CANON 18

Prepared by: Inna Protacio People v. Sevillano 304 SCRA 519 Facts: In a criminal case for rape with homicide, the accused pleaded guilty. However, the 3 PAO lawyers assigned as counsel de officio did not perform their duty. The first did not advise his client of the consequences of pleading guilty, the second left the courtroom during trial and thus did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The third postponed the presentation of evidence for the defense, and when he did appear, he said he would rely solely on the plea in the mistaken belief that it would lower the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not Canon 18 is violated? Held: Case remanded. Canon 18 required every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In this case, the defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. N.B. Case remanded because of error by the judge in not using searching questions to find if the plea was made knowingly. Prepared by: Sas Reyes Santiago v. Fojas A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995 Facts: Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint to declare illegal his expulsion from the union. In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1)res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-

M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals. Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte. The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the expartereception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit. The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago. Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received exparte. Held: The fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall

not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. He is liable for inexcusable negligence. WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

motion. Atty. Montero requested again the same to the CA but was again denied through a resolution. Atty. Montero then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. Such petition was denied by SC because it was filed and paid late. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality. Thus, he filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order. Mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment, while Atty. Montero filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA, therefore the motion for execution was premature. But MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued. Atty. Montero filed a special civil action with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued. Alleging that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions was still pending with the CA. Provincial sheriff deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in annulling such was resolved. It was held later that CA denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution. He again filed an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA. This Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Issue: WON Atty. Montero is guilty of malpractice. Held: We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications. Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.

CANON 19
Prepared by: Jameela Sadain Millare v. Montero AC No. 3283, July 13, 1995 Facts: This case is a complaint for disbarment. The IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law. Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. Co, through her counsel Millare, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Co appealed to CA but it was dismissed for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal. Thus holding the judgment of the MTC became final and executory. Subsequently, a manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty. Montero (Cos counsel) arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Co also admitted his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, and prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment. CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. But later, court ordered the records in the dismissal case be remanded to the court a quo. Atty. Montero filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that to set aside a final and executory judgment is not one of the reliefs properly accorded to them, likewise there was no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision, but CA denied the

Respondent resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud." Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution. Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment. Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws. The Committee on Bar Discipline said that "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice' WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year. SO ORDERED. Prepared by: Vanessa Sanchez Pena v. Aparicio A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565] Facts: Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to the company: The salient parts of the demand letter are as follows: BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like: 1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government. 2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion 3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents 4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Issue: Is respondent guilty of violating Rule 19.01 Canon 19 of the CPR? Held: Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client. In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

CANON 20
Prepared by: Charles Sayo Union Bank v. Pena A.C. No. 4863, September 7, 2001 Facts: -Union Bank bought a parcel of land from Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) -Agreement included a condition that ISC will cause the eviction of all the occupants of the property Union Bank alleges the following facts: -ISC contracted the services of Atty. Magdaleno Pea for the purpose of evicting the occupants

-Atty. Pea then asked for a letter of authority granting him authority to represent Complainant in maintaining possession of the property and in any court action that may arise in connection with the said duty -Union Bank issued a letter of authority, but also a clarification that it was ISC that contracted his services -13 months after the eviction of all the applicants, Atty. Pea filed a collection suit against Union Bank for recovery of attorneys fees, expenses, damages and agents compensation on the basis of the letter of authority issued by Union Banks officers Atty. Bejasa and Mr. Manuel, Jr. -Union Bank filed this case for disbarment alleging that Atty. Pea is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct when it instituted a collection suit on the basis of the letter of authority while knowing fully well the reasons for the issuance of said letter of authority Issue: -WON RESPONDENT COMMITTED MALPRACTICE, DECEIT AND GROSS MISCONDUCT IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR. Held: NO. Because there was refusal to pay just compensation, Atty. Pea merely instituted the proper action. SC agreed with the IBPs findings and recommendation, saying that Complainant failed to meet the required burden of proof in order for the Court to exercise its disciplinary power: Complainant has not proffered any proof that the letter of authority was obtained through machination or other deceitful means. Those who issued the letter was never presented as witnesses, nor were their sworn statements submitted The letters presented cannot by themselves be accorded strong probative weight in the face of (1) Atty. Peas emphatic assertion that he has never seen any of them; (2) the lack of indication that copies were received by him; and (3) the absence of his signature or the date or time he took possession of them Furthermore, the basis for the action was not the letter of authority but an oral contract of agency purportedly entered into by Atty. Pea with the duly authorized officers of Union Bank (proved by averments in the complaint in the other case in Bago City RTC). With or without the letter, Atty. Pea could have instituted a collection suit. The amount of compensation (10% of the market value of the property) was not even mentioned in the letter but was apparently settled in the course of the oral conversation. Dismissed disbarment complaint. He was in the lawful exercise of a right: invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from.

Prepared by: Lawrence Solis Cueto v. Jimenez A.C. No. 5798, January 20, 2005 Facts: Engineer Alex Cueto engaged the services of Attorney Jose Jimenez as notary public sometime in October of 1999. The notary service was for the Construction agreement of a building acquired by the plaintiffs son. Upon notarization, Atty. Jimenez demanded P50,000.00 as payment for the service. Despite his surprise with the price of the service, complainant informed that he had only P30,000.00 on hand. Atty. Jimenez persuaded complainant to pay the P30,000.00 and to issue a check for the remaining P20,000.00. Complainant informed respondent not to deposit the check for lack of sufficient funds. Atty. Jimenez still proceeded with encashing the check, despite being informed beforehand. Also, Engr. Cuetos son, Jose Jimenez III had not yet paid his services as general contractor. Jose then issued a check for P2,500,000.00 but was subsequently dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Atty. Jimenez filed a complaint against Engr. Alex for the violation of BP 22 (Antibouncing check law). Cueto, meanwhile, filed an administrative case against Atty. Jimenez for the violation of Canon 20, rule 20.4 as may be found in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent was required to answer the complaint against him, but failed to answer or appear before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines commission on discipline.. Issue: Whether Atty. Jimenez was guilty of Violating Canon 20, rule 20.4 of the Code of professional responsibility Canon: Canon 20, Rule 20.4 "a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud." Held: Complainants claim that respondents P50,000 notarial fee was exorbitant is debatable. As confirmed by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and construction projects to base the amount of notarial fees on the contract price. Based on the amount demanded by respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price of P5,000,000. It cannot be said therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a reasonable recompense for his service. Furthermore, the two contracting parties implicitly agreed on the cost of Jimenezs notarial service. It was Cuetos responsibility to first inquire how much he was going to be charged for notarization. And once informed, he was free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower amount.

Moreover, there was no compulsion to avail of respondents service. His failure to negotiate the amount of the fee was an implicit acquiescence to the terms of the notarial service. His subsequent act of paying in cash and in check all the more proved it. But, Atty. Jimenez is not justified with the legal action taken to recover the balance the Cuetos had against him. To resort to a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain kind of shameful conduct and inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet embodied in Canon 15 that "a lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." It in all probability explains why Cueto ran short of funds. Respondent therefore should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by complainant Cueto. A lawyer should uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. He should always remind himself that the legal profession is imbued with public service. Remuneration is a mere incident. Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to him, he must never resort to judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from the dignity of the profession. Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Prepared by: Hanna Teves Alcantara v. De Vera

CANON 21
Prepared by: Carlo Tan Rosacio v. Bulalacao A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995 Facts: -Cynthia B. Rosacia is the president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation. -On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement, respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. -On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date -On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf. -Rosacia, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Issue: Whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorneyclient relationship.

Facts: Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera (respondent) is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office. Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent. On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.6 They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27,7 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. In his defense, the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him. Issue: 1) IS RESPONDENT GUILTY OF BARRATRY AND FORUM SHOPPING? 2.) DID THE RESPONDENT VIOLATE HIS DUTIES AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AFTER FILLING SEVERAL CASES AGAINST HIS FORMER CLIENT? Held: Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any illmotive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the manner and the foul language he used in the the pleadings and motions all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds. Furthermore, The respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility19 provides: CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto. The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

Prepared by: Chairee Tiangsing Salonga v. Hildawa ADM. CASE No. 5105 August 12, 1999 Adm. Case No. 419 Commission on Bar Discipline IBP Facts: In an affidavit-complaint, dated 29 March 1996, Fernando Salonga, President of Sikap at Tiyaga Alabang Vendors Association, Inc., ("STAVA"), of Muntinlupa City, charged Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa with gross misconduct and/or deceit. Complainant averred that respondent lawyer was a retained counsel of STAVA for a number of years and, in December 1993, represented the association in Civil Cases No. 2406, No. 2413 and No. 2416, for ejectment against, respectively, Linda Del Rosario, Angelita Manuel and Francisco Vega, all stallholders at the Alabang market, before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa. The defendants deposited the accrued rentals with the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa. On 14 November 1994, respondent lawyer filed a motion to withdraw the deposit. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Hildawa committed an unethical conduct in representing an opponent of STAVA thus violating Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Held: On 25 April 1998, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding the respondent guilty of violation of Canon 16 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended for one year from the practice of law. The basis of the Investigating Commissioner for finding respondent lawyer to have violated Canon 16 4 was the supposed admission of Atty. Hildawa that he withdrew the amount of P104,543.80 for STAVA. This fact, however, was never denied by Atty. Hildawa. It would appear that the real focus should have been then on the issue of whether the withdrawal of the deposit by respondent had the client's authority. Apparently, he did have that authority as one of the signatories of the resolution was complainant Fernando Salonga himself. Atty. Hildawa did not keep the money but turned it over on 10 December 1994, or just one day after receiving it (on 09 December 1994), to Dolores Javinar, the STAVA treasurer, who issued a corresponding receipt therefor. What the treasurer or STAVA might have done thereafter with the funds was no concern of respondent counsel. The Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner, however, that respondent lawyer has transgressed Canon 21 which requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation ceases, a mandate that he has placed in possible jeopardy by agreeing to appear as counsel for a party his client has previously contended with in a case similarly involving said parties. WHEREFORE, the Court ABSOLVES Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa from the charge of having violated his obligation to hold in trust the funds of his client but REPRIMANDS him for having placed at risk his obligation of preserving the confidentiality relationship with a previous client, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with most severely.

SO ORDERED. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar abandoned his duties as a counsel for Orcino

CANON 22
Prepared by: Erwin Torres Orcino v. Gaspar A.C. No. 3773. September 24, 1997 Facts: On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with the Court a letter-complaint against respondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel. Complainant prayed that this Court impose disciplinary sanctions on respondent for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees she fully paid for his services. Complainant engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay respondent legal fees of P20,000.00 -P10,000.00 to be paid upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the conclusion of the case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court and fiscal. This agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22, 1991. In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25, 1991,2 another P5,000.00 on March 31, 1991,3 and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991, for a total of P20,000.00. Atty Gaspar entered into his duties. He interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build a case against the suspects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully attended the preliminary investigation. The case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija. As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused although these hearings were postponed on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to attend the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this hearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence. Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer, Atty. Gaspar gave her the records. Complainant never returned the records nor did she see respondent. On September 18, 1991, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." The motion did not bear the consent of complainant, the court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent." Orcino refused to sign her conformity to respondents withdrawal, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer.

Held: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause. Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party." A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign his motion. He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw. Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with the court, we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the confidence" between them and that there had been "serious diffferences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution." The case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned in Canon 22 rule 22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Neither can this be considered analogous to the grounds enumerated. The case arose from a simple misunderstanding between complainant and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's absence at the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her husband. She vehemently opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate

respondent's services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair that he return to complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to continue their relation under the contract. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action. Prepared by: Virson Vispo Arambulo v. CA G.R. No. 105818, September 17, 1993 CANON 22 -A LAWYER MAY WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES Facts: Petitioners and private respondent are parties to a contract for the construction of a 4storey dormitory building. Private respondent, as the contractor, filed an action before Branch LXI of the Regional Trial Court at Angeles City against the petitioners-spouses Carlos S. Arambulo and Eloisa I. Arambulo to claim the balance of the contract price and the increase in the construction cost due to additional scope of work done and increase in the cost of materials. On 7 February 1991, the Arambulos, through Atty. Jimenez, filed their notice of appeal informing the trial court that they are appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. On 12 February 1991, Atty. Jimenez filed a Withdrawal of Appearance with the express conformity of the defendants, while Atty. Pineda entered his Appearance as their new counsel. Copies of the pleadings were furnished the counsel for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the Summary Index prepared by one Ramon A. Rosario, Officer-in Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court and attached to the original record of CA-G.R. CV No. 32348, indicates that the Withdrawal of Appearance and the Appearance are respectively found on pages 209-210 and 207-208 of the original record of Civil Case No. 5301.

Thereafter, an order directing the "Clerk of Court/Officer-In-Charge" of the court to elevate the complete record of the case to the Court of Appeals was issued by the trial court on 4 March 1991. The Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court transmitted the original record of Civil Case No. 5301, together with pertinent documents, to the Court of Appeals on 24 April 1991 but which the latter received on 16 May 1991. 13 The appeal was then docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 32348. On 19 June 1991, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals sent Atty. Jimenez a letter informing him that the original records of the case were being processed and also requiring him to pay the docketing fee of P400.00 and the additional amount of P20.00 pursuant to R.A. No. 3870 within fifteen days from receipt thereof. From the return card, it appears that Atty. Jimenez received this letter on 9 July 1991. No such letter or any notice to pay the aforesaid amounts was sent to Atty. Romeo Pineda.On 11 November 1991, the Court of appeals (Third Division) promulgated a Resolution reading as follows: For failure to pay the docket fee, the appeal is hereby considered ABANDONED and DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50, Rules of Court. A copy of the resolution was furnished to Atty. Jimenez who, per the return card, received it on 21 November 1991. In a manifestation and motion filed with the Court of Appeals on 21 January 1992, counsel for the plaintiff-appellee prayed that final judgment be entered into the records in view of the failure of the appellants "to perfect their appeal" and that the case be remanded to the trial court for execution of judgment. A copy of the above pleading was sent to Atty. Jimenez. On 22 January 1992, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals made an entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 32348 declaring therein that the Resolution of 11 November 1991 had become final and executory on 7 December 1991. Copy thereof was again sent to Atty. Jimenez. No copy of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals of 11 November 1991 and of the entry of judgment of 22 January 1992 was ever sent to Atty. Pineda. Issue: WoN the withdrawal of Atty. Jimenez was valid or not? Held: Since the withdrawal was with the clients consent, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the clients consent. Under the first sentence of Rule 138, Section 26, the retirement is completed once the withdrawal is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act of the clerk of court of entering the name of the

new counsel in the docket and of giving notice thereof to the adverse party. The failure of the clerk of court to do either does not affect the validity of the retirement. The appearance of the new counsel, Atty. Pineda, did not likewise require the approval of the court. An appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, plea oranswer, orthrough the formal method, viz ., by delivering to the clerk of court a written direction ordering himto enter the appearance of the counsel. Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje G.R. Nos. 49241-42, April 27, 1990 Facts: On July 30, 1971, Respondent Francisco Imperial orally conveyed to petitioner, Rinconada Telephon Company, Inc., a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate a telephone company in Iriga City issued to him by the defunct Public Service Commission. It was only on October 14, 1971 that petitioner and respondent Imperial, executed the deed of sale pursuant to their earlier agreement. However, Imperial also sold the same certificate to Iriga Telephone Company on September 21, 1972 which was approved by the Public Service Commission which led to the filing of cases for damages between petitioner and respondents. Both cases were assigned to respondent judge, Hon. Carlos R. Buenviaje and petitioner was represented by Atty. Luciano Maggay. Imperial was absolved in the Criminal case because he cannot be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Imperial then filed a case for dismissal where the petitioner through Atty. Benjamin Santos sought reconsideration. Thus petitioner, thru the same counsel, filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond. However, respondent judge denied the notice of appeal where they told them that notice of dismissal have been shown to be received by Atty. Luciano Maggay as their counsel. The court then denied the right to appeal through Atty. Santos since the record shows that Atty. Maggay has already exercised their right to Appeal. Petitioner contends that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying them their right to appeal since Atty. Santos was their new counsel before they even sent Atty. Maggay their former counsel the notice of dismissal. Issue: WoN Atty. Maggays termination with Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. is valid? Held:The right of client to terminate his relations with his counsel is universally recognized. Such termination may be with or without. The light of a client to terminate the authority of his counsel includes the right to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings. To be valid, any such change or substitution must be made: a) upon written application; b) with written consent of the client; c) upon written consent of the attorney to be substituted; d) in case the consent of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for

substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record. Not having formally withdrawn as counsel, the order denying the notice of appeal and appeal bond was deemed properly served upon Atty. Maggay. Notice of the order to him was notice to petitioner and for all legal intents and purposes, the date of his receipt is considered the starting point from which the period to appeal prescribed by law starts to run.