Portugal vs. India

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY CASE (Merits)
Portugal v. India
ICJ Reports 1960, p.6
The case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) was referred to the Court by an Application filed on 22 December 1955. In that Application, the Government of Portugal stated that its territory in the Indian Peninsula included two enclaves surrounded by the Territory of India, Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. It was in respect of the communications between those enclaves and the coastal district of Daman, and between each other, that the question arose of a right of passage in favour of Portugal through Indian territory and of a correlative obligation binding upon India. The Application stated that in July 1954 the Government of India prevented Portugal from exercising that right of passage and that Portugal was thus placed in a position in which it became impossible for it to exercise its rights of sovereignty over the enclaves. In its judgment the Court referred to the submissions filed by Portugal which in the first place requested the Court to adjudge and declare that a right of passage was possessed by Portugal and must be respected by India; this right was invoked by Portugal only to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, and it was not contended that passage was accompanied by any immunity and made clear that such passage remained subject to the regulation and control of India, which must be exercised in good faith, India being under an obligation not to prevent the transit necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty. The Court then considered the date with reference to which it must ascertain whether the right invoked existed or did not exist. The question as to the existence of a right of passage having been put to the Court in respect of the dispute which had arisen with regard to obstacles placed by India in the way of passage, it was the eve of the creation of those obstacles that must be selected as the standpoint from which to certain whether or not such a right existed; the selection of that date would leave open the arguments of India regarding the subsequent lapse of the right of passage. Portugal next asked the Court to adjudge and declare that India had not complied with the obligations incumbent upon it by virtue of the right of passage. But the Court pointed out that it had not been asked, either in the Application or in the final Submissions of the Parties, to decide whether or not India's attitude towards those who had instigated the over-throw of Portuguese authority at Dadra and Nagar-Haveli in July and August 1954 constituted a breach of the obligation, said to be binding upon it under general international law, to adopt suitable measures to prevent the incursion of subversive elements into the territory of another State. Turning then to the future, the Submissions of Portugal requested the Court to decide that India must end the measures by which it opposed the exercise of the right of passage or, if the Court should be of opinion that there should be a temporary suspension of the right, to hold that that suspension should end as soon as the course of events disclosed that the justification for the suspension had disappeared. Portugal had previously invited the Court to hold that the
Chairman, Rly. Board v. Chandrima Das
arguments of India concerning its right to adopt an attitude of neutrality, the application of the United Nations Charter and the existence in the enclaves of a local government were without foundation. The Court, however, considered that it was no part of its judicial function to declare in the operative part of its Judgment that any of those arguments was or was not well founded. India had contended in the first place that the right of passage claimed by Portugal was too vague and contradictory to enable the Court to pass judgment upon it by the application of the legal rules enumerated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute. There was no doubt that the day-today exercise of the right might give rise to delicate questions of application but that was not, in the view of the Court, sufficient ground for holding that the right was not susceptible of judicial determination. Portugal had relied on the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and on sanads (decrees) issued by the Maratha ruler in 1783 and 1785, as having conferred on Portugal sovereignty over the enclaves with the right of passage to them; India had objected that what was alleged to be the Treaty of 1779 was not validly entered into and never became in law a treaty binding upon the Marathas. The Court, however, found that the Marathas did not at any time cast any doubt upon the validity or binding character of the Treaty. India had further contended that the Treaty and the two sanads did not operate to transfer sovereignty over the assigned villages to Portugal but only conferred, with respect to the villages, a revenue grant. The Court was unable to conclude from an examination of the various texts of the Treaty of 1779 that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty; the expressions used in the two sanads, on the other hand, established that what was granted to the Portuguese was only a revenue tenure called a jagir or saranjam, and not a single instance had been brought to the notice of the Court in which such a grant had been construed as amounting to a cession of sovereignty. There could, therefore, be no question of any enclave or of any right of passage for the purpose of exercising sovereignty over enclaves. The Court found that the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as sovereign of that part of the country in place of the Marathas: Portuguese sovereignty over the villages had been recognized by the British in fact and by implication and had subsequently been tacitly recognized by India. As a consequence the villages had acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory and there had developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard to passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relied for the purpose of establishing the right of passage claimed by it. It had been objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two States, but the Court found it difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom might be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. It was common ground between the Parties that during the British and post-British periods the passage of private persons and civil officials had not been subject to any restrictions beyond routine control. Merchandise other than arms and ammunition had also passed freely subject only, at certain times, to customs regulations and such regulation and control as were necessitated by considerations of security or revenue. The Court therefore concluded that, with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there had existed a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the
enclaves, it was, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice had been accepted as law by the Parties and had given rise to a right and a correlative obligation. As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the position was different. It appeared that, during the British and post-British periods, Portuguese armed forces and armed police had not passed between Daman and the enclaves as of right, and that after 1878 such passage could only take place with previous authorization by the British and later by India, accorded either under a reciprocal arrangement already agreed to, or in individual cases: it had been argued that that permission was always granted, but there was nothing in the record to show that grant of permission was incumbent on the British or on India as an obligation. A treaty of 26 December 1878 between Great Britain and Portugal had laid down that the armed forces of the two Governments should not enter the Indian dominions of the other, except in specified cases or in consequence of a formal request made by the party desiring such entry. Subsequent correspondence showed that this provision was applicable to passage between Daman and the enclaves: it had been argued on behalf of Portugal that on twentythree occasions armed forces crossed British territory between Daman and the enclaves without obtaining permission, but in 1890, the Government of Bombay had forwarded a complaint to the effect that armed men in the service of the Portuguese Government were in the habit of passing without formal request through a portion of British territory en route from Daman to Nagar-Aveli which would appear to constitute a breach of the Treaty; on 22 December, the Governor-General of Portuguese India had replied: "Portuguese troops never cross British territory without previous permission", and the Secretary-General of the Government of Portuguese India stated on 1 May 1891: "On the part of this Government injunctions will be given for the strictest observance of the Treaty". The requirement of a formal request before passage of armed forces could take place had been repeated in an agreement of 1913. With regard to armed police, the Treaty of 1878 and the Agreement of 1913 had regulated passage on the basis of reciprocity, and an agreement of 1920 had provided that armed police below a certain rank should not enter the territory of the other party without consent previously obtained; finally, an agreement of 1940 concerning passage of Portuguese armed police over the road from Daman to Nagar-Aveli had provided that, if the party did not exceed ten in number, intimation of its passage should be given to the British authorities within twenty-four hours, but that, in other cases, "the existing practice should be followed and concurrence of the British authorities should be obtained by prior notice as heretofore." As regards arms and ammunition, the Treaty of 1878 and rules framed under the Indian Arms Act of 1878 prohibited the importation of arms, ammunition or military stores from Portuguese India and its export to Portuguese India without a special licence. Subsequent practice showed that this provision applied to transit between Daman and the enclaves. The finding of the Court that the practice established between the Parties had required for the passage of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition the permission of the British or Indian authorities rendered it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or
not, in the absence of the practice that actually prevailed, general international custom or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, which had also been invoked by Portugal, could have been relied upon by Portugal in support of its claim to a right of passage in respect of these categories. The Court was dealing with a concrete case having special features: historically the case went back to a period when, and related to a region in which, the relations between neighbouring States were not regulated by precisely formulated rules but were governed largely by practice: finding a practice clearly established between two States, which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice. The Court was, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India had been established in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition. Having found that Portugal had, in 1954, a right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, the Court lastly proceeded to consider whether India had acted contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's right of passage in respect of any of these categories. Portugal had not contended that India had acted contrary to that obligation before July 1954, but it complained that passage was thereafter denied to Portuguese nationals of European origin, to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese Government and to a delegation that the Governor of Daman proposed, in July 1954, to send to NagarAveli and Dadra. The Court found that the events which had occurred in Dadra on 21-22 July 1954 and which had resulted in the overthrow of Portuguese authority in that enclave had created tension in the surrounding Indian district, having regard to that tension, the Court was of the view that India's refusal of passage was covered by its power of regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal. In its Judgment, the Court: (a) found, by 11 votes to 4, that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and the coastal district of Daman and between these enclaves, to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and subject to the regulation and control of India, in respect of private persons, civil of officials and goods in general; (b) found, by 8 votes to 7, that Portugal did not have in 1954 such a right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition; (c) found, by 9 votes to 6, that India had not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from Portugal's right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general. *****
ASYLUM CASE
Columbia v. Peru
ICJ Reports 1950, p. 266
The origin of the Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case lies in the asylum granted on January 3rd, 1949, by the Colombian Ambassador in Lima to M. Victor Ral Haya de la Torre, head of a political party in Peru, the American People's Revolutionary Alliance. On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru; it was suppressed the same day. On the following day, a decree was published charging a political party, the American People's Revolutionary Party, with having prepared and directed the rebellion. The head of the Party, Victor Ral Haya de la Torre, was denounced as being responsible. With other members of the party, he was prosecuted on a charge of military rebellion. As he was still at liberty on November 16th, summonses were published ordering him to appear before the Examining Magistrate. On January 3rd, 1949, he was granted asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima. Meanwhile, on October 27th, 1948, a Military Junta had assumed power in Peru and had published a decree providing for Courts-martial for summary judgment in cases of rebellion, sedition and rioting; but this decree was not applied to the legal proceedings against Haya de la Torre and others, and it has been declared before the Court that this Decree was not applicable to the said proceedings. Furthermore, during the period from October 4th to the beginning of February, 1949, Peru was in a state of siege. On January 4th, 1949, the Colombian Ambassador in Lima informed the Peruvian Government of the asylum granted to Haya de la Torre, at the same time he asked that a safeconduct be issued to enable the refugee to leave the country. On January 14th, he further stated that the refugee had been qualified as a political refugee. The Peruvian Government disputed this qualification and refused to grant a safe-conduct. A diplomatic correspondence ensued which terminated in the signature, in Lima, on August 31st, 1949, of an Act by which the two Governments agreed to submit the case to the International Court of Justice. Colombia maintained before the Court that, according to the Convention in force - the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911 on Extradition, the Havana Convention of 1928 on Asylum the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Political Asylum - and according to American International Law, she was entitled to qualify the nature of the offence for the purposes of the asylum. In this connection, the Court considered that, if the qualification in question were provisional, there could be no doubt on that point: the diplomatic representative would consider whether the required conditions had been satisfied, he would pronounce his opinion and if that opinion were contested, a controversy would then arise which might be settled according to the methods provided by the Parties. But it resulted from the proceedings in the case that Colombia claimed the right of unilateral and definitive qualification binding upon Peru. The first of the Treaties which it invoked - the Bolivarian Agreement, which is the Treaty on extradition - confined itself in one Article to recognizing the institution of asylum in accordance with the principles of international law. But these principles do not entail the right of unilateral qualification. On the other hand, when the Bolivarian Agreement laid down rules for extradition, it was not
possible to deduce from them conclusions concerning diplomatic asylum. In the case of extradition, the refugee was on the territory of the State of refuge: if asylum were granted to him, such decision would not derogate from the sovereignty of the States in which the offence was committed. On the contrary, in the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee was on the territory of the State in which he had committed the offence: the decision to grant asylum derogated from the sovereignty of the territorial State and removed the offender from the jurisdiction of that State. As for the second treaty invoked by Colombia - the Havana Convention - it did not recognize the right of unilateral qualification either explicitly or implicitly. The third treaty the Convention of Montevideo - had not been ratified by Peru and could be invoked against that country. The Colombian Government has finally invoked American International law in General. In addition to the rules arising from agreements, it has relied on an alleged regional or local custom to Latin American States. The party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party, that it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial state. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. Colombia had failed to prove the existence, either regionally or locally, of a constant and uniform practice of unilateral qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon the territorial State. The facts submitted to the Court disclosed too much contradiction and fluctuation to make it possible to discern therein a usage peculiar to Latin America and accepted as law. It therefore followed that Colombia, as the State granting asylum, was not competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru. Colombia also maintained that Peru was under the obligation to issue a safe-conduct to enable the refugee to leave the country in safety. The Court, setting aside for the time being the question of whether asylum was regularly granted and maintained, noted that the clause in the Havana Convention which provided guaranties for the refugee was applicable solely to a case where the territorial State demanded the departure of the refugee from its territory: it was only after such a demand that the diplomatic Agent who granted asylum could, in turn, require a safe-conduct. There was, of course, a practice according to which the diplomatic Agent immediately requested a safe-conduct, which was granted to him: but this practice, which was to be explained by reasons of expediency, laid no obligation upon the territorial State. In the present case, Peru had not demanded the departure of the refugee and was therefore not bound to deliver a safe-conduct. In a counter-claim, Peru had asked the Court to declare that asylum had been granted to Haya de la Torre in violation of the Havana Convention, first, because Haya de la Torre was
accused, not of a political offence but of a common crime and, secondly, because the urgency which was required under the Havana Convention in order to justify asylum was absent in that case. Having observed that Peru had at no time asked for the surrender of the refugee, the Court examined the first point. In this connection, the Court noted that the only charge against the refugee was that of military rebellion, which was not a common crime. Consequently, the Court rejected the counter-claim of Peru on that point, declaring it to be ill-founded. On the question of urgency, the Court, having observed that the essential justification of asylum lay in the imminence or persistence of a danger to the person of the refugee, analysed the facts of the case. Three months had elapsed between the military rebellion and the grant of asylum. There was no question of protecting Haya de la Torre for humanitarian considerations against the violent and uncontrolled action of irresponsible elements of the population, the danger which confronted Haya de la Torre was that of having to face legal proceedings. The Havana Convention was not intended to protect a citizen who had plotted against the institutions of his country from regular legal proceedings. It was not sufficient to be accused of a political offence in order to be entitled to receive asylum; asylum could only intervene against the action of justice in cases where arbitrary action was substituted for the rule of law. It had not been proved that the situation in Peru at the time implied the subordination of justice to the executive or the abolition of judicial guarantees. Besides, the Havana Convention was unable to establish a legal system which would guarantee to persons accused of political offences the privilege of evading their national jurisdiction. Such a conception would come into conflict with one of the oldest traditions of Latin America, that of non-intervention. For if the Havana Convention had wished to ensure general protection to all persons prosecuted for political crimes in the course of revolutionary events, for the sole reason that it should be presumed that such events interfere with the administration of justice, this would lead to foreign interference of a particularly offensive nature in the domestic affairs of States. As for the numerous cases cited by Colombia, the Court was of opinion that considerations of convenience or political expediency seemed to have prompted the territorial State to recognize asylum without such as decision being dictated by any feeling of legal obligation. Asylum in Latin America was an institution which owed its development largely to extra-legal factors. Whilst declaring that at the time at which asylum was granted, on January 3rd, 1949, there was no case of urgency within the meaning of the Havana Convention, the Judgment declared that this in no way constituted a criticism of the Colombian Ambassador. His appreciation of the case was not a relevant factor to the question of the validity of the asylum: only the objective reality of the facts was of importance. The Court therefore came to the conclusion that the grant of asylum was not in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Havana Convention. *****
EFFECT OF AWARDS OF COMPENSATION MADE BY THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ADVISORY OPINION OF I.C.J. (July 13, 1954)

1954 International Law Reports 310
In 1953 the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations gave a numbers of awards in the matter of complaints of certain members of the Secretariat of the United Nations who had been discharged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and who alleged that their discharge was illegal. In some of these cases the Tribunal found that the complaint was justified and made awards in favour of the officials concerned. The question having arisen before the General Assembly whether it was bound to comply with the awards, the General Assembly decided, in December 1953, to submit the following legal questions to the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion: (1) Having regard to the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and to any other relevant instruments and to the relevant records, has the General Assembly the right on any grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by that Tribunal in favour of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of service has been terminated without his assent? (2) If the answer given by the Court to question (1) is in the affirmative, what are the principal grounds upon which the General Assembly could lawfully exercise such a right? The first question is strictly limited in scope. It relates solely to an award made by the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations in favour of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of service has been terminated without his assent. According to Article 2, paragraph I, of the Statute of that Tribunal, it shall be competent to hear and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment of staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of the terms of appointment of such staff member. A comparison between this provision and the terms of the first question submitted to the Court shows that an award as defined by that question must be considered as falling within the competence of the Tribunal as defined by Article 2. A claim arising out of the termination of a contract of service without the assent of the staff member must, in fact, either fall within the term non-observance of contracts of employment, or relate to the terms of appointment of the staff member. The Question concerns, in other words, only awards which are made within the limits of the competence of the Tribunal as determined by Article 2. The Court does not therefore seem to be requested to express its view with regard to awards which may exceed the scope of that statutory competence. The first question is further limited to awards which grant compensation to a staff member, and it relates solely to awards in favour of a staff member whose contract of service has been terminated without his assent. It does not include awards in other disputes arising out of a contract of service. The Court is requested to say whether the General Assembly has the right to refuse to give effect to an award as defined by the question. The term right must signify legal right. The Court is asked to say whether the General Assembly is legally entitled
to refuse to give effect to such awards. The Court is not called upon to express any view with regard to the particular awards which have given rise to the present Advisory Opinion. This examination of the first question shows that the Court is requested to consider the general and abstract question whether the General Assembly is legally entitled to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal, properly constituted and acting within the limits of its statutory competence. The answer to this question depends on the provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal as adopted by the General Assembly on November 24, 1949, and on the Staff Regulations and Rules as in force on December 9, 1953. But the Court will also take into account the amendments which were made to the Statute on the latter date. The Court will first consider whether the Tribunal is established either as a judicial body, or as an advisory organ or a mere subordinate committee of the General Assembly. Article 1 of the Statute provides : A Tribunal is established by the present Statute to be known as the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. This Tribunal shall, according to Article 2, paragraph 1, be competent to hear and pass judgment upon applications, whereupon the paragraph determines the limits of the Tribunals competence as already mentioned above. Article 2, paragraph 3, prescribes: In the event of a dispute as to whether the Tribunal has competence, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Tribunal. Article 10 contains the following provisions : 2. The judgments shall be final and without appeal. 3. The judgments shall state the reasons on which they are based. These provisions and the terminology used are evidence of the judicial nature of the Tribunal. Such terms as tribunal, judgment, competence to pass judgment upon applications, are generally used with respect to judicial bodies. The above-mentioned provisions of Articles 2 and 10 are of an essentially judicial character and conform with rules generally laid down in statutes or laws issued for courts of justice, such as, for instance, in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36, paragraph 6, Article 56, paragraph 1, Article 60, first sentence. They provide a striking contrast to Staff Rule 111.1 of the United Nations. These provisions prescribe both in the original and in the amended text that the Tribunal shall, if it finds that the application is well founded, order the rescinding of the decision contested or the specific performance of the obligation invoked. As the power to issue such orders to the chief administrative officer of the Organization could hardly have been conferred on an advisory organ or a subordinate committee, these provisions confirm the judicial character of the Tribunal. The amended text contains certain modifications of the Tribunals powers and procedure, but these modifications have no bearing upon the judicial nature of its functions. This examination of the relevant provisions of the Statute shows that the Tribunal is established, not as an advisory organ or a mere subordinate committee of the General
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Assembly, but as an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without appeal within the limited field of its functions. According to a well-established and generally recognized principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is res judicata and has binding force between the parties to the dispute. It must therefore be examined who are to be regarded as parties bound by an award of compensation made in favour of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of service has been terminated without has assent. Such a contract of service is concluded between the staff member concerned and the Secretary-General in his capacity as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations Organization, acting on behalf of that Organization as its representative. When the SecretaryGeneral concludes such a contract of service with a staff member, he engages the legal responsibility of the Organization, which is the juridical person on whose behalf he acts. If he terminates the contract of service without the assent of the staff member and this action results in a dispute which is referred to the Administrative Tribunal, the parties to this dispute before the Tribunal are the staff member concerned and the United Nations Organization, represented by the Secretary-General, and these parties will become bound by the judgment of the Tribunal. This judgment is, according to Article 10 of the Tribunals Statute, final and without appeal. The Statute has provided for no kind of review. As this final judgment has binding force on the United Nations Organization as the juridical person responsible for the proper observance of the contract of service, that Organization becomes legally bound to carry out the judgment and to pay the compensation awarded to the staff member. It follows that the General Assembly, as an organ of the United Nations, must likewise be bound by the judgment. The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal has not provided for any kind of review of judgments, which according to Article 10, paragraph 2, shall be final and without appeal. This rule is similar to the corresponding rule in the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations, Article VI, paragraph 1, which equally prescribed that judgments shall be final and without appeal. The report of the Supervisory Commission, proposing the Statute of this Tribunal of the League of Nations, shows that the omission of any provision for a review of judgments was deliberate. The report stated : No provision for the revision of judgments of the Tribunal is inserted in the statute. It is considered that, in the interests of finality and of the avoidance of vexatious proceedings, the Tribunals judgments should be final and without appeal as is provided in Article VI, paragraph 1. The present Advisory Opinion deals with a different legal situation. It concerns judgments pronounced by a permanent judicial tribunal established by the General Assembly, functioning under a special statute and within the organized legal system of the United Nations, and dealing exclusively with internal disputes between the members of the staff and the United Nations represented by the Secretary-General. In order that the judgments pronounced by such a judicial tribunal could be subjected to review by any body other than the tribunal itself, it would be necessary, in the opinion of the Court, that the statute of that tribunal or some other legal instrument governing it should contain an express provision to
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the effect. The General Assembly has the power to amend the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Article 11 of that Statute and to provide for means of redress by another organ. But as no such provisions are inserted in the present Statute, there is no legal ground upon which the General Assembly could proceed to review judgments already pronounced by that Tribunal. Should the General Assembly contemplate, for dealing with future disputes, the making of some provision for the review of the awards of the Tribunal, the Court is of opinion that the General Assembly itself, in view of its composition and functions, could hardly act as a judicial organ considering the arguments of the parties, appraising the evidence produced by them, establishing the facts and declaring the law applicable to them all the more so as one party to the disputes is the United Nations Organization itself. The Establishment of the Administrative Tribunal and the Implied Powers of the General Assembly The Court must now examine the principal contentions which have been put forward, in the written and in the oral statements, by the Governments that take the position that there are grounds which would justify the General Assembly in refusing to give effect to awards of the Administrative Tribunal. The legal power of the General Assembly to establish a tribunal competent to render judgments binding on the United Nations has been challenged. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the General Assembly has been given this power by the Charter. There is no express provision for the establishment of judicial bodies or organs and no indication to the contrary. However, in its Opinion - Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I. C.J. Reports 1949. p. 182 the Court said: Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. The Court must therefore begin by enquiring whether the provisions of the Charter concerning the relations between the staff members and the Organization imply for the Organization the power to establish a judicial tribunal to adjudicate upon disputes arising out of the contracts of service. Under the provisions of Charter XV of the Charter, the Secretariat, which is one of the principle organs of the United Nations, comprises the Secretary-General and the staff. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and he is the chief administrative officer of the Organization. The staff member are appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. In the words of Article 101(3) of the Charter, The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. The contracts of service between the Organization and the staff members are contained in letters of appointment. Each appointment is made subject to terms and conditions provided in
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the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, together with such amendments as may be made from time to time. When the Secretariat was organized, a situation arose in which the relations between the staff members and the Organization were governed by a complex code of law. This code consisted of the Staff Regulations established by the General Assembly, defining the fundamental rights and obligations of the staff, and the Staff Rules, made by the SecretaryGeneral in order to implement the Staff Regulations. It was inevitable that there would be disputes between the Organization and staff members as to their rights and duties. The Charter contains no provision which authorizes any of the principle organs of the United Nations to adjudicate upon these disputes, and Article 105 secures for the United Nations jurisdictional immunities in national courts. It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as between the Organization and the staff members, was essential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give effect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter. Limits of the Implied Powers of the General Assembly But that does not dispose of the problem before the Court. Some of the Governments that take the position that there are grounds which would justify the General Assembly in refusing to give effect to awards, agree that the powers of the General Assembly, and particularly its power to establish regulations under Article 101, imply the power to set up an administrative tribunal. They agree that the General Assembly would be able to establish a tribunal competent to hear and decide staff grievances, to prescribe its jurisdiction, and to authorize it to give a final decision, in the sense that no appeal could be taken as of right. They nevertheless contend that the implied power does not enable the General Assembly to establish a tribunal with authority to make decisions binding on the General Assembly itself. In the first place, it is contended that there was no need to go so far, and that an implied power can only be exercised to the extent that the particular measure under consideration can be regarded as absolutely essential. There can be no doubt that the General Assembly in the exercise of its power could have set up a tribunal without giving finality to its judgments. In fact, however, it decided, after long deliberation, to invest the Tribunal with power to render judgments which would be final and without appeal, and which would be binding on the United Nations. The precise nature and scope of the measures by which the power of creating a tribunal was to be exercised, was a matter for determination by the General Assembly alone. In the second place, it has been argued that, while an implied power of the General Assembly to establish, an administrative tribunal may be both necessary and essential, nevertheless, an implied power to impose legal limitations upon the General Assemblys express Charter powers is not legally admissible.
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It has been contended that the General Assembly cannot, by establishing the Administrative Tribunal, divest itself of the power conferred by paragraph (1) of Article 17 of the Charter, which reads: The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. This provision confers a power on the General Assembly, for the exercise of which Article 18 requires the vote of a two-thirds majority. Accordingly, the establishment of a tribunal competent to make an award of compensation to which the General Assembly was bound to give effect would, it has been argued, contravene the provisions relating to the budgetary power. The Court is unable to accept this contention. The Court notes that Article 17 of the Chapter appears in a section of Chapter IV relating to the General Assembly, which is entitled Functions and Powers. This Article deals with a function of the General Assembly and provides for the consideration and approval by it of the budget of the Organization. Consideration of the budget is thus an act which must be performed and the same is true of its approval, for without such approval there can be no budget. But the function of approving the budget does not mean that the General Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of that expenditure arises out of obligations already incurred by the Organization, and to this extent the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements. The question, therefore, to be decided by the Court is whether these obligations comprise the awards of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal in favour of staff members. The reply to this question must be in the affirmative. The obligatory character of these awards has been established by the considerations set out above relating to the authority of res judicata and the binding effect of the judgments of this Tribunal upon the United Nations Organization. The Court therefore considers that the assignment of the budgetary function to the General Assembly cannot be regarded as conferring upon it the right to further to give effect to the obligation arising out of an award of the Administrative Tribunal. It has also been contended that the implied power of the General Assembly to establish a tribunal cannot be carried so far as to enable the tribunal to intervene in matters falling within the province of the Secretary-General. The Court cannot accept this contention. The General Assembly could at all times limit or control the powers of the SecretaryGeneral in staff matters, by virtue of the provisions of Article 101. Acting under powers conferred by the Charter, the General Assembly authorized the intervention of the Tribunal to the extent that such intervention might result from the exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal by its Statute. Accordingly, when the Tribunal decides that particular action by the Secretary- General involves a breach of the contract of service, it is in no sense intervening in a Charter power of the Secretary-General, because the Secretary-Generals legal powers in staff matters have already been limited in this respect by the General Assembly. A similar problem is involved in the contention that the General assembly cannot authorize and the Secretary-General cannot enter into contracts of service which are not in
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conformity with the Charter. The Staff Regulations are made a part of the contracts of service and No. 11.2 reads as follows: The United Nations Administrative Tribunal shall, under conditions prescribed in its Statute, hear and pass judgment upon applications from staff members alleging non-observance of their terms of appointment, including all pertinent regulations and rules. It is contended that the incorporation, in the contracts of service, of the right to rely on the Stature of the Administrative Tribunal would conflict with the powers conferred on the General Assembly and on the Secretary- General by the Charter. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court cannot accept this contention. There can be no doubt that, by virtue of the terms thus incorporated in the contracts of service, and so long as the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal in its present form is in force, the staff members are entitled to resort to the Tribunal and rely on its judgments. In the third place, the view has been put forward that the Administrative Tribunal is a subsidiary, subordinate, or secondary organ; and that, accordingly, the Tribunals judgments cannot bind the General Assembly which established it. This view assumes that, in adopting the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, the General Assembly was establishing an organ which it deemed necessary for the performance of its own functions. But the Court cannot accept this basic assumption. The Charter does not confer judicial functions on the General Assembly and the relations between staff and Organization come within the scope of Chapter XV of the Charter. In the absence of the establishment of an Administrative Tribunal, the function of resolving disputes between staff and Organization could be discharged by the Secretary-General by virtue of the provisions of Articles 97 and 101. Accordingly, in the three years or more preceding the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal, the Secretary-General coped with this problem by means of joint administrative machinery, leading to ultimate decision by himself. By establishing the Administrative Tribunal the General Assembly was not delegating the performance of its own functions; it was exercising a power which it had under the Charter to regulate staff relations. In regard to the Secretariat, the General Assembly is given by the Charter a power to make regulations, but not a power to adjudicate upon, or otherwise deal with particular instances. It has been argued that an authority exercising a power to make regulations is inherently incapable of creating a subordinate body competent to make decisions binding its creator. There can be no doubt that the Administrative Tribunal is subordinate in the sense that the General Assembly can abolish the Tribunal by repealing the Statute, that it can amend the Statute and provide for review of the future decisions of the Tribunal and that it can amend the Staff Regulations and make new ones. There is no lack of power to deal effectively with any problem that may arise. But the contention that the General Assembly is inherently incapable of creating a tribunal competent to make decisions binding on itself cannot be accepted. It cannot be justified by analogy to national laws, for it is common practice in national legislatures to create courts with the capacity to render decisions legally binding on the legislatures which brought them into being.
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The question cannot be determined on the basis of the description of the relationship between the General Assembly and the Tribunal that is by considering whether the Tribunal is to be regarded as a subsidiary, a subordinate, or a secondary organ, or on the basis of the fact that it was established by the General Assembly. It depends on the intention of the General Assembly in establishing the Tribunal, and on the nature of the functions conferred upon it by its Statute. An examination of the language of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal has show that the General Assembly intended to establish a judicial body, moreover, it had the legal capacity under the Charters to do so. The Practice of the League of Nations as a Precedent The view has been advanced that the Court should follow what has been called the precedent established by the League of Nations in 1946. On that occasion, the Assembly of the League rejected certain awards of its Administrative Tribunal. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the Assembly, which in very special circumstances was winding up the League, was justified in rejecting those awards. The cases adjudicated upon by the Tribunal of the League, and the circumstances in which they arose, are different from those which led to the request for this Opinion. Moreover, the cases arose under the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the League, and not under the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, and the Assembly was acting under the Covenant and not under the Charter. In view of the complete lack of identity between the two situations, and of the conclusions already drawn by the Court from the Charter and the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations and other relevant instruments and records, the Court cannot regard the action of the Assembly of the League in 1946 as an applicable precedent or as an indication of the intention of the General Assembly when the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal was adopted in 1949. *****
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TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR CASE (Merits)
Cambodia v. Thailand
Proceedings in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, between Cambodia and Thailand, were instituted on 6 October 1959 by an Application of the Government of Cambodia; the Government of Thailand having raised two preliminary objections, the Court, by its Judgment of 26 May 1961, found that it had jurisdiction. In its Judgment, the Court found that the subject of the dispute was sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear. This ancient sanctuary, partially in ruins, stood on a promontory of the Dangrek range of mountains which constituted the boundary between Cambodia and Thailand. The dispute had its fons et origo in the boundary settlements made in the period 1904-1908 between France, then conducting the foreign relations of Indo-China, and Siam. The application of the Treaty of 13 February 1904 was, in particular, involved. That Treaty established the general character of the frontier the exact boundary of which was to be delimited by a Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission In the eastern sector of the Dangrek range, in which Preah Vihear was situated, the frontier was to follow the watershed line. For the purpose of delimiting that frontier, it was agreed, at a meeting held on 2 December 1906, that the Mixed Commission should travel along the Dangrek range carrying out all the necessary reconnaissance, and that a survey officer of the French section of the Commission should survey the whole of the eastern part of the range. It had not been contested that the Presidents of the French and Siamese sections duly made this journey, in the course of which they visited the Temple of Preah Vihear. In January-February 1907, the President of the French section had reported to his Government that the frontier-line had been definitely established. It therefore seemed clear that a frontier had been surveyed and fixed, although there was no record of any decision and no reference to the Dangrek region in any minutes of the meetings of the Commission after 2 December 1906. Moreover, at the time when the Commission might have met for the purpose of winding up its work, attention was directed towards the conclusion of a further Franco-Siamese boundary treaty, the Treaty of 23 March 1907. The final stage of the delimitation was the preparation of maps. The Siamese Government, which did not dispose of adequate technical means, had requested that French officers should map the frontier region. These maps were completed in the autumn of 1907 by a team of French officers, some of whom had been members of the Mixed Commission, and they were communicated to the Siamese Government in 1908. Amongst them was a map of the Dangrek range showing Preah Vihear on the Cambodian side. It was on that map (filed as Annex I to its Memorial) that Cambodia had principally relied in support of her claim to sovereignty over the Temple. Thailand, on the other hand, had contended that the map, not being the work of the Mixed Commission, had no binding character; that the frontier indicated on it was not the true watershed line and that the true watershed line would place the Temple in Thailand, that the map had never been accepted by Thailand or, alternatively, that
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if Thailand had accepted it she had done so only because of a mistaken belief that the frontier indicated corresponded with the watershed line. The Annex I map was never formally approved by the Mixed Commission, which had ceased to function some months before its production. While there could be no reasonable doubt that it was based on the work of the surveying officers in the Dangrek sector, the Court nevertheless concluded that, in its inception, it had no binding character. It was clear from the record, however, that the maps were communicated to the Siamese Government as purporting to represent the outcome of the work of delimitation; since there was no reaction on the part of the Siamese authorities, either then or for many years, they must be held to have acquiesced. The maps were moreover communicated to the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission, who said nothing. to the Siamese Minister of the Interior, Prince Damrong, who thanked the French Minister in Bangkok for them, and to the Siamese provincial governors, some of whom knew of Preah Vihear. If the Siamese authorities accepted the Annex I map without investigation, they could not now plead any error vitiating the reality of their consent. The Siamese Government and later the Thai Government had raised no query about the Annex I map prior to its negotiations with Cambodia in Bangkok in 1958. But in 1934-1935 a survey had established a divergence between the map line and the true line of the watershed, and other maps had been produced showing the Temple as being in Thailand: Thailand had nevertheless continued also to use and indeed to publish maps showing Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia. Moreover, in the course of the negotiations for the 1925 and 1937 FrancoSiamese Treaties, which confirmed the existing frontiers, and in 1947 in Washington before the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission, it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter: she did not do so. The natural inference was that she had accepted the frontier at Preah Vihear as it was drawn on the map, irrespective of its correspondence with the watershed line. Thailand had stated that having been, at all material times, in possession of Preah Vihear, she had had no need to raise the matter; she had indeed instanced the acts of her administrative authorities on the ground as evidence that she had never accepted the Annex I line at Preah Vihear. But the Court found it difficult to regard such local acts as negating the consistent attitude of the central authorities. Moreover, when in 1930 Prince Damrong, on a visit to the Temple, was officially received there by the French Resident for the adjoining Cambodian province, Siam failed to react. From these facts, the court concluded that Thailand had accepted the Annex I map. Even if there were any doubt in this connection, Thailand was not precluded from asserting that she had not accepted it since France and Cambodia had relied upon her acceptance and she had for fifty years enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 has conferred on her. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Annex I map caused it to enter the treaty settlement; the Parties had at that time adopted an interpretation of that settlement which caused the map line to prevail over the provisions of the Treaty and, as there was no reason to think that the Parties had attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared with the overriding importance of a final regulation of their own frontiers, the Court considered that the interpretation to be given now would be the same.
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The Court therefore felt bound to pronounce in favour of the frontier indicated on the Annex I map in the disputed area and it became unnecessary to consider whether the line as mapped did in fact correspond to the true watershed line. In its Judgment the Court, by nine votes to three, found that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia and, in consequence, that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory. By seven votes to five, the Court found that Thailand was under an obligation to restore to Cambodia any sculptures, stelae, fragments of monuments, sandstone model and ancient pottery which might, since the date of the occupation of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the Temple or the Temple area by the Thai authorities. *****
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW
Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India

(1996) 5 SCC 647
KULDIP SINGH, J . - Petition - public interest - under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum and is directed against the pollution which is being caused by enormous discharge of untreated effluent by the tanneries and other industries in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is stated that the tanneries are discharging untreated effluent into agricultural fields, roadsides, waterways and open lands. The untreated effluent is finally discharged in River Palar which is the main source of water supply to the residents of the area. According to the petitioner the entire surface and subsoil water of River Palar has been polluted resulting in non-availability of potable water to the residents of the area. It is stated that the tanneries in the State of Tamil Nadu have caused environmental degradation in the area. According to the preliminary survey made by the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Research Centre, Vellore nearly 35,000 hectares of agricultural land in the tanneries belt has become either partially or totally unfit for cultivation. It has been further stated in the petition that the tanneries use about 170 types of chemicals in the chrome tanning processes. The said chemicals include sodium chloride, lime, sodium sulphate, chlorium (sic) sulphate, fat, liquor, ammonia and sulphuric acid besides dyes which are used in large quantities. Nearly 35 litres of water is used for processing one kilogram of finished leather, resulting in dangerously enormous quantities of toxic effluents being let out in the open by the tanning industry. These effluents have spoiled the physico-chemical properties of the soil and have contaminated groundwater by percolation.
2. Along with the affidavit dated 21-7-1992 filed by Deputy Secretary to Government, Environment and Forests Department of Tamil Nadu, a list of villages affected by the tanneries has been attached. The list mentions 59 villages in the three divisions of Thirupathur, Vellore and Ranipet. There is acute shortage of drinking water in these 59 villages and as such alternative arrangements were being made by the Government for the supply of drinking water. 9. It is no doubt correct that the leather industry in India has become a major foreign exchange earner and at present Tamil Nadu is the leading exporter of finished leather accounting for approximately 80 per cent of the countrys export. Though the leather industry is of vital importance to the country as it generates foreign exchange and provides employment avenues it has no right to destroy the ecology, degrade the environment and pose as a health-hazard. It cannot be permitted to expand or even to continue with the present production unless it tackles by itself the problem of pollution created by the said industry. 10. The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to each other is no longer acceptable. Sustainable Development is the answer. In the international sphere, Sustainable Development as a concept came to be known for the first time in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. Thereafter, in 1987 the concept was given a definite shape by the World Commission on Environment and Development in its report called Our Common Future.
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The Commission was chaired by the then Prime Minister of Norway, Ms G.H. Brundtland and as such the report is popularly known as Brundtland Report. In 1991 the World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme and Worldwide Fund for Nature, jointly came out with a document called Caring for the Earth which is a strategy for sustainable living. Finally, came the Earth Summit held in June 1992 at Rio which saw the largest gathering of world leaders ever in the history deliberating and chalking out a blueprint for the survival of the planet. Among the tangible achievements of the Rio Conference was the signing of two conventions, one on biological diversity and another on climate change. These conventions were signed by 153 nations. The delegates also approved by consensus three non-binding documents namely, a Statement on Forestry Principles, a declaration of principles on environmental policy and development initiatives and Agenda 21, a programme of action into the next century in areas like poverty, population and pollution. During the two decades from Stockholm to Rio Sustainable Development has come to be accepted as a viable concept to eradicate poverty and improve the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of the supporting ecosystems. Sustainable Development as defined by the Brundtland Report means Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. We have no hesitation in holding that Sustainable Development as a balancing concept between ecology and development has been accepted as a part of the customary international law though its salient features have yet to be finalised by the international law jurists. 11. Some of the salient principles of Sustainable Development, as culled out from Brundtland Report and other international documents, are Inter-Generational Equity, Use and Conservation of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection, the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle, Obligation to Assist and Cooperate, Eradication of Poverty and Financial Assistance to the developing countries. We are, however, of the view that The Precautionary Principle and The Polluter Pays Principle are essential features of Sustainable Development. The Precautionary Principle - in the context of the municipal law - means: (i) Environmental measures - by the State Government and the statutory authorities - must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. (ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. (iii) The onus of proof is on the actor or the developer/industrialist to show that his action is environmentally benign. 12. The Polluter Pays Principle has been held to be a sound principle by this Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India [(1996) 3 SCC 212]. The Court observed: (W)e are of the opinion that any principle evolved in this behalf should be simple, practical and suited to the conditions obtaining in this country.
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The Court ruled that: ... once the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable care while carrying on his activity. The rule is premised upon the very nature of the activity carried on. Consequently the polluting industries are absolutely liable to compensate for the harm caused by them to villagers in the affected area, to the soil and to the underground water and hence, they are bound to take all necessary measures to remove sludge and other pollutants lying in the affected areas. The Polluter Pays Principle as interpreted by this Court means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. Remediation of the damaged environment is part of the process of Sustainable Development and as such the polluter is liable to pay the cost to the individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology. 13. The Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle have been accepted as part of the law of the land. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. Articles 47, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution are as under: 47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health.-The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. 48A. Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wildlife.-The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. 51A. (g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures. Apart from the constitutional mandate to protect and improve the environment there are plenty of post-independence legislations on the subject but more relevant enactments for our purpose are: the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (the Water Act), the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (the Air Act) and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (the Environment Act). 14. In view of the above-mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions we have no hesitation in holding that the Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle are part of the environmental law of the country. 15. Even otherwise once these principles are accepted as part of the Customary International Law there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of Customary International Law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall be followed by the courts of law. To support we may refer to Justice
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H.R. Khannas opinion in A.D.M. v. Shivakant Shukla [AIR 1976 SC 1207]; Jolly George Varghese case [AIR 1980 SC 470] and Gramophone Co. case [AIR 1984 SC 667]. 16. The constitutional and statutory provisions protect a persons right to fresh air, clean water and pollution-free environment, but the source of the right is the inalienable common law right of clean environment. 17. Our legal system having been founded on the British common law the right of a person to a pollution-free environment is a part of the basic jurisprudence of the land. [The Supreme Court held that sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays principle, being customary norms of international law, are part of Indian environmental law and therefore, have full legal force.] *****
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Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

(1997) 6 SCC 241
VERMA, C.J. - This writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the fundamental
rights of working women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India in view of the prevailing climate in which the violation of these rights is not uncommon. With the increasing awareness and emphasis on gender justice, there is increase in the effort to guard against such violations; and the resentment towards incidents of sexual harassment is also increasing. The present petition has been brought as a class action by certain social activists and NGOs with the aim of focussing attention towards this societal aberration, and assisting in finding suitable methods for realisation of the true concept of gender equality; and to prevent sexual harassment of working women in all workplaces through judicial process, to fill the vacuum in existing legislation. 2. The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incident of alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of Rajasthan. That incident is the subject-matter of a separate criminal action and no further mention of it, by us, is necessary. The incident reveals the hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the depravity to which sexual harassment can degenerate and the urgency for safeguards by an alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative measures. In the absence of legislative measures, the need is to find an effective alternative mechanism to fulfil this felt and urgent social need. 3. Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of Gender Equality and the Right to Life and Liberty. It is a clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victims fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to practise any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business . Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women. This class action under Article 32 of the Constitution is for this reason. A writ of mandamus in such a situation, if it is to be effective, needs to be accompanied by directions for prevention, as the violation of fundamental rights of this kind is a recurring phenomenon. The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the availability of a safe working environment. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive. When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum. 5. Apart from Article 32 of the Constitution of India, we may refer to some other provisions which envisage judicial intervention for eradication of this social evil. Some provisions in the Constitution in addition to Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21, which have relevance are:
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Article 15 : 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.-(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. Article 42 : 42. Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief .-The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 51A : 51-A. Fundamental duties .It shall be the duty of every citizen of India (a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, ...; (e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women; 6. Before we refer to the international conventions and norms having relevance in this field and the manner in which they assume significance in application and judicial interpretation, we may advert to some other provisions in the Constitution which permit such use. These provisions are: Article 51: 51. Promotion of international peace and security.-The State shall endeavour to(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; * * * Article 253: 253. Legislation for giving effect to international agreements.- Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body. Seventh Schedule : List I - Union List 14. Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries. 7. In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all workplaces, the contents of international conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any
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international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51(c) and the enabling power of Parliament to enact laws for implementing the international conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Article 73 also is relevant. It provides that the executive power of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the Union is, therefore, available till Parliament enacts legislation to expressly provide measures needed to curb the evil. 8. Thus, the power of this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of the fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union have to meet the challenge to protect the working women from sexual harassment and to make their fundamental rights meaningful. Governance of the society by the rule of law mandates this requirement as a logical concomitant of the constitutional scheme. The exercise performed by the Court in this matter is with this common perception shared with the learned Solicitor General and other members of the Bar who rendered valuable assistance in the performance of this difficult task in public interest. 9. The progress made at each hearing culminated in the formulation of guidelines to which the Union of India gave its consent through the learned Solicitor General, indicating that these should be the guidelines and norms declared by this Court to govern the behaviour of the employers and all others at the workplaces to curb this social evil. 10. Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right. The common minimum requirement of this right has received global acceptance. The international conventions and norms are, therefore, of great significance in the formulation of the guidelines to achieve this purpose. 11. The obligation of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of these fundamental rights in the absence of legislation must be viewed along with the role of judiciary envisaged in the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA region. These principles were accepted by the Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific at Beijing in 1995 as those representing the minimum standards necessary to be observed in order to maintain the independence and effective functioning of the judiciary. The objectives of the judiciary mentioned in the Beijing Statement are: Objectives of the Judiciary: 10. The objectives and functions of the Judiciary include the following: (a) to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the rule of law; (b) to promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the observance and the attainment of human rights; and (c) to administer the law impartially among persons and between persons and the State. 12. Some provisions in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, of significance in the present context are:
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Article 11: 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: (a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; (f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. Article 24: States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognised in the present Convention. 13. The general recommendations of CEDAW in this context in respect of Article 11 are: Violence and equality in employment: 22. Equality in employment can be seriously impaired when women are subjected to gender specific violence, such as sexual harassment in the workplace. 23. Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour as physical contacts and advances, sexually-coloured remarks, showing pornography and sexual demands, whether by words or actions. Such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem; it is discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment, including recruiting or promotion, or when it creates a hostile working environment. Effective complaints, procedures and remedies, including compensation, should be provided. 24. States should include in their reports information about sexual harassment, and on measures to protect women from sexual harassment and other forms of violence of coercion in the workplace. The Government of India has ratified the above Resolution on 25-6-1993 with some reservations which are not material in the present context. At the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the Government of India has also made an official commitment, inter alia, to formulate and operationalize a national policy on women which will continuously guide and inform action at every level and in every sector; to set up a Commission for Womens Rights to act as a public defender of womens human rights; to institutionalize a national level mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Platform for Action. We have, therefore, no hesitation in placing reliance on the above for the purpose of construing the nature and ambit of constitutional guarantee of gender equality in our Constitution. 14. The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of sufficient amplitude to encompass all the facets of gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. Independence of judiciary forms a part of our constitutional scheme. The international conventions and norms are to be read into them in the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the field when there is no inconsistency between them. It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international conventions and norms for construing domestic law when there is no
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inconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law. The High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 128 Aus LR 353 has recognised the concept of legitimate expectation of its observance in the absence of a contrary legislative provision, even in the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Australia. 15. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [(1993) 2 SCC 746], a provision in the ICCPR was referred to support the view taken that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right, as a public law remedy under Article 32, distinct from the private law remedy in torts. There is no reason why these international conventions and norms cannot, therefore, be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India which embody the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of human activity. 16. In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at workplaces, we lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all workplaces or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. 17. The GUIDELINES and NORMS prescribed herein are as under: HAVING REGARD to the definition of human rights in Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, TAKING NOTE of the fact that the present civil and penal laws in India do not adequately provide for specific protection of women from sexual harassment in workplaces and that enactment of such legislation will take considerable time, It is necessary and expedient for employers in workplaces as well as other responsible persons or institutions to observe certain guidelines to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of women: 1. Duty of the employer or other responsible persons in workplaces and other institutions: It shall be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons in workplaces or other institutions to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by taking all steps required. 2. Definition: For this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as: (a) physical contact and advances; (b) a demand or request for sexual favours; (c) sexually-coloured remarks; (d) showing pornography;
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(e) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances whereunder the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the victims employment or work whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or voluntary, whether in government, public or private enterprise such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem. It is discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work including recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse consequences might be visited if the victim does not consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto. 3. Preventive steps: All employers or persons in charge of workplace whether in the public or private sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. Without prejudice to the generality of this obligation they should take the following steps: (a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined above at the workplace should be notified, published and circulated in appropriate ways. (b) The rules/regulations of government and public sector bodies relating to conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender. (c) As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. (d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at workplaces and no woman employee should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment. 4. Criminal proceedings: Where such conduct amounts to a specific offence under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law, the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by making a complaint with the appropriate authority. In particular, it should ensure that victims or witnesses are not victimized or discriminated against while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. The victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer. 5. Disciplinary action: Where such conduct amounts to misconduct in employment as defined by the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in accordance with those rules. 6. Complaint mechanism: Whether or not such conduct constitutes an offence under law or a breach of the service rules, an appropriate complaint mechanism
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should be created in the employers organization for redress of the complaint made by the victim. Such complaint mechanism should ensure time-bound treatment of complaints. 7. Complaints Committee: The complaint mechanism, referred to in (6) above, should be adequate to provide, where necessary, a Complaints Committee, a special counsellor or other support service, including the maintenance of confidentiality. The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its members should be women. Further, to prevent the possibility of any undue pressure or influence from senior levels, such Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment. The Complaints Committee must make an annual report to the Government Department concerned of the complaints and action taken by them. The employers and person-in-charge will also report on the compliance with the aforesaid guidelines including on the reports of the Complaints Committee to the Government Department. 8. Workers initiative: Employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment at workers meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should be affirmatively discussed in employer-employee meetings. 9. Awareness: Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be created in particular by prominently notifying the guidelines (and appropriate legislation when enacted on the subject) in a suitable manner. 10. Third-party harassment: Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission by any third party or outsider, the employer and person-in-charge will take all steps necessary and reasonable to assist the affected person in terms of support and preventive action. 11. The Central/State Governments are requested to consider adopting suitable measures including legislation to ensure that the guidelines laid down by this order are also observed by the employers in private sector. 12. These guidelines will not prejudice any rights available under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 18. Accordingly, we direct that the above guidelines and norms would be strictly observed in all workplaces for the preservation and enforcement of the right to gender equality of the working women. These directions would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field. These writ petitions are disposed of, accordingly.
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CIT v. P.V.A.L. Kulandagan Chettiar

(2004) 6 SCC 235
S. RAJENDRA BABU, CJI - These appeals involve the following two questions for our
consideration although several other questions were considered by the High Court: (a) Whether the Malaysian income cannot be subjected to tax in India on the basis of the Agreement of Avoidance of Double Taxation entered into between the Government of India and the Government of Malaysia? (b) Whether the capital gains should be taxable only in the country in which the assets are situated? 2. The facts leading to these appeals are that the respondent is a firm owning immovable properties at Ipoh, Malaysia; that during the course of the assessment year the assessee earned income of Rs. 88,424 from rubber estates; that the respondent sold the property, the shortterm capital gains of which came to Rs. 18,113; that the Income Tax Officer assessed that both the incomes are assessable in India and brought the same to tax; that the respondent filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who held that under Article VII(1) of the Agreement of Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion of Tax unless the respondent has a permanent establishment of the business in India such business income in Malaysia cannot be included in the total income of the assessee and, therefore, no part of the capital gains arising to the respondent in the foreign country could be taxed in India. 3. This order was carried in appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after examining various contentions raised before it, confirmed the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and held that: (i) since the respondent has no permanent establishment for business in India, the business income in Malaysia cannot be included in his income in India, and (ii) since the property is situated in Malaysia, capital gains cannot be taxed in India. Thereafter, the matter was carried by way of a reference to the High Court. 4. The High Court held that the finding of the Tribunal is in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement of Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income. The High Court took the view that: Where there exists a provision to the contrary in the Agreement, there is no scope for applying the law of any one of the respective contracting States to tax the income and the liability to tax has to be worked out in the manner and to the extent permitted or allowed under the terms of the Agreement. 8. Where liability to tax arises under the local enactment provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act provide that taxation of global income of an assessee chargeable to tax thereunder is subject to the provisions of an agreement entered into between the Central Government and the Government of a foreign country for avoidance of double taxation as envisaged under Section 90 to the contrary, if any, and such an agreement will act as an exception to or modification of Sections 4 and 5 of the Income Tax Act. The provisions of such agreement cannot fasten a tax liability where the liability is not imposed by a local Act. Where tax liability is imposed by the Act, the agreement may be resorted to either for reducing the tax
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liability or altogether avoiding the tax liability. In case of any conflict between the provisions of the agreement and the Act, the provisions of the agreement would prevail over the provisions of the Act, as is clear from the provisions of Section 90(2) of the Act. Section 90(2) makes it clear that where the Central Government has entered into an agreement with the Government of any country outside India for granting relief of tax, or for avoidance of double taxation, then, in relation to the assessee to whom such agreement applies, the provisions of this Act shall apply to the extent they are more beneficial to that assessee meaning thereby that the Act gets modified in regard to the assessee insofar as the agreement is concerned, if it falls within the category stated therein. 13. The Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Malaysia for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income was entered into on 1-4-1977. This Agreement is applicable to persons who are resident of one or both of the contracting States. 17. The immovable property in question is situate in Malaysia and income is derived from that property. Further, it has also been held as a matter of fact that there is no permanent establishment in India in regard to carrying on the business of rubber plantations in Malaysia out of which income is derived and that finding of fact has been recorded by all the authorities and affirmed by the High Court. We, therefore, do not propose to re-examine the question whether the finding is correct or not. Proceeding on that basis, we hold that business income out of rubber plantations cannot be taxed in India because of closer economic relations between the assessee and Malaysia in which the property is located and where the permanent establishment has been set up will determine the fiscal domicile. On the first issue, the view taken by the High Court is correct. 18. Reading the Treaty in question as a whole when it is intended that even though it is possible for a resident in India to be taxed in terms of Sections 4 and 5, if he is deemed to be a resident of a contracting State where his personal and economic relations are closer, then his residence in India will become irrelevant. The Treaty will have to be interpreted as such and prevails over Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court is justified in reaching its conclusion, though for different reasons from those stated by the High Court. 21. Taxation policy is within the power of the Government and Section 90 of the Income Tax Act enables the Government to formulate its policy through treaties entered into by it and even such treaty treats the fiscal domicile in one State or the other and thus prevails over the other provisions of the Income Tax Act, it would be unnecessary to refer to the terms addressed in OECD or in any of the decisions of foreign jurisdiction or in any other agreements. 22. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to refer to the decisions cited before us since we have taken the view with reference to clauses set out under the Agreement. We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals and they stand dismissed.
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STATE RESPONSIBILITY DRAFT CODE ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS
[Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-third Session (2001)]
PART ONE
THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF A STATE

CHAPTER I General principles Article 1 - Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State. Article 2 - Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. Article 3 - Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law. CHAPTER II Attribution of conduct to a State Article 4 - Conduct of organs of a State 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State. Article 5 - Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.
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Article 6 - Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed. Article 7 - Excess of authority or contravention of instructions The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. Article 8 - Conduct directed or controlled by a State The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct. Article 9 - Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority. Article 10 - Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement 1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under international law. 2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international law. 3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9. Article 11 - Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own. CHAPTER III Breach of an international obligation Article 12 - Existence of a breach of an international obligation There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.
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Article 13 - International obligation in force for a State An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs. Article 14 - Extension in time of the breach of an international obligation 1. The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State not having a continuing character occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even if its effects continue. 2. The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State having a continuing character extends over the entire period during which the act continues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation. 3. The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the event continues and remains not in conformity with that obligation. Article 15 - Breach consisting of a composite act 1. The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, occurs when the action or omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act. 2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation. CHAPTER IV Responsibility of a State in connection with the act of another State Article 16 - Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. Article 17 - Direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful act A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for that act if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. Article 18 - Coercion of another State A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if:
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(a) The act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State; and (b) The coercing State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act. Article 19 - Effect of this chapter This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility, under other provisions of these articles, of the State which commits the act in question, or of any other State. CHAPTER V Circumstances precluding wrongfulness Article 20 - Consent Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent. Article 21 - Self-defence The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 22 - Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with chapter II of Part Three. Article 23 - Force majeure 1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) The situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) The State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring. Article 24 - Distress 1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the authors life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the authors care. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) The situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) The act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril.
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Article 25 - Necessity 1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity. Article 26 - Compliance with peremptory norms Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. Article 27 - Consequences of invoking a circumstance precluding wrongfulness The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to: (a) Compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer exists; (b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.
PART TWO
CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE CHAPTER I General principles Article 28 - Legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act The international responsibility of a State which is entailed by an internationally wrongful act in accordance with the provisions of Part One involves legal consequences as set out in this Part. Article 29 - Continued duty of performance The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this Part do not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached. Article 30 - Cessation and non-repetition The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) To cease that act, if it is continuing;
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(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require. Article 31 - Reparation 1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State. Article 32 - Irrelevance of internal law The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this Part. Article 33 - Scope of international obligations set out in this Part 1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 2. This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State. CHAPTER II Reparation for injury Article 34 - Forms of reparation Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Article 35 - Restitution A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) Is not materially impossible; (b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation. Article 36 - Compensation 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.
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Article 37 - Satisfaction 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State. Article 38 - Interest 1. Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter shall be payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result. 2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should have been paid until the date the obligation to pay is fulfilled. Article 39 - Contribution to the injury In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought. CHAPTER III Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law Article 40 - Application of this chapter 1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation. Article 41 - Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter 1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article 40. 2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law.
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PART THREE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE CHAPTER I Invocation of the responsibility of a State Article 42 - Invocation of responsibility by an injured State A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to: (a) That State individually; or (b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation: (i) Specially affects that State; or (ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation. Article 43 - Notice of claim by an injured State 1. An injured State which invokes the responsibility of another State shall give notice of its claim to that State. 2. The injured State may specify in particular: (a) The conduct that the responsible State should take in order to cease the wrongful act, if it is continuing; (b) What form reparation should take in accordance with the provisions of Part Two. Article 44 - Admissibility of claims The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: (a) The claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims; (b) The claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and effective local remedy has not been exhausted. Article 45 - Loss of the right to invoke responsibility The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: (a) The injured State has validly waived the claim; (b) The injured State is to be considered as having, by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse of the claim. Article 46 - Plurality of injured States Where several States are injured by the same internationally wrongful act, each injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act.
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Article 47 - Plurality of responsible States 1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act. 2. Paragraph 1: (a) Does not permit any injured State to recover, by way of compensation, more than the damage it has suffered; (b) Is without prejudice to any right of recourse against the other responsible States. Article 48 - Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State 1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State: (a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1. CHAPTER II Countermeasures Article 49 - Object and limits of countermeasures 1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two. 2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State. 3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question. Article 50 - Obligations not affected by countermeasures 1. Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) Obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals;
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(d) Other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: (a) Under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State; (b) To respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents. Article 51 - Proportionality Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question. Article 52 - Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures 1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall: (a) Call on the responsible State, in accordance with article 43, to fulfil its obligations under Part Two; (b) Notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that State. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1(b), the injured State may take such urgent countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights. 3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken must be suspended without undue delay if: (a) The internationally wrongful act has ceased; and (b) The dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties. 4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures in good faith. Article 53 - Termination of countermeasures Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful act. Article 54 - Measures taken by States other than an injured State This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1 to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. *****
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NOTTEBOHM CASE
Liechtenstein v. Guatemala
1CJ Reports 1955, p. 4
Nottebohm was a German national since birth in 1881. In 1905 he had taken residence in Guatemala and engaged in substantial business dealings there. In 1939, Nottebohm applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein. He obtained a Liechtenstein passport, had it visaed by the Guatemalan Consul in Zurich, and returned to Guatemala to resume his business activities. At his request, Guatemalan authorities made appropriate changes regarding Nottebohms nationality in the Register of Aliens and in his identity document. On 17 July 1941, United States blacklisted Nottebohm and froze his assets in the United States. War broke out between United States and Germany, and between Guatemala and Germany, on 11 December 1941. Nottebohm was arrested by Guatemalan authorities in 1943 and deported to the United States, where he was interned until 1946 as an enemy alien. On his release, he applied for his readmission to Guatemala but his application was refused. Nottebohm then took up residence in Liechtenstein, but Guatemala had in the meantime taken measures against his properties in that country, culminating in confiscatory legislation of 1949. Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Guatemala in the International Court of Justice, asking the Court to declare that Guatemala had violated international law in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his property and consequently was bound to pay compensation. Guatemalas principal argument in reply was that the Liechtenstein claim was inadmissible on grounds of the claimants nationality. The International Court of Justice observed that the naturalization of Nottebohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. When one State has conferred its nationality upon an individual and another State has conferred its own nationality on the same person, it may occur that each of these States, considering itself to have acted in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction, adheres to its own view and bases itself thereon insofar as its own actions are concerned. In so doing, each State remains within the limits of its domestic jurisdiction. In cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection, international arbitrators have given preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next, the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the center of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
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Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his breaking of a bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far-reaching consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it. It concerns him personally, and to consider it only from the point of view of its repercussions with regard to his property would be to misunderstand its profound significance. In order to appraise its international effects, it is impossible to disregard the circumstances in which it was conferred, the serious character which attaches to it, the real and effective, and not merely verbal preference of the individual seeking it for the country which grants it to him. According to the practice of States, arbitral and judicial decisions and opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis--vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individuals connection with the State which has made him its national. At the time of his naturalization, Nottebohm was settled in Guatemala for 34 years and carried on his activities there. He stayed there until his removal as a result of war measures in 1943. He subsequently attempted to return there, and he now complains of Guatemalas refusal to admit him. In contrast, his connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous. No settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country at the time of his application for naturalization; the application indicates that he was paying a visit and confirms the transient character of his visit by its request that the naturalization proceedings should be initiated and concluded without delay. No intention of settling there was shown at the time or realized in the ensuing weeks, months or years, on the contrary, he returned to Guatemala very shortly after his naturalization and showed every intention of remaining there. The above-mentioned facts clearly establish, on the one hand, the absence of any bond of attachment between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein and, on the other hand, the existence of a long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no way weakened. Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of Nottebohms membership in fact in the population of Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, is way of life or of assuming the obligations-other than fiscal obligation and exercising the rights pertaining to the status thus acquired. Accordingly, International Court of Justice came to the conclusion that Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis--vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissible.
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Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co. Ltd. Case

ICJ Reports, 1964, p. 6
In the case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, the claim is presented on behalf of natural and juristic persons, alleged to be Belgian nationals and shareholders of the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited. The object of the Belgian application is reparation for damage allegedly caused to Belgian nationals (shareholders) by the conduct, said to be contrary to international law, of various organs of the Spanish State towards Barcelona Traction Company. Barcelona Traction Company was incorporated and had its registered office in Canada. Thus, the States, which the present case principally concerns are Belgium, the national State whose organs are alleged to have committed the unlawful acts complained of, and Canada, the State under whose laws Barcelona Traction was incorporated and in whose territory it had its registered office. The following issues arise in this case : first, whether Belgium has a right to exercise diplomatic protection of Belgian shareholders in a company which is a juristic entity incorporated in Canada, the measures complained of having been taken by Spanish government in relation not to any Belgian national but to the company itself, secondly, what considerations govern determination of the nationality of a corporate entity ? On the first issue, the International Court of Justice feels that limited liability company whose capital is represented by shares enjoys in municipal legal systems independent corporate personality and is a separate entity form the shareholder who, so long as the company is in existence, has no right to corporate assets. If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions of municipal law, it would lose touch with reality. It is to rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems and not to municipal law of a particular State, that international law refers. The Court, in its following observation, does not deny the fact that a wrong done to the company frequently causes prejudice to its shareholders. But the mere fact that damage is sustained by both company and shareholder does not imply that both are entitled to claim compensation. Creditors do not have any right to claim compensation from a person who, by wronging their debtor, causes them loss. In such cases, no doubt, the interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not their rights. Thus whenever shareholders interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropriate action; for although two separate entities may have suffered from the same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed. The Court considers that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic protection of shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic claims, could crate an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international economic relations. The danger would be all the greater in as much shares of companies whose activity is international are widely scattered and frequently change hands. The situation would be different if the act complained of is aimed at the direct rights to any declared dividend, the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual assets of the company on liquidation. In such cases, the State of nationality of any
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individual shareholder may intervene in his favour, regardless of the nationality of the company. Some writers contend that diplomatic protection is permissible when it is exercised with respect to corporations constituted in or having the nationality of the respondent State. In support of this thesis, it is argued that otherwise those shareholders would be totally deprived of diplomatic protection. This argument, however, is untenable in view of the fact that to admit such an exception would be to make havoc with the system of international rules regarding the treatment of foreigners. Coming to the second issue, the International Court of Justice points out that in allocating corporate entities to States, International Law is based, but only to a limited extent on an analogy with the rules governing the nationality of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by long practice and by numerous international instruments. This, notwithstanding, further or different links are at times said to be required in order that a right of diplomatic protection should exist. Indeed, it has been the practice of some States to give a company incorporated under their law diplomatic protection solely when it has its seat or management or centre of control in their territory, or when a majority or a substantial portion of the shares has been owned by national of the State concerned. Only then, it has been held, does there exist between the Corporation and the State in question a genuine connection of the kind familiar from other branches of International law. However, in the particular field of diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute test of the genuine connection has found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied are of a relative nature, and sometimes links with one State have had to be weighted against those of another. In the present case, Barcelona Tractions links with Canada are manifold. It was incorporated in Canada and had its registered office there. Its Board meetings were held in Canada for many years. In fact, Canadian nationality of the Company has received has received general recognition. Accordingly, the application of Belgian, government was rejected by the International Court of Justice. *****
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CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (Merits)
Nicaragua v. United States of America

Background The non-appearance of the Respondent and Article 53 of the Statute The Court recalls that subsequent to the delivery of its Judgment of 26 November 1984 on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of Nicaragua's Application, the United States decided not to take part in the present phase of the proceedings. This however does not prevent the Court from giving a decision in the case, but it has to do so while respecting the requirements of Article 53 of the Statute, which provides for the situation when one of the parties does not appear. The Court's jurisdiction being established, it has in accordance with Article 53 to satisfy itself that the claim of the party appearing is well founded in fact and law. In this respect the Court recalls certain guiding principles brought out in a number of previous cases, one of which excludes any possibility of a judgment automatically in favour of the party appearing. It also observes that it is valuable for the Court to know the views of the nonappearing party, even if those views are expressed in ways not provided for in the Rules of Court. The principle of the equality of the parties has to remain the basic principle, and the Court has to ensure that the party which declines to appear should not be permitted to profit from its absence. Justiciability of the dispute The Court considers it appropriate to deal with a preliminary question. It has been suggested that the questions of the use of force and collective self-defence raised in the case fall outside the limits of the kind of questions the Court can deal with, in other words that they are not justiciable. However, in the first place the Parties have not argued that the present dispute is not a "legal dispute" within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and secondly, the Court considers that the case does not necessarily involve it in evaluation of political or military matters, which would be to overstep proper judicial bounds. Consequently, it is equipped to determine these problems. The significance of the multilateral treaty reservation The United States declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute contained a reservation excluding from operation of the declaration disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction. In its Judgment of 26 November 1984 the Court found, on the basis of Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court, that the objection to jurisdiction based on the reservation raised a question concerning matters of substance relating to the merits of the
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case and that the objection did not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character. Since it contained both preliminary aspects and other aspects relating to the merits, it had to be dealt with at the stage of the merits. In order to establish whether its jurisdiction were limited by the effect of the reservation in question, the Court has to ascertain whether any third States, parties to the four multilateral treaties invoked by Nicaragua, and not parties to the proceedings, would be affected by the Judgment. Of these treaties, the Court considers it sufficient to examine the position under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. The Court examines the impact of the multilateral treaty reservation on Nicaragua's claim that the United States has used force in breach of the two Charters. The Court examines in particular the case of El Salvador, for whose benefit primarily the United States claims to be exercising the right of collective self-defence which it regards as a justification of its own conduct towards Nicaragua, that right being endorsed by the United Nations Charter (Art. 51) and the OAS Charter (Art. 21). The dispute is to this extent a dispute arising under multilateral treaties to which the United States, Nicaragua and El Salvador are Parties. It appears clear to the Court that El Salvador would be affected by the Court's decision on the lawfulness of resort by the United States to collective self-defence. As to Nicaragua's claim that the United States has intervened in its affairs contrary to the OAS Charter (Art. 18) the Court observes that it is impossible to say that a ruling on the alleged breach of the Charter by the United States would not affect El Salvador. Having thus found that El Salvador would be affected by the decision that the Court would have to take on the claims of Nicaragua based on violation of the two Charters by the United States, the Court concludes that the jurisdiction conferred on it by the United States declaration does not permit it to entertain these claims. It makes it clear that the effect of the reservation is confined to barring the applicability of these two multilateral treaties as multilateral treaty law, and has no further impact on the sources of international law which Article 38 of the Statute requires the Court to apply, including customary international law. Establishment of the facts: evidence and methods employed by the Court The Court has had to determine the facts relevant to the dispute. The difficulty of its task derived from the marked disagreement between the Parties, the non-appearance of the Respondent, the secrecy surrounding certain conduct, and the fact that the conflict is continuing. On this last point, the Court takes the view, in accordance with the general principles as to the judicial process, that the facts to be taken into account should be those occurring up to the close of the oral proceedings on the merits of the case. With regard to the production of evidence, the Court indicates how the requirements of its Statute - in particular Article 53 - and the Rules of Court have to be met in the case, on the basis that the Court has freedom in estimating the value of the various elements of evidence. It has not seen fit to order an enquiry under Article 50 of the Statute. With regard to certain documentary material (press articles and various books), the Court has treated these with caution. It regards than not as evidence capable of proving facts, but as material which can nevertheless contribute to corroborating the existence of a fact and be taken into account to show whether certain facts are matters of public knowledge. With regard to statements by
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representatives of States, sometimes at the highest level, the Court takes the view that such statements are of particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person who made them. With regard to the evidence of witnesses presented by Nicaragua - five witnesses gave oral evidence and another a written affidavit-one consequence of the absence of the Respondent was that the evidence of the witnesses was not tested by cross-examination. The Court has not treated as evidence any part of the testimony which was a mere expression of opinion as to the probability or otherwise of the existence of a fact not directly known to the witness. With regard in particular to affidavits and sworn statements made by members of a Government, the Court considers that it can certainly retain such parts of this evidence as may be regarded as contrary to the interests or contentions of the State to which the witness has allegiance; for the rest such evidence has to be treated with great reserve. The Court is also aware of a publication of the United States State Department entitled Revolution Beyond Our Borders, Sandinista Intervention in Central America which was not submitted to the Court in any form or manner contemplated by the Statute and Rules of Court. The Court considers that, in view of the special circumstances of this case, it may, within limits, make use of information in that publication. The facts imputable to the United States 1. The Court examines the allegations of Nicaragua that the mining of Nicaraguan ports or waters was carried out by United States military personnel or persons of the nationality of Latin American countries in the pay of the United States. After examining the facts, the Court finds it established that, on a date in late 1983 or early 1984, the President of the United States authorized a United States Government agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan ports, that in early 1984 mines were laid in or close to the ports of El Bluff, Corinto and Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal waters or in its territorial sea or both, by persons in the pay and acting on the instructions of that agency, under the supervision and with the logistic support of United States agents; that neither before the laying of the mines, nor subsequently, did the United States Government issue any public and official warning to international shipping of the existence and location of the mines; and that personal and material injury was caused by the explosion of the mines, which also created risks causing a rise in marine insurance rates. 2. Nicaragua attributes to the direct action of United States personnel, or persons in its pay, operations against oil installations, a naval base, etc., listed in paragraph 81 of the Judgment. The Court finds all these incidents, except three, to be established. Although it is not proved that any United States military personnel took a direct part in the operations, United States agents participated in the planning, direction and support. The imputability to the United States of these attacks appears therefore to the Court to be established. 3. Nicaragua complains of infringement of its air space by United States military aircraft. After indicating the evidence available, the Court finds that the only violations of Nicaraguan air space imputable to the United States on the basis of the evidence are high altitude reconnaissance flights and low altitude flights on 7 to 11 November 1984 causing sonic booms.
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With regard to joint military manoeuvres with Honduras carried out by the United States on Honduran territory near the Honduras/Nicaragua frontier, the Court considers that they may be treated as public knowledge and thus sufficiently established. 4. The Court then examines the genesis, development and activities of the contra force, and the role of the United States in relation to it. According to Nicaragua, the United States conceived, created and organized a mercenary army, the contra force. On the basis of the available information, the Court is not able to satisfy itself that the Respondent State "created" the contra force in Nicaragua, but holds it established that it largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the FDN, one element of the force. It is claimed by Nicaragua that the United States Government devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the contra force, and provided direct combat support for its military operations. In the light of the evidence and material available to it, the Court is not satisfied that all the operations launched by the contra force, at every stage of the conflict, reflected strategy and tactics solely devised by the United States. It therefore cannot uphold the contention of Nicaragua on this point. The Court however finds it clear that a number of operations were decided and planned, if not actually by the United States advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support which the United States was able to offer. It is also established in the Court's view that the support of the United States for the activities of the contras took various forms over the years, such as logistic support the supply of information on the location and movements of the Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, etc. The evidence does not however warrant a finding that the United States gave direct combat support, if that is taken to mean direct intervention by United States combat forces. The Court has to determine whether the relationship of the contras to the United States Government was such that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government. The Court considers that the evidence available to it is insufficient to demonstrate the total dependence of the contras on United States aid. A partial dependency, the exact extent of which the Court cannot establish, may be inferred from the fact that the leaders were selected by the United States, and from other factors such as the organisation, training and equipping of the force, planning of operations, the choosing of targets and the operational support provided. There is no clear evidence that the United States actually exercised such a degree of control as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf. 5. Having reached the above conclusion, the Court takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts, in particular the alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed. 6. Nicaragua has complained of certain measures of an economic nature taken against it by the Government of the United States, which it regards as an indirect form of intervention in its internal affairs. Economic aid was suspended in January 1981, and terminated in April 1981; the United States acted to oppose or block loans to Nicaragua by international financial
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bodies; the sugar import quota from Nicaragua was reduced by 90 percent in September 1983; and a total trade embargo on Nicaragua was declared by an executive order of the President of the United States on 1 May 1985. The conduct of Nicaragua The Court has to ascertain, so far as possible, whether the activities of the United States complained of, claimed to have been the exercise of collective self-defence, may be justified by certain facts attributable to Nicaragua. 1. The United States has contended that Nicaragua was actively supporting armed groups operating in certain of the neighbouring countries, particularly in El Salvador, and specifically in the form of the supply of arms, an accusation which Nicaragua has repudiated. The Court first examines the activity of Nicaragua with regard to El Salvador. Having examined various evidence, and taking account of a number of concordant indications, many of which were provided by Nicaragua itself, from which the Court can reasonably infer the provision of a certain amount of aid from Nicaraguan territory, the Court concludes that support for the armed opposition in El Salvador from Nicaraguan territory was a fact up to the early months of 1981. Subsequently, evidence of military aid from or through Nicaragua remains very weak, despite the deployment by the United States in the region of extensive technical monitoring resources. The Court cannot however conclude that no transport of or traffic in arms existed. It merely takes note that the allegations of arms traffic are not solidly established, and has not been able to satisfy itself that any continuing flow on a significant scale took place after the early months of 1981. Even supposing it were established that military aid was reaching the armed opposition in El Salvador from the territory of Nicaragua, it skill remains to be proved that such aid is imputable to the authorities of Nicaragua, which has not sought to conceal the possibility of weapons crossing its territory, but denies that this is the result of any deliberate official policy on its part. Having regard to the circumstances characterizing this part of Central America, the Court considers that it is scarcely possible for Nicaragua's responsibility for arms traffic on its territory to be automatically assumed. The Court considers it more consistent with the probabilities to recognize that an activity of that nature, if on a limited scale, may very well be pursued unknown to the territorial government. In any event the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period. 2. The United States has also accused Nicaragua of being responsible for cross-border military attacks on Honduras and Costa Rica. While not as fully informed on the question as it would wish to be, the Court considers as established the fact that certain trans-border military incursions are imputable to the Government of Nicaragua. 3. The Judgment recalls certain events which occurred at the time of the fall of President Somoza, since reliance has been placed on them by the United States to contend that the present Government of Nicaragua is in violation of certain alleged assurances given by its immediate predecessor. The Judgment refers in particular to the Plan to secure peace sent on 12 July 1979 by the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua to the Secretary-General of the OAS, mentioning, inter alia, its firm intention to establish full
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observance of human rights in our country and to call the first free elections our country has known in this century. The United States considers that it has a special responsibility regarding the implementation of these commitments. The applicable law: customary international law The Court has reached the conclusion (section V, in fine) that it has to apply the multilateral treaty reservation in the United States declaration, the consequential exclusion of multilateral treaties being without prejudice either to other treaties or other sources of law enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute. In order to determine the law actually to be applied to the dispute, it has to ascertain the consequences of the exclusion of the applicability of the multilateral treaties for the definition of the content of the customary international law which remains applicable. The Court, which has already commented briefly on this subject in the jurisdiction phase (I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 424 and 425, para. 73), develops its initial remarks. It does not consider that it can be claimed, as the United States does, that all the customary rules which may be invoked have a content exactly identical to that of the rules contained in the treaties which cannot be applied by virtue of the United States reservation. Even if a treaty norm and a customary norm relevant to the present dispute were to have exactly the same content, this would not be a reason for the Court to take the view that the operation of the treaty process must necessarily deprive the customary norm of its separate applicability. Consequently, the Court is in no way bound to uphold customary rules only in so far as they differ from the treaty rules which it is prevented by the United States reservation from applying. In response to an argument of the United States, the Court considers that the divergence between the content of the customary norms and that of the treaty law norms is not such that a judgment confined to the field of customary international law would not be susceptible of compliance or execution by the parties. The content of the applicable law 1. Introduction: general observations The Court has next to consider what are the rules of customary law applicable to the present dispute. For this purpose it has to consider whether a customary rule exists in the opinio juris of States, and satisfy itself that it is confirmed by practice. 2. The prohibition of the use of force, and the right of self-defence The Court finds that both Parties take the view that the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the United Nations Charter correspond, in essentials, to those found in customary international law. They therefore accept a treaty-law obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (Art. 2, para. 4, of the Charter). The Court has however to be satisfied that there exists in customary law an opinio juris as to the binding character of such abstention. It considers that this opinio juris may be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625 (XXV) entitled Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
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Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Consent to such resolutions is one of the forms of expression of an opinio juris with regard to the principle of non-use of force, regarded as a principle of customary international law, independently of the provisions, especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-law plane of the Charter. The general rule prohibiting force established in customary law allows for certain exceptions. The exception of the right of individual or collective self-defence is also, in the view of States, established in customary law, as is apparent for example from the terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which refers to an "inherent right", and from the declaration in resolution 2625 (XXV). The Parties, who consider the existence of this right to be established as a matter of customary international law, agree in holding that whether the response to an attack is lawful depends on the observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence. Whether self-defence be individual or collective, it can only be exercised in response to an armed attack. In the view of the Court, this is to be understood as meaning not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by a State of armed bands on to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack had it been carried out by regular armed forces. The Court quotes the definition of aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) as expressing customary law in this respect. The Court does not believe that the concept of armed attack includes assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Furthermore, the Court finds that in customary international law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American legal system, there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective selfdefence in the absence of a request by the State which is a victim of the alleged attack, this being additional to the requirement that the State in question should have declared itself to have been attacked. 3. The principle of non-intervention The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference. Expressions of an opinio juris of States regarding the existence of this principle are numerous. The Court notes that this principle, stated in its own jurisprudence, has been reflected in numerous declarations and resolutions adopted by international organizations and conferences in which the United States and Nicaragua have participated. The text thereof testifies to the acceptance by the United States and Nicaragua of a customary principle which has universal application. As to the content of the principle in customary law, the Court defines the constitutive elements which appear relevant in this case: a prohibited intervention must be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely (for example the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and formulation of foreign policy). Intervention is wrongful when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of coercion, particularly force, either in the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support for subversive activities in another State.
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With regard to the practice of States, the Court notes that there have been in recent years a number of instances of foreign intervention in one State for the benefit of forces opposed to the government of that State. It concludes that the practice of States does not justify the view that any general right of intervention in support of an opposition within another State exists in contemporary international law; and this is in fact not asserted either by the United States or by Nicaragua. 4. Collective counter-measures in response to conduct not amounting to armed attack The Court then considers the question whether, if one State acts towards another in breach of the principle of non-intervention, a third State may lawfully take action by way of counter-measures which would amount to an intervention in the first State's internal affairs. This would be analogous to the right of self-defence in the case of armed attack, but the act giving rise to the reaction would be less grave, not amounting to armed attack. In the view of the Court, under international law in force today, States do not have a right of "collective" armed response to acts which do not constitute an armed attack. 5. State sovereignty Turning to the principle of respect for State sovereignty, the Court recalls that the concept of sovereignty, both in treaty-law and in customary international law, extends to the internal waters and territorial sea of every State and to the airspace above its territory. It notes that the laying of mines necessarily affects the sovereignty of the coastal State, and that if the right of access to ports is hindered by the laying of mines by another State, what is infringed is the freedom of communications and of maritime commerce. 6. Humanitarian law The Court observes that the laying of mines in the waters of another State without any warning or notification is not only an unlawful act but also a breach of the principles of humanitarian law underlying the Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907. This consideration leads the Court on to examination of the international humanitarian law applicable to the dispute. Nicaragua has not expressly invoked the provisions of international humanitarian law as such, but has complained of acts committed on its territory which would appear to be breaches thereof. In its submissions it has accused the United States of having killed, wounded and kidnapped citizens of Nicaragua. Since the evidence available is insufficient for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras, the Court rejects this submission. The question however remains of the law applicable to the acts of the United States in relation to the activities of the contrast Although Nicaragua has refrained from referring to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, to which Nicaragua and the United States are parties, the Court considers that the rules stated in Article 3, which is common to the four Conventions, applying to armed conflicts of a non-international character, should be applied. The United States is under an obligation to "respect" the Conventions and even to "ensure respect" for them, and thus not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3. This obligation derives from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.
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7. The 1956 treaty In its Judgment of 26 November 1984, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain claims concerning the existence of a dispute between the United States and Nicaragua as to the interpretation or application of a number of articles of the treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed at Managua on 21 January 1956. It has to determine the meaning of the various relevant provisions, and in particular of Article XXI, paragraphs I(c) and I(d), by which the parties reserved the power to derogate from the other provisions. Application of the law to the facts Having set out the facts of the case and the rules of international law which appear to be in issue as a result of those facts, the Court has now to appraise the facts in relation to the legal rules applicable, and determine whether there are present any circumstances excluding the unlawfulness of particular acts. 1. The prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence Appraising the facts first in the light of the principle of the non-use of force, the Court considers that the laying of mines in early 1984 and certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and naval bases, imputable to the United States constitute infringements of this principle, unless justified by circumstances which exclude their unlawfulness. It also considers that the United States has committed a prima facie violation of the principle by arming and training the contras, unless this can be justified as an exercise of the right of selfdefence. On the other hand, it does not consider that military manoeuvres held by the United States near the Nicaraguan borders, or the supply of funds to the contras, amounts to a use of force. The Court has to consider whether the acts which it regards as breaches of the principle may be justified by the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, and has therefore to establish whether the circumstances required are present. For this, it would first have to find that Nicaragua engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica, since only such an attack could justify reliance on the right of self-defence. As regards El Salvador, the Court considers that in customary international law the provision of arms to the opposition in another State does not constitute an armed attack on that State. As regards Honduras and Costa Rica, the Court states that, in the absence of sufficient information as to the transborder incursions into the territory of those two States from Nicaragua, it is difficult to decide whether they amount, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua. The Court finds that neither these incursions nor the alleged supply of arms may be relied on as justifying the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. Secondly, in order to determine whether the United States was justified in exercising selfdefence, the Court has to ascertain whether the circumstances required for the exercise of this right of collective self-defence were present, and therefore considers whether the States in question believed that they were the victims of an armed attack by Nicaragua, and requested the assistance of the United States in the exercise of collective self-defence. The Court has seen no evidence that the conduct of those States was consistent with such a situation.
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Finally, appraising the United States activity in relation to the criteria of necessity and proportionality, the Court cannot find that the activities in question were undertaken in the light of necessity, and finds that some of them cannot be regarded as satisfying the criterion of proportionality. Since the plea of collective self-defence advanced by the United States cannot be upheld, it follows that the United States has violated the principle prohibiting recourse to the threat or use of force by the acts referred to in the first paragraph of this section. 2. The principle of non-intervention The Court finds it clearly established that the United States intended, by its support of the contras, to coerce Nicaragua in respect of matters in which each State is permitted to decide freely, and that the intention of the contras themselves was to overthrow the present Government of Nicaragua. It considers that if one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, supports and assists armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow its government, that amounts to an intervention in its internal affairs, whatever the political objective of the State giving support. It therefore finds that the support given by the United States to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention. Humanitarian aid on the other hand cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention. With effect from 1 October 1984, the United States Congress has restricted the use of funds to humanitarian assistance to the contrast The Court recalls that if the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of another State, it must be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, and above all be given without discrimination. With regard to the form of indirect intervention which Nicaragua sees in the taking of certain action of an economic nature against it by the United States, the Court is unable to regard such action in the present case as a breach of the customary law principle of nonintervention. 3. Collective counter-measures in response to conduct not amounting to armed attack Having found that intervention in the internal affairs of another State does not produce an entitlement to take collective counter-measures involving the use of force, the Court finds that the acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have been established and imputable to that State, could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of force. 4. State sovereignty The Court finds that the assistance to the contras, the direct attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, etc., the mining operations in Nicaraguan ports, and the acts of intervention involving the use of force referred to in the Judgment, which are already a breach of the principle of non-use of force, are also an infringement of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty. This principle is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of Nicaraguan territory. These acts cannot be justified by the activities in El Salvador attributed to Nicaragua; assuming that such activities did in fact occur, they do not bring into effect any
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right belonging to the United States. The Court also concludes that, in the context of the present proceedings, the laying of mines in or near Nicaraguan ports constitutes an infringement, to Nicaragua's detriment, of the freedom of communications and of maritime commerce. 5. Humanitarian law The Court has found the United States responsible for the failure to give notice of the mining of Nicaraguan ports. It has also found that, under general principles of humanitarian law, the United States was bound to refrain from encouragement of persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to commit violations of common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. The manual on Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, for the publication and dissemination of which the United States is responsible, advises certain acts which cannot but be regarded as contrary to that article. 6. Other grounds mentioned in justification of the acts of the United States The United States has linked its support to the contras with alleged breaches by the Government of Nicaragua of certain solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the United States and the OAS. The Court considers whether there is anything in the conduct of Nicaragua which might legally warrant counter-measures by the United States in response to the alleged violations. With reference to the Plan to secure peace put forward by the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (12 July 1979), the Court is unable to find anything in the documents and communications transmitting the plan from which it can be inferred that any legal undertaking was intended to exist. The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system. Furthermore the Respondent has not advanced a legal argument based on an alleged new principle of ideological intervention. With regard more specifically to alleged violations of human rights relied on by the United States, the Court considers that the use of force by the United States could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect for such rights, normally provided for in the applicable conventions. With regard to the alleged militarization of Nicaragua, also referred to by the United States to justify its activities, the Court observes that in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception. 7. The 1956 Treaty The Court turns to the claims of Nicaragua based on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956, and the claim that the United States has deprived the Treaty of its object and purpose and emptied it of real content. The Court cannot however entertain these claims unless the conduct complained of is not measures . . . necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States, since Article XXI of the Treaty provides that the Treaty shall not preclude the application of such measures. With regard to the question
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what activities of the United States might have been such as to deprive the Treaty of its object and purpose, the Court makes a distinction. It is unable to regard all the acts complained of in that light, but considers that there are certain activities which undermine the whole spirit of the agreement. These are the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the direct attacks on ports, oil installations, etc., and the general trade embargo. The Court also upholds the contention that the mining of the ports is in manifest contradiction with the freedom of navigation and commerce guaranteed by Article XIX of the Treaty. It also concludes that the trade embargo proclaimed on 1 May 1985 is contrary to that article. The Court therefore finds that the United States is prima facie in breach of an obligation not to deprive the 1956 Treaty of its object and purpose (pacta sunt servanda), and has committed acts in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty. The Court has however to consider whether the exception in Article XXI concerning measures . . . necessary to protect the essential security interests of a Party may be invoked to justify the acts complained of. After examining the available material, particularly the Executive Order of President Reagan of 1 May 1985, the Court finds that the mining of Nicaraguan ports, and the direct attacks on ports and oil installations, and the general trade embargo of 1 May 1985, cannot be justified as necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States. The claim for reparation The Court is requested to adjudge and declare that compensation is due to Nicaragua, the quantum thereof to be fixed subsequently, and to award to Nicaragua the sum of 370.2 million US dollars as an interim award. After satisfying itself that it has jurisdiction to order reparation, the Court considers appropriate the request of Nicaragua for the nature and amount of the reparation to be determined in a subsequent phase of the proceedings. It also considers that there is no provision in the Statute of the Court either specifically empowering it or debarring it from making an interim award of the kind requested. In a cases in which one Party is not appearing, the Court should refrain from any unnecessary act which might prove an obstacle to a negotiated settlement. The Court therefore does not consider that it can accede at this stage to this request by Nicaragua. The provisional measures After recalling certain passages in its Order of 10 May 1984, the Court concludes that it is incumbent on each Party not to direct its conduct solely by reference to what it believes to be its rights. Particularly is this so in a situation of armed conflict where no reparation can efface the results of conduct which the Court may rule to have been contrary to international law Peaceful settlement of disputes; the Contadora process In the present case the Court has already taken note of the Contadora process, and of the fact that it had been endorsed by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, as well as by Nicaragua and the United States. It recalls to both Parties to the present case the need to co-operate with the Contadora efforts in seeking a definitive and lasting peace in Central America, in accordance with the principle of customary international law that
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prescribes the peaceful settlement of international disputes, also endorsed by Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. THE COURT (1) By eleven votes to four, Decides that in adjudicating the dispute brought before it by the Application filed by the Republic of Nicaragua on 9 April 1984, the Court is required to apply the "multilateral treaty reservation" contained in proviso (c) to the declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court by the Government of the Untied States of America deposited on 26 August 1946; (2) By twelve votes to three, Rejects the justification of collective self-defence maintained by the United States of America in connection with the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua the subject of this case; (3) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State; (4) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks on Puerto Sandino on 13 September and 14 October 1983, an attack on Corinto on 10 October 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval Base on 4/5 January 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March 1984; attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March 1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on 9 April 1984; and further by those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State; (5) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by directing or authorizing over Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts imputable to the United States referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of another State; (6) By twelve votes to three, Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce;
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(7) By fourteen votes to one, Decides that, by the acts referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua signed at Managua on 21 January 1956; (8) By fourteen votes to one, Decides that the United States of America, by failing to make known the existence and location of the mines laid by it, referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof, has acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law in this respect; (9) By fourteen votes to one, Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled "Operaciones sicolgicas en guerra de guerrillas", and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America; (10) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has committed acts calculated to deprive of its object and purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956; (11) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956; (12) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations; (13) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated above; (14) By fourteen votes to one, Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the Treaty of
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Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956; (15) By fourteen votes to one, Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, will be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case; (16) Unanimously, Recalls to both Parties their obligation to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international law. *****
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CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS
Mexico v. United States of America

ICJ Reoprts 2004, p. 12
History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties The Court begins by recalling that on 9 January 2003 the United Mexican States instituted proceedings against the United States of America for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 allegedly committed by the United States. In its Application, Mexico based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention. On the same day, Mexico also filed a request for the indication of provisional measures. By an Order of 5 February 2003, the Court indicated the following provisional measures: (a) The United States of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Csar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings; (b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of all measures taken in implementation of this Order. It further decided that, until the Court has rendered its final judgment, it shall remain seised of the matters which formed the subject of that Order. In a letter of 2 November 2003, the Agent of the United States advised the Court that the United States had informed the relevant state authorities of Mexicos application; that, since the Order of 5 February 2003, the United States had obtained from them information about the status of the fifty-four cases, including the three cases identified in paragraph 59 (I) (a) of that Order; and that the United States could confirm that none of the named individuals [had] been executed. The Government of Mexico respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare: (1) That the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexicos Memorial, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failing to inform, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention; (2) That the obligation in Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention requires notification of consular rights and a reasonable opportunity for consular access before the competent authorities of the receiving State take any action potentially detrimental to the foreign nationals rights;
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(3) That the United States of America violated its obligations under Article 36 (2) of the Vienna Convention by failing to provide meaningful and effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (1); by substituting for such review and reconsideration clemency proceedings; and by applying the procedural default doctrine and other municipal law doctrines that fail to attach legal significance to an Article 36 (1) violation on its own terms; (4) That pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is entitled to full reparation for those injuries in the form of restitutio in integrum; (5) That this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the status quo ante by annulling or otherwise depriving of full force or effect the convictions and sentences of all 52 Mexican nationals; (6) That this restitution also includes the obligation to take all measures necessary to ensure that a prior violation of Article 36 shall not affect the subsequent proceedings; (7) That to the extent that any of the 52 convictions or sentences are not annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own choosing, meaningful and effective review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the 52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot be satisfied by means of clemency proceedings or if any municipal law rule or doctrine inconsistent with paragraph (3) above is applied; and (8) That the United States of America shall cease its violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals and shall provide appropriate guarantees and assurances that it shall take measures sufficient to achieve increased compliance with Article 36 (1) and to ensure compliance with Article 36 (2). On the basis of the facts and arguments made by the United States in its CounterMemorial and in these proceedings, the Government of the United States conformed its conduct to this Courts Judgment in the LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America), not only with respect to German nationals but, consistent with the Declaration of the President of the Court in that case, to all detained foreign nationals, adjudge and declare that the claims of the United Mexican States are dismissed. Mexican objection to the United States objections to jurisdiction and admissibility The Court notes at the outset that the United States has presented a number of objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, as well as to the admissibility of the claims advanced by Mexico; that it is however the contention of Mexico that all the objections raised by the United States are inadmissible as having been raised after the expiration of the time-limit laid down by Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court as amended in 2000. The Court notes, however, that Article 79 of the Rules applies only to preliminary objections. It observes that an objection that is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 79 does not thereby become inadmissible; that there are of course circumstances in which the party failing to put forward an objection to jurisdiction might be held to have acquiesced in jurisdiction; that, however, apart from such circumstances, a party failing to avail itself of the Article 79 procedure may forfeit the right to
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bring about a suspension of the proceedings on the merits, but can still argue the objection along with the merits. The Court finds that that is indeed what the United States has done in this case; and that, for reasons to be indicated below, many of its objections are of such a nature that they would in any event probably have had to be heard along with the merits. The Court concludes that it should not exclude from consideration the objections of the United States to jurisdiction and admissibility by reason of the fact that they were not presented within three months from the date of filing of the Memorial. United States objections to jurisdiction By its first jurisdictional objection, the United States suggested that the Mexican Memorial is fundamentally addressed to the treatment of Mexican nationals in the federal and state criminal justice systems of the United States, and to the operation of the United States criminal justice system as a whole; for the Court to address such issues would be an abuse of its jurisdiction. The Court recalls that its jurisdiction in the present case has been invoked under the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to determine the nature and extent of the obligations undertaken by the United States towards Mexico by becoming party to that Convention. If and so far as the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the parties to the Vienna Convention included commitments as to the conduct of their municipal courts in relation to the nationals of other parties, then in order to ascertain whether there have been breaches of the Convention, the Court must be able to examine the actions of those courts in the light of international law. How far it may do so in the present case is a matter for the merits; the first objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld. The second jurisdictional objection presented by the United States was addressed to Mexicos submission that the United States in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing [to death] Mexican nationals, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, as provided by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The United States pointed out that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates no obligations constraining the rights of the United States to arrest a Mexican nationals could not constitute breaches of Article 36, which merely lays down obligations of notification. The Court observes, however, that Mexico argues that depriving a foreign national facing criminal proceedings of the right to consular notification and assistance renders those proceedings fundamentally unfair. In the Courts view that is to argue in favour of a particular interpretation of the Vienna Convention. Such an interpretation may or may not be confirmed on the merits, but is not excluded from the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention. The second objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld. The third objection by the United States to the jurisdiction of the Court refers to the first submission concerning remedies in the Mexican Memorial, namely that Mexico is entitled to restitutio in integrum, and that the United States therefore is under an obligation to restore the status quo ante. The United States objects that this would intrude deeply into the independence of its courts; and that for the Court to declare that the United States is under a specific obligation to vacate convictions and sentences would be beyond its jurisdiction. The Court recalls in this regard, as it did in the LaGrand case, that, where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court in
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order to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 485, para. 48). Whether or how far the Court may order the remedy requested by Mexico are matters to be determined as part of the merits of the dispute; the third objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld. The fourth and last jurisdictional objection of the United States is that, contrary to the contentions of Mexico, the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not consular notification is a human right, or to declare fundamental requirements of substantive or procedural due process. The Court observes that Mexico has presented this argument as being a matter of interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and therefore belonging to the merits. The Court considers that this is indeed a question of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, for which it has jurisdiction; the fourth objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be upheld. United States objections to admissibility The Court notes that the first objection of the United States under this head is that Mexicos submissions should be found inadmissible because they seek to have this Court function as a court of criminal appeal; that there is, in the view of the United States, no other apt characterization of Mexicos two submissions in respect of remedies. The Court observes that this contention is addressed solely to the question of remedies. The United States does not contend on this ground that the Court should decline jurisdiction to enquire into the question of breaches of the Vienna Convention at all, but simply that, if such breaches are shown, the Court should do no more than decide that the United States must provide review and reconsideration along the lines indicated in the Judgment in the LaGrand case (I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 513-514, para. 125). The Court notes that this is a matter of merits; the first objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld. The Court then turns to the objection of the United States based on the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The United States contends that the Court should find inadmissible Mexicos claim to exercise its right of diplomatic protection on behalf of any Mexican national who has failed to meet the customary legal requirement of exhaustion of municipal remedies. The Court recalls that in its final submissions Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States, in failing to comply with Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, has violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals. The Court observes that the individual rights of Mexican nationals under subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention are rights which are to be asserted, at any rate in the first place, within the domestic legal system of the United States. Only when that process is completed and local remedies are exhausted would Mexico be entitled to espouse the individual claims of its nationals through the procedure of diplomatic protection. In the present case Mexico does not, however, claim to be acting solely on that basis. It also asserts its own claims, basing them on the injury which it contends that it has itself suffered, directly and through its nationals, as a result of the violation by the United States of the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c). The Court finds that, in these special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico
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may, in submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). The duty to exhaust local remedies does not apply to such a request. The Court accordingly finds that the second objection by the United States to admissibility cannot be upheld. The Court then turns to the question of the alleged dual nationality of certain of the Mexican nationals the subject of Mexicos claims. The United States contends that in its Memorial Mexico had failed to establish that it may exercise diplomatic protection based on breaches of Mexicos rights under the Vienna Convention with respect to those of its nationals who are also nationals of the United States. The Court recalls, however, that Mexico, in addition to seeking to exercise diplomatic protection of its nationals, is making a claim in its own right on the basis of the alleged breaches by the United States of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Seen from this standpoint, the question of dual nationality is not one of admissibility, but of merits. Without prejudice to the outcome of such examination, the third objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld. The Court then turns to the fourth objection advanced by the United States to the admissibility of Mexicos claims: the contention that The Court should not permit Mexico to pursue a claim against the United States with respect to any individual case where Mexico had actual knowledge of a breach of the [Vienna Convention] but failed to bring such breach to the attention of the United States or did so only after considerable delay. The Court recalls that in the case of Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), it observed that delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application inadmissible, but that international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard (I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 253-254, para. 32). It notes that in that case it had recognized that delay might prejudice the Respondent State, but fines that there has been no suggestion of any such risk of prejudice in the present case. So far as inadmissibility might be based on an implied waiver of rights, the Court considers that only a much more prolonged and consistent inaction on the part of Mexico than any that the United States has alleged might be interpreted as implying such a waiver. The Court notes, furthermore, that Mexico indicated a number of ways in which it brought to the attention of the United States the breaches which it perceived of the Vienna Convention; the fourth objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld. The Court finally examines the objection of the United States that the claim of Mexico is inadmissible in that Mexico should not be allowed to invoke against the United States standards that Mexico does not follow in its own practice. The Court recalls in this respect that it is essential to have in mind the nature of the Vienna Convention. That Convention lays down certain standards to be observed by all States parties, with a view to the unimpeded conduct of consular relations. Even if it were shown, therefore, that Mexicos practice as regards the application of Article 36 was not beyond reproach, this would not constitute a ground of objection to the admissibility of Mexicos claim; the fifth objection of the United States to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
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The Court then turns to the merits of Mexicos claims. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention The Court notes that in the first of its final submissions, Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that, the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexicos Memorial, violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failing to inform, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention. It recalls that it has already in its Judgment in the LaGrand case described Article 36, paragraph 1, as an interrelated rgime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74). After citing the full text of the paragraph, the Court observes that the United States as the receiving State does not deny its duty to perform the obligations indicated therein. However, it claims that those obligations apply only to individuals shown to be of Mexican nationality alone, and not to those of dual Mexican/United States nationality. The United States further contends inter alia that it has not committed any breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), upon the proper interpretation of without delay as used in that subparagraph. Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) The Court finds that thus two major issues under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) are in dispute between the Parties: first, the question of the nationality of the individuals concerned; and second, the question of the meaning to be given to the expression without delay. Nationality of the individuals concerned The Court begins by noting that the Parties disagree as to what each of them must show as regards nationality in connection with the applicability of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1, and as to how the principles of evidence have been met on the facts of the cases. The Court finds that it is for Mexico to show that the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16 of the Judgment held Mexican nationality at the time of their arrest. It notes that to this end Mexico has produced birth certificates and declarations of nationality, whose contents have not been challenged by the United States. The Court observes further that the United States has questioned whether some of these individuals were not also United States nationals. The Court takes the view that it was for the United States to demonstrate that this was so and to furnish the Court with all information on the matter in its possession. In so far as relevant data on that matter are said by the United States to lie within the knowledge of Mexico, it was for the United States to have sought that information from the Mexican authorities. The Court finds that, at no stage, however, has the United States shown the Court that it made specific enquiries of those authorities about particular cases and that responses were not forthcoming. The Court accordingly concludes that the United States has not met its burden of proof in its attempt to show that persons of Mexican nationality were also United States nationals. The
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Court therefore finds that, as regards the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16 of the Judgment, the United States had obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Requirement to inform without delay The Court continues by noting that Mexico, in its second final submission, asks the Court to find that the obligation in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention requires notification of consular rights and a reasonable opportunity for consular access before the competent authorities of the receiving State take any action potentially detrimental to the foreign nationals rights. The Court notes that Mexico contends that, in each of the 52 cases before the Court, the United States failed to provide the arrested persons with information as to their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), without delay. It further notes that the United States disputes both the facts as presented by Mexico and the legal analysis of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention offered by Mexico. The Court first turns to the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), having found that it is applicable to the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16 of the Judgment. It begins by stating that individual concerned to be informed without delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b); the right of the consular post to be notified without delay of the individuals detention, if he so requests; and the obligation of the receiving State to forward without delay any communication addressed to the consular post by the detained person (this last element not having been raised in the case). Beginning with the right of an arrested individual to information, the Court finds that the duty upon the arresting authorities to give the Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), information to the individual arises once it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national. Precisely when this may occur will vary with circumstances. Bearing in mind the complexities of establishing such a fact as explained by the United States, the Court begins by examining the application of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention to the 52 cases. In 45 of these cases, it finds that it has no evidence that the arrested persons claimed United States nationality, or were reasonably thought to be United States nationals, with specific enquiries being made in timely fashion to verify such dual nationality. It notes, however, that seven persons are asserted by the United States to have stated at the time of arrest that they were United States citizens. After examination of those seven cases the Court concludes that Mexico has failed to prove the violation by the United States of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), in only one of these. As regards the other individuals who are alleged to have claimed United States nationality on arrest, the Court finds that the argument of the United States cannot be upheld. The Court points out that the question nonetheless remains as to whether, in each of these 51 cases, the United States did provide the required information to the arrested persons without delay. It is to that question that the Court then turns. The Court notes that in 47 cases the United States nowhere challenges the fact that the Mexican nationals were never informed of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), but that in four cases some doubt remains whether the information that was given was provided without delay; for these, some examination of the term is thus necessary.
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The Court notes that the Parties have very different views on this. According to Mexico, the timing of the notice to the detained person is critical to the exercise of the rights provided by Article 36 and the phrase without delay in paragraph 1 (b) requires unqualified immediacy. Mexico further contends that, in view of the object and purpose of Article 36, which is to enable meaningful consular assistance and the safeguarding of the vulnerability of foreign nationals in custody, consular notification must occur immediately upon detention and prior to any interrogation of the foreign detainee, so that the consul may offer useful advice about the foreign legal system and provide assistance in obtaining counsel before the foreign national makes any ill-informed decisions or the State takes any action potentially prejudicial to his rights. The United States disputed this interpretation of the phrase without delay. In its view it did not mean immediately, and before interrogation and such an understanding was supported neither by the terminology, nor by the object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by its travaux prparatoires. According to the United States, the purpose of Article 36 was to facilitate the exercise of consular functions by a consular officer: The significance of giving consular information to a national is thus limited . It is a procedural device that allows the foreign national to trigger the related process of notification. [It] cannot possibly be fundamental to the criminal justice process. The Court begins by noting that the precise meaning of without delay, as it is to be understood in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), is not defined in the Convention. This phrase therefore requires interpretation according to the customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. After examination of the text of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, its object and purpose, as well as its travaux prparatoires, the Court finds that without delay is not necessarily to be interpreted as immediately upon arrest, nor can it be interpreted to signify that the provision of the information must necessarily precede any interrogation, so that the commencement of interrogation before the information is given would be a breach of Article 36. The Court observes, however, that there is nonetheless a duty upon the arresting authorities to give the information to an arrested person as soon as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national. Applying this interpretation of without delay to the facts of the four outstanding cases, the Court finds that the United States was in breach of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), in respect of these individuals also. The Court accordingly concludes that, with respect to all save one of the 52 individuals listed in paragraph 16 of the Judgment, the United States has violated its obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention to provide information to the arrested person. Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c) The Court begins by recalling its observation above that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), contains three elements. Thus far, it observes, it has been dealing with the right of an arrested person to be informed that he may ask for his consular post to be notified. The Court then turns to another aspect of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). It finds the United States is correct in observing that the fact that a Mexican consular post was not notified under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), does not of necessity show that the arrested person was not informed of his rights under that provision. He may have been informed and declined to have his consular
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post notified. The Court finds in one of the two cases mentioned by the United States in this respect, that that was the case. In two of three further cases in which the United States alleges that the consular post was formally notified without prior information to the individual, the Court finds that the United States did violate its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). The Court notes that, in the first of its final submissions, Mexico also asks the Court to find that the violations it ascribes to the United States in respect of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), have also deprived Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention. The Court recalls that the relationship between the three subparagraphs of Article 36, paragraph 1, has been described by it in its Judgment in the LaGrand case (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74) as an interrelated rgime. The legal conclusions to be drawn from that interrelationship necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the LaGrand case, the Court found that the failure for 16 years to inform the brothers of their right to have their consul notified effectively prevented the exercise of other rights that Germany might have chosen to exercise under subparagraphs (a) and (c). The Court is of the view that it is necessary to revisit the interrelationship of the three subparagraphs of Article 36, paragraph 1, in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the present case. It first recalls that, in one case, when the defendant was informed of his rights, he declined to have his consular post notified. Thus in this case there was no violation of either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1. In the remaining cases, because of the failure of the United States to act in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), Mexico was in effect precluded (in some cases totally, and in some cases for prolonged periods of time) from exercising its right under paragraph 1 (a) to communicate with its nationals and have access to them. As the Court has already had occasion to explain, it is immaterial whether Mexico would have offered consular assistance, or whether a different verdict would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these rights (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 492, para. 74), which might have been acted upon. The Court observes that the same is true, pari passu, of certain rights identified in subparagraph (c): consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, and to converse and correspond with him . Mexico, it notes, laid much emphasis in this litigation upon the importance of consular officers being able to arrange for such representation before and during trial, and especially at sentencing, in cases in which a severe penalty may be imposed. Mexico has further indicated the importance of any financial or other assistance that consular officers may provide to defence counsel, inter alia for investigation of the defendants family background and mental condition, when such information is relevant to the case. The Court observes that the exercise of the rights of the sending State under Article 36, paragraph 1(c), depends upon notification by the authorities of the receiving State. It may be, however, that information drawn to the attention of the sending State by other means may still enable its consular officers to assist in arranging legal representation for its national. The Court finds that has been so in 13 cases. The Court concludes on this aspect of the case in paragraph 106 of the Judgment, where it summarizes its findings as to the violation of the different obligations incumbent upon the United States under Article 36, paragraph 1, in the cases before it.
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Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention The Court then recalls that in its third final submission Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States violated its obligations under Article 36 (2) of the Vienna Convention by failing to provide meaningful and effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (1). More specifically, Mexico contends that the United States uses several municipal legal doctrines to prevent finding any legal effect from the violations of Article 36. First, despite this Courts clear analysis in LaGrand, U.S. courts, at both the state and federal level, continue to invoke default doctrines to bar any review of Article 36 violations even when the national had been unaware of his rights to consular notification and communication and thus his ability to raise their violation as an issue at trial, due to the competent authorities failure to comply with Article 36. Against this contention by Mexico, the United States argues that the criminal justice systems of the United States address all errors in process through both judicial and executive clemency proceedings, relying upon the latter when rules of default have closed out the possibility of the former. That is, the laws and regulations of the United States provide for the correction of mistakes that may be relevant to a criminal defendant to occur through a combination of judicial review and clemency. These processes together, working with other competent authorities, give full effect to the purposes for which Article 36 (1) is intended, in conformity with Article 36 (2). And, insofar as a breach of Article 36 (1) has occurred, these procedures satisfy the remedial function of Article 36 (2) by allowing the United States to provide review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences consistent with LaGrand. The Court observes that it has already considered the application of the so called procedural default rule in the LaGrand case, when the Court addressed the issue of its implications for the application of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention. The Court emphasized that a distinction must be drawn between that rule as such and its specific application in the present case stating: In itself, the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The problem arises when the procedural default rule does not allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information without delay, thus preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending State. (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 497, para. 90.) On this basis, the Court concluded that the procedural default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds (ibid., para. 91). The Court deems this statement to be equally valid in relation to the present case, where a number of Mexican nationals have been placed exactly in such a situation. The Court further observes that the procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any provision been made to prevent its application in cases where it has been the failure of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial trial. The Court notes moreover that in several of the cases cited in Mexicos final submissions the procedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it could be applied at subsequent
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stages in the proceedings. It also points out, however, that in none of the cases, save for the three mentioned below, have the criminal proceedings against the Mexican nationals concerned already reached a stage at which there is no further possibility of judicial reexamination of those cases; that is to say, all possibility is not yet excluded of review and reconsideration of conviction and sentence, as called for in the LaGrand case, and as explained in subsequent paragraphs of the Judgment. The Court finds that it would therefore be premature for the Court to conclude at this stage that, in those cases, there is already a violation of the obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention. By contrast, the Court notes that in the case of three named Mexican nationals, conviction and sentence have become final. Moreover, in one of these cases, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has set an execution date. The Court finds therefore that it must conclude that, subject to its observations below in regard to clemency proceedings, in relation to these three individuals, the United States is in breach of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention. Legal consequences of the breach Having concluded that in most of the cases brought before the Court by Mexico in the 52 instances, there has been a failure to observe the obligations prescribed by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, the Court proceeds to the examination of the legal consequences of such a breach and of the legal remedies therefor. It recalls that Mexico in its fourth, fifth and sixth submissions asks the Court to adjudge and declare: (4) that pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is entitled to full reparation for these injuries in the form of restitutio in integrum; (5) that this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the status quo ante by annulling or otherwise depriving of full force or effect the conviction and sentences of all 52 Mexican nationals; [and] (6) that this restitution also includes the obligation to take all measures necessary to ensure that a prior violation of Article 36 shall not affect the subsequent proceedings. The United States on the other hand argues: LaGrands holding calls for the United States to provide, in each case, review and reconsideration that takes account of the violation, not review and reversal, not across-the-board exclusions of evidence or nullification of convictions simply because a breach of Article 36 (1) occurred and without regard to its effect upon the conviction and sentence and, not a precise, concrete, stated result: to re-establish the status quo ante. The Court points out that its task in the present case is to determine what would be adequate reparation for the violations of Article 36. The Court finds it to be clear from what has been observed above that the internationally wrongful acts committed by the United States were the failure of its competent authorities to inform the Mexican nationals concerned, to notify Mexican consular posts and to enable Mexico to provide consular assistance. It is of the view that it follows that the remedy to make good these violations should consist in an obligation on the United States to permit review and reconsideration of these nationals cases by the United States courts, with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent
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authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice. The Court considers that it is not to be presumed, as Mexico asserts, that partial or total annulment of conviction or sentence provides the necessary and sole remedy. In the present case it is not the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals which are to be regarded as a violation of international law, but solely certain breaches of treaty obligations which preceded them. Mexico, the Court notes, has further contended that the right to consular notification and consular communication under the Vienna Convention is a human right of such a fundamental nature that its infringement will ipso facto produce the effect of vitiating the entire process of the criminal proceedings conducted in violation of this fundamental right. The Court observes that the question of whether or not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that it need decide. It points out, however, that neither the text nor the object and purpose of the Convention, nor any indication in the travaux prparatoires, support the conclusion that fourth and fifth submissions cannot be upheld. In elaboration of its sixth submission, Mexico contends that as an aspect of restitutio in integrum, Mexico is also entitled to an order that in any subsequent criminal proceedings against the nationals, statements and confessions obtained prior to notification to the national of his right to consular assistance be excluded. The Court is of the view that this question is one which has to be examined under the concrete circumstances of each case by the United States courts concerned in the process of their review and reconsideration. For this reason, the sixth submission of Mexico cannot be upheld. Although rejecting the fourth, fifth and sixth submissions of Mexico relating to the remedies for the breaches by the United States of its international obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Court points out that the fact remains that such breaches have been committed, and that it is thus incumbent upon the Court to specify what remedies are required in order to redress the injury done to Mexico and to its nationals by the United States through non-compliance with those international obligations. In this regard, the Court recalls that Mexicos seventh submission also asks the Court to adjudge and declare: That to the extent that any of the 52 convictions or sentences are not annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own choosing, meaningful and effective review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the 52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot be satisfied by means of clemency proceedings or if any municipal law rule or doctrine [that fails to attach legal significance to an Article 36 (1) violation] is applied. On this question of review and reconsideration, the United States takes the position that it has conformed its conduct to the LaGrand Judgment. In a further elaboration of this point, the United States argues that [t]he Court said in LaGrand that the choice of means for allowing the review and reconsideration it called for must be left to the United States. The Court points out that, in stating in its Judgment in the LaGrand case that the United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 516, para. 128; emphasis added), the Court acknowledged that the concrete modalities for such review and reconsideration should be left primarily to the United States. It should be underlined, however, that this freedom in the
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choice of means for such review and reconsideration is not without qualification: as the passage of the Judgment quoted above makes abundantly clear, such review and reconsideration has to be carried out by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 514, para. 125), including, in particular, the question of the legal consequences of the violation upon the criminal proceedings that have followed the violation. The Court observes that the current situation in the United States criminal procedure, as explained by the Agent at the hearings, is such that a claim based on the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, however meritorious in itself, could be barred in the courts of the United States by the operation of the procedural default rule. The Court is of the view that the crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the procedural default rule as it is applied at present, the defendant is effectively limited to seeking the vindication of his rights under the United States Constitution. The Court takes note in this regard that Mexico, in the latter part of its seventh submission, has stated that this obligation of providing review and reconsideration cannot be satisfied by means of clemency proceedings. Furthermore, Mexico argues that the clemency process is in itself an ineffective remedy to satisfy the international obligations of the United States. It concludes: clemency review is standardless, secretive, and immune from judicial oversight. Against this contention of Mexico, the United States claims that it gives full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article 36, paragraph 1,] are intended through executive clemency. It argues that [t]he clemency process is well suited to the task of providing review and reconsideration. The United States explains that, Clemency . . . is more than a matter of grace; it is part of the overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process and that Clemency procedures are an integral part of the existing laws and regulations of the United States through which errors are addressed. The Court emphasizes that the review and reconsideration prescribed by it in the LaGrand case should be effective. Thus it should take account of the violation of the rights set forth in [the] Convention (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 516, para. 128 (7)) and guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined and taken into account in the review and reconsideration process. Lastly, review and reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the conviction. Accordingly, in a situation of the violation of rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, the defendant raises his claim in this respect not as a case of harm to a particular right essential to a fair trial a concept relevant to the enjoyment of due process rights under the United States Constitution but as a case involving the infringement of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1. The rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual concerned, irrespective of the due process rights under United States constitutional law. The Court is of the view that, in cases where the breach of the individual rights of Mexican nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention has resulted, in the sequence of judicial proceedings that has followed, in the individuals concerned being subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, the legal consequences of this breach have to be examined and taken into
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account in the course of review and reconsideration. The Court considers that it is the judicial process that is suited to this task. As regards the clemency procedure, the Court points out what is at issue in the present case is whether the clemency process as practised within the criminal justice systems of different states in the United States can, in and of itself, qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account La Grand Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 514, para. 125). The Court notes that the clemency process, as currently practised within the United States criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the above-mentioned requirements and that it is therefore not sufficient in itself to serve as an appropriate means of review and reconsideration as envisaged by the Court in the LaGrand case. Finally, the Court considers the eighth submission of Mexico, in which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States shall cease its violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals and shall provide appropriate guarantees and assurances that it shall take measures sufficient to achieve increased compliance with Article 36 (1) and to ensure compliance with Article 36 (2). The Court recalls that Mexico, although recognizing the efforts by the United States to raise awareness of consular assistance rights, notes with regret that the United States program, whatever its components, has proven ineffective to prevent the regular and continuing violation by its competent authorities of consular notification and assistance rights guaranteed by Article 36. It also recalls that the United States contradicts this contention of Mexico by claiming that its efforts to improve the conveyance of information about consular notification are continuing unabated and are achieving tangible results. It contends that Mexico fails to establish a regular and continuing pattern of breaches of Article 36 in the wake of LaGrand. Referring to the fact that the Mexican request for guarantees of non-repetition is based on its contention that beyond 52 cases there is a regular and continuing pattern of breaches by the United States of Article 36, the Court observes that, in this respect, there is no evidence properly before it that would establish a general pattern. While it is a matter of concern that, even in the wake of the LaGrand Judgment, there remain a substantial number of cases of failure to carry out the obligation to furnish consular information to Mexican nationals. The Court notes that the United States has been making considerable efforts to ensure that its law enforcement authorities provide consular information to every arrested person they know or have reason to believe is a foreign national. The Court further notes in this regard that in the LaGrand case Germany sought, inter alia, a straightforward assurance that the United States will not repeat its unlawful acts (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 511, para. 120). With regard to this general demand for an assurance of non-repetition, the Court stated: If a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refers to substantial activities which it is carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with the efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot provide an assurance that there will never again be a failure by the United States to observe the obligations of notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. But no State could give such a guarantee and Germany does not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure
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implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting Germanys request for a general assurance of non-repetition. (I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 512-513, para. 124.) The Court believes that as far as the request of Mexico for guarantees and assurances of non-repetition is concerned, what the Court stated in this passage of the LaGrand Judgment remains applicable, and therefore meets that request. The Court then re-emphasizes a point of importance. It points out that in the present case it has been addressing the issues of principle raised in the course of the present proceedings from the viewpoint of the general application of the Vienna Convention, and there can be no question of making a contrario argument in respect of any of the Courts findings in the present Judgment. In other words, the fact that in this case the Courts ruling has concerned only Mexican nationals cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States. The Court finally points out that its Order of 5 February 2003 indicating provisional measures mentioned above, according to its terms and to Article 41 of the Statute, was effective pending final judgment, and that the obligations of the United States in that respect are, with effect from the date of the Judgment, replaced by those declared in this Judgment. The Court observes that it has found in relation to the three persons concerned in the Order (among others), that the United States has committed breaches of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention; and that moreover, in respect of those three persons alone, the United States has also committed breaches of Article 36, paragraph 2. The review and reconsideration of conviction and sentence required by Article 36, paragraph 2, which is the appropriate remedy for breaches of Article 36, paragraph 1, has not been carried out. The Court considers that in these three cases it is for the United States to find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the Judgment. In subparagraphs 4 to 11 (on the merits) of operative paragraph 153 of its Judgment, the Court finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, by not informing, without delay upon their detention, the 51 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (1) above of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the United States of America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph; finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (2) above and thereby depriving the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b); finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, in relation to the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (3) above, the United States of America deprived the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, to communicate with and have access to those nationals and to visit them in detention, and thereby breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of the Convention; finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, in relation to the 34 Mexican nationals referred to in
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paragraph 106 (4) above, the United States of America deprived the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, to arrange for legal representation of those nationals, and thereby breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), of the Convention; finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the conviction and sentences of Mr. Csar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, after the violations referred to in subparagraph (4) above had been established in respect of those individuals, the United States of America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention; finds, by fourteen votes to one, that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (4), (5), (6) and (7) above, by taking account both of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention and of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment; unanimously takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of America to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention; and finds that this commitment must be regarded as meeting the request by the United Mexican States for guarantees and assurances of non-repetition; unanimously finds that, should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been respected, the United States of America shall provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weight to be given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, taking account of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment. *****
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LAW OF THE SEA ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
United Kingdom v. Norway

I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 116
[A Norwegian Decree of 1935 delimited Norways Fishery Zone (by which was meant its territorial sea) along almost 1000 miles of coastline north of latitude 66 28.8 North. The Zone, which the U.K. agreed was, as a matter of historic title, 4 (not 3) miles wide, was measured not from the low-water mark at every point along the coast (as is the normal practice) but from straight base-lines linking the outermost points of land (sometimes drying rocks above water only at high-tide) along it. The preamble to the Decree justified this system on grounds of well-established national titles of right, the geographical conditions prevailing on the Norwegian coasts, and the safeguard of the vital interests of the inhabitants of the northernmost parts of the country. The first of these grounds related to the use of straight baselines in Norwegian decrees of 1869 and 1889 (though for different parts of the coastline totalling only 89 miles) and acquiescence in that use by other states. The geographic conditions were that the coastline concerned is deeply indented by fjords and sunds (sounds) and, for part of its length South of North Cape, is fronted by a fringe of Islands and rocks (the skjaergaard) that is difficult to separate from the mainland. The third ground is explained in the Courts statement that [i]n these barren regions the inhabitants of the coastal zone derive their livelihood essentially from fishing. By using straight baselines Norway enclosed waters within its territorial sea that would have been high seas, and hence open to foreign fishing, if it had used the low water mark line. Several baselines were over 30 miles long; the longest was 44 miles long. In this case, the United Kingdom challenged the legality of Norways straight baseline system and the choice of certain baselines used in applying it. The question was important for British fishing interests. Norwegian enforcement of its system had given rise to disputes involving British fishing vessels]. The Court has no difficulty in finding that, for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides, which has generally been adopted in the practice of States. This criterion is the most-favourable to the coastal State and clearly shows the character of territorial waters as appurtenant to the land territory. The Court notes that the Parties agree as to this criterion, but that they differ as to its application. The Parties also agree that in the case of a low-tide elevation (drying rock) the outer edge at low water of this low-tide elevation may be taken into account as a base-point for calculating the breadth of the territorial sea. The Court finds itself obliged to decide whether the relevant low-water mark is that of the mainland or of the skjaergaard. Since the mainland is bordered in its western sector by the skjaergaard, which constitutes a whole with the mainland, it is the outer line of the
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skjaergaard which must be taken into account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters. This solution is dictated by geographic realities. Three methods have been contemplated to effect the application of the low-water mark rule. The simplest would appear to be the method of the trac parallle, which consists of drawing the outer limit of the belt of territorial waters by following the coast in all its sinuousities. This method may be applied without difficulty to an ordinary coast, which is not too broken. Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern Finnmark, or where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the skjaergaard along the western sector of the coast here in question, the baseline becomes independent of the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a geometric construction. In such circumstances the line of the low-water mark can no longer be put forward as a rule requiring the coast line to be followed in all its sinuousities. Nor can one characterize as exceptions to the rule the very many derogations which would be necessitated by such a rigged coast; the rule would disappear under the exceptions. Such a coast, viewed as a whole, calls for the application of a different method; that is the method of baselines which, within reasonable limits, may depart from the physical line of the coast. It is true that the experts of the Second Sub-committee of the Second Committee of the 1930 Conference for the codification of international law formulated the low-water mark rule somewhat strictly (following all the sinuousities of the coast) but they were the same time obliged to admit many exceptions relating to bays, islands near the coast, groups of islands. In the present case this method of the trac parallle, which was invoked against Norway in the Memorial, was abandoned in the written Reply, and later in the oral argument of the Agent of the United Kingdom Government. Consequently, it is no longer relevant to the case. On the other hand it is said in the reply, the courbe tangente - or, in English, envelopes of arcs of circle - method is the method which the United Kingdom considers to be the correct one. The arcs of circles method, which is constantly used for determining the position of a point or object at sea, is a new technique in so far as it is a method for delimiting the territorial sea. This technique was proposed by the United States delegation at the 1930 Conference for the codification of international law. Its purpose is to secure the application of the principle that the belt of territorial waters must follow the line of the coast. It is not obligatory by law, as was admitted by counsel for the United Kingdom Government in his oral reply. The principle that the belt of territorial waters must follow the general direction of the coast makes it possible to fix certain criteria valid for any delimitation of the territorial sea; these criteria will be elucidated later. The Court will confine itself at this stage to noting that, in order to apply this principle, several States have deemed it necessary to follow the straight baselines method and that they have not encountered objections of principle by other states. This method consists of selecting appropriate points on the low-water mark and drawing straight lines between them. This has been done, not only in the case of well-defined bays, but also in case of minor curvatures of the coast line where it was solely a question of giving a simpler form to the belt of territorial waters.
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It has been contended, on behalf of the United Kingdom, that Norway may draw straight lines only across bays. The court is unable to share this view. If the belt of territorial waters must follow the outer line of the skaergaard, and if the method of straight base-lines must be admitted in certain cases there is no valid reason to draw them only across bays, as in Eastern Finnmark, and not also to draw them between island, islets and rocks, across the sea areas separating them, even when such areas do not fall within the conception of a bay. It is sufficient that they should be situated between the island formations of the skjaergaard, inter fauces terrarum. In the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, Norway is entitled, on historic grounds, to claim as internal waters all fjords and sunds which have the character of a bay. By historic waters are usually meant which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title. In its [United Kingdoms] opinion Norway can justify the claim that these waters are internal on the ground that she has exercised the necessary jurisdiction over them for a long period without opposition from other States, a kind of possessio longi temporis, with the result that her jurisdiction over these waters must now be recognized although it constitutes a derogation from the rules in force. But the United Kingdom Government concedes this only on the basis of historic title; it must therefore be taken that, that Government has not abandoned its contention that the ten-mile rule is to be regarded as a rule of international law. In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that although the tenmile rule has been adopted by certain states both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law. In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway in as much as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast. The Court now comes to the question of the length of the base-lines drawn across the waters lying between the various formations of the skjaergaard. Basing itself on the analogy with the alleged general rule of ten-miles relating to bays, the United Kingdom Government still maintains on this point that the length of straight lines must not exceed ten-miles. In this connection, the practice of States does not justify the formulation of any general rule of law. The attempts that have been made to subject groups of islands or coastal archipelagoes to conditions analogous to the limitation concerning bays (distance between the islands not exceeding twice the breadth of the territorial waters, or ten or twelve sea miles), have not got beyond the stage of proposals. Furthermore, apart from any question of limiting the lines to ten miles, it may be that several lines can be envisaged. In such cases that the coastal State would seem to be in the best position to appraise the local conditions dictating the selection. Consequently, the Court is unable to share the view of the United Kingdom Government, that Norway, in matter of base-lines, now claims recognition of an exceptional system. As
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will be shown later, all that the Court can see therein is the application of general international law to a specific case. It does not at all follow that, in the absence of rules having the technically precise character alleged by the United Kingdom Government, the delimitation undertaken by the Norwegian Government in 1935 is not subject to certain principles which make it possible to judge as to its validity under international law. The delimitation of sea area has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depend upon international law. In this connection, certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea, bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts in question. Among these considerations, some reference must be made to the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain. It is land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coast. If follows that while such a State must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of base-line must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. Another fundamental consideration, of particular importance in this case, is the more or less close relationship existing between certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround them. The real question raised in the choice of base-lines is in effect whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. This idea, which is at the basis of the determination of the rules relating to bays, should be liberally applied in the case of a coast, the geographical configuration of which is as unusual as that of Norway. Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of which extends beyond purely geographical factors : that of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage. Norway puts forward the 1935 Decree as the application of a traditional system of delimitation, a system which she claims to be in complete conformity with international law. The Norwegian Government has referred in this connection to an historic title, the meaning of which was made clear by Counsel for Norway at the sitting on October 12th, 1951 : The Norwegian Government does not rely upon history to justify exceptional rights, to claim areas of sea which the general law would deny; it invokes history, together with other factors, to justify the way in which it applies the general law. This conception of an historic title is in consonance with the Norwegian Governments understanding of the general rules of international law, in its view, these rules of international law take into account the diversity of facts and, therefore, concede that the drawing of base-lines must be adapted to the special conditions obtaining in different regions. In its view, the system of delimitation applied in 1935, a system characterized by the use of straight lines, does not therefore infringe the general law : it is an adaptation rendered necessary by local conditions.
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The Court examined the Norwegian system. The Court finds that this system was consistently applied by Norwegian authorities. The Court considers that too much importance need not be attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions, real or apparent, which the United Kingdom Government claims to have discovered in Norwegian practice. They may be easily understood in the light of the variety of the facts and conditions prevailing, in the long period which has elapsed since 1812, and are not such as to modify the conclusions reached by the Court. From the standpoint of international law, it is now necessary to consider whether the application of the Norwegian system encountered any opposition from foreign States. Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradiction that neither the promulgation of her delimitation Decrees in 1869 and in 1889, nor their application, gave rise to any opposition on the part of foreign States. Since, moreover, these Decrees constitute, as has been shown above, the application of a well-defined and uniform system, it is indeed this system itself which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States. The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact. For a period of more than sixty years the United Kingdom Government itself in no way contested it. It would appear that it was only in its Memorandum of July 27, 1933, that the United Kingdom made a formal and definite protest on this point. The United Kingdom Government has argued that the Norwegian system of delimitation was not known to it and that the system therefore lacked the notoriety essential to provide the basis of an historic title enforceable against it. The Court is unable to accept this view. The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britains position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norways enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom. The Court is thus led to conclude that the method of straight lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law. The question now arises whether the Decree of July 12, 1935, which in its preamble is expressed to be an application of this method, conforms to in it its drawing of the base-lines, or whether, at certain points, it departs from this method to any considerable extent. The Norwegian Government admits that the base-lines must be drawn in such a way as to respect the general direction of the coast and that they must be drawn in a reasonable manner. The delimitation of the Lopphavet basin has also been criticized by the United Kingdom. The Lopphavet basin constitutes an ill-defined geographic whole. It cannot be regarded as having the character of a bay. It is made up of an extensive area of water dotted with large islands which are separated by inlets that terminate in the various fjords. The base-lines has been challenged on the ground that it does not respect the general direction of the coast. It
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should be observed that, however justified the rule in question may be, it is devoid of any mathematical precision. In order properly to apply the rule, regard must be had for the relation between the deviation complained of and what, according to the terms of the rule, must be regarded as the general direction of the coast. Therefore, one cannot confine oneself to examining one sector of the coast alone, except in a case of manifest abuse. In the case in point, the divergence between the base-line and the land formations is not such that it is a distortion of the general direction of the Norwegian coast. Even if it were considered that in the sector under review the deviation was too pronounced, it must be pointed out that the Norwegian Government has relied upon an historic title clearly referable to the waters of Lopphavet. The Court considers that, although it is not always clear to what specific areas they apply, the historical data produced lend some weight to the idea of the survival of traditional rights reserved to the inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing grounds included in the 1935 delimitation, particularly in the case of Lopphavet. Such rights, founded on the vital needs of the population and attested by very ancient and peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into account in drawing a line which, moreover, appears to the Court to have been kept within the bounds of what is moderate and reasonable. For these reasons, the Court finds by ten votes to two that the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12, 1935, is not contrary to international law; and by eight votes to four, that the base-lines fixed by the said Decree in application of this method are not contrary to international law. *****
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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases

ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 The dispute, which was submitted to the Court on 20 February 1967, related to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark on the one hand, and between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands on the other. The two Special Agreements had asked the Court to declare the principles and rules of international law applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the North Sea continental shelf appertaining to each of them beyond the partial boundaries in the immediate vicinity of the coast already determined between the Federal Republic and the Netherlands by an agreement of 1 December 1964 and between the Federal Republic and Denmark by an agreement of 9 June 1965.The Court was not asked actually to delimit the further boundaries involved, the Parties undertaking in their respective Special Agreements to effect such delimitation by agreement in pursuance of the Court's decision. The waters of the North Sea were shallow, the whole seabed, except for the Norwegian Trough, consisting of continental shelf at a depth of less than 200 metres. Most of it had already been delimited between the coastal States concerned. The Federal Republic and Denmark and the Netherlands, respectively, had, however, been unable to agree on the prolongation of the partial boundaries referred to above, mainly because Denmark and the Netherlands had wished this prolongation to be effected on the basis of the equidistance principle, whereas the Federal Republic had considered that it would unduly curtail what the Federal Republic believed should be its proper share of continental shelf area, on the basis of proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. Neither of the boundaries in question would by itself produce this effect, but only both of them together - an element regarded by Denmark and the Netherlands as irrelevant to what they viewed as being two separate delimitations, to be carried out without reference to the other. A boundary based on the equidistance principle, i.e., an "equidistance line", left to each of the Parties concerned all those portions of the continental shelf that were nearer to a point on its own coast than they were to any point on the coast of the other Party. In the case of a concave or recessing coast such as that of the Federal Republic on the North Sea, the effect of the equidistance method was to pull the line of the boundary inwards, in the direction of the concavity. Consequently, where two equidistance lines were drawn, they would, if the curvature were pronounced, inevitably meet at a relatively short distance from the coast, thus "cutting off" the coastal State from the area of the continental shelf outside. In contrast, the effect of convex or outwardly curving coasts, such as were, to a moderate extent, those of Denmark and the Netherlands, was to cause the equidistance lines to leave the coasts on divergent courses, thus having a widening tendency on the area of continental shelf off that coast. It had been contended on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that the whole matter was governed by a mandatory rule of law which, reflecting the language of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April 1958, was designated by them as the "equidistance-special circumstances" rule. That rule was to the effect that in the absence of agreement by the parties to employ another method, all continental shelf boundaries had to be
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drawn by means of an equidistance line unless "special circumstances" were recognized to exist. According to Denmark and the Netherlands, the configuration of the German North Sea coast did not of itself constitute, for either of the two boundary lines concerned, a special circumstance. The Federal Republic, for its part, had contended that the correct rule, at any rate in such circumstances as those of the North Sea, was one according to which each of the States concerned should have a "just and equitable share" of the available continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its sea-frontage. It had also contended that in a sea shaped as is the North Sea, each of the States concerned was entitled to a continental shelf area extending up to the central point of that sea, or at least extending to its median line. Alternatively, the Federal Republic had claimed that if the equidistance method were held to be applicable, the configuration of the German North Sea coast constituted a special circumstance such as to justify a departure from that method of delimitation in this particular case. The Apportionment Theory Rejected The Court felt unable to accept, in the particular form it had taken, the first contention put forward on behalf of the Federal Republic. Its task was to delimit, not to apportion the areas concerned. The process of delimitation involved establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination de novo of such an area. The doctrine of the just and equitable share was wholly at variance with the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf, namely, that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory under the sea existed ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. That right was inherent. In order to exercise it, no special legal acts had to be performed. It followed that the notion of apportioning as yet undelimited area considered as a whole (which underlay the doctrine of the just and equitable share) was inconsistent with the basic concept of continental shelf entitlement. Non-Applicability of Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention The Court then turned to the question whether in delimiting those areas the Federal Republic was under a legal obligation to accept the application of the equidistance principle. While it was probably true that no other method of delimitation had the same combination of practical convenience and certainty of application, those factors did not suffice of themselves to convert what was a method into a rule of law. Such a method would have to draw its legal force from other factors than the existence of those advantages. The first question to be considered was whether the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was binding for all the Parties in the case. Under the formal provisions of the Convention, it was in force for any individual State that had signed it within the time-limit provided, only if that State had also subsequently ratified it. Denmark and the Netherlands had both signed and ratified the Convention and were parties to it, but the Federal Republic, although one of the signatories of the Convention, had never ratified it, and was consequently not a party. It was admitted on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that in the circumstances the Convention could not, as such, be binding on the Federal Republic. But it was contended that the rgime of Article 6 of the Convention had become binding on the
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Federal Republic, because, by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic had assumed the obligations of the Convention. It was clear that only a very definite, very consistent course of conduct on the part of a State in the situation of the Federal Republic could justify upholding those contentions. When a number of States drew up a convention specifically providing for a particular method by which the intention to become bound by the rgime of the convention was to be manifested, it was not lightly to be presumed that a State which had not carried out those formalities had nevertheless somehow become bound in another way. Furthermore, had the Federal Republic ratified the Geneva Convention, it could have entered a reservation to Article 6, by reason of the faculty to do so conferred by Article 12 of the Convention. Only the existence of a situation of estoppel could lend substance to the contention of Denmark and the Netherlands - i.e., if the Federal Republic were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conventional rgime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that rgime, but also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there was no evidence. Accordingly, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention was not, as such, applicable to the delimitations involved in the present proceedings. The Equidistance Principle Not Inherent in the Basic Doctrine of the Continental Shelf It had been maintained by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal Republic was in any event, and quite apart from the Geneva Convention, bound to accept delimitation on an equidistance basis, since the use of that method was a rule of general or customary international law, automatically binding on the Federal Republic. One argument advanced by them in support of this contention, which might be termed the a priori argument, started from the position that the rights of the coastal State to its continental shelf areas were based on its sovereignty over the land domain, of which the shelf area was the natural prolongation under the sea. From this notion of appurtenance was derived the view, which the Court accepted, that the coastal State's rights existed ipso facto and ab initio. Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that the test of appurtenance must be "proximity": all those parts of the shelf being considered as appurtenant to a particular coastal State which were closer to it than they were to any point on the coast of another State. Hence, delimitation had to be effected by a method which would leave to each one of the States concerned all those areas that were nearest to its own coast. As only an equidistance line would do this, only such a line could be valid, it was contended. This view had much force; the greater part of a State's continental shelf areas would normally in fact be nearer to its coasts than to any other. But the real issue was whether it followed that every part of the area concerned must be placed in that way. The Court did not consider this to follow from the notion of proximity, which was a somewhat fluid one. More fundamental was the concept of the continental shelf as being the natural prolongation of the land domain. Even if proximity might afford one of the tests to be applied, and an important one in the right conditions, it might not necessarily be the only, nor in all circumstances the most appropriate, one. Submarine areas did not appertain to the coastal State merely because
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they were near it, nor did their appurtenance depend on any certainty of delimitation as to their boundaries. What conferred the ipso jure title was the fact that the submarine areas concerned might be deemed to be actually part of its territory in the sense that they were a prolongation of its land territory under the sea. Equidistance clearly could not be identified with the notion of natural prolongation, since the use of the equidistance method would frequently cause areas which were the natural prolongation of the territory of one State to be attributed to another. Hence, the notion of equidistance was not an inescapable a priori accompaniment of basic continental shelf doctrine. A review of the genesis of the equidistance method of delimitation confirmed the foregoing conclusion. The "Truman Proclamation" issued by the Government of the United States on 28 September 1945 could be regarded as a starting point of the positive law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated, that the coastal State had an original, natural and exclusive right to the continental shelf off its shores, had come to prevail over all others and was now reflected in the1958 Geneva Convention. With regard to the delimitation of boundaries between the continental shelves of adjacent States, the Truman Proclamation had stated that such boundaries "shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles". These two concepts, of delimitation by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles, had underlain all the subsequent history of the subject. It had been largely on the recommendation of a committee of experts that the principle of equidistance for the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries had been accepted by the United Nations International Law Commission in the text it had laid before the Geneva Conference of 1958 on the Law of the Sea which had adopted the Continental Shelf Convention. It could legitimately be assumed that the experts had been actuated by considerations not of legal theory but of practical convenience and cartography. Moreover, the article adopted by the Commission had given priority to delimitation by agreement and had contained an exception in favour of "special circumstances". The Court consequently considered that Denmark and the Netherlands inverted the true order of things and that, far from an equidistance rule having been generated by an antecedent principle of proximity inherent in the whole concept of continental shelf appurtenance, the latter was rather a rationalization of the former The Equidistance Principle Not a Rule of Customary International Law The question remained whether through positive law processes the equidistance principle must now be regarded as a rule of customary international law. Rejecting the contentions of Denmark and the Netherlands, the Court considered that the principle of equidistance, as it figured in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, had not been proposed by the International Law Commission as an emerging rule of customary international law. This Article could not be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule. This was confirmed by the fact that any State might make reservations in respect of Article 6, unlike Articles 1, 2 and 3, on signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention. While certain other provisions of the Convention, although relating to matters that lay within the field of received customary law, were also not excluded from the faculty of reservation, they all
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related to rules of general maritime law very considerably antedating the Convention which were only incidental to continental shelf rights as such, and had been mentioned in the Convention simply to ensure that they were not prejudiced by the exercise of continental shelf rights. Article 6, however, related directly to continental shelf rights as such, and since it was not excluded from the faculty of reservation, it was a legitimate inference that it was not considered to reflect emergent customary law. It had been argued on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that even if at the date of the Geneva Convention no rule of customary international law existed in favour of the equidistance principle, such a rule had nevertheless come into being since the Convention, partly because of its own impact, and partly on the basis of subsequent State practice. In order for this process to occur it was necessary that Article 6 of the Convention should, at all events potentially, be of a norm-creating character. Article 6 was so framed, however, as to put the obligation to make use of the equidistance method after a primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement. Furthermore, the part played by the notion of special circumstances in relation to the principle of equidistance, the controversies as to the exact meaning and scope of that notion, and the faculty of making reservations to Article 6 must all raise doubts as to the potentially norm-creating character of that Article. Furthermore, while a very widespread and representative participation in a convention might show that a conventional rule had become a general rule of international law, in the present case the number of ratifications and accessions so far was hardly sufficient. As regards the time element, although the passage of only a short period of time was not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, it was indispensable that State practice during that period, including that of States whose interests were specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law was involved. Some 15 cases had been cited in which the States concerned had agreed to draw or had drawn the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance, but there was no evidence that they had so acted because they had felt legally compelled to draw them in that way by reason of a rule of customary law. The cases cited were inconclusive and insufficient evidence of a settled practice. The Court consequently concluded that the Geneva Convention was not in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of customary international law enjoining the use of the equidistance principle, its subsequent effect had not been constitutive of such a rule, and State practice up to date had equally been insufficient for the purpose. The Principles and Rules of Law Applicable The legal situation was that the Parties were under no obligation to apply the equidistance principle either under the 1958 Convention or as a rule of general or customary international law. It consequently became unnecessary for the Court to consider whether or not the configuration of the German North Sea coast constituted a "special circumstance". It remained for the Court, however, to indicate to the Parties the principles and rules of law in the light of which delimitation was to be effected.
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The basic principles in the matter of delimitation, deriving from the Truman Proclamation, were that it must be the object of agreement between the States concerned and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles. The Parties were under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they were so to conduct themselves that the negotiations were meaningful, which would not be the case when one of them insisted upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it. This obligation was merely a special application of a principle underlying all international relations, which was moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Parties were under an obligation to act in such a way that in the particular case, and taking all the circumstances into account, equitable principles were applied. There was no question of the Court's decision being ex aequo et bono. It was precisely a rule of law that called for the application of equitable principles, and in such cases as the present ones the equidistance method could unquestionably lead to inequity. Other methods existed and might be employed, alone or in combination, according to the areas involved. Although the Parties intended themselves to apply the principles and rules laid down by the Court some indication was called for of the possible ways in which they might apply them. The principle and rules of international law applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties are as follows: 1. Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equidistance principles, and taking into account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other; If, in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, unless they decided on a regime of joint jurisdiction, user, or exploitation for the zones which overlap or any part of them.
2.
In the course of negotiations, the factors to be taken into account are to include: 1. The general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the presence of any special or unusual features; 2. So far as known or readily ascertained, the physical and geological structure and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved; 3. The element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring above between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal state and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent states in the same region. *****
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Libya v. Tunisia Continental Shelf Case

In Libya v. Tunisia Continental Shelf case, unlike most previous cases, where one party to the litigation argued for equitable principles and the other party for equidistance, in the present case, both parties strongly endorsed the use of equitable principles, and both denied the mandatory applicability of the 1958 Conventions equidistance rule. The parties also took the same task in trying to utilize the principle of natural prolongation and in attempting to list all relevant circumstances. The parties did disagree, however, on what was the true concept of natural prolongation and what were the relevant circumstances. On 10 June 1977, Libya and Tunisia entered into an agreement for submission to International Court of Justice of the question of the delimitation of continental shelf between the two countries. Under the special agreement, the Court was requested to declare what principles and rules of international law might be applied for the delimitation of each States continental shelf and to clarify the practical method of their delimitation. Under Article 1, paragraph 1 of the special agreement, parties requested the Court to state the principles and the rules of international law which might be applied for delimitation of the areas of the continental shelf respectively appertaining to each of the two States. The parties further called upon the Court, in rendering its decision, to take account of the following three factors: (a) equitable principles; (b) relevant circumstances which characterize the area; and (c) the new accepted trends in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Article 1, second paragraph required the Court to clarify the practical method for the application of these principles and rules so as to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit these areas without difficulties. The Court was, therefore, not called upon itself to draw the actual delimitation line. Natural Prolongation On the issue of natural prolongation, the parties agree that it is the concept of natural prolongation of land into and under the sea which is commanding. The parties, however, differ on the issue of criteria to be applied for determining whether a given area is natural prolongation of one State or another. Libya contended, the natural prolongation is determinable as a matter of scientific fact by the application of geological criteria, equitable principles should play no role in identifying appurtenant continental shelf based upon the juridical concept of natural prolongation. Furthermore, for Libya a delimitation which gives effect to the principle of natural prolongation is necessarily in accordance with equitable principles, since it respects the inherent rights of each State. On the other hand, Tunisia contented, the satisfying of equitable principles in a particular geographical situation is part of the process of the identification of natural prolongation. The issue between the parties in this respect is whether a natural prolongation defined scientifically without reference to equitable principles is truly a natural prolongation for the purpose of delimitation. The Court rejected the arguments of both Libya and Tunisia. Reacting to Libyas contention, International Court of Justice made the observation that it would be wrong to
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suppose that it will in all cases, or even in the majority of them, be possible or appropriate to establish that the natural prolongation of one State, just so far and no further, so that the two prolongations meet along an easily defined line. The Court also apparently disapproved the argument of Tunisia that the satisfying of equitable principles in a particular geographical situation is just as much a part of the process of identification of the natural prolongation as the identification of the natural prolongation are not to be placed on a plane of equality. However, the subsequent part of Courts judgment on the issue of natural prolongation, reveals that the Court has in substance accepted Tunisias contention. It may be re-emphasized here that the Court rejected the concept of natural prolongation. It rejected the idea that natural prolongation provided a principle of general applicability, one which would provide, by itself a solution to all delimitation problems. The Court noted that geological information was not all that useful in setting precise boundaries. The Court stated that the physical factor of natural prolongation should not be considered as one which in and of itself granted legal title, but only to be considered in arriving at an equitable solution. Equity, according to the Court, was involved both in the process of delimitation and in its result. The Court emphatically stated that it was the result which was predominent. Principles were subordinate to the goal. The equitableness of any specific principles of delimitation had to be assessed in the light of the usefulness of that principle in achieving an overall equitable result. In this respect, the judgment of the Court in this case explains Courts judgement in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases wherein the Court did not draw a clear distinction between result and the means. The usefulness of the case lies in its assertion of the equitableness of the result rather than means. In the process of arriving at the above mentioned conclusion, International Court of Justice referred to Article 83, paragraph 1 of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea which is synonymous to Article 83, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 83, paragraph 1 reads as follows : The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. It is important to note that the new text does not contain any specific criterion which could give guidance to the interested States in their effort to achieve an equitable solution which has to be achieved. The principles and rules applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf areas are those which are appropriate to bring about an equitable result. It is pertinent to note that the new text did not affect the role of the concept of natural prolongation. The Court, thereafter, tried to explain its views on the concept of equity. It noted that equity was often understood as an idea apart from law, indeed as a means to avoid or mitigate positive laws. But, it said, this was not the case in the realm of international law. According to Court, equity in international law was a general concept of law, directly applicable as law, taking into account the circumstances of the particular case. Since that which was equitable had to depend on the particular circumstances of each given case, the Court turned to a careful
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assessment of the relevant circumstances submitted by Tunisia and Libya; the geography, geomorphology, land frontier, historic rights and economic considerations. Relevant Circumstances Both the parties recognize that equitable principles dictate that the relevant circumstances which characterize that area be taken into account but they differ as to what they are. The special agreement confers on the Court the task if ascertaining what are the relevant circumstances and assessing their relative weight for the purpose of achieving an equitable result. The Court has, therefore, to balance up the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to produce an equitable result. Tunisia submitted before the International Court of Justice that relevant circumstances to be taken into account included geological and geographical factors, economic factors, and historical factors. On the other hand, Libyas conception of the relevant circumstances was stated in more restricted terms, namely, geological structure of the shelf and its relation to the adjoining landmass and the geographic configuration of the coasts as, a relevant circumstance to be taken into account. Reacting to the above-mentioned contentions, International Court of Justice observed: The relevant circumstances which characterize the area are not limited to the facts of geography or geomorphology, either as a matter of interpretation of the special agreement or in application of the equitable principles requiring all relevant circumstances to be taken into account. Apart from the circumstances of the existence and interests of other States in the area, and the existing, or potential delimitations, between each of the parties and such States, there is also the position of the land frontier or more precisely the position of its inter section with the coastline, to be taken into account. In that connection, the court must in the present case consider a number of alleged maritime limits resulting from the conduct of the States concerned. It has further to give due consideration to the historic rights claimed by Tunisia, and to a number of economic considerations which one or the other party has urged as relevant. Elaborating its observation, the Court noted that the parties were in agreement to take into account the element of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline. In this case also, International Court of Justice considered that the element of proportionality was indeed required by the fundamental principle of ensuring an equitable delimitation between the States concerned. Another circumstance relevant for delimitation examined by the Court was the existence of an area off the coasts of Tunisia over which it claimed historic right deriving from longestablished fishing activities. The historic rights claimed by Tunisia derive from the longestablished interests and activities of its population in exploiting the fisheries of the bed and waters of the Mediterranean off its coasts; the exploitation of the shallow in shore banks for
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fixed fisheries for the catching of swimming species, and of the deeper banks for the collection of sendentary species, namely spongs. The Court did not feel the need to make pronouncement on historical factors as in the opinion of the Court, the practical method for effecting an equitable delimitation adopted by the Court in this case did not affect the historical rights in the area claimed by Tunisia. In this regard, the Court observed: ...it is only if the method of delimitation which the court finds to be appropriate is such that it will or may encroach upon the historic rights area that the Court will have to determine the validity and scope of those rights. If, however, the method of delimitation (adopted by the Court) is such that the delimitation line will undoubtedly leave Tunisia in the full and undisputed exercise of those rights over the area claimed to be subjected to them, then a finding by the Court on the subject will undoubtedly leave Tunisia in the full and undisputed exercise of those rights over the area claimed to be subjected to them, then a finding by the Court on the subject will be unnecessary. Such is in fact, in the view of the Court, the result of the method of delimitation (adopted by the Court). On the issue of the relevance of economic considerations, Tunisia invoked economic considerations in two ways; firstly by drawing attention to its relative poverty vis-a-vis Libya in terms of absence of natural resources like agriculture and minerals, compared with the relative abundance in Libya, especially of oil and gas wealth as well as agricultural resources; secondly, by pointing out that fishing resources derived from its claimed historic rights and historic waters areas must necessarily be taken into account supplementing its national economy in taking out its survival as a country. The Court held: (T)hese economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf areas appertaining to each party. They are virtually extraneous factors since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time, cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. A country might be poor today and become rich tomorrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable economic resource. As to the presence of oil wells in an area to be taken into account in the process of weighing all relevant factors to achieve an equitable result. The comment of the Court on equidistance principle is quite instructive. Commenting on the equidistance principle, the Court observed: (T)he Court held in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, which also concerned adjacent States, that the equidistance method of delimitation of the continental shelf is not prescribed by a mandatory rule of customary law. On the other hand, it emphasized the merits of this rule in cases in which its application leads to an equitable solution. The subsequent practice of States, as is apparent from treaties on continental shelf boundaries, shows that the equidistance method has been employed in a number of cases. But it also shows that States may deviate from an equidistance line, and had made use of other criteria for the delimitation, whenever they found this a better way to arrive at an agreement. One evolution may be combination of an equidistance line in some parts of the area with a line of some other kind in other parts, as dictated by the relevant circumstances. Examples of this
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kind are provided by the 1977 Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between France and the United Kingdom, and by the Convention between France and Spain on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves of the two States in the Bay of Biscay of 29 January, 1974. Treaty practice, as well as the history of Article 83 of the draft convention on the law of the sea, leads to the conclusion that equidistance may be applied if it leads to an equitable solution, if not other methods should be employed. *****
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Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta

In the case concerning Delimitation of Continental Shelf between Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Malta, International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on 3 June 1985. By a notification dated 19 July 1982, received in the Registry of the Court on 26 July 1982, Libya and Malta notified the Court of a special agreement between them for submission to the Court of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between them. Thereafter proceedings began in the International Court of Justice. The question for determination before International Court of Justice was as follows : What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf which appertains to the Republic of Malta and the area of continental shelf which appertains to the Libyan Arab Republic, and how in practice such principles and rules can be applied by the two parties in this particular case in order that they may without difficulty delimit such areas by an agreement? Libya contended that the delimitation should be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result. Libya made it clear that the application of equidistance method was not obligatory, and its application in the particular circumstances of this case would not lead to an equitable result. Malta argued as follows: (i) the principles and rules of international law applicable to the delimitation of the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to Malta and Libya are that the delimitation shall be effected on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution; (ii) in practice the above principles and rules are applied by means of a median line every point which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of Malta, and the low-water mark of the coast of Libya. The Republic of Malta is a state made up of a group of four inhabited islands Malta 2 in area), Gozo (66km2); Comino (2.7km2); Cominotto (less than one-tenth of a (246 km square kilometre), and the uninhabited rock of Filfla. Libya is a mainland State on the coast of North Africa. It encompasses some 1,775,500 square kilometres. The coast of Libya stretches for more than 1,700 kilometres. The following points in the judgement of the International Court of Justice are worth noticing: I. Sources of the Law Applicable The Parties broadly agreed as to the sources of the law applicable in this case. Malta was a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, while Libya was not. Therefore, the parties agreed that 1958 Convention, and in particular the provision for delimitation in Article 6, was not as such applicable in relations between them. Both parties signed the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982. However, it did not enter into force and was, therefore, not operative as treaty law. The Parties, therefore, agreed that the dispute was
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to be governed by customary international law. That does not mean that parties regarded 1982 Convention as irrelevant. The parties admitted that some of the provisions of 1982 Convention constituted, to a certain extent, the expression of customary international law in the matter. However, the parties did not agree in identifying the provisions of the 1982 Convention which have the status of customary international law. In this regard, International court of Justice further observed: The 1982 Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as to the method to be followed to achieve it. It restricts itself to setting a standard, and it is left to States themselves, or to the courts, to endow this standard with specific content. 2. Natural Prolongation and Distance Principle The Libyas view that the prolongation of land territory of State into and under the sea, referred to by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, was a geological fact and natural prolongation in the same physical sense involving geographical as well as geological and geomorphological aspects, remains the fundamental basis of legal title to continental shelf areas. For Malta, while it is still true to say that the continental shelf of a State constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, prolongation is no longer defined by reference to physical features, geological or bathymetric, but by reference to a certain distance from the coast. The court held that both natural prolongation and the distance are essential elements in the juridical concept of the continental shelf. What it means is that where natural prolongation of the continental shelf does not exceed 200 nautical miles from the shore, it is defined by distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening seabed and subsoil. The Court, therefore, felt that the concepts of natural prolongation and distance are not opposed but complementary to each other. In view of the Court, natural prolongation as well as distance from the coast are relevant considerations for delimitation of the opposite continental shelves. 3. Equidistance Method The Court rejected Maltese contention on the applicability of the equidistance principle and observed that the States practice clearly revealed that the rule was not a customary rule of international law. The Court, therefore, took the view that the principle of equidistance is not obligatory. 4. Equitable Principles On equitable principles, the Court affirmed the principles laid down in North Sea Continental Shelf cases and Libya v. Tunisia case. The Court held that delimitation should be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking into account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result. Thus, the Court emphasized equitableness of the means as well as the result. The Court further held that the following circumstances and factors should be taken into account in achieving an equitable delimitation: (i) the general configurations of the coasts of the parties, their oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the general geographical context; (ii) the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the parties and the distance between them;
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(iii) the need to avoid in the delimitation any excessive disproportion between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of the relevant part of its coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines (proportionality factor). The Court rejected the Maltese argument that economic factors and security should also be taken into account as relevant factors in the delimitation of the continental shelves. The Court pointed out that delimitation should not be influenced by the relative economic position of the two States in question, in such a way that the area of continental shelf regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two States would be somewhat increased in order to compensate for its inferiority in economic resources. In the opinion of the Court, such considerations are totally unrelated to the underlying intention of the applicable rules of international law. On security considerations, the Court made the observation that these are unrelated to concept of Continental shelf. *****
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MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN
Qatar v. Bahrain
History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties On 8 July 1991 Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to "sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two States". In this Application, Qatar contended that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute by virtue of two "agreements" concluded between the Parties in December 1987 and December 1990 respectively, the subject and scope of the commitment to the Court's jurisdiction being determined, according to the Applicant, by a formula proposed by Bahrain to Qatar on 26 October 1988 and accepted by Qatar in December 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the "Bahraini formula"). By letters of 14 July and 18 August 1991, Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar. By a Judgment of 1 July 1994, the Court found that the exchanges of letters between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar of 19 and 21 December 1987, and between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain of 19 and 26 December 1987, and the document headed "Minutes" and signed at Doha on 25 December 1990 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, were international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties; and that, by the terms of those agreements, the Parties had undertaken to submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them, as circumscribed by the Bahraini formula. Having noted that it had before it only an Application from Qatar setting out that State's specific claims in connection with that formula, the Court decided to afford the Parties the opportunity to submit to it the whole of the dispute. After each of the Parties had filed a document on the question within the time-limit fixed, the Court, by a Judgment of 15 February 1995, found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain which had been submitted to it; that it was now seised of the whole of the dispute; and that the Application of the State of Qatar as formulated on 30 November 1994 was admissible. On behalf of the Government of Qatar The State of Qatar respectfully requests the Court, rejecting all contrary claims and submissions: I. To adjudge and declare in accordance with international law: A. (1) That the State of Qatar has sovereignty over the Hawar islands; (2) That Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah shoals are low-tide elevations which are under Qatar's sovereignty; B. (1) That the State of Bahrain has no sovereignty over the island of Janan; (2) That the State of Bahrain has no sovereignty over Zubarah;
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(3) That any claim by Bahrain concerning archipelagic baselines and areas for fishing for pearls and swimming fish would be irrelevant for the purpose of maritime delimitation in the present case; II. To draw a single maritime boundary between the maritime areas of sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters appertaining respectively to the State of Qatar and the State of Bahrain on the basis that Zubarah, the Hawar islands and the island of Janan appertain to the State of Qatar and not to the State of Bahrain, that boundary starting from point 2 of the delimitation agreement concluded between Bahrain and Iran in 1971 (51 05' 54" E and 27 02' 47" N), thence proceeding in a southerly direction up to BLV (50 57' 30" E and 26 33' 35" N), then following the line of the British decision of 23 December 1947 up to NSLB (50 49' 48" E and 26 21' 24" N) and up to point L (50 43' 00" E and 25 47' 27" N), thence proceeding to point S1 of the delimitation agreement concluded by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1958 (50 31' 45" E and 25 35' 38" N). On behalf of the Government of Bahrain Having regard to the facts and arguments set forth in Bahrain's Memorial, CounterMemorial, and Reply, and in the present hearings; May it please the Court, rejecting all contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare that: 1. Bahrain is sovereign over Zubarah. 2. Bahrain is sovereign over the Hawar Islands, including Janan and Hadd Janan. 3. In view of Bahrain's sovereignty over all the insular and other features, including Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, comprising the Bahraini archipelago, the maritime boundary between Bahrain and Qatar is as described in Part Two of Bahrain's Memorial." Geographical setting The Court notes that the State of Qatar and the State of Bahrain are both located in the southern part of the Arabian/Persian Gulf (hereinafter referred to as "the Gulf"), almost halfway between the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, to the north-west, and the Strait of Hormuz, at the Gulf's eastern end, to the north of Oman. The mainland to the west and south of the main island of Bahrain and to the south of the Qatar peninsula is part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The mainland on the northern shore of the Gulf is part of Iran. The Qatar peninsula projects northward into the Gulf, on the west from the bay called Dawhat Salwah, and on the east from the region lying to the south of Khor al-Udaid. The capital of the State of Qatar, Doha, is situated on the eastern coast of the peninsula. Bahrain is composed of a number of islands, islets and shoals situated off the eastern and western coasts of its main island, which is also called al-Awal Island. The capital of the State of Bahrain, Manama, is situated in the north-eastern part of al-Awal Island. Zubarah is located on the north-west coast of the Qatar peninsula, opposite the main island of Bahrain. The Hawar Islands are located in the immediate vicinity of the central part of the west coast of the Qatar peninsula, to the south-east of the main island of Bahrain and at a distance of approximately 10 nautical miles from the latter. Janan is located off the southwestern tip of Hawar Island proper. Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah are two maritime
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features located off the north-western coast of the Qatar peninsula and to the north-east of the main island of Bahrain. Historical context Navigation in the Gulf was traditionally in the hands of the inhabitants of the region. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, European powers began to show interest in the area, which lay along one of the trading routes with India. Portugal's virtual monopoly of trade was not challenged until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Great Britain was then anxious to consolidate its presence in the Gulf to protect the growing commercial interests of the East India Company. Between 1797 and 1819 Great Britain despatched numerous punitive expeditions in response to acts of plunder and piracy by Arab tribes led by the Qawasim against British and local ships. In 1819, Great Britain took control of Ras al Khaimah, headquarters of the Qawasim, and signed separate agreements with the various sheikhs of the region. These sheikhs undertook to enter into a General Treaty of Peace. By this Treaty, signed in January 1820, these sheikhs and chiefs undertook on behalf of themselves and their subjects inter alia to abstain for the future from plunder and piracy. It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that Great Britain would adopt a general policy of protection in the Gulf, concluding "exclusive agreements" with most sheikhdoms, including those of Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Dubai. Representation of British interests in the region was entrusted to a British Political Resident in the Gulf, installed in Bushire (Persia), to whom British Political Agents were subsequently subordinated in various sheikhdoms with which Great Britain had concluded agreements. On 31 May 1861 the British Government signed a "Perpetual treaty of peace and friendship" with Sheikh Mahomed bin Khalifah, referred to in the treaty as independent Ruler of Bahrain. Under this treaty, Bahrain undertook inter alia to refrain from all maritime aggression of every description, while Great Britain undertook to provide Bahrain with the necessary support in the maintenance of security of its possessions against aggression. There was no provision in this treaty defining the extent of these possessions. Following hostilities on the Qatar peninsula in 1867, the British Political Resident in the Gulf approached Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah, Chief of Bahrain, and Sheikh Mohamed Al-Thani, Chief of Qatar, and, on 6 and 12 September 1868 respectively, occasioned each to sign an agreement with Great Britain. By these agreements, the Chief of Bahrain recognized inter alia that certain acts of piracy had been committed by Mahomed bin Khalifah, his predecessor, and, "[i]n view of preserving the peace at sea, and precluding the occurrence of further disturbance and in order to keep the Political Resident informed of what happens", he promised to appoint an agent with the Political Resident; for his part, the Chief of Qatar undertook inter alia to return to and reside peacefully in Doha, not to put to sea with hostile intention, and, in the event of disputes or misunderstanding arising, invariably to refer to the Political Resident. According to Bahrain, the "events of 1867-1868" demonstrate that Qatar was not independent from Bahrain. According to Qatar, on the contrary, the 1868 Agreements formally recognized for the first time the separate identity of Qatar.
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While Great Britain had become the dominant maritime Power in the Gulf by this time, the Ottoman Empire, for its part, had re-established its authority over extensive areas of the land on the southern side of the Gulf. In the years following the arrival of the Ottomans on the Qatar peninsula, Great Britain further increased its influence over Bahrain. On 29 July 1913, an Anglo-Ottoman "Convention relating to the Persian Gulf and surrounding territories" was signed, but it was never ratified. Section II of this Convention dealt with Qatar. Article 11 described the course of the line which, according to the agreement between the parties, was to separate the Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd from the "peninsula of al-Qatar". Qatar points out that the Ottomans and the British had also signed, on 9 March 1914, a treaty concerning the frontiers of Aden, which was ratified that same year and whose Article III provided that the line separating Qatar from the Sanjak of Nejd would be "in accordance with Article 11 of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 29 July 1913 relating to the Persian Gulf and the surrounding territories". Under a treaty concluded on 3 November 1916 between Great Britain and the Sheikh of Qatar, the Sheikh of Qatar bound himself inter alia not to "have relations nor correspond with, nor receive the agent of, any other Power without the consent of the High British Government"; nor, without such consent, to cede to any other Power or its subjects, land; nor, without such consent, to grant any monopolies or concessions. In return, the British Government undertook to protect the Sheikh of Qatar and to grant its "good offices" should the Sheikh or his subjects be assailed by land within the territories of Qatar. There was no provision in this treaty defining the extent of those territories. On 29 April 1936 the representative of Petroleum Concessions Ltd. wrote to the British India Office, which had responsibility for relations with the protected States in the Gulf, drawing its attention to a Qatar oil concession of 17 May 1935 and observing that the Ruler of Bahrain, in his negotiations with Petroleum Concessions Ltd., had laid claim to Hawar; he accordingly enquired to which of the two Sheikhdoms (Bahrain or Qatar) Hawar belonged. On 14 July 1936, Petroleum Concessions Ltd. was informed by the India Office that it appeared to the British Government that Hawar belonged to the Sheikh of Bahrain. The content of those communications was not conveyed to the Sheikh of Qatar. In 1937, Qatar attempted to impose taxation on the Naim tribe inhabiting the Zubarah region; Bahrain opposed this as it claimed rights over this region. Relations between Qatar and Bahrain deteriorated. Negotiations between the two States started in spring of 1937 and were broken off in July of that year. Qatar alleges that Bahrain clandestinely and illegally occupied the Hawar Islands in 1937. Bahrain maintains that its Ruler was simply performing legitimate acts of continuing administration in his own territory. By a letter dated 10 May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar protested to the British Government against what he called "the irregular action taken by Bahrain against Qatar", to which he had already referred in February 1938 in a conversation in Doha with the British Political Agent in Bahrain. On 20 May 1938, the latter wrote to the Ruler of Qatar, inviting him to state his case on Hawar at the earliest possible moment. The Ruler of Qatar responded by a letter dated 27 May 1938. Some months later, on 3 January 1939, Bahrain submitted a counter-claim. In a letter of 30 March 1939, the Ruler of Qatar presented his comments on Bahrain's counter-claim to the British Political Agent in
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Bahrain. The Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain were informed on 11 July 1939 that the British Government had decided that the Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain. In May 1946, the Bahrain Petroleum Company Ltd. sought permission to drill in certain areas of the continental shelf, some of which the British considered might belong to Qatar. The British Government decided that this permission could not be granted until there had been a division of the sea-bed between Bahrain and Qatar. It studied the matter and, on 23 December 1947, the British Political Agent in Bahrain sent the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain two letters, in the same terms, showing the line which, the British Government considered divided "in accordance with equitable principles the sea-bed aforesaid". The letter indicated further that the Shaik of Bahrain had sovereign rights in the areas of the Dibal and Jaradah shoals (which should not be considered to be islands having territorial waters), as well as over the islands Hawar group while noting that Janan Island was not regarded as being included in the islands of the Hawar group. In 1971 Qatar and Bahrain ceased to be British protected States. On 21 September 1971, they were both admitted to the United Nations. Beginning in 1976, mediation, also referred to as "good offices", was conducted by the King of Saudi Arabia with the agreement of the Amirs of Bahrain and Qatar. The good offices of King Fahd did not lead to the desired outcome and on 8 July 1991 Qatar instituted proceedings before the Court against Bahrain. Sovereignty over Zubarah The Court notes that both Parties agree that the Al-Khalifah occupied Zubarah in the 1760s and that, some years later, they settled in Bahrain, but that they disagree as to the legal situation which prevailed thereafter and which culminated in the events of 1937. In the Court's view, the terms of the 1868 Agreement between and Great Britain and the Sheikh of Bahrain (see above) show that any attempt by Bahrain to pursue its claims to Zubarah through military action at sea would not be tolerated by the British. The Court finds that thereafter, the new rulers of Bahrain were never in a position to engage in direct acts of authority in Zubarah. Bahrain maintains, however, that the Al-Khalifah continued to exercise control over Zubarah through a Naim-led tribal confederation loyal to them, notwithstanding that at the end of the eighteenth century they had moved the seat of their government to the islands of Bahrain. The Court does not accept this contention. The Court considers that, in view of the role played by Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in the region, it is significant to note Article 11 of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention signed on 29 July 1913, which states inter alia: "it is agreed between the two Governments that the said peninsula will, as in the past, be governed by the Sheikh Jasim-bin-Sani and his successors". Thus Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire did not recognize Bahrain's sovereignty over the peninsula, including Zubarah. In their opinion the whole Qatar peninsula would continue to be governed by Sheikh Jassim Al-Thani, who had formerly been nominated kaimakam by the Ottomans, and by his successors. Both Parties agree that the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was never ratified; they differ on the other hand as to its value as evidence of Qatar's sovereignty over the peninsula. The Court observes that signed but unratified treaties may constitute an accurate expression of the understanding of the
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parties at the time of signature. In the circumstances of this case the Court has come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Ottoman Convention does represent evidence of the views of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as to the factual extent of the authority of the Al-Thani Ruler in Qatar up to 1913. The Court also observes that Article 11 of the 1913 Convention is referred to by Article III of the subsequent Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 9 March 1914, duly ratified that same year. The parties to that treaty therefore did not contemplate any authority over the peninsula other than that of Qatar. The Court then examines certain events which took place in Zubarah in 1937, after the Sheikh of Qatar had attempted to impose taxation on the Naim. It notes, inter alia, that on 5 May 1937, the Political Resident reported on those incidents to the Secretary of State for India, stating that he was "[p]ersonally, therefore, . . . of the opinion that juridically the Bahrain claim to Zubarah must fail". In a telegram of 15 July 1937 to the Political Resident, the British Secretary of State indicated that the Sheikh of Bahrain should be informed that the British Government regretted that it was "not prepared to intervene between Sheikh of Qatar and Naim tribe". In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that it cannot accept Bahrain's contention that Great Britain had always regarded Zubarah as belonging to Bahrain. The terms of the 1868 agreement between the British Government and the Sheikh of Bahrain, of the 1913 and 1914 conventions and of the letters in 1937 from the British Political Resident to the Secretary of State for India, and from the Secretary of State to the Political Resident, all show otherwise. In effect, in 1937 the British Government did not consider that Bahrain had sovereignty over Zubarah; it is for this reason that it refused to provide Bahrain with the assistance which it requested on the basis of the agreements in force between the two countries. In the period after 1868, the authority of the Sheikh of Qatar over the territory of Zubarah was gradually consolidated; it was acknowledged in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention and was definitively established in 1937. The actions of the Sheikh of Qatar in Zubarah that year were an exercise of his authority on his territory and, contrary to what Bahrain has alleged, were not an unlawful use of force against Bahrain. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the first submission made by Bahrain cannot be upheld and that Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah. Sovereignty over the Hawar Islands The Court then turns to the question of sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, leaving aside the question of Janan for the moment. The Court observes that the Parties' lengthy arguments on the issue of sovereignty over the Hawar Islands raise several legal issues: the nature and validity of the 1939 decision by Great Britain; the existence of an original title; effectivits; and the applicability of the principle of uti possidetis juris to the present case. The Court begins by considering the nature and validity of the 1939 British decision. Bahrain maintains that the British decision of 1939 must be considered primarily as an arbitral award, which is res judicata. It claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the award of another tribunal, basing its proposition on decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the present Court. Qatar denies the relevance of the judgments cited by Bahrain. It contends that none of
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them are in the slightest degree relevant to the issue which the Court has to determine in the present case, namely, whether the procedures followed by the British Government in 1938 and 1939 amounted to a process of arbitration which could result in an arbitral award binding upon the parties. The Court first considers the question whether the 1939 British decision must be deemed to constitute an arbitral award. It observes in this respect that the word arbitration, for purposes of public international law, usually refers to "the settlement of differences between States by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law" and that this wording was reaffirmed in the work of the International Law Commission, which reserved the case where the parties might have decided that the requested decision should be taken ex quo et bono. The Court observes that in the present case no agreement existed between the Parties to submit their case to an arbitral tribunal made up of judges chosen by them, who would rule either on the basis of law or ex quo et bono. The Parties had only agreed that the issue would be decided by "His Majesty's Government", but left it to the latter to determine how that decision would be arrived at, and by which officials. It follows that the decision whereby, in 1939, the British Government held that the Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain, did not constitute an international arbitral award. The Court finds that it does not therefore need to consider Bahrain's argument concerning the Court's jurisdiction to examine the validity of arbitral awards. The Court observes, however, that the fact that a decision is not an arbitral award does not mean that the decision is devoid of legal effect. In order to determine the legal effect of the 1939 British decision, it then recalls the events which preceded and immediately followed its adoption. Having done so, the Court considers Qatar's argument challenging the validity of the 1939 British decision. Qatar first contends that it never gave its consent to have the question of the Hawar Islands decided by the British Government. The Court observes, however, that following the Exchange of Letters of 10 and 20 May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar consented on 27 May 1938 to entrust decision of the Hawar Islands question to the British Government. On that day he had submitted his complaint to the British Political Agent. Finally, like the Ruler of Bahrain, he had consented to participate in the proceedings that were to lead to the 1939 decision. The jurisdiction of the British Government to take the decision concerning the Hawar Islands derived from these two consents; the Court therefore has no need to examine whether, in the absence of such consent, the British Government would have had the authority to do so under the treaties making Bahrain and Qatar protected States of Great Britain. Qatar maintains in the second place that the British officials responsible for the Hawar Islands question were biased and had prejudged the matter. The procedure followed is accordingly alleged to have violated "the rule which prohibits bias in a decision-maker on the international plane". It is also claimed that the parties were not given an equal and fair opportunity to present their arguments and that the decision was not reasoned. The Court begins by recalling that the 1939 decision is not an arbitral award made upon completion of arbitral proceedings. This does not, however, mean that it was devoid of all
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legal effect. Quite to the contrary, the pleadings, and in particular the Exchange of Letters referred to above, shows that Bahrain and Qatar consented to the British Government settling their dispute over the Hawar Islands. The 1939 decision must therefore be regarded as a decision that was binding from the outset on both States and continued to be binding on those same States after 1971, when they ceased to be British protected States. The Court further observes that while it is true that the competent British officials proceeded on the premise that Bahrain possessed prima facie title to the islands and that the burden of proving the opposite lay on the Ruler of Qatar, Qatar cannot maintain that it was contrary to justice to proceed on the basis of this premise when Qatar had been informed before agreeing to the procedure that this would occur and had consented to the proceedings being conducted on that basis. During those proceedings the two Rulers were able to present their arguments and each of them was afforded an amount of time which the Court considers was sufficient for this purpose; Qatar's contention that it was subjected to unequal treatment therefore cannot be upheld. The Court also notes that, while the reasoning supporting the 1939 decision was not communicated to the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar, this lack of reasons has no influence on the validity of the decision taken, because no obligation to state reasons had been imposed on the British Government when it was entrusted with the settlement of the matter. Therefore, Qatar's contention that the 1939 British decision is invalid for lack of reasons cannot be upheld. Finally, the fact that the Sheikh of Qatar had protested on several occasions against the content of the British decision of 1939 after he had been informed of it is not such as to render the decision unopposable to him, contrary to what Qatar maintains. The Court accordingly concludes that the decision taken by the British Government on 11 July 1939 is binding on the parties. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, and that the submissions of Qatar on this question cannot be upheld. The Court finally observes that the conclusion thus reached by it on the basis of the British decision of 1939 makes it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the arguments of the Parties based on the existence of an original title, effectivits, and the applicability of the principle of uti possidetis juris to the present case. Sovereignty over Janan Island The Court then considers the Parties' claims to Janan Island. It begins by observing that Qatar and Bahrain have differing ideas of what should be understood by the expression "Janan Island". According to Qatar, "Janan is an island approximately 700 metres long and 175 metres wide situated off the southwestern tip of the main Hawar island . . .". For Bahrain, the term covers "two islands, situated between one and two nautical miles off the southern coast of Jazirat Hawar, which merge into a single island at low tide . . .". After examination of the arguments of the Parties, the Court considers itself entitled to treat Janan and Hadd Janan as one island. The Court then, as it has done in regard to the Parties' claims to the Hawar Islands, begins by considering the effects of the British decision of 1939 on the question of sovereignty over Janan Island. As has already been stated, in that decision the British Government concluded that the Hawar Islands "belong[ed] to the State of Bahrain and not to the State of Qatar". No mention was made of Janan Island. Nor was it specified what was to be understood by the expression "Hawar Islands". The Parties have accordingly debated at length over the issue of
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whether Janan fell to be regarded as part of the Hawar Islands and whether, as a result, it pertained to Bahrain's sovereignty by virtue of the 1939 decision or whether, on the contrary, it was not covered by that decision. In support of their respective arguments, Qatar and Bahrain have each cited documents both anterior and posterior to the British decision of 1939. Qatar has in particular relied on a "decision" by the British Government in 1947 relating to the seabed delimitation between the two States. Bahrain recalled that it had submitted four lists to the British Government -- in April 1936, August 1937, May 1938 and July 1946 -- with regard to the composition of the Hawar Islands. The Court notes that the three lists submitted prior to 1939 by Bahrain to the British Government with regard to the composition of the Hawar group are not identical. In particular, Janan Island appears by name in only one of those three lists. As to the fourth list, which is different from the three previous ones, it does make express reference to Janan Island, but it was submitted to the British Government only in 1946, several years after the adoption of the 1939 decision. Thus, no definite conclusion may be drawn from these various lists. The Court then considers the letters sent on 23 December 1947 by the British Political Agent in Bahrain to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain. By those letters the Political Agent acting on behalf of the British Government informed the two States of the delimitation of their seabeds effected by the British Government. This Government, which had been responsible for the 1939 decision on the Hawar Islands, sought, in the last sentence of subparagraph 4 (ii) of these letters, to make it clear that "Janan Island is not regarded as being included in the islands of the Hawar group". The British Government accordingly did not "recognize" the Sheikh of Bahrain as having "sovereign rights" over that island and, in determining the points fixed in paragraph 5 of those letters, as well as in drawing the map enclosed with those letters, it regarded Janan as belonging to Qatar. The Court considers that the British Government, in thus proceeding, provided an authoritative interpretation of the 1939 decision and of the situation resulting from it. Having regard to all of the foregoing, the Court does not accept Bahrain's argument that in 1939 the British Government recognized "Bahrain's sovereignty over Janan as part of the Hawars". It finds that Qatar has sovereignty over Janan Island including Hadd Janan, on the basis of the decision taken by the British Government in 1939, as interpreted in 1947. Maritime Delimitation The Court then turns to the question of the maritime delimitation. It begins by taking note that the Parties are in agreement that the Court should render its decision on the maritime delimitation in accordance with international law. Neither Bahrain nor Qatar is party to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958; Bahrain has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 but Qatar is only a signatory to it. The Court indicates that customary international law, therefore, is the applicable law. Both Parties, however, agree that most of the provisions of the 1982 Convention which are relevant for the present case reflect customary law.
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A single maritime boundary The Court notes that, under the terms of the Bahraini formula, the Parties requested the Court, in December 1990, to draw a single maritime boundary between their respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters. The Court observes that it should be kept in mind, that the concept of single maritime boundary may encompass a number of functions. In the present case the single maritime boundary will be the result of the delimitation of various jurisdictions. In the southern part of the delimitation area, which is situated where the coasts of the Parties are opposite to each other, the distance between these coasts is nowhere more than 24 nautical miles. The boundary the Court is expected to draw will, therefore, delimit exclusively their territorial seas and, consequently, an area over which they enjoy territorial sovereignty. More to the north, however, where the coasts of the two States are no longer opposite to each other but are rather comparable to adjacent coasts, the delimitation to be carried out will be one between the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone belonging to each of the Parties, areas in which States have only sovereign rights and functional jurisdiction. Thus both Parties have differentiated between a southern and a northern sector. The Court further observes that the concept of a single maritime boundary does not stem from multilateral treaty law but from State practice, and that it finds its explanation in the wish of States to establish one uninterrupted boundary line delimiting the various - partially coincident - zones of maritime jurisdiction appertaining to them. In the case of coincident jurisdictional zones, the determination of a single boundary for the different objects of delimitation can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of these objects to the detriment of the other and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them, as was stated by the Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case. In that case, the Chamber was asked to draw a single line which would delimit both the continental shelf and the superjacent water column. Delimitation of the territorial sea Delimitation of territorial seas does not present comparable problems, since the rights of the coastal State in the area concerned are not functional but territorial, and entail sovereignty over the sea-bed and the superjacent waters and air column. Therefore, when carrying out that part of its task, the Court has to apply in the present case first and foremost the principles and rules of international customary law which refer to the delimitation of the territorial sea, while taking into account that its ultimate task is to draw a single maritime boundary that serves other purposes as well. The Parties agree that the provisions of Article 15 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, headed Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, are part of customary law. This Article provides:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is
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necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith. The Court notes that Article 15 of the 1982 Convention is virtually identical to Article 12, paragraph 1, of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and is to be regarded as having a customary character. It is often referred to as the equidistance/special circumstances rule. The most logical and widely practised approach is first to draw provisionally an equidistance line and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of the existence of special circumstances. The Court explains that once it has delimited the territorial seas belonging to the Parties, it will determine the rules and principles of customary law to be applied to the delimitation of the Parties' continental shelves and their exclusive economic zones or fishery zones. The Court will further decide whether the method to be chosen for this delimitation differs from or is similar to the approach just outlined. The equidistance line The Court begins by noting that the equidistance line is the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. This line can only be drawn when the baselines are known. Neither of the Parties has as yet specified the baselines which are to be used for the determination of the breadth of the territorial sea, nor have they produced official maps or charts which reflect such baselines. Only during the present proceedings have they provided the Court with approximate basepoints which in their view could be used by the Court for the determination of the maritime boundary.

The relevant coasts The Court indicates that it will therefore first determine the relevant coasts of the Parties, from which will be determined the location of the baselines, and the pertinent basepoints from which enable the equidistance line to be measured. Qatar has argued that, for purposes of this delimitation, it is the mainland-to-mainland method which should be applied in order to construct the equidistance line. It claims that the notion of mainland applies both to the Qatar peninsula, which should be understood as including the main Hawar island, and to Bahrain, of which the islands to be taken into consideration are al-Awal (also called Bahrain Island), together with al-Muharraq and Sitrah. For Qatar, application of the mainland-to-mainland method has two main consequences. First, it takes no account of the islands (except for the above-mentioned islands, Hawar on the Qatar side and al-Awal, al-Muharraq and Sitrah on the Bahrain side), islets, rocks, reefs or low-tide elevations lying in the relevant area. Second, in Qatar's view, application of the mainland-tomainland method of calculation would also mean that the equidistance line has to be constructed by reference to the high-water line.
Bahrain contends that it is a de facto archipelago or multiple-island State, characterized by a variety of maritime features of diverse character and size. All these features are closely interlinked and together they constitute the State of Bahrain; reducing that State to a limited number of so-called "principal" islands would be a distortion of reality and a refashioning of geography. Since it is the land which determines maritime rights, the relevant basepoints are
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situated on all those maritime features over which Bahrain has sovereignty. Bahrain further contends that, according to conventional and customary international law, it is the low-water line which is determinative for the breadth of the territorial sea and for the delimitation of overlapping territorial waters. Finally, Bahrain has stated that, as a de facto archipelagic State, it is entitled to declare itself an archipelagic State under Part IV of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and to draw the permissive baselines of Article 47 of that Convention, i.e., straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago. Qatar has contested Bahrain's claim that it is entitled to declare itself an archipelagic State under Part IV of the 1982 Convention. With regard to Bahrains claim the Court observes that Bahrain has not made this claim one of its formal submissions and that the Court is therefore not requested to take a position on this issue. What the Court, however, is called upon to do is to draw a single maritime boundary in accordance with international law. The Court can carry out this delimitation only by applying those rules and principles of customary law which are pertinent under the prevailing circumstances. It emphasizes that its decision will have binding force between the Parties, in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, and consequently could not be put in issue by the unilateral action of either of the Parties, and in particular, by any decision of Bahrain to declare itself an archipelagic State. The Court, therefore, turns to the determination of the relevant coasts from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the Parties is measured. In this respect the Court recalls that under the applicable rules of international law the normal baseline for measuring this breadth is the low-water line along the coast (Art. 5, 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea). In previous cases the Court has made clear that maritime rights derive from the coastal States sovereignty over the land, a principle which can be summarized as the land dominates the sea. It is thus the terrestrial territorial situation that must be taken as starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal State. In order to determine what constitutes Bahrain's relevant coasts and what are the relevant baselines on the Bahraini side, the Court must first establish which islands come under Bahraini sovereignty. The Court recalls that it has concluded that the Hawar Islands belong to Bahrain and that Janan belongs to Qatar. It observes that other islands which can be identified in the delimitation area which are relevant for delimitation purposes in the southern sector are Jazirat Mashtan and Umm Jalid, islands which are at high tide very small in size, but at low tide have a surface which is considerably larger. Bahrain claims to have sovereignty over these islands, a claim which is not contested by Qatar.
Fasht al Azm However, the Parties are divided on the issue of whether Fasht al Azm must be deemed to be part of the island of Sitrah or whether it is a low-tide elevation which is not naturally connected to Sitrah Island. In 1982 Bahrain undertook reclamation works for the construction of a petrochemical plant, during which an artificial channel was dredged connecting the waters on both sides of Fasht al Azm. After careful analysis of the various reports, documents and charts submitted by the Parties, the Court has been unable to establish whether a permanent passage separating Sitrah Island from Fasht al Azm existed before the reclamation
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works of 1982 were undertaken. For the reasons explained below, the Court is nonetheless able to undertake the requested delimitation in this sector without determining the question whether Fasht al Azm is to be regarded as part of the island of Sitrah or as a low-tide elevation.
Qit'at Jaradah Another issue on which the Parties have totally opposing views is whether Qit'at Jaradah is an island or a low-tide elevation. The Court recalls that the legal definition of an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide (1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Art. 10, para. 1; 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 121, para. 1). The Court has carefully analysed the evidence submitted by the Parties and weighed the conclusions of the experts referred to above, in particular the fact that the experts appointed by Qatar did not themselves maintain that it was scientifically proven that Qitat Jaradah is a low-tide elevation. On these bases, the Court concludes that the maritime feature of Qit'at Jaradah satisfies the above-mentioned criteria and that it is an island which should as such be taken into consideration for the drawing of the equidistance line. In the present case, taking into account the size of Qit'at Jaradah, the activities carried out by Bahrain on that island must be considered sufficient to support Bahrain's claim that it has sovereignty over it. Fasht ad Dibal Both Parties agree that Fasht ad Dibal is a low-tide elevation. Whereas Qatar maintains just as it did with regard to Qitat Jaradah - that Fasht ad Dibal as a low-tide elevation cannot be appropriated, Bahrain contends that low-tide elevations by their very nature are territory, and therefore can be appropriated in accordance with the criteria which pertain to the acquisition of territory. Whatever their location, low-tide elevations are always subject to the law which governs the acquisition and preservation of territorial sovereignty, with its subtle dialectic of title and effectivits.
The Court observes that according to the relevant provisions of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea, which reflect customary international law, a low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide (1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Art. 11, para. 1; 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 13, para. 1). When a low-tide elevation is situated in the overlapping area of the territorial sea of two States, whether with opposite or with adjacent coasts, both States in principle are entitled to use its low-water line for the measuring of the breadth of their territorial sea. The same low-tide elevation then forms part of the coastal configuration of the two States. That is so even if the low-tide elevation is nearer to the coast of one State than that of the other, or nearer to an island belonging to one party than it is to the mainland coast of the other. For delimitation purposes the competing rights derived by both coastal States from the relevant provisions of the law of the sea would by necessity seem to neutralize each other. In Bahrain's view, however, it depends upon the effectivits presented by the two coastal States which of them has a superior title to the lowtide elevation in question and is therefore entitled to exercise the right attributed by the relevant provisions of the law of the sea, just as in the case of islands which are situated
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within the limits of the breadth of the territorial sea of more than one State. In the view of the Court the decisive question for the present case is whether a State can acquire sovereignty by appropriation over a low-tide elevation situated within the breadth of its territorial sea when that same low-tide elevation lies also within the breadth of the territorial sea of another State. International treaty law is silent on the question whether low-tide elevations can be considered to be territory. Nor is the Court aware of a uniform and widespread State practice which might have given rise to a customary rule which unequivocally permits or excludes appropriation of low-tide elevations. It is only in the context of the law of the sea that a number of permissive rules have been established with regard to low-tide elevations which are situated at a relatively short distance from a coast. The few existing rules do not justify a general assumption that low-tide elevations are territory in the same sense as islands. It has never been disputed that islands constitute terra firma, and are subject to the rules and principles of territorial acquisition; the difference in effects which the law of the sea attributes to islands and low-tide elevations is considerable. It is thus not established that in the absence of other rules and legal principles, low-tide elevations can, from the viewpoint of the acquisition of sovereignty, be fully assimilated with islands or other land territory. In this respect the Court recalls the rule that a low-tide elevation which is situated beyond the limits of the territorial sea does not have a territorial sea of its own. A low-tide elevation, therefore, as such does not generate the same rights as islands or other territory. The Court, consequently, is of the view that in the present case there is no ground for recognizing the right of Bahrain to use as a baseline the low-water line of those low-tide elevations which are situated in the zone of overlapping claims, or for recognizing Qatar as having such a right. The Court accordingly concludes that for the purposes of drawing the equidistance line, such low-tide elevations must be disregarded. Method of straight baselines The Court further observes that the method of straight baselines, which Bahrain applied in its reasoning and in the maps provided to the Court, is an exception to the normal rules for the determination of baselines and may only be applied if a number of conditions are met. This method must be applied restrictively. Such conditions are primarily that either the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or that there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. The fact that a State considers itself a multiple-island State or a de facto archipelagic State does not allow it to deviate from the normal rules for the determination of baselines unless the relevant conditions are met. The coasts of Bahrain's main islands do not form a deeply indented coast, nor does Bahrain claim this. It contends, however, that the maritime features off the coast of the main islands may be assimilated to a fringe of islands which constitute a whole with the mainland. The Court does not deny that the maritime features east of Bahrain's main islands are part of the overall geographical configuration; it would be going too far, however, to qualify them as a fringe of islands along the coast. The Court, therefore, concludes that Bahrain is not entitled to apply the method of straight baselines. Thus each maritime feature has its own effect for the determination of the baselines, on the understanding that, on the grounds set out before, the low-tide elevations situated in the overlapping zone of territorial seas will be disregarded. It is on this basis that the equidistance line must be drawn. The Court notes, however, that Fasht al Azm requires
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special mention. If this feature were to be regarded as part of the island of Sitrah, the basepoints for the purposes of determining the equidistance line would be situated on Fasht al Azm's eastern low-water line. If it were not to be regarded as part of the island of Sitrah, Fasht al Azm could not provide such basepoints. As the Court has not determined whether this feature does form part of the island of Sitrah, it has drawn two equidistance lines reflecting each of these hypotheses.
Special circumstances The Court then turns to the question of whether there are special circumstances which make it necessary to adjust the equidistance line as provisionally drawn in order to obtain an equitable result in relation to this part of the single maritime boundary to be fixed. With regard to the question of Fasht al Azm, the Court considers that on either of the above-mentioned hypotheses there are special circumstances which justify choosing a delimitation line passing between Fasht al Azm and Qit'at ash Shajarah. With regard to the question of Qit'at Jaradah, the Court observes that it is a very small island, uninhabited and without any vegetation. This tiny island, which - as the Court has determined - comes under Bahraini sovereignty, is situated about midway between the main island of Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula. Consequently, if its low-water line were to be used for determining a basepoint in the construction of the equidistance line, and this line taken as the delimitation line, a disproportionate effect would be given to an insignificant maritime feature. The Court thus finds that there is a special circumstance in this case warranting the choice of a delimitation line passing immediately to the east of Qitat Jaradah. The Court observed earlier that, since it did not determine whether Fasht al Azm is part of Sitrah island or a separate low-tide elevation, it is necessary to draw provisionally two equidistance lines. If no effect is given to Qitat Jaradah and in the event that Fasht al Azm is considered to be part of Sitrah island, the equidistance line thus adjusted cuts through Fasht ad Dibal leaving the greater part of it on the Qatari side. If, however, Fasht al Azm is seen as a lowtide elevation, the adjusted equidistance line runs west of Fasht ad Dibal. In view of the fact that under both hypotheses, Fasht ad Dibal is largely or totally on the Qatari side of the adjusted equidistance line, the Court considers it appropriate to draw the boundary line between Qitat Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal. As Fasht ad Dibal thus is situated in the territorial sea of Qatar, it falls under the sovereignty of that State. On these considerations the Court finds that it is in a position to determine the course of that part of the single maritime boundary which will delimit the territorial seas of the Parties. Before doing so the Court notes, however, that it cannot fix the boundary's southern-most point, since its definitive location is dependent upon the limits of the respective maritime zones of Saudi Arabia and of the Parties. The Court also considers it appropriate, in accordance with common practice, to simplify what would otherwise be a very complex delimitation line in the region of the Hawar Islands. Taking account of all of the foregoing, the Court decides that, from the point of intersection of the respective maritime limits of Saudi Arabia on the one hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other, which cannot be fixed, the boundary will follow a north-easterly direction, then immediately turn in an easterly direction, after which it will pass between
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Jazirat Hawar and Janan; it will subsequently turn to the north and pass between the Hawar Islands and the Qatar peninsula and continue in a northerly direction, leaving the lowtide elevation of Fasht Bu Thur, and Fasht al Azm, on the Bahraini side, and the low-tide elevations of Qita 'a el Erge and Qit'at ash Shajarah on the Qatari side; finally it will pass between Qit'at Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal, leaving Qit'at Jaradah on the Bahraini side and Fasht ad Dibal on the Qatari side. With reference to the question of navigation, the Court notes that the channel connecting Qatar's maritime zones situated to the south of the Hawar Islands and those situated to the north of those islands, is narrow and shallow, and little suited to navigation. It emphasizes that the waters lying between the Hawar Islands and the other Bahraini islands are not internal waters of Bahrain, but the territorial sea of that State. Consequently, Qatari vessels, like those of all other States, shall enjoy in these waters the right of innocent passage accorded by customary international law. In the same way, Bahraini vessels, like those of all other States, enjoy the same right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of Qatar. Delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone The Court then deals with the drawing of the single maritime boundary in that part of the delimitation area which covers both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. Referring to its earlier case-law on the drawing of a single maritime boundary the Court observes that it will follow the same approach in the present case. For the delimitation of the maritime zones beyond the 12-mile zone it will first provisionally draw an equidistance line and then consider whether there are circumstances which must lead to an adjustment of that line. The Court further notes that the equidistance/special circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the delimitation of the territorial sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, as it has been developed since 1958 in case-law and State practice with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, are closely interrelated.
The Court then examines whether there are circumstances which might make it necessary to adjust the equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. With regard to Bahrain's claim concerning the pearling industry, the Court first takes note of the fact that that industry effectively ceased to exist a considerable time ago. It further observes that, from the evidence submitted to it, it is clear that pearl diving in the Gulf area traditionally was considered as a right which was common to the coastal population. The Court, therefore, does not consider the existence of pearling banks, though predominantly exploited in the past by Bahraini fishermen, as forming a circumstance which would justify an eastward shifting of the equidistance line as requested by Bahrain. The Court also considers that it does not need to determine the legal character of the decision contained in the letters of 23 December 1947 of the British Political Agent to the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar with respect to the division of the sea-bed, which Qatar claims as a special circumstance. It suffices for it to note that neither of the Parties has accepted it as a binding decision and that they have invoked only parts of it to support their arguments. Taking into account the fact that it has decided that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, the Court finds that the disparity in length of the coastal fronts of the Parties
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cannot, as Qatar claims, be considered such as to necessitate an adjustment of the equidistance line. The Court finally recalls that in the northern sector the coasts of the Parties are comparable to adjacent coasts abutting on the same maritime areas extending seawards into the Gulf. The northern coasts of the territories belonging to the Parties are not markedly different in character or extent; both are flat and have a very gentle slope. The only noticeable element is Fasht al Jarim as a remote projection of Bahrains coastline in the Gulf area, which, if given full effect, would distort the boundary and have disproportionate effects. In the view of the Court such a distortion, due to a maritime feature located well out to sea and of which at most a minute part is above water at high tide, would not lead to an equitable solution which would be in accord with all other relevant factors referred to above. In the circumstances of the case considerations of equity require that Fasht al Jarim should have no effect in determining the boundary line in the northern sector. The Court accordingly decides that the single maritime boundary in this sector shall be formed in the first place by a line which, from a point situated to the north-west of Fasht ad Dibal, shall meet the equidistance line as adjusted to take account of the absence of effect given to Fasht al Jarim. The boundary shall then follow this adjusted equidistance line until it meets the delimitation line between the respective maritime zones of Iran on the one hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other. For these reasons, The Court, (1) Unanimously finds that the State of Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah; (2) (a) By twelve votes to five, finds that the State of Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar Islands; (b) Unanimously, recalls that vessels of the State of Qatar enjoy in the territorial sea of Bahrain separating the Hawar Islands from the other Bahraini islands the right of innocent passage accorded by customary international law; (3) By thirteen votes to four, finds that the State of Qatar has sovereignty over Janan Island, including Hadd Janan; (4) By twelve votes to five, finds that the State of Bahrain has sovereignty over the island of Qit'at Jaradah; (5) Unanimously, finds that the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal falls under the sovereignty of the State of Qatar; (6) By thirteen votes to four, decides that the single maritime boundary that divides the various maritime zones of the State of Qatar and the State of Bahrain shall be drawn as indicated in paragraph 250 of the present Judgment.
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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982

PART II
TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Article 2 : Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil 1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law. Article 3 : Breadth of the territorial sea Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention. Article 4 : Outer limit of the territorial sea The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. Article 5 : Normal baseline Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. Article 7 : Straight baselines 1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention. 3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on
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them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such elevations has received general international recognition. 5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. 6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. Article 8 : Internal waters 1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. 2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. Article 17 : Right of innocent passage Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Article 18 : Meaning of passage 1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of : (a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. 2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. Article 19 : Meaning of innocent passage 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations ; (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
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(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. Article 20 : Submarines and other underwater vehicles In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Article 21 : Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage 1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following : (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State; (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. Article 29 : Definition of warships For the purposes of this Convention, warship means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline. Article 30 : Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
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therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Article 31 : Responsibility of the flag state for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. Article 32 : Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. Article 33 : Contiguous zone 1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to : (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea; 2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. PART V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Article 55 : Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. Article 56 : Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone 1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bad and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
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(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI. Article 57 : Breadth of the exclusive economic zone The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea in measured. Article 58 : Rights and duties of other states in the exclusive economic zone 1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. Article 60 : Artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone 1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of : (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the costal State in the zone. 2. The costal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
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3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the competent international organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures not entirely removed. 4. The costal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures. 5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones. 6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and safety zones. 7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation. 8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not posses the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf. Article 61 : Conservation of the living resources 1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone. 2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall co-operate to this end. 3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global.
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4. In taking such measures the costal States shall take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintain or restoring population of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. 5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stock shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, including States whose nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone. Article 62 : Utilization of the living resources 1. The costal States shall, promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 2. The costal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the costal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements give other states excess to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70[Right of land-locked States and Right of geographically disadvantaged States], especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein. 3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the costal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the costal State concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of article 69 and 70, the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. 4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the costal State. PART VI
CONTINENTAL SHELF
Article 76 : Definition of the continental shelf 1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the limits provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6.
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3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. 4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either : (i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or (ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope. (b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the sea-bed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) (i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, submarine ridges, the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs. 7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by co-ordinates of latitude and longitude. 8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. 9. The coastal state shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf. The Secretary-General shall give due publicity thereto. 10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
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Article 77 : Rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf 1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. 3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. 4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other nonliving resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil. Article 78 : Legal status of the superjacent waters and air space and the rights and freedoms of other States 1. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters. 2. The exercise of the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention. Article 79 : Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf 1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this article. 2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines. 3. The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State. 4. Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdiction over cables and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction. 5. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to cables or pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.
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Article 80 : Artificial Islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf Article 60 applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf. Article 81 : Drilling on the continental shelf The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes. Article 83 : Delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts 1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the states concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. 4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. Article 85 : Tunnelling This Part does not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means of tunnelling, irrespective of the depth of water above the subsoil. PART VII
HIGH SEAS
Article 86 : Application of the provisions of this Part The provisions of this Part apply to all part of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58. Article 87 : Freedom of the high seas 1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked states : (a) freedom of navigation;
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(b) (c)
freedom of overflight; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
Article 111 : Right of hot pursuit 1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established. 2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the coastal state applicable in accordance with this convention to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones. 3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State. 4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or, the exclusive economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. 5. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. 6. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft; (a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis; (b) the aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until a ship or another aircraft of the coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify an arrest outside the territorial sea that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit without interruption. 7. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and escorted to a port of that State for the purposes of an inquiry before the competent authorities may not be
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claimed solely on the ground that the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the exclusive economic zone or the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary. 8. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained. Article 112 : Right to lay submarine cables and pipelines 1. All states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf. 2. Article 79, paragraph 5, applies to such cables and pipelines. Article 156 : Establishment of the Authority 1. There is hereby established the International Sea-Bed Authority, which shall function in accordance with this Part. 2. All states Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority. 3. Observers at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea who have signed the Final Act and who are not referred to in Article 305, paragraph 1(c), (d), (e) or (f), shall have the right to participate in the Authority as observers, in accordance with its rules, regulations and procedures. 4. The seat of the Authority shall be in Jamaica. 5. The Authority may establish such regional centers or officers as it deems necessary for the exercise of its functions. Article 157 : Nature and fundamental principles of the Authority 1. The Authority is the organization through which States Parties shall, in accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area. 2. The powers and functions of the Authority shall be those expressly conferred upon it by this Convention. The Authority shall have such incidental powers, consistent with this Convention, as are implicit in and necessary for the exercise of those powers and functions with respect to activities in the Area. 3. The Authority is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. 4. All members of the Authority shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Part in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting form membership. Article 158 : Organs of the Authority 1. There are hereby established, as the principal organs of the Authority, an Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. 2. There is hereby established the Enterprise, the organ through which the Authority shall carry out the functions referred to in article 170, paragraph 1.
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3. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with this Part. 4. Each principal organ of the Authority and the Enterprise shall be responsible for exercising those powers and functions which are conferred upon it. In exercising such powers and functions each organ shall avoid taking any action which may derogate from or impede the exercise of specific powers and functions conferred upon another organ. Article 170 : The Enterprise 1. The Enterprise shall be the organ of the Authority which shall carry out activities in the Area directly, pursuant to Article 153, paragraph 2 (a), as well as the transporting, processing and marketing of minerals recovered from the Area. 2. The Enterprise shall, within the framework of the international legal personality of the Authority, have such legal capacity as is provided for in the Statute set forth in Annex IV. The Enterprise shall act in accordance with this Convention and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, as well as the general policies established by the Assembly, and shall be subject to the directives and control of the Council. 3. The Enterprise shall have its principal place of business at the seat of the Authority. 4. The Enterprise shall, in accordance with article 173, paragraph2, and Annex IV, article 11, be provided with such funds as it may require to carry out its functions, and shall receive technology as provided in article 144 and other relevant provisions of this Convention.
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AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982
The States Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing the important contribution of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world, Reaffirming that the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as "the Area"), as well as the resources of the Area, are the common heritage of mankind, Mindful of the importance of the Convention for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and of the growing concern for the global environment, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the results of the informal consultations among States held from 1990 to 1994 on outstanding issues relating to Part XI and related provisions of the Convention (hereinafter referred to as "Part XI"), Noting the political and economic changes, including market-oriented approaches, affecting the implementation of Part XI, Wishing to facilitate universal participation in the Convention, Considering that an agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI would best meet that objective, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Implementation of Part XI 1. The States Parties to this Agreement undertake to implement Part XI in accordance with this Agreement. 2. The Annex forms an integral part of this Agreement. Article 2 Relationship between this Agreement and Part XI 1. The provisions of this Agreement and Part XI shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail. 2. Articles 309 to 319 of the Convention shall apply to this Agreement as they apply to the Convention.
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Article 3 Signature This Agreement shall remain open for signature at United Nations Headquarters by the States and entities referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f), of the Convention for 12 months from the date of its adoption. Article 4 Consent to be bound 1. After the adoption of this Agreement, any instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention shall also represent consent to be bound by this Agreement. 2. No State or entity may establish its consent to be bound by this Agreement unless it has previously established or establishes at the same time its consent to be bound by the Convention. 3. A State or entity referred to in article 3 may express its consent to be bound by this Agreement by: (a) Signature not subject to ratification, formal confirmation or the procedure set out in article 5; (b) Signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation, followed by ratification or formal confirmation; (c) Signature subject to the procedure set out in article 5; or (d) Accession. 4. Formal confirmation by the entities referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(f), of the Convention shall be in accordance with Annex IX of the Convention. 5. The instruments of ratification, formal confirmation or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 5 Simplified procedure 1. A State or entity which has deposited before the date of the adoption of this Agreement an instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention and which has signed this Agreement in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3(c), shall be considered to have established its consent to be bound by this Agreement 12 months after the date of its adoption, unless that State or entity notifies the depositary in writing before that date that it is not availing itself of the simplified procedure set out in this article. 2. In the event of such notification, consent to be bound by this Agreement shall be established in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3(b). Article 6 Entry into force 1. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days after the date on which 40 States have established their consent to be bound in accordance with articles 4 and 5, provided that such States include at least seven of the States referred to in paragraph l(a) of resolution II of the
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Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as "resolution II") and that at least five of those States are developed States. If these conditions for entry into force are fulfilled before 16 November 1994, this Agreement shall enter into force on 16 November 1994. 2. For each State or entity establishing its consent to be bound by this Agreement after the requirements set out in paragraph 1 have been fulfilled, this Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of establishment of its consent to be bound.
Article 7 Provisional application 1. If on 16 November 1994 this Agreement has not entered into force, it shall be applied provisionally pending its entry into force by: (a) States which have consented to its adoption in the General Assembly of the United Nations, except any such State which before 16 November 1994 notifies the depositary in writing either that it will not so apply this Agreement or that it will consent to such application only upon subsequent signature or notification in writing; (b) States and entities which sign this Agreement, except any such State or entity which notifies the depositary in writing at the time of signature that it will not so apply this Agreement; (c) States and entities which consent to its provisional application by so notifying the depositary in writing; (d) States which accede to this Agreement. 2. All such States and entities shall apply this Agreement provisionally in accordance with their national or internal laws and regulations, with effect from 16 November 1994 or the date of signature, notification of consent or accession, if later. 3. Provisional application shall terminate upon the date of entry into force of this Agreement. In any event, provisional application shall terminate on 16 November 1998 if at that date the requirement in article 6, paragraph 1, of consent to be bound by this Agreement by at least seven of the States (of which at least five must be developed States) referred to in paragraph 1(a) of resolution II has not been fulfilled. Article 8 States Parties 1. For the purposes of this Agreement, "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this Agreement and for which this Agreement is in force. 2. This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(c), (d), (e) and (f), of the Convention which become Parties to this Agreement in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent "States Parties" refers to those entities.
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Article 9 Depositary The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the depositary of this Agreement. Article 10 Authentic texts The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement. DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four.
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THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, CONTINENTAL SHELF, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND OTHER MARITIME ZONES ACT, 1976
An Act to provide for certain matters relating to the territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone and other maritime zones of India. Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-seventh Year of the Republic of India as follows: 1. Short title and commencement (1) This Act may be called The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. (2) Sections 5 and 7 shall come into force on such date or on such different dates as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint; and the remaining provisions of this Act shall come into force at once. 2. Definitions In this Act, limit in relation to the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone of India, means the limit of such water, shelf or zone with reference to the mainland of India as well as the individual or composite group or groups of islands constituting part of the territory of India. 3. Sovereignty over, and limits of, territorial waters (1) The sovereignty of India extends and has always extended to the territorial waters of India (hereinafter referred to as the territorial waters) and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over such waters. (2) The limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Central Government may, whenever it considers necessary so to do having regard to International Law and State practice, alter, by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of the territorial waters. (4) No notification shall be issued under sub-section (3) unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament. 4. Use of territorial waters by foreign ships (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, all foreign ships (other than warships including sub-marines and other underwater vehicles) shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of India. (2) Foreign warships including submarines and other underwater vehicles may enter or pass through the territorial waters after giving prior notice to the Central Government :
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Provided that submarines and other underwater vehicles shall navigate on the surface and show their flag while passing through such waters. (3) The Central Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the interests of the peace, good order or security of India or any part thereof, suspend, by notification in the Official Gazette, whether absolutely or subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the notification, the entry of all or any class of foreign ships into such area of the territorial waters as may be specified in the notification. 5. Contiguous zone of India (1) The contiguous zone of India (hereinafter referred to as the contiguous zone) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters and the limit of the contiguous zone is the line every point of which is at a distance of twenty-four nautical miles from the nearest point of the baseline referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the Central Government may, whenever it considers necessary so to do having regard to International Law and State practice, alter by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of the contiguous zone. (3) No notification shall be issued under sub-section (2) unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament. (4) The Central Government may exercise such powers and take such measures in or in relation to the contiguous zone as it may consider necessary with respect to : (a) the security of India, and (b) immigration, sanitation, customs and other fiscal matters. (5) The Central Government may be notification in the Official Gazette: (a) extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment, relating to any matter referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (4), for the time being in force in India or any part thereof to the contiguous zone, and (b) make such provisions as it may consider necessary in such notification for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment; and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the contiguous zone is a part of the territory of India. 6. Continental shelf (1) The continental shelf of India (hereinafter referred to as the continental shelf) comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the limit of its territorial waters throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baseline referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3 where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (2) India has, and always had, full and exclusive sovereign rights in respect of its continental shelf. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (2), the Union has in the continental shelf-
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(a) sovereign rights for the purposes of the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of all resources; (b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction for the construction, maintenance or operation of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and other structures and devices necessary for the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf or for the convenience of shipping or for any other purpose; (c) exclusive jurisdiction to authorize, regulate and control scientific research; and (d) exclusive jurisdiction to preserve and protect the marine environment and to prevent and control marine pollution. (4) No person (including a foreign Government) shall, except under, and in accordance with, the terms of a licence or a letter of authority granted by the Central Government, explore the continental shelf or exploit its resources or carry out any search or excavation or conduct any research within the continental shelf or drill therein or construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure or device therein for any purpose whatsoever. (5) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette : (a) declare any area of the continental shelf and its superjacent waters to be a designated area; and (b) make such provisions as it may deem necessary with respect to(i) the exploration, exploitation and protection of the resources of the continental shelf within such designated area; or (ii) the safety and protection of artificial islands, off shore terminals, installations and other structures and devices in such designated area; or (iii) the protection of marine environment of such designated area; or (iv) customs and other fiscal matters in relation to such designated area. Explanation: A notification issued under this sub-section may provide for the regulation of entry into and passage through the designated area of foreign ships by the establishment of fairways, sea lanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests of India. (6) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette(a) extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment for the time being in force in India or any part thereof to the continental shelf or any part [including any designated area under sub-section (5) ]thereof; and (b) make such provisions as it may consider necessary for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the continental shelf or the part [including, as the case may be, any designated area under sub-section (5)] thereof to which it has been extended is a part of the territory of India. (7) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2) and subject to any measures that may be necessary for protecting the interests of India, the Central Government may not
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impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines on the continental shelf by foreign States: Provided that the consent of the Central Government shall be necessary for the delineation of the course for the laying of such cable or pipelines. 7. Exclusive economic zone (1) The exclusive economic zone of India (hereinafter referred to as the exclusive economic zone) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters, and the limit of such zone is two hundred nautical miles from the baseline referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the Central Government may, whenever it considers necessary so to do having regard to International Law and State practice, alter, by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of the exclusive economic zone. (3) No notification shall be issued under sub-section (2) unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament. (4) In the exclusive economic zone, the Union has(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources, both living and non-living as well as for producing energy from tides, winds and currents; (b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction for the construction, maintenance or operation of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and other structures and devices necessary for the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the zone or for the convenience of shipping or for any other purpose; (c) exclusive jurisdiction to authorize, regulate and control scientific research; (d) exclusive jurisdiction to preserve and protect the marine environment and to prevent and control marine pollution; and (e) such other rights as are recognized by International Law. (5) No person (including a foreign Government) shall, except under, and in accordance with, the terms of any agreement with the Central Government or of a licence or a letter of authority granted by the Central Government, explore or exploit any resources of the exclusive economic zone or carry out any search or excavation or conduct any research within the exclusive economic zone or drill therein or construct, maintain or operate any artificial islands, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure or device therein for any purpose whatsoever: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in relation to fishing by a citizen of India. (6) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette(a) declare any area of the exclusive economic zone to be a designated area; and (b) make such provisions as it may deem necessary with respect to(i) the exploration, exploitation and protection of the resources of such designated area; or
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(ii) other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of such designated area such as the production of energy from tides, winds and currents; or (iii) the safety and protection of artificial island, off-shore terminals, installations and other structures and devices in such designated area; or (iv) the protection of marine environment of such designated area; or (v) customs and other fiscal matters in relation to such designated area. Explanation: A notification issued under this sub-section may provide for the regulation of entry into and passage through the designated area of foreign ships by the establishment of fairways, sea lanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to the interests of India. (7) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette(a) extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment for the time being in force in India or any part thereof in the exclusive economic zone or any part thereof; and (b) make such provisions as it may consider necessary for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the exclusive economic zone or the part thereof to which it has been extended is a part of the territory of India. (8) The provisions of sub-section (7) of section 6 shall apply in relation to the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines on the seabed of the exclusive economic zone as they apply in relation to the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines on the seabed of the continental shelf. (9) In the exclusive economic zone and the air space over the zone, ships and aircraft of all States shall, subject to the exercise by India of its rights within the zone, enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight. 8. Historic waters (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the limits of such waters adjacent to its land territory as are the historic waters of India. (2) The sovereignty of India extends and has always extended to the historic waters of India and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over such waters. 9. Maritime boundaries between India and States having coasts opposite or adjacent to those of India (1) The maritime boundaries between India and any State whose coast is opposite or adjacent to that of India in regard to their respective territorial waters, contiguous zones, continental shelves, exclusive economic zones and other maritime zones shall be as determined by agreement (whether entered into before or after the commencement of this section) between India and such State and pending such agreement between India and any such State, and unless any other provisional arrangements are agreed to between them, the maritime boundaries between India and such State shall not extend beyond the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point from which the breadth of the territorial waters of India and of such State are measured.
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(2) Every agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall, as soon as may be after it is entered into, be published in the Official Gazette. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act. 10. Publication of charts The Central Government may cause the baseline referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3, the limits of the territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone and the historic waters of India and the maritime boundaries as settled by agreements referred to in section 9 to be published in charts. 11. Offences Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or of any notification thereunder shall (without prejudice to any other action which may be taken against such person under any other provision of this or of any other enactment) be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 13. Place of trial Any person committing an offence under this Act or any rules made thereunder or under any of the enactments extended under this Act or under the rules made thereunder may be tried for the offence in any place in which he may be found or in such other place as the Central Government may by general or special order, published in the Official Gazette direct in this behalf. *****
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HUMAN RIGHTS

(2000) 2 SCC 465
S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. - 2. Mrs Chandrima Das, a practising advocate of the Calcutta High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Chairman, Railway Board; General Manager, Eastern Railway; Divisional Railway Manager, Howrah Division; Chief Commercial Manager, Eastern Railway; State of West Bengal through the Chief Secretary; Home Secretary, Government of West Bengal; Superintendent of Police (Railways), Howrah; Superintendent of Police, Howrah; Director General of Police, West Bengal and many other officers including the Deputy High Commissioner, Republic of Bangladesh; claiming compensation for the victim, Smt Hanuffa Khatoon, a Bangladeshi national who was gang-raped by many including employees of the Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station of the Eastern Railway regarding which GRPS Case No. 19 of 1998 was registered on 27-2-1998. Mrs Chandrima Das also claimed several other reliefs including a direction to the respondents to eradicate anti-social and criminal activities at Howrah Railway Station.
3. Respondents Railways and the Union of India have admitted that amongst the main accused you are employees of the Railways and if the prosecution version is proved in accordance with law, they are perpetrators of the heinous crime of gang-rape repeatedly committed upon the hapless victim Hanuffa Khatoon. It is not in dispute that Hanuffa came from Bangladesh. She at the relevant time was the elected representative of the Union Board. She arrived at Howrah Railway Station on 26th February, 1998 at about 1400 hours to avail Jodhpur Express at 2300 hours for paying a visit to Ajmer Sharif. With that intent in mind, she arrived at Calcutta on 24th February, 1998 and stayed at a hotel at 10, Sudder Street, Police Station Taltola and came to Howrah Station on the date and time aforementioned. She had, however, a waitlisted ticket and so she approached a Train Ticket Examiner at the station for confirmation of berth against her ticket. The Train Ticket Examiner asked her to wait in the Ladies Waiting Room. She accordingly came to the Ladies Waiting Room and rested there. At about 1700 hours on 26th February, 1998 two unknown persons (later identified as one Ashoke Singh, a tout who posed himself as a very influential person of the Railways and Siya Ram Singh, a railway ticket broker having good acquaintance with some of the railway staff of Howrah Station) approached her, took her ticket and returned the same after confirming reservation in Coach No. S-3 (Berth No. 17) of Jodhpur Express. At about 2000 hours Siya Ram Singh came again to her with a boy named Kashi and told her to accompany the boy to a restaurant if she wanted to have food for the night. Accordingly at about 2100 hours she went to a nearby eating house with Kashi and had her meal there. Soon after she had taken her meal, she vomited and came back to the Ladies Waiting Room. At about 2100 hours Ashoke Singh along with Rafi Ahmed, a Parcel Supervisor at Howrah Station came to the Ladies Niwas before boarding the train. She appeared to have some doubt initially but on being certified by the lady attendants engaged on duty at the Ladies Waiting Room about their
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credentials she accompanied them to Yatri Niwas. Sita Ram Singh, a khalasi of Electric Department of Howrah Station joined them on the way to Yatri Niwas. She was taken to Room No. 102 on the first floor of Yatri Niwas. The room was booked in the name of Ashoke Singh against Railway Card Pass No. 3638 since 25th February, 1998. In Room No. 102 two other persons viz. one Lalan Singh, Parcel Clerk of Howrah Railway Station and Awdesh Singh, Parcel Clearing Agent were waiting. Hanuffa Khatoon suspected something amiss when Ashoke Singh forced her into the room. Awdesh Singh bolted the room from outside and stood on guard outside the room. The remaining four persons viz. Ashoke, Lalan, Rafi and Sita Ram took liquor inside the room and also forcibly compelled her to consume liquor. All the four persons who were present inside the room brutally violated Hanuffa Khatoon, who, it is said, was in a state of shock and daze. When she could recover she managed to escape from the room of Yatri Niwas and came back to the platform where again she met Siya Ram Singh and found him talking to Ashoke Singh. Seeing her plight Siya Ram Singh pretended to be her saviour and also abused and slapped Ashoke Singh. Since it was well past midnight and Jodhpur Express had already departed, Siya Ram requested Hanuffa Khatoon to accompany him to his residence to rest for the night with his wife and children. He assured her to help entrain Poorva Express on the following morning. Thereafter Siya Ram accompanied by Ram Samiran Sharma, a friend of Siya Ram took her to the rented flat of Ram Samiran Sharma at 66, Pathuriaghata Street, Police Station Jorabagan, Calcutta. There Siya Ram raped Hanuffa and when she protested and resisted violently Siya Ram and Ram Samiran Sharma gagged her mouth and nostrils intending to kill her; as a result Hanuffa bled profusely. On being informed by the landlord of the building following the hue and cry raised by Hanuffa Khatoon, she was rescued by Jorabagan Police. 4. It was on the basis of the above facts that the High Court had awarded a sum of Rs 10 lakhs as compensation for Smt Hanuffa Khatoon as the High Court was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the building (Rail Yatri Niwas) belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by the railway employees. 5. In the present appeal, we are not concerned with the many directions issued by the High Court. The only question argued before us was that the Railways would not be liable to pay compensation to Smt Hanuffa Khatoon who was a foreigner and was not an Indian national. It is also contended that commission of the offence by the person concerned would not make the Railways or the Union of India liable to pay compensation to the victim of the offence. It is contended that since it was the individual act of those persons, they alone would be prosecuted and on being found guilty would be punished and may also be liable to pay fine or compensation, but having regard to the facts of this case, the Railways, or, for that matter, the Union of India would not even be vicariously liable. It is also contended that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on Smt Hanuffa Khatoon, the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, therefore, no compensation could have been legally awarded by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and, that too, at the instance of a practising advocate who, in no way, was concerned or connected with the victim. 6. We may first dispose of the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have been legally initiated for
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claiming damages from the Railways for the offence of rape committed on Smt Hanuffa Khatoon and that Smt Hanuffa Khatoon herself should have approached the court in the realm of private law so that all the questions of fact could have been considered on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties to record a finding whether all the ingredients of the commission of tort against the person of Smt Hanuffa Khatoon were made out, so as to be entitled to the relief of damages. We may also consider the question of locus standi as it is contended on behalf of the appellants that Mrs Chandrima Das, who is a practising advocate of the High Court of Calcutta, could not have legally instituted these proceedings. 12. In the instant case, it is not a mere matter of violation of an ordinary right of a person but the violation of fundamental rights which is involved. Smt Hanuffa Khatoon was a victim of rape. This Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty [(1996) 1 SCC 490] has held rape as an offence which is violative of the fundamental right of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court observed as under: Rape is a crime not only against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against basic human rights and is violative of the victims most cherished right, namely, right to life which includes right to live with human dignity contained in Article 21. 13. Rejecting, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the petition under public law was not maintainable, we now proceed to his next contention relating to the locus standi of the respondent, Mrs Chandrima Das, in filing the petition. 14. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that Mrs Chandrima Das was only a practising advocate of the Calcutta High Court and was, in no way, connected or related to the victim, Smt Hanuffa Khatoon and, therefore, she could not have filed a petition under Article 226 for damages or compensation being awarded to Smt Hanuffa Khatoon on account of the rape committed on her. This contention is based on a misconception. Learned counsel for the appellants is under the impression that the petition filed before the Calcutta High Court was only a petition for damages or compensation for Smt Hanuffa Khatoon. As a matter of fact, the reliefs which were claimed in the petition included the relief for compensation. But many other reliefs as, for example, relief for eradicating antisocial and criminal activities of various kinds at Howrah Railway Station were also claimed. The true nature of the petition, therefore, was that of a petition filed in public interest. 15. The existence of a legal right, no doubt, is the foundation for a petition under Article 226 and a bare interest, maybe of a minimum nature, may give locus standi to a person to file a writ petition, but the concept of locus standi has undergone a sea change, as we shall presently notice. In Satyanarayana Sinha v. S. Lal & Co. (P) Ltd. [(1973) 2 SCC 696] it was held that the foundation for exercising jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226 is ordinarily the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself. In writs like habeas corpus and quo warranto, the rule has been relaxed and modified. 17. In the context of public interest litigation, however, the Court in its various judgments has given the widest amplitude and meaning to the concept of locus standi. In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [(1982) 3 SCC 235], it was laid down that public
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interest litigation could be initiated not only by filing formal petitions in the High Court but even by sending letters and telegrams so as to provide easy access to court. In Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa [(1991) 4 SCC 54], the Court held that the restricted meaning of aggrieved person and the narrow outlook of a specific injury has yielded in favour of a broad and wide construction in the wake of public interest litigation. The Court further observed that public-spirited citizens having faith in the rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing causes of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on a technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or the absence of personal loss or injury. There has, thus, been a spectacular expansion of the concept of locus standi. The concept is much wider and it takes in its stride anyone who is not a mere busybody. 19. It was next contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that Smt Hanuffa Khatoon was a foreign national and, therefore, no relief under public law could be granted to her as there was no violation of the fundamental rights available under the Constitution. It was contended that the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution are available only to citizens of this country and since Smt Hanuffa Khatoon was a Bangladeshi national, she cannot complain of the violation of fundamental rights and on that basis she cannot be granted any relief. This argument must also fail for two reasons: first, on the ground of domestic jurisprudence based on constitutional provisions and secondly, on the ground of human rights jurisprudence based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which has the international recognition as the Moral Code of Conduct having been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 20. We will come to the question of domestic jurisprudence a little later as we intend to first consider the principles and objects behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, as adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1012-1948. The Preamble, inter alia, sets out as under: WHEREAS recognition of the INHERENT DIGNITY and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. WHEREAS disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. WHEREAS it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations. WHEREAS the people of the United Nations have in the Charter affirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, IN THE DIGNITY AND WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON AND IN THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF MEN AND WOMEN and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. WHEREAS member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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WHEREAS a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realisation of this pledge. 21. Thereafter, the Declaration sets out, inter alia, in various articles, the following: 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, NATIONAL OR SOCIAL ORIGIN, PROPERTY, BIRTH OR OTHER STATUS. Furthermore, NO DISTINCTION SHALL BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE POLITICAL, JURISDICTIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE COUNTRY OR TERRITORY to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 22. Apart from the above, the General Assembly also while adopting the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, by its resolution dated 20-12-1993, observed in Article 1 that violence against women means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. In Article 2, it was specified that : violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to: (a) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at
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work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs. 23. In Article 3, it was specified that: (W)omen are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights, which would include, inter alia: (a) the right to life, (b) the right to equality, and (c) the right to liberty and security of person. 24. The International Covenants and Declarations as adopted by the United Nations have to be respected by all signatory States and the meaning given to the above words in those Declarations and Covenants have to be such as would help in effective implementation of those rights. The applicability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles thereof may have to be read, if need be, into the domestic jurisprudence. 25. Lord Diplock in Salomon v. Commr. of Customs and Excise [(1996) 3 All ER 871] said that there is a prima facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law, including specific treaty obligations. So also, Lord Bridge in Brind v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. [(1991) 1 All ER 720 (HL)] observed that it was well settled that, in construing any provision in domestic legislation which was ambiguous in the sense that it was capable of a meaning which either conforms to or conflicts with the International Convention, the courts would presume that Parliament intended to legislate in conformity with the Convention and not in conflict with it. 26. The domestic application of international human rights and norms was considered by the Judicial Colloquia (Judges and Lawyers) at Bangalore in 1988. It was later affirmed by the Colloquia that it was the vital duty of an independent judiciary to interpret and apply national Constitutions in the light of those principles. Further Colloquia were convened in 1994 at Zimbabwe, in 1996 at Hong Kong and in 1997 at Guyana and in all those Colloquia, the question of domestic application of international and regional human rights specially in relation to women, was considered. The Zimbabwe Declaration 1994, inter alia, stated: Judges and lawyers have duty to familiarise themselves with the growing international jurisprudence of human rights and particularly with the expanding material on the protection and promotion of the human rights of women. But this situation may not really arise in our country. 27. Our Constitution guarantees all the basic and fundamental human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, to its citizens and other persons. The chapter dealing with the fundamental rights is contained in Part III of the Constitution. The purpose of this Part is to safeguard the basic human rights from the vicissitudes of political controversy and to place them beyond the reach of the political parties who, by virtue of their majority, may come to form the Government at the Centre or in the State.
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28. The fundamental rights are available to all the citizens of the country but a few of them are also available to persons. While Article 14, which guarantees equality before law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India, is applicable to person which would also include the citizen of the country and non-citizen, both, Article 15 speaks only of citizen and it is specifically provided therein that there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them nor shall any citizen be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort on the aforesaid grounds. Fundamental right guaranteed under Article 15 is, therefore, restricted to citizens. So also, Article 16 which guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment is applicable only to citizens. The fundamental rights contained in Article 19, which contains the right to basic freedoms, namely, freedom of speech and expression; freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms; freedom to form associations or unions; freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India; freedom to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, are available only to citizens of the country. 31. Article 20 guarantees right to protection in respect of conviction for offences. Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty while Article 22 guarantees right to protection against arbitrary arrest and detention. These are wholly in consonance with Article 3, Article 7 and Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 32. The word LIFE has also been used prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. (See Article 3 quoted above.) The fundamental rights under the Constitution are almost in consonance with the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as also the Declaration and the Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and the Covenants of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which India is a party having ratified them, as set out by this Court in Kubic Darusz v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 568]. That being so, since LIFE is also recognised as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, it has to have the same meaning and interpretation as has been placed on that word by this Court in its various decisions relating to Article 21 of the Constitution. The meaning of the word life cannot be narrowed down. According to the tenor of the language used in Article 21, it will be available not only to every citizen of this country, but also to a person who may not be a citizen of the country. 33. Let us now consider the meaning of the word LIFE interpreted by this Court from time to time. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 1295], it was held that the term life indicates something more than mere animal existence. The inhibitions contained in Article 21 against its deprivation extend even to those faculties by which life is enjoyed. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 161], it was held that the right to life under Article 21 means the right to live with dignity, free from exploitation. 34. On this principle, even those who are not citizens of this country and come here merely as tourists or in any other capacity will be entitled to the protection of their lives in accordance with the constitutional provisions. They also have a right to life in this country. Thus, they also have the right to live, so long as they are here, with human dignity. Just as the
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State is under an obligation to protect the life of every citizen in this country, so also the State is under an obligation to protect the life of the persons who are not citizens. 35. The rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are not absolute in terms. They are subject to reasonable restrictions and, therefore, in case of a non-citizen also, those rights will be available subject to such restrictions as may be imposed in the interest of the security of the State or other important considerations. Interest of the nation and security of the State is supreme. Since 1948 when the Universal Declaration was adopted till this day, there have been many changes - political, social and economic while terrorism has disturbed the global scenario. Primacy of the interest of the nation and the security of the State will have to be read into the Universal Declaration as also in every article dealing with fundamental rights, including Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 36. This Court in Bodhisattwa case [(1996) 1 SCC 490] has already held that rape amounts to violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to a woman under Article 21 of the Constitution. 37. Now, Smt Hanuffa Khatoon, who was not the citizen of this country but came here as a citizen of Bangladesh was, nevertheless, entitled to all the constitutional rights available to a citizen so far as right to life was concerned. She was entitled to be treated with dignity and was also entitled to the protection of her person as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. As a national of another country, she could not be subjected to a treatment which was below dignity nor could she be subjected to physical violence at the hands of government employees who outraged her modesty. The right available to her under Article 21 was thus violated. Consequently, the State was under a constitutional liability to pay compensation to her. The judgment passed by the Calcutta High Court, therefore, allowing compensation to her for having been gang-raped, cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. 38. Learned counsel for the appellants then contended that the Central Government cannot be held vicariously liable for the offence of rape committed by the employees of the Railways. It was contended that the liability under the law of torts would arise only when the act complained of was performed in the course of official duty and since rape cannot be said to be an official act, the Central Government would not be liable even under the law of torts. The argument is wholly bad and is contrary to the law settled by this Court on the question of vicarious liability in its various decisions. 42. Running of the Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing the Yatri Niwas at various railway stations to provide lodging and boarding facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of sovereign power. The employees of the Union of India who are deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the railway stations and the Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the government machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Government, of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. Kasturi Lal decision [AIR 1965 SC 1039] therefore, cannot be pressed into aid. Moreover, we are dealing with this case under the public law domain and not in a suit instituted under the
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private law domain against persons who, utilising their official position, got a room in the Yatri Niwas booked in their own name where the act complained of was committed. 43. The appeal having no merit is dismissed with the observation that the amount of compensation shall be made over to the High Commissioner for Bangladesh in India for payment to the victim, Smt Hanuffa Khatoon.
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