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Acknow ledgem ents I wish to thank the C om m ittee for Cultural Relations and Foreign C ontacts, Tirana, for

originally m aking possible the project o f writing this book. The Fakulteti Shkencave Politike-Juridike of Tirana Uni versity helped me to correct m any errors w ithout being in any way responsible for rem aining im perfections. A nd very sincere thanks to the people of Albania, of all ages and positions, w ho in answering my questions in such a frank and com radely spirit, supplied me w ith the inform ation which has contributed to whatever understanding I have of socialism in practice. William Ash

A lbanias difference with the Soviet U nion over the issue of the true nature of socialism, coupled w ith its fraternal alliance w ith Peoples China, has been at the very core o f the split in the world com m unist m ovem ent. Yet, until William Ash w rote this book, no adequate history of Albania has been published in the West. PICKAXE AND RIFLE is m ore than an historical account of this interesting b u t little know n country: it is a political and sociological study of the only socialist state in Europe. Having liberated themselves from fascist occupation, how did the Albanian people free themselves also from the whole system of exploitation and defend their new socialist state from the hostile countries all around them ? What new social institutions and governm ental organisation reflect the transfer of state pow er into the hands of the working people? What are the characteristics of real socialist society as developed by the Albanians, and how have they guaranteed it .gainst the distortions and deform ations which have over taken the o ther East European peoples democracies? And as a result, w hat is the quality of life in Albania today? William Ash, author of MARXISM AND MORAL CONCEPTS, was invited to Albania in 1969 to to u r the to iin try extensively and to collect m aterial for this book. A),.mi, in 1971, the author had an opportunity of visiting Alli.mia at the tim e of the Sixth Congress of the Party of I ilium of Albania, and of checking the draft typescript of III* work with historians, w ith State and Party leaders and, 111 * t im portant o f all, w ith the people in the factories and on 'I tin i *illi i live farms. I In ii suit is a m ost compelling account of real socialism in

O ther books by William Ash


F ictio n T H E LO TU S IN T H E SKY C H O IC E O F ARM S T H E L O N G E ST WAY R O U N D R ID E A PA P E R T IG E R T A K E -O F F N o n -fictio n : M A RX ISM A N D M O R A L C O N C EPTS

PICKAXE AND RIFLE

W illiam Ash

HOW ARD BAKER LONDON

W illiam Ash P IC K A X E A N D R IF L E F irst p u b lish e d b y H o w ard B aker Press L td ., 1974 A H O W A R D B A K E R BOOK

C o p y r ig h t: W illiam A sh, 1974

A ll rights reserved. N o part o f this book may be reproduced in any fo rm or by any means w ith o u t the prior w ritten perm ission o f the Publisher, excepting q uotes used in conncection w ith reviews w ritten specifically fo r inclusion in a magazine or newspaper.

IS UN 0 7 0 8 0 0 0 3 9 X
I mI.Ii.Ih il 11 l l n w i i r i l ll n k c i

I'lriw Ltd.,

^ 1it V t i iIn il \ II mill, W in 11ilriIon, I .oiuliin, S.W. 20 I . | i lit u lij 'i|i. i I ,i 1 i il I Him I Si i vli i I III-. Liverpool, 1 , in.I |-i in| il In I ii i ill III lliiln liy I id , M iirly i Mim il l iiillillm (I, Sin try.

CONTENTS WHO ARE THE ALBANIANS? C hapter 1. From Illyria to the Turkish Conquest 2. Scanderbeg and the G row th of National Conscious ness. THE GREAT LIBERATION WAR From the Turkish C onquest through the N ational M ovement to the Italian Invasion. Beginnings of Albanian National Resistance. The D evelopm ent of Peoples War Relations of the Liberation Leadership w ith other N ational G roups and w ith the Allies The L iberation War against the Nazis and Final V ictory ALBANIA AND THE POST-WAR WORLD Results o f the War in Albania: Relations with Britain and other Countries; the Struggle against Yugoslavia

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

ALBANIAS SOCIALIST SOCIETY !). The State 10. The Party I I . The Mass Organisations THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY OF ALBANIA I C r e a t i n g the Socialist Econom ic Base I ' 1>iveIopm cnt of Agriculture I I Development o f Industry and the Relation betw een Econom ic Base and Social Superstructure

THE SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 15. A lbanias Relations with the Soviet U nion and the Peoples Republic of China THE QUALITY O F LIFE IN THE NEW ALBANIA 16. Socialist Man at Leisure 17. Y outh and E ducation 18. W omen and the Socialist Family 19. Health 20. Arts and Culture 21. A Genuinely Free Society

PICKAXE AND RIFLE (The revolutionary slogan of the Party of Labour of Albania: To build socialism hold ing a pickaxe in one hand and a rifle in the o th er.)

WHO ARE THE ALBANIANS C hapter One: From Illyria to the Turkish Conquest It has been said of the Albanians th at they have hacked their way through history, sword in h a n d . This little country, som ew hat larger than Wales, has been the scene of fierce wars of resistance from the very beginning of European history. These people, num bering till recently fewer than tw o million, have an unm atched record of struggle dow n the centuries to achieve their national integrity, to win and hold for th em selves the right to develop their own resources, their own skills and talents w ith o u t any interference from outside their own borders. The Albanians, descendants of the ancient Illyrians, are the oldest inhabitants of the Balkans going right back to the early Bronze Age; but it was only half way through the T w entieth C entury that Enver H oxha, who had led them in the liberation war against fascism, could at last say: The Albanian people will never again allow themselves to be tram pled on as in the b itter past. They have their rights, dignity and h onour; they have the right to live, to take their own decisions on any m atter, ju st as any other people. The Albanians take their name from an old Illyrian tribe, the Albanoi, w ho inhabited the region from Durrs on the Adriatic coast to m ountainous Dibra the central portion of the present State of Albania. The Illyrians were an IndoI uropean people who in the great migrations from n o rth to Moutli Europe in the second millenium B .C . settled in the western Balkans. They had their own Illyrian language from which, though influenced by the speech of various invaders, m odern Albanian is directly derived. Shkodra in northern Alban ia was the ancient capital of the Illyrian kingdom which vv.in incorporated in the R om an Em pire in 1 6 8 B .C . and Mipplied five Illyrians, including Diocletian, to rule as R om an
nmiTors.

I lie culture o f the Albanians has enriched itself from m any 11

sources, Thracian, Greek, Rom an, Slav, Byzantine and Islamic, w ithout ever losing its identity. Their history is the account of their fight for survival. The developm ent of their national character is intim ately bound up w ith their rugged, scenically spectacular hom eland which lay like a stum bling block across the old imperial routes of trade and conquest. This abrupt dram atic land of lofty peaks dropping sheer into the sea, of deep valleys and bottom less lakes was in the path of the northw ard sweep of G reek colonisers; it lay across the main road, the Via Egnatia, which connected Rom e w ith its eastern em pire; it was overrun by Visigoths, Huns and slavs in their drive to the south; it blocked the invasion of w estern Europe by the Turks. The resistance of the Illyrians to the Rom an Em pire contributed, together w ith the revolts of slaves and colonists and the invasion of barbarian tribes, to its final overthrow. The Illyrian uprising of the first few years of the Christian era, in which wom en fought side by side w ith their m enfolk, was the most terrible, except for th a t against Carthage, of all the wars Rom e waged abroad. In mediaeval times there were successive revolts o f the Arberesh, the Albanians, against Byzantine bondage. A nd in 1185 the Albanian feudal chiefs threw off the yoke of Byzantium and form ed their first state, the principality of A rberia w ith K ruja as its capital. But none of the feudal dynasties, constantly warring w ith each other, was strong enough to unify the country; and the intervention of such m ercantile states as Venice, eager to control the Albanian coast, was a furth er hindrance to centralisation. During this tim e Albania did, however, achieve consider able economic progress. Arable land was extended and the (liltivalion of cereals, olive groves, vineyards and silk all Ili >i i mhed; (here were big herds of sheep and cattle; and the i Im M i n i > ,i)*i it ullural and dairy products m ade it possible to 1 i' 0 |nH l 1 1 1 1 1 nl i ,n li annual yield. In the revival of the cities of rtMlltlllil V, i I In' v I'l'i llie centres of artisan production #II|mVHIM 1 I'*1' mM1 III .ifcs prosperity, Dyrrachion thrived riti mi m h u m Vulmi i, Vlm.t, Skodra as Shkodra and old A u | in i i it* IIn 111 iv11 liii"i\ n I hen and m >w as Herat. I ll m W i l t i I n M l m u I i n ill it ........ w I n n i I n ( > 1 1 m i . i n lurks in
1

I 'i t

the middle of the F ourteenth C entury bypassed C onstant inople and spread over the Balkan peninsula. In the year 1389 a coalition of feudal rulers, Albanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, R um anian and Hungarian, m et the Turks in a bloody encounter on the plain of Kossovo and were com pletely crushed. For some while a struggle over the succession o f the Turkish throne held up all plans of conquest; but by 1421, under Sultan M urad II, the Janissaries and Spahis were on the march again, advancing on Hungary with the intention of battering their way into central Europe, and o f reducing Albania to an obedient base for their attack on the rich Italian states. The Albanian people led by their national hero George K astrioti, know n as Scandcrbeg, repelled the Turkish forces for twenty-five years in a series of rem arkable victories. At a tim e when the O ttom ans were considered invincible, the Albanians successfully resisted m ore than tw enty-tw o fierce campaigns to elim inate this stubborn salient. Sultan M urad II, w ho had never been defeated in th irty years of fighting, was routed before the walls of Kruja and his son M ehm et II, called Fatih, the Conqueror, because of his conquest of C onstantinople, was also defeated u tterly and repulsed. The battles fought by the Albanian people under Scanderbegs leadership echoed far beyond the c o u n try s frontiers and assumed international im portance because in Ilieir courageous and skilful war to defend themselves they defended the whole o f Europe for a quarter of a century, blunting and turning the edge of the massive invasion of the Turkish hordes. The Albanian resistance m ust therefore be recognised as one o f the historical factors contributing to the independent developm ent of European m ercantilism which was a condition o f the subsequent bourgeois revolution. Scanderbeg was a great leader. He succeeded in breaking down feudal separatism and in the heat of battle fusing disparate social elem ents into a central governm ent. He had i Ik unique quality for his time of understanding how to rally about him the Albanian masses and of thus being able to give Ilie war against the Turkish invaders the popular character of i peoples liberation struggle. It is this which explains the 13

legendary epic enacted in the m ountains, valleys, plains and castles o f Albania by an em battled people when the rest of Europe was terror-stricken and prostrate before the Turkish advance. In the m ilitary field he proved him self a great captain, a m aster of exploiting to the full the geographical peculiarities of Albania. He was also a shrewd diplom at who strengthened the position of Albania on the w orld scene by sagacious negotiation w ith a dozen different courts. It is symbolic of the role the war against the Turks under Scanderbegs leadership played in the developm ent of the A lbanian nation th a t the standard of the K astrioti, a tw o-headed eagle on a red background, which Scanderbeg raised over the citadel of Kruja at the beginning of the struggle on Novem ber 28th, 1443, should be the national flag of Albania today. In order to understand the m ore recent history o f Albania it is necessary to know som ething of the desperate resistance o f the Albanian people, few in num ber, ill arm ed and w ith o u t allies, against the vastly superior Turkish foe. Though the Turks finally conquered Albania or w hat was left of it after a quarter of a century of being ceaselessly fought over, they never entirely subjugated the people w ho survived. The sense of a national identity grew so strong through the years of stubborn fighting th at it endured through five hundred years of Turkish oppression, and the b itter struggle to preserve the Albanian language and custom s and to prevent denationalisation never ceased. It was of this fiercely independent tem per o f the Albanians, expressing itself in feudal form s o f behaviour, th at Byron w rote in the Second C anto (Stanza LXV) of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage: Fierce are A lbanias children, yet they lack Not virtues, were those virtues m ore m ature. Wlicr i- is the foe th at ever saw their back? Wlio i .111 so well the toil of war endure? I In ii i.1 1 ivi- fastnesses not m ore secure I hiiit Ihi \ in doubtful time of troublous need: I In ii v\mill Imw deadly! but 1heir friendship sure, Wit i ii < aiiiiiiIi h i Valour bids them bleed, i 111h1 ! t*I ii i nulling mi w hcirV i their chief may lead. 1 1

Chapter Two Scanderbeg and the G row th of N ational Consciousness George K astrioti, born about the year 1405, was the youngest son of a noblem an from the north-eastern p art of Albania whose family had m anaged to extend their holdings during the early years o f the Turkish invasion. Whenever the Turkish grip weakened, the K astrioti, like other feudal houses, sought to strengthen their position, often by contracting alliances w ith Venice or other principalities across the Adriatic. But when the Turkish rulers were able to re-impose their au th o rity , these noblem en were forced back into vassalage. , It was as a vassal o f Sultan M urad II that G eorges father, Jo h n , sent him to the S ultans court at A drianople as a youthful hostage. The Turkish chronicles describe the young man as sturdy, dexterous, com ely and intelligent. The son of a vassal ruler, he was trained at the m ilitary school near the palace; and on being converted to M ohamm edanism he was given the name Skender. He was obliged to take p art in the expeditions of the Turks in which he so distinguished himself as a soldier that he won the title of b ey , thus coming to be called Scanderbeg. Having w on the confidence of the Sultan, he was appointed governor of the im portant district o f Kruja including the fortified castle which was one of the m ost impregnable in Albania. Built high up on the rocky slopes of M ount Kruja the fortifications grow o u t of a huge mass of rock detached from the rest of the m ountain rearing up behind. The unassailable front o f this vast structure of thick walls and hidden passage ways, crow ned w ith a citadel which -.I ill stands, points o u t over the northern coastal plain like .the Inow o f a huge stone warship, com m anding the co u n try s most im portant p o rt, Durrs, ju st visible in the distance 15

against the blue A driatic and, indeed, the whole sweep of coastline right up to A lbanias northern boundary, Kruja was the m ost strategically im portant of all the fortresses in central Albania, Petrela, Rodoni and others, whose signal fires at night could be seen from K rujas high ram parts. During Scanderbegs m any years at the S ultans court and in the Turkish army he had never ceased to think of him self as Albanian nor lost his patriotic feeling for his hom eland. Aspirations for the liberation o f his country guided his thoughts and actions from the m om ent he to o k up his post in Kruja as subash. B ut in order to avoid, by long and careful preparation, the failure o f past revolts, he kept his planning secret. He w ent quietly among the people to find out how ready the masses were to rise. He sought through his fa th e rs connections to discover w hat support there m ight be from abroad. When he was later transferred to the office of the governor of Dibra, some fifty miles to the east of Kruja on w hat is now the frontier w ith Yugoslavia, he was able to continue his preparations, assuring him self of popular support in this region, too. For three years after being sent to Albania by the Sultan he w orked in this underground way to make sure that when the revolt came it w ould break out w ith the m ost shattering force. Tow ard the end of 1443 he decided th at conditions w ithin the country were favourable for a massive uprising and at th at time he was presented w ith the best possible external circum stances for launching a nation-wide insurrection. U nder the leadership of Janosh H unyadi the Hungarians had been able to pass from defensive war against the Turks to offensive operations. In Novem ber 1443 the Hungarian army crossed the Danube and began an advance which threw the Turkish forces opposing them into panic. Scanderbeg was ordered by the Sultan to take his place in the army of the Dibra region and march to throw back the Hungarians. He gave every appearance of obeying this com m and; b ut during tin ( on fusion of the first encounter he suddenly pulled three I.....died Albanian horsem en out of the battle to the dismay I (In I inUisli forces. At the head of this m ounted troop, Wlllt lili n< I'lirvv, Hamza, riding beside him, Scanderbeg M*iIIii|imI li.nk In Dibra where the whole population of the I (i

tow n turned o u t to receive him w ith acclaim. His first task was to clear the land of all occupying garrisons and in the whole system of fortifications enabling the Turks to m aintain their grip on Albania the Castle of Kruja was the m ost form idable. Scanderbeg hurried there from D ibra and gained control of tow n and castle by the ruse of a forged paper announcing th a t the Sultan had re appointed him to the governorship. During the night he opened the castle to his own soldiers w ho had hidden in a forest on the m ountainside and they rushed through the fortress annihilating the Turkish garrison. The capture o f Kruja was the signal for a general revolt of the Albanians. Scanderbeg visited o th er regions spreading the flames of rebellion and returned to Kruja on November 8, 2 1443, when he hoisted the double-headed eagle banner over the battlem ents and proclaim ed the re-establishm ent of the free Albanian principality. T hroughout the rest of th at year Scanderbegs force of Albanian volunteers occupied all the o ther citadels and strong-points in central Albania. But he realised that all the steps taken so far to secure the country w ould prove inadequate once the Turks had ended the threat o f the Hungarian advance and could mass their forces for the reduction of Albanian resistance. W hat was needed was an Albanian army under a unified com m and w ith the financial means o f m aintaining it. In the early p art of the following year preparations were m ade for a convention of all the Albanian nobles who had shown any disposition to resist the Turks. This convention began its work on March 2, 1444, at Lezha, a tow n on the northern coastal plain which belonged to Venice and thus enabled the various feudal nobles to assemble there w ithout misgivings about their own status. The free Albanian m ountaineers were also represented at the meeting. B oth Venice and Ragusa were invited to send delegations and since an anti-Turkish coalition in Albania was so m uch in their interests it was hoped that they w ould offer aid. But Ragusa failed to respond at all and Venice sent only an observer. The convention confirm ed an alliance know n as the Albanian League w ith Scanderbeg as president. An Albanian 17

army m ade up of contingents recruited by each m em ber o f the League was established under the com m and o f Scanderbeg w ho had prom ised the greatest num ber of troops. Each m em ber also pledged a sum of m oney which became p art of the com m on fund for arming and supporting a force of about 8,000 soldiers which w ith peasant volunteers m obilised in emergencies could be expanded to an army of 18,000. The Albanian League was brought in to being solely by the Turkish th reat and the nobles who joined it kept their own dom ains, m erely recognising Scanderbeg as first among equal feudal lords. But in spite of these lim itations, the political and m ilitary alliance form ed at Lezha represented a stage in the developm ent of an Albanian national consciousness which was to have an im portance extending far beyond the im m ediate needs of defence against the im pending invasion. M oreover the League was not simply an agreem ent among nobles for holding on to their own possessions; it was an organisation in which the people themselves participated, n o t simply as dependents o f this or th at noble, b u t in their own right. The victories to be won and the advance in national awareness to be consolidated were achieved by the Albanian people under the political and m ilitary genius of Scanderbeg. No army of m ercenaries nor peasants forced to fight against their will could have proved a m atch for the Turkish Janissaries and Spahis. Scanderbeg spent the spring of 1444 personally going from village to village explaining the significance of the m ilitary m obilisation and recruiting the best m en for the arm y. He inspected fortresses and strongpoints, studying the ways by which they could be attacked, and he set up inform ation posts among the people to w arn of the approach o f the Turkish vanguard on any part of the frontier. There was not long to wait. In Ju n e 1444 an O ttom an .iiiny o f 25,000 m en under the com m and o f Ali Pasha t invit'd (hi Albanian frontier at Dibra. Scanderbeg I'j'iiii nils nit',.if',rd the invading arm y w ith his entire force tiliil Witt lliimvn Inick; bill this was m erely a m anoeuvre to Iim. il...............it.in I...... . deeper into the country. They jtlll mi! lltt .......... . A > 1 1 1 .11 is into the narrow valley of 11 .i
IN

Tervioli surrounded by thick forests and steep m ountains and here, w ithin the natural confines at the end of the valley, the Albanians turned on the Turks and annihilated the whole force. Two other expeditions were sent by the Sultan against the Albanians, in 1445 and 1446, and b o th of them were crushed by the Albanian army. B ut by th en the R epublic of Venice, alarm ed at the growing strength and independence of the Albanian nobles under Scanderbegs leadership, began to fear the loss of the cities on the Albanian coast to which it laid claim. When the lord o f D ania died w ithout heirs, the city should have passed under the au th o rity of the Albanian League. A Venetian force occupied Dania and also took possession of the neighbouring coastal castles. Scanderbeg attacked at once, b ut w ith o u t artillery it was difficult to dislodge the de fenders. However, the V enetians failed to split the League which was their m ain object, and their offer of a princely rew ard to anyone who w ould kill Scanderbeg m et w ith no success either. The fighting against the V enetian occupation forces continued into the following year and was still pinning down a num ber of Albanians when, from the east, a huge Turkish arm y under the personal com m and of Sultan M urad II invaded the country in Ju n e 1448 and m arched tow ard Kruja. Scanderbeg was thus caught betw een tw o hostile forces. He u ndertook a series o f lightning actions against the Venetians in the region of Shkodra and, w ith the aid of peasants in the area whom he roused to revolt, forced the Venetians into an open battle on the River Drin which resulted in a decisive victory for the Albanians. Meanwhile the Turkish advance had been halted by the slubborn resistance of the Castle of Sfetigrad whose cour t e o u s garrison held out against massive assaults w ith siege engines right through the summ er. By this tim e the I Inngarians had launched a n e w campaign and the Sultan was forced to w ithdraw to Edrene in order to prepare for this ,it lack. The tw o forces clashed in O ctober and the Hungarians under H unyadi were badly beaten; b u t the Albanians were

given additional tim e to consolidate their own defences. Two years later the Sultan had amassed another force of m ore than 100,000 m en for the final reduction of Albanian resistance. W ord o f this m ighty arm y began to reach Scanderbeg as it approached the frontier. He called for a general m obilisation and w ithin a few days expanded the army to some 18,000. He placed 1,500 m en in the castle at Kruja against which the Sultan was advancing. He took personal com m and o f 8,000 soldiers whom he held in the Gum enishti M ountains above Kruja. The rest of his forces he split up into small highly mobile bands. From the m om ent the Turkish armies entered Albania, all along the valley of the Shkum bini River, they were harassed by these roving bands. Ambushes were set and sprung continuously; small detachm ents of the Turkish forces were separated and cut dow n; food trains were attacked and destroyed classic guerrilla tactics in classic guerrilla country. By the tim e the Turks reached Kruja and deployed under the steep slope and solid battlem ents, they had already suffered heavy losses. The Sultan ordered the bom bardm ent of the citadel with artillery capable of hurling four hundred pound shells into the fortress. A fter this bom bardm ent there was a general assault. While the Turkish forces were engaged w ith the castle garrison, Scanderbeg swept down from the heights w ith his best troops, striking first one flank of the Turks and then the other. The besieging army was throw n into a com plete panic and the attack broke up in a disorderly rout. During the sum m er tw o m ore m ajor attacks against K ruja were launched and failed as miserably as the first. N or had the guerrilla bands ceased their hit and run operations. The caravans th at kept the Turkish invasion army supplied w ith provisions from M acedonia and Venice were repeatedly attacked. More and m ore peasants were recruited into these I> iii I. which n o t only cut off the Turks from necessary . m|>|ili< .. Imi kept nibbling away at their m ain forces. A fter I 'M mil ,i lull m onths of m ilitary disasters Sultan M urad II i Min 11 I 111 I d in n ' leaving m ore than 20,000 dead under the H'itlU 'il I- 1 1 1 1 i m il in llir valleys and forests through which I I I * 'II lll\ I'llMI il M , I

This great victory n o t only strengthened Scanderbegs position inside Albania. It resounded throughout Europe. C ongratulations on his brilliant achievem ent were received from m any European courts. And Scanderbeg needed allies. There had been great m ilitary successes, b u t six years of war had ruined the country. The Turks, cheated of their expected victory, burned entire villages, drove peasants from the fields and destroyed crops. In the w inter of 1450-51 there was a serious threat of famine. Scanderbeg approached those states with the m ost im m ediate interest in defeating the Turkish design of conquering E urope, b u t only the Kingdom of Naples responded at all and they offered very little actual help. Inside Albania, too, there were those who were having second thoughts about the hard-won achievements on the field of battle. With the intensification of the war Scanderbeg had been forced to constrain the individualistic actions of the nobles who had bound themselves in the Albanian League. Willing enough to join in the m utual defence of their particular feudal interests they could not subscribe w ith any enthusiasm to a long uneven war in the interest o f the whole country. Their selfish conduct made the m obilisation of resources in m anpow er and m aterials increasingly difficult. Their vacillation at critical m om ents was an ever-present danger behind Scanderbegs back. The Turks and Venetians were quick to take advantage of this situation by trying to bribe or co rrupt the nobles into betraying Scanderbeg and the defence of Albania. He was thus left to depend as little as possible on the nobles and to rely m ore and m ore on the Albanian masses. The arm y, in so far as it was attached politically to him, who had no o th er concern b u t the co u n try s freedom , began to have the characteristics o f a national force. When the interests of the war dem anded, he ignored the status of nobles as autonom ous rulers, violated the bound aries of local lords and made use as the need arose of their own castles for quartering troops. He even took coercive action against unreliable nobles and dismissed from office inefficient m em bers of the aristocracy. The w orst offenders against the com m on cause he deprived of lands which he gave 21

to peasants who had distinguished themselves in the fighting. This grow th in Scanderbegs au th o rity and the further erosion of feudal boundaries and privileges m eant th at Albania, at a very early period for such a developm ent, was being fused by the flames o f war into a single and united state. And this in tu rn provoked even greater discontent among the nobles. Some, like the Arianits and Dukagjins, left the League altogether and began plotting w ith the Sultan against Scanderbeg. The treachery of Moisi Golemi, com m ander of the Albanian frontier forces, led to a defeat at the hands of the Turks near Berat. This reverse was rem edied when a large force of Turkish cavalry w ith Moisi Golemi as their guide was surprised in the Dibra district and u tterly annihilated. But the w orst blow to Scanderbeg was the defection of his own nephew and earliest confederate, Ham za K astrioti, w ith w hom he had m ade the historic ride back into Albania as a declaration of war. In the spring of 1457 the Sultan was sufficiently en couraged by the divisions in the ranks of the Albanian feudal chiefs to send an army 80,000 strong under the experienced general Isak bey Evrenos, against the Albanian people. As before, Scanderbeg succeeded in avoiding battle throughout the sum m er, harrying and retreating, feinting and w ith drawing. Then in Septem ber, w hen the Turkish com m ander had becom e certain th at these tactics indicated weakness in the enem y and the promise of an easy victory, his forces were caught o ff guard in the plain of Albulene, not far from Kruja, and thoroughly defeated. Am ong the thousands of prisoners taken was Hamza Kastrioti. This trem endous victory again brought Scanderbeg con gratulations from all over Europe. With the death of the Hungarian patriot, Janosh H unyadi, Scanderbeg had becom e the m ost popular hero in the West and E uropes hope against llu Turkish hordes. Pope Pius II sought to make Scanderbeg i Ih pivolal ligufe in a crusade to be recruited from all ( Ininli iiilniii; Iiii I as on previous occasions, professions of mijijiMii wen mil bac ked by substantial help. Hi umli iln n ile ie d into a three years truce w ith the lu il ., <1 1 1 1 < iu I'.mi lime lor preparing to renew the 1 I\

liberation war. But the armistice was actually broken by Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror. He sent three expeditions against the Albanians in 1462 and sall three were m et, defeated and routed by Scanderbeg. The Sultan then proposed n o t simply a truce b u t a ten years treaty of peace which Scanderbeg signed. However, w hen it looked as though the long-discussed European crusade against the Turks was at last about to be launched, the truce agreem ent was broken. A nd then, once again, internal conflicts among the crusaders brought the venture to an end. T hat left the Albanians under Scanderbeg, after tw enty years o f war which had destroyed the co u n try s econom y and largely depopulated it, facing on their own an enraged Sultan. An expedition com m anded by Ballaban Pasha was im m edi ately m ounted and hurled against Albania. It was crushed as were four successive expeditions. B ut when the Turks had been throw n back for the fifth tim e, the Albanians found themselves at the beginning o f w inter with no supplies of food. Som ehow famine was staved off; but then in the spring of 1466, before the grain stores could be filled, Sultan Fatih took com m and him self of an imperial army of 150,000. With Ballaban Pasha as his deputy-com m ander he set off at the head of this m ighty force for a final showdown w ith this stubborn people who had for so long thw arted Turkish schemes of world conquest. J u s t as fifteen years before, when another huge Turkish army under a S ultans personal direction had invaded the country, the Albanians resorted to guerrilla tactics to weaken and delay the enemy. J u s t as fifteen years before, Kruja, besieged by the S ultans forces and assailed by his engines, stood firm. During this period of stalem ate Scanderbeg made a hasty visit to Rome where he appealed to the Consistory for help. In the streets he was hailed by the crowds as a great hero b u t he had to retu rn to Albania w ithout any prom ise of assistance. Collecting a force of battle-hardened veterans he m ounted an attack on the army before Kruja and, ju st as fifteen years before, the Albanians w on a brilliant victory, ballaban Pasha was killed and the Sultan had to retreat w ith 23

the broken rem nants of his once form idable army, still harassed by guerrilla bands. Yet in Ju ly of 1467 Sultan M ehmet had once more amassed an army which he led in another assault on Albania. A fter a bloody battle near Elbasan the Sultan was convinced th at Albanian resistance had been finally broken and m arched on Kruja. But the garrison of the castle proved as indom itable as ever and the Sultan had to retreat. The following year the Turks changed their tactics and invaded from the n o rth instead of taking their usual route from Dibra along the Shkum bini valley. Scanderbeg at the head o f the Albanian arm y moved north to m eet them , b u t, falling ill, he was left at Lezha. The forces he had trained so well scored a splendid victory over the Turks near Shkodra. As so often in the past the Albanians had shattered the army sent against them ; but at Lezha, on Jan u ary 17th, 1468, their great leader Scanderbeg had died. A fter his death the Albanian resistance continued for some years, indeed it never altogether ceased throughout the whole period o f Turkish dom ination. Kruja did not surrender till 1478, ten years after Scanderbegs death, and remains to this day a shrine of Albanian national straggle with the names of its heroic defenders like C ount Urani, Tanush T hopia and so m any others inscribed in the epic history of Albanias long fight for freedom. Above the tow n o f Kruja, which was destroyed by the fascist invaders during the Second World War and has now been carefully restored, p art of it ju st as it was in the past, there is a huge equestrian statue of Scanderbeg looking out to the sea over the plain below the fortress where so m any of his battles against the Turks were fought and won. W ithout Scanderbegs inspiration and genius, which for twenty-five years had brought victory and international fame to the Albanian people, the struggle against the invading lim es Inst its drive. N ot till the anti-fascist war o f liberation u ,r. IIn same indom itable unity of the people under the Ii .nli i.ltip nl ,i national hero to be achieved again, and this IImii> llit im m lry s freedom, Scanderbegs compelling vision, H i" I " Ii i I iii,ills M i m e d .

THE GREAT LIBERATION WAR Chapter Three From the Turkish Conquest through the National Movement to the Italian Invasion Resistance to the Turkish occupation and control of Albania never ceased and in certain parts o f the country the m ilitary au th o rity never succeeded in establishing m ore than a merely form al adm inistrative system. The highlanders of the m o u n t ainous regions of Himara, Dukagjin and Dibra could n o t be subjected to the colonial feudalism im posed on the rest of the country and rem ained peasant free holders, governing themselves by their own traditional canons and acknow ledging Turkish overlordship only by the paym ent of an annual tribute. Whenever the O ttom an empire was w eakened by internal dissension or wars w ith European states, the highlanders were quick to take up arms in their unending struggle to free themselves from alien rule. In the 17th C entury the Turks undertook a forceful campaign o f converting the Albanians to Islam hoping thereby to break their will to resist. Severe religious discrim ination was practised and the fines and penalties for those who rem ained Christians becam e unbearable. But the conversion of the m ajor part of the Albanians to M oham medanism did n o t decrease the num ber nor the fierceness of the uprisings against the Turkish power. During the 18th and 19th Centuries two great Albanian feudal chiefdoms achieved sem i-autonom ous rule the aristocratic family of the Bushatlies in the no rth and Ali Pasha Tepelena in the south. A plaque on the remains of the great palace at Tepelena com m em orates the visit of Lord Hyron to the court of Ali Pasha which could be said to represent a renewal of w estern European interest in the rom antic land of Scanderbeg. These feudal lords were unable lo m ake com m on cause and unite the country for a national .iruggle, b u t they continued to exert pressure on the Turks 25

and at times succeeded in establishing themselves as indepen dent rulers. In the large region of Janina Ali Pashas great feudal estates were held at the expense of the m ilitary feudal governm ent of Istam bul and he depended for support on the A lbanian population, b o th the ruling class and the arm ed forces o f his dom ain being constituted entirely of Albanians. When about 1830 the Turks began to replace the feudal m ilitary governm ent w ith a m ore m odern state adm inistra tion, there were a series of arm ed revolts of peasants led by local chieftains. F urther attem pts to centralise pow er in Albania by the reform s of T anzim at.had the support of those landlords whose position would be strengthened as the old m ilitary feudal order was abolished. But the highland chieftains in particular and the peasants generally were bitterly opposed to these new forms of subjugation and rebellions broke o ut all over the country culm inating in the great insurrection o f 1847. A t the same tim e as the uprising against the Tanzim at, various personalities were emerging in Albania who felt that the country could n o t be saved by re-establishing a backw ard, feudal even though independent Albania and th at the only hope lay along the road of the advanced E uropean states. This national m ovem ent found its voice at the Conference of Prizren in 1878 which was called to m eet the threat of A lbanias dism em berm ent by the European powers at the Congress of Berlin. O ut of the Conference grew the organ isation of the League o f Prizren which was split betw een those who w anted to make it a predom inantly Muslim body still depending on Turkey to defend A lbanias integrity from other im perialist powers, and those patriots led by Abdul Frasheri who dem anded th at the League should assume a purely Albanian character, irrespective of religion, and fight n o t only to save Albania from partition but to secure its com plete autonom y as well. 1 was the latter line of national resurgence which grew in 1 in in.lh leading to the revolts of 1910 and 1911 and then to In i t in I.il uprising of 1912 when Albania gained its iutlt ....... .in i .J in nearly half a m illennium of oppressive
m1 1-111 mi l Uni in Ilu: g e n e r a l d i v i s i o n o f t h e s po il s a t t h e Hiil "I llu I ii l VVnilil War , B r i t a i n , F r a n c e a n d t h e U n i t e d

States, w ho had acquired a self-assumed right to interfere in A lbanias affairs by the decision of the Conference of Am bassadors held in L ondon in 1913, agreed to pay off their ju n io r partners in the conflict against the Central Powers by carving up A lbania and handing o u t the pieces. In their M em orandum of D ecem ber 9, 1919, Italy was allowed to annex outright the district of V lora and the island o f Sazan and was given a m andate over the rest of the country. The old city of G jirokastra in the south was ceded to Greece and Kora, the m ajor city in the southeast, was to rem ain in political lim bo till its future could be decided. The northern boundary was left intact; b u t the newly-created Yugoslavia was granted the right to construct a railway across A lbania to the Adriatic. By this M em orandum of the Great Powers Albania would have escaped the clutches of T urkey only to becom e the prey of the W estern im perialist countries. A t a Congress sum m oned by Albanian patriots on January 21, 1920, these decisions were firmly rejected and the governm ent which had been prepared to accept the proposed partition and occupa tion of the country was dismissed. A popular uprising against the Italian forces in the Vlora district was so successful th a t Rom e had to agree to w ithdraw its troops by Septem ber of th a t year. With the failure to impose against the will of the Albanian people the main provision o f the G reat Pow er M em orandum the other recom m endations were also abandoned. A sovereign Albania, with its frontiers as established in 1913, applied for m em ber ship of the League of N ations and was accepted by a resolution o f the General Assembly in Decem ber, 1920. But this by no means ended either the internal dissensions w ithin this m ost econom ically backw ard of European countries, no r the external designs against its sovereignty by its im m ediate neighbours. A progressive governm ent under the p atrio t, Fan Noli, came to pow er w ith popular support in Ju n e , 1924; b u t in spite of various liberal measures enacted it failed to consolidate its position w ith the masses or to make adequate m ilitary preparations against reactionary forces which had th e backing of foreign powers bent on inter vention. 27

At the end of the year Ahm ed Zog, who had taken refuge in Yugoslavia when the anti-feudal, reform governm ent assumed office, crossed the frontier into Albania with a force of m ercenaries including troops from General Wrangels White Russian Arm y then quartered in Yugoslavia. The backing of foreign firms, like the British Anglo-Persian Oil Com pany, supplied funds in exchange for the promise of oil concessions. Zog also raised a m ercenary force in Greece which invaded Albania sim ultaneously from the south. With the support of the big feudal landlords inside the country, Zog was able to overthrow the governm ent and establish his reactionary regime throughout the country. His rule depended on the suppression, often by assassina tion, of patriots and the opening of the country to exploitation by foreign companies, m ainly Italian. By 1928, the year in which he had himself proclaim ed King o f Albania, a quarter of the country was let out in concessions to Italian, British and Am erican corporations which discovered and developed for their own profit the oil and m ineral wealth of Albania. A loan of 70 million gold francs was raised from the Italian Com pany for the Econom ic D evelopm ent of Albania on the security of the revenues from custom s duties and the Albanian state m onopolies. This loan was subsequently converted by Mussolini into a debt to the fascist imperial state; and the failure to pay the instalm ents was used by Mussolini io exact further concessions, such as custom s agreements betw een the tw o countries, opening Albania even wider to the penetration of Italian goods and elim inating Albanian producers. So desperate was the econom ic plight of Albania by 1936 th at Zog had to sign a new econom ic agreem ent w ith Rome in exchange for credits. A secret proviso of this agreem ent placed the Albanian arm y under control o f the Italian governm ent and required Albania to construct under Italian direction strategic roads leading to the Yugoslav border. Thus at the tim e of the reconquest of the Rhineland by Nazi Germ any and F rancos fascist insurrection in Spain, when M ussolinis governm ent had launched an unprovoked war of aggression against Ethiopia, the way was also prepared

for the fascist occupation of Albania. Indeed Count Ciano, Ita ly s M inister of Foreign Affairs, on his retu rn from a visit to Tirana at the time of King Zogs marriage in 1938, set out a concrete plan for the conquest of Albania which involved excluding Albania from the League of N ations, destroying the Albanian arm ys capacity for resistance through the Italian officers serving in it, developing by means of subsidies a fifth colum n and spreading throughout Albania fascist and pro-fascist institutions of a social and cultural nature. By March 1939 w orld conditions seemed favourable for M ussolinis invasion of Albania. Czechoslovakia had been occupied by Nazi Germ any w ith o u t any resistance from the W estern Powers. Fascist forces supported by Germ any and Italy were on the verge of victory in Spain. In Yugoslavia the governm ent which had opposed Ita ly s conquest o f Albania suddenly resigned. On March 25th, having massed invasion forces in the southern Italian ports opposite Albania, Mussolini delivered a projected treaty to Z ogs governm ent in the form of an ultim atum . By the terms of this treaty Italian troops should be perm itted to land in A lbanias principal ports and take control of roads, aerodrom es and strategic points along the frontier; Italian farmers should be settled on Albanian land and enjoy full rights of citizenship; Italian citizens residing in Albania should be entitled to hold the m ost im portant official posts and the general secretaries of the governm ent ministries should all be Italian citizens. An answer to these non-negotiable proposals was dem anded before m idnight of April 6th. C ounter proposals from Tirana were simply ignored. Zog, whose policies o f internal repression and external capitulation had brought about A lbanias disastrous situation, quickly collected whatever he could lay his hands on and abandoned the country. Albania had barely begun to emerge from its backward feudal state as a form er Turkish colony when the whole weight of Italian and then Germ an fascism threatened to crush the life out of it. Over four-fifths of the population were illiterate; one out o f every tw o babies died in the first year. A part from the extraction of raw m aterials by foreign 29

firms there was no industry, only handicrafts; and the entire labour force totalled fewer than 15,000 workers. O f the foreign-trained graduates there were perhaps eighty engineers, econom ists and agricultural specialists in the whole country. Such was Albania on the eve of five years o f enem y occupation which in terms of arm ed m ight and savage barbarity were unequalled by anything even the Albanians had ever experienced before. * * * The Italian Invasion A t dawn on G ood Friday, April 7, 1939, an Italian invasion force of 40,000, aboard a fleet of tro o p transports escorted by hundreds of fighter planes, was approaching the four principal ports of Albania Shengjin, Durrs, V lora and Saranda. The supreme com m ander of this aggressive operation, General Guzzoni, could have expected little active resistance from the Albanians. Their arm y had long been virtually under Italian control; fascist agents had been free to carry o u t acts of sabotage and disruption; collaborators w ithin Z ogs governm ent had done their best to demoralise the people and destroy any will to fight back. As the troop ships drew near, it was discovered th at the few artillery pieces had been rendered ineffective, am m unition for rifles and m achine guns had suddenly disappeared and the arm y was throw n into a state of com plete confusion by conflicting orders. Even so, a num ber of individual volunteers and regular soldiers m anaged som ehow to acquire arms and offer resistance. In Durrs the Italian troops who had landed were so h otly engaged they were forced to board their transports again. Warships directed a heavy bom bardm ent against the tow n and another landing was attem pted. Three times troops tried to seize Durrs by assault and three times they were driven back to their ships. An Albanian sailor, Mujo IJlqinaku, who fell at a street intersection while heroically holding o ff an attacking colum n becam e the sym bol for this '.pont.incous and unorganised resistance. liul (.he enemies of Albanian independence w ithin and 30

w ithout had prepared the way too well for individual acts of heroism to stem the Italian advance. Tirana was taken on April 8th, Shkodra and G jirokastra on April 9 th ; and by April 10th alm ost the entire country had been conquered by the fascist forces. This act of aggression evoked no pro test to speak o f on the p art of the W estern powers nor of A lbanias Balkan neigh bours. In the House of Com m ons on April 13, the British Prime M inister, Neville Cham berlain, presented Italian and Albanian versions of the invasion and stated th at the Italian governm ents action had cast a shadow over the genuineness of their intentions to carry out their undertakings n o t to alter the status quo in the M editerranean. But unless Greece or Rum ania should be involved, it was felt th a t there were insufficient grounds for ending the Anglo-Italian A greem ent signed a year before. Mussolini did not, of course, adm it th a t m ilitary occup ation of Albania am ounted to forceful annexation of the country: he described it as insuring the independence of Albania, threatened by other powers, through the personal u n io n of the Kingdom of Albania and the Kingdom of Italy under the crown of the King-Emperor V ictor Em m anuel III. To try to m aintain this political fiction a constituent assem bly o f those who had been in touch w ith the Italian legation in Tirana before the occupation and representatives of landlords, chieftains and business m en sym pathetic to fascism was hastily called to proclaim the act of union. An Albanian G overnm ent under the presidency of one of the biggest landlords, Shefqet bey Verlaci, was established by the invaders; and prom pted by the K ing-Em perors special lieu tenant, Francesco Jacom oni, this pu p p et governm ent prom ulgated a whole series of political and econom ic conventions. By these conventions Albania and Italy were to be one single land subject to all the tariff and custom s regulations of Italy, w ith the Albanian franc tied to the Italian lira. Italian citizens in Albania were to enjoy all the civil and political rights of Albanians. Albania was to have no parliam ent, the legislative as well as the executive pow er being reserved to the King of Italy and Albania and Em peror of Ethiopia in the person of his 31

lieutenant. The international relations of Italy an,d Albania were to be united and concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rom e. And the Albanian arm y was to be suppressed as an independent force and becom e part of the Italian army. Close on the heels of the m ilitary occupiers came special agents from Rom e to set up an Albanian Fascist Party with all its subsidiary organisations for youth, for children, for w om en and for workers. There was no popular response to this move; b u t employees were coerced into enrolling themselves and their families in the respective fascist organ isations and had to subm it to the attem pt at indoctrinating them w ith fascist ideology. These steps having been taken for the com plete colon isation of Albania, tens of thousands of Italians poured into the country workers, farm ers, teachers, technicians, m er chants, industrialists and, of course, state officials. In agriculture M ussolinis reform s for Albania included draining the lands near the coast and settling thousands of Italian farmers there while the Albanian peasants were driven from these areas up into the stony highlands. By 1940 there were more Italian workers in the country than Albanian. In schools and in the adm inistration the Italian language was imposed and the whole culture of the country was subjected to the process o f com plete Italianisation. Swarms of Italian m onopolists moved into Albania to exploit the c o u n try s natural resources and profit from cheap labour. Within the first year there were nearly 140 Italian capitalist enterprises developing mineral w ealth to feed the war econom y of fascist Italy and constructing m ilitary bases and strategic roads connecting the coast w ith the border regions to further Ita ly s aggressive intentions in the Balkans. Two pow erful banks, the Banco di Napoli and the Banco del Lavoro, together w ith the Italian capitalised N ational Bank of Albania, covered the country w ith a financial netw ork controlling all econom ic life. The N ational Bank o f Albania, which had followed a severe policy of deflation up to the Italian invasion, switched 1 1 ,i policy of ruinous inflation and in two years the am ount ill 11 .mi s in circulation rose from some 10 million to over I III million.
1

32

Albania was thus quickly turned into a source of raw m aterials for Italy and a safe m arket for Italian goods the classic condition of any colony. The few native industries were forced o u t of business and craftsm en were reduced to absolute w ant. The w orking conditions o f Albanian labourers, enjoying none o f the advantages o f Italian im m igrant w orkers, were deplorable. The fascist policy of ruthlessly exploiting the countryside to secure foodstuffs for Italian cities and the expanding army of occupation brought the Albanian peasantry to a miserable state. Only the upper ranks of the Albanian m erchant class which entered into jo in t speculation w ith Italian capitalists benefited from the com plete absorption of Albania into Italys fascist econom y.

33

Chapter Four Beginnings of Albanian N ational Resistance T hroughout this period of Italian conquest and the attem p t to consolidate fascist rule in Albania, there was resistance by the people, at first o f a spontaneous and sporadic nature. Even before the actual invasion a com m unist-led anti-fascist dem onstration in Tirana on April 3, 1939, sparked o ff protest dem onstrations all over the country. In Ju n e, tw o m onths after the invasion, the w orkers of the Vlora dockyards w ent on strike against the oppressive conditions im posed on them and held up the unloading of arms and supplies for the occupying troops. Carabinieri had to be used to break up the w orkers resistance. In the Italian enterprises particularly strikes and acts of sabotage by Albanian w orkers were com m on. The obligatory enrolm ent o f Albanians in the various fascist organisations was defied from the start. Workers and em ployees refused to accept m em bership, tore down the fascist party posters, chalked up their own liberation slogans everywhere. Even children took part in the wave of popular resentm ent, like the students o f the lyce in Shkodra who clashed w ith the local m ilitia in the course o f an anti-fascist rally, or those o f the K ora lyce who m arched o u t of school in a body rather than give the fascist salute. Peasants too were involved in this general if, as yet, unorganised resistance and in the Muzeqe district acted together to prevent the m easurem ent of their fields for the purpose of i< allocation. I lie nation-wide dem onstrations on Flag Day, Novem ber H. I'l l!), brought tens of thousands of Albanians out into 1111 1 11 re l ol the principal cities, m arching under the national . llir. 'iln.iilih}', anti lascist slogans and skirmishing w ith the 34

police and carabinieri. So pow erful had the mass m ovem ent of strikes and political dem onstrations grown by April, 1940, ju st one year after the Italian landing, th at the fascist authorities banned all forms of rallies, processions and meetings, and im posed the death penalty on anyone defying the ban. Quite apart from the Italian forces introduced into Albania for launching further acts of aggression in the Balkans, m ore and m ore troops were required simply to suppress continued Albanian resistance. In addition to the IX th A rm y Corps, special detachm ents o f the airforce and navy, fascist militia, carabinieri and border guards were landed, m aking up an occupation force of more than 100,000. To the thousand Albanians of known patriotic sentim ents who were rounded up im m ediately after the invasion and sent to Italian gaols and concentration camps, m ore were added every m onth as arrests were made by the netw ork of police spies and collaborators covering the country. The possession of fire-arms, a strong tradition among the selfreliant Albanians, especially in the m ountainous regions, was ilso subject to sentence o f death. Moving about at night, Iis Icning to foreign broadcasts, showing contem pt for fascist ollicials all became m atters of severe punishm ent including summary execution. Most o f the dem onstrations, protest m ovem ents and v.irious forms o f political and industrial resistance were led 11 \' the com m unists. The com m unist m ovem ent had grown throughout the thirties in spite o f Zogs repressive measures Hid il was the only political organisation in the country wliii h was untainted by any form of collaboration. However, IIn com m unists a t this tim e did n o t represent a united political force capable o f leading a national liberation iiiMu ment in a protracted struggle against fascism. There V i i i , .ipurt from individuals sym pathetic to com m unist ideas, V tin i . main groups, two o f them based in K ora and Shkodra ulilt h Were in conflict w ith each other on questions o f both |inli< \ and organisation and a third, the y o u th group tl I mini y influenced by T rotskyite and anarchist views. Ihii hi spite of these weaknesses, the com m unist-led ruaUhlllie (h iring the first half of 1940 took m ore active 35

forms, passing over to concertcd sabotage of Italian m ilitary installations. With Italy s entry into the Second World War on the side o f Nazi Germ any in Ju n e , 1940, the Albanian resistance became part o f the w orld anti-fascist struggle. In O ctober the Italian fascists, using conquered A lbania as a base, invaded Greece. Included with this aggressive force were two battalions o f Albanians who had been impressed into the Italian army. J u s t as so m any years before the Albanian troop o f horse sent by the Turkish Sultan against the Hungarians had been pulled o u t of the battle by Scanderbeg, so these Albanians, forced to jo in the Italian expedition against the Greeks, refused to fire on Greek soldiers and deserted from the ranks. Avoiding capture they m ade their way back to Albania and took to the m ountains, joining the arm ed bands of the liberation m ovem ent. With other Albanian patriots they supported the Greek people by attacking the Italian lines of com m unication and disrupting the rear of the invasion arm y. The Italian fascists and their collaborators tried to present the aggressive war in the Balkans as an o p p o rtu n ity for Albania to recover the territories lost to Yugoslavia and Greece. Zogs representative in the U nited States, Faik K onitza, said in a statem ent to the Am erican press: Italy is prepared to intervene in order to rectify the injustices that have been inflicted on the Albanian nation and to re-establish the natural and historical boundaries of A lbania. This propaganda failed to make any impression at all on the Albanian people w ho could scarcely be deceived into regarding their fascist oppressors as liberators of their country. They increased their efforts to turn Albania into a very insecure base for the Italian conquest of neighbouring states. Mussolini suffered a hum iliating defeat at the hands o f the Greeks and in a letter to H itler in Novem ber, 1940, he a ttributed the failure of his invasion to insufficient m ilitary preparation and to the unforeseen treason of the Albanians who had turned their guns against the Italians. In pursuit of the retreating Italians, Greek troops entered \lli.mi.i, capturing Kora in Novem ber, 1940, and Gjirokastra hi I > ( ember. Albanian patriots, led by the K ora com m unist ( 36

group, im m ediately requested perm ission to join the Greek forces under their ow n national flag form ing a comm on anti-fascist front. The Greek com m ander rejected this p ro posal and set about establishing G reek civil adm inistration in the liberated portions of Albania, arresting those Albanians who protested against this attem p ted annexation. The heroic defeat of the Italians was m arred by this opportunistic exercise of Greek chauvinism and the possibility o f uniting against the com m on enemy was throw n away. In the spring of 1941 the m ilitary situation in the Balkans was abruptly transform ed by G erm an surprise attacks against Yugoslavia and Greece. The Nazi aggression begun on April 6, 1941, quickly shattered open resistance in b o th countries and w ithin tw o weeks the Yugoslav and G reek armies had capitulated, thus enabling the Italians to expel the Greek forces still in Albania and regain their grip on the whole country. T hat sum m er, on Ju n e 22, 1941, the Nazis launched their attack on the Soviet Union. In spite o f early German successes, this had the effect of enorm ously broadening the anti-fascist war front and creating the prospect o f the eventual defeat of the Axis Powers. It raised the A lbanians hope of liberating their own country and offered the possibility of a friendly alliance w ith the Soviet U nion as a i heck to the am bitions against Albanian sovereignty of the Yugoslav and G reek exile governm ents in London. The fierce resistance of the Soviet people to Nazi aggression and the beginnings of the massive effo rt to shatter ,iih1 hurl back the Germ an invaders gave a n e w impulse to the Albanian com m unists. During the sum m er and autum n of I'll I they were m ore active than ever in spreading armed niluggle to various parts of the country. The K ora comM1 1 1 1 1 *I group in particular issued a series of appeals for a war 1 nl liberation and in the m ountainous regions began to oqi.mise and arm fugitive patriots like those led by Myslim l'i / ,i Along with the form ation o f guerrilla bands w ent the i ll" il lo elim inate the differences among the various comHIIIIiInI groups and unite them into a single revolutionary Mm Hin I ,i ninist party capable of leading the national "liiinnlr. 37

In this effort to establish an Albanian Com m unist Party, a tall, handsom e, young m an, only 31 at the tim e, b u t already politically m atured by revolutionary experiences, soon dem onstrated by his correct assessment o f the situation and his courage in acting on it, the qualities which were to make him the great popular leader o f the c o u n try s grim struggle to free itself and then to consolidate th at freedom after the war. Enver H oxha was born in southern Albania, on O ctober 16, 1908, in G jirokastra, a rom antic old city on the lower slopes o f the Mali i Gjr, which clusters about a majestic fortress looking o u t over the valley of the Vjosa. It was also the birthplace of the brothers, Bajo and eriz Topulli, who played a heroic part in defeating the O ttom an troops and liberating Albania from Turkish rule. A fter finishing second ary school in K ora and coming into contact w ith the com m unists there, Enver H oxha spent six years studying and w orking in France and Belgium. He contributed articles denouncing Zogs regime in A lbania to the French Com m unist press and, subsequently, Zogs agents abroad got him dismissed from a post in the Albanian Consulate in Brussels. He returned hom e in 1936, a convinced com m unist, and pledged at the grave of Bajo Topulli th a t he and all young Albanians w ould fight for a free and unified country. He taught for a tim e at the state lyce in Tirana and then at the lyce in Kora w here he played an active part in the com m unist group. Sacked in 1939 by the collaborationist adm inistration, he w ent to Tirana where he was charged w ith the responsibility of organising the anti-fascist m ovem ent in the capital and surrounding districts. His position as organiser of the Tirana branch o f the K ora group was useful in bringing ab o u t the unity of the com m unist m ovem ent which was the only force potentially qualified to lead the liberation struggle. He made contact with tw o young activists of the Shkodra group, Qemal Stafa and Vasil Shanto, w ho shared his views and were prepared to w ork w ith him in the task o f pulling the m ovem ent together. This was very necessary because T rotskyists and anarchists were characteristically spreading such absurd ideas among the youth as the im possibility o f form ing a com m unist party at sincc there was no working class to speak of and the ill 38

peasants were hopelessly reactionary, or the possibility of merging with fascist organisations in order to fight the enem y from w ithin by conspiratorial means. Even the leaders o f the com m unist factions were incapable of seeing the m istake o f calling for unity on the basis of a federation of existing groups. W hat Enver H oxha correctly dem anded was their com plete fusion into one p arty w ith the u tter elim ination o f any special features which had once distinguished them . He realised that this fusion of Albanian com m unists into a single revolutionary party could n o t be achieved simply by the groups agreeing to shed their distorted views, nor even by the general acceptance in the abstract of a M arxist-Leninist program m e, b u t principally by com m on revolutionary action against the fascist enem y which w ould do m ore than any am ount o f theoretical discussion to weld all professing com m unists in to a unified, fraternal force. In applying this understanding Enver H oxha personally led a great patriotic dem onstration at Tirana in front of the office of the quisling prim e m inister on O ctober 28, 1941. I lie com m unists were involved in fiercely-contested street bailies with the Italian police and the need to fight and ill lend each other w ith o u t regard to w ho belonged to w hat H Klip was the best possible preparation for the convention of i i nnmunists called for the first w eek in Novem ber. As a result "I die dem onstration a sentence o f death was passed on I mm i lloxha in absentia by the fascist authorities. A big ialls in Kora on Novem ber 8, the opening day o f the h u t ling o f com m unist groups, also led to a bloody encounter willi police and carabinieri in which Koi Bako, a veteran m m iiiIm'i o f the K ora group, was killed and m any of the ili MMMislialors were seriously w ounded. I In m eeting held in Tirana under the closest security iHi,iii} mcnls from the 8th to the 14th was attended by 15 m iimmunislN including Enver H oxha, Qemal Stafa, Vasil ....... . line I Iilo Feristeri. Right at the start the decision was Mlo n In disl land the three groups and form the Albanian I Himiiiiiii'.! Party on the basis o f M arxism-Leninism. To help HIM )*' mu I ha II lie old groupings did n o t survive it was agreed llnil ....... ill Ilie form er factional leaders w ould have a place 39

on the Provisional Central C om m ittee, which was elected w ith Enver H oxha at its head. A new program m e in the form of a resolution was approved. This resolution set forth the political tasks of the Albanian Com m unist Party as the m obilisation o f the popular masses of Albania in the arm ed struggle against the fascist invaders and their collaborators for the national independence o f the country, in co-operation with all nationalist, patriotic forces, in m ilitant friendship w ith the people of the Balkans, particularly with the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece, and in alliance w ith the anti-fascist coalition, m ainly the Soviet U nion. It was explained th at the m obilisation of the masses, the w orkers and peasants, had the aim n o t only o f liberating Albania, b u t after independence was won of ending the rule of business m en and landlords and establishing popular dem ocratic rule. A m anifesto issued for secret distribution by the Provisional Central C om m ittee called on the masses to begin the general w ar of liberation. The people should not pay taxes, deliver corn nor give so m uch as a glass o f watei to the enem y occupiers. They should join, arms in hand, the ranks o f the freedom fighters. This same m anifesto addressing itself to com m unists urged them to display revolutionary zeal in all circum stances a spirit of self-sacrifice, initiative and organ isational ability. They m ust stand always in the forefront of struggle, occupy always the advanced posts in the fighting, be always where the danger was greatest and give w ithout hesitation even their lives for the c o u n try s liberation. The leading role of the Com m unist Party in the national struggle was founded entirely on the examples of courageous devotion o f individual com m unists. Com m unists were the m ain target of the savage repression of the Italian fascists. The collaborationist governm ent under Shefqet Verlaci and, when the situation dem anded even m ore brutal measures, under M ustafa Kruja, also directed the full force o f its m ilitary, police and propaganda m achine against the com m unists trying to split the resistance fro n t by detaching non-com m unist elem ents from Party leadership in order to isolate the m ain enem y of the Italian occupation. But the people soon realised th a t the com m unists never 40

called for m ilitary initiative and personal risks which they were not already taking themselves in the fullest measure. O n Novem ber 23, a few weeks after the form ation of the Party, the underground organisation of Albanian Com m unist Y outh was created in Tirana w ith Qemal Stafa as its political secretary. In th at same m onth a guerrilla unit carrying o ut an assault on a fascist com m and post in Tirana was involved in a running gun battle w ith the collaborationist police and killed the chief o f th a t reactionary force. The passing over from spontaneous resistance to an organised liberation war, which after years of hardship and sacrifice was to free Albania from the arm ed m ight of both I tidy and G erm any w ithout the help of any other power, m ust be dated from the foundation o f the Albanian Com m unist Party w hich was to provide the leadership for every stage of the struggle.

Chapter Five The D evelopm ent of Peoples War Throughout 1942 the Albanian Com m unist Party continued to mobilise the people for w hat had becom e a full-scale anti-fascist wrar. By the m iddle of the year partisan units covered alm ost the whole country, carrying o u t frequent attacks against Italian transport colum ns and co-ordinating their actions w ith guerrilla operations inside the cities. During the single night of Ju ly 24th, guerrilla units from one end of Albania to the other knocked down telephone posts, cut wires and cables and blacked out the entire com m unication system, throw ing the Italians in to a state o f panic. In Tirana, guerrilla units burned down the telephone office, seized the archives o f the m inistry of the interior, including the dossiers kept there of all those suspected of working w ith the resistance, blew up the warehouses of the m ilitary engineering departm ent and destroyed m ilitary installations on the airfield. In K ora the headquarters of the fascist p arty was set on fire. In Shkodra the political prison was storm ed and those detained were freed to join the partisans. Individual com m unists, who in fulfilling their party tasks preferred to die than to fall into the hands of the fascist police or the m ilitia o f M ustafa K ruja, w on the adm iration of the whole country. Qemal Stafa, secretary of the recently-form ed Albanian Com m unist Y outh M ovement and him self only 22, became involved on his ow n in a running fight w ith a w hole com pany of militia. He was hunted from one section o f T irana to another till at last, besieged in a house which was com pletely surrounded, he charged o u t w ith only a pistol and was finally brought down. 42

The head o f the T irana guerrilla units, Vojo Kushi, with tw o comrades was cut off by 500 carabinieri and police in a small house in the K odra Kuqe quarter. The battle w ent on for six hours and then tanks were brought up to dislodge the young m en. Vojo Kushi storm ed out breaking through the lirst and second rings o f besiegers and killing a num ber of fascists. He clim bed up on one o f the tanks and had pried open the cover to take it over when he died under a fussillade of bullets. In Shkodra three students, Perlat Rexhepi, Branko Kadia and Jo rd a n Misja were also surrounded by a large force of fascist troops and police. They fought o ff attacks for m any hours and then, when their am m unition was alm ost ex hausted, rushed o ut o f the house firing as they went and killed m any o f the enem y before they themselves died lighting. Midhi Kostani and Kio Greo were capturcd and subjet ted to the m ost brutal tortures to m ake them reveal inform ation about the guerrillas. Both of them died in agony w ithout telling the enem y anything. Such acts o f courage could not but arouse enthusiasm .inlong the people who learned o f such things from secret li.it Is and bulletins which circulated everywhere. The first mim eographed issue o f the paper of the Albanian Com m unist I.ii I y, Xeri i Popullit (Peoples Voice), came o u t in August, I'l 12, and became the m ain source of inform ation about the i mu se of the war and the theory and practice of peoples nI niggle. The leading article o f the first num ber called for the iit1 1y ol all Albanians. All honest, anti-fascist people, ii r ii< Hess o f their religious beliefs or political opinions, m ust iim lr around this organ for an independent, free and ill in- i .1 1ie A lbania. < I In ( n ation of a broad liberation front depended on the Ii-*i|Hiiise of the peasants. They hated the Italians and their iill.ilmi,ilots and they were prepared to fight. Particularly IIihm in the m ountainous regions had a strong tradition of Hlim il ilelence o f their own households. But at first they did IIM wiuli |o join actual guerrilla form ations nor accept the l It nil i 1 1 1 1 > ol the Com m unist Party. Party recruiting agents 1 U Ii- i nine lo lli e villages to try to win peasants over to a 43

m ore active and organised role in the struggle were likely to be m ocked and accused of being tyros in the art of war. However, the peasants soon becam e convinced th at the Party-led N ational Liberation F ro n t was not only capable of taking on the enemy, b u t of bringing about the social em ancipation of the country as well. They were a ttrac ted by the prospect o f lands being tu rned over to them at the conclusion of a war which was to change social conditions in Albania as well as free it from external enemies. Once they began to co-operate m ore closely w ith the fighting units the quality of leadership rem oved their suspicions of the Party. And ju st as peasants were taking arms and joining the partisan bands, so workers, artisans, students and employees were fleeing from the cities and enlisting in the resistance struggle. It was in the partisan bands, in the heat o f battle, th at the alliance of the working class and the peasantry was forged. On Septem ber 16, 1942, a N ational Liberation Conference was convened at Peza which had been liberated by the partisans even though it was only fourteen miles from Tirana. Those attending included n o t only com m unists but wellknow n personalities w ho had come close to the Party in the course o f being engaged in the anti-fascist struggle on their own; patriots like Myslim Peza, a kind of Albanian Robin Hood who for ten years had been an outlaw under the Zogist regime. It also included those who were outspokenly anti com m unist and had n o t so far been engaged in the fighting, as long as they declared themselves in sym pathy w ith the national struggle. Such was Abaz Kupi, a supporter o f the form er King Zog, whom the British had smuggled back into Albania the year before. There were even those like M idhat Frashri w ho had n o t y et com m itted themselves to the national cause at all. I t was impossible for even those elem ents m ost hostile to the Com m unist Party to deny the guiding role the Party had already played or to oppose openly the proposals Enver H oxha advanced on behalf of the Party for the continued prosecution o f the war. O bjections centred around such trivial questions as calling the fighting units partisan u n its or having red stars as insignia. But these differences were

disposed of and the Conference, which was not a m eeting of various political parties b u t of the w hole spectrum of nationalist elem ents under the leadership of the Com m unist Party alone, was able to get on with its task of creating a com m on N ational Liberation F ront. The F ront included all the patriotic forces in the country organised under a General N ational L iberation Council. It was com m itted to an intensification o f the war in all sectors w ith no comprom ise. T hroughout the country local and regional N ational Liberation Councils were to be elected by Ihe people, functioning legally in liberated zones and underground in districts still occupied by the enemy. These Councils had the double task o f acting as m obilisation centres lor the arm ed revolution and as organs of local authority which w ould replace fascist rule as it was overthrow n. In this way the re-establishm ent of a bourgeois-landlord regime, following on the collapse of fascist pow er, w ould be prevented, and the N ational L iberation Councils would remain the basic organs o f the new dem ocratic authority till such time as a constituent assembly could be convoked after the liberation of the whole country. The Conference of Peza thus m erged tw o historic processes in a com m on revolutionary struggle: the national liberation w.n for independence and the popular revolution for establishing true dem ocracy in Albania. Ala rm ed at this developm ent the Italian fascist authorities immediately sent a punitive expedition under Francesco | ..... moni to attack Peza and other centres of partisan in livily. In the cities a campaign of unrestrained terror was Ilium lied against com m unists and those suspected of support ing I hem. Unable to crush the partisan units, the fascists hi r, .ii icd peasants, burned whole villages and arrested and iin iinril people indiscrim inately. Mill the partisan bands continued to grow in num ber and 1 1 1 iii'lli and m ore and m ore liberated zones were created in IV/.i, Skrapar, Kurvelesh, erm enika, M artanesh, Opar, Miilliik.rili,i. The au thority of the N ational Liberation ( (lUlli lls operated freely over wider and wider stretches of
In i m i i i i try.

I\ ll.e end ..I 1942 there were m ore than 10,000 fighters 45

in the resistance arm y organised in partisan units. Each unit, usually of 50 or 60 m en, had a com m ander who need not be a Com m unist Party m em ber and a political adviser appointed by the regional com m ittee o f the Party. The adviser was responsible for the carrying o u t o f a correct political line, b o th in the unit itself and in the area in which it operated. C om m ander and adviser to o k jo in t decisions on the general character of the u n its objectives and on m atters of principle; b u t the com m ander had priority on all m ilitary questions as long as his orders were n o t at variance w ith the political line of the Party nor the agreed strategy o f the war. There was a cell of Party m em bers in each partisan unit, m eeting regularly to discuss m ilitary operations and the provision of supplies, the well-being of the partisans and the admission or expulsion of members. S tudy sessions were held on M arxist-Leninist theory, the international com m unist and w orkers m ovem ent and the history of Albania. These Party cells, working under the guidance of the comm issar or political adviser, were responsible for the morale of the units, for m aintaining a m artial spirit, im parting love for the people and loyalty to the country, encouraging an international outlook, strengthening the close links of partisan com radeship and elim inating illiteracy among the fighting people. M ilitary discipline hardly existed in the units from a formal point o f view, b u t the rules o f m ilitary conduct which the partisans im posed on themselves were very strict. Orders of the com m ander and the political adviser were carried out zealously even w hen obedience involved the probability of dying in action. Of particular im portance was the absolute integrity of partisans in all their dealings w ith the people and their property n o t taking so m uch as a piece of thread for which they did n o t p ay . The units, their own morale and political understanding raised by the Com m unist Party, dissem inated in tu rn among the masses o f the people a warlike spirit and a grasp of the polil it ill aspects of the liberation struggle. As soon as a region was cleared of carabinieri and m ilitia, the partisan units di.solved the local governm ent and replaced it w ith a lieely circled N ational Liberation Council. They assumed the 46

task of protecting the people o f the liberated zones n ot only from enem y counter-attacks, b u t from robbers and spies and all those who w ould take advantage of the confused situation to defraud the people in any way. They began courses to com bat illiteracy, they staged theatrical perform ances which by dram atising the national m ovem ent and caricaturing the enem y b o th entertained the people and raised their en thusiasm for liberating themselves. The partisan bands thus dem onstrated their character as an arm ed force o f the people w ith a political role. And the people for their part soon came to regard the partisan units as their own army. They supported the units w hole-heartedly, supplying inform ation about the enemy, capturing spies and detaining suspected persons moving about in the liberated areas. Their houses were always open to the partisans and they shared w ith them w hat food there was. In the cities cash, clothes and m edicine were supplied freely. Women m ade uniform s for the liberation fighters and the funds of the liberation war were generously increased by the peoples gifts. When the units were n o t engaged in m ilitary operations nor in carrying o u t their political tasks in the N ational Liberation Councils, they studied the tactics of partisan warfare and practised to m ake themselves expert w ith various weapons. Each partisan was required to m aster n o t only the weapons he him self carried b u t all other weapons used by 1 1 1 1 particular u n it; and there were few who did n o t becom e 1. ill idly sharpshooters. The units were equipped w ith conventional rifles, subm u Itine guns, pistols, hand grenades, light m achine guns and, Inii i on, heavy m achine guns, m ortars and 45 mm howitzers. Mi ml of the arms were o f Italian m ake captured in m ilitary ii|iehilions against the enem y on the principle: You m ust Iirht in order to take from the enem y w hat you need to fight 111111 I here were also older weapons from the tim e of the I in f, i.li occupation and the First World War, which people IitiiI kepi concealed th roughout the period of Zogist rule. ||i ........... nnam ent captured from the enemy was usually ||i | 1 i\Til since it w ould be useless to highly m obile units. 1 I \ 1 1 ii .iI of this period of struggle was the liberation of 47

Corovoda, near Berat, in Septem ber 1942. By a series of hit and run attacks the enemy forces in the area were so weakened that it became possible to m ount an assault liberating the village and surrounding countryside. This was followed by brutal reprisals; b u t these savage co u n ter liberation actions, far from intim idating people, inspired them w ith a greater hatred for the invaders of their country and a stronger com m itm ent to the national independence forces. * The way in which the people rallied to the side of the partisans was shown in the battle of Gjormi, southeast of VIora, w here 300 volunteers joined the guerrilla force under the leadership of Mehmet Shehu and Hysni Kapo, making possible a shattering victory over 2000 heavily arm ed Italian troops who were com pletely routed on Jan u ary 2, 1943, leaving the fascist com m ander among the hundreds of dead on the field. A few weeks later partisan units of the K ora district besieged and destroyed the whole fascist m ilitary garrison of Voskopoja. All along the Kuks-Puka highway, victories were scored against the Italians. In three m onths at the beginning o f 1943 the liberated area alm ost doubled. So disastrous for the Italians were these operations that the Viceroy Jacom oni was replaced by General Pariani, in February, w ith orders to intensify violence against the whole population. During that year the partisan units, which had up till then operated against the enem y in isolated groups, began to com bine for attacks on a larger scale. Territorial units were set up in the bigger villages which could be quickly assembled to go in to battle w ith the perm anent partisan form ations. By March, 1943, at the first national Com m unist Party conference held at L abinot, near Elbasan, Enver H oxhas report on behalf of the Central C om m ittee could record 16 m onths of victories. The m astering of M arxist-Leninist 11 .ii hings by Party m em bers was stressed and the idea th at in Iime of war there was no need for books was strongly iiiliiis c d . The conference elected Enver H oxha Secretary <.i in i.il ol the P artys political bureau and those elected to ihi (li nlial C om m ittee included Nako Spiru, Hysni Kapo, <"i" Nushi, Mchinet Shehu and Vasil Shanto. 48

Right through spring and early sum m er attacks were m ounted against the enemy of ever-increasing force. Severe defeats were im posed on Italian troops near the Selenica mine in the Vlora district, at Leskovik on the Struga-Dibra highway, at the Kiok Pass and at Permet. In the Perm et battle alone over 500 Italians were wiped o u t in the five days fighting to liberate the city. Partisan detachm ents from the Kora, G jirokastra and Berat districts com bined forces in this action in which tens of m ilitary vehicles were destroyed and a vast am ount o f arms and am m unition captured. On Ju ly 6th Albanian partisans carried out their first attack on German troops at Barmash on the K ora-Janina highway. In the nation-wide wave of enthusiasm following on these m ilitary successes the Com m unist Party proposed th at the N ational Liberation General Council should m eet, m ainly for the purpose of transform ing the partisan units into a peoples liberation arm y. A t L abinot, w here the first Party conference had taken place, the m eeting was convened on Ju ly 4th, 1943. The Albanian N ational Liberation A rm y, at th at time num bering 10,000 fighters, was to be organised by a unanim ously-appointed General S taff w ith Enver H oxha as chief political adviser. This General S taff assumed the strategic and operational conduct of the arm ed struggle and was assisted in centralising the war effort by the establish ment of district staffs to co-ordinate regional initiative with the over-all battle plan. The General S taff announced on Ju ly Kith: So long as one single armed fascist remains in our i ountry our war m ust continue m ost ferociously. The developm ent o f peoples war m ade possible the great \ ii lories o f the Albanian N ational L iberation A rm y in the Mimmcr and autum n of 1943. Nearly 1000 Italian troops weie killed in the battles fought by partisans and people dmmp, Ju ly at Mallakastra and Tepelena where several enemy illvittioiis had been massed in an attem p t to crush resistance. I In lascists suffered further losses at the battle o f Pojska on Ilu1 IhkIiway betw een T hana and Pograde. In the passes of NliMittii and Buall where 3000 local inhabitants fought illi miIi lii to shoulder w ith the partisans, in the Dibra, <1 1 >1 1 K.i.11 .i, Kora and Shkodra districts bloody actions took I'l i t ' ilmiug the m onth of August in which the Italians lost 49

m ore than 1500 killed. In Septem ber attacks were launched on Germ an troops in Konispol and on a Germ an convoy along the Elbasan-Tirana highway. Staggered by these m ilitary disasters the Italian com m ander-in-chief reported to Rom e th at the m ajority of the Albanian people, w ithout class distinction, have risen up against Italy and against the stationing of our troops in A lbania. He urged headquarters to increase im m ediately the num ber o f occupation forces to enable him to cope w ith the situation. * * * The Albanian people in their war of resistance were learning the same lessons and developing the same m ethods of fighting as other people whose countries have been invaded by pow erful, heavily-armed im perialist armies the people of China in their struggle against the Japanese or the people of Vietnam against the U nited States. The principles of peoples war, waged by ordinary people against aggressive professional forces equipped w ith all the m artial resources o f highly industrialised nations, have been developed into a political and m ilitary science, a science enabling, in the words of Mao Tsetung, the people of a small country to defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their c o u n try . T hat peoples war is indeed a science is dem onstrated by the fact th a t all who have perfected this kind of w arfare in victorious practice have independently arrived at the same conclusions about its successful prosecution. This science has been further attested and inventively elaborated by the experience o f the Albanian people in their resistance struggle against fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. A sum m ary of these experiences was com piled by M ehmet Shehu ju st after the w.n , in 1947, as a guide to the correct developm ent of a 1 1 .1 1ional army. Mehmel Shehu had fought as a volunteer during the civil " ii in Spain where Italian and German support brought 'M im s lo (he fascists. From the very beginning he was ill llvels involved in his own co u n try s liberation struggle 50

against those same tw o powers. In August, 1943, he helped to organise and to o k com m and o f the First Shock Brigade, a m ilitary form ation m arking the advance from small guerrilla units to higher forms of warfare. One of the m ain features of peoples war is the recognition of the im portance of m orale, the advantage enjoyed by those who are conscious o f fighting a ju st war as opposed to those fighting an unjust one. This advantage, form ulated in the principle m en are m ore im portant than w eapons, always lies w'ith those waging p eo p les war which cannot, by its very nature, ever be an aggressive war waged in som eone elses country. M ehm et Shehu m akes this point in his summing up of the experience of the national liberation war. In fighting on the plains as well as in the m ountains man is the decisive factor th at determ ines the fate of the war regardless of any developm ent or arm am ents. A small army can defeat a bigger one, superior in num bers and means, if it wages a ju st war and if it is made up of m en who are politically enlightened on the ju st nature of the war they are waging, united in their determ ination to overcome the enemy, resolved to the end to shed their last drop of blood to achieve victory and well trained to face adversities in battle. O n the field of battle man can replace the weapon, b u t weapons can never diminish Ihe role o f men. W ithout m en a w eapon is nothing but a dead piece o f iron, lifeless and pow erless. In peoples war the relation betw een arm ed fighters and the masses of the people is crucial. Success depends on the partisan being able to live am ong and move among the people 'like a fish in w ater. The people are the intelligence and the ommissariat of the fighting troops, and victory in a liberation 'ilniggle is ultim ately determ ined by the peoples willingness lo share all the hazards o f war with their m en in the field. I his relationship is m aintained on the one hand by the dm iplincd conduct o f the arm ed forces. As a peoples arm y, I'unging from the people, fighting w ith and for the people, dicy m ust treat all as equals and brothers. They m ust have die Nlrictcst regard for the property as well as for the persons ill lIn men and w om en w ith w hom they come in contact, h 11 ihcm through the hardships of a pro tracted war and, iii> 51

in the liberated areas, setting up schools, providing m edical care, improving village am enities, as a prom ise of the better life to be won w ith the victorious conclusion of the resistance struggle. On the other hand the relationship is m aintained as the w orkers and peasants do realise th a t they have a stake in the war which goes beyond sim ply elim inating a dangerous and brutal invading force. They m ust be sustained by their understanding th at the war is revolutionary as well as liberative, n o t being fought to restore previous forms o f local exploitation and oppression b u t to establish socialism, or at least to create the conditions o f a genuine peoples dem oc racy in which socialism can be developed as a successive stage. This political aspect of peoples war was expressed by the A lbanian Com m unist Party in its declaration on the object ives o f the w ar: to free the country from foreign invaders, to do away w ith local reaction, to set up a Peoples Dem ocratic R epublic, to confiscate the large estates of the feudal chiefs and the accum ulated wealth of m erchant speculators and to enact land reform laws, to inaugurate a good life for the people in a free and truly dem ocratic Albania. Because this political perspective m ust guide m ilitary operations, a strong political leadership is essential for the successful waging o f peoples war. As M ehm ct Shehu pointed out: Form er wars of our people have not been successful because the people lacked a capable political party to lead them in their ju st struggles. Only such a party can mobilise, train and lead the people in armed struggle, enabling them to defeat a bigger enemy. O ur people could cope w ith the hardships of an unequal war because the organiser and director o f the liberation m ovem ent, the Albanian Com munis) Party, through its correct political line of action, led ihem from victory to victory. W ithout political commissars ind political organs in the army it w ould n ot have been I iviiblc to train our fighting troops politically and m orally iiuiI \vr would n o t have had an arm y willing at all times to lay down 1 ki i very lives for the people. The m em bers of the 1 I'm I y w n i .1 1 way s the first to attack and the last to retrea t. I him llit Alli.mian national war o f liberation can be seen as 52

successfully exem plifying the political characteristics of p eo p les war generally the response to the aggressive acts of capitalist states of the masses, organised under working class leadership com m itted to ending all forms of exploitation and guided by a com m unist party capable of appraising local conditions in the light o f universal revolutionary experience. The form ulation applies, o f course, not only to resistance to the Axis powers b u t to liberation m ovem ents since the War in m any colonial and semi-colonial countries. M ehm et Shehu has shown how a partisan arm y differs from a regular army in the way it is recruited, the role it is required to play and, m ost im portant, the political back ground out of which it emerges. The partisan army is made up entirely o f volunteers w ho jo in the ranks o f their own free will. There are no age no r sex restrictions and partisan form ations include m en advanced in years, young wom en and boy and girl pioneers as well as m en of m ilitary age. Partisans are, for the m ost part, an infantry equipped with light weapons. Emerging from circum stances of a people occupied by foreign aggressors or oppressed by internal reaction, they have to begin fighting w ith whatever they can get hold of since arms and the factories to produce them are in the hands of the invaders or the regime in power. Progressively they arm themselves w ith weapons snatched from the enemy. While a regular arm y seeks to clear its opponents from the area in which it operates, the partisan arm y is interwoven through and w ithin the enem ys field of operations, providing opportunities for sabotage, cutting lines of com m unication, attacking isolated concentrations and spreading terror and t on fusion through the ranks of the enem y. Terrorising the ru n n y as a step tow ard the developm ent of full scale liberation w.1 1 1'arc must not be confused with isolated terrorist acts which irpresent a distrust of the revolutionary m ovem ent. The tactics of a regular arm y are based m ainly on num bers, both o f m en and means. Partisan tactics are based on quality I lighters their initiative, devotion and com bative spirit. A u vular army relies on the com bined fire power of all its units, while the partisan arm y depends on the excellence of liliti Ksmanship, the positioning o f m en to make the best use 53

of cover and, always, the elem ent of surprise. Being inferior to the enem y in num bers necessitates the partisan principle of the main blow , using m obility and knowledge of the terrain to concentrate forces secretly and quickly at the right tim e and place to achieve relative superiority over the enem y for a knock-out blow. The morale and physical fitness of the partisans, the configuration and topographical features of the ground, tim e and w eather conditions, possibilities of reinforcem ent from other form ations and, above all, the political situation in the area where the fighting is taking place, are all elem ents in these tactics. M obility, o f course, is essential in attacking the enem y where he is weakest on the flanks or, b e tte r still, in the rear. A lthough the overall nature of peoples war is defensive in the sense th a t external aggressors have brought the war to the people by invading their country, it is of the greatest im portance th at the peoples army should be im bued with the spirit o f attack , acquired by assailing the enem y wherever he m ay be and as often as the occasion arises. To m ake use of one of their m ain weapons, surprise, the partisans m ust never lose the initiative and m ust never find themselves fighting a defensive war of m erely trying to hold ground. To allow the initiative to slip from your hands, M ehmet Shehu warned, to hang back and fail to pursue the enem y, to fail to go for him and perm it him to go for you, to pursue you, means defeat pure and simple . . . continuity o f operations is a t the ro o t of all other principles guiding partisan warfare. Only through repeated attacks can be m aintained the moral superiority over the enem y essential for success. For this reason m ilitary operations were co-ordinated through general directives, warlike slogans and orders from above in the m ost elastic terms allowing local com m anders the m axim um scope for initiative and never providing any excuse for partisans to lose their m artial im petus waiting for further instructions. This point was m ade by Enver H oxha in his criticism o f a p.ulisan battalion which was caught off guard in Septem ber l!M'l. Partisans should never be on the defensive. Standing -ii youi own ground m ight well bring our arm y face to face uilli i m ajor enemy force which could exterm inate it. You 54

m ust by all m eans take the offensive so th a t by speedy m anoeuvring and frequent attacks we m ay confuse and cause the enem y losses, by blowing up bridges and hitting convoys incessantly we m ay disrupt the en em y s plans, by raiding depots we may make free w ith the m aterial to equip new arrivals in the ranks of the partisans . . . We are here in our own land. We are b e tte r acquainted w ith our m ountains and m ountain passes. The people are on our side in m ost regions and therefore it cannot be tolerated th a t the enem y should ever take us by surprise.

55

Chapter Six R elations o f the Liberation Leadership w ith other N ational Groups and w ith the Allies The reverses suffered by the Italian forces of occupation in Albania contributed to the overthrow of Mussolini on Ju ly 27, 1943; b u t there was no slackening of the national liberation war which the General S taff ordered to be continued w ith even greater intensity until Italy and G erm any too surrendered unconditionally. When Italy did finally capitulate on Septem ber 8, the Central C om m ittee o f the Albanian Com m unist Party and the General S taff instructed the partisans to break off the arm ed conflict and propose to the Italian troops th at hostilities betw een them should end and that they should join together against the com m on enem y o f Albania and Italy Nazi G erm any. At th at tim e H itlers armies were pouring into Albania from M acedonia and Greece. The Italian com m ander who had replaced Jacom oni, General Renzo Dalmazzo, rejected this proposal and ordered the Italian soldiers to surrender to the Germans as m ost of them did. Many thousands, however, deserted and sought refuge among the Albanian people. Some 1500 Italian soldiers volunteered to enlist in the ranks of the partisans, form ing a com pany o f fighters called the A ntonio Gramsci battalion, after the Marxist intellectual and leader of the Italian Com m unist Party, himself of Albanian descent, who had died in one of M ussolinis prisons. The partisans had clashed for the first time w ith German troops after defeating the Italian garrison at Perm et. The Germans were pushing through Albania from K ora tow ard the Greek city o f Ja n in a w hen the partisans attacked them and inflicted serious losses. The Nazi troops took revenge by setting fire to the nearby village of Borova and m urdering 56

every m an , w om an an d child w ho h ad n o t b een able to escape. O n e h u n d re d and seven p eople w ere m assacred by the G erm ans in this b ru ta l reprisal. This was to be th e p a tte rn o f th e w ar against th e G erm an N azis w h o w ere m u ch m o re ru th less an d d e te rm in e d th a n th e Italians. As E nver H o x h a w ro te to th e F irst S h o ck Brigade in N ovem ber, 1943: G erm an bands o f 50 to 60 soldiers led, to be sure, b y traito rs, com e a n d b u rn up villages and a tta c k o u r ow n b ands w here th e y least ex p e ct them . Y ou sh o u ld p o in t o u t to all o u r com rades th a t o u r b a tta lio n s in general seem to be u n d e r th e im pression th a t th ey still have to do w ith M ussolinis tro o p s w ho lack e d th e sp irit o f c o m b a t. A nd th e lib era tio n forces quickly rallied to deal w ith this m ore d an gerous and m ore vicious foe. A v io len t e n c o u n te r to o k place n ea r V lo ra in th e course o f w hich th e p artisans freed 7000 Italian soldiers and officers held as priso n ers o f w ar and forced th e G erm ans to re tre a t afte r su staining heavy losses. B ut m o re and m ore G erm an tro o p s ro lled in to A lbania from d iffe re n t p arts o f the B alkans and soon w ith an arm y force o f m o re th a n 7 0,000 m en, th e y greatly o u tn u m b e re d the partisans. A fte r h a rd fighting th e N azi tro o p s o ccu p ied all the m ajo r cities and key c o m m u n icatio n p o in ts; b u t the lib eration forces in fierce co m b ats p rev en ted th e m from d ep loying over the w hole c o u n try and m o st regions and a n u m b er o f tow ns rem ained free fo r the c o n tin u e d o p eratio n o f th e p artisan forces. W herever th e G erm ans w ere, they im posed a curfew an d p ro claim ed th a t fro m 20 to 30 A lbanians w o u ld be sh o t o r hanged fo r every G erm an soldier killed, fo r every act o f sabotage, fo r concealing w eapons or I'ood an d this th re a t was ru th lessly carried o u t. T he b itte re s t p.ii I o f th e lib e ra tio n struggle h ad ju s t begun. A long w ith o p eratio n s in th e field against th e p artisan unils, the N azis also p u rsu e d a p o licy o f enrolling th e forces ol inlcrnal re actio n fo r use against th e lib e ra tio n m ovem ent. N .il o nly feudal chiefs an d w e alth y m erch an ts co llab o rated willi (he G erm ans, b u t also m an y o f th o se w ho belonged to liniirgeois-led n atio n alist groups like Balli K o m b tar (N.ilional F ro n t) and L egaliteti (L egality). T h ey covered th eir In n.iyal w ith th e absurd arg u m en t th a t th e G erm an invaders 57

w ere p re p are d to recognise A lb an ias in d e p e n d e n c e against G reek or Yugoslav claim s at th e very tim e w hen th e Nazis w ere savagely try in g to tu rn th e w hole c o u n try in to a base from w hich to o p e ra te against allied landings in so u th e rn E u ro p e o r against the p o p u lar, anti-fascist forces in th e rest o f th e B alkans. W ith th e in te n tio n o f settin g up a quisling gov ern m en t th e G erm ans called a c o n s titu e n t assem bly in T irana on O c to b e r 18, 1943. T he re cen tly fo rm e d p artisan T h ird Brigade was close enough to th e capital to score a d irec t h it w ith a ca p tu re d field gun on th e palace w here the m eetin g was being held. T h e co llab o rato rs fled in panic to h o ld th eir assem bly in a less conspicuous building. Early in N ovem ber a p u p p e t g o v ern m ent was fo rm e d from th o se w ho h ad w o rk e d w ith th e Italian s, th e Zogists an d m em bers o f th e an ti-co m m u n ist re sistan c e organisations. T he N atio n al L ib era tio n G eneral C ouncil w arned peo p le all over A lbania n o t to be deceived by these so rd id political m anoeuvres. B ourgeois n atio n alist organisations like Balli K o m b tar, fo u n d e d ostensibly fo r th e p u rp o se o f resisting th e fascist invaders u n d e r a n o n -c o m m u n ist leadership, h ad first com e in to being a t th e en d o f th e previous year, 1942. A t th a t tim e th e resistance struggle in A lb an ia h ad already reach ed a level w hich led th e A llied G o v ern m en ts to recognise th e role o f th e A lbanians in th e w ar against the A xis P ow ers. A sta te m e n t read in th e H ouse o f C om m ons b y B rita in s Foreign S ecretary , A n th o n y E d en , acknow ledged th e freedom and in d ep en d e n ce o f A lbania a n d le ft it to th e A lb an ian p eo p le to d ecide at th e en d o f th e w ar w h a t regim e and fo rm o f g o v ern m ent th e y w ould have. A lb an ias b o rd e rs w ould be discussed a t th e post-w ar peace co nference. T h e n e x t day th e S oviet M inister o f F oreign A ffairs, V. M olotov, expressed s y m p a th y w ith th e A lbanian lib era tio n m o v em en t and p raised th e heroism o f th e p artisan s. T he Soviet G ov ern m en t recognised th e A lbanian p a trio tic forces as allies in the anti-fascist co alitio n and affirm ed th e right o f the A lbanian p eo p le to choose th e fo rm o f gov ern m en t th ey w a n ted . T he U nited S ta tes S ecretary o f S ta te , C ordell H ull, also praised Ilie A lb anian resistance an d declared A lb an ias rig h t to be a lice and in d ep en d e n t state.

T his in te rn a tio n a l reco g n itio n o f th e successes achieved by th e N atio n al L ib era tio n F ro n t led b y th e A lbanian C om m u n ist P arty so u n d e d a n o te o f alarm fo r th o se elem ents in th e c o u n try w h o d id n o t w ish to see th e ir privileged p o sitio n in th e o ld A lb an ia w iped o u t in a new socialist A lbania afte r th e w ar. T h e N a tio n al L ib eratio n F ro n t drew its stren g th from th e overw helm ing m ajo rity o f th e A lbanian peo p le th e w o rk in g class, th e p o o r and m iddle p easan try , th e p e tty b o u rg eo isie and m o st o f th e m edium bourgeoisie in th e cities, p a trio tic in tellectu als and even certain individuals from th e u p p e r stra ta . It w elcom ed in to its ranks all w ho w ere genuinely p rep ared to fight against th e fascist enem y. T he fo rm er ex p lo itin g classes,the lan d lo rd s, feudal chieftains, re actio n ary b o u rgeoisie, the m ajo rity o f rich peasants and th o se in tellectu als and clergy w ho served th eir in terests, h ad op en ly co llab o rated w ith th e Italian occupiers. B ut w ith even th e p o ssib ility o f an A llied v icto ry it becam e necessary to th in k o f establishing a claim to p a rtic ip a te in th e post-w ar free choice o f g o v e rn m e n t p ro m ised to th e A lbanian people. T h e m o st im p o rta n t o f th e n a tio n a lis t groupings b ro u g h t in to b eing fo r this p u rp o se was Balli K o m b ta r w ith M idhat Frashri, w h o was anti-Z ogist, anti-fascist and a n ti com m unist., as its figurehead. W ith him , how ever, w ere well know n c o llab o rato rs like Ali K elcy ra an d am b itio u s landlords like N u red in b e y V lora. In fa ct, as was su b seq u en tly discovered, th e Italians them selves p ro m p te d the fo rm a tio n ol Balli K o m b tar as a c o u n te r to th e groupings o f genuine Ii.i Iriots w hich cam e in to being at th e Peza C onference. A pio-Z ogist n a tio n a l organisation, L egaliteti, was set up b y Aba/. K upi, a fte r h e h ad b ro k e n w ith th e N atio n al L ib era tio n <ii neral C ouncil to w hich h e h ad b een a p p o in te d at th e Peza C onference. A ctin g u n d e r th e in stru ctio n s o f th e B ritish w ho w in ted to in flu en ce A lb an ia a fte r th e w ar th ro u g h a re sto ratio n o f th e m o n a rc h y , A baz K upi m ain tain ed th a t only Zogs regim e was legal an d h e d em an d ed th a t the N .ilional L ib era tio n F ro n t m u st rally u n d e r th e b a n n e r o f l l alitcti. R e a c tio n a ry C atholics in th e n o rth g ro u p ed llirni.Nolves u n d e r th e leadership o f a big lan d o w n e r, J o h n M u k.igjon, w h o h ad every in te re st in keeping n o rth e rn Mli,in i;i feudal. 59

A t first th ese n a tio n a list organisations did a ttra c t som e p eo p le in to th e ir ranks w ho th o u g h t th ey w ere seriously in te n d e d to resist foreign o cc u p atio n , an d th e N atio n al L ib eratio n F ro n t m ade every e ffo rt to w o rk w ith th em and draw th e m in to th e anti-fascist war. A t th e L ab in o t C o n ference o f th e L ib era tio n F ro n t th e C o m m u n ist P arty invited Balli K o m b ta r to agree to proposals for co -o p eratin g against th e invaders an d th eir A lbanian co llab o rato rs. This ap p ro ach was re je cted on th e grounds th a t the tim e was n o t right for an o p en uprising an d it w o u ld be b e tte r to w ait fo r the p ro m ised second fr o n t w hich m ight even be o p en e d up in A lb an ia itself. This policy o f w aiting, o f w ishing to conserve its forces fo r fighting th e co m m u n ists a fte r th e w ar, n o t the fascists d u rin g it, gained Balli K o m b ta r its d esc rip tio n b y th e p ea san t p a trio ts as th e big grey ass w hich w a ited and w aited and never c ro p p ed grass. T h e C o m m u n ist P arty , in line w ith its p o licy o f building th e w id est possible n a tio n al fro n t against th e enem y, c o n tin u e d its e ffo rts to w in over th e Balli K o m b ta r fo r jo in t a c tio n ; b u t a t th e sam e tim e it was necessary to expose the p lo ts o f th e leaders o f this organisation to b e tra y th e lib era tio n m ovem ent to th e fascists. S ecret d o cu m en ts cam e in to th e possession o f th e P arty revealing th a t tw o leading m em bers o f th e Balli K o m b ta r, Ali K elcyra and N u red in V lora, h ad signed an agreem ent in M arch 1943, w ith the Italian co m m an d e r in chief, R en zo D alm azzo, kn o w n as th e D alm azzo-K elcyra P ro to co l, according to w hich th e Balli K o m b e ta r p ro m ised n o t to s ta rt any arm ed rev o lt in so u th e rn A lb an ia if th e Italians p ro m ised n o t to a tta c k th o se arm ed bands resp ectin g th e agreem ent. This le ft th e Balli K o m b ta r free to organise th e ir o p eratio n s n o t against th e foreign o ccu p y in g forces b u t against th e partisans. As these n a tio n a list groupings began to believe th a t landings in A lbania by B ritish and A m erican forces w ere possible, th e y cam e o u t in b la ta n t o p p o sitio n to the partisan s. A t K olonja, w ith th e su p p o rt o f th e Italians, the Balli K o m b e ta r lau n ch ed a surprise assault on a partisan fo rm a tio n . Again, at M allakastra, w hile p artisan b attalio n s w ere engaged in a fierce b a ttle w ith a larger Italian force in fro n t o f them , th e Balli K o m b e ta r suddenly assailed them

fro m th e rear. By this tim e leaders like M id h at F rashri h ad b eco m e so fan atic in th e ir h a tre d o f com m unism th a t th e y en d o rsed these treach ero u s attack s. T h e o p en m ilitary col la b o ra tio n w ith th e en em y o f these organisations representing th e re actio n ary an d ex p lo itin g classes o f Z ogist tim es h ad the e ffec t o f m erging the w ar fo r the lib e ra tio n o f th e c o u n try w ith a civil w ar to d e te rm in e th e social a n d political ch a rac te r o f a lib e ra te d A lbania. A last e ffo rt to avert a fratricidal w ar was m ade b y the G en eral C ouncil o f th e L ib eratio n F ro n t at th e C o m m u n ist P a rty s suggestion in A ugust, 1943, w hen a m eeting was arran g ed at M ukje, n e a r K ruja, b etw e en Balli K o m b e ta r chiefs a n d a d eleg atio n fro m th e L ib era tio n C ouncil. B ut the delegates from the C ouncil, Y m er D ishnica, a m em ber o f the P a rty s P olitical B ureau, a n d M ustafa G jinishi, instead o f d efen d in g th e line o f th e N ational F ro n t u n d e r C o m m u n ist P arty lead ersh ip w hich h ad b een estab lish ed at th e Peza C o n feren ce and w hich h a d proved so successful in th e lib era tio n w ar, gave w ay u n d er pressure an d agreed to an in d e p e n d e n t ex istence fo r th e Balli K o m b e ta r on an equal fo o tin g w ith th e N atio n al L ib era tio n F ro n t. This w o u ld have resu lted n o t o nly in sp littin g th e lib era tio n forces b u t also in paving th e w ay fo r a re s to ra tio n afte r th e w ar o f re actio n ary elem en ts w ho h ad n o t fired a sh o t in th e c o u n try s defence. O n th e in itiativ e o f Enver H o x h a th e C entral C o m m ittee o f the C o m m u n ist P arty co n d e m n e d th e failure o f Y m er D ishnica an d M u stafa G jinishi to d em an d th a t th e Balli K o m b etar jo in in the w ar against th e fascist invaders and rejected th e M ukje ag reem en t o u t o f han d . A t th e S econd N atio n al L ib era tio n C onference at L ab in o t in S ep tem b er, 1943, th e m ain issue was th e q u e stio n o f th e p e o p le s d em o cratic p o w er a n d the N atio n al L ib eratio n C ouncils were recognised as th e sole representatives o f th a t pow er. R egula tions for th e N atio nal L ib eratio n C ouncils w ere fo rm u late d and executive organs fo r b o th the G eneral C ouncil and the d istrict councils w ere set up. T he M ukje agreem ent was publicly co n d e m n e d as being inim ical to th e p ro se cu tio n o f the w ar a n d th e u n ity o f th e A lbanian p eople. B ut even then, while ex p o sin g th e co llab o ratio n o f th e Balli K o m b etar w ith the en em y , in stru c tio n s w ere issued to m ake use o f any 61

ch ance fo r w o rk in g w ith elem ents o f th e Balli K o m b ta r and o th e r p o litical groups o u tsid e th e lib e ra tio n m o v em en t if th e y ever d id decide to p a rtic ip a te in th e w ar and if th ey agreed to recognise the N atio n al L ib eratio n C ouncils as the o n ly expression o f p o p u lar pow er. E arly in 1943 a B ritish m ilitary m ission was sen t to A lbania b y th e Inter-A llied M ed iterran ean C o m m an d to w ork w ith th e N a tio n al L ib era tio n forces. S oon a fte r its arrival the m ission estab lished secret c o n ta c t w ith th e leaders o f Balli K o m b tar and w ith A baz K upi o f L egaliteti. Even th o u g h it was obvious by this tim e th a t these tw o organisations w ere n o t o n ly refusing to engage the fascists, b u t o fte n actively assisting th em , th e y c o n tin u e d to receive th e g re ater p a rt o f th e aid fro m B ritain a n d th e U n ited S tates in arm s, am m u n itio n , clo th in g and gold. T he Inter-A llied M ed iter ran ean C o m m an d b ro u g h t pressure to b ear o n th e G eneral S ta ff to o rd e r p artisans n o t to fire on th e anarchic b ands o f th ese re actio n ary groupings even w hen u n d e r a tta c k from th em an d , fu rth e r, insisted th a t B ritish officers sh o u ld be recognised as a rb itra to rs in th e relations b etw e en Balli K o m b tar o r L egaliteti an d th e N atio n al L ib era tio n C ouncil. M eanw hile th e B ritish m ission trie d to persuade A baz K upi in p artic u la r to m ake som e show o f fighting th e G erm an tro o p s, th e Italians b y this tim e having c a p itu lated . B ut A baz K u p i becam e less and less w illing to co m m it his forces in any ac tio n at all, arguing th a t th e d e fe a t o f th e G erm ans co u ld be le ft to th e g reat pow ers: his task was to save his stren g th for th e d efeat o f A lbanians w ho o p p o sed Z o g s re tu rn and the re sto ra tio n o f th e old re actio n ary regim e. T he B ritish h ad no b e tte r lu ck w ith a group o f w h a t w o u ld n o w be called revisionists u n d e r M ustafa G jinishi and Y m er D ishnica w ho h ad b ro k e n w ith th e C o m m u n ist P arty a fte r being criticised for th e su rren d er over th e M ukje agreem ent. T hey even p lo tte d w ith such n o to rio u s reactio n aries as th e feudal chieftain J o h n M arkagjon w ho had m ade no p re te n ce o f opposing th e G erm ans. W hat th e B ritish m ission was lo o k in g fo r was an a n ti co m m u n ist fo rce p re p are d to wage all-out w ar against the Nazis an d , at th e con clu sio n o f h o stilities, to resto re a go v ern m en t in A lb an ia favourable to B ritish in terests in th e 62

M editerran ean . No su ch force ex isted in A lbania. T he lib era tio n m o v em en t was to o u n ite d u n d e r th e leadership o f th e C o m m u n ist P arty an d th e forces o f re a c tio n to o openly involved w ith th e enem y a n d to o lacking in p o p u la r su p p o rt to pro v id e th e B ritish any o p p o rtu n ity fo r intervening in A lb an ias civil w ar as th e y w ere to do so disruptively in G reece. T h e A lb an ian lib e ra tio n struggle was sim ply a specific in stan ce o f th e dilem m a c o n fro n tin g th e governm ents o f B ritain an d th e U n ite d S tates in m any p arts o f the w orld o nce th e assaults o f the A xis Pow ers h a d b een checked and th o u g h ts tu rn e d to q u estio n s o f post-w ar settlem en ts. T he th re a t o f fascist co n q u e st h a d b ro u g h t to g e th e r in a defensive alliance g o v ernm ents an d peoples w ith very d iffe re n t long term aim s. In m any co u n tries overrun b y th e Italians, the G erm ans o r th e Jap a n e se th e resistance forces w hich gath ered to expel th e invaders w ere e ith e r co m m unist-led or sym p a th e tic to com m unism . T he anti-fascist w ar thus becam e also, in co u n tries like A lbania, a re v o lu tio n ary w ar to prevent the previous ex p lo iters fro m regaining p o w er ex p lo iters w ho m ay have rep resen ted or been s u p p o rte d by the older im perialist co u n trie s like B ritain o r F rance. T h e com m u n ist-led partisans o f A lb an ia ce rtain ly h ad no in ten tio n o f rid ding them selves o f fascist aggressors in o rd e r to le t B ritain , th e U n ited S tates o r an y o th e r im perialist pow er b ack in to ex p lo it th e m e ith e r d irectly or indirectly. Wlicn Prim e M inister W inston C hurchill, speaking o n b ehalf of B ritish capitalism , sta te d th a t h e h a d n o t assum ed th a t ill lice to p reside over th e liq u id a tio n o f th e B ritish e m p ire, lie w as, in effec t, briefing tb e B ritish m ission in A lbania to w ork fo r a p o st-w ar se ttle m e n t c o n so n a n t w ith th e in terests "I British im perialism in th e M editerran ean. T he C entral C o m m ittee o f th e A lb an ian C o m m u n ist P arty accordingly lU '.nucted its local organs th a t allied m issions should n o t Inli rfcre in o u r in tern a l affairs and sh o u ld in n o w ay be M*K,uded as arb iters b e tw e e n us an d re a c tio n a ry organisations. II o u r w ar against the co m m o n en em y is agreeable to them , km m uch th e b e tte r. O therw ise th e d o o r is w ide open for llu'in lo leave. I lie British m ilitary m ission tried to convince th e A lbanian

L ib eratio n A rm y G eneral S ta ff th a t its forces sh o u ld n o t be m oved in to n o rth e rn A lbania because th e y regarded th a t as A baz K u p is zo n e o f ac tio n even if h e was n o t, in fact, acting. M eanw hile in L o n d o n th e B ritish G o v ern m en t a tte m p te d to set up an A lbanian governm ent in exile u n d er th e d iscred ited ex-King Zog. B ut B ritish prestige su ffe red a severe blow w h en B rigadier Davies in co m m an d o f the m ission and tw o o f his staff, all unfam iliar w ith guerrilla w arfare, w ere c a p tu re d by co llab o rato rs and h an d e d over to th e G erm ans. By S ep tem b er, 1944, the leaders o f th e N atio n al L iber atio n C ouncil felt th a t th e y h ad to le ra te d long enough the clum sy effo rts o f th e B ritish m ission to find frie n d ly agents w hich only re su lted in establishing c o n ta c t w ith the enem ies o f th e partisans w ho w ere bearing the w hole b ru n t o f the war. E nver H o x h a d em an d ed the w ith d raw al o f the m ission w h ich he n o longer h esita te d to describe as agents o f foreign re a c tio n . T h e im p o rtan ce o f th e episode for the A lbanians was th a t it em phasised th e necessity o f self-reliance an d o f n o t d ep en d in g o n o u tsid e assistance if th e y w ere to preserve th eir in d ep en d e n ce a fte r th e w ar. S u b seq u en t dem ands o f th e A nglo-A m erican M ed iterran ean C o m m an d to send p aratro o p s and special arm y u n its to A lbania to jo in the final stages o f th e fight against th e G erm ans w ere firm ly rejected. T he A lbanian N a tio n al L ib era tio n A rm y insisted th a t it was capable o f freeing th e en tire c o u n try on its ow n. W hen B ritish co m m an d o s lan d ed in S aranda a fte r L ib eratio n brigades h ad w ip ed o u t th e G erm an garrison th ere , the G eneral S ta ff co m pelled the B ritish to rem ove th e ir forces w ith o u t delay. T h e m essage sen t to a B ritish w arship lying o ff D urrs was an in v ita tio n to d in n er fo r all the officers and m en w ho cared to lan d u n arm ed b u t a re c e p tio n o f b u llets if th ey cam e ashore eq u ip p ed to o u tsta y th a t lim ited w elcom e. T he sam e p rin cip le governed relations w ith th e U nited S tates. T h e A lbanians recognised the A m ericans as allies b u t resisted any suggestion o f sending U n ited States forces into A lbania. In 1945 w hen P resident T ru m an p ro p o sed to send tw o d estro y ers to D urrs to p ick up various A m ericans w ho fo u n d them selves in A lbania, he was to ld th a t w ould n o t be 64

necessary since these p eo p le w o u ld be m arch ed across the fro n tie r in to G reece and co u ld be pick ed up there. As fo r th e various p seu d o -n atio n alist groupings like Balli K o m b e ta r and L egaliteti, in D ecem ber, 1943, th e G eneral C ouncil finally ab a n d o n ed tiny h o p e o f g ettin g th em to jo in in the fighting a n d d en o u n c ed them all as treach ero u s co llab o ratio n ists. A baz K upi was expelled from th e N ational L ib eratio n C ouncil in w hich his place h ad b een reserved long a fte r his h a tre d o f com m unism h ad carried him in to the en em y cam p.

65

Chapter Seven
T he L ib eratio n War against the Nazis a n d Final V icto ry In N o vem ber, 1943, the G erm ans d ecided to launch a m assive offensive o p e ra tio n to crush resistance in A lbania once and fo r all. T he w in ter cam piagn, co m m an d ed b y th e Nazi general F eh n , involved the tro o p s o f fo u r divisions, som e 4 5 ,0 0 0 m en, eq u ip p ed w ith the m o st m o d ern w eapons an d heavily s u p p o rte d b y a rm o u red cars, tanks and aircraft. In ad d itio n , th e p u p p e t g o v ernm ent a n d those so-called n a tio n a list o rg anisations w hich h a d b y this tim e gone over co m p letely to th e en em y, supplied a force o f 1 0,000 m ercenaries w ho w ere p articu larly useful to th e Nazis fo r espionage and fo r acting as guides in th e w ilder regions. A gainst this trem e n d o u s force th e N atio n al L ib era tio n A rm y h ad 2 0 ,0 0 0 m en organised in fo u r brigades arm ed w ith rifles, a u to m a tic rifles, light an d heavy m achine guns, light and heavy m o rta rs and a few field pieces w hich th e y h ad c a p tu re d and m an -handled u p in to the m o u n tain s. T h e cam paign began w ith a series o f lightning prelim in ary blow s delivered by th e G erm an arm y against th e Peza zone, near T irana, w here th e T h ird Brigade h ad to fight fiercely to b re ak o u t to w ard erm enika, against th e partisans in the D ib ra zone and against B erat w hich h ad been lib era te d b u t was so o n reo ccu p ied b y th e G erm ans w ith th e m o st b ru ta l co n sequences for the civilian p o p u latio n . A few days la te r w hile th e partisans w ere still adjusting th eir p ositions to cope w ith th e first assault a stro n g G erm an fo rce a tta c k e d th e lib era te d zone o f M allakastra, d efen d ed by th e F irst S hock Brigade. T he Brigade was very nearly c u t o ff a n d h ad to m anoeuvre quickly in to a p o sitio n from w hich it was possible to slice th ro u g h th e e n e m y s lines. B u t to carry o u t this m o v em en t it was necessary first to cross th e river V josa a n d this was m anaged by m o u n tin g a diversionary 66

a tta c k from b e h in d S ym iza Hill w hich gave th e b u lk o f the p artisan forces ju s t tim e to get th e ir eq u ip m e n t across th e stream on th e one u n c a p tu re d barge. A fte r a sh o rt b lo o d y e n c o u n te r in w h ich th e G erm an tro o p s w ere p u t tem p o ra rily to flight, th e re st o f th e B rigade fo rd ed th e river an d the w hole fo rce th e n m oved in to the M esapliku d istrict. H ere the F irst B rigade reg ro u p ed and stru c k back, altern atin g its c o u n te r attack s w ith th o se being lau n ch e d by p artisans in the V lo ra d istrict. H eavy losses w ere in flic te d o n the G erm ans at V ajza and along th e B o lena-V ranishta line. T he F irst Brigade th e n sw ung o v er to w a rd Z agoria w hile partisans fro m V lora m oved in to th e M esapliku area to m op up Balli K o m b e ta r elem ents w h o h ad been o p eratin g w ith th e enem y. In D ecem ber a crack G e n n a n division train e d in m o u n tain w arfare, w ith 1,500 n a tio n a list m ercenaries to act as guides an d in fo rm ers, stru ck at the rough up lan d regions o f cen tral A lbania above T iran a w here th e G eneral S ta ff o f th e L ib eratio n A rm y h a d its h ea d q u arters an d w here th e S econd and T h ird P artisan Brigades w ere co n c e n tra te d . These n ew ly -fo rm ed brigades m ade up o f elem ents fro m d iffe re n t regions an d n o t y e t co n so lid ated in to fighting un its capable o f o p eratin g in d e p e n d e n tly , w ere th ro w n in to co n fu sio n fo r a tim e and su ffered heavy losses. T h ey co u ld n o t h alt th e <icrm an offensive, b u t by courageous fighting w hen alm ost co rn ered , b y increasingly skilful m anoeuvring and feinting die p artisan forces did succeed in evading the traps laid for ill cm and slipping aw ay to o th e r districts w here th ey w ere able to re-form . The G erm an p lan for th e w in ter cam paign o f 1943-44 was i'i co -ordinate th e ir prelim in ary atta c k s in such a w ay as to ill ivc th e bulk o f th e partisan force in to th e so u th an d th en , i u llin g o ff th e ir re tre a t, to su rro u n d a n d an n ih ilate th em in I lie V lora, B erat, K o ra triangle. O n J a n u a ry 7, th ree G erm an divisions, w ith th e ir usual c o m p le m e n t o f co llab o rato rs, < Iv.UI ced from th re e d iffe re n t p o in ts to carry o u t th e second, h bum an d -d estro y , p a rt o f the plan in th e so u th e rn region. In .......... . icratio n th e in te rio r districts w ere ravaged, th e villages tinI tow ns on w hich th e partisans d ep e n d ed w ere ca p lin * 'I and p u t to flam es an d h u n d re d s o f peasants w ere In ill illy m u rd ered in ty p ical N azi fashion. 67

A n u m b e r o t fierce ru n n in g engagem ents w ere fought b etw een G erm an tro o p s and th e L ib era tio n forces o f the F irst and F o u rth Brigades. T he partisans k e p t falling b ack to avoid a decisive ac tio n o n th e e n e m y s term s and by break in g th ro u g h the advancing lines an d th e n attac k in g from th e rear succeeded in keeping th e G erm an offensive o ff balance. On J a n u a ry 21 th e b lo o d iest b a ttle o f this stage o f th e w ar was fo u g h t at T enda-e-Q ypit, th e T e n t o f J a rs, n ear P erm et. T w o b a tta lio n s o f the F irst Brigade and th e S krapari guerrilla d e ta c h m e n t rushed dow n from o p p o site directions on Nazi tro o p s try in g to close th e ring and p u t th em to flight. A n o th e r G erm an division was b ro u g h t up fro m G reece to co m p lete th e encirclem en t. T h ro u g h heavy snow , across sw ollen rivers, alw ays a tta c k in g in spite o f priv atio n s and sh ortage o f a m m u n itio n , the First and F o u rth B rigades, s u p p o rte d by o th e r p artisan elem ents and b y local groups o f arm ed peasants, co n sisten tly o u t-m an o eu v red and o u t-fo u g h t th e n um erically su p erio r an d b e tte r eq u ip p ed forces o f the W ehrm acht. Each tim e the G erm ans th o u g h t th e y h ad finished o ff a co m p an y o f partisans and began m oving aw ay to a n o th e r sector, th o se finished o ff partisans w o u ld rise up to a tta c k th e ir flanks and rear. A dvancing to w ard V lora w here resistance was th o u g h t to be w eaker, th e G erm ans u n ex p e cted ly e n c o u n te re d a new brigade, th e S ix th , o n e o f th ree new fighting un its fo rm e d in th e very h e a t o f b attle. In the second h a lf o f F eb ru a ry , 1944, th e brigades and territo ria l b a tta lio n s h ad so successfully w a rd ed o ff th e various prongs o f th e G erm an offensive th a t th e y w ere in a p o sitio n to co u n te r-a tta c k . T h ree b attalio n s o f th e F irst Brigade led by M ehrnet S hehu stru c k back n o rth in to central A lb an ia and su d d en ly ap p eared in the n e ig h b o u rh o o d of T irana, creating a serious diversion b eh in d th e enem y lines. It b ecam e increasingly d ifficu lt fo r th e G erm ans to m aintain th e ir offensive in th e face o f p artisan fo rm atio n s w hich kept springing in to ac tio n w here th e y w ere n o t su p p o sed to be; a n d th ree m o n th s a fte r it began th e furious on slau g h t o f the G erm an w in te r cam paign was over. T his cam paign h a d th o ro u g h ly te ste d th e people of A lb an ia an d th eir L ib era tio n A rm y, finding th em at th e end m o re u n ited and m o re d eterm in e d th a n ever to fight on till 68

final v icto ry . C lose links b etw een C o m m u n ist P arty , L iber a tio n A rm y an d th e peo p le from w hom th ey h ad sprung and fo r w hom th e y fo u g h t ensured th e c o n tin u e d g ro w th o f the resistance m o v em en t in spite o f th e en o rm o u s odds against w hich th e y struggled. T he p eo p le show ed them selves u n w avering in th e ir devotion to th e cause o f n atio n al in d e p e n d ence, pro v id in g th e partisan d e ta c h m e n ts w ith fo o d and c lo th in g in a tim e o f terrib le scarcity and o fte n , w ith w hatever w eapons th e y could find, taking an active p a rt in th e fighting b y harassing th e G erm an convoys. In the cities, to o , peo p le show ed th e sam e stead fast spirit u n d er th e m o st b ru ta l acts o f repression b y H itle rs arm y o f to rtu re rs an d killers. T h o u san d s o f p a trio ts, b o th co m m u n ist and n o n -c o m m u n ist, p artisans w ho h ad com e in to the tow ns for m edical tre a tm e n t and o rd in ary citizens w ho h ad dared to express th eir sy m p ath y fo r th e lib e ra tio n struggle w ere ro u n d e d up an d sen t o ff to th e ex te rm in a tio n cam ps at P rishtina, B elgrade o r B uchenw ald itself. T he Balli K o m b e ta r traito rs w ere p artic u la rly useful to th e G erm ans in p o in tin g o u t p atrio ts. O n th e night o f F eb ru a ry 4 alone th e quisling police, on th e a u th o rity o f th e co llab o ratio n ist M inister o f I lie In terio r X hafer Deva and acting u n d er the d irectio n o f the Nazi ca p tain , Langer, dragged 84 citizens o f T irana o u t o f their beds an d b u tc h e re d them in fro n t o f th eir hom es. T w o young w o m en , Bule Naipi and P ersephone K o k ed h im a cap tu red a n d q u estio n ed b y th e gestapo in G jiro k astra, und erw en t days an d days o f to rtu re w ith o u t revealing a single ih'in o f in fo rm atio n useful to th e G erm ans. A t last th e y w ere tlu g g cd o u t, already m ore dead th a n alive, an d hanged in the Mjiiarc bearing th e nam e o f C eriz T opulli th e h ero o f an i iii lier lib eratio n struggle. T he w in ter cam paign h ad d e m o n stra te d th e basic correctIII '.:. o f th e s tru c tu re o f the L ib era tio n A rm y an d th e ......... Iness o f its tactics. Having w ith sto o d th e assault th e y V i nl over to th e offensive th ro u g h o u t th e so u th e rn h alf o f V Albania, F arly in M arch forces o f th e F irst B rigade and th e Mi'uhil C ollak B attalio n n am ed fo r o n e o f A lb an ias heroes, t in iii led a large n u m b e r o f irregular enem y fo rm a tio n s near Imh I,,i and fo rced th em to su rren d er. A few w eeks la te r tw o bullulions o f th e F o u rth Brigade sm ashed a stro n g G erm an 69

fo rce in th e Devolli region. T he F ifth and S ix th B rigades, having elim inated Balli K o m b ta r c o n c en tratio n s along the V lora-S evaster highw ay, suddenly lau n ch e d sw ift attac k s in th e v icin ity o f V lo ra and inside th e city itself taking the G erm ans co m p letely b y surprise. In A pril th e G eneral S ta ff o f th e L ib era tio n A rm y issued an o rd e r co -ordinating these actions in a general spring cam paign. A tta c k everyw here the b arb aro u s G erm ans. M ake s h o rt w o rk o f traito rs. H it the vital centres o f th e enem y. D em olish dep o ts and b arrack s; blow up bridges and d estro y ro ad s; a tta c k a n d lib era te th e co u n try sid e and cities o f o u r belo v ed A lbania. T he destin y o f th e F a th e rla n d is in y o u r h ands. T he fate o f o u r p eople is b o u n d up w ith y o u r w eapons! F o llow ing on th is o rd e r elem ents o f th e F irst and F o u rth B rigade lib e ra te d P ograde afte r a tw e n ty -fo u r h o u r b a ttle in w h ich th e G erm ans su ffered heavy losses. T he S eventh B rigade fo rced th e enem y tro o p s in th e n eig h b o u rh o o d o f B erat to sh u t them selves inside th e city an d w hen th e y w ere o rd e re d o u t to try to re c a p tu re lo st g round th e partisans engaged th em in a seven day b a ttle ending in a serious G erm an defeat. A reserve force o f G erm ans was su rp rised on th e b anks o f th e O sum i R iver and le ft b e h in d m an y dead and co n sid erab le q u a n titie s o f arm s and am m u n itio n . E ngagem ents w ere also fo u g h t in cen tral A lbania at P eza an d K ruja an d even in th e n o rth e rn highlands w here it was th e n possible fo r th e partisans to e x te n d th e ir op eratio n s. A new brigade, th e E ighth, was fo rm ed in th e course o f th ese n atio n -w id e attac k s w hich lib era te d vast areas from enem y c o n tro l. O n M ay 9 th e F ifth B rigade am b u sh ed a large G erm an convoy com ing fro m G reece a n d head in g fo r P erm et, in flictin g heavy casualties a n d cap tu rin g m u ch m aterial. O n M ay 24, 1944, th e A nti-fascist N a tio n al L ib eratio n Congress m e t in th e lib e ra te d c ity o f P erm et. T he 200 delegates rep resen tin g th e w hole p o p u la tio n su p p o rtin g th e lib e ra tio n w ar w ere draw n from th e ranks o f rev o lu tio n ary co m m u n ists an d sincere n atio n alists, w o rk ers, peasants and in tellectu als, m en an d w om en, p artisan fighters and political ag itato rs o p eratin g b e h in d th e enem y lines in th e first g enuinely d em o cratic elec tio n ever h eld in A lbania. The 70

C o m m ittee chosen b y th e A nti-fascist C ouncil elec ted b y th e Congress was recognised as th e provisional governm ental executive. T h e S ecretary G eneral o f th e C entral C om m ittee o f th e C o m m u n ist P arty o f A lbania, Enver H oxha, was elected C hairm an o f this C om m ittee. T h e C ongress d ecided to set up divisions and arm y corps in th e N atio n al L ib era tio n A rm y an d th e fo rm a tio n o f th e F irst S to rm D ivision was an n o u n ced . E nver H o x h a was a p p o in ted C o m m ander-in-C hief o f th e A rm y. N o t only was it u n a n i m o u sly agreed th a t th e lib e ra tio n w ar against th e foreign aggressor m ust b e in ten sified till th e last fascist soldier had b een ex p elled b u t also th a t h o stilities sh o u ld n o t cease b efo re th e co m p lete d e s tru c tio n o f all co llab o ratio n ist organisations like Balli K o m b ta r and L egaliteti. All th e p o litical and econom ic agreem ents w hich th e Zog go v ern m en t h a d en te re d in to w ith foreign states w ere an n u lled as being against th e in terests o f th e A lbanian p eo p le and it was fu rth e r decided to b ar th e re tu rn o f A hm ed Zog w ho h a d alw ays p lo tte d w ith ex tern al pow ers to secure his p o sitio n in A lbania. N o o th e r g o v e rn m e n t fo rm e d eith er w ith in o r o u tsid e th e c o u n try was to be recognised as long as the A nti-fascist N a tio n al L ib era tio n C ouncil, p o p u larly elected by all th e forces p a rtic ip a tin g in th e lib era tio n struggle, rem ain ed in existence. T he N atio n al L ib era tio n C ouncil th u s becam e th e Provisional D e m o cratic G o v e rn m en t o f th e A lbanian state, liorn o f th e rev o lu tio n ary lib e ra tio n w ar u n d er the leadership oI th e C o m m u n ist P arty . It was d em o cratic in re la tio n to the po p u lar forces in struggle w hich h ad b ro u g h t it in to being iml d ictato rial in re la tio n to all th e enem ies o f lib e ra tio n w ithin an d w ith o u t a d em o cratic d ictato rsh ip o f the people, h o ld in g w ith in itself in e m b ry o th e d ictato rsh ip of the w orking class w hich w ould begin to establish a socialist Nociety w h en A lb an ia was freed. T he Peza C o n feren ce h a d laid th e fo u n d a tio n s o f th e new nl.it e pow er. T he L ab in o t C onference cen tralised this state pow er and p ro claim ed it u n iq u ely au th o ritativ e. T he P erm et Congress, having ro o te d political p o w e r in th e re v o lu tio n ary I" ople, fo u n d ed th e A lbanian P e o p le s D em ocratic S ta te. Its ili i iNions w ere th e basis o f th e state c o n stitu tio n .

B efore ad jo u rn m e n t th e C ongress re-affirm ed its allegiance to th e S oviet-A nglo-A m erican alliance an d sent greetings to th e heads o f th re e great pow ers S talin, C hurchill and R oosevelt. B ut it also publicly d en o u n c ed th e a tte m p ts o f th e U n ited S tates and B ritish allies to in terfe re in th e in tern al affairs o f A lbania. T he tim e w hen A lbania can be used as a m ed iu m o f exchange in in te rn a tio n a l bargaining is gone fo r ev e r. W hile th e C ongress o f P erm et was still in session th e G erm ans, ju s t th re e m o n th s a fte r th e collapse o f th eir w in te r cam paign, began th e ir last great offensive to crush resistance in A lbania. This final e ffo rt was d ic ta te d p a rtly b y the m ilitary n ecessity o f suppressing th e arm ed struggle to ensure th e free m o v em en t o f G erm an tro o p s b etw e en G reece and Y ugoslavia on th e eve o f th eir re tre a t from th e B alkans and p a rtly b y sheer vindictiveness against a p eo p le w ho h a d fru s tra te d th eir m ilitary plans and h u m iliate d th em o n th e field o f b attle. D uring th e last tw o w eeks in M ay a force o f som e 3 5 ,0 0 0 m en was assem bled, m ade u p o f th e divisions w hich had tak en p a rt in th e w in te r offensive stren g th en e d b y th e F irst D ivision o f m o u n ta in tro o p s b ro u g h t up from G reece. T he quisling g o v ern m en t supplied 1 5 ,0 0 0 d esperate p u p p e t tro o p s w hose fa te was now co m p letely lin k ed w ith th e suc cess o r failure o f th e invaders. On M ay 28, th e final day o f th e P erm et C ongress, th e m assive a tta c k against th e lib era te d zones o f th e so u th was lau n ch ed . T h ough th e G erm an force was larger and su p p o rte d by heavier arm o u r and m ore aircraft th a n in th e w in te r o ffe n sive, th e N ational L ib era tio n A rm y h ad increased its ow n nu m b ers and fighting spirit to a relatively g reater degree. T h ere w ere th e n 3 6 ,0 0 0 partisans m o st o f w hom h ad b ecom e seasoned guerrilla fighters ex p erien ced in b o th th e defensive an d offensive o p eratio n s o f p e o p le s w ar. In th e first tw o w eeks o f th e J u n e offensive th e partisans su ffered 500 casualties an d m ore th a n 1,000 p easan t m en, w o m en an d children w ere m u rd ered . B ut over 3 ,0 0 0 G erm an an d c o llab o ratio n ist officers and m en w ere killed in th e sam e p erio d . A n d th e re w ere th o u san d s o f v o lu n teers to replace th e p artisans w ho fell in b a ttle . N o w h ere did th e fascist forces succeed in carrying o u t the

plan o f elim in atin g th e lib era tio n un its. A G erm an colum n com ing from G reece by w ay o f B ilisht did succeed in over ru n n in g th e lib era te d zone o f Devolli. B ut a n o th e r colum n advancing fro m Elbasan to jo in th e G erm an forces aro u n d K o ra was b ro u g h t to a sh attere d h a lt in a surprise a tta c k by th e F irst B rigade at the M oglica Bridge. A G erm an co lu m n in te n d e d to a tta c k th e F irst B rigade from th e re ar never m ade c o n ta c t at all and a fo u rth colum n settin g o u t fro m B erat was so b ad ly m au led b y th e S eventh and T w elfth Brigades th a t it h ad to w ith d raw to B erat again. T h e second phase o f th e offensive sta rte d on J u n e 5 w ith th ree G erm an co lum ns m arching o u t from K ora. B ut p a rti sans o f th e F irst D ivision w ere lying in w ait all along th e line o f m arch. F ro m D ushari M o u n tain across th e S erp e n t Pass to S hem berdhej th e p artisan forces fo u g h t a fierce ru n n in g b attle killing 1 50 G erm ans fo r th e loss o f only 22 partisans. The Seventh and T w elfth Brigades drove back G erm an forces advancing to w a rd th e T e n t o f Ja rs w ith a b a y o n e t charge. All o p eratio n s in th e K ora, B erat, E lbasan th e a tre having failed, th e G erm an divisions tu rn e d to w ard S aranda, V lora and G jiro k astra in th e so u th , th ro w in g m ore th a n 2 0 ,0 0 0 troops in to this th ru st. T he S ixth Brigade a tta c k e d G erm an lorces on fo u r successive days along th e V lora-S aranda ro ad , com p letely d isru p tin g th e ir advance. T he m ain w eight o f th e offensive was th ro w n in to the V lora-G jirokastra zo n e on J u n e I ; b u t th e N a tio n al L ib era tio n A rm y h ad a n tic ip a te d ju s t such an assault a n d su p p o rte d by v o lu n teers fro m th e local p o p u latio n b lu n te d and tu rn e d b ack every p ro n g o f th e <icrm an attac k . T he L ib eratio n A rm y co m m an d did n o t rem a in on the defensive du rin g th is early sum m er cam paign. In response to I lie call fo r in ten sified w ar fro m th e C ongress o f P e rm e t it li.nl been p lan n ed th a t th e F irst S torm Division w o u ld strik e iiMiihward b e y o n d th e S h k u m b in i R iver to w ard th e en d o f 11iti<*( and th e decision to p ro c eed w ith this o p e ra tio n even While ihe G erm an offensive in th e so u th was a t its h eig h t (noved to be a b rillia n t stroke. A n the F irst D ivision drove n o rth th ro u g h cen tral A lb an ia ( I I I v w ere g reeted en th u siastically by th e peo p le an d soon H *W groups o f fig h tin g m en jo in e d in th e advance. W hen the 73

G erm ans h ea rd o f this force, th e y th o u g h t at first th a t it was m ad e u p o f fleeing re m n a n ts o f th e L ib era tio n A rm y th a t was su p p o sed to have been sh a tte re d in th e so u th . B ut as one en em y stro n g h o ld afte r a n o th e r fell to th e partisans and w hole areas w ere lib era te d , th e G erm ans h ad q uickly to ab a n d o n th eir ab o rtiv e cam paign in th e so u th and pull th eir forces back to try to c o u n te r th e th re a t o f th e F irst Division w hich was jo in e d in th e lib era tio n o f th e central an d n o rth e rn d istrict by th e n ew ly-form ed S econd S to rm D ivision. While th e region a ro u n d D ibra was being cleared o f th e last o f the Balli K o m b e ta r elem en ts, this seco n d Division suddenly ap p eared in th e suburbs o f th e capital city itself, d isru p tin g co m m u n icatio n s b etw een T iran a an d th e re st o f th e c o u n try . These tw o divisions w ere th e n in c o rp o ra te d in to a y e t g reater m ilitary u n it, th e F irst A rm y C orps, an d m arched triu m p h a n tly in to th e last b a stio n o f in tern a l re actio n , the feu d al regions o f n o rth e rn A lbania. T he p eople o f th e inac cessible m o u n ta in o u s d istrict a ro u n d M irdita h ad been le ft fo r centuries in ignorance an d iso latio n , having resisted T u rk ish o cc u p a tio n at th e cost o f being c u t o ff in th e ir rug ged fastnesses fro m any c o n ta c t w ith the o u tsid e w orld. T hey w ere h o p efu lly regarded by the co llab o rato rs as likely to resist th e partisans w ith th e sam e stu b b o rn n ess. In stea d these p ro u d b u t b ack w ard m o u n tain eers w ere soon w on over by th e courage and p a trio tism o f th e lib e ra tio n fighters. T he n o rth was freed an d on ly th e palace o f th e u ltra-reac tio n a ry c h ieftain , J o h n M arkagjon, was d e stro y e d as an in d icatio n th a t p atria rch al, feudal rule was en d e d an d M irdita, like o th e r re m o te parts o f th e c o u n try , was to p a rtic ip a te fully in the n ew in d e p e n d e n t A lbania. W ith th e G erm an forces divided an d d istra c te d b y this cam paign o f th e F irst A rm y C orps, th e T w e lfth an d F o u r te e n th Brigades lib e ra te d S aranda and cleared th e w hole coastal region in th e south. In S ep tem b er B erat an d Gjirok astra w ere lib e ra te d . T he F o u rte e n th a n d N in e te e n th Brigades drove th e G erm ans o u t o f V lo ra w hile th e S econd an d N in th B rigades drove to w a rd K o r a w hich was lib era te d o n O c to b e r 24. O nly E lbasan, D urrs, T iran a a n d S h k o d ra still rem ain ed in en em y hands. T he N atio n al L ib era tio n A rm y , now n u m b erin g 70,000 74

fighters, o f w h o m nearly 6 ,0 0 0 w ere w om en, was p a rt o f the great in tern a tio n al anti-fascist force w hich was rolling back th e Nazis on every fro n t. T he A lbanian co m m and had no in te n tio n o f w aitin g fo r th e G erm ans, defeated elsew here, sim ply to be w ith d raw n from th e co u n try . T he T w e n ty -first and T w en ty -seco n d C orps o f th e W ehrm acht still had to be b ro u g h t from G reece across A lbania and o u t b y w ay o f Yugoslavia to tak e p art in the d efence o f G erm any itself. T he N ational L ib eratio n A rm y was d eterm in e d to follow up the v ictorious cam paigns w hich had already liberated th ree fo u rth s o f th e c o u n try b y striking heavy blow s at the G erm an tro o p s m oving n o rth an d at th o se still holding o u t in a few cities and strong p o in ts to try to secure th e m a safe passage th ro u g h th e co u n try . By co n tin u in g to fight w ith th e sam e fe ro c ity w hich had b ro k en th e G erm an grip o n A lbania the partisans were discharging th e ir in tern a tio n al obligations to o th e r people engaged w ith th e sam e enem y. It was in these circum stances o f having nearly co n cluded triu m p h an tly th e w ar o f lib era tio n th a t the second m eeting o f th e N a tio n al C ouncil was h eld in lib e ra te d B erat on O c to b e r 20. T h e assem bly was faced n o t only w ith th e task of finally co m p letin g th e v icto rio u s struggle b u t also w ith all Ilie p o litical, eco n o m ic an d social problem s o f a free b u t war-ravaged state. The C ouncil to o k th e form al decision o f tran sfo rm in g the Anti-fascist N a tio n al C o m m ittee in to th e D em o cratic G overn m ent o f A lb an ia w ith Enver Ilo x h a as Prim e M inister and Minister o f N atio n al D efence. Eleven governm ent d ep a rtm en ts were set u p , th e m o st im p o rta n t bein g th o se co n c ern e d w ith tin resto ratio n o f th e ec o n o m ic and cultural life o f th e lo im try . T h e G o v e rn m en t assum ed the re sp o n sib ility o f m c,uiising, as so o n as co n d itio n s p e rm itte d , d em o cratic i 'It i lions fo r a c o n s titu e n t assem bly w hich w o u ld d ra ft a i mi in I i t h tio n fo r th e n ew A lbanian state. B ut w ith o u t w aiting fill such an assem bly th e C onference approved u n an im o u sly tin D eclaration on th e R ights o f C itizens w hich g u aran teed Piiiiiilily b efo re th e law, freed o m o f speech, of. press, of |(ll|',iMii and conscience, equal rights fo r m en an d w o m en in l*i1 111 eco n o m ic life an d social activities, th e right o f secret Htlil d irect voting and th e rig h t to elect a n d be elected fo r all 75

perso n s over 18 years o f age, th e right o f p e titio n in g all g o v ern m en t bodies, th e right o f appeal and so fo rth . All fascist and pro-fascist organisations w ere p ro h ib ite d . T he local N ational L iberation C ouncils w hich had been organs o f b o th th e g o v ernm ent an d the N ational L ib eratio n F ro n t, w ere th e n c e fo rth to fu n c tio n solely as governm ental organs o f th e p e o p le s d em o cratic p o w er and th e N atio n al L ib er a tio n F ro n t w o u ld create its ow n sep arate m ass org an isatio n s o f w o rk ers, o f w om en, o f y o u th . A few days a fte r th e B erat C o n feren ce, on O c to b e r 25, 19 4 4 , th e N atio n al L ib era tio n A rm y began its last great b a ttle in th e anti-fascist w ar th e lib e ra tio n o f th e capital c ity o f T irana. This was th e cu lm in atio n o f p e o p le s w ar, th e p o in t a t w hich fro m isolated attac k s by guerrilla bands progressing to a co n flic t o f rapid m o v em en t in o rd e r to engage w ith o u t crippling losses an enem y superior in n um bers an d eq u ip m e n t it was finally possible to m eet the foe in full scale fro n ta l w ar. It was fittin g th a t this set piece o f T ira n a s lib e ra tio n should be u n d e rta k e n by th e F irst S torm D ivision co m m an d e d b y M ajor G eneral M ehm et Shehu. T h e G erm ans h ad begun m oving n o rth to S h k o d ra b u t th e y h ad le ft a full division to h o ld T iran a till the last o f th eir forces h ad been w ith d raw n fro m G reece. D uring th e first n ig h t o f th e a tta c k a b o u t h a lf o f th e city fell in to th e hands o f th e p artisan b a tta lio n s and th e w h o le p o p u la tio n o f T iran a rose to h elp in th e h ero ic struggle against tan k s, arm o u red cars and enem y-held bunkers. T hey k e p t th e p artisan forces in fo rm ed o f enem y m ovem ents and supplied them w ith fo o d an d d rin k th ro u g h o u t th e fierce b a ttle . O n th e n e x t day th e fighting reached th e cen tre o f to w n and the sta ff o f th e First D ivision m oved its h ea d q u arters inside th e city. F ro m th a t stage th e lib e ra tio n p ro c eed e d d esperately from s tre e t to stre e t, fro m b arricade to b arricade an d o fte n from h o u se to house. V ery heavy fighting raged aro u n d the M osque o f S ulejm an Bargjini, w here a m o n u m e n t m arks to d a y o n e o f th e b lo o d iest en c o u n te rs o f th e w hole struggle. F o r th e n e x t 12 days the b a ttle w e n t o n incessantly w ith fierce a tta c k s a n d c o u n ter-attac k s, every b lo ck b itte rly c o n te ste d . A t th e height o f th e fighting th e p o sitio n o f th e partisans 76

in th e city was th re a te n e d b y a Nazi division advancing on T ira n a from E lbasan. O th e r brigades d etailed to o p erate in th e vicin ity o f th e capital w ere h astily assem bled and th ro w n against th e G erm an relief colum n o f m ore th a n 3 ,0 0 0 m en. A t M ushqetas on N ovem ber 13 and 14 this G erm an division was sm ashed an d ro u te d . T h en , on th e m orn in g o f N ovem ber 17, T iran a was co m p letely lib e ra te d a fte r 19 days o f the h ard est fighting o f th e war. M ore th a n 2,000 G erm an officers and m en w ere k illed an d th e re st w ere tak en p riso n er; 25 can n o n an d 1,000 heavy m achine guns w ere c a p tu re d ; over 200 tanks and arm o u red cars w ere d e stro y e d o r tak en . T he partisans su ffered o nly 41 7 casualties in killed an d w o u n d e d ; b u t h u n d red s o f civilians w ere lined up against walls and sh o t as th e G erm ans re tre a te d from one p a rt o f the city to an o th er. T h e u tte r d e fe a t o f th e G erm an forces in T irana p u t an end to th e H itler te rro r and p ractically e n d e d the war. W hat was left o f th e Nazi arm ies fled n o rth to S h k o d ra w here the p artisans p re p are d to a tta c k them . H ow ever, th e G erm ans had lo st all taste fo r fighting th e A lbanians. T hey blew up th e larger bridges a n d p u lled o u t o f to w n during th e night, (Tossing th e fro n tie r in to Y ugoslavia w ith h ord es o f c o lla b o r ators trailing along w ith them . A t daw n o n N ovem ber 29 th e partisan brigades e n te re d S h k o d ra w ith o u t firing a sh o t and .ill A lbania h ad b een cleared o f th e last o f th e fascist invaders.

A LB A N IA AND T H E POST-W AR W ORLD

Chapter Eight
R esults o f th e War in A lbania; R elations w ith B ritain an d o th e r co u n tries; T he S truggle against Y ugoslavia A lb an ia m ade a considerable c o n trib u tio n to th e A llied v icto ry over th e fascist pow ers in p ro p o rtio n to its size, a trem e n d o u s c o n trib u tio n . D uring the p a trio tic w ar A lbania k e p t p in n ed do w n 1 0 0,000 Italian and 7 0,000 G erm an soldiers. T he N ational L ib era tio n A rm y in flicted on these tw o invading forces casualties o f 2 6 ,5 9 4 killed, 2 1 ,2 4 5 w o u n d e d an d som e 2 0 ,0 0 0 c a p tu re d th u s elim inating from th e w ar m ore than 6 8 ,6 0 0 officers an d m en. O ver 2,000 tanks an d arm o u red cars w ere c a p tu re d o r d estro y e d ; m ore th an 4 ,0 0 0 can n o n , m o rtars and m achine guns w ere w rested fro m th e enem y for th e use o f partisans and upw ards o f 200 arms d ep o ts w ere b lo w n up. T hese serious blow s against th e en em y w ere n o t in flicted w ith o u t great losses to the A lbanian people. C o u n tin g only th o se w hose death s w ere directly due to enem y ac tio n there w ere 2 8 ,0 0 0 killed o r over 214% o f th e p o p u la tio n . In p ro p o rtio n to its size A lbania lost in th e w ar th ree tim es as m any p eople as B ritain an d 17 tim es as m any as the U nited S tates. In m ilitary losses 1 1 ,0 0 0 partisans w ere killed in ac tio n o r 1% o f the p o p u latio n . O nly th e S oviet U nion h a d a higher percentage o f peo p le w o unded, and 4 4 ,5 0 0 A lbanians w ere im p riso n ed o r d ep o rte d . M aterial dam age was also staggering. M ore th a n a th ird o f all h ab ita tio n s an d , indeed, o f all buildings o f any kind, w ere to ta lly d estro y e d . M ore th a n a th ird o f the livestock was b u tc h e re d o r stolen an d the sam e p ro p o rtio n o f fru it trees an d vineyards h ad b een ruined. N early all th e m ines, p o rts, roads an d especially bridges w ere w recked, an d n o t a single in d u strial p la n t was in w orking order. 78

B ut in sp ite o f th ese losses A lb an ia cam e o u t o f th e w ar w ith certain very great advantages for facing th e problem s ahead. F o r th e first tim e in h isto ry th e A lbanian p eople e n jo y ed an in d ep en d e n ce w hich co u ld n o t be ta k e n fro m th em because th e y h a d w on it them selves w ith o u t any o u tsid e h elp . A n d as a peo p le th e y w ere u n ite d as never b efo re and w o u ld be able to bring to th e fo rm id ab le tasks o f re sto rin g an d developing th eir c o u n try th e sam e u n ity w hich h ad en ab led th em to d e fe a t vastly su p erio r enem ies. T he p e o p le s w ar w hich h a d freed th em fro m ex tern al aggression h ad also lifted fro m th e ir backs th e in te rn a l oppression o f re a c tio n a ry forces w hich co u ld have m ade th eir v ic to ry hollow . A lbania had m ore th a n its share o f heroes and m arty rs in th e anti-fascist w ar b u t unlike so m any o th e r co u n tries th e y d id n o t die in vain. T ravelling a b o u t th e c o u n try to d a y o n e finds everyw here records o f th e epic struggle o f th e A lbanian people. Each to w n has its m o n u m en ts to local heroes and heroines and its re v o lu tio n ary m u seum to keep fresh th e m em o ry o f the sacrifice o f a w h o le gen eratio n to secure A lb an ias n atio n al in d ep en d en ce and socialist fu tu re . T h ey do n o t in te n d to forget th e co st o f freed o m an d every achievem ent in creating a p ro sp ero u s an d ju s t society is a trib u te to those w ho fo u g h t to set A lbania o n its p re se n t course. T he d e te rm in a tio n to d efen d th eir hard-w on freed o m and Ilie social u n ity forged in th e h e a t o f struggle w ere to be challenged, b o th b y A lb an ias tw o n earest neighbours and by B ritain and th e U n ite d S tates, even b efo re th e last sh o t in th e lib eratio n w ar was fired. T o ap p reciate th e fo u n d a tio n s o f Ihis u n ity an d h o w it was fo stered in th e early days o f the IV oples R ep u b lic th u s provides a k ey to th e u n d ersta n d in g of A lbanias im m ed iate post-w ar h isto ry . ^ m As has b e e n s t ^ w m t h e C o m m u n ist P arty H rm nnstri^frl iis i .n iarilv rTTTr^TTrshjpo f t h e l i b e r a ^ i o n r r ^ .jll Ihc nat.riot.ic an d a n d -fa s c is t^ T o ^ e s o f th e c o u n try i n ~ .mi'lc N atio n al L ib era tio n F m n t. This F ro n t in clu d ed the w orking class, p o o r an d m iddle p easan ts, th e sm all city bourgeoisie, p a trio tic in tellectu als and even som e n a tio n al bourgeoisie w ho h a d already b efo re th e w ar b een th re a te n e d with an n ih ilatio n b y foreign capital. T he p ea san try , as b y far

^ t h e largest section o f th e p o p u la tio n in a c o u n try w here 87% o f th e p eople w ere engaged in ag ricu ltu re, was th e largest social grouping in th e L ib eratio n F ro n t and th e principal so u rce o f re c ru itm e n t fo r th e L ib e ra tio n A rm y. T he p n litir^ l b a s ^ o fd ie ^ J F ro n tw a s ^ h c ^ ^ ^ w o rking class, w ith th e w o r k i n ^ T I ^ s ^ ^ j E SM StL3ltiri.iJ f5 r c ? ^ r ^ tfu rjv v I! oIe*'*co'alition o f classes m obilised in t h e i resistance. ih e ^ w o rk in g class at th e beginning o f the w ar was very sm all, to tallin g only a b o u t 1 5,000 o r 13% o f th e p o p u latio n . It was also in ex p erien ced since th ere had n o t been enough d ev elo p m en t o f in d u stry fo r an in dustrialised p ro le ta ria t, tem p ered in class struggle w ith em p lo y ers, to have com e in to being. H ow ever, from 1941 w orkers h ad th eir ow n M arxistL eninist p a rty th e A lbanian C o m m u n ist P arty, su b seq u en tly n am ed th e P arty o f L a b o u r o L A lbania^. A Nlarxlst-Leninist. n a rtv represents the distilled experience o f f i w orkers generally in the rev o lu tio n ary struggle to e m an c ip ate * them selves an d in doing so to end all_(onns_of e x p lo ita tio n, i h e A lbanian w ork in g class m a tu re d an d grew in size u n d er th e leadership o f a M arxist-L eninist p a rty and was th u s eq u ip p ed alm o st fro m its beginnings w ith a c o rre c t p ro letaria n ideology. T h e in terests o f any ex p lo itin g class are necessarily exclusive w hile the in terests o f the w ork in g class, in cluding in th e A lbanian situ a tio n , n o t on ly n atio n al in d ep en d en ce b u t also th e elim in atio n o f e x p lo ita tio n in a genuine p o p u la r dem o cracy , co u ld em brace the real interests o f peasants, p e tty bourgeoisie and intellectuals. . * T o w in th ese o th e r se c tio ns and classes for an alliance w ith th e w orking class t h e / f n p stage o f th e A lbanian rev o lu tio n was lim ited to ju s t th o s^ g o als w hich all p a trio tic forces could s u p p o rt th e d e fe a t o f th e invaders an d the vesting o f state p o w er in th e p eo p le am ong w hom th e w o rk in g class p lay ed a leading b u t n o t co n tro llin g role. T h e fecoirtl stage, d istin ct b u t n o t separate from th e first, w o u ld b e g ln w h e n these goals h ad been achieved a n d w o u ld carry th e re v o lu tio n o n to the bu ilding o f socialism u n d er the d ictato rsh ip o f th e w orking class w hich alone can bar any re tu rn o f capitalist e x p lo it a tio n . B ut b y this stage th e w orking class w o u ld n o t on ly be m u ch m ore ex p erien ced b u t also w ould have increased its 80

n u m b ers b y all th e peasants an d o th e r sections o f the p o p u la tio n w h o h a d b ecom e p ro leta rian ised th ro u g h th eir service as p artisan s u n d er th e leadership o f a w o rk e rs p a rty . A w orking class u n d er th e d ire c t guidance o f its ow n M arxist-L en in ist p a rty ceases to b e sim ply a class-m -itself and acquires th e p o litical consciousness w hich m akes it a cla.ssE l tsel_with_its ow n ideology the ideology o f socialism as o p p o sed to th e ideology o f capitalism . Peasants, intellectuals and o th e rs w n o , m ro u g n sucn e x perience as a lib era tio n w ar u n d er M arx istrlx n in istic aclersh ip ! a d o p t the ideoiom_aLll3e

T h e C o m m u n ist P arty rallied aro u n d it all w ho w ere p rep ared to resist and since th e L ib era tio n War le ft n o co rn er o f A lbania u n to u c h e d , h o w ever re m o te , all sections o f so ciety w ere fo rced so o n er o r la te r to declare them selves. T h ere was n o m id d le g ro u n d b etw e en p a trio tic forces and o u t-an d -o u t co llab o rato rs, and m o st o f th e la tte r w ho h ad n o t b een d ea lt w ith by p artisan s in th e course o f th e w ar fled w ith th e re tre a tin g fascist tro o p s. R eligious leaders o f the three faiths in A lbania, p re d o m in a n tly M uslim b u t w ith som e R om an C ath o licism in th e n o rth and G reek O rth o d o x y in the so u th , h a d also, fo r th e m o st p a rt, co lla b o ra te d w ith eith er the Italian o r G erm an invaders, and th ey , to o , le ft the c o u n try , or, if th e y rem ain ed , w ere largely d iscred ited in the eyes o f th e ir erstw h ile flocks. _ A d istin c tio n w ithin A lbanian society w hich w estern co m m en tato rs em phasise, b etw een th e G hegs o f th e feudal n o rth and th e T o sk s o f th e so u th w here bourgeois influence Irom Italy an d o th e r parts o f E u ro p e h ad been stro n g er, was w eakened d u rin g th e struggle in w hich n o rth and so u th w ere united. As th e p e o p le s d em o cracy afte r th e w ar began weeping aw ay th e rem n an ts o f b o th feudal and bourgeois, N oeial custom s a n d h ab its, this differen ce, w hich no longer llud a class basis an yw ay, te n d e d to disap p ear alto g eth er. Thel A lbanian p eo p le cam e o u t o f th e w ar w ith a u n ity fewl ii.itions can have en jo y ed . T h ey w ere going to n eed it. British im p erialism s in tere st in A lbania dates b ack to 1924 when Z ogs invasion o f A lbania h a d the backing o f certain Hi 1 1ish firms h o p in g to ex p lo it the c o u n try s m ineral w ealth. During th e w ar m em bers o f th e B ritish m ilitary m ission to

A lb an ia h ad to b e ex p elled fo r p lo ttin g w ith co llab o rato rs; b u t th e B ritish G o v e rn m en t u n d e r th e prem iership o f C hurchill o r A ttle e , did n o t give up th e idea o f co n tro llin g this strategically im p o rta n t co rn er o f th e M ed iterran ean area b y having Zog re in sta te d as King. W hen post-w ar elections w ere being h eld th ro u g h o u t A lb an ia on D ecem ber 2, 1945, th e B ritish G o v e rn m en t p ro p o se d to p u t observers in th e c o u n try to oversee th e voting. T he A lbanians assured th e B ritish th a t th ey also k new h o w to c o u n t. In th a t sam e y e a r th e B ritish navy, w ith o u t any co n su l ta tio n , b egan clearing m ines from A lbanian w aters, ignoring th e p ro te st o f th e A lbanian G overnm ent. No A lbanian rep resen tativ e was allow ed on the M editerranean Z one M ine C learance B oard a n d the B ritish even called in G reek m ine-clearing vessels to o p erate in A lb an ias territo ria l w aters in spite o f the strain ed relations b etw een G reece and A lbania. W hen th e A lbanian G o v e rn m en t o b jected , E rnest Bevin, B rita in s foreign secretary , used w h a t he called th e u n c o o p erativ e a ttitu d e o f th e A lbanians as an excuse for declaring in A pril, 1946, th a t His M ajestys G o v ern m en t have d ecided th a t no useful p u rp o se can be served b y opening d ip lo m atic relatio n s w ith th e m . O n M ay 15 th e B ritish cruisers O rion an d S uperb steam ed th ro u g h th e C orfu channel, com ing w ith in hailing d istance o f th e A lbanian shore an d appearing to h ead right in to the h a rb o u r o f S aranda. W arning shots w ere fired fro m the co astal batteries. T h e B ritish G o v ern m en t d em an d e d an ap o lo g y and an assurance th a t th o se responsible h ad been severely p unished. T he reply from the A lbanian G o v ern m en t was n o t an apology b u t an ex p lan a tio n . G reek ships on several occasions h a d a tta c k e d the A lbanian coast and foreign w arships co u ld n o t be p e rm itte d w ith in A lb an ias th ree mile lim it w ith o u t p rio r in fo rm a tio n o f such an in te n tio n . W hile it was tru e th a t th e C orfu channel was an in tern a tio n al w aterw ay , this h ad been established w hen A lbania was u n ab le to assert its leg itim ate rights. B ritain re to rte d thal A lb an ia w ould n o t b e in fo rm ed w hen ships o f the Britisli navy chose to use th e channel, how ever close this m ight bring th e m to the A lbanian shore, an d if th e y w ere fired u p o n they w o u ld fire back. 82

O n O c to b e r 22 B ritish w arships le ft C orfu for A rgostoli an d , u n d e r o rders to be ready to op en up if fired u p o n , w ent o u t o f th eir w ay to test A lbanian reactio n s. Tw o of/- the ships, th e S aum arez an d the V olage, h it m ines involving the loss o f b o th ships and the lives of 40 seam en. E nver H o x h a co m p lain ed to the S ecretary G eneral of the U n ited N atio n s a b o u t B ritish ships en terin g A lb an ias te rri to rial w aters and B ritish airc raft flying over A lbanian soil. T h ree tim es th e B ritish G o v ern m en t has callously violated o u r sovereignty. We have done ev erything in o u r pow er to b rin g a b o u t cordial relations w ith the U n ited S tates and B ritain. . . . All we get fo r o u r pains is an u tte r disregard of o u r rights an d an u n en d in g stream o f d ip lo m a tic n o te s . M eanw hile th e B ritish navy set a b o u t trying to collect p ro o f th a t A lb an ia was responsible for the m ining o f th e tw o ships. T h e m ines in the channel tu rn e d o u t to be G erm an. T he o n e c o u n try in th e w hole M ed iterran ean area possessing n e ith e r m ines, m ine-layers nor p erso n n el train ed in handling m ines was A lbania. N evertheless B ritain accused A lbania o f full resp o n sib ility and d em anded rep aratio n s equal to the value o f th e tw o ships and co m p en sa tio n for th e d ep en d an ts o f the killed an d in ju red sailors. O therw ise the m a tte r w ould be raised in th e S ecu rity C ouncil. W hen B ritain did raise th e m a tte r, the only evidence for th e charge was th e ir c o n te n tio n th a t the m ines lo o k ed to o fresh to have b een in th e w ater m ore th a n six m o n th s. B ut in th e developing C old War situ a tio n th e W estern Pow ers d ecid ed th a t th e B ritish case was proved and the Soviet U nion had to veto th e granting o f the rep aratio n s B ritain d em anded. T he case was th en referred to th e In te rn a tio n a l C o u rt at the H ague, H ysni K apo, the great p artisan leader an d b y th a t tim e a p ro m in e n t m em ber o f the A lbanian P arty and G o v ern m en t, o p p o sed th e charges, arguing th a t on such m eagre evidence A lbania h a d no case to answ er. E ventually, in A pril, 19 4 9 , th e C o u rt p ro m u lg ated its decision. B ritain had n o t v iolated in te rn a tio n a l law in respect to territo rial w aters on th e d ate th e ships were m ined, b u t it had violated in tern atio n al law in th e course o f trying to collect evidence in ihe sam e w aters afterw ards! T h e B ritish claim for dam ages 83

was g ra n te d an d A lbania was o rd e red to p ay <843,947. A lbania, o f course, ignored the dem and. In d e ed it becam e a p o p u la r jo k e in E strad a p erfo rm an ces, a k in d o f A lbanian m usic h all, th a t a c o u n try w ith no navy, w hich h ad n o t stirred b e y o n d its ow n fro n tiers, h ad m anaged to inflict a m illion pounds w o rth o f dam age on the great B ritish fleet! A lbania did n o t p ay th e aw ard, b u t n e ith e r has it ever received back one ounce o f the gold bullion sto red by the A lbanian N ational B ank in tran s-A tla n tic vaults at th e o u t b reak o f th e war. T he U n ited S tates and B ritish G overnm ents w ere unable to reconcile them selves to A lb an ias slipping aw ay from th e free w o rld th a t is, th e w orld free for the o p eratio n s o f A nglo-A m erican m o n o p o ly capitalism . T he m o st serious a tte m p t to subvert the p o p u la r G o v ern m en t in A lbania and resto re a re actio n ary regim e sy m p a th e tic to A nglo-A m erican in terests was a cloak-and-dagger o p eratio n in itia te d in 1946 by the B ritish S ecret Intelligence Service, MI6. T he schem e was to recru it a force o f agents from the co llab o rato rs and tra ito rs w ho h ad escaped from th e c o u n try w ith the G erm ans at th e en d o f th e w ar and p a ra c h u te them in to an area of c en tral A lbania, th e M ati, w here th e re w ere su p p o sed to be elem ents still loyal to Zog. T hese elem ents w ere to be organised in to co u n ter-re v o lu tio n ary groups w hich th e B ritish w ould supply by air-drops. If full-scale civil d istu rb an ce could be p rovoked, th e n an invasion force w ould be landed at various p o in ts on the coast. T he first b atch o f agents was raised from displaced person cam ps in G reece a n d Italy an d from th e ranks o f those w ho h ad acco m p an ied Z og in to exile b efo re the w ar began, their one q u alificatio n being th e virulence o f th eir a n ti com m unism . T h ey w ere tak en to M alta for training and, th ro u g h o u t 1947, d ro p p e d am ong the m o u n tain s o f the M ati. It was like d ro p p in g pebbles in a b o tto m less well as far as th e SIS was concerned. T he o p eratio n c o n tin u e d in ;i sp oradic m an n er u n til 1949 w ith n o results a p a rt from several easily -fru strated sabotage a tte m p ts on the oil fields of K uova and th e co p p er m ines o f R ubik. A t th a t p o in t the A m ericans becam e in tere ste d in the 84

p ro jec t w hich was th e n c e fo rth placed u n d er th e jo in t co n tro l o f th e S ecret Intelligence Service an d th e C entral Intelligence A gency. E rn est Bevin was a t first re lu c ta n t to agree to the massive step p in g u p o f a schem e w hich h ad th u s far proved so ab o rtiv e; b u t A m erican pressure soon p ersuaded him to a u th o rise a n o th e r o p e ra tio n o n a m u ch larger scale. This tim e Z og was asked to re co m m en d personally the right m en to serve as leaders and he p u t his en tire royal guard at the disposal o f th e SIS an d th e CIA. C o m m ittees o f Free A lb an ia w ere set up in Ita ly , E g y p t and G reece as recruiting cen tres and gradually a sm all arm y o f fan atic a n ti co m m u n ists, p ro fessional ad v en tu rers an d crim inals was scraped to g eth er and sen t fo r train in g to C yprus, M alta or West G erm an y . F o r th e n e x t tw o years groups o f agents were d ro p p ed by p a ra c h u te , lan d ed b y subm arine o r filtered across th e A lbanian fro n tier. T he w hole o p eratio n was a series o f disasters for the B ritish an d A m ericans. In J a n u a ry , 1952, in o n e b a ttle w ith agents d ro p p e d in th e n o rth , A lbanian secu rity forces killed 29 and c a p tu re d th e rest w ho w ere sent to T iran a fo r trial. A rm ed p easan ts an d m o u n tain eers w ere on th e lo o k o u t for these enem ies o f the n atio n a l freed o m so h ard ly w on and th ey w ere q u ick ly ro u n d e d up and h an d ed over to the state au th o rities fo r trial an d p u n ish m en t. In an a tte m p t to find o u t w hy things w ere going so b adly th e leader o f the A lbanian m ercenaries was d ro p p e d in to the c o u n try w ith a radio o p e ra to r, to be fo llo w ed b y a m ajor drop o f agents w hen he signalled th e all-clear. He was c a p tu re d by the A lbanian m ilitia and fo rced to tran sm it a m essage th a t the way was clear fo r th e rest to be dropped. U nits o f the A lbanian arm y w a ited in a large circle an d th e B ritish planes Hew over a n d u n lo ad ed scores o f th eir agents in the m iddle o f die ring. T h e leaders w ere sen ten c ed to be sh o t and the o th ers w ere im p risoned. So en d ed th a t p a rtic u la r p lo t o f British and A m erican Intelligence. T he head o f th e B ritish side o f th e A lbanian o p eratio n and, indeed, th e ir ch ief liaison o fficer w ith the C entral Intelligence Agency was K im Philby. It m ay be th a t, as o fte n as possible, lie was g ettin g w o rd to th e A lbanians by w ay o f th e Soviet I Inion w hen th e y could ex p e ct th eir n e x t consignm ent o f 85

secret agents from the SIS and CIA. W estern c o m m en tato rs like to p re te n d th a t the w hole fiasco was th e w o rk o f this Soviet spy. T he reason w hy th e schem e never h ad the slightest chance o f succeeding was th a t the A lbanian people w ere m uch to o closely u n ite d b e h in d the leadership w hich h ad b ro u g h t th em victoriously th ro u g h th e w ar and m u ch to o vigilant in th e defence o f th eir freed o m fo r a bu n ch o f h ired sab o teu rs an d gangsters to be able to cause m uch tro u b le. T hese are th e obvious facts a b o u t a c o u n try w hich the intelligence services o f B ritain and A m erica w ith all th e ir m en in tile field eq u ip p ed w ith all th e latest p arap h ern alia never seem to be able to fin d o u t. T he official a ttitu d e o f B ritain and (he U n ited S tates to A lbania was as u n frie n d ly as th e ir secret o p eratio n s. In spite o f w ar tim e u n d ertak in g s to accep t w h atev er g o v ern m en t the peo p le o f A lbania them selves should choose, B ritain and the U n ited S tates b o th refused to recognise the governm ent o f th e P eo p les R epublic o f A lbania and n e ith e r c o u n try has th u s far established relations o f any kin d w ith it. T hey ex clu d ed A lbania from the San F rancisco C onference th a t fo u n d e d th e U n ite d N atio n s an d from th e L o n d o n an d Paris C onferences on w ar rep aratio n s from Italy and G erm any. N or was A lbania invited to take p a rt in discussions on d raftin g a peace tre a ty w ith Italy . T h ey trie d to b ar A lbania a lto g e th e r from th e Peace C onference w hich began in J u ly 1946. O nly th ro u g h th e insistence o f th e Soviet U nion was th e A lbanian deleg ation, h eaded by E nver H o x h a, finally a d m itte d as rep resen tin g an allied co u n try . D uring the C onference the A lbanians h ad to re p ly freq u en tly to atta c k s on th e ir c o u n try w hich th e G reek g o v ernm ent, b acked by the U n ited S tates and B ritain, in te n d e d to fu rth e r its claim to large areas of A lbanian te rrito ry . B efore leaving for hom e Enver H o x h a solem nly w arned th e m eetin g th a t n e ith e r the Paris C o n fer ence, n o r th e F o u r P ow er C o n feren ce, n o r any o th e r co n feren ce w hatsoever, can tak e up for discussion the bo u n d aries o f m y c o u n try , w ith in w hich n o t even an inch o f foreign land is included. O ur b ound aries are in d isp u ta b le and n o b o d y will dare violate them . . . . L e t th e w hole w orld know th a t th e A lbanian peo p le have n o t sen t th eir delegation to Paris to re n d er a c c o u n t, b u t to dem an d th a t an acco u n t

sh o u ld be re n d ere d to them by those w ho have caused th em so m u ch dam age and against w hom th e A lbanian peo p le have fo u g h t so fiercely to th e e n d . A t ab o u t this tim e th e U n ited S tates S enate passed u n an im o u sly th e P epper R eso lu tio n w hich favoured G reeces claim to th e w hole o f so u th e rn A lbania. Som e tim e later, in 19 4 9 , G reek arm ed forces, su p p o rte d by artillery and airc raft, su d d en ly invaded A lbania to try to establish by force th e claim to K ora an d G jirokastra. T h ey had advanced less th a n a m ile w h en th e y w ere th ro w n b ack by the A lbanian arm y. T he h o stility o f A lb an ias n eig h b o u r to th e so u th was to be e x p e cted since a rig h t w ing g o v ernm ent h ad b een im p o sed on th e G reek p eo p le, w ith th e help o f B ritain and th e U n ited S tates, for th e express pu rp o se o f opposing com m unism . R elatio n s w ith Y ugoslavia m ight have been su p p o sed to develop in a m u ch m ore cordial w ay. C ertainly A lbania did ev ery th in g possible to fo ster th e frien d liest relatio n sh ip w ith this c o u n try w hich h ad shared a co m m o n experience in th e anti-fascist w ar. A n d y e t the gravest th re a t o f all to A lbanian in d ep en d en ce in the im m ediate post-w ar p erio d came precisely from Yugoslavia. W hen th e last G erm an tro o p s w ere driven from A lbania in N ovem ber, 1 9 4 4 , th e N atio n al L ib era tio n A rm y did n o t co n sider th a t th e w ar was over sim ply because th e ir o w n land was lib era te d fro m th e enem y. O n th e orders o f the C om m ander-in-C hief, Enver H o x b a , and at th e re q u est o f the Yugoslav arm y co m m an d , th e T h ird an d F iftb A lbanian Brigades crossed in to Y ugoslavia a n d engaged th e N azi tro o p s aro u n d K osova w hich th e y lib erated . T h ey w ere th e n jo in e d by the T w e n ty -fifth B rigade and all th ree w ere in c o rp o ra te d in the F ifth D ivision w hich in flicted heavy casualties on the (icrm an tro o p s in th e S andjak region an d advanced as far n o rth as Priepolje w hich th e y also liberated. E lem ents o f th e S ix th Division also crossed th e fro n tie r ind p u rsu ed th e en em y to w ard P odgorica, liberating T uzi in a M oody b a ttle on D ecem ber 2. R ight th ro u g h severe w in ter i o n d itio n s fo r w h ich th eir ow n cam paign o f th e previous w inter had h a rd e n e d th em , th e A lbanian p artisans fo u g h t on Yugoslav soil, driving th e G erm ans o u t o f M ontenegro and

freeing m any villages in B osnia an d H erzegovina up to the city o f V ishegrad in w hose lib era tio n th e y jo in e d w ith Yugoslav partisans. In spite o f the rigours o f w in ter in a foreign land the A lbanians w e n t sh o rt o f fo o d them selves ra th e r th an allow th e Y ugoslav peasants to go hungry in expressing th eir friendship an d ad m ira tio n for th eir so u th e rn neighbours w ho h ad com e up to tak e p a rt in th eir struggle. As a Yugoslav m o th e r in Senica said o f th e A lbanians killed in freeing a n o th e r land: Tell th e m o th ers, wives an d sisters o f those w ho laid d ow n th eir lives for th e lib era tio n o f the S andjak, th a t th e sun o f o u r m o u n tain s will w arm the place w here th eir loved ones fell, ju s t as th e sun o f th eir m o u n tain s. T h at th e sp o t w here th e y lie will be revered by us w ith the sam e feelings as th e y w o u ld h av e. N o r did A lb an ias assistance stop w ith this p a rtic ip a tio n in th e final phase o f Y ugoslavias lib eratio n . T here are a m illion A lbanians living w ith in th e fro n tiers o f Y ugoslavia in the K osova d istrict an d th e y ex p e cted th a t new bo u n d aries o f A lbania w o u ld be draw n in such a w ay as to include them once m ore in th eir native land. T he A lbanian G overnm ent urged th em to rem ain as th e y w ere, co n tin u in g to be good citizens o f Y ugoslavia, since this pro b lem like any o th ers co u ld surely be solved b y tw o co u n tries in b o th o f w hich the p eo p le h ad tak en pow er. B ut th e chauvinism re n o u n ced by A lbania was to ch a rac terise all tn e actions o f th e T ito regim e to w a rd its so u th e rn n eig h b o u r, and it soon becam e a p p a ren t th a t the Y ugoslav G o v ern m en t had n o o th e r plans fo r its relatio n s w ith A lbania th an to in c o rp o ra te it as a seventh province in the Y ugo slavian fe d era tio n . T hese plans could n o t be carried o u t if the tw o peoples w ere lin k ed in friendship based on com m on ex p eriences in th e anti-fascist w ar and co m m o n aspirations fo r th e fu tu re . Y ugoslav p a rty an d state officials began to m inim ise th e c o n trib u tio n o f th e A lbanians to the victory over th e co m m dn enem y an d any referen ce to th eir p a rtic i p a tio n finally d ro p p e d o u t o f Y ugoslav acco u n ts o f the p erio d alto g eth er. In terferen ce o f the Co m m u n ist P arty o f Yugoslavia in the in tern a l affairs o f th e C o m m u n ist P arty o f A lbania began as 88

early as th e S cco n d Plen ary session o f th e A lbjm ian Partx_at B erat in N ovem b<j^_19441j o n t he eve o t A lb an ias liberation. T h e session was in te n d e d tc T ta k e up theTas^s""which woulcl c o n fro n t a lib erated A lbania; b u t E nver H o x h a suddenly fo u n d him self having to d efen d the line o f the P arty and, in d eed , th e w hole c o n d u c t o f th e w ar against charges levelled by th e Yugoslav delegation u n d er the leadership o f V elim ir S to in ich w h o was acting o n th e d irect in stru c tio n s o f T ito . T he A lbanian P arty was accused o f having vacillated b etw een sectarianism an d o p p o rtu n ism and Enver H o x h a was criticised as th e source o f these errors. T he lib era tio n m o v em en t in A lbania was said to ow e its success alm ost en tire ly to aid an d advice from th e C o m m u n ist P arty o f Y ugoslavia an d th e leadership o f th e w hole B alkan struggle by T ito . T Such an a tta c k w o u ld have been rid icu led if the w ay for it h ad n o t b een carefully p rep ared . C ertain im p o rta n t m em bers o f th e A lbanian P arty like K oi X oxe, o f th e P olitical B ureau, w ho w ith E nver H o x h a had been a m em b er o f th e K ora group even b efo re th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e P arty , and Sejfulla M alshova, a can d id ate m em ber o f th e C entral C o m m ittee, had already been w on over to the line o f th e Y ugoslav P arty on A lb an ias fu tu re . This line as advanced by S to in ich and strongly su p p o rted b y som e m em bers high in th e counsels o f the A lbanian P arty itself, was based on th e c o n te n tio n th a t A lbania was to o sm all an d to o w eak to sta n d on its ow n after die w ar. It co uld only be a tem p tin g m o rsel fo r the im perialist pow ers. T h erefo re it was necessary, in tern a lly , for Ilie A lbanian G o v ern m en t to b ro a d e n itself by including influential rep resen tatives o f th e re a c tio n a ry bourgeoisie and even im p o rta n t m em bers o f th e clergy, w h atev er role th ey bad p lay ed during the w ar, and p o stp o n e in d efin itely any idea o f carrying o u t th e socialist rev o lu tio n . A nd, ex tern ally , Albania m u st agree to jo in th e Y ugoslav fe d e ra tio n as a step tow ard th e co m p lete fu sio n o f th e tw o c o u n trie s, th e sym bol ill such u n io n being T ito th e great lib e ra to r o f the B alkans >ni(l o f E u ro p e . In a d d itio n to th o se m em bers o f th e A lbanian P arty w ho w orked actively on b eh alf o f the Y ugoslav p lo t against the Interests o f A lb an ia, like K oi X oxe an d S ejfulla M alshova, 89

th e la tte r even p ro p o sin g w ith him self in m in d th e n ee d for a P arty C hairm an over Enver H o x h a s head, th ere w ere m any w ho w ere sim ply co n fu sed a b o u t th e issues. T hey w ere d o u b tfu l a b o u t th e possibility o f a c o u n try th e size o f A lbania being able to m aintain its ow n in d ep en d e n ce and bu ild socialism relying on its ow n effo rts. T h ey could n o t believe th a t th e leadership o f th e Y ugoslav P arty , calling itself M arxist-L eninist, co u ld be m o tiv a te d by the so rt o f chau v in ism characteristic o f im perialist pow ers or could, indeed, actu ally e n te r in to arrangem ents w ith the im perialist pow ers as th e price o f eco n o m ic aid. S uch w ere N ako S piru and o th e r m em bers o f the C entral C o m m ittee w ho agreed th a t sectarianism was the principal danger in th e P arty and d ecided to enlarge th e C entral C o m m ittee by adding new m em bers sy m p a th e tic to the line o f class co llab o ratio n and closer association w ith Y ugoslavia. T he m eeting at B erat dealt a serious blow to th e u n ity o f th e C o m m u n ist P arty o f A lbania and in tro d u c e d th e th re a t o f a re tre a t from socialist principles a n d collusion w ith capitalist co u n trie s, increasingly th e policy o f th e Y ugoslav P arty and leadership. B ut th e p lo t failed in one o f its m ain aim s w hich was to depose Enver H o x h a as S ecretary G eneral, an d this was to prove fatal to any u ltim a te chance o f success. M any m em bers o f th e C entral C o m m ittee m ight be co n fu sed ab o u t th e problem s o f A lb an ias fu tu re course, b u t th ey h ad no d o u b ts a b o u t th e co rrec t leadership o f Enver H o x h a in fo u n d in g tn e A lbanian C o m m u n ist P arty an d guiding the lib eratio n struggle to v ictory. T hey co u ld n o t be sh ifted from th eir su p p o rt by th e a tta c k o f th e Y ugoslav delegation and th e T ito ite s in th e C entral C o m m ittee. E nver H oxha rem ained in a p o sitio n to go o n defending reso lu tely a M arxist-L eninist line fo r th e P arty a n d a socialist p a th fo r the co u n try . D urin^J]i_fle^J_J^Q_^aSJ-1 9 4 5 to 1947, T ito c o n tin ued to use pressure from w ithin a n d w ith o u t to red u ce A lbania to th e statu s o t dep e n d en cy on c e ig ra a e u n a e r cover "7)1' stre n g th e n ing in this lie was aDie in ex p lo it th e p o sitio n w ith in th e A lbanian P arty o f K oi Xoxe w ho h ad becom e d e p u ty p rem ier a n d secretary o f th e Central C o m m ittee. E co n o m ic an d political conventions concluded 90

b etw een th e tw o co u n tries o sten sib ly fo r th eir m u tu al b en e fit w ere n o t very d iffe re n t from the com m ercial agreem ents Italy h ad im p o sed o n A lbania b efo re th e w ar. R evaluing the A lbanian lek in term s o f th e Y ugoslav dinar, establishing a cu stom s u n io n an d su b o rd in atin g A lb an ias econom ic plan to Y ugoslavias, w ere all used by the Y ugoslav leadership to tig h te n th eir grip on A lbania and p rep are th e w ay fo r its to ta l in co rp o ratio n . T he g o o d relatio n s A lbania en jo y e d w ith th e Soviet U nion du rin g tbls p e rio d w ere of greai neip to l.nvei H o x h a amTTill w ho w ere d e term in e d t o m ain tain t he c ()u n ti^ S ijn d e 2 l1di c ijff from Belgrade, ^ i l i n was well a w a r e o f T i to s in te n tio n s an d advised t h e A lbanians ac co rd in g ly . Why was Yugoslavia s o 'k e e n on form ing jo in t in d u strial com panies m A lbania^he asked p o in te d ly , w h en th ey refu sed to form th e m w ith the Soviet U n io n in th eir ow n c o u n try ? Why w ere th e y sending in stru c to rs to th e A lbanian arm y w hen th e y still n eeded Soviet in stru c to rs in th eir ow n? H ow could Yugoslavia provide ex p erts fo r th e d ev elo p m en t o f A lb an ias econom y w hen th e y w ere them selves seeking such ex p e rts from abro ad ? H ow was it th a t Y ugoslavia, itself p o o r and u n d ev elo p ed , su d d enly in te n d e d to assum e the developm ent o f A lbania? In J u n e 1946 Enver H o x h a su b m itte d to th e Political B ureau a special re p o rt on th e n eed to re-exam ine the proceedings o f th e S econd P lenum o f th e C entral C om m ittee at B erat in 1944. He p o in te d o u t th a t th e conclusions reached th e n w ere erro n eo u s an d seriously encro ach ed on the in d ep en d en ce o f th e A lbanian P arty. This re p o rt was opposed in th e P olitical B ureau b y K oi X oxe and Pandi K risto w ho m anaged to get it rejected. Bv 1947. u n d er th e guise o f a tre a ty o f m u tu a l assistance, Yugoslav p lans w ere w ell advanced for a m ilitary coup to C entral C o m m ittee o f the Y ugoslav P arty m ade a vicious ittack o n E nver H o x h a accusing him o f pursuing an individualistic, anti-M arxist line ho stile to Y ugoslavia and against th e in terests o f A lbania itself. In J u ly an A lbanian delegation h ead ed b y E nver H o x h a co n clu d ed an agreem ent in M oscow fo r th e supply o f agricultural m achinery. The 91

Y ugoslav leadership sta te d th a t A lbania co u ld e n te r in to no relatio n s w ith o th e r co u n tries w ith o u t Y ugoslavias approval an d d em anded to see copies o f th e agreem ent. L ater th a t year K oi X oxe tried to p rev en t Enver H o x a from signing a tre a ty o f friendship w ith Bulgaria. A lbania m u st be k e p t isolated to facilitate its ab so rp tio n in to Yugoslavia. In N o v em ber N ako S piru w ho h ad recognised his m istakes at B erat an d had com e aro u n d to firm su p p o rt o f Enver H o x h a was charged by th e X oxe clique w ith having c o lla b o r a te d w ith the enem y during th e w ar. T he false charge to g e th e r w ith th e realisatio n o f th e h arm he had done previously to P arty u n ity was to o m u ch for N ako Spiru and he c o m m itte d suicidc. M chm et S hehu, w ho h a d never w avered in his c o rre c t stan d w ith Enver H oxha, was p rev en ted from a tte n d in g th e P arty m eeting convened in F eb ru a ry , 1948, and also ex clu d ed from the C entral C o m m itte e by K oi X oxe w h o was using his po sitio n as organising secretary to isolate F,nver H oxha. T his F eb ru a ry m eetin g was th e cu lm in atio n o f th e Y ugoslav p lo t. E nver H o x h a was accused o f leading a factio n w hich was responsible fo r all th e m istakes the C o m m u n ist P arty h ad allegedly m ade. T ito s accusations o f th e previous y ear w ere form ally a d o p te d an d all the eco n o m ic an d p o litical ties w ith Y ugoslavia fo r th e colonisation o f A lbania w ere agreed. A fte r this m eetin g Koi X o x e s group pressed on as rapidly as possible w ith p u ttin g the Y ugoslav schem e in to effect. T hey used th eir p o sitio n to place the state security organs above th e P arty a n d began elim inating those m em bers w ho o p p o sed th e schem e. A special co n tro l com m ission arrived from Belgrade to in teg rate th e A lbanian eco n o m y w ith th a t o f Y ugoslavia. As th e final step in im plem enting A lb an ias o u trig h t an n e x atio n , Koi X oxe p u t fo rw ard T ito s dem and th a t th e Soviet m ilitary m ission be expelled and th a t several divisions o f the Y ugoslav arm y should be b ro u g h t in to A lbania to w ard o ff th e danger o f a G reek attac k . E nver H o x h a re so lu te ly o p p osed these dem ands in the C entral C om m itte e and got thim"*7e |r rte d . rirrisiTin saved A lbania lrom once m ore having to take up arm s against an o ccu p y in g arm y and was th e beginning of th e exposure 92

and defea.t_of th e Yugoslav agents w ith in the c o u n try w h o h ad p lo tte d against A lbanian indep en d en ce. T here co u ld no U3iml""be tn e slightest cTouSFafioiuY uiJO slav in ten tio n s and Fmver__Hi2xlia!s_Jnsistcnc.-Q n_the_..need...for A lbanian selfreliance if th e c o u n try was to d evelap_in a socialist w ay had p eo p le b eh in d him Enver H o x h a w en t over to the attac k . On T ito s b irth d a y in M ay, 1948, th ere w ere no greetings from A lbania. T hree w eeks later Y ugoslavia was o rd ered to close its in fo rm atio n ce n tre in T iran a and th e circu latio n o f the Y ugoslav P arty p ap er, Borba, w hich h ad waged a co n tin u o u s cam paign against Enver H o x h a s co rrec t line, was b an n e d in A lbania. S t a l i n was k e p t in fo rm ed o f Y ugoslavias m oves against A lb an ia p artic u la rly the proposal to send tro o p s in to the c o u n try . T he C en tral C o m m ittee o t the C o m m u n ist P arty o f th e Soviet U nion p ro m p tly se n t a le tte r to the eritial (JomrnTt'tee o f the C o m m u n ist P arty o f _Yugoslavia c o n dem ning its o p p o rtu n is t hne w hich w as leadmg_to__Uje re s to ra tion o t capi talism , its violation of socialist n o rms in tire Inner lile o t th e P arty and th e arrogance and conceit_of the leadership, i h e A lbanian P arty w h lcn had rallied behind E tfV W T loxhas leadership against Y ugoslav in terv e n tio n , was so o n to have its prin cip led stan d against a revisionist co n sp iracy e n d o rsed b y th e w o rld co m m u n ist m ovem ent. W hen K oi X o xe realised th a t the p lo t against A lbanian s o v e r e ig n t^ T a d f a ile d L J ie j^ ^ o u t him self w ith an a tta c k on T ito . B ut this sudden_akflllt tu rn fo o led no o n e. He w as expelled from th e P arty, arrested a n d b ro u g h t to trial. m T T o g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T x e ^ ^ I l i e p u b i i c e x p o s m ^ r o f this T ito ist agent h ad th e e ffec t o f alerting o th e r E ast E u ro p ean co u n tries to th e same danger since A lbania, th o u g h the m ost directly th re a te n e d , was n o t the only socialist c o u n try in w hose in tern al affairs T ito h ad in terfe red . T he a tte m p t by th e Y ugoslav leadership u n d er T ito to ta k e over A lbania illu stra te d the d istin c tio n Lenin alw ays m ade betw een th e n ationalism o f an o p p ressor n a tio n and tjTe n a tio n a lism o f an o p p ressed n atio n . T he nationalism w hich Iiad in spired th e p eo ple o f Yugoslavia to" TTgTTt ~the G erm an

o c c u p atio n forces and b ecom e p a rt o f the in te rn a tio n a l rev o lu tio n ary m o v em en t w as tra n sfo rm e d b y T ito , n o t w ith o u t resistance fyom wit.bjn1 t> h^uvinisn^ ifiQUld be d irec ted against a sm aller n a tio n in o rd e r to m ake it a ^ ev e n ih k e p u u n c m a u r e a ie r Y ugoslavia. l'h is co u ld n o t have h ap p e n ed iI* T ito h ad c o m m itte d Yugoslavia to the task o f building socialism because no socialist c o u n try w hich elim inates e x p lo ita tio n w ith in its ow n bo rd ers can absorb an o th e r c o u n try fo r the p u rp o se o f ex p lo itin g it w ith o u t denying its ow n n atu re . In fact, -E i I.-.H 1 h < d istin ctio n (> 1 co m m u n ist lead er enjoying s ta le p o v ^ M x > b etra y socialism by taking a revisionist lin e. R evisionism as a d isto rtio n o f M arxisnT tatal to re v o lu tio n ary advance h ad long existed_asjm erro n eo u s tren d in vario u j5 _ co m rn u n istp in ij a. L enin had w aged a b itte r co ntroversy against this line as ex em p lified by B ernstein, w ho was in flu en ced b y th e social d em o cratic ideas o f the B ritish F abians, and K a u tsk y , w ho h ad degenerated from a M arxist th eo re tic ia n in to a h o stile critic o f the O c to b e r R ev o lu tio n . R evisionism can be described as th e b etra y al o f class struggle. B eginning w ith the assum ption o f th e possibility o f p eaceful tran sitio n to socialism h v narTiam en tary m eans, socialism w ith o u t tears, and o f peaceful roxisTcnc wTtK im perialist co u n tries, even on th e p a rt o f very co untries th e y e x p lo it, revisionism ends in accepting c*'apTfaEm.--Lntermilly and'"subm iffm Xo j n n ^ e r i ^ s i ^ j ,xt(-|-pially. Revisionism had lip ^~r 1' ltiMrl i r '7 prev en ting certain co m m unist parties from -itt j ism or from leading an ti-im p erialist struggles in colonial cou n tries. T ito s revisionism was c o u n te r-re v o lu tio n a ry , re s to r in g UUlCfltSHI Will'I Hie' OourgeoT^TeT 'a^E IlL icaJ*H r()wn an d m aking Y ugoslavia an agent o f im perialist in terests in E a s t ern E u ro p e w hen it had once b e l o n g e d to the socialist bloc. F rom 1944 till 1948 th e A lbanian P arty and people, increasingly u n ite d u n d er E nver H o x h a s leadership, w ere in th e fro n t line o f th e struggle against T ito s b etra y al o f socialism . T hey h ad friendly advice a n d assistance from Stalin a n d th e Soviet P arty ; b u t it was th eir c o u n try w hich was u n d e r direct a tta c k a n d in fighting to preserve th eir own in d ep en d en ce an d th e right to develop th eir ow n socialist 94

so ciety th e y w ere defending, alm ost alone in this instance, th e cause o f socialism generally. In d eed , th e last tense m eetin g b etw e en S talin a n d th e Y ugoslav representatives b efo re th e ex p u lsio n o f Y ugoslavia fro m th e socialist cam p was largely co n c ern e d w ith T ito s actions against A lbania. In the sum m er o f 1948 rep resen tativ es o f the w o rld co m m u n ist an d w o rk e rs parties p artic ip a tin g 'l n the In Io rm atio n B ureau o f C o m m unist P arties m ade an analysis IjHTTe "errors and deviations oi the~"Vugoslav leaders anri nnhlished th eir findings in R eso lu tio n agreed by the B u re a u w a s circ u lated to im prove th e ideological, th eo re tic al a n d po litical w o rk in th e p artie s, to safe-guard socialist achievem ents in co untries w here th e w orking class h ad established its ru le , to p ro te c t th e socialist cam p and co n so lid ate rev o lu tio n ary forces th ro u g h o u t th e w orld and to in ten sify th e struggle against im perialism a n d p rev en t im perialist agents fro m p e n e tra tin g an y fu rth e r in to the p e o p le s d em o cracies. T he leaders o f th e Y ugoslav C om m u n ist P arty w ere charged w ith having ab a n d o n ed in te r natio n alism an d a d o p te d a course o f n arrow n atio n al selfin terest. T h ey ap p a ren tly d o n o t u n d e rsta n d , th e R eso lu tio n p o in te d o u t, or p re te n d th ey do n o t u n d ersta n d , th a t such a n atio n alist o rie n ta tio n m ay only lead to the deg en eratio n of Y ugoslavia in to an o rd in ary bourgeois republic, to th e loss o f its in d ep en d e n ce, to the tra n sfo rm a tio n o f Y ugoslavia in to a co lo n y o f th e im perialist c o u n trie s. _ T he Y ugoslav leadership rejected th e R eso lu tio n and T ito m oved fu rth e r aw ay from M arxism and closer to op en c o llab o ratio n w ith th e U n ited S tates. This b etray al for dollars o f the in terests o f th e w orkers and peasants was n o t carried th rough w ith o u t resistance; an d th o u san d s o f m em bers w ere expelled fro m th e Y ugoslav C o m m u n ist P arty. N early all those in certain provincial governm ents like M ontenegro were jailed an d a large p ro p o rtio n o f com m anders and com m issars o f th e o ld p artisan brigades w ere im p riso n ed o r discharged lrom th e arm y . T he A lbanians living w ithin Y ugoslavias borders at K osovo, in M ontenegro and on th e D ukagjin Plateau w ere su b jected to special acts o f repression. A tte m p ts to m ain tain th e ir A lbanian language and c u ltu re were Iru stra te d an d u n d er th e oppressive acts o f the governm ent 95

th ey becam e a source o f cheap, m enial lab o u r and, in som e cases, o f agents w ho could be sent b ack in to A lbania for subversive purposes. T he tre a ty signed by Y ugoslavia under U n ited S tates in stig atio n in 1953 w ith G reece and T u rk e y linked in a ho stile ring th e past and present enem ies o f A lbanian in d ep en d en ce. T h e A lbanian C o m m u n ist P arty , o f course, w arm ly ap p ro ved th e R eso lu tio n o f th e In fo rm a tio n B ureau w hich was a ju stific a tio n o f th eir ow n sta n d and o f Enver H o x h a s leadership. A t a P arty m eeting in S ep tem b er, 1948, all the agreem ents w ith Y ugoslavia w ere ab ro g ated an d th e task o f purging th e re m n a n ts o f T ito ist influence from th eir ow n ranks w ere carried o u t. M ehm et S hehu and o th e r m em bers u n ju stly ex clu d ed from the previous session w ere w elcom ed b ack and various violations o f socialist legality by the X oxe group w ere re p u d ia ted . N ako S p iru s nam e was cleared o f the charges th a t had b een m ade against him . P arty organisations w ere charged w ith th e responsibility o f m aking clear to the p eo p le the n a tu re o f th e Y ugoslav p lo t an d the w eaknesses in th e A lbanian P arty w hich had allow ed it to go so far. P u b licatio n o f th e P arty p aper, Zeri i P opullit, w hich had lapsed during th e height of Y ugoslav influence, was to be reco m m en ced an d was to include, for the first tim e, all the decisions tak en during this E leventh P arty Plenum . A nd, finally, p re p ara tio n s w ere m ade fo r the first full P arty C ongress in N ovem ber w hich, having m ade a th o ro u g h in v estigation o f th e m istakes w hich had enabled th eir ranks to be p e n e tra te d and having heard th e self-criticism s o f those w ho h ad failed in vigilance, w o u ld be able to go on to a co n sid eratio n o f th e vital tasks o f co n stru c tin g th e socialist base o f society. It was agreed th a t at this C ongress the nam e o f th e P arty w ould be changed to the A lbanian P arty of L a b o u r w hile the M arxist-L eninist line o f th e P arty w o u ld be co n firm ed an d stren g th en e d . While this first severe crisis o f the new state o f A lbania m ay have delayed so m ew h at th e c o u n try s em barking on a c o rre c t socialist course and even allow ed errors to develop during the perio d o f Y ugoslav influence like th e P a rty s rem aining a sem i-secret organisation w hen it h ad becom e .1 P arty in pow er o r like th e concessions m ade to rich peasants 96

w hich im p ed ed th e fo rm a tio n o f agricultural co-operatives, there w ere im p o rta n t gains to o . P a rty an d p eople co u ld go forw ard in th e co n fid en ce o f enjo y in g a leadership w hich had prov ed itself u n d e r th e m o st testin g circum stances. A n d h ad it n o t b een for th e b itte r ex p erien ce o f revisionist b etray al w hich co uld tu rn a w ar-tim e ally in to a co u n ter-re v o lu tio n ary agent o f th e im perialist co u n tries, th e A lbanian p eople could n o t have recognised so quickly a far m ore dangerous and p o w erfu l revisionist th re a t w hich was to develop a fte r S ta lin s death .

97

A L B A N IA S SO C IA LIST SO C IETY C h ap ter N ine

The State
\ T he real q u estio n o f p olitics is w ho rules w hom , w ho enjoys 1 state p ow er an d h ow is th a t p o w er m ain tain ed . J h e essen tial p olitical pro b lem o f a socialist society is th a t o f vesting real state p ow er in th e hands o f th e m asses o t peo p le in to w n and c o u n try sid e, h ea d ed bv the w orking class, and keeping it there__s. socialist society is n o t sim ply c re a te d , tor the w o rk ing m asses; It m u st be created an d preserved by the w o rk ing m asses. It this does n o t co n tin u e to be the case, state an d society will soon degenerate fro m socialism in to som e form o f capitalism w ith a co n se q u en t re sto ra tio n o f e x p lo it ative relations o f p ro d u c tio n . T he C o n stitu tio n o f th e P eo p les R ep u b lic o f A lbania, a d o p te d on M arch 14, 1946, by th e C o n stitu e n t A ssem bly b ro u g h t in to being by the first d em o cratic electio n ever held, is sh o rt, straig h tfo rw ard and d em o cratic in the fullest sense. T he w hole d o c u m e n t o f few er th a n a h u n d re d articles takes up o nly 40 pages o f a very sm all b o o k . This conciseness and sim plicity stem fro m th e fact th a t, unlike m o st c o n stitu tio n s, th ere are no ruling class in terests to be concealed in elab o rate verbiage, n o co m p licated divisions o f pow er to check the s ta te s in terferen ce in business an d finance, no pseudod em o cratic fo rm u latio n s designed to give peo p le the illusion o f governing them selves. It is w o rth w h ile settin g o u t th e basic s tru c tu re o f A lbanian governm ental in stitu tio n s; b u t th e test w hich has to be applied in judging th e ir e fficacy is w hethej th e p eople, th e w orking m asses, really are in c o n tro l o f their ow n social d estin y . T his can only be d e m o n stra te d concretely by exam ples draw n fro m every aspect o f th e life o f th e people an d from th e very q u ality o f th a t lite in the b ro ad est sense. 98

T h e very first p ro c la m atio n o f th e A lbanian P arty of L ab o u r, issued in 1941, set b efo re th e co m m u n ist m em b er ship an d th e p eo p le o f A lbania th e task n o t o n ly o f liberating th e c o u n try b u t o f investing po litical pow er in th e w orking m asses. This double task was re flected in the tw o fo ld re ^ o n s ib jlit^ i^ o f^ th e ^ J i^ y J ^ ^ j^ e i^ J M ^ C ouncils as h o .th m o bilising centres o f th e arm ed struggle and p o p u la r org an isatio ns o f th e new rev o lu tio n ary governing p o w er estab lish ed on th e rum s o t th e o c c u p atio n al regim e o f th e invaders and th e pre-w ar regim e o f th e old exploiting P eo p les p o w er as em b o d ied in the A lbanian C o n stitu tio n was n o t, th e re fo re , g rafted on to the in stitu tio n s o f pre-w ar so ciety n o r even developed as a radical m o d ificatio n o f them . It was estab lish ed a fte r a clean sw eep in w hich th e w hole g o v ernm ental a p p a ratu s o f the old ruling class h ad been b ru sh ed aside. This was the lesson M arx had draw n from tht^ experience o f th e Paris C om m u n i^ ^ -th a i-il. was n o t enough for the w orking class to lay ho ld o f the state m achine o f the bourgeoisie: th e y m u st sm ash it an d create th eir ow n organs m p r o le ta n a r^ a o w e n All the m ajo r d em o cratic organisations w hich enable the A lbanian w o rk in g m asses to exercise state p o w er originated and developed in th e h ea t o f n atio n al struggle. As th e y came into being in answ er to the n a tio n al n eed th e y w ere te ste d in the fires o f th e lib era tio n w ar involving the w hole people. O u t o f th e N atio n al L ib era tio n G eneral C ouncil grew the P eoples A ssem bly; an d the N a tio n al L ib eratio n C o m m ittee ap p o in ted by th e C ouncil becam e the G o v ern m en t, Prim e M inister an d C abinet, elected by the A ssem bly. T he N ational L iberation C ouncils at village, d istrict a n d city levels developed in to th e P eo p les C ouncils w hich are the local organs o f state pow er. T he N a tio n al L ib era tio n F ro n t, set up at Peza in 1942, as a mass o rg an isatio n including all th o se, regardless o f ideo logical, regional o r religious differences, w ho w ere p re p are d to join in th e anti-fascist w ar u n d e r the leadership o f the G eneral C ouncil, diversified in to various mass organisations such as th e D e m o c ratic F ro n t, the T rade U nions, the L ab o u r Y outh U n io n , th e A lbanian W om ens U nion and o th e r 99

v o lu n tary groupings. T he en tire legislative ac tio n o f the g o vernm ent is carried on w ith the active p a rtic ip a tio n o f these m ass organisations in one o r m ore o f w hich all w orkers find a place. In d eed th e fu n d a m e n tal law o f the A lbanian S ta te C o n stitu tio n was on ly ap p ro v ed a fte r th e m ost m eticu lo u s ex a m in a tio n b y w orkers organised in th ese mass fronts. T he general fram ew ork o f governm ent is dem ocratically based on th e m ass organisations, b u t w h a t anim ates th e entire s tru c tu re , gives life to all these in stitu tio n s o f p o p u la r rule an d provides a d irec tio n fo r A lbanian society as a w hole is th e P arty . It is th e re sp o n sib ility o f the A lbanian P arty o f L ab o u r to keep sociahst.m alitkis. the^MLtjcs_ojL_m 2Lkiii class leadership in c o m m an d o f all aspects o f d ev e lo p m e n t, flo w ever d e m o cratic th e C o n stitu tio n as fo rm u la te d , the only g u aran tee against th e g ro w th _ o t_ _ b u re aucracy an d the fo rm atio n o l a new class o f exijjoilgrs_is the P arty. T he P arty is th e social conscience o f th e workintLxlass. T he A lbanian sta te is th e governm ental expression o f w orking class ru le th e d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t, w hich sim ply m eans co m p lete dem ocracy for the w orking masses an d violent o p p o sitio n to th eir enem ies. N o o th e r form o f state can build socialism an d prev en t the re sto ra tio n o f capitalism . T he d ictato rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t is essential for ex p ro p riatin g the possessions o f th e ex p lo iters an d liq u id a t ing private p ro p e rty w hich is th e source o f ex p lo ita tio n . It is also essential fo r p ro te c tin g th e victories o f the socialist rev o lu tio n fro m enem ies inside and ou tsid e the co u n try , z'" T he G o v e rn m en t w hich cam e in to being a fte r th e first real d em o cratic elections on D ecem ber 2. 1945. en a c te d a series o f m easures ol a socialist, th a t is to say, an ti-cap italist and anti-feudalist character. All th e u n equal agreem ents contra c te d w ith o th e r co u n trie s b y fo rm er regim es w ere ab rogated. T he p ro p e rty o f foreign capitalists and war crim inals was confiscated. T he agrarian reform laws based on th e p rinciple o f land to th e tille r re d istrib u te d th e holdings o f big lan d lo rd s. All in d u strial p lants an d m ines were n atio n alised w ith o u t co m p en sa tio n creating a new socialist sec to r in th e ec o n o m y . F oreign trad e and the p ro d u c tio n and d istrib u tio n o f th e industrial o u tp u t w ere b ro u g h t u n d er state 100

co n tro l. L egislation was passed on co n d itio n s o f w ork, length o f th e w o rk in g day and p aid holidays w hich am o u n te d to a c h a rter o f e m an c ip atio n fo r the w orking m asses. A t th e sam e tim e th e w orking class u n d er P arty leadership and th e b ro a d m asses o f th e peo p le w ere m obilised to d efen d th e socialist sta te from th re a te n e d invasion by its im m ediate n eig hbours and from th e aggressive in te n tio n s o f the im perialist pow ers, taking the form e ith e r o f d irect arm ed in te rv e n tio n o r o f subversion th ro u g h re a c tio n a ry elem ents inside th e c o u n try . * Class struggle does n o t cease even afte r th e liq u id a tio n -o f th e e x p lo itin g classes. It sim ply takes d iffe re n t form s as the b attle b etw een th e ideas, custom s an d h a b k s of Lhe old e x p lo ita tive society and the ideals and as^iialioiIg^L L h^JllIiv

socjahsTnianjs^ju^EOIuOSSEr^TIIEmjj^ijililjilOEtjTI^-

As lo n g as there exist any groups inside the c o u n try in te re ste d in th e re sto ra tio n o f capitalism , as long as there exist im perialist co u n tries anxious to o v erth ro w the socialist o rd er by o p e n o r h id d en aggression, as long as th ere exists the T ro jan H orse o f revisionism , th e state o f th e p ro letarian d ictato rsh ip rem ains a necessity if a c o u n try like A lbania is to rem ain socialist. Class struggle transcends sta te b oundaries and appears on the in te rn a tio n a l, scene as the struggle b etw een capitalist ancf socialist co u n trie s and b etw een im perialist and colonial o r neo-colonial co u n tries. A lbania plays its p a rt in this gigantic (o n llic t, n o t o nly d eten d in g its ow n lib e rty b u t actively p articip atin g in th e progress o f hum an so ciety generally. T he socialist state has th e fu n c tio n o f stren g th en in g ties o f fraternal frien d sh ip w ith co u n trie s based on the sam e socialist principles an d o f su p p o rtin g everyw here the rev olutionary n ational lib e ra tio n m ovem ents against im perialist oppression. F or A lb an ia to rem ain socialist, defend itself ;> plav a nr\ m instructive role in in te rn a tio n a l affairs th e state requires the direct p a rtic ip a tio n o f th e people the w orking class, the in o p e ra tiv e p easan try and the po p u lar intelligentsia m n sliliilin g very__neaily th e w hole o f society. N o t only do the Working p eo p le ow n th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , th ey m ust in lively d irec t eco n o m ic, cu ltu ral and p o litical developm ent. I In socialist sta te ca n n o t even be conceived ap a rt from this
101

d irect p a rtic ip a tio n o f the m asses and t he C o n stitu tio n is d esigned to insure th a t such p a rtic ip a tio n occurs at every level an d in every d e p a rtm e n t o f ^ o v ern m rn t. i l has already led to th e discovery o f tale n te d organisers am ong th e w orkers a n d peasants w hose abilities have stren g th en e d th e state ap p a ratu s in th e service o f th e people. S T h e n ro ix ss b y w hich t he p.e_QE>le_ have the fullest o p p o r\ t l i n i t v o f p v p r p c c in a w ill f j y p l v n n p y p fy

d ev elo p m en t and this expression is th e n co-ordin a te d by the po y en im en t in decisions w hich are fed b ack to the p eople fo r im ja le m e n ta tio rw s c a lle d ^ D e m o cratic ce n tra lism is n o t o n ly th e organisational principle o f th e s ta te ap p aratu s ot the FOplt1'^! K ttpuPiic o l A lbania, it is also the org an isational p rincip e o f e v e r y r e m " e s e n t ^ ated w ith th e state a p p aratu s and th e A lbanian P a r t v o f L ab o u r itself. T he ce n tralisatio n o f th e socialist state is n o t a c o n c e n tra tio n o f sta te fu n c tio n s in an in te rd e p e n d e n t b u re a u c ratic co m p lex , n o r is its link w ith d em o cratic p ractice lim ited to a p erio d ic electoral m a n d ate from th e people. It is a c o n tin u o us process o f th e d e m o c ra tisa tio n o f every legislative and executive act ol governm ent according to tne fu n d a m e n tal socialist rule o f th e m ass line from the m asses, to th e m asses. D em o cratic centralism is th e organisational form o f this fu n d a m e n tal m ass line w hich M ao T setu n g h a s d escribed as tjie socialist n e cessity to go to th e m asses an d learn fro m th e m , synthesise th e ir e x p e rie n c e _ J n to _ b&Lier artic u lated _ E im ip ie s an d " m e th o d s, then do__nropapa n d a am ong th e m asses, an d call u p o n them to _ p u tth e s e p r inciples
p r o h le m s and

help ...them achieve lib era tio n and h ap p in ess. It is to e n c o u r age th is social process w hich is re p e a te d over a n d over again w ith resp ect to all th e specific ec o n o m ic and political resp o n sib ilities o f th e socialist state th a t d em o cratic c e n tra l ism has been estab lish ed as th e o p eratio n al basis o f governI m en t. O ne check o n u n d e m o c ra tic p ro ced u res is th e o b ligation o l th e state tn observe socialist legality as set o u t in the C o n s titu tio n rigorously a n d u n co n d itio n ally . T he C on s titu tio n fixes th e co m p eten ce o f th e various state organs an a insures th e suprem acy o f th e p o p u larly elected P eo p les 102

A ssem bly w h ich is th e source o f all ju ridical n orm s regulating th e m o st im p o rta n t relatio n s o f social life. Every citizen having co m p leted eighteen years o f age, regardless o t sex, econom ic s ta tus, social p o sitio n , religious belief or anv o th e r co n sid eratio n , enjoys th e right to elect an d be elected to an y elective b o d y in th e s ta te . E lectors vote directly to r th eir representatives w h e th e r as m em bers o f a village co u n cil, as p e o p le s judges or as d ep u ties o f the P eo p les A ssem bly itself. P olling is done secretly by sealed b allo t in special b o o th s and is u n d e r th e supervision o f electo ral co m m itte es a p p o in te d b y th e m ass organisations o f th e D em o cratic F r o n t trad e unions, y o u th an d w o m e n s associations a n d th e w orking collectives o f in d u strial e n te r prises, ag ricu ltu ral co-operatives, gov ern m en t m inistries, arm y u n its and so on. T hese same m ass organisations o f w orkers have th e right to p re sen t any o f th eir m em bers as candidates. N o tax es, g u aran tees o r deposits are d em an d ed o f candidates n o r o f th e o rg anisations n o m in atin g them . A t o re-electoral m eetin g s, c h a racterised by a spirit o f criticism an d selfcriticism , th e p a st activities o f all th e can d id ates fo r a p artic u lar p o st a re th o ro u g h ly discussed angTin^'v o TuTcd E to give a. full a c c o u n t o f th eir w o rk . The w in n er o f I h r elec tio n is th e ca n d id a te receiving o n e m ore v o te th a n half the n u m b er o f electors registered in th a t p artic u la r c o n stitu e n cy and p a rtic ip a tio n in th e votin g is nearly ] 00%. T he n o m in a tio n o f E nver H o x h a as a can d id ate fo r d e p u ty to th e P eo p les A ssem bly b y T iran a c o n stitu e n c y n u m b e r 219 in J u ly , 1970, to o k th e same fo rm as any o th e r n o m in atio n s in th a t o r any o th e r elections in A lbania since the w ar. His p roposer p o in te d o u t th e significance o f Enver H o x h a s n o m in atio n from th e very d istric t in w hich he h ad fo u n d ed I lie A lbanian P a rty 29 years b efo re. In his electio n speech th e follow ing S ep tem b er, Enver H oxha p o in te d o u t th a t this was the seventh tim e th e peo p le had elected d em o cratically th e ir representatives to the IVoples A ssem bly, casting th eir votes fo r the candidates o f the D em o cratic F ro n t know ing th a t these are am ong th eir best sons and d au g h ters an d th a t, b y voting fo r th em , th e y h.ivc v o ted fo r th e building o f socialism , for the freed o m and Independence o f th e H o m elan d , fo r its p ro sp e rity , fo r the 103

M arxist-L eninist line o f o u r P arty . . . . O n S ep tem b er 20 all th e peo p le o f socialist A lbania w ith o u t e x c e p tio n will go to th e polls a n d vote d irectly fo r th e persons th e y w ish to send to the P eo p les C ouncils, to th e P eo p les C o u rts o f J u stic e an d to th e P eo p les A ssem bly, th u s ratify in g the state pow er w hich was b o rn to them from th e barrel o f th e rifle in the course o f th e ir n atio n al struggle. . . . D uring th e election cam paign the w orking peo p le draw up a balance sheet of th eir creative w o rk , p o in tin g o u t th e g o o d and negative aspects o f th e w ork an d th o se w ho have p erfo rm ed it, criticising w eaknesses and shortcom ings, ad o p tin g and u p h o ld in g progress m ade an d p ro m o tin g to g o v ern m en t posts th o se d ev o ted to ceasclcss re v o lu tio n ary advance. T h e people d o this in o p en , public an d free m eetings w ith o u t th e least o b stacle a n d w ith o u t any tim id ity . T h ey have w on the p o litical right an d achieved th e m a tu rity to h o ld to a c co u n t all w ho err, to pass ju d g e m e n t o n all culprits, to praise and encourage th o se w ho w o rk well. T h ey are fully conscious o f the real force o f o u r p ro leta rian d e m o c ra c y . T he e lec to ral cam paign is an im p o rta n t p a rt o f the rev o lu tio n ary political activ ity o f th e A lbanian p eo p le; but th e relatio n s b etw e en th e p eople an d th eir representatives do n o t en d w hen th e voting is over an d the elec ted deputies receive th eir m an d ate . T he dep u ties have to m aintain c o n tin u o u s c o n ta c t w ith th o se w ho have elected them and re p o rt to them in detail at th e en d o f every session. E lectors have th e rig h t to dism iss a rep resen tativ e an d elect som eone else. This initiative can be ta k e n e ith e r by the electors o f the c o n stitu e n c y o r b y th e mass organisation o f w orkers w hich originally p re sen ted th e re p re se n ta tiv e s can d id atu re. T he P eo p les A nr pan stalc now er. is e lected every fo u r years o n t h e basis o f one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r every 8 0 0 0 in h ab itan ts. I t is an executive b o d y as w ell as legislative, supervising th e ap p licatio n o f th e laws it e n a c ts. Its acts are n o t subject to co n sid eratio n , am en d m e n t n o r alte ra tio n by any o th e r b o d y . I t elects the P raesidium o f the A ssem bly, th e G o v ern m en t, th e High C o u rt o f the R epublic, th e A tto rn e y G eneral an d his d ep u ties. I t also appoints co m m ittees to deal w ith such specific m a tte rs as th e budget, various social q uestions o r foreign affairs. T h ere are norm ally

tw o sessions a y ear b u t e x tra o rd in ary sessions m ay be c a l l e d ^ on th e in itiative o f th e P raesidium or at the req u est o f one th ird o f th e d eputies. T h e Praesidium , as th e p erm a n en t organ o f the A ssem bly, exercises th e lu n ctio n s o f a collective state leadership, calling tK T sessions o f th e A ssem bly, lixing electio n dates, deciding on th e co m p atib ility ot laws w ith the C o n stitu tio n , aw ard in g d ec o ratio n s, ap p o in tin g envoys, choosing. _the.. su p rem e co m m an d o f th e arm ed forces an d declaring a s ta te o f w a rm case o f aggression against A lbania. In all these tasks it is d irectly responsible to th e P e o p le s A ssem bly w hich elects it a n d can dism iss it at any tim e. The G o v ern m en t o f th e P eo p les R epublic is also ap p o in te d an d dism issed b v j.h e P e o p les Assem bly! J i . does n o t c o n s titu te a separate and in d ep en d e n t a u th o rity b u t m u st ren d er an ac co u n t to th e p o p u la r fo ru m o f all its activities. A t th e first session o f eacb new ly-elected A ssem bly the existing prim e m in ister ten d ers th e resignation o f his ca b in e t; and if accep ted , th e A ssem bly chooses one o f its m em bers as prim e m in ister and charges him w ith th e d u ty o f form ing a new ca b in et w hich has to be approved by th e A ssem bly. T he G o v ern m en t draw s up th e general eco n o m ic plan and p resents th e b u d g et, directs the m o n etary system , defends die c o n stitu tio n a l o rd e r and the rights o f citizens and co n d u cts relatio n s w ith foreign pow ers. _ T he p o p u la r c h a rac te r o f th e G o v ern m en t finds expression in its pro g ram m e w hich in resp ect to b o th in tern a l and ex tern al p o licy reflects and safeguards the in terests o f the peo ple, o f th e w orking m asses. T he m ain task o f the program m e in tern a lly is to develop fu rth e r the p ro d u ctiv e loices by increasing in d u strial and agricultural o u tp u t, to develop socialist relatio n s o f p ro d u c tio n , d eep en the socialist in v o lu tio n in th e id r o lo d r a l and c u l t u r a l spheres ami <onso lid ate p e o p les p o w er an d t he m oral an d political u n ity ol l he p eo p le aro u n d th e h a rty and G o v ern m en t. T h e foreign policy o f th e p rogram m e aims at guaranteeing n atio n al in d ep en d en ce and sovereignty against any danger from abro ad , stren g th en in g th e friendship, co llab o ratio n an d m utual aid w ith th e peoples o f o th e r socialist co u n tries, M ipporting th e re v o lu tio n ary n atio n al lib era tio n struggles o f 105

th e op p ressed peoples, ex ten d in g relatio n s w ith co untries o f d iffe re n t social system s based on th e principles o f eq u ality , n o n -in terv e n tio n in each o th e rs in te rn a l affairs, m u tu a l resp ect and p ro fit an d safeguarding real peace. T h e local organs o f state pow er are th e P eo p les C ouncils w hich to g e th e r w ith th e P eo p les A ssem bly c o n stitu te tfre p o litic a l basis o f ^ A lb a n ia - T hese C ouncils fo r villages, districts, tow ns a n d city q u arters are elec te d fo r three yeays by th e sam e voting p ro c ed u re as t h e A ssem bly. Each C ouncil calls p erio d ic mTings to re p o rt on its activities to the e lec to rate and renders an a c c o u n t to th e n e x t C ouncil above it in geographical im p o rtan ce . All m em bers are subject to dism issal by the electo rs an d th e w hole C ouncil can be dissolved if th e p eo p le feel it has n o t deserved th eir co n fid en ce. T he duties o f th e C ouncils are to direct the eco n o m ic a n d cu ltu ral activity w ith in th eir ju risd ictio n , gu a r a n t y DUBTr ~ ol'dl'l and thu fright* oihgww a n d U fa|kc resp o n sib ility for, realising th e econom ic nla and administering th e local b u d g et. T he executive c o m m itte e o f the C ouncil is chosen a i i h o five Lmeetimr a ire r ele c tio n . J u s tic e in A lbania is ad m in istered by the High C o u rt and by D istrict C ourts. T he High C o u rt is a p p o in te d by the P eo p les A ssem bly fo r fo u r y ear periods an d the D istrict C o u rts are elected by the P eo p les C ouncils for a term o f th ree years. These co u rts p ro te c t from violation the socialist system an d socialist p ro p e rty , th e political social and eco n o m ic rights o f th e peo p le and th e personal and p ro p e rty rights to w hich th e y are e n titled , m e co u rts m u st, on th e o n e~ h an d , Tigh t against tne in tern al enem ies o f socialism .id th rev o lu tio n ary violence an d , o n th e o th e r, edu cate the w o rk in g m asses in th e spirit o f d is c ip lin e -socialist legality an d socialist e thics. C an d id ates to b ecom e p e o p le s judges and d e p u ty judges are p ro p o se d b y th e various m ass organisations and associ atio n s o f w o rkers like any o th e r candidates and are su b ject to dism issal on th e sam e term s as o th e r representatives w ho fail to retain th e co n fid en ce o f th e people. T he w hole legal system is supervised a n d ad m in iste red b y the A tto rn e y s O ffice w hich is an organ o f th e P eo p les A ssem bly responsible fo r th e ju s t and un ifo rm ap p licatio n o f the laws. D istrict 106

A tto rn e y s arc a p p o in te d b y this O ffice to carry o u t the same fu n c tio n locally. T he d em o cratic ch a rac te r o f the judicial system is secured b y th e fact th a t judges and d e p u ty judges are elected and can be dism issed bv th e p o p u lar assem blies, th at th e y are electe^l fro m am ong th e w o rk in g m asses and th a t th ey are h elp ed in t h eir tasks b v a ^ s t a n t ^ j u d g e s w h o are ordinary citizens serving 15 days a y ear in..a...judicial capacity w ith the sam e rights and resp o n sibilities and having the same w eight o f ju d g em en t as th e elecltLiuilges. ' This e m p lo y m e n t o f assistant judges assures the p a rtic i p a tio n o f th e b ro a d m asses in the ad m in istratio n o f ju stice b o th to enable them to becom e fam iliar w ith the ju d icial process an d to enable the verdicts o f the courts to b en e fit from th e conscience o f the w orking class. W hat is thus achieved is n o t ju stic e o n b eh alf o f the people by th o se w ho conceal th eir ow n class in terests u n d er a show o f legal professionalism , b u t ju stice by the people them selves the in stitu tio n a lisa tio n o f those p o p u lar co u rts in violently rev o lu tio n ary situ atio n s w hen p eople w ho have been tram p led on fo r centuries take ju stic e in to th eir ow n hands a n d deal su m m arily w ith class oppressors w hose crim es only J th ey can ju dge. In so far as th e co u rts o f justice in villages and tow ns deal w ith n o n -an tag o n istic co n trad ic tio n s am ong th e people,,jEsTt is. conflicts w hich do n o t have th e ir o rigin in irreco n cilab le ( lass d ifferences, t h r v rry p r o c e s s o f d eb a tin g th ese issues in aT* d em o cratic w ay_and_nassing iudg e m e n l j r u v h i d i ^ ^ are involved plavs an educative role in enabling th e masses increasingly to resolve such c o n tra d ictio n s am ong th e m selves. More and m o re cases o t this kind are h an d led by peo p le m llieir ow n collectives at places o f w o rk or residence ju s t as die shrinking n u m b e r o f p e tty crim es against personal or socialist p ro p e rty are dealt w ith collectively on th e basis of criticism an d self-criticism w ith o u t reco u rse to th e police. T he d em o cratisatio n , w hich is to say th e re v o lu tio n isin g. 'iljJic u ^ M aZ X a iZl^TTm g sim ple civilian conflicts in creating die co n d itio n s fo r th e masses to exercise th e ir leading and supervisory ro lp w ith respect to t h e judicial system , is also a Li:i> in th e fight against b u reaucracy. In re cen t years a b ro a d 107

p u b lic discussion has ta k e n placc to sim plify th e laws, m ake th em m o re u n d ersta n d ab le and divest th em o f a p u rely official ch aracter. A j h a n i a n law a s s e r ts th e leadership o f th e P arty over the c o u rts o f justice an d subjects th em to th e criticism and superv isio n o f th e w ork in g m asses. T he prin cip le o f th e ab so lu te in d ep en d en c e o f th e co u rts o f justice, w hich is sim p ly a c o n stitu tio n a l device to r concealing th eir real c l ^ s ch a ra c te r, is re p laced b y th e fran k re co g n itio n o f th e ju d icial s ^ s te m a s a n m s tiU iU o n jj tl^ n o T ^ re te n H Tng to stan d a b o v e c lassesL above society, b u t o p en ly serving th e in tere sts o f th e w orking class. * T E T "various organs o f th e A lbanian sta te and th e C on s titu tio n itself do n o t im pose a d em o cratic ch a rac te r on the c o u n try ; th e y reflect and m ake ex p licit th e d em ocracy in h e re n t in th e d ictato rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t established by th e w o rk in g m asses u n d e r th e leadership o f th e A lbanian P a rty o f L a b o u r in th e re v o lu tio n ary w ar w hich n o t only [expelled ex tern al invaders b u t also d estro y e d th e in tern a l [basis o f ex p lo itin g classes. T he governm ent o f A lbania (expresses th e p o litical p o w e r o f th e b ro a d w ork in g m asses land has n o o th e r in tere sts th a n th o se o f th e w o rk in g m asses [on w hose s u p p o rt and p a rtic ip a tio n it ab so lu tely relies. T he d ictato rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t c a n n o t be stren g th en e d and th e all rounrL devclo p m e n t o f socialist d em o cracy ca n n o t be realised w ith o u t a d eterm in e d struggle against h n re an cra^ x o o ts o f th e regressive an d co u n ter-re v o lu tio n ary p rocess w h ich has t aken nl are in certain erstw hile socialist c o u n tries like th e Soviet U nion and_the_J^ast. E u ro p ean T e o p le s R e p u b lics n ^ g j^ b c sought in th e gradual hnreauc ra tisa tio n o f th e socialist sta te ap p a ratu s, in its e s tra n g e m e n t from th e b ro ad m asses and in th e c r c a tio n .o f -a privileged class o f b u rc a u ia ls. B u rea u cra cy , as E nver H o x h a explained in his re p o rt to th e F ifth C ongress o f th e P arty in 1966, is a co n seq u en ce o f alien influences in h e rite d from th e o ld feudal a n d b o urgeois sta te m ach in ery , from th e detaching o f som e cadres a n d organs from the m asses, from th e blind ap p lica tio n o f foreign experience w ith o u t taking in to con sid eratio n th e co n c rete c o n d itio n s o f o u r co u n try , fro m the cu ltu ral backw ardness in h erited fro m th e p ast, fro m the 108

pressure o f bourgeois an d revisionist ideology, from th e lack l l o f lo o k in g a t pro blem s from a p o litical angle. E nver H o x h a in th a t sam e very im p o rta n t speech a t th e F ifth C ongress w e n t on to say: F u n d am en tally o u r P arty line on state building and o n the general o rie n ta tio n o f p e o p le s p ow er has b een co rrec t. B ut in o u r p ractical activity there have o cc u rre d m an y b u re a u c ra tic d isto rtio n s an d s h o rt com ings, such as su b o rd in atio n o f elected to executive organs, exaggerated form alism in the o p eratio n o f elected organs, excessive c o n c e n tra tio n o f co m p ete n ce in a few h ands, relying fo r everything o n th e ad m in istratio n , lim it atio n o f th e active p a rtic ip a tio n o f th e m asses in th e so lu tio n o f state a n d social problem s and in the c o n tro l o f state organs, b u re a u c ra tic d isto rtio n s in socialist legislation. . . . T h erefo re th e m easures a d o p te d by th e P arty fo r the erad icatio n o f red tap e m ust n o t be seen as m easures o f a sim ple org an isational an d technical c h a rac te r fo r the elim i n atio n o f certain shortcom ings and gaps in th e w o rk o f state organs b u t as m easures having a deep political ch aracter, because th e struggle against red tap e is o n e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t aspects o f the class struggle in o u r c o u n try at the p resen t tim e . T he fig h t against b u reau cracy has to go deep because its ro o ts are deep. This c o n c e p t o f th in k in g , E nver H o x h a ex p lain ed in a la te r speech o n th e revolutionising o f P arty and G o v ern m en t, th e idealistic ideology o f b u reaucratism , is . . . th e ideology o f m in o rity class rule over th e m ajo rity an ideology w hich th e m in o rity inculcates in to th e m inds and conscience o f th e m ajo rity th ro u g h c u ltu re , ed u catio n , politics a n d m orals in o rd e r to m ake it th eir seco n d n a tu re , a m anner o f life, th o u g h t and a c tio n . This is ih r m s n n w h y ' f is necessary, as m u st be considered in m ore d etail, to exjgm i l [it d ictato rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t intojhe_jdi2lagiaL ja]Ia ' 'I e d u c atio n , etlucs and th e arts gen erally .w h ere bourgeois u.iys o f th in k in g h a v e J i i e i j ^ j ^ U e s L i ^ revolu tion w hich co m p lem en ts th e revolu tio n ising o f th e econgjjnc hiisc o t so ciety Som e o f th e m easures ta k e n u n d er the leadership o f t h e A lbanian P arty o f L a b o u r in th e fight against b u reau cracy ' y t e in-: cu rtailin g h ig her salaries to establish a m ore lust ra tio o f

incom es, p a rtic ip a tio n o f cadres, ad m in istrativ e personnel, in tellectu als an d stu d en ts directly in m anual lab o u r side by side w ith w orkers and farm ers, system atic circ u latio n of cadres from th e cen tre to the grass ro o ts and b ack again, placing cadres, P arty m em bers and all state em ployees u n d er th e rigorous supervision o f th e w orking m asses, ap p licatio n o f th e .principle o f democratic centralism against anv sy m p to m s o bureaucratic centralism and im p ro v em en t o f the m e th o d an d style o f w ork by trea tin g all state an d econom ic p ro b lem s not t'rom the sta n d p o in t ol' te c h n o c ra c y and _________ ' _____ econom ist]_________ an d ideology, alw ays keeping p ro le ta ria n politics in th e fo refro n t. T h e fig ht a gainst b u re au cracy an d th e m easures fn r im proving th e style o f w o rk o f th e w hole state an n a ratn s axe n o t a te Tnnnrarv-.cam paign. T h ey are an essential p a rt o f the co n tin u in g struggle to preserve state p ow er in th e h an d s_ af the w o r k i n g m a s s p s and to p rev en t th e d eg en eratio n o f th e state in to th e d ictato rsh ip o f a new privileged class. lh is struggle was raised to a higher level follow ing the F ifth C ongress o f th e P arty in 1966. T he process o f th e rev o lu tio n ising o f th e w hole life o f th e c o u n try o n the prin cip le o f the greatest possible mass involvem ent has n o t only stren g th en e d the eco n o m ic base o f so ciety b u t has led to p ro fo u n d developm ents o f a social, political and id eo logical n a tu re as well. T he A lbanian peo p le have acquired n ew ex p erience con cern in g h o w to b a r the w ay to revisionism and th e re sto ra tio n o f capitalism a n d how to ensure the c o n tin u e d m arch o f the rev o lu tio n to its final v icto ry in full com m unism . It is as a re su lt o f these developm ents in th e fu rth e r rev o lu tio n ising o f th e life o f the c o u n try th a t in th e R e p o rt on th e A ctivity o f the C entral C o m m ittee su b m itte d by E nver H o x h a to th e S ix th C ongress o f th e P arty o f L a b o u r o f A lb an ia h eld in T iran a a t th e beginning o f N ovem ber, 1971, th e p ro p o sal was m ade fo r th e d ra ftin g o f a new c o n stitu tio n . T he R e p o rt w hich the Congress un an im o u sly a d o p te d says: V iew ed th ro u g h th e prism o f th ese deep rev olutionary changes, th e C o n stitu tio n in force, in spite o f later 110

am en d m en ts a n d ad d itio n s, has becom e o u td a te d in m any fu n d a m e n ta l aspects and no longer reflects the socialist re ality in A lb an ia to d a y . T h e re fo re , th e C entral C o m m ittee o f th e P a rty proposes th e d ra ftin g o f a new c o n stitu tio n ap p ro p ria te to th e p re sen t stage o f th e c o u n try s develop m e n t, to th e new re ality , so th a t, as a c o m p o n e n t p a rt o f th e p o litica l su p e rstru c tu re , it m ay serve th e econom ic base an d th e w hole socialist dev elo p m en t o f society b e tte r. T h e refram ing o f th e C o n s titu tio n will be a step o f great th e o re tic a l and p ra ctical im p o rtan ce fo r th e stre n g th ening a n d fu rth e r im p ro v em en t o f th e state o f the d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t in o u r co u n try . T he new C o n s titu tio n will serve as a ju rid ical basis fo r the state o rg an isatio n an d legislation re q u ired by th e p re sen t stage o f o u r socialist co n stru c tio n . It m u st be a ju rid ical, po litical a n d ideological d o c u m e n t w hich co m pletely reflects th e line o f the P arty em b o d ied in o u r revolu tio n a ry p ractice and inspires th e w orking p eople in the struggle fo r the co m p lete c o n stru c tio n o f a socialist s o c ie ty . r here was n o th in g w rong w ith the existing c o n stitu tio n during th e p erio d in w hich it has re flected th e co n so lid atio n o f n atio n al in d ep en d e n ce a fte r th e War and th e first stages o f building socialism . In term s o f p o litica l m a tu rity th e A lbanian people have sim ply o u tg ro w n it. rJ h e _ ^ ] i^ > o fii< 0 ulM i> i dem o cracy has b een succeeded_by_the p h ase o f full socialism w ith th e w o rk in g class playing th e leading role .rm t-Q nly m jliticallv an d econom ically h u L cn ltu rallv as well. T he im plications o f th ese p ro fo u n d social developm ents require expression in a n ew d o c u m e n t w hich will be a m ilepost in the advance o f th e A lbanian peo p le along th e ro ad to com m unism .

Ill

C h ap ter T en

The Party
A ny place o n e goes in A lbania, to w n or c o u n try sid e , coastal plain or m o u n tain s, one sees, p a in te d on fa c to ry walls, in scribed on co lo u rfu l banners stru n g across stree ts, pick ed o u t in flow ers o f d iffe re n t hues in garden cities like V lo ra or d ep icted in w hite-w ashed rocks high up on a hillside, the slogan, L ong Live the A lbanian P arty o f L a b o u r! This is the n atu ra l expression o f a p e o p le s p rid e and co n fid en ce in an o rg an isation w ith o u t w hich th e victorious lib era tio n w ar, the successes o f th e drive to w a rd socialism and, indeed, the w hole p ro sp ero u s, co-operative fabric o f life in A lb an ia to d ay w o u ld be inconceivable. T he p erio d since the fo u n d in g o f the P arty o f L ab o u r in 1941 is the m o st b rillia n t in the long sto ry o f th e A lbanian p eople, realising M arxs ob serv atio n th a t socialism is th e beginning o f h isto ry , true h isto ry m ade by m en consciously pursuing th eir aims in co -o p era tio n ; and ev ery thing b efo re, the w hole dark period o f class-divided societies based on e x p lo ita tio n , is prehistoric. In the c o n stitu tio n o f the P eo p les R epublic o f A lbania th ere is on ly one reference to th e P arty , in A rticle 21 w hich g u arantees to citizens th e right to jo in social organisations. T hese include th e D em o cratic F ro n t, the trade unions, the co-operatives, organisations o f y o u th an d o f w om en, organis ations fo r sp o rt an d defen ce, o r cu ltu ral, scien tific and tech n ical societies. F inally th e m ore active and conscientious citizens o f th e w ork in g class a n d o f the w o rk in g m asses jo in th e ranks o f the A lbanian P arty o f L ab o u r, th e vanguard o rg an isation o f th e w ork in g class an d o f all th e w orking m asses in th e ir endeavours to b u ild th e bases o f socialism and th e leading nucleus o f all th e organisations o f th e w orking m asses, social as w ell as th e s ta te . B ut this b rie f m ention 112

describes im p licitly th e P arty o f L a b o u rs vital role as th e sole directin g an d leading force in the socialist system o f p ro le ta ria n d ictato rsh ip . T h i s f o r c e r e sts on t h e P a rty s close an d p erm a n en t tie,s w ith th e w orking m asses. In th e daily rev o lu tio n ary experience o f th e m asses, by th e ir su p p o rt and opinions, the P arty tests th e ju stic e a n d validity o f its decisions, enriches its ow n ex p erien ce an d gets th e necessary in sp iratio n to c o n tin u e its advance. In com pliance w ith th e aspirations o f the m asses th e P arty issues directives and in stru ctio n s o n im p o rta n t political, eco n o m ic, social, cu ltu ral a n d organisational questions. T hus its in flu en ce in te rp e n e tra te s an d flows th ro u g h all the sta te organs, m ak in g itself felt as a c o n s ta n t pressure guiding th e w hole so ciety along th e ro a d to socialism . N o t p a rt o f th e state organs d efined in the C o n s titu tio n /) th e P arty was th e in itiatin g force in elab o ratin g th e C o n -/ s titu tio n a n d p resen tin g it to the C o n s titu e n t A ssem bly. T he in 11| i n i rr ivf th>< P arty nn the activities m(' the State is exerted p rim arily th ro u g h th e P arty i r r m h r n m-..y h P tr> com m an d in g posts in the state_a 2 aratu s and are to be fo u n d at R H alt levels in th e gov ernm ental and legal stru c tu re , bringing to wRatever**poslUoh LllCV UWUflV H'ie'a'Tded jg ai Ulltl llKidersfnp w hich th eir f a r ty m em b ership enables th em .to e xert th jis bre a th ing in to th e w hole state edifice th e directive in sp iratio n o f :h e raiTy. " Ill UT tf r to im p lem en t this puidin^ role the P^irty crejp fs b ran ch es in all th e e lec ted organs o f th e p e o p le s d em ocratic K overnm ent a n d m all th e industrial, co-operative and social organisatTonsTTt is the d u ty _ o fjiie s e i^ ranches_to_strengthen lhe P a rty s in ilu en ce and to ui)hold_its__poIicy anuinjLJliiise w ho are n o t f a r t y m em bers, tc^ stren g th ertso cialist discipline intl to p rc^ecu ie th e w ar again st b u reau cracy , to supervise i lie ex e cu tio n o t Party d irectives. T he leading role o t the Party over th e p eo p ie s d em o cratic state does n o t m ean at all th at P arty organs are su b stitu te d fo r th e corresp o n d in g I'.overnment organs. T he P a rty s acts are n o t juridical an d are iilv nhlicratcry fo r thncp citizens w h o are m em b ers.

W P

i the state organs since th e y d eterm in e th e gniaLLin_aad Ilie essential c o n te n t o f all th e actT T orm ulated and ex e cu ted 113

bv th e state. T h ey create th e very p o l i t i c a l rlim ate-in w hich th e st.at.el fu n ctio n ^. A nd in certain cases, w ith regard to q uestions vital to th e d ev elo p m en t o f the social o rd e r, the P arty issues directives jo in tly w ith the state organs, thus co n v ertin g th em in to ju rid ical acts w hich are binding o n all citizens. T he m o st im p o rta n t directives are th o se issued b y th e highest fo ru m o f the P arty o f L ab o u r its C ongress. T hese directives provide the basis for the m easures ad o p te d b v th e state organs fo r th e d ev elo p m en t o f th e c o u n try s social a n 4 iPQlitv(^LrTrrp*"* ......................... ""'*** > T h e P arty o f L a b o u r also plays a leadership role in resp ect to th e activities o f all th e mass organisations in the D em o cratic F ro n t. T h ey are th e P a rty s m o st im p o rta n t links w ith th e p eo p le and th ro u g h th e m the vital tw o-w ay process o f learning from th e p eople in o rd e r to teach and guide th em is c o n d u c te d ._Just as during th e w ar, in the early days o f the P arty , th e source o f its a n th n ritv wag thp q u ality rl' {{ ; < m em bers, com m unists alw ays being the first to u n d erta k e the m o st dangerous m issions and to m ain tain m orale in the face o f t h e gravest hardships, s o ^ jp , the p eriy ^ of snci^Ji^t E c o n stru c tio n th e w illingness o f com m unists to accen t ch eer fully tl-|p m o st a rd u o u s tasks, go w herever th e y are n eed ed m o st an d ex em p lify th e so cialist_ jn o rality _ o f p u ttin g th e rn llertiv p in tere st h efn re self-interest is the basis o f the P a rty s in fluence am ong th e masses* T h e co rrectness o f this close relatio n sh ip b etw een P arty and m ass o rganisations is illu stra te d by th e fact th a t in th o se co u n tries w hich have a b a n d o n ed socialism and are in the process o f resto rin g capitalism one o f th e steps ta k e n was tc> p roclaim th e in d ep en d en ce o f mass organisations fro m th e co m m u n ist p a rty , w hich in fa ct m ean t in d ep en d en ce from a p ro leta rian p o litical line. D escribed as freeing these organisations from politics it really involved c u ttin g th em o ff from p ro leta rian influence to allow th e m to fall u n d er bourgeois in flu en ce. As R am iz Alia, a p ro m in e n t m em ber o f the A lbanian P arty o f L a b o u r w ho has p lay ed a leading p a rt in m ass organisations has ex p lain ed : T he heg em o n y o f the p ro le ta ria t is necessarily linked w ith the existence o f the rev o lu tio n ary p a rty o f th e w o rk in g class. W ithout th e leading role o f th e p a rty th e hegem ony an d th e historic m ission ol 114

th e w o rk in g class are e m p ty phrases. The effo rts o f m o d ern revision ists to prove th a t th e h istoric m ission o f the w orking class and the_leadiniJ role o f th (^ _ c o m m u w s^ )a rty are_tw o d ifferen t th in g s, th a t th anks on ly to th e t d a c e i t o c c u p iej in th e system o f social p ro d u c tio n th e w orking class can plav its leadership role, even w ith o u t a M arxist-L eninlst p a r ty .or th ro u g h o th e r so-called w o rk e rs p a rtie s Mike th e R ritkh I L ab o u r T a rty ) wRich are in th e service o f th e bourgeoisie^ h ave n o th in g in com m on witfr T here are h isto rical a n d p o litical reasons w hy th ere have been n o o th e r p arties in A lbania from the tim e o f the fo u n d in g o f th e C o m m u n ist P arty , the A lbanian P arty o f L abour. D uring th e p erio d o f th e lib era tio n w ar, w hen the w idest possible alliance was so u g h t against th e fascist armies o f o cc u p atio n , it w ould have b ee n c o n so n a n t w ith a co rrec t M arxist-L eninist line fo r o th e r political parties to have been in clu d ed in th e N atio n al L ib era tio n F ro n t if th ey su p p o rted th e n atio n al resistance m o v em en t led by the C om m unist Party on b e h a lf o f th e w orking m asses. In fa ct A lbania is a rare exam ple o f a c o u n try in w hich, p rio r to th e creatio n o f the C o m m u n ist P arty , th ere ex isted n eith e r social d em o cratic n o r any o th e r bourgeois p arties. In the course o f the w ar various po litical groupings w hich m ight have c o n stitu te d parties d iscred ited them selves by co llab o ratio n w ith the enem y and th u s elim inated them selves from the anti-fascist coalition. A fte r lib era tio n , the rem n an ts o f th e old ex p lo itin g classes w ith th e s u p p o rt o f U n ited S tates and B ritish agents tried to establish a po litical p a rty w ith the aim o f underm ining the P eoples D em o cratic G overnm ent. B ut this a tte m p t at c re a t ing p o litical s u p p o rt for th e tin y m in o rity o f landow ners and capitalists was in such obvious a n d d irec t co n flic t w ith the ml crests o f th e overw helm ing m asses o f w orkers an d peasants th at it sto o d n o chance w h atev er o f succeeding. It is n o t surprising th a t th o se w ho b acked the fo rm atio n o f l he kind o f p o litical parties w hich could d isru p t a n d reverse the rev o lu tio n ary course o f th e c o u n try sh o u ld describe the absence o f o th e r p arties as u n d e m o c ra tic . T he dem ocratic i h aracter o f a state is n o t d em o n stra te d by th e n u m b e r o f its_^ in )li~lical n a m e s , n o r by th e v ariety, o t cunn ingly-devised 115

program m es o ffered to th e public, n o r by noisy elec to ral


c a m p a i g n s anH H p m a o n g i r a l j T r n r n k p ^ ^ ^ to

m ake anv real difference h o w ever th e jaeo p le vote. It is d eterm in ed h v w h e t h e r th e class in p o w er is th a t o f w orkers jfv or ex p lo iters, w h e th e r state ac tiv ity serves the in tere sts o f a privileged m i n o r i t y rw nino a H i s n r o n o r t i n n a t r am o u n t o f t | ] e sources o f w e a lth o r ra-.icc,-c prrvti.r-p t h a t w ealth. A lbanian experience has proved th a t a M arxistL eninist p a rty o f th e w ork in g class w hose in tere sts are no d iffe ren t from th o se o f peasants an d progressive intellectuals is n o t only p erfec tly capable o f rep resen tin g an d safeguarding th e real in tere sts o f th e p eo p le b u t, in the absence o f o th e r parties w hich w o u ld necessarily be bourgeois, discharges even b e tte r its m ission o f lib eratin g the n a tio n an d proceeding w ith th e socialist revolution. In any case once the w orking class has assum ed s ta te I pow er, aso ccu rred in A lbania w ltb th e final d e f e a t o f t f j ex tern al an d in tern a l enem ies, th e x is U m c < ^ snvp ' ^ t h a t o f th e \^ rk e r _ w o u ld be political nonsense. As Enver H o x h a says o n this p o in t: Since th e w aT ^Fclasses co n tin u es d u rin g th e p erio d o f building a socialist society, during the tran sitio n to com m unism , a n d since political parties express th e in terests o f p artic u la r classes, th e presence o f o th e r, non-M arxist-L eninist parties w o u ld be absurd . . . especially afte r th e co n stru c tio n o f the econom ic base o f socialism . This does n o t at all jeo p ard ise d em ocracy b u t, on the c o n tra ry , stren g th en s real p ro le ta ria n d e m o c ra c y . lu s t ..as m em bers o f the P arty , sharing the sam e c o m m it m e n t to seeing th a t th e ideology o f socialism perm eates every asp ect o f w o rk an d life, bv belonging b o th to th e organs o f th e state and th e m ass organisations help to u n ite governm ent and people, so th e y have a sim ilar role to nlav in resolving o th e r d istin ctio n s in A lbanian so ciety . T he fu rth e r developm e n t o f socialism dem ands th a t certain social co n tra d ictio n s in h erited from th e p ast be n arro w ed and eventually elim i n a te d such as th o se b etw een w o rking class an d peasan try , betw een to w n and co u n try , b etw een in d u stry an d agri c u ltu re , b etw e en m en tal and m anual labour. If th ese c o n tra d ictio n s are n o t dealt w ith, th e y can grow to th e p o in t w here th e y divide so ciety an d even gen erate new class differences. 116

B u t m em b ers o f th e P arty , o p eratin g on b o th sides o f each o f these co n tra d ictio n s, im b u ed w ith the co m m o n aim o f progressively red u cin g th em , m ake a m ajo r c o n trib u tio n to w ard creatin g th e m ore e q u ita b le and m ore closely united^ so ciety in w hich socialism can flourish. In his 1966 re p o rt to th e F ifth C ongress, Enver H o x h a criticised th e P arty fo r n o t m aking the fullest use o f th e d istrib u tio n o f m em bers in o rd e r to b reak dow n these c o n tra d ictio n s. W hile approving th e general tren d o f re c ru it ing th e m ajo rity o f m em bers from p ro d u c tio n centres, from th e ranks o f th e w orking class an d th e lab o u rin g p easan try , h e p o in te d o u t anom alies like th e overw eighting o f city m em b ersh ip w hich w o rk e d against the principle of u n ifi catio n . S im ilarly w ith differences like th o se b etw e en y o u th and age o r b etw e en m en and w o m en , h e p o in te d o u t the need to fight conservative a ttitu d e s w hich h ad led to the u n d er-rep resen tatio n o f w om en an d y o u n g people. T he adm ission o f w o m en to th e P arty is still u n satisfac to ry and does n o t co rrespond to th e vivid, active and rev o lu tio n ary c o n trib u tio n th e y arc m aking in all fields o f th e c o u n try s socialist c o n s tru c tio n . A nd also th e y o u th organisation m ust be regarded as th e in ex h au stib le rev o lu tio n ary reserve fo r the grow th o f th e P arty ra n k s. Since th e P arty plays such a crucial role in m ain tain in g the th ru st o f fu rth e r socialist dev elo p m en t, in assuring co rrect relations b etw e en leadership and p eople, in resolving social co n tra d ictio n s and stren g th en in g th e d ic ta to rsh ip o f the p ro leta riat, it is plain th a t th e h ea lth o f th e P arty th ro u g h co n tin u o u sly p u m p in g in fresh b lo o d to revivify all the P arty s organs is a m a tte r o f th e gravest co n cern fo r the w hole c o u n try . ^ While th e P arty needs new b lo o d this b lo o d m u st be clean. Careful a tte n tio n is paid to such qualities in the candidate m em ber as ch a rac te r, m orals, self-sacrificing sp irit, political m a tu rity , rev o lu tio n ary elan and links w ith the masses. T he lerm o f ca n d id a tu re is n o t m erely form al b u t a tw o to th ree year p erio d o f testin g th e c a n d id a te s c o n d u c t on th e w o rk Iro n t o f socialist c o n stru c tio n , his discipline, resourcefulness and ab ility to d efen d th e P a rty line, his relatio n sh ip s w ith lellow w o rk ers an d th e w o rk in g m asses generally, th e resp ect 117

an d love h e enjoys from com rades and his harshness to his ow n errors an d shortcom ings. I t is also a p erio d o f intensive ideological and political ed u catio n . W hat is re q u ired o f th e m em bers o f th e A lbanian P arty o f ! L ab o u r once th ey have b een accep ted as full p artic ip a n ts in P arty w ork? Enver H o x h a set o u t these re q u irem en ts in con sid erable detail in his 1966 re p o rt. T h e m em bers o f o u r re v o lu tio n ary P arty should be loval t o th e teachings o f M arxism -L eninism , to o u r P arty and to th e p eo ple, re ad y fo r every s a c r if ic e th a t m ay be re flu jre d jn t he in terests o f the revolution and sorialisnp. C om m unists m ust have the discinlined d e t e r m i n a t i o n in im p lem en t th e P arty line and th e s ta te laws w ith o u t allow ing th e ap p lication o f Hirertives to hprnm i- tn erh a n iral. T hey m u st be creative, u n d ersta n d in g th e political essence o f P arty decisions an d governm ental acts in o rd er to apply th em to c o n c rete situ a tio n s in such a w ay as to insure th eir effectiveness. m m T h ey m u st be rigorously co n scien tio u s in seeing ihai t h j i r mm P arty m em bership does n o t b r in g a n d will never bring them even th e sligh te s t personal privilege b u t only confers o n th em t he m o st d ifficu lt and resp o n sible tasljg. T hose w ho th in k d iffe ren tly and use th eir P arty cards to o b ta in fo r them selves o r fo r those personally associated w ith th em any m aterial or m o ral advantages do n o t deserve, n o t even fo r a m o m e n t, the h o n o u r o f being P arty m em bers. C o m m unists should he closely lin k ed w ith the m asses, atten tiv ely <\ p n e c t f u l l v listen to w h at th e y have to sav. live and w o rk w ith them , sense th e ir feelings an d k n o w th e ir needs, p u t them selves at the h ead o f th e m asses and lead them . T hey m u st regard as inim ical every ch aracteristic, self-conceitedness, arrogance or com m andism , w hich leads to negligence o r u n d er-estim atio n o f th e m asses an d th e ir w ork. V aluable m em bers o f o u r P arty are th o se w ho alw ays ta k e in to ac co u n t and fearlessly wage class struggle, ou tsid e a n d w ith in th e ranks of the P arty , reiving for this c o n tin u o us struggle on th e fu n d am en tal p rin cip les o f M arxism -L eninism . i *" T h ey m ust k now how to distinguish, follow ing a co rrect dialectical an a lysis, betw een w hat is good and w hat is fyad. w hat is dangerous and w hat is bold and creative. T h ey must 118

be able to use m eth o d s o f e d u c a tio n an d persuasion, always leaving coercion to th e last. G o o d re v o lu tio n ary P arty m em bers are th o se w h o by th eir w ork and b ehaviour win the co n fid en ce a n d affec tio n o f th e p eo p le, w h o e d u c ate and save th o se w h o m ake m istakes, w ho a tta c k m ercilessly w ith th e greatest h atre d th e incorrigible an d socially dangerous enem ies o f o u r people and o u r P arty. ^C o m m u n ists m u st be en d o w ed w ith re v o lu tio nary vigil ance* in d efen d ing t h e P arty line an d th e p u rity o t its ideals. T hey m u st never hide th eir shortcom ings an d errors, c ritic ising th e ir o w n failures w ith o u t w aiting for o th e rs to do it fo r them . O nly th u s will th ey be in a p o sitio n to criticise the sh ortco m in g s o f th eir com rades and c o rre c t o th ers b y the exam p le o f th e ir ow n p rin cip led co n d u c t, r1R ev o lu tio n ary m em bers m u st w ork c o n sc ie n tiously a t w hatever pi ace th e P arty has assigned th em , alw ays p u ttin g above e v e r y t h i n g t h e general in te re st. T h ey sh o u ld never connive at an y u n h e a lth y situ a tio n c reated b y in co rrect conclusions an d decisions ta k e n b y any P arty or sta te organ, n e ith e r sh o u ld th e y com ply w ith w rong o r a rb itra ry in stru c tions b y an y fu n c tio n a ry . S o u n d ce n tralisatio n in th e P arty organ isatio n m u st b e dialectically lin k ed w ith th e d ecen tralised re sp o n sib ility o f every P arty m em b er, collective resp o n sib ility rightly co m b in ed w ith th e individual resp o n sibility o f each c o m m u n ist. W hat E nver H o x h a has described at som e length as the req u ire m en ts o t JParty m em bers is sim ply M arx ist m o rality a m o rality , in L e n in s w o rd s, en tirely su b o rd in a te d to _ th e interests o f th e class struggle o f the p ro le ta ria t. . . . F o r up (M arxist s ) th e re is no such thing as m o rality ap a rt fro m hum an so c ie ty A n d ending e x p lo ita tio n in h u m an society can only be achieved b y u n itin g th e vast m ajo rity w ho are ex p lo ited , th e w o rkers, against th e class o f ex p lo iters and oppressors in a p ro tra c te d struggle to abolish classes alto g eth er. Class struggle co n tain s by im p licatio n th e w hole o f M arxist m o rality . In th e social reality o f th e class such feelings as so lid arity , fra te rn ity an d th e love o f o n e s fellow m an, w hich c a n n o t ex c ep t as m ere a b stra c t h u m an ism stre tc h across th e gulf b etw e en oppressors and oppressed, find th eir true ex pression am ong th o se sharing th e b u rd e n o f o p p re s 119

sion in all its form s a n d capable by th e ir com radeship and u n ity o f em an cip atin g them selves and society. In th e activity o f stru g gle is realised M arx s in ju n ctio n th a t th e p o in t is n o t sim ply to u n d ersta n d th e w o rld b u t to change it - to th e sort o f place w here th o se fellow feelings need n o lo n y er h e lim ited exploite^L.aiiiljeiyilaiJ^s. It m ight be w o n d ered if a sufficient n u m b er o f people co u ld be fo u n d in A lbania, o r in any c o u n try fo r th a t m a tte r, w ho b y being p re p are d to co m m it them selves to so stren u o u s an eth ic could keep th e C o m m u n ist P arty up to stren g th and able to p erfo rm its tasks o f leadership. B u t it m u st be rem em b ered th a t w ith th e rev o lu tio n ary o v erth ro w o f the ex p lo itin g class and th e assu m p tio n o f state p o w er by the w o rk in g class, as o cc u rre d in A lbania along w ith th e successful conclusion o f th e lib era tio n w ar, th e w hole m oral clim ate o f a c o u n try begins to change; and fo r the individual istic, co m p etitiv e, self-seeking c o n d u c t encouraged b y cap ital ism is progressively su b s titu te d th e fight against self-interest and th e co-operative realisation o f th e collective good d em an d ed b y socialism . T he te st o f w h e th e r such p eo p le e xist in A lbania and can be re cru ited in ad eq u ate n um bers t o m an th e defences a p n n st a re sto ratio n o f capitalism and to c o n s tru c t a new so ciety from w hich ex p lo ita tio n in any form h as been e lim in a ted is precisely th e e x t e n t t n w h i r h s o c i a l i s t r e I a l i o n s ( ) f i p ro d u c t_ _ a t^ h e^ ec o n o m ic _ b ase_ _ a n d iii_soiaJjst m o rality in tn e cu ltu ral sji2 en>trucjjjre_haye_bee^ and are being lu rth e r developed. T h e P a rty o T T ^ a b o u r o f A lbania, Enver H o x h a goes on to say in his re p o rt, m ust cherish th o se m em bers w ho have w o rk ed long an d dev o ted ly in th e P arty ranks and have ac q u ired great exp erien ce in struggle n o t b y p e ttin g them , b u t b y safeguarding th em an d co n tin u in g to provide th em w ith rev o lu tio n ary tasks co m m en su rate w ith th eir ability. T he co m m ittees anrl P arty organisations generally m u st pay th eir m ain a tte n tio n n o t to figures o f p ro d u c tio n increases b u t to th e ed u c atio n o f co m m unists and th e w ork in g people? It i< penpl_jfrfho c r e a te m a te r ia lw e a lth aridjTero^cally^ajTply : th e P arty line, and it is p eo p le also w ho deg en erate, steal or d a m a g c jio c ja h sji)ro p e rty an d violate state laws. 120

T h e prin cip le o f d em o cratic centralism , the su b o rd in atio n o f th e m in o rity to the m ajo rity and th e low er organs to th e higher, is n o t sim ply an organisational_j 3 u e s tio ^ th e fu n d a m e n tal torm s ot e d u c a tio n and political dcvelypm e n t w ith in th e P arty. D e m o c ratic centralism co m b in es iron-likc discipline w ith full d e m o c r a c y , ensuring th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f d e c i s i o n s a rriv e d a |^ a f t p r ^ j j T P ^ v i H p s t discussion a n d testing th ese decisions b y social practice. In th e v erificatio n o t decisions in term s ol m e n 1 UUtlltll T onsequences co m m unists them selves, th e m ajo rity on a p a rti cu lar issue as well as th e m in o rity , are re m o u ld e d and tem p ered . If th e correctness o f th e decision is co n firm ed by re ality this serves to ed u c ate th e m in o rity vo ting against th at d ecisio n s ad o p tio n . If p ractice proves th e c o n tra ry , th e n the m ajo rity v o tin g fo r th e decision m u st m ake self-criticism and co n sid er w h y th e y arrived at a w rong conclusion. * A bove all, th e seriousness o f a re v o lu tio n ary p a rty l i e s j n its a ttitu d g its ow n errors and shortcom ings. In his re p o rt to to th e S eco n d C ongress o f th e P arty in 1952 E nver H o x h a to o k th e w hole P arty severely to task in o rd e r to im prove m eth o d s o f leadership. We call m eetin g a fte r m eetin g w hich go on fo r h o u rs and days o n en d b u t very little com es o u t o f them . D ecisions are ta k e n , m an y decisions at th a t, b u t n o t all o f th em are ap p lied. T h en nearly as m an y decisions are tak en again to carry o u t th e previous decisions. N ew decisions are ad o p ted also on m atters already decided u p o n , b u t fo rg o tten . This is triflin g w ith the w o rk , p re te n d in g y o u are w orking and deciding issues w hen in reality y o u are o b stru ctin g the w o rk . R etu rn in g to the th em e o f P arty shortcom ings in th e 1966 re p o rt E nver H o x h a urged: N o t a single P arty organisation, cadre o r co m m u n ist sh o u ld be afraid o f criticism and self-criticism . I t is a great erro r to tak e a b u re au cratic or liberal a ttitu d e tow ards errors, n o m a tte r by w hom co m m itted . C riticism an d self-criticism should n o t only be co n d u c te d b e h in d closed d oors, w ith in th e P a rty organis ations, b u t o n occasions it m u st be carried o u t in the presence o f th e w orking m asses. T he P arty an d its m em bers do n o t w o rk a n d fight sep a rated from th e m asses so th eir errors a n d sho rtcom ings have consequences fo r th e w orking 121

m asses an d are n o t u n k n o w n to them . T he activ ity o f the' P arty and its m em bers m u st be u n d er the c o n tro l o f the masses. I t is a m istak e to th in k th a t P arty problem s sh o u ld be tack led o n ly b y com m unists o r th a t elections to P arty posts sh o u ld b e held secretly w ith o u t being kn o w n to n o n m em bers as if th e P a rty w ere an illegal organisation, o r as if th e w o rk ing p eo p le w ere in d iffe re n t to th e problem s discussed b y com m unists, th e tasks th ey assign them selves an d th e leaders th e y have e le c te d . Speaking on th e fu rth e r re v o lu tio n isatio n o f th e P a rty and th e G o v e rn m en t in 1968, E nver H o x h a d efined th e class n a tu re o f th e A lbanian P arty o f L ab o u r. We know th a t our P a rty o f L a b o u r is, like all genuine M arxist-L eninist parties, an organised d e ta c h m e n t o f th e w orking class. This im plies th a t th o se in the P a rty are the b est, m o st rev o lu tio n ary and m o st re so lu te vanguard o f th a t class. Such p eo p le do n o t fall as m an n a from heaven. T hey em erge from th e ranks o f the m asses an d distinguish them selves at w o rk and in b a ttle by th e ir virtues and co n d u c t. T hose ad m itte d to the P a rty com e from various classes in our so ciety , from th e w o rk in g class, fro m ag ricultural co-operatives, from em ployees, fro m in te l lectu als a n d p eo p le o f o th e r w alks o f life. N evertheless o u r P arty is n o t an aren a o f classes in w hich each class has its p ro p o rtio n a l n u m b e r o f representatives defending th e indivi dual in terests o f each class. N o, th e hegem ony in o u r P a rty is possessed b y th e w orking class w ith its ow n ideology, M arxism -L eninism . By th e tim e o f th e S ixth P arty C ongress in N ovem ber, 19 7 1 , o u t o f a P arty m em b ersh ip o f 8 6 ,0 0 0 , w o rk ers m ade u p 56% o f th e m em bers an d co-operative peasants 29%. D u rin g this C ongress th e C o n tro l and A u d it C om m ission re p o rte d th a t from 1967 to 1970 1,323 m em bers and 434 ca n d id a te m em bers h ad b een expelled from th e P a rty and 1,400 full m em bers h ad been re d u ced to can d id ate m em bers. T h ere w ere 1,320 appeals against ex p u lsio n h an d led b y the C om m ission a n d in 75% o f th ese cases the decision o f the local P arty co m m ittees to expel was upheld. T he m ajo rity w ere exnelled fo r shortcom ings resulting from in su fficien t ed u c atio n in M arxism -Leninism , to r violations of1 socialist norm s an d for dissolute behaviour. 122

T he im p o rtan ce o f these figures, covering th e p erio d follow ing o n tln v er noXflii s can io r g reater e tto rts fey c o m m u n ists to tak e th e lead in ideological struggle, is th e p ro o f th e y pro v id e th a t belonging to th e P arty o t L a b o u r o't A Jbania does n o t give one special privileges n o r p u t one b e y o n d criticism . T o the c o n tra ry m em bership represents g reater ob lig atio n s to serve th e p eople. T he P arty can only p lay its lead ersh ip role if it purges itself o f th o se u n w o rth y o f thg~ nam e o t co m m u nists as w ell as c o n tin uously revivitvlng itself w ith fresh b lo o d . O ver 2 0 ,0 0 0 new m em bers w ere taken in to th e P a rty bClWUtlll Lilt! F lfltT and S ix th Congresses. < Enver H o x h a s co n tin u in g co n cern fo r the re c titu d e o f the A lb an ian P arty o f L a b o u r w hich he fo u n d ed , is only one asp ect o f th e c o rre c t leadership he has given to th e A lbanian peo p le ever since h e to o k th e initiative in organising th eir resistance to th e fascist o cc u p atio n o f the c o u n try . As C o m m ander-in-C hief o f th e L ib era tio n A rm y, as ack n o w ledged h ead o f th e P arty an d S ta te h e has alw ays b een in the fo re fro n t o f th e struggle fo r n atio n al in d ep en d e n ce and socialist d ev elo p m en t. The ap p reciatio n o f the p eo p le fo r his guidance an d fo r his sharing w ith th em every hard sh ip along th e d ifficu lt w ay th e y have travelled to A lb an ias p resen t p o sitio n as E u ro p e s only socialist c o u n try takes m an y form s. A long w ith slogans w ishing a long life to th e P arty w hich are to be seen everyw here, ap p ear as fre q u e n tly th e letters EN V E R as a p o p u la r trib u te to th e ir co m rade and leader. Every ap p earan ce o f E nver H o x h a on th e streets o f the capital or in w h atev er o th e r to w n or d istrict he visits and m any are th e occasions form al and inform al on w hich he moves freely am o n g th e p eople becom es a sp o n tan eo u s triu m p h al processio n . T he h o u se w here he was b o rn in G jiro k astra has beco m e o n e o f the m useum s o f the A lbanian revolution. T h ere is n o th in g slavish o r m ass organised a b o u t these d em o n stratio n s o f affe c tio n a n d respect. T h a t w o u ld be en tirely _alien to th e to u g h in d e p e n d e n t c h a rac te r o f the A lbania^ Thpy | pVe th e m an as a sta u n c h com rade m struggle: b u t he_also em bodies_^or them t h e j x >litical and philosophical line w hich has e n a h le r l th em to achieve so m uch bv th e ir ow n c o rre c tly -o rie n ta te d efforts. T heir deep

regard fo r Enver H oxha, as fo r th e P arty o f L ab o u r of A lbania, is u ltim ate ly a regard fo r th e principles o f scientific socialism w hich, ap p lied to th e specific c o n d itio n s o f A lbania, have freed th e m from e x tern al in terfe ren c e and laid th e fo u n d a tio n s o f th e ir socialist society. Marxism__by_no m eans rejects th e c o n c ep t o f leadership.

resp ect to th e w orking class as a w hole. Sim ilarly, in the ranks o f revolutionaries th ere are leaders w ho are p artic u la rly well eq u ip p ed to apply th e principles o f scientific socialism , M arxism -L eninism , to th e c o n c rete co n d itio n s o f th eir ow n sphere o f engagem ent. M arxism s un iq u e c o n trib u tio n is_to
d e fin e the d i;ile r) ir:il rrh ilm n h r

1w < > f m . _ b - : i r l < - r c h i p

anrl p e o p lr

p e o le _ a n d jth jD e o ]i}leiiiif r o m b e i n g d e p r i w co n tro j. In th e great social tran sfo rm atio n s o f re cen t h isto ry the w orking m asses in revolt against oppressive co n d itio n s have h ad th e leadership o f a co m m u n ist p a rty and, also, o f a rev o lu tio n ary genius w ho co m b in ed to a rem ark ab le degree th e grasp o f scien tific th e o ry a n d th e p ro fo u n d u n d ersta n d in g o f th e social forces in his ow n c o u n try enabling him to apply th a t th e o ry co n c retely w ith o u tsta n d in g success, th u s c o n trib u tin g creatively to the deepening and b ro ad en in g o f the th e o ry itself. Such was L enin w ho led th e w orkers, peasants an d soldiers o f R ussia in th e first c o n q u e st o f sta te p o w e r and firm estab lish m en t o f a d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t. M ao T setu n g led the C hinese p eo p le in th eir ow n rev o lu tio n ary struggle and d e m o n stra te d b y his leadership o f th e p ro letarian cu ltu ral rev o lu tio n th a t th e w o rk in g m asses, having w on sta te p o w e r an d estab lish ed a d ic ta to rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t, co u ld h o ld on to it by ro o tin g o u t th e rem n an ts o f bourgeois ideology and sm ashing any a tte m p t to restore capitalism . H o Chi M inh led th e V ietnam ese in proving th a t a relatively sm all c o u n try organised in p e o p le s w ar, u n d e r the guidance o f a co m m u n ist p a rty , co u ld tak e o n and d efeat the 124

m ost p o w erfu l im perialist aggressor o f o u r tim es. What Enver H o x h a s leadership o f th e A lbanian p eo p le has show n is_thaj n o c o u n try is to o sm all, no p eo p le to o tew to d efen d _their n atio n al so vereignty against a_ujiole_aiTay_of_hostilc pow ers and set a b o u t th e task^ In so doing Enver H o x h a, the leaders and p eople o f A lbania have en rich ed th e re v o lu tio n ary experience and th eo retical u n d ersta n d in g o f th e w o rld p ro le ta ria t. T h a t is the test of great M arxist-L eninist leadership. O f course these great leaders have alw ays w o rk ed in the closest asso ciatio n w ith o th e rs o f co m p arab le grasp and u n d ersta n d in g , an d on the re c ru itm e n t to th e leadership o f y o u n g er m en w ith th e sam e qualities depends th e c o n tin u ed advance o f socialist c o n stru c tio n and socialist m o rality . Such in A lb an ia are m en like M ehm et S hehu, H ysni K apo, G ogo N ushi w h o re cen tly died, M yslim Peza, A bdyl K ellezi, H axhi Lleshi, S h efq u e t Peci, B eqir B alluku, R am iz Alia, M anush M yftiu , S p iro K oleka, R ita M arko, H aki T oska, Adil arani to m e n tio n o nly a few o f th o se distinguished by their service to th e people w h o them selves include in th e ir ranks inn u m erab le h ero es an d h eroines o f A lb an ias struggles in w ar and peace.

125

C h ap ter Eleven

The Mass Organisations


R ev o lu tio n an d socialism are th e achievem ent o f th e m asses

rev o lu tio n ary p ractice o t tne m asses are the in ex h au stib le source t r o m w h i c h t ^ in s^ ira d o n ^ jU jjL iiid M jJJiS fi-JiiJia lU iiijL j^ ^ learn ing fro m th e m asses in o rd e r to j3 e jih le _ to J1 eacl2_^h^j^ th is n u E s s ^ m e J ^ T o ^ jn T ^ xpressed in thc^organisational p rinciple o f d em o cratic centralism ; it is ro o te d in the very th eo ry o f know ledge o f M arxism . A llJknowled^e^orujm tion o f the objective ex tern al w orld th ro u g h m a n s

know ledge is only co m p lete w hen this rational know ledge has been tested in social p ractice, w hen the a b stra c t ideas o f p hysical a n d social laws have b een d irec ted to th e p ractice o f changing b o th th e objective and subjective w o rld by th eir ap p lica tio n to p ro d u c tio n , to scientific ex p e rim en t, to re v o lu tio n ary class struggle. * T ru th as th e p ro d u c t o f social p ractice is n o t to be fo u n d

vivid creativeness o f t h e m a s s e s ^ v h i c n ^ e n i n describes as the fu n d a m e n tal fa cto r o f th e new social life . T he process o f the m ass line as set fo rth by M ao T setung

( e, ak e th e ideas o f the m asses (sc a tte re d and u n sy stem atic T


ideas) an d c o n c e n tra te th em (th ro u g h stu d y tu rn th em in to c o n c e n tra te d and sy stem atic ideas) th e n go to th e m asses and p ro p ag ate an d ex plain these ideas u n til th e masses em brace th e m as th e ir o w n, h o ld fast to th em a n d tran slate th em in to ac tio n , a n d te st th e correctness o f th ese ideas in such a c tio n . O nce th e ideas d raw n fro m the ex p erien ce o f th e m asses are ta k e n b ack to th e m asses as an ela b o ra te d th e o ry o f re v o lu tio n a ry change a n d are grasped b y th e masses th e y b eco m e a m aterial force w hich changes society and changes th e w o rld . As E nver H o x h a expresses it: M arxism -Leninism is n o t a privilege and m o n o p o ly o f certain ab le-m in d ed p eo p le w h o can u n d e rsta n d it. It is th e scientific ideology o f th e w o rk in g class an d th e w o rk in g m asses and only w hen its ideas are m astered by the w orking m asses does it cease to be so m eth in g a b stra c t and b ecom e a great m aterial force fo r the rev o lu tio n ary tra n sfo rm a tio n o f the w o rld . He stigm atises th o se w ho neglect e ith e r aspect o f this tw o-w ay d ialectic b e tw e e n masses an d leadership. T hose w ho u n d e re stim a te and despise th e experience o f th e w orking m asses, w ho try to co m m an d o th ers o n th e basis o f th eir a u th o rity , in reality have n o th in g to teac h th e masses. T hey are em p ty -h e ad ed c h a tte rb o x e s w hose on ly c a p ita l is th e ir co n ceited n ess and arrogance. On the o th e r h an d th ere are som e co m m u n ists w h o vulgarise th e links w ith th e m asses and th e id ea o f listen in g to th eir opinions. T h ey passively listen to w hat d iffe ren t w orking people say. T h ey approve everything th at is said an d do n o t tak e a stan d on p rinciple, do n o t tryf to analyse th e ideas expressed by the w orking people in o rd er to distinguish w h at is co rrec t from w hat is w rong, th e im p o rta n t from th e trivial and to sum up the m ass experi ence T o d eep en th e mass line the P a rty has to devote special n tjo jL lo -th e 1W 5S itte IH c o n s o l i d a t u ^ T K ^ m E r a T T h e J 'a ^ so th a t th e w o rk in g p eople, rem o u ld ed in ^ o m m u n ia ljfla y, J J J j i ^ g m ^ n ^ ^ o u tn tlc a lr T o n s a o u s j m ^ t e r ^ f ^ h e ^ o u n t ^ . o ic a l^ had m ain tain ed th e closest ties w ith the A lbanian people 127

il

f
d u n n g _ th e anti-fascist struggle becam e, a fte r th e successful w ar. die such m a s^ o ^ a m sa T io n s as trad e u n io n s^ ^ i^ u m o n T o T T o iU h au<TTH"*"women, th e u n io n o f v m t e r s and v a ru m ^ -o ltie r c u U u 2 n T ^ ^ Q r = ^ These D em o cratic F ro n t o r a m s a T Io n ^ ria v ^ T o iS in u e a T o play an im p o rta n t p a rt in tra n sm ittin g th e P arty line to th e peo p le, in edu catin g them in po litical u n ity aro u n d th e P arty and the socialist state and also in providing organised a tte n d a n c e to w hat th e masses in th e co u n try sid e and cities have to say so th a t th e y can p artic ip a te actively in solving social and state p ro b lem s and in struggling against regressive habits and tendencies inim ical to th e b uilding o f socialism . * T r a d e ^ i n i o n s ^ ^ n f a n is e ^ n o ^ o n ^ h ^ b a s i^ c i ^ r ^ ^ s k il l s n o r k in d s o fw o rl^ ^ lo n e ^ b u tre p r e s e n tin g a n id i^ w o rk e i^ ii^ a p arti c u T a n a c t o r y o r m ^ u s U i a ^ e n f e i ^ n s e ^ ^ ^ ^ Z E Q Q T ^ o f c o m m u m s m l O T d e v e l o g ^ i ^ j ^ j ^ j ^ g n s d o u s n e g ^ a ^ B i ^ i ts o f p ro d u c tio n and fo r draw ing w orkers in to a le a d e r s h im o le n o tja n J h M r ^ ^ s p e c tto th ^ m jd u c d v ^ a r o c e s y ts e lf jJ n i^ ^ ^ J ^ e w orldn^jTierl**flI^nav"!T i^^sponsiI)IT T ^^of encouraging socialist em u latio n as th e m ain m o tiv a tio n fo r b e tte r and m o re creative m eth o d s o f w o rk an d th ey are th e principal ch annel for th e tw o-w ay flow o f co n c rete proposals and co u n ter-p ro p o sals b etw een th e econom ic organs o f th e state and th e w ork in g people in th e co m p ilatio n o f th e five-year plans. f A n y A lb anian fa cto ry is a m o d el_of_dem ocratic organis.a tio n ^ T h e w orkers, tra d e u n io n secretaries an d P arty cadres are w illing to talk freely ab o u t th eir ow n o r an y o n e elses c o n d itio n s o f w o rk o r rates o f p ay , including m anagers, specialists o r section leaders, because n o th in g is h id d en from general know ledge. In a p ro m in e n t place a b u lletin b o ard will co n tain n otices o f individual w orkers or collectives w ho have do n e o u tstan d in g ly good w ork or, perhaps, developed som e p ro d u c tiv e in n o v atio n in m achines or th eir use. T here will also be references to th o se w ho have do n e slipshod w ork. The flet rru fe , o r public n o tic e b o ard fo r criticism and self-criticism , is th e m o st characteristic and universal social p h e n o m e n o n in A lbania and th e rules governing its use are 128

strictly ad h ered to . In a fa c to ry , for ex am p le, no charge o f ^ in co m p eten c e against any individual o r collective can go u n an sw ered . N o counter-charge against th e original critic o r critics co n stitu te s an acceptable response. T im e lim its are set for th e p erso n or collective criticised to explain w hy the th in g was d o n e and, if w rong, to m ake self-criticism . An u n satisfac to ry response o r self-criticism co n sid ered to be insincere have resu lted in fa c to ry m anagers being replaced. W hat o fte n strikes a v isitor as strange are the flow er gardens an d trees aro u n d fa cto ry buildings. B ut o f course th ey b elo n g to th e w ork in g people; th e y are the places w here th e y sp en d a good p a rt o f th eir tim e; th ere is no reason w hy th ey sh o u ld n o t be m ade as p leasan t as possible. P arty m em b ers in th e trad e unions, who- in this as in all have tlx: resp o n sib ility ot nrevcmtiivj narrow ness ot o u tlo o k a< d ^ ^ t e n ^ y i ^ ^ ^ i e a l p r i m a r i l ^ w i U i e c o n o m i i |j1 ffl. n j 2k]i U n ch eck ed this ten d en c y can resu lt in a failure to wage class strutnrle am M oTaf^'PBTTlT^TnfiTarv^TasE^rTH ffSroTuTTo'n-i a r ^ ^ n j j j g j^ j^ ^ ^ w o ^ c i^ ^ a r e I e s s h ^ a e ^ jj ^ > -jisjT ie m b e o , wi T he fu tu re o f s o c ia b s m T e p e n d s o n edu catin g t h e n c w g en eratio n in a class rev o lu tio n ary spirit and this resp o n si b ility is u n d e rta k e n by th e U nion o f L ab o u r Y o u th o f A lbania. It is to its y o u n g p eo p le th a t a c o u n try m ust lo o k for passing on an d fu rth e r developing socialist achievem ents and, u ltim a te ly , fo r accom plishing th e tran sitio n from socialist to co m m u n ist society. T he p a trio tic an d re v o lu tio n ary y o u th o f A lbania, ideologically h e a lth y and m orally so u n d , p rep ared fo r h ard w ork in the co n stru c tio n of socialism a n d self-sacrifice in the d efence o f the co u n try , shows th a t th e U n ion o f Y o u th is fu n c tio n in g co rrectly in close association w ith th e P arty. T he co m m u n ist e d u c a tio n o f A lbanian y o u th is taking place in th e m idst o f class struggle a t h o m e and ab ro ad and in Ihe c o n te x t o f b itte r and co m p licated ideological differences betw een revisionist a n d socialist countries. F u rth erm o re young p eo p le do n o t kn o w from personal experience the savage class op p ression o f the p ast and th e sacrifices re q u ired 129

US

to e n d it. I r ^ t l ^ r e l a t i v e h ^ e a c e h d c o n d i t i o n ^ ^ b a n ia ^ r g g ^ ^ a r e r ^ ^ n ^ ^ ^ ^ n l^ J h a t^ ^ th e ^ a ^ ^ n o t in flu en c ed j as has been th e _ a s e ^ in th e E a s tE u r o p e a n


p e o p i c ^ i c m o c -r .ic ie s , b v In 'Ui ^<-< >is id e as w l n c n , U i r o u m i H i f f o r ill j can ta^ e T rian T su E n T a n T m sT d io u r^ rm s... S tu d e n ts p a r tic u I^ jT ^ n a ^ ^ D e tra y such bourgeois te n d encies as idleness and intellectualism , d e ta c h m e n t from the m asses a n d u n co n c ern w ith th e problem s a n d w orries o f the p eo p le, exaggerated dem ands a n d p reten sio n s, conceitedness and disregard for the rev o lu tio n ary exp erien ce o f o ld er p eo p le. C iU ^ ic i^ a tio n h ^ jh ^ sic a H v o i^ ^

m c ^ a f e jo t^ m c H ^ e r ta ii^ im o u iU o f T o m ? o r tr T i! ^ M b a n m a ir n e w '^ r a n 'w a y ^ o n s T T u c U o n 'T s ^ a m e d ^ u r r T ^ y o u n g people w o rk ing in th eir holidays o r during periods tak en o ff from form al e d u c atio n . A visit to o n e o f th eir w o rk cam ps along th e line, o r to som e bare hillside w here th ey are engaged in terracing a n d p lan tin g trees, confirm s the salu tary effec t o f such organised physical lab o u r in encouraging a sense o f co m rad esh ip am ong them selves an d the ideal o f being o f service to th e people. O n th e o th e r h an d , th ere are m isunderstandings in the rest o f so ciety a b o u t th e needs and dem ands o f y o u th , u n ju st co m p lain ts a b o u t th eir beh av io u r and expressions o f m istru st in th e ir ab ility and willingness to learn. T he U nion o f L ab o u r Y o u th , co -operating w ith th e P arty co m m itte es, can co m b at such prejudices, w in re sp ect fo r th eir energy and zeal and o p en up o p p o rtu n itie s fo r th e m to play a full an d responsible p a rt in socialist co n stru c tio n . coilQjX^._lQ-Igudal and_bi 2 IiIQi-Societies m o st w om en suffgr th e -d This was p articu larly tru e o f pre-w ar A lb an ia w here m any w om en still w e n t veiled a n d in th e feudal n o rth th e Lek D ukagjini, a can o n o f m orals covering such custom s as the b lo o d feu d an d defining the po sitio n o f w o m en as th a t o f c h a tte l, still governed social relations. O ne q u o ta tio n from 130

sch o >is^t^em^^^e||2 jS^^E^^E^^S2 3 ^iiii^ < o limb

this canon gives som e in d icatio n o f th e life w om en led. A w om an m u st w o rk h a rd e r th a n a d o n k ey for th e la tte r feeds on grass, w hich costs n o th in g , w hile a w om an lives on b re a d . D uring th e lib era tio n w ar w om en fo u g h t side by side w ith m en and 6 ,0 0 0 o f the 7 0 ,0 0 0 p artisan fighters w ere w om en an d girls. A t th e F irst C ongress o f A nti-fascist W om en, E nver H o x h a said A lbanian w o m en w o n th e ir rights w ith b lo o d and th ese rights are g u aran teed by the G o v e rn m en t o f the P eople w hich th ey , along w ith th eir b ro th e rs, fo u n d e d at the co st o f g reat sacrifices. T he U n io n o f th e W om en o f A lbania has m ade a valuable c o n trib u tio n to th e radical change in th e p o sitio n o f w om en, placing befo re th em th e perspective o f th ro w in g o ff the yoke im p o sed b y th e o u tlo o k a n d h ab its o f th e old regressive fam ily, d o in g aw ay w ith th eir cu ltu ral backw ardness and p a rtic ip a tin g in p ro d u c tiv e lab o u r to win econom ic and social em an c ip atio n a n d eq u a lity w ith m en in all fields. W om en have re sp o n d ed to this challenge and n o w m ake up som e 42% o f th e w o rk force, engaged in all professions and b ran ch es o f in d u stry e x c e p t th e h a rd e st and m o st dangerous jo b s. B ut a struggle still has to be w aged against th e old enslaving co n cep ts. XllI is_a_ontiadiction in the a ttitu d e e v e n ^ o ^ n g jy ^ o m rn u n is ts w h c H ri^ v o ri^ y T j^ o c ju ^ ^ e T e s ^ e j^ . Q n T !ie7jraa^sum pT ion1 r T t ^ ^ e f l S 3 n ^ ^ r w om eT ^ V n iIe in ^ the fj^IcT ^T "T jroaucU on th ere l s a n e m u i i i E I ^ I m S S a r S f la b o u r b etw een m en an d w o m e n , w hen it com cs_loJim iS la b o u r is as w id e s p re a T a i r T t sfiouIcnS erM uch has been d o ne to create^ettt?'T aciT 7B ? ? T S i ^ i?^cH T m p lB s1im eryo!T !ouse-

towns .uid_im _(jT^H ^in7^ lin m ^ n r M n u d im u r c needs to be < lone_to_jm (* n a rlio n ate 5 jn_absoh^.gTy con^l terms in every__I2llre of productive and social life.
T he W o m en s U nion in p a iT n ^ fn p T IT ^ im ^ P a rty still has the co n sid erab le resp o n sib ility o f educating w om en to play the fullest p a rt in socialist c o n stru c tio n claim ing on th e ir b eh alf all th e assistance th e y need to do so and o f educating m en to g et rid o f th e last vestiges o f m ale chauvinism in o rd e r to play their fu llest p a rt in th e socialist fam ily. 131

O th e r m ass organisations m u st be co n sid ered u n d e r a p p ro p riate headings. A necessary c o n d itio n for these m ass organisations to carry o u t th e arduous d em o cratic tasks assigned to th em is the co n tin u in g su p p o rt and assistance o f th e A lbanian P arty o f L abour. Since it is th e d u ty o f every co m m u n ist to be w ith the w ork in g m asses, to w o rk am ong th em an d to provide them w ith co rrec t political leadership, n o mass o rganisation is w ith o u t its co m p lem en t o f active P arty cadres to h elp them realise th e ir im p o rta n t fu n c tio n o f m ed iatin g creatively b etw een P arty and people.

C h ap ter Twelve C reating th e S ocialist E conom ic Base A t th e end o f th e anti-fascist w ar th e m o st pressing pro b lem facing th e A lbanian people was the re c o n stru c tio n o f the c o u n try s sh a tte re d econom y. T o th e P arty o f L a b o u rs call fo r v o lu n ta ry w ork to repair dam age a n d get th e wheels tu rn in g again th e re was a w illing response, a n d soon w orkers and p easants organised in squads, b attalio n s and brigades, ju s t as in th e re cen tly -co n clu d ed w ar, w ere engaged in this new b attle fo r A lb an ias eco n o m ic recovery. Bridges an d highw ays w ere re b u ilt and lines o f c o m m u n i catio n w ere q u ickly re-eslablishcd. D uring 1945 w orkers got som e o f th e factories, pow er statio n s and m ines b ack in to o p eratio n . Peasants w ere m obilised to sow the p loughed land and m ake a s ta rt on rebuilding the b u rn e d -o u t villages. A wave o f en th u siasm fo r w o rk sw ept th e c o u n try and y oung people in th e ir th o u san d s from to w n and c o u n try jo in e d the v o lu n tary la b o u r brigades an d w o rk ed tirelessly at th e tasks o f re c o n stru c tio n . In J a n u a ry 1945 th e law on e x tra o rd in a ry ta x a tio n o f w ar p rofits was passed so th a t a p a rt o f the w ealth accu m u lated hy p ro fitee rs co uld be used to m eet the im m ediate needs o f the p eo p le an d h elp pay fo r re c o n stru c tio n . T h e law fu rth e r provided th a t th e p ro p e rty o f th o se w ho re fu sed to p ay these l.ixes was to be co n fiscated w ith o u t co m p en satio n . D uring th at y ear revenue from th e tax on w ar p ro fits ac co u n ted for m ore th a n h a lf o f th e sta te b u d g et an d w ith th e goods acquired b y th e state fro m confiscating th e p ro p e rty o f d efau lters th e first state-ow ned shops w ere o p en e d in itiatin g a socialist se c to r in trading. A n o th er law was passed re q u isitio n in g fo o d stu ffs and o th e r m aterials in great n eed an d steps w ere ta k e n to stam p 133

o u t h o ard in g an d sp ecu latio n ; a system o f fixed prices was en fo rce d a n d private a c cu m u latio n an d selling o f grain was p ro h ib ite d ; old b an k -n o te s w ere o v erp rin ted in o rd e r to begin checking th e in flatio n w hich h ad so drastically devalued the w ar tim e currency. T h e s e _ te m p o ra ry so lu tio n s o f the c o u n t ry ^s_ fin a n cial proK T onT ^talrfatea^T ?T af!yT 15^es*^rreconsT T uctjoiT . and_at tTTe^sam ^tn n eTurfTTerw eaEen& 3Tn<^H m om i^positoQ ^Q !jlh b o u r g e o is ie ^ n n l^ ^ T tr o n g m tu s T o rT T F T o m g n n n a n c ^ m in B ritain o T T ffi^ 'T Jn ite d S tates co u ld have p u t A lbanian cap italists o n th eir feet again an d th e P arty o f L a b o u r h ad categ o rically reje cted all offers from these tw o co u n tries, kn o w ing only to o well from w ar-tim e ex p erien ce the c o n d itio n s w h ich w o u ld be a tta c h e d to such a id . A p a rt from fratern a l assistance, on a m u tu ally in d e p e n d e n t basis, from th e S oviet U nion an d th e P eo p les D em ocracies, A lbania by th e very n a tu re o f th e p e o p le s po litical p o w e r established by th e re v o lu tio n ary w ar, was firm ly c o m m itte d to developing th e ec o n o m y in th e in tere sts o f th e w ork in g m asses by rely in g on th e ir effo rts and its o w n resources. Qs,2i]&fjiiiip e^fot^jw as-iA e i< h o l ^ h e a r t e d ^ |SgonseBo f t h ^ p e ^ l e t ^ ^ h c iw P arty 's c.ill In ilir o w ^ ia n s H T T s T T ^ ^ III Z lE lI S I u l i J j Z I S ^ ^ oT,r^ c o n stm c H o rr" T fie ^ T ffT e ^ id e w a jith e e n a c |[p fn i hy ihp fo u n d a tio n o l a socialist e c o n o m y In D ecem ber 1944 th e m ines an d th e p ro p e rty o f refugees w ho h ad fled th e c o u n try fo r political reasons w ere n a tio n alised, an d a m o n th later a law tran sferre d to th e A lbanian sta te , w ith o u t co m p en sa tio n , as th e co m m o n p ro p e rty o f the p eo p le, th e banks an d share-holder com panies ow ned by foreign capitalists. I ^ A p r i M ^ 9 4 ^ a l l p n v a t e l v o w n e d n i e ^ i s o jj^ y jg jjo rta tio n v v e r e ta k e n o v e r^ T h ^ n icasu iii^ _ _ ii ix _ T n c U U x T l)\^ ^ i^ 7 T n n M rriU cin eils '1 1.1m jTeoplc; b n j^ h c ir j i o c i a l a n d e c o n o i . tran sfeijjn g
ow n ersh ip o f fhe r n e a n ^ T T 'jp w T n ^ n ^ tn th e p ro n lr an d

j^ u U in ^ ^ ie rn ^ c o m g k te l^ ^ tU i^ p e o p le ^ g g j^ j^ jjja a ta lily sTatc and . u ^ j J ^ ^ n K ^ a s i ^ ^ r T s o H ^H isi^tale^ Iu iX -lL liialism iT T h e i d e o l o g v o f n i ^ ^ o r ^ m ^ ^ T a s ^ a n d ^ c a n _o n ly be m ain tain ed an d d e v e lo p e c ^ /fie n th e w orking c la ^ s e n jo y s 134

stale p o w er, w hat this ch a n ge re ally a m o u n te d to in political term s w a s_ th e tra n s to rm a tio n o f th e p e o p le s dem o cratic
< i c t a t o r s h i t ^ ! v I n c r R jj|!j^ jm ffP r r ^ 3 A s s {Til/ ' m ' ATrH rm ^f

f p r c e s ^ n ^ E ^ a n t i - f a s c i s ^ w a r i n t ^ ^ a d ic ta to rship o f the ) le ta r ^ ^ p r o le ta n n ^ ^ T I rU ^ h jT ^ ^ ^ ^ g n g u m e r ^ ^ ^ a g e r a d v e ^ v e r e s e t u ^ j n j t h ^ n ^ a o l^ w p rk in g class.. In th e c o u n try sid e agrarian m easures w ere en a cted to solve th e co n tra d ic tio n b etw een the lab o u rin g p ea san try and th e big landow ners o n th e basis o f the w ar-tim e alliance b etw e en peasants and w orkers. In A ugust 1945 th e agrarian refo rm law was p ro m u lg ated by w hich existing state-o w n ed land, the estates o f religious in stitu tio n s an d all p riv ately -o w ned lan d exceeding certain d efin ed lim its was ex p ro p ria te d and assigned fo r re d istrib u tio n free o f charge am ong relatively landless peasants o n th e principle th a t lan d belongs to th e tille r. T he p e rm itte d holdings w ere 100 acres fo r ow ner-m anagers w ho h ad d e m o n stra te d th eir ab ility to farm th e ir land efficien tly , 50 acres fo r th o se w ho w ork ed th eir lan d them selves and 17 acres fo r th o se w ho did n o t till th e ir ow n land b u t w ere re q u ired to do so w ith in tw o years. In a c o u n try like A lbania w here arable land was so lim ited in e x te n t th e holdings le ft to private p ro p rie to rs w ere to o large and p e rm itte d lan d lo rd s and rich p easan ts to re ta in to o m uch eco n o m ic pow er. T hese shortcom ings in agrarian reform resu lted from th e influence the C o m m u n ist P arty o f Yugoslavia e x e rted at th a t tim e th ro u g h certain m em bers o f Ilie A lbanian P a rty o f L ab o u r, and once th a t alien influence had b een rem oved these m istakes h a d to be rectified. Up to 12 acres o f land w ere a llo tte d to th e h ead o f each lam ily and th e buying, selling and leasing o f land was p ro h ib ited . n j K ^ j j g J j ^ ^ i ^ n b i U i o n o f l a n d a n ^ ^ ^ ^ a n i s ^ ^ s i s t a n g f

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a g r i c u l t u r a l c o -

Ia rt o f th e ex p ro p ria te d lan d was n o t d istrib u te d b u t 135

tu rn e d in to state farm s w hich established a socialist secto r in ag ricu ltu re. F orests, springs, w a te r supplies and all subsoil riches w ere pro claim ed th e co m m o n p ro p e rty o f th e people w hile m o st o f th e land cu ltiv ated by agricultural w orkers, th eir im p lem en ts and farm anim als w ere th e p ro p e rty o f co-operatives. f AS-iL-sult o f these m easures all the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n

ag n c u ltu ral c o ^ p n ^ v s r ^ a f c T p r o p r ^ T 't^ e T n 'g f ie ^ f o 'm ^ f s o c i a l l s t r x I a ti o n s o T ^ ^ r o d u c t i o n , was d o m in a n t in th e in d u strial sec to r in w hich co-operatives o f h a n d ic ra ft w orkers w ere m arginal; b u t th e agricultural secto r was p re d o m in a n tly co-o p erative w ith sta te farm s m aking up a sm all b u t in flu en tial p ro p o rtio n o f th e w hole. This reflected the basically small scale n a tu re o f agriculture an d th e large scale n a tu re o f in d u strial p ro d u c tio n . B o th form s o f ow nership h ad a socialist ch aracter in th a t e x p lo ita tio n was elim in a ted and d istrib u tio n was based on th e am o u n t o f w ork done. By th e en d o f 1946 87% o f industrial o u tp u t was c o n trilj7 r T e c r ^ ^ T C ^ s to t^ e c ^ r ^ n T T B ^ T C u n 3 a E o ^ S a ^ ^ n laid fo r th e ^nBaTnarT T c o n o m y ^ ^ T e v ^ o ^ m nnljerm ptdb/ a c c o ra in ^ j^ j^ a n rT a m m e r e T ^ u T n ^ ^ l^ r ^ ^ T ^ in ^ p e o ^ e ji u n em p lo y m en t and \v ith _ jj^ JjJj_ j_ a jj^ n a j_ jis^ ^ lab o u r. T ro ? u c H o r^ ~ o u ld be geared to u ie n e e d s o f society regardless o f p ro fita b ility e x c e p t in the w idest sense o f w h a t b en e fited th e w hole c o m m u n ity . B ut A lbania was ec o n o m i cally a very p o o r c o u n try an d w o u ld rem ain so till sm all scale p ro d u c tio n an d prim itive farm ing w ere tran sfo rm ed b y increased in d u strialisa tio n an d fu rth e r collectivisation. O nly in this w ay co u ld th e c o n tra d ic tio n b etw e en th e advanced po litical p o w e r a n d th e b ac k w ard ec o n o m y , th e new socialist relatio n s o f p ro d u c tio n a n d th e low level o f th e forces of p ro d u c tio n be resolved a c o n tra d ic tio n w hich was precisely th e o p p o site o f th a t in th e older industrialised co untries w here highly developed forces o f p ro d u c tio n w ere in co n flict with b ack w ard relatio n s o f p ro d u c tio n re p resen te d by reac tionary state pow er. F ro m a prim itive agrarian c o u n try , p ro b a b ly th e m ost 136

kakv^rd_Jn_Jiuroge1 _^Mbania was to be turned in to an agricuIturabindustrM country w itntneem pnasT s increasingly on the^gvelo^m enT l"lo r inaustry"TiTT7T ventually, 71 w ould
In 1938 th e r n a jo n ^ ^ r T I ie w o r ^ n i'^ p e o p le w e 'r e e n ^ I 'g e d r in ag ricu ltu re an d o nly 1 5 ,0 0 0 w orkers or 13% o f the w o rk fo rce w ere engaged in in d u stry w hich a c c o u n te d fo r only W o o f th e n atio n al incom e. S uch h a d b een th e dam age and d islo catio n o f th e w ar th a t it to o k a little over a year, till th e en d o f 1946, ju s t to get in d u strial an d agricultural p ro d u c tio n b ack up to 1938 levels. B ut fu rth e r m easures w ere being ta k e n to assure a rapid all ro u n d advance as th e skill and energy o f th e w orking m asses w ere c o n c e n tra te d on ending A lb an ias backw ardness. In M ay 1946 the agrarian refo rm law was m o d ified to reduce the holdings o f th o se w ho cu ltiv ated the lan d them selves to 12 acres and to ex p ro p riate alto g eth er th o se w ho did not. In this way som e 4 3 0 ,0 0 0 acres o f land, 4 7 4 ,0 0 0 olive trees and 6 ,0 0 0 d rau g h t anim als becam e available fo r re d istrib u tio n to lan d -p o o r p easan t fam ilies. In J u ly along w ith the n atio n alis atio n o f th e b an k s, new b a n k n o tes w ith five tim es the value o f th e old w ere in tro d u c e d and no fam ily was allow ed to exchange m o re o ld m o n ey th a n th e equivalent o f 100 units o f th e new cu rrency. In A ugust th e law on th e general eco n o m ic sta te plan was ad o p ted . T he P lanning C om m ission, w hich h a d b een set up th e y ear b efo re, was reorganised and w ork was beg u n on d ra ftin g th e eco n o m ic p lan fo r 1947. * f A s ^ a r e s u l t o f t h e s o c i a h s a t io r ^ j o f j ^ h ^ j n n c i M H r i e a n g ^ I p ro d u c ^ o n a n T ^ ^ n ^ ll^ ^ ^ r^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e c o ^ ^ ^ ^ T t llie tim e"o ^ ^ T e n r s ^ w Q ^ e a r 'T > I a r r T o ^ l d r ^ ') u nc^?clvance ' ii)^d^Hl"T3l^ l K r T ^ m 7 r " M n rrjis ^ s in a T ^ n iT ^ r^ m m M n T r T T he socialist form in clu d ed in d u stry , m ining, pow e si at ions, tra n s p o rt an d co m m u n icatio n s, th e financial system foreign trad e , in tern a l w holesale tra d e , sta te retail trading en terp rises, state farm s, state m achine and tra c to r statio n s w hich en ab led th e co-operatives to begin th e m ech an isatio n ill agricultural p ro d u c tio n , forests, w aters a n d subsoil re sources. This fo rm d o m in ated the ec o n o m y an d accountec lor 95% o f all in d u strial p ro d u c tio n . 137

aaaditY _D roduction in clu d ed th e em ploy m e n t o f p o o r and m iddle peasants in ag o __________________ ________ ricu ltu re and artisans inK ancIicn^jarodujyj^^j^^^J],^^ This form re p resen te d a b o u t 80% o f the to ta l volum e o f p ro d u c tio n . T h e: capitalist form in clu d ed rich peasants in the cc o u r ^ y -capita h e o u i^ side m erc n a e j g o l o ^ i i j ^ J j j j ^ l J i ^ j j ^ J h e y w ere p rim arily co n c ern e d w ith th e d is trib u tio n o f goods and th o u g h th e y ac co u n ted fo r only 5% o f th e volum e o f p ro d u c tio n , th e y h an d led 80% o f t h ^ retail trad e. ^ T ^ ie s e th re ^ o rm s o ^ c o n o rn y c o ^ s ^ o n d e d h ^ d ie th r^ social classes - ine working class. Uic working peasantry .ami th e b o u i^ e o is ie ^ A lr e a d ^ th f ^ jD ^ ^

other w a ^ ^ n " w n T c li^ !e v l^vo u lt^ tru 'g g I^'7 o lm am tair^laeir


m illion c

th ey h a d certain initial advantages and. alwaj/S|J i a v e iid i ^ ^ a c k i r u ^ ^ f <w o d ^ c ^ ^ t a l i s ir ^ ^ l l fiJl^ ^fliljLd u

a te rT T T a n u a ^ T ^ W T w I i e n '^ n e w T y s t e m ot procure- | T T m e n t a n d supply was in tro d u c e d b y th e C entral C o m m ittee to stren g th en and im prove th e econom ic relatio n s b etw een to w n an d co u n try sid e, th e th re e kinds o f m ark e ts established re fle c te d these th ree eco n o m ic form s. T he state-g u aran teed m a rk e t supplied goods a t fixed prices to w o rk in g p eople o n th e basis o f ra tio n cards; th e b a rte r m a rk e t su p p lied peasants w ith in d u strial com m o d ities in exchange fo r th e ir agricultural surpluses; and th e free m a rk e t served th o se in to w n an d c o u n try w hose needs w ere n o t m et b y th e o th e r tw o m arkets because th e y w ere n o t supplied w ith ra tio n cards o r w ere n o t engaged in co-operative agricultural p ro d u c tio n . Prices in the free m a rk e t w ere m u ch higher th a n in o th ers an d in this w ay m o n ey ac cu m u lated by rich peasants an d cap italist elem ents w o u ld be gradually m o p p e d up. * D uring 1947 sta te in d u strial enterprises w ere p u t o n a self-supporting basis an d w ere re q u ire d to cover all the expenses o f p ro d u c tio n to g e th e r w ith a surplus fo r accu m u latio n o u t o f th e ir revenues. T he m ain fo rm o f b u d g e t incom e was derived from ta x a tio n on the tu rn over o f econom ic 138

enterprises. T he artisan co-operatives w ere req u ired to lay aside p a rt o f th e ir p ro fits fo r ex p a n sio n and the re m u n e ratio n o f m em bers was p u t on a socialist basis. T he buying and selling co-operatives w ere charged n o t only w ith supplying th e c o u n try sid e w ith in d u strial goods b u t also w ith accu m u latin g ag ricu ltu ral p ro d u c ts fo r th e regular supply o f cities. T hese m easures did n o t solve all th e problem s o f socialist g ro w th b y an y m eans and, p artic u la rly , o n questions like the p ro c u re m e n t o f fo o d grain m uch m o re experience w o u ld be re q u ired in o rd e r to avoid th e d ev elo p m en t o f new c o n tra d ic tions b etw een to w n a n d c o u n try sid e ; b u t the basis had none th e less b een laid fo r a rem ark ab ly ra p id advance o u t o f A lb an ias old eco nom ic backw ardness. W here b efo re th e w ar th e m ajo rity o f w orkshops em p lo y ed few er th a n 25 w orkers, b y 1965 less th a n 1% o f A lbanian w orkers w ere em p lo y ed in such sm all concerns; from 454% o f th e to ta l incom e th e n re p resen te d by in d u stry th e percen tag e had grow n to over 55% ; a n d this g ro w th ra te was assured by a stead y increase in m eans o f p ro d u c tio n at a rate o f som e 65-70% as against a 30-35% rise in co n su m er goods w hich is th e fo rm socialist ac cu m u latio n takes. T he eco n o m ic base was able to sustain increasingly large units o f p ro d u c tio n like the big oil refineries, m echanised c o p p er, ch ro m e and iron-nickel m ines, th e great S talin and Mao T setu n g te x tile m ills, th e H am m er and Sickle k n ittin g m ills, huge ce m e n t factories a n d chem ical w orks fo r th e |>roduction o f fertilisers, th e tra c to r spare p arts fa cto ry at T iran a an d gigantic h y d ro -p o w er statio n s like the Karl M arx ,md F riedrich Engels p lan ts in th e n o rth , an d J o se p h S talin in Ilie so u th an d th e new V au i Dejes (D eja F o rd ) statio n o n the l)rin R iver w hich pro d u ces over o n e billion K w /H . T he rate o f annual increase o f industrial p ro d u c tio n has been over 15%, reaching in 1967 a level 44 tim es th a t o f 19.38, and in u n d er 25 years the n atio n al incom e has grow n l< m ore th a n five tim es its original size. > A lbania, th e m o st back w ard c o u n try in E u ro p e, has left m ost E u ro p e an co u n trie s far b eh in d in its rate o f develop m ent. From a c o u n try _ w h ih jiad t o im p o rt all sorts o f in d u strial K > xls A lbania n ow _exports n in F T n n e jrtj^ a m o u M <' 139

Average G eneral D evelopm ent R ate o f In d u stry (1 951-1966) A lbania 15.0 Y ugoslavia 9.9 G reece 8.3 Italy 8.2 B ulgaria 13.6 R u m an ia 13.2 B ritain 3.1 S oviet U nion 10.6 F ran ce 5.6 U n ited S tates 4.7 Increase in In d u strial P ro d u c tio n (1938 = 100%)

1950
A lbania Y ugoslavia G reece Italy B ulgaria R u m an ia B ritain S oviet U nion F rance U n ited S tates 435 170 107 126 312 147 133 222 120 232

1960
2621 44 4 242 295 1236 500 181 677 214 337

as b efo r _ lh _ ^ a i d an half o f th o se ex p o rts are in d u strial p ro rn icts. P lanning is d om j^aw a^T vT H rT C ^T Ispm poffionate cfevelopm eir^aF d iffe re n t regions. H undreds o f new industrial w o rk sh o p s, factories, pow er statio n s and m ines have been estab lish ed in econom ically back w ard areas and new tow ns have sp ru n g up like S talin, B ulqiza, P atos, M em aliaz, C errik, M aliq an d La. T he need fo r technicians and specialists has b een m e t b y creating the in stitu tio n s to train th em and in 1967 a lo n e m o re th an 1400 g rad u ated from advanced tech n o lo g ical centres fo u r tim es the n u m b e r sen t ab ro ad fo r train in g in th e w h o le 15 y e a r p erio d o f Z ogist rule. H ow has it been possible for such a tin y c o u n try , encircled b y enem ies, to resist all the pressures b ro u g h t to bear by im p erialist co u n tries, the b etrayals o f revisionist co untries an d to achieve such a re co rd o f social and in d u strial progress? 140

T h e answ er is th e sam e as to th e q u estio n o f h o w it was possible to d efeat a vastly su p erio r invasion force by m obilising th e courage, energy and skills o f th e p eo p le w ho b y rely in g o n th eir o w n effo rts w ere able, in th e one case, to free th eir c o u n try , in the o th e r, to develop an d industrialise it. 'H i e j m j a g ^ y j y ^ ^ ^ i e l f ^ d i a n e i s b a s e d o n t h ^ f i y } ^ m e n ta M M a r x is ^ j j r i n c i p l ^ T l K a c l ia n g e ^ ^ r ^ E r o u g T ita b o u t

i S e m a T 7 ^ ^ | ^ ^ iC o n to d ic to rin e s s |Hw ith in > i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ j l T e < ^ a n S n n 7 e ^ a S o n s T v T n ^ y n ? e !^ n n g < ra n ^ e c o n c Ia ? ^ a u s e s / ~77T settin g up a w holly in d e p e n d e n t ec o n o m y w ith all b ranches o f m ach in e-m ak in g and heavy in d u stry developed to th e p o in t w h ere every possible n eed could be m et. B ut selfreliance does n o t m ean self-sufficiency. By relying on th e ir

r jjJ g U o n s h i^ jD ^ jm tU ja ls m i^ D o r ^ ^ ^ so c ia lis r* c o u n T n s^ T?yic f o n o t " n g i e c t t h e n U c m a n a c t o r buTTIie'TTnm vTTa't w h a t th e y p ro d u c e at h om e is o f decisive im p o rtan ce w hile w h a t th e y im p o rt is secondary. As M eh m et S hehu explains it: A biding b y th e prin cip le o f self-reliance does n o t m ean th a t we sh o u ld lock ourselves inside o u r n atio n al hull and ignore advanced foreign e x p e ri ence, n o r sh o u ld we ignore th e in te rn a tio n a l aid o f friendly co u ntries. O n th e c o n tra ry , we should m ake a co rrect appraisal o f an d grasp th e positive experience o f o th e rs and p ro fit from l he in te rn a tio n a l aid o f o u r real friends fo r building socialism in o u r ow n co u n try . . . . J J i i^ y g ^ ^ ^ i i U l f i i ^ ^ U ^ j j j ^ b il i s a y o n o f th ^ e n m j^ jJ ^ I j jf l^ s H ^ J ^ T ^ ^ to ffT l^ ^ ^ b jm a k e ^ itp o s s ib l^ J lo i^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n e ^ U ) c on trib u te th e b e s F T T e T i a ^ ^ ^ n e r ^ o t n ^ g e n e r a ^ o o d o f )im iiu ^ s o c ic ^ T l'? S T ^ f f i^ T M r s F ^ ! o n g r e s ^ c > r tn ^ r a ^ ^ o f I T iioouT l,i m B ? 5 7 ^ ''n v e r H o x h a said: T he A lbanian peo p le w ho have hero ically fo u g h t fo r th e lib e ra tio n o f th eir c o u n try iind for th e ir d em o cratic p e o p le s p o w er have th o u g h t it b est

th a t th ey should base th e ir aspirations for m arching forw ard, first and fo rem o st, o n th eir ow n in ex h au stib le forces. T hey are co nscious th a t, how ever great th eir sacrifices m ay be, th e y are w ork in g fo r them selves and n o t fo r o th ers. T h ey are w o rk in g fo r th e ir P arty an d p e o p le s p o w e r w h ich will surely lead th e m on th e ro a d to w ell-being and socialism . Socialist econom ic_plan n in g takes th e sam e form of d c m io c ra tk ^ je n tra lism j^ f^ T e jT T ^ o i/O T ja m a n life . It is b ased o n t h e m a ^ u m m n p a ^ c ip a H o n o f tn mass s T T T O P T ^ F B ie y ^ Ia c e s o f w ork, in _ c it^ flu a rt rs d ra ^ a i^ c U v e s _ jia iL llia k _ th e ir re m a rk s_ m d g sslio n j. silg o ^ e r ^ ^ ^ r ^ e f f e c t th a t t h e t a n ^ e t s a r e n o t high enough and m o ^ ^ c o u l d D e a c c o m p l i s n e a n r a p a r t i c u l a r s e c to r _ g f

agrTcuTtuHI^M ^ncfustryHT'airTiaH5eerH?ancrT'orrHnsrtwQ_may
process TT?nven,TlSfl?"'pTa5iTTm gcom m ]ttee and w orking p eo p le co n tin u es till the w hole plan in all its details is finally agreed. T h e m eetings o f w ork in g collectives o n th e fo u rth Five Y ear plan, w hich ended in 1970 w ith g re ater increases th a n th o se p ro p o se d in every b ran ch o f th e econom y, involved 1 7 4 ,0 0 0 discussions in w hich 1 4 1,000 proposals w ere p u t fo rw ard. T he fa ct th a t sta te plans fo r econom ic and cu ltu ral d ev elo p m en t b ear th e m arks o f the p e o p le guaran tees th e ir b eing successfully p u t in to effect.

/ 142

C h ap ter T h irtee n

D evelopm ent o f Agriculture


B efore th e w ar the backw ardness o f A lb an ia was n o w here m o re ap p a re n t th a n in th e agricultural system , still based on feudal o r sem i-feudal relations o f p ro d u c tio n w ith the ad d itio n o f som e e x p lo ita tio n o f th e p ea san try by city capitalists. L andlords an d w ealth y p ro p rie to rs to o k h a lf o f th e p ro d u c e in high ren ts an d th e rest w as subject to the fu rth er d ep red atio n o f having to be exchanged at u n fa v o u r able prices fixed b y th e m erch an ts. T h e lab o u rin g p easan try was heavily in d eb t to usurers charging fa n tastically high in terest rates. T h e lan d was tilled w ith prim itive im p lem en ts by in effic ien t m eth o d s and agricultural p ro d u c tio n was abysm ally low. D uring th e w ar th e s u p p o rt o f th e p o o r peasants fo r th e lib eratio n struggle was w on by th e p ro m ise o f land refo rm as p art o f th e rev o lu tio n ary tra n sfo rm a tio n o f th e co u n try . In every lib era te d area th e grain d ep o ts o f the land ow ners w ere co n fiscated and re n t a n d deb ts w ere cancelled. In th e first days o f in d ep en d e n ce th e state co llected grain to p rev en t sp ecu latio n ; th e tith e system was abolished; all d eb ts w ere officially an n u lled and w h a t ren ts rem ain ed w ere fixed a t a low lim it. The agrarian re fo rm , carried o u t in on ly 14 m o n th s during 1945 a n d 1 9 4 6 , was th e first re v o lu tio n in A lb a n ia s i o u n try sid e. A n y rem aining feudal relatio n s w ere abolished, l.md was d istrib u te d free o f charge to th e p easan ts w ho tilled 1 1 and th e la n d lo rd class was liq u id ated . T he liq u id a tio n o f a lass does n o t m ean, o f course, th e an n ih ilatio n o f th e individuals m aking it up any m ore th a n th e liq u id a tio n o f iIn ( lass o f reckless drivers by d isq u alificatio n w o u ld m ean 143

an y th in g b u t p u ttin g an e n d to th a t fo rm o f anti-social behaviour. t hn was a necessary co n d itio n for the socialist tra n sfo rm a tio n o f th e c o u n try sid e _ h u t was nol_ in

^ T e ^ e T T T n ^ T io im ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S m o U e ^ je a s a n ^ c o n o m ^ ^ e T i a t e n a l T ^ T ic ^ a s e d a n H ^ q i n n y i m p o ^ n t ^ n T T 'c o I l e t i y ^ _______ _ _ ^ _ ___________ atiQ]i_i th e tim e being was h eld at bay by legal re stric tio n s o n j J j e 1!STsTeFo!T T a n c L ^ nSoJT^PfWTKTTion o f agriculture provided th e re so lu tio n o f th e c o n tra d ic tio n b etw e en socialist in d u stry , based o n social o w n ership o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , an d a sm all-scale p ea san t ec o n o m y based o n private ow nership o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n . As long as this co n tra d ic tio n rem ain ed , th e tw o realm s o f p ro d u c tio n , in d u strial and agricultural, w ere b o u n d to develop n o t only at d iffe re n t rates b u t even in d iffe ren t p o litical directio n s. S ocialist in d u stry was being su p p lied w ith advanced tech n ical e q u ip m e n t w hile sm all-scale p easan t ag ricu ltu re used th e m o st prim itive tech n iq u e s; in d u stry was cen tralised an d b ro u g h t u n d e r a state plan fo r co -o rd in ated d ev elo p m en t w hile th e p easan t ec o n o m y co u ld on ly develop sp o n tan eo u sly ; and o n th e po litical side th e liq u id a tio n o f the bourgeoisie in th e cities was linked to th e creatio n o f a socialist base fo r in d u stry w hile in th e co u n try sid e private o w n ership on how ever re stric te d a scale co u ld on ly go on g en eratin g capitalism day b y day. If w h a t a m o u n te d to tw o d iffe re n t econom ies w ere allow ed to exist side by side, th ere c o u ld be n o general socialist advance fo r th e w hole co u n try , n o w alking o n tw o legs as th e co -o rd in ated progress o f in d u stry an d agriculture has b een called, and inevitably th ere w o u ld be a d rift b ack to capitalism w hich w o u ld gradually erode th e socialist sector. '^ liS jU illto d ic tio n J a e ^ v e e n to w T ^ m d c o u n ^ y s id e ^ g o in g q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 E ^ S S l ^ ^ Y ^ o T T e c 5 v i s a t! o n T T ^ g n c u I u i r e A lb a m ^ _ s e o n x lj^ o lu tio n i^ 0 T ^ m ra 'H ire a s T !o llecH ^satio n

was brought a b o u t b y l nJnsRn!nTTu>THepnvatc property of small producers into socialist property through the voluntary

(lo p ) Fam ilies celebrating International W o rk ers D ay in Tirana.

(b o tto m ) The Albanian fo o tb a ll team , tile 'Partisans', scores a g oal against a Swedish team in a m atch in the Q em al S ta fa Stadium .

Holiday

accommodation for workers o the Ionian Sea at Dhermi. n

Reunion o f com rades a t the house in Tirana where the P arty o f Labour o f Albania was fo u n d ed on N ovem ber 8th 1941. A ll p la ye d active p a rts in the war o f liberation and are now leading m em bers o f the S ta te and Party. Enver H oxha (secon d fro m right) is fla n k e d on his left by M ehm et Shelni and on his right by H ysni Kapo.

Students on the steps o f Tirana U niversity. Before the war over 8 0 % o f the people of Albania were illiterate and it was the only country in Eu
university.

/ liver H oxha and Vasil Shunto during Albania's war o f resistance. Vasil Slianto was k ille d in action in 1944.

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p jfc f ; *

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uj

nv<?/- H oxha with M aria Biha, whose father. P a rly S ecreta ry for M irdita D istrict, was killed in 1949 by a hand o f traitors in the p a r o f A lb a n ia s im perialist enemies. M aria is now vice-D irector o f the m iddle school which bears her fa th e r name. Bardhok Biba. s

M ao Tsetung and Enver H oxha. The com radeship o f tw o peoples is in llie warm personal greetings o f these two socialist leaders.

co -o p era tio n o f p ea san t ow ners. T h ey u n ite d th e ir land, shared to o ls and farm anim als, an d d istrib u te d the p ro d u c e according to th e w ork days each h ad p u t in, th u s securing the advantages o f larger-scale p ro d u c tio n w ith o u t re-in tro d u cin g e x p lo ita tio n in any form . W ith th e creatio n o f collective p ro p e rty th e co -o rd in atio n o f individual in terests w ith collective in tere sts a n d o f collective in terests w ith th e in terests o f so ciety as a w hole becam e possible. T he P arty o f L ab o u r did n o t leave th e fo rm a tio n o f co-operatives to sp o n tan eo u s d ev elo p m en t b u t carried o u t a cam paign o f political e d u c a tio n am ong th e peasants en co u rag in g th e m to com bine th e ir individual holdings in to socialist u n its. A t th e sam e tim e collectivisation o f agriculture was n o t b ro u g h t a b o u t b y ad m inistrative fiats b u t by th e free choice o f th e w orking p ea san try o n ce th e y h a d b ecom e con v in ced o f th e su p erio rity o f th e collective over individual p lo ts. O p tio n al p a rtic ip a tio n in co-operatives has alw ays been one o f th e basic p rinciples o f th eir organisation. Having p ro v id ed p o litical s u p p o rt fo r th e collectivisation m o v em en t th e socialist state o ffered p ractical eco n o m ic assistance as well. M achine and tra c to r statio n s w ere estab lished fo r th e use o f the bigger collectives; agrarian credits w ere g ran ted o n favourable term s a n d selected seeds, chem ical fertilisers, im proved sto ck and insecticides w ere provided. W ith th e success o f th e first collectives v o lu n tarily set up in 1 9 4 6 , co-operatives so o n spread all over the c o u n try . B ut just as th e first agrarian re v o lu tio n o f land re fo rm h ad involved class struggle against lan d lo rd s, so th e second agrarian rev o lu tio n o f collectivisation involved class struggle against fo rm er rich peasants o r kulaks w ho had h o p e d to acq u ire fo r them selves m u ch o f the re d istrib u te d land as th e sy stem o f tin y p rivate holdings pro v ed u n econom ic. In the course o f this struggle against the kulaks, the p o o r and m iddle peasants changed th eir ow n class ch aracter from th a t o f individual p easants to th a t o f a co-operative p easan try . T h e socialist state h elp ed th e co-operative p easan try in th eir class co n flict by isolating the kulaks po litically and taxing th em eco n o m ically ; b u t the state co u ld only intervene u sefu lly to th e e x te n t th a t th e w o rk in g m asses them selves 145

w ere p re p are d to struggle. T h ere w ere set-backs w hen th e kulaks, no longer a strong eno u g h fo rce to o p pose th e agrarian m easures o f th e p e o p le s state o p en ly , ex p lo ited ideological w eaknesses am ong th e p easan ts and trie d to in cite th em to resist p ro c u re m e n t policies w ith w hich th e y them selves com plied. T hey gave cu rren c y to th e idea th a t the new socialist system m ig h t be go o d fo r city w orkers and em ployees b u t h ad little to o ffe r th e w o rk in g peasants w h o w ere ex p e cted to assum e an u n eq u a l b u rd e n in th e general tra n sfo rm a tio n o f so ciety as a w hole. Since the rev o lu tio n in th e co u n try sid e h ad n o t y e t re su lted in obvious m aterial advantages and since the local P arty organisations did n o t always successfully c o u n te r these attac k s, som e p easan ts, even som e secretaries o f th e n ascen t co-operatives, fell in to th e trap set for th em b y th e kulaks an d re tre a te d in an o p p o rtu n istic w ay fro m th e ap p lica tio n o f p ro c u re m e n t ordinances. In_an_open_letter^O n Som e P roblem s in th e C o u n try sid e p u b lis h e d in Z e n W ^ P o ^ ^ e x jjla in e d ^ J h ^ ^ a ^ a s il^ Q L JL h c new agraria n s y s tm and the p e r s j^ e c tiv e s iW jjD c n c d ^ j^ f o i^ a i^ r u I U ^ a r ^ ^ ^ o ^ m e T ^ ^ T n reIan o iT T o " 7 n r '^ T o T ? ,^ o a a n n e c o m T m v ^ f " 7 n P a m a ! ^ le p o in te d o u t th a T T JT e ^ n a m ^ ro in n ^ v a s rio ^ m e p ro c u re m e n t ord in ances them selves, b u t th e failure o f P arty organisations in th e co u n try sid e to establish the so rt o f links w ith the masses w hich w o u ld have p re v en ted th eir being m isled. F ollow ing this criticism the P arty co m m ittees sh o o k o ff th e ir d efeatist a ttitu d e , purged them selves o f any idea th a t th e answ er to th e c o u n try s econom ic d ifficulties lay in o b tain in g foreign aid and su p p o rte d th e e ffo rts at th e cen tre to b u ild u p larger reserves o f in d u strial goods to be ex ch an g ed fo r agricultural p ro d u c ts. T he C ouncil o f M inisters for its p art allocated special credits fo r th e au tu m n sow ing o f 1949 a n d re d u ced p ro c u re m e n t q u o tas th ro u g h a reclassifica tio n o f land. In th e im proved p o litical clim ate th e co-operative m ove m e n t forged ahead. By 1950 th ere w ere 9 0 co-operatives, by 1955 th ere w ere 318 an d by 1960 th e re w ere 1,482. A t the en d o f 1967, follow ing on th e in c o rp o ra tio n o f sm aller units in to larger an d m o re eco n o m ic aggregates, th e re w ere 1,208 146

co-operatives covering 99% o f th e land surface and including 98% o f all p easan t fam ilies. In itially co-operatives w ere fo rm e d aro u n d each separate village and averaged from 250 to 5 0 0 acres in e x te n t; b u t the u s e o M ^ i c H > ^ t ^ t i o n s j g ^ ^ r e d - the_enlargem ent_of_co^oerco-operatives averaged 1250 acres, th o se in hillier regions 750 MKUU 2 5 0 0 a c r e s ^ ff n ? T o T u n S ry m ie n rin ^ o f sm aller co-operatives n a ^ m a u ^ o s s ib le a b e tte r u tilisatio n o f th e capital provided by th e state an d a b e tte r d istrib u tio n o f available m an pow er and m echanical im plem ents. T hese larger co-operatives w ere also able to carry o u t m ore extensive p ro jects o f land im p rovem ent and reclam ation. D uring th e th ird five-year plan (1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 5 ) m o re th a n 140 reservoirs w ere b u ilt b y co -o p er atives. In th e D ib ra d istrict alone irrig atio n was ex te n d e d to an ad d itio n al 7 5 0 0 acres and vast previously uncultivable tracts w ere p la n te d w ith fru it trees. evidence fo r th e success o f th e w ay in w hich ( (> o p e ra tiv e s _ w e ^ |^TaBn?TTCTrg *prapgggtTTl!g^itTeM wiwp ^ ^ 4 T ^ ^ ^)en o n ty _ _ o f_ ^o ^^^se5^^g^cultu re and w a i H n ^ f o ^ t f i e 4 peasants th e m selves t c ^ c o m l 3 T n ^ lfTf?'nllT iolcfm g?"l<?cFoper.l^ v e I ^ ^ j T j |E r ^ ^ e r ^ T T a v e ,^ e c rw io " T v ^ n n m w a I^ T m n rtT ie | < xdlliliS-tll p e asants u e e ly e n te r e d in to an d rem ain ed tree lo leave if th e y wIsW rTTTTW eTorm ation o i a <?:o-&peranv all l.mcl ii {WffCTPancHnr'TaWPFpTOpfcrty is h an d e d over to the C o m m ittee o f E stim a tio n , a p p o in te d by th e G eneral M eeting w hich is th e co -o p erativ es d em o cratic assem bly. T he m em b er w hose p ro p e rty is being assessed takes p a rt in the d elib er ations o f th e C o m m ittee and the agreed to ta l value o f the p ro p e rty farm im p lem en ts, d ra ft anim als, w agons, seeds is repaid in y early in stallm en ts. F rom th e collective land each fam ily is given a p lo t to <ulIivate in ad d itio n to th e g ro u n d im m ed iately su rro u n d in g l heir dw elling place. T he size o f th e p lo t, w hich varies w ith (h r size o f th e fam ily and w ith th e difference in fe rtility In tw een low land a n d m o u n ta in o u s regions, is fix ed b y the <ieneral M eeting as are th e n u m b ers o f ca ttle, sheep, goats mid pigs w hich can be k e p t privately. H ouses and th e ir 147

furnishings, sheds an d to o ls re q u ired fo r w ork in g th e private p lo ts do n o t b eco m e collective p ro p e rty , though it has been c u sto m a ry fo r m em bers o f th e co-operative, using c o llec t ively-ow ned im p lem en ts, to help each o th e r o n th eir personal holdings thus e x ten d in g th e co-operative prin cip le even to th ese p rivately-ow ned allo tm en ts.

All m em bers en jo y th e fullest d em o cratic rights as belo n g ing to th e G eneral M eeting w hich elects th e executive c o m m itte e and its ch airm an w ho are responsible fo r d ire c tio n an d guidance in th e co-o p erativ es day to day c o n d u c t o f its affairs. T he G eneral M eeting dem ands an d receives regular ac co u n ts from its agents o n th e executive c o m m itte e a n d can dism iss b efo re th e ex p iry o f his term o f office any person w ho has lo st th e co n fid en ce o f th e m em bers o f the co-operative. E ^gaflfl_is_paid according to th e am o u n t o f w ork done, bu- r C n th ^> ^ ^ r T a ^ X e e ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ / m g T m 3 e n ^ ^ T ?"assess ^ w o ^ ^ Q o n ^ o n m ^ T a s i ^ * o ^ c o n e t w ? " ^ T?^!ian^nnivTcfual a T y s ^ n T o ^ e m m ie T a tio n T e U e ^ e r v e ^ ^ ie ^ p i ri t o t team w ork and is m o re co n sisten t w ith a socialist a ttitu d e to w ard lab o u r. W hen co-operatives have b ee n co m b in ed in to larger units, differences in th e fe rtility o f th e various sections m ay have b een re flected in differences in p ay m en ts; b u t these 148

d istin ctio n s have b een abolished by the v o lu n tary ac tio n o f th e co-operative peasants n o w p a rt o f th e sam e enlarged eco n o m ic co m m u n ity . ^ T he larger th e co-operative th e m ore eco n o m ic the u tilisatio n o f m achines and tra c to rs. In 1938 th ere w ere only 30 trac to rs in th e w hole c o u n try . T o d ay , w ith m ore than 10 ,0 0 0 tra c to rs available fo r use in 30 m achine an d tra c to r statio n s, th ere is one tra c to r fo r every 125 acres o f tilled land. T hese sta tio n s provide th e m echanical eq u ip m e n t for carrying o u t 95% o f the ploughing, 80% o f the sow ing, 55% o f th e reap in g an d 85% o f the threshing. F rom being able to perfo rm o n ly a lim ited n u m b e r o f o p eratio n s, m ainly in c o n n e ctio n w ith ploughing, th e m ach in e and tra c to r statio n s now carry o u t a w ide variety o f fu n c tio n s ranging fro m deep ploughing to m ech an ised shearing. T he co-operatives pay the statio n s fo r th e ir w o rk e ith er in farm p ro d u c e o r m o n ey .

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iin ll) u ( s a n T * T n u s tr iir u r T u c MeM ^ Ip m ^ T i^ u u r^ !ir!m ^ T n ^ ". nMal '1 x v ^ o ^ ^ T o < )p e ^ T v e * j2 m d a a tja a r 3 i ^ S I n I ^ a Z l^ l 1 1 in ilio ii^ u u ^ T J M S U in c e lo those th a t are econom ically

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WP ertain o f th e larger c o m b in ed co-operatives the state c invests m o n ey an d th e re tu rn o n these investm ents is allow ed lo rem ain in th e co-operative to stim u late fu rth e r develop m ent. N o t o n ly is this a step in the tra n sitio n from i o operative p ro p e rty relations to th e higher socialist stage o f Nl.ite p ro p e rty relatio n s b u t also th o se w ho ad m in iste r the l liiuls in th e in te re st o f b o th state and co-operative are state em ployees, lik e teachers, d o cto rs an d nurses, an d thus m< rcase th e n u m b ers w ith in th e co-operatives w hose con(In ions o f service are th e sam e as w o rk ers in th e tow ns. Willi th e increase o f p ro d u c tio n th e re has b een a consider 149

able im p ro v em en t in th e w elfare an d richness o f life o f co -o perative m em bers. In place o f th e old so o ty cottages new dwellings have sprung u p everyw here and now m o re th a n h alf o f th e p easan t fam ilies live in houses c o n stru c te d since collectivisation. A lbania is one o f th e few co u n tries in the w o rld w here there is no dw elling, how ever re m o te , w ith o u t elec tricity , th e ru ral elec trificatio n schem e having b een c o m p leted m ore th a n a y ea r ahead o f schedule. T he light o f socialism shines all over th e re p u b lic in every one o f A lb an ias 2 ,5 5 0 villages. T he cred its advanced to the co-operatives fo r th e electrificatio n o f th e co u n try sid e, som e 130 m illion leks, have b een co n v erted in to free grants an d re cen tly a full sta te pen sio n schem e has b een e x te n d e d to all ag ricu ltural co-operatives. C o-operative centres have assum ed th e c h a rac te r o f new , w ell-planned sm all tow ns, each w ith its infirm aries, m a te rn ity hom es, eight-grade schools, gym nasia, th e a tre s, cu ltu ral centres an d artisan shops. F ew er an d few er am enities to be fo u n d in th e larger cities are ab sen t from these hubs o f rural life. O u t o f lan d co n fisc ated from foreign com panies or reclaim ed b y draining sw am ps have b een created state farm s w h ich , like th e tra c to r statio n s, are based on state-o w n ed ra th e r th a n co-operative-ow ned p ro p e rty . A gricultural w o rk ers on th e sta te farm s receive a regular cash wage like b en ch hands. T hese farm s have m o re specialised fu n ctio n s like cultivating new varieties o f cereals, m eetin g th e needs o f large cities an d in d u strial centres fo r vegetables an d fru its o r developing new strains o f live stock. T h ere are at p resen t 32 o f th ese socially-advanced state farm s w hich have becom e ag ricultural schools for ex p erim en tin g w ith th e la test te c h niques, train in g m em bers o f th e co-operatives in new and im p ro ved m eth o d s o f farm ing and b reed in g and acting as a vanguard in the drive fo r rural d evelopm ent. Y ields o n th e sta te farm s are p h en o m en a lly high, 22 tim es m o re cereals a n d fo u r tim es as m uch m ilk being p ro d u c ed over a 15-year p erio d a n d c o tto n and sugar b eet p ro d u c tio n being increased by som e 70%. Fig and citru s trees have been p la n te d over w ide areas o f form erly uncultivable land and extensive olive groves cover th e hills above E lbasan, V lora an d B erat. Large herds o f selected breeds o f ca ttle like Jerse y 150

an d O sterlitz and great flocks o f im proved breeds o f sheep have b een carefully b u ilt up. N o t only is A lb ania very m o u n ta in o u s, on ly 40% o f the land surface b eing n orm ally considered as cultivable a t all, b u t m uch o f th e m ore fertile low lands w ere sw am py and u n d ra in e d a t th e tim e o f lib era tio n and th e coastal plain generally was su b ject to flood an d d ro u g h t. Large drainage a n d irrig atio n p ro jects w ere an u rg en t necessity fo r increasing agricultural p ro d u c tio n . T he M aliqi an d T erb u fi lagoons w ere d ra in e d a n d hu g e irrig atio n schem es w ere carried o u t a ro u n d K ora, Fier, L ezha and o th e r tow ns on th e plains. M ore th a n 5 0 0 .0 0 0 acres o f new lan d have b een reclaim ed a n d m ore th an 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 acres p u t u n d e r irrig atio n , giving A lbania one of th e highest p ro p o rtio n s o f irrig ated land in E urope. F u rth e r schem es in clude th e drainage o f the K akariqi sw am p in th e n o rth an d th e D ropulli plain in the so u th while irrigation canals m an y m iles long flow ing at heights above 6 .0 0 0 feet are b ein g c o n stru c te d in th e m o u n ta in o u s regions. In socialist co u n tries th ere is n o such thing as u n e c o n o m ic land in th e sense th a t a cap italist farm er co u ld n o t m ake an im m ed iate p ro fit b y w orking it. P ro fita b ility is ju d g ed b y w h a t is beneficial in th e long ru n to society as a w hole. In 1966 th e P arty advanced th e slogan L et us take to the hills an d m o u n tain s and m ake th em as b e a u tifu l and fertile as th e p lain s. As o n e travels in th e sum m er along roads cu ttin g th ro u g h th e rugged uplands one sees p eo p le, m ainly young p eo p le, w o rk ing high up on th e steep slopes, terracing the gro u n d fo r p lan tin g orchards and vineyards. A nd in the w inter th e peasan ts o f th e highlands w o rk to sn atch add itio n al stretch e s o f fe rtile lan d fro m th e ro ck -strew n folds and degraded fo rests. T he uneven p a tte rn o f cap italist dev elo p m en t, c o n sta n tly i (-producing b o th inside and ou tsid e n atio n al b o u n d aries th e basic im balance o f o v e r-co n c en trated m etro p o lis an d deprived environs, is precisely th e o p p o site o f th e socialist I> .iIte m o f evening o u t differences and resolving c o n tra dictions b etw e en to w n a n d c o u n try , b etw een m ore a n d less favoured regions. S peaking on th e occasion o f th e 2 5 th iiimiversary o f lib e ra tio n , Enver H o x h a m ade ju s t this p o in t. 'While fighting fo r high yields in th e low land areas, w e do n o t 151

neglect th e struggle for th e ra p id dev elo p m en t o f agriculture in th e hilly an d m o u n ta in o u s areas ju s t as, attac h in g g reat im p o rtan ce to in d u strialisa tio n , we b y no m eans u n d errate th e needs o f th e co u n try sid e. We do n o t advance b y the d e p o p u la tio n o f villages b u t b y th eir g ro w th as th e centres o f a flourishing agriculture. Preserving th e right p ro p o rtio n s is essential to th e cause o f socialist c o n stru c tio n . A llow ing d iscrepancies to develop is frau g h t w ith grave econom ic, p o litical an d ideological c o n se q u en ce s. In p a rt th e elim in atio n o f discrepancies is achieved by state s u p p o rt in the w ay o f special drainage and irrig atio n funds w hich w ere increased b y six tim es in th e fo u rth five-year plan ending in 1970. W ork is pro ceed in g o n 2 3 0 reservoirs, m ainly in th e p o o re r regions. B ut th e p eople them selves also c o n trib u te to the social process o f m aking up for n atu ra l deficiencies. N o t only have ex p erien ced farm w orkers gone u p in to the hills to share th eir ex p ertise, b u t also th e o ld er co-operatives in th e plains have m ade v o lu n tary gifts o f 5,250 c a ttle , 3 6 ,7 0 0 sheep an d 8 ,8 0 0 goats to th e new er co -o p er atives fo rm ed in d ifficu lt circum stances. T he p ro b lem o f m ain tain in g a c o rre c t re latio n sh ip b etw e en ag ricu ltu ral and in d u strial advance as p art o f the p lan n ed elim in atio n o f differences b etw e en tow n and c o u n try has b een a stu b b o rn o n e re q u irin g c o n sta n t a tte n tio n . D uring the first five-year plan (1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 5 ) it becam e obvious th a t the b ack w ardness o f A lb an ias ag ric u ltu re h ad b een u n d e r estim ated an d th e p ro p o se d increases in p ro d u c tio n w ere n o t being realised. In 1953 th e C entral C o m m ittee to o k special step s to deal w ith th e situ atio n . Som e o f th e in v estm en t allo cated to th e in d u strial sec to r was sw itched to agriculture, arrears in th e qu o tas o f fo o d grains and livestock p ro d u c ts fix ed fo r th e previous fo u r years w ere w ritte n o ff and un p aid tax es ow ed b y co-operative m em bers w ere cancelled. T he d iscrepancy b etw e en th e com paratively low prices o f agri cu ltu ra l p ro d u c ts an d th e high prices o f in d u strial goods was ad ju sted and th e m o v em en t was begun o f shifting p lan ts and w o rkshops, p artic u la rly th o se engaged in processing farm p ro d u c ts or m aking farm to o ls, in to the co u n try sid e. T he b u y ing and selling co-operatives established accum ulating p o in ts as near as possible to th e centres o f agricultural 152

p ro d u c tio n and assum ed re sp o n sib ility fo r th e tra n s p o rta tio n o f p ro d u c e to th e tow ns. In su b seq u en t five-year plans th e n eed to check the d isp ro p o rtio n a te rate o f increase in in d u stry and agriculture has been ta k e n in to a c c o u n t by fixing a h ig h er ra te of d ev elo p m en t fo r th e agricultural sector. F o r exam ple in the fo u rth five-year p lan (1966-1970) th e follow ing d ifferentials w ere p ro p o sed an d achieved in narrow ing dow n th e d istin c tions b etw een u rb a n and rural co n d itio n s: P ercentage increase In d u s try A griculture (village) (city) 71-76 50-54 8.7 40 9-11 5 11.5 68 20-25 11

Over-all p ro d u c tio n Average an nual ra te o f increase S ta te in v estm en t Real incom e p e r cap ita New dw elling houses

As a resu lt o f intensive e ffo rts to im prove and develop the rural ec o n o m y , ag ricultural p ro d u c tio n has increased b y fo u r lim es th e pre-w ar level. Up to 1938 the m ain agricultural revenues cam e fro m live sto ck , a b o u t 51% o f the to ta l incom e co m p ared w ith 43% from farm ing, w hile fru it grow ing and fo restry to g e th e r on ly a c c o u n te d fo r 6%. N ow 61% o f the rural incom e is p ro v ided b y farm crops and th e percentages o f fruit-grow ing an d fo re stry have increased. B efore th e w ar the only in d u strial crops w ere to b acc o an d c o tto n . T he p ro d u c tio n o f th ese crops has b een en orm ously increased, tobacco b y n in e tim es as m u ch as in 1938, b y o b tain in g higher yields ra th e r th a n by an e x te n sio n o f acreage. T o them have been ad d ed sugar b eets, sunflow ers, sage, vallonia and m any o th e r crops having in d u strial o r m edicinal uses. T he n itrate p la n t at F ier and the su p erp h o sp h a te p la n t a t La have m ade A lb an ia one o f th e m o st advanced co u n trie s in I .m ope in th e use o f chem ical fertilisers. The state ac cu m u latio n agencies are able to h an d le fo r th e internal m a rk e t o r fo r e x p o rt th e greatest increases o f various i lops p ro d u c ed b y th e co-operatives, even w hen an u n e x p e c 153

ted ly large harvest is g ath ered as w ith th e 1967 su p e r ab u n d an ce o f olives. G rapes to o , th e p ro d u c tio n o f w h ich has greatly increased every year, are en tirely a b so rb ed by d istrib u tio n th ro u g h o u t th e c o u n try o r conversion in to wine. Huge re frig eratio n plants have b een co n stru c te d in all the m ajo r cities fo r th e preserv atio n o f perishables like m eat, fru its an d vegetables. In o n e y ear, fro m 1955 to 1957, ag ricultural p ro d u c tio n rose by 15% a n d in O c to b e r, 1957, th e ra tio n in g system was abolished alto g eth er and th e re was a general low ering o f prices. B ut th e p ro b lem o f differences b etw e en to w n and c o u n try is n o t on ly eco n o m ic. I t is ideological as well. T he struggle to elim inate this c o n tra d ic tio n , th e re fo re , takes the form o f ed u catin g th e p e a sa n try in new socialist a ttitu d e s to w ard p riv ate and collective in tere sts, to w ard the re latio n sh ip o f the individual to the sta te a n d society as a w hole a ttitu d e s w hich are d irectly c o n n e c te d w ith th e increase in p ro d u c tio n m ade possible b y these very socialist relations. Special effo rts have b een m ade to erad icate th e regressive custom s and tra d itio n s, th e religious prejudices an d su p erstitio n s to w hich p eo p le in th e c o u n try sid e w ere th e p a rtic u la r heirs. A long w ith scientific m eth o d s o f w orking th e land has b een ta u g h t a scientific perspective generally and w ith reco g n itio n o f th e p ractical necessity o f th e w o rk er-p easan t alliance has been ta u g h t th e w orld o u tlo o k o f th e p ro le ta ria t. Ideological a tta c k is specially d irec ted against custom s, p rejudices and su p erstitio n s th a t harm th e p e o p le s h ea lth and th e ir ec o n o m y , th a t keep alive th e old p atria rch al relations o f in eq u ality in th e fam ily, th a t abuse th e rights o f w om en, low ering th e ir dignity a n d o b stru c tin g th e ir active p a rtic ip a tio n in th e econom ic, political an d social life o f the co u n try sid e. T o help in this struggle o f ideas an d a ttitu d e s y o u ng peo p le and w orkers go v o lu n tarily in to the c o u n try to live an d w ork side b y side w ith th e peasants fo r considerable p eriods. T here are exchanges o f groups o f p eople b etw een u p lan d and low land regions, b etw een d istricts o f th e n o rth an d th e so u th so th a t b y th e sharing o f experiences an d the spreading o f new ideas th e ideological ed u c atio n o f the p ea san try can b e advanced and th e y will b ecom e progres sively p ro letarian ised . In th e cities courses have b een sta rte d 154

fo r train in g w o m en from th e co-operatives m various skills and p ro fessions, eq uipping th em to go back and play th eir p a rt in raising th e econom ic a n d cu ltu ral level o f life in th e rural co m m u n ities. U ltim ately th e decisive fa c to r in th e great tra n sfo rm a tio n o f ag ricu ltu re is m an th e new m an o f a socialist conscience a n d re v o lu tio n ary spirit. I t is m a n , E nver H o x h a to ld the F ifth C ongress o f the P arty in 1966, w ho m akes a place thrive and o u r m o u n tain s will be tran sfo rm ed by th e hands and th e creative m inds o f o u r p e o p le . I t is in freeing m an to play this creative p ro d u c tiv e role th a t th e P arty an d p eople have achieved such results and Enver H o x h a co u ld say in all tru th at th e tim e o f the celeb ratio n s o f th e T w e n ty fifth A nniversary o f lib eratio n : All o f us have still fresh in o u r m inds th e th a tc h -ro o fe d huts and th e o p p ressed peasants o f M yzeqe, the h u ngry highlands o f P uka and D ukagjin, th e w hole o f o u r suffering an d toiling peasan try . We re m e m b er th e sw am ps and m arshes w hich flo o d ed som e o f o u r b est lands fro m B una to th e V urgu o f Delvina. B ut all th a t belongs to h isto ry , to th e p ast. T o d ay all th e n ew co -o perative co u n try sid e is shining in th e light o f socialism . . . . T h e successes a n d victories achieved are closely co n n e cted w ith th e P arty line fo r th e c o rre c t so lu tio n o f the p easant p ro b lem w hich is am ong th e m o st im p o rta n t and the m ost co m p licated problem s for every c o u n try em barking on the ro a d o f socialist c o n s tru c tio n .

155

C h ap ter F o u rte e n

D evelopm ent o f Industry and the R elation betw een Econom ic Base and Social Superstructure
T he c o m m itm e n t o f the A lbanian p eo p le, o n ce th ey had lib erated them selves, to the task o f tran sfo rm in g th eir c o u n try d irectly from an econom ically b ack w ard sem i-feudal sta te in to a socialist sta te , w ith o u t passing th ro u g h th e phase o f advanced capitalist in d u strialisatio n , posed as th e m o st im m ediate and urg en t post-w ar p ro b lem the rap id develop m e n t o f a socialist in d u stry . B ut in d u strialisa tio n is through a n d through a class issue and th e decision to raise th e w hole in d u strial s tru c tu re on a socialist fo u n d a tio n fro m w hich e x p lo ita tio n o f one class by an o th e r has been ab so lu tely ex clu d ed involves a n u m b e r o f social corollaries a b o u t th e ways in w hich cap ital is ac cu m u lated , th e kinds Of in cen tiv e o ffered to w o rk ers and even th e in te rn a tio n a l c o n te x t in w hich in d u strialisatio n takes place. F irst an d fo rem o st o f course, is involved the p o litical q u estio n o f h o w it can be assured th a t th e beneficiaries o f in d u strialisa tio n are and will rem ain th e great mass o f th e w ork in g peo p le w h o by th e ir creative skill and lab o u r m ake in d u strial dev elo p m en t possible. It can only be assured if state p o w e r is firm ly in th e hands o f the w orking p eo ple. B etw een societies based on ex p lo ita tio n , like feu d al ism o r capitalism , an d fully co m m u n ist so ciety in w hich there are n o classes a t all th ere is a p erio d o f rev o lu tio n ary tran sfo rm atio n o f th e fo rm e r in to th e la tte r. M arx in the C ritiq u e o f th e G o th a P rogram m e h ad laid do w n the necessary political ch a rac te r o f th e tra n sito ry p erio d o f socialism . T he state o f this p erio d ca n n o t be o th e r th a n the rev o lu tio n ary d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t; and this was th e n a tu re o f th e A lbanian sta te c reated by th e P arty and peo ple on w inning indep en d en ce. T h e prim itive ac cu m u latio n w hich enabled co u n trie s like 156

B ritain to em b ark on the ca p ita list m ode o f p ro d u c tio n to o k th e fo rm p a rtly o f saving b y th e early en tre p ren e u rs to invest in the ex p an sio n o f m a n u fa c tu rin g b u t, m uch m ore, o f e x tra ctin g lo o t from th e colonies w hich flow ed b ack to the m o th e r c o u n try to be tu rn e d in to capital. In so far as th rift an d self-denial en te re d in to th e am assing o f capital th ey w ere re flected in th e ideology o f p u ritan ism ; b u t this c u rta ilm e n t o f p re sen t pleasures for fu tu re satisfactions at co m p o u n d in tere st w as ro o te d in a purely individualistic e th ic o f getting ahead an d securing th e personal pow er m o n ey in a capitalist so ciety gives. In so far as the gross e x p lo ita tio n o f colonial peoples p ro v id ed the capital for in d u strialisatio n it was re flected in an ideology o f n a tio n al an d racial chauvinism . In a socialist c o u n try like A lbania the a c cu m u latio n for in v estm en t in in d u strialisatio n cam e p artly from th e ex p ro p riatio n o f th e bourgeoisie, lan d lo rd s and foreign capitalists b u t, m u ch m o re, a n d o n a co n tin u in g basis, from th e savings o f th e w o rk in g p eople by w ay o f the creatio n o f surpluses in in d u strial a n d co-operative en terp rises a large p ro p o rtio n o f w hich was d ev o ted to in v estm en t in industrial expansion ra th e r th a n to sim ply increasing th e p ro d u c tio n o f co n su m ers goods. In the last five y ea r period , for exam ple, 28.2% o f th e n atio n al incom e was set aside for in v estm en t, prim arily in m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , and 71.8% was used for social an d p erso n al co n su m p tio n . B u t this saving was collec tive, co rresp o n d in g to the socialist m o rality o f p u ttin g the interests o f so ciety as a w hole and even o f gen eratio n s y e t to com e above im m ed iate individual interests. Even m o re im p o rta n t in the d evelopm en t o f capitalism than p rim itive ac cu m u latio n is th e creatio n o f an ex p lo itab le lab o u r fo rce w orkers w ho, in M arx s w ords, are free to sell Iheir lab o u r p o w er and have been fre e d o f an y th in g else to dispose of. P eople in B ritain, fo r exam ple, w ere driven o ff the land by E n clo su re A cts, artisans w ere deprived o f th e tools o f Iheir trad e an d an in d u strial arm y o f h a n d s was form ed w hich h ad n o altern ativ e to th eir re c ru itm e n t in to factories and mills o n term s fixed by th e ow ners, p ro d u cin g goods w hich, above th e value necessary to sustain them selves and rep ro d u ce a new g eneration o f w o rk ers, belo n g ed en tirely to the ow ner. T h e only incentive fo r w orking rem ain ed the 157

m aterial one o f w o rk or starve an d th e cash nexus becam e the d o m in an t form o f hu m an relatio n sh ip s generallyreflected in th e social p h e n o m e n o n o f alienation o r co m m o d ity fetishism . Socialist A lb an ia was faced w ith th e sam e p ro b lem o f finding w orkers to m an th e n ew industrial enterprises re q u ired fo r eco n o m ic g row th an d in a c o u n try w here the b u lk o f th e lab o u r force h ad been em p lo y ed in ag ricu ltu re an d w here th ere w ere no train e d technicians n o r specialists to speak of. N o t only was force or pressure ruled o u t by th e very n a tu re o f th e p e o p le s p o litical p o w er so firm ly established, b u t even dependence on m aterial incentives co u ld only re su lt in grosser in eq u ality th a n was co m p atib le w ith socialist relations o f p ro d u c tio n , leading eventually to th e fo rm a tio n o f a n ew privileged class and the c reatio n o f a social clim ate o f co m p etitiv e individualism favourable to the re sto ra tio n o f capitalism . P eople co u ld on ly be d raw n to the great tasks o f socialist in d u strialisa tio n b y th e ir conviction th a t its b enefits w o u ld accrue to th em an d th eir children as collective ow ners o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n an d n o t find th eir w ay, as p ro fits, in to the p o ck ets o f individuals. T he m ain incentive fo r th e e x e rtio n o f th e ir energy and the ap p lica tio n o f th e ir skills was socialist em u latio n . T h e state fo r its p a rt legislated fo r th e w ell-being o f w orkers and tap p ed a relatively new source o f creative lab o u r by establishing th e necessary co n d itio n s fo r w om en to play an equal p a rt w ith m en in th e w o rk o f factories and m ills. T he ed u c atio n al in stitu tio n s re q u ired fo r train in g specialists in various branches o f in d u stry w ere set up so th a t A lbania w o u ld n o t be d e p e n d e n t on foreign ex p erts. T he d e te rm in a tio n to defend and develop socialism n o t o nly m ean t th a t no assistance co u ld be ex p e c te d from ca p ita list co untries b u t even th a t A lb an ias ec o n o m y w o u ld have to be ex p a n d ed an d stren g th en e d u n d e r th e co n d itio n s o f a virtual b lo ck ad e w ith im m ed iate neighbours like Y ugo slavia an d G reece, b o th now p a rt o f th e capitalist w orld, help ing to tig h te n th e ring. O nly fro m o th e r socialist c o u n trie s, m ainly, in th e early stages o f in d u strialisa tio n , the Soviet U nion, and, afterw ards, th e P e o p le s R ep u b lic o f C hina, co u ld A lbania h o p e to receive o r risk accepting credits and technical assistance. 158

The stages of the development of industry in Albania began with the two year plan (1949-1950) which laid the foundation for the rapid economic advance realised in successive five year planning periods, the fourth of these having been completed in 1970 with planned increases in all sectors either fulfilled or overfulfilled. During the two year plan large projects were begun like the Lenin Hydro-power plant to meet the industrial and domestic needs of the Tirana district, the Stalin Textile Mills and the Maliq Sugar Refinery. Of the total investment in this period 47% was devoted to the development of industry with 20% going to the improvement and expansion of mining Albanias rich sub-soil resources. By 1950 general industrial output had been raised to over four times the output in 1938. With the first five year plan (1952-1955) the development of industry gathered such momentum that by the end of the period Albania had been transformed from a backward agricultural into an agrarian industrial country. The Lenin power plant and Stalin textile mills were completed on schedule and many new industrial projects were realised Ihe wood working mills at Elbasan, the cement factory at Vlora, cotton gins at Fier and Rogozhina, the Shkodra lobacco ferm entation plant and woollen textile and furniture factories in Tirana. About 150 new state enterprises in all were commissioned and com pleted and the mining and petroleum industries were further developed. Overall indusIlial output rose to over 11 times that of 1938 and what it 1 .id taken Albania an entire year to produce before the war w.is turned out in 35 days in 1955. During the second five year plan (1956-1960) the average .mimal rate of increase of industrial production rose to the phenomenally high figure of 20%. The Karl Marx hydro electric plant was constructed on the Mati River, an oil icliiicry was built at Cerrik, canneries at Vlora, Elbasan, K(i <a and Shkodra, glass and velvet factories, a porcelain . I1 1 and a food processing combine at Tirana, brick liii lories at many places, a copper enrichment plant at Kni bnesh and a whole network of high tension power lines Were all completed. Industrial production as a whole was 25 limes that of 1938 and it took only 15 days in 1960 to equal
1 111

159

the total production of 1938. Socialist relations of produc tion were so firmly established that 99% of industrial output, 100% of wholesale trade and 90% of retail trade, were all in the socialist sector of the economy. In the third five year plan (1961-1965) the greater emphasis on creating means of production was reflected in a number of major projects like the construction of the Engels and Stalin hydro-electric plants, the Elbasan iron smelting plant and the copper smelting plant at Gjegjan, the copper wire factory at Shkodra, the Tirana tractor spare parts factory, three paper mills, new mines and the first large chemical plants for producing fertilisers in all 430 new works instead of the 400 planned for. In spite of the fact that it was during this period that Khrushchev not only broke off unilaterally all economic agreements between the Soviet Union and Albania, but also, in effect, joined the imperialist countries in their economic blockade, industrial production rose to 35 times that of 1938 with 11 days sufficing to turn out the goods which had then required a whole year to produce. Industry represented 57% of total output as opposed to 8% in 1938. National income as a whole was 536% as compared with 1938 and per capita income 300%. The fourth five year plan (1966-1970) took its character from Enver Hoxhas political report to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour on November 1, 1966, in which he outlined the main tasks of the plan, spoke of the need for improving the work of the Party, strengthening its ties with the masses and rooting out bureaucratic methods and urged the deepening of the ideological and cultural revolution so that the social superstructure would conform to and defend the socialist economic base particularly guard ing against that off shoot and ally of bourgeois ideology revisionism. Among the industrial enterprises set up in this period were sheet metal plants, nitrate and phosphate fertiliser plants, cement factories, a new caustic soda plant, a glass factory at Kavaja, a plastics plant at Durrs and tin huge, fully-automated Mao Tsetung textile mills near Berat. The great hydro-electric plant at Vau i Dejes was opened ahead of schedule at the time of the Sixth Congress in November, 1971, and work has already begun on an eve i
160

larger plant higher up the Drin river. There was a great upsurge in housing construction on the basis of voluntary contributions of labour by the people and the supply of materials by the state, over 20,000 new houses out of the 73,000 completed within the five years being built in this way. Even before the end of the period, in 1968, industrial output was already 52 times that of 1938 and by 1970 a single weeks output was equal to 1938s total production. The national income as a whole and per capita had risen to 806% and 392% respectively compared with pre-war and were 55% and 17% higher than 1965. Albania is fortunate in its mineral wealth petroleum, gas, chrome, iron, nickel, copper, coal, bauxite and bitum en to mention only the most im portant. It was this that first attracted the interest of foreign countries and geological surveys of a superficial nature were carried out by their experts to discover how accessible was this subsoil wealth for exploitation. During the pre-war period monopoly-capitalists look advantage of the open door policy of the Zogist regime to exploit these riches; but since the extraction industries set up were for no other purpose than to make profits for foreign investors they did nothing to create a base for heavy industry in Albania itself. All these enterprises were nationalised by the peoples government in 1944 and work was gradually begun on a Ilioroughgoing survey of mineral reserves, establishing the presence of oil in lime beds and bringing in seven new fields in addition to those already operating near Patos and Stalin (lily, discovering big deposits of iron ore containing nickel in llii' Pograde-Elbasan zone, vast reserves of coal in central All >ania, copper in the north and developing Bulqiza into one "I Ilie richest sources of chrome in the world. Over a million .ind a quarter tons of crude oil have been extracted by drilling equipment made in Albania and there are five times is many mines as before the war. Along with this exploration of new sources of mineral wi al til has gone the development of processing operations nr.idc the country. There are refineries for producing petrol, licii/inc, kerosene and coke at Cerrik and Stalin City, and "i Iicis have recently been constructed. The bulk of mined
161

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copper is processed in Albania, providing copper wire and various by-products for export. The erection of a metal rolling plant at Elbasan, numerous smelting plants, a foundry for ferrochrome and a steel producing capacity of a million tons a year are all steps toward self-reliance in turning the countrys great mineral resources into finished products. The production of fuel is ample to meet all the needs of a rapidly expanding industry. By 1968 the supply of electric power was already 80 times that available in 1938 thus well on the way to realising Lenins slogan that socialism is peoples power plus electrifi cation. To the hydro-electric power plants near Tirana and on the Mati River and the thermo-power stations at Stalin City, Vlora, Cerrik and Maliq have now been added the huge Fier thermo-power station with a 100,000 kw capacity as well as the great Mao Tsetung hydro-electric power plant on the Drin River with an annual output of one billion kwh. In 1967 the decision was taken to complete the electrification of all the rural areas by 1971, a project requiring 5,000 miles of cables, 1,600 transformer stations and 160 sub-stations. This exten sion of electric power to 1,800 villages in every part of the country however remote, was an advance of 14 years on the original plan of completing rural electrification by 1985 and, in fact, was completed in October, 1970, a year ahead of the date fixed by the final plan. Before the war there were only a few primitive repair shops for m otor cars. Now there are over 200 machine shops supplying 70% of the countrys needs for spare parts. This branch of industry, 95 times larger than in 1938, is capable of servicing and repairing all types of machines in use. Special attention is given to the production of agricultural machinery centrifugal pumps, sprinkling equipment, grain threshers, corn shellers, ploughs, harrows, sorting, binding and sowing machines. Also supplied in adequate quantities are conveyors, band saws and circular saws, diesel motors, electric m otors, transformers, metal cutting machines and consumers goods like kitchen utensils. During the fourth five year plan the countrys machine-making capacity was doubled. Chemical production, which did not exist before the war
163

at all, is the youngest branch of Albanian industry. New enterprises have been started producing pharmaceutical goods, plastic articles and cosmetics; and the development of other industries like glass, textile and oil has depended on the creation of a heavy chemical industry. Three great chemical works, the nitrate fertiliser plant at Fier, the superphosphate plant at La and the caustic soda plant at Vlora, are all in full production and by-products like nitric acid, sulphuric acid and oxygen have made Albania self-sufficient in a whole range of industrial chemicals which formerly had to be imported. In one year, 1968, the output of the chemical industry increased by 50 times. Food processing has developed tremendously from the few olive oil presses, flour mills and cigarette factories existing before the war. The total output of food processing plants in 1938 is achieved in nine days now an increase of 37 times as much as then. Sugar mills, fruit, vegetable, meat and fish canneries, wine and soft drink distilleries and processing plants for childrens food are to be found in every district. The Ali Kemendi combine in Tirana has gained an inter national reputation for the quality of its exports of tinned and preserved foods and cigarettes are exported from the factories at Gjirokastra, Shkodra, Elbasan and Durrs. Textiles in the last 30 years have increased by 65 times per capita even though the population has doubled in that period, and from having to im port textiles Albania now exports them to a number of European countries. After the war there was an enormous building programme to restore houses, bridges, roads, ports and mines which had been damaged or destroyed and to construct new factories, cultural centres and public buildings. At the rate of construc tion in 1938 it would have taken over five centuries to equal the buildings completed in the first two decades of socialist construction. Guided by the slogan build faster, cheaper and better construction workers, during the first five years after the war, rebuilt some 62,000 demolished houses and com pleted 1,100 new apartm ent blocks. More than 75,000 new houses were built in rural areas from 1951 to 1965. The state provides long term credits at no interest to enable workers to build their own houses and 30,000 new dwellings have been
164

completed on this basis. In Tirana alone, mass voluntary work on housing is responsible for the building of 800 apartments a year over and above normal planned construc tion. The population of Albania is growing so rapidly that housing remains a problem but at present rates of construc tion the problem will no longer exist in another three or four years. Dwellings which are state property rent at about 3% of the average income and are allocated by the popularly-elected Peoples Councils according to the number of persons in a family. Those who own their own homes can lease them as long as the rent does not exceed the state norm. After the earthquake in 1967 which caused considerable damage in the eastern part of the country, 6,048 houses and buildings were rebuilt or repaired in 29 days. Unlike the, ducticm iiSj>ells<ij ^uin^^orj>m allii^ ^ A lb a n ia ^ jv h jlj^ j^ a d m ^ iu re in d u sta a i^ n te ^ n ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ls^ < nicouragec^^yj^> ]3oS ^f^^ndicrai^c^H }nit^^ thug 1^j]D l^ rese i^ in g ^ K ^ ^ e v e lo p m ^ ^ ^ U ^ ^ ^ ^ H T ^ ^ ^ ^ e ch n iq u es. New workshops have beenTuI^^mcTequipmenTTupjnieaU) raise 15 fold the 1938 manufacture of such articles as glass ware, wickerwork, carpets, embroidery, jewelry, pottery, hriar pipes, fur garments, copper ware and silver filigree work. Examples of the fine workmanship which goes into these goods could be seen at the Olympia Handicrafts Fair in I .ondon in 1970 where for the first time Albania exhibited its characteristic arts and crafts in Britain. The handicraft i cooperatives also operate repair services in both town and country so that workers and their families can keep their possessions in working order and get full value from their purchases. This repair service now makes up 40% of the work ol these co-operatives. Industrial enterprises in Albania are the property of the pe ople and are run by the class enjoying state power, the Workers themselves who, indeed, through their represent atives in the Government manage the countrys entire economy. But is this merely an ideal or do the workers in lually exercise control in the places where they are employed? The managers of enterprises are appointed by the appro165

priatc ministry and arc responsible lo il for the organisation ~q! production. In this task they arr assistprl hv thp Pa7t^ branch, the trade union and the various workers collectives inuTatparticuIaTTor" cem ^M ^ia^er^P ^^^^idM trad^unigji ru n m e enterprise in current' "plan on' Jhc. billing centralised leadership with the maximum creative I^esem anagers are the sons and daughters of workers and peasants, many of whom fought in the anti-fascist war. A num ber of workers who have distinguished themselves on the production line have been prom oted to managerial posts. Others, also the sons and daughters of workers and peasants, have been trained in higher institutes of technology where political education in the revolutionary line of the Party has played an im portant part in fitting them for the respon sibilities of management. Managers are not the owners of factories, pyr <jlo they have g|nKRDililtW tUU-Kni toj^nyjjurn^lass^m c^heirinterm
o l s o cia TT s7 T^n Td iu 7To nT T7 Tie ' c n c r j H I u I u ^ ^ S IILjjiii<i. l

w o rk e rs

T E H ^ |^ t ^ ^ |^ ^ ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ e |j c j o s e s t ^ o ^ p e r a t i o n o f anti n u in a ^ e rs ^ jig H ^ ^ n ~ j^ jp e r^ n s c 7! s s i o r r T i r ^ i e

t^ ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ are r^ u u ]e T p ro (7 u cb o n !* Ti7Tr^e"collectives ^n aiim in iL -aild _ ^am icar personneri'io^etiieil'l''Mffl*W(\lll^'prs c o m b in ^ s c ie n re ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ ^ i^ ^ lle ^ e ^ ^ ^ j^ ^ J L L jM M n d co]ital^r^ion_^oi_solvingpro^uct[on"^roblem s, developing ne^^nvO T ^^T aM ^^SnSR T ft^^of^T nT IT ^irerT IT reeyears of the fcnirriTplan^verTTO T^^^^tTonalisation proposals were made of which more than 170,000 were approved and adopted. All thntp in rr^ n rn isib le nnsts Ho no less th a n a m ont^c Ijr^filtta^vorkJr^iroduction^ven^j^ea^tliu^na^w ving^the distinction between m e n ta l an d m a n n a l la h r.n r an rt f-nahUfirr jeading cadres to be fully acquainted with the practical problems'"BT'Y'TfidiWPlc'm, to maintain the clossTcOTSjjJ^JIyi u m im y g n r T O T B ffia^^nY jnanifest^ioriorT nreaucratism personnel^fnR m g those doing office work to production
166
a n d te c tm o c r ^ is m " " * T h e ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ o n t n i u m i '^ ^ n x i r i a t io n ^ ) f

work and promoting those on the factory floor to positions of leadership..After Enver Hoxhas 1966 Reportxm the in t il some 15,000 cadres were released from state and PadAm iliu w o ^ T o | ^ " ""n^^vvorkers7 colIecTives control the activity of the managers through regular meetings of a supervisory nature. Those in managerial posts can be called to account for shortcomings or mistakes and, if they persist in them and lail to show signs of improvement, they are dismissed. criticism _and self-criticism bulletin boards displayed n r ^ minently i n _ ^ ^ j i ^ w o ^ e ^ ] _ i m i i ^ i dually or .c ollectively, are free to criticise each other or question oTTnanaKcrs lo cleaiadequately with charges against them may and lias resulted in loss of post. When the administrator of the Eushnja industrial complex tried to side step an accounting demanded by the workers, the m atter was referred to the Iarty and immediate action was taken. The manager in charge of planning at the Elbasan Forestry Establishment replied to criticisms by forest workers in the Biza division by threatening to close down the division altogether and this conduct was dealt with summarily. Numerous examples could be given of such working class control; but because differences between management and workers do not involve antagonistic class contradictions, they can usually be resolved in collective discussion. , C o ^ c ^ ^ g lio n ^ e tw e e n w o A e rso n th e fa c to r^ flo o i^ m ^ l iJ nJ^^m J^adci^^^rigosinons^i^Tnam tem ecH j^^^iysteii^of |uymcrU^invv4nd7dTc7eTr^TT',pronourTcccrTfjspanty^TTHi.iIn l)ei'TvWTrTOTr7^r9CW5FWTrr7TT^TiT?a^isamongmcTf)wesI 1 not the lowest in the world, brought about by consistently leiwering the salaries of all high ranking officials including el.ite and Party leaders while improving the rates of pay of lliosc in the medium or lower brackets. Since 1966 when I.nvcr Hoxha at the Fifth Party Congress called for special i llorls in implementing socialist principles, higher salaries leave1 been cut twice and there has been a steady rise in lower itilcs of pay and pensions. Workers themselves have
1

167

responded to the urgency of replacing m onetary with socialist incentives by giving up of their own free will many supplementary payments above their standard income. This playing down of material incentives has narrowed the gap between cadres and the working masses, ctngHtenTTfe tendency ..toarai^LaiLGcialcloirrancHrcomemnt roTTTrocljLu:!ion c o m ^ ^ ^ l o ^ w h i c h i n j 'g J ^ ^ J ^ J j f l M g f i f l i g < ^ ^ n e r S ^ ^ o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A ^ U T ^ a m ^ im e the role of nwraTTncenUvesT^F^ocIalisFemulation, has assumed growing importance as the major motivation in the working masses conscious mobilisation for the advancement of production. In doing away with anomalies in pay and reducing differentials there has been no intention of imposing a flat mechanical equalisation, ignoring the relation between simple jobs and those involving managerial responsibility, between unqualified and qualified work or between onerous and lighter tasks. Jjifi^m t^jflj^orj^ocialist rem uneration is from each according in his ability a n rltn f>arh nrrr.rrlinjrJ^tkp wori-J ^ -^oes\_N ot till the p e n o T ^ ^ ra n s itio n i^compTete the__QJ Jii] l_becoine from each according to his ability and to each according to his ncfsTBut in the transitional period
3 2

divisions^viidiiniith ^ ^ n ^ ~ o F ^ ^ w ^ ^ i^ ^ T ^ T ^ ^ r jr s ^ y J ( d d l m m H n ^ j n o ^ Because the system of paym ent is a just reflection of socialist principles, workers, specialists and managers all know each others rates of pay and talk quite freely about them to anyone interested in how the system works. Some comparative figures in leks per m onth, the standard unit of Albanian currency, will show the measure of present differen tials. At the current rate of exchange a pound sterling is worth about 12 leks; but while the following figures are useful for comparing rates of pay in Albania, they provide no basis for comparing the standard of living of workers in Albania and Britain. This is because all essentials like food, housing and clothes are so very much cheaper in Albania while certain luxury goods tend to be much higher if, indeed, they are available at all.
168

In the huge Mao Tsetung textile combine at Berat the manager receives 1100 leks a m onth and the lowest paid workers start at 550. Skilled technicians receive about 750. At the caustic soda factory in Vlora the chief engineer gets 900 leks, the director 1000, those doing light work from 500 to 550 and average workers between 700 and 750. The manager of the copper wire factory in Shkodra gets only 880 leks per m onth because it is fully-automated and comparalively easy to run, while the workers, 60% of whom are women and young girls, make about 600 leks. All women, who have been drawn into industry in ever increasing numbers, have always received equal pay for equal work. At Ilie tractor spare parts factory in Tirana workers get on the uverage 600 leks a m onth, the chief engineer 900 and model workers may make as much as 1000. Workers, invariably men, engaged in particularly hard or hazardous work like mining, heavy loading and unloading, dyeing where lead .lints are used, diving or glass smelting, receive more pay, often exceeding the salaries of directors; but there is a rontinuous movement by the use of new techniques and equipment toward eliminating the heavier and more li.i/.ardous jobs. To compare these payments in industry with those to wiiters and intellectuals: teachers, depending on qualifii .ilions, start at about 550 leks per month, rising at the end nl l ive years to 700 and after 20 years to 750. They receive additional 20 leks per m onth if they take posts in rural iii e,is. Full time writers in the Writers Union are paid about HIK) leks. Thus the whole range of payments throughout industry mid, indeed, in all other sectors of the economy, fall roughly wilhin limits of from 500 to 1100 leks a m onth, or a m.isiinum differentiation of about two to one. As well as by |i>i\ increases, mainly for the lower and middle ranks of W i n k e r s , the standard of living of workers generally is also Improved by price reductions, particularly of necessities, and li\ l.u'ger allocations of funds for free social services like k i n d e r g a r t e n s , creches, schools and public health. There have Imen 12 major reductions in prices over the whole range of HOixU, quite apart from random decreases in prices of specific
11

,n i

169

commodities, and the reduction announced for the year 1969 alone resulted in a profit to the people of 170 million leks. In the ten year period from 1950 to 1960 expenditure on health and sanitation increased five fold. The right to work is the most important social and econonncreroggj|j^ ^ o ^ e v e ^ /^ b a n ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^ tlT le war^TverTwith a labour fo reen o T a ^erffianTlT^Tium'Eier by which the present labour force increases every two years, unem ploym ent was sometimes as high as 50%. j^jt^w ijiju labour power no longer a commodity to be hired and fired solelyj[n_uiejnterest^j^protitsl^ oriir^mpToymj^Tass')"'wIfli
mgsces t h r m ^ W

according_to_BlaQ^_lQPUlated in the interests of the working


th e re ra n he n o u n e m p l o y m e n t . I n r l ^ d

there is a continuing labour shortage and those released from a particular branch of industry by rising productivity or the adoption of modern techniques are quickly absorbed by new projects. Hushed up agrarian unem ploym ent has dis appeared with the collectivisation of agriculture, and the forced migration of farmers and workers to other countries in search of jobs is a bitter memory of the past. The complete emancipation of women is part of the abolition of unemploy ment and they now make up 42% of the labour force. Just as every citizen is entitled to be elected to any post in the state so also every citizen has the right to take a job in any enterprise. At the same time the administrators of enterprises, in consultation with the workers collectives, can transfer workers from one job to another as the needs of production demand. Ultimately the question of assigning to Qr_djsinisgiaiLllQgt a job is left to the wor^er^tTTemselveran^1 w ithout the c o n sen ^ ?^ ieir7 o ITeniverm^Tiagem ent can take jl Ui-ai_^HTt^Tin';T7rHjT^Tierine<^^ No one under th e a g t^ J^ ^ T T a n ^ n t^ jo b and those under 18 are forbidden to engage in the more arduous kinds of work. Heavier work is also forbidden to women if it could be injurious to their health. The working day is fixed at eight hours, but those on night work do only seven hours with no
170
stration can r&c o m ^ n d ^ is m issa j a r i d j ^ lob for the w ork or r[|ij n K ~ fo u m ^ ^ s e v ^ s m t ^ le

drop in pay, and for those engaged in particularly heavy work the hours may be further reduced while they are still paid the same as for a full eight hour day. Similarly teenagers, mothers in the early stages of pregnancy or for a period after returning to work following on child birth and workers pursuing courses of training all work up to two hours a day less at the full rate. Extra work may be done in times of emergency or to meet special production needs, but entirely at the discrimination of workers and excluding those who might harm themselves by their zeal. Workers are entitled to not less than 36 hours off each week, usually including Sundays, and there are a number of .nmual holidays like Independence Day, Republic Day, May Day and Liberation Day. The yearly vacation is 12 full working days but 24 days for those in their teens, and supplementary leave of from 6 to 36 days is granted to those performing heavier tasks. From 10 to 30 days are granted to workers taking night or correspondence courses to prepare lor their examinations and women workers have 15 weeks off over the period of child birth. Rest homes at the best resorts on Ihe coast or in the m ountains are run by the trade unions lot workers and their families at only 22% of the cost of iii.iintenance. The medical service, including sanatoria, health resorts and i <i upcration centres, is entirely free. Pensions begin at 50 for Ihose in heavy work, at 55 for those in less onerous jobs and I (iO for those doing lighter tasks, women in each category |rtiling five years earlier. The size of pensions is based on m inority and special or meritorious service but averages 70% lie final years pay. Incapacitated workers receive from 7fl% to 95% of their last m onths salary. Family pensions i nvn rases where the wage-eamer dies and are based on the in i lls of the family deprived of support. All these social liners are m et out of funds contributed by industrial ii1 >rises and drawn from the state budget. Workers and employees pay nothing at all. Indeed, from 1970, they have I n i ii relieved of paying any taxes whatsoever. hillI'tv at work is governed by the Labour Ci>dg-_and
I

III

1 11

ilt i~'iinis .iiid regula j^ o n ^ ^ g r e e H o y ^ t J T ^ ^ o r l e r T o ile c ljv e s

/mil ^t,irrTTgau!rrlaHo^MnspcHonfl7sl^ am tary"anc^ecurity


171

om jjiisgiaa^jfl^j^gjJyng^lass^ontroltean^ th e standards of health and hygiene. f " ^ n i^ to r^ T ^ C ^ lie s ^ n e a s u re ^ T o r the well-being of the working class is the revolutionary impetus of socialist construction. By 1968 the industrial targets set for 1970 had already been reached and this, in the main, has been the story of each of the successive five year plans. In these achievements on Albanias industrial front, as in the developmenf"or^grTruTTTTre7TTT?T[eosivie"roT?TTa? been p la y e d b y s o c i^ S T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T c r ^ m im e ^ tn a t ^ ^ t^ ^ ^ ^ ^ siHerafionsTTTave consistently been given priority .over cqjj<^m c^p!s^!'sT?rTTi^!ben^on^va]^tw asdem c>nstrated that men are more im portant than weapons, so in the struggle for socialist construction men are more im portant than machines. Technique, no m atter how advanced, remains a dead letter w ithout the working masses, imbued with a high political sense of duty, to set technique in motion toward social goals collectively fixed. It has been the task of the Albanian Party of Labour to raise the political consciousness of the working class and support its leadership in the social and economic life of the country, exposing reactionary theories which make a fetish of technocracy and exalt experts regardless of their political attitudes. This task finds expression in the Party slogan: Man is the most precious capitaL__oneni for man must be m""TETlf T ^"7 y W n ' Socialism is the creation of the labouring masses. Awaken ing their revolutionary vigour, not in temporary outbursts but in a sustained forward movement, has been the key to Albanias industrial progress. The incentives of their creative activjt^-m illg-Jiam the n atu reo l their socIaTancl ^onomTc an entirehuiW vista for initiative and endeavour. In socialist ^ o c k W ^ jjjiu ^ ^ ta ^ d in ^ ^ e ^ M s^ in m h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ tic i^ a tio jT
w clL L ioim -^^^-m d in tn^flinrT^5mTe^?!7flTrT!onaT!sm MalLilSfilLiS-fliailcip ated^mcnacome^ ^ n a u rT o n io n o u i ancHmygg. In every factory and industrial enterprise on the same

bulletin board which serves for the posting of criticisms and self-criticisms there is a space reserved for commending those workers who have made special contributions to raising production or proved themselves most helpful to others on the production line. There are heroes and heroines of socialist work, outstanding examples of placing general above personal interest as there were heroes and heroines during the anti-fascist war. Adem Reka had been a partisan and after the war he worked so well in the docks at Durrs that he was made a section leader. He was off duty when the tempest of November, 1966, hit the seaport; but hearing that a huge floating crane was in danger of going adrift he rushed to the dockside and was helping to secure the moorings when a napped cable killed him. Hysni Hajasllari a master oil driller who has faced danger so often that it is second nature to him, has on several occasions risked his life to seal off wells out of control. Nuredin Hoxha a chemical worker in Elbasan lost both legs in an accident; but once he was able to walk on the artificial Ilfs provided him, he handed over his pension card and irjoined his fellow-workers at the plant where he has devised ,i number of useful innovations in methods of work. Myzejen Golloberda works in the cloth fabricating depart ment of the Hammer and Sickle knit-wear works in Kora. I b i qualities of leadership have helped her section surpass the I> iimed output for 1970. 1 Alll lough they have only recently started working at the Mm Tsetung textile mills, two girls, Naxije Kaldani and Esma Vodira, have already distinguished themselves as conscienI In us workers. I n Kerkaj is a turner in the Enver mechanical plant who 1it I led work there when the plant opened and has grown up making many proposals for innovations and rationalUillloilB. I wo women tractor drivers at the Kora tractor station, fiilbiiidha Cuka and Liliana Kola, are tireless workers and llim | *u . 1>Ie friends. \inong those singled out for commendation at the Partys Ht lit Congress in November, 1971, were Dila Cuni, a
Willi il,
1

173

co-operative brigade leader in Lezha district who helped bring in a record maize harvest, the tractor driver, Shyqyri Kanapari, who with the same tractor has ploughed more than 70,000 acres, a leading woman worker in the Kora knitgoods combine, Arterie Shahinllari, and the drivers Nikoll Cuni and Mehmet Delvina. Albanian youth are following the same traditions of devoted service in the cause of industrial development. Shkurte Pal Vata, a young girl from the northern highlands, was killed while working on the Rogozhima-Fier railway, built entirely, like all the railways in Albania, by young people. Not only has she become an inspiration to her own generation, but her father, when he heard of her death, took his daughters place at the construction site so that the front of socuilist construction would not be broken for a m om ent. There is nu_siilislitute for d ire c tj'n a ^ in socialist construction. Just as revolution cannot IjeexpoTted, TmtK>scQl^nTHfl3ov(MTorcamccH)u'H)IHjeKaITCnTf^vorTung

people^ Every form of knowing what is best for the people and acting w ithout their full participation will always turn out to be a means of exploiting them and of reintroducing class divisions. Socialism is, quite simply, about people and their collective well-being people irrespective of race, national boundaries or cultural background, people organised co-operatively and armed with the political consciousness to prevent any insidious restoration of capitalism. Only the working masses have the collective understanding to know what is ultimately best for them. Only the working masses have the collective experience to exploit nature in a way that enriches their own lives and the lives of those to come. Only the working masses have the collective morality to build a new society from which all forms of oppression, discrimi nation, individually selfish or narrowly class-interested actions have been eliminated. That is not to question the need for leadership. Socialism ^ ^ J liit-^8jv|^^|o r^aneousl^^B irtsuchii<leade^hi^jni^Jto *jdw ays_l)e_s\^ecr_to^t^e^srcT T !T ie^ernidentifies itselI omEletI^vvimth^tUeresrorn7?rnasses^3roc5ir?g*aIways
174

on the hjisis of the mass lini_lk^i]iijig_rom the masses in order to he a b l^ T ^ ^ a c h thon-i Leaders cut on^^onTTfi^ people are like, in Stalins phrase, Antaeus lifted away from the earth. < There is a need for specialists, for intellectuals, emerging Irom _the_ranks of the working classTTuTTToijly btfTTTWTB Ihem in socialist spint^R'inniSr'Alurr'^ Committee, reporting to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Iarty on deepening socialist revolution through developing llie class struggle and carrying out the mass line put the problem in these words: th,-ir f_P divorce m entel^i^m jnanual labour, because of their position ,uid the role they play inTeacTmg'^nT^rgamsmg'worF'anT^f U ^ alie n ^ b o u rg eo i^ an jIjy ^ ijijjfli^ l^ tU u S ^ ^ i^ jd e o jb jjy . They are^nrTmea to detach themselves from the masses^to ovc^^Te"TTieir^CTity"^nTTinnts7*Tcr^Iip"TnFo"pos^^r|^ rI[oUsnr*anrTTF<Qnc5!ll^^consiHr"Tnar^rv alone are liable T)T^c[irecting and le^ding1_Jt_js_Jiere__tha^_a_^j;y ,i iport anTTirena^rtm rH asrjU m gah^c^^ElE^nLO M jLP^It y ganisaTTonTT!TouTTT^^nsn!y uieT ^vorkw m iinT eIIectuals M stuclenis.'"IJnjMilj4 iLJJUlli fium ...Hit |jliu,hl in -wkich njil . ^i2ijjjJiaJ^_iiiid_lXXiaiifflisIs^^^T^acc(n7i??riTffeTTeciuals, we must see that our intellectua lliT T ^^E ^^fl^ ^ ^^P arty and of Comrade Enver Hoxhajso lli Ihey^ max^e_tempe^c^rrevoTuTTonafT?yTffTTos^?2Slal willi w o ^ e ^ a n ^ je asa n tT a n cnnia^n^rfSffiot^^ ^ o o k s they !TouTTt!nc^m iHio!cHTf 1pTcEa^ffTCWfig^*M^ " ^ M^ ^ TIT >ania has taken great strides along the road of socialist i obstruction, but no one there claims that all social questions llnvc been finally and irreversibly decided in favour of i.ilism. Personal interest had taken deep root in the iicoples consciousness during the centuries-old existence o! |iiivate property and _,misl lhe__alien_ influence of_bourgeois^ individualism, a"
111 , 11 *01

m i ib<-^iWK)t^ppeaIing*T^ ^ T ? T u m a nTty7)r^TO5u?^T5u^ ~TTI7T7scTnoW^TnnTr5!^r"^T T cfinj^iT om ptinve

Ein3fosw Z2---------Z ^ ------- ___ 3 r 2 i v,.n v s S2 ! T i7cnr!TTua!s^stmggfrforsurvival/ mE)^TH?l 2


175

[f

economic Dase,"ffi?7^ o o n e ^ T T aterT ha^E )as^LtscBrwI!rT3e the ideological superstructure is not also socialised, it will corrupt the leadership, deflect the Party from its vanguard role and so weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat that state power can be wrested from the working masses. Revisionism is the cancerous growth within Marxism of bourgeois__jnlendes;__U__gsene ll> J UUlL.lV lllUWlamcjJ

Jgoducjij, Speaking at a meeting in April, 1970, to commemorate the centenary of Lenins birth, Ramiz Alia dealt with this very problem. Of decisive importance to the victory of socialism over capitalism is the establishment of a correct relationship between objective and subjective factors, between basis and superstructure, between economy and politics, between the material conditions of life and the consciousness of man, between proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy, between centralism and initiative from below, between the working masses and Party leadership, between national and international interests. In_QIBBiete_opposition to the theories a n d p ra ^ ic e j^ th ^ ^ v jg ifljy ^ ^ w h a ^ b ^ ^ ^ i^ T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i^

176

e d u c a tio n a n d te m g e n n ^ jj^ jy ig jjg j^ jn a ^ ^ r ^ o ^ y y jjji A importance. ^ n ^ n ^ T S u c a tio n , as Ramiz Alia had pointed out on a previous occasion, it must be shown that to give priority to personal interests means to give priority to the individual not to the collective, to partial not to basic interests, to the interests of the m om ent not to those of the future, to material not to moral stimuli, to national egotism not to proletarian internationalism . . . Self interests are objective interests, entirely legitimate and rational. Society is not something abstract but composed of people (with all their individual needs), just as general interest is not something abstract but is made up of all the vital interests of workers. I'lierefore our fight is not against the very existence of self-interest but against placing it above general interest. We ire for combining and harmonising them by subjecting personal interests to the interests of the working class, of the people, of revolution and socialism. * ' M a m _ Marxists-who were perfectly aware of all that was involved in the developmen^_of_soi^ist_man_jn__terms_of .iirKjisnr^TndeTe^Hna^^T tlT e'm m n JtT es^^^n m in ah n ^o ld wTiVk U1 UWUuIll ibid action to bring about a -m 5 a l in v n e r a d o n a n c ^ w e r ^ a b o i ^ ^ h e ^ U m e t h e Ii*jnsm or^^*^i'^^a^ sT e s^ o o c ^ ^ o ^ ^ m rn uiusm^voTn^*t^e. l""n' l,flTTH^EPHPH3Tn^TI!^^?outTrT!agu^r^n5!??J^I?oupit ili.il young people of 15 would live to see communist society, which meant that he envisaged a transition of some 40 or 50 yr.ns. The revolutionary experience of the Chinese and Alban ian people in building socialism has taught them to ilimk in terms of a much longer period perhaps 10 |min rations. And meanwhile the betrayal of the working class in die Soviet Union and the Eastern European peoples ili itineracies and the restoration of capitalism in those i Min|rics have demonstrated that the vigilance of Party and Wm lung people must not slacken at any time during the ii in itional period. In I.nver Hoxhas Report to th e F iftji_ j|a ^ ^ IlTX. U^irTnrTar^frea3yTeerTTe!eiTea7o*^T^ontica[event
177

.1

of makjx-imput.tattcc-.lii?'Ilf <llp ni',''~^il v' ; o f^h ^d eo lo g ig ijS iiJ^iiio n j^Q i^h ir^erj^v o lu tio n isijjg j^ life in our countiX-aDIIot_bc_understood without further rSofu^ on ^ sinF ^ ^ ocicty is c a r r ie d o u to t^ Ti^S'asT^^^e the c o n sc ie n c e o fa l^ v o d d n ^ g e g jil^ ^ r o l^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p t

< ^uuaiu^m ^^^T m iunan^[m nu^T FnT rT r\rT ?K u7*M|TRd e c isiv ^ ^ c to M n ^ o lv in g th ^ c o m g le x ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ jn |T u 2 5 i^ ^ the former exploiting class elements in our own society and against the imperialists and revisionists beyond our bound aries, remains an imperative task of our Party, our state and our working people. But^we^^should consider class strugglejn ^ b ro a d e ra s|)e ^
u lwIc a ains t the misuse parasitic and speculaliyg_jLiimiS_tXL-Siiatch more from
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one should consider him se^im m un^T ron^viltendencies and think he has nothing to fight against in his own person. A sharp struggle takes place in the conscience of every man between socialist ideology and bourgeois ideology. This report of Enver Hoxhas parallelled both in timing and intent the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. But the similarity of the revolutionary movements in the two countries resulted from the fact that both, as socialist countries developing on Marxist-Leninist principles, had
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encountered the same problems and set about solving llinn by applying the same mass line. f Indeed while the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Cliin.i and the further revolutionising of life in Albania have been identical in ideological content, there have been differences in the way they were carried out stemming from differences in the specific historical conditions in the two countries. The line of Mao Tsetung ever since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China has been consistently that of developing the ideological revolution as complementary to the revol ution in the economic base of society and even in his early writings this social strategy had already been worked out. B u t l,iu Shao Chi and the revisionists who collected around him had constantly advocated an opposition line, being careful not to challenge too openly the popularity and authority of Chinas great leader. By taking advantage of any temporary set-backs to Chinas socialist construction from natural disasters or the beginnings of the split in the world ( ommunist movement they were able to usurp some share in power, being particularly active in cultural and propa late ganda organisations where their bourgeois qualifications secured them a foothold. Mao Tsetung was perfectly aware of what they were doing and at any time could simply have exposed them and invoked his tremendous prestige to have them removed. But he did not wish to deal with the threat Ihey represented on the basis of an inner political bureau or i veil an inner party struggle. He preferred to wait till the political consciousness of workers, young people and the army w.is such that they could be mobilised to repudiate the top pi (iple in authority taking the capitalist road, thus revolutioum; themselves in the process. This application of the mass line resulted in a sharp revolutionary struggle by the working iii.i .ses to recapture that portion of state power which the Mnsionists had assumed. In Albania the problem of a counter-revolutionary it vi .i<>11ist plot within the Party and state originated muc h! M i l l e r , even before the anti-fascist war had been successfully nun huled. Koi Xoxe and other revisionists, with the m i p p u i t of the Yugoslav Party under Tito, made their bid in lIk i .u ly days of the Albanian Peoples Republic to divert the
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country from a socialist course and make it a part of Yugoslavia. Enver Hoxha had no alternative to exerting his leadership at a time chosen by the revisionists because they considered the people too politically immature to understand the issues and support him. They created a very dangerous situation, but Enver Hoxha exposed the nature of their [conspiracy and rallied the forces to deprive them of their I positions. This experience of revisionist betrayal at the very beginning of their socialist history armed the Albanian people against allowing revisionists to creep into im portant posts. That is not to say that there have been no distortions of socialist legality, no incorrect methods of work, no bureau cratic tendencies in Albania to be countered and put right only that these errors were not represented in an organised form within the Party and state requiring a mass upheaval on the scale of Chinas cultural revolution. Just as the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China was the specific form at a particular period in socialist develop ment of a continuing process of rooting out the old selfish, individualistic ideas and habits of bourgeois society, so the further revolutionising of life in Albania goes on continu ously and Enver Hoxhas 1966 Report to the Fifth Party Congress was simply a very cogent expression of the need for perpetual ideological struggle and an urgent call for even more dedicated leadership by communists in creating and fostering the new socialist man. W ithout the conscious development of socialist morality by the working masses they will not only be unable to achieve such dramatic successes in production but they will not even be able to hold on to the state power which is their guarantee during the transition to communism against the restoration of an exploitative system. *

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THE SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Chapter Fifteen
Albanias Relations with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China During the early period of socialist construction Albania enjoyed the closest fraternal relations with the Soviet Union. Stalin had prevented the United States and Britain from excluding Albania from the peace negotiations and the Soviet leadership had supported Albanian resistance to T itos attempts to take over the country, expelling Yugoslavia from Ilie comity of socialist countries in 1948 as a client state of Ilie United States. In spite of the desperate need of the Soviet Union to repair its own colossal war damage and rebuild its industrial strength to meet the challenge of the capitalist world headed by a nuclear-armed United States, long term credits were advanced 10 Albania and specialists helped to set up industrial projects train Albanians to run them. Factories like the huge md Slalin textile plant on the outskirts of Tirana were built with Soviet assistance and Soviet technical aid enabled the Albanians to develop their own mineral resources like the 011 industry which developed around Stalin City, named after the great friend of the Albanian people. Today in most Albanian towns, along with statues of Marx and Lenin, will lie seen those of Stalin as well. _ Albania was in no sense a satellite of the Soviet Union, j Hie relations between the two states were based on a |miInership between countries sharing the same socialist M irations and determined to defend socialism against N| i n* roachments by the capitalist powers. The Albanians were dedicated to developing their country in a spirit of selfli li.nice and any help received was for the purpose of making 1 more not less economically independent. They, played
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their full part in the defence of the socialist camp into which one serious inroad had already been made by the defection of Yugoslavia in exchange for the very different kind of aid supplied by the United States. Albania was the bastion of socialism in the Mediterranean area, preventing the imperial ists from further outflanking the socialist countries in southern Europe and providing the Soviet Union with a base which could be used, with the full concurrence of the Albanian people, in protecting the peoples democracies and the Soviet Union itself. Of Stalin the Albanians say: He always maintained a most fraternal attitude toward our country, always dealing with our Party on the basis of parity and mutual respect, never intervening in its internal affairs nor trying to impose his own ideas. When our Party solicited his counsel on this m atter or that, he insisted that his words were by no means binding, that they should be considered with a critical eye in the light of our conditions and that our Party should decide itself according to its own experience and judgem ent. After Stalins death in March. 1953. a train of events began in the Soviet Union which was to shatter the unity of the communist world, alter profoundly the relations among major world powers and cast Albania once more in the roTe of a small embattled country standing up against a vastly slipenor torce in a struggle for its very existence. One of the first indications that an entirely different line was being adopted by the Soviet leadership came in May, 1955, when Khrushchev unilaterally rejected the decisions of the Information Bureau and other communist and workers parties in respect to T itos betrayal of socialism and headed a delegation to Belgrade for the purpose of rehabilitating, w ithout consultation, the Yugoslav leader. Two days before the delegation left Moscow the Albanian Party of Labour was informed of the visit and asked to approve a statem ent which Khrushchev had drawn up in the name of the Information Bureau w ithout bothering to convene it. This the Albanian Party refused to do on the grounds that there had been no change in the line of the Yugoslav leadership since it had been condemned by the 1948 resolution of communist and workers parties represented on the Bureau, to* 182

As a consequence of Khrushchevs support for the Yugoslav line, in Hungary and other peoples democracies concessions were made to capitalist elements inside~~the' country_ and bourgeois ideology and__culture were giyen_frge ja la ^ In the Peoples^^u B T ico T Albania not only were class enemies granted no concessions but the fight againt bourgeois and revisionist tendencies was intensified. The Central Com mittee had no hesitation in exposing the revisionist activities of Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu in June, 1955, relieving the former of his post on the Central Committee and expelling the latter from the Party altogether. The conference of the four great powers, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, at Geneva in July, 1955, was acclaimed by Khrushchev as a new stage in the relations between states and he described the leaders of the imperialist powers as reasonable people who were trying to ensure peace this on the eve of the Anglo-French-lsraeli attack on Suez! It was in pursuance of such collaboration with imperialism that Khrushchev praised the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and argued that it was no different from the foreign policy of the socialist countries. It was not a line of argument that could impress the Albanian people with their direct experience of the role the Yugoslav leadership had played as the price for dollar aid. ' At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February, 1956, after three years of preparation, Khrushchev presented in the report of the Central Committee a number of new theses described as a creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory which were i n fact a complete departure from Marxism-Leninism. .Col laboration with imperialism which he labelled peaceful io existence' was exalted as tlie policy of all socia3ist states in opposition to Lenins principle jli.it the foreign policy of a socialist country could only be fused on proletarian internationalism an_alliane_witlLthe jevohitionariesolM lTe^idvanced^ the r.j i|n e s s r d n e o p l e s against, i m p e r i a l i s t s . ' K o r t h e s a k e of pe,ireful co-existence at all costs Khrushchev made it clear lli.it he was prepared to give up international class struggle, lenouncing on behalf of the colonial peoples any .right to
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liberate themselves from oppression and reassuring capitalist governments by emphasising peaceful transition to socialism or the Parlimentary road as the only correct line for communist parties everywhere. If only the United States imperialists were given to understand that their economic and military positions all over the world were not to be challenged then they would give up their aggressive designs against the socialist block. What this really am ounted to was an attem pt to freeze the inequalities, for the sake of a peace which the two maip'rl wx>ridj30wersiiiith U n ited Jita le!^ guarantee with their ni'<~lf>ar The creative develop ment of Marxism-Leninism which Khrushchev was advancing was simply the division of the world into Soviet and American spheres of influence in which each was to enjoy unquestioned supremacy a Twentieth Century version of the Popes demarcation line sharing out the new world between Spain and Portugal. Then, Khrushchev was to say, if any mad man wanted war, we, the two strongest countries in the world, would have but to shake our fingers to warn him off and included among the mad m en, of course were any popular leaders wishing to take their countries oul of imperialist bondage. Instead of challenging the policy of nuclear blackmail which the United States government had used ever since the war to keep the world safe for the operations of monopoly capitalism, Khrushchev was going to use the Soviet Unions nuclear capacity to get in on the act. That this was the case was demonstrated later on when Albanias opposition to the Khrushchev line prom pted the threat from Kozlov, a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party, that either the Albanians will accept peaceful co-existence or an atom bomb from the imperialists will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave no Albanian alive. It was at this Congress that Khrushchev made his notorious secret report On the cult of the individual and its con sequences which was an all-out attack on Stalin launched, as was Khrushchevs habit, without any prior warning to fraternal parties. Indeed many communist parties only came
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to know of the contents of the report through the Western press to which it was leaked. The attack, a fabrication of distorted documents and all the slanders of Stalin ever propagated by the enemies of socialism, charged him with being an ignorant despot guilty of the greatest arbitrary cruelty. ^t_j>ei2eLJiUijluijlil purpose of-__consnlida.tinpf Khrushchevs own position by destroying the personal reputation of his illustxiouj (lecessor and, mure Important. TinHermined the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism bv viewing the whole_penod_of socialist construction in the ISoy|ej_ Um on~umfcr Sruilin*s le a d e rs li^ ^ o ^ ra T ^ t^ ^ ^ T o u rg e o i^ g o ^ ll^ ^ ie w d e d ^ J out in odds ancT ends 'o t M arxist-Leninist. languaggi_JThe tremendous achievements oi tJie workers and peasants of the Soviet Union under the guidance of the Communist Party which had transformed a backward, repressive country into a ^reat socialist industrialised state capable of taking on and defeating the armed might of Nazi Germany was described in the report as a dark, anti-democratic period of violations of socialist legality, of terror and murders, of prisons and concentration camps. Stalins victories against capitalism were presented as crimes against socialism; and the enemies of socialism, witting or unwitting agents of imperialism, whom Stalin had at various times unmasked, like Trotsky, llukharin, Zinoviev or, after the war, Tito, were described as martyrs and heroes, victims of Stalins tyranny. In this attack Khrushchev could be sure of the support of all who hated Stalin as a powerful exponent of socialist ideas and a staunch defender of socialism. *" E JJ'he basic political question on which Khrushchevs it tempt to reverse the whole line of the Soviet Communist Kirty depended was whether or not class connicHTad"ceasetr to exist in the Soviet Union. Lenin always took an absolutely unequivocal stand on this issue, holding that during the entire historical period separating capitalism from the classless society communism, that is the period designated as socialism, I i l.iss conflict did continue and therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat remained a political necessity for the develop ment of a socialist society. Indeed, after the assumption of nl.ile power by the working class, bourgeois elements would
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struggle even harder to re-establish themselves, not disdaining to call on outside help from the capitalist world for this purpose. This was the position usually defended by Stalin. Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha, drawing on the experience of the Chinese and Albanian peoples in making and consolidat ing a proletarian revolution, have never wavered from this Marxist-Leninist line. But if Khrushchev could convince others, and those with revisionist tendencies were susceptible to such conviction, HiaT*"al sunn- time earlier man Party dongress class conflict had ended in the Soviet Union, then the dictatorship of the proletariat would from that period have become unnecessary and Stalins actions in defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat could be described as arbitrary an attem pt to bolster up a merely personal dictatorship requiring a cult of the individual to delude the masses into acquiescence. pnrlherm ore, if class conflict had ceased to exist, the Party and state instead of being the political and governmental expressions ol' the dictatorship, of the proletariat could be designated bv Khrushchev as the Party and State of thfL whole people. But in this formulation he departed altogether from anything remotely resembling Marxism. The Marxist view developed by Lenin in such works as State and Revolution and strictly adhered to by all except those deviationists who forfeited any right to call themselves Marxists, was that the state always represented the interests of a particular class in a society in which there was stilTd^ conflict. Neither the state nor the communist party was above class struggle and they would cease to exist whep classesceasedtoexist^JjiiJjtJij^^ which Marx had only predicated of the classless society of full communism. Therefore_a party or a state ot th e jw h o le people1 was nonsense from a Marxist point ot y'pw: fl^d Stalin, in his last theoretical work. E rnnom ir Prnhlpmc of Socialism in the USSR^_^Jii] _atacked revisionist ideaS-ia precisely the same terms the Chinese and Albanians were jo wejjy in use in th e'polemics following t ic 20tK 'Congress.jipecificall\ criticised the state oI_jJi_wholg__ people concept as , anti-Marxist attem pt to undermine the dictatorship of IIn proletariat"
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In fact, the denial of any further need for the leadership ol the working class in a situation where other classes silU existed merely prepared the wav for those anti-worTTmTII.iss elements to recapture political power and begin diveytiiiL tin Soviet" Union from a socialist course. That this was the intention of Khrushchev and the revisionist clique around him became apparent in the economic changes which accompanied these political manoeuvres. The decentralisation of the economy was not a loosening of control from the centre but a change from control by organs responsible to Ll\y working people like t n _ e j j l a l _ a n d - f a g t . y to control b y e x p e r t s , m anagersjiiK lJaureaucnits^^ motivation from the socialist incentives ox putting collectivc above personal interests to m aterial incentives no different trom^ t.nose characteristic ot capitalist socieT^ZIEtiflissIE* economic liberalisation was simply a move from socialism to slate capitalism and, as such, was naturally hailed as a hreak-through by bourgeois economists everywhere. In due course, along with these political and economic changes went a restoration of bourgeois ideology generally the thaw welcomed so effusively by bourgeois ideologues in capitalist countries. But it was never intended that such a restoration would threaten the position of the revisionist party hacks and state officials who had brought it about hence the con tinuing conflict between bourgeois writers and artists in the Soviet Union demanding the freedom of expression they might have expected in a bourgeois democratic society and the Soviet state apparatus with the same bourgeois values who were prepared to welcome works attacking Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat but were not prepared to i oiintenance those criticising themselves and the bureaucratic I dictatorship they had imposed. Neither the Albanian nor the Chinese party was pre wired to accept the line Khrushchev elaborated at the 20th I'n ly Congress, although they tried to maintain correct icl.it ions with the Soviet Union knowing that Khrushchev did speak for the Soviet people. It was not that they thought Ni.ilin, for all his great services to the world proletarian movement, was above criticism. No communist leader is ever rtliovc criticism and every communist leadership has made
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mistakes. Learning from mistakes has been a major feature of the social practice through which the theory of scientific socialism has been creatively developed. But they rejected criticisms made from the point of view of socialisms enemies and realised that Khrushchevs lies and slanders, gaining some credence from the fact that he had played a prominent part in the events he maliciously distorted, was an attem pt to bury for all time not only Stalin but Marxism itself. This rejection by no means implied that Mao Tsetung or Enver Hoxha had any sympathy whatsoever with a cult of the individual which is entirely alien to the spirit of Marxism. Marx himself, when he and Engels had enrolled in a secret communist society, said explictly: Both of us dont give even a brass farthing for our popularisation. . . We participated right from the beginning on the proviso that everything that helped mystic subjugation to authority should be wiped out of the constitution. Lenin always fought any manifestation of such a cult as diametrically opposed to the mass line only those are true bolsheviki leaders who not only teach the workers and peasants but also are taught by them . And in a letter to Shatunovsky Stalin wrote: You speak of your*loyalty to me . . . I woufd advise you to do awav with the nrindnle of_jo^alt:Y t< w g!l!l separate individuals. This is not bolsheviki-like. Be loyal to the working class, _to its party, to its state, This is a ^ ^ a ^ in d iv id u a ls ^ jv h ic h js J I^ ^ ^ m g t^ ^ n d ^ u n n e c e s s a ry It must have seemed odd to those familiar with develop ments in the Soviet Union that Khrushchev, who circulated the secret report On the cult of the individual and its consequences, at the period when this cult was supposed to have flourished had out-done everyone in adulation of Stalin. He described Stalin as the father, the wise teacher, in whose work Marxist-Leninist philosophy has reached its acme . . . the Coryphaeus of science and the genius of m ankind and so on. Indeed Enver Hoxha in speaking on this question in his report to the Albanian Party's Fifth Congress said"thal ' STTiTm might be criticised, not because ne developed and practis^TI his own cult, but only because he did not take^ propri
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measures to restrain this unnecessary propaganda, especially taking into consideration that the grgat reputation which he Jy^J^j^jy^Jj^j^i^uJgleandcleedsjs and love which the Party and people had__for_him, were sufficient to deal a telling blow to the bureaucratic elements is obvious that those who attacked Stalin m iy&b lor having established a personality cult were the very people who had tried to build it up around him, partly in an attem pt to separate him from the masses and partly to lay the grounds for subsequent condemnation. Following the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev began to bring pressure to bear on the Albanian Party of Labour to re-examine its line in the spirit of the conclusions he had promulgated in Moscow. Michael Suslov, one of the Soviet Partys theoreticians who had thrown in his lot with the rrvicionict group around Khrushchev, demanded through Lm Rplishnva of the Albanian Central Committee that the 4]l^ yd-lJta ^ 2 j^ iT ito _ a n d th e se n te n c e v v h ic h h a d >jDeir pronounced against Koi Xoxe. Tuk Takova and othr anti-ParlAL_lements on the grounds_JliaLJilfiSfi^_nors. Q)mmiilgd__!under the influence of Stalins cult of the Df]jY^nal Thig dpTnanrt wag rcppatert in the most arrogam way by the Soviet delegation to the Third Congress of the Albanian Party which m et in Tirana on May 25, 1956. This Congress, representing the 41,372 members and 7,272 randidate members of the Albanian Party, endorsed the political line of the report delivered by Enver Hoxha,
( (msidered it a m istake to think that class struggle is dying away anrl that _the ovc r t h r o w n jija s ^
w h o were je o p ardising the d ic ta to rs h ip < t the p ro lc ta ria j/ M l >

Hi niggle of their own free wilT^nd_^^dk^-Si-2L^^ measures taken bv the Party against revisionist. Trotskvite. iMM>ortujiis^elem entg'. A lthough the*Central Committee had m.ide known to the Soviet leadership its opposition to the mli-Marxist theses of the 20th Party Congress, the Third Albanian Party Congress did not condemn the Khrushchev line openly, wishing to avoid if possible any further damage lo the unity of the international communist movement. The 1%. sisl-Leninist line which the Party of Labour of Albania
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had pursued since its form ation was unanimously confirmed and, unlike a number of other particsV no concessions to revisionism__were made""Tmcf^T..the pre'ssur WnffTT"TTTg* Khrushchev group Increasmglyj^xerted. At the same time tTie XTCanTan press puB IT sneT aiuim ber^r,,Trticles for popular consideration whose political import was directly opposed to the whole tenor of the 20th Congress formulations. Khrushchevs rehabilitation of those who had been con demned previously for revisionist activities enabled antiMarxists to emerge in the peoples democracies and even to resume leadership in several of them with Soviet support. This was particularly the case in Poland and Hungary where the dictatorship of the proletariat was seriously weakened and the ideology and culture of the western bourgeoisie were allowed to spread w ithout check. Disguised as cultural circles counter-revolutionary groups were established in many cities. This situation was, of course, exploited by the capitalist countries which recognised the opportunity for eliminating socialism in much of Eastern Europe. The Albanian Party was aware of what was happening because a plot involving certain members of the Party, backed by Tito and intended to stage a counter-revolution in Albania to coincide with a similar attem pt in Hungary, was discovered on the eve of the Third Party Congress. Two of the conspirators, Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, were warned by Tito to flee to Yugoslavia where an Albanian Resistance G roup was being formed with a radio station at its disposal for hostile broadcasts to Albania; but they were both apprehended at the frontier and brought to trial. To the amazement of the Albanians, who were still taking in the full implications of the revisionist usurpation of state power in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev spoke out in defence of these traitors and condemned the Albanian authorities for arresting and punishing them. Not long afterwards Enver Hoxha, while passing through Moscow, held a conversation with Suslov in which he reported what he had seen in Budapest. He told Suslov that Imre Nagy, one of the rehabilitated revisionist leaders closely associated with Tito, was deserting and was organising counter-revolution at the Petofi Club. Suslov denied cate^;
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orically that Nagy could be contemplating any such act of betrayal and took from a drawer Nagys latest self-criticism to show what a good chap he was! And Khrushchev continued to press for the acceptance of Tito as a socialist leader, when even the Western newspapers were describing Yugoslavia as a transmission belt for conveying economic ideas of the west to the east. In October, 1956, the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary duly occurred and when the Soviet leadership was finally forced to take action to suppress a revolt for which their own revisionist policies were largely responsible, T itos complicity became obvious. All the flags in Yugoslavia were flown at half-mast when the insurrection was put down and the intervention of the Soviet Army to prevent Hungary from passing over to the imperialist powers altogether was des cribed as savage and impermissible. The Soviet leadership disposed of Imre Nagy whom they had themselves placed at the head of the Hungarian state; and yet in looking for those to blame for the tragic events in Hungary, they lashed out not at revisionists but at dogmatists and renewed their attack on the Marxist-Leninists in Albania and China. But why did these things happen after the 20th Congress? I ,nver Hoxha demanded. Did they really happen because the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania is sectarian or dogmatic or pessimistic? The tragedy of the Hungarian people will certainly be a great lesson to all honest people in Ihe world. It will be a lesson to all those who, listening to the imperialists and the forces of reaction with demagogical .Ingans, slacken their vigilance and replace it with opporimiisin. The Party and people of Albania have never fallen .ind never will fall into this trap. They will not be misled by .logans of peoples socialism and catchwords about some unit of democracy that smell of everything except true p i oletarian democracy. In April, 1957, a delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania, headed by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, went In Moscow at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Nnvict Party to hold conversations about the differences Whirh had been developing between them since the 20th I',uly Congress. At one point when Enver Hoxha was
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explaining the stand of the Albanian Party, Khrushchev suddenly interrupted him: You Albanians are trying to take us back to the road of Stalin! He demanded that they change their attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionists and rehabili tate those former members of the Albanian Party who had opposed its Marxist-Leninist leadership. This Enver Hoxha and the other delegates refused to do, whereupon Khrushchev shouted: You Albanians are hot tempered. It is impossible to come to terms with you. The discussion is closed. C This incident was the first open clash between the position \ maintained by the Party of Labour of Albania and the course taken by the Khrushchev revisionists; but even then_thg_talks were not finally suspended and, instead_of_demands and threats, Khrushchev tried to use economic pressure on the delegation. Believing Albania to be absolutely dependent on Soviet credits he announced the cancellation of the debt Albania had incurred up to 1955, some 450 million old roubles. The delegation, however, did not regard this as charity for which they could be expected to modify their stand but as proletarian internationalism between fraternal peoples for which they expressed their thanks and departed w ithout altering in the slightest their revolutionary line. This same line was advanced as tenaciously by the Albanian delegation to tne meeting communist and workers parties held in Moscow in November ot that year. Khrushchev used the opportunity to present as out-dated the Marxist-Leninist teachings on imperialist wars, armed uprisings and socialist revolution, on the leading role of the party of the working class in revolution and socialist construction and on the continuing necessity of the dictator ship of the proletariat to prevent a restoration of capitalism. In drafting the documents of the meeting the revisionists under Khrushchevs influence wanted_to_.Jeax__QllL^um reference to imperialism at all particularly any description T>1 In ited Mates imperialism as the enjimj^I. peace; anil n course they were" vehement, in their objections to a dc l.u ation that^ as the events of thc-Dasl-lwp years had so cleaiT shown, revisionism w as.the_main danger in tbe_jnterntk>n communist movement.
0 1

The Albanian delegation, led by Enver Hoxha, played an active part in exposing these anti-Marxist lorm ulationsT diis cri^ ,^ % ,,th^dele^atlon of tliip Comr|i\ipi^t Party of China, headed on this occasion by Mao T setu j^ jju jijs^ ^ ^ ^ ^ sl^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n n m ^ o f^ ^ ^ n n ci^ le^ allia n ce which was to. grow ever stronger. Such was their deter mination to defend a correct revolutionary line that they gained the support of other delegations and the Khrushchev faction was forced to retreat from positions taken up at the start of the conference. Revisionism was described in the final statem ent as the principal clanger in th cMWrflDjM^
1 1

ln te m ^ j^ g d ^ a j^ u tu la tio ^ T ^ lm ^ ^ ^ ^ pressureex^m all^. But as a concession to preserve the unity ot the movement the Albanian unci, (jlnnese dcjc^^Pns uni agree to lea\r imclum'jed an hiiunciT"Tc-^riij ii<>n ol^TTie^?TE3T^PartAl (^2lgitSS_as^^vm ^^opene^^^e^^teg^^^he~m tem ationai oflih, | | The 1957 Moscow Declaration on the whole represented a victory for the Marxist-Leninist forces but it did not long restrain the revisionists. Khrushchev certainly did not allow himself and those ;iround him in the Soviet leadership to be bound by the socialist principles set forth in the Moscow Declaration. He sowed confusion generally by issuing quite contradictory statements on all the problems which had been collectively discussed and resolved at the Moscow meeting. The United States was praised as a great country prepared to collaborate with the Soviet Union and also described as an aggressive world gendarme. At one time he would call the U.S. president a reasonable, peace-loving friend and at another a hangman who could not even run a kindergarten. He would laud Tito and the Yugoslav experience to the skies and ilicii call Tito an arrogant person who is out of step with the rest of the platoon. Such eclecticism is characteristic__of iliose who are motivated by an unprincipled opportunism; pul the rea^^*nH ^r*K hnIsncnevs policies, behind all the vribal twists and extem pore o_utbursts, was shown m such in )M'liations as the 1951* Camp David talks with l^resuTent
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popular (Icmocracy. lVve have said it nfofc ihanTmce thaTtlTe most complicated international issues can only be settled by the heads of governments vested with the competent authority. At Camp David the whole pattern of the new Moscow line tions and unjust wars. 'A rt' atohlk' dWii' hot distinguish Detween imperialists and working people and millions of workers would be killed for every monopolist destroyed. The oppressed peoples and nations must abandon any idea of even a
____________ _______ "the- glbe. The most im portant factor for the liberation of colonial peoples, he argued, was disarmament; and if they would contain themselves patiently till the imperialist powers voluntarily surrendered their arms, they could then revolt peacefully! ^turally these ideas, representing a complete capitulation to United States nuclear blackmail, were very acceptable to Ki.erihnwpr -ig tlw> ' 1 for the Soviet Unions [)artncrship_hcjng_qai(1

the two maior nuclear"powers. Indeed. Khrushchev (11^777>[ blame the danger of a world war on those who used the threat of nuclear weapons to maintain their economic empire, but on people who pose as Marxist-Leninists, who are dogmatic, who do not believe in the possibility of achieving socialism and communism under conditions ol peaceful co-existence with capitalism. ^ L jilfi^ a ttad ^ o ii Stalinism was tthe coyer.ar_att;acking socialism and restyjim1 capitalism inside the USSR, terror of a nuclear holocaust w.r. the cover lor coming to terms with United States imperialism in dividing the world into respective spheres of influence. In May, 1959, Khrushchev paid a visit to Tirana personally
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I n discuss differences with the Albanian leadership. The trip was not a success. The Albanians yielded neither to blandish ments nor threats. During his brief stay Khrushchev was ( nntemptuous of Albanian efforts to improve and diversify .i",i iculture and to develop its own industry. Turn your little *n u n try into a flourishing garden, he suggested. It would make a nice holiday spot for Soviet tourists. Specialise in "lowing oranges and give up producing your own grain. The Soviet Union has such an abundance of grain that the mice ' ill more than you can produce here. The Albanians with their experience of the necessity of self-sufficiency in i v.entials when under attack were not likely to heed such iidvice fortunately for them in the light of events the following year after the Bucharest meeting. Khrushchev left Tirana in a temper and hinted to Sophocles Venizelos who visited Moscow soon after that the Soviet Union would not be at all averse to territorial and pi'lilicid concessions to Greece on the part of the Albanians.In spile of all this the ideological differences between the n1 > 1. Party of Labour and the Soviet leadership were not U public up till the middle of 1960 and they were not : . 1 . ' mini i ies^The same situation obtained m Cmna where also llit i e was increasing concern by the Marxist-Leninist leader ship headed by Mao Tsetung at the line being taken by the him isluhev revisionists. ^lh;inia and China ^B cuH ^u^eiM n_jlevchj^im ^iocia|jss(^^ ^liiiil,niirni.il print:i|>lo_li n d _ jji^ain t.m i ll^_jj^L^iIIIl-l^iIlIpolicies in their relations with the world at large, they
1111, 111 2

iqjui.lnsioii.s aliaui.,the solit in the socialist camp introduced Li a \ i.'iionism. t in:, awareness was certainly heightened at the Congress of i! l<"iim;mian Workers Party held in Bucharest in June, lUlilJ. I lie Communist Party of the Soviet Union took hiinl.i^e of the occasion to summon a meeting of the It in il delegates of the various communist parties attending t1 Congress, -aQrnp n__the M ^art;je^ were informed of what the meeting was to he about, the F artT o l ..... of Albania, the Communist Party of China, thy
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Workers Party of Vietnam and the Party of Labour of Korea IJ Pfl -that llw infonna^i^jjJly jij^ iB2fiiogin|i o n sa n d fo rJfe Moscow conference of ^li^ communist parties to b e h eld later th a ty e a r. I'o their surprise '3iH!?ovieFT[Tgation suddenly launched an all-out attack on the Communist Party of China supported by informative material released only a short time before the meeting was convened. They accused the Chinese Party of being dogmatic, sectarian, in favour of war and opposed to peaceful co-existence and demanded that their general condemnation of the Chinese leadership should be endorsed immediately by all the parties represented. totally disauproved of this conduct of the Soviet delegation which \inlaU-d 11if |>iincjjiles of relations between IroKnTaT partiesT"TTysniKapc> expressing theTinitecl stand of the Albanians refused categorically to pass judgement on the alleged mistakes of the Communist Party of China without taking full account of the Chinese Partys own views on problems which had been presented in such a hasty, distorted and anti-Marxist way. ffierp the.se questions of the condemliatioi^o^Stalii^the^fun^ariancou^ b y w h ic h ^ w o rk e rsv ^ should not be discussed primerl^ in a meeting organised for the purpose with time for the various parties to consider_their positions r Infuriated by the Albanian opposition to a quick decision against China which the Soviet delegation had tried to obtain, Antropov said bluntly to Hysni Kapo: Albania must decide whether to go with the 200 millions (the Soviet Union) or with the 650 millions (Peoples China) meaning that it was too small and exposed to stand on its own. But the Albanian delegation refused to budge from their position and, in fact the meeting ended w ithout the Soviet delegations achieving its purpose. J^aaibiaai.dtti-Abii^UJaaEj^n^deljegatio^ after the meeting were worked on b ^ m e Khrushchev group ii~| -in e nort to " 1Lil'll the" leadership.. t)T flu Albanian Party who werecTIargecTvrith betraying Albanian Soviet friendshitr^" * " " " ^ " " ^ ^ " " " " " " " " ^ " " " ^ " " " ^ * ^ ^ 196

jj^an ^w h id T ^^^ c o in p lctcJiu ^ig jj^o ^ctio n ir^^jg n ig di)d used it to make contact with officers in J h IViH_\_j_jn^?TuunrrT^^TTrTT^T^rjj^oTj^K n wen expelled liom the Party ^aj^"TfT"T?tEL^-attempt^J^r^n?"^ovi!cT
2

I. Ill ional a rtiv jfjflft ^ T C sid e rU o fth c ^ JU ^ jj^ C o m m issiq pj H eJ|fld h e n r^ ju iA ^ -L M -liie _ S o y iy | E n ijh j^ v jn

vv^iy hack rihMiLYiiLlitjIlMillVYi W[I . )o ro ach an d M.irxist-Leninisl line of the Party. She was joined in her
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R pl^[|A ',o| a m f m h r r n f t h e P olitical B u re au , on h e r

u lieii Jja c ^ y ^ y ^ e^ ^ ^ ^ > fla riy e bribes^'I'hey were no more auccssful with Albanians who had studied in the Soviet Union and were therefore thought to be more susceptible to inii uption. Our cadres, Enver Hoxha said of these efforts, 'liaiiiiiaAjj_iii_lhe natioinTTTTcTTTTnnu anil liTSii^Er^SrTiR: and death |ru jE |le w ith t^ fCiY's^on^5iW ^deijded i im:ir lieroic P artvjnaM arxist ^ As well as these attem pts to undermine the Albanian position from within, there were open attacks from Moscow liol stopping short of scarcely veiled military threats. Ju st i In lore the Moscow conference Marshal Malinovsky launched it vicious diatribe against the Albanian people and leaders; itml Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-chief of the Warsaw In .ily forces, told the Albanian military delegation that oiilraets for military equipment already signed would not be IIM I, adding You are only in the Warsaw Pact for the time III Inn anyway. Then in October when a serious earthquake Mini floods following one of the worst droughts in Albanian lllnry so depleted the grain reserves that the people were liii i d with an acute bread shortage, the Soviet Union refused In nell All Kinia grain even though they were exporting large | Unlitilies at that time to other countries. The mice in Russia M. lnh I eat but the Albanians could starve as far as the Soviet VUioni sis were concerned. China was able to divert supplies I p.i to Albania which carried them through the bad
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Us IIns lime it was obvious what persistence in defending ill Man Leninism against the Khrushchev revisionists might I <(lice more Albania found itself confronting a mighty
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economic and military power whose present leadership was determined to put an end to Albanian resistance in any way possible. And once more the Albanian people showed themselves united and prepared to endure whatever sacrifices were required rather than yield to economic or military pressure by abandoning the correct line of the Party of Labour. It was with the confidence of a unite d co u n try behind him that Enver Hoxha led the Alfojjflian delegation to tire Moscow Conference ^ f j8J. communist..and wprkcrs parties convened in November, I960. To the assembled delegates of the world communist movement he made one of the most courageous speeches of all time, at last exposing the whole anti-Marxist course of Khrushchev and the other revisionists who had usurped state power in the Soviet Union and detailing every move against the principled stand of the Albanian Party and pgople. Mehmet Shehu has iustlv described this great speech as an everlasting monument in the history of the international communist movement, an exceptional contribution of our Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha . . . to the defence of the purity of Marxism-Leninism on a world scale. Y ou, Enver Hoxha addressed Khrushchev directly, raised your hand against a small country and its Party; but we are convinced that the Soviet people who shed their blood in defence of our people and that the great Party of Lenin arc not in agreement with these actions of yours. He denied the charge of ingratitude to the people of the Soviet Union who were as much the victims of revisionism as those outside their country whom Khrushchev had tried to bully and intimidate. He called on all those present to confront imperialism with the colossal economic, military, moral, political and ideological strength of the socialist camp, as well as with the combined strength of the peoples throughout the world. ll< assured them that the Albanian people who detest war arc fully aware of the warlike moves of the imperialist powers; but they have not become pessimistic nor have they been marking time as far as socialist construction is concerned. They have a clear vision of their future and have set to work with full confidence, being always on guard, keeping ill pickaxe in one hand and the rifle in the other. We hold lli
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view that United States-led imperialism should be mercilessly exposed, politically and ideologically . . . No concessions of principle should be made to imperialism. irushchevs false ideas about a change in the character of KJir imperialism were firmly repudiated. Imperialism, particularly United States Imperialism, "has changed neither its skin nor its nature. It is aggressive, it will be aggressive while even a single tooth remains in its m outh . . . Therefore we continue to insist that it must be made clear to the peoples that there can be no absolute guarantee that there will be no world war until socialism has triumphed over the greater part of the world. 11' the spread of socialism was the real road to world peace, 1)(~n peaceful co-existence does not imply, as the revisionists claim, *5iat_we should give up dass_trui^ Imiher prom ote class struggle in capitalist countries, as well lie national liberation movement of the peoples of "l"iiial and dependent countries. The labouring masses of Ilie world, led by the working class and guided by the communist party, should make life impossible for imperialcrush its fighting and economic potential and proceed to the destruction of the old power and the establishment of the new power of the people. Will t h e y do..-this by violence or by the peaceful i mi Iiamentary road? J n y e r Hoxha posed a question around w J ii Ii the revisionists had raised considerable confusion. So T l.i he nointed out, no people, no proletariat, no com munist or workers party has ever assumed power without lil.....Ished, w ithout violence . . . Our Party thinks that on this ! we should be prepare a to tollow both roads^ but Mon i tyn-< ially that of seizing power by violence, because il we are i II prepared for that, the peaceful road has a better chance
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is m ,

III also raised the question of Khrushchevs bargain with I'iUmhower at the Camp David talks to deprive China of lim n bombs. Why should not China have the atom bomb? 11 i k China..and then we shall see lier ihe U.S. imnerialists will darc to brandish their H.... . as they do at present . . . We (Marxist-Leninists) will i i attack first with the bomb; we are opposed to war; we
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a n ^ j^ a d v to ^ d e s tr o ^ d ls u h h ^ meanwhile for defensive purposeT. The imperialists and their agents accuse China and Albania of being warlike and opposed to peaceful co-existence. Why? Because we do not open our borders for them to come on to our land and graze freely. The time has gone forever when the territory of Albania could be treated as a medium of exchange between the great powers. We are opposed to a co-existence with Yugoslavia which means that we should give up our ideological and political struggle with the agents of international imperialism. We are opposed to co-existence with the British or U.S. imperialists for the sake of which we would be expected to recognise the old political, diplomatic and trading concessions King Zogs regime granted them. On the other hand the Party of Labour of Albania would accet_state..' r e Tes's'witTV"YTTg()slavia provided the principles"or"TiK?aceCT bctwccu_states with dlHerent social .systems are observed as- far as ^ d ic l* :i m _ o t J _ y ^ i ^ is concerned1 Titos .Yugoslavia has not been, is not and never ^ULkfe-.-iL-g^cialist country so long as it !s headed by a ur o u p o J j r n e a d e s >riu u r j j f l lL ^ n e v e r a g r e e to carving up Albania to satisfy Greek chauvinists and we condemn Khrushchev for arousing Venizelos hopes of territorial aggrandisement. Taking up the plot against the Communist Party of China at the Bucharest meeting, Enver Hoxha criticised the Soviet leadership in forthright terms. The Party of Labour of Albania is unanimously of the opinion that the Soviet comrades made a grave blunder in unjustly attacking the Communist Party of C hina. . . The Bucharest meeting should, under no circumstances, be forgotten but must be severely condemned as a stain on the international com munist movement. He went on to characterise the three years since the Moscow Conference as a period fully verifying that the revisionists are nothing but splitters of the com munist movement and the socialist camp, avowed enemies ol socialism and the working class. Enver Hoxha realised that: There may be people who wil not be pleased with what our small Party is saying. Our sm;il
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I'iirty may be isolated. Our country may be subjected to economic pressure to try to prove to our people that their leadership is no good. Our Party may be and is being .il Kicked. Suslov equates the Party of Labour of Albania with bourgeois parties and likens its leaders to Kerensky. But this dues not intimidate us . . . Marxism-Leninism has given us th e ii hi lo have our say and no one can take it away from us, i11iei- throupi'" 'ppTTucal..nor economic pressure,, n~!tK?r i)noni;h epithets nor t h r e ^ . lie ended his great speech with an expression of the Party "I Labours determination to do everything possible to .iiciiglhen the unity of the communist and workers moveiiii lit. For nearly ten years the speech remained unpublished mid unknown outside the circle of fraternal parties at the l'l(il) Conference unlike Khrushchevs secret report to the 'llili Party Congress which was carefully leaked to the i nciiiics of socialism. Not till the end of 1969, long after any Ii* h of maintaining the unity of the movement had been (haltered by the Soviet revisionists, was Enver Hoxhas |n rcli made public. In IIi c discussions which took place during the course of llir ( Conference, Khrushchev remarked that he could reach a In Hi i understanding with Harold Macmillan than with the Mlii,ni.ii is. To which the Albanians retorted: That you can miii lo terms with Macmillan, Eisenhower, Kennedy and iln n slooge, Tito, by making all sorts of compromises and I mu rssions is a personal talent of yours which no one .......1Inver Hoxha was to describe the chatterbox Ii it 1.i I.in, N. Khrushchev, as the greatest counter revolutionary that history has ever known. And Mehmet Mill 1 lo Khrushchevs question as to whether they had any Mlli'i'.ms at all to make of Stalin announced: Yes, Not Hi lling lid of you! I In1 Albanian delegation, as at the earlier Moscow Conferii three years before, played a leading part with the tin delegation in improving the draft declaration and < ! until cning its Marxist-Leninist content. There were still iimr. flaws like the wrong evaluation of the 20th Party "M* rv.; but on the whole the Declaration eventually signed tin HI parties was a repudiation of revisionist theses. The
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epoch in which we live, for example, was not characterised as one of peaceful co-existcnce and economic competition, but as tne epocti of the transition Trom capitalism to socialism . . . of the struggle between the tw osociaT'system s, the epoch of socialist revolutions and of national liberation revolutions, the epoch of the collapse of imperialism and the liquidation of the colonial system . . . The Declaration also condemned the Yugoslav form of international opportunism which is a concentrated expression of the theories of modern revisionism. The_.Moscow Conference of 1960 was almost an exact repetition of the 1957 Conference. In both cases Khrushchev and the revisionist Soviet delegation prepared for the meeting by distributing material containing unsubstantiated attacks on the Albanian and Chinese parties; in both cases the revisionists were unable to defend their capitulationist line in open debate; in both cases declarations were drafted and signed which committed all the parties present to the general line of Marxism-Leninism and in both cases the Soviet I revisionists and the revisionists in other countries and parties 5demonstrated their opportunistic character by completely [disregarding the principles set forth in a document they had pound it expedient to sign. Jjhe^^Confereiie^the^Sioviet^ anger at the role the Albanians had played by stepping up their hostile actions in every field. The military-naval base a I Vlora which Albania had agreed to establish as part of its com m itm ent to the defence of the Warsaw Pact countries had already begun to be treated by the Russians as if it were thenown territory or at best an enclave in a vassal state. Then in May, 1961, eight submarines which belonged to Albania were taken by force and Albanian warships anchored at Sevastopol were taken over at the same time. Russian service men at the yiora base had been instructed to conduct themselves in such a way as to provoke an incident which could serve as a pretext for Soviet military intervention in Albania. But the vigilance of the Albanian government, firmly restraining tli Soviet personnel while not providing any unnecessary excuse for Soviet interference, frustrated the plan. Meanwhile all the members of the Albanian army and
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military specialists from Albania studying at military schools .Mid academies in the Soviet Union were expelled and the Albanian representative at the United Command Headi|ii.irlcrs of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow was given 24 hours to I I i out of the country. lilt nlot>ical differences with China to state relations and had Motllcd all the Soviet technicians from China ancTTTad III 1,11 imUTiT(-raily broken" Inm(In (Is of~coTTtracTs ;n7(T~;H')cciiicnls. ____ wan iTi77 I lie Moscow Conference the same kind of V1 ii",1 1 lo bear on Albania. All the agreements concluded IiTiween the Soviet Union and Albania were cancelled; all Hovid specialists were withdrawn; all economic, trade, |i i linical, scientific and cultural relations were suspended and mi economic, political and military blockade was imposed. Nil in .illy for a small country like Albania, already shut off limn the rest of Europe by two unfriendly powers, these In inI ilc actions by the Soviet leadership were very serious. Nni since the anti-fascist war had the Albanian people been loo i (I to endure such hardships nor to face such a grave In ' ii to their very existence. Then they were fighting to bring lo being their peoples democratic state. Now they were III mg l or the survival of their socialist society. But through 1 shortages and anxieties of this period they never wavered I In ii support of the line defended by their leaders and their *v ^SoyieTT eaSr^*vic.ious 1y attacked the Albanian mmI 11ic Peoples Republic of Albania, calling openly jIm roTi? nT" I a cou'n tcr-rcvolu Uon_JiiLjli_All2iUliiin l o overthrow the Marxist-Leninist leadership and I wnTr a revisionist leadership which would be loyal nm nm uJmw. I n-lai, leader of the Chinese delegation, rose to the n T T f^ ^ Ja n ian s as Hysni Kapo liiuFaefended the fin1 ,il (lie Bucharest meeting. He pointed out that M ml ( lilicism and the laying open of disputes between ljurties peiore The enemies of socialism could not be fuflii i f .i serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. vvi vn the Soviet leadership was not deterred from its
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attacks and immediately after the Congress recalled the Soviet ambassador from Tirana and demanded the departure from the USSR of the Albanian ambassador. By cutting off dipjam alk-xelations the Soviet leadership not only intended inddcat^tha^A lbani^w a^ai^gam ^^or^th^m gm ahs^ow ers or their client states. It was in this1 situation that Enver Hoxha declared: " Albanias borders are insurmountable, defended by a brave people and an eagle-like Party which will smash you if you dare attack us. Furthermore Albania is not alone, not isolated. If you touch our borders you must know that to assist socialist Albania to defend itself there are those who will not recognise state boundaries. And to the revisionists he said: If you raise your knife against us, under the cloak of your demagogy, you may rest assured that we shall point our rifle at you; and the cracking of our rifle will be heard throughout the Soviet Union raising around your heads a tempest as the brave and fraternal Soviet people strike you with the terrible fist of Leninism. One of the outstanding sights to greet the eye of the visitor to Tirana is the magnificent Palace of Culture, a huge structure of native marble and glass which is the centre of cultural and social life in the capital. In January, 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decided to build in Tirana a palace of culture as ;i present to the Albanian people. The design was agreed in April, 1960, and in May work began, proceeding rapidly through the close co-operation ol Soviet architects and the State Building Enterprise of Tirana. But by January, 1961, the supply of building materials from the Soviet Union had stopped and the work slowed down. The Albanians had already spent a sum of 48 million leks foi what remained, month after m onth, a vast unfinished building in the middle of town. In April a shipment of materials actually arrived in the port of Durrs but w;is withdrawn at once on the pretext that the materials had been loaded by mistake and were not really intended lot Albania. And at the end of the m onth all the Sovic specialists working on the building were suddenly withdrawn

()ii May 5 the Government of Albania decided to carry out iln ((instruction work on its own. The plan was altered to make the Palace of Culture much larger than originally intended so that it could accommodate even more social and nilinal activities a theatre for operatic performances, mother concert hall and a spacious library as well as lent.mrants, cafes and conference rooms. This splendid building stands today as a popular m onum ent to the II reliance of the Albanian people. In many parts of the m unlry the same thing happened in respect to industrial I'I.ml . like the huge cement factory at Vlora. Begun as joint |iinj< ( Is between Albania and the Soviet Union, they were >"Uiplelcd, after th^ Soviet Union had torn up all its u,i'' incuts, by the Albanian people often without blue III In I s or plans of any kind to guide their work. Among the agreements broken unilaterally by the Soviet (iovnm ncnt was one concerning the training of a thousand i ''UU' Albanians in the Soviet Union on a shared cost basis. A Kuv.ian note in the late summer of 1961 pointed out that llu' |Hi-sent agreement had no real validity because it had In i n ,u l ived at verbally and there was nothing in writing. Thin was followed by a charge of the Soviet Ministry of I " I 'i",u Affairs that the Albanian students were spreading il'imli i , about Soviet-Albanian relations and seeking to draw Im i. I students into provocative discussions. Having got all ||h* Albanian students deported from the country for t<||||i iniug revisionism the Soviet authorities then circulated III'! din x that the young Albanians had been arrested and jlu lot! up on their arrival home for being friendly to the UNNUI lb c Albanian Government was able to reassure the WiiiinIh Iicv contingent on the score of their concern about llni young people whose training in the Soviet Union had u ni abruptly terminated. They were alive and well and mil In ii ii i); their studies at the socialist University of Tirana. |lg ucncral line of the world communist movement which ~1h rn hammered out and signed by the 5T communist 'HT 19(^U Moscow Conterene (jid^T atlT rprevent "M In hrY revisionists from dragging the Soviet Union i ( niuiliies increasingly dependent on it along the road ill. 1ion to imperialism mternat'ohally and the restor1

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ation of capitalism iii whol e series of events jdonp this retrograde path were analysed by the Albanian Party to demonstrate in the clearest way the profound differences between the opportunist line of the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist line of the parties and ^peoples of Albania and China. mmm j* mrTwo Lsuch events were the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border dispute. In the Cuban issue, the Albanians pointed out, Khrushchev acted both as an adventurist and a capitulationist. Having placed rocket sites on Cuban soil w ithout considering the consequences, he not only made unilateral concessions to the United States Government by hastily withdrawing tlj^m, but even exerted pressure on the sovereign state of Cuba to accept the international control of U.S. imperialism operating through the United Nations in order to make good his promises to President Kennedy. This was like the Soviet Governments support of United Nations intervention in the Congo when the U.N. forces carried out the wishes of the United States by destroying the liberation government and conniving at the murder of the popular Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba. In the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Albanians charged, Khrushchev claimed to be neutral but actually supplied military aid to the Indian reactionaries whose aggressive forward policy in disputed territory led to a frontier war against a socialist country. The magnanimity of the Chinese in withdrawing from the territory in question having defeated the Indian forces and in releasing the prisoners taken and returning the arms captured, even repairing those which had been damaged in the fighting, is probably unequalled in history. Q..the.tri-nartitc. Moscow Treaty of 1963 and thfe Mhi^tL^he-Soyiet leadership signed 'VI fh imprrinlUt ppwrHL-I0 trY to prevent China from Mchmet Shehu said in a speech <>I Jhe Peoples Republic of China to become even stron;;< i because nuclear weapons in the hands of the 700 niilli..j. revolutionary people of China, brought up on the teachi m;* of our ureat Marxist-Leninist comrade, Mao Tsetung, arein
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lllC_Siyice of real peace in Asia, in defence of the sovereignty i .1 China and of the freedom of the worlds peoples and of uM ilution. Only China of the states possessing nuclear t ipons has ever given a solemn undertaking never to use IIn in lirst. 'While making a big fuss about the aid which they give' (Ik- Vietnamese people, Mehmet Shehu continued, the Soviet revisionists leave no stone unturned to help the Unitec Si,ilcs subdue the historic struggle of the people of Vietnam And while posing as friends of the Arab people, they betray ihc Palestinian struggle in collaboration with United State Imperialism. I hc final proof of the correctness of Albanias character h.ilion of Soviet revisionism came with the invasion anc military occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Khrush In vism w ithout Khrushchev, since Brezhnev who succeeded! i Ih deposed revisionist leader followed the same line. The! i .il acceptance of this act of aggressionJ^Llhe_ynited Statesj: ired with the hysterm w hipped u _ o v e rJ^ n n ^ ^ | mi mstrated just "how r a M F m l lab oration between the in splitting the world into respective i c i cs of influence had gone in the twelve years between; haa f t!hc to nor hadFoTi^omeTxmF*70T3anTapart inneiuier Keen wished to play any the Warsawl Kll.owed I'm I in whose name the invasion was carried out. On: pidiibcr 12, 1968, Albania announced its withdrawal from; i I'm l altogether. The Warsaw Treaty had been drawn up as ih'tensive association of socialist countries, but it had been nicd by the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union into * 1 lo enslave the very countries participating in it. In i In- speech explaining Albanias stand on the Warsaw \ , \lchm et Shehu described the global strategy of the 1 Siales-Soviet alliance as peace in Europe war ir And why are ail tneir spears pointed toward Asia: nc.r there stands great Peoples China which has become Ilium mountable obstacle to their imperialist and revisionis Imi'. I"i Ilie domination of the world. ili Albania and China, neither of which has a single beyond its own frontiers, have been consistently I- 'I by Ihe imperialists, who have military bases all ove
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the world and are engaged in wars of suppression in many parts nf Aia Africa and Latin America and hv the Soviet Union whose army occupies a fraternal country and whose aid is used as a lever to dominate countries in the Middle aJld h in aJm J^m ainedi)astions of socialism, continuing to support liberation struggles against imperialism and to believe in the resistance to capitalism of the working ciassjuT ne imperialist countries themselves among whose number the Soviet Union must now be counted. By their very existence as countries committed to the construction of socialist societies by establishing socialist economic foundations and, most important of all, by creating socialist man and encouraging a quality of life at every level which is genuinely socialist in content, Albania and China do pose a serious threat to all regimes based on exploitation and oppression; but it is not the kind of threat represented by invading armies or nuclear blackmail. And within the Soviet Union-arid...the.-East European jieonles democracies, like Poland or Hun^ary1 the so-called liberation of economics which Yugoslavia had pioneered rapidly resulted in a complete dismantling of socialism and a restoration of capitalism based on material incentives and the formation of a new exploiting class. Differentials between the wages of workers in factories or on the land and directors, managers and professional experts became even greater than in some capitalist countries where no proletarian revolution had ever taken place. A^^Qjjfljes^jmtic^ havejDointed outj^ from production to difttrihvttj^ji. from economic Lranchcs Jto>-^ v e m m e n to rg ^ m a tio n si the>B ^rcesoj5jUijyyi^gjjjijy ^ Speculation, cornering the market, price rigging and cheating are the order of the day: capitalist roaders in enterprises and government team up in grafting, embezzling, working for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest, dividing up the spoils and taking bribes. Socialist ownership of the whole n e o n l e degenerated into ownership by a privileged stratum, and manipulated by a handful of new bourgeois elements . . . |.jj has been a painful historjffl] lpccrml And wi^_this_ixalQJaliaaQi-aBitalism in the economit
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wholft Tffnsre of social life in the S ovierTTnTon"Th e Albanian


1

licld has gone a general bourgeois demoralisation over the

I'.n ly paper, Zeri Populllt, in an editorial on April 3, 1968, i(escribed the process of bourgeois degeneration developing in the sphere of culture, the arts, ethics and in the whole in.inner of living. Tt |-eromps daily more difficult to differenT the Soviet n li.ilc between the culturallitcaiulw av ________________ t iik mi and othe^^vis^m isT T ^^JiJgg^an^nW ieca^iT alist .......iiiies of the West. The pursuit of an easy and lazy life, I liis moral degeneration and general reversion to a more Mini live social and economic system was naturally used by I III* Ix mrgeois apologists of capitalism to show that you cant i Ii Hif.r human nature and that socialism therefore is always humid to fail. The Albanians in their struggle against H \ Monism not only had the task of defending themselves but til...... I defending the very ideals of socialism and giving the lie i liilcicsted cynics who based their sneers on the betrayal of i i.ilism in the country of the great October Revolution. ^ ^ l ^ ^ n in istJin ^ u rJ^ irT w n ^ co u n tr^ h e^ ^ reat^ o o a tn^t
il lo ihc A lb a nian people_out o f th e irx iJlllX H iliilio iL w itn SiaicL revisionist leaJ.-.-lni. in th,- ni,l,l.-d vcars o f ihc In
, 11

11

A',

well

as

successfully

preserving

and

developing

a_

mu

between the tw o lines in the w o rld com m unist

Il lers. In his report to the Fifth Party Congress, Enver ..iid: You may rest assured, comrades, that come I mtiy in the world at large, our two parties and our two felon will certainly remain together. They will fight llu i and they will win together. And Mao Tsetung lim'd the same idea: An attack on Albania will have to mi with great Peoples China. If the U.S. imperialists, the in Soviet revisionists or any of their lackeys dare to Alhiinia in the slightest, nothing lies ahead for them ii..... iplctc, shameful and memorable defeat. niiilii'ds of years before, the Albanians under the ihl|i of Scanderbeg had finally been conquered by the i> inics of the Turks because no allies were prepared
ii
mi

209

to join them in the struggle. Now many centuries later the Albanian people by their steadfast defence of socialism and their courage in the face of powerful enemies have won the greatest and most reliable ally they could wish for Peoples China. The Albanian people consider it an honour, Enver Hoxha has said, and are proud that they have friends and comrades-in-arms so loyal and resolute, in good as in bad days, as the fraternal Chinese people. < It may seem at first a strange alliance this tiny European country and this great Asian power; but they have certain things in common in their past histories as well as in their present political and economic systems. jaii,are made up of people who have for long occupied the same territory and developed a national identity which endured subjugation by foreign invaders. were semi-feudal, semi-colonial countries at the time of waging liberation wars of epic proportions which were also revolutionary wars. Both went forward to the building of socialist societies without passing through an intervening period of capitalist development. enjoyed the leadership of great Marxist-Leninists who were able to take over and develop creatively in application to their own concrete conditions the revolutionary theory originated by Marx, amplified by Lenin and defended by Stalin, ^^oth^ learning from the experiences of the betrayal of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have waged unremitting struggles against revisionism within and without. The Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China destroyed any hopes of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists that they would capture the fortress from within. As Mehmel Shehu has said: The Proletarian Cultural Revolution led by the great Marxist-Leninist Mao Tsetung swept away all the muck in Chinese society, purged the Chinese peoples revolutionary ranks of the revisionists headed by China's Khrushchev, Liu Shao-chi, multiplied the forces and intcn sified the revolutionary vitality of the Chinese people and frustrated the counter-revolutionary hopes of the im perialist and revisionists. In Albania, too, it was necessary to de with their own early Khrushchev, Koi Xoxe, and the fi against revisionist tendencies has gone on ever since. Bui
1

210

Ihis continuing cultural revolution there have been particu I.nly sharp phases such as that following on Enver Hoxhas i rport submitted to the Fifth Party Congress in 1966. Our struggle for mastering Marxist-Leninist ideas, he said then Tor deepening the ideological and cultural revolution, cannot lie successfully carried out if all the Party members and working masses are not involved in it, and if the mass line, Ilie line of thorough socialist democratisation, is not courage ously implemented in a revolutionary way.^LaJUlLuh a line ijlo uxactice a sharp struggle must be waged against the ilicorv. philosophy, sciences and art are too difficult to he jji.isned bv the masses1 that they can only be graso&dJiy arties and intellectuals. This woulcf mean that Marxismgrasped by t quinism could not bethought thatthe masSS blockade in 11 must have been the economic which the Soviet leaders virtually joined hands with the imperialist powers to strangle Albania economically would mi hi bring about its financial ruin. But to the redoubled i Hurls of the Albanian people was added assistance from the People's Republic of China to prevent the Third Five Year I'I.iii from being sabotaged. It had been prophesied by the li visionists that having cut themselves off from Soviet aid the Alb,i n i;ins would approach the United States cap in hand. No miK eivable hardships could have prevailed on the Albanian people to do any such thing. In fact with the fraternal *^ liiiu'stn iiiin ithifi i YCifYi iitiffl**^^'eri 1 suppose {L iu. a . _hcn b R m g h tto ^IIeir important new in d u s tria l, | II (ijects. AI i lie end of 1963 a delegation he;uljjJ_ii^i_Chou En-lai f>< m uJ I in AihaniaT fJ^ i^ p ^ d m t^ ^ ^ j1 o g ^ |Jy n d ^ e tw e e i^ r? n i men I over the whole field of inTemaVi'onal affairs and on i u reel lim^'oT'^uiIding socialism in their two countries, n editorial in T ^ e n i Fopulff^yP7im uan^^^""T O 4, niimi'iiling on the visit of the Chinese delegation concluded llli the following words: The Albanian people are happy til comrade Chou En-lai has such a high regard for our
211
p | h i iples. A jo in t s t a j^ m e n t issuedi a t _ d i ^ n ^ ^ n R ? v p r r , n il I>\ C h o n ^^^^laTTInc^^HTm ^TTflTefuT^T^l>hiiSm al_lil^l

Party and Government in respect to questions of internal socialist construction and external relations with other countries. This will inspire the Albanian people to carry on with greater determination their struggle along the correct path charted by our Party headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha. The Peoples Republic of China has given and is still giving our Republic valuable many-sided aid in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. This is an im portant factor in the socialist construction of Albania. We therefore express our thanks to the Peoples Republic of China. The gratitude of the Albanian people can be seen in spontaneous expression all over the country. Long live the friendship of the Albanian and Chinese peoples painted on factory walls and inscribed on banners streaming in the breeze. T Jjj^jiU L ^g iit^jjjsistan cefro m th eC h m esein -y ^ sPM M nNwhiffr., '' is tiiven because they k n c iw jh a U h n ^ ir (Jrt of the world struggle againsT imperialism and that their eTfortsTr making Albania a bastion
conscious of the historic mission of their class. In his 1966 Report T ^nverT Joxa^^ison many other occasions, returned to this theme of the revolutionary friendship between Albania and China. Convinced that I am expressing the purest feelings of our militant people and our Party comrades, allow me from the high tribune of this Congress to convey to the fraternal Chinese people and to Chairman Mao Tsetung our profound gratitude for the invaluable aid they have given us. (Prolonged applause). The Chinese on their side could not be more respectful of Albanias sovereignty and independence. They repudiate any hint of the great nation chauvinism for which they have condemned Khrushchev and are well aware that Albanias importance to them and to socialism lies precisely in its self-reliant development as a socialist country in its own right. The aid they give is designed to enhance Albanias independent socialist construction and by no means to tie the Albanian economy to Chinas. This aid is at once important and limited, representing about 10% of Albanias external trade. Its quality, as can be seen in the machine tools at the

Tirana spare parts factory or the fully-automated textile plant near Berat, is of the highest, comparable if not superior to anything to be seen in the capitalist countries of the West. In connection with the setting up of new industrial projects Chinese specialists come to Albania and stay only so long as is necessary to pass on their skills to Albanians, often having learned Albanian for the purpose. They live modestly mi the same standard of rem uneration as Albanian workers, ,iiid are very popular with the people. They give all the Inim ical assistance they can but are (..ireful not to try to impose their own way of doing things on their hosts. The Albanians cannot but compare this friendly and helpful iillitude to the conduct of the Soviet specialists after Stalins d.ith whose arrogance and selfishness made them quite insufferable to a proud people. An engineer newly arrived Imm Moscow not only expected sumptuous accommodation, lull might demand paym ent at four times the salary of the^ I m sident of the Albanian Peoples Republic! In 1968 Enver Hoxha addressing the Tirana regional Party h inference spoke of the delegation which had just visited ( litnia and signed an agreement by which Albania was given Inlcrcst-free credits for the construction of 30 im portant new |Hojects. These, included the metallurgic works at Elbasan whit li can process 800,000 tons of iron-nickel ore a year and inoducc 250,000 tons of high grade rolled steel and the I h i/,a hydro-electric plant producing one billion seven hundred million kilowatt hours a year. This, he pointed out, Wilt proletarian internationalism in its highest form li midship and mutual agreement on all questions providing (hr hasis of economic aid, not economic aid to buy ti|in rment. Allianias foreign policy, like that of China, has remained III inly socialist in a world where so much else has been l.mtly shifting and changing. fundamental .........I'1es of socialist foreign polic iijiiii.iljsm ai______________
flfluc to exploit them.

\ i I h2Jum m ci2a^t^m seTvcs^m croT^oy^nm ents_that


213

iili l.uian internationalism is expressed by the Albanian

state and people in their fraternal support for all those seeking to end their exploitation, w hether by a capitalist class w ithin their own countries or by capitalist governments following colonial policies. As the Foreign M inister of Albania, Nesti Nase, said in a speech delivered in New York on O ctober 2nd, 1972, during the 27th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations: As the representative of a country the noble principle of whose policy is the support of peoples fighting for freedom and independence, 1 cannot rem ain silent in the face of the fact that these countries (of Asia, Africa and Latin America) are the object of the greed of neo-colonialists who threaten their political independence and sovereignty, nor can I fail at the same time to express the full solidarity of our people with their just, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle. A t the same time the Albanians, as M arxist-Leninists, know that revolutions cannot be exported. They have to be made by the working masses themselves under their own M arxist-Leninist leadership. There can never be any question therefore of Albanian interference in the affairs of any other sovereign state, however m uch sym pathy may be felt for the victims of oppression there. What they can offer is their own experience of how a correct line enabled them to overcome m endous odds. Jit, is this im portant consideration which makes it possible ~TO_jgconcil_cornpIeteIy proletarian internationalism with peaceful co-existence which is the m aintenance of corru I relations between states witlL_different sociaLsYSlgmsbased T ^ ^ ^ sp e ^ ^ o re a d io U ie ^ ^ ^ e m ^ n a ^ in te ^ rit^ jio r^ jiy ;to eacTTotflers"aZv;Lr||';|[ ;w h r < " p i ' ~... '( > On this basis Albania established diplom atic relations with Greece in May, 1971, Greece having abandoned the territori;il claims which had poisoned relations in the past. Relations with Yugoslavia have also been much improved withoul A lbanias playing down in any way the great ideological differences between the tw o countries. kV r n r cstentlv follnwinp a lingforeign affairs while continuing to build socialism at home

214

Ihe Chines e^pe o ^ k h a v ^ h a tte re d thejittem tsjof^ % Irs and Soviet Governm ents to keep them isolated from i In- rest of the world. After a series of diplom atic victories by Inc Peoples Republic of China, President N ixons visit to Peking was the final admission of the com plete failure of the policy of trying to shut China behind a great wall of in m-recognition. Il has already been suggested in the United States that Albania m ust soon_be_recognised, if only as a counter to V i\iei influence...in _UlC area increasjnij^__exeried through Yugoslavia. While the two super-powers, the U nited States iiiiiI the Soviet Union, collude w ith each other in trying to nharc world hegem ony, it would be unrealistic, as Enver lluxha has pointed out, to see in the Soviet-American illli.incc only the rapprochem ent and co-operation of the two super-powers, their com mon actions and interests. In \ ii w of their im perialist character, the U nited States and the revisionist Soviet Union are also torn asunder by conflicts, rivalries and deep contradictions which prevent them from in ling always in harm ony and in com plete unity. The i M .ience and worsening of these contradictions are inherent in the very foundation of that alliance, the social-capitalist lyMein of the tw o countries, their imperialist designs. Preparing for war, the two parties also plan to devour one ll does not m atter what motives mav lead the United Jrs lo Ihe recognition of Albania. Albanias relations with t^niied Stales will be based on precisely the same ..... 111Irs of peaceful co-existence, of complete equality, as I'l mi in all Albanias other state relationships. If the United li I 711(11 resumeTcorrect state reiatiOris'with Albania, there I ii11 be little doubt that the British Governm ent, quick I iniiii'Ji to recognise reactionary regimes, would at last realise ill H no purpose is served in continuing to ignore the 30-year tl People's Governm ent of Albania. Albanias Foreign Minister in his United Nations speech friied to China as an insurm ountable obstacle to the plans iiM.C.icssion and hegemony of the two super-powers. The ml' "I progressive m ankind enthusiastically applauded last ilu restoration of the legitim ate rights of the Peoples
Hither.

215

Republic of China in the United Nations. This represents a glowing victory of the great Chinese Peoples Republic and of its ju st external policy, and at the same time a victory for all the peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples of the world. That was the crowning of the struggle th at Member states, including the Peoples Republic of Albania, have carried on unceasingly for over 20 years to put an end to the incredible situation that had been created in our Organisation. The presence of the Peoples Republic of China in the U nited Nations has strengthened many-fold the struggle of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces even here in the Organisation, the struggle of peace-loving m em ber states against the two great imperialist powers and in favour of the rights of peoples and the cause of peace. So these two socialist peoples are linked by the closest fraternal bonds and just as China dem onstrates that no country is too large and too populous for dem ocratic centralism Albania proves that no country is too small and too sparsely populated to build a socialist society by its own independent effort.

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THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE NEW ALBANIA

Chapter Sixteen
Socialist Man at Leisure llnl having tried to explain the historical developm ent of All >ania and the revolutionary struggles of the Albanian people to create a new society, one is still left with the i|iu\stion of w hat the Albanian people are like, at work, at play, in their daily relationships w ith each other. W hat is the 111.11i ty of life in socialist Albania? I'hc Albanians are disciplined and hard working but they in i neither puritanical nor austere. Moral laxity of any kind is tilled out by social disapproval and there are certainly no displays in public of behaviour even mildly offensive, but wluil one notices m ost in any place where Albanians are Ilin ed together is their natural gaiety and good hum our. I hey frown on the extravagant fashions exhibited by some ymmg visitors to Albania from the west because they are very iniucrned about the influence on Albanian youth of the iiiiil.mdish ideas of extrem e individualism and self expression which are characteristic of the alienated youth of capitalist fltlliilrics. But Albanian wom en, who are very good looking, ill i n', altractively, use cosmetics and wear bikinis on the In iii lies as the m ost sensible form of swimwear. Indeed, the IfMkl sandy beach at Durrs or any of the other excellent li.ilIhiik resorts along the beautiful coast of the Adriatic and Inman seas all the way down to Saranda, are good places to lilm nvr the Albanians in a holiday m ood. Their liking for live sports in the open air and sunshine accounts for the lllntifj, lithe, bronzed bodies of this handsom e people. I hn' ol their greatest pleasures is simply the enjoym ent of w |i Ii others com pany. In every tow n or city the evening h'Mn n.ide is a feature of social life. A t the end of the days 'mil the whole population comes out into the. broad

217

boulevards, to stroll about greeting friends, to have coffee or som ething to eat in one of the m any open-air cafes or restaurants in this warm country whole families to three generations taking the fragrant summer air together or young couples walking hand in hand or, perhaps, happy bands of children weaving in and out of the crowds in some extem porised game. There is som ething strange to the visitor from the West in seeing children running about through the streets in such abandon w ithout any surveillance. In his towns they would soon be decim ated by traffic. In Albania, after the end of the working day, there are no lorries nor m otor cars to be seen and the streets and avenues belong entirely to the people for their communal peram bulation which gives each wide thoroughfare the appearance of a fair ground. There are no private cars in Albania. Though m otor cars and lorries are not yet made there, the export surplus is ample to buy from abroad all the transport needed and there are the skills and factories to service them and supply all the spare parts required. A t first cars were made available to individual citizens on a points system, as in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, b u t some owners were charging those who did not possess them yet for lifts and there was keen com petition to get ones name higher up on the list. This was seen as generating the kind of selfish bourgeois ethics rooted in private possession. So all cars were withdrawn and gathered into pools from which collectives can take whal they need for w ork or recreation or for the use of foreign guests. The effort and investm ent which m ight have gone into supplying individual families w ith cars has gone instead into developing an excellent system of public transport with fares constantly being reduced toward the point of a completely free system of transport. If the sight of so many family groups of grandparents, parents, children and even childrens children walking, talking and taking refreshm ent together raises the question of why family relationships are so strong and satisfactory, the answer every one gives is that there is no economic restraint whatsoever compelling families to stay together. The only bond is that of m utual love and respect. That is not In

218

suggest, as will be seen, that there are no problems any more in connection with this aspect of life; but the context in which solutions can be sought is provided by a collective concern with the role of the family in socialist society as, in I.liver H oxhas words, the general spiritual atm osphere ( oloured by the ideals of parents and grown-up members of the family, their attitude tow ard labour and their conIribution to society, which exert a decisive influence on the form ation and cultivation of young people as future workers, i ilizcns and revolutionaries. Or the evening crowds m ay seek various forms of i nlcrtainm ent in the local palace of culture where there are i< <itals, concerts, pageants or plays. They may go to cinemas where a growing num ber of the films shown are Albanian. 1 hey may enjoy the presentation in some large auditorium of lli.it ever popular form, Estrada, which is the Albanian equivalent of the music hall with acts by singers, musicians mid acrobats, w ith dram atic sketches and comic turns. And in till llicse am usem ents and cultural activities the audiences are u<> merely passive in their enjoym ent. N ot only do they 1 Iiti1 1icipate in the sense that every perform ance of any kind hiiN developed collectively under the guidance of constructive i iilii ism which everyone feels free to give b ut also because a |iH|',e proportion of any gathering will belong themselves to mMin cultural group which no factory, school, office, (ii operative farm nor institution of any kind is w ithout. Indeed one has the impression th at in leisure hours a good liiill of the population is always actively engaged in enterliUnmg the other half. National holidays celebrating the founding of the Peoples Hepuhlic, historical anniversaries, victories in the liberation wmi in in socialist construction raise to a higher degree the h illive feeling to be encountered in the streets of the major Imvir. The broad treelined avenue leading from the statue of III iindeihcg in the centre of Tirana to the University on the |Uliiku ts of the city will be filled w ith representatives of the |li Him inlic Front organisations, of factories and farms, of the HIHied services and young pioneers, marching past the IgVli vviu^i stand near the Dajti Hotel under billowing red IlHiinii., shouting revolutionary slogans and paying their

219

respects to Party and state leaders and guests from abroad. In country districts, too, there are regular occasions when thousands of people from the area and friends invited from the towns and the capital come together to celebrate some local event like the annual fete at the village of Billisht, some fifteen miles from Kora, in honour of the form ation of the First Batallion of partisans during the liberation war. Driving to the site of the gathering along a bum py dusty road one sees streams of people walking along paths or across fields, men dressed in their best dark suits and often carrying their shoes in their hands, the wom en in traditional peasant costum es, red blouses, full gaily printed skirts and sandals, the older men wearing their medals, bereaved m others of partisans killed in the fighting crying a little as they greet their dead sons comrades and children shouting and laughing as they hurry tow ard the scene of the days festivities. On rising ground a grove of acacias provides shade from the h o t sun. All around the grove are bulletin boards with pictures of the activities of the co-operatives in the area and the achievements of the rural electrification programme. Strung overhead are banners inscribed with such slogans as R rofte Partie e Punes e Shqiperise Long live the Albanian Party of Labour, Shqiperi, land of the eagles, is the Albanians name for their country; and among the dances perform ed by the men in the course of the m errym aking will be the famous eagle dance. O ther banners wish a long life to Enver Hoxha or set out the main themes to be taken up in a brief political m eeting by a representative of the Central Com m ittee, perhaps the veteran partisan Birro Kondi whose brother also a great partisan fighter died in an accident after the war W ithout unmasking revisionism one cannot defeat im perialism and the people of Albania and Chinas millions are more than a m atch for any enem y. The local Party Secretary speaks of the changes in A lbanias countryside and, specifically, in the Billisht district. Then the vast crowd, m ore than 20,000, move to the lon>; tables under the trees which are piled high with roast chickens and slabs of lam b, home made bread, cream cheese, boiled eggs, tom atoes and corn on the cob. Vast quantities of very good cold beer are drunk during and after the feast to

220

Ihc sound of the constantly repeated toast Gezuer! good health! There is much moving about and groups at the tables are broken up and reform as old comrades are discovered and greeted affectionately. One of the good survivals of feudal customs, along w ith the open-handed hospitality one en counters all over Albania, deepened and given an ew fraternal significance by socialism, is the close dem onstrative friend ship between men. Partisans seeing each other after an interval embrace and kiss warmly. Moving about as freely and greeted as affectionately are the Party and State leaders who have come from Tirana to join in the celebrations the foreign M inister who is also a deputy from this region, an ambassador, several members of the Political Bureau and I1,liver H oxhas younger sister. ' Moving also among the tables are rhapsodes who extem porise songs for any occasion in the com plicated polyphonic style of Albanian folk music dressed traditionally in white ( aps, pleated white skirts and blouses w ith brow n trimming ami decorated w ith big black pom pom s. They sing of the i lunges in the lives of the people brought by twenty-five V ais of socialism, of the advance toward communism. A < yoimg girl accom panied by her husband playing the clarinet Nliigs a song exhorting women to respond to the Partys i all. Some of the men have form ed circles in the bright mmshine outside the grove and are perform ing energetic s joined, to the enjoym ent of those watching, by llilmslcrs and high Party officials. This gay, colourful gathering in a country district, finding In old forms of music, dance and song an expression of their icsolulionary feelings about the new Albania, this informal ill1linn racy of a comradeship in com m on tasks and aspira t io n s which embraces everyone, no m atter in w hat special iiipaitty he may serve, conveys as adequately as anything 11 mid I lie quality of life in socialist Albania today.
l l t u ii <

221

Chapter Seventeen
Y outh and Education Albania, for all its continuous history of a people occupying the same territory for thousands of years and preserving their cultural identity through countless vicissitudes, for all its wealth of ancient m onum ents and living traditions of the past, gives the impression of being a young country. This is partly the rejuvenating effect of the new social system which was born out of the liberation war, is now vigorous and thriving and has a glorious future to look forward to. But it is also because there is, in fact, a high preponderance of children and young people com pared with other European countries. The population under the conditions of socialism has doubled since the war. Far from creating problems this growth in numbers has remedied the chronic under population of the country, which resulted from the hard conditions of the feudal past. Albania was and still remains a country with too few people particularly with the expansion of agriculture to four times its pre-war level of production and the trem endous all round developm ent of industry. In any factory or industrial enterprise one is struck by the youth of the workers, the great m ajority of whom are undci thirty. In the Tirana spare parts factory, for example, 80% ol the 1700 workers are below thirty years of age and of the 55% of the labour force who are women the greatei proportion are girls of tw enty and younger operating machines which in the older industrialised countries would only be handled by male operators well beyond their first youth. The same is true of men and wom en director*, specialists and Party and trade union representatives a grr.it num ber of whom are in their early thirties.

222

Not only have those who were born and brought up under socialism adapted themselves m ore quickly to production work in the new factories, they have also taken the lead in Ihe ideological struggle against bad customs from the past .md religious superstition. To help put an end to the old subjection of wom en, hundreds of girls came together in an ,irca where feudal traditions were strongest and as a political iirt renounced the betrothals which their parents had contracted for them when they were only children. In many towns and districts young people acting on their own initiative have taken over and converted into gymnasia or <ultural centres mosques, churches and basilicas which had I Illi'n into disuse. Before the war of all European countries Albania alone resembled the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in respect to poverty and illiteracy. In 1938 m ore than 80% of the population was illiterate and In parts of the countryside it was as high as 95%. Albania was (lie only country in Europe w ithout a single university. The struggle against illiteracy began during the war among IIk* partisan units and in the liberated areas. In a resolution of lln larty in March, 1943, communists were recom m ended 'In spread culture in the countryside, to organise courses M^iinst illiteracy in order to give our peasants the capacity to piiilicipate in the benefits of culture which the former Iimi lionary regimes had denied them . Alter the war the campaign against illiteracy was waged on I W o fronts teaching all men and wom en up to 40 years of M l" read and write and establishing a netw ork of schools to K1' Mrrvnit the emergence of new illiterate masses. t hganisations of youth and women and the trade unions Win mobilised in this campaign under the slogan: In order In build we m ust acquire knowledge and in order to acquire knowledge we m ust be able to study and learn. Tens of feftiniN.mds of those previously illiterate were enrolled in night Illinois w ithout giving up production work, graduating first Ili<iii elementary classes, then from seven grade schools and |Vl'H completing secondary and higher school courses. By l'if^ ,||,i eracy among all those under 40 had been wiped out mid not I, mg afterward it was abolished among older people

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too. The night schools were m aintained to consolidate this achievement and to keep people, particularly in the rural areas, from slipping back again. The educational system which was established aims at the all round developm ent of the younger generation to prepare them to take an active part in the construction of a new socialist society. Its task is to im part to young men and wom en sound scientific knowledge, to inculcate the MarxistLeninist w orld outlook, to give them professional skill and a correct attitude tow ard work, to imbue them with the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism , thus ensuring their moral, physical and cultural education. The system includes pre-school education from three to seven years of age, general education (the eight year schools) from seven to fifteen, vocational training in a short nine m onth course or a full tw o year general course of technology and higher education at the University for three or four years. The Tirana State University has many departm ents covering 29 special studies and there are branches in m ost of the major cities. The system also includes night and correspondence schools for adults. By 1963 the educational system had developed to the point where every man and wom an in the country was obliged to com plete the course of the eight year schools. In 1969 in 4,971 schools com pared with 674 before the war, there were 543,031 students as against the pre-war num ber ol 58,339. Vocational schools were training 22,800 specialists as against 1,511. The greater proportion of students in eight year and high schools are boarders and of the 19,500 student boarders 13,300 receive full state scholarships and 3,500 hall scholarships. There are no tuition fees in Albania. But having created the basic system of education the country since about 1965 has entered a new phase ol improving the system qualitatively to correspond with the needs of the further developm ent of socialist society. This has m eant nothing less than revolutionising both the methods of teaching and the content of courses. It is really the point Marx made in the Feuerbach theses about educating llir educators and it represents one of the m ost serious problems confronting any society in establishing a truly socialist

educational system. Those w ith the best technical quali fications for teaching posts in the early days of a new socialist state and in a country as educationally backward .is Albania had been, the choice would not be wide might be the least qualified politically to fit youth for its role in the new society. Instead of preparing young people to make their social contribution by putting collective above self-interest .ind teaching them to defend the workers socialist state, s< Iiools could becom e centres of bourgeois influence paving die way ideologically for the restoration of capitalism. The m ovem ent in Albania for revolutionising education li.id from the beginning taken the double directional form of (lie mass line from the masses to the leadership and from d i e leadership to the masses. It could only begin when the pnlilical consciousness of the masses had reached such a level lli.il they could themselves become critical of survivals from d i e past of attitudes and institutions inimical to socialism. In l'l(tr>, revolutionary students, particularly in the educational I'll.iblishments of the capital city Tirana, becoming aware of | | t r discrepancy between Marxism-Leninism and the m ethods |y winch they were taught and the content of that teaching, In I;.in to dem and a new relationship between teachcrs and linden Is, the right to have a say in the choice of texts and the kluiming of courses and closer contacts with the production 11 nin s where they would be working on leaving school. I liver Iloxha welcomed this initiative and form ulated tUhdoni com plaints and criticisms into a revolutionary lliili'ny Ibr overhauling this whole vital section of society. In ill Miriit speech to the Fifth Party Congress on November 1, Inin,, h e stressed the need of linking teaching and education m Ii more closely to life and labour. Speaking n ot only as a ill scii Leninist but as one who had been a teacher himself, Hi iln Kora academy before his dismissal on political pUluU. lie explained the political necessity of an unceasing uliipinenl of education to m eet the demands of socialist llyr and pointed out that Our schools, for all the fiivi'inent in teaching and education, have not yet rid ntftl'lves of bourgeois pedagogy and revisionist influences til is indispensable to revolutionise further the edulliihal system . . . It is particularly necessary to take radical

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measures for the im provem ent of ideological and political education and for educating youth through labour . . . There is still too m uch formalism and verbalism, passivity on the part of pupils and stifling the personality of the young on the part of the teachers, too m uch officialdom in the relations between teachers and pupils resulting in conservative and patriarchal m ethods of education . . . There can be no talk of revolutionising our schools w ithout revolutionising the great army of teachers who m ust set the example of a com m unist attitude tow ard labour and life. He exposed the root of the problem in the detachm ent of schooling from the rest of com m unity life as a special realm where the teacher is dom inant and everything is subjected to its pedagogical aspect; and yet teachers have usually been entirely cut off from production. They felt the needs and profited from the changes in our econom y but in their teaching they pursued m ethods which were completely anachronistic. The Party personnel who were mainly con cerned with the political, econom ic and ideological trans form ation of our country were not interested enough in schools to appreciate the changes that needed to be made in their developm ent. The context in which these revolutionary changes could be made was the understanding that Life is a great school and school itself nothing b u t an integral part of life. Therefore the school should be closely and harm oniously linked with the activities, the work and thought of men in society, serving them, and through them, society as a whole . . . Oni .schools are not merely to provide additional personnel for government and planning departm ents but to turn out cn masse people equipped with the knowledge and science lo play their full role as socialist citizens. Learning and education should not be considered as a means of speculation and personal profit, as it is in bourgeois countries, but as a powerful weapon in the hands of the new m en of social is I society, in order to build our society, to prom ote 0111 com m on socialist production and to develop socialist cultiili in the service of our society. At Enver H oxhas suggestion the Fifth Party Congress *t<| up, under the direct supervision of the Central Com m ittee, all

' durational commission drawing its members from the l irlds nl education, industry and mining, from state farms and ....... pcratives, from the mass organisations of youth and women and from the ranks of physicians, musicians, writers mil philosophers. It was considered that such varied rep re nutation was necessary to ensure the co-ordination of hools with the whole econom ic and social development of Ilie country and to sort o ut priorities in the course of ili mands for trained personnel made on behalf of each of i Ih se fields of activity. In the schools and in the University teachers and proIrmors had to adopt new m ethods and learn to accept the i m u ism of students as part of their own socialist rehabili laiimi. A few found the extension of dem ocratic centralism in the educational system, with students taking an active role In Minimising school life, too much of a break with the old ii mlemic traditions they had hoped to see re-established. Hit y were released to go into production work, perhaps, to li Him to teaching when they have learned from workers the |Mi ialisl ideology of the working class. And students, too, llml lo learn m ore thoroughly that socialist education has ItulliiiiK to do with getting a degree in order to become a M ni nl authority or to secure a com fortable post with a fat i mini y \ A student is judged not on the marks he gets in liiinpeiiiion with his fellows but on the help he gives others III inaileiing subjects. So successful has this approach proved llliil in inch places as the Tirana Secondary School of Culture lmli ills through m utual aid in lessons have realised a llllldn il percent prom otion rate and earned com m endation fill iheii exem plary tidiness and protection of socialist |iinpi rly, I I i hii m s in Marxism-Leninism were made a living part of lln* imri< ulum and n ot just a routine subject to be got W | iiii ,iIi in a mechanical way. Texts and lectures on dialcc j|-il mid historical materialism were related to A lbanias own m nhiiliH i.uy history and students and teachers learned to |il\ principles of scientific socialism to their own lilih lie. and those of their society. And since practice is the >1111 nl Marxism-Leninism, students and teachers began to Mllli Ip ili more actively in the political and econom ic life of

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the country, leaving their books and laboratories to study the application of theory on the production and social front. What all this ferm ent am ounted to was carrying class struggle, the confrontation between bourgeois and socialist ideology, into the schools where the youth of the country were being formed. Enver H oxha returning to the subject of the further revolutionising of our schools in a speech to the Political Bureau in March 1967 described w hat was hap pening in the educational system. During ail this process of restless, not spontaneous but genuinely revolutionary developm ent, the struggle of opposites creates progress and the dialectical developm ent of opposites brings about a qualitative transform ation which takes our society from a high stage of socialist achievement to a still higher one. In this m ajor revolution the decisive role is played by the masses guided by the com m unist party of the proletariat and its M arxist-Leninist ideology. . . Our schools are an im portant arena in this process. As much as had already been done, he called for further elforts still to make our schools forges of the new com m unist man of sound political and theoretical outlook, with the keen appreciation and taste of a M arxist-Leninist revolutionary, endow ed with a daring, creative and realistic s p irit. . . Our schools m ust play their full part in the ideological battle to prevent socialist Albania from ever changing its red revolutionary colour. This address was followed by the setting up of a Central Commission on education to continue the work of the previous commission but on a broader mass basis. It was headed by the great wartime leader and m em ber of the Political Bureau, M ehmet Shehu, who convened a national forum on education at Tirana in April. Abiding always by the mass line, he told those assembled at the meeting, oui Party has made it a habit to consult the masses before takinc, any im portant decision. Therefore in connection with 11it further revolutionisation of our schools the Party considers il necessary to organise a public discussion throughout Ilie country on every aspect of this question. Those taking part in the nation-wide forum were ill teachers w ithout exception and all students from the ninlli

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year on, the working masses, prim arily the working class and Ihose parents who wished to take part. Many of the .i tissions were held in the large production centres where li views could be exchanged with workers so that their (immendations on making education respond to the i' i|uirements of production could be taken into account and I In working class could be mobilised for com pleting the volutionising of the schools begun by the students themn'lvcs. I or over a year public discussions and debates took place hmii one end of Albania to the other w ith com plete freedom I everyone to m ake any suggestions he liked. All proposals ollered, w hether they were contradictory or n ot provided IIn v were n o t at variance with the general principles of mu ulism, were collected in a final docum ent which was then M 'iulimittcd for further discussion. During this vast demoII ii In exercise, which was fully reported at every stage by |tn nn and radio, over 21,000 meetings were held attended by boil,000 people, or m ore than half the adult population of 11111 whole country, at which contributions were made and I n Midcd by 160,000 individual citizens. As M ehmet Shehu tiiiiimcd up the discussions: T h ey corroborated in practice (In1 principle th at the socialist revolution forges ahead lltlollgli class struggle w ith the active participation of the lltHiics who are not only the object but also the subject of (In ideological and cultural revolution. Wl i< n the results of this great national forum on education llml In i n finally co-ordinated they were em bodied in a report Itllnnilled to the Central Com m ittee in Ju n e 1969 and ntMliliiHiusly approved. Among the practical steps taken after p t public discussions were the following: All xi.i.l ents graduating from secondary school are required undergo a probationary period at production work before llt^ adm itted to any higher educational institution. No one fUrtln I* not worked for one year as a simple labourer and fplveil the approval of his or her w orkers collective will be pM" il lor further education. hi In mis will provide courses at all levels and at suitable if* 1 accomm odate workers and peasants in part-tim e III ii IIi n i while continuing in their jobs, during which period
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they will work only a six hour day while being paid at the full rate. Pre-school education will be extended to all children between three and six years of age and the age for starting school will be lowered from seven to six. Schools will be provided for national m inorities particularly those in which Greek is taught as well as Albanian. Secondary schools will be places not simply for study but for study and w ork with at least a quarter of the students time devoted to production. Exam inations lay too much stress on rote learning. Students should study systematically over the whole course of their education not to receive marks but to becom e useful to society. The idea that the m ost suitable m ethod of teaching is from books, that only theory learned from books is culture must be opposed. Theory is derived from practice, is enriched by practice, is confirm ed by practice and corrected by practice. The idea that secondary vocational schools train middle grade technicians, that gymnasia turn out em ployees and that he who has com pleted higher education m ust necessarily be appointed a cadre is a careerist and bourgeois conception. Every one serves wherever he is needed. While students are free to com m ent and criticise and arc encouraged to participate in the organisation of school life there m ust also be proletarian discipline. The spirit of this discipline which should guide both teachers and students lias nothing in com m on w ith indifferentism and liberalism, with petty bourgeois anarchy and violation of rules, with abuse ol dem ocratic rights or accentuating only rights and forgetting obligations. Proletarian discipline requires the all round developm ent of criticism and self-criticism on the pari ol teachers and students alike. During vacations there are holiday camps for young people and pioneer camps for children. Ju st as study is com bine I with work in school, play is com bined with w ork in these camps in the m ountains or on the coast. Y outh groups can he seen everywhere during the summer planting trees on die hillside, terracing abrupt slopes or, perhaps, helping in die

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Iasks of co-operative farms; and even the children from seven in ihirteen in the pioneer camps help w ith the cooking and i ving of meals, keeping the cabins and grounds clean and .l doing an h o u rs work a day in the vegetable gardens or in the In Ids. The same high spirits and cheerful enthusiasm that go inlo games and athletic contests go also into this collective wmk out in the sunshine amid the scenic splendour of Albanias m agnificent m ountains or along its varied coastline ill sandy beaches and coves or rocky spines plunging sheer Inlo the blue translucent water of the Adriatic. They look wi II on it, A lbanias youth, bronzed and fit and happy; and limy arc learning from their earliest age the value of things in li i ms of the muscular toil, sweat and dexterity that go into making them. It is an appreciation of value in this practical ir.i that underlies the understanding of, and the response In, all spiritual and cultural values. I he pioneer camp at Durres is named Qemal Stafa after (In secretary of the Com m unist Y outh section who died Ill'll >i( ally in the war. The cabins and play grounds are under iliii trees in sight of the sea. The 1,600 children are divided litn four battalions which plan their own activities and min|>etc w ith each other in sports. They learn about the III* lory of their country and current socialist developments |lV mounting their own exhibitions of photographs, drawings Mini i aptions. They visit factories and the dock area and m eet HVlilkiTs who explain their jobs to them ; and well known w1111 i is, heroes of labour from the mines or various lm lm .n ial enterprises, come to the camp to lecture and watch (In i hildrens games. I )ne popular game is the re-enactm ent of episodes from the liiii Ii .aii fighting when some veteran has described the event |o ilicin; but it is difficult to get the game started because no ilhl wai l Is to play the part of the fascists. A fter the game is i i both sides kiss each other. Every night a com pany of a im diid children w ith two blankets and some food go up In the hills to sleep o ut and learn about camping. There are " N il , drama and physical education teachers on the staff m .iir assisted by people who come out from tow n to help. In visit the Qemal Stafa pioneer camp ju st behind the mis h( >re of the Adriatic, to see the children playing and
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working, com pletely free but already disciplined, too, from their life at school and in the family and already expressing in their games and activities a wholesom e collective spirit is to recognise that A lbanias socialist future is assured.

Chapter Eighteen
Women and the Socialist Family Hi I the war in the northern regions of Albania a rigid >ic Initial social system, codified under the name of the Canon nl I .ok Dukagjini, was strictly observed. According to this lini'Hi which had been form ulated in the Middle Ages and tlill dom inated social relations the husband is entitled to In il Ii is wife and to tie her up in chains when she defies his ^m il and orders . . . The father is entitled to beat, tie in i hums, imprison or kill his son or daughter . . . The wife is tilth),ed to kneel in obeisance to her husband. In central and pililhom Albania the position of wom en was not much |n ili I. Religious superstition had a strong grip on people. By Mohammedan law a m an was perm itted four wives and could lllvmco any of them by a simple unilateral declaration. A RliiMiaii was not even present at the celebration of her own i ililmg and she had no rights in her children. Catholicism in I tin is! mediaeval form supported the same enslavement and glndalion of wom en and tortured them spiritually as well. I In end of those enslaving customs began during the Itthiiion war when women, shoulder to shoulder with men, lii'hl all the fiercer to em ancipate themselves from a double (in 'ision. Ranged opposite them on the battlefield were II mily the fascist occupying forces, but those reactionary llnmiaii elements th at supported them , feudal chieftains like III M.nkagjon, religious leaders and, indeed, all who in liliiir, to see the country remain as it had been were id* inning wom en to the old life of servitude. Heroines i i died in the war like Zoja Curre, Buie Najpi, Margarita hlltmi, Firi Gerro, Qeriba Deri, Floresha Myteveliu, (mu llazo and Penelope Pirro had not only ensured the fit mi of Albania but also the freedom of wom en in an

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Albania from which the disgrace of the past enshrined in such infamous social laws as the Canon had been expunged by their blood. The C onstitution adopted after the war guaranteed to women absolutely equal rights with men in the political, econom ic and social life of the country; but it was in establishing a socialist base for society that the Party and people cut off the roots of feminine subjection in the institution of private property. Feudal econom ic interests had given birth to the superiority of the male over the female, to patriarchal authority over children, to loveless marriages contracted by parents, to the disdain for girls who, since they would belong to som eone else anyway as far as succession rights were concerned, might as well be sold off or got rid of. Econom ic interests in bourgeois society also make wom en dependent on m en and children dependent on parents and, since there is no real freedom beyond the limils set by econom ic dependence and the laws of private property and inheritance, any apparent freedom of wom en takes purely individualistic forms and the liberation of wom en does not exist only the em ancipation of the coquettes of the bourgeoisie. Socialism by abolishing private property, creating equal econom ic rights and providing social education for children knocks the props out from under the submission of women to m en and children to parents. Enver Hoxh.i describes the socialist em ancipation of wom en led by out Party as n ot a feminist m ovem ent but the advancement ol wom en to equal rights w ith men in all fields so that they march together shoulder to shoulder w ith the same send m ents, aims and ideals tow ard com m unism . Socialism transforms the relations betw een the sexes into entirely personal relations. But n ot at once and not simply mechanically by creating the econom ic conditions for such a transform ation. Here ton there is the need for ideological struggle between old custom* and ways of thought and new, a class struggle between tin feudal or bourgeois conception of marriage and the relations (if the sexes and the socialist conception. Certainly the drawing of wom en into every sphere uf j productive and social life by the provision of creches, by

lightening of dom estic work, by all the steps taken by the (ate to enable them to exercise the equality legally granted Ihem has played a m ajor part in putting the relations between Ihe sexes on a new footing as well as making a trem endous i ontribution to socialist construction. As Enver H oxha said In a speech to the Central Com m ittee in 1967 on the further '11niggle for the com plete em ancipation of women: Only netual life in all its grandeur can give us an adequate idea of what a great vital force the Party set free in the em ancipation "I women. What progressive creative talent lay hidden in this i h .ii part of our population. W hat marvels they are doing mkI will be doing hereafter and with what incalculable moral mid material values they will enrich our socialist life! In 1938 there were 668 wom en workers in all Albania, mostly girls of 14 or 16 w orking a ten hour day for iippallingly low wages. By 1967 over 248,000 wom en, which In 12% of rural and urban workers, were engaged in production wnik on exactly the same term s as men. With the exception til hard or dangerous jobs which would be injurious to their III .ill h, there is no profession and no branch of industry where liny are not em ployed at every level; and in some sectors lilt y are a m ajority of the work force, as in textiles at 73%, (it it I processing 52% and public health and sanitation at 69%. Iiy 1967 there were 40 wom en representatives in the nples Assembly, 10,878 had been elected to the Peoples mncils (36%), 1168 to the Peoples Courts (also 36%) and were members of the Albanian Party of Labour; b ut at I\ I 2% of the total membership this figure was criticised I.iivcr H oxha as much too low and by the time of the - ili I'arty Congress in 1971 the proportion of w om en in the IIV had risen to 22%. O ut of a population of just over two Hit i there are 300,000 women organised in the W omens i"M and wom en play a leadership role as factory managers, le union secretaries and members of the planning commisii

III

I In o' has been a campaign for m ore training facilities for Although 37% of all technicians are wom en, the mi l ion receiving specialised training or adm itted to the mies of higher education and the University of Tirana is i misidered unsatisfactory. There is a general awareness of
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the need to raise the num ber of wom en in those branches of industry where they are still n ot sufficiently represented, like electrical engineering, construction w ork and machine making especially since young women in the tractor machine shop at Tirana have dem onstrated their ability to handle all types of m achinery. N ot only does the full participation of women in pro duction contribute to the solution of the continuing problem of a labour shortage which is as characteristic of a socialist econom y as unem ploym ent is of capitalism; but it is also im portant politically. Women w orkers, Stalin has said, urban and rural workers are the greatest reserve of the working class. This reserve represents half the population. On w hether this reserve of wom en is with or against the working class depends the destiny of the proletarian m ovem ent, the trium ph or defeat of the proletarian revolution and the trium ph or defeat of proletarian state pow er. The com plete em ancipation of wom en to share fully in production w ork depends on establishing new socialist relations in the family as well as on the state creation of conditions enabling wom en to com bine their roles of workers and m others. They m ust also be delivered from the drudgery of household chores and liberated from any survivals of patriarchal attitudes. This is partly achieved by the adequate provision of creches and nursery schools at minimal costs, by cheap, wholesome canteen meals at m idday, by half-cooked food which can be picked up on the way hom e and quickl\ prepared in the evening, by launderettes and other labom saving devices. But m ore im portant is the reconsideration ol the division of labour within the household itself. If there i'. no w ork which wom en cannot do, it follows th at there is also no work, like domestic tasks, which is peculiarly theirs. Many of these tasks can be done by older children brought up with a correct attitude tow ard w ork; but men, pal ticularly, are learning to take their full share of domeslii responsibilities, dropping off young children at creches on the way to work, doing the shopping, dividing the housewoth and, if their wives are attending night school or undergone special training, taking on the whole burden of dom ra n chores.

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It could not be said that all men have taken readily lo those changes. In his speech on prom oting the role of women in socialist society to the Central Com m ittee, Enver lloxlia li.ul to adm it that although many prejudices have been "moved, we would be erring if we thought we had set verything right and could leave it to time to correct any ii'inaining deficiencies . . . Despite economic, political and ideological advances there still exist among many people, and even among communists, erroneous patriarchal attitudes. Mi Innet Shehu appealed to the men of Albania to banish Imrver rem nants of male chauvinism which were inimical to ....ialist relations within the family and to write to him (iiiKonally about some practical step they had taken lo " medy this defect. Albania, probably because it did not pass through a ii|>italist phase in which com m odity exchange dominates m lturc and com modities m ediate all hum an relationships, is .......pletely free of the com m oditisation of sex in terms of Min unis forms of the debasem ent of women like pornography in the general bourgeois voyeurism of Western arts and 'III i .it lire; but there are other wrong attitudes about relations ||i tvveen men and women stemming from the backwardness of (lie past. Erroneous ideas about love exist among us, Enver ||i hli.i has said, Very often love is stigmatised as something lliiiiini.il which leads women to moral laxity and men to (|i IV neracy. But if there is anything which has nothing to do ilHfllli those vices it is genuine love. To explain the socialist Mllii udo toward relations between the sexes he quoted Engels .............. rriage based on love is moral and it is only where love fkl'iM l i.it real marriage exists to o ; and M arxs dictum that the ||V i'ln p m cn t of a given historical period can always bo li (mined by the degree of progress of women toward i i|i >iii, for the trium ph of hum an nature is m anifested most |Milv in the relations between husband and wife. I'inbleins of the family and family relations arc not only a B in iii concern but the concern of society as a whole. Even fnun ides devoted to the line of the Party who arc good K il n endowed w ith a com mendable socialist spirit may ll>'\> themselves behaviour in the family which is incompatiIh vn i 11i com m unist ethics. This cannot be perm itted to

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continue w ithout prejudicing the role of the family as the childs first introduction to socialist life. At the same time the Party m ust rem em ber the delicate and com plicated nature of family relations and avoid any intervention not guided by tact and good judgem ent. In Ju n e 1965 a new Family Code was approved elaborating certain rights guaranteed in the C onstitution and it came into force in 1966. Amongst its provisions are the following: Marriage is contracted with the free will of husband and wife and rests on solid feelings of love, equality and m utual respect. Only monogam ous marriages are recognised. Partners in marriage can choose as their surname that of husband or wife or each may keep his or her original name or add them together. A wife can choose her work or profession w ithout her husbands permission and the handling of the family income is managed by m utual agreement. Personal property held by either before marriage remains his or hers and anything acquired afterwards is joint property. All children regardless of sex are entitled to eqmil shares in the inheritance of jo in t personal property and the wife is the heir of first rank. Divorce is allowed when a marriage has lost all meaning and cohabitation has become intolerable. Causes for divorce are continuous quarrels, m altreatm ent, breach of conjugiil faith, perm anent m ental illness or punishm ent for serious crimes. There is no distinction between husband or wife in the right to sue for divorce and the rearing of children is confided to that parent who in the courts opinion is bctlci qualified to bring them up. All parental rights belong to both parents equally and disagreements are settled by tutelage com m ittees or by IIn courts. Single m others enjoy all due respect and the si,id guarantees their econom ic security and protection. Children born outside marriage are equal in every way to those Ih u m within. Abortions are allowed after consultation with a commit lt't of doctors. Birth control is a m atter of personal choice. Thru is no family planning in the sense of national campaign'. i<t

limit births because Albania is an underpopulated country in which all births are welcomed. In the em ancipation of wom en and the socialist transform.ilion of family relationships, as in all other aspects of social IIIV, the Albanians would n ot claim to have solved all problems finally; but it can be claimed for them that family Ii 11 today is already a happy exam ple of the wholesome i<-.nils of setting about solving those problems the right way in the right social context.

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Chapter Nineteen
Health Before the war A lbanias backwardness was reflected in the incidence of those diseases m ost characteristic of primitive, poverty-stricken countries malaria, tuberculosis, syphilis and trachom a. People infected w ith tuberculosis kept it quiel in order not to wreck a family econom y already precarious enough particularly in the north where undernourishm enl was prevalent and meals often consisted of a single chunk of maize bread. But the disease causing the m ost harm was malaria. The swampy coastal region made Albania one of the most malarial countries in the world. Even in the higher areas ol Kora and Pograde, which are now health resorts, stagnant water provided the breeding grounds for m osquitoes; and what are today the m ost fertile fields in the south wen utterly deserted because of malaria. Half the population vv.i. infected. And yet after the huge drainage programm e w liii Ii cleared the swamps and stagnant water and reclaimed hundreds of thousands of acres for farming, the situation h.ul changed so radically that recently when some anophelci m osquitoes were required for laboratory tests none could lie found! The beautiful people of the Pulati, Shala and Merlin highlands were often infected with syphilis, sometime* whole villages being stricken. There were only ten hospitals with some 800 beds in I lit* whole country, one m aternity ward with 15 beds and dispensaries. There was one doctor for 8,527 inhabiliuil*. com pared with one doctor for 1,200 inhabitants today; MM only 48 new doctors came into practice during the whole I'l years of Zogs reign. The infant m ortality rate was |c|

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thousand and the average span of life only 38.3 years. Now it is 08 years. I'.ven before liberation partisan field hospitals not only Heated the w ounded b ut im proved the conditions of health in the rural areas. The partisan dispensary set up in the Uamica caves near Vlora in 1943 to care for the wounded of tlit* Battle of Gjormi became the first field hospital and was billowed by the establishm ent of other field hospitals at Ku, ltilian, Voskopoja and other places inaccessible to the *nctny. It was o ut of these beginnings that the public health m i vice developed. The first step taken after the war was to provide free medical exam ination for everyone and free medical service to IIk isc em ployed by the state and their families, to all millering from contagious diseases and children under the age "I lour. By 1963 the free medical service was extended to the nine population. No m atter how long a person may be ill iiiid no m atter w hat the expenses of his treatm ent he pays ill....lutely nothing. I'Yom the beginning it was intended that the health service kin mid be preventive and all the inhabitants of any district Hlr under regular observation at the district clinic. On a M mons first exam ination a file is opened and from then on lilt condition of his health is kept under constant review. Ily^ii nic instruction is given to all particularly children and y m i n g people. Preventive m edicine also includes campaigns tyii|M'(l against infectious diseases, mass inoculations, special i In i ks on the health of those in the food processing industry Mini the supervision of the conditions of health in factories timl .ill places of work. I My 1967 the num ber of hospitals had increased to 97 with pit yen limes the num ber of beds as in 1938. There were 113 h m n n ity wards, and five TB sanatoria. There are ten times Urc doctors; five times m ore dentists and four times more pftrmucists. Over 180 times as much is spent on public t'lllh .is in 1938. Ili lorc liberation no doctor had ever set foot in such IfUl.MIH as Dukagjini or Skrapari, Puka or M irdita. Now all K ||i' once isolated places have their rural hospitals, ................. wards and clinics. Peasants are coming from these

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rem ote districts to be trained in medicine. There are public health centres in each locality and model houses and model villages have been constructed to show peasants how to improve their living conditions. All births in the cities take place in m aternity centres and m ost births in the countryside are under medical supervision. Vaccine against scarlet fever is provided by China and diphtheria and polio have been com pletely elim inated. The natural increase in the population has grown from 16.9 per thousand in 1938 to 27.6. Along w ith campaigns against diseases has gone a campaign against superstitious ideas about health. Till fairly recently people in the m ore isolated regions still believed in the evil eye and carried talismans and amulets to ward off its effects. Some put their faith in scraps of paper on which priests had w ritten passages from the Bible. Shkodra m ountaineers thought that every person had a worm in his ear which was the centre of life and if the worm ceased living the person also died. A peasant nam ed Dervish Alla from Gosa had a three year old child whose limbs had gone numb from a touch of tetanus. Because a neighbour had lost two children by relying on the incantations of the local pastor, Dervish Alla took his little daughter to the clinic which Dr Musa Ohri had just scl up. The doctor told him to take the child to hospital at onic, But on the way Dervish Alla began to w onder if he was doing the right thing and if the jinn who had cast a spell on the child m ight not be angry. He went to the pastor who said thi' child was undoubtedly worse because she had been taken lo the clinic and he began calling up spirits to left and right. Bin the child got worse still. Fortunately Dr Ohri decided In follow up the case and when he did not find the child in hospital he hurried to Gosa. The child was saved and has now grown into a wom an w ith a child of her own.

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Chapter Twenty
Arts and Culture lie key to the developm ent of A lbanias art and literature hIim c the war is given in Enver H oxhas 1966 R eport. Our ini lulist art and culture should be firmly based on our native m il, on our wonderful people, arising from the people and M'lvmg them to the full. They should be clear and compreftpiisihlc but never vulgar and thoughtless. Our Party is for lien live works in which the deep ideological content and the III i.i1 1 popular spirit are realised in an artistic form capable of IIIi 11ii^; the feelings profoundly and touching the hearts of j}||r people, in order to inspire and mobilise them for great ili 11 1'. We m ust intensify our struggle for a revolutionary art uni literature of socialist realism . . . As in every other field, a iMip class struggle is taking place here also between the two li iiliigies M arxist-Leninist m aterialist ideology on the one |||lil and feudal and bourgeois ideology on the other. Il'i ,nlent bourgeois culture and art are alien to socialism. We ||ii them and at the same time we appreciate and make |> nl everything that is progressive, dem ocratic and revollniMiy; critically viewed in the light of our own proletarian "logy. All m il lire is class culture. All literature and art belong to III..... classes and serve quite specific political ends. It is as Hi Ii iim illusion to suppose that culture transcends class n iT in rs as to believe that the state stands above conIIn|i ( lass interests. Bourgeois culture is the ideology of III, ill,m which is based on exploitation. Working class |IIH is the ideology of socialism which eliminates the ||nll,ilioii of m an by man. These two world views confront || iillier as a reflection of the class conflict between the IIHriH'.ie and the working class which, in one form or
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another, is universal in this epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Albanian art and literature are firmly com m itted in this world-wide conflict. But while Albanian culture shares the same ideology with the culture of any other country where the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established, it still has, as Enver H oxha explained, a specific quality of its own. Our socialist art and culture have not come out of nothing but arc based on the historical developm ent of our society, on its spiritual life and the best traditions of our people. To rely on these popular traditions of the past and of our own times is essential to the creation of true literary and artistic values and the prom otion of the originality of Albanian culture. It is putting into practice the M arxist-Leninist principle that our art and literature m ust be socialist in content and national in form . A good example of this is provided by Albanian opera, w ith its themes taken from the epic liberation struggles of the people or from their heroic efforts in socialist construction and with its musical form based on the rich traditional folk art in which Albania abounds. Opera itself is n ot a traditional form, though the Italian operas of Verdi, Puccini and othci composers were very popular. It is, for Albania, a new ail form created to m eet the cultural needs of the people. The Institute of Folklore in Tirana has collected a vaM store of m aterial on dance, song and music down the centuries, culled from the different regions of the country | the single voice songs of the north and the complcx polyphonic folk music of the south. Lyric, erotic, ritual is Iii, allegoric and epic works arc all available for the musician and poet who w ant to draw on the past for modes of expression which are peculiarly Albanian. The m agnificent Palace of Culture at Tirana has among iln m any amenities a well-equipped theatre for opera seal mu m ore than a thousand. Admission is very cheap at two and it half leks a ticket or less than a packet of cigarettes and tin it1 are special shows at even lower rates for parties of farrnt u, workers, soldiers or students. The operas, ballets nun pageants presented at the theatre also travel around IIt# country, even up into the highlands. A t first only the sini|iln

uliuws were taken to rem ote areas but in consultation with iIn people of those regions it was decided to present more 11>11isticated works w ith the villagers interrupting the per il nmance if there was anything they wished to have t iplained. I he earliest presentations in the Palace of Culture were ' 11her traditional dances and recitals or works from abroad. I In n in 1959 it was decided to create the first large-scale \l Iin nian opera. It was called Mrika and its them e was the .......I ruction of the great Karl Marx hydro-electric plant. Mi11.a was the heroine who led the mass m obilisation of Winkers to capture saboteurs sent into the country from N(i)inslavia and Greece to blow up the dam. An epic opera on lIn life of Scanderbeg involving a cast of 230 was com posed !i\ Ireng Jakova with a libretto by the poet Lazer Siliqi. Oilier titles include The Heroines by Vangjo Nova and Luigj Imi.ikuqi, on the subject of student resistance to the imans and Girls o f the Mountains com posed for the i ill Ination of the Jubilee Year in 1969 by Nikolla Zoraqi Wlili book by Loni Papa. I here are also ballets like Fatosi Partizan, the child Kin 11 illas, and musical comedies on such themes as a group of VVmin'ii building a new theatre for their com m unity. In (he arts, too, the mass line is applied to the creation of Hhv works. Before opening, an opera will be shown to iMrsi ntatives of the actors collective and workers from i| li operatives and factories, and their opinions are sought on p general content of the new piece and on details about |Hlilies, costumes and so forth. Such criticisms as we w ant III* i Ih lion to be clearer or that doesnt look like the inside III H workers house are taken into account in getting the plilk ready for the first night. And even after that, Htylpupcr criticisms or suggestions by members of the l l l i l l r i i r e will result in additional changes during the actual
ii

nli|i i I iH tiiilry

O llrn a new presentation will touch on a controversial and there will be discussions up and down the about the issue itself and about the way it has been |ilI willi in the work in question. An operetta on the lltlillii l between wom en who feel th at there is no kind of

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work which they cannot do and people who believe that there are jobs too dangerous or too hard for women or, perhaps, simply too unfem inine, gave rise to lengthy debates about where the line should be drawn which involved people from every district. A dom estic comcdy by Spiro omora about progressive grandfather and grandchildren making com m on cause against a father w ith reactionary ideas, raised a storm of discussion about the attitudes of different generations in relation to socialism. Dram atic art after having rem ained undeveloped for a long period revived during the liberation war with partisan actors, script in one hand and rifle in the other, helping to mobilise and inspire the masses by their portrayal of the issues of the national struggle. These groups became the nucleus of the Peoples Dram atic Theatre. In addition to plays reflecting the revolutionary efforts of workers in town and country are also presented the works of world playwrights like Shakespeare 01 Moliere. In 1952 the New Albania Film Studio came into ope) ation. The first productions were newsreels and docn m entaries a visit by Enver H oxha to the northern districts and the transform ation of the countryside, a feature on Albanian folk dance and films dealing w ith various new developments on the agricultural and industrial front. Bill there was a great need for feature films so that cinemas, willi an attendance of ten million a year, would no longer he dependent on unsuitable m aterial. This was particularly I me as films from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe h.id increasingly to be classed w ith decadent bourgeois films ut n ot acceptable to Albanian audiences. Among recently niiidfl full-length features have been Our Land, Echo on the Sen Shore, A Special D ay, T h e Early Years, The CommisMC of Light, The Silent D uel, Open H orizons and I liK A m bush. Many films deal w ith heroic episodes in ihfl] liberation struggle, like T rium ph over D eath, the story ill the heroines Buie Najpi and Persephone Kokedhima whil defied the Gestapo or T h e Eighth in Bronze which uses die setting up of a bronze bust of a partisan hero in his nulivM village to recall the stirring days of the anti-fascist wai Bui m any of the films also deal w ith contem porary problems lil>i

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Ilie conflict in Two Old W ounds between a husband and wife deeply devoted to each other whose careers take them to different places. The Traces begins like a m urder m ystery I>111 proves to be a tragedy of a man who forgets his class allegiance. One of the latest films to be m ade, based on a screenplay by D him iter Xhuvani and called The F itter, is die love story of a young m an and a young wom an who work in the same factory. Reference has already been m ade to the popular art of the I strada vaudeville perform ances staged by the cultural groups of every factory, farm and institution of any kind. Many of the skits are as funny as the old silent film comedies nl the West with the additional ingredient of sharp political n;iI ire. There is a continuous search for new talent by com m ittees i mnposed of artists and parents. The m ost promising young people are sent to the appropriate dram atic or music school in Tirana. All artists regard themselves as teachers as well as pi i formers or creators and they are judged as m uch by their i m ouragement and training of aspirants as by their own Work. Although there arc great artists of the theatre like M.uia Logoreci and Kadri Roshi, there is no star system and die whole emphasis is on collective effort. All actors and hi lists spend one m onth a year at some other kind of Work as mechanics, typographers, agricultural workers or priu'h hands to m aintain their links w ith the working People and to keep their artistic values rooted in the knowledge of the value of things which can only come llinnigli sweating on a jo b . I here are no individualistic composers or writers working mi Iheir own and regarding various forms of idiosyncratic Ii II expression as the highest form of art. They belong either |li one of the musical or dram atic collectives or to the W illeis Union. I lie W riters Union has its roots in the national m ovem ent (Hid 11le liberation struggle. Five hundred years of Turkish ml. did not extinguish the Albanian language nor the thirst I Ihe people for their own art and culture. Then in the nliid of national revival from the middle of the N ineteenth Hilnry to the early part of the Twentieth distinguished

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writers and poets began to emerge like Naim Frashri, K onstantin K ristoforidhi, Vaso Pasha and many others. A fter national independence was proclaim ed in 1912 there was a period of critical realism characterised by strong national feeling and a fierce indictm ent of feudal and bourgeois rule which was stifling all progressive sentim ents. Writers like Millosh Gjergi Nikolla, better known by his pen name, Migjeni, F"an Noli and Ndre Mjeda came to the fore; and in 1930 the Group of T hirty was founded by Migjeni and not only criticised existing society but began to point the way forward. Literary magazines w ith a Marxist influence began to appear, like New World which came out in 1936. O f this period of bourgeois nationalism Enver H oxha has said: The epoch of revival is a dem ocratic revolutionary period of m ajor im portance in the history and literature of our people . . . They fought with rifle and pen for the freedom and enlightenm ent of the people. We should im part to our own people today the positive merits of these m en of the revival . . . But we should n ot forget for a m om ent that they had a negative side too which m ust be subjected to M arxist-Leninist criticism. These weaknesses lie in their idealistic philosophical conceptions. During the anti-fascist war there was a great sorting o ut of the would-be progressives who ended up collaborating with the enemy and the real progressives who com m itted them selves w holeheartedly to the liberation m ovem ent. A fter the form ation of the Party in 1941 these genuine progressives were put in charge of propaganda in the various regions. Aleks Cai, who supplied some of the inform ation used in this chapter, was one of the writers assigned to propaganda w ork in one of the front line areas. The first issue of Zeri i Popullit, Voice of the People, came out in August, 1942, followed by a paper for youth, Call to Liberty. Poems, ski Is and reportage circulated widely and broadsheets, beautifully and inspiringly w ritten to appeal to the people, turned up everywhere even on the bulletin boards in fascist head quarters! A fter the war writers were fully involved in the fir,hi against illiteracy and the struggle over the correct ideologii al line during the period when the Yugoslav Party was trying I"

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i'.iin influence in Albania. A Literary Gazette was started at lhis time; b ut also in newspapers, periodicals and publications <>I all kinds space was reserved for literary contributions. With all these tasks there was a great need for m ore writers .md the talents of workers and peasants were tapped on an increasing scale to bring new faces and fresh ideas into the ' ircle of practising writers. Naturally the ideological conflicts which have arisen within die com m unist world have been reflected in contem porary Albanian literature. In 1956 at the time of the so-called '(haw in Soviet arts and letters, which was really a let mdescence of bourgeois ideology, the Albanian literary irview, Nendori (November), printed an article attacking the idea that man should be viewed as a m em ber of a class rather ih.m as an individual whose opinions and sentim ents were Worthy of consideration simply because they were uniquely In .. Such incorrect attitudes from a socialist point of view wi ie strongly criticised at a conference called by the Party in I'lri7 to discuss literary problem s; but the fight against bourgeois and revisionist tendencies has to be never ending. In his 1966 R eport Enver Hoxha took artists and writers In task for insufficient vigilance in this respect. A fter fprognising the good work they had done, he added: It ulinuld be said, however, that the artistic and cultural IlMl il utions, the W riters Union, the State Publishing House id the literary press, the Party organisations of those llixl it utions and the leading cadres in those sectors are not 11 iv in^ with adequate persistence to carry out the revolutionImnr. of culture, do not show the necessary ideological c and continue to tolerate things in an unpardonable My, thus falling into liberal errors . . . Foreign plays and |i|m i .is including works irreconcilable with our ideology still in too large a place in the repertory of theatres, books n|iy |i\ doubtful authors are published and we translate bourgeois lyoiks en bloc as if we could not do w ithout them . this was not national chauvinism. Great writers like Hindu spcare are studied in Albanian schools; b u t Enver lltmli.i reminded his audience that even in the greatest writers Mild poets of Europe we will n ot find all that we are I f It11 . . . since these writers too reflect, if not directly, at
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least in one way or another, the bourgeois ideas that prevailed at the period in which they lived. And certainly the works of foreign literature could not be taken as models for Albanian audiors in creating a socialist literature which was at once revolutionary and national in spirit. Literature and art m ust reflect the struggle, w ork and life of our own working people, their ideals and aspirations, their noble feelings, their heroic character, their m odesty and grandeur and their revolutionary upsurge. The Party demands that literature and art truly reflect life in its revolutionary developm ent and focus attention on the heroes of our time workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary cadres, men of a new type, who are working and fighting selflessly in building socialism. In order to be able to portray this new man writers spend considerable tim e with the people of village and factory, working and living among them and learning not only to write authentically about them but to write in such a way that their works are accessible to them. Indeed one author, D him iter Xhuvani, whose novel The Tunnel aroused a good deal of discussion about w hether he had accurately described the people of the village where his book was set, w ent to live among them to check his impressions and eventually made th at village his own. New novels, like new operas and new dram atic works, tend to become the subjects of a wide ranging debate about their m erits and defects in which everyone takes part. Those in particular whose sphere of activity may be touched on in the w ork consider il collectively and report their conclusions. This is very helpful to the authors further developm ent as a w riter concerned with the masses and n ot simply expressing his own inner life in a highly individualistic style intended to win the praise ol literary critics as alienated from the people as he would then have become himself. Criticism and self-criticism which characterise the relations of the author w ith his readers and w ith his fellow workers in the W riters Union prevent him from having an exaggerated opinion of him self and thinking of literary creation as an extension of his own ego rather th.in as the form in which he serves the working people. In their efforts to revolutionise their own creative wmk

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fillers always have the guidance of the Albanian Party of I .iliour which dem ands that art and literature m ust play their lull part in consolidating and advancing socialism. The bourgeoisie and the revisionists claim that the concern of Miuxist-Leninist parties for the ideological purity of litera tim imposes a line on writers which sm others creative thought and work. But this question, like any other, has to In seen from a class perspective. Creative for whom ? For Individuals who have detached themselves from the masses mill hy their selfish pursuit of their own subjective interests I I msi iously or unconsciously collaborate with the class t in inies of the masses, or creative for the great working |u o |ilr who alone are capable of changing society and i hinging themselves in the process? It is precisely like 11111 lions of freedom or democracy. Freedom and dem ocracy |iii whom? For the exploiters and their hireling scribblers who in vr the interests of their masters by ascribing the vileness of ||n capitalist system to the plight of man as such and by Hying to distract peoples attention from the great issues of Iiiss struggle or freedom and dem ocracy for the working s and those artists and writers who serve them. iHNNi' All Albanias professional authors are in the W riters |Inlitil; b ut it is by no means an exclusive body and is I mil inuously recruiting new m embers from the ranks of Hunkers and from new generations of revolutionary intellliiiils who are themselves of and with the working class. W ill'is in the Union may have tasks assigned to th e m 1 1 Hles on specific subjects for magazines or newspapers, a Cello for a new opera, reportage on some m ajor developIiii hi If a w riter has a project of his own for a play or a pivi I, a collection of poems or short stories, he puts his l i >1 k isiil to the praesidium of the W riters Union. If agreed, he 111v<n the time he needs while still being paid at the usual Hli of some 800 to 1000 leks a m onth comparable to the SM|(e <>f a skilled m echanic or specialist in a factory. When his Mink is com pleted, it will be discussed with his colleagues ^nin ihc point of view of helping him improve it, correct any IIIiii1 of detail or m istaken ideological im plications. Authors . b f |i.ii(I for their works according to fixed rates but they I t i ve no royalties.

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There has been a rem arkable flourishing of literature in socialist Albania crowning with laurel all the other brilliant achievements and encouraging the people to greater efforts yet in building their new society. Socialist realism has not become a cut-and-dried form ula for churning out w orthy but dull books about stereotyped characters in the hands of such gifted writers as D him iter Shuteriqi, President of the W riters Union, Shefqet Musaraj, Lazer Siliqi, Dhim iter Xhuvani, Pctro M arko, Jakov Xoxe, Qamil Buxheli, Ismail Kadare, Vito Koi, Alqi K risto, Sterjo Spasse and so many others. Far from being a stale and rigid form socialist realism in their books, which cover a wide range of literary styles docum en tary, rom antic, satiric, hum orous, dram atic and epic, sparkles and sizzles in perpetual developm ent through the struggle of opposites, through the struggle of classes, through the struggle of the new with the old. These writers, grounded in Marxism-Leninism, take as their subject m atter the lives of the Albanian working masses and light them up in an inspiring, instructive and entertaining way with their thorough understanding of contradictions. R ooted in reality they also give their works a trem endous lift with thaI indispensable feature of genuine socialist realism revolu tionary rom anticism . To get some idea of the wealth of Albanian literature, take the year 1970 alone in every m onth of which some two or three im portant new novels became available to the reading public in the many bookshops or through the twenty-nine large lending libraries. A t the beginning of the year there w;r. A Difficult B irth by Eleana Kadare, the first full length hovel by a wom an, which took as its them e the emancipation of Albanian women. Commissar M em o, a lyric evocation of the liberation struggle, was the first novel by the well-known poet, Drill m Agolli. The third novel by Ismail Kadare, The C itadel, used .ill episode in the long war against the Turks in which I In Albanian people were led by the great national palrmi Scanderbeg to draw certain parallels with the present <!.i\ resistance against revisionism. Kadare, who though still in lill thirties has twice won the Literary Prize of the R epublic, h.m

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I lined a reputation outside Albania by the translation into liench and English of his two earlier novels The W edding which dealt with the clash of the new social ideals and old Inidal customs and the ironic General of a Dead A rm y in which an Italian charged with recovering particulars about all IIn fascists who died in Albania goes around the country II ying to call up from their graves a dead host. A violent earthquake which interrupted the life of the country in 1967 was the subject of a novel Troublous I >*em ber by another distinguished poet, Fatos Arapi. Standing up Again by Dhim iter Xhuvani counterpointed ii tragedy suffered by one of A lbanias new socialist men with IIn surging life going on around him. A satiric novel The Whole City Laughs by Qamil Buxheli, In lil up to scorn those bureaucratic elements who hinder the development of socialism. Another well-known writer, Jakov Xoxe, brought out a inivel T h e White S o u th about the struggle of peasants in a |*o operative farm to narrow the differences between tow n iiimI countryside. These are only some of the literary works brought out in one year by the Naim Frashri State Publishing House. In mlilition many historical and political works are being |niiiluced in ever-increasing num bers like Kristo Frashris Topular History of A lbania, a History of Albanian Literaline, the well-docum ented History of the Albanian Party of I iihour and the Collected Works of Enver H oxha. This definitive collection of the writings of Enver H oxha is iin event of great im portance not only to the people of Mliania but to revolutionaries all over the world. Their *i|i,nilicance is well summed up in the words of the Secretary id (lie Party Central Com m ittee, Hysni Kapo, on the occasion ill I nver Iloxhas sixtieth birthday on O ctober 16, 1968: And if we, the Albanian com munists and people review liiliiy with legitim ate pride the road that we have covered for Mlnie than a quarter of a century and the victories attained, if r say with unshakable conviction that we have honourably filllillcd our national and international obligations, if we view |H(liiy with certitude and optim ism the future of the I nllierland and the course of socialism in Albania, this is due

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exclusively to our Party, to its just M arxist-Leninist line, to its founder and organiser, Comrade Enver Hoxha who, through his wisdom, M arxist-Leninist capability and daring, succeeded not only in organising the Party of the proletariat, not only in working out the proper political and organis ational line befitting every stage that our Party has gone through, b ut also in applying this line in a consistent manner waging a struggle that knew no com promise against all hostile trends w ithin the Party and against all external enemies of every shade and colour, fighting openly or in secret. The ideas and works of Comrade Enver Hoxha are a living exam ple of Marxism-Leninism in action, of fidelity to and unwavering defence of the fundam ental principles of Marxism-Leninism, of the creative application of these principles to the specific conditions of Albania in the present epoch, of their enrichm ent with the historical experience of the Party of Labour of Albania and of the Albanian people in the National Liberation War, in revolutionary socialist con struction and in the new experience of the international com m unist m ovem ent. The revolutionary experience that figures as our great asset in the balance sheet of the Party ol' Labour of Albania and that constitutes its contribution lo the com m on treasury of the theory and practice of revo lution and socialism is reflected, summed up and elaborated in the m ost com plete, exact and profound m anner in the works and teachings of Comrade Enver H oxha.

Chapter Twenty One


A Genuinely Free Society Albania as seen from the West through the haze of the Cold War and, m ore recently, as a country as rem ote and lino m prehensible as its great fraternal ally, China, is no doubt often thought of as grim and austere, with a people joylessly carrying out the stern dictates of a party that has >,ic rificed everything to some inhum an conception of ideo logical purity. It is described by those who have seen the Albanian coast from Corfu as a brooding, m ysterious abrupt l inil with the im plication that its inhabitants m ust also be I lunge and dour a race of zealots, perhaps, who have h.iilored away their individual liberty for the rigidly-ordered i nllective life of a beehive. No illusion is dispelled more quickly for those fortunate lit*High to have visited Albania; and it is hardly Albanias I,mil if, from the time the Albanians made it clear that they Would develop their own country in their own way w ithout Hillside interference, the hostility of the West has prevented iiioie people from disabusing themselves of such misconII plions by first hand experience. N ot only are they a joyful, Vlfioious independent people who bring trem endous zest to IvlliH and building a new society in their beautiful sunny I'liitl, there is no country in the world which is freer from li uli.lint. I.irlly this freedom from restraint operates at the level of jltiileiiiil conditions under socialism by which no one has to | m .illaid of being out of a job, going hungry, not having a ill i i ni house to live in or ever being deprived of the opportunity of contributing whatever he has to offer for the linpn iveinent and enrichm ent of the life of the com m unity. I' ii tly it operates at the level of morals and social

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relationships which are based on popular respect for the decisions the people themselves have arrived at in their various collectives. Discipline there is, but it is a discipline the people impose on themselves. Socialism cannot be exported, neither can it be imposed from above. People can be told how to m ake a revolution or how to build socialism; but no one can do it for them or in spite of them. A socialist society m ust always be an inner-directed society. Restraint there is, but it is the self-restraint that comes from the constant practice of criticism and self-criticism in every social or productive organisation. The freedom of Albanian society is firmly rooted in the real dem ocracy of the mass line. An example of the mass line in action at the ideological level is provided by the way the question of religion has been dealt w ith in Albania. Before the war there were three main religions. The m ajority of the people, some 65% of the population, as a result of 500 years of Turkish dom ination, were M ohammedans. The influence of Rom an Catholicism was strongest in the north and in the south the Greek O rthodox Church claimed many adherents. As has already been pointed out, during the liberation struggle many leading religious figures discredited themselves with the people by collaborating with the Italian or German invaders; but the hold of superstition rem ained strong, particularly in the rural areas. The transition from a mainly feudal society to socialism was so quick that the mosques and churches hardly had time to dress their practices and doctrines in more sophisticated forms that m ight have had some appeal to .1 m ore enlightened public. Their hold was of a nature to impede social advance and their reactionary views on the family, on the privileges of property and on the spiritual role of mullahs and priests in ordering the lives of the people, soon came into conflict with the movement for the emant i pation of women, with the expropriation of landlords anil with scientific progress in the medical and social services. The Party carried out an intensive ideological strug h against these backward m anifestations which was taken up I>\ all the mass organisations in the Dem ocratic Front. But then' was no order from the state closing down mosques anil churches nor restricting religious rites and observances. An

im portant part in this battle of ideas v v . i <I I I I mI y s n cadres who by the exam ple of the* it (Ii'vkihhi i" | >m11in | welfare did more than arguments could In vmdl< ili M n i .m Leninism as a philosophy at the service nl Ilie m i ..........I I" dem onstrate the superiority of science ovei 111 million', faith. Gradually, first in the cities and then in .............inli\'iidi . the grip of the holy men was weakened. 1 In m<>n|ii< .mil ( Ilurches became em ptier and em ptier. Eventually tin |h ..|d< in this com m unity or th at realised that they li.nl .1 lure building in their midst which no longer had any Illinium , Young people particularly took the initiative in piopo.ni}', .1 social use for these structures and, after meeting In <I .11 with .my objections which m ight still remain, the woik would begin on a voluntary basis of converting the buildings into cultural centres, theatres, concert halls or storage depots, those religious houses of great architectural beauty 01 historical interest have been preserved as part of the peoples traditional heritage like the delightful mosque with its |.;raccful m inaret in the very centre of Tirana around wliii Ii some of the fiercest fighting in the liberation of the capital look place. A large m osque on a rocky slope rising above Dnrrs has been turned into a m agnificent youth centre with views of the blue Adriatic through the arches in the while walls of the high prom enade. The great cathedral at Shkodra has become a fine gymnasium with a huge indoor swimming pool, basket ball courts, boxing rings and well-equipped departments for every branch of sport. The ideological struggle against superstitious attitudes and in 11 social customs still goes on in spite of the successes nlieady achieved on the popular front of creating a genuinely *n. 1 (list way of life. It is waged by the people themselves in their study groups which are a characteristic feature of every In< lory, farm, school or cultural organisation each with its nwn library of essential books and periodicals. The umlci Handing of social custom s, analysing their positive and negative aspects, rejecting w hat is bad and keeping what is Hood, depends on exposing their class origin and appreciating tin roots of backward and reactionary habits in the philo mphical, idealistic and religious ideology of feudalism and

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capitalism. But even when the econom ic basis of these harm ful and stultifying customs has been totally changed the customs themselves may persist unless they are attacked directly and replaced w ith socialist habits. In the countries where revisionism has reversed the progress tow ard socialism, even before the restoration of capitalism and bourgeois m orality had reached its present extent, there was already a tendency to vacillate on the question of religion betw een a tough atheistic line from above and a liberal policy based on expediency. The adherence to the mass line in Albania has avoided these two com plem entary errors. The absence of external restraint appears in a num ber of superficial social phenom ena which even the casual visitor m ay observe: the freedom everyone enjoys of listening to whatever radio programmes he likes, though Radio Tirana provides an excellent dom estic service with particularly good news coverage; the fact that one sees hardly any policemen at all except for those directing traffic at busy intersections; the lack of any reticence in the subjects people are prepared to talk about with utter frankness in the m ost public places. And yet the streets are as clean, socialist property as secure, inform al conversations as politically sound, tastes in the arts and in entertainm ents as judiciously selective as if the peoplt were under constant surveillance. Because, of course, they arc under constant surveillance provided by themselves. The pressure of an enlightened public opinion educated in the socialist ethic of putting collective interest above self-interest is very strong; but it cannot appear as outside pressure I n those, the whole working people, who enter actively inlo iIn form ation and further development. Under the conditions ol proletarian dem ocracy the kinds of offences which keep IIn police busy in capitalist countries are not only declinhi!> rapidly b ut are increasingly dealt with in the variniu collectives w ithout recourse to state coercion, just as'nmrf and more legal cases are settled in the same way out of com I, But of course proletarian dem ocracy has another I.mi which is turned tow ard the class enemies of workers, towurd those who would revive bourgeois ways of thinking .uni feeling as a prelude to diverting the country from its so< i.i lM

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course and restoring capitalism. Thai is 111< l.i<< ol the* dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no lilie ia lis in lor these hostile elements who would mislead w o rk e r, through bourgeois influences in culture and education 01 try lo corrupt them by replacing socialist incentives w itli material incentives. The guardian Party and the soi i.ilisl leadership have not hesitated in the past and will not hesitate in the future to unm ask such enemies at an early stage and m obilise the working masses against them. Nor is there any softness in A lbanias readiness to defend the independence which has cost the lives of so many heroes and heroines and entailed such sacrifices on the part of the people generally. N ot only are the armed services, whic h are also an exam ple of proletarian dem ocracy with llieii absence of ranks and status symbols, in a constant state of prepared ness; b u t all young people take their turn at military service and training. There could be no better proof of the stability of Albanian society and the correct relationship of mutual trust between state and people than the fact that all citizens possess weapons and know how to use them. The working lass in Albania is an arm ed proletariat; and the defence of socialism within and of national sovereignly without rests ultimately on the tested fighting qualities ol workers who still, and for many years to come, will have to build socialism with pickaxe in one hand and rifle in the other. At the beginning of November, 1971, the Sixth Congress ul the Party of Labour of Albania was convened at Tirana, live years after the Fifth Congress in 1966 at which Enver lloxha in the Partys name had called for a great effort in Iurther revolutionising the whole life of the country. This Sixth Congress was an historic socialist occasion, in.irking the successful com pletion of the Fourth Five Year I'I.in half a year ahead of schedule, the launching of the Fifth I'ive Year Plan and the 30th Anniversary of the Party which had been founded there in the capital city back in the dark days of the fascist occupation. The R eport of the Central Committee subm itted by Enver Hoxha analysed the world nil nation drawing attention to the growing revolutionary 1length of the working masses, recorded the economic and in i.iI achievements of the past five years and looked forward

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confidently to tackling the new tasks agreed for the future in consultation with the people themselves. The admission of China to. its rightful place in the U nited Nations, for which the Albanians had fought so long, was a diplom atic victory the Congress noted with appreciation. This Congress afforded one the opportunity of noting the profound contrast between the satisfaction of the Albanian people in w hat they had already accomplished in developing their own resources in their own collective interest and their confidence in the future and the plight of workers in the capitalist countries with their econom ic stagnation, financial crises, ram pant inflation and mass unem ploym ent. As dele gate after delegate came forward to the rostrum of the auditorium in the m agnificent Palace of Culture to contribute to the discussion on the R eport one was aware of how deep socialist ideas and attitudes have penetrated the conscious ness of the people in this M arxist-Leninist land. Brigade leaders from rem ote upland co-operatives, tractor drivers and engineers, men and wom en workers from factories and industrial combines, representatives of the youth and womens organisations, Party cadres, technicians, University lecturers, writers and artists all, in presenting their accounts o f goals achieved in their various fields, short comings yet to be overcome and dedication to further socialist advances in a revolutionary spirit, dem onstrated the great changes that have been w rought in Albanian society and the extent to which the people have changed themselves in the process. A detailed report on the achievements of the Fourth Five Year Plan and the targets accepted for the Fifth was presented by M ehmet Shehu. Overall industrial and a^ri cultural production in the five year period had gone up l>\ 61%, industrial production by 83%, or some 30% higher th.m planned, while agricultural production rose by a substantial 28% which was not as high as the estim ated increase hill included a spectacular growth in the production of I'mul grains and live stock essential to self-sufficiency in food. H i t Fifth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) proposes an increase in industrial production of 66% at an annual rate of 10.1%, Means of production, the heavy industrial base of IIn

econom y, are to be increased by 78-83% and consum er goods industries by 40-44% representing a voluntary saving on the part of the people to ensure continued socialist growth for the benefit of future generations. M ehm et Shehu concluded his report with an acknowledge m ent of w hat econom ic advance was all about. We m ust always hold high the banner of class struggle in the field of production and distribution. Our countrys socialist develop m ent is a process of com plex and continuous struggle waged by the working masses under the leadership of the Party. The struggle for the socialist construction of our country is a com plicated class struggle, its subject and its object is man, with his views, convictions, m orality and consciousness, w ith his interests and relationships both as an individual and as a member of society. At the conclusion of the week-long Congress, after the elections to the Central Com m ittee, the Political Bureau and the Control Commission, a mass rally of over 100,000 people in the great square before the Palace of Culture, with the huge equestrian statue of Scanderbeg at one end, heard a summary of the proceedings of the Congress from their heloved leader, Enver Hoxha. Repeated cheers and chanted slogans filled the air with a m ighty roar as dusk gathered and the coloured lights on the public buildings blazed brightly. As darkness fell groups in traditional costumes danced in the streets and thousands of voices were raised in familiar partisan songs while overhead a brilliant display of fireworks hi the capital city festively. The story of the Albanian people C.oes on b u t we can fittingly take our leave of them in this i elebratory m ood. It is a pleasure for a writer, having some knowledge of Albania which he hopes to deepen, to have told, however inadequately, this story of her people, their Party of Labour and their great M arxist-Leninist leader, Enver Hoxha, because 11 is a story, after so m uch heroic struggle and so much hard i leative w ork, which has come out happy in the end or, Itie m odest Albanian people themselves would insist, in the middle. They see themselves as having taken only the first II m eet steps along the road to communism. We can say on ihcir behalf that their courage, often during their history in

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the face of trem endous odds, and their steadfast dedication to the ideals of socialism have fully deserved the quality of life enjoyed in Albania today.

BOOKS OF REFERENCE
Kristo Frasheri The History o f Albania (A Brief Survey), Tirana, 1964. I'.nver Hoxha Report on the A ctivity o f the Central Com mittee o f the Party o f Labour o f Albania (Subm itted to the Vth Party Congress Novem ber 1, 1966). Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1966. I nver Hoxha, Collected Speeches (1967-68). Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969. Institute of M arxist-Leninist Studies History o f the Party o f Labour o f Albania Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1971. Paul Lendvai Eagles in Cobwebs, Nationalism and Com munism in the Balkans. London, Macdonald, 1970. (Gilbert Mury Albanie: Terre de THomme Nouveau Paris, Francois Maspero, 1970. Nicholas C. Pano The Peoples Republic o f Albania Balti more, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Zeri i Popullit (Peoples Voice) Collected Editorials Oppose Modern Revisionism and Uphold Marxism-Leninism and the Unity o f the International Communist M ovement Vol I. Marxist-Leninist Ideology Will Certainly Overcome Revisionism Vol II. Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1964. Authorship Unspecified Answers to Questions about Albania 1'irana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969.

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BOOKS AND ARTICLES CONSULTED IN REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC CHAPTERS Chapters One and Two Kristo Frasheri George Kastriot-Scanderbeg Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1962. Lord Byron Childe Harolds Pilgrimage. State University of Tirana Institute of H istory and Linguistics George Kastriot-Scanderbeg and the Albanian-Turkish War o f the X V th Century Tirana, 1967. Chapters Three to Seven Julian Am ery Sons o f the Eagle, A Study in Guerrilla Wai, London, Macmillan, 1948. Lefter Kasneci Steeled in the Heat o f Battle Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1966. Selected Readings Pages o f Heroic Deeds Tirana. Hugh Seton-W atson The East European Revolution London, M ethuen, 1956. M ehm et Shehu On the Experience o f the National Liberation War and on the Development o f the National Arm y Tiran.i, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1963. Chapter Eight Leslie Gardiner The Eagle Spreads His Claws Willi.mi Blackwood & Sons, 1966. Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley Philby, IIn' Spy Who Betrayed a Generation Zeri i Popullit (Peoples Voice) Collected Editorials I In Belgrade Revisionist Clique Renegades from MarsitffU Leninism and Agents o f Imperialism Tirana, The Niiliit Frasheri Publishing House, 1964.

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The Truth about the Plight o f the Albanians in Yugoslavia Tirana, 1961. Titoite Yugoslavia at the Crossroads Tirana, 1966.
Chapters Nine to Eleven

Constitution o f the Peoples Republic o f Albania English edition, Tirana, 1964. Enver H oxha It is in the State Power Unity o f the Party and People that Our Strength Lies Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1970. Knver Hoxha On the Role and Tasks o f the Democratic Front fo r the Complete Triumph o f Socialism in Albania Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1967. Lenins Selected Works The Tasks o f the Youth Leagues. Mao Tsetungs Selected Works Get Organised; On Coalition Government; On Practice; Concerning Methods o f Leadership.
Chapters Twelve to Fourteen 1avlo Azdurian and Vangjel Kati L 'Electrification dans la Republique Populaire D A lbanie Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1968. I lasan Benja Establishment and Prospects o f the Develop ment o f Socialist Industry in the Peoples Republic o f Albania Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1968. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations La Reforme Agraire en Republique Populaire D A lbanie Tirana, Milial Duri, 1961. Iiro D odhiba On Stepping Up Agricultural Production and Developing the Co-operative Countryside Inform ation Bulletin of the Central Com m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 2, 1968. Tirana, 1968. I1,liver H oxha Twenty-five Years o f Struggles and Victories on ' the Road to Socialism Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969. Murat Klosi Twenty-Five Years o f Construction Work in

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Socialist Albatiia Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969. Marx and Engels Selected Works Critique o f the Gotha Programme (Karl Marx) Mao Tsetungs Selected Works On Contradiction. Harilla Papajorgji Our Friends Ask . . . Tirana, the Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1970. Haki Toska Workers Control Component Part o f Our Revolutionary Ideology and Practice Inform ation Bulletin of the Central Com m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 2, 1969, Tirana, 1969. A uthorship Unspecified State Social Insurance in the People's Republic o f Albania Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1963.
C hapter Fifteen Ramiz Alia Leninism the Banner o f Struggle and Victories Speech Com m em orating the Centenary of Lenins Birlli. Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1970. Ramiz Alia On Deepening Socialist Revolution through Developing Class Struggle and Carrying out the Mass Line Inform ation Bulletin of the Central C om m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 4, 1968, Tirana, 1968. Central Com m ittee of the Albanian Party of Labour The Facts about Soviet-Albanian Relations Including editorials from Zeri i Popullit, Tirana, 1964. Enver Hoxha Speech Delivered at the Meeting o f SI Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow on November 16, 1960. Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, n o t made public till 1969. Peking Review April 17, 1970 Socialist Construction ami Class Struggle in the Field o f Economics. M ehmet Shehu On the Stand o f the Peoples Republu </ Albania towards the Warsaw Treaty Tirana, 1968. Zeri i Popullit (Peoples Voice) Collected Editorials I In Dangerous Manoeuvres o f N. Khrushchevs Group on IIn So-Called Fight against the 'Cult o f the Individual Should [ Be Stripped Bare o f Their Mask Tirana, The N.iliil Frasheri Publishing House, 1964.

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The Soviet Revisionist Clique Moves at a Quicker Pace toward the Re-establishment o f Capitalism Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1965. Collaboration with American Imperialism to Dominate the World the General Line o f the Soviet Revisionist Leaders Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1965. The All-Round Degeneration and Disintegration in the Countries and Peoples Ruled by Revisionists Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1968. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Caught in the Grip o f Soviet Revisionist Invaders Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1968.
Chapters Sixteen to Tw enty One Ksanthipi Begaja W omens Rights and Her Role in the Peoples Republic o f Albania Tirana, 1967. Ali Cungu (Translator) Specimens o f Albanian Contemporary Prose Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969. Fnver Hoxha On Some Aspects o f the Problem o f Albanian Women Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1967. Enver H oxha Toward Further Revolutionising Our Schools Inform ation Bulletin of the Central C om m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 2, 1968. Tirana, 1968. Knver H oxha Our Younger Generation Marches Along the Revolutionary Road o f the Party Speech to Youth Working on the Rogozhina-Fier Railway, Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1968. Knver H oxha Art and Letters Should Keep Step with Our Revolutionary Masses, with Our Working Class Part of a Speech Delivered to the Tirana Regional Party Conference Decem ber, 1968. Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1969. I lysni Kapo Comrade Enver Hoxha, the Beloved Leader o f Our Party and People on his Sixtieth Birthday Inform ation Bulletin of the Central Com m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 4, 1968. Tirana, 1968. A^im Mero Report on the Activity o f the Labour Youth

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Union Inform ation Bulletin of the Central Com m ittee of the Party of Labour No. 3, 1967. Tirana, 1967. Vefik Qerimi Public Health Service in the Peoples Republic o f Albania Tirana, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1967. Lazer Siliqi (Introduction) Albanian Contemporary Prose Tirana, 1963.

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INDEX agrarian reform , 135, 143, form ation of co-operatives, 144 Albanian League, 17 Albanian national consciousness, 21; under Turkish dom ination, 25; national resurgence, 26 Albanian sovereignty, 11, 58, 82, 84, 204, 209 Ali Pasha Tepelena, 25 Alia, Ramiz, on the revolutionary party, 114; 125, on intellectuals, 175; base and superstructure, 176 armed services, 259 arts and culture, 243-254 authors (novelists, playwrights, poets), 248-253 Balli Kam btar (National Front), 57-62,65, 71 Balluku, Beqir, 125 base and superstructure, 176, 177 Belishova, Liri, 189, 197 Berat Conference, Anti-fascist Com m it tee becomes Dem ocratic Govern m ent of Albania, 75 Bernstein, 94 Bevin, Ernest, 85 Brezhnev, 207 Britain, 31, 44, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79, 81, sinking of Saumarez and Volage, 83; plots against Albanian sover eignty, 84-86; 115, 157, 165, 183 British military mission, 62, 64 Bukharin, 185 bureaucracy, 108 Byron, 14, 25 i apital accum ulation, 157 (^arani, Adil, 125 Chamberlain, Neville, Italian invasion of Albania, 31 China, Peoples Republic, 158, 187-216, 255 Chou En-lai, 203, 211 Churchill, Winston, 63 Ciano, Count, 29 class struggle, 101 Communist Party of Albania (Party ol Labour of Albania), foundation ol Party, 39; manifesto of Provisional Central Comm ittee, 40; l.ahinot National Party Conference, 48; directive at end of Italian occu pation, 56; 80, 96, 100, 112-125 communists, 34, 35, what makes a good com m unist, 118 C onstitution of Albania, 98, 1 10 Czechoslovakia, 207 Davies, Brigadier, 64 dem ocratic centralism , 102, 1 21 dem ocratic elections, 103 Democratic Front, 114, 128 dictatorship of the proletariat, 100, 108, 156, 259 Dishnica, Ymer, 61, 62 Eden, A nthony, recognition of Alba nian liberation struggle, 58 education, 222-232 Eisenhower, President, 194, 201 Engels, role of wom en, 237 estrada (music hall), 219, 247 F abians, 94 family, 218 five year plans, 159-161 flet rrufe (criticism and self-criticism), 128, 167 France, 183 Frasheri, Midhat, 59 Germ any, invades Balkans, 37; 57, Quisling Government set up, 58; winter campaign, 66-69; defe at by Albanian forces, 72-77

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Gjinishi, Mustafa, 61, 62 Grechko, Marshal, 197 Greo, Kio, 43 Greece, 27, attem pt to annex part of Albania, 37; 84, 87, 96 guerrilla tactics, against Turks, 20; liberation war, 50-55 Ho Chi Minh, 124 Hoxha, Enver, Albanian rights, 11; biography, 38; form ation of Com munist Party of Albania, 39; elec ted Secretary Genera] of Political Bureau, 48; on peoples war, 55; on war against Nazis, 57; 61, on British mission, 64; elected Chairman of Provisional G overnment, 71; 75, on British infringem ent of territorial rights, 83; on post-war settlem ent, 86; 90, report on Berat Conference, 91; election speech (1972), 103; on bureaucracy, 108; on single party democracy, 116; what makes a good com munist, 118; Party fail ings, 121; leading role of the work ing class, 122; 125, on MarxismLeninism, 127; socialism, 142; moral problems, 146; tow n and countryside, 151; fourth five year plan, 160; ideological revolution, 178; against revisionism, 189; on Tw entieth Party Congress (USSR), 191; great speech at 1960 Moscow Conference, 198; on Albanian sovereignty, 204; friendship with China, 209; gratitude to China, 212; revolutionising education, 225; em ancipation of women, 235; on arts and culture, 243; criticism of artists, 249; Sixth Party Con gress, 259 Hull, Cordell, recognition of Albanian struggle and right of self-determination, 58 ideological revolution (cultural revol ution), 178-180, 210 Illyrians 11,12 income differentials, 169 industrialisation, 156-165 intellectuals, 175 Islam, conversion of Albanians, 25; 81, 256

Italy, 13, annexation of Vlora, 27; econom ic penetration of Albania, 28; invasion of Albania, 30; Albania turned into an Italian colony, 32; invasion of Greece, 36; capitu lation, 56 Jacom oni, Francesco, 31, 45, 48 Jakova, Tuk, 183 judicial system , 106 Kadia, Branko, 43 Kapo, Hysni, 48, 83, 125, 196, on Enver Hoxha, 253 Kautsky, 94 Kelcyra, Ali, 59 Kennedy, President, 201, 206 Khrushchev, N., 183-207 Kokedhima, Persephone, 69, 246 Koleka, Spiro, 125 Konitza, Faik, 36 Kosova district (Albanians living o ut side Albania), 89, 95 Kostani, Midhi, 43 Kozlov, 184 Kruja, Mustafa, 40, 42 Kupi, Abaz, 44, 59, 62 Kushi, Vojo, 43 I -abinot Conference, 48, 71 League of Nations, recognition of Albania, 27 Legaliteti (Legality, nationalist group), 57, 59, 62, 65 Lenin, against revisionism, 94; Marxisl m orality, 199; 124, 126, 177, 188 Liu Shao-chi, 179, 210 I.leshi, Ilaxhi, 1 25 Macmillan, Prime Minister, 201 Malcshova, Sejfulla, 89 management of factories, 165 Mao Tsetung, on peoples war, 50; on the mass line, 102; 124, mass linr and Marxist theory of know ledge 127; 193, friendship with Albania, 209 Marko, Rita, 125 Markogjon, Joh n, 52, 233 Marx, dictatorship of the proletai i.H, 99; critique of G otha Programme, 156; labour power, 157; egoism, 175; 188, educating the educali >I *

224; freedom of wom en, 237 mass line, 98, 102, of Party, 113; 126-132 Misja, Jordan, 43 Molotov, 58 m onopoly-capitalism , British, 28; Italian, 32 Mukje agreement, 61 Mussolini, 31, 32, on defeat of invasion of Greece, 36; overthrow, 56 M yftiu, Manush, 125 Nagy, Imre, 190 Naipi, Buie, 69, 233, 246 National Liberation Council, form a tion, 44 Noli, Fan, 27, 248 Nushi, Gogo, 48, 125 Pariani, General, 48 partisan units, 45-47 peasants and collectivisation, 147 Pcci, Shefqet, 125 Peoples Assembly, 104 Peoples Councils, 106 Peristeri, Pilo, 39 Permet Congress, Provisional Govern m ent established, 70, 71 Peza, Myslim, 44, 125 Peza Conference of National Liber ation, 4 4 ,7 1 , 99 Philby, Kim, 85 Radio Tirana, 258 religion, 25, 81, 242, 256 revisionism, 94, 97, 114, 176, 179, 183, 187, 189, 208, 258 Rexhepi, Perlat, 43 Roman Catholicism, 81 Scanderbeg (George K astrioti), 13, 15-24,25 Shanto, Vasil, 38, 48 Shehu, Mehmet, 48, on peoples war, 50-55, 92, 96, 125, on self-reliance, 141; 198, 201, China and the bom b, 206; 207, ideological (cul tural) revolution, 210; revolution ising education, 228; Sixth Party Congress (Tirana), 260 Sixth Party Congress (Tirana), 259 Smith, Adam, 175

socialist ethics, 256 social services, 171, health scrvicr, 240-242 Spahiu, Bedri, 183 Spiru, Nako, 48, 90, 92, 96 Stafa, Qemal, 39, 41, heroic death, 42; 231 Stalin, 91, 93, 95, 175, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187 Stoinich, Velimir, 89 Suslov, Michael, 189, 190 Tashko, Koco, 197 Tirana, liberation of, 76 Tito, 89, 93, 94, 181, 185, 190, 191 Topulli, Bajo, 38 Tpulli, er^iz, 69 Toska, Ilaki, 125 town and countryside, 146, 151 trade unions, 128 Trotsky, 35, 38, 185 Turkey, 96 Turks, 1 2, conquest of Albania, 1 5-24, 25 Tw entieth Party Congress (USSR), 183-188, 201 USA, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79, 84-87, 1 15, 194 USSR, Nazi attack on, 37; 58, 158, 181-211 Venizelos, Sophocles, 195, 200 Verlaci, Shefqet, 40 Vlora, Nuredin bey, 59 women, 130, 158, heroines of the resistance, 233; wom en's em anci pation, 234-239 working class, 122, w orkers control, 165-168; right to work, 1 70; heroic workers, 173-174 Xoxe, Koi, 89-93; 179, 189, 210 youth, 129, 222 Yugoslavia, 87-96; 181, 182, 190, 200 Zeri i Popullit (Peoples Voice), l it it issue, 43; 96, 248 Zinoviev, 185 Zog, Ahmed, 28, 29, 59, 71, 81, 84,
200

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