Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87 Facts: Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing

him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes. reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction. Issues: Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries are light felonies. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed. Held: 1. On penalty imposed The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies). The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods. 2. Classification of each felony involved Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor. Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner. 3. Rule on complex crime Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties. 4. Right to assail duplicity of information

Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived. 5. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.

Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription: 1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC. 2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under th e RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding. Zaldivia v Reyes G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277 Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendants counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period. Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription. Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. **Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding. Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr. Facts: Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in the municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal. She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but it was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent judge.

Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed against her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends that criminal cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not require preliminary investigation and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the Prosecutor's office. She also invoked Act No. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Concluding that the case should have been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2 month statutory period. The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor's office it suspends the prescriptive period. Issue: Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was filed on the prosecutor's office? Decision: Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription. Ruling: As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor's office is sufficient to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal's office; the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a penalty of arresto menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It must be the filing of the case in court which will interrupt the period from running. Robin Padilla vs. CA Summary of the Case: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellants car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires was heard and thus, made the officer run out and investigate. Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hotpursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the Police. When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the windows with his hands raised. The officers then noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hit-and-run incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal. The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and pointing to the police while saying iyan kinuha ang baril ko, as if it was in the movies. The gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin. Now, Robins defense was that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. Robin Padilla was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal possession of firearms. He was in possession of a .357 caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6 live ammunitions, One M-16 baby Armalite Rifle with ammunitions, One .380 Pietro Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. Relation to Article3: Section 2. Robin claimed that there was no search warrant or warrant of arrest thus, making his arrest illegal and the evidences inadmissible. The Bill of rights purpose is to put limit to the governments power. In the People vs. Marti

case, the government was not involved. In this case, the government is involved but it was not illegal. Why? According to whats written in the case, a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person: (a) when the person has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit and offense, (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The instances above clearly explain the legality of the arrest. Robin Padilla, my idol had first sideswiped a balut vendor and the incident was heard by Manarang and he saw Robin fled away from the scene, thus, committing a hit-and-run. And Enrique Manarang was a peace officer. When he was halted, the firearms were revealed to the police officers without their act of searching. The firearms were in plain view. And the firearms were found by the police in their pursuit of their official duties. And the police have the right as to where they are because they were in pursuit of Robin when they found the firearms. BROCKA v ENRILE 1990 November 10, 2010 NATURE: Petition for Habeas Corpus FACTS: 63 jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers Jan 28 85 64 petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC 65 all petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended 66 urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 85 On Feb. 7 or 9 85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds BUT 67 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 85 o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al. 68 Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal complainants affidavits had not yet been received o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been officially received informed that said charges were never coursed through the Records Office o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsels request that they be given 7 days within which counsel may confer with their clients no such requirement required under the rules 69 Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on orders of then Pres.Marcos release narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:

o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85 o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition. 70 Hence, this petition. o Brocka, et al contend: bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined YES RATIO: GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final EXCEPTIONS: To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation When double jeopardy is clearly apparent When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had been denied Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials in bad faith: 1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT This PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85 upon receipt of TCs order of release violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48 hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile) Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it violates Court pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile) 2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information [instead of a petition for HC] Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing: 1. spurious and inoperational PDA 2. sham and hasty PI clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew IF-THEN RULE: If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined. xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 105965-70 09 August 1999Facts: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navydesignated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latters supervisor, onmatters relating the activities

of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations forEstafa through falsification of official documents and one information forviolation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) werefiled with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused foralleged. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unitreceived 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. TheSandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against someof the accused after a comprehensive investigation.Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial andnot the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or theperson of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 whichprovides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case.Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal casesor the person of the petitionerDecision: The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determinedby the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus,Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filingof the informations and as now prescribed by law. RA 8249, the latestamendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that such willhave jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the PhilippinesArmy and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank.In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, hisposition as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains and all officers of higher rank. It must be noted that both theNATURE of the OFFENSE and the POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE ACCUSED areconditions SINE QUA NON before Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the personof the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan Law which states that incase where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding toSalary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in theproper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129.Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense chargedsince under Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said lawshall be punished with imprisonment for not less than Six years and Onemonth to FIFTEEN years. The indictment of the petitioner therefore cannot fallwithin the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC. Defensor-Santiago Vs. Vasquez 217 SCRA 633 G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993 Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired. Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to

maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.) Consequently, CPAI cannot be permitted to wrest from petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the administration of thedisputed property until after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts. It is neither fair nor legal to bind aparty to the result of a suit or proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested with theappropriate jurisdiction is null and void.The petition is GRANTED. Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 147406) FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In hisappeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitionerfrom questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein andwithout him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any timeeven for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to thedoctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appealto the CA HELD: No.RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised atany stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous tothat of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raisedso belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings hadalready been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the saidcourts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive toshow cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be consideredas an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is thenatural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with ManilaSurety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was

issued against the defendant.Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu inview of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlierdecision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior courtis in issue. ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before theSurety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barredfrom raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or byrecord, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been heldthat after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser toquestion the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and thenaccepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in theformal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question isresolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid,p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what isurged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar,the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted forconsideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that thecourt a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing ananswer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in courtThe orders appealed from are affirmed