CIVIL CASE DIGESTS (Article 29) PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., - versus NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, G.R. No.

126297 January 31, 2007 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA, - versus FACTS: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed, because in the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered the remarks: "sponge count lacking 2 "announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure." Natividad Agana was discharged on April 24, 1984 and payed hospital bills amounting to 60,000 Php. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines. On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical JUAN FUENTES, G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: MIGUEL AMPIL, - versus NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery. On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes . They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named children. On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas. Issues: G.R. No. 126297 Whether or not of Professional ServicesInc. is solidarily for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. G.R. No. 126467 Whether or not Dr. Fuentes is guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that the pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent. G.R. No. 127590 Whether or not Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and malpractice sans evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividads vagina. HELD: G.R. No. 126297 YES, the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not,

technically employees , the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. "The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. "it is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence." By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. G.R. No. 126467 NO, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which caused the injury." We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when Dr. Ampil found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship."

The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his patients body that should be removed as part of the operation, he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition which imposes upon him the legal duty of calling the new condition to his patients attention, and endeavoring with the means he has at hand to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom. Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. February 2, 2010 RESOLUTION of PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007 NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA, vs. JUAN FUENTES, G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007 And MIGUEL AMPIL, vs. NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007 CORONA, J.: FACTS: Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) filed a second motion for reconsideration urging referral thereof to the Court en banc and seeking modification of the decision dated January 31, 2007 and resolution dated February 11, 2008 which affirmed its vicarious and direct liability for damages to respondents Enrique Agana and the heirs of Natividad Agana (Aganas). Manila Medical Services, Inc. (MMSI), Asian Hospital, Inc. (AHI), and Private Hospital Association of the Philippines (PHAP) all sought to intervene in these cases invoking the common ground that, unless modified, the assailed decision and resolution will jeopardize the financial viability of private hospitals and jack up the cost of health care. ISSUE:

G.R. No. 127590 YES, he is liable despite pointing to other probable causes, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the attending nurses failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad in the United States of America.

Whether or not Professional Services Inc. has been erred to be held liable for the Negligence of Dr. Miguel Ampil. HELD: YES, after gathering its thoughts on the issues, this Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship

with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. **Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. **Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task. As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical director, which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours each week and which were strictly to be observed under pain of administrative sanctions. **That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for that matter, respondents' work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power.

HELD: No. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature. B. BARREDO V GARCIA BOCOBO; July 8, 1942 FACTS - from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death of Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo - May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers - Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved - Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla - CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding > CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law - Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible ISSUE WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla HELD YES. - There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict 1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private interest 2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage 3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt 4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere preponderance of evidence - Presumptions: 1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias - motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (May 31, 1984) A. ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA versus- COURT OF APPEALS Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,600.00 to the complainants as actual damages. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

C. CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO 38 Phil 768 FISHER; October 14, 1918 NATURE An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P. McElroy. FACTS - Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. - January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach. - On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. - The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. - The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited. - The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. - August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff HELD NO Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Reasoning - The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.

- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. - Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations - In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . .." - In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. - Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. - The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is refutable. - In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. - Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. - The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. - The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence: "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily

prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." - In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM, [dissent] - With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we have the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.

CALALAS VS MENDOZA GR 122039| 31 May 2000 FACTS -At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a collegefreshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney wasfilled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor anextension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of thevehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepneystopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzutruck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the leftrear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained afracture of the distal third of the left tibiafibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin. Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period. -On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas before the RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a thirdparty complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. -On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro pay Sunga (1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

(5) to pay the costs. Calalas motion for reconsideration was denied 11 September 1995. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N The CA erred in reversing the TCs ruling? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the 31 March 1991 decision and the 11 September 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals, with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted. 1. Res Judicata does not apply Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict, as she was never a party to that case. Further, the issues in Civil Case 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to Calalas jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the present case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. The principle of res judicata, therefore, does not apply. 2. Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual, and culpa contractual Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of contract or culpa contractual is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. 3. Common carriers presumed at fault unless they observed extraordinary diligence; Burden of proof In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. 4. Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict, not in breach of contract The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. 5. Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. On the other hand, Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Article 1756 provides that In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755. 6. In violation of traffic rules; Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic) Herein, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about 2 meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the RA 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides in Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic) that No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.

7. In violation of traffic rules; Section 32(a) (Exceeding registered capacity) Herein,the driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of Section 32(a) of the same law. Section 32 [a] (Exceeding registered capacity) provides that No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity. The fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. 8. Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very cautious persons Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of Calalas to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances as required by Article 1755. Not only was Calalas unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. 9. Taking of Extension seat cannot be considered an implied assumption of risk Sungas taking an extension seat did not amount to an implied assumption of risk. Otherwise, iIt is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. CIVIL CODE Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101) Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a) Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103) Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) CHAPTER 2: QUASI-DELICTS Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or

negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n) Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n) RPC Title Fourteen: QUASI-OFFENSES Sole Chapter: CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957

AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al) 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966 NATURE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane." - both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON the Court could review the questions of fact Substantive 2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets)

3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find 4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act 5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made by the air-carriers purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorneys fees 9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive HELD 1. NO, NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals, contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. Obiter. - Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before".xxx The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. - FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" - QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties 2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Reasoning - Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. However, CA held that Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carriers employees attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a first class ticket. - If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. -Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok, he was granted the first class seat. If there had been no seat, and if the white man had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat? 3. YES Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Reasoning - There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. - Air France did not present evidence that the white man made a prior reservation, nor proved that the white man had better right over the seat; also, if the managers actions could be justified, they should have presented the manager to testify in court but they did not do so - The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes 4. YES - The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. 5. YES - Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. (note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Reasoning - Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. - alsoFrom a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". Reasoning - Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The petitioner contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay. However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascosos testimony if they had presented the purser. 7. YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". Reasoning - The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept 8. YES

Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\ 9. NO Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner.

AMADO PICART, - versus FRANK SMITH, JR., [G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918] STREET, J.: FACTS: On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith, jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, Picart pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When Smith had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. ISSUE: Whether or not Frank Smith is liable for negligence causing the injuries to Amado Picart. HELD: YES, a prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. ** The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. **The "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. March 2010[3] which denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos.[4] The Facts The present case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by respondent City of Manila against Remedios V. De Caronongan, Patria R. Serrano, Laureano M. Reyes, Paz B. Sison, Teofila B. Sison, Leticia R. Ventanilla, Rosalinda R. Barrozo (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 03108154. In its Complaint,[5] the City of Manila alleged that it passed Ordinance No. 7949 authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by expropriation, negotiation or by any other legal means the parcel of land co-owned by defendants, which is covered by TCT No. 227512 and with an area of 1,182.20 square meters. The City of Manila offered to purchase the property at P1,000.00 per square meter. In their Answer,[6] defendants conveyed their willingness to sell the property to the City of Manila, but at the price of P50,000.00 per square meter which they

(Remedial Case) SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011] ORLANDO A. RAYOS, FE A. RAYOS-DELA PAZ, REPRESENTED BY DR. ANTONIO A. RAYOS, AND ENGR. MANUEL A. RAYOS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENT. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: The Case This petition, captioned as a petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief,[1] assails the Order of 6 January 2011[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, denying reconsideration of the trial courts Order of 11

claimed was the fair market value of the land at the time. In the course of the proceedings, Laureano, one of the defendants, died on 1 December 2003 and was substituted by his son petitioner Manuel A. Rayos. Meanwhile, petitioner Orlando A. Rayos intervened while petitioner Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz was added as a defendant. On 7 December 2009, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and (2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labra[7] and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila[8] apply squarely to the present case. On 11 March 2010, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled that the motion to dismiss did not show any compelling reason to convince the court that the doctrine of stare decisis applies. Petitioners failed to demonstrate how or why the facts in this case are similar with the cited cases in order that the issue in this case be resolved in the same manner. The trial court disposed of the motion to dismiss in this wise: In view of the foregoing, and after intense evaluation of the records on hand, the Motion to Dismiss cannot be granted. In order to prevent further delay to the prejudice of all the proper parties in this case, continue with the trial for the determination of just compensation on July 7, 2010 at one oclock in the afternoon. SO ORDERED.[9] On 6 January 2011, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed with this Court the present petition reiterating the arguments in their motion to dismiss, namely, (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional, and (2) the cases of Lacgao v. Labra[10] and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila[11] apply squarely to this case. The Ruling of the Court We deny the petition. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable. [12] An order denying a motion to dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the court. As such, it is merely interlocutory in nature and thus, not appealable. [13] Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: xxx (c) An interlocutory order; xxx In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, since the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For being a wrong remedy, the present petition deserves outright dismissal. Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court. Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.[14] However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In [Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor],[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] the Court held: This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.) In short, to warrant a direct recourse to this Court, petitioners must show exceptional and compelling reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This petitioners failed to do. Petitioners merely rehashed the arguments in their motion to dismiss, which consist mainly of unsubstantiated allegations. Petitioners invoke the cases of Lagcao v. Labra[18] and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila[19] in challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949 without, however, showing clearly the applicability and similarity of those cases to the present controversy. Neither did petitioners explain why Ordinance No. 7949 is repugnant to the Constitution. Nor did petitioners specifically and sufficiently set forth any extraordinary and important reason to justify direct recourse to this Court.[20] Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief,[21] as can be gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition[22] or mandamus, over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction,[23] it must be stressed that this special treatment is undertaken only in cases with far reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved.[24] In the present case, there is absolutely nothing which shows that it has farreaching implications and involves transcendental questions deserving of this Courts treatment of the petition as one for prohibition or mandamus. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. SO ORDERED.