Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel.

They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees. The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M. On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy was resent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997. The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal.

. Charlie Jao vs. BCC Products Sales and Terrance Ty, G.R, 163700 PETITIONER Charlie Jao alleged that respondents BCC Product Sales, Inc. (BCC) and Terrance Ty employed himas a comptroller. On Oct. 19, 1995, the security guards of BCC barred him from entering its premises. Respondent BCC countered that petitioner was not its employee but that of Sobien Food Corp. (SFC), its major creditor and supplier. SFC had posted him as its comptroller in BCC to oversee BCCs finance and business operations and to look after SFCs interests or investments in BCC. Which contention is more meritorious? Ruling: That of BCC The Supreme Courts (SC) perusal of the affidavit of petitioner compels a conclusion similar to that reached by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Labor Arbiter to the effect that the affidavit supported the contention that petitioner had really worked in BCC as SFCs representative.It does seem more natural and more believable that petitioners affidavit was referring to his employment by SFC even while he was reporting to BCC as a comptroller in behalf of SFC. As respondents pointed out, it was implausiblefor SFC to still post him to oversee and supervise the collections of accounts receivables due from BCC beyondDecember 1995 if, as he insisted, BCC had already illegally dismissed him and had even prevented him fromentering the premises of BCC. Given the patent animosity and strained relations between him and respondents insuch circumstances, indeed, how could he still efficiently perform in behalf of SFC the essential responsibility to oversee and supervise collections at BCC? Surely, respondents would have vigorously objected to any arrangement with SFC involving him.We note that petitioner executed the affidavit in March 1996 to refute a statement Ty himself made in his own affidavitdated Dec. 11, 1995 to the effect that petitioner had illegally appropriated some checks withoutauthority from BCC. Petitioner thereby sought to show that he had the authority to receive the checks pursuant to the arrangementsbetween SFC and BCC.This showing would aid in fending off the criminal charge respondents filed against him arising from his mishandlingof the checks. Naturally, the circumstances petitioner adverted to in his March 1996 affidavit concerned thoseoccurring before December 11, 1995, the same period when he actually worked as comptroller in BCC (Charlie Jaovs. BCC Products Sales Inc. and Terrance Ty, G.R. No. 163700, April 18, 2012)

CALAMBA MEDICAL CENTER v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,et al. 571 SCRA 585 (2008)

FACTS: Petitioner Calamba Medical Center (CMC), engaged the services of medical doctorsspouses Ronaldo Lanzanas (Dr. Ronaldo) and Merceditha Lanzanas (Dr. Merceditha) as part of its team of resident physicians. They were given, among others, identification cards and work schedules; and were paid a monthly retainer. They were likewise enrolled in the Social Security System (SSS). Subsequently, CMCs medical director issued a Memorandum to Dr. Ronaldo after a resident physician overheard Dr. Ronaldo and a fellow employee discussing the low admission in the hospital. After the incident involving her husband, Dr. Merceditha was no longer given any work assignments.

Afterwards, the rank and file employees union of Calamba Medical Center went on a strike. Dr. Ronaldo and Dr. Merceditha meanwhile filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal, respectively before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Board (NLRC-RAB). Consequently, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued a return to work order. Dr. Ronaldo, on the other hand, received a notice of termination indicating his failure to return for work. Dr. Ronaldo thus amended his complaint to illegal dismissal. The CMC contends that the doctors-spouses are not employees of the same, so that they cannot be illegally dismissed.

ISSUES: Whether or not an employee-employer relationship does not exist between Calamba Medical Center and the doctors-spouses Lanzanas

HELD: Under the control test, an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task.

Where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, the element of control is absent.

As priorly stated, the spouses-doctors maintained specific work-schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical director, which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours each week and which were strictly to be observed under pain of administrative sanctions.

That CMC exercised control over spouses-doctors gains light from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for that matter,

spouses-doctors work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of CMC or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the power. With respect to spouses-doctors sharing in some hospital fees, this scheme does not sever the employment tie between them and CMC as this merely mirrors additional form or another form of compensation or incentive similar to what commissionbased employees receive as contemplated in Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code.

The spouses-doctors were in fact made subject to petitioner-hospitals Code of Ethics, the provisions of which cover administrative and disciplinary measures on negligence of duties, personnel conduct and behavior, and offenses against persons, property and the hospitals interest.

More importantly, the CMC itself provided incontrovertible proof of the employment status of respondents, namely, the identification cards it issued them, the payslips and BIR W-2 (now 2316) Forms which reflect their status as employees, and the classification as salary of their remuneration. Moreover, it enrolled respondents in the SSS and Medicare (Philhealth) program. It bears noting at this juncture that mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship,[35] except in cases of compulsory coverage of the self-employed. It would be preposterous for an employer to report certain persons as employees and pay their SSS premiums as well as their wages if they are not its employees.

And if the spouses-doctors were not CMCs employees, how does it account for its issuance of the earlier-quoted March 7, 1998 memorandum explicitly stating that respondent is employed in it and of the subsequent termination letter indicating Dr. Ronaldos employment status.

Finally, under Section 15, Rule X of Book III of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, an employer-employee relationship exists between the resident physicians and the training hospitals, unless there is a training agreement between them, and the training program is duly accredited or approved by the appropriate government agency. In the spouses-doctors case, they were not undergoing any specialization training. They were considered non-training general practitioners, assigned at the emergency rooms and ward sections.