WublhhS : The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi-1 Prirtkr Edition Price : Vidya Vilas Press, Varanasi-1 : Second,

1968. : Rs. 45-00

This is a Second Edition of the work, revised, enlarged, and re-elaborated by the Author, the First Edition having appeared in the SOR, No. XI, published by 1SMEO ( Jstituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente ) , Rome 1956.

(C) T h e

Chowkhamba

Sanskrit

Series

Office

PUBLISHERS AND ORIENTAL & FOREIGN BOOK-SELLERS K. 37/99, Gopal Mandir Lane P. O. CHOWKHAMBA, P. BOX 8, VARANASI-1 ( India ) 1968

PUBLISHERS'

NOTE

ATBJNAVAGUPTA seems to have given the final shape to the philo*.*.* -><- Uty -m i n dia. His name is familiar to all students of Sanskrit His fame is still alive and his poetical It is no wonder ^t^land.Indian Aesthetics.

PmpMlbsphical theories hold ground even today.

|A;%esthetic thought of Abhinavagupta, one of the most profound f f e s t minds that India has ever known, captured the imagination j&aniero Gnoli who, besides being an erudite scholar, l(tiu&, sense of the term. wellp ' k i t o r and able translator of various Sanskrit Texts, is a Saludaya His thorough understanding and scholarly of the Rasa-theory of Abhinavagupta in particular theories of other thinkers in general, are simply wonderful, work, , AESTHETIC he has EXPERIENCE ACCORDING edited and translated the Comwhich constitutes

y Abhinavagupta on the famous smra of Bharata, Vibhavnu( Nalya sastra ) text in the whole of Indian aesthetic thought, and the light of the views of prominent rhetors and philoancient and modern. The theory of Abhinavagupta has e:presented here in a garb which can very easily appeal to

of this work was issued some ten years back by the in the SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA ( No. XI ) under of Giuseppe Tucci, and was much welcomed by the lovers

IX XIII XIV 3 23 88 102 107 115

[VU]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS .b. = Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabharati cf. Preface, p. x n i . = Abhinavagupta, = Haas, George C. O., The Dasarpa> A Treatise of Hindu Dramatwgy by Dhanamjaya, Columbia University Press, New York 1912. = Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols., Cambridge 1932-1955. = De, Sushi! Kumar, Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Luzac, 2 vols., London 1923, 1925. = nandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka with the Locana and Balapny commentaries by Abhinavagupta and Rmaeraka, ed. by Pandit Pattbhirma str, Chowkhamba, Benares 1940. = Abhinavagupta's commentary (locana) on the Dhvanyaloka by Anandavardhana. = Kavi's edition of the Abhinavabharati, cf. Preface, p. x u i . = Hemacandra's Kvynussana, cf. Preface, p XIII. = Chandra Bhan Gupta, The Indian Theatre, Motilal Banarsidass, Banaras 1954. = Abhinavagupta's Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsim, K.S T S , 2 vols, Srinagar 1918-1921. = Abhinavagupta's Isvarapratyabhijnavivftivimarsmi, K. S. T. S., 3 vols , Srnagar 1938-1943. sjayaratha, the commentator of the Abhinavagupta's Tantrcdoka s Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society. -Journal of Bombay University. - Journal of Oriental Research, Madras. = Dandm's Kavydarsa, edited and translated by O Bohthngk, Leipzig 1890. = Kane, P. V., The Sahityadarpai a of Visvanatha ( Paricchedas I, II, Arthlankras ), with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Bombay 1951. =Rjaeekhara's Kavyam mms, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda 1916. = Mammata's Kavyaprakasa, cf. Preface, p. X V. [IX]

Haas P&sgupta,

MA.

DhJ.L. G Be,

t IBORS

$.Ad. JCape, S.D.V.

ABBREVIATIONS K.S.T.S. = Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. Mahimabhatta, = The Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta, ed. with a comm. of Vyaktiviveka Ruyyaka and the Madhusdancomm. by Madhusdana Mira, Chowkhamba, Benares 1936. M.C. = Manikyacandra, cf. Preface, p. x n i . -The NyTiyamanjarl of Jayanta Bhatta, ed. by Surya N.M. Nryana ukla, Benares 1936. = Ntya Sstra, cf. Preface, p. x n i . N.S. P = Pandey, cf. Preface, p. xv. = Pandey, Kanti Chandra, Indian Aesthetics, Chowkhamba, Pandey Banaras 1950. Pandey, A.G. = Pandey, Kanti Chandra: Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1935. P.TV. = Abhinavagupta's ParMrimsikamvarana, K. S. T. S., grnagar 1918. p)v. = Dharmakrti's Pramnavartika with a commentary of Manorathanandin ed. by Rhula Snkrtyyana. Appendix to JBORS, vol. XX1V-XXVI, 1938-1940. Py., svavrtti = MS. of the commentary by Dharmakrti on the ch. I ( svarthemumanapanccheda ) of his Pramnavartika. This MS. belongs to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci. = Kalhana's Rjatarangin, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay R.T. 1892. ' S. K. = The Stmkhya Kcirika of varakrsna with the Snkhya Taitvakaumud of Vchaspati Mira, Bombay 1940. Somnanda, =^Somnanda's ivadrsti with the vrtti of Utpaladeva, ivadrsti rnagar 1934. Spandanirnaya = Ksemarja's Spandanirnaya, K.S.T.S., rnagar 1925. Stavacintamayi = The Stava-Chiniamani of Bhatta Nryana with commentary by Ksemarja, K.S.T.S., $rinagar 1918. T.A. = Abhinavagupta's Tantrloka, with the commentary of Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 12 vols., rlnagar 1918-1938. VijhTmabhairava= The Vijnanabhairava with comm. partly by Ksemarja .and partly by aivopdhyya, K.S.T.S., rnagar 1918. V.P. = Bhartrhari's Vkyapadlya ed. by Crudeva strl Lahore 1939. ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlndischen Gesellschaft. l X]

THE

AESTHETIC TO

EXPERIENCE

ACCORDING

ABHINAVAGUPTA

PREFACE T h i s b o o k was first printed in 1956. Since t h e n I h a v e jfjeyer relinquished m y researches in t h e fields of I n d i a n ^Rhetoric and Aesthetics. Some misinterpretations a n d m i s states occurring in t h e first edition h a v e already b e e n corrected b y myself in 1957, in t h e p a p e r Further Observations on the AbhinavabhratJ, East a n d West, year V I I I , N . 1.April, 1957 >pf>, 100-103. T h i s n e w edition represents, I trust, a great i m p r o v e m e n t in r e g a r d t o t h e first o n e . T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n , t h e ^critical apparatus, t h e translation a n d t h e notes h a v e been completely revised. T h e basic text of A b h i n a v a g u p t a , i.e. t h e "commentary t o t h e famous stra by Bharata, V I , after s t 3 1 , 'Mbhvnubhvavyabhicrisamyogd rasanispattih, has been supplemented b y three n e w texts, viz. t h e Commentaries o n Nfyasstra, I 3 st. 107, o n Dhvunyloka, I, st. 18, a n d I I , st. 4 . A s t o t h e text I h a v e directly compared t h e M S of Abhinabhrat preserved i n t h e library of M a d r a s (M). References t o t h e K a v i ' s edition of t h e Abhinavabharat are t o t h e second edifton of it. T h e letters H e a n d M . C refer t o t h e viveka of ijemacandra and t o t h e samketa of Mnikyacandra respectively, A l t h o u g h t h e additions a n d explanations of H e d o n o t alter i t t a i i y way t h e t h o u g h t of A G . , I h a v e n o t r e p r o d u c e d t h e m i i i i h e text, w h i c h I h a v e tried t o set forth such as it was before $|ie exegetical activity of t h e great jaina scholar. I n so m a n y changes, o n e t h i n g has remained u n c h a n g e d in these t e n years : I m e a n t h e p r o f o u n d debt of g r a t i t u d e I o w e to Prof. G i u s e p p e Tucci, t o w h o m , n o w as t h e n , this b o o k is Abdicated.

[ xiii ]

INTRODUCTION The 1. I n India, t h e study of aestheticswhich was at restricted t o t h e d r a m a d r a w s its origin from n o abstract disinterested desire for k n o w l e d g e b u t from motives of purely empirical order. T h e m o s t ancient text that has d o w n t o us is t h e Ntyasstra fiist or a

come

(4th o r 5th Century A . D . ?), T h i s is a v o l u m i n o u s collecThe

ascribed t o t h e mythical Bharata.

t i o n of observations a n d rules concerned in t h e main with t h e p r o d u c t i o n of d r a m a a n d t h e training of actors and poets. a u t h o r , o r t h e a u t h o r s , w i t h a certain sententiousness and p e d a n t r y typical of I n d i a n t h o u g h t , classify t h e various mental states o r e m o t i o n s of t h e h u m a n soul a n d treat of their transit i o n from t h e practical t o t h e aesthetic plane. is a w o r k o f deep psychological insight. The Ntyasstra to D r a m a appeals

sight a n d h e a r i n g at t h e same time (the only senses t h a t are capable, according t o some I n d i a n t h i n k e r s , of rising a b o v e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e limited " I " ) and is t h e n considered t h e h i g h e s t f o r m of art. I n it b o t h sight and h e a r i n g collaborate by in arousing in t h e spectator, m o r e easily a n d forcibly t h a n any o t h e r form of art, a state

of consciousness sut generis^

conceived intuitively a n d concretely as a juice o r flavour, called Rasa. T h i s typically I n d i a n conception of aesthetic experience as a juice o r a taste savoured by t h e reader or spectator should n o t surprise us. I n India, a n d elsewhere, sensations p r o p e r t o the senses of taste and t o u c h , almost devoid of any noetic representation, arc easily taken t o designate states of consciousness m o r e intimate and r e m o v e d from abstract representations [ xiv ]

INTRODUCTION than t h e ordinary o n e t h a t is t h e aesthetic experience a n d various forms of religious ones. This Rasa, w h e n tasted by t h e spectator, pervades a n d enchants h i m . Aesthetic experience is, therefore, t h e act of tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it t o t h e exclusion of . all else. Bharata, in a famous a p h o r i s m w h i c h , interpreted a n d elaborated in various ways, forms t h e p o i n t of departure of all later I n d i a n aesthetic t h o u g h t s , says, in essence, t h a t Rasa b o m from t h e u n i o n of t h e play w i t h t h e performance of factors. t h e birth "Rasa ? " Out of t h e u n i o n of t h e D e t e r m i n a n t s h e is the says

Jitetally, t h e Consequents a n d t h e T r a n s i t o r y Mental States, of Rasa takes p l a c e " . W h a t is t h e n t h e n a t u r e of emotions and W h a t are its relations w i t h t h e o t h e r

states of consciousness ? A n d h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d this w o r d " birth " ? T h e w h o l e of Indian aesthetics h i n g e s o n such questions, w h i c h h a v e been an inexhaustible source of polemic material t o generations of r h e t o r s a n d thinkers, d o w n to o u r o w n days. But, before u n d e r t a k i n g an examination of their various interpretations, let us briefly e x p o u n d h e r e t h e essentials of t h e empirical psychology of Bharata. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Ntyasstra, eight fundamental feelings, sthyibhva1, (rati\ These soul : D e l i g h t instincts, emotions o r mental states called bhva o r can b e distinguished in t h e h u m a n Fear (bbaya), D i s g u s t {jugupsa), X a u g h t e r (basa), S o r r o w (soka), Angt(krodha),

H e r o i s m (utsha),

a n d W o n d e r (vismaya).

1) The word bhva is made to derive by Bharata, VII, 342-346, from the causative of bhu> to be, which may be intended in two different meanings, that is '* to cause to be " (viz. bring about, create, etc.) and " to pervade ". According to the first meaning, that which is brought about are the purposes of poetry, kvyrtha, that is, the Rasas (cf. below, p. 50, n. Id), According to the second meaning these are so called because they pervade, as a smell, the minds of the spectators. The meaning of sthSyin is permanent, basic, etc, r xv i

INTRODUCTION eight states are i n b o r n in m a n ' s heart. T h e y permanently exist in the m i n d of every man, in t h e form of latent impressions (vasdM) derived from actual experiences in t h e present life o r lerited instincts, and, as such, they are ready t o emerge to>m h i n t o m s consciousness o n any occasion. I n ordinary life each feeling is manifested a n d accompanied by three elements, causes {krand), effects (krya) and concomitant elements (Sahakrw). T h e causes are t h e various situations a n d encounters of life, by w h i c h it is excited ; t h e effects, t h e visible reactions caused b y it a n d expressed b y o u r face, o u r gestures and so o n ; a n d t h e concomitant elements, t h e accessory a n d t e m p o r a r y mental states accompanying it. T h e s e eight bhvas, indeed, d o n o t appear i n a p u r e form. T h e various modulations of o u r mental states are extremely complex, a n d each of t h e fundamental o r p e r m a n e n t states appears in association w i t h o t h e r concomitant mental states, as D i s c o u r a g e m e n t , Weakness, A p p r e h e n s i o n a n d so on. T h e s e occasional, transitory, i m p e r m a n e n t states are, according t o Bharata, thirty six. T h e s e same causes, etc., b e i n g acted o n t h e stage o r described in poetry, n o t lived in real life, give spectators t h e particular pleasure t o w h i c h Bharata gives t h e n a m e of Rasa. T h e fundamental mental states b e i n g eight i n n u m b e r , t h e r e j i r e also eight Rasas, i.e., t h e E r o t i c {srngrd)> t h e C o m i c (hsya), t h e Pathetic (karund), t h e F u r i o u s (raudrd), t h e H e r o i c (vjra), t h e Terrible (bhaynaka), t h e O d i o u s (blbhatsa) a n d t h e Marvellous (adbhuta). Later speculation generally admits a n i n t h p e r m a n e n t feeling, Serenity (Jama)\ t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g Rasa is t h e Quietistic (Jntd). W h e n they are n o t p a r t of real life b u t are elements of poetical expression, even t h e causes, effects a n d concomitant elements, just as t h e p e r m a n e n t mental states, take a n o t h e r n a m e and are called respectively D e t e r m i n a n t s (vibhva), Consequents (anubhva) a n d T r a n s i t o r y Mental States
x v i

INTRODUCTION (yjabhicribhva)1* O f course, from t h e spectator's p o i n t of view, t h e consequents d o n o t follow t h e feeling, as they d o in t h e ordinary life, b u t they act as a sort of causes w h i c h intensify and p r o l o n g t h e feeling, b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e determinants. k<xDandin and Bhatta Lollata. Bharata's text and t h e afore,fi|d a p h o r i s m in particular became, as w e h a v e said, t h e subject PQ study and analysis for a w h o l e series of t h i n k e r s , each of twhojn was anxious t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a clearer u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r d s of t h e Master. T h e earliest of these were, so far as is "known, D a n d i n (7th century) and Bhatta Lollata (9th Cent.), 2 1} There is no need to insist upon the fact that all these English renderings are far from being satisfying. According to Bharata, VII, 346, the term vbhva has the meaning of cognition, vijnna. They are so called, bcause words, gestures and the representation of the temperament are determined, vibhvyafe (that is, known, according to AG) by them. The pKitbhva> on their turn, are so called because the representation, in its three aspects* that is, voice, vac, gestures, anga> and physical reactions, satha, .causes (tjie spectators) to experience (the correspondent feeling). I have followed here the reading accepted by AG (jad ay am anbhvayatt tgangasattvakrtc? bhinajah tasmd anubhvah). The commentary of AG on this part of the Ntyasstra is, however, not available, and there are, of \\passage, many different readings. I i 2) Dandin (7th century ?) wrote the Kvydarla (this work may be consulted also in the translation of O. Bohthngk, Leipzig 1890). Bhatta ^ f o flourished in Kashmir in the 9th or 10th century. He wrote a c y , now lost, on the Ntyasstra of Bharata. Ksemarja {Spandktirnaya, p. 34) and A.G. (M.V.V., v. 778) quote a Bhatta Lollata who Wtote a commentary (yrttt) to the Spandakrik of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhatta Lollatas are one and the same person ; Bhatta Lollata would, in that case, have lived in the reign pf Avantivarman (856-83 A.D. ; Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or if*the reign of his successor, Sankaravarman. This change, also, involves a change in the dates of Sankuka (cf. infra, p. 32, n. 4), who could then no linger be identified with the poet Sankuka, who was a contemporary of Xjtapda (early 9lh century). \'*> [ XVII ]

INTRODUCTION w h o like his great successor, was a K a s h m i r i and probably a follower of o n e of t h e Sivaite mystical schools flourishing in K a s h m i r . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e m , Rasa is simply t h e p e r m a n e n t mental state (anger, fear, etc.) raised t o its h i g h e s t pitch by t h e c o m b i n e d effect of t h e D e t e r m i n a n t s , Consequents and Transit o r y M e n t a l States. Bhatta Lollata maintains t h a t Rasa lies b o t h in t h e represented p e r s o n a g e a n d in t h e imitating actor. T h e actor h e says, feels t h e different bhvas and rasas as t h o u g h they b e l o n g e d truly, o r rather personally, t o h i m . T o t h e objection that, b e i n g it so, t h e actor w o u l d fail t o maintain o r follow t h e t e m p o a n d t h e o t h e r dramatical conventions, Bhatta Lollata answers that, o n t h e contrary, t h e actor can m a n a g e v e r y well w i t h t h e m b y v i r t u e of anusatndhi o r anusamr dhna1 . AnusamdhiUizt literally signifies recollection, m e m o r y a n d e v e n s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n this, i.e., consciousness, awareness, reflection, etc. 2 a n d I h a v e tentatively rendered by " realisation " 3 i s at t h e same t i m e t h e p o w e r t h a n k s t o w h i c h the a c t o r " b e c o m e s " for t h e time b e i n g t h e represented o r imitated p e r s o n a g e (e.g. R m a ) , feels himself as Rma, and t h e faculty t h r o u g h w h i c h h e nevertheless does n o t forget his real 1) Cf A Bh > I, p 264 : rasabhvnm api vsaniesavasena nate sambhavd anusamhibalc ca hydynusarant ; cf also Dh L> infra p. 109 ; and, on all this, K. M. Varma, Seven Words in Bharata, Calcutta 1958, pp 37, 38. An opposit view to that of Lollata was maintained by the followers of Udbhata (a Kashmiri poet and writer at the court of King Jaypda (779-813), according to whom our perception of the actor as having really bhvas and Rasas is an illusion (drstas tu tatpratyayo nate bhramah , A.Bh , I, 264). 2) Cf i. A Bh I, 43, where mranusamdht means uncontrolled, thoughtless. 3) According to some later commentators, the meaning of anusamdhna \ s visualization or something like that ; cf. f i. Prabhkara, Rasapradtpa, Benares 1925, p 23 : anuscmdhnam ca kavivivaksttasyrthasya vsanptapapast sksd tpa kai anam || [ XVIII ]

INTRODUCTION n a t u r e of actor. Seemingly, B h a t t a Lollata's t h e o r y does n o t cpticern t h e p r o b l e m of h o w t h e spectators d o relish Rasa. ^ Jf'Sankuka.Sankuka, a K a s h m i r i w h o lived a little later 1 rthan Lollata, disagrees with this view. A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , Rasa is n o t as t h e " ancients " p u t it, an intensified state b u t an [imitated mental state. I n ordinary life, t h e mental state of a T m n is revealed by t h e causes w h i c h excite it, i.e. t h e determin a n t s ; b y t h e visible effects of his feeling, i.e., t h e c o n s e q u e n t s ; a n d b y his c o n c o m i t a n t feelings, i.e., t h e transitory mental States. T h e successful imitation by t h e actor of t h e characters a n d their experiences is n o d o u b t , Sankuka says, artificial a n d unreal, b u t is n o t realized t o be so by t h e spectators, w h o forget t h e difference between t h e actois and t h e characters, and in ^fetentially experience t h e mental state of t h e characters t h e m "slves. T h i s experiencewhich is actually a peculiar f o r m of .inferenceis, t o Sankuka, different from any o t h e r kind ,o k n o w l e d g e . A h o r s e , imitated b y a painter, H e m a c a n d r a observes, h i n t i n g at Sankuka's t h e o r y , seems t o o n l o o k e r s neither real n o r false, a n d is n o t h i n g b u t an image w h i c h p r e cedes any j u d g e m e n t of reality or unreality. So far, so g o o d . A c c o r d i n g t o A b h i n a v a g u p t a , t h e weak p o i n t of Sankuka's t h e o r y is his premise t h a t t h e aesthetic state of consciousness o r *Rasa is n o t h i n g b u t t h e perception of an imitated mental state. , * 1) Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata. It is doubtful wh^her he should be identified with the poet Sankuka, authoi of a poem $lalled Bhuvanbhyudaj'a, who according to Kalhana(R T, IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitpda (about 830 A D ) In this case, his predecessor, Britta Lollata, can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the $ame name on the Spandakrik, and so his period should be brought back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th Cf. above, p. XVII, n. 1. Sankuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A G. On Sankuki, see De, S P , T, p 38 ; Pandey, A.G., p. 128.

INTRODUCTION T h i s concept of imitation was refuted by A b h i n a v a g u p t a , as it h a d b e e before h i m by his master Bhatta T a u t a , t h e a u t h o r of uis^iyakmtuka, <m i m p o r t a n t w o r k o n poetics, n o w lost. T h e i r reasoning is painstaking a n d a c u t e : t h e effect of imitat i o n (as w h e n a clown imitates t h e son of a king) is in fact l a u g h t e r and m o c k e r y a n d has n o connection with t h e aesthetic experience. T h e imitation t h e o r y is also clearly contradicted b y certain artsdancing, for examplewhich obviously d o a n y t h i n g in real life. m [ 4/ Maffa. Nyaka.A t h i r d t h i n k e r w h o is very i m p o r t a n t i n - t i e h i s t o r y of t h e d o c t r i n e of Rasa is Bhatta Nyaka, a K a s h m i r i of a b o u t t h e first half of t h e 10th century, a u t h o r of t h e lost Sahrdayadarparia1. H i s critique deals first of all 1) Bhatta Nyaka flourished in Kashmir after nandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A. D.), the author of the Dhvanyloka, whom he refutes. Bhatta Nyaka is, therefore, to be placed around 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with the Brhmana Nyaka, who lived during the reign of Sarkaravarman (883-902 A.D.)> and who is mentioned by Kalhana (R.T., V., 159). In the J.P.K.K., Ill, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of saiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhatta Nyaka, to whom he gives the title of mmmsakgranih (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumrila, mmmsakpravara). Another stanza of Bhatta Nyaka (taken from a stotra) is quoted by Ksemarja (Spandanirna-ya, p. 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhatta Nyakas were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhatta Nyaka was the Hrdayadarpana (or Sahrdayadarpana) which has notyet. come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Siva, has been preserved in the AM., I, p. 5. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhatta Nyaka have been collected by T.R. Chintamani, J.O.R.M., Vol. I, pp. 267-276. On the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nyaka and the confutation of the dbvani, cf. T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., vol. 17, part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhatta Nyaka's theory is also stated with few variations in the Dh..L., pp. 180 ff. (infra, p. 107). On Bhatta Nyaka in general, see Sankaran, op. cit., pp. 86-88, 12-4 ; Kane, S.D.V.,p. l2-215 ; Pandey, A.G., pp. 128-130. [ XX ]

INTRODUCTION t h e w o r d " birth " , used b y Bharata ; in w h a t sense, h e ;asks, should t h e w o r d be u n d e r s t o o d ? Perception, p r o d u c tion^ a n d manifestation are facts of everyday life; t h e y h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e aesthetic fact, with Rasa. H e n c e t h e t e a l meaning of " birth " , as used b y Bharata, c a n n o t be perception, o r p r o d u c t i o n , o r manifestation. Theatrical p e r f o r m a n c e (the actions of actors) o r p o e t r y (the w o r d s of a /poet) does n o t m a k e Rasa perceptible, p r o d u c e it, o r manifest it T h e relation b e t w e e n t h e practical, o r literal m e a n i n g , a n d t h e poetic meaning lies in n o n e of these ; rather, it lies in s o m e ^h|ng ft entirely different from these t h r e e facts of everyday life, 4 k m e l y in " revelation " (bhvan). T h i s revelation, as A b h i n a Vgupta says in his paraphrase of t h e Sahrdayadarpana is a special p o w e r , different from t h e p o w e r o f d e n o t i n g , t h a t w o r d s assume in p o e t r y and drama. T h e specific task of this p o w e r , w h i c h as N y a k a says, " has t h e faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental s t u p o r occupying o u r consciousness 1 , i s generalization o r universalisation of t h e t h i n g s represented "or described. " T h e Rasa, revealed b y this p o w e r is t h e n ^enjoyed (bhuj) t h r o u g h a sort of enjoyment different from direct ^experience, from m e m o r y e t c . " T h e core of Bhatta N y a k a ' s doctrine is precisely this concepj^of generalizationone of t h e ? main contributions of I n i a n a e s t h e t i c s T h e aesthetic state of \consciousnesswhether its material b e anger, love, pain, etc. $j$es n o t insert itself i n t o t h e texture of everyday life b u t is 1) During the aesthetic experience, the consciousness of the spectator , J.S,&e from all practical desires. The spectacle is no longer felt in connexion jwith the empirical " I " of the spectator nor in connexion with any other particular individual ; it has the power of abolishing the limited vpefspnality of the spectator, who regains, momentarily, his immaculate ,^eing not yet overshadowed by my. Moha> stupor, is the specific state aroused by tamah. 2 [ XXI ]
A with

INTRODUCTION

seen a n d lived in complete independence of any individual interest. T h e images contemplated o n t h e stage o r read in p o e t r y are seen b y t h e m a n of aesthetic sensibility independently of any relationship w i t h his ordinary life o r w i t h t h e life of t h e actor o r of t h e h e r o of t h e play o r p o e m , a n d appear, therefore, in a generalized (sdhranlkrta, sdhrafh ) way, t h a t is t o say, universally a n d released from individuality. T h e drama p e r f o r m e d o r t h e p o e m recited has t h e p o w e r t o raise t h e spectator, for t h e m o m e n t , a b o v e his limited e g o , his practical interests, w h i c h in everyday life, like " a thick layer of mental s t u p o r " , limit a n d d i m his consciousness. T h i n g s a n d events t h a t in practical life w h e n associated w i t h " I " , w i t h " m i n e " , repel o r grieve us, are felt as a source of pleasure t h e aesthetical pleasure o r R a s a w h e n t h e y are described or represented aesthetically, t h a t is, w h e n t h e y are generalized o r contemplated universally 1 . T h i s conversion of pain i n t o

1) Generality (sdhranya) is the principal character of aesthetic experience. The events and facts of which the determinants, etc., consist are independent of any relation with any particular individual and of any particular association. The situation represented, says Mammata, is independent of the following specifications : " This concerns me " ; " This concerns my enemy " , " This concerns a person who is indifferent to me " , " This does not concern me " ; " This does not concern my enemy " , " This does not concern a person who is indifferent to me ". Generality is thus a state of self-indentification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest and, from this point of view, of any relation whatsoever with the limited Self, and as it were impersonal. The determinants and consequents differ from ordinary causes and effects just on account of this state of generality. The same feelings of delight, sorrow and anger which pervade ordinary life appear m a completely different manner in the aesthetic state of consciousness The witnessing of a scene of ordinary life (e g , a love scene) necessinly aiouses in the spectator a cettain series of feelings (anger, envy, disgust, etc ) proportionate to the closeness of the [ XXII ]

INTRODUCTION a $mt of pleasure is p r o v e d , N y a k a h o l d s , b y t h e fact that, as depicted o n t h e stage, sights and events painful in themselves d o n o t repel us ; o n t h e contrary, w e enjoy t h e m . Rasa, t h e ^aesthetic experience revealed b y t h e p o w e r of revelation (bh?lti), is n o t noetic in character, is n o t a perception, b u t an experience, a fruition (bhogd). T h i s fruition is characterized b ^ a state of lysis (Jayd), of rest i n t o o u r o w n consciousness 1 , ties which bind him to the protagonists of the scene in question. It may bejfchat he is completely indifferent to the actors in the scene and also to the fC| rtlich they perform; in this case he will be in a state of indifference pia$tky&)> which also is at the very opposite pole of the aesthetic experience, wh^ich is characterized by just an active participation (anupravesa) of the cognizing subject in the event represented. The same scene represented on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all particular associations and free from any extraneous interference (vighna)anger, disgust, etc. The spectator is without any pragmatic requirement, any of the interests (desire for gain, etc.), by which ordinary life is characterized. He is immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else ; the task of generalization carried out by the poetic expression breaks the barrier of the limited " I " and eliminates in this way the interests, demands and aims associated with it. * 1) Vtfrntt, rest, denotes the fact of our being absorbed in something, immerged in it, to the exclusion of every other thxngipigahtavedyntaratay), "-without, that is, having any mental movement, any extraneous desire (m other words no obstacle, vighn)^ which comes to break mto that state of Hpmsciousness. In aesthetic language, visrnti denotes, at the same time, the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation of pleasure sui pener is which accompanies that state of consciousness. In t]ie iaiva metaphysics visrnti denotes the repose of everything that exists It! the " I " (everything that exists is reposing in the consciousness, but the .consciousness does not repose in any other thing different from itself, it is deposed in itself) and, implicitly, the repose of the limited " I " in the cons2 ci0usness in its original fullness. The terms "solution" (^OT/V?), "lysis" (/#; a)* pa&centtaon(safflaptti) etc , express the same concept(cf infra, p. 62). They [ XXTII ]

INTRODUCTION t h e pervasion o f consciousness b y bliss and light : it belongs t o t h e same o r d e r as t h e enjoyment of t h e supreme brahman. T h i s last c o n c e p t i o n is very interesting, a n d even at first glance clearly reveals its kinship w i t h certain religious schools of India, w h i c h m u s t h a v e influenced h i m , if only indirectly. BrahmanBh^mh^ri said m o r e t h a n four centuries before B h a t t a Nyakais n o t h i n g b u t t h e o v e r c o m i n g of t h e k n o t s of " I " a n d of " m i n e " x . N o t e n o u g h . T h e same idea of a c o n v e r s i o n of t h e t h i n g s of reality (according t o Nyaka, in t h e aesthetic m o m e n t they appear, as it were, u n d e r a n o t h e r aspect) is t o b e found, applied to t h e mystical rather t h a n t o t h e aesthetic experience in some B u d d h i s t schools. I n religious experience t h e w o r l d of reality is n o t suppressed b u t is seen otherwise. c 'If it b e t r u e (the B u d d h i s t V a s u b a n d h u says) that t h i n g s are unreal, lacking t h a t substantial reality consisting i n their o w n n a t u r e as imagined b y t h e i g n o r a n t , it cannot nevertheless be denied t h a t t h e y d o exist in t h a t ineffable way of being, w h i c h B u d d h a s perceive " (Vtmsatik, 10). T h e n a t u r e of t h i n g s is inexhaustible a n d t h e y reveal m o r e a n d m o r e m o d e s of being, c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e b e h o l d e r ' s v a r y i n g states o f consciousness. Reality, in this sense, may b e t h e matter of a revulsion (parvrtti), o f a sort of sudden reinterpretation t h r o u g h which it is revealed u n d e r a n e w aspect: t h e painful and restless flow of h i s t o r y , t h e samsara, appears t o t h e saint as ineffable quiescence, nirvana. T h i s conception, as will be seen, will recur frequently in the works of the satva schools of Kashmir. Consciousness manifests and illuminates everything. The appearing of all things presupposes the existence of Consciousness, which is, in this sense, light (praksa). On the concept of beatitude {nanda), see infra p. XLII-XLV. 1) Vakyapctdya, I, 5 (comm,), ed. e.f, : mamham ty ahamkragranthisamatikramamtram brahmanah prpith. [ XXIV ]

INTRODUCTION ^ c r i t i c i z e d and at t h e same time developed by A b h i n a v a g u p t a . ^ f final transfiguration of pain, it is true, is as if anticipated foreshadowed in t h e aesthetic experience (this, like t h e experience, transforms reality, converts t h e very guage, w h i c h magically reveals a n e w sense that exists side |^| w i t h t h e practical m e a n i n g ) , b u t o n e m u s t n o t forget ffikt? while the mystical experience is perfect fullness, in which t ^ J c n o t s of " I " a n d " m i n e " are already completely u n d o n e , |g*the aesthetic experience t h e process of u n d o i n g has only just I s g u n . I n it, t h e history, t h e pain has n o t yet entirely lost its h e i g h t ; it is still present, ready t o break o u t m all its violence. 5%e poet's fullness is n o t t h a t of t h e saint. " T h a t fresh o u t l o o k d poetsdeclares n a n d a v a r d h a n a w h o s e activity succeeds i ^ n j o y i n g Rasas all, and that learned o u t l o o k w h i c h proceeds | ^ ? a t d s p r o b i n g t h e t r u t h of objects verilyboth of t h e m w e tx^Lve, tried t o utilize in figuring o u t t h e w o r l d , so l o n g that h a v e I n c o m e exhausted in t h e attempt. O L o r d sleeping o n t h e sea, |rf$ never obtained in any of these, H a p p i n e s s comparable t o j ^ o t i o n for T h e e 1 / ' Aesthetic enjoyment itself is veined by i x o b s c u r e unrest. " Often a m a n " , says Klidsa in a stanza by A b h i n a v a g u p t a , " i n t h e act of a d m i r i n g in happiness shapes or listening t o sweet sounds, feels in himself t. D o e s h e , p e r h a p s , recall, in his soul, affections jp lives, deep within his spirit w i t h o u t his knowledge 2 ? " disquiet t o w h i c h Klidsa alludes, is, observes A b h i n a v a |?ta, an unobjectified desire; it corresponds t o w h a t is, etaphysically, t h e desire w h i c h induces consciousness t o deny ^ fullness and t o crumble in time a n d space 3 . t ) Dh.A., Ill, 43 (comm.). I have reproduced here the translation of Krishnamoorthy. 2) See below, p. 60. ? See below, p. 605 n. 4.
x x v

INTRODUCTION T h e religious and t h e aesthetic experience spring from t h e same source. T h i s is t h e t e n o r o f t w o stanzas, almost certainly by Nyaka, q u o t e d by M a h i m a b h a t t a , a r h e t o r of t h e 11th century : " D r a m a t i c performances and t h e music accompanying t h e m feed t h e Rasa in all its fullness ; hence t h e spectator, a b s o r b e d in t h e tasting of this, t u r n i n g inward, feels pleasure t h r o u g h t h e w h o l e performance. S u n k into his o w n being, h e forgets everything (pertaining t o practical life). T h e r e is manifested in h i m that flow of i n b o r n pleasure, from which t h e yogins d r a w their satisfaction " l . A n o t h e r p r o b l e m explored by Bhatta N y a k a is t h e didactic value of poetry. Differing from t h e current opinion that drama and p o e t r y s h o u l d instruct w h i l e they entertain, N y a k a maintains t h a t instruction is completely secondary and t h a t w h a t really matters is t h e intrinsic value of t h e w o r k 2 . T h e t w o approaches are reconciled b y A b h i n a v a g u p t a , w h o says, in brief, t h a t t h e aesthetic experience i n so far as it nourishes o u r sensitivity has also a didactic value 3 . 5 . Anandavardhana. These are the outlines the end of t h e dev e l o p m e n t of I n d i a n aesthetics t o w a r d thinkers, h a s t r a n s m i t t e d t h e m . of t h e 10th

century, as A b h i n a v a g u p t a , w h o was o n e of India's greatest A K a s h m i r i like his forephilosoBut, r u n n e r s , A b h i n a v a g u p t a unified t h e scattered voices of earlier p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t o a masterful synthesis, e m b r a c i n g phical speculation a n d mysticism as well as aesthetics.

before t u r n i n g t o h i m , w e o u g h t t o g o back in time and p r e cisely at t h e epoch of A v a n t i v a r m a n (855-83), k i n g of K a s h m i r . A t t h e court of this k i n g , t h e r e lived a great r h e t o r and p h i l o 1) See below, p. 48. 2) See below, App. Ill, p. 114. 3) See below, App. Ill, p. 114. [ XXVI ]

INTRODUCTION gopher indeed, b y t h e n a m e of n a n d a v a r d h a n a . jtigpLs b o o k , o n w h i c h A b h i n a v a g u p t a was t o and half later, called t h e Dhvanyloka I n a justly comment a

( " L i g h t of R e Indian

" ) , n a n d a v a r d h a n a reached certain conclusions w h i c h *;wpre accepted, w i t h some rare exceptions, by all later tfcjefors e t w e e n ordinary a n d poetical language. T h e starting p o i n t of his speculation is t h e difference T h e p h i l o s o p h y of radically

language has very ancient r o o t s in India, a n d in various epochs i | s problems h a v e been dealt w i t h b y diverse a n d in substantial agreement o n o n e p o i n t t h e transitive n a t u r e of ordinary speech.
v7>7r~,T

> differing s c h o o l s ; yet Indian thinkers, b o t h Buddhist a n d H i n d u , instrumental L a n g u a g e is essen-

p r a g m a t i c : t h e w o r d s w e use exist in so far as they serve p u r p o s e , and after w e h a v e used t h e m they cease t o be. ^Tfiey, Buddhists h o l d , are powerless t o grasp t h e living reality t things ; they deal w i t h t h e general, w h i c h is simply an i m a g e ^ t h i n g s , an image o u t of focus, so t o speak, a n d ^iareaL s in p o e t r y ? A n d from w h a t is it derived ? flourished ultimately Accordin t h e W h a t is t h e n this n e w n a t u r e or dimension, t h a t speech another Kashmiri rhetor, Udbhata,

j. . ^ c e n t u r y , the essence of poetical language was t h e secondary >horical function of t h e w o r d s 1 . T h e poetical speech h a v e t h o u g h t a t t h e v e r y expense of t h e practical enriches itself with various proceedingsrhymes, O n e of t h e m o s t sy inversionconceived as useless in a purely functional language, b u t essential in t h e poetical o n e . i m p o r t a n t elements of these figures of speech, differing from t h e modes of practical language d o m i n a t e d by a direct way of exis u n d o u b t e d l y t h e secondary function of w o r d s . See, on all that, R. Gnoli, Udbhata s Commentary on the Kvylamkra !, Roma 1962, of which I have reproduced here some passages. [ XXVII ]

INTRODUCTION T h i s and n o t h i n g b u t this will t h e n be t h e very life of poetical language, in antithesis w i t h t h e practical one. n a n d a v a r d h a n a disagrees. T h e secondary function does n o t necessarily imply p o e t t y . Actually, all language is metaphorical. T h e source of p o e t r y m u s t t h e n be a n o t h e r sense or value t h a t is assured by w o r d s , altogether different from t h e primary (i. e., historical o r literal) a n d t h e secondary one. " Poetical m e a n i n g is different from conventional m e a n i n g . I n t h e w o r d s of great poets it shines o u t a n d t o w e r s a b o v e t h e beauty of t h e w e l l - k n o w n o u t e r parts even as c h a r m does in ladies " (Dbvcwy/oka, I, 4). T h i s n e w sensethe poetical senseirreducible, as it is, t o t h e literary o n e , cannot h o w e v e r d o w i t h o u t it, b u t is, as it were, s u p p o r t e d b y it. " T h e poetic m e a n i n g " , h e says, " is n o t u n d e r s t o o d by a m e r e learning in G r a m m a r and Dictionary. I t is u n d e r s t o o d only by t h o s e w h o h a v e an insight i n t o t h e t r u e essence of poetry. T h i s meaning, and t h a t rare w o r d w h i c h possesses t h e p o w e r of conveying it, these t w o m u s t b e studied carefully by t h o s e w h o wish t o b e c o m e t r u e p o e t s . J u s t as a m a n interested in perceiving objects (in t h e dark) directs his efforts t o w a r d s securing the flame of a lamp since this is a means t o realise his end, so also does o n e w h o is ultimately interested in t h e poetic m e a n i n g first evince interest in t h e conventional meaning. J u s t as t h e p u r p o r t of a sentence is grasped only t h r o u g h t h e sense of individual w o r d s , t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e poetic sense is attained only t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of t h e literal sense. T h o u g h by its o w n p o w e r t h e w o r d - i m p o r t conveys t h e sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its p u r p o s e is served, so also does t h a t poetic meaning flash suddenly across t h e t r u t h - p e r c e i v i n g minds of cultured critics, w h e n t h e y are indifferent t o w a r d s the conventional m e a n i n g . T o conclude, connoisseurs give t h e n a m e of [ xxviii ]

INTRODUCTION " resonance " {dhvani) t o t h a t particular sort of p o e t r y i n \fhich b o t h t h e conventional m e a n i n g a n d t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l ^ Word a r e subordinate " (Dhvanyloka, tfgplaced I, 7-13) 1 , Poetry A truly poetical w o r d o r expression is t h a t w h i c h c a n n o t b e b y o t h e r w o r d s , w i t h o u t losing its value. n o synonyms. T h i s p o e t i c m e a n i n g of w o r d s , w h i c h

5, paradoxically, w i t h t h e historical o r literal m e a n i n g ^ r H a h e v a r n a n d a , a p h i l o s o p h e r of t h e 13th century, p o i n t s ^ V t d i n relation t o t h e o t h e r p o w e r s o f w o r d s just as t o m e n ' s o t h e r capacities a n d activities. T h e n a m e | ) | w h i c h it is k n o w n , is resonance {dhvani) o r suggested, m a n i d sense (vyangyd). e bridge 2 . Rasa is n o t h i n g b u t it. P o e t i c w o r d s manifest, suggest it unexpectedly a n d w i t h o u t any n o t i T h e t h e o r y of n a n d a v a r d h a n a , w h i c h w e

I have quoted here the transi, of K Krishnamoorthy. When we read a poem we become, as it were, simultaneously aware tK,Rasas, viz. the sentiments not practically experienced but aesthetically Contemplated, that it suggests. The temporal sequence between the cogni& of the expressed and the suggested sense would be noticeable only in suggested sense were opposed to the expressed one or similar to it, on the same footing. See Di. A7, III, 33: " But this temporal sein the two function of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments sas) are suggested; because sentiments are neither opposed to the sense nor appear as similar to the other senses ; they are not capable j | ^ g conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together %|i|ightningquickness " (transi, cited above). The concept of alaksya| | P ^ and the necessity of admitting it has been expounded at length by ||Qandayatdhana himself, Dh. A.9 III, 33. I cite here some words of P. J^lf {Varit, Premire Leon du Cours de Potique, d. cit., p. 1356): i un jour comment cette altration se marque dans le language et ^ y a un langage potique dans lequel les mots ne sont le mots de l'usage pratique et libre. Ils ne s'associent plus selon les attractions; il sont chargs de deux valeurs simultanment engage quivalente: leur son et leur effet psychique instantan ". [ xxix ]

INTRODUCTION h a v e e x p o u n d e d in its essentials h e r e , is o n e of t h e greatest c o n t r i b u t i o n s of India t o t h e aesthetic p r o b l e m , a n d it deserves e v e n n o w all o u r attention. connects himself t o h i m . " est u n art d u langage. cration de la p r a t i q u e . O n e of t h e m o s t sensitive critics " La posie " , h e says, L e langage, cependant, est u n e Remarquons d'abord que toute que o f o u r times, Paul Valry, m o r e t h a n ten centuries later, ideally

c o m m u n i c a t i o n entre les h o m m e s n'a quelque certitude dans la p r a t i q u e , et p a r la vrification q u e n o u s p r a t i q u e . Je vous demande du jeu. m ' a v e z compris. Mais, en m e d e m a n d a n t d u feu, v o u s avez p u dans u n certain t i m b r e de voixavec u n e certaine et u n e certaine lenteur o u u n e certaine j'ai p u r e m a r q u e r . p e u d e feu. E t voici cependant q u e l'affaire n'est pas trange: le son, et c o m m e la figure finie.

d o n n e la

Vous me donne% du feu : v o u s prononcer inflexion que sans ce

ces quelques m o t s sans importance, avec u n certain t o n , et prcipitation

J'ai compris v o s paroles, puisque,

m m e y penser, je v o u s ai t e n d u ce q u e v o u s demandiez,

Chose

de v o t r e petite phrase,

revient en moi, se rpte en m o i ; c o m m e si elle se plaisait en m o i ; et moi, j ' a i m e m ' e n t e n d r e la redire, cette petite p h r a s e q u i a p r e s q u e p e r d u son sens, qui a cess de servir, et p o u r t a n t v e u t v i v r e encore, mais d ' u n e t o u t autre vie. finie. Elle a cr le b e s o m d'tre encore entendue. . . qui Elle Nous

a pris u n e v a l e u r ; et elle l'a p n s e a u x dpens de sa signification voici sur le b o r d m m e de l'tat de posie. Cette exprience

minuscule va n o u s suffire d c o u v r i r plus d ' u n e vrit " x

1) P. Valety, Varul, Pliade, Pans 1957)

Pocste et Pense Abstraite, pp. 1324-25 ( La

[ XXX ]

INTRODUCTION A d again : * c L a posie n ' a pas le m o i n s d u m o n d e

p o u r object de

c o m m u n i q u e r q u e l q u ' u n q u e l q u e n o t i o n dtermine, q u o i l* p r o s e d o i t suffire. O b s e r v e z seulement le destin de la p r o s e , c o m m e elle expire peine e n t e n d u e , et ou figure finie. expire d e l'tre, c'est--dire d ' t r e remplace dans l'esprit attentif p a r u n e ide Cette ide, d o n t la p r o s e v i e n t d'exciter les c o n d i t i o n s necessaries et suffisantes, s'tant p r o d u i t e , aussitt les m o y e n s s o n t dissous, le l a n g a g e s'vanouit d e v a n t elle. Cfest u n p h n o m n e constant d o n t voici u n d o u b l e c o n t r l e ; iiotre m m o i r e n o u s rpte le discours q u e n o u s n ' a v o n s p a s compris. La rptition rpond l'incomprhension. Elle nom signifie que Pacte du langage n'a pu s'accomplir. Mais au

^contraire, et c o m m e p a r symtrie, si n o u s a v o n s c o m p r i s , n o u s r i o m m e s en possession d ' e x p r i m e r sous d ' a u t r e s formes l'ide Ujue le discours avait c o m p o s e en n o u s . L ' a c t e d u langage ^accompli n o u s a r e n d u s matres d u p o i n t central q u i c o m m a n d e v l multiplicit des expressions possibles d ' u n e ide acquise. E n t%Qmme, le sens, q u i est la t e n d a n c e u n e s u b s t i t u t i o n m e n t a l e s4|iforme, u n i q u e , rsolutoire, est l'objet, la loi, la limite T a n d i s q u e le I n e x i s t e n c e de la prose p u r e . \ T o u t e a u t r e est la fonction d e la posie.
r

3fqnd u n i q u e est exigible de la p r o s e , c'est ici la f o r m e u n i q u e i<jui o r d o n n e et survit. C'est le son, c'est le r y t h m e , ce s o n t He Rapprochements physiques des m o t s , leurs effets d ' i n d u c t i o n a ^ influences mutuelles qui d o m i n e n t , aux dpens de l e u r d e se c o n s o m m e r en u n sens dfini et certain. Il l'emporter

jjptut d o n c q u e dans u n p o m e le sens n e puisse

* $ * la forme et la dtruire sans r e t o u r ; c'est a u contraire le gefour, la f o r m e conserve, o u p l u t t exactement r e p r o d u i t e c o m m e u n i q u e et ncessaire expression de l'tat o u de la jpense qu'elle v i e n t d ' e n g e n d r e r au lecteur, q u i est le r e s s o r t [ xxxi ]

INTRODUCTION d e la puissance p o t i q u e . h a r m o n i q u e de soi-mne " x . L e t us n o w listen t o s o m e lines of t h e great c o m m e n t a t o r of t h e Dhvanyloka, Abhinavagupta : " Aesthetical experience takes place, as everyone can notice, b y v i r t u e , as it w e r e , of t h e squeezing o u t of t h e poetical w o r d . P e r s o n s aesthetically sensitive, indeed, read a n d taste m a n y times o v e r t h e same p o e m . I n contradiction t o practical means a p o e m , indeed, The of p e r c e p t i o n , that, their task b e i n g accomplished, are n o m o r e of any use a n d m u s t t h e n b e a b a n d o n e d 2 , does n o t lose its value after it has b e e n c o m p r e h e n d e d . Un beau vers renajljndifcniment de

ses cendres, il r e d e v i e n t , c o m m e l'effet de son

effet,cause

w o r d s , in p o e t r y , m u s t therefore h a v e a n additional p o w e r , t h a t of suggestion, a n d for this v e r y reason t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l m e a n i n g t o t h e p o e t i c o n e is unnoticeable 3 ^. " W h a t s o m e p e o p l e say, namely t h a t a p h r a s e w o u l d t h e n c o m e t o h a v e m a n y difFerent m e a n i n g s , is d u e solely t o their i g n o r a n c e . A sentencethey say referring t o ordinary s t r u m e n t a l languagewhich has been pronounced once and the meaning of w h i c h h a s already b e e n perceived b y force of c o n v e n t i o n , c a n n o t lead o n e t o perceive t w o difFerent meanings. T h e subject, indeed, c a n n o t r e m e m b e r , at t h e same time, several mutually c o n t r a s t i n g c o n v e n t i o n s ; a n d if, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , remains, t h e n , o n e . N o r can i t b e admitted t h a t t h e these c o n v e n t i o n s are n o t c o n t r a s t i n g , t h e m e a n i n g of t h e sentence difFerent

1) Varit, Commentaire ay Charmy, p. 1510 (d. cit.). 2) This is a quotation from the Vkyapadfya, IT, 38. j^part from Bhartrhari, the practical purpose of language has been discussed at length and with an admirable penetration by Dharmaklrti in his ramt}avrttika> especially I, 92 S. Dharmakrti's work was well-known to Abhinavagupta, who cites it frequently. See, f.i., Locana, pp. 444 and 542 (Benares ed.). 3) See above, p. XXIX, n. 2. [ XXXII ]

INTRODUCTION ianings ate perceived o n e after t h e other, because t h e w o r d s , %& t h e y h a v e m a d e o n e m e a n i n g perceptible a n d h a v e t h u s l e a s e d t o be efficacious, h a v e n o l o n g e r any p o w e r t o r e n d e r p e r c e p t i b l e any o t h e r meaning. A n d even if t h e p h r a s e is y&dnounced a second time, t h e m e a n i n g remains invariably t h e m e , t h e c o n v e n t i o n a n d t h e context b e i n g t h e same. S h o u l d Upmeone object t h a t a sentence can lead o n e t o perceive a n o Mjfier m e a n i n g , independently of t h e o n e perceived t h r o u g h C o n v e n t i o n a n d context, it can be replied that, t h e n , t h e r e is n o fpager any fixed relation b e t w e e n w o r d a n d m e a n i n g ; a n d | h a t o n e falls t h u s i n t o t h e countersense, described in t h e stanza : | * Therefore, w h a t reason can o n e a d d u c e for t h e fact that, o n S e a r i n g t h e p h r a s e : ' H e w h o desires H e a v e n , m u s t offer t h e pe-sacrifice \ o n e does n o t perceive t h e m e a n i n g ' h e m u s t | a t dog-flesh ' P" 1 M o r e o v e r , t h e r e w o u l d b e n o limit t o t h e d u m b e r of possible meanings a n d a general state of u n c e r t a i n t y w o u l d exist. T h e fact of a d m i t t i n g t h a t a sentence can fi^Fe several meanings is t h u s a fallacy. $ " T h e case of t h e poetical w o r d is h o w e v e r different. H e r e , 4deed, t h e aesthetical expression, etc., o n c e perceived, t e n d s 4b b e c o m e itself a n object of aesthetic experience a n d o n e h a s i f c e f o r e n o ulterior application of conventions. Aesthetic ;|ggnition is n o t , in fact, t h e same as t h e forms of p e r c e p t i o n flapper t o a didactic w o r k , namely " l a m c o m m a n d e d t o d o | | i s " , " I want to do t h i s " , and " I have done what I had to fjjo". Such forms of perception tend, in fact, t o an extrinsic end, R e c e s s i v e t o t h e m in time, a n d are t h u s of an ordinary, practical ^ I n aesthetic experience, w h a t h a p p e n s is, instead, t h e of t h e aesthetic tasting of t h e artistic expression. Such an , just as a flower b o r n o f magic, has, as its essence,

1) This is Vramnavrttika, I, 318 (d. cit.). [ XXXIII ]

INTRODUCTION solely t h e present, it is correlated neither w i t h w h a i came b e fore n o r with w h a t comes after. ligious o n e 1 . " A p a r t from some m o d e r n intuitions, of w h i c h Paul V a M ^ is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t penetrating a n d brilliant interpreter, in orde^ t o find s o m e t h i n g similar in t h e western hnguistical exegesis, o n e m u s t t u r n t o t h e conceptionin t h e W e s t connected w i t h t h e h o l y scripturesof a sensus historiens pel literalis, different f r o m t h e sensus spirituahs, eum supponit? a n o t h e r sense. qui, h o w e v e r , super htteralem fundatur of t h e Scriptures, if et S o m e passages literaly T h i s experience is\ therefore different b o t h from t h e o r d i n a r y experience and fronj t h e r e -

taken, are a b s u r d a n d meaningless. of fact, a h i d d e n or

T h e y m u s t therefore h a v e The main difference

E v e r y w o r d of t h e Scriptutes has, as a p o i n t spiritual sense. 3

b e t w e e n India a n d t h e W e s t is based o n t h e fact t h a t w i t h us this c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h goes back t o t h e Alexandrine school a n d especially t o Origineshas remained restricted t o theological speculation. H a d it b e e n developed in a Notwithstanding the the literary undeni-

direction, w e w o u l d h a v e h a d a sort of counterpart t o t h e c o n ception of n a n d a v a r d h a n a . able differences, these t w o conceptions h a v e , howeVer, as a c o m m o n foundation, t h e intuition t h a t b o t h t h e poetical lang u a g e , and, in a n o t h e r sense, t h e religious o n e , d o n o t exhaust themselves in their transitive value, b u t , using the very w o r d s of P a u l Valry, survive t o c o m p r e h e n s i o n . 1) Locana, I, 21 (ed. of Benares, pp. 158460). 2) St. Thomas, Summa Theologieay 1, 1, 10. 3) On the scriptural exegesis in the West one may now consult the beautiful book by H. de Lubac, Histoire et Esprit\ Uintelligence de l'Ecriture d'aprs Or/gne (Paris 1950). This conception has been sucessrvely examined by the same author in the three volumes, Exgse-Mdivale, Le S Quatre Sens de FEcriture, Paris, 1959-61.
[ XXXIY ]

INTRODUCTION 6. Abhinavagupta. W i t h t h e only exception of t h e DhvanyAbhi-

foka, t h e theories p u t forward by Lollata, Sankuka a n d N y a k a a t e k n o w n t o us t h r o u g h t h e p e n of A b h i n a v a g u p t a . nVagupta, son of N a r a s i m h a g u p t a , alias Cukhula, illustrious b r a h m i n family. i t h e Ntyasstra "Dhvanyloka. Kvyakautuka was b o r n

lit K a s h m i r d u r i n g t h e second half of t h e 10th century, of an His w o r k s in t h e field of aesthetics w h i c h is a c o m m e n t a r y of Bhatta The comAbhiThe lire t w o , namely, t h e Abhinavabharat,

and a commentary on Anandavardhana's

T h e commentary o n t h e Kvyakautuka itself has n o t come d o w n t o us.

ifota, w h o was his direct master in poetics is n o w lost.

Jqaentary o n A n a n d a v a r d h a n a ' s Dhvanyloka constitutes o n e of thjs m o s t i m p o r t a n t w o r k s of the dhvant school, w h i c h played a leading role in developing. y H e accepts and p

elaborates t h e core of Bhatta Nyaka's aesthetic ideas, t h a t is, jjfhe concept of generalization, b u t h e rejects N y a k a ' s concepts |>the aesthetic experience as f r ^ t i o n rather t h a n as k n o w l e d g e , b n d of assumption b y poetic w o r d s of t h e p o w e r of tion .
1

revelathe

According to Abhinavagupta,

in w h o s e v i e w

dhpfini a n d t h e Rasa schools are indissolubly m e r g e d , Rasa is pot revealed, b u t suggested, o r manifested, as n a n d a v a r d h a n a %as w o n t t o say. Aesthetic gustation is n o t h i n g b u t a p e r c e p T h e division i n t o eight o r n i n e Rasas tion sm generis, differing from all others. f^ Rasa is unique 2 . ^ r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e p e r m a n e n t mental states (according t o n a n d a v a r d h a n a a n d A b h i n a v a g u p t a t h e r e is indeed a n i n t h 1) See below, pp. 49-51. * " 2) A Bh.> I, p. 271 : eka eva paramrthato rasafy. A.G. says in another passage (A Bb., I, p. 267) that all the vaiious Rasas derive from one cgreat Rasa ' only. On the uni city of Rasa, cf, also V. Raghivan, The Ntimbet of Rasa, pp. 175-9. [ XXXV ]
(

mental state, Q u i e t , a n d t h e n a n i n t h Rasa, t h e Quietistic) has only a n empirical value. " W e t h i n k " , h e says, " that w h a t is ejoyeH is consciousness itself, all full of bliss. picion of pain may b e h e r e ? W h a t susT h e feelings of delight^ s o r r o w , " The

etc., deep w i t h i n o u r spirit, h a v e only o n e function^ t o vary it, a n d t h e representation's function is t o awake them 1 . 59 aesthetic experience ",. w e h a v e seen in a passage previously q u o t e d , " just as $ flower b o r n of magic, has, as its Essence, solely t h e present, it is correlated neither with w h a t catiie before | n o r w i t h w h a t comes after " . T h e s e lines are very important/* T h e state of universality required b y Bhatta N y a k a h o t only implies t h e elimination of any measure of time o r space, b u t e v e n of any particular represented then ? character, knowing for subject. Bhatt LoUata's nonsensical. But where question, w h e r e lies t h e Rasa, w h e t h e r in t h e actor o r in t h e Abhinava is q u i t e " T h e Rasa " , h e says, " d o e s n o t lie in t h e actor. w h a t I h a v e already said). subject.

Y o u h a v e all f o r g o t t e n a n d I remind y o u again (of I n d e e d , I h a v e said that: Rasa is knowing But w h a t is

n o t limited b y any diffrence of space, time a n d Y o u r d o u b t is t h e n d e v o i d of sense. t h e actor ?

T h e actor, I say, is t h e means of t h e tasting, a n d

h e n c e h e is called by t h e n a m e of " vessel " . T h e t a s t ^ o f w i n e , indeed, does n o t stay in t h e vessel, w h i c h is only ;# means necessary t o t h e tasting of it.
2

T h e actor t h e n is iiecessary T h i s elimination of t h e

a n d useful only in t h e b e g i n n i n g " .

1) A-Bh., I, 292 : asmanmate samvedanam evnandaghanamsvdyte I tatra k duhkhsank \ kevalam tasyaiva citrtkarane ratihkdivsanvjprah | tadudbodhane cbhinaydivyprah | 2) A.B/J., I, 291 : at eva-nate na rasah \ kutra tarhi^vsmrtislo na(na) bodhjate | uktam hi desaklapramtrbhednijantrito rasa itj | keyam $ank\ nate tarhi kirn \ svdanopyah '| ata eva ca ptram i'ly ucyte \ [ XXXVI ]

INTRODUCTION singular k n o w i n g subjects t h a t is, of t h e " practical " pei> sonalities of t h e spectators, different each from t h e wiiich is, u n i q u e , " generalized " , n o t circumscribed determination of space, time, etc. otheris b y any succeeded b y a state of consciousness, a " k n o w i n g subject " T h i s conception goes deep

Into t h e doctrines of t h e philosophical school, followed b y | i b h i n a v a . A c c o r d i n g t o it, t h e differences b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s l^ego " are illusory. xmique. Actually t h e " I " o r consciousness is T h e so-called B u d d h i s t Idealism (pijnnavda), accord-

i n g t o w h i c h reality is consciousness, b u t t h e v a r i o u s individualities o r " mental series " , samtna, are different each from t h e o|jaer, is, t o t h e Saiva, clearly contradicted by t h e fact t h a t a $ | i n g appears in t h e same way t o m o r e subjects t h a t see it in tJiQ same place and time. I n other words, two or more subsubject. " When more jects that see t h e same t h i n g are in t h e same psychic c o n d i t i o n , tliajt is, they form a single k n o w i n g subjectssaid Utpaladeva in a w o r k n o w lostare a w a r e o f a^giyen t h i n g , f.e., a vessel, in t h e same place a n d time, t h e n bout this t h i n g , they c o m e t o m a k e u p a n unity 1 ". state of unity, of course, is n o t p e r m a n e n t , and, "pojnt, t h e various limited unique " I ", again
c

This

at a certain responsible but the

T s " , t h a t came t o constitute an The

separate themselves.

p e i n e n t of these u n i o n s and separations is n o t h i n g E o t d , t h e liberty of consciousness itself. ,This state of unity, which, in v a r i o u s degrees, ia hi ptre mdysvdafy \
a

occurs in

pi tu iadupyakah | tena premukhamtre

i^, 1) This passage,, borrowed from the lost tk on the Pratjabhijnkrik, been quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary to Tantrloka, X, p. 67 : ghatadim artham ekaesavyavasthih pramiardh som am scmredwtvafy cimse tadaikyam upaynti \ A [ xxxvii ]

NTRODUCIO& ordinary life also, is specially evident w h e n w e ate assisting, f. i, t o a performance o r d u r i n g certain religious crmonies (f. i., t h e tantric cakras), w h i c h m u s t b e celebrated in m n m o n . I n these assemblies, t h e distinction b e t w e e n one's o w h \ S e l f a n d t h e Self of o t h e r people, w h i c h is f o u n d e d o n t h e multiplicity of bodies, m i n d s and so on, ceases for t h e m o m e n t t o exist, and, b e y o n d t h e m , takes rise a psychological unity, correctly realized as a subject u n i q u e a n d m o r e powerful t h a n t h e precedi n g separated individualities. A b h i n a v a g u p t a in t h e Tantrloka, enters i n t o a state of contraction. reflected in each o t h e r . " T h e consciousness " , says w h i c h consists of, a n d is But, in public celebrations,

animated by, all t h i n g s , o n account of t h e difference of bodies, it r e t u r n s t o a state of expansionsince all t h e c o m p o n e n t s are T h e radiance of one's o w n consciousness in ebullition (i.e., w h e n it is t e n d i n g t o p o u r o u t of itself) is reflected in t h e consciousness of all t h e bystanders, as if in so m a n y m i r r o r s , and, inflamed by these, it abandons w i t h o u t effort its state of individual contraction. F o r this very reason, in meetings of m a n y p e o p l e (at a performance of dancers, singers, etc.), fullness o f joy occurs w h e n every bystander, n o t only o n e of t h e m , is identified w i t h t h e spectacle. u p o f beatitude, attains, in these T h e consciousness, w h i c h , considered separately also, is innately m a d e circumstancesduring t h e

execution of dances, etc.a state of unity, a n d so enters i n t o a state of beatitude w h i c h is full and perfect. I n v i r t u e of t h e in a state absence o f any cause for contraction, jealousy, envy, etc. t h e consciousness finds itself, in these circumstances, o f expansion, free of obstacles, a n d p e r v a d e d by beatitude.

W h e n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , even one only of t h e bystanders does n o t concentrate on t h e spectacle h e is l o o k i n g at, and does n o t shale, therefore, t h e form of consciousness [ xxxviii ] in which the

INTRODUCTION q t h e r spectators are immersed, this consciousness is disturbed, as at t h e t o u c h of an u n e v e n surface. T h i s is t h e reason w h y , d u r i n g t h e celebration of t h e cakra, etc., n o individual m u s t b e f l o w e d t o enter w h o does n o t identify himself w i t h t h e cerej n o i e s a n d t h u s does n o t share the state of consciousness of t h e "celebrants ; this w o u l d cause, in fact, a contraction of t h e consxiousness1 ". T h e s e conceptions pose again a p r o b l e m , namely, w h i c h is ,the relation between t h e aesthetic a n d t h e mystical experience. ^ e h a v e seen t h a t B h a t t a N y a k a likened t h e m each t o o t h e r . A b h i a v a , while accepting, o n t h e o n e h a n d , forward
?

t h e solution p u t

b y Bhatta N y a k a , did n o t fail, o n t h e o t h e r , t o s h o w Religious

up clearly t h e b o u n d a r y lines w h i c h separate t h e state o f mystical

^consciousness from t h a t of aesthetic consciousness.

^experience, h e argued, m a r k s t h e complete disappearance of all polarity, t h e lysis of all dialexis in t h e dissolving fire of G o d : rS\in, M o o n , day a n d n i g h t , g o o d a n d evil are c o n s u m e d in t h e 1) Tantrloka, XXVIII, vv. 373 S. : samvit sarvtmik dehabhedd y samkucet tu s \ melake 'nyonyasanghattaprattbimbd vtkasvar || ucchalanmjarasmyoghah samvitsu pratibimbitah \ bahudarpanavad diptah sarvyetpy ayatnatah || ata eva nrttagtafirabhrtau bahuparsadi \ yah sarvatanmaybhave hldo na tv ekakasya sah || nandanirbhar samvtt pratyekam s tathatkatm \ nrttdau visaye prpt prnnandatvam asnute || irsysydisamkocakaranbhvato 9tra s \ vikasvar nisprattgham satnvid nandayoginl || atanmaye tu kasmtmscit tatrasthe pratthanyate \ sthaputasparfavctt samvld vijtiyatay sthite \\ atas cakrrcanayesu vijtiyam atanmayam \ naiva pravesayet samvitsamkocananibandhanam || See below, pp. 56, 57. [ XXXIX ]

INTRODUCTION a r d e n t flame of consciousness. T h e k n o t s of " I " and ate, in it, completely u n d o n e .

u

mine "

T h e yogin remains, as it were, I n t h e aesthetic experience,

isolated in t h e compact solitude of his consciousness, far b e y o n d any form of discursive t h o u g h t 1 . however, t h e y are transfigured, t h e feelings a n d t h e facts of everyday life, even if are always present. I n respect of its

p r o p e r a n d irreducible character, therefore, w h i c h distinguishes it from any f o r m of ordinary consciousness, the aesthetic ex-^ perience is n o t of a discursive order, i O n t h e other h a n d , as regards its c o n t e n t w h i c h is n o t h i n g b u t ordinary life purified a n d freed from every individual sive consciousness. relationshipthe aesthetic consciousness is n o different from any o t h e r f o r m of discurA r t is n o t absence of lifeevery element Further devotion of life appears in t h e aesthetic experiencebut it is life itself, pacified a n d detached from all passions. 2 (which is a preliminary a n d unavoidable m o m e n t of religious experience) postulates t h e complete a b a n d o n of t o t h e object of w o r s h i p , G o d , Varamesvara* t h e subject who, although

b e i n g i m m a n e n t a n d consubstantial, according t o A b h i n a v a gupta, w i t h t h e t h o u g h t which t h i n k s H i m , becomes in t h e r e ligious m o m e n t as if transcendent t o it and separate from it 4 .

1) See below, pp. 56 and 82; and I.P.V.V., III, pp. 350-1. 2) A Bh.y I, p. 340 (cf. Raghavan, p. 104) : tatra snrvarasnm sntaprya evsvdah, vtsayebhyo vipartvrtty || 3) The bhaktty religious devotion, is paramesvaravisajavaivasyasamtefarifr (I.P.V.V., I, p. 25). Cf. p. 82, n. 4, below. 4) In the very moment that thought (vimarsa, samvtt, etc.), which, in reality, is nothing but subject, becomes the object of thought. ( i.e., when it is taught, meditated upon, etc.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego (aham), Sd(tMan), Consciousness (sappid), Go(svara, Paramsvara, Siva), etc. This concept is fully developed and discussed in the I.P.V.V., and in the IP. V.91, 5, //. 15-17. Cf. also the I.P. V, V., I, pp. 55, 56. [ XL ]

INTRODUCTION Tpie p u r p o s e of t h e y o g i n 'transcendental object. is t o identify himself with this therefore as

Religious d e v o t i o n implies

\$ constant drive t o w a r d s an e n d w h i c h is outside it and, is perfect self-sufficiency.

^ u c h , is t h e very antithesis of t h e aesthetic experience, which I n every way, w h a t e v e r t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e m may Ibe, they spring from t h e same source. Both are characterized the by a state of consciousness self-centered, implying the suppressm of any practical desire, a n d hence t h e m e r g i n g of S u b j e c t into his object, t o t h e exclusion of everything else. T h e appearance o n t h e h o r i z o n of consciousness of desires, of practical $eeds, destroys ipso facto t h e unity of t h e aesthetic or of t h e experience. S o m e t h i n g is shattered, s o m e t h i n g cracks us, and extraneous, dispersive elements p e n e t r a t e - t h e so-called " obstacles " , vighna, Influence.
1

b o r n of t h e ego's

disturbing sense, any

T h e aesthetical and mystical bliss, in this

2

|f| n o t h i n g b u t a state of independence, of liberty from Self. O n this h a n d , t h e concepts of rest " lysis " , j m s t a t i o n and bliss, are strictly connected. J o .Abhinavagupta himself :

raneous solicitation a n d h e n c e of rest, of " lysis " in o u r tasting, But let us n o w listen

1) The vighna, obstacles, are all the extraneous elements which break Jdjue. unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gam, worry of all kinds, Jelre.). The same conception is met with m connexion with religious experience. The vighna are defined in the I.P. V. V., I, p. 18 : vighnanti vilumjf^tj kartavyam iti vighnh dhytmikiayo* navadhnadosdayas tnvidhopaghth feahirthtras ca devatvisesh \ " The obstacles obstruct or hinder what They are of three kinds 3o^e does, this is why they are called obstacles. |rr|herent in the perceiving subject, etc.) : lack of attention, etc. The Infinities which preside over them are also called obstacles ". Their kpbaapal source is lack of attention {anavadhna), i e., the absence of a total ilsat of the whole being on the object of perception, \Z) See above, pp. XXXVIII, XXXIX.

INTRODUCTION " W h a t w e call bliss is n o t h i n g b u t a full illumination of o n e ' s o w n being, accompanied b y a form of cogitation which pervades all one's o w n nature, o n e ' s o w n Self. L e t us consider, for instance, a m a n limited b y h i s particular incomplete ego> defiled a n d contracted by t h e b o d y and so on, a n d let us suppose t h a t h e feels a sense of vacuity in his b o d y a n d is t h e n h u n g r y . L o n g i n g for food, t h a t is, for s o m e t h i n g distinguished from himself, will actually occupy all his m i n d ; a n d therefore, since t h e self-cogitation of w h i c h w e h a v e spoken, consisting i n t h e self-cogitation. does n o t occur in h i m in all its fullness, h e is, as it were, d e v o i d of bliss, bliss N o w let us suppose t h a t t h e Obviously, in belly o f t h a t v e r y m a n becomes full o f food. emergence of vacuity, will cease t o exist.

this case, t h e p r e v i o u s state o f unfullness, consisting in t h e S o o n after, h o w ever, h e will b e g i n t o h a v e n e w longings (he will desire t o e m brace w o m e n , etc.), that, until that m o m e n t , w e r e in a state of latent impressions, .because, as P a t a n j a l i h a s said, " t h e fact t h a t Caitra is in love w i t h o n e w o m a n does n o t imply t h a t h e is o u t of l o v e with t h e o t h e r s " , etc. Owing t o this v e r y contact w i t h o t h e r desires, such a bliss is t h e n incomplete a n d , t h e r e fore, it is n o t t h e s u p r e m e bliss; principle that, and
c 4

I n fact,

according t o t h e

in t h e u n i o n o n e fears t h e future separation \

o n e t h i n g breeds t h e l o n g i n g for a n o t h e r ', h o w can it b e

a source of happiness ? ', t h e forms of bliss w h i c h w e can enjoy in practical life are u n a b l e t o cut off completely t h e desire o f a t h i n g distinguished from one's incomplete bliss. cogitation. said :
c

Self a n d this is w h y t h e y are

A s t o t h e p a r t ' bliss ' w h i c h is in t h e m , its because o f this, B h a t t a N r y a n a h a s

d e t e r m i n a n t element is, h o w e v e r , as before, t h e afore-said selfI n effect, L e t u s give a praise t o Siva I a l l t h e forms o f bliss

which m a y b e found h e r e in these t h r e e w o r l d s , are only his d r o p s , b e l o n g i n g t o h i m , a very ocean o f bliss. [ XLII ]

INTRODUCTION

y; jSl)* W h i c h are these k i n d s of bliss ? O n e of t h e m , for ind u c e , arises while w e are tasting a sweet flavour, etc. T h e m a n is, as it is said, c enjoying \ is in a state of consciousness |$ different from t h e o n e of a h u n g r y m a n w h o eats u p his ^Qod greedily. ^Jie^ rests w i t h i n himself. I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h a t ji&jsuch a state is p r e d o m i n a n t s T o t t h e exterior reality, b u t |laer k n o w i n g subject. A further form of pleasure, different from I former a n d d e v o i d of any extrinsic alteration, is tasted ( j o n e , either t h r o u g h a p o e m or a drama, etc., is p l u n g e d | | 4 some Rasa, as t h e E r o t i c one, a n d so o n . O w i n g t o t h e |$>$ence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc.), Shis pleasure is different from t h e forms of bliss of practical life, because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called T a s t i n g , l ^ , Lysis, Perception, Rest in t h e n a t u r e of t h e k n o w i n g subject. T h e so-called aesthetic sensibility, t h e fact of toeing possessed of h e a r t is caused by this very p r e d o m i n a n c e 4$)the heart, 1 that is, of t h o u g h t (which gives it its v e r y f) Not everybody, A.G. observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste ^0em, Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of ^ait, those who have the consent of the heart (sah rdaya} hrdayasamvdai$k)\ The fact of being possessed of heart is defined in the following {Dh.s.L., p. 38) : yesm kavynusllanbhysavasd visadlbhte manomulft ' varnanyatanmaybhavanayogyata te svahrdayasamvdabhjah sahrdayh \ ^0oktam ( N X VU, v. 10) yo 'rtho hrdayasamvad tasya bhvo rasodbhavah \ sarram vypyate tena suskant kstham ivgnin || ?;f*'The faculty of self-identification with the events represented [the Pterminants, etc.,] demands that the mirror of the mind should be made Completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of jgtry, The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their ^wii hearts, are they who have this faculty. For it has been said : * the lasting ofthat which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Rasa. The ||o4y is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire ' ". The mind and heart must Jt> mirror-like (visada, vimala), ready to receive all the images which are [ XLIII ]

INTRODUCTION n a m e ) , and, at t h e same time, by a soft of indifference t o t h e p a r t " l i g h t " , w h i c h consists a n d rests in t h e k n o w a b l e w h i c h h o w e v e r continues t o exist. T ^ j ^ n t a ^ made the matterjpf s u c h j , Taating a r e j ^ ^ n i n e J L a s a s . They are d e v o i d of obstacles, a n d consist of a Sampling. T h e socalled s u p r e m e bliss, t h e lysis, t h e w o n d e r , is theiefore n o t h i n g b u t a tasting, t h a t is, a cogitation in all its compact density, of o u r o w n liberty . } T h i s liberty is reahssima (that is t o say, n o t metaphorical) a n d inseparable from t h e very nature of consciousness. W e m u s t n o t , h o w e v e r , forget that in t h e tasting of a juice of sweet flavour, etc., t h e r e is, b e t w e e n this bliss a n d us, t h e separating screen, so t o say, of t h e exterior reality. I n leflected in them * vimalamukurakalpbhutanijahrdayah, ABh, p. 37. In 'he TA, III, 200, A G says : tath hi madhure gte sparse v candandtke \ mdhyasthyavtgame y sau hrdaye spandamnat || nandasaktih satvokt y atah sahrdayo janah \ " When the eais are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc , the state of indifference (non-participation, impetsonality, etc ), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration {spandamdat, for the significance of the term spanda, cf. p. 60, n 1) Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude, thanks to which man JS C gifted with heart ' ". According to the saiva of| Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc. / Elsewhere {A Bh, II, p 339), A G. says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavzhrdayatdtmypatiiyogyata). Of course, people whose nature is " gentle (sukumra)" will have a greater feeling for erotic poetry, people of bolder nature will heroic poetry, etc. Every individual has a particular nature (tendencies, innate instincts, beginningless loot desires, vsan), according to which he will feel himself more drawn to some poets than to others. <c Sensibility " (sahrdqyaivi ) also plays an important role in religious experience, but in this case we may not talk of aesthetic sensibility, the more coriect term being religious sensibility, cf. P.T K , p. 45 ff.

INTRODUCTION poetry, in drama, a n d so on, this screen is actually TDM it remains in a latent state. missing,

Also i n these forms of limited screen,

.bliss, h o w e v e r , those people w h o s e hearts are carefully d e v o t e d t o cancel t h e p a r t w h i c h performs t h e function of a succeed in reaching t h e supreme bliss. eating 1 ." T h e aesthetic a n d t h e mystical state of consciousness are n o t only characterized by a particular bliss o r repose. According t o A b h i n a v a g u p t a and his school, they are accompanied b y a sense of w o n d e r o r surprise. T h e w o r d expressing this w o n d e r , i e . camatkra is frequently t o b e found, in its o r d i n a r y , n o n technical sense of surprise, amazement, in I n d i a n literature. " I t appears t o m e " o b s e r v e s V . R a g h a v a n 2 " t h a t originally t h e w o r d camatkra w a s an o n o m a t o p o e i c w o r d referring t o enlarget h e clicking s o u n d w e m a k e w i t h o u r t o n g u e w h e n w e taste s o m e t h i n g snappy, and in t h e course of its semantic m e n t s , camatkra came t o m e a n a s u d d e n fillip relating t o any " Supreme bliss " , it

l^as been said, " m a y even take place, disclosed by d r i n k i n g a n d

feeling of a pleasurable type " . T h e first t o use this t e r m in a

1) These last lines introduce us into the very core of the doctrines professed by a mystical school, the so-called Krama, highly esteemed by Abhinavagupta. According to this school the consciousness, the * I ' ! conceived as a nucleus of energy, nourished by the images offered it by the senses. These must be, as it were, saturated and concentrated into a ufuque point. Saturation and concentration imply each other. They arise when the senses are absorbed in something, to the exclusion of every other thing. The objects which arouse this state may indifferently be a food, an alcoholic drink, a drug, a sexual contact, a song, a dance, and so on. See on all that my tianslation of the Tuntrasra (Abhinavagupta, Essen^a det Tantra, Torino 1960), Introd , passim, and the Appendix No 3, wherein I have translated the pp. 45-52 of the Partitmstkutatana. 2) Some Concepts of the Ahnkara Sastra, Adyar 1942, p. 269. 5 [ XLV ]

INTRODUCTION

technical sense was p r o b a b l y Utpaladeva, w h o was t h e master of the master of A b h i n a v a g u p t a . 1 T h i s w o r d is indeed u n k n o w n t o t h e father o f t h e Pratyabhijn school, Somnanda, a n d in n a n d a v a r d h a n a it occurs once only, used in its o r d i n a r y sense, w i t h o u t any technical c o n n o t a t i o n . Its occurrence b o t h in t h e Yogavsisa (cf. t h e expression cittacamatkra, w h i c h D a s g u p t a HIPb, p . 236 translates 'self-flashing of t h o u g h t ' ) and i n t h e Agnipurya is of n o great significance, because these w o r k s are b o t h later t h a n Utpala a n d m a y be even t h a n A b h i n a v a , T h e t e r m camatkra w a s used, n o d o u b t , by Bhatta N y a k a , b u t p r o b a b l y , as appears from a passage of t h e Hrdayadarpana q u o t e d b y A b h i n a v a 2 , n o t i n its technical m e a n i n g ; a n d a n y h o w , h e w a s later t h a n U t p a l a . I n t h e Spanda School ( V a s u g u p t a , etc.) an idea very like t o t h a t expressed by camatkra is c o n v e y e d b y t h e w o r d vismaya, astonishment. T h e y o g i n is p e n e t r a t e d b y a s t o n i s h m e n t . T h e yogi stages are astonishment 3 . T h e general idea u n d e r l y i n g these w o r d s ( c o m p a r e , i n this connection, also t h e Pali and b u d d h i s t t e r m samvega) is t h a t b o t h t h e mystical a n d t h e aesthetic experience imply t h e cessation of a w o r l d t h e ordinary, historical w o r l d , t h e samsara a n d its s u d d e n replacement by a n e w dimension of reality. I n this sense t h e t w o are w o n d e r o r surprise. A parallel of this idea of a k i n d o f w o n d e r w h i c h fills t h e soul in front of t h e beautiful o r of t h e scared, exists in t h e w e s t e r n t h o u g h t also. W e find it in Plato and especially in N e o p l a t o nismus. " S o u l s " , Plato says, " w h e n they see h e r e any likeness

1) See, f.i., the commentary to the Swadrsh, I, 8, Stvastotrvalu p 41. 2) Locana, comm. on II, 1. 3) See Sivasntra, I, 12 : vivnayoyogabhftmik. According to the M.V.V., II, 99, the yogin is vtsmayvistah. [ XLVI ]

INTRODUCTION of the things of that o t h e r world, $re stricken with w o n d e r , JKwkrJTzovzac and can n o longer control themselves " {Vhaidros, 25{k). A c c o i d i n g to Proclus, this sens of amazement, %K%lr&> accompanies b o t h the beautiful and the sacred. / T h e beautiful, h e says in the Theologia P/tomcay< is ^appearing with w o n d e r ^ez IKTIX-Q^^ fiacvo'ftwov, and incites $ all t h e things t o w a r d s itself t h r o u g h desire and w o n d e r . 1 " \I& t h e same w o r k w e read eventually t h a t " w e are incited towards t h e beautiful w i t h w o n d e r and e m o t i o n " a n d t h a t " " t h e soul, seeing t h e invisible, as it were, rejoices itself, l i m i t e s its appearing, and is astonished at it. A n d as t h e m y s ' tick in t h e m o s t saint religious rites, before t h e mystical visions, $tp stricken with w o n d e r , so, a m o n g t h e intelligibles also, t h e bautiful appears in advance, before t h e c o m m u n i o n w i t h t h e gooc}, and strikes with w o n d e r t h e m w h o are seeing. 2 " , f ^ R e c o r d i n g t o A b h i n a v a g u p t a a n d his school, this w o n d e r 4p present, in a b r o a d e r sense, in e j e r y form of life, it is like j|9fl5ciousness itself, t h e element w h i c h distinguishes consiC|q|saess o r spirit from inanimate matter. Aesthetic sensibias A b h i n a v a says, is n o t h i n g b u t a capacity o f w o n d e r 5 elevated t h a n t h e ordinary o n e . A n o p a q u e h e a r t does ixof w o n d e r , non obstupe seit. T h e appearance of t h e beautiful clo$ n o t arouse in it any shock (ksobhd) o r w o n d e r . 3 ^1) Theologid Platonicc, Frankfurt, 1608, p 51 : ft lavzw ndvza ca TCQOOU KOC K7i/i^eco avecyscpov. .pit3 Itt }2) Ibid, p 151 :

JpoS ok zd icaXov ftef ejcTuAqeaft jcc KCvqoecoC eyecpo^ea TO anoppyrov i edovoa ( Se L (puXr) ) tat pu teoec dyazac TO $av.v KOU sjsjg^ abzo KOLC cooTiep Iv Td ayccoTazai zefazat npo TWV f e/c7tXr}$c zv fiuoufievwv, ouzw r] nav zofi vorjzoe^ npo fxezouoca zo nXXoS npofiacvo'ftevov eKxXrjzzt' TOOS op(ovza$9 r Partrimukvivarana, p. 49. [ XLVII 1

INTRODUCTION While t h e aesthetic experience, w h i c h concerns t h e spectator first of all, was receiving so m u c h attention, I n d i a n p o e t gives life a n d breath t o his w o r k . thought to did n o t neglect t o examine t h e creative m o m e n t , in which t h e T h e chief thinkers study t h e n a t u r e of t h e birth of a w o r k of poetry were n a n d a v a r d h a n a a n d Bhatta T o t a a n d later A b h i n a v a g u p t a , his direct disciple. " I n t h e b o u n d l e s s samsara of p o e t r y " w r i t e s n a n d a v a r d h a n a " t h e p o e t is t h e t r u e a n d sole Creator (lit., Prajpati) ; as it pleases h i m t o create, so t h e w h o l e is transformed. I f t h e p o e t is p e r v a d e d b y Rasa in his p o e m , t h e w h o l e w o r l d will b e suffused b y Rasa. B u t if h e be v o i d of emotion, t h e w o r l d t o o will b e v o i d of Rasa. A g o o d p o e t , b y v i r t u e of his i n d e p e n d e n c e , freely designs e v e n insentient objects t o act as sentient o n e s a n d sentient objects t o act as insentient o n e s 1 " . T h e same c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e Creator, Prajpati h a s also b e e n r e p r o d u c e d b y A b h i n a v a g u p t a . " L i k e t h e Creator " , h e says in t h e Abhinavabhrati, 1, 4, " t h e p o e t creates for himself a w o r l d a c c o r d i n g t o his w i s h . I n d e e d , h e is amply e n d o w e d w i t h t h e p o w e r of creating manifold, extraordinary t h i n g s , originat i n g t h a n k s t o t h e favour of t h e D e i t y , t h e Supreme Vocality, called pratibh2, a n d continually shining w i h i n his h e a r t " . T h e p o e t is at o n c e h e w h o sees (the seer, rsi) a n d h e w h o is able t o express in w o r d s t h a t w h i c h h e sees. T h e famous stanzas by Bhatta T o t a q u o t e d by H e m a c a n d r a , Kyynvisana, p . 379, state v e r y clearly t h a t t h e p o e t m u s t h a v e this d o u b l e quality a n d bear q u o t a t i o n . " I t has b e e n said t h a t n o non-seer can b e deservingly called a p o e t , a n d o n e is a seer only b y v i r t u e of his

1) Db.A.9 III, 43. 2) On this term, see below, p. 49, n, 4 and J. Gonda, The Vision of the Vedtc Poets. The Hague 1963, pp. 318-43, [ XLVIII ]

INTRODUCTION Vision is the p o w e r of disclosing intuitively t h e reality ||i4derlying t h e manifold materials in t h e w o r l d a n d their asjjjj^cts* T o b e t e r m e d a " p o e t " in t h e authoritative texts it is | d ! o u g h t o b e possessed of this vision of reality. B u t i n every^ | y speech t h e w o r l d accords that title t o h i m alone w h o possejaSs vision as well as expression. T h u s , t h o u g h t h e first p o e t ify, Vlmki) was highly gifted w i t h e n d u r i n g a n d clear vision, ?|j?;ew#$ n o t hailed as a p o e t by people until h e e m b o d i e d it in a i n s c r i p t i v e w o r k 1 " . R,asa belongs, in reality, t o t h e p o e t consciousness, s | | q n e ; it is n o t h i n g b u t his " generalized " e activity of t h e actor " , says A b h i n a v a in t h e Abhinavar/J, 1, 2 9 4 " , is d e p e n d i n g o n t h e p o e m a n d it is r o o t e d $|b the generalized consciousness of t h e p o e t . Rasa, i n reality, ^ n o t h i n g b u t this consciousness. T h e spectator also, in t h e ^ g i n n i n g , is enchanted by this perception. T h e determinants, t,, are perceived by h i m only at a later time, t h a n k s t o a s u b analysis. T h i s is t h e p u r p o s e of Bharata. T h u s , as s t h e dramatic performance, t h e p o e m o r t h e m i n d of t h e Ctator, t h e r o o t is only this, viz., t h e Rasa w h i c h lies w i t h i n |e p o e t . T h i s is, as it were, t h e seed. T h e p o e t is, indeed, imparable t o t h e spectator, for, as n a n d a v a r d h a n a said, if t h e p o e t is p e r v a d e d b y Rasa, etc. (see a b o v e , p . X L V I I I ) . ^ p o e m , for its part, is, so t o say, t h e tree. T h e activity of actor, t h a t is, representation, etc., is, as it w e r e , t h e flower, i d t h e tasting of t h e spectators, t h e fruit. T h e r e f o r e , all is p e r v a d e d b y R a s a 2 . " Rasa fills t h e p o e t entirely w i t h itself,

1) See also Gonda, op. cit., p. 338. ) A-Bh., I, p. 294 : kavigatasdhraqlbhtasainvinmlas ca kavyapurahmjro- natavjprah \ satva ca samvit paramrthato rasah \ smjtkasya ca tatpra*$ty vatikrtasya pahd apoddhrabuddhy vibhvdprattir iti prayojanam \ n$ye kvye smjikadhiyi ca tad eva mlam bjasthanyah kavigato rasah \ kavir h "Mmpkatulya eva \ fata evoktam srngar cet kavth itydi nandavardhancryena\ [ XLIX ]

INTRODUCTION a n d is spontaneously translated i n t o poetic expression, like a liquid w h i c h overflows a v a s e " if a p o t is n o t full, it cannot overflow " o r like t h e n a t u r a l manifestation of a state of m i n d (interjections, exclamations, etc.) 1 . I n o t h e r w o r d s , artistic creation is t h e direct o r u n c o n v e n t i o n a l expression of a feeling o r passion " generalized " , t h a t is, freed from^aH^distinctions in t i m e a n d space, a n d therefore from all individual relationships a n d practical interest by an inner force w i t h i n t h e p o e t himself, t h e creative o r artistic intuition, pratibh. T h i s state of consciousness expressed in t h e p o e m , etc., is transferred t o the actor o r t h e reciter, a n d t o t h e spectator. All threepoet, actor a n d spectator, in t h e serene c o n t e m p l a t i o n of t h e w o r k of art, f o r m i n reality a single k n o w i n g subject, m e r g e d t o g e t h e r b y t h e same sensations a n d t h e same purified joy 2 , /y T h e u s e of t h e t e r m pratibh in I n d i a n poetics is very old, and, before A b h i n a v a g u p t a , w e find it in v a r i o u s a u t h o r s of treatises o n poetics, as, f.L, B h m a h a (7th century), D a n d i n (7th century) a n d V a m a n a (8th century). A c c o r d i n g t o these authorities, pratibh is, in brief, a sort of u n b o r n genius, imagination o r quick-wittedness, etc. conceived as t h e primary cause of excellence in literary art 3 , as t h e very seed of poetry 4 . T h i s intuition, t o Rjasekhara (9th century) is n o t limited t o t h e p o e t , kavi. A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , t h e w o r d pratibh has t h e double sense o f creative imagination, genius, inspiration, krayitrt

taio vrkmsthntyam kvyam \ tatra puspdisthniyo 'bhinqydivyprah \ tatra phalasthnyah smjikarassvadah \ tena rasamayam eva viivam j 1) hocanay comm. to I, 5. 2) Cf., f.L, the verse by Bhatta Tota, quoted by A.G., {Locana> comm. on I, 6) : njakasya kaveh srotuh samno 'nubhavas tatah J 3) Cp. Bhmaha, Kvylamkara^ 1, 5, and Dandin, Kvyadarsa, 1, 103. 4) Cp. Vamana, Kvylamkra> 1, 3, 16 : kavitvabjam pratjbhnam.

INTRODUCTION and of aesthetic sensibility, h e r e conceived i n t h e of an active p o w e r w h i c h permits t h e manifestation of p i a , bhvayitri pratibh1. All these descriptions of pratibh, &Wever, w e r e superseded b y t h e definition laid d o w n by t h e toaster of Abhinava, Bhatta T o t a . " I n t u i t i o n " , h e says, " is | | l o r r n of intuitive consciousness, prajn, w h i c h is an inexh a u s t i b l e source of n e w forms. I t is by v i r t u e of this intuition J&lone t h a t o n e deserves t h e title of 'poet 5 , of one, that is, w h o IlliSkilful t o express 2 ". This definition of prahbh came t o be I n c e p t e d a n d q u o t e d in later times by almost all of t h e I n d i a n |etx>ricians. A b h i n a v a himself did n o t a d d very m u c h t o it fand limits himself t o stress t h e fact t h a t pratibh does n o t s c h a u s t itself in t h e poetical intuition, b u t is, in a b r o a d e r | | e n s e , t h e same consciousness, t h e same Self. |* I n t h e majority of m e n it does n o t succeed in liberating Jtself ftom t h e chain of relationships a n d practical interests l ^ l i i c h condition a n d constrict it, but, in t h e p o e t , it b u r n s jjjpth a purified l i g h t t o shine o u t finally in all its fullness f||i, t h e intuition of t h e saints 3 . ? ^ v l ) Cp. Rjasekhara, YJtyyamimms, pp. 12-14. ;v 2) This stanza was a part of the Kvyakautuka, a work not extant now. |J| "h quoted, with some variants, by many writers, either anonymously or rtntioning the source by name. Cf. f.i. Hemacandra, p. 3; Mnikyad , p. 7. The text runs as follows : prajn navanavollekhasUni pratibh mat j taaanuprnanjivadvarnanmpuqah kavih || 3) This concept is expressed in the T.., XI, pp. 60-62 (cf. M V.V., f; 1031 onwards) : jath jath ckrtakam tadrpam atiricyate \ tath tath camatkratratamjam vthhvyate || dymayavarnntarmmagne cotiarottare \ samkete prvaprvmsamajjam pratibhbhidah || dyodrekamahattve'pi pratibhtmani msthith \ dhruvam kavitvavaktrtvaihtm ynti sarvatah || yvad dhmani samketamkrakalanojjhite \ visrntas cinmaye htm hm na vetti na karott ca \\ [ LI ]

INTRODUCTION

I n brief, artistic intuition is a particular hypostasis of u n i versal o r total intuition, t h a t is t o say, of consciousness as a force w h i c h creates a n d continually renews the Universe 1 . continued much Bhatta After A b h i n a v a g u p t a , t h e study of aesthetics creative stimulus.

in India u p t o t h e present day, b u t w i t h o u t receiving n a n d a v a r d h a n a , Bhatta Nyaka,

T o t a a n d A b h m a v a are still t h e m o s t characteristic exponents of this subject a n d their t h o u g h t , a l t h o u g h at times uncertain a n d i n g e n u o u s , reaches, w i t h t h e latter, conclusions w h i c h are still valid t o d a y a n d even relatively n o v e l t o western t h o u g h t . T h e conception of art as an activity a n d an independent spiritual experience, freed of practical interests, w h i c h t h e intuition of K a n t perceived for t h e W e s t , was already, i n 10th century India, a n object of study and controversy. Poetry, said n a n d a v a r d h a n a a n d A b h i n a v a g u p t a is inextinguishable : it exists a n d will exist for ever. L i k e love, it has kindled a n d will c o n t i n u e t o kindle t h e hearts of m e n w i t h n e w a n d life ;
2

pulsing

it is an essential a n d i n d e p e n d e n t p a r t of h u m a n n a t u r e

a n d t h e p o e t s , w h o will never cease t o t a p its source, far from exhausting it, only purify a n d enrich it w i t h n e w a n d everc h a n g i n g experiences 3 .

1) nandavardhana (Dh., p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a particular form of pratibh (pratibhvisesam). A.G.'s comment (Dh.A.L., p. 92) is : pratibh aprvavastunirmanaksam prajn \ tasya visejo rasvesavaisadjasaundarjam kvyaksamatvam j| The concept of pratibh is identified in iaiva metaphysics with that of consciousness as creative emission {yuargd)\ cf., p. es., T.At> V.* p. 432 : . . .visargnandadhraj | siktam tad eva sad msvam sasv&d navana vayate \\ 2) Dh.A.L., p. 540. 3) Dh.A, pp. 545-6. [ "I ]

T E X T [A. Bh., I, pp. 274-287]

evam kramahetum abhidhya rasavisayalaksanastram aha " vibhvnubhvavyabhicrisamyogd rasanispattih " | atra ^bhattalollataprabhrtayas tvad evam vycakhyuh j vibh^ v d i b h i h s a m y o g o ' r t h t sthyinah, t a t o r a s a n i s p a t t i h | t a t r a r v i b h v a s c i t t a v r t t e h sthyytmiky u t p a t t a u k r a n a m j a n u ^bhvs c a n a r a s a j a n y atra v i v a k s i t h , t e s m r a s a k r a n a t v e n a ^ g a n a n n a r h a t v t , api t u b h v n m eva ye ' n u b h v h | v y a b h i Jarinas ca c i t t a v r t t y t m a k a t v d yady api n a s a h a b h v i n a h fSthyin, t a t h p i v s a n t m a t e h a tasya v i v a k s i t I d r s t a n t e / p i vyafijandimadhye kasyacid v s a n t m a k a t sthyivad anya 5 y o d b h t a t v y a b h i c r i v a t | t e n a sthyy eva v i b h v a n u b h v d i b h i r u p a c i t o rasah | sthy b h a v a t v 1 a n u p a c i t a h | sa c o b h ryor api a n u k r y e ' n u k a r t a r y api c n u s a m d h n a b a l d iti 2 | j c i r a n t a n n m cyam eva p a k s a h | t a t h h i d a n d i n a svlam% r a l a k s a n e ' b h y a d h y i cc r a t i h ^ r n g r a t m gat r p a b h u l y a yogena " 3 iti, ity ruhya 4 p a r m k o t i m jtydi ca |
lt

10

15

kopo

raudrtmatm gatah

etan neti n s a n k u k a h 5 | v i b h v d y a y o g e s t h y i n o ling>b)ivenavagatyanupapatteh ? b h v n m p r v a m a b h i d h e y a t ^ptasangt, sthitadasym l a k s a n n t a r a v a i y a t t h y t , m a n d a t a r a .tamamdhyasthydynantypatteh, hsyatase sodhtvbhva-

20

^ 1 bhavatv G, M; tv Hc 13, 2 sa cobhayor apj anukrye 'nukartary %p>i cnusamihnabald iti G, M, the text of Hc is here somewhat enlarged, ia cobhayor apt mukhyay vrtty rmdv anukrye 'nukartan ca nate rmdirv pUnusamdhnabald iti II 17, 3 KAD, II, v. 281, prkprltir darsit seyam nafih srngratm gat \ rpabhulycjogena tad dam rasavad vacah || 4 KAD.9 P ^ v . 283 ity ruhya (Bohthngk's ed.) : adhiruhya G : ruhya M, corrected iix a second hand into adhiruhya : aruhya ca Hc || 5 From this 1. to 1.14 the text has been freely paraphrased and enlarged by Hc || [ 3 ]

R. GNOLI p r p t e h , k m v a s t h s u daasv a s a n l d i y a r a s a b h v d i p r a s a n g t , sokasya p r a t h a m a m t v r a t v a m klt t u m a n d y a d a r a n a m , krodhotsharatnam amatsasthakyasevvipayaye hrasadas a n a m iti viparyayasya d f s y a m n a t v c ca j t a s m d d h e t u b h k

5

v i b h v k h y a i h kryais cnubhvtmabhih sahacrkpais ca vyabhicribhih prayatnrjitatay k r t r i m a i r api t a t h n a b h i mnyamnair anukartrsthatvena lingabalatah pratyamnah sthy b h v o m u k h y a r m d i g a t a s t h y y a n u k a i r a n a f p a h , a n u k a r a n a t p a t v d eva ca n m n t a r e n a v y a p a d i s t o rasah |

v i b h v h i k v y a b a l d 1 a n u s a m d h e y h , a n u b h v h sikstah, Au pf 27T5 v y a b h i c r i n a h k r t t i m a n i j n u ^ b h v r j a n a b a l t | sthyi t u k v y a bald api n n u s a m d h e y a h | t a t i h oka i t y d a y o h i eabd r a t y d i k a m a b h i d h e y k u r v a n t y a b h i d h n a t v e n a , n a t u vcikb h i n a y a t p a t a y v a g a m a y a n t i | n a h i v g eva v c i k a m api t u 15 tay n k v f t t a m , a n g a i r i v n g i k a m | t e n a ) 10 vdaveneva jaladhih iti | t a t h j sokena k sokah krodhena ptyate2 rtastambhas3 'navasthitkrandaih4 | \

tath sthito jo 20

i t y e v a m d a u n a oko ' b h i n e y o ' p i t v a b h i d h e y a h ] bhti

1

patito

likhanty*

kvyabald Hc : kvyabal G,M || 2 Untiaced source ; the first two pdas have been given by Hc and read as follows, vivrddhtmpy agdho 9pt duranto ' pi m ahan api \\ 3 krtastambhas Hc : krtah stambhah G, M ||4 yo 'navasihitkrandath G : yo 'vasthttkrandath M : yena vardbitkrandaih He. The two last pdas of this stanza, whose source I have not succeeded in identifying, are given by Hc and read as follows, hrdayasphutanabhayrtat rodttum (a.l., rtair ardttum) abhyarthyate sacivaih j| 5 ThisisHarsa, Ratnaval, 11,11 ; the complete stanza runs as follows, bhti patito hkhaniys tasy bspmbuslkarakanaughah \svedodgama tva karata lasamsparSd esa me vapusi |l [ 4]

HE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC tu vkyena svrtham abhidadhat udayanagatah ratih s t h y i b h v o ' b h i n y a t e n a t c y a t e | a v a g a m a h y a b h i n a y a n a m v c a k a t v d any | ata eva sthyipas t r e b h i n n a v i b h a k t i k a m api m u n i n n o k t a m 1 t e n a ratir jaaijkriyatnn s r n g r a iti t a d t m a k a t v a m t a t p r a b h a v a t v a m ca l ^ i k t a m | a r t h a k r i y p i m i t h y j n n d d r s t 1 ] n a ctra n a r t a k a ^ v a sukhlti p r a t i p a t t i h , n p y ayam eva r m a iti, n a cpy *ayam n a sukhiti, n p i r m a h syd v n a v y a m iti, 2 n a cpi ^tatsadrsa i t i 3 1 yah sukh r m a asv ayam iti p r a t t i r astti | ftad4 ha j pratibhti na samdeho na tattvam na viparyayah \ dhir asv ayam ity asti nasv evyam ity apt 1 1 viruddhabuddhyasambhedd* avivecitasainplavah* \ yukty paryanuyujyeta sphurann anubhavah kay H iti | t a d i d a m apy a n t a s t a t t v a s n y a m n a v i m a r d a k s a m a m ity p d h y y h 7 | t a t h h y a n u k a f a n a f p o rasa iti yad u c y a t e tat | 4 ) , k i m smjikaprattyabhipryena, 2) Uta n a t b h i p f y e n a , 1^) kirn v * v a s t u v r t t a v i v e c a k a v y k h y t r b u d d h i s a m a v a l a m b a |ena y a t h h u r " v y k h y t r a h k h a l v e v a m v i v e c a y a n t i 8 " iti, %) atha b h a r a t a m u n i v a c a n n u s r e n a | |^C 1) t a t r d y a h p a k s o ' s a m g a t a h 1 kimcid d h i p r a m n e tfopalabdham t a d a n u k a t a n a m iti s a k y a m v a k t u m | y a t h y a m asau s u r m pibatti s u r p n n u k a r a n a t v e n a p a y a h p n a m ||>jatyaksvalokitam p r a t i b h t i | i h a ca n a t a g a t a m kirn t a d He adds here one stanza of Dharmakrti, PV, II, 57, manzpradpaprabiajor mambuddhybhidhvatoh | mtthyjnnvtsese 'pi visesd* rthahriym 2 %$tt || npi rmah syd v na vyam ttt G, Hc : omitted in M || \$$&tt hm tu He adds samjanmtthysamsa}asdtsyapratltibhyo vtlaksan 5 Wtiraturagdwyjena || 4 tad G,M ; yad Hc || %uddhyasambhedd Hc : 6 ^htddhisambhedd G, M || *samplavah G> M. : *vtplavab Hc || | updhyyh G : updhyyah M : bhattatotah Hc || 8 This is Dharmakrti, 9 p , Svavrttu p. 39 (ed. Gnoli) j| tatidyah Hc, M : dyah G jj
1 9

ity anena

10

15

A B/. 20

R. GNOL upalabdham yat sa ity anukaranatay* bhtti cintyam

taccharram tannistham pratiirsakadi romncakagadgadikdi 2 b h u j k s e p a c a l a n a p r a b h r t i 3 b h r k s e p a k a t k s d i k a m ca n a rate c i t t a v r t t i r p a t a y 4 n u k r a t v e n a kasyacit p r a t i b h t i 1 j a d a t v e n a bhinnendfiyagrhyatvena 5 bhinndhikaranatvena c a 6 tato 'tivailaksanyt | m u k h y m u k h y v a l o k a n e 7 ca t a d a n u k a r a n a p r a t i b h s a h ] n a ca r m a g a t m m i m u p a l a b d h a p r v i n a h kecit | e t e n a r m n u k r i n a t a ity api n i r a s t a h p r a v d a h | a t h a n a t a g a t c i t t a v r t t i r eva p r a t i p a n n sat r a t y a n u k r a h s r n g r a ity u c y a t e t a t t p i k i m t m a k a t v e n a s pratyata iti cint y a m I n a n u p r a m a d d i b h i h k r a n a i h k a t k s d i b h i h kfyaih dhftydibhi ca sahacfibhii: l i n g a b h t a i r y laukik kfyarpa k f a n a t p 8 sahacrifp ca c i t t a v t t t i h p r a t i t i y o g y t a d t m a k a t v e n a s n a t a c i t t a v t t t i h p t a t i b h t i \ h a n t a t a t h i t a t y k t e n a i v a s p r a t i p a n n e t i d r e r a t y a n u k a t a n a t v c o y u k t i h | n a n u v i b h v d a y o ' n u k t y e p r a m f t h i k , i h a t v a n u k a r t a r i n a tatheti visesah | a s t v e v a m , kirn t u t e v i b h v d a y o 9 ' t a t k r a n t a t k r y t a t s a h a c a t a t p api k v y a e i k s d i b a l o p a k a l p i t a h k t t r i m h s a n t a h kirn k t t r i m a t v e n a smjikair g r h y a n t e n a v | yadi g r h y a n t e , t a d t a i h k a t h a m r a t e r a v a g a t i h | n a n v ata eva tat pratyamnam ratyanukaranam | m u g d h a b u d d h e 1 0 krannyat sa ity anukaranatay Mc, p. 69 (Hc in a note) : saanukaranatay G, M : yad ratyanukaranatay He : y ad anukaranatay P, p. 417 || 2 3 romneaka0 G, M : romana0 Hc || calana* Hc : *valana* G,M || 4 attavrttirpatay G, M : cittavrttirpy He || 5 bhinnendnyagrhyattena represented in He, is possibly a later addition, and it is, as such, bracke6 ted both in G and M (in a second hand) || ca is omitted by He || 7 Perhaps the original reading was mukhyvalokam only, and a^ukya, bracketed both in G and M and absent in Hc, is a later addition || 8 kranarp G,M : omitted by He || 9 te vtbhvdayo He : te hi vibhv10 dajo G,M II mugdhabuddhe : ratyanukaranabuddhefy krattam G, M ; He J| [ M
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T H E AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE,

ETC.

t a i a p r a b h a v e h i k r y e susiksitena l tatbjiine v a s t v a n t a r a s y n u m n a m t v a d y u k t a m | asusiksitena 2 t u tasyaiva p r a siddhasya k r a n a s y a J y a t h 3 vrbcikavisesd g o m a y a s y a i v n u m n a m v r s c i k a s y a i v a 4 t a t p a r a m m i t h y j n n a m | yatrpi li4gajfinam m i t h y t a t r p i n a t a d b h s n u m n a m y u k t a m 5 | a k h i b s p d d h m a t v e n a jfitd a n u k r a p r a t i b h s a m n d apilingt tadanukrnumnam yuktam | dhmnukratvena lif j n y a m n n n h a r n n g n y a n u k r a j a p a p u n j a p r a t t i r 6 d r s t j V a a n v a k r u d d h o ? pi n a t a h k r u d d h a i v a b h t i | satyam, k t u d d h e n a s a d r s a h | s d r s y a m ca b h r u k u t y d i b h i r g o r 7 iya g a v a y e n a m u k h d i b h i r lti n a i t v a t n u k r a h kascit | n a Jjfpi smjiknm s d r s y a m a t i r asti | smjikanm ca n a | ) h v a s n y n a r t a k e p i a t i p a t t i r ty u c y a t e | a t h a ca t a d a .iukarapratibhsa iti rjkt v c o y u k t i h | yac c o k t a m r m o f j a m i t y asti p r a t i p a t t i h , t a d api yadi t a d t v e ' 8 tiniscitam taduttaraklabhvibdhakavaidhutybhve katham na tattvasyt | b d h a k a s a d b h v e v k a t h a m n a m i t h y v s t a v e n a ca v f t t e n a b d h a k n u d a y e ' p i m i t h y a m eva syt | tena " v i r u d d h a b u d d h y a s a m b h e d d 9 " ity | s a t 1 n a r t a k n t a r e ' p i ca 10 m o 'yarn iti p r a t i p a t t i r asti j ^ t a ca r m a t v a m s m n y a r p a m ity y t a m J yac cocyate v | b h v h k v y d a n u s a m d h y a n t e t a d api n a v i d m a h [ [m hi m a m e y a m st kcid iti s v t m y a t v e n a p r a t i p a t t i r iitasya j atha smjikasya t a t h p r a t t i y o g y h k r i y a n t a ity

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Q 1 ^l Q prabhave hi krye susiksitena tath jHrte He (but jnte for jnne) : p Hrabhavesu hi kryesusiksttena na tath jnne G, M || 2 asusiksitena Hc, 3 $\ astuhksitena M || jath G, Hc : tath M |l 4 vrscikasyaiva G : 5 asjaiva v Hc : vrscikas caiva M || na,. .yuktam : ajuktam 6 na.. .ayuktam G3M || jappuja Hc : jaj>pusj>a G,M \\ p Hc : ganr G,M || 8 tadtve 'tiniscitam (the avagraha added by me) 9 ]$,G {tadaheti {pi) niscttaw) iatve mscitam Hc || %uddhyasambhedt 10 9 H : buddhisambhedt G3M || pt ca G,M : ca omitted by Hc ||

[ 7 ]

R. GNOLI e t a d * e v n u s a m d h n a m u c y a t e , t a r h i sthyini s u t a r m anus a m d h n a m syt I tasyaiva h i m u k h y a t v e n a a s m i n n ayam iti s m j i k n m p r a t i p a t t i h [ yas t u 2 v g v c i k a m i t y d i n bhedbhidhnasamrambhagarbho3 mahyn abhinayarpatv i v e k a h k r t a h sa u t t a r a t r a s v v a s a r e carcayisyate | t a s m t s m j i k a p r a t i t y a n u s r e n a s t h y y a n u k a r a n a m r a s a 4 i t y asat ( 2) n a cpi n a t a s y e t t h a m p r a t i p a t t i h r m a m t a c c i t t a v r t t i m vnukaromti j sadrsakaranam h i tvad anukaranam anupalab d h a p r a k r t i n 5 n a s a k y a m k a r t u m 1 atha p a s c t k a r a n a m a n u k a r a n a m , tal l o k e *py a n u k a r a n t m a t t i p r a s a k t { a t h a n a niyatasya kasyacid a n u k r a h , api t t t a m a p r a k r t e h s o k a m a n u k a r o m i t i , 6 t a r h i k e n e t i c i n t y a m | n a t v a c c h o k e n a tasya tadabhvt | n a csruptdin eokasynukrah, tadvailaksanyd ity u k t a m | iyat t u 7 syt, u t t a m a p r a k r t e r y e oknubhvs tn anukaromti J tatrpi kasyottamaprakrteh ] yasya kasyacid iti cet, s o ' p i visistatm v i n k a t h a m b u d d h v r o p a y i t u m sakyah | y a e v a m r o d i t t i cet, s v t m p i m a d h y e n a t a s y n u p r a v i s t a iti galito " n u k r y n u k a r t r b h v a h 1 kirn ca n a t a h siksvast s v a v i b h v a s m a r a n c c i t t a v r t t i s d h r a n i bhvena hrdayasamvdt kevalam8 anubhvn pradarsayan k v y a m ucita 9 k k u p r a b h r t y u p a s k r e n a p a t h a m s cestata ity etvanmtre ?sya10 p r a t t i r u na tv anukram vedayate { k n t a v e s n u k r a v a d d h i n a r m a c e s t i t a s y n u k r a h | etac ca p r a t h a m d h y y e ' p i d a r s i t a m asmbhih 1 2 |
2 3 Q 1 etad G,M : etvad Hc || Jas tu : jat tu G9U || garbho x Q 4 r sa 5 garbha G3M || # G5M : rasa Hc || ^prakrtin G,Hc : 6 7 prakrtmm M II anukdromttt Hc : anukaroti G,M || iyat tu 8 9 G,M : jat tu Hc || hevalam G,M : kevaln Hc || ucita Hc, 10 M : upacitc G \\ etvanmtre 9sya G3M : etvanmtrasya Hc || Q 11

15

20

prattir

G, He : prattttm M j[

12

Cf.

ABb9

I, p. 37 {infra,

App. I, p. 98) II [ 8 ]

TIE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, 3) n p i v a s t u v t t t n u s r e n a l t a d a n u k r a t v a m , a s a m v e d y tanasya2 v a s t u v t t a t v n u p a p a t t e h j yac ca v a s t u v r t t a m t a d p ^

5

^ 4) n a ca m u n i v a c a n a m e v a m v i d h a m asti k v a c i t sthyyjuikaranam t a s iti \ * n p i Ungarn a t f r t h e m u n e r u p a l a jhyate | p r a t y u t a d h r u v g n a t l a v a i c i t t y a l s y n g o p a j i v a n a m tiitpandi v i p a r y a y e l m g a m iti s a m d h y a n g d h y y n t e vitaasiyamah 4 ] " s a p t a d v p n u k a r a n a m 5 " itydi t v a n y a t h p i ,|akyagamanikam iti | t a d a n u k r e ? pi ca k v a n m n t a r a m kktavesagatyanukarand6 [ ' y a c cocyate v a r n a k a i r h a r i t l d i b h i h samyujyamna eva gint itydi, t a t r a yady a b h i v y a j y a m n a ity a r t h o 'bhipiretas | a d asat ] n a h i s i n d u r d i b h i h p a t a m t t h i k o g a u r abhivyajyate | a d p d i b h i r iva, k i m t u tatsadsah s a m h a v i s e s o n i r v a r t y a t e I ^ e v a 7 h i s i n d r d a y o g a v v a y a v a s a m n i v e s a s a d r s e n a samni^ s a v l s e s e n v a s t h i t g o s a d r g iti p r a t i b h s a s y a visayo n a i v a m yij^hvdisamho t a t i s a d s a t p r a t i p a t t i g r h y a h [ t a s m t b h ;^|iukaranam rasa ity asat | <*yena t v a b h y a d h y i s u k h a d u h k h a j a n a n a s a k t i y u k t visayab h y a i v a s m k h y a d r s s u k h a d u h k h a s v a b h v o rasah [ ^ ca s m a g r y m dalasthny v i b h v h , s a m s k r a k ^ l u b h v a v y a b h i c r i n a h , sthyinas t u t a t s m a g r j a n y n t a r h ^ t k l a a d u h k h a s v a b h a v iti I t e n a cc s t h y i b h v n r a s a t v a m ^ p a n e s y m a 8 " itydv upacram angikurvat granthavii'ofjtham svayam eva b u d h y a m n e n a d s a n v i s k a r a n a m a u k h a % t 9 p r m n i k o janah 1 0 p a r i r a k s i t a iti k i m asyocyate j y a t t v
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25

2 vastuvrttnusrena G,Hc : vastutvnusrena M || asamvedyamanasya 3 4 | | : anusamvedjamnasja G,M. || Cf. infra, p. 00 || Cf. ABh, III, 5 ;c4. XIX if N$, I, v. 120 || 6 Hukarand : Hukaratdau G3M || 8 &0q eva Hc : ata eva G, M || N$, prose after v. 45 || 30 ^Fspmaukharjt Hc: *mairkhyt G, M || prmmh janah G,M : pramnikajanah Ile ||

[ 9 ]

&. GNLt any a t l t a t p r a t t i v a i s a m y a p r a s a n g d i t a t k i y a d

2

atrocyatm |

bhattanyakas t v ha J raso na pratyate, notpadyate, nbhivyajyate | svagatatvena h i prattau karune duhkhit5 v a m syt [ n a ca s p r a t t i r y u k t stder avibhvatvt, svakntsmrtyasamvedant, devatdau sdhranikaranyogya t v t , s a m u d r o l l a n g h a n d e r a s d h r a n y t J n a ca t a d v a t o 3 r m a s y a smtir a n u p a l a b d h a t v t \ n a ca s a b d n u m n d i b h y a s t a t p r a t t a u l o k a s y a sarasat y u k t 4 p r a t y a k s d i v a [ n y a k a y u g a l a k v a b h s e h i p r a t y u t a lajjjugupssprhdisvocitacittavrttyantarodayavyagratay k sarasatvakathpi syt5 | tan n a p r a t t i r 6 a n u b h a v a s m r t y d i r p rasasya y u k t | u t p a t t v a p i t u l y a m e t a d d s a n a m | s a k t i r p a t v e n a p r v a m sthitasya p a s c d a b h i v y a k t a u v i s a y r j a n a t r a t a m y p a t t i h | svagata 7 p a r a g a t a t v d i ca p r v a v a d v i k a l p y a m | t a s m t k v y e d o s bhvagunlamkramayatvalaksanena, ntye caturvidhbhinayarpena nividanijamohasamkatatnivranakrin 8 vibhvdisdhranikarantmanbhidhto dvityenmsena bhvakatvay y p r e n a b h v y a m n o * raso ' n u b h a v a s m r t y d i v i l a k s a n e n a rajastamo'nuvedhavaicitryabald drutivistra9 vikstman sattvodrekapraksnandamayanijasamvidvisrntilaksanenapar a b r a h m s v d a s a v i d h e n a b h o g e n a p a r a m bhujyata iti 1 0 j jat tv anyat tat0 He : jat tv atyantam nah G M || 2 tat hjadc i 3 4 tat ktm jad G,M || tadvato G, M : tattvato He || sarasat 6 jukt Hc : sarasat prajukt G,M (for sarasat7 pi jukt ?) || k 6 satasatvakathpi syt Hc : kasarasatvamathpisyt G,M || Before tan na prattir, etc. He adds the following sentence, paragatatvena tu prattau 7 ttasthyam eva bhavet || svagata0 Hc, M : svagatatva0 G || 8 ^samkatatmvranaknn Hc : ^samkataknn G,M, equally possible || 9 v?stra G5M : Pistara Hc || 10 After bhujyata iti He adds the wordsyat sa evha> followed by two stanzas, surely borrowed from the lost Hrdayadarpana9 abhidh bhvan cny fadbhogkrtir (alia lectio, tadbhogkrtam) eva ca | abiidhdhmatmyte sabdrthlamkr tatah\\ bhvanbhvya eso *pi srngrdigano matah (aba lectio, hi jut) | tabhogkrtarpena vypyaie siddhtmn narafy |j
1

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A Bh,i, 20

t tatra md eva

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. prvapakso 'yam bhattalollatapaksnabhyupagaanutthnopahatam

n b h y u p a g a t a iti t a d d s a n a m

e v a j prattydivyatirikta |aksanyn nmntaram

ca samsre k o b h o g a iti n a v i d eva, k e v a l a m u p y a v a i darsannumitisrunispdanbhivyaktix

Ciah [ rasaneti cet, spi p r a t i p a t t i r jtyupamitipratibhndinmntaravat rgatih s y t

2

pratipadyatm, J

fdvaynabhyupagame ca n i t y o v a ' s a n

v a rasa iti n a t t t y a

| n a c p r a t t a m v a s t v asti v y a v a h r e y o g y a m 3 | 10

a t h o c y a t e p r a t t i r a s y a 4 b h o g k a r a n a m , t a c ca d r u t y d i s v a r p a r a 5 1 t a d astu, t a t h p i n a t a v a n m t r a m | y v a n t o h i rasas tvatya eva rasantmnah :^gunntn

7 6

prattayo bhogikaranasvabhvh |

c n g n g i v a i c i t r y a m a n a n t a m k a l p y a m iti k a tri| 15

Veneyatt ( bhvanhhvya eso 'pi srngardigano hi y at8

9

iti t u y a t k v y e n a b h v y a n t e rasa ity u c y a t e , t a t r a v i b h v d i j a n i t a c a r v a n t m a k s v d a r p a p r a t y a y a g o c a r a t p d a n a m eva b h v a n a m t a d a b h y u p a g a m y a t a eva | yat t k t a m | bhvasamyojanvyangyaparasamvittigocarah svdantmnuhhavo rasah kvyrtha \
10

ucyate

||

2 'san Hc : 'sad G5M || gaUh syt Hc : gattr asym G : 3 sjm M || astt vjavahre jogyam G,M : astttvyavahrayogyam 4 He II prafflir asya Hc : pratthr ih tasya G : pratthr th rasya (for 5 tasasya ?) M, which reading is equally possible || drutydisvarpam 6 He : bhtydisvarpam G3M. || rasantmnah G, M : rastmnab Hc || f gunnm G,M : this is explained by He by sattvdigunnm || 8 gano hi 9 yat He : *gp bhqyat G (corrected into hi yat), M || /// tu yat Hc : 10 Uiyat G,M || This stanza is quoted in this form in the Vyaktiviveka, p, 67 (readparasatnvith* for pansamvitti*). Both in G and M we read Ifithe first pda samvedankhya (corrected into samvedankhyay in G), l^hich is quite nonsensical. He quotes a different stanza : samsargdir istra ekatvt phalayovatah \ vkyrthas tadvad evtra irngrdi raso II iti tad asmkam abhimatam eva ||

R. GNOLI iti t a t r a v y a j y a m n a t a y v y a n g y o r a k s y a t e 1 | a n u b h a v e n a ca t a d v i s a y a iti m a n t a v y a m | n a n v e v a m k a t h a m r a s a t a t t v a m | stm, kim k u r m a h | mnyasiddhe 5 kim aprvam etat samvidvikse 'dhigatgamitvam \ ittham svayamgrhyamaharhahetih dvandvena kim dsayit na lokah || *rdhvordhvam ruhya y ad arthatattvam dhh pasjti srntim avedayant \ phalam tad dyaih parikalpitnm vivekasopnaparamparnm \\ citram nirlambanam eva manye prameyasindhau2 prathamvatram \ tanmrgalbhe satt setubandhapurapratisthdi na vismayya\\ tasmt satm atra na dsitni matni tny eva tu sodhitni \ p rpapratisthpitayojansu mlapratisthphalam 20 mananti || t a r h y u c y a t m p a r i s u d d h a t a t t v a m 3 | u k t a m eva m u n i n , na t v aprvam kimcit | tath h y ha " kvyrthn bhvayantiti b h v h 4 " iti t a t k v y r t h o r a s a h 5 | y a t h h i " r t r i m s a t a 6 ", " t m a g n a u p r d t 7 " i t y d v arthitdilaksitasydhikrinah pratipattimtrd atitvraprarocitat prathamapravrttd anantaram adhikaivopttaklatiraskrenaiva 6 sai8 ' raksyate G (in the first ed.) : laksyate G : labhyate M (corrected into hksyat) || 2 prameyasindhau : prameyasiddhau G, M || 3 parisuddhatattvam G,M : parisudham tattvam He || 4 The entire quotation is kvyrthn hhvayantiti bhvlo (N$, prose at the beginning of ch. VII) || He paraphrases tasmt kvyrtho rasah \\ 6 rtrim sata G: ratrr sate M. 7 Untraced source || Taittirya Samhit, 2, 1, 1 || 8 sai : ste G (corrected into se), M ||
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p'^ao 10

15

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. fpradadni' i t y d i r p s a m k r a m a n d i s v a b h v y a t h d a r s a n a m bfevanVidhiniyogdibhsbhir vyavahtt pratipattih, Mthaiva k v y t m a k d api s a b d d a d h i k r i n o ' d h i k s t i p r a t i |>attih | a d h i k a r ctra v i m a l a p r a t i b h n a s l i h f d a y a h | tasya ca f ! g n v b h a n g a b h i t m a m 2 " iti " u m p i n l l a k a 3 " iti " h a r a s tx k i m c i t 4 " i t y d i v k y e b h y o v k y r t h a p r a t i p a t t e r a n a n t a t a m mnas s k s t k r t m i k apahastita 5 t a t t a d v k y o p t t a k l d i v i b h g t v a t p r a t t i r upajyate | tasym ca yo m r g a p o t a k d i r biiti tasya v i s e s a r p a t v b h v d b h t a iti trsakasy 6 p r a m i t h i k a t v d b h a y a m eva p a t a m d e s a k l d y a n l i n g i t a m , t a t a e^a b h t o ' h a m b h t o ' y a m s a t r u r vayasyo m a d h y a s t h o v e t y diptatyayebhyo duhkhasukhdikttahndibuddhyantarodayabyamavattaya vighnabahulebhyo vilaksanam nirvighnapraitigrhyatn s k s d i v a h r d a y e n i v i s a m n a m 7 c a k s u s o r i v a v i p a ' t i v a t t a m n a m b h a y n a k o rasah | t a t h v i d h e h i b h a y e n t m t y y n t a t i t a s k r t o 8 n a visesata u l l i k h i t a h | e v a m p a t o ' p i | t a t a e v a n a p a r i m i t a m eva s d h r a n y a m api t u * v i t a t a m , v y p t i g f a h a iv d h m g n y o r b h a y a k a m p a y o r eva v j t a d a t r a skstkJ y a m n a t v e p a r i p o s i k natdismagrf, yasym v a s t u s a t m i v y f p i t n m ca d e s a k l a p r a m t r d m m n i y a m a h e t n m | t x y o n y a p r a t i b a n d h a b a l d a t y a n t a m a p a s a r a n e sa e v a s d h p n b h v a h s u t a r m p u s y a t i | ata eva s a r v a s m j i k n m 9 ekabhvan : pratibhvan M (corrected in a second hand into pratibhIjlhvana) : pratibhbhavanG. In my opinion prati is simply a note by ^sdine reader who has not understood the expression jathadarsanam, 2 h^hich was later incorporated in the text || Klidsa, Abhinasa3 4 \iatntala, I, 2|| Klidsa, Kumrasambhava, III, 62 || Klidsa, 5 bid., Ill, 67 ]| apahastita^ He, M (but corrected in a second 6 \Jiand into apahsita): apahasita G || trsakasy He, G: grhakasya 7 8 JML |j nivisamnam He, G : nidhfyamnam M \\ atyantatiraskrto v&M s atyanta omitted by He || sarvasmjiknm G,M : srnffknm He ||
1

10

15 *

20

R. GNOLI g h a n a t a y a i v a 1 p r a t i p a t t e h 2 s u t a r m rasapariposya sarvesm

a n d i v s a n v i c i t n k r t a c e t a s m v s a n s a m v d t | s c v i g h n s a m v i c c a m a t k r a h | tajjo ' p i k a m p a p u l a k o l l u k a s a n d i r v i k ras c a m a t k r a h j y a t h

5

ajja vi hart camakkai kaha kaha vi na mamdarena dahim camdakalkamdalasacchahaim lacchim amgim \\ bhunjnasydbhutabhogaspandvistasya

t a t h h i sa ca t r p t ^ v y a t i r e k e n c c h i n n o b h o g v e e a ity u c y a t e | 10 c a m a t a h kairanam 5 c a m a t k t a iti | sa ca s k s t k r a s v a b h v o m n a s d h y a v a s y o v s a m k a l p o v s m t t i t v t a t h t v e n s p h u f a t y 6 astu | y a d ha | ramjni viksya madhurms paryutsukJbhavatiyat 15 tac cetas s mar at i nnam ca nisamya sabdn \ abodhaprvatn || sukhito 'pijantuh

bhvasthlrni jananntarasauhrdni

20

itydi ( s a t v a t h t v a d essti p t a t t i r , s v d t m yasym t a t i r eva b h t i | tata eva viSesntarnupahitatvt s irasanya sat n a laukik na m i t h y nnirvcy na laukikatuly n a tadt o p d i f p | esaiva copacayvasthstu 7 deedyaniyantrant j a n u k r o ' p y astu b h v n u g m i t a y 8 k a t a n t [ visayasmagry api b h a v a t u vijfinavdvalambant | satvathJ rasantmakavit a v i g h n a p r a t t i g r h y o b h v a eva rasah | tatra vighnpasrak v i b h v a p r a b h r t a y a h 1 t a t h h i loke sakalavighnavinirmukt samvittir eva camatkranirvesarasansvdanabh ogasamekaghanatqyawa G, M (corrected in a second hand from ekaghanataiv) : 2 ekaghanataiva He || prattpatteh He, M: G suggests prafopattify || 3 dahim G,M: kaltim He || 4 sa ca trptt(sa v trpti* ?): sa ctrph* G3M || 5 camatah karanam : ca tnanahkaranatn G, M || 6 tathtvensphuraty M : tathtvena sphurafy G : tathtvensphuranty He || 7 vasthstu Hc : ^vasthsu G,M || 8 bhvnugmitay GPM: anugmitay Hc ||
1

TtE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. pattilayavisirntydisabdair abhidhyate | v i g h n s csym 1) p r a tipattv ayogyat * s a m b h v a n v k a h o nma 2) svagatatva*desaklavisesvesah 3) nijasukhdivivaf paragatatvaniyamena i&bhvah 4) pratityupyavaikalyam 5) s p h u t a t v b h v a h 6) apradhnat 7) samsayayogas ca | tath h i 1) samvedyam asambhvayamnah samvedye samvidam 2 "niveayitum eva na saknoti | k tatra visrntir lti p r a t h a m o "Vighnah | tadapasrane hfdayasamvdo lokasmnyavastu3 ^yisayah | alokasmnyesu t u cestitesv akhanditaprasiddhi4 janitagdhrdhapratyaya prasarakri prakhytarmdinmadheyaparigrahah | ata eva nihsmanyotkarsopadesavyutpatti*payojane n t a k d a u prakhytavastuvisayatvdi niyamena n i r "payisyate 5 | na t u prahasandv i t i 6 | tac ca svvasara eva yaksyma ity stm tvat | 2) svaikagatnm ca s u k h a d u h k h a s a m v i d m svde yathgambhavam tadapagamabhrutaya v a tatpaiiraksvyagtatay v latsadisrjijisay v tajjihsay v tatpracikhypayisay v ladgopanecchay v prakrntarena v samvedanntarasamud^ a m a eva p a r a m o v i g h n a h | paragatatvaniyamabhjm api ^sukhaduhkhnm samvedane niyamena svtmani s u k h a d u h k h a iJnohamdhyasthydisamvidantarodgamanasambb vand avasyl^mbhv v i g h n a h | tadapasrane 7 " kryo ntiprasango ? t r a 8 " |i|ydin p r v a r a n g n i g h a n e n a 9 p r a s t v a n v a l o k a n e n a 1 0 ca ^q natatpatdhigamas t a t p u r a h s a r a h u pratisirsakdin tatsvagatatva* G,M : svagata0 Hc || 2 nivesajttum Hc, M: vtmvesqyttum d tuG, Hc : omitted by M || 4 rSapratjaja G,M: *rdbacttiHc || 5 mrpayisyate GM (ABh, II, eh. XVIII) : mrpjate 6 7 /// Hc : tva G,M || tadapasrane Hc : tadapakrane G : 8 9 p M || Nf, V, v. 165 || Before prvarangmghanena adds prvarangavidhim pratt, which looks like a pda of the N$ || prastvanvalokanena Hc adds nat vidsako vpi (N$, XX, v. 30 laksita0 || u tatpwahsauilo G,M: tatpurahsarah Hc || L 15 ] 20 15

202'

10

R- GNOtt p r a c c h d a n a p r a k r o ' b h y u p y o ? laukikabhsdibhedalsyrigarangapthamandapagatakaksyadiparigrahanatyadharmsahitah | tasmin h y 1 asyaivtraivaitarhy eva ca s u k h a m d u h k h a m veti na b h a v a t i p r a t t i h | svafpasya n i h n a v d rpntarasya cropitasya pratibhsasamvidvisrntivaikalyena svarpe visrntya b h v t satyatadiyarpanihnavamtra eva paryavasnt | tath h y sinapthyapuspagandikdi loke na drstam | na ca tan na kimcit, k a t h a m c i t sambhvyatvd iti sa esa saryo m u n i n sdhranibhvasiddhy rasacarvanopayogitvena parikaraban d h a h samsrita iti tatraiva sphutbhavisyatti tad iha tvan n o d y a m a n l y a m | tatah sa esa svaparaniyatatvighnpasranaprakro vykhytah j 3) nijasukhdivivasibhtas ca k a t h a m 15 ' P."285 sthaih sdhranyamahimn
2

10

vastvantare samvipratipadrthani-

d a m visramayed iti tatpratyhavyapohanya sabddivisayamayair gdhaganikdibhir sravyam ca ' 20

e

sakalabhogyatvas*hisnubhih samsritam yenhrdayo

?

todyagnavicitramandapapada 3 vidapi " drsyam

uparanjanam

hrdayavaimalyaprpty sahrdaykriyate | u k t a m h i iti |

?

4) kirn ca p r a t i t y u p y n m a b h v e k a t h a m prattih | 5) asphutaprattikarisabdalingasambhave yathhuh " sarv . ceyam p r a m i t i h gamnumnasatair altacakrdau iti laukikas
? 6

pi

na
5

prattir " iti |

visrmyati sphutapratitirpapratyaksocitapratyayasknksatvt | pratyaksapr apy svaskstkrta tatavadhrand ananyathbhvasya

svasamvedant j

skstkrntarenaiya balavat tvad ayam k r a m h | tasmt

t a d u b h a y a v i g h n a v i g h t e bhinay l o k a d h a r m v r t t i p r a v r t t y u p a s -

tasmin hy G3M : tasmin hi saiy Hc || 2 *mayair Hc \Qmaybhir G 3 (corrected into may air), M | | pada G,M : omitted by Hc j| 4 6 N$, I, v. 11 II Nyyastra, Vtsyyanabhsya, Y, 1, 3 (th.e edited text gives s for sarv) || 6 tadavadhratit G, M: tatpramityapasrant Hc ||

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC samabhisicyante [ abhinayanain h i sasabdalingavypfayisadrsam eva pratyaksavyprakalpam iti niscesymah 1 | 6) a p r a d h n e ca vastuni kasya samvid visrmyati | tasyaiva /gratyayasya 2 pradhnntaram praty a n u d h v a t a h svtmany avi% n t a t v t | ato ' p r a d h n a t v a m jade v i b h v n u b h v a v a r g e v y a Ibhicrinicaye ca samvidtmake 'pi niyamennyamukhapreksini 3 ; k m b h a v a t i t i tadatiriktah sthyyeva t a t h 4 carvanptram | tatra ; {mrusrthanisthh kscit samvida iti p t a d h n a m | tad yath ratih kma^adanusangidharmarthanisth, k r o d h a s t a t p r a d h n e s v a r t h anisthah kmadhatmaparyavasito ? pi, utshah samastadharmdiparyavasitas, tattvajfinajanitanirvedapryo ? pi b h v o 6 m o k s o r'pya iti tvad esm p r d h n y a m | yady api caism apy a n y o n y a m Tgunabhavo ? sti tathpi t a t p r a d h n e 7 r p a k e t a t t a t p r a d h n a m 8 jhavatti tpakabhedaparyyena sarvesm p r d h n y a m esm laksyate | a d t a b h g b h i n i v i s t a d t s a s 9 t v ekasminn api r p a k e p r t h a k p r d h n y a m | tatra sarve 7m s u k h a p r a d h n h svasamviccarvanarpasyaikaghanasya praksasynandasratvt [ tath h y ^ k a g h a n a s o k a s a m v i c c a r v a n e ? pi l o k e strlokasya 10 hrdayavisr?ntir antaryaenyavisrntisariratvt j avisrntirpataiva ca d u h )kham | tata eva kpilair d u h k h a s y a cnclyam eva p r n a t v e n o "ktm rajovrttitm v a d a d b h i r ity n a n d a r p a t sarvarasnm | | i m tparanjakavisayavast kesm api katukimnsti sparso vrasa h i kleeasahisnutdiprna eva | e v a m r a t y d m m p r hsdinm t u stisayam sakalalokasulabhavibhvata-

IQ

15

20

2 ^; l ABh, II, chapp. VIII || pratjqyasya G 3 M: praijeyasja Hc || f;*prek$ini Hc, M: sampreksini G || 4 tath G,M : omitted by Hc || ;f: kam0 : ktnah G,M (in M h bracketed in a second hand) : kme 5HC H 6 pryo* pi bhvo (see V. Raghavan, Bioja, p. 00) : prajo 7 Ivjhhvo G,M : samas ca Hc || tatpradhne M: taitaipradhne G, 8 9 l H tattatpradhnam G,M: tatpradhnam Hc || *drias G,M : n fdrf Hc II 10 strlokasya G,Hc: 9sti lokasya M || vtrasyeva Hc: vrasja G.M ||

r 17 1

k. GNOLI yoparanjakatvam iti p r d h n y a m 1 | ata evnuttamaprakrtisu ' P. 234 bhulyena hsdayo bhavanti | pmarapryah * sarvo 'pi hasati socati bibheti p a r a n i n d m driyate alpa 2 subhsitatvena ca sarv a t r a vismayate [ ratydyangatay t u p u m a r t h o p a y o g i t v a m api 5 syd esm | e t a d g u n a p r a d h n a b h v a k r t a eva ca dasarpakdib h e d a iti vaksymah | sthyitvam caitvatm eva | jta eva hi j a n t u r iyatbhih samvidbhih p a r t o bhavati | t a t h h i duhkhasamslesavidvesl 10 sukhsvdanasdarah31

15

20

iti nyyena sarvo riramsay vyptah svtmany utkarsajnnitay p a r a m u p a h a s a n n abhstaviyogasamtaptas taddhetusu k o p a paravaso 'saktau ca tato b h r u h kimcid fjijsur 4 apy anucita 5 vastuvisayavaimukhytmakataykrntah kimcid anabhstata6 ybhimanyamnas tattatsvakartavya darsanasamuditavismayah kimcic ca jihsur eva jyate ) na h y etaccittavfttivsansnyah prn bhavati | kevalam kasyacit kcid adhik cittavrttih kcid n, kasyacid ucitavisayaniyantrit kasyacid anyath j tat kcid evk p u r u s r t h o p a y o g i n t y upadesy ] tadvibhgakrtas 7 cottamaprakrtydivyavahrah | ye p u n a r am glnisankprabhrtayas 8 cittavrttivisess te samucitavibhvbhvj janmamadhye ? p i 9 na b h a v a n t y eva I tath h i rasyanam upayuktavato n i u n e r 1 0 glnylasyasramaprabhttayo nottisthanti 1 1 | yasypi v b h a v a n t i vibhvabalt tasypi hetupraksaye ksiyamnh samskrasesatm tvan 1 2 nvasyam a n u b a d h n a n t i | utshdayas 1 3 t u sampditasvakartavyatay pralnakalp api samskrasesatm

prdhnyam He, M : (na) prdhnyam G || 2 alpa0 G,M : sva/pa0 3 4 Hc || Untraced souice || rpsur G3M : possibly, ujjigsur || 5 6 anueifa0 G : ata0 M || svakartavya G,M : svapar4kartavja 7 Hc || tadvibhga0 Hc: tadvibhva G (coirected into tadvibhga), M || 8 glnlumkprahhriayas G,M: dhrfydqyas IIc || 9 9pi G,M : omitted by Hc|| 10 muneh G,M : omitted by IIc || ^notilsthanti G3M: na bhavantiHc || 12 tvan G,M : omitted by Hc || 13 utshdayas G,M : ratydayas Hc ||

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, LTC !h|tivartante kartavyntaravisayasyotshder 1 a k h a n d a n t | 'p|tjaha patanjalih " na h i caitra ekasym striym rakta ity ]|aysu v i r a k t a h 2 " itydi | tasmt sthyirpacittavrttistrasyt f $ p m vyabhicrinah svtmnam udaystamayavaicitryasata^ahasradharmnam ptatilabhamn raktanildistrasytavi5 3 Jalabhvombhana sambhvitabhangisahasfagarbhasphatikakcaT i pJfe^maka 4 padmargamatakatamahnUdimayagolakavat tasmin flutte svasamskravaicitryam anivesayanto *pi tatstrakrtam upa% t t a s a m d a t b h a m bibhratah svayam ca vicitrrthh 5 sthyistram a vicitrayanto ? ntarntarsuddham api sthyistram pratibh- 10 svakeam upanayanto 9pi prvparavyabhicriratnacchy,4abalimnam avasyam nayantali pratibhsanta iti vyabhicfina ucyante f tath lii glno'yam ity u k t e kuta iti hetuprasnensthyitsya s t r y a t e 6 | na t u rma utsha^aktimn ity atra fetupiranam h u h [ ata * eva vibhvs t a t r o d b o d b a k h santah svafpoparaiijakatvam v i d a d h n ratyutshder ucitnucitaJtyamtram vahantj | na tu tadabhve sarvathaiva te nirupkhyh, vsantman sarvajantnm tanmayatvenoktatvt [ ;yyabhicrinm t u svavibhvabhve nmpi nstti vitanisyate f aitad yathyogam vykhyvasare 7 [ evam apradhnatvanirl$$h sthyinirOpanaya 8 cc sthyibhvn rasatvam 9 " ityanay ^mnyalaksanasesabhtay visesalaksananisthay ca k r t a h 1 0 | ^ 7) t a t r n u b h v n m v i b h v n m vyabhicrinm c a p r t h a k ethyini n i y a m o nsti, bspder nandksirogdijatvadarsand kartavyntaravisayasyotshder G,M : vastvcintaravisayasya ratyder He || 3 Q ) * Yogastra, Vysabhsya, 2, 4 |j vlralabhvombhana (see, on this ^passage, R. Gnoli, Further Observations, p. 102) : sviralabhavo{g6) palambhana 0 : viralabhvo bhana M || 4 bhrmaka G : bhramaka M || vicitrr\Jhh : vicitrrthefi G,M [j 6 ^sthyittya stryate He : sthay tasya scyate 7 %J sthyt tasya stryante || Ahb, ch. VII || 8 ^nirupanayait, Mt 9 J0 f*nirpanytn G || Cf. supra, p. 9, 1. 23 || krtah G,M:
1

R. GNOLI vyghrdes ca k r o d h a b h a y d i h e t u t v t sramacintder utshabhaydyanekasahacaratvvalokant x | smagri t u na vyabhicarin ) tath h i b a n d h u v i n s o yatra v i b h v a h paridevitsruptdis t v 2 a n u b h v a s cintdainydis ca vyabhicrr, so 3 'vasyam soka e v e t i | e v a m samsayodaye sanktmakavighnasamanya samyoga u p t t a h 1 tatra lokavyavahre kryakranasahacartmakalingadar4 sane sthyytmaparacittavrttyanumnbhysaptavd a d h u n tair evodynakatksadhrtydibhir 5 laukikm kranatvdibhuvam 10 atikrntair vibhvannubhvansamupatanjakatvamttaptnair ata evlaukikavibhvdivyapadesabhgbhih pracyakfanditpasamskropajivanakhypanya vibhavdinmadheyavyapadesyair b h v d h y y e *pi vaksyamnasvarpabhedaif 6 gunapradhnatparyyena smjikadhiyi samyagyogam s a m b a n d h a m aikgryam v 7 sditavadbhir alaukikanirvighnasamvedantmakac a t v a n g o c a t a t m n t o ' r t h a s carvyamnataikasro na t u siddhasvabhvas ttklika eva na t u carvantiriktaklvalamb sthyivilaksana eva rasah | na t u 8 yath s a n k u k d i b h i t abhyadhyata " sthyyeva vibhvdipratyyyo rasyamnatvd rasa ucyata " i t i 9 | e v a m h i l o k e 'pi kirn n a r a s a h , asato 'pi h i yatra rasaniyat s y t l 0 tatra vastusatah k a t h a m na bhavisyati | tena sthyiprattir a n u m i t i r p v c y , l l na rasah 1 ata eva stre s t h y i g r a h a n a m na k r t a m 1 tat pratyuta ealyabhtam syt | kevalam aucityd evam ucyate sthy rasbhta iti | aucityam t u tatsthyigatatvena kranditay prasiddhnm valokant | smagrUi na vyabhtcnni Hc : palokana.. .vyabhicrini 2 3 GM || tv G,M. : ca Hc || soka eveti Hc3 M: soka eve {va ve) 6 tj G || 4 ojars'aw G , M : darhnaja Hc || dhrtydibhir Hc : 6 7 vlksdMir GM II ABh, eh. VII || v G5M : ca Hc || 8 na tu Hc : nanu G (corrected into na tu), M || 9 /// G,M : omitted by He || 10 sjt GM. (deleted in a secondhand) : omitted by Hc || u vyUc : prcy (corrected into prpj) G : prpj (corrected into prcy) M || [ 20 ]
1

15

20

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. ^ carvanopayogitay vibhvditvvalambant 1 tath h i Maukikacittavttyanumne k rasat | * tenlaukikacamatkrtm p. 286 jrtassvdah smrtyanumnalaukikasvasamvedanavilaksana eva I ^tath h i laukikennumnena samskrtah pramaddi na ttasjthyena pratipadyate, api t u hfdayasamvdtmakasahtdayatva5 ;balt purnbhavisyadrassvdnkurbhavennumanasmftydisorpnam a n m h y a i v a * tanmayibhvocitacarvanpfnatay | na ^ a sa carvan prnmnntard y e n d h u n smrtih syt | na tra laukikapratyaksdipramnavyprah | kirn t v 2 alaukika'vibhvdisamyogabalopanataiveyam carvan | s ca pratyaks- 10 ' numngamopamndilaukikaptamnaj anitaratydyavabodhatas t a t h yogipratyaksajatatasthapatasamvittijfint sakalavaisayiko-patgasnyasuddhaparayogigatasvnandaikaghannubhavc ca fVisisyate, e t e s m 3 yathyogam arjandivighnntarodaya 4 Kttasthysphutatvavisayve^avaivasyakftasaundatyavifaht | atra 15 fYtu svtmaikagatatvaniyamsambhavn svnupravesat paragata.^vaniyambhvt 5 tadvibhvdisdhranyavasasamprabuddhociItanijaratydivsanvesavasc ca na v i g h n n t a r d m m samnbhava ity avocma b a h u s a h 1 ata eva v i b h v d a y o n a nispatti; | | e t a v o rasasya, t a d b o d h p a g a m e ' p i rasasambhavaprasangt | 2 o ^jopi jnaplihetavah, yena p r a m n a m a d h y e p a t e y u h , siddhasya ",kasyacit prameyabhtasya tasasybhvt ] kirn t a r h y e t a d 6 It^ibhvdaya iti | alaukika evyam carvanopayog v i b h v d i ^ y a v a h r a h | kvnyatrettham d r s t a m iti ced b h s a n a m etad ^ a s m k a m 7 alaukikatvasiddh.au 8 | pnakarassvdo ' p i kirn 25 anruhya He (see infra, p. 00,1. 0 also) : ruhya G,M || 2 kimtv Hc, *tj : kirn ^M(cofrectedinto/l//^ in a second hand) || 3 etesm G,Hc : \$$sm M || 4 daya : Hajt G,M. This passage has been paraphrased fey Hc in the following way : yathyogam arjandivtghnntarodayena ttas^thyahetukasphutatvena visayvesavaivasyena ca saundaryaviraht || 5 Hc adds $a visayvekvaivasyam &ix&t*sanibhavtand ttasthysphutatvam afterparaga6 7 Itatvaniyambhvt \\ etad He : etad dhi G,M || etad asmkam 8 C>M : asmkam etad Hc || *stddhau G, Hc : "siddheh M || [ 21 ]
k x

R. GNOL gudamaricdisu hy
5

drsta

iti samnam etat | n a n v evam

raso iti

'prameyah syat, e v a m yuktarn b h a v i t u m arhati, rasyataikaprno asau na prameydisvabhvah | tarhi stre nispattir k a t h a m | neyam rasasya, api t u tadvisaya^asanyh I tannispatty tu yadi tadekyattajivitasya rasasya nispattir ucyate na k a s d d 2 atra dosah | s ca rasan n a p r a m n a v y p r o n a krakavyprah, svayam t u nprmniki svasamvedanasiddhatvt | rasan ca b o d h a r p a i v a , kirn t u b o d h n t a r e b h y o laukikebhyo vilaksanaiva, u p y n m v i b h v d i n m laukikavailaksanyt | tena
10

p/Z288

15

20

vibhvdisamyogd rasan y a t o nispadyate tatas t a t h v i d h a r a s a n g o c a r o l o k o t t a r o ' r t h o rasa iti t t p a r y a m strasya I *ayam atra samksepah | m u k u t a p r a t i s i r s a k d i n tvan natabuddhir cchdyate | g d h a p r k t a n a s a m v i t s a m s k r c ca k v y a b a l m y a m n p i n a tatra r m a d h i r visrmyati | ata e v o 3 b h a y a d e s a k l a t y g a h 1 romficdayas ca b h y a s ratipratftikritay drsts t a t r v a l o k i t deeaklniyamena r a t i m 4 gamay a n t i | yasym s v t m p i t a d v s a n v a t t v d a n u p r a v i s t a h | ata eva n a tatasthatay r a t y a v a g a m a h | na ca niyatakranatay, y e n r j a n b h i s v a n g d i s a m b h v a n | n a ca niyatapartmaikagatatay, yena d u h k h a d v e s d y u d a y a h ] t e n a sdhranibht s a m t n a v r t t e r ekasy e v a v s a m v i d o g o c a r i b h t 5 ratih s r n g r a h | s d h r a m b h v a n ca v i b h v d i b h i r iti | tadvisaya* G,M : tc dvisajy Hc || Hc || 3 ata eva G,M : tata eva Hc || 5 gocaribht Hc,M : gocarabht G ||
1 2 4

na kasctd G,M : tan na kahid ratim Hc, M : tatra ratim G ||

T R A N S L A T I O N

TRANSLATION Bharata s stra 1. After explaining t h e reason for t h e foregoing succession 1 , ^Bharata states t h e stra defining t h e nature of Rasa : " O u t 01 the combination {samjoga) of t h e D e t e r m i n a n t s (yibbvd)> t h e ^Consequents (anubhv) a n d t h e T r a n s i t o r y Mental States (yyaWicriti), t h e birth of Rasa takes place " . The interpretation of Bhatta Lollata, etc.

2. T h i s stra has been explained by Bhatta Lollata, etc., in t h e ^following way :The birth of Rasa takes place o u t of t h e "combination of t h e permanent mental stateimplicit in t h e strawith t h e determinants, etc. M o r e precisely, t h e determinants are t h e cause of t h e birth of t h e feeling, w h i c h constitutes t h e permanent state of mind. T h e consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, t h o s e w h i c h arise from t h e casasfor they cannot be considered as causes of rasa 2 , b u t Jthe consequents of t h e states of m i n d only. E v e n if t h e transitory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accompany simultaneously t h e p e r m a n e n t mental state, still, accordi n g t o Bharata, this is n o t absent, b u t remains in a state of

1) N. $., vi, vv. 1-33. 2) Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectatorsit will make ^tjiem mutter in fear, make their hair stand on end etc. These effects (lit., Consequents, anubhv) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of pUsa. The causes of Rasa can only be the effects of the permanent mental States. 9 [ 25 ]

k. OlSfOL latent impression 1 . I n t h e example 2 t o o , s o m e flavourings appear in a latent state, like t h e p e r m a n e n t state, and others in an e m e r g e n t state, like t h e transitory states. Rasa, therefore, is simply a p e r m a n e n t state, intensified by t h e determinants, t h e consequents, etc.; but, h a d it n o t been intensified, it is only a p e r m a n e n t state. T h i s state is present b o t h in t h e person r e p r o d u c e d a n d in t h e r e p r o d u c i n g actor, by virtue of t h e p o w e r of realization {anusamdhndf. \ 1) It is a general principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition cannot occur simultaneously (cf. Nyyastra, I, I, 16). To avoid a contradiction of this rule, Bhatta Lollata remarks that there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the permanent mental state is presented in the state of a latent impression {samskra, vsan). The word samskra "means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious state and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (smrti). The word vsan Cfogastra, IV, 24) seems to be a later word. . .It comes from the root " pas " to stay. It is often loosely used in a sense of samskra, and in Vysabhfya they are identified in IV, 9. But vsan generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But samskras are the subconscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vsans are innate samskras. not acquired in this life " (Dasgupta, H. I. Ph., I, p. 263). 2) The example occurs in N. $.9 just after the mentioned sutra. " Is there any example ? Yes, it is said that as taste, rasa, results from a combination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, and as six tastes, rasa, are produced by articles such as raw sugar, spices and vegetables, so the permanent states, when they come together with various other states, attain the quality of rasa (/. e., become rasa) ". I have here adopted, with some changes, the translation of Manomohan Ghosh, The N.tyasstra, Calcutta 1951. 3) Cf. the Introd., p. XVIII. The text of Hemacandra is here somewhat enlarged ; it runs "as follows : " This state is present in both the person [ 26 ] i

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. T h i s view, again, is t h e same as t h a t of t h e ancients. D a n d i n , for example, in his definition of t h e ornaments 1 , Association with a n u m b e r of o t h e r elements, said that in t h e feeling of

Relight is transformed into t h e E r o t i c Rasa (srfigrd) "9 and " o n reaching its extreme height, t h e feeling of anger is transformed into t h e Furious Rasa {vaudra) " , etc. The interpretation of Sankuka Lol/ata's and his criticisms of Bhatfa view.

3. T h i s interpretation, says Sankuka, is u n s o u n d . W h y ? %0, Because, w i t h o u t t h e determinants, etc., t h e permanent mental fslte cannot be k n o w n , for t h e determinants, etc., are t h e chaMcteristic signs, i.e., t h e logical reasons {lingo) b y means of p h t c h k n o w l e d g e of it is m a d e possible 2 , b) Because, if t h e J&produced and in the reproducing actor, in the person reproduced (Rma, ||c.) in the primary sense {mukhyay vrttya) and in the reproducing actor by |$rtue of a recollection of the nature of Rma, etc." | | : To sum up3 according to Bhatta Lollata Rasa is a perception of the permanent mental state of the character represented by the actor. This ^i^Jzyibhva, intensified by the Detetminants, etc. is presented to the spectat o r in the form of a Rasa. The same thesis of Bhatta Lollata is met with in fJie Agnipurna ; cf., for example, ch. 339, si. 4 : dbhimnd ratis s ca pariposam vyabhicrydismnyt fyngra iti upeyus \ giyate ||

1) Cp. The Introduction, p. XVII. The ornaments, alamkra, are -figures of speech. 2) Here He. adds : na hi dhmam vin dhardharntahstho vahnir tfwagamyate \\ci If there were no smoke, the fire which is within a mountain l cauld not be perceived ". Hence the interpretation of Lollata, who intended the stra, as if Bharata had said : " Out of the combination of the |&tmanent mental state with the determinants ", etc., does not stand to Reason.

R. GNOLI thesis of Lollata is right, Bharata should first h a v e e x p o u n d e d t h e p e r m a n e n t states a n d only afterwards t h e Rasas 1 , c) Because, t h e second definition of t h e determinants, etc, in their state of full d e v e l o p m e n t , ( p u t f o r w a r d by Bharata in connexion w i t h Rasas, w h i c h a c c o r d i n g t o Bhatta Lollata, , are n o t h i n g b u t p e r m a n e n t mental states), w o u l d b e c o m e a useless waste ibi w o r d s 2 , d) Because, every feeling w o u l d c o m e t o be subdivided i n t o an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc 3 , e) Because, t h e r e w o u l d n o longer b e six varieties of C o m i c Rasa (bsya)*. f) Because, in t h e ten states o f l o v e (kama) t h e r e w o u l d b e an infinite n u m b e r of mental 1) If it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa, why is it that Bharata explained first Rasa (JV. , Chap. VI) and afterwards (JV. , chap. VII) the mental states ? 2) If, as Lollata says, Rasa is no more than an intensified permanent mental state, why should Bharata have taken the trouble to explain the Determinants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in its non-intensified state (N. chap.VII) and once again in connexion with it in its intensified state (JY. . chap. VI) ? It is illogical to explain the. causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its nascent state and once when it has reached its full development. H.C. clarifies : na cotpattau parthnmkranam abhidhya pusyatm punas tadutpattikrat}am abhidhtavyam, vaiyarthypatteh || 3) In other words, if, as Lollata says, the Rasa is nothing but a feeling intensified, "then, as intensity admits of many degrees, isimilarly there ought to be different grades in the Rasa realized " (Sankaraii,! The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani, Madras, 1929, p. 99). 4) " Or if it is urged that only when the utmost intensity is reached is Rasa realized, then the division of the Comic Rasa into six varieties, made by Bharata, would be wrong {ibid., p. 99). As to the six qualities of laughter cp. Bharata, VI, pp. 314-16. They are slight smile QmitJ), smile {hasita)y gentle laughter (yihasita), laughter of ridicule (upahasita), vulgar laughter (apahasita) and excessive laughter (atihasita). Therenderings adopted are those of Manomohan Ghosh, op. cit. [ 2 8 ] I

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. states a n d of Rasas 1 , g) Because w e see t h a t w h a t happens

is just t h e contrary, in t h e sense t h a t s o r r o w (/oka) is at first intense a n d is seen t o g r o w weaker w i t h time, a n d t h a t in the feelings of anger (krodba), h e r o i s m (utshd) a n d delight (raft) a ^diminution is m e t w i t h w h e n t h e indignation (amarsd), firmness \sthairjd) a n d sexual enjoyment (seva) are absent. Therefore, Rasa is simply a p e r m a n e n t state of m i n d , and, tnpre precisely, t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n (anukarana) of t h e p e r m a n e n t %;ate of m i n d p r o p e r t o t h e p e r s o n r e p r o d u c e d R m a , e t c . ; iand just because it is a r e p r o d u c t i o n , it is called by a different w o r d , t h a t is Rasa. T h i s r e p r o d u c e d m e n t a l state is perceived By means of t h r e e kinds of elements, viz., causes, h e r e called b y t h e n a m e of determinants, effects, t h a t is, t h e consequents, and accompanying elements, constituted b y t h e transitory states Jpf mind. T h o u g h these causes, etc., a r e b r o u g h t i n t o existence >y t h e conscious effort (j>rayatna) (of t h e actor), a n d are t h u s artificial a n d unreal (krtrimd)^ yet t h e y are n o t realised t o b e so, T h i s p e r m a n e n t state is perceived (and this p e r c e p t i o n is aroused b y t h e characteristic signs already referred to) as lying i t h e r e p r o d u c i n g actor. / ; T h e determinants, indeed, can b e realized (anusamdba) ' t h r o u g h t h e p o w e r (bald) of poetry, t h e consequents t h r o u g h t h e skill (siks) of t h e actor, a n d t h e transitory mental states t h r o u g h t h e actor's ability t o present his o w n artificial consequents. B u t 1) In the Erotic Rasa there are, according to Bharata, (XX, vv. 154-6) |en stages ; now, if each of them should have different grades according to tlieir intensity, there would then be endless varieties under that Rasa and Reeling alone. Cp. Sankaran, op. cit., pp. 99. The aforementioned ten stages of \ovt(kma) are: longing(abhilsa), anxiety (arthacinta)> recollection r atwsmrti), enumeration of the loved one's merits (gunakrtana), distress &)> r a ving (yilpa), insanity (unmada), fever (yydhi), stupor (jadat), death {marand). Cf. Dasarpa, Haas, p. 132. [29 ]

R. GNOLI t h e p e r m a n e n t state cannot be realized, even t h r o u g h t h e p o w e r of poetry 1 . T h e w o r d s " delight " , " s o r r o w " , etc., as it fe t o b e expected from expressing w o r d s , are, indeed, only able t o t u r n t h e feeling of delight, etc., t o w h i c h they refer into an expressed t h i n g , b u t they are n o t able t o communicate (avagatri) it [in its fullness], as if they were forms of verbal representation (ycikbhtnayd). F o r v e r b a l representation does n o t consist does the merely in w o r d s , b u t rather in w h a t effect t h e w o r d s p r o d u c e ; in t h e same w a y gesticular representation (ngikbhinqya) n o t consist merely in t h e m o v e m e n t of t h e limbs b u t in effect w h i c h this m o v e m e n t produces. In the

following

stanzas, t h e feeling of s o r r o w is n o t a n object of representation b u t simply of verbal expression : " G r e a t , deep, wide, a n d u n b o u n d e d , t h e ocean is nevertheless d r u n k b y u n d e r w a t e r fires : in t h e same way, s o r r o w is d r u n k b y anger 2 " Again : " H e is paralysed by s o r r o w , motionless in this state, so that h e is b e g g e d i m p l o r i n g l y to m o v e by his companions, w h o , filled w i t h t h e fear t h a t tears their hearts, increase their lamentations " 3 . E x a m p l e s m a y b e multiplied.
cc

B u t t h e following stanza ; falling

T h i s m u l t i t u d e of

droplets, fine rain of tears

1) The meaning appears to be that the permanent state can be ascertained only indirectly, through an inferential process. The determinants,, etc., on the other hand, are realized, ascertained, directly.That is why the woid " permanent state " (sthyibhva) is not mentioned in the stra. 2) Unidentified stanza. 3) Unidentified stanza. In both stanzas the word " sorrow " occurs. , Thus, in them sorrow is in the state of verbal expression. [ 30]

TE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETCwhile she painted, p r o d u c e s o n my b o d y t h e effect of a perspiration b o r n from t h e t o u c h of h e r h a n d 1 " , lfke same time t h a t it expresses w h a t is its o w n sense 2 , l rather t h a n expresses verbally 3 , t h e p e r m a n e n t state of delight consisting in a f o r m of pleasure (sukha) t o U d a y a n a \ Representation (abhwayand), indeed, is b u t a p o w e r of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (avagamanasakti)this differing from t h e o n e of verbal expression. Precisely reasons, Bharata did n o t m e n t i o n at all t h e w o r d mental state " in t h e stra, n o t even i n a different case 5 . T h u s t h e E r o t i c Rasa is simply t h e perpa mental state of delight imitated; so t h a t [ w h a t Bharata l&iidj namely] t h a t Rasas are m a d e u p of t h e p e r m a n e n t feelings ^ ^ a r e b o r n of t h e m is quite a p p r o p r i a t e to 6 . I t is f o u n d i c r m o r e , t h a t even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, n o t causal efficiency (arthaknyd1).

jJi Harsa, Ratnaval, II, 11. J2) I.e., Jts literal meaning. s|) The word " delight " does not occur in this stanza. H) The chief character of the Ratnavalt. 5} In the genitive, cf. supra, p. 25. 16) According to Bharata, the erotic and the pathetic Rasas are born fajfrhava) of the sentiments of delight and sorrow lespectively ; while, lead, the other Rasas are made up of them (tmaka). Cf. AG, p. 312. To corroborate this statement, Hemacandra quotes here a famous L of Dharmakrti, PV, II, 57 : " Between two people approaching two 5r, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being eious of what they really are, but] with the idea that it is a jewel, theie I a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of misp cognition. This stanza is also quoted by Mahimabhatta, Vyaktuiveka, |8. Casual efficiency, the capacity to produce effects {arthakny, arthaMijfkaritv) is the basic criterion of every fotm of right cognition, and, |||refoie, of the real existence of a thing. When, for example, a man [ 31 ]

R. GNOLI

F u r t h e r m o r e , h e r e t h e r e is n o n e of t h e following perceptions : " T h e actor is really h a p p y " , " R m a is really t h a t m a n " , " T h a t m a n is n o t h a p p y " , " Is this R m a o r n o t ?", " T h i s is similar t o R m a " , b u t r a t h e r t h e perception r " T h i s is t h a t R m a w h o was h a p p y 1 " . Sankuka himself said : " (Here) t h e r e is neither d o u b t , n o r t r u t h , n o r error ; t h e n o t i o n w h i c h appears is, " T h i s is t h a t " , n o t " T h i s is really, t h a t " . W h a t sort of an a r g u m e n t could disprove an experience e v i d e n t i n a n d by itselfan experience wherein, being5, it d e v o i d of any contradictory idea, o n e cannot distinguish any e r r o r ? "

sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find the water which he expected to find (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his percept tion is a mistaken one; the water which he has seen is not capable of appeasing his desires, of carrying out the functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal, efficiency. In the present case, for instance, it allows the observing subject to find a jewel which is real ; in other terms, it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subjects. Even a mistake, observes Dharmaklrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Sankuka, can be gifted with causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason for a reproduced cognition,,, i.e., the aesthetic cognition, to be gifted with it. The spectators do not,~ in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the fulfilment? of their desires. s 1) Here Mammata quotes and clarifies at the same time AG. "The perception we have ", he says, " takes the form : " This is Rma ". Like thel experience one has when observing a horse in a picture, the afore-mentioned perception is neither valid perception, nor error, not doubt, nor similitudes These, indeed, take respectively the forms : "This is really Rma", " R m r is really this ", " This is Rma " (being, vitiated, in a second time, by the, perception : " T h i s is not Rma"), " I s this Rma or n o t " , cc This is similar to Rma ". [ 32 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. "Ahhinavagupta^ following his master Bhatta To fa, criticises the theory of reproduction^ supported by Sankitka. < 4. T h i s thesis t o o , m y masters say 1 , is w i t h o u t intrinsic value is incapable of resisting a close criticism. Specifically, | r o m w h a t p o i n t of view, m a y w e ask, was Sankuka saying t h a t rasa has t h e n a t u r e of a r e p r o d u c t i o n ? 1. F r o m t h e p o i n t %i v i e w of t h e spectators' perception, 2, or t h a t of actor, S) o r t h a t of t h e critics (vykhytf) w h o analyse t h e real n a t u r e ^astuvrttd) (of dramatic presentation)for it h a s been said t h a t pit is i n fact, t h e critics w h o analyse i n this way 2 4. or, Ifhally, following t h e o p i n i o n of Bharata himself ? 1) The expression " my masters ", observes H e , alludes to Bhatta f||foj:a (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Ilashrnir during the second half of the 10th century. Bhatta To ta wrote fj^work of poetry, the Kvyakautuka, on which A.G. wiote a commentary ^Mvarayd) which has not yet been found. The confutation of ankuka, fgjfVen in the following pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhatta Tota. ^ ; 2) This quotation is taken from the svavrtti of Dharmaldrti to the svr^hnumnapariccheda of the Pramnavrtika (cf. supra, p. 5; ed. Gnoli, p. J39J : vykhytrah khalv evam vivecayanti na vyavahartra^ | te tu svlambanam ^^Mrthakriyyogyam manyamn drsyavtkalpyv arthv ekkrtya pravariante | ^Ffjtctical life (vyavahra) is based, according to Dharmaldrti, on the identification of the thing in se (jvalaksand) with its mental image. The mind ?spper-imposes {drop) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the Is^bject believes that he is faced with reality. The difference between the ,j|J|ng itself, which is real, and the illusory character of the mental image l^hich has been super-imposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created fljy.the ' critics ' and ' philosophers ' (vykhytr, tattvacintaka). In confuting '^hjs concept, A. G. asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing in the ^i%>retical moment by an explanation which contradicts one's awareness ? it in the practical moment. In other words, the spectators, while they are kiersed in the Rasa aroused by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The fact automatically confutes those who sustain ftjie theory that there is an imitation. Cf. infra, pp. 40, 41.

&. GNOt

i . T h e first alternative c a n n o t b e upheld. R e p r o d u c t i o n , indeed, can b e said t o be only s o m e t h i n g perceived b y a means of cognition 1 , as, for example, in t h e case of a p e r s o n drinking s o m e milk (this action b e i n g directly perceived b y t h e spectators), a n d saying " T h u s did so-and-so drink t h e w i n e " . I n this case, t h e action of m i l k - d r i n k i n g reproduces t h e action of w i n e - d r i n k i n g . B u t h e r e w h a t is it t h a t is perceived in t h e actor, w h i c h m i g h t seem t o be a r e p r o d u c t i o n of some feeling, as, for instance, delight ? T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m . His body, t h e h e a d w e a r t h a t crowns it, his horripilations, his faltering w o r d s , t h e raising of his arms, t h e w a v i n g of t h e m , h i s frowns, h i s expressive glances, etc., certainly c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d b y anyo n e as t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of delight, w h i c h is a feeling. T h e y , indeed, b e i n g insentient 2 , b e i n g perceived by different organs of sense 3 , a n d h a v i n g different substrata 4 are t h u s as unlike feelings as it is possible t o imagine. Consciousness of a r e p r o d u c t i o n presupposes, furthermore, perception b o t h of t h e original a n d of t h e c o p y ; b u t n o n e of t h e spectators has ever in his life perceived t h e delight of t h e h e r o , say, Rma. So t h e possibility t h a t t h e actor is r e p r o d u c i n g R m a is excluded. " B u t ( s o m e o n e m i g h t say) w h a t is called erotic Rasa, t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of delight, is simply t h e feeling of t h e actor, which, as perceived b y t h e spectators, appears t o t h e m in this very 1) The explanation is given a few lines below. 2) I. e. they are not of a mental or spiritual nature. 3) Mental movements are perceived by the internal sense, manah9 mind. All the acts, etc. listed, however, are perceived by the external senses such as sight, etc. 4) The body, etc. The mental states are based on the mind. M. G, p 69, comments : tath hi natavapurdnam jadatvam caksurgrhyatvam, rater ajadatvam manogrhyalvam ca \ pratisrsakadnam vapnr adhikarayam, rates tu mano 'dhtkaratjam itt j [ 34 J

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. . f o r m " . T o this opinion, h o w e v e r , w e object : O f w h a t , w h e n ^perceived, does this feeling appear t o consist ? T h i s is t h e I t m a y b e u r g e d t h a t t h e actor's feeling appears t o t j>oblem. t h e spectators t o consist of just t h o s e characteristic signs ^(causes, such as w o m e n , etc., effects, such as expressive glances, jjStc., concomitant elements, such as c o n t e n t m e n t , etc.) w h i c h Serve t o render perceptible an o r d i n a r y feeling. B u t l o ( w e ej&ply), if this w e r e t h e case, t h e feeling of t h e actor w o u l d b e p e r c e i v e d simply in t h e form of delight 1 , so t h a t for y o u r idea ?pf a r e p r o d u c t i o n of delight t h e r e w o u l d b e n o m o r e place. 1** But (you can p e r h a p s u r g e ) t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s , etc., are real ! ; ti t h e r e p r o d u c e d characters a n d h e r e , in t h e actors, unreal " . iTrue. But, even if these determinants, etc., are n o t t h e real ^causes, effects, a n d c o n c o m i t a n t elements of t h e feeling o f t h e I actor, even if, t h a t is t o say, t h e y are fashioned solely b y t h e p o w e r o f t h e p o e m , t h e skill of t h e actor, etc., a n d are t h u s ^artificial, are t h e y so perceived b y t h e specators o r are t h e y perceived as real ? A n d , if t h e y are perceived as artificial, | p w w o u l d it b e possible, t h r o u g h t h e m , t o perceive t h e feeling of delight ? I f y o u say t h a t for this v e r y reason w h a t is p e r ceived is n o t delight b u t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of delight, this , w e reply, could only b e m a d e b y a m a n of dull wits 2 . 1) I.e., there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic ^cognition. %$t*2) Bhatta Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarizd : Assuming that the Determinants, etc, are perceived as unreal I or artificial (krtrma), they cannot legitimize the inference of either Delight ipr an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason (. g , a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped oud does not stand in any cause-effect relation to fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason) we cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e. g , as A G. says, a [ 35 1

R. GNOLI F o r a t h i n g different from t h e usual one can be inferred from m o r e apparently similar effects, only if t h e effect, from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause a n d is recognized as such b y a p e r s o n of experience. A n inexperienced p e r s o n can infer from t h e m t h e usual cause only. F r o m some particular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that t h e i r cause is c o w d u n g ; a n d t h e inference, from t h e m , of a n o t h e r scorpion, as their cause, w o u l d be n o t h i n g b u t a false cognition. But, w h e n t h e cognition of t h e logical reason e.g., smokeis e r r o n e o u s , t h e inference based o n this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. T h e inference from mist ( w h e t h e r it b e s u p p o s e d by t h e o b s e r v e r t o be smoke, o r w h e t h e r t h e latter is a w a r e of its b e i n g only a r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e true logical reason) of s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is a r e p r o d u c t i o n of fire, is, n o d o u b t , u n s o u n d . I n d e e d , a veil of m i s t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h reproduces s m o k e a n d is recognized as a reproduction does n o t legitimate t h e inference of a heap of red roses 3 namely s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e p r o d u c e s fire. heap of red roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the laymen are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example : the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being born from other scorpions and the other kind from dung) ; but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as krtrimd) and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an inexperienced person is a form of mistaken cognition. He. explains : ay am bhvah prasiddhd ratilaksant kranad ratyanukaranam nama kranntaram tatprabhavs ced anubhvh syuh | iathaiva ca visesavzda yadi jnyeran tad ratyanukaranalaksanasya vastvantarasynumnam samanjasam syt \ na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukaranapratitth | avisesavid ca tathvidhnubhva$arianc ratir evanumyate tac ca withyjnnam eveti \ \ 361 :

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. E v e n if t h e actor (it may b e u r g e d ) is n o t himself enraged, ^ he seems so " . T r u e e n o u g h , w e answer, h e is like someff||/who is enraged. B u t this resemblance is d u e t o a con^ t i o n of t h e eyebrows, etc.in t h e same way, t h a t is, t h a t ^resemblance b e t w e e n a real ox a n d a n o t h e r ox-like species p l u e t o t h e shape of t h e muzzle and so on, w i t h o u t that, jfethis, any r e p r o d u c t i o n be involved. A g a i n , t h e spectators ot conscious of this resemblance; t h e perception of t h e m e c t a t o r s , w h i l e they perceive t h e actorit is saidis n o t ^ i t h o u t t h e mental state w h i c h h e appears t o have 1 . T h e r e :, t h e thesis according t o w h i c h w h a t appears is a r e p r o d u c t i o n vain discourse only 2 . F u r t h e r , t o say t h a t t h e audience has t h e perception : T h a t is R a m a 5 ' , is n o t correct. F o r if this perception, v o i d of every d o u b t d u r i n g t h e play is n o t stultified later | some subsequent cognition w h i c h invalidates it (bdhaka), \y is it n o t a t r u e cognition 3 ? A n d , if it is stultified, w h y a false cognition ? I n fact, h o w e v e r , even if n o invalid a t i n g cognition does appear, it will b e always a form of false g T h u s , Sankuka's contention, namely, t h a t this is experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory

1) In other words the spectators are not aware of a resemblance betn the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the cjfcor is immersed in a certain state of consciousness shared also by them. M. C , p. 71 replaces "*//' nkt vcoyuktih" by "/'// svavacanavirof J3) M. C , p. 71 simplifies : yac coktam na bdhakodayah tat katham na na mithy. II l%>4) According to ankuka the aesthetic Imitation ; therefore, he maintains implicitly [ 37 ] rmo 'yam ity asti prattih, samyagjnnam, bdhakodayas cet experience consists of an that it is unreal,

R. GNOLI idea, o n e cannot distinguish any error " , is untrue 1 . Furtherm o r e this same perception, namely " T h i s is Rma " is h a d itj! o t h e r actors also and hence of R m a w e h a v e only his universal* aspect 2 . N o r can his o t h e r assertion, " T h e determinants caf be recognised t h r o u g h t h e p o w e r of p o e t r y " , be successfully explained. Indeed, t h e actor does n o t have t h e perception, " S M is t h e w o m a n I l o v e " , as if, t h a t is to say, St were a p a r t of his o w n real life 3 . If it is replied t h a t this is t h e meaning of the; w o r d realization, i.e., t h a t this is h o w t h e determinants are mad. perceptible t o t h e spectators, t h e n w e answer t h a t there ought? m o r e reasonably t o be, instead, a realization of t h e permanent^ state. I n d e e d , t h e perception of t h e spectators is concerned, in ^ p r i m a r y sense, principally w i t h this and is presented in t h e form u " T h a t m a n (is) in this (feeling) ". T h e p o m p o u s analysis of t h n a t u r e of representation m a d e by Sankuka by t h e e x p r e s s i o n " W o r d . . .verbal representation " , etc.,where h e emphasi&efe t h e diversity [both of verbal representation a n d of t h e simple verbal expression]will be discussed later at t h e appropriate' t i m e a n d place 4 . Therefore, it is w r o n g t o say that from the( p o i n t of v i e w of t h e spectators, Rasa is a r e p r o d u c t i o n of theft p e r m a n e n t m e n t a l state. 1 2. N o r again does t h e actor h a v e this n o t i o n , " I a m re* p r o d u c i n g R m a o r his f e e l i n g " . F o r a reproduction, that!

1) Ci supra, p. 32. 2) See Sankaran, op cit, p. 101 : " and hence the conception ot Rma is only in his universal aspect of a great hero ". 3) The actor does not identify or unite the determinants taken from the poem with the things which are " causes " in his own real life. In other words, he does not have the perception that they form part of his real life. 4) Ch. IX of the N. S, in which A G. discussed it, has unfortunately iot yet come to light. Cf. also N. $., chp. XIV. [ 38 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. . p r o d u c t i o n of actions similar (sadrsakaranam) t o t h o s e of w h o s e n a t u r e w e h a v e n e v e r perceived 1 , is n o t |sible. A n d if y o u say t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m r e o n is after-production (pasctkara?iam)> such r e p r o d u c reply, w o u l d extend t o ordinary life also 2 . I t may b e p|> perhaps, t h a t t h e actor does n o t reproduce a particular |r<|ng (ntyata), a n d that h e has only this notion, " I a m r e p r o *v " t h e s o r r o w of some n o b l e p e r s o n (uttamaprakrti). But |V w e reply, b y w h a t is this r e p r o d u c t i o n performed ? T h i s problem. Certainly n o t b y sorrow, since this is absent Jjhe actor. It is u n d o u b t e d l y n o t d o n e by tears, etc., for |%Sf> as has already been said, are of a n a t u r e o t h e r t h a n that p$$pttow\ Well, it may be replied, t h e n let us say that, in p j i c t o r , t h e following perception occurs : " I am r e p r o d u c i n g H I consequents of t h e sorrow of a n o b l e p e r s o n " . B u t in this cjise again, w e observe, which noble p e r s o n ? If y o u say " any | | g b j e person, n o matter which " , t h e n w e reply t h a t n o p e r s o n t be b r o u g h t into t h e m i n d w i t h o u t a definite idea {yihstatm If, o n o t h e r h a n d , you say t h a t t h e actor is r e p r o d u c i n g a w h o should h a v e w e p t in t h e m a n n e r h e does, t h e n ^ p e r s o n a l i t y (svtm) also intervenes, s o t h a t t h e relation of ggtoduced-reproducmg n o l o n g e r exists. 5 Besides, t h e actor It has not been perceived before. Every imitation presupposes a >us perception. In other words, if imitation is felt m this way, there is an imitation time someone does something which has already been done by some* else. | ) Cf. supra, p. 34. 4) Cf. infra, App. I, p. 95. 5) M.C, p. 71 paraphrases : y a evam roditti cet, tarin svtmnam api ^'nukarotty jtam tasjpi ?odanasadbhvd"//'/ gahto 'nnkrynukarttbhavah || ! they say, there is the notion { he who weeps thus ', then, we reply, we ' assume that the actor is reproducing himself as well (for the actor [ 39 ]

R. GNOLI has n o consciousness of carrying o u t a reproduction. T h e actor's performance, indeed, takes place only t h r o u g h three causes : his skill in art, his m e m o r y of his o w n determinants, and t h e consent 1 of his heart, aroused b y t h e state of generality of the feelings:; a n d in virtue of this, h e displays t h e corresponding consquente a n d reads t h e p o e m w i t h suitable accompanying intonation^ {kku) of voice. Accordingly, h e is conscious of this only a n d n o t of r e p r o d u c i n g someone. Indeed, reproduction of t h e deeds of R m a is different from reproduction of t h e attire of t h e beloved being 1 . But all this w e explained before in t h e first chapter 2 . 3- N o t can it b e said t h a t t h e r e is a r e p r o d u c t i o n from t h e p o i n t of v i e w of t h e n a t u r e of things (vastuvrtta) ; for it is impossible t h a t a t h i n g of w h i c h o n e is n o t conscious, has a real nature 3 W e shall explain further in w h a t t h e nature of t h i n g s consists 4 . 4. N o r did Bharata ever say in any passage : " Rasa is t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of a p e r m a n e n t mental state " . Such an asser-: t i o n was never m a d e b y h i m even indirectly b y means of a $ indication. O n t h e contrary, t h e various sub-divisions of wo-* m e n ' s dance (Jasya), t h e various musical tempi (tl) a n d the,

himself would have to be leally grieving). Thus the reproduced-reproduo ing elation would no longer hold ", 1) Cf. A. Bh , p. 37 A person m love, accoidmg to the Indian rhetors, is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc., of his beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation. H e , p. 424 : vgvesacesUtath priyasynukrttr lila. 2) A.Bb.y ch. I, p. 37. 3) I.e., from the point of view of the analysing mind. Cf. L P. K , II, p. 179 : satmedanatiraskrtm k khalu yuktir nma anupapaths ca bhf<t{ kny bhavisyati. 4) In the statement of his own thesis.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. songs described by Bharata ate an indication of precisely opposite 1 . All this will b e explained later at t h e end o f t h e chapter o n t h e sub-divisions of t h e junctures {samdhyangdf. Ehe expression m e t with in Bharata every n o w and again, "JDrama is an imitation (of all t h e forms of existence in) t h e s^en islands " , etc., can h a v e also o t h e r explanations 3 . A n d , even t h a t was a reproduction, t h e n w h a t w o u l d b e t h e diffeteice between it and t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e attire, t h e walk, e t c , of t h e beloved one 4 ?

Other theories 5. S o m e p e o p l e say : " T h e p i g m e n t s o r p i m e n t , etc. u n d o u b t e d l y c o m p o s e (samyuj) a c o w 5 ' \ N o w if t h e w o r d ^ c o m p o s e " is u n d e r s t o o d in t h e sense of " manifest (abhivyaj)", iese people are also in error. F o r w e c a n n o t say t h a t m i n i u m , ktc, manifest a real {pramrthik) c o w like t h e o n e w h i c h m i g h t be manifested b y a lamp, etc. All they d o is t o p r o d u c e 1) They do not imitate anything in ordinary life. 2) N. $-> XIX. Dasarpa, Haas, 11 : " The Junctmes are the struc&&al divisions of the drama, which correspond to the elements of the plot ithe stages in the hero's realization of his purpose ". The Junctures Undivided into sixty-four sub-divisions (anga). Cf. Ind. T.9 p. 140, etc. 3) N. , I, v. 120 : saptadvpnukaranam nfyam etad bhavisyatt J. In Hher words, drama can be an " imitation " of all the forms of existence SCthe world (the expression " the seven islands ", refers to the world with 'Itltoceans, continents, etc,,; cf. A Bh.> I, p. 42 : saptadvpbhavanukarana* 8i>natye...). The term 'imitation5 must be interpreted as a " re-telling " ^gktrtana) and therefore as a " re-perception " (anuvyavasja). A) Text and translation both doubtful. 5) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition (ffcdifferent colours mixed together and applied to a given surface. 11 [ 41 ]

R. GNOL (nirvrt) a particular a g g r e g a t e (samuhd) similar t o a c o w . T h e only object of t h e image, " I t is like a cow " , is simply this m i n i u m , etc., applied so as t o constitute a particular arrangem e n t {sammvesd) similar to t h e arrangement of t h e limbs of a c o w . I n t h e case of t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e determinants, etc., t h e situation is different : thisas w e h a v e saidcannot be perceived as similar t o delight 1 . T h u s , it is n o t true that Rasa is t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of mental states. A g a i n , o t h e r people say 2 : Rasa, w h i c h is m a d e u p of pleasure a n d pain, is n o t h i n g b u t an external c o m b i n a t i o n (smagri) of v a r i o u s elements 3 a combination possessing the p o w e r of g e n e r a t i n g pleasure and pain. T h i s thesis agrees w i t h Smkhya's doctrine 4 . I n this combination, t h e determin a n t s take t h e place of p e t a l s ; a n d t h e consequents a n d t h e t r a n s i t o r y m e n t a l states d o duty for that w h i c h garnishes it. O u t of it, again, are b o r n t h e p e r m a n e n t mental states. These, 1) The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry ; the pigments etc , are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G. ; all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of determinants, etc., i.e., of material elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature. 2) The followers of this view (their names are unknown to us) based themselves, according to A G (A Bh , p. 312) on a wrong interpretation of one stanza of Bharata (VI, 46). 3) The determinants, etc , are external (i e., they are not psychic states). The elements in question are the determinants, the consequents, and the transitory states ; the latter are also regarded as external m the present passage. 4) According to the Smkhya, external objects are a modification of prakrtt, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is empathically confuted by Dharmakrti, P. V9 II, 268 ff. [ 42 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. .made u p of pleasure a n d pain, are internal. T h e s u p p o r t e r s p | this thesis maintain t h a t expressions such as, " W e shall htlhg t o the state of Rasa t h e p e r m a n e n t mental s t a t e s / ' etc., Must be u n d e r s t o o d metaphorically, i.e., they are themselves t h a t t h e y are in flagrant contradiction w i t h Bharata's T h u s t h e s t u d e n t is p r e s e r v e d from falling i n t o e r r o r jf t h e fact t h a t t h e m e r e statement of this thesis displays garrulously ex ore suo its unsoundness 1 . W h a t use is t h e r e i n ^ p l y i n g t o such people ? L e t us rather state t h e essential ^ p i a t s of t h e o t h e r hypothesis, etc., arising o u t of this difficult p t o b l e m , i.e., w h a t is t h e n a t u r e of aesthetic perception. The vieiv of Bhatta Nydka

6. Again, Bhatta Nyaka says :Rasa is neither perceived ^ratj), n o r p r o d u c e d (utpad), n o r manifested (abhtvyaj). F o r if it^were perceived by t h e spectator as really present in himself, e pathetic Rasa h e w o u l d necessarily experience pain 2 , such a perception does n o t stand t o reason, because ,, etc., does n o t play t h e role of a d e t e r m i n a n t [as regards l f p e c t a t o r ] 3 ; because n o m e m o r y of his o w n b e l o v e d o n e doles arise in t h e spectator's consciousness (while h e looks at because [ t h e representation of} deities, etc., cannot

1) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between and permanent mental states. Its supporters are therefore forced eive a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata fii Rasas from permanent mental states. Thus no one would go to see plays on pathetic, etc., subjects any 3) The spectators are not Rma, etc , so that it is impossible to suppose lljjat the fortunes of St can play the role of determinant in their case. 4) At the same time, there is no identification of the image of St yith that of his own beloved. [ 1

R. GNOLI logically a r o u s e ( in t h e spectator ) t h e state of generality (sdhrcMfikaraqd) [ r e q u i r e d for t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e ] 1 ; because ocean-crossings, etc., [ are extraordinary u n d e r t a k i n g s , a n d t h u s ] fall s h o r t of generality (sdbranya)2. N o t it can^ b e said t h a t w h a t occurs is simply t h e m e m o r y of Rma, as \ e n d o w e d of such-and-such quality 3 , i n so far as t h e spectator' has h a d n o such p r e v i o u s experience. M o r e o v e r , even if it is s u p p o s e d t h a t h e is perceived t h r o u g h verbal testimony (sabda), inference (anumna), etc., logically t h e r e c a n n o t b e any o c c u r r e n c e of Rasa in t h e audiencejust as it is n o t aroused b y a t h i n g perceived t h r o u g h direct knowledge 4 . F o r o n t h e ' a p p e a r a n c e of a pair of lovers u n i t e d t o g e t h e r , t h e m i n d of; a n y o n e p r e s e n t r a t h e r becomes t h e p r e y of conflicting feelings s (shame, disgust, envy, a n d so o n ) ; a n d w e surely cannot say^ t h a t t h e o n l o o k e r in such a scene is in a state of Rasa I If, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is s u p p o s e d t h a t Rasa is perceived as present* i n a t h i r d party, t h e spectator should be in a state of indifference. T h e r e f o r e , it is n o t possible t o s u p p o s e t h a t Rasa can b e perc e i v e d w h e t h e r this perception b e a f o r m of direct experience o r o f m e m o r y . T h e same errors m a y b e i m p u t e d t o t h e thesis w h i c h maintains t h a t Rasa is p r o d u c e d . If it is s u p p o s e d t h a t Rasa first preexists in a potential f o r m (saktirupatvma) and is later manifested, t h e n t h e determinants m u s t necessarily

1) In this passage Bhatta Nyaka maintains that when the determinants etc, are deities, etc., they cannot be perceived as ' general '; the deeds of gods are too different ( from human affairs ) 2) Supra, Intr., pp. XXI, XXII. infra, p. 58. 3) Heroism, etc. 4) In other words, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, all the. more should it arise from a direct perception. This assertion is confuted by A.G.,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. Illuminate it little b y little. 1 Besides, t h e difficulties already E n c o u n t e r e d w o u l d r e c u r : is Rasa manifested as really present o u r o w n self o r as present in a t h i r d party ? Therefore, [four thesis is as follows :) Rasa is revealed (bhvyamm) b y fjspecial p o w e r assumed b y w o r d s in p o e t r y a n d drama, t h e of revelation (bhvan)to b e distinguished from p o w e r enotation (abhidh)consisting of t h e action of generalizing determinants, etc. T h i s p o w e r has t h e faculty of suppressi n g t h e thick layer of m e n t a l s t u p o r (moha) occupying o u r o w n ^consciousness : in p o e t r y it is characterized b y t h e absence of llpfects (dosa) a n d t h e presence of qualities (guna) and ornaments ^ a y ; in drama b y t h e four kinds of representation. , revealed b y this p o w e r , is t h e n enjoyed (bhuj) w i t h a k i n d

1) This objection repeats, mutatis mutandis, the objection of the Budsts and of the mmamsaka against the concept ofsphota, which, according the grammarians {yaiykarana)> is a vocality, eternal and without parts, from the letters and manifested (vyaj) by these. This eternal vocality the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows : is manifested entirely by the first letter of a word or not ? a) If \o}a is manifested in its entirety, the letters which come after are unneIn other words, the first letter would be capable of rendering the meaning of the whole world, b) If sphota is manifested ually, then it could no longer be without parts. This second alterItiye is, therefore, in contradiction to the very nature osphota. The same I r o n i n g is applied by Bhatta Nyaka to Rasa and to the words by which |f(is manifested. $> This gradual manifestation of the Rasa has also been criticized by Sjifcuka, cf. supra, p. 28. |f^ 2) One classical definition of poetry ( H e , p. 33) says : adosau saguslamkrau ca sabdrthau kvyam || " Poetry is word and content withdefects, possessing qualities and also (but not necessarily) ornaments ", [ 4 5 ]

R. GNOLI of enjoyment (bhoga), different from direct experience, etc. T h i s enjoyment, b y v i r t u e of t h e different forms of tact b e t w e e n sattva a n d rajah a n d tamah? is consisting o f t f e 1 a) The light of the self, of the consciousness, does not reveal itself, in the smsrika existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements {guna) of mental substance {buddhi), light, luminous and pleasant, rajah, mobile, dynamic and painful, inert, obstructive and stupid. These three constituent elements are ne^ef present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. T | p state of emergence of the element sattva, limpid and mirror-like, coini with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light an beatitude proper to the Selfthese indeed reflect themselves in sattvai I.P.V.V., I, p 150 : sattvam prakasaripam nirmalanabhahprakhyam saryaf jaladapatalena iva vrantman tamas samvrtam ste \ taira ca mrutasthn^ yam pravrttisvabhvam rajah kriytmakatay kr amena tamojaladam apasrajf}\ nyagbhvayati \\ "Sattva, which is made up of light and is like the immaculatp ether, is completely enshrouded by tamah, the principle of obstruction,^ 1 by a blanket of cloud, Rajah, which is made up of action and is, therefore^ imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes dissipates, the cloud-bank of tamah ' \ The three constituent sattva, rajah and tamah are associated with three states of consciousne^ called, respectively, expansion {viksa), provoked by an absjolutCL pie~j dominance of sattva, fluidity {druti), determined by a contact of satfyjL with rajah, and dilatation {vistara) determined by a contact f saft% with tamah. '<ik^ The conception of the three gunas, belonging, in particular, to the sai khya andyoga systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by thg whole of Indian thought. \ V; b) Druti, vistara, and viksa are each connected with certain Rasas bjfe later Indian theorists. Druti is the proper state of consciousness of srngrft karuna and snta ; vistara oivtra, raudra and blbhatsa ; viksa, ofhsya, adbhuia^ and bhaynaka. Cf. Dh. ."L<> comm., p. 206. Rajah predominates # i ^ druti, tamah in vistara and sattva in viksa. M,G, p. 74 : yad hi rajasj gunasya drutih tamaso vistarah sattvasytiviksah tadnim bhogah svarpam labhatef "It h when rajah is in fluidity, tamah in dilatation, and sattva in full sion that fruition is realized ". [ 46 ]

 H E AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE,

ETC.

[ of fluidity {dnitt) enlargement ( vistara ) a n d expansion ?), i s characterized b y a resting (vtfrnt) o n o n e ' s o w n | | | c i o u s n e s s {samvit\ w h i c h d u e t o t h e e m e r g e n t state of ^ | ^ is p e r v a d e d b y beatitude (nanda) a n d light (u I) The expression sattvodreka is reproduced almost without change aata, p. 74 : sattvodrekapraksnandamayasamvtdvtsrntisatattvena. commented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the gtion, the commentary of Vidycakravartin (K. P., Trivandrum Sans, LXXXVII) : sattvodrekt jau praksnandau tanmayym sam^mdhivrttirpymj yoglnm visrntir vigahtasakalasram nistarangentfatsadrs'ena. M. G, p. 74, comments on : sattvodrekena praksafy nandas tanma y samvit tasym visrntih, s satattvam paramrtho Referring to Rasa A.G. says in Dh.*L., p. 183, that it is vvaicitrynMiddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhvanirvrtwisrniilaksanah* The /definition of the aesthetic experience given by Visvantha in his ina, adds nothing to the conception of A.G. and Bhatta Nyaka. says : 'sattPodrekd akhandasvapraksnandacinmayah J vedymtarasparsasnyo brahmsvdasahodarah || lokottaracamatkraprnah katscit pramtrbhih | pkravad abhinnatpenyam svdyate rasah j| a is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e., qui rationem artis intelhgunt). ded by virtue of the emergence of sattva. It is made up of a full Hgence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact wi f h any ||iicwable thing, twin brother to the tasting oibrahman. It is animated jffifjtgttkra of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very ^J$h- indivisibility ". Cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy, The ^rmahon of Nature in Art, Harvard, 1934, pp.48L Coomaraswamy ates camatkra with "lighting-flash ". According to Visvantha, Ifs1fcothing but the mind or inner sense (manah) devoid of any contact *i$4i$ anc * tamah* | | | | r } i e terminology used by Bhatta Nyaka and referred to by A.G, "y, analogous to that used by Bhoja, m his definition of the stiann : yad tu rajastamolesnnviddham antaljkaranasattva?n bhvyate ta da citisaktel? subhapraksamayasya sattvasya bhvyamnasyodrekt snan[ 47 ]

ft. GNLt a n d is similar t o t h e tasting (svdd) of t h e supreme brahman1^ dah samdhir bhavet || (Bhojavrtti, I,17). " When the matter of concentration (bhvan is commented on by Bhoja bhvan bhvyasya visayntarapanhrenaA cetasipunahpunar nivesanam) is the sattva tinged by the rajah and tamah proper' to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self^ and of the emergence osattva, which is made up of bliss and light and is thl. matter of concentration, that which is called snandasamdhi occurs ' \ ThisV passage is also quoted by Pandey, L Aes.> p. 189, 1) Bhatta Nyaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experi-" ence with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no, longer associated with the limited " I " ; during the aesthetic experience the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the wholes of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same^ thing, mutatis mutandis occurs in mystical experience ; in this sense, aesthetic" experience is similar (savidha, sabrahmacnn, sahodara) to experience of theJ Absolute or of the brahman. Bhatta Nyaka and A. G. (A. G. also acceptai Bhatta Nyaka's opinion ; Dh. .L*, p. 190 : parabrahmsvdasabrahmacrh^ tvam cstav asja rassvadasya), however, do not fail to emphasize the unrmV" takable characteristics of each. Bhatta Nyaka says (Dh, .L* p. 91) : vgdhenur dugdha etam ht rasam y ad balatrsnay \ tena nsya samah sa syd duhyate yogtbhir hi yah | " This Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) is poured forth spontaneously by the word which is like a cow, for love of her children ; for this reason it is different from that which is (laboriously) milked by yogins ". Cf. also A.Bb<} p. 5. On the opinion of A.G., infra, pp. 82-84. Two stanzas which reflecjf the same idea and which are certainly from Bhatta Nyaka, are quoted by Mahimabhatta(iP^/^//w^), p. 94 (seethe translation in the Introd^ p. XXVI) : pthyd atha dhruvgnt fatah samprite rase | tadsvdabharaikgro hrsyaty antarmukhal? ksanam [| tato mrvisayasysya svarpvasthitau mjafy | vyajyaU hldamsyando yena trpyanti yogmah || The association between these two states also appears in the affinities! of the terms which designate them : visrnti, nirvrti, laya, nirvesa, sampaifi camatkra, etc., [ 48 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC I n this exposition, t h e thesis confuted by B h a t t a N y a k a are zd even by ussimply because w e d o n o t accept of Bhatta Lollata. sa h a v e been defiinitely p u t t o death. 1 '*As for t h e rest w e d o n o t see w h a t k i n d of I l l y o u say it is tasting (rasan),
2

the

T h u s t h e errors confuted b y B h a t t a enjoyment disIf, of

|||iguishable from perception, etc., can exist in t h e w o r l d . gtption , a n d is only called b y a n o t h e r n a m e o n t l | particular means {upjdf ig&ce. account

w e reply t h a t this t o o is a p e r b y w h i c h it is called i n t o exisanalogy Rasa is

T h e same t h i n g h a p p e n s in t h e case of direct perception ), reasoning (anumnd), t h e revealed w o r d {sruti\ intuition, (prattbhtia)* Besides, etc., each of w h i c h takes a that

niti\

ferent n a m e .

if w e d o n o t admit

|Qduced o r manifested, w e shall b e forced t o conclude t h a t either eternal o r non-existent : n o t h i r d possibility exists, jain, t h e existence of a n unperceived t h i n g c a n n o t b e affirmThe supporters of Bhatta N y a k a will p e r h a p s reply t h e p e r c e p t i o n of Rasa is just w h a t they call t h e p o w e r of

1) Cf. Dh..L., p. 187. The thesis confuted by Bhatta Nyaka do Judmit the concept of generality; they distinguish between one's own o p t i o n and somebody else's. Cf. supra, introd., pp. XX ff. |2) See below, App. Ill, p. 112. fa* The determinants, etc. The term pratibh, prattbhna, is used in several senses (cf. Intr., LVIII ff. In the present passage, it has the sense of <c an inexplicable ition as to what may occur in the future, for example, c Tomorrow brother will come ". It also includes the power of understanding all of sounds without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal e world and also the power of having heavenly visions " (Dasgupta, Ph., V, 127). This particular form of consciousness is discussed by a, Nyayawcinjar (Benares 1936), pp. 97 ff. 42 [ 49 ]

ft. GISOL b r i n g i n g a b o u t enjoyment (bhoglkarana)1consisting states of fluidity, etc. V e r y well, t h e n ! t h a t it s h o u l d consist solely in these t h r e e states. in For the there

B u t it is impossible

exist just as m a n y forms of p e r c e p t i o n w h o s e nature, accord- \ i n g t o y o u , lies in this v e r y p o w e r of b r i n g i n g a b o u t fruition consisting of a relish, as t h e r e are kinds of Rasa. Besides, t h e ' c o n s t i t u e n t elements, sattva, etc., can b e found set o u t in an infinite n u m b e r of different ways : o n e may p r e d o m i n a t e a t ' o n e t i m e a n d a n o t h e r at a n o t h e r . T h u s it is a b s u r d t o limit t h e forms of relish t o only t h r e e . H o w e v e r , if t h e w o r d " revelation " in t h e expression " t h e Rasas are revealed b y t h e p o e m " ( w h a t B h a t t a N y a k a says is : " T h e v a r i o u s R a s a s t h e erotic, etc., are revealed b y t h e p o w e r of revelation " ) , is used in t h e sense t h a t t h e p o e m becomes t h e m a t t e r of a p e r c e p t i o n , w h i c h consists of a tasting m a d e u p of g u s t a t i o n , a n d w h i c h is generated by t h e determin a n t s , etc., it may be accepted w i t h o u t any q u e s t i o n . A g a i n , in t h e stanza, " Rasa is, it is said, t h e a i m of p o e t r y (kvyrthf it is an experience (anubhava) consisting of a tasting

1) If, says A. G., the expression "enjoyment' 5 is understood in the sense of perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes/ the power of genetatmg the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may cer-^ tainly be accepted. In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment b e - | comes the same as that which followers of thzdhvam school call the power of| evocation (dhvananavypra). Cf. tnfra, App. Ill, p. 113. 1 2 a) The expression kvyrtha is borrowed from Bharata, N. , VII, | p. 342 : kyyitbn bhvayantti bhvh". [The mental states] are called! bbva because they bring into existence (bhv) the aims of the poem " J Artha, A G. comments {A Bb , p. 344), m this expression does not carryj the meaning of sense, something expressed (abhtdheya) but means the fina^ cause, the aim of the poem (arthyanfe prdhnyenety arihh na tv arthasabdo yavc) ; in other words, Rasa. r so i

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. , is t h e matter of cognition b y a n o t ordinary form of consciousness {parasamvitti), determinants, etc., " as manifestedso manifested {yyangyd) b y t h e u n i o n of Bhatta N y a k a apparently considers t h a t t h e t h e o r y of manifestation is By t h e w o r d " experi-

maintained t h a n discarded 1 . %

If&ce" w e m u s t really u n d e r s t a n d t h e object of it 2 . But, b e i n g it so, w h a t is t h e n t h e t r u e n a t u r e of Rasa ? is e n o u g h ! Well, w h a t shall w e d o 3 ? Four stanzas of intermezzo

7) W h y repeat t r u t h s disclosed already in t h e t h o u g h t of predecessor a n d t h u s b e h a v e as n o before ? i m p u t e d t o m e by t h e audience. Tireless, t h e m i n d of m a n climbs ever h i g h e r t o gaze |mth. Behold ! h a v e succeeded each o t h e r o n t h e ladder of t h o u g h t . I n t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h e crossing of t h e river of t h e k n o w a b l e Is, I k n o w , agitated a n d s u p p o r t l e s s : b u t as we advance on T h i s is just t h e fruit of t h e doctrines w h i c h one has behaved T h i s double, serious a n d evident e r r o r will certainly

L) Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of brahman, Jyith the supreme consciousness, cf. supra p. XXIV. 1) The existence of dhvani is explicitly denied by Bhatta Nyaka (cf. pp.e passage quoted by Jacobi, 2DMG, 62, p. 296, Pandey, p. 246 ff.)- I n Some passages, A.G. points out, he seems, nevertheless, to admit its existence implicitly. In this stanza, Bhatta Nyaka uses, for example, the vttbvyaj |tid therefore admits implicitly the theory of dhvani, the sense manifested f.e., not expressed, that words assume in poetry. 2) That is to say, that Rasa is the object of the afore-mentioned ^experience. , 3) At this point A. G. interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines pihh the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the 'exposition of his own thesis. r si i

&. GNOLI d o g g e d l y a l o n g this road, we cease t o be amazed b y built

b r i d g e s , city foundations, o r a n y t h i n g else. A rich a n d fruitful h a r v e s t may b e culled b y posterity from t h e inheritance of t h o u g h t left t o it b y its predecessors. us h e r e a n d n o t refuted. The correct view 8. L e t us t h e n state w h a t is t h e t r u e n a t u r e of Rasa purified of p r e v i o u s mistakes. I t h a s already been stated b y Bharata, F o r h e h a s said : " T h e is simply t h e aim of first perception fire2" there a n d w e shall a d d n o t h i n g n e w . aims of p o e t r y " l . poetry. Therefore, Thus t h e d o c t r i n e s o f t h e sages of antiquity will only b e refined b y

m e n t a l states are called feelings because t h e y m a k e u s feel t h e Rasa F o r instance, immediately after t h e

of t h e literal sense of t h e following expressions, " T h e y lay b y n i g h t " , " H e g a v e it (seil., t h e o m e n t u m ) t o t h e occurs (in a qualified p e r s o n (adhikarin) characterized b y a

certain p r a g m a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t (arthita) a n d so on, a n d possessed o f a k e e n interest in t h e object o f p e r c e p t i o n i n v o l v e d ) a second p e r c e p t i o n eliminating t h e t e m p o r a l data, etc., contained in t h e first.3 T h i s second p e r c e p t i o n consists i n a transfer (samkramaya), etc., of t h e literal sense a n d is presented in t h e f o r m : " I will l a y , " " I will g i v e " , etc. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e various schools, this p e r c e p t i o n is called
4

propulsion

(bhvana),

command

(vidhi), o r d e r {niyogd), etc . N o w , a similar t h i n g may b e said 1) See the literal translation of this quotation at p. 50, n. 2 a. 2) Two quotations taken from revelation (srut), 3) The past tense of the two expressions in question. 4) In other words, some scriptural sentences (e. g., those quoted) awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself, [ 52 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. | 0 h a p p e n in t h e case of p o e t r y : there occurs in a qualified jjsprson a perception
1

transcending t h e

w o r d s of t h e p o e m . I n such

JEbe qualified p e r s o n is in this case any p e r s o n w h o s e h e a r t ppssesses a spotless p o w e r of intuition (pratibhnd).

letc. In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation : the Ipast tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into %he present tense, etc. There arises in the heart of the believer the form ^of consciousness (pratipatti), " I will give the omentum to the fire ", etc. Jjbis passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion Mhvana), order and command (vidhiy niyoga). The terms bhvan, vidhi, land niyoga are proper to the liturgical speculations of mimms (the term fhjivna used by Bhatta Nyaka was probably taken from the terminology Sof the prvamlmtns). The terms vidhi and niyoga, observes J., T.A., Itfp. 167, are used above all by the followers of Prabhkara ; Kumrila's disciples prefer instead the word bhvan. The shift of sense involved, of tcourse, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, iji desire to attain certain ends, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained 411 three Slokas quoted byH. C , p. 98 (no doubt taken from a work on poetics existing prior to A. G., perhaps the Hrdayadarpana of Bhatta rogyam ptavn imbah stutv devant aharpatim \ syd arthvagatih purvam itydivacane jath || tatas copttakldinyakkrenopajyate \ pratipattur manasy evam pratipattir na samsayah \\ yah ko 'pi bhskaram stauti sa sarvo'py agado bhavet \ tasmd aham api staumi roganirmuktaye ravi m || " In the sentence 'Samba regained his health when he praised the Sun , etc. there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense, and then fand on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the perceiving subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc., {assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the ^following form : " Everyone who praises the Sun regains his health ; so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease ". Cf. &P.V.V., I, p. 24 ; I.P.V., I, p. 27. [53 ]

R. GNOLI a p e r s o n h e a r i n g t h e following phrases, " T h e r e he (scil.9 th J deer) is n o w , " Even Um, firmness gracefully b y t h e b e n d i n g dropping
3

of

his n e c k . . . % . .2, " Tfoej after the,

the

g o l d e n karnikra. appears,

of H a r a . . ,

there

immediately

p e r c e p t i o n of their literal sense, a perception of a different order? (an inner [manas] perception, consisting in a direct experience [skstkra*] which completely eliminates t h e temporal

1) Klidsa, Abhijnnasakuntal, 1,2 : <e There he {seil the deer) is no\>et* gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at] the chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder haj| (of his body) repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] b o through fear of the descent of the arrow; strewing the road with grass haliM chewed which drops from his mouth kept open from exhaustion. See fe by reason of his lofty boundmgs he goes chiefly in the air, and little on the ground" (Monier Williams, Sakuntal, Hertford, 1853, p. 9). 2) Klidsa, Kumrasambhava, III, 62 : " Even Um, dropping golden karnikra flowers which glowed among her black tresses, bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ear| before Siva ". 3) Op. cit., Ill, 67 : " The firmness of Hara, even, was somew] shakenlike the sea when the moon is just about to rise; he cast his eyes desire towards the face of Um, towards her lips, red as the fruit the bimba ". 4) Like to sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., the aesthetic experience i | an inner or mental perception (mnasapratyaksa), i.e., it is perceived throug the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is self-knowing {svasamvedan^ siddha). In the A.Bh., p. 291, A. G. observes that the fact of tasti {svdana ; aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form tasting) is of a mental order : it differs from the fact of eating, which is; purely material act (rasanavyprd bhojand adhiko yo mnaso vyprah evsvdanam)* The mind of him who tastes must be ekgra, absorbed in object of the tasting to the exclusion of all else. On the Contrary, who eats may be also anyacitta\ he can also think of other things, Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (alaukika), sut

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. |ction, etc., a s s u m e d by these sentences. Besides, t h e y o u n g :, etc., w h i c h appears in this p e r c e p t i o n is d e v o i d of its (yisesa), and at t h e same time, t h e actor, w h o t h e role of t h e deer], frightens [the spectators] (tr* . .showing t o b e afraid, is unreal (apramrtlnka). As a , w h a t t h e r e appears is simply a n d solely fearfear in uncircumscribed b y time, space, etc. 1 T h i s p e r c e p t i o n fear is of a different o r d e r from t h e ordinary perceptions %l a m afraid, h e m y enemy, m y friend, anybodyis afraid") ; fethese are necessarily affected by t h e appearance of fresh ntal m o v e m e n t s (of s h u n n i n g , etc.) 2 , consisting of plea:e, pain, etc, and just for this reason are full o f obstacles Wd). T h e sensation of t h e fear a b o v e m e n t i o n e d , o n W n d is the oigan of tasting ; during the tasting the mind must be e^of all obstacles, devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory percepSj etc. The subject is immersed in a camatkra set apart from any tion of " self" or " others ". Aesthetic tasting is a c generalised ' |(jeption and free, therefore, of obstacles (in the A.Bb.9 I, p. 291 the ssion svdayanti manas IV. , VI, v. 36, is commented upon in the owing manner : samantat sdhrantbhvena mrvighnapraUpatttvasn indriyntaravtghnasambhvansvyena svdayanti svaparavivekasnyafiftamatkraparavas. . .). In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer %& the actor as such. In the aesthetic experience, these two temporal and lal orders cancel each other out. On the one hand, therefore, the deer, without any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as .ent of ordinary life but is perceived in a generalized form); si', the actor, and hence the impression of fear which he suggests, is reived as a constituent element of practical life. The state of conssness which does occur is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; &a generalized permanent mental state, a Rasa. |)\ " Shunning, etc ", i.e., shunning, accepting and disregarding. [ 55 ]

&. GNOL t h e contrary, is t h e m a t t e r of cognition by a perception d e v o i d of obstacles (nirvighna), a n d m a y be said t o enter directly (nivi$)\ i n t o o u r hearts, t o dance {vipdrivrff before o u r eyes : thisf is t h e terrible Rasa. I n such a fear, one's o w n self is neither^ completely i m m e r s e d (tiraskf) n o r in a state of particular! e m e r g e n c e (ullikhy, a n d t h e same t h i n g h a p p e n s w i t h t h e o t h e r selves. A s a result of this, t h e state of generality i n v o l v e ^ is n o t limited (parimita), b u t extended (vitata)as h a p p e n s at t h e m o m e n t i n w h i c h is formed t h e idea of t h e invariable co*H Vl> comitance (vypti) b e t w e e n s m o k e a n d fire or, in fact, between^ t r e m b l i n g a n d fear 3 . T h e r e f o r e , this idea t o b e c o n f r o n t e d 1) Vtpanvrtmeans to move, to revolve, etc. The use of the wordj is ancient. It is to be found m Bhartrhari (1,125, ftk9 p. 125 (ed. of Lahore) buddhau vtpanvartate. In the same sense (that is, with buddhau) it is used by^ Dharmakirti and Kumrila also. A.G. comments on the word viparivartqk mnasya in the following way (I.P.V., II, p. 140) : vicitratvena visvasya bhed^ bhedtman partvartamnasya spandanena sphurato . . . 2) In the first case there would be no aesthetic cognition, but mystical cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought an distinct apprehensions (yikalpa). In the second case, ordinary discursiv|| cognition would occur. In both these cases, then, the ubhayadesaklatyga^ required by the aesthetic experience would be absent. Cf. the Ntyadarpaijk by Rmacandra and Gunacandra^, Baroda, 1929, p. 161. For the antithesis between tman and para cf. PTV, pp. 71-72 : atra hi madhyamapde scwisrnutenparah . . . ttnana eva sravanam syt na parasya... 3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in II, 4, 12 : da tu darsane vyptigrahanvasthym y avant as taddesasambhvyama^i nasadbhvah pramtras ivatm eko'sau dhmbhsas ca vahnybhsasca % yanaye iva, tvati tesm paramesvarenatkyam mrtmtam\YL. Ch. Pandey, vol. III, p. 178. translates : " But, according to this system, at the time] of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke an^j fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existent^ at that place [i.e., in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admi| the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images^/ the Lord [i.e., Isvara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made the subjects one "? [ 56 ]

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, a real experience 1 is n o u r i s h e d b y t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of

$LG. observes that the pleasure given by a spectacle increases when there *** X& l&rge number of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is ^conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a number of k people. T. A.y X, v. 85 ff. : tatha hy ekgrasakalasmjtkajaneksitam \ nrttam gt am sudhsrasgaratvena manyate || tata evocyate mallanatapreksopadesane | sarvapramtrtdatmyam prnarpnubhvakam \ \ tvanmtrrthasamvittitusth pratyekaio yadi \ kah sambhya gunas tesm pramtraikyam bhavec ca kirn || y add tu tattadvedyaivadharmasamdarbhagarbhitam \ tadvastu hskd prgipd anyadyuktam idam tad |] " The spectators who watch, absorbed, a performance of dancing, of ing, etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments : " anyone, , can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time a greater pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual). ^% for this reason that those who teach the true nature of performances of jostling and acting, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing Ejects lakes place ; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect |ti$ude (J. comments : prnarpeti iyad eva hiprnam rpamyad vigalitave^(tjUfttaratay tatraivtianykanksatvena parmarsanam ntnd). If the mere |%>1|$ciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realization |git the performance is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the ^spectators taken one by one, how then can the different state of consciousIjds, which arises when they are together, be explained ? And how could I||4&11 be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists ? ^^hen, instead, the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same tn|b by all others also, one can say with reason that it appears in a different from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes J., on another nature which generates a very high cumatkra) ". See on that the Introd., pp, XXXVII ff. In A,G. the expression viiatavypti, occurs elsewhere also, and not always in a technical sense (see fj\, p. 378 ; Bh. G.A.S., pp. 110, 136). 1) The aesthetic perception, ^hich is not dependent on the concepts reality and unreality, cannot be spoken of as a real experience (that is, 13 [ 57 ]

R. GN0L1 actors, etc. I n this combination, indeedin, t h a t t h e t>||

limiting causes (niyamahetu),

(time, space, t h e particularize^

c o g n i z i n g subject, etc.) o n o n e side, a n d t h o s e afforded tely d i s a p p e a r t h e afore-mentioned state of generality

t h e p o e m o n t h e other, neutralize each o t h e r a n d t h e n comple readily n o u r i s h e d ; so t h a t b y v i r t u e of t h e v e r y u n i f o r m i t y (ekaghcmat1) of t h e spectator's perception, it being so n o u r i s h e d | readily n o u r i s h e s t h e Rasa in all of t h e m : a n d this occur^j because t h e latent impressions of their m i n d s c o n c o r d w i t h ea.ctf o t h e r , t h e m i n d s b e i n g varied b y beginningless latent i pressions. 2

the direct experience, perception of something real, pratyaksa, skstkrajj but, A.G. says, it is " like " a real experience {skstkryamna-=.skstkra^ kalpa, pratjdksakalpa). See A.Bh, I, p. 43 : the drama is pratyaksakalpnij^ vyavasyavisayo lokaprasiddhasatysatydtvilaksanatvt. In other terms, th^ aesthetic experience is a direct perception sut generis, free of every relation, with practical reality, etc. | 1) The word ekaghanat derives from ghana. " Ghana, from ghan, tqj strike, hinder, etc., has a primary sense of " dense mass ", implying >a, condensation of multiple factors without extension in space " (A. K j Coomaraswamy, The Transformation of Nature m Art, Harvard 1934 p. 209) | Hence ekaghana comes to mean " dense ", " compact ", (( uniform "|j etc., in the sense of a state of consciousness which does not allow the mte^ ference of " obstacles " (vighna). | 2) A.G. replies with this argument to the objection of Bhatta Nayaka| according to whom the spectator can identify himself only with a p e r s | similar to himself but not with a being of a non-ordinary natur, as B deity, etc. The identification and therefore the state of generality require for the aesthetic experience postulates an affinity of nature (latent impxef| ssions, tendencies, instincts, etc.) between the spectator and the person| represented. A G. replies to this objection saying that no being (animal! or deity) exists with which man has no affinity of nature. The samsara isi [ 58 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. This (form of) consciousness w i t h o u t obstacles is called ; t h e physical effects of it, t h a t is t o say, t r e m b l i n g , ation, joyful m o t i o n s of limbs {ullukasana% etc., camatkra*. F o r example : " V i s n u is still t o d a y state of camatkra : h o w , o h h o w is it t h a t t h e limbs :, w h i c h are as beautiful as a piece of t h e m o o n , been taken t o pieces by m o u n t M a n d a r a 4 ? " I n d e e d , m a y be likewise defined as a n i m m e r s i o n in a n en.t {bhogvesah) w h i c h can n e v e r satiate a n d is t h u s .terrupted {trptivyatirekencchinnah). T h e w o r d camatkra, I* p r o p e r l y means t h e action b e i n g d o n e b y a t a s t i n g Sject (camatah karanam), in o t h e r w o r d s , b y t h e enjoying ingless and every man, before being that which he actually is, has all the other beings as well. The consciousness of the spectator thus tsses (in other words, is varied by. ..) the latent impressions of all the ible beings and he is therefore susceptible of identifying himself with of them. The same concept is expounded in the DhA.L., p. 187 ; elow, App. Ill, p. 112. i ) See the Intr., pp. XLV-XLVI. 1) The tttmullukasanah explained by A. G. {A. Bh.> I, p. 330) gtrasyorshldam dhnanam. III, ch. XXII, p. 152 : iha cittavrttir eva samveddnabhumau iam api vypnoti || " The mental movements, which are phenoof consciousness, are also transmitted to the body and pervade it ". Unidentified stanza. This is an allusion to the churning of the The gods and demons took Mount Mandara for a churning stick p arious precious objects were churned from the deep, amongst which >on and Sri (Laksm), the goddess of beauty. The aesthetic expeof camatkra reappears in the consciousness every time the determiits, etc. (the poetic expression), by which it is aroused, are evoked. Cf. pl, I, p. 37 (App. II). The example offered by A.G. (of Visnu who is under the influence of a camatkra) exemplifies this very character of etic pleasure. A.Bk,

R. GNOLI subject, h e w h o is i m m e r s e d i n t h e v i b r a t i o n {spanddf marvellous enjoyment {adbhutabhogdf\ t i n g o f a direct different experience 3 , or of i\ qfi

It may be thought

either as a f o r m of m e n t a l cognition (mnasdhyavasya) consis v | of imagination {satnkalp^ o r o f r e m e m b r a n c e , w h i c h nevertheless, is manifested in M m a n n e r t o its o r d i n a r y n a t u r e . F o r as Klidsa? SurelyJ of, said : " Often a m a n , t h o u g h h a p p y , becomes uneasy of minfc o n seeing beautiful objects a n d h e a r i n g sweet musics.
4

h e r e m e m b e r s in his soul, t h o u g h vaguely, associations

f o r m e r b i r t h s deeply i m p l a n t e d in h i m " . I n a n y case, h o w - | ever, it is a f o r m of perceptiona p e r c e p t i o n in w h i c h wh&fcj i 1) S panda means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the Saiva schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force frotiy which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the fruits of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force] manifests itself in the instinctive motions of consciousness (fear, joy, etc.|| It is the energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought top thought. It is the first moment of will (tccha), the initial motion of the) spirit, which is presupposed by any form of consciousness. The terms; ' heart ' {hrdayd), thought (vimarsa), bliss (nandd), vibration, {sphuratt\ ghrni)> etc., express the same concept. On consciousness as movement^ etc., see, above all, the Spandaknk by Kallata, passim ; Somnanda,^ Sivadrsti, p. 11; .P.V.V., I, 5, v. 14. In the present case, spania is thf movement, the inner rhythm of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic? experience is an inner perception like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in thsf sense, is not of a discursive order (vtkalpaka). 2) Cf. supra Intr., p. XXXIII. 3) I.e., it is a mental or inner perception. 4) Klidsa, Sakuntal, V, 96. This stanza is quoted by A.G., also in I.P.V.V., III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Klidsa alludes, is/ observes A.G., an unobjectified desire ; it corresponds to what is, metaphy^ sically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullne$& [ 6 0 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. 3ears (is just a feeling, for instance) delight, consisting of a F o r this reason, i.e., because it is n o t conditioned 1er specifications 2 , this perception is a p t t o b e c o m e t h e of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form o f o r d i n a r y cognition, n o r is it erroneous, n o r ineffable, n o r like o r d i n a r y perception 3 , n o r does it consist of a super-imposition 4 . T o m^to crumble in time and space, i.e., the navamala. I.P. V. V., Ill, 252 : hi bhunjnarpat svtmavisrnttlaksan sarvatra icch | kvacit tu "mavUrntir bhvntaram angrit avisesam apeksya utthpyate yatra s icch $. ity ucyatej gritavilesatym tu kma iti \ digrahand abhlsamalo yatra Warn smnykram api vsanvahsamtrenste yathha " bhvasthirni tnntarasauhrdni " iti : " The fact of being in a state of camatkray of on the point of enjoying something (characterised by a rest in one's ^ n Self) is, without any exception, a form of will [the will is the first tent of Consciousness, before it crystallizes in the forms of the discursive ition]. Sometimes such a rest in one's own self appears in connexion i an object in general, without any further determinations ; in this case, is called * attachment \ At other times it appears in connexion a determined object and, in this case, there is what is called * love \ word, * etc '., Utpaladeva hints at the maculation of the desire (the imala, etc.; cf. supra) ; it is obtained when the objectiveness considered t only idenfinite, but in a state of latent impression (that is, when it is et developed and appears in a state of potentiality ; the navamala is *re an unobjectified desire, akarmakam abhtlsamtram. T.J\, p. 75 : maculation is an eager agitation consisting in the presumption of non-fullness, a mere desire without an object, a predisposition [^future limitations"]. For example : " . . . the associations of former deeply implanted in him ". d ) In other words, a perception characterized by the presence of a **&-i'^ feeling (delight, gf g ( g , anger, g , etc.) ) Uj By no temporal, spatial, individual, etc., specification. In other i by no obstacle. e., a reproduction of it (Sankuka's doctrine). " As when wrong knowledge follows after the right one is vitiated", App. I, p. 93.

R. GNOLI c o n c l u d e w e m a y say equally well t h a t it consists of a state of intensification 1 using this t e r m t o indicate t h a t it is n o t l i m i t e ^ b y space, e t c . ; t h a t it is a r e p r o d u c t i o n u s i n g this w o r d m e a n t h a t it is a p r o d u c t i o n w h i c h repeats t h e feelings ;
2

toj andi

t h a t it is a c o m b i n a t i o n of different elementsthis conceptiodj b e i n g i n t e r p r e t e d in t h e light of t h e doctrine of t h e vijnnavdinKi F r o m w h i c h e v e r p o i n t of v i e w it is examined, Rasa is, in anjq case, simply a n d solely a mental state w h i c h is t h e m a t t e r of! c o g n i t i o n o n t h e p a r t of a p e r c e p t i o n w i t h o u t obstacles and> consisting i n a relish. The obstacles to the realisation of Rasa

9. I n this connection, t h e elements w h i c h eliminate the] obstacles are t h e determinants, etc. (rasan\ A l s o in t h e o r d i n a r y w o r l d ^ indeed, t h e different w o r d s camatkra, i m m e r s i o n (nirvesa)y relish tasting (svdafta), enjoyment (bhoga), accomplishment^ lysis (Iayd)9 rest (visrnti), etc., m e a n n o t h i n g but(sampatti), whatever.

a [form of] consciousness completely free from any obstacles] N o w , t h e obstacles t o t h e p e r c e p t i o n in question,; in t e m p o r a l a n d spatial determination^ are-^f) t h e unsuitability, t h a t is t o say, t h e lack of v e r i s i m i l i t u d e ! b) t h e i m m e r s i o n perceived as exclusively o n e ' s o w n o r exclusively t h o s e of ano^ t h e r ; c) t h e fact of b e i n g at t h e m e r c y of o u r o w n sensations of 1) Lollata's doctrine. { 2) Tentatively, I have so rendered the linguistic explanation of anukn by bhvnugmitay karant. Lit., " to mean that it is an operation temporally following the feelings ". i{ 3) See above, p. 41. Well, ^ays A.G. here, this theory is also true if i | is interpreted in the light of tyt vijnnavda, the idealistic Buddhism, accordj ing to which everything that exists is pure consciousness or perception! [ 62]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. sure, e t c . ; d) t h e defective state of t h e means of percep-

x; e) t h e lack of e v i d e n c e ; J) t h e lack of some p r e d o m i n a n t | | f e t o r ; g) a n d t h e presence of d o u b t . j I n d e e d , if one considers t h e t h i n g s presented as lacking his

p | | v e t i s i m i l i t u d e , h e c a n n o t obviously i m m e r s e {yinivis) | i t a k e place. T h i s is t h e first obstacle.

^n&ciousness in t h e m , so t h a t n o restno rest, I say, in t h e m T h e means b y w h i c h eliminated is t h e consent of t h e h e a r t w h i c h takes place le v i e w of o r d i n a r y events 1 .
tV/

W h e n extraordinary inci-

\ h a v e t o be portrayed, it is necessary t o choose personages se names are famous, like Rma, etc., w h o m a k e us g i v e t o their undertakingsa believing (pratyqyd) \fesiddht) w h i c h they h a v e enjoyed since antiquity 2 . H;j:eason, it will be said t h a t ntaka*, indeed, J u s t for ly jrooted in ourselves, aroused b y t h e u n i n t e r r u p t e d fame etc., w h o s e p u r p o s e

learning {yyutpatti) and teaching (upadesa) of deeds t r a n s pig t h e ordinary life,necessarily requires t o deal w i t h famous jts a n d so o n . T h i s requirement, h o w e v e r , is absent in B u t all t h a t will b e explained (case of farces {prahasand).

An event of an oidmary character finds a more ready response in the .tor's heart. If the same extraordinary events (crossing of the ocean, etc) which fact, attributed to a legendary figure (Rama, etc ) where referred ordinary man, they would arouse the incredulity of the spectators. ., p. 331 : rmdes tu tathvidham api carttam prvaprastddhtparamItasampratjujoprdham asatyatay na caksti ||" But when such underare referred to Rma, etc., they lose all appearance of falsehood ; :y are rooted in the spectator's confidence, the cumulative result uninterrupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in on ". Of. p. 64, n. 1. [ 63 ]

B.. GNOL at a suitable time and place 1 , enough. b) O n e of t h e principal obstacles regularly occurs w h e n t b ^ l spectator is at t h e mercy of t h e tasting of pleasures, pains, etcjgjjj i n h e r i n g in his o w n p e r s o n . T h i s obstacle consists in t h e appeJfP ranee o f o t h e r forms of consciousness, d u e variously t o f h j | fear of b e i n g a b a n d o n e d b y t h e sensations of pleasure, e t | t o c o n c e r n for their preservation, t o a desire t o p r o c u r e othe similar sensations, t o t h e desire t o get rid of t h e m , give the o p e n expression, h i d e t h e m , etc. E v e n w h e n someone p e r | ceives pleasures, pains, etc., as i n h e r i n g exclusively i n othej p e r s o n s , o t h e r forms of consciousness inevitably arise in (pleasures, pains, m e n t a l s t u p o r , indifference For the time being this4l

1) AM , ch. XVIII. The appropriate subjects for the ten kinds ^ play are described and commented upon in N.S., XVIII. Ntaka plays on elevated subjects. Dasarpa, Haas, p. 4 : " The ten chief ties (of drama) are : the Ntaka, the Prakarana, the Bbga, the the Dima9 the Vyyoga, the Samavakra, the Vthi, the Anka ( = 1 knka), and &Ibamrga". Cf. Ind. Tb., p. 139 ff. In the A.Bb., p. A. G. makes the general remark : na ca vartamnacantnukro yukto \ tatra rgadvesamadhyasthatdm tanmaytbhvbhve prt er abhvena vyutpatUr abhvt^vartamnacante ca dharmdikarmaphalasambandhasya pratyaksatve prayim vaiyarthyam | "It is not fitting to imitate an event of actual life; for *iu^ this case the spectator would be affected by passions (hatred, partisanships indifference, etc ) [extraneous to the aesthetic experience] and would thuf be unable to identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure thus absent, instruction would be absent as well. Besides, in the case an actual event, the relation between the action (its merit etc.) and the fru which result from it is discerned by direct expeiience , it is, therefore, use to set it on the stage ". The word imitation (amtkra) must be understood in a broad Teaching or knowledge is an accessory aim (prayojana) of art; its princj aim is aesthetic pleasure (prtti, natida etc ) Cf. App. Ill, p. 114. [ 64]

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. w h i c h naturally constitute an obstacle. T h e means o f this obstacle are t h e so-called theatrical c o n v e n %^{ntyadharmtf, w h i c h include a n u m b e r of things n o t in ordinary life, as, for instance, t h e zones (kaksy) mg t h e pavilion {tnaydapd) t h e stage (rangapltha), t h e v a r i o u s of w o m e n ' s dance, t h e various dialects (bhs), used, ^ and last b u t n o t least, also t h e different dress of t h e e h e a d w e a r , etc.by w h i c h t h e y h i d e their i d e n t i t y . H o w e v e r , this is revealed t o t h e spectators the preliminaries (purvaranga), (see t h e stanza : best n o t t o insist t o o m u c h o n dance a n d s o n g " ) , as in t h e initial presentation (prastvan), defined 2 stanza : " T h e actress, o r t h e j e s t e r . . . " I n d e e d , | p r e s e n c e of t h e afore-mentioned elements eliminates t h e t i o n : this particular individual i n this particular place, particular m o m e n t , feels pain, pleasure, etc. T h i s eliThe term ntyadbarmiC.S., VI, v. 25 , XIII, v. 70 ff.) refers to all $|>ecific expedients, etc, of the theatre (scenery, costumes, traditional j u t i o n s , etc.) Cf. Ind Tb , p. 15 and Lokadharm and Ntyadharmh by ^ghavan, i n ) O.K., Madras, vol. VII, pp.359-375, vol. VIII, pp. 57-74. [/The " preliminaries " (pjjrvaranga) include the whole body of rites, i, etc., celebrated at the beginning of the play. They end with etion stanza, nndt. There is a risk of distiacting or boring the hy a long-drawn-out performance of these rites. Bharata himself ids that they should not be too much insisted on (iV./., V. 165. , It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songs very reason that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances formed far too long, the actors as well as the spectators will get tired and, m this case, they will not be able to seize, with all their evidence, and the mental states which will be represented "). The nndt vare immediately followed by the " prologue " (prastvana), giving of the play, of the author, etc. The prologue generally consists ,^logue between the producei of the play and an assistant (pnparsvika) ; ;t|er may be replaced by an actress, by the jester, etc.

.. GNOLI m i n a t i o n takes place in so far as in t h e theatrical performance^ t h e r e is o n t h e o n e h a n d t h e n e g a t i o n of t h e real being of tH| actor, a n d o n t h e othersince t h e spectator's c o n s c i o u s n e s s does n o t rest entirely o n t h e represented images 1 there is rest o n t h e real b e i n g b o t h of t h e of t h e superimposed personage2; that, as a result of all this, t h e r e is eventually just a negaikj real b e i n g of t h e actor a n d of t h e real being Indeed, even if dances such
z

t h e character h e is playing. sinaptbya, puspagan4ik >

etc., are n o t seen in ordinary life, 4^;

c a n n o t b e said t h a t they d o n o t exist at allfor it is u n d e n i a b l y t h a t t h e y exist in s o m e way 4 . 1) Here the reading is uncertain ; see the Cnt. App. I *ead ^ sasamvitvisrntivaikalyena and take pratibhsa as image, etc., that is, the H& presented images. ^ 2) In other words, the character of Rma, etc., who is super-impose to the real being of the actor. I 3) Dasarpa, Haas, 99 : " The tenfold enumeration of the sub-division^ (anga) in the Gentle Dance (lsja ; I translate : women's dance) runs a$ follows : the Geyapada (Song), the Sthitapthja (Recitation by one starlet^ mg?) the Asmapfbya (Recitation by one seated), the Puspagandik, the? Pracedaka, the Tngdha, the one called Samdhava, the Dvigdha, the Utta^ mottamak) and the XJktapratyukta (Amoebean Song) ". /* Each of these terms is defined by Bharata, N. , XIX, w . 119-135^ The dance, A.G. remarks, does not imitate anything in real life but is 4J self-subsistent creation, free from any practical aim It is the natural ejcgj pression, through the movements of the limbs, of a given state of mind/" A Bh , I, p. 21 , nartanam nittamgtrnm angopngnm vilsena ksepo na / kenactt kartavymsena \ The dance of Siva is the natural expression of hf| complete and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles (ntrvramrvighna) : sank&*% rasyeva bhagavaiah panprnnandanirhharibhtcidehoccala intaramrvrasundar-<\ krasya. . . , A.Bh , I, p. 21. ^ 4) Thus, even if the character represented is a negation of the acto% as such and of the real character represented by the actor, it cannot be saic| that lie does not exist, that he is a nonentity , his existence in fact is a datum* of one's own consciousness. [ 66 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. T o conclude, all this system of relative a n d connected

tgers has b e e n a d o p t e d by Bharata, m so far as b y v i r t u e o f State of generality p r o d u c e d , it p i o m o t e s t h e g u s t a t i o n of All this will be clarified in t h e chapters w h i c h explain dances, etc. 1 a n d so for t h e time being, it is of n o w e strive after it. A n d thus w e h a v e explained t h e w a y .ate this obstacle, consisting of t h e p e r c e p t i o n of tporal, etc., data as i n h e r i n g exclusively in o n e ' s o w n on o r in o t h e r s . Again, h o w can any one w h o is o v e r p o w e r e d by his o w n 4 Ippiness, etc., make his consciousness rest o n s o m e t h i n g else ? lavoid this obstacle t h e r e h a v e b e e n a d o p t e d v a r i o u s means |>e used at suitable times a n d places, such as music, vocal instrumental, well-decorated halls, well-accomplished p t e s a n s , a n d so on 2 . I n v i r t u e of t h e afore-mentioned of generality these expedientsphonic, etc.,are such >|o be enjoyed by all t h e spectators a n d possess such a c h a r m ) / p o w e r (yparanj) that even a n unaesthetic p e r s o n {ahrdajd) es limpidity of h e a r t and becomes " possessed of h e a r t ' \ | | p e d it has been said, " p o e t r y is visible o r audible 3 " . f) M o r e o v e r , if t h e means of p e r c e p t i o n are absent, p e r c e p ^itself will also naturally b e absent.

} N.f.9 XIX, ff. The term pada after mandapa is not clear to me, and it is not ;esnted in the translation. ., I, v. 11. The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visible dible is not unfamiliar to Indian thought. Only sense-data taken hearing and sight can be tasted independently of any association L e ego, in a generalized way (sadharankrtd). The other senses solely in one's own Self (svttnany etocchahnt ; P.T.V., p. ., ajre unable to break the barrier of the limited <e I " F 67]

R. GNOLI ) E v e n if t h e r e m a y b e such verbal testimonies a n d i ferences, as t o p r o v o k e a n evident perception, perceptio h o w e v e r , does n o t rest (in t h e m ) , because t h e r e is, i n it, expectancy of t h e certainty p r o p e r t o direct experience, w h i consists i n an e v i d e n t perception 1 . F o r as Vtsyayana said : " All valid k n o w l e d g e depends u p o n direct experi^f ence 2 " . I t is w e l l - k n o w n , indeed, t h a t a t h i n g w h i c h h i | J b e e n directly perceived, c a n n o t b e p r o v e d t o b e otherwise b j ^ any n u m b e r o f inferences a n d verbal testimonies. I n c a s d | like t h e imaginary circle of fire created w h e n a b u r n i n stick is swiftly revolved, o u r k n o w l e d g e is disproved only b a m o r e powerful direct perception. T h i s is quite an ordin process. T h e r e f o r e , t o r e m o v e these t w o obstacles, ther areconsecrated b y t r a d i t i o n t h e four m o d e s of r e p r e ^ sentation, furnished w i t h t h e styles {vrttf^ t h e local usages^ } 1) " Even thoughthus A. Sankaran, op. cit., p. 106, paraphrase! this passagethere may be clear and unmistakable verbal testimony and inference, we do not completely rest content with the knowledge derive^ therefrom ; for therein is lacking that perceptual cognition which alone* makes for clear, direct and definite knowledge ". With A. Sankaran, J have read here, sphutaprattikausabdalingasambhave 9pt. Should I have pre|| ferred the reading asphufa, the translation would have been : " Even i^ there may be verbal testimonies and inferenceswhich, as a rule, do* not provoke an evident perception" etc. 2) Nyyastra, Vtsyyanabhsya, I, I, 3 : s (A. G. reads saw a) iyan% pramitih pratyaksapar \ 3) The Styles (yrtti) are four in number : kaihk, sattvat, arabhat and? bhrati. Dasarpa, Haas, p. 74 : " The Gay Style {kaisikf) (is to be used| in (expressing) the Erotic Rasa ; the Grandiose Style (sttvat) in (express,? ing) the Heroic Rasa ; the Horrific Style {arabhat), on the other hand, in (expressing) the Furious and Odious Rasa ; The Eloquent Style (bhrati); everywhere ". On the vrtti see The Vrttis, by V. Raghavan, /.O.R.jj Madras, vol. VI, pp. 346 ff. ; vol. VII, pp. 33 ff. [ 68 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. *0$vrtti)l9 a n d t h e realistic representation {lokadharmtf. Re-

Su** | t ) The local usages (pravrtti) are four in number : vantt, dksinty, t " _ idbt, pnclf, Cf. N . , VI, v. 26, 27 ; XIII, v. 37 and prose, pp. | | | ^ 0 7 . Ind.Th., p. 16 : " Local usages regarding costumes, languages, and professions differ in the different countries of the world, ^are the pravrtti or local colours in drama ". For the best explanation, see A.Bh., I, 292 : tatra ye svabhvato alamukurahrdays ta eva samsrocitakrodhamohbhilsaparavasamanaso na I tesm tathvidhadasarpakkarnanasamaye sdhranarasantmakafa0grhyo rasasamcayo ntyalaksanah (G : laksana) sphuta eva J ye tv r wbfrts tesm pratyaksocitatathvidhacarvanlbhya natdiprakriy svaga%p3akkdisankatahrdayagrantMbhanjanya gftdiprakriy ca munin Mcit I " In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature J | t s like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger, stupor proper to smsrika existence (that of everyday life). The mere tbf hearing the play read is sufficient (in itself, independently of any to induce in them with the greatest clearness the perception of the 5 Rasas which animate it ; this perception consists in a Sampling aated by a generalized Tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a P*6ct perception) available to people who ate deprived of this faculty, ata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc., . the otherto cut the knots of the heart obscured by Anger, Sorrow, ^inherent in one's own Selfhas explained the discipline of vocal music, Representation (and therefore drama in general which is founded ^Representation) consists of a form of direct perception, is an adhyatya (mental cognition, etc. ; also vyavasya, anuvyavasya, cf. App. I) |t|jislike the direct perception {skstkrakalpa, pratyaksakalpa). A.Bh., 150 : abhinayanam hi cittavrttisdhranatpattiprnaskstkrakalp'Syasampdanam |" Representation arouses a mental cognition which Se a direct perception; it consists in causing the generalization of mental cements ' \ A.Bh., XXII, 148 : vighnasambhvanvihlnasakalasdhranaf0ahavaskstkrakalpdhyavasyasampattaye sarvesm prayoga ity uktam \ ^ i ^ s a i d that the acting (prayoga=parsadi prakatfkaranam, A.Bh., I, 16) me four forms of Representation aims just at arousing a mental cognition, tfjph is like a direct perception. It consists of a generalized state of evi[ 69 1

R. GNOLI presentation, indeed, is a different operation from t h a t ,p|?

inference a n d v e r b a l t e s t i m o n y ; and, as w e will e x p o u n d latsS o n , it is almost equal t o direct perception. f) D o e s t h e r e exist a m a n w h o s e consciousness rests o n a n ^ t h i n g of a secondary o r d e r (apradhna) ? Indeed, such a p e r c e j | | t i o n w o u l d find n o rest in itself and w o u l d t h u s r u n (anudhj^ automatically t o w a r d s t h e p r e d o m i n a n t t h i n g . T h i s is t h e *easof|| w h y t h e P e r m a n e n t State only can b e t h e object of T a s t i n g | because, I say, t h e D e t e r m i n a n t s a n d t h e Consequents, w h i c l | j are insentient (jada)y a n d t h e T r a n s i t o r y M e n t a l States, w h i d i | | t h o u g h n o t insentient, nevertheless are necessarily d e p e n d i n g o n t h e P e r m a n e n t States, are all equally subordinate 1 , Now^j a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s sentiments, some are c o n d u c i v e t o t h e end! den ce common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle 'V Drama is the object of cognition by an anuvjavasja (about this word cfil App. I) which is like a direct perception, A.Bh., I, 43. * 1) Cf. Dh..L., p. 177 : taccarvanpi cittavrttisv eva paryavasattt^ rasabhvebhjo ndhikatn carvanjam [ " The Tasting of the Determinants,^ etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus, apart from the bhva (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted. ( A.Bh., I, p. 268 : sa cajadj apj anantavibhvtm tathpi sarvem jda^ nm samvidi tasjs ca bhoktari bhoktrvargasja capradhne bhoktariparjavasne, njakabhilhnabhoktrviiesasthjicittavrttisvabhvah | "Though [drama, etc.} is constituted by a infinite number of determinants, etc., all the elementsJ which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness (the perman&t mental state). This rests in the enjoying subject (the limited enjoying* subject, the practical Self) and the whole of the enjoying subjects rest, in] their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalized knowing sub-*" ject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a permanent meataK state of a particular enjoying subject, called an actor, etc. ". Such a mentajf state, continues A.G. is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions "own 'V " of others ", etc. and, therefore, it pervades also the spectators : ata eva sdharanbhtataya smjtkam api svtmasadbhvena samvesajanti . . , [ 7 0 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. life1 : these are t h e p r e d o m i n a n t ones. T o specify, delight ^ c o n d u c i v e t o pleasure, a n d t o t h e forms a n d profit c o n n e c t e d husangi) w i t h it. A n g e r , i n p e o p l e in w h i c h it p r e d o m i n a t e s , Jconducive t o profitbut can also end in pleasure a n d merit. e r g y ends in all three, merit, etc. Eventually, a n o t h e r .entconsisting a b o v e all in t h e disgust aroused b y t h e pjhwledge of reality 2 is t h e means of liberation. T h e s e four f i t m e n t s only are t h e p r e d o m i n a n t ones. E v e n if t h e y are it t o b e f o u n d in a p r e d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n all four t o g e t h e r , p i t h e emergence o f o n e of t h e m naturally postulates t h e ^ o r d i n a t i o n of t h e o t h e r three, nevertheless s o m e o n e o f is always p r e d o m i n a n t in each drama, so t h a t all of i are clearly recognised as being, in t u r n (that is, o n e in According to a pan-Indian conception, human life is motivated by purposes : kma, artha, dharma, and moksa. Kama is pleasure and ' Artha is material property (economics, politics, etc., are directed to ^fulfilment of this end). Dharma embraces moral and religious duty, i is the liberation or redemption of the soul fiom the flow of exis; ; it is theparamrtha, the supreme purpose of man. For an excellent |3pnt of the four artha, see H. Zimmer, Les Pth/osophtes de l'Inde, Payot, J*35 ff. The principal forms of consciousness {sthytbhva) are those \L are necessary to the fulfilment of these purposes ; they are delight tte anger (krodha), energy (utsha), and serenity (sama). The end of " tispleasure ; however, through pleasure, it can bring us to the achieve|fof profit and right action (Bharata, NJ,, XVIII, v. 72 ff., distinguishes kinds of Erotic Rasa, kmasrngra, arthasrngra, and dharmasrngra). i and Energy are associated with artha and dharma respectively, but |nbf them may also contribute to the realization of all three purposes $.y.L., p. 309 : vraraudrayos tv atyantavtrodho 'pi nstt | samnam i ca dharmrthakmrjanopayogttvam). Spiritual Freedom is the fruit jrenity. ; characteristics of this sthyivbhva are discussed by A.G. in the i, pp. 333-42. Abhinava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary Raghavan, The Number of Rasas, Adyar, 1940. [ 71 ]

k. NOLl this drama a n d t h e o t h e r in a n o t h e r one), equally predomi- n a n t . M o r e o v e r , if t h i n g s are m o r e closely examined, all f o u | of t h e m will b e seen t o b e present in t h e same drama, isfe v a r i o u s passages, i n a p r e - e m i n e n t position. I n this connection, all these Rasas are d o m i n a t e d b y p l e a sure (wkhd), for t h e essence of t h e closely dense {ekaghand)f l i g h t consisting of t h e g u s t a t i o n of o u r o w n consciousness, dsr beatitude 2 . I n d e e d , i n o r d i n a r y life also, w o m e n , even they are i m m e r s e d i n t h e c o m p a c t {ekaghand) g u s t a t i o n of f o r m of consciousness called s o r r o w , find rest in their 1) Uniform, without obstacles (pighna). 2) The intimate essence of consciousness or the " I ", according to^ the saiva is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to &") need, privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. BeatitudeJ is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everjj-*; thing else. The " I " contains all things; everything that exists arises from J its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's owialj consciousness and, therefore, of one's own essential beatitude In this, j sense, Rasa is single. This Tasting is coloured (anuranjtta, rusttd) by latent? impressions (vsan, samskrd) of the mental process of Delight, etc., aroused/ by the determinants, etc., i.e., by poetic expression. From this point of. view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the vibhava (v?beya{j< bhedam rasabhede hetutvena scayatu . ,A.Bb.9 I, p. 290). Cf. AM., I, p. 2 9 2 ^ asmanmate tu samvedanam evnandaghanam svdjaU \ tatra k duhkh\( sank I kevalam tasyaiva citratkarane ratisokdivsanvypras tadudb*, dhane cbhinajdtvjprah \ " According to us, that which is tasted % consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact exclude^! therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which h single dr? itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces ofrl delight, sorrow, etc., which are awakened by the operation of the Coose^ quents, etc. (abhinyaanubhava). For the nature of this *' colouring *f^ infused into the consciousness by the feelings of delight, etc., cf. p. 82, n. 4. [72]

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. jbeart, for this very s o r r o w consists of, a n d is animated by, a |st w i t h o u t o b s t a c l e ^ . Pain, indeed, is simply a n d solely an gijsence of rest. T h i s is precisely t h e reason w h y t h e disciples J Kapila, in explaining t h e activity of rajab, say t h a t t h e soul |f^pain is mobility {cncalydf. All t h e Rasas t h u s consist ^ b e a t i t u d e . But some of t h e m , o n a c c o u n t of t h e objects ;by w h i c h they are coloured 3 , are n o t free from a certain t o u c h .._M/bitterness; this h a p p e n s , for example, in t h e H e r o i c Rasa. jfeb this consists of, a n d is animated by, precisely t h e firm end u r a n c e of misfortunes. *?> T h u s delight, etc., occupy a pre-eminent position. L a u g h :|&, etc., o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , also occupy a p r e - e m i n e n t position, ,0i account of t h e fact that t h e s e w h o s e determinants are easily a c c e s s i b l e t o all type of peoplepossess a n extremely h i g h ^power of w i n n i n g the h e a r t (uparanjakatvamy. F o r this v e r y |geason, laughter, etc., aie mostly t o be m e t w i t h i n p e o p l e 4 ) The concept is as follows : women, even when they are being bitten, l^ctatched, etc., by then lovers (and therefoie experiencing pain) find in the fpain itself the fulfilment, the realisation of all their desire: " they rest in *%}$ hearts " or consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. There%&e, this pain is pleasure, beatitude. Pain occurs only when the consciousp|&s finds no rest in what it contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the object of contemplation, i e, when it desiies something different fiom the | W g m which it is and from what it is. These desires, etc., which interrup t tfye homogeneity and compactness (ekaghanata) of consciousness, are the pgbia, the obstacles. | v The same concept occuis in the Pratparudrya (Madras, 2nd, Ed., J931), comm , p. 209 : sambhogasamaye strtnm cidharadamsandau kririmadufrkhnubhvasttkravad atrpy upapatUh || * 2) Cf. S.K., 13. ^ 3) The Detenninants, etc. ' 4) I.e., they are widely diffused, easily make an impression on tbe consciousness. " 15 [ 73 ]

k. ONOLI of inferior n a t u r e {anuttamaprakrti). E v e r y m a n of l o w l a u g h s , grieves, is afraid, tends t o despise others, a n d is astoij s h e d at t h e p o o r e s t a t t e m p t s at a fine saying. All t h e sa: e v e n t h e s e d e p e n d o n delight, etc., a n d as such may b e of h e i | i n a t t a i n i n g t h e ends of man 1 . T h e division b e t w e e n t h e types of d r a m a is itself based o n t h e different positions occu b y these m e n t a l states. All this will b e explained later. X m e n t a l states of p e r m a n e n t n a t u r e are solely these nine. deed, every creature from its b i r t h possesses these niiie form of consciousness. I n fact, o n t h e basis of t h e principle t h a | | all b e i n g s " h a t e t o be i n c o n t a c t w i t h p a i n a n d are eager taste p l e a s u r e 2 " , e v e r y o n e is b y n a t u r e p e r v a d e d b y sexual^ desires [delight]; believes himself t o be superior t o others, whorqg h e is t h u s led t o deride [laughter] ; grieves w h e n h e is force t o p a r t from w h a t h e loves [sorrow] ; gets a n g r y at t h e cause of such separation [ a n g e r ] ; gets frightened w h e n h e himself powerless [fear]but still is desirous of o v e r c o m i n g the^j d a n g e r w h i c h threatens h i m [heroism] ; is attacked, w h e n judg* i n g a t h i n g t o b e displeasing, b y a sense of revulsion directcfcl just t o w a r d s this ugly object [disgust]; w o n d e r s at t h e sigh#| o f extraordinary deeds d o n e b y himself o r others [astonisl$j m e n t ] ; a n d , lastly, is desirous of a b a n d o n i n g certain t h i n g | | [serenity]. N o living creature exists w i t h o u t t h e latent im|f pression of these sentiments. A l l w e can say is t h a t some t h e m p r e d o m i n a t e i n s o m e p e o p l e a n d o t h e r s in o t h e r s , ancl t h a t i n s o m e p e o p l e t h e y originate from t h e usual causes in o t h e r s from causes different f r o m t h e habitual. T only s o m e sentiments are able t o p r o m o t e t h e ends o | 1) The Comic, Pathetic, Marvellous and Terrible Rasas depend on Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious Rasa? respectively. 2) Unidentified verse. [ 74 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC and, as such, they are rightly t h e object of teaching 2 . | current division of m e n i n t o m e n of elevated n a t u r e , etc., ;ermined b y t h e different position occupied b y t h e s e sentii s . O t h e r sentiments, as weakness, a p p r e h e n s i o n , etc. 3 , o n ^dther h a n d , can never possibly b e manifested if t h e c o r r e s ent determinants d o n o t exist : so, for example, a muni ^"practises rawyana^h i m m u n e from weakness, indolence, .ess, etc. E v e n in o n e i n w h o m , b y v i r t u e of t h e deterants 5 , these are present, t h e y regularly disappear w i t h o u t ijing any trace of themselves w h e n t h e causes o f manifestacease 8 . H e r o i s m , etc., o n t h e contrary, even w h e n t h e y ^arently disappear after their tasks are completed, d o n o t cease Remain in t h e state of latent impressionsfor o t h e r forms o f :pism, c o n c e r n i n g o t h e r tasks, remain intact. I n d e e d , as i h a s said, " T h e fact t h a t Caitra is i n love w i t h o n e does n o t imply t h a t h e is o u t of l o v e w i t h t h e o t h e r s "9 T h u s t h e s e transitory sentiments b e i n g , so t o say, leaded o n t h e t h r e a d of t h e p e r m a n e n t o n e , appear a n d dis1) Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to Realization of the four ends of man. The Transitory Mental States do gfhave this-faculty. Cf. H. G, vtveka* p. 139 (no doubt a quotation L A.G.) : ay am ca nirvedah svayam purusrthastddhaye v utsharatydivat, Ijintnuranjanya hsavismaydivan na prdbhavatity atyantamukhapreksitvd hicry eva \\ 2)A The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of realiza% of the four ends of man. The Transitory feelings. Rasyana (the science of art, of the rasas, or of vegetable juices, etc.) >re or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy." I.e., by virtue of the presence of their causes. |6) I.e., without remaining in the state of latent impressions. 7) Yogastra, Vysabhsya, 2, 4. Caitra stands for any name whatever. The fife quotation is used in the I.P. V. V., II, p. 178 ; cf. supra, Intr., p. XLIL [ 75 ]

R* GNOLI a p p e a r an infinity of times. I n some sense, they are like beads of crystal, glass, m a g n e t , topaz, emerald, sapphire, w h i c h filling t h e t h r e a d o n w h i c h they are t h r e a d e d n o matiifj if red, b l u e , etc. 1 so as t o be set rather far apart from o t h e r a n d continuously c h a n g i n g their position, d o n o t it is true, trace of themselves o n this thread, b u t , all t h e sat n o u r i s h t h e o r n a m e n t a l c o m p o s i t i o n m a d e b y it 2 ; and, b e k themselves v a r i o u s , a n d v a r y i n g in t u r n t h e p e r m a n e n t threa let it n o d o u b t appear at intervals, in its nudity, t h o u g h , at same time, t h e y affect it b y their p o l y c h r o m e reflectionstt$| reflections I mean of t h e transitory jewels : it is for this v e r $ | reason t h a t these sentiments are called " transitory " . W h e e l t h a t is t o say, s o m e o n e says, " T h i s is a f o r m of weakness ",$$ is n a t u r a l t o ask : b y w h a t is it p r o v o k e d ? T h i s questiopj' s h o w s u p precisely t h e instability of this mental m o v e m e n t B u t in t h e case of t h e expression, " R m a is full of h e r o i s m ! ' | o n e does n o t ask for t h e cause. T h e determinants (the ele|! m e n t s w h i c h a w a k e n t h e mental states) are limited, therefore^ t o b r i n g i n g t o actuality t h e p e r m a n e n t sentiments (delight^ h e r o i s m , etc.) c o r r e s p o n d i n g respectively t o their natureJ 1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appe here and there. For a similar image, see A.Bh , I, p. 340 : viralombhitaratnM^ tarlamrbhsamnasitatarastravat. . . The colours (red, blue, etc ) of t | thread allude to the sthyibhva. The various Rasas are each one associt by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotic with green, the Comic wti white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic orange, the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Mar? vellous with yellow). 2) In other words, they are the ornamental elements of the threap Bhr=zpus, nourish ; cf. the often-quoted stanza (e g., Kvyapradtpa, comm.| p. 61) : srakstrabhvd anyesm bhvnm anugmakah \ na tiroihyate sth fair as?u pusyate par am || [76 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. ;they d o this b y infusing into t h e m their o w n c o l o u r i n g , fft w h e n their c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e t e r m i n a n t s are absent, it t b e said t h a t t h e p e r m a n e n t sentiments are
M

non-exis-

) f o r it has b e e n said t h a t these, in t h e state of latent imdons, are present in all beings. O f t h e t r a n s i t o r y sentiits, h o w e v e r , w h e n their c o r r e s p o n d i n g D e t e r m i n a n t s are ait, n o t even t h e names remainall this will b e explained extensively at t h e suitable t i m e a n d place. 1

ISuch a refutation of t h e s u b o r d i n a t e elements has b e e n m a d e JljBharata also t h r o u g h t h e description of t h e p e r m a n e n t lents, i n t r o d u c e d b y t h e w o r d s : " W e shall n o w b r i n g permanent sentiments t o t h e s t h e particular ones. fg) T h e consequents, t h e determinants a n d t h e transitory its considered separately are in n o definite relation t o ^specific p e r m a n e n t sentiment; for, e.g.,, tears, etc. 3 , , o u t of bliss, some disease i n t h e eye, etc., a tiger , J p i s e anger, fear llxiety (cint\
4

state

of

Rasas 2 " .

This

gjggfciption follows o n t h e definition of t h e general m a r k s a n d

may may

etc., and, as w e k n o w , weariness [srama],

etc. 5 , may accompany many p e r m a n e n t feelings,

in the ch. VIII of the A.BL (which has not yet come to light). yV. VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note). In this sentence, Bharata implicitly that only the sthyibhva (i.e., the elements of principal order) >t the vibhva ztc, are brought to the state of Rasa. The general on {smnyalaksand) begins with the sutra : vtbhvnubhvavyabhcfogd rasanispattih. The particular definition (yisesalaksaya) consists description of the characters of each Rasa. Cf. .P.V.V., I, 57. I, 300 : ye sthymo bhv loke cittavrttytmano bahuprakrapansramapraiihandhanakartavyatptabandhbhidhyinas tn apt nma rasatvam visrn>atnatvenopadesadtsnvesymh j Tears are consequents. The tiger is an example of a determinant. Weariness, etc., are the transitory mental states. [ 77]

R. GNOLI as f.i., h e r o i s m , fear, etc. But the combination of these le3 ments h a s an unmistakable signification. T h u s , w h e r e f ^ | death of a close relation is t h e determinant, wailing, s h e d 4 | tears, etc., t h e consequent, a n d anxiety, depression {dai% etc., t h e transitory feelings, t h e n t h e p e r m a n e n t senti: cannot b e o t h e r t h a n S o r r o w . Therefore, considered {\ a possible) arising of d o u b t , c o m b i n a t i o n is used, just t o m o v e this obstacle,

The nature of Rasa 10. Rasa, in this connexion, is just t h a t reality (arthd)\ w h i c h t h e determinants, t h e consequents a n d t h e transit^ feelings after h a v i n g reached a perfect combination (sat yoga), relation (sambandhd), conspiration (aikgrya)where will b e i n t u r n i n a leading o r s u b o r d i n a t e position-in t h e of t h e spectator, m a k e t h e m a t t e r o f a gustation c o n s i s t i n g ! a f o r m of consciousness free of obstacle a n d different from" o r d i n a r y ones. T h i s Rasa differs from t h e p e r m a n e n t fe< consists solely i n this state of gustation a n d is n o t an objeci t h i n g (slddhasvabhvdf\ lasts exactly as l o n g as t h e gustati a n d does n o t lian o n any t i m e separate from it. 2 T h e dejbi minants, etc., (which consist of garden, expressive feelings of c o n t e n t m e n t (dhrti), e t c . ) , transcend o n their t h e state of causes, etc., as these are u n d e r s t o o d i n ordinary T h e i r function consists solely i n t h e fact t h a t t h e y c o l o u r (i consciousness of t h e s p e c t a t o r ) ; this function is called vihhVi 1) I.e., it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which J exist independently of this tasting. Rasa is simply the particular fo of perception called tasting. Cf. infra, p. 85. 2) Cf. D&.A.L., supra, Intr., p. XXXIV. [ 78 ]

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. etc 1 . T h u s , these take t h e name, of a n o n - o r d i | | c h a r a c t e r , of determinants, etc. 2 a n d this d e n o m i n a t i o n expressing their dependence o n t h e latent traces left ^ c o r r e s p o n d i n g preceding causes, etc. 3 T h e particular of t h e various determinants will b e explained later 4 , ^ o p e r a t i o n of t h e determinants, etc., presupposes, of course, \ t spectator, in t h e course of his ordinary life, h a s n o t t o m a k e a close observation of t h e characteristic (effects, causes a n d concomitant elements) of o t h e r 'S mental processes, in o t h e r w o r d s t o deduce t h e o n e o t h e r . [ But let us return t o Rasa. T h i s is, as w e i, different from t h e p e r m a n e n t sentiment ] a n d it canI The determinants, properly speaking, awaken in the spectator the iltraces of the mental movements corresponding to their nature. Aesexjperience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces. The exact ig ovibhvan, etc., is explained by Visvantha as follows, S.D., Ill : m rafyder vihfeya svdnkuranayogyatnayanam \ anbhvanam ?asya ratydel? samanantaram eva rasdirpatay bhvanam \ samcranam ^fasyaitasya samyak cranam | In other words, according to Visvavibhvana is the first manifestation of the germination of Rasa ; ma is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point ; and samcrana (which is not mentioned by A.G.) is the intensiconsolidation of the Rasa. Samcrana according to Visvantha, ^specific operation of the vyabhtcnbhva (samcrivyabhicri)* The these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting ,c functions to the vibhva, etc. Rasa is, in reality, single, and its station does not have earlier and later stages. This division is of a s didactic nature. In so far as they are different from ordinary causes. fflThe determinants, etc. arouse the latent traces of the mental process Relight, etc., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, demand the e of these traces and depend upon them. p j\T.$.> VII ; Abhinava Gupta's commentary on this chapter has not |pme to light. [79 ]

ft. GtfOL n o t absolutely be maintained, as Sankuka did, that w h a t is Rasa is simply a p e r m a n e n t sentiment, b r o u g h t t o o u r ledge by t h e determinants, etc., a n d that, because this is* object of a relish, it takes t h e n a m e of Rasa 1 . F o r , if t h * w e r e so, w h y should Rasa n o t exist also in everyday life ? % if an unreal t h i n g is capable of being t h e object of relii real t h i n g has all t h e m o r e reason t o be capable of it. T h u s , | legitimate t o say t h a t t h e perception of a p e r m a n e n t state consists i n an inference; b u t w e certainly cannot rigfi say t h a t Rasa is also of this n a t u r e . T h i s is t h e real reasi w h y Bharata h a s m a d e n o m e n t i o n i n t h e stra of t h e w < | " p e r m a n e n t s e n t i m e n t " ; o n t h e contrary, t h e m e n t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n a source of difficulties 4 . Such expressi as " T h e p e r m a n e n t sentiment becomes Rasa 5 ", are d u e ' 1) Rasa, says A. G., does not consist in the inference (in infe: cognition) of someone else's mental state (in which case it would . cognition of a discursive order, savzkalpa) but is a personal experieric the spectator identifies himself with this mental state and lives it himsl This observation is aimed at Sankuka, who maintained that Rasa is simp| permanent mental state deduced by the spectators by means of the de|j minants, etc., and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing * an imitation by the actor of the permanent mental state of the character^ represents. 2) Therefore, the imitated permanent mental state is unreal. 3) I.e., Sankuka's reason is not the real one ; cf. supra, p. 31. 4) Bharata did not say " The production of Rasa is provoked union of the permanent mental state (of someone else, i.e., the charaf represented), with the determinants, the consequents, and the trans Mental Movements ". If he had, Rasa would simply be a perceptior someone else's permanent mental movement. 5) Bharata says sometimes (cf. e.g., N . , VI, prose after v. 50 note) that the Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa ; such expressifs A.G. remarks, are only due to the " correspondence (analogy, etc.) " the next note. [ 80 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETCcorrespondence (aucitya) only. T h i s correspondence, t o iepify, is d u e t o t h e fact t h a t t h e very same t h i n g s w h i c h w e r e sly considered t o b e causes, etc., related t o a given anent sentiment, n o w serve t o realize t h e gustation, a n d t h u s presented i n t h e form of determinants, etc 1 . W h a t of a Rasa is t h e r e indeed, in t h e inference of a n o r d i n a r y .timent ? Therefore, t h e tasting of Rasa ( w h i c h consists | camatkra different f r o m any o t h e r k i n d of o r d i n a r y cogni' ) differs from b o t h m e m o r y , inference a n d any f o r m of .ary self-consciousness 2 . Indeed, h e w h o possesses t h e .t traces of t h e ordinary inferential processes, does n o t | | r e h e n d a y o u n g w o m a n , etc. 3 , as if h e w e r e indifferent t o but, b y virtue of his sensibilitywhich quality is c o n in a consent of heart, h e rather a p p r e h e n d s h e r , o u t m o u n t i n g o n t h e steps of m e m o r y , inference, etc., as perged in a gustation, suitable t o an identification (with this g w o m a n , etc.), w h i c h is, so t o say, t h e s p r o u t of t h e tasting |Easa, a b o u t t o appear i n all its fullness. T h i s gustation, ., is n o t already b o r n in t h e past, from s o m e o t h e r means

Dh.A.L*, p. 89 : soke ht sthyibhve ye vibhvnubhvs tatsamucit ptis carvyamntm rasa ity aucityt sthyino rasatpattir ity ucyate \ sa is simply the tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for e, to the determinants and the consequents of the mental state of . The expression: cCthe permanent mental state becomes Rasa", %i^ solely, therefore, by correspondence ". \ Forms of " ordinary etc.
f

self-consciousness "

are, e.g., pleasure,

A young woman " is a determinant ; "etc." here includes the Sequents and the transitory mental states. ^ Impersonally, Ttasthya or madhyasthya, indifference, is the exact gsite of annpravesa, personal or active praticipation. L16 [ 81 ]

k, GNOL of k n o w l e d g e , so t h a t it is, n o w , a f o r m of m e m o r y 1 ; ^ nc is it t h e fruit of t h e o p e r a t i o n of ordinary means o f cognitif) (direct perception, etc.) ; b u t it is aroused solely b y t h e c m | l | | n a t i o n [samyogd) of t h e determinants, etc., w h i c h , as w e - h a | f said, are of a n o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e . T h i s gustation is distinguished a) from perception of ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused b y t h e o r d i | means of cognition (direct perception, inference, t h e reveale w o r d , analogy, e t c . ) ; b) from cognition w i t h o u t active i cipation (tatastha) of t h e t h o u g h t s of others, w h i c h is p*Pp t o t h e direct perception of t h e y o g i n s 2 ; c) and from t h e poj pact (ekaghana) experience of one's o w n beatitude, wKich 1 p r o p e r t o yogins of h i g h e r orders (this perception is i m m a c u l a | free from all impressions [uparga] deriving from exter things). 3 I n d e e d , these t h r e e forms of cognition, bei in d u e o r d e r {yathyogam) subjected t o t h e appearance o ot> tacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence a n d at ^ mercy of t h e (adored) object 4 , are deprived of beauty (saundarya^

1) Cf. Dh. A. L., infra, App. H, p. 104. 2) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people's minds, is one of yogin powers (Yogasutra, III, 19: pratyayasya paracittajnnam ; this quoted and commented by A.G. in 7.P. V., I, 2, 4, 5). This ^ observes A.G., is of an order entirely different from the aesthetic experien|g| In it, in fact, the distinction between one's own self and the self of othc| (svaparavibhga) continues to exist, while the aesthetic expeiience postula|| the generalization of the mental states and therefore the suppression of ygl limited self. 3) Abhinava Gupta alludes, in this passage, to the highest degree j | mystical experience which is free of any trace of ordinary things. \ ! ||f 4) Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair\o|/ opposites ; everything is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moog^; [ 82 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. o n t h e contr ary, because of t h e absence [ of sensations of , pain, etc. ] as i n h e r i n g exclusively i n o u r o w n per-

. day, beautiful and ugly, etc., no longer exist in it. The limited ||if/ is, completely absorbed into Siva or Bhaifava, the adored object ; ||ie|^thng vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience, | ^ K e other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of delight, etc., (iipused by the operation of the determinants, etc.). In other words, iti|eTiaesthetic experience presupposes a pre-constituted knowledge on the Sa^of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are normally f^;t)efore a given situation. This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms, piatfis, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through e experience of one's own reactions and one's own observation of the Ions of others. ^ A e s t h e t i c experience, Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a fjw^fol woman, is, for example, coloured by the mental state of delight, f^liich is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed Jt^preexist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of samskra f^psan. The Determinants which manifest aesthetic experience awaken, Implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also. SrfMnn^ b e a u ty 5 the pleasantness proper to the aesthetic experience are due colouring of these mental processes ; cf. A.Bh. I, p. 290. laukikt uprjandivighnabahuld jogipratyayc ca visayasvdainyatparusd 'ffhksankrasukhaduhkhdivicitravsannuvedho^ ' bhunjate budhh. . . [ " Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the tasting own consciousness; this tasting is endowed with extreme pleasantness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces jpj; pleasure, pain, etc. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is &l of obstacles (pragmatic requirements, etc.), and from the perception of ieKyogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of the total lack JQany tasting of external objects ". Thus by comparison with the aesthetic Experience, the compact homogeneity (ekaghanat) of mystical experience possesses a certain harshness. Its pursuit, that is to say, calls for uncommon force and energy (cf. the concept of vra> hero). Aesthetic experience, on the vlJier hand, is easily attained. It is particularly suitable to people endowed [83 1

R. GNOLI son, of an active participation in o u t o w n $d(svtmnupravt$3^

of t h e absence [ of t h e afore-mentioned sensations ] as i exclusively i n o t h e r persons, a n d t h e i m m e r s i o n (vefa) infj latent traces of o u r o w n sentiments of delight, etc., r e a w a k e | by t h e corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalize A because, I say, of all these causes, t h e appearance of o b s t a d is impossible. 1 again. F o r this reason (afa eva) t h e determinants are n o t t h e catp of t h e p r o d u c t i o n (nispetti) of R a s a ; otherwise, Rasa shc}i| {jnapttf^ continue t o exist e v e n w h e n t h e y n o l o n g e r fall u n d e r JQQ|| nition. N o r are t h e y t h e cause o f its c o g n i t i o n And all this has been said o v e r and pj

with a gentle mind ' (sukumramati). In the DkA.L., p. 51, A.G. Rasa in the following terms : sabdasamarpyamnahrdayasamvdasundarav&h vnubhvasamucitaprgvinivistaratydivsannurgasukumrasvasamvtdnandaf nvjprarasamyarporascth | " Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting beatitude of one's own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant (and notpar^ as in mystical experience) in that the consciousness is coloured by the lat^j traces of the mental states of delight, etc., pre-existing (in the minds oj$ spectators). Such traces are aroused by the corresponding determinantsk consequents, whichpleasant (beautiful, etc.,) by virtue of the consent the heartare afforded by the words ". Cf. Dh.A.L.. 81 : anubb3$$ bhvvabodhanottaram eva tanmabhavanqyukty tadvtbhvnubhvocitacittavfjl vsannuranjitasvasamvidnandacarvangocaro 'rtho rastm sphuraty eva. . . t\ l 1) This passage has been somewhat modified and enlarged by fi candra (see the critical Apparatus) : " Here, on the contrary, because absence [of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively our own person, we are not at the mercy of the [adored] object ; of an active participation in our own self [and] the absence [of the mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is ||<| lack of evidence ; and because of the immersion in the latent traces of own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding nants, etc., which are generalized, there is no possible obstacles *\ [ 84]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. e, t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o b e included a m o n g t h e means iowledge (pratnnd), because Rasa is n o t a n objective \7(siddha), w h i c h could function as a k n o w a b l e object, it, then, that is designated b y t h e expressions, " determ t s etc. ? " W e reply t o this question t h a t t h e expressions rminants etc. " d o n o t designate any ordinary t h i n g , b u t tf serves t o realize t h e gustation (carvanopayog). Does such t h i n g appear elsewhere ? But t h e fact that it does t bccur elsewhere, w e reply, can d o n o t h i n g b u t strengthen |{ thesis of their n o n - o r d i n a r y character. D o e s t h e taste le rasa oi pnaka perhaps occur in molasses, p e p p e r s , etc., w h i c h , h o w e v e r , it consists) ? ] T h e case is perfectly | n l i o g o u s . " But (someone m i g h t say) in this w a y Rasa is n o t |S-pbject of cognition (apramejd) " T h a t is w h a t really occurs, | | e teply and suitably. Rasa, indeed, consists solely of a tasting Ijnclhas &ot t h e n a t u r e of an object of cognition, etc. " But h o w d o y o u t h i n k t h a t t h e expression w h i c h Bharata uses i n | e stra can be justified w h e n h e says : " T h e p r o d u c t i o n of (rasanispatti) " ? T h i s expression, w e reply, m u s t be lerstood in the sense of a p r o d u c t i o n n o t of t h e Rasa, b u t

See the N . , 287 ff. The example of pnaka is to be found fairly in Indian philosophy. Cf. for example, N.M., p. 341 : eva m o 9nja eva vkyrthah pnakdivat, yath pnakam sarkarngakesa^rihntaram eva yath ca smdrahantlalksdtbhyo 'rthntaram itram, yath va sadjarsabhagndhradhaivatdibhyo ''rthntaram eva grmatath padebhyo vkyam, padrthebhyo vkyrthah \ " The meaning of a Ltence differs from the meaning of the words (as happens with pnaka, Just as pnaka is different from sugar, spice, pepper, etc., just as a Siting is different from minium, orpiment, lake etc., or as a piece of music aijifferent from the various notes of which it is composed, so is the meaning $im phrase different from the meaning of the words " [ 85 ]

R. GNOL of t h e tasting w h i c h refers t o t h e Rasa (tadvisayarasana)*

wise, if t h e expression " T h e p r o d u c t i o n of Rasa " is s t o o d i n t h e sense of a p r o d u c t i o n of a Rasa w h o s e subsis is exclusively d e p e n d i n g o n t h e said tasting, o u r thesis % b e set b y a n y difficulty 1 . means of action. Besides, this tasting is neithe fruit of t h e operation of t h e means of cognition n o r O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it can b e said itself, it is n o t ascertained by any means of aknowledge (a nika), for its real existence is an inconfutable d a t u m of o u r f | consciousness {svasamvedanasiddhd). This tasting, more is, n o d o u b t , solely a form of cognition, b u t a form of cog^il; different from any o t h e r ordinary perception. etc., are o f a n o n - o r d i n a r y character. T h i s differ is d u e t o t h e fact t h a t t h e means of it, t h a t is, t h e detei T o conclude is p r o d u c e d b y t h e c o m b i n a t i o n {samyogd) of t h e Determix^ etc., is t h e tasting (rasana)\ and t h e Rasa is t h e non-ore reality, w h i c h is t h e matter o f this tasting. a n d p u r p o r t of t h e stra. All this m a y b e summarized i n t h e following w a y : in* first place, t h e identity o f t h e actor as such is concealed V ] tiaras, headwear, etc. ; in t h e second place, t h e idea t h a t Rma, etc., aroused b y t h e p o w e r o f t h e p o e m , neverthe does n o t succeed i n i m p o s i n g itself u p o n t h e idea of t h e acf<|J for t h e latent traces of t h e said idea are strongly i m p r e s s e d ^ t h e spectator's m i n d s . F o r this v e r y reason, t h e spect is n o l o n g e r living either in t h e space and time of Rma, a l l jk 1) I e , this expression might lend itself to interpi etation in the set] that Rasa is something different from the act of cognition by which it known, so that it would be an object of cognition. A.G.'s reply to J objection is that Rasa is the perception itself, and that the word Rasa not denote anything distinct frofn the perception by which it is known* I
8 6

T h i s is t h e

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, EC. j ijn t h e space and time of t h e actor as such. Acts of h o r r i p i qn, etc., w h i c h h a v e repeatedly been seen b y t h e spectator : course o f everyday life as indexes of delight, etc., serve, S case, t o m a k e k n o w n a delight, etc., uncircumscribed | t h e r time o r space. I n this delight, just because h e possesses I p a t e n t traces of it in himself, t h e Self of t h e spectator also | | i y e l y participates. F o r this v e r y reason, this delight is | p | 6 ; e i v e d neither w i t h indifference, from t h e outside, n o r as if it gwere linked w i t h a particular [ungeneralized] causefor in case, intrusion b y pragmatic requirements, interests or g n ^ etc., w o u l d occur, n o r again as if it exclusively b e l o n g e d K>Ha defined t h i r d personfor, in this case, sensations of pleaue, hatred, etc. w o u l d occur in t h e spectator 1 T h u s , t h e Rasa is simply t h e feeling of delighta feeling, h o w e v e r , is b o t h generalized a n d t h e object of a consciousness, ich may b e either single o r develop consecutively 2 . afe task of generalization is carried o u t by t h e determinants,

Cf. supra, Intr., p. XXII, n. 1. ^2) In the case of a play, long poem, etc. various moods of the soul jjjpcui n alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, etc ) ; in the case of | short poem there is generally speaking only one dominant motif. [ 87 ]

7 1)

APPENDIX

C o m m e n t a r y o n N.S.,
y

I, st. 107 (A.

Bb.t I, p p . etad yojitam ity^j

n a n u caivam apy asmatprsthe k i m naikntato tra bhavatm ^ devnm sarvasya ntyam trailokyasysya 5

cnubhvcinam bhvnuklrtanam kenacid etad yojiti

ayam b h v a h | na y u s m a t p r s t h e

devsurasya b a h i r yathsvastham avasthnam | atreti na devsurijm e k n t e n n u b h v a n a m ] naiva t e ' kenacit prakrena [ tath hi tesu na tattvena dhh sdrsyena yamalakavat [ na b h r n t a t v e n a suktirpyavat J n r o p e n a rupyasmrtipurys

samyagjnnabdhnantara^thl g a u r vahka itiv%t| tatpratikrtitvl

10

jnnarpavat

] na

tadadhyavasyena

notpreksyamnatvena

c a n d r a m u k h a v a t J na

citrapustavat | na tadanukrena

gurusisyavykhyhevkavlj yuktiviracitatadbha ca nijr|

n a ttklikanirmnenendrajlavat | na lg

tay hastalghavdimyvat | sarvesv etesu paksesv as ranatay drastur audsnye rassvdyogt { kaves tavarnanyaniscitatve yogt [ kvyasyaivsampatter
5

anaucityvarjar

laukikamithunadrsva

smsrikaharsakrodhnvaj etat ] ha trdi ?

tpatter* ubhayadarsankulatay mukhyadrstau 6 p r a y o k t r d r s t ^ anusamdhisampattyabhvt7 [ 20 kasyeti \ etad u k t a m bhavati 1

1

kirn t a r h y

Si Hantara* G : ^nantaram M || 2 mithyjnnarpavat : mithyjninf rpam G : mithyjnnarupyam M || 3 gaur vahka itivat M : gaur vahtk G II 4 npajtapatter G : ^navjttaypntter M (corrected in a second into nvajitatpatter | 5 darsankulataj : ^darsanaku (corrected i (sic) latqyG : ^darsancklatayaWL || 6 mukhyadrstau G : mukhaJrstaui^n 7 amisamdhisampattyabhvt is a doubtful correction of mine i ta sampattya (corrected into dvisamvtttyd) bhvt G: skandhisampattjabhvt Ifi [ 88 ]

"THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. te rmdayo na kadcana p r a m n a p a t h a m avat e * yadgamena varnyante tad t a d v i s e s a b u d d h i r 2 yady ^ ^rmyanapryd ekasmn mahvkyd ullasati tathpi tmnatayaiva visesnm sambhvyamnrthakriys'M af 3 Lytmakasvlaksanya paryavasnn na ca tesm vartam:y u p a g a t 4 tvad visesabuddih | kvyesv a p i 5 hdaya eva S d h r a n i b h v o v i b h v d m m jtah j tatrpi k a t h m t r e Qibhvah sambhavati yady api tathpy ' e v a m ye i tesm etad bhavati ' itivkyavad ranjantisaybhvn l ^ l d t t a v r t t i r 6 nirnayagat b h a v a t i | kvye t u gunlam^|manoharasabdasarre i o k o t t a r a r a s a p r n a k e 7 hrdayasamvn i m a g n k r i k 8 tvad bhavati cittavrttih | kirn t u pratyaksaskstkrakalp tatra n a d h r u d e t i 9 | j t u p r a m r t h i k a m kimcid adya m e krtyam bhavisya|evambhtbhisamdhisamskrbhvt sarvaparisatsdh|apramodasraparyantavirasandaranlyalokottaradarsanasra ||,n^yog bhavisymityabhisamdhisamskrd ucitagttody|glj;vanvismrta 1 0 sipsrikabhvatay vimalamukurakalp|^u|anijahrdayah scydyabhinayvalokanodbhinnapramoll^Qkatanmaybhavah pthykarnanaptrntarapravesavast "l^utpanne desaklavisesvesnlingite samyanmithysamIPpambhvandijfinavijneyatvaparmarsnspade rmarIgdivisaydhyavasye tatsamskrnuvrttikranabhtatatsa^^hfdyavasturpagittodyapramadnubhavasamskrascitaavataran \ te : avatryante G : avatarayaste M || 2 buddh'r G : 3 svlaksanya : oslaksanya G : sya/aksanya M || 4 upa; | G : avagata (perhaps corrected into apagat) M || 5 kvyesv pi hrdaya " {(prdaya eva corrected from hrdayam eva) G : kavyetyavihrdayadeva M [| fttavrttir (corrected from cittavrtter) G : cittavrtter M \\ 7 lokottaraG : lokottararasam prnate M 1 1 8 nimagnkrik G : nimagn9 10 an M [I udeti G : tiayati M |j carvanvismrta G : varnanc mrta M | 17 r 8Q 1

10

\5

20

R. GNOLI samanugatataduktarparmdhyavasyasamskra eva ^ i pancasair divasaih sacamatkaras^adyacaritamadhyapravistasvl^ t m a r p a m a t i h svtmadvrena visvam tath pasyan p r a t y e | | k a m smjiko desaklavisesanparmarsena " evamkrin 5 idam " iti liiitmaka 2 vidhisamarpaka 3 samvijjtyam $ 4 5 6 samvidvisesaranj akam prna vallabhpratimam rasas vda sahac|ff, raramyagittodydisamskram 7 rasnubhavavasena 8 hrdayifg b h y a n t a r a n i k h t a m tata evotpumsana 9 satair api m l n i m a | | t r a m apy abhajamnam bhajams tattacchubhsubhaprepT| sjihssatatasytavrttitvd eva s u b h a m caraty asubhanlf samujjhati j i d n i m upyasamvedanlbht tad idam anukirtanam^, anuvyavasyaviseso ntyparaparyyah j nnukra iti b h r a m i ^ t a v y a m anena | b h n d e n a rjaputrasynyasya vnukrtv\| a n y d i b u d d h e r abhvt tad v i k a r a n a m 1 1 iti p r a s i d d h a m j h s a m t r a p h a l a m m a d h y a s t h n m | yadabhipryena muni^ vaksyati " paracestnukarand dhsas samupajyate "12 j 13 tatpaksynm t u tad eva dvessynuvrtty 1 4 diphalam jj t a d b u d d h y a i v a h i daitynm h r d a y a k s o b h a h evambht^ v a y a m upahsabhjanam iti | upahasyatbhravas ca nivartante tatah | na tpadesena | n a n v e v a m tvat niyatnukro m b h t | anukrena t u kirn a p a r d d h a m | na kimcid asambhavd rte | anukra iti h i sadrsakaranam | tat kasya j .
2 sacamatkras : sacamathara* G,M || Untmaka* G (corrected 0 3 from ldhtmaka ) : ldhtmakcP M || samarpaka : Qsamarpitam G : *samarpakam M |J 4 ranjakam : ranjaka G,M | 5 *prattmam : *prattma* G,M || 6 rassva0 G : rassvde M || 7 ^samskram : samskra G,Mj| 8 rasnbhavasena G (corrected from rasvasena) : rasa.. .vasena M \[ 9 l tpumsarufi M : *tpunkha* G | nyasya vnukrtv (corrected from u vnukrte) G : njsjavganukrtellL || tad vikaranam : tad dh vikaranc\m~A (coriected from vikaranam) G : tad dhi kranam M || 12 N..9 VII, 10 j 13 tatpaksynm M : tatpaksiynm G \\ u nuvrUj (corrected from; Htvrttf) G : *mvrttf M || 1

10

^5

20

[ 90 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC tvad rmasya | tasynanukryatvt | etena pramadbhvanm anukaranam p a r k r t a m | na cittavrttnm ^ a k r o d h d i r p n m | na h i n a t o rmasadrsam svtmanah flkam karoti | sarvathaiva tasya tatrbhvt | b h v e tjananukratvt | na cnyad vastv asti yac chokena sadrsam ?|yat I a n u b h v m s t u karoti | kirn t u sajatyn 1 eva J na t u itatsadn | sdhranarupasya kah kena sadtsyatthas |t|tilokyavartinah | sadtsatvam t u na visesatman yaugaIjadyenopapadpte kadcit | k t a m e n a niyata evnukttah smnytmakatve k o ' nukrirthah | tasmd aniya2 ntyam ity api na b h r a m i t a v y a m j asmadup^dhyyakfte kvyakautuke *py ayam evbhipryo m a n t a v y a h I |!ha t v aniyatnukaro ? pi | tennuvyavasya 3 viesavisaykatyam jntyam | tath h y hryavieesdin nivttte taddeeakla^aitramaitfadinataviesapratyaksbhimne viesaleopakt a4 | n e n a ca vin p m y a k s p r a v r t t e r p t e fmdisabdasytroJpayogt ptasiddhatadafthataydataniyacaritavcakasysambh|ranmtfanirkaranennuvyavasyasya pratyaksakalpat, 5 ^hfdpgitdyanusytatay camatkrasthnatvd dhfday|iupraveayogyatvam, abhinayacatustayena svarpapracch| a n a m , prastvandin natajnnajasamskrascivyam, tena ^anjakasmagnmadhynupfavistena pracchditasvasvabhvena ^rkpravrttalaukikapratpksnumnadijanitasamskrasahyena 6 Ijatajnnasamskfasacivena htdayasamvdatanmayibhavanasahakrin ptayoktf dtsyamnena y o 'nuvyavasyo janyate ^ukhaduhkhdykratattaccittavfttifsita 7 nijasamvidnandapi:asksamayo ? ta eva vicitro fasansvdanacamatkfacatvana2 -c- 1 sajtiyn G : jttyn M |l tasmd anityata* G : tasyyata M | Huvyavasya : nuvyavasjavat G,M | 4 *ipyte : yte G, M | : pratyaksakalpat : pratyaksakalpantyt G : pratyaksakalpanM. || 7 O \s Qtanmaybhavana0 : Qtanmayfbhvan ^G,M || r .' ^rparusitcfi { 0 Q ijruparpifa M )|

10

15

20

25

r K

R. GNOLI nirvesabhogdyaparaparyyah, tan ntyam | tatra ya avabhsate vastt?

tac ca jnnkramtram ropitam s v a r p a m 2 smaytma tatklanirmitarpam cnyad v 3 kimcid astu | n t r p j 5 talekhanentmano darsanntarakathparicayaprakafifiaphale p r a k r t a v a s t u n i r p a n a v i g h n a m carantah sahrdayn k h e d a y m f { tasmd anuvyavasytmakam krtanam r s i t a v i k a l p a s a m y ^ danam n t y a m | tadvedanavedyatvt | na t v anukaran^| r p a m j yadi tv evam mukhyalaukikakarannusritayjj c n u k a r a n a m ity ucyate t a n na kascid dosah | sthite v a s t u t a b h e d e sabdapravrtter avivdspadatvt | etac ca yathavasa| r a m vitanisyata ity stm tvat | yatas cedam nanukaranagL{ t a t o yat kaicic coditam tad anavaksam I

10

vastu G : ysfuM || G : cnyatb* M |

svarpam G : svarpam.. .M |)

cnyad vi

[ 92 ]

TRANSLATION " But h o w is it that this b u r d e n (viz. t h e defeat) has b e e n I m p o s e d o n o u r back P" 1 T o this question t h e a u t h o r replies : fHere, by no means, is there a representation of you and the gods # . , I . v. 107 a). ij T h e sense i n t e n d e d in this verse is t h a t n o b o d y has i m p o s e d i p c h a b u r d e n o n y o u r back. B o t h t h e d e m o n s a n d t h e g o d s H e r e , t h a t is, i n t h e N t y a v e d a anyway, ( $tay outside, at ease. J h o s e w h o are seen are n o t t h e real d e m o n s a n d t h e g o d s . A s t o t h e m , indeed, t h e r e arises neither t h e idea of reality, n o r o f similitude, as i n t h e case of twins ; n o r of illusion, as in t h e gase of t h e illusion of a piece of mother-of-pearl, p r e c e d e d by Jnowledge o f a piece of silver ; n o r of super-imposition, as iwhen w r o n g k n o w l e d g e follows after vitiating t h e r i g h t o n e ; Jfior of identity, as w h e n o n e says c this peasant is a c o w ' ; \ipt of a poetical fancy, as w h e n t h e m o o n is fancied as t h e face jrf t h e n i g h t , etc. ; n o r of copy, as in t h e case of a painted m o d e l ; hot o f r e p r o d u c t i o n , as i n t h e case o f t h e counterfeit r e presentation of t h e instruction i m p a r t e d b y a teacher t o his gtudents ; n o r of s u d d e n creation, as in m a g i c ; n o r of an appearance effected b y tricks, as in sleight of h a n d , etc. I n all these cases, indeed, t h e r e is a lack of generalization so t h a t t h e o n 1) According to N.S., vv. 99-106, Drama has not been instituted by !j3rahm to cast an unfavourable light on the demons (Daitya, Vighna >etc), but to represent impartially acts and ideas both of gods and demons, pemons have no reason to be afraid of it and to spoil the dramatic perpprmance. Here the objector is a hypothetical dattya and the " burden'* Is the defeat of the demons by the gods, which was the argument of the dramatical production. ( sceN. , vv. 54 ff). [ 9 3 ]

R. GNOLI l o o k e r , b e i n g consequently i n a state of indifference, will a o t logically b e able t o b e p e r v a d e d b y t h e relish of Rasa. if t h e p o e t aims at a t o o specific (niyata) subject-matter, will n o t be accomplished, a n d h e will n o t b e able t o avoi fault of i m p r o p r i e t y (anaucitya).1 F u r t h e r , as it h a p p e s sight o f a pair of lovers united t o g e t h e r , t h e m i n d will r a t h e r b e c a m e t h e p r e y of t h e ordinary, actual ee of delight, rage, a n d so o n . 2 Eventually, (we m a y h e r e t h a t w h e n e v e r t h e m i n d o f t h e spectators is t r o u b l e d b y ^ sight of t w o different individuals, viz. t h e represented p e r s o n a g e and t h e actor, t h e (necessary) unification (anusamdhi) between; t h e m c a n n o t t a k e place. W h a t is t h e n d r a m a ? T h e a u t h o r answers :

Drama is the re-narration of the things of all the three worlds (JSf* , I, v . 207 b ) . T h e sense i n t e n d e d i n this verse is as follows. personages, i.e., R m a , etc., h a v e n e v e r c o m e d o w n i n t o p a t h of o u r means of k n o w l e d g e . N o w , w h e n they are s^ cribed i n t h e scriptures t h e r e is n o d o u b t , it is true, t h a t tfiej ej Rmyana-like n a r r a t i o n s , t h a t is t o say, these u n i q u e gre&3 sentences, 3 g i v e rise t o t h e idea of t h e individual essengsl 1) See, on the idea of aucitya, V. Raghavan, Some Concepts of the Alamkfd^ $ fair a, Adyar, 1942, pp. 194-257. "Proportion and harmony"-^-says Y | Raghavan, ib. p. 208 "form an aspect of Aucitya, which is propriety, a4ap| | tation, and other points of appropriateness. From the point of view of the perfect agreement between the parts and the chief element of Rasa, ftongL the point of view of this proportion and harmony, I think, Aucitya can jbgj rendered m English into another word also viz., * Sympathy *, which u% word in art-cnticism means e mutual conformity of parts". 2) See supra, p. 44. 3) " The principal clause and the subordinate clauses which are mutually connected together by expectancy, consistency and proximity formj|
9

4 3

THE AESTHETIC EXPEDIENCE, ETC. (gisesa) of each of t h e m . T h i s idea, h o w e v e r , is n o t contrasting with t h e concept o f generalization a n d its p r e s e n c e causes | h t e f o r e n o difficulty. T h e individual essences, indeed, amount t o a real individuality (svlaksayya), possessed of a corresponding causal efficiency (arthakriy), only w h e n t h e y are .contemporary w i t h u s w h i c h c o n t e m p o r a n e i t y , i n this case, does n o t exist. 1 T h i s state o f generalization of t h e dterminants, etc., arises even in p o e m s p r o p e r and, in this case, it penetrates directly i n t o t h e heart. E v e n t h e n , a l t h o u g h t h e g e neralization can occur in mere tales (katha), nevertheless t h e r e

\mqhvkja, when they serve a single purpose " (K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian \Theories of Meaning, Adyar 1963, p, 161). 1) a) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rma, etc. (therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc.), does not involve that cannot be perceived in a generalized form. A personality, etc , in^ itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, its causal efficiency) $#ly when it is contemporary with us, i.e., connected with the present and therefore with the practical interests, etc., of our own Ego. When these personalities are not contemporary, they cannot develop their natural causal efficiency. In the aesthetic perception, they are independent from fthe concepts both of reality and non-reality, and are thus perceived as ^generalized ". In this sense, their particularity (viksd) is not contrasting Wtl^i the concept of generality. i, \ b) In this context, svlaksanya is simply a synonym of svarupa, one's own form or shape, one's own peculiar nature, hence individuality, etc. Syhksanya is commented on by A.G. m this way in the DhA.L.9 p. 538. The causal efficiency {arthakny ; on this concept, cf. p. 31, n. 7 ) in the ysfinse of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individuality (i.e., contemporary with the spectator) only. The generalized image tbf the aesthetic experience has no practical efficiency, i e , does not insert itself in practical life. The concept of causal efficiency in connexion with ;;the one of individuality (in the sense of a particular essence contrasting with |e general essence, the smnjalaksana) has a Buddhist origin and, freely interpreted, became part of the common philosophical vocabulary, [ 95 ]

R. GNOLI lacking a great impressive feeling (ranjana), as in t h e case of t h e sentence, ' Such a n d such a t h i n g h a p p e n s t o t h e m \ r h o d f such a n d such a t h i n g ' ) , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g state of m i n d " | | n o t well decided. I n poetry, o n t h e contrary (and let us feS m e m b e r h e r e t h a t t h e b o d y of p o e t r y is m a d e u p of w o r | embellished b y qualities a n d figures of speech, w i t h Rasa as4l life, t h e Rasa of a n o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e ) every state of mfnfl is, so t o say, completely i m m e r g e d , t h a n k s t o a consent of hearlf T h i s idea, t o be confronted w i t h a k i n d of direct perception' o | experience (pratyaksaskstkrakalpa) does n o t arise, h o w e v e r , | every p e r s o n [who is h e a r i n g o r reading a p o e m ] . I n d r a m a this difficulty does n o t arise. 1 T h e n a t u r e o f i l m a y b e r e s u m e d as follows. Firstly, i n drama there is the absence, w i t h i n us, of t h e i n t e n t i o n : ' T o d a y I m u s t d o sonift h i n g practical ' a n d t h e presence, i n its place, o f t h e i n t e n t i o n ? ! ' T o d a y I am g o i n g t o enjoy sights a n d sounds of a n o n - o r d i n a | n a t u r e deserving of attention, w h i c h will arouse, at t h e end, sM sensation of d i s g u s t 2 a n d w h o s e essence is a generaufc| pleasure shared b y all t h e spectators. T h e relish of suitable v o c a l a n d instrumental m u s i c makes t h e n t h e spectator f o r g f i a b o u t his practical existence (scfnsrikabhva), and, his h e a r | consequently b e i n g t u r n e d as clear as a spotless m i r r o r h e be-; comes capable of identifying himself with t h e mental states^

1) Some individuals whose aesthetic sensibility (consent of the heart| etc.) is poor, need visual illustration of what is suggested by the powef of the poem; such visual illustration (consisting of the actors, etc.) contri butes to bring about the immersion of the spectator in the events reprsente^ to the exclusion of everything else. \ 2) In other words, at the end of the performance and therefore of thf state of pleasure caused by it, there is no such sensation of disgust, as acco " panies all ordinary pleasures. [ 96 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

K

jjjp sorrow, delight, etc., s p r u n g from t h e sight of t h e gestures Ifid of t h e o t h e r species of representation. Listening t o t h e ^ c i t a t i o n makes t h e spectator enter i n t o t h e life of a character Efferent from himself, and, as a result, there g r o w s u p i n h i m Avognition w h o s e object is Rma, Rvana a n d so o n . T h i s c o g n i t i o n is n o t circumscribed by any limitation of space a n d jime, a n d is free from all t h o s e forms of t h o u g h t c o n c e r n i n g which is t h e matter of k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h is either mistaken, cj| uncertain, o r probable, etc. T h a t is n o t all. T h e spectator jj& accompanied by t h e impressions of this cognition ( w h o s e abject was Rama, etc.) a n d t h e n b y a k i n d of camatkra for everal days. 1 T h e s e impressions are evidenced, in their itjni, b y other ones, deposited within h i m by t h e direct percept i o n of t h e various pleasure-producing t h i n g s w o m e n , vocal instrumental musicswhich accompanied t h e performance, last impressions are t h e very cause of t h e continuation of t h e first ones. B u t let us revert t o t h e spectator. H i s o w n self continues t o be m e r g e d in t h e represented exploits, a n d t h r o u g h it, h e goes o n seeing everything i n this light. T h i s Impression of t h e vocal a n d instrumental musics and of t h e o t h e r ^delightful thingsthat, as w e h a v e seen, accompany t h e relish jpf Rasa, are n o t t o b e c o m p a r e d t o [the pleasure given t o us by |b.e sight of] o u r beloved one, a n d colour t h e consciousness in '% special waygives birth, w i t h i n h i m , t o a k i n d of injunction suitable t o b e expressed b y t h e optative m o d e , t h a t is : ' Such and-such a t h i n g (must happen) t o t h o s e w h o d o such-and-such a t h i n g \ This injunction is free of every spatial a n d t e m p o r a l specification. T h e afore-mentioned impression b y v i r t u e of

1) Cf. Mrcchakafik, III, 5 : y at \saiyant virate 'pi gttasamaye gacchm rnvann iva | " To tell the truth, although the song is ended, T seem to hear it as I walk ". 18 [ 97 ]

k. GNot t h e Rasa-experience, remains deeply fixed in t h e heart, lik ; arrow, i n such a w a y t h a t b y n o possible effort can it be let alone extracted. 1 T h a n k s t o it, who t h e desires of t h e g o o d a n d a b a n d o n i n g t h e b a d are constantly present ii m i n d of t h e spectator, avoids t h e b a d . N o w t h e n , as t h e r e is n o awareness of (the actor means, t h e m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m re-narration, found in t h e is a particular re-perception (the w o r d " drama " is b u t synonj|x: for it), a n d n o t a r e p r o d u c t i o n . W e deserve n o t t o b e - d e c e i v | p b y t h e latter. W h e n , indeed, a prince o r some o t h e r personag<j| r e p r o d u c e d in jest, t h e spectators d o n o t h a v e t h e idea t l j | | t h e actor is s o m e o n e other, etc. but laughter in the onlookers. o t h e r people's actions (N.S., Such a performance is k n o ^ f T h i s was just t h e p u r p o s e : g | VII, 10) \ In the r e p r o d u | | | indeed, as a " d e f o r m a t i o n " , and, as such, gives rise t o n o t h i n g Bharata, w h o said : ' L a u g h t e r arises from a r e p r o d u c t i o n ; Q | p e r s o n a g e s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this mimicry gives rise t o f e | | | ings of h a t r e d , i n d i g n a t i o n a n d so o n . T h e agitation of heaifj i n t h e D e m o n s was caused, indeed, b y this very Their ' W e h a v e t h u s b e c o m e a vessel of d e r i s i o n 2 / accordingly does t h e g o o d

t i o n t o o [from spoiling t h e drama] is caused by this fear \oj b e c o m i n g an object of derision and n o t by t h e teaching (| Brahma).
c

Well \ s o m e o n e m i g h t say,

let m e even admit t h a t

is n o t a r e p r o d u c t i o n o f specific t h i n g s ; h o w e v e r , of 1) A similar expression is to be found in the I.P.V*V., I, p. prastddhisataprne valoke kasyacit kcid eva prasiddhih " lneva pratibimi iikhitevntarnikhteva ca (Mlatimdhava, v. 10) " /// nyyena hrdayabhit'takp utptanasatair api hrdayam anunmlya npasarpati \\ 2) Cf. supra, p. 6. [ 98 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. r e p r o d u c t i o n tout cour guilty ?' T o this question w e answer

that, surely, it is guilty of n o t h i n g , w i t h t h e only exception o f a logical impossibility. T h e w o r d r e p r o d u c t i o n , indeed, m e a n s t h e p r o d u c t i o n of similar t h i n g s . him. But similar t o w h o m ? Surely, n o t t o Rama, etc., because it is n o t possible t o r e p r o d u c e A n d , by this very a r g u m e n t , t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n , t o o , of Further, T h e actor, his particular determinants ( w o m e n , etc.) is refuted. even his state of mind, as, f.L, s o r r o w , anger, etc.

indeed, does n o t p r o d u c e , w i t h i n h i m , a s o r r o w similar t o t h a t of Rama, because such a s o r r o w is totally absent in h i m ; and, if it w e r e actually in h i m , it w o u l d n o m o r e b e a r e p r o d u c t i o n . N o r , again, is t h e r e some o t h e r t h i n g w h i c h m a y b e similar t o t h e s o r r o w of Rma.
c

P e r h a p s ', s o m e m i g h t say,

t h e conBut to b u t of

sequents h e produces are similar t o t h o s e of R m a \ this question t o o w e answer t h a t t h e y are n o t similar, t h e same species.

A s t o a universal t h i n g (sdhragd), c o m m o n

t o all t h e t h r e e w o r l d s , 1 w h a t is, in fact, t h e sense o f this t e r m * similarity 'similarity t o w h a t 2 ? Similarity, indeed similarity t o a particular t h i n g c a n n o t ever take place simultaneously; only a specific t h i n g may b e r e p r o d u c e d , a n d t h a t also only gradually. W h a t is t h e n t h e sense of r e p r o d u c t i o n , Therefore, w e deserve n o t t o b e deas t o a generic t h i n g ? specific t h i n g s . Kvyakautuka

ceived b y this t h e o r y viz., that drama is a r e p r o d u c t i o n of n o n T h i s is w h a t o u r master i n t e n d e d t o say in his t o o , a n d n o t , surely, t h a t d r a m a is a r e p r o d u c t i o n form

of n o n specific t h i n g s . D r a m a is t h e n a m a t t e r of cognition b y a special p f re-perception (anuyyavasaya). In the first place,

indeed,

1) And therefore simultaneously present in all individuals. 2) Consequents are a universal reality, common to all people. [ 99 ]

R, GNOLI t h a n k s t o g a r m e n t s , m a k e - u p a n d t h e o t h e r forms of repteaen tation, t h e p r e s u m p t i o n to b e confronted with t h e direct ception of a particular a c t o r (Caitra, Maitra, etc.) a n d of particular space a n d time ceases t o exist ; in t h e second pi since direct p e r c e p t i o n cannot take place w i t h o u t at least m i n i m u m of particularization, recourse is h a d t o such as "Rama, etc. T h e fact t h a t these are t h e names of personages eliminates indeed t h e possibility t h a t o n e declaims their exploits deserving of attention m i g h t p r o v o k e j i n t h e spectators t h e h i n d r a n c e of unverisimilitude. OwingV t o all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct p e r c e p t i o n ! F u r t h e r , because t h e scene represented, being accompanied bf* pleasure-giving vocal musics, etc., is a source of camatkra, ij:| is possessed of a n a t u r a l suitability t o penetrate i n t o t h e h e a r | r A g a i n , t h e four forms o f representation h i d e t h e t r u e identity of t h e actor. Eventually, t h e p r o l o g u e , etc., give t o spectators t h e [constant] impression t h a t they h a v e t o d o w i t h an actof* T h e actor, b e i n g seen, arouses, t h e n , in t h e spectators, a rep e r c e p t i o n (called, t o o , tasting, sampling, camatkra> r e l i s h immersion, enjoyment, etc.), w h i c h , t h o u g h consisting i n tlje light a n d bliss of o u r o w n consciousness, is still affected b y various feelings, a n d is therefore varied. D r a m a is only w h a t appears in this re-perception. I n this connexion, t h e actor is' i m m e r g e d in t h e afore-said colouring combination (of determinants, e t c . ) ; his real identity is h i d d e n ; h e possesses mental impressions arising from direct, inferential a n d o t h e r forms of o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h h a v e occurred i n t h e p a s t ; h e Is p r o v i d e d w i t h mental impressions of t h e awareness of b e i n g an actor, a n d h e partakes i n creating t h e identification of t h e spectators w i t h t h e representation, a n d t h a t t h r o u g h their heart's consent. B u t let us revert t o w h a t appears in t h e aforement i o n e d re-perception. T h i s m a y equally be considered either as [ 100 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC, a n inner image of o u r o w n k n o w l e d g e , o r as a generic superimposed image, o r again as a s u d d e n creation, o r even as s o m e other t h i n g . Anyway, w e h a v e n o intention of b o r i n g h e r e o u r sensible readers with these discussions, r e m o v e d from t h e jhief subject-matter. They, indeed, w o u l d only a m o u n t t o showing off o u r acquaintance with o t h e r systems, and to be a M n d r a n c e t o t h e subject u n d e r discussion. T o sum u p , drama is only a * narration ' (kJrtam), made u p of a fe-perception, a form of consciousness affected by discursive cognitions (; sitavikalpasamvcdand)it is, indeed, t h u s percfeivedand n o t a form of r e p r o d u c t i o n . If, h o w e v e r , y o u say t h a t it is a reproduction, in t h e sense t h a t it follows t h e ^ p r o d u c t i o n " of real, ordinary life, t h e r e is n o fault. Once facts h a v e been clearly determined, w o r d s d o n o t deserve t o b e a source of disagreement. But w e will e x p o u n d t h a t later. F o r t h e time being, this is sufficient.

101

A P P E N D I X II C o m m e n t a r y o n Dh. A., I, 18.

As t o poetry, w h i c h conveys t h e determinants a n d t h e cc quents, t h e r e is n o possible appearance of any element ^ c o u l d p r o v o k e t h e unsuitability of t h e primary meaning^; r l g | | therefore, t h e r e is in this sense little r o o m for metapl^&J " B u t " s o m e o n e m i g h t a r g u e w h a t has it t o d o w i t h / / ' 1 " suitability ? T h e n a t u r e of m e t a p h o r has indeed been de as follows. " T h e m e t a p h o r is said t o b e t h e apprehension $ sense connected w i t h t h e sense directly expressed 2 . Nowjff poetry, w e see t h a t t h e Rasas are connected w i t h t h e d e t e t n ^ nants, t h e consequents etc., w h i c h are directly e x p r e s s ^ indeed, t h e determinants a n d t h e consequents are r e s p e c t i v e t h e causes a n d t h e effects of Rasas, and t h e transitory $Ui co-operate w i t h t h e m " . Y o u r objection, I reply, does notstajgjj t o reason. If it be r i g h t , indeed, w h e n , t h a n k s t o t h e 1) See, on the nature of the metaphor, the study of K. Kunjunn Raf^ op. V.,pp. 229-273. " The three essential conditionshe says, pp. 231-32^ generally accepted by the later lamkrikas as necessary in /aks transfer are (a) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary ing in the context, (b) some relation between the primary and the referent of the word, and (c) sanction for the transferred sense by popp#l usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer. Of these three condition the first two are accepted by all writers ; but the motive element justifying the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of establfsEe| usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belongingJ| the other school of thought are not interested in the motive element ft laksaqa ; it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to t 4 | 2) Kumrila, Tantravrttika, I, 4, 23. See on all that, R. Udbhatcfs Commentary on the Kvylamkra of Bhmaha, Roma 1962, XXXIV-XXXV. [ 102 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC ^ s m o k e ', t h e s m o k e has been apprehended, t h e r e w o u l d arise also t h e idea of fire, just effected by t h e afore-said m e t a p h o r ; jttxd again, from fire, there w o u l d arise t h e idea of r e m o v i n g ^oldness, a n d so o n , so t h a t w o r d s could n o m o r e h a v e any piked meaning O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , if y o u answer t o this, paying that, since t h e w o r d ' s m o k e ' is reposed in its o w n sense, 4t p o w e r cannot actually extend t o fire a n d so o n , t h e n t h e |x>Asequence of y o u r a r g u m e n t a t i o n is o n e only, namely, t h a t seed o f t h e m e t a p h o r is t h e unsuitability of t h e p r i m a r y , because, only if this is present, t h e afore-said repose of a w o r d in its o w n sense can be lacking. N o w , in the conv e y i n g of t h e determinants, etc., t h e r e is n o element w h i c h can p r o v o k e t h e unsuitability of t h e p r i m a r y m e a n i n g . A t this point, s o m e o n e m i g h t perhaps u r g e t h a t t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e feelings of delight, etc., immediately follows t h e /apprehension of t h e determinants, etc., just as t h e idea of fire immediately follows t h e p e r c e p t i o n of s m o k e , a n d that, b e i n g I t "so, t h e r e is little r o o m , in this case, for a p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n ^words. But, instead of answering t o this objection, I will )J?ose a question t o this clever logician, w h o k n o w s so well t h e * jaature of perception, a n d it is t h e following : D o y o u t h i n k t h e apprehension of Rasa is merely t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of feelings of some o t h e r p e r s o n ? Y o u d o n o t deserve t o i n t o such a mistake. I n this case, indeed, t h e said appreh e n s i o n w o u l d be b u t an inference of t h e feelings p r o p e r t o fetich and such people ; w h a t sort of a Rasa could it t h e n possess ? p u t t h e tasting of Rasa, w h i c h is m a d e u p of a n o n - o r d i n a r y Xmmatkra a n d is animated by t h e gustation of t h e determinants, , g t c , p r o p e r t o poetry, cannot certainly be so c o n t e m n e d as t o |t>e placed o n t h e same level as t h e ordinary processes of m e m o r y , inference, etc. Rather, t h e t r u t h is t h a t h e w h o s e h e a r t possesses | t h e latent traces of t h e ordinary inferential process from t h e [ 103 ]

R. GNOLI effect t o t h e cause, etc., does n o t a p p r e h e n d t h e determinaljlf and so on, as if h e w e r e indifferent; being instead at t h e ^^| of his o w n sensibilitywhich quality is also called consent heart, h e rather apprehends t h e m w i t h o u t m o u n t i n g o n ; | j _ path of m e m o r y , inference, etc., as if m e r g e d i n a g u s t a t i | suitable t o an identification (with t h e determinants, etc.), is, so t o say, t h e s p r o u t of t h e tasting of Rasa, a b o u t t o a p p | ^ in all its fullness. T h i s tasting, again, is n o t already b l | in t h e past, from some o t h e r means of k n o w l e d g e , so t h a t n o w , a form of m e m o r y ; n o r is it arisen n o w from s o m e o means of k n o w l e d g e , for as t o a n o n - o r d i n a r y t h i n g , t h e direct perception, etc., are d e v o i d of any p o w e r . H e n c e , the v a&i pressions 6 determinant ', etc., are of a n o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u t ^ f for as Bharata himself h a s said : " T h e w o r d ' d e t e r m i n a n t ! is used for the sake of clear k n o w l e d g e " \ I n everyday U I | they are called causes, n o t determinants. T h e t e r m c c o n l q u e n t ' is, it t o o , n o n - o r d i n a r y . c Because t h e representation ***- Bharata s a y s " b y means of w o r d s , gestures a n d t h e tetaj petament, makes o n e experience (the m e n t a l states) it is culm " consequent " 2 . T h i s experiencing, p r o v o k e d by t h e quents, is n o t h i n g b u t an identification with t h e said I n everyday life, they are called effects, n o t consequnjli Therefore, just w i t h this view in m i n d , namely, t h a t w e d o o i l apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has m a d e n o m e n t i o l of t h e permanent mental states in t h e stra : " O u t of t h e uict of t h e determinants, t h e consequents a n d t h e transitory meuta states, t h e birth of Rasa takes place ? \ O n t h e contrary, t t e

1) N X VII, prose after st. 3. 2) HJ., VII, prose after st. 4. [ 104 ]

HE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC ention of it w o u l d h a v e been a source of difficulty. Such ressions as " T h e p e r m a n e n t m e n t a l state becomes Rasa " d u e t o correspondence onlybecause, t h a t is t o say, t h e g e s t a t i o n arises, beautiful as it is, t h a n k s t o t h e trace, latent I p t h i n us, of t h e feeling correspondent t o t h e determinants a n d t h e consequents ; a n d because in w o r d l y life, i n t h e stage, t h a t ^ o f t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e feelings of othersa k n o w l e d g e , | i t us say, truly indispensable as regards t h e consent of heart Jljre are able t o a p p r e h e n d t h e p e r m a n e n t feelings of delight, etc., iot t h i n g s as gardens, bristling of t h e hairs, and so o n . T h e isitory mental state, is n o d o u b t a feeling, b u t , since it is en| y e d in so far as it is entirely d e p e n d e n t o n t h e principal o n e , is r e c k o n e d by Bharata a m o n g s t t h e determinants a n d t h e Consequents 1 . Therefore, t h e j
c

birth of Rasa ', m e n t i o n e d i n t h e stra, to

be intended as t h e birth of a r e l i s h i n g 2 w h i c h relishing

( a sort of immersion in a gustation, appearing as superior | | y different causes, as, f.L, m e e t i n g with a friend, a n d | o d e v e l o p gradually.

| | 1 t h e o t h e r ordinary feelings of delight, etc., t h a t may be aroused appear T h i s gustation, therefore, is only a

[manifestation, n o t a revelationwhich is t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e Igieans of k n o w l e d g e , and n o t even a p r o d u c t i o n w h i c h is t h e oration of t h e means of action. " But " a t this p o i n t s o m e o n e m i g h t a r g u e " if this gusta|tfon is neither a cognition n o r a p r o d u c t i o n , t h e n w h a t is | | t ? " B u t w e replyhave w e n o t said t h a t this Rasa is of a ^ o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e ? W h a t are, t h e n , these determinants ?

1) The mention of it, therefore, gives rise to no difficulty. 2) If we take literally the expression of the stra, the result would be ihat the Rasa is no more a non-ordinary reality. The birth indeed, requires ilfpme means of action, and these, as such, are of an ordinary nature. 19 r 105 1

R. GNOLI A r e they revealing causes o r p r o d u c i n g causes ? b u t only s o m e t h i n g w h i c h serves t o We rej

t o this question t h a t they are n e i t h e r revealing n o r p r o d u d f realize t h e g u s t a t i o l i B u t for t h e veig D o e s any such t h i n g appear elsewhere ?

reason w h y it does n o t appear w e say t h a t it is of a n o n - o r d i t i | | i nature. B u t ( s o m e o n e m i g h t say) i n this w a y Rasa is n o t || object of c o g n i t i o n (aprameya). L e t us admit it, w e reply what of it ? F o r , since from its gustation, pleasure instruction derive, w h a t o t h e r d o y o u desire ? But, y o u say, it is n o t ascertained b y any means of k n o w l e d g e . u n t r u e , w e reply, because its real existence is an unconfat&bte d a t u m of o u r o w n consciousness ; besides, this g u s t a t i o n Is only a particular f o r m of knowledge. And t h a t is e n o u g h ! suggestim Therefore, t h e said Rasa is of a n o a - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e s o that, even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can b e of it, t h o u g h they are of n o use as t o meaning. there is n o t even t h e s h a d o w of t h e m e t a p h o r . H e r e , then*

[ 106 ]

A P P E N D I X III C o m m e n t a r y o n Dh. A.,

1

I I , 4.

N o w , Bhatta N y a k a says . If t h e Rasa were perceived as present in a t h i r d party, t h e spectator should b e in a state of ^difference. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p o e m w h i c h , f.i., blight describe t h e story of R m a d o e s n o t m a k e t h e reader f||) perceive it as really present in h i m , because t h a t w o u l d imply Njais admission, namely that there is a birth of Rasa in his fpwn self. N o w this birth does n o t stand t o reason, because ^ t does n o t play t h e role of a determinant as regards t h e spectat o r . " But " s o m e o n e may perhaps say<e t h a t w h i c h causes J^er t o b e a determinant is t h e general idea of loverness, w h i c h , fsliared b y her, is t h e cause of t h e a w a k e n i n g of t h e latent i m p r e s s i o n s . " But I reply t o this o b j e c t i o n h o w can t h a t ^happen as regards a description of deities, etc ? F u r t h e r , n o ^memory o f his o w n beloved o n e does arise in t h e spectator's J consciousness (while h e l o o k s at St). A g a i n it is possible t h a t the construction of a b r i d g e o n t h e ocean a n d t h e o t h e r determinants of this kind, p r o p e r t o some extraordinary personages k s R m a and so o n , may b e c o m e general ? N o r it can b e said that w h a t occurs is simply t h e m e m o r y of Rma, as e n d o w e d o f .heroism, etc., in so far as t h e spectator has h a d n o such p r e v i o u s experience. E v e n assuming that h e is perceived t h r o u g h "verbal testimony (sabda), t h e r e cannot b e any birth of Rasa, just as i n t h e case of a pair of lovers united t o g e t h e r , perceived t h r o u g h direct k n o w l e d g e . M o r e o v e r , according t o t h e thesis w h i c h maintains t h a t Rasa is p r o d u c e d , t h e birth of t h e P a t h e t i c 1) See, on the exposition of Bhatta Nyaka's theory, supra, Introd., f. XX, ff. [ 107 ]

R. GNOLI Rasa w o u l d m a k e t h e perceiver t o experience pain, and, quently, h e w o u l d g o n o m o r e t o pathetic r e p r s e n t a t i f ! ? Therefore, t h a t is n o t a p r o d u c t i o n a n d n o t even a manifestai tion. I n d e e d , if it is s u p p o s e d t h a t a Rasa i., t h e E r o i i t onefirst pre-exists in a potential form a n d is later m a n i f e s t t t h e n (the determinants m u s t necessarily) illuminate it lttlif b y little. Besides, t h e difficulties already met w i t h w o u l d r e c W s , is Rasa manifested as really present in o u r o w n self, o r as presggt; i n a t h i r d p a r t y ? T h e r e f o r e , Rasa is neither perceived, " n c p r o d u c e d , n o r manifested b y t h e p o e m . T h e t r u t h is t h a t t f c poetic w o r d is different from t h e o t h e r ones. T h i s happq$y|| t h a n k s t o t h r e e distinct p o w e r s , w h i c h are so t o speak, its {amid) : t h a t is t o say, t h e p o w e r of denotation, which, g| as its object, t h e expressed sense ; t h e p o w e r of revelatiq% w h i c h h a s , as its object, t h e R a s a ; a n d t h e p o w e r of bringing a b o u t enjoyment, w h i c h h a s , as its object, t h e individuals w h p are possessed o f heart. I f i n p o e t r y t h e r e were, indeed, p i f | p o w e r only, i.e., t h e p o w e r of d e n o t a t i o n , w i t h o u t t h e o t h e t ones, w h a t a difference w o u l d still remain between t h e f o r n a m e n t s , as alliteration, etc., a n d t h e treatises illustrating^ t h e m ? A n d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e o r n a m e n t s t h e various s t y l ^ also w o u l d result useless. A n d , again, w h a t w o u l d be t h $ p u r p o s e o f a v o i d i n g cacophony, etc ? Therefore, t h e r e is jgS second p o w e r , called 'revelation of Rasa', t h a n k s t o w h i c h tbfi language of p o e t r y is different f r o m any o t h e r . T h i s poweff t h e so-called revelation, p r o p e r t o p o e t r y is n o t h i n g b u t t l f | faculty o f generalizing t h e determinants. O n c e t h e Rasa h a | been revealed, t h e r e is t h e enjoyment of it. T h i s enjoyment^ w h i c h is different from any o t h e r k i n d of perception, as direct^ k n o w l e d g e and memory, consists o f t h e states o f fluidity, e n | largement a n d expansion, is characterized by a resting, b y \ lysis, in o u r o w n consciousness, constituted b y satttva and [ 108 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. jtjtermixed with rajah and tamah, a n d is similar t o t h e tasting of t h e supreme brahman. T h e chief m e m b e r of p o e t r y is pnly this, quite perfect. T h e so-called instruction h a s only a Secondary place. T h i s is only o n e of t h e theories. T h e critics indeed d o iot agree a b o u t t h e true nature of Rasa. Indeed, some of t h e m Isay that, in t h e first stage, w e h a v e only a p e r m a n e n t state of [mind, w h i c h , being later n o u r i s h e d by t h e transitory states of /mind, etc., is experienced as Rasa. T h i s Rasa, they add, is 'perceived as really present in t h e r e p r o d u c e d personage o n l y ; #nd, being displayed in t h e theater, is called " theater-rasa " 1 . This theory is criticized by others in t h e following way. W h a t is indeed, they say, t h e sense of this intensification of a state of inind b y a n o t h e r one, as regards a mental state, w h i c h naturally ^develops in a succession ? Surely, neither astonishment, n o r s o r r o w n o r anger, etc., are seen t o g r o w m o r e intense w i t h time ! Therefore, y o u r thesis, viz. t h a t Rasa is [perceived as really] present in t h e reproduced personage, does n o t stand t o reason. I f you, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , say it is i n t h e r e p r o d u c i n g actor, obviously h e could n o t follow t h e t e m p o , etc. 2 If, finally, 3 you say t h a t it is in t h e spectators, w h a t a camatkra w o u l d still subsist ? O n t h e contrary, in front of a pathetic scene, the spectators w o u l d necessarily feel i n pain. Therefore, this thesis is n o t sound. W h i c h is t h e n t h e r i g h t o n e ? H e r e , because of t h e infinitude of gradations, n o r e p r o d u c t i o n o f a defined (niyata) permanent feeling m u s t b e m a d e 4 ; this, besides, w o u l d be purposeless, because at t h e sight of this excessive 1) 2) 3) 4) This is Bhatta Lollata's theory. Cf. supra, Introd., pp. XVII ff. Cf. supra, p. XVIII.' Namely, The Rasas and bhvas. That is, characterized by a particular stage. [ 109]

R. GNOL particularity, t h e spectators w o u l d remain indifferent, so there could n o t b e any useful teaching. T h e t r u e n a t u r e Rasa is therefore t h e following. W h e n t h e dete: t h e consequents a n d t h e transitory states are joined tog< with reference t o a p e r m a n e n t state of mind, d e v o i d of( 'defined stage {aniyatvasthtmaka\ t h e r e arises a p e r c e n t different from m e m o r y , viz. " T h i s is R a m a w h o was h a p p T h i s perception has, as its object, t h e p e r m a n e n t feeling, is'$ u p of a tasting, is ultimately f o u n d e d o n t h e r e p r o d u c i n g ac and is t o be found in theater only. Rasa is n o t h i n g b u t I t does n o t require any separate s u p p o r t , b u t , o n t h e cttagjpj t h e spectator is tasting it i n t h e actor, w h o is c o n s i d e r e d ^ identical w i t h t h e r e p r o d u c e d p e r s o n a g e . T h i s is, i n b r | f | | the n a t u r e o f aesthetic experience. Therefore, Rasa lies in** * t h e a t e r x only, n o t in t h e represented personage, e t c . 2 . Some others say : " T h e i m a g e o f t h e p e r m a n e n t state^ mind appearing in t h e r e p r o d u c i n g actor is p r o d u c e d by J assemblage of t h e different forms of representation, etc., as t h e image of a h o r s e , a p p e a r i n g o n a wall, is p r o d u c e d t h e various pigments, as o r p i m e n t , etc. T h i s i m a g e is tasfc||| by a perception of a n o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e , n a m e d also samplirig| a n d is therefore called R a s a . T h e m e a n i n g of t h e e x p r e s s i ^ ' theater-Rasa ', is t h e n ' t h e Rasas w h i c h are caused b y t | theater \ A c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r s , Rasa is n o t h i n g b u t t h e w h o l e of tHq determinants and t h e consequents, supplied by a p a r t i c u l | | assemblage, connected w i t h determinate latent impressiot|$; suitable t o t h e p e r m a n e n t state of m i n d w h i c h is t h e o b j e c | o f t h e acting of t h e afore-mentioned determinants a n d

1) That is to say, in the natas, actors, only. 2) This the theory of Sankuka. t

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. | g c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y an intimate relish o r lysis. A c c o r d i n g t o this theory, t h e Rasas, are n o t h i n g b u t t h e drama, others say t h a t Rasa is t h e m e r e d e t e r m i n a n t o r , again, :mere c o n s e q u e n t ; a c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r s it is n o t h i n g b u t t h e ent state of m i n d ; o t h e r s say t h a t it is t h e t r a n s i t o r y i a l state ; t o o t h e r s , it is a c o m b i n a t i o n of these ; o t h e r s say ft it is t h e situation t o be r e p r o d u c e d ; a n d o t h e r s , finally, ,t i t is an a g g r e g a t e of all that. B u t e n o u g h of t h e s e l u c u brations J l ^ ' X h e afore-mentioned Rasa occurs in p o e t r y also, w h i c h , in ^ h place of t h e realistic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d of t h e theatrical I n v e n t i o n s , possesses t h e n a t u r a l a n d t h e extraordinary m o d e ^ s p e e c h . 1 T h e c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e determinants, etc., b y w h i c h p r o d u c e d , is, in poetry, afforded b y w o r d s of a n o n - o r d i n a r y , e n d o w e d w i t h t h e qualities of clearness (prasanna), {madhurd) a n d powerfulness (pjasvln). E v e n if it b e a b t h a t i n p o e t r y t h e Rasa-perception is someway differi e r t from drama, because of t h e means w h i c h are different, S i e process, h o w e v e r , is t h e same. | p 3 e i n g it so, these faults concern t h e prima facie v i e w only, tf, according t o it, perception is subjected t o t h e distinctions I p o p e r t o oneself t o o t h e r s , etc. A n y h o w , n o m a t t e r w h i c h t h e | | e s i s is, Rasa results t o be a perception. T h i s is u n a v o i d a b l e . deed, t h e existence of an unperceived t h i n g , as, for instance, |& goblin, cannot be affirmed. T h e fact t h a t this p e r c e p t i o n Uncalled by t h e names of relish, tasting, o r enjoyment,does n o t IjBpount t o any difficulty. W e k n o w i n d e e d t h a t t h e direct "Ipgnition, t h e inference, t h e tradition, t h e i n t u i t i o n , t h e supern o r m a l experience, u n d e r their different namescaused by t h e different means w h i c h manifest t h e m , are equally b u t forms 1) Onitsvabhavokti, etc., see V. Raghavan, Some Concepts of the Alamkra Sstra, Adyar 1942, pp. 92-116.

R. GNOLI of p e r c e p t i o n . N o t h i n g t h e n forbids us t o admit t h a t thei occurs in t h e case of Rasa also, for t h e v e r y reason tti means by w h i c h it is manifested, viz. t h e c o m b i n a t i o n t j determinants, etc., assisted b y t h e c o n s e n t of h e a r t a n d s p l are of a n o n - o r d i n a r y n a t u r e . T h e use of t h e express ' T h e Rasas are perceived \ is just like t h e o n e ' t h e p o i is b e i n g c o o k e d \ T h e Rasa, indeed, is merely perce T h e relishing is only a particular perception. T h i s p e r c e | ^ ? in drama, is different from an o r d i n a r y inferential percept" * yet, in t h e b e g i n n i n g , this is required, as a means. Likewif t h e afore-said perception, in p o e t r y , is different from t h e ot verbal perceptions ; yet, in t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h e s e are r e q u i r | as a means. Therefore, t h e prima facie views are p u t t o death. Buj:l you say t h a t t h e exploits of R m a , etc., d o n o t e a r n t h e conss of heart of everybody, t h a t , I answer, is a great m a r k of ness ! E v e r y b o d y ' s m i n d is indeed characterized by t h e various latent i m p r e s s i o n s ; for as it h a s b e e n said, "As desire is permanent, these are beginningless " , and, " O a g r o u n d that t h e remembrances a n d t h e impressions are geneous there is an u n i n t e r r u p t e d succession of latent impr ions, even if they are separated by birth, space, and t i m e 1 Therefore, it is established t h a t Rasa is perceived. T h i s ception, in its t u r n , presents himself in t h e form of a relishing T h i s relishing is p r o d u c e d b y a n e w p o w e r , different frc t h e p o w e r of denotation, w h i c h t h e expressed sense a n d expressing w o r d s c o m e t o possess, t h a t is t h e p o w e r of t i of suggestion. T h e so-called p o w e r of b r i n g i n g a b o u t e n j o j | | ment, p r o p e r t o poetry, a c c o r d i n g t o y o u , consists^ a c t u a l l y of this p o w e r of suggestion only, a n d has, as its object, t h ^ Rasa. T h e o t h e r p o w e r also, vizy t h e p o w e r of effectuatiofff 1) Yogasutra, IV, stras 10 and 9. [ 112 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC| s actually based o n t h e usage of appropriate qualities and |p|naments. W e shall explain it diffusely. I t is n o t h i n g new. O n | | ; e other h a n d , if y o u say t h a t p o e t r y is effecting t h e Rasa, p|)n you, b y this very statement, resuscitate t h e t h e o r y of p r o duction. Besides, this p o w e r of effectuation can be p r o p e r ither t o t h e poetical w o r d s only, because, if t h e express sense ^ n o t k n o w n , t h e afore-said p o w e r cannot logically exist; p o r t o t h e express sense only, because, this b e i n g conveyed i||y o t h e r w o r d s , it does n o t longer exist. W e , o n t h e contrary, Jjftaintain t h a t this p o w e r of effectuation p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e tjtwo of t h e m , as it is confirmed in t h e stanza : " T h a t k i n d jjgf poetry, wherein cither t h e sense of t h e w o r d suggests t h e p t t p l i e d meaning " , etc.. 1 F u r t h e r , t h e effectuation-process ?|let us h e r e remember) is e n d o w e d w i t h t h r e e distinguished Shirts, t h a t is, t h e means, t h e necessary measures, a n d t h e end, CJTherefbre, if w e m a k e t h e p o w e r of manifestation c o r r e s p o n d |tQ t h e means, t h e a p p r o p r i a t e qualities a n d o r n a m e n t s t o t h e ?|iecessary measures, and t h e Rasas t o t h e end, p r o d u c e d by t h e lefiecting p o e m , it is quite clear t h a t t h e p o w e r of suggestion will icorrespond t o t h e first part, viz. t h e means. T h e enjoyment, | n its t u r n , is n o t p r o d u c e d by t h e poetical w o r d , b u t b y this | i o n - o r d i n a r y p o w e r of suggestion only, t h r o u g h t h e suppress-

n of o u r thick pall of mental s t u p o r a n d blindness. This ijoyment consists, according t o you, of t h e states of fluidity, Iftnlargement and expansion, is called also " tasting " , and is of p n o n - o r d i n a r y nature. I n o t h e r w o r d s , h a v i n g once established t h a t Rasa is suggested, t h e afore-mentioned p o w e r of b r i n g i n g 1) Dh.A., I, 13. " That kmd of poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning llfondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning, is designated by the learned as dhvam or c Suggestive poetry * ". (Translation of K.' iknshnamoorthy, ed. cit). 20 [ 113 ]

R GNOLI a b o u t enjoyment is, i t t o o , fatally established, T h e indeed, is identical w i t h t h e camatkra^ arising from t h e experience itself. F u r t h e r , as t h e constituent elements st etc., can b e found set o u t in a n infinite m e m b e r of di: ways, according t o t h e p r e d o m i n a n c e of t h e o n e o r t h e o; it is absurd t o limit t h e forms of tasting t o fluidity, etc., As t o t h e theory, according t o w h i c h t h e tasting of Ras similar t o t h e tasting of t h e supreme brahman^ w e h a v e n o t o object. M o r e o v e r , t h e teaching t o b e derived from is different from t h e injunctions a n d instructions i m p a r t e d ^ religious treatises a n d historical narratives. H o w e v e r , p t h e m , w h o maintain t h a t p o e t r y produces at t h e end a tead which differs from usual analogy, viz. " as R a m a , so I " , consists in an enrichment of o u r o w n p o w e r of intuition^ instrument w h i c h allows t h e tasting of Rasa, w e h a v e noi t o reproach. 1 Therefore, this is definitely e s t a b l i s h ^ namely, t h a t Rasas are manifested a n d are tasted t h r o u g h a ception.

1) See, in this connexion, the A.BL, I. p, 41: nanu deam karoti, netyha, kintu buddhim vivardhayati, svaprattbhm evam fariif} vitaratt || Elsewhere (Dh.A.L., p. 40) A.G. says that the principal elemn j|j not knowledge (for in that ease there would be confusion with works ^ ethics and historiography) but pleasure (prtti, nandd). The pleasure!* knowledge, both sm generis, aroused by poetry are not distinct from * other but are two aspects of the same thing (na caite prfovyutpatt bhmnarB eva> dvayor apy ekavisayatvt, Dh.A.L., p. 336).

GENERAL

INDEX

The numbers refer to pages. a, cf. Power of denotation. (Abhijnnaakuntal, 541. abhilw, cf. Longing. %bhinavabhratl, XXXV, XLVI, f XLIX. /v\bhinavagupta, XIX, et passim. obhinaya, cf. Repiesentation. Absolute, brahman, 47 l b , Accessory aim, prayojana, 641. Accomplishment, sampatti, 62. adbhuta, cf. Marvellous Rasa. adbhutabhoga, cf. Marvellous enjoyment. adhikarin, cf. Qualified person. adhyavasya, cf. Mental cognition. Aesthetic cognition, 562. Aesthetic Experience, XV, XXII 1 , XXXVI, 47 l b , 60 1 , 8 2 \ Anandavardhana, XX 1 , XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIfl, XXIX, XXXIV, XXXV, XLVl, XLIX, LII. Tma\amala, cf. Maculation of desire. anaucitya, cf. Impropriety. anga, cf. Gestures. Anger, krodha, XV, 29, 71 \ 74. ngiknbhinaya, cf. Gestacular representation. Anka, 641. anubhciva, cf. Consequents. anubhva, cf. Experience. anubhvan, 79. anukara, cf. Imitation. anukarana, cf. Imitation. anukarana, cf. Reproduction. anulrtana, cf. Re-telhng. Aesthetic perception, 43, 5 0 \ 54 4 . anumna, cf. Inference. Aesthetic pleasure, prlti or ananda, anumna, cf. Reasoning. 59*, 64 1 . anuptavesa, cf. Personal participation. After-production,pascatkarana, 39. anusamdhZina, cf. Realization. Agnipurna, XLVI, 263. anusamdhi ( or anusamdhna ), cf. Aggregate, samuha, 42. Realisation. fl/wm, cf. Ego. onusamdhi, cf. Unification. ahidaya, cf. Unaesthetic person. anusmtti, cf. Recollection. aikgrya, cf. Conspiration. anuttamapraki ti, cf. Inferior nature. Aim of poetry, kvyrtha, 50. Anuvyavasaya, 60 3 . Ajitpda, XVII 2 , XIX 1 . 2 Anxiety, arthacinta, 29 ] . alaksyakrama, XXIX . Anxiety, cmf, 77, 78. alamkara, cf. Ornaments. apahasita, cf. Vulgar laughter. amarsa, cf. Indignation. apramrthika, cf. Unreal. dnanda, cf. Beatitude, arabhatl ( vrtti} cf. Horrific stvle z, cf. Bliss.

116

GENERAL INDEX Bhatta Niyana, XLII. Bhatta Nyaka,' XX, XX 1 , X3CJ: XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XM$ XXXVI, XLVI, LU, 43, 4 \ 45 1 , 47 a , 49, 50, 51, 5 5 |5 58 3 , 107, 1071. Bhatta Tauta,XX, Bhatta Tota, XXXV, XLVffl, y LU, 33, 33 1 , 35 2 . ^ bh\a, cf. the matter of Rasa. bhvan, cf. Propulsion. bhmcrn, cf. power of revelation.^ bhvyamna, cf. Revealed. bhaya, cf. Fear. X bhaynaka, cf. Terrible Rasa, bhoga, cf. Enjoyment, bhoga, cf. Fruition. bhogkarana, cf. Bringing about enjoyment. Bhoja, 47 l a . Bhojavitii, 47 )a . Bhuvanbhyudaya, XIX 1 . bibfrctsa, cf. Odious Rasa. Bliss, nanda, 60 1 . Brahma, 9 3 \ 98. brahman, XXIV, 115. Brhmana Nyaka, i.e., Bhatta,, Nyaka. Bringing about enjoyment, bhogU' karana, 50. buddhi, cf. Mental substance. Buddhist, XXIV, XXVII, 9 5 \ Buddhistic Idealism, VijMnavday XXXVII. camatkra, cf. Wonder. camatkara, 54*, 59, 59 , 62, 81^ 97, 100, 104, 114. cmcalya, cf. Mobility. 3 Capacity to produce effects, artha* kriykritva, 31 7 . Casual efficiency, arthakriya, 31, 95,9s 1 .

Arrangement, samnivesa, 42. artha, cf. Material property. artha, cf. Reality. arthacinta, cf. Anxiety. arthakrya, cf. Causal efficiency. arthit, cf. Requirement. Artificial, k\trima, 29. Artistic intuition, pratibh, 4. Assistant, pripTirsvika, 65 9 . Astonishment, vsmaya, XLVL svdana, cf. Tasting. atihasita, cf. Excessive laughter. trnan, cf. Self. aticltya, cf. Correspondence. Audramdgadhi ( pravitti ) , 6 9 \ avagamanaakti, cf. Power of communication. Avant (pravitti ) , 691. Avantivarman, XVII 2 , XX 1 , XXXI. v&ta, cf. Immersion. bala, cf. Power. Beatitude, Tinanda, XXIII 1 , 47. Beauty, saundarya, 82. Benediction stanza, rcnc//, 65 2 . Bhairava, 82 1 . Bhmaha, L, 103J. bhakti, cf. Religious devotion. BhZna, 64 1 . Bharata, XIV, XVI, XVII, XXI, XLIX, 25,27 2 , 28, 28 1 , 291, 31 6 , 33, 40, 41, 42 2 , 502, 52, 65 2 , 663, 67, 7 1 \ 761, 77, 77 2 , 80, 80 4 , 98, 104, 105. bhrat ( vttti ) , cf. Eloquent style. Bhartrhari, XXIV, XXXl 2 , 561. Mov, cf. Dialect. Bhskar, 563. Bhatta Lollata, XVII, XVII 2 , XVIII, XIX, XIX 1 , XXXV, XXXVI, 25, 26 \ 26 3 , 27, 28, 28 2 , 49, 6 2 \ 1091.

GENERALINDLX Cause, krana, XVI. f cint, cf. Anxiety. cittacamatkra, cf. Self-flashing of thought. Clearness, prasanna, 111. Cognition, jnapti, 84. Cognition, xijnana, XVII 1 . Combination, sornyoga, 25, 82, 86. Comic Rasa, hcisya, XVI, 28, 76 1 . Command, vidhi, 52, 52 4 . Compactness, ekaghanat, 73 1 . Conscious effort, prayatna, 29. Consciousness, samvid, XL 4 , 34, 47, 5L Consequent, anubhaxa, XVI, 25, 26, 29, 39, 42, 70, 72*, 77, 78, 104, 110. Conspiration, aikagrya, 78. Constituent elements, gtm#, 46 1a . Contentment, <#*//*, 78. Conventional meaning, XXV11I. Correspondence, aucitya, 81. Creative inspiration, krayitn pratibha, L. Creator, Prajpati, XLVIII. Critics, vyakhyaU, 33. Daitya, 94 1 . Dksinty {pravitti ), 69 1 . Dandin, XVI, XVlP, L, 27. DaiarOpa, 29 l , 42 2 , 64 1 , 66 3 . Death, mar ana, 29 \ Defects, dosa, 45. Defined, niyata, 109. Delight, ratf, 29, 35 2 , 71 1 , 73, 74. Demons, 98. Depression, dainya, 78 Determinant, vibhva, XVI, XLIX, 25, 26, 27, 28 3 28 2 , 29, 35, 35', 38, 42, 4 2 \ 44, 45, 51, 59 4 , 62, 70, 72^, 73, 73 3 , 76, 77, 78, 79 l ,80, 81, 82,84, 86, 87, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112.

117

Devoid of obstacles, nirvighna, 56. dharma, cf. Moral and Religious duty. DharmaUrti, XXXII 2 , 377, 33 2 , 42, 56 1 . dhiti, cf. Contentment. dhruvTi, 40. dhvananavypara, cf. Power of evocation. dhvani, cf. Resonance. dhvani, cf. Suggestive poetry. Dhvanyloka, XX 1 , XXVII, XXV11I, XIX, XXXV. Dialect, bhsa, 65. Dilatation, vtstara, 46 a , 47. Dima, 64 \ Direct expenence, skstkcira, 54. Direct perception, daisana, 49. Direct perception, pratyaksasdksatkcirakolpa, 96. Disgust, jugupsa, XV, 74. Distinct apprehensions, vikalpa, 562. Distiess, uhega, 2 9 \ dosa, cf. Defects. Drama, 41. druti, ci. Fluidity. Effects, karya, XVI. Ego, aham,XL4. ekaghanat, cf. Compactness. Elements of principal order, sthnyibhava, 11l. Eloquent style, bhrati vitti, 68 3 . Emotions, Bhva (or sthyibhva), XV. Energy, utsciha, IV. Enjoyment, bhoga, 46, 501, 62. Enumeration of the loved one's meiits, gunahrtana, 29 \ Erotic Rasa, sffigci a, XVI, 27, 29 1 , 31 6 , 34, 6 8 \ 71 1 , 76 1 , 87.

118

GENERAL INDEX hasa, cf. Laughter. hasita, cf. Smile. hsya, cf. Comic Rasa. Heart, htdaya, 60 1 . Hemacandra, XIX, XLVIIIfxi 263,31 7 ,84\ ^.'g^ Heroic Rasa, vira, XVI, 76 1 . Heroism, ntsaha, XV, 29, Historical world, samsara, Horrific style, arabhatl ht daya, cf. Heart, Hrdayadarpana ( i.e., ' darpana \XX\ XLVI, icch, cf. Will. Idealistic Buddhism, vijnandy&d 62\ Ihamrga, 64 1 . Imagination, samkalpa, 60. Imitation, anukarana, 41 3 , 64 l . Imitation theory, XIX. ; Immersion, nirvesa or avesa,1 84. ;1 Immersion in an enjoyment,, hh Impressions, uparaga, 82. Impressive feeling, ranjana, Impropriety, anaucitya, 94. Indifference, Tatasihya or yasthya, 64, 81 4 . Indignation, amarsa, 29. Individual essence, v/tefa, 9< Individuality, svlaksanya, {Ineffable quiescence, nirvarji XXIV. " :',$ Inference, anumana, 44. / c , Inferior nature, anuttamaprakrf^ 74. ;^ Initial presenaticn, prastcncrk 65. "| Inner perception, mlnasapratya^i ksa, 60 3 .

Excessive laughter, atihasita, 28 4 . Expansion, viksa, 46 l a , 47. Exprience, anitbhva, 50. Extended, \itata, 56. External combination, samagr, 42. Extraneous interference, vfghna, XXII 1 . Fame, prasiddhi, 63. Farce, prahasana, 63. Fear, fcAajtf, XV, 74. Fever, vydhi, 29 \ Firmness, sthairya, 29. Fluidity, drw/i, 46 1a , 47, 50. Form of consciousness, pratipatti, 524. Fruition, i/iga, XX1II. Furious Rasa, raudra, XVI, 27, 68 3 , 761. Gay style, kaiiik vitti, 6 8 \ Generality, sdhranya, XXII 1 , 44. General definition, scmanya-lar ksana, UK General essence, smanya-laksana, 95 1 . Gentle laughter, \ihasita, 28*. Gentle mind, sukumaramati, 82'. Gestacular representation, uhgiklbhinaya, 30. Gestures, ahga, XVII 1 . ghrn, cf. Vibration. God, Paramesvara, XL, XL 4 . Goddess of beauty, $n, 594. Grammarian, Vaiyakarana, 45. Grandoise style sattva y nil, 68 3 . gwmz, cf. Constituent elements. guna, cf. Quality. Gunaeandra, 562. gimakrtana, cf. Enumeration of etc. Hara, 54. Harsa,31 ! .

GENERAL INDEX Inner sense, manah,47u. Insanity, unmda, 2 9 \ Intonation, kaku, 40. Intuition, jmatibhna, LI, 49, 53. , Intuitive consciousness, prajha, LI. Invariable concomitance, vyapti, 56. Isvara, cf. Unlimited Ego, or God. Jadacf, cf. Stupor. Jayapda, XVIII 1 . Jayaratha^XXVIl 1 . jnapti, cf. Cognition. jugups, cf. Disgust. Juncture, samdhyahga, 41, 41 2 . Kaisik ( vrtti ) , cf. Gay style. kaksy, cf. Zones. kku, cf. Intonations. Kalhana, XIX 1 , XX 1 . Kiidsa, XXXV, 541, 60, 64 4 . Kalata, 60 1 . kma, cf. Love. Kama, cf. Pleasure. Kant, L1I. Kapila, 73. karana, cf. Cause. krayitr pratibha, cf. Creative inspiration. krya, cf. Effects. karma, cf. Pathetic Rasa. Kashmir, XVII 2 , XIX 1 , XX 1 , .XXIII 1 , XXVI, XLI11 1 , 3 3 \ 60 1 . kathd, cf. Tales. Kvydafa, XVII 2 , L*. Kavyakautuka, XX, XXXV, LI 2 , 3 3 \ 99. Kvyalahkcira ( of Bhmaha ), XXVII 1 , L 3 , 1022. Kvyalankcra ( of Vmana ), L*. Kuvyammms, LI 1 .

119

Kavyanusasana, XLVIII. Kavyapradipa, 76 2 . Kavyrtha, cf. Aim of poetry. kvyrtha, cf. Purpose of poetry. krtana, cf. Narration. krodha, cf. Anger. Ksemaraja, XVH 2 , XVIII, XX 1 . ksobha, cf. Shock. Kumarasambhava, 542. Kumrila, XX 1 , 52*, 5 6 \ 1022. laksanU, cf. Transfer. Laksm, 59. f^a, cf. WomenVdance. Latent impression, vcisana or samskara, XVI, 2 6 \ 72 2 . Laughter, to^, XV, 73, 74. Laughter of ridicule, upahasita, 28 4 . fe^a, cf. Lysis. Learning, vyutpatti, 63, Liberation, moksa, 71 1 . Light, ^rafeitf, XXIII 1 , 47. Limited, par imita, 56. Limiting causes, niyamahetu, 57. /mg, cf. Logical reasons. Local usages, pravrtti, 68. Locana, XXXII 2 , 'xXXIV 1 . Logical reasons, lihga, 27. lokadharm, cf. Realistic representation. ^Lollata, i.e., Bhatta Lollata. Longing, abhilasa, 29 l . Love, kama, 28, 29L.' Lysis, laya, XX11I, XXIII 1 , XLI, 62. Maculation of desire, cnavamala, 60 4 . madhura, cf. Sweetness. mdhyasthya, cf. Indifference. Mahevarnanda, XXIX. Mahimabhatta, XXVI, 31 7 , 47 i b .

120

GENERAL INDEX Musical tempi, cf. Tla. Mystical cognition, 56 2 . /T/ir/J, cf. Benediction Narasimhagupta, xxxv. fc Narration, kirtana, 101. Ntaka, 63, 64 1 . Nature of things, vastuvitta, 4f.| Ncityadarpana, 562. ntyadharm, cf. Theatrical 3t ventions. Niyasstra, XIV, XV, 26 3 . ^ Ntyaveda, 93. nirvana, cf. Ineffebl ^ ^ nitveia, cf. Immerssion. ninighna, cf. Devoid of obstacle! nirviti, cf. Solution. nispatti, cf. Production. niyamahetu, cf. Limiting causs>f niyatay cf. Defined. niyata, cf. Particular being. niyoga, cf. Order. Noble person, uttamaptafati, 3fg Non-ordinary nature, 54*. Nyyamajar, 49 4 . NyayasTttra, 2 6 \ 68 2 . Objective thing, siddha, 85. Obstacle, v/gW, XXIII 1 , XE1J XLI 1 , 55, 58 2 , 62 4 , 64, 6774V Odious Rasa, bbhatsa, XVI,*68?i 76 1 , ojosvin, cf. Powerfulness. Order, niyoga, 52. Ornaments, ahmkeira, 27 1 , 45,. panaka, 85. Pahcali (pravttti), 69 x . paramurlha, cf. Supreme purpose, prmrthika, cf. Real. Paramesvara, cf. God. parasamvitiy cf. Consciousness. * parvttti, cf. Revulsion.

M'ilatimahava, 98 1 . Mammall, XXII 1 , 32 1 , 471*. manah, cf. Inner sense. manoh, cf. Mmd. rwinasdhyavasya, cf. Mental cognition. manasapratyaksa, cf. Inner perception. mandapa, cf. Pavilion. Mandara, 59, 59 e . Manifested, vyangya, 51. Manifested sense, vyangya.XXIX. Mcnikyacandra, LI 2 . marana, cf. Death. Marvellous enjoyment, adbhutabhoga, 60. Maivcllous Rasa, albhuta, XV, 761. Material property, fl/7/wr, 71 1 . matter of Rasa, bhva, 701. my, XXI 1 . Means, upya, 49. Means of knowledge, pramna, 85. Memoiy, sw/f/, 26 ! . Mental cognition, mnasdhyavasaya, 60, 60 3 , 69 ! . Mental perception, manosapiatyaksa, 544. Mental Series, santna, XXXVII. Mental stupor, moha, XXII, 45. Mental substance, buddhi, 46 l a . Mmmsaka, 45. Mind, manah, 343. Mobility, cancolya, 73. wote, cf. Stupor. moksa, cf. Liberation. Moral and Religious duty, dhatma, 71 1 . Micchakatika, 97. mukhyavftti, cf. Primary sense.

GENEf AL INDEX parimita, cf. Limited. parprsvika> cf. Assistant. Particular being, niyata, 39. Particular definition, cf. visesolaksaqa, 112. ; Particularity, Visesa, 55, 95. Patafijali, XLI. Pathetic Rasa, karuna, XVI, 31 6 , 43, 7 6 \ 107. Pavilion, mandapa, 65. /Perfect combination, samyagyoga, 7*. Permanent, sthyay, XV1. Permanent feeling* 77, 110. Permanent mental movement, 844. Permanent mental state, sthayibhva, 26, 27, 301, 31, 38, 40, 42, 43, 4 3 \ 7 5 \ 80, 805, 106. Permanent participation, anupravesa, 8 I e . Personality, svatma, 39. Philosophers, tathacintoka, 33 2 . ; Poetical meaning, XXVI. Power, fcfl/a, 29. A Powerfulness, ojasvin, 111. JPower of communication, avcti gamanasakti, 31. Power of denotation, cf. abhiha, I 45. (Power of evocation, dhyananavyapara, 5 0 \ Power of revelation, bkcnanc, 45. Plato, XLVI. ^Pleasure, kama, 71 \ Pleasure, prlti or ananda, 114. Pleasure, s A ? , 31, 72, 1151. Prabhkara, XVIIP, 52 4 , 641. i Practical existence, samsTmkabhva, 96. Practical life, vyavahra, 33 2 . jprahasana, cf. Farce,

121

Prajapati, cf. Creator. Prakarana, 64 1 . praksa, cf. Light. Prakrti, 42*. prajn, cf. Intuitive consciousness. Prakaa, cf. Light. pramana^ cf. Means of knowledge. Pramnavrttika, XXXII 2 , 33 2 . prasanna, cf. Clearness. prasiddhi, cf. Fame. prastavan,c. Initial presentation. pratapatudrya, 73 1 . pralibhd, cf. Artistic intuition. pratibh, cf. Supreme Vocality. pratipotti, cf. Form of Consciousness. Pratyabhijn-knk, XXXVII1. pratyaksasakptkirakalpo, cf. Direct expeiience. piavitti, cf. Local usage. prayatna, cf. Conscious effort. prayojana, cf. Accessory aim. Preliminaries, pr\arcnga, 65. Primary sense, mukhyo v/Jti, 26 3 . Principal forms of consciousness, sthayibhavo, IV. prti, cf. Aesthetic pleasure. Production, nlsptti, 84. Production of actions similar, sadtsakarana, 39. Production of Rasa, rasa-nhpatii, 85, 86. Propulsion, bhavana, 52, 52 4 . Purpose of poetry, kvyrtha, XV1. Prvannmms, 52 4 . prvaranga, cf. Preliminaries. Qualified person, adhikorin, 52, 53. Quality9 gww, 45. Quiet, &WW, XXXVI. Quietistic Rasa, 5m/<7, XVI, XXXYL

122

GENERAL INDEX Relish, rasanc, 62, Re-perception, anuvyavasay, 99, 101. Representation, abhinaya^W^l Reproduction, anukarariQ1f2S Requirement, arthitn, 52. Resonance, dhvani, XXIX. Rest, visranti, XXIII 1 , 4 7 f $ Re-telling, anukrtana, 413< Revealed, bhavyamana, 15- J Revealed word, sruti, 49. Revelation, bhvana, XXI, > 50. Revelation, sniti, 52. Revulsion, parvrtti, XXlYu sabda, cf. Verbal testimony. sdharanya, cf. Generality. Sahityadarpana, 47 l a . Sahrdayadarpana, XX, XXI. sahf-dayatva, cf. Sensibility. Saiva schools, 60 1 . Sakuntal, 60 . imf, cf. Serenity. samagrl, cf. External combinat! samanyalaksna, cf. General^ nition. sampatli, cf. Accomplishment^ Samavakra, 6 4 \ Samba, 52 4 . sambandha, cf. Relation. Samctana, 79 x . samdhyahga, cf. Junctures. samkapa, cf. Imagination. Smkhya, 42, 42*,46 l a . samkraman, cf. Transfer. samnivesa, cf. Arrangement samsara, cf. Historical world smsrikabhava, cf. Practical ^ | perience. samsrika existence. 46 l a . samskra, cf. Latent

Rjaekhara, L, Ll 1 . Rama, XVIII, 26 3 , 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 43*, 44, 583, 63, 63 2 , 66\ 76, 86, 9 5 \ 97, 9?, 100, 107, 110, 112, 114. Rraacandra, 562. Rmyana, 94. rangaptha, cf. stage. ranjana, cf. Impressive feeling. Rasa, XIV, XV, XVI, XVIII, XX, XXI, XXV, XXIX, XXXV, XXXVJ, XLVIII, XLIX, 25, 26 3 , 28, 29, 33, 38, 42, 43, 44, 444, 49, 50, 52, 54*, 58, 62, 67, 69 2 , 72, 73, 76 \ 77, 77 2 , 78, 79, 7 9 \ 80, 8 0 \ 81,84, 85,86, 8 6 \ 94, 96, 102, 103, 104,105, 1C6, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114. rasan, cf. Relish. rasan, cf. Tasting. rasanispati, cf. Production of Rasa. Rasapradpa, XVIII 3 . Rasyana, 75*. rati, cf. Delight. RatnvaU, 31 \ vaudra, cf. Furious Rasa. Rvana, 97. Raving, vikalpa, 2 9 \ Real, paramrthika, 41. Real nature, vastiivttta, 33. Realisation, anusamdhi, XVIII. Realistic representation, lokadharm, 69. Reality, artha, XX1V, 78. Realization, anusamdhna, 26. Reasoning, anumana, 49. Recollection, anusmrti, 29 1 . Relation,,sambandha, 78. Religious devotion, bhakti, XL 3 .

U1MNUKAL INDEX samuha, cf. Aggregate. samvid, cf. Consciousness. samyagyoga, cf. Perfect combination. samyoga, cf. Combination. Saikaravarman, XVII2, XX1-. Sankuka, XVII 2 , XIX, XIX 1 , XXXV, 27, 31 7 , 32, 33, 37, 374, 38, 4 5 \ 61 s , 80, 803. 8 1 \ HO2. Jnta, cf. Quietistic Rasa. santna, cf. Mental series. saitva, 115. Sttvati ( vrtti )., cf. Grandoise style. saundarya, cf. Beauty. Self, mman, XL 4 . Self-flashing of thought, dttar camatkora, XLVI. Self-knowing, svasanivedanasiddha, 54 4 . /Sensibility, sahrdayatva, XLIII 1 . Serenity, iama, XVI, 71 \ sevay cf. Sexual enjoyment. Sexual enjoyment, sev, 29. Shock, ksobha, XLVII. siddha, cf. Objective thing, iks, cf. Skill. Similitude, 321. Slt, 38, 43, 43 s , 107. iva, cf. God. iva/54 2 , 82 l . ivadrsti, XLVI1, 601. ivastotrval, XLVl 1 . ivastra, XLVI 4 . Skill, iiksa, 29. Slight smile, smita, 28 4 . smita, cf. Slight smile. Smile, hasita, 28 4 . 5"m///, cf. Memory. soka, cf. Sorrow. Solution, nirvrti, XXIII 1 .

123

Somnanda, XLVI, 60 1 . Sorrow, soka, XV, 29, 74. spanda, cf. Vibration. Spandakrik, XIX 1 , 60 1 . spandamnat, cf. State of vibration. Spaninirqaya, Bhatta Lollata quoted, XVII 2 , Bhatta kyaka quoted, XX 1 . Spanda school, XLVL Sphoia, 45. sphurattci, cf. Vibration. srama, cf. Weariness. 3r (Laksrn), cf. Goddess of beauty. srngra, cf. Erotic Rasa. Stage, rafigaptha, 65. State of Indifference, tatasthya, XX11I, State of vibration, spandamanata, XLIII 1 . Stavacintcirnaniy XL1I. sthairya, cf. Firmness. sthy, cf. Permanent. Sthyibhva, 76 1 . sthyibhva, cf. Elements of principal order. sthyibh'va, cf. Emotions. sthyibhva, cf. Principal forms of consciousness. Stupor, ;Wt, 29 1 . Stupor, moha, XXI 1 . Style, vrttu 68, 68 3 . Suggestive poetry, dhvani, 113. sukha, cf. Pleasure. sukumciramati, cf. Gentle mind. Sun God, 524. Supreme purpose, paramartha 9 ll l . Supreme Vocal ity, pratibha, XLVIII. svlaksanya, cf. Individuality.

124

GENERAL INDEX upadesa, cf. Teaching. upahasita, cf. Laughter of ridiciril upamiti, cf. Analogy. uparga, cf. Impression. upya, cf. Means. Utpaladeva, XXXVII, XLVI, utstiha, cf.-Heroism or Energy. ntsipikcmka, 6 4 \ uttamaprakfti, cf. Noble person. vac, cf. Voice. vcikTibhinaya, cf. Verbal re sentation. vaiykorafa, cf. Grammarian. Vkyapadya, XXIV 1 , XXXII 2 . Vmana, L. vs*, cf. Latent Impression. vastuvttta, cf. Nature of things. Vasubandhu, XXIV. Vasugupta, XVII 2 , XLVI. Vtsyyana, 68. Vtsyyanabhsya, 68 2 . Verbal representation, v a ^ naya, 30. *j Verbal testimony, sabda, 44, IOT^ vibhva, cf. Determinant. vibhvana, 78, 79 1 , Vibration, spanda, 60. Vibration, sphuratta or ghirn, 6 0 \ v<#, cf. Command. Vidycakravartin, 47 l a . vighno, cf. Extraneous interference;! vighna, cf. Obstacle. vihasito, cf. Gentle laughter. vijnana, cf. Cognition, yijhanavada, cf. Buddhistic Idea-; hsm. Vijanavdm, 62, vikalpa, cf. Distinct apprehension. vikalpa, cf. Raving. viksa, cf. Expansion. vimarsa, cf. Thought.

Svrthanumanopariccheda, 33 2 . svatm, cf. Personality. Sweetness, madhura, 111. Tales, kath, 95. tamah, XXI 1 . Tantraloka, XXXVII 1 , XXXVIII. Tantrasra, XLV. Tantravartika, 1022. Tasting, asvada, 48, 5 0 \ 544, 62. Tasting, rasari, 49, 86. ttasthya, cf. State of indifference. tattvacintaka, cf. Philosophers. Teaching, upadesa, 63. Terrible Rasa, bhoyanaka, XVI, 56, 76 1 . Theatrical conventions, mine dharm, 65. Thought, vimarsa, XL 4 , 60 1 . Three constituent elements, gunasy 46 l a . Transfer, ldksan, 1021. Transfer, satpkramana, 52. Transitory feelings, 78. Transitory mental movement, 80 4 , 8K Transitory Mental State, vyabhicaribhva, XVI, XVII, 25, 29, 42, 75 1 . Transitory state, 26, 110. Transitory sentiments, 77. Udayana, 31. Udbhata, XVIII 1 , XXVII 1 , 1022. udvega, cf. Distress. ullukasana, 59, 592. Um,.54, Unaesthetic person, ahtdava, 67. Unification, anusamdhi, 95. Uniformity, ekaghanatci, 58. Unlimited Ego, 56 3 . unmada, cf. Insainty, Unreal, aparamarthika, 55.

GENERAL INDEX vira, cf. Heroic Rasa, vismaya, cf. Astonishment. vismaya, cf. Wonder. visera, cf. Individual essence. visera, cf. Particularity. lisesalaksana, cf. Part cuiar definition. Visnu, 59. visrTnti, cf. Rest. stara, cf. Dilatation. Vivantha, 47 l a , 7 9 \ vitata, cf. Extended. VthU 641. Voice, vc9 XVII 1 . v/tt/, cf. Style. Vulgar laughter^ cpahosita, 28 4 . vyabhicribhna, cf. Transitory Mental State. vydh, cf. Fever.

125

vyukhyfflt, cf. Critics. vyaktiviveka, 31 7 , 47 l b . v}Wg}0, cf. Manifested sense. vypti, cf. Invariable concomitance. Vysabhsya, 2 6 \ 75 7 . v)ovahZro, cf. Practical life. Vyayoga, 64 ! . vyutpotti, cf. Learning. Weariness, srama, 77. Will, /ccte, 601. Women's dance, feya, 40, 66 3 . Wonder, vismaya, XV. Wonder, camatkara, XLV. YogaSBUa, 2 6 \ 75 7 , 82 2 , 1121. Yoga system, 46 l a . Yogartisistha, XLVI. Zones, kaksyd, 65.