A

SEMINAR REPORT
ON

“BLUETOOTH”
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
FOR THE AWARD OF THE
DEGREE OF

BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY
IN

ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING

SUBMITTED TO:- SUBMITTED

BY:-
Er. NARANG Sunil Panjeta
(Lec 1805262
 ECN-3

HARYANA ENGINEERING COLLEGE

JAGADHRI
KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY , KURUKSHETRA
(2005-2009)

1. INTRODUCTION

When you use computers, entertainment systems or telephones, the various pieces and
parts of the systems make up a community of electronic devices. These devices
communicate with each other using a variety of wires, cables, radio signals and infrared
light beams, and an even greater variety of connectors, plugs and protocols.

There are lots of different ways that electronic devices can connect to one another. For
example:
• Component cables

• Electrical wires

• Ethernet cables

• WiFi

• Infrared signals

The art of connecting things is becoming more and more complex every day. In this
article, we will look at a method of connecting devices, called Bluetooth, that can
streamline the process. A Bluetooth connection is wireless and automatic, and it has a
number of interesting features that can simplify our daily lives.
A unique new wireless technology specifically designed for short range (10-100) meters
with modest performance of 780Kbps dynamically configurable and hoc networking with
low power. It is well suited for handheld applications and support both voice and data.
Uses 2.4 GHZ unlicensed ISM band. Frequency hopping spread spectrum radio for
higher interference immunity. Supports point to point and point to multipoint connection
with single radio link. Designed to provide low cost, robust, efficient, high capacity voice
and data networking. Uses a combination of circuit and packet switching.

Bluetooth wireless technology is finally here. Originally conceived as a low-power short

range radio technology designed to replace cables for interconnecting devices such as
printers, keyboards, and mice, its perceived potential has evolved into far more
sophisticated usage models. The requirement to do this in a totally automated, seamless,
and user-friendly fashion, without adding appreciable cost, weight, or power drain to the
associated host is an enormous engineering challenge.

Bluetooth devices can form piconets of up to seven slaves and one master, enabling
discovery of services and subsequent implementation of many varied usage models
including wireless headsets, Internet bridges, and wireless operations such as file
exchange, data synchronization, and printing.

Despite talk of Bluetooth competing with wireless LANs, Bluetooth products work over
shorter distances and are designed to solve different problems. The Bluetooth SIG
publishes the Bluetooth specification. The IEEE has formed the 802.15 working group to
define standards for wireless PANs. The 802.15.1 standard for WPAN™s will be
modeled after the Bluetooth specification from the Bluetooth SIG. Microsoft® has
announced support for Bluetooth in the next release of Windows® XP. The waters of
Bluetooth security have yet to be tested. However, the Bluetooth specification has a
robust key management scheme built in, as well as upper layers of security. Bluetooth
uses the national standard AES algorithm for encryption and the general consensus is that
the options for Bluetooth security are strong and robust.

2. BLUTOOTH

“Bluetooth wireless technology is an open specification for a low-cost, low-

power, short-range radio technology for ad-hoc wireless communication of voice
and data anywhere in the world.”

What is Bluetooth?
Bluetooth is a short-range wireless communications technology.
Why this name?
It was taken from the 10th century Danish King Harald Blatand who
unified Denmark and Norway.
When does it appear?
1994 – Ericsson study on a wireless technology to link mobile phones &
accessories.
5 companies joined to form the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) in
1998.
First specification released in July 1999.
1999.
Fig 1 (a)
(a) One of the first modules (Ericsson) (b) A recent module

a.
b. bluetooth connecting examplE

2.1 TIMELINE

 1994 : Ericsson study complete / vision

 1995 : Engineering work begins
 1997 : Intel agrees to collaborate
 1998 : Bluetooth SIG formed: Ericsson, Intel, IBM, Nokia & Toshiba
 1999 : Bluetooth Specification 1.0A
SIG promoter group expanded:
3Com, Lucent, Microsoft & Motorola
 2000 : Bluetooth Specification 1.0B, 2000+ adopters
 2001 : First retail products released, Specification 1.1
 2003 : Bluetooth Specification 1.2
 2005 : Bluetooth Specification 2.0 (?)
2.2 BLEUTOOTH GOALS & VISION

 Originally conceived as a cable replacement technology

 Short-Range Wireless Solutions
 Open Specification
 Voice and Data Capability
 Worldwide Usability
 Other usage models began to develop:
 Personal Area Network (PAN)
 Ad-hoc networks
 Data/voice access pointS
 Wireless telematics

2.3 CORE BLUETOOTH PRODUCTS

• Notebook PCs & Desktop computers
• Printers
• PDAs
• Other handheld devices
• Cell phones
• Wireless peripherals:
• Headsets
• Cameras
Cameras

• CD Player
• TV/VCR/DVD
 • Access Points
• Telephone Answering Devices
• Cordless Phones
• Cars

Example : The Networked Home

2.4 . ADVANTAGES

➢ Simple to install and expand

➢ Need not be in line of sight
➢ Low Cost
➢ Perfect for File transfer and printing application
➢ Simultaneous handling of data and voice on the same channel
➢ Easy to handle

2.5APPLICATIONS OF BLUETOOTH

1. PC and Peripheral networking.

2. Hidden Computing.
3. Data synchronization for Address book and calendars.
4. Cell phone acting as a modem for PDA or Laptop.
5. Personal Area Networking (PAN).
6. Enabling a collection of YOUR personal devices to cooperatively work together
2.6 TECHNICAL FEATURES

Spread Spectrum (Frequency Hopping) &

Connection Type
Time Division Duplex (1600 hops/sec)

2.4 GHz ISM Open Band (79 MHz of

Spectrum
spectrum = 79 channels)

Modulation Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying

Transmission Power 1 mw – 100 mw

Data Rate 1 Mbps

Range 30 ft

Supported Stations 8 devices

Data Security –Authentication Key 128 bit key

Data Security –Encryption Key 8-128 bits (configurable)

Module size 9 x 9 mm

2.7 A Comparison`
3. ABOUT THE NAME

For those who know little about the technology, and even for those who are more than a
little acquainted with it, the name Bluetooth may seem odd. You may wonder, in fact,
how it relates to wireless technology, or speculate that perhaps it’s derived somehow from
the founding members of the SIG. Neither of these ideas is correct.
The name is a romantic gesture that in some sense indicates the excitement the
technology generates as well as the belief in its value as a revolutionary concept. To
combine these qualities in a name required ingenuity and delving into the past. The name
Bluetooth comes from Danish history. Harald Blatand, who was called Bluetooth, was the
son of King Gorm the Old, who ruled Jutland, the main peninsula of Denmark. By the
time Harald became king, he was a skilled Viking warrior. So, when his sister asked for
help to secure control in Norway after her husband died, Harald quickly seized the
opportunity to unite the countries and expand his kingdom. By 960 A.D. according to the
story, Harald was at the height of his powers, and ruled both Denmark and Norway. He
was later credited with bringing Christianity to his Viking realm.
Although it’s popularly believed that King Harald had a blue tooth, and various stories
explain how this came about, it’s more likely that the Bluetooth name is the English
derivative of the original Viking word, Blâtand. The Bluetooth name was chosen for the
wireless technology because its developers and promoters hope it will unite the mobile
world, just as King Harald united his world

4. BLUETOOTH CONNECTION & OPERATION

4.1 HOW BLUETOOTH CREATE A CONNECTION

Bluetooth takes small-area networking to the next level by removing the need for user
intervention and keeping transmission power extremely low to save battery power.

Picture this: You're on your Bluetooth-enabled cell phone, standing outside the door to
your house. You tell the person on the other end of the line to call you back in five
minutes so you can get in the house and put your stuff away. As soon as you walk in the
house, the map you received on your cell phone from your car's Bluetooth-enabled GPS
system is automatically sent to your Bluetooth-enabled computer, because your cell
phone picked up a Bluetooth signal from your PC and automatically sent the data you
designated for transfer. Five minutes later, when your friend calls you back, your
Bluetooth-enabled home phone rings instead of your cell phone. The person called the
same number, but your home phone picked up the Bluetooth signal from your cell phone
and automatically re-routed the call because it realized you were home. And each
transmission signal to and from your cell phone consumes just 1 milliwatt of power, so
your cell phone charge is virtually unaffected by all of this activity.

Bluetooth is essentially a networking standard that works at two levels:

• It provides agreement at the physical level -- Bluetooth is a radio-frequency
standard.
• It provides agreement at the protocol level, where products have to agree on
when bits are sent, how many will be sent at a time, and how the parties in a
conversation can be sure that the message received is the same as the message
sent.
The big draws of Bluetooth are that it is wireless, inexpensive and automatic. There are
other ways to get around using wires, including infrared communication. Infrared (IR)
refers to light waves of a lower frequency than human eyes can receive and interpret.
Infrared is used in most television remote control systems. Infrared communications are
fairly reliable and don't cost very much to build into a device, but there are a couple of
drawbacks. First, infrared is a "line of sight" technology. For example, you have to point

Fig Photo courtesy Bluetooth SIG

Bluetooth wireless PC card

the remote control at the television or DVD player to make things happen. The second
drawback is that infrared is almost always a "one to one" technology. You can send data
between your desktop computer and your laptop computer, but not your laptop computer
and your PDA at the same time. (See How Remote Controls Work to learn more about
qualities of infrared are actually advantageous in some regards. Because infrared
transmitters and receivers have to be lined up with each other, interference between
devices is uncommon. The one-to-one nature of infrared communications is useful in that
you can make sure a message goes only to the intended recipient, even in a room full of
infrared receivers.

Bluetooth is intended to get around the problems that come with infrared systems. The
older Bluetooth 1.0 standard has a maximum transfer speed of 1 megabit per second
(Mbps), while Bluetooth 2.0 can manage up to 3 Mbps. Bluetooth 2.0 is backward-
compatible with 1.0 devices.

4.2 HOW BLUETOOTH OPERATES

Bluetooth networking transmits data via low-power radio waves. It communicates on a

frequency of 2.45 gigahertz (actually between 2.402 GHz and 2.480 GHz, to be exact).
This frequency band has been set aside by international agreement for the use of
industrial, scientific and medical devices (ISM).
A number of devices that you may already use take advantage of this same radio-
frequency band. Baby monitors, garage-door openers and the newest generation of
cordless phones all make use of frequencies in the ISM band. Making sure that Bluetooth
and these other devices don't interfere with one another has been a crucial part of the
design process.
One of the ways Bluetooth devices avoid interfering with other systems is by sending out
very weak signals of about 1 milliwatt. By comparison, the most powerful cell phones
can transmit a signal of 3 watts. The low power limits the range of a Bluetooth device to
about 10 meters (32 feet), cutting the chances of interference between your computer
system and your portable telephone or television. Even with the low power, Bluetooth
doesn't require line of sight between communicating devices. The walls in your house
won't stop a Bluetooth signal, making the standard useful for controlling several devices
in different rooms.
Bluetooth can connect up to eight devices simultaneously. With all of those devices in
the same 10-meter (32-foot) radius, you might think they'd interfere with one another, but
it's unlikely. Bluetooth uses a technique called spread-spectrum frequency hopping that
makes it rare for more than one device to be transmitting on the same frequency at the
same time. In this technique, a device will use 79 individual, randomly chosen
frequencies within a designated range, changing from one to another on a regular basis.
In the case of Bluetooth, the transmitters change frequencies 1,600 times every second,
meaning that more devices can make full use of a limited slice of the radio spectrum.
spectrum.
Since every Bluetooth transmitter uses spread-spectrum transmitting automatically, it’s
unlikely that two transmitters will be on the same frequency at the same time. This same
technique minimizes the risk that portable phones or baby monitors will disrupt Bluetooth
devices, since any interference on a particular frequency will last only a tiny fraction of a
second

When Bluetooth-capable devices come within range of one another, an electronic

conversation takes place to determine whether they have data to share or whether one
needs to control the other. The user doesn't have to press a button or give a command --
the electronic conversation happens automatically. Once the conversation has occurred,
the devices -- whether they're part of a computer system or a stereo -- form a network.
Bluetooth systems create a personal-area network (PAN), or piconet, that may fill a room
or may encompass no more distance than that between the cell phone on a belt-clip and
the headset on your head. Once a piconet is established, the members randomly hop
frequencies in unison so they stay in touch with one another and avoid other piconets that
may be operating in the same room

5. THE PROMISE OF BLUETOOTH – WHAT IT CAN DO

The promise of Bluetooth is extremely ambitious. If Bluetooth lives up to its potential, it

will revolutionize the way people interact with information technology. Originally
conceived as a low-power short-range radio technology designed to replace cables for
interconnecting devices such as printers, keyboards, and mice, its perceived potential has
evolved into much more. It has given rise to the concept of the Personal Area Network
(PAN), a technology of convenience where everything within the Personal Operating
Space (POS) of an individual that is related to communicating information (both voice
and data) is automatically tied into a seamless peer-to-peer network that self-configures
to make information easily accessible. Scenarios for its usage are many and diverse and
are only limited by the imaginations of the companies that create the products.

5.1 COMPARED WITH WIRELESS LANS

There is even talk of Bluetooth competing with WLANs, but Bluetooth products work
over shorter distances and are designed to solve different problems. While the
functionality of a WLAN device stands alone as a network component, the functionality
of a Bluetooth component requires a host. The host can be any number of Bluetooth
enabled devices such as cell phones, headsets, keyboards, PDAs, vending machines,
cameras, and bar code readers.

5.2 USAGE MODEL EXAMPLES.

Following are examples of some usage models for Bluetooth devices.

5.2.1 Wireless Headset

The leading adoption of Bluetooth will initially be in the arena of mobile phones.
Nearly every major mobile phone manufacturer has already released Bluetooth-
enabled models of their popular phones. The driver for this adoption is the ability to use
a wireless headset with the phone. The impact of mobile phone radiation on health has
been under scrutiny for some time, especially since the phone is usually held near the
head. The radio frequency energy emitted by a Bluetooth wireless headset is a fraction
of that emitted by a mobile phone. Additionally, the convenience of being cordless
means the phone can be used even if it is in a briefcase or the trunk.

5.2.2 Internet Bridge

Bluetooth wireless technology can be used to allow a mobile phone or cordless
modem to provide Dial-Up Networking (DUN) capabilities for a PC, allowing it to
connect to the Internet without a physical phone line. This enables a laptop to
automatically utilize the user’s nearby cell phone to dial and connect to a dial-up
service. The user doesn’t need to touch the phone, which might be in a briefcase or
coat pocket.

5.2.3 File Exchange

The ability to perform peer-to-peer file exchange without the presence of a network
infrastructure has many advantages. For example, a salesperson may choose to share
the contents of an electronic slide presentation (as well as datasheets, business cards,
and other electronic collateral) with the audience. Bluetooth enables the automatic
detection of any Bluetooth devices in the room, enabling the transfer (with the
receiver’s permission) of all selected files. (This could also be done with a wireless
LAN, but all parties involved would have to configure their clients to use compatible
network settings. This is not required for Bluetooth.)
5.2.4 Synchronization
Bluetooth allows for data synchronization between devices. For example, a desktop
computer that is Bluetooth enabled can wirelessly synchronize its contact list, task
information, calendar, etc., to a user’s phone, PDA, or notebook. Several Bluetooth-
based synchronization models already exist for both Pocket PC and Palm-based PDAs.

5.2.5 Printing
HP is making printers and notebooks with embedded Bluetooth technology.
Bluetooth-enabled devices can automatically detect Bluetooth-enabled printers in their
area and wirelessly send documents to the printer without going through lengthy
network and printing setup processes. Mobile users who frequently visit remote offices
will find Bluetooth printing a significant improvement in convenience to their current
experience.

5.3 AN ENGINEERING CHALLENGE

 The demands of creating Bluetooth-enabled products are very challenging.

Consider the following:
 Bluetooth must have a very flexible application topology. For example, you might
want your PDA to be able to communicate with any nearby printer, but do you
want your cell phone to send its audio to any nearby hands-free headset?
 Bluetooth must be automatically configurable. If a Bluetooth product can’t figure
out whom it should and shouldn’t talk to and how, the marketplace will consider it
too complicated to use.
 Bluetooth must have quality of service (QoS) features to support voice.
 No one wants cell phones with shorter battery life, so the power required to
support Bluetooth capability must be very low.
 No one wants PDAs that are larger, so adding Bluetooth capability to a device
should not noticeably increase its size.
 In order to replace cables, Bluetooth cannot cost more than cables. This means
 that Bluetooth technology cannot add more than $5 to the cost of the host device.

The phrase “Wireless connections made easy,” which is printed on the cover page of the
more than 1,500 pages of engineering specifications that define Bluetooth, means easy
for the user, but hard for the engineers designing the products. For the reasons outlined
above, Bluetooth presents some of the most demanding engineering challenges in the
telecommunications arena, and products are only just now beginning to appear on the
market.

5.4 BLUETOOTH PRODUCT CERTIFICATION

The Bluetooth Special Interest Group1 (SIG) is a group of companies that cooperate to
define Bluetooth standards and qualify Bluetooth products. A product that has passed
certain testing criteria can be stamped with the Bluetooth logo, assuring a certain level of
interoperability.

6. BLUETOOTH BASICS – HOW IT WORKS

6.1 NETWORK TOPOLOGY

Any Bluetooth device can be a master or a slave, depending on the application scenario.
Bluetooth employs frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) to communicate. So in
order for multiple Bluetooth devices to communicate, they must all synchronize to the
same hopping sequence. The master sets the hopping sequence, and the slaves
synchronize to the Master. A piconet is formed by a master and up to seven active slaves.
The slaves in a piconet only communicate with the master. A scatter net can be formed by
linking two or more piconets. When a device is present in more than one piconet, it must
time-share and synchronize to the master of the piconet with which it is currently
communicating.
While the topology and hierarchical structure of WLAN networks are relatively simple,
Bluetooth networks are far more diverse and dynamic. They are constantly being formed,
modified, and dissolved, as Bluetooth devices move in and out of range of one another.
And because different Bluetooth devices can represent many different usage profiles,
there are any different ways in which Bluetooth devices can interact.

6.2 SERVICE DISCOVERY

The concept of service discovery is utilized to determine what kind of Bluetooth devices
are present and what services they desire or offer. When a Bluetooth device requires a
service, it begins a discovery process by sending out a query for other Bluetooth devices
and the information needed to establish a connection with them. Once other Bluetooth
devices are found and communication is established, the Service Discovery Protocol
(SDP) is utilized to determine what services are supported and what kinds of connections
should be made. In order for the above to happen, devices willing to connect must be
located. Some devices may be set up so that they are invisible. In this case, they can scan
for other Bluetooth devices, but will not respond if they are likewise queried.
Applications determine whether a device is connectable or discoverable, and thus
applications determine the topologies of networks and their internal hierarchies.

6.3 ACL AND SCO LINKS

Once a connection has been established between two devices an Asynchronous
Connection-Less (ACL) link is formed between them. An ACL link provides packet-
switched communication and is the most common link used to handle data traffic. A
master has the option to change an ACL link to a Synchronous Connection Oriented
(SCO) link. An SCO link provides a Quos feature by reserving time slots for transmission
of time-critical Information such as voice. A piconet can have up to three full-duplex
voice links.
6.4 STANDARD PROFILES TO ENABLE USAGE MODELS.
The number and variety of different Bluetooth usage models mean that Bluetooth devices
must call from a large collection of different protocols and functions to implement a
specific usage model. In order to ensure that all usage models will work among devices
from many different manufacturers, this collection of protocols and functions must be
standardized. Bluetooth profiles are standardized definitions of protocols and functions
required for specific kinds of tasks. The current Bluetooth Standard 1.1 contains 13
profiles, with more being continually added. One or more of these profiles are utilized
when implementing various usage models. Some profiles are dependent upon others.
Some of the most basic are:

6.4.1 General Access Profile (Gap)

This profile is required by all usage models and defines how Bluetooth devices
discover and connect to one another, as well as defines security protocols. All Bluetooth
devices must conform to at least the GAP to ensure basic interoperability between
devices.

6.4.2 SERVICE DISCOVERY APPLICATION PROFILE (SDAP)

The SDAP uses parts of the GAP to define the discovery of services for Bluetooth
devices.

6.4.3 SERIAL PORT PROFILE

This profile defines how to set up and connect virtual serial ports between two
devices. This serial cable emulation can then be used for tasks such as data transfer and
printing.

6.4.4 GENERIC OBJECT EXCHANGE PROFILE (GOEP)

GOEP is dependent on the Serial Port Profile and is used by applications to handle
object exchanges. This capability is then used, in turn, by other profiles to perform such
functions as Object Push, File Transfer, and Synchronization (see below).
6.4.5 OBJECT PUSH
This profile is used for the exchange of small objects, such as electronic calling cards.
6.4.6 FILE TRANSFER
This profile is used to transfer files between two Bluetooth devices.
6.4.7 SYNCHRONIZATION
This profile is used to synchronize calendars and address information between
devices.

New profiles not yet part of the standard include the following: a Basic Printing Profile to
facilitate printing of text emails, short messages, and formatted documents; a Hands Free
Profile to enable a mobile phone to be used with a hands-free device in a car; a Basic
Imaging Profile enabling Bluetooth devices to negotiate the size and encoding of
exchanged images; and a Hardcopy Cable Replacement Profile, used by devices such as
laptops and desktop computers that utilize printer drivers.

6.5 POWER LEVELS AND RANGE

Most Bluetooth devices, dependent on batteries for power, are designated as class 3
devices and are designed to operate at a power level of 0 dBm (1 mW), which provides a
range of up to 10 m. Class 2 devices can utilize as much as 4 dBm (2.5 mW) output
power, and class 1 devices can utilize up to 20 dBm (100 mW) of output power. Class 1
devices can have a range up to 100 m. Bluetooth class 2 and 3 devices can optionally
implement adaptive power control. Required for class 1 devices, this mechanism allows a
Bluetooth radio to reduce power to the minimum level required to maintain its link, thus
saving power and reducing the potential for interfering with other nearby networks.
 3. THE EVOLVING BLUETOOTH STANDARD

THE BLUETOOTH SIG

Since the original Bluetooth specification was published in 1999, more than 2000
additional companies have signed on as associate members, able to participate in
development of future standards and extensions by contributing efforts to various
working groups.

THE CURRENT SPECIFICATION

The current specification, Ver. 1.12, defines a radio which operates in the
unregulated Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band as follows:

2.4 GHz, FHSS w/1600 hops/s over 79 channels: 1 Mbps

The fundamental elements of a Bluetooth product are defined in the two lowest
protocol layers, the radio layer and the baseband layer. Included in these layers
are hardware tasks such as frequency hopping control and clock synchronization,
as well as packet assembly with associated FEC (Forward Error Correction) and
ARQ (Automatic Repeat Request).
The link manager layer is responsible for searching for other Bluetooth devices,
creating and tearing down piconets, as well as authentication and encryption.

Higher layer definitions include the Bluetooth profiles.

ENHANCING THE SPECIFICATION

The Bluetooth SIG is currently working on a new specification, due for

publication sometime in 2002. In the interest of maintaining backwards
compatibility, most of this work is confined to describing new profiles.

One of the most intriguing is a car profile that describes the use of personal
devices like pagers, cell phones, and laptops in an automotive environment.
Envisioned usages include the automatic adjustment of various settings in an
automobile, such as seat and mirror positions and radio tuning, based on personal
preferences stored in a Bluetooth device. Another profile would link a cell phone,
car radio, and text-to-speech software on a laptop, to allow email to be spoken
audibly over the car radio.
In addition to developing new profiles, other working groups are developing
extensions to enhance Bluetooth operations. The radio working group is
 developing optional extensions to the current Bluetooth standard that include
higher data rates and handoff capability to support roaming, and the coexistence
working group is collaborating with the IEEE 802.11 and 802.15 working groups
to address interference concerns and ensure that Bluetooth can coexist in the same
environment with WLANs.

4. SECURITY ISSUES AND ATTACKS

In November 2003, it was. discovered that there are serious flaws in the authentication
and/or data transfer mechanisms on some bluetooth enabled devices. Specifically, three
vulnerabilities have been found:
Firstly, confidential data can be obtained, anonymously, and without the owner's
knowledge or consent, from some bluetooth enabled mobile phones. This data includes,
at least, the entire phonebook and calendar, and the phone's IMEI.
Secondly, it has been found that the complete memory contents of some mobile phones
can be accessed by a previously trusted ("paired") device that has since been removed
from the trusted list. This data includes not only the phonebook and calendar, but media
files such as pictures and text messages. In essence, the entire device can be "backed up"
to an attacker's own system.
Thirdly, access can be gained to the AT command set of the device, giving full access to
the higher level commands and channels, such as data, voice and messaging. This third
vulnerability was identified by Martin Herfurt, and they have since started working
together on finding additional possible exploits resulting from this vulnerability.
Finally, the current trend for "Bluejacking" is promoting an environment which puts
consumer devices at greater risk from the above attacks.
Vulnerabilities
8.1 The SNARF attack:
It is possible, on some makes of device, to connect to the device without alerting the
owner of the target device of the request, and gain access to restricted portions of the
stored data therein, including the entire phonebook (and any images or other data
associated with the entries), calendar, realtime clock, business card, properties, change
log, IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity [6], which uniquely identifies the
phone to the mobile network, and is used in illegal phone 'cloning'). This is normally only
possible if the device is in "discoverable" or "visible" mode, but there are tools available
on the Internet that allow even this safety net to be bypassed[4]. Further details will not
be released at this time (see below for more on this), but the attack can and will be
demonstrated to manufacturers and press if required.
8.2 The BACKDOOR attack:
The backdoor attack involves establishing a trust relationship through the "pairing"
mechanism, but ensuring that it no longer appears in the target's register of paired
devices. In this way, unless the owner is actually observing their device at the precise
moment a connection is established, they are unlikely to notice anything untoward, and
the attacker may be free to continue to use any resource that a trusted relationship with
that device grants access to (but note that so far we have only tested file transfers). This
means that not only can data be retrieved from the phone, but other services, such as
modems or Internet, WAP and GPRS gateways may be accessed without the owner's
knowledge or consent. Indications are that once the backdoor is installed, the above
SNARF attack will function on devices that previously denied access, and without the
restrictions of a plain SNARF attack, so we strongly suspect that the other services will
prove to be available also.
8.3 The BLUEBUG attack:
The bluebug attack creates a serial profile connection to the device, thereby giving full
access to the AT command set, which can then be exploited using standard off the shelf
tools, such as PPP for networking and gnokii for messaging, contact management, diverts
and initiating calls. With this facility, it is possible to use the phone to initiate calls to
premium rate numbers, send sms messages, read sms messages, connect to data services
such as the Internet, and even monitor conversations in the vicinity of the phone. This
latter is done via a voice call over the GSM network, so the listening post can be
anywhere in the world. Bluetooth access is only required for a few seconds in order to set
up the call. Call forwarding diverts can be set up, allowing the owner's incoming calls to
be intercepted, either to provide a channel for calls to more expensive destinations, or for
identity theft by impersonation of the victim.

8.4 Bluejacking
Although known to the technical community and early adopters for some time, the
process now known as "Bluejacking"[1] has recently come to the fore in the consumer
arena, and is becoming a popular mechanism for exchanging anonymous messages in
public places. The technique involves abusing the bluetooth "pairing"[2] protocol, the
system by which bluetooth devices authenticate each other, to pass a message during the
initial "handshake" phase. This is possible because the "name" of the initiating bluetooth
device is displayed on the target device as part of the handshake exchange, and, as the
protocal allows a large user defined name field - up to 248 characters - the field itself can
be used to pass the message. This is all well and good, and, on the face of it, fairly
harmless, but, unfortunately, there is a down side. There is a potential security problem
with this, and the more the practice grows and is accepted by the user community, and
leveraged as a marketing tool by the vendors, the worse it will get. The problem lies in
the fact that the protocol being abused is designed for information exchange. The ability
to interface with other devices and exchange, update and synchronise data, is the raison
d'être of bluetooth. The bluejacking technique is using the first part of a process that
allows that exchange to take place, and is therefore open to further abuse if the handshake
completes and the "bluejacker" successfully pairs with the target device. If such an event
occurs, then all data on the target device bacomes available to the initiator, including such
things as phone books, calendars, pictures and text messages. As the current wave of
PDA and telephony integration progresses, the volume and quality of such data will
increase with the devices' capabilities, leading to far more serious potential compromise.
Given the furore that errupted when a second-hand Blackberry PDA was sold without the
previous owner's data having been wiped[3], it is alarming to think of the consequences
of a single bluejacker gathering an entire corporate staff's contact details by simply
attending a conference or camping outside their building or in their foyer with a bluetooth
capable device and evil intent. Of course, corporates are not the only potential targets - a
bluejacking expedition to, say, The House of Commons, or The US Senate, could provide
some interesting, valuable and, who's to say, potentially damaging or compromising data.
The above may sound alarmist and far fetched, and the general reaction would probably
be that most users would not be duped into allowing the connection to complete, so the
risk is small. However, in today's society of instant messaging, the average consumer is
under a constant barrage of unsolicted messages in one form or another, whether it be by
SPAM email, or "You have won!" style SMS text messages, and do not tend to treat them
with much suspicion (although they may well be sceptical about the veracity of the
offers). Another message popping up on their 'phone saying something along the lines of
"You have won 10,000 pounds! Enter this 4 digit PIN number and then dial 0900-
SUCKER to collect your prize!" is unlikely to cause much alarm, and is more than likely
to succeed in many cases.
8.5 VARIOUS OTHER ATTACKS
BLUEBUG is the name of a bluetooth security loophole on some bluetooth-enabled cell
phones. Exploiting this loophole allows the unauthorized downloading phone books and
call lists, the sending and reading of SMS messages from the attacked phone and many
more things.
LONG DISTANCE SNARF- An eye-opener to those who believe that the range of the
wireless technology Bluetooth is 100 meter maximum. The Long-Distance-Snarf
Experiment that took place in the early morning of proofs this assumption wrong

BLUETONE--The information on this page is intended to help people that want to

modify their bluetooth equipment in order to connect an external (directional) antenna to
their Bluetooth dongle. This Bluetooth tuning makes it possible to concentrate the
emission of bluetooth signals to one direction instead of any direction. This direction of
signals enhances the range of bluetooth radios
BLUEPRINTING--Blueprinting is a method to remotely find out details about bluetooth-
enabled devices. Blueprinting can be used for generating statistics about manufacturers
and models and to find out whether there are devices in range that have issues with
Bluetooth security
BLOOVER--Since Adam Laurie's BlueSnarf experiment and the subsequent BlueBug
experiment it is proven that some Bluetooth-enabled phones have security issues. Until
now, attackers need laptops for the snarfing of other people's information. Unless
attackers do a long-distance-snarf, people would see that there is somebody with a laptop
trying to do strange things. Blooover is a proof-of-concept tool that is intended to run on
BT AUDIT--The Bluetooth architecture consists out of two main protocols, L2CAP and
RFCOMM which is layered on top of L2CAP. Since these protocols utilize ports (as they
are named in the popular TCP/IP UDP/IP architecture). It makes sense to have the ability
to scan these in order to find so called open ports and possible vulnerable applications
bound to them.
BLUESMACK- BlueSmack is a Bluetooth attack that knocks out some Bluetooth-
enabled devices immediately. This Denial of Service attack can be conducted using
standard tools that ship with the official Linux Bluez utils package
BT CLASS-Each Bluetooth device has a device class (type of device and services it
provides) which is part of the responds to an inquiry. The device class has a total length
of 24 bits and is separated in three parts

9. BLUETOOTH SECURITY
Bluetooth security, when compared with WLAN security, is both more complex and
simpler. It is more complex in the sense that there are many different options for security
based on different application scenarios. It is simpler in the sense that, for the most part,
they are transparent to the user. With WLANs it is up to the network administrator to add
security at higher levels. With Bluetooth, since the Bluetooth spec includes all levels,
higher-level security features are already built into the devices when appropriate.
Bluetooth security includes both authentication and confidentiality, and is based around
the SAFER+ encryption algorithm. SAFER+ is a block cipher, but in this application is
implemented as a stream cipher. SAFER+ was thoroughly analyzed and tested during the
NIST’s search for a national encryption standard. Although some versions were found to
have very minor weaknesses, the 128-bit version as used in Bluetooth is considered very
strong.

9.1 LINK LAYER SECURITY – KEYS AND MORE KEYS

The Bluetooth Baseband (link layer) specification defines methods for both
authentication and encryption that are subsequently utilized by higher layers.

These methods utilize a number of keys generated by a process that begins with three
basic device entities: a public 48-bit device address, a random number generator, and a
secret PIN which is either built into the unit by the manufacturer or programmed by the
user. A typical PIN may consist of just four decimal digits. However, for applications
requiring more security a PIN code up to 128-bits long can be entered. The first of many
keys is created the first time the Bluetooth device is installed on the host
and is typically never changed. This is referred to as the unit key.

9.1.1 Authentication
When a Bluetooth session (defined as the time interval for which the device is
part of a piconet) is initiated, a series of additional keys is generated. One of these
keys, referred to as the link key or authentication key, is a one-time 128-bit secret
key that is used only during that session. The process of authentication employs
the encryption of a random number by each device to verify that each is sharing
the same secret link key.

9.1.2 Encryption
If encryption is required by the application, an encryption key is further derived
from the
link key, a ciphering offset number, and a random number. While the
authentication key is always 128-bits, the encryption key may be shorter to
accommodate government restrictions on encryption, which vary from country to
country. A new encryption key is generated each time the device enters encryption
mode. The authentication key, however, is used during the entire session.

9.2 APPLICATION LAYER SECURITY

The Bluetooth General Access Profile defines three security modes:

Mode 1 is non-secure. Authentication is optional.

Mode 2 gives service-level enforced security. The service provided by the

application decides whether or not authentication or encryption is required. The
 Bluetooth SIG has published the Bluetooth Security Architecture white paper5
that defines a suitable architecture for implementing service-level enforced
security on Bluetooth devices. The white paper splits devices into different
categories and trust levels, as well as suggesting three security levels for services.
The utilization of a database is suggested for enabling the user to authorize
devices to utilize only particular services. Because the implementation of security
at this level does not affect interoperability, this white paper is advisory only, and
is not part of the Bluetooth specification.

Mode 3 is link-level enforced security. Both devices must implement security

procedures in order for a connection to be established. In addition to the above
modes, a device can be configured to not respond to paging, so that other devices
cannot connect to it. Or it can be configured so that only devices that already
know its address can connect to it. Such numerous and complex levels of security
are necessary to accommodate the large variety of different usage scenarios. It
falls on the designers of Bluetooth products to ensure that the complexity of
Bluetooth is hidden from the user, while still providing the user with necessary
security options.

10. WORKAROUNDS AND FIXES

We are not aware of any workarounds for the SNARF or BLUEBUG attacks at this time,
other than to switch off Bluetooth.
To permanently remove a pairing, and protect against future BACKDOOR attacks, it
seems you must perform a factory reset, but this will, of course, erase all your personal
data. To avoid Blue jacking, "just say no”. The above methods work to the best of our
knowledge, but, as the devices affected are running closed-source proprietory software, it
not possible to verify that without the collaboration of the manufacturers. We therefore
make no claims as to the level of protection they provide, and you must continue to use
Bluetooth at your own risk.
11. Device Authentication In Bluetooth Technology

Bluetooth technology provides a method for authenticating devices. Device

authentication is provided using a shared secret between the two devices. The common
shared secret is called a link key. This link key is established in a special communications
session called pairing. All paired devices (devices that have had a previous connection to
establish security procedures) share a common link key. There are two types of link keys
defined in the unit keys and combination keys.
A device using a unit key uses the same secret for all of its connections. Unit keys are
appropriate for devices with limited memory or a limited user interface. During the
pairing procedure the unit key is transferred (encrypted) to the other unit. Note that only
one of the two paired units is allowed to use a unit key. Combination keys are link keys
that are unique to a particular pair of devices.
The combination key is only used to protect the communication between these two
devices. Clearly a device that uses a unit key is not as secure as a device that uses a
combination key. Since the unit key is common to all devices with which the device has
been paired, all such devices have knowledge of the unit key.
Consequently they are able to eavesdrop on any traffic based on this key. In addition, they
could, in theory, be modified to impersonate other devices using the key. Thus, when
using a unit key there is no protection against attacks from other devices with which the
device has been paired.
As a result, the Bluetooth SIG discourages the use of unit keys in secure applications.
Authentication is performed with a challenge response scheme utilizing the E1 algorithm.
E1 is a modification of the block cipher SAFER+. The scheme operates as follows: The
verifier issues a 128 bit long challenge. The claimant then applies E1 using the challenge,
its 48-bit Bluetooth address, and the current link key. He then returns the 32 most
significant bits of the128 bit result2.
The verifier confirms the response, in which case the authentication has succeeded. In
this case, the roles are switched and the same procedure is applied again, thereby
accomplishing mutual authentication.
The Bluetooth challenge response algorithm differs from that used in 802.11b in very
important ways. In 802.11b the challenge and response
form a plaintext/cipher text pair. This fact, combined with the simplicity of the encryption
method (XOR), allow an intruder to easily determine the authentication key string by
listening to one authentication procedure. In contrast, the Bluetooth authentication
method never transmits the complete challenge response pair. In addition, the E1
algorithm is not easily invertible. Thus even if an attacker has recorded an authentication
challenge response session, he cannot (directly) use this data to compute the
authentication key.

12. BLUETOOTH PAIRING

Pairing is the procedure where a relationship (link key) is established between two
previously unknown devices. The link key is derived when the devices are initially paired
(i.e. the link key does not exist before the pairing procedure). Pairing is facilitated with
yet another key, the initialization key. This key is computed by a pair of devices using the
Bluetooth addresses of each device, a random number, and a shared secret (PIN). Since it
is only used in the initial pairing, the initialization key is only used once. The initial
pairing is the most profitable area of attack on a Bluetooth device. If the attacker can
guess or steal the PIN during the initial pairing, then he can perform a much more
efficient search to derive the link key. This search is further simplified if the
communications occurring while the devices are paired is recorded. For this reason the
Bluetooth SIG strongly encourages the use of long, random PINs and suggests that
pairing be performed only in a private place. Assuming that both devices have a man-
machine interface (such as a keypad) it is also suggested that the PIN be manually
entered into both devices or in any case communicated out-of-band (not transmitted over
the Bluetooth wireless link). Thus, long PINs provide improved security since the PIN
cannot be received over-the-air. To steal the PIN an attacker must guess or record it by
some other means such as direct observation of the user, a more difficult procedure if the
PIN is long and the pairing is performed in private.
As a communication standard, Bluetooth security focuses on the link level. It provides
both entity authentication and link privacy. Since these functions are focused at the lower
network layers, message authentication and secure end-to- end links are not provided.
However, many applications, such as e-mail and browser transactions require end-to-end
security. As with other communication standards, this function is expected to be provided
at higher network layers by specific application providers.
Accordingly, the Bluetooth SIG encourages the reuse of existing transport, session and
application layer security. Accordingly the Bluetooth SIG strongly encourages pairing in
a private place and the use of robust PINs. In addition, simple devices that use unit keys
should not be relied upon to communicate highly secure data.

13. BLUESNARFING

SNARF and bluesnarfing are words that have been spooking through the Internet during
the last months. These words relate to a recently discovered security flaw in Bluetooth-
enabled devices. This report is about a field-trial that has evaluated this security loophole
at the CeBIT 2004 in Hannover. As described in, the SNARF attack enables access to
restricted portions of the device. SNARF is a word coming from computer-hacker jargon.
To snarf something means “to grab a large document or file and use it without the
author’s permission”. So it is possible to, for example read out the affected devices’
phone books. These phone books contain numbers and associated names of persons that
are either stored in the device phone-book, on the SIM card or in the lists of missed,
received or dialed contacts. It is also possible to retrieve and send SMS messages from
the affected phone or to initiate phone calls to any existing number (this feature is of
special interest if you are the running a premium service number yourself.
In theory, all supported AT-commands could be issued to the respective device, but
according to statements of the manufacturers some of the commands are not permitted by
means of this disallowed connection. But there would be no reason of preventing
commands from a connection that the firmware discloses by accident.
13.1 The BlueSnarf Field Trial
The environment was build up by open-source software ran on a laptop computer.

13.2 The Environment Setup

The hardware used for this trial was a COMPAQ Evo N600c with two low-cost MSI
Bluetooth USB-dongles. The software used with this hardware was linux-2.6.22together
with Qualcomm’s Bluetooth stack implementation Bluez (bluez-libs-2-.5, bluez-utils-2.4
and bluez-sdp-1.5). The actual application was implemented in PERL and C. For better
data-mining capabilities, an enterprise-level SQLDBMS (postgresql-7.4.1) has been used
in order to store and access the collected device-information.

13.3 Collected Data Samples and Results

In total, 1269 different devices have been discovered in the period from March 18th to
21st March 2004 at the place described above. Due to the limited range of about ten
meters, not all of the Bluetooth-enabled devices at this place could have been detected.
But still, the number of discovered devices is very high.
13.4 Discovered Device Vendors
The determination of the vendor is done by means of the Bluetooth address. Similar to
the hardware-address (MAC address) of Ethernet network interface cards, also the
Bluetooth address refers to the manufacturer of the Bluetooth chip-set. Table 1 shows the
vendor and the three first bytes of the Bluetooth addresses that are associated with the
respective vendor. Also a value expressing the distribution among the vendors is provided
in this table.
The 70 percent of discovered Nokia handsets clearly represent Nokia’s market-leadership
in Europe. Interestingly, many companies use the Nokia 6310i as a company phone. One
possible reason for this could be the compatibility to the Nokiacar-kits that have been
installed over years in many company cars.
13.5 Vendor Address-Bytes Percentage
 Table 13.5.1 : Device Vendors
Nokia 00:02: EE, 00:60:57, 00:E0:03 70
SonyEricsson 00:0A:D9 11.35
Siemens 00:01:E3 8.2
Unknown miscellaneous 8.1
Other miscellaneous 2.1
13.6 Discovered Models
It cannot be determined from the device’s Bluetooth address which model of the
respective vendor this is. Therefore, the Bluetooth name that on many devices defaults to
the model number has been used to identify the model of the discovered device. The
Bluetooth name of the devices can be set by the user and is therefore not itself a reliable
information to determine the model number. It is worth mentioning that many people use
their full name as identification for their device.
The tables 2, 3 and 4 show the numbers of models that could have been uniquely
determined by their names. So, this graph is not totally correct, but gives a coarse idea on
the vendor/model distribution.
The graph displayed in table 2 supports the assumption that has been made before, that
obviously many companies are using the Nokia 6310i phone for their employees.

13.7 Device Number Percentage

Table 13.7.1: Recognized Nokia Models

Unrecognized 669 75.1
Nokia 6310/6310i 135 15.2
Nokia 6600 48 5.4
Nokia 3650 28 3.1
Nokia 7650 11 1.2
Characteristic for the German/European market was the relatively high presence
Unrecognized
T610
P900
P800

13.8 Device Number Percentage

Table 13.8.1: Recognized SonyEricsson Models

Unrecognized 106 72.1
SonyEricsson T610 33 22.5
SonyEricsson P900 7 4.8
SonyEricsson P800 1 0.6
of Siemens phones. At the moment, only the phones belonging to the 55 series and the
new SX1 are supporting Bluetooth. Unrecognized S55/SL55, SX1

13.9 Device Number Percentage

Unrecognized 69 66.3, Siemens S55/SL55 30 28.9, Siemens SX1 5 4.8

13.10 Discovered Vulnerable Devices

As written in, there are a number of devices that are vulnerable to the SNARF attack.
According to this document there is the Ericsson phone T68/T68i, the SonyEricsson
phones R520m, T610 and Z1010 and the Nokia phones 6310/6310i, 8910/8910i and
7650. Adam Laurie also provides information, whether the respective devices are
attackable in invisible or visible mode, only. Since the setup used for this field trial did
not use a brute-force approach (as presented by @stake) for detecting also invisible
devices, this study only confirms the vulnerability of visible devices. Due to limited
market take-up and the resulting low penetration-rate of some devices, the vulnerability
of some of the listed devices cannot be confirmed by this study.
As displayed in figures 2 and 3, the two top-selling Bluetooth-enabled models of
SonyEricsson and Nokia are vulnerable to the SNARF attack. Experiments with the
SonyEricsson T610 showed that this model is generally not vulnerable to the SNARF
attack. During an earlier presentation of the SNARF attacking February it happened that
T610 phones with recent versions of the T610 firmware were disclosing personal
information. Obviously, newer versions of the T610 firmware do allow SNARF attacks.
Nokia 6310/6310i as mentioned above, this study confirms that the Nokia 6310 and the
more enhanced Nokia 6310i are very vulnerable to the SNARF attack. About 33 percent
of all discovered devices of this type were disclosing personal phone book entries without
requiring user-interaction. Since the snarf-process takes an average Time of 30 seconds
(from the discovery to the end of the attack), it is very likely that a lot more devices could
have been read out. Too many people were just passing the location so that they left the
Bluetooth-covered area too early to be snarfed. SonyEricsson T610 In future when the
newer firmware is running on an increased number of T610-devices the success rate of
the SNARF attack will also increase. In the CeBIT 2004 field trail only 6 percent of all
discovered T610 devices could be read out. Siemens Phones As far as it has been
observed in the CeBIT field trial, Siemens phones are not vulnerable to the SNARF
attack. Bluetooth-enabled Siemens phones like the S55 merely seem to be rather
paranoid. Every time a usual scan-request is received by these phones they cowardly ask
for the user’s confirmation. Actually, this behavior is quite annoying.

13.11 Other Experiences

In preparation for the trial-setup, the Ericsson T68i (which is also on the list of vulnerable
devices) has been checked. It can be confirmed, that this phone is vulnerable. Total
Snarfed 50, SonyEricsson T61033 to the SNARF attack but switches into the hidden
mode automatically (three minutes after activation of the Bluetooth interface). In hidden
mode this phone is not vulnerable.

13.12 What Has Been Done?

The SNARF attack used at the CeBIT was intended to finish as fast as possible. That is
why only the first 10 entries of each phone book were read out. About 50 numbers from
each snarfed phone have been retrieved.
13.13 What Could Have Been Done?
As mentioned in the introduction there could have been done a variety of different things
with an unauthorized Bluetooth connection to the phone. The following paragraphs give
some ideas on the things this security flaw would also allow the attacker to do.

13.13.1 Sending a SMS

The only good way to get to know the number of the snarfed phone is to send an SMS
from the attacked phone to another device. Depending on the manufacturer of the phone,
SMS messages can either be provided in 7bit encoded ASCII-text and/or have to be
provided as a SMS-PDU which is rather tricky to generate. For the creation of SMS-
PDUs there is a tool called PDUSpy in the download section of Nokia phones allow to
issue text-mode and PDU-mode messages to the device, while SonyEricsson phones (and
also Siemens phones) only accept PDU-encoded SMS messages. The sending of an SMS
is not visible to the user. Usually, the issued SMS is not stored in the sent-box of the
snarfed phone. In rare cases, the SMS settings of the snarfed phone are set to require a
report that is generated at the receiving phone. In this case the sender that was not aware
of having sent a message would receive a reception-report from the attacker’s phone
(which includes a phone number). By sending PDU encoded messages, it can be
controlled by setting a flag whether a reception report is generated or not.
This method to get the victim’s phone number is causing costs to the holder of the phone.
That is why it has not been done in the CeBIT field-trial. But it works for sure (at least on
Nokia devices).

It would also be possible to get the device’s phone number by initiating a phone call to
the number of a phone that is able to display the caller’s number. However, this method
would disclose the number of the dialed phone to the owner of the attacked phone,
because every call initiation is writing an entry into the dialed contacts list (DC phone
book).

13.13.2 Initiating a Phone Call

It is possible to initiate phone calls to virtually any other number. It would be very
lucrative to initiate calls to a premium service number that is ran by the attacker. As
mentioned before, dialed numbers are usually stored in the phone’s calling lists and are
also stored at the provider-site for billing purposes. Therefore, this kind of abuse is rather
unlikely. It would also be very easy to find out and sue the person being responsible for
this premium service.

13.13.3 Writing a Phone Book Entry

As mentioned before, every phone call is writing an entry into the “dialed contacts” or
DC phone book of the respective device. By writing a phone book entry into the DC
phone book, the traces on the device that evidence that a call has been made can be
replaced by any number. Since the operator also stores dialed numbers for billing
purposes, this kind of obfuscation would only delay the process of finding the responsible
person. Of course it is also possible to do some nasty phone book entries. Just imagine an
entry that has ’Darling’ as a name and the number of a person you dislike. This owner of
the phone could then get into some trouble with his/her spouse. In the CeBIT-trial no
phone book entries have been done. Such entries would most likely overwrite existing
ones.

13.13.4 Future Work

Ongoing experiments include a SNARF application on Java/J2ME phones. As a
Requirement for this, the respective phones would have to have the MIDP 2.0 API
Implemented together with the optionally provided Bluetooth-API. The only phone that
has these features at the moment is the Nokia 6600.

13.13.5 Blueprinting
Blueprinting aims to set a standard for Bluetooth fingerprinting devices. The idea is
similar to IP fingerprinting techniques as used in tools like an map where it is possible to
determine a hosts operating system by specific behavior of the IP stack. With
Blueprinting it is possible to determine the manufacturer, the device model and the
firmware version of the respective device. The complexity of the introduced method is
intentionally simple so that this procedure can be executed on constrained devices that
are not capable of calculating common hashes such as MD5: the J2ME Connected
Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) Version 1.0 (as used in many mobile handsets)
can perform it. There are many different reasons that justify a method that allows the
identification of Bluetooth-enabled devices by the characteristics of their radio interface.

13.13.6 Device Statistics

One of the purposes that Blueprinting could be used for is statistical examination of
different environments. This way, it is possible to create statistics over manufacturer and
device models in special places as it was done in the CeBIT field trial report. There are
more scenarios where the determination of Bluetooth device properties is making sense.

13.13.7 Automated Application Distribution

There are many different mobile handsets that all have different operating system
platforms running. One of the most popular platforms is Symbian but there is a number of
other platforms Mobile device manufacturers are developing applications for many
different purposes. In order to deliver the application for the right platform, the
application distributor needs to know about the requesting device model, so that the
application that is pushed to the device might be a version that supports e.g. the bigger
display of a certain device. Unfortunately, there are also malicious applications like the
proof-of-concept virus CIBER that could profit from an identification method like
Blueprinting.

13.13.8 Security Audits

Early implementations of the Bluetooth standard in devices of various device
manufacturers are subject to more or less severe security issues. Attacks like the
BlueSnarf attack, the Bluebug attack or the Blue Smack attack, which enable the
extraction of sensitive information, the abuse of telecommunications services or the
denial of service are subject to the firmware and the model of some phones. In order to
communicate eventual security issues to the respective manufacturers it is important to
know about the properties of the concerned device. Blueprinting contributes to the efforts
done in order to make Bluetooth devices more secure.

13.13.9 Device Information

Blueprinting encapsulates the necessary information in order to determine device specific
properties such as the manufacturer, the model information and the firmware version.
Since mobile phones and PDAs make up the biggest group of Bluetooth enabled devices,
Blueprinting mainly focuses on these devices. The method relies on device specific
information that has been collected in experiments such as the CeBIT experiment, and,
therefore, is not as detailed as it could be. Every Bluetooth enabled device has some
characteristics that are either unique (Bluetooth device address), manufacturer specific
(the first part of the Bluetooth device address) or model-specific (service description
records). Blueprinting is combining the different information that Bluetooth-enabled
devices reveal in order to identify the manufacturer as well as the model of the device.
The firmware version that runs on certain devices can be derived based upon devices
different characteristics.
13.13.10 Bluetooth Device Address
As mentioned above the Bluetooth device address (BD ADDR) is unique and globally
refers to one single device. This BD ADDR address consists out of 48 bits (6 bytes) that
are usually notated like MAC addresses (e.g. MM:MM:MM:XX:XX:XX). The address is
programmed into the Bluetooth radio. The first three bytes of this address (the bytes that
are denoted by M’s above) refer to the manufacturer of the chipset. An actual list of all
these codes that refer to different manufacturers can be found in the OUI database hosted
by IEEE.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell anything about the device model by interpretation
of the remaining three bytes. These bytes (denoted by X’s above) are used randomly in
different models. Therefore, for identifying a manufacturer’s model, Blueprinting takes
the SDP profiles, which can be queried from devices that offer services, into account.

13.13.11 SDP Profiles

Service Description Protocol (SDP) profiles are a concept that is used by Bluetooth in
order to identify a certain service to other devices. This is done for auto configuration
purposes and to help a user setup a connection to the specific device. SDP Profiles are
served by the device’s sdp server and provide information on how to access the offered
profiles. Every SDP profile entry has some properties that can be used to identify the
device.

13.13.12 Blueprinting
Blueprinting uses specific information from SDP profiles of a device to create a hash for
the respective device. According to the standard, there is always a field that holds the
Service.
Table 13.13.12.1 OPUSH Profile from a Nokia 6310i
Service Name: OBEX Object Push
Service RecHandle: 0x1000c
Service Class ID List:"OBEX Object Push" (0x1105)
Protocol Descriptor List:"L2CAP" (0x0100)
"RFCOMM" (0x0003)Channel: 9"OBEX" (0x0008)
Language Base Attr List: code ISO639: 0x656e
encoding: 0x6a
base offset: 0x100
Profile Descriptor List:"OBEX Object Push" (0x1105)
Version: 0x0100

Record Handle, which is a 32 bit number that is assigned by the SDP server when a
service is registered during startup of the device (e.g. 0x1000c in table 1). In the case of
mobile phones, the Record Handles for the profile entries at the SDP server are not
dynamically assigned but statically coded in the phone’s firmware. The other value that is
taken into the hash is the RFCOMM channel or the L2CAP psm number that the service
can be accessed under. In the above profile, this would be RFCOMM channel 9. One part
of a device’s Blueprinting hash is the sum of the Rechanneled times the Channel for all
running services. The following example shows this by the example of a Nokia 6310i
SDP profile export.

13.13.12.1 RecHandle Channel Product

0x1000b 2 131094
0x1000c 9 589932
0x1000d 1 65549
0x1000e 15 983250
0x1000f 3 196653
0x10010 13 852176
0x10011 12 786636
3605290

13.13.12.2 Blueprinting Software

The Blueprint software is a proof-of-concept implementation of the herein described
Bluetooth fingerprinting technique. For simplicity, it was implemented in Perl and reads
the output of sdptool. Blueprint uses a simple text based database which contains
fingerprints and information about the associated device. The implementation also
combines the actual fingerprint with the manufacturer part of the BD ADDR to achieve a
higher matching rate.
version: V 5.22 15-11-02 NPL-1
date: n/a
type: mobile phone
note: vulnerable to Bluebug attack

13.14 RELATED WORK

13.14.1 Bluetooth Security Device Database
The Bluetooth Device Security Database was created after various security related bugs
where found on embedded Bluetooth devices. The btdsd projects goal is to collect
information on (default) security settings of Bluetooth enabled devices. The collection
shows that nearly all manufacturers have different default security settings and security
features implemented. The database was used in the evaluation of the Blueprinting
technique.
13.14.2 Future Work
The work described here is the basis for ongoing work in this area. The trifinite.group is
inviting everyone to contribute in all future efforts. Continued progress relies on
developing a more comprehensive set of SDP profiles, which can be sent via email. For
information on how to contribute, check the Bluetooth Device Security Database page .

13.14.3 Non-SDP Fingerprinting

Blueprinting, so far, only uses the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) information for
identifying devices. In the future, data from higher and lower level protocols should be
used for identification as well. Examples could be: Link Manager (LM) commands (when
connecting to a specific service) or Obex behavior.

13.14.4 Conclusions
Blueprinting is a novel method for the identification of Bluetooth-enabled devices by
means of their radio interface and the Bluetooth stack of the operating system. The
information gathered so far about the SDP profiles demonstrates a decreasing diversity in
mobile phone operating systems; the prevalent usage of e.g. Symbian. The increasing
uniformity is evident from similar Blueprinting hashes even when the hardware and the
manufacturer of the products differ. In the future, current trends dictate the variety of
Blueprinting hashes will most likely decrease. The fact that many phones have the same
operating system could result in serious trouble once a security flaw is discovered for a
common operating system.

13.14.5 Blueprint Device Hashes

This section lists the hashes that have been collected so far. Some of the devices have
multiple entries. The explanation for this is that these devices have different firmware
versions that result in a different Blueprinting hash.
14. BLUETOOTH AND WINDOWS XP

Microsoft® has announced support for Bluetooth in the next release of Windows® XP as
follows:

Microsoft is creating native support in the Microsoft® Windows® operating system for
Bluetooth wireless technology. This support is entirely new and is not based on existing
software from other companies. The specific delivery vehicles are to be determined.

Microsoft supports the Bluetooth technology as a wireless bus, complementing USB and
IEEE 1394. The goal for Microsoft software support is to Windows work with several
types of devices that implement Bluetooth wireless technology, such as PC peripherals,
PC companions, and devices bridged to network resources through a PC.

Support for Bluetooth wireless technology is not in the first release of Windows XP,
because there is not a sufficient array of production-quality devices that conform to the
Bluetooth specification for Microsoft to test. However, Microsoft is actively developing
support for Bluetooth technology and will ship this support in a future release. Quality,
reliability and compatibility are principal ship goals for Windows XP, and Microsoft will
not compromise on the customer experience

15. FUTURE OF BLUETOOTH

 Success of Bluetooth depends on how well it is integrated into consumer products

 Consumers are more interested in applications than the technology
 Bluetooth must be successfully integrated into consumer products
 Must provide benefits for consumer
 Must not destroy current product benefits
 Key Success Factors
 Interoperability
 Mass Production at Low Cost
 Ease of Use
End User Experience

16. SUMMARY
It can be said that the name Bluetooth refers not only to a technology, but also to a
standard and a specification. And few standards have taken off as Bluetooth has,
capturing the attention anddevelopment money of major corporations throughout the
world. If it can live up to its expectations and meet the needs of a global marketplace in
an easy-to-use, straightforward manner, it promises to become (like its eponymous King
Harald) a uniting force in the wireless communications world. This chapter helps you get
started with Bluetooth technology by covering the basics:

 The origin of the Bluetooth name

 An overview of the Bluetooth components
  An introduction to the terminology of Bluetooth
 A quick look at Bluetooth networking concepts

17. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bluetooth SIG, http://www.bluetooth.com

2. Bluetooth specifications,
http://www.bluetooth.com/developer/specification/specification.asp
3. A good explanation of the seven-layer OSI Reference Model,
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/introint.htm#xtocid130
454
4. Bluetooth support in Windows XP,
http://www.microsoft.com/hwdev/tech/network/bluetooth/
5. Bluetooth Security Architecture white paper,
http://www.bluetooth.com/developer/whitepaper/whitepaper.asp
6. For more detail contact me SUNIL PANJETA 09466669662