Ryerson University Department of Politics and School of Public Administration Assignment # 1 The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Is The Border Between

Both Permeable? In partial fulfillment of the requirements for CPPA101 DA0: Canadian Public Administration I: Institutions Submitted By: Karim Haj Ali #500337291 Submitted To: Professor R. Reid Drysdale Course Director & Faculty LecturerInstructor Department of Politics and Public Administration, Department of English, The Chang School Ryerson University/First Nations Technical Institute 7th Floor 350 Victoria Street Toronto, Canada M58 2K3 Direct Line: (705) 484-5681 Email: rdrysdal@ryerson.ca Saturday June 1st 2013

THE POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION DICHOTOMY

In his famous article entitled The Study of Administration, Woodrow Wilson (1887) argued for the separation of administration from the study of politics. With contributions from many scholars over the years, Wilsons fundamental ideas evolved into the discourse known as the Politics-Administration dichotomy. This dichotomy is premised on the idea that politics is somehow distinct from public administration, and that there exists a hierarchal relationship between the two (Campbell, 1988). Politics is about setting policy and making decisions on how to best serve the needs of the public, an activity that is inevitably partisan and controversial (Whitaker, 2000). Public administration can be described as a set of activities that involves implementing policies through the application of specialized knowledge and expertise. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices (Wilson, 1887, p.210). Even though the Politics-Administration dichotomy is a fundamental theory in public administration, many argue that it doesnt really exist, that it is to say the division between politics and administration is an artificial one (Whitaker, 2000). This essay will argue that the politics administration dichotomy is an inaccurate description of public bureaucracy. Rather, politics and administration are interdependent, as they require one another in order to strike an appropriate balance between democracy and efficiency. Historically, civil servants were appointed through a system of political patronage (Inwood, 2009). This meant that the ruling political party would usually appoint personnel to bureaucratic positions based on their relationship to the political party and not on their individual qualifications. Many political scientists and scholars viewed this system as corrupt and inefficient. Political patronage allowed a class of politicians [to]

THE POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION DICHOTOMY

become powerful in high places, who have not taken (and who by nature are not qualied to take) any large part in the social and educational life of the people (Eaton, 1880, p.392). Political reformers believed that once a merit-based principle for recruitment was adopted, a better class of leaders and public managers would emerge. The merit principle would allow for accountability and express concern for efficiency (Rosenbloom, 2008). Thus a separation of politics from administration was justified. Although the theory of the dichotomy lingers till this day, it is arguably used as a symbol of anti-corruption in government (Skelley, 2008). In theory, elected representatives debate and politicize about what is the best way to go about dealing with public issues (Inwood, 2009). In effect, politicians create policy and make decisions. On the other hand, senior civil servants have the role of executing the decisions made by politicians; they earn their paycheck so to speak by applying vastly technical and specialized knowledge required to manage day-to-day government operations (Thomas, 1994). While a Minister is the political head of a department, Deputy Ministers (being the most senior of civil servants in their role) are the administrative head of that department and are appointed at the pleasure of the Prime Minister (Inwood, 2009). Therefore, it is not hard to imagine the idea that the bureaucracy holds a monopoly on the expert knowledge that is necessary for the execution of modern day policy-making. Although the final say is down to the Minister of a department, that Minister is usually acting on the advice of his/her Deputy Minister (Thomas, 1994). With the sheer number of tasks and assignments they have to deal with, elected officials cannot be expected to know the details of every single transaction that occurs within their department. This matter is further exacerbated with the continued growth of government and its expenditures

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(Thomas, 1994). Coupled with a fair amount of discretionary power given to the civil service, the theoretical line that separates politics from administration is very permeable if non-existent. In an article by former minister Flora MacDonald, an assertion is made that politicians are at the mercy of bureaucratic domination (1980), simply because that is the way the system has been allowed to develop. McDonald reinforces her claims by drawing on several memoirs and speeches from former cabinet members who share similar views as her. Various claims were made, mainly that the civil service is not entirely impartial and that there is a fear of change of government among the bureaucracy that led them to hinder ministerial progress (MacDonald, 1980). MacDonald also argued that the same issues are prevalent in the USA, and drew on the experience of Henry Kissinger to further her claims. In addition, the former Minister also drew on her own personal experiences, claiming that the Mandarins in Whitehall engaged in certain techniques, or as she described them: entrapment devices, that hindered ministerial influence. Even Alice in wonderland might have difficulty in finding her way through what is likely to become a looking glass jungle, presenting the illusion of ministerial control (MacDonald, 1980). In a reply to MacDonald, former Minister and Mandarin, Mitchel Sharp argues that although there is considerable influence by Bureaucrats on their Ministerial counterparts, this influence is necessary, as the latter tend to be inexperienced and weak especially during the early stages of their careers (1981). Drawing on personal experience, Sharp asserts that Bureaucratic influence should not be viewed as undemocratic, but as an opportunity that ought to be seized by the inexperienced

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Minister. Sharp claims that Ministers are bombarded with complex political issues that can be overwhelming without the aid of civil servants. The former Mandarin claims that public servants can actually help foster efficiency in a new government and avoid certain pitfalls not foreseeable by that government (Sharp, 1981). Sharp responds to McDonalds allegations of Bureaucratic political bias by stating that when a new government took over, there was no resistance to change by the civil service: I can testify from my own experience and my own observation that changes of government such as occurred in 1957 and 1979 were considered in the civil service as providing an opportunity to prove that the service is non-partisan, not withstanding the long years of liberal administration. (1981) However, Sharp leaves open the question of whether public servants do have too much power and influence for their own good. He states that such an answer depends on the way each individual Minister reacts to advice given to him by his Deputy Minister (1981). In conclusion, the Politics-Administration dichotomy is an elegant theory and its existence is justified so far as the Merit-principle is concerned. However, in reality it has no utility, apart from being a fundamental principle in the study of Public Administration. I submit that public administration and politics are not separate but rather interdependent. Just as we have seen, Ministers rely on their Deputy Ministers technical expertise in order to implement policy, whereas the final say is up to the Ministers themselves. The border is very much permeable.

THE POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION DICHOTOMY References

Campbell, C. and Peters, B. G. (1988), The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death or Merely Change?. Governance, 1: 7999. Eaton, Dorman B. 1880. The Civil Service in Great Britain. New York: Harper & Brothers . Inwood, G. J. (2009). Understanding Canadian Public Administration: An Introduction to Theory and Practice (3rd ed.). Scarborough: Pearson-Prentice Hall. MacDonald, Flora. Who is on Top? The Minister of the Mandarins? In Politics Canada, 8th ed., ed. Paul W. Fox and Graham White, 448-52. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1995. Rosenbloom, D. (2008). The Politics Administration Dichotomy In U.S. Historical Context. Public Administration Review, 57-60. Sharp, Mitchell. A Reply From a Former Minister and Mandarin. In Politics Canada, 8th ed., ed. Paul W. Fox and Graham White, 453-56. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1995. Skelley, B. D. (2008). The persistence of the politics-administration dichotomy: An additional Explanation1. Public Administration Quarterly, 32(4), 549-570. Thomas, Paul. The Administrative Machine in Canada, In Politics Canada, 8th ed., ed. Paul W. Fox and Graham White, 527-34. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1995. Whitaker, Reginald. Politics versus Administration: Politicians and Bureaucrats. In Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, 5th ed., ed. Michael Whittington and Glen Williams, 55-78. Scarborough: Nelson, a division of Thomas Learning, 2000. Wilson, Woodrow. The Study of Administration. In Classics of Public Administration, 3rd ed., ed. Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 11-24. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks Cole Publishing, 1992.