Lesaca vs Lesaca Facts: Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946.

He was survived by his second wife (Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. It appears that the deceased and his widow, Juana Felix, had lived together maritally since 1924 but were not married until December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death. Issues and Holdings: Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to legitimate minor children of the deceased pending liquidation of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance? Obviously, the answer should be the affirmative. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a retrovendendo before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not. In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer. Whether a standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and harvested after the death of the one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse. It should belong to the conjugal partnership ************************************************************************ Yaptinchay vs Torres Facts: Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity. Issue: Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership." Held: But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown

before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to coownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. ************************************************************************ So vs Valera The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced to each other by a common friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student; the respondent was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship, culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni) in their relationship and subsequent marriage. Petitioner related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these documents would only be used if they decide to get married. He maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991. Petitioner shows the ff proof for psychological incapacity and initiated proceedings that will annul his marriage with respondent: respondent did not want to practice her profession after passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her Respondent locks petitioner out of the house leaving him to sleep in his car. Respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever there were no clients Respondent threw petitioner and his things out of the house and refused to take him back. Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioners clients Respondent was not the one who took care of their children

Issues: W/N the marriage was void ab initio due to psychological incapacity using proof presented by petitioner. Held: Petition (to hold that marriage is void ab initio) Denied. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage. RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage. RTC decision was based on psychological incapacity and not the absence of requisites. Marriage license submitted by

petitioner as evidence is prima facie evidence of the essential and formal requisites. Petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Molina case: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Normal course of annulment: Marriage, cohabitation, annulment due to psychological incapacity. Present case: cohabitation (almost 18 years), marriage, psychological incapacity. ************************************************************************ Odayat v Amante FACTS: Petitioner filed an administrative case against respondent for Oppression, Falisfication and Immorality. For Immorality, petitioner claims that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive; Long before he filed his complaint against respondent, he came to know that the respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and wife; that they had several children and that one of the reasons why he filed his complaint against the respondent was because of their land dispute.

Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella. He also admits that he has been living with Beatriz Jornada whom he married. Respondent, however, claims he was coerced into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already married to another man, and they separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her whereabouts. To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the certification of the Local Civil Registrar attesting that Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondents contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales. HELD: The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena Abellas marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 of the New Civil code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. ************************************************************************ Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy Facts: Karl Wiegel filed for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to another man. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. She asked to be allowed to present evidence to support her claim. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. Issues: W/N there was a need for Lilia to present evidence. Held: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to Karl Wiegel is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. ************************************************************************

Carino vs Carino Facts: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. ISSUE: W/N the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the

FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all. ************************************************************************ People vs Cobar Facts: In September 1964, Marriage License No. 3942696 was issued at Marawi City in favor of appellant and Rosalita Decena. On September 1, 1965 or about a year later, the two were married. On July 19, 1991, appellant contracted a second marriage with co-accused Genara Herodias. At that time, appellants marriage with Rosalita Decena had not been judicially declared void ab initio. Issues: Is a party to a void marriage who remarries without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of such marriage guilty of bigamy? Under the foregoing facts, is appellant liable for bigamy? Trial court believes so, this despite its ruling, which we find to be in accord with law and the evidence, that accused Vicente Cobar and his first wife Rosalita Decena not having made use of their marriage license No. 3942490 within the limited period of 120 days from its issuance in September 1964, the same was automatically cancelled thereafter and their marriage contracted on September 1, 1965 was deemed solemnized without a license and as such void from the beginning. The Solicitor General disagreed and recommended appellants acquittal for the following reasons: An accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, it was established as a fact that appellants supposed first marriage was void ab initio; hence, he was never legally married to Rosalita Decena. However, the trial court convicted appellant based on the Supreme Courts pronouncement in Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, supra. The trial courts reliance on Domingo is misplaced. The pronouncement thereon has no relevance to a prosecution for bigamy. The petition which gave rise to the aforesaid decision seeks the reversal of Court of Appeals ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial courts order denying petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. The Supreme Court summarized the issues confronting it in said case as follows: First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary, if in affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-5 is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. The Domingo v. Court of Appeals case is the authority for the rule that in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to

enter into another marriage is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void; otherwise, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio. However, for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses as well as an action for the custody and support of their latters presumptive legitime, (i)n such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. In convicting appellant, the trial court disregarded the doctrine laid down in Domingo and focused wholly on the Supreme Courts casual comment which actually cited the opinion of J. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, found on page 46 of her book Handbook On the Family Code of the Philippines, stating that Article 40 of the Family Code is also for the protection of the spouse who believing that his or her marriage is null and void, marries again and (w)ith the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code states: Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The foregoing opinion of J. Sempio-Diy only means that getting a court judgment declaring a previous marriage void ab initio makes matters clear between the parties and thus prevent the person who contracted a subsequent marriage from being exposed to a prosecution for bigamy. This is so because without such court declaration the other party to the previous marriage of his/her heirs naturally might contend that said marriage is valid, hence, raising doubts that the subsequent marriage could be bigamous. It being established that appellants first marriage is void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration, appellant is not liable for bigamy because the element that there should be a first valid marriage when he contracted the second one is lacking. We share the view of the Solicitor General. In addition to the reasons given in support thereof, we shall state our own justification for that view. Bigamy is committed by any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings (Article 349, RPC). Thus, constitutive of said crime are the following essential ingredients: ************************************************************************

People vs Mendoza Facts Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. ISSUE: W/N Mendoza is liable for bigamy? HELD: No. Acquitted. 1. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case (or someone wants to marry a third time and there is a subsisting marriage regardless of its validity). THUS, HIS MARRIAGE WITH LEMA IS NULL AND VOID WITHOUT NEED FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION. 2. Third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.

People vs Aragon Facts Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void. HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper. ************************************************************************

Gomez vs Lipana Facts The case at bar resolves the question whether Lipana forfeited his share in the conjugal partnership during the second marriage where he acted in bad faith. Lipana in this case contracted to marriages: o With Maria Loreto Ancino on 1930 o With Isidra Gomez on 1935, unknown to her was the first marriage. Lipana and Gomez acquired a property in Cubao, Quezon City; Torrens title in the name of Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez. Gomez died on February 1, 1958, intestate and childless and survived only by her sisters. Ofelia Gomez, administrator of the estate, instituted the action to forfeit Lipanas interest in the estate since the marriage with Isidra was void ab initio and Lipana gave the cause for nullity. Lower court favored the appellee, hence the appeal by Lipana with the ff errors: o That the lower court erred in collaterally attacking his marriage with Gomez holding it bigamous and void ab initio o Whether Article 1417 forfeited Lipanas share in the estate. (Article 1417 terminates conjugal partnership through: 1) dissolution of marriage 2) declaration of nullity; forfeiting the share of the spouse who acted in bad faith to the favor of the other spouse) SC affirmed that the second marriage was void and illegal (bigamous). However, it ruled that Article 1417 was no longer in force since the New Civil Code was already in effect since 1950 and Article 1417 should not be reckoned as of the celebration of marriage, rather to the dissolution, which in this case through death of Gomez. It did not forfeit Lipanas share on the estate, giving the other half to the conjugal partnership, being the only just and equitable solution. SC emphasized that since the first marriage has not been dissolved, the conjugal partnership has not ceased either, hence the first wife has interest in the husbands share in the property in dispute even if it was acquired during the second marriage. It also said that the second marriage, since entered into by the second wife in good faith established a conjugal partnership where the second wife has rights. ************************************************************************ Consuegra vs GSIS Facts: In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, with respondent Rosario Diaz and the second, which was

contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin Being a member of the GSIS when Consuegra died the proceeds of his life insurance to petitioner Basilia Berdin who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Consuegra was also entitled to retirement insurance. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, claims that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her. Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS. GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, entitled to and Basilia Berdin entitled to the other . It is the contention of appellants that the lower court erred in not holding that the designated beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose Consuegra are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance of said deceased. Issues: W/N the petitioners as the named beneficiaries in the life insurance become the automatic beneficiaries in the retirement plan as well. Held: If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy. GSIS ruled correctly that the proceeds of the retirement insurance should be divided equally between his first wife and his second wife, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith. In Gomez vs. Lipana, in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man, the SC held FOR THE FIRST WIFE: "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " FOR THE SECOND WIFE: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second

marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage." ************************************************************************ Tolentino vs Paras Facts: Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent while his marriage with petitioner, was still subsisting. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente." Petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from the private respondent to her own. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding

Maning died and at the time of his death he had two families living separately. The question of who the legal heirs of Maning arose. Lower court using an earlier ruling asserts that should go to Talina and her children and the other half to Nancy and her children. The petitioners contend that Maning died in 1964 when the New Civil Code had already superseded the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance with, the new codal provisions and not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable Issues: W/N the NCC has superseded the old Spanish code making Talina and her children the only legal successors of Manings estate. Held: We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules of Court, while the rights to the inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the New Civil Code. There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (Section 29: Illegal Marriages). How will estate be distributed? to Maning, to legal wife, Talina. Manings to be distributed as follows: to Talinas children, to Talina, to Nancys children as natural children. Nancy cannot inherit because their marriage was void ab initio. NOTE: This is in direct contradiction to Gomez vs Lipana and Consuegra vs GSIS. Both deaths occurred after the promulgation of the NCC and second marriages in both cases were entered into in good faith like Nancys.

Issues: W/N the petitioner is the surviving spouse of Amado. Held: Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made. ************************************************************************ Yap vs CA Facts: Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on December 11, 1948. Maning and Bianong were married in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices. Out of the marriage, two surviving heirs were produced: Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap. While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a married man. They had four children.