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UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS Faculty of Civil Law

JURISPRUDENCE ON ADMININSTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

SUBMITTED BY: BONTUYAN, Diwa Rafael DE GUZMAN, Aljon DE LEON, Girlie Venus DELOSO, Omar HIZON, Kenneth James Carlo HIZON, King James Carlo MALANG, William Russel MARANAN, Maica Maris MATIBAG, Marc Justin Basil MEDINA, Eilyn PULLANTE, Irish Rosanne SILVA, Juan Karlo (2A Faculty of Civil Law) SUBMITTED TO: Atty. Enrique Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW A. General Principles B. Quasi-Legislative Powers C. Quasi-Judicial Powers D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies E. Judicial Review LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS A. Public Office B. Eligibility, Qualifications & Disqualifications C. De Facto Officers D. Commencement of Official Relations (Appointments/Elections) E. Next-in-Rank Rule F. Transfer G. Reinstatement H. Detail I. Reassignment J. Prohibitions K. Midnight Appointments L. Liability of Public Officers M. Tenure and Term of Office N. Resignation O. Disciplinary Action and Preventive Suspension P. Recall ELECTION LAWS A. General Principles B. Party-List C. Absentee Voting D. Certificate of Candidacy E. Pre-Election Remedies F. Election Propaganda G. Appreciation of Ballots H. Canvassing I. Pre-Proclamation Controversy J. Post-Election Remedies K. Failure of Election L. Execution Pending Appeal

II.

III.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 2 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

M. Election Offenses

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 3 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW1 I. General Principles EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, et al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, et al. G.R. No. 164171, 20 February 2006, EN BANC (Ynares-Santiago, J.) The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA), through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued Executive Order No. 156 (E.O. 156) providing for the prohibition regarding the importation into the Philippines, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles. Respondent Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., et al. who are members of the Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles filed this action to seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Sec. 3.1., Art. 2 of E.O. 156. Allegedly, E.O. 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 156 is unconstitutional HELD: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:
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Case digest format : UST Law Review Style Guide

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 4 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable. E.O. 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and statutory bases. Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed, and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation. E.O. 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid. R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7227 specifically states that the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and Freeport Zone as "a separate customs territory The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention. This delineates the activities that would have the least of government intervention, and the running of the affairs of the special economic zone would be run principally by the investors themselves, similar to a housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their representatives to run the affairs of the subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines. The Court held that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp. As held in United BF Homeowners Association v. BF Homes, Inc.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 5 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable. LUPO LUPANGCO, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION G.R. No. L-77372, 29 April 1988, FIRST DIVISION (Gancayco, J.) It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare for the examination. Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 10 which orders that no examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Additionally, any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners Lupangco, et al., all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) this complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the said resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. The RTC declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 6 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

enforcement of Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are coequal bodies. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over resolutions of the PRC 2. Whether or not PRC can lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, etc. three (3) days before the date of examination HELD: 1. Petition GRANTED. 2. Petition DENIED. RTC has jurisdiction over the questioned PRC resolutions There is no specific provision in Presidential Decree No. 223 (the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission), that provides that the orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. The case, note-worthily, was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution PRC is within the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. It is well settled in-our jurisdiction that the acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Regional Trial Court. The PRC cannot prohibit the examiners The Court believes that the resolution is unreasonable. The resolution provides that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare for the examination. The purpose of the resolution is praise-worthy, however, Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. By all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 7 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

BIAK-NA-BATO MINING CO. v. HON. ARTURO R. TANCO (Sec. of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources) G.R. Nos. 34267-68, 25 January 1991, SECOND DIVISION (PARAS, J.) As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities Jose Moldero, Saturnino Moldero, Miguel Moldero and Manuel Dirige, appeared to have located 170 mining claims in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains. The land covered by the mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. The said 170 mining claims were divided into four (4) groups: 1. NAGASAT Group with 42 claims; 2. MUGAO Group with 40 claims 3. LUCKY STRIKE Group with 40 claims; and 4. BUMABAG Group with 48 claims Several transactions were executed by Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines Association and Mountain Mines, Inc. In said transactions the two corporations acquired the different mining claims belonging to the four groups, NAGASAT, MUGAO, LUCKY STRIKE and BUMABAG. Meanwhile, BalatocLubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. engaged the services of Mining Engineers to explore and develop the mining area; for its pre-war exploration and development. After the war, Balatoc Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. reconstituted their corporate records before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The reconstitution proceedings filed by Balatoc Lubuagan Mines, Inc. over 42 lode claims known as Nagasat Group and 40 lode claims known as Mugao Mining Group. The Bureau of Mines after due hearing and notice issued the corresponding orders of reconstitution and 88 mining claims of Mountain Mines, Inc. and 82 mining claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. claim maps, lists of mining claims, option agreement, deeds of sale, power of attorney and other documents were reconstituted. Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Canao and Salvador Ellone located several claims covering a wide area of vacant, unoccupied and unclaimed land of the public mineral lands. The land covering the mining claims is adjacent to the patentable mining properties of the Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in accordance with law. The abovenamed locators each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferring and conveying to the petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid declarations of location. Subsequently, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims. However, it received a notice of the letter of the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey because the areas
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 8 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

covered by the mining claims were allegedly in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain mines, Inc. Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines questioning the reconstitution proceedings and claiming that the two (2) deeds of sale over the 88 lode claims in favor of Mountain Mines, Inc. and the other two (2) deeds of sale over 52 lode claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. were fake, fictitious or manufactured. The Director of Mines promulgated a decision against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company. Allegedly, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines. . ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Director of Mines should be accorded with respect and finality HELD: Petition GRANTED. As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in this case at bar. There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. EURO-MED LABORATORIES PHIL. v. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS (represented by its Governor, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS) G.R. No. 148106, 17, July 2006, SECOND DIVISION (CORONA, J.) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may The Province of Batangas through its various authorized representatives of the government hospitals, purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from Euro-Med Laboratories. The province has an unpaid balance of P487,662.80. The purchases were evidenced by invoices duly received and signed by defendants authorized representatives, upon delivery of the merchandise listed in said invoices. Under the terms and conditions of the aforesaid invoices, the Province of Batangas agreed and
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 9 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

covenanted to pay Euro-Med, without need of demand, its obligations in the above-enumerated invoices on various terms indicated therein. Euro-Med made several demands for the province to pay its accountabilities, including setting up several dialogues with the provinces representatives, but these proved fruitless. Despite repeated demands, the province has failed and still fails to comply therewith. A complaint was consequently filed by Euro-Med. On the other hand, the province alleged that some payments it had already made. Province of Batangas moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioners money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA). The RTC dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Audit has primary jurisdiction to the case HELD: Petition GRANTED. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioners collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs jurisdiction. Euro-Meds money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of respondents public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management and their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioners claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. Hence, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioners complaint. LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. Nos. 192935, 07 December 2010, EN BANC, (Mendoza, J.) The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique employees faithfully comply with the law. Dela Cruz 10 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, Equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws MEDINA, to all PULLANTE, SILVA persons or things without distinction. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

On July 30, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All PTC can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions Barely a month after the issuance of E.O. No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers 2. Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause HELD: 1. Petition DENIED. 2. Petition GRANTED. E.O. No.1 does not violate the Principle of Separation of Powers The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. There is a violation of the Principle of Equal Protection of Law
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 11 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. However, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. Applying these precepts to this case, E.O. No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. The Court is not convinced that although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations since it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006, EN BANC (Carpio, J.) When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality Based on the is Outline of Casesas of Atty. Enrique does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality organized a stock or Dela Cruz 12 non-stock corporation, it remains a DELOSO, government instrumentality exercising not only governmental BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, but alsoSILVA corporate powers. MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government, thus, its properties which are owned by the Republic are exempt from Real Estate tax.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 ("MIAA Charter"). The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with the City of Paraaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due. The City Treasurer issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings in the event MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA said that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service, the ownership of these properties remains with the State and that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate tax. ISSUE: Whether or not MIAAs airport lands and buildings are exempt from real estate tax HELD: Petition GRANTED. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Moreover, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or controlled (GOCC) corporation as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. Thus, MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in the law
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 13 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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empowering local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Accordingly, the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CITY TREASURER and CITY ASSESSOR of the CITY OFMANILA G.R. No. 186242, 23 December 2001, THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.) GSIS is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government. GSIS capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS, has no members to speak of. The subject properties under GSISs name are owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) owns 2 parcels of land (Katigbak property & Concepcion-Arroceros property). Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease. The City Treasurer of Manila sent a letter to GSIS President informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002. GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining and injunctive relief before the Manila RTC. Accordingly, the Katigbak property is in the name of GSIS but it has been leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) which has been paying any realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property. On the other hand, the Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS and the MeTC of Manila. Thus, the GSIS should not be ordered to pay the said tax delinquencies The RTC dismissed GSIS petition. ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes HELD: Petition GRANTED. Based on Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and RA 8291 ( GSIS Act of 1997), GSIS is exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty tax. However, under the LGC of 1991 or RA 7160, there is a withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of the LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes. However, the subject properties under GSISs name are owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system. This particular property arrangement is
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 14 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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clearly shown by the fact that the disposal or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through the authority of the President of the Philippines. It is worth-mentioning that the Concepcion-Arroceros property, was transferred, conveyed, and ceded to this Court. This fact only illustrates the nature of the government ownership of the subject GSIS properties. GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch. IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTION IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. MARCIAL MAGSINO, et al. A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, 14 December 2010, EN BANC (Corona, C.J.) The rotation rule must be strictly implemented as it will determine the order in which each chapter will be representing a region, although it might also be waived by the chapter next in rotation by not nominating a candidate for Governor during the election. The rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. However, it is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor While the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Feliciano Bautista (Pres. Bautista) was in Zamboanga, then Executive Vice President, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Atty. Vinluan) and his group called for a special meeting of the Board of Governors two days before the scheduled election of the regional Governors. In the election held in the Greater Manila Region, Atty. Manuel Maramba (Atty. Maramba) won the election presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila Region Governor Marcial Magsino (Gov. Magsino). However, his opponent, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Atty. Soriano) did not accept the results, but instead filed an election protest claiming that the election was void since there were non-delegates of the Quezon City Chapter who were allowed to vote. The Group of Atty. Vinluan granted the protest and declared Atty. Soriano as the Governor of the Greater Manila Region. This was questioned before the Court. With regard to the election in the Western Visayas Region, it was Atty. Erwin Fortunato (Atty. Fortunato) who obtained the highest number of votes. It was also clear that it was the turn of the Romblon Chapter, to which Atty. Fortunato belongs, to represent the Western Visayas Region based on the rotation rule. However, his opponents, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Benjamin Ortega (Atty. Ortega) claim that the rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not mandatory but only directory. In the Western Mindanao Region, the electoral contest between Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic (Atty. Marohomsalic) and Atty. Benjamin Lanto (Atty. Lanto) showed that it was Atty. Marohomsalic who obtained greater number of votes. However, Atty. Lanto questioned the validity of the nomination of Atty. Marohomsalic and claimed that it was only his nomination which is valid. Without conducting any proceeding, the group of Atty. Vinluan proclaimed Atty. Lanto as having been duly elected on the ground that the nomination of the Atty. Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur Chapter. Atty. Marohomsalic brought the matter to the Court.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 15 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Aside from the determination of the winners during the election in the different Regions, it was also claimed that Atty. Vinluans group disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP by deciding on issues without authority and therefore should be appropriately sanctioned. In resolving the issues, the Court formed a Special Committee (Committee) tasked to investigate the case and to come up with its recommendations. The Committee found out that it was Atty. Maramba who should be declared as the representative of the Greater Manila Region and Atty. Fortunato for the Western Visayas Region. On the other hand, it recommended a special election for the Western Mindanao Region. It also found that the acts of Atty. Vinluans group caused disunity and disagreements in IBP and defied the lawful authority of Pres. Bautista. ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Maramba is the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term Whether or not Atty. Fortunato is the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term Whether or not there is a need for a special election in the Western Mindanao Region Whether or not the acts of Atty. Vinluans group constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned HELD: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers composed of nine (9) officers, namely: the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall be elected by the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Saturday of February, and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from the first day of April following their election and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. Atty. Maramba is the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region During the election duly presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila Region Gov. Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates compared to Atty. Soriano, 13 votes to 12 votes. The argument that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken. The Committee considered the situation then involving the Quezon City Chapter (QC Chapter) as not a proper case for the election of additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates as the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapters delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election. Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court subscribes to, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by Atty. Vinluan was a nullity on three grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano already lost the election. Second, the special election conducted by the Vinluan Group was illegal because it was not called nor presided by the regional
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 16 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Governor (Atty. Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his election as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be strictly implemented. Atty. Fortunato is the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region The election of Atty. Fortunato was upheld since he obtained the highest number of votes among the three candidates for the position and also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors. On account thereof, the Court is convinced that the contentions of Attys. Aldon and Ortega cannot prosper. After all, the Court already upheld per its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. More so, when the concerned chapter invoked its right thereto as in the case of Atty. Fortunato who came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in the rotation. Atty. Fortunato did not only come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the said position, but also got the highest number of votes among the candidates that included Attys. Aldon and Ortega. As the election was presided over by then outgoing Governor Raymund Mercado, the Court finds no cogent reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee insofar as upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned. There is no need for a special election in the Western Mindanao Region In the regular election, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the 2009-2011 term. In its Report, the Committee declared that the nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region, thereby sustaining the position of Atty. Marohomsalic and, in effect, the validity of his nomination by Atty. Macalawi. While the Committee points out that six chapters in the region are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during the election. Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of rotation. By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. The rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 17 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The acts of Atty. Vinluans group constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned The Committee declared that the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Vinluans group which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future. It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that (a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that (a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In the case at bar, such canons find application. In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that (t)he actuations of Atty. Vinluans group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluans overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule. Indeed, said actuations of Atty. Vinluan and his group were grossly inimical to the interest of the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as lawyers. They all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust bestowed on them for the high positions that they previously held. While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their positions in the IBP, this can no longer be done as their terms as Governors already expired, especially on the part of Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan, as former EVP of the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the presidency for the term 2009-2011 but now should not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President. Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run as national officers to prevent such similar irregularity from happening again.

II.

Quasi-Legislative Powers CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District of Cotabato), et al. v. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS (Executive Secretary), et al. G.R. No. 96754, 22 June 1995, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 18 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the Republic Act 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) was passed by the legislature which calls for a plebiscite to be held in the various provinces in Mindanao. Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region in the plebiscite. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Collectively, these provinces make-up the so-called Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429, for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao for the provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region. Chiongbian, et al., representatives, alleged that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because:
(1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and; (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. Also, according to them, the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. 5435 is unconstitutional HELD: Petition DENIED. The purpose of R.A. No. 5435 is to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it. Looking back in our countrys history, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City. Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 19 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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The Court further held that While non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. In such case, There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. LORENZO M. TAADA, et al. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, Executive Assistant, et al. G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, EN BANC (Escolin, J.) The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all. Lorenzo Taada, et al. question some presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders which took effect without being published in the Official Gazette or in newspaper of general circulation. They, accordingly, invoke the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern . Taada, et al. also adds that based on the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, they seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is mandatory HELD: Petition GRANTED. Tuvera, et al. contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The Court has ruled in a long line of its decisions that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 20 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. SMART TELECOMMINICATIONS v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003, FIRST DIVISION (Ynarez-Santiago, J.) The rule under our jurisdiction is only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its The National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-62000. The circular provides among others that the Public Telecommunication Entities (PTEs) must: (1) provide a grace period for subscribers when their billing statements are not received within the 30 day period of each billing cycle and during said grace period they are prohibited from disconnecting their service, (2) not charge for calls diverted to voice mailbox or similar facility, (3) verify the identification and address of each purchaser of a prepaid SIM card which will be valid for 2 years, (4) update subscribers of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call and (5) reduce the unit of billing from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The NTC also issued other circulars: 5.) directing cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators and SIM card dealers to strictly comply with the requirement of presentation and verification of identity and address of prepaid SIM card costumers, 6.) ordering to deny acceptance to customers using stolen units, share information on stolen cellphone units with other networks and require existing prepaid costumers to register.. Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (Piltel) filed against NTC, et al. an action for declaration of nullity of the Memorandum Circulars with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Allegedly, the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 21 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications (Smart), Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies shall apply HELD: Petition DENIED. The rule under our jurisdiction is only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or adjudicatory function. It is well-settled that if what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116356, June 29, 1998, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J.) Following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Laws, because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint for sum of money against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (Eastern). The case was about two (2) years of unpaid pilotage fees. Eastern Shipping Lines disputed the claims against them. They dispute the the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1088 (EO 1088). Moreover, allegedly, the case falls within the purview of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Briefly, Eastern argues for the application of the PPA Circular instead of being guided by EO 1088 because the pilotage fees prescribed under the former is lower than that by the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO 1088 should prevail over the circulars issued by the PPA in case of conflict HELD:
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 22 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Petition GRANTED. Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. TORRES G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992, EN BANC (Grio-Aquino, J.) The questioned circulars are shown to be a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) is engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers. Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres (Torres) issued Department Order No. 16 suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers (DH) going to Hong Kong. Moreover, the order states that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. Consequently, POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30 providing for guidelines for the processing and deployment of DHs to Hong Kong; Memorandum Circular No. 37 for the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition praying that the Court will annul the DOLE and POEA circulars. Allegedly, the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive ISSUE: Whether or not the circulars are unconstitutional HELD: Petition DENIED. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by the growing complexity of the modern society. More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 23 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" The questioned circulars are shown to be a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

RENATO C. CORONA (in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs), et al. v. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION G.R. No. 111953, 12 December 1997, EN BANC (Romer, J.) The license of the pilots is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. However, the rule is where the rule is procedural, or merely legal opinions, or even The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 which provides for rules governing pilot conduct and pilotage fees and services. PPA-AO-03-85 requires pilots to acquire licenses and to train for seven (7) months in two (2) ports as probationary pilots. After such, they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness. Later on, PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued which limited all appointments to harbour pilot positions to a term of one (1) year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority. United Harbor Pilots Associaton and the Manila Pilots Association through Capt. Alberto C. Compas (Compas) questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 in the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. The Office of the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona opined that the exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation or interference of property rights without due process. Moreover, according to Corona, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area. ISSUE:
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 24 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Whether or not the circulars are unconstitutional HELD: Petition GRANTED. PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

United Harbor Pilots Association questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to the SC. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with establishment standards." A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 0492 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119761, 29 August 1996, FIRST DIVISION (Vitug, J.) When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has Dela Cruz prescribed. 25 already But, when the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, that can SILVA facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to PULLANTE, or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, manifested it will classify Champion, Hope and More cigarette brands manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune) as foreign brands. According to the World Tobacco Directory, the same are listed as foreign companies. However, subsequent to this action, Fortune changed the name of Hope to Hope Luxury and More to Premium More effectively removing them from the foreign brand category. Republic Act 7654 was enacted amending provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Accordingly:
Sec. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes. - xxx (c) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below based on the constructive manufacturer's wholesale price or the actual manufacturer's wholesale price, whichever is higher: (1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the exportation of which is not authorized by contract or otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack. (2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent (45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93) which reclassifies cigarettes. Thus, More, Hope, and Champion are classified as locally manufactured bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Subsequently, the Commission of Internal Revenue assessed Fortune Tobacco for an ad valorem tax deficiency of P9,598,334.00. Fortune appealed. However, the Court of Tax Appeals upheld the position of Fortune and adjudged that the reclassification of Champion, Hope and More were defective given that they were not currently classified and taxed at 55% pursuant to Section 1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654. Hence, the deficiency ad valorem tax assessment issued on Fortune was cancelled for lack of legal basis. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not notice and hearing are necessary before RMC 37-93 can be enacted 2. Whether or not RMC 37-93 should be published before it takes effect HELD: Petition GRANTED. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 26 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

prescribed. But, when the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. The SC found that RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed as simply a corrective measure. The BIR did not simply interpret the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

JOSE D. LINA, Jr. v. ISIDRO D. CARINO (Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports) G.R. No. 100127, 23 April 1993, EN BANC (Feliciano, J.) After careful examination of the provisions of both P.D. No. 451 and BP. Blg. 232, the Court considers that the legal authority of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of tuition and other school fees, and to issue guidelines for the imposition and collection thereof, like DECS Order No. 30, must be sustained. Sec. Isidro D. Cario, Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports (DECS), issued DECS Order No. 30 entitled "Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges and Universities for School Year 1991-1992." The order allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to the guidelines there set out. Lina denies the legal authority of Sec. Cario to issue DECS Order No. 30. It is his contention that respondent Secretary at the time of issuing DECS Order No. 30, no longer possessed legal authority to do so, considering that authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the imposition of school fees had been transferred to the State Assistance Council ("SAC") by Republic Act No. 6728. Lina also contends that DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728. In DECS Order No. 30 (Section 1 [d], supra), respondent Secretary exempted increases in school fees other than tuition fee (or "other school fees" as distinguished from "tuition fee") from application of the consultation requirement. ISSUE: Whether or not DECS Secretary has the legal authority to issue DECS Order No.30 HELD: Petition GRANTED. As early as 1917, the power to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions and to revoke such permits for cause was granted to the then Secretary of Public Instruction by Act No. 2706 as amended. Republic Act No. 6139, provided for the regulation of tuition and other fees charged by private schools in order to discourage the collection of exorbitant and unreasonable fees.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 27 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

After careful examination of the provisions of both P.D. No. 451 and BP. Blg. 232, the Court considers that the legal authority of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of tuition and other school fees, and to issue guidelines for the imposition and collection thereof, like DECS Order No. 30, must be sustained. An examination of the precise language of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 shows that there is really nothing in Section 42 which must be read as eliminating the power of the DECS Secretary in respect of the fixing of maximum tuition and other school fees vested in him by P.D. No. 451. Under Section 42, a private school may determine for itself in the first instance the rate of tuition and other school fees or charges that it deems appropriate. Such determination by the private school is not, however, binding and conclusive as against the secretary of Education, Culture and Sports. The rates and charges adopted by such private school "shall be collectible, and their application or use authorized" provided that such rates and charges are in accord with rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO (President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.) v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, (Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)), et al. G.R. No. 163980, 3 August 2006, EN BANC (Tinga, J.) A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The Court has been consistent that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the National Government Center (NGC). They filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003 claiming that it was contrary to the provisions of the law which it seeks to implement. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. ISSUE: Whether or not the IRR issued by the National Government Center Administration Committee is invalid HELD: Petition DENIED.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 28 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasijudicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The Court has been consistent that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. In a number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al. G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, EN BANC (Puno, J.) Administrative Order No. 308 is unconstitutional. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 29 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Blas Ople files this petition praying to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 (Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System). According to Ople, the order must be held unconstitutional for 2 reasons: 1. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and 2. It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is unconstitutional HELD: Petition GRANTED. Administrative Order No. 308 is unconstitutional. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. What is more is that Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 30 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al. v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL of the National Economic Development Authority, et al. G.R. No. 167798, 19 April 2006, En Banc (Carpio, J.) Under his constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 (E.O. 420), requiring all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. The law seeks to consolidate the existing identification systems of different government agencies into one multipurpose I.D. thereby reducing inconvenience to the public in their transactions with the government. The proposed uniform I.D. requires the following specific data: (1) name; (2) home address; (3) sex; (4) picture; (5) signature; (6) date of birth; (7) place of birth; (8) marital status; (9) name of parents; (10) height; (11) weight; (12) two index fingerprints and two thumbmarks; (13) any prominent feature, like a mole; and (14) Tax Identification Number (TIN). Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 420 on the grounds that it is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President and it infringes on the citizens right to privacy. ISSUE:
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 31 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Whether or not E.O. 420 is unconstitutional HELD: Petition DENIED. E.O. 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department and also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. This is also known as the faithful execution clause. It must be noted that E.O. 420 applies only to government entities. These entities are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs in order to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways: 1. the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power. 2. the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, this is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. After a perusal of the order, E.O. 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. Sec. 17, Art. VII also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under E.O. 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing E.O. 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing E.O. 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal anylaw but merely implemented and executed existing laws. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system: (1) when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose; (2) when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not; and (3) when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. E.O. 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by it have the proper appropriation or funding. E.O. 420 is not compulsory on all
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 32 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. E.O. 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that E.O. 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE), et al. G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008, EN BANC (Corona, J.) Employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. However, in exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed to the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution. Legislative Veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress, which by itself or R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund and submit an annual report to Congress. The law was questioned by ABAKADA GURO contending that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. They also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9335 providing incentives to officials and employees of BIR and BOC and providing for a Congressional Oversight Committee is unconstitutional HELD: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. The provision creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL while the remaining provisions are UPHELD. Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 33 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into bounty hunters and mercenaries is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of bounty hunting or mercenary activity or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. This Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment beyond the legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. (1)It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. (2)And, when it exercises its
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 34 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. It is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a right or power to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed to the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

HON. SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ (Department of Energy) v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 159149, 26 June 2006, THIRD DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.) For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. The rule cannot amend, modify, or expand, the provisions of the law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. In 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the Department Of Energy to implement B.P. Blg. 33. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (LPG Refillers) asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit. LPG Refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court. Subsequently, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law. The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law. The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 35 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Circular is null and void HELD: Petition DENIED. For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. The Circular lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. As for the second requirement, the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law. Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.

III.

Judicial Powers

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., et al. G.R. No. 83578, 16 March 1989, EN BANC (Sarmiento, J.)
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 36 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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A quasi-judicial body has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making. If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (PADS Task Force), headed by State Prosecutor Jose Rosales issued 6 search warrants against Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. et al (Karamfil). Karamfil filed a petition before the RTC to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants. The RTC issued a TRO and then set the case for a hearing. Subsequently, the RTC favored Karamfil. The Court of Appeals (CA), at first, favored PADS. However, upon motion by Karamfil, the decision was reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not PAD is a quasi-judicial body (co-equal with the rank and standing of the RTC) HELD: Petition DENIED. In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No. 1883." A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest , like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the PADs organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 37 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. The undertaking of PAD is to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

FERDINAND T. SANTOS, et al. v. WILSON GO G.R. No. 156081, 19 October 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.) Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. Respondent Wilson Go (Go) offered to buy a lot for P4,304,000. Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement. In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPIs application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPIs hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the RPC against petitioners as officers of FEPI. The complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to Sell categorically stated that FEPI was the owner of the property. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa. The DOJ reversed the decision. Ferdinand Santos, et al. moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from the resolution of the Sec of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 38 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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HELD: Petition DENIED. The Court did not agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasijudicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making . A quasijudicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions. Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO, et al. v. ROLANDO BANIQUED G.R. No. 150270, 26 November 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, J.) It cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. A quasi-judicial function, as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land. Domogan, on the other hand, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. In his
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 39 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion. Baniqued buttressed his complaint by arguing that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, i.e., there should be a court action and a court order first before his house can be demolished and before he can be ousted from the lot. The RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of Baniqued. The RTC dismissed, later on, the complaint of Baniqued because "are unquestionably members of the executive branch whose functions are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial and he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals, however, granted Banuqued. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the doctrine of administrative remedies should be strictly applied 2. Whether or not the act of the City Mayor in issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function HELD: 1. Petition DENIED. 2. Petition GRANTED. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; (10) in quo warrantoproceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation of due process. Here, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention. The filing of a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The notice of demolition is very clear and speaks for itself. City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind that the house of Baniqued was illegally built and was thus subject to demolition. It could reasonably be assumed that a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have also been denied outright. Petitioners contend, though, that the complaint of Baniqued is premature. They say that what was issued by City Mayor Domogan was only a notice of demolition, and not an order of demolition. In short, petitioners are saying that Baniqued jumped the gun. He should have waited first for the issuance of a demolition order because no demolition can be carried out in the absence of such order. However, the distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition is immaterial. What is material is that Baniqued felt threatened with the impending demolition of his house. The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 40 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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which may be corrected by prohibition . As a parting argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any "tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The issuance of the notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rule-making function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City Mayor a quasi-judicial body. Again, petitioners are mistaken. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. It cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. A quasi-judicial function, as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature

HON. ISIDRO CARIO (Secretary of DECS), et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, et al. G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, EN BANC (Narvasa, J.) The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. A grant of investigatory power does not include a grant of quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. This mass concerted actions happened during ordinary class days. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days. In the administrative case the respondents the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion for suspension was denied. ISSUE:
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 41 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights is a quasi-judicial body which has adjudicatory power HELD: Petition DENIED The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter . The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law . The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the CHR:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the measures for the protection of human rights underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. However, it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 42 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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information. On the other hand, "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers case. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

JESUS C. OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMO ECLIPSE G.R. No. 114683, 18 January 2000, (Buena, J.) The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT (subsidiary of National Irrigation Administration), requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development. Jesus Ocampo, being the training coordinator of NIACONSULT, received the payment for the said training program. Subsequently, NIACONSULT demanded from Ocampo the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN. Ocampo, nevertheless, failed to remit. Maximino Eclipse, president of the company filed an administrative case before OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. Ombudsman decided against Ocampo. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case will be prejudicial to the administrative case HELD: Petition DENIED. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), v. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 43 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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(Mendoza, J.) The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) is a union of supervisory employees. UPSU filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. The petition was denied both by the med-arbiter and the Secretary of Labor. Accordingly, the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not previous administrative determinations constitute res judicata HELD: Petition is DENIED. UPSU argues that the previous administrative determinations do not have the effect of res judicata in this case, because "labor relations proceedings" are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities. But the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH (PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON), et al. v. HON. RENATO C. CORONA (DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), et al. G.R. No. 131457, 24 April 1998, (Martinez, J.) Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary. An Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 44 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the OP can no longer be disturbed on the ground of res judicata HELD: Petition GRANTED. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction , and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction . This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus: x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 45 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA v. ALBERTO C. ROA G.R. No. 140423, 14 July 2006, SECOND DIVISION (Garcia, J.) Being under the control of the President, the decision of the Secretary of Justice is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate. Jose Luis Orosa (Orosa), a dentist, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaintaffidavit charging respondent Alberto C. Roa, also a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written by Roa and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post. The article delved into the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same. Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz dismissed Orosas complaint. Accordingly, the publication is a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice. The Department of Justice favored Roa. The Regional Trial Court reversed this. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. ISSUE:
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 46 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper mode of appeal from a Resolution of the Secretary of Justice HELD: Petition DENIED. Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals. Section 1 thereof provides:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service and Insurance System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

The DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43, albeit any suggestion that it does not perform quasi-judicial functions may have to be rejected. However, its absence from the list of agencies mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the coverage of said Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase "among these agencies," thereby implying that the enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies therein listed. There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Being under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate. METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CHATHAM PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 141897, 24 September 2001 (Davide,Jr. J.) Under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.The grounds for the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 47 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Chatham Properties, Inc. (CHATHAM) and Metro Construction, Inc. (MCI) entered into a contract for the construction of a multi- storey building known as the Chatham House in Salcedo Village, Makati City. MCI sought to collect from CHATHAM a sum of money for unpaid progress billings and other charges and instituted a request for adjudication of its claims with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). CIAC rendered a decision in favor of MCI directing CHATHAM to pay MCI the net sum of P16,126,922.91. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of CIAC based on the jurisprudential principle that absent any showing of arbitrariness, the CIACs findings as an administrative agency and quasi-judicial body should not only be accorded great respect but also given the stamp of finality. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals can review findings of facts of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) HELD: Petition GRANTED. It is clear that Circular No. 1-91 of the Supreme Court covers the CIAC. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. The CIACs primary function is that of a quasi-judicial agency, which is to adjudicate claims and/or determine rights in accordance with procedures set forth in E.O. No. 1008. The language of Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 emphasizes the obvious inclusion of the CIAC even if it is not named in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies. The introductory words among these agencies are preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlight the fact that the list is not exclusive or conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in the enumeration but should be deemed included. In addition, the CIAC is obviously excluded in the catalogue of cases not covered by the Circular and mentioned in Section 2 thereof for the reason that at the time the Circular took effect, E.O. No. 1008 allows appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law. Thus, under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The grounds for the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of facts and appeals involving mixed questions of fact and law. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from final orders or decisions of the CIAC is further fortified by the amendments to B.P. Blg.129, as introduced by R.A. No. 7902. With
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 48 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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the amendments, the Court of Appeals is vested with appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

ELISEO SORIANO v. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD G.R. No. 164785, 29 April 2009, EN BANC (Velasco Jr., J.) Statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. The MTRCB may prohibit the broadcast of television programs or cancel permits for Eliseo Soriano (Soriano), host of the program Ang Dating Daan in UNTV 37 made the following remarks while being aired: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito . Thus, affidavit-complaints were filed by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo against Soriano before the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). The MTRCB preventively suspended Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986. Hence, Soriano filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by MTRCB. MTRCB issued a decision finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan. Hence, Soriano filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 1986 is unconstitutional HELD: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. P.D. 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 49 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or cancelling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved.

It was held that the power of review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that requirement. The stations explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each others signals. In this scheme, station owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraintdenial of permit or subsequent punishment, like suspension or cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3 (i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if applicable. However, the suspension should cover only the television program on which Soriano appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for. On the last not freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech. EMELITA DORAN v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE LUCZON JR. G.R. No. 151344, 26 September 2006, (Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Where an administrative body or officer does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, certiorari does not lie. Emelita A. Doran filed an affidavit-complaint charging Judge Campos with grave misconduct. Judge Campos denied petitioner's allegations. After Doran had completed the presentation of her evidence, Judge Campos filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that he be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence since petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations in her complaint.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 50 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Doran opposed the motion to allow him a demurrer to evidence arguing that such pleading is not permitted since the administrative proceeding is investigative in nature. She cited Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Judge Luczon allowed Judge Campos to file his demurrer to evidence and Doran to file her opposition thereto. Doran challenged Judge Luczon's ruling via a Special Civil action of Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not filing of a Special Civil Action of Certiorari is proper HELD: Petition DENIED. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked, the petition must be directed against any tribunal, board or officer "exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions," which "acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Additionally, it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Judicial or quasi-judicial function involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights It is important to highlight that what is assailed here is the ruling made by Investigating Judge Luczon allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss after the petitioner had completed the presentation of her evidence. Judge Luczon was designated by this Court merely to investigate and, thereafter, submit a report and the appropriate recommendation relative to the said complaint. His function is merely investigative and recommendatory in nature. He has no power to pronounce judgment on the controversy as such function belongs only to this Court pursuant to its power of supervision and control over court personnel and officers. His designation as investigator, therefore, does not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power. Hence, his act/s may not be challenged in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. DESTILERIA LIMTUACO, INC. and CONVOY MARKETING CORPORATION v. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES 28 November 2008, G.R. No. 164242 (Austria-Martinez J.) The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting. The Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation which is composed of several national organizations in the advertising industry. The dilemma begun when Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of one of the accredited advertising organizations under AdBoard, applied for a clearance of the
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 51 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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airing of a radio advertisement with a tagline Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos). Apparently, the AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Some complaints and negative feedbacks were received by the AdBoard. This opted them to ask SLG for a replacement. This was not responded by the petitioner. After some time, the AbBoard recalled the clearance it has previously issued to the petitioner. Destileria, as a consequence, filed a petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. According to them, requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether a petition for writ of prohibition will lie against the order of AdBoard HELD: Petition DENIED. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law According to well-settled rules, an agency is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 179830, 3 December 2009, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.) The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 52 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Atty. Lintang Bedol, Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Maguindanao, was charged with duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Due to certain observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance, consequently, Atty. Bedol was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area of responsibility. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), to determine existing controversies created Task Force Maguindanao which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the city and municipalities in Maguindanao. When Atty. Bedol was questioned by the Task Force, he explained that while in his custody and possession the election paraphernalia were stolen. On the next hearing, Atty. Bedol failed to appear despite due notice. Instead, Atty. Bedol came out on national newspapers and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that those that are saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now and I will answer their accusations. COMELEC issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against Atty. Bedol. Despite this, Atty. Bedol maintained his objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions. Moreover, he added that COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can initiate contempt proceedings despite the fact that it was performing administrative functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators HELD: Petition DENIED. The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws (paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution). The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into: 1. Administrative 2. Quasi-legislative 3. Quasi-judicial The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications . On the other hand, its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress . Lastly, its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws . In the exercise of such power, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. It must
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 53 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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be noted that the the quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation, which is to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed, could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a factfinding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. MANUEL F. CABAL v. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, Jr. G.R. No. L-19052, 29 December 1962, EN BANC (Concepcion J.) Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal. Accordingly, since the defendants are exempted in a criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves, Col. Jose C. Maristela filed a letter-complaint charging Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts. Thus, the President created a committee 5 members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. When the committee asked Cabal to take the witness stand, Cabal objected invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination . The Committee referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila. The City Fiscal filed a charge for contempt against Cabal. Cabal filed with Judge Kapunan a motion to quash the charge upon the ground. According to him, the Committee had no power to order Cabal to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination. Judge Kapunan denied this. ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings held by the Committee is civil and therefore, Cabal may not altogether refuse to take the witness stand HELD: Petition DENIED.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 54 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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The Anti-Graft Law, allows the forfeiture in favor to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary. Thus, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. It has been settled that informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. However, notwithstanding the same, such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal. Accordingly, since the defendants are exempted in a criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves, such applies thereto. ARSENIO PASCUAL, Jr., v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, et al. G.R. No. L-25018, 26 May 1969, EN BANC (Fernando, J.) In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. Arsenio Pascual was charged with malpractice. He was alleged with immorality, among others. Apparently, the counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness Pascual. Of course, Pascual objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. He also alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. ISSUE: Whether or not the right against self-incrimination can be availed of in an administrative hearing HELD: Petition GRANTED. In accordance with the well-settled principle, the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory question, but, also, to take the witness stand. The Court favors Pascual, otherwise, he would be disadvantaged. If he will not be allowed to refuse, chances are, he would suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. Such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 55 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. In brief, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. ARSENIO LUMIQUED (deceased Regional Director of DAR CAR) v. APOLINIO EXEVEA G.R. No. 117565, 18 November 1997, EN BANC (Romero, J.) The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR). Later on, he was dismissed by President Fidel V. Ramos. After Lumiqueds death, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. Based on the antecedents, the dismissal was due to 3 complaints filed by DARCAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the DARs Board of Discipline. Accordingly, Lumiqued was charged with malversation through falsification of official documents. Moreover, he was also accused of violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations. Lastly, he was charged with oppression and harassment. The three affidavit-complaints were referred in to the DOJ for appropriate action. A committee was created to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. They were mandated to conduct an investigation. The committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Petitioner faults the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not Lumiqued is entitled to right to counsel HELD: Petition DENIED. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioner invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 56 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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in the proceedings below. The investigation was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 57 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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IV.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK v. ENRICO LANZANAS G.R. No. 131442, 10 July 2003, FIRST DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party. The decision of the Regional Director may still be elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (Region IV) issued Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of NAPOCOR. Because of the ECC, NAPCOR was authorized to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. Thus, petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. They filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for the cancellation of the ECC. NAPOCOR, on the other hand, claimed that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the case based on lack of action HELD: Petition GRANTED. Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party. The decision of the Regional Director may still be elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his petition dismissible. And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action. Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 58 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.

ANTONIO BERNARDO, et al. v. BENJAMIN ABALOS, et al. G.R. No. 137266, 5 December 2001, EN BANC (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.) The purpose of the requirement of filing a Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to courts is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it and as long as such Motion has not been filed, resort to courts through certiorari is premature. Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., and his son Benjamin "Benhur" C. Abalos, Jr., candidate for City Mayor of the same city in the 1998 elections, were accused for having violated the Omnibus Election Code for vote buying claiming that public school teachers who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters thereat, were induced or unduly influenced to vote for the candidacy of Benjamin "Benhur" Abalos, Jr. the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc found no sufficient evidence to convict them. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, the instant petition was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is not fatal to ones cause of action HELD: Petition DENIED. It is not disputed that the complaint before the COMELEC involves an election offense. But in this petition, they conveniently kept silent why they directly elevated to this Court the questioned Resolution without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. It was only after Abalos had filed their comment on the petition and called this Courts attention for their failure to comply with Section 1 of Rule 13 that they, in their Consolidated Reply, advanced the excuse that they "deemed it best not seek any further dilatory motion for reconsideration', even if allowed by Sec. 1 (d) of COMELEC Rule 13." The failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." Contrary to Bernardo's statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 59 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners' instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court.

HON. ARTURO C. CORONA (Acting Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications), et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 97356, 30 September 1992, THIRD DIVISION (Romero, J.) Filing a case directly with the AAB may be a shortcut to accomplish the laudable purpose of A. O. No. 25. However, whatever advantage may accrue therefrom in terms of time element, may be offset by the denial of the right to a fair and unbiased proceeding insofar as the personnel complained On August 26, 1988, a complaint was filed before Administrative Action Board (AAB) against Leopoldo Bungubung, District Manager of the Port of Manila for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Bungubung filed his answer but later, he filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the case. AAB denied the motion to dismiss in a written order which was issued by DOTC Secretary Reyes himself upon the recommendation of the AAB. Subsequently, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed another "formal charge" against Bungubung and one Mario Tan for dishonesty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Assailing the jurisdiction of the AAB, a petition was filed before the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the AAB has no jurisdiction to try cases involving employees of PPA HELD: Petition GRANTED. While PPA personnel are, as mandated by P.D. 868, "embraced in the Civil Service," the DOTC may not "act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate. It should be noted that the complaint against Bungubung was erroneously filed directly with the AAB and it was no less than DOTC Secretary Reyes who, upon the recommendation of the AAB, denied Bungubung's motion to dismiss. The PPA General Manager also erroneously indorsed to the AAB the complaint he himself filed against Bungubung, without having conducted an investigation and recommending the appropriate penalty as required by the facts found at said investigation.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 60 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Filing a case directly with the AAB may be a shortcut to accomplish the laudable purpose of A. O. No. 25. However, whatever advantage may accrue therefrom in terms of time element, may be offset by the denial of the right to a fair and unbiased proceeding insofar as the personnel complained against is concerned. At the very least, he should be afforded the opportunity of confronting the charges against him in the forum where the law requires that they should be ventilated. If at all, this procedure may deprive the DOTC Secretary of control and supervision over personnel of the PPA below the rank of Assistant General Manager but only at the initial stage of an administrative proceeding. Should the employee be dissatisfied with the ruling of the PPA General Manager, he can always elevate his case to the DOTC Secretary wherein the AAB will play a pivotal role or, at his option, go directly to the Civil Service Commission. In the administrative hierarchy set up under both the PPA Charter and the Civil Service Law, the DOTC Secretary has the ultimate say before recourse to the courts may be made. The claim that the respondents are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB as they actively participated in the proceedings therein deserves scant consideration. While it is true that a party may be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction on appeal, such estoppel may be invoked successfully only if the party failed to raise such question in the early stages of the proceedings. The records show that Bungubung did not wait for the rendition of an AAB decision before he questioned its jurisdiction. After filing his answer, he filed a motion to dismiss on the issue of jurisdiction and even went to the extent of elevating the issue to this Court. For his part, Dinopol also filed a motion to dismiss the case against him and, upon its denial, filed a motion for reconsideration. In the absence of proof of laches on the part of the private respondents, the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy upon which petitioners rely, is inapplicable. Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable in this case. Besides the fact that the AAB was patently without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed against respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the exceptions to the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. ANGELITA MORCAL v. ANTONIO LAVIA, et al. G.R. 166753, 29 November 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Quisimbing, J.) )

In the case at bar, none of the exceptions to the doctrine may be availed of. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Court sees no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioners free patent application for the subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of Angelita Morcal, with her sister Ildefonsa Morcal and other members of their family occupied, cleared and planted seasonal crops on the land up to the time it was declared as public land on May 14, 1941. Noteworthily, their family declared the land for taxation purposes and began planting coconut and other fruit bearing trees. Having been in possession of the said land for almost forty (40) years, petitioner filed Free Patent Application. However, Antonio Lavia and Teresita Lavia protested the free patent application. Morcal filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil action to nullify the Order of the DENR Regional Office which states that only one-half of the lot applied for shall be issued to Morcal. Moreover, the DENR Regional Office denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted Order.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 61 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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The RTC, however, dismissed petitioners civil action. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to the instant case HELD: Petition DENIED. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. The rationale behind the doctrine is that the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. This is not, however, a hard-fastened rule. It admits exception. Among the established exceptions are:
1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings

In the case at bar, none of the foregoing exceptions may be availed of. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Court sees no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioners free patent application for the subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The impugned Orders of the DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. Petitioner cannot circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency.

VICENTE VILLLAFLOR (substituted by his heirs) v. COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC. G.R. No. 95694, 9 October 1997, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J.) In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies Cirilo Piencenaves sold to Vicente Villafor, a parcel of agricultural land planted with Abaca with an area of 50 hectares. The deed states that the land was sold to Villaflor but no formal document was then executed, and since then until the present time, Villaflor has been in possession and occupation of the same.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 62 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Meanwhile, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of land, containing an area of 2 hectares, together with all the improvements existing thereon, for a period of 5 years. In an Agreement to Sell Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, 2 parcels of land. Consequently, Villaflor filed Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, to purchase the tract of public lands. Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an Agreement, confirming the Agreement to Sell but with reference to the Sales Application filed with the Bureau of Land. Villaflor later on informed the Bureau Director that he was already occupying the property when the Bureaus Agusan River Valley Subdivision Project was inaugurated, that the property was formerly claimed as private property, and that therefore, the property was segregated or excluded from disposition because of the claim of private ownership. O n t h e s c h e d ul e d a uc t i on, Nasipit Lumber offered the highest bid of P41.00 per hectare, but since an applicant under C.A. 141, is allowed to equal the bid of the highest bidder, Villaflor tendered an equal bid, deposited the equivalent of 10% of the bid price and then paid the assessment in full. Later on, Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights, in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed to the former representing part of the purchase price of the land, the value of the improvements Villaflor introduced thereon, and the expenses incurred in the publication of the Notice of Sale; in light of his difficulty to develop the same as Villaflor has moved to Manila. Finally, the Director of Lands issued an Order of Award in favor of Nasipit Lumber. Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal agreement in 1955; but the new set of corporate officers refused to recognize Villaflors claim. In a formal pr ot e s t w hi c h V i l l a f l or f i l e d wi t h t he B ur e a u of La nd s , he pr ot e s t e d t h e Sa l e s Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights dated 16 August 1950. On 8 August 1977, the Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in the Deed and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflors protest. Villaflor filed a complaint in the trial court for Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages at about the same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals then reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in this case ISSUE: Petition GRANTED. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 63 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and the minister of natural resources over the issues regarding the identity of the disputed land and the qualification of an awardee of a sales patent is established by Sections 3 and 4 of CA 141, also known as the Public Land Act. Section 3 of said act provides that the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Natural Resources) shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control. Section 4 provides that subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decision as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law mean that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the final arbiter on questions of fact in public land conflicts. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on issues of mixed facts and law.

EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA v. HON. MARIANO M. MALONES G.R. No. 182065, 27 October 2009, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.) Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. The Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 (The Municipal Revised Revenue Code) which contains a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market. Apparently, Ongsuco occupies a stall in the public market. The Code, furthermore, authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market. Two purported public hearings were held. Hon. Malones wrote a letter to Ongsuco, et al. informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 64 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public market, Ongsuco, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against Hon. Malones. It was alleged by Ongsuco, et al. that a public hearing is mandatory for the imposition of goodwill fees. Additionallu, Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, imposing goodwill fees, is invalid on the ground that the conferences held could not be considered public hearings. The law provides that initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later. Apparently, the letter from the Office of the Municipal Mayor was sent to stall holders on August 6, 1998, informing the latter of the meeting to be held, as was in fact held, on August 11, 1998, only five days after notice. The RTC favored Hon. Malones. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same as Ongsuco, et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of administrative remedies apply in this case HELD: Petition DENIED. As a rule, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. In the instant case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code . This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve. ANGELES CITY v. ANGELES CITY ELECTRIC CORPORATION and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 57, ANGELES CITY G.R. No. 166134, 29 June 2010, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.) The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes applies Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique only to national Dela Cruz 65 internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes.
BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Starting July 1995, Angeles Electric Corporation (AEC) has been paying the local franchise tax to the Office of the City Treasurer on a quarterly basis, in addition to the national franchise tax it pays every quarter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Later on, the City Treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment to AEC for payment of business tax, license fee and other charges for the period 1993 to 2004 in the total amount of P94,861,194.10. Within the period prescribed by law, AEC protested the assessment. This was denied by the City Treasurer. The case was appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), but when the City Treasurer levied the properties of AEC, it filed a petition for injunction before the RTC which was granted. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC cannot issue an injunction for the collection of a local tax HELD: Petition DENIED. It is very evident on record that AEC resorted and filed an urgent motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the scheduled auction sale only when a warrant of levy was issued and published in the newspaper setting the auction sale of its property by the City Treasurer, merely few weeks after the petition for declaratory relief has been filed, because if the City Treasurer will not be restrained, it will render this petition moot and academic. To the mind of the Court, since there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law except this application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the auction sale or otherwise exercising other administrative remedies against the petitioner and its properties, this alone justifies the move of the AEC in seeking the injunctive reliefs sought for. A principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government should be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In line with this principle, the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. An exception to this rule obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the collection thereof may jeopardize the interest of the government and/or the taxpayer. The situation, however, is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there is no express provision in the Local Government Cods (LGC) prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. Thus, in the case of Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, the Court ruled that: Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such statutory lapse or intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 66 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

The Court is fully aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that injunction is not proper to restrain the collection of taxes. The issue here as of the moment is the restraining of the City Treasurer from pursuing its auction sale of the AECs properties. The right of ownership and possession of AEC over the properties subject of the auction sale is at stake. During the hearing, AEC was able to show that it had a clear and unmistakable legal right over the properties to be levied and that it would sustain serious damage if these properties, which are vital to its operations, would be sold at public auction. As we see it then, the writ of injunction was properly issued.

V.

Judicial Review

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC. G.R. No. 127371, 25 April 2002, THIRD DIVISION (Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.) When facts and circumstances later transpire that would render the execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. In the case at bar, no exception exists as shown by the facts. If the finality and executor of the decision of ERB would be disturbed then it would result to openly disregarding the rule on finality of judgments. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. (CEPALCO) is a grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to different municipalities in Misamis Oriental. President Corazon Aquino issued a memorandum which consequently caused the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition. The petition
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 67 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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sought the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC) within CEPALCO's franchise area. The ERB granted the petition. According to the ERB, petitioner is capable of distributing power to its industrial consumers. NAPOCOR then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which dismissed it. The decision became final and executory. To implement the decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), and advised of his desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken form NPC, disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC refused the request. To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The trial court decided in favor of PSC and PIA. However, the appellate court granted the petition and dissolved the injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not injuction lies against the final and executory judgment of ERB HELD: Petition DENIED. As a rule, no court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. However, such admits of exceptions. When facts and circumstances later transpire that would render the execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. In the case at bar, no exception exists as shown by the facts. If the finality and executor of the decision of ERB would be disturbed then it would result to openly disregarding the rule on finality of judgments. Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 provides that a review of its decisions or order is lodged in the Supreme Court. It is now settled that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or to Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with RTCs in terms of rank. Hence, such are beyond the control of RTCs. Being co-equal, it intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice.

ESTELITO REMOLANA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 137473, 2 August 2001, EN BANC (Puno, J.) Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction Estelito V. Remolana is a postmaster at Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon. Hi wife Nery, on the other hand, is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 68 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Franciso America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports (DECS) at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commision (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolana who got a rating of 81.25%. Allegedly, Mrs. Remolana asks for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teachers board examination. Thus, CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas issued an order directing to conduct investigation on Mrs. Remolonas eligilbilty. It was discovered that Remolanas name is not in the list of passing and falling examinees. During the preliminary investigation Remolana disclosed that he met Atty. Salupadin who offered to help him regarding the eligibility of his wife for P3,000.00. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge of it. A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolana and Atty. Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSC Director Amilhasan issued a memorandum recommending that the spouses Remolana be found guilty. In a resolution, CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration of the spouses Remolana, absolved Nery Remolana from liability. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review filed by herein petitioner. ISSUE: 1. Whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty 2. Whether or not there is a necessity to revisit the decision of the CSC HELD: 1. Petition GRANTED. 2. Petition DENIED. A civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. It is also well-settled that findings of the administrative body supported by substantial evidence are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on Courts. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 69 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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ARNOLD MOLLANEDA v. LEONIDA UMACOB G.R. No. 140128, 6 June 2001, THIRD DIVISION (Sandoval- Gutierrez, J.) Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction. An administrative agency can delegate the power to hear and receive evidence to a hearing officer, as long as the Leonida Umacob filed a complaint of sexual harassment against Arnold Mollaneda with the Civil Service Commission. Mollaneda filed with CSC-RO his answer denying the allegations and that there are material contradictions in Umacobs version of the incident. Pending resolution by the CSC-RO of Umacobs complaint, the DECS investigating committee recommended to the DECS Regional Director the dropping of the case for lack of merit. On the other hand, the CSC-RO issued resolution charging Mollaneda with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It also found there was a prima facie case against him and eventually elevated to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the records of the case. The Commission issued a resolution finding petitioner guilty and he was meted with penalty of dismissal from government service so petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Commision. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Commission should be given respect and finality by the courts HELD: Petition DENIED. An administrative agency can delegate the power to hear and receive evidence to a hearing officer, as long as the administrative body makes its own independent conclusions. Such findings shall be conclusive upon the courts. The Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate." Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered. In the case at bar, it is evident that the Commission itself evaluated in detail the evidence of both parties as reported by Atty. Buena. VICTOR VALENCIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 122363, 29 April 2003, SECOND DIVISION (Bellosillo, J.) It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that an administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for Based of is Cases Atty. Enrique review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only on if the an Outline appeal firstofmade by the Dela Cruz 70 highest BONTUYAN, administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government. DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA,
PULLANTE, SILVA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

Victor G. Valencia, a government retiree, filed an action to regain possession of his 2 parcels of land situated in Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City, Negros Oriental. According to him, he has been unjustly withheld from him by persons claiming to be tenants with the ostensible complicity of government officials implementing the agrarian reform program. After some time, Victor G. Valencia acquired the first parcel from a certain Bonifacio Supnet. The only tenant of the property at that time was a certain Digoy Besario who was succeeded by his son Jesus Besario. Valencia and Jesus Besario terminated their landlord-tenant relationship. Valencia then entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease agreement over his two (2) parcels of land with a certain Glicerio Henson. Before the ten (10)-year lease expired, apparently without objection from Henson, Valencia leased the property for five (5) years to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law lease. The lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia's written consent. During the period of his lease, Henson instituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the property, although only Crescenciano Frias apparently remained in the land. However, during the lease of Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco Obang (as overseer), Rogelio Tamayo, and others, along with Crescenciano and Marciano Frias, to cultivate the land. When the lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores expired, Valencia demanded that private respondents vacate the premises but they refused and continued cultivating the land despite the demand for them to vacate. Valencia filed a letter of protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual possession of his property. While investigation was being conducted by DAR pursuant to the protest, DAR issued CLTs to private respondents so Valencia filed a second protest and cancellation of the CLTs. Atty. Vilmo Ampong, DAR Hearing Officer, recommended that the CLTs issued to private respondents be cancelled and the final survey conducted on the landholding of Valencia set aside. Despite that, DAR Regional Office in Cebu City dismissed Valencia's protest. Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., by authority of the President, affirmed the order of the DAR. In the Court of Appeals, the appellate court dismissed. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal to the Office of the President from the Department Secretary is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies HELD: Petition GRANTED. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that an administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 71 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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Valencia contends that an appeal to the Office of the President from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. On the other hand, it is the contention of public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General, that an exception to this well-settled principle is the doctrine of qualified political agency. Where the respondent is a Department Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless the President actually disapproves them, administrative remedies have already been exhausted. In this case, the appellate court ruled that the appeal before it was filed beyond the reglementary period as petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the Court of Appeals, where it should have been brought. As a valid exercise of the Secretary's rule-making power to issue internal rules of procedure, DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the President. Thus, petitioner Valencia filed on 24 November 1993 a timely appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Office of the President, which was received on 11 November 1993, well within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 172700, 23 July 2010, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.) Since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. A complaint was filed against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental with the Ombudsman. Allegedly, Rodriguez, committed abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. The sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental received a similar complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. Subsequently, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law. Additionally, Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule against forum shopping. Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer. Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the Ombudsman on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to dismiss. The Ombudsman reiterated its order for Rodriguez to file his position paper where he insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. Complainants maintained there was no more complaint pending in the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the complaint. In a rejoinder, Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case filed against him was not valid because only the vicemayor signed it. Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression and imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the decision of the Ombudsman.
Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 72 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz

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ISSUE: Whether it the Sangguniang Bayan should refrain from hearing the case since the Ombudsman first acquired jurisdiction HELD: Petition GRANTED. Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute complaints again public, official or agency. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the s angguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in the case at bar. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique 73 BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA Dela Cruz