MEN, MACHINES AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN WARFARE 1914 - 1945 BY COLIN J McINNES

MEN, MACHINES AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN WARFARE 1914-45 The reason for starting this analysis of modern land warfare with the Great War of 1914-1918 is straightforward: the First World War brought together three important developments which distinguished it from previous wars, and which were to cast a shadow over the other major conflicts of this century. Firstly, the war involved all of the major industrial powers of the day, and most of the minor. In particular the great battles on the Western Front were fought between the three preeminent industrial powers of the day, at a time when the process of industrialisation was well established within their economies. Secondly, the war was fought by mass armies, and involved entire populations in a manner hitherto largely unknown. And finally, the war was fought with proficient weapons of mass battlefield destruction ( the machine gun and artillery in particular), and saw the introduction of two important new technologies: the aircraft and the tank. Little of this was new in itself. The effects of modern firepower had been witnessed not only in the Russo-Japanese War (to which most European powers had sent military observers), but also the Boer War and even the American Civil War. Similarly from Napoleon on, wars had been fought by ever larger armies, the American Civil War in particular drawing in a large proportion of each sides available manpower. But two things were new. Firstly the level of industrialisation, of mass involvement, and of technological sophistication, was much higher than in previous wars, reaching a qualitatively different level. Secondly, and more importantly, this was the first war in which these factors were combined to such an extent. In particular the battles on the Western Front between Britain, France and Germany involved the three most important industrialised powers of the day, fighting battles with mass armies and deploying weapons of huge destructive power. This analysis therefore concentrates on the Western Front, not because this best represents the nature of the First World War, but because it is here that we see these three
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important developments brought together. The combination of mass armies and devastating firepower clearly posed a variety of new problems for Generals before and during the First World War. The Generals however failed to either accurately predict the nature of the war, or, in the middle years of the war, to provide a solution other than a series of bloody, static attritional battles. Given these failures it was perhaps only natural that the finger of blame for the apparently senseless slaughter at such battles as Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele was pointed at the Generals in charge. It appeared that developments in society and in technology had not been matched by developments in strategy and tactics. This fairly basic (and not entirely accurate) accusation is important because it leads to a series of major questions: how do developments in society, and more especially technology, affect the strategy and conduct of war? How sensitive is military strategy to changes in technology? And how important is technology in affecting the conduct of war? Firepower and the Offensive: Technology and Strategy on the Eve of War The years immediately prior to the First World War were marked by much thinking and discussion on the changed conditions of war, and on the nature of a future war (increasingly seen as an inevitability by military staffs). In particular the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-5, and the Prussian/German victories of the 1860s and 1870s were closely studied, as was the Boer War (though most tended to the conclusion that the colonial nature of that particular war meant that any lessons learnt would not be applicable to a future war in Europe 1 . The key point then is not that the Generals went into the First World War blindly ignorant 1. Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: the British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987), pp. 45 and 67. Michael Howard, Men against fire: the doctrine of the offensive in 1914, in Peter Paret ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford, 1986), pp. 516-20.
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of the changes in warfare. If anything the reverse was true - more attention had been paid to the conduct of war and to the changes in warfare than had usually been the case prior to a major conflict. Rather the key point concerns the lessons learnt by the Generals. Why did they learn the lessons they did? And why did they discard evidence which in retrospect pointed more accurately to what would happen during the war, particularly on the Western Front? The answer to this problem lies perhaps in an examination of the militarys reaction to the two key developments of the period: the emergence of mass armies, and the increased firepower of modern weapons. Although armies had been growing in size, such that the German army launched at France in 1914 was over a million strong, the military had yet to take the step to acknowledge that a future war would involve not just the army, but the whole of society. Similarly the process of industrialisation and the importance of firepower on the battlefield suggested that industrial production would increasingly be harnessed to the war effort, while the pursuit of ever larger armies suggested the eventual mass mobilisation of civilians. Again the military failed to pursue this logic. Instead the military preferred to think in terms of short wars fought by professional armies. Despite the experience of the American Civil War - and to a lesser extent the Russo-Japanese War - in suggesting that wars would not be over quickly, military opinion preferred to think in terms of short wars decided by vigorous offensive actions. Indeed, when Lord Kitchener, the newly appointed War Minister, suggested to the British Cabinet in August 1914 that the war would probably last a number of years and that mass recruitment would therefore be necessary, his views not only shocked the politicians but were considerably out of line with advice from the Chief of the General Staff. 2 In the opinion of General Staffs in Britain and Europe, there was no requirement for mass civilian recruitment, or for the

2. Barbara Tuchman, the Guns of August(London, 1962), p. 120.

harnessing of industry to meet the war effort, because the war would be over quickly. General Staffs were therefore more influenced by German success against France in 1870 than by events in far flung corners of the world. Why was this? For the Germans, clearly the desire to repeat the elder Moltkes massive success against France in 1870 was a not inconsiderable factor. But there is more to it than this. European observers in the Russo-Japanese War saw the beginnings of a new style of war: static, attritional and firepower orientated. Why was this ignored? No one reason suffices, but a number of factors seem to have contributed in varying degrees. Firstly the influence of a fairly crude form of Social Darwinism meant that the Russians and Japanese tended to be viewed as somewhat less sophisticated and capable than the major European powers when it came to war. Secondly, mass armies would erode the status of the military as a separate elite within the hierarchical societies of pre1914. In particular, regular armies possessed a degree of professionalism which set them apart from civilians and which enabled them to claim a special status. Moreover the discipline of the military was often seen as providing benefits which set the military - and in particular the officer class - not merely apart from, but above other classes. Thus the military enjoyed a privileged status which might be threatened by mass, conscript armies. Thirdly, a mass war involving huge armies and the full utilisation of industry threatened to turn war from a glorious activity into a monster, consuming ever more men and resources. Finally if war was fought not by a social elite but by the masses, this might disrupt the social hierarchy and destabilise existing power structures within the state. This was particularly a danger in Central European states where the military constituted an important political elite; but even in more democratic states such as Britain these fears were to be justified by such developments as the emancipation of women after the war. Therefore, if war was kept short and professional, the impact upon society and the militarys position within society could be controlled. Once war expanded and involved the whole of society however, the effects upon social order and upon the militarys privileged status might be profound. Military hierarchies therefore wanted a short war not

because they saw this as the best means of securing victory, 3 but rather a quick victory was essential to avoid the social upheaval of a protracted war. The second area which requires examination in order to assess the Generals failure to predict the nature of war concerns their attitude towards new battlefield technologies. In particular the problem posed by increased battlefield firepower requires some detailed examination. Moreover attitudes towards technology have been used to explain the Generals failure to provide a satisfactory alternative to static, hugely costly and apparently wasteful battles such as Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele. Two schools of thought have been developed using technology to explain the bloody impasse of 1915- 1917. The first suggests that technology inherently favoured the defensive, and that offensives would inevitably be ground down into static, attritional battles. 4 the second school of thought, developed to varying levels of sophistication, argues that the Generals failed fully to appreciate how technology had changed the battlefield, and as a consequence used inappropriate strategies and tactics. 5 But technology alone cannot fully explain the character of the First World War. More important are the attitudes and responses towards the new technologies, which provide important clues in explaining why the war developed the way it did. 3. For the Germans there were admittedly strategic advantages to be gained from a quick victory, most notably in avoiding a war on two fronts. Conversely for the triple entente there were strategic advantages in a protracted war. The British Army in particular was disproportionately small, while the Russian masses (almost the sole military advantage possessed by the Russians being the size of their population) were notoriously slow to mobilise. 4. For example Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to HBomb (Bloomington, lnd., 1972). 5. The most sophisticated exponent of this school is Travers, op.cit., especially chapters 3 and 6. 5

the First World War, and in particular the Western Front, witnessed the impact of what was effectively a revolution in firepower. In particular artillery, the machine gun, and the rifle demonstrated vastly improved range, accuracy, weight and speed of fire. Moreover artillery and machine guns were deployed in numbers never previously seen, while artillery bombardments consumed almost unimaginable quantities of shells: at Verdun some 24 million shells were used over a four month period; in the 8 day preparatory bombardment on the Somme, the British used 1.75 million shells; and in the 19 day bombardment before Passchendaele, 32 trainloads of shells were used - a years production for 55, 000 workers. 6 This scale of firepower was of course a product of the massive industrialisation of the nineteenth century. The consequence of this increased firepower was what was termed the empty battlefield - a battlefield where troops in the open were critically vulnerable to enemy firepower, and were therefore forced to retreat into fortified positions (trenches) beyond the range of enemy firepower. 7 At its crudest and most potent this produced the stereotype of two parallel lines of trenches, the ground between them swept by artillery and machine gun fire. This empty battlefield created a problem for offensive forces. They would have to cross the empty battlefield to engage the enemy, but in so doing they would be vulnerable to enemy fire, and in particular would confront what the influential French Colonel (later Marshal) Foch termed the zone of death - an area outside friendly fire support where infantry would be

6. Brodie, p. 192; John Terraine, the White Heat: the New Warfare 1914-1918 (London, 1982), p. 208-10. 7. Griffith argues that the empty battlefield can actually be traced back over a hundred years before the First World War. See Paddy Griffith, Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam (Chichester, 1981), pp. 9-10 and 45ff. Nevertheless the phenomenon was still a product of firepower, and the awesome firepower of the First World War revealed this phenomenon on a scale never previously seen. 6

most vulnerable to enemy firepower. 8 Overcoming this zone of death was the single most important problem faced by military strategists before and during the war. Again the key point is not that the military were ignorant of the changes in weapons technology and the increased firepower available on the battlefield. Rather it is that their responses to the new technologies simply did not work. Two schools of thought can be easily identified in response to these technological developments. The first, principally associated with the Polish financier Jan Bloch, argued that firepower had fundamentally altered the battlefield by giving defensive forces a decisive advantage. With the massively increased firepower now available, frontal assaults against defended positions would result in little less than slaughter for the attacking forces. The chances of an offensive succeeding against a well defended position were slight. The logic of the empty battlefield therefore led inevitably to the triumph of defence over offence, and to battlefields being dominated by firepower. 9 Blochs ideas however failed to convince military hierarchies - his conclusions were distinctly unpalatable and the military, like most professions, had an aversion to unpalatable advice from an amateur (in this case, a civilian). In contrast the second school of thought effectively swept the board, and had a major, and frequently decisive influence on all of the major powers in 1914. This school of thought is usually termed the cult of the offensive, though perhaps it is more accurately described as the psychological battlefield. Its basis is the belief that victory is determined by the will to win. In France this view was initially developed by Ferdinand Foch, who as director of the French War College ( the

8.

Howard, p. 512

9. I S (J G) B loch, Modern Weapons and Modern War (London, 1900).

Ecole Superieure de Guerre) had an important impact on French military thinking just prior to the war. Fochs beliefs were reflected in a series of aphorisms such as the will to conquer is the first condition of victory, or A battle won is a battle in which one will not confess oneself beaten, or more succinctly Victoire, cest la volonte. 1 0 Similarly Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton, an observer at the Russo-Japanese War and later to command the allied forces at Gallipoli, commented in 1910: Blindness to moral forces and worship of material forces inevitably lead in war to destruction. All that exaggerated reliance placed upon chassepots and mitrailleuses by France before 70; all that trash written by M. Bloch before 1904 about zones of fire across which no living being could pass, heralded nothing but disaster. War is essentially the triumph, not of a chassepot over a needle-gun, not of a line of men entrenched behind wire entanglements and fire-swept zones over men exposing themselves in the open, but of one will over another weaker will. 1 1 (emphasis added) Foch however was careful to ground these near metaphysical aspects of battle in the hard realities of tactics, discipline and the proper use of firepower. But this careful grounding assumed less and less importance in the French army. In particular the ideas of Colonel Grandmaison, Director of Military Operations, struck a chord in the French military hierarchy. Grandmaison developed the idea of the offensive without limit (offensive a loutrance), whereby the French would impose their will on an enemy by seizing the initiative and pursuing it ruthlessly. The defence was all but abandoned - it could only be justified as enabling economies

10. Tuchman, p. 32. 11. Quoted by Travers, pp. 44-5

to be made in peripheral sectors. Rather French planning prior to 1914 could increasingly be summed up in a single word: attack! Battle was a struggle of moral forces, and victory was determined by the will to win. By seizing the initiative, one side imposed its will upon the other, while at the same time imbuing troops with the fighting spirit necessary to cross the zone of death and engage the enemy. 1 2 The cult of the offensive was most influential in France, though it also had a major impact upon Russian thinking. 1 3 Similarly within Germany the offensive was seen as the decisive act, though under Schlieffen moral factors tended to be subsumed by the importance of numbers and material. 1 4 Where the French were flamboyant, the Germans were precise in their emphasis upon material rather than psychological factors. The German offensive was planned in such detail that it resembled less a plan for war than a delicately choreographed movement over 40 days 1 5 . Even in Britain, despite an aversion to formal doctrine, an unofficial cult of the offensive based upon the psychological battlefield can be identified. This was based upon a number of factors. Firstly a consensus had emerged that, despite increases in firepower, offensive action was not only possible but decisive. In this respect the lessons of the South African war were considered abnormal due to the colonial nature of that war. More relevant were the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, where Japanese troops defeated Russian firepower through offensive spirit, high morale and cold steel. 1 6 Secondly, the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Tuchman, pp. 32-4. Tuchman, ch.5. Howard, p. 579. G Ritter, the Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London, 1958) trans A and E Wilson. Travers, pp. 36 and 43.

prevalence of Social Darwinism amongst senior officers produced doubts over the reliability of working class recruits. It was commonly believed that troops drawn from the industrial working classes would lack the necessary moral fibre for war. By an exaggerated emphasis upon offensive action and moral qualities, these troops could be imbued with fighting spirit and their natural deficiencies overcome. In particular the high losses likely in offensive action (a product of improved firepower) required an increased emphasis upon the offensive to ensure that troops closed with the enemy - closing with the enemy being seen as the means of achieving victory. As Travers comments: The offensive was diligently pressed by almost all senior officers, who were afraid of the converse, that troops would normally be fearful or unreliable in crossing the fire-swept zone. 1 7 Thirdly the Army, like most large organizations, functioned best in a structured environment where each component part had a distinct place in the whole and a clear role to play. By assuming the offensive, the integrity of the structure could be maintained: the enemy would respond to your plan, and you could control events. The offensive therefore offered greater control than surrendering the initiative and moving onto the defensive. In this respect the British Army was little different to other armies. 1 8 What emerges from this is that the Generals prior to the First World War were not ignorant of the changes in society and technology, and that they did take change into account in their planning for war. What happened though was that these changes were approached with a series of assumptions about man and war which led to inappropriate lessons being drawn. Social

17. 18.

Travers, p.48. Travers, pp. 37-8 and 53-4.

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Darwinism and anti-modernism led to an emphasis upon the human rather than material aspects of war; the problem of commanding large armies led to the requirement for a structured war, which was more easily accomplished when on the offensive since that side would then possess the initiative; and the dangers of social disruption and the desire to maintain the professional status of the military led to pressure for a short war, again best achieved by decisive offensive action. These of course are broad trends, which vary in their applicability from army to army. Nevertheless the result was that all sides had learnt the lesson that when war came they must immediately take the offensive. As a result August 1914 was marked by a series of offensives: the Russians into East Prussia, the French through Lorraine, the AustroHungarians into Poland. The most successful however was that of the Germans into France, and it is here that any analysis of the war on the Western Front must begin. The Schlieffen Plan and the German Invasion of France The war on the Western Front may be usefully divided into three phases. The first was a war of movement, with the simultaneous German invasion of France and French invasion of Germany. The failure of both offensives led to the so-called Race to the Sea whereby both sides attempted (and failed) to outflank the other. Thus 1914 ended with a line of trenches stretching from the North Sea to Switzerland, ushering in the second phase of the war, that of static attritional warfare. This phase lasted roughly from 1915 through to the German Spring Offensive ( the Kaisers Battle, or Kaiserschlacht) of 1918. It was characterised by a series of huge battles involving hundreds of thousands of casualties, but for little or no territorial gain (indeed one of the more substantial Allied territorial gains of this period was the voluntary German withdrawal of some 11 miles in 1917 to the stronger defences of the Hindenburg Line). The key battles of this period - Verdun, Somme and Passchendaele - still evoke memories of horror and apparently pointless slaughter. The third phase saw movement once again restored to the battlefield. In the Spring of 191 8 the Germans launched their final offensive on

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the Western Front, employing new tactical methods. Despite initial success the offensive ran out of steam, but was followed by the British Summer offensive whose success forced the Germans to sue for peace. This section considers the first phase of the war, and in particular the German invasion of France. Subsequent sections discuss the two other phases of the war. the German invasion of France in 1914 was based upon a plan drawn up by Graf Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1905. 1 9 Schlieffen himself revised the plan on a number of occasions, but the most important changes were made by his successor as Chief of the General Staff, Moltke the Younger, who put the plan into effect in August 1914. The fundamental strategic problem facing the Germans was the danger of a war on two fronts - that the political alliance between France and Russia left Germany facing in both directions when war came. Schlieffen and his successor Moltke reacted to this political problem by attempting a military solution, namely the rapid defeat of France before Russia could fully mobilise, followed by a transfer of troops to the East. This was the heart of Schlieffens Plan. His predecessors, Moltke the Elder and Waldersee, had both planned for a defensive campaign in the West, and an offensive in the East against the weaker Russian forces. Nor did Moltke the Elder hope for a decisive victory, rather planning to cripple

19. the Plan, in the form of a memorandum entitled War against France was dated 31 December 1905. This was Schlieffens last day in office, and the date is symbolic rather than actual. The memorandum was written in December 1905 and January 1906, and was handed to Moltke in February 1906 as a kind of military testament (Ritter, p. 48). Schlieffen himself then proceeded to make a number of alterations, particularly in the additional memoranda of February 1906 and December 1912. In 1911 Schlieffen also produced an operational plan (Red) for the invasion of France, including detailed maps, in response to the German staff exercises of that year. For details on the evolution of Schlieffens ideas, and copies of the various drafts and memoranda, see Ritter, op. cit. 12

France and Russia, and then negotiate a favourable peace. 2 0 Schlieffen therefore not merely reorganised the priorities in war, but also the aim total victory. Schlieffens reasoning for the latter change was heavily influenced by his reading of Clausewitz, and in particular Clausewitzs emphasis on the decisive battle. For [Schlieffen] it did not suffice to lame the opponents must be destroyed. (Liddell Hart) 2 1 they

His reorientation of priorities towards France was founded on a belief that the Russian army would be difficult to destroy given its resources of manpower and the space it could retreat into. In contrast the French defences were vulnerable to a flanking movement through neutral Belgium. Schlieffens Plan therefore envisaged a massive envelopment of the French Army. Leaving the East of Germany relatively lightly defended to allow the maximum concentration of forces in the West, Schlieffen further concentrated his forces on the right wing leaving the centre relatively weak. Thus while French forces were sucked into the centre, German forces would smash through the weak Belgian defences, march West of Paris to avoid the danger of a counter-stroke, and destroy the retreating French army in a decisive 'cauldron battle (kesselschlacht) 2 2 A number of features are worth commenting upon at this stage. Firstly, Schlieffen seems to have relegated politics to a peripheral role in his plan. This was most obvious in the assumption that Russia would fight on Frances side, and vice versa. Equally, the violation of Belgian sovereignty was seen as a military necessity to outflank the French, while the political consequences (bringing both Belgium and more importantly Britain into the war) were paid scant attention. 20. 21. 22. Liddell Hart, foreword to Ritter, p. 4. Liddell Hart, p.5. Ritter, op. cit.; Tuchman, pp. 19-21.

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Secondly, the military basis of the plan was far from new - indeed Schlieffen derived his planned envelopment of the French from Hannibals classic double envelopment of the Romans at Cannae. 2 3 Such a strategy was extremely risky, especially in leaving the centre weak (and, at a more fundamental level, in leaving East Prussia vulnerable to Russian attack). But as Liddell Hart commented It was a conception of Napoleonic boldness ... if the German defensive wing was pushed back, without breaking, that would tend to increase the effect of the offensive wing. It would operate like a revolving door - the harder the French pushed on one side the more sharply would the other side swing round and strike their back. 2 4 This bold conception was badly flawed however. Firstly whereas German troops would have to march around the enveloped French, the French army could be moved by rail the considerably shorter distance across from the German border to their threatened flanks and rear. Even given the blow to French morale caused by German troops appearing in their rear, the French possessed a considerable advantage in terms of interior lines of communication, and improved transportation. Secondly whether Germany possessed the forces necessary to destroy the French Army in battle began to look increasingly doubtful. Even given Schlieffens remarkable innovation of using reservists in the front

23. Tuchman, pp. 20-1. This was to have consequences at a later stage both in the planning and execution of the invasion, when the lure of a double envelopment raised its head. 24. Liddell Hart, p. 6. Ironically the French had similar ideas concerning their offensive in Lorraine - the stronger the German right wing, the greater the French success in the centre would be.

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line, he worried that the German Army would not have the necessary superiority of force for a successful offensive. 2 5 The third noteworthy feature of the Schlieffen Plan was the way in which it emphasised speed and surprise. France would have to be beaten quickly to enable sufficient forces to be transferred to meet the Russian threat, while the surprise caused by marching through neutral Belgium was essential to the breakthrough phase of the envelopment. Moreover speed was important once the breakthrough was achieved to keep the French forces off balance, and to destroy them before they could reform. This coupling of speed and surprise was therefore as much a feature of the envelopment strategy as was breaking through in strength on a weak, narrow sector of the front and striking deep to surround the enemy. But whereas German envelopments in the Second World War were used in part to erode the enemys will to fight - and therefore beat him psychologically as well as physically - Schlieffen saw the envelopment as a means of catching the French Army off balance so that the Germans could then destroy it in a decisive battle. Schlieffens plan was handed to his successor, Moltke the Younger, in early 1906. Although retaining the essence of the Schlieffen Plan, Moltke incorporated a number of important changes. These were subsequently to lead to Moltke being blamed for the plans failure in 1914, and to the original plan being held in something approaching mythical respect. The two most important changes made by Moltke concerned the balance of forces, and the sweep of the envelopment. As more forces became available to Moltke, so he strengthened the centre and

25.

Liddell Hart, pp. 6-7; Tuchman, p. 25.

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left wing relative to his right. 2 6 As a result Moltke was criticised for lacking Schlieffens boldness and for fatally weakening those forces which would deliver the decisive blow. This comparative weakness on the German right 2 7 in turn forced them to wheel East of Paris, the second major alteration from Schlieffens original plan, and one forced on the Germans once the invasion of France was actually under way. This in turn released some of the pressure on the French left and allowed them to execute the successful counter-stroke against the German right flank on the Maine. The miracle of the Maine therefore came at the end of a series of developments initiated by Moltkes weakening of the German right. Whether Moltke fatally altered Schlieffens original plan, or whether he imposed a sensible degree of caution and moved in a direction Schlieffen himself was moving towards, is a point of some dispute. 2 8 Moltke certainly seems to have lacked Schlieffens confidence as a commander, being by nature somewhat more cautious 2 9 Thus the risk to East Prussia and to the German centre on the Western Front loomed large in Moltkes mind. Equally Moltke was wary of moving troops through neutral

26. The ratio of forces on the right compared to the rest of the front changed from 100:15 under Schlieffen to 100:42 under Moltke. L C F Turner, the significance of the Schlieffen plan, in Paul Kennedy ed., the War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-19 14 (London, 1985). 27. Compounded by Moltke transferring two corps from the right wing to the Eastern Front once the invasion had already started. 28. Critics of Moltke include Turner, Terraine, and Gordon Craig in his the Politics of the Prussian Army 1640- 1945(Oxford, 1955). Liddell Hart and Ritter are more favourable towards him. 29. Tuchman, p. 26. 16

Holland lest that leave the Dutch an enemy in the German rear. Moltke was therefore forced to move his two, powerful right wing armies through a bottleneck around Liege. This in turn constrained the number of troops he could allot to the right wing without overburdening his lines of communication. Moltkes final plan envisaged a left wing of some 320, 000 men (8 corps) to hold the front in Alsace and Lorraine against the expected French attack there. A centre of 400, 000 men (4 corps) would attack through the Ardennes, while the right wing of 700, 000 men would smash through Belgium and envelop the French army on the border. The Germans did not expect the Belgians to resist, but as a precaution constructed huge siege guns to destroy the formidable fortresses of Liege and Namur in the path of their advance. In the event this was a wise precaution, as the Belgians did resist. But it also demonstrates the degree of German planning. The whole move through Belgium and South to Paris was precisely timetabled. The roads through Liege would be opened 12 days after mobilization, the French frontier reached 22 days after mobilization, and Paris and decisive victory 39 days after mobilization. On the fortieth day forces would begin to be transported to the East to face the Russians who, slow to mobilize in large numbers, posed a less immediate threat to Germany (though not to East Prussia). Wary of Clausewitzs warning concerning friction - that the unexpected would occur, and that things would go wrong - the Germans attempted to plan for every conceivable contingency. Far from clearing the fog of war, the result of this extensive and highly detailed preplanning was to store up problems. The key feature of the Plan became not its comprehensive attention to detail, but its inflexibility. The Schlieffen Plan failed in August 1914 for a number of possible reasons: the weakening of the German right wing; the excessive requirements placed on the German infantry, who would have to march and fight their way to Paris in some 30

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days 3 0 ; the ability of the French to reorganize and mount a defence against the threat from the German right; and a series of tactical errors and unforeseen delays. But behind these mistakes lies something more fundamental: the German inability and unwillingness to react to a changing situation. The reliance on pre-planning meant that Moltke had little or no control over the battle once it began, and that the Generals in charge of his armies were tied to plans which became less and less relevant as the plan unfolded. This is not to say that decisions were not made in response to developments; rather it is to say that the system was insufficiently responsive to change, both through structural limitations and through the inclination of the commanders in charge of implementing the plan. This then is the first key feature to note. The second is the Schlieffen Plans attitude towards technology. Underpinning the Plan was the assumption that a direct, frontal assault on French positions would be impossible due to the advantages modern firepower gave to the defence. The Schlieffen Plan was therefore based upon a surprise blow against a weak area of the front, enabling the German army to destroy the French in an encounter battle, rather than a set-piece battle against well positioned defences. With the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, and the emergence of a solid line of trenches across the Western Front in late 1914, such a flanking move became impossible. The Generals now faced the problem of frontal assaults against defended positions. The Period of Static Attritional Warfare The period 1915-17 saw a different style of warfare emerge, one characterised by static attritional warfare. It is this period on the Western Front which has led to many of the popular images of the First World War, and in particular to the belief that it was a

30. Paris would be reached 39 days after mobilization began, and therefore less than 30 days after the main thrust through Belgium commenced.

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senseless war where Generals, removed from the battlefield and from the human realities of war, squandered the lives of their men in ill-conceived offensives against well prepared defensive positions. This was the period of huge battles such as Verdun (1916), the Somme (1916) and Passchendaele (1917), where for great loss of life little or no ground was gained. Instead infantry were hurled at artillery and machine guns with predictable results I could see, away to my left and right, long lines of men. Then I heard the patter, patter of machine guns in the distance. By the time Id gone another ten yards there seemed to be only a few men left around me; by the time I had gone twenty yards, I seemed to be on my own. Then I was hit myself. (Sgt. J. Galloway, 3rd Tyneside Irish). 3 1 The continuous line of trenches meant that there were no flanks to turn, therefore commanders were forced into frontal assaults. Worse, it became increasingly apparent that these assaults could not achieve a decisive breakthrough to open up a more mobile campaign. Poor communications between offensive forces, the power of defensive artillery placed outside counter-battery range but within range of forces as they advanced and closed with trenches, and the comparative ease with which reserves could be brought up by train for the defence compared to the difficulty in crossing the empty battlefield to reinforce a break-in, all contributed to an inability to break through enemy lines. Thus a tactical impasse was reached: even if advancing forces could break into enemy lines, they could not break through them. As this became increasingly apparent to commanders, so a new attritional strat

31. Martin Middlebrook, the First Day on the Somme: 1 July 1916 (London, 1984), p. 141.

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egy emerged - what John Terraine calls the wearing out fight 3 2 the purpose of battle was no longer envelopment or the gaining of ground, but the slaughter of the enemys forces in situ. That this would involve huge casualties for ones own side was unfortunate, but inevitable. In its crudest form this was the strategy of the longest purse, where the side to run out of manpower first would lose. How this strategy was arrived at, and the continued hope for a breakthrough resulting in a restoration of mobility, is the focus of this section. In particular it will concentrate on the planning for the huge British offensive on the Somme, which demonstrated the tension between attritional, firepower orientated strategies, and the lingering hope for a restoration of mobility. 1915 saw the Germans focusing their attentions on the Eastern Front, to so cripple the Russian Army (already badly shaken after the defeat at Tannenberg in August 1914) that it could play no more useful role in the war. Accordingly the Germans went on the defensive in the West, holding a front line in France which bulged alarmingly in the direction of Paris. For the French, with the edge of this bulge a mere 5 days march from Paris, and with the psychological blow of the German Army occupying large areas of France, the priority was to throw the Germans back by launching offensives either side of this bulge. Since the British Army was still in the process of transforming itself from a small professional army to Kitcheners million-strong New Army, this offensive would have to be carried out by the French Army. Starting in late 1914, and throughout the early part of 1915, the French attacked the Germans. Again, offensive spirit was emphasised, and elan was considered to be of huge importance. But the firepower of the French artillery began to assume greater

32. Terraine, White Heat, p. 204ff.

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significance, with some pieces firing 25 rounds per minute. The strategy behind this was to exert pressure on the German lines over a sustained period such that eventually cracks would appear. Further pressure would then ensure the collapse of the front at these weak points which could then be exploited. 3 3 In other words, the strategy was based on attrition, and upon a combination of physical and moral factors; but its aim was the restoration of mobility through the exploitation of a weakened sector. The failure of the French 1914-15 offensives, where some quarter of a million casualties saw the capture of no more than a few villages, set the tone for the rest of this period. In February 1916 the Germans, under Moltkes successor Falkenhayn, went back on the offensive in the West, attacking the weakened French Army at Verdun. Falkenhayns aim was simple: the physical destruction of the French Army. By bleeding the French Army dry he hoped to so shatter French morale that their war effort would collapse. Thus the battle plan was not to capture ground, to envelop the enemy, or to break through and restore mobility, but to annihilate the French Army where it stood. 3 4 Slow but inexorable German pressure drew in more French reserves, whose own counterattacks equally sucked in more Germans. Like heavyweight sluggers, the two armies fought each other over a period not of hours, days, or weeks, but months, until by the end of June, after four months of blood letting, the French Army was nearing the point of collapse. Thus the French pressured their British allies into an early start for their own offensive further North. So it was that on the 132nd day of the Battle of Verdun, the British attacked on the Somme. The Somme was the first battle for the New Army, the army of 33. John Terraine, the First World War 1914-18(London, 1984), p.61ff. 34. Terraine, White Heat, p. 204ff. 21

volunteers raised by Lord Kitchener. The battle was to be fought primarily by Rawlinsons Fourth Army, with Allenbys Third Army providing a diversionary attack at Gommecourt on Rawlinsons left, and Goughs Fifth Cavalry Army in reserve to exploit a breakthrough. In overall command was General Sir Douglas Haig. On the eve of battle Rawlinsons Fourth Army amounted to just over half a million men, and on the first day of the battle he would launch some 18 divisions at the Germans with a seven to one numerical superiority. Some 60% of the battalions in these 18 divisions were volunteers, almost none of whom had seen battle before. In later years these would be seen as the cream of the nations manhood; at the time, for commanders like Haig and Rawlinson, they were novice amateurs of questionable reliability under fire. 3 5 The British offensive was a carefully planned, set-piece battle involving a huge preliminary artillery bombardment, extensive preparatory training, and even the construction of tunnels to mine the German positions. Behind this careful preparation however lay a fundamental difference of opinion between Rawlinson and Haig. For Haig, a cavalry officer schooled in the cult of the offensive and the psychological battlefield, the battle offered perhaps the last opportunity for the British cavalry. 3 6 More importantly, Haigs Staff College training had impressed upon him the importance of the structured battlefield. For Haig, an offensive should be structured with three clear, distinct phases. The first phase used artillery to wear down the enemy defences over a period of days or weeks. In the second phase, the infantry would attack across a broad front to draw in enemy reserves. Finally the third phase would see a decisive, surprise blow by

35. 36.

Middlebrook, pp. 78-9. Middlebrook, p. 71.

22

reserve forces against an enemy weak point, resulting in a breakthrough to be exploited by the cavalry. 3 7 Haig therefore ordered Goughs Cavalry Army to wait until Rawlinsons infantry had secured a breakthrough, at which point they would push through the gap created, and head into the German rear. 3 8 In contrast, Rawlinson doubted the practicality of cavalry exploitation because of the increased firepower available to the defence. For Rawlinson the problem was less one of breaking through enemy lines and exploitation, than of holding on to initial gains in the face of the inevitable counter-attack. Rawlinson was therefore less influenced by the cult of the offensive than by the effects of modern firepower. His plan was accordingly somewhat less ambitious in its scope, and centred upon artillery supported by infantry. The essence of Rawlinsons plan may be characterised as bite and hold: a massive artillery bombardment would destroy the enemys first line of defences; the infantry would then walk over the empty battlefield to clear the enemy trenches, and wait for the counter-attack. As Middlebrook comments Rawlinson planned to use the heaviest and longest bombardment of the war to destroy the German line . The infantry themselves were relegated to the role of mopping up and occupying defences that had already been destroyed for them by the artillery. 3 9 The result was a plan where the details were carefully worked out, but which lacked strategic coherence. The root cause of this was the existence at this time of two very different conceptions

37. 38. 39.

See in particular Travers, chapters 4 and 6. Middlebrook, p. 71. Middlebrook, p. 75. See also Travers, pp. 54 and 132-3. 23

of warfare. The first saw battle in human terms, as a triumph of spirit and discipline over firepower. This was the view of Haig and GHQ in France. The second was more modern and emphasised the role - indeed, the dominance - of firepower on the battlefield. These views were held not merely by Rawlinson, but by the Minister of War Lord Kitchener, and by the GIGS General Sir William Robertson. 4 0 What is also interesting is that neither Haig nor Rawlinson appear to have had any strategic objective other than killing Germans. Whereas the Schlieffen Plan was aimed at Paris, the French attack of 1914 at recovering Alsace and Lorraine, and the Russian offensive of 1914 at East Prussia as the gateway to Berlin, by 1916 objectives had been limited to the destruction of enemy armies. The British attacked on 1 July 1916, and suffered their single bloodiest day of this or any war. By evening they had suffered over 57, 000 casualties, and had barely achieved any of their first day objectives. 4 1 The scale of the disaster seems to have initially escaped Haig, who was located well behind the front line and isolated by his staff and his own personality from what was happening. 4 2 Nevertheless news eventually percolated through, and as the battle staggered on Haigs hopes for a breakthrough were slowly dropped. The reasons why the first day was such a disaster are, like many such disasters, many and perhaps all too easily identified in hindsight. Nevertheless there appear to be three broad categories of reasons for the failure of the first day. 4 3 The first concentrates on technical factors, principally that the British artillery failed to penetrate the deep German trenches,

40. 41. 42. 43.

Travers, p. 54. The best single account of this day remains Middlebrook, op. cit. See also Lyn MacDonald, Somme (London, 1989). Travers, p. 153. See particularly Travers, p. 154 ff.

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and that as a result the German machine gunners were still alive and able to fire against the rows of British troops slowly marching across the battlefield. Secondly a number of tactical failures are evident, particularly the failure to even attempt to achieve surprise, poor counterbattery work by the artillery, the early lifting of the artillery barrage which allowed the German machine gunners time to reach the tops of their trenches, and the deployment of the infantry in line-abreast formation to ensure an ordered march across the battlefield. The final set of reasons concern the command relationship. Here there are two broad critiques. Firstly that the Generals, particularly Haig and Rawlinson, were too isolated and insensitive to feedback from more junior officers (even Corps commanders were expected to listen to Rawlinson, and not to offer constructive criticism or other suggestions). Secondly, the nature of the New Army - amateurs, untested by battle led to an excessive emphasis upon discipline and order. In particular troops were expected to march in battle in a preordained, parade-style formation to encourage unit cohesion, and to follow orders at all costs to prevent a collapse of will. The result was a complete loss of initiative and flexibility which, when coupled to the isolation of higher commanders, resulted in mistakes being repeated and compounded. Despite the disaster of the first day, as John Terraine rightly points out the Somme lasted throughout the Summer of 1916 and, following on from Verdun, broke the back of the German Army. After the Somme the Germans were forced to shorten their lines, and retreated to a new line of defences, christened the Hindenburg Line. 4 4 The blood letting was beginning to take its toll. In what was becoming the strategy of the longest purse, the Germans were beginning to look the weaker.

44.

Terraine, First World War, p. 122.

25

1917 however began well for the Germans in the South, with the disastrous French attack of Chemin des Dames. The French were so badly mauled in this that their front line troops mutinied and French commanders were forced onto the defensive for the rest of the war. Further North the British were more successful at Arras in April and June, but the major Summer and Autumn offensive at Passchendaele proved to be another huge battle characterised by massive losses. As the table below indicates, British losses had been steadily mounting. By the beginning of 1918 the British Army had been severely weakened, and the French were effectively incapable of offensive action. 4 5 Although the United States had now entered the war, sizeable numbers of American troops had yet to arrive in France. Germany had also suffered enormously, but going into 1918 it had a major advantage: the Russian revolution had effectively brought the war on the Eastern Front to an end, releasing German troop there for duty on the Western Front. The Spring of 1918 therefore presented the Germans with a window of opportunity. The British and French were still weak, the Americans had yet to arrive, while German troops transferred from the Eastern Front could be used in one last throw of the dice on the Western Front. BRITISH CASUALTIES, 1915- 1917 Neuve Chapelle, March 1915 Aubers Ridge and Festubert, May 1915 Loos, September and October 1915 Somme, July - November 1916 Arras, April and May 1917 Passchendaele, June - November 1917 Cambrai, November and December 1917 Middlebrook, the Kaisers Battle, pp. 22-3 45. Martin Middlebrook, the Kaisers Battle (London, 1983), pp. 20-1. Although over 600, 000 men were available in the UK as reinforcements, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George was unwilling to release them fearing Haig would simply use them as cannon fodder. 12, 892 28, 267 61, 713 415, 000 139, 867 250, 000 70, 264

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The Kaisers Battle: the German Spring Offensive of 1918 4 6 Planning for the German Spring Offensive began late in 1917. In November the decision to launch an offensive was taken, and the choice of Spring the next year was straightforward enough. By then the weather would have improved, troops from the Eastern Front would have arrived and been installed in France, and the Allies would not yet be strong enough to launch an offensive of their own. The choice of where to attack was slightly more difficult, and a number of options were developed. The final choice - Operation Michael - was to attack the British right flank at its junction with the French Army, and then to swing North to roll up and destroy the British Army. The choice of this area for attack was partly determined by ground (particularly the fact that the ground would dry out quickly, thus avoiding the problem of mud encountered by the British attack at Passchendaele). But perhaps more interestingly it was chosen as a weak link in the Allied line. The British forces here were known to be weak, while the junction between the British and French Armies offered many possibilities for confusion and crossed lines of authority amongst the defenders. This then reveals an important point concerning German strategic thinking. The purpose behind the offensive was not to fix the enemy and draw in his reserves in an attritional battle which might eventually result in a breakthrough. Rather the Germans picked a weak sector of the front to facilitate the breakthrough. The defenders would be destroyed not in situ, but in a mobile offensive following a breakthrough. Thus although Middlebrook is correct in drawing a parallel between Operation Michael and Haigs breakthrough plan on the Somme 4 7 (both battles were fought across roughly the same ground), where the two differ fundamentally is in the priority given to the breakthrough.

46. The chief German architect of the 1918 offensive, Ludendorff, named the battle the Kaiserschlacht(Kaisers Battle) in honour of Kaiser Wilhelm II. 47. Middlebrook, Kaisers Battle, p. 32. 27

For Haig the breakthrough was a desirable endgame to a structured, three stage battle; for the Germans in 1918 it was the essence of the operation. 4 8 The true importance of the German offensive to the development of modern warfare however lies in the way in which they attempted to break through enemy lines - the tactical impasse which had confounded military planners since 1914. In order to achieve this the Germans undertook a major reassessment of tactical methods. This reassessment used consultations with front line officers, and encouraged new ideas. This in itself was fundamentally different to the practice elsewhere of imposing solutions from on high, often conceived by General Staffs with little or no immediate contact with the battle. 4 9 The German General Staff itself had also changed. In 1916 during the British offensive on the Somme, the German Chief of the General Staff, Falkenhayn, had been replaced by the partnership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. This partnership, probably the most famous military partnership of this century, had been formed in August 1914. With two Russian armies advancing into East Russia, Ludendorff had been transferred from his successful attack at Liege, and Hindenburg had been brought out of retirement, to take over the command of the German Eighth Army in East Prussia. Within days they had utterly annihilated one of the two advancing Russian armies at Tannenberg, a catastrophe the Russians never really recovered from. The Spring 1918 offensive was to be this mythical partnerships first and only major

48. Other differences include that for Haig the breakthrough would be by cavalry, for the Germans by infantry, and that whereas Haig's attack was across 16 miles of the front, the German attack was much broader, across a 50 mile front. Middlebrook, Kaisers Battle, p. 34. 49. Travers ch. 5 and p. 143.

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offensive on the Western Front, and in particular it was to be Ludendorffs attempt to solve the problem of static, attritional warfare. 5 0 Ludendorff's plan was for an infantry assault and breakthrough supported by artillery. Cavalry played no part in this, despite being the traditional arm of exploitation. The artillery plan, devised by Bruchmuller, forewent the traditional long bombardment to soften up enemy defences over a number of days - the sort of bombardment Rawlinson had relied upon at the Somme. Instead he concentrated half of the German artillery available on the Western Front in a single, massive five hour bombardment. The emphasis had therefore shifted from attrition to shock action, with surprise and concentration of fire being much more prominent considerations. Bruchmuller also paid particular attention to counter-battery work, so that the advancing infantry would be less vulnerable to enemy artillery fire. The physical destruction of the enemy by artillery - the essence of Rawlinsons plan on the Somme - had been replaced with the idea that artillery paved the way for an infantry assault by confusing the enemy, and by degrading the enemys artillery. Infantry tactics were similarly innovative. The traditional practice had been to devise a rigid plan, choreographed in advance by staff officers, capturing one line of trenches at a time in a steady linear advance. Instead, the Germans encouraged greater initiative amongst officers in the field, and attempted to improve

50. Ludendorff was the military planner, and the driving force behind the partnership. The planning for the Spring 1918 offensive was therefore very much his, with Hindenberg taking something of a back seat. 29

the flexibility of operations. Therefore rather than a steady linear advance maintaining contact with both flanks, officers were given a line of advance and encouraged to proceed as quickly as possible along that line, using their own initiative, and regardless of what was happening on their flanks. The advance was to be led by small groups of specially trained troops using infiltration tactics, rather than relying on the weight of a mass, linear attack. Once the front line was pierced, enemy strongpoints were to be by-passed and left for subsequent troops in order to retain the momentum of the attack. Moreover enemy command centres were to be hit hard in an attempt to paralyze the enemys ability to react, and to sow further confusion. 5 1 Finally, in order to further facilitate the breakthrough, German strength would be concentrated at selected points in the line, rather than evenly spread across the entire length of the battlefield. Thus at Queant, a 2, 000 yard line was held by half a British division. Against this the Germans assembled an entire corps totalling five divisions. The aim was to achieve decisive superiority at weak points, thus making a breakthrough possible. 5 2 What emerges from this is a new emphasis upon surprise, momentum and flexibility. Whereas on the Somme, and even with the Schlieffen Plan, these had not headed the list of operational priorities, in the Spring 1918 offensive they became the guiding principles behind German operations. Thus what we have is a new form of the psychological battlefield where human qualities (flexibility and initiative with the attacking force, confusion and despair amongst defenders) are once again considered decisive elements in battlefield success. But whereas in 1914 the French emphasised human qualities over material (firepower), in 1918 Ludendorff marries the human dimension of the battle. .

51. Middlebrook, Kaisers Battle, pp. 53-5; Griffith, pp. 81-2. 52. Middlebrook, Kaisers Battle, pp. 55-6. 30

field to the material, devising an artillery plan to closely support the infantry, and concentrating his forces at key points to achieve numerical (i.e. material) superiority. The Spring 1918 offensive was initially successful, not merely in piercing the British lines, but in creating confusion and panic, particularly amongst Goughs Fifth Army. The offensive however ultimately failed. This was partly due to a series of tactical and operational mistakes made by the Germans, but it is difficult to see these as being the sole reason for the ultimate German failure to knock the British Army out of the war, particularly since the British also made a series of mistakes. It has therefore been popular to blame war-weariness and a lack of material resources for the German failure. In particular it has been noted that the troops following the first line of special troops were of a much poorer quality, again reflecting the toll of four and a half years of hard fighting. But perhaps most important of all was the German inability to translate a tactical success into a strategic. The German breakthrough and exploitation was hugely successful at the tactical level, but it was unable to transfer this into a breakthrough of strategic significance. Thus the offensive was a disaster for the two British armies in its immediate path, but not for the entire British Expeditionary Force in France. The reason for this was the Germans inability to push deeply enough quickly enough. It is tempting to suggest that this was in turn a technological deficiency which mechanisation and the radio would remedy in 1940. But there is also conceivably a tactical deficiency here in that the German breakthrough was too limited in its scope, and relied upon the psychological dislocation of only those forces it immediately faced, and not of the entire British Expeditionary Force. Ludendorff has often been admired for the ambition of the Spring Offensive. Ironically, perhaps the seeds of its failure were in its lack of ambition. 5 3

53. cf. Middlebrook, Kaisers Battle, p. 342. 31

The Killing Ground? How can we explain what happened on the Western Front in the First World War? In particular, how can we explain the static attritional warfare of 191 5-1 917 which constituted what Travers terms the killing ground? there are a number of possible explanations. The first concerns the technology used - that technology determined the character of the war. Developments in firepower, particularly in artillery and machine guns, created the empty battlefield, which in turn made offensive action extremely difficult. Moreover technology limited the means of exploiting a successful break-in. If a line of enemy trenches was captured, then the attacking troops would all too often find themselves vulnerable to enemy counter-attack, out-side the range of their own artillery support, and out of touch with commanders in the rear. Moreover enemy reserves could be brought up by train, while troops to reinforce the attack would have to cross the empty battlefield. Moreover technologies designed to aid offensive action particularly the tank and gas shells - proved of dubious reliability. Thus once the initial mobile phase was over, and there were no flanks to be turned, technology favoured a static attritional war. There is clearly much weight to this argument, but it is not convincing as the sole explanation for the style of warfare which emerged. In particular it fails to explain the initial success of the German Spring Offensive and how the innovative tactics employed by Ludendorff overcame to some extent the problem of offensive action against fixed defences. To blame technology also obscures other factors which were at work during this period, and which also contributed to the style of fighting. A second hypo thesis therefore concerns the way in which the Generals handled the war. It asserts that the Generals failed to react satisfactorily to the new battlefield conditions, and that the strategies and tactics employed were deeply flawed. Thus when Ludendorff develops more appropriate battlefield tactics, the 32

problem is overcome. This argument has received much public exposure, and has led to the popular criticism of Generals such as Haig as donkeys. 5 4 the problem with this view is that the Generals were not simply pig-headed and ignorant of the changes around them (though in some instances this might have been the case). The close attention paid to the lessons of Russo-Japanese War, the application of scientific methods to battle plans, and the detailed planning of offensives suggest that the Generals were careful planners who attempted to learn the lessons of modern warfare. The problem, however, was with the lessons they chose to learn, and those they chose to ignore. As Tim Travers has argued, commanders in 1914 held a set of assumptions about the nature of war, and lessons were learnt within the confines of these assumptions rather than leading to a more fundamental questioning of the assumptions themselves. 5 5 The problem was that the world had changed sufficiently to invalidate these assumptions, and thus their solutions were flawed. In particular assumptions concerning the power of offensive spirit to overcome firepower, and the importance of discipline and tight planning led to fundamentally flawed strategies and tactics.

54. From the phrase lions led by donkeys used to describe the British Expeditionary Force. The great defender of Haig is John Terraine. See particularly his Doug/as Haig: the Educated Soldier (London, 1963). See also Alec Danchevs review of Terraines views, Haig revisited, RUSI Journal 135/2 (1990), pp. 71-4. 55. Travers, op. cit. This is based upon Thomas Kuhns ideas concerning scientific discovery. Kuhn argues that science progresses not as a series of building blocks, each being placed on top of the other, but rather as a series of leaps from one set of fundamental assumptions to another. Thus physicists from Newton worked within a set of assumptions concerning motion and matter. But these assumptions became increasingly tenuous as experiments produced results which did not correspond with these assumptions. Then with Einsteins theory of relativity, these assumptions were abandoned in favour of a different series of assumptions (or what is termed a paradigm). 33

The final hypothesis considers war not as a military but as a social phenomenon. Thus wars between mass industrialised societies, unless they are won quickly, will inevitably develop into wars of attrition where entire societies are mobilised for the war effort, and where victory is dependent upon out-producing the enemy in war material (including manpower). The most popular advocate of this view is John Terraine, who argues that in a war between mass industrialised societies victory is arrived at not by taking ground, but by imposing unacceptable losses upon the enemy. In this respect Terraine claims that the First World War was no different to the American Civil War or the Second World War. This argument again carries some weight, but has two flaws. Firstly it fails to explain why battles in the period 1915-1917 were so static. The wearing down battles of the Second World War in particular were characterised by mobility. Thus this theory may account for the attritional nature of the war, but it fails to explain why it was static. Secondly, it fails to explain the peculiarly wasteful tactics adopted by commanders with respect to their own men, and the manner in which commanders such as Haig, Rawlinson and Moltke were removed from the battlefield. Individually, none of these hypotheses satisfactorily accounts for the events on the Western Front in the First World War, but together they go some way towards an explanation. Perhaps the most interesting feature however concerns the relationship between the human/psychological battlefield and the material/firepower battlefield. Neither conception of war worked particularly well. The French in August 1914 in particular suffered horrendously from an overcommitment to the psychological battlefield in the offensive a loutrance, while firepower theories led to bloody slaughter at Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele. It was only when firepower was satisfactorily married to the human battlefield in Ludendorffs 1918 offensive that the strategic and tactical impasse of modern war was overcome.

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The Inter-War Years In the sorry aftermath of the First World War, two competing schools of thought emerged concerning the nature of modern war. The first considered the Great War to have set the pattern of modern war. In broad terms, wars would be characterised by attrition; by firepower and by the defensive prevailing. This was the predominant school of thought in official circles, and led to the construction of a series of powerful defensive lines, the most famous of which was the French Maginot Line. The second, competing school of thought stemmed from a revulsion at what had happened on the Western Front, and the conviction that a new (and implicitly better) approach was required. Advocates of a radical new approach included Liddell Hart and Fuller in Britain, Guderian in Germany, and Tukhachevskii in the Soviet Union. 5 6 Although there are a number of important differences between these radical thinkers, a number of similarities can also be detected. Firstly there was a common emphasis upon the need to restore mobility to warfare, an emphasis which drew them towards the possibility that mechanisation might revolutionise the battlefield. In particular the impact of the tank received much attention. Secondly there was an emphasis upon avoiding frontal assaults against prepared positions. Liddell Hart in particular is associated with the idea of the indirect approach, though it should be noted that these ideas were not simply geographic (e.g. turning a flank) but psychological (e.g. The use of surprise to catch the enemy unprepared). Thirdly, tactical

56. See for example: Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: the Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii(London, 1987); Brian Bond, Liddell-Hart: A Study of his Military Thought (London, 1977); Brian Holden-Reid, J F C Fuller: Military Thinker(London, 1987); B H Liddell Hart, the Other Side of the Hill: Germanys Generals, their Rise and Fall, with their Own Account of Military Events 1939-45 (London, 1948); Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London, 1983), pp. 160-3. For a critical assessment of Liddell Hart see John J Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988). 35

ideas tended to involve the concentration of force on a narrow front to achieve a breakthrough, which would be exploited by mechanised forces (particularly tanks). And finally these radical thinkers appeared increasingly concerned with psychological effects, and in particular with eroding the enemys will to fight. Thus the confusion caused by the appearance of forces in the defenders rear, forces moreover which were highly mobile and which could therefore appear and disappear with startling rapidity, would cause massive damage to an enemys morale. Thus it was no longer necessary to annihilate the army in the field; rather the enemys will to fight could be eroded. This debate over the nature of modern war was mirrored in the debate over the tank. It is important to note that the debate was less over the tanks importance- most armies readily recognised that it was an important new weapon on the battlefield - but on how it was to be used. Again two schools of thought are apparent. The first saw the tank as a mobile source of firepower to be used in support of the infantry, and therefore to be incorporated into infantry dominated formations. This was the British Armys view, 5 7 the view of the Soviet Union after the purges of the early-mid 1930s, and the view of the German General Staff in the mid-1930s. The second school of thought is more commonly associated with radical thinkers such as Liddell Hart, Guderian and Tukhachevskii, though it was adopted by the Red Army prior to Stalins purges, and increasingly by the German Army in the late 1930s. According to this school of thought, the tank should be used as an independent arm of

57. The British Army was the most fully mechanised army to go to war in 1939, but its view of the tank as an infantry support weapon meant that it operated in a very different manner to, for example, the German Panzer divisions. Thus it was not mechanisation which led to the opening up of the battlefield in the form of the Blitzkrieg, but the way armoured forces were used.

36

exploitation to strike deep into the enemys rear. Tanks should therefore be concentrated in units separate from the main infantry armies, and supported by mechanised infantry. By 1939 neither this debate concerning the tank, nor the broader debate concerning the nature of modern war had been satisfactorily resolved. As will be seen, the Second World War provided some support for both schools of thought in both debates, but by the end of the war a somewhat different style of battle was emerging, incorporating elements from a number of schools of thought in the inter-war years. Blitzkrieg and Attrition: the Second World War Superficially the Second World War appears to have been fought in a very different manner to the First. Whereas the First World War produced a lingering memory of static, attritional warfare, and of apparently senseless battles with higher command removed from the reality and true horrors of war, the popular memory of the Second World War is summed up in one word -Blitzkrieg. In reality however there are strong threads of continuity linking the First to the Second World War. In particular the envelopment strategy of the Schlieffen Plan was also used for the Blitzkrieg; the infantry tactics of Ludendorffs Spring 1918 offensive formed the basis for infantry tactics in the Second World War, and created a number of important innovations for use in manoeuvre warfare; Joffre-esque attritional tactics were extensively applied in set-piece battles - albeit perhaps in a more subtle form; and the middle years of the War were marked by an attritional phase similar in effect, if not necessarily in style, to the middle years of the First World War. 5 8 In other words continuity 58. On this theme of continuity rather than change see G D. Sheffield, Blitzkrieg and attrition: land operations in Europe, 1914-45, in Colin Mclnnes and G D Sheffield eds., Warfare in the Twentieth Century (London, 1988), pp.51-79. I have shamelessly borrowed the title of this section from G D Sheffield. 37

as well as change was apparent. This in turn has suggested a simple technological reductionism: that the elements of change in the character of war were the result of technological developments, and that continuity was the result of deeper features concerning the unchanging nature of warfare and the relationship between society and war. In particular it may be argued that improved battlefield mobility was a product of mechanisation, and therefore that the Blitzkrieg was a tank phenomenon. As with most reductionist arguments, there is an element of truth in this, but this element of truth has been exaggerated to obscure other determining factors. This has therefore produced an argument which simplifies what happened. In particular it obscures the developing relationship between the human and material battlefields which was a key feature of both the First and Second World Wars. The Second World War in Europe may be usefully divided into two broad phases, each characterised by the ascendancy of a specific style of warfare. 5 9 The first phase is from the outbreak of war in 1939 through to the German defeat at El Alamein and the stalling of their offensive at Stalingrad in 1942. This phase was marked by the ascendancy of a manoeuvre-orientated style of warfare, emphasising battlefield mobility, deep envelopment and psychological impact. The second phase, from 1942 through to 1945, saw the ascendancy of a different style of warfare, one which emphasised firepower, attrition and material advantage. A key feature to note however is that the two styles were not mutually exclusive, but rather that at various stages of the war one style was more successful than the other. Thus the French in 1940 failed to engage the Germans in a firepower-orientated style of warfare, while German attempts at manoeuvre warfare

59. This analysis concentrates on the war between European powers, broadly defined to include the war on the Eastern Front and the war in North Africa.

38

at Kursk (1943) and in the Battle of the Bulge (1944) failed. More intriguing still is the way in which one style was incorporated into the other, one providing the dominant theme, the other a major sub- theme. Thus Soviet operational art towards the end of the war emphasised firepower and attritional elements, but also used mobile tank armies for deep envelopment in manoeuvre-style warfare. The first theme, that of a manoeuvre-style warfare demonstrated principally in the German Blitzkrieg campaigns, displays a number of features. Firstly the importance of surprise and deception in catching the enemy off balance and therefore vulnerable to a sudden, daring thrust through his lines. Surprise also enables the attacker to seize the initiative, and erodes the enemys morale. Examples of this are the German Panzer assault through the Ardennes in 1940, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In the first example, the direction of the German assault caught the French by surprise, in the second the timing of the German assault (coupled to Stalins unwillingness to believe the Germans would attack) caught the Red Army by surprise. In both instances surprise assisted greatly not merely in physically weakening the enemy, but in eroding his morale. Following closely on from the importance of surprise, a second key feature is the concentration of force at weak spots. The Ardennes in 1940 again provides a good example, this time of the Germans successfully attacking a weak sector of the Maginot Line, while the failure of the German attack at Kursk in 1943 owed much to the attack being conducted without the benefit of surprise against strong, well prepared Soviet defences. A third characteristic is the use of a combined arms assault to break through enemy lines, to be exploited by a mobile group launched deep into the enemy rear. The important point to note here is that Blitzkrieg did not, as some writers have suggested, involve the avoidance of battle. 6 0 Rather a combined arms 60. Griffith, p. 89.

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assault was the first step in launching a mobile campaign. Thus the Germans fought a tough battle around Sedan before breaking through the French lines in the Ardennes in 1940, a battle in which the infantry supported by firepower were crucial, while the German invasion of the Soviet Union began with massive infantry and artillery assaults on Soviet frontier defences. 6 1 Fourthly, the breakthrough was followed by an envelopment of the enemys armed forces. In France, the bulk of the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force was enveloped by the German thrust from the Ardennes north to the English Channel, while Operational Barbarossa involved the envelopment of huge numbers of Soviet troops, most notably at Minsk and Smolensk. Two features are worth commenting upon concerning this strategy of envelopment. The first is that this was far from an innovative strategy, and had deep roots particularly in the German military tradition. Indeed the planned envelopment of British and French forces in 1940 was initially a fair copy of the Schlieffen Plan, envisaging an attack through Belgium, and it was only at a comparatively late stage that attention shifted to a blow through the Ardennes supplementing the advance through Belgium. Thus although envelopment was a key feature of this style of warfare, it was far from being innovative. Secondly the focus of the envelopment was the enemys armed forces, not a strategic location. Its aim was to render the enemys army incapable of action by both physical and psychological means. Traditionally the envelopment had been used to throw an enemy off balance, leading to its physical destruction in the field. The assumption was that the envelopment would be followed by battle ( the kesselschlacht or cauldron battle), after which the enemy might be physically and/or morally defeated. With the

61. On Sedan see Robert Allan Doughty, the Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, Conn., 1990); on the invasion of the Soviet Union see John Erickson, the Road to Stalingrad(London, 1975).

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Blitzkrieg however it became increasingly apparent that physical destruction might not be necessary, and that the cauldron battle might be avoided. This was because of the psychological impact of mechanized forces appearing in the rear of an army, and the collapse in morale that this might engender. David Irving writes of Rommels advance into France on 16-17 May 1940, having pierced the Maginot Line. There was no firing. Every unit he met meekly surrendered and, at Rommels suggestion, began plodding eastward into captivity, the enemy evidently believing that their position was more precarious than Pommels, which was not so. 6 2 Two final characteristics of this style of warfare were the relative importance attached to maintaining momentum, and the opportunistic nature of many operations. Both of these clearly reflect the human side of modern warfare. Momentum avoids a fixed battle where firepower would play a relatively more important role, and reinforces the psychological dislocation felt by the defending troops. Opportunism favours individual initiative and flexibility over pre-planning. This leads to an important conclusion. The first phase of the Second World War saw the ascendancy of the human battlefield over the material. Surprise, momentum, morale and opportunism are all facets of the human battlefield. But this was grounded in an appreciation of the material aspects of war - in an appreciation of the importance of firepower (for use by attacking forces in piercing enemy lines, and to be denied defending forces once the battlefield opens up), and in an understanding of the need to concentrate at the decisive point. Thus this style of warfare was not so much the triumph of the human battlefield over the material; rather it was

62. David Irving, the Trail of the Fox: the Life of Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel (London, 1977), p. 43.

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that human factors were placed higher on commanders agendas than material. A balance was struck in favour of human factors, but material factors played a supporting role. The second phase of the war however saw a different style of battle emerge, one which placed a higher priority on material aspects. Moreover, whereas the chief practitioners of the first style had been the Germans, this second style of fighting was more closely associated with the Soviets and the Anglo-American alliance. Thus it is not entirely coincidental that the first style Germany sees on the strategic offensive in the West, in North Africa and in the Soviet Union, while the second sees the allies push the Germans Out of North Africa, back up Italy, and across France into the Reich, while the Soviets conduct a series of offensives pushing the Germans back from Stalingrad in the South and Leningrad in the North, to Berlin. Two background factors helped this new style of warfare emerge. Firstly the tank, the weapon which had symbolised the first style of warfare, became less effective as a shock weapon. Troops - particularly infantry - learned new tactics to deal with the tank, and effective anti-tank weapons became increasingly available. Thus at Kursk in 1943, German tanks ran into anti-tank screens supported by Soviet tanks, while at Alam Halfa in 1942 Pommels Afrika Korps was brought up sharp by Montgomerys well-positioned anti-tank defences. This is not to say that the tank could no longer be a decisive weapon; rather it is to say that the tanks psychological impact was reduced as its novelty was eroded, and as weapons and tactics were developed to counter it. Secondly industrial strength and the quantity of weapons began to play an increasing role in battles. Thus Montgomery refused to go on to the offensive in Egypt until he had achieved decisive material superiority over the enemy, while Stalins guiding principles of war - the permanently operating factors - reveal an emphasis on quantity which was in turn reflected in the numerical superiority the Soviets regularly achieved on the battlefield. To destroy German Army Group Centre in Operation Bagration (June 1944) for example, the Soviets amassed a 2.5:1 superiority in men,

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2.9:1 in guns and mortars, 4.3:1 in tanks and 4.5:1 in aircraft. 6 3 As the Soviet maxim put it, quantity has a quality of its own. This second phase of the War was characterised by a number of features. Firstly artillery and infantry became increasingly important in the planning for, and conduct of battles. For the Soviets, artillery was the master of the battlefield, not the tank, whilst Montgomery was noted for his use of artillery at El Alamein. 6 4 Again it is important not to overestimate this. The tank remained an important weapon on the battlefield, whilst artillery and infantry had been far from unimportant in the earlier phase of the war. But the balance had shifted. Also a new type of formation was emerging: the combined arms unit. Battles were being fought by synergistic units - artillery, infantry, armour, and engineers working together such that the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. In addition aircraft became increasingly a factor, not merely in interdicting lines of supply, but in direct support of land operations. 6 5 Thus the modern combined arms, land-air battle emerged in the North African desert, and the Soviet steppes. Secondly battle was increasingly characterised by massive combined arms assaults used to weaken enemy defences, followed by a mobile phase using armoured forces to exploit the break

63. Gerd Niepold, Battle for White Russia: the Destruction of Army Group Centre, June 1944, trans. Richard Simpkin (London, 1987), p. 57. .pa 64. On Montgomery see in particular Nigel Hamiltons three volume history Monty. El Alamein is dealt with in the first volume, Monty: the Making of a General, 1887-1942 (London, 1981). 65. Although the German Stuka had been used in support of the Blitzkrieg campaigns, its effectiveness was very limited (Doughty, pp. 323-4).

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through and envelop the enemy. Thus in Operation Bagration of June 1944, the Soviets deployed a crushing weight on the German line, with infantry, artillery and tanks breaking into enemy lines in a combined arms operation. Mobile tank corps then exploited this success with deep thrusts to surround the enemy. Roughly one-third of all tanks were used in the first phase, two-thirds in the second. 6 6 It is interesting to note the role surprise played in this battle. The Soviets used deception (maskirovka) extensively throughout the war, and by 1944 had become adept in its use. In this instance the Soviets were able to deceive the Germans into thinking that their Summer 1944 offensive would be further to the South against Army Group North Ukraine. As a result the Germans transferred the powerful LVI Panzer Corps from Army Group Centre to Army Group North Ukraine, depriving the former of 82% of its tanks, 20-30% of its artillery, 50% of its self propelled anti-tank guns, and 15% of its divisions. 6 7 It is also interesting to compare Soviet operational art in 1944 with Haigs plans for the Somme. Superficially the two appear to share a number of conceptual similarities, in particular the idea of a massive assault to weaken the defences, followed by a mobile exploitation to envelop the enemy. Yet the two are in reality very different. For the Soviets, surprise, speed of assault, concentration of effort at key points, and combined arms operations were all essential to the successful conduct of the battle, whereas for Haig and Rawlinson they ranked much lower on their list of priorities. The difference was therefore not so much the technology available as the priorities of the commanders fighting the battle, what we might term the battle agenda. A third characteristic of this phase of the war was the relative importance of planning over opportunism. The point is not that 66. 67. Niepold, p.263. Niepold, p.15.

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planning replaced opportunism: detailed planning was in evidence during 1939-42, and opportunism did occur after 1942. But the balance had shifted towards greater planning and a reduced scope for opportunism. This reflects once again the more material approach to war during this phase. A greater emphasis was placed upon the destruction of enemy forces by the careful massing of resources. Less emphasis was placed on daring, risky moves which might backfire, but which if successful might reap disproportionate dividends ( the US General George Patton being a notable exception). In part this was because disproportionate dividends were not required given material superiority. The Germans lacked material superiority in 1940 and 1941, and therefore placed greater emphasis on the human battlefield. The AngloAmerican Allies and the Soviets began to enjoy material superiority from 1942 on, or were able to achieve it through the use of deception, and could use this for battlefield success. Finally the balance between psychological dislocation and the physical destruction of enemy forces was shifted in favour of physical destruction, again symptomatic of a greater emphasis on the material battlefield. Thus Montgomery encouraged his forces at El Alamein to kill Germans, and the essence of his battle plan was the systematic annihilation of the enemy infantry (what he termed crumbling). 6 8 This was a pattern he was to follow in Sicily, Italy and France. Similarly the Soviets placed greater emphasis upon the destruction of German forces than on their cracking under psychological pressure. When morale did play an important role, it was in motivating forces for attack. Montgomery therefore, despite his emphasis upon careful planning and the crumbling of enemy defences, also considered highly motivated soldiers essential to the success of any

68. Hamilton, p. 711ff

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operation. Morale was not to be displaced by firepower, but was to work with it to ensure battlefield success. By the end of the war then a style of warfare had emerged which blended elements of both the human and material battlefields. The material battlefield was dominant, and overwhelming firepower provided the key to success; but human factors provided a major sub- theme, and manoeuvre an important element in overall success. Conclusion Modern Warfare - Principles and Practice Constructing a list of the principles of war can become something akin to a shopping list, or perhaps more accurately a wish list. The purchase of an item from this list may well preclude purchasing other items - what economists call opportunity costs. Such a list may include the following items: Concentration of force at decisive points Surprise Superiority of fire Clear plan of operations Operational flexibility Momentum and mobility Discipline Morale

But what happens when these items contradict each other? For Rawlinson on the Somme, firepower precluded surprise. For Haig, discipline precluded operational flexibility. For Ludendorff, surprise meant foregoing the full exploitation of the concentration of artillery in 1918. For Montgomery, the concentration of force, weight of firepower and clear planning constrained his ability to manoeuvre forces and exploit mobility in the manner Rommel did. The simple answer to this is that a balance needs to be struck between competing principles. But this merely raises the question of where the balance is to be struck. Which principles are to receive priority? And to what extent should other principles be sacrificed for their sake? 46

The period 1914-45 saw the development of a balance through the workings of two not quite distinct sets of priorities. The first emphasised human qualities: morale, surprise, initiative (or, sometimes, discipline). The second emphasised material qualities: firepower, concentration of force, planning. During the First World War these two approaches competed, with clear priority being given to one set of priorities, whilst at the same time others might be almost completely abandoned. This failed. Ludendorffs Spring 1918 Offensive attempted to balance the two approaches, and part of its success was attributable to this. But by 1939 the balance had yet to be fully determined, and although the Germans enjoyed an advantage in the early years through emphasising human qualities (though not to the exclusion of material) this proved to be short-lived. At the end of the war the balance which had emerged favoured the material battlefield, but with important concessions to the human. Thus firepower emerged as dominant, though not to the exclusion of surprise and momentum. Surprise and momentum were to be achieved within a context set by firepower. Similarly clear planning was essential on the complex and large battlefields of the twentieth century. But within this clear plan, elements of flexibility must be built in to allow for the exploitation of initiative, and for opportunism. Thus Operation Desert Storm worked within a context set by a clear plan, and by overwhelming firepower. These were the dominant themes. But within these, initiative, surprise, momentum and flexibility were clear sub- themes.

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THE AUTHOR COLIN J McINNES Dr Colin J Mclnnes is Defence Lecturer in the Department of International Politics, the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. He was formerly a lecturer in the Department of War Studies, RMA Sandhurst. He is the author of a number of books and articles, including Trident: the Only Option?, (1986) Warfare in the Twentieth Century(ed. with C D Sheffield) (1988), NATOs Changing Strategic Agenda (1990), and Security and Strategy in the New Europe (ed.) (1992).

Errata SCSI Occasional Paper Number 1 War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930 Brian Holden Reid Page 8. The second line of Footnote 8 has been replicated at the top of this page and should be deleted. Footnote 18 has been omitted. The following should be inserted above Footnote 19. 18.Brian Holden Reid, .J F C Fuller: Military Thinker(London: Macmillan, 1987), p 28.

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