State of India's Environment, A Citizens Report: Rich Lands Poor People, Is 'Sustainable' Mining Possible?

State of Indias
ENVIRONMENT A C I T I Z E N S ' R E P O RT
RICH LANDS
IS SUSTAINABLE MINING POSSIBLE?
POOR PEOPLE
TO THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST EVERYTHING TO MINING
Governments in India love to talk about poverty but usually serve the interests of contractors and companies. The trouble is that mineral exploitation can easily destroy the natural resource base of the poor forests and biodiversity, in particular unless there is a resources which involves the local people instead of alienating them strong governance of these
1947-2002
Anil Agarwal Founder Director, CSE
State of Indias
ENVIRONMENT A C I T I Z E N S ' R E P O RT
RICH LANDS POOR PEOPLE
IS SUSTAINABLE MINING POSSIBLE?
CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
Writers: Chandra Bhushan and Monali Zeya Hazra Editor: Souparno Banerjee The following people have assisted and made contributions in this report: Radhika Krishnan, Nivit Kumar Yadav, Allyson Amster, Sujit Kumar Singh, Shachi Chaturvedi, Sugandh Juneja, Kanika Sethi, Sonia Henam, Ranjan Panda, Sarabjit Butalia, Ritu Dwivedi, Sumit Singh, R Shreedhar, Philip Neri deSouza, Amit Shanker and Anil Kumar Cover design: Surya Sen Cover photo: Agnimirh Basu Design and layout: Kirpal Singh and Surender Singh Sketches: Shyamal Banerjee Maps: Kirpal Singh (Maps in this report are indicative and not to scale) Production: R Arokia Raj and Gundhar Das
2008 Centre for Science and Environment

Material from this publication can be used, but with acknowledgement.
Published by Centre for Science and Environment 41, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi 110 062 Ph: 91-11-2995 6110, 2995 5124, 2995 6394, 2995 6399 Fax: 91-11-2995 5879, 2995 0870 Email: cse@cseindia.org Website: www.cseindia.org
Printed at Excellent Printing House, New Delhi
CONTENTS
Preface..............................................................................................................................iii
Foreword
CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 4
..................................................................................................iv
Rich lands, poor people ......................................................................1 The industry and its economics ....................................................23 Bearing the brunt: people and the environment ................65 Mining in the states ........................................................................109
A n d h r a P r a d e s h ................................................................................111 C h h a t t i s g a r h ......................................................................................120 G o a ....................................................................................................141 T h e H i m a l a y a n s t a t e s ........................................................................151 J h a r k h a n d a n d We s t B e n g a l ..............................................................159 K a r n a t a k a a n d M a h a r a s h t r a ..............................................................190 K e r a l a a n d Tamil Nadu ......................................................................204 M a d h y a P r a d e s h ................................................................................210 T h e n o r t h - e a s t ..................................................................................220 O r i s s a ..................................................................................................228 R a j a s t h a n a n d G u j a r a t ......................................................................263
CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 7
The challenge of governance ......................................................275 Rehabilitation: the regulatory roadblocks ............................293 The way ahead ....................................................................................315 Annexure: Forest cover and Human Development Index:
major mineral districts of the country ..................................................321
Abbreviations ......................................................................................327 References ............................................................................................330
FOREWORD
This State of Indias Environment report began by chance. It also began with a question. In early 2004, we had visited Nimmalapadu in Andhra Pradesh where tribals had fought and won a significant battle against mining by a big corporation. Nimmalapadu is a remote, idyllic hamlet, with lush green rice fields surrounded by hills. Its tale was truly heroic for over 10 years, the people in this otherwise poor village had fought the might of one of the biggest industrial houses in the country. Their struggle had taken them all the way to the Supreme Court, where a historic judgement had ruled that mining will not be allowed in Indias tribal districts unless the locals were the owners (or majority stakeholders) of the mines. But as we travelled back on the dust road to town, we had one big question: how long would these people be able to hold out against the mining industry? The people were poor, but the lands they lived on were rich and coveted. The minerals under their houses were the drivers of economy across the world. Should mining be banned in such places? Or would it be better to change the terms of the mining contract, so that it benefits people and their environment? What is sustainable mining? Is it at all possible? In 2005, our research on the cement sector enlightened us about another facet. We learnt how the booming Indian cement industry, which was more energy-efficient than its counterparts in the West, was callous and negligent about mining its raw material. The cost it paid for its minerals was miniscule, but the imprint it left on the environment was debilitating. Clearly, our mining regulations were either deficient or not being enforced. It was also apparent that our policy to price mineral raw materials used to manufacture products like cement, was at a variance with new realities; moreover, it paid absolutely no attention to the need to compensate local people whose lands were being devastated. We realised that the cement industry was not unique or unusual in these traits, nor in the grinding poverty and economic backwardness which characterised the areas in which its plants were based. Modern industrial growth needs the resources of the region: its minerals, water and energy. It does not need the people. Employment in the cement sector was dipping. It was clear to us that inclusive growth would require ways to value local resources be it water, minerals or energy so that industry could give back more than it took. This was also a time when I was working on a report for the Prime Minister on tiger conservation. We had assembled a map of India which superimposed the districts which are classified as the poorest in the country, on the forest areas, the watershed areas and the areas of maximum tiger density. There was a complete match. My colleagues, however, pointed out that the map was incomplete unless we added the mineral-rich regions and the areas where Naxalite violence was at its most intense. We did, and a new geography emerged. When I presented my report, I told the Prime Minister that his tragedy was that he headed a country whose poorest people lived on its richest lands. Obviously, something was desperately wrong with the way we practised development. But these issues were fragments, at best, of the bigger story one that was still eluding us. In 2006, we gave a fellowship to journalists to investigate mining and its impacts on environment and people. Media professionals from across the country traversed the mining districts to unfold the harsh realities of mining mafia, pollution, deforestation and peoples anger. The reports were a revelation: we learnt how the fissures were widening between the miners and the inhabitants of these lands. This is when all the pieces in the puzzle fell together. It became clear that after services and manufacturing, the mineral sector was on its way to becoming the next boom sector for the economy. India is sitting pretty on huge mineral reserves. The demand in China is driving up prices to new heights. The government has already opened out the sector to private players players who are big. They are desperate for entry. The stakes are high. The contest an unequal one is on. Ranged on the one side are all the interests that define the incredible India dream; on the other side are people whose land is up for grabs; whose survival depends on the forests which will be needed for mining; whose animals graze on the lands where mining rejects will be dumped; and whose water comes from the hills which will be blasted. The life of these people is in their environment. Its degradation is their devastation. The question, then, is if there is a balance in this challenge. This is what my colleagues have tried to understand and present in this report. From this understanding, they want us to look for the meaning of sustainable mining and to see if we can break this logjam of wealth in the midst of destitution and degradation. The first State of Indias Environment report, published in 1982, had built the foundations of Indias green concern. It had provided us with the insights to understand why a poor nation as ours needed to care for its environment. Almost 25 years later, the sixth State of Indias Environment report tells us that the old challenges of poverty and environmental degradation remain as urgent as ever for new India to resolve. We know that we need a new bargain. How we get it is the only question. Sunita Narain
iv
Rich lands, poor people
he mineral map of India is one that will gladden any potential investor: vast tracts of territory, overlying massive, rich and some entirely untapped deposits of minerals like coal, iron, bauxite, manganese and chromite. For investors, these hold
promises of unimagined wealth; for the lands lawmakers, these constitute the very pillars of their idea of the Modern State. Prospecting and extraction, with each group helping the other, could be a cakewalk. Almost. What queers the picture is a small truth which has remained elusive, ignored or misunderstood over the years: these minerals lie under the same lands which hold most of Indias biologically-diverse forests and water systems. Whats more, the nations poorest, most marginalised people inhabit these lands, its richest. The land and its resources give these people their means of sustenance. The people, a large majority of whom are tribals, have lived in this symbiotic bond for centuries. Minerals, however, are essential for a nation which stands poised on the threshold of a promising future, and must be extracted. Which means the land, its resources and its people must make way for the miners. Enamoured by the mining industrys promises of progress, Indian planners and lawmakers have accomplished this with clinical and brutal precision. Forests are razed, waterways polluted and clogged, farmlands transformed into wasted tracts, and mining dust hangs heavy in the air. As for the people, they are summarily evicted, with little promise or prospect of compensation or rehabilitation. But are these immense costs commensurate with the development gains that mining promises, and which governments harp on? Statistics say they are not. Most mining areas of the nation remain mired in grinding poverty and deprivation. Decades of this lopsided view (and practice) of development are bound to have their fallouts and a growing popular anger has been one of these. In places, this anger has found an expression through spiraling violence, as in cases of regions plagued by Naxalism. In others, peaceful but strident popular protests have been the order of the day. All this points to one incontrovertible truth: that mining, essential as it is, is not a simple dig and sell proposition for a country like India. Its challenges are immense: protection and preservation of environment and inclusive development of all sections of society.
Conventional wisdom and geological evidence suggest that India is richly endowed with mineral resources. Explorations have found over 20,000 known mineral deposits and recoverable reserves of more than 60 minerals. If Indias forests, mineral-bearing areas, regions of tribal habitation and watersheds are all mapped together, they will overlay one another on almost the same areas. In other words, Indias major mineral reserves lie under its richest forests and in the watersheds of its key rivers these lands are also the homes of Indias poorest people, its tribals. The three tribal-dominated states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are the most productive mineral-bearing states as well. They together account for 70 per cent of Indias coal reserves, 80 per cent of its high-grade iron ore, 60 per cent of its bauxite and almost all its chromite reserves. Also, the forest cover in these states is far higher than the national average. Of the top 50 mineral-producing districts in the country, almost half are tribal. The average forest cover in these districts is 28 per cent, much more than the national average of 20.9 per cent. An estimated 1.64 lakh ha of forest land has been diverted for mining in the country. The forests in districts like Jajpur in Orissa, Dhanbad in Jharkhand and Bardhman in West Bengal have been decimated by mining. A large part of the countrys mineral-bearing areas is in the grip of Naxalism: 40 per cent of the mineral-rich districts in the top six mineral-producing states are affected by the movement, which is opposing the lopsided development that mining brings in.
CHAPTER
Rich lands, poor people
ndia is a mineral-rich country. It has a vast geological potential of over 20,000 known mineral deposits, and is in the top ranks in production of some key minerals such as coal, iron ore, chromite and bauxite. According to the Geological Survey of India (GSI), the national exploring agency, the country is yet to tap its complete potential: it has huge reserves of important minerals awaiting exploration and exploitation. Unfortunately for India, almost all its minerals are in the same regions that hold its greenest forests and most abundant river systems. These lands are also largely inhabited by Indias poorest and most marginalised people the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes who depend on the very same forests and watersheds for their survival.
Mining in India, therefore, is not a simple dig and sell proposition as it is made out to be by industry. It is, in fact, a highly complex socio-economic and environmental challenge: at stake are natural resources as well as people forests, wildlife, water, environmental quality and livelihoods.
THE RESERVES AND THEIR SPREAD

Within the country, the geographical distribution of fossil fuels (mainly coal) and metallic mineral reserves is highly uneven. Coal and metallic mineral reserves are spread across central and eastern India along the states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa, as well as some areas of Maharashtra (bordering Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh) and Andhra Pradesh (bordering Chhattisgarh and Orissa). Coal is also found in Assam and Meghalaya, while lignite occurs along the Eastern Ghats in Tamil Nadu. Indias iron ore deposits are in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Goa. The deposits of copper, lead and zinc are mainly in Rajasthan, while the reserves of bauxite are concentrated in the states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. Unlike coal and metallic minerals, non-metallic minerals show an even geographical spread across India. For instance, limestone deposits are spread from Himachal Pradesh in the north to Andhra Pradesh in the south and from Gujarat in the west to Meghalaya in the east. With respect to concentration of mineral deposits, Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh emerge as the three top mineral-bearing states (see Box on pages 4-6: Minerals in India). About 70 per cent of Indias coal, 80 per cent of its hematite iron ore (high-grade ore), 60 per cent of bauxite, 40 per cent of manganese and almost all its chromite are found in these three states.1 If all kinds of minerals, including sand, stone and brick earth are taken into consideration, then almost every district in the country can be said to produce one or other kind of minerals. However, out of the 604 districts in India, mining for fuel, metallic and non-metallic industrial minerals (also referred to as major minerals) is undertaken in 274 districts (including 46 districts where coal and lignite are mined). Of these, 50 districts are extensively mined and produce large quantities of major minerals. These include seven districts in Chhattisgarh; six each in Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh; three each in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra; two each in Goa and Karnataka; and one district each in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, West Bengal and Himachal Pradesh (see Annexure).
DEBANJAN BANDOPADHYAY
Indias mineral reserves are largely concentrated in the states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, which also have the highest numbers of people living below the poverty line
STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING
Minerals in India
The deposits and their locations
Out of Indias total area of 3.29 million sq km, systematic geological mapping has been conducted over 3.15 million sq km.1 According to the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) which prepares an inventory of mineral deposits for the country, India has recoverable reserves of 58 minerals, excluding fuel minerals. Coal The coal resources of India are available mainly in the sedimentary rocks of the older Gondwana formations of peninsular India; some coal is also found in the younger tertiary formations of north-eastern/northern hilly regions.2 Explorations by government agencies till January 2006 have established coal reserves of 253 billion tonne. Of this, about 96 billion tonne are proven reserves. A majority of the reserves 87 per cent are of non-coking coal.3 In terms of distribution of coal reserves, Jharkhand leads with 29 per cent of the total reserves in India (see Graph 1: Distribution of coal reserves). India produced about 407 million tonne (MT) of coal in 2005-06, about 70 per cent of which was accounted for by Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.4 Iron ore India has large reserves of high grade iron ore. Hematite (Fe2O3) and magnetite (Fe3O4) are the main ores of iron. Hematite, which has higher iron content, constitutes 52 per cent of the countrys reserves, and is found in the states of Orissa (which accounts for 33 per cent), Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. About 80 per cent of the magnetite ore deposits occur in the southern states, especially Karnataka (see Graph 2: Distribution of iron ore reserves).5
A profligate sector
India prides itself for having one of the best quality of iron ores in the world in terms of iron content. This has led to a situation where most Indian iron and steel plants reject iron ore containing less than 62 per cent iron. In contrast, the iron and steel industry across the world uses iron ore containing even 50 per cent iron.
With total resources of 22 billion tonne, India is one of the leading producers as well as exporters of iron ore. The country accounts for three per cent of the worlds iron ore reserves; Ukraine, with 21 per cent, has the largest deposits.6 The production of iron ore, constituting of lumps, fines and concentrates, was 154 MT in 2005-06, of which about 40 per cent were lumps and 56 per cent, fines. These were produced by about 270 operational mines.7 The state-wise production data is not available for the year 2005-06 but in 2004-05, Orissa was the major producer, accounting for 28 per cent of the total production in the country. It was followed by Karnataka with 26 per cent, Chhattisgarh and Goa with 16 per cent each, and Jharkhand with 11 per cent.8 Bauxite The total resources of bauxite in the country are placed at 2,926 MT; these include 524 MT of reserves. About 27 per cent of the reserves are of metallurgical grade and 54 per cent of metallurgical mixed grade. The reserves of refractory and chemical grades together account for 11 per cent. The principal states with bauxite reserves include Orissa, which alone accounts for 51 per cent of the total reserves (see Graph 3: Distribution of bauxite reserves).9
GRAPH 1: Distribution of coal reserves

Jharkhand and Orissa have more than 50 per cent
West Bengal 11% Orissa 24%
GRAPH 2: Distribution of iron ore reserves

Magnetite makes up 87 per cent of Karnatakas reserves
Others 11% Andhra Pradesh 7% Chhattisgarh 10%
Others 1% Andhra Pradesh 7% Orissa 17%
Maharashtra 4%
Jharkhand 14% Chhattisgarh 16%
Madhya Pradesh 8%
Jharkhand 29%
Karnataka 41%
Source: http://www.coal.nic.in/, as viewed on November 8, 2006
Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 47-2-47-33
RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE
GRAPH 3: Distribution of bauxite reserves

More than half of the reserves are in Orissa
Others 16% Andhra Pradesh 21%
GRAPH 4: Distribution of manganese reserves

Orissa leads in reserves as well as production
Goa 8% Others 18%
Uttar Pradesh 6%
Gujarat 6%
Karnataka 29%
Orissa 35% Madhya Pradesh 10% Orissa 51%
Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 17-1-17-2
Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 55-2
At the global level, Australia has the largest reserves of bauxite. Indias share is just about four per cent, but it still ranks among the top countries with bauxite reserves.10 In 2005-06, India produced about 12 MT of bauxite from 191 mines; National Aluminium Company (NALCO), a public sector enterprise, alone produced about 40 per cent of this. Orissa accounted for the maximum production (41 per cent), followed by Gujarat (20 per cent), Jharkhand (13 per cent), Maharashtra (12 per cent), Chhattisgarh (nine per cent) and Tamil Nadu (two per cent).11 Manganese ore In India, manganese occurs mainly as bedded sedimentary deposits associated with the Gondite series of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Orissa. Total manganese resources in the country amount to 295 MT, of which 104 MT are reserves. Orissa has the largest manganese reserves about 35 per cent of the countrys total (see Graph 4: Distribution of manganese reserves).12 At the global level, South Africa has the largest reserves of manganese (80 per cent of the worlds total); Indias contribution is only about one per cent.13 In 2005-06, India produced about two MT of manganese ore; Orissa dominated the production figures with 37 per cent, followed by Maharashtra (24 per cent), Madhya Pradesh (19 per cent) and Karnataka (16 per cent).14 Lead and zinc Lead and zinc are the most widely used non-ferrous metals in the world. The total resources of lead and zinc ore in India is 485 MT. Almost 90 per cent of this is in Rajasthan (see Graph 5: Distribution of lead and zinc reserves).15 At the global level, China holds the largest reserves, accounting for more than 21 per cent of the worlds total.16
In 2005-06, India produced about five MT of lead and zinc ore: this included 97,572 tonne of lead concentrate and 8,93,287 tonne of zinc concentrate. Hindustan Zinc Limited, which has its own captive mines in Rajasthan, is the major producer of primary lead and zinc metals in the country.17 Chromite In India, almost 98 per cent of the chromite reserves are present in Orissa, mostly in the Sukinda valley of Jajpur district18 (see Graph 6 on page 6: Distribution of chromite resources). The country has total resources of around 179 MT, comprising of 47 MT of reserves.19
GRAPH 5: Distribution of lead and zinc reserves

Rajasthan dominates in reserves and production
Andhra Pradesh 1% Other 5% Bihar 2% Maharashtra 2%
Rajasthan 90%
GRAPH 6: Distribution of chromite reserves

Orissa has 98 per cent of the total resources
Others 1% Karnataka 1%
found in Karnataka (which holds 29 per cent of the countrys total reserves), Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan (see Graph 7: Distribution of limestone reserves).22 Total resources of limestone of all categories and grades is estimated at 1,70,459 MT; seven per cent of this is reserves. Cement-grade limestone accounts for more than 80 per cent of the total reserves.23 The production of limestone in 2005-06 was 170 MT, produced by about 570 mines. About 96 per cent of this was cement-grade limestone.24 Diamonds Diamond fields in India are grouped into four regions the south Indian tract of Andhra Pradesh; central Indian tract of Madhya Pradesh; Behradin-Kodwalli area in Raipur (Chhattisgarh) and Tokapal-Dugapal area in Bastar (Jharkhand); and the eastern Indian tract in Orissa between the Mahanadi and Godavari valleys.25 Indias resources of diamonds are placed at around 45,80,336 carats as per the United Nations Framework Classification. Of the total resources, 17 per cent is gem-grade and 18 per cent industrial-grade. The remaining resources are unclassified.26 State-wise, 40 per cent of the reserves are held by Andhra Pradesh (see Graph 8: Distribution of diamond reserves). Congo has the largest reserves of diamonds in the world, accounting for 28 per cent of the global total.27 Though officially India produced about 44,170 carats in 2005-06, the unofficial production is estimated to be much higher. There are only two legally operating mines, both in the public sector, located in Panna in Madhya Pradesh. Of the total official output, rough and uncut gem variety constituted 28 per cent, while the remaining 72 per cent was of industrial grade.28
Orissa 98%
At the global level, Kazakhstan holds the largest chromite reserves (26.1 per cent). Indias global share is a bare 0.32 per cent,20 yet the country was the second highest producer of chromite in 2003-04. The production of chromite in 2005-06, by about 20 mines, was more than three MT. Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), the Orissa Mining Corporation and Balasore Alloys Ltd are the major names in the sector, and Orissa (99 per cent) is the key producer.21 Limestone Limestone, the principal raw material in cement manufacturing, is
GRAPH 7: Distribution of limestone reserves

Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh account for the major share
GRAPH 8: Distribution of diamond reserves

Madhya Pradesh is the only producer in India
Others 8% Andhra Pradesh 21% Rajasthan 11% Madhya Pradesh 32% Andhra Pradesh 40%
Meghalaya 8% Chhattisgarh 5%
Madhya Pradesh 3% Gujarat 12%
Himachal Pradesh 3% Karnataka 29% Chhattisgarh 28%
MINING, FORESTS AND TRIBALS

In general, Indias major mineral-producing districts are characterised by large forest covers, big tribal populations and a high incidence of poverty and backwardness (see Box: Fatal overlap and Map 1.1 on page 8: India forests vs minerals). The average forest cover of the 50 major mineral-producing districts stands at 28 per cent; the total forest cover in these districts is 11,890,400 hectare (ha) 18 per cent of the total forest cover in the country. Six of these districts have forest cover more than 50 per cent of their geographical areas. Of the 50 districts, about 62 per cent have a forest cover that is more than the national average of 20.6 per cent. The districts where forest cover is less than 10 per cent are usually either those where mining has been going on for a long time or those that are located in arid and semi-arid regions. Districts like Dhanbad in Jharkhand, Jajpur in Orissa and Burdwan in West Bengal fall in the first category: long years of mining have devastated their forests. In the second category are districts like Kutchh, Jamnagar and Amreli (in Gujarat) and Bhilwara (Rajasthan). Barring Gujarat, the forest cover in the remaining top five mining states Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh is above the national average. Chhattisgarh has the highest forest cover: around 43 per cent. Jharkhand has forests on 30 per cent of its land, while Orissa and Madhya Pradesh have forest cover on 27 and 26 per cent of their lands, respectively. Mining and quarrying has destroyed large tracts of forest land in these areas. One estimate by the government puts the total forest land diverted for mining between 1980 and 2005 at 95,003 ha.2 Other sources point to a much higher figure. Based on
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Sparse and sparser: mining eats up forest land. Tribals, who depend on these forests for livelihoods, suffer
Fatal overlap
of mineral deposits, forests and tribal areas is clear from the characteristics of some major mining districts
Keonjhar, Orissa, produces the maximum amount of iron ore in the country. Officially, it has around 31,256 ha of land under mining (illegal mining is rampant).The district also has 39 per cent of its geographical area under forests; 45 per cent of its population is tribal. Dantewada in Chhattisgarh is the top iron ore producer in the state, accounting for 69 per cent of the total output. The forest cover here is as high as 62 per cent, while the tribal population is 79 per cent. West Singhbhum, a major iron ore producer in Jharkhand, has 39 per cent of its area under forests; 66 per cent of its population is tribal. The district produces 16 MT of iron ore, accounting for almost 100 per cent of iron ore production in the state. Goa, fast emerging as the hub of iron ore export after Bellary in Karnataka, has more than 100 mine leases in each of its two districts. Both districts also have a high forest cover: 65 per cent in south Goa and 51 per cent in the north. Korba in Chhattisgarh, which produces the maximum amount of coal in the country, has about 51 per cent of its geographical area under forests.
Angul, the biggest coal-producing district in Orissa, has forests on 42 per cent of its area. Chatra in Jharkhand, the second highest coal producer in the state, has forest cover on 48 per cent of its area. Udaipur in Rajasthan has the maximum land under mining in the state. It is the second biggest producer of lead and zinc in India. It is also the most forested district in the state and has forest cover on 23 per cent of its area, much more than the national average. Udaipur is also a tribal district; tribals make up about 46 per cent of its population. Of the six major mining districts of Madhya Pradesh Katni, Rewa, Satna, Shahdol, Sidhi and Chhindwara five (Rewa is the exception) have more forest cover than the national average; forest cover in Sidhi and Chhindwara is 85 and 80 per cent more than the national average, respectively. The coalfields of the north-eastern districts of Tinsukia in Assam and Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya have forest cover on 40 and 64 per cent of their geographical areas, respectively. Both these are also tribal districts. Khammam in Andhra Pradesh, one of the leading coal producers in the state, has forest cover on 45 per cent its geographic area and is also a tribal district.
MAP 1.1: India forests vs minerals

Indias mineral deposits are largely beneath its remaining forests
JAMMU & KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND
HARYANA DELHI
ARUNACHAL PRADESH SIKKIM
RAJASTHAN
UTTAR PRADESH
ASSAM
N
A AG UR
LA
ND
BIHAR
MEGHALAYA
M AN IP
TRIPURA
JHARKHAND GUJARAT MADHYA PRADESH WEST BENGAL
CHHATTISGARH BAY OF BENGAL
DAMAN DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI
ORISSA MAHARASHTRA
Very dense forest Moderate forest Open forest Scrub
ANDHRA PRADESH Non-forest ARABIAN SEA Water bodies State boundary GOA Bauxite Chromite Copper KARNATAKA Gold Iron Lead Magnesite
L KERA A
Asbestos Barytes Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum

S ISLAND ICOBAR AN & N ANDAM
Kaolin Kyanite Limestone Mica Sillimanite Silica sand
TAMIL NADU
Manganese Zinc Coal/lignite Petrolum and natural gas Uranium
LAKSHADWEEP
INDIAN OCEAN
Source: Anon, 2001, Environmental Atlas of India, Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi
MIZORAM
information available from various sources including the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF), the total forest land diverted for mining in India has been estimated to be as high as 1,64,610 ha.3 Even this figure would be higher if it took into account the forest land diverted before 1980 when many coal mines took over vast areas of land mostly forests. Examples are Hazaribagh and Dhanbad in Jharkhand and Burdwan in West Bengal. What makes things especially complicated for India is its large tribal population numbering 84.3 million which is approximately above eight per cent of its total population.4 Most of these tribes inhabit lands that are mineral-rich: 90 per cent of Indias coal and 80 per cent of its other minerals are found in tribal areas.5 Of the 50 major mining districts of the country, almost half are tribal districts.6 The co-existence of tribals and minerals is widely acknowledged within the government as well, but with a twist. For instance, the website of the Union ministry of mines says: Mineral deposits generally occur in remote and backward areas with poor infrastructural facilities. Mineral-bearing areas are also often inhabited by tribal population.7 The implicit message in
this statement is that mining is essential to bring backward tribal areas into mainstream developed India. As most tribals also inhabit forest areas, their livelihoods and economy are closely intertwined with the fate of the forests and water sources. According to the Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, the average forest cover in tribal districts of the country is 37 per cent, which is 85 per cent more than the national average.8 Forest degradation due to mining and other development projects has significantly depleted the ecosystem, rendering the tribal population more socially and economically vulnerable. The impact, naturally, has been disproportionately higher on these already poverty-stricken and marginalised people. The problem is likely to get more acute as the government continues its industrialisation drive, pegged at exploiting its vast natural resources without investing much thought or action in safeguarding its people and environment. The crisis has not escaped the attention of some national leaders (such as the late former president K R Narayanan see Box: Two presidents, two Indias); but they have been few and far between, and the country has chosen to ignore their messages.
Two presidents, two Indias

Former presidents Abdul Kalam and K R Narayanan held completely opposite views on the mineral industry
Let it not be said by future generations that the Indian Republic has been built on the destruction of the green earth and innocent tribals who have been living there for centuries. Let it not be said of India that this great Republic, in a hurry to develop itself, is devastating the green mother earth and uprooting our tribal populations.
President Narayanan, 2001
The facilitation for the project through provision of land, infrastructural development, community development etc, can be done by the government agencies whereas the investment in the mine and the associated technological inputs can come from the private sector In addition, the private sector must have the freedom to run the mine in a cost-effective manner.
President Kalam, 2003
Six years ago, India had a president who spoke about development with caution, cognisant of the fact that the current model of development sacrifices human rights and the environment in the pursuit of investment and industry. In his 2001 address to the nation on the eve of Republic Day, the late president Narayanan referred to this problem as the dilemmas of development, and he asked that the country consider carefully how it chose to develop its mining industry. President Narayanan was particularly concerned about minings impact on scheduled tribes: the developmental path we have adopted is hurting them and threatening their very existence...He was challenging the country to confront the environmental and social costs of Indias growing domestic demand for minerals and, as an exporter, Indias willingness to accommodate foreign demand. He was not
against developing industry, but he did speak out against encouraging industry if it was not in the best interest of all of Indias citizens.While the nation must benefit from the exploitation of these mineral resources, we will have also to take into consideration questions of environmental protection and the rights of tribals,he had said. President Kalam was, on the contrary, more concerned about the welfare of industry. On November 1, 2003, he gave the inaugural speech for the 19th World Mining Congress and Expo in New Delhi, in which he spoke of the importance of increased exploration and mining and the need to increase mineral production to feed Indias growing appetite for minerals, without once mentioning the impacts this would have on forests and tribals of the country. The main themes of president Kalams speech revolved around the need to attract more private investment and feed increased demand by rapidly increasing Indias production of major minerals, especially coal. Early on in his speech, the president had expressed concern over the lack of investment in the industry, which he blamed on many things including problems in land acquisition and community development demands. While president Narayanan believed India needed to re-evaluate its practice of meeting increased demand with unchecked production, president Kalam declared that India must increase mineral production as much as 10 times in the case of coal: Indian mining industry should expand the scope of its contribution to the GDP from the existing three-five per cent to over 10 per cent. We should work for increasing the productivity from 0.5 tonne per man-year to 5 tonne per man-year in underground coal mines using long wall mining and from 15 tonne per man-year to 30 tonne per man-year in open-cast mines. Unfortunately, president Narayanans concerns have very few takers today in the government. While Narayanan spoke of the constitutional protection afforded to tribals and their lands (We cannot ignore the social commitments enshrined in our Constitution), it seems the present government is more than willing to ignore this too.
RIVERS AND MINERALS: CLOSE BONDS

The role of mining in changing the hydrological profile of a region is also being increasingly acknowledged and debated. Hard rocks are the major sources of minerals. Out of the countrys geographical area of 3.20 million sq km, as much as 1.82 million sq km is built up of hard rocks and is thus, potentially mineral-bearing. But there is also a problem: hard rocks usually abound in hilly terrains linked to forests, and both forests and hills are the major sources of water for our rivers. Hard rock mining, therefore, not only affects land and forests, but also rivers and waterways. Mining also impacts rivers in other ways: overburden is dumped into valleys, filling streams and rivers, and deforestation leads to increased run-off. The two, in combination, increase floods. Whether it is iron ore in Goa or Karnataka, bauxite in the hills of Chhattisgarh or Orissa, coal in Madhya Pradesh, or limestone and magnetite in Uttarakhand, open-cast mining on catchment slopes has played havoc with nations water resources.9 An analysis of distribution of minerals vis--vis river basins indicates that a significant portion of Indias mineral reserves are in areas which are either near the origins or in the catchments of rivers (see Map 1.2: Mined rivers).
Lost river: unless thoughtfully planned and carried out, mining will destroy water sources, like this one in Goa
Most of Indias iron reserves are found along the courses and watersheds of rivers such as the Indravati in Chhattisgarh, Baitarani in Orissa, Tungabhadra in Karnataka and Mandovi in Goa. Over 80 per cent of the coal in Jharkhand and a substantial portion of the Raniganj coalfields in West Bengal lie within the Damodar river basin. Coal is also found all around the Godavari and its tributaries in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh and along the distributaries of the Son in eastern Madhya Pradesh and western Chhattisgarh. The Mahanadi-Brahmani basin holds all the coal reserves of Orissa, while the coal in Nagpur region lies under the Kanhan river.10 In Rajasthan, mica is distributed between and around the rivers Sambhar, Luni and Chambal, while in Orissa, it is found around the Mahanadi. Chromite is found around the tributaries of the Cauvery, and along the Tungabhadra, Baitarani and Brahmani rivers in Orissa. Limestone occurs near the Chambal, while bauxite deposits exist near the Chenab, Mahi, the tributaries of the Krishna and Cauvery, Mahanadi, Tungabhadra, and near the river Sind (in Madhya Pradesh). Unless they are carefully planned and thoughtfully carried out, mining activities in these regions are bound to degrade the catchments and alter the courses of the rivers. For example, the state of Chhattisgarh also holds the catchments for at least four major river systems the Mahanadi, Godavari, Narmada and Ganga. Large-scale mining in the state is degrading all the catchments, affecting the quality and quantity of water in the rivers. Mining of sand, stone and gravels from riverbeds is another cause for concern. With rapid urbanisation and growth in the housing and infrastructure sector, the demand for these minerals has gone up significantly over the past few years and most of this demand is being met by rampant mining of riverbeds, often illegally. This is changing the course of rivers and eroding their banks. Besides this, mining also leads to increased sedimentation and pollution of a river: examples include the Bhadra river in Karnataka and Shankhini in Chhattisgarh. Overburden and wastes from mines run into a river, choking it. Mining also affects local availability of water as it consumes large volumes of water and breaches the groundwater, thereby altering the hydrological regime. Forty per cent of the captive limestone mines of largescale cement plants in India have breached the groundwater in their regions.11 Consumption by mineral-based industries adds to the stress: due to the presence of minerals and water in the same area, most such industries prefer to set shop along or near the rivers. These not only consume large quantities of water, but also discharge their effluents into the river. The rivers Brahmani and Damodar are examples of such rivers. Mining near river basins, especially in underground coal mines, involves the additional risk of accidents due to inundation. In 1975, over 350 miners lost their lives in a gruesome accident in Chasnala in Jharkhand when water gushed into the mines. The impacts of mining and mineral-based industries on some key watersheds of the country have been summarised in the following pages.
PHILIP NERI DESOUZA
10
MAP 1.2: Mined rivers

Most mineral reserves in India lie near the origin or in the catchments of rivers
NA
JAMMU & KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND HARYANA DELHI SIKKIM RAJASTHAN UTTAR PRADESH
U AR
NA
CH
R LP
AD
ES
ASSAM BIHAR MEGHALAYA
NAGALAND
MANIPUR JHARKHAND GUJARAT MADHYA PRADESH WEST BENGAL TRIPURA MIZORAM
MAHARASHTRA
CH
DAMAN & DIU DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI
HA TT
ISG
AR
ORISSA BAY OF BENGAL
ANDHRA PRADESH
KARNATAKA GOA ARABIAN SEA Bauxite Chromite Copper Gold PONDICHERRY Iron Lead TAMIL NADU Magnesite Manganese Zinc Coal/lignite Petrolum and natural gas INDIAN OCEAN Uranium Asbestos Barytes Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum Kaolin Kyanite Limestone Mica Sillimanite Silica sand ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS River
KE RA LA
LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND
Source: Compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 2006
11
SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
Mining in the watersheds leads to increased sedimentation and pollution of rivers; it also affects local availability of water
12
The Damodar
Flowing through Jharkhand and West Bengal, the rivers watershed covers almost 25,000 sq km.12 In its upper stretch, the Damodar twists through six coalfields (north and south Karnapura, east and west Bokaro, Ramgarh, Jharia and Raniganj) owned by Coal India Limited. The valley is one of Indias most industrialised regions:13 added to these coalfields are 28 iron ore mines, 33 limestone mines, five copper ore mines and 84 mica mines, which are along the rivers coastline. In addition, the numerous coal washeries add considerable pollution load to the river. The region produces 60 per cent of Indias medium-grade coal.14 The river drain[s] almost the entire coal mining area under the Central Coalfields Ltd (CCL), the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd (BCCL) and the Eastern Coalfields Ltd (ECL) all three subsidiaries of the public sector Coal India Limited (CIL).15 This is also evident in the amount of forest land that has been lost: according to Sacred Sites International, a US-based non-profit organisation dedicated to the preservation of sacred sites and traditional culture, the lower valley had a 65 per cent forest cover once upon a time; today, it stands at a meagre 0.05 per cent.16 It is no wonder then, that the Damodar is one of Indias most polluted rivers. The source of much of this pollution is large-scale
sedimentation and non-point source pollution that has been increasing along with the clearing of land. About seven MT of eroded material is brought down from deforested lands and deposited in reservoirs of the Damodar valley by the Damodar and Barakar rivers annually. About 66 per cent of the total land area of the upper Damodar valley has been affected by different forms of erosion. The rate of silting in Maithon reservoir is recorded at more than seven million cubic metre (mcm) annually, as against the designed rate of 0.84 mcm thus exceeding the projected figure by nine times.17 The MoEF has indicated that the growth of mining and loss of forest cover are real threats to the Damodar river valley.18
The Mahanadi
The Mahanadi basin extends over an area of 1,41,000 sq km. Lying in the north-east of the Deccan plateau, the basin covers large areas in the states of Chhattisgarh and Orissa, and some areas in Jharkhand and Maharashtra (see Map 1.3: The Mahanadi river basin). The river rises in a pool six km from Pharsiya village near Nagri town in Raipur district of Chhattisgarh, and falls into the Bay of Bengal, traversing a total distance of 851 km.19
MAP 1.3: The Mahanadi river basin

The river hosts some major coalfields, iron ore mines and a number of mineral-based industries
Thermal power plant Cement plant Sponge iron Iron and steel plant Aluminium smelter/refinery Coal mine Iron ore mine Kurung dam Manendragarh
Bango dam
Ha sd o
Korba Raigarh Kurubhata Bamnidhi Basantpur Rampur Mahanadi
ad i
Ib JHARKHAND
Sundargarh
Apra
River State boundary
Bilaspur Andhiyarkore CHHATTISGARH Simga

nat h
Ghatora Jondhra
Jharsuguda Hirakud dam Sambalpur
Durg
ah
MAHARASHTRA
Kotni
an
Pathardhi Raipur
Seo
Bhilai Tandula dam
Salebhata Kharamal Sukma ORISSA Tel Kantamal Ib Valley Talcher
na
th
Rajim Baronda Rudri Weir Navishankar dam
Se o
Tikarpaha
Mahanadi Bhubaneshwar
Cuttack
Ma ha
ar g i av
Pandigaon
Kesinga Chilika lake

Bh
nad
Paradeep
Konark Puri
ANDHRA
PRADESH
BAY OF BENGAL
Source: Compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
13
The river hosts a number of mining complexes and mineralbased industries. On its upper stretches, there is the Bhilai Steel Plant and the Urla iron and steel complex in Durg district. There are also some cement plants at Durg and Raipur. The other major industrial point on the upper stretch in Chhattisgarh is Korba, which has also been identified by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) as a critically polluted area in this river basin. The major sources of pollution at this stretch are Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), Korba Super Thermal Power Station (KSTPS), Hasdeo Thermal Power Corporation and the coal mining operations of South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL). The river, when it enters Orissa, supports several more mineral-based industries. The basin has the misfortune of hosting two of Indias largest coalfields: the Ib Valley and the Talcher coalfields in Orissa, which together produced about 70 MT of coal in 2005-06.20 The river also has bauxite on its banks: in Orissa, local communities have fought against BALCO to protect the Gandhamardan hills, from where originate a number of the springs that feed the tributaries of the Mahanadi. Besides, the other industries along the river and its tributaries include thermal power plants at Choudwar, cement plants at Bargarh, coal mining at Rampur, aluminium smelter at Hirakud, and several small-scale cement, refractory, steel and sponge iron plants at Jharsuguda.
The Brahmani
The Brahmani-Baitarani basin extends over an area of 51,822 sq km and covers large areas in Orissa and Jharkhand and some parts of Madhya Pradesh. The river, with a catchment area of around 39,000 sq km, originates as two major distributaries the Sankh and the Koel from the Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhand and joins at Veda Vyasa near Rourkela in Orissa to form the Brahmani. It flows through the Eastern Ghats in Sundergarh, Keonjhar, Dhenkanal, Cuttack and Jajpur districts of Orissa and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The major portion of its catchment area lies in Orissa; and due to the vast mineral deposits in this area and the easy availability of water, several industries have come up in and around the river basin. At its upper reach, the river is polluted by effluents from the Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela Fertiliser Plant and the iron ore-mining industries of Bonai subdivision. The pollution level increases in the middle section due to drainage from the coal belts and industrial wastes from the Angul-Talcher region, mainly emptied into it by its tributary, the Nandira. The NALCO smelter at Angul has also contributed to the poor quality of the surface and sub-surface water. The effluent discharged from plant has increased the fluoride level in the drinking water. Downstream, the Brahmani is polluted by mine discharges from the Sukinda belt and industrial activities in Duburi.
The Godavari
The Godavari originates near Triambak in Nasik district of Maharashtra, and flows through the states of Chhattisgarh,
Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. The Godavari basin extends over an area of 3,12,812 sq km. Its four important tributaries are the Manjira, Pranhita, Indravati and the Sabari. The discharge of the river is not very impressive because of moderate annual average rainfall in the basin. Moreover, the river and its watershed are affected due to industrialisation and urbanisation, as the river passes through a number of mineral-rich districts Nagpur, Wardha, Nashik, Chandrapur and Yavatmal in Maharashtra; Bastar and Jagdalpur in Chhattisgarh; Chhindwara and Seoni in Madhya Pradesh; Warangal, Khammam, Kakinada and Adilabad in Andhra Pradesh; Bidar in Karnataka; and Jeypur in Orissa. All these areas add to the pollution load in the river and are also eating away into its watershed. The mines of Western Coalfields in Nagpur and Chandrapur belt are along the Godavari basin. In addition, there is a super thermal power plant at Chandrapur, some coal washeries and several cement plants in the area which draw from the tributaries of the river and also discharge into it. A recent phenomenon has been a mushrooming of sponge iron plants in the area. Mining of sillimanite, corundum and pyrophyllite in Bhandara district also adds to the pollution. The Indravati, a major tributary of the river passes through Bastar, where the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC), the biggest iron ore producer in the country, operates. The tributaries of the river receive thousands of tonne of iron ore fines from the mines of NMDC as they pass through Bastar. Several steel plants are also coming up in this area, which will add to the pollution load of the river. In Andhra Pradesh, several coal mines in the Warangal and Adilabad district are located within the watershed of the river. Besides, these two districts also add on to river pollution due to extensive limestone, iron ore and manganese mining in Adilabad. The coalfields of Singhareni Collieries Company Limited in Karimnagar also contribute to the pollution of the Godavari. In Visakhapatnam district of Andhra Pradesh, bauxite mining in the Eastern Ghats is being opposed by local communities mainly over the issue of water. The stretch in Orissa is also not free of industrial pollution. Jeypore district houses industries as well as the Kolab and Machkund thermal power stations. These cases are not unique: this is the fate which most rivers in the country are saddled with. Unfortunately, very little research has gone into the subject of how mining menaces Indias watersheds and rivers. Without a cumulative environmental impact assessment process, the real impact of mining on Indias watersheds will neither be assessed in full nor curtailed. It is very important, therefore, to study and understand how mining will alter the hydrological regime of the country. Moreover, this should be reflected in legislation; there is no legislation at present on water and mining, and the mineral policy also ignores it.
14
THE MIRAGE OF MINING AND GROWTH

Across the world, the mining industry has been hard-selling dreams of development, employment and growth. It has consistently tried to project a pro-people image by promoting the idea that mining will unleash growth in backward areas and will pull the indigenous communities into the mainstream, thereby improving their lives and livelihoods. But has it really done so? At the macro level, things appear to be different. States like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa, that have a high level of dependence on mineral resources, demonstrate low per capita incomes compared to states which do not depend completely on their mineral wealth (examples are Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Gujarat) (see Table 1.1: Minerals and state economies). The mineraldependent states also have higher levels of poverty, lower growth rates and higher levels of mortality, malnutrition and morbidity. India is not the only country where mining is linked with poverty and poor development outcomes. In most nations of the world, a high level of mineral dependence is associated with retarded economic performance. This phenomenon is so widely and commonly observed that it has been given a name the resource curse. A study by the World Bank, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa, has attributed institutional weakness and political economy as some of the reasons behind the resource curse. The study found that resource-rich economies exhibit weaker institutions compared to resource-poor countries. A recent global study by the Food and Agriculture Organization finds that mineral-rich states have weaker property rights and poor enforcement of the law and that these, in turn, have led to retarded development outcomes. An analysis of the Indian states also reconfirmed that mineral dependence leads to poorer quality institutions, which in turn results in impaired growth and development outcomes.21 Evidence shows that point resources resources extracted from a narrow geographical base weaken
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Instead of integrating tribals into the mainstream, mining has marginalised them further
TABLE 1.1: Minerals and state economies

An inverse relationship exists between dependence on mineral wealth and per capita income
State Contribution of minerals in the state GDP (percentage) 12 6.6 13.2 3 0.72 0.86 Per capita net state domestic product at factor cost in Rs (2003-04) 6,692 5,265 6,651 13,022 12,348 15,082
Chhattisgarh Orissa Jharkhand Gujarat Tamil Nadu Maharashtra
Sources: Directorates of Economics and Statistics of respective state governments; Indian Minerals Yearbook, 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
institutions and accountability. In the case of a country with all of its wealth concentrated in a few pockets, most of the political and administrative power goes into promoting and facilitating extraction of these resources instead of focusing on development of the area. This has been found in case of Orissa, where policies so far have focused on developing the mineral sector, rather than on broad-based development.22 Resource curse, thus, is very much a reality in the mineral-rich areas of India. Of the 50 major mining districts, 60 per cent figure among the 150 most backward districts of the country (see Map 1.4 on page 16: Poverty amidst plenty).23 Four of these mining districts two from Orissa and one each from Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are among the top 25 backward districts of the country; 13 of these districts figure in the top 50 backward districts of the country. A closer look at a few districts gives a clearer picture of the phenomenon of resource curse: Adilabad has the highest number of mines in Andhra Pradesh and is ranked third in terms of total value of mineral
15
MAP 1.4: Poverty amidst plenty

Mineral-bearing districts continue to be among the most backward districts of the country, in spite of the immense wealth they generate
NA
JAMMU & KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND HARYANA DELHI SIKKIM RAJASTHAN
AR
UTTAR PRADESH
UN
AC
P AL
RA
DE
SH
NAGALAND
MANIPUR JHARKHAND WEST BENGAL TRIPURA MIZORAM
GUJARAT
MADHYA PRADESH
CH
DAMAN & DIU DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI MAHARASHTRA
HA
TT
ISG
AR
ANDHRA PRADESH
KARNATAKA GOA ARABIAN SEA
Backward district areas Bauxite Chromite Copper Gold Iron PONDICHERRY Lead Magnesite TAMIL NADU Manganese Zinc Coal/lignite Petrolum and natural gas Uranium Asbestos Barytes Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum Kaolin Kyanite Limestone ISLANDS Mica Sillimanite Silica sand ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR
LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND
INDIAN OCEAN
Source: Anon, 2003, Identification of districts for wage and self-employment programmes, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New Delhi
16
KER
ALA
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Indias mineral-rich districts are marked by grinding poverty, low literacy and poor human development indicators
production, but it is one of the least developed districts in the state. According to the 2001 census, Andhra Pradesh had a per capita income of about Rs 10,000, while Adilabads was only Rs 8,291. The district also lacks physical and social infrastructure: only 55 per cent of the households have electricity compared to the state average of 67 per cent. While the percentage of rural households with access to safe drinking water in the state is 77 per cent, it is 61 per cent in Adilabad. The district lags behind in education as well with a literacy rate of just over 50 per cent compared to the states average literacy rate of 65 per cent.24 Keonjhar, the most mined district of Orissa and the centre of its iron ore production, has quite a few dubious distinctions to its credit. Its infant mortality rate (number of deaths in first year of the birth per 1,000 live births) is 20 per cent higher than the states average. About 60 per cent of its population lives below the poverty line and its per capita district domestic product is one of the lowest in the state. According to the 2001 census, the percentage of rural households with access to safe drinking water in Orissa was 63 per cent; in Keonjhar, the percentage was a meagre 39 per cent.25 Dantewada is fast emerging as the most favoured destination
in Chhattisgarh for steel companies due to the presence of high-grade iron ore. It ranks seventh among the 150 most backward districts in the country. Only about 22 per cent of the households in Dantewada have power connections. Provisions for safe drinking water are available for only half of the households (53 per cent), much lower than the state average (71 per cent). Only one-third of the population is literate once again, lower than the state average.26 Gulbarga and Bellary are two key mining districts in Karnataka. While Bellary is the hub of iron ore mining, accounting for 84 per cent of the iron ore produced in the state, Gulbarga is the largest producer of limestone in the country. Both these districts fare poorly when it comes to human development. Gulbarga is ranked 19th and Bellary 17th out of the 20 districts of Karnataka on the human development index (HDI). Although Bellary boasts of the largest number of private aircrafts in the country, more than 45 per cent of its population lives below the poverty line. The district does not even have the basic amenities only about 41 per cent of its households have access to power. The infant mortality rate is much higher than the states average and life expectancy is lower. Less than 50 per cent of the population of Bellary is literate. The scenario
17
is similar in Gulbarga, where the rate of literacy is as low as 38 per cent. Poverty is rampant with 45 per cent population below the poverty line (the state average is 33 per cent). Only 63 per cent of the households in the district have access to safe drinking water, while 45 per cent have no power connection. There are only 68 hospital beds per lakh population compared to the states average of 86 beds per lakh population.27 Both the mining districts in Maharashtra Yavatmal and Chandrapur not only figure among the 150 most backward districts of the country, but are also ranked 34th and 26th, respectively, out of the 35 districts of Maharashtra, on the HDI. Chandrapur, the largest producer of coal and limestone in the state, has only half of its villages linked by pucca roads, while only 43 per cent of households have access to safe drinking water. Health facilities are poor, with the infant mortality rate (number of deaths in first year of the birth per 1000 live birth) as high as 106 compared to the state average of 74. The per capita income of Chandrapur is more than 20 per cent lower than the state average; about 47 per cent of the families in the district are below the poverty line. Yavatmal leads in coal production, but lags behind in all other aspects. Around 44 per cent of families in the district are below the poverty line. Less than half the households have access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality is 1.7 times more than the state average, while per capita income is 1.8 times lower.28 Rajasthan is one of the leading non-metallic mineral-producing states of the country. Udaipur and Bhilwara are the key mining districts: the mining industry contributed 31 and 25 per cent to Udaipur and Bhilwaras GDP, respectively, between 1998-2001. But as is the case with the other states, both these districts have failed to benefit from their mineral wealth. The per capita income of Udaipur is lower than the state average. Only 32 per cent of villages in the district have
access to power, while 64 per cent get safe drinking water. About one-third of the districts population is below the poverty line. Udaipur has been ranked 27th out of 29 districts in the state in terms of HDI. Bhilwara fares poorly too with only 32 per cent of its villages with access to power and 60 per cent with access to safe drinking water. Almost half the population in the district is below the poverty line, and literacy rate is only 50 per cent.29 Cuddalore, in Tamil Nadu, produces three-fourths of Indias lignite. Groundwater near the lignite mines here has been depleted, leaving local agriculturists high and dry. More than half of Cuddalores population lives below the poverty line and it is ranked 16th out of the 30 districts of Tamil Nadu in HDI. Sonbhadra is the most mined district of Uttar Pradesh. It produces more than 20 MT of coal every year, apart from thousands of tonne of limestone and dolomite. It is also one of the most backward districts of the state. About 55 per cent of its population lives below the poverty line and its literacy rate is less than 50 per cent. There are several other similar examples that go on to prove the theory of resource curse (see Annexure). One of the more recent studies on mining-poverty linkages has been done by the World Bank as part of a research on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Orissa government to deal with mining-led growth and development. The study focuses on the mineral-rich Keonjhar district. It has selected two blocks: Joda, with a high concentration of mines, and Keonjhar Sadar, which is likely to be mined intensively in the near future. The study has found that households in Keonjhar Sadar are significantly better off in terms of average cash incomes and ownership of productive assets, compared with those in Joda (see Table 1.2: Mining prosperity or poverty). Education levels too
TABLE 1.2: Mining prosperity or poverty: a case study of Orissa

Joda, a more mined block, has poorer quality of life and income compared with the less mined area of Keonjhar Sadar
Variable Mean Total cash Days ill income 21,623 37.7 20.0 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.9 4.6 0.9 Joda SD 14,408 35.6 28.7 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.8 3.4 2.3 Mean 25,305 25.5 33.1 0.9 0.8 3.1 2.9 4.4 1.6 Keonjhar Sadar SD 26,890 26.2 33.0 0.3 0.4 2.7 1.2 3.0 2.9 Correlation of weighted mean with distance to mines 0.110* -0.159* 0.193* 0.136* -0.016 0.302* 0.431* -0.006 0.134*
Adult education Better quality of life
Poor quality of house Livestock asset asset
Production
Consumption asset Land owned
Notes: Test for equality of block means is significant at the 5 per cent level * Significant at the 5 per cent level; SD = standard deviation Source: S Srivastava, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa, World Bank, New Delhi
18
Parej perishes
World Bank-supported project leads to poverty and dip in local incomes
The ghost of Parej continues to haunt the World Bank (WB) even after a decade of its support to the Coal Sector Environmental Social Mitigation Project (CSESMP). It all began in 1997, when the Bank supported Coal India Limited (CIL) in expanding coal mines and production in the 25 mines in Hazaribaghs Parej area, under the Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP) with an International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan of over US $530 million. However, parallel to this, pathetic conditions at the mining site forced the WB to give a loan to CIL under the CSESMP to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of this mining expansion. CSESMP was approved in May 1996, with a loan of US $63 million from the International Development Association (IDA). It was envisaged that after being tested and revised as necessary during the five-year time period financed by the Bank, CIL would apply its new environmental and social mitigation policies in its 495 mines. The debate over the Parej projects impacts revolves around the net loss of local livelihoods due to the coal mines. Every Bank-supported project is approved with the condition that it must increase local income and reduce poverty, but the Banks own monitoring team had found loss of income among local residents who were displaced by the Parej coal mines. A recent study by a Delhi-based advocacy group Environics Trust and Hyderabads Samata has refreshed the debate. These groups studied seven villages, including two resettlement sites of CIL, in Parej mines to assess the current socio-economic status of the people and the impacts of coal mining on their lives. The study found that displacement due to mining, irrespective of compensation, has greatly impacted annual incomes. Every acre of land in Parej used to sustain the landowning family for six months, and landless families for three-four months. A family owning three acres got a net income of Rs 2,600 a year after taking care of its consumption needs. It also made about Rs 5,000 from working as wage
labour in nearby areas for a minimum of 100 days. From the nearby forests, a family earned Rs 2,000 a year. Thus, each family used to make Rs 9,600 a year which placed it much above the poverty line for rural areas. Even the landless earned around Rs 7,400 a year from these sources. All this changed with the coming of CIL. For every three acres of land that it took away, CIL compensated a family with a job. The study found that after a land-holding family shifted to resettlement colonies or other places, its net cash inflow went down. The net annual loss in cash inflow was Rs 9,260 for landed families and Rs 7,060 for landless families. As net flow has gone down, the indebtedness of both the communities has increased manifold. Now, on an average, a landowning family has to take a loan of Rs 2,000-3,000 per month. Earlier, loans used to be not more than Rs 500 per month, and were taken and repaid within the community, says the study.Because of shifting, there has not been much impact on the incomes of both landless and landowning families. However, expenditures have increased, thus pushing the residents into a debt trap,points out R Sreedhar, the managing trustee of Environics. Families now spend more money on buying foodgrains, which they were earlier growing on their own lands. The only employment is in the coal mines, while forest access has been barred. As a result, both landowning and landless households are spending the same about Rs 8,200 per month. The CSESMP has the distinction of being the only coal sector project in India to be critically scrutinised by the inspection panel of the Bank for its bad impacts on overall development of the local people. But the Bank has tried to hush up the panels findings. After this, the WB has not supported any other coal sector project, though it is said to be reconsidering its decision on that count. Affected residents of Parej are planning to approach the WB. There have been a few sporadic meetings with Bank officials on introducing activities to increase incomes of the project-affected people. While all these parleys are underway, residents of Parej continue slipping into the debt abyss.
Richard Mahapatra, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
False promises: mining does not really lead to prosperity
are higher for households in Keonjhar Sadar. Households in Joda have reported higher incidences of family illnesses. Wage income is higher in the case of households in Joda, most likely because of the employment benefits of nearby mines. However, the difference is not statistically significant. The study has also concluded that the proximity to mines is detrimental in a number of ways: villages closest to mines bear a greater environmental and economic cost. Similar studies across the country and elsewhere have shown a co-relation between poverty and mining (see Box: Parej perishes). Despite the tall claims of industry as well as government, mining does not seem to usher in prosperity and development on the scales promised; in fact, under current the policies and practices of the government, mining districts and townships have actually slipped deeper into poverty and destitution.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
19
THE RED SHADOW OVER MINING

Poverty and lack of development extract terrible prices and one of them has been the rapid rise of Naxalism. In 2005, Naxalite violence in India claimed 669 lives: this marked an 18 per cent rise in casualties compared to the previous year.30 The government scrambled to give an appropriate response. In his address to the nation on August 15, 2006, prime minister Manmohan Singh termed Naxalism as a threat to Indias national security. Less than a month after this pronouncement, one of his predecessors former prime minister V P Singh came up with a completely different viewpoint: he saw no option but to embrace Naxalism in the present model of development, where forceful acquisition of land and displacement of thousands by the State are the order of the day. Both the statements were made in their respective contexts; both are revealing. To begin with, they mark the rise and rise of Naxalism as a movement that is giving sleepless nights to the nation. They mark the acknowledgement among our leaders of the strength and undisputed popularity of the movement. V P Singhs statement, in particular, also marks a recognition of the
The Naxals have taken advantage of the alienation and poverty of tribal communities. This is evident from the success of the movement in tribal-dominated areas, which are also mineral-rich
murderous track that official development policies have taken over the years, pushing people into the arms of such movements. Naxalism had begun as a peasant movement in 1967, in the tiny hamlet of Naxalbari in West Bengal. The fundamental demand was radical land reform land to the tiller and a violent takeover of power was seen as the only means of achieving this. Governments then were completely unwilling (as they are even now) to yield to these demands, and the movement was brutally crushed. The character of Naxalism changed with the changing times. Forced out of West Bengal, it has now regrouped outside the state largely in heavily forested areas dominated by tribals in the states of Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Its focus has moved to attainment of tribal selfdetermination and control over local resources issues for which it has found ready sympathisers among local communities. In tribal-dominated regions, development has been largely synonymous with the commercial exploitation of forest resources, primarily controlled by the forest department and other government agencies. This has almost obliterated traditional community control of forest resources. Government policies have made out the very existence of tribals as detrimental to Indias biodiversity, and displaced them from their lands. Legislations like the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 have made tribals encroachers on the land they have inhabited for centuries. But this tribal alienation from land has not just been a result of the countrys conservation policy. Tribals have also suffered for years due to development projects, including mining projects. Naxalism has emerged to exploit the often justified tribal angst against this oppression. And with Indias major mineral resources lying under tribaldominated forestlands, mining and related projects have naturally come into the crosshairs of the Naxals. Today, five of Indias top mineral-producing states Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are fighting the rise of the red brigades in most of their mineral-rich districts (see Map 1.5: The red spread). It's not development. It is an express highway to speed up exploitation What they have left for the local people is just air and water pollution, says Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (M) central committee member Kosa, while referring to the mega mining projects in Bastar, Chhattisgarh.31 This Naxal opposition to mining is rapidly acquiring strident tones. On December 20, 2005, the Bihar-Jharkhand special area committee of the CPI (M) sent out a press release opposing the proposed expansion of iron ore mining in West Singhbhum, Jharkhand.32 The militant opposition has unnerved the mining industry. A report by the risk management consultancy, Hill and Associates based in Hong Kong terms Naxalism as a grave operational risk affecting investment climate in the core extractive sector. The report also feels that Naxalism is likely to affect foreign direct investment in the country.33 "The risk exposure would be greater in pockets where Naxalites have joined the tribals in opposing project-induced human displacement... Areas where industrialisation is in the initial stages of development are more prone to stiff opposition by Naxalites, it says.
OUTLOOK
20
MAP 1.5: The red spread

Naxalites are operational in most mining districts, targeting companies as exploiters of poor and tribal people
NA
JAMMU & KASHMIR
Severely affected districts (51) Moderately and marginally affected districts (80)
HIMACHAL PRADESH
PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND HARYANA DELHI SIKKIM
AR
RAJASTHAN UTTAR PRADESH
UN
AC
L HA
PR
AD
ESH
NAGALAND
MANIPUR JHARKHAND WEST BENGAL TRIPURA MIZORAM
GUJARAT
MADHYA PRADESH
DAMAN & DIU DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI MAHARASHTRA
CH HA TT ISG AR H
ANDHRA PRADESH KARNATAKA
GOA ARABIAN SEA Bauxite Chromite Copper PONDICHERRY Gold Iron TAMIL NADU Lead Magnesite Manganese Zinc Coal/lignite Petrolum and natural gas INDIAN OCEAN Uranium Asbestos Barytes Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum Kaolin Kyanite Limestone Mica Sillimanite Silica sand ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS
LAKSHADWEEP ISLAND
Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/pamsweb/technicalreport/report1/chapter-11.pdf, as viewed on May 15, 2007
LA KERA
21
Traditionally, symbols of government machinery (police forces, the forest department, politicians and railway networks) have been the targets of Naxal violence. Industrial establishments are likely to bear the brunt in the future, says the report. In fact, at their ninth congress held in the beginning of 2007, Naxalites clearly expressed their intention of focusing on areas where mega development projects including special economic zones, irrigation projects and mining enterprises were coming up.34 The militants have used various tactics for opposing industrial investment. Threats and kidnapping of officials from companies are often used. In Chhattisgarh, they have threatened to attack the facilities of the Tatas and Essar; both the groups are planning huge steel plants in the state. In some cases, they have carried out the threats. There has been a spate of armed attacks in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa aimed at mining companies. Chhattisgarh has borne the brunt of these attacks the strike on Hindalco being a case in point (see section on Chhattisgarh in Chapter 4). More recently, on May 31, 2007, Naxalites blasted three high-tension power towers in the state, disrupting power supply in large parts of Bastar and affecting iron ore production in the mines run by the state-owned NMDC. According to NMDC officials, the company suffered a daily loss of about Rs 9 crore.35 The rise of Naxalism can be directly linked to a certain crisis of faith: Indias marginalised populations, including its tribals, can no longer trust their lives and livelihoods in the hands of their
To bring the people in mining regions out of the guns shadow, the government must recognise and respect their right to say no
government. Development projects literally pushed down their throats by these governments have become synonymous with poverty and insecurity. With their backs to the wall, these communities believe they have found their way out in the violent ways of the Naxals. In a sense, the phenomenon of Naxalism is as much a crisis of political empowerment as it is of sheer economic backwardness, as it is sadly one of the rare opportunities still available for the marginalised to express their aspirations. The Indian governments attitude to Naxalism, of course, remains as mulish as ever: as an internal security threat, Naxalism and its sympathisers deserve to be stamped out decisively by the States police and army. In his speech, Manmohan Singh claims the path of violence can never solve the problems of the poor. On the other hand, he strongly advocates violence to suppress the movement and solve the problems of the government: Our security forces will respond appropriately to the violence unleashed by Naxalites, he says. It is precisely this myopic vision that is the real problem. Poverty, starvation, malnutrition, unemployment, lack of access to basic necessities like health and education, forced eviction of people from their lands for developmental projects in official parlance, these do not qualify as threats to internal security. Reactions to all of these, and resistance and protests against them, do. Various experiences have proved that a vastly different strategy is required if governments are really keen to solve the problem. The first step is an unambiguous acceptance that development policies have failed vast majorities in the country. The second is an understanding of the basic reasons behind the failure of development policies. And the third, and most difficult, is the political will to institutionalise alternative policies. A prime reason for the spread of Naxalism has been the failure of the State to provide remote areas with facilities for health and education, and the prospect for dignified employment. People in these areas have had to cope with an administration that is always indifferent, often corrupt, and sometimes brutal. Meanwhile, economic development has been powered in good part by wood, water and minerals found on these lands, and for whose profitable exploitation they have often had to make way most of the time involuntarily. It is important to recognise the fact that in the current system, forced eviction of people from their land and livelihood for projects like mining creates poverty and not prosperity. Governments need to be sensitive about these issues. They must work to make people in Naxal-infested areas true partners in the development process by assuring them titles on lands cultivated by them, by allowing them the right to manage forests sustainably, and by giving them a solid stake in industrial or mining projects that come up where they live and at the cost of their homes. Even if land is necessary for mining, people need to be offered deals that are good enough for them to forgo their existing livelihoods. Finally, and most importantly, governments must recognise and respect the right of a community to say no to a development project. Only then will it succeed in creating an atmosphere where progress, modernisation and industrialisation will walk hand-in-hand with peoples aspirations away from the shadow of guns.
NILMADHAV PANDA
22
The industry and its economics
orldwide, the mining industry is on an overdrive. Propelled by Chinas growing economy and its insistent craving for raw materials, mineral prices are hitting the roof. And, understandably, countries like India are cashing in:
to feed the Chinese dragon, states like Goa and Karnataka are mining iron like there was no tomorrow. What aids this global demand-supply equation nicely is a strong national partiality towards mining and miners. Mining means progress: so believe the Indian government and industry. They argue that the countrys most backward regions, which hold its poorest people and richest reserves of minerals, must mine more and more to clamber out of their depths of poverty and destitution. Mining would bring jobs, and jobs would usher in prosperity, they assure us. But does it? To begin with, statistics indicate that there is no truth in the governments contention that the mining sector in India is slackening. India has been mining with a vengeance for some time now the 11 per cent growth rate of the sector is healthy enough. The three top mineral-rich states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are going all out to rope in investors for tapping the wealth beneath their lands. Despite this, minings contribution to the gross domestic product is nothing to write home about: in 10 years, it has stagnated around a mere 2.2-2.5 per cent. Small-scale and public sector mining, both mass employers, are on their way out. Privately-owned, large-scale, mechanised mines are in, and this has meant a massive dip in employment: mining offers lesser jobs now. The mining industrys claims of contribution through royalties and taxes do not hold either; in India, minerals are cheap, royalties low, and whats more, these royalties are rarely used for the benefit of the mined regions. Thus, coupled with the devastation that mineral extraction wreaks on a regions forests, lands, water and people, the net result of increased mining has been increased poverty. This, one would imagine, should be reason enough for our planners to rethink: India must mine, but it must mine to ensure real and lasting prosperity, not the ephemeral idea of progress that it has taken a fancy to.
The global mining industry is having a dream run. Between 2002 and 2005, the index of world prices of minerals, ores and metals has more than doubled. The real prices of most metals are at 10-15 year highs. This has ushered in an era of frenzied mining and profiteering in countries like India, disregarding all environmental and social implications. The value of mineral production in India has more than tripled since liberalisation of the mining sector in 1993. The value grew at an astounding rate of 10.7 per cent during 1993-2005. The growth of the Indian mining industry is likely to be much higher in the coming years. In between 2002-06, an area of 900 sq km was opened for mining for major minerals. Environmental clearance was granted to 540 mines during this period and as on April 2007, there were 508 mining projects awaiting environmental clearance. The Indian mining industry is characterised by a large number of small mines and is dominated by the public sector. With only 25 per cent of Indias operational mines, the public sector accounts for 75 per cent of the total value of mineral production. Another characteristic of Indian mining is that most of the major minerals are produced for captive consumption. But these traits are likely to change soon. The thrust of the new mining policy being promulgated by the government is to move Indian mining towards privately owned, large-scale, mechanised mines. To achieve this, the government is rolling out the red carpet for foreign direct investors and multinational mining companies. Mining is being promoted in the country for the wrong reason employment. The formal mining industry in India employs just 5.6 lakh people and this number is coming down. Between 1991 and 2004, the number of people employed in mining came down by 30 per cent, but the value of mineral production went up four times.
CHAPTER
The industry and its economics
ining activities in India can be traced back 6,000 years. In fact, remains of old mine workings have led to the discovery of a number of mineral deposits which are being worked today (for example, lead-zinc at Zawar, copper at Khetri and gold in Kolar). Unfortunately, no detailed documentation of ancient mining policies and practices in the country exists; some records, however, have been found in Chanakyas 4th century BC treatise on governance, Arthashastra,1 which says that the owner of a piece of land is entitled to half of all minerals and treasures found on it. Chanakya also writes that mines which required large outlays to work, were leased out for a fixed number of shares of the output (perhaps on a royalty basis) and for a fixed rent. Mines that could be worked without large outlays were exploited by the State.
The first recorded reference to largescale mining in India dates back to 1774, when an English firm was granted permission by the East India Company for mining coal in Raniganj. In 1880, M/s John Taylor & Sons Ltd started mining for gold in Kolar. And the countrys first oil well was drilled in Digboi in 1866 just seven years after the worlds first oil well came up in Pennsylvania, USA. During the British period, mineral rights belonged to the states. In some states, these rights were vested in the landlords (zamindars) and were not subject to any regulations or restrictions by the state; landlords were free to grant leases under their own terms and conditions. The Indian mining industry came of age only after independence. On the eve of independence, the annual value of mineral production in the country was a mere Rs 58 crore.2 The country
Indian mining has a 6,000-year history. Remains of old mine workings have led to the discovery of deposits being worked today
25
largely depended on imports. The Mineral Policy Conference held in January 1947 resulted in the enactment of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948, the first legal framework in independent India for the regulation and development of mines. The conference also resulted in the establishment of the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) in March 1948 as the main agency for the development of the mining industry in the country. With the adoption of the Indian Constitution on January 26, 1950, the legislative powers of the Centre and the state governments were clearly defined. Entry 54 of List I in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution empowered the Central government to regulate mining activities and the development of minerals. Entry 23 of List II in the Seventh Schedule empowered the state governments to frame rules and regulations for mining activities and mineral development, subject to the provisions of List I. The Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) of 1956 made the state the sole exploiter of minerals by clearly delineating the role of the public and private sectors. It put major minerals such as coal, lignite, mineral oils, iron ore, copper, zinc and atomic minerals in Schedule A, which was reserved exclusively for the public sector, and minor minerals in Schedule B, in which the private sector was also allowed to participate (see Box: Mineral classification in India). The IPR also envisioned an ambitious programme for developing several mineral-based industries such as steel, non-ferrous metals, cement, power and fertilisers. Coal received the maximum attention, as it was the basic fuel for a whole range of industries a ministry was created exclusively for coal, while all the other minerals were clubbed under one common ministry. The 1956 resolution also led to the strengthening of the Geological Survey of India (GSI) to intensify the exploration of minerals (see Box: Mining operations). In 1957, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Bill was enacted by the Parliament for the regulation of mines and development of minerals. This legislation stipulated that the state governments were the owners of the minerals located within the boundaries of the respective states, while the Central government was the owner of the minerals in the ocean within Indias territorial waters or exclusive economic
Mining operations
The basics of mining processes
Mining is a three-stage operation, involving regional exploration, detailed exploration and extraction (or mining proper). The first two, taken together, are also covered under the generic term prospecting. In India, the term reconnaissance is used to cover the regional exploration phase of prospecting. Mine development, which precedes extraction, is treated as a part of mining, as this work starts only after the mine lease is granted. Regional exploration is mainly a survey activity to identify areas bearing deposits through means such as geological and theme (geophysical and geochemical) mapping, aerial photography, satellite imagery, topographic and underground surveys, and some very limited geophysical exploration with sample drilling. Unlike regional exploration, detailed exploration is invasive and involves close distance drilling, including slim hole drilling, large-scale mapping, and geophysical and geochemical testing to establish economically recoverable ore bodies. Mining involves mine development and extraction. Currently in India, a miner has to take a Reconnaissance Permit (RP) to undertake regional exploration, Prospecting License (PL) to undertake detailed exploration and Mining Lease (ML) to undertake actual mining.
Mineral classification in India

Of major, minor, atomic and fuel minerals
In India, minerals are broadly classified into fuel minerals (coal, lignite, oil and gas), major minerals, minor minerals and atomic minerals. Major minerals constitute metallic and non-metallic industrial minerals like iron ore, bauxite, chromite, lead, zinc, limestone, copper, manganese, etc and precious metals and stones like gold, silver, diamond, ruby etc. Minor minerals mainly constitute construction materials like building stone, sand, brick, earth, marble, gravel, murrum, quartzite/sandstone and kankar. In terms of value, brick earth constitutes the largest share of minor minerals in India: about 26 per cent. India currently produces about 90 minerals. These include four fuel, 10 metallic, 50 non-metallic, three atomic and 23 minor minerals.
zone. Two Rules were framed under the Act (referred to as MMDR Act) the Mineral Concession Rules (MCR) and the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules (MCDR). Under MCR, the Central government kept the powers with itself to grant prospecting licences and mining leases for all minerals other than atomic minerals and minor minerals. State governments were given the powers to give licenses for only minor minerals. Accordingly, most states have framed their own Minor Mineral Concession Rules. Thus, even though a state was the owner of the minerals within its territories, it had limited powers to grant or authorise mining in case of major minerals. The period between late 1950s and early 1970s saw the emergence of a number of public sector companies in the mining and minerals sector: the National Coal Development Corporation (NCDC) came up in 1956, the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) in 1958, Bharat Gold Mines Limited in 1972 and the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) in 1973. The MMDR Act, 1957 was first amended in 1972, enhancing government control over mining through such measures as premature termination of mining leases (because of the large-scale accidents in the privately held coal mines), lowering of ceiling on individual holdings, power to modify mining leases and for the Central government to undertake prospecting and mining operations in certain areas, removal of ceiling on royalty charged on minerals, inclusion of provision of dead rent as part of the act, and enhancement of penalties for non-compliance. In 1986, the MMDR Act was amended again. First Schedule minerals, for which prior approval of the Central government had to be obtained under the act, were increased in number from
26
THE INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMICS
27 to 38; the Central government was authorised to reserve areas for public sector undertakings (PSUs); and mining plan approval was made compulsory. In 1988, the MCDR was revised to enable IBM to monitor and regulate mining activity. In March 1993, alongside economic liberalisation introduced by the government in 1991, a comprehensive National Mineral Policy (NMP) was announced. The policy is more known for what it did not prescribe, than for what it did. This single policy has been used as a tool to liberalise the Indian mining industry, though the policy per se doesnt even talks about private sector investment in exploration and mining (see Box on pages 28-29: Travesty of a policy). Thirteen major minerals iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, sulphur, gold, diamond, copper, lead, zinc, molybdenum, tungsten, nickel and the platinum group of minerals hitherto reserved exclusively for the public sector, were opened up to the private sector. Induction of foreign technology and foreign participation in exploration and mining was encouraged and foreign equity investment in joint ventures (JVs) in mining promoted by Indian companies was allowed. While generally there was a limit of 50 per cent on foreign equity, the government announced its intention to consider relaxation of this limit on a case-by-case basis (see Box: The FDI story). Consequently, amendments were carried out in the MMDR Act in January 1994 and soon after, in the MCR and MCDR. These amendments sought to simplify the procedure for grant of mineral concessions. The objective was to attract investments through private sector participation, including FDI. To encourage private sector investments, especially FDI, in exploration and prospecting, the concept of Large Area Prospecting License (LAPL) was introduced and guidelines were issued in October 1996, whereby the area for a single Prospecting License (PL) for facilitating aerial prospecting was enhanced from 25 sq km to 5,000 sq km, with a proviso that the aggregate area held by a single party would not exceed 10,000 sq km in the whole country.
In another significant move, the government amended the Coal Nationalisation Act, 1973 in 1999, facilitating the entry of private entrepreneurs in coal and lignite production. Till then, coal had remained a monopoly of the state barring captive coal mines granted to the Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO). Despite changes in the Act and the Rules to accelerate private sector investment and FDI in the mining sector, prospecting and mining activity by the private sector did not pick up at the anticipated pace and in February 1997, the Union ministry of mines constituted a committee to go into the reasons for this. The committee submitted its report in January 1998, suggesting wide-ranging amendments in the MMDR Act. Based on the recommendations, amendments were made in the MMDR Act, 1957 in 1999 as well as the MCR and MCDR in January 2000. The key changes were: 1. Introduction of the concept of reconnaissance operations as a distinct stage prior to prospecting, and replacement of LAPL by the instrument of Reconnaissance Permit (RP) 2. RP holder to get priority in the grant of Prospecting License (PL) within reconnaissance areas subject to certain conditions 3. Minerals listed in the First Schedule requiring prior approval of the Centre brought down from 11 to 10 4. Delegation of powers to state governments to renew lapsed Mine Leases/Prospecting License, and grant RP/PL/ML for areas that were not compact or contiguous 5. Liberalisation of area restrictions of RP/PL/ML by making such restrictions applicable state-wise Thus, after the first Mining Act was promulgated in 1957, the act was amended four times in 1972, 1986, 1994, and 1999. After each amendment, corresponding changes were carried out in the two rules, MCR and MCDR. While the first two amendments increased government control and excluded the private sector, the last two did just the opposite. The last two amendments also devolved considerable authority from the Centre to the states. After the amendment made in 1999 in the MMDR Act, which
The FDI story

The mining sector, which enjoys 100 per cent FDI, has been drawing big names like De Beers and Rio Tinto
Till the early 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) was not encouraged in the mining sector. Mineral concessions were restricted to companies with less than 40 per cent foreign holding. The National Mineral Policy, 1993, changed all that by allowing FDI up to 50 per cent with no limit on captive mines. It also allowed additional FDI on a case-by-case basis. However, all FDI proposals required clearance by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). In 1997, FDI up to 50 per cent was taken out of the purview of the FIPB and put on an automatic approval route. In February 2000, FDI was allowed up to 74 per cent under the automatic route for exploration and mining of diamonds and precious stones. In February 2006, the mining sector was opened up to 100 per cent FDI. Besides liberalising procedures, the Indian government has
divested its equity holdings in a number of public sector undertakings such as the Neyveli Lignite Corporation, National Mineral Development Corporation, Kudremukh Iron Ore Co Ltd, Hindustan Copper Ltd, National Aluminium Company Ltd and Hindustan Zinc Ltd. Since 1994, the government has approved 73 proposals of FDI in the mining sector, envisaging an investment of about Rs 4,044 crore. It includes big names like De Beers Consolidated Ltd, Rio Tinto Minerals Development Ltd and BHP World Exploration Inc. De Beers, the South African diamond giant, has acquired prospecting rights to several large tracts of land in Orissa (over 8,500 sq km), Andhra Pradesh (679 sq km) and Chhattisgarh (9,000 sq km). Rio Tinto, a multinational corporation, has diamond and gold prospecting rights in Madhya Pradesh (7,650 sq km) and diamond prospecting rights in Chhattisgarh (6,000 sq km). Broken Hill Properties of Australia has acquired nickel, gold and cobalt prospecting rights in Madhya Pradesh (2,293 sq km).
27
Travesty of a policy
The National Mineral Policy, 1993 has been covertly distorted to usher in privatisation of mining in India, something which was not even enunciated in it
Every major legislative and regulatory change that has happened in the last 14 years in India in the mining and minerals industry has been done in the name of the National Mineral Policy (NMP), 1993. The mining sector has been opened up for private investments, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been allowed and regulations have been relaxed. So what is this NMP all about? The preamble of the NMP reads as follows: 1.1. Minerals are valuable natural resources, being finite and nonrenewable. They constitute the vital raw materials for many basic industries and are a major resource for development. Management of mineral resources has, therefore, to be closely integrated with the overall strategy of development; and exploitation of minerals is to be guided by long-term national goals and perspectives. 1.2. The country is not endowed with all the requisite mineral resources. It is, therefore, imperative to achieve the best use of available mineral resources through scientific methods of mining, beneficiation and economic utilisation. Simultaneously, it is essential to keep in view the present and future needs of defence and development of the country and strive to ensure indigenous availability of basic and strategic minerals to avoid disruption of core industrial production in times of international strife. 1.3. These aspects constitute the essentials of National Mineral Policy which has evolved over the years. The policy also emphasises certain new aspects and elements like mineral exploration in the sea-bed, development of a proper inventory, proper linkage between exploitation of minerals and development of the mineral industry, preference to members of the Scheduled Tribes for development of small deposits in Scheduled Areas, protection of forests, environment and ecology from the adverse effects of mining, enforcement of a mining plan for adoption of proper mining methods and optimum utilisation of minerals, export of minerals in value-added form and recycling of metallic scrap and mineral waste. The preamble, in essence, had nothing to say about opening up of the mining industry to private investments and FDI; instead, it had everything to say about national security, social and environmental fallouts, privileges of Scheduled Tribes, etc. The objectives of the NMP were as follows: (a) to explore for identification of mineral wealth in the land and in off-shore areas; (b) to develop mineral resources taking into account national and strategic considerations and to ensure their adequate supply and best use, keeping in view the present needs and future requirements; (c) to promote necessary linkages for smooth and uninterrupted development of the mineral industry to meet the needs of the country; (d) to promote research and development in minerals; (e) to ensure establishment of appropriate educational and training facilities for human resources development to meet the manpower requirements of the mineral industry; (f) to minimise adverse effects of mineral development on the
forest, environment and ecology through appropriate protective measures; and (g) to ensure conduct of mining operations with due regard to safety and health of all concerned. The objectives of the policy, too, had nothing to say about private investments and FDI; forests, environment, ecology, health and safety, however, were considered important considerations. Significantly, the entire NMP does not allude to encouragement of private investment anywhere. In fact, it only refers to the private sector twice: under the section on survey and exploration, it says that the initiative and co-operation of the private sector will also be drawn upon as required. Under mineral policy and beneficiation, it saysthere shall be co-operation between and co-ordination among all organisations in public and private sector engaged in this task. The policys enumerations on FDI are restricted to the following: Induction of foreign technology and foreign participation in exploration and mining for high value and scarce minerals shall be pursued. Foreign equity investment in joint ventures in mining promoted by Indian companies would be encouraged. In respect of joint venture mining projects of minerals and metals in which the country is deficient or does not have exportable surplus, a stipulated share of production would have to be made available to meet the needs of the domestic market before exports from such projects are allowed. In case of ores whose known reserves are not abundant, preference will be given to those who propose to take up their mining for captive use. In a nutshell, the NMP wanted FDI to meet Indias mineral needs, not to encourage mineral exports. Regarding environment and ecology, the policy had this to say: Extraction and development of minerals are closely interlinked with other natural resources like land, water, air and forest. The areas in which minerals occur often have other resources presenting a choice of utilisation of the resources. Some such areas are ecologically fragile and some are biologically rich. It is necessary to take comprehensive view to facilitate the choice or order of land use keeping in view the needs of development as well as needs of protecting the forests, environment and ecology. Both aspects have to be properly coordinated to facilitate and ensure a sustainable development of mineral resources in harmony with environment. Mining activity often leads to environmental problems like land degradation particularly in open-cast mining, land subsidence in underground mining, deforestation, atmospheric pollution, pollution of rivers and streams, disposal of solid wastes, etc. affecting the ecological balance of the area. Open-cast mining in areas with actual forest cover leads to deforestation. Prevention and mitigation of adverse environmental effects due to mining and processing of minerals and repairing and revegetation of the affected forest area and land covered by trees in accordance with the prescribed norms and established forestry practices shall form the integral part of mine development strategy in every instance. Mining operations shall not ordinarily be taken up in identified ecologically fragile and biologically rich areas. Strip mining in forest areas should as far as possible be avoided and it should be
28
CSE
The National Mineral Policy advocates proactive processes like simultaneous reclamation of exhausted mines; but its exhortations have been largely ignored. The result: eyesores like the one above
permitted only when accompanied with comprehensive time-bound reclamation programme. No mining lease would be granted to any party, private or public, without a proper mining plan including the environmental management plan approved and enforced by statutory authorities. The environmental management plan should adequately provide for controlling the environmental damage, restoration of mined areas and for planting of trees according to the prescribed norms. As far as possible, reclamation and afforestation will proceed concurrently with mineral extraction. Efforts would be made to convert old disused mining sites into forests and other appropriate forms of land use. The policys recommendations on closure of mines and rehabilitation of the displaced population were: Mineral deposits being exhaustible, once the process of extraction of a mine is complete, there is need for its closure. Especially where the mining activities have been spread over a few decades, mining communities get established and closure of the mine means not only loss of jobs, but also disruption of community life. Whenever mine closure becomes necessary, it should be orderly and systematic and so planned as to help the workers and the dependent communities rehabilitate themselves without undue hardships. Mining operations often involve acquisition of land held by individuals including those belonging to the weaker sections. While
compensation is generally paid to the owner for the acquisition of his land, efforts shall be made to ensure suitable rehabilitation of affected persons, especially those belonging to the weaker sections who are likely to be deprived of their means of livelihood as a result of such acquisition. Going by these, the NMP emerges as the most comprehensive and holistic policy that a nation can have to address and reduce the social and environmental fallouts of mining. It is farsighted enough to enunciate the principle of dematerialisation in the conservation of minerals: it states that one of the means to achieve conservation of minerals is by reduction in the requirements of minerals per unit of material output. Despite all these proactive enunciations, the policy has been grossly misinterpreted and misused. Using this policy as an entry point, large-scale mining has been ushered in the country, without giving due consideration to the social and environmental impacts. It has been publicly announced that the policy was made to encourage private sector investment in exploration and mining. Consequently, amendments were carried out in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act in January 1994 and soon after in the MCR and MCDR. These amendments sought to simplify the procedure for grant of mineral concessions, so as to attract large investments through private sector participation, including FDI. Of course, none of the clauses of the policy which related to forests, environment, Scheduled Areas, health or safety were given similar attention.
29
introduced the concept of RPs, till March 31, 2005, 203 RPs covering an area of over 2,78,618 sq km had been granted in 12 states.3 Following its liberalisation in 1993, the mining industry has grown significantly. Between 1993-94 and 2003-04, the value of mineral production (other than atomic minerals) in the country has more than tripled: it has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 10.7 per cent since 1993-94.4 This apparent high, however, has only served to whet the governments appetite; the dominant viewpoint in the corridors of power is that India must mine more for exports and become a major mineral-exporting country of the world. Keeping this in mind, another high-powered committee was set up by the government in September 2005 under the leadership of Anwarul Hoda, member, Planning Commission, to review policies, acts, regulations and procedures for granting RPs, PLs and mining leases and suggest measures to expedite these processes for attracting private investment and FDI. This committee has come out with a set of far more industry-friendly recommendations which, if adopted, will lead to massive changes in the relationship between mining, people and environment (see Chapter 5).
THE MINING BOOM

Mine let the good times roll: this is the title of a report that the global consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers published in June 2006, reflecting the global trends in the mining industry. The mining industry is having a dream run because world prices of minerals, ores and metals have reached record levels. The prices are in the midst of a multi-year upward trend, which started in 2002 on the back of unprecedented demand from China. The year 2006 saw prices skyrocketing further up 48 per cent since the beginning of the year.5 Between 2002 and 2005, the index of world prices of minerals, ores and metals had doubled. During this period, the prices of iron ore increased by 118.5 per cent, copper prices shot up by 136 per cent, lead prices by 116 per cent, nickel
GRAPH 2.1: Monthly commodity price indices

Most mineral prices have gone up between 1995 and 2006
300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All commodities (in current dollars) Minerals, ores and metals Crude petroleum, average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted
Source: Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, p 19
prices by 118 per cent and aluminium prices by 41 per cent.6 By 2005, nickel was at its highest price in 15 years, copper and tin were at their highest in 10 years, and aluminum was at a six-year high.7 The real price of iron ore was at a 15-year high.8 Clearly, the mining industry is going through a boom, and the good times are expected to last (see Graph 2.1: Monthly commodity price indices). The most important factor that has led to these price increases has been the demand from China. From 1990-2000, Chinas metals demand grew at an average of 10 per cent annually; from 2000-2005, it skipped on at 17 per cent per year.9 Today, China is the worlds number one miner of coal, lead, zinc and iron ore and the top producer of steel, aluminium, refined zinc, tin and lead.10 But its domestic mining industry cannot meet the demands of its manufacturing sector. The result: China is importing everything, including bauxite, copper, iron ore, zinc, lead and nickel, to feed its metals industry. Take the examples of iron ore and aluminium. China has been the largest steel producer for nearly a decade, producing about one-third of the worlds steel: this is more than three times the production of Japan and the US, the second and third largest producers.11 Between 1990 and 2000, Chinas steel production nearly doubled, growing at a rate of more than six per cent.12 The demand for iron ore during this period was largely met domestically. But between 2000 and 2005, steel production nearly tripled, rising at an astounding average rate of more than 22 per cent.13 To meet the iron ore requirements of its steel industry, therefore, China moved to imports. Between 2000 and 2004, China imported two-thirds of the worlds traded iron ore, and its imports grew at a rate of more than 30 per cent annually.14 This demand led to skyrocketing of world iron ore prices, which increased by 118.5 per cent between 2002 and 2005.15 The influence of China on the metals market is also apparent in the case of aluminium prices, which have fallen as a result of Chinas increased production. In 2005, China was both the largest producer and consumer of aluminium.16 While prices are at a 10-year high (real dollars), aluminium surpluses are projected through 2010 a result of Chinas increased production; this is expected to drive prices down until they settle just above the prices in the previous 15-year peaks.17 The increase in minerals and metals prices have ushered in an era of frenzied mining and profiteering. Mines that were uneconomical and closed have been opened to meet the Chinese demand. There is a rush to open up new mines and metal manufacturing plants. Countries like India, which have large deposits of bauxite and iron ore, have taken to mining extensively to feed the growing Chinese demand, besides their own growing metals industries (see Box: The frenzy of mining iron). Naturally, mining and metals companies never had it so good. During 2004 and 2005, the global mining industrys performance has exceeded that of the market as a whole by over 300 per cent.18 With net profits eight times that of 2002, 2005 had proved to be a very good year for mining companies, driven by the high prices of copper, gold, iron ore and coal.19 The top 40 global mining companies (which represent over 80 per cent of the world
30
The frenzy of mining iron

Chinese demand for iron ore is responsible for the surge in iron ore mining
Whether it is picturesque Goa, densely forested Koenjhar-Sundergarh in Orissa or hilly Bellary-Hospet in Karnataka, massive iron ore mining is leaving its indelible marks everywhere in the country. The frenzy has taken India by surprise. Not long ago, this segment of the mining industry was on the verge of collapse. Prices were low and domestic and global demands were moderate. Then came China and iron ore miners were a resurrected lot. In five years, the amount of iron ore produced in the country has almost doubled from 77 MT in 2000-01 to 154 MT in 2005-06 (see Table: Iron ore from India). The compound annual growth rate of iron ore production in these years has been a whopping 15 per cent.
Most of the incremental production in iron ore is being exported. The share of exports to the total iron ore production in the country has steadily increased from about 26 per cent in 2000-01 to about 58 per cent in 2005-06. Today, Indias domestic requirement of iron ore is not even 40 per cent of the iron ore produced in the country. The majority of the Indian iron ore is being bought by China. Chinas share in Indias exports of iron has increased from about 30 per cent in 2000-01 to 83 per cent in 2005-06. Today, China consumes far more of Indian iron ore than the Indias own domestic industry. China, in fact, is buying everything from India high grade ore, low grade ore, fines, lumps, concentrates and even the soil of areas like Goa, Joda-Barbil and Bellary-Hospet, which has about 40-50 per cent iron content. Vast tracts, as a result, are doomed to become veritable wastelands to satisfy Chinas unquenchable appetite.
TABLE: Iron ore from India

Production of iron ore has doubled in six years, and exports have surged too
2000-01 Production (in million tonne) Total exports (in million tonne) Exports as percentage of production (in percentage) Exports to: China (in million tonne) China's share in total exports (in percentage) Japan (in million tonne) Japan's share in total exports (in percentage) Others (in million tonne) Share of others in total exports (in percentage) 6.1 30.2 8.2 40.4 5.9 29.4 10.7 46.3 6.3 27.4 6.1 26.3 25.2 52.4 21.7 45.1 1.2 2.5 42.1 67.2 13.1 20.9 7.4 11.8 59.4 76.0 11.1 14.2 7.6 9.8 74.1 83.0 10.3 11.6 4.8 5.4 77.0 20.2 26.2 2001-02 86.2 23.1 26.8 2002-03 99.1 48.0 48.5 2003-04 122.8 62.6 50.9 2004-05 145.9 78.1 53.5 2005-06 154.4 89.3 57.8
Sources: Anon, Indian Minerals Yearbooks 2002-2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur; data from Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation, New Delhi; anon, 2006, Lok Sabha Starred Question No 293, December 12
industry by market capitalisation) reported a 59 per cent increase in aggregate net profits for 2005 up from US $28 billion in 2004 to US $45 billion. The aggregate profits of these companies were a mere US $5 billion in 2002.20 For instance, in 2005, mining multinational BHP Billitons profits more than doubled for the first half of the year, largely due to Chinas demand; Brazils Rio Tinto, one of the largest mining companies in the world, provided China with 25 per cent of its imported iron ore.21 Total shareholder returns (TSR) in 2005 reflect the increasing commodity prices: the average TSR of the top 40 mining companies was 63 per cent. Eight of the companies had a TSR greater than 100 per cent.22 In total, the TSR in 2005 was around US $16 billion, almost double that in 2004.23 The metals and minerals commodities market has historically been cyclical.24 Today, however, the market is looking towards China, India and the rest of the developing world to see if these
highs will be sustained because of continued growth and demand from those countries (which already account for almost half of the global demand).25,26 At the end of 2006, the World Bank had predicted that while the metals and minerals index will decline in 2007 and 2008, it would still be high;27 however, even within the Bank, there is a disagreement on how much countries like India and other emerging economies will influence the market. There is a general sense of optimism that prices will remain high as countries like India catch up with China. A PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey of the global minerals and metals scenario reflects this sense of optimism: India is on the path to a sustained high level of growth. The rapidly growing private sector and massive investments in building infrastructure across the huge country are expected to trigger considerable demand for minerals in the foreseeable future. This will provide great opportunities for increased revenues for the global mining industry.28
31
The production of limestone grew at a CAGR of six per cent, having more than doubled from 83 MT in 1993-94 to 170 MT in 2005-06. The only major mineral whose production stagnated was crude petroleum, mainly because of the limited geological potential. Despite such impressive figures over the last decade, the government and the industry continue to believe that mining is not contributing enough to the growth of the national economy and therefore, this sector has to do more to justify its position in a resurgent India. Most of the current official policies in the country, hence, seem to have been tailored to address this supposed malaise. But most of these policies are silent on the environmental, economic and social fallouts of mining.
MINERAL PRODUCTION IN INDIA

India produced 90 minerals in 2005-06, valued at an estimated Rs 84,211 crore. The list was dominated by fuel minerals coal, lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas which constituted about 73 per cent of the total value of minerals produced in the country (see Graph 2.2: The top minerals in 2005-2006). The contribution of fuel minerals, however, has dipped over the years: in 2001-02, it was as much as 81 per cent of the total value (see Table 2.1: Growth and value between 2001 and 2005). Within fuel minerals, solid fuels (coal and lignite) have overtaken liquid and gaseous fuels (crude petroleum and natural gas) in terms of value. In 2001-02, solid fuels constituted about 47 per cent of the value of fuel minerals; in 2005-06, they made up about 57 per cent of the value, while value from liquid and gaseous fuels decreased from 53 per cent to 43 per cent. Metallic minerals are the next biggest contributors to the total value of minerals. In 2005-06, they constituted about 13.6 per cent a share which has increased in the last few years (in 2001-02, it
DEBANJAN BANDOPAADHYAY
The minerals sector in India has been growing at an impressive 11 per cent, contrary to the poor projections by the government
Indian mining industry has, so far, not disappointed the global consultancy firm. The value of mineral production in the country has tripled since the liberalisation of the mining sector in 1993: from about Rs 25,000 crore in 1993-94 to more than Rs 84,000 crore in 2005-06.29 The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the value of mineral production in the country during 1993-2005 has been an astounding 10.7 per cent. Post-liberalisation, mineral production in the country has bounded ahead on the back of increase in the production of coal, lignite, natural gas, bauxite, chromite, iron ore and limestone. During 1993-2005: Iron ore production grew at a CAGR of 8.25 per cent. The total production of iron ore increased from about 59 MT in 1993-94 to 154 MT in 2005-06. Bauxite production grew at a CAGR of almost seven per cent: it increased from more than five MT in 1993-94 to about 12 MT in 2005-06. Total coal and lignite production grew at a CAGR of four per cent, having jumped from 267 MT in 1993-94 to 437 MT in 2005-06. The production of chromite grew at a CAGR of 10 per cent, from 1.06 MT in 1993-94 to three MT in 2005-06. Natural gas production grew at a CAGR of more than five per cent. The production almost doubled from 16,340 million cubic metre (mcm) in 1993-94 to 31,223 mcm in 2005-06.
GRAPH 2.2: The top minerals in 2005-2006

Fuel minerals lead the pack in contribution to total value
Natural gas 10.7% Lead & zinc 1.0% Iron ore 10.3% Lignite 2.6% Chromite 1.2% Petroluem 21.3%
Limestone 2.3%
Minor minerals 10.0% Others 2.2% Coal 38.4%
Source: Data collected from publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
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TABLE 2.1: Growth and value between 2001 and 2005

Metallic minerals are the fastest growing segment of the minerals industry in India
Sectors Value of mineral production (in Rs crore) Compound annual growth rate (in percentage) 2005-06 84,210.8* 61,484.8 34,506.4 26,978.4 11,486.1 2,828.9 8,411* 8.4 5.7 10.3 0.9 30.4 8.4 10.8 81.0 38.3 42.6 6.5 3.4 9.2 79.3 38.8 40.5 7.0 3.4 10.3 77.7 39.1 38.6 9.0 3.3 10.0 74.5 40.1 34.3 12.2 3.3 10.0 73.0 41.0 32.0 13.6 3.4 10.0 Sectoral contribution to the total value (in percentage)
2001-02 Total: all sectors Fuels (a) Solid fuels (b) Liquid & gaseous fuels Metallic minerals Non-metallic minerals Minor minerals 60,930.8 49,324 23,343.1 25,980.9 3,978.1 2,048.1 5,580.6
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05 81,264.4* 60,511.6 32,625.1 27,886.5 9,940.4 2,686.1 8,126.3*
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
66,878.3 71,381.9 53,042.9 55,480.7 25,930.1 27,926.1 27,112.8 27,554.6 4,679.2 2,248.8 6,907.4 6,395.9 2,371.1 7,134.2
Notes: The table excludes minerals declared as prescribed substances under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. *The data on value of minerals produced in the country for 2004-05 and 2005-06 excludes minor minerals. For estimating the total value of minerals produced, minor mineral value has been estimated based on the past trends, which indicate that minor minerals constitute about 10 per cent of the total value of minerals produced in the country. According to data released by the Indian Bureau of Mines, the value of minerals produced in the country, excluding minor minerals and atomic minerals, was Rs 73,136.4 crore and Rs 75,699.2 crore in 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively. Sources: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 1-5; value of mineral production for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 taken from http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html as viewed on March 21, 2007
was just 6.5 per cent). In fact, metallic minerals are the fastest growing segment of the mineral industry in India. During 2001-05, the value of metallic minerals produced in the country has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 30 per cent, one of the highest in the world. In metallic minerals, iron ore alone contributes three-fourth of the total value. Chromite, which is mainly exported, is the next biggest contributor (8.5 per cent). Minor minerals, mainly sand, gravel, brick, earth and stone, are also important contributors. Though data for the last few years is not available, past trends indicate that they constitute as much as 10 per cent of the value of minerals produced in the country. Non-metallic minerals are minor players in the Indian minerals sector in terms of value, though they are big both in terms of area under mining and volume of minerals produced. Their contribution to the value of total minerals produced in the country has remained at about 3.3-3.4 per cent in the last few years. In non-metallic minerals, limestone constitutes about two-thirds of the total value. Phosphorite is the next important non-metallic mineral produced in the country, constituting about 10 per cent of the total value of these minerals.
What the states produced
In the period 2002-05, mineral production was reported from 32 states and union territories, other than offshore production of petroleum and natural gas. In terms of value of production, the top 10 states along with the offshore production accounted for about 87 per cent of the minerals produced in the country (see Graph 2.3 on page 34: State-wise contribution to mineral value). Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are the major mineral producers of the country,
while states like Goa and Karnataka are the emerging giants. In the last few years, mineral production has increased at an unprecedented rate in some states. Production in Karnataka has almost doubled from Rs 1,133 crore in 2002-03 to Rs 2,117 crore in 2004-05. Goa has increased its value of production by 67 per cent from Rs 495 crore to Rs 829 crore in the same period. Madhya Pradesh has increased its value of mineral production by 38 per cent during 2002-04. Orissa is not far behind: its value of production has increased from Rs 3,443 crore in 2002-03 to Rs 5,820 crore in 2004-05.30 All this mining frenzy has happened on the back of the burgeoning iron ore demand from countries like China. In this period, Andhra Pradesh has made the maximum contribution to the total mineral value generated in the country. The state is the dominant producer of non-metallic and minor minerals. It accounted for 26 per cent of the total revenue generated by minor minerals and 15 per cent of the revenue generated by non-metallic minerals in the country. It also ranked fifth in its contribution to fuel minerals. Orissa, on the other hand, has substantial metallic mineral mining. It accounts for about one-third of the total value of metallic minerals, the highest in the country (see Graph 2.4 on page 34: State-wise contribution to metallic mineral value). Karnataka, Chhattisgarh and Goa are the other metallic mineral-rich states: along with Orissa, they accounted for 82 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals produced in the country. The states with significant contributions to fuel mineral value were coal-rich Orissa, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (see Graph 2.5 on page 34: State-wise contribution to fuel mineral value). Fuel minerals were produced in 19 states, other than offshore production (which alone contributed about one-third of the value).
33
GRAPH 2.3: State-wise contribution to mineral value: 2002-05

Top 10 states accounted for 87 per cent of the value
Others 13.1% Andhra Pradesh 8.6% Assam 4.3% Chhattisgarh 6.6%
GRAPH 2.4: State-wise contribution to metallic mineral value: 2004-05

Orissa and Karnataka contribute more than 50 per cent
Maharashtra 2% Madhya Pradesh 3% Jharkhand 6% Orissa 35% Others 1%
Rajasthan 7%
Offshore 26.5%
Gujarat 7.5%
Goa 10%
Jharkhand 8.2% Madhya Pradesh 6.5% Maharashtra 4.5% Chhattisgarh 13%
West Bengal 3.7% Rajasthan 4.0% Orissa 6.6%
Karnataka 23%
Source: Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-4
GRAPH 2.5: State-wise contribution to fuel mineral value: 2004-05 (in percentage)
Jharkhand generates the highest value in this sector
40
GRAPH 2.6: State-wise contribution to non-metallic mineral value: 2004-05 (in percentage)
Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh generate more than 50 per cent
25
35
23.4 33.4
30
20
25 14.8 15 20 10.0 10 7.9 10 9.2 8.7 7.9 6.9 5 6.5 4.8 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.8 3.7 2.1 1.4 0.4 Others 0 Himachal Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Chhattisgarh Maharashtra Tamil Nadu Karnataka Jharkhand Rajasthan Gujarat Kerala Others Orissa 5 4.6 4.1 3.4 2.4 1.6 1.9 7.5 13.7
15
0 Offshore Jharkhand Gujarat Assam Orissa Tamil Nadu Chhattisgarh Maharashtra Madhya Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Uttaranchal Meghalaya
States
States
34
GRAPH 2.7: State-wise contribution to minor mineral value: 2004-05

Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan contribute half the value
Madhya Pradesh 2% Kerala 2% Haryana 2% Karnataka 2% Gujarat 4% Maharashtra 4% Andhra Pradesh 27% West Bengal 1% Others 3%
In non-metallic minerals, Rajasthan leads a pack of 22 states. The states rich reserves of gypsum and limestone have allowed it to corner 23 per cent of the total non-metallic mineral value (see Graph 2.6: State-wise contribution to non-metallic mineral value). Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are the other two states, which contributed significantly to non-metallic minerals. Minor minerals were produced by 29 states, led by Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The four states together accounted for almost 80 per cent of the total minor mineral value (see Graph 2.7: State-wise contribution to minor mineral value).
INDIA AND THE WORLD

Bihar 12%
Uttar Pradesh 18%
Rajasthan 23%
India accounts for a significant portion of the worlds total production of a number of minerals. It is ranked second in output of chromites, accounting for 17.7 per cent of what is produced globally. It produces 11.5 per cent of the worlds barytes, and seven per cent of its coal and lignite (see Table 2.2: Indias share in global production). Indias contribution to global coal production has remained more or less constant over the past few years: on an average, between 2000 and 2004, it contributed 7.6 per cent of the total
TABLE 2.2: Indias share in global production of minerals, 2003-04

India contributes significantly to the worlds mineral production
Commodity Unit of quantity World Mineral fuels Coal and lignite Petroleum Metallic minerals Bauxite Chromite Iron ore Manganese ore Industrial minerals Barytes Kyanite, andalusite and silimanite Magnesite Apatite and rock phosphate Talc/steatite/pyrophylite Mica Metals Aluminium Copper (refined) Steel (crude) Lead (primary) Zinc (primary) 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 27,900 15,200 9,67,000 6,800 9,200 810 396 31,779 25 252 2.90 2.60 3.29 0.37 2.74 8th 14th 8th 26th 9th 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne Tonne 6,300 584 20,800 141,000 8,700 2,80,000 723 29 324 1,446 903 4,003 11.47 5.0 1.55 1.02 10.37 1.42 2nd 4th 9th 14th 3rd 8th 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 000 tonne 1,55,000 16,400 12,38,000 24,300 10,925 2,905 1,22,838 1,776 7.04 17.71 9.92 7.30 6th 2nd 4th 8th Million tonne Million tonne 5,080 3,596 389 334 7.65 0.93 3rd 26th Production India* Contribution % Rank in order of quantum of production
Note: *Figure relates to 2003-04 Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 1-5
35
GRAPH 2.8: Coal country-wise production (2004)

China and the US account for more than half of the global coal production
Others 22% Russia South Africa 5% 5% Canada 1%
GRAPH 2.10: Bauxite country-wise production (2004)

Contribution of India and China is growing
Guinea 12%
Others 31%
Jamaica 8%
USA 18% Australia 7%
China 7%
India 7% India 7%
China 35%
Australia 35%
Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 15-17
Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 32
coal produced in the world.31 The major producers were China and the US, who together accounted for more than 50 per cent of the global production in 2004 (see Graph 2.8: Coal country-wise production). In 2000, both these countries were contributing almost equally (around 23 per cent) to the worlds coal production. However, China has taken over since and is now putting in 35 per cent, while the US contribution has fallen to 18 per cent. In the case of iron ore, India accounted for 10.5 per cent of the total production in 2004 up from 7.5 per cent in 2000 (see Graph 2.9: Iron ore production (2001-04)). China is the largest iron ore-producing nation, accounting for 23 per cent of the global output in 2004. The nations which have shown significant increase in contribution to world production between 2000 and 2004 are China, India and Australia.
GRAPH 2.9: Iron ore production (2001-04)

Indias contribution to global outputs has been on the rise
12 9.9 10 8.2
Percentage (%)
10.5 8.9 7.5
8 6 4 2 0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Source: L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 32
Bauxite is another important mineral found in significant quantity in the country. India accounts for six-seven per cent of the total bauxite produced in the world. The biggest producers are Australia and Guinea (see Graph 2.10: Bauxite country-wise production). However, in the past five years, contribution of these two countries has gradually gone down while countries like India and China have increased their production by 32 and 34 per cent, respectively.32 India has limited reserves of petroleum and natural gas. In 2004, the country accounted for about 0.9 per cent of the total global production of petroleum products and 1.1 per cent of that of natural gas. Consumption of both these minerals is increasing within the country and is met mainly through imports. Some other minerals in which Indias contribution to global production is low are silver (0.2 per cent), gold (0.12 per cent), diamonds (0.05 per cent), copper (0.2 per cent) and lead (1.7 per cent). Industry experts feel that the current levels of mineral production in India are low, and that the contribution of India in global mineral production is bound to increase significantly in future. The populations of China and India are comparable in size and both economies have grown quickly in recent years. Indias economic growth has accelerated lately, and if liberalisation and economic reforms continue at the same pace, India could soon begin to match China in its contribution to the sector. Indias population is expected to grow more quickly and could overtake Chinas sometime after 2030. As the economy expands and people become wealthier, the need for large-scale new infrastructure will increase and the mineral demand for industrial and consumer goods as well as services will grow. The rate of growth in demand could be very rapid. Today, it is China which is exercising an impact on international mineral markets; tomorrow, it could very well be India.
36
STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY

The Indian mining industry is characterised by a large number of small mines. The total number of mine leases, excluding fuel minerals, atomic minerals and minor minerals, stood at 9,131 in 2004-05. The total number of operational mines (excluding atomic, minor and fuel minerals) was 2,606. However, if we add the number of coal mines, for which the data for only operational mines is available, then the total number of mine leases in the country goes up to 9,693 and the number of operational mines to 3,168.33 A majority of the operational mines (63 per cent) produce non-metallic minerals (see Table 2.3: Operating mines in India), with limestone mines constituting about 30 per cent of total non-metallic mines. In the case of metallic minerals, about 44 per cent of the mines are iron ore mines. In the mining industry, there is no clear-cut classification of what is large, medium or small mining operation. As the total production of a mineral depends on its geological availability, what is large, medium or small varies vastly in scale from one mineral to another. In minerals like coal, iron ore and limestone, a mine
TABLE 2.3: Operating mines in India

A total of 3,168 mines are operating in India
Sector Solid fuel minerals (coal and lignite) Metallic minerals Non-metallic minerals All minerals* 2003-04 562 612 1,958 3,123 2004-05 562 615 1,991 3,168
Note: *Excluding atomic minerals, petroleum (crude), natural gas (utilised) and minor minerals Source: http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on November 15, 2006
producing more than a million tonne of minerals per year might be considered a large mine; in the case of chromites, however, this value might be just 100,000 tonne per annum. Nevertheless, estimates have been put out by various researchers and institutions on the share of mineral production from various segments of the industry and the conclusions are more or less similar. Minor minerals are dominated by small- and medium-scale mines both in terms of numbers as well as production. In major minerals, although a large number of mines are under the small- and medium-scale sector, large-scale mines dominate in terms of production. According to data published by the high-level committee (Hoda committee) constituted by the Planning Commission to review the National Mineral Policy, other than diamonds, iron ore and bauxite, the contribution of small- and medium-scale mines to major mineral production is very small (see Table 2.4: Production from large-, medium- and small-scale mines). Mining in India is largely concentrated in 11 states: Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal. Together, they account for more than 90 per cent of the total number of reporting mines in the country34 (see Table 2.5 on page 38: Reporting mines in India). Other than a few major mining states, the number of mines in most of the states have shown fairly consistent trends over the last decade. The states which showed a dip in the number of reporting mines between 1997-98 and 200405 are Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala and Rajasthan. The number of mines in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh went down in 1998-99 due to the formation of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh respectively. Conversely, the number of operating mines increased in Chhattisgarh (by 60 per cent) and Tamil Nadu (by 40 per cent). The mining and minerals sector in India is dominated by the public sector. In 1993, the government revised the National Mineral Policy, which allowed investments by the private sector
TABLE 2.4: Production from large-, medium- and small-scale mines

Except in the case of diamonds, the Indian mineral industry is dominated by big players
Mineral Total production (2004-2005) Production by large-scale mines Production by small- and medium-scale mines Quantity Share (in percentage) 40 27 7 Nil Nil Nil Nil 100
Quantity
Share (in percentage) 60 73 93 100 100 100 100 Nil
Iron ore (000 tonne) Bauxite (000 tonne) Limestone (000 tonne) Copper concentrate (tonne) Zinc concentrate (tonne) Lead concentrate (tonne) Gold ore (tonne) Diamonds (carats)
1,42,711 11,697 1,61,462 1,45,664 6,66,972 81,635 5,89,877 78,315
85,040 8,575 1,50,065 1,45,664 6,66,972 81,635 5,89,877 Nil
57,671 3,122 11,397 Nil Nil Nil Nil 78,315
Source: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
37
TABLE 2.5: Reporting mines in India

A few states hold most of the mines in the country
State Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Chhattisgarh Goa Gujarat Himachal Pradesh Haryana Jammu & Kashmir Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala Meghalaya Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh Uttarakhand West Bengal India* 1997-98 412 9 335 74 461 39 31 5 207 54 2 514 148 238 526 2 124 43 129 3,354 1998-99 406 9 20 86 76 443 38 29 6 311 202 54 2 425 142 219 501 2 130 21 16 125 3,283 1999-00 385 10 13 66 71 454 33 30 7 343 184 45 2 436 150 229 465 2 134 21 8 121 3,209 2000-01 395 10 10 116 74 430 33 32 7 338 177 42 2 374 137 235 454 2 156 29 15 123 3,191 2001-02 400 10 9 123 75 424 32 28 9 299 192 37 2 371 137 232 465 2 172 38 20 116 3,193 2002-03 413 10 6 125 80 417 32 17 9 292 216 34 4 325 137 243 441 2 171 29 28 115 3,146 2003-04 405 9 8 142 79 421 30 2 8 299 227 35 5 318 152 243 396 2 183 27 27 114 3,132 2004-05 (p) 413 9 10 138 72 430 28 2 8 303 235 38 5 335 156 240 391 2 183 28 29 113 3,168
Notes: P = Provisional *Excluding mines of atomic minerals, petroleum, gas and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 10-7
(domestic as well as foreign) in most minerals. The objective of the new policy is to propel growth in mineral industries to complement the growth of national economy. For this, the government aims to withdraw from the non-strategic sectors and privatise some public sector undertakings in a phased manner. Today, the private sector has been allowed in all segments of the mining industry other than atomic minerals. In addition, industries dependent on minerals are allowed captive mines. Currently, the public sector with only 25 per cent of the nations operational mines accounts for about 75 per cent of the total value of mineral production in the country. Much of the fuel mineral capacity lies with this sector. Coal is still nationalised, though the private sector is allowed to hold captive mines as well as sell coal (see Box: Rejuvenating the coal sector). Private participation and investment in petroleum and natural gas is growing,
Rejuvenating the coal sector

Moves are afoot to liberalise the sector
The Economic Survey 2005-06 has suggested liberalisation of coal mining in India, including bidding of captive blocks and permission to sell excess coal from captive mines, to arrest a slowdown in the mining and electricity sectors. The poor performance of these two sectors were responsible for dragging down industrial growth to 7.8 per cent during the first nine months in 2005-06, as against a growth of 8.6 per cent in the same period of the previous fiscal. Coal India Ltd (CIL) recently proposed to allow captive players to produce coal even before commissioning of their main projects. Further, CIL has offered to buy coal from private players.
38
where companies like Reliance are slowly gaining ground. The contribution of the public sector has gone down in production of natural gas, although it remains constant in petroleum at 87 per cent (see Table 2.6: How the public sector fares). Some other metallic minerals such as copper, lead, zinc and gold are predominantly mined by the public sector, though all these have now been opened for private investment. Currently, the private sector dominates iron ore, bauxite, chromite, limestone, silica and mica mining. A substantial chunk of limestone is also under captive control of the cement industry. The public sectors role is gradually declining in the mining of minerals like bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin and dolomite. In the last few years, the share of the public sector in bauxite and iron ore mining
TABLE 2.6: How the public sector fares

Public sector is steadily losing ground to private sector in metal mining (all figures in per cent)
2002-03 Fuel minerals Coal Lignite Natural gas (utilised) Petroleum Metallic minerals Bauxite Chromite Copper ore Gold Gold ore Iron ore (total) Manganese ore Tin Non-metallic minerals Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum Lime shell Limestone Magnesite Mica (crude) Salt (rock) Silica sand 100 66.94 38.96 99.98 20.57 6.48 56.44 9.12 100 3.69 100.00 57.34 48.88 99.91 21.12 6.14 65.89 1.38 100.00 7.43 100.00 5.93 100.00 57.50 42.69 99.79 21.34 6.53
NIVIT KUMAR YADAV / CSE
2003-04
2004-05
95.36 100 82.29 87.63
94.65 100.00 79.27 87.07
96.12 100.00 78.37 87.49
52.89 22.97 100 100 100 50.16 55.5 100
50.31 26.66 100.00 100.00 100.00 46.84 53.39 85.66
42.57 22.97 100.00 99.29 99.13 40.06 45.43 52.13
has gone down significantly. The structure of the mineral industry can also be determined by the nature of consumption as captive and non-captive mines. For example, most large-scale cement plants have their own captive mines for meeting their requirement of limestone. Similarly, most large-scale integrated iron and steel plants have captive iron ore mines. The government has also allowed captive coal mines for some industries, which include power, iron and cement. In terms of number of mine leases, most of the mines in the country are non-captive in nature: other than fuel minerals, 83 per cent of the total mines leased out are non-captive. Captive mining is only allowed for a few selected minerals: for instance, 34 per cent of bauxite mines35 and 37 per cent of limestone mines have been set aside for captive consumption. In the case of iron ore, only eight per cent has been leased out as captive mines. Some other minerals for which captive mining is allowed include chromite (47 per cent), copper (67 per cent), gold (100 per cent) and lead (100 per cent).36 In terms of production, captive mines have a significant role in some major minerals. In the case of limestone, for instance, more than 90 per cent of the production is from captive mines. About three-fourth of bauxite is produced from captive mines. Copper, zinc and lead are wholly produced in captive mines (see Table 2.7 on page 40: Production from captive and non-captive mines). The conclusions that can be drawn from the above about the structure of the Indian mining industry, therefore, are: Minor minerals are dominated by non-captive small- and medium-scale mines. Fuel minerals are dominated by public sector large-scale mines. In metallic minerals, private large-scale mines dominate. In non-metallic minerals other than limestone, private sector non-captive mines dominate (most are medium- and smallscale mines). Limestone has more of captive large-scale mines. Public sector companies are slowly losing ground to private sector in most metallic and non-metallic minerals.
69.61
Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-8 and 8-9
Most cement plants have their own captive limestone mines
39
TABLE 2.7: Production from captive and non-captive mines

In case of some major minerals, production is dominated by captive mines
Mineral Total production (2004-2005) 1,42,711 11,697 1,61,462 1,45,664 6,66,972 81,635 5,89,877 78,315 Production by captive mines Quantity 35,040 8,575 1,50,065 1,45,664 6,66,972 81,635 5,89,877 Nil Share (in percentage) 25 73 93 100 100 100 100 Nil Production by non-captive mines Quantity 1,07,671 3,122 11,397 Nil Nil Nil Nil 78,315 Share (in percentage) 75 27 7 Nil Nil Nil Nil 100
Iron ore (000 tonne) Bauxite (000 tonne) Limestone (000 tonne) Copper concentrate (tonne) Zinc concentrate (tonne) Lead concentrate (tonne) Gold ore (tonne) Diamond (carats)
SMALL-SCALE MINING
Small-scale mining has its supporters as well as detractors. For the former, small-scale mining is important because it provides employment, is highly productive and profitable, leaves behind a much smaller specific environmental footprint, is a distributor of wealth, and to many is the only way out of poverty. Its detractors, on the other hand, claim that small-scale mines are highly polluting, unsafe and disruptive. The truth lies somewhere between these diametrically opposing views, and depends on factors like the types of minerals being mined, the mining site, the processes and costs of mining, ownership patterns and the regulatory environment. The first and biggest dilemma is to define a small-scale mine (SSM): there is no internationally accepted definition for it. Different countries have their own ideas of SSMs and use different basis for categorising them mine area, production, level of mechanisation, number of people employed or capital investment. For example, in Pakistan and the US, SSMs are defined in terms of employment, which is mines with less than 50 workers in Pakistan and less than 20 in the US. Capital investment is another criterion for small-scale mining, varying from specified limits such as US $2.5 million in Argentina and R 8.0 million in South Africa to Rs 300 million in Pakistan, US $1 million in Thailand and US $30,000 in Zimbabwe.37 India too has struggled to fix a definition for SSM. There are two commonly used definitions, derived from a Committee on Small Mines set up in 1986 by the Mining, Geological and Metallurgical Institute of India (MGMI). These are as follows: A small mine is one in which the raw ore production does not exceed a certain limit depending on the mineral/ore. This definition does not prescribe the limit. The second definition is based on investment and says that small-scale mines are those where investment may not exceed Rs 6 million and if beneficiation or processing plants are installed, the investment may not exceed Rs 10 million.38 However, the Kolkata-based National Institute of
Small Mines (NISM) has adopted a different definition for SSMs: all mines producing minerals upto 0.1 MT per annum for small and 0.1-0.5 MT per annum for medium mines.39 There are also the regulatory definitions. Mines with a lease area of less than five ha are considered small mines and are not covered under the EIA process. However, according to the IBM, SSMs are manual open-cast mines not using explosives and where the average daily employment does not exceed 25. Often, small-scale mining is confused with artisanal mines. However, these two are very different. Artisanal miners normally work in small groups of family members or close relatives, without hired assistants. They may work on their own lands, in public places or on state-owned land with or without any license or formal permission. But in India, small-scale mining is (supposedly) organised mining carried on with acquired mining rights under some statutory control. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), small-scale mining falls into two broad categories. The first of these is mining and quarrying for industrial minerals and construction materials on a small scale, practised across the world. These mines are often regulated and taxed, but poor enforcement and monitoring often results in informal or illegal operations. The second category is of mining of relatively high-value minerals, notably gold and precious stones. These are generally exported; in this case too, laws and regulations are impossible to enforce.
The situation in India
It is estimated that small-scale mining contributes as much as 15-20 per cent of the global value of non-fuel mineral production.40 In India, SSMs extract almost all minor minerals, besides some major minerals; over 40 different minerals are exploited by this sector in the country.41 But India does not have any official statistics on the number of these mines. This is because a majority of them do not fall under the purview of the government organisation responsible for monitoring mine management in India: the IBM. The bureau does not monitor minor minerals (such as sand,
40
stone or marble), which constitute a major chunk of the SSM inventory. Minor minerals fall under the jurisdiction of respective state governments, which usually have extremely poor track records in maintaining statistics. In addition, there are a number of SSMs which operate illegally and do not even exist in official records. Estimations done by the Centre for Science and Environment indicate that there might be hundreds of thousands of SSMs in the country. Consider Rajasthan: officially, it has 1,324 mining leases of major minerals, 10,851 leases of minor minerals and 19,251 stone quarries. In all, Rajasthan alone has 31,426 mines and quarries, a majority of them small-scale. In India, the private sector and non-fuel minerals dominate small-scale mining. The present size of mining operations (production-wise) can be estimated from aggregate production of minerals and the number of operating mines. The average size of mines of high-value minerals such as copper, lead, iron ore and chromite is much more than that of other minerals (see Table 2.8: Mining operations: average sizes 2004-05). However, even in the case of these minerals, there are mines which belong to the SSM category (as the iron ore mines in Keonjhar district of Orissa or limestone mines in Rajasthan). A large number of SSMs target the smaller mineral deposits, whose extraction by large-scale operations is not feasible. The IBMs Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05 has categorised all major minerals into two groups based on production. Mines in Group A are bigger, producing more minerals compared to the mines in Group B. The document puts the total number of mines in Category B (for minerals like slate, tin, quartz, ball clay etc) as only 2,497. This, of course, is barely half the picture as it does not include minor minerals, which form the major part of SSM.42 Undoutedly, SSMs have their advantages, especially for a country like India. To begin with, small mining operations have a high employment potential for workers of all types. Whats more, this employment is available in all seasons, and is a blessing for people who cannot cultivate their lands due to poor rains or droughts. Worldwide, it is estimated that about 13 million people are directly engaged in small-scale mining, mainly in developing countries, and the livelihoods of another 80-100 million are affected by it.43 In the 1970s, 50 per cent of the Indian mining workforce was engaged in small mines.44 A 2002 report by MMSD indicates that the total employment generated by SSMs in the country is about 0.5 million.45 The ILO, in 1999, had however estimated the number of people employed in the sector to be much higher: 1.0-1.1 million people.46 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, a researcher at the Canberra-based Australian National University, estimates the number of people employed in Indian quarries as 12 million.47 Most of these quarries are small-scale operations. Besides their employment potential, SSMs are cost-effective and also contribute to revenues. In 1998, 90 per cent of the revenues from minor minerals, 100 per cent from non-formal minor minerals and 25 per cent from metallic and non-metallic minerals came from SSMs: the total amounted to Rs 5,024 crore,48 which was 11 per cent of the total revenue generated by the mining sector in that year.49 Among the shortfalls of small-scale mining is its largely
TABLE 2.8: Mining operations: average sizes (2004-05)

The average annual production of non-metallic mineral mines is low, indicating the large presence of small-scale mines
Mineral Number of mines 1 2 16 15 197 17 20 5 1 153 5 101 100 6 3 35 42 280 8 122 8 31 6 571 17 125 35 50 194 17 7 13 157 7 6 180 4 Production (in tonne) 15 8,596 288.336 2,04,55.019 11,697,000 84,187 3,640,000 3,073,000 18.56 4,309,000 793 3,73,212 5,59,000 11,450 5,90,000 1,00,363 3,555,000 142,711,000 1,210 9,05,000 7,710 7,04,000 3,929,000 161,462,000 3,81,000 2,379,000 1,366 8,08,000 2,95,719 93,000 1,387 2,386,000 1,905,000 28,761 4,093 7,50,000 3,273 Annual production per mine (tonne/mine) 15.0 4,298.0 18.0 1,363.7 59,375.6 4,952.2 1,82,000.0 6,14,600.0 18.6 28,163.4 158.6 3,695.2 5,590.0 1,908.3 1,96,666.7 2,867.5 84,642.9 5,09,682.1 151.3 7,418.0 963.8 22,709.7 6,54,833.3 2,82,770.6 22,411.8 19,032.0 39.0 16,160.0 1,524.3 5,470.6 198.1 1,83,538.5 12,133.8 4,108.7 682.2 4,166.7 818.3
Agate Apatite Asbestos Barytes Bauxite Calcite Chromite Copper ore Corundum Dolomite Felsite Feldspar Fireclay Fluorite Gold ore Graphite Gypsum Iron ore Jasper Kaolin Kyanite Laterite Lead & zinc concentrates Limestone Magnesite Manganese ore Mica Ochre Quartz Quartzite Sand (other) Shale Silica sand Sillimanite Slate Talc/steatite/soapstone Vermiculite
Source: Analysed from information from anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
41
unorganised, unregulated and unrecognised nature in the country, though it contributes a significant 10 per cent to the total mineral value.50 Working conditions in these mines are abysmal and exploitative. SSMs also exercise considerable impacts on the environment: they destroy forests and biodiversity, lead to siltation of rivers, erosion of land, and overall pollution of land, water and air. This is largely because SSMs neither have enough resources to invest in environment protection, nor the requisite knowledge and consciousness of mineral conservation. A case in point is that of small-scale mining of limestone in the Mussoorie hills of Uttarakhand, which resulted in widespread degradation of the Himalayan environment. Deforestation accelerated soil erosion, which affected the stability of hill slopes leading to frequent landslides and debris flows, particularly during the rainy season. Disposal of waste materials from quarries and surface run-off led to siltation of water courses. Besides, residents of the area had to face problems such as dust, noise and vibration. Mining stopped only after the intervention of the Supreme Court in 1986. Most SSMs go scot-free even when they do not meet environmental standards, as monitoring is non-existent. State pollution control boards do not monitor small mines (less than five ha in area) or illegal mines. Even the SSMs which fall under the purview of the boards escape monitoring, as the boards lack the capacity to deal with so many mines. SSMs have exceedingly poor records with respect to safety. Problems related to occupational health are more serious and pervasive in this sector, and accident rates much higher. As most of the mines are privately owned and in remote areas, accidents largely go unreported. There are no provisions for insurance, compensation or health care. Most workers operate without basic safety equipment, and there are no regular health checks to detect cases of occupational diseases (see Box: Battling feudalism and exploitation). According to the ILO, the number of accidental deaths in the country in SSMs ranges around 15-50 every year.51
Crushing and milling operations in SSMs are notoriously hazardous because of the unprotected machinery, noise and vibration. Workers who participate in wet processes such as sluicing and collecting concentrates, suffer from skin diseases and injuries as a result of permanently wet hands and feet. Women who transport basket-loads of minerals, stones and sand on their heads are prone to lower back injuries, which are aggravated by poor postures during mining in confined spaces, panning and amalgamating. Workers in SSMs are also exposed to hazardous chemicals such as mercury and cyanide which are used in processing. Women, who play a significant role in small-scale and artisanal mining, are also some of its worst sufferers. Of the 13 million or so miners engaged across the world in artisanal-scale mining (ASM), approximately 30 per cent are women.52 About six-seven per cent of artisanal miners in India are women.53 Another document by the MMSD puts the number of women in SSMs at around six to seven per cent about 33,500 of the people employed.54 Women miners get lower wages then men; their living and working conditions are poor, they receive no benefits such as paid holidays or maternity leaves, and have no access to safety gear. Often, their role is limited to menial but more physically intensive jobs. They also become targets for exploitation by men. Child labour is another major problem in the SSM sector (see Box: The story of Shyam). Children, employed illegally, face the same hazards as their adult counterparts, but the risks for them are much more severe. Children as young as six or seven years are employed for breaking rocks with hammers, washing ore, sieving and transporting. They also work in underground mines, setting explosives and fetching and carrying for adult workers. All these drawbacks notwithstanding, it is a fact that smallscale mining generates employment; it is, therefore, necessary to bring it into the ambit of legal framework and monitoring. The NMP, 1993 makes no reference to small-scale mines.
Battling feudalism and exploitation

Shankargarhs silica mineworkers are in dire straits
Shankargarh in Uttar Pradesh is barely 48 km from Allahabad; but one can be forgiven for assuming that this town is not a few kilometres, but decades away. Shankargarh is feudal India at its worst a sad reminder that Indian society is far from having shed the baggage of exploitative structures that have characterised it. Shankargarh is famous for its silica mines. The erstwhile Raja of Shankargarh has mining rights for 99 years in the 46 villages covering an area of 15,000 ha that make up this region. The Raja leases out plots to contractors who, in turn, employ local villagers, the majority of them landless and bonded labourers, at extremely exploitative rates. Since three-fourths of Shankargarh is rocky and unfit for cultivation, the local population has no other source of income than mining. The workers used to earn just Rs 15-20 a day until they rebelled; halla bol, their rebellion, was supported by a non-governmental organisation called Sankalp. In 15 villages, mineworkers captured lands under
lease to the Raja, and started mining themselves because the contractors refused to give them work. After attempts at negotiation failed, they decided to squat on the lands; their contention was that the lease in perpetuity to the Raja was illegal and was encouraging exploitation, bonded labour and child labour. That was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The situation hasnt changed much after all these years. Mining cooperatives, controlled by the workers, have been set up, but working conditions remain as terrible as before, and exploitation is rampant. But what characterises Shankargarh is not the epic battle or its aftermath, but the high prevalence of silicosis, locally known as Shankagarh-wali TB (Shankargarhs tuberculosis). Workers earning a livelihood breaking stone are exposed to silica dust for long periods of time. The average life span here is only 40 years. Treatment for a workers affliction costs Rs 130-150 a month, which he is ill able to afford on the paltry wages he receives. Compensation is unheard off. Since the workers are unorganised, very often, they are not even on the official muster rolls of the contractors. And where the workers have taken over, there is no money to compensate.
42
The story of Shyam

A mineworker and a student
Shyam, now 12 years old, lost his father Kishnaram Bhil when he was only six. He used to work in the mines in Gopalsagar, a small village near Ajmer, Rajasthan. Kishnaram was the only earning member in the family. Shyams mother started working in the mines, getting a measly Rs 25-30 for a days hard labour. This hard-earned money was not enough to fill the bellies of her five children. She began taking the children, including Shyam, his younger brother and little sister to the mines. The children had to sit in the sun the whole day. Soon, Shyam and his brother, Manohar started working in the mines. They used to remove debris, break down pieces of stone into pebbles and load them on the tractors. For this work, they got Rs 10-20 per day. However, their life changed when a Special Child Labour School opened in the neighbourhood. They enrolled, with encouragement from the school staff. According to Shyam: The stipend that we get from school will help us continue our studies after completing our primary education from this school. If there had been no such school, it would never be possible for children like us to learn, and our future would have been nothing but the dark world of mining.
B Dutt, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur
It is imperative to identify SSMs, monitor them and integrate them into the mainstream. This means recording the number of small-scale mines and the number of people employed in them and addressing the issues that are so specific to this category. It is, therefore, important to frame a separate policy for SSMs, educate the miners and monitor them more effectively. There have been attempts to bring some semblance of order into this sector. One of these has been the practice of cluster mining, which involves creating a cluster of SSMs. This could either occur naturally through years of operation or through a pre-planned effort. For example, Pakur stone mining in Bihar, Makrana marble mining in Rajasthan and Naini glass sand mining in Uttar Pradesh have evolved over the years. A preplanned cluster approach was tried in Pachami-Hatgacha, West Bengal for stone mining. In this cluster mining, employment increased from about 200 to 10,000 in a period of two decades, providing minimum sustenance to a large number of people.55 The obvious disadvantage in the case of natural clusters is that they take a long time to develop. Moreover, as they are unplanned, infrastructure and environmental management facilities are usually poor. Planned cluster mining fares better on these counts. However, the concept of cluster mining has not taken off in the absence of official support. For instance, in Rajasthan, which is a major producer of minor minerals, the government has contracted the process of revenue collection to private parties. Clearly, the state has no interest in monitoring its SSMs.
Unlike large mines, small-scale mining provides employment to thousands of people across the country
43
THE AREA UNDER MINING

An area of 6,20,372 ha was leased out for mining in the country till March 2003. This included 9,131 mining leases for 62 metallic and non-metallic minerals, including lignite.56 What this figure leaves out are the lands being mined for coal, atomic, liquid and gaseous fuels and minor minerals. There is no data available on land under coal mining. However, we know that the public sector has acquired 0.13 million ha for mining coal since the nationalisation of the coal industry57 (see Box: The private and the public in mining). As the majority (95 per cent) of coal production is accounted for by the public sector, the land held or acquired by it can be indicative of the land under coal mining (see Table 2.9: Land acquired by public sector coal mines). Thus, the total land leased out for mining (for coal, metallic and non-metallic minerals) in the country stands at 7,54,861 ha. The land under mining would be much higher considering the fact that this data does not include minor minerals (as these are under the purview of the states and it is difficult to get reliable data on them), atomic minerals, petroleum and gas wells and land under private coal mines. An area of 0.75 million ha for mining may seem small compared to the overall size of the country (328.7 million ha). But looking at mine lease area alone gives a very distorted picture of
the actual amount of land diverted by the mining industry. Every mining enterprise includes the conversion of land to purposes such as building roads, railways and ropeways for mineral transport, townships for housing miners and managers, land for stockyard and for preliminary processing operations and land for associated economic activities. In effect, the total land affected by mining is many times larger than the simple lease area. Among the states, in 2003-04, the maximum area of land was leased out for mining in Rajasthan (22 per cent), followed by Orissa (15 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh (eight per cent) (see Table 2.10: Mine leases and lease area the states). Gujarat, on the other hand, had the maximum number of mine leases, accounting
The private and public in mining

The private sector holds less land, but more mines
Of total metallic and non-metallic mines, more than 90 per cent is with the private sector. However, in terms of area under mining, the private sector accounts for only 63 per cent while the remaining is with Central government undertakings (19 per cent) and state enterprises (17.7 per cent). On an average, one private sector mine has an area of only 46.2 ha. In contrast, a Central government undertaking has an area of 562 ha and a state enterprise, 269 ha.
ANUPAMA KUMARI
An area of 0.75 million ha has been leased out for mining in the country. But the total land affected by mining extends on a much larger area as it includes land for transportation, townships and processing plants
44
TABLE 2.9: Land acquired by public sector coal mines

About 18 per cent of land under mining is held by public sector coal mines
Company All rights* ECL BCCL CCL NCL WCL SECL MCL Total 12,471.09 648 42,690.74 15,214 74.91 824.83 17,574.64 89,498.21 10,584.05 35,659.19 Area acquired (hectare) Mining rights** 74.88 2,787.85 22,212.41 Total 12,545.97 3,435.85 74,234.98 15,214 74.91 824.83 28,158.69 1,34,489.23
TABLE 2.10: Mine leases and lease area the states

In 2003-04, Orissa, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand held more than half of the mine leases
State No of leases Share in the total leases (%) 16 0.2 0.6 2.8 0.0 4.3 17.4 1.6 0.6 0.3 4.2 5.6 1.1 12.6 2.4 0.0 0.3 6.9 14.4 0.0 5.9 0.6 1.1 0.9 Lease area Share in Area the per lease mine area lease (%) (ha/mine) 7.7 0.2 0.9 4.9 0.1 4.9 6.0 2.7 0.4 0.2 7.3 8.2 0.4 5.4 2.6 0.1 0.7 15.4 21.7 0.0 6.7 0.4 1.1 2.0 32 81 106 117 122 77 24 114 45 53 118 99 23 29 73 305 174 152 103 22 78 49 68 159 68
(ha) 47,905 1,294 5,422 30,353 486 30,325 37,457 16,890 2,368 1,312 45,185 50,902 2,193 33,465 15,988 610 4,177 95,532 1,34,832 86 41,667 2,757 6,741 12,424 6,20,372
Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Chhattisgarh Delhi Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir
1,482 16 51 259 4 396 1,589 148 53 25 384 514 96 1,154 220 2 24 629 1,312 4 536 56 99 78 9,131
Notes: *All rights are inclusive of mining rights; **mining rights are meant for only mining purposes. Source: Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-2006, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, pp 50
GRAPH 2.11: Area under different mineral mines

More than one-third of lease area is under limestone and iron ore mines
Bauxite 5% China Clay 4% Dolomite 3% Fireclay 4% Gypsum 4% Lignite 6%
Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Orissa Rajasthan
Others 20%
Iron 15%
Sikkim Tamil Nadu
Steatite 5% Silica sand Mica 4% 3%
Limestone 21%
Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh
Manganese ore 6%
West Bengal Total
for 17 per cent followed by Andhra Pradesh with 16 per cent and Rajasthan with 14 per cent. This variance means that the land holding per mine varies from state to state. Surprisingly, it is the smaller states which have allotted more area per mine. For example, Manipur has the maximum land per mine in the country around 305 ha. The mines in Orissa have higher lease area compared to those in Rajasthan or Chhattisgarh. In Andhra Pradesh, mines have the least mine area only 32 ha per mine. The mineral that has the maximum land under mining is lime-
stone, which accounts for 21 per cent of the total area under mining (see Graph 2.11: Area under different mineral mines). Iron ore has the next highest area under mining (15 per cent), followed by manganese ore and lignite (six per cent each). Bauxite mines account for five per cent, while low-value minerals like china clay, fire clay, gypsum, and silica sand all account for four per cent each of the total land under mining. If the area under coal mines is included, it becomes clear that about 50 per cent of the total mine lease area in India is under three major minerals limestone, coal and iron ore.58
45
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
A burden on the exchequer? Illegal mining is making huge dents in the national earnings from the sector
46
GDP AND MINING

In 2004-05, the mining and quarrying sector, excluding atomic minerals, accounted for about 2.2 per cent of the nations gross domestic product (GDP)59 up from from 1.8 per cent in 1970-71 (see Graph 2.12: Minings contribution to GDP trends). In the last 10 years, the share of mining in GDP has remained constant at around 2.2-2.5 per cent. There is no established formula which provides for an optimal contribution of the mining sector to a nations GDP. For instance, mining contributes just 1.7 per cent of the GDP in the US, whereas it constitutes five per cent of Australias GDP, 8.5 per cent of Brazils GDP and 3.4 per cent of Canadas GDP.60 It is important to note here that mining, with only 2.2 per cent contribution to Indias GDP, is already playing havoc with the nations environment and social fabric.
THE MINERAL TRADE IMPORTS

Other than petroleum, the country is largely self-sufficient in most minerals (see Table 2.11 on page 48: How self-sufficient are we?). A majority of the demand for coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromites, limestone, manganese ore and many other minerals is met by domestic production. There are a few minerals which the country imports: these include chrysotile asbestos, borax, kyanite, potash, rock phosphate, elemental sulphur, special grades of fluorspar, flaky and amorphous graphite of high fixed carbon, very low silica limestone, dead burnt magnesite and seawater magnesia. India also imports uncut diamonds, emeralds and semi-precious stones, which are cut and polished before being exported as value-added minerals.
GRAPH 2.12: Minings contribution to GDP trends

The contribution has reduced during the last decade
3.00
Percentage contribution of mining to GDP
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00 1970-71 1972-73 1974-75 1976-77 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 1988-89 1990-91 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 At constant price 2002-03 200405 Re
Source: Anon, 2006, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2005, Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi
SHYAMAL / CSE
47
TABLE 2.11: How self-sufficient are we?

A majority of the demand for most minerals is met by domestic production
Commodity Demand/ domestic consumption ('000 tonne) Supply/ domestic supply ('000 tonne) Order of selfsufficiency (%)
GRAPH 2.13: Value of imports: 2003-04

Indias imports are dominated by petroleum products
Coke 1% Copper ores and conc 1% Others 3%
Diamond (cut) 25%
Asbestos Barytes Bauxite Chromite Dolomite Fireclay Feldspar Fluorspar Gypsum Iron ore Ilmenite Kyanite Limestone and other calcareous minerals Magnesite Manganese ore Rock phosphate (including apatite) Rutile Sillimanite Silica minerals Sulphur Talc/steatite/pyrophyllite
86 135 7,718 7621 3,829 499 202 62 4,220 41,276 161 12 1,37,0023
1* 723 10,925 2,905 4,051 657 332 12 6,0932 1,22,838 465 9 1,53,8844
1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 100 Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 10-17
Coal 4% Petroleum (crude) 66%
226 815 2,693
324 1,776 1,446
100 100 54
13 6 1,612 1,500 271
20 20 4,092 4255 903
100 100 100 28 100
Notes: Although almost the entire domestic demand is satisfied by domestic supplies, some quantities of certain special quality/types of minerals and metals/ ferro-alloys are imported to meet the requirement in certain specific end-uses. * Relates to chrysotiles asbestos 1. Excluding consumption in small-scale; because of shortage of lumpy grade chromite ore, it was imported. 2. Includes all the three forms of gypsum mineral gypsum, byproduct marine gypsum and byproduct phospho-fluoro-boro gypsum 3. Includes calcerous slag/sludge, flyash and flue dust 4. Excludes production of limestone as a minor mineral 5. Includes sulphur equivalent of mine production of pyrites/recovery of byproduct sulphuric acid from copper and zinc smelters and recovery of byproduct sulphur from petroleum refineries Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 1-20
In the last five years, India has begun importing non-coking coal (see Box: Importing coal). The imports are still low about five per cent of the total demand but there are fears that with an increasing energy demand, the gap between demand and domestic availability might widen in future. In 2003-04, India imported about Rs 1,30,060 crore worth of ores and minerals, and this accounted for about 36.2 per cent value of all merchandise imported into India.61 The high import value was mainly due to imports of petroleum crude, which accounted for about two-thirds of the value of mineral imports, and uncut diamonds, which accounted for about one-fourth of the value (see Graph 2.13: Value of imports). If imports of petroleum crude and diamonds are excluded, then imports of coal and coke account for the biggest chunk: about 57 per cent of the value of total imports. Other minerals that figure prominently in the import list include asbestos, copper ore and concentrate, iron ore, limestone and zinc ore and concentrate. Indias imports of ores and minerals have gone up from Rs 92,796 crore in 2001-02 to Rs 1,30,060 crore in 2003-04: a hike of almost 40 per cent. This was mainly propelled by an increase in the imports of crude petroleum. Imports of uncut diamonds also went up by about 50 per cent during this period. Imports of a few other minerals like asbestos (mining of which was banned in the country) and natural gas have also shown a significant hike. In 2003-04, minerals were imported from more than 156 countries, although a majority of the imports was confined to 19 countries. An interesting aspect of the imports is that two-thirds are from unspecified countries, which is defined by IBM as the commodities for which country-wise details are not available. Therefore, for a large chunk of minerals imported into India, the country of origin is unknown. Belgium, United Kingdom, Australia are some other important importers.
48
Importing coal
Even though production is sufficient, inland transportation costs and poor quality have led to coal imports
In the last decade, India has started importing large quantities of coal. The country always depended on imports of metallurgical-grade coking coal to meet about 30-50 per cent its requirements. What is new is that India has started importing non-coking coal, which is mainly used for power generation. There are many reasons behind this, and one of the key ones is economics. In the coastal areas of the country, it is cheaper for the power plants to import coal from countries like Indonesia and South Africa than to transport it inland from the eastern parts of India where the majority of coal is produced. There is also the quality factor. Indian coal is not very high in quality it has a high ash content and low calorific value. Companies, therefore, have started blending high quality imported coal with low-grade indigenous coal. This is giving them better operational efficiencies, while keeping the costs competitive at the same time. The third major factor is the capacity constraint in public sector coal companies to increase production.In the last 10 years or so, we have not been allowed to hire technical and managerial level staff. The current situation is that there are not enough qualified officers to take the lead. We, therefore, are an organisation which is heavy at the bottom and empty at the top,says a senior officer from Coal India Limited (CIL).
TABLE: Production, demand, imports and closing stocks

2002-03 Demand (in MT) Metallurgical coking coal Non-coking coal* Total Production (in MT) Metallurgical coking coal Non-coking coal* Total Imports (in MT) Metallurgical coking coal Non-coking coal Total 12.9 10.3 23.3 13.0 8.7 21.7 16.9 12.0 29.0 18.4 348.9 367.3 18.3 370.9 389.2 18.2 394.8 413.0 30.6 332.7 363.3 30.2 350.4 380.9 34.6 380.2 414.8 2003-04 2004-05
All India figure for closing stock (in MT)3 Coking coal Non-coking coal** Total 3.0 16.4 19.4 2.6 18.7 21.3 3.5 20.5 24.0
Notes: *Including lignite and non-metallurgical coking coal **Excluding Meghalaya coal Sources: Anon, 2005, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No 4497, May 5, 2005; anon, 2007, Economic Survey 2006-07, Union Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and publications of the Union ministry of coal, New Delhi
Indian coal companies face capacity constraints, which is limiting an increase in production. This, along with poor quality of indigenous coal, has promoted coal imports
All the three factors together have led to imports of non-coking coal increasing from about three MT in 1995-96 to about 20 MT in 2005-06. In terms of total coal consumption in the country, imports are still miniscule about five per cent. But if demand increases at a higher rate, India will have to import more coal. On an annual basis, we are still a coal-surplus country and imports hide this fact, says the same officer from CIL. This becomes clear when one looks at the data on supply, demand and closing stocks of coal in the country (see Table: Production, demand, imports and closing stocks). From the data, it is apparent that apart from metallurgical-grade coking coal, the production of all other types of coal exceeded the demand. This is also clearly reflected in the amount of closing stock with the coal companies, which has remained at around 20 MT in all years. No one is denying the fact that there are problems in public sector coal companies, but they are not something that cannot be managed. Our problem also stems from the fact that we produce poor grade coal and also that there are infrastructural bottlenecks to transport coal,the officer adds.
PATRIK OSKARSSON
49
GRAPH 2.14: Value of exports: 2003-04

Diamonds alone account for three-fourths of exports
Iron ore 10.4% Coal 0.6% Chromite 0.3% Others 10.1% Precious & semiprecious stones 1.4% Bauxite 0.3%
THE MINERAL TRADE EXPORTS

In 2003-04, India exported minerals worth Rs 49,911 crore, which was 17 per cent of the total value merchandised out of India.62 Indias exports of ores and minerals went up by 42 per cent between 2001-02 and 2003-04 an increase mainly due to the rise in exports of cut diamonds and iron ore, the key minerals exported from India. In fact, cut diamonds account for 76 per cent of the value of total exports (see Graph 2.14: Value of exports: 2003-04). The second biggest contributor is iron ore, with about 10.5 per cent of the value. The quantity of iron ore exported from the country has more than doubled between 2001-02 and 2003-04 (see Box: A tug-of-war). China The other major minerals exported from the country are precious and semi-precious stones, chromites and coal (see Box: Net importer or exporter?). Minerals were exported to 200 countries in 2003-04, however, 91 per cent of exports were confined to only 11 countries. Other than US, some major destinations for Indias minerals were China, Hong Kong, Belgium and United Arab Emirates. Belgium figures both in import and export list as it supplies raw uncut diamond and later exports back value-added diamonds.
Marble 0.5%
Diamond 76.4%
A tug-of-war
Two Indian associations slug it out over iron ore
A battle has been raging between two associations over exports of iron ore. The Indian Steel Association (ISA) has called for a complete ban on exports, and is being opposed by the Federation of Indian Mineral Industries (FIMI), which wants a ban on captive iron ore mines. The steel industry wants a ban on exports which, it fears, will exhaust the limited reserves of iron ore in India. It also argues that India should export steel rather than iron ore because production of each tonne of steel creates seven to 10 times more value-addition than iron ore mining alone; steel production along with iron ore mining can create five times more direct and permanent employment than just mining. The steel industry has been supported in this by the governments Expert Group on Preferential Grant of Mining Leases for Iron Ore, Chrome Ore and Manganese Ore, also called the Dang committee. This committee has agreed with the steel industry and has recommended that the iron ore in the country should be preserved for steel production and preference should be given to steel companies while allotting iron ore mine leases. It has asserted that the countrys natural advantage of rich iron ore reserves must not be frittered away by continued positioning as a raw material supplier to the developed world and now, even to rapidly industrialising China. The FIMI, which represents the mining industry, has opposed the recommendations of the Dang committee and has taken its case to the Anwarul Hoda committee, set up to examine the mining policy. The minersstand has been clear: they want to sell the iron ore produced by them at the best international prices. In their view, it is not necessary to ban exports to ensure availability of iron ore to domestic industry. If domestic steelmakers are willing to pay the price at which iron ore is
purchased across the world, there is no reason for not selling the ore to them. FIMI also argued that iron ore is not in short supply, regardless of how fast the demand for steel grows, because conversion of resources into proven reserves is simply a function of exploration which will inevitably occur if demand rises. It also brought out the employment card and pointed out the impact on employment the ban will have in Goa, Karnataka and Orissa. The Hoda committee agreed with the mining industry. It believed that there is no scarcity of iron ore in the country. It also believed that any ban on exports would impact employment on a large scale and that exports is a significant catalyst of socio-economic development in backward and tribal belts. It also believed that any restriction on exports would hamper FDI in mining, as foreign investors would view it negatively. It recommended that there is no need to impose any quantitative restrictions on exports currently but that the position should be revisited after 10 years. However, it also recommended that captive mines of steel companies should not be allowed to export iron ore. Exports should only be allowed for stand-alone miners. The matter has now been sent to a Group of Ministers for resolution. The point in question here is not whether iron ore should be exported or preserved for domestic consumption; it is about what the mining of iron is doing to the society as a whole. Miners as well as steel companies are paying peanuts in royalty to the state exchequer. Areas where iron ore is being mined have been ecologically devastated and are poverty-stricken. What is clear is that both the committees have expressed their learned opinions without considering the impacts of iron ore mining on the environment, health and livelihoods of the people of states such as Goa, Karnataka and Orissa. The conflict between the FIMI and the ISA is not of national interest; it is a fight which reeks of greed.
50
Net importer or exporter?

Unless India hits upon huge reserves of petroleum or gold, its dreams of becoming a net exporter will remain distant
The Indian government believes that India has huge reserves of minerals and, therefore, can become a major mineral exporting power an assumption which the Hoda committee report supports when it recommends changes in the mining policy to boost exports of minerals. In Indias mineral basket, there is just one mineral, crude petroleum, which actually decides the countrys trade balance in ores and minerals. If we remove crude petroleum from the basket, India turns into a net exporter of ores and minerals from a net importer (see Table: Trade balance in ores and minerals). But the question is, can India still become a net exporter of ores and minerals if crude petroleum is included in the basket considering the lack of geological potential in the country for producing crude and Indias increasing dependence on imports of this essential fuel? Quite unlikely, unless India moves to non-petroleum fuels or finds huge reserves of gold and diamonds. Globally, the value of minerals is primarily generated by petroleum, gold and diamonds. The rest of minerals produce less than 20 per cent of the total value. India has large reserves of coal, which is low in quality, and metallic and non-metallic minerals, which are low in value. Even if we assume that India starts exporting large quantities of metallic minerals like iron ore and bauxite or non-metallic minerals like
TABLE: Trade balance in ores and minerals (Rs crore)

2001-02 Imports of ores and minerals Exports of ores and minerals Trade balance in ores and minerals (exports imports) 92,797 35,136 -57,660 2002-03 1,17,294 46,618 -70,676 2003-04 1,30,060 49,911 -80,149
Imports and exports excluding crude petroleum Imports of ores and minerals Exports of ores and minerals Trade balance in ores and minerals 31,320 35,136 3,816 39,568 46,618 7,050 43,548 49,799 6,251
Source: Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
limestone or coal, the quantity of these minerals that will need to be exported to balance the trade deficit will be huge. The prices of all these minerals are between Rs 1,000-2,000 per tonne. India will have to export approximately a billion tonne of these minerals to meet its current trade deficit. This is equivalent to the total amount of major metallic, non-metallic and solid fuel minerals India currently produces.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXCHEQUER

The mining and minerals industry contributes to the Central and state government revenues through payments of royalty, dead rent, cess, sales tax, excise duties and custom duties. The major revenue that the state governments, the owners of the minerals in the country, get from the mining sector is by way of royalty on minerals. Royalty is paid on the amount of mineral removed or consumed at the rates specified in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act, 1957. Royalty rates on major minerals are fixed by the Central government, while states are empowered to fix royalty rates on minor minerals. The royalty rates on major minerals are revised every three years. Dead rent is a charge to be paid by the lessee for that area included in the mine lease from which minerals are not extracted. The main purpose of levying dead rent is to discourage the lessee from keeping the mines idle. The existing rates of dead rent are based on the area of the lease and the value of minerals. Accordingly, the dead rent applicable is higher for high-value minerals. The MMDR Act has a provision that if there is a difference in the amount of royalty payable on the minerals extracted from a mine and the amount of dead rent payable for that area, the mine owner will be required to pay the higher of the two amounts. The dead rent rates are specified in the Third Schedule of the Act. In addition to royalty and dead rent, the states also get some meagre revenues from application fees, annual fees from the RPs and prospecting licenses based on area held, surface rent, sales tax
or VAT, local area tax, and stamp duty. Some states like Orissa and West Bengal have also imposed a cess as well as a surcharge on minerals for mining area development (in Orissa, it is termed as peripheral development). For most minerals (39 in all), the royalty is fixed on an ad-valorem basis (percentage of sales price). For most of these 39 minerals, the ad-valorem rates are further based on the domestic sales price. However, for base metals and precious metals (like copper, lead, tin, zinc and gold) the ad-valorem rates are applied on the basis of the London Metal Exchange prices. The interesting part of the royalty rate system in India is that for the major minerals produced in the country like coal, iron ore and limestone, the royalty is a fixed amount per tonne of despatch. In total, there are 22 minerals on which the royalty is based on a fixed amount per unit of dispatch. Internationally, the ad-valorem royalty system is predominantly used; most mineral producers like Australia, Indonesia and China use it. Over the years, India has also moved towards it, though some key minerals have been kept out of this list. One of the major advantages of the ad-valorem system is that it takes into account the rises in price of minerals and, therefore, governments get the share of the rise in mineral prices unlike the fixed rate system where the prices of minerals is not reflected. The main problem with ad-valorem royalty is the determination of price or value on which the royalty rate is to be applied. In the case of metals which are traded at international commodity exchanges, the determination of value is not a problem; but for
51
Evading royalties
Under-reporting on quantity and quality is the easy way out of paying royalties
There are many ways and means for evading royalties. One of the simplest of these is to under-report the amount of minerals produced as is widely practised in iron ore-rich Bellary-Hospet (Karnataka) and Joda-Barbil (Orissa). In these areas, the most conservative estimates put the illegal and legal production as equal from small- and medium-scale privately owned mines. The other route is to declare the ores as low in iron content. In Joda-Barbil, plus-minus 62/65 is the term used to indicate this corruption. In this practice, mine inspectors are paid to declare the mines as inferior grade and royalties are evaded.
others where no international benchmark is available, the determination is problematic, as there is a large scope for undervaluing of minerals by miners when reporting the prices to the government (see Box: Evading royalties). This problem of lower reported price of minerals is quite widespread in India. Though the IBM publishes national- and state-level monthly average values of different minerals for calculation of ad-valorem royalty, the system is not foolproof. This is because the IBM merely picks up the figures from the returns filed by the miners and the values given there are invariably based on pit mouth sales reported by the miners themselves. These could
very well be under-reported. Further, in captive mines owned by the processing industry, there could be a problem of transfer pricing and the price shown in the books of account cannot be said to be the arms-length price. There are no fixed formulae to set royalty rates; countries use various systems to fix them. In some, each mineral is taxed at a different rate, while in others minerals are grouped and each group is uniformly taxed (typical groupings include industrial and construction materials, fertiliser minerals, precious metals, precious stones, base metals and energy minerals). In many countries, there is no differentiation and all minerals (metallic and non-metallic) are levied the same royalty. For example, the royalty rate of all minerals in Argentina is three per cent of the mine head value; in the Philippines, the royalty rate is two per cent of the actual market value, while in Mozambique, it ranges around three-five per cent of the free-on-board.63 In countries with different royalty rates for different minerals, rates are generally assigned depending on the value of minerals, abundance of minerals in the country and whether the minerals are for domestic consumption or for imports. With increasing globalisation in the mining industry, there is pressure on countries to reduce royalty rates for attracting FDI. Other than the geological potential, one of the main factors that multinational mining companies take into account for their investment decisions is the fiscal regime in particular, the rate of royalty. There is, therefore, a clear scenario of a race to the bottom, especially in developing countries that are competing with each other to get FDI. For example, base metals are often taxed at a lower rate, reflecting the fact that investment in base metals is
With increasing globalisation in the mining industry, there is pressure on countries to reduce royalty rates for attracting FDI
52
highly dependent on foreign investors who have many countries to choose from when making their investment decisions. The royalty rates in India are a mixed bag when compared with the rates being charged by other c ountries. In the case of some minerals, Indian royalty rates are very low, while in others they are comparable and in some, they are high. For instance, the royalty on iron ore in India is very low, vary-
ing from Rs 27 per tonne for iron ore lumps containing more than 65 per cent iron (the best grade in the world) to a measly Rs 8 per tonne for iron ore fines containing less than 62 per cent iron (see Table 2.12: Royalty rates in different countries). The royalty rates are insignificant when compared with the sales price of iron ore: currently, the domestic price for high-grade iron ore is about Rs 1,500 per tonne, whereas international prices are between
TABLE 2.12: Royalty rates in different countries

There are no established trends in royalty in different countries
China India Papua New Guinea National law Philippines Botswana Namibia Australia (Western Australia) Provincial law or negotiated agreement act Mostly advalorem or unitbased, and profit based or hybrid for diamonds and V 2.5-7.5% advalorem Brazil Argentina Canada (British Columbia) Provincial law USA (Arizona)
Legislation
National law
National law
National law
National law
National law
National law
Provincial law
Provincial law
Royalty type
Two types: 1. Royalty unitbased plus; 2. Mineral resources compensation fee: ad-valorem based 1. Various ranges for each mineral, expressed in yuan/ tonne ore, plus, 2. 1-4% depending on mineral 2% of sale value
Ad-valorem or unitbased
Advalorem
Advalorem
Advalorem
Ad-valorem (sales revenue)
Advalorem
Most provinces: no royalty; others: advalorem 0-3%
Profit-based Ad-valorem (net revenue) and advalorem (net proceeds) 13% (of net revenue) or 2% (of net proceeds) At least 2%, commissioner to determine rate
Royalty rate
0.4-20%
2.0%
2.0%
3-10%
5-10%
0.2-3.0%
Iron ore
Rs 4-27 per tonne based on grade 0.35% linked to LME prices 7.5% of sale value 10% of sale price
5-7.5% of realised value depending on grade 7.5% of realised price 5% of sale price
Bauxite
2-4% of sale value
Chromite
NA
Diamonds
Industrial 2% of sale value; gems: 4% of sale value 2% ad-valorem plus 0.4-30.0 yuan/ tonne ore
7.5% of realised price
Copper
3.2% advalorem metal of LME value of copper in ore
2% NSR
2% advalorem on market value
3% advalorem on adjusted gross market value
5% advalorem, on market value
Concentrate 5% of royalty value; metal: 2.5% of royalty value
2% ad-valorem on sales value less commercial taxes, transportation and insurance 1% advalorem on sales value less commercial taxes, transportation and insurance 2% ad-valorem on sales value commercial taxes, transportation and insurance deductions Yes sales by Garempeiros is exempt
Catamarca 3% advalorem on sales value less allowable deductions Catamarca 3% advalorem on sales value less allowable deductions
More than At least 2% 13% of net of market revenue less price 2% of net proceeds, or 2% of net proceeds More than 13% of net revenue less 2% of net proceeds, or 2% of net proceeds At least 2% of market price
Gold
4% ad-valorem plus 0.4-30.0 yuan/ tonne ore
1.5% advalorem; London Bullion Market Association price of gold in ore Rs 45-55 per tonne
2% realised FOB
2% advalorem on market value
5% advalorem, on market value
2.5% of invoice value minus deductions such as transport value
Limestone
2% ad-valorem plus 0.5-20.0 yuan/ tonne or yuan/m3 ore
2%
2% advalorem on adjusted on market value
3% ad-valorem on adjusted gross market value
5% advalorem, on net market value
AUD 0.30/t
Catamarca: 3% adless valorem on sales value less allowable net proceeds Catamarca: No
> of 13% of At least 2% net revenue of market less 2% of prices net proceeds, or 2% of
Coal
1% ad-valorem plus 0.3-5.0 yuan/tonne
Rs 65-250 per tonne
2%
10 pesos/t
Up to 5% ad-valorem on market value
7.5% of value if exported
More than At least 2% 13% of net of market revenue less prices 2% of net proceeds, or 2% of net proceeds
Notes: V = Valladium, LME = London Metal Exchange, NSR = Natural System Resources, FOB = Free on board, AUD = Australian dollar Sources: Anon, 2006, Mineral Royalties, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 31-57; Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineralbased growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank and the government of Orissa, June; anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
53
Coal royalties
There is a movement towards ad-valorem rates
In India, the royalty rates for coal are fixed by the Central government. For this, the Union ministry of coal constitutes a study group, which interacts with all the stakeholders the producing states, the consuming states and consumer sectors like power, iron and steel and cement. After taking into account the views of all, the group makes its recommendations to the ministry. The recommendations are considered by the ministry, which then moves a proposal for a government decision. The decision is notified and the new rates of royalty come into effect from the date of such notification. The last revision of the royalty rate was done in 2002. Coal royalty rates are based on fixed amount per tonne of dispatch and not on an ad-valorem basis. The rate was very low during the 1980s, when it was charged at a rate of Rs 2.50-7 per tonne for different grades. Royalties were significantly enhanced in the 1990s; today, they stand at between Rs 65-115 per tonne for low-grade coal, and Rs 250 per tonne for high-grade coal. However, since the 1990s, though royalty rates have increased in terms of amount, they have dipped when these amounts are converted to ad-valorem basis. In 1991, the royalty rate on coal as percentage of sales prices was between 16-33 per cent for various grades. This reduced to 13-25 per cent by 2001. In 2005, the royalty rate on coal as a percentage of sales prices further reduced to 10-16 per cent for various grades.1 This has been a key concern for the coal-
Woes of nationalised coal companies

While coal companies are paying royalty to state governments, these companies are not being paid for the coal consumed by the state-owned electricity boards. In 2005, all the state-owned power utilities together owed Rs 3,326 crore as coal sale dues to Coal India Limited.
producing states, many of which want the royalty rates on coal to move to ad-valorem basis.2 The expert committee which was constituted in 2000 to consider revision of rates of royalty on coal, did not recommend institution of royalty on an ad-valorem basis. It felt that the existing rate in the country was among the highest in the world and raising it further would have a multiplying effect on coal prices, which would translate into higher power costs. Moreover, as the country has to import coal to meet its requirement, the government regulated the royalty in order to maintain parity between the prices of domestic and imported coal (see Box: Woes of nationalised coal companies). The government is doing a rethink. Today, there is a strong feeling within the government to move to coal royalty on an ad-valorem basis. A new committee has been constituted on June 2, 2005 to consider revision of rates of royalty on coal and lignite. The committee has sought views and comments from the states and other stakeholders.
Effective tax rate on mining in India

India has a relatively low rate
Royalties are just one component of total taxes paid by mining companies. The mining sector also pays a variety of other taxes like sales tax, corporate tax, excise duty and registration fees. Some of these taxes are collected by the Central government (corporate tax and excise duty), while others are paid to the states (sales tax, royalties and registration fees). In a recent report titled Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, the World Bank has estimated the effective tax rate on mining industry in India and has benchmarked it with other countries. Effective tax rate is the amount of taxes collected by a government as a per cent of pre-tax cash flow generated by the project over its expected life. The effective tax rate on mining industry in India is about 44 per cent, which is lower than the tax rates in many other major mineral-producing countries. For instance, Canada has an effective tax rate of more than 60 per cent, Papua New Guinea more than 55 per cent, South Africa 45 per cent and Indonesia about 50 per cent. The only major mineral-producing region which has a lower effective tax rate than India is Western Australia (see Graph: Effective tax rate comparison).
GRAPH: Effective tax rate comparison

Western Australia boasts of the lowest effective tax rates
Canada (Ontario) Papua New Guinea Ghana Mexico Indonesia Tanzania Kazakhstan Philippines South Africa India/Orissa Bolivia Peru China Argentina Chile Western Australia 0 10 20 30 40 (in per cent) 50 60 70
Source: Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank, New Delhi
54
TABLE 2.13: State-wise royalty on minerals

Almost in all the states, royalty collected has increased
Total royalty collection (in Rs crore) 2002-03 Chhattisgarh Jharkhand Karnataka Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan Maharashtra Gujarat Kerala Goa Tamil Nadu Andhra Pradesh Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Haryana Assam All India (estimated) 552.4 797.7 83.9 590.7 440.6 399.7 400.7 172.6 1.6 14.8 297.3 769.9 22.6 262.4 118.1 9.4 5,363 2003-04 637.2 900.2 143.6 646.7 547.2 458.0 475.9 217.9 10.5 17.9 324.5 766.6 30.7 254.2 76.8 12.6 6,000 2004-05 694.6 916.2 210.9 733.7 663.6 589.8 568.2 239.0 12.6 17.4 324.8 864.5 35.6 291.9 92.5 13.4 6,814
US $50-60 per tonne. This means that the ad-valorem royalty rate for iron ore in India is less than 0.5 per cent. In comparison, the ad-valorem royalty rate for iron ore in Western Australia is 5-7.5 per cent of the realised value, while in Indonesia it is three per cent of the sales value (see Boxes: Coal royalties and Effective tax rate on mining in India).
States and the royalty
Royalty is the key source of revenue from the mining sector for states; other charges and taxes on the sector contribute little to the state exchequer. Data on royalty is available only from 16 states. These states account for about 90 per cent of the total value of mineral production in the country. If we extrapolate the royalty data for the 16 states (see Table 2.13: State-wise royalty on minerals) in the same proportion as the value of mineral production, the total royalty collected from the mining industry (excluding oil and gas) in India would stand at Rs 6,814 crore in 2004-05. Other than a few states, royalties on minerals are a very small proportion of the total revenue receipts of the major mineral-producing states. In Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, mineral royalties contribute about 10-13 per cent of the total revenue receipts (see Table 2.14: Royalty and revenue receipts). In Orissa, mineral royalties contribute about five-six per cent of the total revenue receipts. In Andhra Pradesh, which has the highest contribution to mineral value in the country, mineral royalties contribute about three per cent to the total revenue receipt. In Goa, a major centre of iron ore production, royalties contribute just one per cent to the total revenue receipt of the state. This raises questions about the ecological viability of having large-scale iron ore mines in a fairly prosperous state, when minerals are not contributing much to either the state exchequer or to local development. Data on mineral-wise royalty collection is unavailable, except for a few states. According to data available on royalties paid by coal and lignite mines, these minerals alone account for about half the royalties paid by the mining industry in India.64
TABLE 2.14: Royalty and revenue receipts (in Rs crore)

In Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, mineral royalty contributes around 10 per cent to the state revenues
States Mineral royalty 2002-03 Total revenue receipt Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt 10.2 10.8 5.2 3.3 0.8 Mineral royalty 2003-04 Total revenue Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt 10.7 12.1 5.8 2.9 1.1 Mineral royalty 2004-05 Total revenue Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt 9.6 13.4 5.6 3.0 1.0
Chhattisgarh Jharkhand Orissa Andhra Pradesh Goa
552.4 797.7 440.6 769.9 14.8
5,417.3 7,406.48 8,438.77 23,002.92 1,833.0
637.2 900.2 547.2 766.6 17.9
5,959.32 7,443.49 9,440.24 26,868.5 1,623.13
694.6 916.2 663.6 864.5 17.4
7,248.87 6,852.64 11,850.19 28,749.51 1,820.02
Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India and mineral royalty data from anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
55
THE PRICING OF MINERALS

Prices of minerals vary according to the grade and in some cases, depending on their usage (as with coal). One way of comparing trends in prices is to look at the wholesale price index (WPI). WPI is an indicator designed to measure the changes in price levels of commodities that flow into the wholesale trade intermediaries. The most widely used price index in India, WPI is a vital guide in economic analysis and policy formulation, and as a basis for price adjustments in business contracts and projects. In the last decade, WPI for non-fuel minerals in India went up by three times from 105 in 1994-95 to 323 in 2004-05 (see Table 2.15: Index numbers of wholesale prices for minerals). All this increase in
prices has happened in the last two years, when the WPI jumped from 122 in 2003-04 to 323 in 2005-06. In fact, before 2002-03, non-fuel mineral prices had remained highly subdued, not even increasing at the rate of general inflation in the Indian economy. The increase in the last two years is mainly due to the bullish increase in prices of metallic minerals, especially iron ore. The WPI of iron ore in India increased from 127 in 2003 to 699 in 2006 (see Table 2.16: Trends in average wholesale price index of key minerals). Other than iron ore, prices of other metallic minerals have remained stable and, in some cases, have even decreased. In the case of non-metallic minerals, there has hardly been any increase in prices in the last 10 years. In fact, prices of limestone, Indias key non-metallic mineral, have decreased.
TABLE 2.15: Index numbers of wholesale prices for minerals

Wholesale prices of minerals have increased significantly over the last decade
Group/sub-group (average of months/ average of weeks ended Saturday) All minerals Metallic minerals Other minerals Fuel, power, light and lubricants Coal mining Minerals oils 1994-95 104.9 103.8 106.7 108.9 105.1 106.1 2002-03 118.8 121.9 113.9 239.2 181.1 254.7 2003-04 121.6 127.5 112.3 254.5 193.6 274.3 2004-05 255.1 344.5 116.8 280.1 231.6 315.8 2005-06 322.8 453.1 117.0 306.8 231.6 359.8
Note: (Base 1993-94=100) Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=375956&ptid=14874&level=5, as viewed on March 12, 2007
TABLE 2.16: Trends in average wholesale price index of key minerals

Wholesale prices of iron ore and coal have increased significantly between 1994 and 2006
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Limestone 100.0 100.0 103.7 94.3 82.7 82.7 83.0 88.2 89.4 88.7 90.8 95.9 95.8 Iron ore 136.9 81.7 89.0 90.4 110.2 129.1 116.6 127.0 127.0 127.0 377.2 544.6 698.6 Coal 104.7 106.3 113.0 135.9 143.0 146.1 156.2 180.3 181.1 189.4 214.9 231.5 231.6 Bauxite 141.7 149.7 153.3 160.4 130.9 91.8 106.7 126.5 118.6 119.1 119.6 102.9 95.2 Chromite 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.4 74.8 93.1 75.5 Magnesite 146.3 127.2 109.5 105.7 123.4 124.4 136.0 254.7 252.7 166.7 142.0 162.7 185.6
Note: (Base 1993-94=100) Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=375956&ptid=14874&level=5, as viewed on March 12, 2007
56
TABLE 2.17: Mineral prices domestic and international markets

Almost all minerals cost much less in India in comparison to international markets
Domestic price (US $/tonne) 2000-01 Bauxite Chromite lumps/fines and chips Iron ore* Feldspar Fluorspar Graphite Deadburnt magnesite Calcined magnesite Mica Silica sand 6.2 63.4 13.5 11.7 99.3 315.5 164.4 147.5 4.1 1.4 2001-02 5.8 57.9 13.9 11.0 99.3 326.7 176.4 91.5 3.7 1.4 2002-03 5.5 57.9 13.5 10.0 99.3 326.7 169.4 94.8 5.6 1.4 International price (US $/tonne) 2000-01 99.3 91.9 37.9 113.5 123.3 491.7 116.7 104.1 502.7 7.7 2001-02 97.5 86.6 65.0 113.5 113.8 491.7 120.0 104.1 546.2 8.1 2002-03 100.8 87.5 77.4 111.8 129.6 495.8 103.3 99.0 507.3 11.9
Note: *Iron ore prices are for the years 2003-04 to 2005-06. Sources: Domestic prices: Indian Bureau of Mines; http://www.indiastat.com/india/showtable.asp?secid=404795&ptid=23, as viewed on May 22, 2007 Foreign prices: Union ministry of mines, Government of India; http://www.indiastat.com/india/showtable.asp?secid=404795&ptid=23, as viewed on May 22, 2007
Prices of fuel minerals, on the other hand, have increased in the last 10 years. The WPI of coal has increased at a CAGR of 8.2 per cent between 1994-95 and 2005-06; that of mineral oil has increased at a CAGR of about 13 per cent over the same period. Compared to the international prices, the prices of metallic and non-metallic minerals in India is very low (see Table 2.17: Mineral prices domestic and international markets). For instance, bauxite is priced 16.5 times lower in the Indian market than the international market. In the case of iron ore, international prices are 4.4 times higher. Similarly, international prices of graphite are 1.53 times higher, while feldspar and mica are both priced 10 times more.
The case of coal
Coal prices in the country were partially deregulated in 1997 (grades A to D) and completely deregulated in January 2000 (grades E to G). This, in theory, conferred the right to fix the price of coal on the two public sector companies, CIL and Singareni Collieries Company Ltd (SCCL), which operate as exclusive producer-cum-traders of coal in India. However, the price fixed by the companies is, in reality, guided by the Union ministry of coal (MoC). Though the principles of fixing the prices have not been set out explicitly, it is, in essence, determined on the basis of costs incurred in production from different mines plus a reasonable profit margin. For example, on an average for SECL, the sales price was 86 per cent more than the royalty on coal in the year 2005.65 The prices of coal are also fixed keeping in mind the requirements of the power sector. However, the present system of pricing has proved unsatisfactory as the demand for coal from non-power users at the price fixed, is far in excess of the available supply. The industry is dominated by two fully government-owned companies operating in two different geographical regions. These companies have never had to compete and as such, have had no
interest in creating a vibrant and competitive coal market. They companies see their role as one of fulfilling the production targets fixed by the government; they, therefore, take up plans and projects to just meet these targets, with very little surplus to serve any unanticipated or sudden increase in demand. New players in coal mining face huge entry barriers and thus, the supply response tends to be slow. Demand-supply gaps persist: only miniscule quantities of coal are available for trading freely. Another peculiarity is that coal is priced in India based on its grades. Each grade of coal is identified by a very broad band of useful heat value (UHV), a concept unique to India. Apart from the fact that the UHV concept is a legacy of the past without any scientific basis, it promotes a slab rate with increasing bandwidth and progressively lower grades of coal as opposed to a fully variable rate linked to the precise calorific value of the coal under consideration. This encourages companies to supply coal at the bottom of the grade bands by passing it off as the next higher band. Between 2002-03 and 2004-05, sale prices of all grades of coal have steadily gone up by about 10 per cent every year.66 The average price of coking coal has increased from Rs 1,000 per tonne in 2002-03 to Rs 1,200 per tonne in 2004-05. The average price of noncoking coal (long flame) has gone up from Rs 875 per tonne in 2002-03 to Rs 1,050 per tonne in 2004-05. On an average, the prevailing price of delivered coal for powering India is around US $30 per tonne. Rest of the coal is sold at a market determined price which, today, stands at around US $50 per tonne.67 A comparison of coal prices of India and other nations shows that the price of coal for thermal power plants is among the lowest in India;68 that the price of Indian coking coal is at the same range as in most developing countries (China, Chile, etc), but is much lower than that in developed economies (France, the US, etc).
57
TABLE 2.18: Landed costs

Imported coal is cost-competitive on the southern shores of Tamil Nadu
Imported coal At the port of entry (Chennai) Australia (6,685) CIF price (Rs/MT) Duty and other incidental (Rs/MT) Landed cost At the port of entry (Okha) CIF price (Rs/MT) Duty and other incidentals (Rs/MT) Landed cost 1,589.50 558.16 2,147.66 1,483.25 537.12 2,020.37 1,294.98 499.85 1,794.83 1,443.72 529.30 1,973.02 Ex-colliery price Transport and other incidental (Rs/MT) 1,568.25 1,132.50 2,700.75 1,483.97 1,132.50 2,616.47 1,269.01 1,132.50 2,401.51 1,589.50 451.06 2,040.66 China (6,877) 1,483.25 430.12 1,913.37 Indonesia (6,019) 1,294.98 392.85 1,687.83 S Africa (6,528) 1,443.72 422.30 1,866.02 Ex-colliery price Transport and other incidental (Rs/MT) A-Gr (6,454) 1,568.25 859.50 2,427.75 B-Gr C-Gr (6,049-6,454) (5,597-6,049) 1,483.97 859.50 2,343.47 1,269.01 859.50 2,128.51 ECL coal from Raniganj (ROM) (rail-cum-sea route)
Source: Anon, Pricing Policy & Credit Control, http://cag.nic.in/reports/commercial/2000_book7/chapter9.htm, as viewed on March 12, 2007
In case of Russia and countries in transition, coking coal is priced quite low;69 and that Indian captive coal prices are in the same range as in most developing countries, but lower than in developed nations.70 Indian coal is relatively low-priced, but after adding freight and handling costs, it reaches the same range as the cost of imported coal near a coastal area. The weighted average free-onrail price of domestic thermal coal sold to power plants is just under US $5 per million kilocalories, inclusive of royalty and tax. Freight and handling adds US $7-11 for distances between 1,000 to 2,000 km, making the delivered price of domestic coal US $12-16
per million kilocalories for distances of 1,000-2,000 km from the mines. Imported coal can be delivered at a cif (cost, insurance and freight) price of about US $13 per million kilocalories, inclusive of a five per cent customs duty at a coastal location.71 Thus, imported coal is cost-competitive at coastal locations on the west coast and the southern shores of Tamil Nadu, especially if it requires minimal or no transportation on land to reach the consumption point (see Table 2.18: Landed costs at Chennai). This is one of the main reasons why the expert committee constituted by the government recommended regulating prices for the power sector (see Box: Coal pricing: expertspeak).
Coal pricing: expertspeak

Expert committee recommends market price for all except the power industry
In December 2005, the Union ministry of coals Expert Committee on the Roadmap for Coal Sector Reforms submitted its report, where it recommended regulating only the price of coal for the power sector. With the increase in share of coal-based power production, over time, the average cost of bulk power would depend on the price at which coal is sold to the power industry. In national interest, it is imperative therefore that power costs are kept at the lowest so that Indian industrial production can be globally competitive and the poor among domestic consumers could be supplied electricity at affordable rates, says the report submitted by the committee. The committee considered it reasonable to have a special price-and-supply arrangement for the power sector, which it named a Class A consumer; all other consumers of coal were to referred as Class B consumers. The committee also recommended that coal requirements of Class A consumers should be supplied at prices determined strictly on a cost-to-produce basis, subject to certain efficiency norms and allowing a rate of return in keeping with other energy supply
industries. A tripartite agreement involving coal suppliers, consumers and transporters called the Fuel Supply and Transport Agreement (FSTA) should cover the supply arrangements for such consumers. The committee said the remaining coal produced in the country should be sold to Class B consumers on the following basis: the larger among these consumers, including associations of consumers with a minimum annual demand of one lakh tonne, can be given 60 per cent of their needs under the FSTA, but at a price indexed to the e-auction price. The remaining quantity required by these companies and that needed by all other smaller consumers could be accessed through traders, imports or e-auctions. For this method to succeed, at least 10 per cent of the total domestic production must be sold in the open market through e-auctions in the first year. Simultaneously, the power utility sector should be asked to set up coastal generating stations along the western coast of India and south Tamil Nadu based on imported coal. This will lower the dependence of domestic power utilities on domestic coal, thereby making it possible, over time, to raise the quantity of coal being sold in the open market through e-auctions. If during the transition, the allocation cannot meet the demand from Class A consumers, the industry should arrange to import the extra requirement.
58
MINING AND EMPLOYMENT

In 1991, the formal mining industry in India employed around 0.8 million people. By 1999, the employment had declined to 0.66 million,72 which further went down to 0.56 million by 2004-05 (see Graph 2.15: Trends in employment). Thus, between 1991 and 2004, the total employment in the mining industry in India decreased by about 30 per cent but the same period saw an almost four-fold jump in the value of mineral production. In India, public sector mines provide the majority of employment in the industry. In 2004-05, the public sector accounted for 85 per cent of the people employed in mining. Coal is the major employment provider. Almost three-fourth
GRAPH 2.15: Trends in employment

Humanpower has decreased over the last decade
800000 700000 7,16,183 Employment (in nos) 600000 500000 400000 300000 200000 100000 0 6,85,673 6,38,741 5,62,778 7,04,537 6,58,901 5,99,301 5,56,647
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2004
2005
Source: Anon, Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=287161&ptid=18528 as viewed on April 28, 2007
of the total people employed in mining are on the payroll of coal companies (mainly public sector). Employment provided by other minerals is relatively small: for instance, iron ore, the major metallic mineral produced in the country, employed only six per cent of the total workforce involved in mining. Limestone, the major nonmetallic mineral, employed only four per cent (see Graph 2.16: Mineral-wise employment status in India). In terms of the geographical distribution of employment in mining, the coal-producing states of Jharkhand, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have the maximum mining employment (see Graph 2.17: State-wise employment in mines). Jharkhand alone accounts for one-fourth of the total number of people employed in mining in India. Mining has been, and is still being, promoted in the country for a wrong reason: employment. A look at the mining industry worldwide tells us that modern large-scale mining doesnt need people a trend which Indian mines are following. It needs big machines and specialised operators to operate them. As the emphasis of mining industry shifts to modernisation and automation, its employment generation potential is going down. Globally, mining is employing less people to produce more. The general trend towards a decrease in employment is most clearly illustrated by the case of South Africa, a major mineral-producing country, where 360,000 mineworkers, or 46 per cent of the industrys 1990 work force, lost their jobs between 1990 and 2000. Employment in the US mining industry decreased by 31 per cent between 1985 and 2000; the coal industry, the biggest sectoral employer, showed the largest drop almost 60 per cent.73 In Canada, between 1994 and 2000, jobs in mining sector declined by 12 per cent.74 In fact, the employment generated in Canada to produce US $1 billion worth of minerals has decreased by 43 per cent between 1998 and 2005. The situation is no different in India. In 1994-95, to produce Rs 1 crore worth of minerals, Indian mines employed about 25 people. By 2003-04, to produce the same value of minerals, only
GRAPH 2.16: Mineral-wise employment status in India

Coal mining employs the highest number of people
Other mines 12%
GRAPH 2.17: State-wise employment in mines (2003)

Jharkhand has the highest numbers of mineworkers
Andhra Pradesh 12% Others 17%
Stone 1% Manganese 2% Limestone 4% Chhattisgarh 8%
Iron ore 6% Chromite 1%
West Bengal 13% Madhya Pradesh 10%
Coal 74% Maharashtra 6%
Jharkhand 26%
Orissa 8%
Source: Anon, Union ministry of statistics and programme implementation, Government of India, New Delhi, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ ShowDataSec.asp?secid=404513&ptid= 18528, as viewed on April 28, 2007
Source: Anon, Union ministry of statistics and programme implementation, Government of India, New Delhi, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ ShowDataSec.asp?secid=404513&ptid= 18528, as viewed on April 28, 2007
59
GRAPH 2.18: Employment potential of Indian mines

Employment potential has decreased considerably in metallic mineral mining
Employment potential (Employment per Rs one crore worth of mineral production)
50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Year All minerals Fuels Metallic minerals Non-metallic minerals 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Source: Analysis based on data from the Union ministry of labour and employment and Union ministry of coal, New Delhi
GRAPH 2.19: Humanpower employment index in Indian mines (average daily employment per 1,000 tonne of output)
Huge quantity of limestone, but humanpower employed is among the lowest
50.00 Average daily employment per 1000 tonnes of output 45.00 40.00 35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 1951 1961 Bauxite Limestone 1971 1981 1991 Years Copper Manganese ore Iron ore Mica 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Analysis based on data from the Union ministry of labour and employment and Union ministry of coal, New Delhi
60
eight people were required. Thus, in the space of nine years, the employment potential (number of people employed to produce per unit worth of minerals) of Indian mines had reduced by about 70 per cent. This reduction has happened across the board. During 19942003, the employment potential of fuel minerals reduced by 63 per cent. During the same period, employment potential in the metallic mineral segment reduced by 73 per cent and in the non-metallic mineral segment, by 83 per cent (see Graph 2.18: Employment potential of Indian mines). Take the case of bauxite. In 1951, 18 people were employed to produce 1,000 tonne of bauxite; by 2002, only 0.5 people were required to produce the same amount. In the case of iron ore, the number of people required to extract 1,000 tonne of ore reduced from 5.5 in 1951 to 0.3 in 2002 (see Graph 2.19: Humanpower employment index in Indian mines). Today, for most major minerals, not even one person is required to produce 1,000 tonne of minerals. For instance, to produce 1,000 tonne of coal, CIL employed about 1.4 persons in 2004-05; in 1996-97, the company had hired 2.5 persons to produce the same amount.75 Compared globally, the Indian mining industry is still considered inefficient vis--vis employment. Major mining countries of the world employ very few people in mining compared to India. The Canadian mining industry, for example, employs just 45,287 persons to produce US $21 billion worth of minerals. The Australian mining industry employs 69,382 persons to produce US $37 billion worth of minerals. In comparison, the Indian mining industry employed 5,56,647 persons to produce US $19 billion
Employment: underground vs open-cast

Underground mines are labour-intensive but less productive
Underground mining is more labour-intensive than open-cast mining. The majority of Indias underground mines are in coal, which is dominated by public sector companies. Labour productivity (amount of minerals produced per labour) in the underground coal mines of the country is about 10 times lower than that of open-cast coal mines. For instance, in 2005-06, coal output per man shift in the underground mines of Coal India Limited (CIL) was 0.69 tonne, whereas in CILs open-cast mines it was 7.15 tonne. Similarly, in the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd, coal output per manshift in underground mines was 0.85 tonne, compared to 8.49 tonne in open-cast mines. To reduce humanpower, most mining companies have started to shift production to open-cast mining. This has resulted in a steady decline in the production of coal from underground mining in the last 10 years. Underground coal mines produced about one-fourth of the total coal in the country in 1996-97; in 2005-06, their contribution fell to a bare 15 per cent.
GRAPH 2.20: Employment potential a comparison

India provides maximum jobs in mining, so far
35,000 29,930
30,000 Number of people employed per billion dollars revenue (US$)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000 2,167 0 Canada Australia 1,890
2,941
South Africa
India
Sources: India: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Canada: Anon, 2006, Facts and Figures 2006, Mining Association of Canada, Ottawa Australia: Anon, 2006, Mineral Industry Survey Report 2006, Mineral Council of Australia, Canberra
worth of minerals. Only South Africa is close to India in terms of number of people in mining 4,57,371 persons. But the country produces minerals worth US $156 billion about eight times higher than India (see Graph 2.20: Employment potential a comparison). The employment potential of Indian mining industry is, therefore, at least 10 times higher than those of other mining nations (barring China, for which no definitive data is available, but most literature indicate that the Chinese mining industry is heavily labour-dependent and employs millions). But the scenario is changing: employment potential of the Indian mining industry is definitely coming down, driven by a desire to take on global competition. Take the case of the captive limestone mines of the large cement companies. To extract one MT of limestone, these mines employ just about 40 people. There are companies which employ far less: the Alathiyur-based Madras Cements Ltd employs just 14 people, while the Sirohi-based Binani Cement Ltd employs 25 people to mine one MT limestone.76 The key question here is whether this is the right way for the Indian mining industry to develop. Mining displaces people not only from their lands, but also from their livelihoods. Unless it is able to provide a reasonable number of jobs to the people reeling under this double whammy, most communities will not accept it. The Western paradigm of mining which requires only the land, forests and water and not the local people cannot work in India. Across the mining areas of the country, conflict between local communities and mining companies is reaching a crescendo and the reasons are not hard to find: besides displacement, pollution and health impacts of mines, employment is becoming a key issue. Deprived of their traditional livelihoods, people need alternatives to survive (see Box: Employment: underground vs open-cast).
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NEW GROWTH AREAS

The Indian mining industry is on the threshold of a quantum surge. Some would contend that the boom has already begun at least in the cases of coal, iron ore, limestone, bauxite and chromite. But India is now reaching out for minerals which it had, till date, neither explored nor mined extensively: copper, lead, zinc, nickel, gold and diamond. From the environment and forest perspective, this is bad news: these big money minerals also generate the maximum amount of waste and are characterised by large mines, huge tailings and desolate landscapes. In the last five years (2002-03 to 2006-07), an area of 392 sq km has been leased out for new mines for the major minerals alone (excluding fuel and atomic minerals). Approvals have been granted to 348 new mine leases during this period. An overall increasing trend is evident in the numbers of mine leases granted over this period in fact, the maximum numbers of mines have been approved in 2005-06 and 2006-07 (see Table 2.19: Leases, licences and permits). The maximum number of leases has been approved for iron ore, limestone and bauxite: about one-third of the total were for iron ore. In terms of lease area, iron ore mines accounted for about 29 per cent of the total (see Table 2.20: Mineral-wise mine leases). Though 13.5 per cent of the total mining leases approved were for limestone, the lease area approved for limestone constituted 28.5 per cent of total lease area. This means that limestone mines were the biggest in size. About 20 per cent of the total leases approved were for
TABLE 2.19: Leases, licences and permits

Numbers of new mine leases show an increasing trend
Year Numbers 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 Total 58 44 56 100 90 348 Mine leases Prospecting licences Reconnaissance permits Numbers 46 46 23 14 5 134 Area (in sq km) 67,709 2,34,043 34.642 24,526 6,961 3,67,882
Area Numbers Area (in ha) (in ha) 10,605 2,430 6,292 8,961 10,921 39,210 28 21 40 14 45 148 5,363 19,699 5,740 2,679 28,133 61,614
Source: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewed on January 15, 2007
TABLE 2.20: Mineral-wise mine leases

Iron ore takes the lions share
Name of the minerals Total mine leases (2002-03 to 2006-07)
bauxite; they covered about 16 per cent of the total lease area. If we consider the types of minerals for which mining leases have been granted in the last five years, it becomes clear that the mineral pattern of the Indian mining industry is not heading for any significant change in the near future. Minerals like iron ore, limestone, bauxite and manganese will continue to dominate mining in the country. State-wise distribution of approved mining leases in the last five years does not show much variation either (see Table 2.21: State-wise mine leases). Rajasthan, which has the largest area under mining leases in the country, has also got approvals for the maximum amount of lease area in the last five years: about 20 per cent of the total in the country. The average size of the lease area
TABLE 2.21: State-wise mine leases

Numbers Percentage Lease Percentage area Bauxite Dolomite and associated minerals Gold and associated minerals Gypsum Iron ore and associated minerals Limestone Manganese ore Mineral sand Uranium Others Total 69 2 2 19 113 47 47 12 1 36 348 19.8 0.6 0.6 5.5 32.5 13.5 13.5 3.4 0.3 10.3 6,104 1,006 638 4,557 11,526 11,193 984 1,589 535 1,078 39,210 15.6 2.6 1.6 11.6 Jharkhand 29.4 Karnataka 28.5 2.5 4.1 1.4 2.7 Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Rajasthan Others Total 38 61 44 12 24 82 348 10.9 17.5 12.6 3.4 6.9 23.6 2,233 4,025 3,139 3,018 8,226 3,258 39,210 5.7 10.3 8.0 7.7 21.0 8.3 16 4.6 3,719 9.5
Rajasthan has the largest area under leases

States Total mine leases (2002-03 to 2006-07) Numbers Percentage Andhra Pradesh Chhattisgarh 40 31 11.5 8.9 Lease Percentage area 7,393 4,199 18.9 10.7
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approved in Rajasthan is about 340 ha mainly for gypsum. Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand are other states in which a significant amount of mining was approved in the last five years. In the last five years, 148 prospecting licences (PLs) for major minerals, covering an area of 616 sq km, were approved. There are no apparent trends in the granting of PLs, except for the fact that the maximum numbers were granted in 2006-07. The industry is prospecting for iron ore, gold, diamonds and mineral sand in India. As much as one-third of the area under PLs granted in the last five years have been for iron ore and associated minerals (mainly manganese); about one-fourth for diamonds and associated minerals; and about 14-15 per cent each for gold and mineral sand (see Table 2.22: Mineral-wise prospecting licences). Where is India prospecting? Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are the key states: about 65 per cent of areas under prospecting were in these two states. Mining companies are searching for diamonds in Andhra Pradesh; iron ore and gold in Chhattisgarh; and mineral sands in Tamil Nadu (see Table 2.23 on page 64: State-wise prospecting licences). In the last five years, 134 reconnaissance permits (RPs) were issued for major minerals, covering an area of 3,67,882 sq km. Of the last five years, the maximum area under RPs was granted in 200304. Comparatively few RPs have been granted in the last two years. Though the maximum numbers of RPs were granted for diamonds and associated minerals (about 51 per cent of total RPs), the maximum area under RPs was for copper, lead, zinc and
TABLE 2.22: Mineral-wise prospecting licences

Iron ore and associated minerals have been granted almost one-third of the area under prospecting licences
Minerals Total prospecting licences (2002-03 to 2006-07) Numbers Percentage Lease area 974 Percentage
Bauxite Gold and associated minerals Diamond and associated minerals Iron ore and associated minerals Manganese ore Mineral sand Others Total
14
9.5
1.6
3.4
8,781
14.3
6.1
14,829
24.1
89 19 6 6 148
60.1 12.8 4.1 4.1
20,520 6,588 9,418 505 61,614
33.3 10.7 15.3 0.8
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TABLE 2.23: State-wise prospecting licences

Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are drawing prospectors
Minerals Total prospecting licences (2002-03 to 2006-07) Numbers Percentage Lease area 18,854 21,222 2,896 4,196 7,244 7,203 61,614 Percentage
TABLE 2.25: State-wise reconnaissance permits

Rajasthan leads, again
Minerals Total reconnaissance permits (2002-03 to 2006-07) Numbers Andhra Pradesh 30.6 34.4 4.7 6.8 11.8 11.7 Chhattisgarh Karnataka Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan Others Total 11 24 15 23 23 22 16 134 Percentage 8.2 17.9 11.2 17.2 17.2 16.4 11.9 Lease area* 21,866 38,279 17,856 37,890 38,309 1,89,260 24,421 3,67,882 Percentage 5.9 10.4 4.9 10.3 10.4 51.4 6.6
Andhra Pradesh Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Tamil Nadu Others Total
15 49 29 15 2 38 148
10.1 33.1 19.6 10.1 1.4 25.7
Note: *in square kilometre Source: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewed on January 15, 2007
TABLE 2.24: Mineral-wise reconnaissance permits

There is a shift towards mining of minerals like copper
Minerals Total reconnaissance permits (2002-03 to 2006-07) Numbers Percentage Lease area* Percentage
Copper, lead, zinc, nickel and associated minerals Diamond and associated minerals Gold and associated minerals Others Total
42 68 14 10 134
32 51 11 6
2,27,766 1,10,515 16,784 12,816.73 3,67,881.73
63 30 5 2
Note: *in square kilometre Source: Analysis based on information given on http://mines.nic.in/, as viewed on January 15, 2007
nickel and associated minerals, including gold (about 63 per cent of the total area under RPs) indicating a shift towards mining of these minerals (see Table 2.24: Mineral-wise reconnaissance permits). In terms of state-wise distribution of RPs, Rajasthan tops the list: it holds more than half the area under RPs. Miners are searching for gold, copper, lead, zinc and nickel in the state, while they look for diamonds and gold in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa (see Table 2.25: State-wise reconnaissance permits). The direction that Indian mining is moving towards is clear. During 2002-06, at least 900 sq km area was opened for the mining of coal and major minerals in the country (see Box: Whats new in coal?). Environmental clearances were granted to 540 odd mines during this period. As on April 6, 2007, there were 508 mining projects awaiting environmental clearance from the Union ministry of environment and forests. The industry is all set to fly. In the short term, the emphasis will continue to remain on old favourites like iron ore, limestone and bauxite, while in the medium and long term, large-scale mining of gold, diamonds, copper, lead and zinc should be expected. Rajasthan, as per all indications, is all set to become a mining powerhouse.
Whats new in coal?

Chhattisgarh and MP have the largest share of new mines
There is no systematic data on new coal mines in the country over the last five years. The Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) does bring out a list of mining projects to which it has granted environmental clearance, but this information is extremely sketchy. After an analysis of the available data, the following picture emerges: Between 2002 and 2006, under the 1994 Environmental Impact
Assessment Notification, 129 coal mines were granted environmental clearance by the MoEF. These mines are either new coal mines or old coal mines that have acquired additional land for mining. An area of 482.3 sq km was opened up for coal mining in the last five years. The maximum numbers of coal mines were in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh alone accounted for about half of the area bought under coal mining in the last five years.
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Bearing the brunt: people and the environment
arge expanses of barren land and open, watery pits. Dust-laden, sooty air. Grim-faced and grimy workers. Busy lines of trucks, bulldozers, excavators usually, the abiding image of mining is one of monochromatic aridity and industry
indicative of what mining does to the landscape. But under this image and extending from it lie hundreds of other stories of how mining affects us: stories of human tragedy, environmental disaster and policy failures. Mining requires land mostly, land belonging to indigenous and marginalised people and land appropriation leads to displacement. Entire villages and communities are uprooted, their livelihoods and lifestyles destroyed, leaving them economically worse off than before and psychologically traumatised. Rehabilitation and compensation are distant dreams at best, and leave out a vast population of landless and tribals who have no legal claims to land. The effects on environment are as severe. Miners enjoy almost unhindered access everywhere: there is no moratorium on mining anywhere in the country. The results have been catastrophic: thousands of hectares of forests including protected areas razed, pristine water sources throttled and polluted, farmlands turned into barren stretches, the air turned rank with mineral dust, and human health held hostage to a variety of mining-induced disorders. The havoc, of course, doesnt stop with this. Post-mining, mountains of waste have completely transformed landscapes and are slowly poisoning everything they come in contact with. On the other hand, mineral-based industries like sponge iron are taking the devastation further afield. One would argue that minings impacts, severe as they are, are perhaps inevitable and unavoidable. Especially so for a nation like India, which has consciously accepted displacement and environmental damage as small prices to pay for the greater good of the country. But this chosen one-track path to progress is leading the nation towards the edge of a deadly precipice, beyond which lurks strife and civil war. Equally inevitable and unavoidable if we dont rethink our options.
Between 1950 and 1991, mining displaced about 26 lakh people the second highest toll among all development projects. Of these, not even 25 per cent have been resettled. About 52 per cent of those displaced were tribals. For every one per cent that it contributes to GDP, mining displaces three-four times more people than all the development projects taken together. Forest land diversion for mining has been rising. During 1998-2005, 216 mining projects were granted forest clearance annually, as against 19 per year during 1980-97. Mining and minerals-based industries consume as well as pollute water. Iron ore mining in India, for instance, used up 77 million tonne of water in 2005-06 enough to meet the daily water needs of more than three million people. An estimated 1.84 billion tonne of waste was generated from mining of major minerals in India in 2006. Among minerals, coal is the chief culprit: every tonne of coal extracted generates three-four tonne of wastes. All mining regions of India are air pollution hotspots. Towns like Korba, Bhilai, Satna and Dhanbad have been declared critical by the CPCB. Coal mining also generates methane, a greenhouse gas: it accounts for 10 per cent of all humanrelated methane emissions. India also has a huge problem of abandoned mines. Officially, there are 510 such mines in the country. But this is a gross underestimation, say experts. Mine rehabilitation is ignored: regulations are lax and implementation non-existent. Coal mines are not even required to undertake mine closure. Minings impacts extend beyond its immediate operations to mineral-based industries, especially steel and sponge iron: both highly polluting and resource-intensive. While the Indian steel industry has registered a growth of 35 per cent in two years, the country is also seeing a mushrooming of sponge iron plants from 23 in 2000 to over 400 in 2007.
CHAPTER
Bearing the brunt: people and the environment

Mining is an environmentally destructive activity. The intensity of this destruction depends on what is being mined, where and how. Unless it is meticulously planned and carefully executed, mining can devastate lands, pollute and deplete water, denude forests, wipe out wildlife, and defile the air. The size and scale of a mining operation is a major determinant of its potential environmental impacts. Growing mechanisation of the mining industry has increased the capacity of mining companies to establish and operate large mines; this, consequently, has increased the environmental impacts of mining. Mining is a high-risk trade-off, and nowhere more so than in areas with high population densities and high-value ecological resources: these are also the areas where most of Indias minerals are found. Therefore, the impacts of mining, both on ecology as well as the people, is magnified here. These impacts include displacement of people and loss of livelihood, loss of sites of cultural importance, changes in lifestyle, impacts on health, effects on women and children, influx of outsiders attracted by prospects of employment, and illegal mining and its associated risks.
DISPLACEMENT: MININGS WORST LEGACY

Involuntary displacement, which is forced upon people to make way for development, has always been a major concern in India. Pushed by its first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India embarked on a policy that accepts displacement for the greater good of the country.1 This path has forced millions out of their homes and lands. Although there are no exact figures, one estimate puts the number of people displaced between 1951 and 1990 at over 21 million.2 N C Saxena, former secretary of the Department of Rural Development, acknowledges that the number could be as high as 50 million in the second half of the 20th century alone.3 Displacement is too mild a term for this systemic impoverishment of people all for the sake of gigantic development projects. It is now widely recognised that when people are displaced, they are unable to recover and end up worse off than before.4 To add to this, a global pattern is now emerging in displacement issues: largely, displaced persons are marginalised populations who have
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Ground reality: the impacts of mining on densely populated, ecologically-rich areas are magnified, and lead to greater poverty
67
little recourse to or possibility of redress. For these groups, the impact of displacement is much more and severe than only moving residence: it reverberates through every facet of their lives. In fact, loss of land accounts for just 10 to 20 per cent of the impoverishment risks known to be associated with involuntary displacement.5 Involuntary displacement creates immense psychological trauma due to disruption in the established lifestyles of the people displaced. Production systems are dismantled, close-knit kinship groups get scattered, long-established relationships are disrupted, traditional sources of employment lost, market links broken, and customs related to food security and credit transfers get dissolved. The systems of social hierarchy and leadership lose their credibility. Ancestral shrines, monuments and the entire sense of history and cultural identity of a community are irretrievably lost. Since the majority of the people displaced are tribals and other vulnerable sections of the society, they are not able to cope with the sudden and dramatic changes in their traditional ways of living. The obvious result of this is impoverishment, both economic and social. Proponents of development projects contend that displacement is inevitable if the nation has to prosper but many disagree. In his book Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood, Walter Fernanades writes that many socio-economic surveys and other studies clearly establish that it is invariably tribal and poor people who suffer, whereas the fruits of development are enjoyed by richer classes and urban populations. The Indian development model has ensured that large projects result in a transfer of resources from the weaker sections of the society to the already privileged ones.
High toll
Does mining lead to disproportionately high levels of displacement?
Macroeconomics suggests it does. Of the total displacement due to developmental projects, mining has accounted for around 12 per cent. But the share of mining in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country stands at around 2.2 per cent. If we exclude the contribution of agriculture to the GDP, then the contribution of mining to the rest of the GDP stands at around 3.5 per cent. This means that for every one per cent contribution of mining to the GDP, it displaces three-four times more people than all other developmental projects taken together.
What the figures say
How many people has mining displaced in India so far? There are no reliable official statistics. There are estimates available for the period 1950 to 1991, which show that of all the developmental projects, mining has displaced the second highest number of people (see Box: High toll); dams have displaced the maximum numbers. Mining projects have displaced around 25.5 lakh people during 1950-91.6 More importantly, not even 25 per cent of these displaced have been resettled (see Table 3.1: Displacement by mining projects). These figures are only for the people who were moved out of their lands; they do not include the thousands who were dependent on the land for their livelihoods, or those
whose lives were affected due to disruption of water tables, dumping of overburden on fertile agricultural lands and destruction of forests. Mining affects tribal populations severely sometimes, more than other development projects. Of all the people displaced by various development projects, about 41 per cent have been tribals. In the case of mining, about 52 per cent of the people displaced were tribals.7 Another estimate by Theodore E Downing in an MMSD (Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development) publication puts the percentage of displaced tribals at 50 per cent of the 1.6 million people displaced by 110 development projects in the country between 1990 and 1995.8 There are no statistics on the number of people displaced due to mining after 1991. But looking at the data on number of mining projects cleared after 1991 and the amount of forest land diverted for mining, it is clear that large-scale displacement must have happened. In the last 10 years alone (1995-2005), as much as 74,000 ha of forest land has been diverted for mining. Displacement due to mining increased substantially since the 1970s as Indias coal production shifted from underground to open-cast mining. Operations Research Group (ORG), a consultant of Coal India Limited (CIL), reported that mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) was creating a pattern of gross violation of human rights, and enormous trauma in the country.9 In one of its environment impact assessment reports for its pending coal sector projects, CIL itself wrote that the victims of resettlement often end up as exploited contract labourers
TABLE 3.1: Displacement by mining projects (1951-90)

Almost half the people affected by mining projects have been tribals; not even one-fourth of them have been resettled
Types of projects Mines All development projects All DPs (lakh) 25.5 213 % of total DPs 12.0 100 DPs resettled (lakh) 6.30 53.80 % of resettled DPs 24.7 25.0 Tribals displaced (lakh) 13.30 85.39 % of all DPs 52.20 40.9 Tribals resettled (lakh) 3.30 21.16 % of tribals resettled 24.81 24.78
Note: DP = displaced persons Source: W Fernandes et al, 1997, Hundred years of involuntary displacement in India, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, pp 17
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BEARING THE BRUNT: PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
The exodus: for every one per cent that it contributes to the GDP, mining displaces three-four times more people than all other development projects taken together
69
From one site to the other

With the large numbers of development projects, multiple displacement is becoming a real problem today
In Uttar Pradesh, the Rihand dam oustees of the early 1960s were displaced again a decade later to make way for coal mines, a third time for industries, and in the 1980s, for the Singrauli Super Thermal Plant. Displaced Soliga tribals of the Kabini dam in Karnataka are now threatened with displacement a second time by the Rajiv Gandhi National Park. In Orissa, Chitkapar village in Koraput district was displaced four times: first by the Hindustan Aeronautical Limiteds MIG factory at Sunabeda in the 1960s, the Upper Kolab dam in the 1980s, and a naval armament depot in the 1990s. The displaced people of Salandi dam in Orissa are expected to be shifted once again due to uranium mines.
mining increases as rich mineral deposits are found in areas with relatively low land acquisition costs, high population density, poor land tenure definition, politically weak and powerless populations and indigenous communities.12
The rehabilitation mess
trapped in perpetual poverty or they simply leave the area, to reappear in the slums of the city or as squatters.10 Worse, because of the large numbers of development projects from dams to mines, there are now a number of cases where people have been displaced more than once (see Box: From one site to the other). Theodore Downing (Avoiding New Poverty: MiningInduced Displacement and Resettlement) describes this as creating a floating population of development-induced poor.11 Downing argues that the likelihood of displacement and resettlement from
The Indian governments mineral extraction policy mimics that of countries such as Canada, the US and Australia. These three countries have native populations that were displaced for mining, but their population densities are much lower than that of India: 3.3, 32.95, and 0.79 persons per sq km, respectively. Even China has a population density which is less than half of Indias: 137 people per sq km. Compare this with Indias population density of 329 persons per sq km, one of the highest in the world. Clearly, the Indian experience can never mirror that of other large mining countries. India faces another unique problem. Tribals and scheduled castes often have little legal claim to land, which pits them against policies designed to compensate landowners naturally, these policies are wholly unfit to address the extant situation in rural India. As a result of all this, in India, rehabilitation (which refers to restoring the incomes, livelihoods and social systems of the displacees to at least the level of their pre-project status) of displaced people has been minimal and not very successful. One estimate by N C Saxena puts the percentage of people rehabilitated at only 29 per cent of the total number of people displaced due to development projects.13 There are no estimates available on the rehabilitation
SHYAMAL / CSE
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Raw deal
Gender inequalities persist in mining-induced displacement and resettlement
The burden of development-induced displacement falls on the politically weakest groups. Within these groups, women often suffer more than men. This is for two reasons: women are often the victims of sexist resettlement and rehabilitation programmes that exclude them from compensation and the consultation process; their roles are often upset by displacement and they are forced into new societies where their traditions place them at a disadvantage.1 Secondly, displacement leads to increased violence against women. According to Layla Mehta of the UK-based Institute of Development Studies, one of the major obstacles is the view that rehabilitation packages given to the man of a household are transferred equally to the women: this view fails to recognise different household
roles, societal constraints and issues of family unity.2 Displacements impact on family ties affects women differently, as security dissolves. The situation is worse for landless women who were dependent on other peoples land (where they worked as agricultural labourers) or on forest resources. These women became further impoverished and often destitute.3 One study found that joblessness among women rose from 56 per cent before displacement to 84 per cent after.4 In India, investigations into the impact of displacement from coal mines have discovered an increase in domestic violence. Besides, children of these women do not receive regular education, perpetuating a cycle of poverty.5 The role of women in their communities has deteriorated as their economic situation has worsened. Their inability to contribute to the household either because they lack the skills demanded in the new location or because their culture restricts mobility and freedom to obtain employment has created a situation where women continue to see their political power diminish.6
performance of mining projects, but considering the fact that mining displaces larger proportions of tribals than any other development projects, its rehabilitation performance is likely to be worse. The fact that tribals are poorly rehabilitated is supported by many studies. A survey carried out among tribal households in five villages at Talcher, Orissa found an increase in unemployment from nine per cent to 43.6 per cent, accompanied by a large shift from primary to tertiary occupations. The survey also reported up to 50-80 per cent reduction in the level of earning among tribes and scheduled castes.14 The other group that is most affected by displacement but hardly ever addressed in resettlement policies, is women (see Box: Raw deal). Traditionally, the approaches to rehabilitate or reconstruct livelihoods have revolved around the following four options:
Land for land: This involves replacing the lost land with new land at some other location. For displaced people from rural communities, this is one of the best and most preferred options as it allows them to continue with their occupation. But this form of compensation is rarely offered in India. In most cases where it is, the new land is usually of inferior quality (mainly wasteland), or not large enough, or is not suitably located. The biggest challenge for this form of compensation is the scarcity of land in India. In many cases, land-based compensation leads to ownership disputes. Employment: Effectiveness of this form of rehabilitation as a quick and reliable option has been documented. People who get jobs are often able to re-establish themselves in lesser time. Besides a permanent job, they may also get free housing, medical care, education allowance for children, travel concessions, and pension on retirement. Naturally, there is always a clamour for jobs among the displaced. Until recently, several public sector undertakings favoured this form of rehabilitation: jobs were provided to at least one member from each family to compensate for the loss of land. However, with the demands of globalisation and rightsizing, companies and governments are shying away from taking on more numbers, especially of unskilled labour (see Box on page 72: Shut out officially). Even in the case of large operations where an employment potential exists, most workers are not from local communities as companies want skilled labour. Employment potential is even lower in private sector companies. Self-employment: As land or jobs can no longer be guaranteed, projects are attempting to promote self-employment schemes to re-establish displaced people. But this is not working. Most displaced people do not view this way of rehabilitation as a dependable source of livelihood. For example, when basket making as a source of livelihood was
Cash compensation: In this case, cash is paid to the displaced people in lieu of land and other properties acquired. Theoretically, cash compensation is seen as a preferable option, as it gives a choice to the people to improve their economic status by investing the money. However, in practice, it often fails to benefit the affected mainly because it completely ignores the needs of a large number of people (labourers, craftspeople, etc) who do not own land, but who stand to lose their livelihoods. The going is not smooth either for those eligible to receive such compensation. To begin with, the packages offered under the Land Acquisition Act are totally inadequate for restoring and enhancing standards of living. Delays in payment of compensation are the norm. Corruption and the role of middlemen ensure that most poor and ignorant oustees end up getting only a small part of the compensation money. Often, cash compensation is paid as a lump sum to oustees, without any advice or help on investing the money. The receivers, who have usually not seen so much money in their lives, end up frittering it away.
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Shut out officially

No jobs for displaced people, says ministry
The Union ministry of coal has issued a directive banning job for displaced people. This has put a number of public sector units in Orissa, such as Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL), in a fix. The ban has resulted in agitations by displaced people and losses in production. It is expected to affect job prospects of 6,000 persons in the Talcher coalfields and 2,000 people in the Ib Valley coalfields in Orissa. Local politicians have threatened a stir if the directive is not overturned, as the order contradicts the rehabilitation policy of the Orissa government.
International Labour Organization (ILO) points out that even in industrial economies, less than five per cent of the unemployed opt for readily available self-employment assistance; moreover, in spite of increasingly sophisticated selection and screening procedures, between 30-60 per cent of these fail within the first few years. Developing countries, with large numbers of unemployed and fewer options on offer, have a much higher proportion of their citizens as self-employed, but the failure rate is as high as in industrialised nations.16 One of the key reasons behind the recurrent failure of the rehabilitation process is financial flawed compensation and under-financing of reconstruction. Compensation has been found again and again to be financially insufficient and poorly conceived and implemented,17 as several micro-studies show. Studies reported by the Center of Mining Environment, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad says that out of a dozen coal mining complexes, only two had a fair overall quality of life. The studies reported that the implementation of rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) policies and packages in the mining areas did not take into account the emotional, mental and physical needs of the project-affected families (PAFs). The PAFs were seldom consulted during development and implementation of the packages. The studies also found that mining activities bring about an increase in the cost of living: in most cases, local communities cannot cope with this because their incomes do not increase proportionately to meet the higher costs. More importantly, the studies found that the social structures of the displaced were being disturbed. For instance, a large disparity in incomes was introduced, which not only led to frustration but also in the disintegration of families.18 While the problem of displacement and rehabilitation exists in all the states where mining has gained a foothold, it is more acute in the mineral-rich states of Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh (see Map 3.1: At war over mining). These three states also have a higher percentage of tribal populations, and have witnessed the maximum number of public protests related to mining. Among the three, Orissa tops anti-mining protests with struggles reported in Jajpur, Rayagada, Keonjhar, Sundergarh, Kalahandi and Jharsuguda. In some cases, protests have been non-violent and successful in completely banning mining (as in the Doon valley in Uttarakhand, where people stopped limestone mining). In others, like Kalinganagar in Orissa, conflict has led to tragic loss of lives and property. It is important to recognise these protests for what they are: people in the mineral-rich areas of the country are not willing to give up their land for mining. They do not believe that mining is going to improve their lot or add to the development of their regions. A history of poor compensation and poorer R&R has created an atmosphere of acute distrust. People do not trust the government and businesses, who they believe are hand-in-glove. And they are not far from the truth: the current paradigm of R&R is flawed and ensures nothing but impoverishment and social disruption.
suggested to the people displaced by the coal mines in Parej in Hazaribagh district of Jharkhand, they accepted it provided they were guaranteed returns equal to a job in CIL, which of course was not possible.15 Generally, displaced people are also reluctant to accept self-employment as it involves drastic changes in their lifestyles and occupations. Moreover, entrepreneur-centred small businesses supported by microcredit tend to exclude the very poor, the people most in need. Many of these income generation schemes have been formulated recently and still remain largely untried; therefore, they cannot guarantee an assured income. Experiences elsewhere are also not very encouraging. A study by the
THE HINDU
People rally against bauxite mining in Andhra Pradesh; such protests are erupting all over the country now
72
MAP 3.1: At war over mining

People in Indias mineral-rich states are not willing to give up their lands for mining; the flashpoints
25. Sambalpur, Orissa, bauxite
NA
26. Pakur, Jharkhand, coal 27. Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, stone 28. Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, slate 29. Solan, Himachal Pradesh, limestone 30. Paonta, Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, illegal mining 31. Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, sand 32. Dhanbad, Jharkhand, coal 33. Sukinda Valley, Jajpur, Orissa, chromite 34. Bardez, Goa, iron ore
SIKKIM ARUNACHAL PRADESH
JAMMU & KASHMIR
28HIMACHAL 51 29PRADESH 27 71 21 30 PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND 53 54

HARYANA DELHI
47
60 59
35. Haldankarwada-Porascadem, Goa, iron 36. Nagarjunasagar, Andhra Pradesh, uranium 37. Bannerghatta National Park, Bangalore, sand 38. Tejaswininagar, Bangalore, Karnataka, sand/stone 39. Srirangapatna, Mandya, Karnataka, sand 40. Rampura, Karnataka, sand 41. Kollegal, Chamarajanagar, Karnataka, granite 42. Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, sand 43. Periyar, Kerala, sand 44. Thiruvallur, Tamil Nadu, sand 45. Ramanathapuram, Tamil Nadu, sand 46. Vellore, Tamil Nadu, sand 47. Jaisalmer, Rajasthan, granite 48. Powai Lake, Mumbai, Maharashtra, stone 49. Vastan, Surat, Gujarat, lignite 50. Vadodara, Gujarat, manganese 51. Salem Tabri, Ludhiana, Punjab, sand 52. Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, illegal mining 53. Rampur, Haryana, quarrying 54. Morni, Haryana, quarrying 55. Sone River, Bihar, sand 56. Shankarpur, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, granite 57. Singrauli, Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh, coal 58. Bastar, Chhattisgarh, iron ore 59. Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, sandstone
RAJASTHAN
20 73 72
GUJARAT
UTTAR PRADESH
55
BIHAR
77 26
ASSAM
14 MEGHALAYA
MANIPUR TRIPURA MIZORAM
76
NAGALAND
57 56
MADHYA PRADESH
70
10 11
32 9
78
50 6 49
52
JHARKHAND WEST BENGAL
75 74
MAHARASHTRA
15
CHHATTISGARH
8 18
17 58 19 68 2
25 69
ORISSA
67 33 16
BAY OF BENGAL
48 24
GOA
ARABIAN SEA
66
ANDHRA PRADESH
4 36
3 61
34,35 62-65
KARNATAKA
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLAND
12 5 13 39 43 41 23
40
38
46 44
37 31 22 1
KERALA TAMIL NADU 45 LAKSHADWEEP
42
1
INDIAN OCEAN
60. Jhingola and Palla villages, Delhi, sand quarrying 61. Nimmalapadu, Andhra Pradesh, calcite 62. Bicholim, Goa, iron ore 63. Tiswadi, Goa, iron ore 64. Ponda, Goa, iron ore
1. Car Nicobar, Andaman & Nicobar, sand 2. Kakinada Yanam, East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh, uranium 3. Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, bauxite 4. Nalgonda, Andhra Pradesh, uranium 5. Tumkar, Karnataka, sand 6. Amreli, Gujarat, limestone 7. Porbandar, Gujarat, limestone 8. Jaduguda, West Singhbhum, Jharkhand, uranium 9. West Singhbhum, Jharkhand, iron ore and coal 10. Hazaribagh, Jharkhand, coal 11. Jharia, Bokaro, Jharkhand, coal 12. Kudremukh, Karnataka, iron ore
13. Madayipara, North Kannur, Kerala, lignite, china clay and sand 14. West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya, uranium 15. Jharsuguda, Orissa, bauxite 16. Kalinganagar, Jajpur, Orissa, iron and steel 17. Kalahandi, Orissa, bauxite 18. Keonjhar, Orissa, iron ore and manganese 19. Kashipur, Rayagada, Orissa, bauxite 20. Karauli, Rajasthan, sandstone 21. Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand, stone, sand and magnesite 22. Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, sand 23. Alappuzha, Kerala, sand 24. Bellary, Karnataka, iron ore
65. Sattari, Goa, iron ore 66. Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, iron ore 67. Jagatsinghpur, Orissa, iron ore 68. Koraput, Orissa, bauxite 69. Angul, Orissa, coal 70. Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh, coal and dolomite 71. Solan, Himachal Pradesh, limestone 72. Udaipur, Rajasthan, marble 73. Rajasmand, Rajasthan, marble 74. Chandrapura, Maharashtra, coal 75. Nagpur, Maharashtra, coal 76. Karbi Anglong, Assam, coal 77. Golaghat, Assam, stone 78. Kutchh, Gujarat, limestone
Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, 2006
73
FORESTS NO MORE
Closely aligned to the issue of displacement is that of forests. Much of the countrys mineral reserves are in areas that are also forested and inhabited by marginalised populations. Mining and quarrying has already destroyed large tracts of forest land in many parts. Diversion of forests is likely to become more acute as the race for exploiting more minerals gathers pace. Government estimates put the total forest land diverted for mining across the country in the period 1980-2005 at 95,003 ha. No estimates are available for forest land diverted for mining before 1980. In terms of numbers, 1,198 mines were granted forestry clearances during 1980-2005 for operating in forest areas under the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.19 However, other sources point to a much higher figure. According to the figure quoted by the national consultation on the Draft Forest Bill, till 1994, 90,695 ha of forests had been leased to mining companies. Since the data available with the MoEF indicates that after 1995, 73,915 ha of forest land were diverted for mining, the total forest land diverted for mining becomes 1,64,610 ha.20 Whatever the statistics say, it is clear that mining in forest land has increased significantly in the last decade. In the 17 years before 1998 (1980-97), forest clearances were granted for only 317 mines with a total diversion of 34,527 ha. Between 1998-2005, the MoEF cleared 881 mining projects in forest areas diverting 60,476 ha of forest area (see Table 3.2: Mine leases in forests). This means
that during 1998-2005, on an average, 216 mining projects were granted forest clearance annually as against 19 clearances annually during 1980-97. Similarly, the total forest area diverted annually for mining during 1998-2005 is four-fold higher than what was diverted every year during 1980-97. This is an extremely worrying trend, since the mining industry has just begun expanding: with the new mining policy on the anvil, which is likely to give a significant boost to the industry, much more forest land is likely to be diverted for mining. Forest diversion not only affects the ecological system of an area, it also impacts livelihoods of people who depend on it for sustenance especially tribals. In times of crisis, forest resources provide a buffer against deprivation and hardship. Forest degradation due to mining and other development projects has significantly depleted the availability and productivity of the ecosystem, rendering the tribal population more vulnerable to natural disasters and adverse climatic shocks. According to statistics presented to the parliament in 2005, the states which lead in production of minerals are also the ones where maximum forest land has been diverted for mining (see Table 3.3: Forest land diversion: the states in the game). Orissa leads, with 15,387 ha forest land diverted for mining, which is more than 16 per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the country. It is closely followed by Chhattisgarh, which diverted about 14,421 ha of forest land for mining about 15 per cent of the total in the country. The other states in this group include Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Jharkhand.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Waiting to be razed: with the new mining policy on the anvil, more forests are expected to make way for mining companies
74
TABLE 3.2: Mine leases in forests

In the last decade, mine leases granted in forest areas have increased significantly
1980-1997 1998-2005 Number of mine leases granted in forest areas Average number of mine leases granted every year Forest land diverted for mining (in hectare) Average amount of forest land diverted for mining every year (in hectare) 317 19 34,527 2,031 881 126 60,476 8,639 Total (1980-2005) 1198 80 95,003 6,334
TABLE 3.3: Forest land diversion: the states in the game

Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh lead in the race for diverting forest lands for mining
State Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Chhattisgarh Goa Gujarat Himachal Pradesh Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala Forest land diverted Share of the for mining (ha) total (percentage) 13,532 142 87 414 14,421 1,282 9,664 1,228 9,059 7,558 29 10,058 4,057 15,387 4,996 436 247 2,110 277 20 95,003 14.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 15.2 1.3 10.2 1.3 9.5 8.0 0.0 10.6 4.3 16.2 5.3 0.5 0.3 2.2 0.3 0.0 100
Source: Mining projects in forest land, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred question no 552, Union ministry of mines, http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp? qref=106142, viewed on October 10, 2006
There are no sacred frontiers today as far as mining in forest areas is concerned. Across the country, mining is taking place inside and outside reserve forests, protected forests, national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. Consider the following examples: The Jamwa Ramgarh Wildlife Sanctuary in Rajasthan has been extensively mined for marble and soapstone. The Keladevi Wildlife Sanctuary, which is part of the Ranthambore Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, has been affected by red sandstone and limestone mining. The Bhagwan Mahaveer Wildlife Sanctuary, Goa, has at least 100-150 mines in a 10-km radius of the protected area. In fact, mine leases are spread over more than 40 per cent of the forest area in Goa. The Gangua Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh is extensively mined for diamond and white sandstone. Areas of Darlaghat Wildlife Sanctuary in Himachal Pradesh were denotified to allow limestone mining. The Gir Wildlife Sanctuary and National Park in Gujarat, the last home of the Asiatic lion, has 100 odd mines in a 10-km radius of the protected area. The Gujarat government denotified the Narayan Sarovar Wildlife Sanctuary reducing its size from about 766 sq km to about 444 sq km to allow limestone and lignite mining. Several iron ore mining projects have been allowed in Sarai Kela Kharsawa Elephant Reserve, Jharkhand. Saranda, Kolhan and Porhat in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand are major elephant habitats. This area is now being extensively mined for iron ore. This has intensified human-elephant conflicts. Coal and oil mining threatens wildlife areas in eastern Assam. Dilli Jeypore and Makum coalfields are in the fragile Patkai hills. Following protests by environmental, social and political groups, the MoEF ordered the Tikak colliery of the North Eastern Coalfields to close down on environmental grounds, but this was allowed to reopen in the 1990s.
Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Andaman & Nicobar Islands India
Source: A Behar, et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the gap between parliament and people, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, pp 57
The list can go on. In general, there is no moratorium per se on mining in any area of the country be it an ecologically fragile area, wildlife sanctuaries, reserve or protected forests, biosphere reserves, national parks, critical water sources or areas inhabited by indigenous communities. The only thing needed to open up any area for mining is permission from the government. For example, under the FCA, 1980 only a prior approval of the government is required to bring about any change in the status of reserve forests or protected forest land for non-forest uses. Regarding wildlife sanctuaries and national parks, the FCA says that states and union territories (UTs) should avoid recommending use of these areas for other purposes. However, in case it is unavoidable, the state/UT government is advised to get the consent of the Indian Board of Wildlife (IBWL). The Wildlife Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002 has no teeth either. While section 29 of the act prohibits mining in sanctuaries, and section 35(6) does the same for national parks; both have been flagrantly violated.
75
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Forests are the lifeline of tribal economies, and destruction of this lifeline is a real threat to tribal communities. They become more vulnerable to natural disasters and climatic shocks
76
The Amman recommendations

Global efforts to limit mining in protected areas have met with some resistance
Some governments equate a protected area with a place where mineral extraction and other development work should be banned; therefore, protected areas are no-go areas for mining in these countries. On the other hand, there are others that retain legal access to mineral rights and other development projects within protected areas. In India, for example, the government retains the legal right to allow mining in protected areas. Accordingly, some governments (and states) have changed or attempted to change the law to allow mining within protected areas, while others have failed to implement existing laws and thus, turned a blind eye to illegal mining in protected areas. In the late 1990s, the Australian governments plan to permit limited uranium mining in an enclave within but excluded from Kakadu National Park and World Heritage Site caused a storm of protest among the international conservation community, which almost ended with the protected area being listed on the UNESCO World Heritage in Danger list. This controversy also opened the debate on protected areas as no-go areas for mining. The debate ended up
demanding a globally agreed standard relating to protected areas and mining. IUCN, the World Conservation Union, sought to tackle this issue through a recommendation at the World Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan in October 2000, which suggested that mining should not take place in IUCN Category I-IV protected areas, which include: Category I: Strictly nature reserve/wilderness area protected area managed mainly for science or wilderness protection. Category II: National park protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation. Category III: Natural monument protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features. Category IV: Habitat/species management area protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention. At present, this would eliminate around six per cent of global land areas from mineral activity. The recommendation was passed by a majority of the members, including many governments, but there were significant exceptions: it was, for example, rejected by the US, which noted that mining policy is an internal matter for sovereign states and that the US government has acted strongly to limit mining where it is not appropriate. The mining industry was also opposed to it.
But across the world, there is increased recognition of the fact that critical ecosystems, biosphere reserves and other protected areas need to be preserved for ecological continuity. This concern was translated into the Amman Recommendations at the World Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan in October 2000 (see Box: The Amman recommendations). The recommendations call on all IUCNs state members to prohibit by law, all exploration and extraction of mineral resources in protected areas corresponding to IUCN protected area management categories I-IV. It is high time that India too decided: it should legislate its no-go areas for mining and other development projects. These
special areas should be identified on the basis of an integrated assessment of ecological, environmental, economic and social impacts; in this, the economic cannot be allowed to dominate, which generally tends to happen if high-value minerals are found. In general, areas providing critical ecological goods and services, areas of high wilderness, cultural or social values or areas inhabited by primitive tribes should be declared as no-go areas. Other than forest land, mining in the country is increasingly taking over agricultural land as well for exploiting mineral reserves (see Box: Limestone from farmlands). For an agrarian society like India, this is a serious concern: millions depend on farming and allied activities for their sustenance.
Limestone from farmlands

Fertile croplands as well as grasslands have been diverted
Besides forests, many mineral reserves in India also lie in the rich fertile plains of the country and its grasslands and shrublands, used for grazing. Limestone, for example, is found in the agricultural lands of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh and the shrub/grassland regions of Rajasthan. In India, the large-scale cement industry has leased out 0.15 million ha of land for captive limestone mines. Of this, almost 60 per cent is agricultural land, 20 per cent forest land and the remaining 20 per cent is wasteland, which in reality is common grazing land in states like Rajasthan. States where maximum agricultural land has been diverted for limestone mining include Karnataka with more than 97 per cent and Andhra Pradesh with 88 per cent (see graph).
GRAPH: Eating into farmland

Cement plants have taken up prime agricultural land
Proportion of agricultural land out of the total lease area 120.0 100.0 83.7 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 57.9 32.6 11.9 33.4 74.1 97.5 88.1 76.1
Hi m Pr ac ad ha Ch esh l ha tti sg ar h M a Pr d ad hy es a Ka h rn at ak a
A Pr nd ad hr e a Ta sh m il Na du M ah ar as ht ra Ra ja st ha n
States
Source: Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts: The life cycle of the Indian cement industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 28
G uj ar at
77
WATER: USED AND DEFILED

Mining does not only consume water; it also pollutes and depletes water sources. Mining operations use up water for beneficiation and processing, wet drilling, cooling the machinery, dust suppression (spraying on haul roads, conveyors, waste dumps and loading and unloading points), plantations and domestic consumption. Though specific water consumption (water consumed to extract one tonne of mineral) of the mining industry may not be very high, its total water consumption is large as the volume of minerals mined is huge and increasing every year. Take the case of limestone mining in India. On an average, about 20-30 litre of water is used to extract one tonne of limestone21 a small amount compared to specific water consumption in other industrial activities. However, considering the fact that about 170 MT of limestone is mined annually, the total water used to extract limestone alone stands at about 4.25 MT. Most limestone mines are located in the water-scarce regions of the country, and water use by them has left the already parched local communities in a worse state. Limestone miners, who are also the owners of neighbouring cement plants, are now feeling the pinch themselves. Growing tensions with the community over water are
A picture of bliss? Hardly. Minerals are often found in watersheds, and their extraction impacts streams and rivers such as this one in Gandhamardan, Orissa
forcing them to conserve the resource by recycling and reusing it. But limestone mines are some of the lowest water consumers in the mining sector limestone is used directly in cement-making without any beneficiation. This is not the case with metallic minerals like iron ore, bauxite, copper or gold, where mineral beneficiation and processing is required to extract minerals; water consumption, therefore, is high. There are no estimates about the total amount of water used up by metallic mineral mines in India. However, some conclusions can be derived from water consumption data of major mines. Average water consumption (excluding domestic consumption) at the iron ore mines of Tata Steel (at Noamundi in Jharkhand and Joda East in Orissa) is about 600 litre per tonne of iron ore.22 Water consumption (excluding domestic consumption) in the Dalli and Rajhara iron ore mines of the Bhilai Steel Plant is about 800 litre per tonne of iron ore.23 Even if we assume a lower value of 500 litre per tonne of iron ore (many small mines dont have beneficiation processes) as a benchmark to estimate the water consumption by iron ore mines in India, the amount of water consumed to extract iron ore in India in 2005-06 comes to a staggering 77 MT enough to meet the daily water requirements of more than three million people. Besides using up water, mines also deplete groundwater by breaching the groundwater table and pumping the water out to extract minerals. In Goa, for instance, most iron ore mines work below the groundwater level. It is estimated that, for every tonne of iron ore that Goa produces, about 10 tonne of water has to be pumped out.24 This has severely depleted the groundwater resources in areas surrounding the mines. The breaching of the groundwater table creates a large cone of depression in the groundwater regime. The result is lowering of groundwater levels in surrounding areas. About 40 per cent of the large captive limestone mines of India have breached the groundwater table.25 The Talcher coalfields in Orissa, with their huge open-cast mines, have dried up local ponds and wells. Continuous dewatering by underground mines also affects groundwater. These mines pump out millions of litres to drain mine galleries and release the water into nearby watercourses. This not only depletes the groundwater, it also causes flooding, siltation and pollution in the watercourses where it is discharged. The Neyveli lignite mines in Tamil Nadu pump out an estimated 40 million litre of water every day.26 Large and deep open-cast mines exercise their own impact on the hydrological regime of a region. Deforestation over mine leaseholds and changes in the watershed characteristics have affected water flows in streams in mining regions: flows have dwindled, perennial streams have turned seasonal, while others have receded. This effect is most pronounced in the case of mountain-top mining. People in Orissa have been opposing bauxite mining on hills like Lanjigarh, Jagatsinghpur and Baphlimali as they fear it will dry up the mountain streams. Geological structures like hills and mountains have multiple and complex functions, and exert tremendous influence on local hydrological conditions. They induce precipitation: through the forest cover that often exists naturally, mountains convert seasonal rainfall into perennial water sources. Mining on mountain-top
PATRIK OSKARSSON
78
PATRIK OSKARSSON
Frothy flow: mineral-based industries like thermal power plants and iron and steel plants are a major source of water pollution
increases surface run-off and decreases infiltration. The run-off, combined with the choking of water courses with overburden and fines, can cause floods and droughts in regions which otherwise have stable and perennial supplies of water.
TABLE 3.4: Water use mineral-based industries

The water thermal plants consume in India in a year is enough to meet the requirements of 950 million people
Industrial sector Annual wastewater discharge (MT) 27,000.9 396.8 Annual consumption (MT) Specific water consumed
Water use in mineral-based industries
Most mineral-based industries are located close to their main inputs the minerals. Thus, the pressure on local water resources comes not only from mining, but also from related industries. Most mineral-based industries such as steel, aluminium and thermal power plants (TPP) are water-intensive. They not only consume large quantities of water, but also discharge wastewater polluting the local environment. For example, TPPs use as much as 35,157 MT of water per annum27: this amount is sufficient to meet the daily requirements of more than 1,751 million people in a year. A major chunk, around 88 per cent (27,000 MT) is discharged as wastewater (see Table 3.4: Water use mineralbased industries). Indian steel companies are not far behind. Every tonne of steel requires about 10-80 tonne of water; altogether, the sector consumes around 516 MT of water every year.28 Future availability of water has been recognised as a challenge by industry experts. B Muthuraman, managing director of Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd (TISCO), stresses on good water management as a long-term vision for the steel industry.29 India is not managing its water well enough to be able to afford it to the steel industry, he says. In Jamshedpur, where Tata Steel is based, groundwater levels have steadily dropped over the years, and the river
Thermal power plants Steel
35,157.4 516.6
80 t/MWh 10-80 t/t
Source: Chandra Bhushan 2004, Overused, Underrated, supplement to Down To Earth, February 29, 2004, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi
Subernarekha is drying up. The city is already drawing around 700 MT from the river for irrigation, potable water supply and industrial usage. Tata Steel is one of the biggest consumers, drawing 124 MT for its plant.30 To make matters worse, there are several pending requests with the state water resources department from around 11 companies, most of them mineral-based, to draw an additional 1,000 MT of water from the river for upcoming projects. These include various future projects of the Tata Group, which alone account for 25 per cent of the additional water demanded by the industry.31 Compared to the steel or thermal power sectors, the cement industry is not a very big consumer of water. The specific water
79
MINING, THE POLLUTER

Besides being a depleting agent, mining is also a major source of pollution. With the induction of new technologies and mechanisation in the minerals sector, the trend is towards bigger mines. Large mining operations require more land, large quantities of water, more excavation and removal machinery, expanded refining facilities and generate enormous amounts of waste: this is one of the principal causes of environmental pollution at a mine site. Large-scale waste disposal requires extensive land area and results in increased erosion and sediment loads in nearby water bodies and land. Dust creation at large open-pit mines can have serious environmental impacts, including respiratory difficulties in nearby communities and increased sediment loads in waterways. Noise levels and visual impacts also increase with the size of an operation: the drilling, blasting and excavating of mineral ores and the grinding and refining processes associated with metal extraction have significant aesthetic, air and noise impacts. The type of mining operation dictates its environmental impact. Surface mining has a much greater impact on the environment than underground mines because of the large amounts of vegetation, soil and rock that must be removed to expose the mineral ore. The removal of the overburden physically alters the landscape and disrupts ecosystem processes. Once removed, improperly contained or stabilised piles of stored waste rock are prone to erosion, threatening local soils and waterways. Large open-cast mines also significantly impact the hydrology of the local area, more so if the mining is undertaken beneath the groundwater table. While underground mines are generally less destructive in terms of volumes of waste created and direct impacts on surface vegetation and waterways, they can have other negative environmental impacts. Underground tunnels can be sources of groundwater contamination when groundwater enters the exposed areas. This type of contamination can occur for decades after mining has ceased and is very difficult to control. Subsidence the dropping of the surface (land) due to underground tunnel collapse is another potential environmental impact related to underground mining. The risk of injury or death for mine workers is higher in an underground mine, where fires or overburden collapse are difficult to control and may trap miners below the surface. The type of mineral being mined also has an important influence on the potential extent of environmental degradation. Construction minerals such as stone, clay and sand are mostly associated with open pit mines and are extracted in extremely high tonnages. Typically, there is little or no processing involved in the extraction of these minerals. As few harsh chemicals are used in their extraction and processing, the problem of release of toxic pollutants is limited. However, mining of these minerals does lead to air and water pollution and can affect the local water regime. The mining of metals, on the other hand, can pose a more serious threat to the environment because of the waste generated in removal and processing of the target metal. Because metals are often scattered in small amounts throughout ore bodies, a large percentage of the material excavated from a mine ends up as
SHYAMAL / CSE
consumption of large-scale cement plants is a low 0.50 MT per tonne of product. This, however, translates into a substantial quantity, as the sector is a large producer. In 2003-04, the industry used up around 39 MT of water.32 To make matters worse, most cement plants tap groundwater to meet their requirements and are located in water-scarce areas. For example, the six cement plants in Rajasthan together source five MT of groundwater every year.33 This puts pressure on local resources, and creates conflicts and tension with communities. Most local villagers complain of water scarcity and are not satisfied with the initiatives undertaken by the companies to supply water. The aluminium industry spins a similar tale. It consumes around three-10 tonne of water to produce a tonne of product: this translates into more than six MT due to the sheer volume of production.34 What is a matter of concern is that many aluminium plants are coming up in water-scarce regions. For example, the upcoming plant of Vedanta in Jharsuguda (Orissa) proposes to use water from the Hirakud reservoir at the rate of 2,060 tonne per hour. This, despite the fact that this reservoir was built to irrigate agricultural fields and the volume of water in the reservoir recedes drastically during summers under such circumstances, withdrawal of 18 MT per annum is bound to lead to acute scarcity. The EIA report of the plant itself has admitted that the wells in the area go dry during summer. Moreover, there are other industries within a 10-km radius of the proposed plant, which draw groundwater from a number of deep borewells.35 Naturally, water has been at the core of numerous protest movements against mining and mineral-based industries, as in the case of iron ore mining in Goa, bauxite in the hills of Andhra Pradesh or Orissa, coal in Singrauli, limestone in the Doon Valley or magnetite in Kumaon.
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waste. If not used and controlled with care, reagents used to separate metals from surrounding ore can generate serious longterm water and air contamination problems. The excavation of metal ores and waste rock in itself poses an environmental risk as some of the related metals may be toxic if they are soluble and bio-available. For example, mercury and lead, which are both toxic and bio-accumulative, can threaten humans and wildlife in their natural states. Copper is non-toxic in its natural state and does not threaten humans if ingested; however, in different chemical forms and high doses, copper can be toxic to aquatic life. The type of rock and ore surrounding the target metal is an important indicator of potential environmental impacts. While deposits can be found in a wide range of media from sands to granite rock, metals are typically surrounded by iron sulfide minerals, which can produce sulfuric acid when oxidised by air and water. Copper, for example, is most commonly found as a copper sulfide (cuprite, chalcopyrite) and is associated with pyrite, an iron sulfide mineral which breaks down easily and yields sulfuric acid. The characteristics of the area are the most important determinants of the potential impact of a mining operation. Mining in forest area can devastate the local biodiversity, water and soil and also change the micro-climatic conditions. Mountain-top mining not only changes the topography and aesthetics of the area, but also impacts the local hydrology and water sources extensively: local streams become its first casualties. The local climate of an area, including rainfall, wind and temperature, influences the type of soil and vegetation present at a mine site and thus, the extent of a mines potential impact on the
local environment. The tropics have, on an average, higher rainfall and greater cloud cover than temperate settings. Rains in tropical regions come in distinct wet and dry seasons, resulting in cyclic wetting and drying of rocks, soils and mining wastes. This rain often comes in torrential storms. High rainfall intensifies the weathering of rock and can result in the leaching of metals and the production of acidic drainage. Heavy rains can also cause tremendous erosion and mobilisation of sediment and may cause catastrophic failures of structures such as tailings impoundments.
Waste woes
Wastes in mining are generated during extraction, beneficiation and processing of minerals. In open-cast mining, the topsoil, earth, rock and other strata called overburden are completely removed to provide access to the ore seam. A good mining practice is to store the topsoil for reuse, but this is largely ignored in India. The remaining overburden is of no use and becomes a part of the waste pool. There is also that portion of the ore which is of no use because of its low grade or quality. These low-grade ores too become a part of the waste pool. The pool also includes tailings, materials left over after the process of separating the valuable from the worthless fraction of an ore. Tailings are generated during beneficiation and processing. In general, the amount of total waste generated from mining depends on the type of mineral extracted, the characteristics of the deposit, as well as the size of the mine. Bigger the mine, larger is the waste generation. Often, a cluster of small mines too creates huge waste problems, mainly because small
P MADHAVAN
Waste land: these towering mountains are nothing but mining wastes, generated during extraction and processing of minerals
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mines generally do not follow good waste management practices. The total waste generated by mining is increasing every year; as higher-grade mineral deposits are getting exhausted, the mineral industry has taken recourse to mining lower grade reserves which generate more waste. In gold mining, it is estimated that only 0.00001 per cent (100,000th of one per cent) of the ore is actually refined into gold everything else is just waste. Gary Gardner and Payal Sampat, in their 1998 publication Mind over Matter: Recasting the Role of Materials in Our Lives (Worldwatch Institute, Washington, DC), point out that in the US, copper ore mined at the beginning of the 20th century consisted of about 2.5 per cent usable metal by weight; today, that proportion has dropped to 0.51 per cent. Take the case of coal: Indian companies are digging deeper and opting for lower grades of coal as the demand for it is soaring up. According to the Directorate General of Mines Safety or DGMS (Waste and Overburden Management in Mega Open-cast Projects Problems and Technical Options), the country is even planning for production from 300-m depth for lower grade coal (D and F grades), in which, for every tonne of coal, about 15 tonne of wastes will be generated. H P D Boruah (Geochemical and Biochemical Properties of Coalmine Tailings of North Eastern Collieries of Assam, Regional Research Laboratory, Jorhat, July 2006) points out that the open-cast mines of North Eastern Coalfields have been producing waste rock at a stripping ratio of 14:1 (the ratio of overburden and wastes excavated to the amount of mineral removed is called the stripping ratio). In 2003-04, the coal mines of Coal India Limited removed about 500 million cubic metre (cu m) of overburden to produce 260 MT of coal, at an average stripping ratio of 1.92 cu m of waste per tonne of coal, reports B Sanyal in The Hindu Business Line (November 22, 2006). In general, the process of extracting solid fuels and metals generates the maximum amount of wastes. In fact, in the case of metals such as copper, zinc, lead and gold, more than 99 per cent of the ore goes as wastes. In comparison, lower quantities of wastes are generated from iron ore and bauxite mining (see Table 3.5: Ores and wastes the global picture). Underground mines are believed to generate less waste than open-cast mines. According to the US Environment Protection Agency (USEPA, 2003, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Orientation Manual, Washington, DC), every year, mines in the US generate waste equivalent in weight to nearly nine times the trash produced by all US cities and towns combined. The USEPA also says that the total amount of waste ore (excluding overburden) that has been generated till date by the US metals mining industry exceeds 90 billion tonne. No such data is available for India. However, a conservative estimation done by the authors of this book indicates that the total amount of wastes (excluding waste produced during beneficiation and processing) generated from the mining of major minerals alone would be around 1.84 billion tonne in 2006. While rocks and soil constitute most mining wastes, the industry also generates waste that is toxic in nature. Some of these toxins such as mercury, arsenic, lead, zinc, chromium and cadmium are inherently present in the ore. They leach out of stored waste piles, contaminating the local environment. Some
TABLE 3.5: Ores and wastes the global picture

Most precious metals have a very high waste generation ratio
Metal Ore mined (million tonne) Percentage of ore that becomes waste (excluding overburden) 60.00 99.00 99.99 99.95 97.50 70.00 70.00 97.50 99.00 99.75
Iron Copper Gold Zinc Lead Aluminium Manganese Nickel Tin Tungsten
25,503 11,026 7,235 1,267 1,077 856 745 387 195 125
Source: G Gardner et al, 1998, Mind over matter: Recasting the role of materials in our lives, Worldwatch Paper 144, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, p 18
toxic chemicals are also found in the wastes as they are added intentionally during extraction and processing. For example, gold is extracted through a technique called heap leaching, which uses cyanide. After use, the cyanide is stored in artificial ponds for reuse. Each bout of leaching takes a few months, after which the heaps receive a layer of fresh ore. Given the scale and duration of these operations (usually decades), contamination of the surrounding environment with cyanide is almost inevitable. The effort of the industry has been to replace cyanide with mercury, which incidentally, is equally toxic. Mine wastes also contain salts and radioactive wastes.
Mining wastes in India

Compared to other minerals, coal mining produces the maximum amount of wastes in India (see Table 3.6: The burden of mining waste in India). For every tonne of coal produced, about three-four tonne of wastes are generated. Limestone and iron ore are the next two biggest contributors to total mining wastes generated in India. According to the data of the IBM, the average stripping ratio for limestone mines in India is 1.05:1. For iron ore mines, the stripping ratio varies widely and is about 1-3:1; this does not include the wastes generated during beneficiation and processing, which can be very high. Bauxite ores in India are harder and have a higher stripping ratio of around 1.2:1 compared to their Australian counterparts (0.13).36,37 How does India dispose off its waste rocks? Overburden management of Indian mines is extremely poor; in most cases, the waste is just piled up in huge heaps on unlined surface, and mine managements do not bother themselves with measures to prevent run-off or particulate emissions. The best use for waste rock is to
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backfill the excavated land, but this is rarely done in practice as companies keep opening different faces of the mine without completely exhausting any one of them (see Box on page 84: Managing wastes). The result is that Indian mines are characterised by large numbers of pits surrounded by big dumps all around. Fines from these dumps are carried by rainwater into nearby watercourses or lands, polluting both. During dry summers, these dumps become a key source of air pollution for surrounding areas. Tailings are another major problem in India. They are generated in the form of slurry during the process of concentration, which involves grinding and milling; their storage is of great concern, specifically due to the presence of heavy metals in them. Most small- and medium-scale mines in India (as well as several large mines) do not have proper systems in place to handle tailings. In more than 100 years of operation of the Kolar gold mines, the total quantity of tailings generated was about 35 MT, reports Current Science. Some of the tailings were used for filling underground voids and for sand stowing. The remaining 32 MT was stored in 15 dumps spread out along an eight-km stretch in the mine area. These tailings have been causing considerable environmental and health hazards for the people in adjoining areas. During dry season, the finer particles get air-borne while during monsoons, the rainwater carries the tailings further down on to tank beds.
According to the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) Limited, about six-seven MT of kimberlite tailings have been collected after recovery of diamonds from the mines at Panna, Madhya Pradesh. On an average, 0.9 MT of tailings is added to the total accumulated volume every year, says the NMDC. In the case of iron ore, the quantity of tailings generated from mining depends on the quality of the ore. In some areas like Kudremukh, the ore is low grade and contains only about 35-38 per cent iron; the balance 62-65 per cent becomes tailings. In fact, the mines of the Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited (KIOCL) have generated a substantial quantity of tailings: approximately 14 MT per annum. These tailings were stored in an earthen dam called the Lakya dam; in 2005, the dam held around 150 MT of tailings.38 Storage of tailings not only requires a significant amount of land, but also has the potential of causing river and air pollution. Pollution of the Sankhini river by NMDCs Bailadilla iron ore mines is now a part of the local lore, and so is the pollution of river Damodar by the coal washeries of Jharkhand and West Bengal. Hexavalent chromium pollution of river Brahmani by the Sukinda chromite mines in Orissa lays bare the truth behind waste management in Indian mines. Another serious concern of tailings storage is the safety of impoundment structures. Failure of the impoundment can have a
TABLE 3.6: The burden of mining waste in India

Coal mining alone accounts for about 80 per cent of wastes generated from mining of major minerals in India
1999-00 COAL Production Overburden and other wastes BAUXITE Production Overburden and other wastes LIMESTONE Production Overburden and other wastes IRON ORE Production Overburden and other wastes OTHERS Production Overburden and other wastes Total overburden and other wastes from major minerals (excluding beneficiation and processing wastes) 7.5 14.5 1,324 5.02 10.60 1,355 4.91 10.38 1,414 7.82 15.20 1,512 8.32 16.26 1,602 9.24 19.30 1,719 9.44 18.61 1,841 75 69.9 80.7 75.2 86.2 80.3 99.1 92.3 122.8 114.5 145.9 136.0 154.4 143.9 129 135 123.6 129.4 129.3 135.3 155.74 163.0 153.39 160.5 165.75 173.5 170.38 178.3 7.1 4.3 7.99 4.84 8.59 5.20 9.87 6.0 10.92 6.6 11.96 7.2 12.34 7.5 300 1,100 310 1,135 323 1,183 337 1,235 356 1,304 377 1,383 407 1,493 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Sources: Estimated by the Centre for Science and Environment based on the data from anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, pp 70 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3
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Managing wastes
Some internationally accepted best practices
Overburden management Excavation from a new pit should begin only after an existing pit has been exhausted. This would ensure that the overburden and interburden generated is used for backfilling the exhausted pit, instead of being dumped elsewhere. Till a pit is exhausted, the overburden should be properly compacted and stacked in specified locations in low-lying non-mineralised zones within the lease area. The height and slope of the overburden dumps should be maintained to prevent accidents. The stacks should be covered with plantations and ledges should be created to prevent losses. Topsoil should be scraped out from the dump site in advance and preserved in low-height dumps, covered with grass and vegetation to preserve its fertility. The dumps should be such that the completed outslopes should not exceed 20 degrees from the horizontal.
Drainage should be constructed to handle heavy rainfall. Sedimentation tanks should be constructed to treat run-offs.
Tailings management Tailings must be managed to optimise human safety and environmental protection. On-land tailings impoundment systems must be designed and constructed by taking into account the soil characteristics, hydrology, and seismic and precipitation conditions (to accommodate surface run-on). The designs should address the structural integrity of the tailings dams or deposits even post-closure. On-land disposal systems should be designed to isolate acid leachate-generating material from oxidation and percolating water. Marine and riverine discharges are not acceptable. The design of the tailings management system must address post-closure issues such as the long-term geotechnical stability of the impoundment, the chemical stability of the tailings, long-term surface and groundwater management, including pollution control, and restoration.
severe impact on people living in the immediate vicinity as well as the environment. Accidents related to failure of tailings dams in India as well as abroad are not uncommon (see Box: In a tailspin). Handling and management of tailings becomes particularly critical when it contains radioactive material. Uranium mining, for instance, generates large volumes of tailings wastes. These contain a number of radioactive materials, which are extremely harmful to human beings and animals. The chief among these are thorium-230, radium-226, radon-222 and pulonium-210. If left on the surface, this radioactive sand can blow in the wind and get deposited on vegetation miles away, entering the food chain; or it can wash into lakes and rivers and contaminate them. While the hazard per gram of mill tailings is low relative to most other radioactive wastes, the large volumes and lack of regulations for containment have resulted in widespread environmental contamination. Unless uranium tailings are perfectly contained in some kind of storage system (yet to be devised), humans and animals who come close to the tailings cannot help ingesting or inhaling some of this radioactive material. This can lead to long-term damages, such as illnesses like cancers and leukaemia, and diseases and malformations in foetuses. The ways of disposal of radioactive wastes include retention in repositories (concentrate and retain) or release into the environment (dilute and disperse). Due to delays in developing radioactive waste disposal facilities, the waste has to be stored for increasingly longer periods. Some countries are also considering extended storage as an alternative to disposal. Mining of some minerals also generates specific wastes such as marble slurry. In marble mining, the stone is cut into slabs using diamond gang saws: around 15-20 per cent of each block of marble turns into powder in this process. To prevent the saw blades from
damage due to friction between stone and blade, water is continuously sprinkled on them. This water mixes with the marble powder, forming slurry. Thus, nearly 20 per cent of the total weight of the marble processed results into marble slurry. Rajasthan itself generates five-six MT of marble slurry from its 4,000 marble mines every year. The states marble-cutting industries dump the slurry in any nearby pit or vacant spaces near their units although notified areas have been marked for dumping leading to severe pollution. Marble slurry creates multidimensional pollution problems. When dumped on land, it adversely affects the productivity of land due to decreased porosity, water absorption, water percolation, etc. Slurry-dumped areas cannot support any vegetation and remain degraded. When dried, the fine particles become air-borne and cause severe air pollution. Apart from occupational health problems, it also affects machinery and instruments installed in industrial areas. During rainy season, the slurry is carried away to rivers, drains, roads and water bodies affecting quality of water, reducing storage capacities and damaging aquatic life. Due to long-term deposition on land, the finer particles block flow regime of aquifers, thus seriously affecting underground water availability.
Mining and water pollution
Closely related to the concerns that mining wastes raise is the issue of water pollution through mining. Mining primarily affects water quality in four ways: through acid mine drainage, heavy metal pollution and leaching, pollution from processing chemicals and through erosion and siltation.
Acid mine drainage: When large quantities of rocks containing sulphide minerals are excavated, they react with water and oxygen to create sulphuric acid. The acid leaches from the
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In a tailspin
Tailings disasters from across the world
The Jaduguda spill, India1: On December 24, 2006, thousands of litres of radioactive wastes spilled into a creek because of a pipe burst; the pipe had carried tailings from the nuclear processing facility to the tailings dam. Consequently, a thick layer of toxic sludge on the surface of the creek killed scores of fish, frogs and other riparian life. The waste from the leak also reached a creek that feeds into the Subarnarekha river, contaminating the water resources of the communities. Notably, this was not the first such accident. In 1986, a tailings dam had burst open and radioactive water had flowed directly into villages. The Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, which is mining in the area, has no alarm mechanism to alert the company in such cases of disasters. Instead, it was the villagers who had arrived at the scene of the accident who informed the company of the toxic spill. Merriespruit tailings dam failure, South Africa2: On February 22, 1994, heavy rains triggered a flowslide from a part of the Merriespruit tailings dam 6,00,000 cubic metre (cu m) of tailings flowed out of the impoundment, killing 17 people and destroying scores of houses before eventually stopping two km away. The disaster could have been averted if a suitable operating manual and emergency plan had existed. Omai tailings dam failure, Guyana3: The Omai gold mine, located in the humid tropics of Guyana, began open-pit mining in 1993. Both the mine and the tailings dam are on the banks of the Omai river. On August 19, 1995, a major breach in the tailings dam led to spillage of an estimated three million cu m of tailing pond water (which contained high concentrations of cyanide) into the Omai. Production was suspended at the mine. The spill was contained on August 24. The Omai case demonstrated that dams that do not have adequate seepage protection around conduits or adequate filters, cannot be expected to survive for long. Bauxite mine tailings dam failure, Brazil4: The state government of Minas Gerais in Brazil had to shut down the Mineracao Rio Pomba
bauxite mine after the failure of a tailings dam on January 22, 2007. Heavy rains caused the dam to break, releasing two million cu m of mud into the Muriae river. Streets and houses in the towns of Mirai and Muriae were partially buried in mud. Plants and animals in the area also suffered serious damages. The water supply of several towns was disrupted as the mudslide affected the rivers. However, state environmental regulators said the mud did not contain any toxic wastes. San Marcelino tailings dam spill, Philippines5: Mine wastes from two damaged tailings dams and spillways of the Dizon Copper Silver Mines Inc (DCSMI) in San Marcelino, Zambales, spilled into the Mapanuepe Lake and eventually into the Santo Tomas river on August 30, 2002. Investigations by the environment protection authority revealed that heavy rains impounded water on the Bayarong and Camalca dams and spillways, eroding these and eventually causing the mine wastes to leak to the lake below. Each dams catchment area spans 50 ha. About 2,000 families live near the mine site, located about 30 km east of San Marcelino town. The lake and the river are the fishing grounds and irrigation sources for five Zambales towns. Inez coal tailings dam failure, USA6: On October 11, 2000, a coal tailings dam of Martin County Coal Corporations preparation plant near Inez, Kentucky, failed, releasing a slurry consisting of an estimated 250 million gallon (950,000 m3) of water and 155,000 cubic yard (118,500 m3) of coal wastes into local streams. About 75 miles (120 km) of rivers and streams turned an iridescent black, causing a fish kill along the Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River and some of its tributaries. Towns along the Tug were forced to turn off their drinking water intakes. The spill contained measurable amounts of metals, including arsenic, mercury, lead, copper and chromium, but not enough to pose health problems in treated water, according to a federal official. The full extent of the environmental damage isnt yet known, and estimates of the clean-up costs go as high as US $60 million. The investigation of the spill shows that the protective barrier between an underground mine and the Martin County coal-waste impoundment was far thinner than regulators thought.
rock as long as its source rock is exposed to air and water and until all the sulphides are leached out a process that can last hundreds of years. This process is called acid mine drainage (AMD). This acid is carried off the mine site by rainwater or surface drainage and deposited into nearby streams, rivers, lakes and groundwater. When the water reaches a certain level of acidity, a naturally occurring type of bacteria called Thiobacillus ferroxidans may kick in, accelerating the oxidation and acidification processes, leaching even more trace metals. Environmental effects of AMD include contamination of drinking water, disrupted growth and reproduction of aquatic plants and animals, loss of aquatic life and corrosion of mining equipment and structures. Typically, AMD has very low pH, high levels of hardness and high iron and sulphate contents. Moreover, it may also have high levels of toxic trace/heavy
metals (if these are present in the mineral) as these are soluble in acidic water. According to the public health engineering department of the government of Meghalaya, AMD is the most persistent pollution problem in the coal mines of North Eastern Coalfields in this state. The problem has also been reported from the Gorbi mines of Singrauli, located in the drainage area of the Sone and Rihand rivers. Though the mine is closed now, the problem of AMD persists in the area. AMD has also been reported from some lead and zinc mines. The AMD problem is compounded by the fact that it also contains toxic metals like arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, mercury, lead, zinc, manganese, aluminium, iron and nickel. It can be minimised by limiting the exposure of mine rocks to water or restricting the amount of time they are in contact with water (see Box on page 86: Preventing acid mine drainage).
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Preventing acid mine drainage

Acid main drainage or AMD is a major impact of coal mining
Waterways should be diverted from open pits, waste rock piles and tailings impoundments to prevent contact and acid production. This can be done through use of impermeable caps and liners. There are two basic options for preventing drainage of acidic materials in the long term dry covers and wet covers. Covers can be defined as natural or artificial medium (such as high density plastics) under which potentially acid-producing wastes are stored. If the cover prevents the entrance of either oxygen or water, acid will not be produced. Soil (dry) covers are usually made of clay or oxide wastes that are impermeable to prevent oxygen access to the wastes. Wet covers (sub-aqueous disposal) that are emerging as one of the best technologies to prevent acid rock drainage, involve the submersion of tailings or other waste under water within an impoundment. Considering the high rainfall in tropical areas, this technique is more attractive than dry covers. Certain naturally occurring bacteria are also known to catalyse or
increase the rate of acid production. One short-term solution, as well as a partial AMD mitigation technique, is the use of bactericides to inhibit the bacteria. This practice is not a long-term solution, but has the potential to be a supplement to a more comprehensive AMD prevention programme. In addition to taking precautions during operation, it is important to rehabilitate the exhausted mine in such a manner that no acidic drainage is formed. Besides, monitoring programmes should be implemented. Where feasible and using models of potential groundwater flows and groundwater chemistry, an open-pit may be flooded to reduce the presence of oxygen and, therefore, prevent the formation of acidic drainage from the pit walls. For underground mining operations, holes should be sealed and tunnels should be lined properly to reduce or eliminate water infiltration. Adits (horizontal tunnels) should be plugged with concrete slabs that allow the underground tunnels to flood with entering groundwater, reducing the flow of oxygen and the potential for acid production. Waste piles or pools should be capped with clay or plastic covers, and soil and vegetation should be applied to all disturbed surfaces, including waste piles and tailings.
Heavy metal pollution: This is caused when metals such as arsenic, cobalt, copper, cadmium, lead, silver and zinc contained in excavated rock or exposed in an underground mine come in contact with water. These metals leach out and get carried downstream as water washes over the rock surface. Although metals can become mobile in neutral pH conditions, leaching is particularly accelerated in low pH conditions. Talcher, in Orissa, is a case in point. Here, mine discharges from the Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd (MCL) contain several heavy metals: arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, zinc and copper, all of which are carcinogenic. Sukindas chromite mines are notorious for their hexavalent chromium pollution. Pollution from processing chemicals: This kind of pollution occurs when chemical agents (such as cyanide or sulphuric acid used by mining companies to separate the target mineral from the ore) spill, leak, or leach from the mine site into nearby water bodies. These chemicals can be highly toxic to humans and animals. Cyanide contamination is an example. Most of the worlds large gold mining corporations use cyanide as the extraction reagent for gold. The Omai gold mine in Guyana, a project of the Canadian mining corporation Cambior, is one of the largest open-pit mines in the world. Its tailings dam failed in 1995, releasing some three billion cubic metre of cyanide-laden tailings into the Omai river, a tributary of Guyanas largest river, the Essequibo. Following the spill, the president of Guyana declared all 51 km of river drainage from the mine to the Atlantic Ocean, home to 23,000 people, an official environmental disaster zone. Initial government reports estimated the cyanide concentration in the Omai to be 28 parts per million, which is 140 times the level that the USEPA considers lethal.39
www.bettermines.org/photos.cfm
The colour of poison: acid mine drainage pollutes water sources with toxic and heavy metals
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In 1992, leaks from the Summitville mine in southern Colorado led to cyanide pollution killing all forms of life in a 17-mile stretch of the Alamosa river. The state filed a suit over clean-up in 1999, which is expected to cost at least US $170 million. Part of the settlement is to be used for restoration of the Alamosa river system. Robert M Friedland, whose company was blamed for the cyanide pollution, agreed to pay US $27.75 million to settle the state lawsuit.40 Fred Pearce, writing in The New Scientist (Tails of woe, November 11, 2000), reported that in the coastal waters of Marinduque island in the Philippines, the Marcopper copper mine pumped 200 MT of toxic waste rock over a period of 16 years, carpeting 80 sq km of seabed, suffocating coral reefs, and poisoning reef fish. Children have tested dangerously high for lead and cyanide in the islands fishing communities. In India, other than in Kolar, gold mining has not happened on a large scale. But this situation can change very soon, as a number of global mining companies have started to prospect for gold in various parts of the country. Gold mining has a very poor environmental track record and India will have to set up stringent regulatory mechanisms to keep the industry in check.
South America spread over 106 ha, had a water footprint which exceeded the land by a factor of 27. Although the water footprint should have declined by a factor of 10 immediately after closure, sustained evaporation from pit lakes and tailings dams meant that the final post-closure water footprint remained at 25 per cent of that encountered during the peak of mining. Mining also impacts groundwater: a range of groundwater pollution problems can be traced to mining activities. The nature of the pollution depends on the materials being excavated and extracted. Both surface and underground mines usually extend below the water table and often, dewatering is required to allow mining to proceed. The water pumped either directly from the mine or from specially constructed boreholes can be highly mineralised: its usual characteristics would include low pH (down to pH 3) and high levels of iron, aluminium and sulphate. Disposal of this mine drainage effluent into surface water or groundwater sources can impact water quality. Pollution of groundwater can also result from the leaching of mine tailings and from settling ponds and can, therefore, be associated with both present and past mining activity.
What mining does to our air and climate
Erosion and sedimentation: Mineral development disturbs soil and rock in the course of constructing and maintaining roads, opening pits, and waste impoundments. In the absence of adequate prevention and control strategies, erosion of the exposed earth may carry substantial amounts of sediments and silt into streams, rivers and lakes. Excessive sediments can clog riverbeds and smother watershed vegetation, wildlife habitat and aquatic organisms. Silt blankets at a streams bottom can cut off the food supply of fish, while floating solids on the surface can adversely affect replenishment of dissolved oxygen. Organic wastes, under the influence of bacterial action, deplete dissolved oxygen by consuming it in biochemical oxidation reactions. This oxygen depletion is the most important single aspect of pollution in natural streams. Replenishment of dissolved oxygen occurs naturally by reaeration of the stream through its surface and by the photosynthetic reactions of green aquatic plants. Re-aeration, however, is retarded by oil films on the surface or by floating solids that decrease the amount of surface available for light penetration into the water, thus retarding photosynthesis. An important case illustrative of this problem is that of the river Bhadra in Kudremukh (Karnataka). The impending disappearance of the Kushawati river in Goa is the most current example of how mining can destroy a river due to sedimentation.
Water use and contamination by a mine does not end with its closure. If overburden dumps and tailings are not contained properly, then they become a major source of water pollution. Water stored in the mine pits continues to affect the groundwater table because of losses through evaporation. A 2006 study conducted by P L Younger for the Adelaide-based Australian Institute of Mining and Technology found that a mine in a humid subtropical area of
Mine areas often have a monochromatic appearance. Coal mining areas are black, bauxite and iron ore-rich regions are red while limestone provides a chalky white hue. The reason: dust emissions from mines, waste dumps and mineral transportation. Fugitive dusts are generated from almost every mining operation: drilling, blasting, hauling, loading and unloading, transporting, crushing and other mineral beneficiation processes. Waste dumps and tailings too are major sources of fugitive dust. The intensity of dust generation is governed by factors such as location and wind speed at the site, hardness of the rock, mining technology, mode of transportation, level of mechanisation and the steps taken by the mines to prevent dust emissions. Mining by blasting, for example, has much higher dust potential compared to technologies like surface miners. Similarly, the dust potential of conveyor transportation is lower than that of transportation by dumpers. Open-cast mines have much higher dust generation potential than underground mines on the other hand, underground coal mines produce methane emissions, which contribute to global warming. Mechanisation has enabled miners to extract large quantities of minerals and therefore, mechanised mines generally have large waste dumps, which become a major source of fugitive dust. Take the case of an iron ore mine with a daily excavation capacity of 3,000 tonne (or around one MT per annum), and generating an equal amount of waste. Assuming that 0.01 per cent of the waste escapes into the atmosphere as fugitive dust (which is a gross underestimation), the mine would release 100 tonne per annum of dust into the surrounding environment. Naturally, all the major mining areas of India are also air pollution hotspots. Korba, Bhilai, Satna and Dhanbad have been declared critical by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) with respect to annual average concentrations of both respirable suspended particulate matter (RSPM) and suspended particulate matter
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(SPM).41 The Angul-Talcher coalfields in Orissa are critically air-polluted areas. The iron and manganese mines of Keonjhar and Sundergarh are not only generating emissions from the mines, but the transportation of minerals on the dilapidated roads have become a major source of air pollution in the region. Dust, due to transportation of iron ore, is a problem in Bellary-Hospet in Karnataka and in Goa as well. During summers, the air is almost unbreathable at some of these places. Air pollution in the old coal mining complexes of Jharia, Raniganj and Bokaro has reached such levels that the CPCB had to set 40 per cent higher ambient air quality standards for these mines compared to standards applicable to new coal mines. Mining-induced dust is known to cause diseases such as pneumoconiosis, silicosis, asbestosis, cataract, corneal ulcers, glaucoma and squint trachoma. In fact, the impact is pronounced when the dust contains particles less than 10 microns in size, small enough to be deposited in lungs. Affected populations include mine workers, people living in the vicinity and people already suffering from one or more ailments. Before the Supreme Court banned stone quarrying on the Delhi-Haryana border, a thick layer of silica dust used to coat the entire stretch of land between Faridabad and Badarpur. Twenty thousand workers and their families were affected; a survey by the University College of
Medical Sciences, New Delhi, had shown that 17 per cent of the labourers at the Badarpur crushers were incurably diseased.42 Silicosis threatened the workers of Bhatti mines, barely 35 km from Delhi, while tuberculosis, blood dysentery and seasonal fevers were quite common. The same fate awaits workers and people in areas like Chandikhol in Orissa and Makrana in Rajasthan where stone quarrying is a cottage industry. Another example is that of the Roro asbestos mines at Chaibasa in Singhbhum district, Jharkhand. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited (now known as Hyderabad Industries Limited), a Birla Group company, used to mine asbestos here, to manufacture asbestos cement products. Abandoned some time back, these mines have left behind open waste dumps of asbestos, which are endangering the lives of the people living in the surrounding areas. Dust generated by mining also reduces agricultural productivity. A 2005 study titled Impact of Mining on Agricultural Productivity by Prajna Paramita Mishra of the Hyderabad-based Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS) and Ayan Kumar Pujari of New Delhis Integrated Research and Action for Development, found that in the Ib valley coalfields of Orissa, agricultural productivity has suffered in the cropfields which are closer to the mines. A rapid environmental impact assessment of iron ore mining in the
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Mining miasma: the air hangs heavy with fugitive dust at every mining site, as at this iron ore mine in Keonjhar, Orissa
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Bellary-Hospet region by the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute, Nagpur, revealed that dust generated due to mining is impacting the agricultural productivity in the area. Lead and zinc smelters, limestone quarries and cement factories have reduced land productivity in areas like Udai Sagar, Khamli and Chittor in Rajasthan. One of the most persistent complaints that one hears from farmers living near limestone mining areas of the country is loss in agricultural productivity. While there are no technical quick-fixes to solve dust emissions from mines, solutions do exist; but Indian mining companies are usually found wanting as far as implementation is concerned. Water sprays and plantations are large-scale feasible solutions to control dust. But in semi-arid and arid areas, where water is scarce, the effectiveness of these two solutions takes a nosedive. Moreover, not many mining companies in India make efforts to develop full-fledged plantations across the mine perimeter and around the mine pit head. One of the most effective ways to reduce emissions is to open mining areas in sequence and restrict exposed surfaces to a minimum. But miners like to open as big an area as possible so that they can pick and choose best quality minerals; they argue that economics demands this kind of an operation. Provision for dust suction devices at crushing, loading and unloading points can also reduce dust generation, but most mining companies choose not to invest in these equipment.
The methane problem

A large proportion of the worlds energy requirement is met from coal: 36 per cent of global electricity is generated from coal, and 70 per cent of the worlds steel is produced using coal and coke.43 This dependence on coal is expected to continue, especially in developing countries coal mining, therefore, will also increase. Burning of coal and other fossil fuels for power generation is one of the major contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) generation. The direct impact of mining on climate change, however, is in the form of release of methane (CH4), a GHG: coal mining accounts for 10 per cent of all human-related methane emissions.44 Climate change today is becoming a grave problem and mines are under pressure to stop methane formation and emissions (see Box: Say no to coal mining).
Say no to coal mining

Australian coal mine blocked over climate impact
An Australian environmental court has ruled against the country's largest independent coal producer, saying that its assessment of the impacts of a new mine should have included an assessment of its impact on climate change.The campaign group Greenpeace has called the ruling "historic". Greenpeace has been demonstrating against the proposal of the Centennial Coal Company to build a new mine in New South Wales. It is believed that the environmental assessment, previously approved by the government, was void; and that there is a sufficiently proximate linkbetween coal mining and GHG emissions for the latter to be considered in the mine's assessment.
THE HINDU
Coal mine workers face the brunt of methane emissions
Coal seams contain pockets of methane. Methane molecules also become attached to the microscopic internal surfaces of coal itself. When miners break open the pockets in coal and coal-bearing rocks, methane is released. Underground coal mining releases more methane than surface or open-pit mining because of the higher gas content of deeper seams. In general, lower quality coals such as brown coal or lignite, have lower methane content. On an average, the total methane emissions globally from coal mining ranged around 25-40 MT in 1990. China, the former Soviet Union and the US together accounted for two-thirds of the worlds methane emissions from coal in the 1990s. In the case of Indian coal mines, specific methane emissions were relatively low and stood at 0.4 MT.45 Capping methane is important: methanes contribution to global warming is second (18 per cent) only to that of carbon dioxide (66 per cent). According to J K Pandey of the Dhanbad-based
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Central Mining Research Institute, methane has a global warming potential of 21 over a 100-year period, which means that on a kilogram-for-kilogram basis, methane is 21 times more potent than carbon dioxide during the same time period. Explosions due to methane gas continue to be one of the major causes of fatalities in Indias underground coalmines. According to the DGMS, between 1901 and 2005, 57 per cent of the total fatalities in Indian coalmines were due to a combination of fire and explosions. To ensure safety, the concentration of methane gas is constantly monitored at workplaces and maintained below 1.25 per cent by increasing fresh air ventilation. There is, however, another side to methane: it is a potential source of clean energy. One kg of methane produces 55,685 kiloJoule (kJ) of heat.46 Pre-mining degasification as a technology to neutralise the negative impact of methane has attracted worldwide attention. The technology aims at producing coal-bed gas by drilling surface boreholes in virgin coal-bearing blocks and using the recovered methane as a fuel resource. The US coal industry has made substantial progress in recovering methane through drainage systems. Out of 142 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of coal mine methane liberated from underground mines in 2000, about 42 Bcf was emitted through drainage systems and about 86 per cent of this was successfully recovered.47 Ventilation air contains methane and till recently, it was not possible to combust it as methane concentrations were not high enough. However, technologies now exist to oxidise and utilise this methane. Reactors can combust the ventilation air at very high temperatures to produce thermal energy. In fact, a successful pilot project has already been conducted in Australia.48 In India too, there is a growing interest in recovering methane from coal-beds. Several explorations are being conducted by research organisations and companies aiming to identify potential methane resources in coal-beds. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has given a grant of US $19.226 million to the Union ministry of coal to promote coal-bed methane (CBM) in the West Bengal-Bihar coalfields.49 The Union ministry of petroleum and natural gas (MoPNG) has awarded 16 CBM blocks to various companies since 2001.50
Abandoned: the problem of mine closure
Finally, the Achilles heel of the mining industry: mine closure. The environmental and social costs of closing and rehabilitating old and abandoned mines around the world are likely to be in trillions of dollars, and far beyond the capability of mining companies alone to deal with: this was what Robert Wilson, chairperson of the London-based metals giant Rio Tinto Plc had said in 2002.51 A recent estimate puts rehabilitation costs just in the US, where regulation is stricter than in many other countries, at US $50-60 billion.52 The problem is much bigger in countries and regions like Russia, eastern Europe, South Africa, China and India where legislations are not comprehensive and implementation is weak. There are no estimates on how much it will cost to undertake proper mine closure for abandoned mines in India. But the costs are likely to be very high, especially for rehabilitating the mega coal mine complexes.
An abandoned open-cast mine leads to considerable pollution, is a threat to life and property, and an eyesore. In the case of an underground mine, there remains the danger of subsidence. Often, companies abandon the mines once they have extracted all the minerals. James Kuipers of the US-based Center for Science in Public Participation estimates that 95 per cent of operating mines in the US have only vague plans for dealing with the environmental consequences of shutting down, such as the pollution of local water courses.53 There are several cases where the government has had to use taxpayers money to pay for the mine closure because the companies declared themselves bankrupt. Since 1980, the US has had a Superfund programme administered by the USEPA to clean up the worst and most hazardous waste sites, a number of which are the result of mining. In the Clarks Fork River region of Montana, for example, where gold and silver mining started in the late 19th century and continued until the early 1950s, rehabilitation costs have been roughly estimated at US $1 billion. The Summitville mine in Colorado is likely to cost some US $225 million to clean up, and the Yerington copper mine in Nevada, around US $200 million. These are just the environmental costs of abandoned mines. Mining in the US is also infamous for ghost towns left behind by the mining companies without any social or economic rehabilitation. No systematic world-wide inventory of abandoned mines exists, but their numbers may run into millions if every shaft and alluvial working is considered.54 Some countries like Canada, the US, Australia and the UK have attempted to produce abandoned mine inventories. For example, in Australia, the New South Wales Department of Mineral Resources has a database of about 500 abandoned mines, but it is not a comprehensive list. In the state of Victoria, there are records of around 2,000 old and historic mines. Canada has more than 10,139 abandoned mines in its files, but only about 60 per cent have been physically assessed.55 There are a large number of abandoned mine sites all over the US. According to the survey conducted by the US Bureau of Land Management, there are about 9,200 abandoned mines on the 264 million acre of land that they manage. It is estimated that 25 per cent of these pose physical safety hazards and approximately five per cent may be causing significant environmental damage, primarily in the form of water pollution. Due to a long history of mining, South Africa has many abandoned mines. These include 134 abandoned asbestos mines and 400 asbestos dumps that are still contributing to the constant flow of asbestos.56 India does not have a detailed inventory of its abandoned mines. According to the website of the IBM, there are 296 abandoned mines (also called orphaned mines) of major minerals in the country.57 Most researchers and environmentalists believe this to be a gross underestimation. This figure does not include the large number of abandoned coal mines in the country. In 2004, the then minister of coal and mines had reported to the parliament that there were 214 abandoned coal mines of Coal India Limited and Singareni Collieries Company Limited alone.58 Of these, a majority had exhausted their reserves and the rest were closed due to techno-economic and safety reasons. If we add up the abandoned coal mines and major mineral mines, then the number
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MONALI ZEYA HAZRA / CSE
Regulations on mine closure are too late, too little; most mine closure plans exist only on paper
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P MADHAVAN
Open secret: closure plans dont usually go beyond huge pits partially filled with water
of officially recognised abandoned mines in the country reaches a minimum of 510. The problem with the above data is that it does not account for hundreds of mines being closed every year. In three years, between 2002-03 to 2004-05, the total number of mines of major minerals closed in the country was 1,227 (see Table 3.7: State-wise mine closure: 2002-2004). There are no consolidated data for closed/abandoned mines of minor minerals. The number is likely to be very high: in 2003-04 alone, 20,996 mining leases/quarry licences were closed/cancelled in Rajasthan due to a Supreme Court order. Out of these, only 15,047 have been reopened.59 According to the official statistics maintained by the IBM on abandoned mines (other than fuel and minor minerals), a majority of these are in the states of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh (see Graph 3.1: State-wise distribution of abandoned mines). The abandoned mines are of a varied range of minerals such as asbestos, bauxite, sand, feldspar, iron ore, etc. However, the largest number of abandoned mines is of limestone, followed by ochre (see Graph 3.2: Mineral-wise distribution of abandoned mines and Box on page 94: Closure chaos: the case of limestone). The reasons for abandonment of mines vary
too; the most common are of lease expiry (36 per cent) followed by exhaustion of minerals (12 per cent). The information on mine rehabilitation in India is as sketchy as that on abandoned mines. According to the 2004 annual report of the Union ministry of mines, five abandoned mines covering an area of about six ha was reclaimed/rehabilitated in that year. This took the total number of mine leases so far reclaimed to 45 covering an area of 645 ha. The ministrys 2005 annual report says: During the year (till September 2005), no abandoned mine has been reclaimed/rehabilitated and the cumulative figure remains 53 mines covering an area of 660 ha. No information about the kind of reclamation/rehabilitation undertaken has been provided in these reports; nor is there any information on the whereabouts of these rehabilitated mines. The truth is that mine rehabilitation is a completely ignored area in India. It was only in 2003 that a mine closure plan was made mandatory for obtaining a mine lease that too, only for major minerals. Coal mines are still not required to have a mine closure plan. It is, therefore, not surprising to see the annual reports of the ministry referring to mine rehabilitation only from 2004 onwards. But even the new regulation is turning out to be a mere formality. The
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TABLE 3.7: State-wise mine closure: 2002-2004

In 2004-2005, officially, more than 800 mines were closed
State Number of mines closed in the year 2002-2003 Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Chhattisgarh Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh Uttarakhand West Bengal India 39 0 2 1 1 27 103 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 144 0 0 2 0 323 2003-2004 5 0 2 1 9 48 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 98 2004-2005 1 0 61 62 198 6 0 0 0 175 7 2 73 0 0 93 0 127 1 0 0 0 806
GRAPH 3.1: State-wise distribution of abandoned mines

Madhya Pradesh accounts for almost half of the abandoned mines in the country
Others 15% Andhra Pradesh 21% Jharkhand 8%
Tamil Nadu 8%
Madhya Pradesh 48%
Source: Analysis based on data provided in website of Indian Bureau of Mines, http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 14, 2006
GRAPH 3.2: Mineral-wise distribution of abandoned mines

Limestone has the largest number of officially abandoned mines
Limestone 22%
Others 42% Fire clay 5%
Quartzite and feldspar 11%
Ochre 20%
Source: State-wise number of mines closed in India (2002-03 to 2004-05), Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 579, November 25, 2005, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=397408&ptid=63, as viewed on February 5, 2007
Source: Analysis based on data provided in website of Indian Bureau of Mines, http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 14, 2006
mine closure plans that are being cleared today are nothing but huge pits disguised as water bodies/water harvesting structures and massive overburden dumps disguised as plantations (see Box on page 95: International best practices for land reclamation). The Green Rating Project of the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), during an environmental rating of the large-scale cement industry, had found that nearly all the big companies (which had captive limestone mines) in the country were not following a proper programme on mine closure. They
did have mine closure plans, but more as a formality to meet regulatory requirements. But mine closure is not only about physical and environmental rehabilitation of the mining areas it also about the socioeconomic stability of the communities dependent on the mine. Social impacts of mine closure, although often neglected, are often as adverse as the environmental effects. Closure of a big mine represents a significant social and cultural upheaval in the communities dependent on it. When a new mine is opened, traditional
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Closure chaos: the case of limestone

Cement industry has largely chosen to ignore systematic mine closure
India is the second largest producer of cement in the world. Most cement plants in the country have captive mines to meet their limestone needs. Limestone is extracted from big open-cast mines. About 0.15 million ha of land has been leased out for extracting limestone.1 Most of this land lies in some of the poorest districts of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. There are, broadly, two approaches to reclamation of an excavated area. One is to begin the reclamation programme after the entire deposit is mined essentially, a repair work. The obvious drawback of this is that at the end of the excavation, the company is faced with the daunting task of reclaiming a vast area consisting of deep quarries created as a result of years of mining. The simplest option is to leave the pits as they are, in the hope that they will serve as water reservoirs. The second approach is to carry on the reclamation programme simultaneously with the mining activity. This ensures that the major portion of the reclamation is completed before the entire deposit is exhausted. It leaves a company with the flexibility to mould and shape the lease area into useful sites. It, however, calls for careful planning. Unfortunately, the Indian cement industry is mired in the repair and forgetmindset. Around 60 per cent of the big cement plants rated by CSEs Green Rating Project had not even started reclamation, though most had exhausted some portion of their mines. The companies rated by GRP had officially exhausted 1,100 ha of land, of which they had reclaimed only 535 ha a bare 48.5 per cent. Of this, 64 per cent had been reclaimed as so-called water reservoirs, while plantations had been done on 35 per cent (see Graph: Actual reclamation of exhausted pits). As per the future plans of these plants,
77 per cent of the exhausted land is to be reclaimed as water reservoirs. Plantations will be done on 22.6 per cent.2 Only one plant plans to reclaim land for agriculture or grazing. While most units planned to reclaim land as reservoirs, they had not taken sufficient steps to ensure proper reclamation. In other words, what was being planned for was just deep pits filled with water and not water reservoirs. Neither did the units have a community-based vision of how the water in the reservoirs was to be ultimately used.
GRAPH: Actual reclamation of exhausted pits

Most pits are being used for storing water an easy option
Construction 0.7%
Plantations/ forests 34.9%
Agriculture 0.5%
Water storage 64.0%
Source: Chandra Bhushan et al, Concrete Facts , The life cycle of the Indian cement industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 38
socio-economic systems and cultural values are greatly disturbed. Migration of skilled workforce, infusion of cash income and modern amenities change the existing social hierarchies, customs and values. A completely new way of life emerges in which traditional skills are lost and new skills are learnt. The local economy, which would have depended on traditional and dispersed livelihood opportunities, becomes totally dependent on a single economic mammoth. When the mine closes, all the economic opportunities shut down with it. Workers lose their jobs and most of the ancillary economic activities dependent on the mine close down, demolishing the economic base of the communities. Across the world, the economics of mining areas have been characterised by a sudden expansion, followed by a severe recession once the ore is depleted. All this has prompted policymakers to rethink mine closure in an integrated socio-economic-environmental paradigm, rather than just landscaping and pollution containment. A notification issued by the IBM on mine closure states that the mine closure plan should address social issues, mainly related to employees laid off and socio-economic repercussions. It, however, is silent
about the need to plan for the wider socio-economic ramifications on the community dependent on mines. An integral part of mine closure processes, which is completely missing in India, relates to public participation in designing appropriate mine closure plans. Today, it is widely recognised across the world that mine closure plans must have the approval of local communities. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, public consultation has become a key element of the closure process. Mine closure committees with membership from all stakeholders are set up with the primary task of developing and implementing a mine closure plan. The plan addresses both bio-physical and socio-economic issues. Once all the stakeholders agree to it, the plan is sent to the government for approval. In India, on the contrary, mine closure plans are the sole responsibility of the IBM and the mining companies. Surprisingly, the issue is addressed only perfunctorily even by the environmental impact assessment process. While giving an environmental clearance to a mining project, the Union ministry of environment and forests only requires a formal letter of approval of the mine closure plan from IBM. The entire process of developing and approving mine closure plans is completely non-transparent.
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International best practices: land reclamation

Opening mines with closure in mind is the mantra
Mine site reclamation, also called rehabilitation, refers to restoration of mined land to its pre-mining conditions, or alteration to make it available for another productive use. The objectives of mine reclamation are to prevent water contamination and sedimentation, restore the ecosystem, and improve the aesthetics of the landscape. Although it is not possible to fully restore the diversity level which existed before mining (such as in the case of a forest), the ultimate goal of reclamation should be to make the landscape as close as possible, physically and biologically, to its earlier state. The other option is to convert the land into a productive landuse like agriculture. A proper mine closure can only be achieved when it is detailed out even before the mine has started operating. Therefore, opening with closure in mind is the key for a successful mine closure. Following measures are internationally adopted for reclamation: Handling topsoil and biomass The topsoil is the most valuable resource for re-vegetation after mining, as it contains the majority of the seeds, roots and microorganisms. Simultaneous replanting (which begins during mining operations) is very important because if topsoil is stockpiled for a long period of time, its quality deteriorates. If topsoil is not available or is no longer suitable for re-vegetation (for example, if it contains weeds or pathogens which could kill plants), then subsoil, overburden or waste rock could be used. Removal of biomass (vegetation) from the mine site affects the rate of rehabilitation of the site. A fully functional ecosystem cannot be developed until the total pool of nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium) and carbon in the system has reached the pre-mine levels. Therefore, the pre-mine biomass should be saved and used for the continuous rehabilitation of areas even during mining operation. These small pockets of forest can form centres of colonisation, as they are a source of bacteria, fungi, seeds and plants and can promote the generation of the natural ecosystem. Measures to reduce erosion The main environmental concern while rehabilitating land is soil movement due to erosion or landslides, a problem especially pertinent to areas with high rainfall. Therefore, an adequate vegetation cover is necessary to control erosion. However, re-vegetation takes time, and during that process landforms are susceptible to wind and water erosion. In between the time of reshaping the land and planting vegetation, wind erosion can be controlled by covering the soil with protective mulch for maintaining moisture in the soil, or erecting wind breaks to protect the landform from exposure to high winds. Erosion is also a concern for waste piles that have not yet been re-vegetated with topsoil or native species. For examples, water erosion controls include the use of catchment areas that collect extra water, and the slowing of water flow over the pile. Water flow over the soil surface can be slowed by encouraging the infiltration of water into the soil,
which can be accomplished by ripping the soil along the contour. It can also be covered with mulch to reduce the impact of raindrops. Re-vegetation The selection of species for re-vegetation generally depends on future land use, soil conditions and climate of the area. As the objective of reclamation is to restore the native vegetation, in most cases, the species to be planted are pre-determined. However, one needs to take into account the changes mining operations may bring about in the soil and ensure that native species would thrive even if this were the case. In restoring forest ecosystems, the goal is to develop an ecosystem that will move through the stages of succession and facilitate the accumulation of biomass. The diversity of plants and their physical requirements in a mature system are such that colonising plants should be used to condition the soil and provide a more appropriate habitat for the later stage plants. Colonisers can be identified during the operation of the mine and then used in the initial rehabilitation of the land. The timing of seeding is important for successful re-vegetation. Usually, seeding should take place immediately before rains begin or early on in the rainy season. In tropical areas, seeding should take place during the wet season. Fertiliser is commonly used to speed up natural processes by increasing species number, plant cover and density, and growth rates. Companies should be careful when using fertilisers, however, to avoid the destruction of seedlings and the growth of unwanted vegetation. Maintenance and success criteria Invasion by animals, weeds and human activities can thwart rehabilitation efforts. Maintenance of the reclaimed area is necessary to predict and address these problems. It is especially important to monitor the area for several years as it may take time for the system to become self-sustaining. Companies should be prepared to rework areas that are not developing adequately. Success criteria for performance should be defined and agreed on by consulting with all relevant parties. Components of such criteria include physical criteria such as stability, resistance to erosion, and re-establishment of drainage; biological criteria including species diversity, canopy cover, seed production, and weed control; water quality standards for drainage water; public safety; productivity of food crops; and the development of a sustainable forest management programme. Monitoring Monitoring should be done from the start of an exploration programme to the construction and operation of the mine, and continue for years after closure and reclamation. Monitoring encompasses a variety of long-term objectives to determine whether the environmental performance of the company is satisfactory. Developing a monitoring programme involves setting goals and objectives, identifying the standards to be followed, physically monitoring the processes during and after the mining operations, and internally and externally assessing the company s performance.
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HOW SAFE IS MINING?

In an interview to The Economist in 1983, the chief safety engineer of a South African mining corporation had pompously declared: Production is more important than safety.60 Such statements are unimaginable today. Growing awareness, public pressure and stringent standards have helped improve health and safety conditions in mining operations in most countries. Between 1994 and 2004, the average annual death rate in South African mines fell from 0.79 per 1,000 workers to 0.61 per 1,000.61 In India, the average death rate in coal mines has dropped from 0.94 per 1,000 employees in 1901-10 to 0.25 in 2001-05; for noncoal mines, the number of deaths went down by 0.76 per 1,000 employees to 0.35.62 Despite this, mining remains an unsafe occupation. Statistics reveal that mine accidents claim over 15,000 lives every year worldwide.63 According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), deaths within the mining sector as a whole account for five per cent of all worker deaths on the job, even though the sector employs less than one per cent of all workers worldwide.64 These are only the reported deaths; a substantial number of mining deaths goes unrecorded. The data on injuries is even less reliable,
but it is likely that thousands of serious injuries are sustained every year. In 1996, South Africas minister for mineral and energy affairs estimated that in his country, each tonne of gold mined cost one life and 12 serious injuries.65 Most mining accidents occur due to fire, blasting, drilling, flooding, cave-in and land subsidence. Explosions and fires in underground mines are especially risky as ventilation streams in the mines can carry smoke and toxic combustion products throughout the mine, making escape through miles of confined passageways difficult. A fire in an underground coal mine is especially hazardous due to the unlimited fuel supply and the presence of flammable methane gas. Methane is non-toxic but it can be asphyxiating in high concentrations as it displaces the available oxygen. In underground mines, most explosives-related fatalities are caused due to miners being too close to the site of a blast, followed by explosive fumes poisoning, misfires, and premature blasts. Another cause is carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning. CO is a toxic gas that is produced from incomplete combustion or explosion of substances containing carbon. Large quantities of CO are generated during mine fires or explosions. The gas blocks the ability of the haemoglobin in the blood to carry oxygen from the lungs to muscles and other tissues in the body.
REUTERS
Bodies of mine accident victims being retrieved from a Dhanbad mine. Accidents in underground coal mines are common; Jharkhand accounts for the most accidents due to coal mining
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TABLE 3.8: Accidents, injuries and fatalities in Indian mines

Coal mines have traditionally been more hazardous than non-coal mines, accounting for 80 per cent of accidents
Year Fatal accidents Accidents 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 137 131 143 128 127 117 105 81 83 88 80 Killed 219 146 165 146 138 144 141 97 113 97 95 Injured 23 20 22 18 21 28 14 15 12 14 13 Coal Serious accidents Accidents 757 677 677 523 595 661 667 629 563 958 730 Injured 790 703 703 542 629 679 706 650 578 972 742 Accidents 66 72 70 56 61 51 71 52 52 59 39 Fatal accidents Killed 74 83 77 65 72 55 81 64 62 66 42 Injured 5 14 13 15 13 2 8 3 16 10 3 Non-coal Serious accidents Accidents 268 263 265 254 230 187 199 205 168 187 80 Injured 274 269 272 258 238 192 200 206 169 193 81
Source: Anon, 2006, Occupational Safety and Health, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of labour and employment, Government of India, New Delhi
In India, mine safety, in terms of reported accidents, fatalities and injuries, has improved (see Table 3.8: Accidents, injuries and fatalities in Indian mines). The number of reported deaths in mine accidents has gone down from 293 in 1995 to 137 in 2005, while the number of reported accidents (both fatal and serious) has dipped from 1,228 in 1995 to 929 in 2005. During the same period, the number of injuries has gone down from 1,092 to 839. Indian coal mines have always been more prone to accidents than mines in the non-coal sectors. In 2005, coal mines accounted for 87 per cent of the accidents, 69 per cent of the deaths and 90 per cent of the injuries of the total incidents in the Indian mining industry. However, the numbers in coal as well as non-coal mines show a declining trend (see Box on page 98: Of coal and death). The state-wise distribution of fatalities in the mining sector in 2001 pointed towards Jharkhand as the leader, accounting for 26 per cent (see Graph 3.3: State-wise distribution of fatalities). The fatalities can largely be attributed to the states coal mines as well as to the rampant illegal mining. West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh are the other states prone to mining accidents. Among non-coal mines, gold mines have the highest rate of fatal and serious accidents. The main reasons behind the fatalities in the non-coal sectors are transportation-related accidents, followed by falling roofs or walls. Casualties due to gas and fire have been minimal.
GRAPH 3.3: State-wise distribution of fatalities (2001)

Jharkhand, due to its numerous coal mines and illegal mining, had the maximum number of mine accidents
Other 22%
Jharkhand 26%
West Bengal 9%
Maharashtra 5% Orissa 6%
Andhra Pradesh 17%
Rajasthan 7%
Madhya Pradesh 8%
Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3247, August 5, 2002, http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=56886&ptid=17902, as viewed on February 17, 2007
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Of coal and death

Safety in coal mines remains a serious problem in India
The only positive side to the grim story of deaths in Indian coal mines is that the rate of accidents has been dropping, especially after the nationalisation of the coal sector in 1970s; the death rate has dropped from 0.62 deaths per 1,000 employees in 1961-70 to 0.25 in 2001-05.1 But even then, fatality rates in Indian coal mines remain higher than in Australian and European coal mines. However, the rates are almost comparable to the fatality rates in USA and Japan (see Graph: Fatality rates across the world). However, the fatality rate in terms of productivity in Indian coal mines fares poorly compared to other countries. In 1999, the number of deaths in Indian coal mines per million tonne of coal produced was 24 times more than that in Australian mines and 16 times more than in US.2 The rate was far better than Chinese coal mines, though; the number of deaths in India per million tonne of coal produced was
13 times lower than Chinas. Open-cast mines are generally believed to be safer than underground mines. For example, the number of fatalities in underground mines accounted for 54 per cent of the total fatalities in the country in 2000, though the production from underground mines was three times lower.3 The yearly number of accidents per million tonne of coal production for underground, open-cast and surface happens to be 1.236, 0.144 and 0.102, respectively (average data from April 1989 to March 1998). Thus, accidents are about 8.5 times more frequent in underground mines than in open-cast mines.4 The single biggest cause of fatal accidents in Indian coal mines has been the fall of roof or the sides in underground mines. The second biggest killer have been transportation-related accidents. But over a period of three years, out of total fatal accidents, accidents due to falling roof or side have gone down from 42 per cent in 2001 to 38 per cent in 2004. At the same time, fatal accidents due to dumpers and trucks have gone up significantly from 20 per cent to 27 per cent.5
GRAPH: Fatality rates across the world

On an average, there were around 0.3 deaths in coal mines per 1,000 employees in India, US and Japan compared to much lower rates in Germany or Australia
Fatality rate per 1,000 employees in coal mines 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1995 Australia 1996 France India 1997 Japan USA 1998 Germany 1999
Source: Anon, 2001, Safety and public grievance cell, Annual Report of the Union ministry of coal 2000-01, www.coal.nic.in/chap120102.pdf, as viewed on December 2, 2006
The mineral diseases
Silicosis
Silicosis is caused by the inhalation of crystalline silica dust, a common air contaminant in hard rock mines; it can develop after several months of exposure, and can lead to complete loss of lung functions. It also increases its victims susceptibility to other lung diseases such as tuberculosis, bronchitis and lung cancer. Exposure to large amounts of free silica can pass unnoticed because silica is odourless, non-irritable and does not cause any immediate noticeable effect and hence, is confused with ordinary dust. Scientific evidence is increasingly demonstrating that exposure over a working lifetime to the commonly used standard of
Other than accidents, a host of occupational health hazards are associated with mining. Mine workers are prone to hearing impairment, skin and eye diseases, metal and radiation poisoning and most commonly, respiratory problems. Vibration-induced diseases are also quite common (see Box: Impaired: what mining does to the body). It is not surprising that in some countries, the lifespan of miners is substantially lower than that of the general population. In Bolivia, for example, the average miner in the tin mines of Potos will live only 35-40 years, whereas the general populations life expectancy at birth is about 64 years.66
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Impaired: what mining does to the body

A host of occupational health hazards are associated with mining activities. Unorganised labour is particularly susceptible
Some of the occupational hazards associated with the mining industry are: Hearing impairment: Approximately, 90 per cent of miners in the US are hearing impaired by the age of 50.1 Skin diseases: Skin diseases result from contact with allergens or irritant substances. Diseases of the eyes Stress: Job stress often occurs in miners due to the conditions of work and the dangerous environment. Occupational hazards associated with vibrations: In 1977, the ILO listed vibration as an occupational hazard and recommended that measures should to be taken to protect employees from it. Regular exposure to vibration causes both vascular and neural disorders such as hand-arm vibration syndrome (HAVS). In South Africa, the prevalence rate of HAVS is estimated at 15 per cent of mine workers exposed to vibration in gold mines,2 while the prevalence in the US has been reported to be as high as 50 per cent.3 Prevalence of HAVS in India has not been documented in detail. It is estimated that around 1.80-18 lakh mine workers are regularly exposed to vibration in Indian mines. Workers in unorganised and private mines are at an increased risk due to extended shift duration.4 A study was conducted on 66 drillers and 35 blasters (as control subject) from limestone mines in India, and it reported a significantly high prevalence of HAVS among drillers as compared to blasters.5 Studies point towards strong epidemiological evidence that occupational exposure to whole body vibration (WBV) is associated with an increased risk of lower back pain, sciatica pain and degenerative changes in the spinal system, including lumbar inter-vertebral disc disorders.6 Countries like the US, the UK, Canada and Australia have enforced specific regulations for control of workplace vibration. The Bureau of Indian Standards has also recommended vibration standards that are identical to corresponding ISO standards. However, these standards are voluntary. There are various minerals such as uranium which are hazardous. Heavy metal poisoning especially lead and chromium and other forms of chemical poisoning are also common. Respiratory diseases: The relationship between mining and occupational lung diseases has been documented since the 1500s, when Georgius Agricola described dust with corrosive qualities eating away the lungs.7 The prevalence and severity of mining-related lung diseases depend on a number of factors including type of mineral mined, exposure levels, the period of exposure and co-existing illnesses and environmental conditions. Common among these ailments are silicosis, asbestosis and pneumoconiosis.
0.1 milligram per cubic metre (mg/m3) of silica results in a significant burden of radiological silicosis and also deaths from silicosis and lung cancer.67 Chronic exposure to silica predisposes to tuberculosis, which remains a major public health problem in countries like India.68 Recently, crystalline silica has been classified as a human carcinogen (Group I) by the International Agency for Research on Cancer.69 Since the earths crust contains about 12 per cent free silica mostly in the form of quartz, mining and tunnelling have a high risk of silica exposure. The sandstone industry, stone quarrying, granite industry, grinding of metals, sand blasting, iron and steel foundries, silica milling, flint crushing and manufacture of abrasives are some occupations in which silica exposure can be high. There are about three million workers in India at high potential risk of silica exposure. A majority of these 56 per cent (17 lakh) are employed in mining and quarries.70 The first cases of silicosis in India were described in the 1940s among the gold miners of Kolar.71 Very few epidemiological studies have been conducted on silicosis in the country. Some of the studies conducted indicate that cases of silicosis are found in all kinds of miners, though they are more prevalent in workers employed in the slate pencil industry, agate mining, etc (see Table 3.9: Silicosis in India).
TABLE 3.9: Silicosis in India

Industry-wise prevalence studies show slate pencil workers to be the highest risk group
Industry Gold mines Gold mines Mica mines/mica processing industries of Bihar Manganese mines Lead and zinc mines Stone cutters Stone cutters Stone cutters Foundries Ordnance factories Agate workers Glass bangle workers Slate pencil workers Mica mines/mica processing Quartz crushing Stone quarry Sand grinding Prevalence (%) 8.84 13.9 34.0 4.1 30.4 20.0 25.0 35.2 27.2 3.5 38.0 7.3 54.6 5.2 12.0 22.0 27.8
Source: Silicosis: an uncommonly diagnosed common occupational disease, ICMR Bulletin Vol 29, No 9, Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi, http://icmr.nic.in/busep99.htm, as viewed on November 23, 2006
99
On their part, a number of state governments in India have passed legislations to counter the problem. Silicosis was first notified under the Factories Act on the basis of a coal mining report. Specific rules have been framed to establish the medical board, the procedures for conducting medical examinations, etc. However, the implementation of these is extremely weak.
Asbestosis
Asbestosis happens due to inhalation of asbestos and causes chest congestions and organ malfunctions. Asbestos mining and milling activities release fibre and dust in the atmosphere. When these minute fibres are inhaled, they get accumulated in the lungs. Long-term exposure causes lung cancer, mesothelioma (cancer of mesothelial linings of the lung and chest cavity), gastrointestinal cancer and asbestosis (scarring of lung tissues). There are two schools of thought regarding the effects of asbestos on human health: North American researchers postulate that use of asbestos in a controlled manner does not pose any harm, whereas their European counterparts claim that asbestos in minute quantities is also lethal. Of the various types of asbestos, blue asbestos or crocidolite is the most dangerous and is banned in most countries, including India. A number of studies have been conducted in India to estimate the prevalence of asbestosis in this country. Some of these
have found that 23-70 per cent of people with direct exposure to asbestos for more than 20 years will develop asbestosis.72 Studies by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH) in Ahmedabad found that 11 per cent of workers in asbestos mines had asbestosis.73 The 2004 report of the Union labour ministrys Saxena committee (set up following a Supreme Court order on the issue of medical benefits and compensation to workers affected by handling of hazardous wastes) also mentions the risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma caused by asbestos. In India, asbestos is regulated under the Factories Act (1948), in which asbestosis is listed as a notifiable disease, as well as the Air and Water Act and the Hazardous Wastes (Handling and Management) Rules, 1989 under the Environment Protection Act (1986). With increased awareness on the deleterious effects of asbestos, the Central government forbade the state governments in 1986 from granting any new mining leases for asbestos. In June 1993, it banned the renewal of existing mining leases of asbestos. The ban, however, does not include usage, manufacture, export and import of asbestos. The government is now considering the possibility of lifting the ban on asbestos mining a move which threatens to put lives of thousands of workers at stake (see Box: Supreme Court comes to the rescue).
Supreme Court comes to the rescue

And speaks out for the workers of asbestos industry
Several judicial cases have been filed in India against the asbestos industry with regard to the health of its workers. The most famous of these is one between Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC), Ahmedabad, Gujarat and others and the Union of India, filed in 1993. The writ petition dealt with the danger to the life of workers employed in the asbestos industry. The Court ruled: Exposure to asbestos and the resultant long tragic chain of adverse medical, legal and societal consequences reminds the legal and social responsibility of the employer or the producer not to endanger the workforce or the community or the society. He is not absolved of the inherent responsibility to the exposed worker or the society at large. The Court ruled that the industrial units must maintain a health record of every worker up to a minimum period of 40 years; insure workers under the Employees State Insurance Act or Workmens Compensation Act; or give health coverage to every worker. In the particular case, the appropriate inspector of factories in Gujarat was directed to send all workers for re-examination to the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH). In case of the positive finding that any of them were suffering from the occupational hazards, the person was entitled to a compensation of Rs 1 lakh within a period of three months from the date of certification by the NIOH. Despite all this, there has not been much change at the ground level. Much of the problem comes from the fact that rules and regulations are poorly implemented.
P MADHAVAN
Dead man walking: workers in asbestos mines run the risk of cancers, chest ailments and organ malfunction
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Coal workers pneumoconiosis

Coal workers pneumoconiosis (CWP) is caused due to inhalation of coal dust from coal mines. The workers affected by this disease suffer from severe lung problems and are prone to lung cancer. There is no standard or limit in India for coal dust. Studies conducted by the NIOH have found that more than two per cent of workers in underground coal mines develop CWP, while 45 per cent develop other respiratory morbidities. In case of workers operating in open-cast coal mines, the percentage is lower at two per cent for CWP and 42 per cent for other respiratory morbidities.74 The statistics, of course, may be presenting only part of the picture; the number of diseases, accidents, injuries and fatalities in the entire mining sector is likely to be much more. Many cases, especially in small-scale and illegal mines, are neither recorded nor reported. Though mining accidents are on the decline, the Indian mining sector has a long way to go before it can be at par with some of the industrialised nations. An important task for the industry is to increase awareness among workers about occupational hazards and risks. Though there are comprehensive laws in place, their implementation is lax. Most of the safety inspections and audits remain on paper. There is an urgent need in India to introduce a comprehensive occupational health and safety act in line with that of many industrialised countries. There is a need to develop capacity to identify and treat mine-related occupational diseases. Failing to address these issues can only lead to further losses for the industry.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Dust standards exist, but only on paper. Workers exposed to coal dust are prone to lung cancer
Uranium kills
The health hazards in uranium mining
Uranium has been mined for ages, but it is only in the last 30 years that the impact of occupational exposure to radiation in mines has been realised and discussed. Radiation-induced occupational cancers appear to be some of the most severe radiation injuries known to occur among workers exposed to ionising radiation. Uranium mining creates risks in two ways: through dust and through released radon, a radioactive gas of natural origin. Radon is found everywhere in the earth's atmosphere, but has low reactivity when it occurs by itself. But in the process of mining, exposure to it leads to alpha irradiation of the bronchial epithelium. A paper on the uranium mines in Erzgebirge, Saxony, in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has tracked the long history of occupational injury from radiation in uranium mines. The study reports: The history of disease in these miners extends over five centuries. The discovery of the lung cancer component was made toward the end of the 19th century, and the suspicion that a connection might exist between this cancer type and exposure to ionising radiation was voiced at the beginning of the 20th century. In the first half of this century, further research was carried out on this disease in the Schneeberg
area of Erzgebirge. After World War II, American uranium mines in the Colorado plateau used the German research results as a basis for working out their own radiation protection standards. But the uranium mines under Soviet occupation in GDR paid no attention to these research findings. For many years, no precautions were taken. The consequence: an estimated 9,000 fatal cases of lung cancer among these underground miners. Uranium miners also face many non-radiation-related hazards. Soluble uranium affects the kidneys if ingested or inhaled because of its chemical toxicity as a heavy metal. The ore in which uranium is found also contains non-radioactive toxic heavy metals. These vary from site to site but may include arsenic, lead, molybdenum, and manganese. Uranium mining is associated with lung damage through silicosis. Silica dust is created in the drilling process and can lead to cancer with an increased risk of tuberculosis, rheumatoid arthritis and kidney disease. Some measures can be taken to reduce toxic exposure to miners, such as proper ventilation, use of protective clothing and masks, and monitoring of absorbed radioactivity doses. In India, uranium mining is currently being done only in Jharkhand. The health impacts due to mining in East Singhbhum in this state have been devastating ranging from respiratory diseases to reproductive disorders (see Chapter 4: Mining in the states Jharkhand and West Bengal).
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BEYOND MINING: THE SAME STORY

The social-environmental downslide that mining triggers, endures much beyond a mines immediate boundaries or impacts mineral-based industries carry forward the mayhem. Sectors such as iron and steel, thermal power plants (TPPs), aluminium, cement, lead and zinc figure among the red category industries in the country: they have an extremely high pollution potential. They are also resource-intensive and generate huge quantities of waste. The global power sector is the biggest contributor to GHG emissions in 2003, it contributed more than 40 per cent of the total CO2 emissions across the world.75 In India, TPPs account for 65 per cent of industrial CO2 emissions from large point sources.76 Another problem associated with Indian TPPs is the huge quantities of flyash they generate. The coal used by these TPPs is of inferior quality, and has an ash content of 35-40 per cent. On an average, more than 100 MT of flyash is generated every year in India, of which more than 90 per cent ends up in waste dumps or in ash ponds.77 Other environmental issues include dust emissions, wastewater generation, and mercury pollution. Cement plants are not far behind TPPs in GHG emissions. The sector accounts for five per cent of global CO2 emissions.78 In 2000, the total CO2 emissions from the world cement industry were around 829 MT,79 a major chunk of which was accounted for by the top three cement producers: China, India and the US. India contributed 47 MT.80 The other major concern associated with this sector is that of dust emissions fugitive as well as point source. Metal smelters and refineries are equally damaging to the environment. Worldwide, smelting adds about 142 MT of sulphur dioxide to the atmosphere every year: that is 13 per cent of total global emissions. Smelting releases a range of other pollutants as well. Emissions of metals such as lead, arsenic, cadmium and zinc are common and can pose serious health risks.81 Lately, two industries have been gaining particular notoriety in India in terms of their impact on environment: iron and steel and sponge iron. Both the sectors are witnessing significant changes. While the steel industry, having received significant investments, is poised to grow, the sponge iron industry is already mushrooming all over the country at a rapid rate. Not surprisingly, the two sectors have sparked off the maximum number of popular protests.
global steel production, with a total output of about 33 MT. By 2006, it had improved its ranking to seventh, producing 44 MT registering a growth of 35 per cent in two years. Today, there are eight major integrated iron and steel plants in the country, of which five are under the Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL). The countrys crude and finished steel production has shown a continuous growth since independence (see Graph 3.5: Trends in steel production). Rapid industrialisation, motorisation and urbanisation have ensured a continuous demand. The IISI projection shows that from 2010 to 2015, world steel demand will grow by more than four per cent annually. Comparatively, the growth in Indias steel demand will be much higher at around eight per cent per annum (more than Chinas, which is expected to be around six per cent per year). While Indias exports of steel have remained more or less constant in recent years, its imports have gone up. In 2002-03, the country imported 1.5 MT of steel, which has almost tripled to 4.1 MT in 2006-07 (see Table 3.10: The steel trade). This indicates that although the production of steel has been continuously increasing, Indias steel plants are unable to cope with the burgeoning market demand. The sector, however, is on the verge of a makeover. Because of the easy availability of high quality raw material and cheap labour and the projected demand for steel, many domestic and international players have shown interest in investing in the sector in the country. A total of 116 MoUs have been signed in various states till November 2006: these will add a capacity of around 150 MT, with an investment of Rs 3,57,000 crore. These proposed projects will take the total steel producing capacity of the country to 180 MT by 2019-20.85
GRAPH 3.4: World production of steel 2005

With three per cent of the global production, India is ranked 7th
NAFTA 11.2% CIS 10% Other Europe 2.9%
China 30.9%
Iron and steel: resource-guzzler and polluter
The Indian iron and steel industry is about eight decades old. In 1957, the country had three integrated steel plants with a total capacity of about two MT.82 In 2007, the countrys total steel production stood at around 44 MT.83 According to the Belgium-based International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), China was the largest producer in 2005, accounting for more than 30 per cent of global steel output. Japan (10 per cent) and the US (eight per cent) followed, while the contribution of India was about three per cent (see Graph 3.4: World production of steel 2005).84 However, the Indian steel sector has recorded a phenomenal growth between 2004 and 2006. In 2004, India ranked ninth in
New EU (10) 2.0% EU (15) 14.6%
Japan 9.9% Others 7.8% Other Asia 7.7%
India 3%
Source: Anon, 2006, World Steel, International Iron and Steel Institute, Belgium, pp no 3
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GRAPH 3.5: Trends in steel production

Steel production has witnessed significant growth since 1998-99
40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Hot metal
Crude/ingot steel
Finished steel
Production (in milion tonne)
Years
Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=13613&ptid=13591&level=5 as viewed on May 25, 2007
Even the existing players are beefing up capacities to meet the growing demand. Indias largest steel manufacturer SAIL is planning to increase its annual production from 12 MT per annum to 22.5 MT per annum by 2011-12, by investing about Rs 37,000 crore.86 Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), the other big player, is also planning to increase its steel-making capacity to 33-34 MT per annum by 2015. Besides increasing the capacity of its Jamshedpur plant from five MT per annum to 10, the company is also planning to set up a 12-MT per annum greenfield project in Jharkhand, a six-MT per annum plant in Orissa and a five-MT per annum capacity unit in Chhattisgarh. The worlds largest steel producer, Arcelor Mittal, has already announced two projects a 12-MT per annum greenfield steel project each in Jharkhand and Orissa. Another global steel producer, Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) has invested in setting up a plant of 12 MT per annum at Jagatsinghpur in Orissa. The states which lead with their steel industries are the ones that hold abundant reserves of iron ore: Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The state of Orissa alone has signed around 45 MoUs with steel investors for producing 60 MT within the next few years.87 Most of the integrated iron and steel plants in the country, including the plants of SAIL and Tata, are based on the blast furnace (BF) process. This method of steel making uses coking coal and iron ore as raw materials coking coal is converted to coke and then fed into a blast furnace along with treated iron ore. The end product is the hot metal, which is sent to the oxygen furnace for conversion into steel. The process is resource-intensive, consumes large quantities of water, and generates large volumes of wastewater and toxic fumes.
TABLE 3.10: The steel trade

Rising imports indicate the domestic steel industrys shortfalls in meeting demand (figures in million tonne)
Year 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 (Prov) 2006-07 (Apr-Mar, 2007) (prov estimated) Import (finished steel) 1.510 1.540 2.109 3.765 4.100 Export (finished steel) 4.506 4.835 4.381 4.350 4.750
Source: An overview of the steel sector, http://steel.nic.in/over.htm, as viewed on May 1, 2007
For example, the five plants of SAIL consume on an average three tonne of raw materials (iron ore, dolomite and coking coal) to produce a tonne of crude steel. The company also uses up 6.5 tonne of water per tonne of crude steel and 31 gigaJoule (GJ) of energy per tonne of product. This means that in a year, SAIL consumes around 38 MT of raw materials, 74 MT of water and 377 million GJ of energy.88 Similarly, TISCO consumes as much as 85 MT of water and more than 39 MT of raw materials.89 The major pollution concerns from the sector include various forms of air pollutants such as particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, greenhouse gases (mainly
103
CO2) and polyaromatic hydrocarbons including benz(a)pyerine and volatile organic carbons. Coke oven plants also release carcinogenic gases. The total dust load from a steel plant is significant, as is evident from SAILs steel plants, which emitted around 36,000 tonne of particulates in a year90; the dust load from TISCOs Jamshedpur plant was 5,305 tonne per annum.91 The integrated iron and steel sector is a big emitter of GHGs: on an average, for making one tonne of crude steel, it generates about 2.5 tonne of CO2 (excluding grid electricity).92 The industry is not only water-intensive, but also discharges large quantities of effluents. The steel plants of SAIL discharge around 53 MT of wastewater every year.93 The effluent contains a wide range of pollutants ranging from organic-inorganic contaminants to heavy metals such as chromium and toxins such as cyanide. For instance, in 2004-05, Tata Steel released around one tonne of cyanide through its wastewater.94 Integrated steel plants also generate significant quantities of hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. SAIL generated seven MT of wastes in 2004-05, of which a major chunk (73 per cent) consisted of slag (BF air cooled and granulated slag).95
These factors, along with the iron and steel sectors need for large chunks of land for the plant as well as for the mines, have ensured that its path for growth is not smooth. Across the country, communities are protesting against new iron and steel plants. They are protesting against the impending displacement, the deterioration in environment and the destruction of the natural resource base. The Tata group is facing stiff resistance against its six-MT plant at Kalinganagar in Orissa. Another Tata Steel project in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, is facing serious setbacks due to peoples protests.96 There are reports of protests against Essars steel plant in Dhurli (Chhattisgarh) as well. The South Korean steel giant, POSCO, is also facing a severe test in Orissa. Communities up against the project fear that over 20,000 people from around 15 neighbouring villages will lose their livelihoods to the project. These people are dependant on betel leaf farming on government land, which the company proposes to acquire. The project is yet to take off. Indias projected steel capacity for 2019-20 is 180 MT, and the sector would require huge resources to meet its requirement of raw material 310 MT of iron ore, 187 MT of coking coal and 1,103 MT of water.97 Clearly, the steel industry must recognise its manifold challenges. These challenges include resource management (especially water), sound environmental management practices and people-friendly policies. The industry cannot and will not grow if it continues to antagonise local communities. Much is at stake: along with improving its bottom line, the industry also needs to ensure an equitable development for people.
Sponge iron: growing menace
Steelmaking is a resource-intensive and polluting process. Communities affected by upcoming steel plants are, therefore, on the warpath
Steel can also be manufactured by directly reducing iron ore (iron oxide) into iron. The product from this process is called direct reduced iron (DRI), or sponge iron. DRI is manufactured using either coal or natural gas. Since natural gas reserves in India are limited, the production of sponge iron is mostly through coal. The pollution associated with sponge iron includes fugitive dust and particulate emissions, gaseous emissions and solid waste.98 India has led the world in sponge iron production since 2001-02; today, it accounts for 20 per cent of the global output. Venezuela, Mexico and Iran are the other major producers. Together, these four countries account for around 60 per cent of the worlds production.99 The sector has largely gained at the expense of the BF and electric arc furnace (EAF) methods, which require coking coal and steel scrap, supplies of which are limited. Another reason for the mushrooming of sponge iron plants across the country is the ease with which they can be set up with the help of local fabricators and suppliers. The capital investment is also low compared to other steel-making techniques. For instance, the cost of setting up a one-MT integrated steel plant with a BF works out to about Rs 3,000 crore. The EAF process, on its part, consumes large quantities of power, and is only used, therefore, to make specialised steel products and alloys.100 Compared to this, setting up a 100-tonne per day sponge iron plant costs around Rs 7-12 crore, which can be recovered in just
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MAP 3.2: The sponge iron spread

The country is expected to have 431 plants by 2007, up from 23 in 2000
NA
JAMMU & KASHMIR
Sponge iron country Plants with capacity more than 66,000 tonne per annum (200 tonne per day)
HIMACHAL PRADESH
PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND HARYANA DELHI SIKKIM RAJASTHAN UTTAR PRADESH BIHAR MEGHALAYA MANIPUR GUJARAT JHARKHAND MADHYA PRADESH TRIPURA ASSAM NAGALAND ARUNACHAL PRADESH
18 1
DAMAN & DIU DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI
38 41
34-37
WEST BENGAL
MIZORAM
TTI
2 3
MAHARASHTRA
10
CH
SGA
RH
19 13-17 39-40 27-33 20-26 9 12

ORISSA
HA
Gujarat (1)
1 Essar Steel Limited, Surat
BAY OF BENGAL
4-5
Maharashtra (5)
2 Sunflag Iron and Steel Co Ltd, Bhandara 3 Lloyds Metals & Engineers Ltd, Chandrapur 4 Ispat Industries Ltd, Raigad 5 Vikram Ispat, Raigad
ARABIAN SEA ANDHRA PRADESH
Jharkhand (41)
11
7 6
KARNATAKA
38 Bihar Sponge Iron Ltd, Kharsawa 41 Balaji Industrial Products Limited, West Singbhum
West Bengal (35) Orissa (93)

9 12 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 39 40 SPS Steel & Power Limited, Jharsuguda Scaw Industries Pvt Ltd, Dhenkanal Beekay Steels & Power Limited, Keonjhar Deepak Steel & Power Ltd, Keonjhar Grewal Associates (P) Ltd, Keonjhar Orissa Sponge Iron Limited, Keonjhar Rungta Mines Ltd, Keonjhar Shree Metaliks Ltd, Keonjhar Tata Sponge Iron Ltd, Keonjhar Neepaz Metaliks Ltd, Sundargarh OCL India Ltd, Sundargarh 34 35 36 37 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Haldia Steels Limited, Burdwan Jai Balaji Sponge Limited, Burdwan Shri Ramrupai Balaji Steels Limited, Burdwan Shyam Sel Ltd, Burdwan HEG Limited, Durg Ind Agro Synergy, Raigarh Jindal Steel & Power Limited, Raigarh Nalwa Sponge Iron Limited, Raigarh Sidhi Vinayak Sponge Iron Pvt Ltd, Raigarh Singhal Enterprises (P) Ltd, Raigarh Nova Iron & Steel Ltd, Bilaspur Prakash Industries Limited, Champa Aarti Sponge and Power Ltd, Raipur Ispat Godavari Ltd, Raipur Khetan Sponge & Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, Raipur Monnet Ispat Limited, Raipur Raipur Alloys & Steel Ltd, Raipur Shri Bajrang Power & Ispat Ltd, Raipur Vandana Global Limited, Raipur
Goa (5)
6 Goa Sponge & Power, Sanguem
Chhattisgarh (70)
8
Karnataka (30)
7 Hospet Ispat Limited, Koppal
TAMIL NADU
ALA KER
Tamil Nadu (5)

8 Sree Renagaraaj Ispat (P) Ltd, Perundurai
Andhra Pradesh (16)

11 GSAL (India) Limited, Vizianagaram
INDIAN OCEAN
Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of plants in each state. Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, 2006
105
12-18 months because of the massive profit margins.101 An unit can make a profit of Rs 60 lakh a month if the production costs are kept low by cheap labour and by not operating the pollution control equipment.102 Naturally, the sector has witnessed a phenomenal growth. In 2000-01, there were 23 plants in India with a total capacity of seven MT. By 2006, the number had gone up to 206 with a total capacity of around 19 MT. According to the Joint Plant Committee constituted in 2005 by the Centre to survey the sponge iron industry, in addition to the existing 206 plants, 225 coal-based sponge iron plants are at various stages of commissioning and construction. It is expected that by 2007, there would be 431 sponge iron plants in the country with a total production capacity of 44 MT.103 The country produced 16 MT of sponge iron in 2006-07 compared to 12 MT in the previous year, registering a growth of about 38 per cent. The production is likely to touch the 20-MT mark by the end of the current fiscal, which means a rate of growth of about 23 per cent over the previous year.104 Due to the surplus coal and iron ore in the central and eastern parts of the country, there is an accumulation of sponge iron plants in the states of Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal. Chhattisgarh ranks at the top in numbers and capacity, followed by Orissa: in 2004-05, Chhattisgarh produced 21 per cent of the total sponge iron in the country. The state had 60 sponge iron plants in 2006; this is expected to go up to 100 very soon. Most of these plants are located in Raigarh, Bilaspur and Raipur districts, in ecologically sensitive areas. For instance, in Raigarh, six plants have come up in the Taraimal reserve forest which has a high wildlife density. The states of Orissa and Jharkhand are not far behind. As of December 2005, there were around 61 sponge iron units operating in Orissa and another 44 had been given the necessary permissions. In addition, many plants are operating illegally in Sundergarh, Keonjhar and Jharsuguda, districts which are rich in coal, dolomite and iron ore. Jharkhand has about 42 functioning sponge iron plants, most them concentrated in the Giridih, Saraikela-Kharsawan, West Singhbhum and Hazaribagh areas. In the past two years, the state government has signed 44 MoUs for industrial projects; of these, 42 are for sponge iron plants.105 The big players in this sector are Jindal Steel and Power Ltd (Chhattisgarh), Ispat Industries Ltd (Maharashtra), Tata Sponge Iron Ltd (Orissa), Orissa Sponge Iron Ltd (Orissa) and Essar Steel Ltd (Gujarat). Due to the boom, many companies are in the process of expansion. For instance, Tata Sponge Iron Ltd is planning to expand its capacity in Keonjhar (Orissa) from 240,000 tonne to 390,000 tonne.106 Jindal Steel and Power Ltd has received clearances in August 2004 for increasing its capacity from 600,000 tonne per annum to 720,000 tonne in Raipur, Chhattisgarh. The rapid growth in the sponge iron industry is a matter of concern. Most plants are located in areas rich in forests, and inhabited by tribals; moreover, almost all these areas are characterised by poor environmental governance. The key problem of the Indian sponge iron industry lies in its highly polluting, coalbased production process; other countries have adopted the relatively cleaner gas-based plants. A typical 100-tonne per day
FIGURE 3.1: Sponging off the earth

Sponge iron plants gobble up huge quantities of resources and spew equally large amounts as wastes
Garbage factor
Pollution cost for a tonne of sponge iron
1.6-1.75 tonne of iron ore 1.2-1.5 tonne of coal 0.035-0.05 tonne of dolomite 1.5-2.0 tonne of water
1.8-2.0 tonne of carbon dioxide 0.25 tonne of dust 0.29 tonne of coal char 0.02 tonne of kiln accretions 0.02 tonne of sulphur dioxide, water vapour and thermal pollution
Source: Radhika Krishnan et al, 2006, Iron in the soul, Down To Earth, September 15, 2006, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, pp 25
sponge iron plant consumes 160-175 tonne of iron ore, 120-150 tonne of coal, 3.5-5 tonne of dolomite and 120-160 tonne of water every day. In return, it emits 180-200 tonne of carbon dioxide, 1-2 tonne of dust (if it is equipped with required pollution control equipment; otherwise, dust emissions can be as high as 10 tonne per day), 25-30 tonne of char and 2.5-3.5 tonne of kiln accretion every day. The total pollution load from the plant, therefore, can be as high as 230-250 tonne per day (see Figure 3.1: Sponging off the earth). In the past five to 10 years, the indiscriminate mushrooming of these factories has ravaged the countryside, affected
106
groundwater supplies, polluted air and water bodies, and severely damaged crops, forest cover, livestock, health and livelihoods. The sector has many problems. Factory owners, interested only in their profit margins, circumvent basic safety and pollution control measures. Almost without exception, all small- and medium-scale plants shut their electro-static precipitators (ESPs) in the evenings to save electricity costs and speed up the production process (it costs a plant about Rs 6 lakh a month to run an ESP continuously). The dust collected from the ESPs is dumped outside the plant in dry form, causing severe pollution. There is no system for disposing off coal char. The toxic slag is dumped haphazardly along highways, in villages, forests and streams. Coal char can contaminate the water table if it seeps underground. Rampant deep boring for water, necessary for the plants cooling systems, has depleted groundwater tables and left village wells dry; one plant can have six to 20 deep borewells. Moreover, most sponge iron plants do not contribute much to the local economy. Despite assurances of job security, very few local villagers are hired, and mostly as unskilled labourers with no insurance or medical benefits. There are no provisions for in-house training and accidents are common. Another common problem is that of land acquisition, which triggers conflicts. Industry often acquires land through subterfuge. Land in villages near Raipur, originally meant for herbal plantations, is being used today to set up sponge iron plants. In Bemeta in Chhattisgarh, villagers claim that land bought at the
rate of approximately Rs 20,000 per ha by the state government was sold to industrialists at roughly Rs 1.25 lakh per ha. Industries are required to get a no-objection certificate from gram panchayats, but even this procedure has been reduced to a mere formality, or at times, ignored completely. Mostly, sarpanchs are bribed and documents manufactured. In Chourenga near Raipur, though the gram sabha did not pass a resolution allowing a plant to come up, blank spaces left in the gram sabhas register were used to fabricate the NOC. Where subterfuge doesnt work, muscle and money power do. Villagers of Tamnar and Patrapalli in Raigarh district allege that when some of them refused to sell their land to Jindal Steel and Power Limited, musclemen threatened them, hot ash was dumped on their land, and their villages were razed with bulldozers. In Chourenga, a canal was filled up and converted into a road by a sponge iron plant. The state government, while admitting that the canal was given on lease to the plant, refuses to admit that a road has been constructed. In Bemeta, a nursery was converted into a road after uprooting 5,000 trees. In Ratanpur near Sundergarh in Orissa, Mahavir Hi-tech Chemicals Pvt Ltd bought around 30 ha along the Ib river in 2004 for a sponge iron plant, without even a gram sabha hearing. The plant affects four villages in the vicinity. A gram sabha was called after protests engineered by Kiran Club, a Balijuri village youth club run by a group of tribal girls and boys. But the meeting was adjourned repeatedly on some pretext or another. Villagers and
CHANDRA BHUSHAN / CSE
Way to dusty death: fugitive emissions from sponge iron plants take a heavy toll of environmental and public health
107
Dark zone: solid waste generated by sponge iron plants is often dumped near forested areas and sources of water
youth club members say the company sent its goons to disrupt the sabha proceedings. It took five attempts at holding a gram sabha meeting before a resolution could finally be passed in February 2005. Nearly 4,000 people attended the meeting and amid police lathicharging, said no to the proposed plant. The factory has been stopped for now, but rumours are afloat that it will make a comeback bid under a different name and in the guise of an integrated steel plant. Ratanpur may have got a reprieve, but in places like Kuarmunda and Podajalanga in Sundergarh district of Orissa, plants have not only acquired land without gram sabha approval, they have even been built and continue to operate despite strong protests by local residents. But the protests are growing across India. In some cases, things have taken a serious enough turn for companies to close down plants. In Nayagaon village in Chaibasa, Jharkhand, villagers simply couldnt take it any more. So, armed with bows, arrows and sticks, about 1,000 tribal men, women and children stormed the gates of Sai Sponge India Ltd on April 7, 2006. They ransacked the factory, damaged property and equipment worth Rs 1 crore and brought production to a halt. We had had enough, says villager Mangal Singh Tamsoy. Ever since it started in 2004, there have been problems. We had no idea what kind of factory was being built next to our fields. We were duped. The land transactions took place without gram sabha approval. The Ho Samaj Mahasabha in Chandil has filed a case in the Jharkhand High Court accusing the Sai Sponge management of violating the Panchayats Extension of the Scheduled Areas Act,
which clearly states that land acquisition for industrial and development projects have to be first approved by the local gram sabha or panchayat. Following the April violence, the plant had to be shut down for 58 days. Work resumed on June 4, 2006 after it finally installed an ESP and after factory owners reached a compromise with the villagers. According to the compromise formula, the plant promised to give the village Rs 1 lakh a year for developmental work; it also promised to send a doctor for free medical checkups in the village once a week, and to give a college scholarship to the most meritorious student in the village. In December 2006, non-governmental organisations, autonomous peoples movements and environmental experts came together in a meeting held in Nagpur to discuss and highlight the adverse social and environmental impacts of the growing sponge iron industry in the country. The groups have launched a national campaign Save livelihoods and environment from the sponge iron industry to address the issue. But despite the public outcry and protests, governments of states like Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand are aggressively going ahead with their industrialisation plans. They believe sponge iron is a core area of development for them, and are planning accordingly. In the light of what the sponge iron industry is doing to the land and its people, these beliefs and plans certainly need a drastic review. Environmental conservation must go hand-in-hand with economic development because development which destroys the environment, is bound to create more poverty.
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Mining in the states
he stories of mining from Indias states might seem similar at first glance, but they also have their points of difference. Almost all the backdrops include lands teeming with resources forests, wildlife, water and minerals. The
protagonists, unfailingly, are rapacious industries and the State, and their opposition: the ragtag groups conveniently placed under the acronym of project-affected people. But there are some typical regional characteristics as well. The drama is at its most intense in three states: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. All three are blessed with immense mineral and natural resources. All three have substantial tribal populations that have their homes on the very lands which hold the minerals. A very large majority of these three states populations subsist below the poverty line. And all three are vying to outdo each other in the game (and name) of development. The fallouts, naturally, are the same: disappearing forests, curdling water sources, barren farmlands, rising displacement and poverty and growing discontent, which has found its most potent and rabid manifestation in the form of Naxal violence. In fact, Chhattisgarh faces an incipient civil war-like situation, with its state-sponsored militias ranged against the rampaging Red mobs. Among the other states, Goa and Karnataka have embarked on a path of no-holds barred prospecting and extraction of iron ore all to feed the ravenous Chinese steel sector. Everything that has iron in it including the soil of the region is being stripped down for export. A similar spectacle can be seen on the riverine and coastal beaches of Kerala and Tamil Nadu: sand is the casualty here. And in all these, and in other states like Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, forests are being put to the axe with terrifying regularity. Protest movements have accompanied almost every new project; the anger, it is clear, is growing. But so is these states determination to let nothing come in the way of their path to progress.
Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand together accounted for 54 per cent of metallic mineral value and 45 per cent of fuel mineral value created in the country. More than 3 lakh hectare of land is currently under mining in these states each boasting more than 25 per cent of land under forest, and with more than 20 per cent tribal population. Even though mining contributes significantly to the economy (between 10-15 per cent) of the three states, the sector has not brought any prosperity: 86 per cent of districts in Jharkhand, 90 per cent in Orissa, and 94 per cent in Chhattisgarh figure among the 150 most backward districts of the country. On the back of Chinese demand, mining of iron ore has gone up exponentially in Goa and Karnataka. Contribution of iron ore to Karnatakas royalty has gone up by six times in three years (2002-03 to 2004-05). Iron ore exports from Goa have gone up by 53 per cent since 1999-00. Both states are also devastated by the mining. Madhya Pradesh is the sole producer of diamonds holding 32 per cent of the deposits, mostly concentrated in Panna district. Panna, ironically, is among the five poorest districts in the state. Moreover, illegal mining thrives here there are over 3,000 illegal mines; 90 per cent of the diamonds mined in the area is sold illegally. Rajasthan is the leader in minor mineral production it has 7,765 leases for minor minerals covering 54,390 ha and 15,786 quarry licenses. It also employs 2.5 million people, 95 per cent of whom are dalits or tribals. Most mines remain unmonitored and have deplorable working conditions unfair wages, no basic rights or social security and high accident rates.
M I N I N G I N T H E S TAT E S
Andhra Pradesh
ndhra Pradesh holds reserves of more than 45 minerals, ranging from coal, limestone, manganese and bauxite to diamonds, dolomite, graphite, sand, coloured granites and silica. The state accounts for 96 per cent of Indias barytes, 40 per cent of its limestone, 30 per cent of its bauxite and six per cent of its coal (see Table 1: The reserves), and is heavily mined. About 16 per cent of Indias mines (or 1,482 mines) are in Andhra Pradesh.1 These do not include the leases under coal or minor minerals. In terms of area, 0.75 per cent of the states 27.5 million ha land is covered under mining leases.2 This may appear to be a small percentage, but given the large land area of the state it turns out to be a whopping 2,06,250 ha. The IBMs Indian Minerals Yearbook
TABLE 1: The reserves

The state has more than 30 per cent of the countrys reserves of five minerals, including limestone
Mineral Barytes Ball clay Calcite Limestone Gold ore Bauxite Tungsten Illmenite Diamond Rutile Garnet Asbestos Fullers earth Feldspar Kyanite Corrundum Coal Steatite Quartz and silica sand Lead and zinc Manganese Quantity (in million tonne) 67.05 7.5 3.9 30,400 6.84 750 12 21.69 1,94,990 carats 1 5 0.25 25 1.5 4.65 1,071 tonne 13,021.50 5 50 7.5 7 Percentage of countrys reserves 95.58 54 41 40 39 30 30 24 16.3 15.5 12.7 11 11 9.3 9 7 6 6 5 4.2 4
2005, however, differs in its estimation. According to it, the area under mining in the state not considering minor minerals and fuel minerals (both of which, incidentally, are important for Andhra Pradesh) is 47,905 ha. There are no estimates of the total amount of forest land diverted for mining in the state. Data is available for the period 1980-2005, according to which about 13,532 ha of forest land was diverted for mining.3 This is the third highest diversion of forest land for mining during this period in the country, after Orissa and Chhattisgarh (see Map on page 112: Minerals and forests). More forests are under threat in regions like Adilabad, Karimnagar and Warangal, which hold both forest and mineral resources. Nellore and Kurnool districts account for almost 15 per cent each of the total mines in the state (see Graph 1: Distribution of mines). In terms of area (excluding fuel and minor minerals), the top five most mined districts in the state are Nellore (14 per cent), Nalgonda (11 per cent), Kurnool and Kadapa (10 per cent each) and Guntur (nine per cent) (see Graph 2 on page 113 : Districts: the area under mining). The minerals which account for the largest number of mines in the state are pyrophylite with 24 per cent, followed by limestone with 14 per cent, mica with eight per cent and barytes with seven per cent.4 Pyrophylite mines are small in size: the numbers are large, but the area is not. On the other hand, limestone mines occupy 46 per cent of the total area under mining, followed by mica with 10 per cent and quartz with nine per cent (see Graph 3 on page 113: Area under different minerals).
GRAPH 1: Distribution of mines

The top five districts account for 58 per cent of the mines
Kurnool 16%
Others 42% Nellore 15%
Anantapur 10% Prakasan 5% Kadapa 12%
Source: http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturaladvantages.html, as viewed on March 17, 2007
Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 9-10
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MAP: Minerals and forests

Andhra Pradesh has the third largest diversion of forests for mining in the country
MAHAR ASHT R A
ta nhi Pra
Adilabad
ORISS A
Bans hadh
Indra vati
ara
Nizamabad
Karim Nagar
Mahe r
CH H ATTISG A RH
Vizianagaram
Na ga va
Srikakulam
Medak Sangareddi
Nizam Sagar
ti
Go da va ri
Warangal
S
Ak
Vishakhapatnam
u ller
ANDHR A P R ADE SH
Rangareddi
Mun si
Khammam West Godavari

Kolleru Lake
East Godavari
BAY OF BEN G A L
eru Pal leru
KA
N AT A
Nalgonda
Bh im
Mahbubnagar
KAR
Nagarjuna Sagar
Kr ish
Guntur
Kr n ish a
Gundla Kamma
Krishna
na
Protests: Bauxite and uranium mining are facing the maximum resistance
Ongole Kurnool
Palleru Manneru
Open forests Dense forests River Iron Manganese Bauxite
Ku nd er Sa er gll u
Nellore
eru Penn
Anantapur
Charavat i
Penneru
Kadapa
Pa pa
gn
Coal/lignite
Ch ey ye ru
Se
ar
uk am
hi
Uranium Gypsum Pulicat Lake Asbestos Graphite
Chittoor Nadari
Limestone Mica
TAMIL NADU
Silica sand
112
MINING IN THE STATES: ANDHRA PRADESH
GRAPH 2: Districts: the area under mining

Nellore is high in number of mines and area under mining
Kadapa 10% Others 25% Guntur 9%
GRAPH 3: Area under different minerals

Limestone has the largest share of land under mining
Others 31%
Kurnool 10% Anantapur 7%
Limestone 46%
Adilabad 7% Rangareddi 7%
Nalgonda 11%
Mica 10% Quartz 9% Barytes 4%
Nellore 14%
Note: The data excludes fuel and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 9-10
Note: The data excludes fuel and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 4
Andhra Pradesh produced about Rs 6,200 crore worth of minerals, accounting for about eight per cent of the total value of minerals produced in the country, in 2004-05.5 If the offshore mineral value is not considered, then the states contribution to the countrys mineral value becomes 11 per cent.6 The value of minerals produced in the state has gone up two-fold between 1997-98 and 2004-05. The growth was significant in the initial years especially between 1999-00 and 2001-02 when it ranged between 28 to 16 per cent per annum. The growth was only one per cent between 2003-04 and 2004-05 (see Graph 4: Trends in mineral value). The mineral with the lions share in the total mineral value
generated in the state is coal, accounting for 53 per cent (as on 2004-05).7 Minor minerals contribute another 30 per cent, while limestone is a distant third with only four per cent (see Graph 5: Contribution of minerals to total value). The state collected about Rs 864 crore as royalty from minerals in 2004-05, which accounted for a meagre three per cent of total revenue receipts in the state (see Table 2 on page 114: Royalty from mining).8 Mining provides employment, directly and indirectly, to about five lakh people in the state.9 One of the reasons for the high employment is the important position held by minor minerals, which employ more numbers.
GRAPH 4: Trends in mineral value

Between 1997 and 2005, the value went up two fold
7,000 5,911 6,000
Mineral value ( in Rs crore)
GRAPH 5: Contribution of minerals to total value

Coal accounts for more than 50 per cent of mineral value
Others 10%
6,144
6,237
5,474 4,752 4,140
5,000 4,000 2,953 3,000 2,000 1,000 0
3,239 Minor minerals 30% Coal 53%
8 9 -9 -9 97 98 19 19
0 1 -0 -0 99 00 19 20
5 2 4 3 -0 -0 -0 -0 04 01 03 02 20 20 20 20
Limestone 4% Barytes 1%
Petroleum 2%
Source: Analysis based on data from publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Source: Based on data from anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
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TABLE 2: Royalty from mining

Minings revenue share remains constant at three per cent
Mineral royalty (in crore) 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 769.9 766.6 864.5 Total revenue Royalty as percentage receipt (in crore) of total revenue receipt 23,002.92 26,868.5 28,749.51 3.3 2.9 3
Limestone and Andhra Pradesh

Though the sector has largely escaped the public fury associated with uranium or bauxite mining, it has its share of problems: impact on groundwater, air pollution and damage due to blasting
Andhra Pradesh holds Indias biggest limestone reserves: more than 30 per cent of the nations total lies within the states boundaries. The mineral is abundantly found in Nalgonda, Kurnool, Kadapa, Adilabad, Anantapur, Karimnagar, Krishna and Rangareddy districts of the state. As a result, many leading cement manufacturers have made these districts their base. Though the mining of limestone has not received the same kind of unwelcome attention or protests as in the case of uranium or bauxite mining, there have been environmental and social implications at the ground level. Most of these impacts are similar to the effects exercised by open-cast mining operations. One of the major complaints of local communities living near limestone mines is related to the alteration of the groundwater profile of the region. For example, communities near the limestone mines of UltraTech (in Anantapur), Zuari Cement (in Kadapa), and India Cement and Andhra Cement (in Guntur) allege that deep mining operations in these regions have breached the groundwater. This has led to acute shortage of water for the people. Damage to structures due to blasting and fugitive dust are the other environmental problems associated with limestone mining, as highlighted by these communities. Mining by large-scale cement plants involves storage and transportation of vast quantities of limestone. Most often, limestone is stored in the open, leading to large amounts of fugitive dust and severe air pollution as a result. Blasting during mining is also a key cause for disaffection: the media has reported extensively of the damage to property due to operations of the Zuari limestone mines in Kadapa. The newspaper Eenadu (September 19, 2000) published an exclusive report on the damage inflicted by the blasting operations of this company and how it has affected the lives of the people. Local people had also lodged a complaint, which resulted in an inspection visit by a team of rural development officers and the local MLA. The team recovered and seized 600 kg of gelatine, and a case was filed against the unit in the local police station. In response to another complaint by villagers of Tnumamapalli, the mandal executive magistrate issued a notice to the unit to improve its blasting operations. These measures have had an impact: the companys mining processes have improved. This is not an isolated case: blasting operations at the mines of India Cement in Guntur have interfered with the social life of the local communities, who report that blasting is conducted randomly at any time without any prior intimation. Residents of Vadapalli village add that the unannounced blasts seem and feel like earthquakes and had caused extensive damages to structures in the vicinity.
Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India; mineral royalty data from Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi
Because of its rich deposits of limestone, bauxite and coal, the state is home to a number of cement and power plants. AP Cement Works, UltraTech Cements Ltd, Madras CementsJayantipuram and Andhra Cements Ltd are some of the big names in cement (see Box: Limestone and Andhra Pradesh). Aluminium companies such as Jindal South-West Housing Ltd (JSWHL) have been eyeing the bauxite wealth of the state, while the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL) is also in the race for mining but both these moves have met with stiff resistance. UCILs forays in Nalgonda district have put at stake the regions water bodies, livelihoods, and even the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Sanctuary. Similarly, the JSWHL plan threatens to uproot tribals from lands and forests which they have inhabited for centuries. What Andhra Pradesh really requires is stricter implementation of its mining regulations. And this is a need which is being felt more acutely as the state continues on its spiral of mining and industrialisation. Andhra Pradesh must realise that progress cannot be at the expense of its people, their livelihoods and ecology.
Large-scale limestone mining in Nalgonda has had a huge impact on the local water regime
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The flashpoints
NIMMALAPADU: FROM WHERE IT ALL BEGAN
In the parlance of mining, Andhra Pradesh has become synonymous with Samata. Calcite mining in Nimmalapadu village would have led to the displacement of a large tribal population with devastating consequences had it not been for the Samata judgement of 1997. The judgement, which has become the primary bugbear for state governments intent on industrialisation, set the pace for securing forest land from marauding developers. Nimmalapadu is one of the 2,400 fertile and resource-rich tribal villages in the hilly region of Paderu panchayat. The residents of Nimmalapadu are agriculturists who harvest three crops a year, having managed to divert a small stream into the village. In 1987, few men wielding chisels, hammers, tapes and magnifying glasses descended on the village and started to dig. Soon, revenue officials appeared on the scene and asked the villagers to vacate. They offered Rs 5,000 per family. The people realised that development work was in progress to mine the abundant mineral deposits in the area. Birla Periclase, owned by the Aditya Birla group, wanted to mine calcite from this tribal village to manufacture magnesia at its factory located 110 km away in Visakhapatnam. Determined not to allow mining in their village, the people of Nimmalapadu began a struggle against the govern-
ment and one of Indias leading business houses. Samata, an NGO based in Hyderabad, helped the villagers in organising the agitation. On the advice of Samata, the villagers filed a case in the High Court, which they lost in 1995. But Samata took up the cause and filed a case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the villagers. In a landmark judgment in 1997, which has come to be referred to as the Samata judgment, the Court ruled that the State had no right to grant leases even on government-owned forest land to private companies on areas governed by the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and that only cooperative societies solely run by scheduled tribes could mine in such areas, subject to compliance with the Forest Conservation Act and the Forest Protection Act. The Andhra Pradesh government was directed to stop all private mining within Scheduled Areas. Birla Periclase had to abandon its Rs 250-crore investment in Nimmalapadu. A spacious black-topped road, built by the company to transport calcite from the mines, remains a metaphor for the villages independence struggle. Nobody walks on that road. It is used for husking and drying paddy. We dont have to use it for walking as we hardly go out. Our own resources are enough for a surplus economy, says a resident. The state authorities, of course, are out in force against the Samata judgement and Nimmalapadu (see Box on page 116: Retribution: Nimmalapadu today). But the people of Andhra Pradesh have refused to be cowed down. Another example of their courage is held up by Jaduguda in the making Nalgonda.10
SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
The epic 10-year struggle of Nimmalapadus residents against mining led to the landmark Samata judgement
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Retribution: Nimmalapadu today

The government has blacklisted the village
The people of Nimmalapadu are not being allowed to remain in peace; despite the Court ruling, private companies are pressuring them to sell their land to allow mining operations. And because of the agitation, government largesse has become scarce. The village is blacklisted as far as development activities are concerned. Says B Ramanna, a tribal villager: "The result of the Samata judgement is that officials do not employ us as contract labourers or implement development schemes such as drinking water supply in our hamlet. We do not even get things like tiles for our houses." The mining blasts which had been carried out during exploration had shaken the foundations of houses in the village. They had led to erosion of topsoil and hampered the seepage of rainwater. Recalling the 10-year struggle, Somanna, a tribal villager, says: "Even a sample mine exploration testing left us devastated. Several families, including a whole hamlet, were displaced. Many houses were destroyed and land was taken forcibly (meagre amounts were given as compensation) for building the road. The exploration has left deep holes that make the land uncultivable." The judgement today is the biggest thorn in the sides of those who have a vested interest in inviting private and foreign mining companies into such areas. In fact, the state and Central governments are now trying to circumvent the Samata judgement. An amendment to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, which will change the scenario to the advantage of these governments, is pending before the Parliament. Samatas executive director, Ravi Rebbapragada, hopes that the government at the Centre will be more sensitive to the misery of the tribal people and ensure their well-being.
THE HINDU
Despite being shunned by official agencies, the people of Nimmalapadu are far from despondent
NALGONDA: DEVASTATION FORETOLD

On April 10, 2006, inspite of all the oppositions and protests by the people, the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) gave environmental clearance to the proposed uranium mine of UCIL at Nalgondas Lambapur and Peddagattu villages and a processing plant at Seripally. The mines have 11.02 MT of uranium ore, which will be extracted in about 20 years. The total leased mining area covers about 527 ha and the processing plant at Seripally is spread over 278 ha. UCIL will spend around Rs 400 crore on the project. There is radiation everywhere on earth. Mining in Nalgonda will not increase it: this comment by S D Prasad, adviser to UCIL, typifies Indian authorities insouciant disregard for the impact of uranium mining on human health and environment. The project has seen everything initial rejection by the pollution control board, unsatisfactory public hearing, massive public protests and even an attack from the Peoples War Group (PWG). It was opposed right from the beginning by peoples representatives, environmental groups and local tribal communities living around the proposed mines. The opposition to the project forced the state government to constitute a technical committee, which
studied the UCIL project at Jaduguda in Jharkhand. The committee gave a clean chit to UCIL, and the state government agreed to go ahead with the project. The project was then opposed by the Consent for Establishment (CFE) committee of the Andhra Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APPCB). The committee came to the conclusion that a processing plant at Mallapuram could not be allowed because of its proximity to Nagarjunasagar reservoir. The reservoir already has uranium concentration in the range of twothree g/l, which is below WHO standards, but the committee believed that mining in this area could increase the leaching into the reservoir.11 For the proposed mine in Lambapur-Peddagattu, the technical committee of the state government had suggested safeguards for its operations. However, the CFE committee decided not to consider UCILs request for consent at the proposed site as the suggestions and recommendations of the technical committee were impracticable and go against the universally accepted precautionary principle. To pacify the Board, UCIL decided to shift its processing plant from Mallapuram to Seripally, which is 20 km from the reservoir. The public hearing for the project was mired in controversy. To have a smooth public hearing, the APPCB planned the hearing
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for the project at remote Peddagattu village on August 19, 2003. Strong protests marked the meeting, where the officials failed to come up with satisfactory answers to peoples queries on health hazards. The Board was forced to arrange another hearing on the same day at the relatively accessible Pedda Adiserapally (the block development headquarters) after the states High Court intervened. The second hearing saw the presence of a large police force the peoples movement was monitored strictly. Before the hearings, allurements such as employment opportunities had been dangled to win over the residents. The authorities have told us that Mallapuram will be transformed into a mallepuvvu (jasmine) and developed on a par with hi-tech Hyderabad, said Satyanarayana, a carpenter who was planning to sell his 1.21 ha land to the company. UCIL informed the gathering that only a fraction of the area to be acquired would come under forest land. But the fact is that about 445 ha out of the total site area of 527 ha lies in the Yellapuram reserve forest. The buffer zone of the notified Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Sanctuary falls within this belt. On January 16, 2004, the MoEF approved the denotification of 1,000 ha of the Rajiv Gandhi Tiger Reserve and 1,000 ha of reserve forest in Chitral to allow UCIL to carry out exploratory drilling for uranium.12 Experts charged the company with remaining mum on the fallout from the possible contamination of water bodies located in the area. They contended that the proposed mines are just one km from human habitation, hardly 10 km from the Nagarjunasagar dam and barely four km from Akkampalli reservoir Hyderabads new source of drinking water. The Movement Against Uranium Project (MAUP), a state-level umbrella group of 20 civil society organisations, emphasised that radioactive mine wastes would enter these water bodies. When pressed on the issue of radiation hazards, the companys managing director said, The people will not be adversely affected and there will be no threat to any water body. He justified his stand claiming that there is no documented proof of any uranium mine accident in India. He also added that the uranium content in the Nalgonda ore is only 0.02 per cent, while in countries like Canada, it is much higher at 2-12 per cent. This translates into lower risk.13 Considering the ratio of uranium in the Nalgonda ore (0.02 per cent), only 2,200 tonne of useful uranium will be extracted during the entire life of the mines. Thus after mining for 20 years, the place will be left with 10.9 MT of waste, predominantly radioactive in nature, with no regulatory mechanism to contain the tailings.14 The public hearing for the relocated processing plant at Seripally was organised by the Board on March 3, 2005. About 1,500 villagers, concerned citizens and civil society groups attended, under the shadow of heavy police presence. All through the proceedings, the villagers vociferously expressed their opposition to the project. Many people in the hearing questioned the decision to relocate the project if the project was bad for Mallapuram, how could it be good for Seripally, they asked. The uranium ore from Lambapur-Peddagattu will have to be transported over 50
Kadapa: lessons not learnt

Uranium beckons, again
In February 2006, Andhra Pradesh chief minister Y S Rajasekhara Reddy announced that the state might have another uranium mine very soon. In fact, the new mine in Kadapa district might even take precedence over the project in Nalgonda. The Kadapa project, estimated to cost Rs 1,030 crore, involves the extraction of uranium from underground mines in 879 ha spread over five villages Mabbuchintalapalle, Thummalapalle, Rajukuntapalle, Bhoomayagaripalle and Kottala. UCIL expects to extract 3,000 tonne of ore per day. The lifespan of the project is stated to be 30 years and its employment potential is just under 1,000 people. The project has been opposed by the Movement Against Uranium Project (MAUP), which says that it is neither technically feasible nor financially viable. The organisation alleged that the EIA report for the project did not qualify to be a full report, as the baseline data measurement was limited only to winter as against all three seasons required for such a report. Moreover, the average quality of the ore was very low only 0.04 per cent. Mining and processing of the ore would invariably contaminate air, soil, underground and surface water. The public hearing for the project was held at Thummalapalle on September 10, 2006. More than 100 protestors were baton-charged and driven away by the police when they tried to prevent the hearing. In a press release, members of the NGO Mines, Minerals and People (MM&P) said "a public hearing based on irrelevant pronouncements is a mere formality and cannot be construed as obtaining the consent of people in a democratic manner". They also questioned the need for taking up such mining in a densely populated area. The MAUP wrote to the member secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board, calling the public hearing a mockery. It demanded that the hearing be treated as null and void and a fresh one be conducted after giving adequate notice, in a free and transparent manner under the supervision of an impartial body.
km to the processing plant at Seripally, passing through a number of villages and tribal hamlets. The decision of the public hearing was not conveyed to those gathered. They were informed by the district collectorate that the minutes of the meeting would be submitted to the expert panel reviewing the clearance of the project. The MAUP continued its agitation against UCIL and the project. A demonstration was held in Nalgonda in front of the office of the environment engineer, APPCB, on October 25, 2005. The activists also arranged a protest walk on January 3, 2006 to mobilise public support against the project. They reached Devarakonda after covering about 40 villages and hamlets and addressed many roadside meetings to educate students and villagers on the ill-effects of uranium. The issue was also raised by the opposition on March 9, 2006 in the state assembly. The main opposition Telugu Desam Party, Telangana Rashtra Samiti, Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India-Marxist,
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S RAMAKRISHNA
Rage: the UCILs uranium mining project in Visakhapatnam is facing the ire of the local people
Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen and Bharatiya Janata Party said the project would not only affect the people of Nalgonda, but will also pose a threat to the state capital by polluting the source of its drinking water. But all these protests and concerns did not deter the MoEF from clearing the project.
BAUXITE BRAWL IN THE EASTERN GHATS

Besides calcite and uranium, Andhra Pradesh is also up in flames over bauxite. JSWHL wants to set up a smelter and refinery at an investment of about Rs 9,000 crore.15 Under the project, bauxite ore will be extracted by the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation from the hill ranges between Papikonda in East Godavari to Sileru and Krishna Devipeta in Visakhapatnam district. However, the project is being opposed by environmentalists, NGOs and the Andhra Pradesh Girijana Sangham (APGS) on various environmental issue (see Box: Recipe for a water-starved future?). Bauxite mining in the area, say the agitationists, will cause environmental disaster and displace tribals, in addition to destroying forests. It also violates Regulation 1 of 70 of the Andhra Tribal Land Transfer (Prevention) Act. JSWHL has promised 0.5 per cent of the revenue earned from the project, estimated at around Rs 10 crore, for development of the region.
Amenities like schools, drinking water and housing have been assured for about 100 villages. The company also promises employment to each displaced family (one member), though it does not mention the kind of job it will offer. Some of the local tribals were taken on a trip to Damanjodi in Orissa by the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) to show them the progress made there after NALCO set up an aluminium plant. However, the brainwashing process did not seem to have delivered the expected results. Korra Nookamma, one among the 47 tribals who went to Damanjodi, says: We are not bothered about the hospitality. We were perturbed when the tribals in Koraput told us that the public sector NALCO did not provide them jobs. Those who were displaced were not given suitable compensation. A public hearing for the project held in November 2006 in Visakhapatnam turned stormy, and several agitating persons were forcibally removed. Farmers from Sabbavaram mandal were denied entry into the venue of the meeting. Despite these gagging moves, the people did manage to express their reservations about the project. JSWHL has now shifted the site of its operations from Vizianagaram to Srungavarapukota district, but the protests have not died down. The tribals refuse to budge from their bauxite-rich lands; they contend that they should have been consulted before permission to mine was granted.
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Recipe for a water-starved future?

Bauxite mining can dry up the Eastern Ghats water sources
Andhra Pradeshs zest for bauxite can spell doom for the life-giving hills and their water bodies in the Eastern Ghats. Rivers like Vamsadhara, Nagavali, Gosthani and Yelaru originate from the Ghats and are the main source of drinking water for thousands of people in the cities, towns and villages of Andhra Pradesh. According to the state governments Forest Department (FD), mining will endanger the environment of Eastern Ghats and affect its species diversity. The FD had submitted a report to the Union ministry of environment and forests stating that mining will drastically reduce water supply to the plain areas and also pollute water sources and bodies extensively. Another study by Kalpavriksh, a Pune-based NGO, in 2003 had clearly indicated that bauxite mining in Visakhapatnam district would adversely affect the river systems of Gosthani, Machkand, Sileru and Sharada. Several experts in the fields of geology and mining as well as environmentalists have expressed their apprehensions that bauxite mining would compound the problem of scarcity of water for drinking purposes and agriculture. The Andhra Pradesh government has set its sights on seven bauxite deposits in this region: Galikonda (14.5 MT), Raktakonda (8.5 MT), Chittamgondi (28 MT), Sapparla (186 MT), Gudem (38 MT), Jerrela (246 MT) and Gurtedu (43 MT). In case the governments proposed plan materialises, districts that would bear the brunt of mining and the resultant water drought will be East Godavari, Vizianagram, Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam. Around 19 rivers and 27 reservoirs would be affected in these districts. Moreover, bauxite mining and its associated infrastructure alumina refineries, aluminium smelters, etc guzzle up a lot of water. In fact, the concretionary nature of bauxite itself makes it well suited for water retention. According to estimates by the Hyderabad-based NGO Samata, together, these would use up more than 14 lakh cubic metre (cu m) of water per year (see Table: The bauxite-water equations).
THE HINDU
Bauxite mountain: Galikonda, with its 14 MT of deposits, is one of the regions in the state governments crosshairs
Add to this the 146 lakh cu m that just one alumina refinery will use up, and more than 32 lakh cu m that an aluminum smelter will consume, and you have a total water usage of about 193 lakh cu m every year. According to Samata, this water would be adequate to meet the requirements of more than 10 lakh people for one year.
Ravi Rebbapragada, Samata, Hyderabad
TABLE: The bauxite-water equations

Location Operations Water consumption per day (lt) 142 106 186 1,300.00 255 1,625.00 275.00 Reserves (MT) 14.5 8.5 28 186.25 38.41 246.04 42.63 Life of operation (years) 10 10 12 25 15 40 15 Water per year (in kilolitre) 51,830 38,690 67,890 4,74,500 93,075 5,93,125 1,00,375 Water for life of mine (in kilolitre) 5,18,300 3,86,900 8,14,680 11,862,500 1,396,125 23,725,000 1,505,625
Galikonda Rakthakonda Chitamgondi Sapparla Gudem Jerrela Gurtedu
Mining Mining Mining Mining Mining Mining Mining
Source: Ravi Rebbapragada, 2007, presentation at the First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People, April 26-27, 2007, New Delhi
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CHAPTER 3 THE STATES: ORISSA

Chhattisgarh
arved out of Madhya Pradesh in the year 2000, Chhattisgarh received most of the parent states wealth, including its forests and mineral reserves. But as is the case with most mineral-rich states in India, most of this wealth co-exists with biodiversity-rich forests. Extraction of this wealth, naturally, has become a contentious issue more so because almost all of Chhattisgarhs tribal population also lives in this same zone (see Map: Minerals and forests).
MINERS PARADISE
Chhattisgarh is one of the richest states in India in terms of mineral wealth, producing 28 major minerals.1 The key minerals are coal and iron ore. Around 16 per cent of Indias coal is in Chhattisgarh; it also holds 10 per cent of the countrys iron ore, five per cent of its limestone, five per cent of its bauxite and 88 per cent of its tin.2 The state accounts for almost one-third of the diamond reserves of the country as well.3 The mineral reserves are distributed across the state; the richest districts, however, are Bastar, Surguja, Korba and Dantewada they, incidentally, are also tribal-dominated and the most forested. These are also the districts where most of the new mining and industrialisation projects are coming up.
Chhattisgarh is the fifth largest contributor to the value of minerals produced in India. It ranks sixth in contribution to fuel mineral value, third in metallic mineral value and sixth in non-metallic mineral value. According to the IBM, in 2004-05, the state produced minerals valued at more than Rs 5,049 crore, which accounted for seven per cent of the total mineral value of India (including offshore mineral value). The share of the state would have been higher at around nine per cent if the offshore contribution was not considered. The states contribution to mineral value has been growing in fits and spurts. It dipped in 2000-01, took a quantum jump the following year, slumped again in 2003-04, and recorded a growth of 14 per cent in 2004-05 (see Graph 1 on page 122: Trends in mineral value). The years that witnessed major jumps are also the years in which higher production of iron ore and bauxite was recorded. Coal and iron ore together account for 94 per cent of the total mineral value produced by the state (see Graph 2 on page 122: Minerals and their value). Expectedly, coal, iron ore and limestone are produced in large volumes. Production of coal from the state has steadily gone up between 2001-02 and 2004-05, and so has the production of bauxite, iron ore, tin concentrate, dolomite, limestone and quartzite (see Table 1 on page 122: Trends in production).
PATRICK OSKARSSON
Red carpet: Chhattisgarh has abundant mineral resources and is one of the emerging destinations for mining companies
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MINING IN THE STATES: CHHATTISGARH

Mineral-rich districts of the state hold the densest forests
UTTAR PRADESH
Govind Ballabh Pant Sagar JHARKHAND
Koriya Surguja
Hasod
Jashpur Korba
Raigarh Bilaspur MADHYA PRADESH Kabirdham Janjgir Mand
Hirakud CHHATTISGARH Raipur Durg Mahasamund

jna o ga n
ath
un
ar
Seon
Kh
Dhamtari MAHARASHTRA Kanker
Ma
ha
Ra
na
di
nd
ORISSA Protests: Mostly against iron ore and coal mines
Open forests Dense forests Bastar River Coal/lignite Indravati Bauxite Tin Gold Dantewada Iron Lead Dolomite ANDHRA PRADESH Limestone Diamond
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GRAPH 1: Trends in mineral value

Mineral value has grown, but in spurts
6,000
TABLE 1: Trends in production

Most minerals have recorded an increase
Unit
5,050
2001-02 53,621 5,56,450 18,660 13,887 8,55,391 168 13,149 500
2002-03 56,758 6,10,777 19,781 10,630 9,17,719 1,535 13,626 11,834 700
2003-04 61,505 8,88,326 23,361 15,576 10,05,119 2,167 13,833 26,158 352
2004-05 69,081 11,08,297 23,118 23,502 11,36,763 2,970 14,772 26,213
Mineral value produced (in Rs crore)
5,000 3,728 3,837 3,000 4,586
Coal Bauxite Iron ore Tin conc. Dolomite Kaolin
000 t t 000 t Kg t t 000 t t t
4,447
4,000
2,000
1,000
Limestone Quartzite
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Years 2003-04 2004-05
Steatite
Source: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-22; Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2004, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 206
GRAPH 2: Minerals and their value

Coal accounts for almost three-fourth of the mineral value
Minor minerals 0.9% Limestone 3.1% Iron ore 20.2% Others 0.6%
GRAPH 3: Districts land under mining

Districts with big coalfields lead the way
Raipur 4%
Others 3%
Durg 5%
Dantewada 3%
Koriya 26%
Bauxite 1.0%
Korba 37% Surguja 16% Coal 74.2% Raigarh 6%
Source: Based on analysis from Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-22
Source: Based on information from documents from the Department of Mines and Geology, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur
Almost 90,000 ha of land in the state is under mining of major minerals and coal.4 The top five most mined districts in the state are Korba, Koriya, Surguja, Raigarh and Durg: these together account for 90 per cent of the total land under mining (see Graph 3: Districts land under mining). Districts like Dantewada, which have drawn most of the new investments, are yet to join this list. There are 344 mining leases in the state: around 34 per cent of these are for limestone. According to the states Department of Mines and Geology, dolomite and coal also account for a significant number of mine leases: 24 and 16 per cent, respectively. The mining and quarrying sector is very important for the states economy. Its contribution to the states GDP in 2001-02 was
12 per cent5 (this is without taking into account the contribution of mineral-based industries). The state collected a revenue of Rs 694 crore from the sector in 2004-05. In terms of contribution to the total revenue receipt of the state, minings share was between 10-11 per cent (see Table 2: Revenues from mining); however, the share shows an overall decreasing trend. Major minerals are the mainstay of the states economy, accounting for, on an average, 99 per cent of the total royalty collected by the state. Coal is the key contributor with an average of 74 per cent. Of the rest, iron ore contributes 20 per cent and bauxite, three per cent.6 Chhattisgarh loses revenue due to illegal mining, especially of diamonds (see Box: Lawless). The state has recently seen a spate of mining and mineral-
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TABLE 2: Revenues from mining (Rs crore)

10 per cent of the states income comes from mining
2002-03 Mineral royalty Total revenue receipt Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt 552.4 5,417.3 10.2 2003-04 637.2 5,959.3 10.7 2004-05 694.6 7,248.9 9.6
Source: Revenue receipt data from the Reserve Bank of India and mineral royalty data from anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi
based industrial projects. Its 2001 mineral policy has made provisions to attract both domestic and international private investments by simplifying procedures. Chhattisgarh is promising a minimum lease area with secured land rights so that investors can safely commit large resources to mining projects. Quick processing of lease applications has been given the top priority. For major minerals under the MMDR Act, approvals are required from the Centre; the state government is helping with strong advocacy to get such approvals quickly. Between 1996 and 2003, Chhattisgarh received over US $105 million worth of FDI; the basic metals and mineral industry, such as steel and aluminium, accounted for more than 85 per cent of this investment.7 Most of the industries with a presence in the
state (SAIL, BALCO) are planning to expand, while there also are the new entrants like TISCO and Essar Steel. Besides, the state is also witnessing the sprouting of numerous sponge iron plants. The Surguja, Raigarh and Bilaspur belts are already home to the South Eastern Coalfields (SECL), a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd. In recent years, Chhattisgarh has received much attention for its diamond reserves (see Box on page 125: Indias diamond bowl?). For the newborn state, mining has definite economic benefits. But in its overdrive to tap the resources mining offers, the state government has been ignoring the disastrous impacts mining has on environment and people. The clamour over rising pollution levels has reached the corridors of power in 2006, three Bharatiya Janata Party members of the state legislature accused their own party-led government of having failed to control industrial pollution in the tribal-dominated Bastar region. Sponge, crusher and other industries are polluting the atmosphere and the government is doing nothing to check that, said Lachchuram Kashyap, one of the MLAs. He added that croplands were becoming barren because of the pollution by these industries, and that this had driven the people of the region to protest against the industries. An industry in Keshlur area of Bastar was closed for three days in January 2006 following stiff opposition from villagers.8 The government, of course, claimed the contrary. Environment minister Ganesh Ram Bhagat says that there is no pollution in Bastar and that the government monitors pollution levels periodically.9
Lawless
Illegal mining of diamonds is resulting in huge losses
Nearly 1,500 illegal mining cases were detected in Chhattisgarh in 2001. Of these, 587 cases were of illegal mining and 834 of illegal transportation of minerals Rs 13 lakh was recovered from the offenders.1 Chhattisgarh regularly loses crores due to the illegal mining of diamonds and precious stones in the Deobhog and Mainpur regions. This, when the state is yet to begin mining diamonds itself. As soon as news spread in the 1990s that the tribal state had rich deposits of diamonds, there was a mad rush from within and outside the state to get rich quickly by frantic digging in the regions where diamondiferous kimberlite rocks are known to exist. Kantibhai Patel, who came down from Gujarat to Mainpur along with his friends, was arrested on charges of smuggling of diamonds. Law enforcement agencies have also nabbed a number of businessmen from Maharashtra and Orissa on the same charges. Interestingly, diamonds that are in the possession of the Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation, are all confiscated.2 A member of the Kamar tribal community living near Deobhog, seemingly unaware about the prohibition on illegal mining, says: I cannot read, I cannot write, I do mining in search of precious gems including diamonds to feed my children and wife. The deposits are easily accessible: the shallow kimberlite can be mined simply by sifting gravel in riverbeds, plains or forest areas. The state government has dispatched its Special Armed Forces personnel to track down the
EJAZ KAISER
Men of the Special Armed Forces guard prospective mine sites
illegal miners, but they continue to operate unchecked. Farooq Memon, a journalist who first reported the probable existence of diamonds in Mainpur in the early 90s, says that middlemen and dealers of precious stones have become rich at the cost of local tribals, who are encouraged to dig diamonds illegally in return for paltry goods or money.
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PATRICK OSKARSSON
What large tracts of Chhattisgarh look like: extensive coal mining in Korba has defaced the landscape
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Indias diamond bowl?

Chhattisgarhs diamonds will rule global markets, believes the states chief minister
Chhattisgarh is all set to become the nations diamond bowl before the decade is out, claims its chief minister Raman Singh. According to him: Diamonds will earn annual revenues of Rs 25,000 crore (US $5.7 billion) for the state in three years. He adds that seven companies, including De Beers, would start mining in the state by 2008. South Africa's De Beers and Diamond Prospecting Pvt Ltd are carrying out surveys along the 3,975 sq km stretch in Kanker, Dhamtari, Durg and Rajnandgaon districts. Mining MNC Rio Tinto has obtained an aerial survey license for parts of Jaspur, Mahasamund and Raipur districts. It says it has detected a kimberlite-rich belt in Raipur. Geo Mysore Services India has been prospecting in Kanker, Rajnandgaon
and Jaspur regions, while Admas Prospecting Pvt Ltd has been eyeing a 3,000 sq km area in Raipur and Mahasamund. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd (JSPL), which has a major industrial complex in Raigarh district, has also submitted a proposal for a diamond survey in Jaspur. "Let 2008 come, Chhattisgarh will dictate diamond prices in world markets and India will be the real diamond king," Singh said in an interview. But state officials are not too sure. According to Shailendra Trivedi, senior director in the Chhattisgarh Mining Development Corporation, if the only diamond mines in the country at Panna cannot yield more than Rs 4 crore annually as royalty for the Madhya Pradesh government, what Chhattisgarh would get is doubtful. Officials are unanimous that it would still take more than a decade to exploit diamonds commercially through mining activities.
Ejaz Kaiser, CSE media fellow, Raipur
NATURAL RESOURCES AT THREAT

The ministers contentions notwithstanding, Chhattisgarh today is facing environmental challenges such as destruction of forests and pollution of rivers, and witnessing public protests due to displacement from mining and industrial projects. The problem is aggravated because Chhattisgarhs mineral wealth co-exists with its forests. The state forms a part of the extended river basin of four major rivers the Mahanadi, Godavari, Narmada and the Ganga. There are 12 rivers in the state with a combined length of 1,885 km. Most of these rivers traverse through mineral-bearing districts. For example, the Indravati passes through iron-rich belts of Bastar and Dantewada while the Mahanadi courses through Raigarh and Raipur. The Hasdeo river flows through the coal-rich belt of Korba and Koriya while the Rihand and Kanhar flow through Surguja. The existence of many of these rivers is today threatened by mining and mineral-based industries. Pollution of the tributaries
of the Indravati due to iron ore mining by the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) has been well documented. According to the Koriya District Report, the groundwater in the district is contaminated due to mining activities.10 Digma village of Ambikapur block in Surguja district also reports a decline in the water table. The District Report mentions that earlier, the people used to dig to a depth of 25 to 30 feet to reach water, but now they have to dig up to 60 to 70 feet. There are similar reports, especially from villages where industry and mining compete for limited water resources.11 According to the official website of Chhattisgarh, 44 per cent of its land is under forests, which make up 12 per cent of the nations forest land. Most of the dense forests are concentrated in the northern districts of Surguja, Koriya, Jaspur and Korba and the southern districts of Bastar, Kanker and Dantewada regions rich in mineral resources (see Table 3: Districts, minerals and forests). In fact, all the mineral districts in the state have high forest cover exceeding more than 30 per cent of their geographic areas.
TABLE 3: Districts, minerals and forests

Most mining districts have more than 30 per cent of their area under forests
District Minerals Area under mining (ha) 2,010.51 3,161.34 27,006.49 4,484.01 12,232.87 19,565.01 Percentage of state's forest in district 20.23 9.74 6.00 4.55 12.84 1.72 Geographic area under forest cover in district (%) 64.24 33.12 50.89 35.93 45.71 62.63
Dantewada Raipur Korba Raigarh Surguja Koriya
Tin ore, iron ore and corrandum Limestone, dolomite, diamond, granite Coal and bauxite Coal, limestone and quartzite Coal and bauxite Coal and fireclay
Source: Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2006, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 51; and information from the Department of Mines and Geology, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur
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In the case of Dantewada, Korba and Koriya, the forest cover is as much as 64, 51 and 63 per cent respectively. According to the chief conservator of forest (CCF) land managements office, around 12,598 ha of forest land was cleared for mining projects between 1985 and 2005 in the state.12 Dantewada, which accounts for 20 per cent of the forest cover of the state, has around 2,010 ha of land under mining for iron ore, tin and corrandum. The Dantewada District Report indicts the mining for the destruction of the districts forest wealth: one-third of Dantewadas forests have been degraded this, when 40 per cent of livelihoods in the district are forest-based.13 In Koriya, the District Reports say that coal dust from coal-handling plants blankets agricultural fields and affects the yields adversely. According to the District Report of Durg, red water from the mines in Daundi block has reduced the productivity of the land.14 Data given to the parliament on the diversion of forest land to mining projects in the state says that about 14,421 ha of forest land has been diverted between 1980-2005.15 The state ranks second in terms of total forest land diverted for mining projects in the country accounting for 15 per cent.16 This is not surprising: the state government views the Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980 as a liability. The states perspective is very clear. It does not wish to be a loser in the race for revenues and other benefits from mines and minerals. The government, however, couches its intentions by claiming that it is seeking an amendment not exclusively for mining, but for distributing land pattas to tribals and for development. It claims to have
already earmarked 50,000 pattas for tribals in forest land, but is unable to give them due to the FCA.17 Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh has said that the Act, besides depriving tribals of land pattas, is also a snag for various development programmes. We cannot go for electrification, build dams or construct roads, Singh complained. But Chhattisgarhs culture, tradition and livelihoods are inextricably linked to its forests (see Box: We exist because forests exist). This high dependence and reliance on forests is common to almost all the forest-rich districts. In fact, nine per cent of rural wage earners in the southern districts of the state depend on forest produce; the figure for northern districts is six per cent. The state government, however, is not letting anything come in its way of getting projects in forest areas cleared. According to records maintained by the office of CCF land management, within five years of the formation of the state, 26 mining projects have been cleared under the FCA. Eighty more projects are currently pending with the MoEF for clearance.18 There are a number of cases where industries have tried bypassing the legislation and illegally exploiting forest land. The Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), owned by the UK-based Vedanta, has come under the scanner for allegedly encroaching on 405 ha of prime forest land and cutting down thousands of trees for its expansion project in 2005.19 The company grabbed (this) government land and cut down 20,000 trees without taking permission from the agencies concerned, Nankiram Kanwar, the then Chhattisgarh revenue minister, had
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Predators: mining operations such as these, dotting Chhattisgarhs hills, are almost waiting to nibble into the states remaining forests
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We exist because forests exist

Peoples account of what forests mean to them published in the District Report of Dakshin Bastar, Dantewada
The forest is the very basis of our lives. We exist because the forest exists. Thus, we strive to protect the forest, at any cost. Our traditions and rituals are closely linked to our forests and trees. We believe that our forests are sacred because our gods and goddesses reside there. The saja, the saja mahua, the mahua semal, the mango, the semal karanji, the banyan, the banyan pipal, the pipal salfi trees are symbols of good fortune and prosperity. The number of salfi trees in a house is an indicator of the wealth and prosperity of the household. The drink that is made from its fruit is an integral part of our culture. If the drinks of salfi, chind and mahua are not offered in ceremonies of birth, death and marriage, the ceremonies are considered incomplete. People revere trees just as they revere their parents and their deities.
said in May 2005. The day after Kanwar made these allegations, he was shifted to the agriculture ministry. The Korba-based company has denied the charges and claimed that the land had been allotted to it between 1968 and 1975. The government has ordered a high-level inquiry and the commissioner of land records has been asked to supervise the investigations. After getting the report, the state government will take the appropriate steps. The state government will not falter even in razing the constructions done under the expansion plan, Kanwar had said before he was shifted from the ministry. Kanwar came to know about the companys misdeeds following a complaint lodged by villagers. He set up an 11-member team to verify the complaint. The report of the team clearly indicated that the company had encroached on land in complete violation of the FCA. The report also pointed out that construction of build-
ings, chimneys and other components of the plant had already been done. Another case is that of Essar Steel Ltd, which had been permitted to cut trees in Bastar to create an 8.4 metre-wide corridor for laying an underground pipeline to transport iron ore slurry to Vizianagram in Andhra Pradesh. Instead, alleges Congress legislator Bhupesh Baghel, the company has created a 20 metre-wide corridor.20 Baghel also points out that the state forest department did not do anything to prevent the destruction of the forest by Essar, except imposing a fine of Rs 95 lakh on it. In October 2005, the Supreme Court (SC) issued a notice to the Central and Chhattisgarh governments and others to file their responses to an application by Baghel against illegal mining and encroachment of forest land by BALCO, Essar Steel Ltd and others.21 There was another case where the SC had to step in and direct the public sector coal company, SECL, to compensate for mining in forest land. In 2006, the court directed the company to pay Rs 300 crore by October 2006 as compensation for using forest land in Chhattisgarh this was in addition to the Rs 50 crore already paid by the company to continue its operations in the state.22 The counsel for the company had argued that since the company had one of the best records for protection of environment and had also deposited Rs 50 crore as compensation, it should be allowed coal-mining operations. The counsel for the MoEF countered by saying that the net present value and performance of compensatory afforestation cost for the forest land in consideration was calculated to be in the range of Rs 600 crore. The fact that mining is destroying the forests, even those beyond the lease area, has been established scientifically in Chhattisgarh. A study undertaken in 2006 by the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun has conclusively documented the impact of mining activities on forest land and agricultural land in some of the mining districts of the state (see Box: Mining has a long reach).
Mining has a long reach

Mine lease area is a poor indicator of the impact of mining
A 2006 study by the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun evaluated the impact of mining on the local landscape of Surguja, Manendragarh and Korba. It found that mining in Bishrampur in Surguja district, despite being limited in operations, has severely affected the land pattern. Around 24 per cent of the forest cover of the area has given way to barren (seven per cent) and degraded (12 per cent) land. A small area of the forest four per cent has been converted for agriculture. While assessing the impact of mining on agriculture, it was found that four per cent of agricultural land had been laid waste due to mining. In Manendragarh district, though slightly more than one per cent of the forest area was under active open cast mining in February 2003, the study found that around 18 per cent of the forest had been converted into barren (highly affected) land, followed by around 44 per cent into degraded forest. The forest closest to the mines had been totally
converted into a non-forest area. When the water table is breached while mining, small and scattered water bodies are formed. In Manendragarh, around 0.06 per cent of the area had been converted into such water bodies. Korba, the third district, has been identified as potentially the richest mining and industrial site in the region. Due to mining activity, around 78 per cent of the forest area had been highly affected. According to the study, six per cent of forest land had been completely converted for industrial purposes; 55 per cent had changed into barren and wasteland, and around 17 per cent had become highly degraded forest. Around eight per cent of the agricultural land in Korba had also been converted into an industrial area. This is one of the very few studies which actually proves the point that mine lease area is a poor indicator to ascertain the impact of mining on land and forests. For every one unit of land under lease area, the actual area affected is likely to be 10-20 units or even more.
Mukesh Kumar, Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun
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POVERTY AMIDST PLENTY

Despite the well documented impacts of mining and the furore they have generated (including Naxal resistance), multinationals and top corporates are making a beeline to the state: Chhattisgarhs abundant mineral resources are the big draw. Essar Steel is in the process of acquiring 2,285 ha in Dantewada; the NMDC has acquired 3,308 ha for its steel plant in Nagarnar, while the Tatas are looking for 2,000 ha for their project in Bastar. According to Goldy M George, a social activist working on dalit and adivasi human rights issues, more than 29,137 ha of land has been leased out to SECL in the coal belt of the state (Surguja, Raigarh and Bilaspur districts); this has affected hundreds of villages.23 In all, the mineral industry has taken over 90,000 ha of land in the state.24 This is without accounting for the land taken by mega mineral-based projects. Land acquisition on such a large scale has, naturally, had its fallouts: extreme discontent. Chhattisgarh is dominated by a number of tribes. Over half the area of the state is a 'scheduled area' or 'tribal majority area' and falls under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. On an average, 31 per cent of the total population in the state belongs to scheduled tribes. Like in other parts of the country, the concentration of tribals is especially high in the mineral-bearing areas. In case of Dantewada, tribals account for 79 per cent of the population, while they constitute 55 and 44 per cent of the population respectively in the case of coal districts of Surguja and Koriya (see Table 4: The poorest districts). And these are the people who have been most affected by the mining and industrialisation process in the state. Only 36 per cent of the total land area in the state is under cultivation or private ownership; the rest of the land is, literally, up for grabs. In the states rural regions, people depend on both agriculture and minor forest produce for their livelihoods.
Most of these villagers are either marginal landowners or landless farmers with no official records to prove their rights over the land they have been living on for centuries. As a result, when industrial and mining projects displace them, they neither get any compensation, nor any alternative employment. The states increasingly marginalised tribal population is, in fact, getting crushed between two evils: industrialisation on one hand, and the raging civil war-like conditions in Chhattisgarh, courtesy the conflict between Naxal insurgents and the Salwa Judum militia (a state-sponsored movement of tribal villagers to fight against Naxalism see next section), on the other. According to The Tribune, almost 40 per cent of the tribal population in the state has been displaced due to mining and industrial projects.25 There is, however, no official figure on the number of people displaced in the state. According to a study by G M George (Mining to Destruction and Hijacking their Rights to Submission), around 1.5 million have been displaced in the state due to industrial projects; of this, more than 500,00 people have been ousted for just the Bhilai project.26 The plight of their brethren in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand has not been lost on the tribals of Chhattisgarh. Their past experience of shabby rehabilitation when their lands were a part of Madhya Pradesh is also warning them to be wary (see Box: Cruel tryst with diamonds): their distrust of industrial and mining projects is acute and growing. Their unwillingness to part with their lands has, inevitably, led to conflagrations and conflicts. These conflicts have been further fanned by Chhattisgarhs dismal economic condition. In spite of mining industries operating in Chhattisgarh for many decades now, the state has not seen much development. About 40.5 per cent of the people of the state are living below the poverty line.27 Infrastructure is poor or almost non-existent in the remote corners of the state. Metalled roads cover only 40 per cent of the 19,720 villages in the state.28 Chhattisgarh
TABLE 4: The poorest districts

More than 40 per cent of Chhattisgarh lives below the poverty line in these districts. Korbas high per capita income on one hand and poor human development indicators on the other show that minings profits are not equally distributed
Tribal district (percentage of tribal population) Ranking among 150 backward districts HDI ranking (out of 16 districts) Literacy rate Percentage of households with safe drinking water 53 67 45 69 27.24 41 70.5 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 58 53 84 84 56 103 73 Percentage of households with power Per capita income (Rs) at current price
Dantewada Raipur Korba Raigarh Surguja Koriya Chhattisgarh
78.83 12.1 41.5 35.38 54.6 44.35 31.80
7 34 35 40 39 15/16*
9 4 1 10 11 13
30.2 68.5 61.7 70.2 54.8 63.1 64.7
22.19 65.7 49.73 60.66 28.36 44.36
12,060 9,524 33,763 8,617 7,573 10,504 10,363
Note: *15 out of 16 districts in the state figure among the 150 most backward districts in India Source: Anon, 2005, Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi
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Cruel tryst with diamonds

How the states poorest people live on its richest lands
Faith played a cruel hand on him. Barnu, a tribal farmer who is credited with finding the first ever diamond on his agricultural land in Chhattisgarh (then in Madhya Pradesh) in the early 90s, died unsung in 2006, blind and mired in deep poverty. He could not even live long enough to secure the compensation for his land taken away by the state government. Barnus diamond find had heralded the discovery of this precious gems raw form in this tribal state. Today, the villagers of Paily Kahan in Mainpur region of Raipur district wait impatiently for the earth to throw up diamonds, after the government okayed mining in their area. Barnus find had led mining inspectors to explore the area and consequently, four kimberlite pipes were detected. Barnus son Kunwar Singh, a farmer, narrated how on several occasions Barnu had knocked the doors of ministers, officials and even the secretariat in Bhopal to seek the compensation promised to him.
Barnus neighbours say that he was not even given alternative land. According to the state government, Barnu partially occupied government land, owing to which there were difficulties in allocating compensation for him. The mining department, of course, said that it was the governments responsibility and the department had nothing to do with compensation. Barnu leaves behind three sons and three daughters. They are still unable to fathom why their late father was denied compensation. It is ironic that Barnus dependents continue to live in abject poverty over one of the richest lands in the country. The sarpanch, Dhansingh Netam, says optimistically: I hope that once the companies start prospecting for diamonds here, we will become rich. But right now, our folks do not have enough even to eat. Barnus agricultural land in Paily Kahan is now fenced by Special Armed Forces personnel to prevent smuggling or illegal mining for diamonds.
Ejaz Kaiser, CSE media fellow, Raipur
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Barnus homestead: the farmer, who discovered diamonds in the state, lived and died in abject poverty
lags behind the national average in terms of percentage of households with power connection and access to drinking water.29 The situation in the mining districts is no better. Out of the seven key mining districts in the state, six figure in the list of 150 most backward districts in the country. The iron-bearing districts of Dantewada and Bastar are among the top 10 most backward districts in the country. Only 22 per cent of households in Dantewada have access to electricity, though the district boasts of
the presence of Essar Steel. Similarly, in Korba, the coal belt of the state, only 40 per cent of households have access to safe drinking water and only half the households are connected to power. Literacy rate in Dantewada is as low as 30 per cent.30 The coal mining districts of Surguja and Koriya are at the bottom of the pile. Both are the two most mined districts in the state after Korba. Surguja has less than 30 per cent of its households with water and power, and its per capita income and literacy is lower than the
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state's average. In Koriya, infant mortality rate is the highest among all districts and more than 50 per cent households have no access to clean water and power. People have also not gained in terms of employment. For example, in NMDC, out of the total number of employees in executive positions, less than five per cent are tribals. In the companys Bailadila iron ore mines, only 31 per cent of the employees in non-executive positions are local tribals.31 The only exception seems to be Korba, which ranked first in HDI, though it is at number 11 and 12 in education and health. Korbas high-income rank is explained largely by its public sector coal mines and industries, which provide employment, enabling it to generate the highest per capita income (Rs 33,736) in the state three times the state's average.32 Dantewada has a high per capita income too, but has the lowest literacy rate and around 50 per cent of its households are without access to clean water. The districts high per capita income (the second highest in the state) is due to its iron ore mines. The contradictory trend of high per capita income on one hand and poor health, education and other human development indicators on the other in mineral districts like Korba and Dantewada goes on to prove that mining and mineral-based industries are making some people rich, but most are getting nothing out of it.
RISE OF THE REDS

The social implications of all this have been severe. Public discontent has found many outlets, and one of these has been the growing influence of Naxalism. Chhattisgarh, along with Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa (all mineral-rich regions faced with peoples ire over mining), is one of the key states on the emerging Naxal-Maoist horizon. In recent years, the state has witnessed several audacious terror strikes perpetrated by Red groups. On March 16, 2007, for example, more than 300 armed Naxalites stormed the Rani Bodli police camp in Dantewada district; 55 policemen were killed and weapons were looted. The Naxal-official machinery stand-off in Chhattisgarh dates back to the 1980s. In Chhattisgarh, Dantewada has been the hotbed of Naxal insurgency. Naxalites have declared the district a liberated zone, which means the administration of Naxals has, in theory, replaced that of the Indian State. This is something which has not happened even in Andhra Pradesh (home to the movement), where Naxalites have only proclaimed guerrilla zones areas where they are carrying out an armed struggle to push the State out. Initially, the movement in India was spearheaded against forest officers, but it also took on the management of a leading paper mill over wages for bamboo-cutting. Over time, it took up the cause of tendu leaf growers against exploitation by contractors. Jal, jungle, jamin kisko (Water, forests and land who do they belong to) was the slogan the movement raised against what it called the exploitative classes, a functionary points out. After fighting against the feudal system rampant among adivasis in the Dandakaranya region in central India, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is now training its guns on
MAHADEO SEN
Backs to the wall: even tribal women are joining the Naxalites war in Bastar against the unmindful exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies
what it calls the unmindful exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies in the mineral-rich regions, setting the stage for confrontation with states who are vying with each other to secure investment. We are not against development or mining, but mining lease should not be given to multinationals or big industrialists who have no stakes in the development of the region. The industries which take up the mining lease, should also work for the social upliftment of the adivasis, the spokesperson of the outfit said in an article published on May 4, 2006.33 The spokesperson gave the example of indiscriminate mining in the Bailadila region, where the worlds best iron ore is mined and exported entirely to Japan through the Visakhapatnam port. The area has hardly seen any development. Mining has been going for over three decades, but the only industry to flourish in the area is prostitution. Mining has destroyed the ecology of the area and the adivasis are left with drinking highly contaminated water, he said. The Naxals have organised mass rallies to rouse public opinion against this exploitation of rich mineral resources. The Naxalites have been particularly outraged by the activities of the Bhilai Steel Plant. According to them, The Bhilai Steel Plant
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might have helped increase the industrial muscle of the country, but it has not brought about any change in the economic status of the tribals in the area. This was the reason why tribals resisted the plant authorities plans to start new iron ore mines at Rowghat and Chargaum villages. The Naxalites unleashed a spate of attacks against mining and related interests between January 1 and July 31, 2006, across the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. Out of these, 13 were in Chhattisgarh alone. Naxalites have also resorted to occasionally taking hostages from among the miners.34 One particularly daring attack was launched on the mining unit of Hindalco in Saridih, Chhattisgarh in May 2006. Around 200 Naxals stormed and shut down the operations of the aluminium-mining unit, and razed several buildings in the complex, using Hindalcos own bulldozers. They also set fire to several documents, and decamped with two trucks and a jeep after loading them with almirahs, computers and office furniture. This stalled mining in the attacked unit, which also incurred a loss of around Rs 1 crore.35 As the war of nerves between Naxal groups and the states in the region over the pace of development peaked, the Chhattisgarh government came up with a novel idea of floating a peoples movement called Salwa Judum to take on the Left-wingers (see Box on pages 132-133: The way of the Salwa Judum). Leader of
the opposition, Mahendra Karma, is one of the leading lights of the Salwa Judum, which is intended to bring the misguided adivasis back into the mainstream and isolate the Naxals. Another major intention of the movement is to bring down the spiralling scale of violence in the region. Possibly, the Salwa Judum has gained some sympathisers among the regions population because of the Naxals anti-development policies and the Naxal-enforced ban on picking of tendu leaves; Naxalite take-over of Dantewada has meant that most government departments and public work programmes (such as road-building) in the district have become non-operational, with the Naxals opposing these because they believe these would only benefit corporate interests or facilitate movement of paramilitary forces. The fear of Naxalites is forcing people to refuse basic amenities: around 3,059 villages in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have refused telephone connections because they fear that the facility would only arouse rebels' suspicions about them being police informers. However, Naxalites and critics of the movement say that Salwa Judum is just a ploy of the government to drive tribals away from their land and hand it over to industries. The adivasis have been moved away from their hamlets and housed in camps run by the state government, where they have been provided with
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Errabore, Dantewada: the trail of devastation after a Naxal attack mirrors the life of the villagers who have been forced into this camp
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The way of the Salwa Judum

The state-sponsored anti-Naxal movement has complicated matters perhaps irretrievably
Ramesh carries a .303 rifle. Hes not sure of his age.Maybe 16, he says doubtfully, and adds that he hasnt really shot anyone yet. The teenager has had only a weeks combat training at the police barracks within the Errabore relief camp, but is officially a special police officer (SPO) of the Chhattisgarh government to fight the Naxalites for a monthly salary of Rs 1,500. Legally, he cant get married or vote, but the government thinks he can handle a gun. If you thought it only happened in Liberia or Congo, welcome to Indias world of child warriors. Ramesh is a part of the anti-Naxal movement sponsored by the state and called the Salwa Judum. In Gondi, the local language, the term means purification hunt. Some say it started in Dantewadas Kerkeli village on May 6, 2005, when villagers stood up against Naxalites who had come to take away a young girl into their fold (The rebels have a policy of recruiting one cadre from every tribal family, if necessary, by force.). Taken by surprise, the Naxalites backed off. This emboldened the villagers. Others say the movement dates to a series of meetings in which villagers, who had suffered through a drought and had no rural employment schemes or development projects to see them through (since government projects tended to sweep around Naxalite-dominated areas), began questioning the rebels enforced boycott of trade in tendu leaf. The Naxals had called tendu leaf boycotts in the past to force prices up, but this time it didnt work. What is clear is that the movement took form only after word of the tribals anger reached Mahendra Karma, a Congress MLA, who promptly
cashed in. He held a massive rally in the area and urged the tribals to take up arms against the Naxals. Many tribals followed his urging. Armed with bows and arrows they set out in groups to hunt out the rebels in the jungles. Karma had led an earlier peoplesinitiative against the Naxals, called the Jan Jagran Abhiyan. This movement began with the same name but was later re-christened Salwa Judum. The Congress leader, a tribal himself, began going from village to village in Dantewada, holding rallies and exhorting people to join the movement. His initiative was publicly supported by chief minister Raman Singh and Salwa Judum became part of the state governments counterinsurgency strategy. Paramilitary forces were brought in to protect its members. The Central government chipped in, offering help in the form of extra paramilitary battalions, vehicles, minesweeping equipment and technology to help locate rebel camps. Several thousand Salwa Judum activists, many of them barely 16 years of age, were appointed SPOs, given some rudimentary training and arms and promised preference for permanent police jobs. If the movement was ever a spontaneous peace mission by the tribals, as the state government and Karma describe it, it very soon stopped being so. Most of the Salwa Judum leaders are either non-tribals or relatively wealthy tribals. Several reports by human rights groups and independent observers have documented the state-sponsored human rights abuses of the Salwa Judum movement. An all-India fact-finding team, comprising members from Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand chapters of Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi, Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, and Indian Association of
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On the move: Dantewadas tribal people have a peripatetic mode of life
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A special police officer: these ill-equipped members of the Salwa Judum are often recruited by force
Peoples Lawyers, which visited Dantewada in November 2005, said it found a patternin the displacements. When Salwa Judum meetings are called, people from neighbouring villages are asked to be present. Heavy security forces accompany the meetings. Villages that refuse to participate, face repeated attacks by the combined forces of Salwa Judum, district forces and a paramilitary Naga battalion, which is stationed in the area, the teams report states.Once in camps, people have no choice but to support the Salwa Judum. Some of them are forced to work as informers against members of their own and neighbouring villages and participate in attacks against them, leading to permanent divisions within villages. Families are sometimes being split between Judum supporters and those who wish to remain in their villages. Another group which visited Dantewada reported that the civil administration there was on the point of collapseand Salwa Judum had turned into an unaccountable, indisciplined and amorphous group led by criminal elements over whom the administration had little control. There is an atmosphere of fear and a great deal of violence in which ordinary villagers, and tribals in particular, are the main sufferers, says the groups report titled, War in the Heart of India. The report said they found evidence of killings, the burning of homes, and attacks on women, including gang-rapesfrom both sides, though only the killings by Maoists are recorded. Unfortunately, the local media is either too compromised or too
intimidated to report the truth. The administration and Salwa Judum activists take exception to any critical reports. Kamlesh Painkra, a young reporter from Bijapur, had to flee to Dantewada town with his family after writing about Judum cadres burning villagers homes. Several other local reporters admitted that they didnt want to risk their lives by seeming pro-Naxal. Afzal Khan, a Bhopalpatnam-based correspondent with the Chhattisgarh daily HindSat, was assaulted as he was suspected of having helped local village heads to make a request to the Raman Singh government to prevent the state-backed militia from entering their villages. The journalist is now hiding at an undisclosed location in Jagdalpur in Bastar and says he fears for his life and the safety of his family. Since it began, the Salwa Judum movement has cost over 350 lives and emptied about 700 tribal villages. Caught between the two forces, terrorised villagers either flee to, or are forced into, relief camps set up along the highways by the state government. Nearly 49,000 tribal people are now living in temporary shelters in 17 roadside camps and 27 new villages that have sprouted across Dantewada, according to the district administration. Another 20,000 have migrated to Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Unable to farm their lands, those living in camps have since lost two crops and their access to forests, precipitating a livelihood crisis. Homeless, jobless, landless, they survive on government rations and occasional stints as daily wagers, building and widening roads and digging ponds under rural employment schemes. After spending Rs 300 crore on these settlements, the state government is now thinking of turning the camps into new villages or resettling villagers on nearby lands. But there arent enough livelihood options in terms of land and forest produce, which sustain 97 per cent of Dantewadas people. While no anti-insurgency effort can succeed without the cooperation from local people, however to deliberately involve civilians in a conflict, especially underage boys and girls, as the Chhattisgarh government has done is, as the Asian Centre for Human Rights has stated,morally and legally untenable. Though both Congress and BJP supported the movement, questions are increasingly being raised and doubts expressed in the political circle. A senior BJP leader described Salwa Judum asa bone stuck in the throat that could neither be spat out nor swallowed. The state Congress leadership, too, is split on the issue. Former chief minister Ajit Jogis faction recently visited the prime minister and declared the movement a failure. They accused the state government of betrayingthe tribals of Bastar. The Congress high command is yet to make its position on Salwa Judum clear, though Union tribal affairs minister P R Kyndiah has called for a review of the movement, saying it was turning into a fratricidal war. Many activists have also alleged that the Salwa Judum is just an excuse of the government to drive tribals out of their home and lands, which can be then handed over to number of industries who have already expressed their keen interest to tap the rich mineral reserves of the state. Inspite of apprehensions by human right organisation, activist, politicians and people, the Chhattisgarh government continues to back Salwa Judum as the answer to the Naxal problems in the state. So far it has only precipitated a deeper crisis instead of solving the problems posed by extremist insurgency.
Maureen Nandini Mitra, Down To Earth, Kolkata
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free food and shelter. While government figures say about 10,000 tribals are relocated, Naxalites claim over 40,000 people have been taken away from their hamlets and housed near paramilitary barracks. A number of tribals have lost their lives in the bloody battle between Salwa Judum activists and Naxalites. A newspaper report puts the number of lives lost in 2006 at 150, out of which 127 were killed in Bastar alone.36 Former chief minister of Chhattisgarh, Ajit Jogi, has urged the state government to give up the Salwa Judum movement, saying that it has failed to provide security to the hapless adivasis. Jogis demand has caused a stir among political circles since the movement has the backing of the state Congress leader, Mahendra Karma. There have been similar demands from CPI as well as the civil rights body, Peoples Union of Democratic Rights (PUDR). In the meantime, the violence continues unabated. Ultra-left groups have mounted fierce attacks on villages, killing anyone suspected of aligning with the Salwa Judum, burning houses and destroying government property. On February 28, 2006, 29 people were killed by a landmine explosion near Konta village in Dantewada while they were returning from a Salwa Judum camp. On April 29 the same year, the dismembered bodies of 15 villagers were discovered on the main highway and jungle roads in the district. On July 16, 2006, Naxals attacked the Errabore relief camp, killing 42. And in all this, it is the people who are the most affected.
The flashpoints
BAILADILA: BATTERED
The Bailadila hill range, rich in dense deciduous and evergreen forests holding medicinal plants, is one of the ecological hotspots of the state. It is also known for its high quality iron ore deposits. Since 1961, the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) has been mining these deposits. To facilitate export of the ore to Japan, a railway line was laid, which attracted outsiders to the area. Mining and the consequent industrialisation have devastated the region, especially in places like Kirandul, Bacheli and Bhansi.37 Forest cover has declined, says a 1997 remote sensing study (see Box: In the line of fire). Local water bodies such as the Shankhini and Dankini rivers have been contaminated; the Shankhini, in fact, is called the lal pani or red water. Yet, people from about 100 villages on the banks of the rivers use their waters for most of their daily needs. For over four decades now, the NMDC has been releasing the Bailadila mines tailings directly into the Shankhini. Some of this slush is held in a tailings dam in Kadampal village at the foot of the mines. Built around 1985 following a National Human Rights Commission directive ordering NMDC to clean up the river, the dam is supposed to allow the tailings to settle to the bottom and let
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Cesspool: river Shankhini runs polluted due to iron ore mining by NMDC
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In the line of fire

Mining in Bailadila is having serious impacts, says study
A remote sensing study conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Council for Science and Technology in 1997 found the environmental impact of iron ore mining in Bailadila to be alarming: it had endangered the rich flora and fauna due to depletion of forest cover.1 The study also pointed towards pollution of water and air and overall degradation of land and soil. The impact of the Kirandul mines on land was especially intense within a 2.5-km radius, badly affecting all agricultural activities. Similarly, the Bacheli mine had affected the forest cover, leading to a deterioration of forest growth in a five-km radius. The study pointed towards irreversible denudation of the forest in the next 25 years if mining activities were allowed in the region. Moreover, it also mentioned that the soil would get eroded, making the land unsuitable even for afforestation programmes. Additionally, the influx of people with increased mining activities would cause heavy damage to the fragile ecosystem. Another study sponsored by the Union ministry of environment and forests between 1989-92 found that mining activity, along with shifting cultivation, had resulted in diminution of the closed forest in Kirandul, while mining was mainly responsible for the disappearance of the closed forest in Bacheli. The study also clearly pointed towards increase in density of trees as the distance from mining pits increased.2
the cleared river water flow out. But it doesnt quite work that way.38 According to Pratap Agarwal, local lawyer and activist who has studied the pollution levels in these rivers, The dams made by the company are nothing but sedimentation tanks. Moreover, as the iron slurry has such high concentration of fillings almost 50 per cent is fillings the sedimentation process is not
effective.39 The volume of slurry produced is so high that the dam fills up in no time. It has to be dredged regularly to function effectively. However, this is not done often enough. So the dark chocolate coloured water flows out (the colour gradually turns a lighter rusty red as the river moves on depositing its unhealthy residues along the banks). The slurry from earlier dredges lies piled up in black plateau-shaped dumps along the dam that, according to a 1989-92 MoEF report, have altered the course of several natural streams in the area. The report recommended building tailing dams in locations without direct links with major water bodies. But no action was taken. There were some attempts to address the situation, but none have been followed through to the end. In 1990, the Union governments science and technology cell reported that reckless exploitation of the mines and release of effluents into the rivers had damaged not just the rivers, but also 35,000 ha of agricultural and forest land around Bailadila. Four years later, the state government declared that 65 villages along the Shankhini and Dankini were affected by the polluted waters and ordered NMDC to dig some 200 wells to provide safe drinking water for these villages. According to Agarwal, The wells were dug but were too shallow and not one of them is functional today.40 In 1997, a report by the Madhya Pradesh Science and Technology Council had described the water pollution from the NMDCs iron ore mines as serious, saying its effects were seen even downstream. The discharge from the plant contained higher amounts of suspended solids, causing turbidity to the Kirandul and Bacheli streams. About 37 villages on the downstream area of Kirandul nala could not use its water for drinking purposes due to high turbidity, the study said.41 The situation has not changed much today. The rivers are still polluted and continue to affect the lives of the people residing on their banks (see Box: Iron river).
Iron river
Down To Earths Maureen Nandini Mitra travels along the Shankhini and Dankini. Excerpts from her report:
Near its source at Kirandul, the Shankhini introduced me to a whole new definition of bad. The closest I can come to describing what it looks like here is: part viscous bog and part a molten brown liquid that resembles something straight out of Willy Wonkas scrumptious chocolate factory, but is sure to taste quite the opposite. No, I didnt attempt to taste. These waters, I wouldnt recommend dipping a toe in, let alone taking a drink from. We drive down a narrow unpaved road and park by the edge of the tailing dam made by NMDC. The slurry here is at the bank-level and resembles a dry, black, clayey riverbed. Deceptive. It isnt solid at all. I hurl a few pebbles in. They sink with a soft, heavy sound. My guide, N R K Pillai, who now runs a convenience store in Dantewada and is a local pointsman of sorts, tells me three children, all siblings, playing on the edge of the dam, drowned there few years ago. One fell accidentally and was pulled under, the other two sank trying to rescue the
first. I stare at the flat surface and imagine being sucked in, my mouth and nostrils slowly filling with clammy, metallic-tasting sludge. Further along the bank, we come across two villagers walking across the bridge over the dams sluice gates. Farmers returning from the local market. For many years now, crops dont grow properly on our land,Soma Kumha, whose extended family owns 121 ha of farmland, tells me. They have to depend on rainwater for irrigation. Fine dust from the mines layers the crop, affecting production. There is no fish left in the river because of its high suspended solids content, which deprives fish of oxygen. Finding safe drinking water is hard and children, especially, routinely suffer from various stomach ailments. Every year during the monsoons, the river overflows and leaves slurry deposits on farmlands. I take one last look at the Shankhini before turning away. It doesnt smell as bad as the Yamuna or the Hooghly. Iron residues dont raise a stink, only leach a whole lot of unsafe stuff into the water, including dangerous amounts of mercury. We have another name for NMDC here,A D Nag, president of the local labour union, tells me as we drive off.Never Mind Dont Care.
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Despite all this devastation, SAILs Bhilai Steel Plant presented a proposal in 1998 to mine at Rowghat in Bailadila, even though this area covered pristine forests; the proposal was greeted with opposition even from the MoEF. The ministry rejected it on the ground that it would involve diversion of around 1,000 ha of dense forest and would be in violation of the FCA.42 There were also protests by environmentalists and the states forest department, as the region holds one of the richest sal forests in the country.43 Even though the project had received environmental clearance in 1996, the issue of forest clearance has been pending since 1985. The company needed the Rowghat mines desperately, as the reserves at its captive mines at Dalli-Rajhara are fast depleting. It, therefore, decided to submit a new plan, which would use a new technology a dry beneficiation plant. According to R P Singh, managing director of Bhilai Steel Plant, due to the technology makeover, the total area required for mining will reduce by nearly 50 per cent. Earlier, SAIL had asked for 2,400 ha; its new proposal called for 750-800 ha.44 The state government gave its formal consent for the use of Rowghat by Bhilai Steel in January 2007. Earlier, in September 2006, the MoEF had issued a gazette notification reserving about 2,029 ha in Rowghat for the company. The IBM too cleared the new proposal in March 2007. With this, the Chhattisgarh government is free to move the MoEF for the necessary forestry clearances.45 A biodiversity planning initiative has recommended that the Bailadila hills be declared a biosphere reserve. The initiative also
felt that the NMDC should restore the biodiversity in the degraded areas and protect the areas that still have biodiversity left.46 Afforestation measures have been taken as part of closure and restoration of the mined area, but the company has planted non-native species such as gulmohar and eucalyptus.
NAGARNAR: CHRONICLE OF A STRUGGLE

In May 2001, the NMDC decided to set up a steel plant in Chhattisgarh. For this, it identified 4,452 ha of land belonging to four villages Nagarnar, Kasturi, Amaguda and Maganpura in Jagdalpur tehsil of Bastar district. These villages are surrounded by some of the most fertile lands in Bastar, which are flanked on three sides by the forests of Bastar and on the fourth side by the Indravati river. The area, which comes under Schedule V of the constitution, is dominated by tribals who make up approximately 80 per cent of its population. In a population of 50,000, about 90 per cent own land, while the remaining are landless labourers who work on the fields of the landowners and eke out a living from the forest and in the town of Jagdalpur.47 As a part of the statutory obligation of consultation with the concerned gram sabhas before starting the process of land acquisition, the company sent a notice to the persons whose lands it proposed to acquire, inviting them to participate in the gram sabha and give their opinion. It was, however, alleged by the local people that many of them did not get the notice. Nevertheless, consultation meetings of the gram sabhas were held, in which the people
SHYAMAL / CSE
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Privatisation pains
BALCO case clouds the Samata judgement
When Sterlite, the Indian company of the Vedanta group, took over BALCOs shares from the government, the employees of the company (BALCO EmployeesUnion of India) approached the Supreme Court to stop the privatisation. Their contention: this violated the Samata judgement, as the land in a Schedule V area acquired by the government was being given on lease to BALCO. However, the case was dismissed. The Court, in its judgement dated December 10, 2001, almost reversed the mechanism for protection of tribal lands. Firstly, it said the judiciary would not transgress into the field of policy decisions. It said that it was not within the scope of judicial review to conduct an enquiry as to whether a particular policy is wise or whether better public policy could be evolved. Thus, the right of the government to have a public policy of its choice was upheld. Secondly, it was held that application of the law in Madhya Pradesh is not the same as in Andhra Pradesh. It was thus interpreted that the Samata judgment is valid only for Andhra Pradesh. Thirdly, it was held that the transfer of management by the disinvestment process would not amount to change of ownership, as technically the legal owner remained the same.
unanimously rejected the project. But the district collector issued a press statement stating that the villagers were in favour of the plant. The NMDC, in collusion with state officials, went about acquiring the land in complete violation of constitutional mandates and provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. As there was no response from the state to the petitions of the tribals, they approached the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (NCSCST). In spite of all this and investigations by the NCSCST, the process of land acquisition continued. A notification was issued on August 8, 2001 and the final award was passed on September 29, 2001. Attempts were made by the district administration to terrorise the people. On October 24, 2001, activists protesting against the project were apprehended and shot at by the police; 45 people, mostly women, were injured. The administration denied the entire incident, but a fact-finding team of the Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) found the reports of excesses to be true. The PUCL also reported that about 250 people had been jailed; those who hadnt been jailed, fled their homes. Most the affected villagers were forced to accept the compensation cheques.48 The NCSCST, on the basis of an inquiry conducted under Article 338 (5) of the constitution, came to the conclusion that the acquisition process violated the constitutional mandate for scheduled areas, and therefore was null and void. It further held that senior officials, including the collector and chief executive officer, were involved in a conspiracy and had indulged in criminal offences such as destruction of public records and fabrication of reports. Further, the national guidelines for establishment of industries in scheduled areas (1974) had not been followed. The commission advised the state government and NMDC to restart
the process and take action against the concerned officials. The advice of the commission was ignored. In March 2002, the four concerned gram sabhas convened a joint assembly, which stressed that the tribals were not opposed to the establishment of the steel plant. However, the assembly put down 10 demands for complete rehabilitation, including land for land. It was also resolved that the agreement must provide safeguards against privatisation to avoid a scenario like the BALCO case (see Box: Privatisation pains). In a meeting with the villagers, local officials conceded nine of the 10 demands put forth by the people. The state government acquired about 289 ha of private land and along with 114 ha of government land, handed it to NMDC.49 According to the Annual Report of the Union ministry of steel, the company has promised to implement a suitable scheme for the progress of the people residing in the zone of influence of 10 km around the plant. The company has given monetary compensation to 302 affected villagers for their land; 98 persons whose lands were entirely acquired have been provided suitable employment in the companys existing projects. NMDC has also committed to bear the cost of training of any person of an affected family who gets admission in any ITI run by NMDC or recognised by the government. Additionally, the company is according priority to local cooperative societies for supply of building materials.50 The Nagarnar steel plant, which was to become operational within six months of land acquisition, has not even begun functioning; it has been four years now.51 According to Pratap Agarwal, the plant was set up to use the iron filling waste dumps in the Bailadila iron ore mines. However, the technology was found to be unfeasible and the company ditched its plans. It is now planning to establish a sponge iron plant instead.52 In a recent move, the state government has cancelled the mine lease of the company and handed it over to Essar Steel. The reason given was that the company had held the lease for the past 30 years without mining it (see Box: NMDCs loss is Essars gain).
NMDCs loss is Essars gain

Bailadila changes hands
India's leading steelmaker, Essar Steel, won the prospecting licence (PL) for Chhattisgarh's Bailadila deposits, which has one of the world's finest quality iron ore stocks, in February 2007. This happened after the state-run National Mineral Development Corporations (NMDC) lease expired unutilised. NMDC had got the mining lease right of an area of 3,308 ha in Bailadila deposit No 3 on February 3, 1977 for a period of three decades. Till February 2007, when its lease expired, the company did not excavate even a single kilogram of iron ore. Under the Mining and Minerals Act, its mining lease automatically lapsed after 30 years. The state government proposed to the Central government to award the PL to Essar Steel for a 2,285-ha stretch in Dantewada district. Essar Steel will use the ore to feed its Rs 700-crore greenfield integrated steel plant to be set up in two phases in Dantewada, with a capacity of about three MT per annum.
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LOHANDIGUDA: TATAS VS PEOPLE

The state, of course, has not learnt anything from Nagarnar. Another protest has boiled over in Lohandiguda region of Bastar this time against a private company, Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO), which is planning a Rs 1,000-crore steel plant in the area. The land in question, belonging to 10 villages in Lohandiguda, is a Schedule V area and one of the few places in the country where wild buffaloes and the tribal culture of the Maria Gond tribes still survive. The company had signed an agreement with the Chhattisgarh government in June 2005 to set up the plant.53 It sought around 2,000 ha of land of which 1,784 ha was private land and 279 ha was government land54 and promised to provide a dream package as compensation. However, the project was received with distrust: the people alleged that the local administration and the company were forcing them to give up their lands. In July 2006, the state industry minister claimed that in a gram sabha held to discuss the fate of the plant, eight out of the 10 affected villages had agreed to drop the agitation and give up
their lands.55 However, villagers and local leaders in Lohandiguda alleged that votes in the gram sabha were obtained by coercion. Why would I give up my agricultural land which has been the source of my livelihood for generations? asked Keshu Markam, a tribal. Local communist party leader Chitranjan Bakchhi summed up the prevailing mood: Now the villagers have decided they will go to any extent to prevent the Tatas from setting up the plant on their fertile lands.56 On February 27, 2007, when a police party arrested tribal leaders to force the land acquisition, an agitating mob attacked it, critically injuring at least 15 people.57 Activists who came to support the tribals were hounded out of Bastar. Jagdalpurs hotel owners were warned not to accept any guests who may be opposing the Tatas. In March, the collector of Jagdalpur convened a meeting of political parties, journalists and business leaders and reiterated the governments resolve: opposition to the Tata project will not be tolerated.58 The project has received flak even from legislators of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is in power. We are not opposing development and Tata is also welcome. We are stressing from the
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Locals going to cast their vote under police protection in a gram sabha held to decide the fate of Tata Steel
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very beginning that the administration should acquire barren and unused land for the Tata unit and not the farmers land. This way, no one will protest and it will also lead to the development of the villagers, said Lachchoo Kashyap, MLA from the Bastar region.59 Despite all this, the Chhattisgarh government is persisting with the project. It has also sent a recommendation to the Indian government for granting a PL to Tata Steel for carrying out a survey on 2,500 ha in the area.60 The Tata group, on its part, is planning to bring the families affected by the project under the 'Tata Parivar' concept, a branded version of its rehabilitation policy. Under this, the company will register all families to be affected by the land acquisition process. They will then periodically monitor them for their income for a minimum period of five years and intervene if and when required. The company has promised that apart from compensation and benefits to the project-affected families, their other needs would also be taken care of. This would include building residential colonies with all amenities like drinking water, power, street lights, sewerage, schools and dispensaries. The company is also creating an umbrella organisation to serve displaced families from all Tata's project which will help locate self-employment 'opportunities' which come up during the construction phase. It would be a customised programme for each family, claims the company, including special programmes and opportunities for women. In the meantime, people from Lohandiguda continue their protest. A second gram sabha conducted by the people has rejected the "conditional consent" given in first gram sabha. Locals from Lohandiguda and Dhurli have now initiated "aar-paar ki ladaai" (a do-or-die struggle).
DHURLI: ENACTMENT OF A FARCE

In June 2005, steel major Essar Steel signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Chhattisgarh to bring in investment worth Rs 7,000 crore in Naxal-hit Dantewada district: the plan was to install a steel plant in two phases. For this, the company sought 600 ha in two tribal villages Dhurli and Bhansi but the 86 families living in these villages protested. They even refused to accept the rehabilitation package. The region being a Schedule V area, permission was needed from the gram sabha for land acquisition and setting up of the plant. In the gram sabha convened on September 9, 2006 (an earlier one had failed see Box on page 140: An insiders account), villagers of Dhurli and Bansi reportedly agreed to give their land to Essar. Eighty-six protesting families held a meeting and agreed to hand over 600 ha of land to Essar Steel, said H S Sethi, Essars Chhattisgarh director. The company will pay the villagers Rs 1,50,000 per acre (Rs 3,70,657 per ha) plus compensation for the trees on the surrendered land. Essar also promised employment to those who were displaced as per Chhattisgarhs industrial policy.61 This claim was met with disbelief and allegations that the
whole process had been a farce. People were coerced and forced to sign on the papers, with the media having no access to the whole proceedings. According to Daily Chhattisgarh, a Hindi newspaper, thousands participated in a rally in Dantewada against the proposed plant in September soon after the gram sabha cleared the project. They gave the collector a note saying they would not give Essar land in September. This is an extract from the report: The villagers, under the leadership of the Dantewada Adivasi Mahasabha and Sangharsh Samiti, Dhurli, said that on September 9, police had forced them to sign no-objection letters. Two constables were posted at each house. No outsider was allowed at the meeting place. People were not allowed to leave their homes or talk to each other. According to the villagers, at nine am they were forced into vehicles and taken to the meeting. They were taken to a room in twos, and pistols were placed on their temples to make them sign. They were told not to step out of the village.62 The company, however, received the go-ahead from the state government and it is in the final stages of acquiring the land. The state government has assured them the 600 ha within June 2007 to begin construction work as early as possible.63 But a new threat has begun looming on the horizon: Naxal insurgents have begun opposing the handing over of the states rich mineral resources to corporate interests. The rebels have threatened to disrupt mining operations not only in the state, but also in other states like Orissa, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh. In a recent attack, over 40 Naxalites raided Bhansi village and killed two farmers for having handed over their land for the Essar plant. The extremists also warned the residents of Bhansi and neighbouring Dhurli against giving up their ancestral farmland to Essar Steel, or they would meet the same fate.64 So, people are now crushed from both sides administrative repression and Naxal threats. There have been some efforts by Chhattisgarh-based activists to fight the tribals cause against the big companies. Activist and lawyer Pratap Agarwal has filed public interest petitions against the proposed plants in the High Court, alleging procedural and environmental norm violations. But the Court dismissed the litigation saying the Chhattisgarh government had only signed MoUs with the two companies, and no final agreement had been made. On the other hand, when an activist requested the details of the MoUs from the Chhattisgarh government under the Right to Information Act, 2005, the request was declined. The state commerce and industry deputy secretary, Shankar Rao Brahmane, refused to disclose the contents of these MoUs citing provisions in the MoUs which stipulated that no details could be disclosed to any third party without the consent of the signatories.65 This obviously raises a lot of suspicions about the deal. The people of the state and the tribals in particular have approached various organisations such as the NCSCST and the National Human Rights Commission for intervention. The state is still young and holds a lot of promise. But its avowed path of trampling the rights of indigenous communities at the alter of development does not bode well for its future.
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An insiders account
A public hearing in Dantewada a journalist reports
Armed police in riot gear stood in clusters around the walled compound where the people of Dhurli village gathered for a gram sabha hearing on August 30, 2005. The single lane highway connecting this village, lying halfway between Dantewada town and the Bailadila iron ore mines, was lined with cars and jeeps of district administrators, Essars top brass, Mahendra Karma, a Congress MLA, and the public engineering and health minister Kedar Kashyap, and their respective entourages. They were all inside the compound. This was the second hearing called to discuss the issue. An earlier one, called on June 10, was cancelled because villagers refused to turn up. Justifying the heavy presence of armed forces, police officials attributed it to possibility of a Naxalite attack. Essar officials said outside elementswere provoking the villagers to reject the steel plant, so they needed extra security. Pisda, Dantewadas collector, said villagers were fighting among themselves, there was tension in the areaand they wanted the people to speak peacefully. Gram sabhas, as per law, cant be attended by outsiders. Hence, gun-toting policemen kept media personnel outsiders beyond the walls, while within the walls Essar officials insiders in Dantewada administrations lingo hobnobbed with state leaders. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, banning the gathering of five or more persons, had been imposed on Dhurli on August 26. Police had also
picked up eight villagers on charges that they had roughed up the sarpanch, Bhagat Kunjam. Villagers started to trickle in around noon. The compound filled up by around 1.30 pm, however. But theres was no meeting or any discussion. Villagers were taken in turns to a room where officials told them they have to sign on a piece of paper indicating whether they are for or against the project. Confused, unable to read what is written on the paper, about 30 gave thumb impressions. By then the rest of the villagers in the compound had begun to get restive. Why arent we being allowed to discuss the issue, they asked. Pisda told them to either sign or get out. Angry villagers left.The hearing was re-scheduled for September 9. They should have allowed us to talk, this wasnt a gram sabha, this was like forced voting,farmer Dashroo Gundru said.We wont sell our land at any cost, let them do their development elsewhere,added Yuvraj Tellam, another farmer. Other villagers crowded around in assent. On September 9, the entire story was replayed. Section 144 was reimposed. The area was sealed off this time. Roads were blocked by Central Industrial Security Force personnel. All the administrators, Essar officials and MLAs were present, once again. Few villagers turned up for the gram sabha, but since this was the second meeting on the subject, by law, no quorum was necessary. The outcome of the meeting was not made public. It was later published in a newspaper that the gram sabha had agreed to hand over the land to the company.
Maureen Nandini Mitra, Down To Earth, Kolkata
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The public hearing was marked by an overbearing presence of khaki; local people were barely visible
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Goa
oa is Indias smallest state spread over 3,70,200 ha, it accounts for just 0.11 per cent of Indias geographical area.1 It is, however, one of Indias leading producers of iron and manganese: four per cent of Indias iron ore reserves and eight per cent of its manganese ore reserves are in Goa (see Table 1: Goas mineral wealth).2 In 2004-05, more than 15 per cent of the iron ore produced in the country came from Goa.3 The state has about eight per cent of its total area under mining, the highest in the country (see Map on page 142: Minerals and forests).4 Some 400 mining leases have been granted in Goa till 2002-03, covering approximately 30,325 ha this works out to almost five per cent of the total area leased out for mining major minerals in the country.5 Of these, 222 mining leases have been granted for extracting iron ore: this accounts for 56 per cent of the total area under mining (see Graph 1: Area under mine leases).6
The number of leases and the total area covered under them have remained almost constant over the years in 1995-96, the area under mining leases was 30,802, while in 2002-03, it was 30,325 (see Graph 2: Mining leases over the years). But the area under mining in Goa is all set to zoom in coming years. As per government records sought under the Right To Information Act, there are as many as 825 mining lease applications, covering an area of 67,822 ha, under various stages of processing. If these leases are granted, which most probably they will be, more than one-fourth of Goas land area will come under mining a recipe for ecological disaster. Iron ore is Goas most significant mineral accounting for more than 98 per cent of the total mineral production in the state in terms of value (see Table 2: Mineral production).7 Most of the iron ore produced in Goa is exported and mining for export has a huge
TABLE 1: Goa's mineral wealth

Iron and manganese are the key minerals
Mineral Iron ore-hematite Iron ore-magnetite Manganese Bauxite Quartz/silica sand Reserves (in 000 tonne) 6,42,113 2,15,557 23,271 53,072 20,004 Proportion of national reserves (in per cent) 5.62 2.02 7.89 1.81 0.69
GRAPH 2: Mining leases over the years

Number of leases in Goa, so far, has remained constant
Total no of mining leases granted in Goa 450 440 430 420 410 400 390 380 370 360 350 1995-96 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Year 401 402 402 395 396 396
Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-23, 11-24
GRAPH 1: Area under mine leases

Iron ore accounts for 56 per cent of the area leased out
Steatite 0.5% Bauxite 5.6 %
Source: Documents published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
TABLE 2: Mineral production

Manganese 37.8%
Production of iron ore has been increasing

Mineral Iron ore (in '000 tonne) Manganese (in tonne)
Iron ore 56.1 %
2002-03 17,889 11,050 52,291 140
2003-04 20,246 13,650 83,205
2004-05 (p) 22,309 7,636 43,218
Bauxite (in tonne) Laterite (in tonne)
Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses, 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 5
141

South Goa accounts for a larger share of Goas mineral wealth and forest resources
MAHARASHTRA
River Tiracol Protests: Resistance movements have been against iron ore mining
River Chapora
Forest area Mining area River Boundry of sanctuary River Mandovi
North Goa
MAHADEI WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
GOA
Ri ve rZ
ua
ri
BHAGVAN MAHAVEER WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
South Goa
NETRAYALI WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
ANDHRA PRADESH GOA

River Talpona
River Galgibaga
COTIGAO WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on information provided by Philip Neri DeSouza, local activist, Goa
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A
Rive r Sa l
A R A B I A N
S E A
MINING IN THE STATES: GOA
Exporting ore, importing disaster

Iron mining in Goa is being propelled by demand from across the shores
For Goa, exporting iron ore is a colonial legacy. The Portuguese began supplying ore to post-World War II Japan, and now Goas industrial houses, some of which had been granted mining concessions by the colonial power, are meeting Chinas huge appetite. Japan, however, still remains an important market for Goas iron ore. Exports of iron ore from Goa have been continuously increasing at the turn of the century, Goa exported 15 MT, and by 2004-05, this had increased to 23 MT (see Graph: The Chinese factor).1 Exports have grown by more than 53 per cent since 1999-00. The price of Indian iron ore in the international market has been soaring it increased from US $17 a tonne in 2000-01 to US $55 a tonne in 2005-06, and it even reached an all-time high of US $83 a tonne briefly in 2004.2 Miners in Goa and Karnataka have been quick to tap the export market, with Goa jumping the supply line. In 2003-04, Goa accounted for 43 per cent of Indias total iron ore exports with China being the major market, accounting for more than 68 per cent.3 In 2004-05, exports from Goa to China increased by a whopping 18 per cent.4 Feeding the ever-growing Chinese appetite for iron ore has been the strongest driver for Goas mining industry for the past few years. Goas iron ore companies arent complaining. and with good reason: record profits. Sesa Goa, for instance, recorded a profit margin of 46 per
cent in 2005-06.5 It is another story that the government receives peanuts from the massive profits that private miners are making. Unlike Goas miners, its villagers are complaining, for all that it is worth. With the massive devastation of farms, forest land and water resources, they are bound to.
GRAPH: The Chinese factor

Demand from China is driving iron production and exports
Exports of iron ore (in million tonne per annum) 25 22.1 20 15.1 15 16.1 16.7 19.0 23.3
10
0 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Year 2003-04 2004-05
Source: Anon, 2007, Economic Survey 2005-06, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panjim, pp 99
impact on the states economy and ecology (see Box: Exporting ore, importing disaster). Goa is a major producer of metallic minerals: the state accounts for 10 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals extracted in the country.8 At just 0.01 per cent, the states share in the countrys total non-metallic mineral value is negligible.9 The value of mineral production in Goa, which has continuously increased since 2000-01 (see Graph 3: Mineral value trends in Goa), stood at Rs 829 crore in 2004-05; iron ore accounted for 99 per cent of this value.10 The value of minor minerals produced in 2004-05 was estimated at Rs 55 crore.11 The state contributed one per cent of the value of minerals produced in the country.12 But the mineral royalty received by the state government was a pittance Rs 15 crore, Rs 18 crore and a little more than Rs 17 crore respectively in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05.13 Revenues from mining account for a minuscule portion of the states total revenues between 0.8-1 per cent.14 While private miners are making windfall profits, the government and the people of the state are seeing none of it. The mining industry in Goa employs about 11,000 persons directly, and about 10,000 persons indirectly, during the mining season from October to May.15 The major mining and mineral-based companies operating in Goa are Sesa Goa, Chowgules, Dempo and Salgaocar, which together extract
GRAPH 3: Mineral value trends in Goa

Value shows a continuous increase since 2000-01
900 829.1 800
700 675.3 600 Value (in Rs crore) 495.9 500 401.1 400 357.6 385.7 294.4 396.3
300
200
100
0 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Year
Source: http://www.indiastat.com/, as viewed on March 26, 2007
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SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
The other face of Goa, thanks to iron ore mining: a far cry from the sea-and-sun-kissed beauty touted by the states tourism department
about 67 per cent of Goas total iron ore, and account for 68 per cent of Goas ore exports.16 The key iron ore deposits are located in Bicholim, Sanguem and Satari taluks, while manganese deposits are confined to the southern and south-eastern parts of Sanguem. Around 1,282 ha of forest land has been diverted for mining activities, which is about four per cent of the total area under mining in the state.17 There is reason to believe that the figures of forest land diverted for mining are much higher. For one, large areas of forests in the state are not classified in government records. These are private forests or community lands, and so forest clearance is not necessary here. Mining done on such forest land is unlikely to be documented. Illegal encroachment is rampant. Even the state government admits it according to the Economic Survey 2005-06, an area of 2,66,000 sq m of government land has been identified as being illegally encroached by mining companies. Whatever the figures are, there is no doubt that mining has completely devastated Goas pristine forests. According to a report by the New Delhi-based The Energy and Resources Institute, at least 18 per cent of Goas forests have been lost to mining.
HIT: WATER, FORESTS AND WILDLIFE

The history of mining in Goa is intrinsically linked with its colonial past. When the Second World War ravaged Japan, leaving its economy in shambles, the country needed iron and steel to rebuild itself. Goa, with its huge reserves, was well suited to meet this demand. Portugal realised that this market was a potential gold mine, and decided to tap it. Portugal also realised that it needed to involve some local Goans and people from other Portugese colonies in its plans; like all colonisers, it hoped that these agents would support its regime in order to protect their own economic interests. In fact, Chowgule and Dempo, who have huge stakes in Goas mining industry today, were migrants who worked for the erstwhile Portugese dynasty. Following this strategy, Portugal awarded mining leases in perpetuity to some Goans mainly small businesspeople. Ever since, large-scale mining of iron ore and its subsequent hugely profitable export has been an integral part of Goas economy leaving an indelible impact on Goan society and environment. It is also a colonial legacy that mining in Goa is still largely in private hands, even after the liberation of Goa and its integration into India. After the Indian Army took over Goa, the mine owners
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went to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which was to decide whether Goa was captured or liberated. The Indian government agreed to let it be termed as liberation, and this gave rights to the mine owners to carry on with the mining concessions granted by the Portugese. In 1986, the concessions were abolished and converted into leases, which were deemed granted. However, many mines are currently operating without lease deeds being signed, which means the government has no control over the mine owners. Unrestrained iron ore mining has devastated the lifeline of Goan society its farmlands, forests, rivers, air and groundwater and Goas people are feeling the pinch (see Box: Mines that undermine farming). Most mines in Goa work below the groundwater level. About 10 tonne of water has to be pumped out for every tonne of ore mined. This leads to depletion of groundwater in the surrounding areas.18 Surface water from the rivers also seeps and flows into the mining pits, leading to drying of the rivers downstream. The once blue waters of Goas rivers are often bloody red, sometimes resembling choked drains. Take the case of primary water sources like the Kushawati, Kalay, Uguem, Khandepar, Advoi, Bicholim Zuari, and Mandovi rivers. The Selaulim reservoir (Goas biggest water supply project) too has not been spared. On one hand, the Curpem and Vichundrem streams deposit mining silt into the reservoir, and on the other, the Tudov, Netrulim and Salaulim rivers which originate in the Netrulim Wildlife
Sanctuary, carry run-off from the mines and haphazardly dump the rejects into the reservoir. Mine run-off from Salginin flows into the Kali river, that joins the sea at Karwar. The renowned Mayem lake has also met the same fate. Goa reels under severe water crisis even when it receives record amounts of rain. In 2005, according to the state government, a deluge of 130 inches washed hundreds of tonnes of silt from mining sites into local water bodies.19 Officials said the holding capacity of these water bodies was considerably reduced following the unprecedented silting. According to Brother Philip Neri de Souza, who is attached to the Don Bosco farm at Sulcorna in Quepem taluka, mining wastes are being discharged right into the Selaulim reservoir. The silt from the mines is now weakening the structure of the Selaulim dam itself. A news report published in 2001 in a local daily Gomantak says, A government official said that the life span of a project of such dimensions should be at least 100 years, but siltation caused by mining in the upper reaches of the catchment area could drastically reduce its longevity. Though the Irrigation Act prevents mining and quarrying activities in the catchment area, the subject comes under the Central Act, and there is a good deal of confusion. According to environmentalist Claude Alvares, Goas mine owners flout even the most basic environment protection norms like constructing bunds to prevent inflow of mining wastes into water bodies. The state governments Mines Department which
Mines that undermine farming

Goa is slowly turning into a mammoth wasteland
Everything in Lamgaon village in Goa is coated with a fine layer of red earth part of the environmental price paid by the community for the nearby iron ore mine. The emitted particles settle on plants and trees, stunting their growth. Earth dislodged by mining is dumped on hill slopes. From there, it is washed down by the monsoons into lakes, riverbeds and irrigation channels, choking them. Look at this muddy water flowing into my farm now, says 48-year-old Shantabal Hoble, a member of the Lamgaon Citizens Committee.It disgorges so much silt that the level of my field has risen by about a third of a metre. The fertile land that once yielded more than two tonne of paddy is buried under the clay from the mine on the hill and now I get less than a tonne of paddy from the field.The channel that brings water to her two hectare field is chocked by silt. Other mine debris has affected the fertility of the farms in the village, 30 km east of Panaji. But Lamgaon is not alone. Many villages have been hit by the activities of the iron ore mines in the state. All over Goa, pollution caused by the transportation of mined material is causing havoc. The dust generated by the heavy trucks has reduced agricultural productivity, apart from causing significant congestion problems. At least 7,000 trucks travel every day in Goa through villages, forests, wildlife sanctuaries and farmlands. And the impact on this small state, with a delicate ecosystem, is enormous.
SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
Dust from mining operations is destroying the fertility of farms
145
PHILIP NERI DESOUZA
Iron ore mining has devastated Goas lifelines its rivers. They are turning bloody red with the iron ore fines running into the water bodies
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Blasted and stoned

The residents of Saleli are reeling from rampant mining and stone crushing near their village
For more than 10 years now, residents of Saleli have been complaining to the authorities against the menace of stone crushing units in their village. Located close to the Mahadei wildlife sanctuary, Saleli is an agricultural village with a population of around 1,200. According to Rajendra Kerkar, an environmentalist from the adjacent village of Keri, Saleli has about 48 mines of meta basalt and meta granite, 13 stone crushers and two hot mix plants. And these are the bane of the local agriculturists. Mining has put paid to 15 of the 25 perennial streams in the village, while blasting at the mines is taking a heavy toll of the villagershealth. Radhike Ragobha, a 55-year old Saleli resident sitting on dharna outside the village temple along with other women of Saleli, says: Blasting in the mines would begin early morning and carry on till late at night. The noise pollution was driving us deaf. Added another villager who lives about 150 metres from one of the 13 stone crushing units, Stone dust has begun telling on our health; my 18-month daughter suffers from constant cough and cold. And we dont even have a primary health care centre here. The nearest hospitals are in Valpoi or
Sankhli, both about 15 km away. There has been no study to ascertain the impact of these 13 stone crushers on the health of Salelis residents. The blasting has also destroyed the villages drinking water and irrigation sources. Pointing towards one of the many blasting sites, Kishori Gawas, a Saleli resident, says, This used to be a perennial source of water, but stone crushing has put paid to it. Now, we have no option but to use groundwater. We have been complaining against this indiscriminate blasting for more than 10 years and have written to various departments. But the authorities have turned a deaf ear to our pleas. Another villager added that stones from the blasting site would often hit our cattle, injuring or even sometimes killing them. But the miners carried on with impunity. The first pollution-related complaint from Saleli was filed way back in 1994 to the Paryavaran Vahini of Goa a scheme launched by the Union ministry of environment and forests in 1992-93 to create environmental awareness through peoples participation. But, says Kerkar, a Paryavahan Vahini member, no action was taken on the complaint filed by Salelis residents. The Vahini was finally wound up in 1997.
Vasudha Sawaiker, Down To Earth, Goa
oversees the functioning of mines has just two engineers, one of whom is bogged down with court matters, Alvares said.20 While Selaulim and Bicholim are choked with silt, the Zuari and Mandovi are threatened by arsenic. They are the major rivers in Goa, flowing over an area of 2,50,000 ha through the states mining belts.21 A large part of Goas iron ore, manganese and ferromanganese ores comes from mines located in the basins and watersheds of these two rivers. In fact, 90 per cent of Goas iron and ferromanganese ores are transported through them to the Marmugao harbour.22 The Mandovi carries discharges from a catchment area of 1,15,000 ha, while the river basin has an area of around 38,000 ha.23 The river carries drainage from 43,500 ha of forest land.24 There are 27 large mines that generate 1,500-6,000 tonne of rejects per day per mine, a substantial portion of which ultimately ends up in the river.25 The Zuari carries discharges from a catchment area of 55,000 ha.26 Ten large mines are located in this basin, generating 1,000-4,000 tonne of rejects per day per mine.27 These mines are equally generous in offloading their wastes into the passive Zuari. A study was conducted to assess the presence and quantity of arsenic in the rivers due to the mining activities in their basins. Six samples were collected from both the estuaries to assess the arsenic content. The iron ore of Mandovi-Zuari catchment area has approximately 50 microgram per gram (g/g) of arsenic, and the study found that partial dissolution of the mining rejects could enrich the dissolved arsenic in estuaries.28 During the pre- and post-monsoon seasons, both estuaries had same arsenate levels (0.11-0.24 microgram per litre, or g/l).29 The arsenate level was low at marine and freshwater ends, while it was at its maximum in the mid-estuarine region.
During monsoons, arsenate levels showed a four-fold increase (0.3-0.78 g/l) with higher concentrations in the surface layer compared to the bottom layer.30 Arsenate was at its peak during the period of maximum precipitation and river discharge, a tell tale sign of mining waste laden with arsenic getting into the rivers. The high levels of arsenate also indicate the possibility of some arsenic associated with iron (as FeAsS) leaching into the rivers and of dissolution of river-borne sediments. Manganese oxides significantly enhance arsenite oxidation and may be behind the high arsenate at the marine end. Among the other rivers in Goa, the Kushawati faces siltation and pollution from iron and manganese fines. The river is the major source of agricultural and drinking water supply for people living in the villages of Rivona, Sulcorna, Pirla, Kevona, Colomba, Chandor, Zambaulim, Paroda and Quepem. Over the last few years, large-scale extraction of minerals in this manganese-rich belt has resulted in contamination of the river from run-offs during monsoons and washing of manganese ore along its banks. Wastes from the mining pits, which flow into the Kushawati, cause siltation of the river and also affect its flow. Many of its tributaries have already dried up due to the mining activities. The Kushawati Bachao Andolan (KBA), which has been campaigning against the pollution of the river, believes that if the situation is not controlled, the regions paddy, coconut, sugarcane and aeracanut plantations will be affected severely. The situation in most of Goa, thus, is serious, particularly for villagers from areas near mining centres: they have already begun selling off their properties. Most of the residents of Pisurlem village in Bicholim taluka which is surrounded by mines, have left after mining wastes destroyed all the 80 wells in the village. Residents of Bicholim say they had begun to order water tankers
147
even before the rains ended, as the groundwater has already been ruined by the mines. The poorer farmers lost their crops due to water stress caused by the mines that have been operating on the periphery of the village. Some farmers decided to take matter into their own hands. Villagers of Surla in Bicholim filed a writ petition against the mining companies in the Bombay High Courts Panjim bench in 2004 because of the heavy losses incurred due to silting of their fields from adjoining mining units since 1993.31 A committee was set up in April 2005 to evaluate the extent of losses (in terms of fertility and water-retaining facility) and the cost of removal of silt. The committee reported that mines were operational on the north, east and south sides of the village all along the hills. It found that approximately 1,090 ha of land (124 ha under paddy, 603 ha under garden crops and 363 ha under dry crops) was affected due to silting. Several farmers had incurred total loss of their kharif as well as rabi crops, while yields of cashew crop had fallen by 50 per cent. The committee suggested that the farmers be paid compensation for the loss of yield. Recently, the court, giving its ruling in the case, said that the
mining companies should pay Rs 3.6 crore by August 30, 2007 to compensate for the losses incurred by the farmers from 1993 till 2006. The compensation amount is to be disbursed to 761 aggrieved farmers whose fields had been destroyed. Mining companies such as Salgaocar Mining Industries, Chowgule & Co Pvt Ltd, Salgaokar & Brothers Pvt Ltd, and V S Dempo & Co Pvt Ltd have been asked to pay Rs 8.5 lakh each, while Timblo Pvt Ltd and D B Bandodkar & Co Pvt Ltd are to pay Rs 3.6 lakh each. Payment of the compensation, however, discharges these companies from the responsibility of desilting the fields. The court has appointed the deputy collector of Bicholim as court commissioner for disbursing the collected amount and has made provisions that farmers not listed among the beneficiaries can still approach the zonal agriculture officer with an application for raising a claim. The judges also directed the companies to undertake adequate protective measures such as providing catchment drains, protective walls and check dams for arresting silt and begin plantations on the waste dumps. They indicated that the compliance of
Overburdened
Goas mining waste dumps are choking its streams, destroying forests and farmlands and killing people
For every tonne of iron ore mined in Goa, three tonne of waste material gets generated. Over a period of 55 years of mining in Goa, it is estimated that hundreds of millions of tonnes of waste and overburden, low-grade ore and tailings have accumulated around mining areas. In most of the mines, overburden and tailings is not properly stored and managed. Forests in Goa have been hugely affected by overburden mountains of overburden can be seen all over forests, and even in protected areas. A case in point is the Netravati sanctuary. Coupled with the fact that dense vegetation on the steep slopes of the Western Ghats has been destroyed by the decades of relentless mining, the overburden gets washed away during monsoons, and finds its way into homes, farms and local water bodies. Mining wastes is one of the reasons for the devastation of forests and farmlands in Goa. A deluge in 2002 led to the collapse of mining reject dumps in six mines, which destroyed the Advoi river. Silt from the dumps covered residential houses and around 100 hectares of agricultural land in Pissurlem and neighbouring villages. The dumps are also an occupational hazard. Six workers were killed on December 9, 2006 when iron ore mining waste dumps collapsed in Tollem mines in Goa. The nearly 100 metre (m) high overburden dumps covering an area in a 200 m radius gave way, burying the excavating machines as well as the operators beneath them. The landslide was so sudden that those trapped were unable to even react. Military personnel were called in for rescue operations. A case of negligence was filed against the board of directors and managers of the mine. The low priority given by mine operators to overburden management culminated in this tragedy. Cases like these abound; many are not ever reported.
SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
Huge mountains of mining waste like this one accidently slipped and killed six workers in Tollem, South Goa
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One good show

Sesa Goas reclamation work is worth emulating
Spread over 200 ha in north Goa, the Sanquelim iron ore mines were exhausted in 1988. The Sesa Goa group of companies had been operating these mines since 1960. Today, the reclaimed land has a football field on it. Prior to reclamation of these mines, experiments were conducted to identify plant species suitable for the mine reclamation site. It was found out that local flora can grow on mine rejects in a water-deficient environment, if the soil is supplemented with organic matter. These findings were used to design a plantation programme for introducing local flora and thus enhancing the biodiversity of the reclaimed area. More than five lakh saplings have been grown at the Sanquelim mine site so far, covering a total area of more than 300 ha. Overburden dumps were initially stabilised by planting acacias closely; acacia acts as a nitrogen fixer and is generally not grazed by cattle. The dump soil finally becomes rich in humus due to the foliage of acacia, which initiates microbial activity and helps in further plant growth. After stabilising and reclaiming the area through this agro-horticultural approach, crops like cashew, jackfruit, coconut, banana and mango were introduced in the area.
SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
Reborn: landscaped and reclaimed iron ore mines
Additionally, mine pits which held water were made available for pisciculture by treating the water with lime and organic and inorganic fertilisers.
Kirti B Gupta, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, Delhi
these protective measures would be monitored by the chief engineer (water resources), and the case would be again reviewed after a year to decide if further compensation is required. Mining is hammering away at Goas other resources too: in the North Goa forest division, immediately adjacent to or often inside the Bhagwan Mahaveer wildlife sanctuary, several mining leases encroach on the sanctuary or impact on its borders. As Goas highly influential mining lobby pushes to increase production of minerals, the states forests and wildlife sanctuaries have suffered. According to a study done by Pune-based NGO Kalpavriksha (Hoghe et al, 2002), the Bhagwan Mahaveer wildlife sanctuary and Molem national park cover a total area of 240 sq km of moist deciduous, semi-evergreen and evergreen forests. The area boasts of a rich diversity of fauna, including the tiger. Occasionally, even black leopards are sighted. Parts of this area were denotified way back in 1985. Other protected areas affected by mining include the Bondla, Neturlim, Mollem and Cotigao wildlife sanctuaries the state government has plans to denotify large areas in these. Apart from actual mining on forest land or protected land, transportation and storage of minerals have endangered these fragile areas. Take, for instance, the Mollem national park. Though it was declared a protected area in 1967, its western and southern boundaries are dotted with mines. The Bellary-Hospet-Mormagoa rail line passes through the Bhagwan Mahaveer wildlife sanctuary. Some iron ore is also being unloaded at Sanvordem, Kalay and Collem. Collem was a sanctuary until it was denotified in 1985. At Kalay, unloading and transportation of iron ore takes place within the sanctuary. Rather than protecting the forests and their wildlife, the government, pushed by the mining lobby, is all set to intensify its spree of denotification of protected areas.
NO MINE MANAGEMENT
Given the nature of mineral resources in Goa, vast quantities of overburden and waste material is generated while mining. Deep quarries are formed which can be filled up by the overburden. However, most mines, helped by poor regulations, just dont bother. Reclamation has found very few takers in Goa. For Goas mine owners, mines are important only as long as something can be exploited from them afterwards, they are just pits. Literally. About 14 mines have been abandoned without restoring the area. Some mines have been abandoned because erstwhile mineral concessions have not been renewed. In all, about 140 mines with broken area of 1,500 ha have been left as pits for water storage.32 In Goa, the reclaimed area is just 9.5 per cent of the total broken area, and land used for waste disposal is about 11 per cent indicating that reclamation is lagging way behind instead of happening simultaneously.33 Back-filling has started in only 10 working mechanised mines, out of a total of 42.34 Of the total area of about 940 ha of these mines, just 12 ha is under reclamation, in which about 55 MT of overburden and wastes have been back-filled.35 There are rare good examples, though. Sesa Goas Sanquelim mines has established a football ground on reclaimed overburden dumps. It cost the company a capital investment of Rs 80 lakh and has an annual budget of Rs 30 lakh (see Box: One good show).36 In 1977, Konkani writer Pundalik Naik wrote Acchev the Upheaval. It was a vivid and brutal portrayal of the impact of rampant iron ore mining on Goas self-sufficient agrarian communities. Though it was written years back, echoes of Acchev can still be heard all over Goa. In fact, as the mining juggernaut gains speed, the upheaval is most certainly going to be even more devastating.
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Tourist paradise? A visitors travelogue

An editorial by Sunita Narain written for Down To Earth
We were standing between a massive mine and a stunning water reservoir. Local activists were explaining to me how this iron ore mine was located in the catchment of the Salaulim water reservoir, the only water source for south Goa. Just as I clicked this depredation on my camera, we were surrounded by a jeep-load of men. They said they were from the mine management and wanted us off the property. We explained that we had come on a public path and that there were no signs to indicate that we were trespassing. But clearly, they were not in a mood to listen. They snatched the keys of our jeep, picked up stones to hit us and got abusive. Before things got totally out of hand, we decided to leave. They followed us till they saw that we left the area and most importantly, could not stop and take more photographs. I was completely baffled at these developments. After all, this was the paradise of Goa, known for its sandy beaches, lush green mountains and most of all, for its peace and calm. This was also the place where industrialists the families of Dempos, Salgoacars, and Timblos with mineral interests, play key roles in education, in culture and in promoting the ethics of good corporate governance. Why would they allow mining to take place next to what is clearly the most important water source for the state? Why were there no signs of regulation even signboards with names of owners, near or around the mine? Why would state regulators allow this to happen? What was happening in this paradise to unleash this violence and simmering tension? I got my answers soon. In the next village of Colomba, I was surrounded once again: not by the goons of a mining company, but by the women of the village. We were standing on top of the hill, overlooking the village nestled between coconut and cashewnut trees. But where we were, the bulldozers, mechanised shovels and transporting trucks were hard at work. They were breaking the hill, shovelling its mud, dumping the rejects and then taking away the ore. This mine had just began, said the agitated women, but already their streams were drying up. The sight of the red rejects on the green lands below was painful. They dragged me down into the village, where they showed me
The rock that protects Vichundrem from mining companies
their wasted fields. They then showed me how the mining rejects and there are tonnes of this red mud were being dumped into their streams. They walked me to a home where the walls had deep gashes, they said because of the blasting done in the mines. The house owner, Devki Kanta Veli, told me that when she complained to the miners about her house, the supervisor told her that they would break it all down next time she opened her mouth. Understandably, they had just one demand: close down the mines. I asked how permissions had been given without the consent of villagers, who were these companies and whose land were they mining. I learnt that in this literate state, a secrecy gravy trail surrounded their operations. It was assumed that conditional environmental clearance had been taken to operate the mine. It was mostly communidade land under local community control, which can only be leased for agricultural purposes. But as the concessions had been granted by the colonial Portuguese government and later converted into leases by the Indian government, these restrictions did not seem to apply. Or if they did, then clearly they did not matter. The ownership was equally muddy, explained the villagers: one Hiralal Khodidas had the lease, but the mine was operated by Sociedade Formento (one of Goas biggest mining companies), through its agent, Raisu Naik, who had in turn sub-contracted it to Gurudas Naik, the ex-sarpanch of the village. This is why, I guess, the mines did not have company signboards. It did not suit them to reveal their identity or their permissions to the villagers. In the next village, Quinamol, the scene was more or less the same. The miners were rowdy; the villagers angry. The only difference was that the mine was older mined for ferro-manganese and now being excavated for iron ore. The mining rejects were bigger; they covered open fields of villagers and filled their water bodies. The tension was palpable. The women told me that they had complained but nobody was listening. I learnt later that the next day after my visit, people of the village stopped a truck loading the material and beat up the driver. A case has now been registered by the police against the women. But is it only their fault? This was the scene in all the villages that we passed. Red mud oozed from the hills above. It was as if is these were tears of blood. What made it particularly devastating is the fact that these villages are not destitute, desperate for livelihoods and money. These are prosperous areas, where agricultural productivity is the basis of economic wealth. It is this well-being that is being destroyed, bit by bit. I understood then what the demand of ore from China, which had raised prices of the mineral as never before, was doing to the greed of Indians. It was in Vichundrem village that I saw the future. Here our vehicle could not proceed up to the hill. It was blocked by a massive boulder. This was the simple but effective blockade by the village. It was their way to keep the miners out of the government forest land, which surrounded their fields and provided it spring water for irrigation. The fields were gleaming green in the sun. The images burned in my mind. When I returned to town that evening I saw on the news that violence had broken out in Nandigram in West Bengal over the governments plan to acquire land. I had just seen a million Nandigrams taking birth. Where are we headed?
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SUNITA NARAIN / CSE
The Himalayan states
he Himalayan states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are rich in minerals, but the ecological fragility of the region has rendered mineral extraction here an extremely hazardous and in some cases, impossible venture. Uttarakhand (erstwhile Uttaranchal) was carved out of Uttar Pradesh in the year 2000: it has an area of about six million ha.1 Nearly 44 per cent of this more than two million ha2 is under thick forest cover. Forest land diverted for mining stands at around 247 ha.3 The state has significant reserves of limestone, magnesite, rock phosphate and soapstone (see Table 1: Minerals in Uttarakhand and Map: Minerals and forests Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh on pages 152-153). Uttarakhand is the second largest producer of magnesite and steatite in the country, contributing 12 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, to the total output.4 Steatite accounts for 53 per cent of the value of mineral production in the state, and magnesite another 44 per cent.5 Although the state has sizeable reserves of limestone, mining of this mineral has been banned. The value of mineral production in the state stood at around Rs 90 crore, and the state received a royalty of more than Rs 35 crore in 2003-04.6
Till 2003, leases covering a total area of 2,757 ha7 were granted for mining in the state. The largest number of leases had been granted for extracting steatite (38), while with 1,413 ha, magnesite led in terms of area under lease.8 Pithoragarh is the most mined district in Uttarakhand with an area of 1,444 ha under mine leases, followed by Bageshwar with 554 ha.9 Himachal Pradesh too has abundant limestone deposits, besides those of magnesite and steatite. The reserves are scattered all over the state limestone in Bilaspur, Sirmaur and Kangra; salt and slates in Mandi; gypsum in Rajban, Bharli Sirmour and Solan; and uranium in Kullu and Hamirpur (see Map on page 152). Forest land diverted for mining in the state is estimated at about 1,228 ha.10 Limestone is the most important mineral for Himachal Pradesh, accounting for 75 per cent of its value of mineral production.11 The state was the sole producer of rock salt in the country in 2004-05. Minor minerals are also an major part of its mineral base, contributing around 24 per cent to the value of minerals produced.12 Himachal Pradesh had about 53 mine leases, with the total area under them being 2,368 ha in 2003.13 A majority of the leases
MONALI ZEYA HAZRA / CSE
Large-scale limestone mining is being done in the two states protected areas, which are being denotified to allow mining
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MAP: Minerals and forests Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh

Both the states are blessed with vast forested tracts; mining in these regions is a recipe for disaster
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
Zas kar
Ch
en
Chamba
Ra vi
ab
Lahul & Spiti
Spiti
Kangra
HIMACHAL PRADESH
Pong reservoir
Protests: Limestone mining has faced maximum resistance

Kullu
Una
Hamirpur
Mandi
Satluj
Govind Sagar Bilaspur
Kinnaur
CHINA (TIBET)
Bh
Uttarkashi
Gi ri
ag
ira
th
Open forests Dense forests River Copper Gold Iron

m Ya
Rudrap
To
ns
rayag
ga
U
Magnesite Coal/lignite Limestone Dolomite Gypsum Graphite Soapstone
Haridwar
an
R P R A D
Champawat
H
a ang
Nainital
Ud ham
Kali
amg
Source: Compiled by Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
152
P U N J A
Shimla Solan
Chamoli
Si rm au r
Tehri Garhwal
n
HARYANA
u na
k la
na
nd
De hr u ad
Pithoragarh
UTTARAKHAND
Pauri Bageshwar
Almora
NEPAL
Sin gh Na gar
MINING IN THE STATES: THE HIMALAYAN STATES
TABLE 1: Minerals in Uttarakhand

The state has considerable limestone reserves, but mining these would lead to excessive environmental damage
Mineral Limestone Marble Rock phosphate Graphite Dolomite (superior) Magnesite Copper Soapstone Quantity (in million tonne) 430.5 6.4 25.0 10.7 30 70.3 1.6 26.6
The flashpoints
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DOON VALLEY
Both the Himalayan states have a history not just of mining, but also of protests by local communities over ecological damage and resource alienation. Uttarakhand, for instance, used to be a limestone-mining hub thanks to the abundant quantities of high-grade limestone available in the Dehradun valley. Protests led to the banning of limestone mining in the Doon valley, courtesy a landmark 1986 judgement by the Supreme Court (SC). The Doon valley, in many ways, epitomises the states tryst with the mining industry. The valley is bordered by the limestone-rich Mussoorie hills to the north. For one interest group (including the operators of the limestone quarries and the scientific and technical agencies of the state government in charge of geology and mining), the most productive use of the limestone deposits in the valley lies in their extraction. For the other and much larger interest group (consisting of the local communities, both rural and urban), the most productive use of the same limestone deposits lies in their in situ function conserving the large volumes of rainwater that falls in the Mussoorie hills during monsoons every year. In 1911, four quarries were being worked in the Doon valley, and by 1982 there were nearly 100 leaseholders holding about 1,250 ha of area. The valleys environment was severely damaged characterised by loss of topsoil, lowering of the water table and deposition of dust on plant surfaces. The kilns led to the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and sulphur dioxide (SO2), causing defoliation, chlorosis and necrosis in plants. But the most severe impact of mining was on local water resources. Blasting of limestone had resulted in landslides, which carried debris to the rivers and streams clogging these natural channels of drainage. Floods, therefore, became a common occurrence in the valley during monsoons. Mining in the Mussoorie hills even affected the water sources of the Doon valley the limestone reserves coincided with the catchment areas of the streams that flowed into the valley. The run-off from the mines changed the course of the rivers and increased the height of the riverbed. Silt and debris affected the canal network, choking canals, necessitating dredging and disrupting the water supply. The resistance to the extraction of limestone from this vulnerable ecosystem was in three phases. In the first phase, local village organisations politically resisted the mining activities. The resistance was quickly interpreted as a block to national progress, and the organisations of the villagers were subverted by converting them into cooperatives and providing them with small leases. Without the support of science or the state, the villagers lost their campaign. The second phase was characterised as a conflict between the state and the lease holders. The Uttar Pradesh government tried to withdraw the lease in 1977 on the grounds that it
Source: http://www.smallindustryindia.com/policies/state/uttran/utran.htm, as viewed on March 29, 2007
TABLE 2: Districts and mine leases in Himachal Pradesh

Solan accounts for the maximum area under leases, because of its cement industry
District Bilaspur Kannaur Mandi Sirmaur Solan Number of leases 4 2 3 42 2 Lease area (hectare) 248.21 609.09 53.86 699.99 757.08
Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences, 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 12
(48) were for extracting limestone; the area under limestone was 1,705 ha accounting for 72 per cent of the total area under leases in the state.14 Gypsum accounts for 26 per cent of the mined area while rock salt takes care of the rest.15 Solan has the maximum area under mine leases, while the maximum number of leases is in Sirmaur (see Table 2: Districts and mine leases in Himachal Pradesh). Solan is home to some huge cement plants which have captive leases for limestone. The key cement manufacturers in the state include Gagal Cement Works owned by Associated Cement Companies Ltd, and the Darlaghat-based unit of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. In Uttarakhand, on the other hand, the big industrial players include producers of steatite such as Katiyar Mining and Industrial Corporation and Parwatiya Mines, and magnesite miner Almora Magnesite Ltd. The Himachal Pradesh government has been laying the red carpet for cement manufacturers, aggressively promoting the state in the name of development and employment generation. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd has undertaken a greenfield project for manufacturing three MT of cement in Baga Bhalag in Solan, and another two-MT cement plant is slated to come up in the Choupal region.
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Limestone: more flashpoints

Limestone is the bone of contention in other regions as well in these states
In Himachal Pradesh, limestone mining emerged as a profitable occupation two decades ago in Sirmaur district: reckless mining resulted in rapid destruction of forests and water pollution.1 In 1986, the government imposed a ban on granting new limestone mining leases.2 In 1995, the government recognised the malpractices being followed in the name of limestone mining in Shimla and ordered the closure of 10-12 mines in the region.3 The mines were accused of violating mining laws regarding the height of the mine and steps to be taken for prevention of water pollution. Solan has been one of the worst-affected districts in Himachal Pradesh. Unscientific mining has drastically reduced the green cover in the neighbouring districts of Bilaspur and Sirmaur. In 1991, Gujarat Ambuja began planning a cement plant in this region inside a wildlife sanctuary. There was immense pressure on the state government to lift the ban on mining to allow the plant to operate. As a counter to this, about 15 panchayats of the area came together to urge the government not to lift the ban. But the government caved in: the cement plant was allowed to be built after denotifying the Darlaghat wildlife sanctuary. The state continues to woo the cement plants despite facing facing opposition from the locals. An example is the proposed 1.2-MT per annum cement plant of Harish Cement, a subisidiary of Aditya Birla Group at Sundernagar in Mandli district.4 Residents of Khatrwari and adjoining villages took out protest rallies forcing the plant to be shifted elsewhere.5 Similar protests by environmentalists and locals have marked the proposed cement and power plant projects of Jaiprakash Industries in Solan district. Inspite of the protests, the work on the cement plant has already begun. Kataldi: in limbo In 2002, a case of limestone mining similar in nature to that of the Doon valley came up in Hemwalghati in the Tehri-Garhwal region.6 Kataldi village, consisting of about 30 families, was at the centre of the controversy here. Limestone mining in this area had faced opposition from the locals on previous occasions as well, the earliest being in 1974-79, which had led to a stay on all mining operations. However, in 1997, a six-year mining lease was obtained by Parvatiya Mineral Industry, which was again met with resistance. Again, in 2001, the company obtained a fresh 30-year lease. The leased area had a perennial natural spring on which a number of surrounding villages were dependent for water. Blasting and digging during the mining operations was feared to restrict access to this water source. Another threat was to the regions bio-diversity. Mining was thought to affect the fertility of the land, leading to loss of food security. Also, the leased area was next to a forest reserve, which served as the only link between forests and the people for purposes of fodder and fuelwood. The lease area of 5.26 ha at Kataldi also fell in the category of mining projects with lease area above five ha as per the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 1994 and also attracted provisions of
VENU MADHAV / CSE
While limestone mining has been banned in neighbouring Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh continues to encourage cement plants
the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Thus, the project required environmental clearances from the Union ministry of environment and forests. However, whether such clearances were obtained or not was not known. A public interest litigation (PIL) was filed in the Nainital High Court by the Academy for Mountain Environics and other peoples organisations, and some residents of Kataldi. The High Courts judgement put the onus on the district collector who, it said, should not allow mining till forest clearance had been granted. According to Kanchi Kohli of Kalpavriksha, a Pune-based organisation working on environmental issues, in response to a Right to Information (RTI) petition filed by Kalpavriksha, the ministry has replied that till now no forest clearance has been asked for. Even the preliminary formality of filing an application by the company to get forest clearances has not been done. At present, no mining activity is going on in the village. Till the 30-year mining lease is cancelled, the matter can be considered pending in spite of the High Courts decision. Its like a sword hanging over peoples heads,adds Kohli.
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would affect the natural beauty and ecology of the region. The SC called on technical experts to inform its decisions. The experts informed the Court that quarrying in the lease areas does not necessarily affect the environmental and ecological balance in regard to water, soil and other related factors. Without counterarguments based on ecology as a public interest science, even the state could not control mining in the Doon valley. In the third phase, citizens groups in Dehradun and Mussoorie headed by the Dehradun-based NGO Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra fought a similar case in the SC this time informed by public interest science. The balance shifted, and the same expert who in 1977 had stated that quarrying was ecologically safe, now opined of the same quarry that the lease area is situated right in the immediate catchment area of a nullah and is thus subjected to conspicuous denudation by flow of water. Rectification of the situation calls for a permanent closure of this mine. The emergence of public interest science supporting
public interest litigation in the Doon valley created a new counterveiling force favouring public interest. Finally, on March 12, 1985, the SC passed an order closing permanently or temporarily, 53 limestone quarries out of 60 within the geogra phical limits of the Doon valley or Dehradun tehsil. This was a landmark judgement: it was rare for the highest court of the country to put a blanket ban on mining activity in an entire region that too on ecological grounds.
UTTARAKHANDS OTHER WOES

In Uttarakhand, soapstone and magnesite quarries have also deprived people of large tracts of forest land, pastures and farms. Eastern Bageshwar is a hub of soapstone mining. There are around 200 mines in the area, many of which are illegal, and an estimated 200-250 trucks ply daily in the region to supply the soapstone. Environmental regulations, of course, fall by the
Soapstone seals Bageshwars fate

Mining for soapstone is devastating this hill region
Bageshwar district in Uttarakhand is known for soapstone mining, with Eastern Bageshwar as its hub. In Kapkot tehsil, the number of active mines has grown from six in 1980 to over 40 in 2005, spread over 2,734 ha of productive farmland, says Naren Singh Bhandari, reader, department of chemistry, Kumaon University. Most mining companies operating in the region are owned by industrialists and entrepreneurs who do not belong to the state.About 200-250 trucks ply daily to transport soapstone,says Mahesh Chandra Joshi, a local journalist. Five companies are mining in Kanda Parav village. Nearly 1,000 tonne of soapstone is mined a day. Every farm with soapstone can yield up to 5,000 kg, says Sunder Singh Garia, gram pradhan. Most of these mines have encroached upon agricultural land. As farmers began profiting from leasing out land, mining on agricultural land got entrenched. According to Girish Gunwant, the subdivisional magistrate of Bageshwar in charge of mining, the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, say that one mining unit cannot exceed 200 metre lengthwise. In reality, however, no restrictions are adhered to.Mining of soapstone continues to a depth of 30-40 feet since there is no limit on excavation,says Keshav Bhatt, a Bageshwar-based journalist. Social activists say there are 150-200 mines in Bageshwar. Of these, many are illegal. Between 1957 and 1976, three major landslides occurred in the districts Chaurashtal village.Soapstone is soft and slippery. Wherever it gets exposed due to mining, large landslips are bound to occur, Bhandari points out. Joshi agrees: As a slope is destabilised, slumping occurs, triggering landslides. Since mined lands are not taken care of after being abandoned, large and devastating landslides can strike in a few years. There are no specific mining policies for the state and miners are taking advantage of the situation, says G S Joshi, district magistrate, Bageshwar. Trees are not planted and mining areas not filled up to avoid expenses. What we get after the mining are gaping craters
SAMRAT MUKHERJEE / CSE
White patches of mined-out soapstone are an eyesore in Bageshwar
filled with water, which increases the threat of landslips, and dwindling natural springs and barren land, says Diwan Singh, a farmer from Kirauli village.
Bidisha Kumar, Down To Earth, New Delhi
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wayside. Soapstone, if exposed due to mining, can trigger off large landslips as it is very soft and slippery. Mining operations are also affecting the flow of water through the aquifer zone, creating large fissures through which water seeps out. This has led to drying up of springs. Land fertility has been drastically reduced, endangering food security of villages. Clay mining in the state has had its share of controversies too: the early 80s had witnessed protests against it in Malla Danpur, Bageshwar district.16 The bone of contention was the government approval granted to six different clay mining leases in five areas of Kaplot development area in Bageshwar (then Almora district). A social organisation, Grameen Utthan Samiti, began organising the people by creating awareness among them against mining. In April 1984, the villagers sent a letter against the mining to the district collector. When they saw no results, a year later, they organised a strike which stopped the mining work for four days. A movement against mining was again launched in June 1985 in which about 150-200 men and women took part. The people demanded the annulment of all mine leases in the area, compensation for the losses, and reclamation of the mined-out lands. They organised a 54-km walk from Chaudasthal to the district headquarters in Bageshwar, laying siege to the administration. The local administration gave a report in favour of the people and finally, in September 1995, the government ordered the miners to stop extracting clay. Ten years down the line, history repeated itself: mining started in the area again, and the villagers rose up against it. In September 1995, under the banner of Grameen Chetna Manch, protests and fastings were once again organised at the Kalika temple in Chaudasthal. Women participated actively in the protests. In 1996, mining was banned once again only to restart in 2002, followed by another round of protests and demonstrations, leading to a ban a third time. Some of the mine owners transferred their leases to other contractors, triggering another agitation. In March 2005, the deputy district magistrate gave an undertaking in
writing to the protestors that no more notices will be given for mining leases. There have been areas where people have given up their lands to miners in the hope of development and employment generation, but have been left high and dry. The people of Chandak, Mostamanu, Sikadani, Dhari, Dhunga, Tadigaon, Punedi, Silpata, Siloli, Mad, Maila, Manesera, Dhunauda and Bhunigaon villages in Pithoragarh district gave their grazing lands, watersheds and van panchayat lands to magnesite companies.17 After some years of functioning, the companies went bankrupt, leaving behind fractured societies. Chandak Magnesite Ltd is a case in point. It used to manufacture dead burnt magnesite (DBM). As India opened up to the global market and reduced import duties, the company lost its market to its Chinese and Korean counterparts. There were no buyers for the locally produced magnesite. When it became impossible to stay in competition, the factory owners locked the factories, without paying the workers their dues or paying off the loans taken from the banks. For the local community, it was a double blow. The fields, covered by dust from the factory, were unable to produce any crops. Grazing grounds had turned into parched deserts. Dustborne diseases were common. Natural water resources, which had been destroyed by explosions, were not in a position to be recharged. Tadigaon has a similar story: in 1976, industrialist J P Khetan acquired a 20-year-old lease of 360 ha of land in the name of Himalayan Magnesite Company, promising villagers employment. Before the end of the lease period, the factory was locked up, rendering 500 to 600 people unemployed. These cases have served to alert the people of other villages like Askot. When a Canadian multinational corporation, Pebble Creek, expressed its interest in mining ascot ore and promised employment to the villagers, the people protested (see Box: The Askot project).
The Askot project

A thriving bio-habitat is all set to be sacrificed to mining
Askot, well known for its musk deer sanctuary, is situated in Pithoragrah district of Uttarakhand. In 2000, the government granted prospecting license here on 793 ha to Pebble Creek Resources Limited, a Canadian mining firm, to explore zinc, copper, silver, lead and gold. In March 2005, the company applied for a 30-year mining lease on 386 ha.The lease was approved by the state government and forwarded for Central approval. The company has prepared a draft EIA and is now waiting for the public hearing process and grant of environmental clearances. Exploration for minerals in Askot is not a new phenomenon; it was previously explored in the period between 1965-88 by different organisations, including the United Nations Development Programme and Geological Survey of India. Pebble Creek estimates that the area has a resource potential of 50 MT of multi-metal ores. This eco-fragile region is already under serious threat from
soapstone mining and stone quarrying. Environmental groups and experts have expressed their concerns about the threat to the region due to mining. The Askot deposits can yield only a few grammes of metals per tonne of ores mined. Why destroy the precious environs for such a little gain? asks R Shreedhar, regional convener of the activist body Mines, Minerals & People. According to him, the geology of the Himalaya makes its imperative to avoid mining there.Large quantities of water can seep into the mines, which will make the region more prone to landslides,he explains. A due diligence assessment carried out by the UK-based Resource Engineering & Development Ltd (RED) on behalf of Pebble Creek highlights some of the major environmental concerns associated with the Askot project. These include disposal of wastes (lump materials, tailings and slurries/fines), discharge of process waters in the vicinity of the Kali river, and the tendency for acid mine drainage. The report also states that mine is situated in an area susceptible to landslides.
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SAMRAT MUKHERJEE / CSE
People of Uttarakhand feel that indiscriminate stone quarrying and soapstone mining has spoilt the delicate ecosystem of the state. Projects like Askot, if allowed, will further degrade the environment and hence, are being strongly opposed
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SAND MINING: GOING ILLEGAL

Sand mining is a key concern in Uttarakhand as well as Himachal Pradesh. A number of rivers in Uttarakhand have been threatened due to unsustainable lifting of gravel and sand from their beds the Gaula, Sharda, lower Kosi and the Dabka, to name a few. Mining in these zones invites the risk of increased erosion, changing courses and heavier floods, posing a grave threat to downstream habitations. For instance, the width of the Gaula river between Haldwani and Lalkuan was 50 feet (15.24 metre) in 1963-64; now the river is more than two km across. It leaves its course frequently.18 The river lies in a tectonically sensitive zone and is thus, highly prone to flash floods. In Himachal Pradesh, the Kullu valley is one of the centres for sand mining. Severe damage has been done to the bed of the river Beas, leading to devastating floods. The riverbed greenery has been reduced drastically and its course has been diverted towards the National Highway and Kullus main business centre. The mining has affected various irrigation and water-supply schemes.19 Illegal quarrying in the Binwa river has posed a threat to an ancient Shiva temple nearby.20 A portion of the temple has developed
cracks because of reckless and unscientific mining. The level of water in the river has gone down, affecting the stability of the temple compound. In 1997, when the government of Himachal Pradesh withdrew the blanket ban allowing short-term permits, illegal mining for sand and other minerals became common. The Kullu valley has borne the consequences:21 flash floods and land erosion. A number of villages like Chandpur, Kinnaur and Sundergarh have fallen prey to environmental disturbances caused by rampant illegal mining and quarrying. In Sundergarh, sand mining from the Suketi khud has lowered the water levels in the area. Indiscriminate sand mining has led to the silting of the Pond dam, reducing its lifespan and storage capacity. It has widened the riverbeds the low-lying areas of Kangra, Palampur and Dehra have lost cultivable land due to this. Landslides have become common. In addition to being an environmental issue, the illegal mining and quarrying is also a huge loss to the state exchequer.22
HIMACHAL PRADESH: UNCLEAN SLATE

Slate quarrying has been another bane for Himachal Pradesh.23 The Dhauladhar range has been shorn of its green cover because of it. Mining at the Khaniara slate quarries in Kangra district have stripped up to 60 per cent of the forest cover and caused innumerable landslides.24 The hills in the Kangra mine area have acquired a barren look due to the excessive mining.25 In 1999, about 20 villages in the interiors of Chamba district, with a population of 18,000, started sinking as a result of illegal slate quarrying.26 Slate mining has aggravated the problem of soil erosion. Surface run-offs have increased, and flash floods have become frequent in the region. The waters of the Manjhi and Manooni khuds in Kangra have turned grey with slate particles and debris from mines. Large-scale slate quarrying on the Rangdhar and Gehra hill slopes have damaged the Chamba-Bharmour highway, which gets blocked during heavy rains due to mine run-offs from the hillsides.27 Quarrying in the state has been carried out in violation of a host of laws including the Forest Conservation Act, the Explosives Act and the Mines Safety Act. Workers have been forced to work under hazardous conditions; more than the sanctioned area is being used for mining. Mining was officially stopped in Khaniyara in 1997, but the mining mafia had remained operative. In 2000, the government succumbed to pressures from the mining lobby and granted permission to restart mining in the area, subject to certain conditions.28 The cases from these two states demonstrate the many facets and one common impact of mining in the Himalaya. The impact is on the regions ecosystems and watersheds, the lifeline of its people, and almost all of it is devastating. For a region whose biggest riches are its forests, streams and rivers, these Himalayan states pose a tough question: is it possible for mining in such fragile ecosystems to be sustainable? If not, then what should be the development paradigm to be followed in such regions? Certainly not mining.
SHYAMAL / CSE
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CHAPTER 3 THE STATES: JHARKHAND

Jharkhand and West Bengal
esides being contiguous states, Jharkhand and West Bengal are bound by virtue of the primacy of coal in their mining industries. In fact, the coal mining belt in these two states almost exists as one continuous, seamless whole, with issues and concerns very similar all across (see Box on pages 168-169 for mining in West Bengal). Mining for coal has, on one hand, played havoc with the two states land and water resources; on the other, underground fires and land subsidence the result of unscientific extraction are threatening large areas with complete annihilation. Jharkhand faces additional traumas: the burden of Jaduguda and its radiation-ravaged population, and large-scale iron ore mining.
JHARKHAND: RESOURCE-RICH
Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar in the year 2000. The states struggle for separation was driven by the aspirations of its predominantly tribal population: it was, essentially, a struggle to protect identity and to gain control over land and resources. The reason behind this battle for self-determination was clear.
Jharkhand is extremely rich in forests and mineral resources but the tribal inheritors of this vast wealth had seen none of it. The history of Jharkhand, therefore, was one of exploitation of resources as well as people, and of protests for community control over resources. Jharkhand has vast reserves of coal, iron ore, fireclay, limestone, copper ore, mica, bauxite, graphite, kyanite and uranium, among other minerals (see Map 1 on page 160: Minerals and forests Jharkhand). While many districts in Jharkhand are resource-rich, the districts of East and West Singhbhum are especially so. According to the IBM, the state accounts for 29 per cent of the countrys coal reserves, 14 per cent of its iron ore and three per cent of its bauxite (see Table 1 on page 161: Jharkhands mineral wealth). Coal is the most important mineral accounting for more than 90 per cent of the states mineral production in terms of value.1 Jharkhand is also the richest Indian state in terms of the quantity of coal reserves and the number of coal mines, accounting for 21 per cent of the coal production in the country in 2004-05.2 Jharkhands output of key minerals has been showing an increasing trend (see Table 2 on page 161: Mineral production).
AMIT SHANKER / CSE
Black gold: Jharkhand has the largest reserves and is the biggest producer of coal in India. Coal is the key mineral in West Bengal as well
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MAP 1: Minerals and forests Jharkhand

If coal is not taken into account, the districts of Purab and Pashchimi Singhbhum emerge as the most mined districts
Protests: Most of the protests have been related to uranium, iron and coal mines
Ganga
Ga
Sa
So n
B I H A R
Pu np un
ua ar Bad adh
hib ga nj
ng a
lgu
Pha
Dh
Godda Pakur
Tilaiya Reservoir
Kodarma
el Ko rth No
Deogarh
Ajay
Garhwa
Giridih Chatra Hazaribagh

Konar Reservoir
Ba
Dumka
ra
ka
Palamu Bokaro B
arr age
Dhanbad
Panchet Reservoir
Maithon Reservoir
Da
Open forests Dense forests
Bokaro
River
od ar
Coal/lignite Uranium
Lohardagga
Bauxite Chromite Ranchi
WEST BENGAL
Gold Iron Copper Lead Manganese
l oe hK ut So
C H H AT T I S G A R H
lb
Gumla
Pashchimi Singhbhum
Purab Singhbhum
Dolomite Limestone Granite Silica sand Graphite Mica
ha ek ar rn ba Su
San
kh
Bu
ang a bl rb
O R I S S A
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MINING IN THE STATES: JHARKHAND AND WEST BENGAL
TABLE 1: Jharkhands mineral wealth

The state has nearly 30 per cent of Indias coal reserves
Mineral Reserves (in million tonne) 72,204 11,425.8 10,682.2 1,338.4 295.1 178.7 2,925.5 3,76,240.6 1,59,267.2 1,70,458.7 695 Proportion of national reserves (in per cent) 29.1 13.7 0.09 0.2 2.6 4.1 3.4 23.51 5.78 0.35 9.73

Approximately 80 million tonne of coal is extracted per year
Mineral Coal (in 000 tonne) Iron ore (in '000 tonne) Copper ore (in tonne) Manganese (in tonne) Bauxite (in tonne) Graphite (in tonne) Dolomite (in tonne) Limestone (in tonne) Fireclay (in tonne) 2002-03 78,628 13,702 89,486 5,120 1,184,102 11,532 2,57,949 891 6,087 2003-04 79,533 14,682 7,388 1,464,393 10,013 2,91,528 745 11,592 2004-05 (p) 78,028 16,087 5,706 1,509,057 15,241 2,33,163 822 8,463
Coal Iron ore-hematite Iron ore-magnetite Copper ore Manganese Chromite Bauxite Granite Graphite Limestone Fireclay
GRAPH 1: The mining districts

Resource-rich West and East Singhbhum are the most mined
Others 20% Singhbhum (East) 20%
Without considering coal, the most mined districts in the state are West and East Singhbhum. West Singhbhum leads both in terms of number of leases granted and the area under mining: over 45 per cent of the land under mining in the state is in this district (see Graph 1: The mining districts). Most of these leases are for iron ore (74 per cent of leased land).3 Of the total number of leases granted in the state for mining, 28 per cent is in this district.4 East Singhbhum follows closely, accounting for 20 per cent of land under mining.5 The majority of land in this district, 87 per cent, was leased for copper mining.6 Today, most of these mines are closed and abandoned. Some of the districts in the state, such as Latehar and Kodarma, account for a significant number of leases, 11 and 10 per cent respectively.7 However, they do not figure prominently in terms of area under mining. This is because both these districts have several small mine leases of low value minerals such as quartz, feldspar, and mica. With respect to coal, the key districts include Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Chatra and Bokaro. Out of the total coal produced in the state in 2004-05, 44 per cent was accounted for by Dhanbad alone.8 Hazaribagh, Chatra and Bokaro followed with 18, 17 and 12 per cent, respectively.9 The value of minerals extracted in Jharkhand in 2004-05 was Rs 5,760 crore approximately eight per cent of the total value of mineral production in the country.10 The value has been decreasing slightly since 2002-03, though it has shown an overall increase of 15 per cent from Rs 5,000 crore in 1998-99 (see Graph 2 on page 162: Value of minerals).11 The state is a large producer of fuel minerals, and accounts for 10 per cent of their total value in the country.12 At just six per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively, the states share in Indias total
Dhanbad 6%
Gumla 7%
Singhbhum (West) 47%
Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2007, Distribution of Leases and Lease Area (by State/District/Minerals) as on March 31, 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
metallic and non-metallic mineral values is lower.13 In 2002-03, the mining industry contributed Rs 797 crore to the state exchequer in the form of royalties.14 Revenue from mining accounts for a substantial portion of Jharkhands total revenue between 11-13 per cent.15 Revenue collected has shown an increasing trend (see Table 3 on page 162: Mineral royalty in Jharkhand), despite the decreasing value of minerals extracted in the state; the increase was due to the revision of royalty rates of coal in 2002. Coal contributes the most 92-93 per cent to the total revenues from mining received by the Jharkhand government; iron ore accounts for another two-three per cent.16 Jharkhand receives
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GRAPH 2: Value of minerals

Shows an overall increasing trend
7000 5890.2 6000
Mineral value (in Rs crore)
GRAPH 3: Mining leases over the years

Number of leases for extracting major minerals is rising, and so is the area under mining
900 5760.1 5876.2 800 700 600 406.3 451.8 451.9
5000.5 5000 4730.8
4967.3
4000 3000
4611 500 400 300 200 100 182.8 384 332 229 384
2000
1000
0 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 Years 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 (P) 0 1999-00 2000-01 Year No. of leases Area in '00 hectares 2001-02 2002-03
Source: Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp? secid=5956&ptid=19252 as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals Source: Documents available with Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
TABLE 3: Mineral royalty in Jharkhand

Mineral royalty forms a substantial portion of revenues
Year Mineral royalty (in Rs crore) 797.7 900.2 916.2 Total revenue Royalty as receipts (in Rs crore) percentage of total revenue receipts 7,406.5 7,443.5 6,852.6 10.8 12.1 13.4
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
Sources: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; Anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November; Anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December
the maximum mining royalty among the coal-producing states of India.17 Jharkhands riches have drawn some of the biggest names in Indian industry to the state. Subsidiaries of Coal India Limited (CIL) Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) and Central Coalfields Limited (CCL) operate here. CIL has 69 collieries, five coal washeries, 30 mining projects and 20 non-mining projects in the state. The Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) is the only public sector company operating captive coal mines in Jharkhand. Among private players, there is the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO). The Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), Rungta Mines Private Limited, IISCO as well as TISCO operate iron ore mines in Singhbhum. Since its formation, the Jharkhand government has been laying the red carpet for industrial investment by offering sops. It
promises to clear applications for mining leases within three months. The erstwhile government had signed 45 MoUs with investors for proposals worth more than Rs 2,20,000 crore, mostly in the minerals and power sectors.18 Although most of these proposals are under scrutiny after a change in government, the state is well on its way to industrialisation. Ispat Industries Limited has plans to set up a three-MT per annum steel plant in the state, whose capacity it proposes to expand to five MT per annum in future. The Arcelor-Mittal group was considering setting up a massive 12-MT steel plant in Jharkhand. The only deterring factor for this huge investment was that the company was demanding high-grade iron ore from the Chiria mines in West Singhbhum, which Jharkhand has not been able to guarantee since it is involved in a court case over control of the mines (see Box: Battle drawn over Chiria mines). The Tatas are also planning to set up a 12-MT steel plant in Tontoposhi, Saraikela district. SAIL, Essar, the Jindals as well as the Chinese steel giant Sinosteel add to a long list of prospective investors in the state. The Jharkhand government has granted 524 leases for mining various major minerals 206 of which have been granted for coal alone.19 A total area of 2.2 lakh ha has been leased out for mining major minerals in the state the highest in the country.20 In addition, 2,717 leases covering an area of 8,426 ha have been granted for extracting minor minerals in the state.21 According to the IBM, the number of mining leases for extracting major minerals (other than coal) shows an overall increasing trend (see Graph 3: Mining leases over the years). The area under mining is also increasing. Between 1999-00 and 2002-03, while the number of leases increased by 67 per cent, the area under mining leases more than doubled from 18,280 ha to 45,190 ha.22
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Battle drawn over Chiria mines

Jharkhand government caught in legal tangle
The Chiria mines in East Singhbhum district of Jharkhand have the second largest deposits of high-grade iron ore in the world after the Urals. The almost virgin mines of deposits worth about two billion tonne are valued at an astronomical US $250 billion (as per current London Metal Exchange prices). These mines were leased to Burnpur-based Indian Iron & Steel Company (IISCO) some 70 years ago, which were later transferred to SAIL when IISCO was merged with it. However, the Jharkhand government has been trying to get back these lucrative mining leases, as it plans to use the mines as a carrot to lure in fresh investments. Towards this objective, the BJP-led Munda government took back two of the 10 leases in the Chiria mines in January 2006: it decided against renewing the mine leases of Budhaburu-Ajitburu and Sukri-Luturburu in Manoharpur ore mines; the leases had reserves of 408 MT. The company, SAIL, went to court as it had made the renewal of
the Chiria mines a pre-requisite for IISCOs merger. It filed three writ petitions against the notification for the takeover of the mines. Based on these, the Jharkhand High Court ordered status quo until the hearing is completed and a verdict given. Both Tata Steel and Archelor Mittal have expressed their interest in Chiria and have agreed to set up steel plants in the area. Mittal Steel is insisting on exporting a part of the iron ore deposits a proposal which the Jharkhand government is not very keen about. The Tata Group seems to be in a better position. However, SAIL is also making concentrated efforts in getting back the lease. In recent months, the Centre, the state government and SAIL have been trying to thrash out differences to persuade Jharkhand to agree to let SAIL keep its mining leases, without which the planned expansion of the company from a current 13.5 MT to 22.5 MT may well run into trouble. SAIL has drawn up plans to invest some Rs 6,000 crore in fresh investments in the Bokaro steel plant in the state and another Rs 2,000 crore in Chiria itself within the next three to five years. The move is part of an effort to arrive at a settlement with the Jharkhand government after the issue was taken up by the prime ministers office.
PAUPERISED: LAND AND THE PEOPLE

The website of the Jharkhand government says that forests in Jharkhand cover about 29 per cent of the states total geographical area. The State of Forest Report 2003 of the Forest Survey of India puts it at almost 30 per cent; of this, 82 per cent consists of protected forests, 17 per cent is reserved forests, and the remaining 3,349 ha are unclassified forests. Jharkhand accounts for nine per cent of the countrys forest cover,23 and its forests are rich reserves of biodiversity. Unfortunately for Jharkhand and its tribal population, much
of the states vast mineral wealth is located under these forests (see Map 1). For example, out of the total forests in the state, the maximum 17 per cent is in the district of West Singhbhum, which incidentally, produces 99 per cent of the iron ore in the state.24 Out of the total geographic area in the district, almost 39 per cent is forested (see Table 4: Forest cover in mining districts). It is also one of the most mined districts in the state. West Singhbhum is not an isolated case. Hazaribagh is the second highest producer of coal in the state. Around 35 per cent of the district's area is covered with forests.25 The cases of Gumla, Ranchi and East Singhbhum are similar.
TABLE 4: Forest cover in mining districts

Most mining districts have significant forest cover, which are threatened; in others, like Dhanbad, mining has already decimated the forests
Percentage of state's forests in the district Hazaribagh West Singhbhum Ranchi Gumla East Singhbhum Chatra Dhanbad Bokaro 9.19 16.78 8.25 11.28 4.06 7.87 0.92 2.56 Percentage of area in district under forest cover 34.81 38.47 24.36 28.24 26.13 47.91 6.94 30.12 Major minerals produced
Coal (second biggest producer in the state) Iron ore and manganese (largest producer in the state) Coal Bauxite Copper Coal (third highest coal-producing district) Coal (Top coal-producing district) Coal
Source: Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 66
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The percentage of area under forest cover in all the mining districts, barring Dhanbad and Bokaro, is more than 20 per cent.26 In the case of Chatra, the third highest coal-producing district in the state, almost 50 per cent of the area is under forest cover.27 Moreover, the presence of minerals and mining operations has already affected the forest cover in this district. The forest cover in Dhanbad district is low because it has been under mining for decades. The forest cover in the Damodar valley, once 65 per cent, stands at only 0.05 per cent today.28 Feeding minerals to meet the nations insatiable appetite has taken its toll on the state rampant mining for decades has turned large tracts of forests into wastelands. Agriculture has been completely ignored. In the 1950s, under the Five Year Plans, large areas of fertile farms and forest lands were used up for industrial purposes. Millions of hectares of forests have been taken over by the government under the Indian Forest Acts of 1878 and 1927, and the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1927, converting community forests into a source of revenue: after all, forests accounted for seven per cent of the money the state earned.29 During the 80s, coal companies acquired thousands of hectares of forests in Jharkhand for mining operations in the Damodar valley.30 In Singhbhum district, a similar devastation of forest lands happened for extracting iron ore. When Jharkhand was born, the task, therefore, was clear: stop the depredation of forest lands. According to the Forest Survey of Indias State of Forest Report, during an assessment published in
Forest cover in the state, particularly in its mineral districts, is much more than the national average
1997, Jharkhand had 2.6 million ha of forests.31 In 1999, it had 2.2 million ha:32 a loss of 0.4 million ha of forest cover.33 The state had a tough challenge: ensuring that around a third of its geographical area remained forested, and curbing further deforestation. But Jharkhand has chosen to continue on its course of industrialisation. In fact, it has increased its rate of mineral exploitation in a mutually disastrous competition with Chhattisgarh and Orissa to invite industrial investment. According to the MoEF, between 1985-2004, more than 9,000 ha of forest land had been diverted for mining in Jharkhand approximately 10 per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in India.34 This does not include the thousands of hectares of forests diverted and devastated by coal mines. Decrease in vital forest cover that once served as important wildlife corridors has resulted in human-animal conflicts in the state (see Box: Destroying Saranda). According to a study by the Wildlife Trust of India (WTI), a Delhi-based nonprofit organisation working on wildlife conservation, 20 such cases were reported in Patratu, south of Hazaribagh, in the month of September 2005 alone.35 All this has resulted in the inevitable. Banduhurang, Turamdih, Jharia, Jaduguda Jharkhand is resounding today with protest movements against what is clearly being seen as state-sponsored environmental degradation, economic exploitation and displacement. While the government grapples with an estimated 45 such movements across its districts, more are likely to erupt with increasing industrialisation. Yet, state officials dismiss these flashpoints as the work of unscrupulous elements. In branding any protest as anti-social and anti-development, the administration finds the perfect justification to unleash the full repressive power of the state in favour of corporate interests. And the stories are numerous heavy presence of police and paramilitary forces, intimidation of protestors by the district administration, fake cases filed against them, demolition and razing of houses, flattening of fields, lathi charges and police firings. Its a sad sequel to the euphoria that greeted the formation of Jharkhand. The very people for whom Jharkhand was ostensibly created are now being sacrificed in the name of their own states development. For most of these people, this development has become synonymous with displacement and loss of livelihoods. Figures on displacement are rarely reliable, since there is usually a high degree of discrepancy between what is officially recorded and ground realities. Between 1950-95, displacement due to the coal industry alone was estimated at 1,049,640 people, mostly tribals.36 Coal companies took over 4,64,563 ha of land (including mine leases), alienating around 2,09,928 families.37 No estimates are available for displacement due to non-coal mining activities. The state has the fifth highest concentration of tribals in India.38 Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes account for 28 per cent and 12 per cent of the total population of the state, respectively.39 Estimates say that 55 per cent of the people displaced due to mining are tribals40 and just 25 per cent of these have been resettled.41 A significant portion of Jharkhands population, 44 per cent, is below the poverty line and more than six per cent is still unable to get sufficient food.42 The poverty ratio in the state is much higher
SUDEEP MUKHIA
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Destroying Saranda
West Singhbhums Saranda forests are seriously imperiled by iron ore mining
Saranda, once so dense that even the suns rays couldnt penetrate it, has Asias largest sal (Shorea robusta) forests and is an important elephant habitat. Today, uncontrolled mining for iron ore, both legal and illegal, is destroying not just the forests, but also the wildlife, apart from the livelihoods of the local tribal communities. The Chiria mines in Saranda are believed to hold the largest deposits of iron ore in Asia. In the 85,000 ha of the Saranda division, 28 leases for iron ore mining already exist in about 9,300 ha. The mining department wants more.What will be left of the forest then?asks C P Khanduja, divisional forest officer (DFO), Saranda. The past few years have seen an increase in mining. Thousands of trucks jam the roads leading to the forest from Chaibasa past Noamundi, disturbing people and damaging ecology. The proposed scale of some projects is an indication of things to come. The Mittals require some 8,000 ha. On the anvil is a steel plant with a capacity of 12 MT and investment of Rs 40,000 crore. The Tatas want 4,800 ha. The Jindals are plugging for 1,800 ha, with a 10-MT mill and Rs 11,500-crore investment. The impact on the forests has been significant. According to the state of forest reports (SFRs), between 1997 and 1999, about 3,200 ha of forest was lost in the Singhbhum region. Between 2001 and 2003, some 7,900 ha of dense forests were lost in East and West Singhbhum districts. Saranda too has been affected, and further degradation will have serious consequences for its considerable biodiversity. According to the forest department: The surplus labour force that was brought in to set up the infrastructure for mining is now engaged in illegal felling of trees for sheer survival.This is apart from the large swathes of forest land that have been cleared for mining. The DFOs of Saranda, Kolhan and Porhat have identified 237 forest compartments out of the total of 289, covering 64,000 ha, as being very compact dense forest areas still untouched by mining. A survey by them showed that a small patch of 40 by 40 metres had about 30 plant species. Apart from elephants, the forests are home to the flying squirrel,
four-horned antelope, sloth bear, leopard and deer. K Z Bhutia, the Kolhan DFO, reports having seen many Oriental white-backed vultures listed by the World Conservation Union as a highly threatened species. We want to save the forest from exploitation. Giving it the status of a virgin forest will protect the areas from being used for commercial activities. This will, in turn, protect elephants and other wildlife,says Bhutia. In 2001, the district was declared an elephant reserve under the Central governments Project Elephant, but the number of elephants has gone down from 424 in 2002 to 375 in 2005.High iron ore content in the rivers makes the water unfit for drinking and the noise of trucks carrying ore scares elephants away from Saranda, which is the core area, says Khanduja. According to R K Singh, who did doctoral research in Saranda between 1993 and 1998: Mining, along with unmanaged tailing disposal into the river system, is the biggest threat to elephant conservation. The Manoharpur group of mines around Chiria transport their ore using roads going through the forest, which is also the main elephant migration route from Saranda to Kolhan. A narrow gauge railway track along this road, used to transport ore, will be converted to broad gauge. The railways have sanctioned a Rs 190-crore project to transport more ore from the Chiria mines. As their habitat is increasingly disturbed, elephants go further in search of food. Reports of humanelephant conflicts have increased in the Kolhan and Porhat divisions. Most funds received under Project Elephant are spent on paying compensation for destruction of crops by elephants. The Koina and Karo rivers, which flow close to the mines, are full of residues which are directly released into these water bodies when ore is washed. This leaves the water and the riverbank red. The result: Koinas crocodile population has completely vanished and its other wildlife species, too, face extinction. The villagers say that all their low-lying agricultural land in Karampada has been rendered unproductive by the red sludge.Neither the land, not the water is of any use,laments the munda (head) of the village.
Ruksan Bose, Down To Earth, New Delhi
than that of the country (26 per cent) as a whole.43 Compared to the other mining states of the country, only Orissa has more numbers of poor people. Jharkhand also has a high percentage of households without food sufficiency almost five times more than the national average.44 Infrastructure and basic amenities are poor. More than half the population in the state has no access to safe drinking water.45 Educational facilities are few; there are only 817 schools per million people, much lower than the national average or in states like Chhattisgarh or Orissa.46 Literary rate is low as well, with just about half the population being literate.47 It is, therefore, not surprising that 86 per cent of the states districts feature in the list of 150 most backward districts of the nation.48 Other than Dhanbad and Ranchi, all the other mineral producing districts in the state are in the list (see Table 5 on page 167: Human development indicators mining districts). The non-coal
producing districts of West Singhbhum and Gumla rank as high as 20th and 5th in the list of backward districts.49 In fact, the situation in non-coal districts is much worse compared to coal districts of the state. The coal-producing districts rank higher in HDI and with some exceptions, have better provisions for safe drinking water and a lower poverty ratio compared to the state's average. This is because the public sector coal mining companies have employed more people, compared to iron ore mines. West Singhbhum, besides having abundant reserves of iron ore and forests, also has 66 per cent of its population from the indigenous communities.50 Mining has not brought about much progress in the lives of the people here. Almost half the population is below poverty line and a significant 19 per cent of households are not food-sufficient.51 Gumla, the only district producing bauxite, has a similar tale. Half its population is poor, and not even 30 per cent has
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KAZIMUDDIN AHMED / CSE
Jharkhand has the fifth highest concentration of tribals in India, and a huge majority of these people depend on forests for their livelihoods
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TABLE 5: Human development indicators mining districts

West Singhbhum, the key iron producing district, lags behind in terms of development
Human development index (overall rank) Hazaribagh Dhanbad Bokaro West Singhbhum Ranchi Gumla East Singhbhum Chatra Jharkhand India 5/22 3/22 4/22 6/22 2/22 12/22 1/22 7/22 Backward district (ranking among 150 backward districts)1 115 100 20 5 111 70 86% of total districts* Tribal district (percentage of tribal population)2 No (3.83) No (8.8) No (12.18) Yes (66.4) Yes (43.5) Yes (69.7) Yes (28.9) No (3.83) 26.3 Literacy rate (percentage) 57.74 67 62.1 50.17 64.57 51.74 68.79 43.24 54.13 65.38 Household access to safe drinking water (percentage) 41.46 100 100 84.15 52.24 29.50 84.69 41.46 42.60 77.90 Population below poverty line (percentage) 31.79 31.42 49.37 45.74 32.63 45.74 37.33 31.79 44 26.10 Percentage of households without food sufficiency 2.29 4.45 19.11 20.27 0.06 7.73 22.36 20.68 12.5 2.3
Note: *19 out of 22 districts are in the backward list Sources: Anon, 2006, Jharkhand Development Report 2006, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi; 1 Anon, 2003, Report of the Task Force; Identification of districts for wage and self-employment programme, Planning Commission, New Delhi, pp 16-17; 2 http://jharkhand.nic.in/about/districts.htm, as viewed on March 16, 2007
The story of Horomocho

A small village in Hazaribagh shows the way
This 52 household all Santhals village holds a few surprises. For one, it has a forest but no forest department officials. Also, it has a community coal mine on the bank of the Rohargada river, a small rivulet of the Damodar.It belongs to the village,the villagers say. But how have they managed to do it, when all mineral deposits in India belong to the government and its contractors? The shadow of government has not touched Horomocho. Ten km to the nearest bus stand, Horomocho has not seen many amenities. But nobody complains.We are rich,says Dhaniram Tutu, the Majhi Haram or head of the village in the traditional Santhali system. The villagers have a coal mine, 200 ha of sal forest, perennial water sources and agricultural fields. A two-room dispensary and a three-room school complete the picture. In 1982, the village declared sovereignty over these. The forests of the village were depleted due to massive felling by the forest department as well as the neighbouring villages. We felt threatened. They (the government) tried to take everything from us
instead of giving us anything,says Dhaniram. This was pre-1982 when some like Dhaniram and Charku had seen schools and gained some confidence. The village decided to act. They first took control over the forests, and next the coal pits. Situated on Indias rich coal belt, Horomocho could foresee its fate: one day the village would be buried in coal pits. The only way to save the village forest, protected since last two decades, was to keep the mines commercially unexploited. So the logical step was to declare the mines as community property. Every year, the villagers take out about 20 tractor-loads of coal for the village,says Lambu, a resident. The coal, however, is distributed free of cost and suffices the fuel requirements of the village for most of the year. Remarkably, this has also decreased a lot of pressure on the forest for which the mine was taken over. The villagers are sure of one thing: whatever it takes, they are not going to part with their jal, jangal and jameen. Fully aware of the confrontations and the difficulties involved, they are also very confident about winning this war and keeping it that way.
Richard Mahapatra, Down To Earth, New Delhi
access to safe drinking water.52 Literacy rate is lower than the state average. Jharkhand has a history of resistance. It is then hardly surprising that tribals are fighting back, and the state is headed towards becoming a conflict zone a second time in its recent history. The tension is palpable all over Jharkhand, specially in areas where large-scale industrial investment is proposed. Taking a cue from the legendary Birsa Munda, mutinies are brewing. The people are showing their anger, their disgust and
their unwillingness to take it any more. And sometimes, they also show exactly what they think of the system by simply taking matters in their hands governing their resources on their own and fulfiling their aspirations of a real Jharkhand (see Box: The story of Horomocho). The message the tribals of Jharkhand are sending to the state government is abundantly clear they will do everything possible to see that the original reason for the formation of Jharkhand is not lost in the quest for industrial development.
167
Minerals and mining in West Bengal

The states focus on industrialisation is leading to environmental chaos
Mining in West Bengal occupies 11,579 ha of the states total area of 8,687,540 ha:1 as per the IBM, this is about 0.13 per cent of the land area. Concentrated in Purulia, Bankura, Bardhaman, Birbhum, Darjeeling, Midnapore (West) and Jalpaiguri districts, the industry mainly mines coal, china clay (kaolin), fireclay, limestone, dolomite, lead and zinc ores, manganese, sulphur and apatite.2 Among minor minerals, stone is mined in Birbhum (see Map: Minerals in West Bengal). These minerals are worth Rs 2,802 crore, about 3.7 per cent of the total value of minerals in India. In fact, mining is the 10th highest contributor to the net state domestic product: the sector contributes about Rs 1,869 crore, or 0.99 per cent of the total state domestic product.3 There were 113 reporting mines in the state in 2004-05, excluding those mining atomic and minor minerals. According to the IBM, although the overall production of minerals in terms of value increased in the state by almost 29.7 per cent between 1997-1998 and 2000-2001, the number of people employed in the sector decreased by 14.8 per cent between the 1991 and 2001 census.4 A
MAP: Minerals in West Bengal

Raniganj, in Bardhaman district, has the richest coal deposits
Coal/lignite Copper Dolomite Graphite Limestone
SIKKIM
Darjeeling Jalpaiguri Cooch Behar
ASSAM
BIHAR
W es
tD
in
aj
pu
MEGHALAYA
Malda
JHARKHAND
Birbhum
Bardhaman Purulia Bankura
WEST BENGAL
Hoogly North 24 Parganas Howrah Kolkata South 24 Parganas
Midnapore
December 2003 state government report on the economy of West Bengal says that the fall in employment was mainly because a number of mines under Eastern Coalfields Limited (ECL) closed down. Currently, the sector employs 1,36,940 persons or 0.97 per cent of the total working population; 93 per cent of this workforce are men.5 Coal is the mainstay of mining in the state. Mainly mined from the Raniganj, Bankura, Purulia, Birbhum and Darjeeling coalfields, it is the highest in terms of production at 23,634,000 tonne and also has the highest value at Rs 2,724 crore, taking up almost 97 per cent of the value of all minerals in the state.6 Currently, West Bengal has 27,815,000 thousand tonne of coal reserves, which is 11 per cent of the countrys reserves of the mineral (see Table: Reserves of minerals).7 Raniganj coalfields alone have a coal reserve of 8,553 MT in an area of 44,350 ha. Raniganj has the richest deposits of good quality semi- and non-coking coal, accounting for about three per cent of the total coal reserves.8 Production of coal increased by 32 per cent from 1990 to 2003-049, but the average number of people employed daily in coal mines reduced by 33 per cent over the same period.10 This was mostly due to either closure or mechanisation of mines. According to the Economic Review of West Bengal, 2005-2006, during this time, the number of coal mines reduced from 199 in 1990 to 100 in 2003. The state holds almost 99 per cent of Indias apatite reserves; the minerals reserves are the second largest (after coal) in West Bengal. But the production of apatite (which is sourced from one mine in Beldih in Purulia district) fell from 13,034 tonne in 2002-03 to 4,950 tonne in 2004-05, says the IBMs Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005. The production of china clay also fell from 83,275 tonne in 2002-03 to 67,099 tonne in 2004-05. Even though production increased in 2003-04 to 86,242 tonne, the value of china clay reduced by almost 18 per cent from the previous year.11 Production of fireclay increased by 86 per cent between 2002-03 and 2004-05. Found in Purulia and Bardhaman districts, its mines, though, decreased in number from eight to five.12 Despite these, the index of production for the mining sector increased to 140 in 2004-05 from 127 in 2003-04, thus registering a growth of almost 10 per cent.13 The sector had an outstanding investment of Rs 2,629 crore in 2005. Economic reviews attribute this to the investor-friendly approach of the state government since 2002.14 The new mineral policy announced by the West Bengal government in 2001 aims at higher investments in the mineral sector. The policy recommends review of existing state policies on mineral exploration and selectively de-reserving mineral areas. The objective is to allow public sector units to concentrate on specific areas, while the remaining could be opened to private and foreign entities.15 Huge investments have also been flowing into the state through the establishment of mineral-based industries like iron and steel and cement. In 1991-2004, 234 new iron and steel plants were set up in the state, almost half of them established in the last three years. They have brought in an investment of Rs 8,356 crore. The state had only two cement units till 2000 between 2002-04, 11 units sprouted. Besides, about 17 sponge iron units were established in 2005 at an investment of Rs 203 crore.16 The state government is also investing in state-owned companies. The Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO) was merged into Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) in 2006, and Rs 9,592 crore was spent on expansion and modernisation of its Burnpur plant.17
Nadia
168
Environmental mayhem Naturally, the state governments focussed efforts to increase industrialisation have had their fallouts. The states mining policy does proclaim minimising the adverse effects of mining on forests and environment and expresses due concerns about the safety and health aspects, but there is nothing concrete to it and the actions are contrary. According to the states 2003 Economic Review, about 14,500 ha of land has been degraded because of mining in West Bengal.18 Most of this land is in the mining districts of Birbhum, Bankura, West Midnapore, Darjeeling and Bardhaman mainly the coal-mining blocks.19 About 277 ha of forest land was diverted for mining between 1980 and 2004 0.29
TABLE: Reserves of minerals

West Bengal holds about 11 per cent of Indias coal
Mineral Apatite Barytes China clay (kaolin) Copper Ore Copper metal Coal Dolomite Feldspar Fireclay Granite Kyanite Lead and zinc ore Lead metal Zinc metal Limestone Manganese ore Pyrite Quartz/silica sand Sillimanite Ilmenite Rutile Tungsten ore Tungsten with WO3 Vermiculite Reserves (in thousand tonne) 13,987.886 433 4,17,011 113 2.09 27,815,000 2,38,029 4,501.25 13,714 33,426 thousand cubic metre 26.52 3,709 139 143 44,706 200 2,500 6,364 1,653 2,087 192 683.429 1.173 5.566 Percentage of national reserve 99.13 0.58 27.34 0.02 0.04 10.98 4.19 9.38 2.52 0.38 0.65 2.09 5.81 1.47 0.05 0.1 2.47 0.26 3.17 0.75 1.73 1.79 1.35 0.69
THE HINDU
per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the country.20 Incidentally, the two districts that have the highest concentration of mining, Bankura and Purulia, also hold the biggest wastelands, 4,047 ha and 5,038 ha, respectively.21 The Buxa tiger reserve, located in Jalpaiguri district, and spread on an area of 76,000 ha had been the victim of dolomite mining till 1997. One public and several private companies were involved in mining which caused soil erosion and deforestation. The deposits have now been leased out to the state-owned North Bengal Dolomite Limited. According to a report by UK-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) International, a non-profit organisation, the MoEF has been rejecting applications for diversification of forest land for dolomite mining. But the seriousness of the state government in protecting natural resources is clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Mineral Advisory Council in September 2002, in which the government has asked the Department of Mines to take up the issue of diverting 12 ha of land inside Buxa for dolomite mining.22 According to a study by Walter Fernandes on development-induced displacement in West Bengal, between 1947 and 2000, 70 lakh people were adversely affected by projects of which about 55 per cent 39 lakh were physically displaced. Of these, only three lakh people were resettled; the remaining 92 per cent had to fend for themselves.23 With about eight special economic zones (SEZs) sanctioned and 40 proposed in the state, displacement is likely to emerge as a major problem. The steel sector is setting up a large base in West Bengal. JSW steels of the Jindal group signed a memorandum of understanding with the West Bengal government in January 2007. The project will take up about 1,974 ha of land in Salboni in West Midnapore district, to set up a 10-MT steel plant. The state government claims only small part of the required land is farmland. It also claims that almost 90 per cent of the land is already with the government. The project is set to bring in Rs 35,000 crore of investment.24
Mining is ravaging West Bengals land and people. When will the state government see the light?
169
DAMODAR: THE SORROW REVISITED

One of the key pollution hotspots in Jharkhand as well as West Bengal is the Damodar valley. In fact, the Damodar, the sorrow of Bengal, has now become a cause of sorrow for the entire nation. It is probably one of the most polluted rivers in the country today, thanks to mining operations and coal-based industries that have sprouted on its mineral-rich banks. The 563-km long Damodar originates near Chandwa village in the Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhands Palamau district. It passes through six districts of Jharkhand and four of West Bengal, before joining the Hooghly river. The basin it flows through supported by its major tributaries, the Barakar and the Konar covers 57 lakh ha, an area which has witnessed unprecedented industrial growth with the availability of raw materials and infrastructural facilities like power and water supply. In a 1998 report, the CPCB classified the river in Dhanbad as D, or heavily polluted. It means the water here can only support some hardy varieties of fish; it cannot be used for drinking or bathing. This classification is not unique to this stretch; it holds for the water quality of the river till as far downstream as Asansol and Durgapur, both in West Bengal. Many stretches of the Damodar and its tributaries resemble large drains carrying black, highly turbid water. The total suspended solid (TSS) count at most places along the upper and middle stretches of the river is 40-50 times higher than the permissible limit. For most part, between
Rajrappa in Hazaribagh district of Jharkhand and Durgapur in West Bengal, the river carries a film of oil and grease from industrial effluents. Yet it continues to be the main source of water for many industrial towns like Jharia. The crux of the problem is the extensive mining in the Damodars watershed. The basin is a repository of approximately 46 per cent of Indias coal reserves. More than 50 per cent of the industries in the region comprise coal mining, coal washeries and coke oven plants. Due to easy availability of coal and prime coking coal, several thermal power plants, steel plants and ancillary industries have come up: there are six coalfields in the Damodars upper stretch, along with 28 iron ore mines, 33 limestone mines, five copper ore mines and 84 mica mines (see Map 2: The Damodar watershed). West Bengal has 30 industrial complexes inside the basin.53 All these industries not only use the water from the river, they also discharge the effluent back into the river (see Table 6: Polluting industries along the river). Minerals, mine rejects and toxic effluents are regularly washed into the river and its tributaries, which receive large quantities of suspended solids, dissolved solids, sulphates and iron from the various mines. Mine rejects from open-cast mines find their way into the river and sometimes even choke the flow of water. Drainage from active and abandoned mines also increases the pollution load. Conservative estimates put the daily outfall of pollutants and effluents at 60 tonne of biochemical oxygen demand load
MAP 3: The Damodar watershed

The entire stretch of the river is dotted with polluting coal mines, washeries and industries
Bar
J h a r k h a n d
aka
r riv
er
Dhanbad Maithon Sindri
Kon ar riv er
Damo
dar r
Gomia iver
Panchet
Asansol Burnpur
Raniganj
Patratu
iver Santhaldih ai r Gow

Bokaro Tenughat Chandrapura Dugdha
Da
Durgapur
mo
da
rr
ive
W e s t
B e n g a l
Coal mine Coal washery Reservoir and dam
Coke oven Distillery Steel plant
Chemical industry Thermal power station
Source: Anil Agarwal et al 1999, State of Indias Environment: The Citizens Fifth Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
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SURYA SEN / CSE
Wheres the river? Run-off from the coal mines, slurry from coal washeries and effluents from industries have been the bane of the Damodar
(BOD load), two tonne of non-metallic toxins and 1.2 tonne of toxic metallic substances. Industrial effluents generated carry high suspended solids in terms of fine coal particles and flyash. Trace elements like nickel, cobalt, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, chromium, barium, germanium, vanadium, boron and strontium in the coal find their way into the river. The coal washeries that dot the area add substantially to the pollution load of the river. Theoretically, in a coal washery, after the coal is washed, the water used full of ash, stones, soil, fine coal particles etc is released into sedimentation ponds as slurry. The heavy coal particles and impurities are allowed to settle in these ponds, after which the clearer water is pumped back to be reused in the washery. But in practice, hardly any recycling happens. When it rains, the slurry is washed straight into the nearest stream and from there, into the river. Dry slurry, or coal fines, is dumped wherever it is convenient to do so. Gurdeep Singh, head of the Centre of Mining Environment at the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, says that very often, slurry is intentionally released into the river. The CPCBs data on the river is contradictory: while it categorises the river as D throughout its length, the Boards 2005 data given in its website says the quality of the river in West Bengal is as good as class A: at none of the monitoring sites, the dissolved oxygen (DO) level is less than six milligramme per litre (mg/litre). At all locations except one, the level of total dissolved solids meets the criterion set by the Bureau of Indian Standards for drinking water: 500 mg/l.
TABLE 6: Polluting industries along the river

Almost all the industries near the Damodar discharge huge loads into the river
Unit Bokaro Thermal Plant Indian Explosives Ltd Sudamdih washery Jamadoda washery Chandrapura Thermal Sindri Fertilisers Sindri ACC IlSCO cold rolling mill + coke plant Hindustan Steel Durgapur Project Ltd Bokaro Steel Plant Carew & Co Philip Carbon Black Others Quantity (kl/d) 6,00,575 4,070,000 18,720 18,306,000 11,600,000 21,000 366,672 29,523,000,000 4,730,000,000 14,000,000,000 24,000 150,000,000 1,600,000,000 18,865
Source: Anil Agarwal et al 1999, State of Indias Environment: The Citizens Fifth Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 74
171
PAREJ: DISPLACEMENT IS THEIR FATE

For the Turi community which used to survive by making baskets, agriculture, and raising livestock, coal has become the bane. It all started in 1981 when Coal India Limited (CIL) decided to mine the communitys land. This was the beginning of the Parej East Open Cast Project (PEOCP), located on the West Bokaro Coalfields in Mandu block of Hazaribagh district. The community was forced to give up its land. Its members were promised jobs; very few got them. The total land acquired by PEOCP was 237 ha, which affected 1,172 persons. Of these, 487 belonged to the Turi tribe.54 The community has faced multiple displacements since the project started. Initially, the Turi used to live in Turi Tola, but the expanding Tata West Bokaro Colliery displaced them once again in 1998. They were then moved to Premnagar and then to the Pindra Relocation Centre. But the Centre is built on a site where Turi ancestors are buried. The community believes the place is haunted. When they were being displaced for the first time, the Turi were told that the baskets used for loading coal would be bought from them. Initially, they did supply the baskets; they were given cane to make the baskets. But then they were told that their baskets were not strong enough. Some of the Turi men became labourers in the mines. Women could find nothing to do. Before they were displaced, the women used to do subsistence farming of mahua, maize, millets and paddy on their lands. But now, they have to buy these from the local markets. Their access to forest resources has also been restricted. As a result, the economic condition as well as the health of the Turi women have taken a beating. The PEOCP is significant as it is sponsored by the World Bank under its ambitious Environment and Social Mitigation Project
Displacement has converted many self-sufficient communities into wage labourers in mines
(ESMP). In mid-1990s, CIL approached the World Bank for loans to fund its worker retrenchment programme. Since the Bank does not fund retrenchment programmes, it instead offered to fund the rehabilitation of the displaced communities due to expansion at 25 coal mines of the CIL. In September 1997, a US $530 million loan was thus granted. ESMP adds a new dimension to rehabilitation efforts, ushering in, theoretically, an extensive use of consultative processes with project-affected people (PAPs) in the preparation of the various action plans. This would, as stated in the ESMP outline, make rehabilitation not only visible and sustainable but more importantly, would address itself to peoples needs. But for the Turi community, ESMP remained another project on paper. In June 2001, a small tribal group the Chhotanagpur Adivasi Seva Samiti (CASS) wrote a letter to the World Bank drawing its attention to the violations of the Banks policies on social and environmental safeguards by PEOCP. In 2002, based on the CASS letter and visits by the Banks officials, a panel was instituted by the Bank to investigate the East Parej Project. The panel released its report in November 2002, in which it listed over 30 violations of the Banks policies on social and environmental safeguards. The panel found that there had been clear violations of the rights of the PAPs. The objective of the Bank that the displaced people must be assisted in improving their former living standards, income earning capacity and production levels, or at least in restoring them, had been not achieved and PAPs have been harmed and continued to suffer harm. On compensation and relocation, the panel found: Land-for-land compensation, which is part of the Banks policy, was not even offered by the project. Many of the displaced have not been and are not being compensated at full replacement cost. The system of compensation is known to provide inadequate compensation: middlemen take a share and there is underreporting of the previous sales price based on which compensation is given. Compensation is fixed on the date of notification, not the date of payment the difference between the two, some times, is even 10 years. The process and basis of house compensation lacks transparency and is open to abuse No title for houses in the resettlement colony has been given so far to the PAPs. The PAPs were not consulted in the selection of the resettlement site. They were simply guided to a pre-selected site and told to move there, without even establishing whether potable water was available at the site. PAPs from Borwa Tola were involuntarily relocated some distance away to Pindra even though there was no provision for a school building or teachers there. The panel indicted the Parej project for poor compensation, relocation and rehabilitation. The World Bank, on its part, accepted that the project has caused poverty, but did nothing to alleviate the poverty. The Turi community remained where it was: displaced and dispossessed.
SURYA SEN / CSE
172
JHARIA: THE LAND OF FUMES AND FIRES

Coal is the bane of Jharia as well: the town, located in Dhanbad district of Jharkhand, has to make do with polluted water, thanks to the coalfields in Damodar valley. There are a total of 86 coal mines in the region; Jharia has one of the most important coalfields in India because of its metallurgical grade coal reserves. According to the Indian School of Mines (ISM), emissions from these mines have deteriorated the air quality to such an extent that the CPCB has declared Dhanbad-Jharia to be one of the most polluted regions of the country. The State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) has declared the region as a problem area and monitors ambient air quality under the National Air Monitoring Programme. Monitoring is done at three locations the Regional Office-cum-Laboratory in Dhanbad, the Mineral Area Development Authority (MADA) in Jharia, and the Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) in Sindri. Ambient air monitoring over 11 years (1991-2002) in these areas clearly indicates that the annual average concentration of suspended particulate matter (SPM) in Jharia is 50 per cent higher than in the residential area (Regional Office, Dhanbad). In many years, the SPM values in the industrial area were twice the values in the residential area.55 In MADA, Jharia, the ambient air quality levels exceed the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) safe limits quite frequently. The CPCB has fixed very lenient standards for ambient air quality (SPM = 500 microgram per cubic metre or g/m3) in some of the old coalfields including Jharia, Bokaro and Raniganj.56 New mines have to meet more stringent standards (SPM = 360 g/m3) and if Jharia had to conform to them, then the annual average concentration of SPM here would exceed the standards in 10 out of 11 years.57 The average ambient air SPM concentration for the 11 years for MADA, Jharia is 425 g/m3, which is below the standard specifically set for this area, but much higher than the standard for new mines.58 The maximum ambient air SPM concentration is as high as 958 g/m3.59 This high concentration is due to mining activities in Jharia coalfields and heavy traffic on the Jharia-Sindri state highway.
MAHADEO SEN
Scorched earth: mines spewing hot gases and fire are common sight in Jharia
Inferno
Jharia is also notorious for its coal fires: underground fires have been raging here for several decades. More than 90 years ago, when the first major blaze was reported from Jharia, private entrepreneurs were mining in this area. Left unattended and stoked by relentless mining activity, as many as 70 fires have erupted in Jharia since then. Of these, 60 are widespread. The open-cast mining areas in Jharia were not backfilled leading to large voids wherever mining was abandoned. The practice of extraction of thick seams by caving at shallow depths damaged the ground surface in the form of subsidence and formation of pot-holes or cracks reaching up to the surface. This, in turn, increased the chances of spontaneous heating of coal seams leading to mine fires. BCCL is now mining coal under the township. The 21st report of the business advisory committee to the Parliament presented in 1992 had said that 37 MT of coal has
already been burnt in Jharia. The value of the damaged coal comes to Rs 1,000 crore.60 A BCCL report has said that some of the fires had endangered production outlets, surface structures, railway lines, roads and drainage channels.61 In 2000, resident of Jharia town Rajesh Chauhan watched as the towns temple snapped into two. The next moment, flames leapt out from underneath spewing noxious gases. In a move that had apathy written all over it, BCCL got a terse message painted on the damaged temple wall: Fire area prone to subsidence. Some 150,000 miners, truck drivers, loaders and other workers brave this hazard to eke out a living in Jharia. The fires have consumed about 42 MT of Indias best coking coal, rendering another 1,864 MT out of bounds. Residents, meanwhile, live in constant fear of a major subsidence that can cause the entire town to collapse. Around 35,000 houses in the town are said to be under immediate threat. A fierce debate rages among scientists, activists and politicians over the ameliorative course that needs to be taken. M M Sharma, deputy director general (mine safety), DGMS, says: Only the fringe areas of Jharia are in danger. BCCL also claims that the fire has been controlled substantially and is limited to only about 900 ha as against the earlier figure of 1,732 ha.62 But in 2002, the then chief minister Babulal Marandi reignited the dispute by declaring that the town must be shifted. This meant relocation of the nearly 0.3 million population of Jharia, approximately 0.1 million houses and other buildings and a prospering economy. Marandi was forced to do a rethink as local leaders opposed the move. First, we need to have a proper rehabilitation plan in place, he clarified.
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Dousing plans: the various responses to Jharia

Committees have studied the problem, and action plans have been suggested, even as the fires rage on
In 1992, the Central government had asserted that the Jharia fires should be controlled so that resources could be exploited. P A Sangma, the then Union minister of state for coal, had said in Parliament: Rs 750 crore worth of coking coal is imported every year, which is a huge bill. We would like to go in for mining as far as possible by dousing the fires at Jharia.1 In 2004, the ministry had a different take: it said in Parliament that there is no mine fire below Jharia town and therefore, there is no plan to shift the town. But it added that Jharia town is surrounded by mine fires like Kujama, Lodna, Simlabahal, Ena, and Rajapur and that some of these localities have been identified to be shifted for safety of the persons residing there. As per the Master Plan/Action Plan, there is a plan for shifting 65,300 houses (BCCL houses 36,208, private houses 15,571, encroachers houses 12,719 and others 802) over a 20-year period.2 Over the years, the inferno underneath Jharia has led to a wide range of responses from various quarters, creation of a number of committees and formulation of numerous plans. Here are a few of the more significant ones: 1988: Central Mine Planning & Design Institutes (CMPDI) Rs 115-crore plan
1989: Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) informs the Chari Committee on Reclamation of Abandoned Coal Minesthat 95 MT coal was saved by fire projects which cost Rs 69 crore. The Committee quoted BCCLs estimate of Rs 300 crore for liquidating the fires in Jharia. It noted the high cost of reclaiming the burning areas, compared to that of overburden dumps (Rs 400,000 per cubic feet and Rs 20,000 per ha for overburden dumps). The emphasis has since shifted to vacating people from unstable areas along with tackling fires. 1994-96: The World Banks project to diagnose and control the fires 1997: A writ petition on the fires filed in the Supreme Court (SC) by Haradhan Roy 1999: The CMPDI prepares a Master Plan for dealing with fire, subsidence and rehabilitation in the BCCL leasehold. This is approved by the BCCL and Coal India Limited (CIL) boards. Master Plan is revised/updated in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Following an SC order, the Plan is examined and approved by different bodies such as the ministry of commerce, Planning Commission, the committee formed by the DGMS, etc. 2006: The updated cost of the project in 2006 stands at Rs 8,637 crore. The project aims to shift persons living in the unstable areas, and deal with the fires by excavation; every body, including encroachers, will be rehabilitated and it will permit BCCL to plan for scientific mining of coal.
S P Banerjee, mining expert, Kolkata
The resettlement option spawned numerous unsuccessful attempts to implement the other solution: putting out the fire. Several organisations and agencies from the Planning Commission to the World Bank have disbursed substantial sums for this, but to little avail (see Box: Dousing plans: the various responses to Jharia). The fire cannot be extinguished, says D D Mishra categorically. He is the former director of Dhanbad-based Central Mining Research Institute (CMRI) and an expert on Jharia fires. The stumbling block is not lack of technology, but the incompetence of BCCL, points out Mishra. He feels that the problem can be snuffed out by employing simple techniques which have been used effectively elsewhere. According to an assessment tabled by the Union ministry of coal and mines in Parliament some years ago, Rs 115 crore has been spent to put out the fires since 1976. BCCL claims that 22 cases were taken up and 10 completely extinguished using all possible technologies. In addition to this, there are said to be ongoing projects worth Rs 100 crore. Ground realities, however, suggest that these are tall claims. Mishra alleges that even elementary solutions such as pumping of sand and water into mines have become a lucrative business proposition for the concerned players. For instance, on paper, BCCL has filled the mines with some 50 MT of sand. But insiders say that less than one-fourth of this amount may have actually reached the pits. There appears to be no permanent solution in sight. The only
option seems to cut out trenches to disconnect fire seams (coal layers), which have been identified. But this would require a huge investment, avers Sharma. If a blaze spreads across a small area, it can be extinguished through expeditious remedial action. But the extent to which it has flared up in Jharia makes dousing it an uphill task particularly when all the prevailing conditions further fan the fire, contends Nitish Priyadarshan, a Ranchi-based geologist who has conducted studies on Jharia mines. Priyadarshan is alluding to continuing mining activity despite the raging fire. Not only has there been no let-up in BCCLS operations, but even open-cast mining has been taken up in the area. Incidentally, one such pit is the site of a major fire. The lack of authentic data has also impeded progress on this front. Immediately after the nationalisation of mining activities in 1973-74, the government was left without even site maps as private operators simply vanished with their working plans. Consequently, though many mines in the Jharia coalfields are considered accident-prone, neither the Union coal ministry nor the CIL possess a comprehensive list of such collieries. According to a retired official of CIL, the DGMS had recommended the closure of 100 unsafe mines long ago. But even today, 20 per cent of the total coal extracted originates from such danger zones, he adds. The outcome: major accidents like the one that occurred on September 10, 1995, when the walls of a mine collapsed after being weakened by fires. Water from a nearby canal gushed in, flooding the pits and tunnels. More than 60 miners lost their lives in the mishap.
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It was as late as 1995 that BCCL obtained a map of the mines and fires using satellite imagery. It was discovered that rampant illegal mining had exposed the pits to oxygen, a catalyst for fire. BCCL is not very sure of the cause of the fires. According to it, 62 per cent of the fires are ignited by spontaneous combustion and 38 per cent due to accidental and other miscellaneous reasons. But a recent research by scientists of the Central Fuel Research Institute, Banaras Hindu University and BCCL itself has disproved this theory. It has found that no single reason can be attributed to the fires. With the fire-extinguishing alternative failing to take off and the blaze threatening to sear Jharia, resettling the towns residents emerged as an option. Sources in BCCL disclose that the relocation move was initiated way back in 1996 when a World Bankfunded expert group reported that Jharia had to be saved from the fire. Two US-based consultants (Gai-Metchem and Northwest Mine Services Limited) jointly executed the Jharia Mine Fire Control Technical Assistance Project during 1994-1996. They recommended that Jharia and Kirkend towns and other built-up areas require immediate isolation from fires. BCCL officials and coal ministry bureaucrats construed this as a green light to relocate local people. The Union government
constituted a high-powered committee, led by the then coal secretary, in December 1996. The panel submitted its report a year later. The recommendation of the committee was accepted by the government and accordingly, master plans for rehabilitation of unstable and fire-affected areas were drawn. Sources in the Union coal ministry as well as in BCCL maintain that the relocation issue has been raked up to facilitate open-cast mining in Jharia. The loss-making BCCL has been propagating this method of extracting coal to cut costs and attempt a turnaround. But an essential prerequisite is evacuation of the towns residents, since the best coal is under it. The CMRI, however, says that underground mining is a better alternative because it can prove profitable without jeopardising the safety of the people. I have been told by several coal ministry officials that relocation is not viable and it cant justify the BCCLs incompetence in curbing the fire, says Shibu Soren, leader of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. He has launched a major protest movement against the proposed evacuation (see Box on page 176: All clear?). Though BCCL is finally ready with a blueprint to shift the residents of Jharia, this has not convinced the local people who have formed the Jharia Coalfield Bachao Committee. Says K D Singh, a leader of the group: BCCL just wants to leave us in the lurch. But
MAP 3: The Jharia fires

There are as many as 66 fires in 44 mines in Jharia
Keshalpur NT OCP East Bhuli Katras KATRAS AREA Nichitpur Bussuriya Tetulmari Dhanbad E. Katras SIJUA AREA Gondudih Mudidih DC Sendra Chord BARORA AREA Bussuriya Bansjora South Katras Benidih Bank KUSUNDA AREA Kan Gobindpur Choitudih More Khas Kusunda Kanee Maheshpur Nudkhurkee Gasli Phulari Bansdeopur Dhansar Tand Tand Dharmaband TISCO Kharkharee BLOCK II PROJ. AREA GOVINDPUR AREA Kusunda d n Loyabad ba KATRAS AREA Pootkee la hu Na i ad Bera K r POOTKEE BALIHARI t Kustore M hu Ka PROJECT AREA di a Balihari Dobari Na KUSTORE Moonidih Lohapatti AREA la Bhagaband WESTERN JHARIA AREA Ganoodih Jharia Murlidih Burra WESTERN JHARIA AREA BASTACOLLA 20/21 pits Garh AREA GoluckSingra dih Kujama Hurriladih Bhut Jarma Goria Tisra Jore Bhatdih D Muraidih
Ak as
idih
BARORA AREA Damuda
ki
na
Khudia Nala
Jog
Ramkanali W Mudidih Salanpur
ri
Govindpur
Koori dih
ry
River
ra Na
Jamunia
Bansjo
Ka
ri
Jo
re
Bastacol
la
Ind
ust
la
amo dar Ri
Mu
rul
ver
idih
Parbatpur Amlabad WESTERN JHARIA AREA Bhawrah South
Area / colliery boundary Surface fire Township River
Su
la
Aluara
ng
Jo
re
Source: Prof S P Banerjee, 2007, Presentation in First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People, New Delhi, April 26-27,
rh rga ssu Ke
Bhura
ngia
Ku
ya
Damodar River
IISCO & TISCO
Sindri Sudamdih Pa the Inc. rD ih Su da md ih Sh aft IISCO
a Ch tka
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175
Subsidence in Jharia
Coal mining is taking its toll the town is in serious trouble
One more tremor and the countrys coal capital, with a population of 4,00,000, will subside and disappear.What is more tragic is that the BCCL, instead of trying to shift the people to safer places, is busy digging their graves,says Ramraj Tiwary, grandson of Pandit Bajrangbali Tiwary, the priest of the erstwhile Jharia estate, resignedly. The statement sums up the impending fate of Jharia, Indias oldest and largest coking coal producing area. While doom knocks at the door of those who have lived there for generations, BCCL, crippled by financial crises and mismanagement, pleads helplessness. In fact the October 27, 1996, tremor came as a preface to the impending tragedy. People had assembled at Sadhan Kutir near Jharias Katras More at 8 pm to give final touches to their preparation for Kali puja. But before they could get down to it, a massive subterranean blast and subsequent explosions shook the entire area. Walls, roofs and floors cracked. Panic-stricken men, women and children rushed out of their rattling houses. The panic run was abetted by the disappearance of a family into a ghost crack that had formed beneath their house. While the BCCL management showed no sympathy, a committee of Bihar Legislative Council members headed by Gautam Sagar Rana visited Jharia for an on-the-spot evaluation. Rana said neither the state government should allow people to commit suicide nor should BCCL be allowed to turn its mines into a mass grave. The
committee summoned the Dhanbad deputy commissioner to provide details of contingency plans to rescue the people in case of an emergency. The Jharia Bachao Samiti accused BCCL of intentionally indulging in underground blasting despite a ban imposed by Director General Mines Safety (DGMS). The samiti convenor M B Pramanik said that on the night of the tremor, BCCL used heavy explosives in a bid to recover two site discharge loader (SDL) machines. The consequent tremor caused cracks in the mine roof that supports a large number of settlements. Similar explosions in future might devour the entire area. BCCL sources, while denying that the blast caused cracks, said soon after the cracks developed BCCL appointed an expert committee headed by former DGMS head H B Ghosh which concluded that cracks developed because of the movement in the old goaves and warned that similar damage in future could not be ruled out. Under these circumstances, prevention of damages is not feasible and, therefore, remedy lies only in evacuation of the buildings,BCCL sources said. On its part, the BCCL management has been claiming that most of the residents are encroachers, especially after a criminal case was filed against it. BCCL claims that through nationalisation, it not only got the underground mining rights, but also the rights over the surface; hence, all those living in the area were illegal settlers.
N A Khan, Down To Earth, New Delhi
All clear?
With the formation of a rehabilitation authority, the hurdles to tapping Jharia fields have been cleared
The Jharkhand government has formed a rehabilitation and development authority, the Jharia Rehabilitation & Development Authority (JRDA), with a plan to set up townships to where all residents of Jharia would be shifted. The JRDA has already begun the construction of houses. The Planning Commission has approved the Rs 5,792-crore action plan and advised BCCL to implement it within 10 years. The Jharia Action Plan (JAP), which aims at shifting 65,000 houses from as many as 532 endangered mine sites, has paved the way for the BCCL to access about 4.6 billion tonne of untapped coking coal reserves in this town. The JAP has components such as fire control in 34 projects in 40 mines and stabilisation of 121 fire-bearing mine sites. The entire money earmarked for JAP would be organised from the sale of coal. CIL has decided to increase the stowing excise duty from Rs 5.5 to Rs 10 per tonne by all its production subsidiaries, while a levy of Rs 6 per tonne would be charged on CILs profit-making companies. These two measures will help generate Rs 350 crore per annum, which will be spent entirely on JAP. Senior executives feel that the JAP, once implemented, will provide scope for large-scale mining in the Jharia coalfields.
without concrete scientific evidence of the threat to Jharia, we are not moving. Eyebrows are also being raised over the economics of the exercise. Mishra estimates that a minimum of Rs 18,000 crore will be needed to shift the entire population of Jharia. This excludes the hardship that the people will have to bear in terms of lost business and livelihood opportunities. Compared to this the cost of extinguishing the fire would be around Rs 8,000 crore, opines Mishra. Even the World Bank-funded project puts it at no more than Rs 10,000 crore. And the figure arrived at by the coal ministry, based on assessments made by different expert groups, is the lowest at Rs 4,070 crore. The estimated net worth of coal that can be extracted from Jharia is a whopping Rs 30,000 crore. The right doses of available technology and political commitment can help put out the fire at the best cost bargain, feels Mishra. Given the massive cost of relocation and the precarious financial position of BCCL, the only way out seems to be to douse the fire. Today, the blaze engulfs Jharia from three sides. In a desperate move to extinguish the fire some years ago, BCCL officials tried to pump water and sand into the mines. The hole they drilled burst and now oozes black fumes. Not far from it, houses caught fire as the people used the abundantly available coal to erect the walls of the structures. In 2000, a major gas eruption forced BCCL to abandon two of its staff colonies and evacuate people temporarily. Many residents had to be admitted to hospitals. Residents of Jharia township are virtually sitting on fire. As the people say, it could turn into a mass grave any moment (see Box: Subsidence in Jharia).
176
AMIT SHANKER / CSE
Disaster zone: Jharia and Raniganj (see next page) are not only plagued by fire, but also by land subsidence
177
The death traps of Raniganj

The coalfields of West Bengal are also being held to ransom by the twin threats of underground fires and land subsidence
When coal is extracted from underground mines, pillars of the mineral are left to support the roof. Once the mine is exhausted, it should ideally be filled with sand to prevent the roof from caving in. But in most cases, this is not done. The mines are abandoned without being stabilised. Once the mining company abandons a mine, the powerful mining mafia takes over. The remaining mineral is illegally and unscientifically removed even the pillars that support the roof are scraped away. Consequently, the roof weakens and gives way leading to loss of property and lives. Methane, a coal bed gas, can build up in abandoned mines, causing blasts that weaken the pillar and the roof and leading to a collapse. According to a report in The Telegraph, in 2002, about 146 villages in Bardhaman district inhabited by six lakh people are threatened by subsidence resulting from rampant illegal mining. In 2004, in a public interest litigation, former member of parliament from Asansol, Haradhan Roy, said that four lakh residents in 56 localities in Asansols coal belt are endangered due to subsidence caused by illegal mining and underground fires.1 A notification issued by the DGMS in 1997 had put the towns of Raniganj, Andal, Asansol, Kulti and Sanctoria in a potentially dangerous subsidence zone.2 In November 2006, 150 miners were trapped in an abandoned mine while extracting coal illegally in Gangtikuli, near Asansol. The mine caved in and was flooded by the overflowing Damodar. Threatened by the coal mafia running the mine, none of the villagers
Abandoned mines are not backfilled, leading to accidents
or the kin of the dead miners reported the deaths.3 In 2002, West Bengals coal mines accounted for 176 accidents, which claimed 10 lives; 170 were injured4. The Union ministry of labour reports that for every 4,167 persons employed in coal mines, one person dies; for every 408 employed, one is injured. Moreover, one person dies for every 1,265,822 tonne of coal extracted, and for every 124,688 tonne extracted, one is injured.5 Non-coal mines reported only one accident in 2002.6 This, however, is an incomplete picture: it does not include accidents that happened in the illegal mines of Raniganj and Asansol. A significant number of injuries and casualties in illegal mines are not even reported and hence, not compensated for. In 2002, the CIL paid a total compensation of Rs 16.28 lakh to only 10 persons.7 Subsidence and underground fires have also damaged and threatened roads and the main railway line of the Eastern Railways.8 In January 2007, land subsidence led to huge cracks on National Highway 2, which connects Kolkata to Delhi. Blasts reportedly weakened underground pillars in mines, leading to the subsidence.9 Accidents in mines can mainly be attributed to the negligence of CIL subsidiaries, which own and operate most of the mines in West Bengal: they do not backfill the abandoned mines. This is despite the fact that in 2005-06, Rs 60 crore was sanctioned to CIL for undertaking safety measures.10 The response of the government has been the usual: various expert committees have been set up, which have recommended measures that are never implemented. An apex monitoring committee was set up by the Union ministry of coal in 1990 to look into the problem of subsidence and underground mine fires. The ministry, in its 2005-06 annual report, says the committee identified 49 unstable locations in June 1992 and added 21 more locations in 1995. Recently, the DGMS indicated that there were 171 unstable locations in the Raniganj and Asansol coal belt. Another high-level committee was set up by the ministry in 1996 to look into land subsidence and fires in Jharia and Raniganj. The committee asked the Coal Mines Planning and Designing India Limited (CMPDIL) to prepare a master plan for the Raniganj coalfields. The CMPDIL report recommended that 59 locations needed to be stabilised, 80 were to be rehabilitated, seven railway lines were to be diverted and seven fire areas were to be bio-reclaimed. In response to another action plan prepared by ECL for shifting and rehabilitation of people from unsafe areas, dealing with fires and stabilising unstable areas, the CMPDIL identified 43 locations for stabilisation, 92 for rehabilitation, diversion of seven railway lines and bio-reclamation of eight fire areas. It also identified 121 locations for stabilisation, 532 for rehabilitation, 66 for fire control under the BCCL. According to the annual report, the CMPDIL has prepared a plan for the rehabilitation of Samdih, Bangalpara, Kena and Harishpur villages which fall under the area mined by ECL. The plan is in progress Rs 15.50 lakh of the earmarked total cost of Rs 32 crore has already been spent. The report also says that while eight sites in Raniganj coalfields have been stabilised, stabilisation of six more sites is in progress.11 Rehabilitation in the state must pick up pace: compared to the population of more than 16,71,972 under threat from mining activities, the rehabilitation work that stands completed is really insignificant.12
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REUTERS
THE BUSINESS OF ILLEGAL MINING

West Singhbhum and Hazaribagh districts of Jharkhand are a smugglers paradise. Far away from the Jharia coalfields, illegal coal mining and smuggling is a profession in itself here. According to an article published in The Hindu Business Line in October 2001, illegal mines in Jharkhand produce and despatch 40 lakh tonne of coal every day.63 Controlled by the powerful coal mafia, and operating with the connivance of officials of public sector mining companies and the local police, illegal mining and theft of coal from company-operated mines has become almost impossible to control. While the mafia provides the muscle power, it is Jharkhands poor who fuel the industry through their labour. A substantial proportion of the population lives below the poverty line, and understandably, grabs any opportunity to earn a living. The work is backbreaking any visitor to Hazaribagh for instance, has seen hundreds of people carrying coal from the mines of CCL in the Rajrappa area, on bicycles, traversing some 70 km on treacherous valley roads (see Box on page 180 : Black: three stories on illegal mining). These coal thieves buy coal from illegal contractors and supply this to the mafia in return for a pittance that keeps their families going. They earn between Rs 500 and Rs 600 a trip. Police harassment is a part of their lives the local administration finds
them easy prey.64 The contractors largely go scot-free as they bribe their way out of trouble: they offer kickbacks to the coal managements and the local administration to avoid penal action. Working conditions in the illegal mines are a travesty of labour laws. Minimum wages are not paid workers earn a paltry Rs 50 a day. Labour laws governing safety and number of
A parallel economy
Illegal rat hole mining is a money-spinner in West Bengal
Irrespective of its exploitative nature, illegal mining has become the mainstay of local economies. According to a report published in The Hindu in 2004, illegal rat hole mining powers an entire economy in West Bengal. There are at least 1,000 small wells, about 40-45 feet deep, in the 20-km stretch in Jamuria covering Nandigram, Sankri Danga, Banamalipur and Baijayantipur. These mines reportedly employed about 25,000 people, mostly poor tribals from Jharkhand. They employed an even greater number as accountants, managers, transporters, etc. The daily production of coal in the illegal mines in Jamuria, Barabani and Raniganj almost equalled the 30,000-40,000 tonne produced by the ECL mines, and generated over Rs 5 crore a day.
AMIT SHANKER / CSE
Steal and toil: pilfered coal being borne on bicycles for supplying to the mafia
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Black: three stories on illegal mining

The illegal miners of Hazaribagh Travelling from Hazaribagh town towards Badakagaon block, one will see hundreds of people carrying coal on their bicycles. These people are from nearby villages and are illegally mining coal in Chandoul village of Badakagaon. The region is a stronghold of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) now known as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Locals say that earlier, officials used to visit the areas to check illegal mining, but now they dont as they are scared of the MCC. For the past several years, these people have been mining more than 500 bags of coal every day and selling them in local markets. One bag of coal sells for Rs 150 in Hazaribagh town. Says Pancheswar Ram of Chandoul, who oversees the illegal operations in Chandoul: We extract as much coal as we can. People are so poor in this tribal belt that they do not get a full meal a day. So we have engaged all our misguided brothers in work to keep their minds away from Naxalism. We are the real owners of this property. So there is no question of allowing the government authorities to take away our property. J L Srivastava, chief conservator of forests (wildlife), says: The people are destroying natural resources because of the governments wrong approach. The government has emerged as the worst alienator of the tribal people. Their day starts with coal At the crack of every dawn, Lakshmi, Jyoti and Khushbu of Godhar, aged between five and eight, rush towards the mines with their baskets. Every day, they manage to get only one-two baskets of coal for which, they cover eight km, the to-and-fro distance between their homes and the mines. Dulari Devi, Munni Devi and Champa also rummage for coal; this coal is used to cook food in their homes. These women are all aged between 35-45 years. The men in their households leave this chore of stealing coal to the women in fact, 75 per cent of those stealing coal in the area are women. This is because if the women are caught, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel guarding the mines do not beat them up, or jail them. However, the women do not escape harassment: eveteasing and physical abuse is common. Most women living in the villages in the area as well as in Ghansadih and Dhansar are dependent on pilfered coal. Living standards are appalling. Wages are inadequate. Residents use the water pumped out from mines for their daily needs. Officials agree that water from the washeries is not treated properly before being disposed off in the Damodar and Khudia rivers. The entire area is covered in black dust. People often suffer from diseases like tuberculosis, bronchitis, silicosis and asthma. Dhanbad-based heart and diabetes specialist Dr N K Singh says that medicines for TB sell the most in Dhanbad. Public sector mines are no better. Women working in the BCCL mines in the Kusunda area of Dhanbad do not have access even to basic amenities. Mine sites and workshops lack toilet facilities. Most women working in these mines are either widows or have lost their
PRADIP SAHA / CSE
Safety gear? Whats that? Working conditions in most coal mines legal and illegal are pathetic
fathers to mine accidents. The management has granted them employment mostly as unskilled labour as compensation. The women are dissatisfied, but cannot protest. The other side of development Evening brings with it a different world in the villages of Belatand, Gandhinagar, Premnagar, Golbhatta and Roopnagar. Promised a life of prosperity, life is just the opposite for these villages. There is a pile of coal in front of every household and the smoke is so thick that one cant see beyond two houses. Only the black of coal is visible everywhere. This black engulfs the life of the women of these villages. These villages fall under the Central Coalfields Limiteds (CCL) Baniyadih project in Giridih district. Not a single household here is free from the influence of alcohol or drugs. Some consume alcohol made of mahua (bassia latifolia), some get drunk on locally made liquor. Every morning, they are back to the mines to steal coal to earn their daily meals. And every evening they go back to the same high. Life, it seems, is in agreement with sunrise and sunset. But then there is nothing else to signify hope and happiness in their lives. Liquor and music provide them means to forget their pain. Maybe thats why there is a small TV or tape recorder in every household. Every household is heavily indebted to the local moneylender. They will, perhaps, never be able to pay back, as the interest keeps on piling and the capital remains as it is. Households that have girls have even more problems. They are indebted in the first place and also have to get their daughters married off, which means spending money for dowry. That will mean borrowing more money.
Anupama Kumari, CSE media fellow, Ranchi and Manish Tiwary, Down To Earth, New Delhi
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The story of Nirjal Birhor

A cycle-wallahs journey from forests to illegally mined coal
Jharkhands business of illegal mining involves a wide network of people, in which each persons role is clearly defined. There are the cutters who cut the coal from the face and are the highest paid among the workers. There are bojharis who carry the coal in head dishes from the surface and dump it in shallow square depressions called khudis. Then come the cycle-wallahs at the fag end of the chain, who bag the coal, load it on cycles and deliver it to consumers. The entire operation is controlled by contractors and the mining mafia. Ant-like processions of ragtag men pushing bicycles the cyclewallahs laden with sacks of coal is a common sight in the state, especially in the region around Hazaribagh. This area used to be covered with thick tropical dry deciduous jungles and was home to a number of indigenous tribes. One of these was the Birhors, literally meaning forest people. Nirjal Birhor used to forage food in the forests way back in the early 1980s. By 2005, forced out of his traditional home, he had become one of the 2,000 odd cycle-wallahs in the eastern Indian coal tracts. Nirjal covers up to 20-22 km in a day, pushing up to 250 kg of coal on a bicycle. He sells the coal door to door, to domestic consumers, small industries such as brick kilns and local tea or food stalls. The coal he carries is either scavenged from existing open cut or underground mines, or old abandoned mines that were not backfilled by sand by the state-owned coal mining company. Nirjal also works in small village dug-mines on individually owned land, or in rat holes sunk in the mining companys leasehold land. All these are illegal activities, but men like Nirjal did not have many options once the forests disappeared. This subsistence collection of coal earns Nirjal and his family only about Rs 42 (US $1) a day. It forms a tiny part of an underground coal mining economy that might well amount to 10 per cent or more of Indias annual coal production of 330 MT from the state-owned coal mines. An informed guesstimate is that the entire black business of coal would be to the tune of at least 70-80 MT annually. To make an assessment of how much coal is carried only on cycles, I, with my colleague David Williams, decided to focus on eastern India.
We counted the number of cycle-wallahs entering individual towns through a particular access road over the day. For example, if Hazaribagh town can be accessed through four roads from four directions, we observed these four roads over four days from 6 am till 6 pm. We did such physical surveys counting the numbers for a sample of towns in eastern India. We took the amount on one cycle conservatively at 200 kg (or 150 kg of coke) to allow for variations in strength of the man, terrain and seasonality. This gave us the amount of coal coming into these sample towns. We then looked at the 2001 census population of these towns to correlate the coal demand with the size of the urban population. In the next step, we took the populations of all sizeable towns of the entire region, and extrapolated the amount of coal that can be demanded by that population. We knew this is a simple procedure, but often the most simple answers and tasks can be the most difficult to find or undertake. We allowed for noise in the calculation in several ways: by leaving out the villages (many families in these villages are switching over to coal and kerosene from biomass as the latter gets harder to collect) and smaller towns and considered only the more nodal ones. We arrived at a figure of around 12 million cycle loads per year delivering coal to domestic and small users such as tea shops, brickkilns and sponge iron plants. Assuming each individual carts only one cycle load per day, this would mean around 33,000 bicycles per day in eastern India. Not only is this significant in terms of employment, together, the cycles annually supply 2.5 MT of coal only in eastern India. This is the production of a medium-sized colliery, and taking into consideration that this is rather low quality coal from shallow dug mines, the amount of coal is valued in the world market at current prices around US $75 million though the cycle-wallahs probably sell it at a much lower rate. All these cycle-wallahs and Nirjals world of survival is illegal as all coal resources belong to the state, and only the state or its chosen agents are allowed to mine it. But what will Nirjal and his ilk do in a dispensation under which lands owned by adivasis or indigenous communities supposed to be legally non-transferable are forcibly taken over by the government and industry?
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Australian National University, Canberra
working hours are flouted with impunity. It is, therefore, not surprising that Jharkhand accounts for the maximum number of deaths due to mining accidents.65 Organised resistance to exploitation through trade unions is suppressed by musclemen on the coal mafias payrolls. Working conditions in legal mines are hardly any better, though. In fact, they are especially abysmal in mines operated by contractors; in spite of this, CIL has earmarked several blocks for handing over to contractors. The extent of contracting is huge more than 50 per cent of the coal extracted in the country comes from mines that are run on contract. Apart from being responsible for abominable working conditions, illegal coal mining and coal smuggling is a big drain on the state exchequer trade union leaders have pointed out that about
Rs 1,000 crore worth of coal is pilfered from coal mines every year.66 On an average, only about 5,600 tonne of coal was recovered every year and 191 FIRs related to illegal mining were lodged by CIL between 2000-01 and 2002-03.67 On its part, the government has taken minimal action to stop this. A high-powered committee looking into illegal mining, and headed by the Union minister of state for coal Dasari Narayana Rao, has recommended that the Indian School of Mines (ISM) and XLRI, Jamshedpur jointly conduct a study to assess the problem of illegal mining in West Bengal and Jharkhand. Coal India Ltd would bear the cost of the study, which would assess the number of illegal mines and total coal reserves and see whether it is possible to run them on a cooperative basis, reported The Financial Express in October 2006.
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The flashpoints
CHAIBASAS ASBESTOS MOUNTAINS
Jharkhand is a state of hills. Some are natural, most often covered with thick forests and picturesque. Some are human-made: Hazaribagh has huge black hills of waste generated from coal mining, towering above the deep coal quarries. But Chaibasas human-made hills have to be seen to be believed massive piles of asbestos waste mixed with chromite, lying above the natural hills, and forming grotesque hilltops. Over the years, this indestructible waste has seeped into the water, soil, vegetation and bodies of people living around the abandoned mines, poisoning the local community and the environment. The Roro hills, located 20 km west of Chaibasa, the district headquarters of West Singhbhum, have been extensively mined over seven decades. The hills have rich reserves of a host of minerals. They were first mined for magnetite. The Tatas and the Birlas, besides other industrial houses, then started mining the asbestos and chromite reserves in the hills. TISCO stopped mining chromite by 1958, when it discovered better reserves elsewhere. After the Tatas and the Kesris stopped mining, the Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited stepped in. Asbestos mining was abandoned in 1982, and since then the
waste dumps have been lying, spread across 100 metres. They have undergone years of disintegration, and have extended several metres down the hill slopes, spreading into the paddy fields on the foothills of the Roro. A 40-cm thick layer of silty waste is spread over these fields now. The dumpsites can potentially contaminate the streams flowing down the hills, as well as the ponds located in the villages. Mines, Minerals, and People (MMP), a coalition of NGOs working on mining issues, had instituted a fact-finding team to do a health survey of the ex-workers and villagers in the area. The results of the study are damning 45 per cent of the respondents had symptoms normally identified with long-term exposure to asbestos: lower back pain, dyspnea (shortness of breath and difficulty in breathing), hemoptysis (blood in the sputum), and blindness.68 The team also examined three chest radiographs (taken between 1998 and 2000) of workers who complained of chest pain and respiratory distress; the radiographs suggested some form of interstitial lung disease (pneumoconiosis, pulmonary tuberculosis as co-morbid conditions). The devastation in the Roro hills is a classic example of how ill-managed wastes from mines can harm human health. Though the mines have been abandoned many years back, the dust from the piles of waste stored in the open pose a serious health risk to local communities, as studies done by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the assistant director general of mines in November 1978 have shown.
MADHUMITA DUTTA
Ghost mountain: asbestos dumps in the Roro hills
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Santhals in turmoil
Illegal quarries brew tribal unrest
Illegal stone quarries in Birbhum district have led to displacement of the people from their land and livelihood. The Santhal tribe of Mallarpur region of the district has been fighting against the stone quarry owners. Many Santhals have lost their farmlands and have been forced to work in the stone mines. The mines, excavated on their fields, have degraded their lands, killed their livestock and imperilled their health. A 2001 report in The Times of India said that there were about 305 stone quarries, mostly illegal, and 325 stone crushers in the area.
The National Institute of Small Mines conducted a survey on about 1,000 Santhal women working in Pachami Hatgaccha and Mallarpur in 2002. The study found that a number of them could not conceive and were suffering from bronchial problems due to dust pollution. A large number were also suffering from sexually transmitted diseases due to sexual exploitation in the mines. A non-governmental organisation, Uthnau, based in Garia village, has been involved in organising the tribals against the stone quarries. It has, with their help, been able to close a few quarries. The quarry mafia has been threatening the organisation and the tribals. The leader of Uthnau, Kunal Deb, was arrested in 2002 on false charges. The local administration and the police are hand-in-glove.
Up in arms in Pachwara
A small village rises against mining
The 1,000 families of Pachwara village in Pakur district have decided to block mining: 15 boys and girls, armed with traditional bows and arrows, guard the barricaded village at all hours. Not even the district magistrate is allowed in. Pachwara was one of the first places to be chosen in the Jharkhand state for development, once the new national policy on coal mine liberalisation, allowing state electricity boards to own captive coal mines anywhere in the country, was adopted in 2001. The Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB) formed a joint venture company, PANEM Coal Mines Limited, with Eastern Minerals Trading Agency to produce, supply, transport and deliver coal from the coal mines of Pachwara Central Block to PSEB thermal power stations. The project envisages
44 years of opencast mining to extract 289 MT of coal. The government hopes to get a royalty of Rs 100 crore per annum from this area. However, Pachwara Central Block also stands on more than 1,100 ha of raiyati (sharecropped land), forests, homesteads and grazing land. Official estimates say 250 families will be displaced within 10-15 years and afterwards, possibly more. The land was acquired without any prior consultation with Pachwaras gram sabha, as stipulated in the Panchayati Raj Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996. PANEM has, belatedly, offered compensation; but the villagers are not interested. The company is all set with petrol pumps, fleets of dumpers and cranes on standby. To curb protests, state authorities have slapped arrest warrants against all but two villagers, but this has not fazed the villagers at all.
JADUGUDA: WHERE DEATH STALKS

Jaduguda has been enshrined in the collective consciousness of India: lying on indigenous Santhali and Ho tribal lands in East Singhbhum district, its claim to fame is that it houses the single uranium mine and processing plant that supplies uranium to all of Indias 10 pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs). The processing plant is a sprawling complex fed by three underground uranium mines and the by-product from three nearby copper mines. All these are owned by Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL), which is under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The three uranium mines of Narwapahar, Bhatin and Jaduguda are situated in a heavily forested area of steep hills, which frame a fertile river valley. This is part of the catchment of the Subarnarekha river, which flows through the states of Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal. Jaduguda is an underground uranium mine, which commenced operations in 1967. The ore grade is around 0.06 per cent so low it would not be considered worth recovering in other countries.69 The mine workforce (largely tribal contractors)
works 1,600-2,000 feet below the surface without any protective clothing.70 It takes more than 1,000 metric tonne of ore to get two metric tonne of uranium (to obtain a typical uranium concentration of 0.2 per cent).71 More than 998 tonne of waste is generated in the process.72 This waste, or mill tailings, contains 85 per cent of the radioactivity in the original ore along with heavy metals and chemical toxic materials.73 When discharged from the mill, the tailings are roughly 40 per cent solid and 60 per cent liquid.74 M V Ramana, fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development, estimates the amount of waste produced during mining and milling to be about four MT. 75 Jaduguda exports yellowcake (U3O8) to the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad, more than a thousand kilometres away in southern India, for fabrication into fuel rods. Waste from the NFC plant, as well as nuclear wastes from other parts of India, are then returned by road and rail to Jaduguda and thrown into tailings ponds along with mill tailings; these ponds are adjacent to tribal villages. There are three large tailings dams at Jaduguda, impounding millions of tonnes of radioactive wastes.76 They are unlined and
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uncovered; so while the solids are mostly contained, the liquids, gasses and fine dust particles are rapidly cycled into the environment. During the dry season, the dams run dry and the wind picks up the loose tailings and blows them around; in the monsoons, the dams overflow into the river. People have used the dams to graze livestock and play soccer, and regularly cross them on their way from one place to another. The ore is brought to the Jaduguda mill in open trucks from the nearby Bhatin and Narwapahar mines. These trucks, sometimes partly covered by tarpaulins and occasionally carrying workers perched on top of the load, are a familiar sight on the narrow roads linking the mines. Every day, about 200 trucks pass through the crowded town, loaded with uranium ore, and uncovered most of the time. Sometimes, only a thin polythene sheet separates the people from the deadly cargo. Tailings have also been used as landfill and construction materials. As the complex has gradually encroached across the landscape, people have had their agricultural lands taken away but not their living space; so that even today, people still live within 30 metres of the tailings structures. Water from the main tailings pond travels five km before joining the Subernarekha. This is life as usual for 50,000 people in seven villages in East Singhbhum.77
In Chatikocha village, 500 people live below the embankment of the areas largest tailings pond. The massive embankment of the tailings pond is all that keeps the village from being swept away by millions of tonne of radioactive materials. As the wind usually blows from above the embankment, solidified with milled uranium ores, it carries with it dust from the tailings pond.78 Besides me, nobody is alive who joined the UCIL as a mill worker in the 1960s, says Saluka Himbram, the village head who retired from UCIL after 34 years of employment. Abnormal births have become common. Half of the villages women have problems in delivery and miscarriages. Some years ago, residents were told not to drink water from the three tubewells. Life becomes hell in summer. His son, who is now working as a miner, has already made 39 visits to a doctor in the last six months. Complaints of defective births, rising tuberculosis, and lung and abdomen cancer from villagers living around the uranium mining facilities is on the rise.79 In 1998, the Jharkhandi Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR) organised a health survey in conjunction with BIRSA, the Bindrai Institute for Research, Study and Action, speaking to people in seven villages within one km of the tailings dams. Forty-seven per cent of the women reported disruptions to their
MAP 4: Uranium in Jharkhand

Uranium deposits are found near rivers, increasing the risk of radioactive contamination for local communities
Subernarekha river
NARWAPAHAR
Gura river RAKHA MINE RAILWAY STATION BHATIN
TAILING PONDS
JADUGODA
Source: Google Earth, as viewed on August 25, 2007
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P MADHAVAN
Unfinished lives: children have been the biggest sufferers in Jaduguda
menstrual cycle, and 18 per cent said they had suffered miscarriages or given birth to stillborn babies in the last five years; 30 per cent reported some sort of fertility problem. Nearly all women complained of fatigue, weakness and depression. Overall, the survey found a high incidence of chronic skin diseases, cancers, TB, bone and brain damage, kidney damage, nervous system disorders, congenital deformities, nausea, blood disorders and other chronic diseases.80 Another study by the environment committee of the Bihar Legislative Council in 1998 also confirmed that uranium was leaching into the river, and that people were living too close to the mine. The team expressed concern at the fact that the tailings dams were unfenced, that wastewater was returning to the treatment plant in open drains, and that there were no warning signs around the plant. The committee recommended a complete health survey and relocation of people at a distance of five km from the mines and tailings ponds. A survey and scientific testing of samples from the soil and water in and around the Jaduguda mines by Hiroaki Koide of Kyoto Universitys Research Reactor Institute in July 2002, found high radioactivity. The permissible limit for radiation exposure by any artificial factor is one millisievert per year (mSv/y), or 0.11 microSv/hour.81 In Jaduguda, there are places where the external gamma dose by only the natural factor exceeds this limit. The
most dangerous source of contamination lies in tailings ponds, and here the amount of air-gamma dose exceeds 10 mSv/y (1.1 microSv/h).82 The same study found high uranium contamination in the areas around the tailings pond and the stream that carries the tailings water to the Subernarekha. Similarly, roads on which trucks carry ore to the mill and the railway station at the Rakha Mines had exceptionally high uranium contamination. Its findings showed: The amount of air-gamma dose exceeds 1 mSv/y in the villages, and reaches 10 mSv/y around the tailings ponds. The perimeter of the tailings ponds is polluted with uranium 10-100 times higher compared with areas without contamination. Number One tailings pond is contaminated by cesium. As the areas uranium mines do not produce cesium, this shows the area is used as a dumping ground for radioactive wastes brought from other polluted sources. Uranium concentrations are high in samples taken from the riverbank and roads. This perhaps indicates that tailings are used as construction materials. At the Rakha Mines station, from where semi-processed uranium is sent to Hyderabad for fuel fabrication, the soil is polluted by only uranium. Its concentration is remarkably high.83
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MAHADEO SEN
Death peddler: mines and the plant of UCIL at Jaduguda have been accused by locals of destroying their lives and health
Accident at Jaduguda
A tailings pond collapse and its impact points to a potential disaster zone
On December 24, 2006, one of the pipes carrying radioactive wastes from the uranium mill to a storage dam (tailings pond) burst, discharging highly toxic wastes into a nearby creek. The accident occurred in Dungridih, a small village near Jaduguda inhabited largely by displaced families whose lands were acquired to construct two of the ponds. UCIL did not have an alarm mechanism to alert the company in cases of such disasters. It was the villagers who arrived at the scene of the accident who informed the company of the toxic spill. Even more reprehensible is the fact that the toxic sludge spewed into creek for nine hours before the flow of the radioactive waste was shut off. Consequently, a thick layer of radioactive sludge along the surface of the creek killed scores of fish, frogs, and other riparian life. According to reports in local Hindi newspapers, UCIL has begun repairing the pipe and removing sludge from the creek.
Another survey of four villages, two in the vicinity of Jaduguda (where a similar plant has been in operation for many years) and two villages some distance away from the plant, conducted by the Gujarat-based Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalaya Vedchhi (SKVV), found that the number of infants born with genetic disorders was six times higher than normal. Of the 70 such cases reported, 60 were born with congenital deformities in villages close to the uranium plant, whereas 10 were born in non-affected areas. Moreover, 16 out of the 60 were mentally retarded, compared to one in other areas. Cases of infants born with polydactyl (extra fingers or toes) and synductyl (fused or missing fingers and toes) are also common in the affected areas.84 In September 2000, the Supreme Court admitted a petition submitted by the JOAR, seeking direction to the Centre and Uranium Corporation of India Limited to take stringent safety measures at Jaduguda. However, the petition was dismissed in April 2004. In its judgment, the Court held that in view of an affidavit filed by the Atomic Energy Commission chairperson that adequate steps have been taken to check and control radiation arising out of uranium waste, the Court did not see any merit in the petition.
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Banduhurang: another Jaduguda?

Jharkhands dangerous tryst with uranium continues
Even after the horrors of Jaduguda, UCIL is determined to continue mining uranium. The people of Jharkhand have, however, learnt their lesson from Jaduguda, even if UCIL hasnt UCIL faces stiff protests every time it proposes to set up shop again in the state. Whether it is Banduhurang, Turamdih or Muhaldih, peoples resistance marks any mention of uranium mining. The Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) held a public hearing on February 25, 2004 in East Singhbhum districts Banduhurang village to get environmental clearance for UCILs proposed mine. The public hearing was duly attended by a large selection of security forces, including the Rapid Action Force, the CRPF and local police. Locals alleged that the company also got its goons to intimidate the people. At the public hearing, the residents of three villages refused to be displaced. The villages reminded UCIL that it still hadnt given them compensations promised in 1985 when lands were taken away for a uranium mine near Thuramdih village. At the meeting, antinuclear activists reeled out stories of radiation-related health problems in villages around uranium mines. UCIL and the Board officials told the people not to worry. But Harsingh Padeya, village head of Banduhurang, doesnt believe them. Padeya lost his lands when UCIL started the Thuramdih mine. He is
still waiting for compensation, and there are at least 250 displaced people like him. Roughly 5,000 people would be displaced by the proposed Banduhurang mine. So this time when the villages got a relocation notice before the public hearing, Padeya and others decided: No uranium without compensation. Villagers and environmental activists hounded the officials at the hearing. They demanded to know if the new mine would cause radiation like the ones in Jaduguda and what would they get in compensation.Poverty is more hazardous than radiation. What if we leave our village and dont get good compensation?says Ashwini Sahoo, a resident of Kerwa village.The hearing didnt promise us a good compensation package and without it we will be destroyed,says Arun Nayak, another resident. In April 2004, refusing to listen to the people, the SPCB gave a no-objection certificate (NOC) to the company to undertake open cast uranium mining at Banduhurang. According to UCIL, the project is likely to be completed by 2007. Similar stories of protest emerge from other prospective uranium mining sites. Dont turn our village into Hiroshima Nagasaki; We dont want the uranium mines; We will die but not give our land these sentiments expressed during a public hearing for a uranium project in Muhaldih village find echoes across Jharkhand.
Anupama Kumari, CSE media fellow, Ranchi
J MADRI
Peoples protest: a march by locals in Jaduguda against UCIL
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In dire straits: Indias nuclear plans

The country faces a uranium drought. And in a rush to end this scarcity, the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) has done nothing to gain peoples confidence
Indias nuclear power generation is entirely dependent on natural uranium (see map: The uranium hotspots), which fuels 13 pressurised heavy water reactors and all research projects. All this uranium comes from the 150-tonne-a-year Jaduguda mines. J L Bhasin, former chairperson and managing director of UCIL, had said in the year 2000 that if the demands of eight reactors currently under construction are considered, India would have enough uranium only till 2007. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), under the direct control of the prime minister, has formulated a three-stage approach on nuclear energy. The approach envisages setting up of natural uranium-fuelled pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) in the first stage, fast breeder reactors (FBR) utilising a uranium-plutonium fuel cycle in the second stage, and breeder reactors utilising thorium fuel in the third stage. However, the countrys nuclear power plan is running 15 years behind the targets set for energy production. The DAE fears that the uranium scarcity and protests can further delay the programme. While setting targets for nuclear power generation, the government in 1985 had assumed that all identified uranium reserves would be explored. No new mines have come up till now and the government is panicking. According to information based on questions asked in Parliament, India needs about 450-500 tonne of uranium oxide (processed uranium ore) every year for the current level of power generation and research (which sources put at 25 per cent of the total uranium need). The scarcity threatens to halt the second-generation FBR programme based on plutonium, which is derived from uranium used in the present thermal nuclear reactors. Without uranium, we cant run the nuclear establishment and achieve the targeted 10,000 MW power in the first stage of nuclear power generation,says P V Dubey, UCILs company secretary. The fast breeder reactors are supposed to produce another 10,000 MW of power by 2020, but R K Sharma, head of Bhabha Atomic Research Centres (BARC) public awareness division, admits: It will take about 10 years before we can switch to FBRs.India doesnt have 50 per cent of the uranium it needs and the shortfall could become 70 per cent. The government had in 1983 estimated that by using 73,000 tonne of uranium reserves, India could produce 10,000 MW of nuclear power till 2000. Till 2005, the country could only produce 3,360 MW.1 Despite a major effort in uranium exploration, India has still not located, after 30 years, any reserves of good quality uranium. The estimated total quantity of uranium available (assured and probable) amounts to the energy equivalent of less than one per cent of Indias coal reserves. A really sizeable nuclear power programme could not be fuelled by the limited quantity of assured reserves.2 The ore at Jaduguda has just 0.06 per cent uranium content, but even to get this bit mines have been dug 905 m below the surface. The Jaduguda mines, which were started in 1967, were supposed to last for 15 years but officials say they wont abandon it for another 30 years. Spending Rs 200 crore, UCIL is extracting uranium from copper tailings
at four 100-year-old and closed copper mines at Surda and Rakha. An estimated Rs 15,000 crore has been spent on all these mines. It is definitely becoming extremely expensive as we dig deeper and deeper to extract less and less, says P P Sharma, superintendent of geology, UCIL. However, undeterred by these problems the government is determined to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020. Aggressively build capabilities and capacity in nuclear power to progressively raise its share in Indias fuel mix, says the Tenth Five Year Plan that hawks for more nuclear energy. To achieve this, it suggests partial privatisation of nuclear power generation and market financing for projects. And for this it will extract uranium at any cost. As R Sreedhar, a former geologist with the Atomic Mineral Division and now with Mines, Minerals and People says: The government was never transparent in its acts and now it wants to bypass the people for access to mines. India would need 5,00,000 MW of power by 2050. It has vast coal reserves, but there are doubts whether all of these can be mined. The countrys hydrocarbon resources wont last long and it will become even more dependent on imports. India would have harnessed all its
MAP: The uranium hotspots

Currently, Jharkhand is Indias sole uranium supplier
Total reserves identified in India Uranium: 90,000 tonne Thorium: 3,60,000 tonne
U U
Domiasiat, West Khasi Hills district, Meghalaya ORE GRADE: 0.085 per cent
Jaduguda, East Singhbhum district, Jharkhand
ORE GRADE: 0.034-0.05 per cent
U
Visakhapatanam Ganjam Prakasam
Bastar district, Chhattisgarh
ORE GRADE: 0.067 per cent
U U
Rajnandgaon district, Chhattisgarh
ORE GRADE: 0.04-0.1 per cent
Lambapur-Peddagattu, Nalgonda district, Andhra Pradesh
Ramanathapuram Tiruneveli Kanyakumari Kollam Kottayam
U U
Gulbarga district, Karnataka
ORE GRADE: 0.010 per cent (mineralisation)
Bargarh district, Orissa
Source: Richard Mahapatra et al 2004, Red Alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30
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hydroelectricity resources by 2050, and non-conventional energy is unlikely to be cost-effective. A mix of all these resources could help, but the DAE feels that nuclear energy is the only solution which can fill the gap between demand and supply. The government agrees and has decided to cut the estimated 70 per cent contribution of coal-based power to 62 per cent by 2020 and compensate the shortfall through nuclear stations. The government wants that by 2050, nuclear reactors supply 25 per cent of Indias total power production. The DAE is sure that it can generate 10,000 MW of nuclear power by 2010 and 20,000 MW by 2020. Its confidence is based on an indigenous technology, which recycles spent fuel of thermal nuclear reactors to get plutonium for FBRs. The Nuclear Power Corporation says it will generate 1,300 MW during the Tenth Five Year Plan and 4,660 MW during the Eleventh Plan to make up for the first 10,000 MW target within the next six years. But with no new mines, how is that possible? Stage II While the first stage of the nuclear programme is way behind schedule and mired in controversies, the second stage seems to have more problems in store. When the Union cabinet sat down on September 2, 2004 to approve the construction of a 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor in Kalpakkam, the prime minister was warned that the countrys stockpile of plutonium was low. The nuclear programmes second stage, which is to be powered by FBRs, will depend on the first stage reactors. But the trouble is that reactors of the first phase dont produce enough plutonium. The government planned that while producing 10,000 MW of electricity, pressurised heavy-water (PHW) reactors of the first stage would also yield about three tonne of plutonium each year. This plutonium would then enable the construction of FBRs of 1,000 MW capacities each in the next decade. The cabinet has approved Rs 3,500 crore for the FBR programme, but the plan has a long way to go: the 500-MW Kalpakkam prototype reactor will only be commissioned in 2010 and plutonium for it has to be stocked from now. Within six months of the cabinets approval for the prototype reactor, DAE secretary Anil Kakodkar proposed to build four more FBRs by 2020 to achieve the target of 20,000 MW nuclear energy. FBRs would use less uranium more effectively, but the problem is that they are closely linked with the performance of conventional reactors. Indias 60,000 tonne of natural uranium deposits, which have a fissile uranium content of only 0.72 per cent, can at most generate 12,000 MW of power for 30 years. Moreover, anti-nuclear activists strongly oppose fast breeder technology. They allege that FBRs are unsafe and have been discarded worldwide. The prototype will be the worlds first to use a plutonium-uranium mixed carbide fuel. During the 1950s, sodium-cooled FBRs fascinated the West. These reactors were hyped as the magical solution to the worlds energy troubles. It didnt turn out that way. More than US $20 billion has been spent worldwide on building 11 plants. One of these, the Kalkar reactor in Germany, was completed in 1991 but never opened because of fears regarding accidents. Six of the other 10 reactors have
been shut. The Japanese Monju reactor, the latest, went critical in 1994 but was shut down in 1995. Crores spent, but power wont be cheap. FBRs generally cost 50-100 per cent more to build than PHW reactors and at least twice as much to run. Even if the DAE constructs the prototype reactor for Rs 3,000 crore, electricity would be expensive and cost between Rs 5 to Rs 10 per unit. Power sector experts say DAEs capital cost estimate for the test reactor is too low. The Russian BN-600 is the cheapest FBR since 1980, but the electricity it produces costs about one-third more per megawatt than the DAEs estimate for Kalpakkam. Compared to the latest US reactor of 1980, the Kalpakkam FBR would cost Rs 22,000 crore. If the 1994 Japanese reactor Monju is used as the benchmark, the capital cost at Kalpakkam would shoot up to Rs 46,000 crore. Stage III Uranium reserves almost over, with little plutonium, and chased away by people from digging new mines Indias nuclear establishment is under tremendous pressure. By 2020, it has to prepare for the thorium-based third phase of the nuclear programme. If this doesnt begin on time, the programme would turn out to be a colossal waste of national resources. Thorium, the government says, is a boon. Using its 3,00,000 tonne of thorium reserves, India can ensure energy for 400 years. But the US, Germany, France, Japan, Russia, Canada and Brazil have abandoned efforts to build thorium-based nuclear reactors after initial forays in the early 1960s. India, however, is not disheartened. The DAE has been running an experimental reactor called Kamini at Kalpakkam since the mid-nineties and is now making plans for an advanced thoriumbased reactor. A project report on setting up a 300-MW demonstration plant, which will predominantly use thorium, is ready, says B Bhattacharjee, director of BARC. The plant can be built in 10 years if the Centre approves the project, he says. BARC has also been developing an advanced heavy water reactor for thorium fuel. Starting from market funding of projects to external help in technology, the government is now considering all options. Since the muchdebated and high profile Indo-US joint statement on civilian nuclear cooperation, there has been a renewed interest in nuclear energy. From the perspective of Indian government, this would give new life to its nuclear programme that has been handicapped by limitations of technology and fuel. Public health can never be a violation of national interest. The loss of credibility in Jaduguda would keep on trailing the nuclear establishment, says Sanghamitra Gadekar, a scientist who has studied the effects of the Jharkhand mines on people. In the sixties, there was talk of nuclear plants producing up to 10,000 MW of power by the eighties. But we have been able to reach just the 3,000-MW mark. Let the government first account for the money it has spent on atomic power projects over all these years, says Dhirendra Sharma, who is an anti-nuclear activist and a former head of the science policy unit at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi. So, whats the way out for Indias nuclear programme? Sorry, you cant suggest anything. Its all secret.
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Karnataka and Maharashtra
arnatakas mineral wealth is distributed more or less evenly over its territory. The forest cover in the state comprises about 19 per cent of its total area: some of this area, such as the forests in the Western Ghats and the Bellary-Hospet area, bear minerals says the state governments 2006 Karnataka Human Development Report (see Map 1: Karnataka minerals and forests). Between 1980 and 2005, around 7,558 ha of forest land in Karnataka was diverted for mining activities: this accounts for approximately eight per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in India.1 Actually, the forest cover diversion would have been much higher as there are no records prior to 1980. According to the State of Environment Report 2003, prepared by the government of Karnataka, a major chunk of the mine leases in some districts is in forest areas. For example, 38 per cent of mine leases in Chitradurga, 66 per cent in Bellary and 96 per cent in Chikamagualur districts are in forest areas. According to the IBM, iron ore, gold, limestone and manganese are the most important minerals produced in the state in 2004-05, these minerals together accounted for 92 per cent of the mineral production in the state in terms of value.2 Karnataka has the largest iron ore reserves in India, 41 per cent, (see Table 1: Karnataka mineral reserves) and accounted for 26 per cent of the iron ore production in the country in 2004-05.3 Karnataka is the sole producer of felsite in India, and a leading producer of gold, dunite and limeshell; in 2004-05, according to the states official website, 99 per cent of the countrys gold, 43 per cent of its dunite, and 65 per cent of its limeshell was mined here (see Table 2: Karnataka mineral outputs).
TABLE 1: Karnataka mineral reserves

Karnataka has more than 40 per cent of Indias iron ore
Mineral Iron ore-hematite Iron ore-magnetite Copper ore Manganese Chromite Bauxite Granite Dolomite Limestone Gold ore Reserves (in million tonne) 1,148.32 7,883.85 34.40 86.57 1.87 44.98 9,571.93 5,352.39 51,210.428 24.232577 Proportion of national reserves (in per cent) 10.1 73.8 2.57 2.9 10.5 1.5 2.5 7.6 30.0 13.1
The primary producers of iron ore in the state are based in Bellary, the biggest being the National Mineral Development Corporation Limited (NMDC). Besides these, the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) has a base in Chikmagalur. Jindal South West Steels Limited will come up in Toranagallu, Bellary district. Gold in the state is extracted primarily by Bharat Gold Mines Limited (BGML), Hutti Gold Mines Limited (HGML) and Deccan Gold Mines Limited (DGML). The biggest limestone producers in the state are Associated Cement Companies Limited and Grasim Cement, both of which are in Gulbarga district. Rich uranium deposits have been found in Belgaum district by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); currently, scientists of the Central Atomic Research Centre, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and Tarapur Atomic Research Centre are exploring the site. According to the IBM, the value of minerals extracted in Karnataka in 2004-05 was Rs 2,116 crore which is approximately three per cent of the total value of mineral production in the country.4 Of this, the value of minor minerals was around Rs 155 crore.5 The value of minerals in the state has increased by almost 50 per cent in seven years: it was around Rs 1,012 crore in 1997-98.6 According to the IBM, Karnataka accounts for 23 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals extracted in the country.7 At just five per cent, the states share in the countrys total non-metallic mineral value is much lower.8 The royalty received by the Karnataka state government was Rs 84 crore, Rs 144 crore and Rs 211 crore respectively in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05.9 In fact, revenues from mining accounted for a miniscule portion of the states total revenue between 0.7-0.8 per cent.10 Though this revenue has increased substantially over the past few years, its contribution to the states total revenue has consistently remained low. Mining certainly has not contributed
TABLE 2: Karnataka mineral outputs

Production of most minerals has been increasing
Mineral Iron ore (in '000 tonne) Manganese (in tonne) Chromite (in tonne) Bauxite (in tonne) Dolomite (in tonne) Limestone (in '000 tonne) Gold (in kg) 2002-03 24,797 2,24,962 19,194 28,835 1,72,778 12,144 2,799 2003-04 31,635 2,59,559 12,425 48,403 2,22,550 13,047 3,261 2004-05 (p) 37,176 3,86,794 11,638 68,323 2,80,256 12,897 3,501
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MINING IN THE STATES: KARNATAKA AND MAHARASHTRA
MAP 1: Karnataka minerals and forests

In the major mineral districts, the maximum number of mine leases have been granted in forest areas
Tir n
Ma
njra
Nizam Sagar
Bidar
MAHARASHTRA
Bh im a
i Bor
M ul lam Bo ni ar th i or a
Gulbarga
Kagna
Bijapur
Panc h Ga nga
a im Bh
ni Do
Dudh
Gang
Ghatpra bha
Kris
hna
Belgaum
iH al
Be
nj
GOA
Dharwad Gadag
Tungabhadra reservoir
Tu
ng
ab
Koppal
ha
Malp
rabh
dr
Bellary
Ka l d ina i
KARNATAKA
ad a
Va r
Uttara Kannada
Haveri Davanagere
ra
Dense forests River Bauxite Chromite Iron Gold
Udupi
ad Bh
Chikmagalur Tumkur
He m av
Pe
Open forests
nn
Tun
er
ga
Bhadra reservoir
Charavat
Kolar
Ne
Dakshina Kannada
tra vat i
Ar
Hassan Mandya
Krishnarajasagara reservoir
ka v
Bangalore rural
Kave ri Fall s
Kodagu Manganese Dolomite Granite Limestone Silica sand Building stone
ri Kave
K E R A L A
Mysore Kabani
Chamarajanagar
at i
at
Bangalore
Stanley Reservoir
Bhavanisagar Reservoir
TAMIL NADU
Pa
pa
Chitradurga
gn
Shim sha
Linganamakki reservoir
Hag ari
Protests: Sand, stone and iron ore have been the cause of major protests
Jog falls
Shimoga
Chi ki H aga ri
Tumkur
i
A N D H R A
P R A D E S H
Bagalkot
Raichur
A SE IAN AB AR
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TABLE 3: Karnataka mineral royalties

A look at percentage contribution of minerals to the total royalty shows the resurgence of iron ore
2002-03 Iron ore Bauxite Limestone Dolomite Manganese Chromite Gold Others Minor minerals 6.4 0.2 53.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 39.1 2003-04 32.2 0.1 35.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 2.0 1.0 27.9 2004-05 37.8 0.1 25.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 3.9 1.1 30.5
GRAPH 1: Karnataka mining leases over the years

The number shows some fluctuations
1200 Total no. of mining leases granted 1000 800 578 600 400 200 0 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 Year 2001-02 2002-03 548 610 514 513
Source: Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals Source: Data collected from various publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
significantly to the states growing economy; the information technology sector has. Iron ore and limestone contribute the most to the total royalty generated (see Table 3: Karnataka mineral royalties). The contribution of iron ore was low in 2002-03 (a little above six per cent), but it shot up to 32 per cent the next year, and increased further to 38 per cent in 2004-05. But the contribution of limestone has decreased over the same period. Interestingly, though minor minerals contribute less than 10 per cent of the value of the mineral production, they accounted for more than 30 per cent of the royalties, indicating that the rate of royalties on minor mineral in Karnataka is far higher than the major minerals. The IBM says that in 2004-05, 425 mine leases had been granted in Karnataka for extracting major minerals.11 According to the State of Environment Report 2003 of the Karnataka government,
there were 5,650 quarry leases of minor minerals over an area of 4,526 ha in December 2004. However, the total number of mines and the area under mining would be much higher, as the state does not account for leases in private land as per the Mysore Land Revenue Code 1888. Since 1998-99, there has been a fluctuating trend in the number of mining leases for major minerals in (see Graph 1: Karnataka mining leases over the years). According to the IBM, a total area of around 51,000 ha had been leased out for mining till 2002-03, excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals.12 In terms of area under mining, just four minerals iron ore, limestone, gold and manganese accounted for more than 75 per cent of the total area under mining in Karnataka (see Graph 2: Karnataka area under mining). A large proportion of the mine leases are in the iron ore-rich Bellary district (see Graph 3: Karnataka mining districts).
GRAPH 2: Karnataka area under mining

Iron ore, limestone, manganese and gold account for more than 75 per cent of the area under mining
China clay 1.74 Chromite 1.94 Copper 0.96 Bauxite 0.17 Gold 12.33
GRAPH 3: Karnataka mining districts

Bellary is Karnatakas most heavily mined district
Bagalkot 7% Others 24%
Bellary 18%
Others 17.65 Manganese 15.82 Tumkur 5%
Chikmagalur 9%
North Kanara 11% Iron ore 27.15 Limestone 22.25 Kolar 11% Gulbarga 5%
Chitradurga 10%
Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 6
Note: Excluding fuel, atomic and minor minerals Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 13-15
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The flashpoints
BELLARY: IRON COUNTRY
Bellary is the poster boy of the globalised Indian mining industry. It is an export hub every day, thousands of tonne of manganese and iron ore is exported from the district through Mangalore, Karwar, Goa and Chennai. It is rich in minerals: approximately 86 per cent of Karnatakas iron ore reserves are here, says the IBM.13 Much of these reserves are of high quality, with an iron content ranging from 62 to 68 per cent.14 For some years now, the Indian mining industry has been meeting the international iron ore demand especially Chinas seemingly insatiable appetite; India is Chinas second largest supplier of iron ore and exported more than 68 MT to that country in 2005-06.15 As the international demand for iron ore has increased, Bellary has risen handsomely to the challenge. And with good reason: the profits have been enormous. A sudden rise in the global price of Indian iron ore from US $17 a tonne in 2000-01 to US $55 a tonne in 2005-06 (it even reached an all-time high of US $83 a tonne briefly in 2004)16 transformed the area into a mining giant responsible for nearly 20 per cent of the countrys iron ore production.17 Iron ore production in the district has gone up three-fold in the last six years.18 For instance, the Vibuthiguda Mines increased production from 88,000 tonne in 2001-02 to 2,67,000 tonne in 2004-05.19 The district produces around 30 to 35 MT of ore annually, of which around 70 to 80 per cent is exported to China, Japan and Australia.20 Pakistan and Korea are also markets for Bellarys mineral wealth.
A code for landowners

Leads to unregulated and unrestrained mining
The Mysore Land Revenue Code 1888 gave private landowners the inherent right to remove minor minerals and stones like granite from their land without permission from the State. Therefore, in the southern part of Karnataka, any person who owns land can extract minor minerals. This Act is applicable only for privately-owned land mining leases have to be obtained for government land. The government had challenged this Act in court, but it was upheld and the Act remains in place. The original purpose of this Act was to ensure that the land is made more arable. However, this has led to completely unregulated mining in parts of the state. Informal contracts exist between landowners and mining companies: companies pay the landowners money in return for mining rights.
B T Venkatesh, Mines, Minerals & People, Bangalore
Open-cast iron ore mining is spread over 18,000 ha in Bellary, Hospet and Sandur taluks of the district.21 Officially, the district has some 99 mines, of which 58 are functioning.22 But the ground reality is different more than 12,000 cases of illegal mining have been reported since the year 2000.23 This phenomenon of a large number of small mines privately owned by individuals is a legacy of the Mysore Land Revenue Code 1888 (see Box: A code for landowners). Illegal mining has been a huge drain on the state exchequer estimates suggest that the Karnataka government lost Rs 3,000 crore to it between 2004 and 2006.24 In comparison, the government
M T SHIVKUMAR
In the red: rampant iron ore mining has completely destroyed the ecology of Bellary
193
The little labourers of Bellary

At least 200,000 boys and girls work in the iron mines
Five-six year old Gangamma, Ishwaramma and Shekamma spend between six to eight hours a day hammering away through a pile of iron stock so that they can build up their pile of iron ore lumps. The pile at the end of the day and the number of iron boxes they fill will determine how much their families will earn. They are not the only ones. Three-year-old Ramesh carries an iron box filled with iron ore lumps on his head, this early induction into the world of mining and exploitation being part of his childhood. His load is not as heavy as the 15 kg that all the other children carry up and down. Their backs and heads hurt, but as they tell themselves,How can we complain? These are not ordinary jobs that these children do. Sitting hunched over hot ferrous ore, chipping away steadily at heavy metal with a hammer is not exactly child's play. At its safest, it is painful for the shoulders, the back, the wrist joints and the arms while the little hands are covered with bruises and blisters. At its most hazardous, it causes severe
M T SHIVKUMAR
Though illegal, child labour is common in Bellarys ion ore mines
injuries, maiming or death when heavy stones fall or the hammer in weary hands sometimes misses its aim. These children know no rest, no play, no learning, nothing but the grim grind of a joyless existence.
earned a paltry Rs 80 crore as royalty from iron ore (at Rs 27 per tonne of iron ore) in 2005.25 This large-scale pilfering of Karnatakas mineral wealth has the patronage of the state administration, particularly the forest department. Investigations of illegal mining have exposed how officials of the forest department issue permits illegally to transport mined ore from forest areas by merely issuing way permits which are meant for transporting forest produce already lifted from the forest area. The way permits are issued to transport material from dumping yards or any other place, where the miner stores the ore, after legally lifting them from the forest. Reports on illegal mining have also found that officials allow three to four days for transporting ore from Sandur-Hospet-Bellary region to Mangalore and Karwar ports, though the required period for transportation is only one day. This unduly long period is granted for facilitating more number of trips per permit. Also, many licensed mine owners have encroached upon the areas beyond the boundaries of their mining area, and some also carry out mining activities at different locations all of this in forest areas. While large mining companies in Bellary-Hospet are expanding feverishly, smaller players are scrambling for all they can find. But unfortunately, amidst all this commotion, concerns about agriculture, ecology, human health and labour laws have taken a back seat (see Boxes: The little labourers of Bellary and Mines and misery the women miners of Bellary). Private mining companies control almost 80 per cent of the land under lease for iron ore operations, with an average lease size of 200 ha.26 The smallest of these private mines four and five-acre operations run by private landowners outside Hospet are largely unregulated. Estimated to number 12,000, these float ore mines so called because workers dig by hand for small quantities of iron ore that float near the surface are said to be the regions biggest thieves of iron ore. Small farmers ruined by years of drought have cashed in on the boom by mining their agricultural farms themselves or contracting them out at Rs 62,500 to
Rs 75,000 a hectare.27 These mines have been the targets of the anti-mining lobby as they are responsible for some of the most egregious violations of labour and environmental laws, including child labour and failure to manage waste or soil erosion. Practically none has mining permits or pays taxes. Agriculture has been one of the worst sufferers of the unplanned mining expansion. Over a period of time, the entire area got covered in mine waste. Agricultural cultivation was affected. From banana, betel nut and paddy, there was a shift to jowar, millets and cotton. Now, even this is grinding to a halt, says B T Venkatesh, an advocate who has studied unorganised mining labour in the area. Before 1990s, we used to get good crop. Now, with all this dust, we have to increase our use of fertilisers and still the yield is poor, rues Jambumani Aryappa, tehsildar of Dhanapura, near Hospet. Human health is, naturally, the casualty. Red Alert, a documentary made by non-governmental organisation (NGO) Sakhi based in Hospet in Bellary district, records the health problems of mine workers. We always have stomach pain. With every gulp of tea, we take in dust, laments a worker. The area has high incidence of lung infections, heart ailments and cancer. Complaints of air pollution are also common, but the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB) remains unmoved. The only problem is dust during transportation, but there are no basic standards fixed and so we cannot take any action, says KSPCB officer C M Satish. Satish is right about the dust from transportation. Roughly 7,500 trucks rumble along Bellarys roads at any given time, most of them carrying far more than the 15-tonne load allowed by law.28 Years of such traffic has turned the areas unpaved roads into crenulated strips of dirt so broken that Bellarys wealthier residents mostly mine owners are purchasing helicopters to bypass them. A 2002 study by the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), Nagpur, found suspended particulate matter at many locations in Sandur between 130 microgram per
194
cubic metre (g/m3) and 1,678 g/m3.29 The maximum observed concentration was 4,474 g/m3, far above the ambient air quality standards.30 On its part, the KSPCB has neither found violations, nor issued any notice to any mine under the Air Act, 1981 or the Water Act, 1974. Studies point at siltation in the Tungabhadra reservoir due to mining activities. The total capacity of the reservoir was 133 thousand million cubic metre (tmc), but now it is only 99 tmc. The rest has been destroyed by silt, says Virupaksha Naik of Jagratha Nayaka Balaga, an NGO based in Bellary.31 Another problem is that the clamour for exports leaves a very small percentage of iron ore for the domestic market. Even Jindal, Kalyani and Kirloskar steel plants are beginning to feel the pinch, because they are not getting adequate raw material, says S S Hiremath, deputy director, Department of Mines and Geology (DoMG). Mining has also negatively impacted the Vysankere forest and the Bellary reserve forest by fragmenting them. The dumping of waste material has caused a loss of topsoil in Bellary forest, but the forest department is not too ruffled. This is a dry zone forest. With gods grace, we have lots of iron. We are compensated for the land and given money for afforestation, says deputy forest conservator Manoj Kumar Shukla. But many in the area still remember the mining belt as a forest area. Venkatesh points out
that while the district is dry, this area receives the highest rainfall of around 900 millimetre.32 Labourers work for as low as Rs 7 for a basket of broken stones.33 Despite their abject poverty, health status and working conditions, their employment is touted as a sign of development, points out A Bhagyalakshmi, member of a fact-finding committee on child labour in the region, set up by Mines, Minerals and People, a coalition of NGOs working on mining issues. Based on NEERIs environmental impact assessment, the Union ministry of environment and forests had directed the state government to ensure that new mining leases are considered only if the area concerned is over five ha and a detailed report about it is available from the IBM.34 Small mines, less than five ha, damage the environment and do not come under the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957.35 The state government was also asked to identify common dumping areas for mine waste and carry out a detailed groundwater study. Neither of the instructions was followed. But the DoMG has called for a check on grant of leases in Hospet. Aided by the iron ore money, many mine owners contested the 2004 elections and became legislators. With mining interests and political clout joining hands, it is now widely believed that only legislative changes can save the region from unbridled mining.
Mines and misery: the women miners of Bellary

While some in Bellary have prospered, its women miners remain in their pitiable state
The sun rarely peeps through the lingering dust clouds, as the women work for more than 10 hours a day for meagre wages. This is Bellary. Mining in a district which had been suffering from a continuous drought for three-four years, did help recover its economy. Lifestyles changed, but the condition of women labourers working in the mines has remained unchanged. More than 20,000 women work in Bellary's unregulated mines without any safety measures. They are mainly engaged in activities like unloading, stone crushing, and loading the ore on to tippers and goods wagons. Drought, poverty and illiteracy have pushed them into this dangerous occupation. They are forced to work beyond work hours even in advanced stages of pregnancy. They have no leave or creche facilities and are always under threat of being thrown out. In some of the quarries, women are forced to work at night and are often sexually abused. Most of these women have health problems. Their children suffer too as they are left at the quarrying sites while their mothers are working. The wages are a pittance: while the men are paid Rs 35-40, women are paid somewhere between Rs 25-30. Women engaged in loading the ore are paid only Rs 18. There have been several cases of people selling their property because of the severe drought and poverty, and going to work in the mines.I sold my two acres of land for Rs 35,000 per acre. Now I am working here. It is a very difficult job. My face starts itching and I feel like vomiting. I cant have food, says Malligavva of Karigallu village. One can find thousands of Malligavvas in the mines.
M T SHIVKUMAR
More than 20,000 women toil in Bellarys unorganised mines
According to an official report, there are 5,432 permanent labourers and more than two lakh unorganised labourers working in the mines. Nearly 35 per cent of this unorganised workforce consists of women. Karnataka is one of states that leads in hiring women in mining accounting for 11 per cent of the total women employed in mining. Right to education, food and employment or better infrastructure is only a dream for these women. Local labour unions, which only do the bidding of politicians (many of whom are the mine owners), have never paid attention to the pathetic conditions of the women workers in the mines.
M T Shivkumar, CSE media fellow, Bangalore
195
M T SHIVKUMAR
Red runs the Bhadra: iron mining and related activities have given an unearthly hue to the river waters
196
WESTERN GHATS: KUDREMUKH TANGLE

Chikmagalur is yet another district rich in iron ore. Located in the forested Western Ghats, the story of mining here is different from Bellarys. For one, extensive mining in the district has a much longer history. The Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited (KIOCL) started mining in the area way back in 1979. Secondly, the sheer ecological fragility of the mining area is an issue: KIOCL is located in an extremely biodiversityrich forest region, notified as a national park, and having a protected status. But probably the most distinguishing feature of mining in Chikmagalur has been the way the livelihood-andenvironment debate has played out (see Box: Livelihood versus environment). One of the biggest casualties of iron ore mining in the Western Ghats has been the river Bhadra. The KIOCL has been mining on an area of 4,604 ha right in the middle of the catchment area of the river (see Map 2: Mining in the Bhadra catchment).36 The topographic and rainfall characteristics of the region, combined with the open-cast mining activities, roadbuilding and other land surface disturbances caused by KIOCLs
operations have resulted in high sediment discharges in the Bhadra river system. As early as 1985, the state government had expressed concerns over the impacts of mining on water quality in the Bhadra river. Several studies were commissioned to assess the impacts among them were the 2001 assessment by the Centre for Ecological Sciences of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore and a 2002 study jointly undertaken by the Bangalorebased Centre for Wildlife Studies (a non-profitable charitable trust researching on wildlife conservation issues), and the Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE), an organisation working on biodiversity issues. While the IISc study pointed out that large-scale deforestation had resulted in an increased flow of silt and iron ore tailings into the Bhadra reservoir, the 2002 study used both secondary as well as monsoon data to confirm that the sediment load in the Bhadra had dramatically increased as a result of mining (see Graph 4 on page 198: Waste overload in the Bhadra). Moreover, it also proved that less than six per cent of the entire Bhadra catchment (comprising the KIOCL mining site) was by far the major contributor to sediment loads in the river.37 The contribution of this small
Livelihood versus environment

In India, environmental issues cannot possibly be seen in isolation from livelihoods: this is illustrated by battlezone Kudremukh
Environmental concerns have shrouded iron mining by KIOCL for years. However, concerns over employment added another dimension to the issue of mining in the ecologically-rich Kudremukh valley, competing with protests over environmental damage. As the protests against ecological damage grew, and as demands for closure of mining activities gathered steam, the company's workers opposed the impending retrenchment. For a long time, the companys management, confident that it would be able to stave off any closure proposals, did nothing to look for alternative mining sites instead, it spent all its energies lobbying for continuing mining. The alternatives included moving the mining operations to Sandur (in Bellary district) or Ongole (Andhra Pradesh), but the company claimed that these plans were not practical, and too expensive. The Kudremukh valley was also one of the battlefields between conservationists and sustainable livelihood groups. The issue was displacement of the local inhabitants in the name of conservation. When mining was stopped by declaring the area as a national park, bodies such as the Kudremukh Rastriya Udayana Virodhi Vakoota (KRUVV) and a number of local groups which had been campaigning against iron ore mining in the region, stoutly resisted the formation of the park since it will lead to the large-scale relocation of forest dwellers. Leo F Saldanha, coordinator, Environmental Support Group, observed: Disenchantment is high among forest dwellers. They first fought against the mining company and now they are being ousted from the habitation which is rightfully theirs.
MAP 2: Mining in the Bhadra catchment

Run-offs from the mines fall directly into the river
Shimoga Left Bank Canal
Bha
va dra ti
Right Bank Canal
Bhadra Dam
Lakkavalli Bhadra Tiger Reserve

er
Bh ad
ra
Catchment area bounary
Kudremukh National Park Gangamoda
Kalasa Streams
Lakya Dam
KIOCL mining area
Source: J Krishnaswamy et al, 2002, Impact of Iron Ore Mining in Kudremukh on Bhadra River Ecosystem, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE), Bangalore
r iv
197
sub-catchment to the total load entering the reservoir in 1985 and 1986 was estimated to be 53 and 67 per cent, respectively. Sediment loading since the beginning of mining in the early 80s (measured at Malleswara) increased successively from 1,197 tonne in 1984 to 49,429 tonne in 1986. Another the major problem created by KIOCL was the disposal of waste tailings. The company had made a 100-metre dam
GRAPH 4: Waste overload in the Bhadra

Sediment load has increased by almost 58 times between 1984 and 2002
60000
40000
20000
0 1984 1985 Malleswara 1986 Nellibeedu 2002
Source: J Krishnaswamy et al, 2002, Impact of Iron Ore Mining in Kudremukh on Bhadra River Ecosystem, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, http://www.wcsindia.org/sedimentreport.pdf, as viewed on April 25, 2007
across the Lakya, a tributary of the Bhadra river, for disposal of tailings. A discharge or overflow from the dam would directly enter into the river as was the case when the Lakya was breached in 1992. Opposition to KIOCLs activities has built up over the years from environmentalists who were concerned about the threat to the regions flora and fauna, to farmers who were affected by the pollution of the streams that originated in the mining area. Farmers complained of decline in agricultural productivity downstream due to deposition of mine tailings, P Sankaran, writing for the website of India Together quotes a fact-sheet put together by the Environment Support Group (ESG), a Bangalorebased non profit organisation involved in research and advocacy on environmental and social justice issues.38 Communities complained of increased sickness and disease due to pollution of the river. Farmers said that paddy yield had declined from 50 quintals to 30 quintals a hectare because of the accumulation of silt and waste tailings in the fields. Sankaran also quotes a farmer of Nellibeedu: Every monsoon, the water brings with it silt and tailings. These solidify and harden in summer. Nothing grows on the field. Mining by KIOCL in the Kudremukh valley ended after an epic struggle by environmentalists and other civil society groups (see Box: Struggle saga). The area was declared a National Park. But the fact remains that an unprecedented effort by various agencies, including the media, was required to achieve this. The KIOCL experience protecting environmental concerns will always be a long haul.
Struggle saga
An account of the battle to save Kudremukh
KIOCL started mining operations on an area of 4,604 ha.1 The inhabitants around the Kudremukh National Park (KNP) witnessed years of mindless mining and consequent loss of habitat and then waged a relentless battle against the public sector undertaking, in what has become one of Indias most poignant stories of ecological destruction and peoples protest. The large-scale resistance followed the mining companys refusal to relinquish its hold despite the expiry of its initial lease in 1999 amidst a prior notification declaring Kudremukh as a national park with a total area of about 60,032 ha.2 When KIOCL asked for an extension of lease for the next 20 years and demanded inclusion of fresh land around the Gangamoola area for mining, prominent environmental groups like the Karkala-based Kudremukh Wildlife Foundation, Bangalores Wildlife First!, Wildlife Conservation Society and Environment Support Group along with the Belthangady-based Nagarika Seva Trust and Parisarasaktara Okkuta took the contentious issue to the Supreme Court (SC). The Delhi-based Legal Action for Wildlife and Environment (LAW-E), and K M Chinappa, trustee of Wildlife First! filed an application in the Court in 2001 contending that mining in the protected area was illegal. Following this, the Court issued notices to the Union and state
Sediment load (tonnes)
governments and KIOCL to file an affidavit as to why mining was being allowed inside a national park. This forced the state government in June 2001 to issue a final notification of the park covering 53,600 ha area, thus protecting the Gangdikal and Nellibeedu regions from mining.3 The move was hailed as a great victory by most wildlife NGOs, but also came in for condemnation as in the same notification, 3,700 ha of forest land was excluded from the national park to facilitate continuation of mining by KIOCL in the already broken area of Kudremukh. The SC, in its ruling on October 30, 2002, ordered the company to stop all mining activities inside KNP by 2005-end. While giving this order, the three-member bench consisting of then Chief Justice B N Kirpal, Justice Y K Sabharwal and Justice Arijit Pasayat rapped the Union and Karnataka governments. The bench pointed out that the two had changed their stances in the case like a chameleon changes colour. The verdict criticised them for not applying their mindwhile adopting an inconsistent standon the renewal of mining lease to the company. Frantic attempts were made by the company as well as the Karnataka government to ensure that mining operations continue, including applying for fresh leases for slope stabilisation and the retrenchment of KIOCLs employees was one of the major arguments put forward to convince everyone that mining should continue in the Ghats. But the Court was firm, and mining finally ended.
Binayak Das, Down To Earth, New Delhi
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THE LURE OF STONE AND SAND

Stone quarrying and mining is big business in Karnataka. Next to the capital city of Bangalore, illegal stone quarrying is happening at as many as 30-40 sites within one kilometre of the Bannerghatta National Park much to the ire of local residents and environmentalists.39 Quarrying began on a small scale way back in 1983, and assumed large-scale proportions by the turn of the century. For the locals, apart from noise and vibrations from the periodic blasts, the dust generated from quarrying is the bane of their existence. Local vegetation is suffering. Livestock that feed on the vegetation fall ill with various diseases. Yields of food crops like ragi and maize have fallen drastically. There is a marked increase in reported cases of tuberculosis and skin diseases amongst the local residents. Illegal quarrying is not restricted to Bannerghatta. It is rampant in other parts of the state too Kanakapura, Ramanagar, Channapatna, Chamrajanagar, Yelandur, Kollegal, Gundalpet, Hungund, Bagalkot, Badami, Gouribidanur, Gudibanda, Chintamani, Bagepalli, Hospet, Kudligi, Sandur, Koppal, Yelburga, Kushtagi, Sadam, Chincholi, Chitapur, Tiptur, Turuvekere, Chikkanayakanahalli, Molakalmur, Challakere, Jagalur, Bailhongal, Gotak, Soudatti, Ramdurga and Kengeri are all hot spots of illegal quarrying.40
Another area that has witnessed heavy mining for stone (in this case, granite) is Kollegal. The Kollegal forests, immortalised by the late brigand Veerappan, are not only famous for sandalwood, but also for their abundant black granite. The forests are a treasure house of biological riches valuable plant species and wildlife (including some of Asias largest elephant herds). One hundred twenty-five quarries have come up in the taluk and these are having a huge impact on the local biodiversity. Locals also claim that quarrying has depleted groundwater sources in the region.41 Kollegal is unfortunately not alone quarrying has also devastated forests in the B R Hills in Yelandur as well as in Bhadravati.42 Mining for laterite is rampant in several forest areas in Sirsi taluk.43 Illegal sand mining on river bed is also a big issue in Karnataka (see Box: The sands of Tungabhadra). Leader of the Opposition in the zilla panchayat Panchappa Kalburgi recently alleged that illegal sand mining was going on unabated in the Bhima riverbed with the tacit blessings of officials. Even though, it was decided at least two times in the Karnataka Development Programme meetings that height restriction frames will be fixed on bridge-cum-barrages across the Bhima to prevent illegally mined sands to be smuggled into Maharashtra. However, even after eight months, the frames had not been fixed.
The sands of Tungabhadra

Sand mining is destroying the river
Farming land as godowns for sand? This is the bank of the Tungabhadra. The beleaguered river a source of water for several huge paper mills and dumping ground for their effluents is also the site for rampant illegal sand mining, which has been prohibited, but continues unabated.1 Many farmers have stopped farming and taken to sand mining as an alternative livelihood to escape from recurrent droughts in the region. Roads, unable to cope with the extra load of trucks, have deteriorated. Groundwater sources have been affected, but the mining continues. According to the state government, on an average, almost nine lakh tonne of sand is mined every year in the state.2 According to a study by the Department of Agricultural Economics, Bangalore, which compared sand mining and non-sand mining areas in the Uttara Pinakini river basin in Karnataka, there is a high rate of failure of irrigation wells (46 per cent) in the case of sand-mined areas compared to non-mined areas (29 per cent). The same pattern is observed in filter point wells; about 68 per cent were not functioning in sand-mined areas. In non-sand mining areas, the proportion of non-functioning filter point wells was 23 per cent. Clearly, as the filter point wells close to sand mining areas are of shallow depth (30-35 ft), they are most affected due to sand mining done at a depth of 25-30 ft. The study found that as the distance from the river increased, the rate of well failure went down, although in each case, more failures were observed in case of sand mining areas (see Graph: Wells undone).
GRAPH: Wells undone

Excessive sand mining adversely affects groundwater recharging, which is reflected in increased number of well failures
0.8 0.7 Proportion of well failure 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0-30 30-120 Distance from stream Sand mining area Non-sand mining area 120-1500
Source: M G Chandrakanth et al, Whither Groundwater? Negative externalities due to sand mining in India, Department of Agricultural Economics, GKVK, UAS, Bangalore
Due to the poor groundwater recharge, farmers incomes have suffered. The same study found that the net returns of farmers in the sand mining area was 28 per cent lower than that in the non-sand mining area.
199
GULBARGA: FARMLANDS, WASTELAND

Karnataka accounts for 30 per cent of the countrys limestone reserves, and 10 per cent of the total land leased out for mining limestone.44 Gulbarga is the hub of these reserves. Unlike the iron ore-rich districts of Chikmagalur and Bellary also rich in forests and wildlife Gulbarga is predominantly agricultural. Apart from three massive limestone mines (operated by Wadi Cement Works, Rajashree Cement and Vasavadatta Cement), some small ones, as well as several small quarries and crushing units dot the landscape. Most limestone mines in the area propose to reclaim minedout land as reservoirs. They have, however, not taken sufficient steps to ensure proper reclamation. In other words, what is being planned for as the ultimate use of the quarried land is deep pits filled with water not water reservoirs. Also, most mines do not have a community-based vision of how the water in the reservoir will be ultimately used, even if rainwater does get stored. For instance, some mines plan to develop the reservoirs as tourist spots, complete with lakes and boating facilities. Consider the situation in Gulbarga district few decades from now. The river Kagina, a tributary of the Bhima, flows in the region, and is the main source of water for the predominantly agrarian communities in the area. According to a study conducted by Green Rating Project of Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), all the three huge plants are going to create massive pits extending over many hectares of land. Rajashree Cement, for instance, has already created quarries over 80 ha of the land since it started mining in 1984. The pits are as deep as 60 m. All three
plants claim in their mine closure plans that the pits will ultimately be filled with rainwater. Rajashree Cement and Wadi Cement Works, between them, are planning to create reservoirs extending over 1,013 ha. Rajashree Cement and Vasavadatta Cement want to build tourist spots near the artificial lakes they hope will be created, and Wadi Cement Works doesnt have any clear plans of how the water will be utilised. Considering the fact that before mining began in the area, the land was being used in a variety of ways by local communities, such a change in land use pattern is an extremely poor deal for the communities. Thats the future in the present, noise and vibrations from the blasting and a sense of disenchantment over unemployment and the poor compensation packages is nearer to their minds. Take for instance, Injepalli village: within the lease area of Vasavadatta Cement, its a good example of the battering that blasting can bestow on the local community. The cracks caused in the houses are so severe that they are no longer safe to live in. Many residents have shifted to nearby villages of Batgera (K) and Batgera (Gate), which, incidentally, are also suffering from the same problem. Currently, around 300 people live in Injepalli. They are very poor, and the compensation amount offered by the management is not sufficient to enable them to purchase houses elsewhere. Negotiations over the details of the relocation package are going on between the management and the villagers. Large-scale limestone mines, together with the many stone quarries, have already had a huge impact on Gulbargas landscape and landuse patterns, but the real impacts will probably be seen in the future, when the plants shut down, and the meagre employment provided by the plants will disappear.
RAMYA VISHWANATHAN / CSE
Large-scale limestone mining in Gulbarga by cement plants has encroached upon agricultural land in a big way
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Mining in Maharashtra
Seventh highest contributor to the total mineral value, the state is a major coal producer
About 19 per cent of Maharashtras geographical area is potentially mineral-bearing.1 The key regions are in and around Nagpur, Chandrapur, Bhandara, Kolhapur, Raigad, Sindhudurg and Thane, and the major minerals are coal, limestone, bauxite, manganese ore, silica sand and laterite. The Ratnagiri coast contains sizeable deposits of illimenite. Undersea oil deposits were discovered near Mumbai in the 1970s. Most of the minerals in Maharashtra are found in areas which are rich in forests (see Map: Maharashtra minerals and forests). For instance, the mineral-rich district of Chandrapur is home to dense forests. According to official estimates, about 4,057 ha of forest land had been leased out for mining operations between 1980-2005.2 This
would mean that 25 per cent of mine leases in Maharashtra were on forest land.3 The state accounts for four per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining in the country.4 There is no data available, however, on how much area may have been destroyed through illegal mining, which is rampant. In 2004-05, more than four per cent of the total value of minerals (excluding atomic minerals) produced in the country was contributed by Maharashtra, says the IBM.5 Barring a slump in 1999-00, the mineral industry has been growing consistently. The value of mineral production has gone up by 35 per cent in seven years from Rs 2,715 crore in 1997-98 to Rs 3,356 crore in 2004-05.6 The growth in the mineral industry, however, has been gradual: there has been no major investment and, therefore, no sudden surge in mineral value. The state has not gone on a mining overdrive as in the case of Orissa, perhaps because it does not have extensive reserves of iron ore or bauxite, two minerals that have drawn major investments in recent years.
MAP: Maharashtra minerals and forests

The state has 25 per cent of its mine leases on forest land
g Wain
ada Narm
Ga
MADHYA PRADESH
Tapi
Ka nh
Pench
anga
Open forests Dense forests
Kun
GUJARAT
Dadra & Nagar Haveli Daman & Diu Daman
Tapi Nandurbar Ukni reservoir Dhule Panjhara
di
an
Jalgaon
a Girh
Wa
a rdh
Purna
Amravati
Bembla
Ar an
Nagpur
Gondia Bhandara
River
CHHATTISGARH Bauxite
Copper
Nashik
Go dav ari
Buldana Pe ng an ga
Pu rn a
W un
Aurangabad
Dudha na
Washim
Yavatmal
Penga
Kolri
Thane Mumbai (Suburban)

M ul
Pravara
a
Hingoli
nga
Bandia
Mun
na
Akola
Wardha
a Waingang
Iron Magnesite Coal/lignite Dolomite Limestone Mica
ar W dh
Chandrapur
Jalna Ahmadnagar Parbhani Nanded Man ar
Gadchiroli
MAHARASHTRA
Mumbai
Gh od
Sin
Indrava ti
Bid
Man jra
Os m
ANDHRA PRADESH
Silica sand
Raigarh
ARABIAN SEA
Pune
Latur
a rn Ti ad
an ab
Nizam Sagar
Satara Koyna reservoir

Ratnagiri
Solapur
Bh im a
Bo ni th or a
Sangli
Pa nc hG
KARNATAKA
an ga
Doni
ga
ish na
Bhima
Kolhapur Gan dh Du
Sin dh ud urg
Ghatprabha
Kr
Protests: Coal and stone quarries are facing most protests
GOA
201
GRAPH: The top grossers

Coal accounts for 84 per cent of the total mineral value
Limestone 2.7% Bauxite 0.9% Minor minerals 8.7% Others 0.3%
Manganese ore 3.5% Iron ore 0.10%
Coal 83.8%
Source: Based on data from anon, 2006, State Review, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-56
According to the IBMs data, coal is the key mineral for the state in terms of value, contributing as much as 84 per cent of the total mineral value.7 The next highest contribution is from minor minerals nine per cent which are important for the state (see Graph: The top grossers). This matches the countrys, where minor minerals account for about 10 per cent of the nations total mineral value. The other contributors are manganese ore (3.5 per cent), bauxite (0.9 per cent) and limestone (three per cent).8 Most major minerals such as limestone, bauxite, fireclay and coal in the state showed an upward swing in production over 2003-04. Maharashtra is also a significant contributor to the countrys total production of manganese and shale, accounting for 24 and 21 per cent respectively.9 The state was the sole producer of corandum in 2004-05. Besides, the state also accounts for nine per cent of coal and 12 per cent of the bauxite produced in the country.10 Though Maharashtra is among the top 10 contributors to the total mineral value of the country, the mining industry does not do much for the economy of the state. The revenue collected by the Maharashtra government from the industry in the form of royalty accounts for only one per cent of the total revenue receipt of the state.11 The mineral industry generated Rs 570 crore in 2004-05, which is an increase of 45 per cent from 2002-03.12 At the same time, the contribution of the industry to the total revenue of the state went down marginally this indicates that though the mining industry is growing, the other segments of the economy are growing better. There were about 220 mining leases in the state, excluding minor minerals and coal, in 2002-03.13 If the number of coal mines is assumed to be the same as the number of mining leases, then there were 270 leases in the state the same year.14 As per IBM data, mining industry occupied
an area of about 15,988 ha till 2002-03.15 Both the number of mine leases and area under mining increased over the period 1995-2001, but dropped suddenly in 2002-03. Mine sizes (area per mine lease) remained more or less constant in the initial years, but shot up in 2000-02 before dipping gradually. This could probably be due to coming into operation of large mines in the particular year. The average landholding per mine lease area is around 69 ha per lease.16 This indicates that the state has more numbers of medium- to small-sized mines. This is expected, since it is an important producer of low-valued minerals such as shale, sand and quartz. The IBMs Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003 points out that besides coal, a major chunk of the mining leases has been granted for limestone, followed by manganese ore and silica. A district-wise analysis of the leases granted shows that Sindhudurg has the maximum number (53), followed by Nagpur (46). However, in terms of area occupied by these mine leases, Chandrapur is the most mined district, followed by Kolhapur. Chandrapur leads as it is home to a number of large captive limestone mines of the states cement industry. The IBM lists INDAL (Indian Aluminium Company Ltd), Associated Cements Company Ltd, UltraTech Cement Ltd, Manganese Ore (India) Ltd, Esmo Minechem Industry, Kasarda Co-operative Mining Society Ltd, among others, as the key mining companies in Maharashtra. Apart from these, the Central Coalfields (subsidiary of Coal India Ltd) also operates mines in the coal-bearing districts of the state. Burden of mining Like all other regions of the country, the state is experiencing the ill effects of mining destruction of forests, poor air quality and illegal mining. In recent years, the main issue facing Maharashtra has been managing its unorganised mining sector, especially sand mining and stone quarries. Sand mining and stone quarrying a lot of it illegal have been the bane of Maharashtra. Sand mining along the Kihim beach and Panvel river has led to noise and dust pollution. One of the earliest stone quarries was at the Uttan-Dongri area of Thane district, which is now suffering due to indiscriminate mining.17 The local people had led demonstrations against the increasing number of stone quarries in the area, which were leading to acute water shortage, environmental pollution and crop failures. Several trees failed to flower and local wells dried up. The quarrying was carried out unscientifically in vertical strips rather than horizontal, increasing run-off, loosening root support for trees and choking underground aquifers. Some of the hills were cut to almost half their size for extracting black stone. Quarrying activities have also been going on in districts like Matheran, Thane, Powai and Chandivali. In Matheran, illegal and secret mining of red laterite rock had created a stir in 1998.18 Mining had been going on in the area for almost a year before residents discovered it. By then, the quarry had stretched half-a-kilometre downhill from the Khoja Sanatorium. Matheran residents believed that the stones from the quarry were being used for the big hotels that had come up in the area. At Powai, quarrying has brought misery to the residents of the area by spoiling the lake and affecting the environment. Another worry here has been the proximity of the quarrying site to an Indian Air Force base.
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The stone quarrying industry employs about 40-50 lakh workers in Maharashtra. Being unorganised, it offers no special legal provisions to protect the interests of workers, who live in dire conditions with no basic amenities like drinking water, electricity or health services. The industry also employs a large number of women and children. In 2002, the state government passed a resolution for setting up the Maharashtra Mining Development Fund (MMDF) for mining-affected areas. The objective was to provide financial assistance for roads, drinking water, health services, electricity and environment. The most serious issue was the right to safe drinking water. Stone quarry workers at Wagholi village in Pune had demanded drinking water under the MMDF, but the government chose to ignore the demand under some pretext or the other. Instead, it decided to allot the entire money for the next five years for developing roads. On top of that, the state government also waived off the 10 per cent contribution to the fund from companies. In April 2005, Santulan, an NGO working for the rights of these workers, filed a PIL in the Mumbai High Court. The demand: provision of water under MMDF. The judgement was in favour of the people and the NGO, and the state was forced to complete the public water scheme in November 2006. What is important to note here is that the workers had to take a legal recourse for the provision of as basic an amenity as water. The state government recently discovered that bauxite was being
The Chandrapur belt is facing water crunch due to the presence of cement companies and limestone mines
mined illegally from a 3,000-ha area in Satara, which had been reserved for windmills. The minister of state for mines, Dasharath Hande, who visited the site, found that considerable digging had already taken place and high-quality mineral was being ferried away. The site is estimated to have 40 MT of bauxite valued at Rs 1,150 crore. The land had been requested by the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency from the mines department for a windmill project, with a written assurance that no bauxite would be mined from the site.19 The Chandrapur belt, which has rich deposits of coal, is also facing the woes of industrialisation and development. The area has as many as 29 coal mines 15 open-cast mines and 14 underground mines. Fed up with the air pollution from the operations of the coal mines, increased vehicular traffic, and thermal power stations, the locals approached the state and the Central governments. Their demand was to ban coal mining by Western Coalfields Limited in their area. People complained of high incidence of respiratory diseases after the operation of the coal mines. A petitions committee was formed by the Lok Sabha in 2003 to look into these complaints. The committee sought response from the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) and commissioned studies to assess the health impacts. Studies were conducted by the Government Medical College, Nagpur, Government Medical College Chandrapur and District Health Officer (DHO). While the first two reports rubbished the complaints of the people, the district health officers study did report tuberculosis, bronchitis, pneumonia and eye diseases. However, the DHO added that these cases could not be only attributed to pollution from coal mines and the cause needs to be ascertained. The Petitions Committee recommended carrying out a comprehensive health study in the Chandrapur district. It also recommended that local people and NGOs should be involved in various schemes/ programmes meant for pollution control in the area to ensure their better implementation. The Chandrapur belt also houses a number of cement plants Gujarat Ambujas Maratha Cement Works, UltraTechs Awarpur Unit and Birla Groups Manikgarh Cements all within a radius of five km. This region faces extreme shortages of water, and the common complaint of the locals is that mining on such a large scale and the cement plants operations have lowered the groundwater in the area. Villagers of Naokhari Khurd, which is two km from Manikagarhs limestone mines, complained that the hand pumps were not working due to lowering of the water table. Villagers of Bibigaon, 3.2 km from UltraTechs Awarpur unit, also complained of water shortage which is affecting their agriculture. The villagers mentioned that though the unit had constructed a number of borewells in the region, most of them now do not yield any water. There were similar complaints from villagers of Sonapur, located just 1.5 km from GACLs Maratha Unit. On their part, the companies have indicated that the decline in groundwater is because of low rainfall and not because of their operations. The state, thankfully, is not witnessing large-scale protests against mining and mineral-based industries at the same scale as in the case of Orissa or Chhattisgarh. However, if the current trend of environmental degradation continues, the people may initiate protest movements to block mining and its related industries.
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Kerala and Tamil Nadu
he mineral histories of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have their distinctive characteristics, but what binds the two south Indian states is their common blight: sand mining. Ecology and livelihoods in both the states are severely threatened by inscrupulous miners who are turning the regions riverbeds and coasts upside down (see Map: Kerala and Tamil Nadu the mineral reserves). Of the two states, Kerala is a relatively small player when it comes to minerals: it contributed only 0.3 per cent of the total mineral value produced in the country in 2004-05, with its produce valued at only Rs 257 crore. Minor minerals represented 55 per cent of this value (see Graph 1: Kerala minerals and their value). Nevertheless, thanks to sand mining, the states mining sector grew three-fold between 1997-98 and 2004-05.1 Kerala is the largest producer of kaolin in the country, accounting for 34 per cent of the total output. It is also the second largest producer of limeshell (28 per cent) and the third largest producer of sillimanite (25 per cent).2 Kerala also has 12 MT of fine sand3
and 35 MT of illimenite4 (the illimenite deposit at Chavara is the worlds largest).5 The coastal districts of Kanyakumari, Tirunelveli, Thoothukkudi, Ramanathapuram and Nagapattinam have reserves of high quality heavy mineral placers such as garnet (23 MT), illimenite (98 MT), rutile (five MT), monazite (two MT) and zircon (eight MT). Recently, Karnatakas Deccan Gold Mines has announced discovery of new gold reserves in Attapadi (Palakkad district), a tribal area.6 The number of mining leases for major minerals in the state has not changed much over a five-year period (see Graph 2: Mine leases in Kerala); the state had 96 mining leases in 2002-03, with a lease area of 2,193 ha.7 Average land holding per lease was about 23 ha. It is clear, therefore, that small mines dominate the states mineral industry. Loss of forest cover to mining in Kerala is a minor issue: just over 29 ha of forests have been diverted for mining.8 In May 2001, Kerala announced that the state would allow private companies into its mining sector. The new policy does not
MAP: Kerala and Tamil Nadu the mineral reserves

Coasts and river basins are the worst affected by mining
ANDHRA PRADESH KARNATAKA
ti
Shim
Nadari
Kannur Open forests Dense forests River Bauxite Copper Iron Magnesite Coal/lignite Graphite Kaolin Limestone Mica Mineral sand Silica sand Glass sand Granite Vembanad lake Pahe Wayanad
Kaban
Stanley reservoir Erode Bhavanisagar reservoir Salem
ar
Ti
Pon
naiy
ru
va
Kaveri falls
na
Protests: Sand mining is the cause of most protests
ra Net Kasaragod
i vat
Krishnarajasagara reservoir
Dharmapuri
al
ai
Vellore
ar eyy Ch
Viluppuram
Kozhikode pore Bay Malappuram
The Nilgiris
Vell a
Namakkal
Kav eri
Kuddalore
Ar iya
Coimbatore
TAMIL NADU
Karur
Perambalur
ll pa i Kol
lur
Palakkad Thrissur
Noyil
i ra va t
lida
Nagapatttinam Karaikal
Thanjavur
KERALA
Ernakulam Per iyar Idukki Kottayam
Dindigul Theni
Vo ll
ar
Madurai Sivaganga Va lg al
Gu a na r
Alappuzha
Achankovit Virudhunagar Va lpp ana mth ur itta Kollam Toothukudi Kalloda Ch i Tirunelveli ttar Thiruvananthapuram
Path
Ramanathapuram
Kanniyakumari
INDIAN OCEAN
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Thiruvaur
Am
p ra hi uc r i T Pudukkottai
Ka nch eep ura m
Kav eri
ka
Pala
Thiruva
va
llur
Chennai
Ar
sha
PONDICHERRY
MINING IN THE STATES: KERALA AND TAMIL NADU
GRAPH 1: Kerala minerals and their value (2004-05)

Minor minerals play an important role for the state
Laterite 0.07% Sillimanite 1.60% Limestone 6.31% Limeshell 1.29% Silica sand 0.22%
GRAPH 2: Mine leases in Kerala

Number of leases and area under them remain relatively unchanged over five years
3,000 Mining lease area (hectares) 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0
Kaolin 34.97% Minor minerals 55.44%
Bauxite 0.10%
19981999
19992000
20002001 Years
20012002
20022003
Source: Analysis based on anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-46
Source: Publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
allow the private sector to be owners and operators, but permits it to create joint ventures with state-owned companies. The major mineral-based companies in the state are the Indian Rare Earths Ltd (IRE), V V Minerals, Beach Mineral Company, Transworld Garnet and Indian Ocean Garnet Sand. The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) has signed an MoU with the state government for establishing a Rs 2,000-crore titanium dioxide plant. Unlike Kerala, Tamil Nadu has large reserves of major minerals (see Graph 3 on page 206: Tamil Nadu minerals). It is the leading producer of lignite in the country, with total reserves of about 30,275 MT.9 Neyveli Lignite Corporation (NLC) has led the development of a large industrial complex around Neyveli in Cuddalore district. Lignite deposits have also been found in and around Mannargudi, Jayamkondam and Srimushnam. Some of the worlds best magnesite deposits are in the state in Salem, Namakkal, Coimbatore and Erode districts. Tamil Nadus magnesite reserves amount to about 73 MT.10 The state also ranks seventh in the country in terms of production of limestone.11 The key districts are Perambalur, Tirunelveli, Thoothukkudi, Virudhunagar, Salem, Karur, Namakkal, Dindigul, Coimbatore and Madurai. The total reserves are about 1,473 MT, and there are 12 major cement plants.12 Tamil Nadu also has deposits of graphite (Sivagangai, Ramanathapuram, Madurai and Tirunelveli); quartz and feldspar (Tiruchirapalli, Salem, Coimbatore, Madurai, Tirunelveli, Erode and Dindigul); granite (Tindivanam, Dharmapuri, Pudukkottai and Madurai); magnetite (Salem, Namakkal and Tiruvannamalai); silica sands (coastal areas of Nagapattinam, Cuddalore, Kancheepuram and Tiruvallur); bauxite (Kodaikanal, Palani, Yercaud and Kolli hill ranges); and clay (Cuddalore, Pudukkottai, Tirunelveli, Tiruvallur, Kancheepuram and Tiruvannamalai).
SASIDHARAN MANGATHIL
Mining-eroded beaches: a common sight in the two states
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GRAPH 3: Tamil Nadu minerals (2002)

A major chunk of Indias lignite is found in the state
Limestone Bauxite Magnetite Quartz/silica sand Clay Feldspar Graphite Gypsum Ilmenite Monazite Magnesite Rutile Lignite Zircon Vermiculite Garnet 42.59 38.10 66.67 7.31 28.16 25.00 17.59 27.78 87.09 0.87 0.85 0.04 5.00 2.60 8.97 33.33
GRAPH 4: Mineral value Tamil Nadu

Lignite and limestone are the two most important minerals, accounting for more than 90 per cent of the total value
Minor minerals 3% Magnesite 2% Limestone 9% Garnet (abrasive) 1% Others 1%
Lignite 84%
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00 Percentage of national resources
Source: Analysis based on anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-80
Source: Analysis based on information from http://www.tnmine.tn.nic.in/TNMining.htm#Reserves, as viewed on March 26, 2007
TABLE 1: Tamil Nadu trends in production

The production of almost all minerals has increased
Mineral Lignite Bauxite Ball clay Dunite Feldspar Fireclay Garnet (abrasive) Unit '000 t Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne 2002-03 18,624 2,64,126 3,982 16,213 1,975 26,926 4,31,787 42,300 13,575 3,08,627 2,06,114 16,997 1,900 2,204 9,861 1,765 2003-04 20,556 2,79,616 2,075 22,530 4,189 29,535 4,90,728 43,782 14,098 3,55,028 2,50,444 15,035 21,712 1,786 11,547 1,458 2004-05 21,567 2,98,822 12,547 3,609 40,221 5,69,505 44,130 4,312 14,636 4,79,308 3,08,808 10,591 9,267 3,180 19,874 1,855
Mineral production in Tamil Nadu is mainly dominated by lignite, limestone, garnet, lime kankar and bauxite (see Table 1: Tamil Nadu trends in production). Lignite accounts for a major chunk of the value generated from mineral production 84 per cent (see Graph 4: Mineral value Tamil Nadu). It is followed by limestone (nine per cent), minor minerals (three per cent) and magnesite (two per cent).13 Mineral production has increased significantly in last few years. Revenue generation by the mining department has increased in the last decade: from Rs 74 crore in 1996-97 to Rs 446 crore in 2004-05 (see Table 2: Tamil Nadu revenue rise). The royalty collected has also shown an overall increasing trend.14
TABLE 2: Tamil Nadu revenue rise

The earnings from mining went up six-fold in nine years
Year 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Amount in Rs crore 73.851 89.941 110.371 124.861 163.121 254.262 317.22 474.812 445.952*
Graphite (run of mines) Tonne Gypsum Limestone Lime kanker Magnesite Quartz Silica sand Steatite Sulphur Vermiculite Tonne '000 t Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne
Source: http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=16559&ptid= 12095&level=3, as viewed on March 26, 2007
Note: *Till February 2005 Sources: 1. http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/chapter10-3.htm, as viewed on March 27, 2007; 2. http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/default.htm, as viewed on March 27, 2007
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A COMMON MISERY
Collapse
As indicated earlier, sand mining has become the key challenge in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Almost 20 years ago, Kerala saw the emergence of its first environmental groups fighting to protect its rivers from rampant sand mining. In 1987, one of these groups began its agitation for the Periyar river, but by 1997 the rivers awesome economic value had thwarted the conservationists efforts.15 By 1998, 45,000 tonne of sand was being mined every day, causing the river to sink seven metre.16 The annual extraction of sand was almost two MT, while annual silt deposit was only 33,000 tonne.17 The sinking riverbeds led to saltwater intrusion at places, which altered the rivers ecology and jeopardised the drinking water sources in turn. 18 In August 1999, a report by the Centre for Earth Science Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, found that mining restrictions intended to protect water resources and bridges had not been enforced this had contributed to 44 of Keralas rivers suffering severe environmental strain and serious risks to a number of concrete bridges.19 That same year, the Keezhumad Panchayat halted all sand mining from the Periyar in its area, citing the reduction of Parunthhuranchi Island from 16 to 10 ha and the risk Sand mining in Tamil Nadu leads to collapse of check-dams
Farmers are at the receiving end of sand mining in Tamil Nadu. Rampant sand mining has led to the disintegration of a check-dam at Mayilapudur, one of nine such dams constructed to redirect water to 68 irrigation tanks from the Nambiyaru river. The tanks water over 3,672 ha of agricultural land in the region. Large-scale mining for sand, carried out with heavy equipment at Rajakkalmangalam, Kannanallur and Mayilapudur, has weakened the foundations of the check-dams. As the river bed experienced sudden floods, the already fragile Mayilapudur check-dam collapsed. Flow of water to seven irrigation tanks Aanaikulam, Veetrirunthaankulam, Karuppaakaalakulam, Ayyappaperikulam, Thangayamkulam, Vilvanamputhurkulam and Konarkulam stopped completely, pushing farmers into a corner. In fact, a member of the state legislature from Radhapuram, M Appavu, had tried to get a stay order from the Madras High Court on further sand mining on the dry river bed; but things spun out of control before the court could intervene.
Sentinels to chaos: rampant sand mining is eating into the coastlines, in spite of all efforts to stall the inevitable
207
to the Aluva water treatment plants pumping station and to the Aluva railway bridge.20 By then, the Periyar was losing 4,000 truckloads each day; the recommended amount was 53.21 The Pampa river in the state has been as severely hit as the Periyar. In 1998-99, 511 trucks per day were hauling sand away from the Pampa. The river lost 11 MT of sand in 1997 alone, which caused the riverbed to sink 2.5 metre below the sea level.22 By 2002, mining of the Pampa had taken its toll: a tributary, the Varattar, shrunk from 150 metre to 10 metre,23 its bed sank three metre, the water table dropped and created a water crisis in the region.24 By 2002, there were reports of 30 illegal mining centres run by gangsters around the state many of them in the Periyar.25 Illegal mining of the Walayar river in the stretch near Pulampara, Kongampara and Kanipiruvu was so intensive that by 2003, drinking and irrigation water was drying up and it posed a risk to the Walayar dam. Illegal mining at the kadavus (banks of a river, lake or pond) in the Pampa meant five to six times more sand than legally allowed was being mined. The extensive mining was jeopardising a newly constructed bridge in Ranni as well as the water authoritys pump houses.26 Over the years, various court rulings, bans and state legislations have tried to curb mining, especially unauthorised mining, in the state but with little impact. In 1998, a six-month ban on sand mining was announced for the Meenachil river.27 Due to a drought in 2004, a three-month ban was implemented for the Bharathapuzha river and its six tributaries in Palakkad, Thrissur, and Malappuram districts.28 The same year, 18 sand mining ghats had their licenses cancelled because they were within 500 metre of lift irrigation projects on the Periyar and Muvattupzuha rivers.29 Another notable success was notched when residents from Torenoor village near Kushalnagar successfully got a stay on sand mining on the Cauvery river after they argued that the mining was polluting the environment.30 But the Pampa continued to be at risk it was discovered that a large-scale sand mining project at the Mukhannur kadavu was taking 20 truckloads of sand each day, when it was authorised to remove only eight.31
Stopped in its tracks

Court halts sand mining in Tiruvallur lake
The Madras High Court has stayed mining of silt and sand in a lake in Thirukandalam in Tiruvallur district in Tamil Nadu. The interim order was passed on a public interest litigation petition stating that the largest lake in the district was being desilted and mined beyond stipulated norms. Though the permission was to desilt only up to eight feet from the topsoil over an area of 150 square metre, the contractors had mined large tracts of sub-soil indiscriminately. When villagers protested the violation and staged a dharna, 33 of them were arrested on false charges, the petition said. The indiscriminate mining would affect the water table in the lake endangering drinking water as well as water for agriculture in the region, it said.
In February 2006, Kochi district halted all new sand mining ghat licenses, while Keralas land revenue commissioner stepped up the states efforts to curb unauthorised sand removal.32 The expert committee on river sand mining, constituted by the land revenue commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram, made a number of recommendations in March 2006 to monitor sand mining more effectively.33 Despite all this, sand mining is flourishing in the state as it is in neighbouring Tamil Nadu, where the threat to livelihoods of local communities from this seems to be more real now.34 In fact, there has been a significant increase in sand mining in Tamil Nadu since the beginning of the 1990s, following a boom in the construction industry. This activity intensified particularly in the southern and western regions of the state after restrictions were imposed on sand mining in Kerala in 1994. The river basins which have been severely affected due to sand mining include the Palar and its tributaries (Cheyyar, Araniyar and Kosathalaiyar in Kanchipuram and Thiruvallur districts); the Cauvery (Karur); the Bhavani (Erode); the Vellar (Perambalur); the Vaigai (Madurai and Theni); and the Thamiraparani (Tirunelveli). Also in the line of fire are the coastal districts of Nagapattinam, Tuticorin, Ramanathapuram and Kanyakumari and the hill regions of Salem and Erode. The Campaign for the Protection of Water Resources-Tamil Nadu has prepared a background note on the conditions in the Palar river basin. The Palar is the longest of the rivers in the districts bordering Chennai and has been a major source of drinking water for the state capital and its suburbs. The Palar and its tributaries also irrigate about three lakh ha of agricultural land in Kanchipuram, Thiruvallur, Chennai and Vellore. Until a century ago these were perennial rivers, but now the water flow is confined to the monsoon months. Because of this and also the thick layer of clay on the riverbed, the possibility of flooding has become minimal. This has attracted sand miners to it. According to the background note, the exposure of the riverbed to solar radiation following deep mining has resulted in its drying up. Water availability has dipped and even the available water has turned saline in several places. Continued sand mining has led to obstruction in the free flow of water during the monsoon, and the volume of water that flows into the Pulicat Lake has dwindled as well. This has brought down the fish catch substantially, thus affecting the livelihoods of hundreds of fisherfolk. The sand mining has also hindered the flow of water into the heavily silted Red Hills and Cholavaram lakes, posing a serious threat to Chennais water supply system. Besides, the continuous flow of traffic, with trucks overloaded with sand, has badly damaged village roads in the region. Because of its proximity to Chennai, the Palar basin mostly serves the ever-increasing sand needs of builders in and around the city and, therefore, is the most exploited of the river basins in the state. Mining operations, both legal and illegal, have been noticed in a number of places and the norm regarding the depth of the mine is often flouted. There are other stories of the havoc sand mining is wreaking across the state. Indiscriminate mining is taking a toll of
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Selling the coast

Coastal mining in Kerala is a contentious affair
For years, villagers and environmentalists in northern Kerala have been trying to protect their coasts and the habitat they provide for a sea turtle, while in the south, people have been fighting the sale of mining rights to private business. On a 20-km stretch of beach north of Calicut, the endangered Olive Ridley turtles lay around 5,000 eggs every year. In the mid-1990s, efforts to collect and protect the eggs were successful, and led to a formal hatchery. However, by 2001, beach erosion from illegal sand mining had gotten so bad in some areas that the turtles were no
longer returning to nest.1 In 2003, it was announced that the Kerala Rare Earths and Minerals Limited (KREML) had been given mining leases on 17 km of the southern coast, but local environmentalists and social activists quickly worked to prevent any more mining. The project was put on hold because of pubic pressure, but in 2005 it was learned that the government had set up a commission to study the impacts and feasibility of coastal mining along the 17-km stretch.2 Erosion and pollution from sand mining along the coast can threaten local villages and the 30,000 fisherfolk of the region.3 Mining and the subsequent erosion would lead to saltwater intrusion into the groundwater;4 seawater would enter the backwaters, threatening inland agriculture.5
Sand mining can lead to intrusion of saltwater into groundwater as well as into the backwaters, precipitating a water and agricultural crisis of mammoth proportions
agriculture in the Thamiraparani river basin, which has an ayacut of about 100,000 ha. In Kanyakumari district, 54 tanks that met drinking water needs have been badly affected; most of them have been closed down. The riverbed in many places has gone down by 12 metre owing to continuous quarrying. Strong local opposition has begun against a government decision to allow silicon sand mining in and around Karumbakkam village in Cheiyur taluk.35 In Nagapattinam district, extensive illegal mining for silicon sand has resulted in depletion of groundwater and affected agriculture. With drain canals blocked, agricultural lands have been flooded in several places and mangrove ecosystems have been damaged.
There are visible impacts of mining of coastal sands in Kanyakumari, Tuticorin and Ramanathapuram. Mining is done to a depth of up to six metre, within 10 metre from the high tide line. It has the potential to cause severe sea erosion, which can have an adverse impact on the fishing communities on the coast. Encroachment by miners has robbed fisherfolk of the space they have used traditionally to land their catch and stow their fishing equipment. In several places, seawater intrusion has resulted in salinisation of well water and depletion of groundwater resources. The disappearance of sand dunes owing to indiscriminate mining has made interior land vulnerable to storms and cyclones.
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Madhya Pradesh
adhya Pradesh (MP) has about 335 operating mines of major minerals (excluding coal) in an area of about 34,000 ha.1 The main minerals found in the state are limestone, bauxite, dolomite, ochre, diamond, coal, gold, copper ore and manganese ore. Important mineral-bearing districts are Katni, Betul, Shahdol, Sidhi, Satna, Balaghat, Jabalpur, Chhindwara, Panna and Shivpuri.2 The state accounts for eight per cent of Indias coal reserves, four per cent of its bauxite, three per cent of limestone, 10 per cent of manganese, and 28 per cent of its copper reserves (see Table 1: Mineral reserves). A 1999 study by the Forest Survey of India (FSI), Dehradun, which examined the forest cover in the metal-mining areas, showed a high degree of overlap between
TABLE 1: Mineral reserves

MP holds significant reserves of coal, copper and limestone
Mineral India Bauxite Calcite Copper ore Copper metal Coal bed methane Diamond Pyrophyllite and diaspore Dolomite Fireclay Gold ore Gold metal Granite Iron ore Lead-zinc ore Limestone Manganese ore Molybdenum ore Molybdenum containing MoS2 Coal Ochre Potash Vermiculite 2,925,550,000 15,997,763 1,338,387,000 10,485,000 1,434 bcm 4,580,336 carat 20,769,776 7,084,209,000 695,027,000 184,478,587 186.93 37,624,611,000 cubic metre 11,425,788,000 485,114,000 170,458,657,000 295,063,000 16,296,732 10,547 247,847,000,000 58,279,801 21,815,000,000 2,621,809 Reserves* Madhya Pradesh 121,544,000 1,108,245 375,722,000 3,457,000 144 bcm 1,453,381 carat 13,014,482 1,841,677,000 110,604,000 12,295,000 16 1,994,084,000 cubic metre 200,658,000 5,410,000 5,883,784,000 28,358,000 8,000,000 5,020 19,232,000,000 9,561,573 1,206,000,000 206,592 Percentage of countrys reserves 4.15 6.93 28.07 32.97 10.04 31.7 62.66 25.99 15.91 6.66 8.56 5.30 1.76 1.12 3.45 9.61 49.09 47.60 7.76 16.41 5.53 7.88
working mine leases and forest areas in the districts of Balaghat, Mandla and Shahdol (see Map 1: Minerals and forests). The IBM says that 1,154 mine leases were given out by the state (excluding coal) in 2005.3 Limestone accounts for the maximum number of mine leases (503), followed by dolomite (131), ochre (97) and bauxite (67).4 Limestone also accounts for the maximum area under lease: 73 per cent of the total lease area in MP (see Graph 1: Mineral-wise mine lease area). The district of Satna leads with 308 mine leases and 9,888 ha of area under leases, followed closely by Katni with a mine lease area of about 8,000 ha (see Graph 2 on page 212: District-wise distribution of mine leases). Both these districts are the limestone belts of the state and house many big names in the cement industry such as Associated Cement Company (ACC), Prism Cements and Birlas Satna Cement Works. The sector contributed about Rs 5,470 crore or five per cent to the gross state domestic product (GSDP) in 2005-06.5 In terms of value of mineral production, Rs 5,186 crore worth of minerals were produced in the state in 2004-05 a jump of nearly 38 per cent from 2002-03.6 MP was among the top 10 states in terms of value of minerals in 2004-05 and generated the third highest royalty from minerals in the country the same year.7 While the production of coal and manganese ore has increased over the years, the production of bauxite and copper ore has decreased (see Table 2 on page 212: Mineral production). The strength of the state is its fuel and non-metallic minerals. It stood fourth and third in contribution to the total fuel mineral value and non-metallic mineral value, respectively, produced in the country in 2004-05.8 The total mineral value produced in the state increased during the period 1997-2000. There was a major dip in the mineral value
GRAPH 1: Mineral-wise mine lease area

Limestone tops in number of leases as well as their area
Bauxite 3.64% Others 12.84%
Manganese ore 4.85% Ochre 3.67% Dolomite 2.06%
Limestone 72.94%
Note: *Quantity in tonne unless specified; bcm = billion cubic metre Source: Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3, 8-4, 11-51
Source: Analysis based on data from anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 6
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MINING IN THE STATES: MADHYA PRADESH
MAP 1: Minerals and forests

Several districts show a high degree of overlap
RAJASTHAN
h mb Ga
ir
Ya hu na
Protests: Mostly against illegal mining
Kunwari
m ha b al
a oren
Bhind
UTTAR PRADESH
Betwa
Gwalior
Sin
Kuno
Sheopur Shivpuri
Datia
Dhas an
ai n
Rana Pratap Sagar Gandhi Sagar
Ba
gh
Gan ga
Be ta
Tikamgarh
Parwan
ns To Rewa
Neemuch
Mandsaur
So u
Guna Chhatarpur
Bet
Parbati
Satna
anth G B Pgar Sa
wa
An
w as
Open forests
Sha
Rajgarh
Newal
Sagar
na
Vidisha
Be
Boarma
Panna
So
Sidhi
So
Ma han adi
tla
Dense forests
M
Bhopal
Helati Reservoir
Damoh
Katni
japu
Ra
So
Ujj ain
Cha
River Copper Bauxite Lead Manganese Coal/lignite Diamond Dolomite Kaolin Limestone Mica
Tapi
An as
Umaria
Jo hi
ah i
Dhar Jhabua
Ba
rw
an
a Narmad West Nimar Ga l

i nd Ku
MAHARASHTRA
by more than 50 per cent in 2000-2001.9 This was due to the formation of Chhattisgarh in 2000. A number of bauxite, coal and iron ore mines located in Raigarh, Bastar, Korba, Surguja, Bilaspur, and Kanker districts became part of Chhattisgarh. The production of bauxite fell from 0.77 MT in 1998-99 to 0.28 MT in 2000-01.10 Surguja, Bastar and Bilaspur, which together contributed almost 62 per cent of the bauxite in Madhya Pradesh in 1998-99, were transferred to Chhattisgarh in 2000. Iron ore production was almost finished off in Madhya Pradesh after the formation of Chhattisgarh, as the Bastar and Dantewada mines shifted to the new state. The production of iron ore in 1998-99 in Madhya Pradesh was 17.27 MT. This plummeted to 0.13 MT.11 The major chunk of limestone mines is based in Rewa and Satna districts of Madhya Pradesh; hence, production of limestone wasnt impacted. But Raipur district, which became part of Chhattisgarh, contributed about 20 per cent of the limestone to the state in 1998-99. The production dropped from 28.87 MT to 21.79 MT during the same period.12
mba l
MADHYA PRADESH
Sehore Dewas
Narm ada
Raisen Narsinghpur
Tawa Reservoir Hoshangabad Chhindwara
Jabalpur
Shahdol
lla
Gamb hir
Indore
Sipr a
Dindori Mandla Ba nj ar Balaghat
East Nimar
a w Ta
Ta pi
Harda Betul
Kan
Pa
Seoni
ga Wain
nc
nga
hh
a ot
CHHATTISGARH
han
h Ward
Madhya Pradesh is the sole producer of diamonds in India. Out of the 4,580,336 carats of deposits countrywide, about 31.7 per cent are in MP.13 Found in Panna district, diamonds are mined mostly from shallow reserves. There are two diamond mines which are completely mechanised and are operated by the stateowned National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC). The total production is 78,315 carats, worth at about Rs 37 crore.14 Production in 2004-05 increased by almost 10 per cent from the previous year.15 The diamond mines employed, on an average, 354 people per day in 2004-05.16 However, a lot of diamond is mined illegally and smuggled out of the state. Coal is another important mineral in the state, accounting for almost 86 per cent of the total value of mineral production.17 MP ranks fifth in the country with respect to coal reserves (19,232 MT), which lie in Shahdol, Umaria, Betul, Chhindwara and Narsinghpur districts.18 The state comes fourth in terms of production after Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh; the output is about 52.68 MT of coal, worth Rs 4,496 crore.19
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GRAPH 2: District-wise distribution of mine leases

Satna, because of its limestone mines, is most mined
Balaghat 7% Others 29% Jabalpur 5%
Suppressed
Despite policy initiatives, power to panchayats remains a pipe dream
Madhya Pradesh had, in 1995, formulated a new mineral policy. Under it, panchayats were associated with the selection process for granting lease of all minor minerals except granite. The royalty amount was also to go to the panchayats. However, this stipulation has remained largely on paper. An illustration of how ineffective it is can be seen in the case of Limbi village of Badwani district. On September 19, 2003, 29 tribals of the village were arrested for campaigning against illegal calcite mining in their village. False charges of extortion were pressed on them because they wanted to use the gram sabha to deny the contractor a lease over their land. The Limbi gram sabha had already passed two written resolutions, on January 26 and April 14, objecting to the mining operations.
Katni 24%
Satna 30%
Rewa 5%
Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 15,16,17
MP is the third largest producer of limestone in the country, with a share of 15 per cent in country-wide outputs.20 In the state, limestone accounts for about five per cent of the value of mineral produced.21 MP is also the leading producer of copper concentrates, pyrophylite, diaspore and slate accounting for about 56 per cent, 73 per cent, 60 per cent and 90 per cent of the total national outputs, respectively.22 Copper concentrates are the third largest contributor to the total value of mineral production in the state: about two per cent.23 In terms of employment, the sector employs 1,53,150 people, constituting 2.4 per cent of the states workforce. Almost 87 per cent of those employed are males.24 The numbers of women in the mining workforce have been falling: according to the 1991 census, 22,562 women were employed in mining and quarrying, and the number fell by more than 10 per cent in 2001. A background paper by the NGO, Mines, Minerals and People (MMP), presented at a seminar on women and mining in Delhi in 2003 says that women
have been pushed into contract labour, which completely lacks work safety and employment security. Most women mineworkers are found in small-scale and unorganised sector mines. Most large-scale private mining industries are highly mechanised and technology-intensive, which exclude womens participation.25 In terms of royalty from mining, the state earned Rs 734 crore in the year 2004-0526 an increase of 24 per cent from Rs 591 crore in 2002-03. However, the industrys contribution to the total revenue receipt of the state shows a marginal drop (see Table 3: Mineral royalty). On an average, the royalty generated from the mineral industry contributed four per cent of the total revenue receipt of the state.27 A major portion of the royalty is from coal (76 per cent), followed by limestone (17 per cent), diamonds (one per cent) and minor minerals (three per cent) (see Graph 3: Mineral-wise contribution to royalty). Industrialisation in Madhya Pradesh has been mostly mineralbased. Between April 2004 and June 2006, a billion dollars worth of

MP is the sole producer of diamonds in the country
Mineral Coal Bauxite Copper ore Iron ore Manganese Diamond Limestone 2002-03 45,736,000 249,264 2,273,531 128,000 344,398 84,407 23,824,000 2003-04 49,826,000 194,401 2,321,026 94,000 376,671 71,260 23,777,000 2004-05 (p) 52,683,000 186,459 2,053,711 201 446,589
TABLE 3: Mineral royalty

Mineral industry contributes 4 per cent of the revenue
Mineral royalty (in Rs crore) Total revenue receipt (in Rs crore) 14,289 19,743 17,016 Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt
2003-04 2004-05 Average
646.71 733.72 690.215
4.5 3.7 4.1
78,315 24,938,000 Sources: Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November; anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai
Note: Quantity in tonne except in minor minerals and diamonds Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-51
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GRAPH 3: Mineral-wise contribution to royalty

Coal contributes three-fourth of the total royalty
Diamond 1% Other Minor minerals 3% Limestone 17% 3%
Hand-in-glove
A national park is lain waste by political manoeuvres
In 1996, local politicians were granted mining leases for forest land inside the Madhav National Park in Shivpuri district: 40 ha of forest land granted in the lease was brought under the revenue department, which is under the control of the district collector. Khair trees were cut overnight to show that the land was viable for mining; more were destroyed later for making roads. Interestingly, 20 stone quarries operated by the state mining department had been closed down in the same area because of the damage they were causing to the national park. These mines employed about 40,000 workers. After their closure, a mining lease was granted to one Saurabh Stone Polishing Pvt Ltd owned by a Congress Party leader. Locals believe that the state-owned mines were shut down due to pressure from the mining mafia. Currently, there is political pressure from local Congress leaders to open the mines, as about 30,000 peoples livelihood is at stake. The national park has been divided into three categories areas located in more than five-km radius, in five-km radius and in less than fivekm radius. There are 15 flagstone mines in Shivpuri, of which eight fall in the area greater than five-km radius. The Union government, in consultation with an empowered committee, has decided to give no-objection certificates to the eight mines after the state government agreed to deposit the compensation and afforestation amount; the two governments are now squabbling over the amount.
Coal 76%
Note: Average for three years from 2002-03 and 2004-05 Source: Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
investment was proposed in the cement and minerals sector alone.28 The state is home to a number of big industrial names. Hindustan Copper Limited (HCL), a company of the Aditya Birla Group, operates captive mines in Malanjkhand; these are the largest copper mines in the country, mining about 50 per cent of the countrys copper reserves. Jindutta Minerals Pvt Ltd, Associated Cement Company Ltd, Grasim Industries Ltd, Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd and Khajuraho Minerals are other major industries in MP.
LAND AND FORESTS: UNDER SIEGE

Naturally, large-scale environmental degradation and social disruption has accompanied this industrialisation. Land degradation has been particularly extensive in regions like Panna (diamond mines) and the Amarkantak forests (bauxite mines). MP also has a challenge in the form of abandoned mines: according to the IBM, the state has the highest number of abandoned mines in the country 145 (the figure, though, is unreliable as it does not account for mines of coal and minor minerals).29 The Wasteland Atlas of India of 2003 says that in MP, 12,148 ha of land has turned into wasteland because of mining. Katni has the maximum area categorised as these wastelands: about 22 per cent of the total mining wasteland in the state.30 Katni also has the second highest number of mine leases, 250, and occupies the second highest lease area.31 The state has a forest area of 7.6 million ha.32 Of this, about 10,058 ha was diverted for mining between 1980 and 2004.33 This accounts for 11 per cent of the total forest land diverted for mining countrywide.34 Illegal mining on forest land is also rampant. In a bid to increase revenues from mining, the state government has been trying to denotify forest land. In 2004, the then state mining minister L K Sharma told journalists that since most illegal mining was happening on plots allotted in forest areas, the
government planned to bring them under revenue limits35 thus legalising the illegal and allowing mining in forests. Back in 1997, the MP government wanted the Union government to make changes in the MMDR Act of 1957 to facilitate a system under which mineral-bearing areas could be advertised and concessions granted irrespective of the extent of the area involved.36 How serious the government is about issues of mining in forest areas is evident from the discussions and decisions that took place at the meetings of the state wildlife board in November 2005. The board made recommendations to denotify the central part of the Son Gharial Sanctuary in Sidhi district. It also cleared the proposals for the construction of the Bagad-Dhavaiya lift irrigation project inside the sanctuary. Besides, the meeting approved renewal of diamond mine leases in proposed forest villages of Panna.37 In another decision, the board agreed to further alter the boundary of the Chambal sanctuary for development needs. It recommended that areas of sand mining and villages should be left out of the sanctuarys limits and approved laying of 765 kilovolt power supply lines of the Power Grid Corporation within the sanctuary.38 This, when forest officials warned that the move would further endanger the freshwater dolphins of Chambal, which are already on the verge of extinction: the power supply lines will interfere with their ability to communicate with other dolphins through sound waves.39 Member of the Wildlife Board and principal investigator of the Panna Tiger Reserve, Raghunandan Singh Chundawat, said: It appeared the
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SHAYAMAL / CSE
government is determined to carry on reckless mining and promote eco-tourism at any cost. He also said that there were efforts to denotify some more protected areas in the state.40 The powerful illegal mining mafia is the biggest threat to forests in the state. In fact, in 2002, the state had to take the help of the Special Armed Forces (SAF) to protect the forests in Ghatigaon and Son bird sanctuary from marauding illegal miners.41 In another case, the people of Bara village in Shankarpur area of the state filed a petition in the Gwalior bench of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court to put a stop to illegal mining and crushing of granite in their village. The village was being polluted by the mining activities. Asthma cases were increasing due to dust from the crushers. Cracks had developed in houses in the village due to blasting.42 The court gave a stay order. In the same case in 2005, the High Court ordered shutting down of mining in another 262 villages inside the districts forest area.43 That the political brass is very much involved in denuding the states forests is evident from the fact that a committee appointed
Amarkantak endangered
Bauxite mining is devastating the hills and forests, and also important watersheds
The two mountain ranges, Vindhyas and Satpuras, meet at Amarkantak in Shahdol district. The Amarkantak mountains are the source for three major rivers in the region the Narmada, Johilla and Son. However, indiscriminate bauxite mining is destroying the forests and endangering the water resources. There are deposits of an estimated five MT of bauxite below the Amarkantak peak, being mined by the Hindustan Aluminium Company (HINDALCO) and the Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO). In 2003, about 2,00,000 tonne of bauxite was mined from the Amarkantak mines. The mining has also impacted the primate population of the biodiverse forests in the area.
The official encroacher

Coal company denudes forests despite court injunctions
Western Coalfield Limited (WCL), a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, has been encroaching on forest land, despite court orders in 1996 to the state government to check violations of the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 (FCA). By June 1999, eight cases of violation of the Act had been registered against WCL, which had encroached upon about 1,349 ha in Pathakheda in Betul district. These encroachments were for setting up poles for electrification for the projects, for running illegal mines, and for constructing offices and houses. But the district forest officer was authorised only in 1999 to investigate and prosecute the violators. Underground mining in Chhattarpur and Betul forests has been continuing since 1992 without approval. But cases were registered against this only in 1998.
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by the Supreme Court (SC) concluded that the state rural industries and animal husbandry minister in 2002, K P Singh, was involved in illegal mining in the forests of Shivpuri. The committee had been set up in 2001 after Santosh Bharti, an activist from Damoh district, filed a case in the SC in 2000. In his petition, he had alleged that the mines run by Singh were originally allotted to poor tribals and scheduled caste youths.44 These leases were taken over by influential people like Singh against a power of attorney.45 The committee had also found the local forest officials responsible for violations of the FCA.46 Illegal mining and quarrying was occupying an area of more than 3,000 ha inside the reserved and protected forests in the district at that time.47 In 1980, when the FCA came into being, numerous mines in Shivpuri were closed down, rendering thousands jobless. When the people protested, the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) opened 15 out of the 20 mines that had been closed down. A suggestion made at the time, that the sanctioned mining and quarrying be given to cooperative societies formed by poorer sections of the society, was agreed upon conditionally. Says Bhartis petition: If conditions of MoEF clearance had been fulfilled, the entire benefit worth hundreds of crore would have gone to the state as well as thousands of poor mining labourers. But the state government has deliberately failed to implement these conditions to protect the interests of the well organised illegal mining mafia operating in Shivpuri district. The petition also points out: The extent of illegal mining can be ascertained from the fact that Babulal Vanshkar, who has a mining lease for 3.72 ha, paid a royalty of more than Rs 60 lakh. He is barely able to have two meals a day. Similarly, Acchelal Adivasi paid a royalty of more than Rs 35.55 lakh for an area of 4.90 ha. He too can barely make his ends meet. In contrast, the state mining corporation, which has a lease of over 73.50 ha, paid Rs 12.32 lakh as royalty.48
The flashpoints
THE PARADOX OF PANNA
Panna district in MP ranks 41st out of the 45 districts in terms of human development index calculated by the Madhya Pradesh Human Development Report of 2002. It is amongst the five poorest districts in the state in terms of income. Ironically, Panna is also the lone diamond-producing district of the country. One doesnt have to dig too deep to find diamonds here. Any piece of rock could be bearing the precious stone.49 A significant portion of the mining is done in the unorganised sector which is also the only source of livelihood for many people in the district. Despite that, labourers do not get more than Rs 15,000 for a stone worth Rs 2 lakh, says Arun Singh, a journalist in Panna, in a report in the news magazine The Week.50 What does thrive in Panna is illegal mining. Only 20 per cent of the mining in Panna happens on revenue land. The rest is done illegally in forest areas. The reason: revenue land is costlier and it is far easier to break the laws and mine inside the forests.51 While licenses were given for 1,339 shallow mines, over 3,000 illegal mines flourish in the district, which mine about 16,000 carats of diamond. Of this, only 335 carats were deposited at the government diamond office in 2005. Local miners and traders say that over 90 per cent of the diamonds mined in the areas 24 villages are sold illegally or smuggled out of Panna to polishing units in Mumbai and Surat. A majority, 84,000 carats, is excavated by the NMDC in its Majhgaon kimberlite pipe.52 The diamonds mined by individuals are supposed to be deposited at the diamond office of the district. They are auctioned four times a year. The amount, after deducting the royalty and the
Diamonds or the tiger?

Diamond mining, legal and illegal, is impacting the Panna Tiger Reserve
According to the Wildlife Protection Society of India, tailings from the NMDC-run diamond mine in Majhgaon are being dumped into the stream that joins the Ken river which in turn goes inside the Panna Tiger Reserve. The noise from the blasting operations disturbs the wildlife and the solid waste is dumped outside the gates of the reserve. The Majhgaon mines, located just outside the reserve, were closed in 2005 by the pollution control board on directions from the Supreme Court. After renewal of lease in 1995, the mines were operating without any environmental clearance. With the lease ending on July 14, 2005, and allegations of encroachment inside the Gangau National Park, the mines were closed down.1 Illegal mining inside the Panna Tiger Reserve had turned it into a fragmented island habitat. The tiger population had reduced to a vulnerable two-three tigers per 100 sq km.The NMDC has approached the court to reopen the mines and the final hearing is awaited.2 Though sandstone mining inside the reserve has also been
stopped, but till 2005 there were reports of sandstone being mined in the buffer area of the reserve. Forests in Shikarpura, Magarpura, Nadarpura, Sigra, Jhanjhar and Devri have almost 200-250 functional sandstone mines. More threats to the reserve are emerging. The Union government plans to make a dam and two power stations across the Ken river and a railway line through the forests to link Khajuraho to Satna. Also, the district planning committee is keen on denotifying a portion of the former Gangau sanctuary to probably restart mining and agriculture. Also, the Ken-Betwa river link proposes to divert surplus waters of the river Ken at Daudhan (2.5 km upstream of existing Gangau weir) through a Ken-Betwa link canal to river Betwa for meeting water requirements in the water-deficit Betwa basin. Chief conservator of forests and field director of Panna Tiger Reserve, Shahbaz Ahmad, said in a news report published by The Hindu Business Line that the proposed development projects would reduce forest cover and cut into the Panna Tiger Reserve. The government is expected to denotify parts of the national park to accommodate the development projects.
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YUSUF BEG
Diamonds are forever: but Pannas ecology might not be. The lure of diamonds has led to large-scale migration and rampant illegal mining
taxes, is given to the finder. But the process is so complicated and time-consuming that no one wants to deposit the diamonds with the diamond office. If one has deposited a diamond just after an auction, the finder has to wait for three months for the stone to be sold and the proceeds to be given to him. To pay back the money the individual has borrowed to unearth the stone, he has to take loans from moneylenders at high interest rates. To run a mine for a year, one needs to invest anything between Rs 25,000 to Rs 1 lakh, whereas the average produce from a mine is two carats. Hence, people prefer selling the stone in the black market though at throwaway prices.53 The states diamond department says that lack of support and cooperation from the forest department and the police have led to the increase in illegal mining in the district. It says that the department is not adequately staffed to monitor all the leases given out in a year.
But the department itself is also to blame for the state of affairs. It is certain that a nexus does exist between administrators and diamond traders. In the past few years, a syndicate has been operating at the auctions at the diamond office. For instance, if a 10-carat stone is valued at Rs 10 lakh by the office, no trader bids more than Rs 6 lakh for it. The stone remains unsold and the process is repeated at the next auction three months later. After a wait of six months, the finder allows the office to sell the diamond at Rs 6 lakh. Later, the traders get together and bid for the same stone. If the same stone is bought for Rs 10.5 lakh, the difference is split amongst the bidders.54 As a consequence of all this, illegal mining has struck deep
Nothing holy about this

The ancient Bharat Mata temple is in trouble
The Bharat Mata temple at the Majhgaon village in Panna is the oldest temple in the region and is now threatened with the diamond mines of the National Mineral Development Corporation. Located above the main quarry, the brick and concrete temple may be destroyed due to extensive mining. Use of explosives has already disturbed its foundations. Meanwhile, project officials perceive the devotees as a threat to the mining operations. There are two roads that lead to the temple, one of which goes through the mines. Visitors who take this route are frisked. The officials say that any piece of rock could be a diamond and it is difficult to stop anyone from whisking one away.
Daku tax
Dacoit gangs make a killing
In Panna district, daku (dacoit) tax plagues illegal diamond miners. Dacoits extort money from them for protecting them against other miscreants as well as the police. The police doesnt dare enter the forest when mining is going on. Gangs have also starting squabbling amongst themselves for the tax. If one gang asks for Rs 1 lakh, the other gang gives a discount of Rs 20,000.Its like a gang war, says Khurshid Khan, in-charge of Brijpur police station.
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roots in the district and the state. It is evident at Khinna ghats, Harra Chauki, Khajri Kudaraiya and Ranibaj areas in Panna. On entering the forests along the river in these areas, one can spot the illegal mines and labourers working in them. They dig the earth, sieve it and then pick out diamonds from it. In Brijpur, a number of dacoit groups are also running illegal mines of diamond and sandstone. This has affected the ancient paintings found on rocks inside the forests. In Nachnegarh in Guner tehsil of the district, the pre-Gupta period Chaturmukh temple, the 500-year-old Rupni temple, the Jain religious site of Shriyansgiri and other archaeological sites are also threatened by the rampant mining.55 Kilkila river, the lifeline of Panna town, has also been affected. News reports allege that mining leases have been given out for the riverbed itself. A case regarding this was filed by environmentalist and resident Rajesh Dikshit in the Jabalpur High Court in 2005.56
SAND MINING IN GHARIAL TERRITORY

Sand mining in MP thrives under official patronage. The state government has been making efforts to seek permission from the SC to allow sand mining in parts of the 435-km stretch of the National Chambal Sanctuary (NCS) (see Map 2: Sand for miners). The sanctuary is a breeding ground for gharials. The state wildlife board had recommended that a 10-km portion near the Piprai mines be kept out of sand mining as it was an ideal place for breeding. In Piprai village, there is an official sanction to sand mining. During renotification of the sanctuary in 1983, Piprai village, though within the range, was left out. The revenue department of
the district promptly leased out about 108 ha for sand mining. Since 2001, a case filed by Madhya Pradeshs forest department to include Piprai village in the protected area has been pending before the Madhya Pradesh High Courts Gwalior bench. The district administration gives contracts for sand mining amounting to around Rs 8 crore every year. But operations have spread to 50 other villages, illegally. Forest officers in Morena allege that the annual turnover from illicit sand mining is more than Rs 20 crore and involves powerful mafias. The operations begin in November/December and continue till the monsoons start, usually till June/July next year. Gharials lay eggs in March/April and many of them are crushed underneath the miners tractors, which are estimated to number 500. Experts and even wildlife officials reason that matters could have been different had Chambal been declared a protected area after giving due consideration to local peoples needs. They say that the authorities could have done well to have adhered to the Guidelines for Wetland Management notified by the Union government in 1992. The document offers a good roadmap for wetland conservation, with the support of local people. Many also accept that given the drought conditions, people have no option but to turn to sand mining. Officials in NCS are today examining whether sand mining can be done sustainably. This is despite the fact that in 2006, forest minister Himmat Kothari admitted in the legislative assembly that 63 cases of illegal sand mining had been registered and 56 trucks were seized between March 2006 and July 2006.57
MAP 2: Sand for miners

Sand mining hotspots in the National Chambal Sanctuary
Pinahat
Usedghat Dholpur Sir Miutra Rajghat Etawah Tigri Rithora Morena Bhind Batesura Sabalgarh Rahu ka gaon Panchnada Gwalior
Ya m un a
Ater Barhi Chakarnagar Bhareh
Ch
am
ba
ri
er
riv er
Baroli
Sand mining affected area
Rameshwar
Source: Kirtiman Awasthi 2006, Croc cant go on, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, November 30
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AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Signs of the times: MP suffers from the depredations of illegal mining (of sand as above), as well as lawful mining (as in Singrauli)
SINGRAULIS BURDEN
Another flashpoint of mining-induced environmental depredation in MP is Singrauli. The countrys thickest coal seam, 135 metres thick, lies in the Singrauli coalfields, in Sidhi district of MP and Sonbhadra district of Uttar Pradesh. Spread over an area of 220,200 ha, most of the mines here are owned by Northern Coalfields Limited (NCL).58 The Singrauli coal project started in the 1960s. It included development of nine open-cast coal mines, six coal-fired thermal power plants, ash dykes and transmission lines in MP. Today, there are 11 coal mines and six thermal power plants across both the states.59 The projects association with the World Bank started in 1977; the Bank invested US $120 million. The major beneficiaries were the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Coal India Limited (CIL).60 This region was once known for its natural and forest wealth. It was home to the famous white tiger; the Kaimur mountain range here was once known for its rich biodiversity. The district has a sizeable number of tribals about 30 per cent of the total population.61 The predominant tribes in the region are the Khairwar, Dhangar, Kol, Baiga, Gond, Dharkar, Panika, Agaria, Kevat and Baiswar. There are about 400 villages just in and around Singrauli. One of the most critical issues surrounding the project, therefore, was mass displacement. According to one report, more than 200,000
people were displaced due to the project.62 Reports by the Centre for International Environmental Law based in the US puts the number of displacement much higher 300,000 people.63 These people primarily lived on subsistence agriculture; cattle rearing was an integral part of the local economy. The displacement and the ensuing pollution reduced the cattle population and hence, a major source of income. In 1997, villagers in Singrauli backed by activist Madhu Kohli filed complaints with the World Bank about inadequate resettlement and rehabilitation. Police and heavy equipment were sent in to forcibly evict the villagers near the Vindhyachal ash dike. A World Bank inspection revealed that project authorities and police gave only one days time to the people to move, that too in the middle of the rainy season. The agitationists were beaten up by the police when they refused to move.64 One elderly widow was physically restrained as her house was bulldozed despite her objections. Villagers say that these abuses have been routine for the last 35 years since the Rihand dam came up in the 1960s. Under pressure from civil society, the World Bank assigned Electricite de France (EDF) to do an environmental impact assessment. The US $4.9 million study reported that two-thirds of the project-affected people and half of those impacted by mining were still jobless. Less than 20 per cent jobs had been given to the locals, who were in dire straits having been removed from their lands, they had no livelihood opportunities left. The altered land use had led to a food deficit in the region.65
218
The study also concluded that the drinking water sources had been contaminated. Groundwater and the water in the Rihand reservoir had been polluted with high levels of mercury, fluorine, chromium and other trace metals. The EDF report said that Singraulis thermal power plants release about 720 kg of mercury every year.66 This, the CPCB says, is 17 per cent of the total mercury emissions in the country.67 A 2003 report by Delhi-based NGO Toxics Link says that Singrauli accounts for 0.3 per cent of the total global and 10 per cent of the total Indian carbon dioxide emissions.68 The Indian Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow, conducted clinical tests on 1,200 people in Singrauli area in 2003 for the presence of mercury. Samples of blood, hair, food and water were taken.69 The levels of mercury in blood were found to be significantly high. More than 66 per cent of the population had more than five nanogram/ml of mercury in their blood. More than 47 per cent had mercury more than one microgramme per milligramme (g/mg). Out of 100 vegetable samples, 23 per cent had mercury levels higher than the permissible limit. Mercury levels were significantly higher in food crops. Six out of 40 water samples had high traces of mercury. In milk, more than 86 per cent samples had high mercury levels.70 With high dust pollution, 50 per cent of the population of the region suffers from lung diseases. Mercury and its compounds such as methylmercury are neurotoxins which leave children, in particular, very vulnerable. They can lead to memory loss, impaired coordination and vision disturbance. There is also
a suggested link to cardiovascular problems. They can also affect the thyroid gland, the digestive system, the liver and skin.71 The source of this mercury, flyash, is a significant problem in Singrauli. The coal-burning power plants release about six MT of flyash a year, making land unfit for cultivation. In parts of Singrauli, the flyash lies in piles five feet thick. It consists of fine particles (including calcium, sulphate, silicon and magnesium), along with toxic trace elements such as mercury, lead, arsenic, selenium, and cadmium. These heavy metals can leach into groundwater and soil, cause acid rain, and affect human health through inhalation. The health effects range from permanent respiratory disorders, aggravation of ailments like asthma, bronchitis, and even lung cancer due to prolonged inhalation of flyash. Silica in flyash can cause silicosis.72 The coal mines, the thermal power plants and the associated industrial developments have ensured that Singrauli is one of the most polluted places in the country. And it will remain so. The future does not bode well for MPs mineral heavy districts. Despite the breaking away of Chhattisgarh, the significance of mining and minerals in the state remains high though the sectors contribution to the states economy is not much. The mineral industry is likely to grow as MP has received a large number of proposals for coal mining. Prodded by the political classes and aided by the illegal mining mafia, mining is sensitive and protected areas is all set to acquire gargantuan proportions especially because the state and its official machinery show no signs of waking up to the imminent devastation.
PRADEEP SAHA / CSE
Rehabilitation has been a sore point for the people displaced to make way for the Singrauli project
219
The north-east
orth-east India, comprising of the seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, is characterised by rich biodiversity, heavy precipitation and high seismicity. Ideally suited, on one hand, to produce a whole range of plantation crops, spices, fruits and vegetables and flowers and herbs, the region also holds reserves of oil, natural gas, coal and limestone (see Table 1: Mineral wealth in the hills). So far, the regions production of minerals and generation of wealth from mineral extraction has not been substantial (see Table 2: Mineral production value). Together, the seven states contribute just above five per cent to the total value of minerals produced in India.1 Of this, the major share comes from Assam and Meghalaya, which contribute above four per cent and one per cent, respectively.2 Assam contributes 4.1 per cent and Meghalaya 1.1 per cent to the total value of fuel minerals extracted in India both the states
TABLE 1: Mineral wealth in the hills

Oil, natural gas, coal and limestone are the key minerals
State Arunachal Pradesh Important minerals Petroleum (Ningru and Dam Duma), limestone (Lohit), dolomite (Kameng), graphite (Lohit, Subansiri), copper ore, gold and pyrites Coal (United Mikirs, North Cachar Hills, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur), petroleum and natural gas (Digboi, Lakhimpur, Sibsagar), limestone (Lakhimpur, United Mikirs, North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong, Nagao and Sibsagar), magnetite, quartzite, kaolin, sillimanite Asbestos, chromite, copper ore, coal, iron ore, lignite, limestone, nickel ore, and petroleum Cement-grade limestone (East Khasi hills, West Garo hills, Jaintia hills), flux and chemical-grade limestone (Khasi and Jaintia hills), sillimanite (Sonapahar, West Khasi hills), coal (Mikir hills, Khasi hills, Garo hills and Jaintia hills), uranium Lignite, sandstone and pyrites
have large coal reserves.3 The share of the north-east in the production of metallic as well as non-metallic minerals in the country is negligible. The region also accounts for a very small portion of the total area under mining leases for instance, Assam with 1,294 ha under mining leases (for metallic and non-metallic minerals) accounts for just 0.21 per cent of the total area under leases in India.4 Meghalayas share, where 4,177 ha is under leases, is another 0.67 per cent.5 A variety of reasons make mineral exploitation in this region a complex process, with very high environmental and social impacts. Given the topography of the region, any exploitation of mineral wealth here will have a direct impact on the forest resources and local ecology (see Map: Minerals and forests). A case in point is the blasting of the Chandardinga hills in Assams Dhubri district: though the mining involved just five ha, the sheer ecological fragility of the region made the project highly controversial (see Box on page 222: A rocky issue). Another case is of limestone mining destroying Meghalayas famous Jurassic Age cave systems (see Box on page 222: Meghalayas lost treasure). Even limited mining in these fragile areas have destroyed the traditional social fabric of the region. Displacement, the key challenge, is an issue here (see Box on page 222: A story of three villages); so are the deplorable working conditions, lack of mining regulations and unscientific mine management practices.
TABLE 2: Mineral production value

Barring Assam and Meghalaya, the other states of the region have limited mining
Value of mineral production in 2004-05 (in Rs 000) Arunachal Pradesh Assam Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram 4,08,133 30,999,446 2,866 7,963,014 8,847 1,774 8,95,534 750,181,419 Percentage contribution
Assam
Manipur
0.0544 4.1323 0.0004 1.0615 0.0012 0.0002 0.1194
Meghalaya
Mizoram Nagaland
Nagaland Coal (Nazira coalfield, Mon district), limestone (Phek), nickeliferous chromite (Tuensang) Oil and natural gas, glass sand, plastic clay, shale and sand Tripura India
Tripura
220
MINING IN THE STATES: THE NORTH-EAST

The regions topography ensures that no mining can happen without cutting forests
Protests: Have been against uranium, limestone, coal and stone quarries TIBET
Upper Subansiri West Siang
East Siang
Dibang Valley
ARUNACHAL PRADESH
Dib ang
Lower Subansiri
ri nsi ba Su
Lohit
Lohit
ra
ut
Kameng
West Kameng
im
BHUTAN
Sanko sh
Papum Pare
pu
Br
ah
Tawang
East Kameng
e Dh
ji ma
r Dib
ap
ug
arh
Tinsukia
Changlang
Sib ha t
sag
La
ar
Tirap
o Am
kh
Sonitpur
Manas
kch
Nalbari
Darrang
un
Mo
Jor
aon
Bo
Wo k
Dhubri Goalpara
Kamrup Ri Bhoi
ills st Ea aro H G
NAGALAND
Phek
Karbi Anglong
Dimapur
ro H
West Khasi Hills
ills
Kohima
We st
M E G H A L AYA
South Garo Hills
East Khasi Hills
Jaintia Hills
North Cachar Hills
Senapati
Ga
glo
Cachar
Tam
Bara k
ng
Zu
nh
Marigaon
Golag hat
Ukhrul
eb
Barpeta
Br
ha
oto
WEST BENGAL
ng
Kokrajhar
ah
ap
Nagaon
Karbi Anglong
aig
Mo
ut
ra
ASSAM
Tu e
MYANMAR
ns an g
ko
en
pil Ko
Imphal East Imphal West Thoubal
Karimgan
BANGLADESH
Hailakand
Bishnupur
Open forests Dense forests State boundary River

We st
Dhalai
MANIPUR
Kolasib
Churachandpur
Chromite Copper Gold Magnesite
So Tri uth pu ra
MIZORAM
Serchhip
Lunglei
Coal/lignite Uranium Dolomite Graphite Limestone

lai ngt Law
Saiha
Champhai
Tri p
Mamit
Aizw
TRIPURA
ura
Nor
r ripu th T
Chandel
al
221
A rocky issue
Biodiversity-rich Chandardinga hills is threatened by mining
In 1996, the Assam government allowed Rock Product Traders to blast in the Chandardinga hills to supply rocks to Bangladesh. Chandardinga hills is a reserve forest covering 284 ha, and blasting was allowed in five ha. Situated on the northern banks of the Brahmaputra river in Dhubri district of Assam, the forest holds valuable trees and medicinal plants. Besides, wildlife including barking deer, leopard and porcupine are found in the area. The hill also controls the hydrological regime of the Brahmaputra, one of the most erosive rivers in the world.
Environmental activists opposed the project there was a fear that the blasting could change the course of the river causing environmental degradation, besides monetary losses. The hill protects the huge low-lying areas of Bilasipara sub-division of Dhubri from inundation. The blasting could cause siltation of the river, leading to serious flood problems in nearby areas. Activists also felt that blasting could adversely affect river dolphins living in the Brahmaputra. Appropriate Technology Mission, an Assam-based NGO, filed a public interest case against the blasting in the Guwahati High Court. Subsequently, the High Court stayed the licence to Rock Product Traders for removal of rocks from Chandardinga. However, the Assam government has decided to continue the controversial project.
Meghalayas lost treasure

Mining will devastate the states cave systems
Meghalaya is home to one of the longest cave systems in the subcontinent. The Meghalaya Adventure Association (MAA), which maps ancient and unique caves, has identified 970 caves in the state. The list includes Krem Kotsati-Umlawan in Lumshnong in the Jaintia Hills district. At more than 21 km, this is the longest natural cave system in India. The breathtaking caves also have a river and a 11-metre high waterfall. Rampant limestone quarrying has destroyed this natural treasure. Most of the caves are already obliterated; one cave system the Krem Puja at Nongtrai village near Cherrapunji has been destroyed by Lafarge, a French company mining limestone to feed its cement plant in Bangladesh. Ironically, Kotsati-Umlawan was slated to be turned into a major tourism destination under the Union governments plans for the development of the north-east region. The famous caves could have attracted global tourism and helped local livelihoods, instead of being sacrificed to feed the cement industry.
Raymond R Kharmujai, Down To Earth, New Delhi
A story of three villages

Coal mining has transformed the land of the Tangsa Nagas. Waste dumps, land subsidence and displacement have become characteristic features of the place
For decades, the Tangsa Naga tribe had been living in the villages No 1, No 2 and No 3 Mallowgaon in the forests of the Patkai range in Upper Assam. In the 1800s, coal deposits were discovered in the Tikok range in Tinsukhia district of Assam, and mining was initiated in 1882 by the Assam Railways & Trading Company. The coal mines, called Makuna coalfields (consisting of five underground and three open cast mines), were taken over by Coal India Limited (CIL) in 1975. Decades of mining have transformed this area. Enormous and ugly dome-like dumps of soil mixed with coal predominate the landscape. Two of the villages No 1 and No 2 Mallowgaon were severely affected by the excessive land subsidence due to the pressure of these dumps and the use of heavy machinery and explosives. Protests by the tribals forced CIL to relocate them on the banks of the Namdung river. CIL is now considering taking over the village No 3 Mallowgaon. The company has discovered coal deposits in the jhum fields of the village and the threat of renewed mining is looming large. Private companies have already started open cast mining in the area. It is clear that rehabilitation and compensation are not the answers. CILs rehabilitation efforts have been nothing but a whitewash. When it relocated the earlier villages, CIL had offered a meagre package of Rs 10,000 per family. Rehabilitation of tribals has to be handled very carefully. Most tribals do not own private land; they practise jhum cultivation on common public land. This often creates barriers in ensuring that they receive proper compensation. Neither is employment an option. CIL has not been hiring in the region since the past 15 years. Moreover, the villagers are not qualified for the jobs offered by the sector. Till date, only three people out of the 35 families living on Tikok mountains have been absorbed as casual labourers at a rate of Rs 1,000-1,500 per month.
Ratna Bharali Talukdar, CSE media fellow, Guwahati
KREM LUBON / YVO WEIDMAN
Indias longest cave, wiped out by limestone quarrying
222
BLACK FUTURES: JAINTIA HILLS, MEGHALAYA

Mining in Meghalaya started with one Captain Lister, a British political agent, who first worked out coal in the Khasi Hills in 1840. Coal mining took quick roots in the state: the proximity here of the coal deposits to the ground makes extraction cost-effective and rewarding. The coal can be mined easily by the rat-hole method, which requires neither modern technology nor trained personnel. All it involves is selecting a site and chopping the trees on it; a 20-50 metre pit is then dug till the coal seam is reached. The overburden is removed from the pit and dumped on adjacent land. There has been an alarming increase in air and water pollution due to unscientific coal mining in Meghalaya, once known for its natural beauty and pollution-free atmosphere. A study by the Meghalaya Pollution Control Board (MPCB) reveals that private coal mining in Jaintia hills is gradually destroying the environment.6 Coal mining is changing the physical structure of the land, spoiling soil quality, threatening the biota and affecting human life. Since overburden is removed from the pits unscientifically, the most fertile humus layer gets dumped at the bottom and gravel and coal particles come up on the exposed surface. The mine spoil also becomes toxic with heavy metal ions, making the survival of any kind of life impossible.7 During monsoons, the water that accumulates in the pits turns highly acidic and toxic.8 This, along with the run-off from mine spoils, poisons drinking water sources and enters agricultural fields, playing havoc with
crop yields. The environmental deterioration due to coal mining is directly proportional to the rate of extraction. MPCBs report says that due to an increase in air pollution levels, the weather has become unusually warm in the coal belt of the state.9 Coal is mined along a highway in Bapung, Lad-rymbai and Klehriat in the Jaintia hills. It has been often noticed that commuters block their noses to avoid inhaling the dust and polluted air. Unscientific mining is gradually destroying the forests, and leading to soil erosion. An MPCB study on water supply in the region concluded that both surface and groundwater in the coal belt contained high proportions of sulphuric acid and other hazardous chemicals.10 The Jaintia hill coal deposits are known for high concentration of sulphide minerals. The study by the state pollution control board also examined the air pollution levels. The report says that the average concentration of suspended particulate matter, sulphur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen in the coal belt locality are 200, 6.5 and 25.5 micro gram per cubic metre or g/Nm3 respectively.11 Air pollution is also due to coal storages, which have affected not only the miners but also people living nearby. Doctors at the Bapung and Klehriat public health centres say that a majority of their patients suffer from asthma, severe cough and other respiratory tract ailments. The unorganised mines are also some of the most unsafe in the country. Accidents and deaths among the workers, mostly daily wage labourers, are common; cases involving collapse of mine roofs go largely unreported.
P MADHAVAN
The landscape of Meghalaya is dotted with deep pits like this one. These are not monitored by regulatory authorities, and neither do they contribute to the states economy
223
P MADHAVAN
Working conditions in rat-hole coal mines in Meghalaya, which are under community control, are pathetic. Most accidents go unreported
224
The states negligence towards regulating mining has also boosted extraction. Since most coal deposits are small, isolated and worked by private operators, the government prefers to stand aside, deeming it uneconomical to invest in organised and scientific mining. As a result, landholders start coal mining as a cottage industry, taking it for granted that mining is a customary right independent of environmental obligations.
ASSAMS TINSUKIA...
The breathtaking green cover that once existed throughout some of Assams hill ranges including the Patkai, Tirap and Tikok hills in Tinsukia district has become a thing of the past. Mining for Assams black gold, coal, has taken a heavy toll. The Patkai hills, for instance, houses rich coal deposits and for decades, the North Eastern Coalfields Limited (NECL) has been at work here. Today, running almost parallel to the natural hills, are hills created by years of dumping of mining wastes. Open-cast mines run by the NECL over the past century have been producing waste rock at a stripping ratio of 1:14 which means that for every tonne of useful mineral extracted, 14 tonne of waste material is generated.12 The entire Patkai valley bears witness to the impact of coal mining. On one hand, the forest cover has been devastated; on the other, paddy fields around the Patkai ranges have been destroyed because groundwater sources have become polluted and acidic discharges have found their way into the fields. A layer of coal lines the paddy fields, and crop yields have fallen. The Tirap and Tikok hills too are sites of large-scale mining for coal. They are also home to several rivers, many of which are being contaminated increasingly due to mining. In Ledo, for instance, the Kecha nadi receives water from the underground Lachit collieries and also from the Tirap open cast mines through an artificial drain in the Itakhola area. Water from the Kecha finally traces its way to the Brahmaputra. In Ledo, the river is not only a source of water but also of pollution. Whenever the river water enters paddy fields, the crops start decaying; their leaves turn yellow and brown. Acid mine drainage (AMD) from coal mining is one of the most challenging environmental problems in the north-east (the only
region in the country which produces high-sulphur coal). Trace metals and other weatherable minerals are leached from the coal and associated strata during mining operations in the form of AMD, and adversely affect the water quality of the region. The Indian School of Mines conducted a study in 1987 to assess this problem in the collieries of Makum and Jeypore coalfields run by the NECL.13 In the study, mine water samples were collected from various dumps of Ledo (Tirap), Bangolai, Jeypore and Tipong collieries. It was found that rock formations in NECL mines are unconsolidated and highly permeable, causing water leakage. Before mining, rocks above the coal are saturated with rain and groundwater. As mining progresses, the overlying rock gets fractured and groundwater starts to drain through it. The water discharges are highly acidic, and ultimately find their way to nearby ravines and rivers (see Table 3: Acid woes). Chemical analysis of mine water samples shows that the water from the coalfields are severally polluted. Considerable changes happen in the pH from neutral to highly acidic as the water flows over the mines. The pH survey in conjunction with acidity and sulphate data shows that severe acidic conditions exist at the Ledo (Tirap) and Jeypore colliery areas, while mild acidic conditions prevail in the Baragolai and Tipong colliery areas.14 At low pH levels, the toxic heavy metals become more soluble; they enter into the solution as a result of secondary reactions between iron sulphates, sulphuric acid and the compounds in nearby clays, sandstones, limestones and sulphides as well as various organic substances in mine drainages or streams. This explains the existence of a host of toxic metals including calcium, chromium, mercury, lead, and arsenic in mine drainages and in streams in which they are discharged (see Table 4: Toxic woes). The trace metal levels exceed the drinking water standards stipulated by various international organisations. Mine management is supposed to treat the acidic wastewater referred to as gas-paani by the locals with lime, but people claim this rarely happens; the water is released untreated into open drains nearby. When it reaches the paddy fields in the vicinity, this highly acidic water damages the fertility of the soil, sometimes beyond repair. It has also harmed plankton and underwater fauna.
TABLE 3: Acid woes

Water discharges from the mines are highly acidic
Mine Flow in rainy season (in gpm) 800 200 300-400 200 400-500 Flow in winter season (in gpm) 200 50-100 200 50-100 100-200 pH
TABLE 4: Toxic woes

Mine discharges contain very high levels of heavy metals
Waterwater discharge from Ledo mines pH Cadmium (in ppb) Chromium (in ppb) Lead (in ppb) Mercury (in ppb) Arsenic (in ppb) 3.61 7.4 455 4846 119 226 Stream water sample downstream of Ledo mines 3.28 0.5 73 1098 14.5 60.1
Ledo (Tirap)
New Mine M&P Dip Baragolai Tipong Jeypore
2.7 3.1 4.2 4.0 2.4
Note: gpm = gallons per minute Source: Gurdeep Singh, 1987, Mine water quality deterioration due to acid mine discharge, International Journal of Mine Water, Volume 6, No. 1, Hungary
Source: Pollution Monitoring Lab, 2007, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
225
...AND THE STONE QUARRIES

The Kaziranga National Park (KNP), a prime habitat for species like the elephant, the Indian one-horned rhinoceros and the tiger, is threatened by stone quarrying. In January 2006, the Assam government sanctioned stone quarrying at Mikir Chang, located some nine km from the park. There was a furore over this move, since it came in the wake of protests over the adverse impacts of stone quarrying in Behora in Golaghat district. The MoEF eventually stepped in and stayed the sanction, saying that it went against an earlier order passed by the ministry in 1996, declaring a 15-km radius around the KNP as a no-development zone.15 However, stone quarrying in the area is not an isolated incident. There are eight major and 12 small stone quarries located along the foothills of Karbi Anglong and Golaghat districts all along strategic elephant corridors south of the KNP; this area is a part of the Kaziranga-Karbi Anglong Elephant Reserve.16 The pattern of elephant movement has been affected lately, and the maximum disturbance has been observed on the southern part of the Park where quarrying activities are presently taking place. Earlier, most stone quarries were operated manually. Now, some of them have been leased out to big extraction companies, which use blasting devices and heavy machinery and flout all environmental norms. Moreover, quarrying at these sites is illegal as they are located less than two km from the park.17 The quarrying has also led to massive siltation in the streams coming down from the southern hills. Some of the streams have been clogged and many have dried up, affecting the neighbouring agricultural fields. Besides Kaziranga, Assam has to contend with rapacious stone miners in other parts of the state as well. The lower Assam hill sector has huge deposits of granite, and is one of major producers of rocks in the country. Stone factories abound in Dhubri, Goalpara and Bongaigaon districts of the state. Silicon dust, which hovers like a toxic mist on these quarries, results in slow and painful death of workers, while leaving many more struggling to survive. Silicosis and tuberculosis are common according to some estimates, 85 per cent of the labour working for 7-13 years has tuberculosis or silicotuberculosis.18 Silicosis is found even in casual labourers. Government statistics are predictably at odds with this estimate not a single case of silicosis or any other occupational disease has ever been reported officially. Labour laws are next to non-existent; working conditions are primitive. Child labour is rampant. Flagrant violations of safety regulations have led to accidents and deaths; many of the factories have not bothered to provide even the basic safety facilities to their workers. Most of the work is done manually with the help of heavy hammers, chisels, and other primitive tools. Heavy slabs of stone often fall on workers, resulting in serious injuries. The mines operate in very congested areas; laws have been regularly distorted and exploited in granting leases for small mines. Illegal mining, sometimes coordinated by organised criminal groups, is rampant. Since hardly any mine owner leaves 15 metres of open space between two mines as directed by law sometimes one mine lies just below the other.19 Stones from one mine can roll down to another, causing serious injuries to workers.
DOMIASIAT: URANIUM BATTLEGROUND

Uranium reserves of nine MT have been discovered in Domiasiat village in the West Khasi Hills of Meghalaya, and the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) is trying hard to access them. Local residents, politicians and activist groups, however, have been steadfastly resisting its attempts to execute a Rs 450-crore project in the area. The pilot project was planned in 1992, but massive public protests in 1996 forced UCIL to withdraw. The project has been strongly opposed by most NGOs of Meghalaya due to the apprehension of radiation-related health hazards. These include the Khasi Students Union (KSU), the Hynniewtrep Environment Status Preservation Organisation (HESPO) and the Meghalaya Peoples Human Rights Council (MPHRC). Almost a decade of lobbying with the state government and the local communities has not won the reserves for UCIL. Every time we turn up at Domiasiat, people chase us away calling us agents of death, says a senior officer of the company. UCIL has been exploring at West Khasi Hills for three decades, but has not done any study on what impact uranium mines would have on the environment. Meghalayas uranium deposits have now become crucial to Indias nuclear programme because the mines in Jharkhands Jaduguda town the sole source so far are running out of reserves. UCIL is, therefore, dangling major incentives to get a toehold in the area. But residents of Domiasiat and Wahkaliar villages have formed village action committees to resist the company. Students, welfare organisations and opposition parties in the state have joined hands to form the Khasi Jaintia Environment Protection Council (KJEPC) to support them. KJEPC convener P B M Basaiawmoit complains that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is going ahead with exploration and mining of uranium in Meghalaya despite strong opposition from the local people.20 Uranium mining in the state has been given a clean chit by a high-level team led by Atomic Energy Commission chairperson R Chidambaram.21 But the tribals are determined to stop further exploration and mining by the DAE. The protest is fast turning into a mammoth peoples movement. The frightful consequences of uranium mining have already manifested themselves in Domiasiat. About 21 families near the Domiasiat mining site are showing symptoms of radiation exposure, claims Basaiawmoit. He admits, though, that medical investigations have not yet been conducted. The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) the nodal body that governs the district as provided for by the Constitutions Sixth Schedule, and also owns the land in question has decided to withdraw its temporary clearance to UCIL for survey and exploration of the area. But ironically, UCIL can override local opinion if the Union government invokes the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The sandstone type uranium deposit at Domiasiat will be cheaper to extract because it is closer to the surface. UCIL estimates that Domiasiat has about 10,000 tonne of uranium ore, spread over 10 sq km. In April-May 2003, UCIL had conducted a geophysical survey in Domiasiat after it received permission from the district council.22 After over a decade, the company resumed investigations and
226
IAN UMEDA
Awaiting doomsday? UCILs plan to mine uranium in Domiasiat threatens the picturesque valley
drilling of uranium deposits in Meghalaya: this time, it negotiated with individual residents. But the protests have continued in various forms rallies, strikes, etc. The three NGOs organised a protest march through the streets of Shillong on the occasion of World Anti-Uranium Day on April 26, 2004.23 A strike supported by KSU was held on October 5, 2004.24 On March 21, 2005, all the organisations protesting against the uranium project have come together to launch the Coordination Committee against Uranium Mining (CCAUM).25 The organisation comprises of 11 groups including the KSU, MPHRC, Western Youth Welfare Organisation (WYWO), NADO, NAIDO, and Lai Lyngdoh Welfare Organisation (LYWO). The CCAUM decided to launch the movement in the entire Khasi and Jaintia hills by organising a public rally at Nongstoin on April 6, 2005.26 On April 12, 2005, some of the organisations erected a gate at Domiasiat to check unauthorised entry into the area.27 Landowner Spillity Lyngdoh Langrin said that the gate was constructed as a symbol of the peoples protest against the proposed uranium mining project. The project has its supporters too. On November 9, 2004, the Langrin War-San Lyngdoh Development Organisation (LWLDO) held a rally at Wahkaji village near Domiasiat to welcome the project.28 The rally was attended by Rangbah Shnongs and Sirdars (headmen) of villages. UCILs Domiasiat proposal received a boost when the highlevel team, which visited Jaduguda in Jharkhand, virtually gave its seal of approval allaying fears of ill-effects. The KHADC chief executive member Prestone Tynsong said the team did not witness any ill-effects of mining on human life, vegetations or animals there.29 In addition to this, another nod for the project was received from the results of the medical survey conducted in
Phangdilion village on December 13, 2005.30 The medical team refuted the claims made by NGOs that the health of the people was getting affected due to the waste left after uranium exploration. At least 376 people, including 169 males and 207 females in the age group of new borns to 80 years, underwent check-ups in the health camp. The team checking them certified that there was no apparent effect of radiation on the general health of the people residing around the mining areas. The team checked patients from Pyndemsynia, Ryngkhiat, Nongmawmluh, Mawt-hemlang and Rangblang, all adjacent to the uranium mining areas. The report, however, said that the medical team could not cover Domiasiat village on the same day as the area was not easily accessible. Another report by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) ruled out any impact on health by radiation due to proposed mining.31 The BARC report indicated that at the estimated dose of 0.02 milli-sievert per year in public domain in the immediate vicinity attributable to the mining operation, no undesirable health impact is expected. This was informed by the states mining and geology minister to the state assembly during question hour on June 27, 2006.32 On April 11, 2006, the KHADC passed a recommendation in favour of the project to the Meghalaya chief minister.33 In fact, the KHADC even served a legal notice on the president of the Hill State Peoples Democratic Party for its misinformation propaganda and malicious campaign against the project. The struggle by anti-mining group and locals in the state continues against UCIL. The public hearing of the project was recently held on June 12, 2007, and was marked by protests. The fate of the project now hangs in balance with most feeling that UCIL will get the green signal even after 10 years of fierce battle by the locals.
227
Orissa
ore than two-thirds of Orissa is made up of hilly forests: the state accounts for seven per cent of Indias forests.1 It also has a 480-km coastline and 11 per cent of Indias surface water resources.2 It is a mineral hotspot as well accounting for 24 per cent of Indias reserves of coal, 17 per cent of its iron ore, 98 per cent of chromite, 51 per cent of bauxite, and 35 per cent of manganese (see Map 1: Minerals and forests and Graph 1: The reserves). Orissa also holds a key position as a mineral producer. It leads the country in the production of iron ore with a share of 28 per cent.3 In 2004-05, the state also accounted for 41 per cent of Indias total production of bauxite, 99 per cent of its chromite, 29 per cent of dolomite, 46 per cent of pyroxenite, 37 per cent of manganese and 41 per cent of quartzite (see Table 1: Mineral production).4 It is, therefore, not surprising that industries are flocking to set up base in the state. The Hindu Business Line (July 24, 2006) reports that the state has received private investment worth Rs 4,00,000 crore in mineral-based industries.5 It boasts the presence of all the big names in Indian industry TISCO, SAIL, NALCO and Hindalco, among others. Several multinationals and leaders in the mining sector (Pohang Iron & Steel Company, Arcelor Mittal,
Rio Tinto and ALCAN) have already acquired mining leases here or are in the process of doing so. According to the Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, the South African diamond giant, De Beers, has also acquired rights to explore over 8,500 sq km in the state.6 What is this mining and industrialisation doing to Orissa? The states environment has already been severely compromised and threatened by it; the real danger is that mining is likely to intensify in the coming years. Biswajit Mohanty, secretary, Wildlife Society of Orissa, and a keen observer of the way Orissa is opening its doors to mining, said in an interview to The Hindu Business Line (June 7, 2006): The industrialisation boom will result in massive environmental degradation since the local environment has a limited carrying capacity to absorb and assimilate effluents and wastes produced from such gigantic production facilities. A case in point is the steel industry. Aggressively promoting investments, Orissa has planned to hike its annual steel production to 56 MT, which shall require about 2,250 MT of iron ore over the next 25 years; currently, the state produces only about two MT of steel.7 The additional steel-making capacity shall require at
GRAPH 1: The reserves

Biodiversity-rich Orissa holds substantial mineral reserves

Iron ore is the fastest growing mineral sector
Mineral Unit 000 tonne Tonne Tonne 000 tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne 000 t Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne Tonne 2002-03 52,229 48,61,208 30,49,410 22,077 6,24,426 11,07,082 46,014 52,228 3,065 7,640 2,274 27,129 2,17,233 10,332 19,000 2,007 2003-04 60,049 49,34,508 28,92,379 31,288 6,07,387 13,39,889 55,718 33,412 3,177 11,341 2,233 41,178 1,98,375 19,409 18,000 2,554 2004-05 66,080 47,48,111 36,28,207 40,567 8,71,113 12,69,056 93,872 40,992 8,005 13,129 2,198 39,235 2,09,224 37,801 19,000 6,318
Dolomite
12
Coal Bauxite
Graphite
77
Chromite
95
Nickel
Iron ore Manganese ore
Mineral sand
32
Dolomite Fireclay Graphite*

98
Manganese
35
Chromite
Kaolin
Bauxite 51
Sillimanite Limestone Pyrophyllite
Coal
24
Iron ore 0
17 20 40 60 80 100
Pyroxenite Quartzite Silica sand Steatite
Percentage of national resource
Sources: Based on analysis from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur; Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, pp 130 (for mineral sand, nickel, graphite and dolomite)
Note: *Run of mine: The mineral as it comes from the mine prior to screening or any other treatment Source: Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-64
228
MINING IN THE STATES: ORISSA
MAP 1: Minerals and forests

Between 1980 and 2005, about 15,386 ha of forest land was diverted for mining in Orissa
So ut hK J H A R K H A N D oe l
Ib
Open forests
W
rn ar
ES
Su ba
Dense forests River Bauxite Chromite Iron Lead

Hasdo
BE
a M
nd
NG
ek ha
AL
Sank
Sundargarh
lang bab Bur
Manganese Coal/lignite Dolomite Graphite
Mayurbhanj
Jha rsu g a ud
Hirakund Reservoir
Baleshwar Deogarh Keonjhargarh
l Sa
Granite
Palri
Sambalpur Bargarh
Br ah an m
di an
t Bat
Kaolin Limestone Mica
ara
ni
Ong
Jajpur Sonapur Angul Dhenkanal
Bhadrak
ad
Bauda Balangir
Sondu
an
ma
ha
ah
na
di
Ken
par dra
Nua pad
Cuttack Nayagarh Jagatsinghpur Khorda Phulbani Kalahandi

ka La ke
In dr
Tel
Ru
sh
Nabarangapur
Nar ang
iku
Rayagada
lya
Ch
ili
Puri
Bao rdhi ng
B AY O F B E N G A L
Bansh adhara
Ganjam Gajapati
i
Nagav
Indravati
ali
Koraput
ri ba Sa
Balimela Reservoir
Jalaput Reservoir
Malkangiri
er u
Sil
P N D H R A
S H
Sa
rad a
Protests: The resistance has been against all types of mines, from iron ore to chromite
229
least 527 million cubic metre of freshwater annually, which will be drawn from major rivers such as the Mahanadi, Brahmani and Baitarani.8 The result: massive environmental loss and contamination, most of which the state is already experiencing. Forests have been ravaged, and landscapes altered. Water sources are drying up or are severely polluted, and air pollution is rising. Large-scale displacement and losses in traditional livelihoods have inevitably accompanied the environmental setbacks. And as a result of all this, conflicts and tensions across the state are on the boil. Local communities are up in arms over the state cosying up to industrial interests in blatant disregard of their rights and welfare.
PLENTY...
Though Orissa does not have a separate mineral policy, it recognises the mineral industry as a potential thrust area within the industrial policy. As indicated above, to promote the industry, the state is offering sops like timely implementation of projects, single window and fast track clearance, and special incentives for projects with investment of over Rs 30 crore.9 The states policy also talks of land bank schemes under which government land will be identified by the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa (IDCO) and earmarked for industries. Any projects in districts like Kalahandi, Nuapada, Bolangir, Sonepur, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati and Deogarh will be given an interest subsidy of five per cent of the term loan as an incentive for backward area development. Orissa is the second highest contributor to the total value generated by the minerals sector in India: according to the IBM, it
accounted for 10 per cent (Rs 5,820 crore) of the total mineral value in 2004-05.10 The strength of the state has been its metallic minerals in 2004-05, it was responsible for 36 per cent of the total value of metallic minerals, the highest in the country.11 The states mineral industry has certainly come a long way. The sector registered a jump of almost three times from 1997-98, when the value of mineral resources generated was Rs 2,237 crore.12 Analysis of the growth pattern of the industry shows that growth was sluggish in the initial period, but picked up after 2001-02. Between 1997-98 and 2001-02, the percentage of growth ranged around six per cent. After 2002-03, the mineral industry boomed in the state and the value of mineral production grew by, on an average, 27 per cent per year (see Graph 2: Trends in value of mineral production). Coal and iron ore are the two most important minerals for the state in terms of value: in 2004-05, coal accounted for 46 per cent of the total mineral value generated, while iron ore contributed 35 per cent (see Graph 3: Value generation the key minerals). The other important minerals were chromite (12 per cent) and bauxite (two per cent). According to the IBM, the state also produced minor minerals worth an estimated Rs 45 crore. Despite this growing significance of minerals in Orissas economy, the contribution of mining to the states GDP in 2003-04 was only 6.6 per cent much lower than the 33 per cent contributed by agricultural and allied activities.13 This contribution had increased very marginally from six per cent in 2000-01, according to the Bhubaneshwar-based Directorate of Economics and Statistics this, as the IBM points out, when the value of mineral production had increased almost two-fold in the same period.14 This can only mean that though the mineral industry in the state
GRAPH 2: Trends in value of mineral production

The industry has boomed: after 2001-02, average growth rate was 27 per cent
70000
GRAPH 3: Value generation the key minerals

Coal and iron account for more than 80 per cent of value
Others 1%
Vaue of mineral production (in Rs million)
60000
58204
50000 47315 40000 34432 26897 23794 28417 20000 22374 23832 Iron ore 35% Coal 46%
30000
10000 Minor minerals 1%

2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 1999-00
1998-99
1997-98
2000-01
2004-05
Manganese 2% Limestone 1% Chromite 12% Bauxite 2%
Years
Source: Based on data collected from Indian Minerals Yearbooks 1997 to 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Source: Analysed from data published in anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-64
230
TABLE 2: Minings share in revenues

Almost unchanged, though the industry is booming
Year Mineral royalty (is Rs crore) Total revenue receipt (is Rs crore) Royalty as percentage of total revenue receipt 5.2 5.8 5.6
GRAPH 4: Minerals and royalty

Royalty from coal accounts for almost two-thirds of the total
Manganese 1% Minor minerals 6% Other major minerals 1%
Iron ore 11% Bauxite 5% Limestone 2% Dolomite 1%
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
440.6 547.2 663.6
8,438.77 9,440.24 11,850.19
Sources: Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November; anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December
Chromite 5%
Coal/lignite 68%
is growing, there are other sectors such as agriculture which are doing better; in fact, the contribution of agriculture to the states GDP went up from 31 per cent in 2000-01 to 33 per cent in 200304, says the Directorate of Economics and Statistics.15 In 2004-05, the Orissa government collected Rs 664 crore as revenue from mining. Compared to other mineral-rich states such as Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, Orissa surprisingly collects lower royalty, though the state generates the second highest mineral value in the country. One plausible explanation is that as coal has a higher royalty than other minerals. Therefore, the states, such as Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, that lead in fuel mineral production are the ones collecting higher royalties. As with the trends in mineral value, the royalty collected by the state has increased after 2001-02, points out the steel and mines department of the Orissa government. But minings contribution to the total revenue generated by the Orissa government has been just about five-six per cent in the years between 2002-03
Note: This is an average of three years (2002-03 to 2004-05) of contribution of royalty from different minerals Source: Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
and 2004-05 (see Table 2: Minings share in revenues). The government has tried in vain to increase its revenue from the minerals sector by bringing in new legislations to tax mineral production (see Box: A failed attempt). The major minerals have been the mainstay of the states mining revenues, accounting for, on an average, 94 per cent of the total royalty collected by the state. Minor minerals contribute the remaining six per cent. Among the various major minerals, coal, is a key contributor to the royalty, accounting for, on an average, 69 per cent (see Graph 4: Minerals and royalty). The other important contributions to the state exchequer came from iron ore (11 per cent), bauxite and chromite (five per cent each).
A failed attempt
The states efforts to bolster revenues from mining fall flat
In 2005, the Orissa government tried for the fourth time to levy a tax on mineral-bearing lands with reference to minerals extracted and sold in the state. But the move was struck down by the Orissa High Court (HC) on December 5, 2005. Companies like NALCO, Mahanadi Coalfields, TISCO, Tata Refractories, Jindal Steel and Power and Eastern Zone Mining Association were the petitioners. The government had proposed to implement the Orissa Rural Infrastructure and Socio-economic Development Act (ORISED), 2004 to mobilise Rs 1,500 crore through a cess on mining tax. The government proposed to use the tax for developing infrastructure in mining areas. However, the Court repealed the Act, indicating that it was constitutionally invalid. In a state vs Centre conflict, the HC had to take a decision on whether the state has the legislative competence to levy tax on minerals, since the Central government already
levies a similar tax. The bench felt the tax was being levied on the value of the minerals extracted, and did not bear a direct relationship with land as a unit. Since it was not a tax on land according to the state list, it was rejected. Since May 25, 2005, the Orissa government had imposed a tax on the value of mineral-bearing land. The tax varied from five per cent to 20 per cent and was levied on minerals like coal, iron ore, chromite, manganese ore, bauxite, limestone, dolomite, fireclay, china clay, graphite and gemstone-bearing mines. The HC order provided relief to mine owners who had been paying the tax. The state government has now been ordered to return the amount to the mine owners. Other legislations in Orissa had tried to levy similar taxes, all of which were repealed by the Supreme Court (SC). These include the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 and the Orissa Cess Act, 1962. The state would now appeal the HC order in the SC.
Padmaparna Ghosh, Down To Earth, New Delhi
231
GRAPH 5: Area under mining

Area is going down, while number of mines is increasing this shows that smaller mines are being phased in
640 630
Number of mines
GRAPH 6: The key districts

Small iron ore mines dominate in Keonjhar and Sundergarh
Mayurbhanj 5%
108 106 104
Area under mining (in '000 ha)
Koraput 6% Jharsuguda 9%
Jajpur 5%
620 102 610 600 590 580 570 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 100 98 96 94 92 90
Others 13%
Angul 10%
Sundergarh 20%
Keonjhar 32%
Number of mines
Area under mining
Note: This does not include land used for extracting minor minerals Source: Indian Minerals Yearbooks and other publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Source: A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)
Small is big: the landscape of districts like Keonjhar and Sundergarh is dotted with small-sized iron ore mines
Mining of different minerals, including coal, is currently being undertaken on 99,952 ha of land in the state.16 In 2005, there were 605 mining leases in Orissa; however, 45 per cent of these leases were not operational.17 According to A Aruna Murthys 2006 Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, only 303 mine leases (55 per cent) covering an area of 72,077 ha and amounting to 72 per cent of the total area, were operational. In the years between 1995 and 1998, the total area under mining in the state had followed the same trends as the total number of mines. However, after 1997-98, while the area under mining has progressively gone down, the number of mining leases has gone up. The explanation for this could be that in recent years, more leases are being granted to smaller mines (see Graph 5: Area under mining). Overall, according to the IBM, the area under mining (excluding coal and minor minerals) has actually reduced from 0.105 million ha in 1995-96 to 95,531 ha in 2002-03. In fact, three of the top seven mining districts of Orissa Keonjhar, Sundergarh and Mayurbhanj along with Jajpur, are dominated by smaller-sized mines. Almost one-third (32 per cent) of the land under mining is in Keonjhar, followed by Sundergarh with 20 per cent (see Graph 6: The key districts). Average land sizes per mining lease in these four districts are 154 ha in Sundargarh, 117 ha in Mayurbhanj, 216 ha in Jajpur, and 263 ha in Keonjhar.18 All the four districts also hold large deposits of iron ore. Clearly, to meet the growing demand of iron ore from China, the Orissa government has resorted to leasing out large numbers of smallersized mines: districts like Keonjhar, which are in a deplorable state today due to extensive mining by small players, have borne the impact. Small mines are largely unregulated. Of the remaining three top mining districts of Angul, Koraput and Jharsuguda, the first two have bigger-sized mines, with average land holdings of 601 ha per mine and 787 ha per mine respectively.19 The reason: Angul has large coal mines
232
Bauxite bonanza
Orissa opens its bauxite wealth to the world... and impoverishes its land and people further
In Orissa, bauxite the principal raw material for making aluminium is becoming synonymous with big business. Widely used in construction, as packaging material and for making automobile and aircraft bodies, global aluminium consumption has increased from 32 MT in 2005 to 35 MT in 2006. It is expected to grow at similar levels in 2007, spurred largely on by Chinese demand. At the same time, environmental regulations and a costly, power-intensive production process have led to scaling down to aluminium production in the West. In India, however and especially in Orissa matters are different. Orissa holds more than half of Indias bauxite reserves, and is rapidly becoming a hub for industries based on bauxite all thanks to, besides its rich reserves, low operating costs and its proximity to ports. Foreign investors like the Sterlite group, Biliton and ALCAN are making a beeline to the state. According to an estimate by the Orissa government, the bauxite reserves in the state are worth Rs 5 lakh crore. The key bauxite zones in the state include the districts of Koraput, Sundergarh, Kalahandi (Lanjigarh), Bolangir and Rayagada (Kashipur). The state already has top producers in the aluminium sector such as NALCO and INDAL. Both these companies are planning to expand their operations: NALCO is increasing its capacity from 2,88,000 tonne per annum (TPA) to 3,45,000 TPA while INDAL is expanding from 65,000 to 100,000 TPA. ALCAN, a Canadian company, had formed a consortium with the Aditya Birla group for setting up a bauxite mine and refinery in Kashipur block. This refinery is 100 per cent export-oriented with a production capacity of three MT per year. Vedanta Alumina Ltd of the Sterlite group has commissioned a 1.4-MT alumina plant at Lanjigarh at a cost of nearly US $800 million. The company will be mining for bauxite over 680 ha of the pristine Niyamgiri forests.
The losers in this hunt for the bonanza have been the tribals inhabiting these bauxite-rich lands. Since most of the resources are located in forest and tribal areas, the onslaught by the aluminium companies has impacted the forests and the tribal populations the most. The project-affected people of NALCOs plant in Damanjodi are still struggling for a proper resettlement package. The people of Kashipur have been fighting Utkal Aluminas plans to mine bauxite in the Baphlimali hills the battle has been going on for more than 10 years and the project is yet to receive an environmental clearance. Recently, ALCAN announced its withdrawal from this project. Vedantas ambitions have hit a similar roadblock, with locals opposing its plans of mining in the Niyamgiri hills, considered sacred by the tribals. They fear that mining will destroy the fragile ecology of Kalahandi, dry up the water streams and ruin their livelihoods. But in spite of opposition by and criticism from experts and the civil society, the company has managed to get the final nod from the Union ministry of environment and forests. Refineries are water-intensive. It is estimated that the UAIL project alone would require 19,000-26,000 cubic metre of water every day, enough to meet the requirement of four lakh people.1 This can only be met through the diversion of local streams and rivers, which is bound to affect water availability for local use and crop irrigation. The quality of rivers and streams are also likely to be affected by run-off from mines and wastewater discharges from the plants. Disposal of the red mud and flyash would require large tracts of land. Emissions of greenhouse gases, dust, SOx and NOx into the air are also an issue. On top of this, more people would be displaced and a majority of these would be tribals with no clear land rights and therefore, no eligibility for rehabilitation and compensation. In most regions, it has been found that the condition of tribals worsens after the initiation of a project. The Orissa government, of course, is unconcerned and is going all out to market its bauxite reserves.
GRAPH 7: Mining leases the spread

Iron ore mines occupy the largest area
Limestone & dolomite 6% Bauxite 6% Chromite 7% Others 16% Iron & manganese 15% Manganese 6% Fireclay 4%
Coal 18%
Iron 22%
Source: A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa)
while Koraput is dominated by bauxite mines. Orissas bauxite reserves, in fact, are becoming a major bone of contention (see Box: Bauxite bonanza). Out of the 605 mining leases, the maximum number has been granted for graphite ore mines (114), followed by iron ore (75) and quartz (72).20 However, in terms of area, iron ore mines account for 22 per cent, coal for 18 per cent and iron and manganese for 15 per cent of the total mining area in the state (see Graph 7: Mining leases the spread). Bauxite and coal mines have larger land holdings per mine compared to iron ore, which is dominated by medium- and small-sized mines. The biggest mining company in Orissa is the state-owned Orissa Mining Corporation (OMC), which holds almost 20 per cent of the total land under mining.21 The second biggest is the Mining Corporation Limited with leases covering 17 per cent of the land under mining.22 According to the Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, two steel companies, SAIL and TISCO, are the other important mining leaseholders, accounting for six per cent each.23
233
...AMIDST GROWING POVERTY

For all its mineral wealth, Orissa performs very poorly in terms of human development indicators. The state has a human development index (HDI) of 0.404; in comparison, Keralas HDI stands at 0.638.24 This is worse than other mineral-rich states of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Rajasthan. Taking into account food availability, food access, and food absorption, Orissa has been put in the category of severely food insecure regions. Even the government agrees that the food insecurity is due to a vulnerable rural population with poor livelihood access. According to the states Human Development Report, the relative per capita income of Orissa has declined vis--vis all other low-income states during the second half of the 1990s precisely the period when the state went on an industrial overdrive. According to this report, Orissas per capita income was threefourths that of the all-India average, and became half by the end of the 1990s. Except Jajpur and Angul, most of the heavily mined districts of Orissa are tribal dominated a trend which can be seen all over the country. In Sundergarh, Koraput and Mayurbhanj, tribals account for more then 50 per cent of the population, while in Keonjhar, more than 44 per cent of the population is from the tribal community (see Table 3: The mining districts human development indicators). Influx of outsiders due to large-scale mining in Angul and Jajpur has made their tribals a minority in their own land. According to the states Human Development Report, the poverty ratio (number of people below the poverty line divided by the total population) in the southern and northern regions in the state which include mining districts like Koraput, Sundergarh, Keonjhar, Angul and Mayurbhanj has increased between 1993-94 and 1999-00. This is despite an overall decreasing trend in the poverty ratio in the whole of Orissa. An estimated 75 per cent of the states poor live in these southern and northern regions.
In Keonjhar, the most mined district of the state, 62 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. In Koraput, the bauxite capital of India, the figure is higher at 79 per cent. Sundergarh performs a little better with 37 per cent of its population under the poverty line. Tribals and dalit families face the brunt of poverty they constitute 44-82 per cent of the total number of below the poverty line families in the most mined districts. However, the performance of some of these districts in HDI within the state is good. Jharsuguda ranks number two, Sundergarh is number four and Angul occupies the sixth position in HDI. The reason for the high ranking of Angul and Jharsuguda is because these are coal-rich districts. The coal mines in the state are under the public sector which generates a far greater number of employment opportunities compared to the private sector. This is the reason why the per capita income of these districts is higher than in the rest of the state. On the other hand, Jajpur, Keonjhar and Koraput are at the bottom of the pack, with HDI ranks of 22, 24 and 27 respectively (out of the total of 30 districts in the state) in all these districts mining is in the hands of the private sector. All the mineral-rich districts are in the list of the 150 most backward districts of the country. It is obvious that minings wealth has not reached the people in these districts. Keonjhar ranks 30 in the list of the most backward districts. Others are even worse Sundergarh is at number 18, and Koraput at number 10. Among the mineral-rich districts, Jajpur does relatively better with a ranking of 136. Koraputs ranking among the backward districts is reflected by the poor education levels: just over 36 per cent of the population in the district is literate. The literacy rate in Keonjhar is around 60 per cent, while Sundergarh and Angul have rates of 65 and 69 per cent, respectively. The per capita income in the mineral-rich districts is the lowest in Jajpur just Rs 4,468. The coal-rich districts show a better
TABLE 3: The mining districts human development indicators

A large majority of the states mineral districts count among the most backward districts in India
District Tribal population (as percentage of total) Ranking among 150 backward districts Human Development Index Literacy rate Per capita income (Rs) 1997-98 (in 1993-94 prices) Percentage of population below poverty line NA 61.92 36.48 NA 78.65 NA 68.42 48.01 Crude birth rate1
Jajpur Keonjhar Sundergarh Angul Koraput Jharsuguda Mayurbhanj Orissa
7.4 44.52 50.74 11.68 50.67 31.88 57.87 23
136 30 18 106 10 67 15 90%*
22/30 24/30 4/30 6/30 27/30 2/30 9/30
72.19 59.75 65.22 69.4 36.2 71.47 52.43 50.97
4,468 5,286 6,823 10,877 5,148 11,210 4,297
29.2 32.3 29.3 31 34.3 27.90 33.3
Note: 1Crude birth rate is the number of births per 1,000 population. * 27 out of 30 districts are in the backward list Source: Anon, 2004, Some measures of human development an inter-district analysis, Human Development Report 2004, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 194
234
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Life in the fast lane: industrialisation has failed to bring prosperity to the states population
performance: average per capita income in Angul is Rs 10,877, while it is Rs 11,210 in Jharsuguda. This is substantially higher than the per capita income in other mining districts. Overall, statistics indicate that the income from mineral extraction rarely benefits the regions from where these minerals come in fact, poverty is increasing in many of these districts. Some districts have gained probably because of higher employment provided by coal mining, but even this has not resulted in overall food security, livelihood access, or better health indicators.
TABLE 4: Orissa forests coexist with mining

Keonjhar, the most-mined district, has 39 per cent of its area under forests
Orissa Mineral Area under mining (ha) Percentage of area under forest cover in the district (%) 9.04 38.97 41.44 41.66 17.68 13.89 38.44
Jajpur Keonjhar Sundergarh Angul Koraput Jharsuguda Mayurbhanj
Chromite Iron ore and manganese Iron ore Coal Bauxite Coal Iron ore
4,543.2 31,255.5 20,017.2 10,230.5 6,297.3 8,865.5 5,391.6
LAND AND FORESTS: IN A MAKEOVER MODE

One of the most severe impacts of mining has been the changes it has brought to Orissas land use patterns and concurrently, its landscape. As in all other states, the land taken for mining in Orissa has either been forest land, agricultural fields or common (grazing) land. Forests have especially borne the brunt of mining. While the mining and minerals industry occupies just 0.64 per cent of the total geographical area in Orissa25, the devastation it has wrought has been immense largely because most of the mineral deposits are in regions with forest cover. Nearly 39 per cent of the land area in Keonjhar is forested (see Table 4: Orissa forests coexist with minerals); the district is extremely rich in iron ore and
Source: Data on area under mining and number of mines from A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa); forest statistics from anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, pp 88
235
AGNIMIRH BASU
Around 73 per cent of Orissas abandoned mines are orphaned the promoter has excavated the mineral and left behind piles of waste as high as this one
236
TABLE 5: Mining and land use

Within 15 years of mining, forest land has reduced to half its original size in Joda and Keonjhar Sadar blocks
Land use changes in Joda block Land use Habitat Agriculture Forest Wasteland Mining Area during 1989 (in ha) 1,466.27 22,128.61 36,191.82 8,294.82 1,646.41 Land use changes in Keonjhar Sadar block Habitat Agriculture Forest Wasteland Mining Water body 2,822.02 36,282.00 12,837.99 4,177.00 755.54 1,089.64 3,642.86 35,452.14 7,576.63 6,280.43 77.76 1,054.10 Area during 2004 (in ha) 1,644.45 21,520.57 24,501.17 18,540.86 2,807.11
Source: Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, World Bank, pp 48
under wasteland has increased by 124 per cent in Joda, while in Sadar block it has gone up by 50 per cent. According to a paper presented by Ranjan Panda, senior researcher and in-charge of Manav Adhikar Samiti, Sambalpur, in an article published by the Society for Study of Peace and Conflict, a public research organisation based in Delhi, in its publication Opinion/Analysis, agricultural land is shrinking in mining and industrial districts like Rayagada and Jharsuguda. In Rayagada, unproductive land is nearly 174 per cent higher than cultivable land. Such lands amount to as high as two-thirds of Jharsugudas total cultivable area.29 But the Orissa government does not seem to be bothered by land degradation. It is, in fact, working hard to fast track forest diversion. One example of the fast-tracking of forest clearances (with generous help from the Centre) for a project is that of POSCO, the South Korean steel giant which wants to set up a steel plant in the state. Since its announcement in 2005, the project has hit several roadblocks from villagers protests and confusion over land rights to the companys inability to secure a mine lease. But the impasse is now being reviewed directly by the prime ministers office to expedite the 12-MT plant. Recently, the Central government asked the Orissa government to clear more forest land for setting up the long-delayed steel plant. The state had asked to submit a plan of action by April 30, 2007. However, Orissa chief secretary A K Tripathi points out that a forest diversion clearance will have to be first approved by the MoEF. To compensate for the raz-
manganese. In Sundergarh and Angul, also heavily mined (Sundergarh is rich in iron ore, and Angul is a coal mining hub), the figures on forest cover are even higher: approximately 42 per cent. In Mayurbhanj, 38 per cent of the district is forested, while the figures for Koraput and Jharsuguda are around 18 and 14 per cent, respectively. According to the estimates of the states department of forests and environment, 31,780 ha of forest land was diverted in Orissa for different projects, including mining, between 1980 and 2005. Mining alone accounted for half of the forest land diverted in the state around 15,386 ha.26 The state also has the dubious distinction of clearing the maximum amount of forest land for mining in the entire country: of total forest land cleared for mining in India, Orissa accounts for 17 per cent.27 Between 2002 and 2005, the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) received 51 proposals for mining in forest areas in the state. Out of this, 35 were approved, four rejected, and eight returned to the state for want of complete information.28 Recent years have seen a spate of projects getting forest clearance. In fact, the impact of diversion of forest land for mining in Keonjhar was documented in a study conducted by the World Bank in 2005. It found that in the Joda and Keonjhar Sadar mining blocks of Keonjhar district, for instance, the area under wasteland and mining has gone up (see Table 5: Mining and land use). In both cases, the biggest casualty has been forest land. In Joda, the area under forests has gone down by almost 50 per cent, while in Sadar, it has reduced by 70 per cent. The land under agriculture also shows a dip in both the cases. At the same time, the area
SHYAMAL / CSE
237
Saving a hill
The story of Gandhamardan
The biodiversity-rich Gandhamardan reserve forest, with an area of around 300 sq km, is situated on the borders of Sambalpur, Bolangir and Kalahandi districts. There are two ancient temples here Nrusinghanath and Harishankar situated near two perennial streams, the waters of which are believed to be sacred. Gandhamardans water resources, with over 800 small perennial springs and many more rain-fed ones, supply water through 63 small streams to 17 large streams joining two rivers, the Ong and Suktel, tributaries of the Maa Nadi (or Mother River). A partial vegetation survey of the slopes conducted by the Botanical Survey of India many years ago, recorded a diversity of 2,700 flowering plants, 125 medicinal plants and 220 species of other important plants. Local and forest department sources claim that a rich variety of fauna also exists, including tiger, leopard, sloth bear, palm civet, jungle cat, wild dog, various primate species and bats. The forest has no human habitation, but is surrounded by the villages and towns of Jharbandh, Paikmal, Padmapur and Gaisilet blocks of Sambalpur in the north-east, Naupara block of Kalahandi in the west, and Khaprakhole and Patnagarh blocks of Bolangir in the south.
The sentinel of Gandhamardan: the temple of the hills presiding deity would have been destroyed by mining something which the people could not accept
More than 200 villages, with a population of around one lakh, are directly dependent on the forest. In 1971, a government gazette notification revealed that a large amount of easily exploitable quality bauxite was stored in the Gandhamardan hill. The public sector Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) applied to the Orissa government for a mining lease over 3,584 ha in the area in mid-1976. In 1981, the Orissa government notified that 36 sq km of the Gandhamardan reserve forest was reserved for exploitation of bauxite for the public sector and a lease was hurriedly sanctioned. In May 1983, when the foundation stone for the mine was laid by the then chief minister, the people held a demonstration and his vehicle was stoned. Until mid-1985, there was an apparent lull, during which BALCO went on erecting the infrastructure while activists collected information and organised the people. Villagers, who had initially welcomed BALCO, began to see the early signs of destruction with the building of roads, railways, ropeways and a water supply reservoir, and started asking questions. Some people filed a public interest case in the Orissa High Court. By August 1986, the Gandhamardan Surakshya Yuva Parishad (GSYP) had been formed with active participation of local youth. In village-level meetings and workshops, the GSYP discussed issues like deforestation, microclimate variation, silting of streams, dust pollution and the entry of frightened wild animals into villages because of blasting. The movement gathered momentum through rallies, slogans and signature campaigns, which resulted in direct action like relay hunger pickets on the BALCO road to prevent vehicles going to the mining sites, and boycotts by labourers. People from 40 villages organised a relay protest: villagers, including women and children, from each village came and blocked the road every day. Administrative harassment began; about 1,300 people, more than half of them women, were either arrested or dragged to court. BALCO authorities, of course, maintained that they would not harm the ecosystem and would be cutting very little forest. However, the protestors were not in a mood to listen. In early 1986, a group of intellectuals from Orissa living in Delhi organised the Gandhamardan Protection Committee and collected signatures to make an appeal to the then prime minister. Some action groups like the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and the Institute for the Study of Society and Culture visited the area and reported against the project. The Union ministry of environment and forests stated in a press release in September 1986 that permission for test mining and to deforest the hills would not be given under the Forest Conservation Act. On the other hand, the ministry of mines tried hard to push the project by setting up an expert committee which stated that the impacts of the mines would be manageable. The people, however, refused to relent: their slogan wasBeat us on our backs, but not on our bellies. The strong protest movement completely stalled the mining activities of the company and the project was shelved (though BALCO claimed to have invested Rs 30 crore in it). But Gandhamardan still remains endangered: the Orissa Mining Corporation now owns the mine lease and may enter into alliance with some mining companies.
A B Mishra, The fight for survival, CSE, New Delhi
238
PATRIK OSKARSSON
ing of forests, the state government will have to provide alternative land to the forest department and pay an equal amount of money for its value and for reforestation, Tripathi says. Destruction of forest land has a direct bearing on wildlife. The elephant population in the state has seen a decline from 1,841 in 2002 to a little over 1,600 in 2005.30 In Talcher (Angul district), elephants were displaced by the coal mining activities of Coal India in the early 1970s. In Sundergarh, mining and the development of the Rourkela Steel Town affected elephants and other wildlife. Elephant habitats and corridors have also been severely impacted in both north and south Keonjhar. The situation in Keonjhar is particularly alarming, as elephant population has come down drastically: according to reports, only about 150 elephants are left in the district and they have no outlet route towards the Satkosia and Similipal ranges (see Box: No place for elephants). The proposed extraction of bauxite from the eco-fragile areas of Niyamgiri, Gandhamardan and Karlapat wildlife sanctuary is likely to exterminate wildlife further and ruin the rich sources of water in the region (see Box: Saving a hill). However, the governments moves towards diversion of land for mining have been strongly opposed by environmentalists and local people, especially tribals, who have spearheaded a movement to save their lands, livelihoods and water resources. For these tribals, forests are not only the sources of livelihood and home to wildlife, but are also important sources of water. In fact, local inhabitants also believe that many of the mineral-rich forested regions of Orissa are sacred and the abodes of local and tribal deities. The protests over the alumina refinery project and bauxite mining by the Vedanta group are probably the best indicators of what exactly is at stake. Vedanta requires about 721 ha for bauxite mining on top of the Niyamgiri hills in Kalahandi district. Much of this land is categorised as a reserved forest.31 The mining area consists of forest and grassland ecosystems of extremely high value as wildlife habitat, for biodiversity, and from the perspective of water availability in this drought-prone area. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) of the Supreme Court,
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Vedantas mining project in Lanjigarh is being bitterly opposed by locals and environmentalists as it would destroy vast tracks of rich bio-diverse forest land in Niyamgiri
No place for elephants

A proposed elephant reserve meets with state apathy
The Orissa government's 'concern' for wildlife is evident: even after the Union ministry of environment and forests approved the creation of a new elephant reserve, the state government seems to have developed cold feet in formally notifying the area. The reason: mines. The proposed reserve Baitarani Elephant Reserve comprises a huge chunk from both Keonjhar and Dhenkanal districts, both rich in metallic minerals. Of the 10,560 sq km proposed for the reserve, Keonjhar alone accounts for 6,548 sq km, while Dhenkanal's contribution is 2,243 sq km. The state government finds this area a little too big. Once declared a reserve, the place will become classified as a sensitive area therefore, not suitable for mining which seems to have sent the state government on the back foot.
in its report on the project, says that the area is rich in wildlife, has a dense forest cover, and has been proposed to be notified as a wildlife sanctuary in the working plan of the area duly approved by the MoEF under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The report recommends that the use of the forest land in an ecologically sensitive area like the Niyamgiri Hills should not be permitted. Attempts have been made to quantify the impact of forest diversion for the Vedanta project. According to guidelines specified by the MoEF, as a thumb rule, the environmental value of one ha of fully-stocked forest (density 1.0) can be taken as Rs 126.74 lakh, to accrue over a period of 50 years.32 Approximately, 660 ha of forest land will be diverted for the mining project alone. Assuming an average density of 0.5, the net present value (NPV) or environmental value of forest diversion at this rate will approximately be equal to Rs 417 crore. Even the officially listed non-forest area (covering 49 ha) has good forest cover, and if this is also covered under the NPV formula, there will be an additional cost of Rs 32 crore. This costing does not take into account the unique and infinitely valuable ensemble of rare species found in the proposed area. While numbers cannot convey the entire impact, they are an indicator of why forest diversion is under fire (see Flashpoints for more on the Vedanta project).
239
Orphaned
Miners in Orissa including public sector companies are afflicted by the dig and run syndrome
One major environmental challenge for the states mining industry in which it has failed miserably has been to return the land in the same form as it was taken. Unfortunately, the common practice has been to simply abandon the mines without making any efforts at land reclamation. According to the IBM, around 73 per cent of the abandoned mines in Orissa are orphaned the promoter has excavated the mineral and vacated the site without reclaiming the land. Talcher is a case in point: it is facing subsidence as the exhausted underground mines have not been filled up with sand as required. A gigantic scam, in fact, is underway in Talcher. Crores of rupees earmarked for sand filling in coal mines have been misappropriated, triggering a serious debate on the safety of life and property of people in mining areas. President of the Talcher-based Brahmani Anchal Suraksha Parishad (BASP), Bhibhudendra Pratap Das, points to the
case of Deoulabeda colliery: here, while coal extraction has been completed, no sand filling has been done. No action has been taken on this under-utilisation of funds. Talcher lies on the earthquake zone, which makes it doubly important for its abandoned mines to be filled up. Way back in 1980, authorities had assured that no mining which might endanger the life and property of people, would be undertaken in the area. In October 2006, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited assured steps would be taken for sand filling; in the absence of sand filling, landslides have occurred at least eight times in the recent past. A public interest litigation has been filed on the issue by Purna Chandra Sahu, a councillor of Talcher municipality. The petitioner has stated that Talcher town was facing environmental threat caused by extensive coal extraction. After coal extraction, the pits are not filled with sand as required, thereby pushing the town into danger, he has said. In response to this, the Orissa High Court has issued notices to the secretary, Union coal ministry; the secretary, Steel and Mines Department, Orissa and Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.
RANJAN PANDA
Dumped: most miners in the state extract the minerals and leave without reclaiming the area
240
WATER: POLLUTED AND DWINDLING

Orissa is considered as a water-surplus state, and this view has become the bane of its water resources. It is assessed that though Orissa occupies only four per cent of India's total geographic area, it has 11 per cent of the countrys total water resources. The state's annual surface water flow has been assessed at 54,540 million cubic metre (mcm).33 The stage of groundwater development in the state has been assessed in 2001 at less than 15 per cent.34 The Orissa government considers this water and mineral abundance as 'competitive advantage'. Orissa has 61 billion tonne of coal reserves, which can sustain power generation in the order of 100,000 MW for a century. The state, which also has vast water resources, can become the powerhouse of the nation, said chief minister Naveen Patnaik while discussing a mega power plant with Anil Ambani of Reliance Energy. Morgan Stanley's latest Global Economic Forum Report has stated that Orissa has the potential to emerge as a centre for the metals business in India and can attract investments up to US $30-40 billion over the next five years this, naturally, has further fuelled such perceptions.
Industries consume water
But the water-surplus picture of Orissa is already being severely mauled by its partiality for heavy water-consuming industries.
The Orissa government has signed about 50 MoUs with private companies to produce more than 70 MT of steel per annum. Other water-consuming thermal and aluminium industries are in the pipeline as well. MoUs have been signed or are being signed to generate more than 37,000 MW of coal-based thermal energy. The effects have begun to be felt. Watersheds and rivers are under threat, and changes in hydrology are imminent. The hilly terrains of the state, with their natural springs, are the sources of many rivers. Mining in these terrains is threatening to completely destroy the springs (see Box: Mines obliterating water sources). One of the villages affected is Junanimunda in the coal-bearing Ib valley region in western Orissa. Coal mining directly underneath the village and adjoining areas, which began in 1988, led to a drying up of all the water sources of the village, including a big kata (water harvesting structure). Junanimunda now does not have a single safe water source. The nearest drinking water source is more than two km away. Like many such villages, Junanimunda is not a 'project-affected village': as it was an underground mine, the mining company was not required to acquire the villagers holdings. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd, which is mining in the region, was 'compassionate' enough to dig three tubewells for the village, but all of them ended up in the voids created by the underground mines.
Mines obliterating water sources

Water sources are seriously imperilled in the state
Sara Dehuri of Upper Kadakala village under Bansapani block in Keonjhar district is unhappy with the government, and worried. Dehuri and her neighbours live near the world-famous Khandadhar waterfalls. The women are up in arms against the states decision of allowing iron ore exploration around the falls. The government has issued prospective licenses to eight private parties to explore iron ore in the area.Once mining begins, it will severely affect perennial streams like Ambila Pani, Jambiri Pani, Kriya Kudar, Pidi Pokhari, Gambhiri Nala, etc, which are the lifelines for nearby 20 villages,says Kolu Dehuri, the head of Kadakala. Sara, Sundari Nayak and Ahalya Dehuri are among the women who have come under the banner of Khandadhar Surakshya Samiti to draw the attention of the government to their plight. They want an assurance that the exploration will be stopped. Mindless and indiscriminate mining activities have already led to water scarcity in Keonjhar the name Kendujhar comes from kendu (ebony trees) and jhar (springs), but the place today can lay claim to neither. Indiscrimate blasting has disturbed the water sources in the hills, admits Bhaktabandhu Senapati, who is engaged in blasting in the mines since 1998. The Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) has warned the state government that there has been a fall of nearly four metres in the groundwater level in the district.The water level may fall further due to mining activities and deforestation, warns water resources consultant Subrat Kumar Das. Women like Sara are not worried without a reason. The state, in its drive towards rapid industrialisation, is diverting large areas of forest
land for mining and other industries and obliterating the rivers and springs in these regions in the process. The Vedanta alumina refinery in Kalahandi, for instance, proposes to mine the Niyamgiri hill for bauxite. The hill is a source of many perennial streams and a permanent source of water to the entire area including Kalahandi and Rayagada districts. It is estimated that mining in Niyamgiri will destroy around 22 water harvesting structures which are located in the foothills and provide water throughout the year. It is also anticipated that the rivers Vamsdhara and Nagvalli, which originate from this hill, will get affected. More than a lakh of people in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh depend on these rivers for drinking water and irrigation. The location of red mud and flyash disposal sites on the banks of the Vamsdhara will pose an environmental risk in the case of flash floods and during rains. The proposed Utkal alumina refinery in Kashipur area of Rayagada district will mine the Baphlimali hill. This will affect around 56 streams which originate from the hill and feed the river Indravati. Red mud disposal sites will be located in the catchment area of Barha Nadi, thus exerting additional pollution stress on the river. A similar threat looms with the proposed expansion projects of Rungta iron and bauxite mines in Sundergarh district. The project will alter around six perennial springs and permanently destroy the catchment area of the river Baitarini. The proposed coal mine of the Orissa Mining Corporation in D block, Talcher coalfields at Angul is likely to affect two streams: the Guendijeri nala and the Kathau Jhor which flow through the lease area. Other streams that flow close to the mine will get heavily polluted and some of them may completely dry up.
Braja Kishore Mishra, CSE media fellow, Bhubaneshwar
241
Women struggle for water

Authorities forced to listen to the protestors
On May 15, 1997 the activists of Balugaon Khamar Mahila Unnayan Sangha, in association with some villagers, stopped mining activity in the Lingaraj mines under Talcher coalfields. Their objective was to force the MCL authorities to ensure regular and adequate supply of drinking water. Open-cast mining had dried up their ponds and wells, forcing them to take recourse to agitation. The conveners of the Sangha blamed the mining authorities for non-fulfilment of their promises of rehabilitation, compensation and employment. They made it clear that unless the village was provided adequate water, mining activities will not be allowed. Faced with huge production losses, the authorities had to accept their demands, and regular supply of water was promised.
Neither the company nor the district administration has bothered to address the villagers problems. We have realised that justice is not meant for people like us. It is reserved for the rich people and companies, says Dukhi Singh, a village leader. The villagers now collect water from a pit below the kata, which is being used as a wastewater dump of the coal mine. Junanimunda is not very far from the Hirakud reservoir. In fact, Junanimunda is one of many new settlements of Hirakud project displaced families. The villagers of Junanimunda gave away their lands to the largest dam in the country, but are now left to fend for themselves for a drop of drinking water. About 300 km from Junanimunda, farmers are staring at a dry future; Sudam Majhi of Sirekeli is one among them who go for
vegetable cultivation in the Tel river bed. Vedanta, which is setting of an alumina refinery 100 km away, will draw water from very near to Sudams fields. Every time the company's pumps are trial run for even few hours, our crops have died, says Sudam. The forest from where the company intends to mine bauxite is home to numerous streams that feed at least three major rivers. The situation is not very different in the coalfields in Talcher and in other parts of Orissa. Earlier, river Brahmani the second largest river of the state used to provide plenty of water to the region to sustain a predominantly agrarian economy. With the coming of mining, industries started guzzling up more than 56 per cent of the river water. They also polluted the water by discharging their effluents into it. Today, the Talcher-Angul region is considered a living desert. The water sources here are deadlier than any sewage drain, rues Sisir Tripathy, coordinator of the District Action Group (DAG), a federation of 21 non-governmental organisations in Dhenkanal district, which is protesting against the rampant coal mining. Water availability has become the single most important casualty of mining, says Tapan Padhi, who surveyed the region for DAG.35 Groundwater is equally stressed. Ten billion litres of groundwater is pumped out every day in the coalfields of Talcher and Ib valley, drying up aquifers in an area of 1,000 sq km (see Box: Women struggle for water).36 When villagers clamoured for compensation and drinking water, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd supplied them the water collected in its mines. The major problem with mining and consequent degradation of water resources is that victims and sufferers generally fail to raise a potent voice to make their plight heard, says octogenarian activist Durga Prasad Nayak. They gradually loose their possessions and livelihood, as in Darlipali, a village surrounded by three open-cast coal mines. Not a single tubewell is running there, and all the old wells are dry. The villagers are entirely dependent on the coal mining company which supplies water twice a day during the summer months. Mining companies are asked, by the environment ministry while granting permission, to record water level four times a year. They seldom do that honestly, alleges environmentalist Biswajeet Mohanty. The whole perception that Orissa is a water-surplus state is absolutely absurd, he adds. If all the new plants the state is planning come up, they will be requiring about or in excess of 900 mcm of water every year.37 The average annual flow in the Mahanadi, the largest river of the state, is about 42,000 mcm and that in the second largest river, Brahmani, is 10,884 mcm a year.38 But 80 per cent of these river flows are in the monsoon months alone and, therefore, of no additional use. While water flow in the two largest rivers will be only about 10,600 mcm in non-monsoon months, industries alone will require about 700 mcm approximately seven per cent of the total average flow in those months, says senior journalist Barendra Krushna Dhala.39 Things will be far worse in the summer months considering that industries need consistent supply. In fact, conflicts over water allocation for industries from the Hirakud reservoir is boiling towards a huge social unrest in that region, says Nayak.
SHYAMAL / CSE
242
Hirakud is representative of what lies ahead in Orissa. Though water supply to industries was never envisaged during the planning of the reservoir, industries soon came up in the late 1950s after Hirakud started functioning. In 1990, the state government earmarked 0.350 million acre feet (MAcF) of water for industrial use.40 The reservoir has a live storage capacity of 3.91 MAcF: the government, therefore, keeps proclaiming that it has enough capacity to meet the 1.3 MAcF required for irrigation. But the farmers find it hard to buy that argument. If the reservoir has so much water, then why are we not getting water in our canals during the beginning of the kharif season? questions Shyamsundar Pradhan, a farmer. The situation has deteriorated after two major industries started drawing water from the reservoir, the farmers allege. This, when industries are drawing just 0.031 MAcF from the earmarked 0.350 MAcF. Imagine what will be the situation when they draw all the 0.350 MAcF of water, asks Dillip Padhi of Hirakhand Nagarik Parishad, which petitioned the president of India seeking a status report on water allocation from Hirakud reservoir to industries. A large part of the states claim to 'water abundance' derives from its confidence that the Hirakud reservoir has enough water. Since 1997, the states water allocation committee has given 1,590 cubic metres per second (cusec) of water from various existing sources to 69 new or expanding industries and mining compa-
nies.41 Out of the total water allocation for industries made in the state, 27 per cent has been made from Hirakud alone.42 Permission for 426 cusecs has been granted in the post-1997 period alone, says D P Nayak. The Brahmani river basin too is an industrial hot spot. The state government is now considering an idea to link Hirakud with the Rengali reservoir. It plans to divert surplus water from the Hirakud through a 150-km long canal. This indicates that the Brahmani is a deficit basin and does not have sufficient water to meet industrial requirements, argues Mohanty. It is absurd to state that Orissa has a lot of groundwater to exploit. The 2003 national habitation survey proved that depleting groundwater level is a cause of concern, says Bimal Pandia of Water Initiatives Orissa, a civil society organisation. About eight per cent of the states population comes under 'not covered' category mostly due to depletion in groundwater levels. Arabinda Behera, commissioner-cum-principal secretary at the ministry of water resources admits that the situation needs careful consideration. Fortunately, there still remain some communities which are in a position to resist this trend effectively. Farmers of the Hirakud command area recently forced stoppage of water procurementrelated construction works inside the Hirakud reservoir area by two major industries Bhushan Steel and Shyam DRI.
Mining in Orissas hilly terrain is threatening to completely obliterate the states natural springs, which are the sources of many rivers
243
Darlipali: raring to go
Pollution from mines is driving people out
At least 132 families in Darlipali village in the coal belt of Ib valley in Orissa do not want to stay in their village any more; they want to be relocated and leave the lands they have tilled for generations. Whats driving them out is pollution the village, in Jharsuguda district, is buried deep in coal mine territory. Darlipali is surrounded by the Lakhanpur open-cast Mine, Belpahar open-cast mine and Lilari open-cast mine all owned by Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd (MCL). The area is littered with coal dumps and consequently, enveloped in a thick layer of coal dust throughout the year. The waterbodies are contaminated by coal dust and oil, and there is a shortage of drinking water.The mines have swallowed up the only source of drinking water in the village, a three ha kata (a traditional water body), says Bhukli Oram, a villager. Five tubewells have so far been installed in the village, but only one is functional. The villagers have to dig pits along the bank of the Lilari nullah for drinking water. A pond called the TISCO dhuda
(named after the nearby abandoned TISCO mines) the only place to bathe other than Lilari nullah is also polluted. The Lilari nullah, a perennial stream that flows through Darlipali to join the Ib, a tributary of the Mahanadi, is also highly polluted. A study by the state pollution control board says: The Mahanadi basin, particularly the Ib valley area, has a rich mining potential of coal. There are 10 coalmines which discharge around 33,065 kilolitres per day of wastewater (into) this river during the monsoon and pose a serious threat, for the effluent contains heavy metals and sulphur compounds.However, A K Murthy, area environment officer, MCL, refutes the report, arguing that coalmines do not pollute rivers. The water has turned black and greasy because thousands of trucks are washed in this nullah. And we dont have any control over these trucks,he says. The villagers dont buy this. Pollution has afflicted our lives deeply; the little compensation we get is hardly of any help to us, says Prabhakara Pradhan, an unskilled labourer at MCLs Budhijam mines.
Ranjan Panda, Down To Earth, Sambalpur
MAP 2: Polluted flows the Brahmani

The river is one of the 10 most polluted rivers in the country and mining is the culprit
So
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Sundargarh
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an M
d
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ut
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ba
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oe
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: Steel plant and captive power plant 1 and 2, Rourkela

T
: Fertiliser plant, Rourkela

A H
Mayurbhanj
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: National Thermal Power Corp, Kaniha : Talcher Thermal Power Station, Talcher
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su har
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tara
ab lan
Hirakud reservoir
Sambalpur Bargarh
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Baleshwar
: Aluminium smelter and coal-based captive power plant, NALCO, Angul

lri Pa
Salandi
Bhadrak
: Orissa Synthetic Ltd, Odapada block, Dhenkanal : Iron ore mining area of Bana subdivision (Barasuan, Koida, Jamda, etc) : Coal mining area, Talcher : Chromite mining area, Sukinda valley
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Sonapur
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Jajpur Brahman i
Balangir
Nua par ha
Bauda
Ma
Baita
Dhenkanal
rani
ha
na
di
Cuttack Nayagarh Khorda
p dra Ken
ara
Ma han adi Jagatsinghapur
: Major affected area (water not for irrigation/human/livestock consumption, mangroves in coastal cyclone-prone areas affected)
Tel
ya
Ganjam
Rayagada
Ch
ik
ul
ili
sh
ka
Ru
ga pu
La
Phulbani
ke
In dr a
Kalahandi
Puri
ba ran
B AY O F B E N G A L
Gajapati
Sa
ba
ri
Malkangiri
Sil
ru
A N
Source: State of Environment Report, Orissa State Pollution Control Board, p 124
Nar ang i
Balimela Reservoir
Indravati
Koraput
Bansh adhara
H
Naga vali
Jalaput Reservoir
P D H R A R
244
SHYAMAL / CSE
Industries also pollute water
The Orissa State of Environment Report, published by the Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB), has classified areas based on their pollution potential. According to it, zone 1 includes districts like Keonjhar and Sundergarh, which are rich in iron and manganese ore and face extensive pollution of rivers and rivulets. During the rainy season, the water in rivers turns red and the level of total suspended solids goes up to 1,000 mg/l. Similarly, zone 2 includes the Angul and Talcher coalfield area. The report also states that most coal mines do not have any effluent treatment system; effluents and wastewater go into the river (see Box: Darlipali: raring to go). Take the example of the Brahmani, the second largest river of Orissa. It is also one of the most polluted rivers in the state and one of the top 10 most polluted rivers in the country due to large-scale mining operations on its banks. The river, with a catchment area of around 39,000 sq km, originates as two major distributaries the Sankh and the Koel from the Chhotanagpur plateau in Jharkhand and joins at Veda Vyasa near Rourkela in Orissa to form the Brahmani. It flows through the Eastern Ghats in Sundergarh, Keonjhar, Dhenkanal, Cuttack and Jajpur districts and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The major portion of its catchment area lies in Orissa; and due to the vast mineral deposits in this area and the easy availability of water, several industries have come up in and around the river basin. At its upper reach, the river is polluted by effluents from the Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela Fertiliser Plant and the iron oremining industries of Bonai subdivision (see Map 2: Polluted flows the Brahmani). The pollution level increases in the middle section
due to drainage from the coal belts and industrial wastes from the Angul-Talcher region, mainly emptied into it by its tributary, the Nandira. The NALCO smelter at Angul has also contributed to the poor quality of the surface and sub-surface water. The effluent discharged from plant has increased the fluoride level in the drinking water. The water contains flouride more than 1.5 mg/l,43 which is considered toxic for animals. According to published reports, effluents discharged from the plant into the river have resulted in deaths of cattle, crop loss and skin allergies. Downstream, the Brahmani is polluted by mine discharges from the Sukinda belt and industrial activities in Duburi. The Damasala river, one of the major tributaries downstream, carries toxic effluents from chromium mining (mainly hexavalent chromium) in the Sukinda valley into the Brahmani (see Box on page 247: Poison river, chromite country). A survey conducted in September 1998 by the Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB) said that chromite mines in the area discharge wastewater rich in hexavalent chromium, a known carcinogen. The 21 mines in the Talcher-Angul area discharge 29,434 kilolitres of heavy metal-laded water into the river. In 1989, a report by Bangkok-based Asian Institute of Technology in collaboration with the OSPCB, observed: The concentration of some heavy metals was higher than the standards in mine discharge. Despite recommendations by several studies, not a single water treatment plant has come up in the Talcher area.44 To make matters worse, flood waters have been reduced in the Brahmani following the construction of the Rengali dam which caters to the needs of the industrial belt.
245
P MADHAVAN
The water resources of Sukinda are contaminated with hexavalent chromium people have no other option but to use them
246
Poison river, chromite country

The Brahmani and the Sukinda valley
Orissa accounts for more than 95 per cent of Indias chromite wealth. According to the IBM, the state has total chromite resources of 175 MT of which 28 MT are proven resources. There are some 16 working mines of chromite in the state, located over 7,482 ha of lease area and 5,264 ha of forest area. A majority of these are in the Sukinda valley region. Almost all the mines in Sukinda are open-cast. Nine open-cast mines are located upstream of the Damsala nala catchment area, while one underground and two open-cast mines are located downstream. It is a prevalent practice in the area to dump the overburden within the mine lease area, through which the Damsala nala flows. Water seepages from these dumps as well as the run-off from the quarries have poisoned this nala, which ultimately meets the Brahmani river. Several studies have found very high levels of hexavalent chromium in the river. The IBM, in association with BRGM, a French company, prepared a Regional Environmental Impact Assessment (REIA) report for the chromite belt of the Sukinda watershed (including a cluster of 12 mines). The REIA identified the pollution of the waters, soils and
P MADHAVAN
Open-cast chromite mining and overburden dumps are polluting the water resources
TABLE: Waste tales from Sukinda

Media Nala sediment Main features Cr = 0.3-2.7 % CrVI = 30-104 mg/kg Ni =190-1,090 mg/kg CrVI = 6-90 mg/kg Hg = 0.04-14.4 mg/kg Ni = 40-580 mg/kg Leachate of river sediments: CrVI = 2-12 mg/l Leachate of paddy sediments: CrVI = 0.7 mg/l 23 out of the 31 monitoring stations exhibit CrVI above drinking water standards (up to 3.4 mg/l) No specific trend season wise 32 out of the 33 monitored wells exhibit CrVI above drinking water standards (up to 0.6 mg/l) 6 wells exhibit Ni above drinking water standards (up to 0.6 mg/l) CrVI concentrations = 0.07-2.14 mg/l Paddy: CrVI = <0.001-142 mg/kg Fish: CrVI = 14-115 mg/kg Fruits : CrVI = 5-28 mg/kg Aquatic grass: CrVI = <0.001-29 mg/kg
Paddy field sediment
Leaching tests
Surface water
Groundwater
Pit water seepage water Fauna and flora
Note: CrVI = hexavalent chromium; Ni = nickel; Cr = chromium; Hg = mercury Source: Anon, 2004, Mining-related chromate water pollution in the Sukinda watershed (Orissa, India), Environment Process Division, BRGM, France
sediments by hexavalent chromium (CrVI) as the key problem. The report listed the main causes of the chromium contamination as mine water discharges, release of benefication-plant effluents and slurries into the environment, and the leaching of waste dumps and ore stockpiles. The mines of Sukinda generate almost seven tonne of overburden per tonne of chromite. Over the years, about 70 MT of overburden has been stocked in the area. The monitoring results conducted by BRGM showed that most wells and water courses in the central part of the watershed were contaminated by CrVI (up to a value of 3.4 mg/l in surface water and 0.6 mg/l in groundwater), and in few places, by nickel (up to 0.6 mg/l in groundwater). The concentration of chromium exceeded the Indian guidelines for drinking water, surface water and soils used for agriculture. CrVI was also found in the food chain, specifically in fish, milk, paddy, fruits and grass. These too exceeded the toxicological standards used in the risk assessment study (see Table: Waste tales from Sukinda). A detailed survey and monitoring conducted by the Central Pollution Control Board in the Sukinda valley and the coal mines in Talcher found enormous volumes of water containing CrVI being discharged into adjacent water bodies. The overburden was being dumped near the quarries, as a result of which soluble metals were percolating into the groundwater. Another study by the Department of Geology, University of Delhi in 2001 found the presence of CrVI in not only the mine discharges, but also in the water supplied for drinking. Mine discharge water contained hexavalent chromium much above permissible limit for households (0.1 mg/l): as high as 52 mg/l in some samples in Damsala downstream of the discharge from TISCO mines. Seventy per cent of the water samples and 61 per cent of drinking water samples analysed possessed CrVI concentration more than the safe level.
247
AIR: IN A HAZE
The OSPCB report, State of Environment in Orissa, has acknowledged air pollution as a major problem in almost all mines in Keonjhar. The report says that the levels are very high at crusher, loading and transfer points, with SPM levels goes as high as 1,000 microgram per cubic metre (g/m3), however, it often ranges around 600 g/m3, which is also more than the prescribed standard.45 Similar is the case in other iron belts of the state such as Sundergarh and Jajpur. One of the biggest reasons for fugitive dust generation is the condition of roads in mining areas. In most cases, proper roads simply do not exist; where they do, they are in a sorry state, made more so with the continuous movement of heavy traffic on them. The situation has forced people to look for innovative ways of protest. In tribal-dominated Keonjhar, the people participated in a day-long sankirtan (singing religious hymns and prayers) programme, seeking divine intervention in solving their problems of bad roads and pollution due to large-scale iron mining.46 Air pollution is particularly severe in the states coal belts. Besides fugitive dust, occasional fires in coal mines add to the woes of the people. In the Lingaraj open-cast coal mines, fire broke out in a dump in November 2006, and has been generating dense smoke ever since, besides destroying huge reserves of coal.
The Director General of Mines Safety (DGMS) has failed to solve the problem.47 The Lingaraj coal mines are, in fact, a case in point. The mines project officer was arrested in connection with a pollution case registered in Talcher.48 The arrest came following allegations of heavy dust emissions from the mines, situated close to the sub-divisional headquarters. Sources said the pollution was so acute that local residents suffered from breathing problems and poor visibility in the evening. Besides the residents, labourers working in the mine and passengers on National Highway-17 also face the brunt of the pollution. The situation was grave enough for the area DIG, Arun Kumar Sarangi, to issue a warning to the mining authorities.49 The OSPCB monitors ambient air quality in some of the coal mines of the state. The maximum concentration of SPM in all the mine areas of the state exceeds the prescribed regulatory standard of 360 g/m3 for industrial areas (see Table 6: State of the air). The quality of ambient air is especially problematic in the Balanda colliery and the Lingaraj open-cast mines with respect to maximum concentrations of SPM and RSPM. For instance, at the Balanda colliery, the maximum RSPM recorded was 246 g/m3, while the maximum value of SPM recorded was as high as 851 g/m3. The concentration of SOx and NOx, though, are within regulatory standards. Other problematic coal mines include Lakhanpur open-cast mines, Lilari open-cast mines and Lajkura open-cast mines.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
One of the biggest reasons for fugitive dust generation is the poor condition of roads in the mining areas
248
TABLE 6: State of the air

Ambient air quality (in g/m3) in mining areas of Orissa (2001-02) concentration of SPM and RSPM is very high
RSPM Max Lingaraj open-cast mines Bharatpur open-cast mines Ananta open-cast mines Balanda colliery Kalinga open-cast mines Jagannath colliery Hingula open-cast mines Belpahar open-cast mines Lajkura open-cast mines Lakhanpur open-cast mines Samalesari open-cast mines Lilari open-cast mines Basundhara open-cast mines 377 216 262 246 104.6 210 180.3 146.64 198.22 284 273.2 170.8 Min 93 91.3 57.2 101 81 55.35 52.32 65.77 63.7 50.4 70 Max 610 486 487 851 379.7 600 402 461.12 611.54 695.51 588.0 695.6 552 SPM Min 336 63.6 180 295.7 80.9 225.6 75.55 151.08 12.96 173 180.82 142 194 Max 36.1 34.6 40.2 30.4 19.2 38.1 36 SO2 Min 16.4 16.6 12.8 14.2 14.6 10.2 12.2 Max 21.1 16.8 38 19.2 16.2 42 10.2 NOX Min 3.4 1.86 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.1 1.82
Note: RSPM = Respirable Suspended Particulate Matter , SPM = Suspended Particulate Matter, SO2 = Sulphur Dioxide, NOx = Nitrogen oxides Source: http://www.envis.nic.in/soer/soer-orissa/mines.HTM, as viewed on March 3, 2007
EIA: PLAYING OUT A FARCE

In 1994, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notification was passed under the Environment Protection Act, 1986: it outlined the procedure for granting environmental clearance to industrial and development projects with the objective of maintaining a balance between the three pillars of development environment, society and economy. According to this procedure, projects classified on the basis of scale and impacts are required to prepare an EIA report. The findings of the report are presented to the local community in a public hearing process during which the locals have an opportunity to express their opinion on the project. The summarised minutes of the public meeting and the EIA report are then presented to the clearance committee set up at the state or Central level, which then decides on the fate of the project. On paper, this seems to be an excellent and foolproof method to reduce the environmental and social implications of a project. But in practice, this rarely happens. The whole procedure stands completely diluted and has been reduced to being a mere formality. There are hardly any projects which are turned down or rejected by the clearance committee even in cases where the public has expressed its opposition to one. One of the biggest drawbacks in the current environmental clearance process is the poor quality of the EIA reports. These are
prepared by consultants hired by the companies. There are a number of cases where EIAs have been found to have glaring and intentional omissions and where the authenticity of the report is in doubt. In Orissa, with the state governments determination to tap its mineral wealth, numerous projects have been cleared post-haste in the last few years. Since January 2005, 36 mining projects have received the nod from the MoEF, in which around 4,978 ha of forest area was diverted.50 Environment and the society, naturally, have been the casualties. Not surprisingly, Orissa has seen its share of controversies related to the environment clearance process and quality of EIA reports (see Box on page 250: Ill assessed). But in spite of these serious lapses, most of these projects are in advanced stages of clearance. Recent trends point to another cause for concern: instead of living up to their role as protectors of environment and of their peoples interests, the state and the Central governments are often striving to outdo each other in acting almost like agents of the companies. For example, in spite of stiff opposition by local people to POSCO, the state and Central governments have given repeated assurances to the South Korean steel giant that the project will be seen through. The EIA and environment clearance process is designed to fail. Keeping in view the level of political interference and corruption and the laxity of the regulatory mechanism, it is unlikely that the process can function as one would expect it to.
249
Ill assessed
EIA reports of some of the major projects in Orissa leave a lot to be desired

The EIA report of the proposed Utkal Alumina plant at Kashipur claims that mining will not affect a single village; this, even though the project plans to adopt open-cast mining. Bhagaban Majhi, convenor, Prakrutik Sampad Surakshya Parishad (PSSP), disagrees: according to him, around 42 villages of the Chandragiri, Maikanch and Kodipari panchayats will be directly affected by the mining. Further, the report mentions only two streams originating from the Baphlimali hills. Locals put the number of streams originating from these hills at an incredible 56, all of which feed the Indravati river basin.The EIA report also fails to present a correct picture of the projects impact on biodiversity, society and culture of the area. Another case of poor EIA report is that of the bauxite mine in Lanjigarh, Kalahandi, owned by the OMC, and operated by the Vedanta group. The report claims that the mine area is unproductive, tree-deficient and not useful for wildlife and forests. However, a Wildlife Institute of India (WII) report had contradicted this finding, saying that these plateaus are very productive with high occurrence of several herbivore and carnivore species. This kind of habitat is especially productive during the rainy season when water and grasses are available for several species. Elephants also visit these areas during rainy season... These areas are also breeding and fawning grounds for four-horned antelopes, barking deer and several other species. The WII study has also claimed that Niyamgiri hill (where the company proposes to mine) is an important source of water for the Vamsadhara and Nagaveli rivers; around 36 streams originate from the hill. The study notes that removal of the layer of bauxite will adversely affect the groundwater
in the region, and consequently, the quality of forested habitats. The EIA report, however, is silent on these impacts. The EIA report of the expansion project of Rungta iron and bauxite mines in Sundergarh district completely ignores the fact that the lease area is an important watershed for river Baitarini and that there are six perennial springs within the area.The report also fails to mention that the lease area is the genesis of rivers such as the Jalap Nadi . In January 2006, the OSPCB published the notice for a public hearing of expansion of the Putulipani iron ore mines in Keonjhar in only one daily The New Indian Express. The EIA notification specifies that the notice should be published in at least in two newspapers, with one in a vernacular language. The mines are owned by Gandhamardhan Sponge Industries (P) Ltd.The projects EIA report was incomplete: it completely failed to identify the impacts of fugitive dust, or the effect on the regions three perennial springs which lie inside the proposed lease area. Moreover, the mines are located close to the Gandhamardan Reserve Forest, home to wildlife such as bear, wild boar, fox, jungle cat and barking deer. Most of these animals are in Schedules I or II (endangered species) of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Strangely, the EIA report concludes that no critically threatened speciesexist within 10 km of the mining area. Yet another example of EIA violation is offered by the coal mines of OMC at Utkal (D block, Talcher coalfields in Angul). The EIA was conducted during the monsoons in violation of the guidelines framed by the MoEF. The report mentioned that more than 50 per cent of the area in the core and buffer zones was covered by reserve and protected forests and shrubs. At the same time, it claimed that animals like elephant, sambar, leopards, etc covered in Schedule I of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 were not present. Local people and forest officials have, on the other hand, reported the presence of elephants, leopards, bear and wild boars in the same area.
PEOPLE: FIGHTING TO THE FINISH

Along with all this, Orissa also has its tribals. With six million of them, the state has the highest proportion of tribal population in the country. Nearly 85 per cent of the states population lives in its rural areas and depends mostly on agriculture and natural resources.51 Large-scale mining and industrial activities are threatening to disrupt the livelihoods and social structures of these segments (see Table 7: The march of progress). The figures tell the story: 1.5 million people were displaced in the state by development projects between 1951 and 1995 42 per cent of these were tribals.52 Mining alone has displaced some 500,000 in the state.53 There are no recent statistics on the number of people being displaced due to development projects, but everyone agrees that the number would be significant. The complete apathy of the government is apparent: it has not done any assessment of how many people have been affected by such projects and what is the status of their rehabilitation. However, some independent estimates peg the displacement figure at at least another 100,000 people till now.54 According to Kundan Kumar, an expert in tribal and land rights in Orissa, the
area acquired for various industrial and development projects in Orissa amounts to around 12 lakh ha, which has affected around 2,170 villages.55 For mining projects, 101,947 ha have been acquired; however, there is no data on the number of villages affected.56 The problem of displacement is more severe in the state as most of the development projects are in tribal/scheduled areas such as Machkund, Salandi, Balimela, Upper Kolab, Indravati or Mandira. Some major industrial projects taken up in scheduled areas include the Rourkela Steel Plant and NALCOs alumina refinery at Damanjodi. A large number of future mining projects under implementation or proposed such as the alumina refineries of Utkal Alumina in Kashipur and Vedanta at Lanjigarh are also in scheduled areas. In four districts of Orissa Dhenkanal, Ganjam, Koraput and Phulbani over half of the tribal land has been lost to non-tribals over a 25-30 year period. A study by Walter Fernandes, director of North Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati, contends that in Koraput alone, over 100,000 tribals have been dispossessed of their land, which included 1.6 lakh ha of forests on which they depended for their survival; more than six per cent of the district population, a majority of it tribal, has been displaced.57
250
The state government justifies its industrialisation overdrive by saying that it will provide employment. But the Orissa Economic Survey, 2002 shows that the employment potential of the mining sector has actually reduced. In Dhenkanal, Jajpur and Keonjhar districts, chromite mines employed 8,886 people in 1995-96 but only 6,679 in 1999-2000. At present, 20 lakh people in the state are unemployed while another 20 lakh are underemployed.58 Samarendra Das, an Orissa-based activist and author of a study on the political economy of mines, says: A Rs 1 crore investment in mines results in only seven employment opportunities. The same investment in medium and big industries creates 40. In contrast, this investment in small and cottage industry would generate 4,475 jobs.59 The districts of Orissa that are the most mined Jajpur, Keonjhar, Dhenkanal, Angul, Jharsuguda, Sundergarh, Mayurbhanj and Koraput are also the poorest districts in the state. Manas Jena, convenor of the Orissa Mines Area People Action Network, worries that mines will create huge imbalances. He says, Our study has found hundreds of families displaced from forests are landing up in urban slums. The percentage of scheduled tribes (ST) in Orissa living around forests has gone down from 95 per cent in 1981 to 80 per cent in 1990.60 The state governments move to allow transfer of land in Fifth Schedule areas for mining and industrial operations is likely to further threaten the lives of tribals: the state has interpreted the Supreme Courts (SC) landmark Samata judgement of 1997 to suit itself (see Box: Subverting the Samata judgement).
TABLE 7: The march of progress

Development projects have affected more than 2,000 villages
Projects Area acquired or affected (ha) 2,00,423 No of villages affected 900
Irrigation dam projects (major) completed Irrigation dam projects (medium) completed Irrigation dam projects (medium) ongoing Irrigation dam projects (major) proposed Industries (all types) Mines (all types of mine leases given out) Wildlife sanctuaries and national parks Total
14,403
118
12,160
92
30,233
113
45,358 1,01,947
176 NA
8,11,155
771
1,215,679
2,170
Source: Kundan Kumar, 2006, Disposed and displaced: A brief paper on tribal issues in Orissa, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/Orissa%20mining%20and%20industrialisation%20note.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007
Subverting the Samata judgement

Orissa interprets the judgement to suit its designs
In 1997, the Supreme Court (SC) had ruled in the Samata versus state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) case that tribal tracts and forest land in scheduled areas were not to be leased out to non-tribals for mining and industrial activity, as this would contravene the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. According to the SC directive, such operations could only be permitted exceptionally subject to the laws of the state concerned. The SC had stipulated that in instances where the law does not completely ban mining in scheduled areas, a state-level cabinet sub-committee should be constituted and a suitable decision taken thereafter. In July 2003, a sub-committee headed by Orissa chief minister Naveen Patnaik conveniently concluded that the judgment was not binding on the state. The decision was premised on the claim that ample provision had been made in the states existing laws to protect tribal interests; the rules cited in this regard were the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (Scheduled Tribes) Regulation (OSATIPR), 1956, and the Orissa Zilla Parishad (Amendment) Act, 1997. The state government has mentioned these two laws to give its dubious agenda a veneer of legitimacy, alleges Bibhu P Tripathi, an Orissa-based advocate. But the fact that certain clauses of OSATIPR itself forbid transfer of land from tribals to non-tribals, weakens the authoritiescase.The Orissa government is not even conversant with its own laws, asserts Tripathi. Highlighting the ludicrousness of the subcommittees stand, he elaborates: It goes against the grain of a recent
amendment to OSATIPR. The new clause, inserted in 2002, explicitly states that no member of the scheduled tribes can transfer any land if the size of their holding gets reduced to less than 2 acres (0.8 ha) of irrigated land or 5 acres (2 ha) of non-irrigated tract in the process. Tripathi observes:The suggestion of the sub-panel will, in effect, violate the regulation because tribal families would be left with no land at all. Rather than regarding the Samata case as a point of reference and insulating tribals, the Orissa government has paved the way for mining in scheduled areas by signing a memorandum of understanding with private companies,charges Tripathi. For its part, the state government purports to have announced a comprehensive rehabilitation package to support the oustees. However, it has failed to fully comply with the SC order on this front as well. The sub-panel has declared that companies would be required to spend five per cent of the net annual profit earned in each project on development activities such as healthcare, education, communication, irrigation and agriculture within a radius of 50 km of the affected area. The SC had ruled that when states give out land in scheduled areas, at least 20 per cent of net profits should be set aside as a permanent fund for the development of local tribals. And this allocation did not include the expenditure for reforestation and maintenance of ecology.Orissa is legally bound to follow the stipulation. It is also consistent with the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy, stresses Rajiv Dhawan, the SC advocate who represented Samata.
Kushal Yadav, Down To Earth, New Delhi
251
Displacement from mining is a major challenge for the state; people displaced 40 years ago still have to be rehabilitated
Till recently, Orissa had more than 11 legislations for rehabilitation and resettlement of project-affected people. In late 2006, the state adopted a comprehensive resettlement and rehabilitation policy, which is considered as one of the best in the country. However, the track record of the state in rehabilitating its displaced communities has been rather poor. Of the 650 families
displaced due to Nilachal Ispat Nigam in Kalinganagar, only 184 have got jobs.61 At Rourkela, 33 villages over 1,013,144 ha of land were acquired by the Orissa government in 1954 to set up SAILs steel plant. This project, along with the Mandira dam, uprooted 4,251 families.62 SAIL and the state government have not been able to resettle and rehabilitate the evacuees of the last 50 years. In January 2006, thousands of tribals armed with bows and arrows blocked road and rail traffic near the steel plant. The tribals were demanding that the land acquired from them should be returned and each member of a family should be provided with a job.63 There have been cases of multiple displacement as well successive displacement of the same families from one place to another following execution of various development projects in those areas. For example, the displaced people of Hirakud dam, who were resettled in the mid-1950s in the upper catchment areas of the reservoir, faced displacement for the second time in the 1980s due to the Ib thermal power project and again in the 1980-90s due to the Ib valley coal mining projects64 (see Box: Displaced AGAIN?). Understandably, Orissa has been the hub of public and sometimes violent protests against mining and mineral-based industries. Cases in point are the 12-year struggle waged by the villagers of Kashipur against Utkals alumina plant, protests by tribals against Tatas iron and steel plant at Kalinganagar, and resistance to BALCOs proposed exploration of Gandhamardan hills in western Orissa. The tragedy has assumed gargantuan proportions in the state because, ironically, of its backwardness: the peoples suffering is magnified in the mining regions as they do not have enough infrastructural facilities to compensate for the loss of land and quality of life. Roads, power, health facilities the state has not been able to provide any of these adequately. Earnings have gone down because people no longer have their land, and most often, they end up as labourers in the mines. The consequence is immense discontent and an acute sense of alienation. The future is likely to witness many more protests if the legitimate concerns of the people are not taken into account by the state.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Displaced AGAIN?
Multiple displacement adds to their agony
In 1967, the people from Derjang village were displaced by the Derjang irrigation project to Dhobamalia Sahi village in Angul district. The same villagers are now again facing displacement because of the proposed Utkal-D coal mining project of the Orissa Mining Corporation. According to local activist Prasanna Behera: People said no to the project in the public hearing.He adds that this project would require diversion of forest land, as more than 50 per cent of the project area falls in forests.1 A similar case is being repeated in Bamaloi grama panchayat of Jajpur district.2 There seems to be no end to the misery of the people who were earlier dispossessed of their land for Hirakud dam
project and now they face the spectre of another displacement due to a proposed aluminium project. However, led by the Sambalpur Zilla Durniti Nibarana Mahila Mancha, people have been staging a protest against the displacement and sitting on a relay hunger-strike in front of the Sambalpur collectors office. Parikshit Kissan, a resident, said, We are yet to recover from the displacement from our parental homes, which are now submerged under the Hirakud reservoir. Another one will ruin us. The villagers are not opposed to the project; they are only demanding the exclusion of Bamaloi from the project area. Our demand is genuine since a second displacement is totally inhuman for the people, said Bhagabati Kissa and Gochandan Rohidas. The collector of Sambalpur, L N Nayak, however says that the people are yet to make specific demands.
252
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
No sunny days: people in the state are a disappointed lot as the mining and industrial projects have failed to bring development which was promised, and are increasingly protesting against new projects
253
The flashpoints
ANGUL-KORAPUT: NALCOS DEPREDATIONS
The National Aluminium Company Ltd (NALCO) set its sights on Orissas Koraput districts in 1981: to mine bauxite. The regions bauxite reserves of 370 MT are expected to last 75 years at the current mining rate of about five MT per annum. The low silica content of the bauxite makes it possible for NALCO to produce high quality aluminium at low cost. Since the region was designated a Schedule V area, the company needed special permission for acquiring land here. The Land Acquisition Act helped: the company managed to obtain around 4,070 ha through the Act to set up its mines and refineries in Damanjodi, Koraput. This was much more than what NALCO required (more than 60 per cent of the land has not been utilised in the last 25 years). Of this land, 172 ha were for the mines, 1,068 ha for a township and 2,830 ha for the plants; 41 per cent of the acquired land was owned by the government, for which no compensation was paid, while another 41 per cent was agricultural land. The company later acquired 1606 ha of land in Angul district for its smelter plant. Majority of the land, 84 per cent was privately owned.65 While no exact data exists, it is estimated that NALCOs overall operations in Koraput as well as for its smelter plant and coal mines in Angul have all together displaced 134 villages, comprising of 6,263 households or 31,325 people. There were several protests against the project in Damanjodi by the affected people. However, the company promised them jobs and a good relocation package, including money for their land. The demands gradually veered towards the promised reparations, and the project authorities were forced to act. Of the 597 families that were initially ousted from Damanjodi, 441 were relocated in Analabadi colony; for this, Analabadi villagers were deprived of their land. About 352 families were offered one job each (mainly as drivers and diggers). Of these, 35 were dalits, 149 tribals, and 168 other castes. Only eight of the employees were women. Overall, every family consisting of 5-15 members received Rs 3,000 per acre, one house consisting of one-and-ahalf rooms, but no farmland. The company paid a compensation package of Rs 1.48 crore for the patta land. No compensation was paid for community property resources (CPR) or government and village lands, on which landless villagers depended for their subsistence. Though the first notification for land take-over was issued in August 1981 and compensation was paid to displaced families in Champapadr and Koraguda villages in 1982, it took more than 20 years to finally shift these villages to the resettlement colony in Damanjodi. By then, the number of people had swelled and there were a significant number of families who simply did not exist in enumeration papers and thus had no right to the resettlement colony.66 The woes of the displaced community did not end with their
MAP 3: NALCOs impact

More than 80,000 people displaced due to the projects
NALCO OPERATIONS (at Koraput and Angul)
Sundargarh
NALCO coal mine NALCO smelter and Mayurbhanj captive power plant
Baleshwar Kendujhargarh Bhadrak
dra par a
Villages displaced - 134 da gu Families displaced - 6,263 rsu Jha Population displaced - 31,325 Debagarh Land acquired - 14,534.52 acre Private lands - 10,426.21 acre* Sambalpur Bargarh Govt. lands - 3,600.31 acre* Sonapur External debt - US $980 million Angul
C H H A T T I S G A R H
Baudh Balangir
Nua pad
Dhenkanal
Jajpur
O R I S S A
Nayagarh
Cuttack
Ken
Paradip Port
Kandhamal
Khurdha Puri Ganjam
Jagatsinghapur
NALCO ash and red mud ponds Kalahandi

Nabarangapur Rayagada Gajapati
Koraput
B A Y O F B E N G A L
NALCO bauxite mining NALCO captive power-plant NALCO refinery, Damanjodi
Malkangiri
A N D H R A P R A D E S H
Vishakhapatnam Port
Source: Compiled by Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
shifting to the new area. The resettlement colony was poorly conceived and lacked basic facilities such as drinking water or educational infrastructure. For example, before being displaced, the people had used the spring water available in their villages. When they shifted, they lost this source; the company had provided only three wells for more than 500 families. In summers, the wells would also dry up. There was only one primary school in the colony. To pursue higher education, students had to travel long distances to other towns. Most of the displaced families living in the colony could not afford the costs involved in these travels. To make matters worse, the resettlement area did not provide for the traditional tribal places of religious worship (sacred groves) or cremation/burial grounds; nor did it consider the needs of tribal councils which were disrupted during the relocation. During the entire displacement and rehabilitation process, NALCO did not bother to consult the affected people and communities, or involve them in the decisionmaking processes. Several years have gone by; the displaced families continue to protest under the banner of NALCO Kshatigrasta Praja Sangh.67 The promises made by the company to provide jobs to the affected people have been forgotten. So far, the company has absorbed 1,094 out of a total of 1,530 substantially affected persons (SAPs) as part of its rehabilitation programme. The people are demanding jobs for the remaining 436 SAPs. Uma Ballay Patnaik, director, NALCO clarifies that it was not possible for the company to take in those persons who were not technically qualified.
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BAPHLIMALI: UAIL GOES FOR BAUXITE

The Paroja Kondha tribe living in Kashipur block of Rayagada district is being asked to give up its land to make way for mining of bauxite by Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL). The government of Orissa entered into a contract with the company, a consortium of Alcan of Canada and Hindalco of India, in 1993. The venture is 100 per cent export-oriented. UAIL plans to mine bauxite from the Baphlimali hills in the area using fully mechanised bauxitemining techniques to recover 196 MT of the mineral. There are contradictory reports on the number of inhabitants who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the project. The companys estimates are extremely low. According to Alcan, only 147 families will be displaced. This number probably reflects the number of families who will be directly forced to relocate. But this is just a tip of iceberg and does not take into account masses of tribals who depend on the land either as small-scale agriculturalists or as landless peasants. UAIL states that there are 1,750 property-holding families in the area. This, again, does not include the majority who are working on land they do not own. In all, UAIL counts 1,900 affected families. In contrast, estimates by local social groups such as the Prakrutika Sampada Suraksha Parishad (PSSP) and other NGOs show that 9,000 people could be affected directly and indirectly. NORAD, the Norwegian international development agency, has released a report indicating that 60,000 people could be affected by the mega bauxite project.68
UAIL is promising employment for each affected propertyowning family. However, this totally excludes the many landless families in the area. In my eyes, it would be appropriate to talk about indirect displacement when we talk about these groups. They are forced out de facto, and the company takes no responsibility for their displacement, says Tarjei Leer-Salvesen, a veteran of the NorWatch campaign and a journalist who has been following the UAIL case. Alcan vice president of planning and strategy, Jeremy Lee Jonas, however assures that landowners or not, they will have compensation. The negative impacts of the project can go well beyond just the human toll. The local environment will be seriously affected. Agricultural land will no longer be cultivable. Hills will be flattened and increased rains will lead to higher siltation in the reservoir that provides water for the region. Several streams that feed the Indravati river would be destroyed and perennial sources of water would dry up. The most visible impact would be the effluent discharge. Dumping discharge into the streams and rivers would raise pollution levels. Facing resistance from local communities, the project has been stalled since inception. The tribals of the area have been mobilised by the PSSP, and have been protesting against the project since 1993 (see Box on page 256: Peoples protest against UAIL). Alcan claims that the project has the support of elected representatives from 23 of the 24 officially project-affected villages; however, the company has not produced any proof that could substantiate this claim.
ASHUTOSH MISHRA
People of Kashipur have successfully mobilised a campaign against Utkal Alumina for more than 10 years
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Peoples protest against UAIL

Kashipur erupts against mining
In 1993, the people of the area met the then chief minister to demand the cancellation of the UAIL project. They used road blockades, public meetings, padyatras (foot marches) and barricades as modes of protest. In Maikanch, on December 16, 2000, police fired on a crowd of 300 protesters, killing three and injuring 30. The day before, Maikanch villagers had stopped political leaders from attending a multi-stakeholder dialogue, which UAIL had organised at Nuagon village. As a result of all this UAIL, which was supposed to begin production in 2002, was forced to reschedule the production deadline to 2005. A fact-finding mission of the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) reported that the tribals of Kashipur block were living under a state of siege. The district administration laid the foundation stone for a police station at D-Karol village, the site of the alumina plant, in September 2004. In December that year, about 1,000 people carried out a roadblock against the proposed station. Eight platoons surrounded them. Amidst abuses hurled back and forth, the police lobbed tear-gas shells and lathi-charged the crowd. For a month afterwards, the reprisals continued.Villagers in the area havent been able to work their fields, or trot off to market, for fear of being picked up by the police. After years of silence, the company has again come into action now. It has put in an application to expand the capacity of its refinery plant from one MT per annum to three MT, and increase output from its bauxite mines from three MT to eight MT even though the project has barely taken off. The authorities organised a public hearing on October 17, 2006 in Tikri, one of the villages affected by the project. The hearing was marked with protests and anger. Many villagers alleged that the officials knew of the discontent and therefore had arranged
the hearing at Tikri, which is 10 km from the site instead of Kucheipadar or Bagrijhola, which were much closer. Many villagers were also not allowed into the meeting. The PSSP, therefore, organised a parallel meeting at Bagrijhola. Villagers from 10 of the 24 villages gathered to rally against the company. Even at the official hearing, anger at UAILs failed promises, at its indifference to popular grievances and at the use of force to stifle protest was in evidence. Speaker after speaker warned company officials not to expect any cooperation from the local people unless UAIL stopped using the police to harass and implicate them in false cases. Even though the project had received the required clearances 11 years ago, neither the refinery nor the mines are operational. In fact, till 2000, no construction had started. The rules governing environment clearances for projects are very clear: clearance granted to any project is valid only for five years within which the construction or operation of the project should commence. Therefore, legally, the environmental clearance for the original project itself has lapsed, and the company needs to get fresh clearances. Instead of doing this, UAIL has started construction for the project and also applied for environmental clearance for expansion. The EIA notification clearly states that expansion is only applicable to an existing operational project and not to a non-operational project. One of the demands made at the Bagrijhola meeting was that the states chief minister, and industries and mines ministers must explain to the people how they were expected to survive after UAIL took away their natural resources. But it doesnt appear that will happen in a hurry. And if the track record is anything to go by, chances of redress for the beleaguered villagers appear slim.
Richard Mahapatra and Ashutosh Mishra, Down To Earth
TALCHERS BANE: MCL AND COAL

Coal mining in Talcher began with underground mines in 1921, and gathered momentum through massive investments in opencast mining in the 60s. The increase in the number of open-cast mines was accompanied by large-scale land acquisition and consequent displacement of people. The Talcher coalfields of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL), a subsidiary of CIL, are located in Angul district. The coalfields seven open-cast mines and three underground mines are spread over an area of 2,100 sq km.69 The company had acquired 2,575 ha of land by the year 2000. Of this, 1,175 ha were government-owned land, and most of the rest was private land.70 Twenty-three villages were affected by the underground mines, while 38 villages suffered due to the opencast projects. One of the villages affected by open-cast mining has already been displaced; seven more villages are to be displaced. According to one estimate, over 35,000 people living in 27 villages have already been affected in and around six open-cast mines. One of the worst affected due to the displacement have been the women. According to an old tribal woman, Dukhi Naik of Hensmul village, We used to earn enough by collecting and
selling forest produce from the nearby village. Even after the death of my husband, I was depending on the forest resources for a living. But Dukhis financial problems have been aggravated with the rapid clearing of the forests for open-cast mining. As Dukhi was landless, she did not receive any compensation or rehabilitation assistance either. Sita Naik of Lacchmanpur village used to work with her husband in their fields and sometimes as daily wage labourers. The government acquired her land in 1988. Unlike Dukhi, her husband received a compensation of Rs 15,000, which was spent on the daughters wedding and to pay the medical bills for her husbands cataract treatment. Sita says, I have not got a job under the rehabilitation package as the land record was under my husbands name. Today, without her land and a job, she is as penniless as Dukhi. According to a survey conducted in 2000, over 80 per cent of the women in affected villages felt that the process of displacement led to disintegration of socio-cultural bases; 90 per cent believed that their conditions have worsened. The women are clear: they did not benefit from the companys resettlement and rehabilitation package, which was targeted only towards men. In villages like Padmabadipur, land was acquired by the
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AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Spread over 2,10,000 ha, the Talcher coalfields have affected 61 villages rehabilitation and resettlement have been given a short shrift
company in 1979; but compensations were doled out after a lapse of 26 years. Out of a total of 3,415 families identified for resettlement, 1,678 families are yet to be resettled. Sources say oustees in villages like Jilinda, Rackus, Gopalprasad and Soloda have been demanding jobs in lieu of their land; MCL has not been able to meet this demand. In fact, villagers of Jilinda want 309 jobs before the new mine, Bhubaneswari, opens. But MCL wants to take up the employment issue only after the mine comes up. A peoples struggle has been going on in the area: the objective is to get a proper rehabilitation and compensation package from MCL. In 2006, protests by the local people broke out frequently and armed police was deployed to bring the situation under control. The company has incurred losses of around Rs 51 crore due to these stirs, while the states losses hover around Rs 64 crore. The mines which have been badly affected by the oustees stir are Hingula, Bharatpur, Jagannath, Ananata and Kalinga, which together produce more than a lakh tonne of coal daily. A highlevel Rehabilitation Advisory Committee (RAC) was formed which suggested 6,026 names for job rehabilitation. However, even after regular intervention by the RAC, the MCL has failed to provide the required number of jobs. The RAC has now been dissolved, and a new committee has taken its place. But its slow pace of work has aggravated the situation.
JAGATSINGHPUR: THE POSCO STRUGGLE

The people of Jagatsinghpur district in coastal Orissa have been engaged in a protest movement against Pohang Iron & Steel Company (POSCO) since June 2005. POSCO-India Private Limited is a subsidiary of the Korean company POSCO, the worlds fourth largest steel producer. POSCO signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the government of Orissa to set up a 12-MT per annum steel plant in Jagatsinghpur, at an estimated investment of US $12 billion.71 The project will also include three mines in Keonjhar and Sundargarh districts, for which a separate MoU will be signed, even to the extent of permitting the company to export iron ore. POSCO had initially requested 2,025 ha of land to build the steel plant and a captive port, 10 km north of the port of Paradip. It subsequently settled for 1,620 ha to reduce potential displacement. Of this revised area, 1,439 ha is government land, while the rest is private. Initially, state officials assumed that only 341 ha of the governments portion were forest land; but they soon discovered that more hectares of forests would have to be razed to make way for the plant. This has led to a tussle between the state revenue and forestry departments. The proposed POSCO plant would displace nearly 22,000 people of 3,700 families residing in 11 villages of Dhinkia, Nuagaon
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REUTERS
People say no: POSCO, the biggest foreign investment in the country, has been greeted with protests
and Gadakujang gram panchayats.72 Most of the people in this area are opposed to the project because the government land promised to the company is also used by 10,000 betel vine owners to grow betel; the crop fetches up to Rs 50 crore annually. The betel crop ensures that no one is unemployed in the area; nobody dies of starvation. The people feel that the government has no right to sell the land and make so many people unemployed. The government, however, contends the project would affect only 500 families, and create thousands of jobs.73 The POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (PPSS), an organisation of local people, has been spearheading the movement against the company. The movement is witnessing voluntary participation from the old, women and children. There seems to be no requirement for a leader to lead it. I would be the first to sacrifice my life if the government takes an inch of land for POSCO, announces 86-year-old Jhaji Samal of Govindpuri village. According to the people, the project would destroy those forests in the area which had protected the people during the cyclone of 1999. The PPSS has proposed two alternate sites for the project Ambiki village and Budha Garia where no human habitation would be affected. But the government seems adamant on the original site, and claims to have formulated a policy to compensate the betel vine owners. POSCO says it would acquire additional land to compensate the villagers. A spokesperson for POSCOs Indian unit said this
move would cost the company about Rs 63 lakh (US $1,40,000), peanuts considering the scale of the project. The company also announced a special scheme for betel farmers. Under it, cultivators will get alternative land for relocation of their vines. For those who wish to continue in the same area, land suitable for vine cultivation will be provided within or outside the project area. Besides, adequate assistance will be extended to them to restart cultivation. The scheme will be in addition to the rehabilitation and resettlement policy of the state government. But a spell of uncertainty has been cast over the proposed project after the visit of the Union minister of commerce in July 2006, and his reported statement that it is not desirable to grant a mining lease to POSCO. The ministry is also opposed to the move to allow POSCO to export iron ore. The Orissa government, after much deliberation, has approved and forwarded POSCOs application for a prospecting licence (PL) of the Khandadhar iron ore mines in Sundergarh, to the Union mining ministry. The company has, among others, applied for the remaining deposits at Khandadhar, spread over 6,200 ha, which has an estimated iron ore reserve of about 200 MT. The company has applied for PL for two more mines Thakurani in Keonjhar and Malingtoli in Sundergarh. The state government has also been asked by the Centre to fast-track the POSCO project. Work on the project was originally scheduled to start in April, with the first phase to be completed by 2010. The company now
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hopes to start earthwork for the first phase from October 2007. The proposed mine lease of the company ran into further controversy on account of two litigations filed by the public sector company, Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd. (KIOCL). The company challenged the states decision to hand over the mining lease at Khandadhar and Barsuan in Sundargarh district to the Korean giant. According to the officials of KIOCL, it had applied for prospective mining licence for the above sites prior to POSCOs application and had also deposited Rs 1.1 crore. The state government, without considering the application, had arbitrarily taken the decision to allot 6,500 ha of land in the mining area to POSCO. The company prayed for quashing of the lease. On the basis of this litigation, the Orissa High Court directed the state government to maintain status quo on grant of mining lease on February 27, 2007. It also issued notices to the state government and POSCO directing them to file counters by March 12. The public hearing for the environmental clearance of the project, organised by the Orissa Pollution Control Board on April 15, 2007, was a good indication of what the people thought. A vocal section of the crowd wanted officials to answer a simple question: What is the use of a public hearing when there is no peace in the project area? The locals have, time and again, raised questions of how the loss of their livelihoods would be compensated, only to receive unsatisfactory answers. The locals are also employing less conventional methods of resisting the project. In May 2007, three POSCO officials were kidnapped people claimed that these officials were trying to persuade them to give up their land. But despite the protest and agitation against the company, it has received environmental clearance in August 2007.
IRON ORE IRE: KALINGANAGAR, KEONJHAR

Kalinganagar, an industrial hub in Jajpur district, has been witnessing intense industrial activity, with 13 mega enterprises having lined up to set shop here. These include Tata Steel, Bhusan Steels, Jindal Steel, MESCO, Nilanchal Ispat Nigam Limited (under SAIL) and Maharashtra Seamless, among others. Thousands of hectares of land have been acquired by the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO) at rock-bottom prices from local tribals; these lands have been sold off to the companies at higher rates. The people, mainly Munda tribals, have been resisting the land acquisition process, compensation packages and the establishment of a Tata Steel plant in the area. Several rounds of dialogues between the people, the company and the government have failed. Events finally reached a flashpoint on January 2, 2006: Tata Steel, with the help of 15 platoons of police, started levelling the land forcibly acquired by it in the villages of Gobarghati, Nuagaon and Chandia. Thousands of tribals peacefully protested this move and demanded that the authorities stop the acquisition. When their demands were not heeded, the tribals tried to force their way on to the land. According to the police, the mob became violent, pelted stones, attacked and axed a policeman to death. The police was forced to retaliate: 12 tribals, including three women and a school student, were shot down. According to the people, the whole episode was planned. While the company and the government were fully prepared, the tribals had no inkling of the companys plans to start work. The people discount the police version which says that the tribals had come prepared for the violence; they contend that the people retaliated when the police began firing. All the persons killed were shot either at their head, chest or waist at point blank range which raises the question why the police did not shoot at the legs to disperse the mob. The incident has steeled the tribals resolve. If given an option of choosing between a better compensation package or no to the company, they are clear: they will chose the latter. In Keonjhar, a proposed plant by Lakshmi Mittal is facing the same steely resolve. Barely a few weeks after Arcelor Mittal signed an MoU with the Orissa government in January 2007 to set up a 12-MT steel plant in the district, the project has run into rough weather. Phulamani, a tribal who will be affected by the proposed project, says: We will not allow Mittal steel to come up here. We will not give away our lands as they are our only source of livelihood. No matter what money the government or Mittal steel gives, we will fight against it till the end.74 This is just one among the angry voices of thousands of villagers at Patna tehsil in Keonjhar. Instead of their land, the locals want the government to give barren land to the company. These angry villagers from 17 villages demonstrated at a protest rally to the Keonjhar district collectors office, demanding that their land should not be acquired for the plant. B B Mohapatra, collector, said: In the memorandum they gave us,
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Betel farmers are likely to be adversely affected by the project as they use the government land, under proposal for acquisition by POSCO
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MONA DAS
Killing fields: 12 tribals were shot to death in Kalinganagar on January 2, 2006 a violent outcome of the protest against industrialisation
they demand that since it is a multi-crop fertile irrigated land, this should not be handed over for the project. Mr Mohapatra clarified that there was no communication from the state government as yet on acquisition or requirement of land.
VEDANTA: THE NEMESIS OF NIYAMGIRI

The Niyamgiri hill in Kalahandi district is a wildlife sanctuary and an elephant reserve. Seventy-five per cent of the area is covered with thick forests, with more than 300 species of vegetation, including about 50 species of medicinal plants. Many of these species are listed as endangered by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. Niyamgiri also has a number of perennial hill streams which serve the irrigation and drinking water needs of the tribals living in the foothills. The Vamsadhara and Nagvalli rivers emanate from this hill: lakhs of people in south Orissa and Andhra Pradesh depend on these rivers. According to Kanchi Kohli of Kalpavriksh, an NGO working on environment and research advocacy, the hill is also considered sacred by the Dongria Khond tribals, who call it Niyam Penu (god). Unfortunately, the area also has rich deposits almost 195 MT of bauxite. In June 2002, villagers of Lanjigarh in this region were served with a land acquisition and gram sabha notice for a proposed alumina refinery project. It was said that the project would be set up by UK-based Sterlite Industries and its group company, Vedanta. Way back in 1997, Sterlite had signed an agreement with the
Orissa government for a mining project. The notice of the district administration proclaimed that when the project materialised, 12 villages would be razed, 60 families would be uprooted and 302 would lose their farmlands. Protests began almost immediately: a mass movement under the banner of the tribal-dominated Niyamgiri Surakhya Samiti began. The objective was to protect the forest, land and water of the area, and its slogan was a simple 'Vedanta hatao' (Remove Vedanta). In 2003, the administration evicted 64 tribal families of Jaganathpur in say activists complete violation of constitutional provisions against alienation of tribal land. Villagers were given no compensation because their fields were listed as government revenue land. In June 2003, the Orissa government signed a fresh MoU with Sterlite for a three-MT per annum bauxite mine on the Niyamgiri hill, along with an alumina refinery, a captive power plant and an alumina smelter. According to the company, around 1,444 ha of land was needed, including about 59 ha of forest land. Despite this, and the opposition and doubts expressed by environmentalists on the ecological feasibility of the project, the company was granted environmental clearance by the MoEF's technical committee. However, the project ran into trouble with the Supreme Court-appointed Central Empowered Committee (CEC) opposing it. The CEC listed the following adverse impacts of the project75: Loss of biodiversity Destruction of water-recharging capacity of the hill and desertification of perennial streams
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Damage to the Tel river: The project's proposed sourcing of water from this river will create hardships for the people, as this river is an important source of water for Bolangir district. Moreover, the river has very little flow. Unsatisfactory compensation to the displaced: The rehabilitation colony was established close to the reserved forests of Niyamgiri and no land was given to villagers for agriculture Forced evictions: Sixty-four households of Jaganathpur village, most of which were Kandha tribals, had been cultivating a piece of revenue land Khasra No 186 for generations. Encroachment cases were filed against them and they were evicted by force without any compensation and in violation of the special protection provided to scheduled tribes. On September 21, 2005, the CEC recommended the revocation of environmental clearances given to Vedanta Alumina Ltd.76 It was very critical of the company which it felt had provided misleading information, and the MoEF for deliberately overlooking them. Some of its observations were77: Since the project involved the use of forest land, the environmental clearance should have been granted by the MoEF only after the project obtained a permit under the Forest Conservation Act. But the company did not file its proposal under the Act. Vedanta deliberately and consciously concealed the involvement of the forest land in the project. In the acquisition notice dated June 6, 2002 issued by the district collector, Kalahandi, it is clearly mentioned that 118 acre (47.75 ha) of forest land is
included in the project site. But in its application for environmental clearance and also during the examination of the proposal, Vedanta concealed this vital fact. In violation of the FCA 1980, the project has been split into alumina refinery project and bauxite mining project, even though bauxite mining is an integral part of the refinery project. The MoEF accorded environmental clearance despite being fully aware that forest land would be used for mining at Niyamgiri if the alumina refinery was to be established at Lanjigarh. The construction work for the refinery was started on the project site much before environmental clearance was accorded on September 22, 2004. A June 2006 study undertaken by the Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun, at the behest of the Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) of the MoEF warns that the threats posed by the proposed project are serious and will lead to irreversible changes in the ecological characteristics of the area. The report titled Studies on impact of proposed Lanjigarh bauxite mining on biodiversity, has pointed out various kinds of environmental degradations such as geomorphologic changes, landscape changes, loss of forests and loss of flora and fauna.78 However, the institute tagged a supplementary report in October 2006, which included a Rs 42-crore plan for mitigation of impacts on wildlife. Based on these two reports, the FAC recommended diversion of forest land for mining in the region. The presence of wildlife in the area has also been questioned: the projects EIA report says that a primary survey has failed to
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Bleak future: Supreme Courts Central Empowered Committee has recommended revoking the environment clearance given to Vedanta, which is now embroiled in a court case
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In most of the cases cited above, the root cause for the rising discontent against mining and mega industrial projects has been the failure of the government to satisfactorily rehabilitate and resettle the displaced people. The fact that a major proportion of the displaced are tribals depending on forests and land for their sustenance, compounds the problem; resettling tribals and integrating them into the mainstream needs to be done with caution, and the governments ham-handed efforts have been anything but. The result: despite boasting of the best R&R policy in the country, Orissa remains in the grip of numerous agitations, old as well as new.
A QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE
One of the key reasons why the state faces so many environmental issues and challenges is its poor institutional framework. There is no dearth of legislations; implementation is the problem. With limited resources at the disposal of the OSPCB as well as the regional arm of the IBM, monitoring of 300-plus mines has been an uphill task. Environmental compliance, as a result, is extremely poor. But according to the Board, compliance by the mining sector is not a problem in the state. Its report on Orissa states that all the big mines monitored by the regional offices comply to sanctioned conditions of clearance and consent. No serious violations/impacts and pollution have been reported in the recent past. Most importantly, the OSPCB talks of only monitoring 154 mines, when there are more than 300 mines in the state. The Boards views notwithstanding, officially there have been cases of violation: of the 48 mines operating in Keonjhar, 10 were refused consent to operate by the Board for violation of different provisions of the Air and Water Acts.83 Top officials of SAIL, TISCO, Hindustan Zinc, Orissa Mining Corporation, Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys Ltd, Orissa Cement Ltd, M L Rungta and others have faced prosecution for mining illegally in forest land without proper approval of the MoEF. About 50 mines were operating in Orissas forests in clear violation of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.84 Under the current regulatory system, small or minor mines with less than five ha area are not covered under the compliance management system. In addition, it is estimated that over 1,000 mines are operating illegally in the state and do not come under the scanner of IBM or the OSPCB. From an environmental perspective, this means a very large percentage of mines are operating without environmental safeguards and this represents a significant gap in the regulatory regime. It is also suspected that a large number of large, small and medium-sized enterprises in the sector are operating without environmental supervision.85 It is quite clear that mining in Orissa is a major socio-economic and environmental challenge. So far, the track record of the mining industry has been very poor, in all aspects, whether it is rehabilitation and resettlement or environmental performance. People do not trust either the companies or the government. The Orissa government will have to reassess the role of mining and mineral-based industries in its future growth paradigm.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Out, damned spots? Vedantas EIA report did not record any wildlife in its primary survey, but a photographers camera captured a full-grown leopard in the area
indicate the presence of all the mammalian species that the region is said to hold. But even as this was being debated, Down To Earth secured clinching evidence of the areas wildlife by photographing a leopard in the wild. The Vedanta case has also created an uproar in the assembly with the opposition accusing the ruling party of selling out to a multinational company and harming the state. In December 2005, hundreds of tribals from Rayagada and Kalahandi districts staged a demonstration in front of the state assembly in Bhubaneshwar urging the government to shelve the project.79 Activists also travelled to London from Orissa to confront Vedanta chairperson Anil Agarwal on his company's human and environmental rights record at its annual general meeting in August 2006. Agarwal and his chief executive Kuldip Kaura faced a barrage of questions from aggrieved shareholders and activists. Agarwal said the company had followed all rules and regulations, and that it would accept any decision reached by the court.80 Denying any wrongdoing at Lanjigarh, the company has said it has neither alienated tribal land nor caused any damage to forests.81 But its statements are suspect: it has been denying that construction work at the site is in progress, while photographic evidence suggests that the company has almost completed construction work and has been planning to commence trial production by procuring raw materials from outside the state.82 Presently, the case relating to the diversion of the forest in the Niyamgiri hill lies with the Supreme Court. And the protests of the people continue.
262
Rajasthan and Gujarat
ajasthan is the state with the maximum number of mine leases in India 1,324 leases for major minerals, 10,851 for minor minerals and 19,251 quarry licenses for mining stones.1 Its most forested district, Udaipur, is also its most mined. The state holds reserves of 44 major and 22 minor minerals.2 According to the IBM, the state has 11 per cent of Indias limestone, 83 per cent of its gypsum and 48 per cent of its copper ore reserves.3 In addition, in 2004-05, Rajasthan was the only producer of garnet, jasper, selenite, wollastonite and zinc concentrates; the leading producer of calcite, lead concentrate, ball clay, fireclay, ochre, phosphorite, silver and steatite; and the second largest producer of asbestos, fluoride (graded), feldspar, copper concentrate and silica sand. Production of the states most important major and minor minerals has remained relatively constant between 2001-05.
Rajasthan is a major producer of non-metallic minerals accounting for about 23 per cent of Indias total production.4 At seven per cent, the states contribution to metallic minerals is much lower.5 The major non-metallic mines are in Rajasmand, Ajmer, Udaipur, Alwar and Dungarpur (see Map on page 264: Forests and minerals Rajasthan).6 In 2004-05, the value of minerals produced in the state was Rs 2,919 crore four per cent of Indias total mineral production, roughly the same contribution as in the previous two years.7 However, the value shows a continuously increasing trend in the state it was Rs 1,752 crore in 1997-98, and has grown by more than 66 per cent since.8 Rajasthan is also the leading producer of minor minerals. In 2004-05, of the total value of minerals produced in the state, as much as 57 per cent was generated by minor minerals (Rs 1,676 crore) (see Graph 1 on page 265: Value of mineral production).
SUNNY SEBASTIAN
Rajasthan is an important producer of minor minerals and accounts for a major chunk of the marble produced in the country
263
MAP: Forests and minerals Rajasthan

Udaipur, the most mined district, is also the most forested
nd a
PUNJAB
Protests: Have been against stone quarries and marble and limestone mines
Ghag har
M
ar
ka
Ganganagar
HARYANA
Hanumangarh
Pakistan
Bikaner Churu Jhunjhunu
RAJASTHAN
Sikar Jaisalmer Nagaur
Sambhar Lake
Alwar Jaipur
Ba
Banganga
Bharatpur
Ya mu na
Jodhpur
Lun i
Dausa
nd i
Gambhir
Dh
Karauli
un d
Dhaulpur Open forests Dense forests River
I
Barmer
ni
a
Suk ai
Ajmer
Khari
Tonk
na s
Sawai Madhopur
Ch
am
ba
Lu
Pali
Ja w al
Kali Sindh
Bhilwara
Banas
Gudha dam
Ba
d Sin
Ba nd i
Copper Lead
Baran
Parwar
Bundi Kota
Ba
Jalor
Rajsamand
ba rm at i
Asbestos Dolomite
wa Bet
Sirohi
Chittaurgar
An
nd i
Sa
ach Ber
Rana Pratap Sagar Gandhi Sagar

So u
Gypsum Kaolin
Dhebar Lake
Udaipur
Ba na s
Jhalawar
Limestone Mica
Sar
ti swa
Dungarpur
Granite
Banswara
m Cha
GUJARAT
MADHYA PRADESH
Silica sand Marble
According to the Planning Commission, the royalty received by the state government was around Rs 400 crore, Rs 458 crore and Rs 590 crore respectively in 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05.9 Revenue from mining accounts for about three per cent of the states total revenue.10 Lead, zinc and limestone contribute the most to the total royalty received (see Table 1: Royalty contribution). Though minor minerals contribute more than 50 per cent in terms of value of mineral production, their contribution to royalty is just five per cent.11 Rajasthan is one of the seven states in India that has districts characterised as high potential by the IBM: more than 100 mining
leases have been granted in these districts.12 These districts Ajmer, Bhilwara and Udaipur contribute 14 per cent of the mining leases and about 18 per cent of the total area under mining in Rajasthan (see Table 2: The mining districts). In 2003, Rajasthan had 1,312 major mineral leases (excluding coal), which was roughly 15 per cent of all of Indias major mineral mining leases.13 The area under major mineral mines was 1,34,831 ha.14 Of the major minerals, maximum mine leases have been granted for steatite (311 leases); these account for about 18 per cent of the total area under mine leases for major minerals in the state.15 Gypsum has the next largest area under lease (16 per cent),
bal
264
MINING IN THE STATES: RAJASTHAN AND GUJARAT
followed by limestone (15 per cent).16 The number of mining leases granted in Rajasthan, as well as the total area under these leases, shows an overall decreasing trend (see Graph 2: Mining leases). But major minerals do not reflect the true picture of mining in Rajasthan; minor minerals and stone quarries do. Rajasthan has thousands of unorganised mines, which can be as small as onetwentieth of a hectare (see Box on page 266: Unaccounted). The state has been attracting a number of public and private
mining companies, including the worlds largest multinational mining giants BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, who in 1998 conducted aerial surveys for base metals in the state.17 Rajasthans zinc production is a boon for Hindustan Zinc Ltd: its current annual production is four lakh tonne of zinc, 0.85 lakh tonne of lead, and 100 tonne of silver.18 Cairn Energy India Pvt Ltd, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Oil India Limited and Phoenix are actively mining for lignite in the state. These four companies are
GRAPH 1: Value of mineral production

Minor minerals account for more than 50 per cent
TABLE 2: The mining districts

Three districts have more than 100 mining leases each
District No of leases 209 151 94 54 76 13 90 22 19 44 66 177 % of total leases 15.9 11.5 7.2 4.1 5.8 1.0 6.9 1.7 1.4 3.4 5.0 13.5 Area (hectares) 8,591 8,486 13,415 7,003 5,210 8,788 8,043 5,465 9,980 4,157 6,581 19,839 % of total area under lease 6.4 6.3 9.9 5.2 3.9 6.5 6.0 4.1 7.4 3.1 4.9 14.7
Phosphorite 7% Limestone 9% Lead and zinc 16%
Ajmer Bhilwara Bikaner

Others 10%
Chittorgarh Dungarpur Ganganagar Jaipur Jaisalmer Nagaur
Minor minerals 58%
Pali Rajasmand Udaipur
Source: Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases and Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 7, 18-20
TABLE 1: Royalty contribution

Lead, zinc and limestone lead in terms of percentage contribution to total royalty from mining
2002-03 Iron ore Copper Limestone Dolomite Lignite Rock phosphate Lead and zinc Others Minor minerals 0.003 0.5 23.4 0.2 0.6 5.3 21.3 43.6 5.1 2003-04 0.005 0.5 20.8 0.1 0.7 5.9 22.5 43.9 5.5 2004-05 0.025 0.6 19.8 0.1 0.5 5.2 25.6 42.2
GRAPH 2: Mining leases

Number and area under mine leases is decreasing
2,000 1,800 1578 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 1995-96 1998-99 No. of leases 1999-00 2000-01 Years 2001-02 2002-03 1,499 1,350 1,295 1,299 1,307 1312 1428 1412 1384 1348 1832
Area under leases (in '00 hectares)
5.9 Source: Analysis based on data from various publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Source: Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi
265
Unaccounted
The minor minerals sector in Rajasthan is a grey area
Rajasthan is best known for its production of marble, sandstone and other stones, but a large proportion of the production of these minerals does not feature in official records. The Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) does not collect detailed information on minor minerals and most of Rajasthans mining falls under this category. Individual state governments are supposed to maintain data as well as regulate the production of these minerals. However, most governments, including Rajasthan, do not do so. Apart from inadequate data, regulation of these mines is also an issue. The Rajasthan Pollution Control Board regulates only those mines that have a lease area of more than five ha. The numerous small mines, therefore, fall outside its purview. The Mine Labour Protection Campaign, an organisation working among workers in Rajasthans mines, says that in 2003-04, the state had 7,765 minor mineral leases covering 54,390 ha and an additional 15,786 quarry licences (see Table: Minor mineral leases and area).1 Rajasthan produces 10 per cent of the worlds and 70 per cent of Indias output of sandstone.2 Officially, in 2003-04, there were 1,199 leases for sandstone covering 20,713 ha. There are no accounts of the large number of illegal sandstone mines in the state.
TABLE: Minor mineral leases and area

Rajasthan has over 7,000 minor mineral leases covering an area of more than 50,000 ha
Mineral Number of leases Area (in hectares) 3,075.71 20,713.44 2,335.51 9,049.51 14,244.04 580.25 386.63 620.92
Marble Sandstone Limestone Masonry stone Limestone (B) Brick earth Serpentine Granite
2,232 1,199 207 2,661 352 20 362 402
Source: Anon, 2007, Database, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, http://www.minelabour.org/Database.PDF, as viewed on March 26, 2007
also exploring for oil in Barmer; 81 wells of depths up to four km have been drilled.19 Current reserves include 300 MT of crude oil, 11,790 million cubic metre of gas, and more than 47 MT of heavy oil.20 The state government believes the reserves could provide one lakh barrels of oil per day for 21 years.21 The state is also drawing sand miners. With the ban on sand mining in the neighbouring states of Haryana, Punjab and Delhi, demand for bajri sand is putting immense pressure on farmlands in Kotputli tehsil, Jaipur district. In 2005-06, 16 sand mining operations opened in Kotputli; the mines are using 13,000 litre of water per hour, or 560 cubic metre per day, which has led to a substantial drop in water levels in local wells.22
Unorganised: Jodhpurs sandstone mines

Mine owners prefer small mines to stay outside the laws reach
Mine owners of Rajasthan have employed an ingenious system of ensuring their operations remain below the radar of any mining regulations: divide mines into small enough plots where industrial standards do not apply. This is the case with the sandstone mines that stretch for 25,000 ha in Jodhpur district. Here, sandstone quarries may be as small as 200 x 100 feet and employ as few as five to eight people who make Rs 30-50 per day (for men) or Rs 15-30 per day (for women). Because these mines operate beyond the law, workers rights are not recognised. Basic facilities such as toilets and water do not exist, nor do safety procedures or compensation for accidents. This last violation is especially cruel as the numbers of work-related accidents and fatalities are high.
Rekha Wazir, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur
WORKING CONDITIONS: DEPLORABLE

There are now over 2.5 million people working in Rajasthans mining sector, many driven there by the states persistent drought that has wrought havoc on rural communities.23 In fact, mining in Rajasthan relies heavily on exploiting marginalised communities: 95 per cent of the workforce are dalits or tribals; 37 per cent are women, and another 15 per cent are children.24 With little political representation, the mining sector has succeeded in implementing a system that relies on unfair wages Rs 50-70 per day for men; Rs 35-55 per day for women; and Rs 25-35 per day for children.25 Basic workers rights such as access to water and toilet facilities, social security, safety equipment and compensation in the case of injury or death do not exist.26 In 2002, the National Campaign on Labour Rights, organised by the Delhi-based Centre for Education and Communication,
released a damning report on the mining industry in Rajasthan, after having visited mines in Makrana, Barmer and Jodhpur (see Box: Unorganised: Jodhpurs sandstone mines). In Makrana, the best of the three, there was an average of one death a day; mineworkers did not receive pay slips, provident fund, pensions, gratuity or maternity benefits; safety regulations were not followed; blasting operations had not been updated; and there
266
Mining cooperatives the way ahead?

Rajasthan is experimenting with a cooperative system
A few years ago, the Mine Labour Protection Campaign set out to improve the working conditions and the quality of life for residents of Sanfa village, Barmer. The village of 754 people and 138 households is in the south-west of Rajasthan, bordered by Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and Pakistan largely desert with little and erratic rainfall, low literacy rates (25 per cent), and no sewage or water system. The villages primary occupation is agriculture, although this is only conducted four months of the year and yields are low. Because Barmer has reserves of 10 major and minor minerals, mining provides the second largest industry for Sanfa residents. There are about 20 mines operating in the area, which employ about 300 people at Rs 80 per 100 khande. The mines are small less than 15 persons per mine unorganised, and therefore without any occupational standards, safety regulations, medical care or compensation.
After visiting the region and organising meetings with mineworkers, 21 people agreed in late 2002 to start a mining cooperative, and in November 2002 they registered the Sanfa Khan Majdoor Theka Samiti. The cooperative applied for lease for mining masonry stone three km from Sanfa, which was granted in May 2003 along with the clearances from the forest department and the district collector. The cooperative has been turning a profit since it became operational in 2003. There are now 14 mining cooperatives in Rajasthan: six are profitably operational, and the remaining are waiting for leases. The wage of mineworkers in these cooperatives is about Rs 140 per day, and their jobs are secure for the life of the mining lease 20 years. Furthermore, cooperatives provide their workers with health facilities, and roles in the decision-making process; the profits are used to provide services for women and children in the communities (such as education), and no children work in these mines.
was no connection to workers organisations or unions.27 According to the Mines Labour Protection Campaign, there are three deaths every day from work-related illnesses like silicosis and tuberculosis.28 In the first six months of 1995, there were 130 mining deaths.29 Most of these were resolved through union leaders; mines do not usually involve the authorities, which has led to families receiving work security promises and some meagre compensations.30 The Gramin Vikas Vigyan Samiti (GRAVIS), a Jodhpur-based NGO, in collaboration with the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), Delhi, carried out two independent surveys among mineworkers in Rajasthan. The first study in 1994 found about 10 per cent of the mineworkers examined suffering from silicosis. A second study was conducted in 1996 at the sandstone mines in Jodhpur which included an elaborate medical examination, lung function test and chest X-rays. Out of the 288 workers examined, 14 per cent were found to be suffering from severe silicosis and 28 per cent were suffering from silicosis of less severity. If these numbers are indicative of mines throughout the state, then an estimated 800,000 workers might be affected.31 In 1997, 25 per cent of open-cast mineworkers in Bijolia had silicosis, bronchitis, asthma or tuberculosis, while 50 per cent had malaria, a result of open-cast mining lending itself to easy breeding grounds.32 The noise levels, at 96-125 db, violated the 75 db limit.33 In March 2004, the Central government ordered the state to close 300 illegal marble mines in Makrana citing failure to implement proper safety and security measures.
Environment Report of the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board says: Out of the leases of 2005, about 30 per cent (around 2,700) are manually operated. In addition to it, there are about 15,000 manually operated quarries. All these mines and quarries and the illegal mines have no mechanism in place to implement environment protection measures.34 In the report, the Board finds that land degradation is the greatest environmental threat from non-metallic mining, and that the most environmentally critical mining area is Ramganj Mandi and Jhalawar. Rajasthan has 32,05,120 ha of forest land which is over nine per cent of the states land area.35 The National Centre for Advocacy Studies reports that about 4,996 ha of this forest land has been converted for mining since 1980.36 In 1996, the Supreme Court (SC) banned all non-forest activities on forest land; the order covered 2,000 mines and quarries over 50,000 ha.37 Mining
All above the law

Illegal mining is a major problem
The Rajasthan State Pollution Board has said in its State of the Environment Report 2006 that illegal mining of feldspar, quartz, sandstone, slate stone and masonry stone is on the rise in the state.1 Illegal mines, it continues, have no mechanism in place to implement environmental protection measures. 2 There are also cases where the government allows mines to operate illegally. Mining for asbestos is banned in India,3 but Rajasthan continued to produce asbestos in 2004-05.4 This is not the only case: each time the state issues a mining lease for a forest area, it violates the Central governments directives. In 2005, in response to the proliferation of illegal mining and the states continued policy of issuing licenses in violation of the Centres laws, the Supreme Court put a stay on all mining licenses issued in Rajasthan after December 16, 2002.5
FORESTS: SYSTEMATIC DENUDATION

Mining has inflicted a body blow to Rajasthans forests and land resources as well. Legal mining operates in the state with little government oversight and illegal mining is rampant land degradation and water and air pollution, therefore, plague the mining regions (see Box: All above the law). The 2006 State of the
267
Playing with fire

Rajasthan continues to dabble with asbestos despite worldwide bans on the mineral
All types of asbestos cause cancer Exposure to chrysotile increases the risk of cancer1
World Health Organization (WHO)
a decision to ban asbestos is not simple. Whereas crocidolite and amosite appear to be strongly linked to disease, chrysotile is not2
Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM)
With 40 countries having banned asbestos and the International Labor Organization and WHO recommending an end to its use, it is surprising that countries still argue that asbestos is safe.Yet, this is what India and many others continue to do. While a ban on mining asbestos was imposed in India in 1986, it only applied to the renewal or granting of new leases. India continues to use asbestos products, which can
In India, asbestos is mined mostly in Rajasthan, which has 54 per cent of the countrys resources
seriously affect the health of users. And now it is considering lifting the ban on chrysotile. Last year, the Union ministry of mines directed the IBM to work with the Central Pollution Control Board to determine what workplace safety safeguards must be implemented so that the ban could be lifted.3 Around the world, 125 million people are exposed to asbestos in the workplace, and around 100,000 people die each year from asbestos-related diseases resulting from occupational exposures.4 Additionally, thousands of deaths from non-workplace exposure occur each year.5 In India, domestic consumption of asbestos amounted to about 86,000 tonne in 2003-04, and it was used up almost entirely for asbestos-cement and asbestos-based products manufacturing.6 Mining of asbestos occurs mostly in Rajasthan, which has 54 per cent of Indias asbestos resources; the remaining reserves are in Karnataka (45 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand (one per cent altogether).7 In 2004-05, almost the entire production (5,619 tonne) was of amphibole asbestos; the remaining 86 per cent came from chrysotile.8 The number of mines is decreasing as a result of the 1986 ban, but Rajasthan still has five-six operational mines. The biggest threat to workers, however, lies not in the mines, but in the mills. The milling process accounts for two-thirds of the total production.9 Unfortunately, much of this is unorganised and lacks any health safeguards. According to Iqbal Ahmad, co-author of a new study on airborne asbestos in the unorganised sectors in India, the number of unorganised asbestos mills is probably around 200, many employing only five-15 people, mostly women who often have to bring their young children to the workplace. Both workers and their children suffer high exposure to the dust in the mills.10 The IBM, however, persists in downplaying and misrepresenting the risk asbestos poses. According to it: The incidence of severe asbestosis has been declining for years and should continue to do so because of dust control in the workplace.11 But, as Ahmad points out, the government has completely failed to control dust and exposure in the unorganised sector. While the IBM says that minerals and chemicals containing 0.1 per cent or more silica are considered carcinogenic12, the WHO maintains that there is no threshold for the carcinogenic effects of asbestos and that the most efficient way to eliminate asbestos-related disease is to stop using all types of asbestos.13 There is also the question of a states responsibility towards other countries. Canada, for instance, has come under fire for continuing to mine and export chrysotile. According to MiningWatch Canada, Virtually all of Canadas asbestos is exported to developing countries like India, Indonesia and Thailand. But it is not only the West that profits from exporting carcinogenic materials. In its Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, the IBM says: Results obtained so far (from research) suggest that chrysotile was less dangerous than amphibole asbestos. Why, then, is India exporting amphibole? In 2003-04, India exported 190 tonne of the mineral to China. India also exports chrysotile and other asbestos, and their primary buyers are other developing countries, primarily China and Bangladesh.
268
P MADHAVAN
A campaign dies
An international campaign to stop mining in protected areas whimpers out
In 2003, there was an international campaign to stop illegal mining in the Sariska Tiger Reserve, the Jamwa Ramgarh Wildlife Sanctuary, and the Kaila Devi Sanctuary. The media lapped it all up, and the campaign received huge publicity. The Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) even managed to convince the British marble industry to consider banning imports of marble from tiger habitats. But more than a year after, the coverage has disappeared, and follow-ups have been rare. The campaign has met the fate of the animal that it had set out to save the tigers of Sariska.
findings by the UK Environmental Investigation Agency, that showed stone mines were located in tiger habitats.44 In May 2005, the SC was told that 145 mines were still operational within Sariskas reserve area (despite the Courts earlier order to ban mining there); the SC requested a report on the issue from the MoEF.45 In 2006, it became known that illegal mining of sandstone was still taking place in the Jawahar Sagar sanctuary at Bundi.46 In the Bijola area, there were 23,800 ha of dense forests in 1971; by 1991, only 12,800 ha remained, and only 2,700 ha was dense. 47
THE FIGHT FOR THE ARAVALLIS

Mining in the Aravalli ranges and the consequent deforestation and ecological devastation is one of the most well-known examples of the impact on environment and people that mining activity can exercise. The Aravalli ranges start from Delhi and extend across Haryana and Rajasthan all the way to Gujarat. They are an important division between the Thar desert and the Central Highlands. They are also one of the main watersheds separating the drainage of the Bay of Bengal from that of the Arabian Sea. Extensive mining of sandstone, marble and other minerals has converted the ranges into a rocky wasteland. Soil erosion is rampant, natural recharging of groundwater has been affected, and riverbeds have been flooded with coarse sand. Mining in the catchments has also played its part in threatening the regions water bodies (see Box on page 270: The changing hills). In 1992, the Central government notified the Aravallis in Gurgaon (Haryana) and Alwar (Rajasthan) under the Environment Protection Act as an ecologically sensitive area (ESA). An SC ruling in 1996 brought to light the fact that 50,000 ha of forest land was being illegally mined in Rajasthan: a large part of this was in the Aravallis. The Delhi Ridge, another extension of the same ranges, was also reeling from the mining and quarrying that went on inside it till the early 1990s, when the Asola-Bhatti area was converted into a sanctuary (mining goes on even now around the borders of the sanctuary). In 1999, the Centre transferred the power of allowing or disallowing mining to the state governments of Haryana and Rajasthan. The states were also asked to develop a master plan for an environmental blueprint of the area, which would take into account the land use of the area within the next couple of years. But due to the lax enforcement of regulations in ESAs there was a confusion among enforcing agencies about the extent of their powers in ESAs mining went on unabated. Another factor was the lack of participation from local communities and local bodies in efforts to protect the hill ranges. In 2002, the SC intervened once again: an order was passed banning all mining in the entire Aravallis. The Court later clarified that only illegal mining had to stop. But in Gurgaon, illegal mining continued. In January 2005, the SC took note of this, and after chastising the Haryana government and accusing it of complicity with the miners, threatened that paramilitary officers would be sent in to enforce its ban order.
RUSTAM VANIA
Marble and sandstone mining in Sariska wildlife sanctuary is also responsible for wiping out the tiger population
continues despite this on 53,000 ha of forests, the industry allegedly having footed the bill for compensatory afforestation.38 The state government, of course, is to blame. By 2002, it had issued leases to hundreds of mines in the Sariska National Park, so that in November 2002, the SC had to order the state to close them down.39 Despite this, marble miners in Jamwa Ramgarh sanctuary just outside Jaipur and Sariska National Park were so confident that they would be allowed to resume mining that owners of 69 closed mines had not even removed their machinery.40 While they were waiting for a final decision to be handed down by a committee created by the then chief minister Ashok Gehlot, forest minister Bhagraj Chaudhary declared: There is no harm in allowing the existing mines to reopen. 41 Over 47,000 ha of the land earmarked for this plan was on baarani land (land where irrigation is not possible), and most of lands were unfit for forests.42 In January 2007, five companies based in Udaipur, including Messers Wolkmen Ltd, received permission from the environment and forest ministry to temporarily resume mining on forest land.43 Rajasthans failure to ban mining in forest areas has led to the UK threatening to ban all stone imports from India in the face of
269
The changing hills

The greens of the Aravallis give way to deep brown craters, courtesy mining
When Gurgaon resident Raghubir Singh was six years old, the portion of the Aravallis in the district was lush green, tall and majestic. Wild animals inhabiting the hills kept the residents of nearby villages at bay. The scenario has changed today. Singh, now 35, stands witness to the gradual stripping of the verdant Aravallis. They hills are full of craters, some as deep as 125 feet a result of intense mining and quarrying. The vegetation, whatever is left after deforestation and degradation, has also changed. The ker and raunj trees are no longer there, says Raghubir Singh. We deliver about 10 trucks of stones a day,says Virender Singh, a mining contractor. According to him, each truck carries 300 cubic feet (cft) to 550 cft of stones, fetching the contractors anything between Rs 300 to Rs 700. At an average, about 50 trucks carry stones from this area. This means roughly 21,250 cft of stones are extracted each day, making the yearly average a whopping 77,56,250 cft from just one quarry. In the whole process of mining and minting money, what seems to be ignored is the environmental fallout.Mining is destroying the ecology of that area and we do not have any idea of the likely outcome,
says V Rajamani, professor of geology at the School of Environmental Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The geological composition of the area is primarily quartzite and pegmatite. According to Rajamani, although 95 per cent of the pegmatite of the area consists of harmless minerals, there also are harmful and useless minerals like fluorine and other trace elements. Mining exposes the rocks and the dust can mix with the soil of the nearby areas. If potassium, lead or mercury are present, it can be harmful, says Rajamani. Apart from affecting whatever is on the surface, these trace elements and harmful minerals can also contaminate water bodies. The dust from silica, for instance, which is created during mining can be very hazardous to human health. The immediate sufferers are the people working in the mines or quarries. Before beginning any quarrying activity in any area, Haryana Minerals Limited (HML), a state government undertaking, has to undertake a report on environmental management and present it to the pollution control board. This report, which includes aspects about the ecology, air and water, is then passed on to the Central government for approval, says S N Sharma, mining engineer, HML. But whether any environmental assessment is made or not, nobody knows.
Kazimuddin Ahmed, Down To Earth, New Delhi
SUNNY SEBASTIAN
Gouged out: large-scale mining in the Aravallis for sandstone, limestone, marble and other minerals is changing the landscape in states like Rajasthan and Haryana
270
The threat, however, had no effect. Mining continued in Gurgaon. According to the Rajasthan Pollution Control Boards 2006 State of Environment Report, it continues in the Rajasthan Aravallis as well, but here it is restricted to areas fewer than 100 metre from the ground level.
WATER: CRITICAL STATUS

The 2006 State of the Environment Report of the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board lists Agucha in Bhilwara district, Dariba-Bethumni in Rajsamand district and Zawar in Udaipur district as environmentally critical [base metal] mining areas, where the release of lead content in air and groundwater are injurious to health.48 Mining in Bijolia, in Bhilwara, has led to severe water problems. By 1997, water levels in the area had dropped two-three metre, and a stream had changed course all a result of a nearby sandstone excavation.49 Groundwater also dropped by five metre between 1987 and 1989.50 The suspended particulate matter (SPM) level in Bijolia was 467 g/m3, twice as much as non-mining areas.51 The limestone mines of Chittor offer another example. Chittor is located near the Chanderia Cement Works run by Birla Corporation Ltd which has captive limestone mines. For the residents of the area, the plant has primarily meant two things massive vibrations from the daily blasts that have caused cracks in buildings, and acute water shortage. The mining activity by the plant has breached the regions water table. The mines have been operational since 1987, and the unit has excavated pits as much as 40 metres deep. In New Surjana village, located near the mines, there is acute water scarcity and recession in the groundwater table. Residents claim that water could earlier be found at 25 feet, but now the water table has fallen to as low as 400-500 feet. Wells and tubewells have dried up as a result. The vast quantities of water stored in the limestone quarries are supplied not to the villages near the plant, but to Chittorgarh town.
problems, it also affects machinery and instruments installed in industrial areas. During the rainy season, the slurry is carried away to rivers, drains and local water bodies, affecting the quality of water, reducing storage capacities and damaging aquatic life. Due to long-term deposition on land, the finer particles block the flow regime of aquifers, thus seriously affecting groundwater availability. In Rajasthan, marble cutting industries dump the slurry in any nearby pits or vacant space available, although notified areas have been marked for dumping (see Box: The case of Chittorgarh). The lack of environmental management practices in the green marble and soapstone industries led to the closure of 226 green marble and 49 soapstone mines in September 2003. Green marble exports were worth about Rs 400 crore in the three months before the closure.55
The case of Chittorgarh

A part of the city is getting choked by marble slurry
On the outskirts of Chittorgarh city, in district Chittor, lies an abandoned mine. Chhatriwali khaan is a huge crater right beside the highway to Udaipur. Suddenly, disquietingly, the flat terrain gives way to a pool of rippling white fluid laced with pink, blue and brown marble slurry. When a researcher from Centre for Science and Environment visited this area, she found that the slurry was being transported here from Chanderia, about 15 km away on the other side of the city. Slurry first began to be dumped in Chhatriwali khaan in 2004. It was the third site around village Senti officials chose for this activity. When dumping first started in 2000, residents protested, for this not only means air pollution but also destruction of invaluable water sources, says Chandra Mohan Saxena, one of the protesters. Five residents were arrested on charges of obstructing official work; their bail amount was set at Rs 1 lakh. Thereafter, the mayor promised Chhatriwali khan will not be filled up. But officials duped the residents and procured a no-objection certificate,reveals Saxena. Today, the result of such deliberate dumping is apparent. The areas groundwater is unfit for drinking and cooking; food cooked in such water literally churns the stomach. Sentis Government Higher Secondary School had the Public Health Engineering Department laboratory test its groundwater. The level of total dissolved solids was found to be 5,040 milligram per litre (mg/l); the acceptable limit is 500-1,500 mg/l. Total hardness (calcium carbonate) was 2,550 mg/l (acceptable limit: 200-600 mg/l). The school has stopped using the water. The amount of slurry Chittorgarhs marble-cutting units generate is quite minuscule, a mere 7,000-8,000 tonne a year. Dungarpurs units generate about 13,000 tonne per year; and Nagaurs, 18,000 tonne per year. In areas where marble-cutting is a firmly established activity, the quantity jumps. In Sirohi, it is 59,000 tonne per year, in Banswara, 65,000 tonne a year and in Ajmer, 79,000 tonne per year.
Ritu Gupta, Down To Earth, New Delhi
MARBLE: BANE OR BOON?

Rajasthan is famous for its marble but quarrying for this beautiful stone has had a tremendous impact on the environment, thanks to poor management practices and inadequate regulations. When marble, mined in huge blocks, is cut into sellable slabs using diamond gangsaws, around 15-20 per cent of each block turns into powder. To prevent the blades from being damaged by the heat from friction between stone and blade, water is continuously sprinkled on them. This water mixes with the marble powder, forming a slurry. The slurry has a water content of nearly 35-45 per cent. Rajasthan generates marble slurry in the range of five-six MT from its 4,000 marble mines every year.52,53,54 The marble slurry imposes serious threats on the entire ecosystem. When dumped on land, it adversely affects productivity due to decreased porosity, water absorption and water percolation. Slurry dumped areas cannot support any vegetation and remain degraded. When dried, the fine particles become air-borne and cause severe air pollution. Apart from occupational health
271
A CASE OF OFFICIAL APATHY

There is an unnerving trend in the labour and environmental problems of the mining industry in Rajasthan: much of it occurs because of the blatant disregard for laws of the Centre as well as the state, or a failure to create strong environmental regulations for the industry. Whats more, unorganised mining operates outside of the law, but considering its immense scale of operations, it is unlikely that the government is in the dark about it. The number of cases where the state has failed in its responsibility to protect habitats and people from illegal mining is well documented. The government and the state pollution control board have not been able to control illegal mining even in Bharatpur, which is within the Taj trapezium, and where mining has been banned since 1996.56 Lack of oversight and monitoring has meant that mines do not abide by some of the most basic safety precautions. Few examples highlight this better than the mines operating at Makrana. In 2003, it was discovered that mining operations at Makrana had disregarded rules on mining distances from railway tracks. While the law required a minimum of 45 metre distance to be maintained from railway tracks, some mines were operating within eight metre of the Jodhpur-Delhi rail track, posing a serious risk to the track (see Box: At risk). Most disconcerting is the fact that these activities have been known since 1998.57 After the state had failed to properly implement an environmental clearance process (EC) as mandated by three Rajasthan High Court orders (in March 2003 and January and April 2004), the High Court ordered the temporary closure of 20,000 mines and quarries until they received environmental clearance certificates from the state pollution control board.58 Six months later, the Court found that the board had issued approvals without properly considering environmental management in the mines.59
P MADHAVAN
The conditions of workers in many of the small mines, which are predominant in the state, are deplorable
At risk
Marble mining leads to cave-ins and questions of safety
On January 7, 2007, two marble mines (No 44 and 45) in the Chak Dungri range in Makrana collapsed, taking down with them a closed railway line and a section of a marble cutting unit. Miraculously, no one was hurt. The collapse was reportedly due to a blast. There are 55 mines on the seven-km stretch, parallel to the Marana-Parbatsar railway line which was closed down a decade ago. Over the years, several mine owners have gone beyond their demarcated boundary under the railway tracks and even beyond them. Most mine owners have also cut through the support pillars of the mines, which have led to the land giving away. Laxmi Punia, senior engineer, North Western Railways, filed a complaint against the owners of the mine that collapsed. He said that the Railways has filed several complaints with the mines department and the state government, but all in vain. They have not been able to control these lease owners and there are fears that the land will give away anytime. Some NGOs have also approached the courts, which on several occasions have taken a written undertaking from the mine owners.
Punia said that in 1999, the High Court had ordered the mine owners to deposit Rs 4 crore for relocating the railway lines, but they have failed to do even that. Officials from the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) accept that the mines are in danger of collapsing. According to D Sengupta, DGMS, Ajmer region:Mining beyond permissible limits does not fall under our purview, but we have issued notices to 450 mines and clearly stated that they are dangerous. We have, time and again, informed the state government that they need to be shut down. D P Gaur, mines engineer at Makrana says, Over the past three months, several notices have been issued to mine owners and licenses of at least three mine owners were cancelled for mining beyond their lease areas. However, they managed to get a stay order and continue their work. The mine owners refute the charges. Manoj Rajaram, son of Uparam Rajora, who owns one of the mines which collapsed, said that the mine collapsed due to loose sand under it.We are not doing any illegal mining and neither was there any blast, he asserted. As the mine owners continue to mine increasing the risk of subsidence, the authorities either feign ignorance or helplessness to control this menace, putting the lives of workers and other people at risk.
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Mining in Gujarat
The states coastlines and wildlife preserves are seriously threatened
Gujarat is the fourth highest contributor in terms of value of mineral production in the country, accounting for more than seven per cent of the total value. In 2004-05, it produced Rs 5,472 crore worth of minerals.1 The major minerals in the state are crude oil, natural gas, lignite and limestone. About 12 per cent of the limestone reserves of the country are in Gujarat.2 Gujarat is also the sole producer of agate, chalk, fluorite (conc) and perlite, and the leading producer of clay (others). It is also the second largest producer of silica sand, lignite, laterite, bauxite and fireclay in the country.3 The states 1,600-km coastline is home to the largest saltpans in the country, producing 65 per cent of Indias salt.4 The states mineral-rich districts include Junagadh, Kutchh, Sabarkantha, Kheda, Amreli, Jamnagar,Valsad, Mehsana, Bharuch and Bhavnagar (see Table: Mineral reserves in Gujarat). Mining provides employment to about 67,790 persons in Gujarat only 0.73 per cent of the total workforce.5 Together with forestry, logging and fishery, it contributes 26 per cent to the state income.6 The impacts of mining in the state are clearly visible in the Wild Ass Sanctuary in the Rann of Kutchh, where illegal salt mining
TABLE: Mineral reserves in Gujarat

Gujarat has large reserves of limestone, dolomite, clay and crude oil
Mineral Estimated reserves in million tonne 105 Percentage District of national reserve
Bauxite
4.15
Jamnagar, Kutchh, Kheda, Junagadh, Sabarkantha, Bhavnagar, Amreli, Valsad Kutchh, Amreli, Jamnagar, Bharuchh, Bhavnagar, Sabarkantha Ahmedabad, Mehsana, Bharuch Bhavnagar, Baroda Kutchh, Bharuch, Surat, Bhavnagar Junagadh, Banaskantha, Amreli, Kutchh, Kheda, Baroda, Jamnagar, Banaskantha, Bharuch, Bhavnagar, Mehsana, Sabarkantha
Bentonite
105
27.6
Crude oil
418
Dolomite Lignite
720 1,072
12.67 -
Limestone
11,500
15.2
Source: http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/resource.html#mineral and http://ibm.nic.in as viewed on May 23, 2007
threatens the endangered khur (the local name for the wild ass, Equus hemionus khur) and other animals and birds. Twenty per cent of Indias salt supply comes from illegal mining within the sanctuary alone, employing 50,000 people.7 The transportation of salt leads to noise and air pollution, disturbs the wildlife (the period of salt mining coincides with the advanced stage of pregnancy in the khur) and damages the delicate ecological balance. A local NGO, the Dhrangadhra Prakrati Mandal, had approached the Gujarat High Court in 1996 against illegal mining in the region. Its petition said that besides illegal mining, the area under the salt-pan has been increasing. Between 1985 and 1990, this area increased from 2,479 ha to 39,955 ha. Successive district collectors and the revenue department have leased out sanctuary land for salt mining in complete violation of the Forest Conservation Act and the Wildlife Protection Act (WPA). Writing in the magazine Seminar in 2000, conservationist Valmik Thapar pointed out that before the sanctuary was notified, there were only 203 licensed mines on 16,600 ha. After the entire area was notified as a sanctuary, another 1,448 mining licenses were given over 29,400 ha, and today nearly 1,700 mines operate on 46,000 ha inside the sanctuary. The new leases were given by the revenue department, flouting the WPA.8 Limestone, one of the states key products, is also responsible for major depredations. The Narayan Sarovar Chinkara sanctuary in Kutchh is a case in point.9 In 1995, the Gujarat government had denotified the sanctuary, reducing its size from 76,579 ha to 44,423 ha,10 to allow the mining of limestone, lignite, bauxite and other minerals. The denotification was challenged in the High Court, but mining operations began; the local population wavered between acceptance and protest. The Kutchhbased Sanghi Industries Limited was allowed to extract limestone within a 250-ha area on the condition that the limestone thus extracted would not be sold. The company was asked to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs 50 lakh to ensure the payment of compensation for any damage caused in the area. Meanwhile, counsel for the Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre (PILSARC) raised the issue of the need to protect an ecosystem in its entirety, thus broadening the scope of the case filed by the Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC) in the Supreme Court. The SC ordered that permits must be restricted and exploitation of the mineral wealth must be controlled. The Court also said that effects should be monitored for five years and a comprehensive study of the notified and denotified areas should be conducted. The destruction caused by existing mines in the vicinity of the sanctuary is clearly visible today. Open-cast mining by the stateowned Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation (GMDC) at Panandro has devastated the land and endangered the wildlife. Another protected area under threat is Saurashtra, which houses the Gir Wildlife Sanctuary and Gir National Park. The region has rich deposits of limestone and many major cement plants have come up. A study done in 1998 showed that there were 100 mines in a 10-km radius of the protected area. These mines were feeding seven cement factories and one soda ash plant.11 On top of this, illegal mining thrives in the coastal regions of the Gir National Park. Located in Junagadh district and spread over an area of 1,80,000 ha, the park is the water catchment for seven rivers. A number of hills on the Girnar range, which falls inside the park and is the only remaining home of the
273
Lawless prospectors
Companies illegally siphon limestone worth crores of rupees
When Porbandar-based Saurashtra Chemicals, owned by detergent giant Nirma, lodged a police complaint in the first week of October 2006 alleging mineral theft from its captive mine in Adityana village near Porbandar, public knowledge about the size of the illegal mining racket in the coastal areas of Saurashtra was scanty. Following the complaint, the state mining department started a special drive in Saurashtra to investigate illegal mining. In two months, it detected theft worth Rs 436 crore from 12 villages in Porbandar district. In these villages, the mining mafia have almost destroyed grazing lands by extracting minerals, says Harinesh Pandya, secretary, Janpath, an Ahmedabad-based NGO that is campaigning against mining in coastal areas. Well-connected people operate leases through power of attorneys or simply in someone elses name. When leases are given for one mine, these are used to mine on government wastelands. More than 1,380 MT of minerals was extracted, said an officer involved in the raids. The miners pay royalty, since royalty-paid material is legal. This has led to a mushrooming of illegal limestone mines.When we matched the records of royalty-paid minerals supplied with excavation work in the approved mines, the disparities began showing. It was then that the scam was uncovered, another official added. Authorities say they inspected records of 33 leaseholders and came across huge theft. Corporate houses have allegedly participated in these illegal operations. According to the mining department, this is the first time big business houses have been suspected. The department has recovered penalties from Nirma, Digvijay Cement and Dhrangadhra Chemical Works for unlawful mining. Between April 2006 to January 2007, 190 cases of illegal mining were registered in Porbandar but the authorities have recovered only Rs 17.3 lakh, says Himanshu Parekh, head of the special drive. According to one estimate, the authorities are yet to recover more than Rs 400 crore.
Illegal mining is rampant in the state
Asiatic lion, have been cleared in the last three decades for quarrying limestone and manufacturing cement. Besides these, there are numerous cases of unrestrained mining of other minerals. In the Ambaji range in Banaskantha district, the MoEF has approved diversion of 190 ha of forest land for marble mining. The Kadipani fluorspar mine has resulted in a loss of 619 ha of forests and significant faunal diversity. Lignite mining has been the bane of tribals in the villages of Mangrol taluka in Surat.12 The quarry, owned by Gujarat Industries Power Company Ltd (GIPCL), initially occupied 100 ha; the company is now planning an expansion. The state government had acquired land in nine villages of the taluka for lignite quarrying, and gave only cash as compensation which was refused by some villagers. No alternative site for re-settlement was allotted. Besides displacing the tribals, the quarry also poses a threat during rains for the houses located on its edge. In fact, the Surat district administration was forced to order villagers living within 100 metre of the quarry to vacate the area, thereby adding to the numbers of displaced. Mining of coral sands for the cement industry has resulted in destruction of corals on the Gujarat coast. When the lease of calcareous sands was terminated in 2003, about 0.5 MT of coral material was mined every year since 1947. As the mining was not rigorously controlled, live corals were often the casualty of dredging. It is estimated that 50 per cent of the corals were destroyed in an area of 3,500 ha.13 Mining is threatening the states immensely rich historical-archeological heritage as well. The Digvijay Cement Company in Jamnagar district has leased limestone mines in Gop, among other locations. Its operations have degraded the nearby Gop hill and damaged the Gopnath temple. They have also led to a rise in air pollution. Grazing land has been encroached upon (see Box: Lawless prospectors). Similarly, illegal stone mining has damaged sites of historical, cultural and archaeological importance on a 100-km stretch of the Saurashtra coast from Porbandar to Dwarka.14 Mining is also destroying the natural stone barriers that check water salinity and prevents seawater from invading nearby villages. For instance, in Baradia village of Okha, the sea has encroached over a stretch of 25 km: this has led to a public outcry against mining, and the villagers are engaged in a legal battle over the issue. Three villages in Pavi Jatpur taluka in Vadodara district are also protesting: in their case, against a manganese mine coming up at an abandoned mine site.Villagers, led by a member of the state legislative assembly, have opposed the implementation of the project on the ground that the site does not have a convincing environment management plan (EMP). The 100-ha project is close to two water bodies and also includes a part of the villagers arable land.15 Clearly, the main casualties of mining in Gujarat have been its wildlife, forests and coastlines. In its eagerness to promote mining and mineral-based industries, the state government has adopted a policy of denotifying reserved forests and has turned a blind eye to illegal mining inside forests and wildlife sanctuaries. Popular protests against mining have been few and far between in the state, largely because Gujarat has the advantage of having a lower density of population in its mineral-rich areas like Kutchh. However, even in these areas, the state has completely failed to address the needs of indigenous people and protect its natural wealth and wildlife.
274
ARVIND YADAV / CSE
The challenge of governance
ndian lawmakers do reveal a grudging acceptance of the deleterious effects mining has on environment: mining in India requires forest and environmental clearances from the Central government.
But while the acceptance is evident, the intent is not. The laws are there, but the details
are either missing or fuzzy. The institutions exist, but so does complete confusion about their responsibilities and concerns. In India, legislation that governs mining, right from its prospecting to its closure stages, suffers from a strange langor. Take, for instance, the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules of 1988. Tasked with ensuring scientific and environment-friendly mining, the rules abound with half-hearted ambiguities and loosely defined terminology, leaving ample scope for not following them. Not surprisingly, the Indian Bureau of Mines, which monitors the industry in the country, says violation of mining laws is rampant: 30-60 per cent of the mines it inspects are found to be operating outside the bounds of laws. Even progressive pieces of legislation like the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) notification have a penchant for leaving things half-baked. Prepared by consultants appointed by project proponents themselves, biased and farcical EIA reports force projects through. People, in the meanwhile, are effectively shut out of the entire assessment process, and forced to watch the drama unfold over their own lands from a distance. The focus in all this, obviously, is on making the most of Indias mineral resources. In fact, to advertise their intent, our lawmakers even decided to modify the emphasis in the nomenclature of the nations key mining legislation the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957 was, thus, changed to Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act. Recently, all pretense of environment-friendliness as far as mining is concerned have been thrown to the winds: the governments Anwarul Hoda committee, which submitted its report in 2006, has upped the ante by recommending changes in laws to assure prospectors that they will get forest clearance wherever they find minerals. In the process, the committee has not bothered to even acknowledge the real challenge that India faces today: to make mining more acceptable to society by ensuring that it is the genesis of prosperity and not of poverty.
Laws related to minings social-environmental impacts have not been codified clearly. A multiplicity of agencies and institutions managing these laws adds to the confusion. As a result, implementation is lax and shoddy. Violation of the laws is rampant. The Indian Bureau of Mines found laws were violated in 30-60 per cent of the mines it inspected between 1999 and 2005. The environmental impact assessment process, a progressive system when it was proposed, has been grossly abused. Its re-engineering has failed to solve any of its fundamental problems. The forest clearance process is being construed not to preserve forests, but to derive compensation for diversion of forest lands. The problem is that even compensatory afforestation for diverted forest land has been unsuccessful: during 19802001, 5.27 lakh hectare of forests were diverted in the country, while compensatory afforestation was taken up only on 3.80 lakh hectare. India did not have mandatory mine closure regulations till 2003. The law which has been enacted is also full of loopholes. For one, the financial surety asked for mine closure is too low to be a deterrent for non-compliance. Despite all this, the Anwarul Hoda committee recommends encouraging the flow of investment in mining and opening up more forests to mining. It believes that miners can create or even improve upon the forest as it existed before the commencement of operations. There is an urgent need to streamline regulatory institutions and beef up regulations, including introducing credible deterrence for non-compliance, for the mining industry.
CHAPTER
The challenge of governance
ining is a sector in which laws related to the environmental and social externalities have not been codified in detail. The environmental law which has been especially tailored for mining and which is under the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988, is two pages of benevolent statements which treats every mine as a special case and leaves ample scope for mine owners and regulators to do nothing. For instance, on mine restoration, it says: ...wherever possible, the waste rock, overburden etc shall be backfilled into the mine excavations with a view to restoring the land to its original use as far as possible. There is also an institutional confusion about who is responsible for what. Both the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) and the state pollution control boards (SPCBs) are responsible for monitoring the environmental aspects of mining. The IBM is supposed to clear mine plans and closure plans, but it is the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) which clears environmental impact assessments (EIAs). Both demand separate environment
management plans (EMPs) one would not, in the normal course, accept the EMP submitted to the other. SPCBs can monitor the air and water pollution, but so does the IBM. The IBM looks after reclamation and closure, and SPCBs have nothing to do with it. Strangely, neither the IBM nor the SPCBs have enough humanpower to monitor even large-scale mines let alone small- and medium-scale and illegal mines. Mining requires forest and environmental clearances from the Central government. On paper, this is an excellent way of preserving forests and safeguarding the environment. However, today, mining is happening in every ecologically sensitive area one can think of in and around reserved forests, wildlife sanctuaries and protected areas, in the Himalaya and the Aravalli, and on the coasts and shorelines. Wildlife sanctuaries and reserved forests have been denotified to allow mining, while some have not been notified at all because they hold prospective mining sites. Prime agricultural lands have been diverted for mining.
PHILIP NERI DESOUZA
Waste or wealth? The biggest challenge that mining faces is to make itself acceptable to society and local communities
277
Environmental governance in mining from the process of granting of lease till the ultimate closure of mines has been effectively reduced to a long series of paperwork, with little impact on the ground. Good, progressive legislations have become a part of this exercise in futility. As a result, the Forest Conservation Act (FCA) is being construed not so much as a tool for preserving forests, as one for deriving compensation for the diversion of forests. Similarly, the Environment Protection Act (EPA), instead of focusing on its basic premise of environmental protection, is preoccupied with environmental impact assessment studies prior to grant of environmental clearances. But the fact remains that the modern urban-industrial economy cannot do without mining. Mining generates great wealth (for a few) and contributes to the state exchequer. It provides some employment as well. Till there exists a demand for minerals and till there are minerals which fulfill that demand, mining is here to stay. The challenge of mining, therefore, is to make it more acceptable to society. The challenge lies in ensuring that mining does not destroy the critical ecosystems of local areas. It lies in ensuring that the pollution from mining is contained and mitigated, and the health and well-being of communities are least affected. It lies in establishing and implementing a governance system that will ensure proper monitoring and regulation of the mining industry.
MINING LEGISLATION
The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (also referred to as the MMDR Act) and the Mines Act, 1952, together with the rules and regulations framed under them, constitute the basic laws governing the mining sector in India (see Chart 5.1: Mining legislation in India). The Mines Act governs the health and safety of workers, while the regulations on mining including grant of lease, royalty, prospecting and conservation are governed by the MMDR Act. Besides, all mining projects have to also comply with the FCA 1980, the Environment Protection Act and Rules, 1986 and the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006. The MMDR Act, 1957 is the main regulation governing the mines and mineral industry. Important rules in force under the act include the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 and the Granite Conservation and Development Rules, 1999. The act provides for general restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operations without government permission; procedure for obtaining prospecting licenses and mining leases; and conservation and systematic development of minerals. It also provides regulations relating to prospecting fees, royalties and dead rent in respect of the prospecting and mining leases for minerals other than minor minerals, payable to the state government. These provisions of the act can only be amended by the Central government through a notification in the official gazette. The royalty rates and the dead rent for minor minerals are fixed by respective state governments. There are also cess and other taxes on minerals levied in accordance with the Cess and Other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992, which is applicable in certain states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Tamil Nadu.
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960
The Mineral Concession Rules (MCR) outline the procedures and conditions for obtaining a prospecting license and mining lease. These rules also stipulate that a mining plan shall incorporate, among others, a plan of the area indicating water sources, limits of forest areas, density of tress, impact of mining activity on forest, land surface and environment including air and water pollution; scheme for restoration of the area by afforestation, adoption of pollution control devices and such measures as may be directed by concerned Central and state government agencies. Environmental management plans, it follows, are part of the mining plans.
Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988
Unregulated: mine management in India is abysmal, as governance and monitoring mechanisms have been reduced to mere paperwork
The Mineral Conservation and Development Rules (MCDR) lay down guidelines for ensuring mining on a scientific basis, while conserving the environment at the same time. The MCDR also govern the specifications in terms of submission and reporting in case of reconnaissance operations, prospecting or applying for mining plan. These rules also specify the operation and working of opencast and underground mines, procedures to follow in case of abandonment or temporary closure of mines, and beneficiation studies.
278
THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE
CHART 5.1: Mining legislation in India

There are three distinct legislations governing safety, environment and development of minerals
MINING LEGISLATION IN INDIA
Mines Act, 1952
Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Environment Protection Act, 1986
Mines Rules, 1955
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960
Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988
State Minor Mineral Concession Rules
Granite Conservation and Development Rules, 1999
The rules have a chapter devoted to environment. There are 11 provisions in this chapter pertaining to storage and utilisation of topsoil, storage of overburden, waste rock, reclamation and rehabilitation of land, measures against ground vibrations, control of surface subsidence, measures against air and noise pollution, discharge of toxic liquids, and restoration of flora. All these provisions are in form of broad guidelines and end up treating each mine as a special case. There are some major lacunae in these rules with respect to environmental protection. To begin with, what the rules state Holder shall take all possible precautions for the protection of environment and control of pollution while prospecting, mining, beneficiation or metallurgical operations is so broad-based that it is almost ambiguous. In the section on storage of overburden and waste rock, the rules say: The dumps shall be properly secured to prevent escape of material therefrom in harmful quantities which may cause degradation of environment and to prevent causation of floods. It does not specify what the harmful quantity is. In the case of storage of overburden, waste rocks, tailings and slimes the rules also say that as far as possible, they should be stored on impervious ground. The rules do not make it mandatory to store these either on impervious surface or lined surface or to take precautions to divert and treat run-off and prevent leaching of wastes in groundwater. In fact, the rules do not make any categorical differentiation between highly polluting and toxic tailing wastes and slimes and less problematic waste rock and overburden; everything is accorded the same treatment. There is no definitive rule for compulsory simultaneous reclamation of land, which is the best practice. The MCDR just recommends phase-wise reclamation, which is again open to diverse interpretations. On mine restoration, they say that wherever possible the waste
rock, overburden etc shall be backfilled into the mine excavations with a view to restoring the land to its original use as far as possible. This leaves ample scope for mine owners and regulators to treat each mine as a special case and evade any responsibility. In fact, the rules give enough scope to mine owners not to backfill the mines. They say: Wherever back-filling of waste rock in the area excavated during mining operations is not feasible, the waste dumps shall be suitably terraced and stablised through vegetation or otherwise. In this, the term not feasible remains undefined. Across India, in mines with large quantities of overburden and wastes, backfilling is an exception. On the discharge of toxic liquids, the rules say: Every holder of prospecting licence or a mining lease shall take all possible precautions to prevent or reduce the discharge of toxic and objectionable liquid effluents from mine, workshop, beneficiation or metallurgical plants and tailing ponds into surface water bodies, groundwater aquifer and useable lands, to a minimum. These effluents shall be suitably treated, if required, to conform to the standards laid down in this regard. This is bizarre, because it leaves everything to the discretion of the mine owner. It does not specify what is minimum. There are no regulations on the amount of wastewater a mine can discharge, nor are there any load-based pollution standards (see Box on pages 280-81: Pollution standards for mining). The result: very few mines in this country have wastewater treatment plants. With respect to blasting, the rules are even more circumspect. They do not specify the distance from a habitation at which blasting can be conducted. They only say that the company should make provisions to minimise ground vibrations. The permissible limits for noise and ground vibrations are not fixed, and vary from mine-to-mine.
279
Pollution standards for mining

Lax and minimal Ambient air standards: An important environmental consequence of mining is dust pollution. The ambient air quality standard applicable to the mining industry is similar to the national ambient air quality standards (see Table 1: Standards national ambient air quality). In the case of coal mines, different standards have been
formulated based on the age of the mine (see Table 2: Standards air quality for coal mining). Older mines have been leniently dealt with: the average annual standard fixed for them is 1.4 times higher than that for new mines. The justification for this is that old mines such as Jharia, Bokaro and Raniganj already have high dust concentrations and therefore, would not be able to meet the stringent standards set for the new mines. The new stringent standard is nothing but a replica of the standard for all types of industries.
TABLE 1: Standards national ambient air quality

Pollutants Time-weighted average Concentration in ambient air Industrial areas Sulphur dioxide (SO2) Annual average* 24 hours** Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) Annual average* 24 hours** Suspended particulate matter (SPM) Annual average* 24 hours** Respirable particulate matter (RPM) (size less than 10 micron) Annual average* 24 hours** Carbon monoxide (CO) 8 hours** 1 hour 80 g/m3 120 g/m3 80 g/m3 120 g/m3 Residential, rural and other areas 60 g/m3 80 g/m3 60 g/m3 80 g/m3 Sensitive areas 15 g/m3 30 g/m3 15 g/m3 30 g/m3 70 g/m3 100 g/m3 50 g/m3 75 g/m3 1.0 mg/ m3 2.0 mg/m3
360 g/m3 500 g/m3 120 g/m3 150 g/m3 5.0 mg/m3 10.0 mg/m3
140 g/m3 200 g/m3 60 g/m3 100 g/m3 2.0 mg/m3 4.0 mg/m3
Notes: *Annual arithmetic mean of minimum 104 measurements in a year taken twice a week; 24 hourly at uniform intervals. **24 hourly/8 hourly values should be met 98 per cent of the time in a year. They may exceed 2 per cent of the time, but not on two consecutive days; g/m3: microgram per cubic metre; mg/m3: milligram per cubic metre Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/as.htm, as viewed on April 4, 2007
TABLE 2: Standards air quality for coal mining

Concentration in ambient air Pollutants SPM Time-weighted averages Annual average* 24 hours** RPM Annual average* 24 hours** SO2 Annual average* 24 hours** NOx Annual average* 24 hours** New coal mines (after December 1998) 360 g/m3 500 g/m3 180 g/m3 Existing coalfields/mines 430 g/m3 600 g/m3 215 g/m3 Old coal mines (Jharia, Raniganj, Bokaro) 500 g/m3 700 g/m3 250 g/m3 300 g/m3 80 g/m3 120 g/m3 80 g/m3 120 g/m3
250 g/m3 80 g/m3 120 g/m3 80 g/m3
300 g/m3 80 g/m3 120 g/m3 80 g/m3
120 g/m3
120 g/m3
Notes: *24 hourly at uniform intervals; **24 hourly/8 hourly values should be met 98 per cent of the time in a year. They may exceed 2 per cent of the time, but not on two consecutive days; SO2: sulphur dioxide; NOx: oxides of nitrogen; SPM: suspended particulate matter; RPM: respirable particulate matter; g/m3: microgram per cubic metre; Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in, as viewed on March 4, 2007
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TABLE 3: Standards effluents from coal mines

Parameters pH Total suspended solids Limit 5.5 to 9.0 100 mg/l 200 mg/l* Oil and grease Nitrogen as nitrates 10 mg/l 10 mg/l
TABLE 5: Standards vibrations due to blasting

Type of structure Dominant excitation frequency (Hz) <8 I. Buildings/structures not belonging to the owner 8-25 >25
a. Domestic houses/structures (kuchcha, brick, cement) b. Industrial buildings (RCC and framed structures) c. Objects of historical importance and sensitive structures
10
15
Notes: *: Standard for effluents discharged as irrigation water on land; mg/l: milligram per litre Source: Central Pollution Control Board, Union ministry of environment and forests, New Delhi
10
20
25
10
TABLE 4: Standards wastewater discharge by industry

Parameters Suspended solids Inland surface water 100 Land for irrigation
II. Buildings belonging to owner with limited span of life a. Domestic houses/structures (kuchcha, brick, cement) b. Industrial buildings (RCC and framed structures)
200 5.5 to 9.0 10 100 0.2 0.2 -
10
15
25
pH Oil and grease Biochemical oxygen demand (3 days at 27C) Chemical oxygen demand Arsenic (as As) Mercury (as Hg) Lead (as Pb) Cadmium (as Cd) Hexavalent chromium (as Cr+6) Copper (as Cu) Zinc (as Zn) Nickel (as Ni) Cyanide (as CN) Manganese Iron (as Fe)
5.5 to 9.0 10 30 250 0.2 0.01 0.1 2.0 0.1 3.0 5.0 3.0 0.2 2 3
15
25
50
Notes: The values under dominant excitation frequency (as in 5 for a dominant excitation frequency of <8 in the case of domestic houses/ structures) denote peak particle velocity (ppv) in metre per second. Source: Directorate General of Mines Safety (Tech) (S&T) Circular No 7 of 1997 Dhanbad, August 29, 1997
dealt with asbestos and states that respirable asbestos fibres should not exceed two fibres per mililitre of air sampled by an open membrane filter.1 Effluent standards: In the case of effluents too, there is a separate set of standards for coal mines (see Table 3: Standards effluents from coal mines), while all other mines follow the general wastewater discharge standard for discharge in inland surface water and on land (see Table 4: Standards wastewater discharge by industry). However, the separate coal standards are not very specific and completely fail to address key parameters such as heavy metals. The effluent standards are concentration based and completely fails to take into account the large volume of run-off discharge from mines duing rainy season. To preserve the water quality, it is important to set load-based standards. Standards for vibrations during blasting: The Directorate General of Mines Safety has specified standards for vibration levels during blasting (see Table 5: Standards vibrations due to blasting). These standards take into account a number of parameters type of structures in the vicinity of the mines (kuchcha or pucca structures will respond differently to blasting), and frequency of blasting being the prominent amongst them.
Note: All values, except pH, are in milligram per litre (mg/l) Source: http://www.cpcb.nic.in/standard32.htm, as viewed on March 4, 2007
Standards for work environment dust levels: To ensure that workers are not affected by dust, the dust level at workplace has been specified under the Metalliferous Mines Regulations (MMR), 1961 and the Coal Mine Regulations, 1957. Respirable dust concentration in the workplace should not exceed five milligram per cubic metre for manganese; for all other types of mines, including coal, it should not exceed the value which is arrived at by dividing the figure of 15 with the percentage of free respirable silica present in the sample. The MMR, 1961 has specifically
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The rules say that trees cut down to make way for mining have to be replaced by double their number. However, there is no mention of the type of afforestation to be done. Thus, a very diverse forest area could be cut and replaced by a monoculture of eucalyptus trees. The provisions of MCR and MCDR are, however, not applicable to coal, atomic minerals and minor minerals. In the case of coal, mine operators have to comply with measures for scientific mining stipulated by the Coal Controller under the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 1974. However, this is such an antiquated regulation that it doesnt even recognise
environmental protection as an integral part of mining coal. In fact, coal mines in India are not even required to submit closure plans. The state governments have, for this purpose, formulated the Minor Mineral Concession Rules, where environment is paid lip service. The focus of Indias mineral regulations, therefore, has been more on development and promotion of the mineral industry as the nomenclature of the MMDR Act suggests. There are some provisions for environmental protection, but they lack substance and enforceability (see Box: Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?).
Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?

Monitoring by the Bureau has not controlled violations
The Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM), functioning under the Department of Mines, Union ministry of mines, is engaged in promotion of conservation and scientific development of mineral resources and protection of environment in mines other than coal, petroleum and natural gas, atomic minerals and minor minerals. It might be the only regulatory institution in the world which on one hand inspects and regulates mines, and on the other provides technical consultancy services to the mining industry. IBMs summary of its inspection activities in the Annual Reports of the ministry allows us to draw some inferences on how effective its policing has been (see Table: IBMs inspection report). To begin with, since the number of operating mines (mines which submit data to the IBM annually) is about 3,100, we can safely assume that IBM inspects about 80-90 per cent of the operating mines at least
once every year. Therefore, in general, the inspection frequency of IBM is about once every year for each mine. The most disturbing part is that the Bureau has found violation of the law in 30-60 per cent of the mines it inspected. Out of the four years for which data is available, the violation percentage was more than 50 per cent in three. This means that violation of mining laws and regulations are rampant in the country. According to IBMs statistics, every year, 50-60 per cent violations were rectified by the mines; prosecution proceedings were launched against about 10 per cent of the mines. IBM has an impressive record with prosecution it wins a significant number of cases it files against erring mines. But despite all this, more than 50 per cent mines were still found in violation in subsequent years. This means that the deterrence available with IBM is either not credible enough, or is not used. The Bureau has the power to close down mines if it finds violation of the law. Data shows that the IBM seldom uses this prerogative it has stopped the operations of less than one per cent of the violators.
TABLE: IBMs inspection report

Almost 30-60 per cent of the inspected mines have been found to be violating the laws
1999-2000 Mines inspected Number of mines in violation Percentage of inspected mines found with violation Violations fully rectified Percentage of violations fully rectified Prosecution launched Percentage of violators against whom prosecution was launched Cases in favour of IBM Cases compounded Percentage of cases in favour of IBM and cases compounded Number of mines in which mining operation suspended Percentage of violators whose mining operation suspended Note: *Data only for April to December; NA: Data not given in the Annual Report Source: Annual Reports of the Union ministry of mines, government of India 2,791 1,404 50.3 759 54.1 131 9.3 28 36 48.9 2000-2001 2,789 835 29.9 508 60.8 79 9.5 51 28 100.0 2001-02* 1,653 986 59.6 613 62.2 51 5.2 33 7 78.4 9 0.9 NA NA NA 1,535 2002-03* 2,145 NA 2003-04* 2,462 1,281 52.0 1,895 147.9 134 10.5 16 24 29.9 3 0.2 NA NA NA 919 2004-05* 1,986 NA
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Environmental legislation has to cover many areas these include comprehensive environmental impact analysis to ensure that projects that are ecologically destructive are not allowed, identification of no-go areas, effective forest and wildlife acts to protect biodiversity, and regulations governing mine closure and mine restoration. There are five main environmental acts that impact the mining industry in India: The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (amended in 1988) The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (amended in 1988) The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (with rules 1986 and 1987) (EPA) The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (amended in 1988) The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (amended in 1991) The EPA, 1986 is the umbrella legislation. It empowers the government of India to take all measures deemed necessary for protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution this includes an authority to direct closure of any industry or operation. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, as the names indicate, provide for the control of water and air pollution; consent under them is required before initiating mining
operations for discharge of effluents into a water body and emissions into air. Today, environmental regulations and monitoring have taken a back seat with regard to mining. The SPCBs are more interested in giving quick consent to establish and operate mines. The reason is that most SPCBs do not have the physical capacity to monitor a large number of mines. Take the case of Orissa: there are approximately 300 officially operational mines in the state (there are hundreds of unofficial ones), but only 172 of these have been covered under the consent management system. The status of monitoring and regulation can be assessed from the fact that many mines of the biggest mining company in the state, the state-owned Orissa Mineral Corporation, operate without the necessary consent from the Orissa State Pollution Control Board (OSPCB). Conditions in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are not any different. A strong monitoring and enforcement system is fundamental for ensuring environmental sustainability. Without a serious deterrence for non-compliance, there will be little or no enforcement of the law. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening in India. In Orissa, less than two-three per cent of industries and mines are subject to enforcement actions for persistently failing to comply with OSPCB orders; and it takes an average of about 200-1,000 days between the show cause notice and subsequent enforcement action.1 Consequently, a credible deterrent is missing for most willful defaulters and there is little incentive to comply
Freeze frame: there is an urgent need for a moratorium on mining in ecologically sensitive areas
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AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Lost in the haze: no legislations have been formulated to address fugitive dust from mineral transportation
with environmental regulations. Perhaps imposing hefty financial penalties for non-compliance could be one solution.
Environmental impact assessment: a lame duck?
In January 1994, the MoEF issued the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notification under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The notification imposed restrictions on undertaking new development projects, or expansion or modernisation of existing ones, unless environmental clearance was obtained from the ministry. This was a progressive step. The idea was to evaluate the potential impacts environmental and social of projects, to ascertain the likely costs and whether the projected benefits justified these costs. The entire exercise sought to minimise and mitigate environmental and social damages. In 1997, an amendment mandated a public hearing for a project (except in cases where exempted) before the final clearance. In September 2006, a new EIA notification was brought into force after re-engineering the existing provisions. The new notification has classified projects under two categories A and B. The projects which fall under category A (including expansion and modernisation of existing projects)
require clearance from the Central government, while category B projects can be cleared at the state level. Mining projects with a lease area of 50 ha or more fall under category A, while those smaller than 50 ha but more than five ha fall under category B. All forms of asbestos mining, irrespective of the area, require clearance from the Central government (see Box: Off bounds?). Prospecting for mining is exempted from getting environmental clearance if concession areas have got approvals for physical survey. There are several drawbacks in the environmental clearance process as envisaged by the new notification. The people have no say in it right from its inception. The preparation of the EIA report is also a controversial aspect: a consultant agency is commissioned by the project proponent to prepare the report. The agency, thus, becomes a service provider of the proponent it is no longer an impartial body. In most cases, the consultancy, instead of identifying the actual impacts, ends up presenting the information in a manner favourable to the project proponent. The public hearing process itself stands grossly abused. A public hearing is only a consultation forum; it has no legal authority to decide whether a project should be initiated or not. The result: even if everyone present in the public hearing
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Off bounds?
Mining in ecologically sensitive areas is, on paper, subject to stricter rules
Any mining project, even if listed under category B, will be treated as category A if it is located wholly or in part within 10 km from the boundary of Protected areas notified under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 Critically polluted areas as notified by the Central Pollution Control Board from time to time Notified eco-sensitive areas Inter-state boundaries and international boundaries
the fundamental problems in it firstly, the conflict of interests in preparation of the EIA report and, therefore, the need for an independent assessment and secondly, the need for consent of the people before clearing the project. In fact, the 2006 EIA notification has further marginalised the role of the people in the environmental clearance process.
The forest and wildlife acts
opposes the project, clearance is granted. In the case of mining projects, where there is hardly any boundary between social, economic and environmental issues, the public hearing is treated as an exclusive environmental public hearing; social and economic concerns are not entertained. Today, the EIA process in the country has become largely ineffectual. Very rarely are any projects rejected; mining projects, even if they have huge environmental externalities, manage to clear the grade. The re-engineering of the EIA process has failed to solve
The Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980 provides for the protection of two classes of forests: reserve and protected. Prior approval of the Central government is required for any change in the status of reserve forests or for non-forest use of protected forest land. Reserve forests have the highest conservation status and the area so classified cannot be used for any non-forest purposes, unless the government de-reserves it. Surface and underground mining are deemed non-forest activities and, therefore, Central government approval is required for mineral concessions in any forest area. The FCA treats renewal of a lease as grant of a new lease; lease renewal too, therefore, requires its clearance. A Forest Advisory Committee advises the government on approvals and other related issues. The FCA stipulates that even if a mining project has applied for environmental clearance, it needs to apply separately and simultaneously for FCA clearance as well if the mine lease area covers forest land. Further, it also mentions that proposals for
SHYAMAL / CSE
285
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Desolation: there are no sacred boundaries for mining, and forests are denotified to allow it. The Hoda committee proposes to encourage the mayhem by opening up more forest areas to mining
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diversion of forest land should be accompanied by an endorsement from the gram panchayat or the local body. The act also requires the developers to pay for purchase of an equivalent area of non-forest land as near as possible to the site of diversion, or twice the degraded forest area, for transfer to the state forest department with sufficient funds for compensatory afforestation, which is then declared as protected forest. However, the compensatory afforestation scheme has been widely criticised by both the civil society and forestry and wildlife experts, who believe that compensatory afforestation cannot be a substitute to a diverse natural forest. There is also a problem of the states not being able to complete the quota of compensatory afforestation. For instance, it is estimated that in Orissa, although 10,000 ha of forest land has been diverted for mining purposes, only 3,000 ha has been covered by the compensatory afforestation scheme.2 The data on compensatory afforestation for the entire country shows that during 1980 to 2001, while 5,27,699 ha of forest area was diverted for various projects, compensatory afforestation was taken up on only 3,80,195 ha.3 Section 2.6 of the guidlines for the act also states that while considering proposals for dereservation or diversion of forest land for non-forest use, it is essential that ecological and environmental losses and socio-economic distress caused to the people who are displaced are weighed against economic and social gains. However instead of being made applicable to all projects this analysis is required only for projects involving forest land more than 20 ha in the plains and more than five ha in the hills. Annexure XX of the guidlines says that states and Union territories (UTs) should avoid recommending use of forest areas inside sanctuaries, national parks and Project Tiger reserves for non-forest purposes. Wherever this is inescapable, the state/UT government has been advised to get the consent of the Indian Board of Wildlife (IBWL). After getting clearance from the board, the proposal can be submitted to the Centre for consideration under the FCA, 1980. In Writ Petition (Civil) No 337 of 1995 (Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India vs Union of India and others), the Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that no denotification would take place without seeking the opinion of the IBWL. In 2002, an amendment was brought in the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, wherein the power to denotify/dereserve national parks and wildlife sanctuaries was vested in the National Board for Wildlife. However, the Supreme Court order dated November 13, 2000 (Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India vs Union of India case) restrained all state governments from dereseving national parks, sanctuaries and forests without prior approval of the court. As things stand today, no national park or sanctuary can be derserved without the permission of the Supreme Court. The Wildlife Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002 is a revision of the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972. It does not have much teeth in terms of stopping the rampant development inside or near reserve forests. However, Section 29 of the Act prohibits mining in sanctuaries, while Section 35(6) does the same for national parks; both have been flagrantly violated. A well-known example of this violation is the case of iron ore mining in Kudremukh National Park in Karnataka, which has recently been closed after directives
of the Supreme Court (see Chapter 4: Mining in the states Karnataka). The Wildlife Conservation Strategy, adopted by the IBWL in 2002, makes two important points which have relevance for mining in forest areas: No diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes from critical and ecologically fragile wildlife habitats shall be allowed. Lands falling within 10 km of boundaries of national parks and sanctuaries should be notified as eco-fragile zones under the EPA. Despite the various safeguards provided within the law, as far as mining is concerned, no frontier appears to be sacred anymore. The mining industry is ravenous. Its burgeoning demand has found support from none other than the Planning Commissions High-level Committee on the National Mineral Policy, which recommends opening up more forest areas for mining. The essential difference between a mining intervention and other interventions is that the miner eventually leaves the land and can recreate or even improve upon the forest as it existed before commencement of operations, reads the committees strange logic. Obviously, the committee has no clue about the difference between in value of a natural forest and a human-made one (see Box on pages 288-89: The Hoda report). This is a suicidal course. Minerals are essential, but they are not critical for human survival; ecological areas and functions are. There is an urgent need for a moratorium on mining in forest lands. With the rapidly increasing mineral demand in the country, if we do not enforce this moratorium now, it might very well be too late.
PRICING FORESTS
In May 2002, following the alarm raised in India over declining forest cover and a Supreme Court (SC) directive to formulate a scheme for compensatory afforestation, the MoEF constituted a Central Empowered Committee (CEC). The committee submitted its recommendations in 2002, elaborating on the procedure for utilisation of funds for compensatory afforestation, activities permissible under compensatory afforestation, compensation for loss of forest land through recovery of net present value (NPV), funds for catchment treatment plan and involvement of user agencies for compensatory afforestation.4 The major recommendation of the CEC was that a company involved in diverting forest land for non-forestry purposes, should pay the NPV of the area diverted. This should be in addition to the funds for compensatory afforestation. The committee felt that the plantations raised under the Compensatory Afforestation Scheme (CAS) could never adequately compensate for the loss of natural forests, as they require more time to mature and even then, are a poor substitute to natural forests. The rate of the NPV was fixed at Rs 5.8-Rs 9.2 lakh per ha of forest land depending on quality and density of the forest diverted. It is already being charged by four states: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Haryana. More than Rs 300 crore collected so far under it is lying with the courts.5
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The Hoda report

The committee aims at diluting the environmental clearance process to attract investment
In its mid-term appraisal of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the Planning Commission realised that the National Mineral Policy (NMP), adopted in 1993 for encouraging the flow of private investment in exploration and mining, had not lived up to its billing. The reason for believing the NMP had failed was laid out thus: [S]o far, the Central government has approved as many as 188 reconnaissance permits, involving an area of 2,54,307.303 sq km and the Foreign Investment Promotion Board has granted 73 approvals for FDI (foreign direct investment) in the mining sector involving an investment of Rs 4,044 crore there is no successful case of a reconnaissance permit being converted into a mining lease so far (emphasis added). this is mainly due to procedural delays in various clearances at both the Central and state government levels, especially in the case of mandatory environmental clearance and inadequate infrastructure. A high-level committee was, therefore, constituted in September 2005 under Anwarul Hoda, member, Planning Commission. The committees terms of reference were: to review the NMP and the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and suggest the changes needed for encouraging investment to review existing procedures for granting Reconnaissance Permits (RPs), Prospecting Licences (PLs), and Mining Leases (MLs) and suggest ways for their streamlining and simplification to review the procedures for according clearance to mineral exploration and mining projects under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and suggest ways for speeding them up to prioritise critical infrastructure needs of the Indian mining sector and make recommendations on ways to facilitate investment to meet these needs to examine the implications of the policy of mineral-rich states to make value addition within the state a condition for grant of mineral concession and make appropriate recommendations in this regard to examine ways of augmenting state revenues from the mineral sector, and to examine any other issue relevant for stimulating investment flows and inducting stateof-the-art technology into the sector. The committee submitted its report in June 2006. Blinkered vision Between 1993-94 and 2005-06, the mineral sector had been growing at a rate of 10.7 per cent, but had also caused massive environmental damage, economic marginalisation and social unrest. The NMP, which had emphasised on meeting the environmental and social challenges posed by mining rather than fast-tracking private investment, failed to deliver on these fronts, a fact ignored while finalising the terms of reference for the Hoda committee. The committees terms concentrated almost exclusively on streamlining procedures to facilitate private investment without recognising the serious environmental and social issues. This was reflected in the composition of the committee, which
consisted solely of government and business representatives. L P Sonkar, adviser (minerals), Planning Commission, and convener of the Hoda committee, put things in perspective with a rhetorical question to Down To Earth: Do you expect us to call tribals to the committee? Apart from this built-in bias, there was a flawed presumption: the committee said that between conservation and exploitation of forest resources, the government always favoured conservation, with the judiciarys intervention making mining clearance more difficult. But statistics say otherwise: the speed and scale of clearances for mining has, in fact, been increasing over the years. Under the Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980, forestry clearance was required from the Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF). In the 17 years (1980-1997) since FCA came into force, forest clearances were granted on an average to roughly 20 mining projects, diverting 2,030 ha annually. Between 1998 and 2005, MoEF cleared about 125 mining projects diverting 8,650 ha of forest land annually. Private unlimited To solve the social-environmental problems, the committee pinned its faith on two mechanisms the sustainable development framework and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a multi-stakeholder group based in Amsterdam which develops reporting guidelines for corporates. Under fire for their poor environmental, social and human rights records in the developing world (see Box: Mine sharks), the worlds leading multinational mining companies had decided in 2000 to initiate a project to examine the role of the sector in contributing to sustainable development. Nine of these companies contracted the International Institute for Environment and Development to undertake the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD), which came out with a wish list of sustainable development principles. Meanwhile, in 2001, these mining companies also promoted the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) to improve their image. The MMSDs sustainable development principles were then converted into a framework by ICMM, to be implemented by all its members. It mandated an annual report on social and environment performance to be verified by private auditors under GRI. The problem with the framework was that it was no different from existing voluntary certification systems. Its principles were so broad and vague for example, contributing to social, economic and institutional development of communities that companies could claim they adhered to them without doing much. The reporting and verification process was also farcical: companies could write what they wanted because verifiers were paid by them. In India, mining companies are supposed to submit annual environmental audit reports and half-yearly progress reports on environment management plans. Given that this mandatory system has failed, it is unlikely that a voluntary one will help make mining sustainable. Not surprisingly, the committee believes if the framework is implemented, more forest land can be opened to mining. Through the thicket At the core of the Hoda committees recommendations on forest clearance are proposals to change laws to assure prospectors they will get forest clearance if they find minerals.
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Mine sharks
Hoda committee lays the red carpet for MNCs
In 2006, each of the worlds top four mining companies posted net profits of over US $5 billion the largest, Australias BHP Billiton, earned US $10 billion. When operating in developing countries, these companies are not above exploiting states with lax laws to circumvent environmental and social safety nets. BHP Billiton operated the OK Tedi mine from 1984-2002 in Papua New Guinea. It had to be hauled up before the International Water Tribunal at The Hague in 19961 to force it to stop dumping 80,0001,20,000 tonne of waste rock each day into local waters, drowning over 170 sq km of forest, destroying the rivers ecology and displacing almost 50,000 people.2 Three years after reaching an estimated US $500 million settlement that required BHP to reform its waste disposal practices and compensate local communities, it announced that no waste disposal method could sufficiently mitigate the environmental impacts of the mine.3 US-based Newmont Mining Company is being held accountable by the Indonesian government for the pollution of Buyat Bay. Between 1996 and 2004, the Newmont Minahasa Raya gold mine disposed off its tailings into the bay.4 The tailings had mercury and arsenic levels much higher than the government standards.5 Newmont reached an out-of-court case settlement of US $30 million with the Indonesian government in February 2002.6 The company continues to dump 1,20,000 tonne of waste every day into the Senunu Bay from another Indonesian mine.7
at the Central level; the committee has recommended that MoEFs internal processes remain unchanged its decisions will be binding on the CCEC. The problem is that the committee has taken a blinkered view of restructuring systems to minimise delays in granting of leases. Take the case of renewing leases. The Hoda committee wants the clearance process for renewals to be a mere formality, unless there are serious adverse effects on the forest and wildlife or environment in an area or violations of stipulated conditions. But it has not specified a mechanism through which serious adverse effects can be identified and monitored. The need for renewals arises to assess damage from actual mining operations and to then decide on a future course of action. Industry cannot complain as cases of large mines being denied renewals on ecological or environmental grounds are almost non-existent. Mines like the Sukinda chromite mines in Jajpur, Orissa, should not have been granted renewals because of the extensive damage they caused; they still got the green signal because regulators often reasoned that since the damage had already been done, mining should continue! So, while the Hoda committees proposals on renewals might not materially change the situation, what should be put in place is a system in which ecological and environmental performance of mines are periodically assessed and renewals granted on the basis of ground reports. Public limited The Hoda committee wants public hearings to be dispensed with for mining leases for areas less than 50 ha and for renewals of any leases. It also wants them to be limited to issues arising out of environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports and to people, legislators or NGOs of areas concerned complete outsiders should not participate. Though the last suggestion is part of the new EIA clearance process, the implications of the first two are disastrous. To say that 50-ha mining does not need public hearings is to imply it has no environmental impacts. However, the number of people a 50-ha mine can affect and the environmental degradation it can cause has been witnessed across the land. The recommendation of the committee to dump public hearings for renewals does not take into account the fact that these are the only forums in which affected communities can express their opinions. Another damaging recommendation, which, if accepted, could multiply environmental and social problems many times relates to size. The Hoda committee wants the upper limit for a single mine lease to go up from the existing 10 sq km (there are a few exceptions in the public sector) to 50-100 sq km to develop world-class ore bodies. What it does not tell is how to deal with massive displacement, especially given that the government cant even deal with the current levels of displacement. Clearly, for mining to remain a viable economic activity, a social licence to operate must be enshrined in future legislation. People will voluntarily accept change if they perceive an overall benefit. But if impoverishment is the anticipated consequence of mining, people will resist. If people do not want mining, then it can only happen with the help of the coercive power of the State, which will be accompanied by large-scale human rights violations and social and economic dislocation. Hodas report comes to the aid of this process of coercion.
Down To Earth, April 30, 2007
Under existing FCA guidelines, permission to survey, explore or prospect for minerals in forest areas does not imply leases will be granted. Before granting leases, detailed impact assessment has been envisaged to protect ecologically sensitive areas. According to the Hoda committee, however, such a stipulation militates against the seamless transfer dispensation that the committee would like to promote to attract investment into mining. It wants the government to spell out in advance the conditions to be met during mining so that forest clearance can be granted without a hitch. This recommendation is based on the belief that the miner eventually leaves the land and can recreate or even improve upon the forest as it existed before commencement of operations. But the 500-odd officially declared abandoned mines (there are thousands of unofficial ones) belie this claim. International experience with mining rehabilitation hasnt been great either. Cosmetic change The core of the committees recommendations for speeding up the forest clearance process is outsourcing the responsibility of divisional forest officers (DFOs) and attenuating the MoEFs role. It has also proposed a coordination-cum-empowered committee (CCEC) at the Centre and in states to act as a single-window clearance outpost. It has recommended that mine lease, forestry and environmental clearance should be parallel rather than sequential processes. No major change has, however, been proposed
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Based on the recommendations of the CEC, the SC ruled that NPV should be obtained from the project proponent. However, the court was not satisfied with the quoted figure as it felt it did not take into account the social and economic costs of diversion. The court felt that the basis for calculation of NPV should be the economic value spread over a period of 50 years, after taking into account intangible benefits from the forest. The SC set up an expert committee on September 26, 2005 to identify the parameters for evaluating forests and the projects eligible for exemption from NPV payment. The committee, headed by Kanchan Chopra, director of the Delhi-based Institute of Economic Growth, submitted its recommendations in May 2006. This committee has gone a step beyond its terms of reference: it has recommended a management system for NPV funds and given protected areas (PAs) an inviolable status. Price cannot be put on the inviolable nature of PAs and biodiversity-rich areas like sacred groves and mangroves, says Chopra. PAs should not be diverted for any non-forestry use at any cost. For areas other than PAs, the committee has set a methodology that includes the goods and services provided by forest ecosystems: timber, nontimber forest produce, firewood, fodder, grazing land, tourism, carbon sequestration, flood control, biodiversity and nutrient cycling, and many more. Though it does not put a price tag on every forest patch, the committee takes Himachal Pradesh as an illustration and sets the minimum NPV at Rs 1.57 lakh per ha for Nahan Circle (a monoculture forest) and the maximum at Rs 8.57 lakh per ha for Bilaspur Circle (a dense forest).The maximum NPV charge is actually infinite, as the PAs havent been priced, says Chopra. Charges will be site-specific and evaluated at the forest-range level, says the report. The committee has further suggested that the full compensation for diversion of forest land should also include the ground rent for the land, which goes into the state coffers, subject to a minimum of Rs 10,000 per ha. The committee took six months and sat through 113 presentations from prospective forest land users, mostly hydroelectric power companies, to prepare the report. It suggests a 30 per cent NPV exemption for major hydroelectric projects. According to Chopra, Projects with more than 50 per cent of additional capital cost burden should be given some consideration and so the exemption for hydroelectric projects. Besides, the committee has identified seven principles under which it has given complete exemption to some public works, welfare projects and tribal rehabilitation projects. It has also acknowledged traditional practices like jhum cultivation as an agro-forestry activity and recommended it for exemption. The committee has, however, expressed concern that no Compensatory Afforestation Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA) collections were distributed between January 2001 and April 2004, even though 5,73,164 ha of forest land was diverted for non-forestry use. It suggests a three-tier system of Central, state and local bodies to ensure proper distribution of funds. In no case should the compensation collected under NPV be treated either as part of the consolidated fund of the Union or the relevant state, says its report.
MINE CLOSURE
Mining is a temporary economic activity that leaves long-term social, economic and environmental footprints. Closing of a mine is all about what kind of footprint will be left behind. It was only in 2003 that India actually put mine closure as a regulatory requirement for operating mines in India. Before this, mine leases used to be granted without any planning on the mine closure. The rule, which has been incorporated under the MCDR 1988, makes the holder of the mining lease responsible for ensuring the implementation of the closure plan. The rule makes it compulsory for all the mines to submit a conceptual mine closure plan at the fresh grant or renewal of the license; a progressive mine closure plan every five years; and a final mine closure plan a year before the actual closure. A financial assurance has to be furnished at the rate of Rs 25,000 per ha for A category mines (generally large mines) and Rs 15,000 per ha for B category mines (generally small mines), with the minimum amount pegged at Rs 2 lakh for category A and Rs 1 lakh for category B. The financial assurance can be submitted in different forms letter of credit, performance or surety bonds, trust funds or any other guarantees acceptable to the authorities. This money might be forfeited if the clause of mine closure plan is not met. According to the guidelines issued for mine closure, the closure plan should address (i) the environmental issues and proposed remediation measures, and (ii) the social issues, mainly related to employees laid off and socio-economic repercussions and the proposed remedial measures.6 Internationally, mine closure is one of the most discussed issues before a mine is allowed to operate. This is because experience with mine closure has been poor and mining companies have left behind ugly footprints ghost towns, waste-choked waterways, tailing dumps and overburden hills for governments and local communities to deal with. Because India has had no binding closure regulations, mining in this country has left behind a truly fractured land officially, 500 odd orphaned mines, and unofficially, thousands of abandoned holes in the ground and hillocks next to them. Most abandoned mines in India are today so-called water bodies, but in reality they are large pits in the ground that are contaminated, many by acid rock drainage. The situation is not expected to change: the 2003 regulations did not do much to alter the status of mine closure in the country. One of the biggest drawbacks of closure legislation in India is that it has not learnt anything from international experience. Hence, it has not included safeguards to ensure sustainable closure of mines. One of the key roadblocks before sustainable closure is the availability of funds at the end of the life of the mine. Financial surety is required by almost all governments, but how much is asked for ultimately decides how a mine is closed. If too little is asked for, then there is a temptation to forfeit the surety and leave the abandoned mine to the government to deal with. There have been cases across the world where mining companies filed for bankruptcy at the end of the life of the mine and left the mines without proper closure (see Box: Escaping liability). Despite these international experiences, the financial
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Escaping liability
In the US, citizens pay for the crimes of mining companies
The US Bankruptcy Code was instituted to protect business owners from a lifetime of debt and to provide a level of insurance for lenders.1 But the code had a loophole: bankruptcy ensures that a company will not be fully liable for debts. So, when a company files for bankruptcy, it might escape being held responsible for cleaning up any pollution that it may have caused. Cleaning up the mess, therefore, could become the states responsibility. An attempt to close this loophole was made through the use of financial assurances most usually, bonding; the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) and many states hardrock mining laws require such assurances. Unfortunately, these financial assurances have grossly underestimated the cost of environmental remediation, especially in the case of hardrock mining because of which they have failed to force mining companies to internalise the cost of pollution. According to Jim Kuipers (MPC Issue Paper No 4), financial assurance is 50 to 10,000 per cent below the actual cost of reclamation. According to him, the unbonded clean-up liability at todays mines ranges from US $1 billion to $12 billion.2 This loophole has been used by mining companies, especially the small- and medium-sized hardrock mining firms, which have declared bankruptcy and left behind billions of dollars of clean-up costs.3 This is a practice intentionally adopted to skirt environmental liability. Not only are companies looking to bankruptcy laws to shelter them from their failure to comply with environmental management practices, but companies are looking to the future potential of bankruptcy to allow them to operate in environmentally reckless ways so that they may keep costs down. Frequently, this is done by creating a subsidiary that is capital-poor.4 The subsidiary can claim bankruptcy even point to its
environmental clean-up costs as a factor in its bankruptcy and the parent company large, and certainly solvent is not held liable for the actions of its subsidiary. When ASARCO declared bankruptcy in 2005, there were over 100 civil environmental cases pending, and its environmental liability was estimated to be between US $500 million and US $1 billion.5 Of course, bankruptcy could make all of that go away. By the time ASARCO declared bankruptcy, it had already sold most of its valuable assets to a shell company owned by Grupo Mexico.6 By selling off its assets, creditors stood little chance of receiving payment from the bankruptcy hearing. Unless the government decides to hold Grupo Mexico liable, the money simply isnt there. The Indonesian government may have been able to force Newmont Gold to pay for the pollution of Buyat Bay in Indonesia, but the US government will have a difficult time convincing Newmont Gold to pay for the pollution created by its subsidiary, Dawn Mining Co, whose Midnite Uranium Mines radiation, heavy metals and acid mine drainage created a Superfund site. With Dawn Mining unable to pay for the clean-up and Newmont most likely to escape liability, this is a clean-up that citizens will have to pay for.7 It is Pegasus Gold, however, which really figured out how to play the system. By the time the mine, the Zortman-Landusky gold mine, closed after the 1998 bankruptcy, it had already achieved quite a bit of notoriety for its cyanide pollution and acid mine drainage; one spill released 50,000 gallons of cyanide solution that contaminated local drinking water.8 When Pegasus declared bankruptcy, Montana discovered that more than 85 per cent of the site was without any surface reclamation.9 And while bankruptcy allowed Pegasus to avoid paying for reclamation, it still managed to pay its members over US $5 million in bonuses, which they then used to create a new company.10
assurance required by Indian regulations is a pittance. A 10-sq km mine lease area has to pay a financial surety of just Rs 2 crore for mine closure, though the annual turnover of such a large mine would be in thousands of crore. This amount is not sufficient to even put the overburden into the pits. The provision of forfeiting of the financial assurance is, therefore, not a deterrent to the erring companies. The problem is that there is also no additional provision to force companies to undertake proper rehabilitation. There are no rules to blacklist the company, nor any other penal provisions for non-compliance. One drawback of closure regulations in the country is the quality of mine closure plans that are being approved and implemented. Mine closure has become a formality one of the many paperworks that need to be done over with to get the clearance. Mine closure plans that are being approved today in the country are all about water bodies, stabilised overburden dumps and plantations; very little is being said about alternate land uses. Take the case of the Gondegaon open-cast coal mine in Nagpur (Maharashtra). Once this nine-sq km mine closes, it will leave about three sq km of overburden dumps (almost a small hill), about two sq km of void in the ground, and more than two sq km of vacant land with plan-
tation. Only about one sq km would be backfilled area, while the rest will hold the existing infrastructure. The case of the limestone mines of Rajashree Cement in Gulbarga, Karnataka is even more eccentric: the mines will create a six sq km water body and provide boating facility for tourists. Most mining proposals today are being cleared on the basis of similar closure plans. None of these closure plans discusses pollution control or remediation the assumption, almost, is that there is no likelihood of pollution once the mines are closed. Acid mine drainage and contamination of water in the left-out voids are not even discussed. Stabilisation and plantation on tailings are discussed, but there is no acknowledgement of the fact that more often than not, tailings are a source of heavy metal pollution; these metals are likely to be carried by run-offs into nearby water bodies. The closure plans fare worse on the socio-economic front. Most do not even consider the issue worth discussing, though under a notification by the IBM on mine closure, social issues, mainly related to employees laid off and socio-economic repercussions have been made an integral part of mine closure plans. Mine closure is a non-issue as far as regulatory paradigm in the country is concerned.
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P MADHAVAN
Cratered land: most mines are abandoned after use, and laws have been completely ineffective in preventing this practice
But it cannot remain so: if we dont want ghost towns, contaminated hills and pools and gaping holes on our lands, we will have to redefine the regulations on mine closure and set up an institutional mechanism that will ensure its implementation. Mine closure is not about planting trees and stabilising overburden; it is about creating a sustainable ecosystem in which the community affected by mining can live after the miners and their equipment are gone. Therefore, mine closure is a combination of environmental, social, economic and development issues that must be clearly defined, understood and planned for before a mine is allowed to operate. This means that mine closure plans need to be discussed and prepared in consultation with the community. For this to happen, major changes need to be effected in the law. Firstly, the law related to land must change. The current practice of giving the land back to the government (mainly the forest and revenue departments) suits the industry perfectly, because by doing so, it just shifts the post-mining responsibility on to the governments shoulders. The land, instead, should be transferred to the commons: entities that will ensure that livelihoods are created out of that land. Secondly, detailed community consultations and approval must become an integral part of developing the mine closure plan. There is also the issue of livelihoods when a mine closes. A mine inflicts a double whammy on local communities: it disrupts
their socio-economic fabric twice once when it begins, and again when it closes down. Mining operations must be designed in a manner so that the transitions do not create undue hardships. This will require preparation of a socio-economic closure plan which should have provisions for alternate economic activities and livelihoods, development of infrastructure in a way that it can be utilised after the mine is closed, utilisation of the mine land for economic and social uses, and compensation for workers. Environmental closure of mines must include decontamination and containment of pollution as a core issue. For all of this, adequate financial provisions and robust regulatory mechanisms are necessary both of which are currently missing. The existing financial surety, which is completely insufficient for undertaking any kind of mine closure, must be revised realistically. Footprints left by mines differ; therefore, the financial surety must be designed accordingly for each mine and should be fixed after taking into account the ground realities. In Canada, the financial assurance ranges from a few million dollars for a small mine to over US $100 million for a large mine.7 There is no denying that mine closure is one the biggest challenges for the Indian mineral industry. Unless, the right environment is created through legislations and financial surety, corporates are unlikely to take this issue seriously.
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Rehabilitation: the regulatory roadblocks
egislative laxity in mining is not restricted to environmental regulations; laws targeted at setting right minings social impacts are as hazy. Land, of course, and the right over it, is at the center of these impacts. The State believes that
since it is the owner of all minerals under its territorial jurisdiction, it has the right to explore and extract them at will and that whoever lives on lands where minerals are located can be summarily evicted to aid the purposes of exploration and extraction. The State prefers to rationalise this act of displacement and land acquisition as all for public purpose. The laws of the land, naturally, follow what the State believes. The Land Acquisition Act, a law dating back to Indias colonial past, is one such piece of legislation. It gives the State the power to grab land, and cannily excuses it from the obligation of resettling or rehabilitating those it dispossesses. In 2004 came the national rehabilitation policy, or the NPRR. Dubbed highly unsatisfactory by most, the policy chooses to ignore the right of the displaced to rehabilitation. The costs of this legislative insensitivity have been immense: lakhs displaced, with most left several notches poorer. Development and mining as part of it need not entail such high costs. Contrary to what these laws and policies presume, displacement need not be an inevitable consequence of development. What is, perhaps, needed is a recognition of the place people hold in the scheme of things, and a respect for their position. What follows is providing these people with what is rightfully theirs the benefits that arise out of mining, and the right to say no to a project. The world has acknowledged the importance of this people-centric approach, and India would do well to join the ranks.
Contrary to claims and expectations, mining has not brought prosperity and growth to Indias mining regions. States like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa that have a high level of dependence on mineral resources, have low per capita incomes, higher levels of poverty, lower growth rates and higher levels of mortality, malnutrition and morbidity. Most conflicts over mining begin in the struggle for land, and land is becoming scarcer. The average landholding in rural India in 2003 was just 0.725 ha 27 per cent lower than the corresponding figure in 1992. Tribals have been hit the hardest. The Planning Commission says over a 25-30 year period, 56 per cent of the total tribal land in the districts of Dhenkanal, Ganjam, Koraput and Phulbani in Orissa was lost. The National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement 2003 is in form of broad guidelines, applicable only to projects that displace 500 families or more en masse in the plains and 250 families en masse in hills. It has other drawbacks as well. Under-financing of rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) is one of the key causes of the failure of resettlement programmes in India. Orissa has introduced one of the better R&R policies in the country, which also includes a comprehensive institutional mechanism to implement it. But it has not been legislated yet, and its provisions are not binding. None of the existing R&R policies in India recognise the principle of free, informed and prior consent, nor do they envisage sharing of benefits of the project with project-affected people. Globally, the practice of free, informed and prior consent and sharing the benefits of mining with local communities is catching on. Countries like Ghana and Namibia have a mineral development fund to return part of the income from royalties to communities affected by mining.
CHAPTER
Rehabilitation: the regulatory roadblocks
ith the second largest population in the world, India also faces critical issues of displacement and rehabilitation (besides environmental impacts) when it comes to mining and mineral-based industrialisation. Most of its mining areas are located in remote and least developed regions, inhabited largely by scheduled tribes and other economically weak and disadvantaged sections of society. Mineral exploration, thus, results in large-scale uprooting and further impoverishment of communities. The track record of the major mineral-bearing states in land acquisition and displacement is abysmal. People displaced from their land 50 years ago due to mining have not been compensated yet. Some have been displaced multiple times. People who have lived on their land and worked it for generations, have been evicted forcibly without any compensation or alternate livelihood just because they do not hold any legally enforceable claims to their land. Compensations offered have been meager; numerous case studies suggest that the majority who have been displaced, now
find themselves worse off than before. Whats more, it is not only mining that tribals are losing their land to; compensatory afforestation to atone for mines on forest lands is also taking its toll. Built into Indian laws are two deeply entrenched attitudes (Canadian and US laws reflect a similar thinking): one, that the State has the right to sell minerals to the highest bidder and two, that whoever lives on the lands where minerals are located has few or no rights to restrict exploration and extraction. According to the Indian constitution, the state government is the owner of the minerals within its territorial jurisdiction. In offshore areas, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, the rights over minerals are vested with the Central government. Since all the minerals are owned by the State, it appropriates the power to deny the people (on whose lands minerals are found), any rights over these resources. It also assumes that the responsibility of developing the mineral resources gives it the power to summarily seize lands and evict the people living on them.
Living on the edge: people displaced from their lands 50 years ago due to mining have not been compensated yet. They are, in most cases, worse off than before
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Chhattisgarh and Orissa, in spite of their mineral wealth, are struggling with poverty, illiteracy, and low growth rates. Why mining is creating poverty instead of prosperity has much to do with the governance systems in place. Indian legislations and policies related to rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R), view rehabilitation in simplistic terms. They vary widely from state to state, from project to project, and from authority to authority. Moreover, the limited policies provide no link with the LAA, which has governed forcible usurpation of land by the State without any clause for rehabilitation. The presumption that displacement is an inevitable consequence of all development projects needs to be reassessed, especially in view of the enormous cost of human suffering. There is a need to avoid such large-scale displacement, particularly of tribals. In cases where it is inevitable, care has to be taken for comprehensive resettlement and rehabilitation.
LAND IS THE KEY

Development projects need land; mining is particularly landintensive. In mineral-rich areas like Bastar in Chhattisgarh, for instance, thousands of hectares of land, sometimes entire villages, are diverted for mining. This is most often the reason that sets local communities off on a collision course with project developers because the same land serves multiple purposes in the local economy in areas where these projects are scheduled. Especially in a predominantly agricultural economy like Indias, the importance of land cannot be overemphasised. It is often the only source of food and livelihoods in these areas. Even so-called wastelands play a central role in sustaining rural economies (see Box: How useless is a wasteland?). And this land is increasingly becoming scarce. The National Sample Survey Organisations (NSSO) report on Household Ownership Holdings in India, 2003 says that the average area of land owned by a household in rural India in 2003 was 0.725 ha which was 27 per cent lower than the corresponding figure in 1992. Not surprising, therefore, that land and its acquisition have been at the centre of almost all protests against projects from Kalinganagar to Dadri and beyond (see Box on pages 298-99: The struggle for land).
RAJNIKANT YADAV
Victimised: mining displaces labourers and agricultural workers dependent on land for their livelihoods
The main point of contention here is that while the surface rights to land are under private and customary ownership, the mineral rights are solely owned by the government. The government grants those rights through prospecting licenses or mine leases to mining companies that meet the criteria specified by law. During the prospecting phase, consultation with local communities is not required and they have no right to intervene. During the mine lease phase, the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) is invoked to acquire land. The owners of land or the traditional/customary land users have no right to deny land acquisition; they can file objections and go to the courts for redressal. The holder of the mine lease, however, has the right to take as much of the surface as is needed to gain access to the minerals (though there are restrictions on the upper limit, which the government has the right to increase on a case-by-case basis), regardless of the preferences of the surface owner. A consequence of this approach is that while the interests of one group are nurtured, that of the other are completely ignored, and even considered to be dispensable. Displaced communities are now asking can the traditional axiom of sacrifice for the good of the country truly be interpreted to mean unlimited sacrifice? Is it ethical for one group to shoulder the ills of development while the benefits go to others? Environmental degradation and the displacement caused by mining accentuates poverty. Resource curse is now a well established phenomenon not only in India but in several other countries. Mineral-rich states like Jharkhand,
How is land acquired?
In most cases, the first time people living in an area where a project is to be sited get to hear of it is when the land acquisition process starts. There are two ways of acquiring land: representatives of companies can approach landowners directly and negotiate the sale, or the government can acquire the land and later sell it to project developers. When companies acquire land directly from the people, it is a clear process. No other agency is involved. Theoretically, people have a right to decide whether or not they want to sell their land. The market decides compensation. However, the price and negotiating with individual land owners act as a dampener on acquisition plans and companies then bank on the government
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REHABILITATION: THE REGULATORY ROADBLOCKS
How useless is a wasteland?

Governments plan to use and divert wastelands productively, but arent local communities already using them?
Recent protests over land acquisition for special economic zones (SEZs) have largely centred around the diversion of farmland it is being argued as a result that this diversion should be avoided as far as possible. The former chairperson of the National Advisory Council, Sonia Gandhi, is believed to have said that not more than 10 per cent of the land acquired should be prime farmland. Consequently, wastelands have gained the high ground now and are being sold as the panacea for all ills. Wastelands, governments argue, can and in fact should be diverted for making them more productive. Just about everyone is eyeing wastelands the Planning Commission says 11 million ha should be set aside for jatropha plantations. The paper industry wants another 36 million ha for plantations; SEZs are the latest entrants in the race.
But in India, there are no wastelands in the true sense of the term. Every bit of land in India is used and the officially designated wastelands are often the backbone of local economies, supporting the most marginalised. Wastelands consist of fallow land, land used for shifting agriculture, grazing land and pastures. In fact, 61 per cent of the area under wastelands in India are common property resources (CPRs). CPRs play an important role in rural economies. According to an NSSO survey, 12 per cent of rural income comes from CPRs. They provide food and fodder for a large proportion of the poor. And they are scarce. According to the same survey, the average CPR area available to a rural household is just 0.31 ha. This low value means a high dependence on these resources. All this goes to say that no land acquisition is benign from a social, environmental and economic point of view.
Padmaparna Ghosh, Down To Earth, November 15, 2006
to acquire land for them. The government, in a tearing hurry to invite investments, is more than happy to comply. Of course, the government is well-equipped for this task the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 allows it to acquire land in coal-rich areas, and the acquired land is automatically leased out to Coal India Ltd. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 gives the government huge and almost autocratic powers over land containing atomic minerals. By far the most powerful piece of legislation available with the government to
acquire land, at least in terms of the sheer scope it provides for mass acquisition, is the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. All these legislations operate under the same premise: the principles of eminent domain (which gives the State overarching rights over all the land) and that of public purpose (the rationale is that the State being the protector and controller of public interest, should have unlimited power to act in this interest). But the government grossly misuses the powers granted to it, and the LAA in particular has come in for strong criticism from many quarters.
SAVE OUR ...
NO ...
SAVE ...
WE WANT...
SHAYAMAL / CSE
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The struggle for land

Cases from across the nation all point to the same angst
Dadri, Uttar Pradesh Not very far from Delhi, about 1,011 ha of land has been acquired in eight villages in western Uttar Pradesh, for Reliance Energy Generation Ltds (REGL) worlds largest gas-based power plant; over 6,000 families have been displaced with meagre compensation. Fears of more displacement are growing with a planned new SEZ adjacent to the power plant. Farmers of the region are up in arms: they are not against the power plant, but are unhappy with the compensation, the way the land has been acquired and the rehabilitation package. REGL had sought the Uttar Pradesh governments help to acquire the land in 2004. Villagers allege that the government took away their land almost by fraud, without their consent and at throw-away prices. Many havent received any compensation at all. Manoj Bharadwaj, a farmer, says: I havent taken a penny for my land, but REGL has already taken possession and had my land barbed.The then chief minister Mulayam Singh had announced compensation at the rate of Rs 37 lakh per ha, but the final compensation was pegged at a low Rs 17.9 lakh per ha. There is some confusion regarding this, which the then district collector of Ghaziabad, Santosh Yadav, explains: When negotiations were
going on, some representatives from Greater Noida were asking for a hike in compensation. The chief minister promised them compensation at the rate of Rs 37 lakh per ha. It was not meant for the people who would be displaced on account of the power plant in Ghaziabad. The Ghaziabad farmers have misunderstood the matter. Farmers claim that they did not want to part with their fertile land that produced three crops a year and sometimes, even four. Says Mangu Singh Rana, president of Maharana Sangram Singh Kishan Sangharsh Samiti (MSSKSS), a union of farmers created to convey dissent against the project: The administration has played with our sentiments. It first threatened some farmers that their leases would be cancelled if they didnt surrender and then they would be compensated at the circle rate of Rs 40 per square yard. Yadav trashes the farmers claims.If you look at the sale deeds, you will find rates ranging from Rs 2.99-7.18 lakh per ha. Besides, the allegation that farmers were scared of their leases getting cancelled is not true because there are only 200 farmers who farm leased lands. Why did 2,800 landowning farmers sign the deed?he asks. But farmers insist that they were coerced into leaving their lands. Yadavs denials notwithstanding, it seems evident that the farmers have been taken for a ride. The rates of land at a high-tech city project at Dasna, 10 km away, is Rs 53.8 lakh per ha. A kilometre away from Dasna
SHAILESH KUMAR / CSE
In opposition: across India, farmers, like this man in Uttar Pradesh, are protesting against land acquisition for development projects
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is Bamheta where builders are paying farmers Rs 2.99 crore per ha. Further ahead, farmers of Nai Basti, Bir Akbarpur and other villages are selling their land for Rs 5.98 crore per ha. Local property dealers believe that the compensation for farmers displaced by the REGL project is very low and that the appropriate rate could be close to Rs 53.8 lakh per ha. The farmers have approached former Samajwadi Party leader Raj Babbar who, along with former prime minister V P Singh, has formed the Jan Morcha to fight their cause.We did a survey and were startled to learn that at least 1,21,406 ha of prime land near highways and fertile agricultural land was given to industrialists across the state,says Babbar. Farmers feel that such projects should be allowed to come up only on barren land. A common question being raised is why did the government act as a middleman between the farmers and REGL.Why didnt REGL buy land from the farmers directly? asks Rana, The farmers are not against the project. They also need electricity. Land was acquired in the name of public purpose for the UP Power Corporation. Why then was it given to REGL? According to Babbar, this is a monumental land scam amounting to thousands of crores of rupees. Nandigram, West Bengal On March 14, 2006, about 3,000 police personnel forced their way into West Bengals Nandigram block; officially, 14 villagers lost their lives, and many more were injured. Villages in the block, in East Midnapur district, had been resisting the state governments plan to set up an SEZ on their lands. Villagers say over 100 people were killed in the bloodbath and several hundred were injured. They say the police, reportedly backed by Communist Party of India-Marxist cadres called the Lakshman Vahini after their leader Lakshman Seth, Member of Parliament from East Midnapur, shot to kill. They raped and killed women, and did not spare even the children. They dumped bodies in the Haldi river, buried some in ditches and carted the rest away in trucks. Nandigram had been virtually cut off since January, when villagers, fearing their lands would be taken to set up the SEZ, dug up roads and blocked all entry points to ensure the area remained inaccessible. It is widely believed that the state sent forces to Nandigram to regain control of the block. Three days after the incident, following public outrage, pressure from Left Front allies and a veiled censure from the governor, West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee finally claimed responsibility, calling the incident an error in assessment. He said the government would not acquire land in Nandigram. The Calcutta High Court called the state action wholly unconstitutionaland taking suo moto cognisance, ordered an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The agency has submitted its report, but the details were unavailable at the time of going to press. Amritsar, Punjab I dont know anything except farming, says Preetam Singh. Singh and his familys livelihood comes from vegetable and dairy farming on his two ha of land. Preetam Singh is one of the 1,500 landholders of seven villages in
Amritsar district who were served a notification for land acquisition for an SEZ on August 17, 2006. The land across the seven villages is very fertile.This is the vegetable belt of Punjab and we get up to three crops in a year, says a farmer. Growing mostly potatoes and peas on the irrigated land, the farmers manage to earn up to Rs 1 lakh from each acre annually and most farmers have holdings between one and five acres. Our crop is sold not only in Punjab but also goes up to Srinagar and Himachal Pradesh, says Karaj Singh Jeete, a farmer. The suburbs of nearby Amritsar town are dotted with cold storages where these vegetables are housed on their way to diverse destinations. But cultivation is not the only reason the locals depend on the land. Every farmer here has about 10 cows or buffaloes. Earnings from agriculture are supplemented by dairy farming.For every Rs 30 we spend on a cow, we earn Rs 100. We easily earn Rs 3,000-4,000 from each cow every month, says Jeete. The fodder and feed for these cows and buffaloes comes from the same land. But the role of dairy farming in this area is not limited only to the landholders. About 40 per cent of the population in these villages comprises landless labourers, each of whom have a couple of cows.The farm workers are paid Rs 100-150 per day. But more than half their earning comes from selling milk. And they buy the fodder for the animals from us,says a farmer. It is not just this project. The state has forcibly acquired 152 ha for the Trident Group. Even though a hundred farmers have not yet received compensation, the perimeter wall has been built and construction started, says Sukhdev Singh Kokri Kalan, general secretary, Bharatiya Kisan Union. What happened to the industrial township in Goindwal Sahib set up in 1986? About 890 ha of agricultural land was taken and now its vacant. Why cant that be given for the SEZ? asks Harjeet Singh Hundal, a farmer in Cheete Kalan village in Amritsar. All Preetam Singh can say, however, is:I cant watch the fields I have tilled with my hands for so long get bulldozed. Kalinganagar, Orissa Before the bloodbath at Nandigram, the most violent land acquisition in recent times happened in Kalinganagar. On January 6, 2006, 12 tribals protesting land acquisition were gunned down by battalions of the Orissa police. Land for a steel plant had been acquired here by the government many years ago, and was finally given to the Tatas in 2005. What set off the protests was the Orissa governments move to sell the land to the Tatas at 10 times the price that it had paid to the tribals. On January 6, Tata officials accompanied by Orissa police personnel arrived at the project site to begin construction of a boundary wall for the plant. When the villagers came to know of this, they came armed with their bows and arrows to protest. They started retreating when they heard bombs exploding; they were shot at as they retreated. Twelve tribals were killed, most of them shot in the back as they were running away. There were also allegations that the police mutilated the bodies of the dead tribals while conducting post-mortems. The incident only served to steel the resolve of the tribals, and the protests have intensified.
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The reason for this criticism is easily understandable: the government uses the LAA to acquire land, ostensibly for public purpose, and then promptly sells this land to companies (which are often privately-owned), sometimes at much higher rates than what it paid to acquire the land. The land acquisition process in Kalinganagar, Orissa, is a case in point: here, the state government acquired land from tribals at the so called market rate, and then sold it to the Tatas for building a steel plant at 10 times this price. It is this self-imposed role of the State that is raising questions. Should the government involve itself in facilitating private land acquistion? What are the criteria that decide what is in public interest, and what is in the interests of business and industry?
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Why is the LAA in the eye of the storm? The controversial act is a 19th century piece of legislation (see Box: A colonial legacy). Its aim is to allow the government to acquire land for public purpose. The main issue with the LAA is its complete rejection of a democratic decision-making process the government does not have to take any permission from the owner of the land for acquiring it, and reserves with itself the right to decide what is public purpose. There are other serious concerns the State has the power to acquire land, but is not duty-bound to resettle and rehabilitate those displaced by the acquisition. While the government has to compensate the landowners, the LAA does not require it to ensure resettlement and rehabilitation. What constitutes adequate compensation is also in question. Legally entitled landowners receive monetary compensation for the land that is acquired, usually at prevailing market rates. But they are not compensated for other losses, like that of livelihood, shelter, habitat, cultural resources, access to natural resources or basic amenities. The law does not take into account the rights of people who are not legal owners of land: like the landless, nomads, fisherfolk and tribals who do not have ownership pattas for land. The act also has an emergency clause, which gives a district collector extraordinary powers without adequate checks and balances, leaving it open to widespread misuse.
Many changes have been proposed in the LAA. The National Advisory Council (NAC), set up by the Central government, has suggested (in its Draft National Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation Policy) the following important changes in the act: It should have a strong, legally enforceable rehabilitation clause within it. It should guarantee the right to sustain life, including livelihoods, shelter and habitat. The eminent domain principle should be subject to the State satisfying these fundamental and legal rights of those who are likely to be displaced. The LAA should be prevented from overriding the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act which is applicable in Schedule V and VI areas. Compensation should be provided not just for loss of land, but also for loss of livelihood, habitat, cultural resources and of access to natural resources. Monetary compensation should be based not on the market value, but on the replacement costs. The government has to define the public purpose to be served by the project. Information on the social, environmental and economic costs should be made readily available, and should be transparently discussed. Project-affected people (PAPs) should have the legal right to challenge the public purpose. Public purpose should be replaced with public good, including the good of those to be displaced. Public good can never include acquiring land for private companies, or even for public sector units that are not producing public goods. The emergency clause should be invoked only in the rarest of the rare cases. The NAC has also detailed out the nature of the rehabilitation package and the institutional changes required to ensure implementation and fix accountability. However, the main thrust of the demands for either revoking the LAA or radically amending it, has been to challenge the eminent domain of the State, and to redefine public purpose.
A colonial legacy
The genesis of a draconian law
In 1824, the British government enacted the Bengal Regulation I. This law empowered the Crown to acquire immovable property for the construction of roads, canals or other public purposes. For the first time, the State was allowed to acquire large tracts of land for public interest as government property. The notion of property and rightsas described in modern law did not exist in India before the advent of the British. The 1824 regulation was modified and amended many times. As the power of the Crown spread over the country, the regulation was extended to Bombay and Madras, and later, to the entire country. The British needed to develop an extensive railway network throughout
India. A comprehensive law giving the government huge powers of land acquisition was, therefore, necessary. The all-powerful Land Acquisition Act, 1894 emerged, based on the principle of eminent domain and the State as the sole controller of land. While the LAA was used by the British to consolidate their hold over the entire country, it was the tribals who bore the brunt. Using the principle of eminent domain, large tracts of land inhabitated by tribals were converted into public lands owned by the State, and rights of access were granted as privileges by the State. This principle later inspired the Forest Act of 1927 and the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972. The British have gone, but the LAA remains: now used by the Indian government to do exactly what the British did in the past forcibly acquire land from people in a completely undemocratic way in the name of public interest.
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Legalising the encroachers?

Despite its positive intent, the Tribal Rights Bill has run into rough weather
The government passed the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 2006. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 had converted tribals into encroachers on the land that had been inhabited by their ancestors for generations. This illegitimate status meant that tribals were not eligible for compensation (however meager) for displacement due to land acquisition. The Tribal Bill was meant to address both forest rights and occupancy rights of people who had been using forest lands for generations, without any formal recognition. The bill, an important milestone for the tribal rights movement in India, was passed after much deliberations; a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) was set up to review the recommendations of the original bill tabled in December 2005. The bill accepted the cut-off date for consideration of land rights as December 2005 rather than 1980 (the year the Forest Conservation Act was enacted). Under it, all those residing in forests for 25 years or more or for three generations prior to 2005 would be eligible to claim land and the ceiling has been set at four ha for each settler family. Also, non-tribal forest dwellers were brought under the ambit of the bill.
However, the bill has continued to be shrouded by controversy, since tribals rights groups feel that there has been significant dilution of the recommendations of the JPC. The bill has defined forest-dwelling scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers as those who primarily reside in the forest. Tribal groups pointed out that most forest dwellers do not strictly dwell inside the forests, living on forest land: they live on the fringes of forests, but are heavily dependent on the forest land and resources for their livelihood. The bill excludes them some estimate that 90 per cent of forest dwellers are likely to be kept from availing the benefits of the bill. The bill has also excluded large numbers of non-tribal forest dwellers through constrictive definition. Also, it no longer mandates gram sabha approval for forest land diversion and land acquisition. Tribal rights groups have also pointed out that the bill is susceptible to interference by the judiciary and other authorities. Section 15 of the bill states that this act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law in force. In other words, this provision may lead to a bizarre situation though forest dwellers will be provided land rights, they might still not be able to exercise these rights over their land, since these rights would be subject to the provisions of the Indian Forest Act. Also, the judiciary has the power to withdraw the rights provided by the bill.
Public purpose, public good or public interest?
Defining public purpose has never been simple. India has a dual society on one hand, there is a rich and influential minority with an ever-increasing appetite for energy-intensive lifestyles and luxury goods; on the other is a huge majority whose demands rarely go beyond a subsistence existence. There is no homogenous public, and so there can be no one definition of public purpose that meets everyones demands. If past experiences are an indicator, public purpose has meant anything that people want and that people can use, at least theoretically for instance, projects providing power, irrigation, steel, aluminum, and even cars have been classified as satisfying a public purpose. As a result, projects that primarily cater to a very limited proportion of Indias population and which lead to a greater accumulation of private wealth, are justified as serving a public purpose. Various social and political movements, civil society groups and even the NAC have recommended a change in the definition of public purpose. The universal belief is that firstly, private sector investment can never constitute public purpose and secondly, only certain public sector projects, providing basic infrastructure like roads, power and irrigation, should come within the ambit of public purpose. The NAC has further recommended that a distinction be made between public purpose and public interest. While public purpose can be taken to mean anything that is open for public consumption, this might not necessarily be in public interest. According to the NAC, public interest can be decided only after the social, economic and environmental costs are
balanced against the benefits. Further, who benefits and to what extent should also be taken into consideration. Studies should comprehensively prove that the proposed project serves public interest more than the current land use patterns. The most significant recommendation is that decisions on public interest should be made in a transparent and participatory fashion, rather than being left at the sole discretion of the government.
Tribal rights and land acquisition
Tribals have always borne the brunt of land acquisition. They, unfortunately, inhabit areas rich in forests as well as mineral resources, and have repeatedly been told to make way for the use of these resources in public interest. Indias first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously told those displaced by the Hirakud dam: if you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interests of the country. Some legislations have attempted to safeguard tribal rights the recently passed Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, 2005 (see Box: Legalising the encroachers?), and the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (referred to as PESA in future) are examples. While the first tries to legalise tribal rights over the lands inhabited by them, the second has attempted to involve them in the decision-making process and give them greater control over local resources. But despite these, land alienation of tribals persists; in fact, it is endemic in large areas of the country. Official figures show that every year, the number of landless in the country increases by two million. A study by the Steering Group on Rural Poverty Alleviation, Watershed Development, Decentralised
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Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan, points out that in four districts of Orissa Dhenkanal, Ganjam, Koraput and Phulbani about 56 per cent of the total tribal land was lost to non-tribals over a 25-30 year period.1 Other estimates claim that 84 per cent of the land area in scheduled districts today either belongs to the government or to non-tribals.2 Tribal anger, as a result is brewing; resistance movements to protect tribal lands are gaining popularity. Several such movements are currently going on in the states of Orissa, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh, emboldened by the success in the late 1980s of the Nimmalapadu case. Tribals of Nimmalapadu in Andhra Pradesh had gone to court to thwart an attempt by the Birla group to take their land (see Mining in the states: Andhra Pradesh). The case led to the landmark Samata judgement which stipulated that land in Scheduled Areas cannot be transferred to private companies for mining (see Box: A landmark judgement).
PESA: reduced to a paper tiger

PESA plays a central role in the land acquisition process, as it is applicable over a significant proportion of tribal lands rich in minerals. Nine mineral-rich states fall under the PESA legislation: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra. The act was first passed by the Central government, and since land is a state subject, these states were asked to pass similar legislations that would be enforceable within their respective areas. PESA is essentially an experiment in decentralisation it proposes extensive powers not to the state government or the gram panchayat, but to the gram sabha, a collective consisting of all adults in the village. The law is unambiguous and clear on land acquisition. It gives the gram sabha control over prospecting of minor minerals; the sabha is empowered to take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land of scheduled tribes, and has to give permission for any development project to come up in Schedule V (tribal-dominated) areas. The gram sabha has the right
A landmark judgement
The Samata ruling gives tribals overriding powers on their lands, but efforts to undermine it are on
In 1997, the Supreme Court had ruled that mining in Schedule V areas, classified on the basis of their tribal populations, should not be allowed without the participation of their people. In other words, mining leases to the private sector would not be allowed in these areas. This judgement, known as the Samata judgement (named after the tribal activist group that had represented the matter to the Court), has become a major thorn in the side of mining ventures. But the opportunity provided by the judgement, in the form of a protective and enabling envelope to manage mining in the lands of poor people, remains unexplored. What the judges noted The judges said that the primary question was whether the government could grant lease of lands situated in Scheduled Areas to non-tribals: this, when tribals were dependent on forests and would be exploited if their lands were alienated. The judges also noted that it was this concern that had led the government to demarcate regions inhabited by tribals as Scheduled Areas, which prohibited the transfer of immovable property by a member of the scheduled tribes to a non-scheduled tribe. The issue before the judges was if the state government was, in fact, above the law and therefore, allowed to allot land to a non-tribal; and whether the land in the Scheduled Areas, which belongs to the government, could be handed over to non-tribals. The divisional bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, where the matter was first heard, had ruled that the regulation did not apply to lands owned by the state government, as the state government was not a natural person. But the Supreme Court judges, after minutely examining the legal interpretation of the state, decreed that the state was indeed a person, directed to fulfill the socio-economic goals set down in the Constitution to establish the egalitarian social order in which socio-eco-
nomic justice is secured to the poor and weaker sections of the society. The judges then, in a majority decision, ruled that the state government is directed to ensure that all concerned industrialists stop forthwith mining operations within the Scheduled Areas, except where the lease has been granted to the state undertaking. In other words, only state governments would be allowed to mine in the areas classified as Scheduled and that too, after due regard to the various environment and forest acts. But the judges did not prohibit mining completely in these areas. It was possible to mine, but only after safeguards were taken to ensure that the needs of economic growth would not impinge on the lives of poor people and the environment. The judges directed that mining could be permitted based on the decision of the states governor, whom the Constitution has empowered to sanction transfer of land. But as the executive is enjoined to protect social, economic and educational interests of the tribals, it has to transmit its duties and obligations to the agency which has been given the charge to exploit resources. Therefore, the private company has to ensure that the duties of the state are maintained. The judges have laid out these duties (see Box: Samata: para 113).At least 20 per cent of the net profits,the judgement also says,should be set apart as a permanent fund as a part of the industrial/business activity for establishment and maintenance of water resources, schools, hospitals, sanitation and transport facilities. In addition, the private agency would have to invest in reforestation and maintenance of ecology. The second approach was that the state governments could organise cooperative societies solely comprising scheduled tribes to exploit mining operations within these areas, again after review and scrutiny under the various forest and environment acts. Recognising also that the issues were complex, the apex court asked the government, after deliberations, to take a policy decision based on the guidelines laid down in the judgement, so that there would be a consistent scheme throughout the countryin respect of tribal lands under which national wealth in the form of minerals is located.
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to reject a project and this is what makes PESA so powerful. However, the versions of the original PESA that different states enacted, have significantly diluted this power. Almost all powers have been made subject to rules and further orders as may be prescribed by the state governments thus making implementation of PESA subject to other legislations. Also, rules enabling PESA have not been passed even many years after the Central law was passed. Says Sanjay Upadhyay, director of the Enviro-Legal Defence Forum, a Delhi-based NGO: A few rules and prescriptions began to surface in early 2000 primarily through revocable official circulars; these again have been totally inoperative because of the ambiguity and lack of clarity of these provisions. The most significant dilution has been in the powers of the gram sabha. PESA originally required the sabha to give its consent for land acquisition. This consent has been reduced to consultation and the recommendations of these consultations are obviously not legally enforceable. Also, different states, instead of keeping decision-making powers at the gram sabha
level, have given them to the different tiers under Panchayati Raj gram panchayat, panchayat samiti and the zila parishad. The potentially radical law, therefore, has been reduced to a paper tiger. Thus, though there have been attempts to empower tribals and local communities in the process of land acquisition, these have been very few and far between. In most cases, the government has found ways to circumvent the people and their role. In any case, legislations such as the LAA have given such sweeping powers to the government that people have hardly had any say when the government has proceeded to acquire their land. More importantly, rehabilitation, which should have been a natural outcome of any land acquisition process, has not been featured into the act. The country did not, in fact, feel the need for a legislation on rehabilitation till 2003; and even then, instead of legislation which would have made it a binding obligation, a national policy was drafted, which is supposed to act only as a guideline.
Samata: para 113

On what the private sector must do

Reforestation and maintenance of ecology in Scheduled Areas Maintenance of roads and communication facilities in the Scheduled Areas where operations of the industry has an impact Supply of potable water to tribals Establishment of schools for imparting free education at primary and secondary level and providing vocational training to tribals to enable them to be qualified, competent and confident in pursuit of employment Providing employment to tribals according to their qualifications in their establishment/factory Establishment of hospitals and camps for providing free medicalaid and treatment to tribals in the Scheduled Areas Maintenance of sanitation Construction of houses for tribals in the Scheduled Areas as enclosures; the expenditure for the above projects should be part of the annual budget of the industry establishment or business avocation/venture
Government wants to dispose In the last few years, as private mining has grown by leaps and bounds, governments have worked overtime, not to develop a position on people and mining but to find ways of diluting the provisions of the Samata judgement. The Union and state governments had filed an application asking for a modification; the application was dismissed by the Supreme Court in early 2000. Then in May 2000, the Andhra Pradesh government asked the states Tribes Advisory Council for an amendment; protests made the chief minister drop the idea. In late 2000, tribal activists released to the media a secret note purportedly written by a joint secretary in the Union ministry of mines
to the Union governments committee of secretaries: it proposed an amendment of the Schedule V to bypass the Samata judgement and so facilitate the leasing of land in tribal areas. This secret note was published in newspapers and led to widespread protests. In 2001, the disinvestment process of BALCO, a public sector unit operating in the tribal areas of Chhattisgarh, raised the issue once again. However, this time, the Supreme Court ruled the decision of the state could not be questioned. After all, it was a mere three-judge bench that had delivered the Samata judgement. To hold fire, it ought to have been a five-judge bench. But the matter refused to fade away. The press reported that many ministers of the government were asking for a review of the judgement. The question was raised repeatedly in the Parliament as well. In March 2001, replying to a direct question on the matter, the government stated that it had no intentions of amending Schedule V to overcome the Samata judgement. But speculations and surmises still flew thick and fast. It was said that the government was planning to amend the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act for this purpose. In August 2004, again, replying to a question in the Lok Sabha, the minister stated that the government is not considering any amendment to the act. But Orissa has gone ahead. In July 2003, a state sub-committee chaired by the chief minister concluded that the Samata judgement was not binding on the state, a false inference because the ruling was applicable to all states. The committees premise was that there were ample legislations at the state level to protect tribals and Orissa could remain outside the rulings ambit. It is thus clear that the central problem in allowing large-scale mining is not mining per se, but its irresponsible embrace by corrupt regulators. In the current scenario, as projects get inaugurated all over the country, so will another cycle of internecine conflicts. And whos to know how violent it will get?
Down To Earth, April 15, 2005
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THE NON-POLICY OF 2003

India did not have a single uniform national R&R policy till 2004. Different states had instituted and followed their own policies, which were rarely linked to the Land Acquisition Act. The Union ministry of rural development finally awoke to this unfortunate state of affairs in 1994, and a draft National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation was prepared. This draft policy, however, chose to ignore rehabilitation as a right of the displaced. Following extensive discussions among voluntary organisations, an alternative citizens draft was prepared in 1994-95, which attempted to correct the imbalance by pushing for displaced peoples right to be rehabilitated. In 1997, a committee of secretaries of the Union government came up with a new draft, which overrode the principal of prior informed consent. With the then government ousted from power in 1999, this draft was relegated to remain under consideration till 2004, when the new government finally promulgated a national rehabilitation policy. The National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Project-affected Families (NPRR-2003) is in the form of broad guidelines applicable only to projects that displace 500 families or more en masse in plains areas and 250 families en masse in hilly areas; the guidelines also cover Desert Development Programme blocks and areas mentioned in Schedules V and VI of the Constitution. The NPRR-2003s simplistic assumptions the policy has failed to incorporate any of the progressive clauses recommended by the civil society during consultations in the earlier drafts have drawn criticism from all quarters. N C Saxena, former secretary of the Planning Commission and a member of the NAC, described it as highly unsatisfactory in an interview to the national daily, The Hindu. According to him, the policy did not provide for transparency or any consultative process. Among the key drawbacks of the NPRR-2003 are its barriers of exclusion that effectively keep a large section of displaced people from the rehabilitation process. The first barrier of exclusion is the clause which says that only those losing 100 per cent of their lands will be eligible for compensation. Another exclusion is the
clause that only if 500 families in plains villages or 250 families in hilly or scheduled areas are affected en masse by the project, will the area be declared an affected zone. The policy also makes allotment of land conditional to availability, thus putting no burden on the government to find land. If in a rare case land is available, only those who have lost their entire land would be entitled. Though the NPRR-2003 lays down that its objective is to provide better standards of living to project-affected families (PAFs), the compensation package it offers is more likely to transform a prosperous farmer into a landless poor. The policy also does not put any onus on the government to give public information about the project and publicly justify the displacement. It doesnt provide a forum to even debate the requirement of the project. Some of the other key concerns which the NPRR-2003 has failed to address are discussed below.
Of alternatives and double-speak
Clause 2.1 of the NPRR-2003 states that its objective is to minimise displacement of persons and identify non-displacing or least displacing alternatives. But this has been nullified by Clause 4.5, which states that such an identification will be done by the rehabilitation administrator in consultation with the requiring body, which is the company for whom land is being acquired by the government! It is unfortunate that instead of the affected people, the requiring body which has no stake in the minimisation of displacement is consulted.
Compensation: cash is better
The predominant method of compensation advocated by the policy is cash, not rehabilitation or livelihood support. But cash compensation is hardly ever adequate in making up for displacement losses (see Box: The question of compensation). Surprisingly, the policy itself recognises the limitations of this form of compensation and states that the system of extending cash compensation does not by itself, in most cases, enable the affected families to obtain cultivable agricultural land, homestead and other resources. The NPRR-2003 makes allotment of land conditional to availability, thus putting no burden on the government to find land. If in a rare case land is available, only those who have lost their entire land are entitled. Further, it offers to replace the agricultural land of the oustees
The question of compensation

Market-driven monetary compensation has a flip side
Land acquisition goes hand-in-hand with compensation. But how is adequate compensation defined? As per prevailing practice, compensation has largely been confined to monetary compensation at current market rates. There are a few exceptions, though: those displaced by the Sardar Sarovar project, for instance, are entitled to land-for-land. Fair market? While many groups have recommended that losses of other kinds livelihoods, cultural resources, habitats and access to natural resources also be compensated, the notion that market is a fair arbitrator of
compensation has also raised many questions. Firstly, it is well known that land prices increase exponentially when an industry or a major infrastructure project is set up. The original landowner is compensated at current rates, preventing the displaced from benefiting from the boom in market prices. A second and related point is that market prices are heavily distorted, as the land market is not sufficiently developed. Agricultural land is, typically, not tradable for non-agricultural use. As such, the market price takes into account the restrictions in use. Land prices (of agricultural land) do not include the probability of industrial or nonagricultural use at much higher prices (given higher productivity of land in industrial use). In land acquisition, therefore, the true prices would have been substantially higher had land been a tradable commodity.
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AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Uncertain futures: one of the key limitations of the National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement is that it keeps a large section of displaced people out of the rehabilitation process that it proposes
with wasteland, wherever agricultural land is not available. Even for tribals, the policy does not go beyond stating that each scheduled tribe PAF shall be given preference in allotment of land. The policy lays down that its objective is to provide better standards of living to PAFs. But it does not elaborate on this; neither does it specify the mechanism to achieve this. In comparison, the draft of the policy was more forthright in claiming to ensure that the resettled people (are) able to rise above the poverty line and enjoy a better standard of living than before displacement. Secondly, benefits to the displaced people must be comparable with the people benefiting from that specific project or with the people who have been beneficiaries of the development process in general. These objectives would have forced the authorities to view R&R as a poverty-reduction strategy, and thus there would have been an incentive for them to seek options that result in the least displacement. Paragraph 6.18 of the NPRR-2003 says: The PAFs shall be provided necessary training facilities for development of entrepreneurship to take up self-employment projects at the resettlement zone as part of R&R benefits. However, it is silent about the responsibilities of the requiring body to provide wage employment, when it is clearly established that the poorest of the poor cannot be trained to produce for the market and their preference is for wage employment. The policy does not even
suggest that all unskilled new jobs created in the project would go to the PAPs. Contrary to the draft policys reference to 26 basic amenities including roads, safe drinking water, education and irrigation, the NPRR-2003 states that the government would decide what amenities are to be provided. The policys paragraph 6.22 says: The PAFs shall be provided the basic amenities and infrastructural facilities at the resettlement site as per norms specified by the appropriate government; it is desirable that provision of drinking water, electricity, schools, dispensaries and access to the resettlement sites amongst others be included.
Who says it was your land?
The NPRR-2003 is designed to keep the majority of oustees out of rehabilitation process, even if they are losing a large part of their lands. One of its clauses says that only those losing 100 per cent of their lands will be eligible for compensation, while another says that only if 500 families in plains villages or 250 families in hilly or scheduled areas are affected en masse by the project, will the area be declared an affected zone. The new policy restricts the provision of housing sites only to those who owned houses at the old site. Paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of the policy state: Any PAF owning a house and whose house has been acquired may be allotted free of cost house site to the extent
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P MADHAVAN
Silent sufferers: most rehabilitation packages totally ignore the rights of women to R&R benefits
of actual loss of area of the acquired house, but not more than 150 sq m of land in rural areas and 75 sq m of land in urban areas. Each PAF of below poverty line (BPL) category shall get a one-time financial assistance of Rs 25,000 for house construction. Non-BPL families shall not be entitled to receive this assistance. This would deprive many families of housing sites: these would include people who have been living in ancestral houses that continue to be in the name of their forefathers, and the poor who live in huts on common lands.
studies, environment impact assessment, environment rehabilitation plans and the detailed R&R plan, as was earlier suggested.
Women get a raw deal, as usual
No transparency, no consultations
The NPRR-2003 does not put any onus on the rehabilitation administrator to give public information about the project or publicly justify the displacement. The administrator is also not required to hold any public hearings to debate the requirement of the project a provision which the draft had contained. There is no mechanism in place that can even question the extent of displacement, let alone ensure its actual minimisation. Clause 4.5 of the policy requires the administrator to hold consultations with PAFs while preparing an R&R scheme or plan, but it does not envision consultations with the civil society; nor does it specifically state that all PAPs and other concerned citizens and peoples organisations would enjoy the right to information about all aspects of the project which are of public interest including the detailed project report, the financial plans, economic or financial viability studies, social impact benchmarks and other
The definition of the family in most resettlement policies and echoed in the NPRR-2003 is based on the assumption that women are totally dependent on men. In the Maharashtra Act of 1989, family has been defined as including spouse, minor sons, unmarried daughters or dependent brothers or sisters. Thus, a major unmarried daughter has no rights, while a major unmarried son would be treated as a separate unit. Even in the case of those displaced by the Narmada project, every son above the age of 18 is to be treated as a separate family, but widows or deserted wives have no such rights. The NPRR-2003 definition of family includes the following members: the head of the family, spouse, minor sons or unmarried daughters, minor brothers or unmarried sisters, father, mother and other members residing with him and dependent on him for their livelihood. Thus, married women, widows or deserted women have absolutely no rights to compensation.
Another draft, but with a difference
Expectedly, a clamour for amending the NPRR-2003 had begun building up soon after it was announced. The NAC took it upon itself to amend the policy, and presented a new draft in December
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2005.3 This draft was certainly more progressive in character, content and intent. But in May 2006, the prime ministers office (PMO), which hosted a secretaries meet to discuss the draft, categorically rejected most of the proactive clauses contained in it. To obfuscate matters further, the government created several committees of secretaries and a Group of Ministers to review the draft policy.4 The NAC has suggested that the new law should be implemented with a retrospective effect of the last 10 years. It also asks for the cost of rehabilitation to be incorporated within the total cost of a development project before assessing its economic feasibility a move which is essential for successful rehabilitation. Besides, the framers of the draft policy want that the zone of influence of a project should not only include people identified as project-affected, but also those on the periphery who have suffered indirect loss of livelihoods. Naturally, industry and elements in the government are stridently opposing this draft. The Union ministry of rural developments report on it is now awaited. In modern times, the existing rehabilitation policies in combination with a colonial-era land acquisition act that we have would do little to address issues related with developmentinduced displacement. There is a need to have a more practical approach in terms of a legally viable policy with stricter and more transparent provisions.
REBUILDING LIVES
Naturally, dismal would be the word that exemplifies the track record of Indian mining authorities on R&R. No current estimates are available about the number of people displaced by mining; however, available data for the period 1950-91 indicates that about 2.55 million people more than half of them tribals had been involuntarily displaced by mining during that period. Whats worse, only about 25 per cent of the displaced population had been resettled (not rehabilitated).5 Mining, thus, has been taking a heavy toll of especially marginal populations: people who are dependent on forests for livelihood and have a lower adaptive capacity for economic and social changes. In fact, there are now cases of people being displaced multiple times, creating what Theodore Downing describes in his report, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement (MMSD, April 2002), as a floating population of development-induced poor.6 Contrary to this abysmal state of affairs on ground, the subject of displacement and rehabilitation seems to have received ample attention from planners and thinkers, at least in theory. Principles that make up an effective R&R policy have been enumerated and are widely accepted. Studies have isolated a set of
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Lost worlds: rehabilitation of project-affected people from mining projects has been largely unsuccessful and completely inadequate
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impoverishment risks and rights usurpation issues that exist across all displacement-causing development projects. Michael Cernea, a US-based sociologist who has worked extensively with the World Bank, has developed a list of nine impoverishment risks associated with involuntary displacement: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services, social disarticulation and education loss.7 Prevention of these risks would necessitate undertaking extensive R&R projects that view displacement as much more than the loss of property. To counter landlessness, governments must ensure that oustees are given lands similar or better in quality to their original holdings. This may mean creating productive lands through human-made restoration techniques. This should also be viewed as an opportunity to counter potential joblessness. Where agricultural land is lost, new lands must provide sustainable livelihoods.8 The solution of offering jobs to oustees in the mining project is most often a false promise; short mine life and the growing tendency towards mechanisation means that employment opportunities in mining are limited and in fact, decreasing.9 Checking homelessness would require adequate compensation and consideration for improving the quality of life.10 The Inter-America Development Bank (IDB) has found that it is also important to consider income when providing housing, as housing that requires maintenance and either new or increased utility fees may lead to impoverishment or homelessness.11 Similarly, issues of food insecurity and health will depend greatly on the economic well-being of the communities. In the short-term, investment in health facilities and measures to mitigate food disruptions can offer immediate relief from potentially life-threat-
ening, but preventable, problems. Special consideration must be given to vulnerable members of the society such as pregnant women, children and the elderly.12 Issues of loss of identity and social disarticulation are much more difficult to address. These demand open dialogue with PAPs and the communities that will receive the displaced persons. Projects must be sensitive to the difficulties of shifting community structures to another location, especially when cultural identities and ways of life are tied to lands and landscapes. Additional consideration must be given to how a new location will impact on the roles of men and women, especially if mobility is affected. According to Downing, as a general rule, vulnerable groups rely heavily on their surrounding environment and alterations to the surrounding ecology are likely to overwhelm individual and community adaptive responses and result in displacement.13 Finally, an assessment of the costs of resettlement and rehabilitation is essential for successfully preventing impoverishment. The costs of R&R must be included in the project cost. It is imperative that the costs are properly determined, as underfinancing of R&R has proven to be one of the greatest contributors to the failure of R&R programmes (see Box: Under-financing and R&R).14 Assessment of the cost of a resettlement programme has a dual purpose: the World Bank has found that when resettlement costs are too high, the profitability of a project can be jeopardised. If the resettlement costs of a project were no more than 10 per cent of its total costs, a 50 per cent overrun could jeopardise the rates of return on 30 per cent of the projects. If resettlement costs were under 10 per cent of the total project costs, overruns were not likely to threaten the internal rate of return.15
Under-financing and R&R

Poor resource allocation is one of the biggest causes of failure of resettlement programmes
A 1986 study carried out by the World Bank on resource allocation for resettlement found a strong correlation between the level of resettlement financing and implementation performance. It also identified country trends regarding higher or lower financing of resettlement. The study included 31 projects with substantial resettlement components, under implementation in 15 countries. For each project, the study calculated the ratio between the per capita average cost allocated for resettlement in each project component and the per capita GNP in the respective country, and then ranked the projects according to their ratio. Independently, the research then examined the projects implementation files, extracting the rankings given to each projects implementation performance in resettlement, and compared them with the ratios of resource allocation to the resettlement components. The studys main finding was that none of the projects with a ratio of 3.5 or higher reported major resettlement difficulties. In contrast, virtually all of the projects with a ratio lower than 2.0 were experiencing serious implementation difficulties. By country, the analysis found that the projects ranked among the
first 10 had a resource allocation ratio between 4.1-10.5. Of these 10 projects, eight were in China. None of these were on the Banks list of projects with implementation problems. At the bottom of the list, the 10 projects ranked last had very low resource allocation ratios, ranging only between 0.5 and 1.9. Six out of these 10 projects were in India, and one each in Madagascar, Nigeria, Brazil and Argentina. The 10 last projects, with low financing ratios were all beset with serious implementation problems. The studys conclusion was:Throwing money at resettlement will not solve all resettlement problems. But starving resettlement of resources is clearly the first step towards resettlement failure. That same study was sharply critical of the World Banks own hesitant and insufficient financial support for resettlement components in its projects. It found that fewer than 15 per cent of the 192 projects with resettlement reviewed included Bank funding for the resettlement component.In 85 per cent of the projects, the funding of resettlement components was left only in the charge of national resources. To change this, the study recommended that constrained (country) budgets and unreliable financial provisioning can be overcome by increasing the World Banks share in resettlement finance(p 147). The Banks Board adopted the studys recommendations, and the World Bank significantly increased its financing share in the total cost of resettlement components.
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ASHUTOSH MISHRA
Battleground: tension is writ large on the faces of these participants at the public hearing of POSCO in Orissa. The anger against such projects is growing, but is the State listening?
It is important to keep in mind that while most discussions about involuntary displacement revolve around the loss of land, it only represents 10-20 per cent of the risks.16 By de-emphasising cash compensation and focusing on land-for-land, an R&R policy does manage to provide a security net for oustees in an equitable manner. The question of equity and ethics, however, demands thinking beyond mitigation; it requires a policy of prevention. Governments and project developers must begin by believing that displacement is not a foregone conclusion in case of development projects. They should seriously consider alternatives to projects that will lead to displacement, and summarily reject those projects which can have severe impacts on local communities. Most funding agencies and international financial institutions have certain criteria for R&R, which they consider as prerequisites for funding projects (see Box on page 310: Whats in a policy?). However, a serious consideration of alternatives to projects is rarely undertaken. Therefore, while the established set of impoverishment risks is important for development of a sound R&R policy, stronger standards should be adopted to evaluate whether or not a project should be allowed to proceed. A recent study from York University in Canada offers one method: assuming there are
certain ethical norms that cannot be violated no matter how great the development benefits, a system of evaluating a projects ethical violations should be made an integral part of the project feasibility. In the study titled The Ethics of Development-Induced Displacement, the researchers of Centre for Refugee Studies have developed a project evaluation based on eight criteria: system design, equity, comparative voluntariness including democratic self-determination, indigenous peoples consent, other human rights, environmental protection, heritage sites, and transparency and compliance. The project has developed a two-part evaluation for a resettlement plan: the first part offers specific limits which if violated result in the projects rejection. If a project does not violate the limits, then it must meet a set of standards delineated by the study. This method offers a transparent process by which communities may hold development projects accountable. It is important to understand that the option not to develop is critical in any discussion about R&R policies. The notion that displacement is an inevitable and acceptable consequence of development must be replaced with a genuine policy of rights allocation and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of development projects.
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Whats in a policy?
Of multilateral lending agencies, their R&R policies, and why these dont work
International financial institutions and multilateral banks exercise a tremendous amount of influence on large-scale development projects and the governments that plan them. Whether it be through directing funding or their control over development policy and technology, these institutions determine countries attitudes towards displacement and environmental degradation. Banks, such as the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have been in the spotlight for past and current abuses against local communities. Two important criticisms of these institutions have been the lack of transparency in their project development and the lack of oversight during construction of projects. Over the past few decades, these lenders led by the WB have developed internal policies for involuntary resettlement. We have noted that while some of the policies are strong, displacement is still happening on too large a scale. Here, we compare the Banks and IDBs involuntary resettlement policies, and question why even when a strong policy exists (as is the case with IDB), projects that impact local communities are allowed to continue. World Bank: weak-kneed approach The World Bank has two involuntary resettlement policies, one for the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and another that applies to its other divisions: both are equally ineffective. The policies are brief and lack any instructions, guidelines or standards, and their language is ambiguous. The Banks Operational Policy 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement was recently updated, but is unavailable; we hope that the updates will reflect some of the WBs own findings on impacts of displacement. The operational policy 4.30, which was replaced by OP 4.12, talked of replacing land with land wherever possible and aimed at maintaining a quality of life similar, if not better, than before. However, nowhere does it consider a no project scenario. The IFCs policy, Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement (2006), is a part of its social and environmental management plan, which also addresses the organisations policy on indigenous rights. Performance Standard 5 does not find it necessary to discuss gender, which is a major concern given the evidence on how worse off women are after displacement. The priority of the IFC is apparent in its General Requirement for Project Design: The client will consider feasible alternative project designs to avoid or at least minimise physical or economic displacement, while balancing environmental, social, and financial costs and benefits. This kind of language actually permits large-scale displacement to occur if alternatives are deemed too costly. IDB: worth emulating? As the largest lender to Latin America and the Caribbean, the IDB has tremendous influence and impact on local communities and environment in this region. The Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects:
Principles and Guidelines (1999) offers a comprehensive policy that attempts to address the weaknesses of past large-scale development projects and resettlement policies. It also clearly lays out for project operators what is necessary to complete a resettlement plan it offers flexibility, while still providing an easy-to-follow structure. In contrast to the IFC policy, which is only seven years older, IDB has extensive sections on weak populations, with a focus on gender issues one of the greatest weaknesses in resettlement plans. The policy instructs project developers to consider the impact of resettlement on existing communities; where many people are to be resettled, it recommends an EIA. Additionally, it requires that indirect impacts be considered and mitigated, something often outside the scope of resettlement policies. Another strength of the policy is that it goes beyond physical, tangible losses and states that issues of identity and culture must be considered. Throughout the policy, the IDB reminds operators that cash compensation is rarely the best answer, and should therefore not be considered a satisfactory resettlement plan. Beyond the involuntary resettlement policy is the IDBs 2006 policy on indigenous rights, which prohibits involuntary resettlement without consent (although the policy does state cases whereby consent may be circumvented). The question remains: do IDB projects have a better track record? On the ground, the IDB seems to have had an unfortunate history of inducing displacement: dams it has funded in the past were linked to state-sponsored terror, as in the case with the Chixoy Dam, Guatemala. The IDB still funds dams and massive development plans that have displacement and environmental implications; this, and its lack of transparency, cast a shadow over its activities though it does appear that more recently, the IDB has been responsive to concerns of local people. Is a good policy enough? While the World Bank has contributed substantially to the current literature on displacement and involuntary resettlement and has given quite a bit of lip service to the issue, its failure to incorporate the complexities of involuntary displacement in its own policies places a question mark on its commitment to the subject. The IDB, on the other hand, despite having a strong policy, cannot boast of a clean slate either. The question, therefore, is: should some projects be rejected and not allowed to proceed? Both the WB and IDBs policies state that they must consider the possibility of rejecting a project. The IDBs language is much stronger in this regard compared to that of the IFC: Resettlement should be avoided wherever possible... The alternative of not carrying out the project should be seriously examined.... But given the numbers of people displaced each year due to development projects, it is clear that few take this aspect of the policies terribly seriously. Have states and lenders become so arrogant that they believe they can entirely mitigate the social and environmental costs of massive development projects? Or is it that they continue to believe that the benefits of these projects are so great for the country, that the impacts on a specific community are an acceptable collateral damage?
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Way to go for our R&R policies
In fact, a close examination of all existing R&R policies in India including that of the states (see Box: States and their R&R: the case of Orissa) exposes their common underpinnings. Not one of these policies recognises the right of the people to say no to a project. The only considerations are providing jobs, compensation for land and homestead, financial assistance for buying shops or plots and some funds for making houses. Neither do these policies recognise the land-for-land principle, and nor do they stress on sharing the benefits of the project with the PAPs. Their compensation packages are fixed arbitrarily, and there is little emphasis given to restoration of incomes and income-earning opportunities for the affected people. For instance, most tribals own few productive assets other than their human capital; even the land on which they work is not legally recognised as theirs. Their livelihood is dependent on the commons and their human capital. As a result, when they are
displaced, they never get adequate one-time compensation. For a rehabilitation effort to succeed in such circumstances, it should account for land-for-land compensation for the loss of access to natural assets and common goods, proper consideration for vulnerable members of the community, and the impacts of moving to a new location. Emerging global best practices with respect to R&R for mining are a combination of peoples right to say no and a participatory and negotiated R&R and benefit sharing package, all with legal and regulatory back-up (see Boxes on pages 312-13: The benefits of sharing and power to the communities). These practices have been developed keeping in view some basic principles. Firstly, for a development project to succeed and to benefit affected populations, there is a need to legally empower the people with adequate and transparent rights and safeguards. Unless this happens, communities will continue to exist at the fringes of
States and their R&R: the case of Orissa

States have been more proactive on this front than the Centre
Even before the Centre formulated its R&R policy, some states, such as Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka enacted legislation for R&R while others, notably Gujarat and Orissa, had put their own R&R policies in place. A few public sector enterprises, such as Coal India Ltd, have also adopted R&R policies. Of these, Orissas R&R policy has been hailed as the most progressive in the country. Orissa had 11 different legislations that included R&R considerations before it enacted a specific policy in May 2006. The objective of the policy is to avoid or minimise displacement, facilitate the process of rehabilitation and develop an institutional mechanism for monitoring and grievance redressal. For those affected by mining projects, the R&R package includes employment to one family member in the project or cash assistance ranging from Rs 1 lakh to Rs 5 lakh with an option for 50 per cent of cash assistance in the form of convertible preference shares; training for self-employment; homestead land subject to availability or Rs 50,000 for relocation elsewhere; a house or housing assistance up to Rs 150,000; and shops or service units to those who opt for self-employment with preference to handicapped persons, scheduled tribes and scheduled castes. In addition to assistance specific to mining projects, certain types of assistance common to PAPs of all projects have also been listed. These include maintenance allowance of Rs 2,000 per month per family for one year; assistance of Rs 10,000 for a temporary shed; and a transportation allowance of Rs 2,000 in lieu of free transport to habitation site. For tribal PAPs, this would also include preferential allotment of land and resettlement as close as possible to their original lands. The policy has several progressive features compared to the other policies existing in the country. To begin with, it has taken into account the plight of women. Thus, its definition of family includes unmarried women, widows and women divorcees. This makes them eligible for the benefits under the policy.
In addition to the prevailing practice of socio-economic surveys, this policy proposes a comprehensive socio-cultural, resource mapping and infrastructural survey to be conducted by an independent agency identified by the government to ensure proper benchmarking. The policy also requires that the resettlement plan should be framed in consultation with the displaced communities as well as gram sabhas and panchayats. This is to be then placed before the Rehabilitation and Periphery Displacement Advisory Committee (RPDAC) for approval. The policy also specifies that the displaced communities should have a say in the selection of the resettlement area and no displacement should take place unless the settlement plan has been approved. All this seems to be an improvement over the previous policies as there is more engagement of displaced communities. The only drawback is that the policy narrows down the beneficiaries by specifying that only displaced communities should be consulted instead of PAPs. Moreover, even if a resettlement plan is made in consultation with the community, it is subject to approval from the government body. The policy establishes an institutional framework to ensure monitoring and implementation of R&R. Some of these institutions include the Compensation Advisory Committee (CAC), the RPDAC, the State-level Resettlement and Rehabilitation Council (SLRRC) and the State-level Unified Directorate of R&R. The responsibility of the CAC, which should have representation of women and indigenous communities wherever possible, is to negotiate the price. The RPDAC oversees the implementation of the R&R package and monitors periphery development. It should also have representation from affected communities and NGOs. The SLRCC is constituted under the chief minister to monitor the implementation of the policy. The policy is a great improvement over other R&R policies of the country as far as compensation package is concerned. It also envisages a much more comprehensive institutional mechanism to implement it. However, the biggest drawback of the policy is that it has not yet been translated into a legislation, which would make its provisions binding.
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The benefits of sharing

Worldwide, wealth from the mineral industry is being channelised into local development
It is now well recognised across the world that the wealth generated by the mining sector comes at a substantial development cost, along with environmental damages and economic exclusion of the marginalised. This has led to new thinking about ways in which mineral wealth can be converted into sustainable development benefits for local communities. Most new approaches that are being constructed and debated are built on a comprehensive framework in which compensation, benefit sharing and community development plans are integrated and the roles of local communities, governments and mining companies are clearly delineated. The challenge, so far, has been to convert these concepts into practice. Most countries offer compensation for land acquisition and relocation. However, it is the benefit sharing which varies from country to country. Typically, royalties fund the provision of benefits, whether they are in the form of infrastructure development, social amenities or direct payments. The methods of revenue distribution and beneficiaries of mineral royalties vary widely. For example, in Canadas North-West Territories, there is a legal provision to share royalty with the local community. Tanzania has a similar, provision but instead of being directly paid to the community, it is routed via the government. In Mozambique, the mining law provides for a percentage of royalties to be paid directly to the lower levels of the government (Mining Code, Law No 14/2002 of June 26, 2002). Ghana has created a mineral development fund to return part of the income from royalties to communities directly affected by mining. Of the total royalties collected, 20 per cent is paid into the fund. Proceeds are then shared among the local government authority, landowners and communities that are adversely affected by mining. Namibia has also created a Mineral Development Fund (MDF), but its expenditure is more broadly targeted than in Ghana. The Namibian MDF is aimed at: promoting and supporting all aspects of mining broadening the contribution of the mining sector to the national economy through diversification and by stimulating economic linkages providing funds for the development of training and education facilities and programmes South Africa has introduced an alternative revenue distribution system with its newly promulgated Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). Although there is no provision for lower levels of government to benefit through mineral royalties, local communities do have the potential to benefit substantially. They are given the option to obtain a preferent right over land and minerals registered in their name, which effectively gives them negotiation powers equal to those of the owners of the mineral rights and fosters community development and social upliftment. To receive a preferential right, the community must submit a development plan to the Department of Minerals and Energy, which can be easily renewed
for five-year periods. A preferential right permits the holder to either prospect or mine for the benefit of the community or, alternatively, to lease such rights to a mining company for a fixed consideration payable directly to the community. The charter of the MPRDA gives preferential treatment, in accordance with black economic empowerment, in mine ownership, procurement, employment and community inclusion into mine decision-making structures. China levies two different royalty taxes, one of which is deposited solely with the national treasury. The second one, called the mineral resources compensation fee (Regulations for the Collection and Administration of the Mineral Resources Compensation Fee, N 150, 1994), is collected by the appropriate county, provincial or city government, with 50 per cent of the amount collected remitted to the Central government and the rest retained by the provinces or cities. In autonomous regions, the split is 40 per cent to the Centre and 60 per cent to the region. In the Philippines, by statute, local government units receive a 40 per cent share of the gross collection from excise taxes on mineral products (royalties) from the mines in their territorial jurisdiction (the National Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines). This amount is distributed as follows: 20 per cent to the province, 45 per cent to the component city and municipality, and 35 per cent to the Barangay (village or district). In Brazil, the taxation authority has been set out in the countrys constitution. It states that with regard to mineral resources, the states, federal districts and municipalities, as well as the federal government, are assured a share in the results of mineral resource exploitation in their respective territories. In accordance with the constitution, statutory law provides that certain proportions of royalty are to be paid to lower levels of the government and to other parties. The distribution is defined as follows: 23 per cent to the states and federal districts, 65 per cent to the municipalities, two per cent to the national fund for scientific and technological development, and 10 per cent to the mining and energy ministry, which shall give two per cent of its share to environmental protection of the mining regions. In Peru, provincial and local community discontent with perceived non-participation in the benefits of mining led to political pressure that culminated in a royalty tax being imposed in 2004 (Law of Mining Royalty). The royalty is to be paid to the Central government and then distributed as follows: 20 per cent to the district municipalities where the exploitation takes place (50 per cent of that goes to the communities where the mine is located); 20 per cent to the provincial municipalities where the exploitation takes place; 40 per cent to the district and provincial municipalities; 15 per cent to the regional government; and five per cent to the national universities of the region where the mine is located. In India, the mechanism of benefit sharing is completely underdeveloped, as the State collects all the royalties and taxes and there is no provision to ensure that the revenues collected from mining percolate down to the local level. This is an area which needs greater attention in coming years because it will ultimately decide the social license to operate for the mining companies.
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Power to the communities

A new concept which empowers right of people over their own land
In most development projects such as mines or special economic zones, the local communities usually end up as mere bystanders or at best, as fringe participants; they stand to lose the most their cumulative environmental, social and economic losses are immense.The concept of free, prior and informed consent, or FPIC, has been designed as a solution to this state of affairs. FPIC recognises indigenous peoples inherent and prior rights to their lands and resources and respects their legitimate authority to require that third parties enter into an equal and respectful relationship with them, based on the principle of informed consent. Therefore, FPIC is about giving local people a formal role and some form of veto power in the consultations and decisions on development projects. It is intended to secure the rights of communities to control access to their land and natural resources, and to share in the benefits when these are utilised by others. In the case of mining, with the bargaining power that FPIC provisions bring them, communities can demand direct compensation for damages or a continuing share of the profits from mineral extraction. In this respect, the FPIC is a tool for greater equity because it gives local communities a co-management role in large development projects. Countries like the Philippines (Congress of the Philippines 1997) and Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1976: Sections 66-78) have enacted laws requiring that FPIC be obtained by the government for projects within the ancestral domains of indigenous peoples. Internationally, the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000:xxxivxxxv, 98-112), the Forest Stewardship Council, the IDBs operational policy on resettlement and the Extractive Industries Review (World Bank Group 2003 Executive Summary: 2-3, Volume 2:29-33, 47-50; MacKay 2004) of the World Bank have all recommended the adoption of FPIC in making decisions about dams, forestry, oil and gas, and mining projects. In addition, FPIC as a principle has been acknowledged in the Convention on Biological Diversity, with regard to access
to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources (Perrault 2004: 22; Casas 2004:2728); it is also enshrined in the International Labour Organizations Convention 169. The global debate on FPIC is highly polarised. Some countries, including India, see FPIC as a possible threat to their ability to direct commercial exploitation of natural resources toward national development goals. On the other hand, there are others that have already devolved and acknowledged certain levels of self-governance over resources to indigenous peoples. The FPIC has become the crux of a debate that juxtaposes concepts of sovereignty that empower governments with the right and the duty to manage concerns within their borders, with those concepts that limit the powers of national governments to benefit some of their population to the detriment of others. Those arguing for full government control often assume that the affected communities will reject development projects though global experience shows that this has not always been the case when communities have had some degree of decision-making powers and were able to get a better deal from a project. There are also problems in operationalising the concept. There are questions that need to be answered before FPIC can be put into practice: What does free mean in practice? How far ahead does prior mean? What are the formal terms of informed consent? In a diverse community, how is consent given and by whom? Is a majority enough or is full consensus required? How is FPIC verified? Does the government verify it or is oversight by an independent party necessary? The right to prior informed consent is effective only if it is defined and applied in a manner that guarantees sustainable development of local communities. Half-hearted measures like public consultation for discussing environmental impacts and consent of a gram sabha currently in vogue in India are of little value. For FPIC to become effective, there is a need to legally establish the following rights: the right to be informed and consulted, the right of community to veto developmental projects, the right to negotiate the terms and conditions, including benefit sharing, and the right to participate in monitoring and enforcement.
society (as most mining experiences show) because industrial interests align with government interests. The first step in this process is to give an effective legal voice to communities to decide whether they want the project or not, or how they want the project to come up and operate. Papua New Guineas mining success (at least from a socio-economic perspective, if not an environmental one) is built upon the veto power that communities can exercise over mining development (see Box on page 314: The Papua New Guinea model). There is an urgent need to introduce this practice in India as well. It would be much more beneficial for the country to replace involuntary displacement with negotiated, participatory approach and voluntary displacement. Resistance to displacement happens when communities perceive impoverishment instead of prosperity as the anticipated consequence of development. In case the community feels that the project will not lead to
social and economic prosperity or that the price it is being asked to pay is too high or that the compensation package it is receiving is too low, then it must have the legally enforceable right to say no. For this to happen, the Land Acquisition Act must be replaced or suitably modified to include the wish of the community as the paramount criteria in the land acquisition process. To ensure that this does not hamper the strategic or legitimate projects of national importance, public purpose must be suitably redefined in the act. The second principle is that instead of a prescriptive one-sizefits-all R&R scheme, it is better to negotiate the R&R packages with the communities themselves. The government can specify minimum acceptable R&R packages from where negotiation can begin. In direct negotiations, companies would never agree to a package that would make their investments uncompetitive, and affected communities would not agree to one that left them worse
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The Papua New Guinea model

A tiny island shows the way in benefit sharing
The Development Forum introduced in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is cited as a good model to implement benefit sharing with the community. This is a participatory model involving the government, the company, and representatives from the local community. The forum has two principal functions.The first is as a venue where the developer and the State share information about the project (on the nature, scope and impacts of the project) with the landowners. The second is to establish how the various stakeholders will share the benefits derived from the project; this is recorded in a series of project agreements. These agreements establish the roles and responsibilities of all involved parties (government, mining company and community) and include services and benefits that will be provided in the projects affected
area. These include the provision of community infrastructure and the sharing of projects financial benefits. The PNG mining act dictates that owners of private land will receive 20 per cent of the total royalty paid for mining leases on the land. In practice, the amount payable to landowners can exceed 20 per cent, such as in the case of the OK Tedi and Lihir mines, which pay 50 per cent. Mining companies pay the landowners directly and pay the balance to the State; the State, of course, monitors and endorses the landowners share for correctness. Finally, the Development Forum in PNG has a firm legal basis. The contracts between the various stakeholders are legally enforceable. Consequently, the forum creates a base for trust and confidence, which is essential to rebuild communities and enhance economic activity. The PNG model is in stark contrast to the prescriptive policy approach in India where the form and level of compensation is predetermined by the government.
off. Hence, a voluntary settlement would be reached only if the agreement is mutually beneficial. In this process, the role of the government becomes very important, not as a bargainer, but as a watchdog and a regulator. The government will have to ensure that all interests are fairly represented, that the negotiations are fair and that the agreement reached is duly implemented. This process will need to have legal foundations to ensure that the community gets what is promised. The third principle is that minerals not only belong to the
government, they also belong to the people by virtue of lying beneath their lands. Therefore, people must have some share in the benefits from mining. In many countries, royalties received from minerals are shared by the government with the affected communities. There are different models of benefit sharing direct payment of cash, local area development fund, trust funds, etc. The key point here is that the communities are empowered often legally to decide how these benefits are to be shared and utilised.
AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE
Self-rule: people should have the right to say no to mining companies
314
A F T E R W O R D
The way ahead
he term sustainable mining, being bandied about by the mining industry, is at best an oxymoron. Mining cannot be sustainable, simply because all ore bodies are finite and nonrenewable. Similarly, terms like environment-friendly mining or green mining are misnomers. Even the best-managed mines will have environmental impacts they will disturb the ecology, destroy biodiversity, devastate the land and leave it unusable, in most cases, for perpetuity. In addition, large-scale displacement and loss of livelihood of locals are also foregone conclusions. These are inevitabilities that we have to reconcile with when we talk about mining. But mining entails another equally inescapable truth that must also be reconciled with: that of the significance of minerals and ores in our lives. Human beings have used minerals almost ever since they existed. The ages of human development have coincided with the use of minerals (such as the bronze or the iron age). It will be naive to imagine that the modern urban-industrial economy can survive without minerals and metals: we cannot wish away mining. The issue, thus, is not whether mining should be undertaken or not. Rather, it is about how it should be undertaken. It is about the policies, norms, procedures and institutions that must be established to ensure that mining is conducted as far aspossible in an environmentally and socially acceptable manner. It is about writing and implementing new environmental and social contracts to ensure that mining not only does the least damage to ecology and environment, but also contributes to the social and economic development of the areas where it is undertaken. This is the challenge that mining poses; it is a challenge that needs to be met forthwith, resolutely.
315
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

To begin with, it is important to recognise and accept the fact that local communities especially tribals have got a raw deal from the government as well as the mining and minerals industry. They have been displaced, dispossessed, marginalised, persecuted and pushed deeper into poverty, all in the name of public interest and national development. Today, most major mining districts in the country are suffering from the phenomenon of resource curse. The wealth generated by mining has largely bypassed local communities and is filling the coffers of rank outsiders. This has primarily happened because policies, laws, regulations and institutions are either non-existent or completely inadequate. It has also happened because of the crass insensitivity of the nation and its lawmakers towards the plight of the people from mining areas: one glaring instance of this is the total absence of any updated information or statistics on the numbers displaced due to mining over the years. All this must change. We must rewrite the contract between communities and the mining establishment so that people get what is rightfully theirs a share in the wealth generated from mining, and the secured right to a clean environment.
LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE Mining should not take place without the consent of the people. Recognising the peoples right to say no makes for eminent business sense too, as it helps avoid conflicts with communities, prevents cost overruns and keeps the companies reputations relatively clean
The very first item of the new social contract should be the social licence to operate. Mining should not take place without the consent of the people affected by it. Community consent, therefore, must be the bedrock of mining policy in the country. Under the current legislative framework, provisions do exist which require community consent before a project is given a go-ahead. For instance, under the environmental clearance process, the practice of public hearing is a form of consultative deliberations where the people are heard. In Scheduled Areas classified on the basis of their tribal population clearance for land acquisition has to be given by the gram sabha. But increasingly, these safeguards are being compromised and weakened. The industry does not see reason in taking peoles consent. As a result, with the assistance of govenment it is working to either circumvent or disable these processes. Public hearings have turned into exercises in futility and the gram sabhas consent is taken for granted. This must change. It is important to recognise that the social licence to operate also makes eminently good business sense. In todays world, where the market capitalisation of companies is largely made up of intangibles primarily a companys brand and reputation the risks created by not obtaining community consent are significant. Conflict with the community not only delays the project and leads to cost overruns, it also mars the reputation of the company. Examples from across the world show that communities accept and support a project whenever they have some degree of decision-making power over it and are able to get a better deal from it. For a start, this requires the outdated Land Acquisition Act under which the state can take land for a wide range of public purposes must be repealed or suitably modified. Simultaneously, the laws on consultation must be strengthened.
SHARE THE BENEFITS

It is now well recognised across the world that the wealth generated by the mining sector comes at a substantial development cost, along with environmental damages and economic exclusion of the marginalised. This has led to increasing attention being paid to ways in which mineral wealth can be converted into sustainable development benefits for local communities. One of the key components of this new approach is benefit sharing. A number of countries have introduced legal provisions to facilitate the sharing of wealth generated from mining with local communities. Typically, royalties fund the provision of benefits, whether they are in the form of infrastructure development, social amenities or direct payments to landowners. So far, in India, the mechanism of benefit sharing has not been institutionalised. But there is an urgent need to do so if we want mining areas to escape the resource curse. Benefit
316
AFTERWORD: THE WAY AHEAD
sharing is also important because it will ultimately decide the social license to operate for the mining companies. It is also clear that India will have to innovate with this contract of sharing benefits.
THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACT

India is one of the leading mining nations of the world, but its laws, regulations and institutions for controlling environmental fallouts of mining are possibly some of the worlds worst. Put simply, India has not invested in managing the environmental impacts of mining. Mining remains one of the most unregulated sectors in the country. The problem starts from the very beginning: the process of granting permission to mine is grossly abused. Ineffective regulations and lax implementation ensure that the problem persists during the operation of the mines. And it remains unsolved even after mining is stopped, because of the abysmal mine closure regulations and their implementation.
TIGHTEN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCES

The very first concern with the environmental clearance process in India is the quality of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report itself. This report is supposed to be the basis for all decisions. According to current practices, the project proponent commissions a consultant or agency to prepare the report. The agency, thus, becomes a service provider of the proponent it is no longer an impartial body. In most cases, the agency or consultancy, instead of identifying the actual impacts, ends up presenting the information in a manner favourable to the project proponent. There is an urgent need to change this practice. EIA reports must be prepared by an impartial party with no vested interests in the project. Instead of the project proponent hiring a consultant to prepare the report, the consultant should be hired and paid by an independent agency of the government. The cost of preparing the EIA report should be charged by this independent agency to the project proponent. This can ensure an armslength distance between the EIA consultant and the project proponent. It is important also to put in place a credible, transparent system for mandatory certification of EIA consultants, with a public complaint handling mechanism built into it. Consultants accused of preparing poor EIA reports should be duly investigated and penalised, if found guilty. Another very important component of the environmental clearance process is the public hearing, a mechanism that gives space to the local community for putting forth its concerns. The governments Hoda committee recommends diluting the public hearing process to expedite mining investments. It wants to dispense with public hearing for mining leases for areas less than 50 ha and for the renewal of mine leases. This recommendation, if accepted, would certainly spell disaster both for environment as well as the mining industry itself. To assume that mining can happen in isolation, without addressing the concerns of the affected communities, is a fallacy. This assumption (largely on the part of governments and mining companies) is the precise reason why across the country, people have risen up against mining. Thus, not involving people in the decision-making process is unhealthy even for the mining industry itself, leave alone the environment. In fact, to ensure a better future for the mining industry, the existing public hearing process needs to be adequately strengthened. The currently practised public hearing process (which has been renamed as the public consultation process to reflect its basic function in view of the government) is limited to being only a forum for consultation, rather than being a platform to collect the concerted views of the community to decide the fate of the project. Today, a project is cleared by the government even if all the people present at the hearing reject it on environmental grounds. This nullifies the very purpose of holding a public hearing. If everyone rejects a project, then the project can only come up by using the coercive power of the State, which is completely undemocratic. This must change if we want people to be partners in the developmental process. The power to decide the fate of the project will have to be divested in the public. This will serve two puposes: firstly, it will ensure that project proponents work hard on the environment management plan and adopt suitable technologies to convince people that the least damage will be done to the environment. Secondly, it will also ensure that project proponents are discouraged
Independent, impartial preparation of Environment Impact Assessment reports, a stronger public hearing process, and stringent implementation of Environment Management Plans might go a long way in ameliorating the present state of affairs
317
from applying for mining rights in critical ecosystems; peoples opposition to such proposals and projects might act as a powerful deterrent. Many mining projects are captive projects they are integrated with the manufacturing plants. Instead of doing separate EIAs for such projects, cumulative EIAs should be done which will bring out the total impact of the project on the environment. To ensure that affected people are able to make the correct decisions, the process of delivering information about the project would need to be strengthened as well. People must be made aware about the project from its outset. At every step, complete information in local languages and dialects must be made available, and this should include the final EIA report. The implementation of environmental management plans, or EMPs, is extremely slipshod in Indian mines simply because there is no mechanism to monitor them. In fact, every effort is made to keep the public completely in the dark about the status of the implementation of the EMP or whether the project proponent is actually living up to its promises. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative to strengthen regulatory capacities to regularly inspect the status of EMP implementation and penalise non-compliance. Additionally, reports on the status must be made public in a transparent manner, and local communities must be kept informed. Experience and examples prove that these communities are in the best position to judge the authenticity of implementation and, therefore, can also apply pressure on the project proponent and regulators.
MANAGE FOREST TRADEOFF BETTER

The forest clearance process in India, governed by the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, is now being construed not so much as a tool for preserving forests, but as a facilitator for deriving compensation for the diversion of forests. While doing nothing substantial to discourage diversion, the process has in fact been concentrating more on the amounts of compensation the forest department can wring out for the diversion. This, certainly, cannot be allowed. First and foremost, it is very important to recognise that there are critical ecosystems that are invaluable and cannot be sacrificed for short-term economic gains. Today, in India, there is no moratorium per se on mining in any part of the country ecologically fragile areas, reserve or protected forests, biosphere reserves, critical water sources and areas inhabited by indigenous communities are all equally at threat from marauding miners. The only safeguard put in place by the Supreme Court is to debar the diversion of protected areas sanctuaries and national parks -- for developmental projects. This direction is being used by many to stop the mining of these areas. But still there is nothing like a legislation which provides protection to areas, which are important for ecological, water or livelihood security. Across the world, there is increased recognition that critical ecosystems need to be protected at all costs. This has lead countries to enact legislation on no-go areas for mining and other development projects. It is high time we did the same. Clearly, this will require careful consideration. We know that we have to protect our national parks and sancturies. In addition, we need to ensure water security, which will require new classification to protect existing forests for their water values. Then there is the concern of people for cultural and social values. All these require to be carefully evaluated so that the balance can be maintained. But ignoring the problem wont make it go away. The Planning Commissions Hoda committee on mining policy went out of it way to provide assurances to prospectors that laws can be modified to allow them access to the forests where they find minerals. This approach does not bode well for Indian forests. The committee has recommended that the government should outline, in advance, the conditions to be met during mining so that forest clearance can be granted irrespective of the regions ecological importance. This recommendation stands in direct contradiction to global best practices, under which forests are not allowed to be diverted without undertaking detailed EIA, and they are not allowed to be diverted for development activities. It is important that India adopts some of these best practices rather than following a race towards the bottom policy to attract foreign investments. No forest should be diverted for mining without considering its wider ramifications on the environment and ecology. Mining should not be allowed if the ecological and environmental costs are higher than the economic gains.
Mining must not be allowed in forests if its environmental, ecological and social costs outweigh its economic gains. As the rest of the world is doing, India can, and must, demarcate no-go areas for development projects regions whose ecosystems need to be preserved for ecological continuity
318
AFTERWORD: THE WAY AHEAD
REGULATE NOW AND REGULATE TOUGH

Existing regulations to control and mitigate environmental fallouts of mining are inadequate. There is, thus, an urgent need to codify detailed environmental management regulations for mining. Best practices like simultaneous reclamation, collection and treatment of surface run-off, fugitive dust control from mining and transportation, tailings management and effective treatment of tailings discharge, storage of tailings, waste rock and slimes on impervious ground/lined surface etc should be codified and made mandatory. Existing pollution standards for mining are concentration-based; these should be reconstituted on the basis of loads. Concentration-based standards do not give correct representation of the extent or level of pollution. For example, a very large quantity of effluents may well meet the concentration-based standards. However, due to the sheer volume of the effluents, these may add a significant pollution load to the receiving medium, which on its part may not have the necessary assimilating capacity. Load-based standards, therefore, are a must. Currently, no regulatory standards exist for containing the impact of mining on water both groundwater as well as surface water. This, when mining across the country is being seen as a major reason behind groundwater depletion, watershed disturbances, reduction in surface water availability and water pollution. The problem is compounded by the fact that the mitigation measures to reduce the impact on groundwater and watersheds are seldom incorporated in the EMPs. Mines are blatantly allowed to breach the groundwater table; no specific measures are required to protect the watershed. There is a need, therefore, to enact laws to protect groundwater and water catchments from mining.
Mine closure is not only about planting trees, stabilising overburden or creating gigantic water bodies. It is about creating a sustainable ecosystem in which the community affected by the mining can live after the miners and their equipment are gone. Mine closure has to be defined, understood and planned for
REFRAME RULES FOR CLOSURE OF MINES

Regulations on closure of mines are equally lax and ineffective. To begin with, they are applicable only to the major minerals; coal mines are not even required to submit closure plans. Secondly, closure plans have become a formality, with overburden hills and water-filled craters being touted as indicators of effective closure. The plans fare worse on the socio-economic front: most mine closure plans do not address the impacts of closure on the workers or the communities dependent on the mine activities for their sustenance. They rarely pay attention to the rehabilitation of these workers and communities. And thirdly, the financial surety for mine closure, asked for by Indian regulations, is a pittance. The amount is so small that companies prefer forfeiting it. There is an urgent need, therefore, to reframe closure regulations. It is important to recognise at the very outset that mine closure is not about planting trees and stabilising overburden; it is about creating a sustainable ecosystem in which the community affected by mining can live after the miners and their equipment are gone. Therefore, mine closure is a combination of environmental, social, economic and development issues that must be clearly defined, understood and planned for before a mine is allowed to operate. Mine closure plans, it follows, need to be discussed and prepared in consultation with the community before a mine comes into operation. For this to happen, some key changes need to be effected in the law. Firstly, the law related to land must be amended. The current practice of giving the land back to the government (mainly the forest and revenue departments) after mining suits the industry perfectly, because by doing so, it shifts the post-mining responsibility on to the governments shoulders. The land, instead, should be transferred to the commons: entities that will ensure that livelihoods are created out of it. Secondly, detailed community consultations and approvals must become an integral part of developing the mine closure plan. On the socio-economic front, mining operations must be designed in a manner that the transitions do not create undue hardships. This will require preparation of a socio-economic closure plan which should have provisions for alternate economic activities and livelihoods, development of infrastructure in a way that it can be utilised after the mine is closed, utilisation of the mine land for economic and social uses, and compensation for workers. Environmental closure of mines must include decontamination and containment of pollution as core issues.
319
For all this, adequate financial provisions and robust regulatory mechanisms are necessary. The existing financial surety, which is completely insufficient for undertaking any kind of mine closure, must be revised realistically. Footprints left by mines differ; therefore, the financial surety must be customised for each mine and should be fixed after taking into account the ground realities.
DONT JUST MAKE REGULATIONS, ENSURE COMPLIANCE

There are four regulatory institutions that govern the environment, health and safety aspects of mines. The Union ministry of environment and forests (MoEF) is responsible for giving environmental and forest clearances, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) clears mining plans and EMPs (the MoEF can also clear EMPs), and the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs) are responsible for giving consent to establish and operate mines under the Water and Air Acts. With respect to compliance monitoring, the MoEF is responsible for monitoring the implementation of EMPs (IBM is also supposed to do this). On the other hand, the IBM and SPCBs are expected to monitor the air and water pollution from mines. IBM is specifically responsible for mine closure; the SPCBs have nothing to do with it. The Directorate-General of Mines Safety (DGMS) is the fourth institution in this regulatory jigsaw, and is responsible for monitoring the health and safety of workers. However, its work overlaps that of other institutions in some cases. For instance, in an open-cast mining project, there is almost no difference between dust levels in the work environment and ambient air quality in and around the mines. Despite this, the DGMS is supposed to take care of the work environment dust levels, while the IBM and the SPCBs are accountable for monitoring the ambient air quality. Caught amidst all this multiplicity of agencies and overlapping of responsibilities, mining, naturally, has remained one of the most unregulated industrial sectors in the country. If there is one key change that is required to improve the environmental performance of Indian mines, then the restructuring and revamping of regulatory institutions must get the priority. A strong monitoring and enforcement system is fundamental for ensuring a degree of environmental sustainability. Without a serious deterrence for non-compliance, there will be little or no enforcement of the law. Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening in India. The current legal route followed for penalising non-compliance is not working simply because it takes a very long time to initiate enforcement actions through the courts. Consequently, a credible deterrent is missing for most willful defaulters as there is little incentive to comply with environmental regulations. There is a need to change the existing paradigm of enforcement actions. Powers must be given to the regulatory agencies with proper checks and balances to impose hefty financial penalties for non-compliance.
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ANNEXURE
Forest cover and Human Development Index: major mineral districts of India
District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal districts (Y/N) Rank Human Development Index Literacy rate (%) Household access to safe drinking water (%) Population below poverty line (%) Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
JHARKHAND Singhbhum (West) Iron ore: 16.085 MT (accounted for 99.9% of states production); Manganese: 5,706 t (only producer in the state) Coal: 16.2 MT (2nd highest producer with 21% share) Coal: 24.9 MT (biggest producer in state, accounting for 32%) Coal: 11.85 MT (ranks third, accounting for 15%) Coal: 9.7 MT (4th place, with a 12% share) Copper (only producer in state) 92 17,198.74 38.47 Yes 6/221 50.17 84.15 45.74 Yes Yes
Hazaribagh
19
957.02
34.81
No
5/22
57.74
41.46
31.79
Yes
Yes
Dhanbad
21
2,082.44
6.94
No
3/22
67
100
31.42
Yes2
Yes
Chatra
47.91
No
7/22
43.24
41.46
31.79
Yes
Yes
Godda
18.82
22.51
No
19/22
43.13
22.66
55.34
Yes
No
Singhbhum (East)
29
7,549.71
26.13
Yes
1/22
68.79
84.69
37.33
Yes
No
ORISSA Jajpur Chromite: 3.5 MT (top producer not only in state but also in the country, with 96% share) Iron ore: 33.248 MT (biggest iron ore producer, with 82% share); Manganese: 0.7 MT (top producer with 81%) Iron ore: 6.985 MT (second highest, with 17% share) 15 5,710.92 9.04 No 22/30 72.19 NA NA Yes No
Keonjhar
101
33,715.57
38.97
Yes
24/30
59.75
NA
61.92
Yes
No
Sundergarh
91
14,810.71
41.44
Yes
4/30
65.22
NA
36.48
Yes
No Conti
321

Contd District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal Human Development Index districts (Y/N) Rank Literacy Household Population rate access to below (%) safe poverty drinking line (%) water (%) No 6/30 69.4 NA NA Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
Angul
Coal: 45 MT (biggest producer in state, accounting for 68%) Bauxite: 4.7 MT (top producer, accounting for 99% of state production) Coal: 19 MT (2nd highest producer, with 29% share)
326.46
41.66
Yes
No
Koraput
11
7,396.27
17.68
Yes
27/30
36.2
NA
78.65
Yes
Yes
Jharsuguda
579.33
13.89
No
2/30
71.47
NA
NA
Yes
No
CHHATTISGARH Dantewada Iron ore: 15.973 MT (top producer, accounting for 69% of state production) Iron ore: 7 MT (2nd highest contributor, with a share of 30%); Limestone: 1.49 MT (third biggest producer, with 10%) Limestone: 11.195 MT (top producer, accounting for 76% share) Coal: 54.5 MT (biggest coal producer in state, with a share of 80%) Coal: 3.5 MT (4th biggest producer, with a share of 5%) Coal: 5.9 MT (2nd highest producer with a share of 7%); Bauxite: 1.1 MT (top producer in state with a 97% share) Coal: 4.3 MT (a share of 6%; the 3rd biggest producer) 11 2,973.44 64.24 Yes 9/16 30.2 53 NA Yes Yes
Durg
98
3,519.65
9.01
Yes
2/16
75.6
72
NA
Yes
No
Raipur
42
3,132.31
33.12
No
4/16
68.5
67
NA
No
No
Korba
0.46
50.89
No
1/16
61.7
45
NA
Yes
No
Raigarh
15
88.36
35.93
Yes
10/16
70.2
69
NA
Yes
No
Surguja
10
5,062.09
45.71
Yes
11/16
54.8
27.24
NA
Yes
Yes
Koriya
62.63
No
13/16
63.1
41
NA
Yes
No
Conti
322
ANNEXURE: FOREST COVER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX: MAJOR MINERAL DISTRICTS OF INDIA
Contd District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal districts (Y/N) Rank Human Development Index Literacy rate (%) Household access to safe drinking water (%) Population below poverty line (%) Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
WEST BENGAL Bardhaman Coal: 21 MT (top coal producer with 98% share) 8 9,884.58 3.2 Yes 5/17 71 96.43 Rural poverty: 18.99 Urban poverty: 17 No No
KARNATAKA Gulbarga Limestone: 11.8 MT (largest producer with a share of 91%) Iron ore: 28.2 MT (biggest iron ore producer, accounting for 76%) 14 3,606.18 10.59 N0 19/204 38.5 63.0 45.54 Yes No
Bellary
84
5,801.23
2.03
No
7/205
45.9
84.2
44.50
No
No
MAHARASHTRA Chandrapur Limestone: 9 MT (largest producer in state, accounting for 88%); Coal: 15.8 MT (top producer with 48% share) Manganese: 0.18 MT (2nd biggest producer with 32%); Coal: 7.6 MT (third major coalproducing district) Coal: 9.7 MT (2nd coal-producing district, accounting for 29%) 36 4,341.42 35.33 No 26/35 73.07 43.35 46.92 Yes Yes
Nagpur
51
1,046.38
22.21
No
5/35
84.18
65.34
34.32
No
No
Yavatmal
36
2,470.99
19.35
No
34/35
74.06
46.06
43.62
Yes
No
GOA North Goa Iron ore: 12.9 MT (accounts for 58% share) Iron ore: 9.4 MT (accounts for 32% share) 100 7,235.33 51.15 No 72.02
906
4.47 No No
South Goa
150
10,930.66
64.50
No
79.98
No
No
GUJARAT Kutchh Lignite: 5.9 MT (biggest lignite producer with 75% share) 75 1,581.32 5.00 No 17/25 60.4 27.1 No No
Conti
323

Contd District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal districts (Y/N) Rank Human Development Index Literacy rate (%) Household access to safe drinking water (%) 23.6 Population below poverty line (%) Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
Jamnagar
Bauxite: 2.1 MT (largest producer with 91% share) Limestone: 6.3 MT (top producer with 35% share)
182
5,428.87
2.61
No
8/25
67.2
No
No
Amreli
10
2,116.96
3.22
N0
15/25
67.7
13.94
No
No
RAJASTHAN Chittorgarh Limestone: 8.9 MT (largest producer with a share of 35%) Lead & zinc: 0.55 MT (largest producer accounting for an 82% share) Lead & zinc: 0.062 MT (second biggest producer); steatite & phosphorite 45 5,985.49 15.43 Yes 21/29 34.3 72.3 43.9 No No
Bhilwara
114
5,505.4
2.10
No
25/29
31.7
60.3
51.6
No
No
Udaipur
109
12,985.69
23.03
Yes
27/29
34.9
64.2
31.8
Yes
No
TAMIL NADU Cuddalore UTTAR PRADESH Sonbhadra ANDHRA PRADESH Nalgonda Limestone: 103.22 MT (Top producer, with 36.1% share in the state) Iron ore: 0.134 MT (2nd largest producer accounting for 5% of production); Limestone: 4.05 MT (2nd largest producer) Iron ore: 0.036 MT (share of 1.3% of the states production) Limestone: 3.6 MT (3rd largest producer with 12.6%) Limestone: 2.81 MT (4th largest producer with 9.8%); Coal: 5.83 MT (3rd largest producer with 6.9% share); Manganese ore: 0.117 MT (11% of state production) 55 5,085 1.08 No 57.84 No Yes Coal: 21.33 MT 6 5,307.67 36.4 No 49.96 54.66 Yes Yes Lignite: 20.84 MT 3 43.4 11.68 No 16/29 71.85 73.23 50.29 Yes No
Kadapa
202
5,533
21.97
No
64.02
No
No
Kurnool
229
5,773
12.15
No
54.43
No
No
Adilabad
37
3,207
37.93
Yes
53.51
Yes
Yes
Conti
324
ANNEXURE: FOREST COVER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX: MAJOR MINERAL DISTRICTS OF INDIA
Contd District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal Human Development Index districts (Y/N) Rank Literacy Household Population rate access to below (%) safe poverty drinking line water (%) No 56 Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
Karimnagar
Limestone: 1.123 MT (with 3.9% share); Coal: 14.7 MT (Top producer with 42.5% share) Coal: 12.99 MT (2nd largest producer with 37.6% share)
14
2,482
13.95
No
Yes
Khammam
47
1,715
44.79
Yes
57.72
Yes
Yes
MADHYA PRADESH
Katni
Limestone: 4.27 MT (4th largest producer, share of 17.1%); Bauxite: 90,386 t (2nd largest producer with a share of 26%) Limestone: 5.692 MT (2nd largest producer with a share of 22.82%); Bauxite: 48,392 t (4th largest producer) Limestone: 8.68 MT (top producer with a share of 34.79%) Bauxite: 90,387 t (top producer with a share of 48.5%)
146
1,943.78
24.06
No
29/45
64.7
100
42.22 (including Jabalpur)
Yes
No
Rewa
31
1,713.99
11.21
No
39/45
62.3
48.11
29.4
No
No
Satna
181
5,926.27
22.37
No
38/45
65.1
53.34
28.8
Yes
No
Shahdol
Bauxite: 41,580 t (3rd largest producer); Coal: 10.66 MT (3rd largest producer) Bauxite: 2,280 t (5th largest producer); Coal: 27.22 MT (biggest producer with 49% share) Coal: 12.72 MT (2nd largest producer in state with 23% share)
553.53
24.95
Yes
31/45
57.8
46.91
33.4
Yes
No
Sidhi
497.77
38.12
Yes
25/45
52.8
51.33
36.4
Yes
No
Chhindwara
117.32
37.32
Yes
13/45
66.0
99.36
31.2
Yes
No
MEGHALAYA Jantia Hills Coal 2 15.28 64.34 Yes 53 13.94 No No Conti
325

Contd District Minerals produced (Data for 2004-05)# Major mineral leases* (Nos) Major mineral lease area* (Ha) Area under forest (% of total area) Tribal Human Development Index districts (Y/N) Rank Literacy Household Population rate access to below (%) safe poverty drinking line (%) water (%) Backward districts (Y/N) Naxalaffected area (Y/N)
ASSAM Tinsukia Coal: 6,99,529 t (biggest producer in the state) 5 mines 40.4 Yes 10/23 63.28 73.96 No No
HIMACHAL PRADESH Solan Limestone: 3.136 MT (biggest producer with 44% share) 2 757.08 42.3 Yes 77.6 81 29.32 No No
Notes: *Mine lease and mine leasing area is only for metallic and non-metallic minerals (does not include fuel, atomic and minor minerals). MT = million tonne; t = tonnes; NA = not available; #data for coal production is for the year 2004 1. The Indicus has ranked all the districts in terms of performance in various indicators such as education, health and civic attainment, poverty, demography and economy. 2. The Planning Commission does not list it as a backward district, but it is indicated in red (extremist-affected) in other Planning Commission documents. 3. Percentage of rural households supplied water 4. Although there are 27 districts in the state since 1997-98, analysis for HDI ranking was done for 20 districts only (the report was published in 1999). 5. Although there are 27 districts in the state since 1997-98, analysis for HDI ranking was done for 20 districts only (the report was published in 1999). 6. Only the state average is available. 7. Only the state average is available. Sources: Anon 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report, 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun Anon, 2003, Identification of Districts for Wage and Self-employment Programmes, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New Delhi Human Development Reports of different states and The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census of India 2001, New Delhi
326
Abbreviations
ACC AMD AP APGS APPCB ASM ATREE BC BALCO BARC BASP BCCL BF BGML BIT BUPC CAC CAGR CASS CBM CCAUM CCEC CCF CCL CEC CERC CESS CFE cft CIL CISF CMPDI CMRI CO CO2 CPCB CPI (M) CPR CRPF CrVI CSE CSESMP CSRP Cu m cusecs Associated Cement Company Acid mine drainage Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Girijana Sangham Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board Artisanal-scale mining Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment Before Christ Bharat Aluminium Company Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Brahmani Anchal Suraksha Parishad Bharat Coking Coal Limited Blast furnace Bharat Goldmines Limited Birla Institute of Technology Bhumi Uchchhed Pratirodh Committee Compensation Advisory Committee Compound annual growth rate Chhotanagpur Adivasi Seva Samiti Coal bed methane Coordination Committee against Uranium Mining Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee Chief Conservator of Forests Central Coalfields Limited Central Empowered Committee Consumer Education and Research Centre Centre for Economic and Social Studies Consent for establishment Cubic feet Coal India Limited Central Industrial Security Force Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Central Mining Research Institute Carbon monoxide Carbon dioxide Central Pollution Control Board Communist Party of India (Maoist) Community property resource Central Reserve Police Force Hexavalent chromium Centre for Science and Environment Coal Sector Environmental Social Mitigation Project Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project Cubic metre Cubic metre per second CWP DAE DAG DBM DCSM DFO DGML DGMS DHO DIG DoMG DRI EAF EC ECL EDF EIA EMP EPA ESA ESG FAC FAO FBR FCA FD FDI FIMI FIPB FIRs FPIC FSTA GACL GDP GDR GHG GIPCL GJ GMDC GNP GRAVIS GRP GSDP GSYP ha HAL Coal Workers Pneumoconiosis Department of Atomic Energy District action group Dead burnt magnesite Dizon Copper Silver Mines Divisional Forest Officer Deccan Gold Mines Limited Director General of Mines Safety District Health Officer Deputy Inspector General Department of Mines & Geology Direct reduced iron Electric arc furnace Environmental clearance Eastern Coalfields Limited Electricite de France Environment Impact Assessment Environment Management Plan Environment Protection Act Ecologically sensitive area Environment Support Group Forest advisory committee Food and Agriculture Organization Fast breeder reactor Forest Conservation Act Forest department Foreign direct investment Federation of Indian Mineral Industries Foreign Investment Promotion Board First information report Free prior informed consent Fuel Supply & Transport Agreement Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited Gross domestic product German Democratic Republic Greenhouse gases Gujarat Industries Power Company Limited Giga joule Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Gross national product Gramin Vikas Vigyan Samiti Green Rating Project Gross state domestic product Gandhamardan Surakshya Yuva Parishad Hectare Hindustan Aeronautical Limited
327
STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING HAVS HC HCL HDI HESPO HGML HINDALCO HML IBM IBRD IBWL ICMM IDB IDCO IFC IISc IISCO IISI ILO INDAL IPR IRE ISA ISM ISO ITDA IUCN JAP JOAR JPC JRDA JSWHL KBA KHADC KIOCL KJEPC KNP KNP KREML KRUV KSPCB KSTPS KSU LAA LAPL LAW-E LWLDO LYWO m MAA MAcF MADA MAUP Hand-arm vibration syndrome High Court Hindustan Copper Limited Human Development Index Hynniewtrp Environment Status Preservation Organisation Hutti Gold Mines Limited Hindustan Aluminium Company Haryana Mineral Limited Indian Bureau of Mines International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Indian Board of Wildlife International Council on Mining and Minerals Inter-America Development Bank Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa International Finance Corporation Indian Institute of Science Indian Iron and Steel Company International Iron and Steel Institute International Labour Organization Indian Aluminium Company Industrial policy resolution Indian Rare Earths Limited Indian Steel Association Indian School of Mines International Organization for Standardization Integrated Tribal Development Agency International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Jharia Action Plan Jharkhandi Organisation against Radiation Joint parliamentary committee Jharia Rehabilitation & Development Authority Jindal South-West Housing Limited Kushawati Bachao Andolan Khasi Hills Autonomous Council Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited Khasi Jaintia Environment Protection Council Kaziranga National Park Kudremukh National Park Kerala Rare Earths and Minerals Limited Kudremukh Rastriya Udayana Virodhi Vakoota Karnataka State Pollution Control Board Korba Super Thermal Power Station Khasi Students Union Land Acquisition Act Large area prospecting license Legal Action for Wildlife and Environment Langrin War-san Lyngdoh Development Organisation Lai Lyngdon Welfare Association Metre Meghalaya Adventure Association Million acre feet Mineral Area Development Authority Movement Against Uranium Project MCC MCDR MCL mcm MCR MDF mg mg/kg mg/l microSv/hour MIDR MLAs MLPC MMDF MMDR Act MMP MMSD MoEF MoPNG MOU MP MPCB MPHRC MPRDA MSSKSS mSv/y MT MW NAAQS NAC NALCO NCAS NCDC NCL NCS NCSTSC NECL NEERI NFC NGO NIOH NISM NLC Nm3 NMDC NMP NOC NOX NPRR NPV NSSO NTPC OMC Maoist Communist Centre Mineral Conservation and Development Rules Mahanadi Coalfields Limited Million cubic metre Mineral Concession Rules Mineral Development Fund Milligram Milligram per kilogram Milligram per litre Microsievert per hour Mining induced displacement and resettlement Member of Legislative Assembly Mine Labour Protection Campaign Maharashtra Mining Development Fund Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act Mines, Minerals and People Mining, Minerals & Sustainable Development Ministry of Environment & Forests Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Memorandum of understanding Madhya Pradesh Meghalaya Pollution Control Board Meghalaya Peoples Human Rights Council Mineral Petroleum Resources Development Act Maharana Sangram Singh Kishan Sangharsh Samiti Millisievert per year Million tonne Megawatt National Ambient Air Quality Standards National Advisory Council National Aluminium Company National Centre for Advocacy Studies National Coal Development Corporation Northern Coalfields Limited National Chambal Sanctuary National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes North Eastern Coalfields National Environmental Engineering Research Institute Nuclear fuel complex Non-governmental organisation National Institute of Occupational Health National Institute of Small Mines Neyveli Lignite Corporation Normal cubic metre National Mineral Development Corporation National Mineral Policy No objection certificate Nitrogen oxides National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation Net present value National Sample Survey Organisation National Thermal Power Corporation Orissa Mining Corporation Limited
328
ABBREVIATIONS ORG ORISED OSATIPR OSPCB PAF PAH PAP PAs PCB PEOCP PHWRs PIL PILSARC PL PNG POSCO PPSS PRIA PSEB PSSP PSU PUDR R&R RAC RED REGL REIA RP RPDAC RSPM SAF SAIL SAPs SC Operations Research Group Orissa Rural Infrastructure and Socio-economic Development Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (Scheduled Tribes) Regulation Orissa State Pollution Control Board Project-affected families Polyaromatic hydrocarbons Project-affected people Protected areas Pollution Control Board Parej East Open Cast Project Pressurised heavy water reactors Public interest litigation Public Interest Legal Support and Research Centre Prospecting license Papua New Guinea Pohang Steel Company POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti Participatory Research In Asia Punjab State Electricity Board Prakrutik Sampad Surakshya Parishad Public sector undertaking Peoples Union of Democratic Rights Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy Rehabilitation advisory committee Resource Engineering & Development Ltd Reliance Energy Generation Limited Regional Environmental Impact Assessment Reconnaissance permit Rehabilitation and Periphery Displacement Advisory Committee Respirable Suspended Particulate Matter Special Armed Force Steel Authority of India Limited Substantially affected people Supreme Court SCCL SD SDL SECL SEZ SFRs SKVV SLRRC SO2 SPM SPO SSM t TISCO tmc TPP TSR TSS UAIL UCIL ug/m3 UK UNDP UNESCO USA USEPA UT VAT VOCs WB WBV WCL WII WPA WPI WYWO Singareni Collieries Company Limited Standard deviation Site discharge loader South Eastern Coalfields Limited Special economic zones State forest reports Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalaya Vedchhi State-level Resettlement and Rehabilitation Council Sulphur dioxide Suspended particulate matter Special police officer Small-scale mine Tonne Tata Steel & Company Limited Thousand million cubic metre Thermal power plant Total shareholder returns Total suspended solids Utkal Alumina International Limited Uranium Corporation of India Limited Microgram per cubic metre United Kingdom United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United States of America US Environment Protection Agency Union Territories Value-added tax Volatile organic compound World Bank Whole body vibration Western Coalfields Limited Wildlife Institute of India Wildlife Protection Act Wholesale price Index Western Youth Welfare Association
329
References
1. RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE
1. 2. Calculated based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 S Chakma, 2005, Deconstructing the urban view of the jungle, National Consultation of Draft Forest Bill 2005, Asian Centre for Human Rights, New Delhi, pp 7-8 Anon, 2001, Total population, population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and their proportions to the total population, Census of India 2001, http://www.censusindia.net/t_00_005.html, as viewed on January 15, 2007 Rupa Jha, 2006, India struggling over tribal land, Give me land, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/worldagenda/pdf/give_me_land.pdf, as viewed on October 12, 2006 Analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on data on tribal districts from anon, 2003, Identification of Districts for Wage and Self-employment Programmes, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New Delhi and data on major mining districts from anon, 2007, Distribution of leases and lease area (by state/district/minerals) as on 31.3.2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur National Mineral Policy 1993, Union ministry of mines, http://mines.nic.in/nmp.html, as viewed on November 10, 2006 Anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 15 V Shiva, 1991, Mining and water conflicts, Ecology and the Politics of Survival, United Nations University, Sage Publications, New Delhi, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80a03e/80A03E0m.htm, as viewed on May 29, 2007 T N Singh et al, 2006, Model simulation study of coal mining under river beds in India, Mine, Water and the Environment, International Mine Water Association, Madrid, June-December, Vol 13 Chandra Bhushan et al, 2006, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 34 The Damodar Valley, Damodar Valley Corporation, http://www. dvcindia.org/about/dvc_valley.htm, as viewed on May 31, 2007 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damodar_River, as viewed on May 30, 2007 ibid Uday Shankar, 1993, Choking slowly to death, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, January 31, Vol 1, No 17, pp 25-36 B Iman, 2001, Preserving Sacred Places in Jharkhand, India, Sacred Sites International, Berkley, http://www.sacred-sites.org/preservation/ endangered_jharkhand.html, as viewed on May 29, 2007 Anon, 1998, Status of Environment in West Bengal, Executive 18. Summary of Report (Vectors of Impacts on Environment): Part II, West Bengal government, Kolkata, http://www.enviswb.gov.in/ENV/ env_drupal/ ?q=book/ print/43, as viewed on May 28, 2007 Preamble, Union ministry of environment and forests, New Delhi, http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/cltech/Damodar/preamble.htm, as viewed on May 30, 2007 Anon, Water quality of rivers in Mahanadi basin, Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi, http://www.cpcb.nic.in/pamsweb/technicalreport/report1/chapter-11.pdf, as viewed on May 15, 2007 Coal Reserves in India, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited, Sambalpur, http://www. mahanadicoal.nic.in/egocoalfield.htm, as viewed on May 29, 2007 Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 18 ibid, p 18 Analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on data from anon, 2003, Identification of Districts for Wage and Self-employment Programmes, Report of the Task Force, Planning Commission, New Delhi Anon, 2001, The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census of India 2001, New Delhi Anon, 2001, The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Census of India 2001 and anon 2004, Some measures of human development: an inter-district analysis, Human Development Report 2004, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar Anon, 2005, Human development in Chhattisgarh, Human Development Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi R Vishwanathan et al, 1999, Human Development in Karnataka-1999, Planning Department, government of Karnataka, Bangalore Anon, 2002, Human Development Report Maharashtra 2002, government of Maharashtra, Mumbai Anon, 2002, Rajasthan Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi Anon, 2006, Status paper on the Naxal problem, Paper presented by Shivraj Patil in Parliament on March 13, http:// www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/ 06Mar13_Naxal%20Problem%20.htm, as viewed onMay 28, 2007 Anon, 2006, No difference between naxalism, terrorism: minister, The Hindu, April 12, The Hindu Group, Chennai, http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041217250300.htm, as viewed on June 2, 2007 Ruksan Bose, 2006, Mine or yours, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, January 15, Vol 14, No 16, p 7 M B Chaterjee, 2006, Naxalism may deter FDI flow into developmental projects: Report Risk exposure greater in pockets where Naxalites have joined tribals, The Hindu Business Line, February 11, The Hindu Group, Chennai, http://www.blonnet.com/2006/02/11/stories/ 2006021101820700.htm, as viewed on June 1, 2007
19.
3.
20.
4.
21.
5.
22. 23.
6.
24. 25.
7. 8. 9.
26.
27. 28. 29. 30.
10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
31.
32.
33.
16.
17.
330
REFERENCES
34. Anon, 2007, Post blockade, Prime Minister takes stock, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 29 35. http://naxalrevolution.blogspot.com/search/label/Chhattisgarh, as viewed on June 5, 2007
4.
Box: Minerals in India

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 8 http://www.coal.nic.in/, as viewed on November 8, 2006 ibid ibid Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 47-2 and 47-3 ibid p 47-27 ibid, pp 47-2 and 47-3 ibid, p 47-9 ibid, pp 17-1 and 17-2 ibid, p 17-12 ibid, pp 17-4 and 17-5 ibid, pp 55-1 and 55-2 ibid, pp 55-3 and 55-4 ibid, p 55-20 ibid, pp 52-1, 52-2 and 52-3 ibid, p 52-13 ibid, pp 52-5 and 52-6 ibid, p 23-1 ibid, p 23-1 ibid, p 23-15 ibid, pp 23-1 and 23-2 ibid, p 53-2 ibid, p 53-1 ibid, p 53-1 ibid, p 29-1 ibid, p 29-2 ibid, p 29-6 ibid, p 29-3 5. 6. 7.
8.
9. 10. 11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
Box: Fatal overlap...

Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment based on anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur and anon, 2005, State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun 18. 19. 20.
Box: Two presidents, two Indias

http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2001/01/25spc01.htm and http://www.coal.nic.in/weboflife-minessafety/Speech.htm, as viewed on June 10, 2007 21. 22. 23. 24.
Box: Parej perishes

Richard Mahapatra, 2007, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
2. THE INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMICS

25. 1. S L Chakarvorty, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in India, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, Kolkata, p 7 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 6 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, 26. 27. 28.
2. 3.
Nagpur, pp 1-2 Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on data from the Union ministry of statistics and programme implementation as cited in http:// www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=53212&ptid= 12095&level=3, as viewed on October 4, 2006 Anon, 2006, Prospects for the Global Economy, The World Bank, Washington, pp 20 Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva David Lague, 2005, Quenching Chinas thirst for materials, International Herald Tribune, New York Times Company, Nevilly Cedex, France, May 28, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/ 05/27/business/wbcommod.php, as viewed on October 18, 2006 Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 Deputies Meeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group, Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p 10 ibid, p i ibid, p 28 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steel_production_by_country, as viewed on October 16, 2006 Analysed based on data from L Jinghai, 2000, Steel in China, International Labour Organization, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/ public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/stlmilln/chap2a.htm and anon, 2001, China Steel Production rises, Peoples Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200101/23/eng20010123_61174.ht ml, as viewed on October 12, 2006 Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi Anon, 2006, Aluminium, Development Prospects Group, The World Bank, Washington Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 Deputies Meeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group, Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p 10 Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, New York, p 3 ibid, p 11 David Lague, 2005, Quenching Chinas thirst for materials, International Herald Tribune, New York Times Company, Nevilly Cedex, France, May 28, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/ business/wbcommod.php, as viewed on April 18, 2007 Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, New York, p 6 ibid, p 3 Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, p 19 Anon, 2006, The Outlook for Metals Markets Prepared for G20 Deputies Meeting in Sydney 2006, Background Paper, The World Bank Group, Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, Washington, p ii Anon, 2006, Trade and Development Report 2006, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, pp 19-20 Anon, 2006, Metals and minerals take off, Prospects for the Global Economy, The World Bank, Washington, p 1 Anon, 2006, Mine: let the good times roll, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, New York, p 30 Estimated by adding the value of minor minerals. The value of
331
29. 30.
31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.
37. 38.
39. 40. 41.
42. 43.
44. 45.
46.
47.
48.
minor minerals has been assumed as 10 per cent of the total value of mineral production in the country, which is consistent with past trends. According to the Indian Bureau of Mines, the value of mineral production in the country, excluding minor minerals and atomic minerals, was Rs 75,699.2 crore in 2005-06. Past trends indicate that the contribution of minor minerals to the total value of minerals produced in the country is about 10 per cent. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 Based on statistics from L E Taylor et al, 2006, World Mineral Production 2000-04, British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK, pp 15-17 ibid, p 32 http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on November 15, 2006 Reporting mines are the mines which are currently operational and reporting to the regulatory agency (Indian Bureau of Mines). Anon, 2004, Deeming mines for captive mines, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No 2229, answered on December 23 Analysed based on information from anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 1999, Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social and Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines, International Labour Office, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/ techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 48 S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in India, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, Kolkata, p 9 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 48 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 48 T Hentschel et al, 2002, Global Report on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, and The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 12 Anon, 2006, Statistical Profiles of Minerals, 2004-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur T Hentschel et al, 2002, Global Report on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, and The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 10 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 50 T Hentschel et al, 2002, Global Report on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, and The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 11 1999, Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social and Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines, International Labour Office, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/ techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Gendered livelihoods in small mines and quarries in India: living on the edge, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies and Australia-South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, p 6 S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and small-scale mining in India, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, Kolkata, p 6
49. 50.
51.
52.
53. 54.
55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.
61. 62. 63. 64. 65.
66.
Total revenue figures taken from the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Assuming the contribution from minor minerals to be totally from small-scale mines; the data has been analysed based on information from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 1999, Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Social and Labour Issues in Small-scale Mines, International Labour Office, Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/ techmeet/tmssm99/tmssmr.htm, as viewed on November 10, 2006 J J Hinton et al, 2003, Women and Artisanal Mining: Gender Roles and the Road Ahead, The Socio-economic Impacts of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Developing Countries, Balkema, Swets Publishers, The Netherlands ibid S L Chakravorty, Artisanal and small-scale mining in India, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, IIED, World Council of Sustainable Development, Kolkata, p 32 Anon, 2001, Overview of Mining and Mineral Industry in India, The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi, p 48 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 3-5 Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-2006, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 50 This analysis does not include the lease area under minor minerals, which is significant. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 1-43 Australia (2001-02): Anon, 2005, 100 years of change in Australian industry, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, December 21, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.NSF/Previousproducts/130 1.0Feature%20Article212005?opendocument&tabname=Summary&p rodno=1301.0&issue=2005&num=&view=, as viewed on April 20, 2007; India (2001-02): Anon, 2006, Table 3: Components of Gross Domestic Product, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India, Delhi, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Annual Publications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20 Indian%20Economy, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Canada (2000): http://www.rncan.gc.ca/media/archives/newsrelease/2002/ 2002133a_e.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007; USA (2005): Anon, 2006, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, 2005, News Release of Bureau of Economic Analysis, October, http://bea.gov/bea/newsrel/gspnewsrelease.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Tanzania (2003): Anon, 2006, Tanzania investing in minerals, International Financial Law Review, November,http://www.iflr.com/?Page=10&PUBID=33&ISS= 22694&SID=659767&TYPE=20, as viewed on April 20, 2007; Brazil (2001): The Minerals Sector, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, www.unepe.org/Outreach/wssd/docs/further_ resources/related_initiatives/WBCSD/WBCSD-minerals.pdf, as viewed on November 12, 2006 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 10-13 ibid, p 10-1 Anon, 2006, Mineral royalties, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 31-57 Anon, 2006, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 1178, March 1 Data from the Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, as cited in h t t p : / / w w w. i n d i a s t a t . c o m / i n d i a / S h o w D a t a . a s p ? s e c i d = 394505&ptid=63&level=3, as viewed on November 20, 2006 Anon, 2004, Notification No CLL/GM(F) Pricing/289, Coal India Limited, Kolkata, June 15
332
REFERENCES
67. ibid 68. Anon, 2007, Steam Coal Prices for Electricity Generation, Energy Prices and Taxes Quarterly Statistics, First Quarter 2007, Part II, Section D, Table 19, and Part III, Section B, Table 16, International Energy Agency, Paris, as cited in http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/stmforelec.html, as viewed on April 12, 2007 69. Anon, 2007, Coking coal prices for industry, Energy Prices and Taxes Quarterly Statistics, Fourth Quarter 2006, Part II, Section D, Table 20, and Part III, Section B, Table 17, International Energy Agency, Paris, as cited in http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/cokeforind.html, as viewed on April 12, 2007 70. ibid 71. Anon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 64 72. Union ministry of labour and employment, as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp?secid=287161& ptid=18528, as viewed on April 15, 2007 73. Anon, 2002, Breaking new ground, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, Earth Scan Publications Ltd, London, p 43 74. Anon, 2002, Canadas mining industry strikes gold in the taxpayers wallet, Media Release by the Pebina Institute, Ottawa, http://www.pembina.org/media/media-release.php?id=1064, as viewed on April 15, 2007 75. Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-06 and past issues, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi 76. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts: The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
Box: The story of Shyam

B Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur
Box: The private and public in mining

Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 8-8
Box: Importing coal

Anon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms, Union ministry of coal, p 64 and Pricing Policy and Credit Control, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi, http://cag.nic.in/reports/commercial/2000_book7/chapter9.htm, as viewed on April 15, 2007
Box: A tug-of-war
A Mukherjee, 2006, Mining sector against giving captive iron ore mine to steel industry, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, September 13
Box: Net importer or exporter?

Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur
Box: Evading royalties

Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
Box: Coal royalties Box: Mineral classification in India

Based on information provided in anon, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2002-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 1. 2. Analysis of the data released by the Union ministry of coal, New Delhi Anon, 2005, Coal royalty, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3967, Union ministry of mines, New Delhi, http://164.100.24.208/ lsq14/quest.asp?qref=10874, as viewed on November 30, 2006
Box: Mining operations

Based on information provided by the Union ministry of mines in its website, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed on October 4, 2006
Box: Effective tax rate on mining in India

Anon, 2006, Environmental and Social Challenges of Mineral-based Growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 39
Box: The FDI story

Union ministry of mines, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed on October 4, 2006
Box: Coal pricing: expertspeak Box: Travesty of a policy

Union ministry of mines, http://www.mines.nic.in/, as viewed on October 4, 2006 Anon, 2005, The Expert Committee on Road Map for Coal Sector Reforms, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 64
Box: Employment: underground vs open-cast Box: The frenzy of mining iron

Analysed based on data from anon, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2002-05, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur; data from Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation, New Delhi; and anon, 2006, Lok Sabha Starred Question No 293, December 12 Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec:asp?secid=287161&ptid =18528, as viewed on November 30, 2006
Box: Whats new in coal?

Analysis based on data collected from the Union ministry of environment and forests, New Delhi
Box: Rejuvenating the coal sector

Anon, 2005, ICRA Rating Feature Coal Shortage: An ICRA Perspective, Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency of India, New Delhi
Box: Battling feudalism and exploitation

Annie Zaidi, 2005, 'Silent victims of silicosis', Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai, Vol 22, November 4, http://www.flonnet.com/ fl2222/stories/20051104002009200.htm, as viewed on March 28, 2007
3. BEARING THE BRUNT: PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

1. A Roy, 1999, The greater common good, Friends of River Narmada, http://www.narmada.org/gcg/gcg.html, as viewed on February 15, 2007
333
2. 3. 4.
5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
10.
11. 12. 13.
14.
15.
16. 17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22. 23.
J Samuel, 1999, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation Policy: Issues and Perspectives, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p ix A Roy, 1999, The greater common good, http://www.narmada. org/gcg/gcg.html, as viewed on April 15, 2007 H M Mathur, 2006, Introduction and overview, Managing Resettlement in India: Approaches, Issues, Experiences, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p 1 T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, London, p 8 W Fernandes et al, 1997, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, p 6 ibid, p 6 T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, London, p 11 Gurdeep Singh, Environmental issues with the best management practices of coal mining in India, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, http://www.teriin.org/events/docs/gurdeep.pdf, as viewed on November 11, 2006 T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, London, p 7 ibid, p 6 ibid, p 6 N C Saxena, 2005, The resettlement and rehabilitation policy of India, Managing Resettlement in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p 100 Michael M Cernea, Impoverishment risks and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement, Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, The World Bank, Washington, p 20 H M Mathur, 2006, New livelihoods for old, Managing Resettlement in India: Approaches, Issues and Experiences, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p 77 ibid, p 79 Michael M Cernea, 2007, Financing for Development, Benefit-sharing Mechanisms in Population Resettlement, Economic and Political Weekly, Sameeksha Trust, Mumbai, March 24-30, pp 1033-1046 Anon, 2006, Making mining environmentally more acceptable, MINENVIS, Center of Mining Environment, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, No 49, June, pp 5-6 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 S Chakma, 2005, Deconstructing urban view of the jungle, National Consultation of Draft Forest Bill, 2005, Asian Centre for Human Rights, New Delhi, pp 7-8 Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 34 Anon, 2005, Corporate Sustainability Report-2004-05, Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited (TISCO), Jamshedpur Anon, 2005, Bhilai Steel Plant Sustainability Report, 2004-05, Steel
Authority of India Limited (SAIL), New Delhi 24. G Venkataraman, 1992, Environmental impact of iron ore mining in Goa through remote sensing, Centre of Studies in Resources Engineering, Indian Institute of Engineering, Mumbai, http://www.csre. iitb.ac.in/gv/proj3/studyareap3.htm, as viewed on November 23, 2006 25. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi 26. G Rodrigo, Water, water, nowhere: a case study of Palayaseevaram village regarding sharing of water with Chennai city and its impact on the village, Forum for Common Resources Concern (FCRC), Ghandian Unit for Integrated Development Education, Chengalpattu, p 5, www.nri.org/WSS-IWRM/Reports/Working Papers/WHIRL%20 working%20paper%209_final.pdf, as viewed on March 15, 2007 27. Chandra Bhushan, 2004, Overused underrated, Supplement to Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, February 29, Vol 12, No 19 28. ibid 29. N Ramakrishnan, 2004, To make 200 million, India needs steel vision Mr B Muthuraman, Managing Director, Tata Steel, The Hindu Business Line, December 21, The Hindu Group, Chennai, http://www.blonnet.com/2004/12/21/stories/2004122100090900.h tm as viewed on May 21, 2007 30. Subhash Pathak, 2007, Water scarcity may compel investors to shift base in Jharkhand, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, July 3, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage. aspx?id=c53dbf05-c672-42bd-bf55-26c08fe859f7&Match ID1=4455&TeamID1=8&TeamID2=5&MatchType1=2&SeriesID1=110 4&PrimaryID=4455, as viewed on May 23, 2007 31. ibid 32. Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 82 33. ibid, p 82 34. Based on information from application of Hindalco for Energy Awards to Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), www.bee-ndia.nic. in/.../EC%20Award/eca06/Award2006_CD/01Aluminium/Hindal coIndustriesLimitedSambalpur.pdf, as viewed on May 21, 2007 and presentation made by MALCO titled MALCOs efforts to conserve water for the future, National Award For Excellence in Water Management on December 21-22, 2006 and production data for aluminium for 2006 from anon, 2006, ICRA Sector Analysis Aluminium 2006 35. Prafulla Samantra, Open Letter to Member Secretary, Orissa Pollution Control Board, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, http://www. freewebs.com/epgorissa/vedantasmelter.htm, as viewed on May 20, 2007 36. S Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The People of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, p 145 37. Anon, 2000, Energy Efficiency Best Practices in the Australian Aluminium Industry: A Commonwealth Government Initiative, www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/aluminiumsummaryreport20040206151753.pdf, as viewed on May 10, 2007 38. Anon, 2005, Environmental Management at KIOCL, Kudremukh, MINENVIS, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, p 1 39. Anon, 1998, Canadian mining company taken to court, InterPress Service, June 23 and anon, 1995, Cyanide Mine Waste Spill Information, Report No 2, August 23, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Guyana
334
REFERENCES
40. Anon, 1993, Colorado mining industry strikes again, High Country News, January 25, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article _id=2006, as viewed on December 19, 2006 41. Anon, 2004, National Ambient Air Quality Status 2003, Central Pollution Control Board, Delhi, pp 13-14 42. Anil Agarwal et al, 1984, The State of Indias Environment, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 23 43. http://www.ipcc.ch/ as, viewed on January 5, 2007 44. Anon, 2005, Opportunities to reduce coal methane emissions in India, US-India Energy Dialogue, www.fossil.energy.gov/international/ Publications/cwg_nov05_cbm_epa.pdf, as viewed on December 10, 2006 45. Anon, 1999, Fugitive emissions from coal mining, website of the Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering, http://www.atse.org.au/index.php?sectionid=511, as viewed on December 10, 2006 46. G B Misra, 1989, Mine Environment and Ventilation, Oxford University Press, Kolkata, pp 8-9 47. Anon, 2003, Coal-bed Methane Outreach Program, US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, www.epa.gov/coalbed/about.htm, as viewed on December 11, 2006 48. J K Pandey, Methane mitigation in Indian coal mining, Central Mining Research Institute, Dhanbad, www.coalinfo.net.cn/coalbed/meeting/2203/papers/coal-mining/CM041.pdf, as viewed on December 12, 2006 49. ibid 50. Tender Notice (May 23, 2003), Union ministry of petroleum and natural gas, http://www.india-cbm2.com, as viewed on December 14, 2006 51. Anon, 2002, Abandoned mines said gigantic problem, Reuters, http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15969/stor y.htm as viewed on December 20, 2006 52. Anon, 2002, Breaking new ground, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, Earth Scan Publications, London 53. Anon, 2002, Abandoned mines said gigantic problem, Reuters, http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15969/stor y.htm as viewed on December 20, 2006 54. Anon,2002, Mining for the Future, Appendix C: Abandoned Mines, Working Paper by Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, London, p C-5 55. ibid, p C-6 56. ibid, p C-8 57. http://ibm.nic.in/frames.html, as viewed on December 20, 2006 58. Lok Sabha Starred Question No 173, answered on July 16, 2004 59. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 3783, answered on May 16, 2006 60. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the Environment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 24 61. Safety: Fatalities and fatality frequency rate in South African mines, Chambers of Mines of South Africa, Johannesburg, www.bullion.org.za/Publications/Facts&Figures/04General.pdf, as viewed on November 23, 2006 62. Union ministry of labour and employment as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=13332&ptid =17902&level=4 as viewed on April 15, 2007 63. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the Environment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 24 64. ibid, p 24 65. ibid, p 26
66. Anon, 2006, Occupational safety and health, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi 67. L Farell et al, 2004, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the Environment, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, p 26 68. M H Ross et al, 2004, Occupational respiratory diseases in mining, Occupational Medicine, 2004, Society of Occupational Medicine, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol 54, No 5, occmed.oxfordjournals. org/cgi/reprint/54/5/304.pdf, as viewed on November 12, 2006 69. Anon, 1999, Silicosis an uncommonly diagnosed common occupational disease, ICMR Bulletin, Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi, Vol 29, No 9, http://icmr.nic.in/busep99.htm, as viewed on November 23, 2006 70. ibid 71. ibid 72. V Kanhere, 2006, The Clemenceau debate and occupational health, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, April-June, Occupational Health and Safety Centre, Mumbai, http://www.ijme.in/142ed46.html, as viewed on November 28, 2006 73. H N Sayeed et al, 2004, Occupational health research in India, Industrial Health 2004, National Institute of Occupational Health, Ahmedabad, www.jniosh.go.jp/english/indu_hel/pdf/42-2-7.pdf, as viewed on November 24, 2006 74. ibid 75. Anon, 2005, The Cement Sustainability Initiative Progress Report, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, June, p 10 76. R P Shukla et al, 2003, Environment: Issues and Challenges in Thermal Power Generation, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India, p 4 77. D DMonte, 2005, Some concrete solutions, India Together, Banglore, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/may/env-flyash.htm, as viewed on May 20, 2007 78. Anon, 2005, The Cement Sustainability Initiative Progress Report, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, p 10 79. Anon, CO2 by sector: Emissions from cement manufacturing, World Resource Institute, Washington, http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.cfm?theme=3&variable_ID=465&action=select_ countries, as viewed on November 20, 2006 80. ibid 81. L Farell et al, 2006, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the Environment, Earthwork and Oxfam Australia, Washington, p 8 82. Anon, 2003, Environmental management in selected industrial sectors: status and needs, Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi 83. Anon, Steel, India Brand Equity Foundation, Gurgaon, http://ibef.in/artdispview.aspx? in=61&art_id=15374&cat_id=487& page=1, as viewed on May 29, 2007 84. Anon, 2006, World Steel, International Iron and Steel Institute, Belgium, p 3 85. Anon, 2006, Economic Editors Conference 2006 Steel, Press Information Bureau of India, Delhi, http://pib.nic.in/release/ release.asp? relid=21801, as viewed on May 29, 2007 86. Anon, Steel consumption, India Brand Equity Foundation, Gurgaon, http://ibef.in/artdispview. aspx?in=61&art_id=15374&cat_id=487& page=2, as viewed on May 29, 2007 87. K Mandal et al, 2006, Major strides in steel, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, October 27, http://www.thehindu businessline.com/2006/10/27/stories/2006102700341100.htm, as viewed on May 10, 2007 88. Steel Authority of India Limited, Delhi, http://www.sail.co.in/environment-other-units.asp, as viewed on May 12, 2007 89. Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel:
335
90 .
91.
92.
93.
94. 95. 96.
97.
98. 99.
100.
101.
102. 103.
104.
105.
106.
Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25 Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi (average for three years 2002-03 to 2004-05) Calculated based on information given in anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel: Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25; this is an average for two years (2003-04 and 2004-05) Anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel: Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron and Steel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 13 of 25; average calculated based on data from 2000-01 to 2003-04 Anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi, p 17 (average of three years from 2002-03 to 2004-05) Anon, 2004-05, Tata Steel: Corporate Sustainability Report, Tata Iron and Steel Company, Jamshedpur, p EN 21of 25 Anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi, p 17 N Mahajan, 2007, Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now, survey team attacked, The Indian Express, Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 1, http://www.indianexpress.com/iep/sunday/story/24499. html, as viewed on May 3, 2007 Calculated by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi based on anon, 2004-05, Steel Authority of India: Environmental performance report, Steel Authority of India Limited, New Delhi, p 17 Sponge Iron Manufacturers Association, Delhi, http://www.simaindia. org/prodfig05-06.cfm, as viewed on May 10, 2007 M C Vijyanthi, 2007, India will rule in sponge iron for the next decade Project Monitor, Mumbai, October 3, http://www.projectsmonitor. com/detailnews.asp?newsid=9773&secid=147, as viewed on May 15, 2007 V S Pinto, 2007, Sponge iron makers face the heat, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, May 12, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content _id=163955, as viewed on May 15, 2007 R Krishnan et al, 2006, Iron in the soul, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 8, September 15, p 27 ibid, p 27 Anon, 2005-06, Survey of Indian Sponge Iron Industry, Joint Plant Committee, Kolkata, cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/ 7Q2KJZ3UEL2RWWO8B44D7XBSEEKBFH-, as viewed on May 11, 2007 V S Pinto, 2007, Sponge iron makers face the heat, The Financial Express, Indian Express Group, New Delhi, May 12, http://www. financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=163955, as viewed on May 15, 2007 R Krishnan et al, 2006, Iron in the soul, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 8, September 15, p 29 Anon, 2003, Tata Sponge Iron to be second largest producer, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Limited, New Delhi, April 22, http://www.tatamail.com/tata_sponge/media/20030422.htm, as viewed on May 17, 2007
Box: From one site to the other

W Fernandes, Pawns in the displacement, India Disasters Report: Towards a policy initiative, Oxfam, Banglore, p 277
Box: Raw deal

1. L Mehta, 2002, The Double Bind: A Gender Analysis of Forced Displacement and Resettlement, First and Preliminary Draft, Workshop: Engendering Resettlement Policies and Programmes in India, New Delhi, pp 4-5, 7, and 10 ibid, pp 7-8 T E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, No 58, Washington, p 12 ibid, p 10 ibid, p 12 ibid, p 12
2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
Box: Shut out officially

Anon, 2005, Stir threat for Orissa coal mines, The Statesman, The Statesman Limited, Kolkata, July 4
Box: The Amman recommendations

Anon, Draft Case Study: Mining and Protected Areas, Cardiff School of City & Regional Planning, Cardiff, UK, http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cplan/sacl/ cs-mining_pas.pdf, as viewed on January 17, 2007 and Defining Protected Area Management Categories, IUCN: The World Conservation Union, Switzerland, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/categories/ index.html, as viewed on December 10, 2006
Box: Limestone from farmlands

Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 28
Box: Managing wastes

Anon, 2000, Reclamation/restoration technique and strategy for mined-out areas, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur and anon, 1998, Base metal and iron ore mining, Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, The World Bank Group, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro. nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/gui_mining_WB/$FILE/mining_PPAH.pdf, as viewed on January 20, 2007
Box: In a tailspin
1. S Dubey, 2007, Toxic Fallout: Jadugudas Nuclear Nightmare, Siliconeer, New American Media, Sacramento, March, Vol VIII, Issue 3, http://www.siliconeer.com/past_issues/2007/siliconeer_march_ 2007.html, as viewed on January 11, 2007 Merriespruit Tailings Dam Failure, Virginia, South Africa, Tailings Info, University of Leeds, Leeds, http://www.tailings.info/merriespruit.htm, as viewed on January 22, 2007 S G Vick, 1996, Failure of the Omai tailings dam, Geotechnical News, BiTech Publishers Ltd, Richmond, September, www.infomine. com/publications/docs/Vick1996.pdf, as viewed on February 1, 2007 Brazil: Tailing Dam Failure in Brazil, Corp Watch, Oakland, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14312, as viewed on February 1, 2007 The San Marcelino tailings dam spill (Zambales, Philippines), Wise Uranium Project, World Information Service on Energy, Amsterdam,
2.
3.
4.
Box: High toll

Analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
5.
336
REFERENCES
6.
http://www.wise-uranium.org/mdafsm.html, as viewed on February 1, 2007 The Inez coal tailings dam failure (Kentucky, USA), Wise Uranium Project, World Information Service on Energy, Amsterdam, www.wise-uranium.org/mdafin.html-44k, as viewed on February 1, 2007
Box: Supreme Court comes to the rescue

Anon, 2000, Death inside factory gate, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, September 30, Vol 9, No 9, p 40
Box: Uranium kills

C Stephens et al, 2001, Worker and Community Health Impacts Related to Mining Operations Internationally, Mining, Mineral and Sustainable Development (MMSD), International Institute for Environment Development (IIED) and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBSCD), Washington, pp 20-21
Box: Preventing acid mine drainage

Amy Rosenfeld Sweeting et al, 2000, Lightening the code A guide to responsible large-scale mining, Conservation International, Washington, pp 35-38, http://www.celb.org/ImageCache/CELB/content/energy_2dmining/ lode_2epdf/v1/lode.pdf, as viewed on June 13, 2007
Box: Say no to coal mining

C Brahic, 2006, Australian coalmine blocked over climate change, New Scientist Environment, December, http://environment.newscientist. com/channel/earth/dn10709-australian-coal-mine-blocked-over-climateimpact.html, as viewed on February 5, 2007
4. MINING IN THE STATES

ANDHRA PRADESH
Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3-5 2. http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturaladvantages.html, as viewed on March 17, 2007 3. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 4. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 4 5. Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-9, 11-12 6. Analysis based on data from anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 7. Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-9, 11-12 8. Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi 9. http://www.aponline.gov.in/Quick%20links/apfactfile/naturaladvantages.html, as viewed on March 17, 2007 10. http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Country/india09.htm, as viewed on March 15, 2007; S Ramakrishna, 2006, Mining muddle, Sahara Time, February 18; anon, 2006, NGOs get set to fight UCIL project, The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Limited, Chennai, September 6; and anon, 2006, AP uranium project hearing a farce, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Limited, Bangalore, September 12 11. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, Red alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30, p 27 12. http://www.wise-uranium.org/upin.html#LAMBAPUR, as viewed on January 28, 2007 13. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, Red alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30, pp 28 14. Calculated based on uranium content as given in Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, Red Alert, Down to Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30, p 28 15. http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Country/india09.htm, as viewed on March 15, 2007 1.
Box: Closure chaos: the case of limestone

Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts, The Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, p 38
Box: International best practices: land reclamation

Amy Rosenfeld Sweeting et al, 2000, Lightening the code A guide to responsible large-scale mining, Conservation International, Washington, pp 38 and 41, http://www.celb.org/ImageCache/CELB/content/energy_ 2dmining/lode_2epdf/v1/lode.pdf, as viewed on June 13, 2007
Box: Of coal and death

1. 2. Anon, 2006, Occupational Safety and Health, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi Anon, 2001, Safety and public grievance cell, Annual Report: Ministry of Coal 2000-01, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, www.coal.nic.in/chap120102.pdf, as viewed on December 2, 2006 Statistics of Mines in India, Volume-I (Coal), 2000, Union ministry of labour, as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData Sec.asp?secid=95898&ptid=17902, as viewed on November 27, 2006 A Mandal et al, The analysis of fatal accidents in Indian coal mines, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, p 6 Union ministry of labour and employment, as cited in http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=391038& ptid=17902&level=4, as viewed on November 28, 2006
3.
4. 5.
Box: Impaired: what mining does to the body

1. C V Beato, 2004, Progress Review: Occupational Health & Safety, US Department of Health & Services Public Health Services, February 18, http://www.healthypeople.gov/data/2010prog/focus20/, as viewed on November 15, 2006 B B Mandal et al, 2006, Risk of vibration in Indian mines, Indian Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Thane, Vol 10, Issue 2, August, p 54 ibid, p 54 ibid, pp 53-57 ibid, p 54 ibid, pp 54-55 M H Ross et al, 2004, Occupational respiratory diseases in mining, Occupational Medicine, Society of Occupational Medicine, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol 54, No 5, p 304
2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Box: Limestone and Andhra Pradesh

Analysed based on information compiled by the Green Rating Project between 1999 and 2004, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
337
Box: Retribution: Nimmalapadu today

A Krishnakumar, 2004, A tribal struggle, Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai, Vol 21, Issue 19, September 11-24, http://www.hinduonnet. com/fline/fl2119/stories/20040924006200400.htm, as viewed on March 15, 2007; Sunita Narain, 2004, Defining poverty and progress, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, April 30, Vol 12, No 23; and Anirudh Bhattacharyya, 1995, Projects may harm environment, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, June 5 20. 21 22.
Box: Kadapa: lessons not learnt

Anon, 2006, AP uranium project hearing a farce, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Limited, Bangalore, September 9
23.
24.
Box: Recipe for a water-starved future?

Ravi Rebbapragada, 2007, Health of the hills is wealth of the plains: the Eastern Ghats...our lives depend on them, presentation at the First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People, Centre for Science and Environment, April 26-27, New Delhi 25.
CHHATTISGARH
1. 2. 3. 4. Anon, 2001, Mineral Policy, Mineral Resource Department, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, p 2 Based on analysis from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur ibid Data on land under major minerals is for the year 2002-03, and has been taken from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-22, while data on land under coal has been taken from documents of the Department of Mines and Geology, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur http://www.pppinindia.com/states_chhattisgarh_bo.asp, as viewed on June 30, 2007 Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi http://www.pppinindia.com/states_chhattisgarh_bo.asp, as viewed on June 30, 2007 Anon, 2006, BJP MLAs accuse Raman Singh government over pollution in Bastar, Press Trust of India, The Press Trust of India Limited, Raipur, February 22 ibid Anon, 2005, Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land, Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, p 21 ibid, p 21 Documents of the Forest Department, Office of the Chief Conservator of Forests (Land Management), government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur Anon, 2005, Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land, Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, p 28 ibid, p 31 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 49 ibid, p 49 Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, Amendment to Forest Act favoured, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, November 4 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) Documents of the Forest Department, Office of the Chief Conservator of Forests (Land Management), government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur R Krishna Das, 2005, Land grab mud on Balco, The Telegraph, ABP
26.
27. 28. 29.
30.
5. 6. 7. 8.
31.
32.
33.
9. 10.
34.
11. 12. 13.
35.
14. 15.
36.
16. 17.
37. 38.
18. 19.
39.
Pvt Ltd, Kolkata, June 24 http://www.steelguru.com/selectedNews.php?y=2005&m= 010&d=022, as viewed on April 18, 2007 http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press766.htm, as viewed on March 20, 2007 Dhananjay Mahapatra, 2006, Coal unit fined Rs 300 crore in damage, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, September 10, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/ 1973779.cms, as viewed on March 20, 2007 Goldy M George, Mining to destruction and hijacking their rights to submission, Countercurrents, Kumaranalloor, http://www.countercurrents.org/ index.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006 Data on area under coal mining has been taken from the Department of Geology and Mines, government of Chhattisgarh, while that on the area under other mining has been sourced from the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2006, Killing in Chhattisgarh, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060503/ edit.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006 Goldy M George, Mining to destruction and hijacking their rights to submission, Countercurrents, Kumaranalloor, http://www.countercurrents.org/index.htm, as viewed on November 28, 2006 Anon, 2006, Jharkhand Development Report 2006, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, p 40 Anon 2006, Vision Document, government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur Analysis based on information obtained from Census of India 2001, The Encyclopedic District Gazetteers of India, Human Development Reports, the website of india-stat.com, and Health Information of India 2003 Anon, 2005, Human development in Chhattisgarh, Human Development Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi Anon, 2006, Information about NMDC under the RTI Act 2005, peoples website of Chhattisgarh, http://www.cgnet.in/Min/Ndmc.pdf, as viewed on December 18, 2006 Anon, 2005, Human development in Chhattisgarh, Human Development Report Chhattisgarh 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, p 193 Anon, 2006, Maoists fighting mindless mining in Chhattisgarh, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press1042.htm, as viewed on May 11, 2007 Bharti Jain, 2006, Naxalites may derail dream steel run, Times News Network, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, September 1, economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1945336.cms, as viewed on December 15, 2006 R Krishna Das et al, 2005, Rebel raid on giant Maoist army cripples Hindalco mining unit, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt Limited, Kolkata, May 9, www.telegraphindia.com/1050510/asp/frontpage/ story_4720076.asp, as viewed on December 11, 2006 Anon, 2006, Chhattisgarh Maoists oppose Tata, Essar plants, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, May 17, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1534881.cms, as viewed on December 17, 2006 Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining on ecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 18 M N Mitra, 2006, River Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh run dry, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49 Based on telephonic communication with Pratap Agarwal, advocate, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh
338
REFERENCES 40. M N Mitra, 2006, River Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh run dry, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49 41. Anon, 1997, Forest area hit by mining in Bailadila, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, March 12 42. N Sharif, 1998, MEF rejects SAIL proposal to tackle iron ore mining in MP, The Observer of Business & Politics, New Delhi, September 11 43. Sanjay Sharma, 1997, Mining projects threaten precious sal forest, Sahara Times, March 8 44. K Mandal, SAIL charting new mining proposal dry beneficiation plant at Chhattisgarh, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/01/10/ stories/2006011001990200.htm, as viewed on December 17, 2006 45. Anon, 2007, Mines bureau clears Bhilais Rowghat, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 27, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id= 159153, as viewed on May 10, 2007 46. Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining on ecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 18 47. Anon, 2002, An investigation into land acquisition and state repression in Nagarnar, Bastar, Chhattisgarh, The Indian Peoples Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights, Mumbai, September 48. http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Industries-envirn-resettlement /2002/chhattisgarh.htm, as viewed on May 27, 2007 49. Anon, 2004, Corporate Social Responsibility, Annual Report of the Ministry of Steel 2003-04, http://www.steel.nic.in/Annual% 20Report%20(2003-04)/English/chapter-20.PDF, as viewed on May 27, 2007 50. ibid 51. Pratap Agarwal, PIL against Tatas Steel Project in Bastar, peoples website of Chhattisgarh, http://www.cgnet.in/Min/document.2006-0225.4099241579, as viewed on May 28, 2007 52. Based on telephonic communication with Pratap Agarwal, advocate, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh 53. Anon, 2007, Tata terror in Bastar, Orissa Sakhi, March 9, http://sanhati.com/articles/201/, as viewed on May 28, 2007 54. Nitin Mahajan, 2007, Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 1, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/24499.html, as viewed on May 28, 2007 55. Anon, 2006, Chhattisgarh tribals to give up land for steel mill, Business Sunday, July 23, http://www.indiaenews.com/business/20060723/15837.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007 56. Anon, 2007, Bastar tribals launch protest against Tata Steels plant, Steel Guru, February 2, http://www.steelguru.com/selectedNews. php?y=2007&m=002&d=026#top, as viewed on May 28, 2007 57. Nitin Mahajan, 2007, Trouble at Tata Bastar plant now, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 1, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/24499.html, as viewed on May 28, 2007 58. Anon, 2007, Tata terror in Bastar, Orissa Sakhi, March 9, http://sanhati.com/articles/201/, as viewed on May 28, 2007 59. Anon, 2007, BJP MLA protests against land acquisition for Bastar steel plant, Associated News of India, March 18, http://www.dailyindia. com/show/126477.php/BJP-MLAs-protest-against-land-acquisition-for-Bastar-steel-plant, as viewed on May 28, 2007 60. Anon, 2007, Police harassing people to give up land for the Tata plant: CPI, India eNews, March 11, http://www.indiaenews.com/ business/20070311/42277.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007 Anon, 2006, Tribal protesters give go ahead to Essar Steel, India Abroad News Service, Raipur, September 13 62. M N Mitra, 2006, Red Alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 11, October 31, pp 27-28 63. Anon, 2007, Farmers killed for giving land for Essar steel plant, India Abroad News Service, April 1, http://in.news.yahoo.com/ 070401/43/6e195.html, as viewed on May 28, 2007 64. ibid 65. Anon, 2006, Tata, Essar Steel MoUs out of right to informations ambit, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, February 15, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/businessline/ blnus/27151406.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007 61.
Box: Lawless
1. Anon, 2001, Nearly 1,500 illegal mining cases detected in Chhattisgarh, Central Chronicle, Ram Gopal Investment Pvt Ltd, Bhopal, November 12 Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, Rampant smuggling of diamonds in the state, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, November 3 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
2.
Box: Indias diamond bowl?

Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, CM calls his state Diamond Bowl, CMDC not optimist, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, October 20 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
Box: We exist because forests exist

Anon, 2005, Natural Resources: Water, Forests and Land, Chhattisgarh Human Development Report 2005, United Nations Development Programme, New Delhi, p 26
Box: Mining has a long reach

Mukesh Kumar, 2005, Geospatial Evaluation of Biodiversity Pattern in Mining Landscape of Northern Chhattisgarh, India, Indian Institute of Remote Sensing, Dehradun, pp 89-94
Box: Cruel tryst with diamonds

Ejaz Kaiser, 2005, Barnus cruel tryst with diamonds, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Raipur, October 22 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
Box: The way of the Salwa Judum

M N Mitra, 2006, Red Alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15 No 11, October 31, pp 22-26
Box: In the line of fire

1. 2. Anon, 1997, Forest area hit by mining in Bailadila, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, March 12 G Venkataraman et al, 1992, Environment impact of Iron ore mining in Bailadila, Bastar district, Madhya Pradesh, through Remote Sensing, Centre for Studies in Resources Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai http://www.csre.iitb.ac.in/gv/ proj4/temporalp4.htm, as viewed on February 14, 2007
Box: Iron river

M N Mitra, 2006, Rivers Sankhini and Dankini in Chhattisgarh run dry, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 15, December 31, pp 48-49
339
Box: Privatisation pains

Anon, 2004, Report of the Expert Group on the prevention of alienation of tribal land and its restoration, Union ministry of rural development, New Delhi, p 147
21.
22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
Box: NMDCs loss is Essars gain

Anon, 2007, Essar wins licence for Bailadila iron ore deposits, India PRwire, Gurgaon, March 4, http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/20070304/19747.htm, as viewed on May 28, 2007
Box: An insiders account

M N Mitra, 2006, Red Alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 11, October 31, pp 27-28
GOA
1. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 1 and anon, 2006, Goa at a glance 2006, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, p 1 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-23, 11-24 ibid, p 47-9 Anon, 2006, Goa at a glance 2006, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, p 1 and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11 Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3 ibid, p 5 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-24 ibid, p 11-4 ibid, p 11-4 ibid, p 11-24 ibid, p 11-24 ibid, p 11-2 Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November and anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 200506, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/goa/goaminerals.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007 Pamela DMello, 1998, Goa environment suffering due to iron ore mining, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Kolkata, April 18 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3 G Venkataraman, 1992, Environmental impact of iron ore mining in Goa through remote sensing, Centre for Studies in Resources Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, http:// www.csre. iitb.ac.in/gv/proj3/studyareap3.htm, as viewed on June 3, 2007 Raju Nayak, 2005, Record rainfall does not liberate Goa from water tankers, Loksatta, The Indian Express Group, Panaji, October 12 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) ibid
2. 3. 4.
33. 34. 35. 36.
P Nair, 2007, Mining companies in Goa to pay compensation for crop loss, Goa Net, August 5, http://www.goanet.org/index.php? name=News &file=article&sid=893, as viewed on August 7, 2007 Nair et al, Arsenic enrichment in estuarine sediments impacts of iron and manganese mining, National Institute of Oceanography, Cochin, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 59 ibid, p 57 ibid, p 57 ibid, p 57 Raju Nayak, 2005, Mining pits pose serious threat to Goas environment, Loksatta, The Indian Express Group, Panaji, October 13 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) ibid ibid ibid Kriti B Gupta et al, 2006, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of forest land for mining purposes, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi, pp 71-72
Box: Exporting ore, importing disaster

1. 2. Anon, 2007, Economic Survey 2005-06, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panaji, p 99 Anon, 2006, How iron disappears in Bellary, MSN India, September 11, http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_ 1008.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 47-28 Anon, 2007, Economic Survey 2005-06, Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation, government of Goa, Panaji, p 98 Anon, 2007, Annual Report Sesa Goa Limited, Sesa Goa, Panjim, http://content.msn.co.in/News/Business/BusinessBS_110906_ 1008.htm, as viewed on June 16, 2007
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
3. 4. 5.
Box: Mines that undermine farming

G Venkatramani, 1992, Mines that undermine farming, Nagpur Times, January 22
15. 16. 17.
Box: Blasted and stoned

Vasudha Sawaiker, 2006, Driven to the extreme, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 17, January 31
Box: Overburdened
Anon, 2006, Six killed in Goas mining tragedy, India eNews, October 12, http://www.indiaenews.com/india/20061210/32003.htm, as viewed on March 10
18.
Box: One good show

Kriti B Gupta et al, 2006, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of forest land for mining purposes, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi, pp 71-72
19.
Box: Tourist paradise? A visitors travelogue

Sunita Narain, 2007, Editorial, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 22, April 15, p 5
20.
340
REFERENCES
THE HIMALAYAN STATES

1. 2. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-82 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-82 and http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/ indian-states/ uttaranchal/InvesOpp.htm, as viewed on March 29, 2007 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-82 ibid, p 11-82 Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 3, 8 ibid, pp 3, 8 ibid, pp 3, 8 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-30 ibid, p 11-30 Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 3, 5 ibid, pp 3, 5 ibid, pp 3, 5 Mahesh Joshi, 2005, People unite as mining shows its ugly face, Nainital Samachar, Nainital, October 1-14 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) Mahesh Joshi, 2005, Mining in Pithoragarh: companies abscond after destroying hundreds of lives, Nainital Samachar, Nainital, October 15-31 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) Bidisha Kumar, 2006, Trying to grow, soft quarries, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 13, November 30, pp 24-26 Anon, 1998, Digging up an eco-disaster in Kullu, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, September 13 Anon, 2004, Quarrying poses threat to ancient temple, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, June 4 Chhavinder Thakur, 1996, Unchecked quarrying plays havoc with Beas, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, October 5 Ravinder Sood, 1998, Illegal mining, quarrying on the rise, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, August 19 Anon, 1995, Kangra area to be declared sensitive, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, April 5 Rakesh Lohumi, 1995, Illegal mining upsets eco-system, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, February 25 Anon, 1996, Mines working sans plans, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, March 3 S P Sharma, 1999, Sinking villages of Chamba, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, January 28 Balkrishna Parashar, 1998, Quarrying threatens highway, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, May 15 S P Sharma, 2000, Nod to mining in Khaniyara, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, October 20
Box: Limestone: more flashpoints

1. http://www.himvani.com/news/2007/03/08/ban-polybags-entirely-in-himachal-kinkari-devi/663/environment/ddsharma/, as viewed on March 31, 2007 Anon, 1997, Pressure on government to lift mining ban, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, December 3 S P Sharma, 1995, Order to close 9 HP mines, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, October 8; anon, 1995, HP closes 12 lime mines, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, February 5; anon, 1996, Mining, cement units denude slopes, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, September 23; S P Sharma, 1999, 20,000 green trees to be axed, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, November 4; Baldev Chauhan, 1998, Uncontrolled limestone mining, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Delhi, July 12 and S R Pundir, 2001, Illegal mining continues unabated, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, July 5 P C Trikannad, 2007, Mega projects in Himachal Pradesh face green wrath, Project Monitor, Mumbai, July 12 www.projectmonitor.com/ detailnews.ap?newsid=13975, as viewed on July 15, 2007 Anon, 2007, Protest against cement factory, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, January 31, www.tribuneindia.com/2007/ 20070131/himachal.htm#4, as viewed on February 14, 2007 Ashish Kothari et al, 2002, Leasing out lives, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, March 9
2. 3.
3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
4.
5.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
6.
Box: Soapstone seals Bageshwars fate

Bidisha Kumar, 2006, Trying to grow, soft quarries, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, November 30, 2006, Vol 15, No 13, pp 27-28
Box: The Askot project

Paul M Boswell, 2006, Technical report on the Gadarwara Mineral Property, India: Report No 4677, Resource Engineering and Development Limited, Vancouver and http://www.pebcreek.com/projects.asp?p-askot-history, as viewed on June 14, 2007
17.
18.
JHARKHAND
Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-37 2. ibid, pp 24-7, 24-8 3. Anon, 2007, Distribution of leases and lease area (by state/district/minerals) as on 31.3.2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 4. ibid 5. ibid 6. ibid 7. ibid 8. http://www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/dwdml.asp#, as viewed on March 23, 2007 9. www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/dwdml.asp#, as viewed on March 23, 2007 10. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 11. Analysed based on data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ ShowDataSec.asp?secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 12. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-4 13. ibid, p 11-4 14. http://jharkhand.nic.in/mineral_collection.htm, as viewed on 1.
19. 20. 21.
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15.
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25. 26. 27. 28.
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31.
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March 25, 2007 Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November and anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 200506, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi ibid P Ranjan, 2006, Madhu Koda starts working, puts all 43 MoUs worth of 2,00,00 crore under scanner in Jharkhand, Indian Daily News, September 19, http://www.indiadaily.org/entry/madhu-kodastarts-working-puts-all-43-mou-worth-of-200000-crore-under-scanner-in-jharkhand/, as viewed on November 10, 2006 http://www.jharkhand.gov.in/depts/mines/acbml.asp, as viewed on March 25, 2007 ibid ibid Based on information published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 66 Based on analysis from anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 66 and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 6, 13 Based on analysis from anon, 2005, The State of Forest Report 2003, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, p 66 ibid, p 66 ibid, p 66 Bulu Iman, 2001, Preserving sacred places in Jharkhand, India, Sacred Sites International, Berkley, http://www.sacred-sites.org/ preservation/endangered_jharkhand.html, as viewed on May 29, 2007 Kumkum Dasgupta et al, 2001, Poor little rich states, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 16, January 15, pp 41-45 Sanjeev Baruah, Collieries set to annihilate rare animals in Jharkhand, Wildlife Trust of India, Dehradun, http://www. wildlifetrustofindia.org/html/news/features/051024_jharkhand_co llieries.html, as viewed on November 12, 2006 Kumkum Dasgupta et al, 2001, Poor little rich states, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 16, January 15, pp 41-45 ibid ibid A Behar, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 Sanjeev Baruah, Collieries set to annihilate rare animals in Jharkhand, Wildlife Trust of India, Dehradun, http://www. wildlifetrustofindia.org/html/news/features/051024_jharkhand_co llieries.html, as viewed on November 12, 2006 Shanti Sawaiyan, Forcible displacement and land alienation is unjust, Mines, Minerals and People, http://www.mmpindia.org/ shanti.PDF, as viewed on November 1, 2006 ibid Shubhangi Thatte, Growth and Distribution of Tribal Population in Jharkhand, 1961-2001: A Census Analysis, http://paa2006.princeton. edu/download_aspx?submissionId=61800, as viewed on November 12, 2006
39. 40.
41.
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54.
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61.
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66.
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Box: Battle drawn over Chiria mines

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Box: Destroying Saranda

Ruksan Bose, 2006, Mine or yours, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 16, January 15, pp 7-8 18. 19.
Box: The story of Horomocho

Richard Mahapatra et al, 2002, The Second Independence, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No 7, August 31, p 29 20.
21.
Box: Minerals and mining in West Bengal

1. Anon, Status on Land, Department of Land and Land Reforms, government of West Bengal, http://www.wbgov.com/e-gov/ admin/newgovtpublications/upload/Pub-Status_on_land.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007 http://ibm.nic.in/miningleases.html#2, as viewed on May 30, 2007; anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal, http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/eco_05_06/ch_5_Industry.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007 Anon, Economic Review 2005-06, government of West Bengal, http://wbplan.gov.in/docs/Eco_Rev 2005-06_statistical_appendix. pdf as viewed on May 30, 2007 22.
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3.
Box: Dousing plans: the various responses to Jharia

S P Banerjee, 2007, Coal fire in Jharia problems and solutions, presentation at
343
the First Anil Agarwal Media Briefing Workshop and Dialogue on Mining, Environment and People, Centre for Science and Environment, April 2627, 2007, New Delhi
Box: Santhals in turmoil

Uhnau: Asha for Education, http://www.ashanet.org/projects/documentview.php?id=3539, as viewed on March 17, 2007 and anon, 2002, Dumped and in despair, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt Ltd, Kolkata, February 1, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1020202/national.htm, as viewed on March 17, 2007
Box: Subsidence in Jharia

N A Khan, 1998, Quarry in quagmire, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No 17, August 15, pp 20-21 Note: 1That part of the mines from which the minerals have been removed partially or wholly.
Box: Up in arms in Pachwara

Richard Mahapatra, 2005, Theirs to mine?, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp 26-27
Box: All clear?

B Sanyal, 2006, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Kolkata, February 9
Box: Accident at Jaduguda

http://www.jadugoda.net/Accidents/index.html, December 18, 2006 as viewed on
Box: The death traps of Raniganj

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Anon, 2004, SC orders rehabilitation of subsidence victims, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, February 26 Debdutta Ghosh, 2001, Bengal threatened by illegal mining, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, January 29 Shaikh Azizur Rahman, 2006, Indias largest coal mines turn into death pits, The Washington Post, November 25 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=394758& ptid= 17902&level=3, as viewed on June 30, 2007 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=412139& ptid=17902&level=3, as viewed on July 10, 2007 Anon, 2002, Picket to protest illegal mining, The Telegraph, ABP Pvt Ltd, Kolkata, February 1 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=89926& ptid= 17902&level=3, as viewed on June 30, 2007 Debdutta Ghosh, 2001, Bengal threatened by illegal mining, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Kolkata, January 29 M N Mitra, 2007, Fault lines, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 9, February 28, p 14 Lok Sabha Starred Question No 124, March 7, 2007, http:// 164.100. 24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=39553, as viewed on June 30, 2007 Anon, 2006, Annual Report 2005-06, Union ministry of coal, New Delhi, p 72 http://web.cmc.net.in/wbcensus/DataTables/02/Table-12.htm and http://www.wbplan.gov.in/docs/Handbook_2004/Burdwan.pdf, as viewed on July 10, 2007
Box: Banduhurang: another Jaduguda?

Anupama Kumari, 2005, Dont turn our village into another HiroshimaNagasaki, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, November 6 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
Box: In dire straits: Indias nuclear plans

Richard Mahapatra et al, 2004, Red alert, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 23, April 30, David Hart et al, Nuclear power in the third world: An analysis, Eco World, http://www.ecoworld.com/home/articles2.cfm?tid=402, as viewed on December 18, 2006 A Roul, 2006, Indias nuclear power assisting energy independence or a dangerous experiment? Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, http://www.ccnr.org/third_world_nukes.html#in, as viewed on December 18, 2006
1.
2.
KARNATAKA AND MAHARASHTRA

A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 2. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-42 3. ibid, p 11-42 4. ibid, p 11-2 5. ibid, p 11-2 6. Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp? secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 7. Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi 8. Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November; and anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December 9. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-4 10. ibid, p 11-4 11. ibid, p 10-7 12. ibid, p 3-5 13. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 14 14. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, High on Chinese demand, Down To Earth, 1.
Box: A parallel economy

Pratim Ranjan Bose, 2004, In Asansol, parties turn blind eye to illegal mining, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, April 27, 2004
Box: Black: three stories on illegal mining

1. Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, A nationalised nightmare, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 4, July 15, p 37 Anupama Kumari, 2005, Their day starts with coal, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, October 29 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) Anupama Kumari, 2005, Where the world changes with sunset, Prabhat Khabar, Ranchi, November 6 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
2.
3.
Box: The story of Nirjal Birhor

Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, 2007, article written for the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
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Box: A code for landowners

B T Venkatesh, 2007, Consultation Meet on Artisanal, Small-scale Mining in India, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, March 20, 2007, New Delhi
Box: The little labourers of Bellary

Shantha Sinha, 2005, Breaking the backs of Indias children, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, Bangalore, May 16
Box: Mines and misery: the women miners of Bellary

M T Shivkumar, 2005, Mines and misery pathetic condition of women, Prajavani, Bellary, October 22 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
Box: Livelihood versus environment

Ravi Sharma, 2006, Waiting for a Miracle, Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai, Vol 23, Issue 1, January 14-27 and Binayak Das, 2002, Deep concerns, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 10, No 20, March 15, pp 44-45
Box: Struggle saga

1. 2. Ravi Sharma, 2001, Kudremukh Concerns, Group, Chennai, Vol 18, Issue 18, September Binayak Das, 2002, Deep concerns, Down Environmental Communications, New Delhi, 15, pp 44-45 Binayak Das, 2002, Deep concerns, Down Environmental Communications, New Delhi, 15, pp 44-45 Frontline, The Hindu To Earth, Society for Vol 10, No 20, March To Earth, Society for Vol 10, No 20, March
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Box: The sands of Tungabhadra

1. Anon, 2003, Illegal sand mining continues on Tungabhadra river bank, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore, March 9 Anon, State of Environment Report 2003, Karnataka Department of Ecology and Environment, Bangalore, http://www.parisara.kar. nic.in/PDF/ Mining.pdf, as viewed on February 12, 2007 M G Chandrakanth et al, Whither groundwater? Negative externalities due to sand mining in India, Department of Agricultural Economics, GKVK, UAS, Bangalore
2.
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Box: Mining in Maharashtra

1. Directorate General Factory Advice Service & Labour Institute, Union ministry of labour and employment, New Delhi, http://dgfasli.nic.in/publication/reports/maharashtra/Chapter2.h tm, as viewed on March 21, 2007 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 ibid, p 57 The area under mining leases, says the Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005 published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, is 15,998 ha: 25 per cent of this would mean 4,057 ha. However, the area under mining leases does not include coal and minor minerals.
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Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 Based on data obtained from various publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Based on data from anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-56 ibid, p 11-56 ibid, p 11-56 ibid, p 11-56 Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi ibid Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3-5 ibid, pp 3-5 and 11-56 ibid, p 3-5 Analysed based on data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3-5 Anon, 1997, Uttan-Dongri residents plan protest against destruction of eco-system by quarries, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Pvt Ltd, Banglore, August 17 Anil Singh, 1998, Hotels rape Matheran hills in quest of construction material, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Mumbai, July 4 Anon, 2002, Government action against bauxite mining, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Bangalore, May 28, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/11202921.cms, as viewed on March 27, 2007
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KERALA AND TAMIL NADU

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Based on information from documents published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-46 Anon, 2007, Economy: Minerals, Kerala government, http://www.kerala.gov.in/, as viewed on March 23, 2007 ibid G K Nair, 2004, Keralas NOC for mineral sand mining revives controversy, The Financial Daily, The Hindu Group, Chennai, March 23 Anon, 2006, New areas for gold mining spotted in Kerala, India PRwire, Gurgaon, http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/ 20061202/8916.htm, as viewed on March 5, 2007 Based on information from documents published by the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 Department of Geology and Mining, government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, http://www.tnmine.tn.nic.in/TN-Mining.htm#Reserves, as viewed on March 26, 2007 ibid ibid ibid Analysis based on anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-80 State Planning Commission, government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/chapter10-3.htm, as viewed on March 27, 2007; and http://www.tn.gov.in/spc/annualplan/ default.htm as viewed on March 27, 2007
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Box: Collapse
P Sudhakar, 2006, Heavy sand mining leads to collapse of checkdam, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 24, http://www. thehindu.com/2006/11/24/stories/2006112404780300.htm as viewed on March 23, 2007
9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
Box: Stopped in its tracks

Anon, 2007, Court halts sand mining in Tiruvallur lake, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, March 22, http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/22/ stories/2007032218740400.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007
Box: Selling the coast

1. A B Kumar, 2001, Bailing out turtles, Down To Earth, Society
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for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 23, April 30, p 41 M. Suchitra and P N Venugopal, Coastal sand mining push despite eco-risks, India Together, Bangalore, http://www.indiatogether.org/ 2005/jun/ env-sminerals.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007 ibid L K Sekhar and S K Jayadev, 2003, Mining in the Alappuzha coast of Kerala a peoples perspective, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environment and Health in Chennai, Department of Geography, University of Madras and Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, December 15-17, p 478 M Suchitra and P N Venugopal, Coastal sand mining push despite eco-risks, India Together, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jun/ env-sminerals.htm, as viewed on March 23, 2007
MADHYA PRADESH
1. Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3 Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-47 Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3 ibid Anon, 2007, Madhya Pradesh Economic Survey 2006-07, government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, p 122 Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51; and anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licenses 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 3 Anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-3; and anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi Analysis based on anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-4 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=5958&ptid= 19252&level=4, as viewed on July 10, 2007 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=3749&ptid= 19204&level=4 and http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData. asp?secid=101761&ptid=19204&level=4, as viewed on June 30, 2007 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=3834&ptid= 19190&level=4, as viewed on June 30, 2007 http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowData.asp?secid=20117& ptid=19219&level=4 and http://www.indiastat.com/india/ ShowData.asp?secid= 56902&ptid=19219&level=4, as viewed on June 30, 2007 Based on data from Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 8-3, 8-4, 11-51 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51 ibid, p 11-51 ibid, p 29-3 ibid, p 11-51 ibid, p 24-1 ibid, p 24-9 ibid, p 53-7 Based on data from anon, 2006, State Reviews, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-51 ibid, p 11-50
2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
7.
8. 9. 10.
11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23. ibid, p 11-51 24. Anon, 2001, Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified by age, industrial category and sex, Census of India 2001, New Delhi, http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt _a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007 25. Anon, 2003, Labour and Women in Mining: Background paper for seminar on women and mining, Mines, Minerals and People, New Delhi, April 26. Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi 27. ibid 28. Sate profile: advantage Madhya Pradesh, Destination Madhya Pradesh, Global Investors Summit, 2007, http://www.destinationmadhyapradesh.com/state-profile/invest-scenario.htm, as viewed on June 30, 2007 29. http://ibm.nic.in/frames, as viewed on April 20, 2007 30. Based on data from anon, 2005, Wasteland Atlas, Department of Land Resources, Union ministry of rural development, New Delhi, http://dolr.nic.in/WastelandsAtlas2005/Madhya_Pradesh.pdf, as viewed on July 10, 2007 31. Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-17 32. Forests of Madhya Pradesh, State of Forest Department Report 2003, Forest Department, Madhya Pradesh, http://www.forest.mp. gov.in/Foresttable2.html, as viewed on April 2, 2007 33. A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 34. ibid 35. Anon, 2004, MP targets Rs 600 crore from mining, Business Standard, Business Standard Ltd, New Delhi, July 8 36. Anon, 1997, MP urges centre to amend Mines and Minerals Act, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, June 19 37. Anon, 2005, Conditional renewal of MP diamond mine lease, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 12 38. ibid 39. ibid 40. ibid 41. Anon, 2002, SAF to help check illegal mining, Central Chronicle, Ram Gopal Investment Pvt Ltd, Bhopal, August 14 42. Anon, 2002, HC orders stay on mining, Central Chronicle, Ram Gopal Investment Pvt Ltd, Bhopal, June 6 43. Anon, 2005, HC fiat on MP stone mines, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, July 21 44. Abhilash Khandekar, 2002, Panel finds MP minister guilty of illegal mining, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, April 1 45. Anon, 2002, Writ filed in SC against illegal mining, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore, December 14 46. Abhilash Khandekar, 2002, Panel finds MP minister guilty of illegal mining, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, April 1 47. Anon, 2002, Writ filed in SC against illegal mining, Deccan Herald, The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd, Bangalore, December 14 48. ibid 49. Deepak Tiwari, 2005, The great diamond loot, The Week, Malayala Manorama Publications, Kochi, March 16 50. ibid 51. Rumni Ghosh, 2005, Who owns the closed diamond mines?, Dainik Bhaskar, Bhaskar Group, Bhopal, November 1 52. Deepak Tiwari, 2005, The great diamond loot, The Week, Malayala Manorama Publications, Kochi, March 16 53. ibid 54. ibid
347
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Rumni Ghosh, 2005, Who owns the closed diamond mines?, Dainik Bhaskar, Bhaskar Group, Bhopal, November 1 ibid Anon, 2006, Govt to seek SC nod for sand mining, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, July 21 Directorate of Geology and Mining-Madhya Pradesh, Mineral Resources Department, government of Madhya Pradesh, http://www. mp.gov.in/geologyandmining/ and Northerm Coalfields Ltd, Sidhi, http://ncl.gov.in/new/profile.htm, as viewed on April 27, 2007 Anon, 2000, More than 3 million poor displaced by World Bank project, Centre for International Environmental Law, Washington, http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/pressreleasevigil.html, as viewed on April 27, 2007 ibid http://www.sidhi.nic.in/english/d_e_population.htm, as viewed on April 27, 2007 John Samuel et al, 2000, Unjust Mining: Issues and Campaign, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune Anon, 2000, More than 3 million poor displaced by World Bank project, Centre for International Environmental Law, Washington, http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/pressreleasevigil.html, as viewed on April 27, 2007 Fossil Fuels and the World Bank, The Whirled Bank Group, Washington, http://www.whirledbank.org/environment/fuels.html, as viewed on April 27, 2007 ibid Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York, http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/singrauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007 Anon, 2003, This is no fiction, mercury is rising, The Economic Times, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, September 21 Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York, http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/singrauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007 R C Srivastava, Guidance and Awareness Raising Materials under New UNEP Mercury Programs (Indian Scenario), Centre for Environment Pollution Monitoring and Mitigation, Lucknow, http://www.chem.unep.ch/mercury/2003-gov-sub/India-submission.pdf as viewed on April 27, 2007 ibid Polluted Places, A project of the Blacksmith Institute, New York, http://www.pollutedplaces.org/region/south_asia/india/singrauli.shtml as viewed on April 27, 2007 ibid
as viewed on April 15, 2007; V Shiva et al, Conflict over natural resources in India, Ecology and the Politics of Survival, United Nations University, Sage Publications, New Delhi, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80a03e/80A03E0m.htm, as viewed on April 15, 2007
Box: The official encroacher

Anon, 1999, WCL and SECL operating illegal mines in the state, Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, Bhopal, June 21
Box: Diamonds or the tiger?

Gar Smith, 2006, Save the tigers, The Edge, January 19, http://www.earthisland.org/project/newsPage2.cfm?newsID=784&pag eID=177&subSiteID=44, as viewed on April 25, 2007; P Devarajan, 2007, Development projects to dissect the Panna, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, January 24
Box: Daku tax

Deepak Tiwari, 2005, The great diamond loot, The Week, Malayala Manorama Publications, Kochi, March 16
Box: Nothing holy about this

Deepak Tiwari, 1999, Holy hitch, The Week, Malayala Manorama Publications, Kochi, February 21
THE NORTH-EAST
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 ibid, p 11-2 ibid, p 11-4 ibid, p 3-5 ibid, p 3-5 Anon, 1998, Stink in the northeast, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 18, February 15, pp 16-17 Uma Shankar, A greenscape goes black, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 2, No 24, May 15, pp 47-48 ibid, pp 47-48 Anon, 1998, Stink in the northeast, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 18, February 15, pp 16-17 ibid, pp 16-17 ibid, pp 16-17 H P D Borauh, 2006, Geochemical and Biochemical Properties of Coalmine Tailings of North Eastern Collieries of Assam, India, Regional Research Laboratory, Jorhat, July, http://crops.confex.com/crops/wc2006/ techprogram/P13641.HTM, as viewed on January 17, 2007 Gurdeep Singh, 1987, Mine water quality deterioration due to acid mine discharge, International Journal of Mine Water, Hungary, Vol 6, No1 ibid Pankaj Sekhsaria ed, 2006, MoEF opposes quarrying at Mikir Chang near Kaziranga, Protected Area Update, Kalpavriksh, Pune, Vol XII, No 2, April, http://www.wii.gov.in/envis/paupdates/60apr06.doc, as viewed on February 15, 2007 Dilpeet B Chhabra ed, 2007, Stone quarrying in KKL threatens wildlife, Jungle Express, WWF-India, New Delhi ibid Shiv Shankar Chatterjee, 1998, Living on the edge, Rashtriya Sahara, July 1
7.
8. 9.
10. 11. 12.
Box: Suppressed
Anon, 1995, MP govt formulates new mineral policy, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, February 2; and Sudhir K Singh, 2003, Narmada andolan to protest adivasi arrest, The Asian Age, Asian Age Holdings Ltd, New Delhi, September 29 13. 14. 15.
Box: Hand-in-glove
Umesh Singh, 2007, Jyotiraditya to stage dharna on mining issue, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, Bhopal, March 31, and Neeraj Mishra, 1996, Madhav National Park may fall prey to mining mafia, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, September 20
16. 17. 18.
Box: Amarkantak endangered

http://www.mp.gov.in/geologyandmining/SHAHDOL/shah_main.htm
348
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19. ibid 20. Richard Mahapatra et al, 2002, The second independence, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 11, No 7, August 31, p 28 21. ibid, p 28 22. http://www.wise-uranium.org/upin.html#KYLLENG, as viewed on January 28, 2007 23. ibid 24. ibid 25. ibid 26. ibid 27. ibid 28. ibid 29. ibid 30. ibid 31. ibid 32. ibid 33. ibid
12. 13. 14.
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Box: A rocky issue

Anon, 1996, The Fortnight, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi (Vol 4, No 18, February 15; Vol 4, No 22, April 15; Vol 4, No 23, April 30; and Vol 5, No 11, October 31)
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Box: Meghalayas lost treasure

Raymond R Kharmujai, 2005, Meghalayas lost treasure, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 2, June 15, p 20
Box: The story of three villages

Ratna Bharali Talukdar, 2005, Uncertain future lies ahead: Khumtong Hakum, Asomiya Protidin, Guwahati, December 8 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment)
26.
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ORISSA
Anon, 2006, Forests and biodiversity, State of Environment Report Orissa, government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar, p 122 2. Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, p 136 3. Based on analysis of data from anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 4. ibid 5. Prafulla Das, 2006, Orissa witnesses frenzied investment activity, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, New Delhi, July 24, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/07/24/stories/2006072402120300.htm, as viewed on April 22, 2007 6. R K Sharma, 2006, Indian mining industry, presentation by the Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, New Delhi 7. P Das, 2005, `Industrialisation will harm Orissas ecology greatly, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, June 7, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/06/07/stories/2005060702321700.htm, as viewed on April 20, 2007 8. ibid 9. Anon, 2001, Industrial Policy 2001, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, http://orissagov.nic.in/industries/IPR2001A.htm, as viewed on February 12, 2007 10. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 11. ibid, p 11-4 1.
29.
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Based on data collected from Indian Minerals Yearbooks 1997 to 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Envis Centre, Centre for Environmental Studies, http://www. cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17, 2007 http://www.cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17, 2007; anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2 http://www.cesorissa.org/economics.asp, as viewed on January 17, 2007 Publications of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur (this does not include data on land used for extracting minor minerals) A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa) ibid ibid ibid ibid ibid ibid Anon, 2004, Introduction, Human Development Report 2004, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 3 Calculated based on data on total geographical area collected from Orissa Forest, Orissa Forest Development Corporation, Bhubaneshwar, http://www.orissafdc.com/orissaforest_ofdc.php, as viewed on February 12, 2007; data on total area under mining collected from A Aruna Murthy, 2006, Status Paper on Mining Leases in Orissa, Vasundhara, Bhubaneshwar (based on information obtained under the RTI Act from the Directorate of Mines, Orissa) A. Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 ibid, p 57 Anon, 2005, Environmental clearance to industries in Orissa, Unstarred Question in Lok Sabha, Union ministry of environment and forests, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=18969, as viewed on November 10, 2006 Ranjan Panda, 2006, Impending Ecological Anarchy: Orissa will turn into a barren land!, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi, http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art100, as viewed on March 14, 2007 Anon, 2005, New Elephant Reserve Plans Hit Mining Roadblock, The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, October 4 Anon, 2005, Ruling of the Central Empowered Committee, Supreme Court of India, www.esgindia.org/moefsuno2005/Vedanta%20 Alumina% 20Orissa.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 Anon, 2006, Vedantas aluminium refinery project and bauxite mining project on Niyamgiri: Environmental and social costs vis-s-vis benefits to Orissa and its people, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/A%20note%20on%20Environ mental%20and%20Social%20Costs%20of%20Vedanta%20vis.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 Ranjan Panda, 2007, Thirsty mines, dispossessed communities, article written for the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi ibid Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, A nationalised nightmare, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 4, July 15, p 36 ibid, p 36
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Ranjan Panda, 2007, Thirsty mines, dispossessed communities, article written for the Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi ibid ibid ibid ibid ibid http://www.cpcb.nic.in/Water/Doc/Chapter4.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 Manish Tiwary et al, 2000, A nationalised nightmare, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 9, No 4, July 15, p 37 Anon, 2006, Mining, State of Environment Report-Orissa, government of Orissa, Bhubaneshwar, p 212 Anon, 2005, Prayer, answer to government apathy, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 25, http://www.hindu.com/ 2005/11/25/stories/ 2005112506050700.htm, as viewed on April 30, 2007 Anon, 2007, Lingaraj coal mine fire causes health problems, The Statesman News Service, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, January 17 Anon, 2007, MCL official held, Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, March 18, http://newindpress.com/ NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20070317223426&Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&T opic=0&aDate=3%2F18%2F2007, as viewed on April 30, 2007 Anon, 2007, Dust pollution from coal mine hits life, Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, March 8, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20070307234811& Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=3%2F8%2F2007, as viewed on April 30, 2007 Abhayaraj Naik et al, 2007, Green Tapism: A Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification 2006, Environment Support Group, Bangalore Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, p 136 Aman Sethi, 2007, Deep dent, Frontline, The Hindu Group, Chennai, Vol 24, Issue 10, June, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/ fl2410/ stories/20070601001804100.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Anon, 2004, Internal displacement is a global crisis affecting 52 countries. The facts..., Drishtikone, August-November, p 12, eficor.org/ publications/Internally_Displaced_People.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Anon, Alcant in India, A Solidarity Campaign with the Advisasis of Kashipur, South Asian Action Network, http://www.saanet.org/ alcant/context.htm#facts, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Kundan Kumar, 2006, Disposed and displaced: A brief paper on tribal issues in Orissa, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, h t t p : / / w w w. f re e w e b s . c o m / e p g o r i s s a / O r i s s a % 2 0 m i n i n g %20and%20industrialisation%20note.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 ibid Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, p 140 Richard Mahapatra, 2005, Theirs to mine? Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, p 28 ibid, p 28 ibid, p 28 D Sathapathy, 2006, Orissa pays the price for progress,
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Rediff News, January 10, http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/jan/ 10orissa.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007 J M Kujur, 2005, Development not for tribes, Mines and Communities, June 18, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/ Country/india17.htm, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Anon, 2006, Tribals blockade India Steel mill, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, January 10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/world/ south_asia/ 4599986.stm, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Anon, 2004, Introduction, Development Induced Displacement in India: Impact on Women, National Commission for Women, New Delhi, pp 2-3, http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/Development%20Induced%20Displace ment%20of%20Women.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Sanjay Khatua et al, 2006, Ecological debt: A case study from Orissa, India, Ecological Debt: The Peoples of the South are the Creditors, World Council of Churches, Geneva, p 150 Manipadma Jena, 2006, Orissa: Draft Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 2006, Economic and Political Weekly, A Sameeksha Trust Publication, Mumbai, February, pp 384-387, http://www.epw.org.in/epw/uploads/articles/1660.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007 Anon, 2006, Nalco appeals to peoples body to call off stir, Statesman News Service, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, February 15 F Dubois, 2004, Alcan in troubled water, Montreal Serai, Vol 17, No 2, http://www.montrealserai.com/2004_Volume_17/17_2/Article_ 5.htm, as viewed on April 12, 2007 http://angul.nic.in/industry.htm#COALFIELD, as viewed on April 12, 2007 Imran Khan, 2000, Dark side of coal mining, Business and Political Observer, October 4; anon, 2006, Talcher coalfield in troubled times, Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, October 19, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ2006101901 5959&Page=Q& Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=10%2F19%2F2006 as viewed on April 12, 2007; and Bijay Mishra, 2006, MCL, government incur Rs 115 Cr losses due to coal mine oustees stir, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, Vol 1, No 3, January-February, p 5, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Mining %20Update_Jan_Feb_2006.pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007 Anon, 2006, Posco India extends specialized medical assistance to the people of Orissa, Press Release by Posco India, Jagatsinghpur, July 2, http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/posco-india-extendsspecialized-medical-assistance.htm, as viewed on January 30, 2007 Anon, 2006, Locals to continue anti-Posco stir, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, Vol 1, No 3, January-February, p 3, http://www.free webs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Mining%20Update_ Jan_Feb_2006.pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007 Anon, 2006, Posco to buy more land to compensate farmers, Orissa Daily News, Bhubaneshwar, November 20 Anon, 2007, Arcelor Mittals Orissa steel plant runs into controversy, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, Vol 2, No 5, January, p 10, http://www. freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Draft%20January%202 007%20Mining%20Update[1][1].pdf, as viewed on April 12, 2007 Anon, 2005, Ruling of the Central Empowered Committee, Supreme Court of India, www.esgindia.org/moefsuno2005/Vedanta% 20Alumina% 20Orissa.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 Anon, 2005, SC committee says no to Vedanta/Sterlites Orissa refinery, Mines and Communities, September 24, 2005, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press747.htm, as viewed on April 17, 2007
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77. Anon, 2005, Ruling of the Central Empowered Committee, Supreme Court of India, www.esgindia.org/moefsuno2005/Vedanta% 20Alumina% 20Orissa.doc, as viewed on April 17, 2007 78. Sandeep Mishra, 2006, Vedantas Orissa project faces hurdle, Times News Network, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, August 4 79. Anon, 2005, Tribals protest against Vedanta, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, December 5 80. Marianne Barriaux, 2006, Tribal activists carry Indian mining protest to London, The Guardian, August 3 81. Peter Popham, 2006, Indian villagers pay a high price as commodity boom comes to rural Orissa, The Independent, August 6 82. Jackie Range, 2006, Vedanta harmed environment in India, Dow Jones Newswire, August 2 83. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No 733, Union ministry of environment and forests, July 12, http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp ?qref=1469, as viewed on February 17, 2007 84. N Patnaik, 1996, SAIL brass face suit over illegal mining, Economic Times, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, August 24 85. Sanjay Srivastav et al, 2006, Environment and social challenges of mineral based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 48
Impact on Women, National Commission for Women, New Delhi, pp 16-17, http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/Development%20Induced%20Displace ment%20of%20Women.pdf, as viewed on April 10, 2007
Box: Darlipali: raring to go

Ranjan Panda, 2006, Undermined, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, May 15, Vol 14, No 24, pp 35-40
Box: Poison river, chromite country

Anon, 2006, Envis Newsletter, Centre for Environmental Studies, Orissa, Vol 5, May-July; C S Dubey et al, 2001, Chromium VI in waters in parts of Sukinda chromite valley and health hazards, Orissa, India, Bull. Environ. Contam. Toxicol. (2001) 67:541548, New York; anon, 2004, Mining-related chromate water pollution in the Sukinda watershed (Orissa, India), Environment Process Division, BRGM, France
Box: Ill assessed

Anon, 2006, Studies on impact of proposed Lanjigarh bauxite mining on biodiversity including wildlife and its habitat, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun, http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/WII%20Report%20on%20Niyamgiri.pdf, as viewed on March 15, 2007; http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/%20New%20Folder/4.Rungta%20 iron& %20Bauxite%20in%20Koida.doc, as viewed on March 15, 2007; http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/-%20New%20Folder/11.%20public%20hearing%20for%20putullipani%20iron%20ore%20mines.doc, as viewed on March 15, 2007; and http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/%20New%20Folder/12.%20utkal%20d%20block%20coal%20mining%20a t%20Raijharan.doc, as viewed on March 15, 2007
Box: A failed attempt

P Ghosh, 2006, Federal express, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 14, No 16, January 15, p 16
Box: Bauxite bonanza

Analysed by the the Industry and Environment Unit of Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi Note: 1 Assuming per capita consumption of 55 litre as recommended by the Union ministry of rural development
Box: Subverting the Samata judgement

Kushal P Yadav, 2003, Breach of law, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 12, No 6, August 15
Box: Saving a hill

A B Mishra, 1987, Mining a hill and undermining a society the case of Gandhamardan, The Fight for Survival, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, pp 125-144
Box: Displaced AGAIN?

E-mail communication with Prasanna Behera, environmental activist working with Nature, Environment and Wildlife Society, Angul, Orissa and anon, 2007, People facing second displacement, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, Kolkata, January 15
Box: No place for elephants

Anon, 2005, New elephant reserve plans hit mining roadblock, The New Indian Express, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, October 4
Box: Peoples protest against UAIL Box: Orphaned

Anon, 2006, Life under threat as expended mines go without sand filling, Mining and Industrialisation Update-Orissa, Environment Protection Group, Orissa, Vol 2, No 2, October, p 22, http://www. freewebs.com/epgorissa/M%20I%20Update/Final%20Mining%20Update%20-%20October%5B1%5D.pdf, as viewed on April 2, 2007; and anon, 2006, HC notice on environmental threat to Talcher, Newindpress.com, Express Network Private Ltd, New Delhi, November 1, Cuttack, http://newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEQ20061101012604&Page=Q&Title=ORISSA&Topic=0&aDate=11%2F1%2F2006, as viewed on April 2, 2007 Richard Mahapatra, 2005, Theirs to mine?, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp 26-27; A Mishra, Orissa aluminum project breaking law to build, expand, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 13, November 30, pp 7-8
RAJASTHAN AND GUJARAT

1. 2. 3. Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, p 7 Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, Jaipur, March, p 42 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-73-11-74, 15-4, 21-3, 45-4, 52-7, 52-8 ibid, p 11-4 ibid, p 11-4 Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, Jaipur, March, p 47 Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 11-2
Box: Mines obliterating water sources

Braja Kishore Mishra, 2005, Khandadhar sacrificed at the mining altar, Samaja, Bhubaneshwar, October 23 (article written under CSEs Media Fellowship on Mining, People and Environment) 4. 5. 6. 7.
Box: Women struggle for water

Anon, 2004, Introduction, Development Induced Displacement in India:
351
8.
9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
32.
33. 34. 35. 36.
37. 38. 39. 40.
Data from http://www.indiastat.com/india/ShowDataSec.asp? secid=5956&ptid=19252, as viewed on March 24, 2007 and anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi Anon, 2006, Annexure 7, National Mineral Policy, Report of the Highlevel Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi; anon, 2006, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2006-07, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, November; and anon, 2005, State Finances A Study of Budgets of 2005-06, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, December Anon, 2006, National Mineral Policy, Report of the High-level Committee, Planning Commission, New Delhi Anon, 2005, Bulletin of Mining Leases & Prospecting Licences 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 23 ibid, pp 4, 18-20 ibid, p 3 ibid, pp 18-20 ibid, pp 18-20 Anon, 1998, Australian mining giants to undertake surveys in Rajasthan, The Financial Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, March 7 Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, p 43 ibid, p 43 ibid, p 43 ibid, p 43 Sunny Sebastian, 2006, Villagers up in arms against sand mine operators, The Hindu, The Hindu Group, Delhi, May 8 Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, Preface ibid, p 7 ibid, p 7 ibid, p 7 Anon, 2002, Rampant illegal mining in Rajasthan, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, February 19 Bahar Dutt, 2005, Organising the Unorganised, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, p 6 Anon, 1995, Mine safety rules flouted, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, June 29 ibid Deepak Malik, 2005, Silicosis a dusty tale in Rajasthan, India Together, Bangalore, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/aug/envlungdust.htm, as viewed on February 21, 2007 Indira Khurana, 1997, The killer mines, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12, November 15, pp 44-45 ibid, pp 44-45 Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 50 http://www.rajforest.nic.in/general_intro.htm, as viewed on March 28, 2007 A Behar et al, 2005, Parliament Digest: Bridging the Gap between Parliament and People, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, p 57 S Mishra, 1996, Mining on forest land continues despite ban, Business and Political Observer, Jaipur, February 25 ibid Anon, 2002, SC notice on Sariska mining, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, November 16 Sukhmani Singh, 2002, Mined over matter, The Indian Express, The
Indian Express Group, New Delhi, April 21 41. ibid 42. Sudhanshu Mishra, 1996, Mining on forest land continues despite ban, Business and Political Observer, Jaipur, December 25 43. Usha Rai, 1997, Renewal of mining in Rajasthan likely, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, January 16 44. Anil Sharma, 2003, Rajasthan stone industry in trouble, The Statesman, The Statesman Ltd, New Delhi, June 23 45. Anon, 2005, Court asks for report on illegal mining in Sariska, The Pioneer, Pioneer Syndication Services, New Delhi, May 6 46. Anon, 2006, Illegal mining threatening Rajasthan sanctuary, Sahara Samay, March 18 47. Indira Khurana, 1997, The killer mines, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12, November 15, pp 44-45 48. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, p 47 49. Indira Khurana, 1997, The killer mines, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 6, No 12, November 15, pp 44-45 50. ibid, pp 44-45 51. ibid, pp 44-45 52. http://stonesofindia.org/papers/18%20-%20Gainful%20 Utilization%20of%20Marble%20Wast%20%20Siddharth%20 Pareek.doc, as viewed on February 1, 2007 53. ibid 54. http://www.iricen.gov.in/, as viewed on February 1, 2007 55. Anon, 2003, Green marble, soapstone quarrying stopped, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, New Delhi, December 13 56. Anon, 2003, SC notice on illegal mining, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, New Delhi, January 24 57. Anon, 2003, On a track to disaster, The Hindustan Times, HT Media Ltd, New Delhi, July 27 58. Anon, 2004, HC order forces 20,000 mines in Rajasthan to suspend work, The Tribune, The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh, May 17 59. Rakesh Bhatnagar, 2004, HC warns Rajasthan for flouting pollution norms, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, November
Box: Unaccounted
1. Anon, 2007, Database, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, http://www.minelabour.org/Database.PDF, as viewed on March 26, 2007 P Madhavan et al, 2005, Budhpura: Ground Zero, Sandstone quarrying in India, India Committee of the Netherlands, The Netherlands, p 6
2.
Box: Unorganised: Jodhpurs sandstone mines

Rekha Wazir, 2001, Child Labour in Jodhpur District, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur
Box: Mining cooperatives the way ahead?

Anon, 2003, A Case Study of Mineworkers Cooperative at Sanfa, Barmer, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur, and conversations with Rana Sengupta of Mine Labour Protection Campaign, March 28, 2007
Box: All above the law

1. 2. 3. Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 42 ibid, p 50 Gopal Krishna, 2006, White asbestos, a health time bomb, India
352
REFERENCES
4. 5.
Together, Bangalore, April 12, http://www.indiatogether.org/ 2006/apr/ hlt-asbestos.htm, as viewed on March 28, 2007 Anon, 2007, State of Environment Report for Rajasthan: 2006, Rajasthan State Pollution Board, Jaipur, p 51 Anon, 2005, Supreme Court stays mining operations in Rajasthan, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, New Delhi, April 13
6. 7. 8.
Box: Playing with fire

Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World Health Organization, Geneva, p 2 2. Anon, 2006, Asbestos, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 15-7, 15-8 3. Anon, 2006, Chrysotile Asbestos Mining, Government of India, March 10, http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=16464&kwd, as viewed on May 2, 2007 4. Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World Health Organization, Geneva, p 1 5. ibid, p 1 6. Anon, 2006, Asbestos, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-7 7. ibid, p 15-1 8. ibid, pp 15-1 to 15-4 9. ibid, p 15-6 10. Telephone conversation with Dr Ahmad, May 7, 2007; and e-mail correspondence, May 7-8, 2007 11. Anon, 2006, Asbestos, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, p 15-7 12. ibid, p 15-8 13. Anon, 2006, Elimination of asbestos-related diseases, World Health Organization, Geneva, p 2 1.
9.
10. 11.
12.
13. 14. 15.
http://www.censusindia.net/results/B_series/advtbl_1.1_India_Pt _a.pdf, as viewed on May 30, 2007 Anon, 2006, Socio-economic Review 2005-06: Gujarat State, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining on ecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 20 V Thapar, 1997, Violating Indias national treasure, Seminar 485, Sanctuary Asia, Vol XVII, No 5, http://www.india-seminar.com/ 2000/485/485%20valmik%20thapar.htm, as viewed on April 2, 2007 Anon, 2000, SC bans mining near chinkara sanctuary, The Hindu Business Line, The Hindu Group, Chennai, February 22, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1708/17080650.htm, as viewed on April 2, 2007 Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining on ecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 20 V Thapar, 1997, Violating Indias national treasure, Seminar 485, Sanctuary Asia, Vol XVII, No 5, http://www.india-seminar.com/ 2000/485/ 485%20valmik%20thapar.htm, as viewed on April 2, 2007 Deep Joshi, 2000, Lignite quarry leaves tribals with no place to call home, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, July 25 Kaustubh A Moghe et al, 2003, Undermining India: Impacts of mining on ecologically sensitive areas, Kalpavriksh, Pune, p 21 Darshan Desai, 2005, Rampant mining eats into Saurashtra coast, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Ahmedabad, June 22 Anon, 2004, Villagers up in arms against mining project, The Times of India, Bennett Coleman & Co Ltd, Ahmedabad, September 10
5. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE

Box: A campaign dies
Analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi 1. Anon, 2006, Environmental and Social Challenges of Mineral-based Growth in Orissa: Building Partnership for Sustainable Development, The World Bank, New Delhi, p 50 Anon, 2005, Mining and Industrialisation Update: Orissa, Environmental Protection Group, Orissa, Vol 1, No 2, November-December, p 9 Anon, 2001, Forestry Statistics India 2001, Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education, Dehradun Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, Pricing forests: net present value assessed, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, June 30, Vol 15, No 3, p 19 and S K Datta et al, Study on NPV calculations for diversion of forest land for mining purposes, Federation of Indian Mining Industries, New Delhi Sonu Jain, 2005, SC defines green cost for projects built on forest land: cost per hectare will factor in trees, biodiversity, density, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, September 29,http://envirovaluation.org/index.php/2005/09/29/indian _express_www_indianexpress_com, as viewed on April 24, 2007 Based on information from Circular Nos 14 and 19 of 2003, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2006, Mining Information Kit for Aboriginal Communities, Government of Canada, p 78
Box: The changing hills

Kazimuddin Ahmed, 1999, Digging the earth, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, June 30, pp 20-21
2. 3. 4.
Box: The case of Chittorgarh

Ritu Gupta, 2005, A slur, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15, pp 50-51
Box: At risk
Palak Nandi, 2007, Mined, The Indian Express, The Indian Express Group, New Delhi, January 15 5.
Box: Mining in Gujarat

1. 2. Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur Anon, 2006, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, pp 11-40, 11-41; and Chandra Bhushan et al, 2005, Concrete Facts: Life Cycle of the Indian Cement Industry, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi Anon, 2005, Indian Minerals Yearbook 2005, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/resource.html#mineral, as viewed on March 17, 2007 Anon, 2001, Advanced Table 1.1, Part A: Main workers classified by age, industrial category and sex, Census of India 2001, New Delhi, 6. 7.
3. 4. 5.
Box: Pollution standards for mining

Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi and Directorate-General of Mines Safety, Dhanbad Note: 1Respirable asbestos fibre means any fibrous form of mineral silicates of chrysolite, actionolite, amosite, anthophyllite, crocidolite, tremolite or any admixure thereof with a length of greater than 5
353
micrometres and a diameter of less than 3 micrometres and a length-todiameter ratio greater than three-is-to-one.
8.
Box: Indian Bureau of Mines: ineffective?

Analysis based on data from Annual Reports, Union ministry of mines, New Delhi
Box: Off bounds?

Anon, 1994, Schedule 1, Environment Impact Assessment Notification, Union ministry of environment and forests, New Delhi, http://envfor.nic.in/, as viewed on October 20, 2007
Anon, Zortman-Landusky Gold Mine, Montana, Westerners for Responsible Mining, http://www.bettermines.org/zortman.cfm, as viewed on March 20, 2007 9. J Kuipers, 2003, Putting a Price on Pollution: Financial Assurance for Mine Reclamation and Closure, Mineral Policy Centre, Washington, MPC Issue Paper No 4, p 14, http://www.earthworksaction.org/ pubs/ PuttingAPriceOnPollution.pdf, as viewed on March 10, 2007 10. ibid, p 14
6. REHABILITATION: THE REGULATORY ROADBLOCKS

1. Anon, 2001, Report of the Steering Group on Rural Poverty Alleviation, Watershed Development, Decentralised Planning and Panchayati Raj Institutions, Planning Commission, New Delhi, planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/strgrp/stgp_rural.pdf, as viewed on May 25, 2007 2. Pradeep Baisakh, 2006, Move to amend tribal land law dangerous, India Together, December, http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/dec/ soc-pattalaw.htm, as viewed on May 25, 2007 3. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Washington, p 13 4. ibid, p 8 5. Anon, 2006, Gist of Communication sent by the NAC to the Government of India in regard to the National Rehabilitation Policy, National Advisory Council, New Delhi, http://nac.nic.in/communication/rehabilitation.html, as viewed on May 10, 2007 6. Nitin Sethi, 2006, Indias rehabilitation policy under a scanner yet again, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 3, June 30, p 7 7. Walter Fernandes et al, 1997, Hundred years of involuntary displacement, Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right to Livelihood, Indian Social Institute, Pune, p 17 8. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Washington, p 6 9. Michael M Cernea, 2004, Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement, UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing, p 14, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/ op/hydro_cernea_population_resettlement_backgroundpaper.pdf, as viewed on May 23, 2007 10. ibid, pp 31-34 11. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Washington, p 10 12. Anon, 1999, Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects: Principles and Guidelines, The Inter-America Development Bank, Washington DC, November, p 10 13. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and
Box: The Hoda report

Chandra Bhushan et al, 2007, Poor folks, rich land, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communication, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 23, April 30, pp 29-32
Box: Mine sharks (The Hoda report)

1. S Kirsch, 2002, Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of the Campaign against OK Tedi Mine, Critique of Anthropology, Sage Publication, London, p 176 Anon, 2004, Ruined land, poisoned water, Dirty Metals, Mining, Communities and the Environment, Earthworks, Oxfam America, Washington, p 7 S Kirsch, 2002, Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of the Campaign against OK Tedi Mine, Critique of Anthropology, Sage Publication, London, p 176 Buyat Bay, Indonesia, No Dirty Gold, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, http://www.nodirtygold.org/buyat_bay_ indonesia.cfm, as viewed on March 15, 2007 ibid Anon, 2006, Mine giant settles pollution case, British Broadcasting Corporation News, London, http%//news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/asia-pacific/4718672.stm, as viewed on March 15, 2007 Buyat Bay, Indonesia, No Dirty Gold, EarthWorks and Oxfam America, Washington, http://www.nodirtygold.org/buyat_bay_ indonesia.cfm, as viewed on March 15, 2007
2.
3.
4.
5. 6.
7.
Box: Escaping liability

1. K S Bergmann, 2004, Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: Closing the Loophole and Parting the Veil, School of Law, University of Maryland, p 5, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=fac_pubs, as viewed on March 11, 2007 J Kuipers, 2003, Putting a Price on Pollution: Financial Assurance for Mine Reclamation and Closure, Mineral Policy Centre, Washington, MPC Issue Paper No 4, p 27, http://www.earthworksaction.org/ pubs/ PuttingAPriceOnPollution.pdf, as viewed on March 10, 2007 ibid, p 12 K S Bergmann, 2004, Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: Closing the Loophole and Parting the Veil, School of Law, University of Maryland, p 3, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1079&context=fac_pubs, as viewed on March 11, 2007 M B Snell, 2006, Going for Broke, Sierra Club, San Francisco, http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200605/goingforbroke/page1.as p, as viewed on March 20, 2007 ibid Anon, 2004, Midnite Uranium Mine, Washington, Westerners for Responsible Mining, http://www.bettermines.org/midnite.cfm, as viewed on March 20, 2007
2.
3. 4.
5.
6. 7.
354
REFERENCES
Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Washington, p 10 14. Michael M Cernea, 2004, Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement, UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing, pp 38-39, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/hydro_cernea_population_resettlement_backgroundpaper. pdf, as viewed on May 23, 2007 15. Theodore E Downing, 2002, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Washington, p 11 16. ibid, p 13
Box: The question of compensation

Sebastian Morris, 2000, Chapter II, India Infrastructure Report 2001 Issues in Regulation and Market Structure, Oxford University Press, New Delhi and analysis by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
Box: Under-financing and R&R

M M Cernea, 2007, Financing for development: Benefit-sharing mechanisms in population resettlement, Economic and Political Weekly, Sameeksha Publications, Mumbai, March 24
Box: Whats in a policy?

Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, International Finance Corporation, The World Bank, http://www.ifc.org/ ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_P S5/$FILE/PS_5_LandAcqInvolResettlement.pdf, as viewed on May 28, 2007 and Involuntary Resettlement in IDB Projects: Principles and Guidelines, The Inter-American Development Bank, www.iadb.org/sds/doc/IndADeruytterePGIRPE.PDF, as viewed on May 25, 2007
Box: How useless is a wasteland?

Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, SEZ how?, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 12, November 15, p 25
Box: The struggle for land

Shailesh Kumar, 2007, UP farmers continue protest against land acquisition by Reliance, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 18, February 15, pp 20-21; Maureen Nandini Mitra, 2007, Testimonies from Nandigram, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 22, April 15, pp 13-14; and Padmaparna Ghosh, 2006, SEZ how?, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 15, No 12, November 15, p 22
Box: States and their R&R: the case of Orissa

Orissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy 2006, government of Orissa, Revenue Department, Bhubaneshwar, http://www.orissa.gov.in/revenue/R&RPOLICIES/Relief%20and%20Rehabilitation/R&R2006/r&R1.h tml, as viewed on May 12, 2007; Orissa R&R Policy, 2006: Key Features, government of Orissa, Revenue Department, Bhubaneshwar, http://www.orissa.gov.in/revenue/R&RPOLICIES/Relief%20and %20Rehabilitation/key%20features/key%20features.html, as viewed on May 10, 2007
Box: A colonial legacy

http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/L_0039.htm, as viewed on May 15, 2007
Box: The benefits of sharing

Sanjay Srivastav, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank, New Delhi
Box: Legalising the encroachers?

Anon, 2006, Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, Union ministry of law and justice, New Delhi, http://www.grain.org/brl_files/actTA06.pdf, as viewed on March 17, 2007
Box: Power to the communities

Anon, 2004, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Twenty-second session, p 5 and information compiled by the Industry and Environment Unit, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
Box: A landmark judgement

Richard Mahapatra, 2005, Theirs to mine, Down To Earth, Society for Environmental Communications, New Delhi, Vol 13, No 22, April 15
Box: The Papua New Guinea model

Sanjay Srivastav, 2006, Environmental and social challenges of mineral-based growth in Orissa: Building partnership for sustainable development, The World Bank, New Delhi, pp 84
355
This book would not have been possible without the invaluable inputs provided by the following:
Participants at the Media Briefing Workshop and First Anil Agarwal Dialogue on Mining, People and Environment, New Delhi, April 26-27, 2007
Achyut Das, director, Agragamee, Rayagada (Orissa) A K Sharma, scientist E (management and systems), Bureau of Indian Standards (New Delhi) Anil Kumar Sharma, chief engineer, Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Asha Krishnaswamy, assistant editor, Deccan Herald, Bangalore (Karnataka) Ashim Roy, general secretary, New Trade Union Initiative (New Delhi) Ashok Mahapatra, editor-in-chief, nakshatranews.com, Bhubaneswar (Orissa) B Babu Rao, former controller of mines, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur (Maharashtra) Biswajit Mohanty, secretary, Wildlife Society of Orissa, Cuttack (Orissa) Carin J Fischer, director, public policy and regulatory affairs, Partnership for Responsible Development (New Delhi) Dionne Bunsha, special correspondent, Frontline, Mumbai (Maharashtra) Gurdeep Singh, professor and head of department, Centre of Mining Environment, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad (Jharkhand) Himanshu Upadhyaya, Intercultural Resources (New Delhi) J N Kini, director (production and projects), Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd, Bangalore (Karnataka) Kanchi Kohli, Kalpavriksh (Delhi) K S Kashinath, general manager (CP&TS), Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd, Bangalore (Karnataka) Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, fellow, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra (Australia) Madhumita Dutta, Corporate Accountability Desk, The Other Media, Chennai (Tamil Nadu) Mahesh K Patil, general manager-environment, Sesa Goa Ltd, Panaji (Goa) Mahesh Langa, senior correspondent, The Indian Express, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) Manshi Asher, programme officer, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune (Maharashtra) M Bhagyalakshmi, director, Sakhi, Hospet (Karnataka) Meena Gupta, secretary, Union ministry of tribal affairs (New Delhi) Nicholas Barla, general secretary, Gangpur Adivasi Forum for Socio-cultural Awakening, Sundargarh (Orissa) Patrik Oskarsson, PhD researcher, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich (United Kingdom) Philip Neri DeSouza, Don Bosco Agro-Ed Complex, Quepem (Goa) Pradeep Kumar, special secretary, Union ministry of mines (New Delhi) Prafulla Samantara, president, Lok Shakti Abhiyan, Berhampur (Orissa) Prakash Joshi, deputy general manager, V S Dempo & Co Pvt Ltd, Panjim (Goa) Ramendra Gupta, chairperson and managing director, Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, Jaduguda (Jharkhand) Ramesh S Gauns, teacher and mining activist, Bicholim (Goa) Rana Sengupta, campaign manager, Mine Labour Protection Campaign, Jodhpur (Rajasthan) Ranjan Sahai, controller of mines, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur (Maharashtra) Ratnakar Gedam, joint advisor (minerals), Planning Commission, Government of India (New Delhi) Ravi Awasthi, chief reporter, Deshbandhu, Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh) Ravi Rebbapragada, chairperson, Mines, Minerals and People, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) R C Kataria, senior environmental engineer, Central Pollution Control Board (Delhi) R Sreedhar, convenor, Mines, Minerals and People (New Delhi) Sachin K Tendulkar, programme manager, Mineral Foundation of Goa, Panaji (Goa) Samit Carr, general secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Association of Jharkhand, Jamshedpur (Jharkhand) Sanjay Raj, president, SANCHARICA, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Sapan Bohidar, district correspondent, Samaj and PTI, Balangir (Orissa) Saurav Bora, sub-editor, The Assam Tribune, Guwahati (Assam) Shekhar Singh, director, Centre for Equity Studies (New Delhi) Shiv Kumar, special correspondent, The Tribune, Mumbai (Maharashtra) Shriprakash, filmmaker and member, Jharkhandi Organisation Against Radiation, Ranchi (Jharkhand) Shubhranshu Choudhury, freelance journalist, Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh) S K Aggarwal, director, Union ministry of environment and forests (New Delhi) S P Banerjee, former director-in-charge, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad (Jharkhand) S Ramakrishna, freelance journalist, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) Sushant Kunkolienkar, senior reporter, Daily Tarun Bharat, Margao (Goa) T V Singh, scientist E (mechanical engineering department), Bureau of Indian Standards (New Delhi) U K Ray, deputy director general, Geological Survey of India, Patna (Bihar) Vaibhav Sridhar, special correspondent, Nai Dunia, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Vasavi Kiro, editor, Sarjom Sakham, Ranchi (Jharkhand) Vibhash Kumar Jha, reporter, The Hindustan Times, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) Virendar Singh, member secretary, Rajasthan Pollution Control Board, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Y K Saxena, vice president-enviroment, health and safety, Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd (New Delhi) Yousuf Beg, secretary, Patthar Khadan Mazdoor Sangh, Panna (Madhya Pradesh)
CSE media fellows, Fifth CSE Media Fellowships on Mining, Environment and Peoples Protests, 2005
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We call Koera chora bhuian, the land of theft and the miners, doko, meaning dacoits. They come and take our forests, land, rivers and even our lives. They take away everything TRIBAL FROM KOERA, KEONJHAR DISTRICT, ORISSA
Mining and mineral industry operations are becoming increasingly environmentally conscious. Yet there are many conflicts that arise in all mineral development projects due to differing perceptions of the owners, investors, consumers and other stakeholders. While much remains to be accomplished to ensure compatibility between environment and mining, with the current arsenal of new technology tools available, clean mining is within the realms of possibility DECLARATION, 19TH WORLD MINING CONGRESS, 2003, NEW DELHI
The miner eventually leaves the land and can recreate or even improve upon the forest as it existed before commencement of operations HODA COMMITTEE REPORT, PLANNING COMMISSION, 2006, NEW DELHI
My ministry has recently assessed the status of compliance of environmental safeguards stipulated for various mining projects. I regret to tell that the status of compliance is poor, to say the least. If perceptible improvement in performance on environmental matters is not to be seen, the government will be constrained to take a hard view T R BAALU, FORMER MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS, SPEAKING AT THE 34TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE FEDERATION OF INDIAN MINERAL INDUSTRIES, 2000, NEW DELHI
Miners will never create jobs for the tribal people. Compensation money will finish in two years, and after that, well be left with nothing BAHA KISKO, COMMUNITY LEADER, PACHWARA, PAKUR DISTRICT, JHARKHAND
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CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT

State of India's Environment, A Citizens Report: Rich Lands Poor People, Is 'Sustainable' Mining Possible?

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State of Indias

TO THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST EVERYTHING TO MINING

Anil Agarwal Founder Director, CSE

RICH LANDS POOR PEOPLE

IS SUSTAINABLE MINING POSSIBLE?

CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT

2008 Centre for Science and Environment

Printed at Excellent Printing House, New Delhi

CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 7

Abbreviations ......................................................................................327 References ............................................................................................330

Rich lands, poor people

Rich lands, poor people

THE RESERVES AND THEIR SPREAD

STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING

GRAPH 1: Distribution of coal reserves

GRAPH 2: Distribution of iron ore reserves

Others 1% Andhra Pradesh 7% Orissa 17%

Jharkhand 14% Chhattisgarh 16%

Source: http://www.coal.nic.in/, as viewed on November 8, 2006

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

GRAPH 3: Distribution of bauxite reserves

GRAPH 4: Distribution of manganese reserves

Orissa 35% Madhya Pradesh 10% Orissa 51%

GRAPH 5: Distribution of lead and zinc reserves

STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING

GRAPH 6: Distribution of chromite reserves

GRAPH 7: Distribution of limestone reserves

GRAPH 8: Distribution of diamond reserves

Madhya Pradesh 3% Gujarat 12%

Himachal Pradesh 3% Karnataka 29% Chhattisgarh 28%

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

MINING, FORESTS AND TRIBALS

AGNIMIRH BASU / CSE

STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING

MAP 1.1: India forests vs minerals

JAMMU & KASHMIR

ARUNACHAL PRADESH SIKKIM

JHARKHAND GUJARAT MADHYA PRADESH WEST BENGAL

CHHATTISGARH BAY OF BENGAL

DAMAN DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI

Very dense forest Moderate forest Open forest Scrub

Asbestos Barytes Diamond Dolomite Graphite Gypsum

Kaolin Kyanite Limestone Mica Sillimanite Silica sand

Manganese Zinc Coal/lignite Petrolum and natural gas Uranium

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

Two presidents, two Indias

STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING

RIVERS AND MINERALS: CLOSE BONDS

PHILIP NERI DESOUZA

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

MAP 1.2: Mined rivers

JAMMU & KASHMIR

PUNJAB UTTARAKHAND HARYANA DELHI SIKKIM RAJASTHAN UTTAR PRADESH

ASSAM BIHAR MEGHALAYA

MANIPUR JHARKHAND GUJARAT MADHYA PRADESH WEST BENGAL TRIPURA MIZORAM

DAMAN & DIU DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI

ORISSA BAY OF BENGAL

STATE OF INDIAS ENVIRONMENT: MINING

SUNITA NARAIN / CSE

RICH LANDS, POOR PEOPLE

MAP 1.3: The Mahanadi river basin

River State boundary

Bilaspur Andhiyarkore CHHATTISGARH Simga