People v. De Vera y Garcia G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999. Panganiban, J.

Facts: Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro, was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the killing of one Frederick Capulong. De Vera and Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During trial, the prosecution presented as witness one Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shot him in the head moments later. Aside from Cacaos testimony, the prosecution also presented De Veras extrajudicial statement which established that he knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera and his co-accused Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The trial court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons. Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who actually shot the victim. However, it convicted De Vera as a principal because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused. Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his conviction before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting De Vera as principal? Held: Yes. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate De Vera. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that De Vera was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution evidence has not established that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill Capulong. De Veras participation, as culled from his own statement, was made after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli.

The trial court erred in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. Hence, there is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law. When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. De Vera failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary. In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na. Consequently, he is convicted as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED.