Professional Documents
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DELEGATION OF POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916 Facts: COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same
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would entail an immense amount of clerical work." ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands? Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law? HELD: The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. RULING: The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
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has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants. US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122 Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose".
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power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
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for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board. So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power. HELD: NO. The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work. Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission. The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
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the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issues: Whether or not there is a delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
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undue
FACTS Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00 NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949. This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year. b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
DECISION
1. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is
not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. 2. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. 3. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs PANGASINAN TRANS. CO. v. SERVICE COM LOVINA v. MORENO PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL SEPARATION OF POWERS Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., Facts:
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PUBLIC
however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute. We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. taThe present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
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resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued. Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 FACTS: A complaint for partition was filed by plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 in CFI against Bernardita R. Macariola concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, their common father. A decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in said civil case awarding their share on the properties to both the plaintiffs and Macariola The decision became and subsequently, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which was approved by the latter notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant. However, both counsels of the respective parties assured that the Project of Partition, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 and Macariola approving the Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
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The case was referred to Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated. Complainant herein then instituted an action before the Court of First which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. The action was dismissed. Hence, this petition
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EH 405
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o The provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. o Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. o It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
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2. Respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business.
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties: 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxx xxx xxx 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage
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not related to the subject. IN RE: RODULFO MANZANO POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES A. RULE-MAKING POWER PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in
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highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys. (c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself which provides: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
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entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied). Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
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There are two cases (Seizure Identification Nos. 1899 and 1990) which were brought on appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the respondent Commissioner of customs, affirming the decisions of the Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila which decreed the forfeiture of two shipments from Hong Kong to Manila, one with 42 and the other with 27 packages of foreign made candies, for illegal violations of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of prohibited merchandise) which requires a license from the Monetary Board or release certificates to be able to receive goods from any foreign country. Appellants Contentions: 1. The imported goods do not involve dollar remittances or the sale of foreign exchange (as was contemplated in circular 44) and that Congress has not authorized the Central Bank to issue regulations governing imports that do not require the sale of foreign exchange, because according to him, it would not have enacted into law Republic Act No. 1410. 2. Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 were promulgated by the Monetary Board without the concurrence of at least five members and without the approval of the President ISSUE: Whether or not the sixty-nine (69) packages of candies in question are subject to forfeiture for violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of merchandise prohibited by law). HELD:
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of foreign exchange must be shown or proved. In default of such showing or proof as in fact the petitioner failed to prove in the instant case, it would be safe to assume that the importations in question involve the sale of foreign exchange which is covered by Circular No. 44 of said bank (which are measures taken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange, the authority of which was conferred to the Monetary Board by Congress by virtue of Section 74, R.A. 265 (see above). Contention Number 2: . is not supported by evidence. Circular Nos. 44 and 45 have been published in the Official Gazette. As such, presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, the ordinary course of business followed, and the law complied with. DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FACTS: The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disablility pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them. Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under
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specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof. It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained" is clearly erroneous. The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.
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carried over the succeeding years with the employee voluntarily retiring or being separated from the service without fault on his part, being entitled to the commutation of all such accumulated vacation or sick leave to his credit provided that it shall in no case exceed ten (10) months. "Officials and employees retired under this Act shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they have to their credit at the time of retirement." 2. Why then did respondent decide otherwise? It may have been due to a misreading of Section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code. What must have misled respondent was a failure to take due note that this section deals solely with a situation when a municipal mayor is absent from his office because of illness. It does not cover therefore the specific case here presented of the right of the elective official to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave upon his retirement or separation from the service through no fault of his own. Moreover it must have felt justified in view of the endorsement of the Commission of the Civil Service, who applied Section 9 of Civil Service Rule XVI, included in which is the express injunction that the leave is not cumulative. Further reflection ought to have cautioned it that certainly this rule is far from being applicable as on its face it is based on the aforesaid Section 2187, which as noted is not in point. "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of
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with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Rule: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
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CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent. ISSUE: WON CSC abused its rule-making power HELD: AFFIRMED. Respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the noncareer service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve. The assailed memorandum circular can not be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law. On the contrary, it was issued pursuant to a power expressly vested by law upon respondent. As such, it must be respected by this Court as a valid issuance of a constitutionally independent body.
SMART VS NLRC (G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003) FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators
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with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Both alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention which was granted. Court issued a temporary restraining order. Motion to dismiss and reconsideration were denied by the RTC. Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals which was granted, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function is under the jurisdiction of regular courts. HELD: CA reversed. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
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law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. A.1. INTERNAL RULES MAGLUNOB VS THE NATIONAL ABACA & OTHER FIBERS CORPORATION (NAFCO) G.R. No. L-6203 February 26, 1954 FACTS: Petitioner-appellants plead that they are landless war veterans and recognized and deserving guerillas qualified to acquire public lands under RA No. 65 and as such to enter upon, occupy, settle and take possession of parts of the parcel of land involved herein. They contend that pursuant to Rep. Acts. Nos. 8 and 65, the directive of the President of the
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lands and government-owned or managed agricultural farms or subdivisions, to obtain homesteads, concessions and franchises, and other privileges for the exploitation of the national resources which are permissible and made available by existing laws or the like;" However, granting that petitioners have a preferential right, they have lost it, because since the passage of the law more than three years have already elapsed. In view of this answer and upon motion of counsel for the respondent a preliminary hearing was held as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. ISSUE: WON RA No. 65 grants specific legal right to petitioners; WON the respondent has specific legal duty enjoined by law to perform in connection therewith. RULING: After hearing the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parcel of land in question belongs exclusively to a corporation whose board of directors happens to be the same board of directors of the respondent NAFCO and for that reason the respondent cannot alienate the lands in question to the petitioners. A motion for reconsideration was denied. From the order of dismissal the petitioners have appealed. If NAFCO is the manager of the parcel of land or is managing the plantation therein, it is not the real party in interest or the party against whom the action should be brought . At the preliminary hearing under section 5, Rule 8, the party asserting a fact must prove it by competent evidence. The duplicate for the owner of the Torrens certificate of title must have been presented or the original in the office of the Registrar of Deeds must have been exhibited to the
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Plaintiff. The company was not able to preserve the receipt stubs from 1936 to 1938 but was able to preserve those for 1939 and 1940. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental ascertained the number of receipts by referring to the conductors daily report for the said period 1936 to 1938. Both the said daily reports of Plaintiffs conductors and the available stubs did not state the value of the goods transported thereunder. However, respondent assumed that the value of the goods covered by each of the freight receipts amounted to more than P5, and assessed a documentary stamp tax of P0.04 on each of the receipts. The tax thus assessed amounted to P7,776.24, which was collected from the deposit of the Plaintiff in the PNB. Plaintiff demanded the refund of the amount, and upon refusal of the Defendant, Plaintiff filed the action. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The CA reversed the decision of the CFI and absolved the DefendantRespondent from the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES:
(1)
Did the Secretary of Finance infringe or violate any right of the taxpayer when he directed that the tax is to be collected in all cases where the bill of lading or receipt does not state that the shipment is worth P5 or less, or, in the language of the Petitioner-Appellant, when he (Secretary) created a presumption of liability to the tax if the receipt fails to state such value?
that tax officers are in no position to witness the issuance of receipts and check the value of the goods for which they are issued. If tax officers were to assess or collect the tax only when they find that the value of the goods covered by the receipts is more than five pesos, the assessment and collection of the tax would be well-nigh impossible, as it is impossible for tax collectors to determine from the receipts alone, if they do not contain the value of the goods, whether the goods receipted for exceed P5, or not. The regulation impliedly required the statement of the value of the goods in the receipts; so that the collection of the tax can be enforced. This the PetitionerAppellant failed to do and he now claims the unreasonableness of the provision as a basis for his exemption. We find that the regulation is not only useful, practical and necessary for the enforcement of the law on the tax on bills of lading and receipts, but also reasonable in its provisions. The regulation above quoted falls within the scope of the administrative power of the Secretary of Finance, as authorized in Section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, because it is essential to the strict enforcement and proper execution of the law which it seeks to implement. Said regulations have the force and effect of law. In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by Law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management,
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'"No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power." Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows: "For the violation of any of the foregoing regulations, the person offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court." The counsel of the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First, that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the Acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: WON it is an undue delegation of legislative power to authorize the Collector to promulgate such law.
Rules for local navigation prescribed by the collector of a port as harbor master pursuant to statutory authority may be sustained as not an undue exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which can not be delegated to a subordinate authority. By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain
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in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] of Act No. 355, of the Philippine Customs Administrative Act, as amended by Acts Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question. "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Rep., 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississippi
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Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature." Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned. We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section of Act No. 1136. So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked, and he is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered. THE UNITED STATES, vs.FRANK TUPASI MOLINA Facts: Frank Tupasi Molina was charged of a crime of perjury, in violation of Section 3, Act no. 1697, when defendant signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position of municipal policeman and made a false declaration under oath that he was qualified to the examinations for municipal police and have not been charged of any crime During trial, prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was sentenced and imprisoned for disturbing public peace. Defendant argues that said Act was not applicable in the present case since this Act was only authorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations. Issue:
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A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law. In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. We held in the many cases that said section 3 was a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that case. The defendant was guilty of the crime charged. PP. v. MACEREN GR No. L-32166 FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
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Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ISSUING ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS. HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
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for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
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destruction of his property during the war. Held: Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation government. Such tax laws are deemed to be laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy. As of the end of 1945, there was no law which Hilado could claim for the destruction of his properties during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. Under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1948, the payment of claims by the War Damage Commission depended upon its discretions non-payment of which does not give rise to any enforceable right. Assuming that the loss (deductible item) represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim, the amount would be at most a proper deduction of his 1950 gross income (not on his 1951 gross income) as the last installment and notice of discontinuation of payment by the War Damage VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: . Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
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rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) . A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: .
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was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is
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G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union Inc. (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the Collective Bargaining Agreement. They also alleged that there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They further contend that NWB is dominated by Toribio himself hence he favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before, as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (Section 1).
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(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The SC further held that that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted, and the entire record of the case was remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO v. ARMANDO RAMOS Facts:
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The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows: Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character. One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the
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misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large. On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens. RTC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings Held: We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.
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there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein. There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner, against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix, in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case, until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines PLDT v. PSC EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305,
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Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness,
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Facts: The Philippine Airlines Inc provides both domestic and international air service. In its domestic service PAL provides, among others, services between Tuguegarao and Manila (designated as Flight 213) and between Baguio and Manila (designated as Flight 205). On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5) passengers. Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of Republic Act No. 776, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by PAL, the CAB reduced the fine to P2,500.00 PAL, in its motion for reconsideration, argued that there is nothing in Republic Act No. 776 in general, nor in Section 42(k) thereof in particular, which expressly empowers CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case and under CAB Resolution No. 109(70). It further stressed that "the power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board my mere implication or interpretation". Issue:
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impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B. explaining clearly in its resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. Republic Act 776 created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity" certain declared policies which include (c) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound
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subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA. The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasiPage 44
broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992 Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a lettercomplaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC
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to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case). EPZA vs. CHR, et. Al G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financialassistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from
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compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
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Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. ISSUES: 1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206 SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman." SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman. 2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid. RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in
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process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. We cannot accept public respondent's argument. Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide
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President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the latter's supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS). On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC) consented to act as originator for UNITED. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. Private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18, 1996. While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc filed a complaint praying for damages,
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3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAP's dispositions are binding on administrative or executive agencies. Private respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain the writ of injunction they so desperately desired.
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EH 405
filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents' propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel. Hence, one can deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents' litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court. Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case.
EH 405
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