Modal Conditions and Strange Worlds MA Dacela Some epistemologists believe that the intuition of luck in Gettier cases

is modal in nature: that S accidentally believes p is explained by the intuition that there is a possible world where S believes otherwise. And that p is accidentally true is explained by the intuition that there is a possible world where p is false. The following counterfactual conditions then, expressed using subjunctive conditionals, were offered to eliminate this sort of luck:
(1) If p were not true, S would not believe that p ( ) and if, in changed circumstances, were p remains true, S would still believe that p ( ). (2) If S were to believe p, it would be the case that p ( ).

I take these conditions to assume a notion of closeness that presupposes the indexicality thesis, which roughly means that any world may be taken as actual. This will help me evaluate how they stand against skepticism, which I interpret here in two ways: the weak sense where the demon world is taken as a far away world and the strong sense where the demon world is taken as the actual world. I will show that these conditions are trivial in both cases. Also, that they do not eliminate luck if you take epistemically strange worlds, like demon worlds and what I call angel worlds, as actual. Outline 1. Safety, Sensitivity, and Skepticism 2. Indexicality Thesis 3. Weak and Strong Skepticism 4. Strange Worlds: Demon Worlds and Angel Worlds 5. Diagnosis and Conclusion

Key Words: Modal Conditions, Safety, Sensitivity, Skepticism