National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992) expropriation case amt.

. for just compensation in dispute judge held in abeyance the write of possession order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without hearing. Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge hence this petition. Issue: W/N the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process of law. Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders. There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. 2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs.TUTAAN G.R. No. L-41641 September 30, 1976 Facts: The complaint, filed on January 16, 1974, is an action to recover from the private respondents Guillermo De los Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo the sum of P1,520.00 plus interest, and the sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due as attorney's fees and, in default of payment thereof, to order the foreclosure of the chattel

mortgage executed by said private respondents covering personal properties valued at P15,340.00, located at Meycauayan, Bulacan. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party defendants for the reason that they were the co-makers of the promissory note executed by the private respondents to evidence the loan. Respondents claim that the loan sued upon is only one of five (5) loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they were charged usurious interest; and that the balance due the petitioner is only P1,260.00 which they are willing to pay upon the petitioner's furnishing them with all the copies of the documents signed by them in connection with the loan obtained by them from the petitioner. On February 17, 1975, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons that the petitioner, in its complaint, seeks and prays for a sum of money amounting to P1,520.00 which comes under the original jurisdiction of the municipal court, and that in view of the alternative prayer for foreclosure of mortgage, the complaint should have been filed in the proper court of Bulacan where the chattels are located and where the deed of chattel mortgage is registered. CFI of Rizal court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice to its refiling in the proper form and in the proper court. On May 7, 1975, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal 6 but the same was denied on June 25, 1975. 7 On July 27, 1975, the petitioner, without prior leave of court, again filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal 8 which the respondent court denied on August 8, 1975. 9 Issue: W/N CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction Held: Yes. It was ruled therein that although the purpose of an action is to recover an amount plus interest which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, yet when said action involves the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage covering personal properties valued at more than P2,000, (now P10,000.00) the action should be instituted before the Court of First Instance. In the instant case, the action is to recover the amount of P1,520.00 plus interest and costs, and involves the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage of personal properties valued at P15,340.00, so that it is clearly within the competence of the respondent court (CFI of Rizal) to try and resolve. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of the respondent court dated April 25, 1975 and August 8, 1975 are hereby set aside and the respondent court directed to resume further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-18426 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Costs against tile private respondents

GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, JR. and ROGELIO SARMIENTO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCO G.R. No. 709 January 30, 1987 Facts: February 28, 1973, four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered on March 1, 1973. Two of the lots, were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title on February 24, 1978.

In 1979, Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money Judgement against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in Civil Case No. 10463 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots were levied upon on September 3, 1980 and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of P517,485.41 on October 6, 1980. On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and in their stead TCTs were issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. CTs Nos. 307100 and 397124 in Sarmiento's name. 3 A day before Limpin's levy on the two lots, Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots .Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, in an order dated September 13, 1983, directed the sale at public auction of the four (4) mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment. On October 12, 1983, the four lots, including those formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself whose bid of P5,200,000.00 was the highest and exactly correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered. 4 Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor covering an the four lots. But the Trial Court, confirmed only the sale of 2 lots refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the other 2 on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Gregorio F. Limpin. Ponce filed a motion for reconsideration and notified but herefused to participate in the hearings contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he did comment that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had been released by Ponce by virtue of a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage" dated July 20, 1977. TC denied the motion, whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC denied the confirmation of the sale of the lots formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, and ordering said Court to confirm the same and issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject to Sarmiento's equity of redemption. Issue: 1. W/N the action of certiorari and mandamus (instituted by Ponce in the Intermediate Appellate Court) was the proper remedy 2. W/N Intermediate Appellate Court has jurisdiction over their persons, alleging that they were not original parties to the action for judicial foreclosure 3. W/N the Appellate Court erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of petitioner Limpin and the subsequent sale of the property to petitioner Sarmiento. Held: 1. Yes. Certain it is that courts have plenary authority and control over the execution of their final and executory judgments and orders. Indeed, once that authority is timely and properly invoked, it becomes the court's ministerial and mandatory function to direct execution. That authority lasts until the judgments are fully satisfied, subject only to the time limitations prescribed therefor. With particular reference to the execution of a judgment hi a mortgage foreclosure action, the authority to direct and effect the same exists until the confirmation of the foreclosure sale (and issuance and implementation of the writ of possession), confirmation being the final act which disposes of the case. Certain it is too, that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be contested and prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom; otherwise, cases would be interminable, and there would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations.

2. Yes. It appears, however, that despite awareness of this ostensible defect, they fully participated without objection in the certiorari and mandamus proceedings before the respondent Appellate Court. Having thus voluntarily appeared and seen the case through its final resolution, they cannot now be permitted to turn about and repudiate the Appellate Court's jurisdiction over them. 3. No. The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the rights and interests of petitioners Limpin and Sarmiento to the property in question are subordinate to those of respondent Ponce, who holds a prior and senior lien. The sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's (and now Sarmiento's equity to redemption. As held in Santiago v. Dionisio supra, the registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing. 23 It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a hen on the property whoever its owner may be. The recordation of the mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said mortgage. On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien or encumbrance, and could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. 25 Petitioner Sarmiento having acquired no better right than his predecessor-in-interest, petitioner Limpin, his title must likewise fail. The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October 21, 1983, the lots had already been bought by Limpin and subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled doctrine is that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March 1, 1973 in the present case. * * * It is well to note that the mortgage in favor of the late Ramon Eugelio was annotated on November 13, 1952 at the back of the certificates of title in controversy, while the adverse claim was only annotated on the same certificate more than one year later, on December 21, 1953. Hence, the adverse claim could not effect the rights of the mortgagee; and the fact that the foreclosure of the mortgage and the consequent public auction sale have been effected long after the annotation of the adverse claim is of no moment, because the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage. 26 Anent the claim that respondent Ponce executed a deed of partial release of his mortgage on July 20, 1977, the evidence discloses that Ponce and Jose Aquino, the mortgagor, thereafter executed separate affidavits dated December 1, 1983, stating that the said partial release was void, not only for want of consideration but also for lack of the signatures of Ponce's two sons who at the time of the execution of the document, were comortgagees as successors and heirs of Mrs. Adela Ponce. Moreover, the Deed of Partial Release was not registered but had simply been attached, together with the Deed of Sale of the lands to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, to said corporation's affidavit of adverse claim, the last being the document which was actually registered, on February 4, 1978 as already stated. Thus the mortgage in favor of Ponce and his late wife was still subsisting, when the notice of levy in favor of Limpin was annotated on the original of OCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, and even when the execution sale in favor of Limpin pursuant to the levy was registered. Said annotation was cancelled only on November 25, 1981, after the properties had been sold on execution to Limpin on October 6, 1981.