MOVING MOUNTAINS A REVIEW BY: JOSELITO C.

GACUTAN INTRODUCTION MOVING MOUNTAINS Lessons in Leadership and Logistics From the Gulf War. By William G. Pagonis with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. Illustrated. 248 pp. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

BODY HAVING kept American forces well supplied during the Persian Gulf war, Lieut. Gen. William G. Pagonis now offers corporate America lessons in innovative management. "Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics From the Gulf War" is not a modest book. General Pagonis maintains that, in effect, his achievements as the leader of a huge Army logistics team rank him among the nation's more imaginative and effective top executives. That would be quite a spinoff victory from the gulf war, if it were true. But while General Pagonis is clearly an effective executive, his management precepts are already known to corporate America, or should be. More than a decade of self-analysis and selfcriticism for having lost the industrial lead to Japan and Germany has produced a huge volume of literature on how to manage workers, reorganize and inspire them, and how to keep strategic goals simple and flexible. "Moving Mountains," is offering an original management tool: 3-by-5 cards, each with a handwritten message, that General Pagonis and his corps used by the thousands to keep information flowing rapidly. But such management agility is now standard in corporate America, and "Moving Mountains" is far from being a breakthrough book. Disconcertingly, General Pagonis shifts back and forth from memoir to management textbook, with the latter occupying two-thirds of the book. The memoir is more vivid, anecdotal and instructive. For months William (Gus) Pagonis was billed in the news media as the logistics genius who, as head of the Army's 22d Support Command, had fed, housed and equipped more than half a million American troops on short notice. As he notes, moving that large a force and all its equipment was like moving the whole state of Alaska and everything in it around the globe and then keeping it going. How did he do it? General Pagonis offers a broad outline, but starves his readers for detail.

One lesson comes through loud and clear. Saudi Arabia turned out to be a wellequipped and friendly staging area for a war. When the general arrived with a skeleton staff, he rented Saudi buses to transport the thousands of troops piling up on airport tarmacs without a clue about what to do next. And he secured 10,000 Bedouin tents to help house them. The greatest feat, getting so many Americans and so much ammunition and equipment from the United States to Saudi Arabia in a few weeks, is not the subject of this book, and that is disappointing. Others managed this aspect of the operation; the general and his men -- a corporate work force, so to speak, that reached 50,000 people -- handled the distribution within Saudi Arabia. And for all their organizational skills, they might have failed if the Saudis had not made available deep-water ports with excellent docks and huge warehouses, fresh food and thousands of trucks and buses that were rented, each with a driver, from the Philippines, Korea, Turkey or Bangladesh. The same war, staged from a much less friendly country like Jordan or Syria, might not have made the 51-year-old General Pagonis such a management hero. MOVING tanks hundreds of miles to the front line, for example, was a major problem. Under their own steam, the tanks would have torn up the asphalt highways or burned too much fuel and created too many maintenance problems. General Pagonis urgently needed big transport trucks, and the Army had only 112 in Saudi Arabia. "We were able to assemble a fleet of nearly 1,300 H.E.T.'s [ heavy equipment transporters ] and tractor trailers, most of which came equipped with experienced third-country national drivers," the general reports. And on to the next problem. Zahir Mastri, a friend of King Fahd, solved General Pagonis's fresh-food problem. As the general tells the story in an amusing section of the book, troops waiting months in the desert for the war to start required a diet that went beyond dry Army rations, and Mr. Mastri's company, Astra Foods, operated the largest covered farm in the world. Soon Astra Foods and the Pagonis team had mess halls everywhere as well as mobile fast-food canteens, with King Fahd paying most of the bill. King Fahd, the good Arab host, had sent Mr. Mastri to the Americans. A successful company, of course, is not only efficient but profitable. The gulf war's urgency saved General Pagonis from budget constraints, and the Army's buying power was a magnet not only for Saudi merchants but also for suppliers in neighboring countries. "Word spread like wildfire that the American military was paying in Saudi riyals -- a desirable currency -- and that payment was made every two weeks," General Pagonis writes. "Since the Saudi Government was in the habit of paying its vendors only once or twice a year, we were suddenly the favorite clients on the block."

And in the end it is that buying power that makes Army executives, even those as skilled as General Pagonis, less than credible as management gurus. Military memoirs, in his view, are no longer the preserve of combat commanders like General Grant or General Eisenhower or, most recently, General Schwarzkopf. Supplying military expeditions in the post-cold war era is also heroic, he believes, and the Army's performance in the gulf is evidence that America is supreme in that field. "Our logistical successes in the gulf war," General Pagonis writes, "suggest to me that our colleagues in the private sector may now get some good guidance from us." In the 19th century European generals came to this country to learn something about moving and supplying large, complicated forces by observing P. T. Barnum's maneuvers with his vast circus. Now American industry, the general suggests, should look not only to Japan and Germany for lessons in efficiency, but also to the United States Army. After his leadership and command of all Army supply in Desert Storm, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William "Gus" Pagonis is considered by many to be a logistical guru. Lt. Gen. Pagonis spearheaded the logistical push into Kuwait during Desert Storm/Shield, including the initial build up of forces. His small team of logisticians tackled a mountain of logistics in supporting almost 550,000 soldiers in every single aspect of warfare and day-to-day support. The logistical framework of any organization can make or break the bank, and strong leadership and efficiency can overcome any major obstacle. The Armys model for large-scale operational support has been adapted and implemented into different civilian markets. Included within this are supply and logistical solutions from both external and internal sources. Corporate leaders also look to the military for leaders coming off of active duty. Lt. Gen. Pagonis and others like him at every level of command are proven leaders who can take their experiences from combat and military leadership and incorporate into their civilian job. Speaking to employers and recent veterans who are searching for jobs in the civilian market, Lt. Gen. Pagonis provides his insight into what makes a successful leader both in combat and behind a desk, as well as the relations between Civilian and Military leadership around the country. Gen-eral Pagonis, the US Army logistics commander during the Gulf War, in his book Moving Mountains, describes the daunting task and the key role that contractors played in the effort. The operation was not without its problems, as contractors entered the theatre without staging through military centres back home. Issues of security and safety were ever present as the threat of chemical and biological warfare was real and persistent. The British experience highlighted the difficulties with Middle Eastern business practices and the need for experienced contracting personnel granted with executive powers. There was a definite need for properly trained logistics personnel

with planning, contracting, and financial skills. As noted earlier, this is exactly the problem that the British experienced in the Crimea war that resulted in the formation of the quartermaster (logistics) corps. In terms of support, the British view in the Gulf was that whilst all the civilian contractors made a significant contribution to our own efforts, they were, inevitably, less predictable in terms of availability, work-rate and re-liability than would have been personnel un-der military discipline. From a Canadian perspective, civilian contractor support revolved around specialist engineering personnel who worked on unique technical systems on both the ships and the fighter aircraft. As the Army did not deploy to the Gulf, signifi-cant amounts of host nation support were not required. Due to the changing nature of military operations at the end of the Cold War, particularly engaging in small contingencies characteristic of a multipolar world, the US Army introduced the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) to provide additional options to a force commander when tasked with a contingency operation. This program is very robust in that thereby a contractor is provided a standing offer to pre-plan for a number of contingencies and holds assets at the ready to meet short notice tasking. The program has been used extensively by the American Army to support peacekeeping operations in Africa, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. The contractors have provided a host of logistical services such as construction, transport, food services, mortu-ary and supply distribution. There have been problems of cost overruns but these were more from overtasking or altered mission re-quirements, rather than poor estimates by the contractor. Further difficulties were caused by a lack of experience exhibited by Army con-tract officers, poor cost reporting, issues of security, and the application of legal status. Other nations are tackling the issue of contractor support to operations. The Australians have just completed a major study in the area of civilian contractor support. They have focused on the strategies to minimize the constraints limiting the employment of contractors supporting Australian Defence The necessity to maintain an organic capability is stated as a fundamen-tal premise. Their effort is to determine ways to assist and augment the force structure, not alter it. Similarly, the British are undertaking the same analysis and have called it Contractors on Deployed Operations. The rationale for the study mirrors that of other na-tions and is highlighted in their Strategic De-fence Review which identified weakness in our ability to sustain forces deployed overseas, particularly where local facilities are limited...and where appropriate, we will con-sider the use of contractors to assist with lo-gistic support. History shows that the use of contractors on the battlefield is not a new concept. Many issues such as assured support, flexibility, cost, contracting practices, impact on troop morale, responsiveness, technology support, protection, security, and legal status have influenced contractor support. Each of these factors must be dealt with in todays context. The nature of conflict has changed where the battle line is blurred, legal issues play a significant role, and the protection of civilians in areas of conflict is paramount. Two of the more critical issues that will confront field commanders are the security and legality of contractors on the battlefield. For the military, contractors on the battlefield are an emotive issue. It is hard to objectively look at functions in peacetime and be assured that in the Clauswitzian friction or fog 40 of war, the assured support will be there. Really there is no option for the militaries of today. Survival and readiness to meet the obligations of your country, optimization of the limited budgets, and a focus on

what is core are essential. Exercises to determine core capabilities are difficult. A quick look at industry can show you that there are as many successes as there are failures. Despite the reluctance by military personnel to undertake this analysis, to be successful, the work must be done. Support to the new highly technological military equipment will demand it, as evidenced in the conflicts and wars of the 20th century. History has shown us that outsourcing is not new. Throughout the ages, the use of civilian contractors to provide logistical support to military forces has been a reality. It also shows us that there are considerable dangers when the use of contractors is not properly applied, as the British found during the Crimean War when there were irregulari-ties in costs and, more worrisome, there was a shortage of supplies. Even in the recent conflicts in East Timor, problems with logis-tics were encountered as a result of outsourc-ing. Conversely, we should not let these failures stop an effort that can be highly ben-eficial. It was Napoleon who set up proper lo-gistic support infrastructure composed of both military and civilian contractors. As a result, his troops were able to march somewhat fast-er and farther than most others, a most impor-tant advantage that goes to explain their success. Due to poor communications and mission creep, cost overruns and duplication occurred in the American War of Revolution, the American Civil War, and then again in Somalia. As high technology influenced warfare through the 20th century, the presence of civilian technical specialists on or near the battlefield became more common. Issues of security, protection and legal status emerged as key problematic factors. During the Vietnam War, when dock workers in Australia refused to load a ship with munitions, the problem of assured support and accountability came into question. Today, there has been a reduction in the size of military forces. Yet, there has been an increase in regional conflict. Additionally, there has been a drive by government to get out of non-core business and focus on governance. All of these factors cause us to look at private business to deliver the programs. For the military the issue of contractors on the battlefield becomes an important one, and an analysis is necessary of the factors that will influence our decisionmaking. The legal issues that are confronting contractors on the battlefield are of great concern, and a concerted effort to address these problems will be fundamental. Where the conflicts today are everything short of war, yet where the threats are significant, contractors and military commanders are in a legal dilemma. Military commanders have an obligation not to put civilians in harms way unless war has been declared and the contractors legal status is prescribed. Essentially, a new support concept for forces in the field will have to be developed but a coordinated master plan will have to be formulated. Proper risk analysis will have to be undertaken to maximize the potential for mission success. Technology will resolve a number of the challenges associated with contractors on the battlefield but it will also bring a host of new responsibilities. Periods of hostility are not the time to resolve these issues. With the outsourcing of critical functions such as field maintenance, the field commander will not have the organic core competencies to support the high-technology equipment if contractors decide to stay home. However, con-tractors have supported the troops through the ages. When war broke out on the morning of January 17th as the United States and allied air-craft bombed Iraq and Kuwait, the US contractors did not leave Saudi Arabia; some in-dustry personnel even remained on the front lines with US troops. This situation will be the norm as we move into the foreseeable future. The real issue is that the duration, scope, number of

locations, and criticality will increase. The Canadian Forces need to be in the forefront of this change. Contractor support of operations will be an essential element of our future. The core competency and capabil-ity analysis must be undertaken and the critical factors of security, protection and legal status must be addressed. The role for strategic leadership in this domain has never been so crucial. The fundamental question is: Will we be there, leading the change? CONLUSION General Pagonis and his command are widely recognized as one of the main reasons that the Gulf War was so successful so quickly. He leads up a career to the Gulf War and how he was able to establish a logistics infrastructure to support 5,000 troops arriving daily. An interesting discussion is how he planned and executed the redeployment of the troops after the ground war was over. Since everyone had expected the war to last much longer than it did, the Armed Forces had built up a large inventory of equipment and supplies. All of these had to be collected, consolidated, cleaned, and shipped back to the US and Europe. This is a great handbook for managers because Pagonis discusses his leadership style in great detail. He is truly a leadership guru. He shows great respect for his subordinates, and he advocates the current buzz words in management: communication, management by walking around, respect, empowerment, cross-training, and flexibility. Even though these words are not new anymore, they seem to have a greater weight because he has actually put them into practice and experienced a great success.