STATUTORY CASES

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29. 1966)

Caltex (Philippines). Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The Postmaster General
1) Facts
The case beIore us now is a petition Ior declaratory relieI against Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar. parying tothat iudgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest` not
to be violative oI the Postal Law. and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use oI the mails
to bring the contest to the attention oI the public.
In 1960. Caltex launched a promotional scheme called toCaltex Hooded Pump Contestt?
which calls Ior participants to toestimate the actual number oI liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a speciIied period.t? The contest is open to all tomotor
vehicle owners and/or licensed drivrest?. There is neither a Iee or consideration required nor a
purchase required to be made. The Iorms are available upon request at each Caltex station and
there is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media Ior publicizing about the contest. thus. Caltex sent
representatives to the postal authorities Ior advance clearing Ior the use oI mails Ior the contest.
However. the postal authorities denied their request in view oI sections 1954 (a). 1982. and 1983
oI the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions oI the Postal Law). which prohibits
the use oI mail in conveying any inIormation concerning non-mailable schemes. such as lottery.
giIt enterprise. or similar scheme.
Caltex sought Ior a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the
part oI the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened
Caltex that iI the contest was conducted. toa Iraud order will have to be issued against it
(Caltex) and all its representativest?. This leads to Caltex`s Iiling oI this petition Ior declaratory
relieI.
The court ruled that the topetitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no
right to bar the public distribution or said rules by the mailst?. The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a suIIicient cause oI action Ior declaratory relieI?
b) Whether or not the proposed toCaltex Hooded Pump Contestt? violates the Postal Law?
3) Ruling

What is Statutory Construction?

Alenz Avril P. De Torres
Relevant facts

Case titles, laws, dates

StatCon doctrine
Recapitulating. we hold that the petition herein states a suIIicient cause oI action Ior declaratory
relieI. and that the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions oI the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY. the iudgment appealed Irom is aIIirmed. No costs.
4) Ratio
Declaratory RelieI is the interpretation oI several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1
Rule 63 oI the Rules oI Court. an action Ior declaratory relieI should be Iiled by a person
interested under a deed. a will. a contract or other written instrument. and whose rights are
aIIected by a statute. an executive order. a regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is iusticiable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relieI has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe Ior iudicial determination
* The toCaltex Hooded Pump Contestt? is a mere togratuitous distribution oI property by
chancet?. It does not qualiIy as a lottery due to the lack oI consideration. An act to be deemed
as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize. (2) chance. and (3) consideration. The participants are not
required to do anything or purchase anything Irom Caltex in order to participate in the contest.
The true test Ior having consideration is towhether the participant pays a valuable
consideration Ior the chance. and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
oI value in return Ior the distribution oI the prize.t?

Notes:

-Indispensable need for statutory construction to determine whether the contest is violative of the prohibitive
provisions on Postal Law.
-The contest is a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
-Noscitur a sociis - a word is known by the company it keeps.
-Statutory Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where the intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236. 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc. Fernando (p): 9 concur. 1 concur with comments. 1 took no part. 1 on leave
Facts: On 5 March 1982. the National Federation oI Labor Iiled with the Ministry oI Labor and
Employment (Labor Relations Division. Zamboanga City). a petition Ior direct certiIication as
the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative oI the monthly paid employees at the
Lumbayao manuIacturing plant oI the Zamboanga Wood Products. Inc. (Zambowood). On 17
April 1982. such employees charged the Iirm beIore the same oIIice Ior underpayment oI
monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982. the union issued a notice oI strike against the Iirm.
alleging illegal termination oI Dionisio Estioca. president oI the said local union; unIair labor
practice; nonpayment oI living allowances; and 'employment oI oppressive alien management
personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.
On 9 July 1982. Zambowood Iiled a complaint with the trial court against the oIIicers and
members oI the union. Ior 'damages Ior obstruction oI private property with prayer Ior
preliminary iniunction and/or restraining order. The union Iiled a motion Ior the dismissal and
Ior the dissolution oI the restraining order. and opposition to the issuance oI the writ oI
preliminary iniunction. contending that the incidents oI picketing are within the exclusive
iurisdiction oI the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code. Article 217) and
not to the Court oI First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence. the petition Ior certiorari.
Issue: Whether construction oI the law is required to determine iurisdiction.
Held: The Iirst and Iundamental duty oI courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only aIter it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subiect matter in a iudicial proceeding is conIerred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed;
it must be conIerred by law in words that do not admit oI doubt. Since the iurisdiction oI courts
and iudicial tribunals is derived exclusively Irom the statutes oI the Iorum. the issue should be
resolved on the basis oI the law or statute in Iorce. ThereIore. since (1) the original wording oI
Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with iurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691
reverted the iurisdiction with respect to money claims oI workers or claims Ior damages arising
Irom employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters aIter Presidential Decree 1367 transIerred
such iurisdiction to the ordinary courts. and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with
respect to the original and exclusive iurisdiction oI Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims
oI workers or claims Ior damages arising Irom employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be
applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original iurisdiction oI a labor arbiter is therein
provided Ior explicitly. It means. it can only mean. that a court oI Iirst instance iudge then. a
regional trial court iudge now. certainly acts beyond the scope oI the authority conIerred on him

When does Statutory Construction come in?

by law when he entertained the suit Ior damages. arising Irom picketing that accompanied a
strike.
The Supreme Court. thus. granted the writ oI certiorari. and nulliIied and set aside the 20 July
1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ oI prohibition. and enioined the Judge oI
said court. or whoever acts in his behalI in the RTC to which this case is assigned. Irom taking
any Iurther action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 |2751|). except Ior the purpose oI dismissing
it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Paat v. CA
GR 111107. 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division. Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 19 May 1989. Victoria de Guzman`s truck was seized by Department oI Environment
and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao. Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan Irom
San Jose. Baggao. Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents Ior the
Iorest products Iound concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989. Aritao CENRO`s Jovito Layugan
issued an order oI conIiscation oI the truck. Its owner. De Guzman. Iailed to submit the required
explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989. DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO`s action oI conIiscation and
ordered the IorIeiture oI the truck invoking Section 68-A oI Presidential Decree 705. as amended
by Executive Order 277. De Guzman Iiled Ior reconsideration but was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary oI DENR. Pending resolution. however. a suit Ior
replevin (Civil Case 4031). was Iiled by De Guzman and company against Layugan and
Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2). contending that the only the court is authorized to
conIiscate and IorIeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal Iorest products. pursuant to the
second paragraph oI Section 68. De Guzman Iurther contended that the seizure is illegal. as she
did not use the truck in the commission oI the crime (oI qualiIied theIt under Article 309 and 310
oI the Revised Penal Code. punishable under Section 68). as allegedly admitted by the Regional
Executive Director. releasing her Irom criminal liability. The trial court thereaIter issued a writ
ordering the return oI the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners Iiled a petition Ior certiorari with
the Court oI Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial court`s order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal one. Hence. the petition.
Issues:
Whether construction admits that the authority to conIiscate or to IorIeit conveyances
belongs to the courts
Whether the truck was used in the commission oI an oIIense under Section 68 oI
Presidential Decree 705. as amended by Executive Order 277
Held: The construction that conveyances are subiect oI conIiscation by the courts exclusively
(pursuant to Section 28. paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention oI the law and inevitably
reduces the other provision oI Section 68-A. aside to the Iact that conveyances are not mentioned
nor included in the Iormer provision. In the construction oI statutes. it must be read in such a way
as to give eIIect to the purpose proiected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light
oI the obiect to be achieved and the evil or mischieI to be suppressed. and they should be given
such construction as will advance the obiect. suppress the mischieI. and secure the beneIits
intended. In the case at bar. the phrase 'to dispose oI the same is broad enough to cover the act
oI IorIeiting conveyances in Iavor oI the government. The only limitation is that it should be
made 'in accordance with pertinent laws. regulations or policies on the matter.
Further. when the statute is clear and explicit. there is hardly room Ior any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization oI the law. The language oI the amendatory executive order. when

it eliminated the phrase 'shall be guilty oI qualiIied theIt as deIined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 oI the Revised Penal Code ' and inserted the words ' shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 oI the Revised Penal Code. meant that the act oI
cutting. gathering. collecting. removing. or possessing Iorest products without authority
constitutes a distinct oIIense independent now Irom the crime oI theIt under Articles 309 and 310
oI the Revised Penal Code. but the penalty to be imposed is that provided Ior under Article 309
and 310 oI the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14
July 1992 resolution oI the CA. made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27
September 1993. and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.

Notes:
-Whether De Guzman failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before proceeding to the courts.
-Yes, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows agencies to correct its error and to
dispose of the case.
-This was violated by De Guzman.
-Whether or not De Guzman's act is in violation of P.D. 705, Sec. 68-A as amended by EO 277.
-Yes, hence the seizure and conscation are lawful.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301. 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc. Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged Ior illegal possession oI Iirearm and ammunition in an
inIormation dated 14 August 1962 in violation oI Section 878 oI the Revise Administrative Code
in connection with Section 2692 oI the Revised Administrative Code. as amended by CA 56 and
as Iurther amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession oI Iirearm on ground oI being a
secret agent oI Governor Feliciano Leviste oI Batangas. On 27 November 1963. the lower court
rendered a decision convicting the accused oI the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment Ior
one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question oI law. it was elevated to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualiIied as such oI the governor is
exempt Irom the requirement oI having a license oI Iirearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawIul Ior any person to possess any Iirearm. detached parts
oI Iirearms or ammunition thereIor. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manuIacture oI Iirearms. parts oI Iirearms. or ammunition except when such Iirearms are
in possession oI such public oIIicials and public servants Ior use in the perIormance oI their
oIIicial duties; as those Iirearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawIully issued to
oIIicers. soldiers. sailors or marines. the Philippines Constabulary. guards in the employment oI
the Bureau oI Prisons. municipal police. provincial governors. lieutenant governors. provincial
treasurers. municipal treasurers. municipal mayors. and guards oI provincial prisoners and iails.
It is the Iirst and Iundamental duty oI courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation
come only aIter it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. The law cannot be any clearer. there being no provision made Ior a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced. and the case no longer speaks
with authority to the extent that the present decision conIlicts with. It may be note that in People
v. Macarandang. a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
oI the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance oI peace and order campaigns and
detection oI crimes suIIiciently put him within the category oI a peace oIIicer` equivalent even
to a member oI the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. Thus. in the present case.
thereIore. the conviction must stand.
The Supreme Court aIIirmed the appealed iudgment.

Daoang v. Municipal 1udge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568. 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division. Padilla (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 23 March 1971. spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy Iiled a petition with the
Municipal Court oI San Nicolas. Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption oI minors Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos. However. minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang. assisted by their Iather
and guardian ad litem. the petitioners herein Iiled an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy. oppositors mother. who died on 1 March 1971. and thereIore said spouses were
disqualiIied to adopt under Article 335 oI the Civil Code. which provides that those who have
legitimate. legitimated. acknowledged natural children or children by legal Iiction cannot adopt.
Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualiIied to adopt under
paragraph 1 oI Article 335 oI the Civil Code.
Held: The words used in paragraph (1) oI Article 335 oI the Civil Code. in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt. are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted.
it changed the word 'descendant. Iound in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code
was patterned. to 'children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly deIined meaning in law
and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule oI statutory construction to the eIIect
that a statute clear and unambiguous on its Iace need not be interpreted. The rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtIul meaning may be the subiects oI statutory construction. In
the present case. Roderick and Rommel Daoang. the grandchildren oI Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy. cannot assail the adoption oI Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by
the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. and aIIirmed the iudgment oI the Municipal Court oI San
Nicolas. Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37). wthout pronouncement as to costs.

People v Nazario
GR L-44143, Aug, 31, 1988

Facts:
-Nazario failed to pay the taxes of his shponds in violation of Municipal Ordinance 12 and 15.
Issue:
-Whether it does not include Nazario
-Whether it is unconstitutional for being an ex post facto
Held:
-DOCTRINE: A "perfectly vague" statute cannot be saved by a saving clause or by construction (Coates v City of
Cinnati). However, imprecise language is not perfectly vague and can be saved by proper construction. Nazario is
the actual operator of the shponds hence, is coved under the term "manager".
-No, Ordinances 12 and 15 are curative measures intended to enhance the original act, Ordinance 4. It is not
applied retroactively.

Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)

GR 123169. 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
En Banc. Francisco (p): 14 concurring
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay oI Pula. Cabanatuan City who won
during the 1994 barangay election. A petition Ior his recall as Punong Barangay was Iiled by the
registered voters oI the barangay. which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was
scheduled on 14 October 1995. where at least 29.30 oI the registered voters signed the petition.
well above the 25 requirement provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13
November 1995. but which was deIerred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner`s opposition.
To prevent the holding oI the recall election. petitioner Iiled beIore the RTC Cabanatuan City a
petition Ior iniunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF). with the trial court issuing a
restraining order. AIter conducting a summary hearing. the trial court liIted the restraining order.
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited Ior contempt Ior misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec
approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996. the Comelec. Ior the third time. re-scheduled the recall
election on 13 January 1996; hence. the instant petition Ior certiorari with urgent prayer Ior
iniunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a
regular local election. the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the Iirst Monday oI May
1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Monteio to support the argument. the Court
in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election
in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part oI the statute must be interpreted with
reIerence to the context. i.e.. that every part oI the statute must be considered together with the
other parts. and kept subservient to the general intent oI the whole enactment. Further. the spirit.
rather than the letter oI a law determines its construction; hence. a statute must be read according
to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation oI the law leads to absurdity which the Court
cannot countenance. A too-literal reading oI the law constrict rather than IulIill its purpose and
deIeat the intention oI its authors. That intention is usually Iound not in 'the letter that killeth but
in the spirit that viviIieth. In the present case. Paragraph (b) oI Section 74 construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local oIIicial may be subiect
oI a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election.
as this would render inutile the recall provision oI the Local Government Code. It would be more
in keeping with the intent oI the recall provision oI the Code to construe regular local election as
one reIerring to an election where the oIIice held by the local elective oIIicial sought to be
recalled will be contested and be Iilled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court. however. has to dismiss the petition Ior having become moot and academic.
as the next regular elections involving the barangay oIIice concerned were seven months away.
Thus. the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996. enioining the recall election.
was made permanent.

Floresca v. Philex Mining
GR L-30642.. 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
En Banc. Makasiar (p): 7 concurring. 1 on leave. 2 took no part. others dissenting
Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one oI Philex Mining Corporations` mine sites.
The heirs oI the miners were able to recover under the Workman`s Compensation Act (WCA).
ThereaIter. a special committee report indicated that the company Iailed to provide the miners
with adequate saIety protection. The heirs decided to Iile a complaint Ior damages beIore the
Court oI First Instance (CFI) oI Manila. Philex Iiled a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and. thereIore. the
CFI has no iurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected iniuries are
compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 oI the WCA; and that the WCA covers work-
connected accidents even iI the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes
a 50 additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs. however.
contend that the CFI has iurisdiction. as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the
Civil Code provisions on damages arising out oI negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint
Ior lack oI iurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal beIore the Supreme Court.
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda. pursuant to the resolution oI 26 November
1976. involving the issue whether the action oI an iniured employee or worker or that oI his heirs
in case oI his death under the Workmen`s Compensation Act is exclusive. selective or
cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an iniured employee or his heirs` action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen`s Compensation
Act. (2: Selective) whether an iniured employee or his heirs have a right oI selection or choice oI
action between availing oI the worker`s right under the Workmen`s Compensation Act and suing
in the regular courts under the Civil Code Ior higher damages (actual. moral and/or exemplary)
Irom the employer by virtue oI negligence (or Iault) oI the employer or oI his other employees.
or (3: Cumulative) whether an iniured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively oI both
actions. i.e.. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen`s Compensation Act and sue
in addition Ior damages in the regular courts. The opinions oI the amici curiae are diverse.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective. i.e. that the
iniured worker or his heirs have the choice oI remedies. but that they cannot pursue both courses
oI action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage oI recourse under the Workmen`s
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It Iurther held that the petitioners who had
received the beneIits under the Workmen`s Compensation Act. such may not preclude them Irom
bringing an action beIore the regular court. as the choice oI the Iirst remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake oI Iact. which nulliIies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. but
that upon the success oI such bids beIore the lower court. the payments made under the
Workmen`s Compensation Act should be deducted Irom the damages that may be decreed in
their Iavor.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court. in determining the action to be selective. is guilty oI iudicial
legislation.

Held: The Court. through its maiority. deIended itselI by holding that the Court does not
legislate but merely applies and gives eIIect to the constitutional guarantees oI social iustice then
secured by Section 5 oI Article II and Section 6 oI Article XIV oI the 1935 Constitution. and
later by Sections 6. 7. and 9 oI Article II oI the Declaration oI Principles and State Policies oI the
1973 Constitution. as amended. and as implemented by Articles 2176. 2177. 2178. 1173. 2201.
2216. 2231 and 2232 oI the New Civil Code oI 1950. Further. it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Licera: that iudicial decisions oI the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itselI. pursuant to Article 8 oI the Civil Code oI the Philippines which decrees that iudicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution Iorm part oI this iurisdiction`s
legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part oI the law as oI the date oI the enactment oI the said law since the Court`s application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into eIIect. Yet. the Court argues that the Court can legislate. pursuant to
Article 9 oI the New Civil Code. which provides that 'No iudge or court shall decline to render
iudgment by reason oI the silence. obscurity or insuIIiciency oI the laws. Thus. even the
legislator himselI recognizes that in certain instances. the court 'do and must legislate to Iill in
the gaps in the law; because the mind oI the legislator. like all human beings. is Iinite and
thereIore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Article 1702 of the New Civil Code: "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763. 13 February 1997
En Banc. Panganiban (p): 8 concur. 3 concur in result
Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila. and gave
birth to a son a year aIter. Reynaldo showed signs oI 'immaturity and irresponsibility on the
early stages oI the marriage. observed Irom his tendency to spend time with his Iriends and
squandering his money with them. Irom his dependency Irom his parents. and his dishonesty on
matters involving his Iinances. Reynaldo was relieved oI his iob in 1986. Roridel became the
sole breadwinner thereaIter. In March 1987. Roridel resigned Irom her iob in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo leIt her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-Iact Ior more than three years.
On 16 August 1990. Roridel Iiled a veriIied petition Ior declaration oI nullity oI her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence Ior Roridel consisted oI her own testimony. that oI two oI her
Iriends. a social worker. and a psychiatrist oI the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conIerence. On
14 May 1991. the trial court rendered iudgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court oI Appeals. The Court oI Appeals denied the appeals and
aIIirmed in toto the RTC`s decision. Hence. the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conIlicting personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
Held: The Court oI Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application oI Philippine civil laws on personal and Iamily rights. and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range oI mental and behavioral conduct on the part oI one
spouse indicative oI how he or she regards the marital union. his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse. as well as his or her conduct in the long haul Ior the attainment oI the
principal obiectives oI marriage; where said conduct. observed and considered as a whole. tends
to cause the union to selI-destruct because it deIeats the very obiectives oI marriage. warrants the
dissolution oI the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court oI Appeals. where psychological incapacity
should reIer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity. existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated. and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment oI the law has been to conIine
the meaning oI psychological incapacity` to the most serious cases oI personality disorders
clearly demonstrative oI an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and signiIicance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity. iuridical antecedence. and
incurability. In the present case. there is no clear showing to us that the psychological deIect
spoken oI is an incapacity; but appears to be more oI a 'diIIiculty. iI not outright 'reIusal or
'neglect in the perIormance oI some marital obligations. Mere showing oI 'irreconcilable
diIIerences and 'conIlicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court. in this case. promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application oI
Article 36 oI the Family Code. removing any visages oI it being the most liberal divorce

procedure in the world: (1) The burden oI prooI belongs to the plaintiII; (2) the root cause oI
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identiIied. alleged in the complaint.
suIIiciently proven by expert. and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be
proven existing at the time oI the celebration oI marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 oI the Family Code as regards husband
and wiIe. and Articles 220 to 225 oI the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal oI the Catholic Church. and
(8) the trial must order the Iiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels Ior the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage oI Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania
de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the
beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the
City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or
acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the
office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo,
she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was
affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of
Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance
Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189
prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the
section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate
courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but
under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2
applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is "any person who for compensation shall be
an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or
indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged,
with costs de oficio.

How must legislative intent be ascertained?

China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development
Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the
defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision
on 20 January 1970.
To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the banks cashier,
disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the
Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to
reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the
Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank
and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information
required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1]
upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders
are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the
position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development
Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.
Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in
such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the
execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not
order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as
contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal
until further order.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs
against the petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista

GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active
participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was
rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board,
(now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the
administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or
widows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of
Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from Pulmonary
Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilaos failure to complete his
supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was
disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his
supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out
that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.
Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basic
pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilaos
monthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases
provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the
purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15
January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in
full of the benefits thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he is
entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension
was finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that
since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of
Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits
should commence from the date of approval of the application.
Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate
a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they
encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness,
disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental
expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially
during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the
general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to
pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered
with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own
particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be
accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges,
and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in government,
educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited,
pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the

pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent
upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12
years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and
intent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of
the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaos
pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each
of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22
June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife
and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14
January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds
appropriated for the purpose.

Matabuena v. Cervante
GR 28771, March 31, 1971

Facts:
-Matabuena donated a parcel of land to Cervantes while they we still cohabiting but not as husband and wife.
-The donation is void under Art 133 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
-Whether or not prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Held:
-Yes. DOCTRINE: What is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. The reason for
the ban is to prevent the probability of undue inuence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the
other.

Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his
legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed
Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration
11950, Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax
Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra
by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to
Venancio. Bartolomes share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an "Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and
descendants of Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters
consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo
owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole
of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter
portion of Lot 26 to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through
a relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalongs fence as
Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221)
covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because
Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to
the latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26.
The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the
portion of the land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the
alleged fraud committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should
have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell; and as to the co-
owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell
more than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning
thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code ("If the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.) Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room
for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what
their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. In the present
case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macarios share (later Anselmos) is only 405 of the 749
square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square meters of Lot
26, 149 square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the
prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA, Longalong
is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the constitution of Anselmos
fraudulent Original Certificate of title.

Literal Construction
-Case
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against petitioners.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus. The court
determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees debt from the latters salary and turn this over to the employees credit union; but which
does not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to
apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The express
provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on
preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for
itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1
and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations
of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is
nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees
payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees wages and
salaries.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 & 3 of opinio
Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in
injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita
Nemeo. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise
being awarded.
Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with another branch of
the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered
by them from the reckless driving of Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the alleged
employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action
principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of
Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was
already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April 1967 that the City Court judgment
is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He noted that the offended parties failed to expressly
waive the civil action or reserved their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which they
filed in the CFI. In view of the waiver and reservation, the Court would be precluded from judging civil
damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
1. Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if originally instituted in the
CFI
The rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case shall be
tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court (Section 7 of
Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. An interpretation that
an independent civil action is barred absent a reservation under Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-
sequitur, as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the rule and ignores what is
explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.
2. A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional doubt
A court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court, both in the present Constitution and under the
1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. Thus,
substantive right cannot to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if
through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a
civil suit. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it provides that in cases of . physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
3. Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored in the pursuit of
serving the interest of a client; Construction should be based on legal norm, not literalness
A counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according

When not favored

to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as
an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be
fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant
being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes
as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing
the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious
labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who
did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in
accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine
announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations
that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were
seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent Director.
Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills
Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion
reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction
placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the
Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made
known to the public as far back as 1 May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1
November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and
careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This
Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re
Allen, a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American
case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is
so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it. There was a
paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, a 1918 decision:
"Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will
ordinarily be controlled thereby. Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous
decisions. As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Philippine Apparel Workers' Union v. NLRC

GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring
Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union
submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to
the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be
assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued
with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a
three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on
21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an
increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was
implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company. The controversy arose when the petitioner union
sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage
increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is
obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a
meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which
were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules
Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD
1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA
against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the
complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the
machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed
to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its
decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for
obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the
parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely
under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed
for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the
petition.
Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.
Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was
already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977.
There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May
1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules
implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said
increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter
of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or
representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have agreed
on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought
about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still
being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed
upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word "grant as used in its rules implementing
PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when
it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same
cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope
of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus,
the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a
misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and
ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the
company.

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong

GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay
before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in
Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for
arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in
the above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank
did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by
paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the
provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by
authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated
the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section
thereof reads as "Status of employees paid by the month. - Employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory
or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked
or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now
Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule
implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday
pay to an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision of
25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a
writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular
holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the banks appeal,
and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with
the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay
execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and
Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to
the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the
Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting
aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of
merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of
the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday
pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor
excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the
implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or

established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is
to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same
must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or
repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A
rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of
the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and
reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople

GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly
paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor,
now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10
unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays
from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the
petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay and the premium or
overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioners
claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that "If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than
P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are
made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not
entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled
to the premium or overtime pay differentials.
Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly
what it says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what
the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both
the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as
far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the
law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers
whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so
erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency
of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental
power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction
was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private
respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the
employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays
under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among
those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September 1976 order, and
reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC
affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission

GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing
that "effective 1 November 1958, all employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take
into consideration and include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well
as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a
maximum of P500 for any one month. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company,
Inc., wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular 7 (7
October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation
that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to
how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court
on appeal.
Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.
Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure
or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the
law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it
has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate
wisdom On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted
meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such
interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a
particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some
other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what "compensation should mean "For the purposes of
this Act. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act.
By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear
mandate of the new law.

Whats is the difference between a rule and an opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.

V. Subjects of Construction
Meaning of words:
Krivenko v Register of Deeds
-Facts:
--Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc.
-Registration was denied by Register of Deeds because he is an alien.
-Issue:
--Whether or not he can own a land under our Constitution.
-Held:
--He can't.
--Article XIII, Constitution - conservation and utilization of natural resources - "public agricultural
lands" - term technically dened in other statues such as The Public Land Act (Act 296)
--The term includes residential lands
--Section 5 and 1 should be read together as pursuing the policy of nationalization.
--DOCTRINE: On meaning of words or phrases, this may be determined through referring to "the
long line of decisions of the court."

Restricted v General
Marcos et. al v Chief of Staff
-Facts:
--Military Tribunals excluded petitioners' rights to appear as counsel for the accused as it is in
violation of Art. 17, Sec. 17 of the Constitution.
-Issue:
--Whether or not "any court" includes military tribunals.
-Held:
--Yes, taking into account the intention of the framers of the Constitution, it is obvious that there
exists the same reasons for prohibiting senators and reps to appear as counsel in a military tribunal
as in civil courts.
--DOCTRINE: In construing a Constitution, it must be taken as established that where words are
used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the
restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended.

The Constitution - How to interpret

Francisco v HOR
-Facts:
--Impeachment proceedings were led against SC CJ Davide.
-2nd impeachment complaint against CJ unconstitutional.
-Issues:
--Whether or not the 2nd complaint falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
--Whether or not this is a political question.
-Held:
--It is unconstitutional because impeachment proceedings are deemed "initiated" already thus, falls
under the one year bar. The bars on impeachment express the intention of the framers not to give
sole jurisdiction to Congress.
--The Constitution is able to answer the issue unequivocally.
--No constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
--DOCTRINES: (1) The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not be
allowed to defeat another. (2) when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a stature must be direct and personal. (3) When the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satises the requirement of personal
interest. (4) In case of a tax payer, he is allowed to sue where the is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deected to any improper purpose, or wastage,
etc. (5) As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any ofcial action which
he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional
Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain
the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all
the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
the petition in intervention, without costs.
1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due
to demands of public interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test Misons right to the office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.
2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which
is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v.
Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with
how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with
what they say and provide.
3. President's power to appoint
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of
officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and
third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of
Constitutional Commission.

4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated

It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior
laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission
was frequently transformed into a venue of "horse-trading and similar malpractices. On the other
hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with
hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground by requiring the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and
leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in
the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The
proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.
6. Construction of "also" in second sentence; consideration of different language of
proximate sentences to determine meaning
The word "also could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too besides "in like manner which
meanings could stress that the word "also in said second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the
officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers
mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings
of the word "also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive
significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and
appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the
second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2
sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions
established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.
7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8. The use of word "alone" after "President" in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship,
a literal import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the
use of the word "alone after the word "President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is,
more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first
sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word "alone after the
word "President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers
in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word "alone
in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot
prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included
with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is
expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).
10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony
with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the
President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the
result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves
on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. It also provides that "until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfecto
assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise, by fixing a different salary for associate
justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary
as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under protest. He contended that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount
to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to a
diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that,
in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution
provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus,
next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a mans
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. It is
essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part
of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is
the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a
permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune
as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their
connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous
duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the
imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service
to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a
nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in
the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices
Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress
enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not
to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a
public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate
a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar,
Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase "which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is
assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution
or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to
the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then
the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the
doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the
interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)

GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December
1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the
filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement,
even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.
Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices and judges
from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain
that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the
Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for
printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When
the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the
issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead
of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription that reads "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

May the preamble be referred to in the construction of Constitutional Provision

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995,
perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince
Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national
patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be
in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory

Are the provisions of the Constitution self-executing

enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting
of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony,
when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner and a "qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization
and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the
Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per
shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-
General, that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They
further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not
indispensable.
Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws
Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date - for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication - but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances
of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.

Statute
Requirements for the publication of laws
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the
motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required
the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause "unless otherwise provided.
Held: The clause "unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules
and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in
the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must
be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or
as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act
3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and
Traffic Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of
Urdanetas Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiffs
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to him. This incident took
place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a
criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of
Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said
ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining
defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from
further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in
its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of
preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat,
and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiffs
drivers license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinances validity should
be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the "mother statute (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time
the criminal case was brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used
the phrase "vehicular traffic (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and
motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its
clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be
able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for
particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA
4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section
35. The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which
states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution
specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore
in view of the foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.

Ordinances
Rules on construction of ordinances vis-a-vis Statute
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez
GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)
En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.
Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of
Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate.
When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the
Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central filed,
through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09
paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request
and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the
importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as
amended by RA 1375.
On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor
to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was
denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the
Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the
importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of
RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of the
Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by
Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).
Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17%
tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The
exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their
cooperatives. The word "directly has been interpreted to mean "without anything intervening.
Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than
his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption.
When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is
that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly
against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes
are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all
fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would
be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by
planters or farmers through their cooperatives.

Tax Laws
How are tax refunds construed?
CIR v. CA
GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)
Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute
of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private
respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies of Philippine society and
culture. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international
organizations, private foundations and government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private respondent
received from Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing
private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged deficiency contractors tax, and an assessment
dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for the fiscal
year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter-
protest and subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the
assessments. On 17 March 988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the assessment for
deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency contractors tax by increasing the
amount due to P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the modified assessment.
At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the said letter-decision of the
petitioner. While the petition was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final
decision dated 3 August 1988 reducing the assessment for deficiency contractors tax from
P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the respondent
court set aside respondents decision, and canceling the deficiency contractors tax assessment in the
amount of P46,516.41 exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. No
pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme
Court via a petition for review.
Issues:
Whether the private respondent has the burden of
proof in the tax case.
Whether the private respondent is taxable as an
independent contractor.
Held: The Commissioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying the
well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and
impractical to determine who are exempted without first determining who are covered by the
aforesaid provision. The Commissioner should have determined first if private respondent was covered
by Section 205, applying the rule of strict interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on
the populace, before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom, following the rule of
construction where "the tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax
unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and
express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in

Who has the burden of proof in tax cases?

construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are
not to be extended by implication. In case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be
imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. In the
present case, Ateneos Institute of Philippine Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was
ever engaged in a business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the university.
Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee. They may however fall as
gifts or donations which are "tax-exempt as shown by private respondents compliance with the
requirement of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such
gifts to an educational institution.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court ruled that the private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for a fee but an
academic institution conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and,
ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued operating for so long
despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals
and the Court of Appeals that "education and not profit is motive for undertaking the research
projects.

Note:
-Burden of proof to show exemption from tax only arises when it has been proven that there is indeed
imposition of tax.
Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos
GR 120082, 11 September 1996 (261 SCRA 667)
Third Division, Davide Jr. (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act
6958. Since the time of its creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty
taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October 1994, the Office of the
Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to
the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified. It also
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing a governmental functions, which
puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. It nonetheless stands in the same
footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers
and functions. The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account, insisting that
the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn
by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of
the government but merely a government owned corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA
paid its tax account "under protest when City is about to issue a warrant of levy against the MCIAAs
properties.
On 29 December 1994, MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the Cebu Regional Trial Court
contending that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees
on an instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature of its powers and
functions, it has the footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government; which claim
the City rejects. On 22 March 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition, citing that close reading of
the LGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations. MCIAAs motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court
in its 4 May 1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.
Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law
frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of
exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the
grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction
does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money
that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation is the
rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the
taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties
based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus
covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is a "taxable person under its Charter (RA
6958), and was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege
only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person
subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code

(LGC) expressly provides that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic],
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With
that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly
repealed by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its
properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision and order of the RTC
Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.

Note:
-The most strict right or law. In general, when a person receives an advantage, as the grant of a license,
he is bound to conform strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a dispute, it
will be strictly construed.
Serfino v. CA
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT
1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18
January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R
(1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT
57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On
15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter
did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of
Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the
spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the
amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff;
and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties
appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of
the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse
the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the
latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction
sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed
punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners
and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its
payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a
receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of
the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not
the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived
from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public
auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagees
fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the
scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land
in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to
the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of
costs.

Tax Sales construed

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must
be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Surigao Consolidated Mining v. CIR

GR 14878, 26 December 1963

Facts:
-Due to the interruption of communications at the outbreak of the war, the company lost contact with its mines and
never received the production reports.
-To avoid incurring any tax liability, it deposited a check payable to the City Treasurer, in payment for as valorem taxes
pursuant to CA 772.
-Company claimed a refund. Denied.
Issue:
-Whether or not SCM may recover its tax payment in light of the condonation made under a subsequent law, RA 81.
Held:
-RA 81 refers to the condonation of unpaid taxes only. Tax liability is equivalent to an exemption. It must be sustained
then when expressed in explicit terms
Doctrine:
-He who claims an exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that
the Legislature intended to exempt him.

Maceda v. Macaraig
GR 88291, 31 May 1991

Facts:
-CA 120 created NAPOCOR and granted it tax and duly exemption privileges. RA 6395 revised its charter.
-NAPOCOR claimed for refund for all deliveries of petroleum products to NAPOCOR, regardless of the period of delivery.
Issue:
-Whether or not NAPOCOR cease to enjoy exemption from indirect tax when PD 938 stated the exemption in general
terms.
Held:
-PD 938's preamble shows that it is not meant to be strictly construed against NAPOCOR.
Doctrine:
-The rule on strict interpretation does not apply in e case of exemptions in favor of government political subdivision or
instrumentality. In the case of property owned by the state or a city or other public corporations, the express exception
should not be construed with the same degree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the
state, since as to such property "exception is the rule and taxation is the exception."

Manahan v. ECC
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric
Fever while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8
May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969,
and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed
to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June
1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever,
is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid
fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
decision of the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by
or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at
the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses
and Claims), workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during
the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in
accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court
applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioners
claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974,
thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations - like the Workmens
Compensation Act and the Labor Code - should be liberally construed to attain their laudable
objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should
die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the
amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse the
petitioners expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased
Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Labor Laws
Rule on the construction of labor laws
Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine
Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11
December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp
Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions,
computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was
complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render
overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing
allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for
distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling
incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to
the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am.
The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most
research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of
the disease.
On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as
amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the
ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had
failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert
and the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefits.
Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite
extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental
stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that
Marcelino N. Villavert had a "bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died, neither is there a
showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by
Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert
died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties
he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary.
Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner death
benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.

Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRC

GR L-64204, 31 May 1985 (135 SCRA 669)
First Division, Melencio-Herrera (p): 5 concurring, 1 on leave
Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a "Contract
of Services with Calmar Security Agency whereby the latter undertook to supply the former with
security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each guard. Thereafter, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo
Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security Agency and petitioner, for
underpayment of salary, non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay. Thereafter, five other
guards filed their complaint for the same causes of action. Petitioner contended that complainants
have no cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship between them.
They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the
Contract of Services, it could not possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws.
Assigned for compulsory arbitration, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
want of employer-employee relationship. When the case was appealed to the NLRC, the decision was
modified by holding that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally, with the
Security Agency on the ground that the petitioner is an indirect employer pursuant to Articles 106 and
107. Hence, the appeal. The petitioner contended that NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal
despite the fact that it was not under oath and the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it
jointly and severally liable with the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its Motion
for Reconsideration.
Issue(s):
Whether the formal defects of the appeal of the
security agency invalidate the appeal.
Whether the security guards from the agency are
entitled to benefits claimed from the company
Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal defects. The lack of
verification could have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. The appeal fee had been paid
although it was delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion must be
exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. Failure to pay
the appeal docketing fee confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and
such power must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances. Moreover, as provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code
"in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this
Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that "in the event that the contractor or subcontractor
fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work

performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him, and Article 107 provides that "the provisions of the immediately preceding Article
shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or
project. In the case at bar, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants
when petitioner entered into a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the
complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioners liability should be without
prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner
may have to pay to complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that
petitioners payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with knowledge of labor
laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal
concern and not any others.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice to petitioners right to seek
reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants. Costs against the private respondent.

Ty v. First National Surety

GR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)
En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring
Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty,
employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local
insurance companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him
personal accident policies. Plaintiffs beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which
paid the insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the
Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by
a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University hospital, and after receiving first-aid,
he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle,
fourth, and fifth fingers of left hand). From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent
medical treatment in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total
disability of plaintiffs left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim
with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiffs claim for
indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability
suffered by him was not covered by his policy.
Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints.
Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S.
Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of his
left hand.
Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms
of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other
temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar,
due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between "temporary disability and "total disability
need not be made in relation to ones occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such
that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable
of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the
policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies,
all of which define partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the
wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Insurance
Rule in the interpretation of insurance provisions
De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance
GR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring
Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In connection with the
celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In
the course of his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight
and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing
Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death
reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the
ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not
covered by the insurance.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy, filed a claim with the
insurance company for payment of indemnity under the insurance policy. Denied, De la Cruz
instituted the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant
insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court
rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff
for the death of the latters son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorneys fees. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.
Held: The terms "accident and "accidental have not acquired any technical meaning, and are
construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. The terms mean that which
happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without ones foresight or expectation: an event
that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not
expected. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result
of injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insureds
voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies
insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present case, while the participation of the
insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased,
perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death or
disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the protection
of the insurance contract (What was included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured
engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind,
mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death
resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against appellant.

Doctrine:
- construed in their ordinary and common acceptation.
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance
GR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)
First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.
Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in Tabaco, Albay used
for the storage of stocks of copra and of hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with
their contents, insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the
Philippine National Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On 21 July
1940, fire of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely
destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed
the insurer by telegram on the same date. The insurance Company resisted payment, claiming
violation of warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been
deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his
brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of
arson but were acquitted by the trial court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.
With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the Court of First Instance of
Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by
the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain
bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940. The records of the
original case were destroyed during the liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After
a trial that lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000
(2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in
accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September 1940, until each is paid, with
costs against the defendant. It also dismissed the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The
Insurance Company appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire
insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral
and their liquid products having a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a
flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.
Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims under the
insurance policy.
Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of "oils (animal and/or
vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300 Fahrenheit, and
is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils mean "lubricants and not
gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and
phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping
gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms
that the general public can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the
company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed
in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though
prohibited by the policy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to
the weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on
the insured premises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the
prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted

Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer

on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that "Bodega
No. 2 which was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured
bodegas.
The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; with
costs against the appellant.

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines

GR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425)
First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 on leave.
Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation, shipped on board the SS `Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of `Black Hot
Rolled Copper Wire Rods. The vessel is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment
was insured with Home Insurance against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361
coils discharged from the vessel were in bad order. The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361 coils
with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, which had to be considered as scrap.
The weight also had a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the loss/damage suffered
by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44,
by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge.
Home Insurance made demands for payment against Eastern Shipping and the transportation
company for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. (A case
"Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen consolidated with this case is of the same nature).
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance company authorized to do
business in the Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In
L-34382, Eastern Shipping Lines denies the allegation of plaintiffs capacity to sue for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, while Angel Jose
Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and
Guacods denied plaintiffs capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the
same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the petitioner had already
secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines during the filing of
the case. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines initially without a license can
claim indemnity through Philippine Courts.
Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not
hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among
countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given a
reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means
that no foreign corporation shall be permitted `to transact business in the Philippine Islands, as this
phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it
complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary
holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be
easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts
was cured by the subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of
these cases.The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue when it averred in its complaints that
it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent
is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as
required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials inadequate to attack the foreign
corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so.
Nevertheless, even if the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue by the

Corporate Law
Rule on the interpretation of Corporate Law provisions
answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the
insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions.
In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered
to pay the Home Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5
January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the costs. The Court dismissed the
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent
Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal
rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorneys fees, and costs. The Court
dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.

Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the
Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in
the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the "Colegio
in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has
never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized
government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice,
polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a
democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of
tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital
of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and
charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs
of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he
claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims
to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-
fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00
as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has
no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he
admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less
than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a
certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the
decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the
decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he
knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered "democracy.;
that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file
his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien
certificates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify
him to become a Filipino citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the
constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying
our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in
so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles
embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a
democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one
must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he
has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as

Naturalization Laws
Rule on the construction of Naturalizations Law
required by the Alien Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed
salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an
amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the
total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the
petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic

GR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese parents. He came to
the Philippines sometime in February 1921 and was given the corresponding alien certificate of
residence and registration. He settled in Cebu City (where he as continuously resided up to the
present time). Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private institution
recognized by the government. He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He, having
associated with some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the
lumber business (1946-present). He invested P5,000.00 capital in the business and at present the
actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00. Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and
realizes a profit share worth P10,000.00 every year. He has no tax liability to the government. He
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he
married one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu
City. All these children had been issued the corresponding alien certificate of registration, with the
exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the
exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and Lourdes who
stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and
colleges recognized by the government.
Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu. On 30 August
1956, the court rendered decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino citizen. On 2 October
1957, however, the government filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which if presented may affect the qualification of petitioner, and finding the same well
founded, the court entertained the motion. After hearing, the court again rendered decision
reaffirming its holding that petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen. The government
interposed an appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.
Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable
and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present case, the petitioner has not filed any
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously
in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education
to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached
grade five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her. Lourdes Lee
has studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor
health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that she continued her studies in a Chinese school,
which employs strictly Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the sincerity
of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not have tolerated
such deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify
to become a Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against petitioner.

Guerrero v. CA
GR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)
Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.
Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to
take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation
situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut
within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was
made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such
other similar chores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the
coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For
attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.
On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary
to public policy. Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from
the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He
felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of
Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacaang, Manila. This led to an execution of an
agreement whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation
as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines).
In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation
with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio
and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants
Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where Benitez and his family lived, thus,
making the Benitez feel that they meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant reinstatement to
the plantation
Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a
real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who has the temporary use and
occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer
who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination
any time, is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under
the law. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships.
Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land but also includes the
promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of
the earth by general industry. Agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis that is,
a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer
works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce.
His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is
established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished
according to law. In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made on 2 May 1973
is clear and categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent was different, being

Agrarian Reform Laws

Rule on the Construction of Agrarian Reform Laws
that of a hired farmhand, the law existing at that time the agreement was made militate against the
claim. Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his ejectment, and thus, was
unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in
ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision. No costs.

Bello v. CA
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City
Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a value of P1,000.00 received
by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were
convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal on the ground
that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in
the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of
Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. The CFI per its
order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of
Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court "for
execution of judgment. Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners motion "for having been
erroneously addressed to this court instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners predicament that the
CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them
and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with
the Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any
objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the
city courts judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of
dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to
the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party
respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to
deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for
review.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the
procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees
cause
Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to
defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as
to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity and therefore a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of
Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination
and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the
higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper
appellate court.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable
and could be "overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals ` act of
dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing

Rules of Court
-procedures which govern the proceedings in the court and which are to be followed by the parties.
Rule on the Construction of the provisions of Rules of Court
substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of
Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive
them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was
rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its
judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate
petitioners appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latters disposition on the merits; without costs.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil
First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue.
The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of
taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the
dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and
absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to
costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority
must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and
none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to
determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court,
upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact
that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood
uses the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can
be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the
unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not
denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact,
in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question
public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the
reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a
public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a
cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such
purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no
necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the
traffic situation.

Expropriation Laws
-The government's right of taking private property for public use or in the interest of the public without
the owner's consent.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the
cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of
charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)

GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr.
filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon
in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his
own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons. His unsworn
withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25
January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendozas withdrawal,
filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution of Mendozas for the said office of vice
mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over
respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all
votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officers opinion
that petitioners name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly
proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice
mayor of Dolores.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendozas withdrawal
was not under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was
not made after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on
the same day.
Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vice
mayor.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death,
withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendozas withdrawal
was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier
that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having
been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the
provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be
defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal
provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status
of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the
election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or
candidacy. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory
and Mendozas failure to observe the requirement should be considered a harmless irregularity. The
bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes
cast in his favor must be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions of Comelec and
annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares
petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said
office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is made immediately
executory.

Election Laws
-discipline falling at the juncture of constitutional law and political science. It researches "the politics of law
and the law of politics; rules that govern the voting of ofcials into government positions.
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner
GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring
Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with
Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street,
municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree
instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming
the contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the
testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between
her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also
signed at the foot of the testament, in the second page, in the presence of the testator and all three
abovenamed witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left
margin or any part of the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the three
instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the
testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the testator, Bonifacio
Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed freely and spontaneously, without
having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue
influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22 February
1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died,
leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document
purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on
the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court because it involves purely a question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will
void
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly
construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that
the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the
true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express
provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same
fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.

Wills
-A document in which a person species the method to be applied in the management and distribution of his
estate after his death.
Rule on the Interpretation of Wills
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law
relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962.
Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the
validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23
November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes
marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during
the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public
policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what
is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the
questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to
the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

How do you determine the intent of the law?

-literal construction
-preamble
-deliberations
Between the living
Particular Latin Rules
Mens Legislatoris - the intention of the law maker;ground upon which historical interpretation of law is given.

Dura Lex Sed Lex

People v Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)

Facts:
-Mapa was charged for illegal possession of rearm and ammunition in violation of Sec 878 of the RAC in connection
with Sec 2692 of the RAC, as amended by CA 56 and further amended by RA 4. Mapa admits possession on grounds
that he is a secret agent of Batangas Gov. Feliciano Leviste. He was convicted.
Issue:
-W/N a secret agent appointed by a Gov is duly exempted from having a license of rearm.
Held:
-People v. Macarandang no longer speaks wit ph authority.
-The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made r a secret agent. The law is explicit that it is unlawful
for any person to possess any rearms or ammunitions thereof, or any instrument or implement used... Except when
such rearms are in possession of such public ofcials and public servants for use in the performance of their ofcial
duties; as those rearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to ofcers, soldiers, sailors or marines,
the Phil. constabulary, guards in the employment of Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, principal treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.
-[the] law [is] harsh, but [it is the] law.

People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as "Special Agent by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated
certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special
agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty
and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in
possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was
conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case
underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was
appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held: The appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v.
Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority
to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for
his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the
firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was
already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged.
Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellants appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with
costs de oficio.

Dura Lex Sed Lex

Community
Investigative
Support
Prevailing
Doctrine then

People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc
Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen
the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes
claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial
confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the
reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the
opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due
hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided
interest in equal share of each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the
instant petition.
Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral
Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express
Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA 6236 had intended
that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so
provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of
cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by
reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236.
Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings
fails to supply any basis for respondents contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time
to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is
found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided
for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061,
expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications
for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from "filing an application
for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28
September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Notes:
-Cadastral Survey - the means by which private and public land is dened, divided, traced, and recorded. The term
derives from French cadastre, a register of the survey of lands and is, in effect, the public record of the extent,
value, and ownership of land for purposes of taxation.

Lerum v. Cruz
87 Phil 652

Facts:
This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and Fernando led for this petition in order to
test the sufciency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the
issuance of a divorce decree.
Issue:
Can the attorneys le a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufciency and probative value of (former)
Judge Cruzs testimony?
Held:
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, declaratory
relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. The sufciency and probative value of a testimony, which
is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case, is not included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed
order is afrmed.

Santos v. Cruz-Pano
GR 55130, Jan. 17, 1983

Facts:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for
having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 7 yrs. and 8
mos .of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years 9 yrs and 4 mos. of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to
the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to 1 yr. and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 1 yr. and
8 mos. as maximum. The petitioner did not appeal after the nal decision of the Court of Appeals, but instead led
a petition for probation with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Ofce,
denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:
(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is to be granted the probation under PD No. 968 (Probation Law) to depreciate the
offense committed.
Held:
The Court found no sufcient justication for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender.
Hence this cannot be sufcient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law shall be applied.
Instead, the petitioner was granted probation by the Court as he is not among the offenders enumerated in the
probation law (PD No. 968) from availing of the benets of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualied
offenders are the following:
(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) those who have previously been convicted by nal judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a ne of not less than two hundred pesos;
(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and
(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.
In expressly enumerating offenders not qualied to enjoy the benets of probation, the clear intent of the law is to
allow said benets to those not included in the enumeration. The Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
applicant for its benets affords the better means of achieving the purpose of the law.

Exc. Manabat v. Aquino

92 Phil 1025

Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus to require the respondent judge of rst instance to give due course to, and hear
the petitioners' appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace which he dismissed believing it had not been
perfected in due time.
Sued on a promissory note in the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Enrique Manabat and his wife, denied liability,
alleging usury. Having failed to appear and present evidence at the hearing, they were ordered to pay the amount
of P1,261.74 plus interest, upon the proofs and introduced by the plaintiffs, spouses Roxas. The Manabats were
notied of the decision and they in turn, sent their notice of appeal, their docket fees and a surety bond. However,
the Roxas couple submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal of the Manabats on the grounds: (a) that the appeal
documents had been received by the inferior court of Tarlac, on September 24, i.e., two days after the expiration
of the time prescribed by law for appeals from that court and (b) because the appeal was frivolous, interposed
obviously for delay.
Noting that the 15-day period expired on September 22, and that the appeal papers were actually received on
September 24, the judge of rst instance declared the appeal was late and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. He
refused to apply section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court on which the Manabats relied to sustain the timeliness of
their move. That section provides that "the date of the mailing" of the court papers "as shown by the post-ofce
registry receipt shall be considered as the date of their ling" in court. His honor opined that this section does not
regulate inferior courts, since it is found only among rules governing courts of rst instance, and, unlike other rules,
it is not extended to inferior courts and therefore excluded by section 19 Rule 4, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder:
SEC. 19. Application of certain rules. Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30, and 39 are applicable in inferior
courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
rule.
Hence this petition for mandamus, appeal being inadequate, because the defendants in the case, (petitioners
herein) have not introduced evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal papers are deemed led in court on September 22 when they were deposited in the
mails by registered mail, or on September 24 when they were actually received.

Held:
The Court ruled that the Manabats appealed on time.
If section 1 Rule 27 is applied, the appeal papers would be deemed led on September 22, and therefore the appeal
would have been seasonably perfected. His Honor, however, and the other respondents, maintain that Rule 27 is
not applicable because it is not mentioned in section 19 Rule 4 hereinbefore quoted, and inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, enumeration of certain rules, excludes others.
That legal maxim is well-known, and respondents' position seems at rst blush tenable. But the maxim is not more
than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive.
Now, if section 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, justices of the peace may disregard, (a) the principles of evidence prescribed
in Rule 123, (b) Rule 131 as to costs and (c) the fundamental principles about splitting or joinder of causes of
action in Rule 2, and the theories about parties in interest, necessary parties, married women etc. in Rule 3.
These undesirable consequences could not have been overlooked by the framers of the Rules. They could not have
intended, therefore, to make the enumeration in section 19 Rule 4 as all-inclusive and exclusive

Escribano v. Avila (GR L-30375, Sept. 12, 1978)

Facts:
Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, led a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong
before the Court of First Instance (now theRTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avilas authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city scal of Cotobato is the only
one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does
not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for Art 360 ("shall be conducted by the provincial or city scal of the province or city, or by the
municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.")

Issue:
Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.

Held:
Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged
exclusively in the city attorney. The enumeration in the law of the public ofcers and the courts that may conduct
preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the
Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the CFI to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived
from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest
and search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFI are the exception
to the rule and not the general rule.

Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for
the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using "jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of
respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful
for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase "and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase "and the like.
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It
is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of
pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like.). Taped jingles therefore were not
prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3
November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.

Ejusdem Generis
When do you apply this rule?

Vera vs. Cuevas

GR L-33693-94, 31 May 1979

Facts: Consolidated Philippines Inc., General Milk Co. (Phil.) Inc., and Milk Industries Inc. are engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of lled milk products throughout the Philippines. The Institute of Evaporated
Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines is a corporation organized to uphold and maintain the highest standards
of local lled milk industries, of which the companies are members. The Commissioner required the companies to
withdraw from the market all of their lled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169
(Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk) of the Tax Code within 15 days from receipt of order with explicit
warning of prosecution for non-compliance. The companies led an action for prohibition and injunction.

Issue: Whether Section 169 of the Tax Code can be enforced against the companies.

Held: With Section 141 (specic tax imposed on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (penalty on sale of skimmed milk
without payment of specic tax and legend required in Section 169) repealed by RA 344 and RA 463, respectively;
Section 169 has lost its tax purpose, and thus the Commissioner necessary lost his authority to enforce the same.
Further, Section 169 applies to skimmed milk, which is different to lled milk.
Furthermore, Section 169 is only being enforced against the respondent companies and not against manufacturers,
distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, and OLAC. Such kind of
enforcement amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws, for the law, if not equally
enforced to persons similarly situated, would offend against the Constitution.

Gaanan v. IAC and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts:
Leonardo Laconico telephoned appellant, Edgardo Gaanan, who is a lawyer, to come to his ofce and advise him on
the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the ofce of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through
a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard
complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the gure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of
the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher
Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault
against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Ofce;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Afdavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier led against Manuel Montebon at the
Cebu City Fiscal's Ofce, whereas Montebon's afdavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be led later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the ofce of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10,
1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an afdavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the afdavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he led against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.

Issues:
a. Whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature
b. Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No.
4200.

Held:
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico
was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished
from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner
the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico led with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Ofce if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that afrmance
of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener
to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.

When the bill was nalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from
the provisions of the Act.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of
a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be
there for ordinary ofce use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in xing the meaning of any of its parts.
The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not
of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

Republic v. Migrino
GR 89483, Aug. 30, 1990

Facts:
- This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to investigate and
cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military ofcer, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
- May 13, 1986 > PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga created, through an order, the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines Anti-Graft Board which
> investigated the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service
> primarily charged with the task of investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019)
> make necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities with respect to the
action to be taken thereon based on its ndings
- October 31, 1987 > Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth
beyond his lawful income Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit his explanation/
comment together with his supporting evidence by this date. Tecson requested, and was granted, several
postponements, but was unable to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of
his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.
- June 30, 1988 > The Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution recommending that
Tecson be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019 and RA 1379.
- The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Tecson moved to dismiss the case on the ff grounds
that:
(1) PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person
(2) action against him under RA 1379 has already prescribed
(3) EO 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of RA 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his
case
(4) having retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of RA
3019.
The Board opposed the motion to dismiss.
- February 8, 1989 > In a resolution, PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
- March 8, 1989 > Tecson moved for reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG in a resolution
- March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. > Tecson was directed to submit his counter-afdavit and other controverting
evidence
- March 13, 1989 > Tecson led a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with RTC Pasig. PCGG led a
motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal
ground that RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board. Tecson opposed the motion to dismiss. PCGG replied to the
opposition.
- June 23, 1989 >Judge Migrino denied PCGGs motion to dismiss
- June 26, 1989 > Judge Migrino granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining PCGG from investigating or prosecuting Tecson under
RA 3019 and 1379 upon the ling of a bond of P20,000.00
- August 29, 1989 > SC issued a restraining order enjoining Judge Migrino from enforcing his orders dated June 23,
1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with the Civil Case
- Tecson led his comment, to which PCGG led a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was led by PCGG. The Court gave
due course to the petition and the parties led their memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

Issue:
WON Judge Migrino gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order dated June 26, 1989 enjoining PCGG, the
Board from investigating and prosecuting Tecson for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, otherwise known as An Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

Held:
Yes. Those who wish to question or challenge the PCGG's acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan,
which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.
- SC is confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence, may be enjoined
from doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been vested by law with
jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.
- Judge Migrino clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case No.
57092 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG. The nullication of the assailed order of
Judge Migrino issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is therefore in order. Likewise, Judge Migrino must be
enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.
- But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent for violation of RA 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case,
without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates
that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.
> PCGG (EO 1), was created due to the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public ofce and/or using their
powers, authority, inuence, connections or relationship. Even though the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth
was done during the administration of Pres. Marcos, what has to be inquired into is WON private respondent acted
as a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of EO 1 when he allegedly unlawfully acquired the
properties.
> It does not sufce that Tecson is or was a government ofcial or employee during the administration of former
Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the
respondent's case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of any public ofcer.
Under RA 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired By Any Public Ofcer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever any public ofcer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public ofcer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
[Sec.2]. The Solicitor General shall le the petition and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after
preliminary investigation by the provincial or city prosecutor.
> Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under
RA 3019 and 1379, and not under EO1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
- The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
- The defense of prescription as Tecson already retired 6 years ago cannot hold water.
It must be pointed out that Sec 2 of RA 1379 should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that "The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public ofcials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel." Considering that Sec 2 of RA 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive
period provided therein had lapsed insofar as Tecson is concerned, we cannot say that he had already acquired a
vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment. Moreover, to bar the Government from
recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation or legitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a
consequence at variance with the clear intent of RA 1379, which provides:
SEC. 11. Laws on Prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be
invoked by, nor shall they benet the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquired by him.
Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor
General under Sec 2 of RA 1379, may still investigate the case and le the petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen.

Exc. US v. Sto. Nino

13 Phil 141

Facts:
Victor Sto.Nio was caught possessing a deadly weapon, to wit:
Iron bar, 15 inches in length, with an iron ball on one end and a string on the other end tied to the wrist.
He was prosecuted under Act No. 1780, An Act to regulate the Importation, Acquisition, Use and Transfer of
Deadly Weapons.

Section 26 of said Act provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or
other deadly weapons, Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to rearms in the possession of persons
who have secured a license therefor or who are entitled to carry the same under the provisions of this Act.
The trial court ruled that the weapon carried by Sto. Nio was not included in the prohibition citing the rule of
EJUSDEM GENERIS.
The trial court argued that the specically enumerated terms refer to bladed weapons (bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris) and therefore, the general phrase or other deadly weapons should be construed to mean and all
other bladed deadly weapons.

Issue:
Whether or not the application of the rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS was proper in this case.

Held:
The rule of EJUSDEM GENERIS does not apply in this case since the proviso clearly indicates the Legislatures
intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the bladed weapons therein specied.

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable
cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a
justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting
on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon
the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim "casus omisus can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the
rule of "casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the
term "judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the
Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader
term "judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of
the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for
trial on the merits.

Notes:

Section 54 - active intervention of public ofcers and employees - no justice, judge, scal, treasurer, or
assessor of any province, no ofcer or employee of the army, no member of the national, provincial, city,
municipal, or rural police force, and no classied civil service ofcer or employee shall aid in any candidate, or
exert inuence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace ofcer.
Casus Omissus
Casus Omissus pro omisso Habendus est (restrictive rule)
Lopez vs. CTA
GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector
of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular
and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a
result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional
customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss
the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its
resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of
said resolution of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of Tax
Appeal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has
appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section
11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions
among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention
the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more
reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say,
the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected by a decision of
the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and
control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found
in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions
upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but
even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to
rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and
carry out the evident intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125,
the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.

Permissive Rule

*Redendo Singula Singulis

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.

GR L-22160 & 22161, 21 Jan 1974

Issue as to dismissal of theappeal. After the appellant had led his brief, the Solicitor General led a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was 47 days late. Appellant's counsel de ocio did
not oppose the motion. Action thereon was "deferred until this case is considered on the merits".(Resolution of
March 7, 1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellee's brief. The lower court's decision convicting
defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14,1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on
February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963, he led a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the
orderofdenial was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendant's counsel through his wife. He
had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary 15 day period for appeal
should be computed from the date of notication and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He
led his notice of appeal only on September10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. - When appeal to be taken.
An appeal must be taken within fteen (15) days from promulgation ornoticeof thejudgment ororder
appealedfrom. This period forperfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is
led until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney
Stat Con:
1. The word must in Section 6 is synonymous with ought. Itconnotescompulsionor mandatoriness. The
clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be effected within fteen days from
thepromulgation of the judgment
The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is conrmed by the
practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for reconsideration was led on March 1st, which
was the fteenth or last day of the reglementary period.
The assumption that the 15-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the
decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken
2) The word "promulgation" in section 6 should beconstrued as referring to "judgment" while the word
"notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule ofreddendo
singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let
each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively".
Therefore,whentheorderdenyingappellant'smotionforreconsiderationwasservedby registered mail
on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to le his notice of appeal and not
eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character of the rule governing
appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3,Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, led on September 10, 1963, was fty-eight days late. Arigoristic
application of section 6 justies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for by the prosecution.
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his counsel's
inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the
record toobviate any possible miscarriage of justice.

Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May
1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the Citys
Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14
May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao
Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697,
petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Roo, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed
to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latters filing of a certificate of candidacy
for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one
construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein,
namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions
in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public appointive office
or position, is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular
section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the
evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be
followed. A statutes clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in
subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the
proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the
Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

Noscitur a sociis
-the meaning of an unclear word or phrase is to be determined (construed) on the basis of its context the words or
phrases surrounding it.

People v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-17663

Facts:
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of libel as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for the
evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, and of impeaching and besmirching
the latters virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing him to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru the
medium of an amplier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: Arsenio
Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City
Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel, which are false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring
the name and reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule.
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is, not libel, but
oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it having been allegedly committed on October 5, 1959, or more
than six (6) months prior to the ling of the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of First Instance of
Manila granted this motion and, accordingly, quashed the information, with costsde ocio. Hence, this appeal
by the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Said
provisions read:

ART. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished byarresto mayorin its maximum period toprision
correccionalin its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall
bearresto menoror a ne not exceeding 200 pesos.
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means, shall be punished byprision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods or a ne ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
ART. 353. Denition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
The prosecution maintains that the medium of an amplier system, thru which the defamatory statements
imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the purview of the terms writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means, appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in amplier system is a means
similar to radio.

Held:
This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendants brief, radio as a means of
publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening
between transmitter and receiver (Library of Universal Knowledge) (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p.
285), while transmission of words by means of an amplier system, such as the one mentioned in the
information, is not thru electromagnetic waves and is with the use of conducting wires intervening
between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . . .

Secondly, even the word radio used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms with
which it is associated writing, printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition
or cinematographical exhibition all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as
a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.
Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the
radio constitute libel (Sorensen vs. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasner, 20 P. [2d] 487,
104 A.L.R. 877), whereas the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous
remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a
prepared text, but not appearing thereon (Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963).
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation punished in Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribed six (6) months after its commission, or on April 5, 1960 (Articles
90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over four (4) months before the ling of said information, in view of which the
order appealed from is afrmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]

Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.
Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-
contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of
the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the
said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. Ocampo further bound
himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to
finish the construction on 20 June 1967.
Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages
(Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorneys fees and costs. Ocampo filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The motion
was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions
arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court
dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of
origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.
1. Where personal actions may be filed
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by
written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another.
2. "May" only permissive
The word "may is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary
circumstances, the term "may be connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May is an
auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case at bar, the
stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the
parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to
submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court
specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v.
Reparations Commission: "May is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI
Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section
2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Construction of Words and Phrases

-"May" and "Shall"
Notes:
May - may provide options to choose from but which one may opt not to
Shall - may provide options to mandatorily choose from

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952)

FACTS:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certicate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel
Respondent company to accept his back pay certicateas payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was
Sec. 2 of RA 304, which providesthat investment funds or banks or other nancial institutions owned or
controlled bythe government shall subject to availability of loanable funds accept or discountat not
more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certicate forcertain specied purposes.
Respondent company contended however that theword shall used in this particular section of the
law is merely directory. The lowercourt sustained Respondent company.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certicate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.

HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signication, the word shall is imperative. However, the rule is not
absolute; it may be construed as may when required bythe context or by the intention of the statute. The
modier, at not more than twoper centum per annum for ten years., the interest to be charged,
that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more but the legislative purpose
and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certicate for the benet of the holders, for whose benet
the same have been issued, can be carried out by xing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the
discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the
acceptance or discount of the certicate is to be subject to the condition of the availability of loanable
funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition
that there are available loanable funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if
there are loanable funds.

Notes:
Shall - limited to the options provided

"Of" and "May" "And" and "Or"

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunication Phil
GR 126496, 30 April 1997

Facts:
On 19 October, 1993, BellTel led with the National Telecommunications Commission
an application for a certicate of public convenience with a further request for the
issuance of a provisional authority (NTC Case 93-481). On 25 March 1994, RA 7692
was enacted granting BellTel a legislative franchise to operate business of providing
telecommunication services. O. 12 July 1994, BellTel led a second application for a
certicate of public convenience, proposing to install 2.6 Million telephone lines in 10
years and to provide a 100% digital local exchange network (NTC case 94-229). I also
moved for the withdrawal of the rst application, without prejudice, which was granted
by the NTC. BellTel's 2nd application was opposed by various telecommunication
companies. BellTel's application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization
Department (CCAD), which found BellTel's proposal technically feasible and BellTel to be
nancially capable. The two deputy commissioners of the NTC signied their approval of
the CCAD recommendation. The working draft was prepared by the legal department,
was initiated by the two deputy commissioners, but was not signed by NTC
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. BellTel led a motion to promulgate, after previously
ling two urgent esparte motion to resolve application which were not acted upon by
the NTC. On 4 July 1995, the NTC denied the motion in an order signed solely by
Commissioner Kintanar. On 17 July 1995, BellTel led a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition against NTC before the SC. The court referred the case to
the CA pursuant to paragraph 1, Section 9 of BP 129. The CA granted BellTel's
position. Hence, the petitions for review by the opposing telecommunication companies
and Commissioner Kintanar.

Issue:
W/N the vote of the Chairman of the Commission is sufcient to legally render an NTC
order resolution or decision.

Held:
Having been organized under EO 146 as "composed of a Commissioner and two deputy
commissioners," the NTC is a collegial body. The "and" means in addition to and it must
be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. Every part must be
given effect. The thing may rather ahve effect than be destroyed. Thus, it requires a
majority vote out of three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case
or any incident therein. The vote alone of the chairman is not sufcient to legally render
an NTC order, resolution or decision. The NTC Circulars and Order of Kintanar, declaring
the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus are null
and void.

"Principally" and "Exclusively"

Alfon v. Republic
GR L-51201, 29 May 1980

Facts:
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May, 1952 to Filomeno
Duterte and Estrella. She was taken care of her uncle and aunt, Mr. And Mrs. Hector
Alfon. When she started schooling, she used the name Estrella Alfon. She used the
same name in schools, universities, and in voting.
She led a veried petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her anne be changed to
Estrella Alfon. The CFI partially denied her petition, granting only a change of rst name
but not the surname, on the ground that Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
"Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Issue:
W/N the court should grant the petition.

Held:
The court grants the petition. The word "principally" is synonymous to primarily and
indicates choice. It is not equivalent to "exclusively," which means solely, so that there
is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname
of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
One of the grounds for change of name is when the change is necessary to svoid
confusion. This applies in the case at bar since Estrella has long used the name of her
uncle.

Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]

Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur
Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrars Office as Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her
uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She
attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella
S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished
Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the
same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.
She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners
prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname.
The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not
only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs.
1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively
The word "principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to "exclusively so that
there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its
mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her
father.
2. Grounds for change of name
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the
grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the
change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw
Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as
the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

"Principally" and "Exclusively"

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on
different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as
Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was
rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In
each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case
was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for
probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than
1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court denied the application for
probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioners
application for probation; without costs.
1. "Previous" applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime
The statute relates "previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the
crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When
he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of
his application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.

"Previously"

"Every"
NHA v. Juco
134 SCRA 172

Facts:
Juco was an employee of the NHA. He led a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but
his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned
corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further
proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC

Issue:
Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter,
covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

Held:
Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specically provides: "The Civil Service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including
every government owned and controlled corporation.
The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort
at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full
consequences of the civil service system. All ofces and rms of the government are
covered.
This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that
personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements.
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It
does not cover cases involving private rms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings.

xxx
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled
corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil
Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by
the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created
by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.

Notes:
There is no need to enumerate.

Surplusages
-1. Redundant words in a statute or legal instrument; language that does not add
meaning <the court must give effect to every word, reading nothing as mere
surplusage>. [Cases: Statutes 202, 206.] 2. Extraneous matter in a pleading
<allegations that are irrelevant to the case will be treated as surplusage>.

Demales v. COMELEC
GR L-28396, 29 Dec 1987

Facts:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject
returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they
were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then
asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question were
disqualied only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. In light
of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
Issues:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from
Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualied from
sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
Held:
RA 4970 reads:
the rst mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipalityof Sebaste shall be
elected in the next general elections for local ofcials and shall have qualied
The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualied is devoid of meaning. The term
of ofce of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election,
despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However,
since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be
annulled.
The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a
candidate for ofce in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body Since
Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation,
there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns
which are otherwise regular..

Punctuations
Arabay v. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte
66 SCRA 617

Facts:
The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance 19 that charged tax for the selling and
distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleum-based products.
Arabay, Inc, distributor of as, oil, and other petroleum products, contested the validity
of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under
Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that "municipalities may not (1) impose any
percentage tax on sales or other taxes... (2) nor impose taxes on articles subject to
specic tax, except gasoline..."

Issue:
W/N Arabay, Inc is entitled to a refund.

Held:
The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as s
sales tax ordinance but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear
terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from the terms that the
amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon the volume of
sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing
sales and specic tax, with the exception of gasoline, there subsists the right of Arabay,
Inc to a refund. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso
in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately
and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose
whatever type or form of taxes. Punctuations are not decisive or controlling elements.
Construction should be based on something more substantial than mere punctuation.

Other Examples
People v. Mejia
GR 118940-41 and GR 119407, 7 July 1997

Facts:
On March 10, 1994 at an expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
the accused attacked the Jeepney driven by Landingin and attacked him and passenger
Catugas, inicting multiple stab wounds. Catugas, who was thrown out of the middle of
the road, survived while Landingin died. Three separate criminal complaints were led
against them: murder, frustrated murder, and violation of RA 6539 or the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1992.

Sec. 14 of the RA 6539 states:

"Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not les than seventeen years and
four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."

Issue:
W/N the phrase "is killed" covers both homicide and murder.
If the crime is frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death?
W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense.

Held:
The words "is killed" make no distinction between homicide and murder. Whether it is
one or the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion
thereof" makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. The killing. Whether
it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to
qualify the carnapping.
The phrase "is killed" refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated murder.
Frustrated homicide or murder is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to
fall under the clause of Sec. 14 "by means of violence or intimidation of persons."

Number, Gender, and Tense

Santillon v. Miranda
GR L-19281, 30 July, 1965

Facts:
On Nov 1, 1953, Santillon died without testament and left his wife, Perfecta, and son,
Claro, several parcels of land located in the province. 4 years after, Claro led a petition
for letters of administration, which was opposed by Perfected and souses Miranda and
Corrales on the grounds of: (1) all the properties in the petition were conjugal (2)
Perfecta conveyed 3/4 of her undivided shares to the spouses (3) administration was
not necessary there being a case on partition pending (4) Perfecta would be the more
appropriate administrator. Perfecta was appoint administratix.

Claro claims 3/4 of 1/2 of his father's estate in accordance with Art. 892 of the New
Civil Code: "If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the
widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. Perfecta
claims 1/2 in accordance with Art. 996: "if a widow or widower and legitimate children
or descendants are left, surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that
of each children.

Issue:
W/N Claro is entitled to 3/4 of the share.

Held:
Claro is not entitled because Art. 892 falls under the chapter on Testamentary
Succession while Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession.
Further, even though the provision states "children or descendants," it is understood to
include the singular "child."

Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs [GR 30264, 12 March 1929]
En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur
Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909 provides that the manufactures of wool, not otherwise
provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem tax, while paragraph 197 provides that vehicles for use on
railways, and detached parts thereof, are subject to 10% ad valorem. Dust shield are manufactured of
mixed wool and hair, and are used in railroad cabins of the Manila Railroad Company. The Insular
Collector of Customs decided that dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for.
Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs and held that dust shields should
be classified as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197
of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same
section of the law. It thus affirmed the appealed judgment in its entirety, without special taxation of
costs in either instance.
1. Nature of dust shields
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief value is the
wool. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil
deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. Dust guard, which is the same
as dust shield, is defined in the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p.
41, as follows: A thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard
chamber at the back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its
purpose is to exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or
box packing.
2. Burden of proof on the validity of a legal collection of duties upon who questions it
The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof
that their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but
whether the importer was right.
3. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do not extend their provisions; in case of doubt
It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their
provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are
construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to
be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. In the
case at bar, taking account the purpose of the article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it is used as a
detached part of railway vehicles.
4. Particular enactment must be operative over the general one in the same statute
Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the
same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense
would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general language are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.

Special over General

What is the rule regarding conicting provisions of the same statute?
According to value
Almeda v. Florentino
Case No. 10
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67
FACTS:
RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14
that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the
term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12
of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended,
the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize
Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position,
purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter.
ISSUE:
Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the
Municipal Board of Pasay City?
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the
provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is
manifested that the legislature so intended.

Amended Section 12 reads:

"...The Vice Mayor shall appoint all the employees of the Board who may be suspended or removed
in accordance with law, and shall approve the payroll of the said employees."

"ut magis valeat quam pereat" (that construction [is to be] sought which gives effect to the
whole of the statute--its every word)

Section 14 limits the power of the Vice Mayor to appoint all the employees under Section 12 other
than the secretary.
Laxamana v. Baltazar [GR L-5955, 19 September 1952]
First Division, Bengzon (p): 7 concur
Facts: In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar,
assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the
provincial governor, acting under section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (RA 180), with the consent
of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the
corresponding official oath. Thus, the quo warranto petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the quo warranto petition with costs.
1. Section 21(a) derived from Section 2180; supplements, not repeal, Section 2195
Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that upon the occasion of the absence,
suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor,
or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest
number of votes. Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code provides that whenever a temporary
vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it
is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the provincial board, if it
is a municipal office. The portion of Section 21(a) relating to municipal offices was taken from section
2180 of the Revised Administrative Code. Thus, when the office of municipal president (now mayor)
became permanently vacant, the vice- president stepped into the office. Likewise, when the municipal
president is suspended, the vice-president takes his place by virtue of Section 2195. Sections 2180 and
2195, thus, supplemented each other. It must also be noted that paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied
to municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal president.
2. Contemporaneous and practical interpretation of re-enacted statute
sWhere a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as
interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily
receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based
upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a
statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of
administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-
enactment. The incorporation of Section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code as Section 21(a) of the
Revised Election Law did not have the effect of enlarging its scope, to supersede or repeal section 2195,
what with the presumption against implied repeals.
3. Particular over general
Even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the
principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the
latter is paramount to the former (Sec. 288, Act 190). Where one statute deals with a subject in general
terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be
harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was
passed prior to the general statute. In the case at bar, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in
the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal
(local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the
latter.
4. Particular not repealed by general statute unless there is manifest intent to repeal such
A special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter

What is the rule regarding conicting provisions of different statues?

is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in
the special law. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of such earlier
statute. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the
general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and
the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
5. Executive Construction given weight by Court
The contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers charged with its
execution deserves great weight in the courts. In the case at bar, the Department of the Interior and the
office of Executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal
governments, even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, have consistently held that in case of
the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law,
assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice- mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged
by the first councilor.

Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan [GR L-21516, 29 April 1966]

En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise (RA. 399, 18 June 1949), for an electric
light, heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions
established in Act 3636, as amended by CA 132 and the Constitution. It was also issued a certificate of
public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18 March 1954. On 1 October
1950, Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or receipts tax of any business operated in the city.
This ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14 December 1950), by enumerating the kinds of
businesses required to pay the tax. It was further amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May 1961) by
modifying the penal provision, and further by Ordinance 148, approved on 11 June 1962 by including
within the coverage of taxable businesses those engaged in the business of electric light, heat and
power (sic). On 13 April 1960, Ordinance 104 was enacted, making it unlawful for any person or firm to
cut or disconnect the electrical connection of any consumer in the city of Butuan without his consent.
The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152; Petition for
declaratory relief), the court declared Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and 148 of the City of Butuan
unconstitutional and ultra vires, as far as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the
business of electric light, heat and power of Butuan Sawmill. The court also annulled Ordinance 104 for
being unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the direct appeal on questions of
law to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision with costs against appellant City of Butuan.
1. Taxation of franchise beyond citys taxation power.
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of Butuan
Sawmill (see Section 2, Act 2264). The inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by
the city of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power
of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be taken as an authority
delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor specifically
provide any such power. It must be noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18
June 1949 while the citys charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
2. Earlier special over the latter general
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad
enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the
general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.(State vs. Stoll; Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty).
3. Construction must consider other provisions of the same act; and its effects
Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264) specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on persons
paying franchise tax. Further, the citys interpretation of the provision would result in double taxation
against the business of the franchisee because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise
tax. The logical construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264, that would not nullify section 2 (j) of the same
Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are not subject to
franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by cities or municipalities.
4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police power
The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any
consumers building with the power plant, without the consent of the consumer, except in case of fire,
clear and positive danger to residents, or order of the authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power

Or else would result in double taxation

No city, municipality, district may levy the following: 1 taxes on persons operating
waterworks, irrigation and other PU except electric light, heat and power. 2 taxes on
persons paying franchise
for the general welfare The ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current
to a company even if the latter does not pay the bills thereof, and to that extent deprives the company
of its property without due process. How the general welfare would be promoted under the ordinance
has neither been explained nor justified. The general welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of
the complaining consumers against the franchise holder, because the legislature has specifically lodged
jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services and their franchises in the Public Service
Commission, and not in the City of Butuan.

Arayata v. Joya
Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government
for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of
the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator.
Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow,
herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code
provision on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to
Florentino for liquidation and distribution.
Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds
of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120s
full conveyance of the property to the widow.
HELD:
Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition, disposition,
and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is
a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail.

City of Manila vs. Teotico

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin
or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay
damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for
the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

What is the rule in case of conict between a special provision of a general law and a general
provision of a special law?
The other law in conict with the CC is RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila), Section 4:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the mayor, the municipal board, or any other city ofcer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, etc, while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.

The special provision of the general law prevails.

David v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay
elections should be held and questions the COMELECs schedule of holding such
elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the
Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years.
Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed.
R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also
contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later
legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC
had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it
stated that the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7
months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997.
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office
for barangay officials.

*also, contemporaneous acts of the legislature

The Constitutional Commission discussed that the term of barangay ofcials will be "as may be
determined by law" thus, as may be determined by the Local Autonomy Code, which is a 3-year
limit.
US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.

External Aids
Origin of the State
Sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders 58:
34. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, the court, at any time before
the defendants have entered upon their defense or upon the application of the counsel of the
government, may direct any defendant to be discharged, that he may be a witness for the United
States.
35. When tow or more persons shall be included in the same charge, and the court shall be of
opinion in respect to a particular defendant that there is not sufcient evidence to put him on his
defense, it must order him to be discharged before the evidence is closed, that he may be a
witness for his codefendant.
36. The order indicated in sections thirty-four and thirty-ve shall amount to an acquittal of the
defendant discharged, and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.

"only granted to those who testify in good faith... (those who do otherwise would commit) an
outrage on law, and a prostitution of justice."
The defendants failure to perform his duty deprived him of the right to plead his former dismissal
as a bar to his prosecution in this case.
He is convicted and sentenced.

"It is a general rule of statcon that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the
statues which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of the facts which affect their
derivation, validity, and operation."

In accordance to the common law of England, of which the practice originates, the FAITHFUL
performance of the agreement entitled him to an equitable rights to a recommendation of
executive clemency.
In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. SSC [ GR L-15045, 20 January 1961]
En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 reserves vote
Facts: On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the
Social Security Commission a request that Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions
and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended (Social
Security Law of 1954). Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security
Commission in its Resolution 572 (s. 1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of
the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958);
hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended.
The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security Commission, with
costs against appellant.
1. Definition of employer, employee, and employment (as defined in law)
The term employer as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or
foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind
and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations
owned or controlled by the Government (par. [c], sec. 8), while an employee refers to any person
who performs services for an `employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used
and who receives compensation for such services (par. [d] sec. 8). Employment, according to
paragraph [j] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly
enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government,
domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain
purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, it is
apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except
those expressly excluded. The definition of the term employer is, thus, sufficiently comprehensive as
to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. Had
the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it
would not have defined an employer in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an
express exception of it.
3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law
When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or
charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par.
[j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of RA
1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include
charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries
The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of
industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily

Legislative debates
explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are
corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.
5. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice
The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power, pursuant to the policy of the
Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which
shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It affords protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the
promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people.
6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public funds for
the benefit of a priest; does not violate right to disseminate religious information
The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming that said funds are
impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement, death or disability benefits
would not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution, since such payment shall be
made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. Further, the contributions
are not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with the contributions imposed upon the
employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Section 9 of RA 1161
In the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of 16 and 60 years
inclusive, if they have been for atleast 6 months at the service if an employer who is a member of
the system,

National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
FACTS:
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower.
ISSUE:
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just
compensation.
HELD:
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative
enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x
x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation
cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.

Presumptions
In favor of validity of Legislative acts
Paat v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95
G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal
logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68 of PD
705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the order of
confiscation in favor of the Governmentas well as the machinery, equipment
which are illegally used
ISSUE:
W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705.
HELD:
No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

Check pp. 5-6

In favor of benecial operation of statutes

Repeals
Rule on retroactivity of repeals

Tac-an v. CA
GR 62251, 29 July 1985

Facts:
Petitioners and respondent are brothers and sisters. Their mother managed the entire
estate, including an agricultural land when their father died. Upon the mother's death,
they partitioned the estate thru a compromise agreement because of Alfonso's
complaints.
Alfonso claims to be the owner of the coconut trees in their land which he planted upon
agreement between him and his mother. He received half of his produce.The petitioners
contend that he is barred by prior judgment of the intestate proceedings.
Issue:
W/N he can claim his share.
Held:
Yes, he has reserved his right to recovery of ownership of coconuts.
He is also not barred by prescription because he led his complaint 2 years after the
intestate proceedings. Art. 1144 of the Cc provides 10 years before the right accrues.
He cannot claim his share because he conceded in a compromise agreement.
Villegas v. Subido [GR L-31711, 30 September 1971]
En Banc, Fernando (p): 8 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: In a letter dated 3 June 1968, the Secretary of Finance (Romualdez), authorized the Office of the
City Treasurer of Manila (Gloria) to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective 1 June 1968.
In AO 40 (s. 1968, 17 June 1968), Mayor Villegas of Manila, directed Gloria to desist and refrain from
exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer, on the ground that Romualdez is not
empowered to make such designation. On 1 January 1969, Mayor Villegas appointed Manuel D. Lapid,
chief of the each division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a
1st indorsement dated 14 February 1969, the Commissioner of Civil Service (Subido) disapproved the
appointment of Lapid, basing his action on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated 19 September
1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section
2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, RA
5185.
On 25 February 1969, Mayor Villegas and Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition, quo warranto
and mandamus, with application for writ of preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered
to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by Romualdez to Gloria to assume the duties
of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Commissioner of Civil
Service commanding him to approve the appointment of Lapid to the said office in accordance with the
Civil Service Rules. It was not until the filing of the petition that Gloria was nominated by the President
of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed.
After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by
the parties, the lower court rendered its decision on 4 August 1969 dismissing the petition. Hence this
appeal by way of certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, without pronouncement as to costs.
1, Officers and employees distinguished
The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an officer to designate those
whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined
by law or not. In the case at hand, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee.
2. Pineda v. Claudio does not apply
The principle, that undue interference with the power and prerogatives of a local executive is sought to
be avoided considering the City Mayors primary responsibility is for efficient governmental
administration, was announced in connection with the appointment of a department head, the chief of
police, who necessarily must enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive, one moreover whose
appointment is expressly vested in the city mayor. The principle therein announced does not extend as
far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose functions do not require that much degree of
confidence, not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the President.
3. Implied repeals not favored; Standard to determine repeal
Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended (See US v. Reyes, 1908). It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to
exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
Implied Repeals
"...ofces entirely paid out of city funds and their resoective assistants shall
be appointd by the mayor provided that this does not apply to city treasurers.
Appointment is governed by RAC.
1987 1967
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.
4. Subsequent general statute does not repeal a special enactment unless intent is manifest
A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as
repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. Generalia
specialibus non derogant. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act. (see Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 1919). At any rate, in
the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the
specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention
upon the part of the legislature.
5. General and special laws distinguished
A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place
naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things
of a class.