Dow Fire Explosion Index

THE INTEGRATION OF DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX
INTO PROCESS DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION

TO ACHIEVE AN INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

A Thesis

by

JAFFEE SUARDIN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

August 2005

Major Subject: Chemical Engineering
THE INTEGRATION OF DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

INTO PROCESS DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION

TO ACHIEVE AN INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

A Thesis

by

JAFFEE SUARDIN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Approved by:

Chair of Committee, M Sam Mannan
Committee Members, Mahmoud El-Halwagi
David Blackwell
Head of Department, Kenneth R Hall

August 2005

Major Subject: Chemical Engineering
iii

ABSTRACT

The Integration of Dow's Fire and Explosion Index into Process Design and
Optimization to Achieve an Inherently Safer Design. (August 2005)
Jaffee Suardin, B.S., Bandung Institute of Teknologi, Indonesia
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr Sam Mannan

The integration of the safety parameter into process design and optimization is
essential. However, there is no previous work in integrating the fire and explosion index
(F&EI) into design and optimization. This research proposed a procedure for integrating
safety into the design and optimization framework by using the safety parameter as
optimization constraint. The method used in this research is Dows Fire and Explosion
Index which is usually calculated manually.
This research automates the calculation of F&EI. The ability to calculate the
F&EI, to determine loss control credit factors and business interruption, and to perform
process unit risk analysis are unique features of this F&EI program. In addition to F&EI
calculation, the F&EI program provides descriptions of each item of the penalties,
chemicals/materials databases, the flexibility to submit known chemical/material data to
databases, and material factor calculations. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses are
automated by generating charts and expressions of F&EI as a function of material
inventory and pressure. The expression will be the focal point in the process of
integrating F&EI into process design and optimization framework.
iv

The proposed procedure of integrating F&EI into process design and
optimization framework is verified by applying it into reactor-distillation column
system. The final result is the optimum economic and inherently safer design for the
reactor and distillation column system.
v

DEDICATION
To Allah SWT for His endless blessing
To Mama for the continuous love, warmness and comfortness
To Daddy for the love, supports, critiques, encouragement and inspiration by being the
best chemical engineer Ive ever seen.
To my sisters Uni Nadia and Lucille who have showered me with sweet and caring love.
To Anis for her love, patience, and never-ending motivation.
To safety society for their continuous efforts in finding safety
take to learning as far as possible, but ALLAH SWT will not give its rewards until
you translate it into action"
(Mohammad SAW)
vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First of all, I would like to show my appreciation to Dr. Sam Mannan, as he is
not only my academic advisor but also my mentor in pursuing my dream. It has been my
pleasure to join his group. His enthusiasm and knowledge have been educational and a
key inspiration to my development as a safety consultant and a mature human being as
well.
I would like to express thanks to Dr. El-Halwagi for his kindness and his
knowledge in process optimization that has guided me throughout the research and
during my study in pursuing my masters degree. I also am grateful to Dr. Blackwell for
giving me ideas about economic matter. As we know, economics is really important in
performing process optimization.
I also thank Dr. Wang for reviewing my ideas and thesis, Zuher Syihab for
guiding me in computer programming and Tanya Mohan for her knowledge in using
LINGO.
I thank Mike OConnor for his endless support to the Mary Kay O'Connor
Process Safety Center to become the leading university institution in process safety. I
also acknowledge and thank Dr. West, Dr. Keren, and all group members and staff at the
Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center for their support and critiques. I also would
like to express thanks to Towanna Hubacek, Ninette Portales, Donna Startz and Mary
Cass for helping me with all the paperwork during my masters program.
Thanks to all my friends and colleagues for making this such a good experience
and making this city feel like home. I realize that many people contributed to my studies,
and I thank them all.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my mama, daddy, sisters and
Anis for their patience, understanding and support.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... iii
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................xi
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................xiv
CHAPTER
I INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................1
1.1 Overview.......................................................................................................1
1.2 Inherently Safer Design.................................................................................2
1.3 Safety Studies................................................................................................3
1.4 Hazard Indices...............................................................................................9
1.5 Process Safety, Design, and Optimization ..................................................11
1.6 Objectives....................................................................................................12
1.7 Contents of this Research............................................................................13
1.7.1 Design Stage Used in This Research..................................................13
1.7.2 Hazard Analysis Tools and Program Developer ................................15
1.7.3 Integrating Hazard Analysis into Process Design and Optimization .15
1.7.4 Case Study: Distillation Column, and Reactor...................................16
1.8 Organization of Thesis ................................................................................16
II DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX......................................................18
2.1 Overview.....................................................................................................18
2.2 Dows Fire and Explosion Index Calculations............................................19
2.2.1 Material Factor (MF)..........................................................................20
2.2.2 Process Unit Hazard Factor (F
3
).........................................................24
2.2.2.1 General Process Hazards (F
1
)................................................. 25
2.2.2.2 Special Process Hazards (F
3
) ................................................. 29
2.2.4 Loss Control Credit Factors ...............................................................42
viii

CHAPTER Page
2.2.4.1 Process Control Credit Factors (C
1
)....................................... 43
2.2.4.2 Material Isolation Credit Factor (C
2
) ..................................... 44
2.2.4.3 Fire Protection Credit factor (C
3
)........................................... 45
2.2.5 Process Unit Risk Analysis Summary................................................46
2.2.5.1 The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) ................................... 46
2.2.5.2 The Radius of Exposure......................................................... 46
2.2.5.3 The Area of Exposure ............................................................ 46
2.2.5.4 Value of the Area of Exposure............................................... 47
2.2.5.5 Damage Factor ....................................................................... 47
2.2.5.6 Base Maximum Probable Property Damage (Base MPPD)... 49
2.2.5.7 Loss Control Credit Factor..................................................... 49
2.2.5.8 Actual Maximum Probable Property Damage ....................... 49
2.2.5.9 Maximum Probable Days Outage (MPDO)........................... 49
2.2.5.10 Business Interruption (BI).................................................... 50
2.3 Fire and Explosion Index Form...................................................................51
III REACTOR -DISTILLATION COLUMN DESIGN
AND ECONOMIC PARAMETER...................................................................55
3.1 Background .................................................................................................55
3.1.1 Reactor ...............................................................................................55
3.1.2 Distillation Column............................................................................57
3.1.3 Economic as Objective Functions of Optimization............................57
3.2 The Method of Lang....................................................................................59
3.3 Distillation Column and Reactor Design Equations ...................................60
3.3.1 Column Distillation Design Equations...............................................60
3.3.1.1 The Diameter and the Height of the Column......................... 62
3.3.1.2 The Distillation Column f.o.b Purchase Cost Estimation ...... 64
3.3.2 Reactor Design Equations ..................................................................67
3.3.2.1 The Reactor f.o.b Purchase Cost Estimation.......................... 69
IV OPTIMIZATION...............................................................................................71
4.1 Overview.....................................................................................................71
4.2 Basic of Optimization .................................................................................72
V FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT.................76
5.1 Overview.....................................................................................................76
5.2 LINGO
......................................................................................................78

ix

CHAPTER Page
5.2.1 LINGO

Syntax and Functions ..........................................................78
5.3 Syntax Used in Microsoft
Visual Basic Application (VBA) ....................79

5.4 Guidelines for Operating F&EI Program....................................................86
5.4.1 F&EI Navigator..................................................................................86
5.4.2 Material Factor Determination...........................................................89
5.4.2.1 Material Data Available in the F&EI Program Databases ..... 89
5.4.2.2 Known Data ........................................................................... 89
5.4.2.3 Material Data Unknown......................................................... 90
5.4.3 Fire and Explosion Index Calculation................................................91
5.4.4 General Process Hazards....................................................................92
5.4.5 Special Process Hazards.....................................................................93
5.4.6 Process Control Credit Factor ............................................................95
5.4.7 Process Unit Risk Analysis ................................................................96
5.4.8 Sensitivity Analysis Chart ..................................................................97
VI CASE STUDIES AND VALIDATION ..........................................................100
6.1 Overview...................................................................................................100
6.2 F&EI Program Validation.........................................................................102
6.2.1 Case Study 1: Bhopal Incident .........................................................103
6.2.1.1 Problem Statement ............................................................... 103
6.2.1.2 F&EI Program Calculation .................................................. 103
6.2.2 Case Study 2: The Nitric Acid Plants...............................................105
6.2.2.2 F&EI Program Calculation .................................................. 106
6.2.3 Case Study 3: Ammonia Synthesis Reactor .....................................107
6.2.3.2 F&EI Calculation with F&EI Program................................ 108
6.2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis.............................................................. 109
6.2.4 Case Study 3: The Installation of a New Railcar Tank Unloading
Facility..............................................................................................112
6.2.4.2 F&EI Program Calculation and Results............................... 113
6.3 Verification of F&EI Program..................................................................113
6.4 Case Study: Reactor-Distillation Column System....................................115
6.4.1 Problem Statement ...........................................................................116
6.4.2 Objective Functions and Optimization Model .................................117
6.4.2.1 Reactor ................................................................................. 117
6.4.2.2 Distillation Column.............................................................. 117
6.5 Summary ...................................................................................................121

x

CHAPTER Page
VII CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK......................................................123
7.1 Conclusion.................................................................................................123
7.2 Future Work ..............................................................................................124
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................126
APPENDIX A................................................................................................................129
APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................176
VITA ..............................................................................................................................179

xi

LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1.1 Typical layers of protection for CPI.................................................................5
Fig. 1.2. Layers of protection characteristics..................................................................7
Fig. 1.3 Inherently safer process design requires no or less additional LOP ................8
Fig. 1.4 Potential incidents for inherently safer design .................................................9
Fig. 2.1 Procedures for calculating F&EI and other risk analysis information...........21
Fig. 2.2. Penalty for Liquids or gases in process (Plot of Equation 2.6) ......................35
Fig. 2.3. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to liquids or gases in
Storage (Plot of Equations (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9))..........................................36
Fig. 2.4. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to combustible solids in
storage/dust in process (Plot of Equations (2.10) and (2.11)) ........................37
Fig. 2.5. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to fired equipment
(Plot of Equations (2.12) and (2.13)) .............................................................40
Fig. 2.6. Determining MPDO from Actual MPPD (Plot of Equations (2.29),
( 2.30), and (2.31)) .........................................................................................51
Fig. 2.7. Process unit analysis summary form..............................................................52
Fig. 2.8. Loss control credit factor form.......................................................................53
Fig. 2.9. Fire and cxplosion index Form.......................................................................54
Fig. 3.1. Costs of reactor and distillation column as a function of
reactor conversion ..........................................................................................56
Fig. 3.2. Distillation column.........................................................................................61
xii

Page
Fig. 5.1. Example: Syntax for exothermic chemical reaction penalty..........................82
Fig. 5.2. User-defined functions in microsoft excel .....................................................83
Fig. 5.3. Example of List Box for exothermic chemical reaction ................................84
Fig. 5.4. Example of CheckBox for operation instruction/procedure credit factor ......85
Fig. 5.5. Check box for material factor determination .................................................86
Fig. 5.6. F&EI navigator...............................................................................................87
Fig. 5.7. The process data for listed data ListBox ........................................................90
Fig. 5.8. The data input form........................................................................................91
Fig. 5.9. The material factor determination for unlisted substances page ....................92
Fig. 5.10. The general process hazards page ..................................................................93
Fig. 5.11. The special process hazard data ListBox .......................................................94
Fig. 5.12. The special process hazard penalty ListBox ..................................................95
Fig. 5.13. The loss control credit factor ListBox............................................................96
Fig. 5.14. The process unit risk analysis summary ListBox...........................................97
Fig. 5.15. Sensitivity chart for the weight of material and its equation..........................98
Fig. 5.16. Sensitivity analysis form................................................................................99
Fig. 6.1. Proposed procedure for integrating safety into process design
and optimization to achieve inherently safer design ....................................101
Fig. 6.2. The production of nitric acid from the oxidation of ammonia.....................105
Fig. 6.3. Sensitivity analysis for operating pressure and material inventory..............112
Fig. 6.4. Rector-distillation column optimization without safety constraint ..............119
xiii

Page
Fig. 6.5. Reactor-distillation column system with F&EI value
as the safety constraint .................................................................................120
xiv

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1.1 The procedures of plant design ......................................................................13
Table 2.1 N
F
classifications and material factor (MF) determination guide ..................22
Table 2.2 Qualitative descriptions for determining reactivity value (N
R
)......................23
Table 2.3 Material factor temperature adjustment .........................................................24
Table 2.4 Qualitative descriptions to determine health factor (N
H
) ...............................30
Table 2.5 Dust explosion penalty...................................................................................32
Table 2.6 High pressure penalty for flammable & combustible liquids.........................33
Table 2.7 Hot oil heat exchange system penalty............................................................41
Table 2.8 Degree of Hazard for F&EI............................................................................42
Table 2.9 Credit Factors for wet pipe and dry pipe used in indoor manufacturing
areas and warehouses .....................................................................................45
Table 6.1 The comparison of results by Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan (2002)
and by F&EI program ..................................................................................104
Table 6.2 The comparison of results by Sinnot (1996) and by F&EI program............106
Table 6.3 The results calculated by F&EI program and by Gupta, Khemani,
& Mannan (2003) .........................................................................................109
Table 6.4 F&EI value, inventory = 24,000 lbs, pressure relief = 1550 psig,
400 psig < operating pressure < 1500 psig...................................................110
Table 6.5 F&EI value, 14,000 lbs < inventory < 58,000 lbs,
pressure relief = 1550 psig, operating pressure = 1469 psig........................111
xv

Page
Table 6.6 The results given by Crowl & Louvar (2002) and by F&EI program..........113
Table 6.7 Reactor optimization ....................................................................................117
Table 6.8 Objective function and economic constraints ..............................................118
1
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW
Along with its advances and benefits to the society, the chemical industry has
also brought along the hazards that need to be managed appropriately. Unfortunately in
some occurrences, lack of knowledge, technology, or failures in management systems
has led to tragic incidents. Examples are the Flixborough incident with 28 fatalities
(Crowl & Louvar, 2001), the Bhopal incident with more than 2,000 fatalities (Crowl &
Louvar, 2001), the Pasadena-Texas explosion with 23 fatalities (Crowl & Louvar, 2001),
and the more recent Texas City-refinery explosion which cost the lives of 15 people, not
to mention multiple injuries, capital loss, lawsuits, decreased stock price, ruined
image/brand, etc. Loss prevention, as the term used by insurance industry, comes not
only from the cost of replacing the damaged plant or equipment and third party claim but
also from the loss of revenue from the opportunity of production and sales.
What exactly had happened? and what are the reasons behind those
incidents? are the questions that can be raised. In answering those questions, we need to
understand what the hazards are. Adapted from the Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS), hazard is defined as physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential for
causing harm to people, the environment, or property (Crowl, 1996). It is very important

This thesis follows the style and format of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries.

2

to note that the hazards are intrinsic and are the basic properties of the material or its
conditions of use. For example, 10,000 lbs of propane holds the same amount of energy
which could be released by 28 tons of TNT. Those energies are inherent to the propane,
cannot be changed, and will be released when equipment or other failure happens and
leads to an incident.
While an inherently safe plant infers a plant that has no hazards on an absolute
basis, such plant with zero risk might be impossible to design and to operate.
Therefore, the need to manage hazards and risks strategically and systematically arises
and one of the strategies is inherently safer design concept (as opposed to inherently safe
plant). In addition, the best strategy seeks to combine inherently safer design with
process design and optimization at the early stages of design where the degree of
freedom for modification is still high.
In the next sections, the objectives, the details of inherently safer design concept,
pertinent previous research, process design and optimization, and their current industry
practice are discussed. The description of the methodology, design and optimization
models, and summary of the research are presented as well.

1.2 INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN
While layers of protection assist in controlling and managing risks associated
with the hazards, it is better to reduce the inherent hazard. The term Inherently Safer
Design started appearing in safety discussion after Trevor Kletz introduced this concept
3

as an identifiable element of process safety in one of his most famous phrases What
You Dont Have Cant Leak.
Inherently safer design infers the elimination of hazards as much as possible out
of a chemical or physical process permanently as opposed to using layers of protection.
It is a challenge for engineers to design an optimal and inherently safer process to
produce good quality and high yield products within acceptable economic limits. There
are four primary principles of inherently safer design concept proposed by Kletz (1991):
1. Intensification to reduce the inventories of hazardous materials as more
inventory of hazardous chemicals mean more hazards.
2. Substitution to use less hazardous materials in the process.
3. Attenuation to operate a process at less dangerous process conditions (pressure,
temperature, flow rate, etc).
4. Limitation of effects to design the process according to the hazards offered by
the process in order to reduce the effects of the hazards.
In the US, inherently safer design started receiving more attention following a highly-
praised paper presented by Kletz in 1985 at the 19
th
Loss Prevention Symposium of the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (Hendershot, 1999).

1.3 SAFETY STUDIES
In the recent years, public concern about safety issues has increased due to risk
posed by more complex and more extreme conditions of the chemical industries to the
employees, communities living near the site, properties, and environment. In the
4

Chemical Process Industries (CPI) point of view, there are also potential economic and
business losses. Therefore, CPI has had significant efforts to manage and to control the
hazards. The most common and traditional approach has focused on layers of protection
(LOP) where additional safety devices and features are added to the process, as shown in
Figure 1.2.
The LOP method has been successful in producing an excellent safety record.
However, this approach has several disadvantages as listed below (Crowl 1996):
LOP increase the complexity of the process, and hence the capital and
operating cost. In the oil and gas industries, 15-30 % of the capital cost goes
to safety issues and pollution prevention (Palaniappan & Srinivasan, 2004).
The hazards within the process remain, even when LOP are installed and are
built based on the anticipation of incidents, as shown in Figure 1.2 (a). Since
nature might find creative ways to release hazards, there are always dangers
from unanticipated failure mechanisms that the LOP are not ready for, as
shown in Figure 1.2 (b).
Since no LOP can be perfect, failures or degradation in LOP may pose risks
offered by the hazards that lead to incidents, as shown in Figure 1.2 (c).
Other efforts by the industries and researchers toward safety studies tend to focus
on hazard identification and control. There has been some work in developing more
advanced hazard and risk analysis methods such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-Consequences
Analysis (CCA), Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and
5

Basic
Control
Critical Alarms, Human/
Manual ntervention
Process
Design
Feed
, F,
XF
Conden
ser
Reboiler
Top
Product,
XD, D
Bottom
Product,
B, XB
Safety
nstrumented
System
Physical Protection
(Relief devices, etc)
Emergency
Responses

Fig. 1.1 Typical layers of protection for CPI (Adapted from Hendershot, 1999)

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) in addition to traditional methods such
as check list, safety review, relative ranking, and What-if analysis (Wang, 2004).
These methods provide qualitative or quantitative information about the hazards and
risks posed by the process, but have not been integrated into process design and
optimization framework.
6

In this section, several inherent safety efforts taken by US corporations and US
affiliates of European company are listed:
Dow Chemical Company Developed the Dow Fire and Explosion Index
(AIChE, 1994a) and the Dow Chemical Exposure Index (AIChE, 1994b) as
hazard ranking methodology based on inherent safety principles.
Exxon Chemical Company Described inherent safety, health and
environment review process based on a life cycle approach (French,
Williams, & Wixom, 2004).
Rohm and Haas Major Incident Prevention Program used checklist based
on inherent safety principles for hazard elimination and risk reduction
(Hendershot, 1999).

Safety studies were not only considered by the industries, but also by the US
federal government by issuing federal regulations such as Process Safety Management
(PSM) of the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations (OSHA), and Risk
Management Program (RMP) of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Overall impression on these efforts is that inherently safer design principles have
not been systematically applied. Comparison between traditional efforts and inherently
safer design must be performed to understand the importance of inherently safer design
principles. As opposed to layer of protection concept, the concept of inherently safer
design is to reduce the inherent hazards rather than to control them. There are two things
about having lower hazards: they need lesser LOP, less complex LOP and offer lower
magnitude of hazards, as shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.
7

Fig. 1.2. Layers of protection characteristics
(a) LOP reduces the anticipated potential incidents, (b) LOP does not reduce unanticipated
potential incidents, (c) degraded LOP does not reduce any potential incidents (adapted from
Hendershot, 1999)

Another impression on the traditional approaches is that the efforts focus on
hazard identification and control without actively changing the design. This research
seeks to integrate inherently safer design concept into process design and optimization
using well-accepted hazard identification method, which will be discussed in the next
8

section. The integration is most effective at the early design stages

where there are a lot
of degrees of freedom for making changes. In addition, the integration of safety into
process design and optimization at the early stages of design will show that safety
parameters have active role and give strong feedback to the basic process design
strategy.

LOP 1
LOP 2
Process
Design
Feed
, F,
XF
Conden
ser
Reboiler
Top
Product,
XD, D
Bottom
Product,
B, XB

Fig. 1.3 Inherently safer process design requires no or less additional LOP

9

Fig. 1.4 Potential incidents for inherently safer design (adapted from Hendershot, 1999)

1.4 HAZARD INDICES
Most methodologies such as HAZOP, FMEA, and FTA are applicable later in the
design stage and require significant funding, special expertise, detailed data and time
(Khan, Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a). On the other hand, hazard indices offers some
characteristics which are applicable to the early stage of design: they can be done
quickly, and provide score, penalty, or credit that is easy to interpret, enables
comparisons among several design options, and does not require detailed data and
special expertise.
There are several hazard indices available as tools for chemical process loss
prevention and risk management. Although no index methodology can cover all safety
parameters, Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) and Safety Weighted Hazard Index
(SWeHI) are found to be robust (Khan, Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a). The F&EI is the most
10

widely known and used in the chemical industries. The following are indices available in
the industries:
Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) (AIChE, 1994a) and Dows Chemical
Exposure Hazards (AIChE, 1994b) as tools to determine relative ranking of fire,
explosion, and chemical exposure hazards.
SWeHI as a tool to define fire, explosion, and toxic release hazards (Khan, Sadiq,
& Amyotte, 2003a).
Environmental Risk Management Screening Tools (ERMST
) from Four
Elements, Inc. for ranking environmental hazards including air, ground water,
surface water pollution (Khan, Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a).
Mond Index as a tool to define fire, explosion, and toxic release hazard (Khan,
Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a).
Hazardous Waste Index (HWI) as a tool for flammability, reactivity, toxicity, and
corrosivity hazard of waste materials (Khan, Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a).
Transportation Risk Screening Model (ADLTRS
) as a tool for determining risk

to people and environment posed by chemical transportation operations (Khan,
Sadiq, & Amyotte, 2003a).
Inherent Safety Index, which was developed by Heikkila (1999) of Helsinki
University of Technology. This method classifies safety factors into two
categories, chemical and process inherent safety. The chemical inherent safety
includes the choice of material used in the whole process by looking at its heat of
reaction, flammability, explosiveness, toxicity, corrosivity, and incompatibility
11

of chemicals. The process inherent safety covers the process equipment and its
conditions such as inventory, pressure, temperature, type of process equipment,
and structure of the process.
Overall Inherent Safety Index, which was developed by Edwards & Lawrence
(1993) to measure the inherent safety potential for different routes of reaction to
obtain the same product.
Fuzzy Logic-based Inherent Safety Index (FLISI), which was developed by
Gentile (2004) of Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University.
One of the major problems in applying inherent safety is that safety mostly based on the
qualitative principles that cannot be easily be evaluated and analyzed. The FLISI was an
attempt to use hierarchical fuzzy logic to measure inherent safety and provide conceptual
framework for inherent safety analysis. The fuzzy logic is very helpful for combining
qualitative information (expert judgment) and quantitative data (numerical modeling) by
using fuzzy IF-THEN rules.

1.5 PROCESS SAFETY, DESIGN, AND OPTIMIZATION
Currently optimization is performed as an attempt to enhance the process design
and the operation conditions of equipment to achieve the largest production, the greatest
profit, minimum production cost, the least energy usage, etc. However, neither objective
functions nor constraint conditions contain safety parameters in the traditional process
optimization. Safety studies are usually performed after process design and optimization.
12

Safety studies as part of process design and optimization are an iterative
procedure and there will not be a single correct or safe solution. Thus, a trade off
must be considered, especially when cost benefit analysis is involved. The objective of
safety studies is to reduce the frequency and the magnitude of hazardous events as long
as economically practicable. All design engineers must be aware of those hazards and
make sure that the design is at an acceptable risk level.
Safety is a focal point of any process design that must be balanced with many
other factors such as economics, practicality, technology, market, etc (Mansfield &
Cassidy, 1994). Safety must be integrated in all aspects of design starting from
conceptual to detailed design. Therefore, safety must be integrated into the overall
design procedure and presented alongside with other objectives and constraints
(Mansfield & Cassidy, 1994).

1.6 OBJECTIVES
It is essential to integrate safety into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design. Therefore, this research is to integrate Dows Fire and Explosion
Index into process design and optimization to achieve inherently safer design.
The objectives of this research are:
1. To computerize Dows Fire and Explosion Index Calculation
2. To generate fire and explosion hazards expressions as a function of operating pressure
and the amount of materials in the process units based on the Dows Fire and
Explosion Index.
13

3. To optimize the reactor and distillation column as case study with economic,
performance, and safety parameters as the constraints.
4. To develop a general procedure for integrating safety parameters into process design
and optimization.

1.7 CONTENTS OF THIS RESEARCH
To achieve the objectives stated above, there are steps, methods and limitation
that are applied to this research. This section discusses the detailed contents of this
research.

1.7.1 Design Stage Used in This Research
Table 1.1 provides the procedure of plant design (Mansfield & Cassidy, 1994).
This research aims at integrating safety at an early stage of design, specifically process
conceptual design.
Table 1.1. The procedures of plant design (Mansfield & Cassidy, 1994)
Decision Point Key Question/Decisions Information Used
Initial Specification

What product
What throughput
Market research
R&D new product ideas
Process Synthesis Route How to make the product
What route, what reactions
and materials
R&D chemists research
Known synthesis routes and
techniques
Chemical Flowsheet Flow rate, conversion, Process synthesis route, lab
14

Table 1.1. Continued
Decision Point Key Question/Decisions Information Used
pressure, temperature,
solvents, etc.
pilot scale trials and
knowledge of existing
process.
Process Flowsheet Batch vs continuous
operations
Unit operation selection
Control philosophy
Info above plus process
engineering design
principles and experience.
Process Conceptual Design Equipment selection and
sizing, inventory of process,
overdesign/flexibility,
preliminary plant layout,
material construction
As above plus equipment
suppliers data, raw material
data, company design
procedures and
requirements
Process Detailed Design Detailed specification based
on concept
Process conceptual design
and codes/standard and
procedures on past
project/design

15

1.7.2 Hazard Analysis Tools and Program Developer
It is essential to integrate process design with a well-accepted hazard index.
Dows Fire and Explosion index (F&EI) 7
th
edition is employed for fire and explosion
hazard analysis. To facilitate the calculation, F&EI calculation is computerized by
developing a built in Excel program with Microsoft Visual Basic
Application.
After developing a mathematical model of the process under study, optimization
is basically solving the model. Hence, an advanced computational solver is needed to run
the calculation faster and more efficiently. There are a lot of optimization solvers
available. This research employs LINGO
optimization software to handle the

optimization model because of LINGO
s simplicity, availability, and researchers

familiarity as well.

1.7.3 Integrating Hazard Analysis into Process Design and Optimization
Most safety analyses are qualitative and an equation that relates safety to process
parameters is hardly available. On the other hand, optimization requires mathematical
model or equations. Hence, it is impossible to design and optimize the process to obtain
optimal and inherently safer design without equations. This research generates the
equation relating safety to process components from the well-accepted hazard analysis
method, Dows Fire and Explosion Index. Fire and explosion hazard are expressed as a
function of pressure and the amount of hazardous chemicals in the process unit. We can
also see the effects of having safety as one of the optimization constraints on process
design and optimization.
16

Economic factors are the driving force of the process design and optimization,
and are normally used as optimization objective functions. This research will combine
process unit performance, economic performance and safety parameter into one
optimization case. The resulting design is expected to be optimal, inherently safer, and
cost effective.

1.7.4 Case Study: Distillation Column, and Reactor
Basic chemical engineering processes includes mixing, separating, and reaction.
Mixing might occur in the reactor and be combined with reaction. A separator is usually
used to separate important products produced from a reactor. The reactor-separator
system is widely used and should be considered as a whole system since the output of
the reactor will define the type and the size of the separator. Therefore, a reactor and
distillation column system is used as a case study in this research.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I discusses the motivation,
objectives, and contents of this research. Chapter II discusses the hazard analysis method
used in this research, Dows Fire and Explosion Index (FEI). All procedures, limitations,
equations, qualitative expressions, options, important guidance, and other detailed data
are provided. Chapter III discusses the selection of the reactor and distillation column
system, their performance and economic factors in the case study of this research.
Chapter IV covers the theory of optimization, kinetic, design, and economic models used
17

in the optimization of the case study. Chapter V discusses the development of the F&EI
program using Microsoft Visual Basic
Application, Microsoft Excel
and LINGO

optimization solver.
Chapter VI recaps the results of this research while Chapter VII gives
conclusions and future works that can be done based on this research. The appendix will
provide all codes and databases employed in the programming of F&EI calculations.

18

2
CHAPTER II
DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX*

2.1 OVERVIEW
Dows Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is the most widely used hazard index
and has been revised six times since 1967. The latest edition (7
th
edition), which was
published in 1994, is employed in this research. AIChE (1994) describes F&EI as the
quantitative measurements which are based on historical data, energy potential of the
materials under evaluation, and the extent to which loss prevention practices are
currently applied. F&EI is valuable as a guide to decide whether it is necessary for
process designers to consider other less hazardous materials and/or other process routes
(Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan, 2002). Moreover, F&EI helps engineers to be aware of
the hazards in each process unit while making important decisions in reducing the
severity and/or the probability of the potential incident.
F&EI relates process hazards to process information (i.e., process conditions,
materials, type of equipment, and other characteristics of the process) in terms of
penalties and credit factors. It should be borne in mind that not every penalty is
applicable to the process under evaluation so that careful judgment should be made and
discussed with the expert if necessary. F&EI is based on the worst case which means
only the most hazardous material are evaluated at a time in a specific operational state

*This chapter is a summary of and all tables and Figure 2.1, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 are reprinted with permission
from Dows Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Giude, by American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE), 1994, AIChE, New York, Copyright 2005 by AIChE. All rights reserved
19

(i.e., start up, shut down, and normal operation). For example, when a process unit has
hazards posed by flammable liquids and dusts, F&EI must be determined based on both
flammable liquids and dusts. Then, the higher F&EI and business interruption must be
the one that is reported to the management as the worst case.
The details of procedures, guidelines, and equations to determine the penalties
and the credit factors of the F&EI are described in the next section. It is very important
to understand that all of the information provided in this chapter is primarily a summary
of the method given in Dows Fire and Explosion Hazard Classification Guide 7
th

edition which was published in 1994 by American Institute of Chemical engineers
(AIChE).

2.2 DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX CALCULATIONS
F&EI calculation is composed of steps as shown in Figure 2.1 (AIChE, 1994)
and is discussed below. To calculate F&EI, the following documents are required
(AIChE, 1994):
1. Plot of the plant/process and/or process flow sheet
2. Replacement cost data for the installed process equipment under study
3. Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide, 7
th
Edition
4. Fire and Explosion Index, Loss Control Credit Factors, Process Unit Analysis
Summary, and Manufacturing Unit Risk Analysis Summary Form.
The method starts with the selection the process unit to be evaluated. The user
must select the process unit that could pose a significant impact in a potential incident.
20

Therefore, these important factors must be considered when selecting the process units
under evaluation (AIChE, 1994):
Chemical energy potential (Material factor).
Quantity of hazardous material.
Business interruption and capital density (dollars per ft
2
).
Operating pressure and temperature.
History of fire and explosion incident related to the same type of process
unit.
The importance of the process unit to the whole process.
The F&EI has two components, Process Unit Hazards Factor (F
3
) and Material
Factor (MF). F
3
consists of General Process Hazards (F
1
) and Special Process Hazards
(F
2
). The F&EI is determined by the Equations (2.1) and (2.2) (AIChE, 1994):
2 1 3
F F F = (2.1)
3
& F MF EI F = (2.2)
2 1 3
, , F F F and MF are discussed hereafter.

2.2.1 Material Factor (MF)
Material factor is the intrinsic rate of potential energy release caused by fire or
explosion produced by combustion or chemical reaction. It is the basic starting point of
the F&EI calculation and plays a critical role in the magnitude of the F&EI. MF is
obtained from reactivity value (N
R
) and flammability value (N
F
). Appendix A provides a
21

list of chemicals that are mostly used in the CPI and their MF. For unlisted chemicals,
the data can be obtained from the material safety data sheet (MSDS).

Select Pertinent Process
Unit
Calculate F1
General Process Hazards Factor
Detemine F&E
F&E = F3 x Material Factor
Calculate F2
Special Process Haxards Factor
Determine Area of Exposure
Determine Process Unit Hazards
Factor F3 = F1 x F2
Determine material factor
Calculate Loss Control
Credit Factor = C1 x C2 x C3
Determine Replacement Value in Exposure Area
Determine Base MPPD
Determine Actual MPPD
Determine MPDO
Determine B
Determine Damage Factor

Fig. 2.1 Procedures for calculating F&EI and other risk analysis information (Reproduced with
permission. Copyright 1994 AIChE)

22

Table 2.1 N
F
classifications and material factor (MF) determination guide (Reproduced with
Reactivity or Instability
Liquids & Gases
Flammablity or
Combustibility
1

NFPA
325 M
or 49
N
R
= 0 N
R
= 1 N
R
= 2 N
R
= 3 N
R
= 4
Non-combustible
2
N
F
= 0 1 14 24 29 40
F.P > 200
o
F N
F
= 1 4 14 24 29 40
100
o
F< F.P < 200
o
F N
F
= 2 10 14 24 29 40
73
o
F <F.P > 100
o
F or
F.P < 73
o
F and BP
100
o
F N
F
= 3 16 16 24 29 40
F.P < 73
o
F & BP <
100
o
F N
F
= 4 21 21 24 29 40
Combustible Dust or Mist
3
24 29 40
St-1 (Kst 200 bar m/sec) 16 16 24 29 40
St-2 (Kst = 201-300 bar m/sec) 21 21 24 29 40
St-3 (Kst > 300 bar m/sec) 24 24 24 29 40
Combustible Solids 24 29 40
Dense > 40 mm thick
4
N
F
= 0 4 14 24 29 40
Open < 40 mm thick
5
N
F
= 1 10 14 24 29 40
Foam, Fiber, Powder,
etc
6
N
F
= 2 16 16 24 29 40

F.P = Flash Point, Closed cup B.P = Boiling Point (STP)
Notes:
1: Includes volatile solids
2: Will not burn in air when exposed to T = 1500
o
F for five minutes.
3: Kst values are for a 16 liter or larger closed test vessel with strong ignition source
4: Includes wood-2 inches nominal thickness, magnesium ingots
5: includes coarse granular material such as plastic pellets, rack storage, wood pellets,
6: Includes rubber goods (tyre, boots), styrofoam, methocel, etc

If the chemicals are not listed in either MSDS or Appendix A, MF can be
determined from N
F
and N
R
. N
R
and N
F
are applicable for temperatures up to 140
o
F,
therefore MF for chemical/material exposed to temperatures higher than 140
o
F must be
adjusted by Temperature Adjustment of Material Factor procedures. The flammability
23

value (N
F
) and the reactivity value (N
R
) and their qualitative descriptions are presented
in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively.

Table 2.2 Qualitative descriptions for determining reactivity value (N
R
)

(Reproduced with
N
R
= 0 Normally stable material even under fire which include:
Material that do not react with water
Material that exhibit exothermic behavior at 572 F < T < 932 F
N
R
= 1 Normally stable material but unstable at elevated pressure (P) and temperature (T),
which include:
Material that change or decompose on exposure to air, light, or moisture
Material that exhibit exothermic behavior at 302 F < T < 572 F
N
R
= 2 Material that readily go through violent chemical change at elevated P and T, which
include
Material that exhibit exothermic behavior at T < 302
o
F
Material that reacts violently or forms potentially explosive material with
water
N
R
= 3 Material that is capable of detonation of explosive decomposition or reaction at the
availability of strong intiating source or heated under confinement before initiation.
This usually includes:
Material that is sensitive to thermal or mechanical shock at elevated P and T
Material that reacts explosively with water even at unavailability of heat or
confinement.
N
R
= 4 Material that is readily capable of detonation or explosive decomposition or explosive
reaction at normal P and T. This includes materials that are sensitive to localized
thermal or mechanical shock at normal P and T.
24

Temperature adjustment is performed only when the temperature of the process
unit under study is above 140
o
F. No adjustment required for material that exhibits
reactivity at temperature less than 140
o
F, has flash point less than 140
o
F, and is handled
at above its flash point at ambient temperature. The temperature adjustment of MF is
determined using table 2.3 (AIChE, 1994). Exotherm start is the temperature where
heat-generating chemical reaction temperature is detected in Accelerating Rate
Calorimeter (ARC) or similar calorimeter.

Table 2.3 Material factor temperature adjustment (Reprinted with permission. Copyright 1994
AIChE)
MATERIAL FACTOR TEMPERATURE ADJUSMENT N
F
St N
R

A. Enter N
F
(St for dusts) and N
R

b. If Temperature < 140
o
F, go to e
c. If temperature above flash point or if temperature > 140
o
F,
enter 1 under N
F

d. If temperature above exotherm start (see paragraph below) or
autoignition, enter 1 under N
R

e. Add each column, but enter 4 when total is 5
f. Using e and tanle 1, determine MF

2.2.2 Process Unit Hazard Factor (F
3
)
Process unit hazard factor incorporates all factors that are likely to contribute to
the occurrence of fire and explosion incidents. The numerical value of process unit
25

hazard factor is determined by general process hazards and special process hazards that
are described hereafter.

2.2.2.1 General Process Hazards (F
1
)
General process hazard items have historically played an important role in
determining the magnitude of potential incidents, and are applicable to most process
conditions. General process hazards cover six items, namely, exothermic chemical
reactions, endothermic processes, material handling and transfer, enclosed or indoor
process units, access and drainage and spill control, although it may not be necessary to
apply all of them.

A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions
This item only concerns the reactor where the chemical reactions take place. The
chemical reactions are classified into several categories and each receives a different
penalty. The chemical reactions considered include:
Mild exothermic reaction (i.e., hydrogenation, hydrolysis, isomerization,
sulfonation, and neutralization) requires a penalty of 0.30.
Moderate exothermic reaction (i.e., Alkylaton, edterification, addition reactions,
oxidation, polymerization, and condensation) requires a penalty of 0.50.
Critical-to-control exothermic reaction (i.e., halogenation) requires a penalty of
1.00.
Particularly sensitive exothermic (i.e., nitration) require a penalty of 1.25.
26

B. Endothermic Processes
All endothermic processes in the reactor require a penalty of 0.2 unless the
energy for the endothermic processes is provided by combustion of a solid, liquid or
gaseous fuel, whose penalty is 0.4. For example, calcination has a penalty of 0.4,
electrolysis has a penalty of 0.20, and pyrolysis or cracking has a penalty of 0.20 if
electricity is used as the energy source (and 0.40 if direct fired heat is used).

C. Material Handling and Transfer
This penalty considers the potential fire hazard in process unit during the
handling, transfer and warehousing of the material. The loading or unloading process of
Class I flammables or LPG type chemicals with the lines that can be connected or
disconnected requires a penalty of 0.50. The air present in the centrifuges, batch reactors,
or mixers (inerted or not inerted) that might initiate a flammability or reactivity hazards
requires a penalty of 0.50. Warehouse storages or yard storages (not storage tanks)
involving chemical with potential fire hazards require a penalty of 0.85, 0.65, 0.40, and
0.25 depend on the flammability of the chemicals handled. Utilizing racks without in-
rack sprinkler will add 0.20 to the penalty.

D. Enclosed Indoor Process Units
Enclosed area is defined as any roofed area with three or more sides or an area
enclosed by a roofless structure with walls on all sides. Open construction is usually
27

more effective than any mechanical ventilation in an enclosed area unless the ventilation
is designed in such a way that all flammables can be collected and dispersed. In such
case the penalty will be reduced. The categories are as follows:
Dust collectors located inside an enclosed area requires a penalty of 0.50.
Handling flammable fluids at a temperature above their flash point in an
enclosed area requires a penalty of 0.30. If more than 1,000 gallons of liquids
are handled, the penalty will be 0.45.
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or any flammable fluids handled at
temperatures above their boiling point in an enclosed area require a penalty
of 0.60. However, if more than 10,000 lb of liquids are handled, the penalty
will be 0.90.
All of the penalties above will be reduced by 50% if mechanical ventilation is
properly designed for the fire hazard.

E. Access
The pertinent process unit must have adequate and ready-to-use access. The
minimum requirements look for at least accesses from two sides, at least one access from
a roadway and an accessible monitor nozzle during operation. Process areas over 10,000
ft
2
or warehouses over 25,000 ft
2
with inadequate accesses will have 0.35 as the penalty.

28

F. Drainage and Spill Control
Incidents involving spills of flammable and combustible liquids around or near
process equipment have been mostly caused by inadequate design of drainage and spill
control. This penalty is given only for material with flash point below 140
o
F or material
handled above its flash point. The main factors of the penalty are the total volume of
combustible or flammable materials and fire fighting water that are safe enough to
handle such amount of materials. The drainage is calculated as the combined volume of
the following:
For process and storage facilities, the total volume used is given by Equation 2.3
(AIChE, 1994):
Total volume = 100 % largest tank capacity + 10 % next largest tank (2.3)
Assume 30 minutes flow rate of fire fighting water or 60 minutes for agricultural
chemicals or environmentally harmful chemicals.
The penalty is assigned according to the following guidelines:
Diking which prevents the spill from reaching other areas but expose all the
equipment within the dike or flat areas around process unit will receive a penalty of
0.50.
If a basin or trench exposes utility lines or does not meet the required distance, the
penalty will be 0.50.
There is no penalty if the diking design requirement below are met:
Diking surrounds three sides of an area and direct spills to an impounding
basin or unexposed drainage trench.
29

Earthen surface requires 2% (min) of the slope to basin or trench while
hard surface requires 1%.
The nearest edge of trench or basin must be separated at least 50ft from
the equipment. However, if firewall were installed, the distance can be
reduced.
The impounding basin must have the capacity at least equal to the total
volume of the fire fighting water.

2.2.2.2 Special Process Hazards (F
3
)
Special process hazards are the factors that play an important role in increasing
the probability of a potential incident and comprise of the specific process condition that
historically contribute to the major causes of fire and explosion incidents. There are 12
items that are listed as special process hazards and are described below:

A. Toxic Material(s)
Toxic material will cause difficulties and limit the ability of emergency response
personnel to reduce the magnitude of the incident.
This penalty depends on health factor (N
H
) of the material. For mixture, take the highest
N
H
. The penalty is given by the Equation (2.4) (AIChE, 1994):
H
N Penalty = 20 . 0 (2.4)
N
H
is defined in NFPA 704 or NFPA 325 M and attached in Appendix A. Table 2.3
summarizes the N
H
according to its qualitative description.
30

Table 2.4 Qualitative descriptions to determine health factor (N
H
) (Reproduced with permission.
Copyright 1994 AIChE)
N
H
= 0 No hazards beyond that normal combustible material offer will occur even on short
exposure under fire conditions.
N
H
= 1 Irritation only on minor residual injury but requires the use of an approved air-
purifying respirator when short exposure of the material happens.
N
H
= 2 Temporary incapacitation, possible residual injury and the use of respiratory protective
equipment with independent air supply will occur on intense or short exposure of the
material.
N
H
= 3 Full body protection is required and serious temporary injury will occur when short
exposure of the material happens.
N
H
= 4 Death and major residual injury occur even at very short exposure of the material.

B. Sub-Atmospheric Pressure
This section is applied based on the knowledge that the introduction of air into
process equipment (i.e., strippers, compressors, etc) could create or increase the risk of
fire or explosion. This will happen only if the inner pressure of the process equipment is
lower than the surrounding pressure. This penalty is applied only if the absolute pressure
of the process equipment under evaluation is less than 500 mmHg and will receive a
penalty of 0.50. If this penalty were applied, do not use the specified penalty given in
Section C of Operation In or Near Flammable Range and the penalty given in the
Section E of Relief Pressure.

31

C. Operation in or Near Flammable Range
The introduction of air into process equipment could create fire and/or explosion
hazards based on the materials and the equipment conditions. The more hazardous the
material and/or process conditions are, the higher the penalty it will receive. However,
no penalty is applied if penalty given in section B is applied. This section covers the
following conditions:
Tank storage handling flammable liquid with N
F
= 3 or 4 and there is a
possibility that air can leak into the tank during pump-out or sudden cooling of
the tank receives a penalty of 0.50. Open vent or non-inert gas padded operating
pressure-vacuum relief receives a penalty of 0.50. Non-inerted storage handling
combustible liquids at temperatures above their flash point receive a penalty of
0.50.
Process equipment that happens to be near flammable range of some material
upon instrumental failure receives a penalty of 0.30. Any process that depends on
inert purge to have it out of flammable range receives a penalty of 0.30. Barges
or tank cars receives a penalty of 0.30.
Process or operation that will always be at or near flammable range by nature
will receive a penalty of 0.80.

D. Dust Explosion
This penalty is applied to any process handling dusts such as transferring,
blending, grinding, bagging, and etc. The hazards come from the maximum rate of the
32

pressure rise and the maximum pressure generated which are both influenced by the
particle size. The finer the dust, the higher the maximum rate of the pressure arise and
also the higher the maximum pressure generated, hence the higher the hazards. The
penalty is based on the particle range size of 90 % of the dust coarser that are measured
using Tyler mesh size. Table 2.5 presents penalties for different particle size ranges.

Table 2.5 Dust explosion penalty (Reproduced with permission. Copyright 1994 AIChE)
Particle Size (Micron) Tyler Mesh Size
Penalty (reduce by 50% in the
presence of an inert gas)
175+ 60 to 80 0.25
150 to 175 80 to 100 0.50
100 to 150 10 to 150 0.75
75 to 100 150 to 200 1.25
< 75 > 200 2.00

E. Relief Pressure
Operating pressure above atmospheric pressure might cause the release of
flammable materials when leakage occurs. Moreover, the rate of release will increase
with higher operating pressure. Therefore, this penalty concerns the likelihood of
flammable material release upon failures of some components in the process unit. The
penalty is determined by the following procedure:
33

The penalty for operating pressures in the range of 0 to 1,000 psig is given by
Equation (2.5) (AIChE, 1994).
3 2
1000
5172 . 0
1000
42879 . 1
1000
61503 . 1
16109 . 0
|
.
|
\
|
+
|
.
|
\
|
+ =
P P P
Penalty (2.5)
With P as the operating pressure.
The penalty for operating pressure higher than 1,000 psig is given in Table
2.5.

Table 2.6 High pressure penalty for flammable & combustible liquids (Reproduced with
Pressure (psig) Pressure (kPa gauge) Penalty
1,000 6,895 0.86
1,500 10,343 0.92
2,000 13,790 0.96
2,500 17,238 0.98
3,000 to 10,000 20,685 to 69,950 1.00
> 10,000 > 68,950 1.50

F. Low Temperature
This section is based on the fact that carbon steel or other metal might be brittle
when exposed to a temperature at or below their ductile/brittle transition temperatures.
No penalty needs to be applied if there is no possibility of such temperatures. If the
process utilizes carbon steel construction and operates at or below its ductile/brittle
transition temperature, the penalty is 0.30. Other materials receive a penalty of 0.20.
34

G. Quantity of Flammable/Unstable Material
This section concerns the effects of the quantities of flammable and unstable
materials on the hazard. There are three categories, calculated separately by considering
only one applicable category based on the material selected as the MF, and discussed
hereafter.
Liquids or Gases in Process
This section considers the quantity of a material that may be spilled and
creates a fire, explosion, or a reactive chemical event. The penalty is based on the
flow rate of the material for 10 minutes, where the larger value between the quantity
of material in the process unit and the quantity of material in the largest connected
unit is applied. The penalty is determined by using Figure 2.2 or given by Equation
(2.6) (AIChE, 1994):
( ) ( ) ( )
2
37244 . 0 42988 . 0 17179 . 0 LogX LogX Y Log + = (2.6)
( ) ( )
4
029984 . 0
3
17712 . 0 LogX LogX +
where Y is the penalty and X is total energy in the process (BTU x 10
9
). This
penalty applies only to these materials:
Flammable and combustible liquids with flash point < 140
o
F.
Flammable gases and liquefied flammable gases.
Combustible liquids with F.P > 140
o
F
Reactive chemicals.

35

0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0.1 1 10 100
Total BTU in Process (x 10
9
)
P
e
n
a
l
t
y

Fig. 2.2. Penalty for liquids or gases in process (Plot of Equation 2.6)

Liquids or Gases in Storage (Outside the Process Area)
This penalty considers flammable and combustible fluids in storage (i.e.,
drums, tanks, material in tank farms, portable container, containers, etc) where no
process is involved. There are three categories which depend on the amount of the
material, the type of the liquid/gases and the heat of combustion (H
C
). The penalty
is determined by using Figure 2.3 or given by Equation (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9)
(AIChE, 1994):

36

0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0.1 1 10 100
Total BTU in storage (10
9
)
P
e
n
a
l
t
y
Curve A Curve B Curve C

Fig. 2.3. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to liquids or gases in storage (Plot of
Equations (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9))

Curve A: Liquefied Gases
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2
018641 . 0 074585 . 0 472171 . 0 289069 . 0 LogX LogX LogX Y Log + + = (2.7)
Curve B: Class I Flammable Liquids (F.P < 100
o
F)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2
015379 . 0 046402 . 0 378703 . 0 403115 . 0 LogX LogX LogX Y Log + = (2.8)
Curve C: Class Combustible Liquids (100
o
F < F.P < 140
o
F)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2
057296 . 0 057296 . 0 363321 . 0 558394 . 0 LogX LogX LogX Y Log + + = (2.9)
where Y is the penalty and X is total energy in the process (BTU x 10
9
).

37

Combustible Solids in Storage/Dust in Process
This penalty covers the quantities of stored solids and dusts when they are
involved as the basis for the MF. The penalty based on the density of the material,
the ease of ignition, and the ability to sustain a flame. The penalty is determined by
the Figure 2.4 or Equations (2.10) and (2.11) (AIChE, 1994):

0.1
1
10
0.1 1 10 100
Total Pounds (10
6
)
P
e
n
a
l
t
y
Curve A Curve B

Fig. 2.4. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to combustible solids in storage/dust in
process (Plot of Equations (2.10) and (2.11))

Curve A: Material with Density < 10 lb/cu ft
LogX LogY + = 464559 . 0 280423 . 0 (2.10)
( ) ( )
3 2
066218 . 0 28291 . 0 LogX LogX +
Curve B: Material with Density > 10 lb/cu ft
38

LogX LogY + = 459926 . 0 358311 . 0 (2.11)
( ) ( )
3 2
02276 . 0 141022 . 0 LogX LogX +
where Y is the penalty and X is total amount in the process (BTU x 10
6
).

H. Corrosion and Erosion
The corrosion rate is the sum of the external and internal corrosion rate. These
following penalties should be applied:
If the corrosion rate<0.005 in/yr with risk of pitting or local erosion, the
penalty is 0.10
If 0.127 mm/yr < Corrosion rate < 0.254 mm/yr, the penalty is 0.20.
If the corrosion rate > 0.254 mm/yr, the penalty is 0.50.
If the risk of stress-corrosion cracking might develop, the penalty is 0.75.
This occurs in process areas contaminated by chlorine vapor over prolonged
periods.
If lining is required to avoid corrosion, the penalty is 0.20. However, this is
not the case if the lining is simply to protect the product from developing
color.

I. Leakage-Joints and Packing
The leaking of flammable or combustible fluids can be found in gaskets, seals of
joints, shafts or packings, especially where thermal and pressure cycling occurs. The
39

penalty is given according to the design of the process unit. These penalties should
be applied:
If it is possible to develop a minor leakage at the pump and gland, the penalty
is 0.10.
If the leakage occurs regularly at pumps, compressors, and flange joints, the
penalty is 0.30.
Processes that have the potential to undergo thermal and pressure cycling
receive a penalty of 0.30.
If the material is penetrating in nature or abrasive slurry that causes problems
with sealing and if the process unit uses rotating shaft seal or packing, the
penalty is 0.40.
Any process unit with sight glasses, bellows assemblies, or expansion joints
receive a penalty of 1.50

J. Use of Fired Equipment
This penalty considers the additional hazards offered by fired equipment. It is
decided based on distances from probable leak points to air intake of the fired equipment
and is determined by using Figure 2.5 or given by Equation (2.12) and (2.13) (AIChE,
1994):
Curve A-1 is used for material released above its flash point and for
combustible dust.
40

3 2
210
42523 . 1
210
75127 . 3
210
3243 . 3
|
.
|
\
|
|
.
|
\
|
+
|
.
|
\
|
=
X X X
LogY (2.12)
Curve A-2 is for material released above its boiling point
3 2
210
09171 . 2
210
70212 . 2
210
3745 . 0
|
.
|
\
|
+
|
.
|
\
|
|
.
|
\
|
=
X X X
LogY (2.13)
where Y is the penalty and X is distance (ft).

0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 50 100 150 200 250
Distances from Possible Leak Source (ft)
P
e
n
a
l
t
y
Above Boiling Point Above Flash point

Fig. 2.5. Quantity of flammable/unstable material penalty to fired equipment (Plot of Equations
(2.12) and (2.13))

If the fired equipment itself is being evaluated, then the distance will be zero. If the
equipment is heating a flammable or combustible material, the penalty will be 1.00.

41

K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System
This penalty is determined based on the quantity and the temperature of the heat
exchange fluids used in the unit. Penalty is not applied to the non-combustible hot oil or
to combustible fluids used below their flash point. The quantity of the fluids used in
calculating the penalty is the smaller value between 15 minutes of spill or the hot oil
inventory in an active circulating hot oil system. Table 2.7 summarizes the penalty for
different quantity of hot oils in heat exchange systems.

Table 2.7 Hot oil heat exchange system penalty (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE
1994)
Quantity, Gallons Above Flash Point Penalty
At or Above Boiling Point
Penalty
< 5,000 0.15 0.25
5,000 to 10,000 0.30 0.45
10,000 to 25,000 0.50 0.75
> 25,000 0.75 1.15

L. Rotating Equipment
This penalty concerns about the hazard offered by large rotating equipment such
as pumps, compressors, agitators, circulating pumps, and centrifuges. The penalty is
defined based on the statistical evidence available for some rotating equipment at a
certain size that is likely to contribute to a potential incident.
42

Process units having compressors in excess of 600 hp and/or pumps in excess of
75 hp receive a penalty of 0.50. The same penalty is given to agitator (mixers) and
circulating pumps in which failure creates exothermic reactions when lack of cooling
occurs and also to other large high speed rotating equipment with substantial loss
history.

2.2.3 The Determination of Fire and Explosion Index
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is the product of the Process Unit
Hazard Factor (F1) and the Material Factor (MF). Then, the degree of hazards (severity)
of the process evaluated can be determined by using Table 2.8.

Table 2.8 Degree of Hazard for F&EI (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE 1994)
F&EI Index Range Degree of Hazards
1 60 Light
61 96 Moderate
97 127 Intermediate
128 158 Heavy
159 up Severe

2.2.4 Loss Control Credit Factors
These factors represent the loss control (protective) features that have been
historically and statistically proven beneficial in preventing or limiting serious incidents.
The basic thinking of using this credit factor is different from the F&EI value. High
43

F&EI shows that process under evaluation contains high hazards while high loss control
credit factor shows that there is less chance for the incident to occur. Therefore, a good
design is usually defined as one which has the lowest possible of the F&EI and the
highest possible loss control credit factor.
There are three categories of loss control credit factors: Process Control (C
1
),
Material Isolation (C
2
) and Fire Protection (C
3
). If no credit factor is applied to a
particular item, the credit factor is 1.0 for that item. The total credit factor is given by
Equation (2.14) (AIChE, 1994):
3 2 1
C C C C
total
= (2.14)
The next sections list items in all categories.

2.2.4.1 Process Control Credit Factors (C
1
)
Process control credit factors consist of:
Emergency Power credit factor of 0.98
This credit factor is applicable only if emergency power is available to
control an incident.
Cooling
If process cooling system is able to handle 10 minutes of normal cooling
during abnormal situation, the credit factor is 0.99. If a backup cooling
system is available to handle 150% of cooling requirement for at least 10
minutes, the credit factor is 0.97.

44

Explosion Control
If explosion suppression systems are employed on dust or vapor-handling
equipment, the credit factor is 0.84. If the overpressure relief systems utilize
rupture disks or explosion-relieving vents that protect the process unit from
abnormal conditions, the credit factor is 0.98.
Emergency Shutdown credit factor of 0.96 to 0.99
If redundant system is able to activate and initiate shutdown sequence in the
event of an incident, the penalty is 0.98. If rotating equipment (i.e.,
compressors, turbines, fans) is designed with vibration detection, the credit
factor is 0.99.
Computer Control credit factor of 0.93 to 0.99
Inert Gas credit factor of 0.94 to 0.96
Operating Instruction/Procedures 0.91 to 0.99
Reactive Chemical Review 0.91 to 0.98
Other Process Hazards Analysis 0.91 to 0.98

2.2.4.2 Material Isolation Credit Factor (C
2
)
Remote Control Valves credit factor of 0.96 to 0.98
Dump/Blowdown credit factor of 0.96 to 0.98
Drainage credit factor of 0.91 to 0.97
Interlock credit factor of 0.98

45

2.2.4.3 Fire Protection Credit factor (C
3
)
Leak Detection credit factor of 0.94 to 0.98
Structural Steel - credit factor of 0.95 to 0.98
Fire Water Supply - credit factor of 0.94 to 0.97
Special Systems credit factor of 0.91
Sprinkler Systems credit factor of 0.74 to 0.97
Credit factors for wet and dry pipes used in indoor manufacturing areas and
warehouses are shown in Table 2.9
Table 2.9 Credit Factors for wet pipe and dry pipe used in indoor manufacturing areas and
warehouses (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE 1994)

Design Credit Factor
Occupancy Gpm/ft
2
Lpm/m
2
Wet Pipe Dry Pipe
Light 0.15 0.20 6.11 8.15 0.87 0.87
Ordinary 0.21 0.34 8.56 to 13.8 0.81 0.84
Extra
Hazard
0.35 14.3 0.74 0.81

Water Curtain - credit factor of 0.97 to 0.98
Foam - credit factor of 0.92 to 0.97
Hand Extinguisher/Monitors credit factor of 0.03 to 0.98
Cable Protection credit factor of 0.94 to 0.98

46

2.2.5 Process Unit Risk Analysis Summary
To identify equipment that potentially contributes to the occurrence of an
incident and to communicate it to the top management in the company, engineers can
use process unit risk analysis summary, which presents hazards based on F&EI and
business interruption of particular equipment. This section discusses how to determine
the business interruption.

2.2.5.1 The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)
All calculation is based on F&EI calculation presented in Section 2.2. The higher
the F&EI value, the higher the hazard thus the higher the business interruption.

2.2.5.2 The Radius of Exposure
This radius of exposure is the radius in which all equipment in the radius range
will be exposed to the potential incident. For large pieces of equipment, the radius starts
from the surface of the equipment while for small equipment the radius starts at the
center of the item considered. The F&EI is converted into the radius of exposure by
using Equation (2.15) (AIChE, 1994):
( ) ( ) EI F ft Exposure of Radius & * 84 . 0 = (2.15)

2.2.5.3 The Area of Exposure
The area of exposure is determined from the radius of exposure using the area of
a circle formulation, as shown in Equation (2.16) (AIChE, 1994).
47

( )
2 2
R ft Exposure of Area = (2.16)
Theoretically, any equipment inside the area of exposure range will be exposed
to the hazard. Better assumption can also be done by taking cylindrical volume over the
equipment under evaluation with the height equal to the radius of exposure.

2.2.5.4 Value of the Area of Exposure
The value of the area of exposure is calculated from the replacement values of all
the property contained within it and the inventory of the material, as shown in Equation
(2.17) (AIChE, 1994).
factor escalation t original value t replacemen = 82 . 0 cos (2.17)
The factor 0.82 is the allowance for items that is not subjected to loss or
replacement (i.e., site preparation, roads, foundation). This factor is flexible to change
when more accurate factor is available. The escalation factor is the chemical engineering
plant cost index (CEPCI) which is different for each year and is available in several
chemical engineering journals.

2.2.5.5 Damage Factor
Damage Factor corresponds to the overall effects resulting from a release of
energy contained in process unit and is calculated from the process unit hazards factors
(F
3
) and the material factors (MF). For MF equal to 1, 4, 10, 14, 16, 21, 24, 29, and 40
and F
3
less or equal to 8, the damage factors are calculated by the Equations (2.18)
(2.26) (AICHE, 1994). For F
3
greater than 8, use F
3
equal to 8.
48

Material Factor of 1:
3 2
* 00029 . 0 * 004031 . 0 * 002957 . 0 003907 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.18)
3 2
* 00029 . 0 * 00081 . 0 * 019071 . 0 025817 . 0 X X X Y + = (2.19)
3 2
* 000013 . 0 * 000809 . 0 * 017596 . 0 098582 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.20)
3 2
* 00057 . 0 * 007628 . 0 * 017596 . 0 20592 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.21)
3 2
* 00088 . 0 * 011055 . 0 * 019886 . 0 256741 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.22)
3 2
* 00073 . 0 * 003912 . 0 * 076531 . 0 340314 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.23)
3 2
* 00038 . 0 * 00135 . 0 * 096443 . 0 395755 . 0 X X X Y + = (2.24)
3 2
* 00031 . 0 * 00216 . 0 * 094288 . 0 484766 . 0 X X X Y + = (2.25)
3 2
* 00044 . 0 * 000332 . 0 * 080772 . 0 554175 . 0 X X X Y + + = (2.26)

49

2.2.5.6 Base Maximum Probable Property Damage (Base MPPD)
Base MPPD is the value (in US dollar) of the plant equipment evaluated or
property losses within the theoretical area of exposure. It is based on the value of the
area of exposure and the damage factor, as shown in Equation (2.27) (AIChE, 1994).
osure of area of Value Factor Damage MPPD Base exp = (2.27)

2.2.5.7 Loss Control Credit Factor
This is calculated based on the section 2.2.4.

2.2.5.8 Actual Maximum Probable Property Damage (Actual MPPD)
Having loss control (protective) features in the equipment will reduce the
magnitude of the incident, thus the damages. Therefore, base MPPD must be modified
according to the loss control features to estimate actual MPPD, which are more
reasonable property damage losses. The actual MPPD is determined by Equation (2.28)
(AIChE, 1994).
MPPD Base Control Loss MPPD Actual = (2.28)

2.2.5.9 Maximum Probable Days Outage (MPDO)
The business interruption consists not only of property damages but also of
product and inventory losses that will determine the value of MPDO. For example,
losses depend on the ability to make up the lost product at distant facilities, the ability to
50

get one-of-a-kind equipment, and loss of profits due to the shutdown of the plant. More
days of outage result in more MPDO, thus more business interruptions.
If such real data for equipment and days of outage are not available, MPDO is
calculated by using Figure 2.6 or by using Equations (2.29), (2.30) and (2.31) (AIChE,
1994). For the equipment which is hard to get, the upper 70 % probability limit is used.
For in-stock equipment, the lower 70 % probability limit is applied.
Upper 70 % Probability Limit
( ) ( ) X LOG Y LOG * 598416 . 0 550233 . 1 + = (2.29)
Normal
( ) ( ) X LOG Y LOG * 592471 . 0 325132 . 1 + = (2.30)
Lower 70 % probability Limit
( ) ( ) X LOG Y LOG * 610426 . 0 045515 . 1 + = (2.31)

2.2.5.10 Business Interruption (BI)
Business interruption in the event of incident is calculated by Equation (2.32)
(AIChE, 1994):
( ) 7 . 0
30
$ = VPM
MPDO
US BI (2.32)
VPM is the value of the months and 0.70 represents the fixed cost plus profit.

51

Fig. 2.6. Determining MPDO from Actual MPPD (Plot of Equations (2.29), (2.30), and (2.31))

2.3 FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX FORM
All values from F&EI calculation are submitted to the Fire and Explosion Index
form, Loss Control Credit factors form, and Process Unit Analysis Summary form. This
is intended to be a summary of the calculations. The forms are shown in Figures 2.7, 2.8,
and 2.9.
Dows Fire and Explosion Index is the hazards analysis method used in this
research. It is very important to have design equations for each of the equipment under
evaluation available in order to integrate the safety parameters into process design and
optimization. The next chapter, Chapter III, provides the design equations used in this
research.

1
10
100
1000
1 10 100 1000
Actual MPPD ($ MM, 1986 basis, CE Index 318.4)
MPDO
Upper 70 % Probability Limit Normal Lower 70 % Probability Limit
52

PROCESS UNIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY

1 Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)
2 Radius of Exposure
ft or
m
3 Area of Exposure
ft
2
or
m
2

4 Value of area of exposure $MM
5 Damage Factor
6 Base Maximum Probable Property Damage (Base MPPD) [4 x 5] $MM
7 Loss Control Credit Factor
8 Actual Maximum Probable Property Damage (Actual MPPD) [6 x 7] $MM
9 Maximum Probable Days Outage (MPDO)
10 Business Interruption (BI) $MM
Fig. 2.7. Process unit analysis summary form (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE 1994)

53

1. Process Control Credit Factors (C1)
Feature Credit Factor Range Credit Factor Used
A Emergency Power 0.98
B Cooling 0.97
C Explosion Control 0.84
D Emergency Shutdown 0.99
E Computer Control 0.97
F Inert Gas 0.94
G Operating Instructions/Procedures 0.97
H Reactive Chemical Review 1
I Other Process Hazard Analysis 0.94
C
1
Value 0.66

2. Material Isolation Credit Factor (C
2
)
A Remote Control Valve 1
B Dump/Blowdown 1
C Drainage 0.97
D Interlock 0.98
C
2
Value 0.95

3. Fire Protection Credit Factor (C
3
)
A Leak Detection 0.94
B Structural Steel 0.98
C Fire Water Supply 0.97
D Special Systems 1.00
E Sprinkler Systems 0.92
F Water Curtains 0.97
G Foam 0.94
H Hand Extinguishers/Monitors 0.98
I Cable Protection 0.94
C
3
Value 0.69

Loss Control Credit Factor = C
1
x C
2
x C
3
= 0.43

Fig. 2.8. Loss Control credit factor form (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE 1994)

54

Material Factor

1 General Process Hazards
Penalty Factor
Range
Penalty
Factor Used
Base Factor
A. Exothermic Chemical reactions
B. Endothermic Processes
C. Material Handling and Transfer
D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Units
E. Access
F. Drainage and Spill Control

2 Special Process Hazards
Base Factor
A. Toxic Material(s)
B. Sub-Atmospheric Pressure (, 500 mmHg)

C. Operation In or Near Flammable Rang __*__
Inerted _____ Not Inerted
1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids
2. Process Upset or Purge Failure
3. Always in Flammable Range
D. Dust Explosion

E. Pressure Operating Pressure ____788.5_
psig or kPa gauge

Relief Setting
________850_____ psig or kPa gauge
F. Low Temperature

G. Quantity of Flamable/Unstable Material: Quantity
_____ lb/kg

Hc = _________
BTU/lb or kcal/kg
1. Liquids or Gases in Process
2. Liquids or Gases in Storage
3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process
H. Corrosion and Erosion
I. Leakage-Joints and Packing
J. Use of Fired Equipment
K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System
L. Rotating Equipment

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)
Process Unit Hazards Factor (F1 x F2) = F3
Fire and Explosion Index (F3 x MF = F&EI)

Fig. 2.9. Fire and Explosion Index Form (Reproduced with permission. Copyright AIChE 1994)
55

CHAPTER III
REACTOR -DISTILLATION COLUMN DESIGN
AND ECONOMIC PARAMETER

3.1 BACKGROUND
3.1.1 Reactor
Basic chemical engineering processes include reaction, separation, and mixing.
Reactors are used in the industry to conduct commercial scale reactions. There are
several characteristics of reactor and its reaction. Reactor physical dimension depends on
the required structure to withstand the operating conditions (pressure, temperature, flow
rate, etc) and the rate of the reaction. The size of a reactor is large not because the
desired output is large but due to the low reaction rate and/or the low conversion (Kletz,
1991). Low conversion means that more un-reacted reactant must be recycled; also,
larger inventory is needed. It is common in the chemical industries that reactor is
followed by separator to separate the un-reacted raw materials and the specified
products. Thus, reactor-distillation column system is a common system used in the
chemical industries. Reactions are slow because of poor mixing or inherently slow
reaction. From an inherently safer design (ISD) point of view, vapor phase reaction is
preferable than liquid phase because the vapor density is less than that of liquid (Kletz,
1991). Therefore, the rate of leak through a hole of a certain size is lower.
In performing economic analysis of a reactor, the separator should be included
since there is trade-off between reactor-separator systems as shown in Figure 3.1.
56

Economic balance between a high reactor cost at high conversion and a high separation
cost at low conversion will determine the optimum reactor conversion. Therefore, it is
necessary to have a procedure to improve reactor performance and/or reactor-distillation
column system to produce desired products while in the range of acceptable economic
profit and safety level. The design equations and economic parameters of a reactor are
presented in this chapter.

Separator
Reactor
Total
1.0
X optimum
C
o
s
t

(
$
)
Reactor Conversion (X)
0

Fig.3.1. Costs of reactor and distillation column as a function of reactor conversion (Smith, 1995)
57

3.1.2 Distillation Column
Distillation column is probably the most widely for separation process in the
chemical industries. Its application ranges from alcohol purification to crude oil
fractionation. Distillation column separates materials based on the volatility of the
components. The component with greater volatility will be easier to separate. A simple
distillation column is shown in Figure 3.2. The rectifying section is the section above the
feed where the concentration of the more volatile components is increased to produce the
top products. The stripping section is located below the feed where the more volatile
components are stripped by the liquid then the bottom products produce. The vapor will
flow upward counter-currently while the liquid will flow downward. Liquid and vapor
are contacted on plates or packing inside the column.
Equations to model distillation column must be developed before optimizing
distillation column. These equations are described in section 3.3.

3.1.3 Economics as Objective Functions of Optimization
Economics as objective functions of optimization consists of two major
components: operating cost and capital cost (Edgar, Himmelblau, & Lasdon, 2001).
Capital cost estimation is available at the following four stages of increasing levels of
accuracy (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
Order-of-magnitude estimate based on laboratory data to estimate the types of
equipment and how to organize the equipment in order to produce chosen
products. Only two things are needed, production rate in lb/year and flow sheet
58

considering gas compressors, reactors, and separation equipment only. Heat
exchanger and liquid pump are not included in the estimation. Mass balance and
equipment sizing are not required either. The accuracy of this method is 50 %.
Study estimate based on preliminary plant design. This estimation uses method
of Lang (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004). The accuracy of this method reaches
35 %. The detailed description about the Lang method is described later in this
chapter.
Preliminary estimate based on detailed design (P&ID) and performed after
optimal design has been achieved. More time is required to perform this method
but the accuracy is increased to 20 %.
Definite estimate based on detailed process design, detailed drawings, cost
estimates, and other data to have accurate cost accounting. It is intended for
construction.
Total production costs consist of direct production cost (operating cost), fixed
charges, plant overhead costs, administrative expenses, and distribution and marketing
expenses (Peters & Timmerhaus, 1991). The optimization variables in this research that
are related to total production cost are operating cost, with the capability to include other
cost if data are available. Operating cost depends on several factors such as raw
materials, operating man, operating supervision, royalties, utilities, etc. However, this
research only uses the raw materials and utilities cost as the operating cost to
demonstrate the proposed methodology.

59

3.2 THE METHOD OF LANG
The method of Lang estimates capital cost using overall factors that multiply the
cost of f.o.b purchase cost of the equipment. The f.o.b purchase cost is the cost of the
equipment paid by the buyer where the seller has the obligation to deliver the equipment
to a certain place for transfer, not directly to the plant site. The data needed for this
method are process design with its material and energy balances, equipment sizing, and
the material of construction. The accuracy of the method of Lang is 35 %.
The method of Lang proceeds by steps as follows (Seider, Seader, & Lewin,
2004):
Prepare an equipment list and their size, the materials of construction, the design
temperature, and the design pressure.
Calculate the total permanent investment (
TCI
C ) by using Equation (3.1) (Seider,
Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
i TCI
P
bi
i
L TCI
C
I
I
f C
|
|
.
|
\
|
= 05 . 1 (3.1)
with
TCI
C represents total permanent investment,
TCI
L
f as Langs factors,
bi
i
I
I
is the ratio
of cost index, and
i
P
C is the total f.o.b purchase cost of the equipment. Lang factor
recommended by Peters & Timmerhaus (1991) for fluids processing chemical plants is
5.7, for solids-fluids processing plants is 4.9, and for solids processing plants is 4.6.
These numbers are based on a value of 100 for the total delivered cost, which is 1.05
times the f.o.b purchase cost.
60

In this research, f.o.b purchase cost for distillation column and reactor are
estimated before using method of Lang and determining the total investment cost, as
shown in the following section. In addition, the technical design equations are also
described.

3.3 DISTILLATION COLUMN AND REACTOR DESIGN EQUATIONS
3.3.1 Column Distillation Design Equations
The design of distillation column consists of many procedures and equations and
commercial simulators have been developed. However, it is very important to
understand the basic design calculations of distillation column, especially those related
to the capital cost and operating cost. Those costs depend on reflux ratio, number of
stages, number of trays, reflux ratio, size of the distillation column vessel, feed flow rate,
the composition of the products required, and the utilities needed by reboiler and
condenser (Edgar, Himmelblau, & Lasdon, 2001).
Increasing reflux ratio increases required condenser heat duty but reduces the
number of stages required thus reducing the capital cost as well as the operating cost.
Thus, the engineer must find the optimal value for the reflux ratio. Total reflux happens
when all condensate is returned to the column as reflux so there will be no product taken.
Total reflux requires only the minimum number of stages that are theoretically necessary
to achieve the separation. Total reflux is usually done at start-up commission and
column testing. The minimum reflux ratio is the reflux ratio required to achieve the
61

specified separation at a certain number of stages. For practical purposes, optimum
reflux ratio will lie between total reflux and minimum reflux ratio.

Fig. 3.2. Distillation column

Reflux ratio (R) (Sinnot, 1996) and minimum reflux ratio (Rm) (Eduljee, 1975)
are shown in Equations (3.2) and (3.3):
D
L
off taken product top of flow
reflux as returned Flow
R = = (3.2)
62

( )
( )
1
1
1
|
|
.
|
\
|
=
f
D
F
D
m
X
X
X
X
R (3.3)
with X
D
as mol fraction of specified product in distillate stream, X
V
as mol fraction of
specified product in feed stream, R
m
as the minimum reflux ratio, L as the flow rate of
the liquid back into column for reflux, D as distillate to product, and as relative
volatility. Physical definition of the symbol can also be seen in Figure 3.2.
The expression of reflux ratio, number of stages ( N ) and minimum number of
stages ( )
m
N are shown in Equations (3.4) and (3.5) (Edgar, Himmelblaue, & Lasdon,
2001):
( ) ( )
(
(
|
.
|
\
|
+
=
+
5668 . 0
1
1 75 . 0
1 R
R R
N
N N
m m
(3.4)
ln
1
1
ln
|
|
.
|
\
|
=
B
B
D
D
m
X
X
X
X
N (3.5)
with = relative volatility.

3.3.1.1 The Diameter and the Height of the Column
The tower diameter is designed to avoid flooding when the liquid is filling the
tower due to too high vapor velocity. Therefore, to calculate the diameter, the flooding
velocity must be determined by Equations (3.7) and (3.8) (Peters & Timmerhaus, 1991).
Then the diameter is determined by using Equation (3.6) (Peters & Timmerhaus, 1991).
63

5 . 0
4
(
(

=

G f
t
u
V
Di (3.6)
( )
MW
T
Po
G

|
|
|
|
.
|
\
|
=
002866 . 0
7 . 14
7 . 14
(3.7)
v
v L
f
K u

=
1
(3.8)
with :
f
u = flooding vapor velocity, m/s, based on the total cross-sectional area.
1
K = empirical constant [=]
s
ft

L
= liquid density [=]
3
ft
lb

v
= vapor density [=]
3
ft
lb

T = operating temperature [=] K
MW = Molecular weight [=]
lbmol
lb

Po = operating pressure [=] atm
Di = inside diameter [=] ft
The height of the distillation column (L) is calculated by using Equation (3.9).
N spacing tray L =
(3.9)
64

Based on the diameter and the height of the column, the cost of the distillation column
can be determined.

3.3.1.2 The Distillation Column f.o.b Purchase Cost Estimation
Distillation column consists of tower vessel and plates/packing. The detailed
description is presented hereafter. The capital cost of the distillation column is the
summation of the vessel cost and the installed plates/packing cost.
A. Vessel
Distillation column tower is a vertical pressure vessel in cylindrical form. Seider,
Seader, & Lewin (2004) presented a method of intermediate complexity which is based
on the weight of the shell and two 2:1 elliptical heads. The f.o.b (free on board) purchase
cost (
T
C ) of distillation column tower includes the nozzles, the manholes, a skirt, and
the internals (not plates and/or packing). The f.o.b cost is based on the platform, the
ladder, the weight of the tower, the wall thickness of the shell, two heads, the tower
diameter, and the tower height.
The equations are shown in Equations (3.10) (3.13):
Towers for 9,000 lb < W < 2,500,000 lb (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
2
ln 02297 . 0 ln 18255 . 0 0374 . 7 exp W W C
V
+ + = (3.10)
Platform and ladder are additional cost,
PL
C and depend on inside diameter
i
D (ft) and
the length of the shell L (ft):
Towers with 3 <
i
D < 24 ft and 27 < L < 170 ft (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
65

( ) ( )
80161 . 0 62216 . 0
1 . 237 L D C
i PL
= (3.11)
The weight,W , depends on the
i
D (ft) and the length of the shell L (ft). For 2:1
elliptical heads, the weight of the shell and its two heads is determined by using
Equation (3.12) (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
( ) ( )
s i s i
t D L t D W 8 . 0 + + = (3.12)
When corrosion, wind, and earthquake are neglected and the internal pressure is greater
than the external pressure (i.e., excluding vacuum operation), the wall thickness is
calculated by ASME pressure-vessel code formula as shown in Equation (3.13) (Seider,
Seader, & Lewin, 2004):

d
i d
p
P SE
D P
t
2 . 1 2
= (3.13)
with
p
t as the wall thickness to bear up the internal pressure (inches),
d
P as the internal
design pressure (psig),
i
D as the inner shell diameter (inches), S as the maximum
allowable stress of the material at the design temperature (psi), and E as the fractional
weld efficiency.
The maximum allowable stress S depends on the material of construction and
the design temperature. The design temperature can be taken as the operating
temperature plus 50
o
F. It is recommended that the design pressure be greater than the
operating pressure (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004). For operating pressures between 0
and 5 psig, the recommended design pressure is 10 psig. In the range of operating
66

pressures from 10 psig to 1,000 psig, Equation (3.14) should be used to determine design
pressure (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
2
0
ln 0015655 . 0 ln 91615 . 0 60608 . 0 exp P P P
o d
+ + = (3.14)
with
0
P represents operating pressure (psig).
For operating pressures greater than 1,000 psig, the design pressure is 1.1 times the
operational pressure.

B. Plates
The cost for plates with all downcomer,
T
C , is provided by Equation (3.15)
(Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
BT TM TT NT T T
C F F F N C = (3.15)
BT
C is the base cost.
For Sieve Trays at CE cost index of 394 and inside diameter in the range of 2 to 16 ft,
BT
C is given by Equation (3.16):
( )
i BT
D C 1739 . 0 exp 369 = (3.16)
T
N is the number of trays utilized in the column distillation. If
T
N is greater than 20
then 1 =
NT
F , and if it is lesser than 20 then 1 >
NT
F as given by Equation (3.17) (Seider,
Seader, & Lewin, 2004)
NT
NT
F
0414 . 1
25 . 2
= (3.17)
67

TT
F for the sieve tray is 1.0 (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004).
TM
F accounts for the
correction for the material of construction and depends on the column diameter as given
by Equations (3.18) (3.22) (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
For Carbon Steel:
TM
F =1.0 (3.18)
For 303 Stainless steel:
TM
F =
i
D 0.0577 1.189+
(3.19)
For 316 Stainless steel:
TM
F =
i
D 0.0724 1.401+
(3.20)
For Carpenter 20CB-3:
TM
F =
i
D 0.0788 1.525+
(3.21)
For Monel:
TM
F =
i
D 0.1120 2.306+
(3.22)

3.3.2 Reactor Design Equations
In this research we use the Plug Flow Reactor (PFR) as a case study. PFR
assumes that there is no diffusion along the flow path, all materials have the same
velocity as the materials advance through the length of the reactor, no longitudinal
mixing along the flow path, and no radial gradient in either temperature and
concentration. The performance of the reactor can be determined by using the following
data:
68

1. The rate of reaction and the mass transfer characteristics of the reacting fluid.
This determines the volume of the reactor needed to produce the specified
product.
2. The constraints dictated by the reactor are set up such as the type and the
geometry of the reactor. This determines the cost of the reactor and thus the
economic parameter. Economic variables of reactor are type, diameter, height,
design pressure, material of construction, and capacity (Edgar, Himmelblau, &
Lasdon, 2001).
Conversion (X) is the measure on how far the reaction has proceeded and is in
the range of 0 to 1 (100 % conversion). In optimizing a reactor, the conversion might not
reach 100% conversion due to other constraints such as economic factors. For reaction
with more than one reactant, the material which the conversion is based on must be
specified. Conversion expression is:

provided material amount
consumed material of amount
Conversion =
( ) ( )
stream inlet in amount
stream outlet in amount stream inlet in amount
= (3.23)

Generally, the independent variables are pressure, temperature, flow rate, and
concentration of the feed. There is no general optimization model for reactor hence the
model is developed for each specific case. For this research, Plug Flow Reactor (PFR)
reactor is used with reaction of: A B + C (gas phase), whose models are given in
Equations (3.24) (3.26) (Fogler, 2002):
69

PFR design equations, rate law for A ----> B + C, and stoichiometry:
}

= =
X
A
o A i
r
dX
F L D Volume
0
2
4
(3.24)

A A
C k r = (3.25)
( )
( ) X
X C
C
Ao
A
+
=
1
1
(3.26)
with D
i
as inside diameter, F
Ao
as molar flow rate of the reactant A, X as the reactor
conversion, C
A
as the concentration of A in the reactor, as volume changes in gas
phase reaction, and C
A0
as the concentration of component A at the reactor entrance.
Combining design equation, rate law, and stoichiometry:
( )
(
+ = = X
X C k
F
L D Volume
Ao
Ao
i

1
1
ln 1
4
2
(3.27)

3.3.2.1 The Reactor f.o.b Purchase Cost Estimation
PFR reactor is a cylindrical vessel that can be determined in the same way as that
of the distillation column with several modifications, only in different orientation. The
reactor is a horizontal pressure vessel in cylindrical form. The f.o.b purchase cost (
P
C )
of horizontal pressure vessel including the nozzles, the manholes, a skirt, and the
internals (not plates and/or packing) are described by Seider, Seader, & Lewin (2004) in
Equations (3.28) (3.29):
Horizontal vessel for 1,000 lb < W < 920,000 lb (Seider, Seader, & Lewin,
2004):
70

( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
2
ln 04333 . 0 ln 2330 . 0 717 . 8 exp W W C
V
+ = (3.28)
Platform and ladder are additional cost,
PL
C and depend on the inner diameter
i
D (ft)
and the length of the shell L (ft):
Horizontal vessel with 3 <
i
D < 12 ft (Seider, Seader, & Lewin, 2004):
( )
20294 . 0
580 , 1
i PL
D C = (3.29)
W,
p
t , and
d
P are evaluated by Equations(3.12), (3.13), and (3.14).
Chapter III has presented the reactor-distillation column design and economic
parameters. Optimization models in this research are built based on the equations in
Chapter III. Before performing optimization, it is necessary to understand the theory of
optimization, which is described in Chapter IV.
71

CHAPTER IV
OPTIMIZATION

4.1 OVERVIEW
It is one of the primary tasks of a chemical engineer to design and operate
chemical processes and ensure them working faster, better, cheaper, safer and greener
(El-Halwagi, 2003). During designing process, there is a correlation between technical
design and economic analysis. In practice, it is very important to have an economically
optimum and inherently safer design which is the best design based on technical and
business performance within acceptable safety level. How do engineers incorporate
those three parameters into process design while achieving the specified product(s)?
Process optimization with technical performance, business performance, and safety
parameters as the constraints might be a good solution. This research attempts to
perform this optimization and analyze the result.
There are several methods available to solve the optimization problem, manually
or computerized. This research solves the optimization problem using software LINGO

by LINDO Inc which is a linear and non-linear solver. Computer software offers faster
and efficient calculation so that this research can focus more on the development of the
mathematical models of the process evaluated and the validation of the proposed
methodology. We decide to use LINGO based on availability, simplicity, and
researchers familiarity as well.

72

4.2 BASIC OF OPTIMIZATION
Optimization deals with the use of efficient and effective quantitative method to
find the optimal solution in the whole solution space. Optimization consists of two steps:
formulating the problem and using mathematical techniques to solve it. However, as
many mathematical tools are available, the formulation of the problem becomes an
important task. Chemical engineers play a very important role in chemical process
optimization as they have enough basic knowledge in equipment design and chemical
processes. Chemical engineer must find the optimization variables that affect the process
significantly as well as define the objective function criteria. The purpose of
optimization is to maximize or minimize the values of a set of functions (called objective
functions) subject to a variety of restrictions (called constraints) (El-Halwagi, 2003). A
typical optimization problem consists of three essential parts: at least one objective
function, equality equations, and inequality equations as constraint.
Edgar, Himelblau, & Lasdon (2001) presented the optimization problem in the
form of:
Minimize : ( ) x f objective function (a)
Subject to : ( ) 0 = x h equality constraints (b)
( ) 0 x g inequality constraints (c)
With x is a vector of n variables ( ) ,.... , , ,
4 3 2 1
x x x x , ( ) x h is a vector of equations of
dimension
1
m , ( ) x g is a vector of inequalities of dimension
2
m and the total number of
constraints is ( )
2 1
m m m + = .
73

For example:
Objective function: maximum conversion (X).
Equality constraint: ( ) X F F
A A
= 1
0

Inequality constraint: 0 X
Edgar, Himmelblau, & Lasdon (2001) also proposed seven steps to solve
optimization problems as follows:
1. Define the process variables and specific characteristics of interest by generating a
list of all available variables.
2. Develop the process models by determining the optimization criteria and the
objective functions in terms of variables defined in step 1 together with the
coefficients.
3. Develop mathematical process or equipment models that relate the input-output
variables together with the coefficients, including both equality and inequality
constraints.
4. Define the type of process model (underdetermined, over-determined, unique
solutions) by identifying the independent and dependent variables to obtain the
number of degree of freedom. Mass balances, energy balances, empirical equations,
conceptual constraints (non-negativity requirement such as conversion must be
greater than zero, etc), external restriction and other physical and chemical principles
are among the base knowledge in developing the model.
5. If the process model is too large and complex:
a. Divide into smaller and manageable model.
74

b. Simplify the objective model and the process model.
6. Apply the appropriate optimization method to the process model.
7. Cross check the answer and do the sensitivity analysis for the uncertainty with the
coefficients and assumptions of the model to analyze or examine the answer.
Since this research employs computer software to solve the optimization, this
chapter will also focus on the development of mathematical/optimization model of the
system under evaluation. The mathematical model is developed based on the
fundamental chemical and physical laws applied to the system as well as the objective
function. There is no specific method on developing mathematical models, it is specific
for an individual system. For example, this research is using a reactor-separator system
with the total of operating and capital cost as the objective function. Based on their
physical properties, reactor and separator consist of vessels. The diameters, the heights,
and the constructing materials of the vessels will determine the total cost. The diameters
and the heights of the vessels are calculated from the rate of reaction, the material
balance, the operating temperature and operating pressure, which are based on the
chemical process of the system. In addition, by incorporating the fact that safety
concerns set limits on the temperature, pressure and material, conversion is in the range
of 0 to 100%, and design limits the product specification, the equality and inequality
constraints can be developed.
All of the equations involved will be the input for LINGO. The detail of the
equation used has been presented in Chapter III. The next chapter, Chapter V, presents
75

the case study which shows the mathematical model for reactor-separator system
developed and the solution from LINGO.
76

CHAPTER V
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

5.1 OVERVIEW
As described previously in chapter II, F&EI seeks to quantify the process
information which is related to hazards (i.e., process conditions, materials, types of
equipment and other characteristics of the process) in the form of penalties and credit
factors. AIChE (1994) presented the F&EI manual which provides detailed procedures,
descriptions, equations, graphical data, and tabular data, but not in the form of computer
software. This makes the calculation even more time consuming when it is done
manually. Moreover, manual calculation requires the user to have the Dow handbook at
hand, limits the ability to document the F&EI calculation process, and reduces the
capability to perform sensitivity analysis and multiple calculations. Therefore, the idea to
automate the F&EI calculation arises.
Etowa, Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan (2002) developed a computer program to
automate F&EI calculation and perform sensitivity analysis using Microsoft Visual
Basic. However, their program was not intended to determine business interruption and
loss control credit factors, to conduct process unit risk analyses, to automate the
sensitivity analysis, or to integrate F&EI calculation into process design and
optimization framework.
F&EI program developed in this research is presented in this chapter. The ability
to calculate the F&EI, to determine loss control credit factors and business interruption,
77

and to perform process unit risk analysis is the unique feature in this F&EI program. In
addition to F&EI calculation, F&EI program provides the descriptions of each item of
the penalties and the chemicals/materials databases. The ability to add chemical/material
data to the databases and to calculate material factors are provided so that the user can
use the program without the F&EI book at hand. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses are
inventory and pressure. The expression will be the focal point in integrating F&EI into
process design and optimization framework.
Part of this research is to develop a user-friendly program based on the Dow Fire
and Explosion Index 7
th
edition (1994 version). The programming language used is
Microsoft Visual Basic
Application (VBA) with Microsoft
Excel (Excel) as the host

application. All codes related to penalties, credit factors, databases, and other functions
of the F&EI program are available in the Appendix: Algorithms for Microsoft
Visual
Basic application.
The optimization problem could be solved by various tools. We investigate the
optimization problem using LINGO

8.0 software by Lindo System Inc.. LINGO
is
employed because of its simplicity, availability, and researchers familiarity as well.
LINGO
is a comprehensive tool to solve linear, nonlinear, and integral optimization

models faster, more easily and efficiently.
This chapter presents guidelines to use the F&EI program.

78

5.2 LINGO

LINGO
is a mathematical modeling language and different from other basic

programming languages such as BASIC or C ++. LINGO
is non-procedural so that the

users are only to specify what they want, not how to find the solution. Therefore,
LINGO
allows the user to express the model in a standard mathematical notation

without additional codes or syntaxes.

5.2.1 LINGO

Syntax and Functions
There are several rules on writing problem statements in LINGO
, which are:
It is not necessary to write the mathematical statement in a certain order. All
statements are considered as the variable that must be satisfied.
LINGO
does not differentiate small and big caps, i.e., y and Y are considered as
the same variable. It handles up to 32 characters length of variables which must
begin with a letter (A-Z) and allows any alphanumeric character and underscore.
Every statement must end with a semicolon (;). This allows the user to have a
long statement with more than 1 line. Example: tp=(Pd*Di)/(25500-1.2*Pd);
can also be written as:
tp=(Pd*Di)/
(25500-1.2*Pd);
Comment begins with exclamation point (!) and ends with semicolon (;).
Comment can be more than 1 line or share lines with other LINGO
statement.
Example:
Comments
79

Cao=0.00415; ![=]lb mol/ft3;
LINGO
defines only two types of mathematical functions: general and

trigonometric. This research employs the following LINGO

general

mathematical
functions:
@EXP(X) returns the constant e(2.718281) to the power X.
@LOG(X) returns the natural logarithm of the function X.
MIN=f(X) or MAX=f(X) - to find maximum or minimum value of the objective
function statement.
After all models are submitted to LINGO
, LINGO
will provide the result in a

new opened-window. All LINGO

models and their solutions applied in this research are
available at Appendix B.

5.3 SYNTAX USED IN MICROSOFT
VISUAL BASIC APPLICATION (VBA)

VBA file is not an executed file, thus it must be open in any Microsoft
Office
.
In this research, the host application is Microsoft
Excel, thus the user must open

Microsoft
Excel to run the F&EI program. Based on the written text, tabular data,
graphs, and expressions in the Dow book, most of the safety parameters, penalties, and
credit factors on the F&EI can be described as IfThen statements, hence algorithms for
the F&EI are prepared in that form. The following are several things that must be
understood before the algorithm can be written:

80

1. Function Procedures
Function procedures are applied to create functions with named arguments,
optional arguments, and specific data type results that are compatible to Microsoft

Excel. It is a VBA procedure that returns a result. Harris (1997) present that the user
simply specifies the arguments the function uses, the actions to be performed, and the
value that the function returns and describes the general syntax for a function as the
following:
Function name ([arglist])
VBA Statements
[name = expression]
End Function
Here name denotes the name of the function; arglist is the argument list of the
function (several arglist must be separated with comma) and name=expression is the
function assignment which tells VBA what value the function should return. The
function procedure begins with the keyword Function followed by the functions name
and ends with End Function keyword.

2. Variable Constant Data Type
String Constant
It is a non-numeric constant and must be enclosed in double quote marks ( ). A
blank string constant is identified by two question marks together with nothing in
between: .
81

Boolean Constant
There are only two Boolean constants: true and false.
Numeric Constant
This consists only of the number 0 through 9 with no symbols or characters.

3. Decision Making Commands
Decision making command is the VBA capability to choose between two
alternatives of procedures based on whether or not the condition is satisfied. For
choosing between branches of decisions, the general VBA syntax is:
If Condition1 Then
Statement1
ElseIf Condition2 Then
Statement2
Else
Statement3
End If
The conditions represent any logical expression and statements represent the
consequences when the conditions are true. VBA executes all conditions according to
the order. For the syntax given, if the logical expression represented by condition1 is
true then VBA executes statement1. However, if the logical expression represented by
condition1 is false then VBA immediately checks condition2 without considering
statement1, and so on. Every decision making command begins with If.Then keyword
and ends with End If keyword.

82

4. User-Defined Functions
In the VBA, the user can expand the collection of the built-in worksheet
functions in Excel. Excel will recognize it as user-defined functions which are the
function procedures stored as worksheet functions in Excel. The user-defined functions
are named by the user and contain any guidelines, arguments, and restrictions defined by
the user. The codes for the function procedure combined with decision making command
for exothermic chemical reaction penalty on F&EI is shown in Figure 5.1

Fig. 5.1. Example: Syntax for exothermic chemical reaction penalty
83

Excel will recognize PenaltyExotherm as name of the user-defined function. To
access the PenaltyExotherm in Excel, the function name and its arguments are
introduced as a formula in a worksheet cell the same way the user would enter any input
to any Excels built-in functions. If the user does not remember the name of the function,
the function can be found in user-defined functions organized under Excels insert -
function dialog, as shown in Figure 5.2.

Fig. 5.2. User-defined functions in Microsoft Excel (Adapted from Microsoft Excel)

5. Creating List Box
List Box displays a list of values/statements that the user can select from. The list
boxes are arranged to allow the user to select only one single value from several
User-defined
functions list
Select user-defined
84

available values/statements. As shown in Figure 5.3, VBA recognizes each
value/statement as a sequenced number. So, the first row of value/statement is
represented as 1, the second row value/statement is represented as 2, and so on.

Fig. 5.3. Example of List Box for exothermic chemical reaction (Adapted from Microsoft Excel)

The user assigns a cell for each input and output by doing right click while the
arrow is on the List Box and then selects format control button. In Figure 5.3, the input
range is A3 to A9. If the user selects moderate exotherm which is the 2
nd
row of
value/statement, then cell B2 (Cell link) will be filled by a number 2. This number is
ListBox
Input Range
Cell Link
Cell Link
Input Range
85

an input to the user-defined function that was described on the section 3- User-Defined
Functions. This research employs not only the List Box, but also Check Box and Option
Box. The procedure for developing Check Box and Option Box are the same as the one
for List Box.

6. Check Box
Check Box is a square box with checkmark when selected and is not for mutually
exclusive procedures. Hence, the user can select more than one statement. The output of
CheckBox is in the form of true/false statement which appears on the cell link assigned
by the user and will be the input for the user-defined function. Figure 5.4 shows an
example of CheckBox built for this research.

Fig. 5.4. Example of CheckBox for operation instruction/procedure credit factor
86

7. Option Button.
It is a round box that is filled with black dot when selected and is mutually
exclusive. Thus, the user can select only one statement. The example of an Option
Button is shown in Figure 5.5.

Fig. 5.5. Check box for material factor determination

5.4 GUIDELINES FOR OPERATING F&EI PROGRAM
The F&EI program has so many features that are represented by buttons. To be
able to use those features, the user selects the certain buttons available in F&EI
navigator. The detailed features are described in the following sections.

5.4.1 F&EI Navigator
F&EI navigator box is a house for many buttons to perform other functions in
F&EI calculation, as shown in Figure 5.6. For example, to determine the material
factors, the button Material Factor on the F&EI navigator must be selected. The
following section will describe the features of each buttons.
Data Input
This button is used to verify whether the material used in the F&EI calculation is
in the databases that the program provides.
87

Fig. 5.6. F&EI navigator

Data Known
This button is selected when material data is not in the databases but available on
other sources. The user submits the data to the program databases using a pop-up
form that appears after clicking Data Known button.
Material Factor
This button is used only when the material data is neither listed in the database
nor available on other sources. This button will lead the user to the Material
Factor Determination for Unlisted Substances page and shows a form for
calculating the material factor.
Input Penalty
This button will bring the user to the page where F&EI calculation is performed.

88

F&EI Table
This button is selected if the user wants to review the summary of every penalty
submitted, the final F&EI value, and the sensitivity analysis form.
Loss Control Credit
This button leads to the submission form for loss control credit factors.
Process Unit Risk Analysis
This button allows the user to determine the business interruption.
View Graphic
This button takes the user to the chart of F&EI versus operating pressure and the
amount of the hazardous material along with their equations.
Limitation
This button shows the limitations of the F&EI method and program.
Select pertinent Unit
This button provides guidance on how to select the pertinent unit used in F&EI
calculation.
F&EI Diagram
This button shows the procedure of F&EI calculation diagram.
About the Program
This button provides important information about the program.

89

5.4.2 Material Factor Determination
As illustrated in chapter II, Material factor represents the intrinsic rate of
potential energy release caused by fire or explosion produced from combustion or
chemical reaction. It is the basic starting point of the F&EI calculation and plays a
critical role in the magnitude of the F&EI. MF is obtained from reactivity value (N
R
) and
flammability value (N
F
). The material factor determination is demonstrated in the next
sections.

5.4.2.1 Material Data Available in the F&EI Program Databases
The F&EI program provides chemical databases for more than 250
chemicals/materials and allows the user to select it from process data from listed data
ListBox. When the material data is available in the F&EI program databases, the user is
permitted to have up to four chemicals/materials in the process unit under evaluation. As
mentioned in Chapter II, the program selects the chemical with the highest material
factor (MF) as the basis for material factor. The Process Data for Listed Data ListBox is
shown in Figure 5.7.

5.4.2.2 Known Data
It is possible that the material used in process unit evaluated is not available in
the databases. If the data is available in any other sources, the program allows the user to
input the data into the F&EI program database. Select Data Known button on F&EI
90

navigator then the page contained the Data Input form appears and permits the user to
input the known-data by selecting Store button. Data Input form is shown in Figure 5.8.

Fig. 5.7. The Process data for listed data ListBox

5.4.2.3 Material Data Unknown
When the material data is unknown, the user can determine it by using the material
factor determination feature in the F&EI program. The material factor depends on
reactivity value N
R
and flammability value N
F
(liquid, solid and gas) or dust class St (for
combustible dust or mists) which are available on Material Factor Determination for
Unlisted Substances page.
91

Fig. 5.8. The Data Input form

The selection of Material Factor button on F&EI navigator will lead the user to
that page. N
R
for liquid, gas, dust, and combustible solids is determined by Reactivity
Value ListBox. Then, check the Option Box according to the material used. Figure 5.9
shows the Material Factor Determination for Unlisted Substances page with
combustible solid checked.

5.4.3 Fire and Explosion Index Calculation
As mentioned in Chapter II, F&EI calculation consists of sequential steps. The
determination of each step is presented in the next sections. To make the penalty
determination easier, the description of each option is available in the column next to the
penalty form.
92

Fig. 5.9. The Material Factor determination for unlisted substances page

5.4.4 General Process Hazards
Selecting Input Penalty button will bring the user to the Fire and Explosion Index
Calculation page which is composed of five green buttons: general process, special
process hazards, process control credit factor, process unit risk analysis, and chart. To
complete the F&EI calculation successfully, the user should go through each of them.
General process hazard calculation is conducted by selecting the General
Process button then the page shown in Figure 5.10 appears and allows the user to give
penalty for each ListBox (A-F) according to the process under evaluation.
93

Fig. 5.10. The General Process Hazards page

5.4.5 Special Process Hazards
The Special Process Hazards page is available by selecting the Special Process
Hazard button. There are the Special Process Hazard Penalty ListBox (A-L) and the
Special Process Hazard Data ListBox. Both ListBox are shown in Figure 5.11 and 5.12.
94

Fig. 5.11. The Special Process Hazard Data ListBox

95

Fig. 5.12. The Special Process Hazard Penalty ListBox

5.4.6 Process Control Credit Factor
The process control credit factor page, as shown in Figure 5.13, will appear
upon selecting the Process Control Credit Factor button. This page contains three
parts: Process Control Credit Factor (C
1
) with A-I list box, Material Isolation Credit
Factor (C
2
) with A-D list box and Fire Protection Credit Factor (C
3
) with A-I list box.
96

Fig. 5.13. The Loss Control Credit Factor ListBox

5.4.7 Process Unit Risk Analysis
Process Unit Risk Analysis page is accessible by clicking the Process Unit Risk
Analysis button. This page contains process unit risk analysis data form and process unit
risk analysis summary, as shown in Figure 5.14.
97

Fig. 5.14. The Process Unit Risk Analysis Summary ListBox

5.4.8 Sensitivity Analysis Chart
The data for sensitivity analysis is given by selecting F&EI button. The user
submits various values for the pressure and the weight of material, then select the run
sensitivity button to run sensitivity analysis. F&EI value for each data submitted will be
calculated and plotted as sensitivity analysis chart. Sensitivity analysis chart is available
by selecting the View Graph button. This page contains the sensitivity curve and the
equation that represents the curve. The sensitivity analysis form and chart are shown in
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16, respectively.

98

Fig. 5.15. Sensitivity chart for the weight of material and its equation

Expression of F&EI as functions of the operating pressure and the amount of
material can be obtained. The expressions are ready to be integrated into process design
and optimization framework. Based on process models which are presented in Chapter
III and IV, we are ready to apply them into case studies. Chapter VI presents the
integration of F&EI into process design and optimization with case studies.

99

Fig. 5.16. Sensitivity analysis form
100

CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDIES AND VALIDATION

6.1 OVERVIEW
This research presents F&EI program to generate the safety parameter expression
as a function of material inventory and operating pressure and incorporate the expression
into process design and optimization framework as an attempt to integrate the safety
parameter integrated into design and optimization. This integration is performed
according to the proposed diagram for integrating F&EI into process design and
optimization as shown in Figure 6.1. The safety parameter used is Dows Fire and
Explosion Index method by AIChE (1994).
The case study and validation are performed to both the F&EI program and the
proposed procedures. The validation has to confirm that the F&EI program is able to
calculate the F&EI value according to the method presented by AIChE (1994) and is
performed by comparing the F&EI programmed-calculation value with published F&EI
value for the three case studies. Once the F&EI program is valid to be used, then it is
ready to be employed to the case study of reactor-separator system.
The validation of the proposed procedures are carried out in order to make sure
that integrating Dows Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) as a safety parameter into
process design and optimization will bring benefit without sacrificing the specified
economic and design parameters. In addition, the validation shows how to integrate the
101

F&EI, what data should be used and what kind of useful output should be getting. The
remainder of this of this chapter presents the case study and validation.

Fig. 6.1. Proposed procedure for integrating safety into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design

102

6.2 F&EI PROGRAM VALIDATION
The case study used are the calculation of F&EI for the Bhopal Incident
presented by Etowa, Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan (2002), the Nitric Acid Plants presented
by Sinnot (1996), the installation of a new railcar tank unloading facility presented by
Crowl & Louvar (2002), and the ammonia synthesis reactor presented by Gupta,
Khemani, & Mannan (2003). Etowa, Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan (2002) calculated the
F&EI for Bhopal by using their own F&EI program to calculate F&EI value. However,
their program is not able to calculate the business interruption, to perform sensitivity
analysis and to generate the F&EI expression as a function of material inventory and
operating pressure. Moreover, all of the case studies only present the F&EI value except
the one by Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003). Therefore, the comparison of F&EI
value is performed on the first three of the case study while the comparison of the loss
control credit factor and process unit risk analysis are performed to the fourth case study.
The sensitivity analysis is confirmed by changing the value of both material
inventory and operating pressure in the special process hazards section of F&EI
manually. Then see whether the sensitivity analysis given by F&EI program will give
the same results as in the manual attempt. The safety expression as the functions of the
material inventory and operating pressure are generated by F&EI program through
sensitivity analysis and least square method performed by MS Excel. MS Excel has been
proved to give an accurate result. Hence, once the F&EI program including sensitivity
analysis is validated by case studies, then the expressions are validated as well. The
demonstration of F&EI program on case studies is shown in the next section.
103

6.2.1 Case Study 1: Bhopal Incident by Etowa, Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan (2002)
6.2.1.1 Problem Statement
The problem statement and data are given by Etowa, Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan
(2002). The name of the equipment involved was tank 610 which was a horizontal tank
with 2.44 m in diameter and 12.20 m long. The F&EI calculation is performed for tank
610 at normal operation. Listed are the data used in F&EI calculation given by Etowa,
Amyottee, Pegg, & Khan (2002).
Data used:
MIC in the tank is flammable liquid
MIC reacts exothermically with water
MIC is transferred from tank 610 to the process area continuously using pump
with power more than 75 hp.
Minor leaks on joints and flanges in the unit might occur due to corrosion which
ranges from 0.127-0.254 mm/year.
Operating temperature is 20
o
C.
Operating Pressure is 138.2 kPa
Relief Pressure is 284 kPa.

6.2.1.2 F&EI Program Calculation
Based on the data above, the F&EI value is calculated using F&EI program. The
comparison of the results is shown in Table 6.1.

104

Table 6.1 The comparison of results by Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan (2002) and by F&EI
program
Data
Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan
(2002)
By F&EI
Program
F
1
1.8 1.85
F
2
4.4 4.5
F
3
8.2 (7.92) 8.3
F&EI 238 (230) 241.7

Degree of Hazards Severe Severe

Table 6.1 shows some differences occur due to calculation error or undefined
data. For example, F
3
calculated by Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan (2002) is F
1
times F
2

so that F
3
must be 7.92 instead of 8.2. This results a different F&EI value. Other
example is F
1
value. While it is possible for material handling/transfer section to receive
the penalty of 0.85, the penalty based on the data given by Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, &
Khan (2002) should be 0.85. In that case, F
1
should be 1.85 and not 1.80. The last
example is the F
3
where the difference came from pressure penalty section. To obtain the
F
3
equal to 4.4, the adjustment for pressure penalty must be 0.7 which is applied only for
highly viscous material. On the other hand, Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan (2002) gave
the liquid property not as highly viscous material but as flammable liquids.
However, all F&EI penalties are within a certain ranges defined by AIChE
(1994) so that any value can be used as penalty as long as it is in the specified ranges. To
accommodate the need for submitting values that is not available in the ListBox, F&EI
program provides the user the ability to input the penalty according to their judgment. In
105

this case study, this ability enables the F&EI value calculated by F&EI program to be
similar to the one by calculated Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan (2002).

6.2.2 Case Study 2: The Nitric Acid Plants by Sinnot (1996)
F&EI calculation for Nitric acid plants had been presented by Sinnot (1996)
according to the block diagram shown in Figure 6.2.

Fig. 6.2. The production of nitric acid from the oxidation of ammonia (adapted from Sinnot, 1996)

The detailed data also presented by (Sinnot, 1996):
Unit under evaluation: Whole plant. It means that all units as a whole without
separate areas and not considering main storages. Although F&EI generally
performed for each pertinent unit, it is possible to consider all plant units as one
pertinent unit. It is allowed only if there are no separate areas between the units
and no roots of incidents for particular equipment analysis is needed.
The largest quantity of ammonia is in Vaporizer which contains 1,100 lbs in
liquid phase.
106

Adequate access and drainage system are provided.
Operating pressure is 103 psig.
Relief valve is operated at 20 % above operating pressure.
Corrosion due to nitric oxide fumes occurs.
Large turbines and compressors are employed.

6.2.2.2 F&EI Program Calculation
Based on the data above, the F&EI value is calculated using F&EI program.
Table 6.2 shows the comparison of the results.

Table 6.2 The comparison of results by Sinnot (1996) and by F&EI program
Data By Sinnot (1996)
By F&EI
Program
F
1
1.5 1.5
F
2
3.45 3.44
F
3
5.2 5.2
F&EI 21 21

Degree of Hazards Light Light

There is slightly difference but can be ignored. This results show that the F&EI program
is able to calculate F&EI value for this case study.

107

6.2.3. Case Study 3: Ammonia Synthesis Reactor
The calculation of F&EI value, process control credit factor, and process unit risk
analysis for ammonia synthesis reactor have been presented by Gupta, Khemani, &
Mannan (2003). They offered several penalties, credit factor and other data needed as the
following:
The material under evaluation is hydrogen.
For general process hazards, the exothermic chemical reaction section receives
the penalty of 0.30 and the access section receives the penalty of 0.20. Other
sections are not applicable. Therefore, the total general process hazards factor
(F
1
) is 1.50.
For special process hazards, process upset or purge failure receives the penalty of
0.30, the always in flammable range section receives the penalty of 0.80, the
pressure section receives the penalty of 0.93, and corrosion and erosion section
receives the penalty of 0.10. Therefore, the total special hazard factor (F
2
) is 5.13
The total process unit hazards factor (F
3
) is 7.7 and the F&EI value is 161.7
For process control credit factor (C
1
), emergency power, cooling, explosion
control, emergency shutdown, computer control, reactive chemical review and
other process hazards analysis section receive the penalty of 0.98, 0.98, 0.91,
0.98, 0.96, 0.95, and 0.95, respectively. Inert gas, operating
instruction/procedures are not applicable. Then, the total of C
1
is 0.742.
108

For material isolation credit factor (C
2
), remote control valves, drainage, and
sections receive 0.97 and 0.94, respectively. Dump/blowdown and interlock
sections are not applicable. The total of C
2
is 0.9118.
For fire protection credit factor (C
3
), leak detection, structure steel, fire water
supply, sprinkler system, hand extinguisher/monitors and cable protection
sections receive the penalty of 0.96, 0.97, 0.96, 0.86, 0.96, and 0.96 respectively.
The special system, water curtains and foam are not applicable in this case study.
The total of C
3
is 0.7085.
For process unit risk analysis, the value of area of exposure is $ 5000/m
2
.
Escalation factor x 0.82 is 1.

6.2.3.2 F&EI Calculation with F&EI Program
Based on the data given by Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003), the F&EI value,
process control credit factor, and process unit risk analysis for ammonia reactor
synthesis reactor are calculated using F&EI program developed in this research. The
results are presented in Table 6.3.
Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003) were concentrating on calculating the loss
control credit factor and process unit risk analysis. The detailed process data that are
needed for F&EI were not all presented thus some differences value might occur when
comparing, as shown in Table 6.3. The operating pressure and pressure relief pressure
were not explicitly given by Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003) so that this research is
109

using operating pressure for ammonia production in fertilizer companies given by
Shreve (1967), which is 1049 psig.

Table 6.3 The results calculated by F&EI program and by Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003)
Data
By Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan
(2003)
By F&EI
Program
F
1
1.5 1.5
F
2
5.13 5.16
F
3
7.7 7.7
F&EI 161.7 161.7

C
1
0.742 0.742
C
2
0.9118 0.9118
C
3
0.7085 0.7074
LCCF 0.4793 (+ 0.15 %) 0.4786

Radius of Exposure (m) 41.4 41.40
Damage Factor 0.83 0.83
MPDO (Days) 86.15 85.94
Business Interuption ($
MM) 201.017
200.516 (-0.25
%)

The pressure relief pressure has to be higher than operating pressure and is
assumed as 1550 psig in this research. This results different penalty for pressure value as
big as 0.03. Thus, the F&EI and other value will be different.

6.2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis is also done to the case study. Manual calculation of
F&EI calculation is performed at several different values of material inventory and
operating pressure. Based on these values, the graph of F&EI versus material inventory
110

and of F&EI versus operating pressure will be generated using least squared method by
MS Excel thus the expression represent the graph will be presented.
Random sample of material inventory are taken and then submitted manually as
an input into the F&EI program. The results compared to the one calculated by F&EI
program through its sensitivity analysis features are shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The
red-colored on the table shows the sample used in the manual calculation.

Table 6.4 F&EI value, inventory = 24,000 lbs, pressure relief = 1550 psig, 400 psig < operating
pressure < 1500 psig
Pressure
(psig) FEI
Inventory = 24,000 lbs
1500 169.5 P
R
= 1550 psig
1450 169.5
Operating
pressure (psig)
F&EI by Manual
Calculation
1400 169.5
1350 169.5 1500 169.5
1300 169.5 1200 169.5
1250 169.5 900 169.5
1200 169.5 800 167.7
1150 169.5 600 160.9
1100 169.5 500 157.9
1050 169.5 400 154.5
1000 169.5
950 168.8
900 167.7
850 166.7
800 165.7
750 164.6
700 163.4
650 162.2
600 160.9
550 159.4
500 157.9
450 156.3
400 154.5

111

Table 6.5 F&EI value, 14,000 lbs < inventory < 58,000 lbs, pressure relief = 1550 psig, operating
pressure = 1469 psig
Inventory FEI
P
o
= 1469 psig

1.40E+04 158.5
P
R
=1550 psig

1.60E+04 161.4
Inventory (lbs)
F&EI by Manual
Calculation
1.80E+04 163.9
2.00E+04 166.0 14000 158.5
2.20E+04 167.9 16000 161.4
2.40E+04 169.5 24000 169.5
2.60E+04 171.0 34000 175.5
2.80E+04 172.3 40000 177.8
3.00E+04 173.5 46000 179.9
3.20E+04 174.5 50000 181
3.40E+04 175.5
3.60E+04 176.4
3.80E+04 177.2
4.00E+04 178.0
4.20E+04 178.7
4.40E+04 179.3
4.60E+04 179.9
4.80E+04 180.5
5.00E+04 181.0
5.20E+04 181.5
5.40E+04 182.0
5.60E+04 182.4
5.80E+04 182.8

Figure 6.3 shows the graph represent the sensitivity analysis and expression for
both F&EI as a function of material inventory and operating pressure which are:
F&EI value = 16.776 ln (material inventory) 0.1696
F&EI value = 2E-5 (operating pressure)
2
+ 0.0538 (operating pressure) + 136.41

112

Fig. 6.3. Sensitivity analysis for operating pressure and material inventory.

6.2.4 Case Study 3: The Installation of a New Railcar Tank Unloading Facility
This case study is adapted from Crowl & Louvar (2002). The data are:
A new railcar tank unloading facility will unload 25,000 gal of either
butadiene or cyclohexane.
The system is prepared with an emergency shutdown system with
remotely operated block valves.
Inert gas is provided at the pressure of 40 psig and the pressure relief
system is prepared to handle pressure of 75 psig.
The unloading procedure instruction and reactive chemical review are
available and has been reviewed by corporate technical staff.
Combustible gas detector and a deluge system with excellent water
supply are installed at unloading site.
113

Diking is surrounding three sides of the facility and directs the spill to a
covered impounding area.
Crowl & Louvar (2002) has performed the F&EI calculation for this system.
F&EI program will calculate the F&EI value which will then be compared to the results
by Crowl & Louvar (2002).

6.2.4.2 F&EI Program Calculation and Results
Based on the data above, the F&EI value is calculated by F&EI program. The
results are shown in Table 6.4.

Table 6.6 The results given by Crowl & Louvar (2002) and by F&EI program
Data By Crowl & Louvar (2002)
By F&EI
Program
F
1
1.5 1.5
F
2
2.94 (+ 1 %) 2.91
F
3
4.41 (+1.1 %) 4.36
F&EI 106 (+ 1.3 %) 104.6

Degree of Hazards Intermediate Intermediate

Radius of Exposure (ft) 90 (+2.3 %) 87.89

6.3 VERIFICATION OF F&EI PROGRAM
After performing four F&EI calculation, one loss control credit factor and
process unit risk analysis, and comparing them to the published F&EI results, the
argument whether the F&EI program is reliable are going to be presented in the
following.
114

From the first case study, several differences occurred. Considering the cause of
the differences and by comparing the results, the F&EI program has done a
good job in estimating F&EI value.
From the second case study by Sinnot (1996), the F&EI program is able to
calculate the F&EI value according to the methodology presented by AIChE
(1994).
As shown in Table 6.3, the F&EI value, radius of exposure, MPDO and
business interruption calculated by F&EI program are different but not more
than 0.5 % than one calculated by Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003). Since
F&EI calculation is performed as estimation this error can be negligible.
Therefore, F&EI program performs a good result for this case study.
From the three published case study, only Gupta, Khemani, & Mannan (2003)
present the loss control credit factor and business calculation. However, the
comparison shows that the errors are not more than 0.6 %. This small error
shows that the F&EI program perform the loss control credit factor and business
calculation according to AIChE (1994).
From the fourth case study by Crowl & Louvar (2002), all data are presented
explicitly thus the calculation is much easier to do. However, Crowl & Louvar
(2002) only presented F&EI value and radius of exposure calculations. The
errors occur are not more than 2.5 %. Considering the cause of the errors, F&EI
once again able to calculate F&EI value.
115

Sensitivity analysis validation shows that the F&EI program is able to calculate
the F&EI for a certain range of material inventory and operating pressure when
the other process conditions are held the same. Thus, the expressions generated
are also valid.
In conclusion, the F&EI program is able to perform Dows Fire and Explosion
Index methodology according to AIChE (1994). In addition, the F&EI program is ready
to be applied to the next case study, the reactor and distillation column system, to
examine the proposed procedures of integrating safety parameter into process design and
optimization. This topic will be discussed on the next section.

6.4 CASE STUDY: REACTOR-DISTILLATION COLUMN SYSTEM
As mentioned on the overview, the integration of Dow Fire and Explosion Index
as a safety parameter follows the procedures proposed in this research. This procedure
will be examined in order to support the argument that integrating safety into process
design and optimization give benefits without necessarily violating the economic and
technical parameter. Hence, the final design is optimum economic and the inherently
safer design for the distillation column system.
The reader might use more or less simple system but that will not affect the
concept offered by the proposed procedures. The next section describes the case study of
reactor and distillation column. In addition, it is very important to notice that the data
presented in this problem statement are adapted from several sources without
specifically representing a certain process. The reason is that this research in
116

concentrating in the concept of integrating F&EI value, not in the deep calculation of
F&EI where expert judgment is really needed and in optimization process which
includes a lot of variables.

6.4.1 Problem Statement
The case study used is the production of A according the reaction:
A B (gas phase)
The reactor is to produce 645 million pounds of chemical B per year from chemical A.
The reaction properties allow only a portion of the chemical A to be converted into
chemical B. Then the output of the reactor in the form of mixture of A and B will be fed
to the distillation column. Distillation column separates the chemical A and B in order to
have product A in a certain number purity.
The data for the process are:
Product is 645 million pounds of B per year.
Pressure range is 2 - 8 atm (reactor) and 10 16 (Distillation column)
Temperature is 120 F
Reactor is isothermal and plug flow Reactor
Feasible optimum conversion is between 40 % and 70 %.

117

6.4.2 Objective Functions and Optimization Model
6.4.2.1 Reactor
The objective function of this cases study is to minimize the total cost for reactor
and distillation column subject to the operating pressure and the conversion.

Table 6.7 Reactor Optimization
Objective function: Minimize Total reactor cost (C
v
+ C
pl
)
Technical Constraints Volume = fn (X, F
Ao
, C
Ao
)
Economic Constraints

Cv = fn (W)
W = fn (D, t
s
, L, D
i
)
t
s
= fn (P
d
, D
i
)
C
pl
= fn (D
i
)
P
d
= fn (P
o
)

The F&EI expressions as a function of material inventory and operating pressure
generated by least squared methods on F&EI program are:
( ) ( ) 46 . 88 0012 . 0 10 3 &
2 8
+ + =

Inventory Inventory EI F
( ) 8 . 109 1176 . 0 & + = pressure EI F

6.4.2.2 Distillation Column
The expressions given by F&EI program are :
( ) ( ) 16 . 101 0018 . 0 10 1 &
2 8
+ + =

Inventory Inventory EI F
( ) ( ) 83 . 106 1072 . 0 10 5 &
2 5
+ + =

pressure pressure EI F
118

Table 6.8 Objective function and economic constraints
Objective function Minimize Total reactor cost (C
v
+ C
pl
+ C
t
)
Economic Constraints

C
v
= fn (W)
W = fn (D, t
s
, L, D
i
)
ts
= fn (Pd, D
i
)
C
pl
= fn (D
i
)
P
d
= fn (P
o
)

The equations above will be the safety constraint for the optimization. The result of the
optimization for reactor-distillation column system is given in Figure 6.5.

119

Fig. 6.4. Rector-distillation column optimization without safety constraint
120

Fig. 6.5. Reactor-distillation column system with F&EI value as the safety constraint

For reactor-distillation column system, the total cost of the system is the total of
the reactor cost and the distillation cost. The vertical line shows the conversion which
gives the F&EI value of 128. If the safety parameter is not considered, the total cost will
be available for the conversion in the range of 40 % and 70 %, as shown in Figure 6.4.
However, safety parameter will not allow the process to apply those conversions since at
this point the process is not inherently safer according to Dows F&EI methodology. The
121

feasible range of conversion after safety parameter has been included is in the range of
49 % and 70 %, as shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5 also shows that safety parameter is employed as only one of the
constraint for the optimization. It will not change any of the design value such as the
cost, the reactor volume, the number of trays, etc. As a constraint, safety will only limit
the feasible area for the optimization solution. Thus, if the optimization with constraint is
performed, the result will be unacceptable and the designer has to adjust the constraint or
the other design variables.

6.5 SUMMARY
The integration of safety parameter into process design and optimization is
essential. However, there is no previous work in integrating F&EI into design and
optimization. This research recommends integrating safety into design and optimization
framework by using safety parameter as optimization constraint. The method used in this
research is Dows Fire and Explosion Index which is usually calculated manually.
This research automates the calculation of F&EI. The ability to calculate the
F&EI, to determine loss control credit factors and business interruption, and to perform
process unit risk analysis are the unique features of this F&EI program. In addition to
F&EI calculation, F&EI program provides the descriptions of each item of the penalties,
chemicals/materials databases, the flexibility to submit known chemical/material data to
databases, and material factor calculations. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses are
122

inventory and pressure. The expression will be the focal point in the process of
integrating F&EI into process design and optimization framework.
The proposed procedure of integrating F&EI into process design and
optimization framework is verified by applying it into process design and optimization
of reactor-distillation column system. The final result is the optimum economic and
inherently safer design for the reactor and distillation column system.
At F&EI value equal to 128, F&EI method will limit the amount of inventory and
the operating pressure that can be used. The safety as constraint will not change the
value of the variable that calculated without safety as constraint. However, it is very
reasonable that in optimization process, the non-feasible area will occur. This is the
reason that in the proposed procedures, when the result is not at acceptable level, the
constraint (including safety parameter) must be re-arranged to get the final results.

123

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

7.1 CONCLUSION
A complete fire and explosion index (F&EI) program that runs a Dows Fire and
Explosion Index has been developed and tested against four case studies. Testing against
four case studies prove that the F&EI program is able to calculate the fire and explosion
index, determine the loss control credit factor to reduce the F&EI value, and predict the
business interruption on the process in the event of incidents, all according to Dows fire
and explosion index method presented by AIChE (1994). In addition, the F&EI program
is also able to perform sensitivity analysis to generate mathematical expression of fire
and explosion index as a function of material inventory and operating pressure.
The case study on reactor-distillation column system proves that the proposed
procedures of integrating safety parameter (Dows F&EI in this research) into process
design and optimization framework quantitatively and systematically are really useful.
The safety parameter will act more like a constraint rather than as the process variable. It
will only limit the feasible area for optimization solution.
There are several contributions presented by this research:
Developing Fire and explosion index, the most widely used and known hazard
index. Texas A&M University and maybe some other school are using Dows
Fire and Explosion Index as safety parameter in their process design class.
124

Having the method computerized will help the student to calculate the F&EI
value, loss control credit factor, business interruption, and sensitivity analysis.
Getting safety parameter as a mathematical expression has been a problem in
safety thus inhibits the integration of safety parameter into process design
systematically. This research presents a simple way to generating expression
from available hazard analysis which can be useful in modeling and predicting
the hazard of the specific process.
Proving that there is possibility for Dows Fire and Explosion Index method to
be integrated into process design and optimization framework while still obeys
the specified technical and economic parameter.

7.2 FUTURE WORK
This work is a preliminary attempt to integrate safety parameter, not only Dows
Fire and Explosion Index, into process design and optimization framework. Therefore,
there are several possibilities to extend this work:
This research has applied the concept into reactor-distillation column system.
This concept should be applied to a more complex process system to see how it
works.
This work presents F&EI program with VBA that need a host application. The
F&EI program could be improved to handle more complex process and should be
converted into an executed program.
125

Dows Fire and Explosion Index is not sensitive to temperature changes. Other
proven safety hazards analysis with the ability to generate expression for the
safety parameter, can be used and be integrated into process design and
optimization. This offers wider range of application of this concept.
Process optimization requires optimization model in the form of mathematical
expression. Currently, hazards analysis methodologies quantify safety parameter
without generating expression represents the safety parameter. Developing or
modifying method in order to generate the safety expression give better safety
parameter representation. Thus, the optimum final design can be achieved.

126

REFERENCES

American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (1994a). Dows fire and explosion
index hazard classification guide (7
th
Ed.). New York: AIChE.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (1987). Dows fire and explosion
index hazard classification guide (6
th
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (1994b). Dows chemical exposure
index guide (1
st
Crowl, D.A. (1996). Inherently safer chemical processes: a life cycle approach. New
York: AIChE.
Crowl, D.A., & Louvar, J.F. (2002). Chemical process safety fundamentals with
applications (2
nd
Ed). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall PTR.
Edgar, T.F., Himmeblau, D.M., & Lasdon, L.S. (2001). Optimization of chemical
processes (2
nd
Ed.). Singapore: McGraw Hill.
Eduljee, H.E. (1975). Equations replace gilliland plot. Hydrocarbon Processing, 54(9),
120-122.
Edward, D.W., & Lawrence, D. (1993). Assessing the inherent safety of chemical
process routes: is there a relation between plant cost and inherent safety.
TransIChemE, Pt. B(Process Safety and Enviromental Protection), 71B, 252.
El-Halwagi, M.M. (2003). Welcome to the fascinating area of process synthesis,
integration, and optimization. CHEN 689 Class Notes. College Station: Texas
A&M University.
Etowa, C.B., Amyotte, P.R., Pegg, M.J., & Khan F.I. (2002). Quantification of inherent
safety aspects of the dow indices. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, 15, 477-487.
Fogler, H.S. (2002). Elements of chemical reaction engineering (3
rd
Ed.). New Delhi,
India: Prentice-Hall of India.
French, R.W., Williams, D.D., & Wixom, E.D. (2004). Inherent safety, health, and
environmental (SHE) reviews. Process Safety Progress, 15(1), 48-51.
127

Gentile, M. (2004). Development of a hierarchical fuzzy model for the evaluation of
inherent safety. Ph.D. Dissertation. College Station:Texas A&M University.
Gupta, J.P., Khemani, M., & Mannan, M.S. (2003). Calculation of Fire and Explosion
Index (F&EI) value for the Dow guide taking credit for the loss control measure.
Journal of Loss Prevention in Process Industries, 16, 235-241.
Harris, M. (1997). Teach Yourself: visual basic
5 for applications in 21 days (3

rd
Ed.).
Indianapolis, Indiana: Sams Publishing.
Heikkila, A.M. (1999). Inherent safety in process plant design: an index based approach.
Ph.D Dissertation, Technical Research Center of Finland, VTT, Espoo: Finland.
Hendershot, Dennis. C. (1999). Inherently safer process design philosophy. Herzlia,
Israel: Rohm and Haas Company, unpublished.
Khan, F.I., & Amyotte, P.R. (2003b). How to make inherent safety practice a reality. The
Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, 81, 1-16.
Khan, F.I., Sadiq R., & Amyotte, P.R. (2003a). Evaluation of available indices for
inherently safer design options. Process Safety Progress, 22(2), 83-98.
Kletz, T. (1991). Plant design for safety: a user-friendly approach. New York:
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation.
Mansfield, D., & Cassidy, K. (1994). Inherently safer approach to plant design: the
benefits of an inherently safer approach and how this can be built into the design
process. Institution of Chemical Engineer Symposium Series,134, 285-299.
Palaniappan, C., Srinivasan, R., & Tan, R. (2004). Selection of inherently safer process
routes: a case study. Chemical Engineering and Processing, 43, 647-653.
Peters, M.S., & Timmerhaus, K.D. (1991). Plant design and economics for chemical
engineers (4
th
Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Seider, W.D., Seader, J.D., & Lewin, D.R. (2004). Product & process design principles:
synthesis, analysis and evaluation (2
nd
Ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Sinnott, R.K. (1996), Coulson & richardsons chemical engineering: chemical
engineering design volume 6 (2
nd
Ed.). Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Smith, R. (1995). Chemical process design. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
128

Wang, Y. (2004). Development of computer-aided fault tree synthesis methodology for
quantitative risk analysis in the chemical process industry. Ph.D.Dissertation,
College Station: Texas A&M University.
129

APPENDIX A
ALGORITHMS FOR MICROSOFT VISUAL BASIC APPLICATION

1. General Process Hazard
A. Penalty for Exothermic Chemical Reactions
Function PenaltyExotherm(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyExotherm = 0.3
ElseIf dtype = 2 Then
PenaltyExotherm = 1
PenaltyExotherm = 1
End If
End Function

Decription for Exothermic Chemical Reactions
Function DetailExotherm(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailExotherm = "Hydrogenation, Hydrolysis, Isomerization, Sulfonation,
Neutralization"
DetailExotherm = "Alkylation, Esterification, Addition reactions, Oxidation,
Polymerization, Condensation"
130

DetailExotherm = " Reaction occuring between an strong reactive organic acid and an
alcohol"
DetailExotherm = "Vigorous oxidizing agents such as chlorates, nitric acids,
hypochlorous acids and salts"
DetailExotherm = "Reaction at which a significant fire and expoliosn potential would
exist when control was lost, example: Halogenation"
DetailExotherm = " Quite hazardous exothermic reactions such as Nitration"
End If
End Function

B. Penalty for Endothermic Processes
Function PenaltyEndotherm(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyEndotherm = 0.2
End If
End Function

131

Description for Endothermic Processes
Function DetailEndotherm(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailEndotherm = "This applies only to reactors"
DetailEndotherm = "Energy provided by combustion of a solids, liquids or gaseous
fuel"
DetailEndotherm = "Heating material to remove chemically bonded water or other
volatile material"
DetailEndotherm = "Separations of ions by means of electric current"
DetailEndotherm = "Thermal decompisition of molecules to smaller ones by use of
high P, T and/or catalyst FOR ELECTRIC OR REMOTE HOT GAS HEAT"
DetailEndotherm = "Thermal decompisition of molecules to smaller ones by use of
high P, T and/or catalyst FOR DIRECT FIRED HEAT"
End If
End Function

C. Penalty to Material Handling and Transfer
Function PenaltyInrack(ByVal IndexCombo As Byte, ByVal bChecked As Boolean) As
Double
Select Case IndexCombo
Case 1:
PenaltyInrack = 0.5
Case 2:
PenaltyInrack = 0.5
Case 3:
PenaltyInrack = 0.85
Case 4:
132

Case 5:
PenaltyInrack = 0.4
Case 6:
Case 7:
PenaltyInrack = 0
End Select

If PenaltyInrack = 0 Then
PenaltyInrack = 0
ElseIf bChecked = True Then
PenaltyInrack = PenaltyInrack + 0.2

End If
End Function

Description to Material Handling and Transfer
Function DetailMaterial(ByVal dtype As String)
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailMaterial = "Transfer line are connected and disconnected"
DetailMaterial = "Add air into centrifuge, batch reactors or batch mixer, whether
inerted or not"
DetailMaterial = "Drums, cylinders, portable flexible containers and aerosol cans as
storage"
DetailMaterial = "Foam, fiber, powder, rubber goods, styrofoam, Methocel cellulose
in dust/leak-free package"
133

DetailMaterial = "Open<40 mm thick, coarse granular materials such as plastics
pellets, rack storage, wood pallets and ground materials such as polystyrene"
DetailMaterial = "100 < Close cup flash point < 140"
End If
End Function

D. Penalty to Enclosed or Indoor Unit
Function Penaltyenclose(ByVal IndexCombo As Byte, ByVal bChecked As Boolean)
As Double
Case 1:
Penaltyenclose = 0.5
Case 2:
Case 3:
Case 4:
Case 5:
Case 6:
Penaltyenclose = 0
End Select

If Penaltyenclose = 0 Then
Penaltyenclose = 0
Penaltyenclose = Penaltyenclose * 0.5
End If
End Function
134

Description to Enclosed or Indoor Unit
Function DetailEnclosed(ByVal dtype As String)
If dtype = 4 Then
DetailEnclosed = "Can be applied to LPG"
DetailEnclosed = "Can be applied to LPG"
Else
DetailEnclosed = ""
End If
End Function

E. Penalty to Access
Function PenaltyAccess(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyAccess = 0.35
PenaltyAccess = 0.35
PenaltyAccess = 0.2
End If
End Function

F. Penalty to Drainage and Spills Control
Function PenaltyDrainage(ByVal dtype As Double) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyDrainage = 0.5
PenaltyDrainage = 0.5
PenaltyDrainage = 0
135

End If
End Function
2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
Special Process Hazards Data
Amount 1
Function Material(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If (0 <= dtype And dtype < 1000000000) Then
Material = "The amount of material in process units"
Else
Material = ""
End If
End Function

Amount 2
Function Materialconnected(ByVal dtype As String) As String
Materialconnected = "The amount of material in the largest connected units. If the
connected unit can be isolated by closure valves operable from remote location in times
of emergency is removed from consideration"
ElseIf dtype = "" Then
Materialconnected = ""
End If
End Function

A. Penalty to Toxic Material
Function PenaltyToxic(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyToxic = 0
PenaltyToxic = 0
136

PenaltyToxic = 1
PenaltyToxic = 2
PenaltyToxic = 3
PenaltyToxic = 4
End If
PenaltyToxic = PenaltyToxic * 0.2
End Function

B. Penalty to Sub-Atmospheric Pressure
Function PenaltySubPressure(ByVal bChecked As Boolean) As Double
If bChecked = True Then
PenaltySubPressure = 0.5
ElseIf PenaltySubPressure = False Then
PenaltySubPressure = 0
End If
End Function

C.1. Tanks Farms Storage Flammable Liquids (for storage)
Function PenaltyTanks(ByVal IndexCombo As Double, ByVal bChecked As Boolean)
As Double
Case 1:
PenaltyTanks = 0
Case 2:
PenaltyTanks = 0.5
Case 3:
PenaltyTanks = 0.5
End Select
137

PenaltyTanks = 0
End If
End Function

Description to C.1
Function DetailTanks(ByVal dtype As Double)
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailTanks = "Air can be breathed during pump-out or sudden cooling of the tank."
DetailTanks = "OPRS = Operating pressure-vacuum relief system"
Else
DetailTanks = ""
End If
End Function

C.2. Process Upset of Purge Failure (for process equipment)
Function PenaltyUpset(ByVal Upset As Double) As Double
Select Case Upset
Case 1:
PenaltyUpset = 0
Case 2:
PenaltyUpset = 0.3
Case 3:
PenaltyUpset = 0.3
Case 4:
PenaltyUpset = 0.3
Case 5:
PenaltyUpset = 0.3
End Select
End Function
138

Description to C.2
Function DetailUpset(ByVal dtype As Double)
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailUpset = "PE is Process Equipment and PST is Process Storage Tanks"
DetailUpset = "PU is Process Units"
Else
DetailUpset = ""
End If
End Function

C.3. Always in Flammable Range
Function PenaltyAlways(ByVal bChecked As String) As Double
PenaltyAlways = 0
Else
PenaltyAlways = 0.8
End If
End Function

D. Dust Explosion
Function PenaltyDust(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyDust = 0
PenaltyDust = 0.25
PenaltyDust = 0.5
PenaltyDust = 0.75
139

PenaltyDust = 1.25
PenaltyDust = 2
End If
End Function

E. Pressure
Function PenaltyPressure(ByVal dtype As Double) As Double
If (0 < dtype And dtype < 0.66) Then
PenaltyPressure = 0
ElseIf (0.66 <= dtype And dtype < 1000) Then
PenaltyPressure = 0.16109 + 1.61503 * (dtype / 1000) - 1.42879 * (dtype / 1000) ^ 2
+ 0.5172 * (dtype / 1000) ^ 3
ElseIf (1000 <= dtype And dtype <= 1500) Then
PenaltyPressure = 0.86
ElseIf (2000 < dtype And dtype <= 2500) Then
ElseIf (dtype > 10000) Then
End If
End Function

140

Penalty to Pressure adjustment
Function adjusment(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
adjusment = 0.7
adjusment = 1.2
adjusment = 1.2
adjusment = 1.3
adjusment = 1#
End If
End Function

F. Penalty to Low Temperature
Function PenaltyLow(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyLow = 0.3
PenaltyLow = 0.2
PenaltyLow = 0
PenaltyLow = 0
End If
End Function

G.1 Penalty to Liquids or Gases in Process
Function PenG1(ByVal dtype As Double, ByVal W1 As Double, ByVal W2 As Double,
HC1 As Double, HC2 As Double) As Double
141

'Liquids or Gases in Storage (Outside The Process Area)
W = W1
HC = HC1
If W2 > W Then
W = W2
HC = HC2
End If
HC = HC / 10 ^ 6
P = W * HC
If (dtype <= 5) And (dtype >= 1) Then
PenG1 = 10 ^ (0.17179 + 0.42988 * Application.Log(P) - 0.37244 *
(Application.Log(P)) ^ 2 + 0.177121 * (Application.Log(P)) ^ 3 - 0.029984 *
(Application.Log(P)) ^ 4)
PenG1 = 0
End If
End Function

G.2. Penalty to Liquid or Gases in Storage (Outside the Process Area)
Function PenaltyG2(ByVal dtype As Double, ByVal P As Double) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyG2 = 10 ^ (-0.289069 + 0.472171 * Application.Log(P) - 0.074585 *
(Application.Log(P)) ^ 2 - 0.018641 * (Application.Log(P) ^ 3))
PenaltyG2 = 0
142

End If
End Function

G.3. Penalty to Combustible Solids in Storage/Dust in Process
Function PenaltyG3(ByVal dtype As Double, ByVal P As Double) As Double
On Error GoTo err
PenaltyG3 = 0
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyG3 = 10 ^ (0.280423 + 0.464559 * Application.Log(P) - 0.28291 *
(Application.Log(P)) ^ 2 + 0.066218 * (Application.Log(P) ^ 3))
(Application.Log(P)) ^ 2 + 0.02276 * (Application.Log(P) ^ 3))
PenaltyG3 = 10 ^ (0.280423 + 0.464559 * Application.Log(6 * P) - 0.28291 *
(Application.Log(6 * P)) ^ 2 + 0.066218 * (Application.Log(6 * P) ^ 3))
PenaltyG3 = 0
End If
err:
End Function

H. Penalty to Corrosion and Erosion
Function PenaltyCorrosion(ByVal dtype As String) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyCorrosion = 0.1
143

PenaltyCorrosion = 0
End If
End Function

I. Penalty to Leakage-Joints and Packing
Function PenaltyLeakage(ByVal dtype As String) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyLeakage = 0.1

J. Penalty to the Use of Fired Equipment
Function PenaltyFired(ByVal dtype As Double, ByVal distance As Double, ByVal
Checked As Boolean) As Double
If (distance > 210) Then
PenaltyFired = 0.1
PenaltyFired = 0.5 * PenaltyFired
144

PenaltyFired = 10 ^ (-3.3243 * (distance / 210) + 3.75127 * (distance / 210) ^ 2 -
1.42523 * (distance / 210) ^ 3)
PenaltyFired = 10 ^ (-3.3243 * (distance / 210) + 3.75127 * (distance / 210) ^ 2 -
1.42523 * (distance / 210) ^ 3)
PenaltyFired = 10 ^ (-0.3745 * (distance / 210) - 2.70212 * (distance / 210) ^ 2 +
2.09171 * (distance / 210) ^ 3)
PenaltyFired = 0
PenaltyFired = 1
PenaltyFired = 0

End If
End Function

Description to the Use of Fired Equipment
Function DetailFired(ByVal dtype As String, ByVal distance As Double) As String
DetailFired = "if the fired equipment is the process unit being evaluated itself, the
distance is zero"
End If
End Function

K. Penalty Hot Oil Exchange System
Function PenaltyHotOil(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyHotOil = 0
PenaltyHotOil = 0
145

PenaltyHotOil = 0
PenaltyHotOil = 0.15
PenaltyHotOil = 0.3
PenaltyHotOil = 0.5
End If
End Function

L. Penalty to Rotating Equipment
Function PenaltyRotating(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyRotating = 0.5
146

PenaltyRotating = 0
End If
End Function

Description to Rotating Equipment
Function Detailrotating(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 3 Then
Detailrotating = "In which failure could create a process exotherm due to lack of
cooling from interupted mixing or circulation of coolant or due to interupted nad
resumed mixing"
Detailrotating = "Ex: centrifuges"
End If
End Function

3. LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTOR
Process Control Credit Factor (C
1
)
A. Credit to Emergency Power
Function PenaltyEmergency(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyEmergency = 0.98
PenaltyEmergency = 1
PenaltyEmergency = 1
End If
End Function

Description to Emergency Power
Function DetailEmergency(ByVal dtype As String) As String
147

If dtype = 1 Then
DetailEmergency = "For provision of emergency power for essential services
(instrument air control instrumentation, agitators, pumps, etc) with automatic changover
from normal to emergency. It is needed to prevent or control a possible fire/explosion
incident"
DetailEmergency = ""
End If
End Function

B. Credit to Cooling System
Function PenaltyCooling(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyCooling = 0.99
PenaltyCooling = 0.97
PenaltyCooling = 1
End If
End Function

C. Credit to Explosion Control
Function PenaltyExplosion(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyExplosion = 0.84
PenaltyExplosion = 0.98
PenaltyExplosion = 1
End If
End Function

148

Description to Explosion Control
Function DetailExplosion(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailExplosion = "ESS is Explosion Suppression System"
DetailExplosion = "ORS is Overpressure Relief System"
End If
End Function
Function PenaltyShutdown(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyShutdown = 0.98
PenaltyShutdown = 1
End If
End Function

D. Credit to Emergency Shutdown
Function DetailShutdown(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailShutdown = "CRE is Critical Rotating Equipment such as compressors,
turbines, fans, etc, that are provided with vibration detection equipment"
DetailShutdown = "CRE is Critical Rotating Equipment such as compressors,
turbines, fans, etc, that are provided with vibration detection equipment"
End If
End Function

149

E. Credit to Computer Control
Function PenaltyComputer(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyComputer = 0.99
PenaltyComputer = 1
End If
End Function

F. Credit to Inert Gas
Function PenaltyInert(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyInert = 0.96
PenaltyInert = 0.94
PenaltyInert = 1
PenaltyInert = 1
End If
End Function
150

Description to Inert Gas
Function DetailInert(ByVal dtype As String) As String
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailInert = "IGS is Inert Gas System"
DetailInert = "IGS is Inert Gas System"
End If
End Function

Credit to Operation Instruction/Procedure - Credit
Function PenaltyOp1(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = True Then
PenaltyOp1 = 0.5
Else
PenaltyOp1 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp2 = 0.5
Else
PenaltyOp2 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp3 = 0.5
151

Else
PenaltyOp3 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp4 = 0.5
Else
PenaltyOp4 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp5 = 0.5
Else
PenaltyOp5 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp6 = 1
Else
PenaltyOp6 = 0
End If
End Function

152

PenaltyOp7 = 1
Else
PenaltyOp7 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp8 = 1
Else
PenaltyOp8 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp9 = 1.5
Else
PenaltyOp9 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp10 = 1.5
Else
PenaltyOp10 = 0
End If
End Function

153

PenaltyOp11 = 2
Else
PenaltyOp11 = 0
End If
End Function

PenaltyOp12 = 3
Else
PenaltyOp12 = 0
End If
End Function

Point for Operation Instruction/Procedure - Points
Function Point(ByVal dtype As String, ByVal IndexCombo As Byte, ByVal bChecked
As Boolean) As Double
a = 0.5
b = 0.5
c = 0.5
d = 0.5
Else
Pointa = 0
End If
End Function

H. Credit to Reactive Chemical Review
Function PenaltyReactive(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
154

PenaltyReactive = 0.91
PenaltyReactive = 0.98
PenaltyReactive = 1
End If
End Function

I. Credit to Other Process Hazards Analysis
Function PenaltyAnalysis(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyAnalysis = 0.91
End If
End Function

155

4. PROCESS UNIT RISK ANALYSIS
5. Determination of Damage Factor
Function DamageFactor(ByVal dtype As Double, ByVal P As Double) As Double
'P = process unit hazards factor, dtype = material factor
If P > 8 Then
P = 8
ElseIf P < 8 And P = 8 Then
P = P
End If

If dtype = 1 Then
DamageFactor = 0.003907 + 0.002957 * P + 0.004031 * P ^ 2 - 0.00029 * P ^ 3
DamageFactor = 0.025817 + 0.019071 * P - 0.00081 * P ^ 2 - 0.000108 * P ^ 3
End If
156

End Function

9. Calculation of MPDO
Function MPDO(ByVal dtype As Byte, ByVal MPPD As Double, ByVal factor As
Double) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
MPDO = 10 ^ (1.550233 + 0.598416 * Application.Log(MPPD / 10 ^ 6))
End If
MPDO = factor * MPDO
End Function

Material Isolation Credit Factor (C
2
)

A. Penalty to Remote Control Valves
Function PenaltyControl(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyControl = 1
PenaltyControl = 0.98
PenaltyControl = 0.96
End If
End Function

Description to Remote Control Valves
Function DetailValves(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
157

If dtype = 1 Then
DetailValves = ""
DetailValves = "ROIV = Remotely Operated Isolation Valves available to such
storage tanks, process vessles or major sections of transfer lines used in an emergency
use"
DetailValves = "ROIV = Remotely Operated Isolation Valves available to such
storage tanks, process vessles or major sections of transfer lines used in an emergency
use"
End If
End Function

B. Penalty to Dump/Blowdown
Function PenaltyDump(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyDump = 1
PenaltyDump = 0.98
PenaltyDump = 0.96
PenaltyDump = 0.96
PenaltyDump = 0.98
End If
End Function

Description to Dump/Blowdown
Function DetailDump(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailDump = ""
158

DetailDump = "Emergency dump tank can be used directly to receive the contents of
the process unit safely with adequate quenching and venting"
DetailDump = "Emergency dump tank can be used directly to receive the contents of
the process unit safely with adequate quenching and venting"
DetailDump = "For Emergency venting, gas/vapor material is piped to a flare system
or to a close vent receiver"
DetailDump = "For normal venting that reduces the exposure of surrounding
equipment to released gases or liquids. Ex: Blowdown from polystyrene reactor to a tank
or receiver"
End If
End Function

Description to Drainage
Function DetailDrainage(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailDrainage = ""
DetailDrainage = "Provide slope of at least 2% (1% on a hards surface) leading to
drainage trench of adquate size. Assume 100% the content of the largest tank + 10 % of
the next largest tank could be released plus 1 hr of deluge/sprinkler fire water"
DetailDrainage = "Drainage could drain the contents away from under or near tanks
and equipment"
DetailDrainage = ""
DetailDrainage = ""
159

DetailDrainage = "The slope is doubtful or if the impounding basin < 50 ft (15 m)
away"
DetailDrainage = "Diking design directs spill to an impounding basin min 50 ft (15 m)
away and capable of receiving 100% the content of the largest tank + 10 % of the next
largest tank could be released plus 1 hr of deluge/sprinkler fire water"
End If
End Function

D. Penalty to Interlock
Function PenaltyInterlock(ByVal dtype As String) As Double
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyInterlock = 1
PenaltyInterlock = 0.98
PenaltyInterlock = 0.98
End If
End Function

Fire Protection Credit Factor (C
3
)

A. Credit to Leak Detection
Function PenaltyLeak(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyLeak = 1
PenaltyLeak = 0.98
PenaltyLeak = 0.94
End If
160

End Function

B. Credit to Structure Steel
Function PenaltySteel(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltySteel = 1
PenaltySteel = 0.98
PenaltySteel = 0.97
PenaltySteel = 0.95
PenaltySteel = 0.98
PenaltySteel = 0.98
End If
End Function

C. Credit to Fire Water Supply
Function PenaltyWater(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyWater = 1
PenaltyWater = 0.94
PenaltyWater = 0.97
PenaltyWater = 0.97
End If
End Function
161

Description to Fire Water Supply
Function DetailWater(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailWater = "Applicable to fire water supply provided by alternative power source,
independent of normal electric service and deliver maximum demand"
End If
End Function

D. Credit to Special Systems
Function PenaltySpecial(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltySpecial = 1
PenaltySpecial = 0.91
End If
End Function

Description to Special System
Function DetailSpecial(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 1 Then
DetailSpecial = ""
DetailSpecial = "Special system include CO2, Halon, smoke, and flame detectors and
blast walls or cubicle, double wall for outer tank and buried tank (discouraged)"
End If
162

End Function

E. Credit to Sprinkler System - Design
Function PenaltyDesign(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyDesign = 1
PenaltyDesign = 0.87
End If
End Function

E. Penalty to Sprinkler System - Area
Function PenaltyArea(ByVal Credit As Double, ByVal Area As Double) As Double
Select Case Credit
Case 1:
PenaltyArea = 1
Case 2:
PenaltyArea = 0.87
Case 3:
PenaltyArea = 0.87
Case 4:
163

PenaltyArea = 0.81
Case 5:
PenaltyArea = 0.84
Case 6:
PenaltyArea = 0.74
Case 7:
PenaltyArea = 0.81
End Select

If Area = 2 Then
PenaltyArea = PenaltyArea * 1.06
ElseIf Area = 3 Then
ElseIf Area = 4 Then
End If
End Function

F. Penalty to Water Curtain
Function PenaltyCurtain(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyCurtain = 1
PenaltyCurtain = 0.98
PenaltyCurtain = 0.97
End If
End Function

Description to Water Curtain
Function DetailCurtain(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
164

If dtype = 2 Then
DetailCurtain = "Appicable to Automatic water spray between source of ignition and a
potential vapor release area and located at least 75 ft (23 m) from the vapor release
point"""
DetailCurtain = "Appicable to Automatic water spray between source of ignition and a
potential vapor release area and located at least 75 ft (23 m) from the vapor release
point"""
End If
End Function

G. Penalty to Foam
Function PenaltyFoam(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyFoam = 1
PenaltyFoam = 0.94
PenaltyFoam = 0.92
PenaltyFoam = 0.97
PenaltyFoam = 0.94
PenaltyFoam = 0.95
PenaltyFoam = 0.97
PenaltyFoam = 0.94
End If
End Function

165

Description to Foam
Function DetailFoam(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 3 Then
DetailFoam = "Automatically means the foam valve is automatically actuated when
fire is detected"
DetailFoam = "Automatic means fire detection systems are used to actuating the foam
system"
End If
End Function

H. Penalty to Hand Extinguisher/Monitors
Function PenaltyHand(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyHand = 1
PenaltyHand = 0.98
PenaltyHand = 1
PenaltyHand = 1
PenaltyHand = 0.97
PenaltyHand = 0.95
PenaltyHand = 0.93
End If
End Function

166

I. Penalty to Cable Protection
Function PenaltyCable(ByVal dtype As Variant) As Variant
If dtype = 1 Then
PenaltyCable = 1
PenaltyCable = 0.98
PenaltyCable = 0.98
PenaltyCable = 0.94
End If
End Function

Description to Cable Protection
Function DetailCable(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If dtype = 2 Then
DetailCable = "Completed with water spray directed onto the top side"
DetailCable = "Applicable for both flooded or dry"
End If
End Function

MATERIAL FACTOR DETERMINATION FOR UNLISTED SUBSTANCES

Material Factor for Liquids and Gases Flammability or Combustibility and
Volatile Solids
Option Base 1

Function Reactivity(ByVal NR As Integer, ByVal NF As Integer)
Dim NF0 As Variant, NF1 As Variant, NF2 As Variant, NF3 As Variant, NF4 As
Variant
167

NF0 = Array(1, 14, 24, 29, 40)

NF1 = NF0
NF1(1) = 4

NF2 = NF0
NF2(1) = 10

NF3 = NF0
NF3(1) = 16: NF3(2) = 16

NF4 = NF0
NF4(1) = 21: NF3(2) = 21

Select Case NF
Case 0: Reactivity = NF0(NR + 1)
End Select
End Function

NF determination for Liquids and Gases Flammability or Combustibility and
Volatile Solids
Function Nflam(ByVal InputCombo As String) As Double
Select Case InputCombo
Case 1:
Nflam = 0
Case 2:
Nflam = 0
168

Case 3:
Nflam = 1
Case 4:
Nflam = 2
Case 5:
Nflam = 3
Case 6:
Nflam = 3
Case 7:
Nflam = 4

End Select
End Function

Material Factor for Combustible Dust or Mists
Function Dust(ByVal NR As Integer, ByVal NF As Integer)
Variant
NF0 = Array(16, 16, 24, 29, 40)

NF1 = NF0

NF2 = NF0
NF2(1) = 21: NF2(2) = 21

NF3 = NF0
NF3(1) = 24: NF3(2) = 24

Select Case NF
Case 0: Dust = NF0(NR + 1)
169

End Select
End Function

Dust Class Determination
Function Stvalue(ByVal InputCombo As String, ByVal user As Double) As Double
Case 1:
Stvalue = 1
Case 2:
Stvalue = 2
Case 3:
Stvalue = 3
Case 4:
Stvalue = user
End Select
End Function

Material Factor for Combustible Solids
Function Solids(ByVal NR As Integer, ByVal NF As Integer)
Variant
NF0 = Array(4, 14, 24, 29, 40)

NF1 = NF0

NF2 = NF0
NF2(1) = 10
170

NF3 = NF0
NF3(1) = 10: NF3(2) = 14

NF4 = NF0
NF4(1) = 16: NF3(2) = 16

Select Case NF
Case 0: Solids = NF0(NR + 1)
End Select
End Function

N
F
for Combustible Solids
Function SolidsVal(ByVal InputCombo As String, ByVal user As Double) As Double
Case 1:
SolidsVal = 1
Case 2:
SolidsVal = 2
Case 3:
SolidsVal = 3
Case 4:
SolidsVal = user
Case 5:
SolidsVal = 1
Case 6:
SolidsVal = 1
171

Case 7:
SolidsVal = 1
Case 8:
SolidsVal = 1
Case 9:
SolidsVal = 2
Case 10:
SolidsVal = 2
Case 11:
SolidsVal = 2
Case 12:
SolidsVal = 1
Case 13:
SolidsVal = 3
Case 14:
SolidsVal = 3
Case 15:
SolidsVal = 3
Case 16:
SolidsVal = 3
End Select
End Function

PenaltyLeakage = 0
End If
End Function

NR Determination
Function UnlistedSubs(ByVal IndexCombo As String, ByVal bChecked As Boolean) As
Double
172

Case 1:
UnlistedSubs = 0
Case 2:
UnlistedSubs = 0
Case 3:
UnlistedSubs = 0
Case 4:
UnlistedSubs = 1
Case 5:
UnlistedSubs = 1
Case 6:
UnlistedSubs = 2
Case 7:
UnlistedSubs = 2
Case 8:
UnlistedSubs = 2
Case 9:
UnlistedSubs = 3
Case 10:
UnlistedSubs = 3
Case 11:
UnlistedSubs = 3
Case 12:
UnlistedSubs = 4
Case 13:
UnlistedSubs = 4
Case 14:
UnlistedSubs = 4

End Select
173

If UnlistedSubs = 4 Then
UnlistedSubs = 4
UnlistedSubs = UnlistedSubs + 1
End If
End Function

F&EI Severity Determination on the F&EI Table
Function FEI(ByVal dtype As Double) As String
If (1 < dtype And dtype <= 60) Then
FEI = "Light"
FEI = "Moderate"
FEI = "Intermediate"
FEI = "HEAVY"
ElseIf (dtype > 158) Then
FEI = "SEVERE"
End If
End Function

STORING KNOWN DATA AS DATABASES
Sub StoreIntoBlankRow()
Dim i As Long
Dim BlankRow As Long

Dim NewData As Range
Set NewData = Range("NewData")
174

With Sheets("Chemicals")
For i = 12 To 64000
If Len(.Range("A" & i)) = 0 And Len(.Range("B" & i)) = 0 Then
BlankRow = i
Exit For
End If
Next

For i = 2 To NewData.Rows.Count
.Cells(BlankRow, i - 1) = NewData.Cells(i, 1)
Next
End With

Call AdjustInputRange(BlankRow)
End Sub

THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL (LB) AND PRESSURE (PSIG) VERSUS F&EI
VALUE
Sub SensMaterialWeight()
Dim matValOr As Double
matValOr = Range("materialval")
With Sheets("F&EI Table")
For i = 9 To 20000
If .Range("G" & i) = 0 Or .Range("G" & i) = "" Then Exit For
Range("materialval") = .Range("G" & i)
.Range("H" & i).Select
.Range("H" & i) = Range("ControlVar")
Next
Range("ControlVar").Select
175

Range("materialval") = matValOr
End With

matValOr = Range("pressval")
For i = 9 To 20000
If .Range("I" & i) = 0 Or .Range("I" & i) = "" Then Exit For
Range("pressval") = .Range("I" & i)
.Range("J" & i).Select
.Range("J" & i) = Range("ControlVar")
Next
Range("pressval") = matValOr
End With

matValOr = Range("tempval")
For i = 9 To 20000
If .Range("K" & i) = 0 Or .Range("K" & i) = "" Then Exit For
Range("tempval") = .Range("K" & i)
.Range("L" & i).Select
.Range("L" & i) = Range("ControlVar")
Next
Range("tempval") = matValOr
End With

End Sub
176

APPENDIX B
ALGORITHMS FOR LINGO: REACTOR-DISTILLATION COLUMN SYSTEM

1. REACTOR

Min=TotalCapitalInvestment;

TotalCapitalInvestment=11.68*Cp;

Cp=Cv+Cpl;
Cv=-2E-07*W^2+1.0346*W+45564;

Cpl=285.1*(Di)^0.73960*(L)^0.70684;
W=0.25326*(Di*12+tp)*(L*12+9.6*Di)*tp; !for Carbon steel, 0.284
lb/inch3;
tp=(Pd*Di*12)/(25500-1.2*Pd); !(inches);
Pd=-9E-05*Po^2+1.1751*Po+12.872;

!CONSTRAINT (economic);
tp>0;
!tp<0.25;

Di>3; ![=]ft;
Di<21; ![=]ft;
L<40; ![=]ft;
W<920000; ![=]lb;

!Volume of Reactor vs Conversion of A ----> B, Plug Flow Reactor, gas
phase, Constant temperature;

Cao*1445=P; !p[=]atm;
Po=(P*14.7)-14.7; !po[=]psig;
P>2;
P<8;
Cao*2.355*L*Di^2=Fao*(2*@LOG(1/(1-X))-X);
Volume=Cao*2.355*L*Di^2;

Fao=Fb/X; ![=] lb mol/s;
Fb=0.40;

X=0.4;

FEI1=3*10^-8*(Wr)^2+0.0012*(Wr)+88.46; !Wr[=]lb;
Wr=Fao*26400; !Wr[=]lb, Fao[=]lb/10 minute;
FEI2=0.1176*Po+109.8; !Po[=]psig;

FEI1>0;
FEI1<128;
FEI2>0;
177

FEI2<128;

2. DISTILLATION COLUMN

Min=TotalCost;

Vm=1080*((44-rhogt)/rhogt)^0.5; !ft/hr;
Did=((56.051*600)/(rhogt*Vm))^0.5; !Didt[=]ft;
rhogt*1445=P; !P[=]atm, ;
Pod=(P*14.7)-14.7; !po[=]psig;

P>10;
P<16;

FEI3=-1E-08*Wr3^2+ 0.0018*Wr3+101.16;
Wr3=7.33*Fao*Xf; !Wr[=]lb, Fao[=]lb for 10 minute;
FEI4=5E-05*Po^2+0.1072*Po+106.83; !Po[=]psig;

!CONSTRAINT (safety parameters);
FEI3>0;
FEI3<128;
FEI4>0;
FEI4<128;

TotalCost=6.68*DistillationCost+OperatingCost;
OperatingCost=780*V;
Distillationcost=Ct+Cpd;

Cpd=Cvd+Cpld;
Wd=0.25326*(Did*12+tpd)*(hd*12+9.6*Did)*tpd;
tpd=(Pdd*Did*12)/(25500-1.2*Pdd);
Pdd=1.1038*(Pod)+21.903; !Pdd[=] psig;
Cvd=0.9295*(Wd) + 174525;
Cpld=237.1*((Did)^0.63316)*(hd^0.8061);

Ct=N*Cbt; !Ftm=1; !Carbon steel, FTT=1, Sieve tray);
Cbt=4.1192*Did^3 - 91.738*Did^2 + 876.76*Did - 1598.2;

Fao=1440;
B>0;
Xd=0.95;

Xb=0.05;
Xf=0.2;

R=18.77;
N=95;

1440=D+B;
1440*Xf=Xd*D+Xb*B;
178

R*D=L;
V=(R+1)*D;

179

VITA

Jaffee Suardin was born as the 2
nd
child to Mr. Suardin, a chemical engineer, and
Mrs. Linggardjati Suardin in Palembang, South Sumatera, Indonesia in December 21,
1977. He lived in the Fertilizer Company Residency in Palembang, Indonesia until he
graduated from SMAN I High School. He was interested in chemical engineering and
pursued a degree at Bandung Institute of Technology in Bandung in 1996, West Java,
Indonesia.
He graduated with a B.S. degree in chemical engineering in 2002. He applied to
Texas A&M University and started the Master of Science program in Fall 2003. In
spring 2004, he joined the Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M
University and began working on his research under the guidance of Dr. M. Sam
Mannan. He received his M.S. degree in chemical engineering in August 2005.
Jaffee Suardins permanent address is:
JL. PHDM II No 79, Komplek PHDM Indah
Palembang, South Sumatera
Indonesia, 30118

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THE INTEGRATION OF DOWS FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

INTO PROCESS DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION

Visual Basic Application (VBA) ....................79

) as a tool for determining risk

optimization software to handle the

s simplicity, availability, and researchers

Application, Microsoft Excel

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Excel (Excel) as the host

is a comprehensive tool to solve linear, nonlinear, and integral optimization

is a mathematical modeling language and different from other basic

is non-procedural so that the

allows the user to express the model in a standard mathematical notation

defines only two types of mathematical functions: general and

will provide the result in a

VISUAL BASIC APPLICATION (VBA)

Excel, thus the user must open

5 for applications in 21 days (3

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