crosses op(ll grotrt H. Anytl1ir r tl . 11 . f' I it . hilc Ius opponcn . I . ,., r.u some form o s 1e et ~ 1 t 1 attackN has to cros..,, m llliJ><< ts IJis progr s~ increases tl1e amoun t of arounc 1c .111 while crossing. illtn .t.'>('' l I1c adv .< ~"> e 1110re Vlt 1 nera 1111 .tgt Ium across it, or makes . r" s"par tcd IJ\ l>arricr<o tlal prod11<:c tl t . . d r \\11Cn states a " " ' " 11~~ accrurng to the ecnse. . . d . . dilemma 1 ease , sinee both can . Itaw IOJC'c ~ advc Ill <it. flJr S he secunty cffeets, t . k Jmpenetrahlt lnt rrl<'r~ "<>1<1 a<.:l11ally pnvc 1 dcfense without being abk to alttac 1 settle for a lfoocl U<'al 1<~~. Hufl(r zon<<; sic,'1 ' . 1. cl : makers 1ave o ~ . . 'v war; m reaJty. ecJSJOn 1 1y g,ve the defcntln tlltH' to prepan, i~t~;n"s. they t 1t>1<' ) "" < the attacker's progress; d tile ntlmher of soldiu:-. available ((Jr tiH fi . uce 11 '1 . . f I 'ti . . . 11 rcc1 problems o ogs cs, tll . t tll cent11 rv A1tlwr Balfo11r not ed Afghauishn'1 Jf ; ,, It. At tJ,e encl < t w nmc een assau . "$ 1 gas it possesses few road!,, and no raiIroads it will .. . d cting" < Jua!JtJes. o 011 1 ' non-con u . k effecti ve use of her great llll lllenca Slpt:riorit} tt 1 l . . ss'ble for HussLa to llll:l e I 11 f'f' r ' Je nnpo . , 1t0 tile Empire.'' The Hussians va uc< > crs or the sw1<' 1 yVJta point immed1ate1 . cJ 1 . I . any .. eac;ons it is not surpnsmg ll 1at when Persia was bcmg IVlt1cu tnto H11ss1an and r ., h {J British m eres orlllllllencc S()Jnt')'earslater' the Hussianssoug1Lassnrances thattllc 1 l 1 ilding potentia.lJy mcnac111g nu ., ' . s 1nr t 1e1r sphcre. British ..- uld ref'ralll frem1 bt 1 WO I roac . _ . ctkJn radica11 altered the a > rbes o conntncs to )' . Jncleeu, smce raJ1 cl c.:o11stn 1 roa . 1 . . .1 r oerencl 'ttl emse1 ancl to att-:tck otJ1ers' many dplomat1c notes an<Ill 11111<.: h 111[(11 ves c ' I. ence activity in tJ1c late nineteenth century centerc< on tlt tS su ">JCd. . 1 . g Oceans, large rivers, and mountain ranges serve .the same .f11nctJon <L'i bnffcr w nes. Being hard to cross, they allow defense aga1nsl supcr~~r numberl!. Tlte defender has merely to stay on his side of tile barrier a nu so cart utd!:;r.e aiJ th~ 111cn he C'dll bring up to it. Th<' attackers men, however, can c:ross o.n ly ~ l~w a.t a ti me, and they are very vulnerable when doing so. If all states were scll.-sufBcient 1 sland , anar chy would be much Jess of a problem. A small investment 1n shore defenses anJ a small army would be sufficient to repel invasion. Only vey wc<tk states would be ~ul nerahle, and only very large ones cou ld mena<.:e others. As notcu above, the Un1ted States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, have partly been able to escape from the state of nature bet-ausc their geographical positions approxi1natcd this ideaL Althoug~ geography cannot be changed to conform to borders, borders can aud do change to conform to geography. Borders across wh ich an attlli:k is <.'<L'i)' tPnd to he unstable. States living within them are likely to expanu or be absorbed. Frw piC'nt war~ are almost inevitable since attacking will often seem the best way to protect what ouc has. This process wjJJ ~op, or at lea'it slow down, whe11 the state's borders rcac:h- hy expansion or contraction- a line of natural obstades. Security without attack will then be possible. Furthem10re, these lines oonstitute salient solutions to bargai ui ng pro~ lerns and, to the extent tJmt they are barriers to migration, are likely to <~vide ethuK groups, thereby rdising the cost~ and lowering the incentives for conquest. . 1 . Attachment to one's state and its land rei nforce one q uac;i-geograpluc<t aJd to the defense. Conquest usually becomes more difficult the deeper the
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kcr pu!>IH's JlJ L CJII< turritory. aliow . ht r\ 1 attac . advatH 'lng ,o Iy 1 a 1~rn '>pure, th<; dcf ' on cngthtJI'I the attack<; . I . <:uucrs tCJ fi gl.t Jer har 11 nf:11 nili rs Ill<:\ : ' 1 CJftc" d<:vastatcu land th ~upp .y 1 1 takes him gh 1ut th rou . s at req 11 m.: trc>< ~ . . )ps or garnson T ht'SC stabr lr/ ng dyrr<U ni ~;s will not O])(:r te I duty a '' , t,.;ricl is sitnat ccl 111 ar its honkrs, or if the pconl I(}Wf.!V(: r' I r tJl C cJ t: ~en U I er's war rna c:: r. c c only about 1l l'lll!.; on I 11<.: win11it rg c;id<.:. In Sllc.: h ~ o not <:~trc aho11 t thClr state, .. t I )IJ r 'IJL 'Ill at work and illl I cI ell'als wr ne i11S11rrnountabh 111 ses, pnsJtiVC.: rccdback Wl. )e tra lrnitating gr<1graphy, trcn hav<.: triccl to create ba . r . . I . r r demilitam:N zonE-s on IJOllt s1ues of. th<: bordt:r altlrnE;! rs. r<::atl<:s rnay.proVI'dc h . 1 SIJ<: zones .....,,IJ rarelv JO roug I deep cnougl1 to proVl'd c rnore than warning. ' Even tl . . ." b e . 1 wa\ r.urope but the Hus~wns auoptcd a gauge: for thei r railro .11stl. t not poss1h!e 10 l d ~:. . . aus 1a was Jroa er than tl at of the nc1ghbonng 'itates, thereby complicating th' l< g . . . ll f I . . 1 , 1ICS pro ) C::ms O an)' "' > IS attacker- mcludmg H.uss1 a.

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Perhaps th e most ambitious. and at lt:asl temporarily suceessful attempts to construct a syste m that..wou ld a1d the defenses or both sides were the intcr.var naval treaties, as they affected JapancseArneric:an relations. As mentioned earlier the problem was that ~e United Stal(;S c.:ould not J efcnd tile Philippines ,vi thou~ denyi ng Japan the ab1hty to prote<.:t her home islands?>On 1941 this <.IHemma bec:ame insoluble when Japan sought to extend her contr()l to ~1 alava and the Dutch Ea'it Indies. the Phi~ippines ha~ bee~ invulnerable, they could have provided a secure hase from wh1ch the Un1ted States could interdict Japanese ship ping hetween the homelanu and the areac; she wao; trying to eonqucr.}1n the 1920s and early 1930s each side wou ld have beeH'vi lli ng to grant the other sec.:urity for its possessions in return for a reciprocal gran t, and tile Washington l':aval Conference agreements were designeu to approach this goal. As a Japanese diplomat later put it, their country's "fundamental principle" was to have "a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense."21 Thus Japan agreed in 1922 to accept a navy only three-fifths as large as that of the United States, and the United States agreed not to fortify its Pacific islands. 22 (Japan had earlier been for<:ed to agree not to fortify the islands she had taken from Germany in World War 1.) Japan's navy would not be large enough to defeat America's anywhere otJler than close to the home islands. Although the Japanese could stiU take the PhWppines, not only would they be unable to move farther, but they might be weakened enough hy their efforts to be vulnerable to counterattack. Japan , however, gained se~;urity. An AmeriC'an attack was rendered more difficult because the American bases were unprotected and because, until 1930, Japan was allowed unlimited numbers ~f cruise~, destroyers, and submarines that could weaken the Americ.:an A as t made ts eet way across the ocean.2.1 The other major determinant of the ofTensedefense balance ~ technology. When weapons are highly vulnerable, they must be employed. before they are ~t~acked. Others can remain quite iuvulnerable in their b~es. The fonner ehamcterJStics arc embodied in unprotected mis iles and many kinds of bombers. (It should be notcu that it is not vulnerability ]Jer e tllat is crucial but the location the vul11 ner-rtbtty. Bombers and missiles tl1at are easy to cles t r0 , onl, after ha...wg been . . launched toward their targets do not create destabWzing dynamics.) JncealntiVes tko stnk< f' are usually absent for naval forces tl1at are tl1reatened bv a nav attac lrst

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hen in the b pmt ,, ed _ the, are usually '''eU r . 1r ;l~h d d iles m harden wos, ~ Uke mtss lvl::!s suc:ce . -...;;s. be prepare to erenc I . 1 Both sides can then sJmultaneous) conditions, forts, trc - ' .J.nd small ssfuJiy. I n ground ' varfare under some off large numbers o r., r r~. Less frgroups of bold .. men in prepared.postt:JOns:endefenses. By and large. it 15 1 C test hetwe;;;~en~~ on the one hand, ;d ' 10hility a d hOrtifi. a few attad.-ers can stonn n ea,. rtinO' liO'ht weapons d . ler cations an suppo o o Ji th ttack on the other. As tJ,,. Erroneous . ea I the way or th s no simple waY to dPtcrmi ne whVIews heId l . weapons that c ear JC 1 IS d " 1 be two world wars show' ereooth and predictable like' those of . orn. before t a sw10gi iUations are not sm "[T]h . ;,... both extent and time. Some occur in t}te c:our nfg ese osc mant. u duJ urn. The}' are uneventhers in the course of a war. still others during ase 0. a . pen senes also be detected: single battle or camprugn .o . a of w rs.n Longer-tenn osctllat:ions can tl:le tv:el.fth to the late tllirteenth cen tu rv, 'vith its wond ..r f . e.,uj ". . I. h h . . . The early Goduc age, rom dunng w 1JC t e attackers m Europe gen. c . d 1 ces was a penod . , . . cathedrals an d 10rti 6e Pa 1e because t 1 rmpro\iement 10 the strength d. creasing difficulties, . . . fd erally met senous an m o estruction. Later. With the spread of e advance in the power c of fortresses outran tb fifteentl:t centurv. old tortresses 1 t1 power to resist An ost 1crr the end oftbe f ' firearms at . a bich the offense possessed, apart rom short-term setbacks 11..... ed d unnc v. ' "" all r. age ensu . g the seventeenth centmY. especr y atter about 1660 and . . _ : advantages. Then. dunn til least the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Success1on m l t40, the defense ~much of the ground it bad lost sinc-e the great medie,al fort~esses~had pro"ed tmable to meet the bombardment of the new and more numerous art:illery.2A . Another scholar has continued the argument: "The offensi,e gained an advan. tage with new forms of heavy mobile artillery in the nineteenth century, but the stalemate of World War I created the impression that the defense again had an advantage; the Gennan invasion in \Vorld \Var IL howe,er. indicated the offensive the field."'25 superiority of highly mechanized armies in The situation today with respect to con,entional weapons is unclear. until recently it was believed that tanks and tactical air power gave the attacker an advantage. The initial analyses of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war inclkated that new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have restored the primacy of the defenst'. These weapons are cheap, easy to use, and can destroy a high proportion of the attacking vehicles and planes that are sighted. It the n would make sense for a status-quo power to buy lots of 820,000 missiles rather than buy a few half-million eUdollar fighter-bombers. Defense would be possible even against a large and w equipped force; states that care primarily about self-protection would not need to engage in anns races. But further examinations of the new technologies and the history of the October War cast doubt on these optimistic conclusions and leave us unable to render any firm judgment26 .Cooceming nuclear weapons, it is generally agreed that defense is impossible~ btntpb DOt ci tbe offense, but of deterrenre. Attack makes no sense, not beca~ it can be beaten off, but because the attacker will be destroyed in rum. ln terms under oonsideration here, the result is the equivalent of the ucteme. F"IJ'St. SJoity is relafu.ely ,.J.~ ...... Less than one percent of the G.~

l SS5

. ooceivahlc cm't .,. rr<:H'>. Second ' hc>th sd(;S <:an SliT JJt I C " ancously gain sccuritv in ;apability Tl tird d e form of sdor1d \tnkc < t11 , atcd t th c an re1 ~> e roregoing, ~cond.d in the r. . f Strike capahrlrh cm he .rrwintai ncd . h . ace o WJ e vanati .., ons rn t e othe:r sides militarY postun'. I w rc rs no purely milita r v b each s.I cle has l() reaet quickly ' reason ' I l ( 'f'> increases in anns. An w~ y(jj L ' and strongly tOtrr Ot t-rving to achieve fir'>l-strike <:apability can 1 y spen l' ng that the other devotes to . , )e neutraJ7..ed b th . ~;b Y e states spenclmg much smaller suml. on protecting its second ,_ .k capa ilitv F ourth, t here arc no -Sl n e . m .,. incentives to stri'kc first . a crisis. Important problems remain, of cou rse. Both sides h . f h ave mterests that go well beyond defense of the homeland The prate t' c 1on o t ese inte ts . . . . . Ricts even 1f ne1ther s1dc destres expansion. Furthermore the .res ereates cond ' .shift from defense to deterrence has greatly incrca'>ed the importanc e rity now rests on each side's belief that th th e an Pld rceptrons of resolve. Secuh'gl . ks f e o er wou prefer to run 1 1 ns o t A total destruction rather than sacrifice ils vital . t m eres s spects of th e secunty dilemma thus appear in a new form. Are weapons p . index rocurements ') . Ive.? Must t hey be so used. If.one side fails to respond t th used as an 'Id th , b of reso o eo t r s Ill up ' k d h b - . 11 1 1t appear '"ea an t ere y mVJte predation? Can b th d . 1 w s1 o f 1 h 1 or is there a zero-sum elem tSI es 1 mu> taneously have 1rnages o 11g reso ve en mvo ved':. Although these problems are real, they are not as severe as those m th e prenuc1 era: ear . . There are m anv md1ces of resolve and states do not so much JUdge 1mages of " . r~solve L~ the ab~tr~c.:t as ask how like~y it is that the other will stand finn in a partic:ular dispute. Smce states are most likelv to stand finn on matte rs wb.1<:h concern , them mos~, it i~ quite possible for both to demonstrate their resolve to rote<:t their p own secunty Simultaneously.

OFFENSE-DEFENSE DIFFERENTIATION
The other major variable that affects how strongly the security dilemma operates is whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack. If they do not, the basic postulate of the security dilemma no longer applies. A state can increase its own security without decreasing that of others. The advantage of the deffmse can only ameliorate the security dilemma. A differentiation between offensive and defensive stances comes close to abolishing it. Such d.ifferentiation does not mean, however, that all security problems will be aboushed. If the offense has the advantage. conquest and aggression will still be possible. And if ~e offense's advantage is great enough, status-quo powers may find it too expenstve to protect themselves by defensive forces and decide to procure offensive weapons eYen though this will menac-e others. Furthennore. states "ill stiiJ ha,e to wony that even if the other's military posture shO\vs that it is pea<.-eful now, it may develop aggressive intentions in the future. Assuming that the defense is at least as potent as the offense, the differentiation betv.'een them allows status-quo states to behave in ways that are dearly different from those of aggressors. Three beneficial consequen<.-es follow. Fi~ status~uo pow~rs can identify each other, thus laying the foundatior~ for ~r~t:ion.. Confh<:ts growmg out of the mistaken belief that the other side lS expansiOnist will be less

:ethe..LJ___
11

prinj

cleQeJ to

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>~ attack on the United States most o rtdtmdaot systems to provide a lot of insuran~ against the \\'0

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t f 1 is .-at

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IEPVJS I OFFENSE, DEFENSE AND

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THE SECURITY DrlEMMA

_, n obtain advance \\'Jrtl ' lt '~ 11 other 1 t. second status-quo states ww 1 rrequen k . ._ . to dc,elop and deplm nl n~ ivc w ,. ' p an . B c . tate can attac , 1t oas <: ap<Jn\ aR.gresston. eL oreas t be disguised and le:.l~ <>. . . Jt~.ir a1110 tl1ese weapons C'.lnno lllll of 1f procure men t o f tate vvi 11 have the tJtllr to take . . . aJ 1 does a status-quo s t:o11 nter. time, as 1t most a ways : . ._1 level of defensive arm~ <l!\ Ln!!; a! its l)Olc . 11 . I cl t 1nai.ntam a 1 11gL . 1 1a1 mea'iures. t nee no ful posture (Although be~ng so anncd shmdd aclversanes are . dopting a peace t d below aJarm other -.tat ns-r[tiO po 11o1 a . .J h rt t ex.ceptton no e wcrs ) w1t 1 t e one tmpo an . t'on "o tctions thal thcv l>cliC'\'(' would not he lak d . t y srJecta1atten 1 l ' < ' < ('ll States o, m ac pa b t:he, 14 that state e~hibitiug S\Jd l beha,ior .,. reel ' u by a status-quo 5tate .ecause de~elopmeot of transportation facilities will \Jar e sive Thus tl1e seJZure or . .r 1 . 1 n aggres if tl r . . . ha~e no commerc1al ,aluc, anu t 1e1 efore c;an onlv be 1ese .acJ 10 es J d . 0 th rs more e il' . In I906 tJ1e British rejectc a RussLan protest about wanted for m ltai)' reasons. ' . . ~ . . . . . . cl' t t of Persia b) clannmg that t1us are a "as on 1 , of lstrategic] ~ the! r actiVities m a IS ne . . , . [ h R . ansl if the)' WJsJ1ed to attack t I1e I nd'. r . . or to put u.ssJ d 1mnortance to t e k 1an..,-rontJer, .. c-I aking us think tl1at they in ten to attac 1t. - ressure upon us JY m< P The same inferences are drawn when a state acqw.res more weapons than c eded 140 r defense Thus. the Japanese spokesman at the 1930 c observers ree1are ne London naval conference said tl1at his country was alarmed. by _the Amencc:n refusal to give Japan a 70 percent ratio (in place of a 60 ~ercent rat:i~) m heavy <:rutSers: "A s long as America held tl1at te~ percent ad~IQ11tage, 1t was poss1 for her t~ attack. So bl~ when America insisted on stXt)' percent mstead of seventy pe1cent, the 1dea would exist tltat iliey were trying to keep that possibility, and the J ~pa~ese people could not a<.:cept that."'2.1! Similarly, when Mussolini tol~ Cham_berlru~ m Janua~y 193~ _that Hitler's arms program was motivated by defens1 consJderahons, the Prune M lllJSter ve repJjed that ..German military forces were now so strong as to make it impossible for any Power or combination of Powers to attack her successfully. She could not want any furilier armaments for defensive purposes; what then did she want tbem for?''29 Of course these inferences can be wrong-as they are especially likely to be because states underestimate the degree to which they menace otbers. 30 And when they are wrong, the security dilemma is deepened. Because the state thinks it has received notice that the other is aggressive, its ov.rn arms building vvill be less restrained and the chanc.:es of cooperation wiLl be decreased. But the dangers of inc:orrect inferences should not obscure the main point: \Vhen offensive and defensive postures are different, much of the uncertainty about the other's intentions that contributes to the security dilemma is removed. The third beneficial consequence of a difference bel:\veen offensive and defensive weapons is that if aiJ states support tl1e status quo, an obvious arms con~~ agreemen~ ~ a on weapons that are useful for attacking. As P:esid~n~ oosevelt put lt m h1s message to the Geneva Disarmamen t Conferenee 111 1933 "If_all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make posSJ'bJe a succ:essm1 attack, defenses automatically will becorne . .r . . Impregnable, and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become secure "31 The f: th h ~ act at sue treaties have been rare the \Vashington navaJ agree mentsthat sed above and the anti-AB M treaty can be cited as examples-sh o": either states are not ai willin t1 at 11 is hard to distin . h ofli ":ays g to guarantee the security of others, or 1 gws enslVe from defensive weapons.
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Is such a cLshd lon possible? Salvador de \1 a . . ve in the disan: .1:nent negotiations of the inte dariaga, the SpaniSh statesman l:l ac . lwar years, . 1 c . according to which d f. thought not: "A weapon . tJter ofTenSJ\ ~ nr c erensJVe 1s e1 . . en o 1 you a 1 ki t french Foreign \l m1ster agreed (although French olic di re oo ng at." The . w) "Every an n can be employed offensive!)' dp . Y_ d not always follow this 0 r e1 v1e I ensJ . y to discover whet 1er arms are intended for pu 1 d r vel)' in t urn. The only . ,va . . . re Y eensJVe pu h . a spirit of aggre~swn 1s m all cases to enq,;re . t th . rposes or are eld tn ...... m o e mtentio f th ncerned.'' Some e"idence for tl1e validity of this ar . n~ o e country CO . . th gument 1 provtded bv th f: s that much time ~~ ese unsuccessful negotiations was de,oted t . :' e act 0 ve from defens1ve weapons. Indeed no simple and b' separating offenSl . . ' unam 1guous d fi ti . r e_ ru on IS possible and m many cases no judgment can be reached. Be1ore tl1e Amencan entry ~ d . intO World \Var I, \\ oo row \.VJison wanted to arm merch t . . th 1v w1 guns in an men on th the back of the sh1p so ey could not initiate a fight but thi d: c ' s expe 1ent cannot be applied to more corn mon rom1s of armaments.32 There are. several problems. Even when a differentiat0 n 'bl 1 IS poss1 e, a status. quo power will want offens1ve arms under any of th ree conditions: (l) If the offense a great adv~ntage over the defense, protection through defensive forc~s WJll_be too e~ens1ve. (2? Status-quo states may need offensive weapons to regam temt~ry lost m the open mg stages of war. It might be possible, hO\vever, for a state to wru.t to procure these weapons until war seems likelv, and thev might be needed only in relatively small numbers, unless the aggressor ~vas able t~ construct strong defenses quickly in the occupied areas. (3) The state may feel that it must be prepared to take the offensive either because the other side wilJ make peace onlv if it loses territory or because the state has commitments to attack if the other makes war on a third party. As noted above, status-quo states with extensive commitments are often forced to behave like aggressors. Even when they lack such commitments, status-quo states must worry about the possibility that if the~' are able to hold off an attack, they will still not be able to end the war unless they move into the other's territory to damage its military forces and inflict pain. }.lany American naval officers after the Civil War, for example. believed that "only by destroying the commerce of the opponent could the United States bring him to tenns."33 A further complication is introduced by the fact that aggressors as well as status-quo powers require defensive forces as a prelude to acquiring offensive ones, to protect one frontier while attacking another, or for insurance in case the war goes badly. Criminals as well as policemen can use buUetproof vests. Hitler as well as Maginot built a line of forts. Indeed, Churchill reports that in 1936 the German Foreign Minister said: "As soon as our fortifications are constructed [on our western borders] and the countries in Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all these countries wi ll begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies, and a new constellation will deveJop.":34 So a state may not necessarily be reassured if its neighbor constructs strong defenses. . More central difficulties are created by the fact that whether _a weapon lS offensive or defensive often depends on the particular s~tuation-~or ~nstance, th~ geogr-aphical setting and the way in which the weapon lS used. !an~. ~ headed the fateful Gem1an thrust through the Ardennes in l940. but tfthe Fn:dned had cltsposed of a properly concentrated annored reserve ' it would have prOVl

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R\115 I OFFENSE, DEFENSE AND THE

I

. . n and into .1 the best means for thetr cutting 0 ff the penetratiolmill'' ,t . . -~~ \-; <. di vhe sastcr became instead an oven M : An r for the Ge rmans w Ita t . b sed they nm sl \, ..u. {iJ r lhe tt-ai rcrat tl eu 0 1er sid bvtou s1 defens1ve.-to ttack on ' Israel in weapons seem o Y 1973 '<m id hav t: to come to the m But the Egyptian a e bee . . . . ff tive air defenses that covere d t Ile I,,;tt Ie f' Id. Neverth 'n w unpossJble Wlthout e ec . . I s J h Simon, then the British Fop ' . C..J : 1f n less , som e ws ti neti 0 ns are posstb e.. d ,0 I.ier e1 Se(' . . stated tha t jus t because a f'gn . . to the vtews C eal , ite < retary, m response "th . reason for saying that the re '' Pr c not strelneeltne tch f could not be drawn , at was no . . d , . ry . er cl h. I allr)racttcal me n an v. omen kll< .v. , to 1 we ll on s 0 . )e ter nto on eith SI e w tc 1 thts .cl f h . we or th at s1 e o t e 1me.,. Altllough tJ1ere are alm ost no 1 apon~ and stra tegies that c kin tJ1ere are som e that are a 111ost cxc 1ustve 1 defensi y are useful only ror attac g. . . . ve. for protection but a state tI1at re 1ecI mostly on the 1 Aggressors couId want t11e111 ' . cou ld not.menace otll ers. More frequently. we c~nnot "cl[etedn]nd t1 abs m u_le le olute sc:o characte r of a weapon , but [we can ] make a compan son .. . an. 1 . . ver wh ethe r . t1 s or not the ofc 1ve potentialities predommate, whe 1e1 a weapon 1 mo re useful rens . in attack or in defens e. "36 . . The esse nce of defense is keeping dte oth er s1de out of you r ter ntory. A pur ely defensive weapon is one that can do this '<vithout ~eing ~bl e to p~n etr ate the enemy's land. Thus a committee of miUtary experts m an_,_nterwar d1sarma ment conference declared tJ1at annaments "incapable of mob~,1ty by me ans of selfcontained power," or movable only afte r l?ng delay, we re only capable of being 3 used for the delimse of a State's territmy." ' The most obvious examples are foJtifications. TI1ey can shelter attacking forces, esp ecially wh en they are bui lt righ t along the frontier,38 but t11ey cannot occupy enemy territ01y. A state with only a strong line of forts, fixed guns, and a smaJI arm y to man the m wo uld not be mu ch of a me nace. Anything else that can serve only as a barrier against attacking troo ps is similarly defensive. In this category are systems that provide warni ng of an attack, the Russian's adoption of a different railroad gauge, and nuclea r land min es that can seal off invasion routes. If total immobility clearly defines a system that is defensive only, Umited mobility is unfortunately ambiguous. As noted above, short-range fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles can be used to cover an attack. And, unlike for ts, the y can advance with the troops. Still, their inability to reach dee p into enemy ten itory does make the m more useful for the defense than for the offens e. Thus, the United State.s and Is~ael would have been more alarmed in the early 1970s had dle Russians prOVIded the Egyptians with long-range instead of sho rt-range aircraft. Naval forces are particularly difficult to classifY in these terms , but those that are very short-legged can be used only for coastal defense. Any forces that for various reasons fight well only wh en on the ir own soil in eff~t ~ck mo~ility and therefore are defensive. The most extrem e example would ~ passtve resiStance. Noncooperation can thwart an aggressor bu t it is veJy hard or large num~rs of people to cross the border and stage a sit- i~ on anothe r' s territory. Morocc:os recent march th S . h success de ded . ~n e parus Sahara approached this tac tic, butitS . pen on spe stan to the extent to which itcial crrcum.vili ces. Similarly guerrilla warfare is defenstve .an ' og on} in o . re~wre.s Cl Support that is like ly to be forthcoJlll. , y pposttion to a foretgn mvasion. Indeed , if gue rrilla warfare were east!)

SECURITY DlLEMMA

able aud if il touk t cn defender!, to destro . l . export' I . J eac 1 gtternlla th l Id not onh lw one w ll< h could be used a<> eas1 t k en th' weapon wou Y o attac the ot1 JS . 1 ren de'' d one's 0\\1 1 .n t one Ln which the offense had the advan ler s terntory as to tag t1 dilemm ct would op<.-> rat e l'Specially strongly. ' e: so 1e secu rity lf gue rrillas aw unable to fight on foreign soil, other kinds . illing to do so. army imbued with lhe idea h t I d of a_rmles may be \n t W un r a on ust wou ld figiJ t }('ss <'1 tctively, if at aH, if the goal' were cony uefens 1v e . ~wars ~~~re J . , Jack both the ability and the will for aggress ion Th I est. Citizen m1l1 tias met) . . L pon ort term of sem ce, tue tim e requi red for mobilization e weah s .employed th cl . , e sI1 I :.I d . Ill d I ,t t .ttacks on t11 e 1om e an . a en t 1emselves mu ch mo re an "'r e spmt of repellin(l o a 't '39 o <.1 se th an to attacks e'en 0 0 foreign ter n Ol)'." Les s ide alistic motives can produce the sam e result A l di edieval warfare J1as d cscn'bed the armies of that period as r ea n(J.. student of m U b 1 d' 1 0 ows: Assem led with difficul ty, t.nsu )Or mate, un able to maneuver ready to l""elt . fr . h . ' " awa) om 1ts standard t}1e mo ment tl1at tts s .ort pen.od of service was over a re dal r . . , 1 u 1 e presented ' 0rc an asse mb_lage of unsolclie rltk e_q ualittes su<: h as have seldom been kno wn to coexist. Primarily mten ded to defend Its 0\V ll borders from t11e Maovar the : orth . . . bJ , man the Saracen .. . , tI1e mstitut10n was utte rly unadap ted to take the offensiv , or e."40 Some political gro upings can l?e sim ilarly described. International coalitio ns are more rea~iJy held toge~ er by fea~ than by hope of gain. Thus Castlereagh was not being entirely sel f-se f\.~n g '~h ~n m 1816 he argued that the Quadrupl e Alli ance "could only have owed 1ts ongm to a sense of common danger: in its \'erv natu re it must be conservative; it cannot threaten eith er the sec:UJity or the liberti~s of other 41 States." It is no accident that most of the major campaigns of expansion hav e been waged by one domina nt nation (for example. Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany), and that coalitions among relati,e equals are usually found def ending the status quo. Most gains from conquest are too unc:ertain and raise too many questions of future squabbles among the victors to hold an alliance togethe r for long. Although defensive coalitions are by no means easy to maintain-confli ctinO' national obj ecti ves and the fre e-rider proble m partly explain why three of them dissolved before Napoleon was defeated- the common inte rest of seeing that no state dominates provid es a strong incentive for solidarity. Weapons that are particularly effe ctive in reducing fortifications and barrier s are of great val ue to the offe nse . This is not to deny that a defensive pow er will wan t some of those weapons if the other side has the m: Brodie is certainly correct to argu e that while the ir tanks allowed the Ge rmans to conque r France, pro perly used Fre nch tanks could have halted the attack. But France would oot have needed these weapo ns if Germany had not acquired the m, wh ereas e~'en if France had no tanks, Ge rm any couJd not have foregone the m since they ~ron~ ed ~~ onl~ chance of breaking through the French lines. Mobile heavy ~llery 1_, sun s ~arl)~ especially use ful in des troying fortifications. The defender. whilt> needing ~le~ to fight off attacking troops or to counte rattack, can usually use lighter gw lS smce they do not nee d to penetrate such massive obstacles. So it is not surpris ing that one of tl1e rew th.mgs c that most nati. s at the terwar dis.......mament conferences On m . were au e to 1.1 ~ agree on was tha t heavy tanks an d mo bile 1ea' )o s were particularlv 1 . valuable to a sta te planning an attack. 42

189

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THE USES OF FORCE

fEP'J IS I OFFENSE, DEFENSE AN

I

. I . de end for their cffpcti\('nc>~" on surpr \\'<.'a pons and stTatewes t ,,at p . . ed bv ~omt ol t, ' d I . . . se are . rr . . . . <.gates ] I ays oenstve. That fact was. recoglllz e principle lwlqr u! l th . to tl1 ~ amostaw d 15 th 1 t conferences ctn C' <.:ornn mte rwar cJsannamen A . lier rC'fJresc 'ntuli\C o! tlab 1 1 11 . Il I I weapons. n eat . wcespre nattona >an on concea et , PI 1il delJ>hia newspapt t ltat anr11 d .. <ltI 1 1 teenth-centur; a \le'-'\' was t 1e mre -nme . d d canes arc entire h ''"clc~s n e . As .1 Th ' f d [i k es d1rks an swoJ ey are fi measure o e cnsed, alnll' I . tta~ks are of murderous chan.wll 1. \\'hoe\cr <:a ... t 1 only for attack. an sue 1 a . . . 1 1:J ltes , . I . ared ltimself for bolmctc e. . SU h a weolp011 laS p!ep C . '} ] t0 ffistirwuis h h etWCCll forces that . It is of course not always P0551 ) e t::o 1 for Lakr.nl! itare most ' ' 't nd forces optimally des1 gne<. Sll<:h c ct've f'or holding tern ory . am{ weapons" a e f e 1 , d fo in E distinction could uot have been ma e 1 the strateuw urope . d b tween d1e Franco-P russ1an \\ ar and World Wa 1 he peno e durino- most oft d'l 1 f 1 r . o r . t ~;cal air forces ca n be rea 1y <: ass ll'( rn these tenn 5 Ne1ther nava1 torces 1101 acu . . t 1 1 . such a distinction 1 poss1) e. t re ccn t ral characte 1. S But the pomt 1ere IS tl1 t ",lten 1 . a _ . . f th 'lemma no longer holds, and one of the mos t troublesome tstic o e secun'ty w consequences of anarchy is removed.

('>

Offense-Defense Differentiation and Strategic Nuclear Weapons

In the interwar period, most statesmen held the reasonable position that '-'Veapons that threatened ch~lians were offensive.4-l But when neither side can protect its civilians, a counter-city posture is defensive becaus~ the state ~ credibly threaten to retaliate only in response to an attack on itself or 1 closest ~es . The costs of this ts strike are so high that the state could not threaten to use it fo r the less-than -vital interest of compelling the other to abandon an establish ed position. In the context of deterrence, offensive weapons are those that provide defense. In the now familiar reversal of common sense, the state that could take its population out of hostage, either by active or passive defense or by destroyi ng tJ1e other's strategic weapons on the ground. would be able to alter the status quo. The desire to prevent such a situation was one of the rationales for the anti-A BM agreeme nts; it explains why some arms controllers opposed buikung ABMs to protect cities, but favored sites that covered ICBM fields. SimiJarly, many analysts wanted to li mit warhead acc:uracy and favored multiple re-entl) vehicles (MRVs), but opposed multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The former are more useful than single warheads for penetrating city defenses, and e nsure that tl1e state has a seco~d-strike_ capability. MIRVs enhance countcrforc:e capabiiHies. . . . . What IS most Important for the argumen t here is that land-based ICBMs are both offensive and defensive, but when both sides rely on PoJmis-type systems (SLBMs), offense and defense use different weapons. ICBM s can be used either to de~troy the other's cities in retaliation or to initiate hostilities by attacking the others . oc and stratecri missiles. some measure s-for instance, hardenin g of mjssile sites . wamOthmg systems-are purely defensive, since they do not rnake a first strike easier. ers are predo . I 0 f"~' . . . defenses and hi mmant Y rei1Slve-for instance, passive or act1ve cit\' , both ' ghly a<.'CUrate warheads. But ICBMs themselves are useftU ~or purposes. And because states seek h' a 1gb level of insuranc e, the desJre lor

tection tL'i \H: " t H ' <:on tcmplati<m of a cou t c pr jsition of cxt :- '' ,(l>I 'k arge numbers of miss, le nSenorce stJ' e can expla.in the . . acqU o very 1 er's intention s f10111 . mil ita1 postu re. Eachs. .d 1t IS .. cHfi cult to infer the 1Ls y , otl1 . rin.' by proc.:nn n).!; ll lOH' missiles decreases t SI es efforts to . mcrease its own seCu ; extent ve efficacy of lh<: off(use.;: and the dcfense .tho an h . detcrmmed by the reiab . e s1de's . case when both o;tdes use SLBMs. The point .ot er th secunty. T hat is not the l I IS at less vulnerabl e t tan and~base d ones (this bears on not of~ sea~based syste~s are the tl at SLBMs are dcfc-ns1ve, retaliatory weapons SL ense defense ratto) but . \ trument of attack aguinst other SLBMs Th h. d BMs are not the main JO k . .. . . e ar est problem c f . tate that wants to ta e tls <:1tles out of hostage is to 1 .. t h on ranting a s oca that requires not S LBMs but anti-submarine weapon e t e other's SLBM s, a JO b A . to attack the other's submarin es (although othtr weapos. . statl dmtghbt use S LB~s e 1 . pro efficient), but w1t 10ut antJ-submanne warfare (ASW) .ns .wou th ably be more .1. . . capa1 1ty e task cannot be )I Jerformed. A status-quo state that wanted to forecro ofc I b rens1 capabJ1 could ve 1 ty ply forego ASW r~search and procurement. . . . stmWhen both stdes rely.on ICBMs' one side's missiles ea tt k th oth . n a ac e er's and so the state cannot be mdifferent to the other's building prog am B t b r u ecause one ' side's SLBMs d o not menace the other's, each side can build as manv as it wants and the other nee_d not respond. Each side's decision on the size' of its fo rce depends on techmcal questions, its judgment about how much destruction is eno~gh to. deter, a~d the amount of ins_urance it is willing to pay for- and these cons1deratwns are mdependent of the s1 of the other's strategic force. Thus the ze crucial nexus in the arms race is severed....
O

D TiiE SECURJlY DILEMMA

191

FOUR WORLDS
The two variables we have been discussing-wheth er the offense or the defense has the advantage, and whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones-ca n be combine d to yield four possible worlds. The first world is the worst for status-quo states. These is no way to get secuJity without menacin g others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain. Because offensive and defensive postures are tJ1e same, status-quo states acquire the same kind of arms that are sought by aggressors. And because the ?ffense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protectmg what you have; status-quo states will therefore behave like aggressors. The situation will be unstable . Arms races are likely. Incentives to strike first will tu m crises into wars. Decisive victories and c'O nquests will be common. States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence Without trying to increase them. Cooperation among status-quo powers "ill be extremely hard to achieve. There are no cases that totally fit this picture, but it bears more than a passi~g resemblance to Europe before World \~Tar I. Blitain and Gennany. although m t~any respects natural allies, ended up as enemies. Of course much of the explanation lies in Germany's ill-chosen policy. And from the perspective of o~r tlleo~' the powers' ability to avoid war in a series of earlier crises cannot be easily ex"})lained.

192

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THE USES OF FORCE

1 ute u

~ I OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE SECUo n-v

'" J T

DILEMMA

acv .. : .:sge ---------~m~e:a~d~v~a~nt~a~ge:_______________ ---- ---- -2

1

T ~AB~LE~t~ _-----:~~;hc;;------- D....- has the ! Offense haS

Doubly dangerous

Offensive posture not distinguishable from defensi ve one Offensive posture distinguishable from defensive one

3 No security dilemma, but aggression possible Status-quo states can follow different policy than aggressors warning given

Sec; t 1 dilemma. but ::l ' l'Y requirements May he compa tible 4 Doubly stable

much of the behavior in this period was the produ ct of technology Neve~ eles~, t ma tined the security dilemma. Decision make ~~ th?ught that the and belihfs la d tage and saw little difference between oHensJVe and defene dt b. gi offense a a tg a van . . . ili" tur The era was charactenzed by arms races. An cl once war s1 m tar)' pos es. ve bilization races created powe rfu1mcen bves to stnke fi rst. seemed likeIy, mo t 1: C!-st world wou Jd be one m wmc1 eac1 SI e reue cl on 1 1 cl In th e nucIear era, the m . vulnerable weapons that were aimed at si1~ilar forces and each s1d~ underst?od the situation. In thjs case, the incentives to strike first would be very h1gh- so htgh that status-quo powers as weUas aggressors would be sorely temp ted to preempt. A~d since the forces could be used to change the status quo as well as to preserve tt, there would be no way for both sides to increase their security simultaneously. Now the familiar logic of deterrence leads both sides to see the dange rs in this world. Indeed, the new understanding of this situation was one reaso n why vulnerable bombers and missiles were replaced. Ironically, the 1950s would have been more hazardous if the decision makers had been aware of the dangers of their pos ture and had therefore felt greater pressure to strike first. In the second world, the security dilemma operates because offensive and defensive postures cannot be distinguished; but it does not opera te as strongly as in the first world because the defense has the advantage, and so an increment in one side's strength increases its security more than it decreases the other's. So, if both sides have reasonable subjective security requirements, are of roughly equal power, and the variables discussed earlier are favorable, it is quite likely that status-quo ~tes can adopt oompatible security policies. Altho ugh a state will not be a?Ie to JUdge ~e ~er:s in~entions from the kinds of weapons it procures, the level of spending will gwe Important midence. Of course a state that seeks a high ]e\'el 0 anns ~t be not an aggressor but merely an insecure state, \vhich if conciliated''~ redua: Its anns, and if confronted will reply in kind. To assume that the apparentl} ~ level of arms indicates aggressiveness could there fore lead to a respo~ would~ the dilemma and create needless conflict. But empathy and skillf ful statesmanship can red this dan uce ger. Furthermore, the advan tageous poslrton o

ann}

.lefense mu n f t!' t a status-r1uo state ca f' . . n o ten mamt . h' ty with a }{ c: ! <t'"l n!. lower than that of ts am a 1gh degree of secUn I expe<.tec.l ad demonstrates tha t ,r k~ the ability or desire to alter the s versary. Such a state esent tirne. Tl w :nr 1 ~~~th of the defense also all tatus quo, at least at the p1 r ows states to tr"int when ther ~Par that others are tne;na,.- th react s1 1 anc.l with res .., -:mg em S0 a1 l ow y . ers wiJI to som' ext(n t he threatenjng to othe th t tough status-quo p<>W . This world is tlw one that comes closest to rs, t at.extent \VJube 1lmttecl. 1 ma C1lng most ) . ds. h Attacking is usuall y lic.m.ler than defending be<.:ause of the str I eno ~~ ist_ory. and obsta des. Bll t purdy defensive postures are rare! oss~~ gth of fortifications ons are usuall y supplemen teu by armies and mob"! YP h~ because fortificatt w ck In the nu<.:1 r era, this world would be oneI .e guns h b1ch can support an ea . . atta m w1 c ot1 d 11 1 1 1 relatively invuln erable JCB Ms and believec.l that l.im't cJ SI es re tee on 1 . 1 war was irnpo \ AJR e sible. Assummg no . v1 Vs, . would take more than nuc ear k tt . . . s, p one attac mg mlSstle to destroy one o r th eaclversarys. reemption is therefore unattr t Ifb h "cl . . I " . have large mventones , t 1ey can tgnore all but drastic increas. ac tve. th ot . SI es th . . . . es on eo er stde. A world of e1ther ICBM s or SLBM s m wh1ch both sides adopted th . 1 ofl1 . nuclear war wou Id P'o bably fi t thi s catego rv too The me e po ICY . m1ted m / ans of preservmg the status quo would also be the means of changing it, as we discussed earlier. And the defense usuaJ iy would have the advantage, because compellence is more difficult than deterrence. Altho ugh a stat~ might succeed in changing the status quo on issues that ma~e r much more to_ It than to others, status-quo powers could deter major provocations unde r most ctrcumstances. In the third world there may be no security dilemma, but there are security problems. Because states can procure defensive systems that do not threaten others, ~e .dilem~a need not operate. But because the offense has the advantage, aggressiOn IS posstble, and perhaps easy. If the offense has less of an advantage, stabtlity and cooperation are likely because the status-quo states will procu re defensive forces. They need not react to others who are similarly armed, but can wait for the warning they would receive if others started to deploy offensive weapons. But each state will have to watch the others carefully, and there is room for false suspicions. The costuness of the defense and the aJiure of the offense can lead to unnecessary mistrust, hostility, and war, unless some of the variables discussed earlier are operating to restrain defection. A hypothetical nuclear world that would fit this description would be one in which both sides relied on SLBM s, but in which ASW techniques were very effective. Offense and defe nse would be different, but the former would have the advantage. This sit uation is not ukely to occur: but if it did. a status-quo state could !ihow its lack of desire to exploit the other by refrai ning from threatening its submarin es. The desire to have more protecting you than merely the other side's fear of retaliation is a strong one, however, and a state that knows that it would not expan d even if its cities were safe is likelv to believe that the other would not feel threatened by its ASW program. It is e~y to see how such a world could become umtable, and how spirals of tensions and conflict <.i>uld develop. . The fourth world is doubly safe. The differentiation between ofTensJve and defensive !i)'Stems permits a way out of the secu rity dilemma; the advantage 0~ the defense disposes of the probl ems discussed in the previous paragraphs. There 15 no

193

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THE USES OF FORCE

;FJ~.I3

OFFENSE, DEFENSE ANDTH I E SECURJry Dll.EMMA

. to be tempte <.l to procur e <.l'rl'li-.iw fcm.:cs reasun for a status-quo po~e~ . ns b ' the posture the' .l'" pt. Jndeetl .: .and au~ssors lTive notice of the1r mtenno ) '. , 11tl1e ::-o o d f, . . t enough. there are no secunl) proLie rns. The 1 ad,antage of the e cnse IS gJea 1 l ll ' f h to alter the status quo" 011 < L ow greater 5 oss of the ultima.te form o t]j~ powe:ans and probab ly wouJclt eud to Freeze the d~otpe for the exerc1 of nonrm tary me se IS n. bution of values. . Id Id I existed in the fi rst decade of tl I< t\' t te tl1 century 1 "en r Th1s wor wou 1ave ail bl 1 1 r h .. k I. tec.mo the dectston ma ers 1ad un derstood the av a e . , b Oil:). tn t at case' the . 1. r0 Jlowed differe nt po1 es ot 1 111 t1 long run .,, cl tc1 1e European powers wou Id have 11 1 f' 1 . . . tl f Even Germany, facin g power u cnctm es on both side Ill le summe r 0 1914. d r F' s, could have made herself secure by developing strong e emcs. ra~ce could also have made her frontier almost impregnable. Furthe rmore, when cnses arose, no ncentives to strike first. . There would have been no comr)eti one wou Id have J1ad 1 . . . . mo biJ' t' tive 1za ton races reductn g the time available for negot1at10ns. . . In the nuclear era, this world would be one m whiCh ~h~ supelp owers relied on SLBM s, ASW technology was not up to its task, an.d limited nuclea r options were not taken seriously. ... Because the problem of v10le~cc below the nuclear threshold would remain , on issues otJ1er than defens e of the homeland, there would stil1 be security dilem mas and security problems. But the world would nevertheless be safer than it has usuaJly been.
QJ

NOTES
1. Thus, when Wolfers argues that a status-quo state that settles for rough equality of power with its adversary, rather than seeking preponderance, may be able to convince

the other to reciprocate by showing that it wants on ly to protect itself, not menace the other, he assumes tbat the defense has an advantage. See Amold Wolfers, Discord a11d Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 126. 2. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New Y ork: Oxford University Press, 1963), chap. 9. 3. Quoted in Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions (New Y ork: Norton , 1975), pp. 377, 461. 4. George Quester, Offense and Def nse in the Intemational System (New Y e ork: John Wi.ley, 1977), p. 105. 5. Herman Kahn, On Themumuclear War (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 211 (also see p. 144). 6. For a general discussion of such mistaken learning from the past, see Jervis, Perception

and Misperception in Intenllltional Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6. The important and still not comple tely unders tood question of why ~his belief formed and was maintained throughout tl1e war is examined in Bemard ~r~c, War and Politics_ (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 262-70; Brodie, "Techno<>glcal Change, Strateg~c Doctrine and Political Outcom es " in Klaus Knorr. ed.. Hiftorical Dime io of li.T z ' . ' .ty Kans n.y ns nationa Securtty Problems (Lawrence: Univers1 Press 0 f as.' 1976), PP 290-92; and Douglas Porch "The French Army and the Spirit of the Offiens1 1900-14 " B vc H 1 &M . ' ' m nan Bond and Ian 'Roy, eds. War ancl Society (New york o mes e1er, 1975), pp.ll7- 43. '

1. some were not ~ ) n~,.trllstic. Grey's remark is well-kno'Wn ''Th over Europe: wt hd.!l not sc>c them lit again in our life-tim~ .. e lamps arc going out all ter, Bethmann ll:>llwt ~. also feared the conseguen. f . hThe Gennan Prime ~linis vieW was that it 'J1'] certainl y pay for the winner. ces 0 t e war. But the controlling Quoted 8(Boston:in Marti n Gilbert, \Vinston S. Churchill Tl1 Th, , H ou~;l1ton ~1iffi in. 1971). p. 84 . ' ' e ChallengeofWar, 1914-1916 9~99. ,r ~ . 9 Quester (fn. 4 ), pp. p c: Robert Art, The Jnifluence oJ corerf!.n PoliCij. S . S (J3everly Htlb: . age rD1eSS1onaJ Papers in InternationalS d' . 0~ eapou;er, 11 26-28. tu les Senes, 19r3), pp. 14-lS, "The 10. Konrad Jarausc:h. 191 "lllusion of Limited War: Chan. ll or Bet hmann k I . Holl , Cal cuJated Ris , Ju y 4, Central European Hi.stony lJ c:e h ( \A, . . I . 1. . , .vtarc 1969): p. 50 wegs .. ~., 11. Brodie, Wm an~ Po tttcs (:''llcw York: Mae:millan , 19-t3)' p. )Q. . . 12. President Roosevelt and the American delegates to the Lea e of ~ . meot Confere nce maintained that the tank and the mobile h: , arUIIations DlSarmalished the dominance or tht: offensive th us making disarm ') ery had reestab. efi . . :. ament more Boggs, Attempts to D ne and Lz.m1t Aggressive" Arnwment in v urgent f \larion . M' OnUJCtj and [coIumb1a: u mvers1ty or . 1ssoun. Studies , XVI, ~ o. 1 1941]: lP131 c) b Strategy th ' t' cl ' pp. 10o . Ut IS was a mmonty post 1on an may not even have been believed b th . . Y e nmencans. Tbe reduced prestige and mfluence of the military and the high press . . . ures t o cut go"emment spending throughout th1s penod also contributed to the lowering of defense budgets. 13. Jon Kimche, The Unfou.ght Battle (;\ew York: Stein, 1968); ~icholas \\llliam Bethell The \Var Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 19.39 (1\ew York: Holt, 1972): AI~ Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 19:39," World Politics, XXJX (April1 977): pp. 404-24. 14. Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., Time Unguarded: The Jronside Diaries. 1937-1940 (New Y ork: McKay, 1962), p. 173. 15. For a short time, as France was falling, the British Cabinet did discuss reaching a negotiated peace with Hitler. The official history UO\vnplays this, but it is CO\'ered in P ~1. H . . Bell, A Certain Eventuality (Farnborough. England: Saxon House. 1974' . pp. 40-40. 16. MacLeod and Kelly (fn. 14). 174. In flat contradiction to common sense and almost f;\erything they believed about modem warfare, the Allies planned an e~pedition to Scandi.na\ia to cut the supply of iron ore to Gennany and to aid Finland against the Russians. But the dominant mood was the one desc1ibed above. 17. Broclie (fn. 11), p. 179. 18. Arthur Balfour, "Memorandum," Committee on Imperial Defence. April 30, 1903, PP 2-3; see the telegrams by Sir Arthur Nicolsoo, in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. eds., British DocU'ments on the Origins of the War; V 4 (London: 1-I.~vl.S.O., l929). ol. PP 429, 524. These baniers do not prevent the passage oflong-range aiJcraft; but f\en in the air, distan<:e usually aids the defender. . . 19. See, for example, the discuss ion of warfare among Chinese warlords in Hst-Sheng Chi, ''The Chinese Warlord System as an International System.'' in Morton Kaplan, ed., :Vetc Approaches to Intematicnwi Relations (New Y S Martin's. 1968). PP 405-25 ork: t. 20 Some American decision makers, including military officers, thought that the best "ay out of the dilemm a was to abandon the Philippines. 21. Quoted in Elting Moniso n, Turmoil and Tradition: A St11d!j of tire Life and Times cif Hen,ry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1960), P 326.
0 0

195

196
" .1ne
,:,,-, "'I"L -

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

- N ~ I OFFENSE, DEFENSE
I

AND llf.E SECURITY

U S - c: ed .. 00 der limitations on Hawaiian defcn<.! ., ~wc# thc..:se wor~ . , . ,o DSl . . rems ;r. The Vmted Stale1 \ 0t 'J i 11 the r"aci.J IC ~L "UJJ no mrcat t0 Japan. ,,:,n=am Braisted. _ posed . 1909-1922 (Austin: Unh-ersity ofTexas Press, l~ tl}, P 6 12. 23. That is part of the reason why the Japanese admtrals strongly obJ.N.I<d whc,, the t.i\ilian I .ded to ~t a seven-to-ten ratio in lighter craft m 1430 Stcphen Pe z _ . p . d U01 --- ..leaders deCJ ., Race to Pearl Harbor{Cambridge, Mass.: Ha:a r . "erst) re'>~ 19~4 }, p. 3. 1963 : ~ ll>;,. AI o see il>ul , 24 . John ~ef, War and Human Progress (~ew York: 1\ort~n. .: dcde ~e.~ (Ithaca, :\.Y PP 237, 242-43 , and 323: c.w. Oman. The Art of War 111 the ;\f1 ,e, C<>meU University Press, 1953). PP 7~72; John B_:eler, H.a~are m ~eudo/ Eur01 .: (Ithaca. N.Y ComeU UniversJty Pr~ss. 1? d ). pp. 21:-14; ~1 chacl lloward. 307 1200 War in European History (London; Oxford Unwe~t)' Press, ~9t6 .' pp. :33-.'37. _ Quincy Wright. A Study of War (abridged eel.: Ch~go: Untverst') ~>f Chicago Pre.ss. 25 1964), P 142. Also see PP ~70, 74-75. T~ere are tmpo~ant exce~hons to thc:se gen. eralizations-the American Civil War. for instance, falls n the mtddle of the period Wrigbt says is dominated by the offeose. . , 26. Geoffre) Kemp. Robert pfaJtzgraff. and Un Raanan. eels., The Other An m- Race (Lex. ington. Mass.: D.C. Heath, J975); James Foster, lhe future of Conventional Arms Control" Policy Sciences. So. 8 (Spring 19'77): pp. 1-19. 27. Richard cballener. Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 {Prioceton. !'.J.: Prioceton University Press, 1973); Grey to Nicolson, in Gooch and Temperley (fn. 18), p. 414. 28. QucXedinJamesCf'O\Io-iey,Japon's QuestforAutonomy (Princeton, K.J.: Princ.-eton univeasity Press, 1966), p. 49. American naval officers agreed wi th the Japanese that a tento-six ratio would endanger Japan's supremacy in her home waters. 29. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, ed., Document~ on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. 3d ser. ID (London: H.M.S.O.. 1950), p. 526. 30. Jervis (fo. 6), pp. ~72, 3.52-5.5. 31. Quoted in Merze Tate, The United States and Annoments (Cambridge, Mass.: Har"ard UDMmity Press, 1948), p. 108. 32. ~ (fn. 12). pp. l5, 40. 33. lenneth Hapt. American Gunboat Diplomocy arul the Old Navy, 1877- 1899 (West port. Coon.: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 20. 34_ Wmstoo CburcbiiJ, The Gatlrering Stonn'(Boston: Hougbton, l 948), p. 206.
u

41
42

.
,

4-'3. 44

197 DllfMMA .. Quoted m Cl.1arl \\ n~tc:r, 7he Foreign Poli uf . . cy Ca.rtlereagh, 11 , 1Jf1.5- 11122 (IJmdon: G. Bell and ~Oil'> I!1fl'3 ,, p. -~J 0. aoggs (fn. 12}, pp. 1 4~ 15, 4 t-48, 60. . Quoted i~ PhihE JtmJan Frontier Law and Order . . .

Press, 19 t0), p. 1, abo sec: pp. 16-17. . BoggS (fn. 12}, pp. 20, ~ -

(Linwln: Urnvtrsity of :\1': hraslca

35. Bnxlie, War and Polities (fn. 6), p. 32.5. 36. BafP (fD. 12}, pp. 42, 83. For a good argument about the possible di.fferentiation betwren &IIIM aod defensive weapons in tbe 1930s~ see Basil UddeU Hart, "Aggression and tbe PJ\lllkm of'Wearms," Enf!)bh ~55 (July 1932): pp. 71- 78. :rr. Quoted in ~ (fn_ 12), p. 39. 38. Oa tl..ose pnds, the Cenuans claimed in 193-2 that the French forts were offensi\'e (lhld.. P 49). Similarly, fonifiOO fon.wd naval bases can be necessary for launc:hjng an
.U') 22). p. ~. 38 'l1le FAI!Pdi made this argument in the interwar period; see Richard challener. ~ tl/the Nation in Ann1 {New Yorlc Columbia University Press. J ~' ' .FiA 44 4pp.IBI-82. 'l1le Ces wns dimgnm see Rnn..., (fo 12)
#

adr:

lee Brl?ted (fn.

n._,

40. 0..(fa.24).pp.57~

PP

;').

Wha t Is Terrorism?
BRUCE HOFFMAN

Wfi'I IS TERRG!.:

-~

. " SO DIFFICULT TO DEFINE?

..

\\tt

everyday vocabnlal): ~' " , ble part of the argot of th e late twe nti eth centur ysimilarly becom e an tnwspe nsa .d or impression o f what tenonsm 1 , but 1 k a more ac: most_people have;~at~~ le ealanatory definition of the word. This im precision ha-; precLse,con~rete tl Y ~dern media. whose efforts to communicate an oft en bee n abetted part1 1 dJe :sa ge in the bri efest amou nt of airtim e or yl JY print spac:e complex an con vo ute m . bJ h d t the promiscuous lab elling o f a range o f v1 Ient acts as "te rroro e e IJOSSI. p kave 1 o Japel or tur ]evl 'tl n on the te Slon ancl- eve n wt 1111 t11e same ism .' 1c up a news! . . . . . age -one can fin d such disparate acts as the bo mbmg of tl le Same I) b roadcast or on . a building, the assassination of a head of state, the massacre o f cJVJ!ta~ s by a military unit, the poisoning of produ ce on sup ermarket she ~v~s or the de hb er~te contamination of over-tl1 e-counter mecilcation in a che mtst s sho p all descn bed as incide nts of terrorism. Indeed, virtuaLly any especi ally abhorre nt act of violence that is perceived as directed against society- wheth er it involv~s the ~ctivities of anti-governm ent dissidents or governme nts the mselves, orga~tze~ ~n me syndicates or common criminals, riotin g mobs or pe rsons engaged m mthtant protest , individual psychotics or lone extortionists -is often labell ed "te rroris m. " ... Terrorism , in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the ter m, is fundamentally and inherently politic;al. It is also ine luctably abo ut powe r: the pu rsuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of powe r to achieve politi cal change. Terrorism is thu s violence- or , equally important, the threat of violen ce- used and directed in pursui t of, or in seJVice of, a political aim. With tlU s vital point clearly illu minated, one can app reciate tl1e significance of the adrutional de fin ition of "terrorist" provided by the [Oxford English Dictionan;]: "Any one wh o attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation ." This de finition unde rscores clearly the other fundamental characteristic of terrorism: that it is a pla nned, calculated, and indeed systematic act. Given trus ~el atively straightfo~ard elucidation , wh y, the n, is terrorism ~o difficult to define . The most compelling reason perhaps is be cause the meamng of the term has changed so frequently over the pas t two hu nd red years.. ..

d n? Few wo1 s have so ins iruously wo rkecl thei r way into 0 1tr L1a ts C nsr . ' ikc "Jnternet"- another grossly over-used ler JTo m th at has
t t

From with Inside.Terronsm 1 Bruce Hoffman, pp. 13 44. Copyright 199 . )y 8 Bruc.:e Hoffm an. Repnnted pennJSsJOn ofColumhia Uni versity Press.

198

rp risingly. .a. 1 . , '''<.ming and usage of the wo d h l Not su ' I 1 r ave c: 1ang(d 0 . "'odate tbc no. i!C cl vern acu lar and discourse [ h r cco111 1' 1. 0 eac suc cessi ' C titn <' lo ~ haS proved inC ff u',JT?~ly elusive in the fac e of att em t~ to COn . \ ~era, ten~rtS l defini tion. At oH' tlm c. the terrorists themselves ~v r . . struc:t fl' one conststent . il j . cl ere raJ mo re o this endeavouJ ,;:m l lCY are to ay. The early practi tion ers didn' coope rali v . _ e I ds or hide be hmd the scrnan ti<: camoufl age of m d t mtn ce theu wor fi I " . " I ore ano "freedom g tte r m ur )an gu ern.lla. , The ninete th- . yne labels such . as exa b 1 cl! 1 en <.:enturv anarchtsts c mple, un a as tE: y proc atm ed the mselves to b t . tO r ' .. .. . b . . e erronsts an d fran klv i\ proclaime d then tacttcs to. e terron sm. The me mbers of 1 arodnay . : d _ . th 1 a Volya stmt.ar 1 ly displaye no qu tumshm usmg ese same words to desc b th. f . ves . deeds. However, sue rankn ess did not las t The JeWJ's] tn e emse1 and tJ1eli . . 1 erronst gro . up oftb e 1940s kno wn as LehJ (t1 He brew c onym for Lohamei Herut Yisrae 1e lcr l, the Freedom Fighte rs for I~rael , mo re popularly k:nov.rn simply as the Ste m Gang after their fo un de r and first leade r, A~ r~ am Ste rn) is thought to be one of the last terrorist gro ups act~aU y _o ~e scnbe 1tself publicly as such. It is sig t nificant, however, that eve n Le h1, wlule 1t may have been far more can cild tha n its latter-dav counterparts, chose as the na me of the organization not "Te rro rist Fiahte;s for Israel," bu t the far less pejorative "F reedom Fighters for Isr ael.'' Si: ila rk although rnore tha~ twenty years later the Brazilian revolu tion ary Car!~~ Marighela displayed few co mpunctions about openly advocating the use of"terrorist" tactics, he still insiste d on depictin g himself and his disciples as "urban gue rrillas" rather than "urban terrorists." Indeed, it is clear from Marighelas writings that he was well aware of the word's undesirable connotations , and stro ve to cilsplace them with positive resonances . "Th e words 'aggressor' and 'terrorist, ., \1arighela wrote in his fam ous Handbook of Urban Guerrilla War (also known as the " \1iniManual"), "no longe r me an what they did. Instead of arousing fear or censure, they are a call to action . To be called an aggressor or a terrorist in Bra zil is now an honour to any citizen, for it me ans that he is fighting, with a gun in his hand, against the monstrosity of the pre sent dictatorship and the suffering it causes .'' This tre nd towards ever mo re convoluted sem antic obfuscations to side-step terrorism 's pejorative overton es has , if anything, become nwre entrenched in recent decad es. Te rrorist organizations almost without exception now regularly select names for themselves that consciou sly eschew the word "terro rism" in any of its forms. Ins tead the se groups actively seek to evo ke images of: Fr eedom an d lib eration (e.g. the National Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Lib eration of Palestine, Freedom for the Basque Ho me land. etc.); Armies or oth er military organizational stn1ctures (e.g: the ~at i~nal Military Organization, the Popular Liberation Arm y. the Fifth Battalion of the Liberation Army, etc.); Actual self-defence move ments (e.g . the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. the Shankhill De fen ce Association. the Organiution for the De fen ce of the Free Peop le, the Jevvish De fense Organization, etc.):
j

200

PART 2

TtlE USES O f FORCE

Righteous '-engeance (thtle O anization for the Opp ~~" l or. E a rth , the rg Justice Commando o f 1e Arm an Genocide. the Palcs iut ,m Heveno em -::.e Organization, etc.) : th ta re decidedl) neutm1 an d t . - o r else deliberate~ choose na erefo re bertft mes or Of all but tl1e most innocuous sugges on_5 association, [<--.g. tht Sh injnu Path D ' Front Line . ai-Dawa ("'The Calf'.) A]faro u ,es- amn It 1-:ach "Thuo," al -G a n 1 at . ..) tlle Lantero Y uth ~l ovc, o nent. e tc .] . al-lslamiya (l be Islamic O rgam za:~;is tllat terrorists clearly <.lo no t sec or regard \\ b a t all these examples suggall l am ., amih' man: til e archtcrr d0 " \})0\"e orist Carlos a themselves as others : If . -d bed Wmse to a French newspaper follo"in g his capture in 1 "he Jackal. escn r . tuallvon the deie ns1 ., and forced to take up arm to protect them ,.. 1994. Cast perpe . -. . . ed stituents o n k terronst p e rce1,e h selve.s and their real 0 ~ 1 ma&J~d co t e m elve as b n tion-and lacking an) \i a b le a lt e m a th e -to reluctant wam.ors. dri,en. . , espera .1 .,: ... <+arepresst, e st ate . a predaton 1;,-al etlmic o r nationalist group , or v1o en ce ag<u.Ju . . nal rd This percei\e d ch tematio o er. aracten. . o f se lf denial also stic an unresponswe m . fro othe r t\ n PS o f political ..J:..&.:-.nnc:hes th e terrorist extre m ists as well as from m ~UJas........- . r. . 1 e d . w ~- ~ ,; olent a, . ocations. A communist o r a re similarlv 10\ec>rv m egcu. ,olupersons . uld likeh readih- accept and ad th h r mtt at e IS m tact a comtio~- for exampl1 - " 0 , d _:...,~ m e_ ~ ,. would doubtless take particu munist or a l"C\U ution~ . 1 lar pride in Jl c:ou., ' . . th . il ) . f t1 . claimma eJ er o lose appellations fo r iliemseh-es. Stm a r ~ , e 'e n a person en in illegal wholl~ disreputable o )l!- h . I . .. h r e ntirel} se Le> n o e nt acti,~ti es. su~ as banks or ~ing out contract killi ngs_- would probably_admi_t to bemg_a bank ri b e r or a murderer for hire. The terrorist. by contrast, " il l ne v e r ackno'' ledge that he is a terrorist and mo reo ver will go to_ e~ t lengths to ev gr ade ~~ obs~~re_ - r: rence or conn~on amsuch me The te rronst '"ill alwavs arQUe th at tt tS socteh 0 o r' the gO\-emment or the socio-e conomic syste~ " and its _ ws la th~t are the re~ "'terrorists... and mofeO\-er that if it were not for this op p ression . he " o u ld not ha' e felt tbe need to defend either himse lf o r the population h e claims to rep resent. .. On one point, at ]e as t, e\'eryon e agrees: terrorism is a p ejora~ ve term. _ is a It word with intrinsically negative co nnotations that is g e n e rally app lied to ones e~ e mies and opponents, or to tho se with whom one disagrees and would o then\1se prefer to ignore. \\ fi a t is called terr orism," Brian Jenkins has writt e n, "thus seems to depend on one's point o f view. Use o f the te rm implies a mo ral judgemen~ ; and ifone party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its o p p on 1 e n t, th e ~ _t has indirectly persuaded others to ad opt its moral vie-.vpoint." H e n c e the d ects~on t~ caD someone or label some organiz ation "t errorist" bec.-omes alm ost un a, oJdabl) RJbjective, depending largely on whet her one sympathizes \vith o r opposes the peuoulgroup'crnseconcemed . If o ne identifies w it h th e victim o f the violence. for "2mple, then the act is terrorism . If, however. o n e identifie s w it h th e perpetrator. the violent act is regarded in a more sy mpathetic , if n o t positive (o r, a t th e worst. an -abivaleat)light; and it is n o t terrorism . ... 1t.e approach where .identiiication with . the \i c ti m determines th e classifica ofa \UaMt act as tenorism is evident in bon th e conclusions o f a parliamen tary worki ng (an orgaumtion comprised o f lon g-established, status quo \Veste rn 1 \e final report of the 1989 North A tlantic Assembly's Subcommittee 00

;'D

roS!

II;A ..U '

srn states: ~~~ . . -: kidna ppi_ng , arso n an d other feloruo '[e~nal beha 'io r, , -. .un: no . n- \\ este m natio ns have . d us acts COnstitute crifi'IJJ'l te rrorist a(; "" .l c1t th ev consider to b e struggles pfrO\e. reluctant to condefi'III as ning. tile d eL;-,, 1g h , c aracte ristic o f terrorism is 0tll nationalliberati " In '- 'c reaso f . u,..., . c on .....,0tj vatio ns o. tS tlfication 10 e 3.lt o \lolence 1. 1f r or reasons behind .t t th e " ' B . . tse , h no . el satisfactory solution e it t er, since it fails to diffe rentiate cleaut th tS ts not ent:JI Yrpetrate d bv states a rlv betw ~n nd b, non-state entities such as te . ' een \l olencel ~nto the hands o f te rroris~ and their apolo~ ..~ who wou7don t p ays I sts. A<thccorthding\? l "l . h'' I o difference benve . .ocn t le O \\ -tee te rr? n st ptpeat e 0 bomb placed argue rubbiserbits in the rowded marke t that wantonly h n and mdiscriminatelv kills or m . atthi~ a radius me asured in ten a s o f feet and the 'mgh-t~cb" prec ,~, n . r isioru~ ~ded onde ery e d b y rur 1orce figl1te r-bombers nance dropp n gw or . from a height of 20 000 ceet d. . that achieves th e s~me ~,a n to n Ii or more an mdiscriminate effects on ilie , crowded marketlace far below. T his rah?~ale thu s equates the random \iolence in flicted on enemy P ulation c e n tres b y milttary fo rc e s- su c h as tlte Luftwaffe's raids on Warsaw and b!-entty, the Alli ed fi re -bombin gs o f D resden and Tokyo. and th e atomic bombs dropped by th e Unjte d States on Hiroshima and 1\agasaki during th e Serond World War, and inde ed the cou~ teiVal ue st rategy o f the post-war su perpowers' strategic nuclear policy, which d eliberat ely targe ted the enemy's ci"ilian population-with the violence com mitte d by subst ate entities labelled "terrorists," since both invoke the infliction o f d eat h a n d injury on non-combatants.. .. It is a familiar argum e n t. Te rr orists, as we have seen, deliberat ely cloak themselves in the terminology o f mil itary ja rgon. T hey consciously po rtray themselves as bona fide (f ree d o m ) fi gh te rs, if not soldiers , w h o -t h o u g h they w ear no identifying uniform o r insi g n ia -a re en title d to treatm en t as prisoners of war {P O Ws) if captured and the re fore should n o t be p rosecuted as common crim inals in ordinary courts o f law. Te rrorist s fu rt h e r argue that, because of their num erical inferiority, far more limited firepowe r a n d paucity o f resources compared " it h an established nation-state's massive d e fe n ce an d national secu rity apparatus, th ey have no choice but to operate c la n destinely, e m erging from the sh a dows to carr y out dramatic lin other words , bloody a n d d est ru ctive) acts o f hit-and-run ,;olence in order to attract attention to, a n d e n su re publici ty for, the mselves and their caus e. . But rationalizations such as th . ese ignore the faet that, even while national anned forces have been responsjble for far more death and destructio n than terror~ might ever aspire to bring about, th e re nonetheless is a ~damental _qualita~: difference b e tw e e n th e two typ es o f violence.. .. In theory, 1f no a.t. . t always ID practi ~rules o f w a r- a s o b se rv e d from the early seventeen th ce ntury~"he~ thP\ wthe -,_ ere first Proposed b y th e D u tc h jurist H ugo Grotius and subsequently co CamOUS Ceneva a n d H a g dified~ d . _..r u e Conventions on \Vanare of th 1860s 1899. 190 t, an e , l949-not only g ra n t civilian non -combatants immunity from atta ck. but also Prohibit taking civilians as h o red or surrendered Impose regulations goverrtinstages ; g th e treatment o f captu soldiers (P O W s); , Outlaw reprisals against e it h e r ci Yi.lians o r p O \\ s; ~ _ Recogniz gh f tizens of neu tral >Y~Les.. a_.J e n e u tr a l te rr it o ry a n d the n uu ts o Cl - - - -- -

HOfFMAN I WHAT IS TERRORISM ?

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"~l'se nt Uphold the in..,iolability o[d. Iomats . d other accrc<.htr .tp an <lhves. . u Even the most curson reVIew of terronst tactics and targets v\' ' pa.st r1 artert~nt\uY re,eals that terrorists have violated all these rules. T1 ll) ; :i r..-quently have le)' .. 1 . h0 m in some instances the~ ha' e then brutall Taken hostage C lvtJans, w Y . tl c Italian prime minister Ald0 \11 oro cli1 CI the Cermm executed (e.g. 1e Iormer ,0 . ,1 k, ,. . . . .. Martin Schleyer, ,. v.rere respec "e :' ta en capt1 and .,ho ve mdustrtalist Hans . d d the Red Anny Faction) \ . cl d b the Red Bnga es an ' ateJ mur ere d dered kidnapped militaJ officers-eve n when y Similarly abuseo an mur . . UN-sponsored peacekeepmg or truce supervisurv they were sen'lng on ' . . th A can Marine Lieutenant-co1oneJ \vtt1am Higgins 1 miSSiOns (e.g. e men d 1 1 ' ~ was der of a U truce monitoring etac 1ment, w 10d) abducted the comman tl h by Lebanese Sb''a terrorists in 1989 and subseguen y ange ; 1 1 ft Undertaken reprisals against wholly innoc~J~t C Ja~s, o e~ m,countries JVl far removed from the terrorists' ostensible t e~tre o ofp~~at1on , thus disdaining any concept of neutral state~ or the ng 1ts o CJtiZens of neutral countries (e.g. the brutal 1986 machine-gun and hand-gre~ ade attack on Turkish Jewish worshjppers at an ~stanbu~ s~nagogue earned ou~ b~ the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization m retal1ation for a recent Israeli ra1d on a guerrilla base in soutllem Lebanon); and . . . . Repeatedly attacked embassies and oilier diplo~a~c ~stalJations (e.g. the bombings ofthe US embassies in Beirut and Kuwrut City m 1983 and 1984, and the mass hostage-taking at tlle Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, in 1996-7), as well as deliberately targeting diplomats and other accredited representatives (e.g. the British ambassador to Umguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, who was kidnapped by leftist terrorists in iliat country in 1971, and the fifty-two American diplomats taken hostage at tile Tehran legation in 1979).
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pJSTJNCTIO NS ;l,-; 1~ ~JATH TO DEFINITION

..,..;Jla warfare is ~o > 1 place to start. Terrorism . . c cueJ 1 .h IS O rtell confus d . I r treatet as ~~"' H._. ;nous W 'guerrilla warfar Th . it e or tqllattd wJtl , o ft I th e. I .. . e uuerrillas o en . 'P O) e same tactics (assassinatiIS ISnot entire~.S\Jrpnsmg. kid sine I;) I h . . . f blic gatl1enng-p accs ostage-taking, ete:.) for th on nappmg, I:>nm I)JO~s 0 pu erce thereby afiecti ng behaviour through the .e samf Pt-pose (to intimitlate odr c1 on both teJ:roJists and guerrillas wear neither ~nr~~tsa 0 fe~r) as tetTorists. Jn l~ ac ' .I~ IIOrm nor 1dent:i:f\ 1 and thus are often inu.istinguis ~able from non-combatan ts. How . /mg 1 ~s1gnia . clination to lump botl1 tcrronsts and guerrillas into th e. er, desptte the JJ1 . catch-all <:ate . f "irregulars,, tl1e1.e are none th e less fundamental dif~ e same b gor; o . , c . 1 . . . erences etween the tw0 ''Guernlla, ror examp e, m 1ts most w1dely accepted usa . ak . I f. d. . . ge. numencally arger group o anne mdmduals, who operate as IS t .1,en to refer to a c d . dl enemy military rorces, an se1 an 1old territorv (even if on! a mtutai) umt attack ze 1. all . 1 . Y epnemer y dunng ), wh1 e a1 exerc1 . some form1 of sovereign"' daylight hours so smg l . hi . 1 , d . . ; or contra over a defined geograp ea a1 ea an 1 population. Terrorists howeve d . fu . . ts . r, o not d uruts, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territ .nction m the open as arme d l'b _ d 1 c . Of\. e 1 er ately avOJ enga~g en~ my m11tary r_orces m combat and rarely exercise ~v direct control or sovere1gnty etther over temt01y or population. It is also useful to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals. Like terrorists, criminals use violence as a means to attaining a specific end. However. \\'h~e the violent act itsel! m~y be simil_ar-kidnapping, shooting, arson, for example-e_ the purpose or ~ohvahon clearly 1s not. \Vhether the criminal employs violence as a means to obtam money, to acquire material goods, or to kill or injure a specific victim for pay, he is acting primarily for selfish, personal moti,ations (usually material gain). Moreover, unlike terrorism, the ordinary criminals violent act is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological repercus ions beyond the act itself. The criminal may of course use some short-term act of ,iolence to "terrorize" his victim, such as waving a gun in the face of a bank clerk dur~lg a robbery in order to ensure the clerk's expeditious compliance. In these mstances, however, the bank robber is conveying no "message" (political or other~vise) y lrough his act of violence beyond facilitating the rapid handing over of his ~oot. The criminal's act therefore is not meant to have any effect reaching be~ond either the incident itself or the immediate victim. Fmther, the "iolence is neither ~nceived nor intended to convey any message to anyone other than the bank clerk himself, whose rapid cooperation is the robber's only objecti,e. Perhaps most fun?amentally, the criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opin~on: he simply wants to abscond with his money or accomplish his mercenary task tn the quickest and easiest way I)OSsible so that he may reap his reward and enjoy the . . . . fru 1ts of his labours. By contrast ilie fundamental aim of tI1e terronst .s vtoIence : ulti~ately to change "the system"~about which the ordinary criminal, of course, ouldn t care less. . .. an We ~ay therefore now attempt to define terrorism as_ tile de~berate crea~ion ~ ~xplOitation of fear through violence or the threat of viOlence m the pursuit of po tical change. All terrorist acts involve violence or tl1e threat of 'iolenet>.
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Admittedly, the armed forces of established states have also been guilty of violating some of the same rules of war. However, when these transgressions do occurwhen civilians are deliberately and wantonly attacked in war or taken hostage and killed by miJitruy forces-tile term "war crime" is used to describe such acts and, imperfect and flawed as both international and national judicial remedies may be, steps nonetheless are often taken to hold the perpetrators accountable for these crimes. By comparison, one of t11e fundamental raisons d'etre of international terrorism is a refusal to be bound by such rules of warfare and codes of conduct. International terrorism disdains any concept of delimited areas of combat or demarcated battlefields, much l~ss respect of neutral territory. Accordingly, terrorists have repeatedly taken the1r often parochial struggles to other sometimes geographically ~t~d . , ' P~ countnes and there deliberately enmeshed persons completely unconnected With the terrorists' cause or grievances in violent incidents designed to generate attention and publicity... . s ate defi Are we to conclude t11at terronsm 1 unpervious to precise much 1 accuJ ? ess mti~nh ~ot entirely. If we cannot define terrorism then we' can at least usefully . nguts tt fmm other typ 0 f 1 ' tl at make terrorism the disr . es vio ence and identify the characteristics 1 met phenomenon of political violence that it is.

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THE USES OF FORCt:.

1to hwe ~~tr-rcac.:hing p:o.' I, ' 1 ~..:,.cal f'fccts b f <tl e terrorist all,tc: k. t j, . ll'i\11 l to .. . ~~YOnd ll.' rt\1tiSil1 is sped flcaJly d<'S1~11~< 1nst1 fc . t, . t' (.;) or ohrect o 1 . Ih' 111\llh'l1 l VK 1111 . 'cl . "ttrttct audi<'1H'< . at '''11?;h l induc) . . lr . t:l t e ( b I tl , . b ' jntitn1datc . a WJ etntrvanational t;o\c tlll'lllorpolitica] <~nvaJ . I. .. \\1llln.am lttc) i t' thuk or religious group. aaln c~bJ e c?tn is,desiP"ned to tr< ;,r, llowc r wl,cre ll parl), . 1erc i5 n . . renen J. en-onst . 111 11 the pnblicitvg is verY li ttle. Thnw! tc or putl 1 opuuon g 1 tJlere . en er . )ower w 1ere oliclate 1 . k to obtain the Jc,eragc influence and . none or t o cons power ' olence terronsts see 11 t1 r " 1 liticaJ change on either a local or an intcrnati fl' all~ >~ 1e1 0 ona1 thev otherwise lack to e ect P scale. .

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THE POLITICAL UTILITY or: FORCE TODAY

rhe Fungibility ofForce

ROBERT ]. ART

There are two fundamental reasons why military power remains more essential to statecraft than is commonly thought. First, in an anarchic realm {one without a central government), force is integral to political interaction. Foreign policy cannot be divorced from military power. Second, force is "fungible." It can be used for a wide variety of tasks and across different policy domains; it can be employed for both military and nonmilitary purposes ....

POWER ASSETS: COMPARISONS AND CONFUSIONS

... I have argued that force is integral to statecraft because international politics is

anarchic. By itself, that fact makes force fungible to a degree. Exactly how fungible an instrument is mi litary power, however, and how does it compare in this regard to the other power assets a state wields? In this section, I answer these questions. First, I make a rough comparison as to the fungibility of the main instruments of statecraft. Second, I present a counterargument that force has little fungibility and then critique it.

Comparing Power Assets

Comparing the instruments of statecraft according to their fungibility is a difficult task. We do not have a large body of empirical studies that syste_mati~y a~~yze ,~h~ comparatjve fungibility of a state's power assets. The few studies we do ha,e, e e though they are carefully done, focus on onJy one or two instruments_ and are m?re concemed with looking at assets within specific issue areas than With c:ompanng
(Sro Robert J. Art, "American Foreign Poli<.)' and the Fung~b h "~;ner l996), pp. 7-42. Copyright l996. Reproduced by pE'nJUSS!On ttp WWw.taylorandfrancis.com.
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ART I THE FUNGIBLUTY OF FORCE

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we lack a conseque nceThrouuhsurficicnt videnec to c:om pare . I ~)'IC. however ;t:' s ('h; acro 'b'lih Cl btt (. 1 '' o r , we C:at1 pmnr assets accorwng to tl t ett' fun<1l I l ' o l . cU [ me uc atwn . Pl'O\ 1C1 :<0. 111 c b 'l,>ark estimates. a state O\'1)1$ Tlle\' . 1 lt l)t)l)U 1 . - tl1e sr . ts . Constder what power asse . .. , . . u of 1ts CtUL.A- ' geogyal) ,L1)'-t1 SIZ(. 1OtcllJOll . anu natule, ,.;.,.,olllV' le a) 0 le\ eI ski s Ulcl r eclucation . e the effecthc1tcss of its potti ru resource endowment of the state; govemanc r tl .. . I c, ~)'S11ts 1 eoloO'\ and r b\ and stands ror. 1e nature o es c . \~ 'uee-tlt e norms a state li \ l OJ te111 aJ " . . altl: -the leY el. sour<:es ' anc nature of 1s pro. t tl f a a1 to fore1gners; we 1 0 l e ~:\tent tts ppel cl h' the political skill of its leaders and the number of skill ducn\e ec :onomv; ea ers tp-. cl .. . . fulleaders 1t , ' and mili'tary, po\~er-the nature, slZe, an composition of 1ts militan nas: . ..L . .r c: all rorces. Of th ese assets. ,vealt11and political skill look to be UJe most versatilegeog. rap1y a11 d go\emance tile least versatiJe. because both are more m the nature of 1 givens th~t set the physical and political context \vi~lin which tl_1e other assets operate; ' .,.e o vaJ ues and poptu...ti011 cu hicrhl)' va1iable.' depending, respectJVely, on the content .of ( . . .. tile values and on the education ru1d skill of tl1e populace, and mdJtary power bes somewhere between wealth and skill on the one hand, and geography and governance on the other hand, but closer to tlte former tl1an to the latter. In rank order, the three most fungible power assets appear to be we~~: poli~cal ski!J, ~nd military po~'er. Economic wealth has the highest fungJbility. It IS the eas1est to convert mto the most liquid asset of all, namely, money, which in turn can be used to buy many rufferent things-such as a good press, topfught international negotiators, smart ]av.yers, cutting-edge technology, bargaining power in _international organizations, and so on. Wealth is also integral to military power. A nch state can generate more military power than a poor one. A state iliat is large and rich can, if it so chooses, generate especially large amounts of military power. The old mercantilist insight that wealtl1 generates power (and vice-versa) is still valid. Political skill is a second power asset tllat is highly fungible. By definition, skilled political operators are ones who can operate weU in different policy realms because tl1ey have mastered the techniques of persuasion and jnfluence. They are equally adept at selUng free trade agreements, wars, or foreign aid to their citizens. Polltically skillful statesmen can roam with ease across different policy realms. Indeed, that is what we commonly mean by a politically skillful leader-one who can lead in many different policy arenas. Thus, wealth and skiJI are resources that are easily transferable from one policy realm to another and are probably the two most liquid power assets. Militazy power is a third fungible asset. It is not as fungible as wealth or skill, but ~hat does not make it illiquid. Military power possesses versatility because force is mt~ ~o poutics, even when states are at peace. If force is integral to international poli~cs. It_m~st b~. fungible. It cannot have petvasive effects and yet be severe!! restricted m Its utility. Its pervasive effects, however, can be uniformly strong, umformly weak, or variable in strength. Which is the c.-ase depends on how milit~' ~er affects the. ~any domains, poucy arenas, and disparate issues that come with_m Its fi~ld. At tll~ muumum, however, military power is fungible to a degree because ItS 1 phys_ use, Its thre~t~ned use, or simply its mere presence structure expect~~ons ca1 and mflueru:e the_ ~litical calculations of actors. The gravitational effects of mJlitar)' ~e~ mean that Its mfluence pervades the other policy realms, even if it is not dornmant m most of them. Pervasiveness implies fungibility.
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e case ' l 1 n ubt .ny power, moreover great ~ In tl1 . er amounts 11 pomt, more of' it is therefore . ~f .mc:rca\e its bility Up to (I t: 01.1<1 ).C tt fun@ d uable to be nllttanly powerful than m'''tariJ k bettc:r than le\li. lt is re es m v wea ~'llt 'I motes l1ave ocrreatN eh 1t m world politic:s than militaril\J ak ' 11an ~ powerful we ones :\Ill 1 1 sta are less uhjc et to th e influence of other stat~s tl1 . . . tan Ystron~ 1 states 1 b rr an ffilttanlv weak , , 1; .1 powe1fu '-latcs can etter o 1 protection to th )' er one!\. \hvtan . . ..1 , . .A o er states. or more s I . threaten them, 111 orucr to m uence their bebavior th . . . . enous } 'li 1. . r 1 an mtlttari.h weak FinaiJy. 1111 tan~ po'"enu states are more secure than <:an ril .1 . ones. b 1 b' mt 1 \' weak ones ta ,e more clout. to c ess su Ject to the ""ill of others to b . To ha\ . . 1 ." e m a stronger po!li. to offer 1 orote<:tion 0 1 l 1l eaten 1 1arm, and to be secure 1 , worId \\'here others n a oon .. nsecure- these are po1 1ti<:al advantages tl1at can be diplom ti ll are 1 . a ea y exp1 . 01ted, d thev can also str engthen .the will, 1 esolve, and bargamjng sta11ce or th e state that an ' h 1 . 1 has them. Thus, alt 1oug m1 tt~l)' power ranks behind wealth and skill in tenns of its ,ersatility, it can be a close thnd behin~ those two, at least for those great powers that choose to generate large amounts of 1t and then to exploit it.

conflating Sufficiency and Fungibility

The view argued here-that military power possesses a relativelY hicrh decrree of . 0 0 fungibility-is not the conventional wisdom. Railier, the commonly accepted ,iew is that put forward by David Baldwin, who argues that militru;- power is of restricted utility. Baldwin asserts: T"o of the most important weaknesses in trarutional theorizing about international politics ha\e been the tendency to exaggerate the eiTec heness of military power t resources and the tendency to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared. 1 Baldwin's view of milita1y power follows from his more general argument that power assets tend to be situationally specific. By that he means: vrhat functions as a power resource in one policy-contingency framev.,ork may be inelevant in another." If assets are situationally or domain-specific, tl1en tl1ey are not easily transferable from one policy realm to another. In fact, as Balch~rin rugues: p~!Hi.cal power resources ... tend to be much less liquid tbru1 economic resources ; and although power resources vaty in their degree of fungibility, 'no political power resource begins to approach the degree of fungibility of money.''2 For Baldwin, two consequences flow from the domain-specific nature of power resources. First, we cannot rely on a gross assessment of as 's o,erall. power assets tate . tn order to determine how well it will do in any specific area. Instead. '' e must assess the strength of the resources that it wields in that specific domain. Seco~d. the ~en :rally low fungibility of political power resources explains what B~d~'m calll> ~: paradox of unrealized power": the fact that a strong state can pre,ru1 m one ~ area and 1 m another. The reason for this, h 11 . e te s us, 15 stmple The. state .o..U JSSue ose . d t has strong assets in the domain where it prevails and \veak ones wh~l"E' 1 ~ . ~ no t On the face of it Baldwin's argument is reasonable. It makes mtwti\e senseot~ argue ' d atir1 armies than the, are at prom . or example, that armies are better at e e g th 'ti . that the more mg stable exchange rates. It also makes good sense to take e posi on fi . e the t'arefuU b to bear on a SJ>!C1 c tssu Ywe assess what specific assets a state can nng

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ART I THE FUNGJBil ..,..,, ._.. , OF FORCE

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~' our !<.>e1\\1'Li l>e o 1 w hat tlte state cm n.'ah<.:ti, tlh 1 'I 1t)lish on t hat < domau1-~r 'l)et'ih<: 1o 1 'l'('L is tllcreorc r ~-sue . To denv t11at ,JJ po\\'er assets are t J E 'i:-.t'l'tto ~uro . quaI.Jy a bsurd . howe,er are the positions that .all <L. t!l oU"C' ( omain-S[)ecific . . . . .. . . d ,. . d t]1at a moss uwentor" of a state~ O\ ( r >m\ ll .tssets 15 not . t 0 tJ ll:' ,une egree. clll ' . . 'k I I . a .t r y . ,..,,;de rel1aoIe. e,en 1 on1 a rough, e....... to how well the late 1s h l ' ! >-. o m anv c. n . ' oive 1 . onKUJl. A e t s are .not equalt'n funoibility and fiJ1'-hll1111!! c ov' not mean dramati s I:J d c-.,t.lh alteJing assessments. . .. .1. . . ~ .-:> . \\"hat does all t11is mean fo r t1te fu ng:tbiJJt;' of nH It.u; po\\ (; I. Should we . . t? accept BaId wm .s VIew about 1 . r argue that ,,e should not. To set wll\', let us look . in ~rreater detail at what else he has to say. . e Baldwin adduces four examples that purport to .demonstrate the illnited versa. . f ili't . ' ' til1tv o m ary powe J. 3 The examples are bypothebcal. but are nonetheless useful 1 to ~nalp because tJ1ey are equivalent to thought expenment . T 1csc arc the ~ examples:
mort' Rm-t\ull'd

Possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelevant to secudng the election of a U.S. citir.en as UN secretary-general: it is a hind ranee. . . . The owner of a political power resource. such as the means to deter atomic attack, is likely to have difficulty converting this resource into an?t!1er resource that would. for instance. allow his country to become the leader of the 1 lmd World. Planes loaded with nuclear weapons may strengthen a states abili ty to deter nuclear attacks but may be irreJe,ant to rescuing the Pueblo [a U.S. destroyer seized by the North Koreans in earh- 1968] on short notice. ' . The ability to get other c-ountries to refrain from attacking on:~ homeland is not the same as the abiJity to "win ilie hearts and minds of the people m a faraway land [the reference is to the Vietnam War).4

Seemjngly persuasive at first glance, t11e examples are, in fact, highly misleading. A little reflection about each will show how Baldwin has committed the carrunal error of conflating the insufficiency of an instrument with its low fungibility, and, therefore, how he has made military power look more domain-specific in each example than it really is. Consider first the United Nations case. Throughout the Un ited Nations' histo.t)', the V nited States never sought, nor did it ever favor, the election of an American as secretary-general. If it had, money and bribes would have been of as little use as a nuclear threat. The Soviet Union would have vetoed it, just as the UnHed States would have vetoed a Soviet national as secretary-general. Neither state would have countenanced the appointment of a citizen from the other, or from one of its client states. The reason is clear: The Cold War polarized the United Nations between East and West, and neither superpower was willing to allow the other to gain undue inAuen<..e in the institution if they could prevent it. Therefore, because neither super power would have ever agreed on a national from the other camp, botl1 sought a secretary-general. from the ranks of the unaligned, neutral nations. This e>.~lains wha col~ war secretaries-general came from the unaligned Scandinavian or Third Worl ~ (Dag Hammarskjold from Sweden; U Thant from Burma, for example), particuJarly during the heyday of the Cold War. This arrangement, moreover, served both superpowers' interest. At those rare times when they both agreed that the

. C' r The Third \ Vorld CX<tmplc ts <-'q uallv misleading To see w1IV. 1 t u pcnonn a . sunpie 'thou(J'ht e v enmcnl. Although .a Third World lead.,., t,,.t1t 1 d arnH:< tis '"' . ' " la >II state with nud ea r weapons mtght not nse automatically to the top of the Third W pack, he. or she ''~ould bccon:e a m~ghty impottant actor nonetheless. Think orld 1 trhh. ld 1 1ow less wct.0 ;" C hn1a and Ind1a, whtch have nuclear wepons, wo11 appear o . . . .. . . _ . "' to other states I r tiH) dt d not posses~ them.; and tlunk of how Iraq, Iran. or Libva. "hjch do not have them. would be vtewed 1f they did. For the former set of states. nuclear weapons add to their global political standing; for the latter set, their mere attempts to acquire them have caused their prominence to rise c:onsiderabk Bv themseh-es. nuclear weapons cannot buy the top slot in the Third \\.orld or.els~ where. Neither economic wealth, nor military power, nor any other power asset alone. c< buy top dog. That slot is resetved for the state that su rpasses the others m in all the key categ01ics of power. Although they do not buy the top position. nuclear weapons nevertheless do significantly enhance t11e international inOuenc.:e of any state that possesses the m, if inB uence is measured by how seriously a state is taken by others. l n this particular case, then, Baldwin is correct to argue that nuclear weapons are not readily convertible into another instmment asset. Although true, the poi nt is irrelevant: They add to the ultj mate resou rce for which all the ot11er assets of a state are mustered- political influence. The Pueblo example is the most complex of the Clses, and the one. when reex< amined, that provides the strongest support for Baldwin s general argument.5 Even when reexam ined, this strong case falls far short of demonstrating that military power ha<; little fungibili ty. . The facts of th e Pueblo case are straightforward. On 23 January 1~, ~orth Korea seized the USS Pueblo, an intelligence ship that was fitted ,,; th so~hlsticated electronic eavesdroppi ng car)abiJities and dtat was listening in on ~orth K orea. and al nost vear er did not release the ship's crew members untiJ 22 December 1968 1 ''\ . . art. the hacl been captured. North Korea c1 d tl1e sup ''"" patrolling 111S1de tts } ~,.. Y aune .. . twelve-mile territorial waters Hmit; the United States den.ie<l tile dt~m b~mse. tts radi 0 "fix" on the Pueblv showed that it was patrolli fic.t ng 11een 'ctnd a hall nautical .nu ed .e from the nearest North Korean land point. Immediate!~' after the ~eizuredi Ul ~'ooot , ~he States b r cl . r ~. eere up 1ts conveutional and nuc1 1orces 111 East As1a. sen ng. , ll , ear . Navv d . d..J' . a1 -aft to Soutl1 Korea, as v. e :l.S ; an Air Force reservists and 350 a wtion <UfCl . . r t 5 mo, t1 d. k [i w1tJun a lt'W nnnu e . 'lng le aircraft carrier USS Enterplise an tts tas . orc-e S K '"Ul b~es A lng t' }' f' the (urcwn sent to out1 or.. , ... c.. t tme of Wonsan, North Korea. Some o
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r~ions tot dd I" lw lpl'ul. 1'\ mediation wa<; 1,., I I N' . 'tet I.J11 1 j .. , t,u-v-fJ't'l lt'l I t I rat ,,ac, ll('lllral, not al igned ooclut more en' l'rw I)<'tau <'it C<: . I <l sec I t . ~ . . . .. . . . hll . 11 ,. r ,cn t1 \ nil ne .re, rndrtat'\ powtr htd not) . cl f m<l ' ltng to o \\it! 1 1 .. . le 1' J we ... 1w11ld nnl <.:oncludc that it llas r10ll11ng to 1 c .l'l'hn~ \tlr('. s-<tC'l 1 ta!1e .c- "ithin tlte in,l1l 11lion. Alllcrieas 11 rct>minen. . . to \\Jtt Arncrita' . <:e \\1t1 thr t.; 1 1111 1 11tbu'lg 5l<t ".1 clear. So. loo. b the lm:l that this stems fron A . . nrtt< :\atiow. h' s eel 1 ment"t p r 051 ron a. the ll! . trorwest nation. a position detking from both .t . . . \ 11s s 'Of c t1 <: . 1 nn<:I<'<IT weapons cannot bu, se s econom 1 and mt.1 '' .A-Jr Th us. altho11~ 1 t ta0 trenc.' . . , ere an -gene raJ P lC' f . iUtarv powN 1 mngs great 1111iucnce in an internati l . . . <: IOns. ttreat n1 . . . , . . I' , .. 11 . . . . . ona 0 1ganl7.ation. oue of o "' 111,un ptt tl)O'itS, ,1 t( t ,\ , IS to lth1eve collective secu 'ty tl 1 the thr(:at or wtOSoc 1 n . 1rou~ 1 use 0 fforce. .

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North Korean harlmr..- lilt\ Hlk ting <.:O't.\l l J I . I f ' . . . \ K . ,. ship striking -;ek :ctc t :\ort 1 ,u11.,, rarg Ns hy a s liJl .. pmg: ' <.: 11.111g a ort 1 0 1( <Ill 1 . k uaval ~nnfire;. In Padt case we deci Jed that th~ n'i wa'i t(JO ~r<a t and lh< aJr <ll td , pos~iblr .I all "J c not want to wul the arj.{IIIIH ut .md lose th< . .. lo a~co 1np Ir~ ww11t too \Ill 1. ><I< 1 ' () con sbtcntly war n etI H t)' advrscrs.

f~tct , rigltt from the outset of the crisis. tl~e North ~orcan ncg~)trators nadc clt>a r that onlv an Am erican t:onfessiou that rt had spu~d on 01 t 1t Korea and ha u iutruded into its territorial waters would secure the crew~ release . For elev<'n 111 onth s the Uni ted Statcs continued to insist th at th e:: P11eblo was n()t engag~d in illegal activity. and that it had not violated No1th Korea's ter:Jitorial waters. Only 011 22 Dece rnhe r, when General Gilbert Woodward. the U .S. rep rese ntative to tlw negotiations. signed a statement in which the U.S. govcm me nt apologized for the espiouage aud tl1c iutrusion. did North Korea release th e ~n.: w. Th ~ American admission of g 11 ilt, however, wa'> made und er protest: !111 medratcly before signing the statement, the government disavowed what it was abo ut to sign ; and imm ediately after the signing. the governmen t disavo,.ved what it had jus t admitted. Alth ougJ, the facts of the Pueblo case are straightforward, the interpretation to be put on them is not. Thi!:i much is dea r: Neither nuclear weapons, nor any of An1 clica's other military assets, appear to have se<;Ured the cre w's release . Equally dea r, however, is that none of its other assets secu red the crew's release either. Should we then conclude from this case tha t military power, diplomacy, and wha teve r othe r assets were em ployed to secure the crew's rele ase have low fung ibility? Cle arly, that wou ld be a foo lish conclusion to draw. The re was only one thing that sec ured the crew's release: the public humiliation of the Un ited States. If nothing but hu miliation worked , it is reasonable to con clude tha t humilia tion either was, or more likely. quic kly became North Korea's goal. Wh en an adversary is firmly fixed on humiliation. military postu ring, economic bribes, dip lom atic pressure, economic.: thre ats, or any oth er tool use d in moderation is not likd y to succeed. Onl y cxtrerne measures, such as waging war or economic bloc.:kade, are like ly to he suc~essful. At that point, the cos ts of such actions must be weighe d aga inst tire ben efits. One clear lesson we can draw from the Puehlo case is tha t sometimes the re are tasks for which none of the traditional tools of statecraft are sufAcient. These situations arc rare, but they do on occasion occur. The Pueblo was one of them. There is, howeve r, a second and equally important point to be drawn from this example. Although it is true that Am erica's military pow er did not sec ure the crew 's release , nevertheless, there were oth er reasons to unde1take the mi litary buiJdup the United States subsequently engaged in. Neitl1e r tl1e United States nor Sou t!l Ko~ea knew why the North had seized the Pueblo. Preside nt Johnson and 111 5 ~visors, however, speculated that the seizure was rela ted to the Tet offensive 111 VJetna.~ t~t began ei~1t days after the Puehlo s cap ture . They reasoned t.l ~at cl1e PueJJ_Lo s seizure was deliberately tim ed to distract the United States and to fnghten the South Koreans. Adding weight to this reasoning was the fact tha t the Pueblo was

Tire American govern ment's denial, its military n.l<'a'>nn-. and its suhsequ< nt diplomatic eflorts, were to no ava il. North Korea rclu scJd lo nl~'asc the t:rew. In

nng t 1e1r hvo di,iSJO The Puehlo's sci:.urc.: th11s raised three problem s forth < Unit. 't" crew and sh1p back; how to dete r the \'<>rtl f cd hO\"' 11et r ' 1 rom engtgStates: f rth to :r n , ..1tive acts ; and how to reassu re the South Kore ffi . < mg m u er rovo..., . . . r uld keep t11eir troops 111 South Y1etnam. A strong c:aseans su btlentlv so that h . ll w-o cou < e made tl 1 t th t 1C) tasks not th e first, were the primarv purpose<; [(Jr th b a e ast 1'\VO . c. ' jtarv buildup 111 Eas t Asm. Arter all the UnHed States e su sequent Americ-an tl'd not 1111 t , ' 1 nee cl additional c rorces there to press me the r orth md1taril)' to release the erew. There wen: alre d . . . . bout 100~ 000 Am encan troops m East Asia. A m.il<itarv builclup h . ,t lda ) .. . ; , owe" er, wou be a useful s1gnal for det en,e nce ~f further provocations and rea<>surance of its alk Unti l (or if) North Korea.s arc hives are opened up, we cannot know whether dete~ rence of further provocation wor k~d, because we do not know what additional plans the North had. \1\lh at we d.? kn~~ ~s th~t the reassurance function of the buildup did work: Sou th Kor ea kept tts c.hVJSJons m South Vietnam. Thus. America's militarY buildup had thre e purposes. Of those, one was achi eved, another ,..,as not, and th~ third we cannot be certain abou t. In sum , it is 'vvrong to draw the conclusion that the Pueblo case shows that forc e has little fungibility, even though military po turing appears not to have got ten the crew released. Baldwin's final example is equally problematic if the point is to how that militarY power has little fungibility. Y it is true that preventing an attack on ones homeland is es, a different task than win ning the hearts and minds of a people in a distant land. Presumably, however, the point of the example is to argu e that the latter task is not merely dille rent fi-om the former. but al.'io more difficult. 1f tltis is the assertion. it is unexceptionable: Compelling anothe r govemment to change it beha\'ior has always been an inherently more difficult task than dete rring a given govemment from attacking one's homelan d. Not only is inte rstate compellence more di:ffi tult than interstate deterrence, but intrastate com pell ence is more difficult tl1an interstate <:OmpeUence. Fore ing the adversmies in a civil war to lay dovm their arms and negotiate an end to t~~eir dispute is a notoriously difficult task, as the Chinese ch-l w :r in the 1940s. the.\ teti a namese civil war in the 1960s, and tl1e Bosnian civil 'var in the 1990s all too tragJ~l~ show. lt is an esp ecially d.ifficlJt task in a situation like Viet11am. where the .ou~Jde power's inte rnal aJJy faces an adversary that has the force of nationalism on tts tde. (Ho Chi Minh was Vie tnam 's greatest nationalist figure of the twentieth centwy and was widely recognized as such within Vieblam. ) It is hard to prevail in achil war wl~e~ the aclversaty rnonopolizes the appeal of nationalism. Equally important, boweverh.tt ~s hard t0 . . 'ted prevail m a civil war witl1out resmt to 1 e. Tlle um States cotJd not a\e ore. . . WOn ' y b cl m tetnam by forc e alone hut it would bave a no chance at alJ to Wtn Wlthout lt. . h th N0 h ' t oug htful anal)'St of military power wou 11 tltere fore disaQ'fee ) \\lt. . e 0 c folio Jtary Wing propositions thclt can be teased out o f tIle c th example:al(1 tnJ1 t rour P<>wc k canno 9 r wor s bet ter fo r defense than for conquest: (- ) militarY .power onea1 e is . . gtlara t 1 (3) 1 an po" er on mht n ec padfication onc e con quest has take n P ace:
I
i

1\vo day<; earl ier thirty-o . . t an r. . ' J . . ' ne SfX;< I no. t cl into St(' ' ~~~H :.;ot WJl llln one-half rnile of th ;IaJ .':\ ortt K n . orea aaents . filtra e l'all 1 1'} . . . la -o ,n re ovc rcon tc li t c. J<;Jr tYIISSron w ts t"' k'll e prc>sdentiI pa. <.:e before p . ( I ey we ared that t 11rou gI lI tese two inci t1 r dent" anl I hresi dent park. The ljnite tes re ' u per aps 0th u Sta vas tryin g to d 1vC'rt \ merican mili tary n~so urt: , f ,. er!) to com e, :\orth 11orea" frJciently ner es ~ ak tJ1e South Korc'<m:-. ~u mus that tl rom \ 1etnam to Korca and n1 e _ 1evwouldh 1 . 1
'J

sc>lated inCJC 11t

2ll

~ ns Rghting in Yielnatu hack home.'

~I:!

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

1

ART I THE FUNGJBJUl)t OF

FORCE

l'r a.rra~'S ' se ' ., ,..., nclliO . re' I><' msu fr : >Ol to win hut !'0 ton. ~.) ' ll',\rl v all th nal. . isrn, not ouly will lo roe: ' e ot Itcr . too Is Cif. slatccra ,.t- monc.:y. rc>litic:tl .s kill l)r<)j)Hgundct, :111d \(1 on . In Slldr ,... < ' -..t~es .,. fl' . (' , tll" S ''llllt' insll f hCIC:' ll<.:\' <I " tiH olllt . 111~lrt tlll('n t" r1 mt rt ;tJY power s11 e r ton . ' " rat makes .it no 111orc. hut no less. fung ible tlran tlrcy arc.. . S < 1 o11r ( \ll I. o j' l3 Cl IIWlll . ('X'I111'f) leo; de 11 wnSIT;Il<' :Ill l 111 pOli , lllt fact aho11 t lllilit lt\' 't "'llll < cll ie' c rmuw thin gs. SliJ'{I~ . lht" t'i ,m llll i)OJ >t tant l> ,,,'t <> pOW(" I': USl'( I a] OIH' , I (;.-. o , : . , ,.. ' to J'Cll1<.>lll IJC'r, 1 l . . 't 01 l e tltlt js f>CCIIU:J r to Imlr taiy pm' <I .tloll l or tlrt~tt)rovcs tll< tt )U IS I c : . l Ill e r 'b'l't . n:-.t 1t l<L'; 1 1 1111g 1 I I y'> s r"h' not Jndccd. no srng le 1 , nt~ n<ll l of state~.:ra ft is l'' < . ll " . . . 'r .CICil t t0 Htt<lln et nv simtificant f(>reicm f?OIIcy. ob1ect 1\'('- a fact I shall term' ''1-lsk . Sl.l rr1 , ~" n . , . < . f:r.: . ncv.,s ' [I , e ., 1.(, {\.VO r eL-;o 11s for thrs. l1rs t. a sl <tt <.'sman mus t untJcipat< ti e msu ncw 11 < < 1 . takc n hv the states he rs t1 mg to mflu ence Tile)' y . cou ntera<:t 10ns tit:\t ,,'lJIIJ<' unde 1 . . . will atlCillj)t tO C ter his stratagems 'Nitl~ tho~ e or therr OWI1 ;.11tC'Y W OIIJl JJills e uif'f'c rt:nt t')ves of insh11 ments to o flset the one.~ he IS ~sm ~: and tl_1c~ wt ll a.t~e mpt to corupt>nsate for their weakness in Oil<' area w1th ll wtr str engt h Ill anot hc. 1. A well -prepared influence attempt therefor(' requires a multi-in ~trt~me~tal approac h to deal with ~le likel v counters to it. Second. < irnpo tt(tnt policy Itself has mal l)' fac-ets. A multilacUlY etel policy hy necessit)' requires "'any instrume nts to impl ell)c nt it. l~<~r both reasons, aiJ truly important matters require a statesman to mus ter s?ve ral , rf not all, the instruments at his disposal. rven though he may rely more heaVIly on som e than on others. l n sum. in state<.:raft no tool can stand alone. For miljtary power, then , as for the othe r instrume nts of state craft, Fungibility should not be equated with sufncie11 cy, and insufficiency shoutd not be eyuated "'ritb low fungibility. A given instJ1Jme nt can carry a state pa1 of the way to a give n goal, t even though it cannot carry the state all the way there. At one and the sam e time, an instmment of statec.:raf t can usefuJiy contribute to atta ining many goal s and yet by itself l:>e insufficient to attain any one of them. Thus, care ful consideration of B aldwin's examples demonstrates the foiJowing : (1) mil itary pow er vvas not sufBcicnt to achieve the defined ta-;k; (2) none of the other traditional policy i nstrur nents were sufficient either; and (3) milita1y power wa-; of som e value, eith er for th e defin ed task or for another task closely connected to it. What the examples did not demonstrate is that states are unable to transfer miJjtary power from one poli cy tac;,k to another. Indeed. to the contra1 Each showed that military power can be used for a vaJiety of y: tasks, even though it may not be sufficient, by itc;elf. to achieve any of them.

j1l f ' ''0\'( ' l"llll1 , 11()[ su ffidt lll l n <:Oil tpd a pop u IUl'C' t 0 ..l l <:C tll(.' f('trit illl.' r . .., t: lll; anu rr 1 l 1. ll clcte iT<'II<:< 1 1 .. l\'' t~o1 r 1 11 \ I) < ptll ,ntl' i" m11r<' clllllC: Il l l<l .'lllll ' ' > <. state. .~ tllis eXcll11pft .. tl l<' llls. lltt'rc is. lw w<'V<' I', a 1 '' ffth thtl slrould bt dr.t. so 1 < . . t , tr 11 1 1 c.: ivtl war ou I ht \ >wr stdv ol . . ~ .- ) \\'he n < o11tside pow l.ll

'""ll

n lll r . thl' wrond <:1'-<' 1 arv p<> r i'i 'lc-II t'Oil'ii'-CIIIC ncts mr tlCllltnilih rv 11ilit w< I 1 11 . '. ~ 1 l<.rat ( y link I . ' 111' rh lite P "l'['fl <;l qf ..,tIc 'llgll ><' Ill n g a state\ b'lr ,. . . I l:C to et norHnilita.ry . JL'. \VI . . I < uflln . tSS' . I C.:' L'il' for( <'' >tS<'l ,lg<U.n'il f'orcc" in tlrc: se<; g<.I I' g I'VNa [r. nn IIat 1\'> lll' ln ._,..,c Ic frrs < ' ' . . ll r11 both (.'<1 \l'!' llllhtar~ p owcr h ('{;OJl i('S fllngemu, Iort< i., link(;(I With allrlii.Hr il ll . .. . trl'. . 1 . e ) Ct:awiC' rt . ,ss l tltcs trict ly u11hta'f) c C> tli<Hn. l <'xpl ainlrowc> ;HIt . tl .: ks prm1 cflccts net:~ otrtstt c I. pa 1 W<Jr and ill~tstrat< hotl w exarnp o . ith '
rrll ' . tlCI'S

c.:otl rtuYCl lll <'l 1

I"~'

c:. an Ot lll:OllJC witlr l-.illnific.. t

2 13

spm -over Effects

'litu . . Amr y en<.:ottn.tcr. w ltdl l('r peac.:<'l'ul or l'o rcef11 1 }'l'elds . '.csu 1 l 1:tl c.:an he . . . . a entia! to the Jl1te racl rons and the outc:o 111 es that tak I . .t J <:onseqll . . I I " I ' .. 'I I .. . e ace rer . rs 11 1t wine: 1 tCI II t I H spr -ovm elft: <.:t .. 1s ({)() ol'tc' p - rn Ol 1 dotn ains " TlliS I ' .. . . , . . n1 orgo tl<>n." Militarv-lo..1 .tarv encountt"ts do no t ptodu<.:c only 111rht ar)' res 11 1 :rt' I .. 1 ts-- till I , .". I . . . . . . . --... tcs aJu wac;tc. an n u:~s ferted enc nm s s11h< ne d. dtt,lc.:ks pt t:VC . allt<'<; prot < 1 . . <;te 11 I cc c ' I . f . 'Ilted c. 1C\' aI'oo I . .l bout 1 ic.:al e ffects t 1<1 1' stgr nlcantly rnfl11 e:nc:e events in utJt ... . do : , .1rmg Jolit . c , f . . . .. " 1 ma1 ns. ,\ 111 tlarv powe r ach 1 c~~s mnc h o ItS fung rbtlr ty th ro11gh this effect: The political shc~<:k waves of a mrl1tar~ c.n<.:oun~('J' rcve rhc~atc beyond the military domain and cxt~.; nd into the othe r P? lrcy dom ams as well. fh t: exercise o[ succ.:cssful dctc: rren<:c, tornpellence, or ddc> nsc affects the overall political fram ework of relations between two states. Bc<.:aUSl' '.11 poli cy don1 ~\.ins arc situated within this ovcrarc:lting frame' w what happens m the latte r all<cts what happens in these domains. Spill -ov~ r ork, effects define with morC" prec ision why forc.: e acts akin to a gravitational ficlu . Aspill-ove r el'fr d can he understood cit her as a prcr cquisitc or a by-prcxluc:t. As a prer equ isite , the result produced by the ac.:t of force checking force creates something that is delibe rate and viewed as essential in orde r to reach a given outcome in anot her do main. As a by-produ ct, the encounte r produ~.:cs sonw thing in another domain that may b< heneRcial b11t is inc.:idcntal or evcu unin tend ed. Of course, what is by-produ ct nnd what is prerequisite hangs on what outcome arc valnC'd in that othe r domain. Tvvo examples will illustrate how the spill-ove r effect works and how it manHe sts itsel f eith er as a prerequisite or a by-produ ct.

HOW FORCE ACHIEVES FUNGIBIUTY

If ~iJitary power is a versatile instn.unent of statecraft, then exactly how does _H achteve its fungibility? Wlmt are the paths through which jt can influence events 111 other domains?

r ..

rv,lttics In the first ,,.,,e :l t!ln' ~ mu1 ...... 1 power encounters miiHary power, but tcrorn thrs :

~l~re are two p~th s. The first is through the spill-over effects that .~~ilitar~ ~~ ~ 011 other JX>~c..y domains; the second, through the phenomenon of hnk~

Examples: Banking and Cold War Interdependence Tht first example has to do with banks; the second with rece nt history. Th( hanking Pxample dell lons tratc s th e role forc: e plays in solvency: the historical example, the role that U.S. mili tary pow N played in creating today's economic interdcpe nd~n c.:e. First, th(' hanki ug example. Begin wit!, this question , Why do we depo~t our llloney in a hank? T he answ er is wr put our mon er in a bank because we thrnk '~<: C' take it out -..vh~never W C want. We believe the mon er is dO there when W(' want rt. In short, we believe the bank to be solvent. . . 1 n . 1\ lnnk is . okent SoIv~nc . .' y rs usu ally thought of sole ly rn ec<~no~r c . _e ~:. : : . an' called. tn hecause rt ltas enough assets to meet its financJal Jrabrllttes rf tl.le. . . afi' Solvcn cy, howe . . . . C! ver, IS a (unc tion , not sunp Iy or nn.tne'"' but of .l)h\'Sit .al .s, ct} ...... . . . Abank' I , rt~ s so Vt rrcy U<.' t)ends on the- fact bot 1 t1 . < ts rxc(ed rts lrahrhtres. (.1 . 1at rts L'iSe 1 balan., 1 1 . <:c s reet is in the black) and that its asse ts are P1~,st~allv l'<.:llre (not .easl} . . . 1 d\'tolen ) PI . . . . . ')'Srcal secu nty is thcrpfore as . 0 . l)'urk olvenc' a.s rts rqUI unpo r1.u lt 1 '1 ' ,d, . ~~ , r t 1 wlwn we resr f 111 ' ' cvt~n though Wt:' ge1 lly take the form er ror gran <( wra

::! ] -4

.PART 2

THE USES OF FORU:.

1\KI I THE FUNGIBILITY 0

F FORCE

2Jii

willJed at wil l t} state . , 1en it . 11 e t lo1nest1c oreIcr. If the banks within a A tcuuiJkl '' 1 sl.l 1 1Ysically securs .ttzcn. wou Id not pu t their mone)' in them. ft sta e rna '( ' . "~ p1 . cl d c1 . 1 1 1 robbers and t(; b' nsinl1 its militarv power to deter an? e en agamst \\nut.- )e {'tJ t ai"e back the funds if a robbery takes pl.t((' (assuming th o ey lre ,d's etnll ~ o recovered) Through its use of its legitimate monopoly on ta e COI11JI>et ld fr . caua1 an 1e tUt . 1 0 11e S<.> i%urc If th t te seeks to neutralize the tJueat o 10rc1 > fr e state f . b ks . . u. e o rorce, a s a ucceeds in estabLishing the physical secunty o Its an . lt prod uces one of th . e r ,. . . , . two prerequisites reqmred tor a ban k's sohenC)' ln sum , in a welJ-ordered state. public fo~ce supp~e.sscs pnvate force. The effect of this suppression is to create a generalize~ sta.~)lht: ~hat sets the context within which all societal interactions take place. Th1s eHect spills over into nu me~ f.~stations, one o.f which is confidence ous other domains and produces many. mani about the physical security O.f banks. This confidence c~n. be v1cwed _as a by-product of the public suppression of private force, as a prerequ1s1te to bankmg solvency, or, more sensiblv, as both. A good J 1jstorical example of the spill-over effect of military powe r is the eco. nomic interdependence produced among the free world's economies during the Cold War. In a fundamental sense, this is the banking analogy writ large. The bank is the free world economies, tJ1e potential robber is th e Soviet Union, and the provider of physical safety is the United States. During the Cold War era, the United States used its militruy power to deter a Soviet attack on its major allies, the \.Vestern Europeans and the Japanese. American military power checked Soviet military power. This military-to-military encounter yielded a high degree of military security for America's allies, but it also produced several b)'-products, one of the most important of which was the creation of an open and interdependent economic order among the United States, \.Vestem Europe, and Japan. Today's era of economic interdependence is in no small part due to the exercise of American military power during the Cold \Var. A brief discussion wiU show how American military power helped create the economk interdependence from which much of today's world benefits. America's forty-year struggle with the Soviets facilitated economic integration \vithjn Western Europe and among \Vestern Europe, North America, and Japan. ?bviously, American mj~tary power wac; not the sole factor responsible for today's mterdependence among the major industrialized nations. Also crucial were the conversion of governments to Keynesian economics; their overwhelming desire to avoid th~ ~tastrophic experience of the Great Depression and the global war it ts b~ought m 1 wake; the lesson they learned from the 1930s about how noncooper ative,. ~ggar-thy-neighbor policies ultimately redound to the disadvantage of all; the willingness of the United States to underwrite the economic costs of setting up the ~-stem an~ of sustaining it for a time; the acceptance by its aJJies of the legitiof Amem:an leadership; the hard work of the peoples involved; and so 0 '~ portantas all these factors were, however we must re me mber where economiC ' openness fj rst began and where it subsequently flourished most: among the great powers that were allied with the United States against the Soviet Union. How, then, did the Soviet threat and the measures taken to counter it belp e produce the modern muac1 of economic interdependence among Arn ericas

;:.acy

allies? A1 Hl l1o'' cxae;lly, did America's 'l' . lt'i . 'I l ln Jt 'J rf] 1ere were ro. ml Jtary power <tnd , ()vers(Jas odustnG . I tl ur wavs. . jitar)' I)resen<.:c colltn Ill<. 1 F' st the spc:unt"' proYKkd hy the United Stat ~ . fl1 es created a 0I' . 1 I If , P Jtl<:al stahilitv . crucial to tiH on er y development of tral . ,, ations As l _ wng re1 k . I . that was wscusscd at tset of th1s ari1<. e. 111ar ets <.lo not exist in Jo--' vacuums th lh po 1 li . l l I .I . the ou ' rk best when ern )<"< c eu m po tlcal frameworks that vield . . . , ra er, ey 0 v American militan pm.C:;r deployt<.l in the Far East ' d pltdl<.:table expecta'' an on the E ' tions. uropcan <:on..1, t brought these 5lahlc expectations first, b)' . 1 prO\lwng the psycho! < 1 . I ' ' < hnen oo ca rance that the Eu ropcans and the Japanese need d t 1 . e o re nuld the 1. . . . reass U mse 'tS by contrn umg to prov1<.le them thereafter \ 'th . . d, second, a sense of safetY th t VI . . an ' a es c bled their econom1 energ1 to work their will. Indeed 1 Id ' 1ncrnher . we s 1ou re r x ~ro ena . was 'ormed was ps)re;hological, not rn1.1 , 1 t the prime reason l" A 1tary: to mak(; . . . ,. . " . . u1a e the Europeans feel secu1h enough agamst the Soviets so that th e). wouId. 1 the lave .d political w~ll to rchud t e ~selv~s economically. The initial purpose of ~ATO is the key to 1ts .( ~nu to the U . S.-Japan ~efense treaty's) long-lasting function: the cresland am1dst a turbulent international sea. ation of a pohbcally stable 1 Second, AmeJic~'s provisi?n of security to its allies in Europe and in the Far East dampen ed the11. resp~ct1ve wncerns about German and Japanese rnilitarv rearmament. The Un1ted States presence protected its allies not onk from th~ Soviets, but also from the Cer~ans .and ~e Japanese. Because Cerma~ and Japanese military power was contamed m alliances that the United States dominated. and especially because American troops were visibly present and literally within each nation, Germany's and Japan's neighbors, while they did not forget the horrors they suffered at the hands of these two during the Second World \\'ar. ne,ertheless, were not paralyzed from cooperating "ith them. The success of tile European Common Market owes as much to the presence of American military power on the continent of Europe as it does to the vision of men like ~lonnet. The same can be said for the Far East. America's military presence has helped "oil the waters" for Japan s economic dominance there. Third, Ametica's military presence helped to dampen cone-ems about disparities in relative economic growth and about vuJnerabilities inherent in interdepend~nce. both of which rue heightened in an open economk order. Freer trade ~enefit~ all nations, but not equally. The most eFficient benefit the most; and econ01m.c ef'fi<:Jencies can be turned to military effect. Interdependence brings dependencu:-s. all the greater the more states speciaUze econmnically. Unequal gain from tr~~e and trade rulitary eiTects. dependencies all too often historically have had adverse political and 1 11 ' t . . Th rough 1ts provision of military protection to tts a111es. t1 'um ed State mitie-ated le the security extemalities of interdependence and enabled the Ce~ums ~~d _the \\lth, all' es to their econom1c orbtts 1 ca1 ap J anese to 1 )ring their neighbors (Amelicas 1 ) m . ili't~n. conquest.or po Jti . . . o t th ed m cu.' u ose netghbors feming that German or Japanese e d I 'th t}1 economiC l)r Olni l_ . uummation would follow. Wicl1 the securitv issue ea t Wl ' . c th i!Thbors to swallow. f n rt 0 f b. 1 anc-e o the Germans and Japanese wac; eas1er LOT etr ne o 1- h . . . Fmally, Ame rica's military presence fostered a solictli1 . that came ' ' h ue lped . of sohdanh', m tu m, e 1 hein g partners agai nst a common enemy. T 1<.\t sense . the ine\itable develo th d ssaJY to O\ert'Ome d vill nece ' ''J . ., eaects of rnilitarv P e etermination and the goo ' bnng. The -spu -o,er u econo d sputes that inten.lependencJes rruc 1
a]
\,;ill

2W

PART 2

THE USES OF FOR<.;~

'n '

I 111:.

1-UNGJBJUTY Q F IORCE

217

Political stability. protectiOII from polcntial c .e rt11 <ll.) and Japaii(!!.C: militay !'( !Sur. .1 . u of'cc>ne;cms aiJollt relatve gauts and depcllclt.:Jcics .111 , 1tl genc.:e, 1IH1 ui:I II IJ'e!l lllln ' . . . . < ' 1 e . . so.H1 .1y- a11 of'Lhese were < tJdeJ by the A l rl< 'IIC<IIl Jt1rl11ary r1 resew . 1 an sense oI '-'' 111 Europe and the Far East.

'hould.nol lw wttkresli nwtc..;d, tholgh Uleyl :tre t ll ~~lllltl o l'll'' lll tl .and <Jllalltif'y l l I ( [ so I'd r'"' anc :~()()( W... 11l .t l .lcl ll. '( Ill d <;orrnnon. Surdv. howcv< tire S('nsc o r, I <t ; . , I ltl 11 se spi ll-over c:.:ffccts. J 111.1 y I " Ill <'d lo [1re . ' t"tll "(' hred 11111St haw laC . . 1 I' serve: a .. . I . 111 e lle iiiY f'lll lllnlts (JII 10\\ ill l1IC alli es ., 11 I I 011 u111 teJ front' agan1sl t w eo m ' c 11 IC ' IIC' < u to ITiait < .t a . . t Ullll(d Stai<"S, W()ll 11per.Ill I't their cconorn Jc . di Sf'llles to go. ( . I I . . I ell I I a . I' . I .,. . r 11 honndcd the lllC'vt la) (' I:COIIOIIIJ(' dl~[> lllus and llllJic d po 1l1<.a - Jnt Jt.tr)' I OI I . 1 . . Pr< . . . ., l lin 11 into a dow11warc -sp1 ra HI}.!; t:L'O IHIIIII( nation 1 Vf'lll C'<I lJCnt 1 10111 esc..;.l <~ n li~ ''J. I

t'OO[HrttiO II a~rd liSt

. . . Lle politic..;< tl will lo ~w.ta ,. rrmotrdc 01 l]IC' SovJCl!i UJJ JI I . I t:n rl(:~s

nn

Linkage Politics
The Sl.:c.:ond way for<:C' <xerts inlluen<.:c 011 other clom ~i ns o ! ' pc~lic.;y .is lhrcmglt lh~.; pCJwcr of li nkage politics. 1n politics, whether ~Jon1 cs_t1 c.; o ~ forc1 1s~~es arc us11 . gn, , ally linked I() Oil<' another. The link can .be e1the r func::tJon~tl or arb fdal. ]f' two issues an link<:cl f'uncliomtlly, then there 1.'-i a causal con nec::t1on bctwC;:en them: A changfl in (J JW produces a change in the othe~-. Tlw pric:e of th e ? oll ar (its excl1angc rate value) and the price of oil imports, for example, are fun c:tionally linked, because the global oil n1arket is priced in dollars. (Not only L hat, oil can o11ly be bought witl dollars. ) A decline iu tl1e value of the dollar will increase the cost of a given amount of oil imported lo the United Stales. Similarly, a rise in the value the dollar wj)l decrease the cost of' a given an1ount of imported oil. As long as oil remain.<; priwd in dollars, the functional tic between exchange rates and energy cannot he ddinked. Mor~over, as the oil-do.llar example illllstrates, functional linkages generally have corresponding spill-over eff(;cts. That is, weakness on one issue (a weaker dollar) produc.:es more weakness on the othe r (more money spent on energy irnports); aH<l strength on one (a stronger d<JIIar) produces greater strength on the other (cheaper euergy imports). Thus, function al linkages produc:e causal effects that either magnify a state's weakness or adclto its strength . Wheu two issues are linked artillciaJJy, th(;re is no causal connection between them. Achange in one does not automatically produce a change in tl1 other.J nstcad. e the two issues hecomc linked because a statcsmau has made a connettion where noue hc~f(m~ existed. Usually, hut not always, this wi ll be done to gain bargaining leverage. B making a link between two heretofore uneonnec.;te<.l issues, statesmen y try to briug ahout politically what is not produced fimctionaU They make a link in y. ordl:!r to t'fJJH} Jeusatc for W(!akncss on a gjven issue. Their method is to tic an issue where th~y are weak to au is~ue where U1ey are stroug. Tl1eir goaJ is to produc;~_. a

or

y 1 . . . )lea< of' ..1 slaH -. rP.all, l'" '' it. is IIC>I. ar1 lc ss nal or any !<.;ss err . I 1'" 1. 'Ill c:<<llll [>k cd :t 1arg ;ul nll g lll, kagc.; below l-C'lJvp ;1.} a rco;111l rovH e ' . I .(' . . . . I p A thN ftJJ a I) cll<JII:l llr :u1 1 ll'lal , J SSIIC linka(I(S j . v ! C l . . h . l:tV<: a <:rncial . , .,11 ,l!ysis ~md I t< cxfrc.rsc of sl at1~ j)OW cr IA f.<. cottsc -qllt;nc< f'nr V\ -can l1e I)O t11 1lw ..ssncs ttr< c<JIItiC'd<d , domains caniJot' b(; wl ll p11t .1k porrlt rtl<>n.: stronaly: , f3 CtiUSC 1 ' 0 Y I 1 1 (;df101 (; JI1 h c an not lw cklillk<'cl, tl ,c11 w< sho1dd fi(Jt vi< tl . n one anuth1~r. 1cy c..; 1f t 1 1 . w Jem 111 iw,l r r .~ 1'hemfon:, wy r:xp <UJatiOI J ol an O lc.:onw ill' . . ' ll . ..uon ron one 1 < U1CJll 1e 1. 1 . 1 l . . a gtvcn urJJ mun that i~ h- .. nc.:om['llct . r cL <;UJ only . t 110es on 111 l 1.11 c Olllc\111 w 1 .dways he 1 Ilt.l n on w I. . I I . (; , I I lOt<1 ri"'lt w own J sue lin kag<~s 11 n tt I I C'f'Xpanatory pow<~rof.tdcHna . Fl roug. n . k . . . . ... I su1n, JS. . . I ' m-rcstn<:tc;d analy'>is 1 c~g< s Ill P< t l<.:ll clr IT!i-1<<.: state w J3arg::unmg Ill ll ;scts IC!Ore r L I ~ I . . . k l'l .. . . . r. f'. ungm t lJdO thc:y rrll' ' llt I . wise h~. J ,JII ag< po I I(.;S I.S cl <ld () International pol'ti . I l'r 1-)' o i1CI . . . ' ea ue. We shou ld not eel othc rwls<'. Stalcs1nen ar c 011l to rnake the hest deals lt1 . . 1 _ t~xp . . . .. , 1 -! . . . ey can J)' cotnpenc;ati 11 , r weakness 111 one> ,u ca v. 1t 1 sl rc ngt t 1n others. Powerful <t 1 .. .. h _ ~ ,or . ., a c:s can ettcr c:nuauc ill n n IJ Ie.se cMrlt1CIISatOI)' 1t 11 kages than can weak (JIIes. Th(y 'Lre strc Jl1Ker .m JJ10re areas < h tltcy tl1an they arc weak; Wll!W( jiJCnlly, r . .can more easily utiljze tl,,. 1 . t (J ' nakc " P r r t I1eu (Ie l <:Jlln the: weak ones Crett.pow .everage in t e . . .:IT a1 o slrcJI11' area<; n . . . ers are , so 1 1e:tter . able 10 shift assets ;;unong 1 ss11e are<-L<i "' order to bnild positions ofbargainingstrength when nee;ess~1y. They c~m , .for exarnp.l~, more <;a~ily ge~1erate military power when d1ey need to rn order to !1n k 1t to non mdJt< tasks. fherelore:, bec.:ause powerful states uy can link issues morC;: ea.<>ly than can weaker ones, c:an cornpensate lor dcf1c.:iencies better, can generate more rcsonrces and do so more c p1i<.:kly when needed, and <.:an shift assets around with greater ea'ic, how powerful a state is overall rernains an essential determinant to how successful it is in tcrnationally, inespec:tive of !tow weak it may be at any given moment on any specific issue in any pa1tic1 domain. [n sum. linkage dar politics enhances the adva11tages of being powerful anJ boosts the fungihility of f()rce by enabling it to cross domains....

Examples: Deficits, Petrodollars, and Oil Prices

Three ... brie f examples show the range of state goals that <.:an be served b) constructing such linkages. The first involves the relatiou between A111eric:a's large and continuing balance o payments deficits and its global uli'iaJJce system. Througho1.'t most of the ~~Id r War era, the Unitecl States ran an annual large balance of payments defic1ts. l listoric.:ally, no nation has been ahle tu buy 1 nore ahroad than il sells abroad (import more than it exports) in as huge a vc;lum~ and for as long a perio.d as ltas 11e Unitcd States. Then! were rnt:lny reasons why it W<L'i able to. rangi11g from the hqllidity that defi cit dollars provided, whicl1enabled world trade to gr~w, to ger~ cral <.:on{identc in the Ameriean ewnomy, ,...,hie:h c.:aused f(Jrcigners to nw~st theH dollar holdings i 11 tl1e Uuited States. Pmt of the reason tllat foreig,u.cr~ continue~ .~0 take A , . ll 1 lnen cas continuing How of c:1 ars 1 o 10wever, \\,.IS. a11 1np!Jc1t' ,f not err,lklt, , "L tradcoff 1 ' f . .. l()U 's ('defic..;it dollars). t1 le : 11 return for their acceptance o AmeHcan 0 "itcd States provided the largest holders tl1 (the Ger:rmms. t!le,Jar~~~se~ en1 and th0' Ja11u1 militcuy protection ag1unst t l1 . . e1 "' . l s) . temies Amenca rm ltary .. e11 ' ' . " sbt>rwth compcrlsateu {or its lac:: k o I"C! I (.]rscp j11 l e. 11 t') nsca (', 12 Alter. tl, e oil fJrice A so . I ,. (' "trodoJl<U"s. 'k " COl i( example involvt:s the recyc mg 0 pc G lf t...rs wer<: hI e . f' l aJJ .s () t lt~ 1970s, the ()}JEC producers, especr y t IlC p.-i'S.Ian u menH.x: . v

rnorc ~csJr~Jie outtome in the weak area either by th reateui.ng to do sowethn 1g. undesirable m tllc strong area, or by promising to do somethi ng beneficial ther~. 11 they C'4fl make the couuection stk:k, then the result of an arti ficial Hnkage 15 11 strengthening of a states overall position. Unlike a functional lin kag~. wJ1ere weak ~~.!><-.ogcts weakness and strength hegel<> strength, in an artif1cial L inkage, streng~h u~.~tas weakruss TiuJs' an art'{' 'a) 1 L~ is a bargaining conne<.:tion t l1at IS 111 ade JO . lCI' 111Kage

or

. ""'-I:

21!}

invc~t !' , \Vh ., JlCUl the). cotLld prontabk . 'I . t ere to put .K'<'tllnulclting more dollars t 1 l < "> utdis 1 ' ciaJ decision especta.J. . . r c ~ .' w 10 were . thost' dollar~ \\':l'> ~m important nnan ' tal t!\1den<:e that !!'t'llC'nl.tintt th<' lamest dollar surpluses. There ts ~trong Ctl <.:tll tlle atJdi~""'agreed ~park a sizable portion of tJ~err petrodoll.tr:. \.. s .. Treasu ry bills (T-bills) in part because of an explicit Amen.~ proposal k nm,, de a secuntv .i ~ . \.,;) tor um b re11a r tl1e Gulf"IJ ,""'Da,id Spiro notes: .B, tJ1e fou rth quart1r of 1977 Sauui :\.rabia accounted for twen~ percent of a.ll holdings of1 reasut~ untes and bon<.Is bv foreign central banks.'1o~ The Saurus also continued to agree to pric:e oiJ in doll.; ratJler than peg it to a basket of curr~ncies .. A1thouC1h ther~ ~,Lrc dear finan <.:iaJ incenthes for both Saudi decisions, the mcenti,es are not .uffi~tent to explain Saudi actions. The Kuwajtis, for example. never put as m<~~ of thetr petrodollars in the United States. nor as many in T-bills. as did the Saudis . .\loreo,er. an internal U.S. Treasurv studv concluded that the Saudis would ha,e done better if oil had been pegO'ed to a b~ket of currencies tJ1an to dollars. Indeed, OPEC had. c..l ecided in 19-r;) . I ~tJ octo price oil in such a basket. but never follo~ved 1rou~ 1. " ~ men~a s provision of security to tJ1e Saudis was an important, e,en tf not suffic1ent, mgredte nt in persuading the'm both to price oil in doUars and then to park the dollms in the United States. BotJ1 decisions were of considerable economic benefit to the United States. Parkin(T Saudi dollars in T-bills ga,e tJ1e American government 'access to a huge pool of foreiQll capital''; pricing oils in dollars meant that the United States 'cou]d print monev 0 to buy oil. "16 \1ilitary pov.:er bought economic benefits. A third example, again im-ol'<ing the Saudis. concerns tJ1e link between American militaiy protection and the price of oil. The Saudis ha,e a long-tenn economic interest that dictates moderation in oil prices. \\'ith a relatively small population and with the worlds largest pro,en oil reserves, their st:Iateg_v lies in maximizing re,enue from oil over tJ1e long terrn. It is therefore to their advantage to keep tJ1e price of oil hiah enough to earn si7..able profits, but not so high as to encourage imestment in aJtemati,e energy sources. Periodicall}; Saudi Arabia has faced considerable pressure from the price hawks within OPEC to push prices higher than its interest dictate . American military protection has strengthened Saudi willingness to resist tJ1e hawks. A specific instance of this interaction between U.S. protection and Saudi moderation, for example. occurred in the fall of 1980, with the onset of the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq attacked Iran in September, and the two countries proceec..led to bomb one another's oil facilities. The initial stages of the war removed about four million barrels of oil per day from ~orld markets and drove the price of oil to its highest l~e) e"er (842 per barrel).1' As part of their balancing strategy in the Gulf. tl1is tim~ the S~u~ ~ad allied themselves with I raq and, fearing Iranian retaliation agamst their ~il fi~J~. asked for American military intervention to deter Iranian ~cks on. thear oil fields and facilities. The United States responded by sendll1g A\\ACS au-craft to Saudi Arabia and by setting up a joint Saudi-American nanu task fort-e to guard against Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf. 18 In return. the Sau~ increased ~eir oil production from 9. 7 million barrels per day (m bd) to 103 which w~ ~e highest level it could sustain, and kept it there for the next ten months. Saudi actions had a c:onsiderable effec1: on oil prices, as Safran argues:

hand the. 1a s1

t lte

developmcnt ' '

a11

'"'

. . t sent O1pnces s.rv..I l t)- n I ' c va"ng afL<~r tl 1 f: 11 f I l l .n ':'} < e('ision to cutp ~.1 . a o t e: rvuuc.:tion by 1 rnbd.tu
e

kand <l panic that had

this instan<.:e, American mjlit . . . b . a!) po" er alon~: ,.,..as not t:C : nt to cause Sau. lt u<.:t1on~ to lower oiJ pric 'a) es, ut Jt was e . l S [j d . . su'uCie ssenti . tl ;c turbulent pcno< . aut E'C:JSJons on how mucI1 oiJ t hev w Id be<.:au e durl Jilg ,,., , ou pump were not ned solelv 1\ e<.<nomic: factors. True the S d. ....,11 . h au lS, ag , . : dete~" . amst t e de tres of the . hawks. wh1ch md ucled tJ1c Tranians had bee n pumpma mo 1 . ' . . nce P to lower od pn<:e . The Sauws had aJso violated the~ re Ol sm<.-e 19711 in order nrl'h 1979, howe,er, when they decided to cut oil od . . long-term strategy in pr uction b, J mbd . . . h ~ ftu~ ncre . Ppease Iran, a mo' e t at triggered a rapid 1 ase m oil pri Th. pn mank to a ision foUO\\ed a political c..lecision to move wplomati all . <.-es. IS pumpin~ dec c ' awa) fro th Li . . . th s 1 m e n1ted ater. however the (;{)-a'ct 1.thi th States Only a few. mon n e Saudi 1 f: . ull! '" '. mg . between an Amencan- .versus an Arab-onented strateO'V ~as reso1 .ru a c::o amil~ ,ed m o: . _ 1 cl . mplomise that le cl to a po I1tice:u reconciliation with the United St t a es; an th,s politicaJ . h l b c: ll . decision was 10 oweo y anot er to mcrease oiJ productio b , 1 b 1 . n \ m <' startma 1Juk h c: , o l979.zo Berore t he I ran- I raq war, t en, Saudi pumping d ..- . eusJons were affected bv . . . b . . . po)jticaJ calculations a out the1r secuntv, m which the strategJ<:. <:onnection \\1th the .I d . Amencans playe a promment role. If this was true in peacetime , sure'. tt was so . 1. m 1, wartime, too. The ffillJtary protectwn announced bv the :\menr...,n.- 0 n September """.., 30 ' .. . . r 1980 was a necessary conwtion for the Saudi mcrease in oil production th t 1011 ed 0\\ a in October. Agam, mili' tary power had bought an economic benefit. I~ sum. these ... exam.ples~ ... A~erica's ability to run deficits. petrodoUar r.ecycling, an? ~oderat~ oil pn~~s-all illustrate just how penClShe hargairuna ~kages ~~ m mte mational pohtics and specifically how military power can be linked politically to produce them. In all cases, military power was not sufficient. Without it, however, the United States could not have produced the fa,orable economic outcomes it achieved.
As in the other

<..''"' s. i~t

NOTES
aJdwin first ork: 1. David Baldwin. Paradoxes of Power (New Y Blackwell. 1989), 151-02. B olitics :31, 1 developed his argument in his "Power Analysis and \\'orld Politics,.. \l orld P ou. (January 1979), 161-94, which is reprinted in ParadoxesofP -er. . ; Quot~s from BaJdwin, Paradvxes ofPou;er. 134-35, 135. and 136. respero,~lr ln frumess to Baldwin, these examples were not fully de,elopecl but c-onstSt of onl) a

PhysicalJy, the Saudi increase of 0.5 mlxl was hardly enough to make up for the sbo~~ caused by the war. PsychologicaDy, however, the Sauru action was crucial in preventing

sentence or two. 1\evertheless. the, are fair aame bec-ause BaJch,in used them as illus0 trations of his more generaJ point ~ut the limit to the utility of nwitary powe~ The fact that he did not de,elop them further led him astray, in my view. He was ~~o<J to show with them that miutary power is less effective than comm?nl~: ~ou<rht. 1 re.mterpret these examples to show how ,ersatile military power in fact LS. :~\either B~d\\m nor l.howe,er. can put a number on the fungibilif\ of military power, and 1rert~~ ~~ 1 "' th him that no political power resource be~ns to approach the degree of Jungtbilit} . -) . of mone " (Baldwm, Paradoxes of Pou:er. 135 . Baldwi Y 4 hnso The . n, Paradm:es of Power, 134. 135. 133. 5 R yndon Bames Jo . n.l or the facts and interpretation of this case. I have relied on L ork: J969 ~ ~ Y Holt. Rine 1art. Vanta p, . {- C\ ge omt: Perspectives of the Presidency. 1963-

220

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

.. , " p1 l('n S. Ka I P <lrt \' mstou. , ~" . . . . . . d -c rces os a Polilica/lll \ l nJI!I , :\ tl-b in~ton D , ' C.: ) 1 1 17] b' Force \\'itlu111t Wm : U.S. Anm ro -n - 0 ) -18 'Ill(1-1- I if,. ]:>'chard P. Steb ill S anc "'. UIH II ' t I, OCl/ltUmt. ()lt ~ 'U . 1: 13 roo,_..ugs..19 1 '~ ' . I -69 (:--Jew York: Simon & ~< u 1 1972). 292-: . ' 302; t\m('rirrm hm!IJ!.Il Rr>lotrons. 1968 _ 1111es I 11",le~ J968 ' 32-36. and the .\'eu: ),ork 1' . . _9 6. Johnson. 536. K,tplan. - Jo I1nson. 535; Bleclumtn and tJ th' t .... t He has written:" k lualh. am techn 1. tquc of rreeS Wl l IS pOI11 . f 11\\lll. o course, ag \ . lhldwin Econrn11ic . r . Ba c tl 1, 15olanon 1 rom tt. e others Sec David k r 111
,.

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rhe St!ategic Logic ofSuicide rerror1sm

ROBERT A. PAPE

. statccrat wor s poor)Princeton Umverstl) p ress. 1985) 1-t:3 < p . . ton ( nncc . rJt Emst Haas en:n though I am U'>illg it clirf<.rentJy than h r.. Stolecm c . ' 9 1 have borrowed th1s term nom .. . t lescribe tlte effects that cooperctholl 011 t>conornic matter s . 1 llcLSe o c 1tle p1 I' . 1 I . I . does lie uscc :c:. estem Europe could ha~Jle on t.lCIr IIJO .'~t:al . allJOI11s .. I le argued amo~<r the .states of W ons, c atters would spt over mtot 1C'II po llca re at1 indttce . ro . . 1 1 tl that coopcnttion cm economi 111 to lC po Jttca mtcgral!on of Westelll . 1 . and lead ultimatelv . t . ' . ~ e, reater cooperatton t1e1 g E . H .15. Beyond the Nation State: lm1ct1011a IS Ill ane1 Internationa[ Europ~. s.eC' (S~,s~ ..~ st'nford UniversitY Press, J964), 48. For111 aas's later assessment 1 " . Qrunmz.ttl/011 tallJOJU. "' see Emst. Haas, T Je 0 :Jsolescence of,Hegiona/ . 11-o ,,.r errects were rr . e. : . . . ' w h lOW cnecnve sp1 0f1 . '1', (Berke]e,.. fnstitute of IntematJonal Stuches, Umvers1ty of CaUfornia .' [ntegratum ,aeory

lO.

~~;:~;lcy is to be clistinguished from Liquidi~' A.ban.k c~~1.be solvent but not liquid. Liq-

uidity refers to the ability of a bank to meet alltts liab1ht1es upo.n demand. Most .banks are not able to do so if all the demands are c-alled at the same tlme. The reason 1s that man\' assel~ of any given bank are tied up in investments. that cannot be calle~ back on short notice but take time to comert into cash. The fw1coon of a central bank 1s to solve tJ1e liquidity problem of a nation's banking system by providing the liquidity in the short term in order to preYent runs on a bank. 11. As Gilpin put it: "Partially for economic reasons, but more importantly for politi~al and strategic ones. \Vestern Europe (primarily West Germany) and Japan agreed to fmance the Ame1ic:an b<1lance of payments deficit." See Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the M~tltin(lfional Cor7wration: The Political Economy of Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 154. 12. For this example, 1have relied exclusively on David Spiro's original and thorough research. See David E. Spiro, Hegemony Uubound: Petrorlollm- Recycling and the De-Legitimation ofAmericfln Power (lthaca: Gornell University Press, forthcoming). chap. 4. 13. Tbe quote is from an interview conducted by Spiro in Boston in 1984 with a form.er American ambassador to the Middle East. See Spiro, 271. (All page references arc lor the manuscript versiou.) 14. Spiro, 261. 15. Spiro, 263-SG, 281-83.
16. Spiro, 259, 287.

ergin, The Pri:::e: The Epic Quest. for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & 17. Daniel Y Schuster, 1992), 71 1. 18. Nadar Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. J988), 322, 410--U. 19. Safran,41 l. 20. Safnm, 23i.

/ l )itical objectives. I<or examp e, specta<.:ular suicide terrorist attacks 1 rcc:ently 1ave . .. . , 1.. . .. . , po been emp1oyed by P,t estin1an groups. m attempts to for<:e Israel to I)all(.1 thc West a . . on . . . . r an an Bank and Gaza, by the Ltberation T1gers of Tami] Eelam to compel tl1e Sn ... k . government to a<.:<.:ept cu1 lHH.lependenttlTamil homeland, and bv AI Qaeda t0 pressnrc r . d d States to w1t 1 ra"" rom 1e Saudi Arabian Peninsula. Moreover. such ue Unite 1 attacks are increasi ng both in tempo and location. Before the earlv 19ROs suicide terrorism w;:lS rare but not unknown. However, since the attack on ~1 e U.S. ~mbas~Y in Beimt in April 1983, there have been at least 188 separate suicide terrorist attach worldwide, in Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan. Afghanistan, Yemen. Turkey, Russia and the United States. The rate has increased from :31 in the 1930s, to 104 in the 1990s, to 53 in 2000-2001 alone. The tise of suicide terrorism i especially remarkable, given that the total number of terrorist incidents world,,ide fell during the period, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to a low of274 in 1998, ''~th 348 in 2.001. \~~1at accounts for the rise in suicide terrorism, especially. the sharp escalation from the 1990s om.vard? Although terrorism has long been part of international politics, we do not have good explanations for the growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Traditional studies of terrorism tend to treat suicide attack as one of manv ' tactics that terrorists use and so do not shed much light on the recent rise of thi type of attack. The small number of studies addressed exvU<:itly to suidde teiTOrism tend to focus on the irrationality of the act of suicide from the perspective of the ~ndividual attacker. As a result, tl1ey focus on individual motives ~ither re~igiot~s 1 ~doctiination (especially Ishunic Fundamentalism) or psychologJcal predispositions that might drive individual suicide bombers. The first-wave explanations of suicide terrorism were developed during the 1980s and were consistent with the data from that period However. as suicide attacks mounted from the 1990s onward, it has be<..'Orne increasingly e,ident that these initial explanations are insufficient to account for which indhiduals bec_-omc ..,.,tions are increas111al\' . suk'de tenonsts and, more importantly, why terronst orgmu..... 0 1 relying on this form of attack. First, although religious moth-es may matter. modem
1e . ..,
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~ rrodst org<mizations are ill<.:reasi ngly relving on suicide att

ks to ac1. maJor 11eve ac

, 97' No. 3 (August 2003). pp. 34~361 . Copyright 2003 h) T r Amencan . ge .., " '.' , . eprill...,d WltI1 t Iw permission ol.Cam bm1 UIll"- 1..,,..., PrE-SS ation. H w

. m ., :\nunica 11 P> . , .. . . . 1 litiad Science ftqt;ict~. F'rom Ho! . Political Scicuct> As~ >ert A. Pape, 1 he Strat<'gtc Logtc of Swca.le Ter:ons j VoJ

221

'lf\l'f I rJ lE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF

222 PART 2 THE USES OF FORCE

SUICID E TERRORISM

2Z.'l

uu 115 re<:, rnenlalislll. ~~- 1 . 't cl to Islamic Funda . ve e1 d , 111111 e s wc~tlc terronsm 1 not .... . \\' tem media but the world s lea l'r 11 ~ , . ,, terrorism. s . 1 . E) . . 1 . w t 1 most attention m es n~cru 1 ts from ac.'tmtllv the Liberation Tigers ofTamd ~ela.m (LIT ' ~~ gJO:~ \: ,. . onunant 1y H'u1 du rr:a 1niJ [:>opulation m north ern .mdI t.:rlS < n <,n Lank<t a'u1 . ., 1 t Ilt' prec 1 UitS st!Leninist eleme nts. 1 he LIT L a l)JJ( ,I('('OI1 Ior 75 0 r 'd Jogv I1 M <H XJ E as "'hose r eo 101111 1<. a mic Stti<:i<.l e the l86 suicide ten-orist attacks from 1980 to 200 1. 'vcn an_ tIHse ' s 'tl1 secuJar orientations accou nt..for about.a ll urd ,.ol .. . ath<.:k.. . . {' . 1 . . ~ s. attack groups \VI ers . . I. stucly of the personal ch.u.acteJrstics o . Slllll( < <lltac:k . 111.ty . 1 Second, e:tltl wug someda\ help identifY individuals ten-o~t organr7.ations are lrkel) to n<.: ruit ror th b putpo s~, the vast spread of suicide terronsm over the las.t two de<.:ad.cs -;uggestc; that tJ,ere may not be a single profile. Until recently, the leadmg exper ts 111 psy<..:lwlo~k: al J1(' profiles ~f suicide terrori sts characterized tJ1eJ'l1 a5 uneOUCi.lted. U 1l lj110ye u, SOC:iaiJy isolated, single men in tJ1eir late teens and early 2.0s . :"Jow ~ve know that sui<:itle terrOJists can be college educated or uneducated, ~am ed or srngle. men or wome n, socially isolated or integrated, from age 13 to ~ge 4t. In other words , although on I)' a tiny number of people become suicide terron ~ts. they wm~ from a broad cross se<.:tion oflifestyles, and it may be impossible to ptck them out m ad,ance. ln contrast to the first-wave explan ations, this article shows that suicid e terrorism follows a strategic logic. Even if many suicide attacke rs are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups tl1at recruit and direct them are not. Viewed from lhe perspective of the terrorist organization, suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recnJits and financial support. or both. Crenshaw has shown that terrorism is best understood in terms of its strategic function; the same is true for suicide terrorism. In essence, suicide terrorism is an extre me form of what Thomas ScheJling calls "the rationality of irrationality," in which an act that is irrational for individual attackers is meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater attacks are sure to come . As such, mode rn suicide terrorism is analogous to instances of international coercion. For states, air power and economic sanctions are often the prefe rred coercive tools. For terrorist groups, suicide attacks are becoming the coercive instrument of choice. To examine the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, this mticl e collects the universe suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, explains how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of these attacks, and evalu ates the limits on their coercive utility. Five principal findings foUow. First, suicide terrorism is strategic. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by indh~ dual fanatics but, rather, occur in cluste rs as part of a large r campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal. Groups using suicide terro rism consistently announce specific politic.-al goals and stop suicide attacks when those goals have been fully or partially achieved. Second, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democmcies to make significant concessions to national self-determination. In general, ~uicide terrorist campaigns seek to achieve spedfic territorial goals, most often .the Withdrawal of the target state's military forces from what the terroristc; see as national homeland. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya,

,, . de terrorist c,,. JMigll l'rorn I!JKO to 20C)J 1 . IJcrn w I I letS I I . t N sutC lgc< . r, 1 osc nwllt guH ''''" lrc11 lo establish or rtarutarn ~df-d. . 1y tcrrori<.l ev~; . . . . S 0 P w1 C:tc nnrnah :ncrr gro 111 unil)'~ h olltt I. ud hy <:om pcllrng an < ry. to v..rtIJdraw F 1 <Jr for urt rer, <~'<'l'V . I r (.'Otrn rrorist <.;amp tu~ll \lll<:f I~)HO ha.-, hetn hr(lr-t ' per t ' r,'' (;u ag<un.!>l 1;J.lctnat had 'a de e'C ronTI of gov<'l 'l llllt:nt . a~ t:J I soJC ocra . derT1 -rhrd duri ng lllC' past 20 y<ars , sui<.:ick terrorisIll Ila.\ L ll \ I l'l . l)(;:(' . ' ' I cac . lear11cJ tl1at it pays. Suicide t crr()n.sts <,oucrht t 1Ynsing terrorist)) have .,. I1ecause and Fre n<.:h Ill I 1tary rorc:<.:s to abandon 1 cb"nc . u,., ,., C0rnpC'I . an . ~ " m rn 19().> I ~. I ~ ,. . nerrc' A1 1 ' rl(, I .I I . Lebanon in J985, f!->raclr for<:(!') to yuil thc.; Cazt 'St np anu lr<;. rWest or<:c::~ In ' B k . _, k . leave an cl 1995 the Sn Lan an governmen t to create an.111cl ep<.;n(1 Tamil ~l 1n t e:nt .1 ~ ' J99 4 an . g90 on and the rnrkis 1 government to grant autono rny t o t1 K11 in a e:. re rm th . . 1- .1 . ' from l < L . os. Terro nst group s uru not ach reve their full obj'e<:tiVies 111 , ll t11ese: ea-.,(;\ a [T k l late 199 .1 se 'ever' in all but t .1e <.:e:L o m ey, the terrorist politi<:al <.:ause rnaue rnorc garns 1 H0\Y after the resort to su rcrut opera trons. ~1an rt had before .... . J':'ourth although mode rate su1C1de terrorism led to rnc)de rltc concesstcms < . . . . . r these more ambrtious S IIICJO~ terron sl campaigns arE: not likely to achitve ~till greater gains _an~l may well frul_comple tely. lu g~neral, suicide terrorism relies on threat to JnA1ct low to medlllm levels of punrshment on civilians . In otl1 ctrer : the wmstances, thjs level of punishment has rarely caust:d modern nation slate,~ to surrender signifkant politicaJ goals, partly because modern nation states are often willing to countenanc e high wsts !'or high interests and partly because mod<"'m nation states are often able to mitigate civilian costs by makin g economic and other adjustm ents. Suicide terro rism does not change a nation's willjngncss to trade high interests for high costs, but suicide attacks can over<:ome a country's efforts to u1itigate civilian <.:osts. Accordjngly, suicide terrorism may marginally increac;e the punishment that is in1lictetl and so make target nation s somewhat more ukcly to surrender modest goals , but it is unlikely to compel states to abandon important interests related to the physical security or national wealth of the state. \ ational govern ments have in fad responded aggressively to ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns in recent years, events which confir m these expectation . Finally, the most promising way to contain suicide terrorism i~ to redut.i:' terrorists' confid ence in their abUity to carry out such attacks on the target ~i~t) . States that face persistent suicid e terrorism should recognize that neither oflenst,e military action nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should in\'est signincant resources in borde r deff:mses anu other means of homeland security.

THE LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

..uted 10 d Most SU1<:1 e terrorism is undertake n as a strategiC e (-r rt di r"'.. towrrd achie\ing ' parti<:uIar po] goals; it is not simply the prod uct ot. ational indi"iduals or an h . . rrr tt1cal . 1 . exprcsS o f f:anatical hatreds. The mrun purpose of SUIc'de terron. sm ts to use t, e atl ion ' 1 threat 0f punishment to coerc e a target aovernment to clange pohc' especr th to . . .. . 't . terromb ne'' as eJI o t'ause d xh'b't tendeodes J! emO<.:ratic states to withdraw forces from tem O homela d TJ from 19(JO to 2001 e . t ' s I a1c 0 1e record of suicide terrorism n . ~ t with tl us stratey';c 0 "" 1n th t' e mmg, goals , and targets of attack that are con 15 en

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o' hut not ,,;th imtlionaI or f. t'1caI be I1avior (1 ) timin r. w ,trf -:e ' '11Cid< atta<:k nna s (1(.xur in Of%Ulized . coherent camprugns. 11 ot as i olatcd c,r r o ' ' h. t'uned inc:i. dt~nt~. :2' na/ ionali.~t ![oals- uicide terrorist campru~L a ~' ~r ded at gain in . I t tl g con t m I o f " ' ta tc terron t ee as tLeir national homeland w rl to"' . specific:tll''at < tjediug foreiPn fcJrce from that territo~: and (3 > l~lrf!et \,. ~ ',m-RIJ sui~ide

two decades ha,e been rutned ,,+ O . lOt'racics wl, h . f . , lt: ' f'rom t1 terrons ts' po111t o vtew make tnore suitable targets 1e

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Defining Suicide Terrorism

Terrorism imolves the use of \iolence b~ an organization o~1er than a national ao,'emment to eau e intimidation or fear amon~ a taraet audience. Although one: Z-ould broaden the definition of terrorism so as to include the action of a national govemment to c:ause terror among an opposing_ population. adopting s~ch a broad definition would wstract attention from what poucy makers would most lJke to kl1ow: how to combat the threat posed by subnational groups to state security. Flllthcr, it c ;ould also create analytic confusion. Terrorist organiz..~~ions and state govemments have different levels of resources, [ace different kinds of incenti\'eS, and are susceptible to different t)pes of pressures. Accordingly, the determinants of their behavior are not likely to be the same and. thus. require separate theoretical investigations. In gen~raJ, terrorism has two pwposes-to gain . upp01ters and to coerce opponento;. .\lfost terrorism seeks both goals to some extent, often ailning to affect enemv ' c;alculations while sim ultaneously mobilizing support for the terrorists cause and, in some cases, even gaining cU1 edge over rival groups in the same social movement. However, there are tracle-offs between these objectives and terr01ists can strike various balances between them. These choices represent different fonns of terrorism, the most important of which are demonstrative, destructive, and suicide terrorism. Denwn.s1ratit;e terrorism is directed mainly at gaining publicity, for any or all oftluee reasons: to recruit more activists, to gain atten tion to grievances from soft~ Jjners on the other side, and to gain attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side. Croups that emphasize ordinary, demonstrative terrorism include the Orange Volunteers (Northern Ireland), National Liberation Arm)' (Columbia), and Red Brigades (Italy). Hostage talong. airline hijacking, and explosions announced in advance are generally intended to use the possibility of harm to bring issues to the atten tion of the target audience. In these cases, terrorists often avoid doing serious harm so as not to undermine sympathy for the political cause. Brian Jenkins captures the essence of demonstrative terrorism with his well-known remark, 'Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Destructive terrorism is more aggressive, seeking to coerce opponents as well as mobilize support for the cause. Destructive terrorists seek to inflict real harm on members of the target audience at the risk of losing sympathy for tl1eir c:ause. Exa(:tly huw groups strike the balance between harm and sympathy depends on ~e nature ~f the political goal. For instance, the Baader-Meinhoft group selecj tive)y assassmated rich German industrialists which alienated certain segments 0 German society but not others. Palestinian t~rrorists in the 1970s often sough~ to kiJJ ac; many lsrctelis as possible, fully alienating Jewish society but still evoking

cl SUf\1\'e a m ison an often emlJio,s a method of attack that requ,res tbe attack d ' . . 51 eed (such as plantmg a <:ar born b. wearing a su cl ers eath m ortler to succ . . JCI e vest or ram . . into a building). ln essence, a suicide terrorist kill h ' nuna an cur. . d pIane iciJls himse lf. 1n pnnc1pI s e. suici e terrorists coultl b ot ers rat the sarn c ti me d th the a 1, . cl . ses or could be UJnttc to targeted assassinations 1e use . 10r demonstrati\'e . . Purpo f' k . I kill . n practice. howe\'e . cide terrorists o ten see Simp y to the largest number of o le r. su~. ximizes the coerci"e Je,erage that c:an be gained from terr ~ P . .does:\lthough tlu ma; I b . f r on lt arP.atest cost tot 1e a.s1 o support 10r the terrorist cause \taxi m. . h o at the s . ~; --1= h . I . . mlZlna t e number . f enemy killed auenates t lose m t 1e target audience who might be svrnpathetic to o I il . . . ... tbe teJ TOJists cause, w 1 e t 1e act of su1c1de creates a debate and oft~u loss of su _ -fals .p port among moderate1segments of the terrorists' communitv even 1 o attracting 1 . . support among radica e ements. Thus, while coercion is an element in all terr . . . onsm. coercion is the paramount objective o f suicide terrorism.

" . 0 C loll'l . -;de terron slll :s ti1e most acrgressive form arC"tw;ts. . S c f u1 . o erronsm . 1 . t the expense ol CJSillg suppo rt among the terra . , . purs,un~ c.-oercion e,e~ a 15 hes il suicide terrorist is that the attacker doe nst own tornmunitv. \\11at d'st'ngu s not expect t0 . 1

, from ~l u'h .1 <:CJn muni tie . Other g10 In ilt ups t 1 e 1 . 1al 11 P ~'~ include the Jr:o;h Hepuhlic:an Arm\' the R . . mp tastze destn1cti . rronsJTl ' I . ,, e\ o1 utJona ,\ '~ te b1 (FARC . at.'l t 11! umcteen th-centurv :\n I . ~armed Forc-e of

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225

The Coercive Logic of Suicide Terrorism

At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy. The central logic of this strategy is simple: Suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to oYetwbelm their interest in resisting the terrorists demands and, so, to cause either the uo,emm to concede or the population to revolt against the ao,emment. The common ent feature of all suicide terrorist campaigns is that they inflict punishment on the opposing society, either directly by killing civilians or indirectly by killing militruy personnel in circumstances that cannot lead to meanjnaful battlefield \ictory. As we shall see, suicide terrorism is rarely a one time e\ent but often occurs in a series of suicide attacks. As such, suicide terrorism generates coercive leveraae both from the immediate panic associated vvith each attack and from the risk of chilian punishment in the future. Suicide terrorism does not occur in the same circumstances as military ~er cion used by states, and these stmctural differences help to e:\'}Jiain the logic of th_e strategy. In virtually all instances of international military coercion, the coercer 15 the stronger state and the target is the weaker state; otJleiWJ.se. th e eoercer would . 1 l'ke1 be deterred or simply unable erations 1 Y to execute the th reateneu nn'liteary 0 ? In tll ese ctrcumstances c:oercers . . h have a cl1mce bel...reen hl~''0 main coerCl\'e strate ' or gies, punishment and denial. Punishment seeks to coerce bYnust~g the costslis . risks t0 th 1. ,.. ' e target society to a level that overwtle 1 the 'cuue of the mterests U1 t ms . . 1. pute D . erual seeks to coerce bv demonstrating to tbe target state that 1t s1mp \('nish . t a can61 not . Win the dispute regardless"of its level ofefJiort. . d therefore g 1ting oth n .I=san IS po I l th bilitr to conquer e w mt ess-for example because the coercer 1as e a b t the" puted t . , . 'ti'all , rely on pums men . . erntory. Hence, although coercers ma~ U1l )

states and some have been strong enough to wage guernll a nllll~<:ll y campaigns as well as terrOJism, none have been strong enough to have senous prospects of achieving their poutical goals by conquest. The suicide len:olist group with the most significant militaJ} capacity l~a'i been the LITE.' hut_ 1t h_as not had a real prospect of controU ing the whole o( the homeland that tt clan11s , mcluding Eastern <Uld Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka. As a result, the only coercive strategy available to suicide terrorists is punishment. Although the element of''suicide'' is novel and the pain inflicte d on civilians is often spectacular and gruesome, the heart of' the strategy of suicide terrorism is the same as the coercive logic used by states when they employ ai1 power or economic sanctions to punish an adversary: to cause mounting civilian costs to overwhelm the target state's interest in the issue in dispute and so to cause it to concede the terrmists' political demands. What creates the coercive leverage is not so much actual damage as the expectation of future damage. Targets may be economic or political, miJitruy or civilian , but in aUcases the main task is less to destroy the spe cific targets than to convince the opposing society that they are vulnerable to more attacks in the future. These features also make suicide terrorism convenient for retaliation, a tit-for-tat interaction that generally occurs between terrorists and the defending government (Crenshaw 1981)... . Suicide terrorists' willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks rue generally more destru ctive than other terrorist attacks. An attacker who is willing to die is much more likely to accomplish the mission and to cause maximum damage to the target. Suicide attackers can conceal w~pons on their own bodies and make last-minute adjustments more easily than ordinary terrorists. They are also better able to infiltrate heavily guarded targets because they do not need escape plans or rescue teams. Suicide attackers are also able t~ use ~rtain especially destructive tactics such as wearing "suicide vests'' and r~mm g veludes into targets. The 188 suicide terrmist attacks fiom 1980 to 200l ~edan average of 13 people each, not counting the unusuaU large numbe r of fataly Ities on ~eptember 11 and also not counting the attackers themselves. DuriJlg UH:l same penod, there were about 4,155 total terrorist incide nts worldwide, which killed 3 207 ~le (also excluding September 11), or less than one person per incident. Overall , from l980 to 2001, suicide attacks amount to 3% of all terrorist attacks but accoun t for 48% of total cl th d . ea s ue to terronsm, agam exclud ing Septem bet 11

t.'tlt.n h~t\ e lhe resour ces to create <1 (onnidabk !! treat to clctt tht oppon nt . in b~lttlt"' :md, if necessaJY. to achicvc a brute force milihu; ' 1 i.c ~, if lhC:' larg~~c:~ory t.'rnme nt ~''-'fuse s to thu~ge its hehador. Tlte Allied boJHhi 11 L. uf CC'rlllany in w ~v0 . . . ' . l"t' \\.u ll AmelicanbombingofNorth Vletnamln 1979 Gm< I ( 'l.llto n atlac:ks t " 11d -. ' 'gcltnst lruq in 1991 all Rt this pattem. Suicide terrorisn1 (and terrorism in genera l). occurs Hnder the revc rse stn, .. tuntl conditions. In suicide terrorism, tbe c~er~e.'."'s.tl~e w~~tk~~. actor and the targ~t is the stronger. Al though s?me _element~.?J th ~. sltuab~n ~ ( 111 _<~m. tl~~ ~arne, flipping the stronger and weake r stdes m a coeJclve_c.hspute has 1 <_lr,unatJc change on the relative feasibility of pu nishme nt and dental. f 11 th ese Cl rct~ 11 lstanc:es. denial io,; imi)OSsible because miJHaJ" conquest is ruled out by relat1ve weakn ess. Eve ' I . I) though some groups using suicide tenorism IHtvc receive~t1mp~>~ant su pport froll)

- '-'\J\UKJSM

227

suiddt : t l ,MC an especially c:onVJnc: secoOd, . .. . . mg way to si 1 h . . ain to wnw ' ~,. '>lll<:tde 1tst:lf 1s a costly l>. a] gna t e hkelil1ood of m~rek~rs coukl not !t..\ 1)ctn tleterrcd by a threat or':stl' ~.:; t~a~ suggtsts that the attac onsor suicidt' ai:ta('k~ can also deliberate[)' hy aliation. Organizations 0 re estratc . . the : tl1at sp the death o f' '' sw<.:HJe attacker to increase furth d ~lrcumstances ilfO\Jnks This can he callccl the " art of martyrdom." The er e~ctations of future: rtac . f .. . . a . ..;005 on lhe basrs o rchgtous or ideolooical,noti more swc1de t erron-;ts JUShfv tl tl eJr acu . b' ves lat match tl b I. r: ' . 1 ader national cmnm t mity, tire more the status of terrorist ma r . 1e e u~rs of a bro ore plausible it Le<.:nmcs that others wiU foUow in their f, trty 5 IS e~~ated. and t1 m 1e .. . nizations common 1 <.:u 1 . y hvate ..sacnficial myths" that.oo steps. Smctde terror. ist orga. k . . . me1 1 e1 Uue aborate t f bols and rituals to mar < mdiv1dual attacker's death m 'b . se so sym k ' r "1" 1 r a . . n Suicide altac.: ers am11 a so o ten receive mateJiaas e <.:ontnb ution to the es lI cl th f ntl tJO . . . .1 f war S 0 rist orgamzat1ons anu rom other supporters. As a result tl1e rt f rom the terro th . . a o martvrdom elicits popular supp01~ from e t~rronsts community, reducing the moral b~klash that suicide attacks rmght otherw1se produce, and so establishes the foundation for credible signals of more atta<.:ks to come. Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorists to increase e~ectations about escala~ng future_costs by deliberately ,iolating nonns in the use of VJolen~e. Th~~ can do tlus by crossmg thresholds of damage, by breaching taboos wncerrung legJhmate targets , and by broadeningrecmitment to confound ex'Pectations about limits on the number of possible terrorists. The element of suicide itself helps increase tl1e credibility of future attacks , because it suggests that attackers cannot be deterred. Altl1ough tl1e capture aJ'ld conviction of Timothy McVeigh crave reason for some confidence that others with similar political views micrbt be deterred. the deaths of the Septem ber 11 hijacke rs did not, because .Americans "vvould have to ex'Pec1: that future Al Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.

The Record of Suicide Terrorism, 1980 to 2001

To characterize the nature of suicide terrOJism, tllis study identified eve':suicide terrorist attack from 1980 to 2001 that could be found in Lexis l\exis' on-line database of world news media. Examination of the universe shows that suicide terrorism hac; three properties that are consistent with the above strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior: (1) timing -nearl y all suicide attacks occur in organized, coh~r~nt campaigns, not as isolated or randomly timed incidents; (2) nationalist goals- stuctd.e terroris t campaigns are directe d at gaining conhol of what the ter,rorists see as .theJr national homeland territOJ y, specifically at ejecting foreign forces tram that temtOt)': and (3) target selection-all suicide terrorist campaigns in the last t\\o decades h_a,~ been aimed at democracies which make more suitable trugets from the terronsts ' pomt of' VJew. Nationalist movements that face non clemocrabc opponents have not resoJted to suicide attack as a mecms of coercion.

Timing. As 1: bl 'd a e l indkates there have been 188 separate sutci e t erro Jist attacks bet\veen 1980 and 2001. or' tl1ese 179 or 95%, were parts of orgru1ized. coheredisn' camt h paig , , ns, w ile only nine were isolated or random events. Seven separate putes

22

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I" V~''-'-

TABLE I SUICIDE TERRORJST CAMPAIGNS, I 98G-200 I t's No cff-~ --::--- ..... N~o~. Terrorist Tenons Allad.s Date Ki lled Target

fl \Pf I THE STRATEGIC lOGIC O F SUICIDE TERRORISM

--~------- ----.:.._ completed Campaigns

1. Apr-Dec

Group

Goal

Behavior

Hezboliah Hezbollah Hezbollah

1983 2. Nov 1983Apr 1985 3. June 1985June 1986

4. July 199GNov 1994 S.Apr 1995Oct2000 6. Apr 1994

LTIE LTTE Hamas

u.s.!France out of Lebanon Israel out of Lebanon Israel out of Lebanon security zone Sri Lanka accept Tamil state Sri Lanka accept Tamil state Israel out of Palestine Israel out of Palestine

6
6
16

384
96

Complete Withdrawal P artial Withdrawal No change

179

14

164

Negotiations No change Partial Withdrawal Gaza Panial withdrawal from West Bank No change Hamas leader released No change No change

54

629 15

7. Od 1994Aug 1995

Hamas

65

8. Feb-Mar 1996 9. Mar-Sept 1997 10. June-Od 1996 11 . Mar-Aug 1999

Hamas Hamas PKK PKK

Retaliation for Israeli assassination Israel out of Palestine Turkey accept Kurd autonomy Turkey release jailed leader

4
3

58

24
17

3
6

Ongojng Campaigns, as of
December 200 I
12. 199613.2000Rebels 14. 2000Rebels 15. 200116. 2000-

AI Qaeda Chechnen Kashmir LTIE Several

Total incidents No. of

188
179

U.S. out of Saudi Peninsula Russia out of Chechnya India out ef Kashmir Sri Lanka accept Tamil state Israel out of Palestine

5
4

3,329

TBD' TBD TBD TBD TBD

53 45
51
177

3 6
39

d Ie tO suicidl 1 t !Sl C~u npaiJ;ns: thc t)resen. 0 f Allltn. I1<1,e Lehanon -.1 't t c><.:<.: 11pal1on o f \Vest Bank ,, <:e (' c.:an and French r cc>S I 11 k . nnt1 .>Ct7.<t. the . d ,or .1 regions of ~_ 1. J ..111 a, the: tnucpcndent:e of tl , K ' . tn ependc:nce: of 1e Tatn' . ll . occupatt.OII (l r c1 1mya, lntltan O<.:<.:upatiOJl KK llrd,sh regHm 0 rTllrk(:y we r as I1mt.r . , tl . d 1 ' 1ussranrican forces on l IH' Satl th. Aral>ian Peninsula o ll h an tc presence rAl11e distinct campatgns. IJccausc in certain disp 0tV<.:ra ' owever. tI1erc have .. o 16 b en . . u 1C: . e d operation ~ Oltt or more lllll<:s either in .re" es t1 terro nstc; eIccted to uspen f I .ponc;c: to C:On <;c , r 5 ., 50 ns. Eleven o t tC' campaigns have ended and fi . ther rec... \ e were on sston~ orf tor . 0 d 1 2001 The atta<.:ks comprising each campaign '""' : gorng as o the o "'re organized b t en. st group (or, somctinrcs. a set of e:ooperating group . . Yt.lc: same ten on ) l . ) s ,ts m t1e onf1otna 1 .t ntifada" in l snte 1 a estme . <.:1 !I 11stcred in time publicall . . d. :> '"' sec:onu 1 'J' . .1 1 1di cl . ' YJUSti 11e m terms of a specified politi:e:u goa , a1 . ree:te agrunst targets related to that goal. :c. The most 1mportant mdicator of the strategic orientation of ... d . . . . f' .. .. . e itning of the suspens1 o campatgns, whJch most oft<::n SUJC:t . terronsts rs on occ 1 d tl1e t . . . I "' 1" . . 1 . . .. urs a mc dectswn by edc e1s o the terronst organ 17_at 1ons that r rtl )ase on ks stf<ateo . . u 1er attac be counteqJrotluctJve to the1r e:oer<.:ive purposes -for in~n"e . wOuld . .. m response to full or par~1al c~nccs~10ns b~ the. ta.rget state t~ the terrorists' political ~oals. Such suspensions ar: often ~cc~mpa n1ed by public explanations that justify tlle decision to opt for a cease-fire. Further, the terrorist organizations discipline is usually fairly good: althou~h there are exceptions, sue:h announced cease-fires usually do stick for a period of months at least, normally until the terrorist leaders take a new strategic decision to resume in pursuit of goals not achieYed in the earUer campaign. This pattern indicates that both te1Torist leaders and their recruits are sensitive to the coercive value of the attacks. As an example of' a suicide campaign , consider Hamas's suicide attacks in l99.5 to compel Israel to withdraw from tovms in the West Bank. Harnas leaders tleliberately withheld attacking during the spring and early summer in order to give PLO negotiations with Israel an opportunity to finalize a withdrawal. However, when in early July, Hamas leaders came to believe that Israel was backsliding and dela~incr withdrawal, Hamas launched a series of suicide attacks. Israel accelerated the pace of its withdrawal, after which Hamas ended the campaign .... If suicide terrorism were mainly irrational or even disorganized. we wOtJd expect a much diffe rent pattern in which either political goals were not art~<.:ulated (e.g., references in news reports to "rogue" attacks) or the stated goals.'a.ned considerably even within the same conflict. We would also expect the timmg ~o be either random or, perhaps, event-driven, in response to particularly pro,ocath:e or infuriating actions by the other side, but little if at all relat~d to the progress of negotiatio ns over issues in dispute that the terrotists want to mfluence.
J..Jl<:l " ,

229

campaigns No. isolated

Source: Robert Pape '11le u . . mOlicago, l}'pescrjj>t. mverse of SUicide Terrorist Attacks worldwide, 198D-200 1.. universitY

~==~----------------~~

Nationalist Goals. . SW<:tde terrorism is a high-cos t strategy. one tl1at ':vou11 011 1. make stratemc sense for l ) o . agroup when h1gh mterests are at stake and , even tllen, . . a last re ort. The reason lS . . . as U YnPnse lat sutC'ide terrmism maximizes coercive le"en1ge at the e,.r- . of support among . h th e the tenonsts own commun 1 . ity and so can be sust,Uile<I over. time on ~\ w en Tbe 'ts er alread the potential poo1o1 recru1 YeXISts a high degree of commitment among d f ts J1 omeiand Jnost tmportant goal that a commun ity can have lS tl1e mdepen ence o 1

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r'F I THE. STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUIQDE TE

.:.:::::::_:_::.._::::_::::=~=-:=:....:..:..:==-_:_------

TABLE 2

MOTIV ATION AND TARGETS OF SUICID E TERRO RJST C \ , 1fAIGNS 198Q

Homeland Region Dispu te

Lebanon. 1983-86 West Bank! Gaza. 1994Tamils in Sri Lanka. 1990Kurds in Turkey, 1990s Chechnya, 2000Kashmir, 2000Saudi Peninsula. 1996-

'

-2oo ,

Status
U.S./F/IDF military presence IDF military presence SL military presence Turkey military presence Russia military presence Indian military presence u.s. military presence

Terrorist Goal
U.S./F/IDF w1thdravval IDF withdrawal SL withdrawal Turkey withdrawal Russian withdrawal Indian withdrawal U.S. withdrawal

iar gct a Democracy..,

Ye> Yes Yes (1950) Yes (1 983) Yes (1993) Yes Yes

(population , property. and way oflife_) from foreign inAue n~e or co~1trol: As a result, a strc~.tegy of suicide terrorism is most I~ kely to he us~d to c~dne ,e nationalist g~als. su<.:h as gaining control of what the te:ronsts see a<;. the1r national homeland ternto ry and expelling foreign military forces from that terntory. In fac.t, every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2001 has had as a major objectiveor as its central objective c-oercing a foreign govem ment that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out. Table 2 summalizes the disputes that have engendered suicide terrmist campaigns. Since 1980, there has not been a suicide terrorist campaign directed mainly against domestic opponents or against foreign opponents who did not have military forces .in the terrmists homeland. Although attacks against civilians are often the most salient to Western observers, actually every suicide terrorist campaign in the past two decades has included attacks directly against the foreign military forces in d1e count ry, and most have been waged by guerrilla organizations that also use more conventional methods of attack against those forces. Even A1 Qaeda fits this pattem. Although Saudi Arabia is not unde r Ameiican military occupation per se and the terrorists have political objectives against the Saudi regime and others, one major objective of Al Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Saudi Peninsula and there have been attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama Bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabi a. To be sure, tl1ere is a major debate among Islamists over the morality of suicide attacks, but within Sauru Arabia there is little de?ate.over AI Qaeda's objection to American forces in the region and over 95% of Saudi soc1ety reportedly agrees with Bin Laden on this matte r. . Still, ~ven if s~icid e terrorism follows a strategic logic, could some suicide ter:o~ lSt camprugns be trrational in the sense that they are being waged for unrealis~c goals? .The an~er is tha~ some suicide terrorist groups have not been .real.istic 10 ~xpe<.~mg the full concesstons demanded of the targe t, but this is normal for disputes mvolvmg overlapping nationalist claims and even for coercive attempts in general

the arnbitiora~ ,r noris t leaders art: realic;ti .. {i<~ther, . two oJists, IJO Jl,, l' < r n:,. .f not therr methods <.: rn r. other senses. First . . I t de ten arc 01ten , sutct rs realize; thLJ g~ nerally reflect quite tom .more mainstream th bserve I f" t1 . mon strrught f, an o f d tennination c .L rn o ICtr comm unity. Seco d th - orward nationalist s~l - et suprJoJ for tlwir policy goals versus the h n t. ese groups often havt: si(Tt ruficafl . < e same as t IJU'>~ oI" otl1er nationalists .vitl rgetl state ' goals that are t\nic:alo . lv rnueh th . d " . . , ' the terron sts an more moderate" leadenn 1etr corn muntty. DtiTerences . all between ain level of violence and-s omet imes -the rs usu y coneern th e usefulness legt 0 f a cert< tmacyof . ets besides foreign troops in the country, suth as' att ks. 1ttaclG ngadditiona] ' tar~ st third parties and civiLans. Thus, it is not that thac 10 ~ther <.:ountries or aga~n I and then seek ot ters , support. Rather, the terrorist e terronsts pursue radical . goals th vthem 1 ;,. societies who are e most optimistic about thesarestmp1 embers of. ' u1e.u use fulness of v 1 r achieving goals ~hat many, and .often most, support. 'IO ence lO r The behav1or of Hamas tllustrates the point. Hamas t . h raeli retaliation t hat 1 been tostly for Palestinians erronsm as .provoked 1as whl [s . . 1 f b t . ' Ie appare ntly unrealJStJC-goa o a o 1shmg the state of Israel. Althoupursmng etheh ro state establishlnC1 an Arab b d in all of "b.istoric Palestine" may be poo g PPal P .~c; of ~ Id . bl . . . r, most estimans agree that 1t wou e esrra e tf poss1b l~. Hamas's terrorist violence was in fact car~~y calculated ~nd ~ntro~ed. In A~.ril 1994, as its first suicide c-ampaign was begmrung, Ham~ leade~s e:'Plamed that martyrdom operations" would be used to achjeve intermediate objectives, such as Israeli withdrawal from the 'Nest Bank and Gaza, while the final objective of creating an Islamic state from the Jordan lliver to the Mediterranean may require other forms of armed resistance.

RRORJSM

231

Democracies as the Targets.

Suicide terrotism is more likely to be employed against states \\itl1 democratic political systems than authoritarian govemments for several reasons. First, democracies are often thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive punishment. Domestic critics and international rivals , as well as terrorists, often view democracies as "soft,- usually on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy. Even if there is little evidence that democracies are easier to coerce than otl1er regime types , tllis image of democracy matters. Sinte terrorists can inflict only moderate damage in comparison to even small interstate \\h terrorars, ism can be expected to coerce only if the target state is viewed as especially vulnerable to punishment. Second, suicide tenorism is a tool of the weak, which means that, regardless of how much punishment the terrorists inflict . the target state almost always hac; the capacity to retaliate \vith far more extreme punishment or e,en by exterminating the terrOtists' comm unity. Accordingly, suic.ide teJTOrists must ~ot onl)' have high interests at stake , they must also be confident that their opponent \~rill be ~t least somewhat restrained. \1\th.ile there are infamous exceptions, democracles ~a"e - n geneldUY been more restrained in their use of force agru.nst Cl\ilians at least .smce . . World War II. Final ly, suicitle attacks may also be harder to organize or pub~cwtha~n authontarian poli "hili. 'ce states, although tl1ese poss1 ties are"eakened b, tbe fact t we-ak auth ontan an states are also not targets. h b d mocIn f:act, the target state clern SUIClCle campaign as d a .e .. een of evei)' mo racv Th U . . r ,.. ' e ruted States, Fran ce, Israel , India, Sn. ~.J<U1ka Turke, an Russia were

J!j~

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

; 'F.. I iHE STRATEGIC LOGIC 0

F SUICIDE TERROR!

'I 1 1 1 "' (> < 15 :u (. t'lllOt'nll'l('$ W lel tll")' ,vtJ 1ttackcd b) suicide ll'JTo! i~.;l c.l'llJ1 a;rr1 ' ('V(;Il 1-l thowrh the la.st three became dcmocracres more rccerlll) I h 111 t 11 ' <llwr-; .. .. ... t trtddlc Turkev and Iraq. illustrate tl1 l)cJiltl t1 1 .-11 .. I( at IC:Jt T l1' 1:'\.UJ'dS. W 1 ]1 :S < liC tt' lTOJi. t carnpaigns are more likely to be targ~ted. ~tgal!l~t d(~IIIOer:n<.:ies lh<tn . . .w ll1011'tanan reg'ul1es. A1LI1<)llgh rraq has been far 11101 ( bn 11 .tl [I)\\ md Its Kill'( ['1s I1 . J popu Iat 1011 tl l<ll1 Ilas -nl11-ke)', vi<)lent Kunlish 'gr<)llps l1aV<' mPd sni<.:idc 'lttat ks . . y -~anst 'c . excIusl\re 1 an< 1 c]e 1110c1-.(1t1 Turkey and not al!<11r1St the aut hontana11 rc1, 1111 <.' 11 1 . ~-> lraq. There are plenty of national groups Ltvmg llll~N < lllthontanan regirnPs With ~rie,ances that could possibly inspire suicide terron sm. bill non<: ha,e. Thus. tlw fact that rebels have resorted to this strategy on I)' when they fa<.:<' the mo re suitabl< type of target counts against arguments th~t st~icidc tcrroric; m is a nonstrat<gic: response, motivated mainly by fanaticism or trrabonal hatreds.
.1 '
L

,J

TERRORISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

The main ree:Lson that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that te rrorists have leanwd from the experience of 1980s and 1990s are not, for tJ1e most part, products of wilueyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reac;onable assessments of the outcomes of suicide terrorist campaigns during lhis period. T<> understand bow terrorists groups have ac;sessecl the effectiveness of suic:iclr terrorism requires tJ1ree tasks: (J ) explanation of appropriate standards for evaluating the effectiveness of coercion from the standpoint of coercers; (2) analysis of' the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns that have ended as of 2001 to determine how frequently target states made concessions that were, or at least could have been, interpreted as due to suicide attack; and (3) dose analysis of terrorists' learning from particular campaigns. Because some analysts see suicide terrorism as fundamentally irrationaL it is important to assess whether tJ1e lessons that the ten-01ists drew were reasonable conclusions from the record. The crucial cases are the Ham as and Islamic: Jihad campaigns against Israel during the 1990s, because they are most frequently cited ac; aimed at unreallstic goals and therefore as basically irrational.

JfCSSIII'( '.rdlcss of whether that . coerClve { PIE:ssur<! is L the no..nic hard' l or otlwr hnJes of costs H . . k eco ". . . n . . owever fr m lne form ofJ,ves.at os ' rcer the ke' q I''>Lon IS whether a partkula .. OJn the perl>pt<:tive of "' coe effective t-1 . st . olf~ 1<lll ,1It 1rnat1ve methods of inA r e:ocrc1ve r.tte~ promises to . . . I,e morencreased ) effort . Th1s 1s cspe<.:ially true ~ uenc:e and so, warrants c:ontin( . 0r t erronsts wh0 h d or J I cl . u~ ed to a particular goa a11 so W illing to exhaust viJtuaJI are 1 e:omghly m1tt . bandoning it. Tn tlds search for an effec:tive st t y any alternativt rather t}lan a ' . . . ra egy, CO<!r . . . likely to be lar~ely a f undwn of est1mates of the succ:ess of c:ers assessments a:de terrorists, th1s means assess ments of whether p t ..~,ast efforts; for sui. as S UICJuc c:a1n cl e significant concessiOns. patgns prod duce . .. lance at the b e hav10r or sutc:tdc terrorists re . 1 h Ag 'ea s t at s ch t . rr l10 ds are_ i~portant ~n their calculations. AJI11of th:cle-on_s between alternative met ons that have resmted to suJc:H.le terronsm began the' . f orgamtl r..a . . . . tr e:oercJ\'C e forts ,.._ith re conventional guet n 11a operattons, nonsuicide terrorism 0 b th b O 11 ez ollah m . '} 1 l p rJ mas Jslamtc f11ac, t 1e KK , t I1e LITE and AJ Qaetla all, r clocl . na . .. . . .' use cmonstrative and destrucbve ~1eans ol vJOienc_e long before resorting to suicide attack. lndeed. looking at the_ tra~ectOJy of te~Tonst groups ov~r time, there is a tlistinct element of eA-perunentatwn m th e technt~ues and strategtes used by thesE:: groups and distinct movement toward those techn1ques and strategies that produce the mo t effect. Al Qaeda actuall~.prides_ itself for a.~ommitmen t to even tactical learning over timethe infamous terronst .~11anual stresses at numerous points the importanc:e of wtiting "lessons learned memoranda tJ1at can be shared with other members to improve the effectiveness of future attacks ....

SM

233

The Apparent Success of Suicide Terrorism

Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists' political cause about half the time. As Table 1 shows, of the 11 suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed du.rincr 1980-2001, six closely correlate with significant poucy changes by the target state toward the te rrorists' major political goals. In one case, the terrorists territorial goals were fully achieved (Hezbollah v. US/F, 1983); in tJ1ree cases, the terro1ists territorial aims were partly achieved (Hezbollah ,.. Israel. 1983-85: Hmnas ,.. Israel, 1994; and Hamas v. Israel, 1994-95); in one case. the target crovernment entered into sovereignty negotiations with the terrorists (LTIE ,._ Sri Lanka, 1993-94); and in one case, the terrorist organization's top leader was released from prison (Hamas v. Israel, 1997). F ive campaigns did not lead to noticeable conces. SJons (Hezbollah ,s second effmt against Israel m Le banon, 19::: "6 a Hamas camo.:.r-o , paign in 1996 retaliatinO' for an Israeli assassination: the LTf E ,._ Sri ~ka. 1995-2002; and both PKK campaigns). Coercive success is so rare that _even a ~0% sur . "'cess rate is signific<m t because internatJOna1 mili'tat) . and economtc coercJOn. . us h ' ks 1 tl1. 11 a third of the t1me. ' mg t e same standards as above, generally wor ess " 980s and Th . cl to "'run m the 1 ere were limits to what suicide terronsm appeare eo . 'n<t interests 1 11 0 990s. Most of the gains for the terrorists' cause were modest. not m'o ' .all . _ <'ent a] .it] t r tothe target countries secuJity or welll l. an cl mos were potenti :' re' oca . c 1 poliC\ ble. F tJ . . . . elati\'elr nunor 10re gn , . or l e Umteu States and France, Lebanon was a~ [ rv) 1 to 1997 were mterest 1srae l's apparent concessions to t1 P I sti mans rom 1-.,on 1e a e

Standards of Assessment
Terrorists, like other people, learn from experience. Since the main purpose of suicide terrorism is coercion, the learning that is Hkely to have the greatest impact on terrorists' future behavior is the lessons that they have drawn from past campaigns about the coercive effectiveness of suicide attack. Most analyses of coercion focus on the decision making of target states, largd)' to determine their vulnerability to various coercive pressures. The analysis here, how~~er, seek.s to determine why terrorist coercers are increasingly attracte? W a specfic c.-oerciVe strategy. For this purpose, we must develop a new set of standards. because assessing the value of coercive pressure for the coercer is not the same problem as assessing its impact on the target. f From the perspective of a target state, the key question is whether the value 0 UJe L'Oncession that the coercer is demanding is greater than the costs imposed by


2~l4

_,. .

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

lor('( s

PI I THE STRATEGIC LOGIC

securitv bufTer zone along the soutJ1em edg~ of the c;~)IIJ1t.r: 101 <llll~L hcr 15 years f rom w'1 1 a second HeziJoiJaJ1 stLicide terronst <:cllllJ><llgn fmiPc.l to dsloclue it 1.1 uc 1 . . t'1 1e Sri Lmkan uove mment did conduct appa rentl y senou. ncgotiallc with the 1:TTF ms from Nove J~be r 1994 to Ap1ill995, but did not <:Oncede th: Taut il's main dernanci c . uove . 10r md epen denC"", . ... and since 1995, the r: mment has prefe necl to prosecute tl e war rathe r than consider permitting Ta.rml secesson. . Still, these six concessions, or at least apparent conc<.ss1ons. lwlp to explain whv suici de terrorism is on the rise. In three of the ~ases , the target gove rnment po~cy changes are clearly due to coercive pressure from the. terrorist ~roup. The American and French withdrawal was perhaps the most clea r-cut cocrc1ve su<:<.:es~ for suicide terrorism. In his memoirs, Pres ident Honald Heagan explained the U.S. decision to with draw from Lebanon:
The price we

fr0111 ) of Caz.1 and the \\'es.t Ba~k and released Sheikh Yas in dt,::- 1c same P<;~~ Israelis ttlemcnt in the occupied territoties aJn~ost dou blt d :tllt! r <t'lll C\e nts have sl1own that L racl is not cletened from sending for<:c h~t~k m wlw 11 rlt>ce ~say. 1n two disputes. the tenorists a<:hieved initial su<:ccss l ~nt frult:d ~~ ~\...11 greater goals Alth ough Israel \\ithdrew from mu<:h of Lebanon m June l\-J~:), t rl'lained a six- rlil~ 1

mort ' modest than the, micrbt appc;u. Altho11gh Isrcwl with drc" .ts

.\ ' d 1994, Ham as began a . lsra~ J to the J Jt'b~o \1l'iSac.re. Afte r two atta<:ks lsenels of suic:ide hornbincr . latton , srae dedd d 't/> m 1m: h wac, regu r\hdrawal fro m G.a ' ired under the Oslo A(J e to a<:celerate its ,v:~ b n delayed. Ha rn:1~ l hen suspended attacks ~ c, . reement but whj h Iad ee 9- I I ( cl or nve month F c I 4 to Augu st 19 .?. amas an Islamic.- Jihad ) earned out s. rorn Oc:toher 199 '"' gainst Israel. h ~cptember 1995 Israel ag d a total of se\'en suic:ide ttacr--' " ' ree a. t Bank town s that Dece mbe r, whkh it earlier had to withdraw from certain 1 . d could \\es Apri l 1996 at 1 c r t 1c ~oonest. Hamas then suspend d rume not be done beore I gn durin g the ast week of. February and first e attac:ks until . retaliation k f Its caJ11PaJ . . M atch 1997, Hamas began a suicide attack campwee o ~are; h 19(\6 Fmally. ai th~t . , 111 bo t every two months until September 1997 In res gn m~luded a u . h ponse 1sraeh Pri an attack . . tan)1ahu autl1 onzed t e assassination of a Hamas d Tl me\['tn1ster \ 1 er. le attem .e r .. ,' ] d h 1 I ea man. Jord an. wue o an t e srae 1 agents were captu d , Pl , .m .Am I Sh ikh Ah re . t O ~et them b k Israel agreed to re e~e e m.ed Y assin. spiritual leader of \\a~. 'd . rule tl1.iS was .not a conceSSIOn to the terro nsts' territorial goals , the . d b. . , . . re lS no amas mterprete t IS m an) way different from the standard evl . ence that . . H . vle" that tlus release was the prod uct o f Amencan and Jordanian pressure ....

r concessio n~.

OF SUlCI DE TEAA

* "';..

o~M

'

2~

Hamas

had to pay in Beirut w~ so great; the tracredy at the barrac~ was so enormous.... \-\le had to puJJ out . . .. \Ve couldn t stay there and 11111 the nsk of another

THE UMITS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Despite suicide terrorists' reasons for confidence in the coerche effectiveness of t!Us strategy, there. are sharp limits to what suicide terrorism is Likely to accomplish iJ1 the future. Dun ng the 1980s and 1990s. terrorist leaders learned that moderate punishme nt often leads to moderate concessions and so concluded that more ambitious suicide campaigns wou ld lead to greater political gains. Howe,er, toda,-'s more ambitious suicide te rrorist campaigns are likely to fail. Although suicide t;rrorism is somewhat more effective than ordinary coerche punishment usina air power or econ omic sanctions, it is not drastically so.

suicide attack on tJ1e Marines.

The IDF withdrawal from most of southern Leb anon in 1985 and the Sri Lankan governme nt decision to hold nego tiations with the LTIE were also widely understood to be a direct result of the coercive punishment imposed by HezboUah and LITE respecti\'ely. 1n both cases , the concessions follO\.ved perio ds in which d1e terrorists had turned more and more to suicide attacks , but since Hezbollal1 and the LITE employed a c:ombination of suicide attack and conventional attack on their opponents, one can question the relative weight of suici de attack in coercing these target states. However, there is little question in eithe r case that punisbmen t pressures inflicted by these terro rist organizations were decisive in the outcomes. For instance. as a candidate in the Novem ber 9, 1994 , pres idential election of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratw1ga explicitly asked for a mandate to redraw boundaries so as to appease the Tamils in their de mand for a separate homeland in the island's north east provil1ces, often saying, "vVe defi nitely hope to begin discu ssions \\ith the TamiJ people, with their represen tativ es-i ncluding the Tigers- and offer them political solutions to end the war ... (invo lvi ng] extensi,'e devolution." This would, Kumaratunga said, "cre ate an enviJonment in which people could live without fear. The other three concessions, or argu able concessions, are less clear-cut. All three involve llamas campaigns against Israel. Not counting the ongoing seco~d intifada, Harnas waged four separate suicide attac k cam paigns agai nst Israel. 10 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. One, in 1996, did not correspond with Israeli conces 51005 'T'L: _ of 1 J.Jw; campaign was announce d as retaliation for Israe l's assas sination ' Hamas leader; no particular coercive goal was annou need , and it was suspended .b~ Hamas after four attacks in two weeks. The othe r thre e all do correspond w,th

Suicide Terrorism Is Unlikely to Achieve Ambitious Goals

In intern ation al military coercion, threats to inflict military defeat often generate more coercive leve rage than punishment. Punishment, u ing anything short of nuclear weapons, is a relativelv weak coercive strateg)' because modem nation st-ates generally will acce pt lugh costs rather than abandon important national goals, while mod em administ rative techniques and economic adju tments on'r time often allow state s to minimize civilian costs. The most punishing air attacks ''ith conventional munitions in history were the American B-29 rai~ ag~t Japan 's 62 largest cities from March to August HMS. Although the e nuds killed nearly 800,000 Japa nese ci\il ians -almost 10% died on the first da~ the ~tare~~ 9 1945 flre-bombing ofTokvo whic h killed o,er 85,()()()-the cou,entional bom mg ~d not.~mpel the Japa nese to su rrender. diffi ult than for Sutcide terrorism makes adjustment to reduce damage more . c -ect states fa"".J 'th . ,L "'"-u V.'l militruv coercion or econon11c saneti.ons Howe,er it does not aill . uae target state s intere~ts in the issues at stake. As a result. suicide terro nsm can
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dest goals. such <L'i ''~thdr, \'.,d fro 111 t<~r. cocr<'e :>tates to abandon limited ~r ' no eJ.s case in J994 ~utd 199.t:;. 1 tu nr)ort nt()ry . . . or as tn 1sra < 1)' a11d of 1 strategc unportance ow rtant area. However sus~,; Id<.' l<>rro . . a1 . cl ~ ~' fJ ., more nnpo p< uti \\1t1 Ja\\ dJ ro11 ~ l I al5 central to t h<'l.r we;;Jth nr "~'<:ruitv s nsn 1 is I .k 1 t to aban<. on go uc 1 as. un lJ e y to cause targc s d .-.' the economic pro peels of tJw , ,,\I( or strencrl) .u loss of territorv that woul " (::ii.J\en n I Lit . the rivals of the state. .. 1111 t more effective than in ill t<'rncttio 11 . . Suicide terrorism makes purus1 en . ., . 1 . . . . ' 11lntl. . . . . riJJiJ g to counten,tnC( htg 1 cost~ ror llnpori 1tan: coerc1on. Targets rematn " 1 .. cl' . <lt tl ' . . . omic or rmUtarv a jiiStmcnt:, to pt cvent suic'1 l . . . .k I . goals. but admmJstratJve, econ l < 11 e ) tu be deterred h .1 . . d attackers themseh es ,u c u n attack are harder. w h1e sU ICl e . . l'k I . ~ Y . . Accordingl)' su 1c1de attack ts 1 e ' to pH sent a thn~at 0f tl1e threat of ret 1anon. al . . . . . . 1 .ted c ,.,,....0 } . Junishment that the target go' em ment cannot co,n continumg LmJ 'J\ < ': . . p IeteIv eIumna te, . d tlle upJJer bound on what punishment can ge:un for c:oerccrs an . . 1 .. .s recogru'zably 1 . 1 . 1 1 terrorism than 111 mternationa lntlitcuv cocrc:11J1 ' 1 ug11er 11 su c dal . . . r. The data 0 11 suicide tenorism from 1980 to 2001 support th1s condu. ioJJ. 'While suicide ten orism has achieved modest or very limited goals, it has so far failed to compel target democracies to abandon goals central t~ national.wealtl. or securitv. When the United States withdre'v from Lebanon m 1984, 1t had no import~nt security, economic, or e,en i~eoJogical interests at stak~. Lebanon was J araelv a humanitarian mission and not v1 ewed as central to tl1e national welfare of 0 tJ 1 United States. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon in June 19R.5 but e remained in a security buffer on the edge of southern Lebanon for more than a ' decade afterward, despite the fact tbat 17 of 22 suic:ide attacks occurred in J98.5 and 1986. Israel's withd rawals from Gaza and the 'Nest Bank in 1994 and 1995 occurred at the same time that settlements increased and did littJe to hinder the JDF's return. and so these concessions were more modest than they may appear. Sri Lanka has suffered more casualties from suicide attack than Israel but has not acc-eded to demands that it surrender part of its national territory. Thus, tJ1e logit of punishment and the record of suicide terrorism suggests tl1at, unless suicide terrorists acquire far more destructive technologies, suicide attacks for more ambi tious goals are likely to fail and will continue to provoke more aggressive military responses.
<

POUCY IMPUCATIONS FOR CONTAINING SUICIDE TERRORISM

While the rise in suicide terrorism and the reasons behind it seem daunting, there are important policy lessons to learn. The current policy debate is misguided. Offensive military action or c:oncessions alone rarely work for long. For 0.'er 20 years, the g?vemments of Israel and other states targeted by suicide terrons.rn have engaged m extensive military efforts to kill, isolate, and jail suicide terr?n t leade~ ~d operati~~ sometimes with the help of quite good surveillanc.:e of th~ terro~. commumties. Thus far, they have met \\~th meager success. Althoug ~~n of ~de terrorist organizations can disrupt their operations t~m porarily, at rarely ~'lelds long-term gains. Of the 11 major suicide terrorist camp<Ugns

that 1 p decapilatic,n . lwn tire leader in Turki h ur <:y-<lid so as a result r I aders 11 cl I l . . , s <:ustoclv ask d h. o e So far, lea er-. ''P c <:e.apttatlon Ita<; also not ended' <.; ~ follower<; to stoJ~ogh the U nittd ~~ ,,tc~ suc:ce~sfully toppled the Talib~n ~aeda's <.:arnpaign. Al mber 200] ' A] Q ,teda laum:h~d scvtn SU(;(;essful . . :u In Afghanistan in 1 1 oec:e t December 2002. killing some 2.50 \Vesterr1 c ~~~ <: e terrori!>t attacks fro 1n l An o JVJ 1ans n . h . I~ before September 11 , 2001 , <.:ornbined. ore t an 1n the three 5 yearconcessions are also not a simpie answer. Con<.: . that are w1c1e1 beId t I)e terronsts, <.:ornrnunit esslonsdto natio nat1St gne'v m .. ances .~ k' . y can re uce pop 1 , ~ rther terrorism, ma mg 1t more dj fficult to re<.:ruit . . u ar support ~or uoving the standing of more moderate nationalist el'tnew t~UI<:Jd~ attack<;rs and 1<:::s wno are 1n c.:o ru-t' . 1mpr I I 0. t1 the terrorists. Sue 1 )ene11ts can be realiz~d howev:. m~---dtion 1 r t he <:once . ,,, 1 11 .F h ' .. r, on "J reallYdo substantia y satls y t e nationalist or self-detennination . . . SSions . aspirations of a large fraction of the communih'. . . Partial, incremental, or dehberately staggered con<:ession . th . d ut over a substantial period of time are likely to become thew~ t atflare raggt:u th o . . . ~ . rs o JO worlds. Incremental co~promdselm.ay app~ar-or eastly be portra~ed-to the terrorists' community as s1mply e <l)1ng tactics and, thus, mav fail to reduc . . . h h . . , e. or actuall, . net JJl crease the1r distrust t at t etr ma.Jn concerns will e,er be 1 . Furth er. . merementalism provides time and opportunity for the terrorists to intentionalh- pro,oke the target state in hopes of derailing the smooth progress of negotiated compromise in the short term, so tbat they can reradicalize their own communitY and actually escalate their efforts toward even greater gains in the long term. Thus. states that are willing to make concessions should do so in a single step if at all po ible. Advocates of concessions should also recognize that. e,en if they are successful in undermining the terrorist leaders' base of support. almost any con<:ession at all ,,;11 tend to encourage the terrorist leaders further about their O\\ll coerci\'e effectiveness. Thus, even in the aftermath of a real settlement \\ith the opposing community, some terrorists will remain moti,ated to continue attacks and. for the medium term, may be able to do so, which in tenn ,,ould put a premium on combining concessions \vith other solutions. Given the limits of offense and of concessions, homeland security and defensive efforts generally must be a core part of any solutjon. Cndermining the feasibility of suicide terrorism is a difficult task. After all. a major advantaae of uicide attack is that it is more difficult to prevent than other ~pes of attack How<:'\er. the difficulty of achieving perfect security should not keep us from taking serio~ measures to pre,ent would-be terrorists from easiJy entering their target ooe~. :\s Chaim Kaufmann has shown even intense ethnic ci,iJ wars can often be topped by demographic separation because it greatly reduces botl1 means and incenthee for the sides to attack each other. This logic may apply \\ith even more force to ~h related pro bl em of SUICtde terronsm, smce, ror swc1de attlckers oainina ph, 1cal . . c ::: . e a<.'C-ess to the general area of the target is the only genuinel) deman~ng.part ~f anal operation, and as we ha\e seen, resentment of c occur. rore1gn . nation of their naoon homeland is a key part of the motive for suicide terrorism. hie d The requirements for demographic separation depend on geogralp ban f othe . . r ctrcumstances that may not be attainab Ie lll all c-ases For e~np e, muc o

f.~( I .1d ended <Le; o :.:

1 '

LOGIC OF . SUICIDE TERRORISM

I
'tn

~ <Jnc-the: PKK versus T k

2.17

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

l~r:.kl's difficult\' in cont;.tining suicide te rr01is m d er iq_s f', op, tl11 dt'<'l)l. 1111 ( ' I"J))" . ' . e!'t ~'tttlt'lllt'nt p<lttems of the \ V Uan k and Gaza. which m ; I- t! ... dfe<:tive Ien 'X<u 11 > anlf .' <f tlw border between Palestinian and Jewish settled <tre;>a~ pr tdic<i.l~~ infinite

nndcred even ,ery intensive' Israeli border control c.fforl i 1" 'lccthc. As a r/~<tv(' tenitmial concessions could well encourage tcrronst lladrrs lo ~trive li>r s~~~t, tiH greater gains while greater repression may on~: exacerb~tt< _ <o,t<.litions or 0 ~~~dl pation that cultivate more recruits for terronst organtz;.ttlons. f nstcad tl , 1<.: u. course to improve Israel's securi ty may ,.vell be a com bill<~d st:ategy: al;w,:~-o nli<:;~~ .:ally se para((s ll g tenitorv on the \!Vest Bank along with an actual wall that physH IC . . . populations. Similarly, if A1 Qaeda proves able to <.:ontmue s:uc1~lc attacks against lht American homeland, the United States should emphasm:' lmp rmi ng its domestit: security. In the short term , the United States should adopt stronger border c:on. trois to make it more difflcuJt for suicide attackers to entE'r the United States. In the long term, the United States should wo~k toward e~1ergy in~ependent: e anu, thus, reduce the need for American troops 111 the Persian Gulf countries where their presence has helped recruit suicide terrorists to attack Ame rica. These Jneusures will not provide a perfect solution, but they may make it far more difficult lor AI Qaeda to contin ue attacks in the United States, especially spectaeular attat:ks . that require elaborate coordination. Perhaps most impmtant, the close association hetween foreign militaJ)' oct:upations and the growth of suicide terrorist move ments in th e occupied regions should give pause to those "vho favor solutions that involve conquering countries in order to transfonn their political systems. Conquering countri es may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but it is important to recognize that o<.:eupation of more <:.'Ountries may well increase the number of terrorists coming at us.
1

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear Instability in South Asia
SCOTT D. SAGAN

The emerging .n~clear histo?' o~ India and Pakistan strongly supports the pessimistic predictions of orgaruzahonal theorists. Military organizational beha,ior has led to serious problems in meeting all three requirements for stable nuclear deterrence-prevention of preventive war during periods of transition when one side has a temporary advantage, the development of survivable second-strike forces, and avoidance of accidental nuclear war.... These problems have now appeared in India and Pakistan. It should be acknowledged from the start that there are impmtant differences between the nuclear relationship emerging between India and Pakistan and the cold war system that developed over time between the United State and the Soviet Union. While the differences are clear, however, the significance of these differences is not. For example, the nuclear arsenals in South Asia are, and are likel~ to remain. much smaller and less sophisticated than were the U.S. and So\.iet <trsenals. This should make each arsenal both more vulnerable to a cow1terforce attack (an attack y on the adversa1 's own nuclear fo rces) i.illd less capable of mounting ~ounterfo~ attacks, and thus the net effect is uncertain. There are also imp01tant differences tn civil-military relations in the two cases, but these differences, too. are both stabilizing and potentially destabilizing. The Soviets and the Americans both e,entually de,e~ oped an "assertive" command system with tiaht high-level civilian control OYer therr 0 trol of the ;J nuclear weapons. Also India has an extreme system of assertive Cl\ mn ron military, with (at least until recently) very little direct military influence on any <tspect . Of nucIear weapons policy Pakistan however, 1S at the otller end of the spectrum, . a1 ' ""th the military in complete control of the nuc1 arsent , and \\~th onh- margm. .. ' ear al "' l ods when there "as a 1 " R m uence from civilian political leaders, even during t le pen
enneth ~- ~raltz. . b'' Scott D. Sagan and K From h l r sed b'' penlUSSlOU of T e Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Reneu;cd ' ~~-\~ l08. Copyright 2003, 1995 by W. \V. Norton & Company. ne. Norton & Company l nc 239
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SAGAN I NUCLEAR INSTABiliTY . . IN SOUTH ASIA

I 'cl . 1 aJry but held no disputed tern tory l>ch\ ecrr tlwrn and ha 1 seatec ' eo1 o~ca rw tl ' L 11() . lust01y of anneJ v101 . a,:,' . eac1 o wr. . . . . ence u:tinst 1 cndunng . , There is also, however. a crucia!Jy lmportant s."n~l~u .'l) he l\.v~en llw 111ll'ltar conditions that existed in c:old war and those thal ex tst. rn Sou tit t\ sr;t loduy. 111 hot it e;ases, the parochial interests and routine behaviors of the nrgar ti:t,ations that manage nuclear weapons Jjmit the stabil ity of ~ucJcar ~ete rrence. Tlw newest nu~.:lear weapons will not make exactly the same nustakes wtth J.ltc.: lc'ar wcapon:-; as uid llrcir supet}')Ower predecessors. They are. however, also unlrkely lo. mc:~l wtth complc 0 t succ.:ess in the difficult effort to control these weapons an cl n rarntam r111c:l ear pra(;c.

b d There are. Rnnllv. in port t chilian-kcl KOV(' t1lll1ent rn Js ama a til I :1, 1 1k1 1 1 1 cli!'l(: '.. 11 C:t~s in .. ~ 1 ) ' 1ra n t <:o ' 1 lllutualundcrstnm ing, proxmrr'ty ' tnd hos rty rJUJ c\ am . I . I rrrrno 11 . slrt colonial and prc-colonial J1rstory, 1 some common. cu turt1 rouh .urcl ' n . < <:orn. rave I I cl 11 1 four wars ag..unsl c'a<.1 ol ll'r.. md ar(' r rnu11 border; they also have engage . .. . .. '""rrlvtd . a . 1 t r.('t v . . r=spute about the status ofKuslt11111. Jn ~.:orrt. '1. tire Arn<>ri rn vro en 11 -vcc.r UJ . I I I ..:<u,\ . "' te sides of the globe arrc1vW\\'Ct <'il<.' r nl wr a-. rnvst<.: . ancI Sovtels were on opposr " ,. ... . : nous. r. ' orten unpre d'ret abl e adversr,es The cold war SUJJe l}JOW< ,., we rc 111\(Jhcd Il l I clctp. ." . . 1

THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTIVE WAR

Pakistan has been under clire<.t military rule for almost half of its existence, anc..l so111e analysts have argued that the organizational hiases of its military leaders had strong effects on strategic decisions concerning the initiation and c:onclu<.:t of the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. In contrast, Inclia has a sustained tradition of strict civilian control over the military sinc.-e its independence. These patterns of civil-military relations influence nuclear weapons doc:tri.ne and operations. In India, the rn ilit~uy has traclitionaJJy not been involved in decisions conceming nuclear testing, design, or even command and control. In Pakistan, the military largely runs the nuclear weapons program; even during the periods in which civiLian prime ministe rs have held the reins of government, they have neither been told the fuU detai ls of the nuclear weapons program nor been given direct control over the operational arsenal. An organizational theory lens suggests that it is ve1 f()Jtunate that it was I nclia, y not Pakistan, that was the first to develop nuclear weapons in South Asia. Military ruJe in lslamabad (and military influence during periods of civi lian rule) cmtainly has played an important role in Pakistani decision making conce rn ing the use of forc:e (see the discussion of the Kargil conflict below). But the Pakistani military did not possess nuclear weapons before India tested in I 974, and th us was not in a position to argue that preventive war now was bette r than war later after India developed a rudimentary arsenal. . The preventive war problem in South Asia is a complex one, however, and new ~VJdence. suggests that miutary influence in India produced serious risks of preventive war m the 1980s, despite strong institutionalized civilian control. The govemment of ~rim~ Minister Indira Gandhi considered, but then rejected, plans to attack Pakistan s Kahuta nudear facility in the early 1980s, a preventive attack plan tha~ was recommended hy senior Indian military leaders. Yet, cl<> occurred in clw Uruted States, the preferences of senior officers did not suddenly change when

, . Ie , ders ru led .tcr,dn~;t prrvt nlive war. fnstead th e be1 we t cl . jjafl el . refs cJVI su rface latN 111 a poter ttla11 1nore dangero r y n un e r~ou nd lvto re . . , 1,. . h us orm. , on J These belrcls c>nH. !,< t llOHl l c shad<>ws dUJingthe 1 98~- .. . us crisis bc~r in lat< 191:>6wlrcn the l ndian u . 1 Brasstac:ks" crisis .5 seno . . ~ m rtan.rnit' t ..1 l11 . cse in Haja~tlran ruvolvnrg an esti mat...l 9 - ruv. 1 ra cu a ma.'isrv<: tnil. T . exet 1 . v U - J0 ,V\A) trOQ 5 d rt<U: di g tbe issmtn<.:<: of lr\'c ammun ition to troops and . I ,,,P an. l.\)00 tanks, . do n -offensive,. atl.tC: k, . IUUJng Indian '' . ur me: Air Fore eonc: uumg \VJLh a sunulated ,.. .k . ..counter r e . militar)' r earin~ tI1at tI1 exerc:ise micrht tu s,.n es' mto Pakistan. The e . m m to a 1 _ c:a1 , arg PaJ<ishUll e c I 1njlHal)' for<:es a11cl concluc:tt:d exerc.:ise;:s along the 1 .1 wh'rc:h led to attack, alertet )Qruer r t . counter-rnoven1<:nls c1oser to the border and a . ne ran nilital)' n operational 1nd A' 1 alert The resulting c:Iisis produc.;ed a flunv or dip! . . . ran rr Force ' omatic aetiVJtv and . only after direct intervention by the highest political th . . ' was resoIved . . . au onties. The traditJOnal explimatwn for th e Bra<;staeks crisis hac; b . t. . . . . . . ,cl 1 I) k' . . .. ' ec" tnat Jt dental cnSJS, e;,w se Jy . . .<~ 1stan s mJsmternretation of . . l was an accr . t' an mal \'<:'rte;:ntlv t 1 . 1 : Ocative Indwn Army exert lse. For example' Devin Hagerty's dear cu e:xamrprov .. .. .. " . . . . .. , nation of Ne"v Delh1 s rn t~nhons m conductmg Brasstac.;ks concludes that "India's conduct of '_norr:1al' ex~r~1~e~ ra_ng alarm .?ell~ in Pa~istan; subsequent!~. the logic of the secunty eWe m mcl str u<.:tur ed both stdes behavror, with each interpretin the other's defensive moves..as prepara~.o~s for ?ffe?sive action. ' A stronger mqJanation, however, unpacks New Delh1s mtentions to look at what diFferent Indjan decision makers in the capital wanted to do before and during the crisis. The key is to understand the preventive-war tbinkincr of the then-l ndian chief of the Army Staff, General Krishnaswami Sw1darji. Sundarji apparently belie,ed that India's security would be greatly eroded by Pakistani development of a usable nuclear arsenal and th us deliberately designed the Brasstacks exerci e in hopes of provoking a Pakistani military response. He hoped that this would then provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingenc~ plans to go on the offensive against Pakistan and to take out its nuclear program in a preventive sttike. According to the memoirs of Ueutenant General P. )J. Hoon. the commander in chief of the Western Army dming Brass tacks: Brasstacks was no militar)' exercise. It was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth".~ \\~th Pakistan. And what is even more shocki11g is that the Prime Minister. Mr. RaJ1' ' Gandhi, was not aware of these plans for war. -L . "' I Tl1e preventive war motivation behin d SWlU<UJlS pans l1e 1) to explain why ~ . :

241

the Indian militmy <.lid not provide full notification of the exercise to the P~~stam t1 t11en c 1 to use the specml 1 tme to exp1 tl1etr operttions 'vhen mfonna. 1ot an rcu ed run ' tion was requested by Pakistan durincr the crisis. A final piece of eddence_c?nfimls tllat sundarji advocated a preventive 0 stnke agcunst Pakishan during the cnSJS. Con h sitlerations of an attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities went all the way up to t e most senior decision makers in New Delhi in January 19 7: . . 1 [Pnme Minister] Raji\ [Gandhi ] now consrdered the po~s'b'litv that Pakistan might t t and General initiate war \\~th India. In a meeting wit11 a handful of semobr blurealll~: sa preemptive S d .. aki t the draw ,. aunc UJ c:> un arjt, he c:ontemplated beating P stan cl d. cl autornaticalk an attack 1 attack on the Arrny Resetve South. This would ha,:e ~' ~ ; k:i'stani nucle~r riposte to on Pakistan's nucl~ar fadlities to remove the potentral or a a

SAGAN I NUCLEAR INSTAB

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ILITY IN SOUTH

lndia' attack. Hclcvant ( I ' ic\\ to the discu!)sion. Sun <trJ argu clear one) but. upou " .. . . k ( perI taps a nu ' Pa~;stan i countcrattac the Mimstty of l)c>l< nst f . I I Jsor 1om how. One inlportan l ~l eIV 1 tl1 1 hst wtr tn<J t 1 r 'India and Paldstan have already ,oug lt e r ' ' '. 1 . Tl . ew ultimatcl)' preval c . contemplating anotIwr one . 1tSVI

tJ., cies were not < . . . . govenuneot age1 ed that I nth a~ (.'Jtl\ ' r ' d ..

11 l

-1 . -.ces J~norPig thl IJk<'ly iJll,m\tiorla rca<.:tion . I < .. seque.. . . ant tlu pre::di<.:tat I con c conscqutncr ~ n ! ,l,t lllliJtary ifltllrl>ion i 1 d . r 'I llr<; ol.tltt K nJ n la, howe:'E:r. pr<wed to L ) e . } I .I mesll t factor Ill lH '' . Jinat< w uO . oe a arg1 operation. . . . .. . . ific<Hl stgfl . crJd the P,tktstutt \rllt} ,dso started the: Clpc ti ra on With ll , sec) > lt appar<:nt 1elicf1 m <: C1 the lo1'1 of ,vhal kLs IH< tailed the "stt)]t . 1 1 Y.1 mstabl t\ "' n r UoWJOn .. ~I/ parad.ox"-that a rO bl ' nuclear balan<:e ht:Lwc<n fndia and Paki sta n Pl:!lrrllt tcd 111 . 1 sta e
I

ASIA

24:1

THE KARGIL CONFUCT AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

. m1s ts canno t accept tll' t the Brasstacks crisis rnay haw been a delil)cratc . " 0 p t1 . 1 JU . . k a prevel. t,ve attack' but they m1ght be rcassured by the final c t attempt to spar The PO"'Cr or . "' .. . . . . . 11 come, as sensor pol't'e;a] Jeaders stepped in to stop further .c~calabon. nc e to Prevent war 111 South As1a, optnTI I!its ms1st. .has been dc1 >n . . nucIear cle ten-enc scnssJons in 1984; lht: strated in repeated crises: the In<.lian preventtve attack d1 Brasstacks clisis; and the 1.990 Kashmir crisis. "There .is no '.nore ironclad law in t . tional relations theory than this," Devin Hage rtys deta1led study conclnues ' "2 m ema 1 "nuclear states do not fight wars with each ot 1er. In the spring and summer of 19~9, howev~r, one year af~er the exchange of nuclear tests, India and Pakistan did fight a war m tl1e mountams along the line of control separating the portions of Kashmir_ controlled by each c~unt~, near the Indian town of Kargil. The conflict began m May, when the Indian mtelligencc services discovered what appeared to be Paldstani regular forces lodged in mountain redoubts on the Indian side of the line of control. For almost two months, Indian Army units attacked the Pakistani forces and Indian Air Force jets bombed their bases high in the Himalayan peaks. Although the Indian forces carefully stayed on their side of the line of control in Kashmir, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee informed the U.S. government that he might have to order attaeks into Pakistan. U.S. spy sateUites revealed that Indian tanks and heavy artillery were being prepared for a counter-offensive in Rajasthan. The fighting ended in July, when Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Wa<;hington and, after receiving "political cover" in the form of statement that President Bill Clinton would "take a personal interest" in resolving the Kashmir proble m, pledged to withdraw forces to the Pakistanj side of the une of control. Over one thousand Indian and Pakistani soldiers died in the conflict, and Sharifs decision to pull out was one of the major causes of the coup that overthrew his regime in October 1999. The 1999 Kargil conflict is disturbing not only because it demonstrates tha~ nuclear-armed states can fight wars, but also because the organizational biases ol the Pakistani military were a major cause of the conflict. Moreover, such biases continue to exist and could play a role in starting crises in the future. This increases ~he .dangers of both a preventive and preemptive stlike if war is considered meVItabJe, as well as the risk of a deliberate but limited use of nuclear weapons 011 ' ' the battlefield. Three puzzling aspects of the Kargil conflict are understanda ble from an org~ nizationaJ perspective. First, in late 1998, the Pakistani military planned the Katg~l ~=ttO much more attention as organization theory would prewc ' . ~ oper on, paymg the tactical effec:ts of the surprise mili~ maneuver than to the broader strategtc

0r( ()ffcnsive 1 mpt111ty m Kasl1 111ir. It is r place wtt 11 I nportant to tt( l . tl . h . . 11 I . coons ..>.c.; J)' scntor m1litary of'Rcers tL ore strongly he: l a 1 l1\1h lat t L 1s bf'licf I , ta \. vas rnle at the heigJt of t I1c: r Itting near Karml Pak nan. w an C:<t(ters. For 1g ' . ~ n1 f rmv le J . a ' . . .. exafnP I : . a c n. statt:u that 15 almost a red ale1t SJtnatJOit , hut they nev'-rth e ess JO\t~l <.l " h ... t11ere ce of the KargiJ conAict lcadi ng to a f11 11-lledged wa b.. . e t ere is r,o r chvecn th<: hvo s'd .. ~ ~ SI r eh3J1 " I . . , I es. A] though Pnme Mmlst<::r ."" ~~vvaz . I an apparently approved. the >I ant 0 . ss the line of control, 1t IS not clear that he was fully bri r 1 I tl move for<.:es eec on le nature . r h ac:ro scope. . potential consequences o t e operation. The r rime ministe , t 1 . rs s atemenl that he ., d . I l Ol . ear as "tnring to avo1c nuc fuiJ war an. . h1s sw:ruestion that he fe' d 'th India was at are tn I h w: .r . h tting ready to launc a -sea e m1 tary operation aP"ainst Pakistan.. pro\lu: adcar 1 o .1. f'd ge . COn trast to the con1 ent mutary assessment that there was ,'l.rttt ll v no ne;k 0f an a ' bldian counterattack or escalation to nuclear war. arV.I Thjrd, th~ curre~ t ~akistani military government's interpretation of the K crisis, at least m pubhc, IS that Nawaz ShariJ lost courage and hacked down unn~ essarily. This view is not widely shared hy Pakistani scholars and journalists, but such a "stab in the back" tJ1esis does se1ve the parochial self-interests of the Pakistani army, which does not want to acknowledge its errors or those of the current ~lusharraf regime. The New Delhi govemment's interpretation, howe\er, is that the Indian threats that miJitary esc;alation-a cou nterattack across the international border-wou ld be ordered, if necessary, forced Pakistan to retreat. These different "lessons learned" could produce ominous outcomes in future cri e :each side believes that the Kargil conflict proved that if its government di plays resolve and threatens to escalate to new levels of violence, the other ide "ill exhibit restrrunt and back away from the brink. Future military crises between India and Pakistan are likely to be nuclear crL~es. Proliferation optimjsts are not concerned about this likelihood, howe\'er. sinc.-e they argue that the danger of preventive war, if it ever existed at alL has be~n euminated by the developmen t of deliverable nuclear weapons in both c~~ntrt~s after May 1998. The problem of preventive war during petiods of transttion m . South Asia is only of ltistorical interest now, optimists would insist. 1 am not convinced by this argument for t\vo basic reason First there 1~ an arms race looming on the hotiwn in South Asia. The Incuan government has vven strong support to the Bush administration's plans to develop missile Je(ense tecl.tn~l. . . . ogy alld I1as expressed mterest m eventuaIIy p10cunng OJ. devclopin<r its own. mtssile . . c defense capahility. I believe that the Indian nuclear program i strongly mRu~~ced by the fact that hawkish nuclear policies are popular among Indian .voters an lUSd China i . ukelv to respon li . . seJVe tl . I d . . b CiaJlS. le uomestic political interests of Indian po ncre b . 1 1.una the st7..e an dc to th U nent . ' J: e .S. decision to build national missile eLenses ~ 1 thelnwan go\em readiJ . . less of its own missiJe force. This will in tu m encourage 1 op to mere . 1ts own missile deployment-; an d <.eve1 defense technol()g\. ' ase

. to take

2-&4

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

SAGAN I NUCLEAR INSTAB

lUl)' INSOl.JTH
ASIA 245

d em uet . en t:nt ,. , , opportunity for \ n '' e war Jo i . ''better now than later: could encourage precipitous action u itlwr <.:ountn, ~re.: hof . 'h . ao,cmment had c,en a fleeting moment o f supeno n,) m tl us l h \ k' ll<l of arn,1s . t e ' l:' . . race.: The second reason to be pessimistic is ~hat, Ul ~enou ~ <.:nse'i. attacks might b~ initiated based on tbe belief that an enemy s _use of nu~lcm \\'vapo n~ is im minent and UJ 1<l\'Oidable. While it is dear that the ex1 stence of nucl~..tr "'t'apons in South Asia made both governments cautious in their use o[ conven tJOnal milita') ' force in 1999. it is also clear that Indian leaders were prepared to e calate the con Aict if necessary. Pakistani political authorities, however, made nu ~lear threats du 1 th ing 0 crisis, suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used prec1se l_r under such conditions. \1 oreo,er, according to U.S. officials the Pakistani military. appare ntly "ithout the Prime Minister,s knowledge took initial steps to alert its nuclear forces during the Kargi l confHct. This dangerous alerting pattem was repeated in the South Asian crises that occurred after the Septem ber ll. 2001. terrmist attacks in the United States and the December 13, 2001, teJTOri st attack on the Parliament in New Delhi. In both cases, the Pakistani government feared that its nuclea r forces would be attacked and therefore took alert measures to disperse the nuclea r weapo ns and missiles to new locations away from their storage sites. Pakistani fears that attacks on their nuclea r arsenal were being planned may not have been entirely fanciful. After the September l l Pentagon and \Vorld Trade Cente r attacks, President Bush \ amed Islarnabad that PaJdstan would either side with the United States in v the new war against terrorism or else be treated as a terrorist state. The de,elopment of military plans for U.S. commando raids against the Palastani nuclear weapons sites was soon widely reported. President Musharr af defused the crisis by deciding to abandon support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to provide logistical and intelligence support for the U.S. war there. After the December 13 terrorist attack against the Indian Parliam ent, the Indian government sent massjve military forces to the Pakistani border and threatened to attack unless Musharraf cracked down on the radical Islamic groups that supp01ted terrorist operations in Kashmir and l\ew Delhi. Before M usharraf could respond, General S. Padmanabhan, the Indian Army chief, issued a belJicose statement announcing that the military buildup '\vas not an exercise": "A lot of viable options (beginning from a strike on the camps to a full conventional war) are available. We can do it. If we go to war, joU good."4 Senior Indian political authorities criticized y the Army chief for making the statem ent, and diplom ats in New Delhi speculate~ that General Padmanabhan had deliberately made it more difficult for the Paldstams to back down in this crisis, thus increasing the likelihood of war. Again , President Mush_~ d~fused the crisis, at least tempo rarily, by initiating a crackdown on lslanuc Jihadi groups promoting terrorism in Kashmir and the rest of India. \Vhat l~sons should be drawn from these dange rous crises? Optimists will _I~o~ at onJy tlle final result and assume that it was inevitable: Deter rence and coeJrJOJ work~ as serious threats were issued , the Pakistani presid ent compromised and 00

Thes del)Jo, ments in India. ho,,e, er, will threaten tl1t st . . . ' 1 tortxs il_ PaJ..isttul , and Lhi~ would ytevJta l~ly_ reopen t I_e '''~.11 t.l 1 P''-'H "ntl\-c war con ideratJons. ~lilrta.r~' btases. under thr P l

ed. At a clt 1 t>J' l<veL howeve r hvo n . . r ore omm . \v;r eel. First, PresldPnt \ lllo;har rafs decision lo hack dooH 1 ons should he s es le<u1l wn . dtable, l)ld he was suhw<..:t to signiR<:ant Cliticis' n rrorn lsla .Was bv no me c . . : ans roe ,;,.cles for l11s co11c.:dtatorv stance. Other l ) .. t. : . mt<: part1 and som es ilitafV Cu , r M~StanJ lead e 111 tl. er way, and, imhcd . ~lusharraf mav be less ers could have O'On<> Ie 0 1 I ' . prone to C< . n tl ecisel)' bec:ausC' w was f'orced to change pol': cl Jmprom1se in the: ~11 tu rep1 l<.;les un , tl1ese crises. Sec:ontl, tJ,c Pakistani fear that .1 pre ti er the th reat of attack . . vtn ve or . 10 . tits nuclea r <usencll was 1mrninent forced it to t k . preemptive strike l<taUlS .b tl . -r L : I 'li 't- . et steps in o 1 cnscs. 1ClKJng nuc: ear weapons a a le \erv danuerous mt tar. . : o a]ertJno . . < ne tnJSSJ 1 OUt f th es ' 0 ' storage locations and deploymg them into the field eu more secure k b . mav make the ~ . . I ~ 1 ~-' O vwnerable to an enemy attac , ut 1t makes the weapons more' \wnerabl t l<:es ress < ( th . ternal attacks by teJTOn l orgamzatJOns. Given the number f I Q dae o e t or lfl P ki t tl1JS 1'dden terrorist problem 0 a ae mem~rs 11 and Supporte rs m a. s an, . . . may we ll ha,e betn tl 1 most serious nuclea1 dange1 of th~ cnses. In sho1 , the crises of t ~ 2001 and 2002 delnonstrate that nuclea r weapons m South Asia may well proc uce a modicum of 1 . restraint, but also momentous dangers. In future crises in South Asia, the likelihood of either a preYe ti . . fl n 'e or preempore attack will be str~ngl y 111 uenc~tl by a com.plex mixture of perceptions of the adversa1 intent, estimates a~~ut tts ~ttme offensive and defensive capabilities. y's and estimates of th e vulnerabthty of tts current nuclear arsenal. Organizational biases could encou rage worst-case assumptions about the ad,ersa r.:s intent and pessimistic belie fs about the prospects for successful strategic deter;ence over the long term. Unfortunately, as will be seen below, inherent organizational characte ristics can also produce vulne rabilities to an enemy strike.
occurr
L

SURVIVABILITY OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA

The fear of retalia tion is central to successful deterrence. and the second requirement for stability \vith nuclear weapo ns is therefore the development of secure. second-strike forces. Unfortunate ly, there are strong reasons to be c-onc:med about the ability of the Indian and Pakista ni military to maintain survivable forces. ~wo proble ms can alread y be seen to have reduced (at least temporaril~'} th~ sur~ ' 1vability of nuclea r forces in Pakistan. First. there is e'videnc e that the Pakistanr military, as was the case in the cold war examples cited earlier. deployed i~s missile f~r~es, following st~mdard operating procedures, in ways that produce 51~~atures ~'1 ng away their deployme nt locations. Indian intelUgen~ officers_. f?r example. 1 ~'ntifl.ed the loc:ations of planned Pakista ni deployments of ~I -ll nussiles b) spotting the placement of "secre f' defense cornmunicatio n tenninals nearby. Asecond, and even more tlramatic example follows a cold war precedent quite close!~- Justf as the d . . . roa engme ers in 'the Soviet Union madvertentl~, ga'e awa\' the locahon o their ICBM . 'th to s because constm ction crews bUllt roacls "'1 "ide-rawus turns ne:\1 1e . aled tl Ihe missil il I . . e s os, Pakistani road constr uction crews 1a,e utadvertentl)' Slgn round H. . ds and OCatton of the "secre t" M-ll missiles bv placing \\lde-radius roa . abouts 0 utSt(1 e newly constructed garagesat t he sargoclha militar\' base.

.! Ui

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

SAGAN I NUCLEAR INSTA

BIUTY IN SOUTH

FinaJ h . anakts hould ;.tlso not iQ11ore the po sihillt:. At ' :''<m or Pak . . . o Jstan 1 inh..Jli,rentt> tl<Tencies l'l>ulcl intercept messages revcali nv j, ... ''-"lt'' 1 , ..1t 0 '-< 1 ~ ~ . r ons of otlwn,i:t~ unintble military forces. an absolutely c:: n th. I 1 ue '' ith small Ol~\CIUl' nuclear arsenals. The historv of the 1971 war, for t\U"1 nle. dcmonstr t0 r 1 ' . :a es th.tt both tates' intelligence agencies were able to mterccpt cnl1cal d assified messngcs sent b, and to the other side . . .. Perhap~ most dramatically, on December 12, 19!1, LI_H..: ~~~<lns inter<:epted a radio message scheduling a rneeting ofhigh-level Pakis~an_1 of~cmls at Govern ment House in Dacca, vvhich led to an air attack on the bwkling m the middle of the meeti ng.... ...

Minisler .) hlrt ' f ('<:ls ton to order the tesh f pnme . J fT' . . to J,tan' intd ~~'I . tl JC.:<rs mlonlled Id m tll -.'itlo Pakilltc:un. nHdear ,,cant, . or rru . . at 1e 1ncl" ,,.,.n ~ . 1 I(\r-.wli air forces set1' . bout to lau nc.:h , t In ., rn lt\ < sltike on the test s't Tl t~n aJt< -ere ,, r I . . I e. tc tnc:id . '' and the causl c) I us wa mmg tllessage is not I E:nt ts shrc)ttdc::d in myst_ebryl' that Pa!Gstani intc llig~nc< of'ficen. sirnpl)' msd<: c~fir: AlthouKh it is (;(:Jtainh r10sst e . . 1 1 . I'lJkely explanatJOn JS l1tat I nter-ServiCC':: 1nt ,11 .cnti e>d ai rcra~t .tn the rteticm. . more . . c tgenc:c (lS 1) 0 ff . o- a . tl1erewasanyth nalol an tmminent i nc.lian-Is. 1. k. t<:tals did not beheve . rete ' in . oncocted (or exaggeralPd) the wamingofapreve t' attac .k Hl98. butdehher teIyc . n tve stn p to t th a . ster who ""as waven n~ under U.S. [) ressure to test th ' mtl11 . e weapon orcc: _e prime ,, ar which of tJ ese IS the more wonisome interp. t t' f s tmmewatelv. 1t soot Cle .. . te atonotlie .-d ' 1 ngs could be catastrophtc m a c:nsis whether thev ar"' d , . , tn<:t ent: false \\Jnl 1 ffi . ' "' e11>er.Lte provoc- ti L I .
0

<. }

ASIA

uI

NORMAL ACCIDENTS AND UNAUTHORIZED USE IN NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA

the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals be more safe and sec.;ure than were the U.S. and Soviet arsenals during the cold 'var? It is clear that the emerging South Asian nuclear deterrence system is both smaller and less complex today than was the case in the United States or Soviet Union at the height of the cold war. It is also clear, however, that the South Asian nuclear relationship is inherently more tightJy coupled because of geographical proximity. \Vith inadequate warning systems in place and with weapons with short fught times emerging in the region, the time-lines for decision making are highly compressed and the danger that one accident could lead to another and then lead to a catastrophic accidental war is high and growing. The proximity of New Dellii and Islamabad to their potential adversary's border poses particular concerns about rapid 'decapitation " attacks on national capitals. Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about social stability and support for terrorists inside Pakistan, problems that could compromise nuclear weapons safety and security. Proliferation optimists will cite the small sizes of India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals as a reason to be less worried about these problems. Y the key from a et normal accidents perspective is not the numbers, but rather the stmcture of the arsenal. Here there is both good and bad news. The good news is that under normal peacetime conditions, neither the Indians, nor the Pakistanis regularly deploy nuclear forces mated with delivery systems in the field. The bad news, however, is two-fold. First, Pakistani nuclear weapons do not have PALs (Permissive Action Links, the advanced electronic locks on U.S. nuclear weapons that require a special c..'Ode for the weapons' activation) on them. Second, Pakistan has started to alert its nuclear weapons in crises; it did so in 1999 during the Kargil crisis and then again in September and December of 2001, in response to fears of Indian (and maybe U.S.) military action after the terrorist attacks in New Y ork, Washjngton. and New Delhi. From an organizational perspective, it is not surprising to find evidence of seri~us ~ts emerging in ~e Indian nuclear and missile programs .... The false warn:~ mcident that occurred JUSt prior to the Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 . dem . strat{es] the dangers of aa.idental war in South Asia. During the crucial days just pnor
\ ViJl

r actual attac . It is important to note that the possibility of a false warning d . . . S l .. . . l . < tal nuclear war tn out 1 Asta IS 1ec ucecl, but IS by 110 means el pro ucmg an ac:ci. cl, b .. den . fi . . . . nnmate vJndtas ' doption of a nuclea1 no- 1st-usc.policy.. Not only might the Pakistaru. government, a . . 6" cl . . . 1 stated rst-use octnne, 1espond to . following ts mteUgence (in this case false) that 1 India was about to attack suc~~ssful ~y a large portion of Pakistani nuc:le-ar forces. but either government could mtstdenti fy an accidental nuclear detonation oc:cunin during transpmt and alert activities at one of their own military bases as the start counterforce attack by the other state. Pakistani officials should be pa.tticularh- ensitive to this possibility because of the 1988 Ojberi incident, in which a ~assive conventional munitions explosion at a secret ammunition dump near Rawalpindi caused fears among some dedsion makers that an Indian attack had becrun. The poss.ibility of this kind of accident producing a false warning of an attack cannot, howe\er, be ruled out in India, either, ac; long as the govemment plans to alert force or mate nuclear weapons to delivety vehicles during crises. In addition, there should be serious concern about whether both countries can maintain centralized control over their nuclear weapons. Although go,emment policy in this regard is, for obvious reasons, kept classified, it is known that Pakistan has no personnel reliability program (PRP) for the officers who control the arsenal or the guards who protect the weapons storage sites. In the United States. the program is a set of psychological tests and organizational checks; each year. between 2.5 percent and 5.0 percent of previously PRP certi.fied individuals ha~e been decerti fied, that is, deemed unsuitable for nuclear weapons related duties. Pres~~~bly, similarly low, but stiJl significant, percentaae~ o~ ?ffic-ers, sol~ers. an~ C.1VJlians in other countries would be of questionable rebabthty <\S guardians of th arsenal. This personnel reliability problem is serious in Indict where ch~ian cu~ todians matntam custody of the . . nuclear weapons; I.t Pa1t'tcularh- womsome tn IS , Pakistan, where the weapons are controlled ttan . 0 . C 'li . by a pro f'essiOna1nllt. oro-<uuzatJOn facmg the difficult challenge of maintaining discipline while dealul~ 1~\,th Ta ~ :'~g 1 econ . . 1: 100 f nd;t.mentauSJTI . liS SI u . o~y, senous social problems, and gro'"mg reug _ u has theft or u e b ation Increases the risk of accidents and of unauthonzed u e. sue: Yterrorists gr .. . F' oups. . I1 Pakistani mihtar:' has fl mally, there is evidence that neither the l ndtan nor t ~ . . is eould be Ocused sufficiently on the danger that a missile test laullch unng a ens

a o~s n~ gue inteiHgence o . cer .or genutnely belie,ed. but inaccurate. reports ortmmment ro k

o r;

- t

I"AK I 1.

THE USES Of fUKL.t.

.~ ' I

11'1 !:)0tJTH

weapons launches in war. ln India, Wbeeler I~land 15 rCJ~Ortctlly being used like \'anden berg air force base, a test site in peacetJme a~d cnses: und a lau neh site in war. During Kargi1, aecording to the Indian Anny cluef of staff, nudear alert ac:uv. ities were also detected at "some of Pakistan 's launch are~s-some or the are (ls where they carried out tests earlier of one of tl1ei r missiles.> Nudear South Asia will be a dangerous place, n~>t becm~se of ill will or irra. tionali ty among government leaders. nor becaus~ or any. 11mque cultural inhibitions against strategic thinking in botl1 countnes. I~cl1a and Pakistan face a danO'erous nuclear future because they have become ltke other nuclear powers. Their leaders seek security through nuclear deterrenc:e, but imperfect humans inside imperfect orgartizations control their nuclear weapons. If my theories are right, these organizations will someday fail to produce secure nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately the evidence from tl1ese first year~ o~ South Asia's nuclear history suggests that t11e pessimistic predictions of orgamzation themy are likely to come true. even though I cannot predict the precise pathway by which deterrence will break down. The organizational perspective suggests that there are more similarities than differences between nu d ear powers in the way they manage, or at least try to manage, nuclear weapons operations. There is, however, one important structural difference between the new nuclear powers and their cold war predecessors Just as each new child is bom into a different family, each new nuclear power is born into a different nuclear system in which nuclear states influence each other's behavior. Some observers believe that the possibility that other nuclear powers-suc h as the United States or China-can intetvene in future crises in South Asia may be a major constraint on undesired escalation. I fear the opposite: the possibility of inteJvention may encourage the governments of Indja and Pakistan to engage in risky behavior, initiating crises or making limited uses of force, precisely because they anticipate (correctly or incorrectly) that other nuclear powers may bail them out diplomatically if the going gets rough. The possibility that other nuclear states might be able to influence nuclear behavior in South Asia does, however, lead to one final optimistic note. There are many potential unilateral steps and bilateral agreements that could be instituted to reduce the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, and the U.S. govern ment can play a useful role in helping to facilitate such agreements. Many, though not all, of the problems identified in tllis article can be reduced if nuclear weapons in both countries are maintained in a de-alerted state with warheads removed f~o~ delivel)' vehicles. U.S. assistance could be helpful i~ providing the ar~s veri fk'atJon t~hnol~~ that could permit such de-alerting (or non-alerting in this case~ to take place Within a cooperative framework The United States could also b

pass o n all"~mce n~tiJication of a Norwegian weather ro<.:kct laH.t<. . rlrat resulted i:~ S('tious f~tlsc warning of a missile attack M~re~ver, hc~th. ~~~_,. !) ukl'>t an is and the l ndian s appear to be planning to use their mtssde te~t fac:llr t~es lor actual nut:lear

t. as part r,f mi!>p\'1\.'t.hed a~ the:> ~tart of a uuclear attack. There W<.tS ;\n l., lllissile thl l .ahore accords in Jan u<lJ)" 1999. to provide a~van<.:~ n 'i.J . fil m Hussians <lis. tt>sts. but <:'\en such an agreement is not a fo_ol-proof_soluh 1 ~ 11 .: , 111 :\1osc< to a failure t t"'\('1'('(( in lanuatY 199.5 when a bureaucratic snafu

or

JlJ~( Ill '( and \V'lrniJig. r . rn ormati I 111 proVJUIJ1g I tt< , . 1 fu }le p tirne or Ill Cl 1St,., 'o rc:cw<:P the <.lange . t r I on' nn a <:asc-by-c: . h . ase ac;ts, ' r OJ I a se alar . ,. . . , . . 1 . I.. . . peace rns. ~ Jnallv . . ~a Cl managcm~nt f rn . of storag( ~Jt< s .tH "' Jnc:reased o nudear, 1 1 ecunty veapons s encouraO"ed by s 1,mng wttcr security deviccs rror stora(f . operati()ns can .. . o ,o L . . oc Sites and u1scussmg I "besl j)radJC:<.'<;. amzatrona org "here will be no progrcss on any of tht:'se . 1 ISsues, how , . .1 . ever, llnless Indians, t.: tanis and Amcncans stop ucnymg that :~eric . . bl pto ems . . . JUS l, d ' paruS st. . CxJ A ba~i<: awarecomrnanc an control problems exist . f O nuclear I I .1: . - s tn ew Dd I . I hlamabad . 1 fJ ki ness . . . rl an< nfoJtunate y nw an anu a stani leaders too ft ' o ' en . . . but u in turn, re fusecl to assrst t I1e In<.lians and p" kis tnvralt7.<: tl1e1n. Th e United a tanrs 111 devE-1 . . . f' t1 . States, et .r tv and secunty or 1eu nuc:lcar. weapons until an er t he terropma 1rnproved .. . I. sa~e., Se ternber 11, 2001. \Vas 1mgton officials argued before the S onst attacks on Pt any assistance in tJtis area would 'reward' lslamah cl. d _eptember 11 attacks . a an :\ew D lh f . tha and signal to ~ther potet~~tal n_udear weapons states that the Unit e. I or t~Sting, kseld States was not rious about Jts nonprohferatJon goals. The Septembe. 11 attac . ed the u.S. ovI . .. . . . . .. . . l . . se c > ern ment to SWltC1 JtS position, anu Paktstam offiuals ac. ePted, at Ieast . .-g 1 m . . . 1 that some ass1stance WJth tl1e1r nuclear weapons security coulc.l b f 1 ~nnc P .e' e use u . It IS <:JlJClal . p L.: . cc that such err01ts to tmprove aKJstani nudear security measures 1 1ullv .mpl )e c 1 e, mented and eventually be extended to India. rNuclear weapons will remain in Pakjstan and India [!or tile n0 reseea ble fu ture, . . . . . and the conHJCt ove1 Kaslnmr WJ ll continue to smolcler. threatenrna to erupt . a mto ider w and more dangerous war. The deep poUtical problems between the two South Asian nuclear states may someday be resolved, and the U.S. government should encourage progres_s toward that end. In the meantime. the U.S. government should do whatever 1t can to reduce the risk that India and Pakistan will use nuclear weapons against each other.
JV

. .

ASIA

249

NOTES
L Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, .\Ifass., sliT Press, 1998). p. 92, 106. Z. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear P1olijeration, p.l84. 3. Ihtasham ul Haque, "Peace Linked to Kashmir Solution ... Dmcn \\'ire Serrice. June 26.
1999.

;)_ Raj Chenagappa, "Pakistan Tried ~uclear Blackmail." The i\ etcspaper Today. January 12, 2000. www.thenewspapeitoday.c:omlinterview/index.phtml? I~TER

~- "Army Ready for War, Says Chief," The State.sman (India). Janual)' l ~ 2002.

IEWJNT_PADCOUNT. V

- ...... , '"11

r IN SO

.
lJTH ASIA 2 J

Nuclear Stability in South As;~

KENNETH N. WALTZ

The Ametican govern men~ and most ~metican jour_nali~ts k~o~ on ~he ~>lossoming of nuclear forces in SoutJ1 Asl<l as an onunous event, d.iffcJcnt Ill unph<:ation and effect from all the similar events that we wonied about throughoul the cold war. A l!:lg8 ork i\:ew Y Times headline, for example, proclaimed that "l m.lias Ar111~ Hace Isn't Safe Like the Cold \1\lar." Few thought the American-Soviet arms ra<:e safe at the time, and for good reasons few Indians and Pakistanis eA~ect an. arms ~ace n~)w. Most of the alannLc;t predictions about the fate of the subconti nent display forged ulness about the ork pao;t and c:onfusion over the effects of nuclear weapons. In the same New Y Times article, Joseph Cilincione, dire<.:tor of the Non-ProLiferation Proje<:t at the Carnegie Endovvment, reports that Pentagon war games between Pakistan and India alwavs end \.vith a nuclear exchange. Has everyone i11 that building forgotten that deterren~e works precisely because nuclear states fear that conventionaJ milita1y engagements may escalate to tJ1e nuclear level, and therefore they draw back from the b1ink? Admiral David E. Jeremiah, once vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, laments the cultural mindset that leads Americans to believe that "every body thinks like us,'' and a longtime president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Michael Krepon, worries that because of the Pressler Amendment, which <:ut off aid to nations developing nuclear weapons, Pakistani officers have not had the benefit of attending our military schools. Ones reaction to both statements may well be "thank goodness." The Brooki ngs Institution totaled up the cost of American nuclear weapons over the decades and arrived at the figure of 5.5 trillion dollars. Strobe Talbott, when he was deputy secretary of state, implied that military competition between Pakistan and India will cause them to spend on a proportionate scale. \1\lhen asked why we should not provide India and Pakistan with advice about, and equipment for safe deterrence, he retorted that "if they locked the mselves into the mentality of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction ), they will then be tempted into-like uset a considerable escalation of the arms race." 1 Y nuclear states need race only to the second-strike level, which is easy to ach ieve and maintain. Indian and Pakistani leaders have learned from our folly. A minimal deterrent deters as well as a maxi mal one. Homi Jehangar Bhabha, father of the Indian bomb, called this "absolute deterrence." K. Subrahmanyam, a foremos t strategist, e mphasizes that Indians have leamed that to build large forces is wasteful and foolish. An arsenal of about sixty weapons, he believes, will deter either Pakistan or C hina; and Pakistan might

From The Spread of Nuclellr Weapo11.s: A Debate Renewed by Sc:ott D. Sagatl and K(;onnelh ~- ~Valt7.f 011 0 PP 109-124. Copyright @ 2003. 1995 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. UscJ by penlliS$' W W. I\orton & Company, Jne.

!J J;l ''~on ly a min irnn m <>llntn h ut orrent y t ( 'l. I en sau. )el bout twenty l( B~ l <:, has hcen c:ontent .th . e .runa, witlt <v ' , .l<t.' en touav 1 S1 nail \VJ 11 ny a o ~~ tn would fo 0\\ Jts ex,u nplc were it not f'c) th u nUJn )Cr<;; and lnd , d, la an r e JSru ti Plli\Js " . '1 defenses o n the slrat<:gi<: anns bllanc:e. A - p \'e cffe<.:t<; or AJn . enc.:an m n.111a. PoJ-t al . mssJe 1 1 1 . trints on bot!, <:ot111 trws ensure this. TtliJott h~ u1s<:e l<: das well as cc.:oPc>ITIJC as coos "' reliance on nudcar we>apons."2 The United St . me a ~lohal trend awa, from ons now hcc:ausc it h the world's dominant . ates doe~ rely le<;s on nuc:lca' r conventio 1 weap . L na year ell On its armed forc:cs in the 2000 as the next e1gnt hi power, spcndincr as ,.., 1 u m ~ spen, crs <:ornbinE-d. . rtly for that reaso11, some other c:ountries reh- m , ore on t1e r nu<;) .I . 1 a P 1 v\' Jl 1 1ts conventional forces 10 . hi 1 ear weapons- 1 Ss ia for examp e. . that once s 1am es. c Ru. ountncs ted on one oft he two great powers fnr militan . . , ass1stance are coun Provide security for themselves: Pakistan ' lndta', 1rag, Japan a ncm <:oncemed to d 11. h orea 'n .-.. ort K , e all examples. . ar India tested its "peaceFul bomb" in 1974. Its next tests ea later. The United States complained loudly both times y, t th ~~ ~ven~-four years e . . I r manv years onend-e v nJted States tested . tl nuclear weapons rn,my t1mes ye,u y or d , w h1c1 1s more than the tests of all more an a thousand . th 1 above an d below grou n o er c:ountnes eom. c. . , . bined. Amenca s exc:use was, at nrst, that it anticipated a morta1th reat 1 t )e rom 1 . l . .r Soviet Uruon and, ater, that 1t actuallv faced such a tbreat Alnen,.as nonpro1 llera"' . ' . . tion pobcy demes that such reasonmg can legitimate other countries' enterina tlle tight circle of nuclear powers. Nevertheless, the reasonina tlle cnited S~atcs applied to itself applies to India and to Pakistan as well. Doe~ anyone belie,e that testing nuclear warheads is something that, in their place, we wouid not ha"e done? The question reused by India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests is not whether tllev should have been conducted, but whether their security requires their becoming nuclear powers. Some count1ies need nuclear weapons; some do not. BrJZil and Argentina set themselves on course to become nuclear states. Both decided to abandon the eff01t. Neither posed a threat to the other. South Africa became a nuclear state and th en, finding no commensurate threat, reversed its policy. Pakistan obviously needs nuclear weapons. When a~ked why nuclear weap(Jl1 are so popular in Pakistan, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto ans,vered, "It's our history. A histmy of three wars with a larger neighbor. India is fiv<:' times larger ~han we are. Their military stre ngth is five times larger. In 19/1, our country was rus r~tegrated. So the security issue for Pakistan is an issue of survinu ... From the.o~her Side, Shankar Bajpa.i, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan, China. an~ the ~mtecl States, has said that "Pakistan's quest for a nuclear capabili~ steams lr~n~ .1 ~ ~:ar 0 of its larger neighbor, removing that fear should open up immense P Jblhti_es -:'bil' pos51 tties for a less worried and more relaxed lir Sh am ltad J'\ 11m1d Pakistan s ' J 1e. foreign 1 1 .1n soutl1 o\.s'a nuclear. deterrenc-e 'di ' secretary, has ec:hoed their tboug 1ts: . her m an era of durable peace bet\'.een p.-1..: tan ami . Inrua pro,, . ng may d cuus us ernPCJ<tlh Jrunmu an di the r . . r-- ' .lk. bo t a , equtstte In<:entives fo r resolving alJ OUtstan ng ISSUe . w u . ashm K tr."3 In recent years some 1ndians and Pak' ... . han' beOltn to t<u a about ... e- aslruus r *Times reporter, JUSt A' ' peaceful e f' 1 1po115 as a accommodation and according to a !' etc 01 nuc ear" ( . , ' evervbod .. . possessiOn 0 "dtes the two countnes -; f:actor }l Y .m Kashmir l us ung towards peace.''4
n . ...:sRed
\VII

S eed, . <

'lY' twenty lrl1.J. 'c ' lnd ia. Sowe have <.:I. d tJ,. t anne tt no nuclcar <.: .1 t

;-,

l! 2

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

JtO J OUJ

In the 1980s 1ftcr the Sodc t occupation of Af<ghani"' t'l 1, ;'llilud St < ..... ates k11owina of Ptl..i ta11 5 11 uclear )rogrPss, nevert lt eless conlt n uc d .c lllJI">Iy l),k ' c . 1 ... . , ,, IStan \\ith ophisticated connmtional weapons. Th: 'l!nJtcd s_talr J,l tot t:art muth ~-tbnut Pakistan s nucle ar progress as long as Sovtet "c~JTI<.>~ '' lmm tted Arnerican polic~ . Once the So-.ie t Unio11 went into steep ~lechn e and thL'll disappeared 1 .\ meric a dropped Pakistan. with a speed that_ surpn ec! not 011_' Paki tan but Jndi~ as well. For Pakistan to compete convenhona.IJy wtth Indr t ,.,l') ec:onornicallr impossible. :\ uclear weapons linked to a sensible strateg) are .t lo\\ cost way of'le~~ eling the pla}~ ng 6eld. Understandably Pakis tan fe lt itself pw~s<'U to follow the nuclear course. Can India be seen in a sirniJar light? \\'i_th it~ supelior_ com entional forces, it needed no nucle ar weapons to protect itself agamst a Pakistan that lacked them but what about China? Americans think of India as the dominant power in Soutl~ Asia. Jndia feels differently. India is part of a hostile world. \ Vith a \-1uslim minoJitv of about }.50 million, it adjoin s Muslim Pakistan, and beyond lies a .Vluslirn world becom ing more fundamentalist and more hostil e. To the north is an in<.:reasingh nationalist, steadily more powerful, and potentially unstable China. The United States has reinforeed India's \-VOnies about a Chinese-Paldstani-American axis notably when Amel ica "tilted" toward Pakistan in the 1971 war with India. In the' middle of the war. Henry Kissinger told Mao Zedong, ''VVe want to keep the pressure on India both militarily and politically; adding that if China "took measures to protect its security, tl1e US would oppose efforts of others to interfere."5 In a show of support for Pakistan, the American navy moved tl1e aircraft carrier Enterprir,e into the Indian Ocean. To this day, Indians consi der this an attem pt to hold them in nuclear awe. They call it blackmail. India continues to believe that America favors China over India. A professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University found nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad "unpr ecede nted in the history of international relations.'>S And an Indian minister of defense wond ered, as many Indians do, "why India and Pakistan should be seen as blowing eac:h othe r up when nu dear weapons in the hands of the Unite d States and China are seen as stabilizing fa<.:tors.''7 That the United States seems to trust Chjna as an old nucle ar power, and not India as a new one, is a cause of bitter resentment. The dec.ision to make nuclear weapons was a momentous one for India. The tests of May 1998 were ovenvhelmingly popular with tl1e public at large, but the decision emerged over decades, witl1 much opposition along the way. Even today. Indians who view nuclear deterrence as a diffieult and demanding task believe that India \\!ill be unable to develop and deploy a nuclear force sufficient for tl1e deterr~nre of China. In their view, the main effec t of India's developing nuclear capabiJjties wa<; to cause Pakistan to develop its own. India is there fore worse off vvith nuclear weapons than it would have been without them. The Indian view that carried the da)' rests on the contrary argument: name ly, that it does not take much to deter. Is it farfetched for India to worry about a Chinese threa t to its secuiity? Any country has trouble seeing the world as others do. Let's try. If the United States shared a two-thousand-mile border with a country that was more populous, more prosperous, more heavily armed, and in possession of flu dear weapons, we would react militarily and, judging from our response to the Sovie t Union, more vigorously
~

.t:a has dorw '' I c1t i-~ fa rfc:tchcd i< r h ASIA 253 . . ,, JOr t e Un't .1 tJc. ese threat to 1t<; \('('ttl lt\' and then won' e . h l 1 eu Stat<:s to \ \ 'o L. . u w rrv an<> t CIJU1!(anti Bajpai. a pmfL.:-..,or at :\ehru Unive1rsi y tli .1 n a uoes too. . tt a . nent. He dollh t' dtat 1ntlia'!l nuclear d ~t ty, strongly opposes India' 1 arrna al I I . s .. u 1\runach Pra< <'!'> 1 111 the northe~st C:! errent would d'tssuade Ch nu<: ear p akIStan . r. ~etZII1:;, . . Or f .. tna lrOm , rorn se17.mg Kash . . 10 rthwest. Th1s IS t:OI nparablc to the wor . d tJle 1 ,. . . ry. reamt u . h tn1r m u niJurg grab. S01rw .\rnenc:an militarv C:< n Pm t e 1960s aho t ' n ~ll . . ; J nmentators . . ' u a .011 might suddenl: setze Hamburg, wllic.;hJutt d. \\Orncd tl1at the Soviet Um c., re et ask .Is N ATO's ngI1hiJl1..., to regain Hamb e mto Ea<it Germttn v. and LLten. ene ' ': urg worth ki ' r m e1ration?'' Simihuly, Kanti Bajpai imagi nes "a quick rabb~ n~ a nu_clear <:onflang tes' backed bv nucl. ear weapon~' in the hope o fgpresen thrust mto the two sta ' o 1 cl ompli. "b Such wornes are as fan<:iful as Ame . .. . ng n 1a ''ith a fait ace Id ncan wornes wep . th The invader wou 1 1avc to assem ble troops near th b d . e 111 e cold war. its forces , including nu dear ones. \ Vith the potentieal ~~s~ 111 ~ 1 ~ \\ould then alert would China or Paldstan run such tisks? east!) foreseeable, why One answe r to the question is tJ1at Pakistan did . c control into Kashrrur an l fight for a time at a fairh- mo' e troops atross the 1me of : high 1 . . h 1 . . . . ' known as Kargil . Josep h cmJ'lCJOne votces widespread fear. e\e m t . e engagement wh . . . cl h . . "J . . . bl s en, 1 confl1ct m mm , e says, ust assem e all the risk factors and ,,,t, the. Kashmir lt d v This JS the most angerous and unstable militarv situation m th mu. tp1ii1t out ld. . . , e "or . H1s pronouncement repeats tl1e bred old error of inferring from the con. ti al . 'en on past what cl1e nuclear future holds , a ITl Jstake made almost every time another <..'Ountn ets nuclear "~eap~ns. With nucl~ar weapons added, conventional!~ dangerou' ~d unstable sJtuations becom e safer and stable r ones. ?\ udear weapons produce what Joseph Nye calls the "crystal ball" effect. Everyone knows that if force uets out of hand all th~ parties to a ~onflict face catast rophe. With conventional we~pons. the Cl)!Stal ballts cloud ed. \V1th nuclear weapons, it is perfec tly clear. What reasons do we have to believe that India's and Pakistan:<; CI)'Si:al balls are clouded? \Veil, again , Kargil. Some observers worn' that Pakistan mav belie,e that it C'cln safely raise the level of conventional ,;olen~ since nuclear we~pons limit the extent of Inrua's respo nse. But, of course, they also limit the size and scope of Pakistan's attack, since Pakistan knows it could face nuclear retaliation. And the same reasoning applies to I nrua. I t's the same old story: In the presence of nucle.ar weapous. aC'Ountry can achieve a significant vict01y only by risking de,astating retaliation. Sagan calls Kargil the fomth Inruan-Pakis tani war bcc.;ause it fits the social science definition holding that a militruy encounter is a war if it produces more thmt one ~ou~and b~~e-related deaths. r f KargiJ is called a war. then the definition ~~~a: _Uires reVJsJon: and now that both countties haYe nuclear weapon the fifth "ar q W!Uhe no worse than the so-called fourth one. The late Pakistani chief of the anllY st~. General Mirza Aslam Beg, remarked that India and Pakistan c~n no longer fi~t even a conventional war over Kc,L<;hmir, and his counterpart. the cluef of the ~ndi.an ltrrny . . .. de staff' r-.. ral KnshnaswamJ Sundat]I concurred. K gil sI1owed once au-.un that uene ar ~. terrence does not fim1ly prote ct disputed areas but does limit the e:-.tent o~:e '~C: Ienc.-e 1 di . k n an rear admiral Raia Menon put the larger pomt snnp, The Kan!.u cnsiS . e<alJ .. dcmonstn t I h ~ the h a ec t at the subcontiue ntal nuclear t luesl1 ~Id prob:tblv lies,.temton ) m < , 10 eartland of both countries, and not on the Kashmrr cease-fire line.

WALTZ I NUCLEAR STAB IUl)' IN SOUTH

:!54

PART 2

THE USES OF FOJ<Ct.

- " ' vlf\DILI

ry LN so

liTH ASIA

T1h.~ ob,iou. conclusion to draw From Kargil is tl~at tL'-' J nt< of nuclear 11 rll-:;:->~ 1 '., Th is contrast . w~apons prevented escalation from ma_jor skirmish t~ starkl~ '"ith the bloody 1965 war, in ""hi eh both partles wen~ - '' cl only with c.:ou~ ,entional weapons. . , Another question is whether India and Pakistan ~an fin111~ C'Ollt rol and safe], deploy nuclear forces sufficient to deter. Because I. scud ~no~Jglr abont the ease ~ dete~ence in chapter 8, J shall concentrate on que~tions of s::lfety and control. Sagan claims that "the emerging history of nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan strongJ , suppmts the pessimistic predictions of organizational theorist:." y,:=-t the evidenc2, accumulated over five decades, shows that nuclear states fight w1 nudecu states only th at low leveJs, that accidents seldom occur, and that when they do they never have bad effects. If nuclear pessimists were tight, nuclear ~etenence ":ould have l~tilecl again and again. Nuclear pessimists deal with the pot~nb.al caus~s of cat~l<;~ophe; optimists, with the effects tl1e causes do not' produce. Smce the ev1dence fails to support the predictions of pessimists, one wonders \.vhy the spread ?f_ nudear ~veapons to South Asia should have bad rather than good effects. What differences m the situation o!' India and Pakistan may cause their fates to depart from the nuclear nom1? If they and their situations are different, then the happy history of the nuclear past does not forecast their futures. American commentators dwell on the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union earlier and India and Pakistan today. Among the seeming differences, these are given prominence: differences in the states involved, differenees in their histories of conflict, and differences in the distance between the competing parties. I consider them in turn.

. tever the id<'Jd i l v of ruler!., and wlrateve . tl . Wl,a I I r re c1 taracte . . . 1Gll beh c.WlOt'~ ! 11( '\ pro< I I(;C arc stroncrJy , d . .. fiSlt(;s of their St t > attOI l . . r. , corr thOrt<:d h h a e\ J 11 pe ,,ention al v;eapom. a c. d ensrve countrv 1. t0 k. Yl e world ontsid' r.th con . . ' ra.s as rtsell' 1 " v' l . rness to 1 polrc\ 111 order to dissuadt' . . . . lOw n1uch [X,wer it ts ust [1 (.1 . . . I . I . . ' ' <lll aggr CSS!Vt: st t r . Ill es w1U1Jig to run ng 1 1tsk~ are hard to dissr ad, ~rl a e rorn stnkiuc. countn l ' .. ' rI I e. ' re charae:t' . . . I') s and t 1e temp< r,unents o eaders htve t< 1 t c nstrc~ ol gm. lfnen ' ) )(' ctref11 11 er . . . . weapons, any state will he deterred by anothe 1. .'t <. Yweiglred. With uc1 e...... . 1 . s ate s scco 11 cl L n ed not be preocc11p1ec.. vv1th the qualities of the t t 1 . -stn~e forces. s a e t 1at IS to b~ d 0ue ne . ze its leaders. In a tr uc1 world , any state- 1 th ear e ctcrrc.:tl or 1e er ruled bv. Sa] scrubnJ J . . w edong a Sad am Hussem, or a Krm ]ong U -wilJ b d , a t 111 . a Z M ao ' . . e ~ 1 to its own destruction. eterred bv tl te kn ow1 edge that aggresstve actions may ead ,

255

ooES DETERRENCE DEPEND ON THE DETERRERS'

RECENT HISTORY?
IndiaandPakistanhavefoughtthreewarsinlittle morethanfiftyvea andKaslnur . ; er . . 1 . is a bone in the throat of Palmtan. In conhast, America and Russia have never fought a war against each other. Yet some other nuclear countries look more like India and Pakistan, and nuclear weapons have kept the peace between them. Russia and China have suffered numerous . iJita1y jnvasions by one another over the cenm turies. In the 1960s, when both had nuclear weapons, skirmishes broke out from time to time along the Siberian frontier, and the fighting \vas on a fairly large scale. The bitterness of the antagonists rivalled that between lncua and Pakistan fueled h,, ethnic resentments and ideological clifferenc:es. ' Clashes between nuclear countries over petipheral areas are hardly the exception. Of today's eight nuclear countries, five have fought their neighbors in the past half century: Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, and India. Those who be)jeve that the South Asian situation is without parallel often ignore the Middle East. The parallel is not exact, but it is instructive. The Middle East is umivalled For long-standiug conHict, ineconcilable disputes, feeUngs of distnJst and hatred, and recurrent wars. In 1973, two nonnuclear Arab countries, Egypt and Syria, attacked Israel and fought what by anyone's definition was a war. Limited in extent by one siues nuclear weapons, it nonetheless did not spiral out of control.

DOES DETERRENCE DEPEND ON WHO IS DETERRING WHOM?

For decades we believed that we were trying to deter two monstrous countries-one an "evil empire" and the other a totalitarian country ruled by a megalomaniac. Now we learn that deterrence worked in the pa'it because the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were settled and sensible societies. Karl Kaiser, of the Research Institute of the Gennan Society for Foreign Aflarrs, and A.Ithur G. Rubinoff of cl1e University of Toronto, for example, argue that the success of deterrence depends on its context, that is, on who the countries are and on how they relate to each other. In Kaiser's view, "the stability of nuclear deterrence between East and West rest[ ed] on a multitude of military and politic:al factors which in other regions are either totally missing or are only partially present." In Rubinoff's view, it is foolish to compare the American-Soviet eonfliet with South Asia, where the dynamics are "reminiscent of the outbreak of the First World War." Reminiscence flickers however since no one tllen ' ' had nuclear weapons. With a Hindu chauvinic;t in power in New Delhi and an Islamic party governing India, Rubim>ff finds "no resemblanc-e to the deteJTent situation that characterized the U.S.-Soviet confuct."JJ That statement may once have applied to I~dia and Pakistan., but only until they armed themselves with nuclear weapons. T~e history of the cold war shows that what matters is not the character of the countnes that have nuclear weapons but the fact that they h ave them. Differences amoJlg nuclear oountries abound, hut for keeping the peace what difference have they rnade?

DOES DETERRENCE DEPEND ON DISTANCE?

Proximity is a constantly emr)hasized difference between the relations of Jndia an.d Pakis tan and that of the United States and the SoV1et umon. America and Russ1a . are separatecl by vast distances Pakistan and In cl'1 I'tve clk"ek bv 1 Thev contmowl a _~ k h ua)} b . ' 'S George Per Ov1C 1 th'ng Yru agatnst each othe r in irritating and <angerous wa) had th . . fear t1 'some bodv blows up some 1 . Is m mmd when he exnressed lus . 1at . . \l;ho 1btg a 11 . Th . re on vour wa'>. ., 5 ne nd1a says That's it and takes out targets. en you ' . c~.. "''ere go ' ' ! tl , same wo1 ~ mg to back down?'"l2 Much the same fears in muc t 1c .t b . k.. one exnt . 1 1ul t "go to ul' nn , "1' essed during the cold war. The two antagomsts m o

!!5 6

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCI! .

e ~nite d States and the so ,'iet Union ale rted thei r fc>rces a number of t11nes. Do mg s~ is a way of saying, "This is getting serious, and we both had b~ tter c~lm U0\~'11 . 1_)espite the pessimism engendered by the histOJ)' of ~outh Asia, Indiat~-P aki=tant wars have been. as wars go. guite restrained. As Admtral Menon has wn tten. An y analysis of the three wars fought often refers to the rather gentlemanl y nm nn er in wh ich they were fouaht with care taken to avoid civilian casual ties.'' 13 Pa kistan's 1999 thrust into Kasl~n ir may have been rash, ye t as Me non has rightl y said, ''S ubsecJuent Pakistani attempts to signal an unwillin gness to escalate we re matu re and sober. "14 And in the Kargil campaign. India never sent its troops a~ros. the line of control. Hist01y tells us only what we want to know. A pa.ir of Ne w Yo rk Times journalists con trasts then with now by claiming that, except in Cuba , "the Ameticans and So,iets took care not to place ilieir troops in di.rec t military co nfrontation:Is What, the n, were NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization troops do ing in the miudJ e of Eu rope, where confrontation '""as a constant and serious busin ess ? Proximity does make warni ng time short. Missiles can fly be tween Islamabad and New De lhi in less than five minutes. Y nuclear coun et tries in the past have often been dose mi.litarily if not geographically. Cuba is on ly ni nety miles from Am erican shores , and that is proximity enough . Th e United States flew planes at the Soviet Union 's borders and across the m, believing its rad ars wou ld not spot the m. Ameri can bravado continues. In Apiil2001, an Am eri can surve illance plane was struck by a Chinese plane over waters near China. Close su rveillance is provocative even if international legalities are nicely ob served. As President Thvight D. Ei senhowe r sai d when an American plane went down thirty-two miles from the Chinese coast in August 1956, "If planes we re Aying 20 to 50 miles from our sho res, we would be very likely to shoot the m down if they came in closer. whether through error or no t."I6 Operation Brass tacks was an all-service Indian operation sta ged in 1987. A s Sagan says, it is widel y be lieved that General Sundarji inten de d it to be a prelude to a war in which India wo uld destroy Pakis tan's nucle ar fac ilities. Sundarji may have tho ught that even if Pakistan had a few bombs, In dia wo uld be able to destroy the m on the ground. In retrospect, Brasstacks looks mo re lik e a typical instance of Indian failure to coordinate polic ies among the Prim e Minis ter's Office, the Exter nal Affairs Ministry, tl1e De fense Ministry, an d the military services. . Brac;stacks is not something new in the nucle ar annals. It pa les in companson to provocative acts by the United States and the Sovie t Unjon . In 1983, ~or example, Able Archer- a recur ren t NATO military exercise -w as more extensive than t\'e r before. Jt was held at a tim e of extraordinary tensio n. The Soviets

\\() tdd slip ewer tlw edge. an<.I once tl te e xchange of warlH ~' ' 1 . . . . . . n n et 1er side:: 'tl Jj ...,. 't \\"t>u 11 bc \\'l t mg t o sLop 1 b, gtVJng 111 to the otheJ. In a<.tu.tl t.. lt '.-.:<:ver ba ki t .. . ~ d0\ \11 in ti nws of crisis proved not to 11g pro 11 c.> m e do tw c ng 1 be such a ' . shcu'l' a com . teres t mOIe completeh- than wlwt t 11 tr" J okc0110 t nt' mon m . emnrac:e . Ea c h ma . . t 0 l1etJ1J'na else ..as well hut IJn!lt "' oc: ed in I. d ea tI1 s ) wan s l n . ' . . . wan t tn os t or all to get out of tJte dire situation tJ1ey are in. Dunng the Kargtl fJg htu_1g . J ndia went to "H ~adin ess State :3,.. which means that warheads ~~~ re prep an:d for placement on delint-y \T hicles, an d Pakistan apparently took sm11lar ~teps. rlwse we re seen a~ ras h at~d dangerous moves, but what does on e ex~e.ct? Th

WALTZ I NUCI....EAR ST ABILITY [N SOUT

H ASIA 257 . ,ed t]lat su qm ' ' I h r! k<y ltJ J\ mc ri<:an war la bebelted alert of I , At ' llll cl <'ar for<.:es was thoughtpl ns. Du ring , the <:x<:rcic ll rnu a l .1 )y t 1e s SI . . E OVI et~ lo he a re' I . 1< J11C a ll Pershing j . t:l '\SI l'S we re to be deploye d m nc a one /1 d tJ1 at som e of tht1n, wi th lheiJ' ~~ty-kJ t urope !.<>on. Tit.. S . )'eV I 0 On payJo. d fif bedJ e -m inute d(liHJ;, lim e to ' Moscow, had air d . .a ty-meter ac:c()\l ets ur . S 0 ten ea ) arnw::d E . acv. adJ11. stration , Deh:t tsc . ec.:retarv Casr1ar Welnl) ' . ar1 m the Rta"an. y 10l . / erg ., a . d that it was Otlr ann to be ahle to fight su.st . .erdand oth . er offi churne . l 1 b ] , am , ,tn "'"11 a I cials proit . me reason SoVIet . ra l <.'rs c teveu _ was about to begm. nnc ear war. With l 50 ' 'ast distances be )etween the United Stltes and R . . v; ' a stances makc w hen Amcn.can troops md ...... il uss1 Wl1at drl(::r 1r di these . . ' "1ss es are: star1011 l . ence do ~ d Nort11east Asta? Those who believe that the lndian-P k:i . et tn ~-'out precedent have ei the r little knowleuge of cold tth~tan 1 confro Europt ntation w1u1 . war IStorv or oddJ .d r is ti,e memones. . ~ etecProx.imity short ens the tn ne between launch and land' \\'' th . stons Id see me m to be required Actin tng. ' httle warn b ' quick .d eci . tl wou . t . . . g on ear1 warningsmg v . coming rrusst es 1at may turn out to be false couhl be r tal of t I h . 1.0 1 , a tion tl1at deteT ce c cmcm ds the threat of swift retal atio o )Ot s1des. The ren no , . . .. 1 . . . me A rican and Ru ssmn thmkin g, and It remains so todav with n ''asr mgra.med in botl1 1 , 0r<.:es shuon hair-trigger ale rt. Y de terrence of a would-be attacker does et not d cl 11b 1 belief tl1at retaltati?n Wl e prompt, but only on the belief tha .epen on t1c t the attacked mav in due course retaliate. A_s K. Subrahmanyam has put it, "Th e stri ke back need n~t 1 be highly tim e-critical. " ' A small force may be a vulnerable for ce, but smaller i w e than bigge r only if th e attacker believes he <:an destroyall ors of the force before any of it can be launche d. Students of organizations rightly worry about <.:omplex and tightly-coupled systems because they are susceptible to damaging accidents. Th ey wrongly belif\e that conflicting nucle ar states should be thought of as a tightly -coupled sy-stem. Fortunate ly, nuclear weapons loosen the coupling of states by les sening the effects of proximity and by cuttin g through the complexities of conven tional confrontations. Organization al theorists fail to distinguish between the tec hnical complexities of nuclear-weapons systems and the simplicity of the situations they create. Sagan points ou t tha t the survival of Indian and Pakistani forces cannot be !!Uaranteed. But neither can the ir co mplete destruction, and that is what matters. Oddly, m pessimists believe that countries witll small and techno any logically limited nuclear forces may be able to accomplish the difficult feat of making a successful ~ t strike but not the easy one of making their own nuc:lear force a~p~ar to be mvulnerable. They overlook a basic nuclear truth: If some part of a f~rce lS Ul\UJnerable, all of the force is invulnerable. Destroying even a major portion of a nudear ftorc d e oes no good because of the damage a small nu mber 0 f sur ng wMheads vJvt . .. can d0 con ve ntion al weapon s put a premi on st nki ng first to gain the 1mtial Um ad . . t te this prenuum. vantage and set the course of the wa r. Nuclear weapons e muna .. The . . 'al f . . 't . half a dozen C s. itie lni h advantage is ins ignificant if the cost o gcu nmg I IS . d. d ""' . tv e tmportant than the size of arsenals, t 1 sophlS ticatio n of eomnltln an aor te . . the COntrol th se b e pr oxi mity of co mpetitors, an d t11e 1 t0 rv ofI the relatiOns. are .. us . nst lhhes of lea de rs. Fo rtu na telv nuclear weapons m e eauers beha,e 'ensibly kl even th .. ' . ough unde r oth er circumstan ces they 1111gIlt be brash and rec ess.
ak , .

~38

PART 2

THE USES OF FORCE

r

YI'\.LI L Y

NlJCLEAR s

The South Asiln ituation. said so often to .be wilhont . .P u' ., i' rr pecl'l!lt. finds r~t:c. .~ dlnts galore. Rather than assuming that the ptescnt_ c I o('b .!lllllf."tlltly from past. we should emphasize the simihuities and learn 1rolll tltPnJ. ~ 'ttnnately, l nd~~ 1 <1 and Pakist<m have learned (iom their nuclear predr ces5or!). . . Sagan believes that future Indian~P<tkist.a n i ctiS<'S m a~ be nw It ar. On<.:e <.:nun. tries have n11clear -.veapons any confrontation that m e n! :-. tL 1 tt rm "cri sis" is .1 nuclear one. \tVith conventional weapons. crises te~1~ tnv~ard JltStcJ hil ity Bet:ausu ~I' the perceived, Or misperceived, advantage or stn.kll1~ fir<.;t, .war I nay be the: OUtCOI11e. ~uclear weapons make crises stable,. w!11ch ts m~ nnpotiant I'C'<l'ion l'or be lievi ng that India and Pakistan are better off '~1th than wtthout tltc m. et Y because nuclear weapons limit escaJatwn , they may tem pt countries t fight small . ,vars. GJenn Snyder long ago idenlined the st~ategic stabil ity/tat:tic,:; instability paradox. Benefits carry costs in the nuclear ~)u JOess just as they do in other endeavors. The possibility of fighting at lov~' l~vels IS~~~ a bad p rice to pay for the impossibility of fighting at high levels. Th1s m poss1biJty beco mes obvious, since in the presence of nuclear weapons no one can score major gains, and all t:an lose catastrophically Sagan canies Snyder's logic a step farther by arguing that Pakistan and India may nevertheless fight to a higher level of violence, belie,ing that if one side or the other begins to lose control, a third party will step in to p revent the use of nuclear weapons. The idea is a hangover fro m cold war days whe n the United States and the Soviet Union thought they had compelling reasons to intervene in other COlllttries' conflicts. The end of the cold war reduced the incentives for such intervention. As K. Subrahmanyam has said, "In a world dominated by th e Cold War, there was a certain preruct.ability that any Chinese nuclear threat to India would be countervailed by one or the other super power or both. In the afterm ath of the Cold \.Var that predictability has disappeared. " 18 Intervention by a thjrd party during low-level fighting would stiJl be possible, but neither side couJd count on it. Kanti Bajpai spotted another consequence of nuclear weapons that may be harmful: They may drive the antagonists apart hy removing the need to agree. Since deterrence works, Bajpai wonders why countries would tJ)' to settle their differences. India and Pakistan, however, did not reach agreement on Kashmir or on other issues when neither had nuclear weapons; now both sides have at least an incentive to discuss their problems. Crises on the subcontinent recur, and when they do, voi.ces of despair predict a conventional clash ending in nuclear blasts. On Dece mber 13, 2001, five gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament. Fourteen people died, including the gun men. In~a, blaming Pakistani terrorists, mounted it~ largest mobilization in the past s ~rty ye~~s and massed troops and equipment along the India-Pakistan border. A ~n the cnsts of 1990, the United States deployed its c..liplomats, this tim e dispatchmg Secretary of State Colin PowelJ to calm the contestants. Tempers on both sides ffar~d, bombast filJed the air, and an American commentato r pointed out ?nee agam that all of the American military's war games show that a conventiOnal Indian-Pakistani war will end in a nuclear conflagration. Both India and Pakjstan claimed that they could fight conventionally in the face of nuclear weapons. ~\~hat reason do we have to believe that militarv and civilian leaders on either side h.ul to
J

z-9 ASIA . I1tlllg a <:onventi al a tand the dang . . . 'g S war a . on {. p . 11 der 1 gamst a nudea . tatements o < - l s cader General M h 1.1 fh~:n military lead~~ C l lplasizcd that any ~~~taarraf, were main)y;o~:~i:bor: ry engagements would h tory. Jo limited to such target:- as guerrilla trainin be trernists. As an a.st .t<" analyst put it "lnclg camps and militarv facJ1ti ave to 1 es used ' Ias wav of I k ' . . I . .. . bveX . oo mg at thjs is th , ' tl1reatemng Pa <J:)tan s coJe tnterests so th at we re . ey would hav ' l cl ,. 19 I d. oot . weapons. . n .li:'lil Pa ers made it cle th at th c no tncentive to 1 h aunc . ar . . ne1r I mtru siuns by irreg 1 f' ey mtended to pressure akistan to control 1mlttary h .. u ar orces. p ,_, _ . r . P atUStan a Kas lnJ n settlement wou Id be unr . . made it cIear J: 1a its oressure ror t1 t alarmist observers, mainly Amencan, neither side looked. emttting. Except to .. as though it would cros even approach the uuclcar threshold. The s I proposlbon th t d . f fi h . or a nuc ear weapons o g ting an ult1 mately preserv ...,it l'"' the extent d ki . e peace agai n ~ d . Are India an Pa stan worse or better off now that the)' ha . oun vlndic:ation. 1 ' e nucearweapons? e cl1eir futures di mmer or brighter? I "vill sum. Ar rnse no one b)' sa. "b . . r . . 1 have }ooked m vam ror 1mportant differences between the . )'mg . nghter." plight of India and pakistan and that of other nuclear countries. Nuclea . th r weapons put all b . h countries at possess them m t e same oat. South Asia is s.,;d to be th e "act.d test" d c.u . or eterrenc-e optimists. So far, nuclear deterrence has passed all ofth e many tests tt has faced.
NOTES

TH TABrury IN SOU

1. Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "India's Arms Race Isn't Safe Like the Cold war Neu: . . rork Times. July 12, 1998, section 4, p. 18.
g '.11' rs (March!April 1999), p. 117. 3. Claudia Dreifus, "Benazir Bhutto," New York Times Maaa:.ine, ~1av 15. 199-t. . 39 K. Shankar Bajpai, '' 1\ uclear Exchange, .. Far Easten1 Eco;omic Reci~, June 2.1,~993: p. 24; Sbamshad Ab mad, "The Nuclear Subcontinent: Bringing Stabilitv to South .-\sia." '" Foreign Affairs 78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p. 125. 4. John F. Bums, "War-Weary Kashmiris Contemplate the Price of Peace.ry Seu.: York Times, JuJy 11, 2001, p. A3. 5. Quoted in Jonathan Spence, "Kissinger and tl1e Emperor," .Veu; York Ret:ietc of Books. March 4, 1999, p. 21. 6. Amitabh Maltoo, "India's Nuclear Policy in an .1\ narchic \\'orld:' in \1attoo. eel.. lndia's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran li and Beyo~1Cl (New Delhi: Har-Anand. 1999\ p. 22. 7 ~rge..Femandes, quoted in John F. Bums, "Indian Defense ChiefCaUs l .S. H~po cntical, New York Times, June 18, 1998, p. A6. 8 Kanti Bajpai, ''The FaJlacy of an Indian Deterrent," in Amitabh M attoo. ed.: lt~dia 's Nuclear Deterrent, p. 183. China does not recognize Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim as parts of India. 9 Quoted in Erlanger "India's Arms Race Isn't Safe Like the Cold W ar.'' :~ Haja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for lndia (New Delhi: Saae, 2000), P: 116. , 2 Karl Kaiser, "Nonproliferation and >Juclear Deterrence. ~un:n:al 31. ~ o.. 111 '!he Failwe of\ udear Deterrence (March!April, 1989), p. 125; Arthur G. RubinoiT. South As.la," ..,. 1 ~ I . P-Al- wronto Globe and Mail. June l, 199 12 '' ou\e Got the Bomb. So Do 1. . 0 . ~uoted in Celia \V. Dugger and Ba.rry Bearak, Y ou are Y to Fight," New York Times. Janua.ty 16. 2000. sec. -4, P l.
2. Strobe Talbott, "Dealing \vi.th the Bomb in Soutl1 Asia, Forei n A"ai

-8 \ 0 1

'J

-~~~----

"" ...

1 n e.

u;:,c.;:, ut- tUKL.t :.

l.l ~h.non .. \ \udnu - 'trotcgyfor Judia , p. 293. l I. llnd .. p. \97. . 15. :<lia \\'. Dugger and 13arry Bt' <lrak. "You've Cot the 13omb. So Dr I uw I Dan You to Fight .'' .\ 'cu; rork Tim('S. J <UlliO.U}' 16. 2000. section 4. p- 1._ . 16. James Bamford, "The Dangers of Spy Planes ," New )_01_k Tllne.~ \pn l ;J, 200 I, p. 1\21.. 17. K. Subrahmanvan. "Nucl ear F'orce Desigll ancl Mulllnurn Dttc n llC:<' Strategy," iu Bharat Karnad~ ed .. Future Im7Jeriled: Judir/<; Security in rlu lVlJ()y (Ill(/ Hr'!JOIId (NC' 11 Delhi: Vikino-, 1994). l . Ibid., p. 186. . f 1 J . 0 t I<' nshlHt e !or Delens< 19. The analvst is Commodore Uday 13haskar, deputy dm> <:tory Studies ~~d Analys is. quoted in Hajiv Chandrasekaran "~or l nlU D<:teiTenct May 'ot a Preve nt \Var; Washi11gton Post Foreign Service. Jantn- y l t, 2002. P Al. u

' yztu 1 e primary instruments that states can and must use nam m more deta'l one 0 f . 'li tJl cl . I h ' e1 ml tary power l n art Three, we are concerne w1t 1 t e other [)Iimary instru y. t f : P . men o state action. econonuc power. Disparities in powe r, as we sa'.v earlie r have important efre t bh ' 1, c s on state e avior. Such dispant1e~ occur not Simpl y because of the differences in the miutmY power that states w1eld but also because of the differences in econom1c resources . that they generate. In the fi~st mstance, th~ force that a nation can wield is dependent in part on the economic wealth that 1t can muster to support and sustain 't~ military forces_. vVealth is ther~fore a C~l~ponent of state power. But the generati~~ of wealth , unlike the gene ration of m1lttary powe r, is also an end of state action. Except in the rares t of circumstances, miUtmy power is never souaht as an end in itself, but rather is acquired as a means to attain security or the other ends that a state pursues. By contrast, wealth is both a component of state power and a uood that can be consumed by its citizenry. Force is mustered ptimarily for the exiernal arena. Wealth is sough t for both the external and the domestic arena. ~.loreover. wealth and power differ in the degree to which states can pursue each ''~thout detriment to the positions and interests of other nations. ~o situation in international politics is ever totally cooperative or conflictual, but the potential for cooperative behavior is great er in the realm of wealth than in the realm of power. It is the duality of economic power (as a component and end of state actio~ ) and its greater potential for common gains that makes the analysis of th.e role 1t plays in state behavior and international interactions complex and elu 1 The 'e. study of international political economy, as it has been traditionall~ understood. encompasses both these aspects of economic powe r. St<l

the P I...nteart One, we exam ined[rom meaning ofTwo we anal saw. the consequences 10r . n cl . In Part anarchy and behav10r that owe 1t. _
1

PERSPECTIVEs ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

"The , . Sctence of economics presupposes a gtven political order' .and c-annot. be . . a1 k. pro6tablYstu<li ed in isolation from polltics." So wrote E H Cm 10 his semm \\Or ~
261

26:!

PART 3

THE INTERNATION AL POU TICA L ECONOM Y

THE INTERNATIONAL PO
an r or nineteenth- n' t~ts, th~: world's weal th wH c::. .. . u lWenticth-c: ...., txcc1 an (:Uth could be 111C.:J'(. 'id lor all, hut be<.:ausc wealtl .I entu ry rnercantt' l ,, ' . . . . . \, e p<>W is relative. 110l cihso lutc, c.:onAt<.:t wou )' 1 contrihutes lo national IV\IS'-<i. er . d u 1 -vWc r an A 11 thre e SCh0 0b or thOUght are JllOtivatd by<.:Ontinue. th ". . n . M .1. . . . econ omtc.:s. c rcantt 1sts stress the pri ma' etr vtew<.., on tlre reIahon ofpolf . ocs to d . 1 thc.:s and th 't of national po,\er a n relattvc position in ...y o. po1 tl e c:onsec1ut nt urstU IC mternati . 1 ., Pal nd Marxists stress the prim a<.:y of economi s F ona arena. B liboth er s a " or t1 fo 1e h nomic harm ony can override the for<.:es of nao . rmer, t e potential for eCO . tsm . d For the latte r, econom 1 : . rests dete rmin e ona.1. l if onlYfree trade 1s c. mte b e ursu po ttlc.:a eha\10 , . 1 . P c.rst is conflictu al, tl 1e sec.:ond mus t be also Both l'b 1 d r anu, smce . the u . I era1 an Ma . t s sh poHtics fro m mte rn at10 nal relations the form er th h f . TXJS 5 want to I Jant ' through the unive rsal spread of. communism . Merc.:a roug ree trad~ tlle lattt Jk ter . . db 1 . n1 ' se presc.:Jipbons as nruve an e 1 that the national inte::sts. t fe reahsts' "'le\\. eve t the . lb I . res s o every state a only partly dete nn mcc _ y t teu ~c.:onomi c.: interests. re Contemporary wnters continu e to wrestle with the relation b 1.\1. .. t . , t' 1a re . Rob 1 een na 0na ra1rs ert 0 . Keo hane anal) e 1 po lti<.:S and econom1c.:s 1n m e1. 1, . . . .. .. . . rzes w 1at t} pes 0 f international pohtical structures are co~duc1~e. to economic.: cooperation among nations. He finds the theor?' of hegem~mc stablity-that a dominant power is necessaJ)' to cr~a_t~ and sustam a stable mte mational economic order-a suggestive but not defimbve way to understand the last one hundred years. A hegemonic power can fost er economic cooperation among states, as the United States diu after World War II, but cooperation can occur in the absence of such a power. A hegernonic power is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition fo r interstate cooperation. Bruce R. Sco tt looks at the political-economic relations bel.\,een rich and poor states, and asks why the gap between thes e two has increased durin g the globalization era of the last twe nty years, when, in fact, neoclassical economic theory predicts that the gap sho uld have decreased. According to this theory, in a free global market poor states lessen the gap because they are supposed to urow !aster than rich states. That this has not happen ed is due , according to Sc.:ott, to the barriers imposed by the rich states on imm igration and agliculture from the poorer states. and to the inad equ ate governm ent structures in the poor states that make them less than ideal outl ets for c.:apital investm ents from the rich states. Th~. the reasons are political-econom ic in nature, and the fault lies with both the nch and the poor states.

l'ht lkcn ty ) cm~ Cris is. in 1939. Fifty years earli er, in aut s~ : "ltitlc.d so<.:ill . . I1 ISJl1 l . topi an or 'ci(n ti fk" .Karl Marx.s c:oau tI10r. rL ' nee l n_c_ 1 lgtI" tt\M rted : <"i : malLt'iatist concep~ion of histOJ)' stmts from the prop o~t tlml th:tt thl' prouu<.: tio he th0 memts to support hu man life. . . is the basis of all social stn1 durL ...... These 1 ~~f ,;c."ws- that econ omi c processes are not autonomous but J'('cpnn political stru <.: tllr :' to support them and that economi c factors dete rrni ne tlr~ 'iO<.:~al and politic:~ structures of states-represent the polar extremes on th(' relatJOn\IHp of poli tic:!\ an<.J E't'OllOtnics. \ Vhich ,;ew is correct? To this qu~ st~on the_r~ is n~ imp k or ~i ngle an!lwer. :\ ny repl y is as much philosophical as rt IS em~) mcal. ~ he <-'C:Onom1 inte rests c of indi viduals in a state and of states within th e mtc rnat onal ar:ena do powcrfnl h affe c.:t the goals that are sought and th_e_degree_of succ~ss '~'t t h wlli c.:h thE>y ar~ attained . But the politi<.:aJ shu cture of mte rn atro naJ ad1 ts e:J so a constrain t. on Anarclw makes cooperati ve actions more diffi cu lt to attai n than vonlcl othe rwise be the ~ase and requires that states t~en con ~ide r both rel~1 tivc and abso lutc positions whe n framing actions in the mte rnab onal eco nom1 c realm. Anti oft en in inte rnational politics the imperatives of security and survival ove rri de the <.li<:tates of economic interests. War, afte r all, alm ost neve r pays in a st ric:t balance-sheet sense, particul arly when waged between states of roughl)' equal power. The economic wealth lost in fighting is usually not recouped in the peace th at follows. The best answers to the question , wha t is tbe re latio n between poli tic.:!~ and economics in inte rnational affairs, have been give n by the classical theo rists international politics. Robert Gilpin examines thre e schools of thought- the liberals, the Marxists, and the mercantiHsts. Unlike the othe r two , Hbe ral political ec:onomists have stressed the cooperative, not the c:onflictual, natu re of inte rnational economic relations. They have exte nde d Ada m Smith's argu me nts about the dom estic economy to the international economy. SmHh argued that the specialization of function by individuals within a state , toge ther wi th their unfe ttered pursuit of thei r own self-interests, would increase the wealth of a nati on and thereby benefit all. Collective harmony and national wealth could th us be the produc.:t of selfinterested behavior, if onJy the gove rnm ent wou ld provide as little restraint on individual action as was necessary. The eighteenth-century phil osophers and the nine teenth- and twentieth-centu ry free traders argued that what was good for individuals within a state would also be good for states in th e inte rnation al arena. B y trading freely with one another, states could specialize according to their respective comparative advantages and tile wealth of all nations would, as a consequ ence, increac;e. "Make trade not war" has bee n the slogan of the Jjbe ral free traders. By contrast, both mercantiusts and Marxists have seen state relation s as inherently conlietual. For Marxi~t~. this is so because capitausts within and among states compete fier<:ely with one another to maximize their profits. Dri ven by tl1eir greed. they are incapable of cooperating with one anothe r. Because a state's poH :y is det~ ~ c. ~ined by ~e capitalist ruling c~s , states will wage wars for profit and , under t.:enJO ~ dit.-tum, wdl wage wars to rediVIde the world's wealth. Imperia H as the hJghes sm stage of capitalism L~ a cla~sic zero-sum situation. Mercantilisto; also argu e that economic fac:tors make relations among states c:onflictual. Tl1eir anal ysis, ho.vever. rests not on the externalization of class conflict, but on the natu re of poutical and

.Jo{)oornl

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l<l nt H .:<.: ntury rnerc: til'

L.

UTICAL ECONOMY

263

or

THE MEANING OF GLOBALIZATION

At th b 1 e eginning of the twe nty-first centu1y, wluc1 way WJJJ the intemational poiH. t ica] ld t t11e political will ne<..-essary o economy go? Can the nations of the wor mus er d h all ven if res . . . . P erve a relative ly ope n mte mat wmu syste m that has bene1ite t em e . the h h 1 a1 costs ol se,ere e<.'OOOffilC.:. disY ave ben efited unequally? Or, have t e po the od ~ been too Iocar h pr uc lons , w 1eh the ope n system of the 1 . two decadesclhastill nake sense when ast great? Will states laps e into protectionis m'? Does free tra e s 1

:U ).t

PART 3

TH.E INTERNATIONAL POLfTICAL ECONOl\.rr

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

longer Rxed . wh <'n . the refore . comp;uative advantages are no longc.r 'lta tk hu l perhaps ea~';'~ created behind pro tectionist barri ers? le T he e are difficult qu estions to answe r. How the~ are ;1J1S\\'t'rc~d dep ew~ LJ . lcav. ilv on how ecunonucally interdepend ent one sees tI1c tt:tltons of the wo rld t .1 . l I .. l ntPrde pe ndencc'' is one of those terms that has c en': op ed a 11l) . . Oua Ttad of mean 'v. . ntgs. The most fruitfu l \ovay to use the term, when constden.n~ I he r<'l . atlonsh ip between this concep t and peaceful cooperation am on~ stat<'_s, l!l a~ [ol lo~vs: IntcrdC'p<:nde ncc is the size of the stake tha t a state believes tt has m see mg other stat(:s' econo mies prospe r so as to help its own eco nomy prospe r too. fll terdependen<:e can be high or low. The more highJy pe rceived i nt~rcle ~ende~ce .is, the larger a state's stake in the economic we ll-being of the co11ntnes W wh tch Jth 1 heavily intert acts; the less interdepe nde nce, the smalle r is its stake. High levels of interdependence should fac ilitate cooperation aJ.ll ong sta tes for the ir mutual g<ti n. After World War II, the United States used its considerable econom ic: and military power to create an ope n intem ation aJ economic ord er by wo rking to lower the barrie rs among nation s to the R of manufactu red goods, raw ow materials other than agricultu re, and capital . The result of tlus international eco nom ic openness was a rise in tJ1e level of inte rdependence, pa rticularly among tb e industlializec.l nat ions of the wo rld , but also, to a con siderable degree, among the ind ustliaJizing nations in East Asia and Latin America. But interdep ende nce has its costs as weU a~ its benefits. High levels of participation in the inte rnatio nal econo my can bri ng the benefits of efficie ncy tl1at Row fro m specializatio n, but also the des truction of national industries tl1at can no longer com pe te inte rna tionally. Sta tes today must reconcile the imperatives of what Robert Gil pin has called "Keyn es at home" with "Smith abroad": maintenance of full employment domestically and competitive participation in the inte rnational economy. Th rough exports and cap ital inB ows, interdepende nce can help a state inc rease its wealth , but it also bri ngs vulnerabilities that derive from the need to rely partia!Jy on others for one's own prospe tity. Balancing the two imperatives is a difficult political act. Interdependence can exist between pai rs of cou ntJi es an d can be generated by importan t but narrow flows of goods. Globaliza tion , as the ter m indicates, involves most if not all countries an d a wid e ran ge of eco no mic transacti ons. The potential loss of autonomy is broade r because the nat ure of nat ional econom ies, the abilities of states to direct the ir indivi dual econo mk an d eve n social policies. and the stability of governme nts are affect ed by the movemen t toward a truly worldwide economy. The readin gs in this section explore various asp ect s of in terdep endenc.:e and globalization . Jeffrey Franke l provides several be nchma rks by wh ich to measure the globali7 on and integration of the wo rld econo my tod ay an ..ati d the n provi_ des a tentative balance sheet on the economic an d soc ial effects of globalizatJOn . Martin Wolf ~al~es the factors that have produ ced globaliza tion and assesse~. the threats to 1t. Fmally, Ke nneth N. Waltz argues tha t the wo rld wide nature 0 .za gJobal1 ti on has been exagge rated an d t11at sta . tes -e sp ecially powen!: .1 ones like w the United States--continue to play leadin g roles and to be gu ide d by poHtleal <!alculations.
110

fnt:to r tn dm\l lWnts (land . labor, capital, and ted moloro ;,n.

OS AND co.;s OF GLOBALIZATION rB PR

265

.. Jobalization ~hould nul only be measured and c . rod a ~"sessed. Doe~ it benefit all states that be<:ome ompareld, how lys eve r; _J 0 Je ,.., entang ed in 't d it must . ws efit at the exp ense o~ the many? 1s heavy parti<:ipation in tbe I ' or o a few bell 'site to ccononnc develo pment, or c:an such , t' ,. .global eoonor rerequt 1 1 ] . pc IC:tpatwn actuaU . hny a u p elo ment? Does go >a JZatJ()n hasten the degradation of the . } tann dev_._ ~protectio n of worke r lights in both the ric.;h and r)()Q . . . enVlro~ment, w e eaJ\ . . I 1 countnes . and !1tve t00 I' Power. to mu 1tm atlona . c:orporatlons? Globali?.ation m . 1 ; o1uc . . " ay 1 .1 but 1 1s no longc1 seen d S. . unalloyed <rood as the prot t)e. aSact of toda 5 t ,m wor1 u, . Y o , es s m eattlem l999 and in Genoa in 20~ 1 d~mo~strate,the three readings m tl11s section take differi ng stands on tllese . . b qutstions. 0 am. 1 Rodrik asserts that gobal1zation can . ea false ?ro rnis~ to developing stat es. He chalfree-trade orthodoxy by showmg that h1gh tarilf and nontam'fba 1 0 . en(Jes . . . , mers do not 1 necessarily bnng w1tl1 the m low g1 th, an~ cugues_ t the preparations o~v tha that poorer states must take to open tl1emse~ves up to mtem_ahonal trade and investm ent divert precious and scarce res o~ rc~s from the tas k o~ economic developm ent. Geoffrey Garrett argues that globahzation may have benefit ed the rich and poor counhies, but it has hurt both the middle income countries and the industrial middle classes in the wealthy countries. This "middle" has missed the benefits of globalizati on because neither the middle income countries nor the middle classes within the rich countries can compete in eithe r the global k wle dge economy or the global -no low wage economy. The only ho pe for both parts of the "missing middle' is to ent er the global knowledge economy. Joh n Micke lthwait and Ad rian Wooldridge tak e an opposin(1 view to both Rodrik and Garrett. Global economic growth , they arg ue, has been aided significantly by tJ1e growth in wo rld trade. Globalization can also be a force lor protecting the enviro nm ent because the wealthier states become, the more they tend to clean up the ir environment. Fin ally, globalization aids wo rkers because m national companies generally pay better wages and provide bet ulti ter working conditions than the ir local competitors.

:1{#' --.

...

-----------=--=-~~-

PERSPECTIVES ON PO LITICAL ECONOMY

rhe Nature ofPolitical Economy

ROBERT GILPIN
The international corp orations hat;e evidently declared /eol l ,. . 1 , ogtca war on the "antiquated natwn state. ... The charge that materialisn L _ ._ 1, mouenu:::.ation and intern a~ ion~ L is ~he new liberal creed of corporate capitalism is is1~ 0 valid one: The .t1;1plzcat1~n tS clea~: The. nation .state as a political unit of democrattc d.ectswn -makzng must, m the mtere~i of "proJ!.ress," yield control to the new mercantile mini-powers. 1 While the stru cture of the multinational corporation ~~a modern concept, designed to meet the requirements of a modem age, the nation st~te is very 0 old-fashioned idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present com]Jlex world. 2

These two statements-t he first by Kari Levitt, a Canadian nationalist, the second by George Ball, a form er United States tmdersecretary of state express a dominant theme of contemporary writings on intemational relations. Intemational society. we are told, is increasingly rent between its economic and its political organjzation. On the one hand, powerful economic and technological forces are creating a hi<1hly interdependent world economy, thus diminishing the tr-aditional significance of national boundaries. On the other band, the nation-state continues to command men's loyalties and to be the basic unit of political decision making. As o_ne \\~ter has put the issue, "The conflict of our era is between ethnocentric nationalism and geocenmc technology."3 . .. Ball and Lev itt represent two contending positions with res_pect to t~s conf!Jct. Whereas Ball advocates the diminution of the power of the nation-state m order ~o give full rein to the productive potentialities of the multinational COJP?ration, ~~~~ argues for a powerful nationalism which could counterbalance Ame ncan c:orpo
From US
!l....,

. 20-J-4. Copvri~ht C L975 by 1 Power and the Multinational Corporati<>ll by Robert C'lpUl, PP ~ B ~ LL.C. ""'ll{' Books l . 1.. mher of Perseus oo ne. Reprinted by permjssion of Basw Bool\.~. a me

267

v u .. r 11'1 I

I HI:: NATURE 0

F POUTICAL ECONOMY

dl,tniuatinn. \\'ha t appears to one <lS the logical .u.t_d I -;iJ,lhk~ tonstqllt'n<:< . t.' ('t)llO Jllic ratio nalit v cent s to the othe r tu be Htl C' llmi o:t tit<' pa rt o f' A tn tf ol .11 impeliali m to elim inate < contell< t c:e1tcr of1>uwer t<:a11 u mg . <Th Altll ~)u t> the adv('nt of the multination;tl. corpontt ton 1,,,:--. put the clu" t . . . thl' r "'lationsbip behveen economics and pol,n cs m a llC'' 1:!. 111 \l' . Jt s nn old 's ton f)f iss11 .. the nineteenth century. for exampi~. it "~<lS tl~i~ iso;.ue t~a~ di, id('d t:la~s icallih~.;'i:11l ~ t like John Stuart Mill from econo n~l~o naltst~ .. ~ C'.l~~c ~u tl<~l h~. Cco rg Fri<>dri<:h .ntc List. \\'he reas the form er gave pnmaC) Ill the ot ~,tn tz,ttto ll of .s<'<: tt'ly to tconotllit and the production of weaJth. the latte r emphas1 the polt t teal detc rm inat ion ol' 4<'d ec.:onomic relations. As th is issue is central both to.th ~ c~utelllp~rary debate o the 11 multinational corporati on and to the argum ent of tlus stud) , tlus chapter anah~~,es the three major treatments of the relationship between Ct'OI IOini cs and politi~~ that is, the th~ee major ideologies of poli tical economy.

THE MEANING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

The argument of this study is that the relationship between e<:onomi<:s and politics, at least in the modern worl d, is a reciprocal one. On the one hand, politic.:s large ly detennines the framework of economic acti"ity and channels it in directio~s intended to serve the interests of dominan t groups; the exercise of power in all its forms is a major determinant of the nature of an economic: system. On the other hand , the economic process itself tends to redistribute power and wealth; it transforms the power relationships amon g groups. This in tu m leads to a trans for mation of the political system, there by gi\'ing rise to a new structu re of economic relationships. Thus, the dynamics of international relations in the mod em world is largely a function of the reciprocal interactio n between economics and politic.:s. First o[ all, what do I mean by "politics" or "economics"? Cha rles Kindleberaer speaks of economics and politics as two diffe rent methods of allocating scarce resources: the first through a market mechanism , the latte r through a budget. Hobert 0 . Keohane and Joseph Nye, in an excellent analysis of international politi cal t>conomy, define economics and politics in term s of two levels of analysis: tl1ose of st111cture and of process:5 Politics is the domain ''having to do with the establishm ent of an order of relations, a structure... :>6 Economics deals with "short-term aiJocative belta,ior (i.e., holding institutions, fundamental assumptions, and expee;tations constant). :; Like Kind.Jeberger's definition , however, this definition tends to isolate economic <Uld poJiti.c:al phenomena exc-ept under certain condition s, which Keohane and Nye define as the "politicization" of the economic syste m. Neither formulation comes to terms adequately with the dynamic and intimate nature of the relationship between the ~~;o: In this study, the issue of the relationship between economics and pol~hcs translates into that between wealth and power. According to thjs statement of th~ problem, economics takes as its province the creation and distribution of wealth, po~tics is the re.alm of power. I shall exam ine their relationship from seve~al ideo logical perspec-tives, includi~g my o~. But what is weal tl1? \.Vhat is powe,:? ded In response to the question, What 1 wealth?, an econ omist-colleague respOI1 e s "What do you want, my thirty-se<.:ond or thirty-volume answe r?" Basic concepts aJ

269 . n econotll t<.' <my held of in<Jttiry t\ h ltSJVC I I r . I! e l sSI.,),e. .Ac;k a r)I1\.SIU't tor IllS ( (' llli tion of the n h line: alien~ea)(! dcfinit:iO ' . f tls arc . . < ~ re 0 spac: . t. pO ;Jl tJOt cret a' c~ ' t ,fn ng response. \\'hat ,. u <'.time, alld.matter, .,,1d IJ \\ o . I . ' 0 11 Wl get i . . <u ~'0 e whic h ts u. .~b { 1t perm tts the ph)sicist to\) il l . s ,m operational dc:finfl on . ll I I . tiO .d t'onswoulc.I c . J cn nn >t 'llnlertl es<.:rutin)'.Of th ~ll hilan tntellectuaI edificewhose fotlfl a I nJar k UlC conc.:ept () r\\'eaItI1. upon which the p . osopher S11 ' fi e scten . cannot be dan l'(1 . u c1 f' 111 e 1nithe way. PauJ Sam Is ce of econonu~ ultimately . rests.trv though he pru' i<ks a clue in his definition of ue on, ~n his textbook. doe n~t e,en r ' nd society choose .. . to emplov scarce rmxlucti ,economtcs as "tlle ~tudy of how . nen a . . . 1 . 1 1 . .b " . ' <: , . ornrnodines ... anc c tstJt nte them for consum )t'resourc:es . .. to I)rod uce 'an!! F' ous c [ ton. ~ a, tJu1t weal tJ 1 is an~tI1ing (e;apital, land, or labor) that . ollowina th.IS Ieau, we .., can 5 . . can 1pI1)'SIC;a1asstts an cl human e;apital (in<.:l d' generate futu re . . coll1} JOsed o hod moome; Jt IS . rpo Jttl.ca I scien u mg etn iecl know! I ) The basic cone;ept o ce is power. t-.~lost olinc:a.l sci . . elge t stop here; thev would include in the definjtion of pal 1 . ennsts would ~onvhich powe r i~ used , wheth er this be the advancem e~ttc:oa thc~encbeJthe purpose rs 1 0 . f e or he domination o one grou p over another. In anv tase few wouldpu IC welfare h di t sent from t e foUo"~ng statemen t o f I IaroIcI Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan:
0

()

f.

wider sense, of all the deference values. or of influence in gencral).9

The concept o.f.powcr is pe:haps the most fundamental in the \\'hole of political ~<.:i ence: The pohtlcal process ts the shapina, distribution_ and exercise of power in a

Power as such is not the sole or even the principal aoal of tate behavior. Other goals or values constitute the objectives pursu ed by nation-states: welfare, securitr. prestige. But powe r in its seve ral form s (military, economi('. psychological) is ultimately the necessa1 means to achieve these goals. For this reaso n. nation-states y are intensely jealous of and sensitive to their relative power position. The distribution of power is imp ortant because it profoundly affects the ability of state to achieve what they perceive to be their interests. The nature of powe r, however, is even more elushe than that of wealth. The number and varie ty of definitions should be an embarrassment to polltical scien tists. Unfortunately, th is study cannot bring the intradisciplinary squabble to an end. Rath er, it adopts the denition used by Hems J. Morgenthau in his influential P s Among Nations: '" man's control over the minds and actions of other men ... 10 olitic Thus, power, like wealth, is the capacity to produce certain results. Unlike wealth, however, power cannot be quantified: indeed. it cannot he ~vere mphasize d that pow er has an important psychological dimension. Perce ptions of power relations are of critical imp01tance; as a consequence. a fundam~n tal task of states men is to manipulate the perceptions of other state s~en ~egardmg the distribution of powe r. Moreover, power is relative to a specific sttuation o.r set of C ircumstances; there is no single hienuchy of power 10 ter national relatiOnS 111 .. Power may take many for-ms-militarv, economic, or ps~'chologi~aJ-:-t~ough. 10 the Anal analysis force is the ultimate form of po"'e r. Finally. tJ1e lnability to predict the behavio; of others or the outcome of events is of great significance. Uncetrtamty of o regarding the distribution of power an d t he ab'l'tv . the statesmrnthe tt Ulti tehcde~ntrol even ts plays an impOJtant role in intemntional relation. . ma .'t .as 'l ter mtnation of the distribution of powe r C<W be mude onl\' tn retrospec
J

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PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTLCAL ECONOM'r

GILPIN I THE NATURE

OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

a t:entral place in the history of international relation . . I' l1ort, powe~~~ely, 15 t!'lusin_> concept indeed upon which to erect a science of pr' 1 itic~ an "nch mutually exclusive definitions of economics anti p>!it ics as these counter to much contemr1onuv scholarship by both economists and political . _ run ; f' l l . . SCJe nti ' t S, for hoth disCiplineS are invading the Ofll1 ~f )' ex<: IJSl\.l! JUrisd ictions of' tit , other. Economists, iJl particular, have beco_J~e JJlt~.l~ec:t_uaJ_ llnl~~rialists; they <\IJI)hing their analytical techniques to tradttwna] 1 of pobti<:Hl science Wit 1 ssue::. . 1' ' 1 great success. These developments, however, r~aJly rem[o_r~e lite basic premise of this study, namely, the inseparability of econon11~S and poh~c.s. The distinction drawn above between econ01m~:s as the scJence of wealth and polities as the science of power is essentially an analytical one. In the real world, wealth and power are ultimately joined. This, in fact, is the bask rationale for a poHtical economy of intemational relations. But in order to develop the art, ument of th is stucl r wealth and power will be treated, at least for the moment, as analytically distinct. y, To provide a perspective on tbe natur~ of po~ticc~ ~conomy, the next section v.rill discuss the d1ree prevailing concept10ns of pohhcal economy: liberalism, Marxism, and mercantilism. Liberalism regards politics and economics as relatively separable and autonomous spheres of activities; I associate most professional economists as well as many other academics, businessmen, and American officials with this outlook Marxism refers to the radicaJ criti.que of capitalism identified with Karl Marx and his contemporary disciples; according to this conception, economics determines politics and political structure. Mercantilism is a more questionable term because of its historical association with th e desire of nation-states for a trade surplus and for treasure (money). One must distinguish, however, between the specific form mercantilism took in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the general outJook of mercantilistic thought. The essence of the mercantilistic perspective, whether it is labeled economic nationalism, protectionism, or the doctrine of the Gennan Historical School, is the subsmvience of economy to the state and its interests-interests that range from matters of domestic welfare to those of international security. It is this more general meaning of mercantilism that is implied by the use of the term in this study. Following the discussion of these three schools of thought, I shall elaborate my own, more eclecticQview of political economy and demonstrate its releve:mce for understanding the phenomenon of the multinational corporation.
:Htch

l'\ll\St'quenct' of war. Jt is precisely for this reason that w;~.r kt<" bnd_ 11 nfortu . .

;..-----ornic Nature of econ relations Nature of the actors . Goal of economic activity tionship between .. Rela 1 economics and po ltiCS

rA.f3!.-E

I coMPARlSO!v _.r~ THE THREE CONCEPTI

271
ONS OF POLITIC

:.Jberalisrn

~~~~-----~~~~~----~~~~------~M~e:rc~a:n~til~ is~m~~ Harmonious : Conflictual

Conflictual Households and firms Max1mization of global welfare E conomics should determine politics Dynamic equilibrium Economic classes

. Marx1sm

AL ECONOMY

a: r

N ation-states

T heory of change

Maximization of Maximization of class interests national interest Economics does PolitiCS determines determine politics economics Tendency toward S in the hifts disequilibrium distribution of power
I

THREECONCEPTIONSOFPOUTICALECONOMY
The three prevailing conceptions of political economy diffe r on many points- Several critical differences will be examined in this brief comparison. (See Table J.)

Adam Smith. Disputing his mer<;antilist predecessors S 'th . . . 1 . , . ld b . ' mt argued that mternational econom1c re abons cou e made a positive-s h . . um s ld gam, and .no one need lose, from a proper 0game; t at 1 to say' everyone cou d . f" . . } d. 'b . f. . r enng o economlC.: . relations' albe1t t 1e Jstn ution o these gains may not be equa1 FoIIow1ng Smitb . . liberalism assumes that there 1s a basiC hannony between true natio na]merest and t , . . . cosmopolitan ~cono~1c mterest. Thus, a prominent member of this school of thought has wntten, m response to a radical critique, that the economic efficiencY of the sterling standard in the nineteenth century and that of the dollar standard i~ the twentieth centu ry serve "the cosmopolitan interest in a national fonn."ll Although Great Britain and the United States gained the most from the international role of their respective currencies, everyone else gained as weU. Liberals argue that, given this underlying identity of national and cosmopolitan interests in a free market, the state should not interfere "vith economic transactions across national boundaries. Through free exchange of commodities. removal of restrictions on the How of investment, and an international division of labor. everyone will benefit in the long run as a result of a more efficient utilization of the world's scarce resources. The national interest is therefore best served, liberals maintain, by a generous and cooperative attitude regardin<T economic relations with other counhies. In essence, the pursuit of self-interest in a free. competitive economy achieves the greatest good for the greatest number in international 110 less than in the national society. . Both mercantilists and Marxists, on the other hand, begin "\~th the premtse that the essence of economic relations is conflictual. There is 110 unde:l~'ing harmony; indeed, one group's gain is another's loss. Thus, in the language of game ~1 e orv h . . .,, w ereas liberals regard econom1c relahons as a no n-zero-sum 11ame, Maoosts o and mercantilists view economic relations as essentially a zero-sum game.

The Goal of Economic Activity

The Nature of Economic Relations
The basic assumption of liberalism is that the nature of international ecoJ~orni~ 0 relations is essentially harmonious. Herein lay th. great intellectual innovatJOll e

For th lib . . . . 15 t}1 . timum or efficient use of r. thewoeId' eral, the goal of econom1c actJVJty 00 ofe opld we1 While most lib. ti wor 1are. r s scarce resources and the max:tmtza . .b Marxists an<l erais fu di - ne distn ution, ' re se to make value judgments regar ng mcol

:2 - ,.,

...

PART 3

THE lNTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOM'

GILPIN I

THE NATURE O

F POUTICAI_

trt:>s.!. the distributive effects of economJ<: :e>J:,H 1 1s I or thl' M . the di tribution o f wealth among social dasse~ ~central for tht lTIPrtanlilist it~~:\~ di tribution of c mplo\ment. industrv. and milttar: PO\\'< non~ nat1on-stat" hH . / . -' I. I . . '"\ l at b. mo t igni.ficant. Thus. the goal of ec,.onomtc (anu po I<.J .1cttv1t~ for bot!. .\fatl(. ~'ts and mercantilists is the redistribution of wealth and pm ..:r

m~rtantilisb

ECONOMY

The State and Public Policy

These three perspectives differ decisively in ~eir 'iew_ regarding the nature of th<: e<..'Onomic actors. In Marxist analysis, the bas1c actors In both clolllcstic: and intE:rnational relations are economk classes; the interesb of the dominant class U<:termine the forei&rn policy of the state.. For me rca nt~ists. _tl c real actors in international e<.:onomic relations are nation-states: nat1 onal mtcrest <.l cterminel> foreign policy. National interest may at times be inAuenced b~ the peculiar economic interests of classes, elites, or other subgroups of the soc1 cty; hut factors of geography, external configurations of po~ver. and th e exigcn~ies of national survival are primary in determining foreign policy. Th~~ whe reas !berals spe~k of world welfare and Marxists of class interests, mercantiLists recogmze only the mterests of particular nation-states. . . Although liberal economists such as Da\1d R1cardo and Joseph Schumpettr recognized the importanc:e of class conllict and neoclassical liberals analyz.e economic growth and polic.')' in terms of national economies, the Liberal emphasis is on the individual consumer, firm, or entrepreneur. The liberal ideal is summarized in the view of Harry Johnson that the nation-state has no meaning as an economic:
~ti~u

Underlying these contrasting views are di ffering conceptions of the nature of the state and public policy. For liberals, the state represents an aggregation of private interests: public policy is but the outcome of a pluraHstic struggle amon11 interest groups. Marxists, on the other hand, regard the state as simply the "executive committee of the niling class,... and public poucy reflects its interests. Merc:antiJists, however, regard the state a~ an organic unit in it~ own right: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Public poli<..y, therefore, embodies the national interest or Rousseau's "general will" as conceived by the poli tical elite.

Theories of Change

1be Relationship between Economics and Politics:

Liberalism, Marxism, and mercantilism also have differing views on the relation-

srup between economics and politics. And their differences on this issue are directJy relevant to their contrasting theories of international politicaJ change. Although the liberal ideal is the separation of economics from politics in the interest of maximi7ing world welfare, the fulfillment of this ideaJ would have import ...r." nnlif.i,_J lications. The cIassiea] statement of these implications was that ' . AlP ~ amp . d Adam Smith in The Wealth of Natil>ru.J3 Economic growth, Smith argued, 15 primarily a fimctionoftbeenentofth e division oflabor, whicl1 in tu m is dependent

n tbe scale of the rn tdat.. Thus he aH--ked t h(; ha .. . ~~ upo . alines and m<:r<.:anllhstc stat(;s avain.t th rn(:rs ertt.tcd b.. r. dal ..;nclp "' ., e excha , 11 u PJl'" .....ent of markt s rt nt(;n were to Jnulo'pl th . nue of goods and Ll ]atge" Y <. 1 . organi 7.ation and e1r w(:aJt}' -> argue;d u1e: en clic.:tion betwe<n po hcal . m1th th cantra . f h I L e<.'Onormc ati at . t ohed in fa\or o t e atte r. Tuat L~. the pur~uit of wealth r On' lty had to be res of the political ordcr. ~houlu tk:t<:rmine the nature . 5 bsequentI}. f rom nm<::tten th -<.:entuT\ econom .b u , 1c 1 erals t0 t\ J . rs on economic inl<:gration, there has existed th . L vtntitth<:t:ntuT\ \\11te . h. I e uream of , , . fworlc.l commer<:e, m w 1c l national boundanes I' a great repuhllc o wou u <:ease t 0 h omic importance and the web of trade would bind all th a\e art~ great 4 ~thne prosperitv of pea<.:e."' 1 For liberals the lon$1-term t dt pec;pJt of tftt world 11) / o ren IS toward . Id . on wherein funct1 ons. authorin:, and lovalties . .11 he v.or tnlegran ' units to large r ones; from states to federalism-from fed transfe rred from 'l ' WJ .. roaller at ~onal unions and from these to superstates."l:3 The l~gic: of ecoenr ~r~ todsuprhana. _ , om1 nmcal developme nt, 1t L'> argueu, has set mankind on an inexo . bl <.: an tee no lv~ ra e course toward lobal political unification and world peac:t. g In Marxism, the <.:oncept of the contradiction between economic and .ti ...,.1 1 .I . t h' . alJ .hereas classical liberals-although pol 1.41 relations was enacteu 1n o stone aw. _\' Smith less than ~tl_1ers-h~ld that the rt~mremenls of economic: rationaliry ought to determine political r~lahons, the .\llaTXISt position was that the mode of production does in fact determme the superstructure of political relations. Thtrefore. it 15 argued, history can be understood as the product of the dialectical process-the contradiction between the evolving techniques of production and the resistant sociopolitical system. AJthough Marx and Engels wrote remarkably Dttle on international ec.-onomic:s, Engels, in his famous polemic, Anti-Duhring, explicitJy considers whether ec:onomics or politics is pimary in determining the structure of international relations.16 E. K. Duhring, a minor figure in the German Historical School. had argued, in contradiction to Marxism, that property and market relations resulted less from the economic logic of capitalism than from extraec-onomic political factors: "The basis of the exploitation of many by man was an historka1 act of force which created an exploitative economic system for the benefit of the stronger_.lan n orclass." 17 Since Engels, in his attack on Duhring, used the example o~the u~~ tion of Germany through the Zollverein or customs union of 183.'3, his ~~'SJS 15 direc:tly relevant to this discussion of the relationship between econonu<:s and po~ticaJ organization. .. Engels argued that when contradictions arise between economic and poUtic-~ structures, political power adapts it<ielf to the (.' hanges m the balanC'e.of econom1c r forces; politics }'1.elds to the dictates of economjc de.,elopment. Thus, m th~ casehado lllneteenth-century Germanv the requirements of dustrial production gb m '"'~"h beco ~' frag ted structure. 1 ou . ~e mcompatible with its feudal, pohticalJy . . men .. he ed. "it was P>~tical reaction was victorious in 1815 and agam m l84b, argu growing d the unable . cal d t in Cennanv an . . to prevent the growth of large-s em us TY_ ket ..1 ~ ln. summarv. Engels partk,pation of German commerce in the world mar ' 19 \\'rot ..Ce e, rman unity had become an econoauc necessitv..

273

ti

2i 4

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

GILPJN I THE NATURE

OF POLJn CAL ECO~OMY

In tht> ' il'W of both Smitl1 aud Engels. the nation-state re1 .,t J a proar . . . . l d tl . 1 ess1 ve 1 stage u1 human developm ent, because 1 en arge le po1t '1 t , t nt of econon,tcth itv. l n E>ach successhe economic epoch. advances in technc.l .-. ; sd an iner , . I<: . f' li . - I . . . ea.slng ~cale of productio n necessitate an enlargement o po ti~a mgrl>'ll?.<tltOII. Because th city-state and feudalism restricted t11e ~cale of production and th~ _dhision or labo: made possible bv tl1e I ndusnial Revolution, t11ey prevented tl1t t fhtJ( nt utilizati ' b on of re ources and were. therefore, superseded . YIarger P?utical 111 . t:lith con))idered . 'ts. S tiUs to be a de irable objective; for Engels 1t was an lus~oncal l1('t<'S!>Jty. Thus, in the opinion of liberals, tiJe establish m~:1t. of tl1e :zou_ erem was ,t n~o' ement toward v ma.~mizing world economic welfare;20 tor ~ru'X!sts 1t was tl1e unavo1 dable triumph of the German industrialists over the feudal anstocracy. ~lercantili<>t writers from Alexander Hamilton to Frederich Li t to Charles d Gaulle, on the other hand, have emphasized the primacy of politic ; politics, in thi: view, determines economic organization. \ Vhe reas Yiru-xists and liberals ha\'e pointed to the productio n of wealth as the basic det~rmi~1ant of social and political organization, the mercantilists of th_e ~rma1~ Htstoncal School, for example, stressed the primacy of national secunty, mdustnal deve lopmen t, and national sen. timent in internatio nal political and economi c dynamics. In response to Engels's interpretation of the unification of Germany, mercantilists would no doubt agree with Jacob Viner that "Prussia enginee red the customs union primarily for political reasons, in order to gain hegemo ny or at least inAuence over tl1e lesser Gem1an states. It was largely in order to make certain tl1at the hegemony should be Prussian and not Austrian that Prussia continually opposed Austrian entry into the Union, either openly or by pressing for a customs union tariff lower than highly protectionist Austria could stomach."21 In pursuit of this strategic interest, it was "Prussian might, rathe r than a common zeal for political unification arising out of economic partnership, [that] . . . played th e major role."22 In contrast to .Marxism, neither ilberalism nor mercantilism has a developed theory of dynamics. The basic assumption of orthodox economic analysis (ilberalism) is the tendency toward equilibrium; liberalism takes for granted the existi ng social order and given institutions. Change is assumed to be gradual and adaptive-a continuous process of dynamic equilibrium. There is no necessary connection between such political phenomena as war and revolution and the evolution of the economic system. although they would not deny that rrtisguided statesme n can blunder into war orer economic issues or that revolutions are conflicts over the distribution of wealth; but neither is inevitably linked to the evolution of the productive system. As for mercantilism, it sees change as taking place owing to shifts in the balance of power; yet, mercantilist writers such as members of the German Historical School and contemporar)' political realists have not developed a systematic theory of how this shift occurs. On the other hand, dynamics is central to Marxism ; indeed Marxism is es~en tially a theory of social change. It emphasizes the tendency toward disequilibnurn owing to changes in the means of producti on and the consequ e nt effects on the ever-pre sent class con liet. When these tendencies can no longer be contamed' the sociopolitical system breaks down through violent upheaval. Thus war and revo~u. .. tion are seen as an mtegral part of the economi c process. Politics and eco nomJcs are intimately joined.

WhY an Intema tinnal Economy?

2i5

these different' .uncmg the three ide 1 . .froJl'l I . . .. . th . o ogles, one . tiVe exp anatlOII'> tor e eXIstence a U f . Can get a sense f l . respec n unc:tJoning of th . o tneJr eeooornY e mternational , n interdepe ndent world economv constitu h ru . R ' liberal economist-.. esponding to technol tes. t e normal state of affairs ~ most ., . . 1 . ogtca1 advan . . or ommuntcabon". t 1 scope of the market m h . e ces m transportatio aJ1 dc cl l . n . continuouslv cxpan s. T 1us, despite tempo ec arusm ' ac:cordi ng to thb anal)' . sJS. / . . rary setbacks tl l . wward global ec.:onom1 mtegration. The functi . c f ' .'e oncr-tenn trend IS is determined pri marilv bv considerations of' ofnfin? o the mtemational econ~ orn)' . .' l he basis of the mte rnational monetarv system e c1enc:v Th~roe of the dollar r , , as t d . . , 1 examplt s 1 . d 0r reference for it among tra ers and nations as the vehicle 1 exp ~e by tht P erce 23 The system is maintain ed bv the mutua],.. , f l 0b mternational cornm . ' trade, monetary arrangem ents, and investme nt. l., 0 t le enents pro..,'ded by A second view-o ne shared by Marxists and mercantil'5ts alik . 1 ternationc economy is essentiaU al interdependent m ) an a1 e -15 that every h' . 'al h . lmpen tem. The 1mpen or egemoru c power organizes trade ITIO t or. Jerarchical sysd. . d . . ne an . an tn\'eshnent relations m order to a vance 1 own economic and political 1 ts nt ts 1 th cl 11 th eres of the economic an espec1a y e political influence of the heae n e absence . the , t> momc power, system w~uld fragmen t m to au~arkic_ economies or regional blocs. \Yhereas for liberalism mamtenance of. harmoru ous International market relations 15 th r . e norm. 1 0r .\+larxism and mercantilism conflicts of class or national interests are the norm.

f.

PERSPECTIVE OF THE AUTHOR

M own perspective on political economy rests on what 1 regard as a fundamental clify ... ference in emphasis between economics and politics: namely, the distinction between absolute and relative gains. The emphasis of economic science or, at least of liberal economics-is on absolute gains; the ultimate defense oflibel"alis m is that O\'er tht> long run everyone gains, albeit in varying degrees, from a liberal economic regime. Economics, according to thjs formulation, need not be a zero-sum game. Everyone can ~ain in wealth through a more efficient division oflabor; moreo,er. B-eryone <."cllt lose. mabsolute terms, from economjc inefficiency. Herein lies the strength oflibemli.sm. This economic emphasis on absolute gains is in fact embodied il.1what one can characterize as the ultimate ideal of liberal economics: the achie,ement of a :Pa~eto optimum" world. Such a properly ordered world '~ould be ~ne wherein byImproving the position of one individual (by adding to hLS possessiOns) no o~e ~lse's position is dete riorated ." As Oskar ~1orgenstem has obsened, ..[e]cono~c literature is replete with the use of the Pareto optimum thus fonn~ated or ~ :~ivalent language."24 It is a world freed from 'interpe_r~on~l comp~~o~~dof:~; ty, and thus a world freed from what is central to pohtJcs. 1.e.. etJuc J ~ f and eo o . n Ict regardin g the Just and relative distn.bution f utiUtv That the notion o d et a Pllri d t 1an does not etra fJ ~to optimum is rife with conceptual prob_ an IS u ~p And this emphasis Iems rom Its centrality as the implicit objective of liberal econonucs.

~i"(i

P.t\ RT J

TI'iE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOM'r

GIL!JIN I THE NATURE

.. 1

OFPouncAL

or11 th< ,~. \hsolute g;ains for aiJ dilrcrs f111id.tl1w1.! tl! nt l'('I.HlOtll i<:s ~m < l(-'llt l:-.t:-.: . th(':\ l>t.' l . . I p l ll' llUllWlla as studied'" jJOiitical st . . ,.,/ tr11ggl .., for 11 ''h'rt I'
~),1 I tl'it'lf o r as a llll':llls to tll(' a(hicvewent of

otlw r goal-; Tlw tsscnlial l:tt'l ofJ1lllilics is that [Jower is ;11\\'a\" l'l'lath\ ont .sttt' ~<tll) . ( ... s . . 111 ' Jli.)\\'L r ish~ net.tssil\ a11othc.r's loss. Thus. C\'Cll though t" o sl.tlt., mav h<. gtin . .11 :1 1 g it is tJw cll(ct of tlu t' t!<lill~ on re ltl\e :\hsnluteh ill \\'('UJtJ{ in {)OJitic.aJ termS I , ' . ow('r [1<>sitions "'" ich is of [JI'i tWHY i11111ortancc. .I .rom l 11 s 11nltt im/ {lerspt:,(.1. l> 1\'( . . tlwrl"'on.'. the mer"C<Ull ilists are corrPct m cmphastzmg that lll pm\ c.r t<rnts, inter~ nation a I rc>lat ions is a zero-sum game. 1n a brilliallt a 11 alysis of int em ational politics. the rel:tlt,it~ of power and it s prof()uncl implications were set f(>t1:h by Jean-J acqu <'s Holl.,stau:

OWe r 'IS . ' 1

Thl' . talc>, hdng an ortifi~ial body is not limited. iu an~ "'ay. ... It ca~1 always incrc<L~('; it ' t alwa~'S ft.'t'ls its< If' wrak if them' is auother U al. 1 st~ongcr. Ib tcu.n ty and prcscrvation dC'mHnd that it nmkc itself mort' powerful th:m.1 ts nc1~hhors ..lt ca~l tncrcasl', nourish and exercise its puwcr onl~, at their c-Xv cns< .. . while the n~<'cpmhty of 111an has natural limits that hchn cn soc:ielies can grow without cease, untd one ;lbsorh~ all th< others... Because tIt( grandeur of tlw state is purely relative it is forcer! lo l'~lllp;trt ilsclf with tlta; of the others. . .. Jt is in vain that it wishe..s to keep itself to itscll: it hcconws small or great. "l'ak or strong. according to whether its nei~hbor expands or <:ont racts, bc('omes stmnger or declines... . ' The chief thing I notie<' is a patent <.Onh-;,tdiction in the condition of the human m<.'t".. .. Behvl'Cn man and n1<u1 we lh-e in the c."Onditiou of d1c civil state, subjected to )a,\~:

heh\'ecn p<"ople aud people we enjo~ natural Hbcrty, which make. the situation worse. Lhing ut tlc sanl<' time in the social order and in the state of nature, W (' suIfer from Ulc incon,cniences of both without finding . .. security in citJ1er.... \Ve sec men united by anificial bonds. hut united to d('stro~ each other; and all the hotTOt'S of war take bi rth from the prec::tutious thE'y have taken in order to prevent them . . .. '" 'ar i bom of pC'ace. or at least or

..

tlte pn.ocautions which men h:l\'e taken ror the purpose of achieving durable peace.:!.'; Because of the n~lativity of power, therefore, nation-states are engaged in a neverending struggle to improve or preserve their relative power positions. This rather stark formulation obviously draws too sharp a disti11ction between economics and politics. Certainly, for example, liberal economists may he intcresteu in questions of distribution; the ilistributive issue was, in fact, o f central concem to Ricardo and other classical writers. However, when economjsts stop taking the system for granted and start asking questions about ilishibution , they have really ventured into what I regard as the essence of politics, for distribution is really a political issue. In a world in which power rests on wealth, changes in the relative djstribution of wealtJ1 imply changes in the distribution of powe r and in the political system itself This. in fact, is what is meant by saying t11at politics is about relative gains. Politi<:s t'Oncems t11e efforts of groups to redistribute gains to thei r own advantage .. Similarly, to argue that politics is about relative gains is not to argue that it 15 a 111 constant-sum gc1me. On the contrary, man's power over nature and his fellow 1~1< . has grown immensely in absolute tenns over the past several centlllies. It is certrunl~ the case t11at everyone's absolute capabilities can increase due to the develop me~~ ~ new weaponry, the expansion of productive c-apabilities, or changes in the P?~tie< S)'Stem itself. Obviously such absolute jncreases in powe r are important pohocally.

27 7 . c deny. f(,r < ~ 'J JI(' tl tat tl 1 advc: ll 1 ,. I o nu<.:lear . 'J ( I I I . Who cell r weapons h a.~ proroundl . t . louslv. ntcrmtltOII.t I''' ltt<.:'i >W . too s ates t:an IJ . .tte.teC . negotiate ulsannamcnt u } w )eve1 of n1ili t.m 'il )lahihtv. , s I d ) l1 .1 r uoes n o t alt l . l tl 't ' otl er )'et recognl lOll. o . lH.''it ' .H<.:ts er t 1' nn . Iatt\.t' c1~~ n 1HtlH>Il of power arc f r cl l ' ne consideration th . ctes in the r<' at o un amer t I . . . 11 . I . . . chilrlr cl Slgnlficanc:c p j . Jl , Though a tn.t~ H ~.unmK or dedining . b I l , tnaab so ute capahility, what \\~11 ~otlthese -l'l' \ Ci )stttes princ:ipall. i\ll' th< < eets . . nso ute gai . cern 1 l . ns or asses on relative nons. How. lor cxample. do ehanues in .h proc b I .,. I .,. p<>SI 1 or On<' state to impose l! ttCtl\'e Cap act,/ or military . . poni)' af eel t H? a )I lY ' ? 'll . cu ar . wea e that 111 a part1 1 s1tuallon :otbsolute glin 1 s Wt 11 on .anoth er. 1l mav vcrv , ' 1 < s \VJ not tfle t . weUb B t the eflo1ts of grou ps to cause or prevent such sh'ft . h c: re .attve positions. 1 111 s t e relattve distribntion of~power constitut~ the ~ritical issue <~f politics. . This fo rmu lation o f th e natme of politics obviouslv d not ."Y cooperate in orde r tu advance their mutual . t" . oesB deny that nations . . m e1est. ut even . nlo . .1 ons may have tmportant consequences for the utst n.b ut10n . pow cooperati"e tl 1 . . ac 01 er 111 t le sysc tem. For example, tl1 c Stratcg1 Arms Limitation Talks (SAL'T') b ,s etween the Unit d , . u . ] t he Sov1et 111 are obvi.ously motivated . e . bv. . 011 SrJtes anc ' a common mtcrest in pre. I . . . . 0 1 . . . vent:ing the1 monuc ecu Wdl. t 1e1 states \vill also benefit f tl k f 1 1e ns o war be-tween ] cl , , . .. the superpowers ts rcl 11cc . ) et, SALT may also be seen ac; a . tt . n a cmpt to stahthze . {' 1d' t . of Cl1ma an d otJ1er th' rd the mtemat1ona . tstt 1 >Ulton o power to the dtsadvantage 1 powers. In short, m terms of the .system .ac; a whole , political cooperat'1 c:an have a 0n . . profound efTect on the relative (bstnbutJon of power among nation-state . The point may perhaps be clarified by distinguishing between two aspects of power. When one speaks of absolute gains in power, such as ad,ancc in economic tapabilities or weapons development, one is referring ptincipally to increases in physical or matetial capabilities. But while such capabi]jties are an important component of power. power, as we have seen, is more than ph~sical capability. Power is also a p~)'chological relationship: Who can influence whom to do what? From this perspective, what may be of most importance is how changes in capability aiTect this psychological relationship. lnsof~tr as they do, they alter the relathe distribution of power in the system. In a world in which PO\ver rests increasingly on economic and industrial tapabilities, one cannot really distinguish between wealth (resources, treasure. and un industry) and power as national goals. In the short 1 there may be conflicts between the purswt of powe r and the pursuit of wealth: in the long mn the two pur~uits are identical. The re fore, the position taken in this stud is similar to \'iner's Interpretation of classicaJ mercantilism:

ECONOMY

or

What then is the corr~c:t interpretation of merr.antillst doctrilte :Uld pmctice "ith respect to the roles of power lmd plenty as ends of national poli~? I bcHr'-e t~lat. (~ractkall} all mercantilists, whatever the periou. country, or status of the particular mdi\1(lual. wot~~ 11 have subscribed to all of the following propositions: (1) wealth is ~~ absol~ttel~ e~~ t "' means to power, whether ror security or for aggresstou: (?.) power ts essential or' ,uua le , 1 1 as a means to the acquisition or retention ofw;alth: {3} wealth and pow-r are etha<' pro~_r betwl"<'O ~ enu:.. h ul . nic ak" timate ends of national policv: (4} there is long-nul arrnon~ . rv for a time to Ill t econo t. ~ . alth h . ....~ oug m particular circ:umstaHceS it may l.JC' ne<..ess.t . r. and tllt'l'elore Uso ofluna-nu1 pi'O)-pt'O.l sac s . e n ces m the interest of military sectUity

11

PART 3

TH.E lNTERNATlONAL POUTICAL ECONOM\

GILPIN I THE NATURE . OF POLiTICAl ECONOMY 279

1 internati Thi interpretation of the role of the econ~m ic t"\i t frun Olla) f relation i ub tantiaJh rufl"erent from tJ1at of \l arxJ'illl. In ' ewo rk anal~ i. the economic factor is red ~ced to tl~c .prol' ' : .ts it aiTc.ct:. th lt of behmior of indhidual or firms. Accorrungl~ the {or etgu ( J!r e ' l'ctpitali t t e are determined b, the desire of capitalists for profits. Tit' is, m our ,iew f: llEc'~ ar . narrow a conception of the economJC aspect o f m tenutwuaI r,ldtlOll'i. Instead too 10 this studv we label 'economic.. tJ1ose sou rc-e of wealth upon'' lud1natiowtl power , . and domestic welfare are dependent. t; nderstood in these broader tenns. the economic !noth t' and <'<.'<momit: acti\itie ects of are fundamental to ilie struggle for power amona nation-state~. The ob.1 COn. I 1 tention in tJ1e struggles of tJ1e balanc-e _of})O'ver ~~c u< e tl.H:' c.-enters of economic: power. As R. c. Ha..vtrey has expressed It. the_ p~litical moth cs at work C<Ul only be expressed in tenm of the economic. Every confttct JS one of po~ver ~md 1~ower depends on resources.'-2; l n pursuit of wealth a11d power, tJ1erefo:e. ~1ati01~s (capta.list. socialist, :ontend over the territorial division and e:xpl01tation ol lhc globe. or fascist) c Even at ilie level of peaceful economic interc~urse, one cannot separate out the political element. Contrary to the attitude of li?eralism, international economic relations are in reality political relations. The mte rdependencc of national economies creates economic power. defined as the capacity of one state to dama(Te another through tJ1e interruption of commercial and financial relations.z: Tl 1e attempts to create and to escape from such dependency relationships constitute an important aspect of international relations in the modern era. The primary actors in the international system are nation-states in pursuit or what they define as their national interest. This is not to argue, however, that nationstates are tJ1e only actors, oor do I believe that the national interest"' is something akin to Rousseau's "general will"-the expression of an organic entity separable from its component parts. Except in the abstract models of poutical scientists, it has never been the case that ilie international system was composed solely of nationstates. In an exaggerated acknowledgment of the importance of non state or transnational actors at an earlier time, John A. Hobson asked rhetorically whether "a great war couJd be undertaken by any European state, or a great state loan subscribed, ir the House of Rothschild and its coru1exions set their face against it.''29 What has to be explained, however, are the economic and poli tical ci rcumstances that enable such transnatjonal actors to play their semi-independent role in international affairs. The argument of this study is that the primary determinants of the role played by these non-state actors are the larger configurations of power a111ong nation-states. What is determinant is the interplay of national interests. As for the concept of"national interest," the national interest of a given nationstate is, of course, what its political and economic eute determines it to be. 1n part, as Marxists argue, this eute will define it in tenns of its own group or cla'\S interests. But the national interest comprehends more than this. More general influences, such as cultural values and considerations relevant to the security of the state itself~ geographical position, the evolution of milit~rv technology, and the international d1s ~1 tribution of power: are of greater Importance. There is a sense, then, m w1cl 1 the 11 . factors that determine the national interest are objective. A ruung elite that Jatls to take these factors into account does so at its peril. In short, then, there is a basis for

.m optimum tarill ir I . . P ' order to maXJmtze 1ts ow~ gruns_ at t e e>.vense of the system as a whole. . For this reason, a hbera.l ll)temational econonw requires a PO'' er to manage . .. n . ,. 1 and stab1lize the system. As Charles Kindleberger has <:or1VInc.:mg1 'll0\\11. t1 ~.me cent1 tt>n11ovemance role \-vas performed b, Great B1itain throuahout tile n l 1 o . o turv and up to 1931, and bv the . United States after 1945.111 Tile I 11 1b1.... o1Crt>at I h' . ' Britain in 1929 to c~ntmue ru~~~~a the s~stem and the unwillingne. oftlw Cnited States to assume th1s responstbdJty lec.l to the coUap e of the , tem in tht' creat epression." The result was the fragmentation of the world. econonn into rh ill D economic blocs. Both dominant economic power bad failed to o,erco 1~1 e tht Ji\ishe forces of nationalism and regionalism. The argument of this study is that the modern world econonl\ ha:. t'\'Oiwd through the ernergence of great national economies that ban ucct' ~ivt>lv beconw . dominant. In the words of the distinguished French economist Fran~ois Perrom:. "the economic evolution of the world has resulted from a succes ion of domin.mt economies, each in tu m taking the lead in international acti\ity and inAuenCt'.... Throughout the nineteenth centUJy the B1itish economy was the dominant economy in the world. From the [eighteen] seventies on. Gennan~ was Jominant in respect to certain other Continental countries and in ce1tain specified fields. In the twentieth century, the United States economy has clearly been and till is the internationally dominan t econonn-. "31 An economic system, th~n , does not arise spontaneously O\\ing to the operation of an in\~sible hand and in the absence of the exercise of po"c~r. Ratlwr. eH't; e<:onom~c system rests on a particular political order; its nature c<.umot be un~~r stood aside from politics. This basic point was made some re:u-s ago b~ E. 1l. Carr when he wrote that "the science of economics presuppo es a gl\en politi<.'tl ordl'r < sought to con. and eannot be profitably studied in isolation from poutic:s. 32 Carr . . , based on lret> tnlllt> was . I 1 \'!nee hi c 1 h s re ow Englishmen that an intemattona et'OllOll'l~ 1t e thlt reHecte< th b not a d, f natural and inevitable state of affairs ut ra er one < . . . economle and political interests of Great Bntrun. The s~'Stem b:l.Sed on reeBtra c . f 11ti h bad eo r d b~ the exercise o me mto existence through, and was mamtame
~

the n;tl ir>r sl.tle ;l.,c If a.. an actor p . . . llJ !>umg Its 0\\Tl . ,, .,oenr eo et of St'(urit\ , 11. . t conc:en1s 111 <01 np,t 1llon or c:oopemtio eO . '<' :1re 1 n \\'1 t1 othe-r . . . dst".l u5 . n<lttOrHt.tt<.'.. ,ul U15th". in a ,mrld ' <.: nlildmg Ilalion-stutes. how d ....;erdepend<m mlt ~rMt ion;J econonw') \\l ~ _one <.:\-plain the c.\i~t t:H('C I. 1\" UlK' . U . . . f ;}!1 r )1\-that IS. <Ul i' {'ClllOlll\ C'hararterized b\ rei .ti I f a ut'r.tl int~nl"lhon 0 tU a Ye \ ret- t . 1 . . r I . econOI . rac c. <:mrenc.'\ C"' . .bUh and lrc:e< nm o <.apita] mo,ement. ->~11rernam mtact h . . t>rO ' l.' . '. ttO au t...rkic natow.l <.'tunonHe!-. and reaional 0 r .unpenal ~ rat .er than fm(Tmcr\t t-. . . . .._. 11 ,er is provrdcd h~ hberalasrn: ec..'Onomic coorv-rati . ... oupmgs. In part. tlttI on. J 1 f I,\)or cn1ancc eiTiciencY,-- th tnterdt'pencl'nt't", and an . J: . . ulS' ml e ma\i . 'i.lltenlatJonal ui'1sron o < c ' mLzallon . -th ~ation- tates are induct.xl to enter u1e intem,\tiOn<u \ le l of a~ate . ,,-e-u . ise of more mpd growth: greater benefits can beL .cl ll m X'<.'"ausc of the 1t.a r ,1 . rom P ~- , or a fragmentation 0 1 ull' world econornv The L :_. . 1an could 1 , o1 b, x )ta111rd _ _1 I . m<onc.<U rcoord s .. f" aut-.trl\) ug,ge~b. lO\\ 1 at the existence o mutual economic benefits . \\et\ - IS not a1 s en 1 . ever, u1 uc-e o\lg 1 lo tn(1 . bons to pay tJ1e costs of a market system or to forao op -h . : ' . r others. There is liwl'"'" poi ~lnJties of achunc1111!. tl1c1r 1 na tile d . . , interests at t 1e expense o 1at .mger t1 a rnr '. " < 0'''" ' lOn ~l:t) . . ursue certain short-range policies. su<.:h as the imr)ositio11 0 1 ~
1

1<1

.J

:!SO

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONA L POUTICAL ECONOM Y

GILPIN 1 THE NATU

RE OF POUTJCAi

X)nomic and military power. With tJ1e rise alter 1880 ofnt'\'. mdtnal and rn. t'< powers \\ith conlmsting economk interests-name!~. (., n m I ll1<ln . dtlrtary lJ ' U!i (' .I l I baseu on rcc lr1 d llH1 Brili I pow t(! tates-an international economy . v111l0< ' sl .(' . j l industr 1 er 1 >ecame less and less ,~able. Eventually thrs shr l rn t t< lntu" '<~. and militmy power led to the collapse of the svstem in World \\ ar 1 Ft ,!lowin(r ll1e rnt,. M . war petiod' a liberal international economy was revtvcd thro\tgl r the "X" rctseer. '"' ..J 0r powe r by the "vorld's newlr emergent dommant econor ny-the Unitcd States. Accordinglv ti1c regime of free investment and tiw pre<'minenc:e of tJ1c multi. "' national corporation in ti1e contemporary world have reflected th<: economi<.: . and >Oliti.caJ interests of tite United States. The muJtinati.onal corporation has pr<>spcred . . I because it has been dependent on ti1e power of, and consrstent \\lth the poiitic:al . tntcr. "tgu ests of' tile United States. This is .not to deny the analyse of economists who " e tl1at :orporation ts a response to contemporary technological .111d the multinational c ' econonlic developments. The argument is rather that these economic and technc1ogt > 1i . I fT . ti . ects because the United 1eu pro ounu e 1 ea] factors have been able to exercts~ States-sometimes "~tl1 the cooperation. ~f 0~1er states and sometimes over their opposition-has created ti1e necessary political fr~~~work.. As for~ er Secreta1y of the Treasury Henry Fowler stated several years ago, tt 1S ... unpossJble to overestimate the e>..tent to ,vhic:h the efT~rts and opportuniti~s for Americ~n firms abroad depend upon the vast presence and mfJuence and prestige ti1at Amenca holds in the world.'>33 By the mid-1970s, however, the international distti buti.on of pov.,er and the world economy resting on it were far clillerent from what ti1ey had been when Fowler's words were spoken. The rise of foreign ec.'O nomic competitors, America's growing dependence upon foreign sources of energy and oti1er resources, and the expansion of Soviet military capabilities have greatly diminished America's presence anc.l influence in ti1e world. One must ask if, as a consequence, the reign of ti1e Ameri<:an multinationals over international economic affairs will c.'Onti.nue into the future. ln summary, although nation-states, as mercantilists suggest, do seek to control economic and technological forces and channel them to their own advantage. this is impossible over the long run. The spread of economic growth and industrialization ~~)t be prevented. In time the diffusion of industry and technology undermines the poSJtJOn of the dominant power. As both Uberals and Marxists have empha.,ized, the evolution of econorrric relations profoundly influences the nature of the international pontical system. The relationship between economics and politics is a reciprocal one. . . Alth~ugb_ economic and accompanying political change may weU be ine,~table. It ts not ~evitable that the process of economic developmen t and technological advance will produce an increasingly integrated world society. In the 1930s, Eugene Staley posed the issue:
.1

2 ECONOMy . . I 'I 81 IJC me .1ta 11 rty with \vh I gard to t tc J politi tJJ re ' f h c:s would adJ'uc;t l \,1 A ting the in ten"<: fcorH,rn it: nationalis o tcc:hn 0 1 m o t e p .1 1 1 1 [te ec.: ogy. !I enou in whicll} nted out t tat t t C ::t< ju~lr riC'nt rntv ve Ol JC wrot s b th ', ry we . le)' P c, ta. ds e e other way a nds us in hts own lt "l1e and in earlier round As h . ec: peno rerrll ' . " 1 . rtical renlitr es: Jn t JC' Dark Ages' fc)lloWin th On0mJcs ha.c; had t0 ci e P0 ' nology adjusted itsd f to politics. The In g .~e collapse of tht: Rornan aEJUSt to mp agntncent H 1 tee1 ornan roads fell . t di rre, . the baths and aqucdltC:ts and am r>h ith . eatres and .1 . a1 . paJf, 1as tnto ruintn o sre. S . . ction and d'tst n'b ution ~ Vi s. ocrety apSed back to loc 1Srn tn prodr1

l d tJ1e technology and th e governme;:ntal syst

art

f ' orgot muc:h of the le .. arnmg . ems o earlier days.")5

coNCLUSION
. the purpose of this chapter has been to set forth th be employed in this study. Th is framework is a stat e analfytic:al framework that v..ill . ement o . , I 't l ti . . I drawn upon whiJ diff what J rnean by.. poltti<:al 1t 1as ec,.onomy. n 1 s ec ec ctsm vaiJing perspectives of politi.c:al economy It, 11 . ~ enng from , the three preas mcorporated th . strengths and has attempted to overcome their weakn esses In b f etr1 respective . . omy in this study means tl1e reciprocal ano dyna""; . teractton inne t po Jtical ec:on . .. uC m m tions of the pursuit of wealth and tile pursw't o f power. In the emational relah s t distribution of power and the nature of tile political system are maJor clort run. the . . e ermmants , of the framework \vtthm which wealth is produced and di5t .b d 'ts m economic e ('ficiency and in the locati. rt ute ln the Iona ru n. 0 . f' econmmc: activitv t 1 however, sh1 on o . ., ent . to undermme ano. transform the. existing political system. Th'L'l po1 ca1 transfonna1ti . . . . tion m turn gtves nse to changes m economic relations that reA t th e mterests of the ec d eaU poUti y ascen ant state m the system.

NOTES
ari ~ K Levitt, "The ~!interland Economy," Canadian Fon11n 50 (July-August 1970): p. 163. 2. George W. Ba11, The Promise of the Multinational Corporation .. Fortune June 1 ' ' . ' 1967' p. 80.

Jlay ~ ~ dney _Ro~fe, "Updating Adam Smith," Jntet7 (No,emher 1968): p. 15. 1arles Kmdleberger, Power and li-fone':r The Economics of lntemntional P olitics and ork: the Politics of Intemational Economics (New Y Basic Books, J970). p. 5. orld Politics and the International Economic obert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 'W i>. R System," in C. Fred Bergsten, ed .. The Future ofthe Intemational co11omic Order: An . ~~~dafor Research (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath.1973). p.ll6.

A conflict rages between technology and politics. Economics, so closely linked to both,

1. lbid., p. l.L7.

has become tbe major battlefield. Stability and peace will reign in the world economy onl~'_when, someiJow, tlte forces on the side of technology and the forces on the side of poli~ have once more be<.:ome accommodated to each other. 34

Stal~ believed, a~ do many present-day writers that politics and technology mU$t uJtimateJy adjust to one another. But he differ~d with contemporary writers

8 Paul Samuelson Economics Att lntroductony Analysis (New Y M ork: cCraw-Hill, . ' 1967) .. p. 5. 9 Harold LassweUand Abraham Kaplan Power a11d Society: A Frameu:mi for Polttu;al . 1 H :~ 10 lnquirr1 (New H aven, Conn.: Yale Umversrty Press, 1950), p. s 3 ork: lfred A. Knop~. _P Z6. For . Among Nations (New Y A ans Morgenthau, Politics ~ore C.'Omp1ex but essentiaUy identical view. see Robert DahJ. .\'fodRm Poilt~e.al AnalyStS Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1963).
t

I L ~indldwr~('l'. Porvrn11ul Mo11ey. p. 227. l ~. h)l Joh nsou:-; c:rit iq ne of economic nationalism. Sf'O l l.ur '\ Xaticmnli 111 in Old mu/ N<'W States (Chicago: Unin."rsil)' of r '} c..
13. Atlam Smith. The Wealth vfNalions (New York: Modern Li l .'
'

~s. 11167). 7.
1

r <tl. . Econm,,i
c
H30). p. 1.36

14.

J. B. Condlin'c-, The Commerce of Nations (New York: \V. \ \ '. \

f{egemony m the World Political economy

ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

. 15. Amitai Et7.ioni. "The Dialectics of Supemational Unification il' lnt r11 atimw[ /'(I [lfi(;,Jf .. ork: Communities (Ntw Y Doubleday. 1966). p. 14 1 16. The rclC'vant sections appear in Emst Wangen11 ~ 0 cd ... Tl~r Hu/ of l'orq _, ;,, 1-Ji:~tory: ,\ ork: Study of Bi.~mm-cks Policy of Blood and h on , tnms. J.td <.oll<'n (J\<,w Y

17. 18. 19. 20.

International Publishers, 1968). lhid., p. 12. Ibid.. p. 13. lbicl., p. 14. ork: Gustav Stopler, The German Economy (New Y Harrourt, Brace and \1\forld, 1967).

f S di tt Ad . . t . P Jl. 21. Jacob Vincr, The Customs Union lssne, tu es m tl ~ m u us ratron. o lntemational Law and Organization, No. 10 (!\ew York: Carnegre Endowment fo r Intcrnational Peace, 1950). pp. 98-99. . . 22. Ibid., p. 101. 23. Richard Cooper. "Eurodollars. Resenre Dollars, and Asymmetncs 111 the International Monetary System: journal of International Economics 2 (September 1972): pp. 32.5-44. 24. Oskar Morgenstem. "Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: An lnterpretation ." joumal ofEc01wmic Literature 10 (December 1972): p. 1169. 25. Quoted in F. H. Hinsler. Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1963), pp. 50--Sl. 26. Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,'' in The Long Vieu; and the Short: Studies in Economic Theory and Pmctice {Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), p. 286. 27. R. C. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty (London: Longmans, Green, 19.52). p. 120. 28. Albert Hirshman, National Power and the Stmcture of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 16. 29. John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (1902; 3rd ed., rev., London: G. Alien and Unwin. 1938), p. 57. 30. Charles KindJeberger, The World in Depr-ession 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 293. 31. Fran90is Perrou.x, "The Domination Effect and Modem Economic Theory," in Power in Economics, ed. K. W. Rothschild (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 67. ork: Macmillan, 1951), p.lli. 32. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisi.r;, 1919-1939 (New Y 33. Quoted in Kari Levitt, Sileut Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada (~ew York: Liveright Press, 1970), p. 100. 34. Eugene StaJey, World Economy in Transition: Technology vs. Politics, Lai.sse::.. Faire t;S. Plan~ing. PQtcer vs. Welfare (New York: Council on Foreign Relations [under the auspl(!CS of the American Coordinating Committee for International Studies], 1939). pp. 51-52. 35. Jbid., p. 52.

.. common today for troubled supporters of liberal <:a .t . 15 1 it taJO"ia on British preponderance in the nineteenth PI a Ism to look back with century and A cl h , nos l:)mencan omiafter World War IT. T ose eras are imamned to b . Ce lmp er e S 1 ones . h h o . . . oan m w 1c a . gle power, possessmg supenonty of economic and .lit 1 m1 ary resou s1n ented a plan for international order based on its interests and it J.c~s, Imp em s VISion of the . rld. As Robert Gilpin has expressed it, "the Pax BJitanntca an d Pax American . . wo a, like the Pax Rom.mw , ensured an mtemational system o[ relativ e peace and secud tl u 't cl s . . 1 f .b rity. Great Bntam an 1e m e tates created and enforeed th 1 e ru es o a 1 eral d " intemational econom1c or er. Und~rlying :}.lis.~tat~ment is. ~ne of the tw~ ~en~ral propositions of the theory of . e hegemoruc stab1hty. that orde1 m world politics IS typicallv creatod by a mg1 .. , , . . . . dmmnant power. Smce regtmes constitute elements of an international order. this implies that the fonnation of intemational regimes nonnal.ly depends on hegemom. The other major tenet of the theory of hegemonic stability is that the maintenance ~f order requires continued hegemony. As Charles P. Kindleberger has said, "For the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.'-:! This implies that cooperation, . . . [the] mutual adjustment of state policies to one another, also depends on the perpetuation ofhegemony. I discuss hegemony before elaborating my definitions of cooperation and regimes because my emphasis on how international institutions such as regime facilitate cooperation only makes sense if cooperation and discord are not determined simply by interests and power. In this chapter I argue that a detenninistic version of the theory of hegemonic stability, relying only on the realist concepts of interests and power, is indeed incorrect. There is some validity in a modest version of the first proposition of the theory of hegemonic stability-that hegemony can facilitate a certain type of cooperation-but there is Httle reason to belie,e that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperative relationships. Furthermore, and even more important for the argument ~resented here, the second major proposition of the theory is ~rroneous: coo.perahon does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemoruc leader after mter . nationa1 regtmes have been established. Post-hegemoruc cooperation is also possible....

Re . ~~r Hegemony by Robert 0. Keohane. Copynght 1.

. . . . . Pn.nted b)' pe rm1ssron of p nnceton UmverSJty press.

From Au..

984 b, Prin<:~ton L" nh1'rsit) Press.

283

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r-1'\1'\:J

.>

I Ht:. IN I t::KNAIIUNAL PUU IJLAL t:.LUNUM Y

................. - . ' ' '-'-'L..IYIVNY

INiHE WO
RLO POLITICAl

Tlw t:l..~k or the pre ent chapter is to explore in a prcli mman \\ t the \al , limi~aliom. of th(' concept of hegemony for the t~1d~ of.<. O'>p .1lion. Tl~e ~~~ 't'<'tlon anah-zc. the claim of the theOIY of hegemoruc stah1hh , tl. second . SI . . ' . . .SC<:tio 1 hm.Oy <td.d.ress<> the relationship. betv.ree.n mtbt~ll)' pow: r <li'cl 11< gemony in th : \\ orld pohbcal economy: and the final section seeks to ennch nm nnderstandin ~ tht> concept lw considering Marxian insigbts. ~rany Yf arxjan IJJtPrnretati go 1. ons of hegemony tu m out to bear an lll~cann~ rese.mbla nce t~ Realist Hkas, using different lamruaae to make similar pomts. Antomo Gramsc1 s con<:eptl nn of ideolo . ~ heuemom howe,e r does provide an insightfu l supplem ent to l)urelv mateng1c:al . '"' . 1~t , a1 arguments, whether Realist or Marxist.

EVALUATING THE THEORY OF HEGEMONIC STABILITY

The theo.f\ of hegemonic stability. as applied to the \:vorld political econom . I V defines hegemony as preponderance of materia resources. Four sets of resoure:~s, are especially important. Hegemonic powers must ha\e control over raw material!>. control over sources of capital, control o,er markets, and competitive advantages in the producti on of highly valued goods. The importance of controlling sources of raw materials has provided a tradi. tional justification for territorial expansion and impe rialism, as well as for the extension of informal inBuence .... (S]hifts in the locus of control over oil affected the power of states and the evoJution of international regimes. Guaranteed ac<.:e s to capital, though less obvious as a source of powe r, may be equally important. Countries with well-functiorung capital markets can borrow cheaply and may be able to provide credit to friends or even deny it to adversaries. Holland derived politicaJ and economic power from the quality of its capi tal markets in the seventeenth century; Britain did so in the eighteen th and nineteen th centu ries; and the United States has similarly benefited during the last fifty years. Potentia] power may also be derived from the size of one's market for imports. The threat to cut off a particular state's access to one's own market, v:hile a!Jov,,ng i other countries continued access, is a "potent and historicaiJy relevant weapon of economic power'."3 Conversely, the offer to open up one's own huge market to other exporters, in return for concessions or deferenc e, can be an effective means of influence. The bigger one's O\\ll market, and the greater the government's discretion in opening it up or cLosing it off, the gre.ater one's potential economic power. 1De final dimension of economic prepond erance is competitive superiority in the production of goods. lmmanuel Wallerstein has defined hegemon y in economic terms as "a situation wherein the produc1:s of a given c'Ore state are produced so efficiently that they are by and large competitive even in other core states, and therefore the gi\'en core state will be the primary beneficiary of a max.imally free world marlcet:4 As a definition of economic preponderance this is interesting but poorly worked out, since under conditions of overall balance of payments equilibrium each unit--eve n the poorest and least develop ed-will have some comparative advan tage. 1be fact that in 1960 the United States had a trade deficit in textiles and apparel aod in basic manufadured goods (established products not, on the whole, involving

also important.

of complex or w \\ l c:hnolo):,rv) diu not . " ~a .... u e use c status. s TrH1 t l ne- s1 1ould' expect tl tnwcate th t L lost p .,.t . a lt nad ..J'(lnoTJlJ I II . e economi . 11 rw.omtnant !:'-" rt products t at : ,.. . a )O r-mt(;nsive or th ea y preponderat1t . mnD . ( .. at are prod .1 !~talc tn I ~~ ction tecbmqu c.c, owpetitlv(; atlvantage d U<.:eu \vith well-k . C>es nown PruuU . exports everytIung. I> t hat . produ<.:es and exnot mean tlat the leadin {;C(mut tt oi11Y d those that "vill provide the basis for p od ~ms the most profitab~ ...1 ctS an r . r U<.1ng eve pruull d services in the IUtl~n. In general, this abiJjtv \\~IJ bt h-d! n more advan<.:eU goods an riority of the leadutg <.:ou ntry, although it ~a . a) std on the ttX:hnolom<.:aJ sope . . .,..,. (}Ver"-aluab1 resources }le ldi ngsgnJ. fi <:ant rents. ) so rest on its pol:iti<.:al oontrol e . ~0 be considerPd hege monic: in the world . . 1' . po 1tJca1 ec:o . must have <H.:<:ess to <:ru<:1al raw matert'aLs I nomy, tberelore a coun try . . 11, contro ma . ta.in a large market for Lmports and hold c . JOr sources of capital. rnaJil d . . ' omparat:ive adv tag . th high value adde . ''vleldmg relativelv high wage ' \\1 . , s anu profitsanIt ts m goods tronger on these di mcns10ns taken as a whole than a lh must also be s ' . .. . ' <.:ountrv f hegemomc stabt bty predicts that the more one suchny o. er_ , The th eory 1 o I . power uommates thew Id h or . political economy, t 1e more cooperative will interstate relarIons be. T. . . a pars1 . <1... monjous tl1eory t hat re I1 on . .. a uas1c force model " in whkh outc JS LS es the tangible capabilities of actors. ' omes reAec.t Y like many such basic fo rce models, this crude theorv of b et, . b' . c d' . egemomc sta Jljnr makes tmpenec t pre Jctions. In the twentieth centuT) t eo . .. 1 rrectl v antit1pates 'J . the relative cooperativeness of the twenty years after \Vorld 'vVar 11 ' lt . . 1 at 1 .s east partially mtstaken , however, abo~t tr~nds ~~ c:ooperation when hegemony erodes. Between 1900 and 1913 a decline m Bnhsh power coincided \'<ith a decrease rather ~an an in~rease in conflict ov~r commercial issues.... [R]ecent changes in intematwnal regi mes can only part1ally be attributed to a decline in Amerit:an power. How to interpre t the prevalence of discord in tl1e interwar years is difficult. since it i~ not clear whether any country was hegemonic in material tenns during those two decades. The United States, though considerably ahead in productivity. did not replace Britain as the most important financial center and lagged behind in volume of trade. Although American domestic oil production was more than sufficient for domestic needs during these years, Britain still controlled the bulk of major Middle Eastern oil fields. Nevertheless, what prevented American leadership of a cooperative world political economy in these years was less lack of &'0nomic resources than an absence of political willingness to make and enforce rules for the system. Britain, despite its efforts, was too weak to do so effective!~ The crucial factor in producing discord lay in American politics. not in the matenal facto~ to which the theory points. . .. Unlike the crude basic force model, a refined version of hegemoru~ stability theory does not assert an automatic link between power and leadership. ~eg~ mony is defined as a situation in wruch "one state is powerful enough to ~~tam the essential rules governin . g interstate relations, an d WJru ng t0 do so'"6 Tlus Inter. h th reti ~ t P ve 1ramework retains an emphasis on power but 1 ks more senously d an e 00 t 0 tTUde power theory at the internal characteristics of the strong ~te. It . oes ~ ass . t ume that strength automati cally creates 10centives 0 pro1ect one s power J. abll'nn.l d d . ion making processes are vcau. Domestic attitudes political structures, an eClS
J .

ECONOMY

'

2 '6

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL paU TICA L ECONOMY

KEOI I '\Nf I HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD PO

MATERIA L FFSOL:RCES OF BRlTAIN A 2~7 r,\BLf. !mo NS OF WOR LD rRAO E AJ-m RELATIVE~ THE UNITED STATE$ pROpO BOR PRODUCTrvrry AS HEGEMONS: 1 f roport1on of world trade
LlTlCAL ECONOMY

exercise leaderslup are necessary to acti~te . the po Jted r bt.ullsln p between power capabilities and outcomes. Force activation models a e P.)s ntially post I .. c. rather tllan a prio ri, since one can al ways ..save.. sueI1 a ttWJ .lite: the fact 10c, b t11inkina of reasons whr an actor would not have wanted to U<:< all of its availahl) potenti~ power. In eff~ct, this modificati_on of the theo ry deddr~s that states Wit~ preponderant resources will be hegemonJC_excep t_ when they dc<:Jde not to <:omrnit tJ1e necessary effort to the tasks ofleadership, yet Jt does not tell us what will det mine the latte r decision. As a causal theory this is ~ot very help fuJ, since whethe~r~ gi\en configuration of power will lead the potential hegemon _to mai ntain a set of rules remains indeterminate unless we know a great deal about 1ts domestic politics. Only the cruder theory generates predictions. \Vh ~n 1 refe: without qualification to the theory ofhegemonic stabiljty. therefore, I \VllJ be referring to this hasic force model. We have seen that the most striking con tention of this theo ry-t hat hegemony is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for cooperation-is not strongly supported by the experience of this centu.ry. T~ng a longer period of about 150 years, the reco rd remains ambiguous. International economic relations were relatively cooperative both in the era of British hegemon~ during the mid-tolate nineteenth century and in the two decades of American dominance after World War Il. But onJy in the seco nd of these periods was there a trend toward the predicted disruption of established rules and increased discord. And a closer examination of the British experience casts doubt on the causal role of British hegemony in producing cooperation in the nineteenth century. Both Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in tl1e twentieth met the material prerequisites for hegemony bett er than any othe r states since the Industrial Revolution. In 1880 Britain was the financial cen ter of the world, and it controlled extensive raw materials, both in its formal empire and through investments in areas not part of the Imperial domain. It had the highest per capita inoome in the world and approximately double the share of world trade and imestment of its nearest competitor, France. Only in the aggregate size of its economy had it already fallen behind the United States. 7 Britain's share of world trade grad uai1y declined during the ne>.t sixty years, hut in 1938 it was still the world's largest trader, with 14 percent of the world total. In the nine teen th century Britain's relative labor productivity was the highest in the world, although it declined rather precipitously thereafter. As Table 1 shows, Britain in the late nineteenth century and the United States after World War II were roughly comparable in thei r proportions of world trade, although until 1970 or so the United States had maintained much higher levels of relative productivity than Britain had done three-quarters of a century earlier. Yet, despite Britain's material strength, it did not always enforce its preferred rules. Britain certainly did maintain freedom of the seas. But it did not induce major continental powers, after the 1870s, to retain liberal trade policies. A recent investigation of the subject has concluded that British efforts to make and enforce rules were less extensive and less successful than hegemonic stability theory would lead us to believe they were.8

This tU't'!tJmenfs reliance on state decisions as well as pt) ve '~ 1 ',thil ities put . e 11 . ' into tJw cateaory of what ~1arc1 c~. s. "force activation ' . 0 .ecisionss Jt 1 ,. . to

- - - ~~--------------~~----------~R:el~l~v~e~a~oo~r~p~r~~~-~ ai l uctwi~
sfitaln. 1870
24.0
Britain. 1890 srita'n. 1913 Britain, 1938

~ : ~

United States. 1977

tJnlted States. 1950 unrted States. 1960 vn1'ted States. 1970

14.0

18.4 15 3
14.4 13.4

l 63 \.45 l 15 92

277
2 28

172
1.45

compared with the average rate of productivity in the oth ' AS e: oavid A. Lake, "Inte rnati onal Economic Structures and~ me!"'?ers of_lhe world econ om, sout' 1934," world Politics, vol. 35, no. 4 Quly 1983), table (p mlencan Fore1gn Econom c Policy _ 1 1 525 d I887 an table 3 (p. 54!).

Attempts by the United States after \Vorld War u to ak d for the worl d po1. 1 economy were much more effectivem e an .t enforce rules Itica tha B . , had after 194;:> did n been. Amenca not merely replicate earlier Bn'tishn am s. t\'er . the contrary, the d1rr-erences between Britain's "hegemony" in the expenence' on 1 . rune tecnth century and Americas a~e r_ vVorld Wa_r ~I were profound. As we ha\e seen. Britain had oC\er been as supeno r m produchVlty to the rest of the world as the United States was after 1945. Nor was the United States ever as dependent on forei!!n trade and investment as Britain. Equally important, America's economic p~ ers-o,er whom its hegemo ny \Vas exercised, since America's abilitv to make the rules hardlv ' extended to the socialist cam p-w ere also its military allies: but Britain's chieftradingpartners had been its major military and political rivals. In addition. one reason for Britain's relative ineffectiveness in maintaining a free trade regime is that it had never made extensive use of the principle of reciprocity in trade.9 It thus had sacri ficed potential leve rage over other countries that preferred to retain their 0\\11 restrictions while Britain practiced free trade. The policies of these states mjuht well have been alte red had they been confronted with a choice between a closed British market for their expo rts on the one hand and mutual lowering of barriers on the other. Finally, Britain had an empire to which it could retreat, by selling less advanced goods to its colonies rather than competing in more open markets. American hegemony, rather than being one more instance of a general phenom~ non, was essentially unique in the scope and efficacy of the_instrurnents at the disposal of a hegemonic state and in the degree of success attruned. That the theory of hegemonic stability is supported by only one or at most two case5 casts doubt . general validity. . . Even maJor ponents of the theorv . . pro on tts dl be refrclin from making such claim s In an article published in l981. Kin e rgh r e . seemed to entertain the possibility that two or more countnes 1111gbt "take onbt e . th _ task 0 f .1=providing leadersh ip together, thus adWJg to 1 'timaC\ shann<t cloak ur egt :all . .~ e for dens d v 15 an reducing the danger that leadershiP . regarded cvruJc ;, as a Gilpin . l't;...., dom . d Ch 1 I ~. 'n mation and exploitation."10 In War all ange 1 Uont. eO fb...nemonic Promu1 u what appeared to gate be a highly detenmrus tic conception o "5

:! S

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

KEC

' I HEGEMONY IN THE WO

RLD POLITICAL ECONOMY

c,ck s: "tht cotwl n!'inn of one hege monic war is the lwginnitJ (Jf :tJHJll ter c: . I . . I J, . . ~nm t 1. t'\patlsion. and cvE>n lu:l 1,1 I' c cc lllC. "ll )'tl l c Olll fl 1 1 ~'- ew wa., Y( Co[ < t<' deter. mi11istk. tll tcl he asst' rtcd that ''stales c:an learn to lw 11\Cll <' 1 1t~htt tt l'd in th ,. der. nit ions of their itJ!'c n sts and e<ltt learn to lw more c.:oopct..ttl\ 1 ' in their ~<::h~:.~ ior. ~ Dcsl)itt' the erosion of hegemony. "there arc n.'a' 01 1: 101 h<lie\'irllr t) l , n 1a t1 w 1t"CS<'J it <.lisL'Cfttilil )rittll l in lhC> inter natio nal S)' Si em c.:an lw nsol\td witho11 t [ '" resort 1:; to hegemon ic war." . Tlw empirical evidence for the gene ral validity of he~enwnic ~tahility theory i, weak. nnd C'vcn its chie f adhNcnts have ~oubts abou.t tl. In add.tlior.l. 1h<.: logic:al unde rpinn iugs of the th('Ol)' are suspe<:l. Kmdl cbL'r~er s strong claun fo r the nc:ctssity of a single leader rested 011 the theory of ~ol lectiv~ good s. I le argued that "the dange r we fcH:<.' is not loo muc h po"vcr in tl~e tlll.crnatiOil <ll ~conf.>my, hut too littk-, not an excess of' domination. but a superAlllt)' of would-he I ree nd ers, tmwi lling to mind the store, and waiting for a storekeeper to appear. "14 .. . [S)omc of 'the goods" produced by hege monic leatle rship <:lr e not gcnnincly collcclivc in cJ 1arac:ter, although the implications of tltis fact arc not necessaril> as tlamaging to the theOJy as migh t be imagi ned at first. More critical is the fact that in international economic syst<'ms a few actors typicalJy control a prepo nde ran c.:e of reso urces. This point is ~specially telling, since the theory .of collective ~oocls t~oes not proper!)' imply that cooperation among a few countries should be Jmp oss1ble. Indeed, one; of the original purposes of Olso ns use of the theo ty '.vas to show that in systems with only a few participants these actors 'can provide the mselves with collecti,e goods wi.tl1out relyi ng on any posi tive induce ments apart from the good itself.''IS Logically. hegemony should not be a necessary condition for the eme rgence of cooperation in an oligopolistic syste m. Tlr<' theory of be>gernonic stabili ty is thus sugges tive but by no mea ns definitive. Concentrated power alone is not sufhcien t to create a stab le inte mational economic orde r iu whic h cooperation flou rishes, and the argu ment that hegemony is necessary for <'ooperation is both theoretically and e mpirically wea k If hegemony is rede fined as the ability and wiiJingness of a single state to make and enforc:e mles. furth ermore, the claim that hege mony is suffi cie nt for c.:ooperation becom es virtually tautological. The crude theo ry of hege rnonic stability establishes a useful , if somewhat si m plistic, starting-point for an analysis of changes in international cooperati on and discord. lts refined vers ion raises a looser but suggestive set of interpretive ques tions for t11e analysis of some e ras in the history of the inter national political ecot.l omy. Such an inter preti ve fram ework does not constitute an explanatory syste iiHC theor)'. but it can help us think of hege mony in anothe r way -less as a concept th< tl helps to explain outcomes in terms of power than as a way of describing an inter national system in which lead ershjp is exercised by a sing le state. Rather th:111 being a component of a scien tific gene ralization- that power is a necessary or 5111 . ficient condition for cooperation- the concept of hegemon y, defin ed in term s ol willingness as well as ability to lead. helps us think about the incentives facing the' potential hege mon. Und er what conditions, dom estic and inte rnational, will such a (.'Ountry decide to invest in the construction of rules and institutions?

ncern for tltc ir 1'( ntivc f"a<:irw the I s 289 Co l. . r t-lcgemon l>h Id ntly neglec:ter ll t 111\ cs Ja<:ing otlttr c:c . ou also alert freqluey confront in c-on-:Idcri ng whether to eh ~~nhi es in the system . \Vha~ ~o ~e dot ,ki about tlw c; krtb lio; ts of scconllary<l enge or defer to a would-be<:) cclu; encr thin o < [ powers raises th ea er. Theories o 1 l.!,<n ony <; 1 1<-' H>ulu seck not on) , t . t:: question of d c ence. . k' . e1ero engage Jlt I'll 1 e-tna mg and rule-enfo) o ana1)'7.e domtnantpowers' d . sioJ'lS t l f' ent eel. dtry states <. (' e r Lo the leadership of th rc:em. ' but a)so to explore wh. I secon ' I .. [I (:; egem ~ ccoun t { the er;tt mac:~ o egemon ic regim es and foron . Th t . they nt>ed to or th . a. IS, a. n . with hegeH\ony. We wiiJ see later t1 G 1at .~ c:oextstenc:e of tOOJ>eratJO monv" provides som e valuable clues helping ramsc ts no t'ton or "' ogic:al cl ]Jegel I us un erstand h IUt>ol and hegemony nt togct 1er. ow cooperation
I ' (

[!

MIUTARY POWER AND HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD pOUTICAL ECONOMY

efore taking up d1es c themes, we need to clanh., the relationslu b B . h .d ') 11s is of hegemon y ID t e WOJ} polttical economy and the <jUeSg OilP fel,veen t1 analvs ili't . . . u o m an pow'r. :\ begem oruc state must possess enough miht~n.r r)Ower to be able to t t. th . . . . - J. pro e<: e mternational political economy that Jt dommates from incursions bv hostile adversaries This is essential because economic.iss~Jes, if they are crucial en;ugh to basic.: nation~ values, may be~o me milita1y-s~cunty LSsues as "'ell. For instance, Japan attacked the United States m 1941 p<utly m respo nse to the freezing of Japane e assets in the U nited States, which denied Japan "access to all the ,;tally needed supplie outside her own C ol, in particular her most crucial need, oil."16 During and after \\'orld lontr War II the United States used its militruy power to assure itself ac-cess to the petroleumof the Middle East; and at the end of 1974 SecretarvofState Henr :\ .1\isslnger warned that the United States migh t res01t to milita:ty action if oil-c>.porting <..'Ounbies : threatened "some actual stnmrulation of the industrialized "orld:t:Yet the hegemonic power need not be militarily dominant worl<h\ide. :\either British nor Ame rican powe r ever extended so far. Britain was challenged militarily during the nineteen th century by France. Germany, and especially Ru. ia: e,en at the height of its powe r after \,Yorld Wru Il the United States confronted a recal~i trant Soviet adverse:uy and fought a ,.var against China. The militt': conditions for economic hege mon y are met if the economically prepondenmt <.'Ottllh}' h.as suffi cient militaJy capabiliti es to prevent incursions by others that would clen~ Jt access to major areas of its econ omic activity. d . .. Tlle sources of hegemony tJ1erefore meIude su ffi c1ent militan power to eter or . ~eb ff . . u attempts to capt ure and close off 1mp01t<mt <treas 0f the world political econ on1 B . . } ut m the conte mporaty world. at anv rate. . 1S di1netut For a hwemon to use tt ~e . ili' . ml taf\ tttcuy power directly to attai n its ec-on'omiC poli c~' 0 b~ecti,es \\1th tts m g t-o . be . 1\!lr+ 1out gmmn t""'ners and allies. Allies cannot be threatened wtt.h force w1t1 _c to . ques tion the alhance c nor are threats to cease derendiner t11em unless e' couJOnDe e . . lStallc the h ' crrcu M egemon s economic rules ven ' eredible ex"Cept u1 extraorchnaJYlltical n . al economy any of the relationships Y.rithin' the hege mon.ic intemanon po
h
<.;

th .

:.:NU

1-'AJ< 1" J

THE INTERNA IIUNAL I'VL-1 11'-'' u .. ............. ' ~ " '

..

nr. WURLo p OLITICAL ECONQ

MY 2!H

dnn1inate-d b\ the Un ilf'd States after World \l\ 'ar l1 at'f n <:loselv th , idt'al ~ve ot<complex i n t erdependence'"-,~ri.th ll1ul t~ple .~.~~tH'" lll'l!t. plC' chunn~ls ~ 0 contact among societies, :.1 nd inefficacy of mtlitary fOL ce fot mo ~ pnht:\ objC'<.: tivcsthan the converse ideal type of realist theory.I~> Thi. does not mean that military force h<~S b_ecom e u se lee;\ I ~ hus <.:ertainlv played an indirect role even in U.S. relations wtt_ tls cl~~est .lll tt's, sn,<.<. Cerrnan~ h and Japan could hardly ignore the fact that Ame ncan 111 '.htary PfJ'~'c,r sh iddcd the1{ 1 from Soviet pressure. lt has played a more ovett . role I ll the MJ<.luiP Eas t, where Ame1ican military power has occasionally bee n <.h rcctly em_ lo)cd and has always p cast a shadow and where u.S. military aid has been consptcuous. Yc't ehangc!i ln relations of military power have not been the ~~lajor f<~ct~rs affec ting patterns of cooperation and discord among the ad\an_ced mdus!Ttalt: ed coun tries since the end of\Vorld \Var II. Only in th e case of Mtddle E< L'itern oil haw, they been higlrlv significant as forces contlibu ting to chang~s i_ in te rnational econo mic rcgi sne~, n and even in that case .. . shifts in econ01mc: mterdependence, and the refore in economic power, were more important. Through~~t th e period between ~94.5 and 1983 the United States re mained a far stronger m!lttary power than any of its allies and the only country capable of defending the m from the Soviet Un ion or of intervening effectively against serious opposition in areas such as_ the Midcllc East. .. . Some readers may wish to ctiticize this account by argumg that militruy power has been more important than claimed here. By conside ring military power only as a background condition for post\var American hegemony rather than as a variable, I invite such a debate. Any such c1itique, however, should keep in mind what I am trying to e>..plain [here] ... not t11e somces of hegemony (in domestic Lnstitutions, basic resources, and technological advances any more than in military power), but rather the effects of changes in hegemony on cooperation among th e advanced industrialized countries. I seek to account for tl1e impact of American domi nance on the creation of international economic regimes and the effects of an erosion of that preponderant position on those regimes. Only if these problems-not other questions that might be interesting~oulc.l be understood better by e>.1)loring more deeply the impact of changes in relations of military power would thi s hypothetical critique be damaging to my argument.

~\PP 1~m.iu

11

NOTIONS OF HEGEMONY
For Marxists, the fundamental forces affecting the world political economy are those of class struggle and uneven development. International history is dynamic 31 dialectical rather than cyclical. The maneuvers of states reflect the stages of capitahst development and the contradictions of that development. For a Marxist, it is futile to discuss hegemony, or the operation of international institutions, without understanding that they operate, in the contemporary world syste m, within a capitalist con.text shaped by the evolutionary patterns and functional requirements of capitallss~ Determinists may call these requirements laws. Historicists may see the patte~ns (~ providing some clues into a rather open-ended process that is nevertheless affecte

:d

dJy by what 1 - g HIL before: people maki h . pro,oun ng t elr ov.rn hist please. . ory, but not just as theY A y genuinely .. -.,, an theory of world .. ~n . , 1 . po ttJcs be . .taJsm Accordmg o \ lanmt doctrine nos . . ' mooth and gms \\lth an ana]}'"Sts of . 1 1. eaP ductive forces \v thm the confines of C' .t 1. progresstve develop f prO .I . ap1 a 1St rclati f ment 0 . t for long. Con traut<:tJOns are bound to ap . ons o production ,.., ersJS . s .....n P r rm of tendencies towarcl stagnation and depear. 1t 1 likeJ, ll1at they will take .1 . . ) the ,o A .1 . . c tne 1n the rat f . , also be re ecteu 111 ct1ses of legitimacy F th . . . e o profit, but thev or 9 may f economic <:rises. 1 Any "c f h e cap,tahst state even th. . bsence o nsJs o egemony'' 1"1 1 ' m e a me-and more f unc lnmentally-a crisis of ea t' '"' nee:essan y be at the 1 tl sarne . . p1< uLSm. For Maoosts, theones of hegemony are necessarilv .. . , p~rtial ' smc.-e lain changes in the contradictions facing capitalism '>.C\iertl1eless \1they dol not exp f, often used the concept o negemony, implicitly defined si m I . as dom-' . ar.osts 1ave f anaiV'Ting the smface manifestations of world poU tics ~y . . ~ance. as a way ots as well- as ;-- met. . u. ,. 111 .and power are comple . er tcapitalism. For ~vlarx. un . canti sts, wea t h tS . " . men ary; eac depends on the other.... _[T]he analyses of _the Marnst Fred Block and ti1e Realist Robert cJ . 1 e quite sim1lar: both empha.:;rr.e the role of U.S. hegemon , . . . d pm ar \i m creating or er after the Second World War and the disturbing effects of the erosi~n of A . _ 11 , mencan power. Jmmanuel Wauerstem s work also illustrates this point He LS at . pams to stress that modem world histmy should be seen as the history of capitalism as a world S\-'S tem. Apart from "r:la~vely minor ~ccidents" resulting F geo!rraphy. peculiarities rom of history, or luck, 1t IS the operations of the world-market forces which accentuate the differences, institutionalize them, and make them impossible to surmow\t over the long run."20 Nevertheless , when considering particular epochs, \Vallerstei.n emphasizes hegemony and t11e role of military force. Dutch economic hegemony in the seventeenth century was destroyed not by the operation of the world-market ~:-s tem or contradiction s of capitalism, but by the force of British and French arms.21 The Marxian adoption of mercantilist categories raises analytical ambiguitie having to do with the relationship between capitalism and the state. \'larxists who adopt this approach have difficulty maintaining a class focus. since their unit of analysis shifts to the country, rather t11an the class, fo r purposes of explaining international events. This is a problem for both Block and Wallerstein. as it often appears that their e mbrace of state-centered analysis has releaated the concept of class to the shadowy background of political economy. The puzzle of the relationship between the state and capitalism is also reflected in the old debate b~l\,:een Lenin and Kautsky about "ultra-imperiallsm."22 Lenin claimed that contradicti?ns among the capitalist powers we re fundamental and could not be resol~'ed_. aaamst K autsky's view that capitalism could go through a phase in which capitalist states could maintain unity for a considerable period of time. .a. r er Tl1e successful operation of American hegemony 10r over a quarter-centun anbe alis ~l the end of World War Il supports Kautsky's forecast that ultra-impe~ m_~ c ~able and contradicts Lenin's thesis that capitalism made int~r-tm~~s ''~ lneVitabl . f rl ether ultra-mlpe Ill cou e. It does not however, resolve the ISSUe 0 " 1 . .,'"'.situation tnai t ' be ai is of the (.'()fltempon.u.' i n amed in the absence of hegemony. An an ~-s . . rialism-American n Marxian terminology would hold that one fonn of ultra-unpe
c

292

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTl CAL ECONOMY

KEO

'

f. ' HEGEMONY IN THE WO

whether fundamental contradictions in capitalism or in tllC' t'(><'.XJslPntc of <:apit Jtsrn . a ), with the state system prevent any such recovery. . . The kev question of this book-how mternat10nal WO(Wralion <:an b maintained ~mong the advanced capitalist states in _the ab!>cncc. of Arneti<:a~ hegemony-poses essentially the same problem. The v1e~v taken here is sirnilar to that of Kautsky and his followers, although th~ terrm_n ol~~~ is different. My contention is that the common interests of the leading captlahst stales, bolstC:!red b , the effects of exjsti11g intemational regimes (mostly created during a period of Amet~ ican hegemony), are strong enough to make sust~~ed coo~era~on .possi?le, though not inevitable. One need not go so far as ... the mternatJOnaltzatton of capital" to understand the strong interests that capitalists have in maintain ing some cooperation in the midst of rivalry. Uneven development in tl1e context of a state system maintains rivalry and ensures that cooperation will be incomplete and fragile ... but it does not imply that the struggle must become violent or that <:ompromises that benefit all sides are impossible. Despite the similarities between my concerns and those of many Marxists, 1 do not adopt their categories in this study. Marxian e.x-plkations of the "laws of capitalism" are not sufficiently well established that they can be relied upon for inferences about relations among states in the world political economy or for the analysis of future international cooperation. Insofar as there are fundamental contradictions in capitalism , they wilJ surely have great impact on fu ture international cooperation; but the e>.1stence and nature of these contradictions seem too murky to justify incorporating them into my analytical framework. As this discussion indicates, Marxian insights into international hegemony derive in part from combining Realist conceptions of hegemony as dominance witl1 arguments about the contradictions of capitalism. But this is not the only Marxian contribution to the debate. In the thought of Antonio Gramsci and his followers, hegemony is distinguished from sheer dominance. As Robert \ V. Cox has expressed it: Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between objectire material forces and ethico-political ideas-in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups. A hegemonial structure ofworld order is one in which power takes a primarily consensual form, as distinguisbeJ from a non-hegemonic order in wh~c~t there are manifestly rival powers and no power has been able to establish the legttl macy of its dominance.24 The value of this conception of hegemony is that it helps us understand the willingness of the partners of a hegemon to defer to hegemonial leadership. He~e mons require deference to enable them to construct a structure of world capitahst

h<'g<'mom- is nnw breaking d0 ..,,m, leading to increased d1son icr., h. 1t the iss, 1 .. n:. ent i~ "whether all this will uJtimately result in a lle\\1 c.ap1 t.ai. I ()rid orde ~ ll P . . . . I . r, n 111 1 11 tlw <:ontenclin a t't'\'Oiutionary reconstitution of v.rorld society, ?r m t le cor:nm.on ' dasse and nations.''23 The issue from a Marx:~~ st~uldpomt I' "~'1 I~ ultra-irnpctiaJ~ ism could be revived by new efforts at inter-captal.ist collaboratro 'or, on the <:onoa . 1

3 s too expel' 1 , 11cl perhaps self-def . der It I eating to a h1 or tl. key distinc:lJC ti ' ' tcn h~gemonv . n l . ' ,., 11 1 e . , <1 < 1mpe ct' eve this b\ r10 rcc; a1tc . . ' (UJ k an empi re. do( not dommate societies th na Jsrn IS that a he r oh e b . rough a . b gemon 1.1 tructure ut r;,t1u, superv1scs the relati h' <.:urn er omc pol . supe t societ,ies through a corn hi nation of hcie~ns lips between politicallv .lhdtal drs oen en ,rare ues of , m er of markets.:..." I l c.~e monv rests on the sub ti control and the oper: rion dary states that thty are benefiting as well Jec \'he awareness b} elites ~con as on t e n m se 'tself to sacri fice tangible shOtt-term benefits~ . \VJ mgness of the he~e mon\~aluable as the c:onceplion of kleolouical hege or m~a~gible long-term gains .h o mony IS 10 help u . Id I1e usec1 \VJt some <:aution F' t r ence it shou h m us understand e,er ' d . liS ' we s ould t d . ders of secon a1y states are nec:essmily the ' ctims of"fal . n.o assum~: that i 1 ea , accept the hegemoni<: ideology, or that they constitut se ~onsctousness~ when cl1e) . . rI . . ti . th t betrays the mte1ests o t 1e nation to 1ts own selfish e a small ' paras1 c:al e1 ds .. 1te arselves as Robert Gilpin has, that during both the pen. B. ~t t'i u.seful to remind ou ' . I h ax ntannrca and tl1 p e ax Arnericana countnes ot 1er t an the .hegemon prospered, and th . tl "h 1 "6 at mcleed man . of e ttself.- Under some eo cl't } them grew faster .1an t I 1egemonlf . . h . h . n I tons-not nec:essar. il)' all-lt may e not on y m t e se .-Interest of peripheral elites, but concl uctve to h f 1 the econonuc growt o t 1~1r countnes, for th~m to defer to the hegemon. 27 We may also be .permitted. to doubt that 1deolocncal begemon). as endunno . . o IS nternationally as It IS dom estically. The powerfuJ ideolom: of nationat1 1 not l .. . o.: sm .s ., aV'ailable for the hegemon, outside of Its own country, but rather for its enemies. Opponents of hegemony can often make nationalism the weapon of the weak and may also seek to invent cosmopolitan ideologies that delegitimjze heuemom, such as the c~rrent. i?eol?gy of a New Internation.al Economic Order, ins~ead of ~oing along w1th legthmating ones. Thus the potential for challenges to hegemonic ideology alw-ays exists.

RLD POLITICAL E CONOMy

29

CONCLUSIONS
Claims for the general validity of the theOI)' of hegemonlc stability are often exaggerated. The dom inance of a single great power may contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary. But Realist and Marxian arguments about hegemony both generate some important insights. . . . Hegemony is related in complex ways to cooperation and to tnshtuttons uch as international regimes. Successful hegemonic leadership itsel~ d:pe~1els 011 a certain fonn of asymmetrical cooperation. The hegemon plays a dJStmcti,e ~le. p~'di c d c VI ng tts partners with leadership in return 10r e1 erence: but unlike tn unpenal ' . . power, 1t cannot make and enforce mles Without a certam clegree of consent from . . other sovereign . states. As the interwar expenence ill t rat es. matenal predomlus . d h nan a1 rr ce one does not guarantee either stab'l'tty or euecti \e leader-hip. lndee .tt1e 1 hegemon may have to invest resources . . ti 111 order to ensure tha 'ts m mstitu ons preferred rules will guide the behavior of other eountries. . ration C h . d he!!emons reqwre coope OOperation may be fostered by egemon~, an t temati\'es on the to make and enforce rules. Hegemony and coo{Jfration are no '11 '

~~

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POliTICAL ECONOMY

KEOI

.'iEGEMONY IN THE WO

o an 1 cl ., 'l)enttion. we ltvt tl " ,,0 I1 ('Cplio )'Zc t IlC l"l' I:ltionshipS b<twee n hegemo nv and COO . . L't'X)}Je11 ltion that is somew hat tart rather than sy1upy-sweet. Jt tal!s' take into . . n ul the f.1<.' ts that coercion is alwavs possible in world poHtics .and th..tt ~..on flicts 0 r'l<.:<:otlnt tnte . ' . rest er neY \CU11sh even when there are rmportant shared mten~ts. . [C)ooperat1011 should be defined not as the absence of conflic t-whic h b alway~ at least . c tially imp01tant elemen t of intemational relatio ns-bu t as a pr(}(:Pss that inw~l~e~ten. the use of discord to stimulate mutual adjustment.

c..'Onlr:.H~. the~ <tr(> often found in symbiotic relatio11ships with r 1:

lntlt . r

e 1.

AL ECONOMY . ,. 29;) . J.,eo.in , Jmpen : 11w liighest Sta 0.r ~e J Capztal' 39) 92 V. 1 ork L~m (~ew Y l .l9 'PP '-~l. " blishers ntcmationa\ p~ aoni Arrighi , "A f ''i'> of' Hegemony,, . S .
,..tt

RlDPounc

amtr A 1 I." .tanuel Wallerstein,tn n . . mm. Ciovanni :\rri . Dt .,._. under Frank. anc lJ amzcs of Global Cri.tL~ (~I, .And re G nthlv Review Pr( c;-;. I ~)82), p. 108.

GtOV<

NOTES
1. Robert 0. Keohane. 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Jntemati Economic Regimes, 1967-1977.'' in Ole Holsti e~ al., Change in the ll!tenw uo11 at ~~.:~ lJ tem (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131-162. 2. Charles P. KindJeberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University 0 f ' California Press, 1973), p. 305. 3. Timothy J. McKeo,.,vn, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and :-.Jineteenth Century T<uiff Levels in Europe," International Or[!anization, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winte r 1980), p. 78. 4. l mmanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System 11: M..ercan tili<>m and the Consolidation of the European \Vorld~Economy . 1600-17.50 ( ~ew York: Academ ic Press, 1980) ' p.38. 5. Stephe n D. Krasner, "United States Commercial and Yfoneta ry Policy: Unrave lling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Fmeign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 68-69. 6. Robert 0 . Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics ;11 Transition (Boston : Little, Brown), p. 44. 7. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structu re of International Trade," World Pol.itics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aprill 976), p. 333. 8. McKeown, p. 88. 9. Ibid. 10. Charles P. Kindleb erger, "Dominance and Leadership in the Interna tional Economy,'' Interna twnd Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (June 1981), p. 252. 11. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Camb ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 210. 1.2. lbjd., p. 227. 13. Ibid., p. 234. 14. Ibid. p. 253. 15. Mancur Olson. quoted in McKeown, p. 79. .: 16. Paul Schroeder, The Axls Alliance and Japanese-American Relations (lthaca, N.Y CorneU University Press, 1958), p. 53. li. Seyom Brown, The Face.<> of Power: Constancy and Chanue in United States Foreign Policy from Tro11Uln to Reagan (New York: Columbia Unive~ity Press, 1983). P 428. 18. Keohane and Nye, chap. 2. 19. Jurgen Haberman, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976). 20. lmmanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 21. 21. Wallerstein. The Modem World,. System 11, PP 38-39 .

);f:\\ York "S . 1 F . . . . Mo ' oua or<:cs, States, and v'V< kl ~ bert W. Cox, 24 Jl~lations Theory," Jouma l of International StrHlie.so ~1UOrd~rs: Beyond lntcrnati a! ' z ermrum , vol. 10, no. 2 (S on 81), P 153. nole 27. urnrner 19 '1'1 all er~tem, 1e Modem World system: Capit [ . nanuel W , . 2-'..J. 1011 a LS1 Af,nculture and the _ Origins ofthe EutOpea n World- Economy in the Sixteenth ork: Century (New Y Academic press, 1974), PP 15-;_'. . 26. Robert Gilpin , PP .l t.o- l 85. ,.. . This is not to say that hegemo.ny m general benefits small or weak tJ t I11s will be the case. He '~- f. countries. There <:ertai.nly is no assurance 1at tons states from exploiting small ones and may constructgem may prevent middle-sized d as ructure of ord 1 .~1 b er con ucive to world economic growu1; ut t 1ey may also exploit smaller states econom icall .J, . their patterns of autonomous developm ent through economtc political Yor uistort 'li r w l1ether hegemony helps poo . . 's cannot or mt tary intervention. T I1e tssueo .l be r countrie answervu unconditionally, because too many otl1er factors intervene U til complex and sophisticated tl1eory of the relationships among hegemony tbn f:a moreand welfare o er actors. .. U 15 . . developed , rt remruns an ernpmc a y open question .

'- OTI I THE GREAT DIVIDE IN

The Great Divide in the

Global Village
BRUCE R. SCOTI

INCOMES ARE DIVERGING

Mainstream economic thought promises that glob~iz.atiun \\ill lead to a widespread improvement in average incomes. Firms will reap mcr~'ied economies of stale: in a larger market, and inwmes ,,.,;JJ converge as poor countnes gro'-''' more rapidly than rich ones. In this "win-win " perspecti ve, the importance of nation-states fades as the: "a]obal viJJage grows and market integration and prosperity take hold. 0 But the evidence paints a different picture. A\erage incomes have inde;etl been growing, but so has the income gap between rich and poor countries. Both trends have been evident for more tl1an 200 years, but improved global c:omm unications have led to an increased awareness among the poor or income in equalities and heightened the pressure to emigrate to richer countries. In response, the indusbiaJlzed nations have erected higher barriers against immigration, making the world economy seem more like a gated community than a global village. And although international markets for goods and capital have opened up since World War 1I and multilateral organizations now articulate ruJes and monitor the world economy, economic inequality among countries continues to increase. Some two billion people earn less than $2 per day. At first glance, there are two causes of this divergence between economic theory and reality. First, the rich countries insist on barriers to immigration and agricultural imports. Second, most poor nations have been unable to attract much foreign <:apital due to their own governme nt failings. These two issues are fundame ntally linked: by fordng poor people to remain in badly governed states, immigration barriers deny those most in need the opportunity to "move up" by "moving out." In tum, that immobility eliminates a potential source of pressure on ineffective governments. thus facilitating their survival. Since the rich countries are unlikely to lower their agricultural and im migration barriers significantly, they must recognize that politics is a key cause of economic inequality. And since most developing countries receive little foreign investment, clle wealthy nations must also acknowle dge that the 'Washington consensus, which assumes that free markets \vill bring about economic convergence, is mistaken . lf the)' at least admit these realities, they will abandon the notion that their own particular
Bmce R Scott, lbe Great Divide in the Global Village." Reprinted by permission of Fnrei(!.ll Affair.., ~ol. SO, No. J (January/February 200J ), pp. 160-177. Copyright 2001 by the Council on Foreign Rela tions, Inc.

D<ries are the I)( t c:ountric~. Jn tum th . h strat"'o. ~ derable freecl m t u ' 'Jr dc\cIopment strate . s ould all0\\ . poorer c h. :ountn canst . l l gJes to t e1r ov. . es . ore [Jragmat~t 'w ' l.1t ro e of tht: statt bw. . . il C:Jrc:umstru,.... uus J1l . ~"Omes ptvotal ""' 1n , 11y ha,e ec,>nonH \ <;; and polic:vmakers . \\ ' not come t0 th ? Since the h <trfl*' rs erected bv rich count . ese ner . _ .' nes are seen 1.tal conclusions 500 uv leaders of thuo;chcountnes find it comen t as \ thto political tabL r f 1 len overlook . -.d on the part u t c: !! obal ec:onom\' that has b to Jb . em and foc11S Jflste.. . ' een 1 erah d Th . . political po\\'er m mu 1 1 ti ateral organ izations k . ze e rich ex>untnes . . ma es 1 diffi . 1 ~ t hons to challenge ti11S se lf-servmg world-vie\\' A d t _ c:u t or developinC1 1 oau . n s anuard a d . o v do as much h::trm a<; good. g1 their focus on . ven . ea em1c solutions rna, th . . . I economte: ther than on e mstitutions t 1at underpin mark ~ts E.stabilitv ancl grO\\th ., ra . . e . . ored the po)j tic al 1ssues at stake in modernizing instituti cononuc theory has . ~gng that market-based prices can allocate resources app ~ns.lmcorrectly assumJJl r . . ropnate r. The fiasco of re1onn m Russ1a has forced a belated . reapprrusal of th. it d st in markets. Many obse1 vers now admit that the tr" .ti . LS ) m trU. . . h . . . . ansi on economtes need d appropnate property ng ts and an effectiVe state to enforce tl .h e . f' lose nu ts as much as .tb th ev needed the Jjb eralization o prices. Indeed, uberal.izao ' on ''1 out propem rights turned out to be the path to gangsterism. not capitalism eh .th state, ach' .e d m h . . did ''1 effective te\ uc greater success m 1ts transition than ma, R .a more . .. . d d h l l ussta, e'en though Be1.1~g procee e muc rn.ore s ow y with liberalization and p.ri"atization. Econom ic developm ent requ1res the transformation of institutions as well as the freeing of prices,. which in tu m requires political and social modernization as well as economi c reform. The state plays a key role in this process; ,,;thout it. de,elopmental strategies have little hope of succeeding. The creation of effective states in the developing world will not be driven by familiar market forces. e"en if pressures from capital markets can force fiscal and monetary discipline. And in a world still governed by "states rights," real progress in achie,ing accountable uo,emments will require reforms beyond the mandates of multilateral institution .

THE GlOBAL VIlLA

GE

297

GO WITH THE FLOW

In theory, globalization provides an opportun.ity to raise incomes through increased specialization and trade. This opportunity is conditioned b~ the size of the markets in question , which in tu m depends on geography. transportation costs. communication nehvorks and the institutions that underpin markets. Free trade . ' mcreases both the size of the market and the pressure to improve economic performance. Those who are most competitive take adv<mtage of the enhanced market opportunities to survive and prosper. Neoclassical economic theOI)' predicts that poor countries should grow faster than nch ones in a free global market. l ul Capital from ne1 nations earch of chea_Per labor should How to poorer economies. and labor should migrate fr?~ low.tncome areas toward those with higher wages. As a result. labor and capital COst~and eventually income in rich and poor areas should eventually con,erkge. . The . economy demonst rates how th' tl1eOJ), can work in a free mar et 1S With th e appropriate institutio ns. Since the 1880s, a reo1arkable convergence

us

1!9

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUT ICAL ECON OMY

,.JTI I THE GREAT DMDE IN TH

E GLOBAL VfllAGE

ol: incomes among the country's regions has oc~urred. E urnp(~an Union h \\1lnc ed a similar phenomenon. with the ex<.:epbons of CrePe<> an I tal)~ '>nuth <1.'> half. the :\Je--=:.ogiomo. \\'hat is important. however. is that l,r}'l America and ~ro 1 EU enjoy labor and capital mobility as well as free intemal trade. t But the rest of the worJcl does not fit this pattern. The: 1 o,t reccm t \Vor[d Der.;elopment Report shows that real per capita incom es! or the nc:lwst one-third of countries rose by an annual 1.9 percent between 19 t0 a_nd l H95, wl tercas tht: middle third went up by onJy 0.7 percent and the bottom thlr(l showed no inc:rease at all. In the \ Vestem industrial nations and Jap~ alone. averag~ real incomes have been rising about 2.5 percent annually si.nce 19v~a fact that further ac<:(;ntuatt!l the divergence of global income. These nch counm_es ac:coun t for about 60 percent of world GDP but only 15 perce nt of world population. Wlw is it that the poor countries c-ontinue to faJJ furthe r behjnd? One key reason is that ~ostrich countries have largely excl uded the international flow of labor into their markets sinc.-e the interwar period. As a re~;ult, low-skilled labor is not free to Row across international boundaries in search of more lucrative jobs. From an Ameri<:an or European perspective, immigration appears to have risen in recen t years, even approaching its previous peak of a century ago in the Un ited States . Although troe, this comparison misses the c,-entral point. Billions of poor peoplt: could improve their standard of ~vi.ng by migrating to rich cow1tries. But in 1997, the United States allowed in only 737,000 immigrants from develop.ing nations, while Europe admitted about 665,000. Taken together, these flows are only 0.04 perce nt of all potential imnUgrants. The point is not that the ric:h countries should permit unfettered irnmj gration. A huge influx of cheap labor would no doubt be politically explosive; many European countries have already curtailed immigration from poor countries for fear of a severe backlash. But the more salient Lc;sue is that rich nations who laud liberalism and free markets are rejecting those very principles when they restrict freedom of movement. The same goes for agricultural imports. Both Europe and Japan have high trade barriers in agriculture, while the UnRed States remruns modestly prote ctioni st. Mainstream economic theory does provide a partial rationalization for ric:hcountryprote<::tionism: Immigration barrie rs need not be a major handicap to poor nations because they can be offset by capital flows from industrialized economies to developing ones. In other words, poor people need not demand space in rich countries because the rich will send their capital to help develop the poor countries. This was indeed the case before World War I but it has not been so since ' \Vorld War 11. But the question of direct investment , which typically brings technologies and know-how as well as financial capital, is more complicate d than theories would predict. The total stock of foreign direct investment did rise almos t sevenfold from 1980 to 1997, increasing from 4 percent to 12 percent of world GDP during that period. But very little has gone to the poorest countries. In 1997, about 70 percent went from one rich counoy to another, 8 developing countries received ~ut 20 ~nt , and the remainder was divided among more than 100 poor nabon5 According to the World Bank, the truly poor countries received less than 7 percent of the foreign direct investment to all developing countries in 1992-98. At the sarne

:h(:;

the unrestrict<< ,.~ of <:apital markets in d . 1 tJJ1le, f Jn rich cou nt . r~ opportunHv for ~Leov eve hopmg t'Ountries l1ive:s larg6.. t:rl11S ro , ~ (:rs t at ar . . ~ "'' JJJ": It is not accJd f'td] that ric:h countries ins t e rernmlS(;ent of colO.alisJ11 1h . . . lS on orv-n , k nJ advantage an< amers m agri<:u lture and 1 . ~~ rnar ets where the\ m LnVe aJ1 mtgTation, vf th '"' advantage. nere ey would be atadis . " ti L Ac for the Astan eers, tne1r strong grO\vth 15 cl la ,.,... . I . ue rgely to th . high t forei<m cap1ta . <;mgapore stands out be(.-au se .t h etr 11 savinsrs O 1 rate, n . ::> gn Ulvestment, but 1t has also achieved one of the h'gh as enjoyed a great ckal of . d forel I est omesti . the world, and its government has been a leading inA . c:-savl!l~ rates 10 . . Uen<:e on the funds. China JS now repeab~g t h.IS pattern, With a savings rate of almost use of these . 4{) GDP This factor, along With domestic: credit creation ' L been 1ts k:,percent of . nas otor f omic gro..vth. Chma now holds more than 8100 billo . m o econ th cl I l n m1 ow-..,elding forei exchange reserves, e secon argest reserves in the world. ' gnln short, global marke ts offer opportunities for aB b t .. . ' u opportunities do not guarantee results. Ylost poork count nes have been unable t0 avru.1 themselves al of much foreJgn ~aplt o: to ta e a~van tage of inc:reased market at-cess. True, these coun~es have_ rrused theu trade ~tios (expo~s plus_importc;J frorn about 3.5percent oftherr .GDP m 1981 to almost '?0 percent 1n_ 199 r. But withou t the .'\sian tigers. developUlg-country exports remrun less than 2.:, percent of ,.,.orld exports. Part of the problem is that the traditional advantages of poor countries ba,e been in primary commodities (agriculture and minerals), and these c-ategories ha,e shrunk from about 70 perce nt of world trade in 1900 to about 20 percent at the end of the century. Opportunities for growth in the world market have shifted from raw or semiprocessed commodities toward manufactured goods and service s-and. within these categories, toward more knowledge-intensive segments. This trend obviously favors rich countries over poor ones, since most of the latter are still peripheral playe rs in the knowledge economy. (Again , the Asian tigers are the exception. In 1995, they exported as much in high-technologr (Joods as did France. Germany, Italy, and Britain comb ined- whic h together ha,e three times the population of the tigers. ) .

299

ONE COUNTRY, 1WO SYSTEMS

Why is the performan ce of poor countries so uneven and out of s~nc \\ith tl)eor~~ cal forecasts? Systemic barriers at home and abroad inhibit the economic poten~ of poorer nations, the most formidable of these obstacles being their 0 ' \11 domestic po~tical and administrative problems. These factors, of course, Ue outside the f,..,..... c a1ys ....uework of mainstream econom1 an JS. A use ful analnov is the antebellum ~o: economy of the Unite d States which e>.'Oerienced a imilar set of i~pedim~nts. ' r f tl1 c -' 1 \\ arsawmcomes Like today's "global village " the U.S. economy be1ore e Jvu . diverge as the South fell behind the North. One reason for the Confed~racys ~d~ sion and h fallmg behin m both t e r~sulting civil war was Sou~hem ~.tion that it was ulous ~orth was ore economtc and political power, whi1e the ncber and~ . pothp , . rth 1780 llttractin by 1 g more immigrants. Half of the U.S. popul ti00. lhed m inetheon\'e m l' ~mes origina 860, this share had climbed to two-thirds. In I t t5. UlCO
i ..

300

PART 3

THE INTE. NATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOMY R

. {.QTI I THE GREAT DIVIDE IN THE G

LOBAL VillAGE

government, laws, and economy? Almo~t from theJ~ ~~c~pU?n, the So~Jtl tern colonic, followed a different path from the J\orth-spec1altzmg m plantation agricultur<: rather than small farms with diversified c:~ps-d.ue to. geography and slavery. Thanks to slave Jabor, Southerners were gru~mg ec?nom1es of scale and building comparative advantage in agriculture, exporting therr goods tu world markets anti the North. Gang labor outprocluced "free" _ (paid) lahor. But the No~th was huikli ng even greater advantages by developing a m1d~le class, a rnanufa<.:tu nng sector, and a more modem sooal and political cuJture. W1th plans to complete transcontinental railroads pending, the North was on the verge of ac~ieving econo~ ic and political dominance and the capacity to shut off further expans1on of slavery m the West. The South chose war over ~orthem domination-and modernization. Although the Constitution guaranteed free trade and free movement of capital and Jabor, the institution of slavery meant that the South had much less lac:tor mobiJity than the North. It also ensured less development of its bum an resources, a less equal distribution of income, a smaller market for manufactures, and a less dynamic economy. Jt wa'i less attractive to both European immigrants and external capitaJ. With stagnant incomes in the older states, it was fal1ng behind. In these respects, it was a forerunner of many of today's poor countries, especially those in Latin America. What finally put the South on the path to econorruc e;onvergence? Four years of civiJ war with a total of 600,000 deaths and v~t destruction of property were only a start. Three constitutional amendments and twelve years of military "ree;onstruction" were designed to bring equal rights and due process to the South. But the reestab Jishment of racial segregation following Reconstruction led to sharecropping as former slaves refused to return to the work gangs. Labor productivity dropped so much that Southern incomes feU to about half of the North's in 1880. In fact, income <.:onvergence did not take off until the 1940s, when a wartime boom in the ;\ orth s industrial cities attracted Southern migrants in search of better jobs. At the same time, the South began drawing capital as firms sought lower wages, an anti-union enviro~ ment, and military contracts in important congressional districts. But this process drd not fully succeed until the 1960s, as new federal laws and federal troops brought full <.:iviJ right'> to the South and ensured that the region could final1y modernize.

Southern ~ tates equaled those in ;\Jew En~Jand. ~ven thoP .!h ~\(,tltJ' (inc:llltlin r .J: g sItt\e ) was w propo1~onately concentrated m the South. 13\ ~ 1 1. tn<:omc_.s ,,,, ll1(; u . . no rtl 1cast were abo ut ~o perc""nt higher than those m the: cmgm tl Southem statCs the Nort11 's railroad mileage was about 40 percent greater ~ ard ruanufa<:turin~ . r0ur ti'mes higJ er) than the South s. A the econcmust Hohcrt p 01,fJII 1 mvest ment 1 . . . $ . ,., . 1a~ pointed out, tlte South was not poor-in 1860 tt_wa'l nchc~ lhau all ~uropean statt:s except EngJand-but Northern in~omes were stdl m~~h htgher :..t.nd m<.:rew;ing. Why had Southern incomes diverged from t~o~e m t~e ~ortl~ under tht: salll<.:
.J ,. ,

1liE GREAT DIVIDE

Although slavery is a rarity today, the traditional U.S. divide between North a~d South provides a good model for understanding contemporary circumstanc.:es 1 n

So . . de',elopingcou .t 1 s. Jn th<: Amcric:an . 1l th ' vot<:r 11 1ti 'da . 311Y J1l and verv u n, '1 1 1 rl 1ool ing wcrc the rut rm tlfm, se:gr&Jat-;1 stng. " l . .., cY h00 . re repeated tor 1 >~' t 1 eli tc:s in today's e, not the < :ty lf .X(;(:pli<m---dnd suc:h ctJCS a I I poor c:ountr tl tlJ p ru had abunJant an< relati ve to popul~~-:on h ItS. orazil, \l exico d e l1 u w en the~ E and tl eir incomes mug; 1 y approxi111ated those in Xtt 1~rc~peans arrived, aJl 1 . S I I~ . . or n A 4 The econom1sts tan <y , r,german and Kenneth S k rnenea . t Ieast until 1 1700 se states, l'1 e t 1 (',on 1 1 k ,e Cl eracy developed ag . oooffh-ve pomti,;IJ out . .J <~ 1 that the I ' n<.1.1tura1 S}'St landhoi<Hngs for t 1<> protluction of export c:rops h ems based on 35 " t j and many Caribbean islands also adopted slav suc h~ls sugar and coffee. Bl<lZI erv, w I e Peru d \< : don forced indigenous labnr rather than African si" an le:oco 1 reue aves. History shows that the politi<:al development of \ orth Amerka a . nations-most of which were colonized bv European . t nd ~e,elop Ulg d b j . ' s a some pomt-was 1 . hea..,ily influence y morta hty.UIn <:olontes with tolerable death rat es 1Austraba, ,J . ada New ZeaIanu, an cl t . e n1teu1 States) the <:olonists 50 , d Can . f ' on exerte pressure for British-style pr?tect1ons o . persons and property. But elsewhere (most of a) Africa Latin Ame. nca, Indonesm, and to a lesser tlegree, lnd1 , d'tSease c:aused . such high mortality _rates that. the few resident Europeans were permitted to exploit a disenfranch1~ ed la_bonng <.:lass, whether slave or free. \\'hen the colonial era ended in these reg10ns, tt was followed by "}jberationist'' regimes (often authoritarian and incompetent) that maintained the pre"ious system of exploitation for tbe advantage of a small domestic elite. Existing inequaljties "'ithin poor c:ountries continued; poUcies and instituti ons rarely protected individuaJ rights or private initiative for the bulk of the population anti allowed elites to skim off rents from anv sectors that could bear it. The economist Hernando de Soto has shown how governments in the developing world fail to recognize poor <.:itizens'legaJ titles to their homes and businesses, thereby depriving them of the use of their assets for <.-ollateral. The losses in poten tial capital to these countries h an~ d'-''3.rfed the cumulative capital inflows going to these economies in the last century. The legacy of these colonial systems also tends to perpetuate the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and political power while limiting capital mobility. Thus major developing nations such as Brazil, China, lndia, Indonesia, and ~exico are experiencing a divergence of incomes by provin<.:e within their econom1 as es: labor and capital fail to find better opportunities. E,en in recent times, loc-al ehtes have fought to maintain oppressive conditions in Brazil. El SaJvador, Guatem~. M exico, ~icaragua, and Peru. Faced with violent intimidation, poor people m r these countries have suffe red from unjust law emorcement nn tlar to what was once experienced by black sharecroppers in the American South. . . ,..l . . t Mvuem1 . zahon and economt deve1 opment mev1 abl) threaten the e>JSting distn'buhon of power and income and powe rf: .l l' . sta. w e Jtes con un 1Je to protect theak tu5 ' quo- -even if it means that th eir society as a w ho1 e:u1 ~ 1urther behind. It t es e r-' r . . mo h re t an a constitution, universal suffrage, an d reguI tections to achieve uo'are . nk the ri<tht of ernmental accountability and the rule of law. It may "ell be that 0 ' d . \-e exit. . . bilih. to corrupt an repressT emgrahon-- can peacefully bnng accounta: ., . i"ck the reai . ultil teral institutions -~mes. Unlike the U.S. federal govemment, m a . E economic leiitim _rr f st count nes. uropes ,.,~,_ acy to mtervene in the internal aHrurs o mo .d db . the emigrc1tion "'lleeff m t he second half of the nineteent1 cent u. , was aJ e ) rv l
;
Ql

301

:iV:.!.

I"AKI J

I HI:. IN II:.K.Nf\1

JUI'O t\L r-UWli\...F\1.- &..'-'-'"'-' ' " .

-... "' ntvLOBAL

VIllAGE

~,f ()() million people to l'\orth Ametic:a. Argentina. Brazil. -~ ' 1 \ns tralia. Th l'tnit..rt~ltinn-about 10 percent of the labor force-helped rw-, -"uropean wag~: "Jute l~lwes ina infhted wages in Iabor-scarce areas such ac, -\ ustralia and tl " .. o ... I f , 1c l'nit(> 'tcttes . .A comparable out-migration of la )Or rom toua~ s poor <:Olln tries d would imoke huJ1drcds of millions of people. Of course, Latin America has seen some success. Chile. has rec(ivcd the most attention for its free market initiatives, but its reforms \vere Implemented by a brutalh repressive milita1y regime-hard ly a model for achie,ing ec-otlomi<: rcl'onn thr~ugh den,ocratic processes. Costa Rica wo~ld se~m to be a much better model fore tablish.ing accountabiJity, but its economic performance has not bee n as striking as Chiles. . . Italv, uke the United States in an earlter era. JS anothe r good example of"ont counov: two svstems." Italy's per capita income has largely cau<rht up with that of its Europe~1 neighbors over the past 2.0 years. e~e.n exceeding Britain's and equaling France's in 1990, but its Me;:;zogwm~ has faded to keep UJ~ Whereas overaU Italian incomes have been convergmg toward those of the EU, Mez::.ogiomo incomes have been diverging from those i_n the... north. South em incomes fell from 65 percent of the northern average tn 19 /5 to 56 percent 20 years later; in Calabria, they fell to 47 percent of the northern ave rage. Southern unemployment rose from 8 percent in 1915 to 19 percent in 1995-almost three times the northern average. In short, 50 years of subsidies from Rome and tl1e EU have failed to stop tl1e Me;:;zogiomo from falling fUJther behind. Instead, they have yielded local regimes characterized by greatly incre.:'1Sed public-sector employment, patronage, dependency, and corrupti.on- not unlike the results of foreign aid for developing countries. And the continujng existence of the Mafia further challenges modernization. Democracy, then. is not enough to ensu re that the governed are allowed to reap the gains of their own efforts. An effective state requires good laws as well as law enforcement that is timely, even-handed, and accessible to tl1e poor. In many countries, achieving objective law enforcement means reducing the extralegal powers of vested interests. When this is not possible, the only recou rse usuaJly available is emigration. But if the educated elite manages to emigrate while the masses remain trapped in a society that is short of leaders, the latter vvill face even more formidable odds as they try to create effective institutions and policies. Although Italians stilJ emigrate from south to north, the size of this How is declining, thanks in part to generous transfer payments that a1low them to consume almost as much as northerners. In addition, policymaking for the M e;:;::ogionw is still concentrated in Rome. The immigration barriers in rich countries not only foreclose opportunities in the global village to billions of poor people, they help support repressive, pseudodemocratic governments by denying the citizens of these countries tbe right to vote against the regime with their feet. In effect, the strict dictates of sovereig~ty allow wealthy nations to continue to set the rules in their own favor while aJiowwg badly governed poor nations to continue to abuse their own citizens and ret~d ~nomic development . Hence the remedy for income divergence must be pohttcal as well as economic.

GEP

~ING INSTITLJ -~ iONS RIGHT

303

. g to econon ie tht oty. developing nation . ~rdm 1 . . Wl 11 creatt d A . ns needed to l!ll( ,c q1m thC'1r 1narkets so that th . an modernize ll 1 t: . titutJO ' eJ markets . d fi r LOS tch the performance or ri<:h <:ounbies. But re l' ty. an rms can ~adally ma cl S . a] . a IJ For example, e (>to s cU1< YS IS makes clear that I rr IS mu<:h rno re COmpIE!X than . cl1eory. h e le<:tivelv m0 bU . d ces offers a mu<.: more potent source of capital r ' lZmg omcstic resour . d ' . ror most <.level . . c01eign inflows o. Yet mmnstream economists and tl . r opmg nations than [I iCir rmal ese resources. \ Vestern economic advisers in R . !O . models largelv gnore th uss1a were s1mlarl bJ . 1.. 1 1 1 ;,.. reliance on an economic model that had no inStitut al Y mus1ded by u1eu . IOn COnte:-.t and n cai perspective. Econom1sts have scrambled in recent vea t no JStor1 . ' rs o rtcornmgs, and the \ \'asI . 1mgton consensus now recrwres the<.'Orreet some of these ... h ,. . . . ho s ng . ll as the "rig1 , pnces. But littl e useful theotv exists ., guid ,, t hmstitutions as 1t . to . we . . . .. . . '. e pouc.:y w en tl comes to institutional analysiS, cl~d gaps m the .mstitutional foundations in most develo in countries leave economic models pursumg unrealistic solutions or worse. P g The adjustment of ins~tut~ons inevitably favors certain actors and disadvantages others. As a result, rno~ermzatlon_ c~uses conRict that must be resolved through politics as well as economics. At a mm1mum, successful development signifies that the forces for institutional chan<re have won out over the status quo. Achievina a "le,el playing field" signifies that regulatory and political competition is weU gmemed. Economists who suggest that all countries must adopt Western institutions to achieve Western levels of income often fail to consider tJ1e changes and political risks involved. The exp erts who recommended that formerly communist counhies apply ''shock therapy" to markets and democracy disregarded the political and regulatory issues involved. Each change requires a victory in the "legislati,e market" and successful persuasion within the state bureaucracy for political approval. Countries with lower incomes and fewer educated people than Russia face e,en more significant developmental challenges just to achie,e economic stability, let alone attract foreign investment or make effective use of it. Institutional deficiencies, not capital shortages, are the major impediment to development, and as such they must be addressed before foreign investors will be willing to send in capit~. Although price liberalization can be undettaken rapidly, no rapid proc~ss ~ast~e from revolution) exists for an economy modemizing its institutions. Bo~s ) elts~ may be credited with a remarkable tumover, if not a coup d'etat. but his erratic management style and the lack of parliamentary support ensured that his go,e~ 1 ment would never be strong. In these circumstances, 1eIpmg the new Russum . . . ~ eg~me Improve law enforcemen t should have come a1lead of mass .pn,-aozatJon. . Launeh. capitalism in a country wl1ere no one otl1er tllan apparatchiks had access mg . d di to stgm cant amounts of n capital was an open tati.on to gangstensm an .a sffi\11 d er di d c 0 1' e te system. Naive economic models ma cle 10r muve P Jcv recommen ations.

How THE WEST WON

The stat . . c de,eloprnent. European~ n . e s cruc1al role is evident in the \\ est s econonu ed .,, asJtington consensu Olll.ic supremacy was forged not by actors who follow a

304

PART 3

THE LNTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOMY

::..COD I THE GREAT DIVlDE IN

THE GLOBAL VJt I

'-U\GI

,"~

modd but by strong states. In tl1e flfteenth centlll)'. Europ"'an inc'>mes were n much hioher than those in China, India, or Japau. The natimH:i,l'(~ \\a<, a EtJr ot o . opean innon1tion that replaced feudalism and establtshed the mle of l,tw: in tu rn, a le framework was formed for effective markets. Once tl1eSC:' countries were.: in the they were able to continuously increase their edge through tedmolngi<:ul advan<:c:s. ' 1 addition, European settlers took their civilization with tlJem to North !\1ne ric..:a anti th: SoutJ1 Pacific, rapidJy raising these areas to rich-~ounb;r status as well. Thus Euro e' early lead became tJ1e basis for accumulating further advantages \\~Lh l~tr-rcacl~n~ implications. Europe's rise to economic leadership was not rapid at first. Acc:ording to th economist Angus Maddison, Europe's economy grew around 0.07 pcn:cnt a yec:~ until 1700; only after J820 did it reach one percent. But tJ1e ~Jace ~f technologic:al and institutional innovation accelerated thereafter. Meanwlule, dtscovel)' of new markets in Afiica, Asia, and the Americas created new economic oppmtunities. Secular political forces ove1threw the hegemony of the Catl10lic Church. Feu<.laHsm was eroded by rising incomes and replaced by a system that financed government through taxes, freeing up land and labor to be traded in markets. Markets permitted a more efficient reallocation of land and labor, allowing further rises in ineomes. Effective property rights allowed individuals to keep the fmits of their own labor, thereby encouraging adrutional work And privatization of common land facilitated the clearing of additional acreage. The nation-state helped forge all these improvements. It opened up markets by expanding territory; reduced transaction costs; standardized weights, measures, and monetary units; and cut transport costs by improving roads, harbors, and canals. In addition, it was the state that established effective property rights. The European state system thrived on flexible alliances, which constantly changed to maintain a balance of power. Military and economic rivalries prompted states to promote development in agriculture and commerce as well as technological innovation in areas such as shipping and weaponry. Absent the hegemony of a single church or state, technology was diffused and secularized. Clocks, for instance, transferred timekeeping from the monastery to the village clock tower; th e printing press did much the same for the production and distribution of books. Europes development contrasts sharply v.rith Asia's. In the early modern era, China saw itself as the center of the world, without real rivals. It had a much larger population than Europe and a far bigger market as well. But though the Chinese pioneered the development of clocks, the printing press, gunpowder, and iron, they did not have the externa] competitive stimuJus to promote economic development. Meanwhile, Japan sealed itself off from external influences for more than 200 years, while India, which had continuous competition within the subcontinent. never developed an effective national state prior to the colonial era. . The ~uropeans also led in establishing accountable govern ment, even though Jt "':as achteved neither easily nor peacefully. Most European states developed the notion that the sovereign (whether a monarch or a parliament) had a duty to prot~ subjects and property in return for taxes and service in the army. Rulers in the Qing, Mughal, and Ottoman Empires, in contrast, never recognized a comparable

le::

bility to their <:ni;J "-.. Durint; the Midtlle A . . ons . . . . . . resP . democratic cJt) -<;t.t t cs, ,md m tle sevente,ges, l talv prodU<:e:d a numLuaslentll <:<:nturv 1-1 I uer fq o nodern republit aftt>r a century of rebeJJ , o land created first 1 . . 1011 anti warf . !I 1e llieved constJtlltJona1 tncJllarehy in 1689 r<)ll . are With talll ac . . '' owmg two . I . Spai11 . Bn cl revolution and tlt<:'n <.hctatorship Franee a h _ revo utions. After ' <: 1 1 ac . evcu b l))oo. Y nineteenth centmy. a the <.:ounta le govemnent 111 l -c rope led the way 111 separahng <.:hurch and st'lte pU . [ . ' -an essential . tiry and adoption o the s<:rentiRc method-after th . rh precursor to free mqt r ears . st"lte in turn pavec1t 1 way 10r capitalism and its "e e. ti niy Y war. Th e 1e d . ec ul a1 ' rea ve estructi .. C 5 . . destruction could hardly bec:ome the norm until . .zed .. on. re0 all' e 1 1 rgam rebgron lost u to execute as 1eretics t 1ose en trepreneu rs who woul' he status 1 s oower . u upset t c ~~ the Reformation , Europeans soon recognized anothe f 'JUO. t\.Jler f. . . .. r unuamental tenet of . 1, cap1talism: the role o mte1est.as a return for the use of capital CapLtausm requued .1 ' . at P olitical leaders al ow pnvate hands to hold power as weiJ asweal t h;m turn . th .. . power R owed f~om ~he~ ~~ n~b~hty to merch.ants in <;ities. European states also per~ tted banks msu1 .ance firms, and stock markets to develop The t " . th tnl . ) eas m 1 s recipe Jay in ~e ~otion that pnvat~ as w~ll as state organizations could mobilize and reallocate soc1ety-s resources-a n 1dea w1th profound social, poUtieal, and e<.-onomic implications today Most of Europe's leading powers did not rely on private initiative alone but adopted mercantilism to promote their development. This strategy used state power to create a trading system that would raise national inc:ome, pennitting the government to enhance its own power through adclitional taxes. Even though corruption was sometimes a side effect, the system generaJiy worked well. V enice w~ the early leader, from about 1000 to 1500; the Dutch followed in the six-teenth and seventeenth centuries; Britain became dominant in the ei<Ybteenth centurv. In " Britain, as in the other cases, mercantilist ex-port promotion was associated v.ith a dramatic rise in state spending and employ1nent (especiall~ in the na,-y} as well as , "crony capitalism." After World War II, ex-port-promotion regimes were adopted by Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan with similar success. Tcxlay. of <.'Ourse, such strategies are condemned as violations of global trade rules, even for poor countries. . Finally, geography played a pivotal role in Europe's rise, pro,idin~ a tempemte climate, navigable rivers, accessible coastline, and defensible bound~e for future states. In addition Europe lacked the conditions for the production of laborintenSIVe commodi'ties such ~le; co[' . . fee. cotton, sugar. ~r t ~ bacco-production that . \ rth mght have induced the establishment of sla,ery. L1ke m the Amencan 0 ' J European agriculture was largely rain-fed, diversified. and small-scale. . . Europe,s rise then was pcutly due to the creation andd'fTuston ftechnolog1 1 <.:al . ' ' f . I B t the underhwg causes mnovations and the gradual accumulation o capita u . ai=---~ t were poltical d . ~ e 1 an social. The creation of'the nation-st te and institution d sta cl a nvalry f1 . c 1 . ostered government accountabilitv. Sc1entinc en J'ghtenment an upwar hi . such SOcal b"li a) h 1 d Europe ac e'e tr: [! mo 1 ty, spurred by healthy competition. so e ~ . lack these factors ~ ormations. But many of toda,,s de,eloping countnes sti11 t'niCJa) fl ' or economic transformation.

ru ~

300

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOMY

_, 11

~l GTI I THE GREAT DIVIDE

l ' vnt'l l'\ ol poo rlv m wed Jers c.. . l . . ' '111 < r;, COllntries th tnl }'ne overnment~ ton ,1r:u11 I lctr fiscal dcfict d ax ' ereby helpin dis 1 g . . I S an 1 g cP v ,ressure will n'" mHtiCH<:e the feudal .. t monet . rrenc) . Ill \~y;h.tnl~tan and Lran S) s ems in Pak:i arv polici.... But . . ""' ell h t},eocrac\Cs or th e kl ept .stan and Saudi A ., 1 e . . -, , .. . raIJtcl. l n Mexico. The fmces ol capttal markets will n l ~cract cs tn K enya or ootI \er . o r .. I I' I s , take posses ton pu ) tc: ands'' or the sluo re ftram Br"l squatters . -tlan 0 iiS tile} or ,,;11 they help discipli ne landlords and ,;gilm ~ 10 de Janeiro or Sao P< o. n contro I o f I '. . . . 0 I . lll c r t 1LII st.1te. n) trong. account llantes m lndia's B'l1ar a\ they . fight .o a) e government can do tl 1at.

PLAYING CATCH-UP
Gl,lb~ui7:\tion offer~ oppottunit ies for all nations. but most df"'' l 'P~ng coutltries tll"l' \'el~ poorl~ positionC'd to capit:ilize o~ them. ~ talnnal duna t '" IHn ited access tu n:l'i~a blr wuter. lcmg distan ces to ll'lHJOf mar.-kcts. :llld und1t lked population ~rn.m1h ~m. nul_. p:ut ortJ\C problem. Such count ne!\ also h a\(' \'( r;. lllll' Cfll<\l int'Orne , str"ttCltm..s inlwri te-d from colonial regimes. and thest> pattern~ ol rncome dishibu. tion :Ut-' hard to change unles prompted by a major uphea\'l.tl :-ueh as a war or a 1'('\'0iution. But as serious as tJwse disad"antages :tre. tlw greatt'st disad,antage ha llCt'n the lXX>r quality of go,emmtnt. _ If today's global oppmtunitics nrt> far greate r a~1d potenn~ll~ more at'Ccs ible thml at anv other time in world histol~' de,elopmg l'Oun tm's are also flllther behind than ever before . Realistic political logic sug_gcsts that \\'('ak gO\ernmen ts nt>t.-'d to show that the, can m:mage their afl~lirs much bette r before they pretend to baY(' strategic ~unbitic~n . So wh:\t kind of catch-up mode ls could they adopt ? Substituting dome!;tic goods for imports was the most popular route to economk developme nt prior to t11e 1980s. But its inward orient ation made those who <tdopted it unable to take ad,~mtage of the new alo~al oppo rtunitie~ and ultimately it led to a dead end. Although the Unite d States enJoyed success \\lth such a strat.... <'g'. from J790 until 19-40. no de,eloping counn : has a home mark et larae enouah to support a modem econom~ toda~ The otJ1er successful earl~ gro\\t h model was European mercantilism, namely e.xpo:rt promotion. <Le; pione ered by Venice. the Dut<.'h republic. Britain. and German~'- Al rno t all of the East Asian success stories. China indud<'Cl. are modem versions of the ex-port-orie nted fo rm of mercantilism . For its part. free trade remai ns the right model fo r rich cou ntries because it provides decentralized initiathes to search for tomorrow's mark et opportunities. But it does not neres arily promote development. Britain did not adopt free trade w1til the 1840s. long after it had become the world 's leadi ng industrial po\\'e r. The prescription of lower trade barriers may help avoid e,en worse strategies at the bands of bad go"em ments. but the \Vashingto n-consensus model remains be t suited for those who are ahead rathe r than behind. Toda,, s shareholder capitalism brings additionaJ threats to poor count:Iies, first by ele\'ating compensation for successfitl executives, and second b~ subordinating all acti\ities to those that maximize shareholder value. Since 1970, the estimated earn ings of an American chief executive have gone from 30 times to 450 times that of the &\'t"~ worker. ln the leading developing countries. this ratio is still less than SO. App})ing a similar ..market-friendly" rise in executive compensation within t11e de,e~ opingworld would therefore only aggra.Yate the income gap. pro,i ding new <U1lmuru tion for populist politicians. In addition, shareholde r capitalism calls for narrowing ~: managerial focus to the interests of shareholders. even if this means droppiua actin ties that offset local market imperfections. A leadin g South African bank has sbed almost a million small accounts-mostly held by black s-to mise its earnings p~r share. Should this banlc, like its American counterparts, have an obligation to ser\'e tts cooamunity. including its black members, in return for its banking license? Poor nations must improve the effectiveness of their institutions and bureau ~-m spatE> of entre nched opposition and poorly paid ci\il setva nts. As the pma l;st Thomas Friedman has point ed out, it is true that foreign-exchange

durnp tht

IN THE GLOBAL VJr ' ~GE

307

LOOKING AHEAD
ased trade and inYestrnen t hme indeed brought great . Inere 1 l _J tries. but the olo nu cconom~ IS hardlv a \\in-win shati mpro"ements in some n coun . . ~ on. nouahi,. one bill.io11 nP.Ople earn less than $1 per day, and their numbers are ~ r-l' . " l . bl . growm0 -sources to ame 101 ate .sue 1 pt o ems eXlst, but the political and d .a.. Economic: . . " .1 f tl a realize the potenti<u o 1ese resources in poor areas is lacki mmiStrati,e .\\lll D .. 1 0 ng. e.e1 opmP"oation governmen ts neecl bot1 the. pres~ure to reform their administrations ~d 1 institutions, and the acces_s t~ het? m .domg so. But so,ereignty removes much of the e~temal pressure, whrle 1mn11gration barriers reduce key internal moti\'ation. A the \ Vashington conse nsus on the unhersality of the rich-countrv model is both nd simplistic and self-s erving. ' The world needs a more pragmatic, country-by-eount:J: approach. ,,ith room for neomercantilist regirnes until such cow1tries are firmly on the comergence track. Poor nations should be allowed to do what today's rich countries did to get ahead. not be force d to adop t tl1e laissez-faire approach. Insisting on the merits of comparati\'e ad,an tage in low-wage, low-gro"th industries is a sure w<I\ to sta, poor. And continued pover ty will lead to rising Je,els of illegal immiqrntion.and lo";_ le"el violence, such as kidnappings and vigilante justice. as the poor take the onl; options that remain. Over time, tl1e rich countries ''ill be forced to pay more attention to the fortun es of the poor -if only to enjoy their 0\\11 prosperity and safety. Still, the key initiatives must come from the poor countries. not the rich. ln tbe last 50 years , China. India, and Indonesia ha,e led the world in reducinu po"erty. In China, it took civil war and re,olution , with tens of millions of deaths. to create a strong state and econo mic stability; a de facto coup d'etat in 197 brought about a \'fry fortun ate chang e of management. The basic forces behind Chinese refo:m \\-ere political and domestic and their success depended as much on better USing r~rces as openi ng up m~kets. Meanwhile. the fom1er So,iet U~jon and Af~ca ~ at tbe other extre . me. Their economic decline stems f'rom tlletr tru.Iure to mamtain effecthe states and ensure the rule of law. . It will be . failure and econon11t -~~- not surnr isina ifsomeoftodavs statesexpen ence _ 1 .:~ ~ . r o " . donesta . d p~~an ''ill be . . an De m the new centu l)r Argentin'.l Colombta. ln . al r.:l ' ..., fro 10t aJ ft'IDOll' 1au cases to watch . but other nation s could also suffer ~ bea~ikon the ~or example, the Indian state of Bihar. Income growth e~n -~ "'1;ill, ......~_ !_ . . . and political capabili'ties of pu bUc actors u1 SO\t>re~ states. . '1'\.~ . ""U.JilllllStrative t.... . .1 r UJCI( is wh . , . d d mu.~;t ao fJC')UllU 110 nnal lhode y, m the end, external economic < ld,,ce an ru a1 ~ i Is and ('Onfonn to each countrY's unique political and SOCI contex

e:

THE MEANING OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization of the Economy

JEFFREY FRANKEL

Economic globalization is one of the most powerful forces to ha,e shaped the taoods and senic.:es has L_~ war world. In particular. international trade in o ~me increasingly important o,er the past fifty ~ears. and international financial flows over the past thirty years. This chapter documents quantitative!~ the proces of globali7..ation for trade and finance. It then briefly aoes beyond the eau e of international economic integration to consider its effects, concludina that globalization is overall a good thing, not just for economic gro"th but also when noneconornir goals are taken into account. The two major drivers of economic globalization are reduced costs to trans}X)rtation and communication in the private sector and reduced po~cy barriers to trade and investment on the part of the public sector. Technoloocal pr<mess and innovation have long been drh ing the costs of transportation and comrnunica~on steadily lower. In the postwar period we ha,e seen major further cost-sa,mg advances, even within ocean shipping: supertankers. roU-on-roll-off ships. and OOntainerized cargo. Between 1920 and 1990 d1e a,erage ocean freight and ~rt charges per short ton of U.S. import and e>.port cargo fell from S95.00 to 829.00 (m 1990 dollars). An increasing share of cargo goes by air. Between 1930 and ~990: 3''~r age air transport revenue per passenger miJe fell from S0.68 to S?.ll. Jet rur hip~~ng aoods that had pwlously bet>n cl~ ifi~ and refrigeration have changed the status of0 aitogether as not tradable intemationally. ~ow fre h-cut R ''ers, penshwle brocro~ 0 . and stn benies live lobsters and e,en ice cream are se11t between continents. f aw ' . Commurucations' costs have fallen e,en more rapld}~. {)\er this period the cost o a S3 39 . ork three..minute telephone call from New Y to London feU fro~ SQ4-1.65 to - Recent mventions such as faxes and tl1e Intemet require no toutiJla. 0
x1 John D. Donahllt'. eds. CotetllQ11lT ;;~1, ~Globalization of the Econom~-- in Jose~ s. ~~~ ar . 4S-$. portjor15 o{tbt- led and ~ ng \Vorld. Washington. DC: Brookings lnstttutJOn. 2!XX>. PP
r.A'-_ F

have been omitted.

309

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PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICA L ECONO

FRANKEL I GLOBAUZATION OF

lt L t'<L"' to exacrf1t'ratc the extent of globalizat inn . , xcited c.1 h.'"'l ' ISClJ lht> topic make. it ound a though the rap1d mcn:.a!)e 111 t unomic: . S~ j on of . . . rrar < h.:ros ' naltonal borders 1 unprecedente d. Some conl nttnt t or!. illlJlylnteb . 10n s tl . .),_ now gone so fa r that it is complete: one I 1ears t I1at w_c;tam:1 and national b 1at n h-ts d

l1i.E ECONOMY

.. l lon e1er matter. that the nation-state and geograp I1y arC' llt 111seh e.s no lo Ot <::rs n() ,-.m~ for economic purposes , and that it is now as easy to do business ,,~~e: r~lc. tomer across the globe as across town. After all. hac; not the World wc.1 c:u,. c \Veb reduced cross-bor der baniers to zero? Jt would be a mistake for poJicymakers or p rivate citiwns to base de<:is' . . . I . . tons 011 the notion that globaJizatJOn 1 so new th~t t 1e e~penence of the past i.s not rek s vant. or that the phenome non is now 1rrevers1 ble, or thHt national monetae. authoriti es are now powerless in the face o~ tJ1e global mar~etpl ac:e, or that tl~ quality of life of Americans either economic or non ec:onom1 aspects- is deterc: mined more by developm ents abroad than by American actions at home. It is best to recognize that at any point in histmy many powerful fo rces are working to drive countries apart, at the same ti me as othe r powerful forces are working to shrink the world. In the 1990s. for example , at the same time that forc:cs such as the Internet and dollarization have led some to proclaim the dec:une of the nation-state, more new nations have been created (out of the ru ins of the former Soviet bloc) than in any decade other than the decoloni zing 1960s, each with its own cunencies and trade policies. The forces of shrinkage have dominated in recent decades, but the centrifugaJ forces are important as well.

TWO BENCHMARKS FOR MEASURING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The overall post-World War If record of economic integrati on across national borders, powerful as it has been, is, in two respects, not as striking as widely beueved. The first perspective is to judge by the standard of l O years ago. The second is to O judge by the standard of what it would mean to have truJy perfect global integration.

Judging Globalization 2000 by the Standard ofl900

The globalization that took place in the nineteenth century was at least as impresshe as the current episode. The most revolutionary breakthroughs in transp01tation < U1d communieation had aJready happened by 1900-for example, the railroad, steamship, telegraph , and refrigeration. Freight rates had fallen shrup ly through?ut the century. An environment of political stability was provided by the Pax BJitanmc:t ~d an environment of monetary stability was provided by the gold standard. Kevtn Rour~e and Jeffrey Williarnson show that, as a result of rapidly growing tnide, lnternational differences in commodity prices narrowed dramatically. It is inescapable to invoke a particula rly famous quote from John Mayn~1rd Keynes: "What an extraordinary episode in the progress of man that age was whJ~ came to an end in August 1914! ... The inhabitan t of London could order b~

h ne sipping his n1om H~ L{a in bed, the '<trio od telep o l ; t the sam< t; IT r 'ttl L~r the sam<; means auspr U<.:ts of the whole eartlt i d e <.,'()U C . f. \!E::ntuf (' his . a1tJ . . I~sources and ne"" ~J.lt~':ims~ o any qu~uter of the world.''' "e 1 tn the nann--ctl ' rr-he world took <l g1,mt stE::p bac.:k f10m economc 1 h . . 1 g C a1 t 44. Some of t1 c:aus<;s of this retrogression 1 . .t7.ation1 dunng the period H. )914-19 1 Id 1 :: ~est that followc<. \\ or \\ ar I . the monetan weH ISolation t sentiments in t b'l IS the \' . , 111 a tyand on t]lat plagued th<.: llltcrwar period, increases in tariffs and econorrnc depres~ duding most saliently th.e a~loption by the U.S. Con ess of th ot~er trade harriers ~~ f !930 the rise of the [asctst bloc.: in the 1930s andgrl . e Smoot-Ilawley tart r tu o ' f' 1 (' ' 1c . . the 1940s. AJJ o t 1ese a<:tors pertain to barriers th tnse o the corn munt~t bloc . 10 th r . . in contrast to c rorces of technology and the a .\\ere created b:, gO\ernp ,t k rnents, m a e mar etpla . 1 h d to reduce baniers. As a result, the world that emerued . n _ <:e. w uc ten . ll I h t> m 1..,.kJ was far more fragmente d economtc:a y t 1an t e wor~d that had turned to war in 1914. The victors, however, were determmed not to repeatthe nfst k th c.l c. ld . . 1ta rnade es . t L'1e time of the nrst wor war. rl11S hme tJ1ey would work Jt a . ev au . ' o p1 omote e<."Onomic ntegration m large prut to advance long-term politic:al goals 1i . 1 o go"em mternational money, mvestme nt, and trade, they estabhshed multilateral in titutions-the Jntemational Monetary Fund, \ Vorld Bank, and General Aareement on Tariffs and Trade. The United States initially led the way by reducing trade barriers and makina a'~ailable gold-conve1tible dollars. By one basic measure of trade, exp01t s or imports of merchandise as a fraction of total output, it took more than h.venty-R years after the end of World \\'ar II before ve the United States around 1970 reached the same level of ulobali7 ..ation that it had experienced on the eve of World War I. This fraction continued to increase rapidly between 1971 and 1997- reaching about 9 percent today, still far lower than that in Britain throughout the ]ate and early twentieth centuries. By otJ1er measures, some pertaining to the freedom of factor movements. the world even b~ the turn of tbe m illennium was no more integrated than that of the preceding turn of the c-entury. Most people find it surprising that trade did not reattain its pre-\\'orlc.l \\"ar I importanee until the early 1970s. The signic:an ce of the comparison "ith 100 years ago goes well beyond faetoids that economic historians enjoy springing on the uninitiate d. Because technological kno'vv-how is irreversible-or was irreversible over the second millennium, if not entirely over the first- there is a tendency to see globaliza tion as irreversible. But the political forces that !'ragmented the world for thirty years {1914 44) were evidently far more po~,erful than .the accretion of technological progress in transp01t that 'vent on dW:ng.that pe~od. The .lesson is that nothing is inevitable about the process of glo~al1zation. For lt to <.'Ontinue, world leaders must make choices of the sort made m the aftemlath of World War II, instead of those made in the aftermath of\\'orld War 1.

3 Ll

JUdging by the Globalization 2000 Standard of Perfect International Integration

aps perfect economic integration across nattona1 b rders is a stnl\\' man. tifY B st . . Ut . this , . mple rhetonc eXIsts to JU . . raw m . the tnte men have their pmposes. andbe b tcase tl enouah to 1111press the crows rest. A good straw man needs to . su s antial Perh .

. .

:3 12

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITlCAL ECONOM'l'

<

FRANKEL I GLOBALIZATION OF

nnd ~et not so substantial that he can't be knocked fl at . Ou ' tion complete in ternational integration qualifies adw iJ ;t

lliE ECONOM y

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e proposj.

share 0

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:1 10

Consider again the basic statistics of trade integr,t ' -.1 countr . exports of goods and services, or total imports, as a frac:tior (,( .1 P. Wit] , t~; rtot~ increase in services included, these ratios now average J2 P' re l'llt fcJJ the U ~Pld States. The curren t level of trade likely represents a doubli ng fnJm lOO year nrted As remarkable as is tltis evidence of declining transportation costs, tmif[<;s ago. othe r baniers to trade, it is still verv far from tl1e conditior that woul-1 [)revar r ' ~lnd , u these costs and barriers were zero. More sophisticated slatic;tks hclow vvill d 1 ment this claim. But a very simple calcuJation is sufflcienl to make t!1e point.~~~~ output is about one-fou rth of gross world product. The output of producers in othe r counhies is thus about three-fourths of gross world product. If America were prone to buy goods an~ services from foreign p.roducers as easily as fro~ domestic producers, then fore1 products would co~str tute a share ofU.S. spendgn ing equal to that of the spending of the average res1 dent of the planet. The U.S. import-CDP rati.o would eq~al .75. The same wou k~ be tru e.of the U.S. exportCOP ratio. And yet these rabos are only about one-stxth of tlus hypothetical level (12 percent/75 percent=one-sixth). In other words, globaJjzation would have to increase another sixfold, as measured by the trade ratio, before it wouJ d literaUy be true that Americans did business as easily across the globe as across the countrv. Other countries are also a long way from pe1 fect openness in this sense. The ;verall ratio of merchandise trade to output worldwide is about twice the U .S. ratio. This is to be expected, as other cow1tries are smaller. For the other two large economiesJapan and the European Union considered as a whole the ratio is closer to tl1e U.S. level. In almost all cases, the ratio falls far short of the level that would prevail in a perfectly integrated world. In Figure 1, the vertical di mension represents the share of a country's output that is sold to its fellow citizens, rather than exported. The downward movement for most countries illustrates that they have become more open over the past 130 years. (One can also see that the integration trend was interrupted during cl1e interwar period.) The United States is still far from perfect openness: the share of output sold at home is disproportionate to the share of world output. Other countries have a higher ratio of trade to GDP than the United States as a result of being smaller and less self-sufficient. Nonetheless, they are similarly far from pe1fect openness. Why is globalization still so far from complete? To get an idea of the combination of transportation costs, trade barriers, and other frictions that remains yet to be dismantled, we must delve more deeply into the statistics.

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FIGURE 1 Country Size (Share of World Output) versus Closedness (Sales at

Home/Total Output)

source: Author's calculations and data from Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy rPans Development Center of the Organization for Economic C ooperation and Development. 19951 Note: Closedness =(I - (x/GDPJt I 00.

STATISTICAL MEASURES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

It can be instructive to look at direct measures of how some of the barriers to trans border integration have changed during the twentieth century- the level of trui~s on manufactures as an illustration of trade policy, or the price of a tr.ans~Atla~tJ~ telephone call as an illustration of technological change in commumcations an transportation. Nevertheless, the political and physical determinants are to~ 0 numerous and varied to be aggregated into a few key statistics that are capable

m easuring t11e overall extent of integration in trade or finance. Tariff rate . for example, differ treme ndously across commodities, and there is no single sensible way to aggregate them. The situation is even worse for non tariff barriers. Alternative possible measures of the importance of tari ffs and other trade barriers have very low correlation with each other.... lt is more rewarding to look at summary measures of the effects of crossborder baniers on the pattem s of trade and investment than to look at me~~res of ~le barriers themselves. Two sorts of measures are in use: those pertar.nmg to quantities and those pertaining to prices. . . ... Measures of quantities might appear more direct : . JUS t how btg are mter. . national R ows?'' But economists often prefer to look at pnce me~~res. In_t!:e "::;~ place, the quality of the data is often hjgher for prices than qwmhties. { Tlu 15 ~ ti 1 1 . a1 cu ar y true of data on intemational nnancr marke ts-the data on the pnc-es . al ) 10 . oH 1gn secUiities are extreme!)' good. the data on aggi-e<tate intemanon trace .a ore r;,' all . 1 10 t _ secunttes are l t a conceptu e'e, er extre me ly bad.) In the sec-ond P ace. en>n a ..h . e 1 measur nati a] . . ds ific assets. w llC on d1flerentials in the ptices of spec1fic goo or s~Je<: . lin e more useful 1 ule e. . abu of international arbitrage to hold tl1ese Imces m .cl atthe example of Jty Indicat . . ors o f t he extent of integration m a causa1 sen e Cons1 er centatre of totu . . U.S. t . d . . aih era e Ul petroleum products. It 1 not especl , large as a per s

:ll-t

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOM

FRANKEL I GLOBALIZ ATlON OF

. ()Cilll 1s t

THEECON

l":S. output or consumption of petroleum products. And et ,_,lies the p . of oil \\i th in lhe United States closely to the !)rice in tl w '- . t 1. ne:e . 1 . c. ~ nar) of tountrics lhat record'S no bilateral oiJ trade whatsoe\ <'I ' t.l 1t lh< . all . .lr pne:e f bam.e~s ~~~~l tlv;: ]' t ' I fen Iargc-s<:al ~ 11~0\"l' dosel) togetJ~er. ~t i~ the absence o bade that kec-o l)llCes m line and makes the ma1kets lilt' ~rr.ttcd 111 'k lllf)<'t e . r meanmgful sense, not the magnitude of trade that takes place.

The Ability of Arbitrage to Eliminate Interna tional Differentials in Goods Prices

According to basic economic theory. arbitrage, defined as tht activity of buyin . an item in a pJace where it is cheap and sin1ulta~eously s~IJing the same item whe~e it is expensive, should drive plices into equality. Its frulure to do so perfectly is a source of repeated surprise to economists (though perhaps to uobody else). Often the explanation is that the commodities in question a:e not in filC:t identical. Brand names matter, if for no other reason than matters of retailing, warranty, and <.:ustomer seJvice. A BMW is ceJtainJy not the same automobile as a Lexus, and even a BMW sold in Germany is not the same as a BMW sold in th e United States (different air pollution control equipment, for example). VVhen the compatison across countries uses aggregate price indexes, as in standard tests or purchasing power parity," it is no surprise to 6nd only weak evidence of arbi trage. The finding of intemational price differentials is more surplising in the case of nondifferentiatecl non-brand-name commodities such as standardized ball bearings. Tests find that price differentials for specific goods are far larger across national borders than they are with in countries. Exchange rate variability is a likely culprit. Even more surprising is the paucity of evidence of a tendency for price differentials to diminish over the long sweep of history. Kenneth Froot, Michael Kim, and Kenneth Rogoff have obtained data on prices in England and Holland since tl1e year 1273 for eight commodities (barley, butter, cheese, eggs, oats, peas, silver, and wheat). 2 Deviations from the so-called Law of One Price across the English Channel are no smaller or less persistent now than they were in the past, even though technological progress has certainly reduced the cost of shipping these products dramatically. Evidently other forces have counteracted tl1e fall in transport costs; candidates are trade barriers under Europe's Common Agricultural Policy and volatility in the exchange rate between tJ1e guilder and the pou nd.

Y<: J<: 1 stan<:. " . carnaut name <1 'll >jt:<:tlve rt::sistanc ,~ e, and Peter D d d _Ross 1J f' e. 1\' ale 311 ng many po'>St proo s that distan<.:e is st'JI . . j\rno rved ten d em:) tmvard geographjc:aJ I 11 nport t, an one of th<: <.1 the obse agg1 omerati . ' mp1 <:st tS J . y for industry to <:on<:<'ntrate remonalJv is .d on of Industries T\ ouenc . . . o / ev1 ene:e both f 1e te . and comm umcctbon and o( increasing r tu rtatwn . . e ms to seal o costs to transpO Tl agglomeratiOn occur<; even m se<.:tors wh .et 1e . . . ere phys1c:a] tn production. Jj 'b)e, as in financ1al sen'lces or computer softw . r~nsport t'()Sls are oeg ~ Manhattan and information techno1oi1V firm are. Fmanclal firms t'Oncentrate JO o; s c.:onc:entrate sJ on they choose to 1 oc:ate near each other 15 . b In 1l<:on \'alle\. eas The r .h . . I commodities w1t ea<.:h other and wish to s not e<.:ause they are trac.U11.v . vsJCa.J . . ave on s11p i . . 1 ., I P1' to-face contact 1 nnportant for ex<.:hanginu inrorm t' r s dp ng <:ol>ts. Rather. raceo 11 a IOn an ne t' . d The importance of distanc.;e is also revealed bv an l . . f cl go tatinu eals. , a . 1 .ons. If transport costs and other <:oysls o d ata on ~mc:es of' ds in different ocat1 t f . goo . sb busmess at. . tance are 1mportant, then ar b'1trage should do a better. so f omg . k . a dJS ]' l h 11 JO o eepmg pnc:es of mIar goods m me w 1en t ey are so u at locations dose togeth h h Sll I d l . . . er rat er t an far art. Charles Enge an Jo m Rogers study pnces m fourteen eo . . ap . nsumptlon c:alecities. They find that th di gories for t'\venty-tlll'ee Canad.1an and .U.S. tJ . ~ , stance Nort I Amen.can Cl t'tes sigruJICan y affects the variabilin ofetheir relabetween two 1 tive pnces . . Statistical estimates find highly significant effe<:ts of distance 011 bilateral trade. When the distance bet'\veen t'\vo countries is increased b) 1 percent. trade between them falls by 0. 7 to 1.0 percent. This statistic, like the others that follow. pertains to the effect in isolation, holding constant other effects on trade. such as the size of tJ1e trailing partners....
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1.

Other Geographical Variables

Other physical attributes of location also have statistically significant eiTec:ts. Landlocked <.'Ountries engage in less trade by a factor of about one-third. holding other fac.tors equal. Two cou ntries that are adjacent to each other trade about 0 percent more than two otherwise similar countries.

Factors Contributing to Home-Country Bias in Trade

Geography in general-and distance in particular-remain far more important inhibitions to trade than widely believed.

Distance
Distance is still an important barrier to trade and not solely because of physical . . !_r sh~m.g costs. The ~ ff'ects of imormational barriers are observed to decre~e '~~th . . JJ proXJmJty and WJth lmguistic, cultural, historica1, and political links. We m1ght ea

Linguistic barriers remain an impediment to trade. Two countries that speak ~e same language trade about 50 percent more than two othen,ise similar coun~e The ~nultitude of languages is one of tJ1e reasons why e<.'Onomic integration remillns far from complete in the European Union. h . . ,ear C0 Iomallinks have also been important h'stoncall~ In 1960 the w. en 1 . ' th b . . e t trade ben,een e reak-up of the largest colonial emprres began m earn h r: col . r times greater t au 10r orues and the colonial power was on average t\~o to 1our , Uer other. . cr 1r . d\ reduced frorn an ear VIse similar pairs of countries. This enect, a ea , _ d l980s But it pe-ak 111 1 lll th l9 t0s an e. has t 1e colonial era, has continued to decline cl cl in the sample. not disappeared. Indeed if small dependencies are me1 e . estimated u then tw . ' . till t de on average an uruts that share the same colomzer s . ra. iJar countries (as recently 80 percent more with each other than t'\vo otbet'-nse 5101

linguistic and Colonial Factors

316

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOM Y

' t I) . l rade

FRANKEL I GLOBAUZA:n

ON OF 'l'1.

nE ECONOMy

317

as 1990). In addition, if one of the pair is the colonial mol h

to nine times greater than it would otherwise be.

. . f' IS IVlJ

Military Factors The effects on bilateral tntde of po}jtico-miutary alliances. ' .l.I' have also he, examined. Theoretically and empiri~ly (in the gravity frame\\ o.d I rade is genera.~t . Y higher among countries that are alhes and lower among <.:OIIIl h1t'" that are attU<t1or potentia] adversaries. Understandably. 1f two countnes are CllfH'n lly at war, there. n.1~s as hig!1 as a 99 pem.mt reduction in 1g 6 ~~ usually a negative effect on trade. It_ More typical is an 82 percent reduction m 1990.
Free 1tade Areas Regional trading arrangements reduce tariff.s and other trade barriers within a grou of countries, though there is a range from mild preferential trading arrangements t~ full-fledged economic unions. Often the members of such groups are already tight! linked through proximity, common language, or other ties. But even holding consta~ for such factors, in the gravity model. the formation of a free trade area is esti mated on average to raise trade by 70 to 170 percent. A serious common market, such a~ the European Union, can have a bigger effect. Nevertheless, in each of the EU member countries, a large bias toward trade '"rithin that count1y remains. Political Links A naive economists view would be that once tariffs and other ex1_)licit trade barriers between countries are removed, and geographic determinants of transportation costs are held constant, trade should move as easily across national boundari e~ as within them. But this is far from the case in reality. If two geographic units belong to the same sovereign nation, such as France and its overseas departm ents, trade is roughly tripled. Thus political relationships among geographic units have larger effects on trade than such factors as explicit trade policies or linguistic barriers. Common Country Even after adjusting for distance (including noncontiguity) and linguistic barriers, all countries still exhibit a substantial bias toward buying domestic goods rather than foreign .... There would be some great advantages of having data at the level of states or provinces within countries. We would be able to ascertain how trade between two geographical entities is affected by their common membership in a political union. We have learned that when two geographical units share such links as speaking a common language, their bilateral trade is dearly boosted. It stands to reason that when two units share a common cultural heritage or legal system, their trade '"~11 be enhanced by even more. Data are not generally available on trade among U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, German lander, British counties, or French depart ments. But there do exist data on trade undertaken by Canadia n provinces, amo~lg one another and with major American states. They show a strong intranational bJ_as to trade. Ontario exports three times as much to British Columbia as to CaliforJlla. even though the latter has ten times as many people. (the figures are for 198B.)

. -:r>'1 to s~tspe<.:t that th CIJ has long lweu . 'fhere eciaiJy the largr !l~t<:tuation in the exc:h~ extstcn<.:c of <lifTerent Ctt rn.:nctes ange rate I d esp ;lll break-up of th e Bntton Wo<H.is tttonutary svste . s )<;tw<!en <.:urren<.:its . , Stnc~;: , m tn H.l7 1 1 1. ] the c all( n:vestment. Ex<.:hange rate 0 uctt , f tas been abct rr to ter u . tern atJonal trac . J<ttons are d early related tll the failures of tlw J.tW of one pti<:<; observed ilt 10 ,..,ed that, for example, Canadians and Am . good\ markets. \Vh<:n it . ~~ encans tradt f . .1 obse ar wr, 1 wtl trymen than . l ea<.: 11. ot1 10 a context w here trade b rnorc with thetr coun 1 arners, geoaraphv .11guistic batTt ers mve neen eli minated the . currency differen . . ' .., ' anc11J ce 1S one of the . ne suspects.. pnt romoting tracle anlI f' . sevt-ral mottvatJons [I th ts 1nance one of P . or . of common cu rrenctes or <.:urren<:v hoards b'! rougII v twentv e. recent adop. 1 ' ' . . tton j countnes ow:r ast decade (tncludmg the eleven members of th E. . 999) . At t he same time ho\ve e llropean Econorn1c and . . t he P . 1. Monetary U mon 111 ver approXJm t 1 h 1 fa e Yt e same mber of new cu rrencies have come into exjstente . '. 1 o the breaku f ,Le; a resu t . bl nu .

rrendes

the former SoVlet

0<.:.

Po

Measures of Financial Market Integration

' 11 The delegates who met at Bretton Woods.in 1944 had a desigJ r0 r tl1e wor Id mone' . . . tc1tly did not accor~ financial markets the presumption that was tary system that _exp1 atwrded trade m goods, the pr~sumptlon that international integration was unambiguously good a_nd that bamers should be liberalized as rapidly as po.sible. Although econom1c theory can make as elegant a case in lmor of free trade in asset a' for free trade in goods and se1vices, the delegates had been persuaded by t}1e experience of the 1930s that some degree of conhols on international capital movements was desirable. It was not until the final1973 breakdown of the S\:stem of fixed ' that Gennany and the United States removed their c.-apital c.'Ontrols. exchange rates Japan and the United Kingdom kept theirs until the end of the 1910s. and most other European counhies did not liberalize until the end of the 19 0 . ~lany emerging market countries also opened up to hu-ge-scale intemational c-apital movements in d1e 1990s (though the subsequent crises have convinced some ob e1vers that those delegates at Bretton Woods mjght have had it right in the first plac.e). Tests regardin g financial markets show intemationa.l integration that has increased tremendously over the past thirty years but that is les complete than often supposed. This generalization applies to quantity-h<lSed tests as well as to price-based tests. It is true that the gross volume of cross-border capita.! flo,vs has ~'0'"11 very l~e. 0 ~ ~~0' ~r ~erhaps the most impressive and \.videly cited statistic is the gross vol~e Ul foreign exchange markets: $1.5 trillion per day world"ide. by Aprill99 , " hich ~ 011 tbe order of a hundred times greater than the volume of trade in goods an. "Stil10' . Net c-apital Hows are for most purposes more mten: e than QTOS flows. sen,; ~ tes. , 1. 0 f COP than were ' how . ever. Net capital flows today tre Far smaller as cl s 1c1re pre-\Vorld War I net AO\vs out of Gr~at Britain and into such hmd-abu~ldantdcoCut~les as Argentina, Australia and Canada. Furt11ennore, Martin Feldstetn an .. n mu es th"'l r ' influential paper that net t-clpltca1 fl 0"-s are 1ar smauer .... Hon0 ka argued in a very

3l '

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOMY

FRANKEL I GLOBAUZATlON OF TH
319 e clnssical I ht.' r !~o...o; Imt:k to Adam S . J r l1 mJt' and D . . . I . . . j . . a",d Rl<:ardo. Ad ith argued t 1al sp l l tlHm-the division of labo r--enhances prod . ~ Oicardo exl<:ll d tl uo; <:onc:ept to trad e between . srn I I' . I av1C D .. de allo\\'S ('<K' I <' til.l ~ lo spe<:ialize in h . <:ountnes. The nuchvlt\' ti : 0 On IS W at lt doe be bat tt cl t ,a)ue of tts outpm It I go\'ernment restricts trade r s st. tltus lllaximizino esources th~.l c..;on of goods that <:ould he imported mo h.eapl , th are wasted ln th., c re <: . t'Ol'u u > an thev can be P d domesttcctlk pro' . duce What if one cou n ll) 1s better than anyone else at ro . ment in favor of frN' trude stilJ carries the da)' All tph at~ucmg euerlj good? The cl IS req . argu be relatively less sktlled than another in th cl . utre ts for a count0 e pro U<:tion of . C! f' try der for it to benent rom trade. Thts is the doctnne of compar ti some good in d or a ve a vantagendamental (if perhaps c:ounterintuitive) princi'pl th J fu e at under! th 1 ne eory les et 1 of . ternational trade. It makes sense for Michael Jordan t o pay someon t 1n h h ee se to mow . . IHS lawn even if Jordan could do it better hlmself because e as a c . . r omparatlve n . dvantage at basketball over lawn mowing. Similarly it 1 k a es sense ror the Un'ted ' . . a 1 ffi . States to pay to nnport certam goods that can be produced more e . ctentlv abroad . 1 . I . (apparel, shoes, troptca agncu tu re, consumer electronics), because th' Umted e . d . . a1 uoods (aircraft , fi nanc1 sem<:es States has a comparative a vantage m other o . , wheat, and computer software). This is the classi~al view of the benefits of free trade in a nutshell. Two kev attributes of the classJcal theory are worth Bagging. First, it assumes perfect co~ petition, constant returns to scale, and fixed technolog)~ assumptions that are not very realistic. Second, the gains from trade are primarily static in nature-that is, they affect the level of real income. The e~mination of trade barriers raises income. but this is more along the lines of a one-time increase. What of the "new trade theory"? It is more realistic than the classical theory, in that it takes into accoun t imperfect competition, increasing retums to scale, and changing technology. It can be viewed as providing equally strona, or stronger. support for the so1t of free trade policies that the United States has followed throughout the postwar peliod, that is, multilateral and bilateral negotiations to reduce trade barriers, than did the classical theory. To be sure, these theories say that, under certain vel)' special conditions, one country can get ahead by interventions (for example, subsidies to strategic sectors), prO\~ded the govern ment gets it exactly right and provided the actions of other countries are taken as given. But these theories also tend to ha,e the property th~t 15 a world in which everyone is subsidizing at once is a worl~ i~ whic~ ~veryone worse off, and that we are all better off if we can agree to Unut substdies or other , interventions. to all nake Bilater or multilateral agreements w bere otl1er SI'des 1 concessions . U.S. al a 1 Prouucts, in return for whatever concessions th e uruted St tes makes are ,,rtu ' 't r the only sorts of trade agreements the United States has made. Indee<L m~1stcl~~s greement anu una T cl A trad rt barriers by e agreements (like the North American Free ra e. . . 1 ~<:ession to the vV'TO) have required much larger reductions I'll ~~their barriers .S. trading partners than by the United States. The reason ts a 11 ' lication were higher than those of the United States to start with. But the natun tmp
EEcONOMy

J tl mobility: a lml' "ould e\-pcct them to be in a world of perfect inlcm,t"" 1 tlmost <:om. counhY that suffers a shortfall in national saving tends to e.x,' JOtT<>wing Fro metlSu.rate fall in imestment, rather than making up the di!Tt't l abroad. Simtlark, imestors in e,ery country hold far lower prn1 ~ ) or their nt) rrn t" rho. ll ..1 . . tl1 tl . 11 ~ 'P ' \\' -diversn lio- in the fom1 of other countries secunties an w~ we . . btas. E'~'den tl~. 1111 ~'l t t 1fom1ationtned and portfolio. a puzzle known as home count~'} transactions costs are stiJl important barners to cross-countJ) tll\ l str. nl. The abili ty of arbitrage to equate asset prices. or . rate~ ofI rett rn across <:oun. , 1 111 l1 tries has been ,videly tested. One would expec~ tt1 ~t l c a )'( 'Jl( 'c of baniers to cross-border Anancial Hows, arbitrage wo~d bnng tnterest rate!'. m to C'quality. But the answer depends on the precise condition tested. Interest rate~ that ha,e had the element of exchange risk removed by forward market c:ove>r are> indeed virtu. ialized coun.trics, showing that ally equated across national borders amon~ indust1 they have fe'"' controls on international cap1tal movemen.ts. But 1nterest rates seem not to be equalized across countlies w~1en they are ad,1n stcd for expectations of exchange rate changes rather than for forward exc:h<mge rates, and interest rates are definitely not equalized when adjusted fo r exp.e cted inflation rates. Evidently, ' currency differences are important enough to dnve a wedge between e>.Pected rates of return. Furthermore, residual transactions costs or imperfect information apparently affects cross-border investment in equities. They discourage investors altogether from investing in some information-i ntensive assets. such as mortgages, across national borders. Furthermore. country risk still adds a substantial penalty wedge to all investments in developing countries. In short. though intemational financ:ial markets, much like goods markets, have become far more integrated in recent decades, tl1ey have traversed less of the distance to perfect integration than is widely believed. Globalization is neither new, nor complete, nor irreversible.

The Impact of Economic Globalization

What are the effects of globalization and its merits? We must acknowledge a lower degree of certainty in our answers. It becomes harder to LlioJate cause and effect. Moreover, once we extend the list of objectives beyond maxi mizing national incomes, value judgments come into play. Nevertheless, economic theory and empirical research still have much to contribute.

The Effect of Trade on the Level and Growth of Real Income

\Vhy do economists consider economic integration so important? What are the

benefits of free trade for the economy?

The Theoretical case for Trade

ClassicaJ economic theory tells us that there are national gains from trade, associated with the phrase "comparative advantage." Over the past two decades, scholars have developed a "new trade theory." It suggests the existence of a~ditional benefits from trade, which are termed dynamic. We consider each theory ll1 turn.

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t;RANKEL I GLOBAL!ZA.TJ
ON OF TlfE ECONOMY

llc>r'" tl tan the r0 re 'un demand for U.S. l)rn,lt 1 . l ~ 1 t t:lt ~uc 1 agreements nuse 1 1o Y 1 tJ1e United States i , H , . .lenefit from a , . . r.u t' U.S. demcutd for Import~: ~n~ . f mc:reased elll tl 1 positi,c "tenn. of trade effect. This JUSt adds to tl~e usuc ( gains to consumers from mte m[!nt ll . tr i . d and ... f . d ct~ncy o pro uc0 0 11 1 Furthermore. e,en when a govem~en~ oes not e.tr L n on from abroad for trade barriers, intef\ention in practice IS us~all~' bas<:ll t 1 ' 1 ~< lcquate know}. edge and is corrupted by int~rest group~. See.~Jl~g t~ ml(;' .c:ut ,lJ S<.'<:tor-specific intef\ention is tile most effective way of ~cow agmg_1 en.t-su kn ,g hehnvior. Glob. alization increases the number of competitors operating. m tlw economy. Not onl . does tJtjs work to reduce djstortionaiy rn~nopol~r power m th: ma~kC:'tpla<.:e (whic~ is otherwise exerdsed by raising prices), tt .can also red~ce dJstorttonary corporate power in the political arena (wruch is exerc1sed by lobbymg~. Most important, new trade tl1eory offers reason to bcJw,.'e that openness can have a permanent effect on a count1y's rate of growth, not JUSt th e level of rea] GDP. A high rate of economic interaction with the rest of the world speeds the absorption of frontier technologies and global m<magement best practices, spurs innovation and cost-cutting, and competes away monopoly. These dvnamic gains come from a number of sources. Ther include the benefits of greate~ market size and enhanced competition. Other sources include technologic-al improvements through increased contact with foreigners and their altemathe production styles. Such contact can come, for example, fiom direct investment by foreign firms with proprietary knowledge or by the ex}Josure to imported goods that embody technologies developed abroad. Each of these elements of international trade and interactions has the effect of promoting growth in the domestic economy. When combined with the static effects. tl1ere is no question that the efforts to open markets, when successful, can yield significant dividends.

of its opennvs restJt d to affectin~ '! . . Ppose iibera1zatH>1 1 d o

for tra e

that haue can a~ ect a count , , f. ' o tl CDP in a "one-shot" f .1) s growth rate-as ash,on-makes the l'ase 111ore compelling.. ..
Id

32 1

economic Interdependence . . 'actO ,d financ1aI !lltc!.._ratton generally increase th 1 l'f d aear 'f", Auctuations <ll110lll4 cotmtries. Floatincr exchruw etrans ~lSSion of business . . rates . . vc e 1 .s Auctuattons.oWhen c e.tal g1ve <:ountnes some c. 0.00 agamst one ano t 1er h apt market . l1 10su1 s are 1ghly intecl floating rates do 11()t gtve complete insulation as th J7.C orate ' ation g maior in cl ustna1 d economies shows. But int e. post-1973 corre1 bernatJonal trans . . 1 '1 :.~ arnon tntSsJon <:an cl d for a country as eas1y as )ad, as happens when d O a verse omestic d I cl rr tl be go eve opnents are in part passe o to 1e rest of the world. The trade balan ~ ortant automatic stabilizer for output and employment i ce.can .a<:t a~ an 1 ' mprovmg m reces~P and worsening in booms. . . . .c sJons 1cnses IS more worrying. The decad f th Contagion of nn<tnCia 0 ]1 exarnpI.es. tl 1e 1992-93 cnses m t he European e e h e 1990s alone xc ange rate mecba. b .. ., . abounds w1t 1 . sm the "tequJ1a cns1s .t 1at . egan Wlth the December 1994 deval uatJon of the . 01 \1exican peso, and the cnses .m East Asta and emerging markets world"ide from July 1997 to January 1999. Evtdently when one country has a crisis it affects others. There is now a greater consensus among economists than before that not all of the observed volatility, or its cross-cou ntry correlation, can be attributed to efficient capital markets punishing or rewarding countries based on a rational evaluation of the economic fundamentals. It is difficult to do justice in one paragraph to a discussion that is as voluminous and vigorous as the debate over the welfare impli<:ations of the swelling international capital flows. Still, the majority view remains that countries are overall better off with modem globalized financial markets than without them.

The Empirical case for Ttade

Citing theory is not a complete answer to the question , "how do we know that trade is good?" We need empirical evidence. Economists have undertaken statistical tests of the determinants of countries' growth rates. Investment i.n physical capital and investment in human capital are the two factors that emerge the most strongly. But other factors matter. Estimates of growth equations have found a role for openness, measured, for example, as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. David Romer and I look at a cross-section of 100 countries during the period since 1960. The study sought to address a major concern about simultaneous causality between growth and trade: does openness lead to growth, or does growth lead to openness? \Ve found that the effect of openness on growth is even stronger when we correct for the simultaneity compared with standard estimates. The estimate of the effect of openness on income per capita ranges from 0.3 to 3.0. Consider a round middle number such as 1.0. The increase in U.S. openness ~nee the !950s is 0.12. Multiplying the nvo numbers together implies that the me~ mtegration has had an effect of 12 percent on U.S. income. More ~a matically, compare a stylized Burma, with a ratio close to zero, versus a stybzed Sing~re, ~th a ratio close to lOO percent. Our ballpark estimate, the coe~cien; of 1.0, Implies that Singapore's income is lOO percent highe r than Burmas as

The Effect of Trade on Other Social Goals

Many who fear globalization concede that trade has a positive effect on aggregate national income but suspect that it has adverse effects on other highly valued goals such as labor rights, food safety, culture, and so forth. Here we l'Onsider only two major values equality and the environment-and briefly at that.

Income Distribution lntemational trade and investment can be a powerful source of gro"th in poor COun tnes, he1 10 are 1em catch up wtt}1 t11ose w1 . al1ead u1 endowments of cap-f pmg t 1 'tal 1 and technoloO'\:. This was an important component f tJ1e spectactuar gro\\th o . 1 OJ . East As1an countries between the 1960s and t11e !990s."hICh remains a nurac e l... 0 even in the aH:ermatl1 of the 1997-98 currency crises. By pron:ot~g come\~ostencef trade can help reduce the enormous worId\\1'de mequalitY m mcome. ti those w} are concerned about income distnbuti.on. howe,er: seem more mo \O h H kscher-Ohlinvated by within-country equality than global equality. A standard textbook theOI)' of international trade, t edi ec 1t] :... -rountrv ake regar ng " lu . Sam L, uetSon model, has a striking predict1011 to m

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J

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTJCN- ECONOMY

1

FRA.NKEL I GLOBALIZA'h

which typic:ally impose the theoretical fra.mewc~rk rather than le:t111g it- are that between .5 and 30 percent of the increase 1s attnbutable to trad_c. fcc:hnology, raising the demand for skilled workers faster tl~an th~ supply, 1s the major factor responsible for the rest. One of the higher estimates IS that trade tontributes onethird of the net increase in the wage gap. On a sample of seventy-three countries.' ?hakrab~rti finds. that trade actuaUy reduces inequalit)', as meao;ured by the Gm1 coeffic1ent. Thts relationship also holds for each inc:ome class. Clearly, income distribution is determined by many factors beyond traue. One is redistribution policies undertaken by the government. In some cases such policies are initiated in an effort to compensate or ''buy off' groups thought to be adversely affected by trade. But a far more important phenomenon is the tendency for countries to implement greater redistribution as they grow richer. A long-estabHshed empirical regularity is th e tendency for income inequality to worsen at early stages of growth and then to improve at later stages. The original explanation for th is phenomenon, known as the Kuznets curve, had to do with rural-urban migration. But a common modem interpretation is that income redistribution is a "superior good"-something that societies choose to purchase more of, even though at some cost to aggregate income, as they grow rich enough to be able to aJTord to do so. If this is right, then trade can be expected eventually to raise equalit)', by raising aggregate income.

have capital and ski lls -..vill benefit at the expense of llltSkJll< { l lllrl'as in p O<lr ncl The same j)r< l:c c ., ' ,'1 ls I'or inter. < . , . countrie-s it ,,~JI be the other way arou I. r I '/ ... . 1 , . . . na t wna I capttw1 molljn. (o r. 0 r that 111atter' for mlemat JOn 1 I IJC 11lrlc,flt'ltv). 1t 1 been verv difficult, however. to find substanti~l cltr~c:t ~\'ldc C~_c. dH pr~:tli<:tio ill~ of the m~dcl during the postwar petiod. includinp; dl'ln 1" 1111)'' :I 1''<ls within eith:~ . , . 1 I') . kelv ne1 or poor coun t nes . Most t1 ~ the phenomena of chaiii!,Jng 'c:h11olouy ntratndustrv trade and worker ties to specific industn es are mon 111 p<Jrtant today th the f~ctor cn,dowments at the he<ut of the Hecksc:her-Oh It n- '>amtl('l-.,ot t model. an 1 ( . ' Jn tlle Unt'tec Stttcs . the gaiJ between wages paid to ski llvd workers and wclgcs Uld paid to unskilled workers rose by 18 pe~centage ~omts be.hvc~n ~ 9 r3 and ] 995 < then 1eveJed off. The fear is that trade JS respons1ble for some of th e gap, hy benefiting skilled workers more than unskilled workers. Common sta1Jsti.c:al csti mates-

J .s 1 tthescarcefactorsof l>rodwtc . . . Jut1on. t 1 t 1a mcome custn 1 11 L fit This means .that lllncl. ('J' , . :mJ the abundan t factor~ w1 )ene

11

.f'rc > trau . 1n

~. ~, tl lOse who

3 32M1on of high!) : . g ~e<:tor~ in low re l - ~~~ . . ~u~u countnes in ord resean.:h suggests th pr titive Bu t cc:on c..oOt1lpe ajor .deterntitt ' .mns' ability to corn a~ environmental re e~ t~ s~ ,r a "rac:e to the bo~ete mtemationallv Fu~ ation IS ,,otaJllg counter to ft i nJ.l111'otrade allows <.:CH tnC'~ lo attain mort of ohm," is the Paret~-impr errnore, ovement w atever th . l n0iJlt: _etr goals are, includin l'H.:orne for a gjven level of r~ Jer rnarket-mea.c;~,r enVIronmental qualitv g lug! environment for ' ~1\ en level of income , or a . . . better 1 o[ th e effects of tr .d ""he econometn<. stuc J<s a e r et dif1erent r.cs11lts (Iepend'mg on what spe 'fi and !!To\vth on the emiro nf C.1 c measur d I k men t g es o pollution the) There is a nee to oo at other environmental . . . t ntena as well 1 . cl' l I . . .1 . use. t IS tfficult to lt . . ne for examp e. l lc tr clue IS anything hut b d r a lOr the s 1 1 rna~ ' forests or enc1 UlVlva of tropical angered species without b dwood su stantial efft0 rts b ' bar }' govem1em. . oents to protect t1 The argument tl1at nc:her countries will take step5 to c.:1 up the 1 ean 1 r envJTonments ~ 11 )ds only for issues when the etTec:ts are felt domesti t-d.Uv-where tt1 I10 e pnmary 'bads" such as smog or water pollution, are external to th e:_ e u.rm or household b . . S , tl ' ut . ternal to 1e <.:ountry. ome envtronmental extemaliti .L es ulat have recei-,ed d . cl h . . Jl) . ncreased attenbon 1n recent ec:a e, owever are global B'odi . . 1 '<erstty overfish 1 ' h d mg, four crood ozone depletion, an green ouse gas emissions are o 1 'A ton of carexamp es. . J 1al warmmg effec-t regarc!Jess of whe th Id . . bon dioxide has tl1e same go)' re m e wor tt 15 . -1= cl al . emitted. In these cases, mwvt u nations can do little to improve the envrronment on . . their own, no matter how .concerned therr populations or hO\v efliecti' .e therr governments. For each of tl1e fou r examples, governments have negotiated international treaties in an attempt to deal with the problem. But onlv tbe attempt to address 0 zone . . depletion, the Montre al Protocol, can be said as yet to have met \\ith much success. Is the popular impression then correct, that international trade and finan<:e es. exacerbates tl1ese global environmental externalities? Y but onh- in the sense ' that trade and finance promote economic growth. Clearly if mankind were still a population of a few million people living in preindustrial pO\ert:. greenhouse gas emissions would not be a big issue. Industrialization leads to environmental degradation, and trade is part of indushialization. But virtually everyone wants industrialization, at least for the mselves. Deliberate self-impoverishment is not a promising option. Once this point is recogni7~d. there is nothing special about trade compared with the other som ces of economic growth: capital accumulation, rural-urban migration, and technological progress ....

ON OF THE Ec ONOMY

Environment
Similar logic holds that trade and growth can also be good for the environment, once the country gets past a certain level of per capita income. Gene Grossman and~~ Krueger found what is called the environmental Kuznets curve: growth is bad for all' and water pollution at the initial stages of industrialization but later on reduces pollution as c:ountries become rich enough to pay to dean up their environm.ents. ~ key point is that popular desires need not translate automatically into enVIron.n.le~t quality; rather government intervention is usually required to address externalities., 1 TI1e idea that trade can be good for environment is surprising to many. T e ' . po11ution-haven hypotr1es1S instead holds that trade encourages fi rms to locate

SUMMARy OF CONCLUSIONS
This chapter gives confident answers to questions about the extent and ~urce of ~nomic globalization and moderately confident answers to some questions about Its effects. ed Wlth respect to trade rutd.finance Tl d le world has become increasingly integrat . smce the end of vVorld \Var 11 owing to declining costs to transport~tion.thaner . Tl henomenon ts net ' . com mumcatton and declining government barners. te P . . th half-c:enturv ; e d~~cm n~n or complete, however. Globalization was more

:l2-&

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOM Y

geogmphv still impede trade and investment substa~ti.dh. \., tlt'ulation su ,_ gcsts that' the ratio of trade to output would have to 111 cr<'a~ : t 1 .utotle:r sixfo~ "' e10re .tt wouId be t me that Americans trade across the glol < a r r th. as 't<:n>ss the b r c erences in currenctes.JanguagEs Ill f'o hltcal syst coun t rv. Such bamet.5 as d 1 w . d' . 11 erns 11 11 each l{ave their own statistically estimated trade-mtpe mg ' ' ' <.<''>, hcsides the . . .gn1 rermumng s1 fi eant effects of distance ' borders, and otheJ ~ O\!r phical and traL I.!C polic.y variabIes. . . . The chapter's discussion of the impacts of ~conomJC gl(Jhah.t.allon has necessarily been exceedingly brief. Both theOJ)' ~~d evidence are I ( <l'l dea~ly support. 0 f th e propOSI On that trade has a posJtive effect fon rcal comes. fhis is ,11hy 'ti' IVe . . . . ' .s L econom1 t s be1eve 1 1 1nportant that the process o mt("rnat 1onal mtcgration JJe 1 t s 1 ' . allowed to continue, especially for the sake of tho~e countncs Lhat are_ poor. still Effects on social values other than aggre?a~e mco.mes can be pos1t'ive or nega. d din on the details and the statistical evtdence does not always give tive, epen g ' . . . d . ..1 .. clear-cut answers about the bottom line. In the two most stu tcu c<tses, mcome distribution and environmental pollution, there seems to be a pattern whereby things get worse in the early stages of industrializatio~ b~t th~n sta_rt to get better at higher levels of income. Societies that bec~m~ nch m te1ms of market~measured output choose to improve their quality of life m _othe r ways as well. It 1 possible s that the same principle extends to noneconom1c values suc_h ~ safety, human rights. and democracy. In short, there is reaso.n to hope that, ~1de from the_va~ous more direet effects of trade on noneconom1c values, the re LS a general mdire<.-t beneficial effect that comes through the positive effect of trade on income . . ..

prt.3o(;edinu \\'oriel War 1, and much oftbe progress duri ul tJ., ' 'i <.:l'ntury h . tmereI\ re,crsc(1t 1 c1 o fftl tat caJne Ln between In tltt. , , ' I rcr d, g1 as le osmg . . ..,t~r ob 1 . . 111 1c .. 1 a tzatlon IS far f rom comp1 Con t raryto popular unJ)l'CS":r,: 'i ' ete. . > uers and t

Will Globe ' .ation Survive?

MARTtf\' \.VOLF

---

------

au

NOTES
1. John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Conr;equences ofThe Peace (Harcou rt Brace, and

is not the first age of globalization. The decad he ours remarkably sil nilar to ou r own era. Under the aegu; ofore U tFirst .World \\'ar ~ ~e ,,,ere f . the 01 cl . ulated by a host o technolog1cal advances the ld . e KmgdCJrn and stiJJld remarkably Free movement of' people ~d a1 wor e~Joyed an era of liberal tr.t e, ' most entirely fr 'tal The world also enjoyed an unprecedented nse. . ee movemt:nt of cap1 m prospenty A , c1 mic historian , Angus .\lladdison, real[ Gross Dom ~ p d ccc,r rng to the e<:O no . ' esu<.: ro u<.t] 1 d t a rate of 1.3 percent a year m the world as a whole between 18,...0 ~ lper 1ea r?se ~ot far short of the improvement of the past three decades. 0~1 an~i:913~ Th~s is both victims of coloni~lism; faiJed tos hare ~n t~e rising prosperity. Y an Afnca, Then came the war. Norman AngeU , m hJS notorious book, J'h G , y e reat IUusum ublished m 1910, arguecl persuastve1 t hat war was a ruinous foU H h cl P . Y e ope to th at no th m? cou Id come from a European war but mutual ruin.persuade people His hopes failed. Many have smce condemned him for his innocence. But if one reads his book. one will find not that he tho~ght war impossible, but that he thought it insane. He hoped people would pr?ve ration_al. People, as is their wont, disappointed him. That war began the rum of the first globalization. The economic disarra)' of the interwar years, the failure of the United States to assume the responsibilities of power, the weariness and weakness of the United Kingdom and France, the bitterness of the Germans, and the Bolshevik triumph in Russia completed the job. The failure of the first liberal order-that of the 19th centurv-lecl to 30 vears of ' ' catastrophe. "Never agai n" was the motto under whi<.:h I wTote my book, \\'lly

Globalization vVo-rks-. 2
Since then, we have recreated a better .Uberal international order-one that extends opportu nities to the world as a whole. It is our duty to our descendants not to tb.row away th is golden opportunity once again. Yet the fact that we should not do something does not mean that we will not do so. Globalization is fragile, for a simple reason: A global market economy depends on the support of states. States provide the security of property and person on which all <.'Omplex exchange depends. But states are necessarilv territorial. The loyalties they create, e\'oke, or ' reflect are steeped in humanity's characteristic tribalism. . In the remarks that follow, I wish to extend this argument by first analysJ~g th~ driving forces of globalization and then looking at its achievements and frulure before examining the risks that lie ahead. I conclude with what ~ve can do to mm th miZe ose risks. But when I say "we,.. 1 reallYmean 'vou the Umted States.
M t nstitute for International ~-artm W M\Vill Clobali7..ation Su.rvive?"' The l11icd \\bitulan J...eoture. th olf. "'l'O . . n of the au or. nomtcs, W ashington, DC.. ApriJ 5, 2005. Reprinted by penniSSIO 325

Howe (1920). 2. Kenneth Froot, Michael Kim, and Kenneth Hogoff, "The Law of One Price over 700 Y ears," Working Paper 5132 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bu reau of Economic Research, May 1995). 3. Hans Linnemann, An Econometric Study of IntenwU onal Trade Flows (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1960); and Peter Drvsdale and Ross Garnaut, "Trade Jntensities and the Analysis of Bilateral Trade Flows 'in a Many-Country World," Hitotsuhashi Jnunral of Eccnomics, Vol. 22 (1982), pp. 62-84. . a1 4. Edward Mansfield, uEffec:ts of International Politics on Regionalism in I ntemah o~ Trade," in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, eels., Regional lntegrati.o 11 ant t rel Global Trading System (Harvester Wbeatsheaf, 1993); Edwarcl Mansfi eId and Rache fi Id Bronson, "The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows," in Edward M~s ~tr and Helen Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism. (Columbia Und1 ei'S.it r v 1 r Press 1997); and Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, "Power pol1 JCs an ne 20 national Ttade," American Political Science Reoieu:, Vol. 87 (June 1993), PP 408-

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WOLF I WILL GLOB AUZATION SURV!vt.,

327 World v\'m J 1 c ralizalion hcttan fte ancw th L I'> . A r 1 d ' ougn haltingly . \l' 1 1ttc under tlw wisc.J e .10 d across t 11' 111 " f . 1p . c rop ' 1 a sm all II Uinl)' ea crsh of' tht Unlt'' t vestern pLI I t 1960s the !.Ill . vs, o 0tates B <:.:r o relaf 1 . ' ae conornies wa<., J,l Cl fllll lg more visible B h I IV<:: y ()utward-lcx>k111g . y th~ ~t y . . .. 1 A.S1ao e 1 1Jl... tl1 lrs were also becom t e att: ts,ro~. the fa.ilur(: , r . . g and nation a so stat(, evruc t h rng lannJO r . P must be the mo<;t dramatic: period of econ . 1 n f is ~et the sta:~c 10r th 1 a quarter of a c:entu nrn1<: 1heral .at1on there ha!. what '" 17 b a process at atL'i, 111 ever h ry, rought s . 1. beenc . dditional peop 1 Wlllln the purview of the I b I . . t>met lflglike fourb'l I g o a market 1 h .11 }Ion a Think of the eauI Jl'lt;S a One: .the transform at'IOn of ~ ao .Zed . I . I t is almost certam y, t 1e most mtcmationally 0 pen 1 eo tong's tChina into . arge . . \\ 1:1 un ry m nistory the ..I= , se of the Sovrct cmpr re; and the end of Inwas "J ' I<:e:nse r .. Th . . .1 1 CO 'lap ese ' ne transformeu t 1c econom1c lrves of about 28 b.I 11. peopleaJ. t ...t evcnl'i B IOn . . . (llo . u 1zatron also swept across much 0 f L . menca. ulls was not -'] Economic ube ra1 all n A (lJ In all these cases, moreove r, what happened. wa<; ncJt ust ub . . era1l7..a.tion rder. As has usually been the case, the move towar'- th eJmarket has bt. at the 1 Ul) bo I cl . en s1rnu been exc" ti . Th taneously intern a an exte rnal. There have ep ons. e Umtecl Stat 9 tJ c:entury, wI1en it combined high prot ti . . ts \\~clS one in the 1 1 ec on agasnst tmports h B h . IIV'h with laissez- f:arre at ome. ut w en countries decide to adopt the LVJSIC of the mar. . aJJ y do so both clomestLeally and international! 0 ket they norm Y n<:e one has 1 k ' accepted that 1~ar -e~ re atrons make sense among domestic residents, it is hard to argue that foretgne rs must be excluded. A country's international transa<..ti ons a~e. after all, just the aggregate of the individual transactions b) its resideJlts u OTOO\t:T, VJ because the motivation for such transactions is the same as for transat1:ions "ith fellow residents, they are just as likely to contribute to the welfare of those who undertake them. This is the logic of international integration. It is impossib le in a short space to examine this liberalization in detail. But let us take one example: China. Between 1992 and 2002, the weighted a\erctge tariff on Chinese imports feU from 40.6 percent to 6.4 percent. In effect, China, v.ithin just ten years, moved from having import barriers comparable to those of today's high in<:ome countries in the early 1950s to levels close to the current ones of the high-inoome countries. And. since a tax on imports is also a tax on exports, China's exports exploded: Between 1999 and last year, exports rose from S200 billion to not much short of 8600 billion. What we are seeing here is nothing short of a global market re-.olution .
tjU

WHAT DRIVES GLOBA LIZATIO N

,. l!> across fron. 1 de6ne globalization as the integration of econom~es ~hrouu'. r ti~rs. It is dJi,en. in turn, by two fo:ce~: the .red.u<.:tron 111 ti1L (" f .' r):. lransportatin,, e:u rd communications and economtc hberaliza~on . The red tJ H., 11 1 the costs of 1' ' L11man histo transportation and communications is a consistent tend1 though one that has accelerated over the p ast two centmies. b .: ' 1!1 ~~ , : (' liberalizatio~' however, is far from consistent. On the contnuy, tbe last two <:"lit 11 rs have seen t\vc; upswings and one huge downswing.

Falling costs of Transportation and Communications

Changes in transportation and co~mun icatio.ns technolo?' cre~Lt~. ~~)portunities s for increased commerce and are. m turn, created by them. 11 us 1 not a new phenom enon.3 The railway, the .steams~ip, the refrigerator. and the telegraph created the opportunities for the mtegratio~ ?f ~e 19th and early 20th centuries. The railway made the shipping of commodities m. l~uJ k over land feasible for the first time in rustory. With the steamship, tens of mill10ns of people could cross the oceans with ease-an d did so. The first transatlantic cable was laid in 1866. This, argues professo r Kevin O'Rourke, was "the most important breakthrough of the last 200 years" for the capital markets. "No otl1er innovation," he writes, "including the late nineteenthcentury invention , the telephon e, or its late twentieth-centu ry equivalent, the Internet, has had c.'Omparable impact on the speed of information Aows and capital market integration."4 The 20th century added the containe r ship, the giant tanker, and the airli ner. It also added radio, television, transcontinental telephon y, the sateiJite, the computer. and the Internet. New opportunities have been created and, again, they have been exploited . They are to be seen in 24-hour financiaJ markets, mass tourism, and tl1e global interconn ection of production that has spawned the multinational corporations of today.

Economic Liberalization
In the long run, then, the world seems bound to become more globalized because opportunities have grown enormously. But history tells us that this does not mean a never-ending rise in integration. In the 19th century, a rising ride of liberalism reached its highest point in the last one or two decades of the century. Thereupon a c:ombination of powerful forces reversed the tide. I define those forces as the four Ts"': geopolitical insec:uri ty-the rivalry among the great powers that culmin~ted in two world wars; macroeconomic instability-abov e all the Great DepressiOn; protectionist interests -particu larly importan t in the U nHed States in 193~, whe~ the Smoot-HawJey tariff was enacted; and c'Ollectivist ideas-na tionalis m, unpend alism, soc..ialism . and communism. By 1945, the integrated world economy ha

GLOBALIZATION'S RECORD
What has been the result of the interaction of these twin forces, the declln~g '~ts ofcommunications and the move to the market? Summarized briefly, two ~~g ~ngs have happened over the past two and a half dec-ades: The first is a huge ~ m thetill and the second tS a s f. inte th. th gration of the goods-producing sectors o econonues, e tw0 asnPCts of one mg: in h bigg r -- . 'T"L. ha . . er mcrease in fore ign direct investme nt. T ese are nati nal tomrutmes. uev ,e, b f JntPn... ti [--;oou~n ~;thin ~&a ono production across frontiers Ytrans .. ~ . . t lla, process, created something quite new: specta~izatt~n n:uati\e f c'Omr-- aU''3ll-oe. lllanuf: actunng on the basis of specific sou.rc;es o

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:128 PART 3 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOI\t WOLF I WILL GLOB

H'd. Twc, th Yet it is also important to be clear about what ha<: IH ,i l.al patticul<tr. are almost certainly less globalized than 'l <~ ., ti"\ ~ >: htbor ~~~gs, in arkets . <Uld long-term capital markets. .. oltl.t ' c rld"o, 110 1 The former is shown b)' the fa<:t that tl1e proportlon .., pu ation J . h. I fb ut LS a 1011t .J 1'' 1 now ag . IVing in countries other tl1ru1 t11e c."Ountry o , amst ab . I . I I1 . al 1 10 percent in the late 19th century. It JS so s 1own )) l 1<. .tf c- tllv 11n11 p .. 1 Out eccuent d . I ' u c gaps in real wages across tl1e plru1et for peopIe w1 l mu<..1 l u s.urw ~ki lis. The latter is shown by the failure to generate WllS l\tt nt hrge net capital fl . from rich countries to poorer ones. In fact, over the pa.;t :-.<.'\'tn }ears, the 11 AO\\s et ows 11 h d I fi have gone in tl1e opposite clirectio~~ bom. t re evebol pmg 'f~ot < t<~ the world:s rie:h. est country. The failure to create we asiS ror sta <' JWt Jows of <:apital from .the rich world to the poor one is. I would argue, the greatest sing!< f~til 11 rc ofth e se(:. ond age of globalization. If we tum to hum<:u1 welfare, what is our assessment? Globalization has brought large ee;on~mic gains. to many pa1ts of the world. above all to Asia, which has successfully ex1)lmted the ladder of develop: ment created by labor-intensive manufactures. Globalization has brought about huge reductions in the number of peo 1 in extreme poverty. According to the latest World Bank data, the proporti~~ of the east Asian popu~tion living. on less than a dollar ~ day at purchasing power parity fell from .)6 percent m 1981 to 16 percen t m 2001. This is the biggest and fastest reduction in extreme poverty in world history. The relatively rapid growth of Asian developing countries has almost certainly reduced global inequality among households for the first time sinc.-e the 1820s. Globalization has brought big gains to the developed countries as well. Recent work by the Institute for International Economics suggests that the gains to the United States alone amount to $1,000 billion-almost 10 percent of GDP. For the United Kingdom, the gai ns must be rar greater.5 Globalization has not worked well for Afri.ca or much of Latin America. For this there are three reasons: the resource curse, pe rsistent protectionism in agriculture, and the weak supply conditions in these countries. In addition, for these countries, the entry of China into the world economy is a massive shock, both positive and, in some cases, negative.
M.y c:onclusion then is that we have done quite well, but we must do better. For this reason, I strongly support the idea of a big push on Afrka. It is also why we must do what we can to encourage the rest of Latin America to learn from Chile's success, not Argentina's failure.

. ' r ' 11 er thesatnefat ')fi . 1dsintegratJOil e. o answ 1. r1 towa . -"e account o t ' I I re:n<.:es and simiJant es betw <:r t 1JS quesuon, one ucc<h h l to car' ten t t:St: tw() <:n. I u cons(;yuenc:e of tl kdo.,.vn last tilllt ,,.x: 1s. The le cornbi11ed r . . 'b 1 btea or<:e of prc l, . . sts antill era ,, ' :t <:<onorn1e: instability . d. c.t,on,st l < ' an mtcm r . 1 intere ' l same fou I' IOJ"\IT1'.1 !I 0 1t1C a{)OC:aiYPse t o ren1m,~ a IOna) rivaJI'\I Jlow l'ktlv 1 -r are t11e
E. 329

ALIZATJON SURVJv ,

protectionist Interests
The first force undcrly1ng the disintegration of the earli tectionist interest~. shown most decisively. th .Ue~ forrn of glohali7.ation W'" ...., m e nted St t . . . . II pro a es m the inten.var st ars. The h1g 1 y protecllon1 policies of the wo I'' b ' r us lggtst anu rnost successful . ye sm economy un cl e~mmcd t1h cmj 1 elsewhere. d'R Yet these forces have happily been signifi<.:antl 1 y rno ed and amtliorated by contemporary econ01nic uevclopmen ts. The rise of the inte rnationally integrated trans t 1 IOna <.:ornpan has recl uced d w1tjmgn css) of producers to wrap thna . 1 . .Y the ability (an . emse ves m national A I . . . . a~s. t 1s no accident t11at protcctJomst mterests are strongest in redo . owned and operated industries-suc:h as steel and ag . P 1 mmantly nationally ' ne:u ture Is a 't ta f in the United States less or more American than a Gen raJ. \A oyo actory . e .VIOtors ractOT\' in China.? Is GoId man sae; hs 1n F ran kfu rt less or more Amencan th an HSBC in~ . . E:\\ York? The answer to such questions is: Wno knows? ~~ 0 d em cornpan1es have h . . . 1. global mterests. T e same IS true for many of their most valued emp o~ee . \ation 1 fi d h alists .n t e cosmopo Jtan attitudes of companies and many top- 1 1emp1 ovees eve . . . obJec~o.nable. A stgrufican.t consequence, however, is the breakdown in the abilitv and willmgness of compan1es to collaborate ,Jiith trades unions on their demand f~r protection. Developing countries have been affected by the same trends. Inward ~oreign direct investm ent and intraindustry trade diffuse traditional prote<:tionist ~nterests. The c?ncep~ o~ a purely national business sector has become inc:reasingly melevant and, JUSt as 10 mdustrial countries, this diffuses protectionist lobbyinu. The in~rease in servke sector employment and the decline in employ~ent in manufactunng has, along with the rise in the portion of the population in retirement, reduced the share of the voters whose jobs are directly vulnerable to import competition. Consumers have also become accustomed to foreign products. They may, as workers, complai n about imports. But they still like the products foreign companies provide. Many in high-income countries express concern about the d~li.ne in relative wages and employment opportunities of the unskilled. But the political power of unskilled workers has diminished. Moreover. the consensus of ::~~mists, disputed by only a minority of politicians, is that this decline in oppor. Dlties reflects changes in technology, not in trade. In addi tion, the existence of multilateral institutions and a web of strong mternational commitments makes it far more difficult for protectionist interests t~ capture legislatures, as they once did. There is too much at stake for cowltries to reverse the commitments they have made. Even the Bush admini tration. ~'ed~ ~hough it is to unilateralism, has never said that it should ignore its obU~ati~ns m:~~~atbe World Tr~de Organization (WT?), even th~ugh it is the most bmding teral econonuc commitment the Umted States has.

TIIREATS TO GLOBAUZATION
Doing ~r would be excellent. But we can also do far worse. The international
e<.t>nomJc mtegration of the late 19th century went into reverse. Is the present more

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nuZA1lON SlJRVIvr:,
. 331

Collectivist Ideas
element in the 20th centUI)' collapse or I he hf:e~ ... ( ; t:tf ional <)r(Jp bl'~an. at home. with the dse of antiJiberal ideas. Th~n an P"' ~ ' today hNwce~ groups then and now, particularly wi~h what _Lire l~>n llcr t I 'f~ ~ c:o'IO mist of' the OECD, David Henderson, has called _'n e~~ m:,llcnm u ~ 1.' ~~>lle~u~1"t.~ - the groups wl ro unite to protest against glohaJ cap1tahsm. But LllJS gr o''I' of PlOlcsters is ver different-an d much less inteiJectually coherent- than the opponents of' liberaf. ism of a century ago. The antagonjsts ~f libera~slll ~lrcu cmrv<:rgc around two d ideas: radical soc:ialism and raciaJly-defined nattnnal~s m. Both grollps (;<tllcu for control of the state over the economy and ptimacy of the ('{)llecthe over the sell~ seeJ.:ing individual. Both sought power-and knew what they wantt>d to do with it. That made them extraorcHnatily dangerous. . The intellectual origins of today's antiliberal mc~vement a~e far m.ore diverse. They indude environmentalists, developmen.t lohb1cs,. popuhsts, soctalists, communL'its, and anarchists. These groups are un1tecl only 111. what the~ oppose. They are rooted in no cohesive social force. such as th e organtzed working class. They largely reject party politics. They offer no alternative way of running an economy. They are split in their objectives. Part of what so~e protesters say-~otal~ly on the hypoclisy of the advanced countries an.d th~ pl1ght ?[the poor-ts vahd. But a political movement cannot beat somethmg wtth nothmg. A movement that offers only protest is unlikely to triumph.
A
Sl't'Olld
1

as, ll1 essence bee.; I tn .S. current ""nunt . .1 ]d' ' ome t 1e world' bo :ll-"" rt Since 1t IS 'i" wor s most creditwortl1 . d b s rrowe:r of ln<t reso d cun ency, . . h Y e tor ancl th . Jtlo' )cl's most tmsle 1 IS etter placed to l h t e Issuer of wor .1 . J pe In the T)rocess, t1 Umteu States i.<; making it poP ay t rIS role than any other 1C 'bl ntr)' I . sst e ror the Id , 0 cP bl high levels of econ01mc activity, by absorbing the excess w?r to run at tolera ~ental Europe and accommodating the merC'antil' f savmgs of Japan 3Jld.coo . . . it has been substitutLng . own excellent credit r0 ISm o emerrting As'la. 1n tts th odditJOI'l, ' a . g-market economtes. wh tch would otherwise ha, r e poor credit 0 f weak he rnergiO 1 en th . Id' 'e sure v e . . 1borrowers. That has eliminated the big financial cris r th ' e wor s . , tl _ . es o e 1990s 11octpa 1 P t this "solution to 1e auc1 mg-up problem for the world . . Y e . . . . .. . . . economy ttself car. twO big nsks: nsmg pt otechomst senhment m the United St t d nes dd . a es, an . at some oint, a brutal and su en cor~echon , as the rest of the world decides that its bold? of' u cla.i .ms are excesstve and, not least' too vulnerable to the deprecLation . . mgs 'ollar that must occur if the U .S. curr~nt ac~ount deficit is to fall sharply as a share of GDP. The chance of a hard landmg, WI~ unpredictable political consequences in the United States and among the creditors, though not 100 percent, is not zero either, and, as I have frequently argued, the odds increase with each passing year.

1 <;lion of global econom . 1 Can not le<Wr : yet ' tc tnstabt . . ,vhat Ls both the " r ~ l and most disturbing feature t 1:) Wtthout touchin upOil dence for n ..cw; tonomic stability on e I . of t!1e world eeonomv~ . depen . .c . h . xp ostve nses U . , 1ts def-icits. The v ma.

:>tc\tc:~

Internationa l Rivalry
Yet the most important cause of the 20th century breakdov.rn was the collapse of harmonious international relations, as rivalries among the great powers and the rise of communism and fascism fragmented the globe. . . . [Niall] Ferguson, too, emphasizes the geopolitical dangers, pointing to 6ve parallels between the Un ited States today and the United Kingdom a century ago: overstretched, physically and financially; great power rivalry. with China now in Germany's role; an unstable alliance system, \vith the disintegration of the transatlantiC; relationship; rogue regimes (then Serbia, now Iran and North ~orea); and revolutionary organizations (then the Bolsheviks, now AI Qaeda).8 I be~~ve he is right: the breakdown in economics starts from a breakdown in global politics. For the moment, however, the situation is different, in four fundamental respects:
I

Economic Instability
The decisive event in the collapse of the integrated economy of the late 19t11 and early 20th centuries was the Great Depression in the United States and the financial and exchange rate crises that rolled across the world in the 1930s. In developing countries, financial and exchange rate crises have come with depressing frequency over the past tv.ro decades. Substantial financial and exchange rate crises also e1~pt~d among the other advanced economies in the 1980s and early 1990s. Japan LS sttll struggling with the aftermath of its bubble eoonomy, while the U rtited States has also suffered a huge stock market bubble, which reached its maximum extent i.n 2000: All these are signs of significant financial iustabiuty. Yet it is almost tmposstble to believe that the outcome will be another 1930s. The move to floating rates has. as Max Corden foresaw, significantly reduced the risk of such crises. 7 The woes inflicted upon Argentina by the collapse of its currency board at the end of 200l should, therefore, be viewed as the end of an era rather than as the beginning of a new one. Its crisis has also had remarkably little effect on other emerging-mar~et economies. Much of the transfer of resources to developing countries is now taktng plac-e in the longer-term, more sustainable form of foreign direct investment..For all these reasons, the likelihood of massive waves of financial crises in emergu~g rnarket economies has declined. It is also striking that, despite these crises, no st~ nificant country has reversed its commitment to liberal trade or even to freedom . :es from exchange controls. That even includes Argentina. Today, sueh po)tCJ are J . seen as a dead end-the quickest way to join Castro's Cuba or K.im Jong-t')'5 Nort 1 Korea in far from splendid isolation.

There is a single undisputed hegemon, the United States. anti little c~anbf of a war among the great powers in the near futu re, except jus~ co~ceJ\'3 .~ et 1 between the United States and China over rrruwan. Y Cluna 1s not. at present, powerful enough to be a Jival of the United s(~a~~: atavistiC notion Second, all the great powers have largely abandone d h than inter. at . hat prosperity derives from temton gru.ns a11d plun er rat erbiking feat f th l change One o e s na] economic developmen t and peacefu ex Id' '"'eat powers are . ts t ures of today's war against terronsm tl1at all the wor s et on the same side. . arket-led economic Third, all the great powers share a co~mttme;~~~;ntegration . development and international economic and P

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rc : 1
I
'I

WOLF I WILL GLOB

CYiobal institutions and habits of c.:losc Fourth. ~ commitment to cooperation.

n.J nI'Orl:e tl )C

All these are powerful ctifferences between the' worlr1 ('f , .j'h a Cf" tu n ')' t . I . . go and today s world. Against this, we must note two o Mou-; 1 ,u tic,, The breakdovm of the eruly 20th centmy occurred. in P' i h( t,tUS( or the ures to accommodate tising powers in the global econon.ut m, I p )li tic:al <mlerprcsThe rise of China will , in time' create compruable pressures. l lthv l lited .Sttt'~s renhl' , " . 1 _ns wedded to notions of global primacy rather than of a shand ~~lohal order . A with a rising China would seem virtually inevitable. Jnd('C'd, John ''karsheil~):~n t<;t fessor of poHtical science at the Universi~ of ~hicago. argu('S that c:onAict (tho~o . . not \var) is inevitable tout court: the Umted States, he ar~ues. will not to] er,ttegh . 1 for exact1 t 1 same rc<Lo;on Lhat Thuc d'd '. y 1e sb-ategic rivaJ.9 vVar would then ensue e~ thought it arose between Athens and Spruta: The status quo powers feared the~i: 0 e a rival , while the Jising power resented the pretensions of tlw in cum bents. In addition, China's 1ise will force uncomfo,tablc ('<.:Onomic adjustments 11 the rest of the world. These are already creating protectionist pressu res, notabl ~ in the United States. It is not, alas, impossible to envisage <1 spiral or mutual bo~til~ ity that unuermines the commitment to a )j beral inte rnational economic.: order. Today, however, instead of such a breakdown in relations among the world' most important powers, we confront an alternative threat: mega-ten~orism. Som; ork fear that terrorist outrages on the s~e of the attac_ks on . ew Y and Washington of September 11, 2001--or even b1gger ones-wtll end the commitment to open borders. It is not difficult to envisage the devastating impact the smuggling of a nuclear device into a country on a container ship would have on confidence in open borders. Closely related fears concern tl1e development or weapons of mass destruction by regimes hostile to the uberal world order in general and the United States in particular. At worst, such regimes might collaborate "vith terrorists to inflict vast, and virtually untraceable, damage on civilized stiltes. Fear of what might come across borders must act as a tax on globalization. lf y countries had to be sure of the safety oJ eve1 shipment and person that crosses their et borders, much of today's globalization would become impossible. Y that would aJso hand the victory to the terrorists and their sponsors. At present, it does not appear that the world's response to September 11 will be to close borders. That would only exacerbate the desperation in the world's less economically successful countries. Global <.ooperation to control terrorists and improved secUlity measures seeu1 a ~ore appropriate and effective route. But the danger is a genui ne one. It cannot be IgllOred.

.,..,3 RVIvE? .,, () 1. 1 1 r ...., vears ln" '.:cent guous Iy w ' -.rcmenta] <.1 .-11ob1 tll1 d d incremental l'T 111d from ~oJt}1 Amen.ea b emand for cll.1from As'. h . . . ee e Janations !or tc cla . lllgll prices. If on , b y two to one. Th . la as e~c s IS one 0 f com mes th . ' e~'P the.. allv unsta ble ( .u If rq~H>n ecms set to b e . th JS with lhe f: act at th . an e\ ecome . r10bllC 1 1 pnt<n tml for disrut)tion d c er more import r-,1 . vital fuel, t H' ant sourte an even eo LJ t II of uJJS cans might rce:L\OIH,) :V ask. should thev be th . nutct is not small \\11. J1 . . nv , ar e pnce f I I. I) . AITle o ensuring oil t Ch ,. l ' same ( ug) p n<:<' a~ t 1e one thev pay th emse ves? Th o tna . , . . .. . at u1e 1 e search for vit 1 a]s was a motl\ .ttmg orce behmd territo 'a] a raw n expansi . h . Il . n1ttteJ1 on tn t e Hrst half of lh .-.1-. century. It cou ( C<L~tly become so again in th e e years ahead. < 2vu

AlJZAllON SU

SO WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Globalization is not in evitable. It depends on politi . 1 cla . cs. n to ys world t d . \ill 1 S U.. po I1t1cs. v1t 1out successful uS . 1 dersb at r 1 epends ab ove all on ea 1p 1 1 0f upheavals, the present globalization may founder, just as the last ana ~ e huge e did. l suggest three priorities: d First, a big effort must be made to ensure that thew . k ea est an poorest coun l h .. . tries are m a post bon to s. are at east some of the benefits 0 f th 1 bal e a o economv . h 1 1 : and acl vancmg tee no ogtes. t ts too easy to tmagme that b th 'ddl ' y e mt e of thJs .. I. . 1 5 b '1 century, as many as . 1 ton to 2 billton people \villlive in eo un tries whose real incomes per head are less than a hundredth of those in the richest s h . Id . uc a \\Or bl 'bl b cannot poss1 y e sta e. Sec?n? , an ~~ually big effort must be made to fix the sources of global macroeconomic mstabtbty. In the long mn, it will be important for emer!ring-market 0 economies to pursue policies that allow them to borrow in their O\\TI cu.rrencies. ~ore importantly, Chi na mus.t be told firmly that the Asian mercantilist strategy will not work for a country of its scale. At the very least, it should run a current account deficit equal to the net inflow of foreign direct investment. Third and most important, the United States must find a way to deal with the three principal long-term sources of geopolitical instability: dependency on oil from the Gulf region; Islamic fundamentalism; and a rising China. ln none of these cases will the United States be able to achieve what it wants on its own. ln all cases. however, the outcome will depend on U.S.leadership. . Progress or relapse the choice is largely. but not entirely. the United States'. Hts.tory will judge. We can only warn. Peace, prosperity, and harmonious international relations are neither normal nor natural. They must be worked for by every generation. Ours is no exception.

Resource Insufficiency
Power is not the only asset whose availability creates a zero-sum relationsbjp. So does t1le supply of finite resources. While most countries now understctnd that wealth is created by production and exchange, not plunder, that is not so obvious!~ ~~ofaccess to raw materials, particularly fossil fuels. If one accepts that the supply 15 mdeed, finite, then more demand by new consumers makes other consumers
. ( ~ (Paris: Qru-anisation for . . Md . e a dtson , The Wvrld Economy: Hrstonca1 5tatts ILS ale d . Y t,;ni"ersitv 2 ~con_omic Co-operation and Development. 2003). artin Wolf. Why Globali~.ation Works (New Ha,en and Lon on. Press, 2004), x-xviiL
l. Ang

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THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONOM

1 ' !

3 . Kt',in O'Rourke. "Europe and the Causes of Cloln.lr' iP 1\:ierzkowski. eJ .. 11mpe and Gl.obali::.(l/icm ( B<L'-in~o,tokt"

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aJobalizatl ~Jn

and Governance

5 . .lnstit ute for 1nternational Economics, ''A lew Forcig11 E c:cmnm~<. Polil:y for 1h . States" (\.Vashington: lnsl'itute for International F:<:onomic~>. Fcbruary 9~ ~ntcu OOS). http://\\ WW.i ie .com/publications/newsreleaseslfcppr.h t11 1. 6. See Da,id Henderson , A11ti-Liheralism 2000: tltc nist cif \',.u: .\ftllenniu, 11 Collect' .. ltiL~''' ( London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 200 J). 7. See \:\: Max Corden. Economic Polietj. Exchall{!.e Rate.~. and the llltcmwtiolla/ S . ystem 'I . . . cl eh 1cag~: UllJ.VC':lt')' o f' ( .11cago Press. 1994). .. (Oxford: Oxford University Press an 8. Niall Ferguson, ''Sinking Globalization, Forel{!,n Ajfmrs ( \l arci11Aprii200 5), 64--11 ' 11 9 John J Mearsbeimer' "Better to Be Godzilla than Bamhi." Foreiun Pot1c. (Janua 1 ~'ry February 2005).
7

KENNETH N. WALTZ

of states 1 197g 1 described the interdependence ~n ased but only to about the 1910 level if measur:d bow bdut increasing. lt has tal Ytra e or cap1 fl .f rp I ' tocre ows as ower 1 measured by the mobility fl b rcentage of GN : o al 'l't I1e mu tu. mw ary dependence of states vet a or, and lower still if 11 pe r ured by t Id s 1 one ee1 that tb rneas e wor r . become a smaHer one. International travel has be. aster easier d c:ome 1 d . .. . I1as ' li : an eaper; mustc, art, cwsmes, an cmema have all become . c:osmopo tan m the d Th I b . ch centers anc eyon . . e Peony Pavilion was produced . . entiren' m tls . "'orld's maJor ., ... r r tJ1e first time 10 400 years, and 1t was presented not in Shan h . g a1 or BelJmg but 0 . al Jl ork. in New Y Co~mumcation IS most mstantaneous, and more than words~ be transmitted, wht~h makes the reduced mobility of labor of less consequence. High-technology JObs can be brought to the workers instead of the workers to the jobs; foreigners. can become part of American design teams without lea\ing their homelands. Before World War I, the close interdependence of states was thouaht of as heralding an .er~ of. peace among nations and democracy and prospe~ty within them. Asso~tahng mterdependence, peace, democracy, and prosperity is nothing new. In hts much translated and v.ridely read book, The Great Illusion (1933), Nonnan Angell summed up the texts of generations of classic-al and neoclassical economists and drew from them the dramatic conclusion that ,.,ars would no longer be fought because they would not pay.\Vorld War I instead produced the great disillusion, which reduced political optimism to a level that remained low almost until the end of the Cold War. I say "almost" because beginning in the 1970s a new optimism, strikingly si milar in content to the old, began to resurface. Interdependence was again associated with peace and peace increasingly with democracy, which began to spread wonderfully to Latin America. to Asia, and with the Soviet Union's collapse, to Eastern Europe. Francis Fukuyama (1992) fore.saw a time when all states would be liberal democracies and, more recently, :\hchael Doyle (1997) projected the year for it to happen as l)ing between 2050 and 21~. John Mueller (1989), heralding the disappearance of war amon~ the worlds advanced countries, argued that Norman Angell's premises were nght all along, CJ _ but that he had published his book prematurely. ower and I nterr.wpen. . Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye m tl1e.rr 1977 b00k P d li dence, strengthened the notion that interdependence promotes peace an n~~~ the use of force by arguing that simple interdependence had become camp ex
oliticS. \'ol. 32. ~o. 1Sciencr & P
4

fC bridge Um,-erst., . . "1.1enc:e As. la . soc tion. Reprinted with the pernusSJOll o am

enneth N. Waltz, ~Globalization and Governance. PS: ~olttJca 999 b' The American Political (~ K 0 1 with minor re,i)ions. Cop)nght . ' k. ~r ~- mber 1999), pp. 693--700 ~ '",...

Fro

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335

~~6

PART 3

TH.E LNTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECO 0!\n

()llr ffl(.'(OJ'ic \

WALTZ I GLOBALIZATION

ANDGQ\Ih> ..

L.I\NI\NCE

33;

markt>ts mattt"r more: states matter le !'. Each ti~h lt>ni n:! of t lw L't'nno ; ~ s ~~~~ mi. t'S the bendtts of economic excha~1ge and 111.\kl'~ " r .tmong the 1~re>.: ad,~mced states increasing!~ cost!~ The srmp_lc and ~JI,tusthll propositions are ~~e at as the benefits of peace rise. so do the costs of war. \\ hen , t.tks ptrtl'i,e wa rs to . ' ~ me mnnenseh- co tlv. the, ''ill be dIS111C1 d I o ugI1t .tl le. llt. \\.<U Ilecome rar'e. 1 utbe > IS . . . not abolished ~cause e,en the stronge!:t economc forc.:e~ cannot conquer~ . ear or eliminate concern for national ltonor{ Friedman J998. I96-91 ). )Iace I>ol'ti r at Economic interests become so ~trong that markets begin to re1 L ' ..._ home and abroad. That economics depresses pohttcs and llmlls its significan('(> . taken to be a happy t110ug~t. Tbe ~rst section of this papc>r t''I:Hillines its applitatio:~ domestically: the second. mtematwna.ll~' .

. f int~l"ti('I'\Pildl'llt'<.'. hindin~ the t"COilOtni<: ;U1d hf'lll'L' till' I' I ' 1 ll (~re ' (s o f' st , ,. <~le enr lllOl't' tighth- tocrether. Now. we hear from mam ''L , , 1t tn iLrdependE>n . , . ~ lll!! has rl':tchetl .\1.' 1 another height. tnmsCl' nc1 ~t all'!'> .tiH' -~lllg_ The Borrf rlt~ \\ orld. which is the titlf' and theme of i(enichi Ohnml'' l!J90 i'<nk. P<o 1 ~ es\

. '' ' I. . J/1 cltarue. .. ,_ olll Tl e ht'rd IHl~

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11

THE STATE OF THE STATE

Globalization is the fad of the 1990s. and globalization is made in America. Thomas Friedman's The Lc:rus and the Olive Tr-ee is a celebration of the American \V<W, of market capitalism and UberaJ democracy. Free market , transparcnc\'. and fle~bil. ity are t11e watchwords. The "electronic herd .. mo,es vast amounts of capital in and out of countries according to their political and economic merits. Capital mO\es almost instantaneously into countries "itb table govemments, progressive econom ies, open accounting, and honest dealing, and out of countries larking those qualities. States can defy the 'herd ... but tl1ey will pay a ptice, usually a steep one, as did Thailand. \talaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea in the 1990s. Some countries may de~ the herd inadvertently (the countries just mentioned); others. out of ideological conviction (Cuba and North Korea); some. because they can afford to (oil-rich countries); ot11ers, because histOJ)' has passed them by (man.r African countries). Countries v.rishing to attract capit.al and to aain the benefits of toJavs and , o I I ' ~omo~ws tee lno ogy have to don the "golden straitjacket." a package or policies mcluding balanced budgets, economic deregulation, openness to investment aod trade, and a stable currency. The herd decides which countries to reward and which to punish, and nothing can be done about its decisions. In September 199i. at a World Bank meeting, Malaysia's prime ministe r Or. Mahathir Mohammad. ' eomPlained bttterIY that great powers and intemational speculators had fo~I . . As1a11 t'Ountries to open their markets and had manipulated their currend es 111 order to destroy them. Friedman (1999, 93) wonders what Robert Hubin, then-U.S. treasu~ ~retruy, might have said in response. He imagines it would hare been ~mething like this: "What planet are you living on? . . . Glob- ~'~,.~tion isn't a choice. ~ult cWZa . d Jt S a re-.Uitv ."' an the only way you can grow at the speed that your people " ' ~~u~ .15 by t~ping into the globa1 stock and bond markets, by seeldng ou~ nationals to mvest in your country, and by selling into the global trading systet

tC'iq>hom number. \\'hen tl 1 le 1erd de ,. l . I 1 Cl( es to Withdrc~w t . _I froll1 ;\ (.'0\lllt 1'\. t !eH' I~ 110 Oil (" to t'0111I)Iai, rto nt>tjtj r < I' 0 O IJ U t(1lt< . r the herd ar<' t'(l .l't'li\c .one. .. The\' are not mac1 ~ on or relief. Deci<: e: the" h , . , 51ons o . . appen, and the, , 11 hec<Hl~<' 111.111\ Ill\ l -.tor~ mJt,1duaUv make d .. . 1 e<:L~ on sunult . lutpp< .1 _ . . . r rrounds to 111\ to;t or to withdmw their fu 11~- Do what di aneous y and on 1. . ,, 111111 sp ease the herd. ) 't "ill trample you mto the ground. Globalizatio . I n lS s laped b, market not h . . :uK I ' ,..,., (10\'el" mcnts. " Glob<tlization nwans homogenization. Price p od a1 1 r ucts \\' lae same all . h ~'"~ we t 1, and profit tes of interest <\nd r I t<.'nd to become the 0 \ er t e world Lik I'll . . c :tny powerfulmowmt>nt t Or c.: lc\llge. globalization encounters reslSt ance-m Amcnca. t. t . I . ~ro tn religious Ium anwnt<ttsts; auroad. from anti-Ameri . . camsts; cvervwhE>r<> lrom . I . . "" . . '' . . 1 tsts. Am t1e reststers become bitter be .. tural traditJona 1 l lous " cause <..'On C 1 or not . cu "\. th< . know ther are doomed. Dnven by technolocn.- intenJatio na1 fi nance sweeps all :>: , , before 1t. Undet the p10tection of Amencan milrtary power, globalizatron proceeds . . . . ", . . 1 . relen~~ess~ As Fne< m.u1 pt ochums: Amenca truly is the ultimate heni~m he~eJllOil'.

The "end of the Cold \ \'ar and the collapse of communism haw~ discrediteti all models other t11an libe ral democracy: The statement is by La.m Diamond, and Friedman repeats it with appronu. There is one best way. and A~erica has found it...Ifs a post-industrial world. and America today is good at evet:thing that i postgovernment as such. industrial" (1-!5. 303). The herd does not care about fonllS of ... but it ,aJues anJ re'<nuds "stability. predictability. tr-ansparenc,, and the abilih to transfer and protect its printte property: Liberal democracie~ represent the ~ne best way. The message to all governments is clear: Confonn or suffer. vs There is much in what Ftiedman savs. and he sa. it ,er" well. But how much? . . And. specifically. what is the efTect of closer interdependence on the tonduct of the intemal and ext e rnal afl~rirs or nations? First, we should ask how far globalization has proceeded? As eve~one knows. much of the world has been left aside: most of Aftica and Latin America. Russia. all uts of the Middle East except IsraeL and large p< of .-\ si a. Moreo,er. !or many countries, the degree of participation in the global economy varies b~ region. Northern ~taly, for example, is in; southe m Italy is out. In fact. globalization is not global,but 15 mainly limited to n01them latitudes. Linda \Veiss points out that as of 1991. 1o/c of the '~orld stock of foreign direct investment was in high-wage countries of the owed by the United ~ingdom. Gennan~. _and north: mainlv the United States, foU Canada. SI1e adds that the extent of concentration h , ,-',,, b\' 1J points smt-t> . as am . 1967 (Weiss 1998; cf., Hirst and Thompson 1996. 7:2). . . rd Second , we shouJd coml)are the inte rd epen<.lence of11 ations now w1t1tulte e~ a .. . pendence earlier. The first paragmph ot t1us paper su~ests that 111 most "..ays we . 1 ' . . d ,,th of mtemation.u tr.luc l1 .. . hav ro1 ed ad e not exceeded levels reached m 1910. T e mp gro o ll ngro~:nanfd investment from the middle 1850s into the 1910s pr~edll 1. . . - I o war 111t erncu revolution. and nahonat1 tnsul ' h After \\ ort ar IP t.lkinC1 a .I an,_.. . ~ l borders to traue '' Hit' tst pot . k d 0 ,r tht> vears of tts tctes lmgcred as the United States openec Iaxed t i 1their mar ets un ere l tiht< e toward countries thtlt protecte<

(3 t5 ).

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......... . L. I

vLU8 AUZAn

ows ag . ' atn as Thi rd, money markets may be the only economi c S<'<.:tor one ea . beco m: tJul y gl~bal. Fmance cap1.t aJ m~ves free I n y..acro s lhe frontiers or say has OE cou ntnes and qUJtc freely elsewhere (\Veiss 1998, xn). Hob ert vVade notes tl . mte rest rates \V I1m nortl1 countnes an d between nort J1crn and southernlat I eal lt ern bies ,ary by no more tl1an 5%. This seems quite large until one notices va ..c~un. . across countries of 10 to 50 times m real wages, xears of schooling, and numnations ber . working scientists. Still , with tJ1e moveme nt of fina nci al assets as with comm s;~ ties, the present remains like the past. Despite today's ease of communica: 1 financial markets at tl1e turn of the previous cen tury \vere at least as integratedon, they are now (Wade 1996, 73-7 5). as Obviously, tl1e world is not one . Sadly, the dispariti es of the North and South remain ~ride. Perhaps su rprisingly, among tJ1e coun tries that are tJ1ought of as bein in the zone of globalization, differences are considerable and persiste nt. To take jus~ one example, finan cial patterns diffe r markedly across countries. The United States dep ends on capital imports , vVestern Europe does not, and Japan is a major capital exporter. The more closely one looks, the more one nnds variations. That is hardly surprising. What looks smooth, uniform , and simple from a distance, on closer inspection proves to be pockmarked , vari ega ted, and complex. Yet here, the variations are large enough to sustain the conclusion that globaJization, even within its zon e, is not a statemen t about tJ1e present, but a prediction about the future. ~any globalizers underes timate the exte nt to which the new looks like the old. In any competitive system the winners are imitated by the losers, or they continue to lose. In political as in economic developmen t, late com ers imitate the practices and adopt the insti tution of the countri es who have shown the way. Occasionally, someone nnds a way to outflank, to inve nt a new way, or to inge niously modify an old way to gain an advantage; and then the process of imitation begins anew. That competitors begin to look like one ano ther if the competition is dose and continuous is a familiar story. Competition among states has always led some of them to ~itate others politically, militarily, and economically; but the apostles of globanzahon argue that the process has now spe d up immensely and that the straitjacket allows _little room to wiggle. In the old political era, the strong vanquished tl~e weak; m the new economic era, "the fast eat the slow" (Klaus Schwab quoted 11l Fri~man 1999, 171 ). No longer is it "Do what tl1e strong party says or risk physical p~msh~enf'; but instead "Do what the electronic her d requ ires or remain impoveruhed. But ~en , in a competitive system ther e are always winners and losers. A few do exceptionally well, some get along, and many bring up the rear. States have to conform to the ways of the more successful among thern or pay a stiff price for not doing so. We then have to ask what is the state of the state?
n perc enta ge of GD P (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 36).

1rom war <.Ie\as tatio n. One migh t say th ti. . tt.' t"( I~p. .m1 tn to th e 1960s a m l'nct dcfiC'it' cJe,elol>ed whi ch helps tu 1 , l . ' 't" stead . mtt h . t'pc nde ncc thereafter. Am ong the rich est .' ! . .., 1 , y gtowth n of OE CD s). e~,) e the... c<.:onom ia lOttntrw O iiS grew at abo ut tvvJc t;Jl< ( 1! (' ))[) . f es (the ll~co r , a \:IV , ~1)0rts.we.re 9.5 % of their G D~s; in 1900, 20 ..5~i (~\,t (1,1 996, ter 196o 62 ; cf: .In l99 .. lt 1). Fmd 111g that 1999 approxtm~te ly equals t 9l { lll ~\te nt of inte rtl' Wetss enc:e tS hardly surprising. \1\T is true of bade also hold~ f< r cap ittl A hat epen<]. .
t t'"'\)\ t ' t'

ON AND GOvtRNAN

'

?D

CE 339 rnes of po1 ... :l ur1 tiJ e; <.:oil~ of en<.: . t becO 1 . I18 W nesS. ge of glo1 17.. ,., t 11at economic: and tompassmg e<:ono111ic pr"' w tl 1 1 ec1 1nolo 1f ..,;esse!\'J 'fhe .ty of ooliti wl uutt {;C:o nutni<.: forms and r .gt<:a orees irni'V\s forrnt r . unction 5 <" e near un e the herd 1~ ,tl tra<..:ted only to countrie . h on states. The d becaus . II s Wit reliabl y so . ent s-th at 1 tc, ' lt raJ democratic ones s. e, stable. and 0 .o verrun . t . - ~ . pen go Y a glance at Jll<>t t.ll< fMS t .t.) years reveals that a varie ' of .. et t ave prodlJc:ed unpress1vc resu lts and were d . l) pohncal-econom1 1 ,. terns L' a mtred th '" sys the 1930s and agatn in the 1950s, the Soviet U . . ll1 etr day for doing mons so In , 110ng the wor1d's h.gI1~sl , so . ressive in tb ,_ econom . gnmrth rates Imp I<: "ere ~u 1 . .. l b , 0s that Ame r . 0 . ve1 n a ne passe< ) . In the 1960s Preside e K take t beJI1<1 o , n ennedy "0 t .. nc:a 1eared ? g again" and Am e1 icas radically diffe rent syste . cl o t1 countty 1e oVLll ' m game w Id J1l 705 ' Western European welfare states with managed d di or respect. In the ghly regarcle d. I n t I1e 1 . ate tOs anti through much anth ,n::cted e<.::onomtc:s f lll 0 were .. o e f neo mercanhhsm was t1 1ought to be the wave oft! fu 00s' the Japanese brancl O . . . . . 1e ture: and \V r: ope and the Untte d States worned about bemg able to ke I . estem .!Jur . I f . . . I up. mlta . 1 vas the counse o som e, p1y t 1e Japanese economy openep d ak . te or pera IS 1 -. f n m ur grounds was tJ1e message o others. America did not sur..-.eed. e 1t.compete d on O . ""' m omg much of either. Y in the 1990~, Its economy has flourished. Globalizers offer it as th et ultimate political-econmmc motl.el- and so history again comes to an end. Yet it~ odd to conclude from a d~cade s experience that the one best model has at last appeared . Globalizat~on, if it w~r e realized , would mean a near uniformity of conditions across cou ntn es. E.ven m the 1990s, one finds little evidence of globalization. The advanced cou ntne s of the world have enjoyed or suffered quite different fates. Major w este rn Eur opean countries were plagued by high and persistent unemployment; N01theast and Southeast Asian countries experienced economic stagnation or coll apse while China continued to do quite well; and we know about the United States. Variation in the fortu nes of nations underlines the point: The country that has done best, at leas t late ly, is the United States. Those who have fared poorly ha,e supposedly don e so because they have failed to conform to the American Way. Clobalizers do not claim tl1at glob alization is complete, but only that it is in process and that the process is irreversible . Some evidence supports the conclusion; so~1e does not. Looking at the big picture, one notices that nations whose economies have faltered or failed have bee n more fully controlled, directed. and .suppo~ed gove mmentally than the Am erican economy. So\~et-style economies failed mise rably; in China, only tl1e free-market sect~r flourishes; the once much -fa"ored Swedish model has proved wanting. One CC:Ul ea~ily add more examples. From . them . IS tempting to leap to the coneIus1 h t A ea has indeed found, or .on t a Lt men stumbled onto, the one bes t way. . . . O'N ill ~hen he was a congressObVl.ously, Tho mas Frie dman tl1inks so. T1p e \\ . F ed . local \\ ron{T. n man man from Massachuse tts declared that all politics are . 0 . . the . . ' tums says, all politics have become global. "The electrom.c herd,. he wntets.li es under who! . UCJl e wor1 into a parliamentary system, m w1. t e\ierY o mm eo ' d , <To,e the fear of a no-confide nce vote from the herd" (1999 62 US) t une a nation'5 d. I6 d 1 . . n It hard to believe that economic processes direct or e en h to place resources po)tc1 tllat spontaneou s]~ es arrived at (1ecistons about w ere

-.. -

>f:'

3-tQ
1\'\\ ":\ rd

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTJCAL ECONOMY

LTZ I GLOBALlZAn WA

R ON AND GOVE. N

or pm1i h a nationaJ economy so sbongly that a e;m l l h~r does what ' plt:lS~. the herd or its et-onom, fails to prosper or c,en t-l. . j .t . \ \ 'e all recall rt:'<.:ent cases, onte of them m~ntioned above. that c;een lo . J')rt Friedman 's the h:. ~lcntionin<T them both makes a point and raises douL'' 0 First. v.ithin advanced count1ies at similar le,els ol <k.~:.l pmc:n t that . cl_osely inte:-:related, one expects unifor_mities ?f fo~n l_ancl functll,Jl lo be rnost r:~e et displayed. Y Stephen \,Voolcock, looking at forms of COJ})_~rate govc" rnance Withi~ the European community, nnds a "specb:Um of approaches and expects it to persist for the foreseeable future (1996, 196). Smce the 1950s, tJ1e economies of German , and France have grown more closely together as eac:~1 became th<: principal tradin} et partner of the other. Y a study of the two _c~untnes concludes that France h~ c'Opied German policies but has been unw1llmg or unable to copy institutions (Boltho 1996). GDP per vvork hour among seven of tJ1e most prosperous countries came close together between the 1950s and the 1980s (Boyer J996, 37). Countries at a high level of development do tend to converge in productivity, but that is something of a tautology. Second, even if all politics have become global, economies remain local perhaps to a surprising extent. Countries with large economies continue to do most of their business at home. Americans produce 88% of the goods they buy. Sectors that are scarcely involved in international trade, such as government, construction, nonprofit organizations, utHities, and wholesale and retaiJ trade employ 82% of Americans (Lawrence 1997, 21). As PauJ Krugman says, "The United States is still almost 90% an economy that produces goods and se1vices for its own use" (1997, 166). For the world's three largest economies-the United States, Japan, and the European Union-take n as a unit, exports are 12% or less of GDP (\Veiss 1998, 176). What I found to be true in 1970 remains true today: The world is less interdependent than is usually supposed (vValtz 1970). ~ oreover, developed countries, oil imports aside, do the bulk of their external business 'vith one anoilier, and that means that the extent of their dependence on corn modities that iliey could not produce for themselves is further reduced. Reinforcing the parochial pattern of productivity, the famous footloose corporations in fact turn out to be firmly anchored in their home bases. One study of the world's 100 largest corporations concludes tl1at not one of them could be called truly "global" or "footloose." Another study found one multinational corporation that seemed to be leaving its home base: Britain's chemical company, ICI (Weiss 1998, 18, 22; cf., Hirst and Thompson 1996, 82-93, 90, 95ff.). On all the important counts location of most assets, site of research and developmen t, ownership, and managemen t-the importance of a corporation's home base is marked. And ~e technological prowess of corporations corresponds closely to that of the countnes . in which they are located. 5 1 "traniformative capacity" of states, as Linda Weiss emphasizes. Third, the the key to their success in the world economy (Weiss 1998, xii). Because technolog . al d caJ mnovation IS rapt , and because economic conditions at home an d abroad 1 c~?e often,_ sta~s that ~dapt easily have considerable advantag~s. Interna;~:ill politics remams mter-national. As the title of a review by William H M

w do it well, anJ they grc> and prosper. Othe . . . 1ose With the rs Just manag t .. some e t1vc 1 ay it is .in compd1 , ~yste1ns . In this sprt Ezra Taft o get. along. That's B . the w, . enson. when he President EtsenJ10wer : sec:retan of agricultu d re, . was ca's sma11 f.anne rs: " G N I)ig or get out." Su . . gave thiS kind! Y a vice to c.:cess m cornperm. .1 ;\men 1 e systems t 1e sy. tC' m to adopt wavs thev would r uires the units of er pre1 to avoid ' . I . req States adapt tot 1e1r env1ronment. Some are light a t d Jn he United States looked tc; he heavy afoot in the 19805 w~ ' a ot~ers are heavy T It see med tl1at MITI (Ministry of en apan s economv was , . oming. Somettrnes 1ntemational Trade and bo d b y gent.uses who guided Japan's ec.:ono . cr rtJ Industry) was manne m) eno esslv to its N l is1 . t States tl-at appears 1 h, afoot t s mpress1ve accomp . 1ments. ow 1 1 the United 1a 1 lighter than any other country. I_ts gov~~ment is open: Accurate financilinfonna~ c tion flows fre~l~, most ec:onom 1 dec~s1?.ns are made by pri,ate firms. These are eXIbihty and for quick adaptation to changina the charactenshc:s that make for H 0 conditions. Competitive systems select for success. Over time, the quaHties that make for success vary. Student~ of AmeJican government point out that one of the advantages of a federal system IS that the separate states can act as laboratories for socialeconomic experimentation. \Vhen some states succeed, others may imitate them. The same thought applies to nations. One must wonder who the next winner will be. States adapt; they also prote<.:t themselves. Different nations. with distinct institutions and trailitions, protect themselves in different ways. Japan fosters industries, defends them, and manages its trade. The United States uses its political, economic:, and military leverage to protect itself and manipulate international events to promote its interests. Thus, as David E. Spiro elaborately shows, international markets and institutions did not recycle petrodollars after 1974. The United States did. Despite many statements to the contrary, the United St~tes worked effectively through tH fferent administrations and under different cabmet secretaries to undermine markets and thwart intemational institutions. Its le"erage enabled it to manipulate the oil crisis to serve its 0\\11 interests (1999. chap. 6'Many of the interdependers of the 1970s expected the state to \\ither and fade away. Charles Kindleberger wrote in 1969 that "the nation-state is jt~ ~~t ~~~~ as an e~nomic unit" (207). Globalizers of the HJ~s believe that_ thiS -~~~~o~aan H. happen mg. The state has lost its "monopolv over mtemal soveretgn~, thi eo fgth ' ei R neeke writes, and as "an extemally sovereign actor \\ill become a ng o e . been Jt past" (1997, 137; cf., Thurow 1999). Internally, the states monoP?ly l~asll ne'-~lished c:omplete, but it seems more nearlv so now th an earlier. at least m '' e -esta'. soci 1 t f state contro 0\ er tl ' stat Th e ~s. e range of govemmental functions~~ le ~xten ~ l\" wtsoftheworld the b t with their ty and B<.'Onomy has seldom been fuller tl1an tt ts 110'' In mat " 1 . . . I ed 111temal powers u l'Ont-e h rn as been not with the state's dimtms l aoc
J

341 1) puts it, "Tenito~ial St.tlt~. Buried Too S(Jon."' Glc . >bal (199 k . . over rrom n atJUll 1 pohliCS. The twcntie th Cf:flhH\' or World polt Ila.\ I l<:S " . f ( ttl eo notionState. The tw~n~ ..IJ,t \\111 be too. Trade 'and tee1 . wa.\.1thctcntw~ of the ' 1nolo , . " . . na g e best way .to or~artl /.t a pol tt\ and its ec:onomv. :\ati IDaluonotdetenn a me . " . . . 1 10 m deal of restLenc:c. State~ sttll have a wide r n ' f"c1 . c \itsystems displa' . a 5 a ge o 1o1 . . reat ~e. ost state survive g 1cl1e units that suTVJ\'e 111 com petitive systems are tl ahility to adapt,

ANCE

3.12

PAKIJ

11 ... ... . -

... ...... ... ' ut..voJ\LizAno

do es any 'o ,, J9.3o . 1 one s eveJ, let ti~ poUtical social-econ<JJmc fur c:t ,>ns md tlonl' toa rune e < States perform essen ~ ible competitor to them. T h<>\ f,Jstc.~tl~e in ~ o~her organization appears as a pods prosperity l)ossible. In the." st,lk of natur s tuhons . . ke t emal peace an thine" States turn possessron 111to prO[)CJ e, as.1}(ant ty d . that ma ut anu . 't t 1 there is ''no mUJe an prosperity possibIe. T I1e smerc.i~ state vntl thus . d h. and pn ., l fixed ..., . c k ake sa,ing pro uc on, , roved to be the best organization ror eepmg peac:C:' and fosterin t m c well beinc:T.l VIe do not have to wonder what hap g he borders has/ pens to . r d . o eo11ditions ror econom1 vhen a state begms to ra e away. \'\ e have all too , d . mt~ny ' . . 1 1920 soc,ety an economy " . s .anu. '3Os and .again ~ n the b,,;ous ones are Chrna m t 1e r . .. f . .. . . examp Ies. A rew o d 70 ost-Soviet Russta, and many A ncan states smcc the1r tndep d 1960 en p ain sT 1 sc,o rnpetent a state the likelier it is to dissolve into component parts . ' ence. 1e ess or to be unable to adapt to transnational developments. Challenges at home and abroad test the mettle of states. Some states fad , and other states pass the tests nicely. In modem times, enough states always make it to keep th e international sys. tern going as a system of states. The challenges vary; states endure. They have .. proved to be hardy survivors. . Having asked how international conditions affect states, I now reverse the question and ask how states affect the conduct of international political affairs.
:<.'nll)'

~ntroJ has lessened sornc.~wl ,.t' \ d Jthough state c e, incr'\:'<t"t.>. " 11 < S . . and B1itain, for examp1 arc t 1 tctte~ . 1of c:Tovemmen tal rcgulat '' 1 belie' -e thttt the Ullltec ' . o e' t ,enth-centul)' 1 e

NAND GOVERNANCE

343

THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL POUTICS

Economic globalization would mean that the world economy, or at least the globalized portion of it, would be integrated and not merely interde pendent. The differenc.-e between an interdependent and an integrated world is a qualitative one and not a mere matter of proportionately more trade and a greater and more rapid flow of capital. With integration, the world would look like one big state. Economic markets and economic interests cannot perform the fun ctions of government. Integration requires or presumes a govemment to protect, direct, and control. l_nterdependence, in oontrast to integration, is "the mere mutualism" of states, as Emile Durkheim put it. It is not only less close than usually thought but also polio cally less consequentiaL Interdependence did not produce the world-shaking event~ of 1989-91. Apolitical event, the failure of one of the world's two great powe~s, did tha~. Had the configuration of international politics not fu ndamentally c anged, neither the unification of Germany nor the war against Saddam Hussein li are . would have been po 'bl Th e most Important events in international po tics SSI e. e 1. d b . . c xp ame y differences in the capab'J . o f states not by econom ic rorces oper 11ties ati even ' ng across states or transeending them. Interdependers and globa1 IZers nst ' more so, argue that th e mternational economjc interests of states work agai their goin t et nuclear w.geao w.ar.inh.iT~e, they do. Y if one asks whether economic interests or . Iy ts nuclear bit wa pons r more strongly the answer obvious weapons E . d gether ' . uropean great powers pnor to World War I were tightly tie to e<x>norni<:all Th . Y ey nevertheless r gh t a long and bloody war. The Umted States rou

. d the SoviE-" l ct;'''"'' Wl re not even loose!Y connected . 11 1 a ll c\ econom1callv. Tl 1 cl cl , sted pcc1<.:<.' Jll ' l 1ro11gh the four-and-a-half 1 eca es of t1 c eo-ex old War. The I( t importan t causl'~ of peace, as of war are ~0 .1 . . .. unu m mternau . 1 1 , . os 111 onclpo Jttcal conr t' oons ind udtn g tl1 W<'clponry available to states E . 0llo d f vents 1. wmg thC:: Cold War n aticall)' dcll'lOil'it rat<: the political weakness o econom1c force Th . dra1 . (not just th< mterdepenclenc:e) of the part f h . . s. c mtegras o t e Sovtet Union tl f . . I . ll f' h . . oon an o ,, goslaVIa, Wlt l ,t o t eJr entanglmg economic inte t d .l res s, Ju not prevent th . d C Ju . eJr disintegration. ovcrnments an people sacrific:e welfare and ev en secunty to nationalism, cthnic:ity. and religion. . Political explanations weigh heavily in ac:counting ~ . or mternational-political . l' . . . account r events. NattonaJ po 1tlcs,. not mtemattonal markets ' 10r many mtematJonal . . econonnc developments. A . number of students of politics and of econom1cs . mterests believe that blocs arc I)ecommg more common internationally Eco nom1c . . and market fo r:es do no_t create blocs;_governments do. Without governmental decisions, the Coal and Steel Commumty, the European Economic Communitv and the European Union would not have emerged. The representatives of stat~~ negotiate regulations in the Eu ropean Commission. The Single-Market Act of 1985 provided that some types of directives would require less than a unanimous vote in tJ1e Council of Ministers. This political act cleared the way for passage of most of the harmonization standards for Europe (Dumez and Jeunemaitre 1996, 229). American governments forged NAFTA; Japan fashioned an East and Southeast Asian producing and trading area. The decisions and acts of a country. or a set of countries arriving at political agreements, shape international political and economic institutions. Governments now intervene much more in international economic matters than they did in the earlier era of interdependence. Before World War I, fo reign-ministry officials were famed for their lack of knowledge of, or interest in, economic affairs. Because governments have become much more active in economic affairs at home and abroad, interdependence has become less of an autonomous force in international politics. The many commentators who exaggerate the closeness of interdepen~ence. m . and even more so those who wnte of gIobalizahon, tlHnk unit rather than 10 syser temic terms. Many small states import and ex-port large shares of t11 gross domestic products. States witJ1 large GDPs do not. They are little uependentf o hea\,uYdepend on them The.ttermsth . f on others while a number of other states arger um s o e set bv the 1 ' '_ . ul {n'e or . <:tre political economic and military compehtion 0 f multipolantv, Wl ' ' . tl . the intemational mtemational-political system. Through ce_ntun~s e1 . . comparabl e slZe competmg w1th one ano. 1 . ..., the de!1fee of . d so great powers of an': . depen dent Un der b- an urupo1 system was quite closely mter b r nch'on but primarilY by interdependence declined markedly. ther not v n . . . areater political impact States are differentiated from one ano 1 . . t eapab1ty. For two reasons, mequaliti'es across. states lave :. the inequ ali.ties of F' -st states. . than mequalities across income groups witlun dJ . R' hu countries ha,e become . " tc more rap . d n a svstem without censtates are larger and have been growmg . d poor. Secon , 1 . .h . abilih is disproportion. ne er while poor countJies have remame . d di , f the uru'ts ot greater cap d 111stitutions to rect an tral governance the influence o f[l tive laws an ' ately large because there are no e ec
J

3-N

pART3

THEINTERNAJ

IONAL pOUTICAL ECONOM Y

=
WALTZ I GLOBAUZATlON AND GOVERN ANCE 34.

<tdvanta ble to work the system to t The" are a arw ed in 1970 t I1at " 'llat t'< n re statege. as the . t1 . Ctm~trJtn 1em. 11 b s capa . J nple showec __ .J II ~1tv wi tnd their abi j tv to u c t 1 r r { f 110111 ic: le, .J: ex~cu >ehuuO :lr 'erag t ' . .~ conwMons ' t doublv bl e or to adJUSt to extem, . I U 'ted States was then and 1.~ ~~' essed : 1 d ,._ t ue T 1e m l 1 . tlle intematjonal economy. sen 11w as a l)rinc polioca a 'an ao 'Pa1'11 " . f . h' hi . im})Ortant m . . ar. good~ ancl services Yet. . g ) remruns 1 ber of coun tnes and as a ma,or suppher o ... . t: . Its . 'te low Precisely because the United States is re'ativeJ ket ror a num 1 LS qw . . 1 depen dence 00 ot 1ers Y h 't has a wide range of pohc:~' c:ho,c:es and the abil't)' l)Oth I . ers. . l1ttIe dependent on ot tl ertand to assist them. T1 J1erd" wtth its c:al)ital m 1e 1 s 0 a)' nee t .. . b g pressure on o are ectivelv decides that th ey c pol1ttcaU, and econom.. .t . to nn 1 1 coU . 1 from countnes w ten 1 ome countries abroad, like some nrm at home, are so impar. j . caJ]v W1WO rthV, bUt S 1 . ta.nt-' that tb ey' cannot be allowed to fail. Nationa govemmen ts and intemat0naJ . then come to the rescue. The United States.ts th e .countrv that most o~ten 11 J . agencies has the ability and tJle will to step m. The age~c~ t 1at m~s: ofte~ acts lS the IMF, and most countnes ti11nk of the IM F as the enf01 cement ann of the U.S Treasury (Strange l996, 192). Thomas Friedman belie~es that when the. "l~erd" makes its decisions, there is no appeal; but often there IS an appeal, and 1t IS for a bail out . . . . organized by the Uruted States. . The international economy, like national economies. operates \Vltlun a set of rules and institutions. Rules and institutions have to be made and sustained. Britain, to a large extent, provided this service prior to \Vorl d V/ar I; no one did between the wars, and the United States has done so since. More than any other state, the United States makes the rules and maintains the institutions that shape tbe international political economy. Economically, the United States is the world's most important countiy; miUtaras iJy, it is not only the most important country. it is the decisive one. Thom Friedman puts the point simply: The world is sustained by "the presence of American power and America's willingness to use that power against those who ill would threaten the system of globalization .... The hidden hand of the market w . never work without a hidden fist" (1999, 373). But the hidden fist is in full view On its military forces, the United States outspends the ne>.:t six or seven big spenders combined. When force is needed to keep or to restore th e peace, either the United Sta~~s leads th~ way or the peace is not kept. The Cold War militarized international politics. Relations between tile United States and the Soviet Union, and among some -~ther countries as well, came to be defined largely in a single dimension. the ~tary one. As the German socio]oai~t Erich Weede has remarked, "~ational) oaki . secunty d .. CCISion m ng m some .. . democracies (most notably in West Gennany . IS actually penetrated by the United States" (1989, 225) .... kets. Many globalizers beJ is increasingly ruled by mar Lookingat the state amo Jeve that the world . . 1 ds to a different conclus10n. T1 main differd 1e ng . between mtem ti0 naJ states. ea ease li ence po tics now and earlier is not found in the we~ lar a interde nden d ity the~~b ~of states but in their growing inequality. With the end of b 1 ~0 d 1 J0ps1 e ~m ution of c bili uali apa ties across states has become extreme Y Rather than el . ties of intema~ ~nomic forces and depressing political ones, the i~~i~s. as politics enhance the political role of one country. Poh USUal prevails over economics.I '
1
G ., .1

;)

NOTE
. The picture- of'LIe pu rpose' alld lhC' pcrl(muancc of state . s IS cspccJa11yclcar in Thomson I. ancJ Knc sncr (HJH9).

REFERENCES
ork: Angcll, Norman . J9:3~. :.he Great lllusio11. ew Y G. P. Putnams Sons. France Converged on Germany?" In National Dir;en.-ity and Boltho, Andrea .. 19~6- Has _ Global Capitalism, eel. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore. fthat-a: Comell Universit" Press. Bover, Hohert. 1996. "The Convergen<:e Hypothesis Hevisited: Globali'l..ation But Still the Century of 1 ations." In National Diversity and Glohnl Capitahsm. eel. Suzanne Berger and Honald Dore. lthaca: Cornell University Press. Carter, Ashton B., and WiiJiam J. Perry. 1999. Pre~;entive Deje11se: A Neu; Security Strategy for America. Washington. DC: The Brookings Institution . . and John D. Steinbruner. 1992. A New Concept of Cooperative Security. \\'ashington. DC: The Brooki ngs Institution. Doyle, Michael W. 1997. \Vays of\V(Ir mtd Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. ~ew ork: .W. Y 'vV Norton. Dumez, Ilerve, and AJain Jeunernaitre. 1996. "The Convergence of Competition Policies in Europe: Intema.l Dynamics and Extemallmposition." In National Di~rsit and Global Capitalism, ed. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore. lthaca: Comell Umvers1ty Press. ork: Fukuyama Francis. 1992. The End (if History and the Last Man. New Y Free Press. ork: Farrar, Straus. Friedman,' Thomas L. 1999. The Lexus and the Olite Tree. New Y

--

fior \ ,.leinam. eh. Giroux. Jcago. Gardner. Lloyd. 1995. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the \Var.sce Cambridge. UK: Pohty Press. 'l .1. . .re . ' ' ,. . . AJI: . . - ( ~ larch/April). ; n ttzes O overnan Eco11omy and the Poss1 18 I P. 1999 "TI l C Lo11 ely Sur1erpower. Fm etf,ll ,'J.Iam . d tl 'p rsistenc:e of Ameriean . . . Huntington. Sarnue Ikenben)', John. 1998/99. "Institutions, StrategJc Resttm~: ~l l t e Postwar Order.'' Interrwtimwl Security 2~ (Win~er!: ,:~-;,~~rdepCI!dellce: \Vorld Politic Keohane, Robe1t 0 ., and Joseph S. Nye. 1917. Powel 0 ale Ab { Kcw lla\en: Y ljniversi~ . in Trans ition. Boston: Little, Bro-.vn. , .., KindJeberger, Charles P. 1969. A mcrtc.tI 1 Busme.s.s root . . Ol>session." ln Tlw Scu: Shape of Press. Krugman Paul. 199- "Compe ttlVerJess A Dangerous ,/+. . , . -1 1. ' ld F(n-ewll A;; mrs. N , 1 orton ar \ esist the Binge." In The 1 ew . ; I1 . H ork: World Politics. New Y W.W. 5 Lawrence, Robert Z. 1997 'V\~0 'kers and EcononliS k 1Fvreiu1 Affairs. 1 . \V I' New \'or : ,r b anc ,/' ,tttcs. .S/wpe llj Pot . New ~ork WW orton . The Obsol~sce 1 1Cf' o Mn;or a 1 11 . from Ooomst1 '1 Mueller, John. 1989. Hetreat . 101 . B ried Too Soon... ,\1rrs1 1 Intemotwnal Bcu.1c Books. \ MC"Neill, William H. 1997. "Territotial States u
1 dit~ked ' nterest. .. Forri[!.ll ~umrs _ Studies Review. 1 11 Nye, Joscph Jr. I 999. " Hedcfinin~ thr Nati~;;;lrld Pou;er (llld Stratrey m tlw lnte Ohrnac. Kcnic:hi. 1990. The Bflrderless 1 Econnmy. New Y k rr_l "'rBusiness. or : ,up,

His/~~~e~~d Grahame Thompson. 1996. Globalizatioll in Questio~: The International

,n: .

-s (julv/Au!rust.

l1AtU 3

THE iNTERNATIONAL 1-'U U liLA.L

' { .
P ,.,
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lkint'Vkt..
,

\\"olf~Jng
'
~

11.

1991.

ctob;\l

Puhli1

t '\ m\'lllhl'l't Dt'\'<'111bcr).

1\;Jfl/rs

Spim. 0;\\it.l E. 1999. Th e Hiddell Hand nf Amcricn11 H {! 1 IOII!J. p1 t mdol/ . (1/ l~I.'Cij [ . I> . c mg a114 lll ft'l'ltational .\ Jm*et . It haca: Come 11 nt\'N 11~ '' s'. . Stmntre. ' ll'an. 1996. Thl' Retreat of tlw State: The D~ljil\ion o{ l'ou:cr 111 tlre \' 'or{[ . . . , l ~,.,. clmy Cambridge: Cambridge C nhersty Press. . Thom 'on. J;.uJiCt' E.. and tephen D. Kmsner. 19 9. "Global Tr.m...actions ;U1d the Consolida. ue" tion of Son.rei!mt\'... In Globol Cluiii{!.C mu/ Thcon / I('(I I Chalfc11 .... .,. 1 \ pproa I l:' Le ~ le.s to \l (>rid PoliHcs for the 1900 . ed. Emst-Otto Czempid and Jam~.s '\. Hosen . au. Xtnot. ~On, MA: uAington Books. Thu':>"': Les~er C: 1999. Building ' \ ealth: The 1Xcn. R1~~e., Jlw llldiri~lurJ/.<;. Co,panies m ' ld .\ atimrs m a Klwu:lrdgc-Based Economy. :-.l ew ) ork. llarperCollms. \\'ade. Robert. 1996. "Globalization ttnd Its Limits: Re po1ts of the Death of th "' . e :. . ationaJ I . .. I , . . I o Econonw Are Grosslv Exauoerated. n , ,flftoiW 11 ll'l'I 'Sitt;. cmt Global Cap/ (I tISm ed I . . oo . ' lthaca: Come Umversll)' Pres. . Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dare. \\'altz. Kenneth t\. 1970. T he ~ hth of National Interdependence." Jn Th e llltenr t' a tOna1 . : Corporation. ed. Charles P. Kmdleberger. Cambndge, MA: MIT Press. ___. "Structuml Realism after the Cold War.'' Presented at the Annual \leetina of th e o American Political Science Association. Boston. \\'eede. Erich. 1989. 'Collective Goods in an Interdependent World: Authority and Order as Detenninants of ~eace an?. Prosperity. .. In Globnl Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to \\ orld Poht1cs for the 1990s. ed. Emst-Otto Czempiel and James X. Rosenau. Lexington. .\lA: Le:tington Books. \\'eiss. Linda. 1998. The Myth of the Patcerless State: Got:eming the Economy in a Global Era. Cambridge. li K: Polity Press. \\'oolcock. Stephen. 1996. competition among Forms of Corporate Go"emance in the European CommWli~: The Case of Britain." In Xalional Diversity am/ Global Capitalism. ed. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore. lthaca: Comell Uni,ersity Press.

76

THE PROS AND CONS OF GLOBALIZATION

rrading in Illusions
OANI RODRIK

Asenior U.S. Trea.su ry official recently urged Mexico's government to work harder to reduce violent crime because ''such high levels of crime and violence mav dri\'e away foreign investors." This admonition nicely illustrates how foreign trade and investment have become the ultimate yardstick for evaluating the social and emnomic policies of governments in developing countries. Forget the slum dwellers or campesinos who live amidst crime and po,erty throughout the de,eloping world. Just mention "investor sentiment'' or "competitiveness in world marketsand policyrrrakers will come to attention in a hurry. version of priorities is a remarkable consensus on the Underlying this pe1 imperative of global economic integration. Openness to trade and in,estment flows is no longer viewed simply as a component of a cotmtrys development strategy; it has mutated into the most potent catalyst for economic gro,,th known to humanity. Predictably, senior officials of the world Tr-ade Organizati.on l\\'i?), International Monetary Fund (I MF}, and other international fin~~c1~ ~enctes incessantly repeat the open ness mantra. In recent years, however, tillth m mtegration has spread quickly to political leaders and policymakers aro~nd th~ wor~d.. Joining the world economy is no longer a matter simply of disman~mg ~arn~rs to trade and investment. Countries now must also compl}' with a long hst of adu1ls s. reqm.rements from new r)atent rul es to more ngorous bankina standards. The tIOn . nstitutional refonns l . , . 1 . compre tenSI\e 1 apost es of economic integnation prescnbe . that took toda)~'S advanced countries generations to accomplish so that de,elopmg . ks f d the ns o par. . a1 all countnes can, as the cliche aoes maximize the gams an mmuruze . b become, for . practle< . o ' ti . . . mtegration as lpahon m the world economy. Global C purposes, a substitute for a de,elopment strategv.
ol' . ue #123 \ \iard\ Apri12001 PP 54-02. . Frnm 0 . . 'th n~mnissiOil _.J an1 Rodrik. 'T radina in IUusions.~ f cmngu F 'CIJ ISS . a1 pt>at.-e. Repriott.'' \\1 r . ~ . "' 11)y t1 CamE>gl<' Endowment for Intematlon 200 le

1(\

347

',i I'"'

"'"'

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECC'

RODRIK/TRA

This trend is bad news for the world's poor. T hl 11 ' I 1 ofgloh . 1 1\.~st:-; On . hak ' emr)irica) ground and Seriously Ul-..tO: io; 1 lt 111uknr ' <I ~ntcgration . ' . '- s pnor'ti (.ocusmg on intcmational integration, govemm<->nt... Ill 'I ( (J' llalions uiv I es. B y resourct' . admi nistrative capabilities, and political c-ap1t.t <J\\; 1v fro t"' crt hurnan . . more dC\'elopment priorities such as education, puI11.c It<.' ti t! . iudu~t rial,, .. . urgent . d . <.:<tpa<.:tty SOCI<U cohesion. This emphasis also un enn1nes 11asc(nt <h-mocrati<.: institor ~nd rcmo,ing t11c choice of development strategy from puhltt d<-!nttc. ons br \Vorld markets are a source of tedmology and <:apil.tl, it would be ..11 r . . . . 1~ I . de"elopmg world not to expl01t these opportuntbes. Jlll g ohalt7.alion is SI ya or tl1C not cut to development. Successful economic growth strate:gic.:s hav(' always r ~hort. . . . . judicious blend of imported practices W1tJ, domes ti'<: 111SlttuttonaJ innovatequlrcu a , . . ons PoJ c:ymakers need to forge a domestic growth strategy by rPiying on dorncsti' . d f . '- rnvestors and domestic institutions. The <.:osiliest downst .e o tlw llllc'gralionist {~tith is tl . crowds out serious thinking and efforts along suc;h lines. lat t

DING IN ILLUSIONS

ulatiOl , ' ' .. eart o the As'. r~ reg 1990s. f J<-no ! hr tltnbllltHlS effort!) by th (' tan nnanci;l) <:riSi!. of 7 ,, )ate . J ule . ,d standard, <'' J nnng fbcal transparenc:v c to esta)1 h . s mternational ~-'es ar . . , t . . ; monetary and fi . cou... g supe1 vtston. O<tl a < I'>Sem mation. <.:orporate . nanctal poli<:v, lfl"'1J1 ~ . govemctn<.:c and , b d ds. The F n lallt:n.I (.taI) .,.tty F"0111 m (FSF)- C , I . ' a<:<.:ounting sttUI <U I I . a ~ t organt7.atio .I - . ltltion frotn l "\\" opmg nations-has design ted 1 n WJt' rninitnal reset ' . . . a 2 of th, d P .. 1for creatmg \Otllld fmanctal systems in dcvel . re 0 ese stan ard<; as ssen a opmg countri 11 r: 1 e odium include~ an additional 59 standards the a . es. 1e tU I FSP cc.llnpe . . . 1 . . t'Ons1ders "re). r ntnctal svst<:tns. )llngma the total number genc:y 1 f __ evant or d ft
5otJO .
' ' ,.,

and <.:Of111JI, l.t' govr;nltlll<.:e were at the h

~49

EXCUSES, EXCUSES
Countries that have bougl1t wholeheartedly into the integration orthodoxy are discovering tllat openness does not deliver on its promise. Despite shar1)ly lowering their barriers to trade and investment since the 1980s, scores of coun tries in Latin America and Africa are stagnating or gro,v:ing less rapidly than iJl the heyday of import substitution during the 1960s and 1970s. By contrast, the fastest growing countries are China. India, and others in East and Southeast Asia. Policymakers in these counhies have also espoused trade and investment liberalization, but they have done so in an unorthodox manner-gradually, seguentiaJJy, and only after an initial period of high growth-and a~ part of a broader policy package witll many unconventional features. The disappointing outc;omes with deep liberalization have been absorbed into the faith with remarkable aplomb. Those who view global integration as the prerequisite for economic development now simply add the caveat that opening borders is insufficient. Reaping the gains from openness, they argue, also requires a full complement of institutional reforms. Consider trade liberalization. Asking any World Bc economist what a successmk ful trade-liberalization program requires will likely elicit a laundry H of measures st beyond the simple reduction of tariff and non tariff barriers: tax reform to make up for ~ost tariff revenues; social safety nets to compensate displaced workers; adminis trative reform to bring trade practices into compliance with wro rules; labor market reform to enhance worker mobiJity across industries; technological assistance 10 upgrade ~rms hurt by import competition; and training programs to ensur~ that export-onented firms and investors have ac-cess to skilled workers. As the promise of trade ~beralization faiJs to materialize, tl1e prerequisites keep expanding. For example, Clare Short, Great Britain's secretary of state for intemational development, recently added universal provision of health and education to tl1e list. .h In tlle financial arena, integrat:iorusts have pushed complementary reforms WJt r 1 even greater fanfare and urgency. The prevailing view in Washington and ocl .~ Group of Seven (G-7) capitals is that weaknesses in banking systems, prudent:J

o cuues to il ~0 t Jative capital movements, the IMF and G-7 also typ'call end oiT specu I r . I y . tn es to a<.:cu 11111 ate orctgn reserves and avoid exchange . t urge developmg . coun . -ra e reg1mes that dift a "hard peg" (tying the value of one's currencv to that of. . bl. er from ll ) . . " ,H , . ; . a more sta c currenc:v 1 'JS the U .S. do ,u o <L pure oat (letting the market dete . . 1 I , sue "' ) nmne t 1e appropri-, ate exchange rate . A cynic mi<tht wonder whether the IJOint of all these prere<~uts1tes . mere1 1s y to provide easy cover for ~ventual fmlure. Integrati.onists can conveniently blame disappointin~ growth performance or a financial crisis on "slippage" in the implementation of complc1;1 c~tary reforms.rather than on a poorly designed liberalization. So if Bangladesh s I reer trade pohcy does not procluce a large enough spurt in growth, the World Bank concludes that the problem must involve lagging reforms in public administration or continued "political uncertainty" (always a favorite). And if Argentina gets caught up in a confidence crisis despite significant trdde and financial liberalizati on, the I MF reasons that structural refonns have been inadequate and must he deepened.
1:)

FREE TRADE-OFFS
Most (but certainly not all) of the institutional refonns on the integrationist aO"enda are perfectly sensible, and in a world without financiaL administrative, or po~itical t.-onstraints, there would be Little argument about the need to adopt them. But mth.e real world, governments face difficult choices over bow to. d~pl~y ~hetr fiscal resources, admi nistrative capabilities, and political capital. Setting tnst~tutional priorities to maxi m ize in tearation in to the global economy has real opportumty 00 ~ 0 'Onomist \1ichael FmConsider some illustrative trade-ofTs. World Bank.....,1de ec u< . ger ha<; estimated that a kn)ical developinu counhy must spend $150 million to Ul1~1 e'!1 agreements (tllose 0 n customs valuation. ment requirements under Just three vVTO gt ) . . d I . J . t llectttal propert} n<J lts . 5< . l1Utmy and phytosamtary measures, and tra e-re ateu m e -d . 1. . t b dget for manv least e' e As Fmger notes this sum equals a years deve1 opmen u . fi : :aJ :odes , . d f . I menting nanct c oped countties. And while the budgetary bur en tmp ~..~. t.. :l~ . S tlhstantial and cl 1 doubtewv en~ a t stan<.larcls has never been fully estimate un ' de,eloping divers1on of fiscal ~ m and human resources as well ShouId governments .,.. 11ents me.an .. . , eo . . . . t ,en tf tho~ lfl' e,d untnes tram more bank audttors and accountan s, e . . 1 "''tion for crirls? rew -.I di11g 011 pntnaJ\ e<. U.oer seconda1 y-school teachers or redu<.:eu spen tl . ' errries on "importI tJ . .ts focus 1eLr en .:o ') . n 1 area of legal reform should govemmen e ..;c legal instinttions. tng" 1, a] ' . .stiJW t1 omes" c~ codes ar1d standards or on unprov1ng e.xJ r

350

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICA l. r

'

RODRIK !TRA

DING IN IU.USIONS

lt\ Turk~.,~. a Wt.'ak eoalition govenuncnt speul "' \1 1 : t tl d 11 rin, 19<.: lllg f'orergn Ill VC'!-. c tl (H olctl ior g ..d8 ga11 l<ri 1111 r . th<' (>Q1 a1:-uppot1 J()r a l)i 11 prov1t I' . ,., I 1 . ' . 'i.\lll>ll. But wouldn't a better Iong-rull slral! ~.:; I),\\ <' involvcdor Intern,'lltonul r :l.l'lHO . '' i IIVtstors ,J~k~;11111 g lhiJ t:>XcisUng lt>g;ctl regime f(>r the benefit of fo reign aud d,' '

, Jn puhlil' heaJth should governmen ts pronrntc lht n,crsc ellgt.nceri 1 . ' uc '"' nes and the unportal1 011 ol c1 '-co,t ,.., 11 ,. 1I {; d rug 11f~ of [Xtlenl "U basic medici . olatrng \\TO nrle . , . ~ rc>nr unauthorized" surt>liers, even if dorng so nwan <; , .1 ~ <tg.u nst j Iegrs 1at 1 1 o11 111 1997 allowi no . SH<:r practices ? When South Africa passec ,.., 1mports r 1 patentE"U AlDS drugs from c:l1<:>aper sourccs, lrc.: <:mrntry can1c nndcr . <) pressure from Western govl'rnrn ents. which <l rgu<'d that th< South Af'... !ievcrp . ne:an policy conflicted with wro mlcs on intellectual property. H ow 111 uch shoulu politician s spend on so<.:iaJ protcction policies in view f ) .. cJjscrp 1 "? 1eru .s t:t'llt ral bunk hold . r o the . llll' et constrain ts imposecI I)y mark fiscal s 1ore1gn . . .. ' 11 reserves equal to 15 months of 1 rp01ts a an. rnsrtrance poltc.:y against the Str(Iden capH:al ou tflows tlrat fi nan<:ially open cconOIII ICS. ofte n expcri<nce. The opportur ril cost of this policy amo~nts to almost J per~cnt of gross dom csti<.: product annually_: more than enough to fund a generous ant1povcrty program. How should governments choose their ex~hangc-rate re~imes'? During the last four decades, virtually every growth boom 111 tbe devcloplllg world has been et accompanied by a controlle d depreciation of' the dom esti c: currency. Y financial open ness makes it all hut impossible to manage th e exdr ange rate. How should poUc.ymakers focus U1eir a11tioorruption strategies? Should they target tlle ltigh-Jeve l cornrption that foreign investors often uecry or the pel~t :orruptiou that affects the poor the most? Perhaps, as the proponents of permanent c normal trade relations with China argued in the recent U .S. debate, a government that is forced to protect the rights of foreign investors wil1 become more inclined to protect the rights of its own citizens as well. But this is, at best, a trickleclown strategy of institutional reform. Shouldn't reforms target the desired end~ direc:tly -whether those ends are the rule oflaw. improved observance of human rights, or reduced corruption? The rules for admission into the worJd economy not only reflect little awareness of development priorities, they are ofte n completely unrelated to sensible economic principles. For instarwe, WfO agreeme nts on anti-Jum ping, subsidies and countervailing measures, agriculture, textiles, and trade-related intellectual property rights lack any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups in advanced industrial countries. Bilateral and regional trade agreements are typically far worse, a.s they impose even tighter prerequisites on developing countries in return for crumbs of enhanced "market acce~s.'' For. example, the African Growth aud Opportunity Act signed by U.~ f 2000 provides increase<.l access to the U.S. market onl~ 1 President Clmton in May ~frican apparel manufacturers use U .$.-produced fabric: and yarns. This rest ne tion severely limits the potentiaJ economic spillovers in African countries. There arc similar questions ahout the apl)ropriateness of financial codes aHd standards. These codes rely heavily on an Anglo-Ame rican style of' corp.orilte fT govema~ee and an arm's-length model of financial development. They close ~ alternatwe p~hs. to financial development of the sort that have been followed ) many of tcxlays nch countries (for example, Germ~my, Japan, or South Korea).

._ a '>trat<.:!tv of 'glc h 1 . ah v ., tzatron > a rv . I I11 e' )Irlent f. .r 0 (; alJ CTCJ\W'-s c l jl JtCl' ,tl V 11101'1.: dcvdoJ 'yr>S t 1 v that an c >u M - rrcnul . 1 m 1 Y any of tire inslit u<l!C I ,f'o rms nccdvd fo r llt'>PttlOrr 1nto tltc world et:onornv .. b . . . . . n re. trO . l lr or prouu cc hr o.rdrJ <;<'(lltOtn tc benefits. Bt t tl .. ~n . c rndt pendcntly ICSe pnonf . d I . . . . I' . I I . Jestra J res o not nc<:c~d. I < oindde wrt 1l 1< pnur rt tcs o a comprehe nsive (VC oprnt'nt agenda. y sMI1 c
ach of tl1c''
:<1 \
J

351

ASIAN MYTHS
f the insliln tinnal rcfiJrms ncedl~u to J'oin tl1e . . 1nt~::mation 1 ' . Even . a ee:onomrc rnunity are expensrv< and predudc investments in o tllCr crucla) areas 1 <.'Orn ' pro. argue t 1:.1t the vast incrcac;es . . l)alization advocates . gro\1.-th th rn economrc I . . go at . . riahly result from 1nscrtJ011 into the global markctplace WL.11 more than . .. . -:. ' . . . .k . lnv.. ' e the Ectst Asran trgers or Chrna, th e advocates sa . , mpensate for tl1osu costs. T,t. . ' .I eo Y .nternat1onal trade and foreign capital Bows? here W would they be ~vJt tou t 1 . . That these coun t n8s reaped. enormous benefits from thoir progressJVe rntegra" . tion into the world economy rs .uJJ~ent~lble. But look c.:losely at what policies produced tl~osc .resul.ts, and you \vtll nnd l.rttle that resembles today's rule book. Countnes like Sou th .Korea ancl Ta1wan had to abide by lew international constraints and pay few of the modem costs of integration during their fonnative growth experience in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, global trade rules were sparse and economies faced almost none of today's common pressures to open their borders to capital flows. So these countlies combined tl1eir outward orientation "~th unorthodox poUcies: high levels of t;uiff and non-tariff barriers, pubtc ownership of large segments of banking and indust1y, ex-port subsidies, domestic-content requireents, patent and copyrigh t infringements, and restrictions on capital flows (includm ing on foreign direct investme nt). Such policies are either precluded by today's trade ank. rules or are highJy frowned upon by organizations like the 1MF and the World B China also followed a highl)' unorthodox two-track strategy, ,;olating practiy caU every rule in the guidebook (including, most notably, the requirement of private property rights ). India, which significantly raised its economic gro>wth rate in the early 1980s, re mains one of the world's most highly protected economies. All of tl1ese countries liberalized trade gradually, over a period of decades, not years. Significant import Liberalization did r~ot occur until after a transition to high econom ic growth had taken place. And far from "'~ping the institution~ slate. clean. 1 all of these nations managed to eke growth out of their existing instituhOns. m~r sian lect as they may have been. Indeed, when some of the more successful A economies gave in to Western pressure to liberalize capitaJ Aows rapidJy, they were .d r rewarded with the Asian financial crisis. ren d . That . why these countries can hardl y be const ered poster chtl . ~ IOr . 1s success cases . tod g1 d tl le China lndta, and t1 0ther Asmn ays ohal ru les. South Korea . ' had tl}(' freeuom to do thei r own thing, ' and they use<1t I1 t freedom abun an. .Y . a ences w1thout runmng h Tod, 1 ys g ohalizers would be unable to replicate t ese expen afoul of tJ IM I . rail deve!OJ)Olent For the wro. )e o"e The As'tan expeliell ce highlight~ a deeper P 1t. A soun( n tJ\e in achiedng 011 . t Srate"'~ tJ . e,; lat procl uces high economiC gro'vth 15 far more e ec
l

t' ll\h'!!mtinn \\i th tlw world econonw than a fJ\l rc \ 1 t '\ LOl)]s t Str . loL dize 15 l ategy that reJ t. n up .. nn~..~~s to work it maaic. In otl1er words. tit es 1ave n l :-. Integration i tlw re ult. not tl1e cause. nf econom ic and it e~actly ba~.:k. ' ' ~trt lllt'nt. .\ relatiYek l)rotected econonw like \ 'i etn~u n is integJan so_ctal develop . . much more rar)Idlv than an open econorm like Lr " ;ti ng 'Vlth t he worl b t.'t'onom~ u ecaus v QUJ . . . e retna111 , unhke limb, has a reasonably functional ecouomy and polity.

RODRIK ! TRA

DTNG IN llLUSlONs

Integration into the global economy, unlike tariff rates or .. . c.;ap1tal-ac: . Iations. is not somethmg that policymak 'ers <.:ontrol directlv. Tell .count . reg11 ministers in developing nations that tl1ey should increase tJ1ei; "r) . t'~g h~an~.:e a1 tc1pah . th_em that they need to improve te<.:hnon tn world trade" is as meaningful as telling olog. ical capabilities- and just as helpful Policymakers need to know whicl 1 strategi th tl spec1. fi c: presc:1iptions tllat the <:urrees . w1ll produce these results, and whe er 1e nt orthodo:\y offers are up to the task.
I;;

. (" rational or othenvis ) ble' subject lo , . e, h UJ'lsta 1 r ~re .\ _plenty of e\idence pam<;s.' sh~~~~htedness. and that , I If-fulfilling prop . e( ~. seten followetl by fin<l~ ~Jal crctslt-JUSt ask ~lexico, Thailan finan<:lalliberalization is ~nlittle convincing e\1~.t.:n~( to SUg1;cst that higher rates ~r Turk~y-wbile there 15 economtc grO\\th follow . !-account Uhenuizattott. . tl c.1p1ta 1. . Perhaos 1e mostl c 1s1ngenuous argument in hvo r ofJberalt. . ' x .' ows is that t 1(-: t lneat of massive and sudden caprtal mozmg mtemational a] H . . finan Cl pline IJolicvmakers m developing nations who m'gh t Ot1 \ements serves to 1el"\\<i.S I diSCI . bJ ' uovemments . h b e manage their nomies irrespons1 :-'. In other words, 0 mtg t e less li d .. . . . eco k ~ . me ne to would uander their soc:Jeltes resources 1f such a<:tions spooh sq ctice. howe,er, the discipline argument falls apart B . or~~g~ lenders. In . e aVJor m mtemati al db . d . pra on IS ommate y mootl swings unrelated to f d Pital markets un amentals In Pood 1 . tJ ea t' fi . o c 1 a c 1ron1 fiscal deficit has an tas ..;mes a govern ment w1 I er I me nancm(1 its . b . [ cl f . ' u . .0 t ending when 1 can on ow un s rom mvestors abroad' \VItness Russla pnor to sp

3;>3

ot

TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE

8

Do lo,,ver trade barriers spur greater economic progress? The a\ailable studies reveal no systematic relationship between a coun try's a\erage level of tariff and nontariff barriers and its subsequent economic gro\\th rate. If anything, the evidence for the 1990s indicates a positive relationship between import tariffs and economic growth [see chart]. The only clear pattern is that countries dismantle their trade restrictions as they grow richer. This finding explains why today's rich countries, with few exceptions, embarked on modem economic growth behind protective barriers but now display low trade barriers. The absence of a strong negative relationship between trade restrictions and economic growth may seem surprising in view of the ubiquitous claim that trade Liberalization promotes higher growth. Indeed, the economics literature is replete with cross-national studies concluding tllat growth and economic dynamism are strongly linked to more open trade policies. A particularly influential study finds that economies iliat are "open," by tl1e study's own definition , grew 2.45 percentage points faster annually than closed ones-an enormous difference. Upon closer look, however, such studies tu m out to be unreliable. In_a detailed review of the empirical literature, University of Maryland econom~st Francisco Rodriguez and I found a major gap between the results that economist have actually obtained and the policy conclusions they have typically drawn .. For . . e, examp1 m many cases economtsts blame poor growth on tl1e govern ment's fa1Jure to liberalize trade policies, when the true culprits are ineffective institutl~ns. geographic determinants (such as location in a tropical region), or i napprop~a~e macroeconomic policies (such as an overvalued exchange rate). Once these mts<l . relationship across countnes be tween t1e agnoses are corrected, any meaningful In level of trade barriers and economic growth evaporates. The evidence on the benefits of liberalizing capital flows is even weak~~~nd theory, the appeal of capital mobility seems obvious: If capital is free to en_~rbe an tlr leave) markets based on the potential return on investment, the result Wl e inheren k re eua'lentallocation ofgl obal resources. But in reality, financial mar -ets ar

China

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6
Guyana Korea, Rep. Malaysia Indonesia

-s:.
Q.

!:! 11)

unexplained' GDP growth represents a country's actual economic growth rate minus its expected growth rate based on initial income levels, government spending, and inflation rates. The data cover 113 countries (not all are shown).
Thailand India

e .,
ID ID

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a.

Uganda Taiwan Singapore Chile Ghana

ID

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Gl

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ID

Cl

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Cambodia Sri Lanka E . . Malta thropra Israel 2 Nepal Suriname Ben,in Norway Poland El Salvador Zi~babwe Tanzam ya Oman Paraguay Gr Egypt Mali N b Hong Kong amt ra rco d e zambia Morocco ahrain E 0 cua or Central African Republic Gabon U.S.A. Austral!a Niger Japan Romanra e lvory Coast go T~ can~a . Iceland Algena Madagascar Belarus - 2 Congo H~ngary Estonia e Rwanda Mongolia Albania . Swrtzerland

I Turk~y Brazil

g sh:__---Tl~~ni~si~a --~~s:an~l~ade~
Pakistan

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-4

Haiti Bulgaria e cameroon

:I

-6

----L----~----L---~--~~~00 50 0
1

10

40 30 20 Average import tariffs (percent)

G 055 oomestic Product (GDP) UR I HIGH TARIFFS DON'T MEAN LOW GROWTH r . ~Wth and Tariff Rates, 1990s rce: Auchors calculations based on World &mk dalu. FIG

'

'i4

PARf 3
)f

THE INTERNATIONAL POUTICAL ECONO!.' ''

.\t~t'ntina in tll(> L990s. And in bad tin1c~. ~PVr u, .nts rnav h . (' J J " (; I 0 r C(;Q ~luol t lll.tpptopriatt polic ies in orde r to confom1 lo l 11 h1a~ ~ f ii J l'<'ign inv . to ' I p0 1 t .,, h 'llnch of E- estors; '\1 t nts~ t Iw t'M:l'S. heh- restricth e monetary ancl f' 1s<..a tIw im nwdiatl' afterm<tth of the Asian fi nancra I cnsr~ \ 1. r ason why M. IJ\si i!St m :..('\ .a 'ti' a aysta l "s a> Ie to rec."'\ e r so quickly ter t I1e. m1posr on o f C.:<~I" 1<.'(Jlll rnlc; in Septeml., af

lOO~

Globalization 's Missing Middle

GEOFFREY GARRETT

199S was that Prime Minister Mahatlur Moha.mad rcsrskd d11 ltigh interest ra~er and tight fiscal [)Oiicies that South Korea, Tba:rlamL and lndoucsia adopted ,es ' d ::tl l)(; behest of the Jntemational Monetary Fun

sQUEEZED
GROWTH BEGINS AT HOME
\Veil-trained economists are justifiably proud of the textbook case in favor of fret trade. For all the themy's simplicity. it is one of our profcc;sion's most significant achievements. However, in their zeal to promote ~he virt ues of trade, the most ardent proponents are pedclling a cartoon ve rsion of the. ar~ rmcnt, vastly overstatincr the effectiveness of economic openness as a tool for lostc ring development. S;ch drums only endanger broad public accepta~ce ~f the real arlid_e because they unleash unrealistic expectations about the benefits of free trade. erther economic; theory nor empirical evidence guarantees that deep trade liberalization will deliver higher economic growth. Economic openness and all its accouterments do not deserve tJ1e priority they typically receive in d1e development strategies pushed by leading multilateral organizations. Countries that have achieved long-term economic growth have usually combined the opportunities offered by world markets with a grO\.vth strategy that mobilizes the capabilities of domestic institutions and investors. Designing such a growth strategy is both harder and easier than implementing typical integration policies. It is harder because the binding constraints on growth are usually country specific and do .not respond well to standardized recipes. But it is easier because once those ~nstramts are targeted, relatively simple policy changes can yield e normous economrc payolf.~ and start a virtuous cycle of growth and additional reform. Unorthodox innovations that depart from the integration rule book a~~ typically part and parcel of such strategies. Pubuc e nte rptises during the MerJr restoration in Japan; township and village enterprises in China; an export pr~ess ing zone in Mauritius; generous tax incentives for priority investments in Tarwar~~ extensive credit subsidies in South Korea; infant-industry protection in BrazL during the 1960s and 1970s-these are some of the innovations that have bee~ 0 instrumental in kick-starting investment and growth in the pa~t. None came out a Washington economist's tool lot. ther Few of these experiments have worked as well when tra~~planted : settings, only underscoring the decisive importance of local c:ondibo~. : o . tional tive. development strategies need to be tailored to prevailing domestic tn~titu akers strengths. There is simply no alternative to a homegrown business plan. Poh.<-'Y";hen1who look to Washington and financial markets for the answe rs are condemn~g -""ent. . t di ilJ US!OH" seJve;s to mimicking the conventional wisdom du jour, and to eventuw s . The Polarized dehate over the: effects of free trade and mternational l:a 1 1A . .. t become a fixture o f world pohtics. Boosters of globa}j 7 ti P a ows has . '0 te anc n-win propos1tlon J 1 t1 neI1 . 1the poor, developed a .a d assert that it . cl on 1 . ts a wr W B I . I . n eve oprng countries alike. President George . . us 1 1as said that ''a world that trad . f cl . , . l es m ree om grows in prospenty, rerteratmg .a t 1eme Bill Clinton championed in tl1e 1990s. But . . . . ]J g.IoIJaI e l1t~ 1mrng.~ts pockets at the expense of everyone else. John critiCS see a st~a K erry's decJY! ng of outsou rcmg by Benedict Amold CEOs" is this year's version of R Perot's 1~_9~ forecas~ that the ~orth AtJ~nti? Free Trade Agreement (\AYfA) oss would make a gtant sucking sound by drawmg jobs out of the United States. All this good-versus-evil rh etoric obscures one key fact: while globalization has benefited many, it has squeezed the middle class, both within sO<.:ieties and in the international system. In today's global markets, there are only two wa)'S to get ahead. People and countries must be competitive in either the knowledge economy, which rewards skills and institutions that promote cutting-edge technological innovation, or the low-wage economy, which uses widely available technology to do routine tasks at d1e lowest possible cost. Those who cannot compete i11 either include not only the erstwhile industrial middle class in wealthy nations, but also most countries in the middle of the worldwide distribution of income, notably in Latin America and eastern and central Europe . .. . The question is, how can they be helped? Displaced American manufacturing workers wouJd probably rather get jobs at Microsoft or Gen~n.tech ~1an at McDonald's or Wai-Mart. But for most of them this just is not a reahstic option. On the global stage, countries such as Mexico and Poland would simjlarly like to com~te with Japan and Germany in the U.S. market for high-value-added goods and se!Vlce~. li1S B theLr work forces are not skilled enough and their economrc titution not suffiut ciently supportive of investment or innovation to take advantage of the knocedwl~ge \VQ k r ers they do have As a result' the middJe-moome counmes have been for rnto ..1 . .L _ , _ _ .-~ ) anufacturing anu, unwmnable battles 'vvith China for market share m stanuar(ll;WU m rncreasingly, with India for low-wage service-sector e~ports. allen e of helping In the United States and the rest of the 'Western world, the~ llg d tood th ,~ , _ cl b d0 vn) tSWe un ers c wsaffected middle class "tech up" (rather than um '

:ffec

. . rf rlreifffl Affairs. Frolll C IT . .. R . ted br ~rm~slOn o t. ~0 1 eo rey Garrett "Globali7.ation's Missing Mtddle. epnn ,' " b . the C<>tUlCil on ForelgJl " 83 N 6 , ' ",, na. Copvrigltt 2vvo ) R . ' 0 (Novem ber/December 2004), PP ()'t-VV ei attons, Jne.

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOM~

Ltlf

Pe\lpt~ mu stlw ~hen access to the e<.lucation and traiiJI.

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. (" . t0 , MlCt.'t'Ss nl knowledge workers. Like,,1se, m
~
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I s .\l~ P'-' up the ~lohal skill chain. Yleaningful ed.ucatwnal rtl. r '' :~. lrm~ ovcrthtl' I >e tt lS onl~ the bcuinnina. Mi<.ldle-income countries need bro, rt :,d <leep in.-t1... .' >ut ' ltbon l . r . e. n . c a c r<'rorms m ~memment, banking, and law to tran 101 m <<N; tus tl at sli H . Jnnova. .. . -h . I t . ti on m to ones that foster it with strong proper ;'-ne; 1 ' ngJill('" (llcc:tive f' . . ll1an<:tal systems, and good govemance.. . .
111Ust

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trlw( ' ' on n th ern cou ntri(.

'Ul

ANOTHER COUNTRY
Princeton economist Paul Krugman lamented in Th e ew York Times two years ago that "the middle-class America of my yo~tl~ was ano~hC'r c:ountry.'' He was g right. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistl~s, manu fac:tn ri '.1 employment, the quintessential American middle-class occupabml , has fallc' n from one-fifth to one-tenth of total American jobs in just t~1e ~~~t tw~ decade~. 1cnnwhile, employment in .,professional and business sen 'lces, "vlnch pay htgher salaries to more skilled workers, has more than doublecl overtaking manufa<:tUJing in the process. At the same time, the number oflow-payingjobs in "leisure and hospitality" industries has also essentially doubled and now rivals total manufactu ring employment. Jobs on the American factory floor have thus been replaced, in more or less equal oors and by the new measure. by .,junk" jobs such as flipping burgers and cleaning A glamour professions of writing sofhvare and managing money. The result is that the distribution of income in the United States has been stretched at both the high and low ends, significantly increasing social inequality. A similar process has been taking place at the global level. The world's wealthiest countries have grown richer in recent decades as a result of dramatic advances in technology, and the rate of economic advance hac; been even faster in the new manufacturing dynamos among the world's poorest countries. Squeezed hetween these two success stories, the countries in the middle have floundered. One easy way to measure these changes js to track pe r capita national income worldv.'ide according t0 the three major country groupings created by the World Bank. The top 25 percent of countries are labeled "high income," a category that comprises the nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, plus a few small Middle Eastern oil exporters and trading states such as Singapore. The bottom 30 percent are labeled "low income." T his group in~Judes more than half of the world's six billion people, chiefly in the countries of Aslll ~d sub-Saharan Afric.:a. The remaining 45 percent of countries-almost alJ of Latlll America and the former Soviet bloc as well as the Asian tigers and much of the Middle East-are "middle income." In 1980 (a useful ending date for the pre-globalization period), the difference~ in per capita inc:..'O me among these three groups of countries were enormou~ 311 roughly 1,000 percent both between the low- and middle-income countries ess be... t he m1'ddle- and high-income countries. Average GDP per caplta was 1 ,ween than $.'300 in the low-inoo~ne grou~, roughly $2,500 in the middle-i~c~~e !:;~~~ and more than $20,000 m the lugh-income group (in 1995 dollars at

' dvances m biotec:h and ~on and coullltliTIJt.tl ions technology Jfl . ~~au 111 At the other end of the spectrum , the world's reost cou~tries fared e\'en -indeed much btlter. During the 1980s 199 s the1r aJ an . 1 cl b better re per capita e increase )' more t tan 160 percent. This g vth '. . rm mLracle w d .1 )llcom as spurred not .les of agJicultunu pro ucts (the focus of ongoina d b t f o e a e over the f tu . . bv Stu u reo the d i ld Trade Orgamzation ), but by large-scale exnort f f: s o stan ardiz d . , ,,or re manu d goods ' rangmg from steel to shoes to computer har dware. Exports 0 rall ac. . wre _ goods services increasc<.l 111 the low-mcome countries from 1 h d percc t f t . an 00. Over the same period thess h an lv n f GDP in 1980 to 28 percent 111.20 f . , e s are o manufactur,. . . I d . . g 10 total ex'norts .tnp e , .nsmg 10rn b percent to more t]1an 4;:, percent. . . . . -r rn . To be sure, plOfoumlmequahties remam m the cross-nationa1 d.istn.bution of . . . ncome (even 1f one. nses . compansons bar;ed on purchasing-pcwer panty, w1. h l uc . . . . . . ta substantially mcre~se estimates of per cap1 mcome in developing countries. rather than cornp<~nsons bas~d on mark~t exchange rates). But the big story of the past two decades IS that the mcome ratio between the countries characterized as high and low incon:e in 1980 has essentially been cut in half. ~oreover, the gro\\th led by manufactunng exports seems to have benefited wide cross-sections of the population in low-income countries .. . Although proponents of globalization can point to record growth in low-income c'Ountries as proof of their \visdom, they should be troubled by the economic sta!mab . tion in middle-income countries. Supporters ofNAFTAare wont to label the treaty a success for middle-income Mexico because it has stimulated trade and manufa~ turing across the border from the United States. And it is true that e~-ports in the mjddJe-income world increased from less than 20 percent of GDP in 1980 to more than 30 percent in 2000, while the share of manufacturing in total exports increased from under 30 percen t to more than 50 percent. But despite the export gro,.,th. this group of nations h~Lc; fallen even further behind the West. de~ring the aue-old logic of"catch up," by which poorer countiies reap t11e rewards of technology de,eloped in richer nations. Real per capHa income in the middle-income group grew b~' less than 20 percent during the 1980s and 1990s, less than half of the ~wth ~te achieved in the high-income world and less than one-eight!~ of that u~ lowmcome countries. As a result, the ratio of per capita incomes of lugh- aud middle . _ mcome countries actuall)' increased b)' about 20 percent clunng the past two . . clecades, while the ratio between high- and low-mcome countnes droPped b\' . ' 50 percent. These figures are all the more troubling because middle-income counedtnes tend t0 have better-developed econonlic ancl politica1 ti'tutions and more uf . ms t:ated Jabor forces-which development economists constder kev drhers o . . th 'ddJe'> The growth- than their low-income counterparts. . . t countnes m e mt . Wh h 1 ll markets. They ha,e an~ Y as g obaJjzation been disappomting r.or . b ver seems to be that they have not found a mche U1 wo~ c . ted bv wealth'' e::o u~able to compete in high-value-added n:arke~ki.ll~~~;d thei; legal and mtes because their work forces are not sufficient!)

3;>7 . . 1u ttI for inflation) Aft e rates and : er two de<:ad f . chang es. o mtegration of t tnattonaliYtarkets. bv 2000 ex . al economws Jllf , per cap,ta in<:omes in th ' natwn es cateuoriz.cd a I ~~I income in 1980 had . e ' mereased bv . . o <>untl1 ~ real terms, due m 11(J n,tll part to mnovation fueled bv a . ' roug~ly :)0 ptrcent

GARRETI I GLOBALLZATlON'S MlS SING MIDDLE

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAl POUTICAL FCONO:~'!

GARR En I GLOBAUZATIONs M ISSING MIDDLE

U~\nkin~ sv, tems an not SOj)lHstiraL<d <.'DOI Wh. \-; ., re ph . 1 c ) 1av<.; h I 1 ' ... . I lOlct.: I> to tn to con1 lwte with Cl1 ina and otl ,,, \' w ... ). a<. Jttle ttt <. '"' ,tH. <.:<:ono . . . . . . k . . I l11Jes 111 llMJ <. t~ for tanda rciJzeJ produ cts made w1th v.id1 h , ' 1)1" .111 ,1 r<-' ativ I ~ ' 1 Jnc tee Hl.olo~rtcs. But because of thei r highe r watrc.s the ndddlt-i C<> ll'ltJ. e Yolu 1:' < ons are b ou ud to lose the battle . . . .

SEARCHING FOR EXPlANATIONS

The suc:ccss of globalization in both high- and low-income: conn trks ,.a11 1 rea 1'1J "' Je ' ~( Y ex'Plained by mainstream econo mics. Technological c.:hauw and the inte rnatJonal f . . mtegratwn o marke ts have spurr ed growth in high- inc:o111e nations, reversin tl g . e slowdown of the J 970s. Low-incom e countries have exploited their com paratlVc a dvantage in cIleap labor to gain large shares of the global mark etplace. The failure of middle-inw me c:ounhies to compete in global markets for eithe r knowledge or low-wage produ cts is dec:i<.ledJ., less well understood h ever. It Aies in tJ1e face of many economists' core belie f thal all countries ~ho:~d gain from opening their markets to the outside world by doing what they do best even if they do not do it as weUas their comp etitors. As a result, supporters of"fr~ trade for all" by to explain the poor perfom1ance of middle-income nation s b pointing to causes other than theiT inability to fin<.l a producti ve niche in the glob~ econo my. Thes e true believers argue that the integration of the middle tier into international markets is not at fault for these countries' recent dire economic record and that freer trade has ameliorated, not exace rbate d, their problems ... .

FROM MISSING TO MODERNIZED

Coun ter to mainstream economic expectations, middle-income countries have strug gled economically in the last two <.lecades, and those that have opened their et markets more have fared even worse. Y a return to protec:tion ism is unlikely to do any good. The pace and pervasiveness of technological chang e make it difficult, if not impossible, to put the globalization genie back in its bottle. But the formul.a 15 agree ment s"-bilaterally, regio naJ ly, and multilaterallyof "mor e free- trade .. d .. unlikely to work, either. The challe nge for the middle-income world is to find '"'ays to tech up an enter the global knowledge e<.:onomy, so as to escap e the trap of having to cl~_rnb down to comp ete in standardized manufacturing and, increasingly, standardized services. This will requi re educational reforms geare d toward producing a la%, pool of skille d and creative Jabor, as weJI as good government, sec.:ure prope 1 d . ffi .enL'V. Sue t . . . . nghts , and strong financial syste ms to fight corruption an tne. CL 1 'minted newb -oeo refor ms woul d give entre prene urs incentives to take advantage of will y ext,_ e ti 0 n r Europe knowledge workers, foste ring innovation . But such a trans rorma astern sive and difficult to execu te, and the countries of Latin America and edemocraC')' has . . to are not likely to be able to achieve it on their own. T he trans1tion

tself prove d t Iw pr; ~ <. .try catalyst. Instead it has . raised popular enw':t ti 11otl JjticianS find inc r~.:a nglyhdifficult to satisfY -r--- a ons . at po th. wh at can the \ \ c"t J lo c 1 For much f p? o eastern E 1 ' enhv ' ean Union , long aw drawn out as the proce { urope, h , into the . gorop the answe r. poIan<1' f I ungary, and the oth ss o accesS lon as been m r , ay . er I ormerlv c I . ., I . ,re11 be t vere admJtted t m ~c,tr tope that tnembership vi.ll b : :ommum.st t:ountnes tha 'ght to Greece, Portugal, and Spain over the p \t 20 rmg to them what it has years access to western .I brou an marke ts, cap1ta1, anu cl evelopment assistaas . h nee, as well EoroPe( as ot er. less tanoiadvantages. J ew memb impo but equally f h rtant h ~ ers . o t e E U.. t e fu U range of its laws re uJmust adopt the acquLs bIe. ti nmrmautazre ~~hough it has o~ten been derided as overly burea u~ratfc a:do;: an~ ~nstitu~ons. . terotic, over time, uis has abgne d the domestic institutions of th ese nahons v.ith the acq , h b. . . ~m~.on European practice, nngm~ t e EU s poorest members stabilitv , ' predJctab,lity, d credibility- and an emr1 ronment condu cive to the an emergence of the kn rJ .k ,; --'ge economy-far more qUJ<.: ly than they could othen.se have expected ov. h . . eu . .. : Latin Amencan nation s ave aggressive!)' pursued closer econom tc relatio . . . ns 11p with the EU, but. members1 ts obVIously not an option forth em, and they have no . . analogous orgaruzahon on the contment. NAFTA is more tlvan a mere rree tnad e . d 1 agreement, but 1ts ru es an regulations are rudim entary compared with the EU's 1~ un.allo~ed fr~e-trade agreements alone cannot do the job and an EU~l~~ orgamzatJon 1s a p1pe ~ream , what c:an be done for Latin Ameri ca? The \\orld Bank has been promo~ng smart development assistance, focusing on the creation of knowledge economtes. So far, however, it has remained largely ineffecthe as an agent of change in the middle-income world. The United States recently launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative to foster educational , financial, and judicial reform in the middl e-income countries of that region. Such efforts should be replicated in Latin America and all middle-income countries to counteract the economic stagnation and rising popular frustration that threaten these nations' openness and stabilitv. ' em today is that U .S. policymake rs have more pressing things on The probl their mind than Latin America's economic woes. In the earlv Cold War era. the ' democrc1tic and capitalist Marshal! Plan advan ced U.S. foreign policy by creating bulwarks against communism in Europe. Bailing out Russia and Mexico also made ~ense in the years following the Cold War, when traditional security issues receded mto the background . But since the September 11, 2001, attacks. achieving political goals through ec:onomic means has been given a much lower priority th~ the war on terrorism. And if a new Marshall Plan is created, it will focus on the ~hddle East. The ultimate irony facing globalization's missing middle ma~ be that the more the free trade project found ers in Latin America, the greater "'1ll be t~e ~ressure on people in the region to migrate to the United States. ~1igration \\llJ. m tum. squeeze employment and wages for the American manufacturing middle cl~ even mo re and f'orce the U S govemment to th' k creati'vely about groWillg 10 East Gennans . . eco . . , .. . nomic problems south of its border. After all. the flow of former 1 K0 hl to i1west mass1\ .e' m we t mto s em Germany motivated Chancellor He1 th . mut e the form 1 .6ed count 1} , Rar>id mcreases mals() E er Y comm unist part of the newly um cl .01k in westem urope . number 0 f eastern Euro peans looking to live an "'

3~9

PART 3

THE INTERI'JATIONAL POUTICAL ECO:W~ M .

Ca'>e

td etstL 111 L ~:.uroptan s WJ11 he nc (' 1 1t )CCaHsc w(st. 1 u r Pt ,u 1 iJ . Crntan s we 1 ~1> ~t> d t llt>tr transit '1 ion to the knov.rlC'dge ccon01m I'<rlan tl u,, miu-rat!> nl<..: nt 'v11 . L' . d , . , . . M 1 'nto tl on
t

'ltrtng t 'Wl

~otl tht

f()r the E U's castcrn ('':p.

l'- 0 .

11. L hke East

1 1 contin ent mcJVc into the knowle uge economy. le P the Be f(m , SeotcmbN ] J, the disagre ement O\ 'N ~lobali:t.alicm was the p . . raut hn<: 111 workl politics. Even touay, I . . r . . e11Sunn g that globali:~.ation:s beneftn n<.:, I)aI . 1 s 1ea a 11 part of the world would provide a bcurock upon which pPa<:e and prosp a ch . . c entv tl1e twe ntv-first centurv can be hutlt. l.inrortunatc 1 sr) f:ar tl1e middle n ' 1n ' .' -1 <.:<Jme nations have been left out. The United States aud tl1 E U must help Latin Ameri. e and eastern Europe cleve_lop compe titive kno,~le tlge cconom i~s. Tl~is prnjee;t m~ seem banal compa red \VJ th the war on terron s m_. hu~ o':er tune, tgnoring those pushe d aside by globalization will have immen se lmphc atJous -economie;ally and politically.

llJte

State~ from NfC'xico and tJ1e rest of Latin Arlll ric.:t ,..,ill ultir natcly

'e

stupid 15

WhY th~ Globalization Backlash

JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE

11

coMPANIES"

GLOBALIZAT10N MEANS THE TRIUMPH OF GIANT

Non.~ense. If you listen to antiglobalists, we Bve in a world of"Disnevfi ti ,. and "Coca-Colonization" in which giant companies simultaneoush- tra~p: 0~ 0\er their smaller eommerc1a1nvals an d turn national governments into helpless lackevs. They are o,vrong on both counts . ' The proportion of output from big companies has declined, not increased. Globalization radically shifts ilie balance of advantage from incumbents to challengers. Incumbents could once protect themselves behind lofty barriers such as the high cost of capital, the difficulty of acquiring new technology, or the importance of close relationships with national governments. Globalization reduces the importance of all these things. Lower barriers make capital easier to raise, technology easier to buv, markets easier to reach, and ties with national governments e'-er less important. Yo~ no longer have to be a multinational to have the reach of one. By all rights, Motorola Inc. ought to be the undisputed ruler of the wireless world. The company was the first to mass-produce car phones. It also sits in the heart of the world's biggest market for them. But it has been humbled by \ okia Corp., a relatively small compa ny from Finland that onl~ a decade ago ,.,.,as more interested in bathroom tissue than mobile phones. Nokia's only weapons were better phones and better management. Against these, mere size proved a pun~ defense-which helps explain why giants such as AT&T Corp. and General ~lotors Corp. {G~) now look so vulnerable. . . is uallv 1 The 1 that companies are now more Important than go,emments eq . , dea misleading. Far from getting smaller, govemments in most Wes~em countnes remain colossal consuming more than 40 percent ofWestem Europesgross domestic product ( P), for example. Thev continue to expand their influencetho,-er <'Orpo-tb rat beh . 'ell a e aVJor through regulatOl)' policy. Bill Gates rap1 Ydisco,ered atfea ra er obscure Jusbce Department antitrust lawyer, Joe1Kl 'as a much more rsome . eiD, ''

GD

Fl'l)rn J 1 . I 1.~1 B acklash." Foreign P oliry, issUe ~> 10 M1cklethwait and Adrian \Vooldritlge. '1 he C OUiUlza0011. Endowment for lnternatiOOal 1126 Peat-t:~~te~ber/C~<:tober 2001), pp. 16-28. e 2001 b~ the earoeg~e pnnted With pennission. 361

362

PART 3

THE rNTER

NATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY M ICY.' E lP WAfT AND WOOLDRIDGE I GLO

. l)'

Jtck Welch, the litt'l' ol \, r ;,.;.1 Biv 13 . 1 n 'liS1n , ,1 nere comp.u 111 O I>J>oucnt tIuu1 < ) . ,vhen tJ1e similarly anonym<H :. !H;nall<:r-tt . css. . , I00 in Be1 gwm < s of th rue! Ius \\atcl . 1 ! k dwhatwOLtld have bec1 tlw IHg:t.::;t :-.' ll le nrcr in . 0 1 (' lJSto COt~r1liSSJ01l L) 0C e and Honeywell. Europran . .. Electric ry, that between (,el~cral d .. tatistics'' about so many c:om pani,.s hl'ing biv11 r the oft-quote s k I C>Oer th,.n As tOr t1 GM 1 as biu a.s Denrnar - t 1e-.c c:ontpar< sales r ...,, s 0 tlw idea pwt couutnesres \rctlue added the <:orrec:t corporat<~ c:o1 1gures np . . ~ p s CD measu ' . anson With CD . tnc~ \\l If f dle Financial Times has pOi nted out. GM then t-~ IS fit I - I pros. As MaJtm o 1 o23rclbiggestcountrvtot1e :J.5 lt,a IJOi tlllt~ sames s lues from being ar; large as t le . ze as a bask('t case like Ukntine.

BAiiZATION BACKLASH

363

"GLOBALIZATION IS DESTROYING THE ENVIRONMENT''

Not really. Myth provides a p.lime .exa.mple of a conceit th at u~1derlies a great tleal of antiglobal thinking. Take one sel1-ev1dent ~ruth that. all scnsrhlcyeople <:an 11 ness of all sorts tends to despod .the . enVlron.mcnt. 1 . agree upon- b. s1 . . , . . hen repeat that observation in hjghly emotive language, tgnonng .tll othe r mrtrgatmg factors. Then heap all the blame on global companies, .global reg11lators, and indeetl globalization itself, w]1en the bulk of the damage rs done by local governments, loe;al companies, and even local voters. And, whatever happens, keep running away from the really hard question: How much is greenery worth? A good starting point is that almost all business that produces a physical product tends to be dirty. Until relatively recently, businesspcople were reluctant to admit this reality. That not only made tl1ern look shifty, it also meant that they never made arguments about t11e choices involved. For instance, dllling t11e furor in 1995 over tJ1e of(o;hore disposal of its Brent Spar oil rig, Shell f~ti leu to argue with any force tJ1at Greenpeace's demand that t11e rig be disposed of' on land was by no means the greener solution. Nowadays, business, particularly multinational business, is better behaved. Busi.nesspeople have not become softer. They have simply wised up to two things. The first is that di rty factories lose them consumers. The second is that environmental regulations are not prohibitively expensive, parti<:ulurly for multinationals. A 1990 study l>y the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, found tha~ even the most polluting industries don't have to spend more than 2 percent of th~tr revenues on being good environmental citizens. Go to a ghastly eyesore in the Tlurd World, such as Cubatao, the capital of Brazil's chemical business (once d~bhecl the most polluted city on earth). and you find that multinational compa ~ues ten~ to be cleaner than their Brazilian counterparts-and keener to abide by mtemational standards. . . . .. th What about the idea that trade, bYmcreasmg busmess actiVIty generallYharms . . . the envtkeron~ent? Tius IScertainly true in the short term . If open borders incre<'l~e e mar t 10r a chemical f: t La . 1 . ac ory m gos, the factory will create more c1e 1nicclls. But as countnes grow ri 1 h al index of c ler, t ey so tenu to clean up their act: An elaborate . enVIronmental sustai hl . . d E, omJc 1 Forum tl na tty m 122 countries prepared for the Worl con d 1owed 8t us year s 1 s an a rong con-elation between a cou ntry's greennes

th (tl10ugh. I 'J h( f',tir, an even stronger on 'tl . . e \vl 1 ts 1 of . ack enerally, <tllhou~l <:11\ 1ronmentaJism is a good thin it m corrupt1on). ~fore gther vimres, ir~tluclill~. from a developinu c ~~ ~t be balanced against o . . . . o oun .... r s pomt of . wth vtew. econom1c O It is patro111zmg for .nch-world greens to de .de that Afric gr . . c1 h Id tolerate clirt1er < a ne~ water 111 exchange for more wealth. ur ans s ou not Alas, the cost of the environment is nearlv alw- t b 1 d. ' China. acco.(li ng to I Ite \" Id Bank air and wate ays lla .u ate mcorreclly In vor _ .1 , ' r po utton <:ost Sv4 billion a ear-8 percent o f t1e countrys COP. But it is not th 0 ll . . Y . . ~ . 1. . . e P uting compames that bear tlus pnce. F01 t 1at matter, what mcentive do Indi 11 h . I 1 . an po uters ave to stop throwmg rubb1s 1m tot 1e Ganges that then wrecks Banglad h' . . .. . . . es s nee padl' ? One wes. reason why fish stocks are alarmmgly low globally is because the seas of the world .1 l)rovicle a textbook example of the "tragedy of the <:ommoJ's .. Because nobouy b l f' 1 . owns them, no ot y ee s respons1ble for them. If a Norweuian fisherman d t . B .. 1 . al will ~ oes no piJJage tl1e1~ , tIten h IS nt1s 1 nv, .'This dynamic is also dramatically evident in the current tmpasse over global warmmg. But bla~ing these thing~ on globalization seems a spurious way to let local politicians off the hook. The nght way to protest, say, George W. Bush's decision to junk the Kyoto Protocol is not to blame "the market," but Bush himself. And how exactly would a less interlinked world help? Global warming would not go away if trade barriers went up. Far from being caused by unfettered capitalism, emironmental damage is often caused by exactJy the opposite. One reason fishing Beets can continue to ravage the oceans is because governments spend 821 billion a year supporting them. Brazil's government initially spurred on the despoliation of the rain forest. The World-watch Institute reckons that there are 8650 bJiion worth of subsidies going to environmentally destructive activities. On the other hand, globalization sometimes directly benefits the environment by promoting things such as trade in pollution-control technology and the privatization of state-owned companies, which become less polluting as they are restructured.
..,veal

"GLOBALIZATION MAKES GEOGRAPHY IRRELEVANT'

Wrong again. You might think that t11e death of ~listance a~o means the death of geography. The tntth is probably the opposite. It most tan~ble res~urc~s ntanoible are within anyone's reach, tJ1en w I1at matters are the 1 o thmgs wluch m turn means proximity to people. d . 1 t of excel. . .~. 1 1 tself aroun vanous c users The world economy ts VISlO Yorgaru.zmg _11 S t Tt .,;n challenae .con \ lallev and Wau tree .. 11e .mcu 1 ence, rnost obviously Ho11ywoocl, Sili ,. .o f , . . . t tJ1emselves m , cmous center.; o for companies in a global economy IS to Sltua e f U . to a alobal produc.J:a o excellence and weave toget1 uUleren t centers o exce .ence m ..~,eir comparati"e 1er t in c 1 r commututies is to 1mes u u. tion network. The main challenge 0 .t d 1 connections ,,;th Latin 'ts 01 advantage. Look at the wav that Miami has exp1 e h ed 'ts exq.>'rtise in oil to / cl t 1 Houston as us 1 America. Or t11e way d1at the energy us ~r u move into gas, electric:ih', and energy trading. ks d . aV ., . I -stic . an mo'e Is ..1-~ rubbish. ConsidThe idea t11at businesses can sun~ Yup lish and German compa11ies that ha'-e erable publicity has been given to the few Swe<

PART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

MICt

h WA!T AND WOOLDRJDG E I GLOBAUZATION BACKLAsH 36;,

I some opeations out of their high lv tax(>d llo'lwlands: the r...,1ston. 11 . 111onc ~ "'" evcnh1a ~ C!. _.. ck it out. Wander aro11nd Lw Ang<:les. Ame ica's :; 1 mam . 1 1 ncr those n1 IllS Snl fl I 0 10 IS ~ factories churni . " t: cturing crnter. <UlC1) ou will find squadrons o b ow-tt-c: 1 1 ng Out manu et . d 1 tl s. all of which could proba ly be n I <I( (:' c:l,eapcr clsewh , t0 rs hlllllhtre. an c o te r il I) ere. ) Thev llt ly partI}' c. personal reasons (many are 1am y-o\'v1le< . parllv hcc.:ause tllty ror . I. . . r 1 gt Jabor costs by usmg more mac 1mcs. but most)), bee.\use ... 1 compensate ror u . . OlJ .s r()f Los AngeIes 1 a Imb 11 all three industJies-a place wht>rC:' 0<.'SI~I1('rs, sur)plicrs and distributors are just around the comer. . Finally, borders remain much more Jmportant t~um man~. people imagine. Canada and the United States are both English-speakmg co11ntncs and members of the North American Free Trade Agreement._ But the averag<-> Cm~adian province does 12 times as much trade in goods ar~d 40 times as much trade tn servic.:es \\~th another Canadian province as it does with an American state of the same size and proximity. Similar figures exist {or the European Union (E U) countries.

"GLOBAUZATION MEANS AMERICANIZATION"

True, globalization certainly tilts the playing field in favor of liberal virrues such as accountability, transparency, and individual 1 ights that are often deemed to be American. Y does this mean Americanization? Foreign dictators who want to use xenoet phobia to prop up their positions would no doubt argue that it does. But the United States has no monopoly on liberal virtues. Classical libe ralism was first developed by a group of British tl1inkers-John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith. We stiU use a French phrase, laissez faire, when we invoke the ideal of a free market economy. The first joint stock company was developed in Blitain rather than the United States. Indeed, American de moeraey was arguably the product of British corporations such as the Virginia Company. For all its bureaucracy, the EU now enshrines liberal values such as dernoeratic representation and individual rights every bit as firmly as the U.S. Constitution. Certain!~. ~urope is now moving closer to the Anglo-Amerkan shareholder ~odel of <..~ltalism than it had in the immediate postwar years. A popular share-ownmg culture IS slowly putting dov.rn roots in Europe. The euro Uke the single market before it' is fof(,.;"g European comparues to s un. But these' d eve oprnents do not . . . . '"' 1 1 mean _ European companies or European society will become rnere facsimiles of that Amenca Europeans will bab] . . ocial solidari than pro Ycontinue to put much more emp1 1as1s on s ,. the United States. France's tight labor laws (inc.:luding a relatively new3-~ hourty week) have not sto ped 1 b P tts go al comiJanies from being competitive,J: thouo 1 they have ............l-lv k t 't 1 . :aull 15 unemployment rate unnecessarily high. The Non.uc c 1 ep tri wb -nU<U' --~'lopedose economic perfonnance has matched America's, argue that their we11; lr. ut:Ve we tare states mak the 1 are no af!"'"':.l t h . e tr economies more A exible because peop e I 'IUU o c ange JObs Th . . aJ ntcrllil market of 500 'I'' . ere are growmg signs that Europe (v.rith a potenti IU ted rm uon people) h.:.m~ . . t the 111 S.,.~~ ...t.. .....L be IS '"'ouTIIng to flex itS muscles aucunS 1: uau:::~, "'M::Uler 1t thr gh . l"' all)' cus agt'eeing With American~~ .vetom~ ~ergers, buiJding its own army, or genen reLgn policy m areali such as the Middle East.
Not necessarily.

Nor does glol ' 'i;at ion ne<:cssariJy mea th . . True American f1Ill" <.:an Ile seen almost'n e.Amencaniz fIOn of popular culture: all tl m , over . closest thing we I1aw to a universal food and B .tn 'e world: th e s ~lacl\1 is the sg ou are in Tibet. Bnt cultural trade is a t\~o wa n ey Spears 15 hard to avoid, even if ~s (Andrew Llo~d \\'cbbcr's) or th~ bests~Ue:t:~c{ehs. If you look at popular musis . lSlS . continues to exerc1sc a powerful inHuenc:e on the U t. e Harry Potter sene~). Bntaiu dS .. . Programs on An1eric.:an televisionIfat the moment :te.. ~al~e~; The most s~ccessful .gners own ha of Ame ica's top e book- bli . . rea ty programs rnporte ~d from Europe. Fores 1 20 half of its film studios. On the whole, consumers ha kpclu shmg houses and . . . . . ucts, sometI1mg t I1at 1s becommg eas1 to satisfy as ve a mar e taste for local proder te-' 1 k . . -.nno 1.1.e most popular television program ogy ma es econom1es of scale less 1mportant. 1 E . . . . . m uropean countnes ss nearly always a IocaJ produchon. A few years ago hardly an If . E p _ Pean teenager would have been caught listening to lo<.:alg.rouysse,1 . -resFpect~g}1asur~., r11ow rant:e Air and Sweden has T 1 Cardigans. 1e But there is a more important reason "vhy globalization does not mean the triumph of a partkular nationauty. The essence of globalization is that it in<:reases choice. And th_ !ncludes the choice to l~v~ life according to your O'-"TJlights. A nice is example of th1s 1s the Bruderhof, a religious group that is rather like the Amish. The Bruderhof reject many features of the modern world. Thev don't ha,e radios or televisions; they don 't approve of feminism and homosell:ualitv. But thev ha\e ' ' established a highly successful global toy business using a mixture of Japane e management techniques and American technology. The result: They have all the money that they need to keep their community flourishing, but they have not had to abandon their way of life.

"GLOBALIZATION MEANS A RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN LABOR STANDARDS"

This argu ment rests on four misconceptions. . . The first is that employers are concerned, above all, Wlth the ~nee_ of hlbor. Jn fact, what really interests them is the value of labor. Some compames \Vlllundoub_tedly move routine tasks to parts of the world where hourly wage~ are lower. But 111 general what employers want is not cheap workers but productive ones. And the most productive workers are usually those with the best education. access to the best mac h' uood infrastructure. mery, and a support srstem tl1at . ludes th'ngs like o me . l . If tll e " race to the bottom .' argument were corre"t . would ex,)ect foretgTl . . ,ou r .. direct investment (FDI) to be pouring into countries "ith the lowest wage a~d.the Weakest labor standruds. ~othing could be fu rther from the trutl~. The 'Grut~d States is the world's largest recipient of FDI. Y after year the Un~tedalIStahesl hasd ear t run a net surpl us in its cal)ital account (and t1 1 0 ' ,. of forei1111 cap1t . 1as chods pe le n1 e to keep Interest rates low1 build new factones, and bn11g new production. met . th h to. bear on the economy).' About 80 percent f Us FDl goes too er ne couno . . f t hies Amencan investment in countnes lik ,,.,exl 00 and Clnna ts a mere ragmen . . 'e u . of u s . Investmen t at home.
No.

a6(l

i>ART 3

THE INTERNATIONAL POU TICAL ECONOM,

MICKLl

~11 1 AND WOOLDRIDGE

IGLOBAU

is that globa lization is weakcni11g tl u l't >f vonpanics to . honw l'l'gions. But companies depend on the environtll( ,,, t'l lirst tl'<"at d ~hetr in all otts of\\'a,s, some obvious, some more subtle. Du .ug tht J tstit:c ~etlcm nwnfs investigation of Microsoft, BiU Gates could not l:an"' thre1te> twd 10 tnc>,~ar~ opcration to the Bahamas, even though Microsoft h c.L<; r<:lat j, d) rf>W fixed ass hts ~I icrosoft depends not just on a supply of educated work, rs (wl.o would ~ts. 1 . . . Iationsl11p \Vl.tl1 A lltencm t ltni\ersities. lave re fused to move) but also on its close re The third idea-that global companies are hostile to .. ,\ orktr protection'' h . sU(; as trade-union rights and labor standards--con truns a l taIf'-tntth. Companies rare) react favorably to unions (or indeed to govemments ). ~1at wan~ to shackle thei~ freedom of maneuver \Vith inflexible rul~s abou~, say. hmng a11d fuing. But, by and large, multinationals are much less hostil~ ~o thmgs such ~~s safe working environments, on-the-job training, and opportumties for promotion. Once again, the ke facto r for companies is boosting productivity rather than lowering the price the~ pay for Jabor, so a well-trained and heal thy workfor<.:e is important. Su 1vey aft;r survey shows multinationals providing bigh~r w;-tges and better working conditions for their employees than their local competitors. The fourth and largest misconception is that global i7.ation is a zero-sum game: that if the rich are getting richer as a result of globalization, then th e poor must be getting poorer. But the argument in favor of globalization is that it <:an improve the Jot of everybody by leading to a more efficient use of resources. Of course, globalization does not ahvays achieve this goal, and of course it cannot impose efficiency without a certain amount of pain, but in general , globalization improves the living standards of the vast majority of people. In the half century since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the world economy has grown sixfold, in part because trade has expanded 16-fold. The Organisation for Economi<: Co-operation and Development calculates that nations that are relatively open to trade grow about twice as fac;t as tl10se that are relatively closed. Despite the Asian crisis, the World Bank calculates that some 800 million people moved out of absolute poverty in the past decade. And the people left behind still tend to suffer from too bttle globalization (be it trade barriers to the goods that they produce or restraints on the information they can get at home) rather than too much.
Thl'
St't'Ulld

. I H 367 ny eon cct\ . ' IIIC'a~Hrc nttional By " . . ' ' ' govemm . ,.5 in the tnten l iOt al order than global. . ents art far nore . Jaye 111Stitutio 0 '"'P<>rta l P the U.S. Trea~ur !)tpartrncnt that decid d h ns. uring the Asian ... ~ ,v-etS F. (An d I 'J I w <.:nsts, lt w 1~ r 'Jt. l was W Jiting the ht ~._ ether tr>bat'I out count. the IM I , c ecK..c;.) For .11 th r nes. not eartland aho t t tt U. 1 . s black he[jcopt a E: ears in the t\ m . can h . crs. nati aJ en. 1 . on he ther to send pcacer;.<epmg troops. And uow the mtemati govenlmcnts de<:icl w . I I al . . e w constrrunt. T w n11m )er of international on tnS hlutions face a oe . . nongovem a] (~GOs) increase<.11 rom rJ,OOO m 1990 to 26,000 b tl ment organizations ; Id-fashioned multilateral institution and you ,~ ~en~n~ of the decade. Visit any Onitoring it. T here are 1,700 dustered around th Ul. surrounded by \COs m e mted ;\af . f! Geneva, for examp I~ ons o nce-s in Membership of th e VVTO suggests that globaJ ,.,t . 12 1 IS a bott n r I . 0n wl1en GATTwas IOn ne ed m 1948, it only had 2J contractin a . ,0' up pr~ess. ndustrialized nations; today the WTO has 142 membe g P rties, most of them l 1 . rs, more l1an three . rt of them developmg natl()ns, and 20 more countries are . I . . qua ers 'vil I1at tl1e gIo baJ <.:1 servants who run mosteager y WaJti ng to .join It may be true t int t' . . 1mstttuttons . I I d (. erna IOna are not direct y e ecte JUSt as the heads of civil service de . t .1 . par ments are not directly elected). But t 1ey ~re accountable to national govern ments, the ma'ori of which are now democrac1es. J ty Indeed, you c~uld argue that the real democratic deficit in global institutions is to be fou nd not m the IMF and the WTO but in the ~COs that protest against them. NGOs claim to represent global civil society (whatever that is). But nobody eJects them. They are not accountable to democratic governments. The) represent nobody but their members and their activist cadres, which in some of the noisiest cases means a few hundred people.

ZATION BACICL.As

'-

"GLOBAliZATION CONCENTRATES POWER IN UNDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS UKE THE WTO"

No. Organizations like the World Trade Organization (vVTO) and the Inter. nuch 1 . ess national Monetary Fund (IMF) are not quite paper tigers. Butt hey are 1 powerfuJ than their detractors (and a few of their inmates) imagine. The \\'1'0 : essentially an arbitration mechanism: It deals with issues that clashing govern~ne;nt refer to it. The IMF is a crisis managemen t agency. True, it can impose stnng 'th . reqwrements for structural reforms on its clients, and it has o ft en donesoWJ if MF breathtaking arrogance and insensitivity. But governments only resort to the 1 they are already in serious trouble.

Contem ora,.,. World Politics

the ColJ ith Wwethe endaofnew era orWar, the start of the '\.YarPartJerronsm 'h and the war .m n . F international politics. In are in ,....,q
0 .,. . ,.

our we ave ptcked fiv e reatures of th1s CJa t 1at we beheve are the most importa t r 11 < 1 n IOr unc erstanding its . I 1 Ll 1 maJor contours anu c 1a enges for more. systematic analysis r 1ey .are: the future of. 1 .1 war (both convent1 ona anu unconventional) the uses to wh ,h A . men<.:an power LC ' . ,. . 1 1 ._ . should be put a~<. t 1e 1eact1ons ~f ?thers to that power, the causes and ways of deal. ing with domestiC collapse and c1viJ wars. the protection of the global envuonment, . especialJy th~ .garga.nhmn task of copm~ with likely dimate change, and the effe<.ts on world pohtlcs bemg wrought by the nse of new actors and new forces, such as the European Union, n~n?overnm~ntal organizations (1\GOs}, transnational c-orporations, and a more activ1st comm1tment to the rule of international law.
. . 1 . .

I '" '

CONFUCT, WAR, AND TERRORISM

War is as old as the time when human beings first organized themselves into groups. In the modem era, it has been the great powers that ha,e fought most. and that have always conducted their policies with the possibUity of war in mind. Will the world be as ravaged by war in the decades to come as it has been since the dawn of civilization? Or are we now enteling a new era when war will disappear or be transformed? If war continues, will it still be waged between the kind of actors who were most prominent in the past? Robert Jervis, Samuel P. Huntington, and Fareed Zakaria address the fu~re nature of war anu the likely sources of conflict. Jervis argues that war among th: nch democracies of North America, Western Europe. and Japan is not onl>: a thmg of the pa~ but is no longer even contemplated. Since war among the lea~lg powe~ has been the motor of traditional intemational politics, the <.:oming era will be radically different. The rest of the world is not likely to remain at peac.-e. ho,~e,er..anldd the Umtecl States may continue to intervene abroad 1u mueh of the Tlurd \\ or cl conflicts between, but especially within, states rage and dispute~ o,er horde~ a~-~ c natu ra] resources provide proximate reasons ,or eonfl"tct Huntmgton argues tmu .J . 1li ti' a] thm state-centereu Ul the f: 1 1 au t ines of future conflicts will be more "1' za on . the reasons \\l'~. . . . . . . d exnlams . nat dentifles seven major world c1vihzations an r ure. He L
<;; ___

369

:110

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

CONTEMPORARY WORLD
1

,, politkal con1Jicts. and somctirnes wars, are nwn 1: ' ~~~~ helonging to diffe rent ci,ilizations rather than amou g ,~ l , " ._.<111,,_, C states J\utzati 0 ' "' ' ~\. The ob,ious new eleme nts of <.:onA1 ct are tlw \\a! on ,, is 111 and th l raq triggered hy al Qaeda's attack on the World 'f radL' C l .- and tile p e war 111 \ 1<my 0 f tIle conse quences 0 f' tI1e AmenC<Ul resrc:nse u c ( ~c u ssed in entagon . th " 1uestion o of ten a.kc>d .tfter Septe mbe next sectio n. Fareed Zakaria looks at the c er 1l, 1 ll\' do thev hate us?'' Is there some th ing \\'HJ'tl_ ! witl1 An}) 2001 "\~ t:ountrie. ' . 1 ' ' ~ Musurn countries, or the West? The answe rs are not snnplc., an d inc:l ude a comhJ 'f'r cl yet to lJc t l 1 1cn.ut {'rom it. with H . . . :!li nation of the desire to be li ke tl1e \1\fest an gton playing a role but the confli ct not being cen trally about r<'li.~i on.

cur am

THE USES OF, AND REACTIONS TO, AMERICAN POWER

Since the colJapse of the Sovie t Union in 1991, the Un ited States has been the world's strongest economic and military powe r. and. as a consequence. analys ts have argued ve that we U in a "unipolar" world -one dominated by a single state. Immediate! , following the end of the Cold War, America's economic and milit<.uy shength was a~ important feature of international poUticallife: Ametican milita ry powe r deployed abroad ""as a stabilizing influence in key regions, and America's remarkable ec."Onomic growth in the 1990s helped other states to prosper as well. For many of the conflicts that have erupted since 1991, the Unite d States has been the "911" of the world. But 9/11 now obviously has an additional meaning, and the use of American power since the terrorist attacks raises a host of new issues. How will the United States pursue its war on terror? To what extent is this largely an Amelican struggle? Is the invasio.n/liberation of I raq a uniqu e event or the first of many such adven tures? What is the role of other states, how will they react to the highly assertive American policy, and how heavily should the Unite d States weigh their prefe rences and interests? These issues are sharply raised by what can be called the "Bush Doctrine" outlln ed in nume rous official documents and presidential speeches and embodied in many American actions, especially the ouster of Sadd am Hussein. Many people have attributed the new American policy and the sharp shift in Presid ent Bush 's policy to a combination of factors, most obviously the terrorist attacks, but also Bush 's unilaterilis t predi spositions, his religious beliefs, and the role of nee-conservatives in his administration. While not denying the relevance of these factors, Robe rt Jervis looks to the struc ture of the international system for much of the explanation. Reili sts uke Morgenthau and Waltz have stressed that powe r is checked only by counter-balancing power. A unipolar system wi1l be highly condu cive to unilateralism on the prut of the leading state .as 115 and that count ries which share it sees both that no other states can block it interests are not sufficiently powerful enough to act on their own, but rather will wait for the leading power to shoul der the burde n of action . Many Americans agree with Presid ent Bush that the best way to fight . cannot d . nsm t erron sm an secure American intere sts is to spread democracy. Terro thrive in a free and open society, it is often said. Gregory Cause sharply cballeng~ this comfortable conclusion. Terrorism can have widesprea d support in the genel

. . . n indeed. th(' 1" -:I, lhnnblk an Army rec'CJved moral . . . . ulatJO ' -.. poP . 1.suJ?port from !..'O>~IIll l lllltles within the UnJ.ted States (Jrganr7.ational ' cuid F } . . aJICia urt lermore fr frJl . in Islamic: cot ntw .. 1na~ well produce go . ee vernments hostil to tlre United Jecoons e e . Statc:s~ tleh of the fate of r\ merit:an policy will be determ1necl by h h . lv 0 "' . ww for many c.:ountn E:s 1 t o rea<.:t to the rise of Amencan powe ot ers react to cl 't d 1 an the rnost impo rtant Cjli(::Stiun tl1 ran assemvecv have to a " ess JS thinking WO! I Il I imp l)' t hat others would trv to nswer TradirIonaI baIance of h th . n wart t e United s 1 . )OweJ tates and I . . its powe r. Bul cune nt Circumstances are unusual d. . an IS . -' be m others' interests. Th ltS far from <.:Icar th at Id re!fl tn h attempts wou succe eu or luct s we are likely to see a vatiety of responses aimed at u.sd tep~en Walt argues gut mg, mfluencing, an<1 . U111'let l States poI na lcies. He argues th t ' etimes thwartmg .1 a . . . some its own mterests, tl1e U nJted States should conside th to most eiTective). . r e mterests and likelv f th serv . responses o o ers.

POuncs

37t

FAILED STATES, CM L WARS, AND NATION-BUILDING

Although civil sbife and domestic collapse are as old as history, they have become more prominent a:ter ~e Cold vVar ~d have become even more imPortant recenth through the perce1Ved ll.nks to terron sm. State failure and civil war are fed by both internal and extemal causes, which makes them particularly hard to unders t~d and deal with. Because of tl1e ~ro~ in tl1e number of states and because of the heightJ ened consequences for regiOn s, 1 not for the entire worlcl of disturbance in one area, these subjects are now high on the agenda of both scholars and polic)makers. Because we live in a welJ-established country with a high degree of public order, most of us too easily forge t that this situation is not a natural one, but rather the hardwon result of a broad concatenation of political, economic, and social forces. Under some circumstances, central au thority can not only be subject to violent dispute. but can also be so tom apart that it simply disappears, resulting in the national go,emment being replaced by local wrulords, roving bands of thugs, and chaos. Robert Rotbe rg looks at stron g, weak, and collapsing states. He details many of ~e paths that lead to state collapse, as welJ as examining states that seemed headed mthis direction but have saved themselves. State failure and civil war are often reciprocally related, of course. One prominent ex'J)lanation for domestic ~o~der, viol~oce, and disintegration is the power of deep grievances and divisi_ons w~t~ ~state , a.r:s, often along ethnic lines. Chaim Kaufmann analyzes the nature of ethmc ctvil.w shows why they are so intractable, and surveys the various methods of interv:rung m ~l~tn.' He concludes that physical separation of tlte warring ethnic groups , etther by <:reanng safe areas \vi thin a state or by partitioning the state. offers the best long-te~ hhope to stop the kilung. Most curre nt discussion focuses not on di,iding countnes ut on rebuildi ng them . James Dobbins extmcts t he 1 essons we can team from out. . SJders' attempts at nation-building and democratiZation smce \Vorld War 11. He 1 ooks at the efforts of the United States and the Ul\. arguing that while they oper~e d l Lcons1 enng the obstacles. Focusmg SOmewh1t dire 1 has done fiurl)' we neren tl)'' each ' t te . .stic Of course tnore di rectly on demo cmtiz ation, James Payne is more pcssJou

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD PGL, 1

nl ~~tit~ l'n.>nl St'\'L'ral attempts, most obvioush- m I . '<-'hl'ls al><>ltt \\I1e tJ1er mterYenbons can ' prc,1 tu ' trongl:' inAuence the future course of Ameri<:Cir' pol

"' . t in, but it is cl t h., .utd demo. eanhat

C:raty

wm

THEE~ONMENTANDCUMATE C~~GE
Protection of the global environment is not a ne>'' 1ssm but ts 1 unporta . d . J. . n<.:e has mcrease Wl t tm the last two decades, with the ureatcr dan1 g, . 1 ~ < c m t 1e "' d 1 of tlw ozone Iaver and th orm of ep etion of the world's fisheries, degradation 1 global wanning and attendant cum ate change. T he Unilcd <~tio,ns C ; t1reat of on . the E nVlronment held in Rio in 1992 marked a watershed in internat rerence on l ' ona awareness o f the increasing threat to the global e nvironmenl. Truly global environmental threats, as opposed to strictly national 0 especially difficult to deal witJ1 because tJ1ey are a commons" problem ~es, are . n sucb j b . . . cases, concerta~on of state action does not corn~ eas1 y ecause the situation looks as follows: No smgle state owns the resource bemg consumed (or abused) b all use it (or abuse it), and none can be prevented from using and abusing it 'A ~t commons (or public) good is therefore one that no single indiviuual or entity owns b that aLl need and can use. For such goods, no individual or state has an incenti~'e ~~ minimize its exploitation unless it is persuaded that all others will act in a similar fashion. This represents a collective action problem: uncoordinated individual action produces collective disaster. This is the "tragedy of the commons" and the message of Garrett Hardin 's article. Environmental degradation is not onJy bad in itself but can lead to international and domestic c:onBicts. The ways in which this can happen are complex, however. plores many of them. Economic and social changes put Thomas Homer-Dixon ex great pressure on political systems and the coming years wiiJ test our foresight, discipline, and skill. Both the policy and the inteiJectual questions are of course contested, and part of the dispute pivots on whether one should be optimistic or pessimistic about the ability of market forces to bring about appropriate behavior. Climate change induced by man-made global wanning, or what is tenned ''the enhanced greenhouse effect," may be humankind's greatest challenge. Widespread and growing use of fossil fuels to develop and sustain modem economies has added enough carbon dioxide to the world's atmosphere to cause the average global temr:rature to increase by ~early one degree centigrade since the onset of the ~dustrial Revolution. This may sound iJlsirrnif:cant, but it is not. The overall change 10 global ed tJ1111 d1e 'E>'uu J temperature from the depths of the last k-e Age untiJ now can be measur W range of four to nine degrees centigrade. The best estimates of cli matologists are that at present and projected rates of fossil fuel burning, the average global temperatu~ will increase from two to six degrees centigrade by the end of tJ1e twenty-first ~~tu~ 1 At the high end of this estimate, we will be in the range witltin which seve~e ~ change occurred in the past. Climate change raises dangers not only ~f wJdesr:itM~ dislocations but also of catastrophic climate change if warming feeds on Jtself (po feedback in which warming produces more warming).

373 RLo POUT!CS nate chang< i" tlt ~~~~!:!;est c:omtnons problem f I Clu ," o t1 c:m . 11 . Every nation ' II T a butes to it. H l to ~ ' -.cmw tnnc:h lllore than otb c.-ootn contributes aho tl'Hw-fH'th of the greenh ers. he U~tited Stat<::s fo , r ouse gases rod . e. . Il1P1 P U<:ed each vear h eM! . also a hig c:nnln , Jtt>r but so, too are nati . . . ons t at c:ut do ' . . I China JS wn lhetr forests h trees absorh Lar Jon dtox1tie. Slowing g . . reen ouse gas because 1 emtsstons, and d c: . b), stabilizing l1llll at a safe level. will reou ] tre a egre 0 f . . e,e, a ' e mtemational not vet ach iend in humankind's hjsto"' It a1 \V). ll'k I .. pr so 1 1 coopera0 00 d e ~ mvolve mas...... sfers of resour<:c>s from the rich nations to th e poor. a optio f 1 51\'e trcv n c ean and . nmentally-frieudly ent:rgv technolooies novel poJti -econom .. h J <.:a1 , o ' . I . en,,,o c se ernes k 011ssions tradin g n~ 1t . and sactifice bv both ricb and poor. be e The nations of the workl have been wrestling with th 1 ext reme1 compl 5 b )' for about 15 years. At the Hio Conference in 1992. thev eo . cl th ex pro Iem " mmJtte emselves t0 .th .l .. t: wanning hilt they made nu specific c mework conventton on ueaung Wl global , . . a ,ra . r,<.: llmitrnents. Rw was .more an lexl1ortabon to act than a spec1n p1 r actton. At an ror . c co1 Ll e Kvoto Conference l1l 1997, t "le nch developecl states did la) 0 t u a pIan oraction 1 ul . :ommitted them to. reduce by 2010 their greenhouse gas emss,;ons. from stx to that c ... " c I1e1r .19~0 levels. ~he world's poorer developing states. however. eight percent bel~w ~ refused to make SImilar bmdmg <:omm1tments, argumu that the developed states had created the problem and therefore should solve it, first by reduc:inO' their own emissions and t11~n by giving the. developi~g stat~ the financial resources and te<:hnolog:. to build enwonmentally safe energy mdustries. The parties to the Kvoto Treaty have subsequently been engaged in negotiating the specific me~ures ~nd me<:h~lisms necessary to put the Kyoto commitments into effect, and most of t11em ha,e rati6ed yoto Protocol, but the United States decided not to be part of this process. If the the K world is to deal effectively \vith global wanning, then Third World nations, China. and orld the United States must be convinced to do their share. Indeed. Third W nations are not likely to agree to help until the United States takes serious action to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. John BrO'-"lle looks at the mix of market and political measures that states must take if they are to tackle this problem seriously.
I )

CONTEMPORARY WO

NEW ACTORS AND NEW FORCES

The state system we live in today dates roughly from the Peace of\\'estphalia. whicb ended the Thirty Years War, one of the bloodiest in human history. Conseque~tly. the modem international system of states has recent1v celebrated its 350th culm,ersary. Will it accommodate the rise of newly powerful ~tates? \~ill tl1e state system itse~ continue? That is, will the state remain the most important, although not tlle onl~ . unportant, actor in world politics? .. Chi na ts not a new actor in world politics, but 1t JS an reasin(Jhimportant one. f Cl . " e. me Wtl un tl1e United States there is a sharp debate about"' hether the ''rise o una , 1 . . \\ill bly lead to conflict with the Umted States. R'tc1, d K Betts and T1 d . . 1omas lar meVJta <;.<anusm an . . . Chn tensen anal)rze the contrasting reasons for optiJlllSill . d for. nP_ r-- an s . 0 f th t ndentious arguments. prod . . . li . f ....,,..;!>I e e mswer that straightens out man) uce a mtxed < urope 10 h t e form of the Ewopean Union is a new actor 111 world {>O tits. 1 a F ......

--- ... -qf the def . . El' <:onslih ttion should not be exaggerated ; the J:~ 1 r '"t to fad<; a:t of~i.e thcr does the lack of direc tly-elected institutions mun th t.iet EL; i~ undemay.. ~~~ 1:> tJ ter. It lS a creative way of moV111g some declSlOTl'i t o a :mpanation ()(;rati< ~l al level . : kecpmg many otl1ers \VIth nation al borders. m w1ule The six final selections of this book anal)rte tlee t;r0v. iu~ impmtanc:e of . tate actors. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkin k prc,,idE a more syst no~. analvsis of :\GOs and show how transnatio na1 network~ (I)Wrate and increematt<: . asmg1 affect state action. Sebastian !vtallabv takes the uncon ventional if not pe ... y ; . 1 position that while NGOs often do great good m the world we must not forgetverse th they have their own interests and their own views of th~ interests of those claim to speak for, and these may not corresp ond to what _ best for those popula. ts tions . Many NGOs are deeply conce med about hum an nghts. and at bottom , the most fundamental units in th e world are not states bu t individuals. R11oda E. How ard and Jack Oonn elly argue that, although cultu res and systems di ffer, eae:h individual still has a set of rights by virtue ofbe.i ng hum an. In the absence of effective international government, there is no choic e but to rely on states for the enforcement of human rights. So states are both stren gthened beeause iliey have assumed new responsibilities and weakened becau se their sovereignty is <.: haJ. lenged by universal norms and outside actors. States are also challe nged by the flow of commodities and peopl e that illegally flow across their borders, especially drugs, anns , terro rists, money derived from crime, migrants, and re fugees. Moises Nairn examines these and the limite d respo nses availa ble to state authorities. Daniel Drez ner looks at anoth er important area- the regulation of the intemet and argues that far from undermining the state power, this new techn ology and the forms of politics it calls up stren gthen the state in many ways. _Steven R. ~atn~r argue s that international law is having greate r effect on state action , and by_ Implication, that international politics are becoming more regulated and domestic-like. More international law is being written, and enforce ment is being improved. Whet he r the forces and actors described above will eventually subvert the state system or instead remain subservient to it, or whetJ1er some new patterns now difficult to imagine will e merge, is something we will be able to answer only several decades from now.
r

Mm

~lt11pkt~on e.AsAndrew .\1 oravscik argue~.' tt~: ;

co r:r LICT, WAR, AND TERRORISM

th:

rhe Era of Leading Power Peace

ROBERT JERV1S

War and the possibility of war among the great powers has been the motor of international politics, not only strongly influencing the boundaries and distribution of values among the m, but deeply affecting their internal arrangements and shaping the fates of th e smaller ones. Being seen as an ever-present possibiUty produced by deeply-rooted factors such as human nature and the lack of world government, this force ~as expected to continue indefinitelr. But I would ~~e tbat war among the leadmg great powe rs-the most developed states of the Umted States, West Euro pe, and Japa n-will not occur in the future, and indeed is no longer a source of conce rn for them (M ueller 1989). . . Now, however, the leading states form what Karl Deutsch called a pluralistic security community, a group among whom war is literally unthinkable i.e., neither the publics nor the political elites nor even the military establishments e:\-pect war with each other (Deutsch et al. 1957). No official in the Community would a<hocate a polic.y on the grounds that it would improve tJ states postion m the event of war 1e with other mem bers or allow the state to more effecti vely threaten them. . Although no one state can move away from th e relianc:e on ,..,Clf bv itself lest t , . y r become a victim they can collective1 do so .f each ''0 rsakes the resort to fforce. J . h ..s developme nt challenges many ' Th1 of our th eones an d nuses the question o w at international politics y.rilJ be like in the future . . d ted is unpre Security comm unitie s are not unprecedented B t what lS ftb ce en onal u temati 1 that the states that constitute this one are the leading me~~rs tho ~ nt struggle ' e S)stem and so are natural rivals who in the past were cenmu to e '101

. _...:.t., tial A ddress- American F1\lrn RA L.. f , A-di PO\''er Peace: p~n . ...1. nnM Poli. "'-Je.rt Jervis, 'Theo ries of War in an Era o ~ ng . Ice &cieu:. \'ol. 96. ~o. 1 l~l;uur ~ , tical SCience Association. 2001,~ American P oilt1col Sciet . R nntedwitbthepeun$011 ~~ 4 ~yright 4) 2002 by The Amerit".tn Political Scilm<;e ~~~ omitted. bridge University Press. Portions oftht> text and some footnotes

.:0

375

376

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

'' " '-'I

Nt

I::.RA OF LJ:'I\n "-1'\UING PQ\t"'n

, >;;."'

PEAet.

for ecu rity. power, and contested values. \Vi nston Cl u ~c;ratet1 on! sli~htly wll('n he declared that "people talk~d :.1 lot of ,. ' c 11 lhey sai~ nothing wns ever settled by war. Notl dJ1g in hlstO') \vas e 1 tcer>l hy wars" {q uoted in Gilbert 1983, 8n0-6J ). Even cases of major eh '~ ' ' 11t war' s Uc.;I1 as I Blit~ti n yiekling hegemon y in the Westem lte l~l bp lere to tl ' 11' d Stales at the tum of the twentieth centu ry, were stro~gly 111 n 11 ~n~cd ' '' Hr. . .., calculations. Threatening war, preparing for it, and trymg to avoid ll ha, l' If l at eel all aspec.:u, of politics, and so a world in which war a~nong tl~c ll to~t dv,l'loped states is unthinkable will be very di fferent from the hlstmy With wl~:h ":<arc fam iliar. To paraphrase and extend a claim made by Evan. Luard (1986, .' ' ), ~1 V<tl the scale ant! frequency of war among the great powers m th_e prec:Pdmt!; l~l i_ll<>nnia, this is a change of spectac~lar proportions.. ~erh~p~ the sm~le ~n~st ,slnkmg discontinui ty that the history of mtemational poltti_cs has_ an)"~h~t e pt 0\1dc d. Two major states, Russia and Cluna, m1ght flght_each olhC' r or _a me mber of the Commun ity. But, as I wiU discuss below, such a con H1ct wou ld he dtfferent from traditional wars between great powers. FUJtherm ore, these c;ou ntri cs lack many of the attributes of great powers: their intemal regimes are s_haky, th~y H_rc not at the forefront of any advanced forms of technology or econo~1 1c organtzatio~ , they can pose challenges only regionally, and they have no attra~tio 1~ as models lo: others. They are not among the most developed states and J thmk 1t woulcl be fmr to put them outside the ranks of the great powers as well. But thei r military potential, their status as nuclear powers, and t11e size of their economies renders that judgment easily debatable and so I will not press it but rather wilJ argue that the set of states that form the Community are not all the great powers, but all the most developed ones.

terrorist .llt.t - tre of 1mpn> <:t'dcnt 1 u . et ma ni . mpact 011 d(lf "' aud mtcrnaUontl poit g tude and "~J 1 ficaJlt l . ' l IC.:S, 1 I J )Ut u na'' . sigtl1 t'al to be a ftll llt")lttd suh~litutt: forvreat <>uotthinktl h a oten I . ' . o p<J\\rer war- tey <l\e the P f olitics. Desp1 1 1l t lon <.: to tl1e contrary tl l1 . t.e., to be the cl .. ce 0 r I . ' , lerc rJVJng ror . ~ wi}l unite to CO l n Jt!t t~n'OrJSlll ; the forms of th' IS little (;I ianc:e that a\1 L ntJ1eS r I tne c;ou d r,ten are a us<: 11 to o I f'<>r slates, and state!s h I~ S<:ou rge . too \'.tried a d are . lee OJ ' ave many 0 th . n 1n< I ,,.,t as importan t as eorn hatm" terrorism s . I er mteresu, th t at e.... . . . .n . lllll 1 y, alth ar h a are ber 11 have tnggcrcd Slgt11fieant chancres in Am . oug the event\ of 5eJ>tern . a] alignments, 1 I) t li . . o . I eve lI1at . a fairly short enc:an foretgn P<>K'\i and m .d 01 1 rernah . . peno of tim . ; 10 cl conflicts of mlerest w11l ruassctt themselves E t h e preVJ()us out1 l<s an . . .. ven I t is is h 00 l "hng ten ons111 bC'comes the n10st impo1 mt croall. t ' not t e case and Jc )< :orn ' o or most all .. w:ty -'or ove a ' from leading power "var is still both important 'and puzl.Ung. states. the
JleCent
111

--

WILL THE SECURITY COMMUNITY LAST?

Predictions about the n'laintenance of the Community are obvio lv dis putable (indeed, 1imltat_1on s _on peop1 ' ab'I' ty t o prediet could undermine us , but nothin<1 e s 1J it), inthe short penod s1~ce the end of the Cold War points to an unraveling. \\'e c:ould make a long H of d1sputes . bu~ there _were at least as many in the earlier period. st, The Europeans ~ffo 1t to establish an m~epe1~dent security force is aimed at permitting them to mte1~ene whe_n the Umte_d Sta_tes chooses not to (or perhaps by threatening such actH?n , to tngger Amencan mtervention), not at fighting the United States. Even if Europe were to unite either to balanc-e against the United States or because of its own intemal dynamics and the world were to become bipolar again, it is very unlikely that suspicions, fears for the future, and conflicts of interest wou ld be severe enough to break the Community. A greater t11reat would be the failure of Europe to unite coupled ''~th an American withdrawal of forces, -..vhich could lead to "security c :ompetition" within Europe (Art l996a; Mearshe ime r 2001, 385-96). Partly general, the fears would focus on Germany. Their magnitude is harJ to gauge and it is difficult to estimate what external shocks or kinds of German behavior would activate them. The fact that Thatcher and Mittenand opposed German unification is surely not_ fo:gotten in Germany and is an indication that concerns remain. But this danger 15 hkely to <'Onstitute a self-de nying prophecy in two ways. First. many Germans are a""~ of the need not only to reassure others by tying themselves closely to Europe. but also to s k . . . ee to make 1t unli kely that future generations o[ ermm1s would want to break .d a1 these bonds even if they could. Second Americans who worry about the rest .u dan c ' ger Wln 1avor keeping some troops in Europe as tJl e uInmate intra-European ecurity guarantee. . for En tations 0 f peace close orf important rou t e.s to war. Th e .matn reoontl:tat "l>ee l ' re Japanese aggression in the 1930s was the desire f'or a seIf-s uflktent sp leseen as .. Would 11 t powers t1 was 1at . permit Japan to fight the war with the \ves em . t...l ved that lll('vitabl a: b t l ecause tt was 1ft: e, not because of particular conmcts. u l t..~li . that te securitv a great po wers always fight each other. By contrast. 1f 5tates VC' e' e1.t.:0 it and will fro t'Omm . t 0 t111eats m'\ uu umty WJ..Il last they will not be hypersensth\'t'

CENTRAL QUESTIONS
Five questions arise. First, does the existence of the Community mean the end of security threats to its members, and more speeifically to the United States? Second, will the Community endure? Third, what are the causes of its constntc tion and maintenance? Fourth, what are the implications for this transformation for the conduct of international affairs? Finally, what does this say about theories of the causes of war?

CONTINUED THREATS
The fact that the United States is not menaced by the most developed countries d~s not mean that it does not face any military threats at all. Indeed,_ sot~e see_th~ Uruted States as no more secure than it was during the Cold War, bemg un~en~e by terrorists and "rogue" states, in addition to Russia and China. But even 1f I am 101 wrong to believe that these claims are greatly exaggera ted, these conflicts do 1 . have tlte p~tential to drive world politics the way that clashes an~ong the_ 1~~~:~~ powers did m the past. They do not permeate all facets of internati onal pohticS . . . structure state-soc1 relations; they do not represent a struggle for domwance 111 ety the international syste m or a direct challeng e to American vital interests.

c .

378

P ART 4

coNTEM

roRARYwoRUJ wu . ~.,..J
JERVlS I TilE ERA OF LEAD
I'NG POWER PEACE

.-e precautionarv measures th ' , Id l 1 ed to un dertell\ ' ll1ue l' . not ft'f I t Iw ne be Thus the United States lS not d u h r] th t 1 ~ne the .of other mern rs. destroy A .can cttJes <llH' , I I( those 311 r h . a sf-cun~ i iles could men rs and french .nuclear m ss ... 1 plans for missile defense, the~ de Ill t feel thtwo c:oun. tries ohed to Arnenc,u . b j e ne J forces in response. As long as peace JS e ren l (,, he ve r , lik eu to Jllcrease ~etrd . t irals of tension and threat is low. ) ely, tht chance of ma 'erten sp . . . . rtheless. tile point witl1 wluch I began thi s section 1 11 nmoid I! c; 7\e'-e . u rroreseca1>le ''11! tlissol a) e. \Vorld . .. . e rapidlv and sa\lng that no 1mg . I pofitics C'cUl c1 1ang , . ~ _, 11 di ' e t 1e c . . t the same as saving that 1t wru not sso1 (Bt>tts 1982) llo th orn. ve 1 rnuruty rs no . , ( b J ) e ext that it rests on democracy and prospent) see. eo"' , ~n~~ung that would un ent . these,,uuJd also undennine the C-ommuruty. Drast1c climate change 1 der. mme . . eau d al 1ted. But . . hake tlle foundations of much that we ha'e come to take fm grw so s . . a1 J . 1(. tl I . It lS hard to see how dynamics at tl1e mtemation eve I.e., 1e nornta tra3ectol)' of 1ears c.li r putes. and rivalries) could produce war among tl1e 1 di ng states. In oth er wore]; sea Community does not ha,e wit11in it tl1e seeds of its 0\11 destru<;tion. ' the Our faith in the continuation of this peace is increased to th e exte11 t tl . b . 1at w think we understand rts causes and have reason to elJeve that thev will continuee . , This is our next topic.

:l79

EXPLANATIONSFOR THE SECURITY COMMUNITY

There are social constructhist, liberaL and realist exnlanations for the c . ..L.=ch aJL . . r ommuruty ww , . mough proceedmg from different assumptions and often usin ruffer tenns, mvoke overlapping fac:tors. g ent

. knowledged leud1.r<; PI the.: human race in tl ,le 11 . le causes o[ p0 liti I . ..J ile Senator A 1<.:rt Hc"endgc proc:laimecJ thlt "God I ea Improvement ~ 1 ~ ld'( quottd in Van Evera l9o" - ) Th lUmade us the master orcran. ' . ers of the wor IZ I c)<f , 2 r . ese s ti ::. a) because t wy arc .,o at vtuiance from wlvt L en ments are.shO<:king oa we na\'e bee t h tod and oursC'lws. \\ e cou Id not adopt thes . thers . n aug e VIews Without r t to thmk about O f beliefs and vaIues. An understanding of tl1e enects of eJec.ting a hrO"dd set h . . O the Europe;ms, <m d. to tUl unfortunately lesser extent the a sue C.'Onceptions led and harmonize thc1r textbooks after World \V U d Jh panese, to de-nationalb.e . . ar an as simHa I 1 - . ,.vith remammg enem1es to fo!Jow a different patll: Tl oals r Y eu countries a 12-year-old chjJd in Pakistan inc:lude the "ability t0le~ for the education of designs about Pakistan; acknowledge and identih, r . that mav be,. ki ow all about India's evil y ~orces . Paldstan; understand the Kac;hmir problem (quoted.m K umar 2001 29) ng agrunst vor . . The central obJeCt10n to constructionism is that 1 mts ta kes ef; for ea 't t rect 1 I)Ut the identities , images ' and seIf-Images are su use: s description is correct, . ' t h1re, being the product of peace and of the matenal mcenti ves d'1scussed b ruc pers 1 What is. crucial . not lpeople's thinking but the factors th t d . Tl . e ow. . . b is l , . a nve lt. le valH.lity of this drum. 1. eyonc t 1e reach of current evidence but 1 pomts t o a cnttque of the s . . t . constructiVlSt eH gument that the Community will last ' wh'ch p1 r . . . . . 1 aces great ra1t h m tile power o f soctahzatlon and the ability of ideas to repucate and sustam them 1. selves. T t.US conception may betray an excessive faith in the validity of ideas that seem self-evident today, but that our successors . . might re1 . Construct'JVIsm mav ect . ~resent us With actor~ who are "over-socialized" (\Vrong 1976. eh. 2) and leave t~ little role for agency m the form of people who think differently perhaps beca . 'al , use tbeu maten cond itions are different.

Social Constructivism
Social ...L 1 d titi.constructivist aoc'Ounts stress the roe 0 f norms o f non-viole nce and shared . 1 en es mat, t1 trough an mteractive . f . tions ha 1 d th cl d process 0 rectprocal behaviors and exnecta' ve e e a .vance democ . t 0 h r In contradistin ti th . racies assume t e role of each other's friend. importance of ~a~n t]o c e liberal and realist explanations, this down plays the a en ,actors and elevate5 1d f and conceptions of ap . eas, tmages o oneself and others, duc.-ed this enormo p hriftop~a~e cond~ct. The roots of the changes that have pro u5 5 d m mternationa1 P0 Jtics among some countries but not 1 others is not specified tail b c.ycIe ofbehavior bel' m e d ' ut the p rocess IS a seIf-reinforcing one-a benign f n I beco, Ie s, an expectations. ceop e me socialized. . peace. Individuals in ti Co mto attitudes, beliefs, and values that are conducive to le mmunity may see their own country as strong and good-and eveo better than th that was oommon in the 0 ers-but they rarely espouse the virulent nationalism that the Gennans were ..~ Before World War I, one German figure could proclailn ~ that the Germanse~t;st civilized people known to history" while another ~other people hate us. Th e the chosen people of this century," which e"-'J>lains spu:itual SUperiority." Tho ey do not understand us but they fear our tremendoUS 1 gr~ and lllO!It highly ~ acaulay similarly wrote that the British were ~:d : people that ever the world saw" and were th

Liberalism
Th~ liberal explanation has received most attention. AJtlwugh it comes in se\eraJ ~anants, the central strands are the pacifying effects of democracy and economic

mterdependence.

Democracy The members of the Community are democracies, and many scholars Rrgue that democracies rarely if ever fight each other. Although tl1e statistical evidence is, as usual, subject to debate, Jack Levy is correct to claim that it is 'as close as anything we have to an e mpiJicallaw in international politics (Levy 1989. 88). Less secure, however, is our understanding of why this is the case. ha,e numerous explanations, which can be seen as competing or complementary. Democracies are systems of dispersed power, and dispersed power means multiple veto points and groups that could block W'ctr. (This seems true almost by definition, hut if the accounts of fo rmer Soviet leaders are to be trusted. Brezhne, was more constrained by his colleagues than was Nixon, at least where ~ms cont~ol was concerned.) Related are the norms of these regimes: democrac1es function through compromise, non-violence, and respect for law. To the extent that ~es~ v lues .and a h~bits govern fo reign policy, they are conducive to peace. especalJ> m relations With other democracies who reciprocate.

'"e

' '"'a

't

\..U N I t.MPUKAKY WUKW PVU I JL ::>

Jt:.IWIS I

THE. ERA , OF LEADING

. B~ havmg a relatively free Bow of intelligence and encou r;1.riar t Tnation. 1.n10<;r . . <<: Icss lr'kely to make egregious enor-s in estimating what(.'( Ir ~ ., artion will -~~es ar~ tam ~e peace. The other side of the informational coin b that Ut.' , acies can rnatneffecti\'(:>1~ telegraph tl1eir own intentions, and so avoid both tr nt:<.:essar , ~ore of confiict and wars that stem from others' inconecl belief~ that tht dc ~;ptr~s bluffing (although an obvious cost is an inability to bluffi. ac.y ts . Finally, in a recasting of tl1e traditional_ argument tl1 at dernocracies are 1 hkely to go to war because those who hold ultimate authori t~ 1L'., the general ess lie) will pay the price for conAict some argue that the institutional and coalilub. nature of democratic regimes requires their leaders to purc;ue successful polici~~~~ they are to stav in office. Thus democracies \vill put grcattr efforts into \VJ. 1 ' nn1ng wars and be careful to choose to figh t only wars they can ''in. Autocracies 1 1ave a much narrower base and so can stay in power by buying off thci r supporters even if thei~ foreign po~cies ar~ un~ecessari_ly ~ostly. ~hese ~rguments, while highly su _ gestive, share \.VJ.th earlier liberal trunking qu1te styl zc::d assum ptions about tJ~ preferences of societal actors and pay little atte ntion to how e<lch counhy antici~ pates the behavi.or of others and assesses how others e>q)ect it to behave. These explanations fo r tl1e democratic peace are thoughtful and often ingenious, but not conclusive. Many of them lead us to expect not only dyadic effects but monadic ones as well-i.e., de mocracies should be generally peaceful, not onl): peaceful toward each other, a finding that most scholars deny. They would also lead us to expect that one democracy would not seek to overthrow another, a proposition that is contradicted by American behavior during the Cold War. Furthennore, most of the arguments are built around dyads but it is not entirely clear that the posited causes would apply as well to multilateral groupings like the Community. , The causal role of democracy is hard to establish bec:ause these regimes have been relatively rare until recently, much of the democratic peace can be explained by t11e Soviet threat, and the same factors that lead countries to bec:ome democratic (e.g., being relatively rich and secure) are conduc:ive to peace between them. It is particularly important and difficult to control for the role of common interest, wltid1 loomed so large during the Cold War. But interests are not objective and may be strongly influenc:ed by tl1e country's internal regime. Thus the democraci.es may have made common cause during the Cold War in part because they were democracies: common interest may be a mechanism by which the democratic peace is sustained as much as it is a competing explanation for it (for this and related issues, see Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; Gartzke 1998, 2000; Maoz 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999; Schweller 2000). Moreover, if democracies are more likely to become economically interdependent with one another, additional common interest will be created. But to bring up the importance of interest is to highlight an ambiguity and raise a ques~on. The ambiguity is whether the theory leads us to expect democracies never to fight ~h other o~ "merely" to fight less than do other dyads. (Most scholars take the la~~ VJ.ew, but this does not mean that this is what most versions of the theory actu : imply.) The related hypothetical question is: Is it impossib]e for two democracies to have a conflict of interest so severe that it leads to war? This troubles the stronger version of the argument because it is hard to answer in the affirmative.
11

O~her . cholars have argued t11at the key eJemeut lie~

tl ..

1inf(H

111

CE 381 But wou ld de 111o .- I l<t such 1 potent conflict f. ( 0 nterest 1 tJw st tt ~~tl<. ,L <.Iata is the f king as i!S ~tfl s that most <hs~\lllwcl the intE;matiactal -or rather, the j'ud< evelop~ At least recrune I on order . h gment th rr tated their OWll P' lp c~-.-the USSR G . m t e twenti th - at the deva5 ll 1 erman)' _, e <-'entu 1 Kaiser \Vi H.' 111. On<.; reason for th. unuer the \ azi . d, ry a so der ttfl Id (I 1 ts connecr s an perh 'e the wor >ttl .>C'cause the intemati I IOn mav be th .1 aps, rer!1Cll' .1 cl cl ona order e uestre t0 . that were au\'<Ul<:t emo<:racies it m was established b tnes ' av not be .. ' counsed it were not). :\ot aiJ mu rderous reg surpns1ng that tl ' oppo h .1 tmes are as a b . 1ose who 1 da). and ot ers w1t 1 )Oth power and g d d . m thou.~ (e.g. ldi A . UgaJ1 ) 1 1 ran estgns mrns (e.g., Maos Ch r ~a. Jut~~ rs 1ard to understand thedis ~ay remain restrained r eign policy w1thout reference to their dome t . ruptrve Ce::nnan and So . 1or s 1c reg1mes. lllet
1 lll:s
I

POWER PEA

Interdependence . . T'he second leg or tlle liberal explanation for the communtty ts tl1 h'gll . nomjc interdependence. The baste argument wa~ develo ed bv e 1 1 ev~l of etocl1e other nineteenth-ccntmy British liberals As th r P , Cobden, Bnght,and . ronner I1ere is no other certain wa)'eof .h put it "F~ee T11ade is God's diplomacy an d t ., (Q l. B J970 8 UOiung people nP..ace. uotec m oume , 5. For a general treatm t fCobd tn honcls 0 r r -""' 'd o Cain 19 r9. For t I1e most recent eVJ. ence. see McMUlanen 9- R ens \lews see 19 1 c . ' ; 1 mterdependence has been exaou ussett and Ooeal 2001 eh. 4; 1 arguments t 1at 0r t d d . ' 1 --<:oera e an miSUnderstood, see _w fadit:z 197?, 19 r9 eh. t, 1999. Most traditional liberal tl1inking and the rest of my bne scuss1on assumes symmetry: as Hirscbman 194.5 showed, as\mm~tric de~ende_nce c:an ~~:ovide th~ b~is f~r e>;ploitati\e bargaining.) Altl1ou$. the e"1dence for this proposition remams m dispute, the eausaJ argument is relatheh straightforward. "If goods cannot cross borders. ai11"Ues ,,iJr is the c-entral daim. ~ the words of the nineteenth-century French economist Frederic:k B astiat which were often repeated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull (perhaps excessh-ely influent-ed by the experienc:e of the 1930s). Extensive economic' interc-ourse allows states to gain by trade the wealth that they would otherwise seek through fighting. Relatedly, individuals and groups who conduct these economic relations develop a powerful stake in keeping the peace and maintaining good relations. Thus it is particular!) significant that in the contemporaty world many firms have important ties ahroad and that illrect foreign investment holds the fates of important actors hostage to<.'Ontinued good relations. There can be a benign cycle here as increasing lerels ~f trade strengthen the political power of actors who have a stake in Jeepeniug these lies. The libe ral view assumes that actors place a high priority on w~alth. that trade 1 . IS a > etter route to it than conquest , and that actors w1 grun economicalh from the ' -" . . 1o 0 ft rnf'f'lam' m exchange are politkaiJy powerful. These assmnpoons are en ~e. e~hl' -- d . . - .I the modem world but are not without theJI vwnerabili'ties. At times onor an . . ' . glory, m addition to more traditional forms of mdi\l.cl ual anJ..nationalmterest. can [lgll came to its 0 be more salient than economic gain. Thus as the ~lof()(.'("dl'l c~l f: th's affair c~ G . _,c "If - 1aain shp a\\~d'' rom 1 max, eneral von Moltke wrote to his wue: \H~ <~ fu r the Gennan WitJl our tai l between our lebs ... I shall de~;pair of th~ .~e hall move to u Em di 0 , restgnau ptre. I shall then retire. But before han ng Ul 1 torate we shall then ~~lilih the Army and to plac:e ourseh'es wtder Japanese p dro~evelop into ninnies" ue m a posthon to make money Witltont tnterference an to .. . .
I

011 1

 <&..

C l\)\

OF LEAD

' e people a n graJ c 'latus <c\nd glorv an.d elevate material well-hem<> l~ , , . s 0 do..h, ::".)' " t1 t 1 1at . tht' Community rests in prut upon people ghing p rit;: t t > <Jn c..um 1e. stabrJity 0r dC'CJ} mode m society's embodime nt of individualistito, r !oil' i, i val .ptibon. Critics 1 ... sl ~. rmag-1 . tJ ot hers d generate great . ucs, c.\ me 1at coul er rnten vlkH, ,Il ('('lllfli c:t. ut one c:an
-..t.t 1 value t

\ll\tt)hd in Bl'rghahn 1973, 97). Tradi tionallibC't al t. stt..' ~H'(I tl la t CI..'OI\otnic 1 .. activity was so potent ne . mh.>re st m maintaiuing peace. . but because it rcco11~t . .

..

" lt g'\v

'_ tood this W a ell

nu

.1

Then." are four general arguments against tlw pacific , linen<.<' of int l e nce. F irst, if it is hard to go from the magnitude of cconoJui<.- fiov,r to tl r e~<. epent). s " ould be incurred if they were disrupted, it is even m on diflic:ult to cs~ c:~sts that much politi c"u impact these costs will have, whi<:h depend!'> on the other mat~ how tions i.n play and the political context. Tl~is means that we do nol have a t~~~srdera. tells us the expected magnitude of the effect. Second, even the sign of the en~ tl~at be dispu ted: interdepen dence can increase confli ct as states gain bargainin e~t can age over each other, fear that others v.till exploit them, and face additional sog. ever. . . . . UJces of dispu tes. These eff~c ts ~~ght not anse.If states expect to re mam at peace with each other, however. Thnd, 1t 1 clear that Interdependence does not guarantee s High levels of economic integration did not preve nt \V orld War I , and natio~se~e. were much more unified than any seclllity community have peace fully dissolved~: fough t civiJ wars. But this does not mean that interdependence is not condu cive to peace. Fourth, interdependenc e may be more an effect than a e;ause , more the prod uct than a generator of expectations of peace and cooperation.

r<veals dicr ~ 383 ueren<.:{:;s b . t~tcs uo;uull y uiv~s . . etwecn c-urr . . ,., " t:onsttl cr' hi ent and heg . d indee d tts ov n p "r'l <>ren<.:cs arc often . fJ a <: Wei~ht l() ~. . Past . \-VS ,U1 l 'I 'n C ,'le For their part'> ~ o 1er 111cmhers ofth tll (:;nt:t:d b} lh eir~. .,.lu P'<~.rt:ners t omm ""' was tru J{o5ovo. Arnerican po ' 1 r not displa<.:e . it "fl A untty seek to h e tn stralfl . , . le men<.: h arness a u c011 ally decay but 111<:rc ased Europ ean and J an egemony wiU n vel'ltu . Sllrelv e contrary to t Ile C\pc:<:tatio ns of standard apanese strcnglh need not lead t. theon war, nvalry. Unlik~ P' t;' ions eras of heuemon)r th es of hegem and o ony wer dl 0 , great P .1 and accepte )y ntost states, which o not Bte current pea~.:e seems un. does . erceu entJrelv well with eaJ <.:o,
cxc, }3ut c es The L n lr c\ etJ10rll . .
>I

loser

ING POWER PEACE

r 1sm.

Realist Explanations
The crude st realist explanation for tJ1e Com munity would focus on the rise of the comm on threa t from Russ ia and China. While not entirely implausible, this argument does not fit tJ1e views espoused by most elites in Japan and Europe, who are relatively unconcerned abou t these countries and belie ve th at whatever dangers eman ate from them would be magnified rathe r than decreased by a confrontational policy.

American Hegemony Two other realist accounts are stronger. The first argues that the Community is largely caused by the other enormous change in world polit ics-t he American dominance of world politics. U.S. defense spending, to take the most easily qucmtifiable indicator, is now great er than that of the next 8 countries combined (O'Hanlon 2001, 4-5). Furth ermore, thanks to the Japan ese constitution and the integration of armed forces within NATO, America's allies do not have to fear attacks from each other: their militaries (especially Germ any's) are so truncated that they could not fight a major war without Ame rican assistance or attack eac~ other without undertaking a military buildup that would give others a great deal 0 warning. Ame rican dominance also leads us to expect that key outcomes, & the om expansion of NATO , to the Ame rican-led wars in Kosovo and the Persian Gulf, to the IMF bailouts of Turkey and Argentina in the spring of 2001, will conform to American preferences.

Nuclear weapo~s . .. b second realist argum <: nt was farrnhar during the C ll T e on now. Tlus ts tl1e pac~.h.,;,ng ff' . . . .. . e ec:t of nuclea ..o t War but recetves less 1 atten ti . 'r . fficient num bers and rnvuJnerable configuratioweapons whJCh, r possessed k' . 1 10 su . . . vl<.:tory i .L war a feckless opbo n. An 1mmechate obiection isns, ma e all th t mposst le and h l J a not the m . the Community ave nuc ear weapons. But this is . aJor m 1 teehntc:allv eostates . . on .. anv and Japan could p1 oduce nuclear weapons if a thY t Gerrn 1 l asrrect. l ners fully understanc. T he other factors discussed in the rea . oomec their art P . I . . preVIous pages mayor may not be 1mportant; nu<.: eru weapo ns by themselves would be sufficient to kee the great powers at peace. P While there .is ~ great deal to this argument, it is not without its problems. First, because th1s kind of deterre1~ce rests on the perceived possibility of war, it may explain peace, but not a secunty community. Second, mutual deterrence can be used as a platfo rm fo r hostility, coercion, and even limited wars. In what Glenn Snyder (1965; also see Jervis 1989, 19-23, 74-106) calls the stability-instability paradox, the common realization that all-out war would be irrational provides alicense for threats and the use of lower levels of violence. Under some circumstances a state could use tJ1e share d fear of nuclear war to exploit others. If the state thinks that the other is preoccupied with the possibility of war and does not anticipate that the state \vill make the concessions needed to reduce this danger. it will expect the other to retre at and so can stand firm. In other words, the fact that war ,..'Ould be the worst possible outcome for both sides does not automatically lead to W1COerced peace, let alone to a security community.
J

ASynthetic Interactive Explanation

I think the devel opme nt and maintenance of the Commuru.tv . best ex'Tllained bv a , 15 -rE .th . . f: di y. corn bmation and reformulation of several actors scussed pre,ious1 ven Wl .. di . . the belief that <:onquest 15 Ue qualifications Just discussed, a necessary con tion LS l . .. ued d'fR ] . aucrressJOn lS encomato 1 cut and war is terrib ly costly. \Vben conquest 15 eas~. 00 . defensh-e and the secun en ty dilem ma operates w1'th particular ,;dousness as e' h ,e modem st t a es need to Qrer)are to attack (Van Evera 1999) But when states ta5 hard for ar . . r rmes \vtth extensive firepower and, even more, nu clear weapons. I I anyone to believe that war could make sense. . lls the costs. Were S .. we tatesmen must consider the gains that war ,mght hnncr asts But if anything. the ed ea they to be very high, they might outweigh great e:\:pect cos '
Q.

et;Jf.:.,;.t.ed ~ ~'af wit.h:n ~ OKM.anrrt:: :u. ' ~~ JI!mtril.:s., mdudir<'g ~ ~.a: ~ \,;,,r~J ~

with. WdT is 00 ~ S(::(:J'J af ~ iJJ i~ff; 00 gr'~ p!AI'F-T 11:2kr tfJda-. '4't~~ af9'f:e wJtb nJe.Odur~ J'.o(~df fhat .. fJI} triumph of~ iS '1Ui ~ YJ gr~ t:.\ . supreme triumph af v.sl' (ptoted in fi.a1bangh J%1 9Y In tarfit:T"cr.s:s ; : (;lmlrt.,..JrJy be~Ned that war brougfl out the bet in indi..idua!s and r.atic.ms (;;~ that the "i~ of c.fuciplrnc. risk-taling. and sdf-w:rifict: hat 'l:ar rf:f.JIIirtd '4" t're <:~aJtral to cit-ib.zatiorL R;}atcdl). J'JOfJ(1T and gfrJl) used tiJ he ~ntral vahli:\. Jr. a: world so constitutf:.d. the ma.t:eriaJ ~f.s ofpeace would bE: much less irtlp'".ll't;Q_ hJgb levels of tTade, ttc difficnJf} of miling ooru~uest pay, and even n~ WE:apJI'.s might r.ot p7'"00J.Jre peact;. l>e:moc'J7k.') and identity aWJ (JP'=1af.e through c,~,f.Jat actors ~alue. and may m part be r~ible Cur the decline in milfuari~m just rlOtf:d. Compr(Jmist:, oor6fdtr. ation fortf.e intere su of (Jthen~ respt:ct for Ja.,.~ and a ~huooing af \io1ertee outsidf this cooh':st all are values tf.at ~rpm demoera.')' and are r~dpr~ (.1Jlm~ by it. 1be Community ahc:J i\ relamdy homogent:.<)tJS in that its members art ~ emouati'es and hav~ values that are ~KfrJY.dibly similar. One impulse to ~r a is tht . desire to ebang the other rouratry, and thirs da~s if vaJu~ are shared l1c Urrited ~ <:OUid COJ)(jU~ Can . for t:Xamplt:, but What wouJd be the poim when 10 mudt ofwhat it W'..mfs to .set: ~e is aJrtady in pJa.ce? Uotr. d to the rise of the Community is the dt:cline in territorial dispu1:s ~~~~~,~~~~~ oommon ~Md~~ fllcb iD the patt, and we have become so a-'(:ustomed to their a~ce that it is easy to lose fi8bt o( how dtaltic and OOJlU:(JUerJtial ttr~ ,-bange is. Germans no loogff ~.that and l.orr2ine are PreJl(..-h; tOO French are not disturbed by the~ Jew,~ of Cem1a11 preaeooe in these pr<Mnces. French furthennore pennittfd tile to return to Germany and are not bothered by this loss. and indeed W il a Jo. at aiL Akhoogb for years the Gemaans refused to r~ . . . _ to the 1CMt territorieS to the east. they did so upon unificatiOn and ft"'

frc&eamJJntybrfrr9rSWlj ~.d. tS[r"(:"~ . 0 ~JURe ~ Zh() befiefib are subjc::(:tnre. <ft-p:; 'J!r: .: a: "'l d:1 ' " f .~~ ' J~ 41(:tnn t."a~ft.J(:, a:r.d c:hangt:s in"~ a: t.t~ :u:mu f;.~ : er :.ar 4.'1/;rJ ~f, ~ ti_~t '7!. ~~m ~ the actr.~n "..Jr:es ftr. !5"4ft' ~~ . ie IL~ .,.T.,i 4,, ~ v~ ~ .'--~ ,.ed ~)~!:: .,.~ .VJaroo ~to cf'w,~ slt-n.i). Their importanct ar.c. ~~J.t..., ~. . .JJTr~ <.b. . -~we ""'fm nt at-aM: flh:. 'Sazi U:rrnany ),tJicl... O'iT"J~r~-: ' ( I ~w~~] r~~ Jr~JJ'dof naticmalmrer~ and t(;:(..1Jrify. P'J." '~er:tLri:: ea.:. ~ ~ :n or4.:-r ()~ the dur~. o( tbe- An"31J r~. -x ' changes (r.er the last 50-7.5 i ean in "~ tl~ ~t"dffe~ iird P'sMit.-s r:, ilitde1-elopt-d slat~ v.Jue drivt SOJJ""J(:' of trte c.:ak."Uiation~ of cs'Joss an.d hertent\. T ~; ,,
, ,I ...

p-=acc~ithm

"itb the ta:tm t . 10 &en in the~ tka tl'~<t dl.; r!r~. n.-hbr~ or:e hat~ Jx~- 4 \JI"ie crJUlrl ~r.r.it. abw: r~t ~~ rt d tfwa-, 1-tard tfJ lex-at<~ a prrnt-r ;. f,, r. ~ memf: en ~ prrAide a ~"'... F J.J!'ttlt:~f m

ne

nae

do;

t'*-wtendNdin~.

tilla IDr)'

are abFd to dispute, as are the developm~ ~ diem.. la p.a~~ it il unclear bow mu<.-b they are rOoted Ul

mvalues in general and nationalism and~

What are
Jleace?

~y ..,. the .implications of the existence of the secun ooroBlJil '" JUI 11111 a1 ~c~ates will carry out relations among tbemseh-es and for get'

it t'-1..-d l- 5t

In f. ter-national [Jolrtw and ''' ...,, <cts of cl 15pec:t o 1T1 J>rc..''ious eras. no b .1 nticiiJation of fir turc \\,t ,,,.<mu tl ornestic 111 1 d v t1 c te , b le 1 .I e > olitics wNe untouc te I , n the Community. In tlw <P ~ ~'C:c of th . a~.~rng l lJ then <: wnge J ese \\'t'J'S. MucI Wl l I t that is out the questJOll ()1,:. d(;' of E 111. st<I tl!s po . . -a deve opmen < ., Ope .1 1 .cc . . . one another anu ,umtlgamct~Jn~ . tlw will neither cons1der usmg 01 c~~,IIIJ\t unlikelv w1dun rt- .T Y ,, 11 then be significant con fli<..ls of intere"t nor . . gnty. 1 1ere 11 ~. . ., lose tlterr soverel : tl 1 The)rwiJI contmue to be n vnls 111 "iOine resp Without . . f reso1 vmg ten . . .. ec:ts . .1 dear me.ans? b Indeed the stabil1ty-mstabiJJty paradox im rJiies tl ' ttnu . VJth eac1 ot er. 1 c lat th I to >argam' . tl . t c)'SI)utes will remain peacend \ ill rC'n to\e sorne rest. . e v I I e.>:nectatJOn ta .u. k . I<Unt . sJar~c r . . d ompetjtive ta<.:tics. The dense networ of institutions . . s on VltUJ)eratron an c . . . . f' _ . . I . Wtt1 11n . 1 uJd serve to r>roVIde mu 1 1 means 01 1 (!SO , , 11<1 eonfl' t b tlp e the Commumty s 10 . . . . "cl . t: le 'd uJo'ple w1ys for a dissatrsfie countly to s1lO\"-. Jts tltsoleasu.s, ut wiU also proVl e m ' r I e and threaten wsruption. The fact tbat the situation is a ne~ o?e,roses ~haJienges <ll~d oppoJtunities for states. What goals will bave highest pnonty? How nn.p~rtant.'.vlll conside rations of status be? Will non-military alHance~ form? B~~.gammg will continue, and this means that varieties of power, indu~ng the abdJ~' . tO ~1elp ~nd hurt others, will remain relevant. Threats, bluffs, warrungs. the mohthzatJOn of resources for future confucts, intense diplomatic negotiations, and shifting patte rns of working with and against others all ~ remain. But the content of these forrns wiJI differ from those of traditional international politics. Politics v.~thin d1e Community may come to resemble the relations between the United States and Canada and Australia that Keohane and Nye (1977) described as complex interdependence: extensive transnationaJ and transgm emmental relations bargains c~rried out across ~er~nt issue areas, and bargruning power gained througl~ a~ym~etric dependence but ilm1ted by overaU eo m mon interests. Despite this pathbreaking study, however, we know little about how thjs kind of politics vvill be (.'()nducted. A'i numerous commentators have noted, economi c isstJes and economic: resources will play large roles, but the changed context will matter. Relative economic ad~tage was sought in the past in part because it contribu ted to military security. This no longer being.the case, tl1 e posswili' ties f'or cooperation are t increased. Even though force will not be threateneu w1th'm t 1 Commu 11 .1 . . 1e nity, 1t '"' remam Important in relations . . among 1ts mem bers. During the Cold \Var the prote<:tion the Umted State fli d d u h . . sa or e to tts a tes gave it an importa nt moral claim and 5 ill tgn cant argammg leverage D . 't h d . . . -= n true forth d fi . fu espt e t e ecreased level of threat, tlliS wUJ be em e mte ture becaus 1=tarily J States m h ban th U cl Se tmu apan and EurorJe need t11e Unrted uc more t ability to lead milit e .mte . tates needs the m. While the unique American resentments and c.~.operations like those in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo causes mctions even-or especiall . r .with its aliies, It a1so gives it a resource t11at is potent y-1 It 15 never explicitly brought to the table.

. . Within the commu nity temational PolitiCS ..

- - -- ........ VI

Lt.I\UING

POWER PEACE

3~7

or

Four Possible Futures Even Within th la . e contours of a Corn . . . 0f re tions that are possibl fo muruty, there IS a significa nt range of patterns e, ur ofwhich can b b .
e n efly sketched .

The greatcsl < h n~e would he a world in whid, n r al 1 her climinislll ( d the dislinc:tions between dorne at. .0 n _ ~ut~nomy would h< 1 furt 1 \1t-d s IC anu rore1gn 1 would tinue to erot e. ieval Europe. wi th it O I . r V"' eo n . ...r appmg 10rms ofpo K')' . ather than comp,trtmc ntallzcd nation-states which n1 ht . I I sovere1 gnt:y I J [ . ' I g UISSO ve bee t} , re no longer ncet cc to provJde security and can no lc)n . I h . allse 1e) a ger contra t err eco . 11 . one model here. A t 1ough most scholars see the red ti r.O . nonucs, I5 . f' UC . 011 0 S VE:rergntv d t} rowth of the power o non-gove rn mental organizations as .1 an le g . . conuuct\ e to peace and harmony, one can readi1 y rmag1ne sharp conflicts for e . . 1 among busmess .1 . ' e interests, 1 I Or, anu environm entalists (many Marxists see xamp . A . a) cl . . . ). 1 . h . . . ass inctly 11nportant , )<:tween t ose wrth different views of the g00clcon Jets as mcreas1r b 0 . . . . , . a]~ . calhng fOJ g1eLtteJ cent! 1zatron to solve common problems a dHe; etween those . n th ose acl vocatmg , increased loca I contro I. But state power and interest woul-1 b . . .. . . , u m any case e great!, dec:reased. The notion of nahonalmterest always contested \ .0 Jd b ' . ' ,. u ecome even more problematic. A second world, not completely incompatible with the first would b 1 C e one m which. states 111 t 1~ omm~mity play a large role, but with more extensive and intensive cooperation. Relah~ns wou~d be increasingly governed by principles and Jaws, a change that could bemgnJy spill over into relations outside the CommuniP,.. Although bargaining would not disappear, there would be more joint efforts to solve common problems and the line between "high" and '1ovi' politics would become even more blurred. In this world, the United States would share more pO\.ver and responsibilitvwith the rest of the Community than is true today. While popular with scholars at l~ast as likely is a continuation of the present trajectory in which the United States maintains hegemony and rejects significan t limitations on its freedom of action. :\ational interests would remain distinct and the United States would follow the familiar pattern in which ambitions and perceived interests expand as power does. Both confucts of interest and the belief that hegemony best produces collective goods would le.ad the United States to oppose the efforts of others to become a counterweight if not a rival to it. In effect, the United States would lead an empire. but probably a relati\ely benign one. Doing so would be rendered more c.UfRcult by the fact that the American self-image precludes seeing its role for what it is, in part because of the popularity of values of equality and supranationalism. Other members of the Community would resent seeing their interests overridden by the United States on some occasions, but the exploitation would be limited by their bargaining power and the American realization that excessive discontent would have serious long-tenn c'Onsequences. Others might accept these costs in return for th.e U.S. sectui.ty guarantee and the ability to keep their own defense spending very low, especially because the alternative to American-dominated stability might be worse. The foUJth model also starts with the American attempt to maintain hegemony, but this time the costs and dangers of American unilateralism become suffid~nt to lead others to form a counter-balancing coalition, one that might include Russia and ~hina as well. Europe and Japan might also becom~ more ~se1tive because the~: fear that the Un.ited States will eventually withdraw rts secunty guarantee, the~b) accelerating if not creating a rift \vithin the Commu~ity. M~ch ~lat. r~hsm stresses -the clash of national interests , the weakness of mtemationa1mstitutions.

PART 4
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N'fEMPtJI'UU:\.J '' ,.. -

d the use of power ali(J t I r t"- W ould . . an ' ,..,riJl" for ;leI\illltage.erence tllat force won 1 I not n . <.'lJ lllcrnplaC:otne to th. er ( t c\J .1 m:u1et1 ~ 1:> a1 c{j 11 " 11!)\'l , Tlti< r. but \dth tbt' ,,t; . onJ, inrurecclv. as dis<.H<;<, d c t and the ,ore. Id enter JO . Would L ... nu.1 ,,... balance wou 11e,,. an d tlle familiar' and tl1e cenlr nlnt 11 \tion ;" what I IJt a hw; f h l .., .-..1ue mixture o t e \\'b twill be the final arbiter of '!tsp11 tt>s? \VJ- 1 ~1 lirna :.u ~ I ~ mons. a . tl 1 (' Iat /ql)rl ratio \\itl rep ace caJ ., How fun91ble \\lll le re e\ <Ult ,CJrtll\ of pow b us of . be lOstpotent. .o . cl ,. . . er e? threat "ill n . ssibilities rruses two broa qucsltwl'i tlrat J e:annot . Outlining tllese po. all determined. as manv structu r,tl theories wo ldanS\ver. r. essentr v . u im 1 First. is the ,uture . al. clloJces stronulv mAuenced h, 'ariable dom . P} : . d n naoon estrc: or does tt depen .d t ., Sec:ond if the future is not determ ined h P<>1 d accJ en s. , ow m h itics. leaders, an_ l U 'ted States has yet to make. and what will . U<: 111ost Lnfl\l. depends on choJces t le m . ') ence these chotces.
J ,,
CV

JERVIS I THE ERA OF lEADLNG POWER PEACE

1

389

t Schools of thought propose d1fferent explanations for the ns r th c en h f eo e ommu'tv and so lea<.l tCJ '><>mew at d1 ferent propositions about th"' c:o .J'ti d J11., l . " nw ons un er ,\hich anarch~ :an )C ~ompa~rble \~th peace. Construc:thism stresse the importance of identttr cc; and 1deas: hberalLc;m argues for the power of material incenthes for peace; realism look~ at the costs of '~'ar and the details of the payofT structure: my composite C\J>Ianation stresses the mteraction among several factors of costs. benefits, \alue:s, and path-dependence. But what is most important is that the Community constitutes a proof by existence of uncoerced peace \\ithout e:entral authority. Because these countries are the most powerful ones and particulark war-prone, the Corn munity poses a fundamental challenge to our understanding ~f world politics and our expectations of future possibilities.

vers because ''. 11lt> the) ma~ be able to guarantee the Se<:urih. f th po' o\'ide t1m t''><.apP f'rom t1 state of nature for them A .' l h o e~. no one o 1e can Pr . . \\ e avt seen. diiTer-

IMPUCATIONS FOR THEORIES OF THE CAUSES OF WAR

't . ty Wl1 atever 1 s explanation . tJ1e verv existence of a security comm uni. among tlle ". r . Jeadin powers refutes many theones of the causes o wa:. 01 at least mdicates they g . au. w are not umvers-"y ,--'id Thus human nature and th e unve fo r dominance honor, . . and glorr may exist and contribute to a '"'1de ,.ar1ety of human hehaviors but they are not fated to lead to war. The obvious rebuttal is that war still exists outside the Community and that civil wars continue unabated. But only wars fought by members of the Community have tlle potential to undennine the argument that, unde r so me conditions, attributes of humans and societies that were seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not do so. The cases tllat could be marshalled are the Gulf War and the operation in Kosovo, but they do not help these theories. These wars were provoked b~ others, gained Uttle honor and glory for the Community, and were fought in a manner that minimized the loss of life on the other side. It would be hard to portray them as marufestations of brutal or evil hu man nature. I ndeed, it is more plausible to see t11e Communjty's behavior as consistent wi th a gene ral trend toward its becoming less violent generally: the abolition of official torture and the decreased appeal ofcapjtaJ punishment, to take the most salient examples (Mueller 1989). The existence of the Community also casts douht on theories that argue that ~1e l~ng powers always struggle for dominance for gain, status, or security, and are Willing to use force to this end. Traditional Marxist theories claim that capitalists never cooperate; proponents of the law of uneven grO\vth see changes in the re e ~~r of ~jor states as producing cycles of domination, stability, challenge, and war. Smularly, power transitions., in which rising powers catch up \.vith domjnant ~ arifbe seen to.be very diffit11lt to manage peacefully. These theories, uke the verSJOno egemorucstab'JityA=-----sed bo th Unite! 1 WM:US a ve have yet to be tested because e Stat has es not yet d 1 ed the arguments ' 'tions L .. ec made here are correct, trans will not uave the sam m 1 But if m\' greater . e Vlo ent outcome that they had in the past, leading us tor-. F attention to the conditions under which these theories do and do not hold. . or most scholars th funda . a1 narch). mmnn...nded by th ' .e e secunty dil mental cause of war is intem at:Jon aleadi11g th emma. These forces p ress hardest on e

REFERENCES
Robert J. 1996. "Why W estern Europe ::\eeds the United States and :\ATO.- Politico/ Science Quarterly 111 (Spring): 1- 39. Berghahn, V. R. 1973. Gennany and the Approach of War in 1914. :\ew Y St. ~ l artin's ork: Press. Setts, Richard. 1992. "Systems of Peace or Causes of War? CoU ective Secwi~. Arms Control. and the ::\ew Europe." International Security li (Summer): .5-!3. Boume, Kenneth. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Victorian England: 1830-1902. Oxford: Clarendon Press. _ Cain, Peter. 1979. capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of fuchard Cobden. British j ournal of International Stlldies 5 (October): 229--li. _ . Deutsch, Karl \V., et aJ. 1957. Political Community and the :\ ort~ Atlant1 ,Area: Interc national Organi~.ations in the Light of Historical Ex].1erience. Pnnceton, ~ J : Pnnceton University Press. .. . . :)Q Farber, Henry, and Joanne Gowa. 1995. "Polities and Peace. lntematumal SecunhJ (Fall): 123-46. p L'ti ?" j al 1 Farber, Henry and Joanne Gowa. 1997. "Common Interests or Common t es. ow.., of Politics .59 (May): 123-46. . . , d h Ori ns of the Gartzke Erik. 1998. ''Kant \ Ve All Get Along? Motive. Opportumt). an ~ e gt 0eJ~1ocratic Peace... American joumal of Poli~ica./ Scie.~ce 42 ( 1;;:,~~ ~tudies Quarterly Gartzke, Erik. 2000. "Preferences and Democratic Peace. lntenw 44 (June): 191 - 212. , . Hour 1939-1941. London: Gilbert, M artin. 1983. \Vinston S. Churchill. Volume V Fmest I.
Art,

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Heinemann. ,fTh odore Roosetelt. ::\ewY Collier ork: 0J Harbaugh, WilU Henry. 1961. The Life and Times am e Books. ~re r Forf'ign Trade. Berkeley .rscI1man, Albert 0 . 194:;: National Power and the Struth 0'J H1 v. . p and Los Angeles: University ?f Calif~n~a ~-- lution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meamng of ~uc ear evo Annogeddun lthaca. NY: Comell University Press. d l lterdependence: World Politics Keohane. Robert.0 ., and Joseph Nye. eds. 19/i. Powerml 1 in 1h msitioll. Boston, MA: LittJe Brown.

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MPORARY WORLD POLITICS CONTE

tlJe Suhcontinent. Tlw Nut :,n, ',1ril 2.3 2{)Q . . 1111g Oil I, 2o . . . .. 001 "13nst . r-.30. . . n 1.,,.5 anti \ Var. In 1!1e O n{.!lln 'lie 1 '''r<'nt Kumar. Armtava. 2 Ion of M . 9 "Domeshc ro h" ajor l> Lcw. J:t<:k S. 198 1d Theodore K. Rabh. Camt>ridt- Carllbrid ge Unjvcr. \\'tu:s-, cds. Hobert I. Rot erg aJ

The Clash of Civilizations?

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

1 tonal Society: A Study ill sity Press. PP 79- ~ I '"l 1986 War Ill ntenw t ~m. E~.

l ni'111(1ilnlld

SPt:iol

vgy. LondOn:

ew lOrk: Mueller, Jo 111. 1989 . . . . . . Basic Books. . ungton O'HanIon, MJChae1E. 2001 Defiense PoltCtj Chozcesfm the B11sh Arhtllllls/r(ffirm W:asJ DC: Brookings Institulion Press. Oneall John R., and Bruce Russett.. ~999.. the_ Lil~.eral Pea~~ .I :'~1 an Art~l~tct of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Cntiques. /ntenwltOIWilnfel act ums 25 (.3): 2J .3-41. cracy RtiiSSe rt 81Jce and John R. Oneal. 2001. Trirmglllatilll_!, Peace: Dc1no. ' ork: lorton. Jnterdepend.e11ce, and Jntenwtional Orgamzotions. New Y SclrweUer. Randall L. 2000. "Democracy and the Post-Cold War Era." In The New World OrdRr, eds. Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin. New York: St.' Martin 's Press. pp. 46-SO. Snyder, Glenn. 1965. "The Balance of ~ower and tJ1e Balan<.:e of Terror... l n The Bawnce of Power. ed. Paul Seabury San Fral1CJsco: Chandler. pp. 184-201.

. o1111 J 2001 The Trauedy ofOrent Power l o 1f1cs. <'W York: orton. b b Mearshermer 1 Retreatfiom Doomsday: The 0 so PSCe11ce of Major War N. I '

I C tro"ers, Over the Demot:ratic P<a<:<" Ikarguar A LB. Tauris. u Ctio . 1997 "Tle on / Zeev. 11 or . -f?~ I I mationnl Security 22 (Summer): J62-!:.l">. M<toz. d C A. t .. \1 , . I Cr<tcks in the \ V<u . 11 e . on I<.: . J t'' Wll lnltm afion l S J99'"' "Interdependence an 1 a tu dies ) 3-SS. illan, Susan M McM 3 . I' t . &'View 41 supplement 1 (May .
v

THE NEXT PAITERN OF CONFLICT

World politics is en~cring a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of _what it wiJI be-the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nat1on-states, and the decline of the nation-state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions et catches a<>pects of the emerging reality. Y they all miss a <.:rucial, indeed a central. aspect of what global politics is likely to be in tJ1e coming years. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of <.:onflict in this new world wiJl not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of confuct will be culturaL :\ation states will remain the most powerfuJ actors in world affairs, but the principal confucts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The i clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between chrlizations "vill be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the e,olution of conftict in the modem world. For a centul)' and a half after tJ1e emergence of the modem estem world international system with the Peace ofWestphalla tJ1e conflicts of the\V were largely among princes emperors, absolute monarchs, and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilbt economi<.: strength, and, most important, the territory tJ1ey rule~. In the ~ro~ss ~1ey created nation-states, and beginning with the French Revolution the pnnc1pal ~n~s of conHict were bel:\.veen nations ratJ1er tl1ru1 princes. In 1793, as R R Pal mer put 1t. "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun.'' This nineteen~h century pattern lasted untiJ the end of World War I. Th~n. a~.a result of the Ru~s1an Revolution and the reaction against it, tl1e confHct of nations ytelded to the conlhrt of ideologies, first among communism. fascism-Nazism, and ~beral der~ocra~y, and . , . f . then between com mumsm ancl libera1 democrac} During the Cold \\ar, this latter a . } d fined re e conmct became embodi d u1 the strugg1 be tv;\een the 1:\~ro sunPrpowers, ne1ther o . 1 cai EUtoperu1 sense and each of wh1c 1 e whieh was a nation-state in the c ass1 d .d l . . . e pn,,, arilv its identity in tetms of its ideology. 1 tates an 1 eo og1es ''er ti. .. \\"lli . Lind has These conflicts between pnnces, na on-s . . . .. . within Western Civilization, "\~'esten1 Cl\il wars. as 1 am conflicts
J

'?s.

Van Everd, Stephen. 1984. ''The Cult of the Offensive and the Origi ns of the First World War." International Semrity 9 (Summer): 58-107. Van Evem, Stephen. J999. Causes ofWar: Pou;er and the Roots of Conjlict. I thaca, l\'Y: Comell
Uuiversity Press. ennetll N. 1970. "The Myth of National Interdependence.'' In The llltenwtional Waltz. K Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 205-23. enneth N. 1979. Theory of lntematiorwl Politics. Reading, MA: Addisou-Wesley Waltz, K

Publishing. enneth N. 1999. "Globalization and Govemance.'' PS: Political Science & Politics Waltz. K 32 (December): 693-700. Wrong, Dennis H. l976. Skeptical Sociology. New York: Columbia University Press.

Re rinted by pennission of Foref~n Abairs, Fmm Samuel P. 11 untingtun. "The Clash of Cl'1~7.ab0~ b . Couoril on f oreign Relatiolls. Inc. > Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer L993), pp. 22-49. Copynght 1 391
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tbe

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:192 PART 4 CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS HUNTINGTON 1 THE ClASH

labeled thlm. This was as true of the Cold \Var <I::. it .w;l~ nf tlu world wars ant! tl earlier wars or the SE'venteen.th , eigh~e~,~tll . Jlllll'IPt>lllll t'C'Illllries. With tll~ cnd of the Cold War, inte1~1at1CHl<~ po!Jt,cs, mo' E'S 0 ' 11 .ol th \\ <''>lcnt phase, and i~~ centerpiece becomes the.mtcractt.o~ .~).C ~' cen the \ ~ t ' t ".11 d. llOI:- \ ~'~s~ern C:iViliz~:. tions and among non-''' estem CJ\111Z< ltJons. f n 1ht pcth!I<:s of <:JvJitzatj 01 . . ls, the peoples and governm ents of non-\u'esten: ~J\.1.1 l'".m.~ no Iongcr remain tl . '"a ' objects or history as targets of\ V estcrn c:olonJ aiJsm h 11 t JOill thf' \Vest as movers a~~ shapers of histo1 y.

'

OF CiVII.J7 A'h

ilJ I(!

ttJry l.ave been the histo f , .. 1 5 of humal 0 reacle Arnokl Tcr,ilwe identifi ed 21 maJor ci ~. . CJ\IJ.hzations. ln A Stud .r f[isWry, . 11 Vl 1 tzatJons onlv . y oJ )OJ'C:lfV \Ull c . ' , SlX of them ev; t. the con te111l , .-.s m

~ONS?

393

WtiY ciVILIZATIO NS WILL CLASH

viJi.zation identity '"rill he in<.:reasingly important in the fu C' ed in large measur e by the interactions among seven tur~,hand ~e world will be s1 tap V C f . e1g . These include v estern, on ~1cr.an, Japanese, Islamic orHind t maJor.<.i VJl Jzations. . Latin American, and possibly African civilization. The mo~t im ~~~:VIC-~rthodox, c ture \\~U occur along the cultural fault lines separating th ~vi!iza _onfi.Jcts of the ,u ese CI tions from one another. ' w11ywill this be the case? First differences among civilizations are not only real the b . , . . cl f h . y are asic. Civiliza. --ultu re, tradi tion. and . trons are differe ntiate rom eac ot11er by history language " . . . , ost .l:e . m important, rehg1.0n. The people of different civilizations hay,e uu11 ren t \lews on' the relations betwee~ God and man, t11e individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and childre n, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority. equalitv and hierarchy. These differe nces are the prod~ct of centuries. They '"'ill not soon. disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean confuct, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuJies, however, differences among civilizations have generated t1:1e most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. Second , the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civi.lization-consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased recepti,ity to imllligr.i tion by "good'" European Catholic Poles. Americ-ans react far more negamely to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries .... The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance th~ civilization-consciousness of people that, in tum. iJ1vigorates differences and arumosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into hist00' Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are se1)arating people from longstcmding 1 ' 1 enti'ties. The)' also weaken o<:<u d . . tate as a somce of identity. In muc1 of tl the nation-s Id -.T'!!ion has mo"ed rn to 1 1e wor r~c . _ h 1 fill ul!S gap. often in the form of movements t11at are 1 beled -fundamentalist. . Sue a . . cl: as movements are found in Western Christianity. Judai.sm . Buddlusm. ~d.HlOfu UIS11l,dam . well as m Islam. In most countri. . . es and most telig:Jons tJ1e I">eOple active m u~ en .. n talist pro essio movements are young, college-educated mtddJe-dass techruClllns, [I identity . bas' 1 als, and business persons .... The revival of religion P~ des .a~,=-A15 nsor ti0. and . dari . d UJlltes CJVw4 COmmthnent that transce nds national bo~ es at~. nhanced bv the dual role f Fourth , U1e growth of civilization-consciOusness r.sfe r At the same time. 0 tile West. On the one hand. the West is at a peak 0 po\'er.

THE NATURE OF CMLIZATIONS

During the Cold War the world was ruvided i~1to the First, Seco'_ld, ~nd Third worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevan t. It 1s far more mcanmgful now to gr oup countries not in terms of their political or C"c:ono~11i<.: ~ystems or in terms of their level of economic developrnenl but rather in terms of the1r <.:ulture and civilization. What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A c:i,i lization is a cultural entity. Villages , regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, rC'ligious groups , all have distinct cultures at cliffere~t levels of cultural hete_rogen~ity. Th e culture of a village in southem Italy may be cl.irfere nt from that of a Vlllage Jl1 northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European commuruties, in tum, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese, and Westerners, however, are not part of any broade r cultu ral entity. They constitute civiLizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short or that which distinguishes human s from other species. It is defined both by common objecti ve elemen ts, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identifica tion of people. People have levels of identity: A resident of Rome may defin e himsel f with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Ital.ian, a Catholic, a Cblistian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with vdl.ich he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. Civilizations may involve a large numbe r of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lu<:ian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation-states, as is the case with Western , Latin American, and Arab civilizations. or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivi lizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic, and Mala) subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless mean ingful entities, and while the lir~es between them ~~e seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they.nst' a~d fall; they dtVJde and merge. And, as any studen t of history knows, chilizahotlS disappear and are buried in the sand'i of time. . ._ Westerners tend to think of nation,..states as the principal actors i.n global affatrs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader

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PART 4

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- -
HUNTINGTON 1 THE ClASH OF . CTVIUZATIONS?

. lt '1 return to the.. rn( ', Jl( nn enon , s , J . ps <lS a H~ 11 ' . O<:t:IJ . hc)\\'l'' l'l'. z I I)( I l,t . _, z t' lS lncreasmglv onr tl : I:. re4trcnces t toc rtinll 1 Cl\u IZ<l 101 . . 0 t () 1 >fthe amon1! non-\\ estetJ -'"" sianization"inJapan ht't el rends ' . 1ru le 111 11l\\" U"t1anu n.. to\\ ;1!11 a tut11 g ., f 1 dia the failure of \\'i. 't' u c ts l) f sot:i . ga(:y . 0 n . . a ISm Ilt'. .. , r~~~ dui7.<th0ll"re-lslamization .. of th_e :VrcJ'I ,_ Il ,,tst . t\ \Vest at 1 and am~ t nee ' u the nahonah 111 and he \\'ests that increasmg;h- haH tk, t.,.,,re. the will Peak . . 1fronts non , and tl uf Jts power col the ,,oriel in non-\ restem wa~s. tt resource to haptle 1 .t f non-\Vestem societies wen: tlsttallv the peo 1e e 1 es o . . pe I n tJ Je past d 'th tile West had been educate tl al U\lorcl. the Sorbo 1 '"ho t in,ohe w1 ' nne were mos d b bed Western attitude and ' al ncs. At the sam . ' or dl t and 1 a sol 13 e tirn San 1llrs ' . Western countries often remaiu<:'tl deeplv imbueI . e, the pojJUlace m nonI . I. . .u 'VJth 'ow 1 diuenous cu re. N ' however, these re ations 11ps arc hemg reversed. A . . . . "' t le ul o . . di- digeni7-ation of ehtes IS occurnng m many non-We t d . \ Vestern1zation an 11 . ' s ern e . 1 san1e time tJ1at Western , usually Am en can, cultures shdes . d countnes at t 1e f tl J ' J , an habits become more PorrJtdar amona the. mass o 1e peop c. o . Fifth cultural characteristics and differences are les~ mutable and hence less e~. ' . c: . . ily comprOJmsed.and resolved than political and econom1 ones. In the former SoVJet . . . Umon, c.-om n1u rusts can become democrats. the nch can become poor and the poor . h but Russians cannot bec-ome Estoruans and Azens can not become Am1enians. ~ne ciass and ideological confucts, the key que~on ""as "\ Vh~ch sic.le are you on?'' and peopleCOuld and did choose sides and change s1des. In conAI<.:ts bet\.veen ci\~lizations, . . . the question is "What are you?' That 1s a gtven that cann?t be changec.l . .. . Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half- Muslim. Finallv, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intra~egionaf rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 pe rcent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 pe rcent to 36 percent in l\1orth America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful econom ic regionalism will reinforce civi~zation-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionaJjsm may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western ChristianH . y The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian, and American cultures. Japan, in w ntrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic e ntity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and ~vestment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cul~ral di~erences with those C.'Ountries inhibit and pe rhaps preclude its promoting regional e<:onomic integration like that in Europe and North America. Co~mon c_lture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the u ~nomJc. relations bet\veen the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, T~wan, Smgapore, and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian coun tries 1 . logi wth the c0 Jd War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome 1deo. lf ea] differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. C.'UJ tura] oommonaity .. pal East 1 lS a prerequ1s1te for economic integration, the pnncJ

'tu

. n e<:OOCJII i h O( of the future is JikeJv to be ce t d ;\51a . . ' n ere on Ch n fact. already c.: '""~ 1~1to existence. . . . lna. lS LIO<: is. in Culture at.'d (. bg10n also form the basis of the Economic Coo . . . 11 which bn .gs together ten non-Arab \iluslim ' :o bi peration Organrz.a. tJO , .. . .... un es: 1ran. Pakista 1i . j\Zerb:ujan, K,v..t~hst,tn, Kyrgyz.c;t~, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, lizbekin. urk~. t:.g1anistan. One 1 pet us to the rev:tval and ex-nansion of this m . stan, 1 wj . ..r orgamzation [! and .L .I crinalh" in the 1960s by Turkey. Pakistan. and Iran 15 th a1 . ounw:u . fl o tr " I f h . . . e re lZation aders of se,era o t ese countries that they had no cban f. d . . bv the , Ie . s :1 I c 0 a miSSIOn to the :e EuroyJean Comtnumty. 1muar y, Caricom ' the Central Americ:an Common \tarket and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build b d . . a Central A tn~ncan econom1c entity bridging the Anglo-Latin roa er Caribbean. divide however. have tu date fruJed. ' As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms. thev are like! to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and pe~ple of dil~er ent ethnicity or religion .. .. Most important, the efforts of the 'Nest to promote its values of democracy and Libera}jsm as universal values, to maintain its military predominance, and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and fonn coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobi lize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity. The clash of civilizations thus occurs at t\vo levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines bet\veen civilizations struggle, often 'iolently. o,er the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different chiliz.ations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

395

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CMUZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing ilie political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodsh~d. The_Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe political!}~ and 1 ~eolo~~r The Colc.l War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the Ideologtcal\di"lSJon \' uJ al di n of Europe between estem of Europe has disappeared, the c tur VlSIO . d 1 on the 0 t.er h u' . d and 0 rt. ~cl ~x. Christiamty <:U1 1s am. Christianity, on the one han li . E as William \\'allare . i , nt divtding ne m urope. has reemerged. T he most s1gn ea bound of Western Christianity in the has suggested, may well be the eastern th ~undaries between Finland and year 1500. This line runs along what are now . e t through Belarus and t.;kraine . . . Russ1a and bet\veen t he Balti'c st ates and Russ1a, cu s Orthodox eastern liknune, '-. f tholic wes t em .Utuame rom t of Romarua. and ilien goes separating the more Ca f th . swings westward separ-ating TranS)'h-arua rom e res . ting Croatia and SIo\'e. .. al separa . tlY 01lg the line 0 0\\ line of course. coincides \\lth through Yugoslavia almost exac his . , lavta. In the Balkans t Ottoman empires. The peopIes nia from the rest of Yugos bur and the historic boundary between the Hapsp gt stant or Catholic; they shared the to the north and west of th . line are ro e 1s

SOO

PART

CUN I C.IU I

..... - -

new world order will begin.". . .

. European bistorv-fttH1:. 1r'- Jt l Hcnai. . , . 0f . ssane: )11 exf>encn <:es 111 l1on ~~~- lndust . e, t'OUHIIC I" 1tenrnen t . the French .Hc\'0 na 1 R t~e I . evolu. Rc:~forrmttion . the En tg econor11icalh better. of( than I" . r< (jpl r>s to the east ralh' , ,; ,. ther arc genek (! .rwaro' t O Increasing nwo 1'"''"~~'''' 'll ., co mrnon EUro, <tnrj uOI . . . 0 the, !11<1) now loo lid- tion of democrallc pol!tu. I \'.''>terns. The p Pe-ctn ee<;nom, and to tlte co~s~=- a e Orthodox or M li sIiIll i H ; hi c;torieally beo)ples to ' tt1 0 fth rs waear I ,. I I eon tlte east and sou . es and were on.' ~~ 1t :'- touched b)' th h geQ . Tsanst empu .I . l .. e s ap to the Ottoman or the, are aeneralh ess ,\c ' 11 <.<:d ceonornie: ll rng o . ayth tl1e res tofEurope:. lop stable democratre po t events in d ttr<.:al . v~tems Tl , ey 1 likelr to e' e 1e 'el seem much ess l d the Iron Curtain of ideolot_l\ <L<; the most s c, "et . f . ltu e bas rep ace . I . . gnl,rt: Curtam o cu r A tlle events in Yugoslana s 10\\ . tl ts not only . <tnt dividing line in Europ: . s . '' of bloody con Aict. . . . a 1 of toe . . 15 Jso at omes a une . difference, rt a . II th Vlest . .. began to retreat; lhl' c:olonral empire d' Aft world War e . f d . s ISap. 1 manifested tt. . d- er Ara b natronal'sm and then Jslamrc un arnenta tsm first l I .. Llern. peare . West 1 . 1. the . >ecame heavilv dependent on t 1e Persran Gu lf countries f'or tts . . se 'es, the 0 11 . l1 Mu.slim countries became mone~-nc1 d . -ne nerav I 1 and, when they ,\IJ.shed , e ,::.. . . 1. l to weapons-ne] Se'eral wars occurred between. AnDs an r Israel (created bYtlle I . r West). France 1oug}l t a bloodv and ruthless .\var m A gena .ror most of the 1950s; ~ British and French forces invaded E.&'Pt 111 1956; Amenean forces went into . ... Le banon m 19<>8; subsequenth- Amencan force retumed to Lebanon attacked . . Ubva, and engaged in ,arious military ~ncounters mth Iran: Arab and Islamic terron:sts. supported bv at least three yftddle Easte rn governments, emploved tile .' . weapon of the weak and bombed \Vestem planes and ~ nstallati~ns and seized Western hostages. This ...,arfare between Arabs and th e \\ est culmmated in 1990, when the United States sent a massiYe army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath ~ATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its ''southern tier." Trus centuries-old mWtary interaction between the \ Vest and Islam is unhlek to decline. It could bec:ome ~ore virulent. The Gulf \Var left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the \ Vest's militaJy presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countJies, in addition to t11e otl exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democ rac.y become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist move me?~ In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western ~litical forc-es. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicated rela tions between Islamic countries and the \Vest. ... .. _on_both sides the interaction between Islam and the "''est is seen as a clash of "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, sw:lim author, 15 defirutely going to come from the M usl.im world. ft 15 10 tht P of the Islamic nations from the ~aghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a

, !1 w

HUNTINGTON I THE CLAsH OF C IVLUZATIONS?

I

south . h te pa\l, this antagonism was ep'to .. d . I,e . t , 1. I h ' ITIJ7,e rn the i . f dealers alld l '1'1 I avc:~ . It as been reflected in the on oin . ~age ~ Arab slave b tween A nl 1 Jll blacks, the fighting in Chad be~ g L~I<.:Jvt] war m the Sudan ents and t IH .r. \ f rnrn<.;nt. t he tensions between OrthO<] Ch . . veen ' Jyan-support...J msurcu 1 ~e tJ1e Hom or Africa, and the political conflicts rec: ox. nsttans and ~uslims 1 0 1 d umng nots . . I nee betw(;'C:I \1m. uns an Christians in i\igeria Th od '.and c:om muna1 vtoe rC 1m~tra~11ty are l.kely to enhance ern emtzation of Af d . tlle sprea<.l o the probabilitv of violen . n<:a an. ce along thts f:ault line. Symptornatrc of the intensification of this con A t '. p . c: of S da speech 111 Khartoum tn Fe bruary 1993 attacking the ac.tionswasth ope John PauJ I I's government against the Christian minority there. e u ns lslamtSt
I

397

On the northern honler of Islam eonfliet has increas n 1 ed he . '. 1 g y erupt cl M us I. peoples, mduding the carnage of Bosnia and S . tween Orthodox an tm th 1 b b arajevo, e simmenng \ 10 enc:~ etw~en Ser and Albanian, the tenuous relations between BuJgarians.a~d thctr Turk1sh minority, the violence between Ossetians and lngush, the unrem1ttrng slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Hussians and ~ u~lims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russtan 111terests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion rein forces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. . .. The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensif}ing religious strife ,,;thin India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial ~uslim minority. The destruction of the A yodhya mosque in Dec-ember 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In Eac;t Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of1ibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy tO\vard its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade. and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate.... The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, .but at least ~n the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The bast.e values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more diff~rent. The economic issues bet\.veen the United States and Europe are no less senous than~~ bet\veen the United States and Japan, but they do not ha"e the sru.ne poulti . c ture salience and emotional intens1ty because the differenc-es between Amen<.'ant;??tion A ,... ......... and European culture are so much Iess than those between nmencan ....,w.c.oo and Japanese civilization. tJ . . th extent to which thev The interactions behveen civilizations vary grea ) m ~ . _ redomi..... . ean~ P d bY' 10Ience. Economic competition c1 West and are likely to be characterize bci ;ilizations of the nates between the American and European ~u C:ntinent bowE!'-er, the prolifbetween both of them and Japan. On the Eurasum . " th~c cleansing," has not flj . . ed at tle ~treme m e eration of ethnic con 'et, eptonuz fr d most violent between groups been totally random. It has been most equent an

~~ons. Th~- We~s_

a~ ~ndian

has

Hist~, paga been with thethe other.great. antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamick civ:ilizatiOll pies to
n, arurrust, and now increasingly Christian blac

peo

PART 4 coNTEMpORARY WORLD POUTICS

. . . ,., ..;005 In Eurasia the i!H.,l' h ~t ric fa ult j 1 b 1 . dfTerent CJ\1 J7_.,.u . nes h belongmg to 1 aBame. This is partJcularJ_, t ' , ~"~ll'-' the b e "een . t t ' s 'lft' once more ' .., . CI'-1 1z.<t Jon ' ped rs1 c bloc of nations f.rorn t1h . , !lll!!e .~r Afnc:ounda.nes ()f t ha ami a to the cre.(cen -sal rs between ~fuslims. on the orH : 'ld, ,Utd Orth cl centraJ o As. \ iolence Jso occu ta. . Israel Hindus iJ1 Indi a. BucldhJ'ih 111 Bllrtna and Cox Serbs in the Balk-ans. ews J.D ' borders. , atholics in tlre Philippine . Islarn bas blood~

398

HUNTINGTON I THE ClASH OF m m ..... "'.. lULI\TIONS?

399

cJVll1ZATION RAllYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME

Grou s or states belonging to one cidlization that become imolved in war . peopl~ from a different civilization naturally try to rail~ ~upport from other rnwrth bers of their own chilization. As the post- Cold War world evolves, <.:ivi) ~rnt JZahon c:ommouality. what H. D. S. Green":a~ tlas t erme d tl1e "k'm-coun try" syndrome . replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power w nsideration lS -''ti s. . principal basis for c :ooperatton and eo~ ons. It can be seen gradually emer as the 0 the post-Cold \\ ar conflicts in the Pers1an Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia Ngi g tn r. one these was a 1u11-sca1e war between Cl'ilizations. b ut eacl1 Jn\'O1 ved some eleme of of civilizational ralhing. which seemed to become more imrJortant as the oon~ B~ts continued and which mar provide a foretaste of the future. First. in the Gulf War one Arab state imaded another and then fought a alition of Arab. \\'estem, and other_ states. \\'bile only a few .\1 uslim govem~:nts O\'erth supported Saddam Hussem, manr Arab elites privatelv cheered hi . " m on. and he _was h1ghly popula: among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movemrents .uruversally .sup~rted Iraq rc1tl1er than the \Vestern-backed govem_ments_o_f K~v.wt and Saudi Arab.a. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussem exp~Cltl}' m~oked an Isla~ic ap~aJ. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a v.ar between CJVJI.zations. "It is not t11e world against I SafarAI-Hawali deanofislamic Studiesatthe Umm AI-Q ura Uru'versty rM . as aq t't d 1y 1 1 m 1 e<,'(,'a. 1 m a WJ. . e C ated tape. "It is the West agai nst Islam." Ignoring the rivalry Jrcu .. '~ed~o Irahn and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei eau I Or a o1 war against th \VI ;t 'Th . . ' eed lans 'V . . . e es e struggle aga.mst Amencan aggression, ~~~ Ph . and pohcies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on war pat IS a martyr " 'This 15 , . Ar.ilis and all M li a w~, King Hussein of Jordan argued, 'against all . us ms and not aga.mst Iraq aJone "

f:

Union. Armenian ~try syndro~e also appeared in confl.icts in the fonner Soviet increasingly . far) ~<:cesses m 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to bec:ome "'" ' ~._ supportive of Its relioious ethnic and lin . . b th . J..., : ne JJOn'' e a Turlcish nation ~ et" ' guistic re ren m AzerJ.T<Ujarl Turlash official in gg. "Wee ng the same sentiments as the A.zerbaijanis," said one 1 2 tos ofatrocities and are. kin are ~der pressure. Our newspapers are full of the phoe . as g us ifwe are still tra1. pol ICf. Maybe we sbouJd show Anne . . ~no~ about pursuing our ~eu ~urgut Gm~ agreed, remarkin rua that there s a b1g Turkey in the region. President little bit." Turlcey, 0za1 th g that Turkey should at least "scare the ArmenianS 8 Force-. a _ . reatened again in 1993 would " h ts c " Turkish Air r - new reconnassance flinM.. ' s ow 1 Jangs. &Q along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended

Second, tbe kin

. .. .

shipment.., ., 1d ai r Ai15hts to Armenia; and Turke\' and . uld not ac<:t'pt d1-;me,nberment of AzerbaiJan . 1n the -ast vears rannoun~d thf'!'l. lran \\0 1 -; 0 d et u 0 ,ernnwnt <>upported AzerbaiJan because .ts . ' Its existen<.:e, the e . ~ I h l go\ernment \vas d . So r. . ommated bv ,o.rll'ler c"Om ll1UIIl..,t~. \\ 1L 1 t e end of the So\11et uruon~ however )'tical ,.. . . ' 1 t:ions Cfa,e way to religrous ones. Russian troops fought th .de po <:onsiderao .. d h " on e Sl of the Arm . and Az,erbruJan a<:('use t e Russian government of turning 180 "eruans. support for C~ristian Armenia. degrees tmvard Third, \Vlth respect to the fighting in the forme r y ugoslav1a. \\.estem bJ manifested s~1npa th y and support for the Bosnian \1 usli d h h pu ICS . I d f } ms an t e orrors thev tl1e .1an s o t 1e Serbs. Relatively little 00ncern was expressed howsuffered at , . ' ever. over Croatran attacks on Muslims and participation m th e ucsmemberment .],_ of 1 h Bosnia-Herzegonna. n t e early stages of the Yugoslav breaku c ..m an . 1 fl 1 . .. p, ennanv, d1sp ay o u1p omatic m1tiative and muscle induce,d the other 11 members u.nusu al ' . of the European C om mu~1ty to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the popes determination to provide strong backin t th , . t . th V . d g o e t.'o Cath olre coun nes, e atican exten ed recognition even before the c tv cti? The States _followe? the European lead. Thus the \\ estem CJ\llizatio~ ~allied behind their coreligionists. Subsequentlr Croatia was reported to be rece1\1~g subs~antial ~~antities of arms from Central European and other \ Vestem _countries. Bons Yeltsin s government, on the other bancl attempted to pursue a m1dclle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alien~te Ru~sia from th~ West. Russian consenathe and nationalist groups, ho\\'e,er, mcluding many legt.slators, attacked the go\emment for not beina more forthcomjng in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 se\eral hundred R~ssians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces. and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia. Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the \\'est for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the v .K anns embargo. l ran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; lranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to trai n and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other c."Ountries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By tl1e end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-a-vis the Serbs. . . . . . Civilization rallying to date has been limited. but it has ~n g_n>'-'1Dg, ~ at clearly has the potentiaJ to spread much further. As the co~cts m the Pers1an Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued. the positions of nations and the cleavages between them' increasingly were along ch-.lizationallines. Populist ~iticians. i religious leaders and tl1e media ha,e found it a potent means of arousmg mass support and of ~ressuring hesitant governments. In the comin~ years. the local conflicts most likelv to escalate into major wars "ill be those. as m Bosniaifantbed ~ ' 11 ti J The next world war re IS Caucasus, along the fault lines between C1" za ons. one, will be a war between civilizations.

road

~~:ed_

leadin;:c:~\~

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PART 4

ORARY WORLD POLITICS coNTEMP HUNTINGTON I THE CLASH OF C IVIUZATIONS?

401

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

.. ""rtordinar:r>eak of pmn1 HI r~ l.1lion to otlle r CI\'JI' 1 r w tt all ex ' 17-Cllion . t .1s disappeared 11om t w nttr \Jilita')' ts 110 ' The \\ est 1 s. con A .~ < .. er OJJponen 1' J . k~ble and \Vestern mdlt<ll) pmv\ r IS unriv:tl d I<:, <lll"Jon . Its supmpow . ' e . Ap . g cl tates IS unt 1111 < ; art fr0 ,., . CJ economic challenge. Jt Ol ll lllalcs internat \\.estern s . . . ~ < lOI1ll . . aces n tl \t\ est 1 Japan, ~~ . . ,. ns and with rapan mternatiOnaJ ('C:Oll011li<.; instit t ' ' Pohtic:aJ - 11 Ions Cl I 1I 1 . d secuntv mstltU 10 issues are effective \' sett ec )) a directorate of t 1 u oba1 'h d aJl 1e . . . . )Olitical an secun/ 1 a d1rectorlte . I . . . d France world economiC 1 sues >) I 0 1 t le tJ 'ltte<] . . ' . . , . .1 ' States. BntaJn. an n1ted cl . . . nd Jai>an. all of wluc 1 mamt,un C\tJ ttordmari)v ose rei ti .I . I dI States, Gennan). a . . tl to the exclusion of lesser an arge \ non-\\ este 111 cou ntnes. cl o~ n . . . .. I ' . wi th eacI1 o 1er 01 m t 1e I ntC'rnahonal Mo netary F ecJ. . 1 swns made at t!Je u N Secu.ntv Cow1cii that reflect the interests of the_West are presen:ed t~ the world as reflectin llnd desires of tl1e world commumt): The very plu cl~C? ~. ~1C? world communi ~the ~~ become the euphemis~ic coJiectl\~e noun_ (rc~)lacm~ th e ~ree World ") d gl\e the global leuitimacy to actionsI reRectmg d t1mte1ests o( the Umted States an othe . . o westem powers. Tll~ough t 1e I_M~ ru~ o 1er ~~ternatJOnaJ economic institution r 5 nations the ~ the West promotes 1ts economic mte1ests and unpo. es on other nomic policies it thinl.:s appropriate. I n any poll of non-\Vestern peoples th eco. undoubtedly would \\in tl1e support of finance ministers and a few othe;s : IMF' an overwbeLningly unfa,orable rating from just about everyone else wh' ut get agtee with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of I.VIF officials as "ne~-B ~ hw~~~~-~ . . . . otl1er peop1 ' money, JI11I'>Osmg undemocr>t c .0 s eviJ\S d .en es 1 w1o Iove expropnaling . " 1 an a1 c . 1 rules of economic and political conduct and stifling econom ic freedom." d Western domination of the U.N. Security Counci I and its decisions t empere 1 b occasJOna1 abstentJon b> Cb. a, produced U ..\'. legitimation of,the W est'5 : m . on y y use of force to dme Iraq out of Kuwait and its e liminati'o11 of I raq ,s sop1 . 11sticated . . s ~,eapon~ and capacity to produce such weapons .... The \ <\lest in effect 1 usmg mtemational in stitutions, mili tary power and economic resources to run the world . 10 ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and ' promote Western political and economic values. . That at least is tlJe wa)' in wh'leI1 non- u r vvestem ers see the new world and there is . . .:l! ' D .a: ement of trutll i th . . . a sJgrw,cant e1 n en VIew. Inerences in IJower and struggles for . '''mn llwl,_ /.economic and instituti al the West and th ' . .:I:.. . on power are tl1us one source of conflict between . ffi I\'W7..atio ns. n 1 erences m culture , that is basic values and . o er C beU f e s, are a second source of . li con et. \.Vestem concepts differ fun damentaJI\' from those pre"a1 t . tJ 'J' v en m o 1er v CI_u zations. Western idea<; of individualism, liberalism, constitutionali ality ilb sm, 1 . c tree markets the se lUman nghts' equ- , erty, the rule of law, democrat); paration of ehurc1 and state, often have little resonance m ' ,,.. J 1 Islamic Concuc1 apanese H' d B uu rl ~fforts to propagat; such . .'. 01 u, ~ddhist, or Orthodox cultures. We~tem 11 unperialism" and a ,.ft'!-~.. < ~ac; produce mstead a reaction against "human nghts rt rca.tunnation of di 14 values, as can be seen in the suppo or religious fundamentalism b m genous Y the younger generation in non-Western cuJtureS The very notion that th d ,, . ..1 direc:uy at odds with th ere .could be a "uruversal civilization" is a Westem 1 eo. what distinguishes one e Partilculansm of most Asian societies and their emphasis on peop e from anoth er.... These differences are most mamfest

West . 0 1 tlte cfl<>rts o1 tl C nitcd States and other . ~md powtrs to induce other peoples h c dopl \ V -;t l r 1 ideaS conc(;!mi ng democra 3 t0 cy an uman . h . . . ati<.: govenllnrH t ~ongmatec.l in the West . v11. . has dev ng l.'d. .Modem demoI > ' V nen lt . n , . <.:1 odeties 1t has usuauy r>een the product of Westem eo1 . e ope m non-Western S .. omalism 1 f. . < : or mpos1tion. T he centreJ ruos o world politk:s in tl . f uture 1s hkel t 1 . Je h 1trase, t e con liict between "th " ' Y o )e, m Kishore Mahb11baru s p " cl . f. non-\' ' ctvi ljzations to W e vvest and the Rest an the 'vestcrn responses o 1 responses gcnerallv take one or a combmati estefmthpower and values. Those on o ree form A ' N non-Weste111 states can, like Burma and ! orth K orea attempts. t one extreme, t0 . .. pursue a course of isolation, to msulate their societies from p t '. ration or corru ti ~ b th ene r f1ect, to opt out of participatio . th " ' P on Y e West, and, in c n m e vvestem-dom t d 1 bal . l . ma e commumty. T 1e costs of thts course' however, are 1. h ancl 1ew stat ha g 0 r ug es ve sued it exclusively. A second alternative ' the equJv ent of ''banclwagoni pur'' . . ng m d international relatwns theory, is to attempt to Join th w e est an accept 1ts values Tl ti d 1 ancl mst1tut1ons. 1e ur a temative is to attempt to ''b l a u power and cooperating with ance" the West by develd . opmg economJC an . m 1tary otller non-\ Vestern soct. tl . . . eoes agamst 1e. West, wlule preserving indigenous val ues and . . mstitutions m ' sh01t , to modernize but not to Westernize.
1
a! '

THE TORN COUNTRIES

In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries \vith large numbers of peoples of different civilizations ... are canrudates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homooeneitv but are divided over whether ilieir society belongs to one civiJjzation or ano~ber. These are tom countries. Their leaders typically \vish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture, and traditions of their countries are non-Western. Tbe most obvious and prototypical tom countly is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attati.i rk tTadjtion and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nationstate. They allied Turkey with the vVest in NATO and in the GulfWar; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastem Muslim society. In addition, while tJ1e elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey \vill not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and tlley don't say that.'. Having rejected Mecca. and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tas.hkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to bec"Ome the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to . . carve out this new identity for itself. During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat s1milar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted

.f02

PART4

coNTEMI'ORA .

RY WORLD POUTICS

J'O<iition to tl 1e t.J . t ~~ 1lo join it in tl nlleij lle great task c1e North ' 1i de Are<l. l' eXJ ' . Or red . ArneJi~Ul Free nt !I . 'ntroduced fundarnenhu t r nn1c refonns th efin. 1 . 'd t't)' anc. Jave J I 1g< at~ iug Mexi~ 1 en d tal political cl1ange. n . U top adviser to p en. tual/\' w lead to fi.m a~nd n. bed at length to me all tht> changes the Sa] reSident ill e . -' d Gortan escn k I 1 Inas Car/os Swina.s e . \\11 he finished. I remar cc: T 1at's most imp . gov. 111aking. .JJen . I' . emment was call . want to change MexJCo rom a Latin Ame1icaressl\,e. II seems to me that b~J . Y) ourrv ., He looked at me with ~u n:H and n <:ol.llntry ise . AI11 encan coun~ r . -L exc Cl! rtl1 into a \ 'o . ~rvin! . t llled: .. , . tl 1That's prec1se1 w lIatwe are ~ 1 . .... to do. bu..of course. we could neversa y , .. . Exac 1Y As Jus remark 111UJ . . ...l'cates in MeXJco as 111 Tw kcy. SlgJllficant element . Yso bl' , ., , . s msoc pu JC ~ redefinition of tlJeir cowl~S IdentJty. 1n Turkey, E uropean-onen l ety resist the ak stures to Islam (Ozal's pilgJimage to .\tlecca) so al~o M .ted leaders have.to m ~e ~:d leaders jJave to make gestures to those wh~ hold M ~XICOs Nortl1 Amencan-oner . . G d I . eXJco to . . be a Latm Amencan count:J.y (Salinas' Ibero-Amenc;:m ua a a.Jara summit). . . dl Historically Turkey has been the most profoun y tom cou ntry. For the United . States, MeXJc0 ' 15 tlle most immediate tom counhy. Glohally the most important . . tom countrY is Russia. The question of whetl1er Russta IS part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by. the cOJ~munist .~ctory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted It to Russi_an conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dommance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. \Vith communism disc.Tedited Russians once again face that question .. .. To redefine its civilization identity, a tom country must meet three requirements. First, its politic.:al and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be wilung to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the oonvert. All three requireme nts in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between U .beral demO<:racy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despi~e their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could hare q~ite diffe~ent go~s. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate With _a SoVJe~ .Ma~t. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a traditionalist. If, the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject . democrat)' and lations between R begm behaving like Russians but not Jike Westerners, the re d h ur ' ussJa an t e vvest could again become distant and eonll' -'-A ICWSJ
1\f :iro has stop . S to join Europe.. e-.; . . toinlitate tbe Unt te(1, t Uld Slttes < is instead attemp~lfg can leaders are enga,gt c
j

ped deflJling it.sell h.\

HUNTINGTON I THE ClAsH OF CNIUZATIONS?

-:;::;n

THE CONFUCfAN-ISLAMJc CONNECTION

The obstacles to non-~ t . . . . 1 Thev are -- -t l' Lati es em countries JOming the West vary cons1derab Y ' 'CC1S IOr n American
anu ast European countries. They are greater 10 . es of tbe former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim.
.J

Orthodox countri

c.

r the

... Co.. fn cian . I :. '1, .md Buddhist so<:ieties Japan hao; esta bl ished . c .1 'tself a~ :m :- oc1alc rncmber of the West lt . . th a umquc position rOI IS tn e West tn some respe<:ts hut I rly not of tl \ \ '(st in important dimensions Th cea .sh osecountries th tf' 1 Jtu re and poMr < o not w1 to, or <:annot Jo th " ' a or reasons of cu . Ll1 develop111g thctr own economic, mHitary and elivvcst compete Wl'th l he West . 1 1 y0 1110tinu th<'lr internal development and b,y ,or.,.. po tit.ca1P?'hver. They do this by pr ..., . '-VVpera mg \VJt othe \~ ountries. Tlw most prominent form of tl"lis <." "'pe t . th r n~n- estcrn connection th at has emerged to challenge Western .ra IO sts. e Confuc1 -1 1 -v.~ nt n IS an s am1 c 1 ere , va1 anc..l pow c Almo!'>t witlto11t exception, Western countries ar d ues . . er. " e 1e1r ower. . . . C11nm, 1 h Korea, and several MiddJe East re ucmg t 1 miJitary "ort ta h P . h .. em tes, Significantl v expan d mg t e1r m1 1 1tary <:apabilities They are do s tl . b owever' are h . . 'm Western O f arrns fro and non-Western sources by tl1e d mg1 us 'v t c 1mport and f. d' . . . . eve opment o m 1 genous arms mdustnes. One result ts the emergence of what Char! . K h . " , es raut ammer has called Weapon States, and the Weapon States are not Wet ~ t . l d C>. f s em s ates. Another resu It IS t 1~ re enmtton o arms control, whi<:h is a Western concept and a Western goal. Dunng the Cold War tl1e primary purpose of arms control was to estabHsh a stable mi litary balance between tbe United States and its allies anc.l the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the prima.ry objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do th~ through international agreements, ec..'Onomic pressure, and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies. The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nudear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence, and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal nonn and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West. . The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert tl1eir right to acqmre and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for th~ir sec.~rity. Th.e~ also have absorbed to the full the truth of the response of the Imhan defense mmtster when 1 ' ' . ' asked what lesson he leamed f rom t he Gulf 'vvar. "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, ~d missiles are viewed probably erroneous Iy, as the potential equalizer of supenor ' . Western conventionaJ power. Chma, of course, alreadv has nuclear weapons; , 1 ial . . 0 Pakistan and India have the capab''' to dep1 y them. ~ort11 Korea. Iran, ffiraq, JJJty . . . c L1b)'a and Algeria appear to be attemptmg t0 acqmre them. A top 1raman o 1988 , d ' h0 uld nuclear weapons. an 10 has declared that all Muslim states s a~wr~ all' fo development of 'd the pres1 ent o f Iran repo rt dl issued a directive c . mg r e Y . . d d' 1 ca1 weapons." "offensive and defensive chemical, bJOlogJCal, an ra 10\ <>glst milit!lT\"caMbilities is \ 1 pment of cowtter- 1e ...... ;create mtlitarv tCentrally important to t he deve 0 d 'ts means to th e sustained expansion o f e h. il'tary power an 1 mas m 1 t Clu'na is rapidlv increasing 1 c ' power. Buoyed by spectacuIar ec.'Onorn1 deve opmen

403

coNTfMJ'ORARY WORLD POUTICS 404 PART4

HUNTINGTON I THE CLASH OF CIVIU

. :f' notlerniz~= d. and \1gOJ.ousi)' moving forward "1 . . . "uon of. 1 its militarv spen mg ' . u weapons from the fom 1 l c;tates it is cl ts 1 -~ed fo~s. It is pure ~asul19o92 1 tested a one-rn eg,Ltw . . I Jr devi~e. I t . evelop. t . Jes; u1 . . . 1 ing long-range mtss bilHies acgumng aen.lt ....,: 'lChng techo ol LS deve. aping power-projection. capfta came~ Its militruy buildup and 'assertion ogyf, and 0 sove hase an rurcr.1 1 ., ' t~<ing to pure uth China Sea are provoking a ll1LLtr atcr<U region al arms r. eignt: over the ~ 0 . al . CbU1a 1s so a maior exnor ter of arm anJ weapons techn o1 raee :1 r in East Asra. ais Lib\a and Iraq that could be 11C>ed to manufacture ogy 1 t / 1 rted maten toIt has helped Algeria b il' I1as expo u u a rcado r suitable for nuc: ear and ne1Ye gas. . nuc ear weapons d roduction. Chma has soJd to Iran nuclear tech 1 researc1 <Ul P 1 d no1 ogy weapons . officials believe could only be use to creat e weapons and apparent! thatA~nen~m onents of 300-rnile-range missil es to Pakistan. North Korea h y has shippe Ppons program under wa\ for some while and has sold adva ""'~ 1 wea had a nuc ear . . .1 technology to Syna and Iran. T1 A o f weapons and wean-.vu 1e ow missiles an d rruss1 e . . 1 pons . nerally from East As1a to the Mt'delle E ast. T ne re IS, however so teehno1 rs ge ogy . h . d S. me . the reverse direction; Chma as recc1ve tinger missiles nom rr m~m~ t tn A Confucian-Islamic milita1y connection 1 t us come m to being, designed 1as to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the rniJJtary power of the \Vest. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said. "a reneg ades' mutu al support pac~ run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms comp etition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the \Vest. In an old-fashjoned arms race, each side developed its ov.rn arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new fonn of arms comp etitio n, one side is developing its anns and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms buildup while at the same time reducing its O\VTl military capabilities.

ZATIONS?

405

Pakistan.

IMPUCATIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace alJ other identities. ~ ~ation-:mtes will disappear, that each civilization will becom e a single coherent po~tical entity, that groups within a civilization will not conHi<.:t with and even fight ~ac~ other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civiand important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict . een CIVJI.zations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dom~~thi~ global form of confliet; international relations histoiically a game played out WJ n West : t ' . whi h em cwuzation, will mcreasingly be de-Western ized and become a game ~cal c. n?n-Western civi~zations are actors and not simply obiec.:ts; successful pollt1 , secunty, and eco . J thin ..: 1 :_~._, 0 !IlOmJc mtemational institutions are more likely to deve1P WI . .J:CC ilizati Civw.t.aOons than across CIVJJ . ns; conflicts between groups in uiuerent Cl\. IZ.atio ons will be more freq t _.a:cts between . th uen ' more sustained, and more violent than coruu cn.:J:__._, ~groups m e same <:ivilization; violent conflicts betw een group s in different .nuu.auons are the most lik I d could lead to global wars th e Yan most dangerous sourc e of escalation that , e paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between ;::on s

~~ .r~

non-\" vestem eo m ., rnake thc.>ir <.r Jll. nr ., part of the west, but in most cases face u~ es Wl I try to omplishi11g du'>; a central fO<:us of conflict f, th . maJor obstacles to ace ' ., .1 or e 11l1mediate fut vill be betwe en thl' \\ ~'"t a nu severa1Islamic-Confucian states. ure ' This is not to advocate the desirability of conf11ct b tw ... s e een <.:t\-W...ati set fOJth dco,criptive hypotheses ac; to what the future mav b lik lfth ons. lt 1S to ~ lS ' e e sib le hypot 1 ;ses, 1 ,ever, J t . necessary to consider their im licati ese are plauH 10\\ , P Western liC) These implications should be cliVIcled between short-termons for ta e and po . advan long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clear!}' in th . t f hg . . . . . . e m erest o t e \\est to prom ote greate1 coope ration and uruty within its own vil t . d h et 1za 10n, particularly between rts Euro pean an Nort American components to . th. . E . ' moorp West soctebes m astern Europe and Latm America whose cultu .orate mto e res are c1 to ose 1 those of the \\ est; to prom.ote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and J ap~n ; to prevcn~ e~calation ofl~cal inter-civili7-ation conflicts into major intercivilization wars; to hrn1t the expansiOn of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic: states; to 1~o~er~te the reduc.-tion of Western military capabilities and maintain miut<ll)' supen onty m East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to vVest em values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reAect and legitimate Western interests and values; and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions. In the longe r term other measures would be called for. Western chi.lization is botl1 \ Vestem and modem. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modem without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations \vill continue to attempt to acquire the wealth. technology, skills, machines, and weapons that are part of being modem. They will also attem pt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and Yalues. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the \!\T will increasingly have to accommodate those non-Western modern chilizaest tions whose powe r approaches that of the West but whose values and int~res~ differ significantly from those of the \Vest. This will require the West to ~amtam the economic and military powe r necessruy to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It wil1 also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underl}in? n otl1er CIVIlizations an d tl1e ways m whicl1 people 1 those civilizations see theu d mterests. It \vill requi re an e 10rt to 1 entify eIe rnents of commonalitv between . . . Western and other eivilizahons. For the re1 evant flu tu re there will be no .umversal . civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.

.. 1 West w cl tilt Ht>st''; the elites in some tom t 1e

rr

NOTE
.. Th Natior~a/ltLterest (Summer 199"2), 1. Kishore Mahbubani. "The West and the Rest. e 3-13.

ZAKARIA I WHY
,

DO THEY HATE. US?

407

FAREED ZAKARIA

' oned t . "~T]Jy should we care? . .. Anger" not e enough to get us t11 or answenng, vi t1 . . b . long struggle. For 1at we\ vill need an swe rs. The one . rough what 1 swe to ea s f: il' \\~ cl r s we 1 1ave . h e been comforting but am 1ar. e stan 10r freedom d an the , I1earcI so far av hate it. We are rich and the~ ~ovy us. We are stJ:o:l~ and th~y resent this. All . ....... wI11ch 1 u e. But there are bill10ns of poor and weak and oppressed peol)le around s the world. They don't turn planes into bombs. Th~y don t blow themselves u t kill thousands of civilians. If envy were the cause o{ terrolism, Beverly Hills, ~f~ A venue and Mayfctir would have become morgues long ago. There is sometJ, stronger at work here than deprivation and jealousy. Some tl1ing that can move rn~! to kill but also to die. Osama bin Laden has an answer-religion. For him and his followers, this is a holy war between Islam and the Western world. Most ~ uslims disagree. Every Islamic country in the world has condemned the attacks of September 11. To man bin Laden belongs to a long line of extremists who have invoked religion to justit mass murder and spur men to suicide. Tbe words "thug,'' "zealot," and "assassin" aU co~e from ancient t~rror cults- Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim, respectively-that believed they were domg llie work of God. The terrorist's mind is its own place and ~ke Milton's Satan, can make a hell of heaven, a heaven of hell Vlhether it i~ the Unabomber, Aum Shinrikyo or BaJllch Goldstein (who killed scores of unarmed Muslims in Hebron), terrorists are almost always misfits who place their own nvisted morality above mankind's.

. v1111y do tbe terrorists bate us?" Americans c:ould be pard To the question "' ,. ,iJJ b

;f

ll

ADMIRATION FOR BIN LADEN

But bin Laden and hi 1111 'di s 0 owers are not an isolated cult like Aum Shinrikyo or the B h DaVJ ans or dem t d I fllllC Th en e oners like Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber. We:~~mde ouft of a ~ult~re that reinforces their hostility, distrust, and hatred of the an o Amenca m parti . 1 This u1 bt fuels the fianati . th . cu ar. c ture does not condone terronsm u CISm at rs at 1 h art 1i t be reassuring, but it is false s e o say that al Qaeda is a fringe group may you will detect a t . Read the Arab press in the aftermath of the attacks and no -so-hidden admiration for bin Laden. Or consider this from the
fareed '7,.1-.-!. . ._....lil. '1he Politks ofR:~a Wh 2001 Xeo.~~SWeck, Inc. All rightx n..oserved ~: . YDo 11ley Hate Us?" From Newsweek. October 15, 2001. @ "'t> 406 . epnnted by permission.

reJioion. Other scholars have Uisagree~l pomt'mg out } an mtolerant and violent o u., th t l I slaughter o~ mnoce1~ts and prohihits suicide. Nothin will a s _am condemns the "true Islam or quotmg ilie Quran. The Quran . . g be solved by searching for . . ts a vast vague book fill d . and contradictions (much like the Bible). Y ou ~d . . ' e w1th poetry and incitements to stn.Jggle, beautiful express . can f m lt condemnations of war 1 0 . o erance and t . )tevers. Quotations from it usually nsU to1 against unbe t s em strictures e us more about tt 1 selected the passages than about Islam Every 1 . . . te person w 10 re l~on 1s compatible with t1J b and tl1e worst of humankind. Through its long h'st Chri . . e est ... .l . S . . b I ory, stiamty has SUJ)ported inqwsitlons anc anti- em1tism, ut also human rights d a1 r l 1 . . an SOCI we1 rare. Searchtng t 'le 1.1story books 1 also of limited value F s th C d . l1e Turkish expansion of the 15th centu rom e 1rusa es of the Ilth centUiy to t t ti 1 m ry o le eo orua era . the early 20th century, Islam and the West have often battled ili't 1 Th' . h d m any. IS tens1on has eXISted for un reds of ye~s, during which there have been many periods of peace and even harmony. Un til the 1950s, for example, Jews and Christians lived peaceably under Muslim rule. In fact, Bemard Lewis, the preeminent historian of Islam, has argued that for much of history religious minorities did better under Muslim rulers than they did under Christian ones. All that has changed in tlle past f~w decad~s: So surely ~e relevant question we must ask is, Why are we in a particularly dtfficult phase nght now? What has gone wrong in the world of Islam tl1at ex-plains not the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 or the siege ofVienna of 1683 but September 11, 2001? Let us nrst peer inside that vast Islamic world. Many of the largest Muslim countries in the world show little of this anti-American rage. The biggest, Indonesia, bad, until the recent Asian economic crisis, been diligently folhving Washington's ad\~ce on economics, witl1 impressive results. The second and third most populous Muslim countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have mLxed Islam and modernity "~th some success. While both countries are impoverished, both have voted a woman into power as prime minister, before most Western countries have done so. Next is Turkey. the sixth largest Muslim country in the world, a flawed but functioning secular democracy and a close ally of the \Vest (being a member of NATO). Only when you get to the Middle East do you see in lurid colors all the dysfun.ctions that people conjure up when they think of Islam today. In Iran. Egypt, ~}~ Iraq, Jordan the occupied territories and the Persian Gulf, the resurgence of lslatruc ' . An seems to be evef\'where. fundamentalism is virulent, and a raw anti- 1encamsm This is the land of suicide bombers, flag-bume~ and fiery mulla: 'jg50s and l960s But even the Arab rage at America is relatively recent. In e Id Id d . . cl S . t d the Arab wor wou en up It seemed unimamnable that the Umte ta es an . h ed Heikal o ' . rful J. oumalist, ~1o am ' locked in a cultu raJ clash. Egypt s most pD'~e f the ULlited States ... was a described the mood at the time: "The whole picture 0

reiudices predi<.:tmg a "clash of <.:ivilizations'~b est to dust off old essa"'S and older P ) I enveen the \ V, d ' torian Paul Jo mson has argued that Islam is inbinsica]) , e.st an Islam. The his-

_t.;stani tlf'\\' 'P<'f The Nation: "Septe b Pwu . k . m er 11 was . rroriSII1 S s~' e ll \vas reaction and revenge .not mmdless terrorism r te 1 r ..1 1 . , even retributi ., tOr that .Osant.t >Ill .....tue n Jeheves that this . a on .... The problem . not ' IS religi . . . IS that milhon!> of rwople ~cross the Islamic world seem OUs \\ar agamst America. lt's This awh\'ard reality hac; led some in th W to agree.

RARY WORLD POUTJCS

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PART 4

coNTEMP0

America ha ,emer traveled to the M1.1~ , tst in th epowerfuI Clrtd I . I first reLimon. But 0 ear y Ig. [ 1. t111g than e' er. lOs {America "vas o a g sten11 w 1 i'roachabJe more appea I'Tiocle d even then the image od Coca-Cola. Somet1 . 1 ling l<lJp(n.;-d in thes I rnty: J . an e ands "" J ~A . I ll ' . . Hilton hote s clll c 10 f nti-American rage 111 t 1e J tt c et c East, we need ,ast crus, to pltJmb understand the roots o faJ . . . b t tlle l)ast 30. not tbe past 300 years o ustor) u

. Bnt'llll anc1 r 1 I h 'deoJo!!V or comllltJillSI I c <Tiamorous one. 'I < , 000 111 1 es twav tncdt e ' ged c. ~ ~ V from \ orIcI '\.at T1 \\'as 5,

. .

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lAKARJA I
C roundecl1

WHY 00 TH.

409 p and killed by tl1e reaime .tl IJ . . e \.VI 1 no e:onse u . I . ., , . capital. Dcu P l'; JS. Js t Je oldest continuous! . h b q enc.:es. (ThiS ln a land h w ose :ty a tllllost unt IuJl kahi E' reversa1of a global pattYm aJ 1ted Cl Ln the world ) -. . 1n an em most < every Arab country tod . ess free than 1t wa.; 30 years ago. There are r l ay JS rew countrie . I . s m t 1e world of which one <;an say lhal. . . .

EY HATE US?

wealth 's Negative Effects

. The mon<:y that the gulf sheiks have fritt d . be ]1eve. Just one example aere. away .JS on a seale tbat is almost d, f: impossible to . . avore pnnce 0 f Saudi Arabta, at the . . d age of2t>, bwlt a palace m Riyadh for 8300 mu . l t (l'jven a $J billion commission on the kingdom' Ion1anh' as an addltion al bounty, was 'th T&T Far s e ep one contract WJ. A . . aJ ,~ . o he progress, wealth has actual] had so from prooucng po1 Y me negative effec:ts. It has enriched and empowered the gulf go brethren, they, too, have bec:ome more repr:~;;ents 5? that, like their Arab f. eties they once ruled have become gilded cagesvfillovder ~~thme The Bedouin soci' e Wl . d. 1 discontented you ng men-some of whom now live in Ac h rustrated b'tter a~ cl With u . . r Osama bm Laden, (B'm Laden and some of his aides g amstan an..:r work come rrom pnvueged backgrounds in Sau cl i Arabia.) fr Id By the late 1980s, while the rest of the world was watcl1 mg o regJmes om p M?SCO\~ to rague to Seoul to_ Johannesburg crack, the Arabs were stuck with tJ1eir agmg dtc~at~rs and con11pt king~. Regimes that might have seemed promising in the 1960s ~ere .n~w exposed as tired, corrupt kleptocracies, deeply unpopular and thoroughly J Ilegitimate. One ha<; to add that many of them are close American allies.

CHAPTER I : THE RULERS

,.. . d'ffi It t coniure up the excitement in the Amb world in the late 1900s as t F . , ,d E J It JS t cu o L a1 Abde1 Nasser consolidated power m gyp;\..1 Ol lCeca es Arabs hacl been ki d Cam t crovemors and deca ent ngs. now . 1ey were ach ieVi ng their 1 d by eoIonaJ 0 . 1 l1l e r was 1e1r dreams of JJ Jdei)endence and Nasser t1 .new sav10r,.a modern man 10r t e d . .1 exan e, 1 era He was bom u11der Bnhs1 ru 1 . m .A1 . n a, a cosmopolt'tan c 1 . . pos"var 1 ~, s that was more Meditemmean tl1an Arab. H1 f01 mahve years were spent . tl of the society. \Vith his tailored suit~ an1~ Anny, the most Westernized segment fashionable dark glasses, he cut an energetic fig ure on tlle world stage. "The Lion of Egypt,r he spoke for all tl1e Arab world. Nasser believed tl1at Arab politics needed to be fired by modern ideas like selfdetermination, socialism and Arab unity. And before oil money tumed the Gulf states into golden geese, Egypt was the undisputed leader of the Middle East. So Nasser's vision became the region:c;. Every regime. from th e Baathists in Syria and Iraq to the conservative monarchies of the Gulf, spoke in similar terms and tones. It wasn't that they were just aping Nasser. The Middle East desperately wanted to become modem. It failed. For all their energy these regimes chose bad ideas and i~plemented them _in ~vorse ways. Socialism produced bureaucracy and stagnation. Rather than adjusting to the failu res of central planning, the economies never reall~.moved on. TJ1e r~publics calcified into dictatorships. Third World "nonalign_ent m .became pro-SoVJet propaganda. Arab unity cracked and crumbled as countnes_~scovered their own national interests and oppo1tunities. Worst of all, Israel ~lumiliated the Arabs in the wars of 1967 and 1973. When Saddam Hussein mvaded Kuwait in 1990, he destroyed the last re mnants of the Arab idea.
h

CHAPTER II: FAILED IDEAS

How does a region that once yearned for modernity reject it so dramatically? About a decade ago, in a casual conversation with an elderly Arab intellectual, I expressed my frustration that governments in the Middle East had been unable to liberalize their economies and societies in the way that the East Asians had done. "Look at Singapore, Hong Kong and Seoul," I said. pointing to their extraordinaly economic achievements. The ~an , a gentle, charming scholar. straightened up and repued s~ly, "Look at tl1em. They have simply aped the West. Their cities are cheap copt_es of Houston and Dallas. That may be all right fo r 6shing villages. But we are h~rrs .~o one of the great civilizations of the world. We cannot become slums of the \\ est. Th s d' SI'IJ U t Wl. the West is at the heart of the Arab problem. It h d'ffi u} S10nmen 'th l I makes economic advance impossible and political progress fraught '~t 1 . c . ty. Modernization is now taken to mean, inevitably, uncontrollably. "'-e~e~tion . . . f baJ ti JS and, even worse Americamzation. Th' rIear JMS ParaJyzed Arab Cl\llization. In ' ed 1 AIDS world seems less readYto confJron t the acre o gfJo . lza on some ways the Arab t than even Africa despite the devastation that continent has su er darom t the 0 . ' eas and economic and political dysfunction. At 1 . t th e Africans want to a P new global economy. The Antb worId has no t ~'et taken that 6rst step.

Egypt's Quiet Nightmare

. - f Look at Egypt toda Th . Y e promtse o Nassensm has turned into a quiet nightmare. Th - ~' Jj s e government 1 efficient 0 n1 vu m Yone area: squashing dissent and strang ng c1 soc ty I th I te n e past 30 years E t' gyp s economy has sputtered along while 1ts popu alion has cl bl d U ing for jo~~ h:Jd co~~nplo~ment is at 25 percent, and 90 p ercent of those ~earch . ge diplomas. Once the heart of Arab intellectual hfe, the country prod 37 theangrypro~~~Jt~~ ' ~ books every year (compared with Israel's 4,000). For all Shockingly, E o~eigners, Egyptians know all thjs. one of the worlds gyptt as fared better than its Arab neighbors. Syria has become mos oppressive police states, a country where 25,000 people can

ffi

J IO

pART4 coNJEMf'ORA

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lAKAruA I WHY 00 THEY

. alth b ut n r. ~.m. let u~ stay in power It

l l' .. Past or FUture? . tllat once yearnet u r'Pllty c:ould . The question is l1o" a .~e:eo~ges the Arabs studic d ';tie (when h:e~:t it so dramatically. In tl~e ~:U,d imented algebra. In th.t 1 I t n tury, when thas long forgotten in tl1e \\ est d . the form of ~apoleon !:> ( 1 r r<:'..,l of Egypt th e \Vest 10 set ashore in Arab huthl .s. . ..e_cul cidlization. In het cl'> the histon e 1 ' 0<:aJs . d bv 1S po" w . an Alb "'ere fascmate . ed the l9tll century saw Enropc a 1 mc;pired liberal ..ert Hourani has document . , . tl u ddle East. pohticaJ . I t Rounsh m Je .vl and ~ocJal tho~g ~ra oftlle late l9tll and early 20th C:(:'llluriP!:> raised hopes ofB .. The colomal b disapnointed. but stilJ Arab eliles remained f: . nttsh c . dsl t11at were to e r d ,. . ascJnat<-.t m en up kings and generals attem1 \ r<:tona College in AI e cu h t1 W Future est exandri Wit . le h and manners of British gentlemen. Many then went a, Ieammg t~~~~~e~ and Sandhurst-a tradition that is still maintained by Jo: t? Oxford, ~J t1 glg now thevgo to Hotchkiss or Lawre::nce,ille. After World W: ns roval fam1 y, wu l b Id . . .. L ,, b arJ 1 l.ib a1 R'ckered briefly m the Ara wo1 , as 1ueas a out opening u : a new er age J . lik Leb PpoJ. 1 . and soc1 g";ned currencv LD places e Egypt. .el." "" anon, Iraq and SVl"i B tJcs , . . . 1 .a ut . smce t11 . were 1 of a world of kings and anstocrat ., tJH:!Se 1deas died witll th ose e' . Jart old regi~es. The new ones, however, turned out to be JU t as \iVestem. ~asser thought his ideas for Egypt and the Arab world were modern. Th were also Western. His ''national charter: of J962 rea~s as j[ it were written by le~ wing intellectuals in Paris or London. (Like many Tlurd \\ orld leaders of the time Sasser was a devoted reader of France's Le Monde and Britain's New Statesman.) Even his most passionately held project, Pan-Arabism , was European. It was aversion of the nationalism that had united Ita]~; and Germany in the 1870s-that those who spoke one language should be one nation.
p

liATE US?

4 IJ

th . we ' . h . was e mverse I . olution- J.') tax-tllon, ut no representati . s ogan of the Amcri'""" ~v on e1ther - The 1W\ .'~' of globalization ha-; hit th A b e ra world 10 societie5 arP o1 enough to be disrupted by modemj wn a very strange way. ~~ can ride thr , .. a,t:. They see the television shows th f: ty, but not so open that they 0 ~ ast th But the, don t 'iCC genuine liberalization 1 the 'SOc1etv foods and the fizzy drinks. ' --, es b and grealtr openness. Globauzation in th Ar b ' ' WJ . ln<..Teased opportuni. 1 f e a world 1 the . ti , s . of glohallzatJOn-a sew o Western products and b'llb . . en . cs cancature 1 some in thei r sodeties it means more things t b oards With bttle else. For unsettling, dangerous phenomenon. As a result ~h uy. F~r the regimes it is an globabzation b ut for the most part not touch it. .'. . e peop e they rule can look at

cHAPTER Ill: ENTER RELIGION

The Origins of 1/Islamic Fundamentalism"
Nasser was a reasonably devout Muslim ' but he had no interestm moong re1 . . k 1 . 1g10n w1 ~oUtics: It struc 11m as movmg ?ackward This became apparent to tlle small tll Islam.IC parties that supported Nasser.s rise to power. The most important one, the Muslim Brotherhood, began opposmg him "igorously, often \iolently. :Xasser cracked down on it in 1954, imprisoning more than a thousand of its leaders and executing six. One of those jailed, Sayyid Qutub, a frail man with a 6ery pen. \YTote a book in prison called "Signposts on the Road," which in some ways marks the beginnings of modern political Islam or what is often called "Islamic fundamentalism." In his book, Qutub condemned Nasser as an impious Muslim and his regime as un-lslamic. Indeed, he went on, almost every modem Arab regime was simOarly flawed. Qutub envisioned a better, more virtuous polity that was based on strict Islamic principles, a core goal of orthodox Muslims since the 1880s. As tlle regimes of the Middle East grew more distant and oppressive and hollow in tile decades following Nasser, fundamentalism's appeal grew. It flourished because the Muslim Brotherhood and organizations like it at least tried to gi\'e people a sense of meaning and purpose in a changing world, something no leader in the Middle East tried to do. In his seminal work, 'The Arab Predicament," Fouad Ajami explains, "The fundamentalist call has resonance because it invited men to participate [inl contrast to a political culture that reduces citizens t~ spectato:S ~nd asks them to leave things to their rulers. At a time when the future lS uncertam, 1t c.-onneds them to a tradition that reduces bewilderment." Fundamentalism gave Arabs who were dissatisfied with their lot a powerful language of opposition.

One Failure After Another

America thinks of modernity as all good- and it has been almost all good for America. But for tJ1e Arab world, modernity has been one failure after another. Each path followed-socialism, secularism, nationalL~m-has turned into a dead en~. \Vhi.le otller c:ountries adjusted to their failures, Arab regimes got stuck in the1r ways..~nd those that reformed economically could not bring themselves to ease up polJtkalJy. The Shah of Iran, the Middle Eastern rule r who tried to move his c:ount:ry into the modern era fastest, reaped the most viole nt reaction in the lraman revolution of 1979. But even the shah's modernization-compare d, for example, with the East Asian approach of hard work, investment and thrift-was an attempt to buy modernization with oil wealth. It ~ms out that modernization takes more than strongmen and oil mon~: 1 mpo~ng foreign stuff-Cadillacs, Gulfstreams and McDonald's-is easy. mporting the inner stuffin 0 f od . )j caJ n~rties accountab~ d th gs m em soc1ety-a free market, po ti " r- = le ~ ty an e rule of law-is difficult and dangerous. The Gulf states. for :tten ute, with the goods and even the tics, the Gulf road. Nothmg was homegrown; nothing is even now. As for ~! governments offered their peopJe a bargain: we will bribe you Wl

Few Pathways for Dissent

. . Th Arab world is a political desert On that sc.'Ore, Islam had )jttle competition. e r clis nt As a result. h f ess few path-wavs 10r se w:~t no real political parties, no ree pr . . Jtics. And fundamentalist the mosque tumed into the place to Brotherhood to Hamas organizations have done more than talk From e us Jm

=ed ;~

mode~tion

worke~

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RY woRLD POLITICS

.tl:!

. . dde social service . n .tssistance h tttlve' p10 . j 1 . ' coun l to Hi7builah. t e~ :. f those who treasu re Cl\'1 ' ; it is disturb se ing J ...,. nontn housulg. or jJ'be"aJ aroups are eh il ' "- \ . . . ng to sl!,. 01 ~"'antl die East these I ' .. ' ~ " tht in the .\hd _ ,. got a hemendous boo:-. r l 9 t9 whe ' JslallliC fundament;ul JSdl11tl e shah oflran. The I ram '\'Olution d n Ayato)Jah r . . topp e 1 . emon RuJwUalt Khorneuu uld b t'lken on bv groups wJth111 society. It al st rated that a powerful ruler ~o "ell s'eeminah' benign for ces o f t)rogress-sodrevealed . k ocJety evv cu . t .. . e . how n a bro en s dd to the tunnoil. UntJI th e 19 ,() . most MusJ 1 u:ation and technology-c; a t and lived in villages anJ tO \\lts. Thev practi~ ~ skim the .\1iddle East were,i diterda epted itself to the local cuJtu re. Piu ;alistic aned a lnd of J that na a a I s a11l ft streetrshiped saints went to shrine , sang reliaious h to erant, wo ' o )'Tnns peopleli o. en art all technicallYdisallowecl in L Iam. (This was Parti and tllese cherished re B, .~ e l970s, cularl . ) g10us however,-peop 1 had 1 e )egun movina out of the vi)] Y true m Iran. ) u fi . . . . experience was not roote d a spcct c p1 m ace. At the sa . ages . and thelf re1 Ig.ous . . d th ' I I me . g to read and they cliscovei e at a ne'"' s am was being I). time h thevwere 1 eamm . cJ . I . , . Ieac ed by the fundamentalists. an abstract fruth not roote m 1J~toncal experience hut lit. enal , pun'tarucaJ and bv the book It was Islam of the H1gh Church as opposed to , Islam of the village fair. .
lC :

PART 4

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ZAKARIA I WHY DO

. THEY HATE US?

413

Vahhabis111 In the past 30 years Saudi-fi.mded 5 h00ls h ' < ,, ds of Id!' educated, fanati<:al Muslims wh c . th ave churned out tens of nov 5311 . . . . . Id 1 slii11 "1th great suspicion. America in.thjs wo 0 VIew c mode . IS . m war and ;vILl rId VIew . al most alwavs evil. non'

Allied with Fundamentalism

This ex Jortcd fundamentaUsm has in turn infected 1 t . h 1 but c.;ountrics outside the Arab world, like Pakistan. ~u~~~ ~~ er Arab so~eties Gen. Zia ul-llaq, the dictator decided that as he q , h gd e !~-yea~ retgn of . 'Ll r d th . s uas e po Itical dissent he needed a11.1 n e 10un 1 em m the fundamentailsts 'Nth the ru'd of Saudi finan cs. .. 1 ciers an d .functtonanes,l 1e.set up scores of madrasa.'i th roughout t he countrv The, . bought htrn t~_mpora?' egibmacy but l:ave eroded the social fabric of Paldst~n. ' If there JS one g1eat cause of the nse of Islamk fundamentalis th a] b h m, 1t IS e total failure of po.IJtic . ms tutions m t e Arab world Muslim elites have averted thelf . . eyes from tl~s reality. ~onference~ at Islamic centers would still rather discuss "Islam and the EnVJ ronment l k exam me the dysfunctions of the current reoi . . than h o-mes. But as the moderate rn<lJOnty oo s t e other way, Islam is being taken over by a small poisonous element, people who advocate cruel attitudes toward women, education. the economy ~nd modern hle in ?e_neral. I have seen this happen in India, where 1grew up. The nch, colorful, pluralistic and easygoing Islam of my youth has turned into a dour, pLnitanical faith, policed by petty theocrats and religious c'Ommissars. The next section deals with what the United States can do to help the Islamic world. But if Muslims do not take it upon themselves to stop their religion from falling prey to medievalists, nothing any outsider can do will save them.

Against "Westoxification"
In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini used a powerful technology-the audiocassette. His sermons were ~stributed. throu~hout the country_ a~ cl became the vehicle of opposition to the shahs repressiVe re_g~ me. But Kl.10me1ru was not alone in using the language of Islam as a political tool. Intellectuals, disillusioned by the half-baked or overrapid_mo?ernizati_on ~at.~vas thro~ving their world into tum1oil, were writing books agamst Westoxi.fication and calling the modem Iranian man-half Western half Eastern-rootless. Fashionable intellectuals. often writing from the comfort of London or Paris, would critique Ame1ican secularism and consumerism and endorse an Islamic alternative. As theories like tl1ese spread across the Arab world, they appealed not to the poorest of the poor, for whom \.Vestenlization was magical (it ~~ant food an.d medicine). They appealed to the hal f-educated hordes entering the Cities of Ule Middle East or seeking education and jobs in the West. The fact.that Islam is a1 gh1yegaJitanan religiOn wr the most part has also proved c u an emlimpoweallenng call for people who felt powerless. At the same time it means that no Mus r Y has the auth 'ty t pro M li . on o question whether someone who claims to be a cltarv~id Thus m15 koneh. The fundamentalists, from Sayyid Qutub on, have jumped into . ey w fled the Muslimas wIdether people are ,,good Muslim s." It is a question that 1 tem 1as . but intelloctual an~rs .And .here we come to the failure not simply of governments the fanaticism fth OCfuJal elites. Moderate Muslims are loath to criticize or debunk 0 ndamentalists LIKe the moderates ' :L Iand, cl1e\' are scared ofwhat e uld ha in Northern Ire ' The biggest b!pen to them if they speak their mind. the Persian Cui( particuJarl ~am ~as ~en made by the moderate monarchies of game. It deflectS atte . Y audi Arabta. The Saudi regime has played a cJange~ gious schools from its shoddy record at home by funding re: centers that spread a rigid, puritanical brand of Islam

CHAPTER IV: WHAT TO DO

America's greatest sins toward the Arab world are sins of omission. If almost any Arab were to have read this essay so far, he would have objected vigorously by now. ''It is all very well to talk about the failures of the Arab world,.. he would say. "but what about the fai.lures of the West? You speak oflong-tenn decline, but our problems are with specific, cruel American policies." For most Arabs, relations ""ith the United States have been filled with disappointment. vVhile the Arab world has long felt betrayed by Europe's colonial powers. its disillusionment with America begins most importantly with the creation of Israel in 1948. As the Arabs see it, at a time when colonies were winning independence from the West, here was a state largely composed of foreign people being im~se? on a region with Western backing. The anaer deepened in the wake of Amencas support for Israel during the wars of 1967 ~nd 1973, and ever since in its relations 'Nith the Palestinians. The daily exposure to Israel's iron-fisted mle ovde: tdhe occhud . 1 h . t , s of the Arab an m ee t e p1ec tenitories has turned thts mto t e grea eauAe can polic\' u1 the regton . . . as broaJer Islamic-wo rld. Elsewhere, tb ey 1 k at rf thui'JS and tyrants WI-thout oo men ' cynically geared to America's oil interests, suppo mg e. , an Yhes1 ation.... 't . v r. 1 es and cert<Ull1 11'01nthepo,ntof,1e'" There is substance to some ofth ese c 1_arg ' . 1~, fair Like anv L'OUDh)~ of an Arab American actions are never gomg to seem entire . '
'

;:u.s

(madrasas~:~

414

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corm:MPORAR

y WORLD POLITICS

. ,

.
ZAKARJA I WHY 00 THEY HAT US?

are SI ed dea )' n f ' . ay rroll'l h h This neglect tum ulted in tl1e Jise o om ! -tt1( nand the TaJb t at e.r after 1989 res b . J an Th red ver can make. ut rt '" a colltmon Arnenc:a ~~is fra ctt1 country . not the gnl\est error a greatin the Arab \,orld. Bul rl Ila.<, flr c n careless. n onc.... al po' America has not been ven

I 1 m view, Amenca s grcu . c .s toward the . cl has its interests. I yglected to press any n I here to ope Arab wotld Arne~s oromission. \Ve havedlne .l the case of Afgh<mr t. . Walking awn~ its sOc;.

EXplaining Arab Rage

.. .

::::.and~ Theiroperations will be disrupted, their finances drained,~ will a11 fade~tlo)ed There ~ill~ associated costs to pursuing such a strategy. but mt,
we~ ~othing else matters on the military front.
.

h to exnlam Arab rage. After all, rf concem forth p I ness is not enoug r t1 . hI h e alts Yet car~ ess fthe problem, why have 1eu Ara )rct ren done noth 0 tinians IS at the heart tt1 in any Arab nation hut Jordan, and the aid the mg ~or them? (Tlley cannot .resejn~scuJe ) Israel treats its one million Arabs as se~ ~~~~e from the G~ states IS~: democ;acy. And yet the tragedy of the Arab worldn. -c.ass tizens a disgrace on ' ..J, 1s that Cl ' ds th . more poutical rights and u.ignities t 1 most Arab nations f1'i 1an Israel accor: em r. 1 d o- veto . therrown peop1 Wll)' is the focus ofArab anger on srae dan not those refl'imes.? e. . . a 0' . Jrecte d at . America have to be T he dJspropomonate feelings of gnevance . . . . 1 placed in the 0\erall context of the sense ~f humr.Jabon, ec~me, and despair that sweeps the Arab world. After all. the C~nese. V1gorously ~~s~gre~ with most of Americas foreign policy and ha\e fought wa~s w1th U.S. proXJes. Afncan states feel the same sense of disappointment and unfauness. But they do not work it into a rage against America Arabs, howe\er, feel that ~ey ar~ under siege from the mod. ern world and that the United States .symbohzes th1s world. Thus every action America takes gets magnified a thousandfold. And even when we do not act. the rumors of our gigantic powers and nefarious deeds stilJ spread. Most Americans would not believe how common the rumor is throughout the Arab world that either the CIA or lsraels ~fossad blew up the \Vorld Trade Center to justify attacks on Arabsand .\fuslims. This is the culture from \>vhich the suicide bombers have come. America must now devise a strategy to deal with this form of religious terrorism. As is now"'idelyunderstood, this will be a long war, with many fronts and battles small and large. Our strategy must be divided along three lines: military, politic.:al, and c.ulturaL On the military front-by which I mean war, covert operations and other fonns of coercion-the goal is simple: the total destruction of aJ Qaeda. Even if we llt"\'er understand a11 the causes of apocal_}.ptic terror, we must do battle against it. Ev-eJY person who~ and helps in a terrorist operation must understand that he will be

. . ry r<:at. 0 or )()v<" 1 Jefcnse for<:(., J<IV< JC<;n a lgned for everything but th(: real da . ' a~s. now, Cll~r wiiJ inevitabl) r:J.Hn~c.) n~<:r W<; fa(;C. Tluo; The J>" rposc of an international coalition is pr c.;" d . a .lle;a1an .. ture of this war. we wJIJ nee<.! the constant coopcntion of tl stratc.:uic: ( H:n l1 tY r< a n I 1 c h < <J acr govc;m rn<:uL~lo . rn ake arrc::.o;ts, ~ JUt <own sare ouses, close bank a<.:<:lmnts a d h . .. t< . liance po I.t1cs 1..ts. bc<.:ome a matter of hvl-1 national n .'~ arc rnt<:11 gera<.:t-. 1 . Jl . Al . Th . , Fl . SC<.:11n 1 y. JUt l 1 )Crc.: tt; a broader imperat ive. <; Untted States dominates tl.e worl<1 1 . wa tJ . bl n . a UI(.;VIla y arouses envy or anger or oppos1t1on. That comes with the l'll""er b tY la:1t'll ,_. ,.... , u we s ' nee~1tf> get things uo:a . If W<: can .mask our .p<,wer in-surry, work witlt-in~tituticms like c the unitec.J 1\at1ons ~e~urrty Council, U.S. might will bf:.- easier for mJJch c:,f tlae worlc.J to bear. Bush s father understood this, whi<J1 is why he en~ured that th<: United Nations sanctioned the Gulf War. The point here Le; to suc.;ct;;cJ, and international legili ma<.y <.:an help us do that. Now we ge~ to Israel_. l.t is obviously one of the central and most charg<:d pmhlems in th e regwn. But rt IS a problem to which we cannot offer the Arah world support for its solution- th<; extinction of the state. We cannot in aoy way wc-.Jcc:n our commitment to the existence and health of Israel. . .. .. . On Israel we should make a clear distin<;tion between its right to exist and its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. On the first we should lx: a..s unyielding as ever; on the second we should continue trying to c :onstruct a final dt:al along the lines that Bill Clinton and Ehud Barak out~ned. I suggE...c,t that we do thL'i lc~s because it wiU lower the temperature in the Arab world-who knO\vs if it will?than because it's the right thing to do. Israt:l cannot remain a demo<:racy and tontinue to occupy and rnilitarily rule three million people agttinst their wishes. lt''i bad for Israel, had for the Palestinians and bad for the United Statc.-s. But po.licy changes, large or comall, are not at the heart of the ~trugg!e wc.facc. The thjrd, vital <.:omponent to this battle~ a cultural stralcf?Y The. Umted State\ must heJ.p Islam enter the modern world. It sounds like au. un~ss1IJlc challcmgc. and it certainly is not one we would have chosen. But Amenca- mdeeJ tb~ wlicJle world- faces a dire security tbrtat that wiU not be resolved unJE::s~ we can stop ~he . political, economic and cultural eollapse that IltS at the root.s of Arah raae Dunng . .,., . , the Cold War the West employed myriad ideological strategJes to di.~1'cdit th~ . a:ppeal of comrnuni~m make democra(.y seem att rac:tive' and prornott~ open SOC.1' teties. We will have to do something on that sca1t: to wm th'15 <.1J It uraJ strnAA1
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ensu'>. To dt, !hi.., we.: will have to r 1ive tlp S< ( ' I I consav to 111 tY ,J!r, I.ttc:ra I' , an d stop insistina th 1Jrri C. ...o. <. War rcf\<;xc.:s, '>11<:I a~ <111 1sru Cl ' all erhi , a irna I 'I a1 l( I >Out .. . Htl g 11ssi,L I'> ltk<ly lo rc:-erncrge as a new milita tl ~ J n va U\ 1011 Jlarlly tJ

4 l!J

1be New New Wortd Order

we now have~lS more compl~ and more ambitious. At the .broade~ )ewi danger.. _. . to reorder the mtematiooaJ system around thiS pressmg De"
The~

Fresh Thinking in the Arab World

but on the oondition that tJ~ ern~ first, we have to help moderate Arab !.'tates.' abia' have gagfd in a ~ly dance m.oderation. For too l~ng regimes like Sau~ Ar~ ~-a fundamental ~VJth re~gious extremJsm. Ev~n Egypt. ~~about A!:ri~ and lsrc~el. (That way ISm, allow!. its controlled media to ~t c u' 1der But more broadly, we must they don't rant about the dic:tatorshlp the)' veu:;ir ./ le that hlam is ooropatible persuad(: Arctb moderates to make the ea.~ to peop

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fundam enta J<. ts. . aJItiJHed ~1t breaking the po . . of the Anth world 11d othe rs, like PaL ' ' . the nations l()sta \\"e ha\'C to press . J>Ln up and g.,: n, 1 m j1as spread- to refw n. . > . f f mdamenta JS . . run 1 egit. where th<' VJniS o ' . . , I t0 do busmess \\'1"th tlle.se reguJIC~: .\' r . Jusl .l'i we. did With South I I imac:y. \\ c nee< . CoId \<\'ar. we can ally \\'ll t 1t'St' dctatorsh 1 . 1 -r: . 1 1 dunng tle I ps and Korea anc <l"'' :U r For those who arguf> t l i tl "e should not eng . I . toward reiOn11. l I I I age m still. pus 1t 1 em I Id .. . c eign 1 )olit\' is not t wo o~') . I lave myself b b t..J' wou sa' OJ . een natlou- UJ f ti0 n bUJ.1,, . places where our mter<'~ls we re unclear and . wng. _ cr wn 0 111 t! aJ skeptic o na likch' that we '~o uld st<1). the course. In this <.:<1-"l\ stable political deve. I d 1 seeme un 1 .key to re ducmo OlJJ. single greatest secu nty t 1reat. we have no . er opt~lent IS t le t back into the nation-buiJding business. . option but dsge e a uaun 0.ng clJ' 'Ienge ' but the re are manv good s1gns. . .. AJ Qaeda to lik ..L ,u . ' . 1t soun .r. . n . t ore oowenu 1t1 lan t" e. comiJjned force oJ many tlete nnmed govern ments. . .. . . r I . 1 s no mfundament,uJsm stiD does not speak to the 111<lJOnty1() t 1c Musum people. In c . lslamic 1 o f th 1 . _ Pakistan, funuamen tal. t PaJties have yet to . more t l<ln 11' p e reent o e vote. fn JS . get c I . 1 . t d Iran haHng expenenced the bmtal puntamsm OLfu 1e mu ,uls, peop e are yearning I ' . all 1sts di for normaJcv. 1n Egypt for ' the repression, the n arnenta cl are a potent force 1 r nant If t11e \Vest can help Is am enter mo e m1ty m gruty and but so .cu not dom 1 u J , 1 . peace. 1t \VI1111me done tnore than aclueved secunty. It \Vt 1ctve c 1anged the world

1htt it cIoes a 1 with moclc111 soctet). ' eo le of other fitilhs llll( cr .' and that it hi-ISwele<>JHed r, ,.P. U1d broadcast fr<>SII ,,, I J ate ~f u lim grou~s tnd se 10 clrsofthe < wer <

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I

EXplaining the Bush Doctrjne

ROBERT JERVIS

The i~vasiot~ of Iraq, although ~portant in itself. is even more noteworthy as a mam festat10n ?f the Bush Doctn~e. In a sharp break from the president's preSeptem ber 11 VIews. that saw Amencan leadership. and especially its use of force, restricted to dcfendmg narrow and traditional \ita! interests. he has enunciated a far-reaching program that calls for sometlling very much like an empire. The Doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the importanc:e of a state's domestic regime in determjning its foreign policy and the related judgment that tl1is is a time of great opportunity to transform international politics, the perception of great threats that can be defeated only br new and vigorous policies (most notably preventive war). a willingness to act unilaterally when nE'Cessary, and as both a cause and a sum mary of these beliefs. an 0\eniding sense that peace and stability requires the United States to assert its primacy in world politics. It is of course possible that I am exaggerating and that what we are seeing is mostly an elaborate rationale for the ovetthrow of Saddam Hussejn that ,viJI have little relevance be)'ond that. I think the Doctline is real, howev~r. It is ~ui~e articulate and American poli cy sin ce the e nd of the war has beencons1stent wtth 1t.

DEMOCRACY AND UBERAUSM

. . . . . ~ TIHs IS not to sa) that the Doctnne IS entire1. consistent and one. component h '"'~"h . . may not fit well with the rest despite receMng pnde of place m t e 1 e

0 - -1 R be rt ]eNis, understanding the Bush Doctnne. Rep rintl'U b,. pe nn"ISS""-0 from Political Scirnce '"'

Quarterly, 118 (FaJI 2003): 365-388.

4 17

.tl , . 5 which 'tarts !I, '. .. The gr , . 0 l 1e v . , eat s t-.-. . , . fowll ~('('uri~ Strat<~ b tween libem .wd ' nt. J' ..t~.tnis m end d" uggJ~ _ ,1 I . , . I -ent utY e . l . I . e \Vith f the t\\"f.' Otlet l c . of fr('edom-<lnc "ll r f :-ustamable a o..,.i ive ,,cOl"" for the force. ,ocrac,. anuI fI" nl .... r" . Tl . t . . "'e t ~ " rnodeJ ftOt d le spread d"'" f edom. en of national succe. s: re o "make the world not JU:'t o,arc r better," a "path tllese hnt ,..Juesopen the p<tth t . en to aJJ."I Th is taps dl c 11 \merican belie( Ithat] is, not .Americas alone. r ~ IS d , o~"' Wilson and echoed b~ 13tll Clinton ands_anl~ tr-c~. .. . . clitions e mtnC11ted lw \ oo J C1 JJowerful states. l I1at tt '.uI ues are 'univ ts Inked f conunon amon,:, . \\''1 . ersal a d to the belie ~ 1 en tire world. fu t as t son sought to '' t . h 11 till benent t te .. B 1 " eac !th their spread " . . l to elect aood men. so us 1 \\Ul bring free e countries of Latin :\rnenct es witlto~t them. This agenda horrifies ReaJrnarkets a n ' 01 ~ Iec f1 15 to coun 'd le,el officials think this i window dressing sts (and and free e b aHsts) - ome r m " ; )'COn perhaps re ddi : 't as the heart of the doctrine.' a \iew that is endo d trast. John Ga s sees 1 rse by

.H S

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419

other officdial~. .. ~ 0. 15 lrgu ment is tl1at strong measures to spread dern The a . mtmstr a or ' l )'b . . 1rag will not only , OCrac:y od I "'rill be efficacious. Indeet. 1 eratmg 1r uce are needed anc . < there. but "i ll encouraae it in tl1e rest o f t 1 ~1 1ddle East. There. 1e dernocrac, l IS no 1 . tibili..... ben,-een Islam or ruw otl1er culture anc t e mocrac,; the exam 1 f . mcompa l.' . I d 1 . : . P eo litical pluralism in one count:~: "ill b_ emu ate . T .le lmplicJt belief is that e :mocrac, can take hold when tbe artificial obstacles to 1t are remO\ed. Far from being the.product of unusuall~ propiti?us ci rcum stan~es , a fre_ a_nd plur-alist syse tem is the natur-al order tl1at \\1JJ pre,-aiJ unless somethmg special mtervenes. Fur. tllennore. more democrc1cies will mean greater stability, peaceful relations with neighbors. and less terrorism. comforting claims that evidence indicates is questionable at best. 4 \\ ould a democratic Iraq be stable? \\ ouJd an Iraq that reflected the will of its people recognize Israel or renounce all claims to Kuwait? Would a democratic Palestinian state be more willing to Ji,e at peace with Israel than an authoritarian one. especially if it did not gain all of the te rritory lost in 1967? Previous e~:perience also calls into question the links betwee n democ racr and free markets, each of which can readilv undermine the othe r. But such doubts do not cloud official pronouncements or e,en the off-the-record comments of top officials. The United States now appears to have a faith- based foreign poLicy. This (or any other) administration may not act on it. No American govemment ~as been ~~g to sacrifice stabWty and support of U .S. policy to honor democracy m countries like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. and Pakistan. But the current \'iew does ~allel Ronald Reagan spolicy of not accepting a detente with the USSR that ~ liml_t~ to arms control and insisting on a large r age nda that included human nghts within the SO\iet Union, and thus implicitly called for new domestic regime. The Bush administration 1 heir to tb1s tradition s . . when it declares that any agree. ment With North Korea would have to address a range of problems in addition to nuclear weapons incJ di "th b Th ' u ng e a ominable way [the North] treats its peopIe.-s ~ argument _s that, as in Iraq, regime change is necessary because tyrannical i f:er:nmen~w1U ~ways be prone to disregard agreements and coerce their neigh ~t .as aboeynustreat their own citizens. Notwithstan ding their being Realists err \lews ut how st t :_.a are Liberals th . be'' a es umuence one anothe r, Bush and his colleagues m err uefs abo t tb u e sources of foreign policy.

Con istt d, Liberalism, this perspective lS h'gh\ ' O . . . l uilit'. ol 1 ~ress. .A week after Septembe 11 B h . ptimlstic m seeina the osst r . us ) IS re d o P of his ell t st adv1 sers: "\Ve have an opportun parte to ha"e told 00 1 ~. -d freedon and we have to get it right " He ty dtodrestructure the world to"'"1 e>..-poun e this th . eech 111arku1~ the 6-month anniversary of the att k "'''h erne m a formal sp v' en . clisrupted anel .scatte recl anc1d'tscredited, ... we will ac .then thatthe terrortsts are see d the old and seriS di.;putes can be settled within the bounds of reas ou .' ,. . . on, an goodwill, and m secunty. T ee a peacefuJ world beyond the war on terror d 'th utual unity. \\'e are building ~hat wo_rld together:-s ln Febru~:' ~~ ~ourag~ and responded to a reporter s queshon about the predictable F h . ~ _prestde~t . . . . h "h' .h . . renc olicy b) sa~'lng t at JStO as giVen us a umque opportunitv t dcntictSm of his T) r d P t th _ , o eren reedom .:\.nd we re gomg o selZe e moment ' and do it ." One month 1 t er he dec1 11 . l a ared. "\Ve understanc 11 storv 1as called us into action and we are not . k tl.. ' gomg to m1ss that opportumty to ma e 1e world more peaceful and more free."s

THREAT AND PREVENTIVE WAR

The second pillar of the Bush doctrine is that we live in a time not only of opportunity, but of great tl1reat, posed primarily by terrorists and rogue states. Optimism and pessimism are linked in the belief that if the U.S. does not make the world better. it will grow more dangerous. As Bush said in his West Point address of June 1, 2002: Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and militru; aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the a&,aressi\'e beha,ior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of O \'ercoming the ron,entional superiority of the U.S. These threats cannot be contained by deterrence. Terrorists are fanatics and there is . nothing that they value that we can hold at risk; rogues like Iraq are risk-acceptant and accident prone. The heightened sense of vulnerability increases the dissatisfaction with deterrence, but it is noteworthy that this stance taps into the longstanding Republican critique of many American Cold War policies. One ~"i.ng of the party always sought defense rather than deterrence (or, to be more prectSe. ~eterrence by denial instead of deterrence by punishment). ~d this was reHected ~~ the ~ for escalation dominance, multiple nuclear options, and defense against ballis . nussiles.9 th Because even defense may not be possible against terro~ts _or rogues, e United States must be ready to wage preventive wars and to act a~~ ~ emerg~ ing threats before they are fully fonned," as Bush puts it. 10 Prevention 15 not a ne'' element in world politics although Dale Ccpeland's important treat~ent ~...:agglraqer~ 1 ates its previous centrali~~. 11 Israel launched a pre\'entive strike agamlast_.l eattack ' Id u s ffi ials nuclear program in 1981. during the Co \\ ar 0 c contemp teu t .........,hwties 12 ing the USSR and the PRC before they could develop robust nuc ear~ ed '. and the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansion in the 19th century stemm m

in:

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42
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JERVTS I EXPlAINJ:NG T'lsr B

ru:. USH

DO<::'nuN

pa tJntcould rnenac --countnr at tlHtt ti111v' uw the prevennv ' 1 -' I . lJrt'~enceL'nitedStateS'v-as weal\ the a.ssociateu <.esm~ tc tn-;11 rc the m e \var d0(;. TI d . te !rtll an on ' . amten . . based on streno . . rQtte that pren. nh\'( ",trs are rarely ant-e tnne 1 e Cnl:lCS a o ericctn donunano .be euecti,e and man}'.htJm;,t~ pe exaggerated necess;uy ' er r /'\rn o an f or can be bec'c~use deterrence c iJ'tarized policies. L1 ya. or L~ample, once the l . t "~th strong but less m Jd. of the Axis of ,;J. Bismarck called preventi eading me t0 be outs1 e . . f ve wars ro!!ue now seems ,. d although the di.spanty o po\\cr between the U . .. 5~cide for fear of dea~l. an this is no Jonger the case. tl1e argument G nlted 5 . tJ f. Jj I or such d ItS ad.'ersanes mean. States an. e ee of confidence tllat le ~turc \\1 )e bleak unless th wars implies a lugh dl gr belief that tJus world w!IJ be worse than ilie lik ey e1 one y are undertaken or at east a produced by tlle war. r tJiree larue obstacles. First. by definition tJ e rei Th. 0 lie.;' then races o li . I 1 h ' 1 evant s_ P 15 . d 0 1 tain because it involves prec ctions a lOUt t reats that resd . information harfu to )Thus while in retrospect it is easy to say that ilie West 1 e time in the ture. tl . ern some . . d Hitler long before 1939. at 1e time it was far from cl allies shouldldha,e stop:7o be such a menace. !\o one who reads NevilJe Cham~ar that he wou tum ou 11 I rI . , eeches can believe t11at he was a fool. In some case , a we -paced spy might :~~to rovide solid evidence that the other ha~ to be stopped, but in many other ph '\azi Germanv even th1s would not be sufficient because cases-per aps mcluding ' . . leaders do not themselves know how they will act m the fu;ure. ~he Bush Doctrine implies tJ1at the problem is not s? diffi_c~t because ~1e states f~re1gn poU.c.y is shaped if not detennined bv its domestic political system. fh us knoWing that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are brutal ructatorships tells us th~t they '-viJJ seek to ?ominate their neighbors. sponsor terrorism, and threaten the Umted States. But while the generalization that states tl1at oppress their own people will disturb the international system fits manv cases it is far from universal, which means that such short-cuts to the ' ' assessment process are fallible. Second and relatedly, even in formation on capahiUties and past behavior may be difficult to come by, as the case of Iraq shows. Saddam's ~nks to terrorists were murky and remain subject to debate, and while much remains unclear, it seems that the United States and Britain not only publicly exaggerated but also privately overestimated the extent of his WM D program. Third, unless all challengers are deterred by the exercise of the Doctrine in Iraq, preventive war will have to be repeated as other threats reach a simaar threshold Doing so will require sustained domestic if not international support, which is made less likely by the first two complications. The very nature of a preventive war means that the evidence is ambiguous and the supporting arguments are subject to rebuttal If Bri~ and France had gone to war with Germany before 1939, large segments of the pub~c would have believed that the war was not necessary. If it had gone ~lly. the public would have wanted to sue for peace if it had gone well, public opi.JUOO would ha ed . ' . on will v ve qu~on Its WISdom. \\'bile it is too early to say how Amencan opml cl (and is likely to change over time), a degree National le inhibJt the repetition of this policy seems probable. . take stron . .aders are aware of these diffk u.lties and generally hesttate to g actions m the face of such uncertainty. While one common motive for W'df

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~p.in:ion

been tlw , t h~tl the situation will deteriorate unl has ..10 d in cl< l h!<. k111d of fear drives the security dil ess the state acts strongly ~~;i~~ons if th r ." 11. They know that many potentiat~~~ea~ers usually put off u he:- mad. \orse by precipitous militarv ac...: d h will never eventuate or Wl f h ' -uon, an t ev are di ti ' . pre sposoo to 5tpone. to JW<Jt urt t>r developments and info road. In reJcclin~ th is approach (in lraq if notr:m:. orthn to kick the can down , 1' 0 1e crues arc hehavmg unusually, althouch this does t . ' m Korea} Bus h and hlS h lleab eo . b no mean t ey ar Part of the rea.,on for their stance is the feeling of\ bil . e wrong. 1 uent beHef that the: risks and <.:osts of inaction are una~n~:~lv ~~ an~tbe <:Onseqtlte few lines that brought applause in Bush's Cincinnati spep h' fOgh . beote one of ec 2002 and that shows t he powerfu I psychological link between Septo bcto r 7'd h S drive to depose , add am: "\u Wl11 not live in fear." Taken Bte em er 11 an t e ve . all th'. ak 1 rear IS r. r Sense Unfortunate y, Otten well-founded What 1 1 r y, .lS m es no t ndic t d . . :a es IS an un erstandable tlestre for a .safer world, desp~te that fact that the United States diu live in fear through?ut the Cold ~ar_and su~ve~ quite well But if the sentence has little logical meanmg, th e emotion 1t embodtes LS an understandable fear of fear a drive to gain certainty, an impulse to assert control by ac-ting. ' This reading of ~ush'~ statement is consistent with my impression that many people who opposed mvading Iraq before September 11, but altered their positio~ afterwards, had not taken terrorism terribly seriously before 9/ll. a categorv that 13 includes George Bush. Those who had studied the subject were of course surprised by the timing and method of ilie attacks, but not that they took place. and so changed their beliefs only incrementally. But Bush frequently acknowledges. indeed stresses, that he was shocked by the assault, which greatly increased his feelings of danger and led him to feel that drastically different policies were ne<:essary. As he put it in his Cincinnati speech: "On September 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability." It is no accident that this sentence comes between t\vo paragraphs about the need to disarm Iraq. Three months later in response to an accusation that he always wanted to invade Iraq, Bush replied: "prior to September 11, we were discussing smart sanctions .... After September 11, the doctrine ?f containment just doesn't hold any water.... My vision shifted dramatically after September 11, because 1 now realize the stakes, I realize the world has changed."14 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld similarly explained that the United States "rod not act in Iraq because we had cliscovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of wea~ns . 'd of mass murder. 'Ne acted because we saw the existing eVI enee in a new light, through the prism of our exnerience on September 11"lS The claim that some pos. r sibili ties are unlikely enough to be put as1de. 1 P1 ibility m fact>. of the ob,,ous ost aus . h \\' Id ~imlanes mto t e essed or retort: "What could be less likely than terronsts 8)'lng ~ r . T~ade Center and the Pentagon?" D_ring the Col~ ~ar, ~:~d !~~;lrmight u h1s exasperation with wild suggestions ~~t military ed out and often preundertake: "All sorts of notions and propositions are chum . bl. th t Such . sented for consideration \\~th the prefatory words 'It is concei\'3 e a of whathas cei\'ed ,L. . 1 wor~ establish the1r own trot h, ror the fi et that someone con Whether it is a . . ble lS concei\Cl . ever proposition follows is enougJl to estab] h that It 16 \" t case analysis is now lS ... vors ' wortJ1 a second thought, however, . another matter I.S hard to <.lis miss.
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lNG THE BUSH DOCTRINE

UNILATERALISM
r ,entive wars is linked to tilt func.la mentaJ un,l . 111 eed .or pre' r c lterat The perce1vec . .t 1 hard to get a consensu~ or su<:h strong a t 1 s srn D trine smce ' c.: IO ns of the Bus II oc . 011 to let the dominant pu'' er <:anv the fuiJ b and 1a 'e every reas I " 1 U rd other states also 1as deep roots in the non-nort 1eastcrn parts of the R b en. ' . t 1 epu J UnilatemuJsm t d Ul tJ1e Reagan Administration. draws on long '<:an ... -standin P...rtv was well .represen e and was pali ofB ush.s out Ioo k bc ('ore Septemb g ;. . aJ ditions, Amencan poh.tic traf: 11 others was needed in Afghani~tan and solicited. er 11. Of course, ass1stance r01 . . . . . > m Iraq. 1 IIOU Id no t be mistaken for JOU1t ,.entut es as t w Umted States clicl not But tl1ese s . I 1 h . et others preferences. n strcss111g t 1at t e United St t bend its po]Jcy to me IJ (1 . . a es is . . m t1Ie plural ratl1er than an a Jance t w tniSSIOn determ,nes tl1 . builrung eoal1t10ns . e 1 R field's phrase) American leaders have made 1t clear that the . co<utnon, 111 ums . ' . .. 1 . . . . Yw1 11 . p't1 ol aJ1)' particular countty 1 1e1 thttr1 comprom 1 011 at . se forego tJ1e pa1tJ Cl n . Even before September 11 Bush displayed II.ttle w1 1lmgness to cater to world pu blw op10101, 01. to heed the .cries of outrage from European countties as tlle .. . . . . . United States interpreted 1ts mterests, and the mtet ests of the world, in its own way. Thus tJ1e Bush administration walke? av''a~' fro~n the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the protocol Implementmg the ban on biological weapons rather than trying to work wit~. t~ese fra~new~rks and modify them. The United States also ignored European cntiC ISI11S of Its M1dclle Eastern policy. On a smaller scale, it forced out the heads of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the fntergovemmental Panel on Climate Change. 1n response to this kind of behavior, European diplomats can only say: "Big partners should consult with smaller partners." 17 The operative word is "should." When in ti1e wake of the overthrow ofSaddam, Chirac declares: '\Ve are no longer in an era where one or two countries control the fate of another country," he describes the world as he would like it to be, not as it is. 18 The administration has defended each of its actions, but not its general stance. The most principled, persuasive, and perhaps correct defe nse is built around tJ1e difficulty in procuringpub~c goods. As long as leadership is shared, very little will happen b~cause no one actor will be willing to shoulder the costs and the responsibilities. "At tillS mome~t l~tory, if ti1ere is a problem, we're expected to deal with it," is ~~w B~h explains It; We are trying to lead the world," is what one administration offictal ~d when the United States blocked language in a UN declaration on chiJd health that rrught read as condoning abortion.19 This is not entirely hypocritical: many of the countries that endorsed the Kyoto protocol had grave reservations but "vere unwilling to stand up to strongly comrrutted domestic groups. Clin Indeed, real consultation is likely to produce inaction as was true in 1993 when .. ton calle.d for "lift and strike" in Yugoslavia (i.e., ~fting the arms ernb~O agamst: Bd sma and striking Serbian forces). But because he believed in shanng o power an W'dS unwilli t0 h st pher . to ascertain Europeanng move on his own ' he sent Secretarv of State C n did not Thi -1 work J \Qr.... h VIews. s multilateral and democratic procedure f ~'-4use t e Europeans did d tl1e face o apparent Am - . not want to be put on the spot, an 111 . . If encan mdecis100 th fu pohC) the United Stat h d . ey re sed to endorse such a strong cl 1er es a mfonned the Europeans rather than consulted them,

robably w~)lll~l have com~lained, but gone alon ; what . . . . P ften is effcl'lJv( lcadcrsh1p. Could Arafat hav g b cntJcs call untlateralism 0 0 sition if ti t<: United States had sought consen . e eehn moved rrom his central position? Bush could also argue that just as Rsus rat, er than stakin . . . g out tts own 1 kuropean cottnsels to moderate his rhetoric led :~~sd r 0 ~~g t~e sophisti<:ated system, so his insistcnct on confronting tyrants has s);..,l: ~~~mation or the So..,iet Ius general pe rspective, if not to his particular policies. ' ght others around to

423

AMERICAN HEGEMONY
Tbe final element of the Doctrine, which draws together the th h bJ h 1 . o ers, IS t e esta 1s _ mentof Amencan 1egemony, pnmacy or empire In the Bush D t th . ' oc nne ere are no universal norms or rules govemmg all states On the conmnr order can be mam . <u 7 , tai11ed only 1 the dommant power behaves cndte differently from the otJ1ers. Th us f '1. the adm inistration is not worried that its preventive war doctrine or attackin lra without Security Council endorsement will set a precedent for others becau~e th~ dictates that apply to them do not bind the United States. Similarly. the United States sees no contradiction between expanrung the ambit of nuclear weapons to threaten tJ1eir employment even if otl1ers have not used WMD first on the one hand and a vigorous anti-proliferation policy on the other. American security, world stability, and tl1e spread of liberalism require the United States to act in ways others cann~t and must not. This is not a double standard, but is what world order requires. Hegemony is implied when tJ1e Bush Kuclear Posture Re,~ew talks of dissuading future military competitors. At first glance this seems to refer to Russia and China, but ti1e point applies to the countries of Western Europe as weU, either individually or as a unit. This was clear in ti1e draft defense guidance written by Paul Wolfowitz for Dick Cheney at the end of the first Bush administration and also was implied by President Bush when he declared to tl1e graduating cadet~ at West Point: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and li~i~g rivalrie~ to trade and other pursuits of peace. ~2o This would mean not only sustauung such a lugh level of miutary spending that no other country or group of countrie~ wouJd be tempted to challenge it but also using force on behalf of others so they will not need ' to develop potent militaryestablishmentsoftherro,vn. In an1mpliClt end rsement of hegemonic stabilHy theory, the dri' ing belief is tJ1a~ the w~rkl cannot ~0 '~. ~I return to traditional multipolar balance of power politics, which would me\1ta ~ turn dangerous and destructive.

i?

?e

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

. were taken b, surprise by this tum in Although many observers-myself mcluded- be It is ~nsistent "ith standard American r)OllC)' we probably should not havche en.. A nencan beha,ior in the .t: ' d t1 mu pre\1ous 1 d patterns of intemational politics an WJ 1 th t .Le United States woul .War. Until recently, however, 1t w not seem c1 . -':d ear a Ul Cold

5 denl , ftlle Pres1 reporttbis erutb for.''2 1\ VC' can only spe<:ulate on what1p. llltk:i ng ate o t n . ri 115 ,htt J was pu o . _ , 1cs1tle IS" ' d My estimate is that he wotl 1 1ave in\'adcd A 11t u 1 Jgha 1nt G Id 1 1ave one. . ' s an b ore wou d I . . si Iraq nor wouJd he have moved e~way (rom treaties and , I ut not procee ec agar n .. Ti .. ". , 1 , ot 1cr . . a ssues. o som~:: extent, l 1C il , t 1 current a<; . . 10 arrangements over wide range of 1 u Seltion of strong American hegemony may be an acci ent. . . dent waiting to. har1pen. To start wt th , the re are shuctura} But 1t was an 'accJ . . reasons. to h e exmected a large terronst attack. Bu1. Lacl(;'n had attacked Atnencan av T . interests abroad and from early ~n sough t to ~tnkc 1ts hornela~d. His enmity stemmed primarily from the est?bhsbmen.t of Umted .s~a.t~s bases m Saudi Arabia, which wa~ a product of Americas world-WJde respons1b1 ltt1cs. (I ron ically, the overtllrow ofSaddam is likely to permit the Uni ted States to greatly redu<.:e its presence in Saudi Arabia, although I doubt if bin Laden expected this result to follow from his attack or that he "~11 now be satisfied.) F urthermore, al Qaeda was not the only group targeting the United States; as Richard Betts has argued, terrorism is the obvious weapon of weak actors against the leading state. 22 Even witl10ut terrorism, both internal and structural factors predisposed the United States to assert its dominance. I think the latter are more important, but it is almost a truism of the history of American fo reign re lations that the United States rarely if ever engages in deeply cooperative ventures with equals.2-1 Unlike the European states who were surrounded by peers, once th e United States had established its regional dominance, it had great choice about the terms on which it would work witJ1 others. Thus when the United States in te rvened in World War I, it insisted that the coalition be called the "Allied and Associated Powers"- i.e., it was an associate, with freedom of action, not an ally. The structure of the American ~ovemment, its weak party system, its domestic diversity, and its political traditions, ~ mak~ sustained cooperation difficult. It would be an exaggeration to say that urulat~ralrsm is the American way of foreign policy, but there certainly is a strong puU m this direction.

. t al fasl uon and <L'i:.c r l 11 ~ P"'' '"t:}. The n . 1uhlrunr1a er. <..:wArn . n r.1ct behave 111 a l lo [ t . sed bv the illl<:r.t('tJotJ hr l\\ ('(' ll tlrC' lcr. . Cl1ta11 1 '" , .. ted 1 no c,tu . . rorrst . l'tnce was preuprt.t B lt who brought to tiH c,rr,~' .t llu>rl' uniltt ... I iltal:ks S' . . 0f George us . I er l o I utd tire clcci:JOll d . clomestic opponcr1b. B11s ' s rcsponsc lo Se t Ul Oc,k ' 1 ors an 1 us P emb tJ1rur his pre< ecess . . ous con,ersion am1 o\\ ' "otn<thing to 1. er IJ I . carher re 1 rgr I 11s re} . rnc~y paraU I 115 . . e ensity to see the strug_g <' a.., <>u hctwecn gO< .1 'gt(,us . r. 'allv 1 115 . . . 'I . 'I behcs, espeCI - Ill I' prop ,ust as h1s commg to ( llt sl ~m t: meaning t )u anu ev,. that . . . to be 1eve . . , o 1 }) . 11\ There IS reason . I t er-<-onal life so the war on lerronsm has he:<:on re\fi. 1 . . nd disso u e P ., ' 1t: I tot 1 ously arm ess a . ti.. of his foreim1jJOiic,, but a l.;o lw. ~a<:rt>d mission A <m)' c, charactens c a . . n it~s : tl1e delliHng . .. . "I believe the pres1dent '' <L<; smcer<', afte r 9/J tl . 0<:1

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PART4

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JERVIS I EXPLAINING THE BUSH DOCTRINE
425

vrh this <U. OIH or his driving ideas, Waltz saw the l'k l'h od r 1 1 v tJH' of I lw posl-Cold War era start e 1 0 0 current hehavior froll'l
The l)(lwcrhd ~late may, and the United States does tL k r 11 r fpcac<. jmtl(e. an 0 we11 -bcing in tl.e world But th, 10 o 1Lself as acti ng aor t1 sake . e: O I, whtcl1 may conflict 'th th cse tenns wrll be defi 1 1 l'k . (1 of tl a<' power f 11 r net llln wt 1 e prea ercnces and tl 14 to l \t 1 other'. lu int<rualional politics. overwhelming pow dI ~ mterE-<,t~ of 1 an eads olhl.'l"i to t t . . \\f' I I . . er re~ s balancC' a~au\"t tl. rl' 1Cntgn mtent. the United St t h b h ry o . I . bl . a es as c aved and until its powe r 1 hroug Jt tnlo a sent anc.:e of balance will conti s t b h .' . annoy and friglttcu others.25 ' nue 0 e ,we m ways that

Parts of the Bush DoctJine are unique to the circurnstan<:cs. but it is the exception rath~r than the rule fo r states to stay on the patL of moderation when others do not Iorce tl1em to do so.26 Second, states definitions of ~heir interests tend to expand as their power does. It then becomes worth pursumg a whole host of objectives that were o11 t of reach when the state's secUJity was in doubt and all efforts had to he directed to pri ma1 objecti~es. Under th~ new circumstances, states seek what \\'olfers c:alled y "milieu goals. "2 / The hope of spreading democracy and liberalism throughout the world has always been an American goal, but the lack of a peer competitor now makes it more realistic-although perhaps not very realistie-to actively strive for it. Seen in this light, the administration's perception that this is a time of great opportunity in the Middle East is the product not so much of the special circumstances in the region, but of the enormous resources at Americas disposal. More specifically, the quick American victory in Afghanistan probably contJibuted to the ex'Pansion of American goals, just as the easy military victory in Iraq will encourage the pursuit of a wider agenda, if not threatening force against other tyrants (" moving down the list," in the cuJTent phrase). Bush.:s i~tial speec~ ~fter September 11 declared war on terroristc; "with a global reach. Th.1 was ambttious, s but at least the restliction to these kinds of terrorists meant that many others were not of concern. The modifier was dropped in the wake of Afghanistan . h~~ve~er. Not only did rhetoric shift to seeing terrorism .in general as a m~nace.t? CIVJh~tion and ''the new totalitarian threat,''28 but the United States sent first rmlitary tnuners and then a combat unit to the Philippines to attack guerrillas who posed only a scant links to al Qaeda. .f urmL nimal threat to Americans and who have no stgm 1 f. power can 10crease power.as "' e1.as therm ore at least up to a point. tl1e exercise o . il . , d . 1 l ge suppl" o1o ''as stgm6interests. I do not think that the estre to contro a ar . . ddit' a1 . ti cant motivation for the Iraqi war, but 1t WJ gtve the Umted States an a IOn instrument of influence. . . beha,ior is that increased relative A thiJd structural ex-nlanation for Amencan . . d b'ccti\ e As -r are both objecthe an su j power btings with it ne"': fears. The"r~as~~al Securitv as Ambiguous S~n1bol." the Wolfers notes in his classtc essay on Natim ,r : . f tlus' as maJ tlueats disor r 1 can diverge from the 10nner. 29 ] 11 one manuestation o ousl\' seen as quite manatter tl at were pr~' . } all)' e1 ,.<1te ones 1 'ed tl .1were, durinll the he1 of appear, people psycho ogtc e' ght t be '\S wom as le) o ld ageable. Indeed people now seem 0 < tt ck e,en witlt \VMD, cou the Cold War despite the f:act that . te rrorist or rogue .a a But there is more to . t1 a tt 1an ll Id \N HI's de,astatJOn. cause only a small fraction of \vor cu

. More importantly, the United States may be acting like a normal state that has gamed a posr. 011 0 fdommance. There are 'ti four facets to this argument. Frrst and ~osJt gener~ rs the core of the Realist outlook that power is checked most effec tive Yand often only b baJ . . b' Ycounter- ancmg power. It follows that states t1 . e not 1at a.~ s~t~:~~oaexte~aJ restraints tend to feel few restraints at alL As Edmund Burke p ' ~s~hon endorsed by Hans Morgenthau: "I dread our own power and our own amb1tion I ~ d b . . , thttl we are not ' ea our emg too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to sa) ~-" men, and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves.

426

PAR1"

4 CONTEMf'()rvv

n&oy

WORLD POU11L!:l

, quires cu1 cnon n<JII' <,t,H r iu the \vorJcl nant tate .tC . . . -cholot{': A cIonu th globe..vlost count n< s ;:.n ,mmarilv con . ortl<.:r attd p-''tert' ts spread throu~hou~ _,; ete neighborh cx>ds; th . ' orld IS the he:gerncen:ec~ With m . tJ ir unmewa s what happen m le I . h b s tJ,at leads it to be w num"d wit]1 anyt hinon hnelgh. borhood. and it i not on) I ~ n fusion of narrow ars<.l broad s<:lf-in tt:res t ~t at hap. alP.nsan,wllere. Tbe resu tJSa ed about tJ1e cledin<: of ;\ne:rican po . lapoint a1 ts were worn . when most an > tJ (I the linitecl State s."Jke son1e earlier great wcr' not . 1 p ts 0 1 excesses. \\'altz noted a~. ~urih came to be identi fled with the rnainte~~V<.:rs. t f tlle c :ountn m '1 ~1 : the interes 0 f ntries at the top, th js is pr<:u.icta11 e behavior anc:cof a 'J . Id order or C.'OU .r certam wor . , :tent thev bec:ome se Ir-rem.orc:ing. ":J(J . . . . 0 nc:e et . . t sts reach a certam ex , " states m ere . J hn S Galbraith explored the related clynau1i<.: of the " t b The histonan o . ent unjntended ex.,ansJOn o f co1 .__ ,, _ As a Eur u1 Ol1l<u.J.:)m. fr . .. that Pfod uced tile r uropean ontJer . d nclave in Africa or Asia. usually along lite coa~ t or river it also power game a~fieed bounclarv that had to be polic ed. Thi led to furth er ex~ . aruned an unpacl " . . .1 .,AtnsJ lr""_-fl d u.en of settle ment and this 10 tu m prod uceu a new area that h don ofm uencean on ' h to 31 be rotected and a new zone of th.reat. T ere we~e ~ew natura] limits toathis p . process. There are not Jikelv to be manv now. The .wars 1n. Afghanistan and Iraq ha\e . " 1 l d to the establishment of United States bases a nu secu n ty comm1tments in central ~ an area previously beyond reach. Jt is not hard to imagine how the United States could be drawn further into politics in the regio n, and to find itself using force to oppose terrorist or guerrilla move men ts that arise th ere, perhaps in part in reaction to the American presence. The same dynamic could play out in Colombia. The fourth facet can be seen as a broader conception of the previous point. As Realists stress, even states that find the statu s quo acce ptab le have to worry about the future. Indeed, the more an actor sees the current situa tion ac; satisfactOJv, the more it will expec.t the future to be worse. Psychology plays a role here too: prospe<:t theory argues that actors are pron e to acce pt great risks when iliey beJjeve they will suffer losses unless they act boJdly. The adoption of a preventive war doctrine may be a mistake, especially if take n too far, but is not foreign to normal state behavior, as I noted earuer, and appeals to states that have a valued position ~o maintain. However sec.11re states are, only rare ly can they be secure enough. and 1 they are currently very powe rful they will have stron g reaso ns to act now to f prevent a deterioration that couJd allow othe rs to harm them in the futu re. AJJ this means that unde r the Bush Doctrine the United States is not a status quo ~er. Its motives may not be selfish, but the combjnation of powe r, fear, and perceJV~ opportunity lead it to seek to reshape world pout ics and the societies of of Its members. This tracks with and extends traditional ideas in American oreJgn rel~ons held by both liberals and conservatives that saw the United States as a ded ution~"' eo t As h fi ft revol -:-'. un ry. t e rst modern dem ocracy, the Unite d 5tates was . oun on pnn(1ples ofeq ali ..:1: dvil society that whil . . . u . ty, progress, and a govern men t s uboruinat~ to . tv 11\1'~ ~-~~- _. e mttially bemg uniquely Ame rican had univ ersal appucabill , ~ ~ a state' [! . safe and r. I s oreJgn policy is inse para ble' from its dom estJc regnne' a ULe conditi J.>eaCeu world reqUlred ..L spre ad of thes e arra ngem ents . V nder current f . ~~ifo terronsrn and WMD, tyrannical gove rnm ents pose too much of a strongwu not Ck:tual clanger to be tolerated. The world cann ot stan d still Wl"thout Amen . can rntervention, the international environm e nt will become more
,-I
I

JERVIS I EXPlAlNING THE BUSH DOCTRINE

427

eoacing to A ne rica anti its values, but stron gac1:ion can incr , . . rllroduce a bette r wor_ rn a. process akin to the det:p stcuritv :~ts ~~zu.nry and ld_. P rotect itself the: U n1ted States is impelled to act in a . th, . ~a. m order to P I f. A. . t bring to l w su r ace <;On 1cts w1th others Even rwa} at WJ . m crease or at th e . Ieas b . . J prevru.1 Sltoation is mg . sfactorv, 1t cannot e mamtamed by purely defensive .., sa tJ d , . . measures. Maki.na the id safe for Amencan ernocracy 1 beLieved to reqw re th t di.ct a1 ~ s \'ID r 1 . k aton regJmes be banished, or at east ept from weapons of mass destructioa n. Although not mentioned in the pronouncements the Bush D :t . . ad f . ' . oc nne IS m e possible by the cx1 stence o a secunty community among the world's most powerful and developed states (the United S~tes, Western Europe, and Japan}.3.'3 The lack of fears of war amo ng these countn es allows the United States to focus on other dangers and to pursue othe r goals. Furth ermore, the development of the securitv community gives the United States a position that it now wants to preserYe. '

11

CONCLUSION
The war against Sadclam marks out the path on which the United States is embarked, and iJluminates the Links between preve ntive war and hegemony, which was much of the reason for the opposition at home and abroad. Bush's goals are extraordinarily ambitious , involving remaking not onJy international politics but recakitrant societies as well, which is seen as an end in itself and a means to A merican security. For better or (and ?) for worse, the United States has set itself tasks that prudent states would sbun . As a resuJt, it will be infringing on what adversaries (if not allies ) see as their vitaJ interests. Coercion and especially deterrence may be insufficient for these tasks because these instrume nts share with traditional diplomacy the desire to minimize conflict by limiting one's own claims to interests that others ~ affor~ to r~ States that seek more need to be highly assertive if not aggressive (which proVld~ additional reasons to question the goals themselves). The beliefs of Bush and his colleagues that Saddam's regime wo uJd have been an unacceptable menace to mterests ifIt hacl been aIlowecl t bt,.;n nuclear weapons not onJv tell us Ame ncan oo = . , about their fears for the limits of United States influence that mght ~ave been imposed, but also speak volumes about the expansive definition of Umted States interests that they hold .34 b. t disarm Saddam 0 Inde ed the war is hard to understand if the only 1ect w~ 0 f his \\'\ID , E had th inflated estimates o or even to remove him from power. ven e t l)' too remote o JUstir" the effort J capability been accu rate, the danger was stmp b . d racy and stability to But if c:hanging the Iraqi regime was expected to ~g emthroocughout the world. . . the M 1ddle East , discourage tyran t5 an cl enercrize re1onners degree of wbat it cono- .cl h.ah and demonstrate the American WlWngness to provt e a larto of a large r proiect. the tl lik 1 not 1en asP J siders world orde r whether others e tor ' , d the fears e.xcessive if not war makes sense. Those who find both the hopeLo d Salisb~rv when be tried to s an ti h statesman r Jt.. delusjonal agree with the grea t Bn s . . f 1877-78: "It bas genenw)' bring some perspective to the Eastem Cns~ o dea but if an,thing is more been acknowledged to be madness t 0 go to war 10r an t ' ..35 unsatisfactory, it is to go to war agamst a nightmare.
J __

poten

428

PART

lwthcr lhe B ectJate <I JOU us 1 IYsp. tl1e common impres~ion , <''IllOC'rac:ics. and es 1 D 1 \\"c can 011 t: ..O<:tlill~: will work. ContrcU) t~ d 1 easy to sustain a clear lliH' ()f polic.:y when <:rally lh(! 't United States. do not n lli 11g Significant casualties ''ill ~u re ly be c le ~xternal .1 environment rs nol compeI tl ink tJ1e United States '' i11 uraw back orrosrve, and I . gets toug 1 I . . cl d I . when tl1e gorng .1 tl e united States 1S 111 eC' t t<: strongest eo 1 I .. untJy rtl1ermore' wu e b'ect to two familiar I' . . Fu . till JllltlatJOn'>: 1t 1 Ilarder to b . hl tl ~ oecause t 1 cooper~at Ul 11 than to c Id. rts power 1S s d su ~ds on 0 tJ1ers . declsJons 1. wor 1crr . d ccess epen . . 1 IS 11 0n destroy. an s.u reach its goals. The war 111 Ira~ has mcre<L the risks tha e<:es. 'ied sai)' for tile s~te to veapons but it has also mcreased th eir in<.:entiv . t ott1ers r. . . rsumg nuc1 ear' ' J. es to do race rn pu t what tJ1ese weapons can acc.:omp 1 everyone . sh, SO. 1 A 1111d the debate a >OU which malces them very attractive to states wh agrees th at . . r cl 1 can deter mvas10n, ... 1 . o 1ear th ~Y . 1 Anlerican gun sights. Both Vl::.utzs argument that proJiferan ~y mlgllt be m t le d l. h .on Wdl roduce stability and the contraJy an hmore co dmmfon cl atm l at it would make P Id dangerous .imply that t e sprea o nuc.: ear weapons will . d the wor more . 1 1 cl f.. . re uce . ._a ce because others wiJJ 1ave ess nee o rts secunty guarant Amencan JTuJUen h . . al . .. r I . ees and will be able to fend off its tllreats ~o t e~ VJt mterests. r le _ mencan attempt to A . . . s mlflJnuze tlle abili'ty of others to resist Uruted States pressnres 1 the mark of a coun. . try bent not on maintaining the status quo, but on fash10 nmg a new and better ord Russia and traditional American allies may see th emselves better off with t~r. United States as an assertive hegemon, alJowing them to gain the benefits of worl~ order while being spa:ed. the costs, and_ they may conc:l~de that any challenge would fail or bring \VJtll 1t dangerous nvalry. Indeed, Witl10ut the war in Iraq I doubt tllat tile spring of 2003 would have seen the d egree of cooperation that the United States obtained from Europe in combatting the Iranian nudear program. and from Japan and tl1e PRC in containing North Korea. But I suspect that much will depend on allies' answers to severaJ questions: Can tl1e American domestic political system sustain the Bush Doctrine over the long run ? \!\Till the United States be open to allied influence and values? Will it put pressure on Israel as well as on the Arabs to reach a settlement? More generally, wiU it seek to advance the broad interests of the diverse countries and people in the world or will it exploit its power for its own narrower political, economic, and soc1al interests? Bush 's world give~ little place for other states eve~ democracies-exe;ept as members of a supporting cast. Conflating broader with narrower interests an d believi ng that one has a mon~poly on wisdom are familiar patterns for dominant powers, and ones that rarely Sit well with other powerful states.

RARY WORLD POLITICS O coNTEMP . ,. I t the crucial qucst1011 or "

JERVIS I EXPLAINING THE BUSH D OCTRJNE

429

NOTES
I.

truth 15 tl PP 1 Bush's West Point speech similarly dec are 1 le same in every ltu conflict betw cu re, m every time, and in every place ... \il1 are in a ve ( men and een good and evil." "'When it comes to the common rights and needs 0~ Craduatio:o~:n, ~here is no clash of civilizations." "Remarks by the President at 2~; Release J erCJse of the Unites States MiJitanr Academy," White House Pr une 1, 2002, P 3_ -,

\VhCit~SHouse, "The National (Waslungton. 0 .. eptember 2002) Security Strategy of the United States," 1 d "Moral 1

Thus Sau1111 I I Ju r tlill~ton , who agrees that a state's f. . . . z. bv its donw,lt< rc:gimc, argues tlrat c:onflict can be odrelgnd pohc.:y ~~ ~trongly influenced ' . . . re uce . on'" b} n0 t h. values on oth t r c;o:~et1c~: The_ Cl(/.~1! of Civ-ili:.ation.~ and th~ ?us mgWestcm order ( ~<"'" York: Srrnon a11d Schuster, 1996}. RemtJkm~ of the Workl . 3 John r,cwis Caddis, "Bush's Securitv Strate ... r, . Novernher/Dcc:<::mber 2002, pp. 5Ch57. ' gy, ore,gn Pol1 cy, :\o. 133, . 4 Edward ~l ansfield and Jack Snyder, De"wcrati::&ionand \~ {C forthcot ning). ar ambndge: ~IT Press, S. Quoted in Davicl Sangcr, "U.S. to Withdraw From Arms Accord With ~ ~ 1K New York Ti111es, Oc:tober 20, 2002. ort l orea, p, 1 . H' . 6 Quoted in Frank Bruni, "For President a Mission and , . 99 . " . ' a 0 e m 1 story," tbid, Septembct ~-, 2001 , President Thanks World CoalHion for Anti-Terrorism Efforts .. White Jlousc Press Release, March 11 2002, pp r-<t. also see "Remarks by t he '} . . . . . Pres1 dent at 2002 Graduatton Exer<:1 pp. 4-.5. se," 1. "President Bush, Prime Minister Koizwni Hold Press Conference," White House Press Helease, February J8, 2002, p. 6. 8. "President, Vice President Discuss the ~iddle East," White House Press Release March 21, 2002, p. 2. ' 9. It is no accident that the leading theorist of this school of thought, Albert Wohlstetter, trained and sponsored many of the driving figures of the Bush administration. such a~ Paul Wolfo"vitz and Richard Perle. 10. Letter accompanying "National Security Strategy of the u.s .. ~ p. ii. Calling this aspec-t of the doctrine and our poUcy against Iraq "preemptive." as the Bush administration does. is to do violence to the English Janguage. :\o one thought that Iraq was about to attack anyone; rather the argument was that Iraq and perhaps others are terrible menaces that eventually will do the U.S. great harm and must be dealt \\ith as soon as possible, before tJ1e harm has been inflicted and while prophylactic actions can be taken at reasonable cost. For a study of cases. see Robert Lit\vak, ''The l\ew Calculus of Preemption; Survival, Vol. 44. Winter 2002-03, pp. 53-79. 11. Dale CopeJand, The 01igins of Major War (Ithaca, l\Y: Come!~ University_ Press. 2000): also see John Mearsheimer. Tragedy of Great Pou.:er P oliHcs (New York: ;\orton. 2001). For important conceptual distinctions and propositions, see Jack _Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," WO'rlcl Po/itict;. \lol. 40, October 1987, pp. 82-107 and, for a study that is skeptical of the general prevalence of preven~ve '~m but presents one example, Levy and Joseph Gochal. Democrac~' and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign," Security Studies. Vol. 11, Wmter 2001J2~pp. l-4.9. On t11e U.S. experience, see Art. Grand Strategy for America, PP 181-9': ~and~l . 1 Schweller argues that democratic states ,.ght preven 0ve}. onl} under verv restnctive cun . ., p fi ?'" cumstances: "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracses More acsf ~ r. , 1992 235-69, and notes the unusual nahtre o t 1e World Poltttcs, \ ol. 44, Januai) PP all IJ . d isti'og the temptaare genen we sen.e res fTl .11ull . Lost v Israeli cases. For tlle argument tJ1at states . . h d B 'St king First: A HlSton o )arll\1 ~ tion to fight preventJvely, see HJC ar. etts, . n , _ ~ 1 0.' 1, .2003, PPb,i-24.eFor a Opportunities," Ethics and Intenwtrmwl A.ffarrs, ~o1 l t. I . driven pre, ntive . . tJ , hch in one mterpretation lS , review of power transitiOn 1eoT). ,,. 1 _ 0 ' l 011d W Evaluations and ~_ ar. . . k K 1 . d Doualas LenJJ\e. can Y motivation. see ]ace ug er an t> . . \ n>itv of M.ichiaan Press. 1996). e 0111 E1tensions ofT!ut War Ledger (Ann Arbor. p . o t . Pril~ceton Gnhersity Press. 12. Marc Trachtenberg. History and Stra_trl ( n~:b~~her to strangle the Baby in the 1991) eh. 3 Wi!H Burr and Jeffrey Ric le son,J p. am m 1nc.n t;.t Intemotional ' ' d 1 eh ese Nuc ear rogra ~' f Cradle' The United States an t le 10 G . Vol. 25, Wmter 2ooo~~Ol PP 54-99. regory Ml.tl""vich shows how mu<-h o . Secu.rity,
A.

RARY woRLD POUTIL!;,

PART 4

coNTEMPO

. . .. was driv rn b_, th- 1 1 that it could 1 C 11 \Var po tC) . r1 not ~u 1\nlt'ric-.lll early 0 c. . undemlillill{!. thl' 1\r et_ I tt . \.111 '1. '(/ . l s SI rategy to s, I ~laill ~ ged confrontahon. NY ComPll Unt, c-r'il:, Plt.,s, 2000) ':J Oert, th 11 pro_~ B[oc )947-]956 (Jtllaca~ ~~orge Ten et bcli<',(r. ,l.at .. Bush. had b e Sovtc b rt \ roo<Jwaru. r I ...,,,'()ing toRo e d . stration lead ers! ror I ' tu rori st attacks''. ecn llle lc<illl 13 A,-.v -' . .8 . repared of aa1 o( [the a Jmun. 2002). P 31 . Bc r ~ I1en Ilis aclm in.istrati us/, ot \Var ter ore p k s non and Se 1US ' on had (\'ew Yor : u . . d the PRC. <:on. centrated on Hus~a j;~,ary L 200-3. .. e 14 '~etc rork TimS. Risen DaVId saouer. and Thom Slta nktr. In Ske tchv Data 0 ' Tryi 15. Quoted in Jam es Julv 20, 2003. ' ng lCJ 1 Gauge [raq Threat. 1 D ;pment of Nuclear Strategy." lnte nwt io11al Sec . 1 le unty , Vol 2 16. Bemafd B,.--':e "T1 eve

.t30

JERVIS I EXPLAlNING THE BUSH DOCTRINE

431

"bd

,(}UJ

Springl978,p.83E I "Bush's Move On ABM Pa<:t Give~ Pause toE 17. Quoted in Steven r angleerr. )3 ~OOJ. also see Suzanne Dal ey, "Many in Euurope ans: -k r: es Decem J ' .... ' . Neu; ) OI . !n1S 'will Not Consult The m," ibid ., JauuaJ)' .31 ' 2002; Erlange r,rope V. . "Pr OJt:c \Vorrv .t11at U. , . 1 Bec ... . Await Bush in Europe." Ib"d...~v o) 2:1 -900 2; EJ bet' kerotests: ' 17..3. and fnends Too. Offi a1 .. bd March J7 2003 ' U.s. Unilateralism Worries Trade " ~~ s. ~. I . 'T' R ~ . u s' T' .., . K DeYoung Chi rac :v oves 10 epa u . . 1es, Washin oto p 18. Quoted m aren . " n ost, April 16,.2003. . l )'\ B b woodward inte niew W:l'tl1 Bush 111 I'b'I(., X 1ovem b er 19, 2002 (also 19 Quoted m o . . \ d d Bush at WarP 281 ); quoted m Somm1. Seng upta , "U .N. Forum Stallssee 11 voo war .. n and Abo ' on rtion Rights "New York r es, 10 May 2002. Llm. ex Ed ucauo S ' . . ZO. "Remarks by the President at 2002 Gradu~tion Exe rctse," p. 4. The Wol fowitz draft is summarized in stories in the New York T11n es, March 8 and May 24, 1992. Also see Zalmay Khalilzad, From Containment to Global Lea_~rship? America and the Worl d After the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAN D, 199.:>), and Rob ert Kagan and William Kristol. eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportu nity in Arnerican Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). This stance gives others incentives to develop asymmetric responses, of which terrorism is only the most obvio us example. For possible PRC options, see Thomas Chr iste nse n, "Posing Problems With out Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U .S. Security Poli cy," International Security, Vol. 25, Spring 2001 , pp. 5-40. 21. Quoted in James Harding, "Conflicting Views Fro m Two Bush Camps," Fina ncial Tmzes, March 20, 2003; for a percepti ve anal ysis, see Bru ni, "Fo r President, a Miss ion and a Role in History." Also see Woodward, Bush at Wa r, pp. 102, 205 , 281. 22. Richard Betts, 'Tbe Soft Underbelly of American Prim acy: Tac tical Advanta ges or Terror," Political Sci~1u:e Quarterly, Vol. 117, Spr ing 2002, pp. 19- 36. 23. See, for example, Jesse Helms' defense of unilaterialism as the only way consisten t with American ~terest:s and traditions: "American Sovereignty and the UN ," Nationallnteres t, No. 62, Wmter 2000/01, pp. 31-34. For a discussion of historical, sociological, and geographical sources of t1le moralistic outlook in Am eric an foreign policy, see AnJo ld Wolfers, Discord and Collohoration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uruversity Press, 1962 ), 15 and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in Ame <.~ter rica (Ne w York: Harcourt, B~ . 1955), chapter 11. For a discussion of cur rent U.S. policy in terms of its self-image ~ an exa,>nti,....... J c p y..v uu state, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Th e High and the Mig hty, Amen all ro.spect, Vd. l, January2003, pp. 28-31. 24. Quoted in Hans M tha .. . ork: Knopf } orgen u, Pol~tics Am ong Nations, 5th ed, reVJse d (Ne" , Y 1978 25. Kenn~ Wai:~ 169-!0, emphasis in the original. . ,. pS: Political Sci ' Amenca as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspecnve. ence and Politics, Vol. 24, Dec emb er 1991, p. 69.
I
' I

crat<: and c:onscnsual behavior: \Vendt Social Tlleo eas.rcan and .have Ied to more 01 Od n 1 Y Car ubrid~e Univc rsity Press, 1999): 'Schroeder Tl~eoJ 1ntematLon_al Pol!tws ( ~ew ork: T .r. " o , rans olitiCS Lt63 -1otJ,, ('....ew y ork: O>..ford University Press 1'\n ) Jormatwnof Eur;opea d~ P n ' . 1 1 . G 1:]"4 an Does the Histo , of 1nternatJOIIat >o Jtics o A here?" in David Wetzel and 11 d .nyw T) . dC 1eo ore Hamerow eus otlt enn an Hi.'itory (Westport: Praegc 1111 ernaliOIIll l P I cs an -) ' . .'' . r. . 1 )' . r. 199 I pp. 1::>-36. This IS a central questiOn o mte mationa po 1t1cs and historv th~t 1 , . / a canno t f uU .1 . uss here ,. u1sc ut beli t'VC that at Ieast the m1ld state ment that unbalanced p b . d ower . 'clan gerous can IS easil)' be suslar ne . 21. Wolfe rs. Discord and Collaboration, chapter 5. no w. ,;Preside nt Thanks Wo rld Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Errorts"; 0 d S "' av1 anuer. 'In Reichstag. Bush Condemns Terror as New Des potism," New York Times, 24 M; 2002 Also see "nemarks by Presiden t at 2002 Graduation Exercise : p. 3. The que~on of bow broad the target should be was debated within the administration from the start ...vith Bush inibally insisting on a focu s on Al Qaeda: Woodward, Bush at War. p. 48. ' 29. Discord and Collaboration. chapter 10. 30. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, ~A .: Addison-\Vesley, 1979 ). p. 200. 31. John S. Galbraitb, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British E>-'Pansio n: Comparative Studies in Soci ety and History, Vol. 2, January 1960, pp. 34-48: Reluctan t Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-18.54 (Berkeley: Unive~ity of Califomia Press, 1963). Also see Ronald Robinson and John Gallager with .1\l.ice Denny. Afiica and the Victorians: The Official Mi11d of Imperialism (London: ~lacmillao. 1961). A related imperial dyn amic that is likely to recur is that tuming a previously recalcitrant state into a client usually weakens it internally and requires further intenention. 32. Rob ert Jervis, wa s the Cold War a Security Dilemma?'' Journal of Cold War History, Vol. 3, Winter 2001, pp. 36-60; also see Paul Roe, ''Former Yugosla"ia: The Secu rity Dilemma Tha t Never vVas?" European Joumal of International Relations, \ 'ol. 6, September 2000, pp. 373-93. The current combination of fe~ ru:'d hope that prod uces offensive acbons for defensive motives resembles the combmation that produced the pursuit of prep onderance in the afte rmath ofWorld War 11. ,. . .. 33. Rob ett Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace. Amencan P oltttcal Science Review, Vol. 96, March 2003, pp. 1- 14. . 34. I have discusse d how Bush's policy toward Iraq does ~1d does 1~ot ~t wJth deterren ~ thinking in "Th e Confrontation Between Iraq and the U.S.: Imphrati~ns for, the Th_eo .' and Practice of Deterrence,.. Europea n journal of International Reltltums. Vol. 9. ?\o. 2 June 2003, pp. 315-37. 35. Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Disnudi, Gladstone, an d the Eastem Question (Xew Y ork: Norton, 1972), p. 222.

"and er \',~n< lt and. more persuasi vely Paul Sell d tJ6 AI e... I ~ lifv tlrb geJJ<rali zation, arguing that ailing roe er wou d cl'sagree or at least prev a 1 mot . J

GAUSE HI I CAN DEMOCRACY

STOP TERRORISM?

_ __!E~~~~------------------..._

GREGORY GAUSE Ill

.11 .1 ecl w1th thc: m. The em pha~is on electoral . 1 on cJjst us . . . - rnm euiate U.S. mterests e1ther in the war on t uemocracv \vtu . ; not, howeYer, 5e~"e 1 E t poh erronsm or in 0 tt , . <:tes. ~('ddJe clS uer tmp<ntant 1 It 1 thus lime to rethi nk the U.S . em ph"sts on 1 5 ' "" emocr world . Hather than pu sh for quick election!. th'"<:U 't dacy [)romotJo . S Afab . "' 111 e tates shouldn I ll the 1 focus its cnur~ ot~ encouragmg the development of secular, nation alis

WHAT FREEDOM BRINGS

. . . d States ts engaged in wh at President Gc:org~ \~!. Bu sh h"''s eall <..: The Umte , t 1 till democracv in th e Ar ab \\'Orld. Th e Busl , cl ed , ns . a . l o "generahon a1 cha, 1en<Te. contend tJ1at this push for Arab <.le mocrac)' 1 a llllni d o will s. . d its deten et s . . not h<ltlon an . aJ but also improve U .S. sec u nty. A democ rac)' g on! .> d Amencan v ues II row sprea Id 1 tl'nking <Toes the region v.i stop generatina anti-Am .s tn the Arab wor ' t le .u o ' . . r . t' democracy in the Middle E ast I.S t I re1 1e ore not merelvcen can . terronsm. Promo mg h. h .1 onstsj S ty goa ki tis necessary toa c te\ et em. tent wtt 1 U. secun ' . . damental qu estion: ls It true t1 t1 mo re democrati 1at 1e But t his begs a fun . . . . . . .. e less hkelv 1t ts to produce te rr.011sts and te1tOJ. groups?c a country becomeS, tll J.St ' . . 1n s the securin rationale for pro moh ng de mo cracv m the Arab wo rld ot1 words, I ter , based on a sound premise? UnfOJtun~tely, t.h.e answe r ap pe ars, to be no. Although what is kilown about terrorism is adm1ttedJ~ mcomple te, the da ta ava ilable do not show a strong relation ship between democracy an d an absence of or a red uction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from fac tors mu ch mo re specifi c tl1an regim e type. \'or is it likely that democratization would en d the cu rre nt campai gn against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-mind ed groups are not fig hti ng for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose the ir vision of an Islamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the A1ab wo rld wo uld "drain the swamp," eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations am ong th e Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for the rn. Even if democrac.)'were achieved in the MiddJ e East, \vhat kind of gov ernments would it produce? Would they cooperate with the Unite d States on im portant policy objectives besides curbing terrorism , such as advan cing the ArabIsraeli peace process, maintaining securi ty in the Persian Gulf, an d e nsuring steady supplies of oil? ~~ ~ne can predict the course a new de mocracy will take, bu t bas ed on public opmiOn surveys and recent elections in the Arab world , the ad\en t of democracy tl~e ~e seems likely to produce new Islami st governments tha t would be much less willing to cooperate with the United States than are the cu rre nt au tbm itarian rulers. . ~~answers to these questions should give \Vashington pa use . Th e Bush admin istrations_ democrac.y initiative can be defen ded as an effort to spr ead American democratic val ues at an st . Yeo , or as a 1 g-term gamble that even 1f IslamlSt:s do come on to power the realiti f ' es o governance will moder ate the m or the pubbc \WJ grow
From F. Cregory Cause lii "C fF n oreig Affaitf Vol. 84 !\ (S ' an Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Reprint ed by pen :gn ~. h)(;... o. 5 eptembcr/October 2005), pp. 62-76. Copydght 2005 by the nission

t d~~ea\ .t1 0 ruan1 wns that could compete on an equal foon cu ~ zat l1 ' . 1 1 t ' ~ 1 era po ng wtt - nly by do tng so can \ Vac;hmgton help ensure that when ele t 1 c,s amtst parties. 0 . . . . , c tons nnallv to O<.:<:ur 1 the res ults are mo re m 1 w1th U.S. interests. me ,

THE MISSING LINK

President Bu sh has been d ear about wh y he thinks promoting democr at'\' in the Arab wo rld is central to U .S. interests. "Our strategy to keep the pea c~ in the longer term ," Bu sh said in a speech in March 2005, is to help change the conditi ons that gi\'e rise to extremism and terror, especia llr in the broader Middle Eas t. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a c.ycle of tvranny and despair and radicalism. vVhen a dictato rship controls the politica l life of a ~ountry, res ponsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from thei r social and eco nomic failures, dk tators place blame on other countries and other ra<:es, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This stat us quo of despotism and anger cannot be igno red or appeased, kept in a box or bought off. Bush's be lief in the Link between terrorism and a lack of democracy is not limited to his adm inistration. During the 2004 presidential campai gn, Senator John Ke rry (D-Ma'is .) emph asized the need for gr~ter politi~al ref ~rm in t~1e Middle East as an integral patt of the war on terronsm. Marti~ lnd yk, ~ semor Middle Ea st policymake r in the Clinton administrati?n, has wntt.e n th~t It was a mistake for Clinton to focus on Arab-Israeli peace while downp~y?ng Middle East democracy, and he has urged Washi ngton to con cent~ate on politi~ reform.' ln.a recent book he co-authored M01ton Halperin , the cltrector of policy planmng md . Clinton's State Departm ent, 'argues that the roots 0 f ,l1Q eda.lie in the poverty an a . E t and Pakistan. and that t hese educational de ficiencies of Saucli Arabta, gyp ' . .t nature of those states . d can be an . deficiencies were caused by t 1 authon anan 1e . . combated only through dem ocratization. The New 'Y ork Trm es C'O1 t Tl 0 nas uml~us l t . l . t 0 the public than anvone e se. Friedman has done mo re to sell th IS ogiC . th academic literature on Despi te the wide acceptance of this colnnectJo~. l~tical indicators such as 1 the relatio nship betwe en teiTori sm and ot lerdsociopotudies md 11e ner~ survevs . . goo case s e democracy, is sur prisin gly scant. Tl1e1e are c th t tl) to detenn ine whether 0 5 but 1 ew a of terrorists an d terrorist orgamza on ' r t he problem is the quality of tll e more democracy leads to less terronst11 Put o ( rist incidents with a crossdata available. Th e Western press tends to report teno rist attacks . M over. ore . f th bon.ler ele me nt mo re complete1 than home9Towlenterbut not the Y . f ~ . n t ro identity 0 ~ f tc ' most of the statistics iclentL Yt1l e Jocatton o an tncfrom nondemocratic tries < fl .'Oll 1ether t 1ev came 1. pe rpe tra tor s-a nd mucI1 less w l

Council on Fort''

432

~3~

PART 4

CONTEMP0

RARY WORLD POUTICS

GAUSE In I CAN DEMOCRAcY

. r.ormation onlv prC:'I illtl :tr, con <.:lusions r . mJ., 1 tn n ete ' " rorn I lnco 1 1..1 1 to discredit l (:i,cn sue 1 .1le. Howe,er. even these 't1 le t "'Jrt'tre I . . t1es l'er<h ' loossw 1 1J.tt underlie . th lip. ac< demic t .11 k between etrotisl11 and aut wntanartl\ln t s e: 13 I' l:><>sedk dose . I0 cric. In a Wldel, cited stud\ of terronst ('\ <:'nt~ in the 198o~ \Jsh . : . ' , . . tl adn11ntstmt1on.s o.. . E bank and Leona1d \'\ embc rg de monstrate tl . le . . I . tJsts \\ J11 Jam u .11 I 1atm po!Jhca CJen . d mocracies and that ucner<u ;.- >oth the \'ictirn . 0 t :dents occur m e . 1 tenonst JllCI .. (democracies. Exammmg mcK ents from J 975~t<~nd tll e t0 rs .1re c1tizens o d 1 o 19g1 perpetra < V . . .5 ...,.s Quan Li has foun t 1at a1 lhou<'h terrorist I 1ia State mvet ll) . . . . . .., attaek5 Penns) vat democratic political parttclpattOn IS l11gh. th e kind of h 1 frequent w 1 1en . <: eck aret es 1 l'beral democrac\. "lJicallv places on executive pm' er seems to en<;ourag s l' , 1 t la . . I 1 .5 r~cent book. Dying to \Vm: 1he Strategic Logic o~' S .. e ' terronst actions. n 11 ' f . . b 'J u 1 om 1 are almost a]tctde . 1 1 rt Pape finds that the targets o su1CJC e .., Jers TenonS?n, 'o )e 1. 1 . I wavs . t t tJ at the motivation of the groups uenJnt those bombings 1 to .s . . democrac.:1es. ou 1 . 1:ta g .. B I1t agams t n1w t)' occupation and for .self-dete rmmatlon. Terrorists c'tre not driven by a desire for clemocracy but by the1r oppOSition to what they see as foreign domination. The numbers published by the U.S_. g~ve.rnm e~t do not bear out claims of a close link between ten01isn1 and autbontanamsm e1ther. Between 2000 and 2003. according to tJ1e State Departments annual "Pattems of ~lobal Terrorism" report: 269 major terrorist incidents around the world oc-curred m countries classified as 'free by Freedom House. 119 oc-curred in "partly free countries, and 138 occuJTed in "not freencountries. (This count excludes both terrorist attacks by Palestinians on Israel, which would increase tlle number of attacks in democracies even more, and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, whkh originated in other countries.) This is not to argue tl1at free countries are more Hkely to produce terrorists than other countries. Rad1er, these numbers simply indicate that tllere is no relationship between the incidence of terrorism in a given country and the degree of fTeedom enjoyed by its citizens. They certainly do not indicate that democracies are substantially less susceptible to terrorism than are other forms of government. TeJTorism, of course, is not distributed randomly. According to official U.S. government data, the vast majority of terrorist incidents occurred in only a few countries. Indeed, half of alJ tl1e terrorist inc:idents in "not free" countries in 2003 t~JOk P.lac~ in just two countries: Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems that dernocratiza tion did bttJe to discourage terrorists from operating there-and may even have encouraged terrorism.
_ As for the "free" countries, terrorist incidents in India accounted for fully 70 percent of the totaL It is fair to a~sume that groups based in Pakistan carried out a number of those attacks, particularly in Kashmir. but clearly not alJ the perpetra tors were foreigne A [j 1 r . rs. sgm cant number of terrorist events in India took Pace Iilr from Kashm1r reBectin tJ 1 al . 0 ler OC gnevances against the central govemmen t And ' . g as strong and Vlbrant as Indian democracy is both a sitting prime m1rus teJ and . . r . a 10nner pnme m h ' .. Gandhi . mister ave been assassinated-Indira Gandhi and her son. RajJ\' , respectively If d , d . I dia's numbers ~0 Id be . emocracy re uced the prospects for terronsm. n ~ not so hjgh. Companng InWa, th Id' 1 . the world's most e wor s most populous democracy, and C una, 1 popu ous authoritarian state, highlights the d ifficulty of assuming tha1

STOP TERRORISM?

435

can c;o]ve tl te terrorism problem F 0002 1eJ1lO . or 2003 the ". Patterns c 1 bal Terronsm report md'1 catcs 203 international t . of 0 G n China. A list of terrorist incidents between _errodnst attacks m India and 19 r6 an 2004 . none 1 M-rnomu1 lnsttute c .. . 0. nal xor the Prevention of'rr . sh '<:omp1'led h, nhc a o c 1erronsm . 1 dia and only 18 in China. Even if China unde ' O\l;s more than 400 tn n ' . .11 d b . r-reports such incide ts b factor of ten, Jt stl en ures su stantJally fewer terrorist attacks th .n y a onshii) bcl\.vcen authoritarianism and terrorinn an India. Lf the Iat1 re . . . ., were as strong: as th B h . d ninistration tmplies, the dJS<.:repancy between the nu b f . . e. us aI I I . I cl' m er o terronst mctdents in China and t 1e nu m )e~ m n ta would run the other way. More anecdotal eVIdence also calls into question a n l . . ec.:essary re ationship between regtm.e ~e and ter~onsm. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of brutal terrorist .o:gan1zat.'~ns arose .m democr~tic countries: the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provtslona] Insh ~epubhcan Army m Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Japanese Red Army m Japan, and. t.he Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West Germany. The transiti.on to democracy il1 Spain did not eliminate Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA ) Basque separatist terrorism. Turkish democracy suffered through a decade of mounting political violence that lasted until the late 1970s. The strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has produced its own terrorists, including the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.lt appears that at least three of the suicide bombers in the London attacks of July were born and raised in the democratic United Kingdom. :\early every day brings a painful reminder that real democratization in Iraq has been accompanied by serious terrorism. And a memorial in Oklahoma City testifies to the fact that e,en U.S. democracy has not been free of terrorism of domestic origins. There is, in other words, no solid empirical e'idence for a strona Unk ben,een democracy, or any other regi me type, and terrorism, in eitl1er a positiv~ ~r a ne~~ tive direction. In her highJy praised post-September 11 study of r~ligt~us .militants, Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stem argues that 'clemocratization 1s not .. ~,. necessarily the best way to fi g1 IsIamtc exu errusln because the transition to 1t . . democracy "has been found to be an especially vulnerable penod for states acrofs 5 t11e board." Terrorism springs from sources otIJer d1an the fom1 of government o 1 Id . . a . th at a more democratic Arab 'vor Wl11 ' sunp y state. There is no reason to belteve . . by virtue of being more democratic, generate fewer terronsts.
Cracy

FLAWED
. g the u.$. push for 'th the argument supportin There are also looical probIems Wl . t1 assertion that democracy o . n Under1 pna le' .. democracy as part of the war on terronsJ arti? . ate openk in competitive l . . . th b li f th able to p clp . . . cl wtll reduce terronsm lS e e e .a... blic s uare. potential terroristS an politics and have their voices heard m the pu ~ lence to achie,e their goals. terrorist sympathizers would not need to resort to no that the, couId wm 111 the fid the con en\." ' Th habits f e1 . Even if they lost in one round o ections, """a-democratic means. e 1, h fu ture would inhibit d1e temptati.on to resort to e.w the antTer of t e Arab pubucs . d 11 r.ocus 0 . rtrenusm an of democracy woultl ame1 10rate ex . i St tes at their own governments, not at tl1e Urutec a
I'D

coNTE.Mf'ORARY WORLD POUTJC~

436

pART4 GAUSE Ill 1 CAN DEMOCRA

CY STOP TERRORISM, .
4:l7

. . ust e:L~ logical to assu'" :I at tcnorists L . I . be But Jt IS J b'liz I t - . . . . ' Wno r \\ el. Ill~). . .. 11endas that could mo . ~. ~c ~cc l ll I 1.t~ontJcs, Would re ~reJy rerJresent pohnca! ae . . le and rninonty nghts nu \ lHc:h libe ral d Je<.:ttht: . I of ,uaJonty m I .I e'll<>cra \erv princ1p e . l eve their goals throug 1 ut moeratic: poljtics I <.:y is . f I . could not ac u t1 u~-'.) ll seems more, \v 'Y\v0Uiu based. I t te) . tic process over wse go<. l'k they pri\~lege th~ ?::raarticipate in the de moc:ratw proc:ess by a burn:nely th.a~ ha\ing been m?b!liz I ~a desire so strong that they \VC re willing to c t; ~es~re . . al. . . OntJnlt, Iue"e Particular goa s to ac . d r eless civilians to re 1ze 1t-tcrro nsts and potentia] acts ~cramst ens . . f . 1 ce -o- d e1 C\' if it rod not prod uc:e tJleJr (ICSJre d results R tcrror. 0 VJO en Id attack emocra ' r 1 espect fl ists wou . d ocraC)' despite a verv succ:essiU e 1 ection in Janua or tJ1e nascent Iraqi em , . ,f t1 . . ry 2()()5 has not stopped I raqi. and foreign tenonsts rom 1e1r campaign against the new pol.itical order. b d TJ Terrorist organizations are not mass- ased organ.Jz~tJon.s. . lcy are srnaJI and . Th are not organized or based on emocr a be pnnc:1ples. They re secretive. . ey . d f' IJ h vo1 ve around strong Ieaders and a cluster of comm1tte o owcrs w o are willing to tak e actions from which the vast majority of people, eve n t~ ose who might support their political agenda, would rightly sh~nk. It seems unhkely that simply being out. voted would deRect them from therr path. The United States' major foe in ~e war on. terrorism, al Qaeda, certainly would not close up shop if every Muslim country m th e world were to become a democracy. Osama bin Laden has been very clear about democrac:y: he does not like it. His political model is the early Muslim caliphate. In his view, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan came the closest in modem times to that model. In an October 2003 message to Iraqis," bin Laden castigated those in the Arab world who are "calling for a peaceful democratic solution in dealing with apostate governments or with Jewish and crusader invaders instead of fighting in the name of God." He referred to democracy as "this deviant and mislearung praetice" and "the faith ofthe ignorant." Bin Laden's ally in Iraq, Abu M usab al-Zargawi, reacted to the January 2005 Iraqi election even more rurectly: 'The le~slator who must be obeyed in a democracy is man, and not God .... That is the very essence of heresy and polytheism and error, as it contraructs the bases of the fruth and monotheism, a~~ because it makes the weak, ignorant man God's partne r in His most central diVJne prerogative-namely, ruling and legislating." th AJ Qaeda's leaders distrust democracy, and not just on ideological grounds: ey know they could not come to power through free elections. There is no reason to believ~ that a move toward more democracy in Arab states would deflect them [mm th~tr course. And there is no reason to believe that they could not recruit fol ;:;ers m more democratic Arab states especially if those states continued to be~e ~relations with the United States made peace with Israel, and generally the ~iddlm ways acceptable to Washington.' A1 Qaeda objects to the U.S. agenda in e.East as much as, if not more than democracy If as W'ashington hopesd. a de ffiocratic Middle E ' ' an COOperat with U ast COntinued to accept a major U.S. role in the regJOn b anti-Am e. . .S. goals, it is foolish to think that dem ocracy would end ~~ encamsm and d . d cru1llng channels for a1 Qaeda. ry up passive support, funding sources, an re

When it W()rkr.,, liberal dcn1ocracy is th . h . . c orrn I Jat ll re<I uc:es or prevents terro .est 1Th of govemrn<:nt. But ther<' is o evidene<.: l . n I . . . , h f' nsm. e funda aJ Ule Bush < unm~lralJOn s pus or democrac: ' in th H . . m~~t a%umption of ) t Arab world IS se . I n nous y nawed.

ANGRY VOICES
It is highly unlikely that dernoc:ratically elec:ted Arab ovem operative-: with the Unileu States as the current a th ~ . mer~ts would be as(;()ontanan n::tnmes 11o th e extent that 1 . oprmon can be rnea~ured in these eou tri Jublrc: . . l'f' un t' ,\ _ strongly sllpport dcrnoc:rac:y. When they have a chanc es researc:h . ows that n.Ja bs . sh . generally turn out tn perc:entages far greater than Ae o.vote m real elec:ti ons, they d . . . , menc:ans o 1 But many Arabs hold negative views of the United Stat . IfAr b m t1e1r eJect rons. all ecte .1 es. were democratiC y e1 d anu more representative of publi' a govemmenl~L tl . . ... oprmon, 1ey wou 1 thus ( be more ant1 ~Amenc:an. Ft.Jrther democratization in the Middle East would. for the foreseeable (uture, most hkely generate Islamist govemments 1 . ,, . . . ess mcunec1 to <:O oper~te w~tlt the U~~ teu States o.n 1mportant U.S. poliey goals, including militarv has

ing nghts m the reg10n, peace w1th Israel, and llie war on terrorism. . . . Although it is not possible to pinpoint from poll data the precise reasons for anti-Americanism in tl1e ~rab world, lliere are inrucations that it is U.S. policy in the regjon, not a reje<:tion of American ideals, that drives the sentiment. In the Zogbr lntemationaJ-Sadat Chair poll of February-March 2003, respondents in me of six Arab countries said that their attitudes toward the United States were based more on U.S. policy than on U.S. values. Forty-sLx perc-ent ofEg)ptians polled identified U.S. policy as the source of their feelings, compared v..ith 43 percent who stressed American values. No fewer than 58 percent of re~pondents in Jordan. Lebanon, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia also emphasized tl1eir opposition to U.S. policy.... Even if democratization couJd reduce anti-Americanism, tJ1ere is no guarantee that such a reduction would yield pro-American governments. Anecdotal e\~ dence certainly seems to indkate, for example, that the publi<: in non-Arab Iran ha'i a better impression of the United States than does the Iranian govemm~nt. The Iranian public's more pro-AmeriC'an stance did not, howe.ver, translat.e 1nto votes for the candiuate fav01ing rapprochement with the Umted States rn the second round of tl1e recent presidential election. History also indicates that legitimate uernocratic elections in Arab states ,.,..~tluld - L most likely benefit Ishmists. In aJ 1recent Arau eIections, the)' bave emerged as lE' government's leadmg < oppos1t1on, and ill man), of tJ1em they have done . ........ pohtJc:al . . very t Party an overth I 1 1st pal) am d Deve1 well. In Moroc:co, tl1e new Justice an . op~en. . ' f lts first contest. 2002 took 42 of the 32.5 seats in the parhamentaf} e~c~ons fop l' Forc:es and the . t:h Socialist Umon o opu elf (0 nIy two long-establ I d is 1e pruties, e ti. . . ) The same )"ear. in 50 d 48 r~1)ee 'e1 I \. ndepenclence Party, won more seats: an an:l of the 4o seats in parliament 21 Bahrain, Islamist canclidates took between 19 .d dent canrudates). This (depending on how observers classified somea]m epenbo)"""tted the elections, w success came even though the maJOr SI11a polihc' group protesting changes in the constjtution.

- . - oJ' vr I tJO<URlSM?

439

ntE LONG HAUL

. . The Bu.sh admJrust_ratton rican terrorism emanahn_ from the re; Jt could in Yto have g fact h nuch effect on anti-.\ me eh less cooperatt,e on a whole rancre ofts elp ' 1 nunents mu . o sues than the current rev me . Unfortunatelv th brinu to power go'e terr . c ons m011 . including the war t1 . . t to workina with th e autho1itarian Arab ere is . . \ at us pom 0 o overn. no uood altemati e k 1 1 the United States. o Jling to wor ' " . ments that are \\l . n plomoting democrac, m the Arab world it sh Id hi gt n inSIStS 0 . . If \\ as n toral e~erie nces m th e recr.wn. V\'here ' thereOu ec ..r . fro 01 the \ 'arJOUS e1 t are learn Is1 . parties as in \llorocco. t he Islanusts have a ha cl 1 rooted non- anus ' . r strong Y . . th fi ld The same is true m non -Arab Turkey, whe re the Islamer . d0 rrunatmu e e . . . . time o od ted its message 0\er time to conten d w1th the power 1stf litical partv has m era . . . . o po ' d 'th well-estabhshed more secu lar parties. Likewise th the secular arm, an Wl , . b bl . . e t . a1 of \'Oters in Lebanon ,,,11 pro a ~ preven t Hezbollah and <lh-erse conressJOn mrx I h . . c. Con w 1 ts trOm dominating elections .there. di verse y, d ere non- Islamist other Is amis litical forces have been suppressed, as ~ _Sau . .'\rab' ~n Ba1 . . Islamist _~a mun po . parties an d candidates c-an command the political field.. \\ ashm gton shouJd take no . . . . comfort from the success of rulmg parties m Algena. Egypt, and ),emen mer 1 lamist challenuers: once stripped of their patronage and secu rity apparatus. 0 ~g parties do not fare ,ery well in dem~ratic transitional elections. .. The United States must focus on pushing Arab go\ernm ents to make political space for liberal, secular, leftist. nationalist, and oth er non-Islamist parties to set wm roots and mobilize ,-oters. \\ashington sho uld sup port those groups that are more likely to accept U.S. foreign policy and emulate u.S. political values. The most effective way to demonstrate that support is to openly pressure Arab regimes when they obstruct the political activity of more liberal gro ups -as the administration did with Egypt after the jailing of the liberal refo nne rs Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman ~our, and as it should do ,-.,ith Saudi Arabia regarding the May sentencing of peaceful political acfuists to long prison terms. But \Vashington will also need to drop its focus on prompt elec-tions in Arab countries whe re no strong, organized altemati\'e to Islamist parties exists even at the risk of disappointing Arab liberals by being more cautious about their electoral prospects than they are. ~inistration officials, including Presiden t Bush, have often stated tha~ the transition to democracy in the Arab world will be difficult and that Amenc:ans should not expect qui~k results. Yet whenever the Bus h administration publicly ~fends ~mocratization, it cites a familiar litany of M uslim-world elections~o: m -~ghanistan, Iraq. Lebanon , the Palestinian territories, and Saudi A.rabta . t : ..:~r that the policy is working. It will take years howeve r, for non-lsdlarrusbt ~ IOrt: es to be ead ' . . ful that this fi Y to compete for power in these elections, an d 15 OUthe tt throuor any other U.S. administration will have the pati ence to see 'l:s process gb. If~ ~not show that patience, Washington must realize that 1 It is not onlypolicy Will lead to Islamist domination of Arab politics. . . tion's ~- - . 'ti . ~ foeus on elections that is troubling in the adrnt.mstrad..-.nfl -:-- --. . ma ative m th Arab -y c."" dence that W: bin e . . world. Also problematic is the unJUStine urse of as gton has m its ability to predict, and eve n direct, the eo . . 5 pustl 10

~, r r democrac, in the Arah world is unlike} .

-u

adm lJttcs in other countries. l\;oA b inistration official would . . . Po to the natve v1ew tl1at ra democra<:v will prod . Sign on. at least not in . pu blic, . h . . ., uce that ,s cooperate w1th t e Umted States. Y Washington's gO\emments d "-ill et dem ai\Va\ b cl . .. to assume that Ara emocratk trans1lio ns like the recent docracy a. \ocates . seem . . ' emocratic transitions in eastem Europe, ~tin Amenca, and East Asi~ \Villlead to regimes that support, or at least ~o not 1~pede , the b_road r~nge of U.S. foreign polley interests. They do not appre~1ate that m th~se reg1mes , liberalism prevailed because its great ideological compe~tor, cor:nmumsm, ~as thoroughly discredited, whereas the Arab world offe rs a real 1deo logJcal alternative to liberal democrac.y: the movement that claims as its motto "Islam is the solution. " Washington's hubris should have been crus hed in Iraq, whe re even the presence of 140,000 American troops has not allowed politics to proceed according to the U.S. plan. Y the Bush administration et displays little of the humility or the patience that such a daunting task demands. lf tJ1e United States really does see the democracy-promotion initiathe in the Arab world as a "generational challenge," the enti re nation will ha\e to learn these traits.
J'

Taming American Powei

STEPHENM. WALT

WA1.1 I TAMINGMn-nr" '

~\..4\. ~

POWER

1liE GREAT DEBATE

uC\makers ha,e spent the past decad: d~bating.h ow best to wield Amen poF ..t.. rest of the world. the debate IS O\ er ho\\ best to deal \'vith .t \\~ (:an power. or we 1 '1th so h . try h power in the hands of one country-a councl? t at considers itself de~-+-:-ed ~ muc . ~J lead the world-hO\v should other nations respon . . .. no."' Hv do vou deal ,,;tb American powe r? This quest ion is one for wh 1 h . d h f h C orld leader must have an answer. An t e response o ot er states to U S I e\erv , \\ . 11 . . . is sometlting Americans must care about as \\e . Bas1c: secu nty IS at issue. power as th September 11. 2001. terrorist attacks de~onstrate~ _o i_s the health of the li.S~ s economy. with the marke~ share of U:S. firms dec~mmg tn key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. The time to worry IS now. To be sure, many governments still value t;.S. power and seek to use it to advan<:e their 0\\11 interests. Y 8\en \ \'ashington's close allies are now looking for wa)-s to tame et the United States' might. ~any countries fear U.S. inRuence, and they have dC\ised numerous strategies to manage and limit it The l;nite d States will not and should not exit the world st~e an~~e soon. But ~t must make its domj nant position acceptable t~ others-by ~mg military force spanngly, by fostering great er cooperation \\ith key allies, and, most unportant of all, by rebuilding its crum bung international image. U.S.

OF POWER AND POUCY

Bill Clin es m 0 account eithe r "a great deal" or "a fair amount... ton has described th U . ed around the world,.. e rut .s.tates ~ "a beac on of hope .to peopIes declared uS ~d Harvard political sc1entist Samue l Huntington has --~ ?redomu~an open --wuv nues and mt ce to be "central to the future of freedom, democraL)' ti aJ cm hegemon mamtainm a ema on order." In other word s, without a beru~ enjoy the prospenty ~dpeace~ global order, many coun tries wouJd not be able S<X:unty they have come to tak-e for grant ed.

~thericans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both thei r coun try and the rest 0 e .~orld . In ~002: the Pew Global Attitudes Proje ct foun d that 79 percent of li.S. citizensd be~eve Jt is good that "Ame rican ideas and custo ms are spreading th aroun e world," and . moie than -0 perce nt think that U .S. foreig n policy takes 1 the mterests of other stat t

No.S(

~root Stepbeo M. Wait, laming Ame .

m )

...

ncan Power.'" Reprinted by permission of Foreign Ajfmrs: ~~ pp. l~l20. Copyright 2005 by the Council on Foreign ReJ.atiO!lS.

. \'ol. $4.

{jnfortLlllateJy, this rosy \if;W of U S . vnere, accor<1. to t he 2002 Pew SUJvev -power . l'i not shart:-d 0Vt~4S lng . ..1. 1 \ .d h . ' , nited Stat~ coust ers t e mtere ts of oth, ()\:eJ wne mmer ma . . s say that the .. v ers not much ,.. 0 "JOnhe .. perc.:ent and 60 percent of foreigners polJed th '- h .r not at all.., Betw:en 40 m not I I e war on terrons so e y out of securi tv eo . 1n11: t b Umted State waghlg its . rs "" Tl(;cms ut also to " oil.'' "protec~ Jsra~ 1 target ~ uslim governments,~ or "d .. <:ontro1Midc:_ast . January 200."J BB~ survey of 21 countries found onl . five~ffil~atc the ~~rl~ . A Poland, Sou th r\ fnca, and South Korea-where a >. . . :ndia, the Ph1hppmes. attitud es towa.rd the ~nited States. Although the ~{:;~~pie had "~itive" rebounded slightly smc:e the imasion of lraq h , . gJobaJ standing has . . . . \O years ago, Pew reported . 10 June 200.:::> that maJo n ties m alJ l5 countries it su . d ..r . . . ' I j rveye <.:ha! Iengmg I \ menc:as go bal m11tarv supremac.-v" and that Ia\.or another <.-ount rv r . " d t . suppo mr "war on terro r ts ec mmg on everv eontinent. . Indeed. 1...:r.~ rtC the L.S.-Ied da tb :' <. uL.Cns m ana France Germ~ny, t he !\.e erlan~, Russ1a Spain , and the Cnited Kin dom now hold more favo rahle vtews of Chma than of the United States. g The Uni~ed S~at~s . image is especiaJJy ~leak in the Arab world .\!though Arab populations ,.,ew li.S. popular culture. u.S. scienc-e and technol~. and the American peopl e somewhat favorably, a 2004 Zogby International poU f~und that fe,,er tl1an 10 percent of those surveyed in E~pt , Jordan. Lebanon. ~lorocc:o. Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates approYed oft.; .S. potc.y on Arabs.lraq. or the Palestinians. Indeed, when asked to indic-ate their "first thought" about the u nited States, the most common response was "unfair foreign policy." The same year, a Pew survey revealed that Osama bin Laden's popularity rating Y."aS more than 40 points higher than President Bush's in Jordan, \1oroc:co, and Paki tan. In 2005, Pew reported that majorities in predominantly ~fuslim countries express con<..-em that U.S. military power may ultimately be turned against them.If the United States' primae}' is a force for good as the country's Leaders proclaim and its citizens overwhelmingly belif'e-why do even its allies ba,e concerns about its influenL-e? They have mi.sghiogs because th~ recognize that Washington 's power could threaten their O\\ll interests. Even tbo~ co~tries that do not fear a U.S. attack are still aware that the linited States position as the world 's lone supe rpower makes it easier for Washin~on to get its way. And of course, U.S. leaders have sought primacy precise~ because they understand that weaker nations have less dout. It should come as no surprise. then, that other states re main wary desp1te assurances from \lF~-L gton that liS nnwer benefits l ~um ~ F-. the entire world. As a Chjnese official remarked a few years ago. Ho"" can we baseU \toreo 8\-en our O\vn national securitv on your assurances 0 f good _,,;jf'T . .ver'th we . ' . CTI\lng em more mtcntioned U.S. pouc:ies c-an inad,ertentJY}1ann ther nations ~ ed the reaso n for concern about the Iong reac h 0 f u5 power \\ben 1t- support t reate a 0 c Afghan muJahideen in the 1980s, the U01ted States was not . tJ\1ngget aJ ~,..,1. t ' th u cl States was not m1ng 0 V(llf;UA global te rrorist organjzation. Anu e rute .h rt for the war in Iraq. to bomb the Madrid subway when it courted Spams s~ppo .J _ ..J nsequencesof , eo Y hoth unfortunate developme nts were, m part. the urontenUt"U .J about tbew~n-s et _ U.S. policy, illustrating why a1J states mu st be somewhat coll(:emeu the United States chooses to use its powe r.
J
M

441

'

U s fcJrcicm poli c~ tell< 1 portray anti~A . f 1 111 uscu Iar ' tmenca . PropotH:nts o ' . tlues or sintp 1 rc~f'n tt tH.m t of U s d . ntst11 e . .. rd Amencan vc . l ,. . as hm tilt~ tO\h l ' . . t ..Amedca m :l S targetN o attaek bec.auseomtnanee. . 1lt1 Pre!'ident Bush has sate la Jn the world.'' lie. later explain ed ''TI1 \tVt! re th~;: f fieec om ' e bJi!!htest beacon SetJtember 11, 2001. \\ en not p rotesting ou. err~n~~ ' kd . < poh who att<lC e c>UI. cou ntt' onxistence .' And the Pentago ns new lationa1I D .c . les. rotestu1" ouJ e, u 1e The\ were P b t ted 'Our leacng pos tt1o n 111 t1 world will c .efense . din ~ f are1 s a , 1, O uet ntin Strategy, 1ssue {' . sentment ,,md resistan ce... o d ~e a degree o J e , l { . ' bree une ~ ' . ft t:h in this arcrument. Jut oretgn opposition to tht U . There is a !ITa111 ru t .1 . ~. ,.. ti'on to SIJecific U.S. po 1ICJes. Tl1e u mteu States has b nrted States ts most1 a reac y c . . . 1 een . arl)' 15 vears but 1ts mte rn at1o na stan d'mcr remaincl r the . le great power IOI ne , , r . . . I 1 o so late l990s. Although som e ror e1 eac ers exp ressed eou IaJrly gn hiuh throug1 t 1 l 1e 1. . I .. . I b tb ' . . lbalance most nat iOn s-t 1en peop 1 an d t Iten govern mec:erns c t about epowerln ' cl I s< k d f: bly on the United States an we comed \\' as h'mgton's glob :tllend loo e avora . . a er. Att .b ting the current unpopulanty of the Um te cl States sole ly to <its pow sh1p. n u d . . . . er or values cannot explain the sharp ec1 m tts ll~agc tl lat ]las occurred since me 2ooo.or especially the intense a~tip~thy toward Pre stde nt Bush himself. Moreover, the United States mam opponents have the mselves repeatedlv indicated that problematic U.S. policies are their primruy concern. For exampie, bin Laden has made it clear that his hatred is fueled by opposition to what he regards as unjust U.S. actions in the Middle East, not to Am eli can valu es per se. According to the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey, "Antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for pouticaUy and economically" (italics in the miginal ). Similarly, a 200 4 study by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board concluded that "M uslirns do not 'hate our freedom,' but rather they hate our policies ." And the State De par tment's Advismy Group on Public: Diplomacy concluded in 2003 that "Arabs and Muslims ... supp01t our values but believe that our poJjcies do not Jjve up to them." Disagreemen t with U.S. foreign policy does not mean the poucy is wrong, but it does mean U.S. actions come v.~tb a price. \Vh en foreign populations disapprove ofU.S. policy and are fearful of U.S. dominance the ir crovernme nts are less likely d ) b to. ~n orse.Washington's initiatives and more likely to look for ways to hinder them. Rismg anti~Americanism also increases the num ber of ext remists who can be recruited into violent movements such as al Qae da. The Un ited States may still be able to gain others' compliance and overco me overt resista nce but achie,~ng success will be 1 ore d'fficu1 cl 1 n ' tan more expensive. US Regardless of whether they disagree with U.S. policy or v.rith tl1e simple fact of N:aitFower, can other states do anything to tame the American colossus? Historian 1 r"erguson has argued tJlat th e centra] issue is wh eth er Am ericans have a "Wln to powe equ al to . t, played th k their. global responst'hili'ties. p resi dent Bus h , f'or h. pa1 hLS down f . IS ' 0 That's okae ~tl gomg Jt alone: "At some point we may be the only ones left. : can over~~~m~. We are America." Such statements imply tha t the United State~ But this''" fi e~tional resistance to its agenda so long as its resolve is 6rnUJS ~dmt . the ence IS w1w . ""'n d. Although primac.y in a:na nte oth er states cannot diml11ish . r r . . . Some countries neak tenn ' there are stt11 ma ny ways they can rem 10 U s powe . g see to mani 1 t th pu a e e United States for their ow11 purposes' usUl

4~~

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WALT I TAMING AMERICAN POWER

tCC 01 '

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gain \tVashington 's trust support .1 ' e confron tational, atte mpting to oppose' and u d, anu protection. 0 t1 are ters .nor , . n ercut U S int . st I . h .. e the Unite cl States abibty to defend or advance .ts c . eJ e. s. n e1t er cas ' . . cl J own roretgn poltc:y age nda is impau e .
IF yo U CA N'T BE AT 'EM

. ...,mocl< ion to lt

Given the reality of U.S. power: s?me states choose to accommodate it-a nd in doing so, atle mpt to ens ure that It IS used to their benefit A re.. , . . ' "' coun tnes warv 0 f coercive measures or even posstbl e military intervention bv the United St 't , . . . a al . t1 . po1 s to accord With U.S. mterest, in order to defl es, may choose to re tgn 1e11 IC"le s ect u.S. pressure. More freq.uentl~, countries ally themselves with Washington to counter threats _rose~l by their regwnal. adversaries ..By developing a close relationshjp \\ith the Um ted States, as well as With key Amencan constituencies, foreign powers can manipulate U.S. primacy to their own advantage. Instead of resisting U.S. power, a few sta tes -Libya is the most recent example-" ban dw ago n" with the United States. To appease Washington. bandwagoners reaH gn their foreign policies according to Washington 's dictates. Although the United States has often tried to compel such realignments by pres~ suring weak and isolated opponents-including Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, and Syr ia- this strategy rarely works. Even Libya's acquiescence was due as much to prolonged sanctions as to any implied military threat. More commonly, states choose to ally themselves with the United States out of a desire for U.S. protection from a regional threat. The United States has long been an attractive ally against intimidating neighbors: it is strong enough to shift a regional balance of power, and it generally does so wi~hout ~onquering.its allies in the process. Poland , for example, seeks stronger ties \"llth the ~ruted ~tates because, as one PoHsh official explain ed, Poland 'is a country that thmks seno~ly about security .. . [and] for such a cow1try, ifs good to be a close ~ly of th~ Uruted States.'' The specter of China's rising power has created a host 0 ~ diplomatic ?P~;h tunities for Washington in Asia: India wantc; to develop a strategJC partnershtp w1. . the United States and Malaysta, the Phili'ppmes, an d Singapore want U.S. forces ' . . l al ~atler Persian Gulf states see the to remain in the region . Sm111 y, sever, sn. ar . United States 1s a valuable counterwetght t0 thei r Jaruer netghbors.d b . v. ' I U . d St tes do not o so passJve1 States that do ally then1selves wi.tll t 'l e mte a l . t 'd bl 1 gth to ensure t 1at. m re urn. c s pow~r v Ind eed , they often go to cons1 era e en s B lti .. ting personal ties vvith is used in ways that further their own inte~estsl. dy cu \ a as TonY Blair seek to h . U .S. officials, especial1 t1 prestd~n t, foretgtl ea ers sue affect how \ rashington y 1e t1 d to reinforce the United States' commitment to tem an wields its power. . . . d t f the unusual openness of the Foreign powers also attempt to take a v~'l~~e ~ttacks Saudi Arabi launched a U.S. political system. After the September ~1, 2 , ter dte perception that the . 1u, multimillio n~dollar public re1 ns camp<Ugn to c:oun foreigu uove mm ano u ents couauroyal family was supt)()rting terrorism. More comJnOI y. age th~ U.S. go,emment . . "' orate with domestic spec1al-mterest groups to enoour:

The open. decentralized, ~nd , ';r' .d U.S. political . to uppor1 them. 'I t1 s sort of manipulation. ntl .J u t rudition f r system i \ . unerJu e to ll . 0 ree s e,tremeI~ vt . of media outlets also give organvu mtt n!>l groups eo . spet<:h < tlte nnuotucle us foreign policy, foreiQ11 gme 1' l(nt.c; c:an c Uld nsldtrable l<ttitude. To inAue~d el bb)15.ts cultivate key u.S. legi,Ja (JfS and c:ongoul~ Amenc.'!l.. co . ' ali ts 1 re pru ress1o al ....,, 5 1~ B JOUITl' tial members of ilie executhe branch..tnd mobilize n aides, try to _eo-opt m t J e ~essure on their elected officials. p sympathetic Amencans to pu .c.cant cases of foreign penetration oceu r w 1 u s et} . . len The most stgnm I d ln1c g 11 behalf f tJ1eir traditional home an s. Sue 1 obbving has roup~ lobby 0 ~ A eni~ Greece Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan. for ~xample ~~rno;ed tht causes oth . rnllobbies relv 01~ familiar tools of poJiticaJ pressure. inclu'run e e forts of e " . . tbese.b ,.;me direct congressional lobbvmg, and extens1ve letter-writi g e:arnprugn contri Uu0115 , " . . ng or m di 1 . e a camprugns . Several other ethnic groups are. trymg to bmitate the well-clocumentn.t . success of organizations such as_tbe Arme_ru~ Assem ly of AmeJica, the Amen vu lenic Educational ProgressiVe AssoCiation, and the American Israe1 pubJ can . . , Hel . Affairs Committee. Indian Amencans, for example, have formed several ou . IC lobbyi.ng organizations in recent years. The groups' poten ti al impact has P btical lost on tl1e Indian government: in 2004, an official Indian government eo not_ ~en "th I di 'tv th U cl S mmissJon concluded tl1at ~ n a~ ~mm~ ~n _e mte ta~es constitutes an invaluable asset in strengtherung Indias relationship '.v1th the worlds only superpower." Apart from occasional attempts by some eth nic lobbies to silence u.S. d tic opposition to their agendas (attempts that violate the democratic; princio~esf open d~bate), ~ese a~tivi~es are l~gitimate. But they could also entice the J~:d States mto acting agamst Its best mterests. Such influence can lead u s IOreJgn r . , 1 poucy astray precisely ~caus~ the ~nited ~tates' ?ominant global position gives U.S. leaders so much latitude m making foreign policy decisions.
.I

~.:J

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Wl\lf I TAMING AM:E

RICAN POWER

OPPOSING AMERICAN POWER

~thouthgh co~ntries use strategies of accommodation to furthe r their own ambitions, e Uruted States usually gets some thmg Important out of them: compliance. . M . any . h countries, however' are not cont ent to ach. . 1eve t he1r goals by accommodating or allymg t emselves with th u d S are ioc:ompatible with US e . rute tates. When foreign powers have aims tllat sition Some . policy, they must develop workable strategies of oppo. . the United Stcountnes attempt t0 balanee U .S. power by banding together agrunst ., b d . s ' er withi a~es or y .evelopmg specl cmilitary options others try to bind US tb . pow n e constramts of. t . a] . . ' _:J attempting to extr et . m emation Institutions. Some resort to blackmau, able consequence: su~r:~~ons from \Vashington by threate ning it with_ undesirrefuse U.S. demands And spread of nuclear weapons; others si mply 1gnore or attacking U.S. legi~ many countries are trying to unde rmine U.S. power b~ facilitated. Such effi acy, a strategy that Washington's recent actions have greatJ} been muted butth orts tobebalance the power of the United States have thus far eyare . . Although a number ofl ~g to hamstring U.S. foreign policy. Id the global response to U S ea. ers have openly called for a more multi~polar wor~ pnmacy does not resemble the coalitions that defeat

ermany 111 both world .wars or the SOVlet Umon . . . . 44:, th G ther natio11c.. I1<\VC' not forged a form a1 . . S 10 t: Cold war. rhE' rcaso anti-U JJ' 0 States does not pose t1tc same level of th y a I ante is simpl<: tt ,. . 'Tl . . 1 1 .. reat. et stat be . le u mted n subtler w,t\ s.. wtt , t 1<: exphctt aim of c hecki ng u s are. oes CJtnning to. . 10rces r I . . . JOtn antt-U .S. alhan<.:e, eountnes are "soft bal an<:mg.:. coo . power. Rather than f,ormm~ . 30 d' . nnsitions to oppose U .. .~ poI ic:v and obt..,; more . .r mattng their dip)Otnatic S . rcull tn.flue few examplcs: France, Germany, and Rus . nee together. To name ust. ' S Sta pursued a 1mified J a U mtcu tates from obtaining U\ SecuritY . s~r-dtegythat helped prevent t_he the invaston of 1raq, and their actions all , d . Counc1l authorization ~0 . .. . . . owe weaker st t . r Chile to res1st u .S. pressu re a<; well Lat p . a es such as Mexico and er, reSident B 1 cl France, Germany. and the United Kingdo us 1 tne to persuade: grams, but he failed to c hive a wedge betwe: ~~get tough on lran's nudE:ar prodiplomatic campaign instead. Bevond Eu ~m ab~d ended . f rope, corn med o up. endorsing their American countries has defeated the Bush ad . . . . , pposttion rom Latin government of H ugo Ch{tvez in Venezueia, ili~~:~:~t~n,s efforts to pressure the new bead of th e Organization of American Stat . d b.IS. k ttemp~s to select the a "cl es, an oc ed a U S p I create a emocracy review" panel within the OAS. roposa to Someth of balancing U.S. power are less benign, . h ways j , . }j sue as v.:hen countnes mo b1.ze I .etr m1 1ta1y resources and develop der SI\.e trategtes that e:mloit I en areas m w 11<.: 1 U. S. strength is not overwhelming As L pent agon s 2V\JoJ \ational fV\~ : c . Ule Derense Strategy notes, 'The U S milit~n., predommat es m t he worId 0 f . . ~1 tradztwnal forms of warfare. Potential adversaries acco rdlog1. sm awa\' from . . ~ Lft challengmg the U mted States through traditional militarY actions and adopt. . metric capabilities and methods" (italics in the original). ~m vVeaker states typically rely on some combination of three broad options. First, iliey develop conventional militaJ} capabilities specifically designed to neutralize U.S. strengths. In the 1999 Koso,o war, Serbia used surface-to-air missiles as well as camouflage and other deceptive tactics to blunt XATO's air offenshe. Facing a vastly stronger coalition, the Serbs eventually lost but they perfonned far better than ~ATO expected. Similarly, China is now acquiring military c-apabilities-including anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missUes, and electronic countenneasure technologies-that c-ould hinder U .S. forces if they tried to operate in China's neighborhood. Second, advers::rries sometimes depend on terrorism, tl1e classic "weapon of the weak.., Terrorists "vin by attacking the stronger side's resolve and forcing it to take actions that alienate potential supporters. Al Qaeda and the Iraqi_ insur~e~cy use terrorism because it allows them to attack "ulnerable targets while av01ding direct confrontation ,vith superior U.S. forces. Terrorism can ~s~ provoke ~e United States into overreacting in wa~-s that could increase oppostt~on to the u.~. presence in the Middle East. Sometimes, the strategy \.o,orks: terronsm helped bm Laden drive much of the U.S. presence out of Saudi Arabia-andit may still defeat
J

.I

the U.S. mission in Iraq. . f Third, to balance U.S. primacy, some countries attempt to obtrun :;1.po~e: mass destruction (\VMD) especiaJJv nuclear anllS. The current nuc d~rth .l ' and that is why Iran a.Jl ' o 1e1 r euemtes, ueveloped these weapons to deter t.1 r .c . ted "It is bas1 aJJ v a matter of Korea want them today. As one lraman reiormer sta . .. ' equilibrium. If I tlon 't have [nuclear weapons]. I don't have secunty.

4..f6

PAKI ,.

~v

. , 1 .l dired couute1poise:. tt l. I ~. dom inan ce ' nlc\n y 't r . lJJlfJ' Sll C' I . cl' lu~l t:'ado f Olll ,.., . . d States IJ, Inn mg Jt" t In powerf'ul. . . sates . the Uwte ' . l. I . tntet nat hont to t'(>n~tnun k best in areas Jn w 1K' 1 l " pn macv is ' 'On a[ 1lot so ,..- . JIS. s cling \\'OJ .s a1 . economic <l['c . .s. I l ~~ not. however a (' . Pro. . . " instHuttO m 1<111 1 . 11 ternahon . , n e1f . 1.ts .' . U S. action in core area of. uounced. sue n, l10 nal S<.'cu 1i ty. Tl . ecl've ..;trateCJ'\ for re. tnumngS .h, Council authOJization l01 the wars in v l e 0 ntteu n. .. d . 1 to 0 btrun ecunl_- waging tl1em. ;\.or could \\ .ashington1\..0so,o and tate feu e .t 1 cram k . . .1 cep otl I . t lid not stop I ' lntq. butt lcl c . llin au Jntemational Cnmmcu Court, even thou ,h . ler stc1tes from cshtbllsd gtl coUJt's autllmity O\'er th e l,; nited States. g Jt has . d knowle ge le rent e to ac k . onomics because the United talcs is less dominnt . " tn th B111 di0 g wor s 111 ec . t mational trade and finance cannot occur wi thout <.:ot at . d because 111 e [ . 111nonl , area an F . nple althouah the mles o t 1 \,\ o riel Trade Org . . ) 1e ce ted rules. or exai , l? . antzatJon ac P 1 . U S nterests Washmgton cannot pre' e nt the organi~atio f' . aenerally avOJ L ' . d S 1 . ' n rom o . . ., ble n Jlirlas when th e U111te tates vw ates Its pti nciples 1 . N issumaun1 ctvora o . . d' . l . . 01 can o . e tllese rulings w1thout Jeopar t21ng t l C tradmg order on h h Washington gnOJ . . . "' .. . .. . w1 c U.S. prosperity depends. Moreove1, the Um~ecl ~tate s ~an not Sll~ply J1 ctate the JateJal trade aareements-vi'luch c~Jso helps cxpJam \Vashingtons , terms of llllLltJ o . . . . ropensity to negotiate bilateral deals wtth m~VIdual states. The United States c:an ~us be prutly hound in this arena. but less easily than oth~r states. Blackmailing t]1e United States, on tl1e other hand, 1 an especially effective s strategy for states to use-i~ they can get away wi ~1 it. Blackmc~ lers must make a credible threat that the Umted States cannot easily guard agamst and demands that it can reasonab~' satis~' As long as \Vashington believes that the demands will not be repeated, it may choose to comply. But blackmailing only works in vel)' special circumstances. Threats to use \ VMD or give them to terrotists are n~t credible, because blackmailers would thereby ttigger tl1e ir own destruction. Threatening to acquire WMD is, however, another matter. North Korea has been using this threat to great effect, even though the power of the United States dwarfs tllat of North Korea. Y Pyongyang was able to extract repeated concessions from et Washington and its allies-most obviously in the 1994 Agreed Frameworksimply by continuing to develop nuclear weapons.... Even the United States' allies sometimes use blackmail to gain concessionsby threatening tl1eir own colJapse if they do not receive more U.S. support. Afghan President Ham id Karzai and Pakistan's military leader, Pe rvez M usharraf, for example,. have both won additional benefits by convincing Washington that radicals would seize power if their regimes were to fall. .

WALT I TAMtNG AMERICAN POWER

4'17

them. Thus, lsrat'l has repeatedly pledged to sto builclin ru posst'bl<:: to fulfill Palestinians h;w< promised to crack down on mjli~t b g_ settle~entc; and the frequently tempted to s,k utht netthb er Side has ac.tually don e much. U.S. leaders are d 1 . k a cost1 ispute or let others see00 e ot er wa}' wh balk, rather than ns y that th . en otl~ers Attacking U.S. legitimacy is also a favorite way to ~~<:an\,.be ~penl~d~fied. ' h eroue h national clout. As the worId 's dominant power tlle United St t vas mgton s mter ' a Ies as much to gain 1at IS d from th e percepton t1 ItS power . legitimate Whe . . n peop e aroun the world believe that U.S. pnmacy advances broader global interests w h' fi ds . .. . . .. 1 eas.er to 1a11 y mtemahona1 support for 1ts policies IeaVlng 1 as mgton . n 1t ts . d 0 ppos10 on 1so1 . . . ate and ineffe<:ttvc. Accordmg~y, the ~mted States' opponents are currently seelong to convince others that Washmgton 1s selfish, hypocritical, immoral, and unsuited for world leadership, and tllat its dominance harms them. This assault on U.S. le itima<.;y does no~ directly challenge U.S. power, but it encourages other peopl~ to resent and res1st U.S. supremacy. Unfortunately, the United States has unwittingly given its critics a great deal of ammunition in recent years. Not only did the Bush administration disregard the UN Secmity Council when it launched its preventive war against Iraq, but its justification for the war turned out to be false, and its bungled occupation has inflicted new suffering on the Iraqi people.... The rest of tlle world sees the invasion as a demonstration of the dangers of unchecked U.S. power. To make matters worse, U.S. policies since September ll have reinforced the belief that the United States does not abide by its own ideals. The torture and abuse graphically documented at Abu Ghraib prison, tlle deaths of Y!uslim prisoners of war in U.S. custody, the desecration of the Koran by U.S. interrogators, the harsh treatment of and denial of due process to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. and the conspicuous absence of a single high-level resignation in the w-ake of these revelations have all made it easy for ilie United States' critics to portray the c-ountry as quick to condemn everyone but itself. . . . . ,. Like President Bush, who said that the Abu Ghraih abuses d1d no~ re8e~t tlle America I know," Americans may dismiss these accusations as ~alse. ~1 1 S~eadtng, o~ exaggerated. But the issue is not what Americans think of tllelr natto~1 5 cond~ctb the issue is how that conduct appears to others. Some of tl1ese accusations may .e . . tl unfounded, but many are seen as vaJjd And th.ey , rapidly drammg 1e reserv01r are , ower of international goodwill that makes the Umted States status as a superp
acceptable to the world. r heart nd minds and it is losina . 0 . 111 . 1 bal strugg1 ror e sa ' 0 The Umted States 1 a g s h. _ . . . . . to grow Was m~lon will face gre1ter resistance and . 0 f anti-Amencamsm continues I ' . _, 11 c el ;,..creasinalv threatened m . rt Amencans WUl re 0. find It harder to attract suppo tl1 . t alone will merelr exacerbate the such a world but hving to counter tllese rea s 1 ' 'ted fear of U.S. power and isolate the um States e,en more.
Ul

. . fon nally a<:<llli<'..,<:ing to U.S. clemands ancl then do as 1 ' mg ttle s

Balking L~ SOmet:i . cl States use of its te 't r mes overt-as when Turkey refused to grant the Urute dl rn ory ~or the 1 war- but many countries raq choose a su bt Iet. approa

Anotller strategy, balking, is a more passive way for states to limit U.S. power: when_ the Uruted States demands something, thev simpl)' re fuse. Balking is an espeCially fli ti tJ1od , too, because even a country / ed e ec ve me as powerfuJ as the Umt States cannot force every state to do its bidding all of the time. And the more some ~test.balk, tlle more overextended the Unjted States becomes-making it easier tOr Obter states to balk . . ll . k cl t end ts nuc1 coU bo as we Russ1a has balked for example' when as e 0 1 ear tiJ1g r a ration with Iran, just as India and Pakistan balked by resJs . . p e~sur~ to forgo nuclear testing in 1998.

vs

A NEW APPROACH
Over the last 15 years, the umpo ar . .

. ode for tJ1e world. but other t'Ountrtes . , . may believe that the1r clomma nt pOSihOn lS go

. 1 era has tauaht .,n important lesson: Americans ...

.RARY woRLD pOUTICS PART 4 coNTEMpO 44 U S supremacy and 1., ;, d<, eloped ways t -' r o . r more ambi'"aJent about. tead of aJJowirH! t 1h:: v: ;tell tates to act tarne . f..1 are . 'I . tJten. 1ns ... h d k . W1th u s power. I roJUC"dl ) . \\' bington to \>\'Of. rll' ,.. o CO I1Vlllce the I . .... primaC\ reqUJres as_ 15 to be welcomed r,tther than feared ot ler 1mpUJ 11 ,_,. h U s. power onsof tbeworld t at h uld be ruled out Hntnu.hateh. True err nah . I ti0 nism s o . . ' rorts t0 !\ retreat to ISO a Id di ;.,;.,b if the {;nited Statps \\ithclrew fron1 . gth WOU Jlluuv \\orld uld 11ot be worth the cost . De~pite what Critir.. restnct l.i .S. stren """ rn alfairs, but m benefits wo ...... does indeed depend on the Ll. nited States. to m .a) ebal commum,, . I 1 d t1 campaign to am. belie'-e the go ue ' eed 0 f tJ1e seas. wao the war on terronsm. (-'a 1e . contain the fr om rwrite die UN. the International ~lonctru) Fund, and the trol \V.\10. and uncle th tJ . us \\'asbin!1ton s o,erarchin<T inAuence also h un o e1 ps k, among 0 Ider der0 b)' dampening great-power rival1ies in several \\orld Ban . . stable wor or r tJ U . maUltam a Id b safer or more prosperous 1 1e mted States with. regions. Few states wou e
e assumes that onJy a fev,; parts of the world are of strategic balancer ThiS strategy . d . I' cl . ili U01'ted States such as Europe. m ustna 1 ze As1a, and the 1mportance to e ' di I I U d . ulf I t d of controlling these areas rect y, t 1e mte States would Pers1an G ns ea f Tl t to maintain the reQional b a1 ance o power. 1e Umted States rely on local ac ors o . fi h . . . wou Id still stand ready to deplov its power agrunst spec1 c t reats to 1ts mterests' , 't uld ntenene onlv when absolutely necessary-w1 the local balance 1en but 1 WO L cl b broke down and vital U.S. interests were c~early threa~ene )' hostile forces. In short, while remaining engaged with its allies, the U mted States should keep its milit presence as small as possible. Reducing the size of the U .S. footprint wouli diminish the likelihood that foreign terrorists especially suicide bombers-would target the United States, because such responses are most often triggered by perceived foreign occupation. . , Being less directly involved on the ground would also bolster the U mted States freedom of action. Washington would be able to play hard to get, making its support for others c :ond.itional on broad compliance with U.S. goals. Other states would be less likely to take U.S. protec..1:ion for granted. By diminishing global concerns about U.S. dominance, this approach would also make it easier for Washington to gain global backing on those rare occasions when it needed to use force. Playing hard to get would not win over a recalcitrant regime such as that in Pyongyang, but it would make it easier for the United States to attract broad assistance for its policies in even those hard cases. Most important, the United States must defend its inte rnational legitimacy. ~ashington must first recognize how it appears to others and then develop a sus ~ed campaign to shape these perceptions. The United States cannot expect to WJ.D over the entire world, but it can surely do better than it has of late. 0 be effective, a public relations campaign needs a good product. 1 ~ ~- 5 foreigD policy makes global problems worse while U.S. government and mlbta1)' personnel trample on human rights, then no amount of public diplomacy will res cue the nation5 mage. To restore the moral stature it possessed before t1 abuses le 1 at Ahu_ Ghraib, at Guantanamo, and in Afghanistan Washington must sincere y apologize to the VICtims, and the senior officials responsible should be asked to '
e m

WALT I TAMING AMERICAN POWER

449

drewcompJe~ly. U 1
Inst~d, .

.t d States should resume its traditional role as an "offshore

. Bv faili nt; to hold top officials accountable the U - ed S s1gn- ~ ' 1 1 JUt tates d re 1 values neither t 1e ng 1ts of others nor its own id< als lt . h e~onstrates t that waY to rebuild the nation's global image. e IS ard to tmagine a worse . I' . .R y U.s. fore1gn poli1c.;h must 1e ect a greater appreciation of what , : S powe annot<lccomps. possessing unmatchedstrengthdoe t v th _r_c.'an aJl d c Id . . I s no mean e li mted an or shou 1mpose 1ts va ues on others no matter ho lH Stat eSC< ' w se ess Americans . . tl110 k their moti,es are. Instead of telling the world what to do and how to 1 . . tvea te mp tation tJ1at. both neoconservattve empue-builders and libe,...almtemationa1 . . " 1sts find hard to res1 st-the U~1ted ~tates must lead by example. Over time. other nations will see how At~encans ltve and what they stand for, and the rest of the world will want those thmgs too. As Woodrow Wilson once counseled, the United States should "exercise the s~l f-res_tr~nt of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to mtsuse 1t. ... The United States' current task is to rebuild the sense of trust, admiration, and legitimacy it once enjoyed, so that the rest of the world can focus not on taming U.S. power but on reaping the benefits that it can bring.

FAILED STATES CIVIL WARS, AND NATI 0 N-BUILDING

I

Failed States, Collapsed states, Weak States. Causes and Indicators

ROBERT I. ROTBERG

Tl1is clecade's failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Congo, Uberia., Sierra Leone, ancl the Sudan .... Somalia is a collapsed state. Together they are the contemporary classical failed and collapsed states, but others were once collapsed or faiJed and many other modem nation-states now approach the brink of failure, some much more ominously than others. Another group of states drifts disastrously downward from weak to failing to faiJed. vVhat is of particular interest is why and how states slip from weakness toward failure, or not. The list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and poorly governed states need necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a state as fruling-Colombia and Indonesia, among others-need not doom it iJTetrievably to full failure. W11at does it take to clrive a fruli ng state over the edge into failure or colJapse? .. . How [could] Somalia, a nation-state of about 9 million people with a strongly cohesive cultural tradition, a common language, a common religion, <md a shared history of nationalism ... fail, and then collapse? Perhaps ... it never constitut~ a sin~e coherent tenitory, having been part of the colonial empi~es of two suzenuns. with otJ1er SomaHs living outside the boundaries oftJ1e two colomes. Then. as was ~ften ~~ experience elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the first elected. proto-dem~rahc. post \ lt,hame;orrupedt, independence civilian government~ proved to be 'experimen.~aL ineffialcten ''tical culture 1 Gener . o m . .creating any kind of nationa1 pou . and mcapable of
m Causes ed States. \\'eak States: .r Terror.and CollS('queuces.illl(l Caanbrid!{e. MA . Tt From Hob<'rt J. Hotberg, "faikd States, CoUaps Hobcrt I Hothc:rrr cd St(lte Failure anti State Weakness "' tl mut'. uJ P.ess 2003 PP 1-29 d tl .. Brooki.ngs lnstHu ton r . ' c-- 4Sl ~ ahon an 1 ~ \Vashingtou, DC: Worltl Peace f ounc1
~

:-,,,~;.,,.

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452

PART4

COi'l '-''

~rrr~iJ'ORARY woRLD rouncs

.

f" go,,emment and democrac.:y, abused his citizen!~' h . ~ destroved U1stJtutions o .h .~. . uman 1t e tate i:l! poss1 1 e mto his own 'tnd h . ed . of the resources o u 1~ rights, channel as man) . eel everYone else at tIle en d o f l J CoId ds lE> \\ar of w11at subclan's han an d depm . wa~ , f 5 '' supreme rule. :\ 11 of the lll<l.JOr dans and subclans 0 tl left of the spoils o omCUJ . er . n '- -~me alienated. HlS shock troop perpetrated one outr than Siad Barres 0\\ un;a f ..1 . ~e _;..,.,... reU after another agcwu 14 O\\' Somalis. Bv the onset o Cl\1 war m 1991. the Sorna]j sta1f: I ft . had long smce failed The chil v.-ar destfO\ed what was e . and Somalia coUapsed

. arn1,.' decided .that the poht; ... ;,m~ were TlJ .lnlJl~ th f the ander o .. . iad Barre. comm ,er in !969, suspending tlte um.;tution, bannjng JX>liti ~f: countn. so he usurped r<>' d ., conuption. T\\'enr. \ 'C<lf'> a110 mam misacl <.<U 0 . d sing an en ,. " V(;nttr p.wes. an prom cceed d 1 destro\inu anv sembla.JK'f~ of national goven1 <.~ n . e . . mental Iat~r: S1ad.Barre had su b, the Soviet Union and then b~ t 1 LuJted States, Siad l3arr , first 1c

leg~timaC). _Ba~ke~

onto itself . . . ca11 d cl 1 President Stevens (1968-1985) systemati .. )' re u<.:e 1Urnan security \~thin Sierra Leone so as to maximize his own personal power. <md ... that increase in personal power pennitted a quantum.leap in}~ c.-ontrol O the cow1try's rents and \er riches. Stf'\ens "sold chanc.:es to profit from disorder to those wbo could pay for it through providing senices.-2 H~ er~ a p~\ate 1~tary force to te_r~orize his 0 ,,11 people and to a&,arandize, espec1all~: m the diamond fields. As ~e offic1al rule oflaw receded. the law of the jungle, presided o\er by Stevens. took 1ts place. Institutions ofgovernment \\'ere broken or c :orrupted. The state became illegitimate, and a civil war over spoils, encouraged and assisted from outside. turned failure into a collapse. In 200-2, after hideous atrocities, a brutal intervention by a \Nest African peac-e enforcement contingent, much more war, and the arrival of British paratroopers and a large U~ peacekeeping forre, Sierra Leone reco,ered suffieiently to be considered failed rather than collapsed. It even held effective elections. Mobutu used analogous tactics in the patrimony of Zaire. As his people's selfproclaimed guide. or as the personalist embodiment of national leadership during the Cold War, he deployed the largesse of his American and other\Vestern patrons to enhance his personal wealth, to heighten his stature over his countrymen, and to weave a tightly manipulated web ofloyalties across the army and into alJ aspects of Zairese society. Every proper political and democratic institution was an obstacle to the edifice that he created. So was civil society, poJjtics itself in the broad sense. an~ ea_>n_omic de\'eJopment. Letting the country's Belgian-built infrastructure rot. mamtainmg a colonial type of resource extrac:t:ion (of copper, other metals, and dia~onds), rebuffing the rise of a real bourgeoisie, and feeding his people false glorie inst~ of real substance and per capita growth accentuated his own power. wealth. and mpo.rtance. As with Stevens and Siad Barre, the modernizing state was the enem}~ Mobutu had no sense of noblesse obHge. Rene Leman.:hand says that for :~tu~ state, patronage was the ~dispen~ble lubricant. Ultimately, ho,_vever, ~c:ant ran out and the Mobutist machine was brought to a ... standstill !he ~nahility of the Mobutist state to generate a volume of rewards consistent with its clientelistic ambiti 'The . . . ~ns IS the Key ... [toJ ... its rapid loss oflegitimacy. ..3 damentai~ dn.1Sl0ns of the failed Sudanese state north and south, reflect fu 0 and colonial dhnic, ~~ and linguistic differences; Egyptian and Bri.tish ~nq~~ Haws and patterns; post-independence dispanties

cliscrinunaLon.; the. north dominatin th 453 ~ _, e 1 South. A we a~ c,tate m the north pr<>Vlumg SOuth/; and the div..... of oil l' ~'erv ....,05 tJv ~1 uslm w nstituent-;. became th po itical goods at rr, . :, m the '" ' . . . h e nude, f. l nmtcu 1 ls f, ae . war wtU1 tht: so~t (from 1~h5 to 1972 and fr lS o a truly failed state v.'hen its~ Lts equation. The Sudanese war has th d b orn l9&1lhrouuh 2002) ong . .]j e u 1ous disti . o entered the }<;r . . larc.rest numI o.f C:J\ll an ca'iualties (0\.~:;r 2 million n<.tion .of having . o ~ ..I the o . . . Lnmct=. \,~th. ~e large~t J~temally di~plac.:ed and refugee 1 m an~ tnl~a'itate war. ooupled 4 1111U.Jon). Sla\CI) (north aaamst south) A . h population m the world ,aho , 'I ut the c :entral go\ernments writ rare!)' runs ouns es as well " oreover. in the .-~,L. lt . . ""'uu'10 -' bom bs them, raids them and prmldes no pot .'-<ll goods to its southem citizens. , regards bL. tack th result, the Sudan has long been failed. Y northemer _sou emers as enemy. :\.sa et, imate, even though the southern insurgents d dsh regard their state as }Hrit. till c d cl o not an a\'e sour.ht 'th -~ or autonomy ror eca es ... . However, so long as oil r(!\ rt eJ er secession the Sudan is unlikely to collapse entirely. . . . enues shore up the north. The paradigm of failure ... holds equa!Jy well .th . . . detaiJed material, in Afghanistan, Angola, Burur:di. and ~be ~ 1 m 11ar hut differen~ ldlling fields and internally clisplaced drcumstanc:es are alm ~ndeed, A na naolas tainlv as destructive as the Sudan's. The wars in Mrd-arust ~as mla,tense an~ <:eT B . '. . . . ou an, .-.ngo urundi. and Li~~ ha'-e been eq~ally ~umatic for ordinary combatants and hapless ci\ilians unwittingly c."augbt up m a V1<.1ous and (until 2002 in Angola, intenninable battle for resources and power between determined opponents. Burundi's majoritv-minoritv war has prod~ced fewer deaths in recent decades, but it continues ~enduring contest for pnmacy that antedates the modem nation-state itself. From birth eronomic.aJly weak and geographically limited. Burundi's capacity to perform has for a decade been fatally crippled by majority-backed insurgencies against autocratic minority-led governments.

ROTBERG 1 FAILED ST ATEs, COlJAPSEo ST ATEs, WEAK STATEs

WEAKNESS AND THE POSSffilUlY OF FAIWRE

CoUapsed and faiJed designate the consequences of a process of decay at the nation-state level. The capacity of those nation-states to perfonn positively for their citizens has atrophied. But ... that atrophy is neither inevitable nor the result of bappenstance. For a state to fail is not that e~ Crossing from w~ess into failure takes will as welJ as neglect. Thus. weak nation-states need not tip mto f:-: 1 .... cwure There are several interesting cases that mdeed test the prOOSton f the distinction between weakness and failure: . Sri Lanka has been embroiled in a bitter and destructive chil war for~= years. As much as 1.5 percent of its t~talland mass has_at times in~~ a Tamil been controlled by the rebel Liberation.~?ers _of T~~\ E:':~- has been able separatist insurgencv. Additionally, the lJ 1E "\1 th relati ;e P :i~ d . 2001 a. d . kill off rival Tamw.. an m .a.. lO assassinate prime ministers, bomb pres1 ents. ,__....,hle . . . . . . al d . air force base. But as u ""''"t"""' even destroy the nations cJvtl rur temun an rnam bee f u;,.,.a ~'11 the land have n o pUlUJo as the Sinhala-dominated governments of the 15 eak close to ~ ed 01e~w ' ~~ '-'a. 'E rebellion., so the nation-state has remam

'OT

.t54

pART4

CONTEMPO

RARY WORLD POU I IC!:J

t>ercent of SJi l .ank<HlS llw gov('rn men t I) r ttppm~ O\'C t m Tl . ds are 111 aintaine d and sch ool ' aH. l hospitals l'un er or111 cr s Ihh" we 11 ll' JOa . ' d e ast. Stn I ~ IOn t\'<l~Oih , . tile wtr-torn north an t:e t 1 early l 99P . ' to e 1 red exte nt even 111 < "s ~om e ttklll I .xl 'b'ted tobu st leve ls of economic growt h. The aut hority of Site loo ' , L.'ln a l<l'i e: lJ 1 k' <.:es11 . a-sp t per . sin: govcmments ext et tds securely to tJ1e Sin ha1 c>< mg HO d cent ol' the coun l . d. clptured Tamil areas. For t tesc r<'asons, esp1te a con.sum . trr. an m to t1 re ' te . . . ,..,. li . . . . tng fl' f' ded on intense mal.onty-n'll.llOfl,/ < S<.:1. . nat1on and clep .. 1nH intelT1<l 1con 1 t oun .c . . . . . . . . . 11\atJmjc md religrous dHfcre nce s, Sn Lan ka r)ro1.ects atttl non and on pronounced e < J the couutrv, has sulTere d no loss or legitimacy c., 10 rit)' tJ l i'OUg I t Inuc)l Of lOU I . 1 110ng Sinhala, and has successfully escaped fruJure. . . . . . rndonesia is another case of wealmess avOJding fe lure tles prte \oVldesp read inseu curity. As the "vorld's largest Mu slin ~ nation. its far-flun g ~cltipe la~o harbors sepa ratist wars in Aceh in the west and m Pa1~ua ~ formerly Ina n Jaya) m the east , plus large pockets of Muslim-Christian con8tct ~~ Ambon .and the Maluku islan ds, Mu slim -Chdstian hostility in northem Sulawes1, and eth mc xe nophobic outbursts in Kaliman tan. Given a1J of these conA.ictual situations, non e of which has bec:ome less bitte r since the end of the Soeha1to dictatorship, it would be easy to conc:lude that Indonesia wac; approaching failw-e. Y .. only the insu rge nts in Aceh and Pap et. ua want to secede and arc contesting the state. The several oth er battles take pla<. :e within the state. not against it. They do not threaten the inte grity and resources of t11e state in the way that the enduring, but low-level, war in Ace h doe s. In Aceh and Papua, the government retains the upper han d. Overall, mo st of Indonesia is still secu re. In most of the country the governme nt projects pow er and auth01ity. It man ages to provide most other necessary political goods to most of Indonesia desp ite dangerous ec.'Onomic and othe r developments in the pos t-So eha rto era. \i\~1at about Colombia? An othe nvis e well-endow ed, pro spe rou s, and ostensibly stable state controls only two-thirds ofits territory, a clear hin t of failure. Three pliv ate annies project tJ1eir own power across larg e zones c.:atved out of the very body of the state. The official defense and political esta blishm ent has renoun ced or lost autholity in those wnes to insurgent groups and dru g traffickers. Mo reo ver, Colombia is tense and disturbed. It boasts the sec'Ond highest arm ual per capita mu rde r rate in the world. Its politicians and businessme n routine ly wear arm ore d ves ts and travel with weU-anned guards, a clear indi cator of the state's inability to e nsu re personal secu rity. Even .so the .rest of Colom bia as a state still deli vers schooling and meruc:al care , o~antZes a ph~1cal a_n~ communications infrastruct ure, provides econom k oppo~ mty,. and remau~s legitimate. Colombia is weak becaus e of its multiple insurgencJ ~, 15 c.' but Omparati vely ~ng and well-perfonning in the areas ove r which it maintru ns ~ntrol. When and tf the governm ent of Colombia can re-inse rt itse lf into tJ1 e disputed zones and further reduce the power of dru g traffickers, d1e state's reach. "viJI expa_nd. T?en, a weak, endangered state will be able to move fiut her away from poss1b~e failure toward strength . Zimbabwe is an exam 1 f . . P e o a onc e unq uestionably strong Afnca n state that has f:alie n rapidly thr h akn t Zimb b . oug ":e. ess to the very edg e of the abyss o f r:-= re. AJI au~ . a we 1 m order to JOin the ranks of fail ed stat es is a widesp read mterna1 acks msurgent moveme nt di . r t be poli rectecl aga.mst the government. Tha t cou ld come. partiC.'U Iarj y 1 tical d an economic det erioration of the coun try conh.11ues
.

.. , . to fi.u urc. ~~ . 80 ot

ROTBERG I FAilED STATES COLLAPS I EO STATEs, WEAK STATEs

45:)

hecked. J1 2000 and 200 l , CD p per <:apita li1 b '1 J ac~ l flatjon gall ope t fro m 30 per cent to 116 percS u Th vard bYlQ percent a year. ent l n u.S. dollar from 38:1 to 500:1. Foreign d 1 e oc~l c.urrenc:y f:> IJ against .. j te t , . . " 6 () . an . ernJJioymc nt JOSe to pere;ent 111 a country of uomeshc mvestm ent ceast::d. tl 11 U 12 s . a1 serv1c:es van 1 1 d. HIV c e;tton rates c1 b dm1 IOn. Ht::alth 1 euuca1 1e tn1e uon d . Jm e to 30 percent anuh b :JQOO Zimbabwea ns )'1ng every wee k. Respect forth 1 f1 , WJt a out tJ I cl I' . . ed and thCJI su )Ve rte . Po tt1e;al institutions ceasedetrurc o . aw fwas b ellYbata ter d . . o gen the state preye on lts rea1 an d tts supposed opponents 'unction fully. A ts of hu10 . 1 d shameless ly stealing a presidential election. The gove' e; t~ Ire~ :xr ress10n n a . hi . rnmen eg1nmac vanished. Corruption , meanw. le, Aounshed, with the rulin g elitespocketin \' th .. . local and Congol ese war gams and letting most Zimbabweans uo h R gal en d 2009 d . b ungry. le starva tion appeare d m m1 .- "' ..., .esp1te food. aid from abroal All of th' . . . . u. 1s m1sery, an d the ten den cy to .fad , 1 esulted (as 1t had earlier m the Congo and Sierra Leone) from the ruthless design s and vengean<.:e of an omnipotent ruler.... A num ber of oth er nation-states belong in the category of weak states that show a high pot ent ial to fail. ~epal has been a clear case sine;e its \1aoist insurgency began again roiling the mountains and plains of the monarchist country. Already hin der ed by geography and poverty, ~epal has never been a robust provider of political goods to its inhabitants. The palace massacre of 2001 undermined the legitimacy of the monarchy, and thus of the ruling government. With the flare-u p of a det erm ine d mral rebellion in 2002, and ~epal's demonstrated inability to cop e effectively, security of persons and of regions became harder and harder to achieve, absent military assistance from India. Under these circumstances , Nep al can hardly project power or credibility. Failure becomes a distinct possibility. . . . . .. A thir d variety of weak state includes the endunnglyweak . .. Hruti has aJ,~Cl)'S been on the edg e of failu re, particularly during the nine ~eent~ ~nd twentie~ centuries. But its ent ren che d weaknesses include no ethmc. reug10us , or othe ~or communal cleavages. T h ere are no msurgen t movet11ents - has Haiti exneri: . standards f 1 enced radi cal or rapid deflation m o 1vmg an d national expectations' . . . h 19go Ha'ti has alw vs been the poorest a Uke Arg ent ina in 2002 and Russta m t e . s. 1 , polity in the We ster n hemisph ere. d al . b...:an compro1as '\ a}'S "'"' 1 Haiti's nation al capacity to pro n'de P0 l'ti'cal goo s 1 . . hi , . k institutions. an tntimtdated Cl\il mlSed by aut ocr atic and corrupt leaders P ''ea . . . tes of infant mortal. . ua l soctetv, lug h leve ls of en.me, low GDP IeveIs per capita. 1 1 ra , other deficiencies. do ty, ' t abh 1 suspicion or out righ t hostit from 1 s neib ors' an mrun . The Haitian go,tty . th 1900 . 5 . Narcotlcs trafficking has been a senous problem smce e t -diet smugger5 general ' and drugs em men t has bee n una ble or un willing to 10 et p .cl 1 Jean-Bertrand Aristide t . . H . . e 1 under rest en transs h 1ppers in parbc:ular. ruh. . ev ~ . . vise of weakness. Y gt'en v~ry et, 10 (19 90- 199 1, 199 4-1 995 , 2000- ), is gnpped a . t aJ ethruc. re~gious , or lin. .ted organiz ed d' d tUnt . 'ty inte rnal ISSJ ence, almost no tn emdistrust bv the maJon of d . . .. ety a ' _ret: gutstic cleavages within Hruhan soct . except th eep ric class cnWJati'0 ns' the . histo the upper classes and of mulattos because ?f edtr ands communal differences ' . . tngredie nts of maj or civil stnf.e are absen t Failure em oup violence. H31'ti seems n cross-gr <.;apable of bei ng transformed into consun~ 1. g condem ned to re main weak, but without failU1g.
urtC
tn'

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PART4

EMPORARY WORLU 1-'ULIIIL.::> CONT

ROT BERG 1 FAILED ST

.. urap . ttte I I~at IQ' cn tl,cir gcor hi('a l .tnd pl : <> <:al legacy (' 11 d 1 1 " :I 1011-S , . b' ' .. se of rr)obal warl1l i ng alH c at.. ~ ~ rn ic: <:li mat ir I .Utlire . 111 .-.. . 11 1 .,c,eral c.;ases. eca u. . '11 ') (lt' . . 1 . tl)' weak incl11de (no t a l11 ll 1 J 13urkina F'tc 1,1nc-,c. 1st r I " . lSJde ret1 Jll 1'1 e n ''o, '-'h can lt <.OI : ~ . in Afd ca: Georgia and \lnldc 'a iu the form S ttd, Chant Gu111ea. <.ti1C1 1ge' r. . er ' b 1 c .,stTimo r and Laos Asu1. r~ac11 11a~ 1ls own uit <>vi et .. Jll . l ' 1 wd Cam o<Jcl , c.. ' ., 11lgtu sh 1\JOJ dG .. and Moldova battle their o,,n sol ar !>ll<:cessl'ul se . . ing features. an eorg_Ja .. . Cl l . t 0 1e time harbored . VJCJous. clVl1 \\ ,u , and Burkinp.lratist a ,.., movements. tac a ' f ll '1 ~ aso . d Laos are tll ru led hy autoc:mls un n<"m v to civil soc ty ~i aer. Cam bod1a, an ' . . . . . . , ' . 1e and .., . . . to pa1t1C1patory govelnance East Tunor IS a \Cl ) n<:w stdt e, hav1ng been re'S.<;Hcd . . t d b . the United . ations afte r two b1tt cr and unrewa rdin g col . and reSU a e Y SCit . . J J d . b,.,tal final I 11donesJ.an spree o (' c)estJ.uction and death OllJaJ mter uc es an a "' J' . . . . . ~ast . 1011 Tunor even w1t]1 U'' ' J1elp enters its full maJ ontv. w1t 1 t a caJ re of exper1 cl r '. a1 nd btJreaucrats and without much 111 the way of physica l res cnce proiess on s a . . 011 1c:es. . . .. _. . . t1c:a The will mgn ess of' these weak states to. prov1de pol1 l goo d:; 111 qua nt1tv and cJUa1 , ity is severely limited at the bes t of ti1~ es. Almost any external shock or inte rnal emergency could push tllem over the bnnk.
1

INDICATORS OF FAILURE
serious mistakes of omission and commission . E,e n in the modern states with inherited weaknesses, failure is not preordain ed. Poo r, arbitrary, absent-minded creations predisposed to failure need not fail. Indeed , Botswana, Jirt poor at independence and a forlorn excuse for a state, under dete rmined and visionary leadership created a state strong enough to take full advantage of a sub sequ ent , and much unexpected, resource bonanza. Similarly, a sugar mo nocultu re like Mauriti us was transfonned by dete rmined visionary leadership into a thriving plural society based on manufacturing for export. In con trast, Mahl\vi and Mali (two examples among many) remain weak and vel)' poo r, albeit democ:mti<.:, having both bee n unable. in their different circumstances, to overcom e the arb itra ry configu rati on of tJ1ei r borders, a common absence of eas ily exploitable resources, geographical bin drances, and decades of despotism. Climatic change may hit both Malawi and M ali particularly hard, too. Nation-states are blessed or cursed hy the discovery or absence of natural resources, like oil or diamonds, within rec eived bor de rs. Bu t it is not the accidental quality of thei r borders that is the original flaw ; it is wh at has been mad e of dle chall~nges and opportunjties of a given outline tha t dete rmines wh eth er a state r~mams weak, becomes stronger, or slides toward failure and coll apse. The colon~al errors were many, especially the free ing of Africa south of tl1e Sahara as fortyeight ad mirus trativ e ternton es mstead of six or seven larger ones and the abysrn al fail~re. to transfer the reins of authority much earlier and much m~ re thorou~.l y to an mdigenat. But it is not possible to pre dic t this centu ry's can did ates for frulu re solely or even largely on the basis of colonial mistreatme nt. . .. . Three kinds of signals of impending faiJure -ec onomic political, and deaths m com bat -pr ovi d 1 . e c earer, more timely, and mo re actiona'ble wammgs. On the
As this chapter has sugges ted earlier, the road to nation-state failu re is litte red with

eonom i<: f 'm t, Indonesia in 199WEAK SlATEs 457 e -g 1 z I t- I ~>~ \ ' . !97 2-J 9t . ~~'' II O)a bwe in 2001 - 20( '~'gena in 199l-t ut:tions 111 mcomcs and living t .1 >2 each pr0'.; .. . 9<.19, red 0\. tn\lan(;(; Lchanon in s anuardc; . d' rl ough tOne IIOlcd ClO U for [)rev<;rtt' tn nets O en Jve tneas ICatt::cJ tht r~ !.1'bjU:vSof f IICM rapkl t t ownward spiral starts in cam est C.J ure~ lo hav<; be~n. tt aJ ure ~arly d n1 a cone 'rt .I y - a ernpted 0 rnornen hJ m; <:or ru pt auto<;rats and tl . e tu, dcte:rrnined err nee the . 1Cir ec.plallr uort can siQ\ . few in<:enti \'<.'S to arrest their state's sl'd . } corrupt ac;sociatt':S \ tts 1 1 1sualh .1 e, smce th e: d from imp ow ns 1me nt anu misery. As r . ey nn clever,,,.. ' t i.._ hu\c . . , d . . JOre1 and d gn . . n)'S o Jt:ntflt obs J van1 sh, ,mI per cap1ta mcomes r~'l . the ma'is ofomcstic mvtstment d . . I . dJ nes 'lp. see the 1 beet t 1, e ducatlonal and logist 17 . r .t emec1r. .ens m an imi'Vriled ta 1 1enlt 1 . . r 0t sho1t ages occur. Pnvahon and hunger fea 1 away. FC>od andsr te ll . s rne t ~ I k c . o ow, espec,aJiv r j ue1 inte rvenes. f 1an S to 10re1 exchange sr" : . gn , I a(; lffiatic <;atastrophe . varC:ItltS there is I thing that matters. Meanwhtle, in the typ al r'.1 . ess and ltss of everv. r .. cadres arrogate to themselves mcreasing' p IC aHmg state ruling Iamihes and rt' f 100 fC: tematica11YS kI.m t1 State treasury take advant S of the available p1e. Tll.'V S)'S 1e age foreign exchange, partake of smu'ggling and th o o ricial 'ersus street <:osts of f rent what littl.e is availab le into their own stitkypalmse If 't s o smuggJmg, an d gat her .b 1 ibrate t he B of 1 JCJt fun ds mto overseas accounts were poss1 le reliablY to ca1ow Jt ti b . . .. ld b . . na on y nation, robust earh wanllngs wou e available. Absent deta1led reports of s h th f th d . ' . hb uc e escnptors 10 th1s paragrap ecom~ very suggesti~~e indicators that can bet. e:hed. in real wat< time, and can forecast senous trouble, if not an end state of failure. Politi.cally, the available i.ndicato:s are equally clear, if somewhat less quantiliably prec1 A leader and 1 associates begin by subverting democratic norms. se. 1JS greatly restricting participato ry processes, and coerdng a legislature and the bureau cracy into subservien ce. They end judicial independence, block chil society, and suborn the security forces. Poutical goods become scarce or are supplied to the learung class only. The rulers demonstrate more and more contempt for their peo ples, surrou nd the mse lves with family, clan , or ethnic allies. and distance themselves from the ir subjects. The state becomes equated in the eyes of most citizens with the particular drives and desires of a leader and a smallish group. Man y of these leaders drive grandly down their boulevards in mot~rcades. com mandee r commercial aircraft for foreign excursions, and put the1r faces promin ently on the local currency, on airports and ships. and on o,ersize photographs in public places. . . r The third indicator is the level of violence. If it rises prectpttously becaus~ 0 . . 1t . skirmtshes hostilities or out na1 ClVl.1war, tt. state cm be considered crumbling. ue . . 0 . ' ' h b bilin: [failure rises. \ ot e,ef\ Cl\il As national hum an secunty rates fall, t e pro a ., ~ . . b t 1 but ] cc a wammg S0 A so1 e or ~lative Jl111. u eonfJlCt pre c1p1tates frulure, eac 1 one rs ~ be . . b . certatn num r cannot preen me rates and civilian combat death coun~ a ove. a . . d th t the glue that scribe failure . But they show that a society IS dete~oratm~ cm a . bmcls a new (or an old ) state toge ther IS beco ming latalk thm . ' 0 . . d nee that a strong st te is be<,'Omina a No si ngle indicator proVIdes certatn evJ e . B t . dicious assessment of weak or a weak state is headin g pell -mell into f~ure. .u a Jt~ ken toaether, should tb ion, o e several available indi.cators discussecl in thts sectTh a dance 111aneuvers . avoi . 1: provide both qua ntifiable and quautati',e wamu1gs en .1 ean occur anu eff01ts at preventiOn c... be mounted. ''n
I

ATEs COL!..A PSEo STATEs

I

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PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

THE HAND OF MAN

. f 1 '" 15 larueI)' man l11c1Cle, not tccic.le ntal. l nstitu lion;L lra[!:ililies anti stn,t:tlira] ( , Statc ~u ure r. f' . ~-.. t those deficiencies ustwll; 11ark back to decisio . A >1t1ibute to ru 1 ure, rJU aws C< 1 ( n) So it is that lea<1 . <>rror~ across histmy ns <>r erslup . f ons of men rare1 wome 1. y I . 1 ,tc (' al gain in tJH:., con ten1porary era, <at1ershi.p mistakes l.tve . deshoyed states or person ' . .. . . r . l''"'es in Africa As1a, ancI 0 cec1m. l 1. .tI1.eacIy operate 011t:on. a 1.1t tl tinuc to erode rntgt1e po lu '
le

possible and Impossible Solutions to Eth nic Civil Wars

CHAIM KAUFMANN

fers accele rated and human rights abuses mounted, count e rva~.ling '~lolence signified the extent to whjch states in question h~d br~k~n fundantcntc~l soc1al contra<:ts and become hollow receptacles of personahst pnVJlege, personal~<;t m le, a.nd national impoverishment. Inhabitants of failed states understand what 1 means for life to be t brutish and shmt. . lu earlie r, less interconnected eras, state weakness anti failure could be isolated and kept distant from d1e developed world. Failure o~ce l~ekl fe,. er implications for v the surrounding regions and for d1e peace and secunty of the globe . Now, however, as much as their citizen s suffer, the failings of states also pose enorm ous clangers beyond their own borde rs. Preventing nation-states from failing, and resuscitating those that have failed and ,~,~IJ fail, have thus becom e the critical, all-consuming, snategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time. The chapte rs in this book demonstrate how and why states have failed and will fail, and how weak states have in several cases been spared tJ1e descent into despair and destmction .

cusr) ofrailure. . "' nnnan .1el.e h s l> een ( fa1J ure or eo11.apse, 1 . agcnt:y bas '' n . state . \1\lherever t 1 c'U '- glcJ .ro I neered t I1e sl1 c 1 m soength 01-weakness and wdlfnlly pres1ded ovc~r profound tnc . < .1 . . 11 cIestab1Jzmg 1.esour'e 5j1nts from tl1e state to the mlmg lew. As those resourc-e tt"n ... 1

u

~-

NOTES
1. Waiter Clarke and Robert Gosende, "Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself," in Robert Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness i11 a Time of Terror

(Wa'ihington , D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), 129- 158. 2. William Reno, "Sierra Leone: Warfare in a Post-State Socie ty," in Rotbc rg, ed., 75. 3. Rene Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: From Fai lure to Potential R econstruction ," in Rotberg, ed., 37.

This paper offers a theorh of how ethnic wars end and proposes an t y . . . ' . . m erven ti'on 1 1 strategy based on 1t. T 1e t eory rests on two ms1ghts: First, in ethnic wars both hypernationalist mobiliza~on r~~toric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to tJ1e point that cross-ethmc political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. Second, intermingled population settlement patterns c:reate real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic "cleansing," and preve nt de-escalation unless the groups are separated. As a result , restoring civil poUtics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the ' possibilities for ethnic cooperation . Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demograph ically separated into defen sible enclaves. Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reaso ns and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians. While ethnic fighting can be stopped by other means, such as peace enforcement by international forces or by a conqu ering empire, such peaces last only as long as the enforcers remain. This mean s that to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population move ments to create true na~onal ho~e lands. Sovereignty is secondary: Defensible ethnic en.claves reduce. v10lence With or witho ut indep ende nt sovereignty, while partition wtthout separ~tion d~s no~ ing to stop mass killing. Once massacres have taken place, et~mc.. cleanst~g v.~ll occur. The alternative is to let the interahamu;e and the Cbetmks cleanse therr enemies in their own way. th f 0 The remainder of this paper has three parts. The next part develops a . eory how ethnic wars end. Then I present a strategy for international r:ubllitaryb. mtit~ rvent. . o ons tion to stop ethnic wars and 'dampen fu ture VJOlence and rebut possl . eh ~ec t o k . l11s strategy. The eonclusion addresses the mora1 an d politic-.al sta es m umaru anan t intervention in ethnic conflicts.
...

.. . ns to Ethnic Ci"il W~.- lntematiOIIol $ecfJrity. From Chaim Kaufmann. ''Possible and lmpoSSJble SolutiO d t . .d Fellows of Harvard Collegt> and tbe Vo! 20 ~ "' . No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-17;:>. \l<l l996 b~, the Prest en an ~11T Press. of11u! M assachusetts Institute ofTechnol~. Reprinted by penmsston 459

~ ('i()

PART 4

CONTEMPO.KAKY

vvv~

. .- -

-. in Ethnic wars

~ --------.,

HOW ETHNIC CIVIL WARS END

.. H .-' , . . wtrs ar<' not a ll tUI'ke. Ethnic confi ids are di'JI""'' IIH t.... ct 11 <.:< nnlllrtJI Jc'l . .. Cvl ng distinct hc n lag<c., O\ c 1 I JC powpr n!latio~~ ~1. . ,. ' . ' llfJ vcs havi l wluc:h sec t 1CJn s<.1 <1.'> 1 wa1 , :m < I)J IIc-.(.., IJ<.; twc" . t'cs wf1iJc ideological <.:JVJ a<.:'-' ' 1 hetwccn t1JC; c:om m11 Ill J "'JV"r . 11 unitv over how. that coJnrJIIIIlll v .,J, clllld lw ,_, "' IJ('C 12 .I. I . . . . . .. 'l tlO IIS Wl t 11 11 ( 1<' SanlC;: (;01 0 1 JIIil<> flIll.( I ITJ ' . tl , ff..-Xl l)ility of lJ1dJV1Uilal IO\ahl<'' \\ luC'I1 arc < . l rt . TIH' k( 'V Ulii C:rCJlC:C '" H.: ""' . 't ' . eo o Ka . . . . J<1 1 g'. 1c:onfl 1<: !., 111 t aiJJJOst eompletefy ngJdJnctlllJH'\\ar-. ti1111C.: <:1\ d ware., foll ow f rclln tl 11' 1act. 'I . . " Tll C possJ )Ic an d 11.,..possible solutions to < \Var Ilard ens eth nic identities to the pomt that <.'roso,-cLIIIII<' political appcal~ become futile, which nleans that vi<:tory can he alic,u r<.cl OJdy by phys ical <.:ontrol over the tenitory in dispute. Ethnjc wa:s ~lso ge~ <.: rat~ lll l <' ll!.(' S~'Cllrity dil<: Jnrni.l..\ both because the esealation of each stde s rnobdzaiJOII rhc:lonc.: pn.sc:nt<; a rcal threat to the oth er, and even more beeausc i~tenn inglcd pop11 lation scttlc -r1cnt " pattcrns ercate defensive vulnerabilitics and ~ffensi ve op_porr_ ''i tics . . s Onec this occurs, the war eannot end 11ntd th e sewn ty ddc IJJJ IJa 1 rcdu<:ed h 11 physical suparation of the Jival groups. Solution~ tktt a:i 1 at res toring llllllti-ethni~ civil polities and at avoiding population trans fers-such ~lli power-shari ng, state rebuilding, or identity rcconstruction-<.:annot wo rk because they do nothing lo dampen the seeurity dilemma, and because ethnic fears and hatreds hardened by war arc extremely resistant to change. The result is that ethnic wars ean end in only three ways: wilh complete vi<:tory of one side; hy temporary suppression of the conAict by third party military oc.;cupation; or by self-governance of separate eommunities. The reeord of the ethnjc.; wars of the la.">t half eentury bears this out.

. , tJ.on JdentilJ _ to sway illdividualloyalties does not plav an irr1 rt ant ro (; m cth .c . 111 11 pet1 l>eeauS<' d 1lfiiC.: . 1 . . are fixed by birth, Whilepo t . 1 ll entitleS eo,vars, no Cveryon( may he . r . . fj I . 'I ""' : cj\11 Jized as l:tn aetJvc g 1ter or hJs or her own grou p, hardly anvone ever n &'ts ' posing c-llllliC.: grou p. ,.,ob

_ dentit)' is relatv<>~Y. ">of~ .as"Jt s -~ ~atter of JOtlJVJdual belief, or sometimes of poUt~cal behavior. RchgJOus uen t~ti<:!S ~re harder, because while they also depend on 1 r ,.. 1 u1 . ie be1 f, change generally. reqwres formal acc:eptance by the new 1w;.t , wh.ch rnav be denied. Eth ni.c identities are hardest, since they depend on language, c:wtur~, and religion, wlllc.: J. art! hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one c.-an

dcn fort~i~ferent i_ ti ty _e~t~?o.~ ~s i~ply th~ir ?~ membership rule.~. Jdeologkal

The Dynamics of Ethnic War

It is useful to compare c.:haracteristies of ethnic conAkts with those of ideological <.:onflicts. The latter are competitions between the government and the rebels for the loyalties of the people. The critical features of these conflicts are that ideological loyalties are changeable and diffic:ult to ac;sess, and the san e population serves a~ the shared mobilization base for both sides. As a result, winning the "hemts and minds" of the population is both possible and necessary f()r victory. The most important instruments art! political, economic, and social ref(Jrms that reclress popular grievances such as poverty, inequality, corruption, and physieal insecuri ty. Control of access to population is also important, both to allow recro itrn<:!nt anu implcJnentatjon of refonn prornises, and to bl{)(;k the enemy from thcs<:! ta<>ks. Population con# troJ, however, ca~not be guaranteed solely by physical control over teni tory. hut ~epend~ ~n car~~~ intelligence, persuasion, and coercion. Purely military successes are often ~ndeclsJve as long as the enemy's base of political support is undamaged: " Ethm~ ~ars, however, have nearly the opposite properties. Jn<.livi<.lual lc~yaltJeS are both ngtd and transparent, while each side's mobilization base is Ji,mted to mem~ers of its.own. group in friendly-controlled tenitory. The result is that ethuit ]fhc:ts are pnmanly military struggles in which victory depends on physical c;onoon tro over the dispute1 terntory, not on appealc; to members of the other grou p u

. .. change. Ethnic.: idenllt1cs are hardened further by mtense eonAi<.1., so that leaders cannot broaden their appeals to in~lude ~embers of opposing groups. A~ ethnic c.:onAittc; escalate, populat1ons eo me mcreasmgly to hold enemy images of the other group, either because of deliberate efforts by elites to ereate such images or because of increasing real threats. ... Once th e con Aict reaches the level of large-scale violence, tales of atrocitiestrue or invented- perpetuated or planned against members of the group by the ethnic enemy provide hard-liners with an unanswerable argument. In .March 1992 a Serb woman in Foea in Eastern Bosnia was convinced that "there were lists of Serbs who were marked for death. My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape." The fact that neither she nor other to,vnspeople had seen any such lists did not prevent them from believi ng such ~es without question.4 The Croatian Ustasha in World War II went further, terronz:mg Serbs in order to provoke a backlash that could then be used to mobilize Croats for defense against Serb retaliation. In this environment, cross-ethnic appeals are not likely to attract members of the other group. The Yugoslav Partisans in World \Var 11 are often credited ~th transeending the ethnic conflict between the Croatian Ustas~a ~nd the SerbJ~ Chetniks with an anti-Cerman, pan-Yugoslav program. In fact 1t did not work. Tlto was a Croat, but Partisan officers as well as the rank and file were virtu~ly all ~erbs th 1 al . _ and Montenegrins. Only in 1944, when Germ a~ Wl c raw. made PartiSan \lctory certain, <lid Croats begin to join the Partisans m numbers. not because they pre ferred a multi-ethn ic Yugosl~via to a Greater Croatia, but. because they preferred a h h multi-ethnic Yugoslavia to a Yugoslavia cleansed of Croatians. .' d . di .d al 1 ntity choiCe. Even t ose w o . e ds b . . b'l'zation for Ethmc war aJso shrinks scope for m V1 u mo I I 'd . . I1 Ie value on their ethnic 1 entity are pressed towar et rue to impose sanclik 1 . put tt ~vo reasons. First, extremists within each comm~~{;ethe ~/ader of the Croatd th t be ''was too tions on those who do not contribute to the cause. a di . ed on the groun . . , nee as dangerous to d tan Democratic Union m Bosma was sm1Ss enou . C l ati n is easy tot dro,e nationalist e>.1remm h uc Bosnian, too little Croat. ' one 1 0 ?roup security or ac; actually traito~ous. Such ar~;~~ ~. to assassinate Mahatma t of Rwancla in 1994. and sts to overthrow President Makanos of Cyprus C dh' m 1948, to mac;sacre near1 the whole govemmen Y an 1 to kill Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

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J(At.JfMAN N I

v o.; ........ ~ ... - .....

'-J..J..>IU L..C.

~ULU

I IONS TO ETHNIC avrL WARS

46.1

portant identity is often irnpc J~"l .J) t 11' oppo')ing ~<.co n cl an d more J rn . . . . .. group 1 1ttlc:al passivity u j r t! l I 1 nost mu rderous membe rs. Assm alHH or }!'J t spccJ K'<ry JG~ s '. vs Rwmdan Tutsis, or A7.<.: rbaijaurs Ill '..:agorno- Karal . k :c no gOO<.1 or crmau 1 . e' < d )cl 111 ._ .an A Bo n1 M us)' !I 'm cl'oolteacher recent!/, hu nente : . tl ar thought of ourselves a' Yi usli 111\ \\'e W< re Yugoo;la v~ Blsl I \ Vt never. unti 1 w w . I. . . w tcn - -' hecause we are Mu'llnn!>. I lmg'> c:l1anged. I ht tl<:fin,t . we I> egan to hI? murder~ . . son of w1o we are toda) ,, . e 11 ,..., Leen determined by our kdlers:' I

. rurther the longer the w nAic:t continues. Multi-ethnic town ~ e h01ce con tracs 11 as yet untouched by war are swamped by rad1ca1Jzed r~fugces, l~nd<:- nninin g mod. erate leaders who preach tolerance. For example, whde a poltJOll or the pre-war Serb populatjon remained in Bosnian go~em r n ent-co nlroii<J d Sarajcvo when tlr( fighting started, their nu mbers have dedmed as the gmem rnent has taken on :t more narrowly Muslim religious character over years of war, and pressure on Serhc; has increased. Where 80,000 remained in July 1993, only 30,000 were left in August 199.5. The Tutsi Rwandan Pa~otic Front (HP F ) sl:owe~t remarkable restraint during the 1994 civil war, but smce tl1 en the RPF hac; 1mpnsoned tens of thousands of genocide suspects in appalLi ng conditions, failed to prevent massacres of thousands of Hutu civilians in several incide nts, and allowe d Tutsi syuatters to seize the property of many absent H utus. What can finally eli minate identity choice altogether is fear of genocide. The hypem ationalist rhetoric used for group mohilization often includes images of the enemy group as a threat to the physical existence of th e nati on, in turn justifying unli mited violence against the ethnic enemy; this threatening discourse can usually be observed by membe rs of the target group. Even worse are actual massacres of civilians, especially when condoned by leaders of the perpe trating group, whi<:h are virtually certain to convin ce the members of the targete d group that group defense is their only option . . ..
'l_;

:Oks

f rorn. the HJfll c<:- nsus. which idtntifi ed the national'ty 0 fall but l.f) percent of 1 c~roups r:pulahon. cl1e \\fbere public ree;ords are not adequate, private ones can bt used imtead World \Var IT Yugoslav censuses relit d on church records Ah t ds pre- ,. ble demographk inteJJjgence e:an often be obtained fT~m 1~~~ anyth rec.~r at alJ re Jll d V\."al co-e mcs. ... Finally, in u~prepare encoun ters ethnicity can often be gauged bv outward earance: Tutsts are ge nerally tall and thjn, while Hutus are relativeh: short and apP 1~'-~ , Russians are generally fairer than Kazakh s. When phvsiognom : _._ h' . stoC ~ 1S am lguous, other signs_such as 1 an~uage or_ accent, s~mame, dress, posture, ritual mutilation, diet, hab~ts, occup~ hon , regwn ~r ne1ghborhood ,,.;thin urban areas. or certain possessJOn.s may g1 dues. Res1dents of Zagreb , for example, are marked ve Serbs by certam names , attendance at an Orthodox church. or possession of printed in Cyrillic. . . . Perhaps the strongest eVIdence of mtelligence reliability in ethnic conflicts is that- in dramatic contrast to ideological insurgencies- history records almost no instances of mistaken "cleansing" of co-ethnics.

:raJ

Identifying Loyalties A consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is th at in ethnic wars assessing individual loyalties is much ea')ier tJ1an in ideological conHicts. Even if some members of both groups remain unmobilized, as long as vi rtually none actively support the other group, each side can treat all co-eth nics as frie nds without risk of coddling an enemy agent and can treat all members of the other group ar.; enemies without risk of losing a recruit. Although it often requires e.fTort, each side can almost always iden ti fy memhers of its own and the other group in any territory it controls. Ethnicity can he identified by outward appearance, public or private rewrd'>, and local social lo10wledge. 111 ~eties where ethnicity is important, it is often offic:iaJJy recorded in personal ideutity do(.1Jments or in censuses. In 1994 Rwandan death squads used neighborhood target lists prepared in advance, as well as roadblocks that checked identity cards. Jn ! 98.3 ri~ inS~ Lanka, Sinhalese mobs went through mixed neighborhoo~ sele<-:~ mg Ta_mal dwe~ ~ f~r destru(.1:ion with the help of Buddrust monks carryt~ g. e:~r lists. ~le Jt might not have been possible to preclkt the Yugosl av CIVIl . . rty years 10 advance, one could have identi fled the memhers of each of the warnng

The Decisiveness ofTerritory Another consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is that population control depends wholly on territo rial control. Since each side can recruit only from its own community and only in friendly-controlled territory, incenti,es to seize areas populated bv co-eth nics are strong, as is the pressure to cleanse friendl~-controlled territo~ of enemy ethni cs by relocation to de facto concentration camps, expulsion or massacre. 'Because of the decisiveness of territorial control, military strategy in ethnic wars is very differe nt than in ideological conflic ts. u nlike ideological insurge ~ts, who often evade rather than risk battle, or a counter-imurgent government, which might forbear to attack rather than risk bombarding civilians. ethnic combatants must fight for everv piece of land. By contrast. eombat an ts m ethnic ""-ars are much ' less free to decun e unfavorable batt1 because the) cannot afford to abandon .an, es . .s 1 e y settlement to an enemy who 1 l'k 1 to .. c1 se" it bv massacre. expulsiOn, ean . 'bl destruction of homes , and poss1 y eo1 . t' omza ton. B), the time a town can be retaken, its value \-"'ill have been lost. .. tt bec"'use . e decisive Attntion ma ers ... In ethnic civil wars, mili tary operations ar cl \lfost im rtant, the side's mobilization pools are separate and can be depfl~te . m npounitv in . . smce each side's mobilization base IS li nnted t0 members o tts own co I d., es . . . th 11 's populahon centers re uc fnendly-contro lled territory, conquenng e enet > . . dl ttl ents reduces ones 0\\ll. \filitarv .. Its mobilization base while loss of fnen Yse em . . , ' . . ta nt to totah 1cton control of the entire teJ Titory at 1 ssue IStan mou

b anv remedY for severe e rue The second problem that must be overcome Y . . f thnic strife. once \io.a, . . that COnJuct 1S the secUiity dilemma. RegardJess 0 f the ongms o e l t) reaches the pomt I ence (or abuse of state power by one group that contro s 1

Security Dilemmas in Ethnic wars

th .

PART 4

CONTEMpORARY WORLD POUTICS

KAVFMANN I POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE SOLUnONS TO EnfNlC CrvtL WARS

to p rotect tlwm. ('ac:h "<>rn nrun '" ethnic ec:uritY. t) r.'l' t kc re pon lb lh or I . ntll!>t mou1 rzc to.~ f . ell\; each uroups mobili;a! ion ('Onstitute . . V1l lt>r c:ondrhons o anar . ' F. I . s .t real t f' t1 rs 140 r n,0 reasons. 1rst. t lt' nationalist rheto . r Ilreat to t he securih' o. o le seems to and o lten does indi<:<alc offcnsivone th at t b'l: cten . . . 110 ' IZ<ttion on . . . Intent accompames 1 dentin itseJf can lw se<'n 1)\' other u Cnder the e conditiOnS. group ' . . roups as a tJueat to their safe~. . c: .. . . .1 . abilin acqUired 10r d e f'en. e <::an u~u.t 11 ' . a Iso be us ~d r . Second. nu 1tar:' cap .a r, . , . . <: ror rr . oiTense. Further. ouense often has an ad' antage O\ er uerens<: ,m mter-c:omrn ttnJty c . . I a . :, conrtlct. espec1alJY ''llen settlement IJattems <11 e rnte1 -mmg c cl. because isolateu J-ets are harder to hold t11an to take. . poc The realin of the mutuaJ security thre~ts means that solut:ior~s to ~'thnic: conflicts must do mo~ than undo the causes: until or unles. tl~~ ecunty dilemma tan be reduce d oreli 1 .. 11 ated neither side can afford to demohiiJZe. 1ll
.1

t, on the tate 1, ctnno t re tvll111llllll res . iJ . [I . ts own

Demography and security Dilemmas . The severity of ethnic security dilemmas IS greatest when demography is most internlixed.' weakest when communj~ settlements are most separate. The more mixed tJ1e opposing groups. the stronger the offense _ rei at~ on to th ~ clefense; the in more separated they are, the stronuer the defense lil relatton to olfensc.6 \\'hen settlement patterns are extremely mixed, both sides are \l.Jinerable to attack not only by organized military forces but aJso by local militias or gangs from adjac-ent towns or neighborhoods. Since well-defined fronts are impossible, there is no effective means of defense against such raids. Accordingly. each side has a strong incentive at bot11 national and locallevels~to kilJ or drhe out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogeneous encla,es more practical to defend. Better, but still bad, are well-defined enclaves \Vith islands of one or both sides' popuJations behind the other's front. Each side then has an incenthe to attack to rescue its surrounded co-ethnics before they are destroyed by the enemy, as well a~ incentives to wipe out enemy islands behind its own lines, both to pre-empt rescue attempts and to eliminate possible bases for fifth columnists or guenillas. The safest pattern is a well-defined demographic front that separates nearly homogeneous regions. Such a front can be defended by organ ized milita1y forces, so populations are not at risk unless defenses are breached. At the same time the strongest motive for attack disappears, since there are few or no endangered co-ethnics behind enemy lines. Further, offensive and defensive mobilization measures are more clistinguishabJ~ wh~n po~~tions are separated than when they are mixed. Although hypernatio~t political rhetoric, as well as conventional military forces, have both offensJve and defensive uses regardless of population settlement patterns, some other fonns of ethnic mobilization do not. Local militias and ethnically based local self-governing authorities have both offensive and defensive capabilities when populations are mixed: Ethnic militias can become death squads, while IocaJ gov~mments dominated by one group can di~enfranchise minorities. When populations are separated, however, such local organizations have defensive value only.

WaT and Ethnic Unm~xing_ tuse of thl -.cc:unty dtlemma. ethnic war c . BeC auses 1111c 1Turkey. the partition oflndia. theet1 unm oong. Tl'~ war be~'een Cre<"'C:L' anc 194JS-4g . cl the rcc:en t " w between Armenia and Azerbu... . II Arab-1 raclr war. ,111 . . . ' J<UH\ ere a follow d h . ~ . ~on or expubton of mo t ()( the rninorih populatic>n h .d e Y emrgrau . ' s on eac s1 e ~t or tl liJlion lbo le ft nort 1 lern ~igeria durirw the ~ igerian c J \\' .F 11 e . 1an one . l I (' I f I . t" gr01ns. three- ourt 1s o t 1e Tamrl population of Col l\l Aar. 0 0\\11111 191)3 bo ::. . po... 1 to the predoml. om antlv Tarmj nortl1 an cl em;t o f t he 1s Iand. Bv the end 0 f 1nn 4 et I bo _ n ' 1 S h a "" on v a ut tO000 non-Serhs . remamec 111 er, -controlled areas of Bosn1 w1'th 1 ' t han 40,000 . . . . ess Serbs still m ~lu lrm- <tnd Croat-controlled re!!ions Of 600 000 S b . . . . 1. . . er s m pre-war ' Croatl<1. 111 oh,tb no m01 e than l 00.000 remam outside of Serl)-con tro11eLI eastern SJa,onia. Collapse of multi-ethnic states often causes some ethnic: unrnLX'ing e,en without w;tr. The retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans sparked movement of Muslims southward and eashvard as well as some unmix.ing of different Christian peoples in the southern Balkans. Twelve million Germans left Eastern Europe after world War ll, one and a half million behveen 1950 and 1987, and another one and a half million since 1989, essentially dissohing the Cern1an d.iaspora. Of 25 million Russians outside Russia in 1989. as manv as three to four million had aone to Russia bv the end of 1992. From 1990 to i993, 200,000 Hungarians left 0 Vojvodina. replaced by 400.000 Serb refuuees from other parts of ex-YugosJa,ia.
~

465

Ethnic Separation and Peace Once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions. ,en if an international force or an imperial conqueror were to impose peace, the conflict ,..-ould resume as soon as it left. Even if a national government were somehow re-created despite mutual suspicions, neither group could safely enbust its security to it. Continuing mutual threat also ensures perpetuation of hypemationalist propaganda, both for mobilization and because the plausibili~' of the threat posed b)' the enemy gives radical nationalists an unanswerable advantage over moderate_c; in intra-group
debates. . . . . . . ulations Ethnic separation does not guarantee peace, but 1t allows 1t. Once poP . .. . are separated both cleansing an d rescue 1mpe1ati\es disappear, war 1s no longer . . maJor mandatoty. At' the same time. any attempt to setze more tern'ton requues aal . . . conventional militarv offenstve. Thus the con lict chan ges from one of muhr ,.pre. al . .t 1 ' . . hi <7 COJl\ention tntersta e \ \ elf 11 emptive ethnic cleansing to somethmg approac nb cl t amntE'<' . I 1 tual deterren<..-e oes 110 gu M which normal deterrence dynamiCS app ~- u he robabilit\ of outbreaks, <\S that there vvill be no further violence, but 1t reduces t P ' , well as the likely aims and intensity of those that do occurd. T k""'\' stnce thejr popu. " There have been no wars among BuIga:na. Gree<..-e an urc1~ reached crisis on I . . u Iation exchanges of the 1920s. E t11ruc ' 10Iem'e on C\nnts' '' tl ' utition and pop L- 1 cl 19.-.4 1 as been zero suwe .1e P' several occasions bet\veen 1960 an f -1\l.eri ethnic con. . , d ki h . .. ion. The Armeman . , . u1 ation exchange wluch followe Tur s 10' as an Nauomo-Karabakh . V r> all H sparked by independence <.lemancls 0fthe most1 Anneru, c"'nque~t of of 1c:t ' a1 b . 1992. Anneman .v Autonomous Oblast, escalated to fuJI-sc. e war Y

.(()6

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTrCS

[(AUFMAN~ I POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIB

. 1 l. Wl'tll the land which formerly separatcd itrl'nm1 Annen i prop 1-.: tr.th tkh tor~'l l~ ' ' liet rnearly 111 members o (' eat:I1 gn)11p r<llll enerny-<.: " er, tlonr \\ith t sp1 accmen o . < ' on troll 1 ' ..:::- . d. d re lsi'le separation w1th no nunontJLs to hght over le ,1, ec t~"'mtOllt'S. create cl en I LJ ' c\umg to a ccase-nre in April 1994.

THEORIES OF ETHNIC PEACE

Those considering humanitarian intenention to encl _ethni<: civil wars should set as their goal lasting safe!:)'. ratJ1er than perfect peace. Gt,en th.e per~istence of ethnic rivaJJies, safety" is best defined as freedo~ from ~1~eats of ~~l~11C mu.rder, ex'})ro. pJiation. or expulsion for the overw~elmmg. m~JOnty of ~JVI~l;;~n~ o~ all groups. Absence of formal peace, even occaswnal teJ rOJ:sn~ or bo1.d.c.1 ski rm1 shes, would not undermine th.is, provided tJ1at the great ma.1onty of CJvihans are not at risk "Lasting" must mean that the situation remains stable indefin itely < lfter th e i nter~ vention forces leave. Truces of weeb, months, or even years do not quali.Jy as lasting safety if ethnic cleansing eventually resumes with full force.

Alternatives to Separation
Besides demographic separation, the literature on possible solutions to ethnic conllicts contains four main alternatives: suppression, reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing, and state-building.

Suppression
Many ethnic civiJ wars lead to the complete victory of one side and the forcible suppression of the other. This may reduce violence in some cases, but wilJ never be an aim of outsiders consideting humanitarian in te rvention. Further, remission of violenue may be only temporary, as the defeated group usually rebels again at any opportunity. Even the fact that ce1tain conquerors, such as the English in Scotland or the Dutch in Friesland, eventually pennitted genui.ne political assimilation after decades of suppression, does not recommend this as a re medy for endangered peoples today.

Reconstruction ofEthnic Identities

The most ambitious program to end ethnic violence would be to reconstruct ethnic identities according to the "Constructivist Model" of nationalism. Constructivists argue ~at in~vid.ual and group identities are fluid, continually being made and remade m soctal discourse. Further, these identities are man ipulable by political entrepreneurs. Violent ethnic conflicts are the resuJt of pernicious group identities created by hypernation st myth-making; many inter-group conflicts are qut'te ' ali recent, as are the ethnic identities themselves. h The ~ey is elite rivalries withi n communities in which aggressive leaders use ypehrnatio~t propaganda to gain and hold ~ower. History does not 1natterl; et 1. 1 lead er past mter-comm uruty re1 tions nave in fact been peaceful or con.fl'ctua . a . ~rs ~1 redefine, reinterpret, and invent facts to suit their arguments. includd mg ege atrocities and exaggerated or imagined threats. This process can fee

wh

on itself. a~ nalJo.naltsts use the self-fulfillin . 467 . escalate> tiH <:o11fhc:t and to Justify th e1r own g nature of their aru" p numcntc; both tics becomt~ a <:ornpctition in hype . .ower, so that intra-eo . to rnahonahst . mmumtv pol relations enter a tlesc.:ending spiral of v 1 extremiSm. and inter-<: ' . t. .. 1 . 'IO ence. ommunttv lt Jollo\\ S t 1at ethn1<: conHicts g . .1 . . enerated by th . exclus1ve I ( entitles should he reversil)l b e promotion of pem .. . . . e )' encourllmn 10di . l<.:1ous. I> adopt more e111gn. m<:lus1ve identities Le d -o g VJduals and ll'roups t . fl .1 'd . . . a erscan choos t h. ...,. o the bas1s o )roaucr 1 en hties that transce d th th . e o mo thzc suy>port on .. I I n e e ntc di .. class, or Clv1<: oya ty to the nation-sttte 1f mem bers f tb \lSton,.such a<. idcolocn., < ,.,;, 0 persuaded to adopt a larger identity, ethni<: anta onjsm e opposmg group, can be However, even if ethnic hostility can b g.. s should fade away. .. . . . e tonstll.lcted " th be I1 that v1 reasons to eve olent conHicts cannot b .. ' ere are strong . : harmony. Iclent1ty reconstruction under cond'ti e retonstll.l<.:ted'' baek to ethn1c: f. 1 ons o. mtense conA' -t 1. b impossible because onc.:e ethnic; groups are mobJ d c lC LS prona ly ' 1 ror war the , n 1 ze already proclucetl, ami will continue reproducing ,.al . .' . } Wl 'ave . r I . , soc1 mstttut10ns and 0 courses t hat remwrce t 1e1r group identity and shut 0 t h d .s'd tn u or s out own eompetina 1 en 1 es. Replacement of ethnicity by some other basis r110 r pou ea1 1c enti cation ''ti 1 n . re~Uires that ~oh ~1cal parties h~ve cross-ethnic appeal, but examples of this in the m1dst of ethmc v1 olence are vutually impossible to find . . . . ln f:ac . e\ien eth me t , tension far short of war often undermines not just political appeals across ethnk lines but. al.so appeals within a s.ingle group for cooperation with other groups. In Y ugoslav1a m the 1920s, Malaya m the 1940s, Ceylon in the 1950s, and in :\igeria in the 1950s and 1960, parties that advocated cooperation across ethnic lines proved unable to compete with strictly nationalist parties. Even if constructivists are right that the ancient past does not matter, recent history does. In tense violence creates personal experiences of fear, misery, and loss which lo<:k people into their group identity and their enemy relationship "~th the other group. Elite as well as mass opinions are affected: more than 5.000 deaths in the 1946 Calcutta liots convinced many previously optimistic Hindu and Muslim leaders that the groups could not live together. The Tutsi-controiJed government of Burunru, which had witnessed the partial genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1962-63 and survived Hutu-led coup attempts in 1965 and 1969, regarded ~he 1972 rebellion as another attempt at genocide, and responded by murdenng between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus. Fresh rounds of violence in 1988 and 1993-94 have reinforced the apocalyptic fears of both sides. . . Finally, literacy preserves atrocity memories and enhances thetr use for po~t ical mobilization. 7 The result is that atrocity histories cannot be reconstructed; \lC. ti ms can sometimes be persuade d to accept exaggerated atrocitv tales but c-annot ; be talked out of real ones. The result is that the bounds of debate are_ pennane~tl~ altered the lea1ers who used \1\forld War IT Croatian atrocities to whip up Ser '.an ' u h h nationalism in the 1980s were making use of a resource w IC Since then rem:urn always available in Serbian political discourse. . . e c1 ones vtc 1 . h d tities mto mc us1v If direct action to transform exclusiVe et ntc 1 e~ uJd c e nPace tem. r . 1 tituhons eo enrorc 1-JS J01easibJe, outside I10Wers O internatwna U1S r . d .. te leaders . tl . ts would nPrnut mo eJa . porarily in the hope that reducecl secw1 11 ea ty r

LE SOLUTIONS TO EfliNl

CCIVll WARS

468

PART 4

coNJEMPO

RARY WORLD POUTICS

f(AUFMA J'\1\ / POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE SO

, 11

econstruction of JJlOr' i en. 4n identities \A 'l. . t0 IJromote tl Je I . l. . . v Id . \\ithin eac I1 gwup . . . . to adol)t an ovenll'c 1111~ ..."n'tv may bu. c . I . ' af survw ots r , "' lll1pos persuading et tmc \\ c od of uuaranteecl saf1~ !'1 l!,hl allow mod . ffi tJy prolongec1pen o . ,. stble. a su eren f tl1e 0 t extreme h)'Pernat IOJaH~'" hack tow:t r(l . crate . . 501 1e o 1 m .s . . leaders to temper t'onlt'sms. However. thts stdlle.wes bothc51tl.s rnore . . 11 . . u pa.rate na ] n ' . . . <.!S berugn. a )eJt sh se. aJ f h 'P"rnationalislll bv radl(:al polrt1 eutre pr'"n VUI<:al I t evw o ) ~ / nerable to a er r . , k e ers have left and secu rity threats once again "'apcurs' . espec1ally after tl1e peace e P Pear more realistic.

1 1 . . or "consoc1ationaidemocracv" proposed by Aren Lljp~u1rt. 1us approach asstllnes ; I t th . .ty 15 somewhat manipulable, but not so ree y as const ructivists say tha e rue . a: r . di son however, need not result in conmct; even 1 po 1 1rnobiJization is 1hca EtJ11llC VI I ' . . .f . .zecl on etlm1c lt'nes, civil politics can be mamtame d 1 e tJ1111c e I' adhere to orgam . . . . 1tes a . -shanng bar"";11 that equ1tably protects aU gtoups. The key components are power 0 cu. . d. . . . I) joint exercise of govemmentali:>O'"~-e~; 2) prop~ttio~al .. JSb1bu.tJon of govem ment funds and jobs; 3) autonomy on ethmc 1 ssues . wh1 1f g10u~s a1 ~concentrated ter( ch, ritoriallv, may be achieved by regional federation ); and 4) a mmonty veto on issues of vital imPortance to each group . Even if powe~-shruing ea?avert ~otential ethnic c :onJlicts or dampen mild ones, our concern here J.S whether tt can bn.ng peace under the conditions of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilization that are likely to motivate intetvention. The answer is no. The indispensable componen t of any power-sharing deal is a plausible minority veto, one which the strongest side will accep t and which the weaker side believes that the stronger will respect. Traditions of stronger loyalties to the state than to parochial groups and histories of inter- ethni c compromise could provide reason for confidence, but in a civil war these will have been destroyed, if they were ever present, by the fighting itself and accompanying ethnic mobilization. OnJy a balance of power among the competi ng groups can provide a "hard" veto- one which the majority must respect. Regional concentrati on of populations could partially substitute for balanced powe r if the minority group can credibly threaten to secede if its veto is overridden. In any situation wher e humanitarian intetvention might be considered, however, these conditions too are unlikely to be ~et. Interventions are likely to be aimed at saving a weak group that canno t defend ttself; b~anced sides do not need defense. Dem ographic separation is also unlikely. beca~~e if th~ populations were already separated, the ethnic cleansing and related atroc1ties whiCh are most likely to provoke intervention wouJd not be occuning. . The core reason why powe r-sharing cannot resolve ethni c civil wars is that it is mh~rently .volun.taristic; it requires conscious decisions by elites to cooperate to avOid. ethnic stnfe. Unde r conditions of hypem ationalist mobilization and real secu~ty threats, group leaders are unlikely to be receptive to compromise, and ~ven ~they are, they cannot aet without being discre dited and replaced by harderline nvals.

Power-Sharing d I J pn'nt for ciVJC . r)eace 1Tl mu1n-ctl1mc. s ates lS power t ". . best-d I -shu1.ng The eve ope ) ue d .. . . c

. "' ' .cc il anc:e lent tl1<L" and rm:nase V10icnce-e specttll llltng1 1it Ilia) achl<tllv worsen "" 1 . LL I . ' y agamst dvilia . . : ,,:cunty nate the tl tnc\t.!l pos< by pockets ol the opposin aro\1 . n~as both side~; climi'U f11 rt IH:r, OlH.:e tltcre has hten heavy figl t_g n hp 1 ~ thetr midst. 1 . ~"c:h othe r far too lll t lC:1 to entr11 st any -n 1 , lltc>r'1 mg, t e stdes l'kt::1 to tlistrus t ty t ' MC 1 y e< . ' o a central r potentiall~ be used aga1~s_t them. . . . govtrnment that could The final approach 1 mternational impositio f . s . n o power-shanng 1 1 (>t:ClJl)ving the c:ou nt1y to eocm.:e both sitl<s irlt<>. .. . I , 1 ct<:<.:eptmg t l<; aorw \IC ' rtquires revent in tcr-ethn ic.: violtnce untiJ it can be imple , t _ Th .~ emcnt and to 1 [> 1 11 11 . l } c eu. e 111tcrven h ever. cannol I) IlK t w stronger side to upholtl the agrt' ,. . trs, ow1 the mtcrve nti " 3.. . ement a ter forces leave. . . . Tl1e 1 ntisl1 <jtd 1 111I)OSC power-shlring. .I . on . ' a<; a <:OnUlt.iOn lor (\ )Jio intlepenclence, 1 1 broke tlown almost immetliatel) Tl G k , .1 . t mt t incensecl 1 wI1at t I1c.:y saw as Turki.sh C)nriot abuse of tl1e 1c .ree C\-pnots 1y r . lr mmontv veto.' im )h ovenode the veto and operatetl the 0 11ovemment in violation of th . _I . cl e constitution Similarly, w1 iJ e at m ependenc:e in 1948 the Sri Lankan c:onsttu... b 1 ' . . . . . I u011 . annet1 reH g10us 01: communal ~1sc:nmmation , the Sinhal ese rnajority promptlv disenfranchised half of the Tamil s on the grounds that they were actuallv Indians. and increasingly discliminated against Tamils in education, govemme~t employment. and other areas.
I .

ing tl1t ,, . a~ c r -;idc, hlocka cl ing tltc t 469 ;U 1 < s ronger or p l'all ...1' ar 1 IJ\. dire<:! nnbt 1! I lll t~'tventioll. When hot! 1 'itucs rcll' . ydisanninath t '>trnnge n 'in" till' Ill l'O..,b )I ll no profit , they WiJ\tl , . . < 17.C t1 further fia\ t lat .r I> o ' I .1 . cgotiate an .1 r ,..., 1 m!; '"'ll ,v<"r ;tlthmlg; 1 1 popu lcttiOIIS are still int, . 'g eernunt. This can\) 1 rO ' . .

LUTIONS TO cn-u... .._ nNlC CfVTL WARS

State-Building
Gerald Helm an and Steven Ratner argue that states in which government breakdown. economic f~1ilure, and internal ,;olence imperil their own citizens and threaten neighboti ng states can be res<:ued by international "consen<ltorship" to administer critical government functions until the country can govern itself following a free and fair election. Ideally. the failed state would volunt:uily delegate specified functions to an international executor, although in extreme C<t'>es invohing masshe violations of hurnan rights or the prospect of large-sca.le warfare, the international community could act even without an invitation. As with imposing powe r-sharing. this requires occupying the co.untry (~d ~1a~ require conqu ering it), coercing all sides to accep t a democratic (.'()nstitution. enforcing peace until elections can be held, and admin.ister!n g the economy and the elections. Conse 1 vatorship thus requjres even more finesse than enforced powe r-sharing, and probably more miUtary risk_s. . .. . f>_ .. _ Helm an and Hatne r cite the UN intervenhon 111 Cambodia m 199... 93 to cJe ... c c , 'enat " ale a sare environme nt tor f'ree e1 s as cons < or"'hip's best succ-ess. However, ection . was an t11e govemance ofCmbodia not an ethmc confl1 ct tIus ideological war o,er " h . . over disempowe ring minorities or d!Smembeun g. the counhv Bv contrast. t e . . . ' b Lildi growth of the V .S.-U N mission in Somc.tlia fro m farnme reUef to sh.l~e- rf: tB ~~ , was a failure, and no one has been so boId as to prop<)Se consen'ators hp or osru.t or Rwanda. . . ' ffi . vel . and cheaply stop an ethnic Even if conservators.hi11 could rap,dl~ . e ectJ > h' Id be aained . f . lections not mg wou t:7 CJvt1 war, rebuiJd institutions, and ensure Jee e

to ad?<>uld out.,ide intervention make power-sharing work? One approach would be ~ust the balance ofpower between the warring sides to a "hurting stalemate" by

.ro

P ART 4

MPORARY WORLD POUTICS CONTE

.

J<AUFMANN I P<JSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE SO

!ABLE J

LU TIONS TO ETH

torship wou ld only be H rnorc .,.

,.0 wc:tcd all parliC'!> 11 11 r a nd sal(: ty 1I . . 11 ctonl 11 l< l lc o~tlc.:om< ccsstrv. T hus, . Sl'l'IPIJ' l'l 1 "' ('onll ic:ls <.:' l.tl ,\ unIl'~s . 111 1 rid str 11 1 ne 1 w C>nst:rv I1anug wot power-s exnensive way to r<' a<'h tlw ~t:r l it npas!-.e. a.

N CIV WARS IC IL

ETII!\IC CIVIL WARS RESOLVED Dates

19):

47 L

194 4- 1997

combatants

- Military victory (
A.

Deaths (OOOs)

Outcome

Ethnic Separation . .. of a particular confi ic:t , onc:e eonllntntil i<s an 11101.1 .. Re<tardl<'SS o f t 1 causes , lC . . "' -. . . . )J lt.(:d l'l. ~ J h of rn 11 tual scwnty th1 e.tls p~t vc nh both dc rnohiJ . . for vJOicnct'. t1 rc:a '/ 1c . - ~1 I . tz.~tron . f ]l)mcl1lationaJist d JSCOIJI'St'. ( HI!>. aSitllg p<a<.;( I'CC . and dc-escaIatron o 1 . 1 . rnanv eases lh]lllrtl. . .h, dilemma. The most eflicta am 111 ve 1 rcmova I of l I1 secun.1 e . . , . . . .... on} way to do t1.s IS tO .SCI>Jr~tC' the ethmc g10ups. f hc lliOI'I llllC liS<; the vrnkn<.;'r-. , L] 1e 11 . < ' ~ .k I t s ~llat separation will be the only opllon. more l, e y 1 1. ' . . The exact threshold re mains an open. qt~f>Stlc~n. The. dcd uetive logi<.: ol' tht: proble m suggests that the critical varicl~JJ~ IS l ~ar fo r S IIIV 1VH I. O r~(;( a majority o r either group comes t~ belie-ve th<lt the. kill~g .~ J nm~~(~'~'!)Ht~u1 ls ol th~i~ mvn group is not collsidcred a cn mc by the othe t, they canno t accept .llly_govelll tng arrangement that could be captured by the enemy gro11p a11d usl'cl agarnst the m. The most persuasive source of such belie fs is the nr assacrc of civilians, hut it is not clear that there is a specific number of in cidents or to tal d c;at hs beyond whi<.: h ethnic reconci liation bccomes impossible. Mo re important is li te rxte nt to whith wide sections of the attacking group seem to cond one the ki ll ings, and can b<: observed doing so by members of the target group. In this situa tion the attacks are likely to be seen as reA ecting not just the bloodthirsti ness a particular regime or terrorist faction, but the prefe rence of the opposing g roup as a who le, which 1neans that no promise of non-repetition can be believed. Testing this proposition directly requires bette r J at;] on the attitudes of threatened populations during and after ethnic wars than we now have. N ext best is aggregate analysis of the patterns of ends of ethnk wars, supple me nted by invcstigation of individual cases as deeply a~ the data permits. I make a start at such an analysis below.

K vs. Iran urds Karens. others vs. Myanmar Chtnese vs Mali:lya Tibetans vs. China Hmong vs. Laos K atangans vs. Congo P apuans vs. Indonesia B vs. Rhodesta lacks lbos vs. Nigeria Hmong vs. Thailand Palestinians vs. Jordan T imorese vs. Indonesia Aceh vs. Indonesia Tigreans, others vs. Ethiopta U ighurs etc. vs. China Sikhs vs. India B ouganvilleans vs. Papua Tutsis vs. Rwanda Shiites vs. Iraq
B. De facto

45-SOs 4548-60 51 -89 59-72 60-64 64-86 65-80 67- 70 67-80 70 74-82 75-80s 75-91 80
84

40 400

15
lOO

50 100 19

so
2000 .30 15 200 15 .600
2

or

88 90-94 91

25 1 750 35

Suppressed LargE:IJ >oppressed ' sporadiC VJOit:-nce Suppre>sed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels VJCtonous Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels victorious Suporessed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels vtctonous Suppressed

or de jure partition ( 16): 44-50s 45-52 46-47 47-49 61 -91 63- 74 71 888890-92 9291 91-95 92-95 9294-97 150 40 .500 20 250 .10 1000 15 350 1
2

U krainians vs. USSR Lithuanians vs. USSR Muslims vs. Sikhs, H indus (India) Jews vs. Arabs (Palestine) Eritreans vs. Ethiopia Turks vs. Cyprus Bengalis vs. Pakistan Armenians vs. Azerbaijan Somali clans S outh Ossetians R ussians vs. Moldova Slovenia vs. Yugoslavra Croatia vs. Yugoslavia Serbs vs B osnia Abkhazians vs. Georgia Chechnyans vs. Russia

How Ethnic Wars Have Ended

At least 46 significant ethnic civil wars have e ndecJ since 1944.1-i Of the total, nineteen. ~ere ended by the military victmy of one side, sixteen by de j twe or de facto partitr~n, and two have bee n suppressed by military occ upatio n by a third pHrty. Only nr ~~ ethnic civil wars have been e nded by a negotiate d agreeme nt that did not partition the country. (See Table 1.) !he.d~ta suppo..rt the argume nt that separation of g roups is the key to ending ~thmc CIVIl wars. Every case in which the state was preserved by agreement m~oJved a regionally concentrated minority, and in eve 1y case but one the solution remforced th~ ethnic role in politics by allowing region ally co ncent rated mi n~rities to ~n.trol their own destinies th rough autonomy for the regions whe re they fonn a ma,on~ of the population. South Africa is a partial exception , si nce the main element of the agreement was majority rule, although eve n in this case the powers reserved to th" ()roVJnces ouer some . rr ' autonomy to whites, coJo re cls, an d Zulus.

1 30 150 15 .20

Suppressed; later Independent \991 Suppressed; later independent 199 i Partition 1947 Partition 1948 Independent 1993 De facto partition Independent 1971 De facro partition De facto partttton tn N.; ongoing tn S De facto partiuon De tacr.o partttton Independent 1991 Independent 199 1 De facto partttlon De facto partruon. sporadiC vto!ence De facro partr1ion

PART 4

CONTEMPU.KJU~t

., ..... -

J<AL.li-M A ~ , t'V::>~ ltlLt:: ANo IMPos SIBLE SOLUTIONS TO~:">"

~C~o,~n~ba~t~a~nt~s-----------~------- ----- ----- - --C. Conflic t suppressed by ongotn 60Kurds vs. Iraq 75 _90 Lebanese Civil War

Deaths ~AB~LE~I~~c:co~n~t~in~ue~d~)-~~=-----~;&;00\~~;;:. , Dates

~==-=----Outcome
D f.

pesign in ~

Settlements

""HNIC CIVJL

WARs

473

. g Jrd party military occup d ion (2) :

215 120
. e acto partition Nominal power sh . anng d e facto Partition .

D. Regional Autonomy Agreements (8): 52-75 Nagas vs. India 59-80S Basques vs. Spain 67-89 Tripuras vs. India 72-87 Moros vs. Philippines 73-77 Baluchis vs. Pakistan 75-89 Chittagong hill peoples vs.
Bangladesh Miskitos vs. Nicaragua Mayas vs. Guatemala 81-88 61-97

13
1

13 50

.5
24
1

Autonomy 1972 Autonomy 1980 Autonomy 1972 Limited autonomy 1990 Limited autonomy Limited autonomy 1989 Autonomy 1990 Limited autonomy 1997

166

E. Power-sharing Agreements (I):

Blacks vs. South Africa 60s-93 20 Modified majority rule

There is not a single case where non-ethnic civil politics were create d or restored by reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing coalitions, or state-building. Further, deaths in these cases average roughly five times lower than in the wars which ended in either suppression or partition: slightl y more than 30,000, compared to about 175,000. This lends support to the proposition that the more extreme the violence, the less the chances for any form of reconciliation. Finally, it should be noted that all eight of the cases resolved through autonomy involve groups that were largely demographically separated even at the beginning of the conflict, which may help explain why there were fewer deaths.

INTERVENTION TO RESOLVE ETHNIC CIVIL WARS

International inteiVentions that seek to ensu re lasting safety for populations endangered by ethnic war-w hether by the United Nations, by major powers with global reach, or b~ regional power s-mus t be guided by two principles. First, s_e~em ents must aun at physically separating the warring communities and establishing a bal~ce of relat~ve strength that makes it unprofitable for either s~~e to ~mpt .to reVISe the t~rntorial settlement. Second, although economic or milit~ ass~ce may suffice m some cases, direct miJHary inte1vention will be necessal) when aid to the weaker side would create a window of oppor tunity for the stronger, or when there is an imm diat e . e need to stop ongoing genocide.

wi V nless. ontsJd(rs are .1 lli11g to nrovi t le permm, t l . . L' cJn of an c l IT;H.: <.:JvJ war rccluires ." . . < en sc<.:uity O'llar t t1 separation r I ,..,~ an ecs stahl e criti<.;ctl ,mable IS den1ographv t . ~ t 1c grot 1 into .1 . . e T(;solups Tl1 . . " no S<werevnty p . . u<. 1 hit r e} Jaration ll'<l' ( s Jn<;Cnti ves for ethni<.: <.: I .. . ,..,.. ohtkal partitio ens h ~ons. . s . .. eansmg und . d; n \\'lt out eth111 . fit creal<:S JH.w mmonhes. Conversely .1 lunge it altually. . < I . u<' mogr~phit: tn(;rea<;es th(.:m HidS even wit 1011t separate sovereignt)' . ltJ ~ separation dan1T\l'>ns tl . a H>ugn L- e )I er t Ile pro~pe<;ts for prcserv;ng. . the more .mtenc;<:; the previa1n1c:C!coning, the smn I .. .1 I . cl smg e stat , , r PartJtlo n \\1t 10ut et 1mc: sep<lration . t , C\en 1 k>Oc;ely f<:-dtustnght.1 . m<:reases <.:onfl' t b aries of sovcregn su<.:<.;essur states m ty pro ._ d. . I<.: ecausc, while ra <::u ..I bollT 1 . . o r t I'le lllHJOnty group in each VJuc c.:1cnsihl f. . . tuvulnerabJllt)' t , . e onts tl1at retlu(;e the .. . . s ate, stdy-behmu . . .. l. S1gn1.R pletely eli.'POs~c <.;ant 1rreden ta are both a <:all to their m~nontits art tomdanger to thc1r hosts. They create incentives t ethnJ(; homeland and a r mount rescue tl operations I>eJOre t1 situation solidifi es. Cree<.o 's 1e :e 1920 . . . 0 r e ll1l(; deanl>ing tined in this way, while the 1947 decision to pa t't Pmal va-;~n ofTurkeywa-; jus. l , .. war in advance of Imp1 ementation and the Lnclus ton f Mestme gen erated a (;J\'J\ . . . IOn rn-ma . ,vitJ1in l nwa has helped <.:ause three wars Intemati o us1 .. JOn'tv KaslHmr ' 1 recogmtion of Croatian . . cl d . ona and Bosman m epen en<.:e d'd more to <:ause than to t S b' . . 1 . . ] .. wa1 betwee n Armem. . c Azerbc11Jan ha.<; the same sou s.op. er tan mvas1011 . The a an cl . . . . 1 ., . . k . . . rce, a~ o concerns over the mte1nat1ona s~cw Lty :1s s_ of the several Russmn cliasporas. Inter-e thmc secunty dilemmas can be nearly or wholly elimn t d th . cli . . . 1 a e w1 out partition 1f th~ee co~ tions are met: Ftrst, there must be enough demograpruc: separation that ethmc regtons do not themselves <.:ontain mili.tarilysignificant minorities. Second, there must be enough regional self-defense capability that abrogating the autonomv of any region wouJd he more costly than any possible mothe for doing so. Third. I~ autonomy must be so complete that minority groups can protect their key interests even lacking any influence at tl1e national level. Even after an ethnic war, a single state <.:ouJd offer some advantages, not least of which are the economic benefits of a mmmon market. However, potential interven ers should recognize that groups that control distin<.:t territories can insist on the de facto pa1tition, and often will. While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require totaJ ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irrede ntist rescue operations. Before the Krajina offen he, for e>.<lmple. President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia is said to have thought that the 12 percent Serb minority in Crm~tia was too large. but that half as many would b~ toler~ble. The 173,000 Arabs remaining in Israel by 1951 were too few and too disorgamzed to be seen as a serious threat . .. rtant in particular, conc:entraGeographic custtibution of minonties l.S aIso . unpo ( . . l h. 01il . a tions near clisrmted borders or astJide strateg~c commurucations constitute >Ot a: t It 1 lik-eldo sparkconruc . ltary vulnerabilitv and an irredentist opportwuty, ;;mu so are . . b . be at . " . h . ll 'ts \1usllm maJontv, as en IS not surprising that India's portion of Kas lnJJ, ~1 11 I . h m1ues today. . 1115 thc center of three interstate wars and an ongomg u1vencr w uc C'OO o illi MusUms who while there has been no international conflict o,er the hun.c. ~:ttl~niolenre. ~ d Y ve isperse d tJu-oughout most of the rest of' 1ndi a. ill td relatt,e1 u e '
t

ked

4i4

PART 4

C01 ._n 'f

~ rl'f:' A11J(JJ<IV\l

H V'....... ,' - -

. . I . ter-!TTOLIP houndarie. sholld . ~ l\\ 1\ along the b \\ he>n.' po_ rb e.h'" . ~rs alld mountain range~ . ' '>floukl also be,,.. est i _, t 'n~un sue ,\:s 11' . t I(' I t'll~ ' t ~. ' . e t Jossible nwnn ing c>:r ' ','lt\'l' fronts. "" s1 A 10rt . . 'bl t0 allo"' t1 1 ,l\1 t 1e w '-' J~.l. "' <: . dl 11 eiahbor i also impo rtant. h ll 1 tr.H le and for po cce;<;s 'b t0 tl 1e et or to a 1 nen \ c 11 1 __ . ~ssor state ~usenals hou c 11. um raged , by aid tsstt] le mthhtn ru rst.-mce. 5 ucc<: r . . . tl e tron<Ter. to rocus o n <1 .Hn ..: n .t , armaments 5 oh 1e l weaker or am:trons on l !l o k J . . uc . d - ~'I .. cl . 10urcraft missil es and roe et-;.\\ h Le> <t\'Old rnD' instr1.1m as ton,a r ~mu en an a1 ' . . . butzkm ee1 attacks posstble. sue l1 a. t.m k" fi ght<>r-bombers ents cl that cou]d mak 'e o b ff" . 'Ie artillen. Tll e e conditions \\'ould make u cyu<.>nt o ensl\es exc:ee , an1 . mour u ng v e.'--penshe and like!~ to fail.

Intervention Strategy
The le\el of international action required to resoh'e an ethn ic war \\ill depend on the militarY situation on the ground. If there L an exi~ti ng tale mate along <.lefensible lines..the international community should simpl~, recognize and strenuthen it. pro\iding transportation. protection. ~d rese ttlement assi. tanc:e .for refugees. However, where one side has the capacity to uo on the offensl\e agamst the other, intervention will be necessary. Interventions should therefore almost alwa~-s be on beha lf of the weaker side: the stronuer needs no defense . .\loreo\er. unle s the inte rnational communitY can . agree on a clear aggressor and a clear \ictim. there is no monUor political case for intenention. If both sides have behaved so badly that there is little to choose between them. intervention should not and probably ,,ilJ not be undertaken.9 Almost no one in the \Vest. for instance. has advocated assistinu eithe r side in the Croatian-Serb l'Onfuct.H1 \ Vhile tJ1e interventio n itself could be carrie d out by any willing actors, U~ sponsorship is hiuhly desirable, most of all to head off possible ext ernal aid to the group identified as the aggressor. The three available tools are sanctions, military aid, and direc t military inter\ention. Economic sanctions ha,e limited Je,erage against combatants in ethnic wars, who often see their tenitoriaJ security requi reme nts as absolute .... \ \11ether military aid to the client can achieve an acceptable te nitorial outcome depends on the population balance between the sides, the local geography. and tl1e organizational cohesion of the client group . ... The ... prob lem witJ1 '"arms length" aid is that it cannot prevent etlmic aggressors from killing mem bers of the client group in tenitories from which they expect to have to retre at. Aid also does not restrain pos~ble atrocities by the client group if their military fortunes impro,e. . I~ the client is too weak to achieve a viable separation with mate rial aid alo~e, or~ either or both sides cannot be trusted to abide by promises of non-retribu~on ~amst enemy civilians, the intern ational comm unity must designate a separation li~e ~d ~eploy an intervention force to take physical contr ol of the territmy on tlle client s side of th~ line. \Ve might call this approach "con quer and divide." The separation campaign is waged as a conventional military operation. T~e larger the forces committed the bette r, both to minimize intervenors ' casual~es and to shorten the campaign by threatening the opponent with overwheLn:rn! defeat. Although some argue that any intervention force woul d become mired Ill
~

neans th< the rnain pitfalls to fore . J) dtfferent nature of eth . ' .h rgn mJ Jtarv . t . 11!C: confl.j t ttencies are e1t er weak er or absent ~ . , m en:enbons in ideolnai-' . <: o I l . I ost rob elll~ ;..~re 11111<: 1 S!mp er. since Jo aJty rmportant the .mtervenors'-o\.41 rnsur. . int Jj P .. Y . tntelligen . 1 e 1gen<.-e easier: 0 uts1tle rs c:an safelv a'isume t} ce 1s )Oth less importa d r t1 her ' nt and those o. 1e ot are enemies E1at members 0 f the red group are Fri an r outsrders a]J . ds ' cl h . ven l c-annot tell the groups aen locals can. an t e lovaltv of guides ProVJ.clecl b art ' .' Y the I I aJI . P a result. the marn mtelbgence task shifts f . ~<.-a ) can be counted on. As r . forces. a tas k01 W 1 . h major power mil't rom assessmg lo:alties to 1 ' 11C . OCating enem\' 1 anes . On t 1 grouncl, the intervenors would bare verv eaPable. 1e . and uradu alh- advance to car)ture the enti egm at one end of the target rP.oinn o . . re target territo . . - e-r ous front the entrre tJme. It is not necessary t . ry, mamtammg a contintJfriendl)' ground forces need never cross theod~ ~~qu;r th~ whole country: indeed. are dri\e n out of each loealitv civilians of t1 gn ed lmt. After enemy forces . d '' 1e aroup h0 . behind are mtem e , to be exchanged after the enemv ethnic o Tb "' remam . . . . war. removes the enem\''s local base. preventing countennsuraenc) probl 1sfr support .. . I Id b db o ems om ansma. Enemv ci\ilrans s 10u e protecte . \'close supenision of client t . action as . .0 roops m well as b . foreign control of intemees. \ The final concern is possible massacres of chilians oft11e li t . . c en group m temtory not ) et captured or be) ond the planned separation line. Some of this must ~ e.>.pected..since ongoing atrocities are t11e most likeh-impetus for outside m t . ti . . l th . . en en on, tl1e question 1s w 1e er mtervention actually increases the risk of attacks on chilians. A major advantage of a powerful ground presence is that opponent beha\ior can be coerced by threatening to advance t11e separation line in n>taliation for anv atrocities. Once the military campaign is complete and refugees ha\e been re;ettled, further reconstruction and military aid may be needed to help the client achieve a \iable economy and self-d efense capability before t11e inten:enors can depart The ease of exit will depend on the regional geography and balance of power. Bosnia has sufficient population and skills to be made economical!~ and militarily \iable. prmided that access to the outside world through Croatia is maintained. Although the weakness of the Turkish Republic of ~orth em c~'PTUS has required a pennanent Turkish garrison, the almost equal weakness of the Creek Cypriots allows the ganison to be small , cheap, and inacti\e. li.S. Operation Pro\i~e.Comfo~ helps secure the Kurclish encla\e in northern Iraq by prohibiting Iraqr arr operation: as well as by threatenul u air strikes ae1runs t an Iraqi ground in\'asion of the regton. 0 0 . . . . urds This mterventio n has no easv eXIt, however. Sllce the 1raqt K are landlocked . . ' . h. . and threatened b)' Turkey wluc rs wagmg a \\ar . ainst its 0 ,m Kurdish mmonh~ ag ' . . ] rkev as well as Iraq, a task Real security for the Kurds might requtre partitJOmng u , ' no outsid e actor is willing to contemplate.

l(J\lJFl\1AN~ ' POSSLBLE AND IMPoss IBLE SOLlJTIONS TO ~.. . ..., rmlC CIVU. WARS Vietna111-1 h<. qu agm ire, the fundamentall ' .

_ 47.,

OBJECTIONS TO ETHNIC SEPARATION AND PARI f'l ION

. ,ltion as poUcy for reso}\mg ethnic There are five important obtections toe c sepan 1 tiO'n exchanges cause J a ' ... conflicts: that it encourages splintenng 0f st~t~~ that .popuintemational ones. that to r human suffering, that it simpIy transonns c1vil wars m

. .

thni .

476

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

i<AUfMAN~; I POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSJB

rurnp states \VI'11 not

. . nd t1Jat in the enJ. it c!\ be vrr11 ' a J e ' '

' '14 to resolve cth .

n1<.;

antagonisrns. . . . 1 rgani7.-ations, westem le : .r rd Sl'holars p nost .ntemattona o , opul Among I . . e anathema. They conlrad, c I ri~hed westem ' a. I ges md partitiOn ar Vutucs oon exc 1an '. . 1 on the intemational lega1 101 IT 1 state sovcreignh., r a1 nteCTraoon tramp e ll . .,, and o SOCl r o-1 , I' . tllat have been condemnet )\ r ' >\t of the world ( . t a ticu ar po 1c1es . c:.v sugges P '. ..1 ,..,.;n of Cyprus). The integnh of .st, tc<; a11d their bnrl ~ 1i k ulaterm pa u o11 .r ' uen; IS ur eys Lll lt principle whiJe self-deternurmtion lakes second pia . t suall)' seen as a paramour ' . . . <.:c. n u . . ng lives mav reqULre rgJlonng statc-t:cntcreu legal n ethnrc wars 1 1oweve1 savr , 1 cl I I orms. . 1 ' . The legm costs of etl1111c sepa n<1tion must be compare lo I H', rrtn r<Ul conseque nccs, , ,., . ot111mmediatean d long tem1 if the warnng gJOups ell e not. ~cp.lrcltccl. ru r)arar)l1 rase . b . vVmston Cl1ure1u. sep'""non is t11e worst solution, ex<.:ept for all the others . u c:u" .

. n.riees. tl 1 'lll<lllllllg transfers . 477 . --one rndlion . ..,rried oul 1:1 ,11 1 organ1zc<.l and plann .1 ' Ov<:r 60 r)erccnt of tl t< ' Cu wav th le; total 1 1 A nlatc d c...rilid!lm is that trmsf ' ~ vntually no lo~ses -wtr( . ' ers rer:{UJ re th . . oncentrallc 11 <.:w11ps for civi lians ofth e mtervcnors to t)p L (; . e opposin th . erat< e fact be carried out. 1lowcvcr. this is saf<:r th th g e OJ<.; groups until t r o . an e alte . r ran\ers <.:ln local aJk or ,I 11 owll1g the war to run 't ma rves of admini'itr ti I 'h ' s <:ourse A . I a on )y t <' interne<::~ dcpcnd on planlling and resources. . s Wtt I transfers, tire risks to the
se

. .

LE SOLUTIONS TO ETH
NJC CrvTL WARS

Partition Encourages Splintering of States

If international interventions for ethnic separation encou rage s~ce~sion attempts elsewhere, they could increase rather than decrease global ethn1c v1olence. However, this is unlikely, because government use of force to suppress them makes almost all secession attempts extremely costJy; only groups that see no viable alternative try. What intervention can do. is redu~e loss oflife w~1ere .states are breaking up anyway. An e.xpectation that the mtemationaJ commumty \VIU never intervene, however, encourages repression of minorities, as in Turkey or the Sudan, and wars of ethnic conquest, as by Serbia.

Population Transfers Cause Suffering

Separation of inte1111ingled ethnic groups necessarily involves significant refugee Rows, usually in both directions. Population transfers during ethnic conflicts have often led to much suffering, so an obvious question is whether foreign intervention to relocate populations would only increase suffering. In fact, however, the biggest cause of suffering in population exchanges is spontaneous refugee movement. Planned populati.on transfers are much safer. When ethnic conflicts turn violent, they generate spontan~us refugee movements as people flee from intense fighting or are kicked out by netghbo~, marauding gangs, or a conquering army. Spontaneous refugees freq_u~ntly su~er ~ect attack by hostile civilians or armed forces. They often leave preC1pita~ely, wtth madequate money, transport, or food supplies, and before re~ef can be orgaruzed. They make vulnerable targets for banditry and plunder and are often so needy as to be likely perpetrators also. Planned population exchang,es can address all of these risks by fu . th prepanng re gee relief and security operations in advance. 1 and ~ ~ ~ 947 lndia-Pakistan exchange, nearly the entire movement of between 12 d ~ lion.people took place in a few months. The British were surptised by clle speed wtth wluch this movement took place and were not ready to control, support. an ' stag protect the refugees. E stimates of deaths go as high as one million. In t 1 first f h 1e h ~~ odst epopulation exchanges among Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in the I920s. f unure o thousands of fu ' d ban ditry and e re gees moved spontaneously and many died ue to '. f xposure. When after 1925 the League of Nations ueployed capable relie

Post-sepuralroll wars are possible, motivat"d . h . . . fears 1f' orw SJC.l<.: s11spccts t I1e othe:r of reVlSe .eJ. t er bv reva Iusm or by security . I ' ne IOilLSt p ans Tl r ' eost of sueI1 wars, IH>wever m11 st be com . d e requency and hutnan . I I pare to t 1 like! ' . . le separatll1g. W J<.:Jt t 1e alternative is interco ) <.:onsequcnccs of not . mmuna1s1 aughte r, separatton 1s the onlv . . . defensible cI10rc.:e. , In fact the record of hventieth-centurv etl . . . . . . 1 11 ' lnJe; partitions 1s faJrl .1 T. h tion 0'1 Ire an<. lets produced no interstate VI I . . al h ) goou. e parti. o ence l ou h len<.:e continues in demographically m d N rtl g mter<.'Omrnunal vioJxe l o lem Ireland 1 u. . d ki have fought two wars since partition one in 1gc 15 h .. alnl a.an Pa stan ' u; over et nrc y rnrxe<.l Kasl 1 . while the :;econd in 1971 resulted not from ln<.lo-Pakis~ . , . . "1- . mlr. . . li m re I1grous. conA1ct lJut from ethnic con.Bict be"llanr state nv<wv or HmduMus . (" ' . ) 'ki . .. " . ~'\ een Pa alIS. Incl'. mtervention 1.esolved the conflict b\ enabt . VI est .1 stanrs and Beng r,lll tl cl , mg 1e muepen ence of Banglaclesh. These \vars have been much less dangerous. espe<.T y to Clvilian~. than a11 . . . . . the polihcc~ ~md poss1ble physrcal extinction that .vtuslims feared if the subcontinent were not dh11de<.l. The worst post-partition history is probablv that of the Arab-Israeli co~~t. Eve~ h~~:~ civilian deaths would almost certainly h~ve been higher without partition. It 1 dlfficult even to imagine any alternative; the British c:ould not and s would not stay, and neither side would share power or submit to rule bv the other.
1

separation Merely Substitutes lntem t' . a Ional for Civil Wars

Rump States Will Not Be Viable

Many analysts of eth nic conflict question the economic: and military viability of partitioned states. History, however, records no examples of ethnic: partitions which failed for e<.:onomic reasons. In any case, intervenors have subst<UJtial influence over econorni(' out<.:omes: They can determine partition lines, guarantee trade. access an <.I, if necessc,uy, provide sigruficant aid in relation to the economic sizes ol likely can<.li<.lates. Peace itself also enhcmces recovery prospects. Thus the more imp01tant issue is militaiy \iability, particularly sinc.:t' interventions \\~ll most often be in f~tvor of the weaker side. If the cuent has economic: strength comparable to the opponent, it can provide tor its own defense. If it does not, the intervenors will have to provide militaty aid and possibly a security guarantee.. . EnsurintT the client's securitv wiJll>e made easier by the opponents scar<:tt)~ ~fl . . n . 1 . ill options for revision. First, anv' large-scale conventiona1 attack 15 J'krlr to. . , because t 1 intervenors ,.vi ll have drawn tl bord . f'0 r 1mximum defens1bilit\ .. " 1e 1e ers cl c: rth and ensured that the client is better an ned I r necessary, the\' Call .)ell I U l ' er ts . n . I oiTensives IS w1 1 1lat ug < SJstance through ai r stlikes. Breaking up corl\en Oll<l te<.:hnology air power <.loes best.

~i8

PART 4

. RARY WORLD POUTICS CONTEMPO

. ( I

f(AVfMJI.' 't'

. . f aJI guerrilla part te~ Stl t '> ll Over a period . econd, inliltratJon o .smt become ''fuzzy... and .. , ttt,llly to break cl of . . . own IcI cause boundanes o f some obse1vers ot. h oc:. . hut 1t shoulu not b time. con . 1 , n:tior concern o .. . e Till 1 >een cl ' ~ !:IS k I at least some CIVI 1 Id '\ .... <;upport, house r d. I . lv wor w1ere . , 'ee lnfiltranon can on. r. th 1 separation h O\\ C\c 1~ ..m m flltrato rs would I ' uc cJ tl ~ IJas A1ter e ' . )e and ht e . I guem . oion where no one wdl hdp tlt e tll: instead > 11 . . letel)' 1 1 reo!Ost'l e ,, 11 entenng a comp . te . tLIJv with authorities agaimt them. The worst .. c 11 1 . r on tl 1e 1n 'and cooperaorist in filtration has cost lht>,. Imt never comes <:I <:ct!~e m onn t . b blv Israel w 1 !ere en .I I . ose ts pro a " . I, . t , territorial integlity. Rete:ui<ltor~ capa )ilitics could a] to tllreatemng t le sta e s I b I. . . .so stoo sue 1 e l<l\1 01. allow tJw client to dampen. evel1

.OSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE s OlUTIONS TO ETHNIC CrVJL WARS

'''I

r,

Partition Does Not Resolve Ethnic Hatreds .s . . s n ''ll)'ones power to resolve ethnic hatreds once there l!as It 1 not c1 th<l t I't 1 1 "' ea1 . . .. . been large-scale violence, especially m:nders of ~lvllmns . In the long :un, however,
reduced, the I~lausibility of bypernationali~t appe<lls 111<l)~ eventually decline. Certainly ethnic hostility cannot be. re~uced without ser~arat1on. A.s J~ng as ei~h.er side fears even intennittently. that 1t vnU be attacked b) th e othe1, past atrocJtles and old h~treds can easily be aroused. If, however, it becomes and re mains implausible that the other group could ever seriously endanger the nation, hypemationalist drum-beating may fall on deafer and deafer ears. The only stronger measure would be to attempt a thorough re -engineering of the involved groups' political and social systems, comparable to the rehabilitation of Germany after World War IT. The costs would be steep, since this would require conquering the country and occupying it for a long time, possi bly for decades. The apparent benignj{ication of Germany suggests that, if the international community is prepared to go this far, this approach could succeed. . separat1011 may !Jell) reduce inter-ethmc antagon1sm; once real set:unty threats are

CONCLUSION
Humanitarian intervention to establish lasting safety for peoples endangered by ethnic civil wars is feasible, but only if the international community is prepared to recognize that some shattered states cannot be restored, and that population transfers are sometimes necessary. .. .

~l~mately we have a responsibility to be honest with ourselves as well as witll

the VICtims of ethnic wars all over the world. The world's major powers must decide whether they will be willing to spend any of their own soldiers' lives to save strangers, or whether they will continue to offer false h opes to endangered peoples.

NOTES
J Ethnic wars involve 0 . d l (rr.. k1sh . rgaruze arge-scale violence whether by regular forces 1 ur or Jraq1 ope t' ' l s

ra IOns agrunst the Kurds) or highly mobilized civilian popu aoon

or the P l .. . . fl' . I a estin,an intlijin I } f d ean!lliH! ~ o rls )y rncrnbers of' one etL . ~a . A requent asptct . .. tl . . rmrc group t 1 . . IS (' unc anotlwr I 0111 a certarn area by means h o e llnrnate the po 1 . suc as disc:ri . . pu atron of expulsunl .md llaal.sa<:re. F'or proposals . mmation. expropriation t, . on mana{lln11 ctl . . . error. levels ol 1'1 Illllt' rno 1>I 1r7.atJon and violew S o " 101<: nvalries involvin I .. . , . . . -.e, Ste tephen v E , .. g ower em e n~~= I TC\Cnting War Ill the Forme s . an \era, Managing theE t r OvJct Em i .. S a~ t992). 361-3'32; Tcd Hopf. "Managing Soviet o . P r~, ecurity Studie~ 3 {Spring ' LSmtegration ADemand r B-havioral Hegun<>:.. I1tI emat umnl Secunty 17, 1 (Summer 1992 _:_ IOr 2. An ethnic: group (or nation) is <:ommonJv cl fi d ), 44-tv. P0 ,tedly. ~har<' <:nltural. or ra<;ial characteristi~ ne as. a body of individuals who pur. 1 1 . 1 . cs, espec.1ally comm ; al ongu1. w 1rc: 1 ul~tinglllsh them from me b f on ancestry or territo1 0 0 ther groups. Sec Max Weber (Cuenthc>r .Hoth. and Claus Wittich e..Js ) E ~ ers . ' ~X . conom.y anr,1 Societ . A ')ntlive Socwlogy, Vol. l (Berkeley Calif . UnJve .ty fC ,,. Y n Outline of Inter} . . ' .. rsJ o a1 uomia Pr 196! ) 39.5; Anthony D. Sm1th, Na.tional ldentitty (Reno U . . f ess. 8 . pp. 389. mvers1tyo 14. 21. Opposing communities in ethnic dvil cona,.t I Id. NevadaPre~s. 199l)PP . uh.. s identity, bon1 and citizenship of the state They do 10 t meconcllable VISIOns of t he ers, k . . no see to control a stat ,h identJ ty all Sl(les accept, but rather to redefine or divid th . lf e ~ ose . 1 H. b e e state rtse By contrast ideolog1<:a con 1cts may e defined as those in which all d h .. ' t I. SI es s are a corrunon \1S1on of commun1ty memners 11p, a common preference for politi al f h . . I c organlz.ation o t e community as a smg estate, and a common sense of the leaitimate '- d f h e> . ooun anes o t at state. The opposrn~ ~1des see~ control of the state, not its division or destnJCtion. It follows that some relt?~ous conA1cts-those between confessions which see themselves as separate commumtJes, as between Catholics and Protestants in Northern lreland-are best catego~ized with ethnic con~icts, while others-over interpretation of a shared religion, e.g., disputes over the soc1al roles of Islam in Iran, Algeria, and Egypt-should be considered ideological contests. On religious differences as ethnic di'isions. see Arend Lijphart, 'The Power-Sharing Approach: in Joseph V. Montville. ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Mrtltiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1990), pp. 491-509, at 491. 3. While the discussion below delineates ideal types, mi.xed cases occur. The key distinction is the extent to which mobilization appeals are ba~ed on race or confession (ethnk) rather tl1an on political, economic, or social ideals (ideological). During the Cold War a number of Third World ethnic conflicts were misidentified by the superpowers :LS ideological struggles because local groups stressed ideology to gain outside support. ln Angola the MPLA drew their supp01t from the coastal Kimbundu tribe. the FNLJ\ from the Bankongo in the north (and across the border in Zaire), and UNLTA from. Q\imbundu, Chokwc, and Ngangela in the interior of tl1e south. The fonner were a1.ded by the Soviets and the latter two. at various times, by both the United States and China. 4. Reported by Andrej Gustincieof Reuters, cited in Misha Clenny, T~c Fall of ~'ug~lavia (New Y ork: Penguin 1992), p. 166. Another tactic used by e.xtremtsts to radic:alv.e .<-'O IS ' eth n1cs to accuse the other s1de of cnmes sun ilar t o tb eJr own ln jW)' 1992 cumdst r Iarge-scale rape of Bosm<m Mus l' women bY Serb 1orces Bosnian Serb accused Mus1m . 1 1 of impregnating kidnapped b ' ums Ser women m order to create a new race ofjarussary so . diers. Hoy Gutman, A Witness to Get1ocide (New York Macmtllan,l993). P x. .. \! . . 5 M1'kiea Babic quoted in Chris Hedges, ~u Turns Saraie\o Awa\' from Europe. " ew vvar ~ . York Times (July 28, 1995). . i.fi eo1fiic:t particularlv 1 6. In<:reased geographic intennoong of etllnic groups oft~n m}e~ es lncr~asing nun;if the state is too weak or too biased to assure t~le sec~n! ~s~e:;~~tinian relations. A bers of Jev.rish settlers in the \t'l est Bank ~a~ t~ e~e ded the Ni erian civil war was major reason for the failure of t11e negotiatiOns that prece g
n

(the

i11 l~

. I ttllliiVe m I~ '\Wauda

4 19

lf'ttlftc the 'al l'l\ q,' ll\ i n~ Ill tltt liOrtl I . 11 lt:tcll'r~ to )!W '\ I H'l 11 till' in.lhilit~ 0 r JIC111H I I Ni<~l't'ia: :\ c :(ll/1111~/ ..,,11, If '' ll ll~ton , D.C. : .t)11. Jl n'CId 1). ' clswt . t< .. "' !) l'C'j..'l (:PO . J!JR2). p. 55. . I I .. 1 1 \V(Ir!cl \Vnr 11. tlu ( 'r.tli .rtt Uslasha rl'l'll:o.tlt I I '( ' Jl()(ft'l 'l I li S. I I I I . Etlm k coni Ir:ttunt:. 1: ' I ...111sc tlw' \\t'l'l' .L''II" '''' to ""''a natio nal l (I S , I . t.~ t'<>IIW . '1111 'I('('<'P' ,clne:lh't I 11 1s . . . fb lt t' S illite rate pr.i'. lllh \\t'll' < lur("I 'X('Wtltd to for . . I lent of n 1 lglfln . w . . . I I . ~vt sdOHSlii 'SS ua t'fH'IH , I In IOl-12 Bos nu11 1 S11 1 ct " '' l ' t ltanstrs . 1 11111 . . til'' PIIC't' tonv r1 t l , IJratl '' 1 11 J tlwir St'l' l' . . Tntsi 1 na~sal'rt:- of 11 11111' in burun tli in 1972 1' 11 1 t ltcltt .. nu lnlfcI t Itt' ntos t < 1 'd ~I us fills. .,,, , ' ('l'll as f>Oi cnti:t I t'l I tllll' Ic<H 1 and nftcrw-trtl trs 1 11 1 t d l>t't 'Jl 1 w 1 t' 10 , s ctntr:tl\'t I O llt't tl ttl I. I I ... I of 11 utns to s<cOJHllll) S\'hoo ls.. . . . . . . . IH' ~O't' llllllt ,' tl rest ndCIIa<.tntssllll whidt slopp ed lt lltporanl~ I Ht l Ill whH I .. I 'I "lrs h th<. sant Tl . . t. I J )('S 11()1 Ill(' llf I ( 1\ I \\. li. ~~~to .I t . I f' tltlitll' owr tlw s:nllt' 11':.111':. (l'.~.. 13llt'lllld t or S~tdan ) or lln tntliS h tl'l' I'('SII Illl'l tg (' I r ll . I (.'(Ill ' . ' . , (' IllS fl'tVC' IW<' Il si~r wd H 1101 11 ) llllj) l'IIH 'lllcd as u l'tlt i~ it ("\Sl'~ In wht(lt Jll'llt'<' agrt c 111 A 1) . . .' JJ l t' Ins vs Jsrat'l. Oviln hllll< 1 v:.. t~go a " wnt 111 ~ (1'.1'.. a 1 s 1111. .. . . 1 .:, .1 11 dvocltcs 111 inh'IVt'lllto ll 111 1 .:I It:IV<. ('"'P Imst'l..Cd Strh JOSIH q Thi~ is w 1 t 1 s1rong<:l\' tl' . ' . . . p >o d lO illt ('rvcntioll illsisl l>n th<' li H)ral ('<tlll.valcn et of. the; two ~ t:1'111ll'S. w1 1 I 1 )I (' t()St: (I I s, r:: . "''rim e ofW tr " ~'ne )ork Timr.'l ( Apn'I 2.>. 199,1): Char ft.s (' ~icIl'~. ;\ nt IIOlW I .( '\\'1:;, v ' ' ' . . _ , ' ' Boycl. "Mak;,;1! Pea(e with tlw Guilt y." hmign AJ{mrs. t-1 , 5 (St'p h. miH'r/Octoh<r
I
0 0 (

.a so

PART 4

y WORLD POUTICS R CONTfMPORA

Nation- B~ilding: UN surpasses u.s. on Learning Curve

)AMES DOBBINS

I \;;19.5). pp. 2. -0it 2 . . . . 10 Further altllltpts :ltl'V!.'ll hunJed ittll'I'VCllltO II rarlly nchH '\'t' thl'll' ~oals , lcildtn g rithtr to rwurl; ('()ntpil'tP p1tssivit)'. :lS in th1 cast of UNP HOFO I~ In 13osn ia. or cvcntuaJI)' Io < >pen 00111 f>,1t again!'t 011t or all sick-s . AI worst. j>():lce-kecpt~tg dTorts umy actually pro loug fi~!tting. ...

Since Workl \Nar Il. the United Nations (UN ) mcl tl , u d S . . . . . ( e I <I1st m<:tl ve sty1 o1 nahcm-huildin11 derived fro n tl n1te tates have dcvelopN . . . es 1 . lelr very drrercnt 11 at urcs and <:a paIHbtw s. The Unttc d Nations i<; ., tcr ~.,,. 11 . . 1 tl0 na1 o rg<'n17.atiun . . "' 11 1 11 eulirclv.dcpe.nd('nt. on 1 mt"m.bers for the wherewithal to 'or1'uct t' h 'Id' ts . ' " u na 100- u1 mg. TI U111 t<.d Stat es. IS tlw world s only supe rpower, commanding abundant re ourc<>s .JC? of its own and havmg ae;cess to thost-' of many othe r nations and institutions. W<:' at th : HAND ~orp orati on deRn e nation-huilc~ng as "the use of armed lclrcc in the af t('rmath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy." We have examined eight instan<:cs in which the United Nations took the lead in ))UCh encleavors and ci~ht in whic h the United Slates took the lead. UN operations have almost always be<n umle rmanncd and under-reso urceJ , hl'<.:ausl' 111cm ber st<ltes are rarely willing to comm it the manpower or the money any prudent milita1 wmm ande r would desire. As a result. smc.ill ~md weak UN forces are y routinely deployed into what they hope. on the basis of be. t-ease assumptions. "~11 prove to he post-conflict situations. Whe re such assumptions have proven Ul fou nded . U fo r<:c>s have had to be reinforced. withdrawn. or, in extre me' cases, rescued . Neve rtheless, UN natio n-building missions huv<"' often met with success. Througho ut the 1990s, the United States adopted the opposite approach. basing its plans on worst-<:ase assumptions and rrlying on overwhelming force to quick ly establish a stable environment and to dctl.r resistance from forming. B) interv eni ng in nu mbe rs and with capabilities that discouraged sign ifkan t resistaHce, U.S.-led c:oalitions achieved progresshely higher lenls of success throughout the 1990s, l'rom Somalia to Haiti to Bosni< to Kosovo. l But iu sizing its stabilization op<'rations in Al~h mtistan . and lraq. the. new Ame rieau leade rship abandoned the strategy of U\'t'tw hdm mg preponder.uwe.: known as the Powt>ll doctrine, ill favor of' t1 sma11 r t pnn f' or "low pronlc lt! lOO fo rce posture that had char acte tizcd UN O tions. ln both Af~hanistttn. and 1raq. lX'ra the origi nal Amc rican -lcd forces proved tu1ahle to establish a secure en~~nme nt.' S In l)Ot I1 counhi es the 1 U.. f'ore<' 1. "'s }w lnd to tx SJmuficanth nutm cv" ' 11 ' l:>. ased , but coun try has . 1 f IIH.:re in neither tlus yet suffi 1t 0 est111 h adPnuate le\'e so lt'<'<. ' ) 15 ~ , ,
. . ~ o" \ L) . . J:unr Oobbms. "Nntion-Bu ilc..llll)!: UN Surpa.;;.~e~ ll . on uanmtg. cun\', nn- """1Rl't'lo"ll'. \'ol. 29. 1 with ntmll~ll.lll N 1 1 1 L I~ A"' 0 Comontllon 1 rprcx u-~~ ' l ~ {Sptiu~ 200.5). p ,. 24- 2\:l. C:op\'ri~lt t 21Xl5 ~~ :' ' .,
' J) Corpo ~t ion inlht fun11a t

of PAN

; 1ht Clturt\ll('t' Ctn((r. f<xtbt)() k \1:\ C .(IJl\11~

481

-tS2

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY

WORlD 1-'UU Ill.:!

l)UJ.H.:

o.~'

... . . ...... UVlL UIJ'Ill l:

UN SUR.P

ASSES U.S, ON I t:Anu

Ccn puh!Jl' :'t'C'III1~ ll . , ll'lSSiVe l en~f. Wit 1 -;l'l :( !1 r<:t'J l ( of the eJ t' .I I .. I c . ' 1 rt:phtceu l~ orgclll .. 't.cnll1C' ontcl I wco Jilill o h'Olll dk~t:<l I 'I'll,~ procluc:tion.In 1..I re ti'.< 1 10 ' d ICSttC n . . rout ltJ:v:; f2:' o~s 011 j)I'OC UC .I y l>e orr)h in g 111l'o <- !.1 d.1r!<.n <.tvl. l c:on llic:t taq . ' 111 . . . U S occupalJOII 111<t ... J'('$1St<IIIC<' ((,),I ' -'I r h ut ap[Jroach to natJI)tl ! n:Jd11 1~ IS 111Uc:h Jv-'tl . -roo . " er Tl te 1 , pro flle ' smcu k .pn than to U .$.-style p <>''ng '<t('t t'llfo rc<'! tnen t ~rl . 1 UN tvle r>eace 'cept Slllt<.'c to -s. b. 1.... to coll1J)en satc to some degnc. at least, l'or its "J . ic 1 1N f 11 _ htS an a 1 1" ' ' ' ru Umte~. t a H~ns : .. . et o~.ver'' attlibutes of' loc~tl imp mita li t) and international >ower defi ctt Wit, SOli P 1 . . I . d St tes does not have sueI1 ac1 t ttge:, 111 SJtuatJ.ons \.Vh"rc van I r acy The U11lte t1 .... c e~ '':'c .. Jr. rty t the con Aict bein gten ninn.te<I orwIwre the U nited States ,.. 0 Ame ncat tse tSc:lp<~ . . . . 11 I .. t 'thout an mternatwnaI m.mc] ,. ,ttt has felt cornpe ec to ,w WJ . . . , .. . . . . . cl S t 11 be well tch1seJ to Jesume supe rs1zmg .tts natwn-bUJiding The U mte ta es "'0u u < . . d 1 . t11e 51 .tiJ-footptint apr1roach to the U llltc d ='-lat.ions. At the sune trussrons an to eave 11( Um ecl St ttes wouJd be well ach~sed to emulate the track record of' the 't time t1 1e < . ' d Nat:i'OilS m Ill1r !e111e11 t:i'ng lessons leam ed fmm pnor operations. 1 Urute . . .
.

. . 1

. Mcrhalllslan, Icduced -

lcn~ l" ol' in

.,

t~

~11'-lG CURVE

iolcnce have b

100 :

il

-------(Germany --------3;;~~
Eastern Slavonia + Kosovo Sierra + Jap Leone + an Congo ++ Columbia Haiti
~

+ East Timor+ ~ Iraq Bosnia + Namibia

~ Afghanistan

+ Mozambique

+ El Salvador
0.01
I

UN-Ied cases
U.S.Ie<.l cases

10

100 Annual per-capita assistance in 2000 U S d 11 . . o ars

1000

INPUTS AND OUTPUTS

The UN exverience with nation-building bega? in the newly inde pendent Congo in 1960. Since then, the instances in which UN forces have been used fo r nationbuilding have a.ll occurred since the end of the Cold \Var in 1989, to inc:lude Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastem Slavonia (in Croatia), Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The U.S. experience began with the occupations of Wes t Gennany and Japan in 1945; continued in Soma.Ua, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo after 1989; and expanded to Afgbarustan and Iraq in this decade. Nation-building can be measured in tenns of inputs (suc h as manpower, money, and time) and outputs (such as casualties, peace, econom ic growth, and democratization). Success depends not just on the inputs, of cou rse, but also on the wisdom with which the resources are employed and on the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes being foste red. Nevertheless, success depends in some mea5ure on the quantity of international military and police personn el, the quantity of external economic: assistance, and the ti rne ove r which they are app lied. In terms of personnel, military force levels for UN missions ranged from nearly 20,000 troops deployed in the Congo and 16,000 in Cambod ia to fewe r than 5,000 in Namibia and El Salvador. UN missions have norm ally fielded much smaller continge nts than Ametican-led operatjons. In abso lute numbers , the .largest UN contingent was smallertl1an the smallest U.S. contingent. However, t11e UN ~issions in Eastern Slavonia and East Timor did deploy sizable military forces relative to the local popuJations (see Figure 1). In terms of money, UN-Ied operations have tended to be less well supported with int~ rnational economic assistance than U.S. ope rations, in both abso lute and pr~portional terms. This reflects the greater access of the Uni ted States to donor ass~ance funds, including its own, and to those of the international financial jnsti.tuhons ~0 ~hich it belongs. In effect, the United States can always ens ure the level ~f funding It deems necessary. The United Nations seldom can. Many UN operalions are consec1 l uent Ypoor1 supported with ec.onomic assistance. y

UN Cases of Nation-Buildino Have Involved Fewer T h ~ roops an d/or Less Money Per Cap1 ta T an U.S. Cases (Except m Some Extremely small Societies, Like East Timor)
FIGURE 1
source: Figure I is rr~m James Dobbins et al., .The UN's. Role in Notion-Building: From The Congo 10 Iraq, p. 244. Copyrtght 2005 RAND Corporatton. Repnnted by permission of RAND corporation .

In terms of time, UN forces have tended to remain in post-conflict countries for shorter periods than have U.S. forces. In tl1e early 1990s, both U~- and U.S.-Ied operations tendeu to be terminated rather quickly, often immediately follO\.\ing the completion of an initial democratic election and the inauguration of a new government. As experie nce vv:ith nati on-building grew, both the United Nations and tJ1e United States recognized that reconciliation and democratization could require more than a single election. By the end of the decade, both U~- and U.S.-Ied operations had become more extended. .. For each of the eight UN and eight U.S. missions, v.:e measured outpu.ts, including casualties suffered, peace sustained, economic growth, and democrat.lzation. Cas ualties suffered are a good measure of the difficulties encountered m a nat10n-building operation. Mtsstons Wl'tl1 h' h casuaJn.rlevels have been amonu tl1e tg ; ~ least successful. highest number of casua1ties, Among the UN-led cases the Congo had the . . , f h . ti0 n The Cam bodian operareflecting the peace enforcement nature o t e opera. d h . . f th 0 pulation 1 t e seconcl-highest la t1on, lightly manned as a proportion o e P
r

'

casualty level, followed by Sierra Leone. . . 1993 the United States Following the loss of 18 U.S. soIdiers 111 Somalial m t of the decade. But h took grea t precautions to avoid casualties thr~ug t 1afte res tl f the Sept. 11, . . di . . h d t.n the em1a 1 o Amenca.n sensitivity to casualties rnl.lllS e . d St tes abandoned its strategv 2001 , terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Umf~ e. ti al-building operations. Sigof deploYing ovenvhelm ing force at the out et 0 hna. 01 and Iraq than in Bosnia fi / . Afg arustan . 0 1 cantly lower force-to -pOJJulation ratios m '"' h .ltv .db h hi<T er casmu , levels There ha,e or Kosovo have been accompame Y mur o

4.Sl

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

DOB

1 NATION-BUILDING

UN

htt'll IIHH'<' easualtics an lOng U.S.

nation-building operations

stu~hed gotn~

f~rces. iT~

A(gl:an ..s .tn than in all Am~:li<: ~)atk to I J4.5, .wd I hC' <.:U!>nulty levels ~11

SURPASSES U.S. ON lEARN

lr:tq ar<' t<'ll tirnes higher than trt Afghalllstan . . . n Peace is the most essential prodnct of nation-htn,ldlll,._ \\ Tthout peace. " 'tl economic ~ Q'rowth nor democratjzation is possible. \\ lth il' ,,u. some lev"l er' iE'r ]{ '- Ot; nomiC' growth becomes almost inedtable. am c e111ocral1zation at k~Lo;t . tx). ... . . . . .. .. l . I ( poss1hle Among the 16 SOCietieS studJeclllJem.un at pE"acc ~(}( cl~. <lllC f) do not (see Tahll .

and Cam bc' nmain demo<.:ratic . INGCURVE 485 . some of(;() us.-led ea'-' ' ( ,cnnany and )apa11 .are clearly d more than others A urse . . dernocratJt 'lt st 111 under varving degrees of int emO<:ratic Bosn1a and K . mong the ; wd HaH i ar t not<Ierno<.:ratic an-1 Ar b . emationa) ad . . osovo are ' ' c u 'g anJst mmistrat' . cratic structures m exceptionally d'ffi . I . an and Iraq are e k:i ICJn; Somalia ' cu t C:trcumstances. e ng to build demo-

Of t.hc 8 Ul'<-led <:<t<;es, 7 are at peace. Of the 8 U.. -led

ea<;('-;,

4 an. atrwa. . 4 are cc, I).

UN 6, UNITED STATES 4
UN-led nation-building missions tencl to be sm U h . to take place m less demanding circum stances a er t an American 0 peratJons . to b fore more numerous, to have more Clrcumspe tl cl more frequent and t1 ' . ' e {' . 1ereleast among the., missions studied-to . ~ Y . . . . enJoy a lugJler etmed objectives, an cl-at efforts. By contrast, U.S.-led nation-b ']cl success rate than us 1 .1 .. . . ". . . Ul mg 1 las taken I . . . .- eu cu cu mstanc:es, 1eqUJ reel larger force s an cl strong P ace 111 more demand . d mg economic support, espoused more ambiti b' ~~ man ates, received more missions studied-fallen short of the ob -~~~vo Jech~es, and-at least among the Nations. J es mOJe often than has the United There are three explanations for the b tt UN 1 rufferent selection of cases would produc e d~~ ' success rate. The first is that a . . . ea merent result Th d. h U.S. cases are mtnns1cally more difficult. The third is th e s~con .IS t at the done a better job of learning from its mi t k th at the Uruted ations has 1 Table 2). s a es an 1as the United States (see . ~hroughout ~e 1990s, ~he United States became steadily better at nationbuilding. The Hru.tlan operation was better manaaed than Somali B . b tJ H ti d K b o a. osma etter 1an d .ru , an osovo etter than Bosnia The us. 1 cwve was not sus earnmg ~ne. mto th: curre~t ? ecade. The administration that took office in 2001 initiallv sdamed nation-bwlding as au unsuitable activity for U.S. forces. \\ 11en co~ ~e~e? to engage in such missions, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. tbe admintstlation sought to break with the strategies and institutional responses that had been honed throughout the 1990s to deal with these challenges. The United Nations has largely avoided the institutional discontinuWes that have marred U.S. performance. Current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was U~dersecretary-General for Peacekeeping and head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia throughout the first half of the 1990s, when UN nation-building began to burgeon. T he United States and other member govemments chose him for_his current post largely on the basis of his demonstrated skills in managing the UN peacekeeping portfolio. Some of his closest associates from that period mored up with him to the UN front office while others remain in the UN Department of Pe~cekeeping Operations. As a result, an increasingly e:\:perienced cadre of inter5 national civil setvants has 1 UN nation-building missions over the past 1 years. un Similarly, many UN peacekeeping operations in the field are headed and staffed by veterans of earlier operations. . d Whereas the United Nations has gradually built up a cadre of expenence h llation-builc.lers the United States starts each mission more or less f~m scra~c d. Tl u . ' . 1f it were 1ts first an le mted States tends to staff each new operation as

not--or not vet-at peace. These ~ategorizations are necess<.uily prodsional. parti<-ularlv for the . . B . s . ongolllg operations in Afghanist~n and Iraq. Peace Ill o:<;lll<l. H'ITa ~<'011<.' , East Timor, and Kosovo has been sustamed. but so far onl~ With the ongomg J 1r<.stncc (J r mter. national peacekeepers. The key determinan t of economic grovvth see m~ to lw not Hw level o1 eco. . . nomic: assistance bu_t rather the prese~ce of 1~1temattonal pPaceke<pe rs and their success ~~~ suppressmg renewed co11~1Ct. As dl~strat~d hy. .. . Iraq, security is a prereqws1te for growth, and money JS no subst1tute for adequate secmity for . . .I . . ces. ndeed, secunty \VIt 1011t economJc assts t ance . mucI1 more 1 ts ikcly to SJ)U r . _ I eco nom1c gro\o\-t I1 tl1an IS economic assJs t ance W1tl10ut secunty. . The final output is democratization. Table l characterizes each of the 16 societie~ as democrat~c or _not based on ratings from Freedom House and the Poli IV Project at the Umvers1ty of Maryland. Among the UN -led cases, all but the

C~go

TABLE I PEACE AND DEMOCRACY ARE THE MOST lMPORTANT MEASURES OF SUCCESS

Country or Territory Congo Namibia El Salvador Cambodia Mozambique Eastern Slav,onia Sierra L eone East Timor Germany Japan Somalia Haiti Bosnia' Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq
Ongoing operation.
UN-Ied cases us-led cases Sa>J.Jrce: The UN'S R 1 . o e In Nation-Building, 2005.

At Peace

Democratic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
?
?

No Yes Yes 'es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No

Pi\RT 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

_ _ ._

!::TA~B~LE ~T~H~E:_U~N ~2~ ~H_:IS~TO~R~Y_::O::_F::A:; -B _UI___G N TIO:_N_ _ LD IN _

Country or . Years
Lead t s noops AC Peak

DOl ., S I NATION-BUilDING: UN SURPASSES . U.S. ON lEARNING CURV TABLE 2 (( .mtinued)

487

~Tc::"'r~n:to:rY:__:_=~--_:_-~-:-:-==.===~-----:-------Congo
196o-1964 19.828

or

1essons

Assessment P artially succes$f:.JI costly. and controversral. UN ensured decolon1zation and territonal integrity but not democracy.

~a rned

country or rerritory

.:::--~P~e~a~k~~~~a~d~------------~----------Years Troops Actors Lessons

Assessment

UN-Ied

Namibia

1989-1990 4,493

UN-Ied

Successful. UN helped ensure peace, democratic development, and economic growth.

Successful. UN negotiated lasting peace settlement and transition to democracy after 12 -year civil war. Cambodia Partially successful. 1991-1993 15,991 UN-Ied Democratization UN organized elections, requires long-term verified withdrawal engagement. of foreign troops, and ended large-scale civil war. But democracy did not take hold. Mozambique 1992- 1994 6,576 UN-Ied Mostly successful. Cooperation of Transition to neighboring states is independence was critical to success. peaceful and Incorporation of democratic. insurgent groups into But negative economic political process is key growth. to democratic transition. Eastern 1995-1998 8,248 UN-Ied Successful. UN can successfully Slavonia Well-resourced conduct small peace enforcement missions operation and clear with support from end state contributed to peaceful and major powers. democratic transition. S ierra 199815,255 UN-Ied, Initially unsuccessful, Lack of support from Leone present parallel then much major power can UK improved. undermine UN E Salvador l
1991-1996 4,948

UN-Ied

Money and manpower demands almost always exceed supply. Controversial missions leave legacies of "risk aversion. " Compliant neighbors a competen t government. and a clear end state can contribute to successful outcome. UN participation in settlement negotiations can facilitate smooth transition .

----------------------~~~-~~~~----~Le~a~r:ne~d~-----

Source: The UN's Role in Nation-Building, 2005.

destined to be its last. Service in such missions has never been e d d . . .. . . r gar e as career enhancmg fo r Amencan mihtary or Foreign Service officers. Recruitment is often a problem , terms tend to be short, and few individual s volunteer for more than one mission. The UN success rate among the missions studied- seven out of eight societies left peaceful , six out of eight left democratic-substantiates the ,iew that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating confli<:ts, ensuring against their recurrence, and promoting democra cy. The sharp overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world over the past decade also points to the efficacy of nation-building. During the 1990s, deaths from armed conflict were averagi ng over 200,000 per year. Most were in Africa. In 2003, the last year for which figures exist, that number bad fallen to 27,000, less than 15 percent of the previous average. Despite the daily dosage of horrific violence displayed in Iraq and Afghanis tan, the world has not become a more violent place '"ithin the past decade. Rather, the reverse is true. International peacekeeping and nationbuilding have contributed to this decline in deaths from armed conflicts (see Figure 2). The cost of UN nation-building tends to look quite modest compared with the cost of larger and more demanding U.S.-led opemtions. At present. the ~nit~d States is spending some $4.5 billion per month to support its military operations 10 Iraq. This is more than the United Nations spends to run all 17 of its c.ur:eut peacekeeping missions for a year. This is not to suggest that the United 1\a~ons . . . . . it Cou ld perform the U.S. misston m Iraq mme cheaply, or perform . at all. It ISnot l to underlin e that tl1ere are 17 other places where the United States ~vtll probab Y f have to intervene because UN troops are doing so at a tiny fraction of the cost 0 U.S.-led operations.

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

OOB' 'IS I NATION-BUILDING: UN SURPASs

ES U.S. ON LEARNING cun.n-

50
40

~------==~----------~
Number of ongoing civil wars

- --

Number of ongoing ~N peacekeepmg operal!ons

- 30
Ill

;p
0
D

~ > Cl)

20

::J

,
10
,

,,

, ...... ;,,',

',

~~~-:'-------1~ ~--: 9~60 19~7~0----~19~8~----~,9~9~0----~00~0~ 0 2~ 1945

. . . .. . .

.. ---'

,,,

~--

,_,

,.-

__ ___ ,,

FIGURE 2 The Number of civil wars Has Declined Si nee I he Ea rly 1990s as the Number
. 'rorn)ames o Fearon and oavtd D. Llllltn, .Ncolruslecshlp and the Problem Source F1gure 2 . adapred " tS . . of weak Slates.'' lntcmacional Security. Vol. 28. No. 4 (Spnng 2004), pp. ~-43, F1?ure I. ) 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard college and the Massachusells lnsltlute ot Technology. Used by permission of The MIT Press.

of UN operations Has Grown

HJGHLYINTERDE PENDENT
Despite the Unit(>d Nations signi ficant achievements in the field of nation-building, the organization continues to exhibit wealmesses that decades of cx 11e1ience have yet to overcome. Most UN missions cue undermanned and tmderfunded. UN-Ied miJibuy forces are often sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic hest-case a-;sumpUons. Troop quality is uneven and has even gotten worse, a.s 111any rich Western nations have followed V.S. practice and bec.:ome less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operatio.11s. Police and civil personnel are always of mixed mmpetenc.:e. All c:ompontuts of the missi<m anive late; police and civil admiuistrators arrive even more slowly than soldiers. These same weaknesses have been exhibited in the U.S.-Icu operation in Iraq. There. it was an American-led stabilization force that was deployed on tl1e basis of unrealistic, best-cao;e a.c;sumptions and American troops that arrived in inadequate numbers and had to be progressively reinforced as new, unanticipated challenges emerged. There, it was the quality of the U.S.-Ied coalition's militmy contingents that proved distinctly variable, as bas been their wilHngness to take orders and risks and to ac<:ept casualties. There, it was American civil administrators wl10 were late to arrive, of mixed competence, and not available in adequate numbers. These we~esses thus appear to be endernie to nation~building rathe r than unique to the Uruted Nations. or any mtervention tJ1e
'
r .

. I.. 11 eworl-. I~ !' .most nation-building misstons. Tl1e UN fra r,u . k . el)' low c:o~t <,I ncture, a comparatively h'gl . mewor o!Tcrs a <:omp~ ..... tlv . . I I success rate . d h .... a.1 l'k ' an t e gre3test degree of 11 wnwtjonal kg1hmac:y. Other possible options 1 uch a.c; coa1 1l!ons Iecl I)y tI1e United States tl are J e1 to be e'ther more e>..'l'V>nsive E 'v (5 U th ~ pable ( ucI1 as coa1 . 1hons led by the Afri,_, le .uropean Umon, or x :'ATO) or less c.. . . . '-Cln OJOn, e Org . . r 1 States. or tit< Assoc1atJc~n of Southeast Asian Nations). ' an zation o American Tlte 1110r<' Pxpens1ve options are best su1 d t . . ons entry or cmp Ioy more.: l I1an 20,000 men, which e far rn1ss1 that rer1u1~e ~arced so to has b limit for UN opNutions. The less capable optio ~end the eiTective upper ns te there is a regi on a 11)U t not a global consensus for a<:ti are su1 1 to miss'IOns w1 lere . .. ... on or le simply cl oes nul care enougl1 to foot 25 percent of the bill. woe re t1 United State s Although tl1e UN and U.S. styles of nation-buiJdiJ1g are cl' ti . 1 bl h I1Iy 1 1"1tcrcIependent. I t a rare O[)eration in which b th15 nguLna r , t ey are ilso h1g lS . < b . . o are not 1nvo1 1 Both ve< . UN and U.S. nation- uddmg efforts presently stand at n" . h' t 1 1 n . ' ...,u IS O Hg 1S. ' 1e nt United Nat1 currently has about 60 000 troo1 cleploved m 1-r eo t Th . ons )s .. . , un nes. 1s 1s a modest expeditioncuy comm1tm~nt in comparison with that of the United States, hut it exceeLls that of any other nat1on or combination of nations. Demand for uN-Ied peacekeeping op_erations n~vertheless f~ exceeds the available supply, particularly in sub-Saharan Afnca. Amencan anned forces, the world's most powerfuL also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such missions. A decade ago, in the wake of UN and U.S. setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia. nation-building became a term of opprobrium, leading a significant segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept. Ten years later, nation-buildincr appears ever more clearly as a responsibWty that neither the United ~ations nor the Unjted States can escape. The United Nations and the United States bring different capabilities to the process. Neither is Ukely to succeed without the other. Both have much to learn not just from their ow11 experience but also from that of each other.

"-"t:.

489

Asst~ming ad~quate consensus among Security Council members 0 11 tht' purpose

u111t- ..J Nahons eu
l ..:t11 tiom~ provides the most suitab e msu

PAYNE I DECONSTRUCTrNG NATION BUilDING

491

BY JAMES L. PAYNE

. . . , generaJJ)' triumph~ ov<'r <'XJ>('Jic nce. The past- th<.: wpe I. \\'1 ,n . lunumg Ill tO w.tr, 1 . I I I' H P t. 1 . ' . f r I tabu 1 . ()(' w 1a t J1(1p{Jened wh<'ll t liS w;tc; tru.x Je o re-tends to atJOII . . . CJIIItl sta IS tea . I f nratOJyand the thump of mdltmy boots. At tlw out' 1 eel in the 1 o angl)' eat )e gnor b 1 , 11 t force will be succ:.:esslul up 1 11mg v1rtue and thar . . 111 10 ( set, it is easy to e Jeve ''' 15t01y has no relevan(;e. 1 . 11 Late1 t1. c:.:on f' 1 e 11 the force of arms has. c.:C11 tercc on nat1on .huildin" y 11s H enc:.: 1 . . . ~?' ea f . n ctatorshtp or e; 1 vrl that . t hC' K 1 0 IIIVa di I111 and o<:curJving. a land . aff-h<.:ted by d1 . . . IS, J' . , . . . . nation war antI tummg Jt u1 to a d~~mocnat)' Alas ' m theu .c .ntiii1SI<LSI11 lor . . budc.l 111 g ~ . .. . . prac.:titiOnCJ Shave senousJy looked at orce o f arms, ne'tJJ"I' tl1e theonsts nor the 1 " I)y f. the historical experience with this kind of policy. Jf, after the troops leave, another dictatorship or anotJ1er civil war ensues, th~n one l~as plo11ghc~ the ~ea. On~ hc.t~ suffered the costs of the invasion-Am encans k11le~: local ~nhab1tants ktlled, destruction of property, tax 111oney sc1uandered, loss of mtemati.onal support, and so on-to no lasting purpose. . . . To see how nation builrnng in general works out, I have comp1led a list of- all tJ1c cases since J850 in which the United States and Great Britain employed military forces in a foreign land to (;Uitivate democracy. 1 included only those cases where ground troops were cleployecl and dearly intervened in local politics. I have left aside the cases involving lesser types of involvement such as sending aid or military advisors or limited peac.;e-keeping efl'orts or simply having military bases in tbe country. ln order to constitute a complete case of attempted nation building, troops have to have left the country (or be uninvolved poHtic.:ally if based in the country) so that we may see whether, in the absence of military support, a stable democracy continued to exist. For this reason we cannot use ongoing involvements such as BosJtia, Kosovo, Afghanistan , and Jraq. The application of this definition identifies 5J instances of attempted nation building by Britain and the United States. The question is, how often did they succeed? The meaning of success involves more than holding an election and setting 11P 3 government. Nation building implies builcl.ing, that is, e;onstructing a lasting edifice. The ~ation builders c:oncur in thb; notion of dUJ'ahility. Their idea isn't just to hold elec.tions, get out, and have the country reve1t to <marchy or dietatorship. As President Bu~h ha~.sa~cl, the aim in Jrac1is to create lasting institutions of freedom. To c~l a nation buJlding effort a succ.:ess, therefore, we need to see that the military occupat1011 of the target t'Ountry was followed by the estab)jshmen t of an enduring democracy.
Jamcs L. J>ayne, neconstru ti , N . . . ,. 24 200.5. pp. 1 3-15 R . ed c. ~g ation Budcling, 1 p<'nnJSSJCHI of tlw publish~r. Tile Amelica11 ConseroatiiA:, Octoher t1>nnt 'l'f 490

To ic.l<:ntd 1cc;1 dt'i in these terms, I inspec.ted thc l't-... t .I l I po th ll :c n the tm >I '\ 1l1c rawa. 1 Ioo keel for events betoken ' 1\,;W mstorv of C'(l(:h c Junt r:. ,uter . I . mg c ;o of democrati . 11 ch 1i:! r 1e !>upprcsston of opposition leaders or part'~ c apse . f. ind . c I rtl e. . , l . . .1 . 1es, maJor m nnuement11 1 0 1, f rreedolfl<, o spcech press, anu assembly' Vlolent transr of power murder of o .tcJ kader!> hy ot er leaders, and signi fic:ant civil war lrc:rs ' I ' rr cl IJ , ' po . . . . . . .:qutreu arge an mu!. le fai1 11 res along these l1nes as cv1den<.:e of democratic.; f:... ;Jure A r f !JP , .. . w 1 arrests o oppoew bon )eack-rs were not enough to WS<Juahfy the count-ru as a .1 r SI . .. . . . . ~1 uerncx::rac.y nor a 1ew assassinatwn". of amb,guous mea~mg nor a Simple military c.;oup nor the resignation of an excc:.:utive 1n the fac~ of mass1ve street demonstrations. If numerous free and fair elections were held, ~us was taken ac; strong evidence that demcx:rac.y survived. Elections that were one-stded and to some degree rigged by the incumbents were taken as a negative sign, but tl1ey djd not, in themselves, disqualifY the country as democratic. The results of applying these principles to the politic:.:a! outc.;orne~ in the 51 cases ofinterventi.on are shown in the following table. Overall, the resultc; indicate that military inte1 vention succeeded in leaving behind democracies in 14 cases-27 percent of the time. The conclusion, then, is that nation building by force is generally unsuccessful. A president who went around the world invading countries to make them democratic would (ruJ most of the time. One group of countries that seem especially resistant to democracy-building efforts are the Arab lands. There have been nine interventions in Arab countries in the past century. ln no case did stable democrat')' follow the military occupation. In assessing the effectiveness of nation-building efforts, we should be careful not to confuse conjunction with cause. Just because some military interventions have been followed by democracy, this does not mean that the interventions c.;aused the democracy. There is a worldwide movement against the use of force, and this trend promotes democratic development. Ruler~ are becom~g l~ss disposed to use violence to repress oppositions, and oppositions .are less mc~ed to use force against incumbents. As a result, countries are becornmg clemcx::racies on their own, without any outside help. .. . For example, we might be tempted to praise the Bntish occu~ation. of Mal aysta as tonngmg clemocracy. But m t]1e s"ne pen'od the neighbonng Ast.an u . . . . c.;ountry of.~fhai lan d , not occup1ed, also JOmed the caJnp of democratic nations. In .. . . aila d , f. 1 al act, in Freedom Houses survey o f pol'ti'c n'ghts and CIVIl ~berties. Tb h n. . uld .Mala)'SJa '''O a\ e ranks al1ead of Malaysia. It is quite poss1'bl~ tben, that become a democracy without British intervention. . f . build. . lesson in the effectiveness o nation South Korea presents an mteresting d th U .t d States was heavily . B , mg. egin ning in 1945, when US tro.ops lande ' .e Tlm e ~tical involvement . involved in guiding political decisions m South Korea. 'lallslpo ed to uo their own b d tlle South .Koreans were ow essentially ceased after J961, an . dictatorship under General Park way politically. This way prove~ to.be a Jmhta~ . Thereupon followed two 1979 Chung- Hee, which lasted untd h~s murde~ bl d . street demonstrations. By coups, a violent uprising in KwangJu. and m~yl doob )en greatJv relaxed and come , 1985, however the suppression of ClviJ liberties 1ah K a can be called a democ.. ' . I t time Sout ore petttive elet:tions were held. Smce t la . S here is a case where 16 years 0 rac.:y (aJbeit a noisy one with plenty of corruptionf). ""ratic nation building. while d 0 fA r 1 mcrican tutelage brought 1a1 ure 111 terms o em\Ao

492

PART 4

coNTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

5

PAYNE I DECONSTRUCTING NATION Bl1ILDING

493

~~a~s~o~2~00~0 ~----:-~---------B;iJril ish nccupalions u.s. occupations

Austna 1945-1955 cuba 1898-1902 Cuba 1906-1909 Cuba 1917-1922 Oomlmcan Republic 1911-1 924 Dominican Republic 1965- 1967 Grenada 1983-1985 Haitl 1915-1934 Haiti 1994-1996 Honduras 1924 Italy 1943-194 5 Japan 1945-1952 Lebanon 1958 Lebanon 1982-1984 Mexico 1914-1917 Nicaragua 1909-1910 Nicaragua 1912-1925 Nicaragua 1926-1933 Panama 1903-1933 Panama 1989-1995 Philippines 1898-1946 Somalia 1992-1994 South Korea 1945-1961 West Germany 1945-1952 $UCCeSS failure fa1 lure failure failure $UCCeSS success failure failure failure success success failure failure failure failure failure failure failure success success failure failure success

noNS BY THE UNlTED STH I ; AXD GREAT BRITAIN NATION-BUILDING MIUTARY OCCUPA '

Botswana 1886- 1966 Brune1 1888-1984 Burma (Myanmar) 1885- 1948 Cyprus 1914- 1960 Egypt 1882-1 922 FiJi 1874- 1970 Ghana 1886-195 7 Iraq 1917-1932 Iraq 1941 - 194 7 Jordan 1921- 1956 Kenya 1894- 1963 Lesotho 1884- 1966 Malawi (Nyasaland) 1891-1964 Malaysia 1909- 195 7 Maldives 1887-1 976 Nigeria 1861-1960 Palestine 1917-1948 Sierra Leone 1885-1961 Solomon Islands 1893-1978 South Yemen (Aden) 1934- 1967 Sudan 1899-1956 Swaziland 1903-1968 Tanzania 1920- 1963 Tonga 1900-1970 Uganda 1894-1962 Zambia (N. Rhodesia) 1891-1964 Zimbabwe (S. Rhodesia) 1888-1980

success
failure failure fa1lure fa1lure success failure failure failure failure failure failure failure success success failure failure failure success failure failure failure failure success failure failure failure

choloro - Jot that it would help them. For the most P yplovec sef their mission as getting themselve d th part, these government em ' too h, tJ . r 'thout tnuc egg on 1e1r taces. The)' have s an 1 e U. S. out of the c:ountn. no 'd .. ; Wl .. tJ h c earer 1 ea of how to ... tiJl democratic cu 1 re mn. t. e readers of this page. tu ms A look at some spectfic: examples of nation buildi 'IJ . I1e J989 U S mvaslUn o f Panama is credited ng I UStrates the intellectual . cuum. T 1 . b . V<1 . tl . .. m OUJ ta u1 ation as a nationWas us pos1t1ve outcome the resuJt of th . . . building success. 0 ? f' tJ e JOlitical sc1 ence. ne o 1e nation builders Lt. Col John T expert application of F' h 1 h . I . ' e k on tbe Panam a expenence that g1\es quite a different p IS y , h as wntten a tur hi boo . 1 . . f, r . le e. IS e1was C ef of Policv an( Strategy or U.S. 10rces m Panama, and it wash' b t fi h ' I . . IS JO o gure out ow to implement t 1e nuss1on statement. The orders looked simple . . . on paper: ucon duct nation bUIJ~ng operations .to ensure democracy." But Fisbel quickly disc:overed that the instructi?n was .meanu~gless. because. ?emocr~cy was an "undefined goal ... It seemed .to lum tl1at 1t v~asn.t the JOb of military officers to figure out how to implement tlus undefined obJective, but, as he obseJVes with a touch of irritation "tJ1ere are no U.S. civilian strategists clearly articulating strategies to achieve democ~acv."
The fact that ther~ ~vas no clear definition of the conditions that constitute democracy meant that th.e YIJ!Jta~ Support Croup and the other U.S. government agencies that were attempting to ass1st the Endara government had only the \'aguest concept of what actions and programs would lead the country toward democracy ...

the country evolved to democracy on its own 2.5 years after Ame1ican involvement in local politics ceased. Nations around the world are gradually becoming democratic on their own. Therefore, the 14 cases of nation-building "success'' cannot be attri bute<.! to rniJitaJ)' inteJVention. These countries might well have become democracies without it. The na~on-buil~ng idea ha-; a critical, generally overlooked, gap: who knows how to do Jt? Pund1ts and presidents talk about nation building as if it were a se.ttled technology, like building bridges or removing gall bladders. Huge amounts of government and foundation money have been pou~ed into the topic of democracy building, and academics and bureaucrats have r1roduced reams of verbose <.:om ment:~ru B t till } - ,: u s t 1cre is no concrete, useable body of knowledge. d And,d~mg a non-specialty, there cannot be any experts in it. The people who en }up omg the so-called nation building are simply ordinary government emp oyees who happen t0 d . h . wm up at the scene of the miutary occupation. Man), t1mes t ey are milita Hi . aJ 0 ry cers With no hackground in politics, sociology, or socr

In practice, vvhat the goal of "ensuring democracy" boiled down to was installing Cuillermo Endara, the winner of a previous election, as president, supporting him as he became increasingly highhanded and unpopular, and then stepping away after his opponent was elected in 1994.... Austria presents an instructive example of what nation building has actually amounted to on the ground. In our tabulation, Austria is classified as a case of succ:essful nation building, but a close look reveals that the U.S. role was irreleYant. if not harmful. After tl1e war, Austria was jointly occupied by Russia as weU as the \Vestem powers. The Soviets brought Karl Renner, the elderly and respected Austria~ Socialist leader to Vienna to be the head of a provisional go\emment. Rem1ers provisional go;ernment declared the establishment of the Democratic Au~an Republic on April27, 1945. For six months, the United States refused to r~~ze this government (fearing that the Russians were up to no good in supporting tt). Finally, when it could not be denied that the provisional government was popular and functioning, the United States recognized it. . l ildi lcls Austria thus presents a uoubly ironic lesson in how nation mallngdun h . Tl1e United States-the democratic power-stood m tJle'vav of loc ea . ers who . . 1d the SoVlet Umon-t e were attempting to establish a democratic re~me, m . fi th first demowor~u's leading dictatorship-unintention~y acted as rmd\\~:~~ t: be "built." crane administration. Obviously. in Austna, no democracy bl' h democracy on The democratic forces in Austria were strong enough to.~sta 15 a their own, and they did it in spite of the nation builters.d tak a close look at what The advocates of nation building need to g~ hac f ~ ated powers. In the e really happened in the postwar political evolution t e 0e e

I ~cl that Anw rican L'iH'I't. -;tplk d sophisticatC< . . . . . 1 'l<f ., 11 JS :-;uppostc:ountri <:s to b <.<''lllH ': 'tn;"ra<:Jrs against tl! . lorP of natJOll >Ut mg.. . I I CJr . tl13 1 force< t tese . ll Tl e countri es hecam< dt'P.nrJ.!<:i<'s 0 11 their 0 , , social cnguwt> nng 1 ~ . " ws JJ 1 .. r thr~t wa, at a I p >e r-shuflif.n t~ 1 re ... tu.~.s- ->T t 1t~ mt 1tmy 0 , , '" Ju I . w1 . t \\clSfl -.<:u. n enert s an< ''l ~ .. 1indrl!lce titan a help. ami the bt~~npttous g 1 1 J J ' v 1 e raU mote o a I "'l<l fnrtlter illustrut es Ito\\' 1ap Jazard and unf()(::us I , pntJon '.vere gt ~ , e< ecent rnterveu twn 111 J < Tl1 ~ 1 J . \VI11 c the militarv campmg11 w ;;t<; a su cc<ss, the oc<..:tlpa. . e 1 1 s 111 prac:0 c.:e. 1 111 nat:Jon >tu< _g ~ . . 1. 1 en characterized hy n;u\et<' and impro'visation. TJ l<' 1 1 , .. . . tion and admuush at.Jon lclS Je rt, .J k lootinc:r after v1ctor) , nor t lC Ior cc' to, c o . J and the resnlt ,. . , . . o cy c u.S. had no. poli(' I to I .1ec:.. struc.:tu re. the raprd fonnatwn o1.gcmgs ol t 1ngs and partr .. 11111 1 I . . . ad n ' ('(' ' l W<lS a ravagmg o OCc d I .5 o('Jocal 511 pj)Ort for the U.S. c' ori. T le crv1lran 1111 1 ' 5 . . . . military fjgI1ters, au a os. , n fi t t 1 tire hmds of retired Lt. Gen. ]a)' ( .a.rrne1 who. was two weeks . . ' t ration wa" rs pu a . t B <~lldad md who naive!)' expected to find 1 tunctiomng government ) . " . . Iate getting o ao ' ' . t Je <.:Otrn t ry. Af:Le,a rnonth , the hapless Garner was fu cc. .re placed. by I aul Bremet . . . n t rn 1 <l'i chief administrator. Two months after the li1V<l'il0Tl, Lt. Gen. Wrl ham Wallace, the v CoqJs commander, described the nation-building "techn ~~ue" U.S. ofHcials were . applying in Iraq: 'We're making this up h_ere as we go along. Nation building by military force rs not a cohere nt, de fensrhle policy. It is based on no theo.ry, it has no proven technit{Ue or methodology, and there are no experts who know how to do it. The record shows that it usually faiJs, and even when it appears to succeed, the positive result owes more to historical evolution and local political C"uJture tJ1eU1 anything nation builders might have done.
1 '
1

-S94

PART 4

oRARY woRLD pounc s P coNTEM

THE ENVIRONMENT

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ----~~~~ ~-----

rhe Tragedy of the Commons

GARRETT HARDIN

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicit ly exorcize the spiri t of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. ln economic affairs , The \'Vealth of Nations (1776) popularized the "invisible hand." the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promo te . . . the public interest." 1 Adam SmHh did not assert that tlus was invaria bly true, and perhaps neithe r did any of his followers. But he contributed to a domin ant tendency of though t that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reache d individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumpUon is correc t it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-frure in reprod uction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimmn population. If the assumption is not correc t, we need to reexamine our individ ual freedoms to see which ones are defensible .

TRAGEDY OF FREEDOM IN A COMMONS

The rebuttal to the invisib le hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketch ed in a littJe-known pamphlet in 1833 by a matl1ematic-al amateur named William Foster Lloyd (1794-1852).2 We may well call it "tl1e trag~): of the commons,'' using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead _used tt: 'The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhap piness. It resides in the solemruty of the remorseless

~ bv Carrett llard.i.n from f th c E t ~1... o e ommons. can Assoclatl.On 10C uu:: xcerptetl!abridged with permission from "The Tragedy nco A S ctence, Vol. 162 ( 13 December 1968), pp. 1243-1267. Cop~mght l;;IUO me~ Advance ment of Science. Portions of the text and some footuotes have bceo Oimtted.

PART4
.

CONTE
u:J JJ

MPORARY WORLD poU TICS

tC) silY

HARDIN I THE TRA

~ l d< sti 11)' <.: an 0 I 11 )' : \ (Jh c ttttlta)){)ill<> . .ss. "\ tier t Ill tl1t> drama."'

GEDY OF THE COMMONS

Voril isonly h) thcr_ that tl< utlt clcveloJ>~ in tlt i~ wa\ . P't tJ l ' pas tnn 0{1<' tl l ll / 1. 1 o T Iw trag< y C) the con11nonsll'>(,Sirt 'lll will trv to kttp . t~. l !l!ll l\' <.:alll c ' ts t I h J' r< >. . . 1 , , " Ieel t wl cac "' ' ' . ~ RII. Jt IS to >< expec I rtll uern ent nct\. \\'01 k r<'.L''> ; t>h salt.sfa<.:totilv f'<s. 1 1 ~"' >r s1ble 011l1e cornmOJ1:s Sue l an <11 ' cltir w and dis<.'aS<' keep tlw nlll nhurs of bot! _ 1 1 ~ . L ctus<J tnl>< W<ll s, poc u ~-> centu ries )e ' 11 b 1 tlta <:arrvinct' cap;win o f' t IJ(> I;Ill< I. }'.. ly, how<v~r1 mal . l bet.st w e e ow " 1 ~"> 1 ' man .In< ' f .. k . . ' that is the cby whe n th<' 1 -<< cl goal of social ong 'slre <:omes the Jav 0 l (.!(; Ollll lg , ' . . . r' .. ' . . . .1 ..... At this r 111 t. the 111 I1cH' nt Io~K:. <J r t Ile cornrnon s 10 stabtlrty becomes a ' C<L hJ remorselessly gene rates tTagcdy. . . . ' . . . . . . n aII . "'ath herdslllan seeks to max111ltZ< IliS. gcun . Expltc:1 or t)y As a ratio > g. ern , . .1. . .. J . .. rmp.tcrty. mol<: or j css .ronsdouSiy. he askS, ''\\ hat IS tJw 11t1 ll) (O Ill(' of adding one 1 . . . . a to my 1 rl?" 1'his utility has one ncgat1ve anL1ont ' pos tliV contnoncnt rnore amm 1 <' . ~ le u . ., . . The positive co 1 nent is a function of tlw _u1cr<'l.l~Cnl. of ?~<' an1rn~l. Since. npo t!te herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the c~ddttH>nal ant mal, the positive utility is nearly +L . . . . ,. . . . The negative component 1S a (unc t101~ of the .tddJ.tton,~l ovc,1gt ..cl7.1.ng ct.eateel hy oue more animal. Since. however, the eflects of overgrazmg are sha red by aJI the herdsmen, the negative utjJity for any particular dccision- rn aki ng herdsman is only a rmction of- 1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman condudes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add ano the r animal to his herd. And another; and another.. .. But this is the conclusion rea<.:hed by each ar1d every rational herdsma11 sharing a corn mons. The rein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that com pels ldm to increase his herd wit hou t limit- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all me n rush , each pu rsuiug his ovvn best interest in a society that believes in the free dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all .... In an approximate way, the logk of the wm mo ns has bee n understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agticu lture or the invention of private prope~ ~n real estate. But it is under~tood mostly only in spe cial cases whi ch are not sufl1 c1en tly generalized. Even at this late date, cattlemen leas ing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more than an amb ivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring feJeral authorities to inc rease the head cou nt to the point where overgrazing proJuc:es erosion and weed-dominance. Lik ewise, the o<.:ean~ ofth_e,world continue to suffer from the survival of the phil osophy of the commons. M~tim~ nations_ \vill respond automatically to the shj hboleth of tl1c freedom of the b . seas. Professmg to IJelJeve 1n tl1e ...mex1 sti J e resources of the oceans ," tIwy . ' 1au tl nng species after species of flsh and whales closer to extinction ... .
1

then goe:-. O il ,,orkirt!!of tht11 gs. .r., . . e. lwman 1 ll)' of 11< hC' illtJstratr cI nt terms I , (' 'l'tv ofls<:ap eca n

"Tit i~ hll'\ it ti h indd enb which 1 !.

bC' l li HCk

ething in- sewage , or chemical, radioact ive and h son rurncs mto 1 . . t 1e a~r; . eat wastes . mt and distracti d o water: noxious I dat11rc rol1 f . I Tl an< ("\ .. . the line o c.,1g lt. 1e eaIculations of utilityng an unpleas'ant at1 tstng si{m a h Vtrt s ntto fi I I I . I re muc1 t e same ~ h c 1 . . nal 11 1an 11< s t 1at 1JSS1areofthe costofthe t h _, ' s erore. The ntttO < 1 was es e wschar , . 1 ls is less tha n the cost of pu1ifying his wastes h ,c . ges mto t e <.'()m. 1no erore re1 . e for en~ n one, we are lo<.:ked into a system of ur . easmu them. smce thtSis ~-> t11t ' . IOU1 mg ou r ovvn nest" 1 we behave only as mdepenuent, rationa!, free-enterplisers. so ong as The tragedy of the corn mons as a food basket is avert d h . . omething f. a U J'ke 1t. But the air and waters surrot e . .)' pnvate property'or onn y 1 s 1 0 us d re11 ced and so t 1e trage y of the commons as a cesspootnmmg b cannot readilv be l us t 11 . e prevented by' c tifrerent means, by coer<.:tve laws or taxing devices that make t eh . 11 r th 1 .. ll . eaper or e pollute r to treat 1 p~ utant tha~ to discharge them untreated. We have not 11s progressed as fa_r wtth . the solution_ of this problem ac; we have with the first. inde ed, ou~ ~articu lar concept of pnvat.e property, which deters us from exhausting the posttJvc resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a fa<:tory on ue bank of a stre am -wh ose property extends to the middle of the stream-often 1 has difficulty s~eing why it is ~ot his n~tural right. to .muddy the waters ving past his door. The law, always beh md the hm es, req UJres elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt to it this newly perceived aspect of the commons. The pollution problem is a consequence of populations. It did not much matter how a lone ly American frontiersman disposed of his waste. "Flo\ving water pu rifies itself every 10 rniJes," my grandfather used to say, and the myth was near enough to the trut h whe n he was a boy, for there were not too many people. But as population be<:ame den ser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloa ded , calling for a redefiniti.on of property rights.

497

ao. .

HOW TO LEGISLATE TEMPERANCE?

Analysis of the pollution proble m as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality. namely: The morality of an act i~ a function of the state of the system, at the ti'me it is pelform er/. 4 Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, bec ause there is no pu hli<:; the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty yea rs ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut _out on~y the tongue for his dinn er, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not m any 1111portant sense being was tefu l. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior. . . . . . f That morality js systetn -sensitive escaped the attentio n of mo~t c.~fie~ 0 ethics in the past. 'Thou shalt not ... "is the form of traditiomtl etlucal d1~ecti;~s whi<.:h make no allowance for p< ular circ umstan<:es. The laws of our sooe~ 0 uiic noo Iow the pat tern of ancient ethi cs, and there I.ore are r --rly sniteu to ttovemmg a . . e . .1 . . 1 5olunon 1s to augment statu_ complex, crowd ed chan<Teable wor1 0 ur epKyc JC u. all ' l"' .. t all . 1111possible to spell out t he to1y law with administrative law. Smce 1t IS prat JC ) . h . tl backvlfd or to mn an automoc:omlitions und er which it is safe to bum tras 111 l e ,' h 0 tails to bureaus. The res uJt 15 bu c wit hou t smog-control. by Jaw we cleIegate t e e

POLLUTION
In a reverse way the tra d f th . He 't ' . 'ge Y 0 e commons reaiJIJears in pro ble ms of. poJJutJOn. re I IS not a question of tak , . . mg somethmg out of the com mons, hut of puttJHg

HARDIN 1 THE TRAGEDY OF -nm

J9R

PART 4

CONTEMPO

RARY WORLD POLITICS

. I

'n.c. COMMONS

tly fcar('d f(>r an <~ IIC'it t , ~ ' - ()u is custodiet adrnirli:-.trativc law, whcf, IS rlg ~ I the watch"r' rhtn, ~d . ' "" Jo lrn J\dan,~ Said u . . I /J .. Who .~ha I w,ttc 1 ('law~ and not Ill' B . , IJ ll(" l l l ;t( I1111111 i/J'>fJ.) (' /I V{O(l'S . 8(rators . . ... tJOvernment o . I I . . tfttl W<' mmf ItdV( cl F> f tS I tiW lotaJ 'i\. ~f<JJJ, ,IH 'illl~U <11 y !table {( n ' l ralit\' o ac > tryiug to <valual<' I 1<' 1110 , 1l IJ, III CO, not J.tw..,. . I g .1 <TC)ve nllllt' t , I {' corruption. po< u<:llr 't- , . I , (thou"h no t 11cccso,ari ; to 1 11 or<.:< ); but how dcJ . . . . ea.\)' to lcgJs aW e1 11 ProI11 1 1rem~> ll ? . . (' ind.icltc~ thdt it t'. tr l >< ' a('comp is ed bc:st . . Expenenc Ieg' 1 l<.:IIIJ)nnC'<'. cJ . . . tive Jaw.< \Ve li111ll po'' ' 1 .1. . 11nnec:cssurily if' w< ale )tIll<'!. l 111 li'lt i<)JJ nf a mullS1ra I . I1 I w c' J l1rollg . t fQuis 1:ustodiel den ies " ' l I< l iSt of adm injslrative thtt the S( f)(Jin e n . .l W' S11ppos<.: ' . . tl , hr<lSC as a perpetuaI J'CIII lll u('f' 0 {' I'ea rr danver!) nl 1 vv: hould ntlwr r<"latn w P I n aw. ( s . I . .. I llcnge Jacin!T li S Jl()W is to ill \'('111 t )(> < :orr('Ctivc W(' C' IIIIIOI aVOJd. T l(' !<H al c ta. ('> AI n J ways to Ieg..fccd1ltmate k' 1htt are ncct1 1lo k. <.:u~todians }JOIIPSL \vt> mn~t 111c(' 1 e(, ucp , Im<: .~ . the mwdcd ~wtlaontyo.f bot1 t 1 , <.:ustotl.ians aml tJH.. comc.:l i vc <' CC, hacks. 1 e
. .

lt<.~l. (' taken her revenge, and the van'etv H . e w omo cont,-, ollttJ' rtind aml would he replaced by the var:iety ~tpum~" would :0rne ex . h . omo progemtll.it.LS .., IJCC Tl " rgt~n al'n t assumes t at consc1ence or the des r h'ldr 1e '' . 1re 1or c en ( . .5 hereditary-but heredttary only in the most g e a] r1 no m,\tter 1 I1) 1 ner \\'h'c1 ,,; Jl be the same whether the attitude is transmitted tb 10rmal sense. The h su t "'' } I roua germ cells re rnatically... . T 1e argument las here been stated in the oonot t f h , or exoso roblem. 1 tt . 1Les equaJJ . ll ex . )lit app v we to any instanc:et h h o t e popun . 1uon P ' w JC soc:rety appeal a nclividual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for tile d bs 10 an r . .,. k genera1goo - v of his c.:onsc1ence. 10 m a e such an appeal is to set up as fo,.n th ' means , . .. . . e .....: ve system at works toward the cltmmatron of consctence from the race. .. .
Ou ld
'H

499

MUTUAL COERCION MUTUALLY AGREED UPON

The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort . Consider bank-robbing. The man who takes money from a
bank acts as if the bank were a commons. How do we prevent such action? Certainly not by hying to control his behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rath er than rely on propaganda we follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons. That we thereby infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret. The morality of bank-robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say 'Thou shalt not rob banks," without providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created ~y coercion. Taxing is a good coercive device. To keep downtow11 shop~rs temperate 1.n their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short penods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We nee d not actually c b'd a Cl'tizen to park as long as he wants ror 1. . . .. to we need merely make it increasingly expen51ve for him to do so. ~ot prohibt~glon, ' er but carefully bia<~ed options are what we ouer ]um. aA M dison Avenue man nu... 1t J a . call this persuasion I prefer the greater c~mdor of the word <.:~r~1011 d . , . . 1 . b' .d isions of distant an lrresponTo many, the wof(l coerciOn nnp les ar Itrruy e~ . . Th onlv kind of 'bl b b h' . t cesstry' prut of ItS mearung. . bv the ,maJ'orih.r e SI e ureaucrats; ut t 1s ts no a ne ' d ; coercion J recommend is mutua] roerc10n, muh1allv a~ee upon ' . o . t , that we are required to .1 . t , rcion 1s not o sa~ To say that we mutmu 1 )'agree o coe . . ? We all grumble about . . enJoy it, or even to pretend we enJOY1t \ Vho enJo,s ta'\eS ize that volunt<U} taxes . we tl1cm. But we accept compuIsory t .ues becaused ( recogn bl'nah') suppor1 taxes ancl l would favor the conscienceless. \ ''l e ms ti'tute an gm m u eo r of the commons .... other coercive devices to escape the l10rro

FREEDOM TO BREED IS INTOLERABLE

Tl I( ' I rugrdy of' th<. (:Oll1111011S is i~vo~ved ill population r~;ol~l~ ms j 11 annt~t er way. In u world gov<'mcd soiC"Iy by the pnncrple of dog C!at <.log - 1f 1ndeed thcr e c~er was SJJC'!t ;r "~rorlcl-how many children a family had woukl not be a matter of public coucNn . Pannls who bred too exu bcrantJy would leave fewer dese;endants, not 111orc', bccall!><' they \.\Ould be unable to care adec1uately for their children.... If <aC'h human fiunily were dependent only 011 its own resources; if the children of improvidtnt parents starved to death ; if, thus, overbrceding brought its own "pnnisluuent" to the g<nn line- then there would be no public interest in coni rolliu~ th<! lmcding of families. But our society is deeply corn mitted to the welf:IJ( stale and hence is confronted with another aspect of th e tragedy of the C:OIIlllt011S. In a welfare statf', how shall we deal \~~th the fiunily, the religion, th e race, or tlw <:lass (or inde<.d any distinguishaule and whesive group) that adopts overl!n<.'(ling < a polky to st'<:ure its own aggrandizement? To couple the concept of ts lreodornto hrN'd witl1 tht-> belieftltat evetyonc born has an equal right to the commons is to lock tlw world into a tragi<: course of action . . ..

CONSCIENCE IS SELF-EUMINATING
1t is a lllislakc lo think that we c:;,rn control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an app<al to.cons.c:ic.ntc. Charles Calton Darwin made this pui nt when he spoke ?". 1 h<~ C(n.lcmual of lite publication of his grandfather's great book. The .. rgument IS strrught lonvard and Darwinian.
Pt>ople vmy. Confronted with appeals to limit brecding, sorue people \\~11 undoubted!)' r<ASJX>nd to tl 1 tJ 11 1 .11 H' P ea more 1an others. Those who have more <.: u < ren WJ produc.'t' hrger f ti f h ..1 . ' rac ono t e next generation thu.n those ""it h more susccp!lu e l'OilS<.:rences. 1 he d'fli . . 1 111Je accentuated. generation bv generat ron . , .. er<'nce WJ. In ( ;. G 0Un>.'m swords "It JIL that it would take hundreds o f gem:r ' . r r t1c prolr< \ may we ue a 1011s nr 1 nit 1 " n e lllStmet to develop in this way, but if it shoulJ 00 so.

of the people affected.

RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY

. ulation problems lS p . . f this analysis of mans pop di ons of low elhaps tJ1e simp lest summary o . . .c ble onlY under con ti thIS: The commons, if jushnable . t a)J IS jUStJna C a

500

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUT!CS

)opulation has incrca<icd. !J, '(llllmo ns h1 had to ..,. . . densll.'. t\ s tll" htlnrtn 1 's -.. popu Ianon . . . h~..' ab~lndoned in one aspect after anothe r. . First "'e abandoned the commons in. food gathc~mg. cudo~11~g fa rm lanc.l anu restticting pastures and hunting and fishmg areas. 1 he e rcstnct ons are still not complete throuahout the world. Somewhat later we saw that the commons e:l'i a place fo~ waste tlisposal would al 0 have to be abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domes tic sewage are estem world; are_ s~ill struggling t? c~(~S? the commons widely accepted in the\ V to pollution by automobiles, factories, msecttc1de spraye rs. fc1tdtzmg operati ons, and atomic ener<N installations .... Everv new e~closure of th e commons involves the infringeme nt of somebody's personal Uberty. Infringements made_ in the distant past ar~ a~~ept ed because no s contemporary complains of a loss. It 1 the newly proposed mfnnge ments that we vigorously oppose; cries of "lights" and "freedom .. fill the air. But what does "freedom mean? \.Vhen men mutually agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind became more free. not less so. Individuals locked into the logic of the comrnons are free only to bring on universal ruin: once ther see the necessity of mutual coercion. they become free to pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity... v The most important aspect of necessity that ,. e must now recognize is the necessity of abando ning the commons in breeding. ~o techni cal solution can rescue us from the misery of ovetpopulation. Freedom to breed wi ll bling ruin to all. At the mome nt, to avoid hard decisions many of us are tempte d to propagandize for conscience and responsible parenthood. The te mptation must be resisted, because an appeal to independently acting consciences selects for the disappearance of all conscience in the long run, and an increase in anxiety in the short. The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon. "Freedom is the recognition of necessity"-an d it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons.

aus Environmental Changes as C

THOMAS HOMER-DIXON

':e

. How might .environmental chan~Te lead to acute conu t? some ex-perts mc . o propose tl~at enVlronmental change may shift the balance of power between states either reg10nally or globally, producing instabilities that could lead to war. 0 r,ao; . 1 global environ menta I cam age increases the <..lisparity between the North and the South, poor nations may militmily confront the rich for a greater share of the world's wealth . Warmer tempe ratures could lead to contention o,er new ice-free sea-lan es in the Arctic or more accessible resources in the Antarctic. Bulging popmd ulation s c lancl stress may produce waves of environmental refugees that spill across borders wi.th destabilizing effects on the recipie nt's domestic order and on international stability. Countries may fight over d'vindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution. In developing countries, a sharp drop in food crop production could lead to intemal strife across urban-rural and nomadicsedentaJy cleavages. If environmental degradation makes food supplies increasingly tight, exporters may be tempted to use food as a \veapon. Environmental change could ultimately cause the gradual impmerishment of societies in both the North and South, which could aggravate class and ethnic cleavages. undermine liberal regimes, ancl spawn insurgencies. Finally, many sd1olars indicate that environmental degradation will "ratchet up'' the level of stress ~vithin n~tional and international society, thus increasing the likeJjhood of many different kinds of conflict and impeding the development of cooperative solutions.

NOTES
. .1. A~~ Smith. The Weal.th of Notions (New York: Modern Libra1y, 1937), p. 423. 2. \\1U~am Foster Uoyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford: Oxford U!11verst) Press. 1853), reprinted in part in Population, Evolution, a11d Birth Colltrol, A. H~~g, ed. (San Francisco: Freeman, 1964). p. 37. 3. A. N Whitehead, Science and the Moclem World (New York: Mentor, 1948), P 17. . ~ J Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966). 6 <>. S. Tax, ed., Evolution after Dancin , Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. I9 0). p. 469.

THE RANGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

fliecte d soon er and more seo:ereh-r.bv- em'ia1 t Develor)ing countries are likely to be a . 1 c rIon. the\ do not ha"e tne nnanr1 ronme ntal change than tieh countn es. By cenm ed world- furthem1ore. tl1e1T social fth e de' .e1 . _J ' material, or intellectual resources o . 1 op n,en \\1u1discoru. It 15 probable' be fr~gJ e a.ncl . bl . ehend or respond to and political institutions tend to theref()re, that developing societies '"tU be less a e to appr environmental clisruption.
. LS Cau..c;es ciAt\lk Conftid. ~ I td FdJow-. of Tllrf'sholcl En' iromnt'Jttl.l C t:mgcs' F _ 11 6 @ 1991 "'' th~ Pre;idcut ill rom Thomas F. Honlt'r-Dixon. "On the lnt~:nwuo11al St>ettrity . \'ol. 16. o. 2 (I':JI l~J ). PP '7Ulol~ . Rt>prinied b) pemli5sion of Tbe \ fiT Harvard Collegt> and tht." Massachusetts ltL~btute of Trc ...eJ r Press. Portions of th<> text and some .ootn otes });1\1' bceu onu.. 501

502

PART 4
\'H' ll

CONTEMPUKAJU

VVVlU....... - - - - -

' '"''-'

L AUSEs

OF ACUTE CONFU

" ithin .lnd amon~ den'loi.Jing c:ountnes: greenhou~e ",u mu~g.. ' , )Spheric ozone land. oveluse a~n< . IetJt>ll. ac1cI deposition deforestation ' degradation ofk . l I J [c 1 . ucp ..tter supplies. and depletion o . ns 1stoc s. I ht .. )rohJc..ms can all and pollution of "" be cmdeh- characterized as large-scale human-mduced p ro! len s with long-tenn and often irre,ersible consequences. "vhich is why the_v are <~ne, t:;rouped together _,. under the rubric ..global change. However, the~' va? areatJ m "~)a[j~ sca.le: the first two imohe o('nuineJy global physical processe~. while the last fhl lm-olve regionaJ ph~-sical processes, although they may appear m local~s all m_er tlw planet. These se,en problems also vruy in time scale: for examp_le, wh1le a regJon can he deforested in only a few yerus, ru1d se,ere ecological wd so~1al e~ects ma) he noticeable almost immediately. humru1-induced greenhouse wanmng wJII probabl~ c!E:- velop over man, decades and may not have truly serious implicati0~1~ for humanki nd rcn ha! ra c.:entu~' or more after the signal is first detected. In addition, some of these problems (fo.r instance, deforestation and degradation of water supplies) are mu<:h more advanced than otl1ers (such as greenl1ouse warming and ozone depletion) and are already producing setious social disruption. This vruiance in tangible evidence for tJ1ese problems contrib~t~ to great ~erences in our certain_ty about their ultimate seveJity. The uncertainties surrounding greenhouse wannmg, for example, are thus far greater tl1an those conceming deforestation. . Many of thes_e problems are_caus~y interrelated. For instance, acid deposition ~mages agncultur~I land, fish~nes, and forests. Greenhouse warm ing may contribute to deforestation by movmg northward the optimal te mperature and precipitation zones for many tree species, by increasing tbe se,erity of windstorms and wildflres, and by expwding the range of pests and diseases. The release of carbon from these dying forests would reinforce the greenJ1ouse effect. The increased incidence of ultraviolet radiation due to the depletion of the ozone layer will probably damage trees and crops, wd it may also damage the phytoplankton at the bottom of the ocean food chain. . F~all!', when we consider the social effects of environmental change, espeCI~Y of climate change, we should be especially aware of changes in the incidence of extreme" environmental events. Social impacts result "not so much from slow Buctua~ons in the mean, but from the tails of the ilistlibution, from extreme . 1 events. .\.Vhile a two-to-tluee d egree ce1 mean go bal warmmg might not seem SIUS . too 5'~ d Sl,.,..,;f::cant for agricultural prod uction, It may produce a large increase in cropevastating droughts, Roods, heat waves, and storms.

rn:~jor L'lld ron mental prob!ems ... migh_tyJ~u.:d I ~k

:a . tu le to <.:onflict

In thus work1ng from both ends towards. the 'dill . . hypothe~Jze t~utt four pnndpal social effec:ts ma .ml ~ of the causal chain, I y, either smgly or in c:ombinatio substantial I) m <:r ease the probability of n, . acute conflic.;t . d . In evelopmg countries tura decreased agncu 1 1 production ec:ono .. d I . mic ec me pop I t cl. ' fI .. . . . u a Jon lsplacement and disruption o egJ tlmlzed and autho .t ti . . ' d . n a ve mstJtuti . 1 often be causally inter] k d . ons an soc:~al relations. These effects w1 I .c . m e . sometimes ' 1'th rem1orcing relal . F "' tionsh1ps. or examp e, the population dis 1 p acement result' f . aCTlicultural pro cl uct1on may further disrupt . 1 a] mg rom a decrease in agnc.:u tur prod f10 0 o decline may lead to the flight of people with a] h . cl uc _ n. r economic ln we t < education 1 h could eVJsc:e rate umversities ' courts ' and 111stituti ons of ec.:ono . ' w.11 C m turn . mic management, aU of which are cru<.:Ial to a healthy economy.

er 503 ''hovl' quf":' stiou . To a<.ld rcss it we m t us use hoth th b , . cial effects o I env1ronmental change . d t1 b t e est knowledge about the O kn an 1e r soc:1a1con fl ic:t. s owledge about llle nature es . . a11d causes o

Agricultural Production
Decreased agricultural production is often mentioned .,.. potenti'ally the most wor""' risome consequence of environmental change ... . L~rge tra~t~ ar~ being lost each year to urban encroachment, erosion, nutrient depletion, salm~zahon ,_ waterlogging, acidification, wd compacting. The geographer Vaclav Smtl, who IS generally very conservative in his assessments of emi ronmental damage, estimates tl1at two to three million hectares of cropland are lost annually to e rosion; perhaps twice as much land goes to urbanization. and at least one million hectares are abandoned because of excessive salinitv. In addition.. " about one-fifth of the vvorld's crop land is suffering from some degree of desert:iHcation. Taken together, he concludes, the planet will lose about 100 million hectares of arable land between 198.5 and 2000 ... _t Greenhouse warming and climate change [can affect] ... agricultural production. Coastal croplancl in countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt is extremely\Ul nerable to storm surges. Such events could become more c-ommon and devastating, because global warming will cause sea levels to rise and might inter~ sify storms. The green house effect will also change precipitation p~ttems and sml moisture; while this may benefit some agricultural regions, others will suffer.

FOURPIDNCWALSOC~EflECTS
Environmental degradation may cause countless often subtle changes in developTh ing <uv-. ti ese range fJrom mcreased communal cooking as fuel-wood .7V\..Ie es. L. _ a1 UCUJmes scarce around Afri , vill ages, to worsened povert" of Filipino coast b can fishennen wh d ., d h ose once-a undant groun s ave been clestroyecl by trawlers an industrial poll ti Wh. h between envi~o:;~nt~cchof the many types of social effects might be crucial links ange and acute conflict? This is the first part of the

Economic Decline
If we are interested in environment-conflict linkages. perhaps the 010 t in~phortant ti the further impo,ens ment degrada 011 IS h _er t potential social effect of environmental . t diversin ol factors rrug t aJJec . . ed brozone . . tt may produce in developing societies. A grea 1 d ultra,ioJet radiation caus . d li . t k which could wealth production. For exampIe, mcrease depletion is Likely to raise the rate of disease in humans ank . "e_s ocproduce shortma' ults. Loggtng for emort mar ets ff c~n damage roads. h :-r cl runo ave serious economic res c term economic gain ror the countrys elite' but mcrease rtn ttation reduces t1 1e il h 51 bridges, and other valuable infrastJucture. wh e t e ex a

5().j

PART 4

CONTEMP0RARY WORLD POUTICS

HOMER~DIXON

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AS

CAUSES OF ACUTE CONfUCT

r

50.~

..... 1 tric capaCI of rher. . A forf:> . :8 and it ab orb. an TII tr..lllS[X>rt o.md I~~ droe ec 1 r . d more espens'" f: milies that u e it for 1Ue becomes carrer ~ hou ehold budget for the poor a

royed, wood "'...:: "hare of the

H

PopuJation Displacement

' tat0 rs ha,e suggested that envi ron men tal ck er" l:ttwn rna, produce . Some commen "en\lronmental refugees ... Sea~levcl rise rn.t~ dri,e people back of b . EO'\pt spreading desert ma\ C:'rnptv ahelian coun vast num ers tal d d Ita areas m c. a\c e. from .coas an pulations mo'.e south Filipino fishermen ma~ lt ... their depleted th . IS somewhat miselr po r tries ..J' fish. as ounds cor the Cl.0.es. The tenn ~emironmental refugee t mpues that environmental uisruption could be a mg . 1 clinagrhowever because 1 1 f fuaee Bows. Usuallv, though , en\lronmcn tal disn.Iption ' ea o . . 1 bJ 1 c1 dear proxunate cause o re o u ' IJl will be onlv one of many teracting pbvsical and socra van a es. me . mg aaricul~ .c / . tural and econom1 decline, that ultimatelv .force people from thetr. homelands Ie, over tj1e last three decades. millions of pcop 1 have tn1grated from di e 'I 1 . 1 . . For examp \ 1 . . . Banglades h to ne1g1 bonng West Bengal and Assam m In a. \ 11 e uetruled data . . are scarce (m p art because the Bangladeshi government .ts reluctant to. adrm t there is significant out~migration). many specialists belie,e tl11s move_men t IS a_ result, at least in part, of shortages of adequate!~ fe~e land due to a rap1dly gro,vmg population. Flooding. caused by deforestation m watersheds upstream on the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, might also be dmi.ng people from the area. I~ the future, this migration could be aggravated by rising sea~Je,els coupled wtth extreme weather events (both perhaps resulting from cl.irnate change).

Disrupted Institutions and Social Relations

The fourth social effect especially relevant to the connection between emironment change and acute conflict is the disruption of institutions and of legitimized, acx.:epted, and authoritative social relations. In many developing societies, the three social effects described above are likelv to tear this fabric of custom and habitual behavior. A drop in agricultural output may weaken rural communities by causing malnutrition and disease, and by encouraging people to leave; economic decline may corrode confidence in the national purpose, weaken the tax base, and undermine financial, legal, and political institutions; and mass migrations of people into a region may disrupt labor markets, shift class relations, and upset d1e tradi~ tional balance of economic and political authority between eth nk groups.
;

Ops ,ctreltblr-'>, .md pulses was 2.5 percent At tl 1e reoional 1 . I . h I er .., uction kcpl , t t<H. of popnlation gro\\th . except t::' Af t\C IO<:rcas<.-d hxl _ prod 10 1 I)~ C\'"(>Orts from develo!)l..d . . nca, ant1 local shortr.. IJs wen. allc\1atcc r~ c:ountne ,.,.,th h "u . ~ge surpluses. We h . 1 ight thercfor<.' conclude that developing eount . . . nes . n otem1ittent a-, 1stancc rrom \ .orthem grain export ta\e SIJffi<.1ent eaPa<:ty. ,.,.,th ers, o respond to emiron mental I . . .. . problems. But aggre~ate figu res htde s1gn1ficant disparities in food availah'litv within de,elopi ng coun tries. ~ I OJeO\er, these figures are becomin 11 . amon~ ~nd than the\ once were: many de,eloping countries have alread . g ed s promlsm~ Jenefit, and the rate of increase } reape mo l of the ' in 1 hal green revo )ution s potentia11 o . duction has cIe<.: Ime cl 1 over 40 percent since the l960s Fo gth ' cerea1pro. )}' r ree succe 1ve . ,years-from 19H t throug~ 1989 estimated global cereal consumption exceeded production. Bumper gram. crops were again harvested in 1990, but carr\'-o,er stocks can be depleteu rap1dly, and we remain "'~thin one or two years of aglobal food crisis. o\er th e long term, the capacity of developing countries to respond efTec.ti\'ek to the consequences of environmental change on agriculture " ill depend on th~ complex inte ractions within each society of ... the society's pre\'ailing land-use practices, land distribution, and market mechanisms \\ithin the agricultural sector. \-farket factors are especially relevant today as numerous de\'eloping <.'Ountrie are reunquishing state control over the marketplace, reducing go,emment spending. and removing impediments to foreign imestment. Economists often contend thatin a market economy with an efficient price mechanism emironmentally induted scarcity will encourage conservation, technological innonltion. and resource substi~ tution. JuJjan Simon. in particular, displays an unwa,ering faith in the capacity of human ingenuity to overcome scarcity when spurred by self~interest.~ ~~an~ et-onomists point to the success of the green revolution, which was ~fte~ driven b~ market forces: it involved both new technologies and the substitution of petroleum resources (in the rorm of fertilizer) for inadequate or degraded nutrients in the _soil. adJustd . . . es ~ This ar~ument supports the pohc1 for rna~ket libenaliz ti'on. an. 'st.ructural . ment" currently promoted by intemational financial and lencling m~tituti~ns. such. as, the International Monetruy Fund and \Vorld Bank. Below, howe,,er, I su~e~t '~~) .. these poIJc1es ' vill no t be 'an effiective response to environmental sc-arcity m e future.

CORNUCOPIANS AND NEO-MALTHUSIANS

onJ , use the labels ..cornucopian .. for . Experts in environmental studies now corn~. > . . ts like Paul and Anne gl t ctinathestockofan\'Sin e optimists like Simon and "neo- Malthusian for pesstmls Ebrlicb.3 Comucopians do not worry much about prbo e ~ genuin can ah\ Cl\ 'S be ' . . resource. because of tl1eir frutJ1 that market-dJi,en uman m to produce the same 5 ' tappetl to allow the substitution ot. more abund-mt resource . . ht to criticize the idea that reso~rce . vice. . . . end-use se1 d t' 11e again. human beugs Historically c:ornucop1ans have been ng " . n, ' scarcity places fixed limits on human actl''~r Time an 11

The Capadty ofDeveloping Countries to Respond: FJISt-Stage lnteNentions

Can developing countries respond to environmental problems effectively enoug}~ to av~rt ~ negative SOCial effects? The aggregate data on world food produc~on ~ gwe us reason for optimism. Between 1965 and 1986, many developmg regiOns suffered serious environmental problems, including erosion, sali ruzation, and loss of land to ~i~tion. Yet global cereal production increased at 3 perce~t a year, meat and nulk output increased 2 percent annually, while the rate for oil

.,vv

.....

... ...

- . " uc.;:,

AS CAUSEs OF

. . .111cl J1('(J Malt h11 o;ian!> haH 1.1 1\ll y ; l(:(.'JI', (;d . ' havt cr cllr tiV t'l l tc< I sctrcJlJC:S, I . t thL'i exp t rw ncc pc rl < . a" ( ft l lttn , l'(J I'JII Iof ..crving wolf: Hilt in <L'i~ uJnlflg t l a . . copau r-. ov er1 k sc.:vcn factors. .-.,;,s of c:n.llc:al n <.CJIIIC '<., . oo 1< j>;t<;l I I. . ll SIJ ' 11 rious scarcr u'-' . . . .t y hrsl, w 1 a.'> se r cre ltt'plc scardti<'<; that exl11l ,, 1 rf11 l lltltracliv. . w ,ace mu cl ~lllg1 n~h weemets. An agricultu c, ~ppe arc y. Id r~d rt:giCJII lll: t} ''JI ( x unp k:, k \iJn tJIIccdback. anJ thre!) 0 J ~oi crre . ~'(!. . cl b degra (;(1 wa t e r and . l t-; e11ho11 \r' mdll<.:(d J)rec.:i pit l' . tancously .u f ctc Yd d . . let radiation . flus make s l iH f IJ tun Iwtf dy u ll<.:10 11 , , (; u tra . I1<mgcs., an d 10 cr<'<l.'iC d 1 . vJO ic ac.;t {') , c rorn nrs tomorrow wdii H' full of c:x lrC' ntt E!V<ttl 1 nak tarn (!or po_ . 1 crs an econas numc rou'~ resou rce<; lwco111c cy 'i c,ca n.:c sirnultariC'. ld surpnses Furt erm orc , aJ I .. h d 'de.. tt'fv' substitution J10SSI'I>I.1. . ;<; t Ital pro<..uc<; the sunc llH 1 t 11 be ar er to 1 " , ous y, I wr . ' t . tl at prc:;vailfd when ~ca rc.;tty wa~ I<" ~ \Cvc n. Seco nd in en d-u se services at cos s I . cl I I 11 . . the pas t the sc.;arcty of a gtvon resou rcc usuaUy lllCr<;ase s ow v, a owr ng li, n< ,ffJr " . . . . d t"c.; llnologicaJ adJ' ustmfmt. Bul hurn an popdatl.ons arc socra 1 cconorn re.;, an e mud, 1 ' argcr an d ac: t'1vt-0-cs. c f 111cJ;viduals arc ' on .a. global ave rage, rnut: 1 more r<;sou rcC;1 J . . . b r e Tl11 ... means that dc btbtal mg sca rct. tt. e~ o 1- ck-velop mtensJVc t1 t<;n 1a11 ero r . mud, -~ . . mor<; quc: kJy: wheJJe c.;OLinlrtcs mU,V be ucfor est ed 10 a /cw cl;<.:ades; most of' a .0 , t 1 can dJsapr car in a trcncraton; anti c:nltc al oz on e d<; ple 1 r( ~g1 11 s opsor lion may n . , . occur in as little as twe nty years. Th~nl , today~ c:onsu mp lr~n ha<; far gre ater mome nt 11 m than in the past. because of the size of th e cons u mUJg populati on , the sheer quantity of rnaterial consuu1ed by thi ~ population , ~nd_t ~IC dens ity of its intcrwovt>n fabric of consumption activities. fh c co un tless tndJVtdual and co rporate economic actors maldng up hurnan soe;iety are heavily com mitted to certain patterns of resource use; and the abi li ty of ou r marke ts to au ap t may be sha rpl y constrained by these entre nched interests. . T11 ese first three factors may soon co mbine to pro du ce a da un tin g syn drome of environmentaJJy induced scarcity: humankind wiJ I fa<.:<; mu ltiple res ou rc:e shortages that are interacting and unpredictab le, that grow to cri sis proportions rapidl y, and that will be hard to address because of powe rful co mm itm en ts to ce rtain consumption patterns. The lc>urth rea~(>n that cornucopian argum en ts may no t ap ply in the future is that the free-market price mechan ism is a bad ga ug e of scarcity, especiaiJy for resources held in common, such as a be nign climate an d pro du cti ve seas. In the pas t, many suc:h resources seemed endlessly ab un da nt; no w they are being degraded an d depleted , and we are learning that the ir inc rea sed sca rcity often Ita~ tre m~ncl_ou s bc~ring on a so<.:iety's we ll-bein g. Y thi s s<: et arcity is at best rcflec:ted only m<lirectly m ma rke t prices. In aduition , pe ople oft en ca nn ot pa tt icipate in marke t transa<:tions in whiclr they have an intere st, eithe r be caus e they lack the ~csources or because they are distant from the transactio n pr ocess in tim e or space; m these c~ses the tru ~ scarc.ity of the resource is not re fl ec ted by its pri ce. . . Tire fifth reason IS an extcusion of a point made ea rUe r: ma rk et-dri ven adapta tion to resource scarcity t 1 y IS mos Jke1 to succe ed in we alt hy so cie ties, w1 re a1 lll11e J dah reserves of capital k nt 1 .rge, an d " . . . . . . ' now eu tal en t lte lp economic actors mven t ne'v tc~nolc~gws , Ide ntifY conservation possibilities and make the trans itio n to new pr . U(:t:Jon .and c.-onsumption patte rns. Y mau~ of the so cie tie et s faci ng the wost senous envuonme ntal p bl . . h . f 1 ro ems m t e commg de cade s wiJI be po or; even 1 t1e)I
1.

. h

ACIJTE CO\'FU aV(.; effiu t n t rnarkc!l'> , la<.;k of <.:apital _ k h 1 '' er 501 . anu n<JW-h( .11 rw w1 hind(:r ll . t11cse proI,I, rns. H:t r TH,po Sixth cCJfJIIH'<Jpians have an an .l . rw- tr> a<:uron,.;;ti(; fait \-1 . h J 1nravel a ne It 1mu1agc t.h<; my riad pro<;tss ~ f' m JTnankind' , Lt ( " o naturt n . ne, !> e:>.'flCd t 1 nu rnan !-.Cicntifi<; and tc<.:hni<.:al . tat . l<:rt ,., a Priori ClO llt\ , ' r ' . II I . mgenUit} <.:an I rta.<;cm of scarc.; tty. urn an > mgc, may not hav t tl e ._ ' ii way<; 'illnr.cmr,t all"" ttJ . . . . 1e: n., ouate ly l Itc un n p1. , tle s of <;nvmmmental- meniAl capa<;:t.J -~~ :XI -a1 t<J und<:rc,tand ad ) t..j . SO<;J sy~ imposSirJ c, g~ven th<; p}1 .<.:al , biolnaic.-al and se .-.I I te:ms 0 . eyst r tl rrt4) '>implv he . b" X;Ji i aws uc vt;rn th 1 to reUIJC:~ a 11 Scarcity Or r<;pai r alJ cnvironm<;ntaJ dama : \l mg tse S)Sltm<,, nature of tlte:se sys t<;rns may keep us from fullv a ti _. !?; .' oreow:r, the <;ha.otic cl various adaptatton an mterv<;ntion strate(lies "PE:nb <.:lpatmg the const . of . Ik I d !;)" . r ap~ rnor-.t tmprJrt<tn(\Utntts~:. t . an u tecli ntca now (:; ge must be huilt increment 11 - 'il'1entin< . . a diffuston to t he L a der socJety often takes decadey ALii\er upcm la"er-< d. oro s ' t 1 ' an . {'\n y ecnnu::al solutic105 tts envir?nme utaI s<:a:c1ty tnay arrive too late to prevent catastrop he:. tfJ Seve nth and finall y, future environme ntal problems r the th . d' .1 h a r an tnspm.ng thr wave o f mgenUJty pre Jdeu y comucopians , rnav instead redu'" th l f . y ava1'l I I . . Th . ingenutt ""' a i em a soctety. e succ.:ess of market mechanism cl e supp ' o . ..1. ] . . bl . . . . . . s epenus on an wt nc ate anc sta e. sys te~ of mstttutions, soctal relati oru,. and har~::d undtrstandings ... . Comu coptans oft en ove rlook the role ofs od al ingenu jtv in produdn the complex legal an d economic clim ate in which teclmical ingen ui~ can flourish~Pol icymakers must be <.:leve r "social engineers" to design and implement effective ma rke t mechanisms. Unfortunate ly, however, the syndrome of multiple, intera<.ting. un pre dic tab le, and rapidly changing environmental pro blems will increase the com ple xity an d pressu re of the policyrnaking setting. It wiiJ also generate increased "social friction " as elites and interest groups struggle to pro tect their prerogatives. Th e ability of poUcymakers to be good social enginee rs is like ly to go dou;n , not up, as these stresses inc rease.

NOTES
1. Smil gives a startli ng a(.;count of the situation in China. Fro m 1957 to L9i7 the <.-ountry I~ 33.33 million hectares offanr.Iand (30 percent of its 1957 total), whilei! added 21.2 m~n hectares of largely marg)nalland. He notes that ~th e net loss of l2 mi~ o~ hectares dun11g a single generation wh en the c.-ountry's population grew by about 300 m1ll1on ~pie means that pe r capita availability of arable land dropped by 40 percen t and that Clunas fannl_an~ is now no mo re abu ndant than Bangladesh 's- a mere one -tenth of a hectare per caprta. See Smil Energy Food Envircmmcnt , pp. 22-3 and 2.30. . ' ' ' . 2. Snnon, Th e Ultimate Hes(m rce. Populah.on growlh b> s 's anah,sis is not necessartmon ' '

d t} ily a bad thing in fa<.:t it may be helpfu l because it increases the lab 1 or force an . e pool ' ' B of potentia l human ingenuity. See also Ester oserup, The Conditions of AgnCtJ1 tura . p (Chicago: J-r opu Growth: Th e Economics of Agran.all Clwnge t l ne~ P latwn ressure . Aklin e, 1965). . .. 3. El1rJjcJt, Ehrli<.: h, and Holdren, Ecoscience: Ebrhch and Ehrhch Tl p lation Explosion. . le opu

Beyond Kyoto
JOHN BROWN_

THE CARBON CHALLENGE

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KNOWNSANOUNKNOWNS

510

PAKJ

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DtYONt ) KYOTO

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obabh- be able to bar 1t<::r levelf> at Industrialized coun tries'"~ ... pdr ~d cities in tht' :\. I , 1 fo r exaJnp .J.:.. r . d cades. .LAin on 1t ~. least in the next~~\ e Id b k surcrin<:t seas. And fan I r : tn~ countri es r es to ho ac o . . . alreadv h;we de1ens ate b. adJu tina tmgatiOu . u . ~1 11~ t I1e cro ' 1 u clim \ ,., ps can respond to c 1anges 1 ,e~ment financial f>up poi' 13 1 'I If:' deYeloping 1 thev plant. in many cases \\f,tJ1 go -... . like h to fare C.'OJ1 '-H: . .., I ' wor-.e on both " c. fifths o 1umaJ11 l ' , 15 world. home to ,our- ousands of ~pie have' already becu '. "j> 1,t((d by pc::riodic fronts. Hundreds of th , d b i tence farmers- wh o an lar If'>~ adaptive than flooding in Bangladesh. an sual ad\' truggling at the climali( rnargi n. . . . thetr ncher counterpart s-a re .re a1tJ1ougJ1 un li.ke h. wou Id h.t,e gra "e con< e d atic scen anos. ' The most r~ d. ..,terns. Rapid change. in dimat<. could up et the . quences f1or h01namt"hantJ ecoS) rorexample which. 1rom.caJly. wou ld cause much ..:c. ' : Tl . _.r,. ti fthe ' ort A anu c1 a ono rcw . northem Europe b~ weakenlllg the heat-rich Gul f Id aJ tem peratures m , eo er reg~on . forest t'Ou1d deplete dramaticall~ due to drying in the Stream The Amazon ratn . g huge ,olumes of carbon t1 IS store cl m trees. And an 1at atmosphere. m tum re1 easm . . . . . sea J .nel from melting 1 m Antarctica could occur. These ce acceJerated nse m " . . . . ,..,.., .10 not lead to cnsp ometah1 ror po)j C\. But thev mean es c UJlcert.am consequen........ u . . ,. . d mprovements in meac;urement and leammg \\111 be cruc1al. t I pre<:auti on an I 1at . .. , A sober strategy would ensure that any mcrease m the "'orld ,s. tem perature is limited to ben\'een 2 or 3 degrees Celsius abo,e the current level m the long run. Focused on that goaL a growing number of governments and experts have concluded tJ1at polky shouJd aim to stabilize C.'Oncentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere jn the l"'o:~.nge from 500 to 550 ppm over the next century, which is less titan ~ice the pre-industriaJ Je,el. On the basis of known technology. the cost of me eting this goal would be high. But the track record of technological progress in oth er fields indicates an enormous pote ntial for costs to falJ as new ideas are developed and applied . In the energy industry, for example. the c:osts of deep-water oiJ and gas develo pm ent ha,e faU by a fCK.-tor of t11ree over the last 1.5 years, dramatically extendi ng the frontier en of commerdal acth-ity. There is no reason to think that research and development in the area of benign energy systems would be less successful. Pre dicti ng where that success might come will not be eas y-but that means pro gress must be made on multiple fronts. ~~y people be~ eve that the 500--.550 ppm goal wouJd help avoid the worst ~mtties. But we must rec:ognize this assessment for what it is: a judgment mformed by current knowledge, rather than a con firm ed conclus ion to the story...

EFFICIENCY AND lRANSFORMATION

Bot bseq na.. L m tJ1 h the exa tt level of the 1"'-'41\ globa1carbon di ox1de emJssto ns ove r ttme and e suL ueot decline are unknown. We can safe ly ass um e howeve r that emisSIOJlS rom developing count will k .. . . nes eep nsmg as economicacti vity and mcomes growIn ThJS means that leade h1 . the short rs P must <:ome from the ind ustrianzed wor Icl and profitably. the .developed world can use ene rgy mu<:h mo re efTi cien~y clear ampetus for change, business could put new technolowes

w:r:

....... d sef\'it',,._ to use: cautiously at fir t but m . ....,. . ore aggresSively as th bes dentifie d and put mto practice with the norma} tu e t . h alr mover of capital t S\.'Stems are ' Bu!>mt ss as eady foun d that it is po 'bl SSI . . eratioH s. Cu unterintuitively. BP found th- t .t . e to reduce e mtss1ons from its bl O p . . a 1 v.as a e to reach 1 a1 'ts reducinp: f~1mssto ns by 10 percent below its mtti target of 1990 l . ls . h company added around S650 million of shareh~lde~v~u:~t cost. Indeed.. the reductio ns e;arnC;; from the tlimination of leaks and . t Othuse ~e bulk of the \\ as electricity generator Ent ergy. car manufacturer Toyotae. d er. finns-:-rueh as . 1in to-are ha.,ing similar experienc-es. The overwhelm' an mmma g~ant Rio . .. 1 . expenm <::nts IS tnat e ffi c1ency can both pav dhidends and mu message .from the e . . . . _ ' reduc.e emiSSIOns. Y re d uc111~ emiSSions by ... 2.~ billion tons per vear in 2.050 ill et . ffi reqm than JUSt e ctencY Imp rovements. Given the world's nsmg d " d r re more ' we must also transfo rm the enerCN sYstem itself making full.,...eman f lLOT energy - -L e: , "'' use 0 OW-<:-<U I.IUn fuels as weU as carbon.-free energy systems. Paradigm shifts must O<X:ur across the economy: transportation ac.'Coun ts for 20 percent of total emissions. indusm c-ontributes ano the r 20 percent, the domestic and commercial sectors emit around 25 percent, and power-generation acwunts for another 3.5 percent. A \\ide-ramtina 0 set of policies is thu s calJ ed for. In power generation, opti ons include switching from c-oal to less-carbon inte nsive natural gas. For example, 400 new gas plants, each generating 1.000 megawatts, would reduce emissions by one billion tons per year. Such a reduction would be difficult \Vi thin the parameters of tod.ays electricity systems----400.000 megawatts is roughly equal to all of China's electric power c-apacity, or half the installed capacity in the United States. Zero-carbon fuels '"'Ould also help reduce emissions. If 200,000 megawatts of coal-ae nerated power were to be replaced ,,;th nuclear power, car bon dioxide emissions would be reduced by one billion tons per year. Progress on the nuclear front will demand investment in new technologies. as well as a viable plan for locating reactors that ensures that radioacti,e materials are kep t out of the environ ment and beyond terrorists' reach. Coal, too , could be made carbon-free. using ad,anced power plants that gasify the fuel and the n generate power while stripping away the car~n for sequ~ tion und erground. Coal gasification could become a huge growth mdustry. China 1S among the top investors in this technol ogy. not just be<..-ause these plants ~e much cleaner, but also because they could be keystones in a program to S)llthest.ze clean liquid fuels for transportation needs. . . . More efficient buildings wou ld also resu lt in large energ)~ sav~gs,_ smce 0\e r one-third of today's ene rgy is used indoors. Given that electrification lS a cenn:-al feat ure of indust rial and postindustrial societies, innovators must tap the potential for ult ra-e fficien t electrical appliances. Investm ent in a digi tally controU ~ power grid could aid this effort by allowing major appliances to "tal k" directly "1 ~ powehr 1 'ts generators so that the whole system ope n1tes. c.oser t0 1 optimu,m. potential. Sue allowin a smart gnd '' wo uld red uc.:e losses in electnctty transmlSSlon "bile also g fulle r use of was te beat from power generators m f;actories and homes th . . . . be d tnansportation too. Gl\-en e massn-e The re are effic1 .y savmgs to ma e m enc . . . al fu ls both 10 terms of 1ts power de1lS1ty and its advantages of gasoline ove r nv e . ease of storage -tra nsp ort is unlikely to switch to new fuels m the near fu ture. More

51 2

PART 4

c o NTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

BROWNE I BEYOND KYOTO

strictest regulatory body ~ e h . ues /()r gasoline injec.:lion al!-.o l1old pror11ise ~ ing a second look. Adv~nce te~l nJ~y the road . Such \'(:hic ll's I ntve the potcn~~~ 'd I tric uaso~ne cars ,t rea 011 do I1.Ybn e ec -o . i1 , ge per gallon of their conH-ntionaI counte 111,1115 1an ea .. to get more U .t\'IICC t1le m. de nand for SJ)eed and fl exi IJiIity in air trave l, policy. c1 the increasmg COJlSllrTiel I . . ven r th 0 JpOJtunities for cutting cmtSSIOII~ f'rom aircraft. makers should also rocus on e l . . S , 'I . r . . equire ma or mves h11ents. omc Wl I . Jso requ1re new cl 1 All of these ef rorts w 1 J 1 . . . . . st begin to blllld and test suel1 systems. Only w1 evith infrastructures . 8 ut we mu nee can we decide how best to (l'1rcct our c orts. dence from actuaJ e>.pene

muld ng transportatic ,q ' f'Rcic nt, while 1. 0.c~. other ernissio11s th at promising apprm1ches w l 1 nc,llnlion. Fo '1 t11 ter lumts on r meeting t 1e eve-s c . . <l el or g<Lo;olinc ears at ("' l } r t:allon (111 pg) 1 5 example, runn ing 600 md 1 Jon ~ . bJlion fewer tons of l'll ) n dioxi de per yea. ' instead of 30 mpg wOuJd resu1t 1n a. es mean while. elf(' sn ' .e:....n that even th1. . I ffi t cJjese engm , e Advanced ultra-e cen . } world-th e Califomia Air Hc,o nn c., Board- is tak~ 111 1
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DOWN TO BUSINESS
ole of business is to transfonn possibiliti es into reali ty. And that means being pr:~~cal, undertaking focus ed research, an~ testi~g the different po.ssibili~~es in real commercial markets. The energy busmess IS now global, whtch offers a tremendous ad,antage: international companies access knowledge around the world and apply it quickly throughout their operations. But the busin ess sector cannot succeed in isoL ation. Harn essing business potential requires fair and credible incentives to drive the process of innovation and change. In responding to global warm ing, that role mus t fall to the government. Neith er prescriptive regulations nor fiscal interventions designed to collect reven ue rather than to alter behavior provide the answer. Rath er, governm ents must identi fy meaningful objectives and enco urage the busi ness sector to attain them by using its knowledge of technology, markets, and consume r pref erences. Recent experience suggests that emissions trading regi mes -whereby govemmen t sets a binding cap on total emissions , dividing the total into "emission credits'' that are given to those who emit carbon ruox:i de-a re the best policy for encouraging business. Policymakers (notably in the United States) have dem onst rated that it is possible to design such systems for other pollutants, such as sulp hur dioxide, thereby harnessing the power of innovation and the flexibility of the market to protect the environm ent, whHe avoiding crippling costs. The same insights should apply to carbon ~oxide. A well-designed trading regime would incl ude a strictly enforced cap, wbJch would make carbon dioxide emission cred its scarcer (and thus mo~e .valuable) and would there by increase the incentive for business to control emiSsions. Such a syste m would also allow firm s and hous ehol ds the flexibiUty to apply resources where they have the greatest impact, which is essential , because the best mea'>.ures for controlling carbon dioxide are hard to anticipate with precision and are Widely dispersed acros th s e economy. And a credible emission tradi ng systern would create ince t' t u . . n lves o mvest . radical new technologies the kind t 1 WJ m l~lt be cructal m buiJdi ng a carbon-free energy syste m in the future. ' Tl

,.,.,uch more likely to come through the grad ~I enc:y. '" ua process ofknt lnstead, progress is national and regional efforts on the basis of th . k 1hng together diverse e1 trac reco ] f r . achievement. The key task today is to Hnd ti th rt s o expenence and . prac ces at will lead t0 . \o\rill enabl e todays dive rse and fragmented red ti re: . a system that . Th h' f uc orts to be mon b aS IS. e story o trade liberalization overone second halfvalu ecl on a c~mthe centu ry shows that gradual ism can yield impressive results. of the twentieth At present, the nasc.:ent Eu ropean emission t di . . . . cl , l" B il . ra ng system ... IS the most advance examp e. u ton soun d mon1toring and vert'ficati . t f' h 1 . tne svstem ' on po 1c1es is the centerp1ece o t e Eu ropean effort to implement tb . . ' .l' . e commttments auopted at Kyoto . . .. T he potential for extending the scope of th t di b . . cl . e ra ng ao;e 1 m eed cons1derable, not least through the incorporation of effec:tive nc t' stl . . 1 en 1 ves 1at wt11 rewa. busmesses whose mvestments reduce emissions outs de E rd . 1 urope. sue h as m Russta and the .eme rgmg. m~rk et economies of Asia-wbere large and relative! low-cost redu ctions of em tsstons are possible. y Markets are ~merging in other regions as well. The Chicago Climate Exchange , open ed m December 2003, involves 19 North American entities that have agre ed to reduce their emissions by one percent per year over four years. Canada may yet create a market for carbon dioxide as it aims to meet the Kvoto targets. And U.S. states have become laboratories for innovation and cha~ge. For example, Massachusetts, New Y ork, and New Hampshire are adopting rules that will spur the creation of market-based emission tracling systems. Voluntary systems for measuring e missions -such as one being crafted in California-may also provide further foun dations for emission trading. There is a stronO' argument for linking these efforts. U.S. policymakers should also consider establishing a transatlantic pa1tnership to work toward a common market-based trading system. Offering positive incentives is one key contribution that government can make to sti mulate business. Another is organizing research. It is crucial to extend our unde rstan ding of the science of cljmate change: monitoring key ~ariab~es with sufficient precision to unde rstand both natural variability and the climates ~esponse to human activity. A key targe t of such work must be to understand tl1e preciSe conne~ tion betvveen the concentration of carbon ruoxide in the atmosphere and changes lll climate. Such research must also advance our knowledge of available choices: with tl1e clock ticking we cannot wait for definite answers before we take action. Gove rnm e~t intervention must take other forms too. Transforming the energ)' fi . . . syste m '..vill require new technologtes Wit h nsks that ' vilJ be too high (and bene ts .. . s too remo te) for priva te firms to pr0\11cleall the needecl investment. ThlS 1 one area h uld ak . }1 cli capac1tv s o in which the United States, with its outstandi ng tec ru >< f : f t e a . tl board m uston o resources lead ership role. Innovatio n will reqUire an across- lef rt li of key r a po o o ror basic science and technology. as we ll as tlle de' elopment .o 1 de photovoltaic k . I - . 0 uemonst ration projects. T he pnon.h.es c such wor mtu 1t me u ror . . l 'ty) fissiOn reactor t echnolnO'\ enerciV ~a. o. cells (which convert sunligl1t mto e ectnct . from biomass, and the use of hydrogen.

Em isstons trading systems need n0t h. 'd . . . e entJc appli ed untversa 11 y rrorn u~y one. The political 'real't al m every country, nor he . 1 15 1 Y tJ at we are unlikely to see t he suddl'n e rncrgence of a single regim . . . ... L e, S(;()pe and 1 comparah! C' to we e mergence of a single mlobaJ c:urr amh'tIOn , t1 would be 1at

i>l 3

514

PART4

CONTEAtPO

RARY woRLD paUTrCS

1_ . d ris~ sn,o 1ed in uch in' c.' ' tuw l . n c~mtc n ts wit!, ' . GiH' II the eo t .m ~ . -s of the futu re lta\"l t ' 'I: " -e stJ\{' to eo m. . . d cornmon \le" COlll lllOil 111t~rest'$ .Ul f )rtun ateh . there cir1. Jll,U l; f 't,'tHen ts of inte r. . llllle t 1 ('nO ~-' tnd re ources-. c f'ront Juuh-ener{!\ [>h' .... to .!stronom, tnd tesr cc ........ 1 1 nnovat:wn' .... _. . lhthOJtal rxtrtners up tn u ,..lru lenue is dilTer~nt. 1'1 I tt 1t nn olves not ,._ . Tl ulobal w:mmn . _ < o uud ear IUSso n. se~ _ T-cation of non~l techniqJJe' th rout;h prod ucts 1 1 onl; basic cience but also t l e afpp ,petition. Bu t that i!- '' ll\ tise t>roO'T"C"m of ti d the test o con . o u dlilt mu_t " 1 tStan . k 51ould u1\oh-e c:ollaboratron not Jm-t between difI rese treh utd de,-elopment .., or . . . but also between go,e nHnents cult1 busm t . fere nt countnes f l collabomthe work already und erw-ay. In :\0\ember 1 o sue 1 The re :1re examp es . . aJ , 1 . ..;.-u held in \\ ashingto n. D.C .. began tJ1e proces of .)()()3 a muu ten -1 e rneeu.uo e' ' a1 - . . . . ..s partnerships for rese.arcb on the potent! o f t 1 lwdroge n 1e buildir1u mte mat:iona.r - b'll' c; _ ~ } r . _ ..J .. ter; has aJread, pled ued Sl .' 1 1 O .er t1 next me years 0n \ 1e t'C'Cmom,. T 1e vJUt eu 5 <cl . m t1us area. A sunttr collaboration- the 1ntem abona] C ar1 Seq uestra. . . )On for wo rk .... . . , ~ d L: t:ion a...c:a ersrup f orum- is built around t1te concept of c.-1ptunng1carbon and stor_ ~ . . . . l .__ n _ Again. this sche me complements prounun 1 t 1e l.i- mte d States. 11 mg 1t geo ogiccW~ . such as FutureGen. a 81 billion public-p nntte partners1 to promote enuss1onsup free ooal-nred electricity and h;drcx!eo prod uction. Tbe e re earc b e lTorts are a rood start. but the, mus t uo hand-in -han d ''itb the creation of credible caps on :mis sions and tradinu S\'St: ms. wl1ieh ,,ilJ create the i..ncenmes to tran sform the 0 . energy system.

515 here i" fa(. neat. off- the-shelf solution f, T . . or enga~ng th d .t ere are enc.'(J l r l~g stgns of the process of ern . e e\eloptng '"-orl d But ut,..,..e 111za ti I n Cl1ina r for mou on. and lndja inf-..vnoml<: development actin g ~ a t tOl ~ c I . a1 d ' ..tral ga~ ror ('oct I rea y being put in place ras ructu re neeessary to subststute A d. rHl< } Id I v ons of t 1P ''or . t 1e spre ad of inte rnational .t nh m man ofth e 01'I -producinc . re@ . . h ec no1 IS maki . 00''1: ture and rc~mJeCt t e natural gas that is oft ~o: nu eaP . . . en assoc1ated \\ith 1 1t po sible to ,-eoting or Aanng 1t mto the atmosphere. Efforts to chan e th . Ol ~ rather than ,. ,. . land u e in the developing world are also e . g e tn<:.e ntives that aov. e ncouragmg rto the Amazon and the forests of Southeast Asia, ractical. Fr : the_ C o Basin a Jong Ph- ershlps of ~o,e:mle nts nonCTove m mental organizations' and busmp 11 esse . . .. mounts of money and skiJlfully designed incenti . s are s O"-ing. the '-'ay. Small . tu " b . ' es are deforest ation y creatmg a stake in protectin g the forests. stemmmu the tide of 0 These and othe r e fforts reA the determination of bl' ect ICS, business to tran scend t I1e h ars h and unacceptable trad puff be gove rnments.' and . h dards d e-o tween t e des1re to impro,e ~~~uw stan an allow people the free dom to use energy for heat ~ght, and mob1hty on the one hand , and tl1e desire for a clean en'vironment on the other.

BROWN I BEYOND I<YOT 0 .

UNFINISHED BUSINESS
The app ropr iate response to the faltering Kyoto Protocol is neither disma, nor fatalism . A com plet e inte rnational agreeme nt on a subject of such complexih and uncertainty is still a long way off. But as those who championed the cause oftiberal trade foun d afte r that first meeting in 1946, great causes acquire liYes of their 0\m. Consolidate d political agreements often follow, rather than lead, the realities on the ground. Taking small step s never feels entirely satisfactory. ~or does taking action \\ithout com plet e scie ntific knowledge. But certainty and perfection have never figured pro min ently in the sto~ of human progress. Business, in particular, is accustomed to making decisions in conditions of considerable uncertaint: applyina its exnerie nce and skills to areas of acmitv whe re much is unknown . That is o r ' whv it "ill have a vital role in meeting the challenae of climate change and why 0 the con trib utio n it is already making is so enco~oing.
J

D~OPmGSOUJnONS

achie,e basic leYels of de,elopment to abandon thei r aspiratio ns to grow and to improve their people's ming standards. But it wow d be equally wrong to ignore the fact that by 2()'2j. energy-related carbon dioxide e miss ions from de,eloping countries are likely to exceed those from the me mher state s of the Organization of Eoonomic Cooperation and De,elopment. Instead of being dau nted by the scale of this chaDenge, poli<..jmakers must recogni7..e the scale of the opportunity: deve loping countries ha,e the potential to leapfrog the develop ed world's pro cess of industrialization. thereby pro\iding an enormous opp ortu nity to imp rove ene rg>' efficienc.y and reduc-e emissions. So far, most international efforts to engage developing countries have focu sed on the K~uto Protocol'S CJean Development Mechanism (CD M) -a sche me that ~uuld e~e in\"est:ment by awarding emission credits for the quantity of e mis~ red~ B~ing from a particular project. In principle, the CD M was a good idea. In practice, 1t has bec-ome tangled in red tape and has requ ired governments and ID\-e sfors to do the impossible: estimate the level of emissions that would ha\e occurred in the absence of a projec.t and then to calculate the margmal effect of their actions. The onlv . . mill that . PI'Ojects that can mee t this test are small and discrete: a steel sustainahly grown wood instead of coaJ for coke, for example , or a tiny ~ _ dam that 3\'erts the nee d to build a coal-fired pow er plant. Such are unportant, but they are hardly the stuff of radical transformation.

ft would be morall~ wron g and politicall~ futile to expe ct countries stru ggling to

ae:_:

NEW ACTORS AND NEW FORCES

The mse of China: Getting the Questions Right

RICHARD K. BElTS AND THOMAS ] . CHRISTENSEN

... It is hardly inevitable that China will be a threat to American interests, but the United States is much more likely to go to war with China than it is with any other major power.... Debate about whether and how China might threaten U.S. security interests has often been simplistically polarized. Views range from alarmist to complacent: from those who see China emerging as a hefty and dangerous superpower, to those who believe the country's prospects are vastly overrated; and from those who see its economic growth as an engine for building threatening military capabilities, to those who see that growth as a welcome force for political liberalization and international cooperation. Most strategic debate about China still focuses on a few simple questions. With respect to capabilities, these revolve mainly around whether the Chinese armed forces will develop to the point that they rival U.S. military power, and whether the economic su rge-with its implications for miJita.ry transfom1ationwi1J continue indefinitely or stall. With regard to intentions. China '-''.atcbers "'ant to know how thoroughly and how soon t11e country ~.~ inte.grate mto a glo?al economy that allegedly constrains conflict; whether Bet)lng w11l adopt aggresstve aims as its powe r grows; and whether political liberalization will occur as its wealth

F f .,.,,, ..t.. Ula: etf Ulg th e Que tions Ri~t ~The S otionol 'rom Ricltard K Bctts and Thomas J. Christensen. ~c b. ' . " . . rInterest. ~o. 62 (Winter 2000/01). pp. 17- 29. This arti<'Je 1s repnn ted \\ith me n.rnUS)10TI o -""" Nalional Interest. All right rr crved.

517

ENSEN I THE RISE OF CHINA G

5 18 PART 4
CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLm CS .

E111NGTHt

. ~the r the Peop les Hup11ll!:c of C.hma f PH C) grow . Con cem also zeroes Ill o~ w 1 J= ha.( the ability to take Taiwan ?Y fo~cet.l most basic lcvcl, but th ey .1:1 tJ.,. Y.'ronv r11 uesh ,., cse are re le,'ant (1. ons at .1te e Tlw mos t \\Orri'itHlle pc,\SJ.>J.1. 1 Jti<s are ehat ones to genera te progress In a mature u e C tions, and I>d Wff n ~~1 b t and . t thes .JUCs ann . . tl10se tlta t Jc bcvond the answer:; oh t chn t can ' ' h. pose a grave proI,ItJn f'vcn if. it 1 t .c ''Points The tmt IS l a J ' comp acen ' 1 ' . . . 11 th<' Ame rican model. dc><'s not i11tcncl to c:omdoes not beco me: a JTII 1 Jtary power o .I '1 I' . . t glol)al econo1nv anu 1 JcraJ. 1 J.t.cs no 1t1call y. S. nni. nteg rates ll1 o a '' mJt ag.e;ress~n.dJS . uJd (: e a dangcrou ~ c:onAict ()\'er Taiwa11 ewn if it l11m s larlv the UJlJte . tates <.:O a<.: l .1 1 m/~hat Beijing lacks the capaci ty to conyuer t Je IS ane .

WILL CHINA'S MILITARY POWER RlVAL AMERICA'S?

There is little disagreement that the People's Libe r~tion Army (PLi\), a generic: designation for all the Chin ese ann ~c.l forces, remaJ~S a tl1r: adb arc fo rcc, well below Western standar<h. Pocket~ of exceiJence notw1thstandmg, HH>st personnel are poorly educated and train ed. Wea po~s systems are old, ancJ ev~n those acquired most recentJy are inferior to those m Western arse nals: Many umts spend a good deal of time in non-military activities; staff.s do not pract1 complex, largece sc:ale operation s; exercises and training regi mens are limited; and equipm ent is not well maintained. Even according to the highest estimates , de fcnse spend.ing per soldier is low by First World standards, indicating the dom inan ce of quantity over quality in the Chinese forces. Tht: main clic;agree ment among Western analysts of Chinas military is abou t whether the PLA is poised to move out of its unimpressive condition and into a new era of modernity, efficienc;y and c;ompetitiven ess, as anticipated economic refo rm and growth translate into military improve ment. ... For China to develop a military on the model of the Unit ed States would be a tremendous stretc:h. The main issue is not whe ther Beijing wiJI have high defe nse budgets or access to cutting-edge technology. A rich China 1night weU be able to acquire most types of advanced weaponry. Deeply ingrained habits of threat assessme nt in the U.S. defense community enco urage focusing on thes e fa<.:tors. U~fortun ately, however, basic "bean counts" of manpower and units and the qua lity of weapons platforms are poor measures of truly modem military capabi H More ty. fu?dame ntaJ to_ that a~~ssme nt is whether the PLA establish men t is capable of ~sn~g wh~tever mcrease m resources it migh t receive to buHd the compJex supportmg mfrastru tture necessary to make Chinese forces competitive in com bat. ... . If the ~LA remains se<;ond-rate, should the world breatJ1e a sigh of relief? Not enhreJy.. F1rst Ame rican m'l'tary t LI power IS not tue only relevant stan dard of compan~n. Othe r armed forces 10 A th 1 p t I . . S at t 1e LA cou ld come up against are mucrl la <: oser to the Chmese standard than t th A . ( h 0 """'h 1 -'I I.. e men c:an. T is is true even of.Taiwan,s t "'"' no e>gl\AU Ysop ushc ated lt C!~-- d tJ U . d ml 1 ary, wh<>se long isolation has eroded its quality. ) JCUJ O 1e nJte States has g10 baJ . cl ..r mte rcsts an d ofte n finds itself distracte d or pm ne uOw rl In other regions Th. d h Ch. bilities to cope 'th th IT t e mese do not need to match U.S. capaWJ em. Rather than trying to mat ch an Am eric an revolution in

5111 . . ry affairs tiJc:y 1n1 do better to devel ght ro11 ,ta 0 P a counter_ . . .\ . . . . . etrical -.t l':l.teg1 options on vari ous p ..... f I c as)111" . a. ,.s <> t JC tcch rt'\ o utum ~)\ d, ..1c..mg 1 ' : rcunwen t lJ S. advantages. no (I!Slc:a\ \{X"ttnun that call cl I one such (.'\am p e cou Id be "cybtrwar'' a Aks . h ~l4t on the oom I - ~ ......-~ation svstems t hat stitc es Ame rican mil.lta . in,~.O " r ry supenorit:v t P f-1(L ntt:v.ork of uld be the u')C or new weapons like land attack cruis t : . ogHnt:r. Another eO pons such ao; nava l min es to impede Ame n''"' ma sstles or lO\.,.er te:ch ,,.ea I .. ~n . . ther could he t 1e mod1fication of China's no fia<.X:ess to the reg~.on. St!U t . anO . . rs -use poht\ 0 \ ,,eapons. makmg an exce ption fo r repelling an imasion of Ch , n nn~ ear ts h lthougI1 1t a Imos t umm agma ble tat China would use l mese t~'>rntor\ , A . . . ,. . I . [ nue: ear '' eapons m an effort to gam po 1hca concessiOns ram Taiwan, it migbt threaten their li.S. military action on beh alf of the island. . . . use to deter Tai_wan is both the ~ost dangerous_~d most likely instance of Chinese power projectio n ( mo:e ~n wh1ch below), but 1 lS not the only one. China has oonteivable t points of conA1ct 1n several _rlaces that would not require its forces to cross large bodies of wate r. and whe :e 1t would not be facing opposition as potent as Taiwan's military. Although less !Jke ly than conflict over Taiwan, an imbroglio in K orea would be scarcely less .dangerous if tbe Pyo ngyang regime were to t.'OUapse and South Korean or Am~ncan for~es were to move into tbe vacuum without Beijing's agreement. Far too little atte ntion has been focused on the odds of miscalculation in a con fuse d si tuation of this sort. The PLA does not have tbe American army 's logistical capacity, but even a half century ago it managed to project a force of hundreds of thou sand s of men deep into Korea. WhiJe the Chi nese navy is weak, some of its neigbbors' na.,.ies are weaker stilL Two of these neighbo rs, Vietnam and the Philippines, have outstanding sovereignty disp utes with C hina and have not fared well in naval skirmishes in the past three dec ad es. We also cannot rule out tbe possibility of a land attack. The PLA did poorly in its invasion of Vietnam over twenty years ago, but the Vietnamese army is now less than half th e size it was then, and the Vietnamese economic base is far more infe rior to Chi nas than it was in 1978. Logistical limitations wouJd hamper. but not prec lude , PRC action in Mongolia, or in the Russian Far Eas t if that regio.n were to fall out of MosCO\-'Is effective control. Granted , conflict over these plac.'CS 15 improbable. The pro blem is that the same could ha\e been said of most wars befo re they hap pen ed.

QUESno~s RICKr

WILL CHINA BECOME THE WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMY?

'tv: a's MUitary pote ntjaJ grows out of eco~ omJ C capacJ . . Chi-~ eeonomv like its miliit bas ~n the fastest tary, is neither to be e nvied nor deru grated. In recent be } 'd t in the Jate . . growmg maj or eco nomy m the wor Id Unr1l 5trains . cam.e evi en ...re and to th futu loon h. h vth rates straight mto e """S, it was common to proJect 1g gro' t . ) the twenty 6.rs cenhrv But China's ~~ r see China's GN P surpassing Ame nca s ear Ym L of ts prob lems the man} 1 economy faces dau nting challenges. An d e\,en if it sol\es the f~its of <TrrMth touse . Central governm ent may e-not have suffiClent contro10\er them for military coe rcion. .

520

PART 4

coNTMPO

RARY WORlD POUTICS

aETfS AJ~l> CHRJSTENSEN I

Charact cril.<

THE RISE OF CHIN A: GE I liNG THE QUESTIONS RIGHT

. . : I' , t 1ere are no unist, Par .1. . d . . t\' mamtmn s stab1 1t) unn g the transiti.on measures work an d tJ1e CO111111 . . .0 ,,,.11 be exnensi,e espewilly for a central governme nt that' t1 u:' process ofd owg s r . a tar snuille . perce1 e of G ~ P than do Western governme nts. As China r tag t ak u1 es I grows through capitalist refOI~~s , Beijing must s'crarnble to flnd new way s to tax prhate wealth. Howe,er ineffic1ent they may ha' e been. large :-;tate-owned ente.~ prises pro,ided a hu-ge portion of govemr:1ent revenu es. Th~ soft loa~s tha t oflcials forced government-owned banks to gJve to these ente1ynses funct10ne u as an indirect tax on families. wbi<.:h. before Chinese membersh1p of the V/T O , had no alternatives to tl1e tate banks. If the Party is successful in demolishing bot h the monopoly of state-owned banks and the sturdy safety net for state-owned enterprises. it ,,~11 need to raise money else-where for the govemm~n t ope rating budget. That budget, in turn , will be strained by increases in weHare spe nding needeu to maintain sociaJ stability-pensions for the une mployed and reti red, and compensations to the military for its lost sollfces of legal and illegal revenu e .. ..
11

. I . 1 . , I the I11~ 1es1 c' ;p ill th<' '' l>rld lo'1 1'1<:apita wcalth . \'e n if Clun:l at ue\C< . th tco nld lw J'(':tll<)(,ll u t-J t ll' lllilit:uy . .. . 1 .. wlluld f>CI'Sist, Iu111t1n~ d'spc>saule uJc:ome ,,~! ill\nhe x,!Jtc 1ll' n "' HH a~ures .. .. swh gru l ' Is il'': tilable to spur'" t -c>wnecl c>nl1 " ~ l otofthctnt>lhOl t et1>ri'-t' s thnt tlll'latf'n to lc- 1v,. . 1 c u . as r<'fonn of. the nnrulcJ, 5e<tor rult s a ctsj'ohlc:ss. Tlu;se \\o nkl ,ou tllw " , r.mks of' the 1 1 so f'ad litional ur1 1esc" 11 ><ln tensofnltlon c !0<) Juon tlreuck in sca re1 of k. Sumlar [)roh1 \\'or . . 1 < Aoating popuj atJon f 111cre tt<lll 1. . . nu ,-er:tll size of tliC' PLA (nPvdcd for > 1.. tlw 0 mod.T I 1111'I'ta " as cut m.ICK.'i 111 . . lem. :wect tle ~ ' . al' . ) . "".at e yet more d1sgruntk d ci!Jt.ens. 1o n1 . tain ct111 . 1 ofesslon v;,1t10n er" 1 ennzauon anc pr . 'I r ~ 1 -. r bJ )'jj '1:\'fes especliU \' 101. 0 Illc"'r. . tJ1e militan Ot'< .'<lll le <ependent on busi. corntorta c J CS. . . I ' o'llling croods oth PI"~se suhj<'Ct lo hig h tarifTs. Jf' .f , o tJ."1IC and hu'O'e-sea e s1111101"' nes ac 'rdi~ J J 0 ffi ISO ('!'SaT<.> tOStl)' 111 unifonn ' then, tl1e miUtarv units need to b, < a> e . . cers an<. _ . der to illlJJiemcnl :'uccessfuiJy the plan to get tltc PLA subsJdrzed at a 1 1 lclt<> In or ug 1 .-,: out 0 f (,'()JllJ1le fCliU1cthities and back into the b<m<lcks. E I ' r. 11 . rtl . a . ... . . e1sv vavs out f'or Bel) mg. ' en t .l g10\\ 1-spurnng i\ IJ i a 1

or

WILL CHINA BE PACIFIED BY GLOBALIZATION?

To pessimists steeped in realpolitik, a rich China will necessarily be a threat , because economic power can be translated into military power and power generates am bition. To optimists impressed with the revolutionary imp)jcations of globalization, however, a more powerfuJ China v..iU not be a threat because it wi ll have too mu ch to ]ose from disnJpting international trade and inveshnent. The latter vie\v is more corn m on in the \\'est than the_ fonner, which seems to many to reek of old thi nking. . The _nohon that a web of comme rcial ties discourages war, how eve r, is ttself q~te old, if not exac.-tly venerable. It was popularized by He nry Th omas Buckle ~n _ 18.50s, by Norman AngeUjust a year before Wo rld V 1 the Var erupted, and aga.m m the 1970s. when interdependence was said to have red uce d the utility of force. AI Gore quoted his father as sa)'l ng "When goods do not cross borders, armies wiJI." The argu~ent this time around is that the proposi tion is fina lly true bec ause t he nah ue of mterdepe d . t n enc-e has changed m a crucial way. A cen tur y ago 1 was

<l hy vertical trade between at l bet\v 'mpen centers a d 1 fina jJroclud s een wealthier nations a .1 r . . n eo omes, trade in tinu port101 mvest much mu1 e c.l irect investm ent and transna d10 . menl!s. "l'--' y there is .1 vua ona1pro uchon of goods h' h r a arowing in terpene tration of econom ies . tb w 1c 10sters o ' ,1 ' m e sense that o part or anothe r. ' With the PRC, Taiwan Ja d th '. ne economy owns ieces of < 'ach oth er, how can they figh t ~thpoaunt,dant ~ Uruht~d States aU owni ng P . the Chinese eI1te make more and more money es roymg t e1r own prope rty') A5 f b'l al . . . I . d . rom ' ater mvestments u1 T<UW<ln, Slln p e g1ee WiJ.I prevent buffing and puffing f , . ram crossmg the 1, toWl nne . war I oughJy enmeshes the PRC in the 1 baliz If develo pm ent t 1or d 0 fore, peace wi ll follow. g .e economy, thereThere are at least t\vo problems with this latest version of t d tJ b 1 . m er ependence theOJ)'- One IS 1a~ ~t '1. s1de_s m a political dispute have a stake in not overturning profitable econon11c mtegration. The PRC might not wan t to kill LL e g Id . . . u o en goose, but ne1~her '.vould Tmwan ~r the ~~ted Stat~s. Why, t11en, should Beijing be any mo re ruooous to ~a.ck down .m a cnsiS than Trupei or Washington? Mutual depend ence makes a political confltct a game of chicken, in which each side ex'PCcts the other to bow to the stakes, and in which collision may result rat11er than concession. The second problem is that the re is little reason to assume that sober ec.'O nomic interest 'vill necessarily override national honor in a crisis. A tough stand by Beijing may be viewed from the inside as essential for regime sunival. eve n if it is not seen by detached observers as being in China's "national interest." In an imbroglio over Taiwan, which cap ital s will feel the strongest emotional inh ibitions agains t backing down? Beijing and Taipei both have a greater material, mor al and historical stake in the outcome than does the United States. The global economy does indeed change logical incentives to compromis e io poHtical conflict, but not to the degree that it makes Beijing likely to be mo re "reasonable" than anyone else. Economic globalization does not eliminate the high priority that nations place on their political ide ntity and integrity. Drawing Chi na into the web of global inte rde pendence may do more to encourage peace t11an war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fea r of economic consequences.

521

WILL CHINA BECOME AGGRESSIVE?

Whether China has aggressive motives is what most polic>:makers want to know abo ut Be ijing's strategic inte ntions. Optimists say the answer IS no, because the PRC is ideologically anti-imperialist and seeks only respect as a status quo gre at power. . . . , er PesstmJsts say the answer ts yes , because . see tlune- set of Chinese grudges and tera .. . 1, ritotial am bitions are on hold only for a lack of confide nce in capabthty, or sunp) because all great powers tend to become aggressiVe ' ,hen the, get the chance. 1 But such focusi ng on the unh.keIYoddsof de )'berate aggressiOn diverts atten. h lik 1' and almost as dangerous. tion from possibilities that are botl1 mu r more e ) . th . or d . aries vtew etr m~n behavt Most countries viewed as aggressors bYt1 a \ers . 'lelf .. rl l B ... 1 a tiger . wruting. about t o set s m as defensive and legitimate. \\ 1et ter etjmg . t . t the most re1 n question No eva out delibe rate ly on a pre datory rampage, ts no
J

522

PART 4

coN TfM PO

RARY WORLD PO W IC~

sf.'J I;, n

ow

... .. _ . .... ....... ...

u::. K.l!>t:. OF CHINA: GEm.NG THE QUESnONS RfGHT

, . I . d NS have an int nc ~t 1 1 ' I rnlrlj ll<'it of tlr<; e\ridc ncc su,;ge:-.Is tl1 tl Ch' nese ea l)o n Boll<tpw tc , (Jr A I'JIf I I 1 < ' . ' r j( rnodl 1 0 . cu 1 . c his Khan , P "' ' '>} ,en sort praehc . . . . Vi ~ . k ,d 1g, pcssJJms.ts 1. Kai ser V ll tehn c; ( ' ' ' tT.V. 1.. ~ 1 Cc n na 11 y" . s . more o1ten 111vo c . '>} bl u ng great power erntr ~rw r::!tJ a \.,..o rJd alrc~auy century ago. eh111 1s a late-. oom.l , Is a eo nti ne ntal ptl\\ ' r ~lll . 1 l(, . .. .. JJ by ear1 aJ rr v~t rer . tJ II< cd hy olh<r ordered Stlategrei.l Y . , UUt indi\'iduaJhw nkr r (,, 1tl1 tJJ(: l'X(;tptic)IJ or . er powers WI10 ctre Coll ectr vely .strougpall) a biJ StJ illg (.'I) Ufl ll) ' W J( 1 j )' I gn at C'X J1<:t:la tions Sta I UIllre cl . . tes and, per 1' 1P5 . <1t" rJ1ational t 1C .. I ' p (~cki llg on J< t c,,, 1 wrtlr rcgarc l (() r I )' . . fi d 'th 1 place Ill t le rn " 'ts I ssa c1 trs e wr . t. al prest1ge an d rcspect Th e CJUCSt for a rightful "pia<.' <. iH the !>ll n'' will il mtcma 10 ~ . I r . ' is argued, mevrtab y .os ter growrng fric:tion with Japan , H11ssia Indi a or the Unil<d States. . . cl . s Ophm1sts o not l1ave a ),ard tim e brushing off thi . analo~y to a stat<.: of a dil:. .. . . . difc ent con tinent at a different tun e, a lon g-gone e fercnt ctr 1 e on a rer ru when tw . . 1 . . . . . tJ m r0 r civilized intern atronal bt' havJOr. T 1e1r be nrg 11 view lm pc rra1 Ism was le nor 11 . . . . . . . ' . uc 1 prnent arr 1 trade \VIII rnevrtably make Ch1n ,t fat an .I t hat cco nom1c d happy ve o u . .' .. .1 . ~,. unrnteresleu rn wrc>wrng its weight around, stnkcs them as c:o1 nrnon sense. It . . . could him out to be tru e. Jt is more an art1d e of fa1th , l~owe ve r, than a pred1ction grounded in historical experi ence. Th e United States, for exa m ple, i~ quite interested in gaining the goodies from globalization, ye t on the wo rld stage 1t so me tim es throws its weigh t around witl1 righteous ab~ndo.n .. , . Ind et:d. the most disturbing analogy for Chrna s future hc hav . 1or may not be Genrrany but the United States. If China acts with tl 1c same de gre e of ea ution and responsibility in its region in this centu ry ac; the United States <.}jd in its ne ighborhood in the past century, Asia is in for big trouble. \Vashing ton intervened frequ ently in Mexico, Central Am erica and the Caribbean for reac;ons most Americ;ans consider legitimate, defensive, altruistic an d hu mane . Th e Un ited States and its allies in Asia, however, would see co mparable Ch ine se regional policing ac; a mortal threat. Even if China does not throw its weigh t aro un d, th e fact that there are other~ who can respond to the growth of Chi nese po we r setc; up the possibility of a classic spi ral of tense actions and reactions. Chi na laces alliances involving the United States, Japan , Au stralja and South Ko rea, am l po tentia l all iances in Southeast Asia.
('J
J

5Z3

WOULD CHINESE LIBERALIZATION GUARANTEE PEACE?

Many as~ u.me tJ~at as long ac; democratization accompan ies th e growth of Ch iuese powe~.Cht.na WJJl not necessarily pose a security chall enge. Th is wo uld hold true t>ven tf Chma proves able to maintain high lev cb of econ om ic au d techn ological growth, a healthy degree of government accumulatio n of the ine rt:asin g natio nal w~t~ ~d , thereby, military modt:rnization. This the ory of the de mo cratic ~ t~at deve!oped democracies virtually never fight one anoth er- is c.:u rre ntly e ~ost ~flue ntJal poHtical science theory among Am eri can for eig n policy elites. Even 1f. we accept the d L emocratic peace t 1 ry at fac e value the re are sever al 1eo probJCfnS With app)vin 1 t0 Ch 't . really li ". g ma. F1rst, as Fa reed Zakaria has 'no ted . the theory app 88 only to hheral de ntocra de s on the We ste rn ntodel, on es with restra intc;

IJt action an d !;Uarantees of mino 'nh nty just i l ' C:OI ICC . al)Iy turn in an illiberal d' nF,11ts Dcrncx:ratizat' r1 IV :t' h IOI J m""' 11na 1 co goslavia I ran or oth er un plca.c;ant exa m~pJL... rrc~ JI<Jn , on .t. y ; mc 11 . . ....., Vlo ent actrvJScn. xlcl of post-Ttto 1 Sec.:oncl ll< dc..: mocrat1c peace tll(.:ory do s t , c y ern oc rad e'i Jnust recognize each oth er as demO<;no : app1 clearl y t( 1 1 D , r h 1 J t VJ war. . t. rac1e~ ror l c tne;orv to , prnl J. Th ev also Imv<.: to v1ew cacu other as leg,itimate ind ~ . 1 ,. ' Y 1 . ' epenue:nt an d sovere;1gn i1 1tcs ~ta "-Jo ma tte r 1ow many Arne nc.:ans and Taiwa nts~ bel' ~ th . . . h' . . teve at Truwan IS or 'ihould be a sovc re1 state, t IS Vle w IS w1dcly reJcctcd on the ro.,: I gn .... n an d (an d . not a pre;rnLse IS of pac;t or c.;11 rrc nt U.S. po 1 ). icy Third , while lih cral democracy is paci~c the pro fh . .1 t.. . I dd .. . , ces~ o ecorn mg a ue mocracy c.;a n ue v10 ent an estab1 lr7.mg. This is part.i<:ula rlv tnJ e of de .. L 1 kd 1 cl 'vi.! . / mocrah7 g states tna t ac. eve opc Cl SOCieties, indepe ndent news .Jn media, heaJth outle ts for popu lar gncv~nc~s, and _ marke tplac:e for ideas where <.:ou a ntervailin g ~ews c.-arr be ue batcd. Th1s g1 el~tcs inc: ~ntives to manipulate populist ves or nationalist the n;~s an~ ~o ado~t tough 1.nternat10nal policies as an eloctoral strategy. :~ I ~~e Ch mc se Commu n1st Party has behaved like many autho ritarian regimes, but w1 much more s uc:c.:ess. It has systematically prevente th d the ric;e of both an indep ende nt press and a civil society. Although the foreign press has pe netrated China, dom es tic: politi cal publkations are still stri c.-tly <.:ir<:um scribed bv t11e state. As the ... cra<.:kdown on the Falun Gong de monstrates, the Party is afraid of any group that organizes for any purpose without state sanction. regardless of how apoliticaJ it ap pe ars to be. Th e Chine se gove rnm ent's concerns about its legitimac.-y are not me re expressions of paranoia. Th e intensity of criticism of the leadersh ip that one hears privately in plac.:es ranging from taxi cabs to governme nt offices is astonishing. Aware ness of its unpopularity gives the governme nt in Be ijing incentives to use na tionaU sm as a replacement for the now holJow she ll of com muni~t ideology. But the Party is also aware that nationaHsrn is not an inert tool to be pulled out of a kit and ma nip ula ted at the whim of the government. It is doub le-edged. Vo~atile a~d potentially uncontrollable, especially on emotional issues sucb as rela.t!Ons w1~ Japan an d Taiwan , natio nalism is powerful enough to prop up a <."'~r_nun1s t party m a capitalist socie ty, but it could also severe ly damag~ the _ra rty i1 lt "~~ re tu~~d agai nst the state. Officials in Beijing are aware that nation~IJ Sm ~vas a maJOr force 111 the Co mm un ist Pa rty's overthrow of the Kuomintang. as 1t wa s m the 1911- 12 revol ution tha t ove rth rew the Qing dy na sty . . [! .. . In the early phases of democratization , China should be npe odr JLndgofliSm . . 11ypernationalism could be expI01te cl to mo bl popular support an to e ect 1ae . . th . 't nee of irredeutist c1 . ns, ancl the au criticism of th e sta te esp eci ally gtven c eXJs e . . . . , . .. . I' . ,. th mainJand and m Truwan. lfd emocdange r ol ethn1 c an d reg1 al sp lttlsm on . e f ak . titu on tions. political leaders ratization we re to oc cu r in the curr~nt eo~ tex t~ a1'% nationalism in ways that and opposition parti es would ha :e mc~n~~~es t .~~hough perhaps C')mical. arguco uld de stabilize the region. In lact. thiS1 a favon e, f 5 lt. artv democfaC\.. t.. P me nt offe red to foreig ne rs 1Jy commum st opponents o 1 mu 1 , . . . Chinese Jemocratization 1 ~ I 'bl scenanos Ill w,uCil l11 ere are , however, p aus1 e . . Id make the mainland more aJ tJ m1g11t red uce intematt.on <.-onutc:t Democrati7.atwn cou off . b'o 1 ered to Truwan. th us . ork Im agina tive with regar<.l to t he framev.r s for unmca I

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R.ARY WORLD POLITICS

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I H t.

PART 4

CONTEMPD

KISE OF CHINA: GE1 1LNG THE Q' re .......

V&;.,;)

. I:tiH I . Illort I , l", et . I . > I mirht :tlso ut:tke tltt pro~pt I , 1 o:land :, dipl oJll<tllt :u \\ nlt."Ill b11l l1a1 pos11C' 1 :-- blttoT:uw :ul:tll< <li.;to ttr.l I ll ' > tlnt.t :-' tl it.; Oj)!>osil<': a J'l'11 ''''t t I I>r 1 I' I>y 1aiwan tt' I ' 1 n' hkc 1 1,\11 v . . .;ibilitv is not ncc'<ss:m )' 1110 . .- 1. 1.1 . that 111Iifi(ation w1th the llt<unln11d u 11 dc r . . 11 . . . 0 \1 llleltJ Oll:l1Jt ( tll ~ . . I . I that the i:dan< tas 1t~ ' II . 1 that cknt ocra t it.<tlWII nu t w Ill:ti il and is a . . . nt<.'<'<-'J>Ia > e. ,lilt . I I' . . .111 v circJunstanccs ts 11 < e . closin~ wJJ t< nw o oppo rlt iilll)'. w1tl the 1 ' . . . . I Tuiwan mav st '1 J . threa tto1m waiw scgo(u . ' cltiC''~<I <L'i the \ Vc!>ts S\li1J X1llv for T;uwan 's 1 I< 1 1 1 " " e1 ce hopes of gaining lr1J~ Jfl{ <'~)< I . .. t nifkattOll hal dens. . oprx.>sJtJou o tt . . JOcJatization < " .~ellltiiil'. s it< I1 r<'ars 011 1'aiwan L 1 . nnc en . ~ JfA nleJtC.. , IS VJCW m;unU . 1c1 Stti" S ri sk war to l)J'('\ 't'lll I . cll I a ( <' lll<)('rat-K faiwan ' w Id the 111tec ... . 011 are well PIaccu. f I rut o a arg<'l. JenlOCrltic China? The nwin reasons a pns ide 11 t fro111 I)ecornrng l ' ~ 1 .. , Anlc ricans around action iu dde nse ol Taiwan's , >I 11 CUl.lcntly use. to Jno1 JZC . . cou c . . Mmv obse rvers VI<.'\\'<l <.'Jllo t: racv as 1~tuwan . s r 1 IclllocracY wouJd s1ntp1 ClsappeaJ. .t ( . .,.. l rnrest sccunt)' tssct., 1' .. s( it incrC'ctses U.S. supp01t. Tl1e. are right. But it oecau )li"<.?; d '. . tl t Jrovides Taiwan 's sccurit ; it is t Ill' CUITt nt contrast is not JUSt emocr.tcy ta l . . .. . . .,..mwan .s. <emoc1..1C)" Hld the mam land .s aut1 . clll.t nlslll . . . . . lOllt between , 1
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Chi n.1's ~rowing pow N causes so many hcachchcs I ~I . lii S arc' 1 use 1L~ lit rat . , . ('u)1 t 1 'tliJ>IicatL< not y car. But before one latncnt argt: )' >eta '} . tl , . f <~le I I .I s lE: rtS(' 0 c llllC c po < 011, sho11lt to ns1<. <r an even more tlll<.:<'rlain altern ar 1 Cl . W{ r. 1 . . . '.111 Csc weakness and ol!Hj )S('. 1 ot Inng Old . t 1 ctll1s 1<\t Chmas marc h to rrrc ' te. . c . . .1 I . cl PO\\ Ct sttllu s <:annot lw derailed. S('ve rc ec.:onomte uts ocat1 on and political fr cr ncnt t' II 11 t . J , . 1 1 , ' r. HO\\ count ry Jnl o < tSOJ< Cl, am t 1e <.;entral gove rnment <.;ouH r ro ,\con cou. c t1d the t . , . . , . .. . . . . " 1 v oo cn pp1 to use external ad~c ntut cs _ J c~Uy supper t and mamtatn unity. Hard-bitte n realisc.; should to ts hesitate h<.'~on" _h_opm~ for such d~!vc lopm enls, howt'ver. The last time China was we<\k and <.bsu ntf1c d- m the era of warlordism and revolution .n the firs t half of the i twentie th cen tury- it was a disaster, not only for China. but also for international peace and stability.
('!

NOTES
PP H 6-7. 2. John M. Owen IV, Libem l Peace. U/;eral War: Amelica11 Politi cs and lntemntic mnl Security (lthaca, NY: Corncll University Press, l99i). 3. Edward D. Mansfleld and Jack L. Snycler. "Democratization and the Danger of War.'' Jnt ema l ional Secw ity (Summer 1995 ).
1. Hichard Hosecrancc. The Hise of the Tradi11g State (:--Jew Y ork: Basic Books. 1 986).

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM

Optimists 011 the China challenge are often guil ty ol' ccmt radic tOJy argumen t~ .. On thro ne hand, they argue that Chjna will only beco me a dangNous cn<'m y d the United States treats it like onc>. At the same time , they atte mpt to de monstrate why China will not be able to develop the militmy capacity to pose any appreciable threat to us fo r a ve1y long time . ll ow <.;an Cltina be both hope lessly weak and potentiaJiy dangerous? There are ways to square this circl e by asking tbe righ t questions. C hina can pose security challenges to the United States even if it is unlikely to narr ow t l1e gap in military power. This is true because of geography; because of Arnc riea's reliall(;c on aJHances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U .S. forces, U.S. regional allies, anJ the Ame rican homeland, even whil e losin g a war in the technical. miutary sense. Optimists are correct to focus on Chin ese intentions and the potc ntially pacifying infinences that the United State s aud othe r iute rnational acto rs can have on China. But they often assume too much abou t th<:' positiv<:' effe cts of globalization, interdepe ndence aud political liberalization, beca use they unde rcstimnte die ~ole of nationalist emotion and the possi bHity of misp ercc ptions and inad vcrte m:e 10 war. They aJso forge t that interdepe ndence is a two-way stree t that restrains not only the Chinese, but China's potential adve rsaries as wel l. In addressing the China chall enge, the United Stat es need s to think hard ahout_ thr~ related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war thro ugh prudent, coerctve diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails third how t . . o end cnses anu1 term tnate war at costs accepta1 1 t0 the J e Umted States and its allies ....

JvtvKAvL~lK I EUROPE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

527

Europe Without Illusions

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

I1 was

e nof If1

"'mstitution that allmcted op7w~ition lmt its ~ ""' l'J,, 101' "" ll'rlflt' "' , 'J su

style and symboli.s111

The people of Fran<:e and the Netherlands have spo~en. Th e constitution is dead, Turkish membership is too, and progress in areas from services <leregulation to Balkan enlargement will now be hard . ... It is time to view Europe as it really is. Far from demonstrating that the EU is in dedi11e or disarray, the c1i.sis demonstrates its essen tia l stabi)jty and legitimacy. The central error of tJ1e European constitutional framers was one of style and symbolism rather than substance. The constitution contained a set of modest reforms, et ve1y mucb in line with European popular preferences. Y European leaders upset the emerging pragmatic settlement by dressing up the reforms as a grand scheme for constitutional revision and popular democratisation of the EU. Looking back in 50 years, historians will not see the referendums as the end of the EU-not even as the beginning of tJ1e end. The w1ion remains the most successful e.xpetiment in political institution-building since the second world war. Historians will see instead the last gasp of idealistic European federalism born in the mid-1940s, symbolised by the phrase "ever closer union," and aimed at establis~ng a United States of Europe. It is time to recogn ise that the EU can neither asp.tre to replace nation states nor seek democratic legitimacy in the same way nahons do. The current EU constitutional settlement, which ha<; defined a stable balance , .. . . . between Brussels an cl na t'tona1cap1ta) s an cl democratic legitimacy through rndlrec.t ~ccountabtlrty and extensjve checks and balances, is here to stay. To see why tht.s 1s so we must unde1stan cl tl1e natu re o f t1 current constitutional c:om1e . pr~mJse, ~he reasons why European leaders ealled it into question, and the deeper . . essons tl1JSteaches us about the limits ofEuropean mtegratJOn. v, t' 0 mg patterns in t11e recent rer ection leren dums. were a re B . of three related . . motivations that have dom . t d ma e every EU election in history. First is ideological t extremism Th . l .1 I e cen re supported E and left, which .urope, w l J e t 1e extre me right t now account fo aJ . .1 r most one t urd of the F renc I1 anu D utc h e1 ectorates voted .. no." . Seco d . . ' . uJ n JS protest votmg against h unpop ar governmeuts. 1 turd, and most unpor. tant is a reacti f' l on agamst t e . , business, the educated eltte and ms~cw:ty e t by poorer Europeans. Whereas wealthier Europeans favoured the constitution,

Qfthe author.

And~ Moravcsik, Europe Without Jllusio ~

M

ns, Prospect, Issue I12 (JuJy 2005). Reprinted by pcnnission

526

. 1 se ho fearf1II of1 unemployment, labour market reform , go bal'satton pri,ati ;.f10 1 r L .. t 1 o f .we we 1 state opposed it 10 da , h ~a n are 1uatJon d the conso ) t e e c:oncems do' etaiJ .1 . . .J an . vith the pen.:e1vcu economtc anu cultural threat posed b , \,f 1 . . . ) f cli ff' he primary political probl .vtus Jm 1mm1gration ' E r This type o sa ection IS t em IOr uropean go\'cm. cl b 't . . J: . r .. rnents toel ay, smce 1 IS wrecte oth against poor eco nomtc penormance and cl . -' . . r . against retOJ m measures ues1gne to 1mprove it. As Fareed z k . b a ana o serves. the , 1 h "E ... ~ ' . . S tr:tgedy 1 t c~t m ope neec s more of what s producing populist paranora: econom1c ' to survlVe m an era oreconomk eompetition young . . . reform unmtgrants to sustam 1ts . . cl a more strategtc relationship with the M 1 h' h social market, an ' us lll1 worId w 1c would ' be dramatically enhanced by Turkish membership in the EU.'' . tself. The constitution 1s Forgotten in the. electoral chaos was the document 1 , after all, a conservative text containing incremental improvements which consou~ dat: E~. developmen ts of the past 20 years. The "no" campaigns conceded the des1rability ~f t~e mode.st reforms from the start-including the foreign minister, stronger ar~ti-cnm~ p~hcy and strea.mlining of voting procedures. Such changes are populru, not least rn France, which proposed most of them. One is forced to conclude that this document became controversial not because its content was objectionable , but because its content was so innocuous that citizens saw a chance to cast an inexpensive protest vote. What were they protesting against? Here, too, the referendums cannot be viewed as plebiscites directed at the EU's poucies. Though the EU is associated ... with labour market and welfare reform, these matters remain firmly within the competence of the member states. The EU's activities as a whole, while they include oversight of state subsidies and trade policy, may just as reasonably be seen as part of a European effort to manage globalisation rather than promote it. Opponents made occasional mention of EU policies not contained in the constitution, such as the recent enlargement to 2.5, the introduction of the euro, the deregulaet tion of electricity and Turkish accession. Y only tJ1e last of these seems to have swayed many voters, and they seem to have been unaware that free migration has been ruled even before negotiations begin. So what lesson should the EU take away? The relative lack of direct criticism of the constitution, the lack of fundamental objections to EU policies ancl above all, the stunning lack of positive proposals for reform are striking evidence.of the underlying stability of the EU system. The 15.years si~ce the fall ~f the Ber~n wall has been, after all, the most successful period m EU lustory. The Sl~gle ma~ket, the euro and a nascent European foreign and defense poli~ ~e ~t~ bemg. 1~ enlargement was carried out with surprisingly little disruption~m e~sttn~ me~ b~ m states, and proved the most cost-effective western instrumen~ tJor a vanhcd ~ gst~bl to ha,e qme ,. reac e a a e clemocracy and security. In sum, th e Eu appears n . t 1 trade arnculconstitutional sett1ement. o ? Th EU now pre-emmen egulation and he)ps to b . lS e vVhat is that settlement. , olicy and some u~1ness r fi t . t statistics one often reads, ure, 'shing, eurozone monetary P , . . . r reiQ'Jl poucv Contra.J} o _, 1 ation. gulation and )eiDs1 , m 10 o co-orwnate cooperatiOn . b 90 . cent of European re b h. health, pensions. education. cnme, t lS amounts to only a out. - per Most areas of greatest public co~cern_-taxes, . fimllv national. Wiili a tax base ' infrastructu re , defence, and immigration-remam

521$

PART 4

C0 l'f' LIYIT""~

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wo.RLD POUTIC5
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MOftWCS(J( I EUROp[ ~ _

~ ~ an adrniJi~tnt:cm <rr. r Jw: n that c,J a a fiftieth t!w si-~ of the me~ >er and ' narrrJU. leg;-.1 rar cl th f:u .vill n<:v(;r 3 11 . ... Jj(.;C foru or armv " sm;w (.1L! no po I d ...J , ".. , ,ctrathcl" dtJ(t.:-Uic.Un~ t.~r,_ . tJ<-~ fi ~-aJ ,\' an ~moJ ~ ' ' ewortJf"'tLSS . a}.in to tJ.,. siu 0' et c,! rJ ' J'J~K c,r tJ , . 1 Tht-:re is no"~' gr~:::! prOJ~:ti(ly cl anuc:. ln JJ; JWJ J th4; 1f ckli lwr afic 111 , th~ 1 ' ,,. c rrenc.-v of the 1J'W'-Js. to)""' 0 } ~tn,yC ~J . d .,-.~ -' 0..-.)"' two cJ.av<. to ( 1l ''Xf1i111 'ii(J I ,, r J . <.:CJJfJnt,U t f tal ron~:ention e\v cu '" I ; . l , .. oon sti U !CJT ea.Jlh . fiscal and educ:-dlion fi'Jlit it IH\ f' little \ IJPJ'f'Jrt fences . Eu ropean hI b~s whikJ a (;5-styit? mi itary Ul (;on ,cx<;e<.-d.s Eu rope s lnf: :tn \ <JIId in~ ult \ il'> "dv ili<Jr; up "'

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fi J( r'" of th(; U .. will enerate gr<N-tk Th<:re ;~little <-:Vidence of a rc_gu 1 ry t}r 'i(.i. 1 ato u rau : ~... ttom,. .1 by tJ Eli and there remains ple ntv of mu m for '>'x:ial poJt() the g. [Jt.J ky unv en . e "" ,. . " h , . at national )lNeL Th e noofiooraJ ..Angfo-Saxon thr eat ~~a rnyt . bn tam ~ IJmlcluag up its w<:lfart: state fast(.."f than any of its pQrtm:rs, h~ partly on a S<:ancliraavian rm.Kk:J that tops international "''mp..'fitiven~s ~an kings. 1r.d.c< , ;d \~th continental JiheraJi~tion and Bri tish 1iOC1aJ dernocratL(jati(Jn. Eu mp e!l !MX:JaJ ~y,tcms are: oorwergmg--tJ1rough tfu~ pressu re tl naticmaJ politk.-s, not a\ the res ult of l>O me Et i soc.iaJ polky pipe dream. A similar ccJflStitutronaJ rornpromis.e ha.s ernerJ;W with regard to imtitution~. Thou.gfr AngJo-Arocrican Eumsooptic..~ haw: sough t to resurr6<.1 the bog<-)'fnan of a Br uue h su(Xa'ltatc headed by the Europt::an <:omrnL-,~km j treaty chan~s sin cc J970 have ttmnstenrly moved EJJmpe in the opposite dir(::(..tion . 'flley have in< :rcased tht: power lit he c:ouncil of ministers (favoured by Fra nce and Bri tain , particu larly for matt.ers outsiOO the E!C:1JrJCJmic ooreJ and the directly de d:oo Eum~ an parliament (iavourcd by (~rmanyJ at the expense of the ted mocrati<: ccrrnrois sion, The prcJI(XI500 CCJfa~tulion .sought tn marginally improve the EU's t:fl k:ienc. y and tr~er"'y, ..vh.& retaining its l-YctSic stJlJ(..ture. AJI of thj s L\ the SE:nsih)e ~tufT polk:y wor1ks love and puhiJ~ w:nt:r~Jy support European parliamentary oo-de< ..ic;ion was ~ . raatiooal pu fia nx.>trts gained an etdvisory and ga tck wp jng role, the rotating prcsKk.-ncy WdS ahoJi\1-fed, voting we ights w<.....-e adjusted U> repr<..-sent large cou ntries more fairf~ fiwcigr1 polk.y COf.JT din aru m wa~ centraJi%d in a fcm:ign min L~tcr and SO llll. resuh wa5 a muJtinationaJ CiJfL~JtUtionaJ COtrip t<Jmi.'ie tha t attended tO the interests t,f ~and small uJU ntrK. . left and right pa rties. ~ and Europhilc and EfJ~ ter.deoc.8. 1bc rdimns f..'fljoyed hrcr.KI suppcJrt arnCJng me mber statL"S, and~ met a lt1if.JUJ challenge in tfx: rtff~end urn dch-cttts. The IJj~e~t ch an go ~eation (,( a Europe;.m foreign mini~ ernpowert~d to rtc om mc nd , dJOugh mn mpc.-c, a more oo-cwdiraated UJrcign po)k.y-.mjoy~> 70 per Cf;nt approv al across .Europe, And mu~ the EU as it is1 the etmstitution struck thf~ da~si<: idc alut ~ o~ower cber union" from the treaty of Rome and substituted tl1e mo re ~~ "f.mity in ~rJity... ' So .it was not the subJtaooe of the emerging e1mstitutional sc.>ttJernent that trig-yped The objectionable aspect was its form~ an idealistic constitution. the l970s, LMyen have rCff,tll'dOO dte trC'dty of .Home as a de fac.1o <..-onstitution
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h

nNWe . r .. l' ideals. . - ' nolk"' of wh' h we~ hran ] y, rrm cn Jn n :JC:n ; r c rn r J J<: 1aJ r-1 11 Cor~rd...,- Eurupean WC:. .,, . L ,. cl. Eli pol kie s shoaJid tin s p1 .. e1 k' Jm \ . C)(; HI~ \eOSJJ)1 dfort~ (~

~ n;,- ~Jib t'l:f~(.~ l ...t J'"" '"H ar, TY.Iticm d .. . ..t . . .GY.;u (JO curCJnl:!~t:l 1 r~a <o u u }(~~Ornate lht P. U .: ~ (v:rr~tx."Tl:di~,. . ..t ti.~~:: 1.. 1 lJ ~ - 1 tn(! .1-.. e-cliies . J-.u (frt:: ntliiJ"'J:a~t S<:holart ncJli:-.;._ TJ ..1 'I."~ cJf Ul(: ~ ~ <lli!C 1 <ate tlJ(: tr ~ l ArrL-.L , .,. ""-...... & afi1J {Xjf tfl( . ,,.,_ '0\T.i~rt is u npcJpu lar pri Jn;.srily lxuaJ~ it i.~ 5(:(..-rctiv u..-n.:.uxt. ~r;'lkd thaPhe f;. L E::, Cl'>(fl~ IJ~ ~-U. I _..._ (mm th(: pu }'JC -10 sum , oc<.:au~ it \UfTE::T'I f "-A . _ "UJilrn.cuJif;: a:ld ~t .t lr J I' .. t. L fj.<,ehe r. u1~ 10nnc-r ~ rmarJ forti~, mirust.tr,t<m1 a ~ri(J(:r~..'~ (I e the illf"' ~- !~k mation a b1~ push wtth hL\ celehrat.E::d lecture~~ the ~of ~~~n~, -w~ ~!,i. Humholdt linive r')ity in 2J~YJ. ... f.:nc: P'Ant (l u~~au,., at idt:a was to le;gitirnatt: the EU ru-Jt through t ~ usefuJ regulation. ~ had beer, the case f()r :)() v~ but~. ' ~muc ~(,.!:h :..r:d ~ .,, JX'llUCJ tising it. nu.~ was to 1-x; clone via a oonstitJJtiona} oorrventicnJ ..'il(f1; &Jd ~ Entt. :J'X.<.n prosp<x:t of a re-cn~ment of Philade!phia J7f57. million~ cl ~~~ ~ ~: we re supp<~ to deliberate ~ rnea111ng Gf Europe. ~l(~re prc~.~ootic ho1~....l to com bat <.ynid~m hy simp~fying the trtatvand delffit.:ati w EL.~1~: . . .fk. ~. . .. .1 1~ , Pr"-J'(fl..fdr.~ To JustifY the n~ for change, reformers alSQ sei7.i:d on the peret.>pbtm tha t I}~ EL wo uld need a radical overhaul to ~oid gridkx.-k '"'ith 25 r&her than 15 rn emr~ fear that now seems unjustified, b<Jth ~~the ne-.\' stau:s are pr() l.in-: constru~;tl\e and because the EU is not rnoving as far or fast M it once did. o Of cCJu rse , the c.onstitutional delibe-ration did not roobilise Europe ans. f'e- dti.zens we re aware of th~ 200 com;entionneh' delibcr.st ions. \\l.en tf.:Stimof!v from dv il society was rc.quE.:sted, professors turned up. \\1~.en a ~o uth wnfer~ was called . wou ld-he Euroc.:rats attended. \\ben those who did attend came to consid er de mocnu:y, they found that the arrangement Europe currently has u approp ria te to a diverse polity in which member ~ates insist on cbcdcs and
Ll< .
ptl IJilC

d'JC" IJffl!; nt Ha \ an uru~r.:ccs~ rv ..,..-f(ljfl2I\ lHUV<: , L l in fact ,._..., J IJll JJ1J ' ~ 'd J }1

I'IU\fJ ~

nw

n.e

crc tio n all bu t eliminates

no "demcx:ratic deficit~ in the El - llCJt mu<.;h of on e. Once we set aside ideal notions of dernoc1CK.J and look to real-\\OOd sta nd ards, we sec that the E U ~ as transparent. ~e , .3(:cou n~~ and -~ as its memhe r states. The rt:lativc lack of centr.dased financia) or .

con stit uti on <.;Onlai~. Th is is as it should be, f.or the re is

balances at evt:ry level. There was little popular or dit e support for &JI'l0C l'3ik reform be-yond the modest inc:re-d.Ses in scrutiny by national and European parlia.m ents the

rnL~~ion, a ~uperrnajority of de~oc:ratic national~~ Studies show parliamen t. and must then be mplemented ~ . e to shifts in pams.n that E U legislation is
Eutopeat' c;itj7JePI Enthusiasts for democra(.y faiJ to grasp rts limitS. ~~~ tlwrr will nc)t necessarily create rational (let alone su~rtiVe -.ents ~-erage ~ nd to be ta oppm .. with intense pre fcren<:es about the EU tc

~cl popular opinion.

tradE: pol.icv constitutional adjudication and central banking-are the sam e ~.J .,, . in most democracies, where these funL~ns are pol'tieaninsulated for souuu rea1 Y . cbecb and balsom. The notion of imposing dem ocr atic rontrol through m~ . .;..,niD S(J\'ereign ..v~di~rnPflt . JS more an<.:t.-s , rathe r than through elections to a s... W" ' r- -- - -.IIA>k a .sav as Hri Ameri can than European- b ut 1t no 1.. S L timate for that. Evef}nne o- - ; ~.t.>S -er . _ ..L-~com.1! ..,; - -- in a sy~ tem in which a European wrecuve ~ approval from a lf:l .."W _,. _ and . directly elected
both C()JlS(;nsual and relatively responsw

c.:o m.~ption . The E \;'s areas~ ~tooomous autl~Z.

. .

:>:lO

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POU fiCS

111;v y tax . . 1 . and political parl H'' kc>1'P 1111 I)' ~~ I'1.w '(s.t w s- lt \ lla lly th11t '1 I t. . Ill< ~rcn cl i ug- 111 th<'ir 111ind at auy cu1e ti ll t<'. u.HI tl'"' n '>p,,., 1 1 ' 111 '4" 1 'lldic ul y . 1 l 1 ! Ill( 1 I.'IS II CS . 1-1 P" 11 1,f r< c>p< n 1ll: tlll ' w<'ak. . t < L< .ul atHI IH 1ttcr I( ('i s 11' , 111 . ' . . l'J' t rzcn s (:tr..! . l' C 11. 1c>t 1, 1,1uclinrr tht wdf :1 1 a11d 1ch ntJI' 1'>..,11<'1 tl,,. ' " llll poItc1cs .1 , ' , " n .r . ..1 dCJm inat< d rc f<:r< u1 clch atc~ . rc rnai11 al mo~ l c,<l~t \JVt l 't 11 1 ''' 1'" t:d l1and .... TI H 11du . ' (;u1IJI'CJ o (' I urop ran <:1 t'rl)rt lC "" 'l''' l<' ltigl1 l11111011ts CJr fot'll till I iS'ili C'~ <>vc r ,LJ . ec ' '' 1,,crl< '' . . . , the )!C'ars ~uggC'sts that d ti:t.ens I:Jil to partcpa tc .111 1 . ~ ~ ~)oltl l< s ll'''. hctaJrM the : -y ar<' blo<:kcd from cloiug :-.n, b11t IJC;C'ausc tltr'y IJaVC' lliSll.ffH.'JC:nt lt lccJ tlr vc_ Sorn <' dcmo<:r:-ttic C'llllliJsia.'llS propost ju111 p-st <.U11ug I, U drrnoc-ra<.:y by in<.:orpora ting 1101- buttnll issues lik< social polic:y lllld irnmig~aliiJII , dv.. pi iC' ti t(' la<.: k or popular support for doin g so .... YC'l a11yonc cx~c pt '~ ~)lll los~ l)'ll <' r ea 11 s< that this e is the sort of' ~xtrt'm<.: cure that will kill the patw11 t. l ltC're ts l1 ttlc tlntl <.:o11ld leac.J the Europ~ an publiC' ltJ cb.:isivdy rejc~ ct all i11sl il11l ioll ;ts dcr ply <' rn bc:dcled as the EU, but tran sfC.~rring controve rsial issu('S like 'iodal policy lo il wit ho11 1j11slificalion Jrtight just cJo il. More sobe r voices propose to cmpowN national pari ianw 11 ts, wltic.;! 1tlw consti tution sougl1 t to do in a mod est way. Y this rcv<'als a fina l fallacy of tl w cle moc ratiset ers. For there" is little reason to bdievc that t11rning poli c..:y over to a legislature makes it m()rc lcgitimatc. In wes tern democracies , populari ty is invc Iy corrclatcc.J !rS<' with direct electoral acco untabili ty. The most popular institutions arC' C ()urts, poli ce {(JJoos and the rnilitary Parliame nts arc.. generally disli ked. Whalevc r tl1 c sourc<.: ol' Europe's dc,dining popularity- a general decl ine in political trus t, unfa mi liarity with institu tion.<:, xenoplrohia, dis(cmte nt wilh economic perJ(Jrman<.:c-it l1w; little to do with ils democratic mandate. Forcing an unstructured debate ahout an institution that handles matlcrs like tele eomm11ni<.:atious standardisation, the composition of the Bos nia stabilisa tion forc.:e and the privatisa tion of elec tricity production inexorably drove deb ate to the lowest common denominator. Whe n pro -Europe an political cUtes fo und themselves def(mrung a constitution with modest coli tent , th<'y felt tl1ey had no altc rnative hut to oversell it using in flate d notions of what the EU does and rhetoric Jrawn from J950s Europe an idea lism. SmaJI wonder tltey were outgunn ecl by grumpy populists with stronge r symbols rooted in class, nation and race (and eve n more inflated views of what the EU does). Publics be<.:ame cou fused and aJarm ed by the scare tactics of both si<.les. The refcm.mdum s cam e to inltabit a stra nge twili ght wne of symboli c polities, in whi<.:h clai ms abo ut the E U bore little relationship to reality, and suppo~ and oppositi~.n for a !>tatus <JUO constitution became a pote nt symbol for the mynad hopes and fears of modern electorates. In the wake of this debacle, Europe an politi<:ians must find a constructive path f01ward. They shou l<.l start with a coll ective mea culp a. The doc ume nt itself' must be r~~o unc~d. The n over the next few yea rs, the E U should re turn to its successful tra<.IJ tJon of quiet. and pragmatic. refor m. E urop eans consistently sup por t incremen tal au:ances J~ the. union's fore ign, inte rnal secu rity and eco nomic policies ~l~ng the hnes set forth m the constitution. Turkish mem bership is off the agenda, as Jt prob a~ly would have hcc n even wi thout the referc n<.lums. Politicians need to <.:once<.le thJs , and concede it loud and clear, in orde r to prese rve con tin ued EU enla rgement in the Balkans. Y a halfway arra nge men t acceptable to both E U and et

"''"'<

. . l rnay \t . r tlw r J.Jtrf)!JI' llll pok y could contrih trncrnbc r r; hp lnal i'l tn rrcntl ud)(. e:r II.Jr O Y 1 f.uropcan politi<:iaw;11 e a\ 1n11<.:1 1 tc, ~1 hC:l l p<:aU; a d 1Jfl ,,fl ..r ~11 AI H>VI ' a 1 , j <> . 11 neec lh ack , 1 .1 S{ t tmtv of a o., tah Ic l'.l tropc:an con~ litutiona ) 'Vttl JW . I' " (;fn(; nt . ~nl .C:ug<. txpliti tl" the CXI: t n(.f' . uc ' . lll that it Iucks 111 p< cy co-o rdi natinn 1'I . J .e: ~ , ')I I w 1 (; rc:~p cc.:tmuIHHr1 g<miw, of tt11' r.l,; ~~ 1 t~1 sy111bols l Ita l 'ilt attac: 1 to national i'" . p l . ,.., '' pow<:rful rl 1et, n . . , Uv 1 ( traye d as st al >Ic and successful. Tlt(; r<.: .n 1ty.I IJ ))IC,;~ Wl11 b< rea-;'lurcd if it> i\ i!.O() , IS fl() s 1 arncJu l corn . . P >rcip.lcs hen . On tI1<.: cont rary a con~tt . r.nn. I' . r , - J u1 tona1 order prnm1Sf w11h ~rand ,. ~~1 t dern oc..: raliC po Jtlcs or tl1c iss11cs me sl t, t .. " . r ).tlt t ten to c.: 1t1zcns hut prc~( 'l'\f's n<~titmal ~a d1 indirec..:t < c tnoc ralc orm s tltost: issues 1 . <: c :ltt s l(> rnQre . . a art: o11 concc css 1 an adrnint st rat1ve, techni<:al or legal c.:ons . . h' m, or 011 wrud, thfre is . . "1-.)y distin c..:tivf.! syste m o I multi-le vel gove matlCC::n~u s , IS 1Fl ' appe.at Tl < EC 's " . t} "' 1 1e on1 new fo 0 rIn::;. s y t . non to e1 rgc and pros pt:r since the . f .1 fw rm s <1te <>r~arus;)me o tnc welf 20th cent11ry. Now it is a 1naturc: constitutionaJ orde are state at tht turn f the h r . .. r, one t at no onge move 1orwar<.1to 1 tmate its past and present suc.:ces~e s Le(',t b 11 d r needs t0 ewt . dd . . tl c un mullt be the Europe.an ce ntra Itscrs an emocratisers for whom ". .on . . . . . t:ver c:Ioser un1 ., rcmams an end tn ttscl r. They wtllms1st that the answ tr to failed durnoc ac .. . ., r :y IS more clemoc. racy and the answer to a. fatle~ cons ~i tution is anot her constitution. But Europe has moved beyond them. DJsownm g thts well -meaning, even admirable, bantl of idealists may seem harsh, but it ~s both necessary and just. On this basis, Europeans can deve lop a new discourse of national inte rest, pragmati <: co-operation and constitutional stability- a <.liscourse that sees Europe as it is. The constitution is dead, long live the con stitution!

MORAVCSIK I E-UROPEWITH . OlJT 1 l.l..OStONS 'f 1 ,-ki ~ l ' p11bltr" ren wns a n:ali .,lit I ' I I I' . g<J <Nl'r th . a ~.:nc:xt2.() y<&r\and . L. Turke y tl,all I H' ttntted type of FlJ

l\~ J

Transnational Activist Netvvor.k::,

MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK

r Networks are tOl111S o f 0 1atnization characte rized by voluntmy, rec iprocal, and t:>c . . .zo , ton nta1 pattern s of com mun1......., 00 n and exchanae ... . MaJOr actors m advocac)' I ..... t:> ne1 de tl1e r1 lo"'~ncr (1) intern ational and clomest1c no rol networks mav 1 u ngovernt:>' ' mental research an d ad',0 cacy organizations' (2) local soc1 move me nts ; (3) founal . . dations; (4) the media; (5) churches, bade uni.on s, ~ons umer org~n1za tions, ~nd intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and intematiOJ~al mt ergovernme ntal orgaruza. tiens, an d (7) p"'ts of the execu tive and/or parhame ntary branches or govern~ k al rnents. Not a1J these wiJI be present in each ad vocacy networ . l mti research suggests, however, that international and domestic NG Os [n~n~~ov.ernme.ntal organizations] play a centTal role in all advocacy ~~t\.vork s, us u~lly uuhatmg ~~tions and press uring more powerful actors to take pos1tions. NG Os mtroduce nev\ 1deas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes. . . Groups in a network share val ues and frequently exch ange mformation and services. The Sow of infom1ation among actors in the ne t\~J ork reveals a dense web of connections among these groups, bod1 formal and inform al. Th e movement of funds and services is especially notable between foundations an d NGOs, and some NGOs provide services such as training for other NGOs in the same and sometimes other advocacy networks. Personnel also circulate within and am ong ne tworks, as rel evant players move from one to an.other in a version of the "revo lving door." ... Aclvocacy networks are not new. We can find example s as far back as the nineteenth-century campaign for the abolition of s.avery. l But their number, size, and professionalism , and t11e speed, density, and complex ity of international linkages among the m has grown dramatically jn the last three de cades . .. . Trans na tional advocacy net\vorks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where (I ) channe ls between domestic groups an d the ir governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ine ffective for resolving a conflict , setting into motion the "boom erang" patte rn of influence characteristic of these networks; (2) activists or "political entre pren eu rs" believe that ne t\vorking will furthe r their missions and cam paigns, an d active ly promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create are nas for forming and strengthening net\vorks. Whe re channels of parti cipation are blocked, the

532

Reprinted from Activists BeyoiU.! Border.;: AtlooC(Icy Netwo rks in l nte rruLtional Politics, edi teJ by Marg~n:t E. K an~ K ryn Sikkink, pp. 8-24 . Copyrigh eck atb t 1998 by Cornell University. Used hy pemusson of the publisher. ComeUUniversity Press. Portion s of the te>.t have been omitted.

53 otcrnati onal urena may be the on ly means th t d . I . . .. attentwn to t I1t :1r 1ssues.. Boom erang strate.g a omcshc: acti . h Vls . les are most corn m ts . a"e to gain where the targe t IS a state's domesti c policies or b h . on . e aVlor where a . m campaigns broad procecl uraI eI1ange mvolving dispersed act . . . .j ors, strateg.es are <.:ampcugn seeks It is no accH en t t1at so many advocacy netwo '-.. dd .l'f 1 . more w fuse. their campaigns. Governm ents are the primary r~ a ress cla1ms abou t nghts in .. gu their primary violators. When a governm ent violates arantors" of right b ls f s.. ut a o . . ' . d d 0 r re . .. . indJVJdu ,us an om estle groups oft en have no recours uses to recogruze righ~ .th. _ 1 s, e \vl m uomestJc politic:al or judici al are nas. T I1ey may seek international connecti ons finallv to e ress th . concerns and even to proteet the ir lives. ' xp elr W he n eh an ne ls be~een the state and its do mestic actors are bloc:ked the boom erang patte rn of mRue nce characte ristic of tra nsnational netw k ' " . N CO . b h . occ ur: Dome shc. J or s may s ypass t e1r state and directly search ou t international allies to try to bn ng pressure on their states from outside. This is most obvious! t11e case. in human rights. campaigns. Similarly, ind ige nous rights campaig/s and e.nvu:on 1~e ntal camprugns t~at support the dema nds of local peoples for partic1pat10n m development proJects that would affect the m frequently involve tllis kind of tJiangu lation. Linkages are important for both sides: For the less powe rful Third 'World actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they could not e>.:pect to have on their own; for northern groups, they make credible the assertion that they are strug gling with, and not only for, their southern partners. Not surprisingly, such rel ationships can produce considerab le tensions . ... Just as oppression and injustice do not themselves pro duce movements or revolutions , claims around issues amenable to internation al action do not produce transnational ne tworks. Activist s-"people who care enou gh about some issue that they are prep are d to inc ur significant costs and act to achieve their goals"1 lo. -< Th ey cre ate them when they believe that transnationaJ n~~vorking will.f~~ er t11eir organizational mi ss io ns -by sharing infonnation, ~~~g greater VJS1bility. gaining access to wide r publics, multiplying channels of 1~tutio~1al access. and so forth . Fo r example, in the campaign to stop the promo t1on of mfant f?nnula to poor women in deve lopmg coun tnes, orgamzers se ttled on a bovcott of Nestle, the ' . tactic. B . ecause Nestle was a transnao.onaJ actor, Iargest producer as its mam 1 ' . k . activists believed a transnational networ was necessan to bnnu pressure on , o . . . . 9 eh issue areas. participation m co rporation s and governmen ts.- Over tJme, m su ential component ofthe collective identi~ansnational ne tworks has become an ess . a art of their common repertoire. ties of the activists involved , and netwo rking P k rs r the core net\vor e 110 r a new campaign Th e political en tre pren eurs w ho become have often g<line d experie nce in earlier ones. . . ed ,er the last two decades. ' 'ti Op po rtunities for network actlvl es have mc.reas f O'. . temational orgamzattons . . tn In addition to the efforts of. p1oneers. a Proliferaoon oChean ' . Pr air travel and new r an d conferences has prov1'cled rOCI for connecttOnS. ati l"' . 1:.c. .. r on flows an d s1mpw~ . per. . electronic commw1icat1on teehnoIogtes SJ:>ee<:11111onnds ' I b.i ft . 15 a broader cwtura 5 . . clt sonal contact among actiVists. Un der1 t- 1 e. henfa g1 ~'ln tes new kind of a obal pu blic o 1 The new ne tworks have dependecl 01 the creatiOnthe t96 aJ ac . of 0s .. (or Civil society), which grew as a cultur 1 ) eg

KCK AND SfKKJNK I TRANSNATIONAL ACllVlST ~ "'- ' NORJ<s

::l

534

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

HOW DO TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETVVORKS \JO RK?

eek influ ence in man\ of the ame ways that s11 ation 1l advocacy networ ks 5 ran . _ , .]movements do. Sinc.:e they are not powerful in a otl1e r IJollticcu groups or socr,t . r . .. f th cl tl y must use the power o f t1 . 11110 nnution, .rdeas 1err traditional sense o e wor ' le . .1 J r natjon and valu e contexts wrt1 \\ 1 1 states make' Hn H< 1 and strategres to ruter t 1e mron . .. . . . . . . Tl1e bulk o f 1 t ne.... vorks do mtght be t e1.med JX"'.su<~s. 0 1. socJalizaron . . po)tctes w 1a l\ . . . but nett1 1er proc s devoid of conAict. Persuast on and soc.:taltzation often bon ess t . . . . inv;lve not just reasoning \\nth opponents. but also bnn~ng pressur<:, ann-l.wtstmg, encouraCTing sanctions. and sharrung. . "' 0 1 , of tactics that nenvorks use in tl1eir efforts at persuasron, social0 ur ;'P Og) ization, and pressure includes (l ) infonnation politics, or t I1.e a b'l'rty to ~tnc.kl y and ' credibly generate politically usable information -~1d move rt to whe re tt v.11ll ~ave the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the abd~t)' to call upon symbols , actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience tJ1at ts freq uently far away; (3) ler;arage politics, or ilie abilit) to call upon pow~1ful actors to. affect a situation where weaker members of a nenvork are unlikely to have mfluence; and (4) accountability politics, or ilie effort to bold powerfuJ actors to their previously stated policies or principles.... Network members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways and by seeking hospitable venues. Sometimes iliey create issues by framing old problems in new ways ; occasionally they help transform other actors' understanding of their identities and their interests. Land use rights in ilie Amazon, for example, took on an entirely different charac.:ter and gained quite different allies viewed in a deforestation frame than they did in eith er social justice or regional deve lopment frames. In ilie 1970s and 1980s man y states decided for the first time that promotion of human rights in othe r cou ntries was a legitimate foreign policy goal and an auilientic ex-pression of national inte rest. This decision came in part from interaction vvith an emerging global human rights nenvork. We argue that this represents not the victory of morality over selfinterest, but a transformed understanding of national inte rest, possible in part because of structured interactions between state components and networks. This changed understanding cannot be derived solely lfrom changing global and ec.:onornic conditions, although these are relevant. ...
T~

Infonnation Politics
Information binds network members toaeilier and is essential for network effectiveness. _M ~y information exchanges ar; info rma l-telephone calls , e-mail and fax com~u~wat10n s,. and ilie circulation of newsletters, pam phlets, and bulletins. They provtde information that would not otheiWise be available from sources that might not othe iWi~e.be heard, and they mus t make this info rmation comprehensible and usefuJ to actiVIsts and publics who may be geographicall y and!or socially distant. Nonstate actors gain infl . . [! . fl . uence bYseMng as alternate sources of. mformatJ.on. 1n ~rmation ows m advocacy networks provide not only facts but test imo nystones told by people whose li h ves ave been af" 1ected. Moreover, activists mte rpre t

TRANSNATIONALAcnv 1 . . 1ST NEiWORJ<s _ facts anc tt sttmony, usually fra . . 535 mmg ISsues si 1 . bec<Ut~c t I1 ' 1r P'll1JOSe is lo persu cl s . <~ e peop1 e mp y.. m term c)f nght and cl this proc l ~s of persuasion occur? An rr . an sttmulate them to , t wrong, . . . ecttv ac affatrs ts lWtl1 natural nor accitlc et 1 .cl e fram e musts1 that a o; HO\._: does 1er . ow . n a1. 1 entify tl1 .,.ven state of ancl propo<;c c.:recItble solution s. The se.. . e responsiblt nartv 0 . _1 l d atms requtre cl - , r parties appe<u to s 1are principles, which of'l. , h ear. powerful messa11e th ' . f h . en ave mor . " s at than ad":cl' ~ tee ~tea l expe rts. An impOttant art ofethlmpa~t. on state ptl\.ic:~ informatt.on IS prects.ely whetller an issue is deKned ri e ~ohtlca\ stru~\e over ilius subJeCt to cons1deration by "qualified" e erts P manly as technical-and cern s a broa uer global constituency. . . . x:p -or as something that conNetw orks stJive to uncover and investigat bl k . . e pro ems, and alert tl1 . oohcyma e1s. One actiV1st desclibed this as tl "I . ptess r . 1e 1uman nghts m the d0 1 and ,. 0 "promotmg cha nge by reporting facts."3 To be credib! h . f' e. ogy ks. must be re liaI by netwOl )le and well documented 't e, t . e m ormation producecl . . . . I . 1 cl d . o tion the tion must Je tnne y an ramatic. Sometimes thes.e mgatn attena1 ,f. mformalti 1 . .. A. I b th d'b' . s po1 con Jet, Jut o ere 1 1ltty and drama seem to u p e got'al o mfonnation 1tlcs be ., . .. . . . esse com nts a st1cttegy ell med at persuadmg pu bbcs and policyrnakers to eh n 1 th ponecls of f'.. . c .. ange eu mm . The notion o reporting racts does not fully express the\ ... . . . :vay nel.\vorks strategically use mformatJon to frame issues Networks call attent n to . 10 c tssues, or even create 1ssues by usmg language that dramatizes and drav.S attention to their ' con~erns. ~ g~od exam ple is the recent campaign against ilie practice of female gemtal mutilation . Before 1976 the '.videspread practice of female circumcision in many Af1ican and a few Asian and Middle Eastern countries was known outside iliese regions mainly among medical experts and aniliropologists. 4 A controversial campaign, initiated in 1974 by a network of women's and human rights organizations , began to draw wider attention to the issues by renaming ilie problem. Pre\iously the practice was referred to by technically "neutral" terms such as female circumcision, clitoridectomy, or infibulation. The campaign around female genital "mu tilation" raise d its salience, literally creating tile issue as a matter of publ.ic international concern . By renaming tlle practice ilie nenvork broke the linkage wiili male circumcision (seen as a personal medical or cultural decision ). implied a linkage with the more fe.ued procedure of castration , and refrclJ'l1ed the issue as one of violenc e against women. It ilius resituated ilie practice as a human rights . . vtoIahon .... Hum an rights activists, baby food campaigners, and "~omen's groups.' dramatize the situations of the victims and turn the cold facts mto human stones, intended to move peo ple to action. The baby food c.:ampaign, for example. re~ed heavily on pub lic health studies that proved that improper bottle feeding cont nb uted to mfant malnutntJ.on am1mortal'"' .111d tlnt corporate sales promo1,/- k .. ts 11epack d an cl -aue tion was leading to a decline in breast feeding. Networ acti'15 tie . . d . d to promote ac on.. The mterpreted this information in dramat1c ways e:sJgn~ cl . h1 t entitled B1 W: t publishe a pamp e ntis 1 developm ent organization War on an G tran"lated into "The Baby Kille rs" whic h the Swiss Tl1jrd World Actjon routpl ,~e activists ' . " N -tle inadverten v g Cerma~ and retitled "Ne stle KHis. Bab1es. es .. d World Action Group for a prommen t public forum when 1t sued tl1e Tlur defamation and libe l. ...

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xchange aided b) comp tmJ ; ~ ~ comm unicaA l Iense weI) o f nortI1- ou cl1 e . . . < . tl1at ts an 110 longer rnonopohze IJ1lcrrr~dl 1 >1 flows as they non. llll' ans O'Qvemme n c . o- decade ago . TJ1ese technolomes have had an enun nous . lll1{)act could a mere I1al f. e . . . . . r t:i to ancl from Third \Vorld countnes, " htre mad seiVJce ha<; on mo\1ng 11110nna on . . .. , ous, thev also o specta.l ach .mlages of. couJ'Se to m,e of ten been sIow an d preCan , ~ . . . "Ccess to tJ em A good example of lhe ne\\ 111formattonal 1 oraamzat'wns t11at llave c. 0 ... ro1 0 f neuvorks occurred ,,,ben US . environmentalists pressured President e . George Bush to raise the issue of gold m~e rs' ong_oing imasion~ of the Yanoma,~i indigenous reserve when Brazilian pres1dent Fe1nando Collo1 de Mello was m \Vashjngton in 1991. Collor believed t11at l:e had squelche d protest o~~r the Y anomami ques tion by creating major med1a events out of tl~e d:'J1a':'1t1~g of airstrips used by gold mine rs, but network me~nber~ had curr ent ~~formation faxed from Bra7il, and they countered his claim s \VJth eVIde nce tl1at mme rs had rebuilt the airstrips and were still invading the Yanomami ~r~a. . . . . .. The media is an essential partn er in network m formation pobttcs. To reach a broader audience, networks strive to attract press attention. Sym path etic journalists may become part of the network, but more often networ~ activists cultivate a reputation for credibility with the press , and package their information in a timely and dramatic way to draw press attention.

537 The hurn a11 nghts 1ssue beca me n , ti bl . nstihlllOII'i <.:onnected human rightsego a e because govemment~ or ",a . practi l . . ces lo nl nc1a bilateral c.liplomatlc relattons. In the unt d S military and economic aid or t 1 1e tates hum 'gh o age by providing policy-makers with in 11 eo t' h ann t~ groups uot ltvert at militc.uv an<1c<.:onornic aid. To make the issrma 10n . bl convmced thern eo cut off . . j . . ue ncgotta e NCO Fi . h d to profile or sa tence, usmg mformation and s 'mbolic ol~ . s 1rst a to raise its membe rs of the network had to link coo)p t' P tics. Then more pow~rful . era some money, trade, or prestige. Similarly in the envi 1on to . , thing else or value: . . ' IS multi k campa1 lmkage of environmentalronm enta1 ts .th lateral deveI ment ban gn, t ti opfu 1. pro ec on WJ access to loan':i \\""'" very powe 1 ...,
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Activists frame issues by identifYing and providing convincing explanations for powerful symboilc even ts, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks. Symboilc interpretation is part of the process of persuasio n by which networks create awareness and expand their constituencies. Awarding the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize to Maya activist Rigo berta Men chu and the UN's designation of 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples heightened public awareness of the situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Indigenous peoples' use of 1992, the 500th anniversary of the voyage of Columbus to the Ame ricas, to raise a host of issues well illustrates the use of symbolic events to reshape understandings . ...

Altl1ough NGO influ ence often depends on securi f 1 a11 . j . 11cl cl. . es. ereclib 11ty ::;tl epen s m part on the1r ability to mob1 ng power u 1 the1r 11Z th . . . . . e e1r own mem bers and affect public opm10n ':a the m~dia. In democracies the potential to influence votes gives large memberslup organtZations an advantage o:ver nonmemb 1 . . . . ers np orgamzanons tn lobb)'l~g fo r policy change; en\lironmental organizations, several of whose memberships number in the millions, are more likely to have this added clout than are human rights organizations. Moral leverage involves what some commentators ha,e called the "mobilt:,ation ofsham,e," where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny. Network activists exert moral leverage on the assumption that governments value the good opinion of others; insofar as netwo rks c-an demonstrate that a state is violating international obligations or is not lhing up to its o'"'ll claims, they hope to jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior. The degree to which states are vulnerable to this kind of press ure varies, and wiiJ be discussed fUither below.

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Networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments. and oth~r actors to publicly change their positions on issues. TL: ts often dismiSsed as .mconsews . . t 1 ouential change since talk ts ct1eap an d governm e1ts sornetimes change discursiVe .. . 1 ' k d bli ttention Network act:iVlsts, ho\\positions hoping to divert net:wor an pu c a bili'h: ''tics rt nities for accounta ., pou ever, trv to make such state ments mto oppo u f . . r. r example in 1 0 . t d 1 el to a pnnCip1 't e-n ' Once a gove rnm ent has publicly comlmt e kss tions and their ., t\ or can use tl10se pos1 favor of hum an rights or clemocraC)-ne v b discourse and practice. . comman d of information, to expose cl1e distance h et\veen to save face by dosing . tn' nts, w1 mav uc Thjs is embarrassing to many governn,e that distance. t bilit\' politics was the ability of Perh aps the hest example of net\vork ac~u n a ~ ons of tJ1e 19i5 Helsinki l . c. the hum an rights neh.vork to use tlle I1Uman ng 1ts pro\1SIts of Eastern Europe 10 r . . . Accords to presswe the Soviet Uruon an d the go\'emmen riohts mo,-ernent 10 the . h an 1 Ulll d t le o change. The Helsinki Accords beIpe. 1evJve the Moscow Helsinki Group and the 1'k 1 e es Soviet Union, spavvned new organizatl_ons ~1 d helped protect acti\ists from Helsinki Watch Committe e in the Umted rSt~ted .to ~tosrow's obligations unde r the . . repression. 5 The human ngI, t s ne twork reiei i n...nples of abuses. .h Helsinki Final Act and juxtaposed t hese \\lt exl.U"
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Activists in advocacy networks are concerned with political effectiveness. Their definition of effectiveness often includes some policy change by "target actors" such as governments, international finan cial im tituti ons like the World Bank, or priva te actors like transnatio nal COiporations. In orde r to bring about policy ~han ge, networks need to pressure and pers uade more pow erful acto rs. To gain m8uence the n~tw?rks seek leverage (the word appears often in the discourse of ~dv~y organizations) over more powerful actors. By leveraging mor e powe rful msti~tions . weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly. The identification of mate rial or moral leverage is a crucial strategic step in network campaigns. Material .l~erage ~ually links the issue to mon ey or goods (but potentially also to votes m mternational organizations, prestigio us offices, or othe r benefits).

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NOTES
1. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, ''Mobilizing Techno),, ~1 ' : in Frontiers in Social Movement TheonJ, ed. Aklon D. ~ 1< n:"
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M ueller (.\iew Haven: Yale University Press. 1992). P ~2. . 2. See Kathryn Sikkink, codes of Conduct for Tr~nsn_anonal <.c T m.~.m~".= The Case of the WHO/U NJCEF Code.'' Internotional Orgam;:,(Jtton 40 (.\ ut llllll I% 6): 8 f 5-40. 3. Oorothy Q. Thomas, "Holding Govemments Account;1ble by Puhlw Pnssmc." in Ours by Right: Women~~ Rights os H11man Rights. ed. Joanna Ken t London: Zed Books, t99.'3), p. 83. 4. Female genital mutilation is most widely practiced in Africa. wh<rc il is reported to occur in at feast twenty-six countries. Between 85 and 114 million wome n in the world today are csUmated to have e'-perienced genital mutilation. World Bc111k Development Report 1.9.93: Jnvesting i11 Health (New York: Oxford University Press. 19~)3), p. 50. 5. Discussion of the Helsinki Accords is based on Daniel Thomas, 1orms and Change in World Politics: Human Rights, d1e Helsinki Accords, and the De111isc of' Com munism ' 1975-1990," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1997.

l'"<tive Action: Carol McClurg

SEBASTIAN MALLABY

Last year, I visited Uganda. I w t d d1 . le.ssne.ss turned around c an e to understan low a showcase of Af . h tti I10pe ncan u ng t e numb 0 f . . a1 people living below th d . er nahon poverty hne by almost 40 e percent unng the 1990 . . . s. But I wanted to get to the bottom of another Issue too Th \iu Id . e 'vor Bank was ' f. t1 nver NiJe at a bea t'f~- promotmg a dam near the source o 1e u I w spot c:alJed B . I , UJaga J. Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were . . t m revo1 The 1 t based in Berkeley, California, maintained tha~ th n ernationa~ Rivers Network, e Ugandan enVIronmental movement was outraged at the likely dam t age o waterfalls t th who lived there would be uprooted fro th . 1 d ~a e site, and that the poor o couldn't afford. It was surely a clash thm t. err an h r the sake of electricity they a went to t e heart of the I baliza . Ie. Was the NGO movement ac:tina as a c .:1 d h k . go tion strugg IVuize c ec on mdustrializati o ill' ; t di s an. ng up . or m IOns of poor people whose views the World Bank i . ored') ':;; gn .. was tt retarding the battle against poverty bv withholdi ng eIectnc1ty t bat would .fuel , . economic growth, ultimately benefiting poor citizens? . I called the Berkeley activists and asked for some ad..ice. Who ran this u andan enVIronmental .movem~nt they clain1ed was so outraged? Where were the vlliagers w~o would be cruelly dislocated by the dam project? NGOs such as the International ~IVers Network usually love helping Western journalists, and because these journalISt~ ar~ gen~rally far from the scene of the disputed development project, they sometimes Simply report what they are told. But now that I was in Uganda, a few hours' drive from the proposed dam, I got a warier re~-ponse. Lori Pottinger, tlle Intemational Rivers activist who led the Bujagali campaign, explained that her ~gandan counterpmts were preoccupied just then, and that snooping around the VIllages at the Bujagali site wouJd get me into trouble with the authorities. Not wanting to give up right away, I tracked down Pottinger's Ugandan counterparts by other means and telephoned their office. Afrienclly voice in..ited me to come over straightaway. When I arrived, the groups young director sat me dov.n and plied me witJ1 leaflets and reports that gratefully acknowledge<! the sponsorship of a group called tJ1e Swedish Society for Nature Conser\'ation. After half an

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ctll)cmh:' hour of cmwersation, I <t.o;ked t he questwn th a t 1 ' organization wa.'i this? This is a membership organization.' I was told. .. How m<UlV members?" I asked. Yl) host kind!~ ~lood np .md rummaged about in his de k. returning with a blue notebook. ..Here is the list,"' he said triumphantly. ugandn s ~ ational .\\'>Oc:iation of Professional Environmentalists had ail of 2.5 member -not t'\:tcll~ tt hroad platform from which to oppose electricity for millions. . . . My next move was to visit Bujagali. I met up WJ!h a Ugandan 'iOCJologJst who knew the reuion well and promised to translate for me. She slopped at a duster of buildings onthe edge of the dam site to check in wit!, the local government representative who, far from threatening to call the cop~ , greeted us cheerfully. For the next three hours, we inteJviewed villager after vi llager and found the same stOJy: The "dam people" had come and promised generous financial terms, and the villagers were happy to accept them and relocate. My sociologist (;()mpanion said we might have sample bias because we were intervievving men, who might value cash more th an th e land that women tended. So we interviewed some women, who offered the same pro-project line. The only people who objected to the dam were those living just outside its perimeter. They were angi)' because the project would not affect them, meaning no generous payout. This story is a tragedy for Uganda. Cunics and factories are being deprived of electricity by Californians whose idea of an electricity crisis is a handful of summer blackouts. But it is also a tragedy for the fight against poverty worldwide, because projects in dozens of countries are similarly held up for fear of activist resistance. Time after time, feisty Intemet-enabled groups make scary claims about the iniquities of development projects. Time after time, Western publics raised on stories of vVorld Bank white elephants believe them. Lawmakers in European parliaments and the U.S. Congress accept NCO arguments at face value, and the government officials who sit on the World Bank's board respond by blocking fu nding for deserving projects. The consequences can be preposterously ironic. NGOs claim to campaign on behalf of poor people, yet many of their campaigns harm the poor. They claim to protect the environment, but by forcing the World Bank to pull out of sensitive projects, they cause these schemes to go ahead without the environmental safeguards that the bank would have imposed on them. Likewise, NGOs purport to hold the ~orld Bank accountable, yet the bank is answerable to the governments who are Its shareholders; it is the NGOs' accountability that is murky. FUJthermore, the offensives mounted by activist groups sometimes have no basis in fact whats~ever.. If think this an exaggeration, consider the story of an anti-poverty effort m Chma s western province of Qinghai.

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There was nothi~g.apparently controversial when, in April 1999, the World Bank conduded negotiations on a project in Qinghai. China was the bank's star client at

!JavJ,.! hlicd around 200 million P 1 u1e ' . '. } . . . . eop e out of pov, 1 1 . Ject Cr1) deC:tde 1 he Qmg Ml p1 O was designed to move 58 000 f: c nnng the prt\'iotJ~ c c;]y . Ies. [)Hn:h d lu lbade to another part of th e proVJn<:e' ir annc:rs from a hoJ'I<',. . ,1h . rm 1es ""()u]J nse from around 20 ngatc c } a <:mall dam f a ers 1n(;oJ 1 I . . cents a dav t0 I I . ld actu c~lh 'il l 1s1 Chma had carried out s st. ' a e,c at \vhi<:h tilL'\ U eo omc 30 such ) ast. All h< n:ducetl pove1 ltl ty. re O<:ahon projee:L~ in lhc P The day the Qinghai loan negotiations conclnded ~ . . project Petros Aklilu , got a. call from the Tibet Inform atIOn :~the banks Lo d manag<:r, . . orders on the C I1mese admi nistrative d.ivis1 kn ' etwork m n on. Qmghai 0n own as the Tib b 1 emon. Because tl1e reg10n covers part of hhto .. 1'T'::b et Autonomou~ Ro nca ! I et and 1 u fQ h . 5 million inhabitants are Tibetan, the interest of'IIb t h mJ Jon o mg ais Aklilu e;q)laiJ ted that the scheme would benefit th~ e ~~~b ers was not surprising. to newly irrigated land, and that Tibetans who st , d b hi edtans who would move aye would 1 popu]ation pressure . their area. In sum althe mh eh , benefit from reduce( m . 11 ' oug mas .T1bct poliC) was abomm<D e, tI1e ban k's proJect would actually h 1 T"b k c b e P 1 etans. A hlu put down the phone an d rorgot a out the conversation. He soon had cause to remember it. Within a few days th T"b r . 1n1orrnanon .h d . ' < ' blIS e a stOJy m tts newsletter about a "cont e I et , xr Id Network pu . " . rovers1a1 vvor 8ank prOJ~ct th~t wo~ld dramatically ~feet the demography" of Qinghai by moving ethmc Chmese mto a culturally T1betan area. This was a strange claim. F. t "b ]. l . h . di trS , no T1 etans IVec m t e unme ate settlement area: The nearest were .276 nomadic herders (the bank had counted them carefully) who wintered 37 miles south of the project. Second, Qinghai had been part of China for as long as the United States had been independent. It was no more Tibetan than Texas is Mexican. But the Tibet Information Network was not deterred. "Population transfer of Chinese into traditional Tibetan areas has become a major concem for Tibetans," the groups newsletter said ominously. Within a few weeks, the London activists had forged an intemational coalition. It drew from the various legions of the anti-World Bank army: environmental groups opposed to dams; human rights groups opposed to relocation; other groups opposing cooperation with China. Representathes of 59 organizations-an astonishing worldwide network stretching from Mexico to Thailand--:--illspatc~1ed a long letter to World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn protesting the transfer of "Chinese farmers into a traditionally Tibetan area.., Campaigners deluged the bank tl b - 1. . WI 1 e-matls and faxes, anti- at~ posters appeared around Washington ' and Tibet . . . the Beastie actiVlsts set up camp outside the bank' headquarters A rap star from th Tibe . s . f 1 Boys declared that the bank's loan would lead to the 'destruction e tan peoples ." . . th . ctivists quicklv ...,on allies m . Despite the inaccuracy of tlus drum, e a Ri hard Cere who had , actor c Hollywood and the U .S. Congress, most notabl the and Democratic Rep. ~ancy ;bet 1 recently narrated a documentary film about uncu1g aJoint apnP'cir.Ulre 1 Pl 999 ease k r: e os1 of California. On June 15, 1 'a press re th bcumoplanned to move 60,<XX> by Pelosi and a pro-Tibet musician stated that ~ ~ stituted onlv 40 percent . . CJunese con . . Iln.1c Chinese" into Qinghru, even though Han Han Chinese were not .JUO\lng mto et of. the 58 ,000 settlers, and even tliough. these . mern ber'S of concrress fired off a . . SL\1)' . eo-Qtnghai, just relocating witlun the provmce.
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11 rmm :\orth Carolina, leapt at the chance to condemn ( _h nil 1 "m!!l<., bn:.ath. \\'hen a \ \'orld Bank delegation went to Caplt! ' . '. t ~ ul1J ~ the lawm.tkcrs. it was confronted "vith a map that did not ewn sbo '- QJ I_L J. The entire pro'; nee had been labeled Tibet, never mind that Tibetans account d fur onJy one in fh c people tltere. . . The bank was totally encirded . It was SJmultan eousl; up agamst student protesters and the right wing of the Republican Pa_~ and alt!Jougl~ the bank's as ailants were A wrong on the facts. nobody was \VI1hng to stlck up for the instiat tution. In June ]999, the Clinton adminLc;tration annou~c ed t.hat ~l would vote against the Qinghaj project when it came before the w orld B~nk s hoard. The Lilliputian activists had taken on the bank. and they had won the first round.

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APPEASEMENT DENIED
The most common reaction to this sort of story is that the bank must comm unicate better with its critics and learn how to compromise with them. Unfortunately, this prescription is naive. It presumes tl1e critics are open to compromise. But campaigning NGOs, as distinct from those with real developm ent programs in the field, almost have to be radical. If they stop denouncing big organizations, nobody wi Usend them cash or quote them in the newspapers. Partly for this reason, and partly out of a likeable conviction that the status quo is never good enough, most NGOs do not have an off switch. Y can do everything possible to meet them ou halfway, but they will stiUdemonst rate outside your building. Of course, there will be grown-up groups like Oxfam, World Vision, or the World Wildlife Fund that may accept you r olive branch. But they will be the exceptions, and they may cooperate only cautiously. They don't want to be the next target for the radicals. The second round of the Qinghai battle illustrated this problem. Confronted with the news that the Clinton administration would block the project, Wolfensohn Hew into a rage. He worried about th reats by the U.S. Congress to cut contributions to the bank's subsidized lending program if the project went ahead, unde rmining the bank's ability to help its poorest clients. He fretted that the adverse publicity might cost him a chance at winning a Nobel Peace Prize and that his Hollywood connecti ons would tu m on him. And he feared that one of his central achie,vements would be jeopardi zed: Since taking the helm of the bank in 1995, Wolfensohn had done more than any of his prede(;essors to reach out to NGOs. He welcomed the bank's most ardent critics to private dinners at his home, made a point of meeting with them wherever he traveled, and even created commissions to solicit their advice on WorJd Bank policy. Whe~ the Qinghai battle came to a head, Wolfensohn did everything possible to defus~.lt..He went out of his way to hear the arguments of the NGOs, treating his own staff WJth much less deference. He summon ed the project team to his office and demanded to know whose arse he should kick first. After much raging and fu ming. he hit upon a scheme that would meet the NCOs part way. The project would be referred to the bank's Inspection Panel, a tribunal staffed by eminent persons

who in\'f::' ~igate projects' cornpljance with th , safegu<mb. e banks emironmental . Tht- ne thists alJeged several . t and S0<:1al . . tns ance~ . I t'~ . t I Jat one gm.deLne requiring " ofInon-complian<.:e. Thev d . d. ~ examp . was breathe d, along with anotl1er req s~cJa h action to protect etl;nic :~e . _or r cl . umng t at res ttl monties critics Jocuse particularly on the bank' . e ement he voluntar\' Th fi cl Q' l . ..C s enVironm r , e classi e mg 1aLas a 'ategory B" roect ( . ental S~teguards. The bank had ment), rather than a high-risk "Cat ~ posmg medium risk to the emi egorv ronkimpy emiron mental impact 'b A and th ere[!ore commissioned an l arguab: s cl' Inspection Panel, Wolfensohn calculate~ tuh Y By r~fening these claims to the . . . . at now b ecome a teehmeaI mqun-y into the b k' a pohtical fight ove1. TL'bet would . In a sane world, this strategy would haan ~ op~ational guidelines . But the day after the bank decided to ve oug t some peace \\ith the activists. convene an Ins ti p students climbed up the face of the bank's head art ~c on anel a pair of claiming , 'World Bank Approves China's Geno~~e i~;~et ~;~~~~d a banner ~ro groups disapproved of these tactics- after all there .d ely, other TJbet but they were unwilling to speak out publici} againwstas hn~ e:llence o: ~enocide t . b err 1e ow acti\ists M eanwhile, mem ers of congress continued to toe the 1 f\GO 1: R bli k f une. epu can Sens. Conme Mac o Flonda and Benjamin Gilman of ~ew York accw;ed the bank of "cultural genocide." A House of Representatives subcommittee voted in 1999 to cut contributions to the bank's soft-loan window by 220 million. . \Vhen_ t~ e Inspec~i o~ Panel inquiry got under way, it only succeeded in bringmg the actiVIst attack mstde the World Bank's building. The head of the Inspection Panel, Canadian environmentalist Jim Mac~eill , clearly favored acmists over bank staff, whom he treated with prosecutorial vigor. He seemed more interested in finding technical infringements of the bank's safeguard policies than in asking the big questions: Would the Qinghai project reduce poverty? The answer was yes, but the panel seemed indifferent. \ould it cause environmental damacre? The bottom line was no, and yet the panel insisted on poking holes in the bank's p~oc~dures. The panel's final report, delivered in April2000, 'vas a 160-page milictment of the Qinghai project. It insisted that the scheme should have been r~ted Cat~gory A for environm entalJiskiness, that insufficient attention had been prud to the Impact on Mongolian and Tibetan nomads, and that tl1e recruitment of volunt~ers for . . resettlem ent was compromised because 10ten'le'''S were not confidential. The . tal anel's report did not worry too much about whether a C~tegory A enthvuonmen ds P the proJeCt or w1 .er noma 1e assessment would have found reasons to opp~s~. . cl b . the pro1 It rod ect. . . Y . 1rues or 0 ther fac 1hties create interviews, the farmfi t f rom c I might actually be~e .. c of the :es not dwell on the fact that, whateve r the cucuJ~st~ man\' more people wanted to ers' desire to relocate was beyond doubt. In ee move than the project could accommodate. de a last-ilitch attempt to placate the In June 2000, the bank's management ma cl' and proiect preparation the f J NCOs by proposing another year 's wortJ1 o stu Jes continued their calls {Ior canh NGOs bank estimated would cost $2 million. Y t _e cl the mana11ers' proposal, and the et celing the project. In July, the bank board re_1ectt . china ~onned the bank that second round of the Qinghai battle ~e to a c ose. it would withdraw its request for financmg.

- ....... I:"VUI{

543

1-t 5-

PART 4

uncs CONTEMPORARY WORLD PO

1

, - ---~"" . VVt:l\ 1 Y

HUKI1NG THE POOR

545

1 . ah cl . h tl esettlement proicd bv J[S{' . Tt <1 : r<.:Jme appar" ; ' "a..' fJre !IJng ea w1tcl 1e r re the bank's environmcutall:Oil 11.. and move 'h" I . I . ttr>lh . enl th at C ma p anne to tgno 1 'e \"COs were haVIng a hare tllllt' ' lc;Co\enng the 1c more peop Ie to t I new area. TJ . s f 1e Ch" . ., l . ans, s0 they asked Wolfensohn what \\.tc t~nwg on. .. 111ese p1 detm 1 o t1 ou lot "How the fuck do 1 know what they're dowg? v\ olfen<.<Jim ~ 1 back. Y just got us out of there!'"
J

h ,~~ Id Bank pulled out of Qinghm. L ~ 1 r1 Not lon11 cuter t e vor had heard that t I f' ' ' ' h Thev . . " r n . If ,enso n. env1sts went lo VlSJt \ vo1 1

... t't

n of Tibet

'C

gr \c~mrnent

THE SLEEPING BANK AWAKENS

ersions of this story play out all over the world. The bank desig11s a reasonable V aws. NCOs seize on these flaws and add a la~ge sprinproject>whiclt inevitably has H kling of inHammatory rhetoric. The World Ba~k puJJs ou t, ~ut the proJeCt goes. ahead any.,.,ay, minus the bank:'i social and envHonrnen tal safeguards. Because of the fear of NCO assault, the bank is obliged to foiJow its precaution<uy guidelines to the letter, ad<.ling many months and dollars to project preparation. Accorcling to a bank stu<.ly carried out in 2001, safeguard policies of one kind or another inflate total project preparation costs by somewhere between $200 miluon and $300 million annually. This money comes out of the hides of the world's poor, and the associated delays mean further months without the electricity or clean water that a bank project might bring-harming the poor a second time over. The bank's expense and delays do not even benefit the environ mental and human rigllts agendas that t\COs hold so dear. Because of the high cost of doing business with the bank, countries with the option of borrowing on private capital markets increasingly do so. For example, China, which borrowed $1.7 billion from the World Bank in 2000, accepted only half as much in 2001 and 2002-and the infrao;tructure that China built without the bank's financing was subjected to less scrutiny. Some level of conditionality is essential, but after waves of punishing assault by NCOs, the World Bank has come to reflect the agenda of acti vists who insist upon perfectionist safeguards. In sum, the world's premier development institution has come perilously close to losing touch wi th the needs and realities of developing countries. The good news is that many within the bank have come to understand this dilemma. After experiences like Qinghai and a decade of Wolfensohn's efforts to woo the NGOs, th~y ~ave rightly realized that you can't wi n over every critic. For exa,_nple, the bank mv1ted several NGOs to participate in a commission tasked with setting standards for future dams; the commission responded with a list of standards so onerous as to mak~ most dams unviable. In late 2001, a group within the bank pushed hack,_r~rs~arung the bank's board that the institution should not feel bound by. the commJSSJon s excessive recommendat" 1 1ons. Ths year, a bank-appomtecl com. . . ffiiSSJOn on extrac~ve mdustries followed the NGOs' lead callin on the World Bank ' to pull out of all oil and coal projects because o f the pollution g create. But tlus they demand overIooks the develo . d d pmg worId's nee for energy which ha~ to be sat1sfie . f:.. 1 ' I somehow. Ancl Jt 4us to acknowedge that 2.3 biUion people currentJy depend on
!

wood anc. other biomass fuels that <:aiJSe even more defo t r d Thankfullv. the bank's management rejected the corn . r:s ~IOn an air pollution. This na'icent counterattack must go b d thmJSSion s recom mendation . . . f the Qinghai battle is that throa er an one mstitu lion, however. b k The lesson o '~ e an . cannot fight the.... eosa1 I. . . one. b . Commen tators, po ltiCJans and HolJvwood 1 ce e nties must reslst t he temptation ' ' to side uncritically with feisty a<:tivists. The \Voriel Bank's prerucament is part of 1 bede..,ils argedr conu~druall globalization. In many of the world's rich captals, an espec1 ym that h in \\' La a'i mgton, . is Public policydl decided by a bewildering arrav of . terest groups campaign m , c cl mg similar arm f cl si ngle-mm e y tOr narrow goals. A Y o a vocates pounds upon . ]. . . . . big mtemat10na mshtuhons like the bank' demandi ng th ey. bend to particuJar . . .1 rorests, notb that concerns: no uamage to. mdigenous peoples' no harm to ram r mg . m1ght threaten, human nghts, or Tibet ' or democratic values . However noble many . . . nsti"tuti"ons' record, th conof the actiVISts .motives, and however flawed the big 1 . IS . . stant campa1gmng threatens to disable not just the World Bank but regional deve.lopment _banks and govemment~l aid organizations such as the U.S. Agency for Internat10n~l Devel_op~ent. If this takes place, the world may lose the potential for good that b1g orgamzahons offer: to rise above the single-issue advocacy that small groups tend to pursue and to square off against humanity's grandest problems in all their hideous complexity.

HOWARD AND DQa.n..E UMAN ,~ ,,. UYI H

Human Rjghts in World Po.Itfc....:

RHODA E. HOWARD AND JACK DC NNELLY

The International Human Rights Co,enants1 note tl1at hu man ri~hts "derive from tJ1e inherent dignity of tlle human person: But while the struggle to <L<;surc a life of ights as a dignity is probably as old ~ human ociety itself, reliance on human mec.;hanism to realize tJ1at dignity is a relatively rec:ent development. H uman Jights are. by definition, the rights one has simply because one is a human being. This simple and relatively uncontroversial definition , though , is more compu<:ated tJ1an it may appear on tl1e surface. It identifies human rights as right<;, in the strict and strong sense of tl1at term , and it establishes that they are held simply by virtue of being human ....

WHAT RIGHTS DO WE HAVE?

The definition of human or natural rights a') the rights of each person simply as a hu man being specifies their character; they are rights. The definition also spedfies their sou rce: (human ) nature ... . What is it in human nature that gives rise to human rights? There are two basic answers to this question. On the one hand, many people argue that human rights arise from human needs, from tlle naturally given reqwsites for physical and mental healtll and well-being. On the otller hand, many argue tl1at human rights reflect the minimum requirements for human dignity or rruJral personality. These latter y arguments derive from essentiaU philosophical theories of human "nature," dignity, or moral personality. Needs theories of hu man rights run into tlle problem of empirical confirmations; the simple fact is that there is sound scientific evidence only for a very narrow list of human needs. But if we use "needs" in a broader, in part nonscientific, sense, then th~ hvo..theorie~, overla~. We can th us say that people have human rights to those th~ngs ne~ded f~r a life of dign ity, for the full developmen t of their moral person~lity. The nature that gives rise to human rights is thus moral nature. Th1s moral nature is, in part, a social creation. Human nature in the relevant ~~s.e: is an amalgam co~sisting both of psycho-biological facts (con~traints and posSJbJltties) and of the soc1al structures and experiences that are no less a part of tJ1e
F~ International flatuihook of Humnn Rights, edited by Jack DonneUy and Rboda E. Howard, y PP 19- lOf). ('~~t 1987 by Jack DonneU and Rhoda E. Howard. Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishmg Croup, Inc., Westport, cr.

547 POuncs essentt J ~tme of men and wom H en. uman be are not isolated in . . 'd als h mgs , u . w o are essentiall . s . rather :reatures, in part eve ~\lduals, but Theref01 <i tlleory of human righ~ OCtal c of hu tnt nature and the no less must recognize both the essne SOcitialal creations. n uni sa1 t. _. essential . socioeco!Om t~ traditions and institutions particutar~.ty arising from cul ver 1\' tural and .. !L UJn,lll nghts are, by their nat ure, uruversaJ . . coincidental th at we have a Urtive~a l D ec: Iaration of Human R' hts fo ; t JS not . b 1g ts men ancl women. Therefore in 1 b . ' r uman nghts are the n'ghts of all 1 as1e: outli.n ' at ]east more or less "across the board., But es a JSt of human rights must ap I\ ' shaped by the particular societies . .L. h the nature of human beings alsop 15 m wmc th l' human righ ts r~ust be qualified in at least tw0 . ey JVe. Thus the universality of First, tlle forms in which UnJve al . mportant ways. rs nghts are . ti ms tutionalized are subjec-t to some legiti mate cultural and political v . ti :~~For exam~le, what counts as popuJar participation in government may society. Both multiparty and single-partv. ' ~t .n a certam range, from society to political participation. Although the ru~egJ= ~ay reflect legitimate notions of g p ~ c:annot be removed from power in some one-party states individual ' d d representatives can be b c ange an electoral pressure may result in significant policy changes. . . Second, and no less important the unive alitv (' qualified by the obvious fact that ~v particul: ~ m pnnCipleh) of human rights is , no matter ow broad its cross ' . I cuItural an d mtemationa acceptance. reflects the necessariJ Y contingent under. f . . . stan dmgs o a .particular era. For example' in th e seventeenth ancl eighteenth . h . . . centunes, t .e nghts of man were mdeed the rights 01: men. no t "omen, and social 'I . and economic nghts (other than the right to private property) were unheard of. Thus we ~ ust expect a ~adual evolution of even a consensual list of human rights. as collective underst~dings of. the essential elements of human dignity. the conditions of moral personality, evolve m response to changing ideas and material circumstances. In other words, human rights are by their essential nature urmersal in form. They are, by definition, the rights held by each (and every) person simply as a human being. But any universal list of human rights is subject to a variety of justifiable implementations. I n our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is a minimum list that is nearly universally accepted, although additional rights ha,e been added (e.g., self-determination) and further new rights (e.g., the right to nondiscrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or the right to peace) ma~ be added in the future. \.Ve are in no position to offer a philosophical defense of the list of rights in the Universal Declaration. To do so would require an account of the source of human rights-hum an nature-that would certainly e~ceed the space avail.able to us. Nonetheless the Universal Declaration is nearly umversally accepted b) states. For practical polltical purposes we can treat it as authoritative.

RIGHTs IN WORJ..o

n:
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L
l

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: v

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS

. deseJ"\'es some attention. There are, . . The mternationa l context of nation~ practices. rights standards that are wide~ as we have already noted, intemat10nal human

5--IS

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

HOWARD AND DONNELLY I HUMAN

UJS ('Il" 'i lil n:l! 'Vu lua tion or . . . l at lea .st -hv sta ~.::s. ac<:cptel I- 111 pn nc1p e . . ' ... .-chinCT ~et of. . "llabll " J \la ne I:tnJ s to mh . . k I WJtlmlanoveJc.u ,.., . nalJOnaJ praC S lil e pa ce tiCe ]' tJ O nm i!ted t!JClllSefn'~ 'V}wl<vc r the for~..:e which virtuaJI~ all states have_ exp JCJ .Y <.: .t' attendant I<Pal irn tJ m 11 fro m int(:> r. . . 1 1 . 1 nationa1 sovereJgn'tv' wJt1 II s nw n,rhts ro of cla.J ms o 1 . mK . .I . I ' , . J11 ation of natJOna 1UJ n 1 tit ts frolll tlw p(' rsr1e<.:. natJOnaJ actwn , t tc c _va .... f Unive rsal Oedarat.ou tiiiJ'> IS cert:.tinly . t 1<' ove of t 1 n t crna tional sta ndarLL'.> o bl1 tll the moral daim sk(tch 1e ed abo ve thtt . f ncomforta e '"'1 appropnate,cven ' one_rs~ .l . d d h)r the very idea of hun1a ll rights. 1 sueJ1 ulllvers'1J'stic scrut1ny JSucll1an e 1 t. s it has rcccn th he<..om r c ashionablc l 11 h I. ' . ture on intemabona1re a lOll . , t c tcJa . . s aJk 0 f t auona1 reg.mes. ., tllat 1 nor llls and de d!\ion -makin 'g procedures to t m em . . . .' ce )ted b)' states m a given Issue "rea National human rights practi ces do take ac 1 . . b d . . t ~ t of an international human rights reg m1 e cen tered place w1thm t1 roa e1 con ex 1e

. t ., Th us LI IC'

( I

on the United Nations. We have already sketched the p1incipal n~nns ofth.IS 1 .egw~e-:-t l1e1. r 1 1~t o . ng 1ts . 1 U m t 1e nwers"1 Ded aJ ..au 1 Th ese nonns/ nghts are furthe 1 elah01 ctted 111 two u ho 1 . . . ... tl lntematio naJ Covenant on Econom1 Soctal an cl Cu Jtural Rtg c, maJOr trcaues, 1e hts 1 1 and the fntemationaJ Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, '"' uc 1 were op ened for signature and ratification in 1966 and ca1~~ into force in 197~. Alm ost alJ of the countries studied in thjs volume have rabf1ed (become a party to) both the Covenant 011 CiviJ and PoliticaJ Rjghts and the Covenant on Econom ic, SociaJ and CuJtu raJ Right . ... Even the countries that a~e not parti.e~ to the Co venants_ often accept the principles of the Universal Decla ration. l n ad<.htwn,.there are~ vanety of single-issue treaties that have been formulated under UN auspices on topJcs such as racial discrimination , the rights of v.romen, and torture. These later Covenants and Conventions go into much greater detail than the Universal De daration and include a few important changes. For example, the Covenants promi ne ntly include a right to nationaJ seJf-detennination , wruch is absent in the Un ive rsa J De claration , but do not include a 1ight to private property. Nevertheless, for the most part they can be seen simply as elaborations on the Unive rsal Declaration, wh ich remains the central normative document in the inte rnational hum an rights regim e. What is the legal and political force of these norms? Th e Unive rsal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaim ed in 1948 by tl1e United Natio ns Ge neral Assembly. As such, it has no force of law. Resolutions of the Ge neral Assembly , even solemn declarations, are merely recommendations to states; the Gene ral As sem bly has no international legislative powers. Over the years, however, the Unive rsal Declaration has come to be something more than a mere recommendation. There are two principal sources of international law, namely. tre aty and custom. Althou gh today we tend to think first of treaty, historically cus tom is at least as important. A rul e or principle attains the force of customary int ern ati onal law when it can meet two tests. First, the principle or rule mu st ref lect the general practice of the o~etwh eJming majority of states. Secon d, wh at law yers call op-i11io juris, tl1e sense of obligation , must be taken into account. Is the cus tomal)' pra ctice seen by states as an obligation, rat her than a mere convenience or courtesy? Today it is a common view of international lawyers that the Universal Declaration has attain~d som~thing o~ the status of customary international law, so that the rig hts it contains are m some Important sense binding on states.

the lnternat a] POlJTlcs 549 r on Human R h Ilave t I1e JOrce of inte rnati 11 sud ona aw b lg ts Covenants are tre1ties d that 1:- IH states that have (v 1Se . o1 an1 rar f' only for the P"'>+: to t'he tran ti as unt y) ut d .... ues samC' h true of the single-issue tre t ' I lle or acceded to th t ea es, . a tes t 1at d c reaties Th hap!-> pos si ble that the norms of th C roun out the regime's nor I .' e . . e ovenants . s. custoul ary mtern ahonal law even for states thatare com . t.o acquirem t IS perare mg the force of the funda men tal weakness of inte ti a] . . l b. . rna on 1 1s not parties. But in erther (;aSe. aw <.1 . . natwnal lega o hga hons are volunta . , . . . n1 accepted un erscored: Virtuallv all . t er' tn 1 h1 IS obv1ously the case for tre fy . s . I I h a Jes. states are free t0 b ent1 re y as t 1ey c oose. It is no less true th h f ecome parties or not 0 practice and opinio ju.ris likewise assur'e t~utg ' c~~om, where the tests ofstate volu ntari ly acquired. In fact a state that a 1~t~ rlnationallegal obliga tion is onl y ' exp l<:Jt y reJect f Proe;ess of custom formation is exempt e s a practice durin~ the ven custom obligations. Fo r example, Saudi Arabia's obectrom to th ary .~ tem ion atio rights of wo me n during the drafting of the UJ . . D el pro :lslons on nallegal the equ mversa1 ec aration mgl1t b h 11 al 1 exempt it from such a norm, even if the norm . t d. . e e c to . d. 1 accep e mtemationallv as cus5 h . ri1 y b m mg. Sue cons1derations are tom a particular!)' imp rt t l . . . o an w 1en we as k what here 1s to mternational law and what me force t cban 1 s . t t 1 sm eXJ . . . s o 1mp ement an d enforce the n ghts specifi ed m the Universal Decla ration and tl'e c . . . . ovenan ts. Accepta.nce of a~ obligation by states d~s not carry with it acceptanc e of any me thod of mternatlonal enforcement. Qlllte the contrary. Unless there is an explicit en forcement mechanism attached to the obligation, its enforc ement rests simply on th e good faith of the parties. The Universal Declaration contains no enforcemen t mechanisms of any sort. Even if we accept it as ba,ing the force of international law, its implementation is left entirely in the hands of indh~dual states. Th e Covenants do have some implem entation machinery, but the machinery's practical weakness is perhaps its most strikina feature ... . Th e on e otl1er major locus of activity in the international human rights regime is the UN Commission on Human Rights. In addition to being the bod y that played the principal role in the formulation of the Universal Declaration , the Covenants, and most of the major single-issue human rights treaties, it has some weak impleme ntation powe rs. Its public discussion of human rights situati~ns in various <.:ountries can he lp to mobilize international public opinion, whic.h ts not ~wa ys utterly useless in helping to reform national practice. For example, m the ~9.t 0s t~e Co_m. Sion I)1 d a maJOr ro1 rnJS aye e m pu blic1zmg the hutnan rights conditions m Ch. ile, . . , lsrael, an d South Africa. Furthermore, 1t 1. empowered bv ECOSOC resolution s . . di 'd als d 1503 (1970) to investigate communications (complaints) fronli~ bml "'' ut cl~ . "ro gro ups tha t "ap pear to reveal a consistent pattern of e ss and re a y attes e vtolations of human rig hts." hl hemmed in bv conTh e 1503 proced ure, howeve r, is at least as_ rougt ) have c'Onsid tho h ered.2 r t straints as are the other emorcemen ~echamsms t a we ced pro ure deals only 1 1503 1 Al.though individuals may communicate gnevances, t etl parti'cular cases ofindi. d ti .olations not le ' \Vlth "situations" of gross an systema c VI. . ' . al . d nent in their particuviduals. Individuals cannot even obtain an mtem~tJOnb JU gt rights obligations of r lar case let alone internati.onal enrorceme nt of d1e uman confide aJ til l .,;05 nti' un a h rocec ure rema~ the ir government. Furthermore, t e en tue P

I , r' hf' rmore,

RIGHTS IN WORI...D

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PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORlD POU TJCS

HOWARD AND DONNElLY I HUMAN

RIGHTS rN WORLD POLITICS

: 1 ~ '"blacklist" 11e Commission does p ubl H) casei-: con clud~d , nl th~ugh 1 , four cases (Equc~ton. : C1: t' i ;"ti . Malaw i, 1 of cotllltrie be111g stu die d. I~ ~n > . d . . ) 1. h Comn11sston gone P111 t1c vvith a V5C"i c . ' J 1 r>st fo rcef 1 J u ,m Jug u.l) 1.l.'i l e J . ovokcd by the plight 01 J~ '' .!1 ' \Vttnvs se~ in . coneItiSton " as a 1980 reso utw, P' he ho e LJ 1at all huJ,J,lrl ns1 . n th we n be in Mala\\'i, whi ch me rely exp1 essed t P g rc> pected in Malawi s dd" . . 1 b 1hum an 1ights regi me, the re an. . r !..)< ild1 r\gimcs. Th e 1 ln a ItJO nto tlJS go cl < ' I r: . Cl t . r1~r 11 an and Peor)les R1g 1ts , drawn up I> llw 0 rga niza)' L9 J A111 can 1ar e1 o ~U .. . . . . cl for a Hun 1an Hights Comntts<:ton b11t 1t JS not yet non of Afncan U111 ty, proVI es . . I E . d tbe Am ericas the re are lug11 c1 1 d systems 1y eve ope fu nct10mng. n "'urope an . . . . .b b s wit h verv strong mvest1gatory pO\\ crs an cl regional rnvo 1 g ot commJ SSIO vm n ' l. 1 rt . th the au tboritv to make legaII' b.mu ng c.1 .. ns on comy ccisJo 1 an ng 1ts cou s VVI 1Um ; '-l 1 d. c . p 1 . ts by rn aJVI"d uaIs (although only eight state ha,e accepte t "le JUns lCtion of run , . . the Inter-A me lican Cou rt of Human Rtghts ). . . Eve n in Europe and the Am ericas, ho~vever, 1mplem~entation and eJJ~or: ement remain primarily nationaL In nearly tJm;y years the _ ropean _Com Eu mtsston of Hu man Rights has conside red only about 3.::>0 cases, whde the Eu 1 ~pe an Court of Huma n Rights has handled onl y one-fifth that n um~er. Such J:egt~n~l po,vers certainly should not be ignored or denigrated. Th ey prov1d e authontat1ve _m_terpretations in cases of genuin e disagreem ents and a pov:erful che ck on backsl id~ng and occasional deviations by states. But the real forc;e of eve n the Eu rop ean reg tme lies in the voluntary acceptance of human rights by the states in question, which has innniteJy more to do with dom estic politics than vvith inte rnational proced ures. In sum , at the international level the re are compre hensive, authoritative hum an rights norms that are widely accepted as binding on all states . Imple me nta tion and enforcement of these nonns, ho,.vever, both in theory and in practice, are left to states. The international context of national human rights practices certain ly cannot be ignored. Furthermore, international nonns may have an important socializing effect on national leaders and be use ful to national advoca tes of improved dom esti c human rights practices. But tl1e real work of impLem enting and enforc ing human rights takes plac;e at the national level. . . . Before the level of the nat ion-state is discussed, however, one final elem ent of the intemational context nee ds to be considered, namely, human rights as an issue in national foreign policies.
1

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POUCY

Beyond the human rights related activities of states in intern ational institutions such as those discussed in the preceding section , many states have chosen to make human rights a concern in their bilateral foreign relations.3 in fact, mu ch of the surge of ~nterest in human rights in the last decade can be traced to the cat alyzing effect of President Jimmy Carter's (1977-1981) efforts to make inte rnational human rights an objective ofU.S. foreign policy. In a discussion of human rights as an issue in national foreign po licy, at least ~ree problems need to be considered. First, a nation must select a particular set of nghts to pursue. Second, the legal and moral issues raised by inte rve ntion on

behall r. . nan rig.hts abroad need to b e ore . rn ust I ,r gra te d m to the nation 's broad exp1 . d Thi rcl hum r er JOre1gn polic:v .an nghts concerns . at best -~:I one o rseveral fo reign pot b . , smce human nghts are ' ' . . Jcy flw .ntcma bonal normative conseno JeC:tJves. . . sus on 1 1um solves tb< proI1]em o{the choice of a set of ri hts to an rights noted above larg U v<: rv sim ilar to that of the universal D gl . pursue, for unl ess a state cho ely st a oses ec aration 1ts ft be rusmissecl as fatally Rawed by partisan .d . e orts are almost e:er tain to c . or 1 eo1 cal b"1as Th f" og1 clai ms by olnctals of the Reagan admin.istrati th . us, or example, not really true human rights are almost un.iv;~all a~:~onomtc and social righ ts are the Ca rter adm inistration's serious attention t .y ?unced. By the same token, was uJtimatcly subordinate to a concern for o economtc and SOC:a] nghts, even if . c .1 d .. l 1t 1 ~ righ tribute c1 to the inte rnational perception of its J\11 Jjan po Jtic ts, greatly con. h po cy human ng ts, not JUSt a new rhetoric for the Cold w as genum ely con.cerned with . . al . . ar onia intematJon perception 1s almost a necessary concliti or neo-co1 h bhsm Such an al h cli c f on- t oug su ffi c1e nt con tio n-t or an e fective international hunan 1ts li y no means a . f A state IS, o cou rse, free to pursue any obiectives t ng1 po cy. h r 1 J 1 w1s es m Its rore1gn po tcy. If 1t w1s hes 1ts hum an nghts policy to be taken senously h . . . , owever, th e policy must at leas t be en unctated m terms conststent with the ntemano al 1 n consensus t bat has b~e n forg~d aro und t~e Uni~ersal ~ec~aration. In practice, some rights must be g1ven parttc ula~ prommence m a nation s foreign policy, given the limited material resourc_es and mte matio?al political capital of even the most powerful stat e, but the basiC con tou rs of pohcy must be set by the Universal Declaration. After the lights to be pursued have been selected, the second problem , tha t of interve nti on on beh alf of human rights, arises. Wh en state A pursues human rights in its relations with state B, A usually will be seeking to alter the way that B treats its own citizens. Th is is, by definition, a matter essentially within the dom estic jurisdiction of B and thus outside the legitimate jurisdiction of A. 1\s action, therefore, is vulnerable to the charge of intervention, a charge that carries conside rable legal, moral , and political force in a world, such as ours, that is structu red at the international level around sovereign nation-states. Th e leg al problems raised by foreign policy action on behalf of human righ ts abr oad are probably the most troubling. Sovereignty entails the principle of nonintervention ; to say tha t A has sovereign jurisdiction over X is essentially equ ivalent to saying tha t no one else may intervene in A with respec_t to X: Becaus e sovereignty is the foundation of international law, any foreign pohc~' a~tion that ~ounts to inte rvention is prohibited by international law. On the face of It at least, tl~_pro. ition app . h1b lies to actJon on behalf ofh uman nghts as much as anv other acti.vttv. ' . . . ' It might be suggested that we can circumvent the legal prosc~ption ~ mtth er. c vention in the case of human nghts bYreierence to particular treaties .or e'e n e . d" sed above. lntemational nonns . general internatio nal normative consensus .1scus . . al . . t 1ational orgaruzations, 1 one mdiet per se, howeve r, do not authonze even m en th E,en if all states are . . . d ose VIdual states acting m epen dent ly, t0 enforce cl . norms. versal Declara tion. it . hts enume rate m tlle uru 1 lly bou nd to implem ent the ng ega ] v that any. parti.cular state or group of states simply does not follow, in 1 c or m a' ogt rfi tl .free to accept intemationa1 is entitle d to enforce that obugation. States are pe ~c ) . eh d legal obligations that have no en emen t 1nechamsms atta e orc

551

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J\NO DONNEt

CONff i.fpORARY WORW POUTICS

.1. .... ention c:~rd' c tnW:fr I ' tu s tiiJ leave~ J <t'-'Otwn.g JO l <;, ' . r . t . ti' onaJ action at irnpro l 1g thr . l l l1 1 sit ~~~ht'> Perfor<.'OJJ\1 d rable room 10r tn ema. .

. u.Y / HUMAN

~rupu ICJIJ

. J b Iegall "' perrm.ss1.11e actions on c halfofl1 u1nan rights abroad . . . . . " .~ n international legal ~rspedive on huma01tana11 llltCf"\enttoJJ , howcvt:r, dOE"S not exhaust the subject. Recently. several. au~ors haw arglJed. _strrmgl y and . ncngl)', that moral c:onsideratwn.~> m at least some .c:Jrc:UJn~tane:c~ we bel1eve oonvJ ::1 1 justify humanimrian interve:mtion on behalf of human nght~ . .\.1 c:h~t<:l \~ab..<~ r. whose book j u4ft aruf Unju,s't War~ has pro\'oked m.ucll of ~he rtcen t rnoral dL'icu~ sicm of humanitarian intenention. can be taken as iJJu~trati\'C of '> uch argumenlo;. \\'alzer pr~ts a strong defense of the morality of tl1e: gen_cr~l intr.:r:nanonal principle of nonintervention, arguing that it gives _force to_ th~ ~as1c: nght .of ~eople~ to self-determjnation, which in rum rests on the nghts of' ndJvJduals, ac:tmg m c.:oncert as a communitv. to choose their ovm go\emment. \Valzcr hac; heen <:riticizcd ' for interpreting thjs principle in a wa~ that is excessively favorable to states by arguing that the pres umption of legitim acy f and thus agains t intervention) should hold in all but the most extreme circumstances . :\onetheless, even \Valre r allows that intervention must be permitted "when the violation of human rights is so tenible that it makes talk of (..-omm unity or self-determin ation ... see1n <:ynic:al and irrelevant,--s when gross, persistent, and 5)'Slem atic violations of human rights shock the mor-al oonS<:'ience of mankind. The idea underlying such argum ents is that human rights are of such paramount mora1 importance that gross and systematic violatio ns present a moral justification for remedial international action. If the international community as a whole ~not or wjiJ not ac:t:-a nd above we have shown that an effecti ve coU ective international response will usually be impossi ble-th en one or more states may be morally justified in actir1g ad hoc on behaJf of the international community. International law and rnoraljty th us lead to different and conflic..-ti ng conclusions in at least some c.:ases. One of the fun<..tions of international poHti<:s is to help to resolve such a oonRict~ political considerations will play a substantial role in determining how a strste wiJJ respond in its foreign poJic:y to the competing moral and legal demands placed on it. But the political dimensions of such decisions point to the prac.:tical dangers by moraJ argument.c; in favor of humanitarian intervention .... Human rights may be moral concerns, but often they are not m-erely moral co~ms. Morality and realism are not necessariJy incompatible, and to treat them as 1f they al~ays ":'ere can harm not onJy a state's human rights polic.y but its br~r foreJgn polc..-y as weJI. ~ Someti~ a.country can afford to CK.:t on it~ human rights oonc.:em~; other times ~cannot. Politics mvolves compromise, a~ are~ll]t of multiple and not always compatible goals that are pursued and the res~taoc:e of a world that more often than not is unsu~e .ofthe J"drtic..~r objoctives heing sought. Human rights, like other goals of foreagn policy. must at times be compromised . In some instances there is little that a country can afford to do even in tOO face of major human rights violations ....

. Ie<:tl\.c or compr c hensn.e re""tn'ctJ'oM of trade:. and othf.r lonns. of mtc:rae:ticm arc ~ "" , . . all actions that fall short of interve ntion. Thus m mosl cJr<. 'H Ls~anr ~'~ thc:y Will h

diplomac:\'. public p rt>lf'C r l ('(} dcJTJnatiOil<, mant'f' o f a Ioreu~u coun t 1) r ' . lom~hc relation~ redudng or lu.Itmt IfJTt 1gn aid. and downgr ading or I>reaking d 1p au _ . .
r

Qu1'et

. Ort1gn hu man ngh ts, ~well as other ftore,"~<W(; .about t}I(:: relathc wein4-.r to be polk.:v . , 1gn po1 ~<>a) J<:v ~ gjven to ing traclc-o ff!> need to be f(>rm 11 Jat F / .., s, and at l~st rough ml Ji mak 1 made tar!v in th e process of wor'-'nge< . urthenr1Cm::, \IJ.th <kcision n~-~r L ~ ' KJ out a poJ ~ ...~..J " ~ to ue ho<.: rf'.sponse~ to m mediate proble d l(;y, <UIU - e. m<; an c.-rise J.... as a matter of pnn.<.1p1 Ad human rights policies of countnes L s, ''mJc:h have hetm the. - -'- . th suc:n as Ca . I '~ m e aJmost sure to lead to inconsistencies and. h nac a and the united'" States, aTt fact. \Vithout suc:h efforts to integrate h mco .~rE-nee, both in appearan<X; and in . urnan IK)', any trade-offs that are made nnghts 10to thE. structurE: of national foreign po Standards will be undeniably diffic lt tw1r remain, ~tt:rally, unprintipled. . :u o tc; j . . 1 severe problems. Hard cases andIOrrnulati ' an< therr ~p1 . v.ill ratse no ess ex.ce Jc:ation P ons gra)' areas and fuzzy boun,_ - l.i n1 su<.:h efforts . are unavrndable. So are uanes. ess . bowever, the resulting polic:v is Jikelv to appear basel ar~ senous~ undertaken_ ' . ess or mr~ci<*u;nt, an d proha ,. bly will be so in fa.c:t as welJ." .....,~.... -

n variatirm~ in the trtat POI.mcs 553 cons1 t P()1 hu rnan riul-. ts ,.,rne;nt <Jf hum n 1ts vjrjl-... K-y, 1 an -~ Fl' '-'JTl<:.trr~ nt<:d .:w.... s are rated r(J the hrcyc.ttlcr framc.work ff' . . to be ex.plkitlvand to 00 part. of a g . h , . I f' . ' 0 0 J (::)(I n J ; <X') :rentl.. an mtc5! a1 part o , not Ju.st sornc."thinv tad..~ po li.y J\ human rights < ') mt (: 0 '..,. cult decisions have to he ::.__.J on to, a etmntrv's 0\'traJJ~> .c.! roust lxI

RIGHTs IS WOR.L.o

There are many opportunities for fore~gn lie . h - r ,. . . . . b . po of ng ts m 10re1gn c:ountries, ut effective a:tion req ;y action on behalf f human the . . wres same sort o care and attenti on reqUired for SU(;(;ess in any area of foreign poli<:y. ...

CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This view of the creation of the indi...idual, v.ith indhidual needs for human rights, is criticiz ed by many advocates of the "cultural relativisf schooJ of human rights. They presen t the argument that human rights are a \Vestem construct with limited [universal] applicability. >'6 But cultural relathism, as applied to human rights, fails to grasp the nature of culture. A number of erroneous assumptions underlie this viewpoint. Criticism of the universaJity of human rights often stems from erroneous perceptions of the persistence of traditional societies, societies ~ ~ princip~ ~ social justice are based not on rights but on status and on th~ ~te~re of P"'1 lege and responsibility. Often anthropologically anacbrorusti<: are presented of premo dem societies, taking no account whatsoever of ~e social changes . we have described above. It JS assumed tbat culture is a static entitv. But cuJture. . values like the indivi dual-i s adaptive. _ ne can accept the pnn:pl~!: =~ O and norms do indeed glue soc:1ety togethe r, and~ ey~-e a strong bold 00 assuming cultural stasis. Even though elements~ ~:midualsareactors"'-bo people's individual pwcbes, cultures can and do c ge: . . . ~the ~' . can influence their own fate, even if therr range of chot<:e as prevaJent social structure, culture, or ideology. that culture is a unitarY ad Cultural relativist argume~ts also ?ften=:alw ays be, a part_ ~~ne of unique whole that is that one IS bom mto, u1~~ - 'ues and indihJtiOdS that . , ' . ated t of c runu \111 tive, comprehensive, and mtegr se

pictlln:s

- ' VM J\ND rrL--

'J , or onh in part. mce m :~ ! re the soc;a) ,.. t 11 l t j-... l'h:utCTet I mere men raJ ' 1 1 "' v"" ' .~ .. ' dhu manright s mmt\:!~"Y J.u nonm ofea ch uome and rolts \'arv, so. tt IS argue . . ec. . Id ,_~ both -aJuabie in and of thc1r own ngh ana () nnn1 rooted ' y $0l'lt >h an 1 1e to ~ \ " a,.. J bl . mnt> n.1ous . to c1 1 1enge. Therefore such argum( Jl l t1 p 1c.:a e on1 to v a.s to be.~ 1 la ~ I. " . . . . .t 1 C'e rtrun \\ estem octebes. o un pose them on othe r socie l1e.., tron t w ll(;1 they did ..nall\' anse uld d senous and irreparable datn a~e h1 t}ose cultures. In wo not onm o . 1 r tl ~ I 1 t adept cul tural accommodatwmsts. t 1ey are able to .act 1oug 1. peop e are qw e WJUCh aspe ts f a "new" culture thev "'ish to adopt an d w h-1Ch aspects L : C boose c 0 ' 1 of the -old r they wish to retain. For example, the marabouts. pncs~ ).' wh? lead Senegal's traditi~naJ Musum broth erhoods, have become leading pobti<.:al figur es and ha,e acquired considerable wealth and power t~~ough the p~anut trade. . Still another assumption of the cultural relabvtsm school IS that ~u l~u:e 15 un.aft cted bv social structure. But structure does affect culture. To a stgntficant ~'ten; cuJtur~ and values reflect the basic economic and pouticaJ organization of a ..... . SOCl e.J. For example , a socie tv such as Toku gawa Japan that mo,es from a feudal , , struchJre to an organized bureaucratic state is bo~ nd to e~e nencc ch~n ges in ,-aJues. Or the amalgamation of many different ethru c groups m to one nat1on-state inevitably changes the way that individuals view themsel~(es: F ~r exam ple, ~late sponsored retention of ethnic custo ms, as unde r Canadas rnulticuJ turaJ poltcy ~f presef\ing ethnic communities, cannot mask ilie fact that most of those commuruties are merging into the larger Canadian society. A final assumption of the c:ulturaJ relativist "iew of hum an rights is that c.:ultu raJ practices are neutral in their impact on different individuals and groups. Y very few et social practices, whether cultural or othe rwise, distribute the same bene fits to each member of a group. In considering any cultural practice it is usefuJ to ask, who bene fits from its retention? Those who speak for the group are usually those most capable of articulating the groups values to the outside world. But such spokesmen are likely to stress, in their articulation of "group" values, those particular valu es that are most to their own advantage. Both iliose who choose to adopt "ne\\~' ideals, such as poUtical democracy or atheism. and those who choose to retain "old" ideals, such as a God-fearing political consensus, may be doing so in their own interests. Culture is both influenced by, and an instrument of, conflict among individuals or social groups. Just as those who attempt to modify or change c~toms may have personaJ interests in so doing. so also do those who attempt to preserve them . Quite often , relativist arguments are adopted principally to proteet the interests of those in f>O'"Ver. Thus the notio n that human rights cannot be applied across cultures violates both the prioc1ple of human rights and its practice. Human rights mean precisely that: rights held by virtue of being human. Human rights do not mean human dignily*'nor do they represent the sum of personal resources (material, moral, or spiritual) that an individual might hold Cultural variances that do not violate basic human rights undoubtedly enrich the world But to permit the interests of the powerful to masquerade behind spurious defenses of cultural relativity is merely to lessen the <--bance that the victims of their polides will be abJe to com plain . In the DIOde~ wodd. concepts such as <..'Ultural relativity, which deny to individuals the MDOral right to make oomparisons and to insist on universal standards of right and WJOOg, are happily adopted by those who rontrol the state.
.
I I

THJR ~J vVO RLO CRITICISMS

'VVFl l::,

fNWOR.IJ> P0t.mcs

vca rs a number of r.r..110 "''"' mentators f ..L the cor ttpl of univ trsal human rirrl.- F rorn u te Third \\orld hat~ c: :i...---a ' 'H"s rer1u< :nu<: UCI,I appearo., to he to exempt S<Jrne Third. World a:ntly: thc . tntc--ntiurJ c,{ thf: < :rlti<.isJM udg . cO\cT J mc'n.t generated by the c.:onccpt of um\e r~ h Timtnts from the st.sral. -rl of . . uar1 cism m fact: serves to cove r ab 1 .~..5 of ! urnan nghts. \1uch of .t..- ......a. ~ tu man uae '""'"' ~ mental dicta torship, or allegedly "so<.ial' .,. rights b, . /stat e c:orpor::.ti~ df:\.ek;n.. . . . l5l reg~mts r A c;om mon cntlc:tsm of the <:on<:<..>nt of . . ......... ,~.,._. \V rn 1n ongm , 1t must be limited ... its,umvtrsaJ human nouu s u la{ sirl(:e it is este in li ., b'li . a 1 logically anc.l empirically. this <:ritic.isrn is~~~ t} to the \~~t ern workl.Both applicability to its place or people of Origi n J =ie dge lS not limited in its that medicines disC;Overed in the devel oped~ne . not as~ume, for eump~~ of E uropean origin. ~or is it reasonable to ~t ::""~_;vdl cure only ptopl~ certain kind -ab out social arrangements instead of abo h edge b thought of a or enc e-s 11m1ted lace !lt uman raJ sc1 to 1ts p of origin. -ntOSe same Third W iology.ticsnatuorld or t reject universal conc.:epts of human rights often happily accept .\f~ . en lO which also origi nate d in th~ W~ern_\\:orld , in the nrind of a Germ=.,.,.~ m, The fact that human nghts IS ongmally a liberal notion, rooted in the rise of a class of bo~rgeois <.1~~ in Europe who demanded indhiduaJ rights against tbe power of kings and nobthty, does not make human rights inappli~ble to the rest of the world. As we argu e above, all over the world there are (10';.\' formal states. ~o~r-bose citizens are incre asingly individualized. All over the world, therefore. there are people who need prote<.tions against the depradations of class-ruled governments. Moreove r, whatever the Hberal origins of human rights, the list now accepted as universal indu des a wide range of economic and soc.ial rights that were first adv<r cate d by socialist and soc.:ial-democratic c :rit:ics of liberalism. Although eighteenthcentury liberals stressed the right to private property. the 1966 Inte~ Human lligh ts Covenants do not mention it, substituting instead the ~to SO\'emgnty O"w'er national reso urces . . .. To attribute the idea of wmersal human rights ta an outdated Uberalism , unaffected by later notions of welfare democ:racy and tillin:Huenced ~ socialist concerns with economic rights, is simply incorrect. ,_.~:~.... . The absence of a right to priva_te prope~ ~ the U,.:eoants ~ a \\Oddoolooial Third seDSI tivity to the legitimate preocwpations of socialist.~ posttiooal bmnan rigbts iD governments . Conservative critics of recent trends m rntema of them also . . nal . . ty 0\-er resources. as some fact depl ore the nght to natio SO\~re~gn fthe~idnal. Wecemunlydooot deplore any attention to the eco~omJC ngbts 0 . rights of the i,ndi\idnal are shar e this view of rights; we believe that the ~~;dual we are (Ula!med as important as dvil and political rights._But Jt JS indiciduol ~~aseoougb not with. \Ve would like to see a world in whicJJ ~to ecoi)001ic 50'--ereigntY . merely a world in which every state has the~ Third wortdist aswrt:MJO ~ \Ve are skeptical, therefore, of the ~idual rigbD"group" rights ought to be more impo~!~a~]ocaterigbtstoasodalil!ti' lldl ..grou p.. in question proves to be~e s~~~!.rigbts?Si~~ -~ ._ . . that is already the chief violator of i.n<ln1 . cl UJdj\idoah fD pr.-&~ sion "peoples' righ ts." The communal rights
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f\NU DONNELLY I

- ~6 ,:).)

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

'St J"ctuse of tlrl' dt ~it of tiH larcrer . su individual i . .ortJ rnate . t U rion rrsks arre. I ~ o SOVJe r fu ndarne ntaltst rn 1e J .. rrorce official atJ1eism. ~o p .. to e1 11 H' 1grc: f(Jr t 1 term ~roup ng lts IS 10 vi ll ' Hi er u<>e that we can cnVJ < I1 IJ , hunter-cralherers. pao;toralist s, <1r srrhsistenc:e T ~ one co~pe ~o 1protection of natrve pcop es. usu~ { . . . ll ctidtics arc lwing 'iolatcd by th e rhose }Jropertv ngLlts as c: o . It al' t S h crr<>llfJ!> are flgh tinv a hattle ' agncu ur IS s, "ti that encroach upon t1 M 1em. uc.: ~ . ) algcr !>tate socle ~Js. d - ao11 and the state's ~:u.:curnulat iv<' tendencies. For cl 1 agajnst the forces o mo crnlza , . h Q 1 eve1op. es ex:tmple natJVe pcop 1 rn c anada began in the J970s to obJed to state ' . . . . ,u 1 men t proJe<:ts sue 1 as tl1e J nes Ba)' I-f,vdroelectric pro1ect 111 uc Jec, w 1rc depnved t1 ' 0 f t 1 r t.adto I1a11ands . '!\t tJ1e moment, there IS no r11ternattOnaJ f)'(' " . Jet I I J 1el11 . . ~ . human rights protection for such gro~ ps or the1 r way o. J. e .. One way to prote<.:t such group nghts would be to 1 ncorpor~l.e th e group as a legal entity in order to preserve ilieir land claims. However, ~v~n .d the law~Jrotects such group rights, individual members of ilie group .ma?' pr e.fe1 ~~ move mto the larger society in respon e to the processes of modem1Zat10n discussed above. Both . opinions must be protected. If the purpose of group rights is to protect large: ~stablished groups of people who share the same territory, customs, language, religiOn, and ancestry, then such protection eould only occu; at the e.xpense of states' rights. These groups, under international hu man rights law, do not have d1e right to withdraw from the states that enfold them. M oreover, it is clearly not the intention of Third World defenders of group rights to allow sucb a right to secession. A first principle of the Organization of African Unity, for example, is to preserve the sovereignty of all its member tates not only against outside attack but also against internal attempts at secession. Group rights appear to mean, in practice, states, rights. But the rights of states are the rights of the individuals and classes who control the state. Many Third World and socialist regimes also argue that lights ought to be tied to duties. A citizen's rights, it is argued, ought to be contingent upon his duties toward the society at large-privilege is contingent on responsibility. Such a view of rights made sense in nonstate societies in which each "person" fulfilled his roles along with others, aJJ of the roles togetl1er creating a close-knit, tradition-bou nd group. But in modern state societies, to tie rights to duties is to risk the former's complete disappearance. All duties .._vi.l] be aimed toward the preservation of the state and of the interests of those who control it. It is true that no human rights are absolute; even in societies that adhere in r p_inci?le to ~he libe.raJ ethos, individuals are frequently deprived of righ ts, espe~ially m w~~e or 1f they are convicted of criminal acts. However, such deprivations ~. legt~mately be made only after the most scrupulous protection of civil ~d political_ nghts u~der the rule of law. The difficulty with tying rights to duties t With?ut _he mtennediate step of scrutiny by a genuinely independent juiliciary is the likelihood of wholesale cancellation of rights by the ruling class. But if one has

. d lte in tlwi r '1\\ r l'l'' ;'11 1tston rs are . own Ia nguage ' .an d lll T u )'t'c.:tl Hiahtc;. ludr\i. 1 1..: tn I'ret' to . . ancl .[>o o r rdi~ion, spcu k tIwrr n I C:rv:rJ . , . . h cultural r>ra<tic; \ \\ I( h a l lllf'tlllingprotected rn the Covenant on I 1 . group~ to en,age tn t ose OU}) .. ricrht <. u \iuap) l'lt'<\11 that the .. e c [i come togf>t 1er rn ' n 1 1 d o ten a gr ' r ' ful to them. On the. ot ler lan group-ror. e~ntJJI~ ' that t ll' i11Uh J<lllal Ch ristian ,..., t 0 the b d

,.;ghts "' r. ly because one is human a h n 10r no othe . 1 r " r reason, t en it is much more pnncl p e, ror the state to cane 1th difficu l: rights h 1ying that only certain types of~ em. It.can not legitimate the denial of uman bemgs, exh ibiting certain kinds of behavior ;1r<. entitled to them. al h One> fi 11al critidsm of the view of un rvers uman 'ghts bed . h . em ded in the Inter.~ s national CO'-cnants 1 t at an undue stress . 1 .cl ''tical n'gh ts, whereas lS . . . . . the ovem<.l'mg nghts pnonty in the Third ,11 atId on CJvd and pou vvor IS ec:ono . . Ire agent o f economic: development-and h mrc nghts. In th is view, the state as t distribution of economic goods or "rights" to the m;nce, presumably, of eventual with problems of guaranteeing political parti . . .ses-~h.ould not be bothered tecting people's basic: civil rights. These righ~~p~ti?n m deciSIOn making, or of pros t ~ th, .1 IS argued, come "after" development is completed. The empirical basis r . . b development per se w1')1not guarantee future h IS argument is weak Econom1c or any other kind. Often, development means ~~an n~ ts, whehther of an economic equiconomJc . li . table < stnb utive measures. Moreover, development 'tr gro\vt 'ftbut without 1 s 11 d , needs and views F' ategJes o en fat! because of en t at tent' ton to cthzens insuffi c1 . ma b eve opment plans are . . . . th e continued Vlolations of citizens' rightsy, th 1 ] las 1: r often <l cover ror y e ru mgc s. . d Thus we return to where we started: the rights of all men an women agrunst all governments to treatment a~ free equal maten'ally and phystcall y secure per. . , . . .. . sons. Th1s IS what human digmty means and reqwres in our era. And the individual human rights of the Universal Declaration and the Covenants are the means b y which individuals today carry out the struggle to achieve their dignity. . . .

HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD POuncs dr

557

NOTES
1. The Internatjonal Bill of Human Rights includes the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Chil and Political Rights (1966}. and the Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant. 2. Howard Tolley, "The Conceal.ed Crack in the Citadel: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights' Response to Confidential Communications,~ Human Rights Quar. ., . . terly 6 (November 1984): 420-62. 3. This section draws heavily on Jack Donnelly, "Human Rrghts a~d ~orergn Pou:r, World Politics 34 (Jul 1982): 574-95, and "Humau Rights, Humanrtanan lnterve~tion ]'tv .Y 'J and American Fore1gn Policy: Law, Mora.r, and Polih'cs.. joumol or lntematumal d Human . ti ". . Affai.rs 37 (Winter 1984): 311-28. \ d Tem' Narrun: j.onrntenen on NonintervenSl R Beitz. .. an ' e, tO 4. See, r r examp1 Jerome ater an 1 Rights," joumal of Politics 48 (February 1986): ~d96.bcl.~ar~~ . . 9 (Summer 1980): hy on Pu re ''JJ01rs ., PI 1 .1 ~Human Rights and Foreign Poucy: tion and Communat Integnty, 11 osop 385-91; and Robert Matiliews and Cranford ~ratt, ~-J ; f\(av 1985): 159-88. .. ' ,.~ , . . Pnnc1p Ies and Canawan p racti ce," Hu nwn Rrohts Quo~ny 19/.), p. 90. For cnti ooks o k: B . B . ' . . h 5. MJC ael Walzer just an d UnJUSt \11ars (New Yor . asrc - Beitz. ..~oninter\'ention-; . Y Affi . 9 . d N d' u:'\onintervention : ' cisms of Walzer see Slater an 1 ar t.ll, ; . State .. Philosqphy and Public au~ ' and David Luban, ''The Romance of ilie Nation .nu Ri hts: A\\'estem Concept wi th Li 'ted . (Summer 1980): 392-97. 6. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Humanan~ Ideological Perspet'lice~. Pollis and Applicability," in Human Rights: ~ulturall-IB. ork: Schwa!.>, ed. (New Y Praeger, 19t9), PP

NAiM 1 nu: FIVE W

The pjve wars ofGlobalizatior?

MOISES NAfM

~S9 d soldiers diplomats, an cl economists b w o un erstand h ow to use in.. l .. . regu lal!onc.; to stc::er markets away from b d ""'n "e~ and a soc1al out . . gc)V(rn tn f' nt comhatants alone w'IJ not end th comes. But c:hanltin g th eA sKiH 1_. Set of . . r:. , t . . ese \\ ars. Thetr doctrinel> and instJtntwns also need a maJor overhaul.

ARs OF GLOBAUZATION

THE FIVE WARS

d Pick up Hll)' newspaper anywhere in the world about illegal migrants, drug busts smuggled, ' any lay, and you will find news veapons aunde d ' . re money, or c:ounterfeil goods. The global nature of these five wa d rs was ummaoin bl ago. The reso urces-financial, human, instjtutional technok; .a e JUSt a ecade the combata~ts. have reached unfathomable order~ of ma J~~;-deployed by So have the numbers of v1chms. The tactics and tricks of both sd b gglg 1 es o et1 mind y t f 1e . e 1 you cut through th e fog of daily headlines and orchestrated h t P o o ops, one mescapable , I1 eme rges: T 1 world s governments are fighting a qualt ti 1 h 1e trut 1 a ve y new p enome . .I non w1t 1 obsolete tools, madequate laws inefficient bureaucrati. c arrangements . . fT . ' and me rechve strateg1es. Not surprisingly' the evidence sho,vs that governments . are Iosmg.

The pcrsistcncl' of al Qnt'da underscores how h:mJ it is f~>r govem ntr11ts to stamp 011l stat cless, d<.<<nlralized networks that move frL'ely, <[tHckly, and stealthily across tl<ltional borders to engage: in terror. The intense nlC'dia c:ovcrag(' devotetl to the war on tNrorism. however, obscures five other similar global wars !'hat pit governmct~ ts against agile, well-financed nehvorks of high ly dediclted inclividuals. These art' tlte fights against the illegal international tracle in drugs, arms, intellectua] property, people, and rnoney. Religious zeal or politic.:al goals clrive terrorists, but the promise of enormous llnancial gain motivates those \vho battle governments in these flvc wars. Tragically, profit is no less a motivator for murde r, mayhem, and globaJ insecurity than religious fanaticism. Jn one rcmll or another, governments have been fighti ng these five wars for centuries. And losing them. Indeed, thanks to tl1e changes spurred by globalization over tJw last decade, their losing streak ha'i become even more pronounced. To be ~u re. nation-states have benefited from the information revolution, stronger politrcal and economic: linkages, and the shrinking importance of geographic distance. ~nfo.rtun;~tely. criminal networks have benefited even more. Never fette red by the rs rucet1 of sovereit,rnty, they are now increasingly free of geographic constraints. Moreover, globalization has not only expantled illegal markets and boosted the size and the r<'snurces of criminal nenvorks, it has also imposed more bu rdens on ~ov~rnmt!nts: Tighte~ public budg~ts, dece~1tralization, privatization, deregulation, lr.torc ope n env1ronment for rnternational trade and investment all make the and < tas~ of fighting gloha! crimi nals more difficult. Governments are made up of cumb~~so~u~ _bur~au~rac1~s that generally cooperate with difficulty, but drug traffickeJs. arms. de<tl~~ s, ahen .smu~lers, counterfei ters, an d money launderers have r~fine~ nch.vorkmg to a lugh sc1ence, entering into complex and improbable strateglC alhances that span cultures and continents. 1e ) e. , . Defeating these. foes may prove 1mposs1.11 But t1 fl rst steps to reversing I . l1e1r recent dramahc gains must l)e to recogmze t he fundamental similarities ve among. tJle n wars and to treat t1lese conA not as law enforce ment problems tcts but as a new global trend tJ1at sll' Id tJ apes e wor as much as confrontations ber.vcen . . .. . . . . . nation-stcttes d1d m the past c t . ffi a1 . aJone \VI.11 never wm these wars.us oms Cl s, police off1cers, lawyers and Judges . . G v o emmen ts must recru1t and <.leploy more sp1es,

Drugs
The best known of the five wars is, of course, the war on drugs. In 1999, the United H Na~ions' ". .uman Developme.nt Report" calculated the annual trade in illicit drugs at $400 bilbon, roughly the siZe of the Spanish economy and about 8 percent of world trade. Many countries are reporting an increase in drug use. Feeding this habit is a global supply chain that uses everything from passenger jets that can carry shipments of cocaine worth $500 million in a single trip to custom-built submarines that ply tl1e vvaters benveen Colombia and Puerto Rico. To fotl eavesdroppers, drug sm ugglers use "cloned" cell phones and broadband radio receivers while also relying on complex financial stmctures that blend legitimate and illegitimate ente1prises with elaborate fronts and structures of cross-ownership. The Uni ted States spends between $35 billion and $40 billion each year on the war on drugs; most of this money is spent on interdiction :and intellige~ce. But ~e creativity and boldness of drug cartels has routinely outstripped steady.mcreases m governmen t resources. Responding to tighter security at the U.S.-MeXJcan ?order, drug smugglers built a tunnel to move tons of drugs and billions of dollars m cas~ 0 until authorities discovered it in March 2002. CAer tlte last decade.' the,su~!ed dicatinu coca plantations 1as sum . tJ1e Bolivian and Peruvian governments m era b. . dis la o p cmg coca S.-supported Plan Colom ta IS te the heroic t . Desp1 production to Colombia. Now, the U tb Andean coun nes. k aJ d technical support of procl uction and processing la bs bac' to 0 er 6 efforts of these Andean countries and the massi'~e o~tcr .an Peru Colombia. and ' the United States the total acreage of coca P antatihons m . 11gg 1 to 910 939 in 206 200 ectares 11 f ' . .. ' . t Jeff DeSimone. the median BoliVIa has increased m the last decade rom 0 15 2001. Be tween 1990 and 2000, according to ~"u r m $!52 to SI12.... . . . pnce o f a gram of cocame ll1 the Uru'ted States Ie .ro

. From Mois~$ Nafm, "Fiv<' Wars of Globalization ~ f, . orrngn Poltcy, No. 1:34 (january/Fehrutuy 2003). / PP 29-36. 2002 by the Carneaie E ' nuowmrnt JOr lntematonaI peacc. HcplinteJ with per111ission. b' 1

558

NAlM 1 THE FlV

560

PAR1 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

Arms Trafficking
1 . IteJ. [r1 J99l' . tltt~ Pvl'tl\~, 11 Hli 1an r)arad tulet"l . .. d . I twret. :~ Or ug~ . 111 .mm o ten ~0 F> 1 1 L ' ..J. he Re\'oJutiomuy :\ nncc rorce~ o,r Co ' o11rb.t , t'llt>rrilh gro up . ~ 10.000 "" ~ /!)tot d t .,.,ker l ,I . 11' d l 0 drug growe rs an '..tt 1'"- s Thl' gro''l) }JIII<.:ha,Pcl tJ r,. -.veal)Ons in . c; osc. ~ il re ' II .1.0 11 AK-:17c; itt drculatiort toda\ <~re 111 the wrong 1 of 1 \ 80 I J eh'1 Most_, the rougU .t,d mttion . onh' V) million (m .tl'n'!t >pl'rce nt) ol'the or 1 kmds. Accor wng to t 1 nl t " 1e ' . . . J -'J d ,. I1t ree:tiJ011S in Cl t'L'lll<ll1011 t o dil) clrt:. liS~J b) . govcrn?50 m1l ron smcu arms an 1g " . Jtarv or 1 f' . . or ces. Illicl trade aC'counts for a1tnost Q(J percent ol the ~ ment mr 1 po rce . .

~ ' . n arms trade an d '' erate" more than $ I brlhon a yea r. Small arms helped tottI smau gen ., . . '1 f t 1 49 1 1 arges t col1Acts of the last decade and 111 2001 were estimated to fiue 46 o 1e . . . lJe responsJ'ble f'or. 1,()00 clelt]1s a da)'', more than 80 percent o1 tho. e vtcti rns were . ' wome n and children. . .. Smail ann are just a small prut of the probl em. The rllcge:~ marke ~ for mun1tions eJ1C001pa5SeS t0p-Of.-the-)Jne tanks' 1adar svstems that. detect Stealth arrcraft, and the , I , . . . makings of the deadliest weapons of mass destruct1on. 1 he ln~er natiOnal Atorntc Energy Agency hac; confirmed more than a dozen cases of smuggled n.uclea~ weapons-usable material, and hundreds more cases have been reporte~ and_ mvestigated over the last decade. The actual supply of ~tole11 nuclear-, bJOlog1 cal-, ?r chemical-weapons matelials and technology may still be smaU. But the poter~tial demand is strong and growing from both wouJd-be nuclear powe rs and terronsts. Constrained supply ru1d increasing demand cause prices to Jise and create enormous incentives for illegal activities. More than one fifth of the 120,000 worke rs in Russia's former "nuclear cities"-whe re more than half of alJ employees earn less thru1 $50 a mont h-say they would be wiiJing to work in the military complex of anoth er country. Gove rnmen ts have been largely ineffective in cu rbing eithe r supply or demand .... Mul ti lateral efforts to cwb the man ufacture and clistJi bution of weapons are faltering, not least because some powers are unwiJJing to accep t curbs on thei r own activities. In 2001, for exam ple, the Unite d States blocked a legall y bindi ng gJobaJ treaty to control small arms i.n part because it worried abou t restrictions on its own citizens' rights to own guns. In the absence of effective international legislation and enforcement, the laws of economics dictate the sale of more weapons at cheaper prices: In 1986, an AK-47 in Ko]owa, Kenya, cost 15 cows. Today, it costs just four.

50 pt r )t or medical drugs in 1\ igeria cl . no ~ 11m1te d to consum , an Thalland are 1 1 copies ~-_.r prod )OOt [)rob I l JS Th . . . . "' ucts: Italian . k , .eg J\ \.\'orn 'hal the11 $2 b1lhon a year exnort k . ma ers of mdustrial valves . IJ . Id T . valves o;o m wor . markets at pri<:es thatmar et IS eroded bYcounterfeit Chinese Tlw rlrive rs of this bootler~tring bo are 40 percent <:heaper. oo om . boosting both the:: dema nd and the suppl are .c:ornp\ex. -~ec hnology is obviously f Yo 111 cgallv . d . Napsl er. the now defunct Internet company that all <:Ople p10ducts. Users of download and reproduce copyrighted music for free ~wed anyone, anywhere to in just one year. Some 500,000 film files are trade~ew _from zero to 20 miiHon services such <L'i Kazaa and Morpheus and m l t druly throug 200" some 900 iJljh flle-sbaring ae could be downJoaded for free on the 'Internet-th t :- al m on music files more files than those avaiJable when Napster rea had~' mo~t two and a half times Global marketing and branding are also pfa ~nIt: pe~~ m February2001. attracted to products bearing a well-kno'J.'ll brand Yllik gp P ' as m~re people are da .cl e to the rapt growt h and . mtegration into the global ec ra or Cartier And thanks f . h k 1 count Chma , w1t wea centra governments andineffectiveonomy o d - nes, such as la . _ _{' kn ws, pro ucmg an d e.x-port mg near perrect ockoffs are botJ1 less ex"Pensive and less risky. In the words of the C EO o~ one. ~f the best ~own S\~s watchmakers: "\Ne now compete with a pr??u ct ma~ufact~r~d by Ch~ese pnsoners. The business is run by the Chinese military, thetr families and fnends, using roughly the same machines we have. which they purchased at the same industrial fairs we go to...... Governme nts have attem pted to protect intellectual property rights through various means, most notab ly the World Trade Organization's Agreement on TradeRelated Aspe cts of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS ). Several other organizations such as the vVorld Intellectual Property Organization. the World Customs Union, and Interpol are also involved. Y the large and growing volume of tJ1is et trade, or a simp le stroll in the streets of Manhattan or Madrid. show that governmen ts are far from '~nni ng this fight.
l
'l

E WARs OF GLOBAUZATION

561

Alien Smuggling
The man or woman who sells a bogus Hennes scarf or a Rolex watch in the streets of Milan is likely to be an illeual alien. Just as likely, he or she was transported 0 .cc. across several contin ents by a tra.~ ucki ng network alJied " 1'th anothe r network that . . . specializes in the illegal cop)'ln g, manu f:act unng, and distributmcr of high-end, brand -name produ cts. . . d. dinu to the United Alie n smugglina is a $7 billion a year enterpnse an a~r Ro hl , .. 000 00 b . b 0 f organized cnme. oug ) ~ ' Nations is the fast est growmg usmess ab t the same number as illepeople enter the United States illegally each >:e:~ ou . nateh- 150 million who gally enter the European Union, and part 0 f the apbprokXldloor traveJers are volun. . f .. 1 Many o ese ac hve outside their coun tnes o ongm. . , the to .dollar fee for passage.from 000 tary migra nts who pay smu~lers up to $3S;uncked-tKat is, bought an~ sold mterChin a to New York. Othe rs, mstead, are tr . a1 Research Sen1ce reckons natio naU )'-as comm odities. The U.S. C~ngressioln are trafficked across borders. e that each year between 1 million ane12 011ruon peopA woman can be ..bought... m Id . u the majo rity of whom are women and c1 ren.

Intellectual Property
In 2001, two days after recording the voice track of a movie in Hollywood, actor Denn is Hopper was in Shanghai where a street vendo r sold hi m an excellent pirated copy of the movie with his voice already on it. "I don't know how they got my v~ice i~to the c~u.n~ry before I got here," he wondered. Hopper's experience is one tiny shce of an rllJCtt trade that cost the Unite d States an estim ated $9.4 bill ion in 2001. The piracy rate of busin ess software in Japan and France is 40 perce nt, in Greece and South Korea it is about 60 percent, and in Germ any and Britain it hovers around 30 percent. Forty percent of Procter & Gam ble sham poos and 60 percent of Honda motorbikes sold in China in 2001 were pirate d. Up to

NAiM I THE FlVE WARs OF Gl..OBAUZATION

56:l PART 4 CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS
r 10r

563

arrest, deportation, or violence against the1r fau11l1es l~ac:k ~Will~ Government evcrywlwrc are enacting tougher Jl111nJg.r~tl tou la\~s und devoting more lime, monc~y. and technology to fight the fl ow ol dl<:~al aiJ<~~ls. ~ut the plight of t1 1 United Kingdom 's government illustratrs how tough that f1gl, t 1 Tl1 c s. e British government throws money at the problem, pla~1:-. lo use the Hc~yal J avy and Royal Air Force to intercept iiJegal immjhrrants, and 1111pu,~es larg<; fmes on truck drivers who (generally 11 nwittingly) transport stowaways. Stdl, 42,000 of the .50,000 refugees who have passed through the Sangatte c~111 1p (a main entry point fo r illegal i111 migration to the Un ited Kingdom) over the last three years have made it to Britain. At current rates, it will take 4:3 years for Britain to clear its asylum backlog. And that country is an island. Continental nations such as Spain, Italy, or the United States face an even greater challenge as immigration pressmes overwhelm their abil ity to control the inflow of illegal a.Jjens.
Money Laundering

tl ( . ()r .I 11111('5 ,'a r.nc..:ct. t I J1d \l1e terJ' Af'Jic:a pmlaw 200.001) . JlldrtJl u )'Car l)()ruer -;mug{{ er~ 1n .en ra a v' ' . . . rra ffi ker<, -1Ja 11 v 1 ntp1 ' 'l'c..:tims \vith Job olfN'i c>r 111 the< < of ( },tldrcn, w1th , 1c 1111 c . . rr "aJtJ es 0 11 crs <> f at1 1 op 10n .111 w.;: 11cr countr1 -- and then kecjJ th<', \ tc 11111' 111 st~ bscrvenc:e through physical vioJenC:~, debt bondag~. pilS~J~Orl f'Oilfl \C',t!J< II l <ITI U threats of
J() .

. 1uuisoara, H 01nam:t.

,uJc: 'I ,, I r: Eu rope . The UniteJ ~ations CI JiJdrt. ll s I IIIIJ ~l . I I :, ll ml c:ross1

>etwecn }b

e--o..tn cl S20fl and 'r

F::wt'd with thL<; growing tide governm t h . ' en s ave st d . h eppe up the1r efforts to ClatTlJ? do\\ n cm rogue mtemational banking t ax avens ar1<.1 . e inu ninent, Iargc-scale introduction of e-m ' money 1 aundering. Th oney-cards . h . an store large a1 nounts of money and thus can b il Wit m1<:rochips that C ' e eas y transport d 'd channel<. or <,imply exchanged among individuals-will onJ ~ ou~1 e regular Ymagn1fy thlS challenge.

WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN'T WIN

The fundamen tal changes that have ~ven the five wa . . . l o rs new mtens1ty Ovt! th 1 decade are hke y to persist. Technoloav will continue t _ _1 r e ast 1 . I h bl o; o spreau W!ue1 c:rim'nal v 1 net\.vorks wd e a e to exploit these technolouies more q kl th '' er me: governments that must cope Wit h t1ght budgets, bureaucracies media se tiY an d 1 1 u ' ru Intern atJOna trad e w1 contmue to grow providing mo1e , ny, an he ectorates r . . . ,. , . . . '. . cover ror t e expans1 on of ilJJclt trade. International m1grat1on will hkewise grow W!.th h th tl . 11 ' muc e same effect, o Len ng e 1mca y based gangs an ever growing supply of recruits and victi ms. The spre~d ?f d_em?cracy may also help criminal cartels, which can manipula~e w~ak publ1c mshtuti~ns. by co~rupting police officers or tempting politicians w1th offers of cash fo r the1r mcreasmgly expensive election campaigns. And ironically, even the spread of international law- with its growing web of embargoes, sanctions, and conventions-will offer criminals new opportunities for providing forbidden goods to those on the wrong side of the international communitv. These changes may affect each of the five wars in different ways. but these confl icts will continue to share four common characteristics:

rr .

The Cayman Islands has a population of36,000. It also has more than 2,200 mutual funds, 500 insurance companies, 60,000 businesses, and 600 banks and trust companies with almost $800 billion in assets. Not surprisingly, it figures prominently in any discussion of money laundering. So does the United States, several of whose major banks have been caught up in investigations of money laundering, tax evasion, and fraud. Few, if any, countries can claim to be free of the practi<:e of helping jndividuaJs and companies hide funds from govern ments, credi tors, business partners, or even family members, including the proceeds of tax evasion, gambling, and other crimes. Estimates of the volume of global money laundering range between 2 and .5 percent of the world's annual gross national product, or between $800 billion and $2 trillion. Smuggling money, gold coins, and other valuables is an ancient trade. Y in the et last two decades, new political and economic trends coincided with technological changes to make this ancient trade easier, cheaper, and less risky. Political changes led to the deregulation of financial markets that now faciHtate cross-border money ~ans~ers, .~cl. technological changes made distance less of a factor and money less phystcal. SUJtcases full of banknotes are still a key tool for money launderers, but computers, the Internet, and complex financial schemes that combine legal and illegal practices and institutions are more common. The sophistitation of technology, the complex web of financial institutions that crisscross the globe and the ease with which "dirty" funds can be eJec-oncally morp)1ed mto ]egatJmate assets ma ke t11e ' . . ;u I ~egul.ation of international_flows of money a daunting task. In Russia, for example, it 1 ~ es~a~ed ~ha~ by the rntd-1990s organized crime groups had set up 700 legal and financial mstituttons to launder their money.

They are not bound by geography. Some forms of crime have always had an international component: The Mafia was bom in Sicily and exported to the UnHed States, and smuggling has always been by definition international. But ~1e five wars are tmly global. \Vhere is the theater or front line of the war on drugs_. Is it Colom bia or Miami ? Myanmar (Burrna) or Milan? Where are the battles agamst money launderers being fought? In Nauru or in London? Is China the main theater in the war against the infringement of intelJectual property, or are the trenches of that war on the Internet?

They def.y traditional notions ofsovere1gnty. AI Qaeda's members have passtrul :1! th b t the) are v state1 ess. orts and nationalities-and often more an one u rth . P . . . Tl ame is also tme o e en mTheir allegiance is to then cause, not to any nation. hte ~ , . . tentlv not true of inaJ networks engaged in the five wars. The same. O e, er, ~~ ~:dge~-who fight \\ government employees-police officers, customs ay,ents, ean mments Wllcring these . . lin disad'" cllltage ror go~ "'b-tllem. Thjs asymmetry IS a cnpp g . h nbatants on one side of the wars. Highly paid, hypermotivated, and r~:::e :~antage of national borders. wars (the criminal gangs) C.ln seek refuge m ' t ) ., e fewer resourc:es and are 'de {the govemmen s 1 senior CIA offic. la' but combatants of the otI SI 1er r 1al reported . . al . f 50 rereigntv. A ronner . , ,.w._ hampered by tradition notions o ' ' le mone,. and weapons olVV that international criminal gangs are able todmo}v~ peo'Tl ag.enc let alone worldwide. p :v insi e us O\\ .,, ally faster than he can move resources

NAiM I THE FIVE WARs OF

564 PART 4 CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS
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difli: rcnt

56.'l JlON V. lop more flexible not' . . ron~ of sov hat restricting the scope of . ererg11ty. Cove rec:og u. t 1 rnments n d mu tilateral . . fi action for the s k f ec to Th . thci r l rr>te;nty tS o ten a moot point a e o prot ...: b ut by stateless netw k et r soveretgnty is compro . t't;ung h b) nal!( -states suit of tr;.trle. In Mav 1999 fo r examolr s that break laws and cro srrubose:dd chuly. Mt r er:; in p P e, t e Vene 1 ' . . / 'JC zue an governrncnt d . y 1onzation to A over Ven plane~ nut1 1 .uelan territory to monitor air rot:ntted U.s monh used by narcotraffickers Veneezz
J

GLOBAUZA

action of thousands of independent. statelcs~ orgamL:tl.IOib. fl.ll''\C' .~I'OllpS are motivated by lar~t.' profit obtained b~ exvloiting intemattonaly nce dd ferc>ntials. an unsatisfied demand. or the eo t ad\antage!> produced hy theft. rlourl~ wae;es for a Chinese cook are f~u hivher in Manhattan than in F11jian. A gram of cocaine in Kansas City is J 7,000 percent more expen. ive than i~t Bogot<'i. Fake Italian ,alves are 40 percent cheaper because counterfeiters don t have to cover the costs of developing the product. A well-funded guerrilla group .vill pay anyt hing to get the weapons it needs. In each of these five wars, the incentives to successfully overcome govern ment-imposed limits to trade are imply enormous.
They pit bureaucracies against netwotks. The S<U11e network that smuggles East European women to Berlin may be i1woh-ed in distributing opium there. The proceeds of the latter fund tl1e purchase of cou nterfeit Bulgari watches made in China and often sold on the streets of Manhattan by illegal African immigrants. Colombian drug cartels make deals with Ukrainian arms traffickers, while Wall Street brokers controlled by the U.S.-based Mafia have been known to front for Russian money launderers. These hjghly decentralized groups and individuals are bound by strong ties ofloyalty and common purpose and organized around semiautonomous clusters or "nodes" capable of operating swiftly and 6ex:ibly. Joh n Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, two of the best known experts on these types of organizations, observe that networks often lack central leadership, command, or headquarters, thus 'no precise heart or head that can be targeted. The network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) has little to no hierarchy; there may be multiple leaders.... Thus tJ1e [organization:~] design may sometimes appear acephalous (headless), and at other tirnes polyccphalous (Hydra-headed)." Typically, governments respond to these challenges by forming inten:tgency task forces or creating new bureaucracies. Consider ~e creation of the new Department of Homeland Security in the United Stat~s, wb1ch ~ncompasses 22 fonner federal agencies and their 170,000 employees and ts responsible for, among otl1er things, fighting tl1e war on drugs.

Th ey pit govemmenfs against market Jo tces: l11 c>.~th of tltc' fhc wa':~ one or more government bureanc:racie fight to c:onl<UII ~h.e d~span~tl'. 1111 loord matetl

u es corn I ue an autho 'f .. b I im n tes P a<;ed more on thL' sym o ic value of asserting sov . portant;f' I gnty over ai ere1 I ~fi k r s~ace t 1an on the fact tl drug tral c ers p anes regularly violate V< f~rmg an d .. managing" sovereigntv enezuelan terntor>'- \\'ithout new~ at of cocl1 orm" . , governments will . c.: I111 nghting the five wars. COntinue to fac.-e a 1arge disad \antage w e

't ' Strengthen existing multilateral t'ns t z ut tons Th 1 bal nature of the~ e g0 . wars means no govern ment regardless of .t .. c 1 1 s econom1 poJti al ' . c ,or mthtarvpower w'iil make much progress acting alone Ifth . ' wtous tlle 1 d IS seems o1 1 . ' n w Y oes lnterPol, the mu Itilateral agency in charge of fightmg . h mtemational c nme. 384, only 112 of whom are pouce officers a1d a . 1 n an nuaJ budget of Sv8ave a staff of 'll' I ' IOn, . than the price of some boats or planes used bi\ druu tr-affick " S1mil rnt E ess l ers"' ; 0 equivalent, has a staff of240 ru1d b dg f. _ ~r~. uropoL Europe's Interpol a u et o $.jl million 0 ne reason Interpol is poorly funded and staffed . b . ts ecause 1ts 181 member cl , . 'ghtl governments on t trust each other. Manv assume' and perhaps nu v so that the ' . k . . al . , cnmm, netvvor s they are fighting have r)enetrated th e police clepartrnents of . . , h ot er countnes an d that shanng mformation with such compromised officials es. ' would not be prudent. Others fear today's allies will become tomo rrows enem1 . . . Still others face legal1mperuments to sharing intelligence with fellow nation-states or have intelligence se1~ces and law enforcement agencies \\ith organizational cultu r~s that mak~ effective collaboration almost impossible. Progress will only be made tf the world s governments unite behind stronger, more effective multilateral organization s.

RETHINKING THE PROBLEM

tradermvolved m the five wars Bu t th ey can ancl should do better. There are at least 10ur areas where efforts can Id b 'cl etter 1 eas on how to tackle the oroblems )'le r posed by these wars:

These five wars stretch and even render obsolete many of tJ1e existing institutions, legal frameworks, military doctrines, weapons systems, and law enforcement techniques on which governments :oncept of war "fronts .. defined have relied for years. Analysts need to retl1ink the c by geography and the definition of"combatants" according to tl1e Geneva Convention. The functions of intelligence agents, soldiers, police officers, customs agents. or immigration officers need rethinking and adaptation to the new realities. Po~cy makers aJso need to reconsider the notion that o'mership is essentially a ph~'Stcal reality and not a "virtual" one or that onJy sovereign nations can issue money when thinking about ways to fight the five wars. sible. In some cases this reality may force goYenunents to. move bemberettpre~~ er arket incenti,es mav ti } ' the market to regulating it. In ot 1ers. crea ng m k li.__ t...' logy can often , . bureaucracies to curb tJ1e excesses of these mar ets. euwo encrvrmon usmg 1 p<>''-erfuJ ; r]i s can For exa.mp e, accomplish more than go,emment po cte

Devi.~i;e new mechanisms and institutions.

Gove~ents ~ay never be able to completely eradicate the kind of international

. lation. Beating market forces is next to impos. fro Move from repression to regu

!'j(i(i

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

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The Global SJo~ernance of the In ternet: Brmgmg the state Back In

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DANIEL W. DREZNER

lilllinttc thc nt- gmt'lllllll'lll\ can l snnply . . , . . . . ustificd a11d it wo11ld he rnrptud<.:nt to c J >< I f' 1 . t 1 ..1fTl<:ki 11g ill lwro111, lrn nt: ll l 1 111g-.. or we .tpons nl r 1 k. wtlk twty frorrltlc gtag.un:> ttcr deal with o llrN .M'~lt tvnh o I l<'!>t' lllds ol 1 . ' ' ' ' ' ln'ISS dc~lru <:l iOil. f3ul SOC' ICt )' C<ll1 l~ )rohil>ition. Polt c:ymaktr~ must locus on I ton. not 1 1 . '.. . . r<HI~ 1 rq~u .1 1 tllcgal tmc Ic t1 ctn arnl'lioralc problcllls that .ha\'C' dC'fJ td k . ' .. .. .. . . . . . 1 opportlllllltts w 1c r< u1a1 c t e g uJttio 11 . . 11 JJ 1 '"' . approacIl(;S IJ<lS<'<1on pro 111I<>1 '"l(l anned tnl crthclloll nl ll l l l lll ,tllOII,d I r cLdc. . lJld ,. )ol' ',,ians vote rs IIC<'d to rcalmlhat tlrc way 111. . .. y, Ul ttnratc:1 governnu.:n 1s,r 1t1. . which tlw world is conducting these' Five wars is doonred. to fH~ I-:"ol for lac~ ul effort, rcsonrc:cs, or political wiU but because l~w c:ollctt.'ve thr~1k111g thal gt~tdcs govcn 11 nc 11 t siTatcgics i 11 tlw five wars is rooted n wro11g tdcas, Ialse ass11 nplo~ 1s, and obsol<-te iHslilutions. Recognizing that governments have no c.kiii CC of wm ning unless they change thr ways tltey wage these wars is an indisp<'11subl0 first step
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in the search for solutions.

globalization and tl1 e lntemet weaken tilt: ability 0 r t t . , s a <.:s to rc.:gulatr tht '? ,. 1 global ('('()110llly. r liS paper argues that ... states partic:ult I , tl r Y lC great pnwe" . r . . . d l't' 't cl cxte rclliHIII the pnmary actors ror handlmg the social and pol 1 1 rna 1 1 e~ ercatc ~ . . u by globalt:t.alJOn and the Internet. As the primary actors t 11"' g1eat powc:rs arc t te , r . . . 1 stcntly ~uccessful m achi.e~ng their prefercnecs relative.: to other actors. most cc!ns1 se PowNfuI states will t.1 a range of foreign policy substitutes, suclr as coercion, induce me nts, uelcgatJon, and foi1Jm shopping across different international institutious to advance their desired preferences into desired outc:omcs. Nonstate actors can still influence outcomes on the margins, but their interactions with states arc rnore nuanced than the globalization literature suggests. The substitutability principle is essential to understanding how glohw.ation affect<; global govemance. States can and wiJJ substitute d.illerent governance structures, am] diffe rent polic.y tools to create those struch1res, depending on the (;()nsteUation of state interests. Great-power options include delegating regime management to nonstate actors, creating international regimes with strong enforcement c-apabilities. tolerating the generating competing regimes to protect material interests. absence of eiTective cooperation because of divergent state preferences. Because globalization scholars fail to consider the delegation stnttegy as a cxmscious state choice, they have misinterpreted the state's role in glob<ll govcmance. The international regulation of tbe lntemet provides a fe.rtile testin.g ground for these arguments. Plior analysis on the lntemet has been fuzzy, du~ m part. to the assumption that all I ntemet-related activity can be defined along a smgle policy dimension. In fact, the Internet has generated multiple. areas of.go\~ma.nce. incl uding the development of technical protocols, censorship. e-ta.xabon, mtellec . " tual prope rty and pnvacy nghts. For many of th<>se issue areas' states . express . ' . . d divergent in terests halt cross- border 1nternet transactions that contradict their t 1 aniz.ations (ICOs) an treaties . ' f references and use international governmen a org P in which therehare large ?..ones 0 . ' will to advance their preferences. Even on tssues great powers dard1 0onof technical protocols.1 t e.I~ . .. .. za agreement. such as the stem thc1r demeu enw. . manipulate private forms of aut hon'ty t o achieve
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tt tm- Stak' Blldc In: (' of tht- Jntrnwt: Bnngm,.. From Dauic:l W. l)rczner, ~rhl' Global C:ovi?nMnc rl JlO (Fil112004l: 417-495. u lit I Sciefll:.' Quorte y, fJ61 1\cprirrtcd by JWrlllissiOll froul r l) ICO

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GLOBAUZATION AND THE INTERNET: THE ACCI~PTED WISDOM

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A THEORY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Tlw tlwc:~Y propo~.td Jrtort ll'i\l llfw\ tlrat
polit ic:" 1 tk ... 11u fc,ulc lwl1lud tlris '1'1"' 1111 1 1 J ' '' ' P rm "1>1 111p t: 11rwil ~>odu l I!. NIIt 'li origluultd 1111 "' "''I li"'' doiiJCMk rnc,l,l<trr'l lwlim ,.., '1 .. 'Htl011 1111(Jr I Jrcrrr urlcnr:rliorral lssuc s. ( :ov< rrr 1 ' , 11 urtuh Will llllf urully JUtltr tlrul 11lc 1I I l . 1 11 re<tuc~ tlu wJw.t ~"~. 1m rtguI'ut orr~ rn1rror llltlr ow11 rrutfonul slun 1 ,,, rl~ CJUr< ~. 1111 " cCJHlo\ '' a11y ncJulslt< l<glshtl vt or rcuulatory ~ f uovtrumclll b ~~~ ~"~ ' ' wtll tl . t ,. c mn~t*l or tt~<~ '' m!\~ ror uull!malllrm'l tondllc tc to urtc.w '

'I'ABU~ I A TYVOLOCY OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE ISSUES

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DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GOVERN

570 PART 4 CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

ANCE OF THE INTERNET

571

the tnmsac:tiou costs that arc inherent in a univcrs::li-rncndwr-;lup 1( .0. parltcularly one that operates on a one-nation. one-vole princ-iple. Covernmcu l:-. <:an a<:t lik~ a hoMd of cli rf'ctors: states dt>volve regime management to nonstal< aetors, wlule . still ensuri ng that they can inf-luence any renegotiation. of the rnlcs of Ll re garne. ff th e bargaining COrL' between the great powers lS Sll t<tlJto 11011CXI.Sten~, then global regulatory coonli nation is litr less likeJy. and the er~ force me n t rcgrnw .for any proposed global staudard will be nonexistent. The prelercnees of the ptmpheral GOs, anti N COs. If states, however, help to deterrnine the tactics of great powers, T the peripJ1eral states have moderate preferences. that is, within th e zone of greatpower prefer('uces, then powerful states ha,e an incentive to attract as many aiJjes as possible as a way to enhance the le!9timacy of their own standards. This could be accomplished in a nu mber of ways. One option \vould be to bring the issue to international bargaining fora in which t11e membership and the govemance structure benefit their position. Another possibility is for great powers to apply their laws extraterritorially, coercing states to adopt their position. Regardless of the chosen strategy. the outcome is one of rival standards. Different fora or a!Jiances vvill generate altemative sets of regulatory standards, with no clear standard accepted as international law. Nonstatc actors may try to advocate for one set of global principles over another. hut the divergence of great-power preferences will make such lobbying a largely futile exercise. Any international agreements that do emerge are unstable equilibria. Enforeing such standards on recalcitrant great powers will be next to impossible. If peripheral states have immoderate preferences, t11en great powers will lack y, even tl1e ability to attract natural alUes from the periphe1 reducing the number of possible bargaining arenas. One possible outcome in this distribution of preferenees is the creation of "shan'l" standards. Governments agree to a notional set of standards with weak or nonexistent monitoring or enforcement schemes. Sham stand~ds_ permit g~vernments to cl~ir~ tJ1e de jure existence of globaJ regulat01y coor~na~1on, even m t11e absence of effective enforcement. Another possible outcome IS s1mple noncooperation, with states enforcing their own nationt11 standards. The great powers will try to propagate their preferred set of standards but their ' influence wiiJ be limited to small, dependent alJies. In the a.bsence of a bargaining core among great powers, NGOs that prefer to see more stnngent.~lobaJ regulations can pursue three strategies. First, they can try to enhance the leg1timacy of sham standards by engaging in enforcement activities, such as consumer boycotts or "nammg and shammg" exercises against actors that . . VJ~Iate st~da~ds. If this strategy is successful, states and/or firms pay a political pnc:c for v10latmg these standards Second , theabsence ofgenwnc coordination, m .NGOs can generate their own "voIun tary" eodes and standards and apply consumer

m. I10weh.t. ,grcnt po\H rs l' 4 ' t. J legate tlte . al to an :wrc(trt<.nl. \1 tlw same lu11e, t<.to r., rather , mm to nwH~o\t'rtll 1 1 1 1 ~'"' . . . . . re 1:' l adual impl<nwulalion oft 1e regu atOI) than !COs. Th is is p;.lrtly for functional reasons: J\(,(> pill~!.!( J ''.11 ' t~bltc.: pohcy n ualhcntH! m1orn J.Lt L'l Utd lmmess. adv.ul tage 1 o . n<.'l\\'orh can hcne a c:o rnp<~ rattv<.' . " , tng tlw rcqutstlt> tee1tnr<:a1cxpl'Jtrsc. rM ore t'r11portanth tilt' del<.... ton to 1mvate actors also pro\idc~ great powers a less-pubH<: and mon-(IJ.o<.ll\:e pal.ll\\:ay of 1 . . . cnsu rmg cont ro1 over t-1e regimes govcmance structure. Dd(u;atton elumnates

prcssut" on mt t1 tinational corporations to adhere to th fai l, tlv~ ca n at l~ast ac~ a.~ monitors of corporate and :~:r c~o~ al t:n~orctmcnt can act as lohb)'lsts, Cajolmg core states into narrowin ~haVlor. Thtrd, ;\COs These ( fforts can alter the behavior of marg al . g their set of preferen<.es. m actors, Lut are unlikely tC> he a source of dfcctive governance. This model suggests that nonstate actors can piay tmportant 1 10 f ro ~s suppl)~ng globaJ governance, but only under certain constell ti 0 ~ffectiveness of IGOs declines as great power disaa ons st~te mterests. The greements nst Th 1 d f nons~ate actors vary widely from quadrant to uadrant. Th e r? e .an influence o e ~~~enc:e q. great-power preferences remains constant. The prese nee of a bargammg . of core for among the great powers is a necessary condition ef~e"tive global governance. If .. . . . , ,, _ t11esc states can 1each a bargam ' the outcome is efcective po1 coon.unation tcy n ' . regardless of .the preferences or strategies of other actors If th ese st ates have . dJVergent preferences, then global governance is highly unlikely....

1
s

WHEN STATES DISAGREE ABOUT THE INTERNET

The best example of a club standards outcome for Internet issues concerns IPR [Intellectual Property Rights]. Developed and developing countries have divergent preferences on this issue. Because most goods and services produced for the lntemet are created in the advanced industrialized states, these countries have an incentive to enforce IPR. Developing countries prefer lax standards as a way of accelerating the transfer of technology and lowering the cost of acquiring new innovations and ideas. The emerging international regulatory regime on this issue mirrors great-power preferences. In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) negotiated two treaties-one on copyrights and one on performances and phonograms-to 2 cover online IPR. Experts agree that these treaties provide "strong" !PR protectio~These effo rts came in the wake of Ametican and European efforts to apply economic v sanctions against countries ,. ith lax IPR regimes. Furtl~ermo,~e. the key ~egotiating parties behind the Uruguay round of the GATT-the quad of the V rut~ States, Japan , Canada, and the European Union-strengthened the I~R regune by permitting member countiies to use the VVTO enforcement mecharusm to enforce that (TRIP) Statistical anal~es demonstrateB the r trade-related intellectual property ffi t OD COpyn'ght enforcement. etween _,[1 l . d tiOnShad a SlgiWJcant e ec threat of WfQ sanC . f)' oo percent m eve opmg d . 1 that the 1995 and 2000 soff\yare piracy declined bY near t w ces 1 ma e 1 c ear f4 countries.3 The WfO, reflecting great-power pre eren 'ts t alt 1 enforcement ofiPR. of the ri,~aJ-standards __,n ood growth of the Internet ww no er e examp1 a g . d . 15 th Internet there is increased d The regulation of ata pnvacy . sacte over e t outcome. As more commerce IS ran . d t of the nPrsonal information of r t takina a van age . . is the biggest roncem :;, h concern about firms or governmen s .H e at 0 pmon poUs show t the pnV'clC~ States adopted wuerent United . n and of online consumers. ud privacy rights is based on freedom Internet users. The European ~ru~ dered a fundamental right to be stances on the issue. The U.S. attitu ~ to~ pnvacv lS const . . E ' from state intervenhon; m urope.

;;;2 PARI4 CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITiCS

countries to re\ise their own laws in an attempt to compl) w1th J L, prC'f~nnces. Se\'cral nonstate actors hied to mediate a solution on the i\.Su< with no success. Human rights groups lobbied the U.S. government to ac<:ept tll(' EU rq;n latory position because it represented more-shingent protection of oonsum(rs.'1 A tmnsnationaJ business group, the GBDe, attempted to develop a common ,olu nta~y framework on data privacy. Th is effort failed miserably, witl1 both U.S. and E U officials criticizing the final product. Instead, the U.S. response was to encourage American mu ltinatjonaJs to estabush self-regulatmy mechanisms that would meet EU standards. Sets of voluntary principles, such as those provided byTRUSTe and BBBOnlinc, were developed. At the same time, American and European negotiators agreed to a "safe barbor" mmpromjse. The EU would not impose sanctions against U.S. firms that adhered to a voluntary standard consistent with the Data Protection Directive. The safe harbor compromise went into effect in .1\"ovember 2000, but the EU (state-directed) and U.S. (self-regulation) approaches remrun rival standards. Both TR USTe and BBBOnline have taken steps to become transnational certifiers. At the same time, U.S. compliance with the EU rurective re mains uncertain. Few mmpanies registered for the safe harbor in the year after the agreement went into effect. Furt:bennore, Federal Trade Commission studies show that U.S. fi rms do not enforce their own privacy principles.. ..5 The regulation of Internet content-that is, censorship- neatly fits the outcome of sham standards. Governments have wildly divergent preferences regarding the extent to which Internet content should be regulated. Totalitarian governments such as Cuba or Saudi Arabia want absolute con trol over citizen access to the Internet. Authoritarian governments such as Singapore or Chjna want to exploit the Internet's commercial opportunities while restricting the use of the Internet for political criticism. Liberal democracies also wish to place restrictions on offensive forms of content. These countries' definitions of objectionable content range from child pornography (the United States) to Nazi memorabilia (France). For this issue, there is no bargaining core among nation-states. The predicted outcome would be sham standards and the unilateral use of national regulation to bar undesired content. Internet enthusiasts have long dismissed the ability of states to take this action. . . . However, the evidence strongly suggests that states can regulate Internet content when they so desire. Such efforts are never 100 percent effective, but that is a goal that fe~ regulatory efforts achieve. As Jack Goldsmith obseiVes: "If govemm~ts can rc:USe the cost of Net transactions, they can regulate Net transactions. 6 In particular, governments. ha~e ~covered that by pressuring Internet service providers, they can exercise sJgru.ficant control over access to content.

prott c!td h\ tlw ~tatt. As a resull. the re W<J.!> no ' I ~t..ltes for comprdwn!-i\ < rq~ulation of data p rivacy. . ' .1 . I n c:ontr<L'il , in 1995. the E U passed a swccpiuJ.! D t.'1 r') ' D n <.tlv< that ; set dt.tr !.ruichutct' < enforcement mechan isms fo 1 JIOP . 1 tnd '' fh c direcliw wall to take el'fl~ct in late 1998, and to ensure th,Jt fi, 1Jb cfHI I 0' '\ LCJc. the law b' can vinc.r out operations bcvond the E U juril>diclion. I lw \ 'il'Olt ol L ll ct tizens' ' h ' l per onal data to third countries with ina d eguate pm tcc t tclll \vas 1J.Uli:Ct. Tl1is threat proved sufficiently potent for Australia. Canada a~1d ':l'>l f rn. l:.u ropean l 111 s}

' ess IJ exarnplc' 0 r of 1nh rn t nlcnt. For lotaU tarian states th ..J s gov(mrncnt r<~tr"lat ( 1. . y e ITI<JUes nf rPgu'tion 1 hcfr . 10n ~.. 111 ell . uvr . .u )a s11np1 outlaws the sale f m av(' ,.,.. 1 ' o personal . t.:mc < Myan tnar ou tl;.tws personal ownership of me' S . C:OIIrputcrs to individral . JUCms. s. 11 \ " 1 a<:<.:ess to be routed through au<.l 1 Arah <:1 by r('CJ' '' n n~ a vc ) a nsors tht 1ntemct eclit~ for <:onten t, hlod<ing access to pomogra h' ~ pnl~~ serw~r that the govcmnu:nt . p 1<.:, re gJOus and I' 'c:all matenaI ' po tli y sensitive Anthoritalian states have succeedc' . . . . . u m restncting 1 al Internet w1 thout sacnAcmg its commercL al 'bl . po l l'i<: content on the posst uties s 1nternct i11 tltc same way that it regulates P . t h mgapore regulates the . nn . )'' . deletmg wl1at tI1e government considers to b f'ror .roadc:a.st mi;Uia, effectively . h e o rensJVe or ~ b , . Sin uaporcs approac has been the model r1 u versJVe matcriaP n 10 r many Ea.~;t As' including Cl:ina. In July 2002, China was able to ersuade m tan governments, service provtde rs and web portals, including y~ 1 ore than 300 lntemet refrain ing from "producing, posting or dissemJnat~o., to s~~ a voluntary pledge . ' mg pemiC \IS. f IO th may je~pa.rdize sta~e security and ~srupt social stability."& m ormation at As for the developed democra<:Jes, a French court . . d d . 1 d N succee e m a legal effort to get Yahoo. to rop az1 paraphernalia from its auction st B fh 1 e. ecause o t e number , , th of' mmor servers at target Web sites to particular gf>{)(Jr h -b'ap JCareas, govemmenlll have the means to censor the national content of the W with t 1 ball eb . 'b . f. f' . ou go ycensonng the distn uhon o. m ormation. Unilateral content regulation has sucteeded despite the strong normative con~ensus among Internet enthusiasts against such regulation.9 The Septe mber 11 terronst attacks and the terrorists' use of the Internet to communicate with each other have only accelerated the pace of content requlation in the 0 developed world. . . . Human rights NCOs have protested these disparate national efforts to curb Internet content, but this has not led to the creation of any effective system of global governance on the matter. JGOs have been largely hamstrung by the extreme distribution of state preferences over content regulation. This was reflected in the first meeting of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in December 2003. One of the key sticking points at this meeting was the language regarding the extent to which any agreement would affect the regulation of speech on the Internet. China, in particular, protested the U.S.-inspired language reg~ng p~ ~eedorns. As a result, ~Jthough language was ins~rted into ~e. Declaration of Pri~f! that es specifically addressed press freedoms, 1t was he-aviJ) watered ~n. an guage reaffirming state sovereignty was also added. r . . . For e" h of the issue areas m question, govern ments have d.iventent pre1erences c o ~ . Th resultin lobal governance regarding the content of Internet regulation. e g gf The state power. dependi ng the distribution ogreat powers ha"-e structures vary in effectiveness, because the enforce ment of IPR on the Internet has su a1 .....,"t .......es into comnli yu been willing to coerce rec ('luau similar preferences and have . . . ghts-the outcome is the absence .-l: ......~ver pm-acv n Wh en great powers ~ ~ - states fl.a''e divergent preferences. as m t he ance. of a stable international r~me. '"~;n!mteral steps to regulate aL.'CCSS to the Intercensorship case, the result~ effecti e cularly salient. first. nonstate actorS have net. Two facts about these Issues are parti c .:.~s on these isstJeS. Second. ~ mment preJere........ been unable to influenc:e gove
1

DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GO VERNANCE OF llfE JMTrn '"1;,.1\NET 11w ,,sn lli~<L'> been unilateral but Su<.:c . f 1

573

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DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GO !Si 1

PART 4
CO"fTEMPORARY WORLD POU11CS

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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNET TECHNIL '\L PROTOCOL$

J I{'('I trJJC<uI ' ' .. st'llldaJ'Cis on the l nt('nWI all ,I ch s\k ( '\<tln j) IE' >.t<rn;dilic:s HI work, in tJ 1al a !->tandarJ:., utilit y cor:n,_ o,JCI: dirct:t ly to the p 11 Nwork c . s . ' <1 t J;-0 1 ll1e Intcmelto he ll'wful for. inlnrmalio11al and 1111111 I )('J' 0 I C:011S IIIJI('r . (l ,,u,_.., 1 . .

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prod 1reers need to agree on I h<' tcdiJIJ('al protoeols that pc:nnil 11 ser!> lo successfully trans111it and ac('ess data. Alt llr~ugh t:(Jfl1.1110il protoe~ls c:reate obvious publi<. goods. such standards <.:an also reap d1~propo rllona~u benefits fcJr n<.:tors that cit lrcr own tlw standards in a proprktary f<lSht on or lt ave hrst-mover advantages in cxploiting those standards. Because of the hugc.: network ex_tc_rnalities that we eviJc 11 t in tire Jnternct, however, we wou ld cxpcd a large bargam111g core among ~tates, ltading to a ham1onized standards outcome. Popular and sdroJarly histories of the Internet argue tl1 at the tcchnicaJ protocols were crcaled by an epistemic community of computer experts who helonge<.l to the IETF, and that no goven11ncnt <.:ould tln.vart this outcome. A closer look at t~1e origins of these protocols and the regimes for managing them suggests a rather different picture. At two cnJCiaJ junctures in the growth of the Intemet- tl1e acceptance of the Transmission Control Proto<.:ol!Intemet Protocol (TCPIIP) for exchanging information ac:ross di~parate computer networks, and the creation of the ICANN regime for goveming t!.e lntt'rnet Domain Name System (DNS)-govemments took active steps to ensure that the outcome serviced their interests and that the management regime rernai ned private but amenable to state interests. In the first episode, governments acted in conce1t to prevent computer firms from acquiring too much in8uence over the setting of standards; in the Se(;{)nd episode, they acted to prevent particular NGOs and JGOs from acquiring too much inRuence. TCPIIP was developed between 197:3 and 1978 by members of the Advanced Research Pmjects Agency Network (ARPANET), the DefEmse Department's network that connected civilian and military research complexes. The protocols were designed so as to permit interoperabiUty between disparate hardware systems. TCP is responsible for packing and unpacking data such tl1 they can be at transferred from one computer to another; IP is responsi ble for ensuring that data are routed to the appropriate recipients. To use a postal analogy, TCP is the functional equivalent of the envelope, and JP is the functional eguivaleut of the address/ZIP code on the envelope. TCP/IP placed minimal code demands on new entrants to the network, wluch was c;onsistent with the research community's norm of open access. to However, this was also consistent with U.S. government preferences as well. ... Although Defensc Department and ARPANET constituents favored the TCP/lP protocol, other networks did not rely on it. The actors behind these aJtemative networko; had different motivations. Companies with investments in computer networks

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developing their own pro ri RN'ET 575 I , ..L p etary Standar.L re " J'r , (J ntttnagmg u1e1r own netwo ks B u:5, Si) as t.o r'- th . r y the rruu-sevcnti(!S ""'P e "'-'< ' X<r ,;< f twork Systems (XNS) o 'tal V.. ~--~untary . , 'gl wa-; m k . . ~mx V.CtS P' sh tior Dt~tal Nt!twork Archite<.ture (DEC-~E;r eting Digital E:quiprrtE::nt (( l. m~ ), an<llB~1 'WaS promotin17 .ts ~:rx'ra1 l'I'\Ork Arch itecture (S~A) to its gov 1 .J)"\tr:rn emment buve wa~ far fro111 lhe de facto standard when the eh rs. . In other word~. TCP!l anc.l it faced strong opposition from c.-orpo . t stan rds debate of the l97fJ\ start dp . . . ra e ac.tors. e, 1t(' l flUJO T economtc powers feared th 1 fi rrn 's ownershi p of the dominant network e prosplect ~f being held hostage to a u protO<:O Thts was art' I stales wt 1 government monopolies of the teleco~m . , . P ICU arly true for cern was not unfounded. In 1975 IBM ref . d C umcations set-tor. This con' ' use a anadia 1 develop a protocol that could interface \vith non- lBM h: ~ovemment Tef1uest to the corporation urged Canada to accept IBM' . d v~re systems. Instead, s propnetarv S~A t\i k In 1978, th e French government issued a report . . ' ne vor protocol. ments: "If IBM became master of the network :ar~~g ?t er Elduropean govemu I tj I fth e world power structure." Jt wou have a sharear e Wl mg y or unWJ mg y-o There were two international responses to th's th t Th ~ . da . . 1 re-a . e nrst was a cond e ff~rt by Cana. , Bnta;n. and France to de\elop a nonproprietary standard. ~erte called Reeommendatwn X.2.:,, for the Consultative Comm'ttee on rntemation a1 J Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITI) of the Intema..:onal lielecommumcations . . u Umon (~TU ), a umversal-membership IGO. Created in less than six months. X.25 was des1gned as a public standard freely available to all private firms. The ITU ~pprov~d the standard in 1976; the French, Japanese, and British governments 1mmediately adopted X.25 as the standard for their government networks. Because of the significance of these markets for producers, IBM, Digital, and Hone}weU reluctantly agreed to offer X.2.5-compatible software on their computers in ~ tion to their own proprietary standards .... The CCIIT initiative was a successful holding action that prevented the emergence of a norm for proprietary standards. The second and more signilicant initiative was the push by the United States, the UK, France, Canada. and Japan to have the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-an NCO of technical standard setters-develop compatible nehvork standards for both priV'ate and public uses. This push was unusual, in that ordinarily the ISO declared an official standard only after there was a rough consensus an1ong producers. ln advocating a role for the ISO at an earUer stage, the major economic powers were ~le-arly trying to accelerate . . . e creation of an mtemationa1 regtme consistent \\oitb the1r preferences. th . th 9- 8 0on f the Open S)-stems InterconnecThis initiative resulted m e 1 r crea dard. . . al dard met~ian a numm tion (OSI) model. OSI is not so much a sta\ as al can communic-ate with arcltitecture through which disparate nenvor protoco s

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PART 4

COl\TEMPORARY WORlD POUTICS '

\meti can <: )JUpH tt'r l'nx.lucet :l cI 1.ull'e to compete with JB\1 . L)i~t al , t ' "tl it<> pref'ked 0 ' l bee-m e ll \\ ,t._ ' PI ' ~ pt'txlucen. The:- l . _~. !!O' em ment 1 ' rce codnw. c:>r't'n~-e, tor nonpropnetu:. open 'ou , .. ~d <l("(t.''-~il 1 hn . t : lt' T( 1 1 P ende fit 'erond hecau e 0 1 stre ~ed openn<: at . ,. ~. 1e O ~ I ,r. r tmew ork than \dth otlw1 P" }l<'Sl'd protocols. mor~ eam I s 1 \\lt1 t 1 e 1 . . . 'tl the 1 0 as the Jo,,\tton for tn:lna ,!lng network indudincT .:\.2-5. Furt1 1ennore. \\1 1 ~ ~ .. ~f . t sh..,...nvh- cncoum!!td :\HP. \ '\ I 1 p.irtKIp.m t to stem d arw. t 1 L _ . !!OH? m men 1e v c-. .. 1 . . .. 0 tthD and meetintr... in ordlr tn ~et the TCP! lP acti\ e }' paJtiC I pate Ill 1 COlllll1I <- ' .~ t t ,,1 the OS I fr::11ne" 0 1k. B' I 9') t the l 0 had th protocoI accepted as coru 15 en . . . . .. officialh- recognized TCPIIP as conistent \\lth 0 l P 1 ~ncple ~e"C <lll ~ TCP/ l P -' ':d was a~rea d' \\1 e J,. u e d m tJ1e c 111ted ttte and constdered rt'hable. .1t became . . . .o s tan d. d the [nte 1 et o vrew in size a clas 1<: e\.am ple of hJstoncal 11 . ar as th e de fa ct .. , k . "11 oc -m. v ~:\embers of the Internet community often argue cl1at t I1 ' 1 1 urc o f ... . .:....:J or m OSI to replace TCP/ IP is an exam ple of tate being ~nabl e to r~gtt.late c~berspace. Thi anrument is factualk ronec t but misses the pnmruy motl\ atiOn of both ,entures. The chief concern. of both ilie ITU and ISO initiathe was not to replace TCP/ IP but to ward off corporate attempts to lock in a dominant proprietary standard for network protocols. If go,emments had not interYened. the probable outcome would have been a 5\stem of propriete10 network protocols. The actual outcome reflected the prefe~ences of go\emments. Furthermo re. consistent "ith the model presented here. states relied on a uniYe rsal-membe rship IGO to boost legitimacy and delegated a nonstate actor to manage the actual standards. The second ao\emment interYention o,er technical protocols came two decades later. As the com mercial possibilities of the Inter net and \Vorld V/ide \Veb emerged in the early nineties. all of the re[e,ant actors recog nized tl1e need to create a more robust regime to manage the 0:\S for unique Internet addresses. The DXS is responsible for creating unique identifiers for each individual Inter net address. This includes. among others, the ,alued general Top Level Domains (gTLDs). such as .c'Om..org, or .edu. as weU as the coun try code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs), such as .de or .uk. Ther e .... .-ere three reasons for conce rn abou t DNS manageme nt. First, Inter net commentators agreed that the D~S system repre sente d an excellent focal point through which an actor could control access to the Internet. Seco nd, actors with valued trademarks were concerned about the possibility of "cyber-squatters acquiring valuable addresses, such as www.burgerking.com or \\'W\v.nike.com. Third. there were significant commercial opportunities in managing the D~S system. Between 1994 and 1998, the U.S. government contracted the DNS registry to Network Solutions Incorporated (. SI). That monopoly was estim ated in 1996 to be worth Sl billion to ~SI. The first efforts to develop an international regim e to reform the DNS system came from nonstate actors, particularly the ISOC, a network of resea rchers teSJX>nsible for developing and managing the original A RPAN ET. After repea ted false starts, ISOC fonned the International Ad Hoc Com mitte e (IAHC) to deve lop a proposal to manage domain names in lieu of NSI. The IAHC was an emin ent persons group. with representatives from ISOC, the International Trademark

on. \\lPO . and the ITU Th ~ 57ant . ' ''<.'cl itself as the natural.loc e_ lTU was Particularh' th "c ...,-:ue . ation for an internati .naleagcr to~ in\'oh~t o recri ~. l result of this proce ss,.. ome to man~oe HC vas a memorand --s L ! "' he p<lrties on gTLDs (gTLD-M um of understandin .}.; 0 U). TI1e gTLD-Mou O'O\ t>ntance functions to an er tih h t g \, l0U) amoncz; t" '! onsec1 tl propos - . nes<.. m e re ts. l COs, and ISOC. Th lTU 1e ITU, with representanoed asst~ m Gene ' tt in \larch 1997 to oive tlle . e arranged a "formal" ion; n !Tom bu i. oagreem . b'ung c:erem }us process neatIy fits the definitio f ent llie trappmgs of an intern.,h al onv T . tn . I cl . n o an eplstem . .....uon, treatv actors lll\'O ,.e m the creation of lli TLD IC: communit\'. Furthe and tech nical experts-are precisel)~~ -\lOU -lCO . business con;::re. ~ ature on how t11e Internet would affecte alcbtoalrs emphasized in llie alobalizatio~1~tes, . go governance 1 erTl lE' a TLD -MOU unmediatelv ran .. 1 ment trong y protested the agree.ment.mto opposttion fro m l\vo groups. Co\em. Th U S blasting the ITU secretariat. .. . European Jni~n secretary of state wrote a memo ment because it was deemed too u.S.-centric. T~:v:ment oppose~} the agreetion from a significant fraction of Inte t hp _posal also ran mto op~ime .zed proposed governance structure as lacking in cl ent USiasts The). en'tiCt . ilie emocratic aecountabilitv d solicitous o f corporate concerns. , an as too The IAHC proposal spurred President Clinton t Jul . rd tl . . th o Issue a \ 1. 199 t executive o e r auf t110I1Zld ng . e commerce secretary to support efforts to make the aO\ernance o 1e omam name system private and competi'ti. ,.. p d ..: .. 1 d .0 . . ve. rest enuai a VlSOr lra Ma?a zmer was put m cb~ge of the initiati,e. underscoring the high prioritv the Uwte d States gaye to settling the issue liS prefe~ences on the ISSUe were cL to ear: have a nonstate actor-rather than a universal-m embership IGO such as the !TU manage the D NS regime. ... Given the !TU's one-n ation, one-,ote structure, and the secretariat's eagerness to indep ende ntly manage the issue area, it is not surprising that the United States want ed to switch fora. Historically, the United States has shifted governance of new issue areas away from the ITU in order to lock in its own preferences.... The Euro pean Union also \\'anted three significant changes to the lAHC proposal. The EU commission insisted that the WIPO be involved in any governance struc tu re. This was a hedge against U.S. trademark law being imposed by fiat. The Euro pean s agreed with the U.S. government that the ~SI monopo~ of the gTLD registries had to be broke n up. The European motin1tion for this, howe~rer, was preve nting total U.S. dominance of the Internet. Finally, there was a desue for.a formal governmental channel between anr private order and governments~ ~ was consi dered especially relevant to the management of the ccTLDs. The~=~~ State s was sensitive to these concerns. and promised that there would be a 51 cant numb er of Europeans on any Intemet go"e.ntance board per that officiall\ ed bite pa In June 1998, t11e C omrnerce Department lSSU a '' . ed ri,atization of the D~S ~'Stem rejec ted the gTLD -MO U process and ad,~t P. ~ t bottom-up coordination. based on four principles: stability. com~tltion , thpn-.:a~te ~ner. Among Intero tt \\ rT~ ___1 and repre senta tion. T here were r.v0 reactions to ealled the Intemariutw rorum . . f If rganized conferences, c; .. enth us1asts, a senes o se -o th the idea of pfO\iding ClbZe0 feedback on the Whit e Paper (IF\\"F) was held \\l \ .
l I;'

UK2Nf:R I Tl{ GLOBAL GO VERNANCE 0 lli:E

.37R

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTJCS

UK.t.ZNER I THE GLQ

. r 1 t1' 11tional to rlre lJ S. prop osal..\If any p('opJe c1 I'Jf c.l t Jw I F\~ J1. ,4 l l ' u I 1 t s rrr reprc~cJt 1~:\'C'" ,\ .t \YP mee t<.'OO \l ntion . ,\.I tuoug1 u. . gove rn nu.: 1 11 c rn~s. l 1 rerc L'> con~r'dera) e cv1 Icnce dc1~ Jnslr"trrw th' t 1r J .. Jr'Jt o,.., lracl Tl'l .1c ,, ~:>. ' , rr Jw . cJutc:ome. rfl ll!J w,.1~ bectrJ"' ISOC Allh 'n ll ~11d brmp<'rr er wet on t po 1rcy ' '' ~ Unio n officials wer e simultaneously negotiating the <'\tc t v .ttur ~ >! '.dlilt a pri~
J "'

. .: . mtnr-mtzed .... J2 Had the great powers not inteiVened, the outcome in thjs case would have been significantly ruffer~nt from ICANN. The JSOC initially wanted to expand the num ber of gTLDs to fifty. The management of the DNS syste m would have been h~~ in the one-country, one-vote ITU , rathe r than in a private, non-profit orgamzation. !he percentage of Ame ricans running the regim e would have been larger. Tlus case d~monstrates that nonstate actors have agenda-setting powers. However, once an Issue comes to the attention of states, the outc ome wilJ refle ct great-power preferences. In both the protocol wars of the 1970s and the creation of iCANN in the 1990s, government preferences were consistent. The grea t powers repe atedly acted to

'-ate rnternct reginrc would look like. The res 11 Jt was !CAN N. Wlril e ICAJ \r\ was incorp()r<rkd h) k~v nw mhurs ol' ISOC. the resulting govemaucc structure accomrnodattd LrJtl, (; '> :HJJ Errm_p<'<ll l conc< rns. A gove rn ment aJ visory <:om mittc c \~a.., cre.Jh:d to .tt I as a ('rm~Iurl for g?vcrnment concerns. The .SI monopoly ~f gi LO~ w~~ ~~n:ke~r ..:11d th~ I ~ U :v~:<; grvtm onl_v a peripheral role m the new rcgunc. A sJgmfrc,m. fracl.on of JC A:'\;\ l s governing board consisted of non-Americans .. . . While T SOC's wish to mHnage the DNS syste m was granl<.;d. afte r a fashio11, the negotiatin g history of JCANN shows that the key actors we re states. J ~ was the U.S. government that rejected the IAHC process, ~hut out th e ITV fro m the process, and ensured the crea tion of a priva te orde r to manage ti re policy issue. European , Japanese , and Australian gove rnmen ts ensu red that the eventual regime would not be dominated by the United States. The key governme nts vetted the initial roster of JCANN's gove rning board. In contrast, ele ments of global civi l socie ty were largely shut out of the process ... . ICA~N~'> hi~tory sinc.-e its 1998 creation only underscores these cond usions. Nonstate actors out of the JSOC loop have vigorously protested ICANN's gove r~ nance structure and lack of openness to outside input. In c;ont rast to daims that the Internet would foste r greater democratic participation, many individuals have protested at the travel oosts of attending ICANN's meetings. Meetings are not wide ly available on the Web. More gene rally, its detractors label iCANN as unde mocratic and unresponsive, and a threat to the more-decentralized culture of the Inte rnet. Key governme nts have been consistent in ensuring th eir influence and in preferring stability over representation .... At the same time, U.S. and European preferences on the matter have been carried out. Sin<;e ICANN's creation, competition to provide domain name services has increased, prices have falle n, and trade mark disputes have been settled more quickly. JCAN N's own governing body has also indicated its eagerness to cater more to governme nt prefe rences. ICANN currently lists as one of its core values: "Act with sensitivity to the public interest and related gove rnme ntal concerns, so that the need for direct governmental action is

1 ensJ ' the Internet would b ~ET ...... e govern d ut., <)poly power to any one a :t givh. e so as to rn""'r . <:: or be 't ""' mtz,e effi . n j;r; H r an I eo Se(;retariat. In th~ I a multinational finn CJE:nty Without ent! J . '' to ensure that multinati 1 fil970s, governments , a n(mstate oro,_,_ rr etaf\ nr '''~'>rk protocols. In the ] ona rms wou I' not dev~l a<..'ted wL Jnttrnet ON\ u th ~u1 : f -7'7\.JS , gove natH " u trHtS to prevent :"-JGOs and ICO rn ments ac..tw inP eir ~TI prollri. s from Jn bott. liiSta nces, gove rnme nts d d oversteppingttconcert wt'th multi. . . e1 egate r neu tal mtc~rnalronal organizations-}SO d eg~me rnana11ement ~. polic:~. authrmt.,. 0 an lCA~x u) n<ma~ and to nt<u n their influence over futu . -to ensure tffi . 0 l!rnmtnre po1 -y shifts. r<. c.,ent 01Jtcomes

BALGOVE RNANCE OF lliE

RETHINKING GLOBALIZATION AND GL

. OBAL GOVERN ANCE

Th e globalization literature argues that the low . exchange, the exponential growth of the I t enng of traditicmai hC:IJ'Ji(;rs ~A n ernet . ...., state acto rs conspire to weaken the state's role in g1 and th e nse of networked non' tion Liter ature is wrong; states are still th . obal governance. The gloh-ctlv-a. . e on t he bmary ques t1on of state powe r ve pnmary a<.tors Furthermore. in focusin~r s r glossed over the dive rsity of relati onships us nonstate po'ver, .these scholars have that c:an exist acto rs in wo rld poutics. A recognition of the b . . b' ?et\\ een heterogeneous . 1hty struc tures g1 us a more powe rful lens with su stituta b of gl0 bal governance ves hi h . . . w <: to o serve the r fl .. gJo baIlZabon. A reVIew of Internet gove rnance d amr cations of emonstrates pre fer to let private actors take the governance lead, th . willthat even ~vhen states . their desi red ends. e) mteJVene to advance States may be the prim ary actors but they are not th nJ Th . 1 1 ' e o y ac-tors. e case stu d1es c ear y show that nonstate actors can affect t 0 u comes througb therr techn . . . ... zcal expe rtJse and agenda-settmg abdtties However only bv ai th 'd f 1 . , ~vmg e great rs pn e o p ace ts 1t poss1ble to set the conditions under which non-state tpowe11 ac ors \\1 exe rcise th e1r in fl uenc e .... By failing to recognize that states can substitute unilateral measures. intergovernm e ntal accords, and delegation to nonstate actors, scholars of global gover~ nanc e have unnecessarily restricted their analyses to simple comparisons of direct state invo lveme nt versus the role of nonstate actors. This is particularly true of the dele gatio n option. Unless delegation is recognized as a conscious state choice, rese arch ers inevitably miscode such variables as state power. The "-alue~added of the subs titutabili ty concept is that it permits the development of more generalizable theories .... Ironically, globalization scholars have erred not in thinking too grandly about glob al gove rnan ce, but in not thinking grandly enough.

NOTES
. orlt J Thomas Friedman, The Lexu.s and tIte 0 1 1iree (Xew Y Farrar, Strauss, & Gi.roul. we

1999), 86. land Knight. Global kcJronjc Commer-ce: 2. Catherine Mann , Sue Eckert. and Sarah Clee __, Ecooo~Jlid. 2W>l. ll8. . . A Polu.:y Primer (Washington, DC Institute for lntema11ODal

PART 4

COIIITLMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

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STEVEN R. RATNER

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terly J J3 (~priug JS1.)8 ), "3-:-~9. . . k Co1nmuuication in A-.1.1 'ldlr:tll/l/1/llniratio ns . _ Ccor'r<.llc Wan~ '" RC'Kulallllg J'\c twor oretgn Kalatlul "Chinas l)ot-CorrunlJ!ll'>m. 1 - - no- SI. tn ' ~"~ ' ..~ f'nlir.y 2.'3 (April JSi99}: 2t i - VJI ; Jall 'p,0 ! . . J22 (j111 'Jrv/ Frbruarv20()1), 74-l 5. thr~ I nlNll C'l," acct:'>SCO at 'u .. ' '1< r tllj ~n ll urnau H ight~ Watd1, J-ret;: .E1-l'!es~~on . . ..,.. . .. J,up:l/www.hrw.org/advO<.a<.)'/intcrnet/. Z.'J .M ay 200 Se)'mourCoodrnan. WhoCovcrns lltc: l ntcJnct. IOJtv {nt Will Jost'~r. Ant 1 , 1 kows ki . an(I - ) J- 18 . ...

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20jun02.htlll, JO Septt-utber 2002

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The mo,e fro~ describing the.w?rld to prescribing for it fonns the core of international law. ~~n those committing hum~ rights atrO<:ities-war criminals from Bosnia or polttical leaders from Cambod.ia- be tried in foreign courts or before international tribunals? How can members of the United l';ations ensure res t for the d~cisions of its Security Council? What is the best way to regulate tran~: tional envi r~nmental bazar~ su~h. as greenhouse gas emissions or ocean dumping? Can the Umted States allow Its c1tizens to sue European companies for their use of land and factories confiscated by the Cuban go\ernment from Americans more than a generation ago? All these questions turn on political decisions by states-but what international lawyers see and seek in such scenarios is a process whose actions are informed and influenced by principles oflaw, not just raw power. For international lawyers, devising and enforcing universal rules of conduct for states means o\ercoming two cardinal challenges: how to make such precepts legitimate in a diverse community of nations; and how to make them stick in the absence of any one sovereign authority or supranational enforcement mechanism.... Today, the end of the Cold War has loosened many of the blockages to international lawmaking and implementation. Although legal scholars still ask what states can do on their own-pass extraterritorial laws, use force. or prosecute war criminals-they do so assuming that coordinated action is now more feasible than in the past. Global and regional treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mjnes, the Maastricht Treaty, and the North American Free Trade Agreement now seJVe as the starting point for scruti nizing state behavior according to some objective standard The ground seems ready then for an acceleration of t~is century's great trend in international law: the increasing international regulation of more and more issues once typically seen as part of state domestic jurisdiction. But any a~empt ~o create the lofty, supranational legal edifice idealized by some of the fields practitioners and scholars promises to be problematic at best. Once para_lyzed b~ the deadlock between East and West, and between North and South, the mternational
. .aL 0 f Gl bal Nonns. ~ Foreign Policrj. issue 1110

toft Intemational Peace. Reprinted From Stephen R. Ratner, "lntemational Law: ~he Tnd s (Spring 1998), PP 65-75. 1998 by the Camegte En 0\\lnen or permission.

S81

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RATNER I INTERNATIONAL LAW THE TRJ

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PART 1

CON fFMPORARY WORlD POUTICS

: ,f,,~ 11ew cl uor J''' t with tlw c hall' 11gt ,,.l!,ti ' "''' rn IJ III'' 11''" C'Oflh' ll " r . J v.itJ 1 e'il .J,b, 11'd 1 t r. 1 \ ,, <'II J) IIW ~t.tl c ' ,uc.lt a-. Hcl:tnl'> or Croat1a to co111p) "' . I L" I I I I' 'I 1 t le whose (: tn.;tii JI'>I:.IIC'I s lnal;. rn ,. ~, 'Y of \\11 1 . JOI II ,I JJ anc nl 1< r a1 !'l ' .L ' I lllltrn.Liicmal nrl{'\. lutcrnalional law JTI II\1 \(ck fo < n Jr,l c 1 g VII I ! rang e: 11 . 1 I O\ l of new .1. t Awl '"' 1t liHJVC'> of Ion"" topic' and lcc I1110Iogwo,, ;L\ W t' <I~ 1 rtrrf Il('r .tWH} f.10111 'I 1netl)' .. r gn'' cc>tv~rns-tlw. trc at nH ut c.f dlj)!out.ll-. ()r -.l,,p., torct ..... . . . ., . 11 lo . Irollrrtcrr t.tlI 01 l,,lrr ,I,UJdrc[,_ t)l I I I 1(.. \CHS lo I J';l( I JO il H ) ( If1cstk areas- tIJV . th proponcnh 111 11!>1 ' .tncna~t. ng Iy c:on r l 1I('W ()I)\ I ''lci(S Ill'a( ("I. rem

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)-by the On'~"i'l 1. r A.. . Tite MAl 'Y"' .a tor. or F ri <~ht ' ally gov<rntllent to intc .: . . give~ fo . . .<:cmorntc n I rnattona) arht . rcty. mvcst 1 ratiC>n f<>r Corrt hJ.W {)I ' I JH cll'ti<.:c imits their freed , Or:. tlu: < <>rn to tnvest ,, pcnsati()r I \\ l t ' r H I t 1H: <.:asc of hard or soft I or <u\est. '\\ lt:Jt a . new . I or n prcscntatton in internataw,aJ L . partiClpants are 10 k . d<Jll<lll r I processes. They include ton uodies, contcrenc:cs a mg Jntrea'>E:d rollpi~tgs .11< b and 1 g I . . su state entiti ho h fl\ner lc(lal sotnC' wt~y 1 l < nt< .>y :rnat1onal c:ornmunty (Ch es, t tho!lt rC;<: . ' 1-j (Tib<.: t. Ka~l11n ir); nongovernmcntal ~ . ~hnya, Hon~ Kong) an~)~U?J:d tn Clairning tltat the states to whkh they ; eglamzadtions (:\COs}; and c.x;mnc~t nc)t
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shift s i11 tl;c kinds of issncs tltat legal scholars now talk about and stud).

New Forms, New Players 'JiacfitionaiJy, most rules of international law C.:Ollld he> fottnd in Or!(' of' two plates: treaties- binding. written agreements bctwccn sla~(s; or cu~totn:uy lawuncodifiC'd, hut equally binding rules based on longstan<~lllg beh.a~1 or that st:ltcs accept a.c; comp11ls()ry. ~n,e strategic: arms reduction treatlt'S rcqumng the Unt~cd Stale!~ and Hussia to cut their nuclear weapons arsenals offer examples of the former; the ru le; that governments cannot be sued in th<' courts of another state for most of their public aets provid~s an example of the latter. l listorically, treaties have gradually displaced much customary law, a~; international ru les have bccorne increasingly codified. But as new d()Jnains from the environment to the Jntcnwt come to be seen as appropriate for inl<'mational regulatiCJn, states are someti mes reluctant lo embrace any sort of IJjnding mic. Jn the pac;t, rnany legal scholars and international courts simply accepted the notion tltat no law governed a particular subject t111lil a new treaty was ccmcluucd or states signaled tlt~ir consent to a new customary-law rule (witness the rtductance witl1 which humau dghts norms were cc>nsidercd law prior to the UN 's two key treaties in I96fi) or, alternatively, struggled to find customa1y law where none existed. However, today all hut the most dc><;trinairc of sd10lars see a role for socaJJed soft law- precepts emanating from international bodies that conform in some sense to expectations of required behavior hut that arc not b.inding on states. For example, in J992 thC' World Bank completed a set of Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Though these an not binding on any bank member, states and corporations invoke them as the standard for how developing nations should treat foreign capital to encourage invest rncnt. This soft law enables states to adjust to the regulation of many new areas of internationaJ concern without fearing a violation (and possible legal eount ermcasures) if they fail to comply. Norrnativc expectations are built more quickly thau they would through the evolutiou of a customary-law rule, and more gently tlaan if a new treaty nJic wen~ foisted ou states. Soft law principles also represent a starting poi nt for oc-w hard law, which attaches a penalty to noncompliance. Jn this case, the bank's _guidelines hav( served as the basis for the negotiation of a new treaty- the

ong o not al d t' "ra I!JO\ their intcrc!-.1~. t I1esc nonstate actors dem cl ways a equate!> rr:p . an rest:nt face cl stauncb opposition to the a say .in th e <.:cmtcnt of Hf'\\ norm I tav< Som e . 1~95, C.:hi lla~ government relegated NCO,rtpartJc:d,pation in de<.:ic;ion rnakino ,s. . s o a ISta t ,. n Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. n venue du ring the U\ 's But otltcr groups may suc<.:eed even as f' fl' . ar as e ec:hvcly taki delegation. For example, U.S. telecommun . t' ng over an official lea JOns c:ompan. . h 1 have seem<.'d almost to dictate U.S. positions . th I _es sue as Motorola . ( J ~r u ) I m . tion Umon t e UN agency responsible fo e ntemational Telet'OmrnunK-atti Ib standards. At the lTU's 1992 conference on all:tinngl 0 ~telecommunications tethnologics, Motorola's stake in protecting its plan;~ e ra 0 spec ,:trum for new ul . or new sate1 bet-ame a utes U.S. . paramount mterest, res ting in a sizeable Moto 1 t di . 0 h ro a eam atten n~ as part of the U. S. d c IcgatJOn. t er corporations have acted outs'd . 1 e go'<emrnent 11 1 . channels entire y JY promu gatrng pnvate codes: In response to publi<: p e "ik ed . 11' .1 1 r ssure, ." e 1 ssu a f se -unposeu ru es to prote<.:t worker rights in the develo set o . pmg worId. 1t IS not that states are no Ionger the pnmary makers of international law. But . . . these other actors have independent views--and the resources to push them-that do not fit neatly into traditional theories of how law is made and enforced.

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New Enforcement Strategies

Most states comply with much, even most, international law almost continuallywhether the law of the sea, diplomatic immunity, or civil aviation rules. But without mee;hanisms to bring transgressors into line, international law will be ulaw" in name only. This state of affairs, when it occurs, is ignored by too many lawyers, who delight in large bodies of rules but often discount patterns of noncompliance. For example, Western governments, and many scholars, insisted throughout the l960s and 1970s that when nationalizing foreign property. developing states we~ legally bound to com pensate former owners for the full economic value. despate those states' repeated re fusals to pay such huge sums. . . . f The traditional toolbox to secure complianc.-e with the law of nations consistS 0 . ( roca1 action !IC1',li.Jist the violator), or. negotiations, mediation, countenneasures recJp ..,. . --Court . rare cases recourse to supranational JUdiClaJ bodies such as the lntematiotw . . m . such ' law Amencans f Justice. (The last of these was t)1 Jincbpm 0 f tJ1e world ofbe. thatFor manv years. o e . ) as Andrcw Carnegie and EWIU Root sought to bnng mto . mJ'. titutions'. whose these tools have been SUIJI'>lernented by the work of iJ~~em~tiotnVJonslators But todav. l .. bil. haine agruns reports and resolutions often help mo JZe s

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RAT NER I INTE RNA TION AL r PART 4 CONT'E.\1PORARY WORLD POU flCS

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ph with U:\ resolu tiom. ' 0 tJ r. d fi t th disptJle ettle ment ["ai1elS tn tl1( \\,o r <.- 1 rar1 Orga< n tc ree-tra e ron . e . . 1 1 tl1c mznlion (\' 'TO ) JJOW 1 1ave the 1 1. uthoritv to i sue binding n!lmlg-.1 t at a low h cga a 1 lor m cmP.ri \1C a tracle d'1 tc to 1mpose ~r -- flc tariffs on the loser ... Anr .t lt C :\ !o. ac oc spu 1 Jnc-' hi'b un aJs fc th r . u Yugoslavia and Hwa nda how t1 tl ,., 1t ea-;t posCntl 1at or e 1ormer . . bl e to de\ 1Se ms t'tu" ' s topL1 15h individuals for human right'> atrcx:1ti.cs" :'\onethe 1 uon n 1 . , un1tv lO cl te offcom1er Bosnian Serb prestden t Radova11 KaracbJ.c and ~ a Iess. <tS tl 1e nnp General Ratko Mladic: reveals, the uccess of these enforceme11t me<.:1 <;ms ,anL depends on the wiWngn ess of states to support them:_l~galism meets realism_.",: . Increasingly. domestic courts provide an additional,ven,ue to enfm ~e mte rnational Jaw. In Spain. for exam ple. Judge :YJanuel Carc1~ Cas tell6~1 of ~be National Court ha~ agre ed to hear a controversial human -:'ghts case m vol~ng charges against Chile's former dictator. General Augusto ~mo che t. ~eanw hlie , Castell6nis colleague, Judge Baltasar Garz6n, hea~s testi~o~y agam_st ~ho_se responsible for the "Di rty Warn of the 1970s in Argentina. (Spam IS asserting_Ju_nsdiction in both cases because its nationals were among the thousands of victim s tortured and killed.) And though Karadzic remains at large, he has been sued in U.S. federal court under the Alie n Tor t Claims Act, which alJows foreign nationals recovery against Karad.7 for the rape and torture of civilians during his "ethnk Jc cleansing" campaign in the form er Yugoslavia. At a minimum, this provides a symbolic measure of solace for his victims.

ofte n r , ,J at t Il e prospect that th:es mternatlonallaw for it e nor ms L. . ~ ft V\ T O. .:ry dispute resolution panels that mIgh t:~ enfor<:t-Q0\\11 r.,'c1 Jt tn~ ao4i _s r rce 01> n d <Jse d markets could order .t t b the l mted States ht';i . l\. In th<~ I'0 I . . I o c oose be ope~ lr> tion la'' ' '" 1c:h as those ban nmg imports f twec:n en,ironm. tal use to . o tuna <:aught . tn prv~"(; and t},e 1>ro~ pcds o f retal1atory sanctions r th m neL~ that lc'U d h 1 1 o~e laws h . o1 tn~) tor; e rle, ts on trade. In such a scenari o . t . ave mcidental cb p . , I th . f . \ VT O, )<:to me s e nen cl of business 'am ernanonalla\. as . preted h- db ' mttr scnmmah ugaboo t ,. Itc tv , ' see ks to ~ro muJ gate environn tal law of . whe n t men . envno~meutabtc; B;t gre enhouse gas conven tion just concluded at K . 'as It has '"lth the proP'J"'..ed Si mi larl y, _the Unjt~d States wants to use U:eo~~ ~~the tab~es are tumtd a com pre hen sive sanchons regi me on Iraq that has th n '. Cou nc~ to keep in pkc:t"intern ational .. rather than "U .S.-imposed .. all th h~l dihploma tic appeal ofhein" e w 1 oldi . 1-. dues because not all Ut\- program s conform to Washin e on' n_ back on pa~1n~it.; " g sole superpowe r, the United States can defv inte ti gtal 5 \'<lshes. As the world's . . , " t' of immed tate sanction; but other states will beg ma .on standards '' 1'th uttI- Ie'<IJ' t . . . m th en 1mportant Iegal regimes such as thoseo question Its motives . h. to streng c . r ovenng nuc1 and m ")lll~ ear nonpro lire ration. c1 ca1 terr11

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The noti on of henn etically sealed areas of international law each a h h. apter m a trea s~- 1 s mcreasmg1 anachronistic. Environmen tal and trade0 lCe ccan no y law long~r be discussed separately ~ the tuna-dolphin example shO\Vs; and when pri~ate rnvesto rs have to reckon ~1th se~ous abuses by local governments , foreign mves tme nt law cannot be exammed w1thout some consideration of human rights and L r law. The result is a new breed of scholarship linking previously distinct abo subjects and the realization among some practitioners that overspecialization leads to myo pic lawyering. Mo reo ver, beyond the legal field, inte rnationallawyers must address the twoway inte raction between international law and broader sociological and cultural trends in society. In one notable example, the debate on a clash of cultures in\olving so-calle d Asian values has forced students of hu man rights to stand back and consider wh eth er righ ts granted in human rights treaties mean the same thing in all states. Can Singapore sup press free speech for the goal of ~a~o~ unit): ~d develo pm ent , esp ecially if it claims that its cuJture see~ uninhib1ted politic-~ spe ech as less than a birthright? Of oourse, cuJtural assertions tend to be m-eri) broad and many human rights activists interpret these claims as excuses for ' authoritarianism ; the arguments, lwwever, can no longer be ignorecl. and black and whj te rules of treaty interpretation will not help much. has direct ffects 00 In the oth er direction, the proliferation of new ?,<'nns A~~ treatv d b contro\'e Fr. _. e ates over glo bal iza tion -the "Jihad versus Mc\Vorld rk acrsv. ~ different . will clea co on ozone or gre enh ouse gase~, fo~ mstan~, rote<:tion. versus dt"\-elopment. but perspectives on the priority of envuonmental p rdiversity.w Indeed almost once ado pte d it cannot tolerate violations in the name o m..H.. domestic (.'OI)CefD t 0 subiP.i.i a once s I..UJ by definition, the decision by states ~~-

The Legitimacy Problem

is brewing about the legitimac:..y of such measures. As inte rnational organizations are freed up to take more actions by the end of the East-West conflict and the tem pering of North-South tension s, the United States and its like-minded allies seem well positioned to impose their agenda on all Legal sch olars question whe the r \ Vestem dominance of the Organization for Security and Cooperatio n in Eu rop e, UN, Wf O, and other international institutions is not merely raw power assertin g its muscle again, albeit through multilateral bodies, to the detriment of a genuin e rule of law. Tha t this debate is more than academic can be see n vividly in the ongoing discussion abo ut reforming the Security Council. Many Am eric ans may laud the council's new muscle during the last five years, it has slapped a debilitating embargo and weapons inspection regime on Iraq , prohibited air trafllc with Lib ya due to its sanctuary for those accused of the Pan Am 103 bombing, and approved a U.S.-Jed occupation of Haiti. But smaller states feel thre ate ned by a Security <Auncil in which the West is often able to c:onvinc e enough states to app rove suc h council actions, and only a Chinese veto (which was used only once in the last 25 yea rs) seems to protect them ... . Foc1JSing on enforcement and legitimacy also provides a use ful len s through which to evaluate V .S. reactions to international nonns: Even as the United States
Even as scholars seek to devise better enforcement mec hanisms, a seri ous debate

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PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORW POUTICS

to international regulation means that cultural, value-basC'd, or "~overeignty'' argume nts no longer enjoy the upper hand. If a state e lects not to :-.j~ 1 ;J :najor treaty,

or ignores one it has assigned-as with the United States and the agree ment on the elimination oflandmines or Iraq and the one on nuclear nonprolif(ration- it is more likely to be condemned as a pariah than admired for its rugged individualism.

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