Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952.

Prenton of Delon ot oy ob i ager Ta esr ant Hay no be tear for gen pone St {oon bonnet Bp ie copenite ROMY HS oe foot gor. NOVERIER 1979 by Cotcret fred H. oe Tafa. Sou ernie ee 1 wVSANC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER a oe be Gercrovocten, any sneonVER IOWA SHIEARE, ee] ABILITY FOR — Nei Z QRIGINS OF A Frcin IMPARE® e “e i 4 | =e Gow me | py DTIC ¥ ELECTE col aasees Paddock, Jt SUL 1 7 1980 Choc pee); ABSTRACT 4 This study examines the United States Army's activities in psychological § and unconventional warfare during and after World War II to determine the {m-| \—petun fors and origina of, the forsel apectat vartara? capability created {a 1952 with the sutabitabeene of the Feychologcal tartare Canter at Tort Brass, Novth Caretta | / Research for the atuty wan conducted at the Dike University library, tha svchlven and brary of the US Ary John P. Kenedy Caater for Mistery Arse: scey the US Ary Miseacy Htatory Ioneitute, che US Arey War College Itbrery, the US Army Center cf Military Hiatory, the jeral Records Canter, and the National Archives. Eaph 8 was placed on original documents in the Joint Chiefs of staff and War De tent General StafS/Repartuent of the Army file i for the 1941-52 perfod. Personal interviews were wiso conducted with selected! individuals at the Center fcr Miliery Asatatance and the Army War Coll Sith cha tmpetun of the Korean War, helyhtentng cold gar tensions, and the persistent pressures of secre! Fy of the Arny Frank Pace, Jr., the Arey created an unprecedented staff organization in early 1951: the Office of the Chief i ' ‘ of Prycholontcal warfare (CCP). Under ‘Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the OCPY guided the butld-vp of prychological warfare and formated plans tor the sreation of an organization untque in the Arry'a history: the 10ch spectal | | Forces Group. Designed to organize, train, and ort indigenous personnel {4 behird-rhe-Lines restatance activities co Pretard# a Soviet tavaston {n Europe, the Croup! true historical forerunner--eontrary to the offletal Lineage of Spectal Fere wns the Office of Strategte Services, not the Rangers ot the fayLat Syectal Service Force. To provide the necessary training, matertel, and doctrinal support for both unconventional and peycholowical warfare, McClure couvinced the Army to establish the peychological Warfare Conter at Port peychological warfare had « fornal Lineage Brags, North Carolina, Bacau ‘and ‘therefore greater deceptance by the Aray--vhich unconventioxal warfare 444 not enjzy--Spactil Forces was brought into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, prychological warfare. Froa World War II to early 1853 MeClure provided the contiqulty, expertiee, and viston that wan #0 sential t6 creation of the OCW, Spects] Foruas, and the Peychologtcal Warfare | canter, McClure's cont#ibuticns have goue unrecognized, but hie Legacy is clear: the foundation that he 1a{d was butlt upon {n the 196)"e when "spestal counterinturgency, and the Cantor at Port warfare" was expanded te encoupas Bragg renaina to this dey, His athlevenante were not easily attained: in ac dition to rivalry with the Mir Fores and CIA, peychological ard unconventional warfare vere relatively new, “outcof-the-erlnstraa activietes that en- ’ ary and countered reetatance aid lack of understanding during « parted of bul msoyover coustratets. “fhe amar in vhteh peyshologion’ and uncokventionsl warfare evolved from 1941 uncil their union as « formal. Ary capability in 1952 auggests «theme that runa throughout the history of spectal varfa the story of « hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature. lw}PREFACE, My original intent with thie study wae to analyze hav the United states Azay, which wan developed to fight conventional ware, evolved institutionally after World War IZ to cope with the denands of low-intensity warfare. The Primary focus for this favestigarion was to be the evolution of the Aray's Joha Fo Kennedy Centes for Military As stance at Fort Bragg, Novth Carolina, fron te incestion tr the warly i950's through the Vietnam yeare. T still intent, a¥ a follow-on projent, to eccowplish that origina! goal; my pra- ut t7 cesvarch, however, revealed that the story of how and why vhe Any in the £: decided to undortake such a qu f plece has not deon adecuately fold. Ths avudy ts intended to £111 that vo'd in our w{litary history Svectfically, tv examines the Arcy's activities in paychological ant uncomen- tonal warfare during and after World War II co detemntne the tapetus for, anc origins of, the formal “spectal varfare” capability created in 1952 with the establishnent of the Paychologteal Warfare Center (later the Center for Mille tary Assistance). An understanding of these historical rosts should provide a more enlightened perspective from which to assess the subsequent evolution of “epectal warfare" in the Aray T am indebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke Uatversity for intttally suameating this topte and for his eorstructive advice, pertteularly during the conceptual pase. The coumwnts and inet ghts provided on the outitpe and manue Script by my mentor, Professor Theodsre Ror cf Duke, vere tmva The long talks with Professor John K. Mahon, vitver y of Florida, duriay hie year with the US Army rilleary History Institute, were most exprectated, of Iw)rei were the coments on the manuscript by Professor Rarold Deutach of the Ary War Collage faculty, For their expert, willing assiatance during ny research, Tum particularly indebted to Willian Cunliffe and Ed Reese of the ational Archives, Mise Hannah Zeidltk of the US Aray Center of Military History, Mise Joyce Eakin and Dr. Richard Somers of che Military History Institute, and Wea. Beverly Lindsey of the Joho F. Kenoedy Canter for Military Asstetance. Wy sincers gratitude goes to uy wife, Theresa, for ber patience, initiative, ‘and choroujbly professional typing of tha manuscript. Mr. Paul Tabor, The Adjutant Genial Office, Departnent of the Aray, was most understanding and hetpful in the interagency processing of ay personal notes ari documents taken from the Katioral Archives, and of the final manageript. In the final analysis, timely ermpletion-of the study would not have been possible without the encouragevent, assistancé, and environment needed for « serious research ‘affort which were provided by the Army War College and Strategic Studies Institute. Finally, this study is dedicated to my wife and three children, who know better than anyone what sacrifices have been required. ALB. PL, dr. Carlisle, Pennsylvania Novenber 1979 [vt]Te ImRopueTION. ©. 62gcq550G5005 fi 11, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORDWAR IT. ee 7 The Coordinator of Inforuation. ©... 2... ee... 7 OSS and OWI. ws See ts 10 The Army's Peychologtcal Warfare Branch. 111111) dg Dizeniution of the Feychological Warfare Branch. |)! de Theater Psychological Warfare... 0... ss ll. a8 The Propaganda Branch, G-2. 0... 550q050d000 appraisal LID iii TIT. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR IT. 2... 5 Woftictal" Unconventional Warfare Unite... 2... 1... 35 OS5 and Unconventional Warfare)... LT) 37 OSS and the Army. ee Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines ||| | fil az Attitudes Tovard Unconventional Warfare Sop oe ass Dissolution of OSS... ee eee lS aepraisal. Dl tt TV, THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I: PEYCHC:A GICAL WES7TERP. 6L Impetus of the Cold Were. fe) Creation of the cla. tl Arny Desobillzation. ||) | aoe ft 66 Poywar to Flans and Operations Division, | | || | 69 Bisenhover and MeClure see ee Oe ia (Rega) Puce tonfeal scabs Seer ne eee grt The Carroll Report ITIL oe Sordun Gray ~ Revival of Interest. | | | poet l ll osr oad ya Scecer ratte) colxaread Ges tee ee THE IOTERYAR YEARS, PART II: UNCONVENTIONAL WARTARE .. . . 108 The Atrborne Reconnaissance Untte. 108 JOS and WSC Activities TTI Ii ae The Office of Policy Cocrdtnation. | 2) 1] lll at [ves]vir. vant. SOURCES. [eonetqued) Aray Assistance to OPC The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division. . . . « ‘The Aruy and Unconventional Warfare Prior to Kore: KOREA AND THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Impetus for a Payvar Division at Departoent of the Army. Creation of the Office of the Chief of Payver... ++ - OGPY aad Prychological Warfa: OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea... - ‘THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG 2 eee es Paywar in Europe . . in Korea. Psychological Warfare Activities in the United ‘The Special Fores The Road to Port Bragg. ss ee ‘THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER AND THE ORIGINS Orgentzatice of the Center... 2 ses The 10th {yecial Forces Group... +--+ + + ray seming Ot ee ee Ivitt] ‘Ranger Regiment... + ~ Stat oF 120 123 126 128 1s 135 157 73 73 180 185 204 230 Bi 238 251 260ee . a PSYCPCLOGICAL AND UNUONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 1941-1952: ORIGINS OF A SPECIAL WARFARE" CAPABILITY FOR ‘ TRE UNITED STATES ARvt te of nwt oy, tc mt ‘though the size and nature of the forces sp employed varied in twa world wars role with regularly orgenized divisions ani vithout the use of nuclear weapons. Whether infantry, mechanized infantry, arepred, or atrborne, the division ¥ the basic formation of the Army, the key organization in terms of which strength was measured in conventional ver.| After World Wer TZ, political and military leaders began to consider other fhras of conflict ta which American forcas conceivably might be engaged. Orgaptzation, equipment, and doctrine were reexamined in view of the possibility, of a nuclear war, but in this process the division remained « fundamental sllitary organization. Sinultane- ously, @ few thinkers began to consider the possibility of having forces ee oe srs betie cae of comeeion var « cupbtltey fuer tn canst ae eee eee ee ee ee eater aa 7 would be necessary for such task. In 1952 the Army created the first formal unconventional warfare force h in its history, the 10th Special Forces Group, assigned to the Psychological i | 1] (Icon eden cll nH ETRE i | | Warfere Canter, an institution created that sane year at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From thut year to the present tine, this institution, known con- jcutively as the Psychological Warfare Center, The Special Warfare Center (1956), and finally the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (1969), constituted the headquarters for Army achoole and units orfented tovard “epectal warfare Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., aefined "special warfare" in 1962 a8 "a term used by the Army to enbrace all military and paremilitary easures and activities related to unco-.entional warfare, counterineurgency, A and psychological warfare." Uneonventionel warfare primerily enconp! guerrilla type operations and subversion, to be carried out within eneny or eneny-controlled territory by predoninately indigenous persoancl, but sup~ ported and directed by U.S. forces. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, included all actions, military and political, taken by the forces of the United States alone or in conjunction with a legal government to prevent or elintnate subversive insurgency, Finally, paychological warfare dealt with communication, boti: spoken and written; it encompassed those activities planned and conducted to influence the opinions, enotions, actitudes, and behavior of the eneay, the indigenous population, and neutral or friendly foreign groups 2 in such a way as to support the accomplishment of United States objectives. Unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warf-re, then, comprised the key eleceats of special warfare, a concept succinctly stated by lostice, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, Svecial Warfare, U.S. Ary (Washington, D.C., 1962), p 55. ?rptd., pp. 8£-; The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of U.3. Military Terns for Joint Usage, Washington, D.C., August 1568.Secretary Stahr as including the cupability to fight “gs guerrillas as wall as against guerrillas and also ‘evolves the employment of peychological de- will to raster." vices to undernina the eneny' Secretary Stahr's words vere spoken in the early 1960's when epectel reached ite warfare, then symbolized by the Spacial Forces “Green Beret: zenith under the Kennedy administration. In the Late 1960's end 1970's, epectal warfare changed sonevhat in form and enphasis, and receded ia importance within the Army. The atudent of spectal warfare history might be ex- 4 cused for ‘noting that the more recent period is reminiscent of the 1950's, when epectal warfare as a concept struggied for survival. The: story of spe- etal warfare is a story of the Amy, hesitantly and reluctantly, groping with concepts of an “unconventional” nature. . To understand the evolution of special varfare, particularly ite eabry- conte existence in the early 1950's, one ust grapple with the questions of how and why if all began. An examination of the organtzation af the Paycho- logical Warfare Canter upon inception in 1952 reveals that ite major subor~ dinate elenents--the Paychological Warfare School (divided into prychological operations snd spectal forces instructional departments), the 6th Hadio Broad- casting and Leaflet Group and the 10th Special Forces Group--alll involved two of the three couponeats of special warfare; that 1s, psychological and unconventional. warfare.? The third couponent, counterinsurgency, did not join the lexicon of spactal warfare until the 1960's and United States involvement in \gpectal Warfare, U.S. Army, p. 5. 2yemorandum Number 14, Headquarters, The Paychological Warfare Center, Tort Bragg, Worth Carolina, 12 Nove 62, "Organization and Functions Menual, Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center.”cy 3 Southeast kata, Apparently, in the 1952 organteation of the Fort Bragg center, eychological wartare occupied « position of ascendancy over urconventionsl ee ——— Jonicel Wertare Scuool. Tie auapicton of the apparent doatnance of paycho- oatcal warfare te strangthenad by a perusal of the official unclassified Mterature of the day, particularly the annual Department of Defence re- norte for 1952-52. Tha January 1 to January 30, 1952, report, for example, while highlighting the tablishewnt of the Paychological Warfare Canter, seken no wencion of the concomitant creation of the 10ch Special Forces Group the firwt unit of 18 type tn che Arsy's ntatory.} Thane observations lead to some oe plexing queations concerning the origing of epectal warfare » ‘hare not adequ-tely anavered by starting one's fnvestination with the year 1952. Why, tm 191, did the Army decide, for the Herat Cine in Bla Matory, to develop the formal beginnings of @ spectal var~ fare capability by eateditahing the Peychologteal Wartere Center at Fort Brann? What vere the root, of hatorical antecedents, of paychutopteal and uncomvent ‘onal vastare ta Mted Staten Army @ arisnce, and why were these concepts phyatcally enbodted tn the sane location {n 19527 Finally, why, $n terms of priority ant emphas wow paycholngical vartare parently excendant over unconventional warfare? In ahort, what were the pre-1952 roore of the Paychoingical Warfare Center a + concomtactiy, the ortaine of epectal war fn the Untred States Aron? In order to suppest # more there queartonn shan proaentty extern, thts atudy will trace the hlatorteat fenan Semtanial Renort of the Sarrerery of Paroven of the Secretary of the Brow, Sener ary tary of the Ale Force, U Sarcary throng 40 fine ana6 roots of peychological and wseonventional varfare from Werld War IT to ereation of the Peychological Warfare Canter’ in 1952.GUPTER II PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II With the outbreak of World War II, the United States had virtually no organized capability to conduct psychological and unconventional warfare un- ULL President Roosevelt tablished the Coordinator of Information (COI) on July h, 1941, and at the same time deatgnated Colonel Willian J. Donovan as the flret director. Thus ves begun a bold idea, for through COI and ito aue- | OF, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the U.S. began "ite first | organized venture into the fields of espionage, propaganda, subversion ant related activities under the aegis of « centralized intelligence agency." The Coordinator of Information Beonseally, the ereation of OOL vas in large peasure due to recomenda- Coun wtecwing from Donovan's fact-finding trips to the Middle East end Britain, vhere he had been {apressed by the Brittah method of coubintng (4a agencten called the Poltctcal Warfare Beecutive (PVE) and the Spectat Opera- Sore Executive [508]) peopaganda efforts and the “unorthodoe" operations of va sabotage, subversion, amt gerrilla varfare. He had been impressed with the British system of intelligence and counterintelligence, as conducted by thelr Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and their ability to coordinate weceit, War Repos Sy vol. 1 (New York: Walker and Compa elltgener Dovtaton, WIC, The Pentnann, Yasninaton, D.C., October 1946, "A Syllabus of Peychalogical War= " § Goeny Ford, Donovan of 0.8.8. (Roaton: Little, Bram and Com- +1), pe 35 Propaganda Beane fare,” 92. pany, 1%), pp. I35t | v1Anteliigence activities with peychological warfare and special operations. Donovan thus proposed to Roosevelt the creation of a single agency in vhich to centralize the intelligence gathered by several uncoordinated offices in Washington, ae well as combining the functions of psychological warfare and special operations, on the British model.! According to Donovan's biographer, Corey Ford, the President welcomed "che suggestion of a single agency which vould serve as @ clearinghouse for ‘all intelligence, as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and « training cen- : ter for vhat vere euphenistically called 'spectal operations.'" As a0 often happens to those who recommend measures of a far-reaching nature, Donovan was “Amvited" by the President to head the agency which ha had proposed.” Int- tally CO contained evo major divisions, Research and Anatysis (REA) and the Foreign Informtion Service (PIS), plus secret intelligence and sabotage branches that vere of 4 training nature only prior to U.S. entry {nto the war. Dr, William L. Langer, a Harvard ‘historian, became director of R&A, an office designed co evaluate ali incaning intelligence. Tha paychological varfare division of OOK was PIS, headed by Robert £. sherwood, a playeright and confi- dant of President Roosevelt.> As William F. Daugherty hes written, the FIS undertook to syread the gospel of democracy . . . and to explain the objec 4 tives of the United States throughout the world except {a Latin America." To carry out these aims, PIS selected information from the wire services to be used ae propaganda on its eleven comercial short-wave stations that Lpord, Donovan of 0.5.8., pp. 91, 106f., 110. 2rbtd., p. 108. Jrpid., pp. 11O£.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, vo. 1, pp. % 31. Suttiten £. davpherty ard Morrie Janovite, A Peychologteal Mari ot Cane book (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 127.| 9 transmitted in several languages. After Pearl Harbor, Shervood's organizatton broadcast more than three hundred fifteer 1 minute programs a week io Europe and Asta. Donovan's all-encompassing concep: of psychological warfare ves of crucial importance. The first stage wae to be “inteliigence penetration the results processed by research and analysis made avatlable for strategic Planning and propaganda. Donovan celled propaganda the “arrow of initial Pevetration," and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of botage and subversion, to be followed by conmando raids, guerrilla ection, and behind-the-lines resistance movenents. All of this represented the softentng-up process of an area prior to Lnvasion by friendly armed forct Donovan vistonary dream was to untfy all of these functions in auppert of conventional unit operations, and thereby "forge a new instrument of war."2 To carry out this concept effectively, Donovan felt that the COI should be made « supporting agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the latter having been created in February 1942. Firet of all, the military services! de facto control over personne! and material resources made it nec ary, be believed, to place CLI under JCS authority. Pragnatically, he realized that the 5Ot's varied secret activities could not be carrted out without con currence and support from theater commanders, and aleo that these activities should be closely coortinated vith conventional military operations. Unsue= censfully, he argued for several months vith Roosevelt for COI to be brought Tpord, Donovan of U.S.5., p. 124, ‘Roosevelt, Yat Report of th10 under the JCS, and for PIS foreign propaganta to be more closely coordinated with intelligence activities of the military services. 988 and or ‘The comprehersive nature of Donovan's concept of psychological warfare aot shared by everyone, hovever, for less than a year after COL's creation, om June 11, 1942, President Roosevelt ordered the FIS be transferred to the newly established Office of War Information (WI). By the same executive order, Roosevelt aleo dissolved the COT and supplanted it with « new organizetion, the Office of Strategic Services (08S), with Donovan continuing as its head.? The change, hovever, did include putting OSS under the JCS, as recommended by Donovan on June 8.> In effect, as Edvard Hymoff succinctly stat nS "COT bacane OSS and FIS becam « division of the Offica of War Information. Roosevelt's decision to reorganize the psychological warfare effort sp- ing nunber oZ' government parently had several motivations. Firat, the inert information agenci sted problens of overall coordination, so that there was a need to consolidate wartime information and paychological varfare activities. There vas elso groving recognition that COT had become unwieldy, and the President preferred that United States wartine propaganda be separated william R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), pp. 1628.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, vol. 1, p. 20. 2pord, Donovan of 0.$.3., pp. 12°¥., 337; Rooserclt, Mar Report of the 58, vol. 1, pp. 26£-3 Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, p: 182- elt, War Report of the OSS, vol. 1, p. 26. 4zavard Hyootf, The OSS in Worid Var IT (Wew York: Baltimore Books, 197), p. 46. Spord, Donovan of 0.8.8., p. 176. 3Rootee TEST | | n from strategie intelligence and subversive operations, racher than combined. Then there vas the problem of peraonalits + for Donovan and sherwood had dif ferent views on the preper role of FIS as & part of Ol. According to ‘orey Ferd, "Colonel Donovan believed that, once a state of var extated, the prope: ssnde arm should be exploited as 4 weapon of deception and subversion, ant thovld be under military mpervision," while RoSert Shervood, hied of FIS, "held that propaganda broadcasts should stick scrupulously to the frets, and Jet the truth eventvally prevail." Sherwood, who believed tha: “the ‘American tease overseas would suffer . . . if ve emulated Axts methods ard resorted to Mes and deceit," also thought that FIS should renain under elvilian direction, aed clashed with Donovan over his propoca! to put (1 and FIS under Jes Jriedtetion. These differences of views vere hardening into perscaal ‘animosity between the two men, and since both Donovan and Sherwood had the Respect of the President, he evidently felt that {t would be vise to separate shetr responsibi iities.? Perhaps the most important factor, however, was the eee cee 2 a Satth che) Disecect or} thal paieecst tc ounce | uenorandum to the Prt ‘dent on March 7, 1942, proposing a reorganization of war information services which resulted in the formation of the ovt.? Thus, for a variety of reasons, the President shifted the major responsibiiit. for Paychological warfare to the nev!y created OvT. Fetablishnent of the OWT, hovev » either solved all the problems of Tiynoff, The 088 {n World war I, p. 70. “ord, Donovan of 0.8:$., pp. 124f.; Roosevelt, var Report of the OSS, P. 19; Corson, The Armies of ignaranca, p' Ios" Report of the OSS, pp. 26-28; Corson, The Armies of Aroorevelt, Ignorance, pp. 184:12 coordination nor delimited responsibilities for peychological warfare, even with a highly respected CBS reporter Like Elmer Davis as its first director. ‘Though most of the existing information services vere transferred to CWI, Donovan's agency continued to’ keep its fingers in the propaganda pie. Donovan had fought to keep FIS under his direction in COL, but, having lost thet battle, he continued to assume sone psychological warfare functions for the OSS. Hvantually, hovever, the lines of responsibility were more clearly drava and accepted by the two agencies. In addition to ite intelligence and the OSS retained responsibility for "black" special operations activiti » information issued from a concealed or falsified Propaganda operations (1, source), which were esi 1 neially covert activities designed to lover the eneny's nora! The OWI, on the other hand, controlled all propaganda in the United States, and all “white” propaganda (1.¢., information, official or otherwise, Jed from a known source) outside the United States, with the ex- plainly 4 ception of the Western Hemisphere, vhich remained a responsibility of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affaire (CIAA) in the State Depart- fe order nore clearly pent.? In March 1943, another presidential execut: identified OWI's responsibilities for conducting foreign information and overt be coordinated propaganda operations, and also decreed that its activiti with plans of the military services.? Apaul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Nev York: Duell, Sloan, and Fearcé, 1954), p. 93; Hymoff, OSS in World War IT, p. 70; Daugherty and Jani witz, Casebook, p. 128; A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare," op. cit., p. 25 Of 0.5.5., pp: 126-128. 2zsnebarger, Paychological Warfare, p. 93; Daugherty and Janowitz, Case- book, Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 185. 3paugherty and Janovite, Cavebook, p. 129.| | Warfare h When the European war broke out, the Aray, Like other agencies, was i11- Prepared to understand, mich le, Plan for and conduct, paychological warfare activities, During World War I, t had given token recognition to the {ax Portance of this field by establishing the Paychological Warfare Sub-Section of G-2 in the War Department, and the Propaganda Section, 6-2, GHQ, AEF, but from 1918 to 1941 no peychologtcal warfare office existed ot the War Depart ment, #0 the fons of experience were lost. By 1941 there was only one of ficer on the War Department staff with psychological varfare experience from the previous war. Tits was Colonel charles H. Mason who, as Chief of the In« telltgence Branch, Military Intelligence Diviston (MD) fron Novenber 1940 to July 1941,, attempted to r stablish a branch within the division for paychological warfare planning and operations. His attenpts vere in vain, hovever, and Mason "conplained thai: his efforts vere met with indifference and oppost- tion within the War Depertment 2 ‘The first positive steps tovard creation of @ psychological warfare capability came about as a result of the porsonal interest of Mr. Jolin McCloy, Fecently appointed Assistant Secretary of War. Influenced by the effectiveness. of German propaganda, he suggested in June 1941 that a spectal study group be organized by Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of staff, 2, to plan for future psychological warfare operations.? Mr, MeCloy's ace tion is {Illustrative of a thene that recurs wt critical points throughout the Tahe Military Intelligence Diviston, WDCS, Washington 25, D.0., "A Hatory of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 Decenber 1941.2 Septenber 1945," 1946, pp. 2898. 2ria., p. 290.ry che incervantion by important jovernsental ={vil- history of spactal warfar fens to prod hesitant ani caitious Aray uniformed leaders into taking action on concepts of an “unconventional” nature. 1941, as the Paychologic Branch, with Lieutenant Colonel Percy Black as ite » exrtously, chief. A great deal of secrecy surrounded ite creation, b: Colonel Mason, the only officer with World War I psychological warfare experi- ‘ence, vas not even informed of its existence. Black's initic! stuty examined all agenctes--offictal and private--angaged in psychological {formation or propaganda and concluded that "there was no effort to study the etfect of propaganda on various groups, or relate propaganda plans to the lane of the military high conmand." Some of the activities of this enbryonic office included: Maison with the Foreign Monitoring Broadcast Service, FCC, to obtain daily and weekly sumaries of foreign broadaasts; the coupletion of surveys for the Office for Coordination of Comercial and Cultural Relations, aod for the Council for Democracy; initiation of a weekly telegram service to military missions with a brief sumary of national defense progress; and 2 purchasing of copies of Nevaweek and Life for distribution to selected missions in Europe to counteract the pictorial propaganda of Germany.’ As n, these initial efforts by the Army in paychological varfare were can be rather modest in scope. Shortly after its inception, the nane of the Paychologic Branch wes changed (0 the Special Stuy Group, prinarily because of the strict security of civilian conceratng existence of the orgenization. An advisory commit: professional psychologists felt that {t was inadvisable to use terme like Tiptd., pp, 2918.i "Propaganda," “control of opinion," and “peychtatr. thus the name Spactal Study Group " ould be far less revealing than any references to psychology ot propagand: Warfare Branch, -2, primarily becaus fesin, 4n March 1842, the came vas changed to Paychological the groving suaber of personnel. involved nade strict sacrecy difficult and because thie sane secrecy tnpeced coordination with other offices. Colonel Black vas aucceeded by Colonel Oscar M- Solbert, who remained chtef of the branch until July 26, 1942, ate succe: ‘or was Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, who contimed as chief until die- solution of the branch in Decenber 1942.1 he Special Study Group/Paychologtcal Warfare Branch continued and ox: Panded upon the type activities begun under the Paychologie Branch, One of its most important and tangible projicte the production of a daily analysis of Axis propaganda, of which over 300 ts je8 wera circulated for sidance to the Office of Facta and Pigures, Offica of Coordinator of Inte fesrican Affaire, Nettonal Broadcasting Corporation, and the Bureau of Public Relations. Since the War Departuent did not control radio broadcasting, the Branch was lintted to making suggestions. Th varie! from itens to be ine ctuled in spenches by the Chtaf of Staff to brosdeacte with a definite objective, the latter being given to COL. The Branch also Participated in planning of leaflet operations tn ser: egie and combat phases, and developed the Combat Propaganda Bulletin to record Lei ona learned and recent activities for dia- fritueton both in Washington and to the pilitary theaters, a Decenber 1942, the frat peychologtcal warfare unite vere created, with the formation of the 1st and 2nd Kadio Service Sections, each vith an — Vbtd., pp. 2938.5 Linebarger, Prychologtenl Warfere labus of Psychological Warfa, PP. 938.5 A syle "ps 2.| | 1 16 authorized strength of thrse officere and thirty-nine enlisted men. Together the tvo formed the 1st Coubat Propagcada Company. Whan the Psychological War- fare Branch was dissolved on Decenber 31, 1942, the company was transferred from the Military Intelligence Service (MS) to 08%, then back to MIS on March 2, 1943. Ae thie point, the company vas reorganized into combat propagcada teams with redio tranmitters, sound trucks, and language personcel, then sent to Europe for utilizatton.! Concurrent with, ani related to, the activation of the Combat Propa- ganda Teams vas the developueut of a Draft Training Manual, "Combat Propaganda Company," in the autumn of 1942. An existing pamphlet, "Military Intelligence Propaganda--Confidential," vritten by Major F. M. Robinett in December 1940, was used as its foundation, The manual proved to be quite useful in providing organizational principles for the props, ada coupanies formed in Europe during 1943 to 1945.7 The activities of the Spoctal Studies Group/Paychologica: War- fare Branch during 1941-42, then were varied but relatively low-level in nature, and certainly were not considered "center atage" by the War Department. Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch Dissolution of the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch in December 1942 was inextricably tied to the problem of defining psychological warfare--which etles and confusion over persisted throughout the war--and to the interagency responsibilities in this relatively new field. JCS had created a Joint Psycho- wre Committee (JPHC) in March 1942 (JCS 12), to plan peychological logical Wa Ang Hiatory of the Military Intelligence Divieiou,"" pp. 305, 309f.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, p. 213. 2nq Miatory of the Military Intelligence Division," pp. 310-312.Ny aie ka i i | 1 7 warfare in combat th ters and enamy-controlled areas. This committee was reconstituted on June 21, 1942 (JCS 68), after the OSS and OUI were established 4s tvo separate agencies. Meabership wi from the Army's G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence (OMI), the War Depart- made up of general and flag office: ‘bent General Staff (i065), the Coumander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Donovan # chatroan. Established at the sane time vas a Joint Paychological Varfere Subcommittee (JIWSC), « Supporting Committee on Faychological Warfare vithin 085, and a Joint Peychological Karfare Advisory Comnttten (JEVAC), with Perovan as chatraan, The latter committee vas foraed for the specific purpon of coordinating the activiti of other agencies outside the jurisdiction of the JCS vhich were involved in aspects of paychological varfars, such Nelson Rockefeller's Coordinator of Inter-Anerican Affairs (CIAA), Henry Wallace's Beard of Economie Warfare (@BB:), the OWI, and the state Department. One of the firet tasks of these various committees was the problen of defining peychotogical warfare, and to that end a "Basic Eatinate of Peycho- Teste-1 Warfare" vas prepared by the OSS Supporting Comittee and ultinately srroved by the JHC on Septenber 7. The fine hend of Donovan may be seen in the definition contained in thts asic Estimate, for according to it varfare » including moral and physical, Dy which the end 1s attained--other than those of recogniser oilitery aperations, but inciuding the psychological exploitation of the see Sut of those recognized military actions--vhich tend to Geateey the MAUL of the arecy to achteve victory and to danege his soliciony or Ssenomis capacity to do ao; vbish tand to deprive the eneay of the sup Pork, ateistance or eynpathy of his allies or associates er of neatecta, or whieh cary Ris Acquisition of such support, assistance, or ayspatiy: oF which tend to create, saintain, or increase the vill €0 victory of TRoosevelt, War Revert of the OSS, pp. 97£.; Corson, Armies of Ignorance, P: 1995 "A Rlatory of the Milfeary Intelligence Division,” op Sis:rere 1s ‘our own people and allive and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support, assistance and sympathy of seutral The Basic Ratinate further specified sropaganda, subversion, combat arch and ceplonage as the propaganda conpantes and intelligence secured by r tools necessary to carry out this broad ccncept of psychological varfare.1 Although che 03S Supporting Committee had spenc etx months trying to develop a asleable definition, the JPHC, after having approved it, did not forverd. ‘a doctrine statenent.? the Basic Estimate tu the JCS for approval ‘This difficulty over arriving at an acceptable definition of peycho- Logical varfare was also Linked to the problens 055 encountered while trying to find ite niche as a new agency. As the War Report of the O55 state: contributing factor to the vhole situation wav o definite resentment of OSS, on fas such, which found its strongest expression in Donovan's colleagues on the JRC, This resentment seened to be based, in part, upon the fact that 05S ves a civilian agency, and, in part, upon the position of OSS as an agency of the JCS and fear that it might encroarh upon the functions of G-2 and/or ONt."? committee system proved to be ‘At any rate, the axtating psychological warfar ponderous, confusing, and generally unvorkable. Finally, on Decenber 23, 1942, the JCS moved to improve the situation by Aavuing JCS 155/40, which abolished the JPNC ani designated OSS as being responsible for “planning, developing, coordinating, and executing the atlitary . program of paychologtcal werfrre," and for “the compilation of such political, pecychological, sociological and aconomic information as nay be required by Ipooseve!t, War Report of the OSS, p. 99. 2eorson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 2008. Fnoosevelt, Yar Report of the 085, p. 101.© dectston by the Aruy to abolish {ke Peychologteal Warfare Branch, ax announced by Military Intelligence Service Mano 147, 31 December 1942, for “since the Offices of Strategic Serv- ‘eae was reeponatble for propaganda, there appeared £0 be no need for the Branch."? Later, ae will be seen, a ead vas found fore Peychologteal warfare branch on the Aray staff, ané St vas reactivated. Bot at thte poine the Army's partict pation in paychological wartare, af Le fe fn the Washington arena, appeared to be minimal. Such wae not the cane overseas, for the JCS 155/40, which had Precipisatsd the denise of the Arsy's Paychological Wertare Branch, also save Theater Cornanders control of paychologtcal warfare La their Jurtedter tonal 3 Mrene’ Te eifecr, he War Dnvartoeat, a4 Paul Linebarger atates, conetdered ‘autonomou! “the thesters in this respect and [left] to che respective Theater Gowrandera the daiinteton of thelr relattonsh{p vith OI ant 038, and thee ues of each nd tostcal Warfare Mist SI the Army's operational work $m paychologteal warfare van (here: fore dove 30 the theater Level, vere the respooatble aFgantrat ion wae normally 1 ¥arfare Branch (IMR). The largest of thene, the deatenatl 2s a Payot el peek stactnen COUN epee ete Atrtea tn Nevenber $8, ae the a PF Coneral Etseshower, then later expanted tn Satory of the MELtary Intelitgnnce Dilute pe nee forhacane, Puycholaglent Warfare, p. 9720 February 1944 to the Peychological Warfare Divicion, Suprene Baséquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PVD/SHAEP). General Eisenhower created PYD be~ cause as Supreme Commander for all allied military activities in Western: Burope, he desired to bring under his control the wyriad of American and British agencies attempting to conduct paychological warfare activities in the theater.! As for a definition of peychological warfare, FVD/SHAEF described it as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to underaina the eneny's will to resiet, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters."? With this definition, then, and the overall objective of controlling and coordinating puychological varfare in the area of Continental Europe controlled by the Supreme Commander, the specific misstons of FVD were: (a) To wage peychological warfare against the oneny. (b) To use the various media available to prychological var~ fare to sustain the morale of the oeople of friendly nations oc~ cupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander. (@) To conduct so-called consolidation propaganda operations in Mberated friendly countries. [Consol {dation propaganda vas chat directed toward a military force and designed to inure compliance with the inetruc~ Elona promulgated by the comander of the occupying force.] (é) To control {nformation services tn Allied-occupted Garnany. To carry out these tasks PYD had a number of paychological warfare tools at tte dtaposal, Tranemitters of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) line Paychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedt- tinnary Force, "An Account of ita Opsratinns tn the Weetern European Campaign, jonua3" (Bad Homburg, Germany, Octcber 1945), pp. 17-19; Brigadier General Rohert A. MeClure, "Trends in Army Paychological Warfare," Army Information » February 1952, p. 10 2ptatorical Records Sect ton, AGD, Reference Ald Mumber 7, “Records Fer- tasting to Paycholopical Warfare ia Custody of Historical Records Section,” 5 Nowomber 1949, ps 5, RG 319, PSO 091.412 (7 October 1949), F/M 25/2, National Are tven 3paychologica! Warfare Division, “Operations tn Western Burope," p. 13a and OWI were important, particularly after D-Day when PVD prepared ditectives for both BBC and the OWI stations knovn as the American Broadc ting $eation tions were carried out by the use 4n Europe (ABSIE). Large-scale leaflet ope: ou atrerafe and artillery akilie, and propaganda ves also dissesinated to enemy front-line units through loudspeakers. | ‘The basic Army field operating unit for psychological varfare vas the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (RB) Company. Ae vill be renenbered, the nucleus for this type of units vas formed by the Military Intelligence Service| (415) in December 1942 and, after being transferred for « brief period to the OSS, they went back to the Army in March 1943, The equipment for these units vas volike anything most conventional soldiers had seen. Included vere such itens 49 public address systens, radios, monitoring sete, “oudspeakers, typeyriters, mobile printing pr jes, and leaflet bombs. Normally they vere broken up by the separate Army groupe and fLeld armies into emall teane, often to wirk in direct support of front-line comentional combat unite. One MRB Conpaity commander, Major Edvard A. Caskey, described his reaponatbi lit being con= cerned primarily with tuctteal, or combat, propaganda. Le company ured short Tange radto broadcasts and tactteal leaflets printed on the apot, hen de- Livered to enemy 1ine through the une of modified artillery smoke sheila. He alno maintained prisoner-of-war interrogation team who worked with 3-2. As Caskey explained: "Both Germane and Italfana [prisoners] stated that the con tent of the leaflets h areatly Influenced thetr dectefon. They all tnstated that they were mostly impressed with the veractty of our leaflete.*2 Tinta. p. a7 ZAllied Force Howtquarters, Paycholozical Warfare Branch, Memoraniun pre= pared in Washington, D.C., 26 Nowmbor 186), hy Major Edward A, Cashers Come pander, Lat oA Company, RG 16S Canes}, MID’ (6-2), Propayanda Branch Corres. pondenre, 1939-4 , PWS, Rox Ho, 333, Nattonal archives |2 were formed in the United States and-sent to Eventually five such compant Burope to serve under PYD/SHAEF. Although these unite were the result of rather hasty improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational concepts that they embodied were co reappear in the psychological warfare unite formed later, during the Korean Conflict. Taken together, than, there vere a cunber of diverse organizations in PuD, civilian and military, that somehow had to be fused {ato a common peychological warfare organization. According to an account prepared by the PYD staff, PYD/SHAEF "was the first agency, aflitary or ctviltea, to coordinate arn Burope the efforts of the nuserous atlitary and successfully in We civilian agencies which hed waged Anglo-American paychologteal varfare since the beginning of the war." The Chief of PYD, Brigadier General Robert A. ich representing one of the respective McClure, was assisted by four deputies, civilian agencies which contributed personnel to FAD. Two of these agancies were Anerican--the OWI and the 28S; and two were Brictsh~-the Political Intel- Ligence Department of the Foreign Office (PID), and the Mintetry of Informa- tion (HOI). General MeClure's name bears renenbering, for, aa will be shown later, he was to figure prominently in establishing the Paychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952.7 Not everyone was enamored with PHD operations, of course. After all, it was a rather strange collection of personnel, equipment, and activities by conventional unit standards. Perhaps illustrative of this was a survey report Tsqul K. Padover and Harold D. Lasevell, "Psychological Warfare," Head. Line Series, March 20, 1951, Mmber 86, pp. 14f.; Daugherty and Janowite, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. 131f.; A Syllabus of Paychological Warfare, pp. 32-43, 2paychological Warfare Division, "Operations {n Western Burope,™ pp. 13 Daugherty and Janowitz, A Paychologiccl Warfare Casebook, p. 131i 4‘ August 1943 by the Inepuctor General, Major Ganaral Virgil L. Pete, jon, in which he described the PVE in North Africa (forerunner of PAD/SHAEF) as" Baterogeneous group of some 468 writers, peychologiate, ‘economtats, Linguist: an world travelers," whose efforts "vere sopavhat lacking in coordination and control, until they were all jenbled in one butlding and placed under com by oe ID OTe say ey, Fenarks with the compliment that his Survey Group "was much inpressed vith the totustry and enthusiasm of the people engeged in these prychological varfare activity 1" but added a caveat that dtaplayed aubivalence tovard a nev and ai tte: int organization: "but does not feel qualified to arrive at any conclu stone regarding thetr value to the Theater, or the Aray as a vhole."!! Prof ‘or Paul K. Sadover, # PAD combat intelligence officer, recalled that © free PAD was not ouch appreciated; hard-bitten regular Arny nen referred fe the peychologtcal warriors as ‘feather maxchante.'” But later ia the war, the organization's effectiven Taceived sore respect fron “formerly eus ptctous comande "particularly at the tactical level, vhere at the end feven gung-ho generals like George Patton Ked for front-line support because "HE was Gafinteoly recognized that the loudapeakers helped to persuade the eneay to come over with arme in the air,"2 ihe Propaganda Branch, Go2 Te samy reepects, the activities of the PYB in North Africa (FWB/ARHQ) Provided much of the impetus tovard evencual re ablishment of @ psychological Tar Departoent, Office of the Inspector General, Washington 25, D.C., Te aeamtum fo, the Deputy Chief of Scat from Majer General Viner! Le Peterson, toe ine eect! Survey of Crgeuications, Adstntetration, Suri: eco Procaduren of the North African Theater of Cyerations, National Aecnee? *Pudover and Lesmvell, "Paychologteal Wartare ine Series, p. 16.24 warfare branch at the War Dupartoent. Gonerai McClure's deputy, Mr. C. D. Jackson, OMT, returned to the United States for « visit in June 1943. During hte trip he talked with Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who ia 1941 had displayed the interest in paychological varfore that resulted in tablishnant of the Paychologic Sranch. Still decply interested in the sub- Sect, Secretary McCloy proceeded to staff sone papers left with him by Mr. Jackson which cont ined a proposal that a contral psychological warfare branch be established at che War Department to direct and coordinate the work of the theater WB's.1 The soed had been planted. Prior to this, on 9 March 1943, as a result of the continuing difficulty of trying to delineate clearly the responsibilities of OSS and ONT with respect to propaganda, Presidential Executive Order 9312 was issued. This order gave OWE responsibility for planning, developing, ant executing all foreign propa- mination of information," which applied ganda activities “involving the dis to open, or “white,” propaganda. This action necessitated @ revision of JCS 158/4/D, which had given OSS responsibility for military propaganda in De~ eember 1942 and which had been the major reason for dissolution of the War De- partment's Paychological Warfare Branch. The revised directive, JCS 155/7/D, was tarued on 4 April 1963 and simply onitted any reference to O#T and propagenda.? Thus a major constraint was lifted, albeit one that had been largely self-impoted, that alloved the Aruy to recreate a psychological warfare branch 4m Washington. By August 1943 the papers Mr. Jackson left with Secretary McCloy were Mea mtatory of the Military Intelligence Division," p. 416. *boovevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 105-107, 213.25 beginning to have an impact. In addition to proposing that a/central paychological warfare branch be established at War Departzent level, the papers leo described the system in vhich propaganda pianring and control were car- vied out in the North African theater. In sm interesting memorandum to Colonel Otto L. Nelson, Secretary to the Ceneral Staff, Brigadier conaral J.B. Hull, Acting Asintant Ghiet of Staff, Operations and Plane Directorate (ORD), comented that “although the value of propaganda may not be as great # ite proponents claim, £¢ ta a recognized instrument of modern war which can be useful." After this rather anbiva'ent endorsement, he went on to etat that the principles contained in the FYB North Africa papers were sound, and recommended that they be circulated to th ter commanders. This, in fact, was accomplished with a letter dated 20 August 1943 to all major commanders chat forvarded the papers "in the event you desire to establish siatlar agencies." Interestingly, one of the papers signed by Colonel C. Hazeltine strongly advocated a mixed civilian-military team as "a must for maxtoum re. sulte tn a PWD organization."2 Tt vas this very civilian influence snd in= terface that nade peychological varfare and unconventional warfare suspect to any conventtonal-atnded Army officers. In the neantine, the previously mentioned report by the Inspector Gene-al, Major General Peterson, vas releared cn 17 August 1943, and contained Jopp, wDGS, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Colonel 0. L. Nelaon from Brigadier General J. f. uli, Acting Aariatant Chief of Staff, OPD. subject: Organization for Propiganda Planning, 12 August 1943, OPD 000/26 (2 July 1943), Section I, Cases 1-39, National Archive 2yncs, The Adjutant General's Office, Washington 25, D.c., Letter to all major commanders, subject: Organization for Propaganda Planning, 20 Augaee 1343, AG 092.412 (16 August 1943), filed with OFD 000.24, Sec. I, Cases 1-39, National Archives,26 a complaint from General McClure “that there vas no corresponding agency e: tablished in the War Department, through vhich he could channelize his correspondence." about this time, the JCS began to get into the act by consider ing plans to improve coordination at high levels, and to raquire theaters to Both of these matters were subait definite plane on peychological varfar: discussed at the August 23, 1943, meeting of the Army's General Counct!. General MeMarnay, the Deputy Chiat of Staff, recognized the responsibility of 2 (NI "for wort of this work," and vas not prepared to decide "whether or not the War Departaant should establish an agency primarily for dealing with chase matters ox attempt to coordinate by Ltaison with OW," chus a directed the Operations Division and G-2 to "get together and submit reconmendations The immediate result of this directive vas a report to the Jotnt Intel- Ligence Committee on 8 Septenber 1943 signed by the Assistant Chief of staff, G2, and the Assistant Ghlef of Staff, OPD, voich outlined all the agencies primarily responsible for preperation ani dissemination of foreign propa~ sands, and concluded that 4 War Departzent agency for control of propaganda should be established and have a direct channel through JCS to the Conbined ein this area, the Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Recognizing the Army's defictene: report also noted that "the abolition of the Paychological Warfare Section of ©2 [1 Decenber 1942] has seriously reduewd the War Department's ability to : gone Finally, the report also aupply appropriate material to propagand: included a rather curious avsessment of the value of psychological warfart ypcs, office of the Deputy Chef of Staff, extract from atmutes of Gnoaral coucil Mecting, 23 August 1943, OPD 000,24, Sec. Ii, Casee 40-Cl, National Archives.minds and, therefore, ‘Aeris we 40 © sonevhat lokevara acknovledpoant of this nev fleld, but te did Fepresent an endorsenent, albeit begrudging, and the nonentun for a nev verchological vartare branch in the War Departaent was gathering, By the middle of October, Major General Handy, the G-3, and Major Genera! Strong, the G-2, had subeitted « more detatled study to coneral MeNarney recom mending che abiahnent of ¢ central authority within the War Depertuent for formulation and dissemination of propaganda plans, Policies, und rele, ‘This report was approved by General MeNarney and ‘the Secretary of War on 26 October.? The matter appeared to be settled, Novever, there then enaued 4 period ourtig vhich both General Strong ‘And General Handy strenuously avoided acceptance of the new funct' yn. Ina ‘S*nerandum £0 General Handy on 6 Novenber 1943, General Strong attached a study prepared by G-3 vhich concluded that the nev branch jould be in the Operations Division becavse it "has the groatest interest in operational propa- senda and « direct chanzel to the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff on all operational subjects." Not to be outdone, General. Handy acknowledged on 26S, Mencrandun to Jotne Intelligence Sommittee with inclo By Asststant Chief of stazf, G-2, and Ansletane chiee of Staff, OPD, subject : YE Departwent Propazanda Controi Agency, 8 Septerses 1943, OPD 00:24, See. TL, Cases 40-61, National Archives. FUDGS, Yenorandum for the peputy Chief of Staff, subject: Psychological rarecTelEstablishnent of Agency for Dealing with Proties ee Paychological warfare, 16 October 1943, OFD 000.24, Sec. II, Gagne Gorey Nattonal Archives, Sancs, HD, 6-2, Yanorandus for Major General T. T, Handy from Major Reed HeeereeY. SEEONE, G2, 6 November 1943, OPD O00 24 ey, TT, Cas 40-61, National Archives28 10 Noveaber that G-3 did have an interest in operational propaganda, but chat the new branch should be under|G-2'e direction because bis positions das a venber of the Bnargency Conbinjd Propagande Cooittes and as « Joint chief of Security Control gave him ¢lose couch with Wer Department coordination avd control of propaganda. matter was finally resolved by referral pack to the original recomendations approved by Ganaral HeKarney on 26 Oc~ over, which iad epecitied the sav propaganda agency would be extablished in the Military Intelligence Divis: Jon 2).? . his attention to the dialogue between G-2 and G-3 over a new function may xppear inconsequential, but it [eee some insight into attitudes toward peychologicat warfare, General Stiff divisions normally do not avoid or | rear es mH pri mi i | tia reluctance dieplayed by both Glneral Handy and General Strong to accent I fan activity that vas new, perhaps difficult to understand, and considered by nary officers to be merely a minor) aide show in the war effort, is itlustr ITIL Sea rain ie nn to i ‘q hesttant and reluctant Army, when faced with concepts of an “unconventional” = stn othe ow Potato 2 formyl smn ovo many niga Bran Dwtin ate 8 puring the General Council meeting held the sane day, General Kroner, the G-2 tative, potnted out that the head of peychological varfare activities : | repr lypes, operations Division, | Menorandun for Major General George V- strong fron Major General T. T. Handy, Subject: War Department, Propagends Search, 10 Novenber 1945, OPE 000124, Sec. IT, Cases 40-61, National archives. 2uq History of the Military) Intelligence Division," pp. 317f.i | i | 29 in North Africa, Brigadier General McClure, had indicated that thare vas no corresponding agency in the War Departmant to consider psychological varfare Probiens "at the proper level." General Kroner concluded hia renarke by stat ing that "thts is indicated as a need for thts very important branch." The ed planted six months earlier by General MeCiure's deputy in his discusstons with Assistant Secratary of War McCloy and by Ganeral McClure’ own personal statements during the intervening period, had finally borne fruit. Broadly speaking, the nev branch's primary responsibility was to coordinate all propegenda functions for the War Department. ore apectfically, it would prepare and dis: minate propaganda itens for use of the OWI, CIAA, and other nonn{litary organtzations. The G-2 would be advised by the branch on all propaganda problens presented by theater comanders, and propaganda satters brought before the JCS and CCS would be coordinated by War Department action. . Propagenda plans of the OWI and CIAA would be processed through the JCS by the branch. Tt vould coordinate with aintlar branches in the Navy, sta Department, and other government departments. Finally, the. ranch chief was to serve as the Aruy member of the JCS liaison with OWI and CIAA.2 The branch chief selected for this fledgling office was Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stanlay, who was transferred from the Special Services Divi- ston, Initially only four officers staffed the branch, but eventually nore Lipid, p. 318. Zunes, 6-2, Memorandum fro= Yajor General strong for Coumanding General, Arny Aix Forces; Asststant Chief of Staff, Operations Division; Chief, ciel) Affaire Division and Director, Bureau of Public Relations, subject: drone ganda Section, MID, 23 Hovenber 1943. Menorandum attaches copy of MID sree Fandun nunber 78, 15 November 1943, establishing a Propaganda Branch ta the MED, ané requesta cooperation and coordination of all addr Filed with OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National ArchivesRe 7 30 were assigned, to include some who had been asaociated with the old Peycho- logical Warfare Branch before:ite dissolution. Internally, the branch vas organized {nto Operations and Research and Analysis Sections, and renained Dastcally in this configuration until May 1945. At this point, upon the recoa- wendation of Lieutenant Colonel Stanley, the function of preparing intelligence Feports based on the analysis of foreign propaganda was transferred to the Sociological Branch, G-2. With this function vent most of the Research and ‘Analysis Section. ‘At the end of the war, « few sentor officers recognized the need to butld upon the Army's experience and retain a capability for prychological varfare. In a Decenber 1945 letter to the War Department, Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, then head of the Joint Strategic Survey Comittee of the JCS, stated; To avoid a repetition of the °¥B mistakes we mede in World War II and to take full advantage of the experience gained in that war, I ‘ecommend that a couprehensive study be rade of this subject at an arly date with « view of @, Analysing [sic] all available PYB material of World War II, including particularly the PVB reports fron the verious theaters of operations to establish sound P¥B priaciples, techniques, organiza: tion, equipment and procedures for future employment of this weapon. b. Establishing short courses in our staff schools to provide future comanders and staff officers with a general underetanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare. ec. Examining the feasibility of establiehing a small PYB section in the War Department to provide continuing study of this sub- Ject, or failing that, to assign this responsibility to an existing setiion or agency best prepared to assume it.2 The Propaganda Branch had foreseen the need for such a study. In May Inq usetory of the Military Intelligence Division,” pp. 318f. 250s, Joint Strategic Survey Connittee, Letter from Major General L. L. Lennitzer, USA, to Lieutenant General J. £. Hull, Operations Division, War De- partment, subject: Research and Analysis of PHD Activities in World War II, 22 December 1945, OPD 000.24, Sec. III, Casen 62- , National Archives.—— an 1965 letters had been 1 HE to theater PWB's requesting the appropriate historical material; The branch continued in extstence until January 1947, when the responsibility for peychological warfare activities wes transferred from G-2 t0 the Plans and Operations Diviston. Te de difficule--£¢ cot impossible. C0 discuss the evolution of Aray experience { psychological varfare during World War II vithout taking into secount the impact on it of the major civilian agencies that had an interest im this activiey, First, the Coordinator of Information, thes ite successor, » and, finally, the Office of War Informe- ‘Arny's development of « paychological warfare capability as they engayed in their interagency struggles to sort out responstbilied, in the nev fleld. In many respects, it vas the confuston and lack of coordination generated by the profuston of agencies that forced the War Departnent to reestablish a Propaganda Branch in Novenber 194%. Through thts office ani the theater Peychologteal Warfare Branch, the! Army found it nece: jary to werk closely with the neies, and in particular the OWI, for the duration of the war. This reliance on civilian agencies did not sit well with many profe stonal aflitary men. An illustration of this attitude can be found by quot ing from the unsigned letter of an officer with Headquarters, Western Task Forces, in 1942; I still believe ve could get along far better without the OWI. The Psychological situation is far too complex to bs handled by posts and gentlenen of the press in Washington and even the Garman Proper ganda Machine worked in reverse in the face of actual military Ta.re ERR 32 The only propaganda vhich can achieve results fe the of deeds not words. One U.S. medium tank has proved far more effective than all the bag of trick gadgets, which mazely of— fend good taste and give nothing concrete where want is great. ‘This officer ended his letter with the conclusion, "I believe that such agencies as the OWI and 033 can be profitably eliminated in the future." Trontcally, it was a civilian--Ase: who pushed the Arny Sato developing branch at the War Departeest For-tha Planning and courdination of psychological warfare activities, initially in tant Secretary of Wer John MeCloy-- June 1961 and again in November 1943. And it was a civilian--Mr. C.D. Jackson of tha WI--who, as General McClure's deputy, provided Secretary McCloy with the PYB/AFHO organizational papers that were in turn used by him 45 a stimulus to resurrect a psychological varfare branch in 1943. The initiative demonstrated by icfluential civilian officials to prod souevhat conservative Aray leaders into venturing forth in a tev and uncertain field {theme we shall sea throughout our investigation of the origins of « apectal warfare capability for the Army. Certainly Brigedier General McClure vas an exception to this theme. The civiltanem{ itary team that he headed first in North Africa in PWB/AFHQ, then later in PYD/SHAEP, served as the model for successful Army psychological warfare operations during the var. The Mobile Radio Brcadcasting (HRB) cou antes eaploved in Europe were the first tactical propagnda units of thelr type in the Aray's history, and ware to influence the development of siafler uakes during the Korean War, And McClure hineelf had a strong hand in urging that a central peychological varfare agency be established in the War Tapes, ¢-2, unsigned letter from individual with Heedquarters, Western Task Force, 26 Novenber 1942. Apparently the writer was previously aseigned to G2, RG319, G2 322.001 (1 October 1942), Box nunber 576, National Archives.ee ees) Dprartment, ALL in All, General HeClure aust be considered the most sapor- tant Arwy officer to energe in this new field during World War It. | Although small throughout the Propaganda Branch, G-2, and ite predeces- sore, the Paychologic Branch, the Spectal Study Group, and the Psychological Warfare Branch, perforzed « low-key, but valuable rvica. Ite "principal " states "A History of the Military Intelligence Diviston," "was in the dance 4t gave Co operational units tn the field, and as an agency for the chordination of propaganda activities with military operatione."! antle the extent of thin succe ay be somevhat overstated by the MID history, none- theleas the fact that such an agency wae found to be nevel ry was demonstrated by the creation of the Propazanda Branch ten months after dissolution of the Peychologtcal Warfare Branch. | Ary personnel enployed tn paychologicai warfare i> all theaters ptobably never totaled more than 2,000 at any one tine,? a minuscule number i when compared to many other activities. Despite the often lees-than-enthust= antic manner in which the Army embraced {¢, hovaver, gradually paycholog! eal warfare gained greater respectability, Formal organizations and procedures chat evantu- Ware developed--patntully and hegruitatngly at tines, to be aur ally bentowed thin new entomvor wtih a degree of Lentttmacy. The fmoact of paychalogtcal warfare ia alwaye difficult to ansens. But Ganeral Fineshover, at Inant, thought the European expertomnt une ful. Tn thie var [he wrote tn the BROSIARE © account of te operaeton) which was total in every senge of the word, we have anen pany great "A Wigtary of the MiLUary Intel 327; ana alan. Plates AH Moen, nas Te eA Staten ony 1G: The Rrenkt yA), pp. at Daghe sptoal Warf a Carel pp. AE nt tnnvetery A Payohchanges in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological varfare as a specific and effective weapon. The exact contribution of peychologtcal warfare tovard the final vietory cannot, of course, be measured in terns of tovns destroyed or barriers passed. However, I am convinced that the expenditure of wen and money in wielding the spoken and written word vas an important contributing factor in undermining tha enemy's will to resiet and supporting the fighting morale of our potential Allies in the occupied tountries. Wit rout doubt, peychological warfare has proved ite right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.! Thus, World War IT sew the nation--and the Army--develop the foundation for « modern paychological warfare capability. What it would do with this foundation, so painfully acquired, would remain to be seen. Vetter, General of the Army Deight D. Elsenhover, Readquarterr, U.S. Turopean Theater, Office of the Conmanding General, in "The Paycho- rn Europe," p. 1. Toroes logical Warfare Diviaton, Operations ta WeCHAPTER IIT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR IZ Activation of the 10th Special Forces Group in May 1952 completed the original group of organizations which comprised the Psychological Warfare Center, and supposedly provided the United stat Arey vith the firet untt tn its history formally organized to conduct “unconventfonal," or guerrilla, warfare. A logical question, therefore, vould corcern the Army's rationale for enbarking on this nev venture, so alien to tts more traditional role of conventional warfare. One also wonders 1f there had been any previous experience with unconventional varfare in the Army's history that may have served 4s « forerunner for its desire to create auch a capability tn 1982. Then there {8 the question of why the Army decided to combine unconventional warfare with psychological varfare in 1952. As with paychologteal varfare, ve must begin our search for the antwers to these questions by exanining Averican experience during World War IT. MOfELctal" Unconventional Warfare Units The task of tracing the origina of unconventional warfare in the United States Army 1s complicated by the fact that in the early 1960's # number of World War IZ “elite” unite were inetu in the offtetal Uneage of Special Forces. One of these was the Firat Spectal Service Force, @ Joint Anerican= Canadian untt formed in 142 at Fort Willtan Henry Harrison, Montana, and com manded by Major General Robert T. Frederick. Also included {n the offictal Lineage were Untted States Ary Ranger Battalions, the first of which was 3136 formed on June 19, 1942, at Carrickfergus in Northern Ireland, under the con mand of Colonel Willfem 0. Darby. A similar organization, Brigadier General Frank Merrill's 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as "Merrill! Marauders,” was not officially a part of Special Forces lineage but has been Lineage, hovever, using these units an Lineal antecedents of unconventional warfare is misleading since none of then, by definition, was an unconventional varfare organization. According to the . Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms, unconventional warfare “includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion + + + conducted within eneay or eneny controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed by personnel from an outside country."2 The First Spectal Service Force, the Ranger Battalions, and "Merrill's Maraudera™ did not fit this description; they were primarily long- range penetration organizations that specialized in reconnatssance, raiding, ard commando operations. British Royal Marina Comandos and Orde Wingate's Raiders performed similar tasks for the British throughout the Second World War, Yet the author himself renenbera standing in « mass formation vith the 77th Spectal Forces Group at Fort Bragg in early 1960 vhen the Pirat Special Service Force was reconstituted and consolidated with the Ranger Battalions, ." undated mineographed fact sheet located in G-1 archives, Juhn F. Kennedy Canter for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Departoent of the Ary Directive AGAO-322, October 18, 1960, consolidated the various Ranger Battalions with the Firat Specizi Service Force and redesignated them ali as the lat Special Forces--which became the parent unit of all Special Forcas Groupe 2me Joint Chiefs of staff, Dictionary of U.S. Militecy Terms for Joint Youre, Washington, D.c., August 1968,37 Groups. And « meno: able day it vas, as retired Major General Frederick came down from Canada to Preside over the conferral of Pirat Spectal Service and Ranger unit colors, Lineage, and honors to the Army's Special Forces. felt Looking back upon that scene, one vonders tolay vhy Special Fore tt nece: Fy to adopt the lineage of unita that vere not true forerunners of unconventional warfare. An argument could probably be made that « fev individual fron these units becane early members of Special Forces, and that some of the tactics and techniques of their former organizations were incor- but the porated into Special Forces training alone are insufficient explant tions. Apparently the ansver was simply that the Aray had no true unconven- tonal warfare units of its own to draw history frou, therefore someone in authority decided to take the next best alternative of borrowing the lineage of some of its better-known “elite” special-purpose units of Horld War II fame. While the lineage of these units undoubtedly adds to the luster of fore Spectal Forces, very little 1s served by dvelling on their history runners of a United Statec Army unconventional varfare capability. War snd_Unconvent io e Personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, however, did participate in unconventional warfare activities during World War IZ, and the United stat Arny contributed officers ant men co this unique organization. The OSS, trans formed from the Coordinator of Information Office after the formation of the Office of War Information in June 1942, bore the atanp of William Joseph Donovan, an imaginative, forceful man of 58, who had been known since his youth as "Wild B11.’ Donovan was a highly decorated World War I hero who became a miJIlonatre Wall Street corporate levyer before being chosen by38 President Roosevelt, a# one critic of OSS expressed it, “to direct the Kew Deal's excursion into espionage, sabotage, ‘black' propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and other ‘un-American’ activities." Under the leadership of auch « dynamic personality, another scholar described the OSS as “a combined research, foreign espionage, and apectal operations agency” through which the United States "became engaged for the first time in intensive strategic intel- jarch and extensive espionage and political action operations on « ‘As an agency established to meet the spectal conditions of World War II, the OSS "was the first of its kind in the history of the United. states.” Largely because of the imagination and foresight of General Donovan, who had the ability "to visualize an oak when he sev an acorn," the 05S “undertook 18 calling for more varied and carried out more different types of enterpris ekille than any other single organization of its size in the history of our 3 country."3 such disparate tasks required a veritable potpourri of talent with Americana from all walks of life participating. Writers over the years have varied widely with their estimates of OSS strength, with figures of between 12,000 and 30,000 offered.” Hovever, the vecently released official ¥ 1p. warris smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley? University of California Press, 1972), pp. 1-2. 2parry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 64; The OSS Assessment . Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Coupany, Ine., 1948), p. 10) Boss staff, Assessment of Men, pp. 64-65. 4see, for example, the variance of figures in Ford, Donovan of 0.5.8.3 Ransom, Gosteal Intelligence ami National Security; Bysoff, The OSS in World war II} Sateh, 383.39 Report of the OSS placed that agency's maximum strength in Decenber 1944 as 13,000 personsel, with epproxinately 7,500 of that munber atationed overseas. Donovan's organization vas basically broken down into three main fune~ tlons: intelligence, special operations, and training. Intelligenct and t spectal operations were each further subdivided into several branches, with research and analysis, secret intelligence, and counterespionage, for example, under intelligence, white encompassed by special operations vere activities such as sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and psychological warfare. Interestingly, "Morale Operations" (40), & the psychological warfare capability was known Lack” of covert prop: branch responsible for creating and disseminating ganda? During one of his severe] reorganizations of OSS, Dowovan, in January 1963, established the post of Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Opera- ‘tons (PO) to supervise ani divert the activities of both the Special Oper: tions ($0) and Morale Operations (M0) branches. In Kay 1943, a third branch spectfically organized for guerrilla warfare--the Operational Group (06) Com mand--was also placed under the Deputy Director, PYO. Still later, this title was changed to sinply Deputy Director, Operations, with SO, MO, and 0G as subordinate branches.? Although one can easily become confused by the ityriad of seemingly interchangeable organtzational titles and activities in OSS, the main point to be made here is that Donovan, even after having lost the r sponsibility for overt, or "white," propaganda to WWI in March 1942, continued Ipoosevelt, War Report of the OSS, p. 116. 2pord, bunovan of 0.8.8., pp. 167-168, 338-339. 3Roonevelt, War Report of the OSS, p. 205.i | | ern throughout the war to think in terms of a close intarrelationship between, peychological varfare and what in later years became inom as unconventional warfarn. Although ite role in strategic intelligence vas important, that aspect of OSS most applicable to this discussion of unconventional warfare was “spactal operations," a term which covered, according to Harry Hove Ransone, espionage, counter-intelligence in foreign nations, sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla and partisan-group activity . . . and im vari- fous other forms of psychological warfare and underground operations. In essence, OS$ assumed operational responsibility in a field previously ignored and scorned by many diylonate and military profession ale. iS and the The last point 18 significant; the OSS was not military organization, long with civilians--did partici- but personnel from the military service pate in its activities, Anong the military services, the Army contributed by far the post personnel during the war. In Novesber 1963, the number detailed co 085 by the Arny stood at 4,097 personas by May 1945, that figure had more than doubled to 8,360.7 ‘As early as October 10, 1941, when he created a "Special Activities seriously considering the idea of spectal opera~ ‘section in COL, Donovan was tions, to include the formation of guerrilla units. Many of his ideas had : been obtained froa a study of the organization and methods of Britain's Special Operations Executive (S08). Moving quickly, by Decesber he had propose! to the President that the United States organize “a guerrilla corps, Ypansom, Central Intelligence, pp. 64-65. 2A, Office of the Chief of Staff, Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 13 Novenber 1945. Figures axtracted from the Report of the War De- pertment Manpover Board, p. 15, Military History Institute (iI).ne | pean senamimnrasme ent a1 independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and inbued with a maximum of the offensive and imaginative epirit."" By the early part of 1942 he was re queating training areas fron the Departnent of Interior, and instructor personnel from the War Departuent. Lack of a War Departoent allotment, however, Ampeded initial recruiting efforts for the projected guerrilla organizations. Predictably, the military servic had sone misgivings about a guerrilla corps "independent and separate from the Army and Navy." In the first place, during this period after Pearl Harbor, United States forces vere in diserray and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had yet to be organized. Furthersore, Donovan’ Proposal was perhaps not very wise as a bureaucratic maneuver, as Willian 2. Corson inas observed: "For Donovan tc think, even with FDR's endorsement, that such an organization could be brought to pa in the face of the military's obvious objections was, charitably, «> act of lunacy on hie part."? ‘Aside from the bureaucratic sensitivitié involved, many senior milis 7 leaders bad serious reservations about the practicality of Donova ideas. Major General Strong, Arty G-2, in comenting on a menorandum from the COT in June 1942 (by this time COL had been diesolved and Donovan was Director, 083), on "Orgenization of Guerrilla Warfare Comand," regarded the proposal as "a sentially unsound and unproductive." He believed that most of the operations envisaged by such a force could and should be carried out by specially trained regular troops; therefore, "to squander time, men, equipment, and tonnage on apectal guerriila organizations and at the same time to complicate the command TRocsevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 70, 72, 80-82. 2corson, ixzies of Ignorance, p. 177. In a bit of understatement in War Report of thy OSS, Roosevelt comented that "there seened to ba a deep: on the ‘Seated disapprovs’ of the organization of independent military force part of the War Departrent" (p. 223)mg neem: ‘and supply systems of the Aray by such projects would be culpable mismanage- ment." While recognizing the value of sabotage and subversive activities as an aid to military operations, Strong questioned the feasibility of directing auch forces from Washington. Guerrilla warfare, if conducted at all, was @ function of ragular Aray task forcas whose operations would “take the form of raids and are practically identical with commande operations." This last statement revealed « fundamental, but not uncommon, uisunderstanding of the true nature of guerrilla warfart Despite the reluctance of the military services, however, one of the benefits of OSS being brought under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the issuance of JCS 155/4D on 23 Decenber 1942, which gave OSS responsibility for the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Personnel enployed in this function would be limited to “organizers, fomenters and operational auclet of guerrilla units."? Thus OSS had a charter. While Donovan's initial ideas for a "Guerrilla Group," comprised of ten "Guerrilla Battalions,” 41d not survive intact, he did ultinately create a variety of unconventional warfare activities that depended heavily on the participation of personnel from the Aray. Probably the best known unconventional warfare operation in which Untted States Army personnel contributed significantly was that of Detachoent 101 in Burma, commanded by Colonel W. R. Peera. Detachment 101 organized and trained native Kachin tribesmen to conduct successful guerrille warfare operations lypes, 6-2, Washington 25, D.C., Meno for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, subject: Comments on Meno from the COI re Organization of Guerrilla War- fare Command, June 23, 1942, from Major Gareral George V. Strong, RG 319, ‘Army Intelligence, 370.64, Box Number 874, National Archives. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 105, 223.PN eeenscen Rare mmm en 43 ‘against the Japanese {n 1943-1945. One former OSS member suggested in a conversation with the author that 101 “represented a sort of microcosm of the en- ttre range of OSS capabilities. The Kaching, led by 101, performed a variety of uncouventional warfar missions: They gathered intelligence, aided in ea- cape and evasion efforts for downed United States fliers; they undertook espt- onage and counterespionage missions, the attacking of Japanese Lines of cou- munications, and other such activities in support of allied conventional operations. Alnost 700 United States Army officers and enlisted nen contributed to 101's operations in Northern Burma over a three-year period. Total Guerrilla strength reached sonething over 10,000 by February 1945. After the complecion of its mission in Burma, Detachnent 101 received the Presidential Unt Citation.? According to one student of OSS hLetory, Detachment 101 performed "the most successful OSS guerrilla operations of the var." While Detachment 101 may have enjoyed the most spectaculer tactical con- dat success, the major OSS effort during the entire war was directed at France.5 Here, United States Aray personnel nade a a{gnificant contribution iHugh Chandler, private interview held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 8, 1973, 20.8. Army Spectal Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Readings in Guerrilla Warfare, Decenber 1, 1960, p. 29 Putlites R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road (Joston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), pp. 207-220. Information on Detachment 101 activities is also contained in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Rune Out_in CBI; United States Army {n World War IT, China-Burma-Tndj Giashington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959). See also Kernit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSs, vol. 2 (ew York: Walker and Company, 1976), pp. 369-392. “smith, Oss, p. 248. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. x, 358.i oy to the three groups of OSS operational units that worked behind enany lines in direct support of the French Resistance, The firat group consisted of 77 ‘Americans who worked in civilian clothes as organizers of secret natwork o radio operators, or ce instructors in the use of weapons and explosivi ‘Thirty-three wenbers of this group were active in France bafore June 6, 1944 (D-Lay).’ The second group consisted of 78 Americans who vere members of the “Jedburgh teams," which vere organized in Britain or Algiers and parachuted into France beginning with D-Day. Jedburgh teans consisted of a British or American officer, « French officer, and a radio operator. These teams operated Primarily in uniform, and were to coordinate and legitimatize Maquis activities under the aegis of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, to obtain supplies for the Resistance groups, to report significant intelligence, and as 4 secondary role to engage in guerrilla warfare and attacks on German lines of retreat or commnication.! The largest group in France consisted of some 356 Americans, who vere menbers of OSS “Operational Groups" (0's). Recruits for the OG's were all French-speaking volunteers from United States Army units, primarily infantry and engineer (for denolition experts) outfits. Medical technicians were pro- cured from the Medical Corps, radio operators from the Signal Corps.” Working in uniform, these teans were parachuted behind the lines after D-Day to perform a variety of missions, including cutting and harassing enemy Lines of Line Office of Strategic Services, 1944-1945, "OSS Aid to the French Re- statance in World War II: Origin and Development in France, Sumery," pp. 10- LL, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (USAJFKCHA) Archives. operational Group Command, Office of Strategic Services, Greroble, France, September 20, 1944, "OSS’Aid to the French Resistance in World War II: Operations in Southern France, Operational Groupe," pp. 1-3, USAJFKCMA Archives; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 170, 222.alana etait esr cea» 45 communication, attacks on vital aneay insta)lations, organization and training of local reeiatance elenunts, boosting of nora and sustaining local r ‘ance elenants, and furntshing of intelligence to the Allied arntes. Ine terestingly, Dunovan drew a distinction between the mission of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OC's, although some aspecte of their tactical eperations were similar. The crucial difference in his mind was that the OC's “fitted into the pattern of 055 activities behind the enexy Lines." Actually, the mission of the Operational Groups was not only distiret from that of the Rangers and Commandos but also from that of other OSS activi- flee, The 0¢ Branch had been established on May 4, 1943; then on Novenber 27, 1944, the Operational Group Comand was activated as a separate entity within OSS. In addition to basic military training, 0G recruits received more spectalized instruction on such aubjects as fore‘ga weapons, operation and repair of enemy vehicles, enemy espionage organizations, communications, demolitions, organization and trainiog of civilians for guerrilla warfare, parachute junp- ing, and amphibious operations. Theft basic function vas to organize rest: ance groups into effective guerrilla units, equtp them with weapons and sup- Plies, and lead these unite into attacks against eneny targets, in concert with orders from the theater commander. As for how the concept of their Ployment differed from other Special Operations activities, an USS general orientation booklet published in 1944 described it thus: “0G personnel ac= fivate guerrillas as ailitary organizations to engage eneny forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with TRoosevelt, War Kegort of the OSS, p, 223; Departrent of the Army, Or- ganization and Trairing Division, Washington, D.C., "A Study of Special and Subversive Operations," 25 Novenber 1947, G-3 Hot File, 091.4127S, 1949, Box 10, National Archives.re ey 46 Individual acts of scbotage.” Clearly, the OC's were primarily destgned for guerrilla varfare, and the principles that they exbodied vere to have « sig- nificaut influence on the Aray's effort to form a siatlar capability in later years. Another interesting and pertinent aspect of the 0G concept was its basic operational unit, the section, composed of two officers and thirteen enlisted men, Eight years later the first formal unconventional varfare unft formed in the United States Aray--the 10th Special Forces Group--was to adopt this sama structure for its basic operational detachnent. Also significant ts the fact that the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group was Colonel ‘Aaron Bank, an Aray officer who had served’ with the OSS in France, Bvea the mane "Spectal Fo: ces" ta reminiscent of the conbined headquarters formed in 1943 by the OSS and the British Spectal Operations Ewicutive (SOE) vhich in Headquarters" (SFHQ).? 1944 was renamed "Spectal Fore "Throughout France," atates the War Report of the OSS, "before ani sf- ter D-Day, SFHQ supplied, directed, and communicated with the Maquis in the enthusiastic analysia of the Largest resistance uprising in history."? A le rendered by the G-2 Division, War role of SFHQ, and in particular the OSS, wi logsice of strategic Services, Operational Group Coman, Washington, D.C.» booklet, "OG--Operational Group Coumand," Decesber 1946, USAJFKGHA Archives; Roosevelt, Kar Report of the OSS, pp. 223-225. 2operational Group Command, Office of Strategic Services, Grenoble, France, Septender 20, 1944, "OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War IT: Operations in Southern France, Operational Groups"; Spectal Operations Research Office, Undergrounda in Insurgent, Revoluttonary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: The Anerican University, 1963), p. 204; Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets: Wer Report of the S$, vol. 2, p. 145; OSS booklet, "0G-- ‘Operational Group Command. 3Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS, vol. 2, p. 219.47 Department General Staff in a “Sumuary of Franch Restatance, 6 June - 31 Auguat 1944," and tive following opening paragraph {2 quoted from the introduction to that report: Te must be borne in mind that so-called resietance activities in France vere the combination of the efforts of the local French thea selves under the organization and direction of Averican, British, and Franch agents of SFHQ infiltrated from the United Kingdom and Nqcth Africa. In the aajority of cases, the specific acts of sabctage were : coun: tted directly by the locel French; and it {s to them, for their courage and dering, that the greater portion of credit for the and results accompliabed aust be given, Hovavery if fy not at all aug of se for OSS in generel, and SO particularly, to take credit for ite Share in the planning and divacting of the overall chess of botage | ting evaluation probably tells us more about the lov ‘The rather inte regard with which unconventional activities in general, and the OSS an par= theular, were held by many Aray officers than Lt does about the value of the Resiatance iteelf. | While the success of 035 and SOE efforts in France 1a difficult to es- thmete, {0 comenting on the effectivers with snteh the Magu cut enemy Lines of coomnteation tn support of the Normandy Landings, General Etseahover stated that the French Reatatance forces vers worth fifteen diviatone to him in hie tmvaston of the European continent.” Mppines | Guerrilia Warfare to the Ph One large unconventional warfare operation that was not OS¢-directed, but fone in which tmited States Army personnel plaved a key role, was the Philfppine Campatan, 1941-1945. There a number of Arty officers escaped to the mountatna Lpepartmant of the Army, General Staff, C-2, "Summary of French Peatat- ance, 6 June = 31 Augean 1944," USAT 2Lteutenant Colonel Heary C. Hart, “Ustted States Employment of Unter~ ground Forcas,” Milttary Review 24 (warch 1947):52-565 U.S. Army Spectal Ware fare School, Readings in Guryilie Warfare, p. 28when the Japanese overran the islands, to eutablish extensive intelligence networks and guerrilla forces. In Northern Lusoa, Lieutenaot Colonel Russell Volcknann equipped, trained, ant commanded five Filipino regisents thet auc- cessfully engaged the Jepanase in combat both immediately before and duriag the landing of 0.8. forces at Lingayen in January 1945. 0a Mintanso, Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig eventually consolidated some 37,00 guer= rilla troops, and held 90 percent of the island until tha end of the war? Both Volcimann and Fertig vere to figure prominently in the activation of the in the ‘Aray's Special Fore rly 1950 Attitudes Tovard Unconventional Warfare At the end of World War II hostilities, President Roosevelt foresay the ead for a permanent strategic intelligence organization for the postwar Period, end asked General Donovan to give sous thought to {ce possible structure, Replying with a “Masorandum for the President," Donovan proposed the EadLishmant of « central intelligence authority," which would report d= rectly to the President, “with responsibility to frame intelligence objectiv. and to collect and coordinate the tntalligence material required by the Exacu- tive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy.” Donovan also urged the Presicent to keep the trained and specialized personnel, of OSS fron being dispersed after the war 20 that they could help contribute to this proposed organization.” : Tcolonel R. W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Eneny Lines tn the Philippines (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1954); U-S. ‘drwy Special Wartare School, Readings in Guerrilla Warfare, p. 28; Department of the Army, Organtzation and Training Division, Washington 25, D.C., "A Study of Special and Subversive Operations," 25 November 1947, G-3 Hot File, 091.412TS, 1949, Box No. 10, National Archives. 2yord, Donovan of 0.8.8., pp. 302, 340-342.49 Someone in the federal bureaucracy leaked a cory of Donovan's memorandum to the prei » and the resultant public furor over what the Chicago Tribune called @ proposed "Super-Spy System for Postvar Nev Deal” forced Roosevelt to tell Donovan that he “would wait out the storm ind subuit the proposel at a ore propitious monent." That was in February 1945. In April the President fed, and with his death the fortunes of OSS vere dealt a severe blov.! while Donovan had enjoyed the confidence of FOR, the situation vas considerably dif- i ferent with President Truman, vho, charges Edvard Hywoff, “had no concept of jented for the future of American OSS a8 an organization nor vhat it repre foret yn policy dectston-naking."2 President Truman ordered that the OSS be disbanded on October 1, 1945. One scholar has suggested that Truman was motivated parently because of pressures from the armed services, the FBI, the Uepartment of State, and the Bureau of the Budget. Another {nfluence. wan undoubtedly Mr. ‘Truman's own apparent prejudice against the cloak 2M dagger operations by the United States. To continue an interna- Sagral spying organization in peacetine seemed sguehow un-American 1a ihe atmosphere of the immediate post-war period St vould perhaps be instructive to dvell on this analy: for a moment. In the first place, one mst not fall into the trap of exaggerating the suc- cas of 095 unconventional warfare operations. It may well be true, as one historian ies suggested, that the most significant long-range work wee done im strategic intelligence by the much leas publicized and ronantictzed “collage professors, Iavyern, and others who worked tirelessly in the research unite, in the anatysis of econente objectives, and in other operational anal- yets and techrical groups utthin OSS," for Lt was these groupe who contributed Tiptd., pp. 303-308. 2ymoff, The OSS tn World CAL, p. 341. Ransom, Central Intelligence, pp. 71-72.50 much data on which successful vartime operations vere based, and developed techniques useful to contemporary intelligence research and analysi Moreover, unconventional warfare operations of the 08S actually constituted « rather small portion of the ovorall United States war effort, and many of these resistance activities were haphazard, poorly organized, and uncoordinated with the overal! operations. And yet, ona World Wer II par- thetpant has written that “unconventional warfare operations [not nacessarily those sponsored by OSS] during World War II reaped « substantial strategic harvest," citing as examples the accouplishments of Russian, Yugoslav, Albanian, and Franch partisans in {mobilizing large ausbers of Carman and Italian divisions.” ‘The point of this particular discussion, hovaver, 1s act to attempt to Judge the relative success or failure of OSS unconventional warfare opera: e enother resistance partictpant, Charles tions, but’ rather to iLlustrate. Thayer, has done--that the first American experience with modern, sophisticated and large scale guerrilla movements took place during World War II. More im portantly, 1t vas basically a civilian-led United States agency--the 0S3--and that stepped in to attempt to capitalize on the po- 3 not the military servic tential for guerrilla varfare.. infant organiza- In providing leadership in this area, General Donovan’ tion apparently incurred the wrath of other governmental agencies, including the military services. Opposition toward the intelligence and special, Anpta., pp. 62-63. orbu 2stavko N. Bfelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era, 4 (all 1960) 1323-337. Scharies Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper and Row, i363), p. 180,| | a operations efforts of OSS was ao intense that Dr. William Langer, head of Re- yarch and Analys: }» later observed that “perhaps Bill Donovan’ freatest single achievement was to survive." Even after ‘eing placed under the direc= tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1942, Donovan instated on OSS inde- Penfence and freedom from subservience to any single agency or military serv- tee. Te was this independence of OSS that vas eapectally resented by “the traditionalists in the armed forces," claims journalist Edvard Hynoff in The OSS in World War IT, primarily because by ettizens in uatform vho had become officers only because they were in O83," hey had been plagued during th: var and in afdition, ven more frustrating for the military professionals were the irreverent individuals in OSS who constantly flouted both authority and standard operating procedures."? Hynoff himself vas a menber of OSS, and per hape best typifies the attitude of many Donovan "operatives" by his statenent that one of the things he liked most about the unorthodox agency was that “it was so urmilitary."? Donovan alveys protected his “trreverent indtvidualie however, by reportedly often saying, "I'd rather have a young lieutenant with guts enough to disobey an order than a colonel too regimented to think and act for himsel#."4 One of the most consistent and outspoken opponents of OSS wan Major General George V. Strong, Chief of Army G-2 (Intelligence), who felt from the beginning of COI's existence that Donovan's organtzation conflicted in in= terests with the Army, and also offered the argument that "Wild BLLI" independence vould make him ineffective as a "team player." Later, vhen OSS was Tord, Donovan of 0.5.5., p. 131. *Hymoft, The 035 of World War II, p. 341. Dietd., p. 2. “sotth, 058, p. 6.rr 32 initially struggling for survival after having cone under the direction of c the 30S, General Strong, according to Corey Ford, "refused to exercise his authority so that OSS could obtain the supplies and personnel of vbich it was desperately in need." In fact, for six months after OSS came under its direction, the JCS fatled to give Donovan's organization any operational instruc- tions or official directive as to ite responsibilities. This logjam was broken only after President Roosevelt learned of the delay and told General Marshall, Chairman of the JCS, to "give B11 Donovan « Little elbow room to operate in." In the face of such determined opposition to OSS, it appears that the most significant factor in the survival of Donovan's unconventional outfit was the personal backing of FDR. As Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden noted in ‘Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage, the major OSS adver Nyere fully conscious of Donovan’ ies vere the Aray, Navy, and FBI, but these servic close friendship with Roosevelt,” and therefcre were evare that "if it came to a showdown, the back door of the White House was always open to William J. "2 the interesting parallel between Roosevelt's Donovan and a spectal pl support of OSS and John P. Kennedy's vigorous promotion of Spectal Forces in the face of reluctant foot-dragging by sone senior military leaders” vill not be lost on students of special warfare history, particularly when one con siders the subsequent lose of influence by both organizations after the deaths of the two presidents . Lpord, Donovan of 0.8.8., pp. 109, 129, 162. 2seewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The 0.8.8. and Averican Eaptonage (lew York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946), p. 15. Smerbert Riffkind, "From Rockets to Rifles: The President's Guerrilla Policy," The Review (May-June 1962), pp. 1-12.33 Although the service and particularly the Arsy--contributed personnel £0 OSS, sone comanders vere reluctant to utilize OSS teams in thetr areas of Feeponsibility. Detachment 101, for example, vas initially prevented from operating in Burma because General Joseph Stilvell, commander of Anerican forces in Ghina, Burma, India (CBI), w fervently prejudiced against the ‘irregular’ military activity proposed by OSs. iMeparaged guerrilla tactics as ‘illegal action’ and ‘shadow boxing.'"l stiivell eventually re. lented and lati Praised the contributions of 101, but General Douglas MacArthur absolutely refused to permit OSS to operate in the South Pacific throughout the war, even when General Donovan offered a plan to support guer- riLla operations in the Philippines.2 Tt would appear that in addition to the personal rivalry, bureaucratic antipathy, and Jealousy which were provoked by General Donovan's organtza- ton, the operations of OSS may have antagonized military leaders of the "regu lar" United setae; Arny who, by their training and experience, were condi- toned to think primarily in terms of conventional warfare. Sone of thes leaders, therefcre, may well have looked kance at what they considered to be the unorthodox and unnecessary OSS guerrilla warfare activities. As an example, Charles Thayer in his book Guerrilla claims that many general officers "harbor a deep-seated aversion to guerrillas, apparently because they fit no conventional pattern and their underhended clandestine tactics have little in common with the military code of honor and chivalry which career soldiers . . . Like to associate vith thetr professton."? In yet another attempt to explata Tsmith, OSS, pp. 243-264. Pransom, Central Intelligence, p. 66; Smith, OSS, pp. 34, 250-251. pp. xvit-mviit, Sthayer, Guerrilla4 the reason for the aversion of many United States military leaders to unconventional warfare, Fradklin Mark Osanka, « student of guerrilla activities, has offered this perhaps more convincing rationale: Guerrilla warfare Has not been an American forte (because) in most of its ware... the United States has not hed to rely upon guer~ wille warfar dean experience with guerrilla warfare has been limited by the strgngth of American arms. The United States has been able to mobilize overvheluing econonic and military pover and to bring it to beat directly on the enemy, attacking him not where he was veakest but |vhere he vas strongest, because ve are stronge; still. American m{litary doctrine has reflected this experience. aven in the face|of opposition from the military, hovever, by the end of the var a nucleus of officers trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare had bean develeped by fhe 058. According to Thayer, sertous efforts were made ‘at that time to persuade the Pentagon that this nucleus be retained in som form for future potent{al war, but “these recomendations were to no avail on the ostensible ground that such ‘elite’ groups vere incompatible with the denocratic tradition."? While this explanation of the Pentagon's refusal a a bit extrene, a respected military historian, Russell Weigley, may states in his History bf the U.S. Army that there has been « “long-standing suspicion of elite forces” by the Acmy.> Certainly this uspicion" may well have been an important] factor in the Aray's reluctance to create an “unconventional warfare! capability in the inmediate postwar period, particularly with the stilicfresh senortes of OSS-Aray rivalry during the war. Interest tingly enough, Thayer diso points out chat while most of the guerrtiia-warfare eer cee sae TERRES a ean, of ae ere tees aig useeha tovnee 2hayer, Guerrilla, p. 180. Bpussell Weigley, History of the United States Aray (New York: The Macnillan Company, 1967), p» 543.55 ‘rained personne] vere discharged, @ nucleus of peychological varfare experts was retained, "largely as a result of the navly acquired respectability of thts technique in the course of World Wer II." Consider for a moment thie latter etatenent in Light of what hes bean pravicusly discussed. Paychological warfare gained " Pectability" during World War II, but vhat Thayer fatle to Point out is that there vere formal staffs and unite within the Aray charged with the responsibility for prychologteal warfare. In other words, peycho- Jogical warfare hac an tdeneity, hovever tenuous, within the Army, an identity that guerrilla varfare 414 not share, since most of the officers and ven vho operated in this enviroment vere assigned to the CSS--an organization that vas certainly not considered to be part of the Aray. At any rate, paychological warfare "survived" in the tomedia post-World War II Aray, although just barely, while the Pentagon apparently gave little consideration to building upon the nucleus of 0SS-trained officers to create a formal unconventional warfare capability. Dissolution of oss Diemenberment of the OSS took place quickly with President Trunan's order dtesolving the agency in October 1945, By this tine General Donovan had re fired to civilian life, and the renains of his former orgauization vere dis- Persed to somevhat unreceptive State and War departments. Many of the care folly trained personne! gradually drifted avay to other Jobs outside governent. Portions of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations Branche Were assimilated in the War Departuent's nevly established strategic Services ‘Unie (SSL), which, according to Corey Ford, "was nothing more than a caretaker Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 181.body formed to preside over the liquidation of the OSS espionage networ! Brigadier General Joho Magruder, formerly Assistant Director of OSS, was head of SSU, but by February 1946 he had resigned in protest over the agency's con- any type tiouing loss of highly trained personnel. or alt practical purpose: of formal United states cepebility for guerrilla warfare disappeared. What Lietle renained of 058 consisted prinar{ly of sone secret intelligence and analysis personnel. Seeningly, there was Little desire or need in the ‘amedi- ate postwar period for the types of skills and services that had been offered by 088 during the war. Apprateal The only trve unconventional varfare organization in the United Stati during World War IT vas the Office of str gic Services (085), a civilian agency. Although a few army officers participated in non-0SS directed guer- Fille operations in the Philippines, most of the Aray's experience in unconventional warfare cane from providing personnel to serve vith the OSS. Of Particular note were the OSS Operational Groups (0G! » which vere recruited entirely from the Army and employed extensively in Europe. In terms of or- santzation, training, and concept of employment, the OG presaged the basic operational detachment to be adopted by the Army's 10th Spectal Forces Grcup Asatth, 088, pp. 364-3°5; Ford, Donovan of 0.S.S., pp. 314, 343; Hymoff, O86 in World Wer It, pp 341-342; Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa The 0-3-5. P. 233; Allen Dulles, The craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and To 1963), p. 43; OPD Meno Vasber 6168, 30 Septenber 1945, states Ceneral Magruder was instructed "to c acinus liquidation of activities and persoansl not needed for peacetina purposes," CCS 385 (2-8-42), Sec. I, PI. 10, Box No. 87, National Archives. A menorandua by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, ae part of JCS 965/2, 28 August 1945, "Withdrawal of Al1 Service Personnel With OSS." indicated ap- Proximately 8,000 U.S. Army officers and enlisted ven on duty with O59 in July 1945, CCS 385 (2-8-42), Sec. I, PE. 10, Box 37, National ArchivesmS Sra Am AEE 37 upon its creation in 1952. Thus, for the Army the true roots of « modern unconventional arfare capability lay in its association with the Oss. Clearly, the central figure in unconventional warfare during World W XE was Major General Willian Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services. Ednond Taylor, a forner nenber of COI/0SS, vividly describes tn his book Avakentng Fron Wictory Donovan's fascination with the potential chat he thought unconventionel rfare offered: ‘The paramtlitary and guerrilla aspects of the OSS mission probably interested him aore than any other. By combining vilimited nerve, Yankee ingenuity, and self-reliance, the Anerican tradition of frontier warfare, and the most advanced twentieth-century science or technology, Donovan believed that effectively unconventional co!u- tions could be foun to almost any strategic problem. Abovu and Se- yond his other, sometimes mutually incompatible goals, Donovan, I think, hoped to demonstrate through OSS that the normally untapped Yeserves of individual courage and resource, and the dynanisn of the individual will to vin constitute the basic rav materials of victory, and that in an increasingly mechanized vor}d, hunan dignity 4» still not only a moral but a strategic quantity. Taylor, an unabashed adnirer of Donovan ("I etayed in 0SS--though sovetines attached to it by nothing more tangible than the invisible presence of Donovan in my mind . . . ."), offers a personal conclusion of the General! dedication to unconventional warfare in an eloquent, yet moving p far as I was concerned General Donovan's denonstration was conclusive, and it made an abiding contribution to the development of ay personal outlook on the unending struggle for survival among nations and civilizations, instZtutions and ideologies, that ve call history." Without question, Donovan inherited many of hie ideas from the British. But only 4 man of his stature, perseverance, and personal dynamism could have Indnond Taylor, Awakening Fron History (Boston: Gambit, 1969), pp. 345£. 2mpia., p. 346.38 successfully applied these unoxchodox concapts in the face of the intense opposition and competing bureaucratic interests that marked United States interagency efforts during the var. Thus, shile som of the Amy officers detailed to 088 were to use this exzerience and play important roles in the creation of the 10th Spactal Forces in the early 1950's, surely Willier J. Donovan must be considered the “spiritual” father of Army unconventional warfare. Actually, Donovan's influence on the Aray extends beyond that of unconventional warfare; 1¢ also embraces psychological warfare. As discussed tn chapter II, the initial ides bebind formation of the Coordinator of Information (at least as conceived by Donovan) included combining intelligence, special will be operations, ard propaganda functions in the sane agency. Indeed, recalled, his all-encompassing concept of "psychological warfare” included 411 the elenente--and then some!--of what the Aray was later to call "special warfare" (with the exception of counterinsurgency). Probably Donovan's greatest ponsibility for open, or “white,” propa- disappointment was to lose the 1 sania, to che Office of War Information in 1942, vhen OT was reconfigured nto the OSS. Even after this setback, Donovan never lost his insistence on the close tnterrelationship of peychological warfare and special opsrations (Ud), and continued to stress this throughout the war. Ie is the author's be~ Mef that this interrelationship, so firmly believed in by Donovan, had an influence on Brigadier General McClure's ideas about conbining psychological and unconventional warfare functions et both the Arny Staff and the Psychological Warfare Canter in the early 1950's. The Coordinator of Information, then, can be considered « common point of origin for both unconventional and psychological warfare in nodern Anerican experience. In a very reel sense, William Donovan can also be legitimately considered the spiritual father of « "special warfare”59 capability for the Army. In comparing the experience of the Aray with psychological and uncoaven- ‘tonal warfare during World War IZ, one is struck by the simtiariti. tn ine stitutional responses to thece two relatively new activities. To many pro- fai onal military men, both vere unerthodox, untried activities, heavily influenced by etviltani Toge: , they never involved more than 10,000 Aray Personnel at any one tine--a minor sideshow, tought maay, in couparison to the overall “conventional” war effort. The responce to both was often hesitancy, skepticten, indifference, and even antagonten. Paychological warfare, hovever, gradually gained greater acceptance and Fespectability within the Aray. The cructal difference was that formal staff sections acd unite vere developed by the Army to employ thie weapon. Yes there was still a heavy reliance on civilians, but a{litary sen were in com mand and made the final decisions to its use--particularly in the virtually autonomous theaters. Thus, peychological warfare gradually acquired « measure of legitinacy within the Army, and survived as a formal activity after the war. Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, remained the province of a etvilian agency, the 05S. Although Donovan's outfit relied heavily upon personnel from the Army, and was subject to JCS direction, it nonetheless remained 4 separate and distinct organization. The tensions created by this inde- jeribed in the final pendent, “unconventional” posture were perhaps best di portion of the War Report of the 0s: ‘An agency engaged in secret and unorthodox activities {s peculiarly susceptible to difficulties in its relations with other agencies and departnents of its goverment. Secrecy inevitably creates a psychological attitude of distrust and suspicion on the part of others. In many instances, this attitule is aggravated by the clash with established procedures and regulations which the performance of60 Arregular and unorthodox activities often entails. As a result of this independence, 0S$--and unconventional warfere--did not attain the degree of acceptance vithin the Army ultimately enjoyed by Peychelogical warfare. Lacking solid institutional roots, 085 failed to aur- and. Its demise meast the disappearance of any formal vive with the war’ United States capability for uncoaventional warfare. Only tha legacy of William Donovan and the experience of the OSS personnel who renained vere left to build upon for future developuent of « similar capability. Both would se drawn spon with the coming of the Cold War. Thoosevelt, War Report of the OSS, p. 255.CHAPTER IV ‘THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I; PSYCHOLOGICAL UARFARE Inpetus of the cold “It 4s hard now to remanber how menacing the Soviet encroachments ap- Peared," wrote Ray Cline in 1976.1 cline, « former deputy director of the GAs wan epeaking of the 1947-48 period, during which American concerae about Soviet intentions were gathering in intensity. The situation vas auch that in March 1948 the Commander in Chief, Zuropean Command, Colonel Lucius Clay, cabled Washington: "I have felt « subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which nov gives me « feeling that it [var] eay cove with Gracatic suddennens."? The Soviet Union's excansion tate Eastern Europe; Pressures on Greece, Turkey, and Iran; th Berlin Blockade; the fall of china to the Commintate and the USSR", detonation of an atomte device in 1949; and the Korean War in 1950--these were just some of the developsents that gradue ally hardened the attitudes of U.S polleynakers and shattered Averican dri Of @ post-World War IT peace These attitudes emerged from vhat Dantel Yergin has called the sanding ideas of American postwar foretgn polley~ nt {-Comuniam and a new doctrine of artiona curity." The reaults, save Yergin, vore policies that lay S. Cline, Se GIA Washington, D.C Blueprint of the 38) Poorer, | | | 1"tneluded containment, confrontation and intervention, the mathods by which US leaders have sought to maka the world safe for Averica."? As our policy to respond to the perceived military makers struggled to find effective me. ‘and ideological threats, they examined vays to improve U.S. capabilities in . The tatttal result, intelligence and psychological and unconventional warfar of this quest was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but f€ was also to have an impact, ultimately, on the military services, particularly tal warfare capability for the the Argy, To understand the origins of « Asay, ve first must briefiy aketch the early history of the CIA, for the ovo are inextricably tntervoven, Creation of the CIA Three months after he disbanded the 05S, President Truman, on January 22, 1946, ereated the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)--the direct predecessor of the CIA. He’hed realized the aged for « centralized body to collate and coordinate intelligence information and to eliminate friction asong competing military intelligence services. By the apring of 1946, the War Departoent's Strategic Services Unit (SSU) vas transferred to the CIC, giving it the rem : nants of an OSS clandestine collection capability. This resulted tm the «1 tablishnent of the Office of Special Operations (080), responsible for espi- By June 1966, the Central Intelligence Group had 5 ptonay onage and counter: a atrength of approximately 1,800, of which about one-third were overseas with oso. With the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the CIG be~ cane an independent department and vas renaned the Central Intelligence Agency Ipantel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origine of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston? Houghton Mifflin Co. 1977), pr 54.6 (CIA). The major tasks assigned to the Agancy were: (1) to advise the HSC on matters re! ed to national cecurity, (2) to make recomendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the departmente, (@) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for ite appropriate ate yrvicas of common concern," and (5) "to per- ination, (4) to carry out form auch other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security ae the NSC from time to time direst." Functions of the CIG-- clandestine and overt collection, production of national current intelli genci and interagency coordination for national estimates--vere continued by the new agency. While the original discussions which centered around tha creation of both the CIG and CIA focused on the problem of intelligence coordination, within @ year cf the 1947 Act the CIA vas charged with the conduct of covert |. On December prychological, political, perantlitary, and econonte activitt 14, 1967, the National Security Council adopted NSC 4/A, which gave the CIA responsibility for covert psychological operations. shortly thereafter, on December 22, the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out peychological operations. By June 1948, this authority for covert operations had been broadened by NSC 10/2 to include political and economic warfare, and paramilitary activities (such ae support to guerrillas and sabotage). To replace the Special Procedures Group, the Office of Spectal Projects was created and shortly thereafter renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Ita head was Frank Wisner, the former OSS station chief im Rumania. By the end of 1948, the CIA had « limited com vert action capability ‘This capability for covert action vas expanded significantly aa a result,of the Korean War and the CIA's participation in perantlitery activities in the Far East. OPC's personnel strangth went from 302 im 1949 to 2,812, plus 3,142 overseea contract personnel, in 1952; its budget, from $4,700,000 to $82,000,000; and its ove: stations, frow seven to forty-seven during the ane period. Another atimlue for CTA/OPC's expansion had been NSC 68, issued on 14 April 1950, which called for a sonmilitary offensive against the Soviet Vaton, including covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to fos ter unrest in her satellite countries. Similarly, RSC 10/5, which on October ‘TL, 1951, replaced NSC 10/2, again called for an intensification of covert ac~ tion and reaffirmed the CIA's responsibility for its conduct. Finally, in August 1952, tha clandestice collection, secret intelligence functions of tha office of Special Operations (050) vere merged with the covert action capab{lities of OPC. The resultant analgenation was called the Directorate or Plans (Doe), vith Frank Wisner of OPC in charge and Richard Halne from OSO as his second in comand. Thus by 1953 the CIA was six tines the size it had been in 1967, and the clandestine services had becone by far the largest component 10 the agency. This necessarily brief overview of the CIA's wrly history has covered only the highlights, but there ara a few points thet should be emphasized for the purposes of this study. First, there was the influence of OSS. Corey lpor a concise summary of the early history of the CIA, see U.S. Congress, Seaate, Select Comittee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to In- Celligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed staff Reports on Foreign and Mili- Eary Intelligence, Book IV (4th Cong., 24 Sesa., Sonate, Raport No. 94-755, Spell 23, 1996) Qleshington, D.C.: Gevernment Printing Office, 1976), pp. 4-41- ‘eo, see Tyrua G. Fain, ad, The Intelligence Comunity: History, Organiza: tion, and Issues, Public Documents Series (New York: Bovker Company, 1977)» pp. (8; and Cline, Secreta, Spi examination, see Corson, Arai land Scholars, pp. 99-110. For a more detailed ‘of Ignorance, pp. 221-329.6 Ford, Willian J. Donoven's biographer, states that the CIA “was the direct ‘outgrowth of Donovan's World War II organization, and was based on funda ental OSS principles." Allen Dulles, firat eivilten director of the cr, states im hie The Gratt of Intelligence that Truman based his establishoent of tha CIA on the controveratal recomendations offered by Donovan prior to Roosevelt's death in 1945, and also that “much of the Imovhow and some of the Personnel in OSS vere taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency." In feet, 4m 1949 one-third of the CIA's personnel had aerved with OSs. In ite fret year, hovever, the Agency was prisarily intelli gence-oriented, #0 people with World War I Pectal operations experience vere not recruited. By the latter part of 1948, a groving number of forver OSS personnel vith guerrilla warfare experience began to Join the intelligence agency. This influx eon- Sted 1a the later 1540's, and, when che Korean War broke, aven sore former 088 personnel joined the cra.4 Second, the preoccupation of U.S. policymakers with the Soviet threat during this period would be difficult to over timate. The impetus of the Gold War provided an environment of fear that alloved a resurgence of interest 4m prychological and unconventional warfare. As atated by the Senate select Coumtttee report on intelligence activities, "Decisions regarding U.S. apon- norahip of clandestine activities were gradual but constatent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet intentions."5 Pinally, the growth of the Vord, Donovan of Oss, p. 316. pollen, The Grafe of Intelligence, p. 45. 3Senate Report No. 94-755, Book IV, p. 28. qiogh Shandier, private interview hald at Fort Bragg, North caroline, March 8, 1973; Hysoft, The OSS in World War ff, or aay Ssenate Select Comittee to Study Governmental Operations, Report No. 96-755, Book IV, p. 26.Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was important, for it was this part of the GIA with which the Aray would have the greatest interaction as it gropad to develop its omm capability for paychological and unconventional warfare. Army Dezobt lization During the pertod 1945-46, Army peychological warfare staffs and unite were dissipated rapidly in the genaral denobilization of the wartine ailttary stablisheent. To be sure, a fev senior officers recomended that the Ary Profit from ite experience in this relatively nev field. As will be recalled, tn Decenber 1945 Major General Lemnttzer urged that the Arey determine its lee sone learned in wartime to develop psychological varfare principles, organiza- for the future. He also recomended that instruction be thon, and procedur vice schools "to provide future comanders and staff of- included in the Hears with « general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare Brigadier General McClure echoed the sentimente expressed by General rly Lannitzer with letter to the Propaganda Branch, War Departaest, in 1946: "T urge that a couprehensive document on the subject of psychological warfare be produced and used in the National War College and the Coomand and General Staff School." McClure pronounced hie ovn verdict about the level of ' knowledge in the Army on this subject by concluding: "The ignorance, anong 2 military personnel, about paychological varfare, even new, is astoundiny Lyotnt chiefs of staff, Joint strategic Survey Comittee, Washington 25, D.C., Latter to Lieutenant General J. E. Hall, Operations Division, War Depart- ment, Subject: Resaarch and Analysis of PB Activities in World War II, 22 De- cember 1945, from Major General Lennitzer, USA; RG 319 Aruy Operations, Pi 091.412 (22 August 1946) (P/V $7), National Archive Zoestea of Director, Information Control, Office of Military Governent67 And at a higher level, the Chief of the JCS Historical Section, Major Gaveral E. F. Harding (USA), recomended in February 1946 that the JCS enploy 4 civilian professional to write a history cf World War IT psychological warfare. To make his point about the necessity for such a study, Harding noted that the Aray'a World War I experience in this activity was not recorded, and argued the importance of psychological warfare in modern total war.) Despite these entreaties, the nation longed to return promptly to normalcy, and the military services vere faced vith managing the problems of rapid denobilize- tlon, #0 not auch attention was given infeially to the relatively minor sub- Ject of psychological warfare.? Not that there were not sone in the Aray vho early on had grave reserva- thons about the intentions of the Soviet Union, a major ally in war. As @ Senate report on U.S, intelligence activities states, “American military intelligence officers were anong the first to perceive the changed aituation."? for Germany, APO 742, U.S. Aray, Letter fron Brigadier General R. A. McClure, Director, to Propaganda Branch, MID War Department, RG 319, 091.412 (13 January 1946), Box No. 263, Washington National Records Center (WRC). Note that after McClure left PYD/SHAEF at the war's end, he becone the Director, Information Control, a related activity. Votne chiefs of staff, Historical Section, Memo for the JCS, Subject: History of Peychological Warfare During World Wat II, § February 1946, from Major General E. F. Harding, Chief, CCS 314.7 (2-8-46), Box No. 39, National Archives. 24 perusal of the Army General Council Minutes for the immediate postwar period provides one with the flavor of the mindboggling problene faced by the Arvy during the rush to denobitize. The General Council met weekly, was com= posed of the senior War Jepartnont leadership, and chaired by either the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff. Minutes in U.S. Army Military History Inetitute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 3u.s. congress, Senate, Select cemittes to Stuty Covernsental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book 1 (Séth Cong. 24 Seas., Senate Repoct Ho. 95-755, April 76, 1376) (Washington, D.C-i Covernmant Printing Office, 1976), p. 19.In « leagthy letter veitten in January 1946, Major General W. G. Wyman, the e--both, G-2 of Army Ground Forces, presented his views on the ideological thr: domestic and international--posed by the USSR. Entitled "Project to Conbat Subversive Activities in the United States," Wyman began by stating: "The confusion of miad and the inconsiderate thinking of the soldiers of the Ground Forces in the United States is illustrative of similar thought which exists amongst troops of occupation ani the civilian population of the United States." Obviously alarmed about the problems associated with demobilization, he asked rhetorically, "[WJhere is the mental penicillin that can be applied to our loose thinking to insure the wholesome thought that is so urgently needed in and democracy, our country today? Launching into @ comparison of communt! he outlined several arcas of the vorld under Soviet domination or pressure jed the domestic scene: "Our (ithe tentacles of communtsn"), then addre troubles of the day--labor, demobilization, the discontented soldter--chese things are the sores on which the vultures of comuntem vill feed and fatten.” Having given an overview of the 111s, Hyman then turned to hie presertp- ton: There must be some agency, some group either within or outside our national security forces, which can interest itself in these matters. There must be sone weapon by whicn we can defend ourselves from the secret thing which is working at our vitals--this cancer of modern civilization... . Anew government policy is desperately needed to implement the peychological effort indicated. ... We mst sombat this creeping shadow which 1s in our midst. General Wyman concluded his letter by urging that the War Department, the interest of national security," recomend to the President that: a. Federal intelligence agencies concentrate on collecting information on activities subversive to our goverment at hone and abroad. . A goverment agency be selected to wage « psychological war against these activities.€. A policy be established to publicize such subversive activitt and expose then to our people.t ‘This rather remarkable anslysis vividly portrays the mood of the times. While Ceneral Wynan's views may appear sonevhat extrene today, they represented the gemiine concerns and fears of a segnent of American society, both 4n and out of untform. A larger portion of the population, hovever, desired peace and a return to noreal, and it was these conflicting pressures that policy-makers struggled with in the mediate postvar period. These sane c*! flicking pressures tnpacted upon the evolution of prychologtesl varfe in the Army. Paywar to Plans and Operations Division Ia Mey 1946 a recommendation was staffed by the Intelligence Division, 2, that War Departaent responsibility for psychological warfrre be moved from G-2 and that a special staff diviaton be created for this activity. Hov- ever, both the Chief of Information and the Director, Plans and Operations Division, felt that auch a special staff division vas not justified in peace, a0 the recommendation vas withdravn tn late June. General Norstad, the Direc tor, Plans and Operations, did express the view that planning and policy guidance for psychological warfare should be the responsibility of his division, but only if the Propaganda Branch personnel from G-2 were transferred to him with the functton.? Vpadquerters, Arcy Ground Forces, Washington 25, D.C. Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Departnent General Staff, Subject: Project to Conbat Subversive Activites - The United States, 15 January 1946, from Major General W. G. Kyman, G-2, RG 319, Army Operations, P&O 091.412 (15 January 1946), Rational Archive Yunis, Intelligence Division, Washington 25, D.C., Summary sheet, 22 May 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412, Section IA, Case 7, National archivei 70 eaffed, General MeClure--who At the sane time that this paper was bet: was in Germany as Director, Information Control--responded to a request from Colonel D. W. Johnston, Chief, Propaganda Branch, for his recomendations a1 to the preper place for psychological warfare agencies "within the staff structure of all appropriate echelons." Using his wartime experience as an example, MeClure argued strongly that peychological warfare should not be under G-2: ‘A great part of my difficulty in carrying out what I felt was my mis- ‘fon was with G-2, The G-2's all felt that they had a monopoly on Antelli gence and were reluctant in the earlier stages to give any of that intelligence to Psychological Warfare knoving that it vould be broadcast or used in print. He believed that an association of psychological warfare vith G-3 was wore productive: “My greatest contacts were with G-3 and it was with the oper tional phases ani even long range operational plans . . . that I feel we did our best work." McClure’s clear preference, however, vas for a separste, spectal staff section: I am firmly convinced that rn activity ss important and as rani- fied as Psychological Warfare is one which should have the personal, attention of the Chief of Staff and that the Director of Fsycho- logical Warfare should Likewise have access to the Chief of staff ani even to the Commander hineelf. And here Ganeral McClure found the opportunity to put ina plug on a favorii theme of his by stating: Thad that relationship with the Chief of Staff and the Supreme Commander [Eisenhower] throughout the war and even then it was not ‘satisfactory as it should have been because of our failure in peacctime to indoctrinate Commanders and Staff Officers with the capabilities and limitations of Paychological Warfare. He concluded his remarks by recommending again that "Psychological Werfare be a separate Staff Section reporting directly to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Stasé with the closest Ifaison with the g Sections as vell as with othern Spectal Saft sections." re was to be another four and a half years before the apectal staff saction that McClure recomended vould cone to fruttion on the Ary Staff, and hi would be its first bead. Realising that any attenpt to create « special ataff section for peycho- Topical warfare at that tine vould ba futile, Colonel Johnston’ nonetheless Proceeded with an attenpt to move the function out of the Intelligence Divi« ston. On August 22, 1946, he subuitted a lengthy menorandum for the Chief of Staff recommending the tabitshnent of c "Psychological Warfare Group" under the Plans and Operations Division, in the WDGS. Relying heavily on General MeClure’s argunenta in his 21 June letter, Johnaton emphasized that peycho= Yogseal warfare was “prinartly operational tn satura and does not fall readily within the scope of the Intelligence Division." Pethape the moat interesting spect of Johnson's rationale for making paychological varfare « Plans and Operations Division responsibility was his belief that it would eltatnate future interference by civilians in this field: Ja ihe svent of « future emergency, white overall politcal and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House and tha beote Department, the existence of « nuclear organization within the Wer De= partnent possessing a complete plan for military psychological werfere aad fhe technical means for implenentation, would avoid the situetion of World War II, wherein theater comsandere had thrust upon them efeiliea quencies to conduct psychological varfare within thelr theaters, with re- suyant conflict of authority and lack of control over training standards and performance, Jottice of nilitary Government for Germany (U.S.), Office of the Diree- pena giateraation Zontrol, Latter to Colonel D. ¥. Johiston, Chief, tropes Beato Ane oer eGr2s 21 June 1946, from Brigadier General Robert A. Heclure, RG 319) Army Operations, P60 091.412, 22 august 1946 (PW #7), Necioagl Archive *uD0s, Intelitgence Division, Washington, 2.¢., MID 912, Menorandum for Plane ae Gf State, Subject: Eetablishnent of Paychologieal Warfare. Groop Pao Oy a sPezattons Division, WHGS, 22 August 1946, RO319, Atay Opecariogs PO 091.412 (22 August 1946) (EW #7), National Archive:n Hare again we see evidence of the resentnent of many regular officers tovard what they considered to be unarranted civilian interference. It ts unlikely, however, that General McClure shared Johnston's view on this particular tseue, in Light of his experience as Chief < PHL/SHAEF during the var. Nonetheless, the view prevailed among many in the Army. In eny evant, @ decision was not made on Colonel Johnston's recomend. ‘fons until October, and the results vere probably somevhat different than the had envisaged. The original paper had picked up some additional facete, and what the Acting Chief of Staff approved on 3 October 1546 vas a series of War Department recommendations to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Comittee (siicc) "to give early consideration to, and wake prompt recoumendat ions con cerning Psychological Warfare Policy," and also to "consider tnforming the U.S. public of foreign subversive activities within U.3."! tn these recommendations, particularly the latter concerning subversive activities, che influe ence of General Wynan's January letter can be seen. With regard to the initial ‘recommendation to ‘ablish a Paychological Warfare Croup in the Plans and Operations Division, hovever, the decision was to decentralize certain psychological warfare operations to other divisions and agencti » but with Plans and Operations providing overall planning and policy guidance.? Soma foot-dragging then ensued until, during an informal conversation on Novenber 6, 1946, between General Hodes and General Lincola, General Hodex agreed to take over immediately the peychological warfare functions of 6-2 WDGS, Plans and operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memo for Record, Supject: Establishaent of Psychological Warfare Group, P60 Division, WDGS, 4 October 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (27 Septeaber 1946), National Archive 2mia.B and to absorb its Propaganda Branch.! Tha Propaganda Branch wat formally 4! continued by Intelligence Division Mesorandum Ho. 100 on 29 Novester 1946, and ‘the Branch personnel assigned to the Policy Secti« » Plane aod Operations Divi- ston.? A minor era in the evolution of War Department bureaucracy vas thus pasead. Psychological warfare, which from 1941 had) been a G-2 responsibility, was passed to the operations side cf the house. | Aetually, the responsibility for peychologtcal warfare had bean diluted tn the process. While War Departaant Hesorandun No, 575-10-1, Lasvet oa 10 Senay 1947, eazy a loo of Pat ant Spfutona vient rapa t I bility for general supervision of Amy psychological warfare activitte: several other War Department agencies were given pieces of the ple, These included the Director of Intelligence, who retained the responsibility for collection, evaluation, and interpretation of sociological and yaychological | inforsation, and the analysis cf foreign propagenda--es well as the Director of Organization and Tratning; the Director of Service, Supply, and Procure- ment; the Director of R wreh and Development; and /the Chief of Public In- formation.” Real centralization of psychological warfare activities was not to occur unts1 later, when the Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare was formed in January 1951, with General McClure se ite head. Jypcs, Plans ani Operations Divieton, Washington 25, D.C., handwritten notes dated 6 Novesber 1946, RG 319, Aray Operations, PSO 091.412, Section TA, a 7, National Archives. apes, Intelligence Division, Memorandum No. 100, Subject: Discontim~ ance of Fropaganda Branch, I.D., 29 November 1946, RG 319, Army Operstions, P60 091.412 (29 Novenber 1946), National Archiv 3yDss, War Department Menozandum No. 575-10-1, Responsibility of War Departuant Agencies for Psychological Warfare Punctions, 10 January 1947, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (18 December 1946), Nationel Archives,Hisenhower_and McC1u1 ‘About the time that responsibility for paychological warfare wes being. pessod to the Plane and Operations Division, some interest in the field wae Discus ons of the subject of co- being exhibited at a higher policy level: vert operations as a future form of war--apparently intetated becmise of Che doterest of Secretary of War Robert Patterson--took place in the SWNCC. As 5 ‘an offshoot, 1n Dacenber 1946 « SWNCC subcommittee formulated guidelinas for the conduct of peychological warfare in peacetime and wertina. Than, in April 1946 a SHNCC subcommittee was formed to consider and plan peychological. war fare; 1a June 1947 it was renamed the Special Studies and Evaluation Subezm mittee? Aray Chief of Staff Diight Eisenhover entered tha peychologtcal warfare arena at this point. In a memo dated 19 June 1947, Eisechower indicated © the Director of Plans and Operations his desire for the War Department "co take those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of paychological warfare and of cover and deception and that there should continue in being « nucleus of personnel capable of handling these arts in case an energency att 2 ae the sam time the former World War II Supreme Allied Connander asked his old Chief of the Paychological Warfare Division, SHAET, for coments on the subject. McClure exphasized in his reply that “psychological varfare must become aleo RG ly.s. Congress, Senate Report No. 94-755, Book IV, pp. 26f- 319, Army Operations, P60 091.4)2 (12 Mey 1947), Rational Archive gar Department, The Chtaf of Staff, Washington 25, D.C.» Menorandus for the Direccor, Plane and Oparaticas, WDG3, 19 June 1947, from Dwight D. Eisenhover, RO 319, Aray Operations, P60 091.412 (19 June 1947), National Archiv15 ‘# part of every fucure var plan," lamented the dispersion of people with World War IZ experience, and specifically recomended that: . tlitery group, on a voluntary basis, be charged vith studying psychological warfare policies and practices duriug thie var. b. Research be undertaken, at once, into the effective: WW [psychological warfare) APY Branch of the Director of Informacion be 4. A Pa Reserve, of limited munber, be -ctablished 4. Training for PY be underta the General Staff Collese ‘and the National Defense College. ; 5 of Ja Might of che strong views that he expressed earlier concerning the trability of a Spectal Staff section for psychological warfare, MeClur Tacomendatiou to put this function under the Chief of Information appears strange. Perhaps he had decided that auch « proposal vas futile, in view of the previous resistance to this idea shown by the War Departuent staff. Per- haps te was simply because his post-World War II experience in Inforeation had convinced him that this was the proper course. As he e-plained in hie memo- Fandum £0 Eisenhower: “It [paychological warfare] {4 nore than intelligence; it {0 more than operations... to friend and aneny.0? Very little resulted from General McClure's recommentations. A ctvilten btatortan, Dr. E. P. Lilly, had bean employed by the JCS to write « history of Peychological warfare for World War II, #0 that took care of the firet tvo Tecommentations, according to the Director of tant and Operations in the IOs, Plane and Operations Diviston, Mennrendim for the Chief of staff, Subject: Paychoogical Warfare, Z1 June 1347, from Briqaiter General Robece A, eClure, PhO staff reaction, and Director, P60 Memo for the Chief of seaff, 29 duty 1947, RG 319, Arey Operations, 1948-52, Box €9, PAO ON GI? (21 Joon 1947), Nattonal Archives. i Ira.6 staff reaction requested by Elseshover, It was not believed thet peychological warfare should be a function of the Chief of Information, but, rather, the responsibilities in this field should renain as outlined in Wer Departoent Mauo 575-10-1. Mor was the establishment of « paychological wa:tare reserve pelteved to ba practical. With regard to MeClure's final recomeodation, the Director of Plana and Operations, Major General Lauris Norstad, sisply replied that the subject of peychological warfare vas included in the curriculum of the National War College, the Command and General Staff College and the Air : War College. Another senior officer vho was unhappy with the progre! of U.S. peycho- Major General W. G . Wyman. He wrote to Caneral Norstad logical warfare w clared "I believe that the SWNCC on 16 June, and, with Bie usual intensity group that has beca set up i# not sufficiently poverful to accomplish the wr- gene national requirement in thia field. Such a group aust beve no diverting ducies to taka then may fron this very extensive subject which {s so taportant to us." ‘Ha went on to state that a national psychological warfare objective gust be established, and the Army needed an interim directive so that it could pring an eggreseive program to bear on appropriate objectives without: further " je concluded by reaffiraing the necessity for action at the highest level: “I am convinced that @ national agency must be set up, using SWNCC perhaps, but stirred up and goaded far beyond any present concept to immediate ac- thon."? lpia. 2yeatquarters, Arey Ground Forces, Ft. Monroe, VA, Latter to Major General Lairie Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations, WDGS, from Major General W. C. Wyman, 14 June 1947, RG 329, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (14 June 1947), Section II, Cases 16-30, National Archive:” orstas reply foldcatd egeenst onthe ened for satlonelegeney, Sot be rained canara Hyman thatthe veld dicetion and costo of we | Depeteet fneton. a tated Wren | tine activities vas primarily a stat that two officers from the Plans and Operations Division were nenbers of the SNNCC Subcommittee on Paychological Warfare, vhich wa> primarily « contingency Planning organization that should not engage in the day-to-day business of “selling democracy." He went on to draw a distinction between the peacetine activity of “selling democracy," an infornation function, and "psychological ‘ warfare," which "should apply only to wartime or prebellijerency and have as tte frank objective the coercion as vell as the provisicn of thought." Wyman agreed with Noratad's ” but shying avay from the term "psychological varfar felt that there was “a great need for « synonyn wich could be used in peace Hime that would not shock the sensibilities of « citizen of democracy."? The problem was not a nev one. During World War IT, agency differences over “open,” "white," or “overt as opposed to “closed,” "black," or “covert” Propaganda, had been a source of continuing difficulty. In fact, it hed been one of the primary factors that caused dissolution of the Coordinator of In- formation, and the division of peychological warfai Teaponsibilities between OWT (overt) and OSS (covert). But this was a nev kind of war--a "cold war''s- in which most Americans desired peace. Many military men vanted to have 106s, Plans and operations Division, Wesh{agton 25, D.C., Latter to Major General W. C. Wyman, Headquarters, Army Ground Forees, Fi. Monroe, VA. from Major General Laurie Norstad, 16 July 1947, RC 319, Aray Operations, P&O 081.422 (14 June 1947), Section IT, Cases 16-30, National Avchives™ | Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Pe. Monroe, VA, Letter to Major General Noratad from Major General Wynan, 22 July 1947, R319, Army 1 16-30, National i Operations, F&O 091.412 (14 June 1947), Section 11, Ca Archives ere caret es tere am8 nothing to do with psychological varfare in the firat place; it vas not “real soldiering." Even those who felt that psychological warfare was tmportant were understandably perplexed as to the proper role of the military in this multifaceted and unorthodox activity. The correspondence between General Norstad and General Wyman mirrored the dilema faced by concerned professionals. Noretad asked the Chief of Information, Major General M.S. Eddy, for 4 informal views on this sensitive subject. Eddy's reply, in a lengthy memorandum written in October 1947, prevides us with some valuable insights began by concurring "in the need to undertake without delay an extensive campaign of psychological warfare, in both overt and covert phases, as a matter of national necessity to offset the effectiveness of the groving PY campaign "But then he discussed launched against the United States by [the] 0.8.8.1 nting auch a campaign to the Aerican the absolute importance of carefully pri public, and the role of the military in auch an effort: Although the succcas or failure of such a PW campaign will be of the most vital military concern, the political structure of the U.S. pre- cludes making PY a military effort. In fact, the polittesl considers tlons are so sensitive in this field that the whole program may be da~ feated at its inception--no matter who assumes the initiatives-tf the entire question of ways and peans of broaching the aubject to the President, the Congress, the people--particularly the press--is not minutely. examined by the best brains available and handled with che utmont tact, finesse and discretion. Othervise, the American people and the Congress wi!l mtsunderstand and disapprove the project at the outset. He believed that covert peychologtcal warfare would probably not be ace cepted by the American people “without a great deal of preliniuary education and groundwork," ard emphasized that it should be conducted “under the aegis of an agency not directly connected with the armed forces." The public and Congress, on the other hand, would probably accept overt prychological warfare, but only {f they were fully informed as to its need and methods. This would79 ‘sacasettate the voluntary cooperation of the information media. Terns like “paychological warfar ‘Propaganda, and “subversion” must be carefully erplained “ao as not to arouse public indignation or fear of 'gestapo-ten' and suthoritartanten 1a our om country." And as for the role of the military in this endeavor, Eddy thought that "the entire subject should be sponsored by etviltan ‘not menbers of the military establishnent--both in and out of the Severnment. Publicly recognized military participation should be limited to stvice, concurrence and such performance as may be delegated ty it.! General Eddy's views provide a vivid portrayal of the murky and por Utteally sensitive area that vas paychological warfare in the early Cold War Pertod. The extreme caution he advocated undoubtedly contributed to the ambivalent attitudes of many nior Arny officers tovard thia "grey are, tivity during the tntervar period. General McClure, hovever, vas not ambivalent, and varely alesed an opportunity to press for a strong Aray role in peychological warfare. Respond- tng to « request fron Bisenhover for a enall nunber of civilian candidates for 4 paychological warfare re ve, McClure in eazly Novenber 1947 recomended a soup of eight for policy planning purpos: and outlined how they could be used. He then added: Although activities of this group vould have to be coordinated vith ggher axed services and with the State Departuent, {t appears to be Toepartaent of the Argy, chief of ‘Information, Washington 25, D.C., Yenorandue for the Director, Plans and Operations Division, sub ject Paycho- Topical Warfare, 31 October 1947, from Major General M. 3. Eddy, NG 329, Plans Sor .ete ag ant Divieten, 1946-1948, 091.3 - 091.7, Section I, Box #28, Peo 091.412 TS (31 October 1947), National Archives.Military Mision systems. MeClure vas correct; the Army was heavily involved in civil affairs, information contol, and “reorientation” activities in several occupied countries. No one was moze ware of this than this forner Chief of PYD/SHAEF, who left that position after the war to become Director of Information Control in Germany, and pt the tian of this menorendum ty Eisenhower was Chief of the Civil Affaire Division. Several McClure War Department New York Field Offic was to sound thi theme meny times during the next few ye. ne of thel men recomended by MeClure for the peychological warfare reserve group was Willian S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of the Colunbis Broad- casting Systen. | Paley cane to see General Etsenhover shortly after the MeClure memorandum and expressed his willingness to help in peychologteal warfare planning, tit preferred to do so as a civilian consultant rather than in untfora. In a wenorandun to Secretary Forrestal on the subject, Eisenhower agreed with Paley's preference “inasmuch as the sense of the discussion mong interested agencies has been to effect that civilians should control and pre- dominate in the current organization and plannin | established his acceptance of civilian leadership in psychological warfare planning, the Chief cf Staff then made a pitch for « strong role for the military in the ongoing procei I realize there are high-level committees considering the subject, but it seens to me that the a’ ‘tary must give continued impetus : to the orgaiization and realistic functioning of this important ac~ tivity. her, the Armed Services should prepare plana nov involving enunciation of policy and methods applying to actual war. IWar Department - Special staff, Civil Affairs Division, New York Field ofttcn, Memorandum for General Dvight D. Eiseshover, Subject!” Candidates for Paychological Warfare Reserve, fron Brigadier General Robert A. Meclure, Chief, Bev York Field Office, 3 Rovesber 1967, RG 319, Aray Operations, 760 091.412 (5 November 1947), National Archive:— 81 ea argument for ailitary participation in paychologtcal verfare planning Msenhover tactfully put « plug in for Army leadership, waing his old PID/SHAEP chief and his assoctation vith Paley as « aveetener: 3)do not know whether the responsibility for this Planning should be seperate, the JCS or to an ad hoc comittes unter sent iemediate aavehe hocd of a ihe, latter event, I could, 1f you a0 desire weeatl cclnce taf & combined counittce, a brigadier germrat rete ss A sxgetsive experience in his field during the war in Bver the diplomat, Elsenhover closed his mamorandun to the Secretary eee ep teee ctor) | Tete) nota) Nae! oo|otee partes cient express readiness fo be helpful. If the matter ts conpletely in hand through the processes of the high-level connittees, ay suggestions say not be pertinent" The Chief of Staff's offer vas not acted upon; MeClure stayed at his post 4 New York. Nonetheless, Elsenhover's interest tn Peychological warfare was evident and it wes equally evident that Robert A. MeClure carried some vetght HEH the Chief, But the Aray continued to feel tts way singerly in this an- biguous and politically sensitive field. ‘The Army's Reaction to NSC-4 The task of delineating agency responsibilities for Psychological warfare Proved to be difficult. In early Novenber 1947, the secretaries of Defense Azwy, Navy, Atz Force, and the JCS determined that propaganda of all kind qvert and covert--was a function of the State Department, in consultation with —— Toepartoent of the Army, The Chief of staff, Memorandum for Secretary Foupertal, Subject: Paychological Warfare, from’ Detohe ne ELsenhover, 17 No- vesber 1947, RG 319, Aray Operationa, National archives,| ann a2 the CIA and a military representative. Accordingly, President Truman assigned on Novenber 24, & psychological warfare coordination to the Secretary of Stat eretary of State George decision that was reversed within three weeks Maxehall opposed taking responsibility for covert actions that might embarrass tha Departuent and discredit U.S. foreign policy. Ha favored placing such activities outside the Department, but still subject to guidance from the Secr tary of State. Similarly, the military wanted to maintain some control over covert psychological activities, but they did not want co assume operational jociation with covert activities, the responsibility. Unwilling to risk ult was NSC-4, entitled "Coordina- Departments turned to the CIA.) The 1 tion of Foreign Intelligence Information Activities," a directive that in informa- December 1941 "empovered the Sacratary of State to coordinate ove tion activities designed to counter comunien," and an annex, NSC-4A, which netructed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert psychological activities in pursuit of the aim set forth in NSC-4."2 shortly thereafter, on Decenber 22, the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out such covert opera tions.? Thus responsibility for covert psychological warfare was fixed, or #0 it appeared. But much needed to be dona to pin dovn agency responsibilities for the overt side. The Army's initial reaction to NSC-4 was an attempt to get its am house in order, A study was initiated in January 1948 "to determine what steps are : required to strengthen and coordinate all domestic and foreign information Agenate Report No, 94-755, Book iV, pp. 27-29. 2rpid., Book I, pp. 48f. 3tpid., Book TY, p. 2!3 measures of tha Departoant of the Aruy tn furtherance of the attatnaent of U.S+ abfonal objectives in coupltance with NSC-4 and exiating regulations,” The study dtacuned the "insidious ad costructive" Coumuntst propaganda vhich ‘“trectly threatened" U.S. national sscurity, advocated strong caunterpropa- sande weatures, both foreign and dovestic, and daclared that “inasmuch a the ‘se OF Propaganda an 4 veapon of either var or peace ts of fundamental concern 0 the Departnent of the Army, 1 18 belleved taperative that Army efforts in this field be coordinated and directe: ‘Then, with regard to the sensitivity of psychological varfar tive posture: reasace that the American people and Congress do not like and/or are SEASS of doweetic propaganda, is no excuse for us to sideatee or Got ne mathe jg The TesPonsibility of accepting the consequence of cary ieee tg ie far greater. The Anerican people have proved ton ‘samy, tines that they can "take it" 1¢ they ate told why. There was a lengthy discussion of opinion surveys from Yorld War Ii--a cme for concern since they indicated "a lack of paychological condittoning of the soldier's mind before going to var." Thus the wish: "LE the Ary could enfese tm ‘white’ propaganda for civilian consumption, {¢ would be beneficial an Prior indoctrination of the future power of Arsy manpower." The study emphasized chet three Army Special Staff Diviston--Civil Affairs, Mblis Information, and Troop Jatorsacton and Bducatton--were engaged in ate ‘evination of "White" propaganda, but that tt vas uncoordinated. Purtheroore, ee Oey eitdeces onfomnerat eerie te ston," as specified by tho War Devavtment Yenorandim No. $75-10-1 teaued in Tamary 1967. Stoce the stuty 148 preparad by Colonel Yeaton of the Plane and Operations Division, this 1 ter conclusion ves a rather cand{4 and surprising adatesion.ry Im any event, to remedy the situation described, the study recomended: ‘That the Chief of Information be directed to supervise all current operations of the Department of the Army in the field of information, public relations, or education which have peychologicc! or propaganda implications. ‘That all "white" propaganda, donestic and foreign, implemented by the Department of the Army and disseninated by the three (3) Special Staff Divisions (Civil Affairs, Public Information end Troop Information and Education) be coordinated by the Chief of Informa- tion. ‘That for paychological varfare or propaganda purposes, the Chief of Information receive policy guidance from the Director of Plant and Operations Division through appropriate and continuous liaison. ‘The Chief of Information concurred with the recomendations, but felt strongly that the Plane and Operations Division should coordinate the overall peychological warfare effort. Understandably, he also cautioned against painting the Chief of Information with the psychological warfare/propaganda brush. The P&O Division concurred with this, but saw "no danger if handled as suggested.” On December 18, 1948, the study recomendations were approved by the Secretary of the Aray.! As we have seen, the Army's initial reaction to NSC-4 produced very litele in the way of far-reaching measures, but rather an attempt to improve its internal coordination of yyehological and information act{~tties. ‘These steps were rather modest in scope, but indicative of the cross~ currents of uncertainty and caution, on the one hand, and a desire to “do sonething” about a perceived condition of national malaise and weakness, on the other. They reflected not only a sense of frustration by some with the lack of strong national direction in psychological varfare, but also Apepartoent of the Aruy, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet and Study to Chief of Staff, Subject: A Study of Peycho- logical Warfare, from Lt General A. C. Wedeneyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 10 February 1948, RG 319, P6O Division, 1946-48, 091.3 - 091.7 Section I, Box No. 28, P&O 091.412 TS (15 January 1948), National Archive:85 uncertainty about the Aray's role in providing the leadership needed in such @ politically sensitive area. Another inter, fing facet of this action was General McCluce's role. The officer who prepared the study for P60 Division ‘Colonel Yeaton--apparently felt that 1t was important to note for the Chief of Staff that the peper had deen presented co McClure, “who gave complete concurrenc Bven from hie office tn Nev York, General McClure continued to influence the Aray's thinking on this abject. MeClure's influence continued to be felt--at all levels of paychologteal warfare, A venorandum for the nav Chief of Staff, Ganeral Ouar Bradley, wrtt- ten in March 1948 by Lieu wnt General J. C. Wedemeyer (uho had replaced Notatad as Director of Plans and Operations), gave some indication as to MeClure'a stature: In the last var this activity [paychological warfare] was not promptly or efficiently developed. Organization and functions were accouplie iad under duress. During the course of the war, aany men becane quite pro- ficient in this unusual, but very vital vork. I believe that Brigasier General Robert A. McClure should be brought to the War Department “for consultation in the premises.2 The folloveup menorané'ss to this paragraph by the Assistant Chief, Plans and Policy Group, of the Plans ant Operations Division, simply confiras the key role of McClure tn policy matters: General McClure visited Washington before and after his trip to Europe. On the occasion of each visit, he spent considerable tine in Lipaa. Zoepertoent of the Army, Plans and Operations Divistor., Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 18 March 1948, fron’ Lieutencnr General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director, Plans and Operations, RC 319, Plane and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section T, Box No. 28, filed with Po) 091.412 (30 Novenber 1948), National Archives.ca er Policy. He was consulted on tae provision of SANACC 304/6 and his recomendations are embodied in JCS 1735. Ha edited asd approved ‘Our peychological warfare study now in the hands of the Jotat Plan- ners. General McClure now feels that close liaison has been estab- Lished between P60 and hineelf. Ha has been of great assistance in the past, and his opinion will be sought in the future on all major peychological warfare tssves.. stature--and his close relationship with Further evidence of McClure’ General Wedameyer--was a June 1948 "Dear Bob” letter by Wedemeyer, who wrote Ganaral MeClure thanking him for his coments on an Arsy pamphlet entitled tactical Psychological Warfare" to be used at the Ground General School st Fort Riley: Your constructive vievs make it possible to improve these training publications. I hope that we can send similar material to you in the future, in order to obtain the continued benefit of your knovledge and experiences. Furthermore, I trust that you can find time to put down ca paper more of your experiences and reflections on the broader aspects of psychological varfare, because ve finj ourselves short of seasoned, mature Army writing in this field. 4a 2 "Dear Al" letter t0 Switching to a higher policy level, McClure Gevergl Wedemeyer in July 1948--laid out in considerable detail his concerns and recomendations on psychological varfare. Ha began by addressing a recent conversation vith Ganeral Omer Bradley, who appreciated the value of peycho- Logical warfare during Wartine, but apparently felt that the Ary should Ipepartment of tie Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Director, Plans an! Operations, Subject: Proposed Trip of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, 30 March 1948, from Co!onel William S. Biddle, Aesietant Chief, Plare and Policy Group, ¥9 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section I, Box wo. 28, P/O 091.412 (30 March 1948), National Archive 2pepartment of the Army, Plans and Operators Division, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Brigadier General RoSert A. McClure, Civil Affairs Division, New York Field Office, from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 18 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, filed with P60 (091.412 (28 May 1948}, National Archives.| | 87 confine itself to planning and leave the overall responsibility to the state Department. McClure had some mlsgivings about this approach: Iam sure fev people realize that today the Dapartasnt of che Au:y ts tha foremost U.S. propaganda agency of our Government. Why, end how come, vould require involved explanation to tha uninformd.” tu and I know the ansvers. By default State Departuent ha: not taxen over its responsibilities in thie field for many reasons--particularly appropriations. 7 Waving stated his major theme, McClure then supported tt by pri neing 4 tour d’horizon of the Army's activities. The Armed Forces Radio networks, the Overseas Stars and Stripes nevepaper, the Troop Hlucation and Inforastion Program in Europe and the Far East, the Aray's "complete responsibility for the propaganda to four occupied countries," the fact that the uirmy controlled wore radio brosdcasts than State world-wide, the U.S. Military Government neve- Papers published in three foreign countries, the 50 to 75 documentary filas dtetrtbuted each year, rhe world nevereels made in three languages each week, tha control of all U.S. comercial films shown in occupied countries, the cultural centers established in 60 cities of the occupied areas, the magazines Published for foreign distribution (wa, the Aray, publish five vhile state Publishes one"), and the millions of pamphlets and leaflets printed for educa- tLonal purposes in four occupied countries 1 of this, and wore, prom.ted McClure to declare, "I should say today that the Aray has five tines the out- Frojaction of America than State has and probably « greater audience for its propaganda." Furthermore, the Army should not take « head-In-the-sand attitude on activities, beca + "Call Se what you may, international information, the respons bilities still 1 Propaganda, or Paychological Warfart fe with us." Tha rerponsibility for directing and coordinating propaganda that was in line with clearly established U.S. Govarnmant objectives could not be tgnored, butthere was “no Army or Mational Defense Agency doing so." To illustrate hie point, McClure used Lis ova office--vhich vas rasponsible for « sizeable por= an example of the Leck of central tioa of the program in occupied arass- AQtrection and coordisavion: “In the year I have lven in charge of the New York Field Office of Civil Affairs Division there has never been « conference outside of wy om office oa propaganda policy." Apperently this last statement for the handveitten exclenation atartled somacoe--perhaps Genaral Wedemeyer: “Wou!* appears vaxt to it. Continuing to beat the drum, McClure ackuovledged that NSC~4 was « step tm the right direction tovard the coordination necessary, but “a graat vaed foe unity of purpose and central direction remained." Then, « touch of as- sertive pride: “The Arey hes taken a major interest in this field and should be privileged to take the lead, if necessary." Having Laid his foundation, McClure then sumarized his ples to the Di- rector of Plane and Operations by stati ‘The whole purpose of this letter to you is to urge: ‘Tecognition of the responsibility of the Arsy; fn organization in being vithin the National Defense setup to carry oo tha operations which the Army has assumed; ‘c. an organization to plan for and further psychological warfare: ‘a study of Paychological Warfare--its capabilities and shortcomings; ‘utilization of those willing, experienced civilians, who are axctous to help « future Psychological Warfare organization. This was folloved by two pages of specific recomendations, to include ‘a vettoual organization to handle both black and white propaganda ("the present separation of black and white propaganda between State and CIA is hesically unsound") and a mumber of others addressing technical research and various studies needed, paychological warfare instruction for service schools, ways to improve the Reserve program for peychological warfare officers, and an olf89 theme: “indoctrination of commanders in the capabilities and Limitations of Propaganda in varfar Apologizing for @ lengthy letter, McClure closed by stating that he had made {t personal, rather than official, communication since “ouch of thie is outside af the field of my official responstoility."? Tt was, in fact, a rather anazing letter, particularly eo since it was written by man who adnicted that much of what he wrote shout was outside his “offictal responsibility." In terns of breadth, scope, and imagination, Ae mist be considered one of the most comprehensive personal communications on the subject of psychological warfare written by an Army officer during the intervar years. McClure's letter has been dwelt upon at sone length because of the insights that it provides to the thinking of a man who later vas to Play such an instrumental role in the organization of the Arny for psycho= logical and unconventional warfare. General Wedemeyer acknowledged McClure’s dedication and expertise with thot ghtful but delayed--reply in September: "T an deeply grateful, Bob, for your fine letter and the {nclosures. I realize that you are unquestion= ably our outstanding authority on this very important sibject, psychological warfare, Wd feel deeply indebted for your contribution.” In an interesting wide note, he nenttoned that Frank Wianer, Director of CIA's nevly created Office of Spectal Projects (Later renaued Office of Policy Coordination), had recently inquired ahout the possibility of McClure "Joining up with his team bec! js ha recognized that "you are perhaps the most knowletzeabie and Tnenartment of the Arny, Civil Affatre Division, New York Fleld Office Tather to Lieutenant General Alhert C. Yodeneyer, Director, Pinna an Onerac Efons Division, from Brigadter General Kohert A. McClure, Chief, New York Field Office, 8 July 1948, RG 319, Arey Operations, P4 092.412, Nat Lonal Archives.experienced officer in the game." McClure did not do se, hovever, and there ie a certain trony in this minor episode tn view of the conflicts thet were later to arise detveen Wisner's “team” and that of Senarel McClure as Chief of the Army's Office of Peychological Warfere in the early 1950's, ‘The eavence of Wedeneyer's response to McClure's principal argunant. conrarning recognition of the Army's rasponsibilities an also the need for a national psychological warfare orgenizaticn was basically that the situation was out of the Army's hands. Until the NSC made a decision on a nusber of proposals before 4¢ for such an organization, he replied, not much could be done at tha policy level, nor could Army plans for paychological warfare be firmed up.? Actually, Wedeneyer had given the subject more thought than might have been indicated by his response to McClure. In early August he had written « memorandum to General Ouar Bradley, the Chief of Staff, to offer "a few of ay thoughts" on psychological varfare: ‘Thus fer in our planning, both within the Joint Staff and in P6O Divi- tion, we have bean inclined to think of psychological warfare as & ‘beans which we should develop for giving furthor effect to strategic plans already developed. That is, we have considered it desirable to draw up a "psychological varfare annex" to each strategic plan. I am now inclined to think that thie may be an unsound approach. Ie rs tericts paychological warfare activities within the narroved limits of the strategic operations alregdy determined without dus consideration of the psychological probli Lpepartmerct of the Ary, Plans and Operations Diviston, Washington 25, .C., Latter to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, New York Field Of- fice, Civil Affaira Division, from Lieutenant Ganeral A. C. Wedemeyer, Direc~ toe of Plans and Opertions, 17 Septenber 1948, RG 319, Aray Operations, P5O 091,412. National Archives. 2rd. 3pepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Diviston, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Ganeral Bradley, Subject: Psychological Warfare,1 Tas was an {nportant insight. What Wedemeyer ves supgesting vas that Pevchological varfare should be considered as an integral Part of the str, Sette plansing process, rather than as an afterthought, to those Plans. The Jack of understanding by senior commanders and staffs $f the eructal distine- Ston between these tvo approaches has historically plagued the efforts of Peychological warfare planners. The t repre: ¢ philosophical advance, but ong that we Poet rod caliees aoteatts Cera etty bins rites the seer doa eeeist Russia to overthrov thetr present tocaliecr ean Rovern- faking. °° TeMder them maximum practicable assistaice tn thes weer taking. i tote ete empected that auch a plan vill develoy to the sreate: Pronchs erent the fell capabilities of a paycholonical terse aoe ona ay Produce s radically different seneoe cg silitary opararioms iron that contemplated under the HALFMOON coneentt Er aahgn this plan ts developed, 1£ it appears to bare suffletent merit, ve will then suggest thar you present it to the Joint chiefs of Stafi for Joine consideration, Despite its soneuhat grandiose objective, wedeneyet!s Proposal did indi Sate the importance of assessing, and perhaps acting upon, the potential Pevchotostcal vulnerebtlittes of a acctety--anather taportant insighe. Pradiey's response vas guarded, indicating that while the Proposal w, "e good idea," it "ntshe he impracticable as @ Line of action, but on the Caan Zant IMA, by General A. C. Medeneyer', ELled with Po 091-422 TS (1 sepe Sect lon Td Gg tag Plaas and Operations Divistone oiecear geet to 091.7, Section I, Box Ho. 28, Nattonal aresives lreta,other hand it may not.” He conceded that, in any event, “it would furnish some ideas for modification of HALFHOON," the ganeval plan for Europe. There fe Little indication, however, that much resulted fron Vedeneyer's proposal, partially due to the tact that he was unable to pry eway from othsr divisions the caliber of planners needed for the task envisaged.» While not enough to satisfy some Like General McClure, some work had been done in Army paychological warfare, both at the staff level and in the field. In June 1547, on the basis of a directive from the Director of Organization and Training, WDGS, a pilot "Tactical Information Detachnant” was sctivated at ne: teame, sn experimental unie. This detachment Fort Riley, Kans utilizing loudspeakers and leaflets, to participate in Army field maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean area, and Haveli. The Tactical Information Detachment was to be the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the United States Army when the Korean War erupted in June 1950, Studies were started by Headquarters, Aray Ground Forces, for a combat propa: ganda unit of @ cellular type to replace the mobile tems of the Mobzle Radio Broadcasting Companies used in World War II. Paychologteal varfare extension courses were prepared by the Ary General School at Fort Riley prinertly for apectalists in the Military Intelligence Reserve.? ‘At the Department of the Army, the Plans and Operations Diviston--in September 1948--prepared @ "tentative Psychological Warfare Plan (Armyy' for wartime, vhich included estinaces of Spectal Staff personnel required at Apepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Schuyler, Subject: Lt. Col. Willan H. Baumer, 16 August 1948 by Le. Col. Robert M. Gant, Chief, Personnel Branch, F&O Divi- ation, filed with PSO 091.412 18 (1 September 1948), RG 319, Plana and Oper: tions Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, National fare, p. 301. 1, BrychologtealAray, and corps levels, as vell as operating personnel to serve tace tteal untts down to the level of Regimental Conbat Teams. Staffing of this tentative plan folloved, but in late Decenber 1948 it was determined that "no action is required or possible since, until higher authority has determined the degree of Aray responsiuiiity in PY [psychological warfare], the degree of Arsy need for T/Osz unite cannot be determined."* At the and of 1948, then, the Aruy ws decide the extent of its role in psychological warfare. still gingerly feeling its way, wating for "higher authority" to Tn early 1949 sone sovenent was seen toverd providing for national= Jevel overt paychological warfare planning. In February, the Nationa) Security Council agreed that an organization for the peacetine planning of overt psycho- logteal warfare should be established within the stat Department, and directed the NSC staff to prepare a proposed directive on the matter. The directive ea- taplished an organization consisting of a director appointed by the Secretary of State, consulsants from the same agencies, as well as liaison from the CIA. Ths organization vas to be charged with planning and preparation “for the co erdinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programe and overt Peychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of var as de- Fermined by the President." A sintlar planning function previously assigned to the SANAGC Subcommitene on Spectal Studies and Evaluations vas to be teral- nated, according to the directive. While there vas sone dieagreenent mong Woepartrent of the Aray, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C.» DF to Director, Orgen{zation and Training Division, Subject: S/0E for Peycholonieal warfare Units, from Director, Plans and Operations, 20 Septecber 1948; also Meworandum for Record, Subject: T/OE for Paychelogical Warfare Units, 22 Dacenber 1948, RG 319, Plans and Operations Diviafen, 1946-08, Got.) 7092.7, Section I, Box No. 28, PSO 091.412 TS (20 Septecber 1943), National archives,the military services as to certain revisions to the proposed directive, they were resolved--at least initially--in the interest of expediting the action. ‘Aa Ganaral Maddocks (sho hed replaced General Wedemyer as Director of Plans and Operations) penned on a manorandun to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, General Wedeseyer: “P.S. The iaportent underlying factor in this matter is to get started. The directive cin be amended as wl need therefor aris To thie epistle, General , after the group starts work. McClure undoubtedly would have added, "Amen!" : One of the reasons the Army moved rather hesitantly in peychologtcal concern about Aruy {n- warfare was Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall joctation with co- volvement in this activity. He definitely opposed any vert operations, stating in June 1948 that he did not want the Arsy “even to know anything about it."? However, through the conbined efforts of tvo civilian members of his staff--Under Secretary Draper and Assistant Secretary Gray--and General Wedeoeyer, Royall gradually relented at least to the point of allowing more participation by the Army in overt peychological warfare. Me. Draper started the bell rolling by employing « ctvilian consultant, Mr. Wallace Carroll, to prepare a atudy concerning the Aray's role in current Apepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Cobat Oparations, Subject: Planning for Kartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare (NSC Staff Memorandum of 23 February 1949), 4 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 091.412 TS (23 February 1949), National Archive: 2pepartment of che Army, Plans and Operations Diviston, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Briefing on USC Meeting, 3 June Nacional 1948, RG 319, Army Operations 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot File ArchivesPsychological warfare activities. Carroll's study, forvarded to the Under Secretary on February 24, 1949, recamended that @ eeparate "unit" be tablished to take charge of the Departoent of the Arsy's psychological warfare Fesponsibilities. The "unit" vould be headed by a geueral officer or qualified civilian, vho would coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plane and Operations (who at this time was General Wedeneyer).! Apparently, the Under Secretary nade the results of Carrols atudy available to Royall, because in a subsequent discussion between General Wedenyer, the Secretary, and Mr. Gray, Wedeneyer reported that "Mr. Royall hhas changed sovevhat in his view in that he accepts that we in the Department of the Aray must participate a little; in fact, ie was pointed out to him by Mr. Seay that we are actually participating in Burope. Mr. Royall wants thie activity under # civilian Secretary and has designated Mr. Gray to supervise sane.'2 im this report to the Chief of Staff, General Onar Bradley, Wedemeyer stated that Mr. Gray subsequently asked him (Wedemeyer) to speak to the Sec retary with a propcaed organization that would have Gray as head, @ civilian assistant for ps’ “ological warfare, and a group of sight to ten officers in sn and Operations Division. Wedemeyer concluded by reminding the Tnepartment of the Army, Office of the Under Secretary of the Aray, Washineton, D.C., "The Army's Ro1e ta Current Peychologicai Warfare,” A Re- port to Willian #. Draper, Under Secretary of the Army, by Wallace Ci 24 February 1949, RG 319, ‘Aray Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Pil PEO 091.412 75 (24 February 1949), National Archives. Thapar of the Arsy, Plars anf Operations Division, Washington 25, D.G., Extract on Paychological Warfare from Deputy Chief of staff's (Combat Plons and Operation-) Diary of important events occurring during Chief of Staft's recent absence, 15 arch 1249, RG 312, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box Ho. 10, Hot Files, CSUGA (15 March 1949) TS, National Archives.Chief that "Mr. Royall 4s very desirous that the uniform services should not accept certain be involved too much in psychological warfare, but he do Limited responsibilities in the Departnent." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations apparently thought that even this lukevara endorsement represented progresa aince Royall had told hin a year earlier that "the Arey ‘would have no part in peychological warfare and he admonished ne definitely not to pertictpate in auch activity." Responding promptly to Gray's request, on March 17, 1949, General Wedeneyer forvarded to Secretary Royall the following memorandum: 1. Me. Gordon Cray asked me to discuss Psychological Warfare wich Mr. Carroll, a civilian consultant, vhum Mr. Sraper employed to investigate realistic and minimum Army participation. Mr~ Carroll prepared « study which I have analyzed carefully. Further, T talked to officers who have had exrerience in the psychological field. 2) Vast Saturday Mr. Gray and I had a étscussion concerning Army participation that would be acceptable to you, and also that would Insure a realistic and yec not enbarrassing role for the Aray. 3. ‘I reconmend that Psychological Warfare be supervised ty Mr- Gray as a responsibility of his office. A small group of officers could be located in P60 where they vould coordinate with the tater- national Group and the Strategic Planning Group of that Division of the General Staff. Mr. Gray should have a civilian assistsnt whos: primary function would be to handle all psychological warfare matters for him and to maintain appropriate contacts with the State Depart- went. ‘This latter Department in the final analysis should be Teaponsible for all Psychological Warfare matters of policy and for the coordination of Prychological Warfare activities. The Avay should do nothing except with the cognizance and at the request of the Stats Department. I had hoped to talk to you personally about the above matter; hovever, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in almost continuous sion and 12 has not been possible to do so. Mr. Gray asked me & few days ago to express ay viaws to you concerning this subject; hence this memo. lmta. 2ogpartment of the Aray, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plane and Combat oparations, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Secretary Royall from Lieutenant General A.C. Wedemeyer, 17 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, CSUSA 385 (17 March 1949) C, National archive7 TE was a nasterful exanple of bureaucratic persuasion. Using the recon “enfation of an outside civilian conaultant to pry an opening in Royall's op Position, Draper, Gray, and General Wedemeyer vorked together effectively to Sactfutly nudge the Secretary tovard accepting sone Anerease tn Ary peycho- Jestsal varfare plansing. Royal's sensitivity on the subject undoubtedly was 4 factor influencing the Amy's anbiy, fictale traquently found it necessary £0 prod unt formed Aray leaders into a Seater effort in psychological warfare. Such was to be the case with Gordon “eay, who succeeded Royall as Secretary of the Arzy on June 20, 1949, of Intar Gordon Gray--R Not surprisingly, the emphasis on inere, fed Army partintpation in prycholockcal warfare urged upon Kenneth C. Royall near end of his tenure Wat continued by hts successor. And with this apparent upswing in interese by the Ary, again the advice of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure wai Bees Gemae Oohig Weote Chatoes Diceerer oteie Operation General Charles L. Bolte, un July 7: Folucton TECGIT that some tise ago we talked briefly about the dis- ESE on tT dttarpenrance of adequate planaing oo exnee penaures in on exprea ne grivenolontcal warfare, osnce the var. Tages that Fecelving adeqeery, “greets Over tha fact that his matter wea hee ceenauiTg adequate, ££ any, ectertion on the pare of the appropriate suchorities, at least in the Military Ratablishoene t —— Tenartment of the Army, Plane an verations Divtaton, Washington 25, epee tn £0 Betandler central Robert A vectors eet Major General Charies Thon Tate geeOF OF Plans and Operations, J July Meage oe 319, Zemy Overt Archives, {2752+ BX No. 10, Hot Files, 260'091-419 3°¢7 July 1949), National Archives.In view of of World War I, Bolte contin T think that revived and thi note adequate suggest, oF 20: dater for appo: Secretary of ti the names of ail) be relieved ro knov that the matter is being it some measures are to be taken to restore us co @ ition. In that connection I have been asked to the suggestions of, some nanes of possible candi- tment to a civilian position in the Office of the ‘Aray. I thought possibly you might have in mind appropriate individuals. McClure, who by now had movd from New York to Fort ord, California, to 5 be the Aastetant Di}Leton Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, ansmered Prouptly. Grousing about having received unexpected orders transfecting hia to the Northera Military District of Vancouver Barracks ("The orders gave ne only one week £0 pack up and move which shave the consideration which the Ho the domestic side of 1ife), MeClure nonethel: Army usually. give Plauded the apparent resurgence of interest: "I an very pleased with the coveena of your latter amd realise tht the of A (Bepartsnt of the Aray] 10 at last working up ¢0 the icportance of one of {ts major wespons--a weapon whtch can be lined without repercussions of an atoale bond category." He then went on to B commend several potential candidstes for the civilian MeClure's letter was en route to General Bolte when, on July 11, « oeet~ ing was held in the Secretary of the Aray's Office to report on the proj Of psychological warfare organization within the Department of the Aray. This much vas clear: (1)/a civilian "supervisor" for psychological warfare would Maadquarters, Fort Ord, California, Letter from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure to Major General Charles L. Bolte, Directer of Plans and Operations, Departmenc of the Army, 12 July 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, io4 No. 10, Hot Files, 091.412 8 (7 July 1949), ‘National archives.on be located in the Offics of the Ass: ant Secretary, (2) a small working group for psychological warfare vould be established in the Plane and Operations (280) Diviston, and () a nucleus of information operators would be forned tn the Office of the Chief of Inforsation, What vas not clear, hovever, wes the relationship between the civiltar supervisor" anc the team of officers in P&0. General Wedeneyer'e understanding vas that the eivilien "should not be in « position of authority with P60 nor violate the chain of command . . . but should merely ‘monitor! the PY functions of PEO along with FW functions of other ccaponents of the Departuent of the Aray." The Secretary's understanding on the matter was quite different, as reported in Wedaneyer's memorandum for record: Mr. Gray stated the matter nore forcefully . . . [he] apectfically indicated that the civiltan "supervisor" was not merely to monitor but vas to take a real part in the vork concerning Pa ard he said, in essence, "if, as things develop, we tun into a difficulty six or edght or twelve monzhs from now, and if we do operate we are sure to run into @ difficulty sooner or later, Iwant to be able to say that it was not Just a wflitary matter but thet it was a fool efvilian mixed up in it. I am thinking this way for the protection of the si litary."2 Another interesting aspect of this meeting was the input provided by Professor Paul Linebarger, a civilfan consultant and author of a recantly pub- re. Linebarger offered hie views on desir- Ashed book on paycholegical war able qualifications for the efyilian "supervisor" and suggested that the Plane and Cperations Divistor could not fulf{ll tts paychologieal warfare reeponst- bilities unless the officers dectgnated weru assigned full-time and given the opportunity for travel. Ganeral Bolte, Director of P&0, was sonevhat Lpenarenant of the Army, Pans ant Operatiens Metston, Washineton 25. Cu, Menwvavhin foe Record, Subject: Meeting With Secretary Gray Cencernsng, yeholnatcal Wazfar-, 11 Jnty 1989, 86319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box Ho. + Hot Files, C8 USA385 © (il July 1949), National Archives. D, P we100 reluctant to endorse this latter suggestion, and "indicated, as be had indicated from time to time at other points in the Conference, that the respousi- bility should be written out fer P6O in full but that any external attexpt to freeze or commit P&O personnel or structure would be unfortunate."* This meeting provides a valuable snapshot of the atate of psychological warfare at the Department of the Aray in mid-1949: Gordon Gray, only a month into his new office, intensely interested in psychological varfare and force- Sully exerting his authority in terms of organization, yet also alert to the political sensitivity of the aubject; General Wedenayer and General Zolte, interested in the subject but wary about its effect on traditional concerns of chain of command and Lines of authority, and perhaps just a litcle resentful of the civilian influence in this field, particularly when « ayriad of other, wore fantliar "purely military" problens undoubtedly competed for their attention ( resistance to “external” pressures » for eiample, General Bolte’ on him to dedicat officers aclely to psychological warfare); Professor Linebarger, the civilian consultant, naturally arctous to see thie specialized Just a Litele tapatient vith subject receive greater attention, end perhay the lese-than-total endorsement of peychological varfare by military leaders. Such was the range of emotions and attitudes on psychological warfare, all of which combined to portray « total picture of hesitancy and slov progr within the Department of the Aray eleven sonths before the Korean War would erupt. Part of this hesitercy can be attributed to the fact that many Aray leaders still coneider sd psychological varfare to be a aew development. Lipta. FACT ERE aT RE Re nmtemen ~101 Despite its use by the Ary in orld War II, the Director of Organtzation and ‘Training in May 1949 lumped psychological warfare together with atonic warfare, radiological defense, biological varfare, guided missiles, and subversive warfare as "new developments jof warfare] or modificatious of previous developments." General Bolte, Director of Plat and Operations, thought {t premature to parcel out responsibilities of these topics to specific General Staff agencies until the!~.role and employment vere better understcod. Instead, he recomnenied that all General Staff divisions designate contact officers for discussions of the developments under P&0 monitorship.! Furthermore, the subject of psychological warfare was receiving Little attention in military service schools. ‘A student conmittre report done at the Arzed Forces Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in sune 1949 concluded that there vas no adequate course paychological vxrfare at any service instailution that would provide the necessary knowledge for an In- formation and Education officer.? The Ground General School curriculum at Fort Riley showed ning hours of instruction, there was one hor at the Command and General Staff School, tentative and draft field uanvale were heing used in Schools and for extension courses, and thers were no traning programs for all of which ted to the admission $n a Plans and Reserves avatlabie or planned: Tnepartrent of the Arsy, #rmy Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum oy Wator General H.R. Bull, Director, Organization and Tratuing Division. su Coneral Staff Bratonsthility for Yianning Pertatning to New Develo; Warfare, 12 wry 1945; also Memorandum by Major General Charles Bolte, Plans an! Operations, cormenting on above aubject, RG 319, Army 30331 (2 tay 1369), Natlomd Archive: School, Garlisle Barracks, PA, Student Com losteal Warfare and Propaganda Analycis, ons, PSO 091.412 (8 Septenber 1949), Nationalni 402 Operations Division memorandum on 4 October 1949 that “mich remains to be done Af the Army is to be ready to fulfill its operational and mobilization responsibilities in the field of psychological warfare." By early 1950, Secretary Gray was beginning to suspect the sane. He decided to query the Chief of Staff, General J. Lavton Collins (who had suc~ ceeded General Bradley in August 1949), with « menorandum on February 7: As you know, I am keenly interested in the proopt and velopment of psychological warfare within the Ary. T should like to have @ report on the status of this matter by February Leh. In thie cuinection, I am particularly interested in what consideration has been given to psychological warfare in conjunction with tie current reorganization within the General Staff. ffective de- There was not much progress to report to the Secretary of the Army. The opening paragraph of “Report on the Army Paychological Warfare Program," in fact, was a classic example of the type of bureaucratic gobbledygook often used to obfuscate an issue: While definite progress has been made in the last six months in the development and execution of a psychological warfare program within the Army, much remains to be accomplished. The establishment of a sound, comprehecsive program and the effective carrying out of the many tasks and activities under such a program includes the solution of many problems which are interrelated and the solution of which 1 Aependent upon the sequential and systenatic development and completion of the more fundamental aspects of the overall program. An effort has been made, hovever, to meet the higher priority requirements in all tuportant areas of the progran as developed to date. Loepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Diviston, Washington 25, D.G., Memorandum to Organization and Training Division requesting infornat ion ‘on paychological warfare training in being or planned, 19 August 1949; also 260 Divivion nemo on subject, 4 October 1949, RG 319, Aray Operations, PSO 091.412 (19 August 1949), National Archives. office of the Secretery of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum from Gordon Gray to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 7 February 1950, RGJ19, Army Operations, 1549-52, Hot Files, Box lo. 19, PSO 091.412 (7 February 1950), National Archives. 3department of the Army, Plans and Operations Diviston, Washington 25,103 ' Gray undoubtedly had to read that paragraph more than once, and even then probably wondered exactly vhat he had been told. In essence, sone progr reported in operational planning, in the preparation of draft Tables of Organization and Equipment for troop uatts, and iu nomateriel re- had been slow, hovever, in staff organizetion for peycho- yarch. Progret logical warfare, doctrine and techniques, personnel ant unit training, training literature and training aids, materiel, ant intelligence requirenents. Most of the report, in fact, discussed problem areas and things that needed to be done. One interesting item in this last category was the expressed need for « "school center for psychological warfare at which tactical doctrine, techniques, training Mterature and tactical studies can be prepared." The Psychol gical Warfare Canter, created almost two years later at Fort Bragg, was eventua’ iw to fill this void. Probal_y of greatest interest to the Secretery, however, was a stat ent in the report to the effect that an incr ye in organization and staff personne! for psychological warfare would shortly be recomended. Of interest, no doubt, because Gray had been waiting patiently since March 1949 for progress on this score. Finally, the report tactfully asked the Secretary to be patient ant recognize the difficulties inherent in dealing with « new function: "For an apprecicble period of tine, the development and execution of a prychological warfare program will be essentially a ‘pioneering’ effort and will depend Dice, "Report va the Ary Psychological Warfare Program," 13 February 1950, RG 319, Arsy Operations, 1949-52, Hot Files, Box No. 10, T60 091.412 TS (7 February 1950), Yational Archives. lyta. i104 primarily upon initiative, constant direction, and follow-up provided by the General Staff and by Plans and Operations Division in particular."! The Morth Korean invasion vas a little over four months avay-at the tine of this Faport, and Gordon Gray was to leave his office withia a mouth. “only t": Prelude to Korea IE the Army Staff thought that the new Secretary of the Aray would Int in paychologteal warfare, they were sncn up on the pressure for more progre Atsabused of that notion. Within five weeks of replacing Gacdon Gray, Frank Pace, Jr., sent the Chief of Staff a memorandum clearly outlining his n:erest Am the subject: 1. On 7 February 1950, Secretary Gray requested @ report on the status of psychological warfare development within the Army vith particular reference to what organizaticnal provision had been made within the Departnent of the Army for the direction and development of Aray capability in this field. It 1s my underatanding thet a plan to authorize the establishment of a Paycholos au iaseee Rcenealt G-3, Operations, and to provide adequate staf: (8 approved on the condition that spaces be provided from vithia G-3's curvest perseanel cet ling. 2. Like tr. Gray, whose views on the subject of Psychological Warfare are similar to mine, I believe the prompt development of the capabilities of the varicus responsible agencies and departnents: of the goverment to execute Psychological Warfare operations under terns of reference established by the National Security Counetl te vital to the national security. The Department of the Aray, of course, has a definite responsibility for psychological warfare development insofar it affects nationg? security and the conduct of military operations. 3. Please keep me advised on the progress being mde in the ef Eablishment of the contemplated branch to handle this activity for the Department of the Army and in the procurement of cecessary personnel.= Some, but not much, progress had been made. Shortly after the statue Lyte department of the Aray, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Army Organization for Paychological Warfare, 29 May 1950, from Frank Pace, Jr., RG 319, G-3 Opera~ ttons, March 1959-51, (91.412 Case 1-20, Box No. 154, National Archives.SC ETT 105 report to Secretary Gray in mid-February, a study hed been forvarded to the Chief of State recommending the allocation of additional personnel for further developoent of both psychological warfare and special operations, and that & separate branch, designated the Subsidiary Plans Branch, Se established tn the Plans Group, P60 Division for that purpose. Additionally, certain psychor Logical varfare functions charged to the Chief of Information had previously been transferred, with personnel, to the P60 Division in an attempt to Laprove the organizational problen.? A requizenent had been established for approximately sixteen officers with spectalized qualifications {n psychological warfare and special operations for asstgnneut to Headquarters, Departnent of the Army, U.S. Aray, Europe, Aray Fiolé Forces, and the Comand and General Staff College, with the first five to be available July 1951, The G-1 was requested to provide « civilian graduate course in International Relations to furnish supplemental background in peychologicat verfare and special operations for the officers selected. [A Job description vas designed, stating that the officers to be selected must have nad direct experience in, or be thoroughly fantiiar with, the con~ duet of paychologtcal warfare or of clandestine and paranilitary operations in support of nilitary operations." Lattera vere sent to major subordinate headquarters announcing the program.” Apepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington, 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Bolte, Subject: Amy Organization for Peycho- logical Warfare, from General Sch 13 February 1950, 85 319, Aray Opera: ses iout52, Hot Files, Box No. 10, P60 091.412 TS (7 February 1930), Na- tfonal Arch! 2pepartnant of the Army, G-3, Operations, Washinnten 25, D.C., Momo rardum to Aasiatant Chief of Staff, G-l, Personnel, Subject: Requirenent for Oreteers With Specialized Tratning, 13 March 1960, OPS 091.412 (13 March $950); Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant: General, Washington 25,106 ties of conferences vas initiated by G-3, Operations (the radesig- nated Plans and Operations Division), with Headquarters, Aray Pield Fors: Fort Monroa, Virginia, to discuss delineation of responsibilities for peycho- Jogteal warfare, The firet vas scheduled for March 29, 1950. Gna of the prow posed items for discussion at this conference is vorthy of nete: “Preparation and conduct of spactalized achooi courses for Peychological Warfare student Personnel, and of general indoctrination courses for all students, including consideration of the destrabiiity of establishing a ‘achool center’ (prefer- a ction dn, an axisting Aruy school)."! while emphasis, Aray Field Forces pointed out that personnel ami fiscal limtations presented "s parplex- ably as a part of, of asa agreeing that psychological warfare deserved grt ing problem." An encouraging start had been made with the Tactical Informa- ton Detachment (two officers and approximately twenty men), the paychological warfare exteusion courses “nov nearing completion," and with the Mmited but valuable training material assenbled. "But we adait that this 1a only @ start," wrote Major General Robert Macon, Deputy Chief of Army Fieid Forces, to the G-3.2 D.C.» Letter to Comander-in-chief, Par Last, Comending General, U.S. Aray, Europe, Chief, Army Field Forces, Commandant, Command and General Staff Cot. deg 17 April 1950, AGAO-S 210.61 (31 March’ 1950) G-3; both filed tn RC 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, Box No. 154, National Archives, ‘Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandua, Subject: Army Progrem for Psychological Warfare, i3 March 1950, R319, 6-3 Qpetacions, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, Box Ho. 154, OPS'091.412'(10 March 1950), National Archiver. Zarmy Field Forces, Office of the Chief, Ft. Monroe, VA, Latter to Major General R. £. Duff, Acting Assistant Chief of staff, G-3, fron Major Geneval Robert C. Macon, Deputy Chief, 7 June 1950, RC 319, G3 091.412 (Section ITT) (Casns 41-60) (Case 50 withdrawn’ fi TIT A), Natfonat Archives.107 “only a start" also accurat ly described the situation at Headquarters, Department of the Aray. In ansver to Secretary Pace's primary question in his 29 May menorandum, the G-3 replied that the Psychological Warfare Branch would be activated about 1 August" if nect ary peraonzel savings were effected as a result of an ongoing G-3 survey.! Pifteen months and two aecre- tarine of the Arny after Kenneth Royall’ Anstructions to establish auch a bronca, the Army Staff searched for the necessary personnel spac : Thus, four and a half years after General Lenntczer and General MeClun had urged continued development of psychological warfare, the Arny was 111- prepared in terms of personnel, equipmeat, and organization. On the eve of the Korean War, "only a start" had been made tovard developnent of a paycho- Logical warfare capability. lnepartment of the Arny, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Suomary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, froa Major General Charies L. Bolte, G-3, 13 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, OPS 091.412 (Section IZ) (Cases 21-40) (Case 26 withdrawn’ ftled Section II'A), 091.412 (5 July 1950) §, National Archives.( CHAPTER V ‘THE INTERAAR YEARS, ART IT: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE If the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological varfare w eager in June 1950, {8 unconventional warfare capability vas nonexistent. Te vas not supposed to have such a capability in peacetine--NSC 10/2 gave the responsibility for covert perantlitary activities to the CIA in June 1948. This 14 not to say, hovever, that the Army did not consider developing such function, It did. pd the etory of the Army's initial tentative ateps in this field during the interwar years is an important link in the decisions chat ultimately led to creation of the 10th Special Forces concept in early 1952. The Airborne Reconnatseance Units ‘As we have sean, the impetus for the initiction of covert activities after World War IT did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunner of the CIA. Rather, it came fron Secretary of War Robert Patterson in late 1946, prompting discussion among agencies initially on the subject of peychological operations.! within the Department of the Army, Patterson di- feted in Auguat 1946 that a SECRET letter be sent to the Commanding General, Aray Ground Forces (AGP), indicating that "airborne reconnaissance agents" were successfully employed during World War II under the supervision of the ty s. congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Oper: tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelli- gence, Boor IY (94th Congress, 2d Sension, Senate Report No. 94-755, April 23, 1976) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 26. 1108)“oe los Office of Strategic Services (055). Since the inactivation of ©8S, no branch 4m the War Department vas taking an active interest in the development of "air horne Feconnaissance," stated the letter. Ary Ground Forces vas therefore Tequested to prepare « atudy and subs! Feecnmendationa on the desirability and oraantzation of such a untt.* The study was received by the war Department General Staff in February 1947. Included tn the recomendation vas a request for an expertowacal untt of six officers and thirty-five enlisted zen. The Concurring vith MID's recomendations, the Director of Organization and Training approved the study in April and directed the Commanding Generai, Army Ground Forces, to develop tactics, techniques, and training for the Proposed “ait. A Table of Organtzation and Equipment (TOE) was also to be Prepared and svimteted Co the War Departnent, after which the necessary personne! spaces es aa reson cb he) eloesaceivatonler cneterielee, oe ects Nocs, Military Intelligence Div!ston, Washington 23, D.C., Memorandim to the Adjutant General, subj Airborne Reconnaissance Unite, 19 August 1946, from Major General 5. J. Chamberlain. Director op Intelligence, RG 319, ser ugg iitaence Decimal Fite, 1961-08, flor 70:5 to 1oieae ee 373.2, 373.14, Box No. 874, Washington National Records Center (iNRo), Zaps, Military Intetltgence Division, Hashington 25, D.C., Memdranduse dance Unite, gratntzatéon and Training Diviaton, Subject? Atrborte were fel ltgences 6 tone gat? M- A. Sotomcn, Ansiscant Executtve, discreet Foon 30g 1a eeSt LMT. RG 319, Army Intelligence Decical Finere 1941-48, rom 370-5 1-31-42 to 375.2, 373.18, Box Ko. Ars, whaes AWDGS. Milttary Intetligence Division, Washington 25, 0.¢., Menorandun $9 Commsuding General, Arvy Ground Forees, Fort Mantoe, VA" subieee” Airborne110 Bvents of the next eighteen months, hovever, shoved the difficulties whep attenpting to create « nev entity, | which « military bureaucracy fac particulurly during periods of fiscal and personnel constraints. By the mid- de of 1948, staff officers from Headquarters, Aray Ground Forces, were corresponding with Colonel Ray Peers, forner comanser of Detachment 101, 03S, to seek advice on organizational concepts for "tha Airborne Recon Company, oF as we have named it, the Ranger croup." ‘The title "Ranger Group" demonstrated the not unesmon confusion that often occurred when the Army tried to grépple with creation of aa “uncomentirnal” organization, particularly one vith 20 formal predece-s:.6 in Army history. This is borne out in Major Ernest Sanussen's letter to Colonel Pears, in which he noted that "ve have strayed in many respects from your recommendations. This ts largely due to our efforts to make a ailitary organization which can be composed of cells of minimum size, and {s thereby capable of being made into TOE."? ‘The confusion over what to call the new unit reflected differing ideas ‘as to its concept of employment. A War Department paper that discussed adding one “Ranger Group" to the General Reserve Troop Basis noted that the proposed unit would not accomplish the purpose its author (apparently a Colonel Conrad) envisaged, "if approved from an 085 point of view." This was in Septenber 1968; Army Fiald Forces (formerly Army Ground Forces) was still working on « Reconnaissance Units, from Lieutenant Caneral C. P. Hall, Director of Organtza- Clon and Training, 9 April 1947, RG 319, Aray Intelligence Decimal Files, 961-48, from 370.5 1-31-42 t0 373.2, 373-14, Box 874, WNRC. Agray Pleld Forces, Office of the Chief, Fort Monroe, VA, letter from Major Ernest Samusson, Jr., to Colonel W. R. Peers, U.S. Army Coumand and Staff College, 24 June 1948, RG 319, Aray Intelligence Lecimal Files 1941-48, 373.14, Box No. 874, WNRC. 2a.un ‘TOE for the Ranger Group that eas not expected to be sporoved prior to Janus ary 1949.1 Circulation of the proposal anong the staff at Arey Picld Forces (AFF) 44d not clear up the confuston--the unit being developed was slovly turning |. This was into a hybrid organtzat’ ~ that combined Ranger and 055 concept. apparent in the proposed Tanger Group wlseion, which ves to “organtze and con duct overt and covert operations behind eneuy Lines thereby arsuaing funetione formerly perfrcmm! by unite of the OSS." The Group of approvinately 115 of- fleers and 135 enlisted men would be attached to Aimy Groups and/or Araies £0 perform tactical missions. Tts capsbilities would include the conduct of sabotage and surprise attacks in the enemy's rear are: 3 black" psycho= logical warfare and propaganda; the collection of information by reconnali sance and espionage; the development, organization, control, and supply of Tesiatance groups; the recruitment, training, and direction of foreign civil- Aan agents; the control of captured eneny agents and assisting tatelligence # staffs in counterespiorage; and the organization and control of ¢: 2 ape ay tems in eneny-held territory. Prom an S point of view," this organizational concept should have been unacceptable. It attempted to lump together missions and capabilities Uypes, Organization and Training Division, Washington 25, 0.C., Memo- randum to Director of Intellizence, Subject: Ranger Group {Old Proposed Air- borne Reconnaissance Cowpany), from Major General R. R. BULI, Acting Director, Ost Division, 13 Septenber 1942, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decine: Files, 1941-48, 373.14, Box No. 874, WNRC. 2army Ground Forces, Intelligence Section, Pert Monroe, VA, Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Roland N, Gleszer, Intelligence Division, WDCS. Mero was sant hy an officer named "Farris," with a copy of paper on the Ranger Group that the Intelligence Section war submitting to the Plans Section for forsarding co the W265. RC 319, Army Intelligence Decinal Files, 1941-42, 373-14, Box No. 874, WNRC.nz of rangers and coonandos with those of Special Gperations and Operational Group elements of tho OSS. It cmbinad the Cactical with the strategic. The mission statoment said OSS, but the title was Ranger Group; the mission state- belied OSS precepts--and Donovan ment also tactical, but the capabilict himself drew a distinction betveen the missions of Rangers and Comandos and these of the OSS, ae we sav in chapter III. Eventually Ranger units vere forwed and utilized in Korea, but they were not the OSS-type “unconventional warfare organizations that Secretary of War Patterson probably had in nind when he first surfaced the issue in 1946. ‘The dialogue that took place on the “Airborne Reconnaissance Units/ during 1946-48 clearly shoved che influence of 0S on Army thinking, and pre: similar discussions in the early 1950's prior to the formation of the 10th Speciel Forces Group. j ‘Another example of early Army thinking on the subject of unconventiona! worfare van a study of special and subversive operations, done in Late 1947 by the Organization and Training Division, Departsent of the Aray Staff. Its stated purpose was "to study special and subversive operations to deter- nine the desirability of including instruction and study of such operations 7 1. operations were considered to be the activt- in the school syatea."? spe thes of U.S. troops to activate and/or support resistance groups behind eneay * Lines, as well as small nie operations behind enewy lines. Not included tn the atudy were secret intelligence, morale operations ("black" propaganda) or psychological warfare. j Apepartaent of the Army, Organization and Training Division, Washington 25, D.C., "A Study of Special and Subversive Operations," 25 Novenber 1947, | RG'319. Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, G-3, Hot File 091.412 fs (1949), National Archives.i us Relying heavily on OSS historical data, to include tha sevon volumes of the official War Report of the OSS, which had not been approved for release at ‘that time, the etudy concluded that “epacial operations of a subversive nature” offered great potential that "no ccmander should ignore" in thelr support of Wartine military operations. The study's recomendations included providing four to six hours instruction on the subject in appropriate service schools, continued study of the cxpabtlities and desirable organization for spectal operations, and the creation of « “spectal operations company." Tha interesting potnt about the latter recommendation was a further coment that "this notion should be deferred pendirg receipt of recommendat‘ons from the Joint Chiets of Staff regarding # proposal to ablich @ guerilla warfare corps. JES and NSC Activis ‘The JOS proposal referred to was actually a series of studies on guer- villa warfars that culminated in JCS 1807/1 on 17 August 1948, @ penorandum forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Pertinent aspects of thet menorantun were as follove: 4. The United States should providy itself with the organization and the means of supporting furetg resistance movenents in guerrilla Warfare to the advantage of United States national security during peace and war, h. Guerrilla varfare should be supported under policy direction of Nsc. €. Agencies for conducting guerrilla warfare can be established by adding to the CIA's special operations functions the reeponaibility for supporting foreign restutance movenents and by authorizing the : Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in the conduct of auch operations. a. Primary interest in guerrilla warfare should be that o: “TA in peacetime and HME [Natfona! Military Establishnent] in war’ ime. @. A separate guerrilla ver: choot end corpa_ehould not be [emphasis added]. Instead HE, in coord ifat ion with State Department and CIA ahould select personnel, give then necessary training in established Army schools, supplenented by courses 1a Lipa.us other military and State Department schools. £. The trained personnel should not be permanently separated from their original service, They should be available on call for introduction {nto countries to organize, direct, and lead native guerrillas. ‘The JCS vas clearly backing avay fro the idea of establishing 4 “guer- villa warfare corps” within the military services. Why? Because during this sane period the CIA vas beginning to establish its poaition in the field of covert activities. Driven by the impetus of the Cold Wa:, the National Se- curity Council in Decesber 1947 gave the CIA responsibility for the corduct of covart paychological operations (NSC 4/A), and in June 1948 expanded that charter with NSC 10/2 to include: Any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation ures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee 1ibera~ tion groupe; and support of indigenous gnt{-Comuniet elements in threatened countries of the free world. To carry out these activities for CIA, initially the Spectal Procedures Group vas established in December 1947, which was replaced by the Office of Special Projects after NSC 10/2 was issued, then shortly thereafter renamed JCS and NSC ace the Office of Pol!cy Coordinat‘on.? Apparent in all of tht tions during the late 1947-early 198 period was a perceptible shifting of responsibility for covert activities to the CIA. Ipepartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.c., "Study on Guerrilla Warfare," 1 March 1949, RG 319, Aruy Uperutions, » P6O 370.64 TS (1 March 1949), National 2pepartnent of the Army, Plans and Operaticrs Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Secrstary of the Army, Subject: Director of Special Studies (WSC 10), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 19 May 1948, RG 319, Army Operaticns, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Pal P6O 0927S (12 May 1948), National archive: 3senate Report No. 94-725, Book IV, pp. 28-30.us ‘he Army Staff's reaction to this shift vas an interesting coubination of Cold War enthusiaen mixed vt: caution concerning jurisdictional preroge- rae For example, ic a uescrandum to the Secretary of the Army on NSC 10, the Plans and Operations Division comented: PEO considers that there is an urgent need for a Director of Special Studies [eventually the Office of Special Projects in 10/1 and 10/2] under NSC who has a directive to strengthen and extend covert oper: tions with the objective of defeating comunism in the present "cold war." A coordinated national effort can win the "war of words” by proving that our American way of life te approaching that ideal desired by all mankind. Hovever, it te believed that the authority of this Director should not infringe on the wartine prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning plans for the conduct of a war. ‘And in a subsequent memorandum to the Secretary, P60 suggested changes to a CIA report on NSC 10 that were designed to correct portions "which appear to infringe upon the JCS responsibilities concerning training and var plans," a5 vell as "the implication that similarity in operational methods in covert intelligence activities and covert operations makes the CIA the sole agency to 2 this latter point reveals fust a touch of resent~ conduct such operations. ment concerning the CIA's movenent into the covert operations field. There was little doubt in Secretary of the Aray Royal's mind on this subject, hovever. On tha following day, he caphatically stared "that despite the recomendations of the Army staff, he did not want a representative of the Army to be a member of the special services group [eventually the CIA's Office Sal Projects}, and further that he does act vart the Army to get into “dun for the Secretary of the Aray, Subject: Director of Spe- sc 10), 19 May 1948, PAO G2? TS (12 May 1948), Natdcaal ment of the Army, Plans and Operst‘ons Division, Washington 25, D.C., Marorandum for the Secretary ef the Army, Subject: Director of Special Studies (NSC 10), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plane and Cperations, 2 June 1948, RG 319, Aray Gperations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Piles, Pa) 0927S (12 May 1948), National Archives.16 covert activities or even to know anything sbout it. Despite Royall's reluctance, the Army provided an officer--Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton--to be the representative for both the JCS and the Secretary of De- fense to the CiA's Office of Special Projects, in accordance with WSC 10/2.” ‘The new office was to plan and conduct covert operations, "in time of pea: under the policy guidance of an operations advisory committee composed of representatives from the State and Defense Departsents. Such plane and opera tions would be “coordinated with und acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for vartime covert operations." ‘The responsibility for covert operations already had been given to the CIA with the NSC 10/2 directive. The military services agreed to this because of their strong desire to "do something” about the perceived threat of Com- joctated with the muniem, and because of their reluctance to become openly “dirty tricks” business in peacetine. At the sane time, the Services--and par~ ticularly the Army--were sensitive to their institutional prerogatives and resisted any interpretations that would remove from then a voice in the conduct Apepartment of the Ary, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C.) Memorandum for the Recor’, Subject: Briefing on NSC Meeting, 3 tune 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, National Archives. 2pepartnent of the Aray, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Designation Of uilitary Establishuent Representatives NSC 10/2 (Office of Special Projects) (ce 1735/14), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director, PSO Division, 1 August 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Bex Na. 9, Hot Files, P60 091,412 TS Gi July 1948), National Archives. Spepartrct of the Army, Pens ard Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/1), from Lieucenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plane and Operations, 16 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, PEO 091.412 TS (16 June 1948), National Archiv-——— ! t 7 | | i | oF werin core seattont. plang and preperation ceponstitisie for auch vartine activiti » however, provided & potential area for anbiguity and discord, as ve shall see lati Creation of the Office of Spactal Project} did not mean that the mtlitary ceased to think about unconventional warfare, In response to « request from the Secretary of Defense to continue examination of “unconventional opera- tons event, the study was sentially an exercise to establish for planning purpos hone seogcaphical areas of the world where tt would he advantageous ¢o have in place resistance novenents that could vage guerrilla warfare in the vent of hostilities. The priority extabltshed, by geographical area, for the creation of auch organizations was: Central Burope, Middle fast, South Europe, West Europe, Scandinavia, and the Far Ea: ‘The! study also concluded that the JCS should retain strategic and broad policy planning functions of guerrilla varfare" within the National Military Establishent, and that the Army "should be assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare function ‘The Navy and Air Force should not have primary, but "collateral responsibilities," for this activity. Finally, a familiar theme--in tine of war, the Theater Crmanders should control guerrilla warfare within their areas.! Sdepartmars of the Army, Plans ant Operations Division, Mashington 25, D.C., Memorandim for Record, Subject: Study on Guerrilla Warfare, 1 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 370.64 TS (1 Merch 1949), National Archives.Office of Polls dination Without question, the NSC 10/2 directive vas perceived by many to be # lation of U.S. interest in the covert side of the cold War. significant As William R. Corson states ‘The intelligence community's reaction to the se" The inigoreenent and support of the “dirty tricks motte. Tn their view no holds were barred ts oaily interpreted to mean that not only Che president but “AS piye on the top had said to put on the Beate ‘Knuckles and go tO Ee 7 cyord about NSC 10/2 erickled down G0 Ene working staffs in Work: colligance community, it was eransleted £0 Sete that a declara- tee of war had deen issyed with equal tf not nore ‘force than 1 the . Congress had so decided. ‘The principal agent for this increased euphasi o> covert activities was to be the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (orc), headed by Frank G. Wiener- ‘A lawyer by training, Wisner had served with distinction in the OSS, planning ‘and participating tn a munber of tnaginative operations in the Balkans during the war, At the tine of hia selection £0 head the OPCs he was serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for occupied countries. Although by back= excellent candi- ground, experience, ani tenperanant Wisner appeared to be date for tha nev post, Aray intelligence Loaders oppored the choice on the basis that he was “another Donovan who'll run S87 with the ball." Nonethe= tess, George Marshall was confident that Wisner wae the right san for the job, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal endorsed the chotce-” 1948-52 was to have an ioe since the grovth of OPC during the y portant Ainpact on the Aray's development of Sf% O¥% ngpectal warfare" cai piiiey, 1 12 important to understand Wisner's view of his charter. This vas qutlined in tone detail in a 1 August 1949 memorandum £9 colonel Ivan D. Yeaton es Tgorson, The Armies of Ignorance, P 304. 2 qpid., pp. 306f,ng of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.! Wisner explained that the mission of OPC was: To plan and to execute special (covert) operations or measures which are designed to re‘nforce or to accomplish United State: foreign policy objectives; in paavetine, to formulate and execute plans to the necessary atate of readiness in order that appropriate special (covert) operations may be executed in tine of war aa considered necessary for competent authority; in wartime, to plan and execute auch special (covert) operations or measures as may be appropriate in the discharge of the OPC mission or as directed by ‘competent authority. Activities of the new organization would wet it apart from other governmental agencies principally through an important distinction: The techniques and seans by vhich OPC attains its objectives dif- far from those of the Department of State and the National Military Establishment inasmuch ac OPC operations ara conducted in a covert or clandestine manner to the end that official United States interest or responsibility is not permtzed to appear and 4f auch interest should inadvertently appear, it con be plausibly disclained by this government . Specifically, the OPC vas responsible for the planning and conduct of the covert and clandestine aspecce of: 4, Political warfare including assistance to underground resietance movenents and support of ind‘genous anti-Communist elene: in threatened countries of the free world. >. Paychologica? warfare including "black" and "gray" propa senda. ¢. Economie warfare. 4. Evacuation including the paranount responsibility for ee- cape and evasion. €- Guerrilla and partisan type varfare. f. Sabotage and countersabotage. B. Other covert operations (excluding espionage, counterespionage and cover and deception for military operations). Having laid out the mesion and responsibilitt of OPC, Wisner pro- Tostica of Policy Coordination, Menorandun for: Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedeneyer, OCSA, Subject: ‘Tranmittal of CPC response to the Special Section Joint Strategie Plana Group request fer information regarding the need for establishment of an HME organization for collaboration with OPC, from Prank G. Wisner, assistant Director of Policy Coordination, 1 August 320 1949, RG 319, Army Cpevations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, Ci (1 Asgust 1949) 7S, National Archives.120 of mutual education, collaboration and understanding" betveen OPC, the Departuent of State, and the military services with respect to this "new weapon in the United States arsenal." In particular, he felt that the National Military Establishnent should “provide guidance and support vith respect to such escape and evasion, countercabotage, sabotage and guerrilla warfare activitisn as may be undertaken during peace- for ‘$ise of vhich must be prepared during peacetine to a state of resdine wartime execution [enphasis added]. Thie Latter point ts important to highlight, because later considerable 4ifterences of view vere to develop between the Aruy and OPC over just who was sation and in zesponsible for what--and to vhat degree--both in peacetine pre} var. At this point, hovever, the field appeared to be left relatively open to the CIA/OPC, and Frank Wisner vas ancious to receive help frou the military services in getting his operation under way. Army Assistance to OPC tance from the Army in the training of In mid-1949 Wisner requested a personnel for guerrilla varfare, for the provision of certain logistical aup= port, and for the nomination of an Army officer to be chief of the "Guerrilla Warfare Group" of CIA (the latter request was subsequently withdrawn). The sacratary of the Army evthorized the Plans ani Operations Division to contact the CIA diract to determine the details of assistance required. Lieutenant Cotonel John R. Deane, Jr., was designated as the Army's representative for the purpose of such coordination. Later, Lieutenant Colonels R. A. Baker and E. B. Baker were designated for direct contact in the areas of logistics andaa By Novenber 1949, a series of conferences between epresentatives of the Department of the Army and the CIA had resulted in the selection of Fort Benning as a suitable site for the location of a training course desired by ntaiv the CIA. Tuterestingly, one of the CIA/02C repre vho took part in these conferences vi fan Army Ifeutenant colonel who had served with Detach- pent 101 in Burma during World War 11.7 This officer's former experience in OSS ensured him an daportant role 4m these Aray-CIA conferences. For example, in one meeting a discussion of Oss tks fer organizations in World War IZ resulted in egreenent anong the participants that the mest efficient operation was cne in which all elandes- tine organizations vere brought under one head. While not committing OPC to 4 position, this former Detachnent 101 menber stated that he felt "reasonably certain" that all of these plans and projects would be done vith the knowledge and approval of theater comanders, He furcher expressed the view that the proposed joint training endeavor would assist in training some military personnel in covert activities, thus making the transition to JCS control of such operations in ci of war @ smoother task. \pepartnent of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Department of the Army Assistance to the Central Intelligence Agency in the Field of Guerrilla Warfare, 26 July 1949, and Sumary Sheet for Chief of Staff, same subject, 29 July'1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, PSO 370.64 TS (23 June 1949), National Archives 2nepartnent of the Arey, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Lepartrent of the Army Assistance to the GIA in the Field of Guerrilla Warfare, 21 Novenber 1949 and Notes on Meet- ing of Representatives of CIA and MME Re Joint CIA/NKE Training Progran, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P60 370.64 TS (21 No- venber 1949), National Archives.122 With reapect to thie latter point, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Deana, Plans and Operations Division, expressed an opinion that {f the CIA came under ‘no necessity for the Army to organize Jes control during wartime, there ws OsS-type units in peacetime, since their resistance operations would conflict with those of the CIA. Thus he believed that the National Military Zetablish- ment vould want to ensure JCS juriediction over CIA during war, and in this way the Aray--by ite assistance to the CIA in its peacetime training progren-- would be laying the groundvork for possible future behind-the-lines sunport for its tactical ground operations. The uotes on these meetings show « con- yn ative on siderable azount of agreement betveen Deane pnd the OPC rapri these issues, as wel) as the other participants. Indeed, the importance of these early conferences between the CIA and the Army--in addition to high- Lighting the influence of OSS experience--was the degree of harmony that ¢x- 1 Aated, harmony that vould ‘later disappear in jurisdictional squabble Further evidence of this attitude of cooperativeness was the provision of two Aray studies on guerrilla varfare to the CIA, to assist thea in tie preparation of @ training program for covert operations. The studies, preparad by Major Materazzi and Captain West of the Plans and Operations Division, were forvarded with « nesorandun indicating that they represented solely the individeal views of the officers vho prepared then. Nonetheless, the studies denonstrated « recognition by sone officers of the potential value of resistance operations in a future war. They also demonstrated again the influence of OSS experiance on those officers interested in the subject of covert operations. Yurther, both papers concluded that the Arsy should organize lpia.erg 123 and train @ unit in peacetine for the purpose of suport of foreign resistance movenents in the event of hostilities. Both studi had been prepared in early 1949, hovever, and with the groving prominence of the CIA in this field thay hed apparently hese overtaken by events.) on The Joint subsidiary Plane Div ‘The emergence of the CIA ir both psychological varfare and covert operations, as wall as the graving interest anong the Services in these activities becaise of increasing Cold War tensions, led to the establishnent of the Joint Substdiary Plans Division (JSPD) in late 1949. This nev jotat ‘agency, under the control of JCS, was to coordinate the peacetime development o: psychological warfare and covert operations capabilities within the med Services, coordinate detailed ~litary plans and other agencies of the government, par- tleularly wich Department of State and the Office of Policy Coordin Eton (CI4}, end, in wartime, vould become the means by which the JCS would provide continuous direction and guidance in these specialized flelds to ecomenders under their control.2 Rear /dniral Leslte C. Stevens vas cted to be the First Chief of the JSPD, although he had Lintted experience in paychological warfare and covert operations. Stevens vas to be assisted by deputies from each of the other Services, and initially by @ enall staff of atx officers, His nowina- tton was concurred in by the Arny.? Toepartmcnt of che Army, Plaus ent Operations Divisio, Washington 25, 2.0. Menorandun For: The Uirector of Central Intelligence, Subject? Request for Documents, 18 Octobcr 1949, RG 319, Ary Operaticns, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P60 370.64 TS (18 October 1949), National archives 2oepartment of the Aray, Plans and Operations Division, Waxsington 25, D.G., Memorandum for the Chief of Steff, Subject: The Military Orgenication for Paychological and Cover Operations (JCS 1735/32), 2 Novenber 1949, from Mejor General Charles L. Bolze, Director, P60, RC 319, Army Operations, 1949- 52, Box Ho. 10, Hot Files, P60'091.412 TS (28 October 1949), National Archives. Sra.124 r | ually, the principal impetus for establishment of the JSPD appears to have comp from the CIA. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in May 1949, thk Director of Central Intelligence requested that a staff of Service representatives be appointed to “consult with and assist CIA officers in the establishnent of « paramilitary training program." Frank Wisner's request for unilateral assistance from the Aray was part of this overall move by the { CIA. The JCS considered the CIA's request and detercined that a need existed for the proposed training program. Their creation of the JSPD in Novesber 1949, thpy believed, also provided the staff requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chief, JSPD, was directed to effect the necessary Liajson between the CIA and the National Military Establishnent. Prior to Ko avident that the responsibility for unconventional primarily as a resuit of NSC 10/2 shifting to the CIA. The ine ‘agency had agreed to attach liaison officers to the staffs of uni- fed comands to participate in planning for special operations, and the JCS staffed @ message to these comands notifying them that such Liaison vas available if they desired te.? Slowly but surely, the "new kid on the block” Apgpartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Paramilitary Training Program (JCS 1735/34), 23 November 1949, from Major General Bolte, RC 319, Arty Operations, 1943-52, Box No. 10, Hoc Files, P& 091.412 7S (16 November 1949), National Archives: 2pgpartment of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Megorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Liaison With Unified Com mands fot Spec‘al Operations, 20 December 1949, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, Director of Plans and Operationa, RC 319, Army Operations, 1949-32, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 091.412 TS (17 December 1949), National1s was beconing more active, and the Services appeared willing to accept him. This is not to wy that the Services thenselves ceased to consider the potential for unconventional warfare in the face of groving U.S. Soviet tensions. An excellent exanple of this interest was a letter from Colonel C. H. Gerhardt, G-2, Headquarters Second Aray, Fort Meade, Maryland, to Lieutenant General Alfred H. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of staff for Plans and Conba” Operation Gerliardt, who had just attended a conference that included General Gruenther and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Arther Collins, indicated his concern for both psychological and unconventional warfare in thie paragrapt Now as to the ideas: About tvo years back Froggy’ Reed of the Ordnance was out here and we got talking about new developments. He stated that there appeared to be no nav developments planned in Sabotage equipment and other material necessary for an underground. We then wrote up a short atudy to fit the then situation as far as doing something about equipment was concerned, Europe being concerned after being overrun by the Red Arny. The stages being: first, psychological warfare; second, an organized underground. This underground to be planned for now, end particularly deve lop- ment of equipment, new and streamlined explosive os, kits of various kinds, etc., that could be stockp{led--some here and sone in the countries involved, and an organization put into being that would blossom into a resistance movenent in case of invasion. Gerhardt's letter was shovn to General Colling, whe wrote next to the cited paragraph: "I agree that something definite should be done on a plan and an organization." Both the Director of Logistics end the Director of In- telligence were requested to “investigate the pri jent status of planning on the matter and submit appropriate recommendations." The resultant status report on covert operations summed up basically vhat has been discussed in Meadquarters, Second Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, Letter to Lieutenant General alfred M. Gruenther, 30 Noverber 1949, from Colonel C. Be Gerhardt, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, filed with P60'000.5 (30 Novenber 1949) TS, National Archives.126 this chapter: the CIA's responsibility, under NSC 10/2, for planning and con eablishsent of OPC to implement ducting covert operations in peacetine, the NSC 10/2; the work of two ad hoc JCS committees to prepare guidance to OPC in ton; the creation of the the fields of guerrilla warfare and escape and e of the Joint JSPD to insure “the effective discharge of the responsibiliti Chiefs of Staff for psychological warfare and covert operations"; and the Secretary of the Aray's approval on 28 July 1949 of the provision of unt- 1 Lateral assistance to OPC in the field of guerrilla warfar Because of its sensitivity, the draft reply to Gerhardt's letter left out much of the material contained in the status reports prepared by the Army Staff. Nonethelews, the paragraph that dealt with covert operations was significant: We have been active on the Joint and Service levels for sonetine now in the field of resistance movements and other allied covert operations. We are convinced that the utilization of indigenous man- Fewer in covert operations is an important and very necessary adjunct fo conventional type operations. We feel that we are making progress in these matters but, of course, ve wust proceed with considerable ‘eaution. This statewent typifies the Arny's attitude tovard unconventional warfare during the interwar years, As has been shown, the Army--prompted by Secretary of War Robert Patterson--began considering the possibilities for a covert operations capability patterned after OSS units as early as 1946, prior lppid.; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Director, Plans and Operations Division, 5 January 1950, CSUSA 381 (5 January 1950) C, from Lieutenent General Alfred M. Fruenther, and Plans and Operations Division Sumary Sheet, Subject: Plans and Orgenization for Underground Development, 17 January 1950, Tab "B, Planning Status in Covert Operations, &0 000.5 (30 Novpaber 1949), TS, Na- tional Archives, filed in RC 319, Army Operations, 1949152, Box No. 10, Hot Files, National Archives. 2qhid.; Tab “C," proposed letter to Colonel Gerhardt.wa? to the establishnent of the CIA and OPC. This inter: twas fueled on the one hand by @ groving suspicion of Soviet intentions, but also sopevhat con- strained, on the other hand, by a recognition of the political sensitivity of such a capability during peacetine. Thus it wus almost with a Mef that the Sezvict and particularly the Army--velcooed the emergence of CIA/OPC to take the pricary reuponeibility for covert operations, During a period of personnel and fiscal constrainte, this alloved the Army to concentrate on che "conventional type operations" with which ¢ was more confort- able. Nonetheless, the Aray could not entirely evade sone responsibility for the enbryonie developnent of an unconventional warfare capability. Thus 4 agreed to assist the OPC in ite initial organizational and training efforts. In fact, the evidence suggests that some Aray leaders sav limited cooperation with CIA/OPC as in their enlightened self-intere 8; that ta, an opportunity to preserve coms influence during a period vhere institutional prerogatives and Jurisdictional boundart ina new field were in a process of flux. At any rate, the Army's attitude tovard unconventional « wrfare during the intervar years was ambivalent. Limfted though it vas, hovever, the Army's activity in this fleld--partioularly the doctrinat confusion that marked its tentative thinking on unconventional warfare and its early interaction with the CIA/OPC--in important to grasp for a full understanding of the subs quent developmants that contributed to the creation of Special Forces. The first of these developnente ws the outbreak of var in Korea.CHAPTER VI KOREA AND THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE d the A Llttie over two years after North Korean armed forces cros 38th Parallel, the United States Army, 1a May 1952, established the Paycho- logical Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Caroline. This institution en- coupassed @ school for both prychological operations and Special Forces traia- ing, operational psychological warfare units, and the first formal unconventional warfare force in its history--the 10th Special Forces Group. We have eT seen that while some planning activity took place during the post-World Ws 1 yeers, the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological warfare was aint in June 1950. Simtlarly, while some eubryonic thinking on unconventional warfare took place within the Army during the intervar years, at the tine of the Ability for that type of ectivity outbreak of war in Kor primary recyou had shifted to the CIA/OPC--or so tt appeared. Thus, an examination of the period between June 1950 ani May 1952 {8 crucial to understanding the Aray's unprecedented decisions to establish « center in which capabilities for both paychologinal cnd unconventional warfare would be conbired at Fort Bragg. Korean War on these decistons. ‘This chaptar examines the impact of ¢ Impetus for a Psyvar Diviston at Department of the Ary When the North Korea. invasion began on June 22, 1950, a small Special Far East Comand Projects Branch existed in the G-2 Divieton of Headquarte [1287Fry (PecoM) that was charged with the responsibility for the developoent of stra tegte and tactical warfare plans. This branch, headed by a civilian, Mr. J. Woodall Greene (who had been in the Far East since 1943), was initially con fined to radio broadcasting from Japan and to leaflet air drops, both of which were begun by June 29. Its shortages of personnel were pertially overcone by the auguentation of local State Department Information Service personnel. The Department of the Arcy, of course, was unable to furnish adequate support, due to shortages in trained personnel, units, and suitable equipment.1 The situation was such that by June 5, Secretary of the Army Prank Pa v-who, it will be venenbered, had been prodding the Aray Staff to get ite Paychological warfare house in order--displayed his concern with « memorandum for the Chief of staf: Bvents of the current Korean situation further confirm ay views on the need for a Psychological Warfare organization in the Departuent of the Army. Please let me have a report on this matter showing action taken or being taken and, as well, such reconmendations as you dex appropriate at this time.? The Secretary was told that action had been taken to activate a branch of ten officers within the G-3 Division on July 31, 1950, to provide General Staff supervision of all psychclogical warfare and special operations activities. Additionally, a study to determine how to provide for a nucleus of Ybepartment of the Army, G-3 Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Report on Psychological Warfare Activities--Far East Comand, 31 August 1950, RG 315, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412 Case 41-100, Box No. 157, OPS 091.412 $ (29 August 1950), National Archives. 2oepartnent of the Aray, Office of the Secretary of the Aray, Washington 25, D.C., Memorancim for General Collin, Subject: Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, 5 July 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., filed with G-3 031.412 § (5 July 1950), National Archives130 u personnel trained in psychological varfare was in progress. Te is interest ing to note that the Army planned to coubine psychological warfare and apectal operations activities in the proposed branch. Even with the CIA/oPCts sroving proninence in the latter field, apparently the Army vanted to at least keep ita hand {n the game. Understandably, Secretary Pace vas beginning to show his inpatience with the glacter-like mcvenent of the Aray bureaucracy on a subject of per- din chapter II, there were a number of sonal concern to him. As waa discu reasons for this apparent foot-Jragging by the Ary Staff during the interwar years, But at this point perhaps the most candid analysis of the Army's. failure was done in mid-July 2950 by a young staff officer in the G-3 Division: With the transfer of primary responsibility for Psychological Werfare from G-2 to G-3 in January 1947, the activity reverted basically to a plancing function insofar as the Department of the Army was concerned. Being largely a planning function, the activity consisted mainly of actions on highly classified matters viiich seldom came to the attention of other Ganeral Staff Divisions and the Technical Services. Conse- quently, because of the relative newness of the activity and because 1 of the high classification placed upon it, a general lack of information gradually developed outside vf G-3 (740) concerning Psychological Warfare. The lov priority placed on this activity within G-3 1a 1948, plus the return to inactive duty of aost experienced Psychological War fare officers, tended to accelerate this condition The officer went on to state that with the outbreak of war in Korea,, the ‘Aray again had an interest in pevchological warfare operations. He thus recomended that the respoveibilities for this field be more clearly delineated among Ivepartment of the Arny, G-3 Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Sumary Sheet for the Chief of Staff, Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, 13 July 1950, from Major General charles L. Bolte, ACofS, G-3 091.412 § (5 July 1950), National Archives. i 2oepartment of the Ary, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Nemorandua ' for Record, Subject: Delineation of Responsibilities for Psychological Warfar 17 July 1380, by Major RK. B. Stark, RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, if 091.412 Case 1-20, Box No. 154, OPS 091.412 (17 July 1950), National Archiver.a the General Staff, the Technical Services, and the Chief of Aray Field Force! Within a nonth of this assessment, the nave of that old World Wer IT paychological warrior, Brigadier General Robert McClure, again surfaced. In a "Dear AI” letter to Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer (who had recently moved from his Pentagon assignnent to become Commanding General of the Sixth Arny, vith headquarters in San Francisco), Major General Charles Bolte, the G-3, stated that the Army's program for psychological warfare was being reviewed in order to determine "the further organizational steps necessary to weet the operaticrsl requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war." He further indicated that the Army's responsibilities in this field were such that the possibility of @ permanent staff agency, "preferably in the form of a Special Staff Division," should be considered for the Department of the Army. In order to develop specific recomendaticns on psychological warfare organiz tion for the Chief of Staff, Bolte requested the advice and assistance of McClure (who was assigned to General Wedemeyer) for a few days because "I know of no one better qualified to assist us in that respect." In less than two weeks, Bolte received this message from McClure: “Will report to you for TOY 3 29 auguet."? Help was on the way. Notwithetanding these steps, by the end of August the Secretary of the Arus's patience with the apparent lack of progress in psychological warfare lime. 2bepartment of the Aray, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedeneyer, Conmanding General, Sixth Army, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, G-3, 12 August 1950, RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, Box No. 154, 091.412 (11 August 1950), National archives. 3thtd.; Hessage from MeClure to Major General C. L. Bolte, 24 August 1950.organization came to anend. His displeasure, plainly evident in « memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, deserves to be quoted in ite entirety: 1, Ihave been following the progress of the development of a paychological warfare progran within the Departwent of the Army with considerable concern. I am not st all satisfied that we are giving this matter attention and support commensurate with the capabilit of psychological warfare as a military weapon and an instrument of national polley. 2. The discussion of the Army Policy Council meetings of 15 and 16 August and my own review of the Army's effort in this field have indicated that the principal difficulty for well over # year has been orgenization and manpover. Although I an aware of the high caliber of work which has been performed, it is of particular concern to me that . @ psychological warfare organization vhich Mr. Gray approved in July 1949 has through delay in its establishment cost the Aruy the servicae of these spaces vhich for the past year could have been utilized in developing the Army program to a more comprehensive deyree. Nor do I believe that with the establishment of a psychological werfare branch as of 1 August we have in fact assured ourselves of accomplishing de- sized results, 1f in so doing we are forced to rely on the Korean crisis to secure te.porary spaces to meet personnel requirenents for a unit which was not designed or intended to operate under war-time condi tions. 3. The establishment of a psychological varfare organization within the Department of the Army indicates recognition of the importance of this activity in military science. Adequate allovance should therefore be made in the appropriate personnel ceilings to afford this field the permanent spaces it requires. I do not believe an organizi tion which has necessitated so many studies and taken so long to set up should ove its final establishnent and couplenent of personnel to an emergency which may well varrant an entirely different type staff unit. 4. I therefore desire that such spaces az have been allocated to Psychological warfare on a temporary basis be established on a perma- Rent basis and that the nomination of suitable personnel to bring the Fecently established psychological warfare branch to required strength be expedited. 5. I have asked Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson to give this matter of nanpower for psychological warfare his personal attention. This letter {s important in several respects. Firat, the blunt tone of Tepartnent of the Aray, Office of the Secretary of the Aray, Washington 25, D.C, Memorandum for Genetal Collins, Subject: Army Organization for Psychological Warfare, 30 August 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jes, filed with OPS 091.412 (30 August 1950), RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, Box No. 154, National Archiver133 Pace's meno--unusually so for correspondence between a Secretary of the Arny and the Chief of Staff--vividly denonstrates his exasperation with vhat he perceived to be foot-dragging by the Army on a subject that he considered to be vitally important. Second, {t gives us some valuable insights into Pace personal philosophy concerning paychological warfare, particularly with respect to having the necessary permanent organizational franevork in place during Peacetine, rather than relying on a crists-(aposed response to the problea. Finally, the venorandum 1s further evidence of a thene that we have aeen throughout this study--the pressure brought to bear by civilian leaders on an Aruy sonevhat reluctant to grapple with activities of an “unconventional” nature. What Secretary Pace--and his predecessors--were perhaps not as sensitive to, hovever, were the genuine difficulties that personnel and fiscal constraints posed for Arny leaders. After all, most of them vere men who had advanced in a rystem that gave highest priority to the “conventional,” or "regu lar" unite--infantry, armor, and artillery--assoctated with the conbat arms. Even with those senior officers vho displayed interest in psychological and unconventional warfare capabilities, it should not have been considered un- natural for then--with the exception of a few like General McClure--to place these activities {n a lover priority when faces with the necessity of making such chotees. In any event, the Army Staff--both as a result of Secretary Pace! prodding and as a result of sone other ongoing actions--struggled in the face of @ deteriorating coubat situation in Korea to improve ita psychological warfare organization. Tronteally, on the sane day that Pace's blistering memorandum was signed, General Bolte, the G-3, reported in a meeting on the Army's136 fet io Ganeral Council that McClure had arrived in Washington to advice and preparation of recomendations to the Chief of Staff on several important aspects of paychological warfare--to include the possible establishnent of « special staff division at the Departoent of the Aray, operations in the Far Rest Comand, and adequate, preparatory seasures in the Buropean Command.? on the folloving day, August 31, Ceneral Bolte forvarded « rocommenda- tion to the Chief of Staff for immediate activation of the Psychological War- fare Division, Special Staff, stating that this step was necessary becau that the Aray is not review of present organizational arrangements indicat prepared to meet its Paychological Warfare obligations,” which had greatly in- war tensions and the Korean Conflict. The creased as a result of groving organizational concept and proposed strength of 102 personel for the new division were quickly approved by the Vice Chief of Staff on the first of Sep- tember.” McClure obviously had a hand in these moves, because during the period ‘August 28 - September 3 he held conferences with all the Deputy chiets of Stuff, the Vice Chief of Staff, Secretary Face, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and menbers of the Joint staff. At the September 13 meeting of the General Council, General Bolte reported that General McClure ablich a psychological warfare proposal to fully aupported the ¢- Lpepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, Item No. 8, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 30 August 1950, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barrscka, PA. 2pepartment of the Ary, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Shect for Chief of Staff, Subject: Department of the Amy Organization for Paychological Warfare, 31 August 1950, RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412 Case 41-100, Box No. 157, OPS 091.412 (31 August 1950) S, National Archive!5 division, and thet approval for such had been obtained. To affect an orderly transition, initially the Subsidiary Plans Branch of G-3 would be expanded to take care of paychological varfare planning. Later the activity would be transferred from G-3 to the nev division, after final approval hed been given as to ite functions, and after acquisition of auffictent personnel.? Greation of the Office of the chief of Faychological Warfare Despite the sense of urgency, creation of the new division did not occur overnight. First of all, there vas the problem of obtaining authorization for ‘the permanent allocation of the additional personnel needed. A more serious jary personnel trained in specialized skills ai £f1culty was procuring the ne: of peychological warfare. Since there was no basic course available in psycho- the G-3 re- logical warfare within the Army--indeed, within all the Servic quested thet a minimum of six officers attend A thirteen-veek course on the subject proposed by Georgetamn University, and scheduled to begin on October 2. Miietedly, this was a purely stopgap measure that would not adequately meet the Aray's overall roquirenent for trained officers.” There vere, in fact, only seven officers on active duty who were quali- fled in the field of peychological varfare in 1950. One of these, Lieutenant Colonel John 0. Weaver, was sought by the Chief, Army Field Forces, for as- + to decoue Chief of signnent to the Aray General School at Fort Riley, Kani Apepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, Item No. 3, 13 September 1950, Military History Institute: 2pepartment of the Ary, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Paychological Warfare Training, 12 Sep- teaber 1950, from Major General Cherles L. Bolte, G-3, National Archives.16 4 projected paychological warfare department. Weaver hed served as comnand- ing officer of the conbat propaganda team of the Fifth Aray in Italy during World War I, and was a graduate of the British psychological varfare school in Cairo. In one of the first actions signed by Brigadier General Robert MeClure in his new position of Chief, Psychological Warfare Division (an obvious chotca!), this request was forvarded to the Assignent Branch of the ‘Adjutant General and acted upon quickly. Weaver was ordered to report to Fort Riley by Decenber 1950.1 . on October 31, General McClure held his fiat weekly staff meeting with personnel of Me embryonic division, The minutes from this initial meeting sive us some valuable insights into McClure's philosophy tovard peychological warfare and unconventional warfare. Firat, he stated that he had "backing from the top don" for ssychological warfare, and the division would be authorized a considerable qunber of personnel. But then he {esued a varning: “as a general policy, all officers igned to this work should watch their step as there is an opinion prevalent anong individuals not conversant with paychological warfare that anyone connected with the function ts a 'long- © must hatred, starry-eyed' individual." Such @ pessimistic note at the out; have been disquieting to the assembled officers, particularly those who vere ambitious. This statement was a commentary on the Army's attitude on psychological warfare--or at least its attitude as perceived by a “true believer” Like General MeClure. Ha hastened to adc, however, "I think that there is ‘department cf the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., DF to Spectal Assignnents Branch, Career Management Division, Office of the Adjutant General, Subject: Personnel for Psychological Warfare Division, OCAFFE, 25 October 1950, from Brigadier General Fobert A. McClure, Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, RC 319, G-3 Operations, G3 991.412 {19 septenber 1950), National Archives.137 >" a rather pragoatic approach, 1 nothing that 1a not ninety percent common pechaps, to quell the apprehensions of his new subordinat With respect to unconventional warfare, McClure stated that Ganeral Bolte agreed vith him that the function did not i long {n G-3 and should be trane- fered to the Paychological Warfare Division. Tt should be remembered thet at this poine the Psychological Warfare Division--expanded from the Subsidtary Plans Branch--had not yet formally becone a separate Special Staff division, and therefore was still under the G-3. In any event, McClure felt that his wich, nev organization should possibly be entitled "psychological warfare, three subdivisions: psychological warfare, cover and deception, and unconven- idence of McClure's early feelings about the tlonal warfare.” We see here marriage of psychological and unconventional warfare, but also his perhaps natural tendency to place psychologica! warfare in a relatively higher priority. This attitude on his part undoubtedly would be a factor in the subj quent co-location of psychological and unconventional warfare units at Fort Bragg in 1952, and the selection of the title, Psychological Warfare Center. Finally, on Janrary 15, 1951, the Office of the Chtef of Psychological Warfare (OCPY) was offictally recognized--but not without difficulty. This was best expressed in a letter by MeClure to Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of Staft, EUCOM, on that sane day: Orders have been issued effective today, separating this Division from G-3 and setting it up as a Special Staff division. With most of the stops pulled out it has till taken us four months to get Apepartment of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Minutes of Feychological Warfare Division Staff Meeting, 31 October 1950, RC 219, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, Box No. 2, File 020 Staff Meet~ ings, National Archives. 2msa.the aduiniatrative responsibility frp G-3. Even in tine of grav emergency the Pentagon moves slovly. A note of exasperation, perhaps, that Secretary of the Aray Pace would have agreed with. Honetheless, « nev organization, the first of its type in Army Staff history, had been born. Paychological Warfare had evolved fron « iy small section vithin a branch of G-3 to an office at Special staff level with direct access to the Chief of Staff. : By early Februsry McClure tad briefed the General Counei! on the organization and function of OCPW and explained the necessity for « rapid organization of unconventional warfare. At this point his views on the organization of his new division were firm--sinea the division had been recognized and published in orders, he wanted to get an anendnent authorizing special opmratteng ac- 1) unconventional war- etvied propagand: » and he envisaged three divisions fare, and support? | ‘As stated in the special regulation that later outlined its organization on of the Office of the chief of Peychologieal Warfare and functions, the mi was to “formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and Supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in those fields." To Apepartment of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., letter to Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, EUCOM, from Brigadier Gineral McClure, 15 January 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-34, Box No. 6, 091.412 Propaganda, National Archives. Geueral Order No. 1, Depart- ment of the Aray, 17 Janvary 1951, established the division as of 15 Jamary 1951, General Council Minutes, 24 January 1951, Military History Institute. | 2pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of staff, W ington, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 31 January 1951, Military Histéey Institute; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menocandum for Record, Subject: Weekly Staff Meeting, 1 February 1951, RG 319, Army Chief of Spectal Warfare, Box No. 2, Rational Archivespresets 139 carry out this mission, the office was organized {nto three major divisions-- Paychological Operations, Requirement: and Special Operations. “Although the thrust of this organization was on peychological warfare, the words "end special operations" in the above mission statement and the existence of the Special Operations Division arc highly significant because tt was in this division that plans for creation of the U.S. Amy! fiat formal unconventional varfare capability were formulated. Both the Psychological Operations and Special Operations Divietons vere subdivided into branches for plans, operations, and intelligence and evaluotion, while the Requirement Division was primarily concerned with matters pertaining to organization, personnel, training, logistics, and research requirements to support both peychologics! und spectal operations activities? Clearly, the tvo major concerns of this unprecedented Arny Staff office were psychological and unconventional warfare (or "special operations," as the Latter was termed at this time). Over the next sixteen months--a period of fr Ae, dive activity for General McClure and his staff--plans, polictes, and decisions vere made in the Office of the Chief of Peychological Warfare that vere instrumental in the Arsy's decisions to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to create the 10th Spectal Forces Group, the first unit of tes type in Army history, and finally, to co-locate the tvo capabilities of psychological and unconventional warfare at this new center. To fully understand vhy these decisions were made, we now turn to an Apepartment of the Army, Special Regulations No. 10-250-1, 22 May 1951, “Organizations and Functions, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Peychological Wazfare, Special Staf," pp. 11-12; U.S. Department of Defense, Sensannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 through June 20, 1951, Pp. 92.140 ‘exantnation of these two activities in Korea, 1a seen from the perspective of OCPW--and particularly from that of General McClure. OCP and Psychological re in Kore: Shortly after the fornal establishnent of the OCPH, Secretary of the in entered the fray to give MeClure's enbryonic program « well- Army Pace timed boost of support. In another of his by now well-known memorandums to the Chief of Steff reference to psychological varfare, Pace referred to the ‘estcblishment of the OCP (one can slmost sense a between-the-lines "and it! about time!"), then unequivocally presented his views on the subject: I ax keenly interested in and concerned over the successful de~ velopment and progress of the psychological warfare progran. Its vital importance to naticnal security and defense in the preeect fevergensy aust be fully recognized by all responsible comanders and staffs throughout the Aray. McClure could not have asked for a batter entrée in the struggle for recognition and influence that any new organization invariably experienc in a bureaucracy, particularly one that ‘s “different.” But the Secretary went even further--he also put in a plug for the special operations part of yd that MeClure's office. Referring again to OCPW's organization, he stre theater commanders should use it as «model to put their ova staffs on a sound basis: Such @ basis should envisage the supervision of a combination of propaganda and unconventional warfare activities [emphasis added] by staff organizations that will provide for effective integration of those activities in such away as to insure full support of : Lnepartment of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington 25, D.c., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Importance of Army-wide Support of the Peychological Warfare Program, fron Secretary Pace, 2 February 1951, RC 319 (ray Staff), Pay War, Decimal File 1951-54, 284-385, Box No. 23, filed with Psy War 385 (2'February 1951), National Archivescosbat operations now being conducted or contesolated and planned for the future. heretofor Since Pac had not mentioned unconventional warfare in his prodding of the Chief of Staff, and since he referenced in this sane menorandum a recent discussion with the Chief of Paychological Warfare and mesbers of the Army Policy Council, one could reasonably conclude that the Secre- tary's apparent endorsement of combining psychological and unconventional var~ fare planning functions was ac least partially influenced by General MeClure's views on this concept. At any rate, the philosophy expressed by Pace! randum in this regard is significant, for McClure carried it forvard in his relationships with both Far ast and European theater commands and his at~ tempts to influence their staff organizations, and with Headquarter: aray Field Forces in the United staté culminating in the co-location of paychological and unconventional warfare schooling and capabilities under the Psycho- logical Warfare Center, established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1952. The "present energency" that Secretary Pace referred to, of course, vas the war in Kor » abetted by heightening cold war tensions with the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. But he belfeved that the Korean situation offered an "especial opportunity for highly profitable exploitation" : for psychological warfare.? Indeed, @ key feature of the period under discussion vas the intense personal interest in the psycho’ gical warfare aspects of the conflict shown by the Secretary--an interest that was of great assist~ ance to General McClure Examples of the Secretary's preoccupation with the subject are to be Tria. 2a.12 found in his numerous conversations vith Ganeral McClure and frequent con munteations with the Couander-in-Chief, Fer Zest Command, General Matthey B. Ridgevay. In early May 1951, Pace called McClure into his office, re:rerated ed his view that his "keen interest" in psychological warfare, and expr “quality rather than quantity" should be the measure of success in utilization of this tool. He told McClure that he tad discussed psychological wai fare with General Ridgeway afd passed on his desire that an all-out effort be made in the field. Offering to help McClure with his attempts to get the Air : Force to furnish a special squadron of aircraft for psychological and uncon- |, Pace concluded the conference by asking the ventional warfare purpost k his as General to keep him informed of activities in the field and to s statance {£ any problem developed.! Later in the sane month, the Secretary called MeClure t. inquire whether the Army was prepared for psychological war- of UN forces rasult in routing of fare activities "should the military succe the Reds." He also wanted to now if McClure was satisfied with the Far East Command's performance in psychological warfare, and restated his interest in quality rather than quantity in their production of leaflets and radio broadcasts.? By the end of May, Pace vas convinced that the time was ripe for the maximum use of peychological varfare in Korea, and conveyed his "great personal Upepartnant of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Manorandum for Record, Subject: Conversation with the Secretary of the Army, 10 May 1951, by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, RC'319, Aray Chief of Spectal Werfare, National Archives. 2pepertment of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum fo= Record, Subject: Telephone Conversation, with Mr. Pace, Sec/Aray, 26 May 1951, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Guief of Paychological Warfare, RG 319, Aray-Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.143 interest in the matter" to General Ridgevay.! “reply to Pace gives us an excellent snapshot The Far East Commander’ in Korea at this point. Ridgevay stated of psychological warfare activit I fis plan to materially expand the psychological varfare effort in support of i stlttary operations, and Sodicated that cvrrent Leaflet operations gave priority to tactical leaflets, "whose themes can be varied on short notice to s1juse propaganda emphasis to fit different battle situations." A mmber of broad thenes vere being used for these tactical operations, to include good treatuent of prisoners, Untted Nations Materiel superiority, and sounting eneny casualty figures. Strategie propaganda efforts included neva sheets, troop leaflets designed to depress norale and increase susceptibility to later tactical propaganda, and civilian le: flets| to arouse anti-Chinese and anti- Soviet feeling. Plans vere under vay to double the weekly leaflet effort of Radio broadcasts, totalling 13 hours approximately 13 million leafle sin @atly im the Korean Language, vould be auguented by short-wave broade Chinese to reach Chinese troops in Korea, a# well as Chinese civilians and troops in Manchuria. While it was too early to determine how large a factor Peychological varfare had been in the recent heavy increase in the mmber of eneny prisoners taken, "preliminary interrogations indicate considerable effectiveness, both by leaflete and by loudspeaker: Ridgeway concluded by i stating his belief that regular paychologi¢al warfare guidance froe Washington was of "considerebl2 importance," since activities were "an integral part of Tpepartoent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, : Washington 25, D.C., Meseage DA 92760, 31 May 1951, from Chief of Staff, USA, to CINCFE; filed with "sy War 091.412 TS (13 June 1951), Psychological fare Far East Command, RG 319, Aray-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, National Archives146 the worldvide US effort in this field-and should be closely geared to activi- al ties in other areas, especially in the Far ast. This latter point by Ridgeway vas alertly seized upon by Pace. During meetings with menbers of the Army Staff, he frequently stressed his ender: ment of paychological warfare and urged them to give it their full support. He believed that not enough effort was being put into it, and considered it "the cheapest form of warfare." He emphasized that psychological warfare had to be conducted within the framework of national policy, and -hat the situa tion during negotiations in Korea illustrated this point. Explaining that he felt a responsibility to "do something” to ensure that necessary high-level. goverment policy views on the subject were prepared and properly coordinated with field psychological warfare, he directed that General McClure prepare a memorandum stating “what he as Secretary of the Amy should do" in this matter.? General Ridgevay folloved up his desire for "nore positive and definitive in August 1951. policy guidance” for psychological warfare in a message to Ya He also asked for help in providing ¢ few qualified personnel for a psycho- Logical warfare planning group in FECOM, adding an interesting note concerning the primary qualities that he desired in those personnel: "I personally rate integrity and intellectual capacity above experience, for the latter without Ipepectment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfa: Washington 25, D.C., Message C 64846, 13 June 1951, from CIMCFE to SECARMY; filed with Pay War 091.412 TS (16 June 1951), Paychological Warfure Fer East Coumand, RC 319, Arny-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, National Archives. 2pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Wavhington 25, D.C., Memorandim for Record, Subject: ORO Briefing for secretary of the Aray Pace, 23 July 1951, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, National1s doth of the former ts a liability, not an asset." Pace! ‘Personal for Ridgeway" reply again denonatrated hie interest in thie rather specialized fieid: 'sychological warfare can and must becone one of our most effective weapons in conbatting communism. I am anxious to ‘ake whatever steps I can to achieve this end." Pace indicated that the ree cent establishoent of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), headed by Gordon Gray, shovld be able to provide the national level policy guidence needed, and that “every effort te being exerted to make the board fully opera- Sonal at the earliest possible date."? As directed by President Truman, the PSB was created to provide more effective planning of peychological operations within the framework of approved national policies, and to coordinate the Peychologtcal operations of all govermental departuents and agenct. The Secretary's attenpts to influence the situation in Korea went beyond these communications with FECOM. We sont a copy of Ridgevay's cable to Gordon Gray, together with his reply. Additionally, MeClure forwarded copies of the ‘sme oessage to the JCS, urging then to emphasize to the Peychological Strategy Board that General Ridgeway's request for high-level policy guidance be ine cluded "among the foremost of the Board's priority operational matters." Toepartment of the Aray, Office of the chief of Paychological Warfare, Yoginaton 25, D.c-, unnuabered cable fron General Ridgevay to Secretary Face, sohtast 1951, filed with Pay War 091.412 FEOOM TS (17 Septeuber 1951)” Re 319 Army-Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives "oepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychclogical Warfare, wiangnston, D.C. Message DA 51176, 11 September 1951, from Secretary Pees to Ridgeway; fled with Pay War 091.4i2 PECOM TS (17 September 1951), RE 309 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, a Yashicaton 3, Dec, tootantn fot Cees Noe eS Seats BES Sodje” “oeydaologtont vateace bedier ee gSteetatay lane ; Ont HREM 15° UT auakacbee DEISe BEUSRS Sta, £E FEC ep wae i 19sie3a, eto eer fateniamenET 146 Unquestionably, Secretary Pace's intense interest in the Korean situa- ats: tion, and in particular his preoccupation with psychological warfart nificantly impacted upon the attitudes and decision of key decision-makers in the Far Bast Command. Moreover, his enthusissm for the subject must have certainly been an aid to General McClure in his endeavors to carve out & niche for the OCPW within the Washington bureaucracy. McClure vas to make valuable use of the Secretary's sponsorship of psychological warfare, par- tteularly in hie relations with the Far East Command. General MeClure's attitude toward the Par East Comand's conduct of peychologtcal warfare activities was mixed. On the one hand, he often ¢ pressed satisfaction with PECOM's progress in this area, was publicly compli- mentary of its efforts, and enthusiastically attempted to give it assietenct On the other hand, he was privately critical of psychological warfare opera tions in the Par East, and felt that the Command there was not willing to ac- jaure on them to cept the help offered. Undeterred, he intended “to put prt a let us help ther MeClure's primary concern was with the Far East Command's organization for paychological warfare, Initially, the responsibility for prychological warfare resided in the G-2 Division of Headquarters, FEOM. Reflecting his own World War IT experience in establishing the EYD/SHAEF and, nore recently, with the OCR, McClure believed that a special staff division combining both psychological and unconventional warfare functions would enhance its stature and factlitate operations. Thus, he urged in letters, reports, and visite Ipepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum of Weekly Staff Meetings, 8 March 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 020 Staff Meetings, Hox No. 2, National Archives.co 147 that this step be taken. Ha also recomended that the let Radio Broadcasting an Leaflet (RSL) Group becone the theater operating agency for Peychological Warfare vhen it arrived frou the Uaited States later in 1951.) At this pomt, oe ———_. of ee ———— pent, @ snail unit of a little over eventy personnel, Moen the Morth Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950, the Tactteai Tsfornation Detachoent--organteed at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947--vas the only Sperational peychological warfere troop unit in the U.S. Aray. sent to Kor An the fall of 1950, tt vas reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet con- Pay» and served as Eighth Aray's tactical propaganda un{t throughout the confltct.? Tactical propagimda, sonetines called coubat Propaganda, was di- Tected at 9 specific auitence in the forvard battle areas and in support of Jocalized operations.? Mobile loudapeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft be- Sant 4 Prinary means cf conducting tactical propaganda in Korea. One note Northy example vas the use of « (-47 atreraftenounted loudspeaker that in 1951 sirrled overhead 1,800 Chinese Couuntst troops and induced then to surrender.4 —___ Loeparteent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Payckological Warfare, Yagrtngton 2%, D.C.» Informal Report as a Resule of Viste ne Chief, Peycho- Hees penta fare Divinion, DA, 24\April 1951, RO 319, Arey-rton ee Spectal War- . fare, Pey War 319.1 75 (24 april 1951), Box'No. 7, tatinras Archives, Zteutenant Eenest Conine, “New Hortzone in Paychological Warfare, : Tpfgematton Digest (December 1952), p. 22; letter, eon? Hays, dated 5 vay 1969; and Linebarger, Peychologteal Warfare, pp. 401° soa. *eychologteal Warfare Divicton, "Operation in Western Europe," p. 13; Propaganda Bronch, "Syllabus," p. 2) Lineberger, Poscholenr as Warfare, p. 45, “U.S. Departnent of Deena Semtacoual Report of the Secretary of De- fense, Janvary 1 through June 30, 1951, p 92>us Tt should be remenbered that as early as 1947, while there was no real nilitary psychological organ{zation in being, « enall planning staff--a Psycho logical Warfare Section (PWS)--had been created in the Ganeral Headquarters (Gig) of the Far East Command. Although the PWS had absolutely no field operating units, with hasty augnentation it did begin using leaflets and radio two daye after the invasion. Obviously, the PHS could not long or efficiently support full-scale strategie operations, s0 the lst Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RBSL) Group . was organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, and shipped to Korea in July 1951. The 1st RBGL Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations.! strategic propaganda was intended to further Long-term strategic aims, and vas directed at enemy forces, popula- tions, of enemy-occupied areas.? To accomplish these tasks the lst RBS Group had the equipment and capability to produce newspapers, leaflets, and ans of broadcasting radio propaganda. The Group augeent or replace other supervised # radio station network known as the Voice of the United Nations, and often produced more than twenty million leaflets per week, disseminated as propaganda by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shella.? Ex- ample themes for the leaflets were inducements for eneuy soldiers to surrender, and those intended to bolster Korern civilian morale by proclaiming United Nations support. Although the RB&L Group was a concept accelerated to meet the require- Ininebarger, Paychological Warfare, pp. 301-302, 304. 2ryid., p. 45; Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western " p, 13; Propagendr, Branch, “Syllabus,” p. 2. Europe Stinebarger, Paychological Warfare, pp. 301-302, 304, 306-307.were initiated by G-3, Department of the Army, in early 1950), it performed functions siatiar to those deemed nece sary to the conduct of poychological warfare in Wovld War IZ. And in ies Mobile Radio Broadcasting (RS) Coupany, a direct ancestral Linkage could be shovn with the oobile radio broadcasting coupanies formed under PID/SHAEF to conduct propaganda operations in North Africa and the Buropean Theater during 1944-45, In potnt of fact, the HRB compantes were the basic unite organized to prosecute tacticel psychological warfare during World War IT, although te later becane established that radio was essentially ‘a strategic weapon and had no place in a purely tactical psychological unit.! Both the strategic Propaganda concept ecbodied in the RB6L Group and the tactical propaganda idea expressed by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company were to figure proninently in the psychological warfare capability subsequently formed as part of the Peychological Warfare Center in 1952. By April 1952, when the military situation had atalemated generally along the 38th parallel, three different types of psychological warfare vere under way on the Korean Peninsula. "Strategie" paychologtcal warfare was carried out by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ FECOM, located in Tokyo, having cade the transition to a special stuff section, as recomended by McClure. Tt was sisted in this endeavor by the Ist RBEL Group, the headquarters of vhich vas 10 located in Tokyo. Leaflet operations were confined to North Korea le: 4 4O-mile zone directly north of the military Line Treychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western Europe," p. 19; MeClure, "Trends in Psychological Varfare," p. 10; Daugherty and Janowitz, A Peychological Warfare Casebook, p. 132; The Intelligence School, Fort Riley, Kansas, “Tactical Peychological Warfare; The Combat Psychological War- Hare Detachnent," October 1946, p. 1.150 nadie operations covered North and South Korea as well ax parte of Manchurte Aizected by the Paysho- and China. "Tactical" paychological warfare ws logieal Warfare Divieton, G-3, of HQ Eighth Aray, eventually located in Seoul: | assisted ‘by the lst L&L Company, this division directed leaflet and loud- apeater operations within 40 alles of the military Line of contact, “Coo carried out by the State Departuent's U.S. Informa solidation" propaganda ws tion Service, based in Pusan, Its printed and visual media operations vere confined to that part of Korea under the civil administration of the ROK . were under the control of field governnent. Radio operations in this a1 teams of the lst RB&L Group's Mobile Radio Broadcasting Coupany.* qo return to General NeClure's views with respect to prychological war fare activities in Korea, another concern was what he considered to be the fatture to use Korea as a profitable testing ground or laboratory. He ber | tdeved that the campaign there provided great opportunities for both experi mentation and testing of methods and equipuent, but expressed to the Chief of Staff in August 1951 bis disappointment in the reults to that potnt. As | an example of what he had in wind, McClure suggested that noise devices for spreading of terror could be used vith helicopters: : Ipepartnent of the Aray, Office of the Chtef of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C. Memorandim for: Chief, Psychological Operations Pivi- Nesningepject; Report on Field Trip to HQ, 7ECOM and Korea, Captats Janse J- felishes, Jr, Operations Branch, RG 319, Ary-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 333-334, Pay War 333 (22 April 1952), Box Now 14, Nationa). Archives. | 2oepartuent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Ware Washingean 25, D.C., Menorardim for Record, Subject: Briefing of the Chie waaeeege on Letter #row General Doyle Hickey, Chief of Staff, FROOM, and | Shcen*tneertm Report on Couprehensive Psychological Warfare Plans, 7 August Toole RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 1y Pay War 020 C/Staff TS (9 August 1951), National Archive SSS eee151 General MeClure was partieslarly critical of the afr support for peychox Yestcal warfaro in Korea, and utilized every tool at his disposal in an attenpt 9 tuprove the situation. Ia 4 "Dear Charles" letter to the G-2, cq FECOM, Major General Charlas A. Willoughby, he unvetled hie concerns: T.anly vish that oireraft vere assigned for the tactical leafletting and strategie le: 8 and timing could be given with an assurance that they would be hit. The Nec sock terior of a 6-47, showing « couple of hari attempting wir RrOe CUE handfule of loose leaflets which apparently were bloving all over the intertor. j Demonstrating his ovn exerience in World War II, McClure continued: Tefene plat the Air Forces have fallen dom badly on us in not using, Th toes seinntng of this trouble, the techniques that we wound up wich 18,1245» uch as: spectai lenftet squadrons, fibre casings for sens Jet bonbs (of which these are 80,000 here in'the Arsenal)” resslas Qperations plans and orders, printing and dalivery on call, ete, we {7g sci11 putting pressures on back here but can do very little un. leas VEC makes this type of operaticn a military requirenent.! Puring his visit to FECOM in April 1951, MeClure again presented his ‘views on the subject of air support, stating that "unless aircraft demands are sade operations requirements, the uirdrops wili continue on a catch-as-catch- can basis." The C-47, he felt, ws inappropriate for leaflet drops, thus “Front line support suffers for lack of delivery by fighter bomber." ie recomended that @ special squadron be organtzed for peychological and unco ventional warfare purposes.? Toepartment of the Atay, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, eee ee, 237 D.C.» letter to Major General charles L. Willovente, Aonieeete Gtet of stage, C-2, GHQ, Far East Comand, from Brigaiier Genorst MeClure, JO March 1951, RC 319, Aruy-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Deckus” Files, 1981-54, Pey War 091.612 (10 March 1951), Box No. 6, National Acchevess Poupartrent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Payshological Warfare, Yeprington 25, D.C.» Informal Report an a Result of Visit of Chief, Frychee pobscst Warfare Division, DA, 24 April 1951, RC 319, Arcy-Chie! of’ Speciny Warfare, "y War 319.1 7S (24 April 1951), Box No. 7, National Archives,152 Having outlined his basic thenes, McClure hamered avay at chen with every opportunity. He told the U.S. Air Force Director of Operations in May that "we vere using 1918 methods of dropping leaflets over front Line troops and that 4¢ was both inefficient and expensive," and requested that the spectal adr wings being organized to cupport CIA activities in Korea be utilized fu paychological warfare. In June he fired off a nemorandus to the JCS recon- ending that discussions be initiated between the Services in order to achieve maxim utilization of all tactical aircraft for the support of peychological warfare. He forcefully expressed his views to both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Aruy, both of vhom attempted to influence the situation in diacuasions and correspondence with their counterparts in the Air Force.! Writing to the Chief of Staff, Far East Command, on "the question of air support for psychological warfare operations," McClure charged that such su port in actual practice was worked out locally, with the theater comander unable to obtain a specific allocation of aircraft. Observing that the "un= desirability of such a haphazard arrangement was apparent in the European theater during World War IT and is in great measure borne out by what I saw Ipepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conference with General Zdwards, Director of Operations, USAF, 10 May 1951, Psy War 337 (10 May 1951); Mauorandun for the Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, Subject: Par- theipation by the Tactical Air Forces of the Services in Psychological War- fare, 14 June 1951, Pay War 360 (14 June 1951); Memorandum for Record, Sub- fect! Briefing of the Chief of Staff on letter from General Doyle Hickey, Ghief of Staff, FECOM, and FECOM Interim Report on Comprehensive Psychological Warfare Plans, 7 August 1951, Psy War 020 C/staff TS (9 August 1951); Meno- randum for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subject: Equipment for Psycho- logical Operations in Korea, 9 June 1951, from Revert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of the Army, OSA 400 Korea; Memorandum for: General McClure, Sub- fect: Utilization of Aircraft in the Conduct of Psychological Warfare, 24 July 1951, by Colonel Frederick $. Haydon, Chief, Plans Branch, Psy War 373'8 (24 July’ 1951); RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.153 and covered in my report to General Ridgevay during my recent inspection of Psychological warfare operations tn rea,” ieClure boldly reiterated his pro- Posal: "The solution we arrived at in Europe, and vhich I fismly believe ta the renedy now, was to pla certain spacified aircraft under the operational control of the Paychological Warfare Staff of the Sentor Cormander." But even before this step, such support "should be determined to be an operational requirement, and this determination should be sade nov, once and for all.” Tus was rather forceful Language to be used in addressing @ three-star general, and seacked of telling the Theater Commander how to do his job. Perhaps the Wmowledge that he had the support ot the Secretary of the Army gave McClure a measure of confidence in these matters. At any rate, the point that he vi frying to make, HeClure believed, vas basic to the whole question--peychological warfare aust be recognized as inportant by the Theater Commander. tlay- Ang once established this premise, it was ity imply a question of the nece: for the theater staff to control its operational tools in order to fulfill ies mission efficiently and effeccively."! This wi vintage Moclure. ia campaign to improve the atr support for i Paychological warfare in Zorea 4s illustrative of the strategies and techniques i snployed by thie articulate, energetic "true bellever" in his attempts ro influe ence events in the theater comand. se: another example of Seneral MeClure's technique was his reaction to “Operation Killer," a phrase used by EQ FECOM in ite press releases to describe TDepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chef of Paychotogtcal Warfare, Wesngnaton 25, D.G., letter to Lisutenant General Doyle 0. Rickey, Chief of BO 313, tea gmat 13 July 1951, from Brigadier General Robert A. MeClure, Poy Wet SEP (Siaff, Pay War Decimal Pile (C), 1951-54, 360-370.64, Box Rov 19, Pay War 369 (13 July 1951), Natéonal Archives.15h operations against the North Korean and Chinese forces. Tha following passage in a letter written to Major Caneral Willoughby is again illustrative of McClure's approach: 1 have personally been disturbed by the couparatively few Chinese prisoners ve are taking, either by surrender or by capture. I ree Piize that they ace not fighting as the Chinese did in their civil Ware in the three-year period that I sat slong the Shankaivan Rail- Way Line. On the othar hand, for tvo thousand years the Chines hve been induced to change sides, even to that of the Japanese, by peveigerations of pereonal gain or creature couforts. Is it possible that the "Operation Killer" and the "Hunter Killer Teans" have been fo widely publicized to Chinese forces that they do not believe that they vould be alloved to surrender? The wide publicity and : Constant repetition of the “killer” intent of our operations and the gloating of the press, and apparently even the individuals in the Battle Area, over the mmbera killed versus the cumbers captured, has led to a good deal of unfavorable international resc- tions. penonstrating that he did indeed understand the perspective of the combat soldier, McClure added 1 fully recognize thet our troops must adopt « tough, hard-boiled Killer attitude if they are going to rot only survive, but to win these battles. I wonder, hovever, if that indoctrination, which, T repeat, is very necessary, needs to be widely publicized in the press and broadcast to our enentes.! Willoughby's response to MeClure acknowledged that the “unfavorable paychological effects caused by recent publicity of such terms an ‘Operation Killer! has been recognized here, and you will note that Eighth Army neve releases have avoided such phraseology." His reply also indicated acceptance of several other McClure suggestions on propaganda thenes and techniques.7 : Lpepartmiat of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological W. Washington 25, L.C., letter to Major General Charlee A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, 1-2, General Headquarters, Far Zast Command, from Brigadier General McClure, 12'March 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951- 54, Box No. 6, Pey War 091.412 (10 March 1951), National Archives, Zpepartnant of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,[rrr - 155, Thus, through personal and offietal correspondence discussions with key pez= sonnel, adroit use of his relationshtp with the Secretary of the Aray, and vistte to the Far Zast Comand--both by hinself and menbers of his statf-- MeClure kept his finger on the pulse of event in Korea at the seme tine that he struggled to staff the OCPY and to establish a niche for hie nev organizetion within the Fectagon bureaueracy. These efforts by OCH to help were not always apprectated by HQ FECOM. Aa an exanple, in January 1952 General Hickey wrote to NeClure questioning « UP story entitled “Pay War Accounts for Third of POW's." Hickey felt that the story vas an exaggeration, stating: While psychological warfare has unquestionably been one factor in lovering the conbat effectiveness of eneny soldiers and in influence ing many of thea to desezt, it aeens evident that in alaoet all cases the action of our ground trcops, supported by other combat arms, remains the strongest and most direct reason for the capture of prisoners To this instance, McClure demonstrated considerable tact in his response, telling Hickey, "I share fully your concern over the tendency to overplay the Tesults of psychological warfare operations as evidenced in the United Prees atspatch vaich you brought to ay attention in your letter of 13 January.” Never losing an opportunity to sell his wares, hovever, the General further elaborated: On the whole, I believe that ve have been successful in our de~ termined effort to keep psychological warfare in a proper context Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Brigadier General McClure fron Major General Willovghby, 24 March 1951, RG 319 (Arny Staff), Psy War Admin Office, 1951-54, 091.412 - 091.714, Box No. 8, Pay War 091.412 (24 March 1951), National archives. Toepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter from Lieutenant General Doyle C. Hickey, Chief of Staff, GHQ, Far East Command, 13 January 1952, to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, RC 319 (Arny Staff), Admin Office, Psychological Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 1, Pay War 000.7 (13’January 1952), National ArchivesEE ee Ty 156 within the "famtly of weapons." My views on this potat are included in the Secretary's report which stat sychological wariare has been. firmly recognized as an integral uenber of our family of weapons. While ve realize fully that this node of operation is not deciaive by itself, it 1s also certain that, in conbinstion with the conventional conbat weapons, paychological varfare will contribute materially to the winning of wars.’ ‘The report that McClure referred to was the Secretary of the Arny's seai- annual report, included in the Senfannual Report of the Secretary of Defense-- {llustreting again the sintlarity of vievs between Secvetary Tace and the Chief, OCPY, on the subject of peychological warfare. This exchange of let- : ters, hovever, 18 also illustrative of the tendency of cowentional comendere to be sensitive to actions that appear to downgrade the "primary role of the coubat role of the combat troops in the field," as Hickey expreased it, and thus to consider psychological warfare as strictly an ancillary, supporting activity. Asan iv? nery officer, McClure recognized this. tendency, and his ‘the conventional reply to Genera: mickey reflects an attempt both to placa commander's view--to take a balanced position, that is--but also to inure that "psywar" received the recognition that he felt it deserved. McClure walked this particular tightrope often. Other criticisms by the Psywar Section, Far East Command, of the support received from the United States included « serious shortage of personnel with psychological warfare training or experience, particularly during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the var; lack of firm, prompt high-level policy guidance and operational directives; the limitativas of current printing, Lpepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter from Brigadier General McClure to Lieutenant General Hickey, 28 January 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Admin Office, Psycho- logisal Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 1, Psy War 000.7 (13 January 1952), Natuonai Archives.loudspeaker and dissemination equipment; a serious shortage of Mingutat a lack of understanding of psychological warfare capabilities by comanders ‘and troops at all echelons, which FECOM attributed to an apparently ineffective orientation progran in the United stat This latter problem area was finally overcome, according to a FECOM report, through high-level emphasis and orientation by the Paywar Section within the theater; at the end of the conflict "all division and Corps commanders vere enthusiastic supporters of Peywar, and demanding peyvar support beyond ability of peywar agencies to produce." Notwithstanding these differences of perspectives between the Far East Command and OCPH, it ie apparent that General McClure and his staff genuinely strove both to sist FECOM and to influence the organization and conduct of Psychological warfare in Korea. In large measure, these efforts were succes ful--due principally to the personal interest and sponsorship of Secretary Pace, to the provision of psychological warfare personnel and units by OCW, and to the energetic, dedicated leadership of Cenera! McClure. Unconventional warfare activity in Korea, hovever, we another story. QOPH and Unconventional Waréa: in Korea General McClure! s attitude tovard the Far East Command's conduct of unconventional warfare operations was sin{lar to his views on its paychological warfare effort, and perhaps even sore critical, His eriticiams focused on two broad areas: overall organization and planning fer unconventional warfare by Tepartnent of the Army, Office of the chief of Peychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., AFFE Cable No. EX 22958 to DEPTAR Wash, DC for Pay War, 090425Sep 53, Ri 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 333-334, Box No. 14, Psy War 334 § (9 September 1953), National ArchivesFECOM, and CIA involvement. When the Korean War started, even the minimal psyvar organization that existed in FECOM was more than that for unconventional warfare. Operations were initiated in the winter of 1950 by the G-3, Eighth Army, when it appeared of disaffected North Korean civilian that the potential existed for the ut personnel in behind-the-lines activities. Officers and enlisted personnel-- many of thea with no previous experience in unconventional warfare--were recruited froa within the theater to train and direct these native personnel in . guerrilla-cype activities. To control these operations, the G-3 Miscellaneous Group, Eighth Aruy, wus initially formed, later redesignated the Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, then finally called the Far East Command Liaison De~ tachment (Korea), 8240th Army unit. According to its TD, the mission of the aoséeh a, To develop and direct partisan warfare by training io sabotage indigenous groups and individvals both within Allied lines and behind enemy Line .. Supply partisan groups and agents operating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation. * Although tactical ‘conditions dictated that initially more emphasis be placed on operations as opposed to training, by early 1952 the 8240th had three control organizations for guerrilla operations known as LEOPARD, WOLF- PACK, and KIRKLAND} air support--C-46s and C-47s--was provided by BAKER Sec- tion. All of the control organizations were based on the islands off the eat Uneadquarters, Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Table of Distribution Number 80-8086, Kiscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, undated, RC 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Deciaal Files, 1951-34, 400.i12 to 413.52, Box No. 26, Pay War 400.34 (S) (1951), National Archives; Interview with Robert Bodroghy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Carlisle Bi rack#, PA, 15 May 1979. As a young Aray officer, Bodroghy was a menber of the LEOPARD organ!zation.159 t sn vest coasts of the Korean Fontnaula. While their strengths varied, by tate 1952, for example, LEOPARD reported 5,500 coubat effactives and WOLFPACK, $1800. The forces of these organizations operated as groups from centers within North Korea while others conducted tactical raids, ambushes, and ssrhtbtous operations from the Ui-held offshore Lalands. while U.S. person nel often accompanted the tactical operations, rarely vere they asuigoed in- ! definitely to the guerrilla forces located within matnland North Korea. Aa an example of thir hit. ind-run activity, the Far East Command reported a tots of 63 raids and 25 patrols launched against Communist fore during She period November 15-21, 1952, resulting in 1,382 eneny casualti though a8 vas often the case tn these type operation”, the casualty figures aay have been ingiated.! WOLFPACK provides an excellent example of the manner in vhich the unconventional varfare orgent: tions evolved and operated. Established in March 1952, using the standard battalion organization as a guide, the initial force had an aggregate strength of 4,000 North Koreans. AE the beginning, the U.S. personnel consisted of four officer: pe ‘the commander, one other in WOLF- PACK headquarters, and tvo dn subordinate unite ind three enlisted men, two of whom were communications spectalis Coabat operations vere required con- Y with the process of organizing, equipping, and training. Initially, Ninterview with Robert Bodzoghy; Pay War O91 Korea 1 December 1952), Deceakes Neary from Korea of itens of Operational Interest for Porred ioc) Tasreea, G9322 86,319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Dectost Pros, 7 1931554, 092-091.412, Box No. 7, National Archives; #Q Fax gan Concand,, Orecaeronstachnent (Korea), S2dieh Arey Unit, Guerrilla Section, cence BAKER seeetee Re; 1952, Co Commanders of LEOPARD, WOLFPAGE, KIRLAD, oad Hon fing red LgAPEtl 1952, by LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, OL Guertin pion ne igtided with Staff visit of Colonel Bradford Butler, Jee meee 1953, RG 519, Army-Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, National Archinnes160 six battalion-type unite were organized, each with a separate island operating pase, and by Jure 1952 tvo wore units had bees created. By Decesber 1952 the WOLFPACK staf? consisted, in U.S. personnel, of comander, $3, 52, tvo en- Ltated radio operators, one operations NOO, and one intelligence NCO. The $3 acd $2 vere Mteutenants without previous unconventional warfare or special operations experience. Only three of the eight subordinate units were com aanded by U.S. officers (captains), the others by North Koreans. The captain generally functioned as a comande: of a battalton-size group. A total of vo subordinate units, as general assistants and, on enlisted men served in th cccasion, as deputies to the captains to vhos they were assigned.! The opérations conducted by WOLFPACK units were generally divided into three categories: coastal, intermediate, and interior. Coastal-type, opera tions were planned oa # conventional basis vith forces of up to 800 men, often involved the use of air and naval fire support, and hed as their primary objec tive the killing and capture of persoonel, Intermediate operations took place further inland, were executed by groups of five to ten men over a period cf three to five days, and generally directed ageinst pinpoint targets such as gn positions, wire lines, and targets vulnerable to sniping and denoiittons. Interior operations were representative of the more cli operations in that a small elenent mede an initial reconnaissance, folloved by a larger increnent, then recruiting in the operational area rod infiltration of the final {nerenent. Planning usually called for these forces to be . Lpapartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum for Record, Subject: Notes on WOLFPACK, Source: Major R. H. Ripley, Series No. 037760, Forner Comanding Officer, by Colone! Bradford Butler, Jr., Chief, Special Forces Operations and Training Branch, Special Forces Division, 29 Deceuber 1952, RG 319, Ammy-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; interview with Robert Bodvoghy.161 fntiitrated in the spring and £o reusin until Noveaber of the ame year. / 1a 1953, cadre rom WOLFPACK and the other organizations subordinate to tha ar Hast Command Liaison Dntachnent (8240th Aray Unit) were uéiliead to form vhat vas called the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (QMPPH), com ‘tecing of five Partisan Infantey Ragioante and one Partisan Aisboroa Tataatry Fsuient, It was planned that this "first United Nations Partisan Division" world tech @ strength of 20,000 personnel by March 1953, Guidelines to the Fextwntal Comanders by the 8240th included the folloving advice: Initiative and aggressiveness tenpered by calm judgnent will be en fouraged. Avoid trying to win vie ar by yourself; pace the attack in accordance with your advantace: wher the advantage b. Bet avay to fight another day. Tift at are Filla's tactics, The rlanning vf such an operation should snelade am escape route and railying point. Substitute speed and surprise for sas: Although this vas classic, Mao T ‘eng type advice for the conduct of guerrilla varfare, as the guerrilla organization becane larger and more con ventional, according to one participant, the effectivene: of ite operations decreased correspondingly? To everaec these unconventional warfare operations in Korea, Headquarter: FEOOM in Tokyo established the Far Eu: Coamand Listson Group (FEC/LG), under She operational control of the 6-2. Tie CIA's operations, on the other hand, were controlled by the Documents Research Division, a part of the spectal ina. 2nadquarters, Fer East Command Liaison Detachnent (Korea), 8240th Ary Boity Querida Operations outline 1953, by LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC tus Bits Divison, 22 January 1953, ftled vith Staff Visit of Colowl Beodjory Matkendy netitareh 1953, RG 319, Aray-Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, Mations) k:citvan. “interview with Robert Bodroghy.162 Staff, Headquarters, FECOM, and headed by a CIA representative. Within Korea, CIA operations--both those of the 050 and OPC--were controlled by the Joint Advisory Comission Korea (JACK), the head of which was a military of- fiear assigned to the CIA. Activities of the CIA ran the gemut of both co- : vert intelligence and unconventional varfara and included the placing of agents for intelligence and to assist downed pilote in escape and evasion, Sabotage, small-boat patrolling on both the east and vest coasts for tactical information, the organization of stay-behind indigenous forces in certain areas, shallow penetration patrolling to augnent combat patrolling and to gain Snformation for large tactical comanders, and sove guerrilla varfare. As one might have expacted, the variety of unconventional warfare activities en- Saged in by both the CIA and the Services resulted in sove conflicting and overlapping interests.! In an attempt to eliminate this conflict, an organization for Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) was activated in Decenber 1951. Its purpose was to centralize direction of all services and CIA unconventional warfare operations at Headquarters, PECOM, by coubining them in one organization to support U.S. forces in Korea, ‘The CCRAK wes put under the direct command of the Coumander-in-Chief Far East, but continued under the staff supervision of G-2. The Deputy Chief, CCRAK, was an individual desig Tnendquarters, Par East Comand, Letter from Major General Willoughby fo Major General Bolte, Subject: Covert Intelligence Activities, Korea, 1? January 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 1S Decimal Files, Box No. 5, 091 Korea, National Archives; Joint Subsidiary Plans Divi- ston, JCS, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Subject: Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 Novenber - 17 December 1951, by Colonel W. H. S. Wright, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, » 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Pay War 333 TS (20 December 1951), National Archive163 nated by the Chief, Documents Research Saction (CIA). Colonel Archibald Stuart, U.S. Army, was installed as the Chief, CCRAK, and soon promoted to entialiy, the unconventional warfare organizational brigadier general. franevork of the services and the CIA in Korea remained unchanged, hovever, with continuing examples of lack of coordination anong their activities. Te vas this apparent lack of coordination of unconventional warfare acy tivities and relative autonoay enjoyed by the CIA that most concerned General McClure. In early 1951 he had already comented on the “uousval organtza- thon! that FECOM had etablished, “shareby responsibility for covert opera tions and special operations behind the ines is placed in the office of the AC of S, G2, in addition to its intelligence responsibility.” He thought that such operations should be the responsibility of G-3, or, even better, of 4 spectal staff division for both psychological warfare and spectal opera- 2 tions.” As we have seen, the Chief, OCP, had recommended to the FECOM that auch a division be established--and 1 wae, 1n June 1951, but apparently the nev division's responsibilities for special operations existed in nane only, and in reality resided within the G-2. Celling the G-3's attention to the ap= Parent contravention by FECOM of its am general order which established « Special Operations Section within the Psychological Warfare Diviston, MeCiure recomended that a cable be dispatched to CINCFE requesting clarification of theater connand and staff organization for planning and conduct of overt and Lipid.; interview with Robert Bodroghy. Poepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.c., Memorandum for: The Assistant Chie! of staff, G-2, Subject: Reports on Special Operations in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 091, Box No. 6, Pay War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives164 covert uncoaventional varfare and psychological varfare and tha relationship of CIA/OPC to that organization.! The racomendation vas returved to OCPY without action 4 full evo months later with the coment, "[WJhen the psychological varfare organization within YEOOM has been established on « firm bi 1 te considered that represent tives from your office should go to the Par ast Comsnd to discuss paychological warfare activities." While this response from 6-3 may have been an attenpt to keep an overzealous OCEY fron appearing to question the prerogs- th of a theater commander, it was also indicative of deeper tensions be- office and those of the principal staff agencie: tween MeCluri particularly the G-2 and 6-3. These tensions were the result of meny factors, to tctude the inevitable personality conflicts that often develoy{ when stronge willed men disagree over issues. For example, there vas "bad feeling" be- due to tween McClure and the G-2, Major General Bolling, part of which w Jurisdictional differences over the staff responsibility for escape and evasion. Perhaps the mejor factor, hovever, was the belief of many etaff of- fleera that the relatively naw fields of peychological and unconventional varfare vere "incidental activities" that denanted « larger share pf attention and resources than was Justified in terme of their real value to the Aray. This was particularly true of the younger field, unconditional warfare, and unfortunately the single-minded dedication with which some of McClure's staff pursued the creation of Special Forces alienated many of those with whom they had to coordinate.? \pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandim to: ACofS, G-3, Subject: CINCFE Organization for Covert Operations and Clandestine Intelligence, 3 August 1951, from briga- dfer General McClure, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, ional Archives, alao, interview with 1951-54, Box No. 2, Psy War 040 CIA TS (20 July 1951), Ne 2rpid.; response from G-3 wan dated 2 October 195:Ce 165, Undeterred by the G-3 rebuff, McClure tried other tactics to emphasize his point on staff organization. Writing to the Chief of Staff, FECOM, in i October 1951, he observed: Tunderstand that in the setup of your nev Psyvar Division you have not yet reached a firm decision on the placing of the special operations and particularly guerrilla warfare and similar type activities, I strongly reiterate ry coment to you on ay visit to your Headquar- tere in April, chat Payvar and Special Operations gre ao interrelated that they should be under the sane Staff Division, With perhaps sone exaggeration, he adde: ‘We have found the organtzation here at the Department of the Army. level to be vorking splendidly and in complete harmony with other Staff Division, both General and Special." MeClure's principal concern about placing special operations under G-2 was that it might therefore become relegated to a lei r priority, thus: While Spectal Operations has. sone aspects of intelligence gathering, that is by no seans its principal mission, and if it renaine under G-2 risks being subordinated to the intelligence field. All our planning here contenplates the separation of the intelligence field from the Special Operations field... . I feel very strongly that the Special Operations is as it states an operation more appropri- ately monitored by G-3 than G-2. ‘The recommendation had little effect, so, several months later, McClure decided to try another tack. He prepared a comprehensive analysis of the Far East Command's organization for psychological and special operations for General Mark Clark, who had replaced General Ridgeway as Comander-in-Chief : Far East in April 1952. Reviewing his recommendation to Ridgeway in April Colonel (Retired) John B. B. Trussell, 7 May 1979; a review of the OCPw, G-2 and G-3 files reveals mmerous instances of policy differences. Toepartnent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Lieutenant General Doyle 0. Hickey, Chief of Staff, GQ, Far East Comand, 25 October 1°51, from Brigadier General McClure RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 091.412 Far East, National Archives.166 1951 to entablish an organization to handle psychological and spectal operations and the subsequent FECOM general order in June 1951 to establich such an office, McClure observer While T have no desire to prescribe or unduly influence the organtz: tion which should be adopted by any Theater Commander, I vould like to point out the fact that Psychological Warfare Section, GQ FECOM has to date assumed only those functions pertaining to Peychological Warfare. Spec{al Operations has renained under the Assistant Chief of Stat, 6-2. . ‘As a result of a JCS message in August 1951, CLA and Covert Operations in Korea had been placed under CINFE. ‘The activation of CCRAK was an attenpt to bring all behind-the-Line operations under single comand agency, but 1 temeined under the general staff supervision of G-2, FEC, as McClure reninded Clark. Additionally--and this was a particularly crucial point with the Chief, OCPY--CIA, FEC insisted that CIA Korea (JACK) be maintained as an integral organization and renain under the control of CIA, Far East. Besed on frequent field trips to FEGOM by menbers of his office and their background experience, plus a comprehensive debriefing of a former mem der of CORAK, MeClure offered the following conclusions in his analysis for Clark: 4. G2, FEC, General Staff supervision of CCRAK and all behind the-line operations has resulted in emphasis on intelligence, rather than adequate developing indigenous forces (guerrilla) in North Korea and in support of Eighth Ary. b. To obtain « balance of G2-G) interest, this office is of the opinion thet Special Operations functions should be placed in the Paychological Warfare ¢. In order to elimi and facilities, duplication of personnel, equipment, and to insure efficient coordinated operations, CLA, department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfar Washington 25, D.¢., Meworandum for General Clark, Subject: Psychological War- fare Matters, 2 May 1952, by Brigadier General McClure, RG 319, Army-Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 6, Pay War 091.412 TS, National Archive: Z167 Korna, should be integrated into # joint task force organization (army, Navy, Air, aud CIA) under the conmand of CINCFE. 4. The organizational integrity policy advocated by CIA is a basic factor adversely affecting Special Forces operations in Korea. Highly qualified personnel for key positions in Special Operations furnished in accordance with « special FEC requisition are not fully utilized in thie field! These conciustons and their supporting discussion vividly depict the extent of OCPW's disapproval with the autonoaous CIA role in Korea. While all behind-the-Line operations vere ostenstbly under the control of CINCPE, 1m reality, McClure argued, @ dual chain of comand existed. The Comander Of CORAK took his orders from CINCFE; the Deputy Chief, CORAK received ate marching orders from Docunents Research Diviston (CIA Par East), vho in eurn Feceived thetr guidance fron CIA Headquarters in Washington. At the opera: tonal level, this meant that JACK (CIA, Korea) did not carry out missions tn support of Eighth Aray without authority froa CIA, Par East. Cooperation on the coordination of those unconventional warfare operat fons sun by CORAK and Eighth Arcy vas too dependent on the personalities of key individuals, he felt, Ironteally, the CIA in Korea depended heavily on the utilization of military personnel integrated into their organization, and often engaged in activities aintlar to those conducted by Eighth Army--but without proper overs a1] coordination, All in all, McClure argued, CIA's inetatence on organtza- tfonal integrity resulted in an allegedly Joint Comand--CCRAK--that had no authority to exercise comand Juriediction over CIA personnel and efforts, im unnecessary duplication of personnel and activities, and in multiple chan- To- nels that complicated the coordination and integration of operation gether with the lack of overal} fornal planning and training for unconven= loa.a ne rE ELE EERE ee ET aE eT a TY 168 tlonal warfare by CORAK or any other agency, and the emphasis placed on intelligence a2 opposed to guerrilla warfare, this added up to a situation wherein the potential for behind-the-Lines operations was far from being re: alized, McClure and his staff believed.’ As we shall see, chase differences with the CIA were the harbinger of simtlar frustrations encountered by OCP in ite efforts to create Special Forces and to plan for their employment in Europe, and is a major thene in the evolution of the Amy's attempt to cre~ ate its own special warfare capsbility. Stortly after his memorandum to General Clark, MeClure reiterated his vies to the G-3: "I believe that the unconventionsl warfare organization for Korea, including CIA/OPC participation therein reflects fundanental and serious defects, specifically for the conduct of guerrilla warfare." These latter activities vere criticized as “essentially minor in consequence and sporadic in nature" and FECOM lacked “an overall, integrated progran of Te 4s inte: Special Forces operations in Korea. ting to note that OCW began to use the term "Special Forces Operations" as differentiated from ‘special operations,” to describe U.S. Aray participation in guerrilla warfare activiti "gpectal Operations," through long usage in the Army and as gutlined in "Field Service Regulations" (FM 100-5), related to “night com bat," "Jungle operations," "Joint amphibious operations," and similar activi- : 2 the lpia. 2yepartwent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfar Washington 25, D.C., Memorandim for Asaistant Chief of Staff, G3, Subect: Revised Discussion of Queries Concerning Guerrilla Warfare, 23 May 1952, by Seigadier General McClure, RC 319, Aray-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.64 TS (23 May 1952), National Archives;169 i Actually, few Special Forces personnel were used for unconventional war= fare operations (a Kores. | The 10th Special Porces Group vas not offtetally i coated until May 1952, at which tine it began tratning and continued re- eruiting efforts for porsdonel. Although Headguartern FEGIM was urged by OCEY ta Kovesber 1952 ant Jamary 1953 to requiattton Spactel Forces staff personnel and detachoents | this vas aot accomplished until early 1953, rezult- fog in che deployrent af fifty-five officers and ntae enlisted nen froe the toch spectat Zorcee Group duriny March, Apeil, end Mav of that year. Some of these personnel vere distiivstoned with thetr asstgmente, believing thet thets Special Forces and disborne training had not been properly utilized. ea More importantly, however, there vere no Spectal Forces operational, nents, as oppoced to individvala, requested ani employed by the Far East Com mand. One would have thought that this could have provided an excellent opportunity to both utilize and test the unconventional warfare doctrine and organizations being developed in the United States. Obviously Ceneral McClure thought s0, because he complained on numerous occasions of the difficulty encountered by OCP/ in getting experience data from FECOM and in having then conduct "Laboratory" tests of guerrilla operations, Menorandum for Colonel D. Y. Johnson, Assistant Chief, Plans Division, ACofS, G-3, Subject: Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of stati for Uncotivaneional Warfare, fron Brigadier General McClure, TS Decimal Files, Box Wo. 15, Pay War 370.64 TS (26 October 1951), National Archives. TRendquarters, 10th Spectal Forces Group Airborue, Fort Bragg, NC, Let~ ter to Conmanding Officer, Psychological Warfare Center, Tort Bragg, NC, Sub= Ject: Situation of Special Forces Officers in FECOM, 19 May 1953, by Colonel Aaron Bask, Commanding Officer, filed with Pey War 220.3 (14 May 1953), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Major General Riley F. Ennis, Assistant Chief of Steff, G-2, GiQ, FECOM, from Colonel ¥illian J. Blythe, Chief, Special Forces Division, 24 Novenber 1952, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, NationalET oe 170 ‘Although McClure continued throughout his tenure as Chief, OCP, to have reservations about the Far East Command's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare, not everyone shared his views. A staff visit to FECOM by a member of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division in late 1951 confirmed the fact that the organtzetion for tha “covert” aspects of unconventional warfare did not, follow the genaral lines of command and staff responsibility esteb- Lished by OCPW, but also resulted in the observation that there wac little Anelination to do sot there is novhere within FEC a desire to organize covert activities Teer a Faychological Warfare Saction as in D/A [Depertuent of the ‘Day. The organization is suitable to the personalities and opere- ‘Sue within the theater. Te 12 sound, workable, and has the un- cualified backing of both tke military and CIA personnel concerned, Tien top to Botton, Officers withia the theater are of tha opinion, ana rightly so, that the theater should be free to colve its organiz: Efonal probleme in {ts omm way; that whet may ceem ideal organiza Clonally to far-off Washington ts nof necessarily the best solution to thosa more nearly under the gina. The tone of this report indicates that there war sove sympathy by JCS with FECOM's posture on this matter. Furthermore, as we have seen, both the Department of the Aray G-2 end G-3 from time to time resisted OCP's attempts to influence FECOM's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare. The Archives; Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Message DA 927769 to CINCFE, 2 January 1953, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decinal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 15, Pey War 370.64 TS (13 December 1952), National ixchives; Cifice of the Chief of Paychologicel Warfare, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conversation vith General Taylor reference Special Forces Operations : jn the Fer Bast Coumand, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 7S Decimal Files, Box No. 319, Pay War 337 TS (26 December 1952, National Archives; interview with Robert Bodroghy. Lyne Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Subject: Re~ port on Teip to FECM, 26 Rovenber - 17 Daceuber 1951, by Colonel W. H. 8. fright, U-3 Army, 20 Decenber 1951, filed with Psy War 333 TS (20 Decesber 1951), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal File 323.3233, Box No. 9, Rational ArchivFacords of this period reveal « number of instances where the G-3 in particu- Laz attempted to stop or "tone down OCPH's initiatives and proposed cables. In early 1953, for example, G-3 nonconcurred in a cable to FECOM that re- Ob- quested information concerning the statue and role of “partisan fore serving tartly that "considering the nunber of G-2 and PSYWAR officers ho have visited FECOM within the past few months for the purpose of exaniaing COUK organization and activities, thers should be no dearth of information on the subject in DA," the G-3 response went on to conclude: "While the cs tenable purpose of the proposed cable is to obtain information, the overall effect tends t~werds veiled suspicion chat CINCFE 48 on the ‘wrong track."? ‘This was, of course, exactly what McClure's office suspected, but their ‘efforta to get FECOM to recognize the errors of its ways in anconventiona! warfare generally came to naught. Although the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, shared soue of McClure's concerns reference lack of & fully integrated Joint staff in Korea for unconventional warfare, the Far Fast Cou mander, General Clark, insisted that the CIA's organtzational integrity under CORAK be maintained. And while Clark also inatructed his staff to establish closer Liaison with OCPY, this did not result in any significant organtz: tional changes by FEOOM in their handling of unconventional warfare.? \epartment of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.c., Disposition Fora to G-1, G-2, G3, Subject: The Status and Role of "Partisan Forces," 18 February 1953, frou Brigadier General McClure with G-3 response, 20 February 1953, by MaJor General C.D. Eddlenan, RG 319, Army-Chief of Spectal Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 3£3.7-385, Box Ko. 20, Pay War 384 FETS (18 February 1953), Yational Archives. 2oepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Yashington 25, D.G., Latter 1... “eneral Collins to General Clark, 19 Pabruary 1953, filed with Psy War 370.64 TS (19 February 1953), KG 319, Aray-Chief of Special War - fare, TS Deciaal Piles, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15; Headquarters, Tarim Yor ali practical purposes, the Far East Comand--and the Clar-want their on way, relatively uninfluanced in this activity by Generel HeClure and his staff. With the impetus of the Korean War,.the Aray saved in late 1950 to cre- date an unprecedented staff orgentuatton--the Office of the Gilet of Peycho- ogteal Warfare, The personal interest in paychotogical warfare, and per- atetent pressure that Secretary of the Aray Pace brought to bear on sentor . ‘ray officers, both before and after the outbreak of war, were key factors £9 thie step. With Pace’s support, Brigadier Coneral McClure created staff ‘under vaich vere placed the responsibilities for both peycholog:cal and an- of staffing and organizing thts conventional warfare, ‘hile in the proce: tempt office, MeClure energetically turned to the amergency 1a Fores ins to both asatst aud influence the Far Zast Conmahd's organization and cond: of paycholryteal. and wnconvent icna’ wssfare--capabilities that the Amy Bed to the neglected during the interwar years, Me w firat endeavor, lese so ir the Latter. The conf:tet in Korea, hrvewec, 1 wee only one part of the story tn our quest t+ deternice why the ny che J0¢h Special eatablish the Paychological Warfare cam.2s art te creat Horces Grovp: To couplece the picture, va mut next examine the events (25 wore alan tecing place beth im the United ‘taces and tn Europe. East Command, véfice of the Comander-in-chief, Letter fron General Clerk £0 caateal Golline, 12 March 1953, fled with Pay War 370.64 TS (9 April 1953), RO a19, Arey-chief of special Wavfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2- 370.64, Bex No. 15, Mational Archives: ‘| { {| | imal ewCHAPTER VIT ‘THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG Spurred by the var in Korea anf the persis ne pre ure of Secretary of the Acay Frank Pace, creation of cre Office of the Chief of Psychological War~ fare took place in early 1951--a hey Mink 4n the chain of evente leading to establishment of the ‘sychologieal Warfare Genter at Fort Bragg, North Caro- Una. Under the Ieacersh’9 of Brigadier General Robert A. MeClure, the OCP Anietated plens that resulced in authorization for tls unprecedenced center and for activation of an squally unprecedented coucezt and organtzation-- Spectal Forses, To -cx late cur examiaation of lew and why this occurred-- that ta, to urderstard the origins of « "specini warfare" capability for the Aruy--ve must look be;-ind the mere oovious st imilve of the Yoress emergency to the evercs caring piss Sth ta Ruroye end in the United Scates. Pyar in lurope While the coiflict a: Ee-ae oa" arly ecw iw a metor shae of the OCPH's attention, MeClu, @ goon aétuz arrival in deshington thet hie a quaiutances in the European theater would be ruatnd ng him cf their requirements. In Decenber 1950 the Chief of Staff of ea/quarters, European Command, nt him a "Dear Bob letter: Iwas sorry to hear that you lost yous aise bi.let on the West Const, but feel that the Army will benefit materially frou your aseigunent as head of the new Psychological Warfare Division in the Departmen: Certainly, we have no other officer who has the broad experience vt ich you have had in that field.? Ineadquarters, European Comand, letter from Major General Daniv] Noor. 1173) {1% ‘After this {ntroductory compliment, General Noce got down to business, sycho= acating that their difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for logical warfare and special operations had substantially sloved progress ia planning for these activities. He outlined his requirenents for trained of- yd recently ficers in both fields, indicating that these needs had been discu with Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Deane, Jr., whom McClure had sent to Europe on one of MeClure's ‘4 liaison trip. Interestingly, in a coment that reflects organizational philosophy, Noce added: The organization of your division works in quite well with the paychological warfare and unconventional warfare organization Thich ve have established in this headquerters, since ve nave placed both of these activities in one branch of our OPOT (6-3) Division. McClure's reply reflected his frustration in attempting to restore specialized skills neglected in the immediate post-World War II period 1 folly appreciate your difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for psychological warfare aad unconventional warfare activities. We ave encountering the same difficulties here. I am greatly em~ Darrassed that ve have been unable so far to furnish you the tvo officers for psychological warfare planning which you requested in a radio message some time ago.! ‘This to precisely the condition that McClure and a few other farsighted individuals had sought to avoid when Just a few years previous they had 1a~ mented the dispersion of people with World War II experience, and warned about Chief of Staff, to Brigedier General Robert A. McClure, 13 December 1950, RG Sto aray = Chict of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decinal Files, Box No. 6, Pay War 091-412 7S (13 December 1950, 15 January 1951), National Archives Ipepactuent of the Aruy, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., letter tc Major Greerel Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, EUG, from Brigadier General Mecluce, 13 Jesvary 1951, RC'319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare 1951-54, TS Deciaal Files, Box No. 6, Pay War 091.412 TS (13 December 1950, 15 Jamuary 1954), National Archive15 the lack of attuntion being paid to maintaining peychological varfare capability. Now chair prophecies were being fulfilled. As one of the few senior offtcare who grasped the complexities and possibilities of this spectalized ‘fteld, McClure struggled to redress the shortage of trained pe:nonne: itu tLon in both the U.S. and the overt fe theaters and also to maximize his personal experience to improve the situation. Vesble to innedtately provide the planners that General Noce needed, : MeClure offered do “some Iittle work here along that line ggestions for you." In this sane letter, McClure again discussed the valuable con- Fributton made by ctvittane in prychotogical warfare, pentioning specttically the forthcoming visit to Lurope of Mr. C.D. Jackton, ha former Deputy Shroughout World War II. He also provided « lengthy Intelligence and Evaluation Deane; 2 AusHee 1951, RG 319 Atay « chistee Special Warfare 1951-54, 73 Pecinal Files, Box No. 6, Pay War O91-a12, Rational archives,178 Europe, McClure noted somevhat peevishly thet while both the Army and Air Force had exhibits at the conference illustrating paychological warfare ob- Jectives, techniques, and historical examples, the Air Force exhibit "was an elaborate and expensive one" which had been on tour in the United States and would visit portions of Europe. Moreover, in his eyes the exhibit vas mis: leading: It is unfortunate thet the air exhibit faila to indicate any Joint participation by other services in the field of Psychological War- fare. A false inpreasion fs given that the Air Force 1a unilaterally conducting Psychological Warfare even in Korea today. Korean leaf- : lets used in the exhibit and sample ones given to the audience leave the impression that the Air Force determines the content, prints the leaflet, selects the target, and then makes distribution. Quite the contrary, no leaflet has been designed or printed by the Air Force in the Pér Bast connand to date. Ie te an Army operation except for airlift distribution. This is the sane practice as World War II. We have seen that McClure vas critical of Air Force support of Aray psychological warfare operations in Korea, but this statenent reveala an even deeper concern--that the Air Force, in ite organization and activits vas “going into Peywar in a big way, disturbingly a0 in some respects," as he re- marked to his staff.? Apparently the Air Force felt that they had claim to « strategic role in psychological warfare beyond that of simply providing the airplanes for leaflet distribution. Not illogically, they argued that in \pepartment of the Army, Cffice of the Chief of Psychological Warfa Washington 25, D.C., Meno for Record, Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, k¢ Arny - Ghief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, Pay War 020 Staff Meetings National Archives; Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Paychological Warfare Conference EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by Brigadier General McClure, 6 Decenber 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special War- fave, Pay War 3348 (6 December 1951), National Archiv 2pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Faychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memo for Record, Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1°51, RG 319 Aruy - Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, Pay War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.179 ! tion to providing the airlift through their special Aerial Resupply and Communication (ARC) Wings, they should also be able to compose and print 1 1 lets.” In their staff organization, research projeccs and training plans, the ‘Afz Force embarked upon a psycholegical varfare program that resulted in vhat one disinterested Navy observer characterized as “the clash of tvo groving organizations, Avmy and Air Force Paychologicai Warfare."? McClure, on the other hand, believed that the Air Force plane, if implemented, would “result 4n extravagant duplication of the mintnal numbers of personnel and itens of equipment envisaged for Arny propaganda operations."? McClure's suspicions i of the ‘Air Force intrusions into what he considered to be Aray terrain continued unabated and were intensified by disagreenents over 1 ponsibilities for unconventional varfa: Our investigation of this latter topic will cone laters now we mst turn to the important activities in psychological warfare taking place in the United States. Naterview with Colonel John B. B. Trussell, U.S. Amy (Retized), at Carlisle Barracks, PA, 7 May 1979. Colonel Trussell, as a Lieutenant Colonel, was a staff officer in the OCPW during the early 1950's. 2epartment of the Arny, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum from Captain Halin, USN, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Air Force Views Relating to Retardation (of Soviet Advances), 20 October 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 15 Decimal Files, Box No. 16, Pay War 381, National Archives; ace also Pey War 350.001 TS (7 Jamuary 1952), Subject: Paychological Warfare Presentacion for PSB, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 13, and Pay War 385 TS (29 August 1951), Subject: Appraisal of Capabilities of Psychological Operations An Departuent of Defense, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 20, National Archives department of the Aray, Office of the Ghlef of Peychological Warfare, Mashington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. army, Subject Psychological Warfare Conference, EUCOM, 27-28 Novenber 1951, by Brigadier General MeClure, 6 Decenber 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare Pay War 334 8 (6 December 1951), National Archives180 Peychological Warfare Activities in the United states ‘The requirenents of the theater comands, both in Europe and the Far Bast, and the concurrent necessity to develop a training program and supporting structure for psychological varfare in the United States, placed heavy denands upon MeClure's office. The immediate need for « qualified Psychological War- fare Officer in each Army Headquarters was met by sending selected personnel to a 17-week course at Georgetown University, but this stopgap measure only scratched the urface. A letter from one of McClure's staff to the harried comander of the lat Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, being readied at Fort Riley, Kansas, for deployment to the Far East, vividly depicts the situation: In order that you will be better able to appreciate the personnel problens facing us here, I vould like to give you a little indication of our imnediate requirements for officers. We must find 36 officers for your Group, 24 officers for a student body for the first unit officers’ course in the Psychological Warfare School, 14 officers for the Staff and Faculty of the Psychological Warfare School, 5 officers for the Ist Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 8 officers for the 5th Loudepeaker and Leaflet Company, which is to be activated in the near future, and «proximately 20 additional officers for this office. That totals 109 officers needed in the immediave future and there are additional miscellaneous slots to be filled. To meet this requiremant, ve have so far requested approximately 100 officers. We are finding that we get only fifty percent of those we request. Those now being requested will not be avail: able at the earliest until late April or May. Hovever, we hope to have enough available by mid-April to provide a minimum ataff for the units at Riley, a minimum etaff for the School, and a small student body for the first unit officers’ course. ‘As we sor earlier, plans to establish the Psychological Warfare Depart- ment as a part of the Ary General School at Fort Riley began in the winter Ipepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter from Major Kenneth B. Stark to LTC Hower E. Shields, 12 March 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.181 of 1950 when General MoClure forvarded a request from the Chief, Army Field Forces, to have Lieutenant Colonel John 0. Weaver assigned cs ite first Chief. Heaver finally acquired enough of a faculty tc establish “the world's ‘frat formal school of military propaganda” in the spring of 1951. The pur= pose of his initial endeavor, the Psychological Warfare Officer Course, w to train selected officers for assignnent to psychological varfare staff and operational units; to develop in officers an underatand. ing of the nature and employment of propaganda in combat ard to make then knovledgeable of the organization's methods and rechniqu for the tactical conduct of propaganda in the field.1 Destgned to provide a general introduction to psychological warfare, str. fegte intelligence, foreign army organization, intelligence, and psychological operations, courses for officers ranged from six to seven veeks in duration. Four officer and two noncommissioned officer cla: 8 were gradu- ated between June 1951 and April 1952, for a total of 334 students. Thie included representatives from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as vell as Allied students from Cana Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Iealy.? By April 1951, OCPY had requested the activation of five psychological warfare unite: the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Coupany (the old Tactical Tuinebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 304; letter, Colonel Otte Hayes, 1959, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Canter for Spectal eriare, Tort Bragg, North Carolina; Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, pyoetan of Instruction for Paychological Warfare Unit Officer," Jeruary 1951, p. 1. USAJFECENMA Archives. Zammy General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, "Program of Instruction for Faychologteal Warfare Officer Course,” August 1951, p. 12; letter, Coleone Bayes, May 5, 1969, to Office of Information. Colonel Hayes wes fecelind to Aitive duty in 1951 eo be the Psychological Warfare Division's Deputy ae Fost BeTy After, the Paychological Warfare Center was activated at Fort Brigg, RC, in 1952, he became the first Director of the Psychological Operations e- partoent (in the Psychological Warfare School) and renained in that position for eighteen months.182 Information Detachaent) with the Eighth Arsy in Korea; the 2d Loudspeaker and Leaflet Coupany at Fort Riley as « prototype unit; the Sth Loudspeaker anc Leaflet Cospany at Fort Riley but scheduled for shipment to Burope; the lat Radto Broadcasting ani Leaflet Group at Fort Riley originally as # prototype att but scheduled for shipment to the Far East comand; ani the 30let (Re- jrve) Radio Broadcasting Group, which was to be stationed at Fort Riley for training in May, then shipped to Europe. Additionally, organizational con~ cepts and functions for these troop units, as vell as for the OCPY and a Paychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, for theater command use vere developed. A directive vas sent to Army Pleld Forces to establish training prograns for the general indoctrination of all ailitary persoonel in paychological varfare, and to prepare detailed prograns for both active and Reserve peywar usits. In accordance with this directive, all Aray achools were re quested to include general indoctrination instruction in psychological warfare tn their curriculum. And by the end of May, McClure began sending out the firet of a series of informtional letters designed to maintain a close con~ 1 tact between OCFW and Psychological Warfare officers in the Army Headquarters. To conduct nonmateriel research in support of the burgeoning psyche- logical warfare effort, the Aray relied almost exclusively upon a civilian agency, the Operations Research Office (ORO), operated under contract by the Johns Hopkins University. Examples of the type studies done by ORO were « three-volume basic reference vork fcr psychological warfare, specific country- lpepartment of the Aruy, Cffice uf the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Progrese Keport, Personnel and Training Division, 1 April 1951, NG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Pay War 319.1, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, letter to LTC John ¥. White, G-3 Section, Headquarters, First Aray, Covernor's Island, New York, from Generel MeClire, 24 May 1951, Pay War 320.2, National Archives.t { : | i 183 I oriented manuals for the u of psychological warfare operators, an analycis and grouping of sample leaflets from World War II and Horea to develop clasaification schemes, ant a considerable amount of field operations research done in Korea. McClure's staff was not entirely satisfied with ORO's work, claiming that thetr projects were "tco general in concept" and not | easily utilized by the Army's psychological operators. And Johns Hopkins also began to have misgivings about the contract, believing that it could not properly perform the development research (as opposed to operations research) required by OCPW in support of peychological warfare. Eventually the Hunan Resources Research Office (HUMRRO) was formed to supplant ORO and undertake a paral program in psychological research for the Army. | McClure was particularly interested in improving the development and pro- curament of suitable materiel for the conduct of peychological varfare. He falt that “as a result of the 1945-49 hiatus in paychological warfare and of the tye equipuent pit uncer development were a mobile reproduction unit for propaganda leafle: a newly designed Lightweight portable loudspeaker for use in front-Line operations, and a completely equipped mobile 5,000-vatt. Toepartment of the Aruy, Operations Resnarct. Office, Washington 25, D.c., letter froa Ellis A. Johnson, Director, to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Subject: Pesearch fur Paychological Warfare, 8 May 1951, Pey War 400.112; Office of tha Catef of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for: chief, Paychological Warfere, Subject: Non-aateriel Research Program, 7 February 1951, from LTC Jerone G. Sacks, Rasearch Brauch, filed with Pay War 400.112 (29 February 1951); Officn of the Secratary of the Aray, Memorandum for the i Secretary of Defense, Subject: Appreteal of Capabilities of Paychologica Operations in Dapartnent of Defense, from Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., 21 Sep- tenber 1951, RG 319 Army - Chtef of Spactal Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box 1 fo. 20, Pay War 385 TS, National Archives. |radio brosdeasting station. ‘And 4£ this uyriad of competing requirements was not enough to keep it busy, the OCEW vas soon faced with the possibility of a reduction in its civilian and military personnel etrength--a threat that they avoided by invok- ing the previously announced views of Secrecary of the Aray Paco with respect to support of the Aroy's psychological varfare progran, McClure had a dtfft- cult enough tine as tt vas obtaining “be qualified people that he seeded for : the apactalized skills of prychologicul varfare and special operations. coupled with the fact that many officers vere reluctant to become tnvolved tn an activity considered to be “out of the mainstrean," he often had co "take what he could get," in the words of one of his former staff officers. Many of the officers that were sent to OCH felt “trapped” by the assignment because of MoClure's reluctance to release them for other jobs, apparently a source of considerable discontent.” There was also sone disgruntlenent among his officers conct ning MeClure's insistence oa special staff status for the OCH, rather than re- mataing under the G-3 as a part of the General Staff--a position, they thought, of greater statore and "clout" within the Aray bureaucracy. Certainly there the General vas come basis for these feelings--under normal circunstanct Ipepertment of the Anas. Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare Washingzon 25, D.C., "Briefing fur Secratary of Tefense on OCPY Activities, 5 Noveaber 1951, RG319 (Army Staf), Pay War Admin Office, Records Branc! , Decinal File (C), 1951-54, 334-337, Pay War 337 S (5 November 1951), Natic ual Archives. 2oypartmaat of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychologicel Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Subject: Reduction of Military and Civilian Personnel in the Chief of Staff area, 27 August 1951, RG 319 Aray - Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Piles, 1951-54, (92-230, Box No. 9, Pay War 230 (17 Auguat 1951), National Archives; interview with Colonel Joha B. B. Trussell, $ Hay 1979.18s Staf{ does carry more "clout" and an aura of greater preatige. But McClure's World War IT experience had firmly etched ia his mind the overrid! 1B advane tages of relative autonouy and acc to the top decision makers that special staff status afforded. As we have seen, this was a theme consistently advocated by him, both in the United States and in hie relations with the theater commande. Despite these resentents, hovever, McClure was apparently Liked and held 1n high eateem by those vho worked for him. "Robbie! backed his subordinates loyally, was treneninusly energetic and enthusiastic about OcrW's rots, and was considerably sore articulate than mst general officere of his time.! And he had vt on. This vision extended to the field of uncon ventional warfare. The Spectal Forces Ranger Regiment ‘At the time of OCPW's creation, General McClure had successfully lotbied to have responsibilities for the unconventional warfa function from G-3 transferred to him. While some thinking on the subject of behind-the-lines activites and special suite had taken place in the Army during the interver years, nothing much had been done to follow through on these initial ide: particu larly in view of the CIA/OF<'s assumption of the primary responsibility for covert operations. Under McClure's leadership, thie situation vas to change: for within a year and a half the plans formulated within Ais Spectal Opera- fiona Division (later renaned the Spectal Forces Division) to create « formal vreonventional warfare capability for the Army came to fruition. But the path to that goal ws Rot easy, nor did it proceed in a straight line. McClure realized that his om firsthand expertise was basically in the Materview with Colonel John B. 8. Tru: 1, 9 May 1979.186 paychological varfare field, so early on he indicated to hie staff that be was “fighting for officers vith background and experience in specisl opera- ttons."! Into the Special Operations Division be brought several officers with World War II and Korean War experience in guerrilla warfare or with Jong-range penatration unite: Lieutenant Cclonel Melvin Russell Blair and ‘Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Waters, both of whom had served with "Merri ll’ Marauders"; Colcol Aaroo Bank, vho had fought. with the French Maquis as: mmenber ‘of the 088; Colonel Wendell Fertiz, sho comanded the guerrillas on and Lioutenant Colonel Mindanao after tha Japenese occupied the Philippines Russell Votzkmana, who hed organized and conducted gueretlle warfare opere- tions in North Luson and had planned and directed behind-the-Lines opera~ tions tn North Korea.” Colonel Yolekmann remembered that General McClure approached him {1 the hospital (he had been evacuated from Korea to Walter Reed Hospital in Decesbar 1951) with a request to help organize the Special Operations Divi- ‘sion, and it was only after being assured that the Departeent of the Aray was interested in organized behind-the-Lines operations that he agread to take the Job.? Together the group in OCPW prepared studies, plane, organization and operational concepts and treiaing programa for a formal U.3. Army unconventional warfare capability--Spectal Force! Apepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare Washington 25, 9.C., Weakly Staff Meeting, & March 195%, RG 319 Aruy - Chie of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Piles, Box No. 2, National Archive etter, Brigadier General R. W. Volcknenn (Retired), to Office of In- formation, John P. Kennedy Canter for Spectal Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Caro- Line, March 21, 1969; and letzers, Colonel Aaron Bank (Patired), £0 Office of {nformarion, John F. Kennedy Center for Spectal Warfare, February 17, 1968, and April 3, 1968. Atetter, Brigedier General Volckmann, March 21, 1959.‘These stutva and organizational concepts were inevitably bi considerable extent on the personal operational experience of the officers involved, plus research of the past major resistance novenents. In addition to bie World War IT guerrilla warfare adventures, Colonel Volcinaan possessed a considerable anount of inforaation resulting from more than six wonths of research he had undertaken in 1949 at Fort Banning, Georgia, vhile preparing draft field mamate ou Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare and Goubatting Guersitls Forces.' Colonel Bank, another key figure, had operated as a Jedburgh iu southern France, later organized and trained anti-Nazi Gersan prisoners of war for herassing tactics against the Germans in Austria (the jeigment was ultimately cancelled) and still later completed two OSS ati 2 ‘sions in Indo-China. Bank, who Joined OCPW as Chief of the Special Operations Diviston at the end of March 1951 (to be succeeded by Colonel Fertig in July), gives Voleknann considerable credit for "the developoent of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sel] the ‘ablishnent of Special Forces unite in the active Army." Bank algo makes it clear that he and Volckaann based thetr plans for the Army's unconventional warfare capability ou their World War IT experiences with the Philippine guerrillas and OSS, and that Special Forces units Tipta.; letters, Colonel Bank, February 17, 1968, and April », 1969. 2uetter, Colonel Aaron Bank (Retired), to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, February 23, 1969. Spepartwent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutas of Staff Meetings, 29 March 1951 and 19 July 1959, RG 319 Arwy ~ Chief of Special Warfare, 75 Decinal Files, Box No. 2, National Archives. These frequent changes of division chief Jesignations were probably due to the relative date of rank, or seniority, among the colonels brought into the Spacte! Operations Diviston188 wore developed "in the OSS pattern of tiny unice with the prime mixsion of developing, training, and equipping the guerrilla potential deep in enexy territory." To those who would insist on Linzing the Army's Renger unite forerunoers of Spectel Forces, Bank unequivocally states that “actually they ince [Spectal Forces] have no connection with ranger type organ-rations their mission and operations are far more complex, tine consuming, require much deeper penetration and initially ere often of @ strategic natuce."? ‘The coments of Volcknann and Bank, made in retrospect, may give the : on that thie rather clear delineation of roles and missions for spe Special Forces was clearly understood from the vezy beginning. The evidence suggests otherwise, In actuality, the path that Led to the concept for or~ ganization and employment of Spactal Forces vas tortuous and marked by con- troveray. tha initial discussions within the Aray on this subject, im fact, wers reminiscent of the rather confus.4 dialogue that took place during the tntervar years concerning the “Airborne Reconnaissance unite," the "Ranger croup," and the “Spactal Operations Company," all of which teaied co inter~ mingle OSS and Ranger precepts. The task of clearing up this doctrinal confusion proved to be no easier in 1951 than it vas durtag the period prior to Korei We have seen that in early Februacy 1951, General McClure briefed the Army Genesel Counct1 on the necensity for a rapid organization of unconventional warfare, and that shortly thereafter Secretary face provided strong official support for the conbining of paychologtcal and unconventional warfare planning functions. By Late March, a few veeks after Volcknann Joined OC, Useter, Colonel saron Bank, Febrary 23, 1973.189 MeClure's new office received a copy of a brief memorandum to the Director, Organtzation and Training Division, from Major General Maxell D. Taylor, the 6-3: In consultation with Generul McClure, please develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare within the field of G-3 interests. Having determined what our responsibility is, I should then like to verify that the various elesents in the. guerrilla mission are clearly asmigned to eubordinate Army unita.? Te dn interesting to note that Taylor's directive included anti- guevsilla warfare. While sone Lip service was given to this in the studiee which folloved, it was not to be considered an important part of the Special Forces bag of tricks unti} the 1960's, when "counterinsurgency" becere the third leg of the “special warfare" triad at Fort Brage- ‘AL any rate, to this point General McClure had not been able to du much about the uncomentional warfare part of his mission. Arrangenenta had been nade for a fow officers from Aray Field Forces and the various Arzy headquarters in the United States to atiend » staff Faniltarization Course in Guer~ villa darfare at Fort Benning, Georgla, commencing April 5, 1951. tn wost cases, there were the same officers who attended the spectal paychological warfare course run by Georgetown Univeraity.? The course in guerrilla warfare was set up after a series of conferenzes in 1949 between the Army and the CIA resulted in the selection of Fort Benning as the site for a training cours Toepartnent of the Army, Office of the G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Meno- randum for Director, OST Division, Subject: Responsibilities of Army with Respect to Guerrilla Warfere, 20 March 1951, by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2 = 370.64, Box No. 15, Psy War 373.64.TS (20 Mereh 1951), Notional Archives. ?oepartnent of the Army, Cffice of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washinston 25, D.C., Minutes of Woekly Staff Meeting, B March 1951, RC 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfire, 1951-54, TS Dectral Piles, Box No. 2, National Archives.190 desired by the CIA. And McClure had requested that his office receive full ports on all behind-the-Lines operations in Korea in order to carry out its assigned responsibilities in the field of unconventional warfare. ther than these tentative st the special operations planning in OCPY at this point lagged considerably behind that being done in psychclogizal warfare, primarily Decause of a lack of experienced personnel. As McClure acquired tha people hs needed, hovever, he plunged ahead. Within ten days of receiving General Taylor's mesorandum, McClure discussed the subject of guerilla warfare with him and General Bolte, and re~ ported to Lis staff that both were “very much" in favor of organizing "foreign national units." The G-3 was to do a study on the use of foreign nationals: as individuals or in unite, while OCPW's Special Operations Division was requested to study the possibility of organizing a Ranger Company at Furt: Riley with ich platoon constituting a different nationality group. One of the purposes of this company would be to work with U.S. aggressor forces in exerci to teach soldiers counterguertilla tactics. McClure's tentative thinking at this early stage vas to propose organization of six Ranger coupanies of foreign nationals in Europe, each company to consist of a different nationality and attached tu a U.S. division. These companies vere to be in addition to “regular" Ranger battalions of U.S. perronnel.” rly dialo Iwo points need to ve noted about this Apepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sub- Ject: Reports on Special Operatiors in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brigadier General MeClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, Box No. 5, Psy War O91 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives. 2pepartnent of the Aruy, Office of the Chief of Psychological Wazfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 29 March 1951, RG 319 Arey ~ Chief of Spectal Karfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Bex No. 2, National Archives.i clear that the focus of attention for future possible utilization of unconven currently engaged in a tional warfare was on Europe--even though the Ary wi "uot var" in Korea. The "foreign nationale” referred to vera those from Eastern European countries, and would be brought into the U.S. Aray through the provisions of the Lodge BLI1. Secondly, it was also obvious that the Princtpals involved in this discuesion--to include General MeClure--had not sorted out in their minds the type of special unit desired, nor ite prinary objective Perhaps this was because the Chief of Staff hinself vas unclear on the subject, a was evident in his viate to the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, a fev days later. During his conference there, General Collins observed that "the Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activitf-s. 7 person= ally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the 1 nucleus of expansion in this dirvetion. This statezent is particularly interesting vier ore .onsidews the rather clear-cut delineation between the roles and miseonm eelel Poece and Ranger units later insisted on by the Chief “¥ Sicfi. But aust) a ealiaeation vas oot either well understood oF agreed to by Kay decisinn saver on early 1951, Meutenant Colonel Volcknann fron OCPH wes prsaint. +i the eonforance attended by Seneval Colline at Fort Benning, and vne asked o> tho Tafentry Teadquarters, The Tafa The Cornanding General, The 1 tions Re General Collins's Co ry School, Fort Reantne, Georgia, Menorandim to: try Center, Subfect: Analysis and Sugges yeence 5 April 1931, from LTC R. W. Voleknann, 9 April 1951, £Lled with Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), RG 319 Ary = Chief lone Archive: of Special Yarfare, 1951-54, TSPecimal Files, Box No. 12,192 School to analyze portions of the Chief of Staff's statenents. Volckmann's analysis should be examined in some detail, for it 1s the firat evidence within OCPW of the philosophicel basis for creation of an Aruy unconventional warfare capebility. Piret of all, Volcknana interpreted General Collins's use of the phrase “subversive activities" to mean vhat he called "special forces operations." He defined the lacter to include operations carried on within or behind the eneny's lines, which could encompass the folloving: 1. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfa 2. Sabotage and subversion. 3. Evasion and excape. 4. Ranger and ervaando type operations. 5. Long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance. 6. Paychological warfare (through above nedia).! Secondly, commenting on the Chief of Staff's reference to indigenous personel, Volcknann offered the fcllowing theoretical framework to clarify the overall objective of special forces operations: We ney visualize the vorld today as being divided into two major groups or layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together by comon ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. Th full exploitation cf our sympathetic blue layer within the eneny's 5 sphere of influence 1 basically the mission of special forces operations. It is from the blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence that ve suet foster resistance movenents, orgenize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, co-tuct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape. We should, through special forces operations, exploit this layer to assist our ranger and com mando operations, and as a media fcr psychological warfare. pid.193, Exploitation of this "sympathetic blue layer stated Volcknenn, vould enable the West to offset the manpover superiority of Soviet forces in Europe, farticularly during the initial stages of their dnvasion. Siatlarly, the Allies aust be prepared to counter the "red layer" within their friendly sphere of influence; a problem that involved rear area defense, for the Soviets would explott thet "sympathetic red layer" to the maxiaun. To effect the transition from this theoretical framework to reality, at least as far as the Aray was concerned, Volclnann advocated that concrete measures be taken: "[T]hrough actual comand, staff, training, and opevations we should pull the overall field of spectal forces operations cut of the clouds, out of the disc. on stage, and reduce it to organization, training, and operations." To accompit« he recommended that the Infantry Center be designed an the focal point Zor dvctrine, policy, and technique, and further advocated the activation of a "Special Forces Comand" under the Center to Nexplore, develop and conduct trcining in the field of epectcl forces opera tions." Under this command should be placed Ranger training end "all other special forces operations.” Ivo other points should be noted in Volcknann's analysis. Fe belleved that this concept should be considered an accepted fleld of conventional grourd warfare; therefore "we should cease to regard special forces operations as irregular or unconventional warfare." Thus, the vltimate objective of special forces operations was to “organize and support, wherever possible within the eneny's sphere of influence, guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis that are capable of offictent and controlled exploitation in conjunction with our land, air, and sea force Having established thia point, Volcknann procended to carve out what he194, envisaged as the Aray' ite relationship to the CIA: role in this activity, both enong the Servicns and in To mo, it is basically sound that the military (the Army, since this field falls within ground operations) has the inherent responsibility Ap peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces ope= tions and in time of war to organize and conduct special forces opera tone, Furthe:, I fnel thet if is ungound, dangerous, and unvorkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civi! agency. Volckaenn's analysis ts inportant because it contains most of the major | @lemenes of controversy attendant to the creation of aa unconventional varfare capability for the Army. It also provides ua vith sone valuable insights ‘ato the philosophy of the man vho, probably wore than any officer in General MeClura's employ, shaped the creation of Special Forces. Certainly, Volekmann rvations abuut the CIA's role vis. vis the military Services-- and particularly the Army--was a major thene during these early years of OCPW's ex: fence, as v1 his view that among the Survices the Army should have the predominant responsibility in this relatively new field. (The Air Force, in particular, disagreed with this contention.) His rather astute attenpt to avoid use of terms Like " irregular" or "unconventional" warfare indicated an early recognition of the need to allay the suspicions of conventional military en (aithough the tern “unconventional warfare" renains in use to this day). And his advocacy of a "Spectal Forces Command" and training center was to cone to fruttion the following year--but not at Fort Benning, avd not in the form that he intended. While Voleknann clearly attached considerable iaportance to the potential us of indigenous personnel in guerrilla waréai apparently the Sype organization that he initially had in mind to support and direct these | Personnel was a Runger unit--not the OSS-type Special Forces organization that | lpia. eA orn werent mena195 he witisately played such an instrumental role in creating. His use of the words pecia! forces operations," then, was precticaily synonymous with OcPH's understending of "special operations"; that 1s, broadly defined as All types of behind-the-lines activities conducted Zor a nilitary purpose, not just guerrilla warfare.! toter he would ve more specific in differanti- ating betveen Ranger and Comando missions, and those involving the organiz tion and support of indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare. Another interesting aspect of Volckmavn's memorandum was the bureau eratic tactic employed to Uring it to the attention of decision makers. After Voleimann returned from the Fort Benning confererce, his menorandum was sent to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, with a request that "the Anterpretation that hes been placad on these statenents of General Collins be confirmed end/or commented on in order that appropriate action may be initiated by the sistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to initiate the directives necessary to arzouplish the desires of the Chief of staff."2 This proved to be the inpetus for a series of foundational studies by OCP, to include the initial one, "Arny Responsibilities in Respect to Special (Forces) Opera tions," written principally by Volcimann and later approved by the Chief of Staff--a classic illustration of the manner in vhich one achieves “wisibslity" Loepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandun for General Taylor, Assistant Chief cf Staff G-3, Subject: Definitions Relating to Paychologi¢al Warfare, special Opera: tions and Guerrilla Warfare, i7 April 1951, RG 319 Army = Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Pay War 370.64 (17 April 1951), National Archivas. 2pepartnent of the Aray, Office of the chief of Peycholugical Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet to Chief of Staff, Subject: General Col- lins Conference at the Infantry Center, 5 April 1951, from Colonel Edward Glavin, Acting Chief of Psychological Warfare (Summary Sheet was prepared by LTC Voickmann), 16 Apri 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Psy War 337 (16 April 1951), National archives.196 for a pet project in the Pentagon bureauctacy. By the end of May the thinking in G-3 and OCEW had begun to cryatellire Concerning the utilization of Lodge Bill recruits. Standards of eelection were established, and a goal of 890 individuals established for those vho would volunteer for airtorne training, and vho possessed specialties related Mon of these aliens wuld be to to the conduct of guerriila warfare, The w: organize guerrilla beads in Eastern Europe after war bagan and attack the Soviet 1iaes of communicacion--the purpose being to alow, or "retard," the Soviet advance into Western Europe. Plans were being developed to trair the: Personnel in increments of 1U0 in a cycle that included Basic Combat Training, followed by completion of the Ranger Cource at Fort Benning, then further Spectalized instruction in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, clandestine couruni- 2 cations and related avbJect At the eri of this training cycie, the aliens would be made available that the planning was te to the Eurypean Theater Command, It wae he cise. One alternative being axamined vas the formation of additional lita.; also Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of ¥sychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Iriefing Notes Conference with G-1, 2, 3,4) and AFF RE Training in the Field of Special (Porees) Operations, 21 june 1951, RG 319 Aruy - Chief of Special Warfare 1951-54, TS Desimal Files, Box No. 12, Pay War 337 TS (2i June 1951), National Archives. Tne siudies resulting from this action, in addition to "Army Responsibilities in Report to Spectal (Foress) operations,” vere: "Theater Special Forces Comand and @.1.) spectal Forces Training Command"; "Special Forces Ranger Unite - and - Spectel Forces Ranger Unite Recruiting and Training of Perscanel"; "Rear Atos Defense"; and "Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs .* Staff sar Matters Pere taining to Guerrilla Waréare.” 2pepartmenc of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General Eddieran, Subjet: Utilization of Lodge Bill Recruits in Special (forces) Operations, 23 May 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, ‘TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370:66, box No. 15, Pay War 33.2 TS (23 May 1951), National Archiv197 "(Spectal Forces) Ranger Companies" to which could be assigned those Americans would bu made avatlable to the theater command for comitment on D-Day. An= other idea was to cove the aliens to Europe for organization inte provisional, units, #0 as to be available for such operations upon the outbreak of hostili- th These options show evidence of McClure's initial ruminations on the subject, but {t was clear that nothing definite had been settled upon. and Eastern European aliens trained for behind-the-lines operations, and wtich | Approximately « month late-, OCPW's thinking on the Lodge ofll recruits i began to show more specificity. The formation of « "Special Forces Regiment" of threa bettaitons, a total of 2,481 personael, vas proposed. Approximately 1,300 of the 2,097 enlisted requirements would be Lodge Bill recruits, and te tovisiged thet the force could be trained and deployed to Europe in com pany-uize increments. The total force vauld serve as the troops required to imsleweat the unconventional warfure portion of current wer plans and exploit the estimated 370,000 2 potential within the USSR and its The latter statenent ts particularly interesting because, as we » the subject of resistance potential in Europe was to become a bone of contention between the Army and CIA. Also notavorthy during thie period vere discussions by OCPY vhich {ncluded the idea that approximately 4,415 Personnel organized into appropriate “operational groups (an OSS term) would de required in peacetime for ccmmitaent in the event of var, the object being lipid. *oeparment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychologteal Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to ACofS, G-3, Subject: Staff Studies, "Special Forces Ranger Untie" ang "Spscial Forces Ranger Unite, Recruiting and Training of Personnel," 12 June 1951, General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 75 Decimal Filew, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.64 (12 June 1951), Naticnal Archives.198 to avoid the mistakes made during World War I: "We must act scatter arne, yd and hope that they will fall ammunition and supplies like so much grass on fertile soll and in turn prove of sove assistance to our aims." To direct these forces 1a Europe, a “Theater Special Forces Training Command” in the United States vas proposed. Notvithetanding this discussion of OSS-type organization, at this point the beste frase of reference was the Special Forces Ranger unte.? This frame of reference began to take on 4 different perspective vhen , Comander-in-Chief, Far East Comund, deactivated all of his Ranger com panies in July 1951. The Rangers hed been reactivat 14 during the Korean and attached to infantry divietona. The €2i3th Conflict 49 separate compant drwy Unit, known informally an the 8th Ranger Company, wes the first to be created and was formed at Camp Drake, Japan, in August 1950, with voluntears from U.S. forcer in the Par East. Tt was attached to the 25th Infantry Divi- 135k. Bae ton, took part in the drive to the Yalu, and deactivated in Ma tween September 1950 and September 1951, fourteen Airborne Ranger companies ware formed and trained by the Ranger Command at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Lpepartmane of Se Army, Office of the Chief of Prychological Werfare, Washington Z5, D.C., Ariefing Notes Conference with Gel, 2, 3, 4 and AFF RE Training in the Feld of Syectal (Forces) Operations, 21 June 1951, RC 319 Army > Chief of Spectal warfare, 54, TS Decinel Piles, Box No: 12, Pay War 337 TS (21 June 1951), National Archives, Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Volekwann had eaciier reiverated Co McClure the conclusion “that « need cxtare for training conmant or center that will bring together the sary sex- nents of special (forces) operations under a program that will fully develop doctrine, pouictes, tachniques and tactica . . . and that Witt develop equipment and supplies." This cae after « crip, directed by MeClure, to obterve training and {natruction at the CIA's "School Nawher One," the Ranger Training Cantar, and the Infantry Ceater--all at Fort Benning, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memmranlur for: General McClure, Subject: Findings and Recommendatione RE Scactes %rrations Training, Fort Benning, Gacraia, 24 April 1951, by LTC R. W. Tslewmacn, RG 219 Army - Chief of Spactal Warfare, TS Decimal Flies, 1971-54, 1/0.2-390.64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.66 TS (3 May 1951), National Archivew.199 Lat, 2d, 34, Ath, Sth, and 8th companies were assigned to divisions throughout the Kighth Army in Korea and vere used primarily ar long-range patrols for teed miesions and to spearhead attacks. The 2d and 4th were aloo at- special tached to the 187th Regimental Combat Team for the combat jump at Munsou-ni. After suffering more than 50 percent casualties, the Reager companies vere Anactivated and the remaining personnel assigned chroughout the divisions.! At the time of CINCFE's action, the Couander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), indicated that he could see no need for Ranger companies in Europe, although he believed that there might be a need for Ranger units of battalion size under certain circumstances. One of CINCFUR's primary reasons for his position was the feeling that "Rangers, as a vhole, drain firet class soldiers from infantry organizations,” a comon complaint leveled against elite unite--and one that Special Force: would have to contend with.” More pertinent to the advocat of "Special Forces Operations," hovevar, were the views of both CINCPE and CINCEUR that the Pangera vere not capable of conducting guerrilla warfare type missions in thetr theaters due to racial and language bounderi Instead, they believed, such afesions should be conducted by indigenous person~ nel who were in turn trained, supplied, and controlled by American military personnel.? lpepartment of tha Army, Office of the Chief of Paycholesical Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Tanger Unita, 17 July 1951, from Colonel Wendell Fertig, thief, Special Operations, PG 319 (Aray Staff), Psy War Adain Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box'No. 13, Psy War 322 $'(17 July 1951), National Archive: 2rytd.; also see Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Hi1L tary Units in Modern Depoctacies (Cambridge: Center for International 4: Harvard, 1978), pp. 55-38. 3pepartment of the Ary, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare,200 Voicing a related concern, Army Field Forces--ts commating on OCRY's staff study "Special Forces Ranger Unite'--forvarded their view thet any reference to Rangers should be deleted because “anvistoned Special Forces will in all probability be involved in subversive activities." Thay believed that the concept of Special Forces should focus on the use of indigenous guerrilla affed anger unite; cherefure, sroupe bohind eneny Lines rather than American Rangers and Special Forces siould be kept as separate and distinct organisc- tions. ‘The result of all this was a meeting on August 23, 1951, prosided wer by the G-3, General Taylor, out of which came a dectston to deactivate. all Ranger unita and convert the Ranger Training Consand to « depertoent: of the Infantry School. ‘This departwent would conduct Ranger training for aelecced officers and enlisted men, who upon completion of the course would be returned yent day). to thor parent units (@ pattern which has continued until the pr concerning what agency would be capable During the meeting the question arot of conducting "Jeep penetration activities," at which point, according to Colonel Aaron Bank's memorandum, "General Taylor was t: croughly briefed on the mission and capabilities of a Special Forces organizatton."2 This was perhaps the perfect {illustration of that old adage, “being at Tad jutant General, Ary Pleld Forces, Letter to Adjutant General, Depart- ment of the Army, Subject: Training of Individuals and Unite of the Army in Spectal (Forces) Operations, 23 August 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal larfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, 091.412 TS Propaganda (23 August 1951), National Archives. Zoepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Peychologteal Wartar Moahirgeon 25, D.C., Memorandim for Record, Subject: Conference ta Resaive Ranger Program, 24 August 1951, by Colonel Aaron Bank, Special Operations Divi = sion, RG 319, Psy War 337 (24 August 1951), Nattonal Archives. The principale attending the conference were Genera Taylor, General Bradford, G-3, At. . and General McAuliffe, G-1201 he T1ghe place at the right tine," because ultimately the personae] spaces teeded to create the 10th Special Forces Croup vere aude avatlable as 4 result of the deactivation of the Ranger units. Henceforth, there was to be ltete uae of "Ranger" terminology uy OCPY in their efforts fe sell the concept of Spectal Forces, or tn their proposals for the organization to carry out guerrilla varfare, Thair initial draft TOSE for the "Special Forces Group," for example, presented as the sroup's missio ‘To infiltrate tte component gperational groups [enthasis aided] to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerriila potential on @ milt- tery basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea, and air forces."! The erganization and functions of this group and {ts subordinate operational elenents clearly depicted the influence of OSS concepts: particularly the Operational Group Command--rather than those of the Rangers Tronteally, a year later OCW found it nece ry to potat out to Army Field Forces that use of the subordinate unite of the Spectal Porces Group of independent coumande or Ranger type missions, "while a capability," was "to be discouraged as being highly wasteful of the highly developed ski tl wranped che 10a up in the operational teams."? hie vas in the fall of 1952, wh Yoepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychologieal Wat fare, Washington 25, D.C., Herorandum for: ACOfS, G-3, Subject: Request for spaces in the Active Army, 26 Septenber 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RC 319 (ermy Stati), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal Tile (C), 1951-54, 311.5-319.1, Box No. 11, Pay War 320.2 (28 Septenber 1951}, National Archives. 2oeparement of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychclogical Werfa Washingtos 25, D.C., Memorandum to ACofS, G-3, Subject: Table of Organiza. Hon and Equipment 33-510 (proposed) for Special Forces Croup (Abn); 13 Now vember 1952, with drafe lst Ind letter to OCAFF, RG 319 Army = Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decinal Files, Box No. 8, Fay War 320.3 TS (0 Septenber 1952), National Archives.eee nen a earner 202 Special Forces Group was recruiting and training at ort Bragg for deployment to Europe. But Aray Field Foces wes not the on!y Comand tn Late 1952 that had ideas different from those of OCPH on hov Spectal Forcss elements would be uctiized. In his prelimtoary planning for the uttltzation of the 10th, Brigadier General Liebel, of the Buropsan Couand, envisaged the D-Day euploy- ment of small groups to strike at close-in targets within a fifty-mile zone immediately in front of U.S. tactical divisions. McClure objected strenuously on this question of "baie Spectal Forces d-ctring," telling Liebel that such an activity wae a Ranger or Comando-type action, normally of short dura tlon, vhich would not require highly. trained Special Forces personnel, and veation of the thus "was act in consonence-with the concept underlying the loth Spectal Forces Group." That concep was clear, thought MeClure: "We continve to maintain that Spactal Forces Opérational Detachnent s have the nit- sion and capability of developing indigenous guerrilla forces, conducting operations behind the enewy lines, and of sustaining these operations for «n McClure told Liebel that “the indefinitely long tine.” To buttr Chief of Staff has insisted that Special Forces shall not duplicate the train ing and doctrine of ranger and commando units." This was the same Chief of Staff, General Collins, who in April 1951 atated that he hed "personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve Ipeadquarters, European Coumard, Latter to Brigadier General McClure, 12 Novenber 1952, from Brigadier General Willard K. Liebel, Chief, Support Plana Branch, J-3, Psy War 240 (12 Noveuber 1952); Office of the Chief of Psychological War Latter to Brigadier General Liebel, 8 December 1952, from McClure, Pay war 230 (8 December 1952); Office of the Chief of Psycho- logical Warfare, Letter to Tiebdel from McClure, 19 Decenber 1952, Pay War 290 (19 Decenber 1952), RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1952-54, TS Dectmal Files, Box'No. 6, Rational Archiv203 subversive activities). for expansion in thie direction" (to tatetat ‘Tete apparent curnsbout in the Chief of Staff's philosophy illustrates fhe confusion and difficulties that often accompany the energeace of « nev Concept within military bureaucracy--particularly 4£ that concept involves the creation of un Velite” unt. One of the prineinai requirements for "elt tenese" 4s Che possession of a specialized functon, one that does not fall within the Province of ther etitrry organizations. Ie te difficult to justify the ex: ietence of elite unite Lf there appears to be unnecessary overlapping or re- Gusdency of thetr functions and capabilities with those of other unite. “This {0 pertigularly so during periods of scuts manpower shortages. tr. order to ind the acceptance survive, the definition of an elite unit's spectal mission of that mission by the bureaucracy--ts « cructally important task. McClure and his staff cave to recognize this necessity. With the deace cify guerrilla Fivation of the Rangers sore and more effort vas expended to 2; warfare a2 the prinary mission of the Spactal Forces organization thet they Part of the confusion vhich marked this effort was of thely oon propo: aking, however. Thetr concept of “Spectal Forces Operations," for Anstanée, was 4m actuality an all-encompassing heading under which was grouped the many eat ae ea eceagaee eee) oar! 1o) var tare wan oneeencsel ee tee Sor consisted only of their Uetng conducted within or wehind eneny Lines. one would have thought, obviously, that a Special Forces unit should couduet ‘which tncluded, by OCPW's definition, Ranger and "Special Forces Operations" Commando activities, But no: as tine went on, the architects of Spectal Forces found te sary to point out the error, a5 they eav tt, of Linking nades_and Politic! ens, particularly nis discussion of ‘The 3206 the Group and ts component unit missions with the tera "Special Forces Opera- tlona" on the assumption that the Special Forces Group was « TOSE untt d ‘signed to conduct all such operations. Needles to say, this rather subtle and nie Ctatinction wust have been lost on many. This blurring of rol ons was uve aided, either, by OCPW's initial moves to graft the guerrills warfare concept onto the Ranger organization, only to be followed by ite rather vigorous efforts to dissociate Special Forces from the Rangers. Eventually, OCPY did ansver General Taylor's initial directive tu develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla warfare and then tc essign that Fesponsibility to subordinate Army units. The unit that evolved at Fort Bragg nd its orgartzation was based on OSS in’ 1952 waa the Special Forces Group-. concepts, not Ranger. Perhaps Volcknann and company had OSS organizational principles clearly in mind ‘from the very beginning, but found it more oppor- tune to gain initial acceptance for their ideas by tagging them on to the Rangers, whose historical precedence in the Army was knom--and particularly since the Chief of Staff initially appeared to favor utilization of the Rangers in a guerrilla warfare role. Or perhaps it vas simply a case of the officers involved grappling with nev ideas and experimenting with the types of organtzational machinery to implement those idi Im all probability, the answer is that combination of the tvo motives was at work during this initial conceptual perio’, and the deactivation of the Rangers helped to clarify the situation. Concurrent with the deactivation of the Rangers, General McClure began to take an inte it in establishing a training facility for both paychol> warfare and unconventional warfare. To be sure, Colonel Volekmann hed205 campaigned since April for a training comand or center that would fully develop doctrine, techniques, and logtatical aspects of specta) ferces opera: tions. And there had been some discussion between the G-3 Division and AFF in early 1950, before the creation of OCPH, of the need for e "school center" for Peychologicrl warfare--vhich resulted in establishment of the Peychological War- fare Department at Fort Riley, just orodveing ite first graduates. But now MeCiure began to entertain the idea of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of oC" at @ post other than Fort Ailey.) MeClure aad Colonel Bank visited Army Finld Foret in mid-August to out~ Line the Army's responsibilities in the field of unconventional varfare and to ser the lack of organization, training, or planning that had been done in unconventional warfare, as coupared to the progr made in psychological vai ablishing a "Guerrilla Training Command” st Fort fare. The possibility of Benning or perhaps Zort Campbell vas discuased, to which would also be moved the Puychological Warfare Department from Port Riley.” Thus began the search Ipepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Findings Recomendations re Special Operations Training, Fort Benning, Georgia, from Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Volckmann, 24 April 1951, RG 319 Army = Chief of Spestal Warfare, TS Decimal Piles, 1951-54, fron 370.2 - 370.64, Box No. 15, Pa; War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), National Archives. Volckmann had been directed by McClure to visit Fort Benning for che purpose of observing and re viewing the courser of training and instruction at the CIA's "School Number One," the Ranger Training Center, and the Infancry School, with enphasis on the epectal operations reiated instruction, then render a report to him con= cerning findings and recormendations (see menorandum fron MeClure to Volekmann, 19 March 1951, filed with above reference). For discussion by McClure and Bank with AFF concerning a Training Center, see Department of the Arny, Office of the Chief of Psychological ¥orfare, Washington 25, D.c., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 16 August 1931, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 1S Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meeting, Box No. 2, Netional Archives. 4 AThid., eepectally Minutes of Weekly Staff Mecting, 16 Auguet 1951.206 for a training center, « search that would end with the selection of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Along thir ad to Fort Bragg would travel McClure! ‘efforts to establish Special Forces and its concept of employment, and to gain suthorization for the canter he envisuged. It was mot an easy Journey. Piret of all, there was the matter of the CIA. As we heva ween, the Aray basically weleomd the energence of CIA/OPC during the interver years, ‘and in 1949 agreed to provide it unilateral assistance in the field of guerrilla varfare, which included helping in the location and establishsent of a ‘at Fort Benning, Georgia, And after the outbreak of war in training cour Korea, the Aruy also provided ove parsonnel to the CIA for thetr activities in that theater. But then General McClure and his OCEW appeared on the scene, By the apring of 1951, McClure had already expressed bis reservations concerning the relatively aitonocous OFC role in Rorea. In yubsequent monthe, the frustri tions of unsuccessfully attempting to influence this situation in Korta, plus che battle to bring Special Forces into being and plan for its employment tn turope, increased MeClure's reservations to outright auapictons of the CA's motives. ‘These suspicions were reciprocated. As an example, in mid-1951, both cra/oRC and OCP ries of conferences to determine means of red into # further collaboration in guerrilla warfare training programs. Even though the study that resulted indicated that the CIA would benetit by sending some of ite personnel to the center being proposed by OCPY, the forwarding memorandum sent to Ganeral McClure stated that "Mr. Wisrer would like tt to be clearly understood that this understanding {s reached on the assumption that the Aray fe creating @ Spectal Forces Training Coumand for its own purposes and not at207 tha request of CIA."! The caveat expressed by Prank Wisner, heed of OPC, war obvious: The CIA was not going to place itself in the position of providing an excuse for the Army to use in Justifying the creation of its om uncomven- Clonal warfare capability. Perhaps {t vas inavitable that tvo etrong-villed, energetic man like Wlaner and McClure, both eyeing the sane “turf in a rela tively nev f1eld, would coe tate conflict in attempting to establish the foudaries within which each would operate. Not that chre warn tot attenpia to define those boundaries and to co- other. ‘here were. Both men entered into an initial, tenta- operate with eaci tive agreement in July 195i concerning their understanding of the respective roles of CIA/OPC and OCPW in the #214 of unconventional warfare. This was i folloved by the aforementioned conferences on training programs, and in April 1952 the two agencies agreed to an official liaison arrangement to coordinate materiel research activities.” There ts also evidence that despise his eurly reservations concerning Teentral Intelligence Agency, Office of Policy Coordination, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Through: Joint Jubstdiaty Plans Division, JCS, Subject: Joint CIA-D/A Guerrilla Werfare Training, from KtIbourne Johnston, Deputy Assistant Dirextor for Policy Co- ordination, 17 August 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff), Pay War Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 360-370.64, Bex No. 19, Pay War 370.64 (21 August 1951) S, National Archives. 2yepartisent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Agroenent Between Mr. Frank ‘ifaner, Ausistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, and Brigadier General Robert HeClure, chief Poy War-~ Special Staff, D/A,'on the Rnsyective Rolea wad Responsibilities of CIA/OPC and Pay Yaz Division, Special Staff, Depacteent of the Army, in the Field of Unconventional Warfare, 17 July 1951, 26519 Army ~ Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, 78 Decinal Files, Rox No. 2, 020 CIA, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfere, Menorasdea for: Chief, Joint Substdsary Plans Division, JOS, Subject: Coordination of Army Paycholegieal Warfare Ma- teriel Research Activities with CiA, 25 March 1952, from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, anf reply from OTA, 23 April 1952, RG 319. (Arcy Staff), Psy War Atoin Office, Box No. 25, Poy War 400.112 (25 March 1952) C, National, Archives.208 in Korea, McClure took « considerably| more broad-minded view of CIA's role in unconventionul warfare than did certain wenbers of hic ff. After returning from an important visit to Zurppe in August and Sop- tenber 1952, to discuss unconventional varfare planning for that th MeClura chided bis staff: Putnam [a 39S officer] and I talbed at Length reference the philosophies I expreased--as I have repeated over and over with you people. Putnan says they are not being reflected by you people at tae JSPD level. T balieve the Arzy should be the Ex- ecutive Agent for guerrilla activities. I am not going to fight with CIA as to their rasponsibilities in those fields. ‘Another {4 the fact that I am fully in accord vith supporting CIA in their peacetine activities in getting reudy| for war to th maximum extent I can and in wertine vill velcoue chy of their re sources to the maximum of their capability. ! ‘This was the praguatic McClure of World Wer II who, as Chief, PyD/ SHAR?, brought together a number of disparate agencies |and nationality groups, civilian as well as military, in order to get the Job cone. He had learned his trade well from that master of compromise and cooperation, Dwight D. Btsenhover. But as the months and years went by, MéClure becam less tolerant, gradvally adopting in his condesmation of tht CIA the phrat the most virulent erities on his staff. At the end of hts tenure as chief, OCPH, the subject preoccupied him. What caused this turnabout of affaira? Perhaps the most succinct explanation of McClure's change of attitude can be fend in one of his last 1. ters before departing OCPW in early 1953. Writing to his old friend, : Lieutenant Generat Bolte, then Comander-in-Chief, Europe, McClure explained: Tepartment of the Aruy, Office of the Gilef of Psycholngical Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Meeting, 5 Septenber 1951, RC 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Necimal Files, Box No. 12, Psy War 337 TS (S Septenber 1951}, National Archives. i209 Unfortunately T will not go through Germany on my way to Iran else would take the of portunity to bring you up to date on the Aray/CIA relationship. I feel that the latest paer on command zelationship has s0 much fine print in it that we have committed ourselves to the creation of @ fourth service which wilt affactively tia the hands of the military and require the Theater Gomander to lean on and support GIA for all Unconventional Warfare. in recent conferences at CIA, I have heard the statevent made repeatedly that, "Since ve are nov a fourth service many of the activities for which the Any vas planning should be trensferred to CIA, including the command of military forces designed for guerrilla wacfare in time of war." Needless to say I an very unhappy about tt doth because I question the ability of CIA and second, because I have never be) ever the Joint Chiefs dn- tended €0 abrogate their responsibi}ittes for the active comand of military operations in tive of war. Here, then, were MeClure's key grievances. Aside fron the perennial question during these carly years of the precise delineation of peacetine and Vertine responsibilities for enconentional warfare betveen the CIA and DOD, MeClure had simply cove to belteve that the CIA was not capable of holding up their end of the bargain--hovever it was defined. Imbued with the urgency of Preparing the nation and the Aray for a possible war in Europe, McClure was dis- eisfied with the CIA's apparent lack of progress in preparation of guerrilla warfare. He reported to the Chief of Staff in early Septenber 1951 that the "CIA has only now inieiated planning fer the exceut‘on of preparatory measures to aid in the retardation of a Soviet advance."? He belicved, therefore, that the nilitary--and particularly the Army--needed to have unconventional warfare forces Voepartzent of the Arvy, Office of the Chiat of Psychological Warfare Washington, D.C., Letter to ‘deutenant Grneral Charles L. Bolte, Conmander-in Ghief, U.S. Aray, Burope, fron Brigadier General MeClure, 1953 undated (probably late Fetruary or early March 1953), RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Ofice, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, Box No. 3, Pey War 040 CIA (undated) 5°, National archives. Zoepartennt of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychologteal Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Sumary Sheet for Chief of staff, Subject: Staff Visit co Europe, 13 Septenber 1951, fron Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Dectmal Files 323.3-333, Box'No. 9, Psy War 333 Europe TS (12 Septender 1951), National arc216 to being, and that necessary planning, orgarization, and traintag be carried out prior to D-bay. In his view, the military services could not Leave auch preparations to chance or in the hands of a civilian agency. Nor should the JCS allov a situation t0 develop where the theater comander in ar. active cheater of war would not have full control over all military operations tn he believed. his area of responsibitity--as had happened in Kore: Underlying MeClure's doubts concerning CIA's capability to perform the unconventional warfare aission, hovever, vas a deeper difference of phtlosophy betveen OCPY end CIA concerning the nature of resistance potential tn Buiope. The CIA position on this subject vas perhaps most eloquently stated by its Director, Goneral Walter 3. Smith, ina letter written Co the Army G-2 in March 1952. Saith opened bia letter by refer=ing £2 MeCiure oe follows At certain times in the past ve have beea importened by Genera! MeClure's people to provide them with detailed information concerning guerrilla groupe cf wnich ve may have some knovledge. We have consistently declined to furnish this infrrmation to General McClure because the information requested impinges directly upon secret operations in which we are curvently engaged [ni for which, at this tim, we exe solely responsible.! Here was a real source of irritation. The CIA--understandably--was reluctant to share information in its operations vhich could lead to conpromise of important intelligence assets, and perhaps undermine by preaature dia~ stance potenticl that vould be counted upon in vartine. closure tha very rei o understandably--was frustrated by ite inability to re- MoClure's office: quire ‘the information believed to be neceasary for proper prewar plenning; Acentral Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director, Washington 25, D.C. Letter to Major General A. R. Solling, Assistant Chief of Staff, 6-2, Departsent of the Army, March 10, 1952, fron Walter B, Smith, Director, Filed with RC 319 Army - Chief of Special Varfare, 1951-54, TS Dacimal Piles, Box Wo. 15, Pay War 370.64, Guerrilla Warfare, Nationa archives.2 and the extrese secrecy involved only hei jitened thetr suspicions of CIA's It was to be a perennial topic of discord between the Lack of preparedne: two agencies Not only weuld they refuse to provide the information desired, said Smith, but hie agency questioned the “validity of General McClure's proposal for retardation by guerrilla forces." Expressing both the views of his of "the leading British experts in this field,” Smith ex- It 4a highly doubtful thet general resistance forces vill develop any substantial offeasive copability until at least D plus six months. Enemy controls and reprisals will be extrenely aavere upon the outbreak of war. Certain underground organizations have even indicated tist they will hesitate to go into action until the Allied battle line is stabilized on the continent and the tide is turning our vay. After enlarging upon this thene for several pavagraphe, Smit then sum marizea his position yns outlined above, any program vhich conteaplates that je acale resistance organ‘:"tions, developed prior to D-day and held in readiness for an indefinite period of time would be willing and capable to deliver major offensive blovs within the first fev weeks after the comencenent of hostilities is considered by ue to be unrealistic and infeasible. MeClure had, of course, considered the pros cai cons of what ne termed the “two different schools cf thought on the timing of the commitment of unconventional forces." One school held that the first few days of a Soviet attack were critical, and that even a few hours of delay accouplisied by uncon ventional warfare forces would be significant. The other school (the "British view") held that guerrilla forces stiwuld not dissipate their efforts prenaturely and thus did not favor any uprising until regular allied armed forces were ina Lipa.position to support them. His om anslysii Staff in September 1951 was that: To accept the latter view would mean nothing would heppan on D-Day ‘and not until ve were ina position to start liberating overrun countries. To azcept the former view vould mean attrition might completely dissolve that work and organization which had been created. My personal view is that aven with the attrition we have more to gain thas to lose, and that 1f the British can organise after D-Day for a future use, such guerrilla forces as desired, obviously we coyld reorgentze in’ those areas where attrition had taken tee toll. In addition to disagreeing on the philosophical approach as to how the resistance should be generated, vhen it should be committed, the CIA also took ‘exception with OCPH's attempts Co estinate resistance potential in Eastern in Ocha" Europa. IL culled the projected indigenouo strength eatinati Special Forces Operations Plan for Europe “unrealiette and unattainabl this and other views advanced by the CIA apparently formed tha basia for 2 Anitiel JCS disapproval of tke plan in late 195 These were fundamental differences. MeClure's deepest concern, however, vas best illustrated by the remark in his letter to Bolte about CIA's enbi- tions to becom a “fourth service." He was genuinely apprehensive of allov- eablish the baste for undue Ang too much latitude to the CIA which could Upepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Mashingtoa 25, D.C., Menorandur for: Caneral J. Lavten Collins, Chef of Staff Subject: Staff Visit to Europe, from Srigadier General McClure, 10 Septeber 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-5’, 323.3°333, Box No. 9, Pay War 333 (10 september 1951), National Archiv 2ahe CIA's statement appeared 11 a menorandum dated 6 June 1952, an en- closite to JCS 1969/73, Memorandur for Chairman, JCS, Subject: Overseas CIA Togistical Support Banen; ae Office of the Chief of Taychological Warfare, Memorandum for: Cafel of Hilitary ilatory, Subject: Summary of Major Events and Problems, Pey War 316.7 TS (15 Auguat 1953); see alao Tay War 314.7 (6 January 1953}, Whatory of DA Activities, for OCTW's explanation of why C5 di appr wes thelr Sprctal Forces Operations Flan for Zurcpe; both ara filed in RG 319 Army = chief of Spectal Warfare, 1¥31 34, FS Decimal Pilea, 311-319.1, Box No. 7, National Archives.a3 Fellance by the military on CIA/OPC for unconventionsl varfare activities. In doing so, he feared, unconventional varfare nay then “becone regarded among - nilitary commanders and planners as 4 limited, spectal ‘eloak and dagger! fune- tion rather than as a basicatly important, possibly yential military responsibility.) Here again was a reminder of the inage problem, as perceived by McClure and his staf: the constant battle to achieve legitimacy for unconventional warfare among “conventional” uilitary officers. If too much responsibility for unconventional warfare was pas: to the CIA, it could reinforce the Teservations that sany officers already harbored concerning the Army's role in unconventional warfare. In a period of budgetary and manpower shortages, such reservations could quickly lead to the conclusion that the Army could not-+and should not etempt to duplicate the functions of « civilian agency. In short, MeClure's primary concern--vhile well intentioned--was bureaucratic in nature and aimed at the establishnent and preservation of an unconventional warfare capability for the Aray. Another threat to McClure's attempts to eatablish « strong Aray role in vuneonvent fo 1 warfare was the opposition of vhe Air Force. We have already seen that he was critical of the Air Force support of Army paychological warfare activities in Korea, and concerned over what ha considered to be the Ipepartuent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandim for: Brigadier General Paul D. Harkins, Sud Ject: JSPC 808/112, Command Relationships Between the CIA/OPC Organization and the Armed Forces in Actual Theaters of War Where Anerican Forces Are Ene gaged (29 Decenber 1952), from Brigadier General McClure, Chief of Peycho- logical Warfare, 30 December 1952, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 000.1-020, Box No. 1, National Archives. General Harkins was the “Army Planner,” @ senior officer responsible for presenting the Army's position on JCS actions.24 unnecessarily duplicative propaganda equipment and persounel in their perial Resupply ard Communication wings. These sane wings, hovever, and their support of CIA operations in Korea, also gave the Air Force clain to 4 leading role tn unconventional warfare. Their list of wartine missions for these ARC wings included: the introduction and evacuation of agents behind enemy lines; serial resupply of guerrillas; support of comando type oper! tions and isolated Aruy unite; and the printing and peckaging of leaflete, well as providing trained personnel capable of conducting psychological warfare through other media, In short, the Air Fores claimed the ARC wings during peacetine or provided then with a capability to support CIA activitt wartine; to conduct overt psychological warfare; and to direct, coordinate, ‘and support unconventional warfare operat ions.1 ‘This close peacetine association with the CIA caused the Atz Force--in the eyes of OCR--to champion CIA/OPC as the egency responsible for planning and preparing for the conduct of unconventional warfare, thus taking tasve with he concept that the Army had a major reaponsibilicy and princtpal fune~ tion in this field as part of land varfere, Sin{larly, this association with CIA/OPC was being used, thought OCP, to seek « unilateral, preeminent Air Force position among the Services for control and direction of vartime uncon- 2 ventional warfare activities. Apepartmert of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfa Washington 25, D.C., Acr Force Presentation Co the Psychological Strategy Board fon 10 January 1952, filed with RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal Warfare, TS Dect~ mal Files, 1951-54, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Pay War 350.001 TS (7 Jamuary 1952), National Archives 2pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychologica! Warfare, WashLagton 25, D.C., Discunstons of Questions by the Under Secretary of the Ary concerning Army Role in Guerrizla and Unconventional Warfare, in response to a Memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff, Subject: Guerrilla Warfare, 1121s ‘As one might have expected, General McClure divegreed with the contention of the Air Foree. In his view, the Alr Ferce was sentially a "supply agency" for unconventional varfare activities, “with transportation capable of doing certain things that the Ground Fores are going to require and going to comand." He supported Air Force developeant of special wings to support Psychol: gical and unconventional warfars activities but not to duplicate the @ Ifcenee to ¢: Army's capabi lied aa dominant role in these fields.! He was particularly disturbed by the lack of and certainly not to be used Joint unconventional warfare planning that he found when he visited Europe in the 1 of 1951, and told the Chief of Staff that the Air Force not only disagreed with the Aray view on retardation, but elec "Zelt they had a major Feapenstbtiity in the €1eld of unconventional warfare which did not exclude the actual comand of guerrillas." Because of the unilateral efforts of the Servic and what he sav as unnecessary duplication and confusion among tnem and in their relationship with CIA, McClure believed that one Service should and that Service, of course, should be the Ara. Valuable support for McClure's view of « predowinant role for the Amy avctl 1952, ESled with Pay War 320.64 TS (3 May 1952) (12 May 1952), TS Dect= ral Piles, 1951-54, Dox No. 15, National Archives, Toepartoent of the Ary, Cfftce of the Ghtaf of Paychotostcal warfare, Wavoingtor, D.C., Manutes of Meeting, 5 Septenber 1951, RG 319 Army ~ Chie? of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 15 Deetnal Files, Box No. 12, Psy War 337 TS (5. Sep~ tember 1°51), National Archives. Zonpartnent of the Army, Offize of the Chief of Taychological Warfare, Wastington 2%, D.C., Momorandim for: General 2. Levten Coline, Chior of Staff, Subjects Staff Viatc to Europe, fiom Brigadier General NeClure, 12 Septnrber 1951, RG 329 Aray - Chief of Spactal Warfere, TS Decinal Files, 1951-54, 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Fay War 333 (10 Septenbar 1951), National Archtun4a unconventional warfare cane from General Eisenhower, the Suprema Allied Comandar in Kurope. During another visit to Europe in Novenber 1951, MeClure briefed Eisenhower on the coumand and coordination difficulties that had arisen vith reepect to unconventional warfare planning for Europe. Eisenhower was "keenly alert” to the potential that unconventional warfare offered, stated McClure in hie trip report to the Chief of Staff, and gave permission to quote him on the folloving view One Service wust not only have a paramount interest in this field but also ve the controlling authority. 3 In wy opiniva this field is an Army one and. . . in uy theater te will bes ‘All facilities must be put under the Army. The Navy and Air Force will have to support the Army. Air support is esgential but ia this field the Air orce ie only a transport outfic. Eisenhower went on to speak strongly against extravagance resulting from duplication or individual Service Jealousies. It was a strong endorat sent of MeClure's views, but the interservice rivalry 4m unconventional war~ fare contimed, particularly with respect to planning and comand responsibilities in Zurope. | Although OCP eventually did succeed in obtaining recos- nition for the Army as having primary responsibility anong the Services for thie new field,? the conflict betveen the Air Force and Aruy that marked this Apepartment of the Aruy, Office ot the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, 2.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Aray, Subject: Unconventional Warfare (Special Forces Operations) Discussions Held at EUCOM and SHAPE, from Brigadier General McClure, 5 Decenber 1951, RG 319 Aray - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370,64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.64 TS (5 December 1951), National Archive: 2peportment of che Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Chief Military History, Summary of Masor Activities of OCW for Period 9 Septenber 1951 to 31 December 1952, 7 April 1953. JCS Decision 1969/18, 27 March 1952, Responaibilittes of the Services and the Joint Chiafa of Scaff for Guerrilla Warfare, assigned to the Army the primary responsibility for guerrilla varfa: it pertain to combat opera- thons oa land, The Ary war also made primarily responsible for the develop~ ment, in evordination with the other Services and subject to JCS policy27 Process--as that between the Army and the Cli--vas a key feature in the b drop of MeClure's efforts to create Special Forces and establish the Peycho- logical Warfare Center. In addition to the interagescy and interservice rivalry that OCEY had fo contend with, thare vas also the aot inconsidarable challenge of selling the Aray on the Spectal Forces concept and the idea of a centralized training comand for both paychological and unconventional varfare. In Juno 1951 Geoeral Collins--the Chiaf of staff. ‘pProved the conclusions of Volcknann's initial study, “Aray Responsibilities for Special Forces Operations," and fore Nerded 48 fo the JOS indicating that until they delineated: Service responei- bilities for unconventional warfare, the Ar-y would use chis study as a basis for planning. Although an toportas inttial step, this general endorsement. ¥y Collins to proceed with investigation and planning on the subject did not Provide OCPY vith the srecific authorteation needed, This cane only after the inftial étecussion by McClure and Colonel Bank with Aray Field Forces in August 1952, when the G-3 in mid-Septenber cone curred with the recommendation of the Ary Pleld Forces that a training center should be established for paychological warfare and special operations, Indie cating to OGPY that this center should be established initially Yon an austere eT eF gE ihe doetzine, tastier, techniques, proceduree, and equtpoent ETELTES Dy guerrilla forces tn combat operations cn land and the techn of Ghia? "E meh forces with the asstatance of the other Services, RE See Arey we sat meekal Harfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal File, S1II9 1 Boe ee 7, Pay War 31.7 (6 January 1953), National Archives , ‘ceneral Collins's directive renatned in stfeet for nine months, unet1 eTnepaar ea eeepc tocar deer cons arallaN rtsreaeviee! tees 1saq=* cys ca Seaimated the Army as having peisery renponstbility mong the Sereieen foe Flacenane se care: TOMI; see etao Brigadier Ganeral Bullock's (weclavels re rneese"s t8 hee, OCTa) ‘briesing to the Chief, Arey Fleld See cce ene sore penrons Wirginia, 5 October 1953, RG 319 arey ~ Chet of spectal Warfare, Ts Tsay mete» 1951-54, 337-350.0>, Box No. 13, Pay War 337 19 (2 Ootenet 1953), National Archtver.218 undertaken “to establish basis," the G-3 also directed that action should tha extent to which the resources of the Aruy are to be allocated to Special preted too liberally by the Forces) Operations.” Last this guidance be inte rather pointedly added: Spectal Forces enthusiasts, the followiug caution w In view of the acute menpover situation and the known reluctance of overseas commanders to accept special units within their troop cetl- ing, in preference to established units, the basic policy in regard to Spectal (Forces) Operations should be the maximm utilization of Andigenous personne} for such operations and the minimm use of Anerican peracnnel. Following on the heels of the deactivation of the Ranger units, this statement is a rather clear indication of the wariness with which conventional commanders and staffs regarded "elite" and “spectal" unita--particularly during periods of budgetary and manpover short: Wbett rather narrowe-provided by G-3 was a- In any event, the opening: Jertly acted upon by OCPH. A virtual cascade of actions poured forth from MoClure's staff: representatives net with the staff of Army Field Forces to develop an agreed Teble of Distribution (TD) for a Psychological Warfare Cen- ter; T-bles of Organization and Equipment for the units of « Spectal Forces Group (no longer called « Special Forces Ranger Regizent) were developed for staffing; @ proposed training circular dese:tbing the mission, capabilities organization, concept .of employment and training of a Special Forces Group was written; a requirement for 3,700 personnel spaces, including 300 spaces for the proposed training center, was submitted; « proposed directive to the Chief Apepartment of the Ary, Organization and Training Division, G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief cf Psychological Warfare, Subject: Training of Individuals and Unite of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, 14 September 1951, from Brigadier Ganeral D. A. D. Ogden, G-3 370.2 TS (23 August 1951), filed sith RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.2 TS (16 September 1951),29 of Army Field Forces outlining his rasponsibilities in paychological warfare and Special Forcss Operations was prepared, as vel © suggested AFP tratn- Ang progrms fox thess ftelde; and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was recomended as the site for the new center, with a suggested activation date of Decenber a 1, 1951, All of this was reported to the G-3 of October 5, scarcely three weeks after OCEW received the go-ahead from then. McClure wanted to nove fast! Avuy Yield Foreas had recomended that the proposed training center be eetablished at either Fort Campbell or Canp Pickett, Virginia. The OCP favored Fort Camphell because t had airborne and parachute maintenence f cilities, but recomended to G-3 that a final decteton on the location be held until ¢ survey of installations was conducted.? In the final analysts, neither the perscnnel spaces requested for Special Forces ani the Center, the target date for activation of the Canter, nor th. tentutive preferred location would prove to be xccurate, but progress tovard accomplishment of HeClure's goal vas being made. Both McClure sd his chief architect for the Special Forces concept, Volckmann, realized the suspicions engendered among many offic by these Toepartnent of the Arey, Office of the Chief of Paychological warf 8, Kashington 25, D.c., Response to G-3, 370.2 TS (14 Septeaber 1951}, Sub jee Fraining of Individuals and Unite of the Aray in Special (Forces) Operation from Briyadiex “eeral MeClure, 5 October 1951, RG 319 Army ~ Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Piles, 370.2-370.64, tox No. 15. filed WS eee Naz 370-2 1S (14 September 1951), National Archims. Minutes of the 13 Septeroer 1951 veekly OW Scaff Meeting show that a ple. tore Centos for Faychologizal Warfare and Special Operations Training was ba'ng worked gnr with the intent of naking the necesaary suggestions fo AFP, vie In torn See Shen Eacormend fo G-3 that euch a center be eatablished--un interesting, but not uncommon, bit of bureaucratic maneworing to get a get project onder a7 F6,219 Army ~ Cite of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Dacinal Files, soe No. Z, Pay War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archiv Zeta, 5 October 1951, OCPH respense to G-3.220 efforts to introduce into the Army new ideas and an unprecedented orgenize- Both men toox steps to attempt to dispel tion to carry out those ide these euspicions. In a paper written in latu October 1951, Voleknann analyzed the problem this way: The question of capabilities and support that must be di- verted 20 behind-the-lines operations brings us tc e final major problem. So any strictly conventional ailitary minds "flash-red” Ze the mention of anything "special" or at the diversion of personnel end equipment to any channel other than conventional regular forces. In away, they ere justified in safeguarding the diveraton of persounel, equipment and support that will in any vay tend to Weaken the capab!lities of our regular forces. For the most part, however, their fears are without foundation. If they will but take tine to view the problem of any future war as a whole, thetr initial reactions shovld be modified and their fears dispelled. Voletmann believed that historical analysis of World War II shoved that behind tha-lines operations were not fully developed and fell far short of th-de potential. This was due, he beileved, to s failure by the military to activities as an integral part of conventional warfare; proper regard the eophasis, in other words, was lacking at both staff and operating levels. The result, in his view, was guerrilla warfare conducted as a "side show" and on a shoestring" basis, for the most part uncoo=dinated with the operations of conventional forces. To prevent this from happening in the fur.re, and to convince military mea of the Snportance of behind: the-Lines operations in modern warfare, be advocated general indoctrination on the subject through service schools and specialized training in appropriate centers--like the one for "special forces operations" that he had advocated six months previcusly.? Ipepartwent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., "Special Forces Operations," by Colonel Volekmann, 26 October 1951, filed in Psy War 372.2 Operations, National Archiv 2rp4a.m2 Similarly, in « briefing prepered for the Secretary of Defense in carly Novenber 1951, General McClure votced his concerns about the adverse tsage that unconvensional variare had anong scoe military ven: Ted's Seth tole that the dynamite manner in which sy office developed ee coeeePrahension on the part of some that the Arsy was seeking te see Ee suetds not properly a part of ground warfare. This i furchece pare sem Cur intent. We have sought and will continue to acek to ere pare ourselves and the Arny to discharge those responsibilities heck aye Proper and appropriate Army functions... . This broad fete gf wncomentional warfare must be planned and conducted on « Joine and National basis. No one Service can "go it alone "tL While he vas proud of what hie officer had accoaplished MeClure told those present at this briefing that he ws also "deeply apprehensive over the future." Typifying the cold war fears that inbued 20 many senior of- fteere vith a sense of urgency, he stated that "none of us in this room ton ‘ay knows how auch tive ve will have," because "we face an aseay vho ts pre- Pared fo take the field tonorrov sorning." ie sumation: "In Paychologtcal Operations ve are fast approaching a state of readines but 1a Special Operations "we are years behind."2 An tronte footnote concer: g the term "special operations" should be mentioned. It was about chis tim the fall of 1951--that the Army begen to sHept the term “special forces operaticns" as opposed to "special operations” fhe reason Eoing that the latter term was defined through long usage tn the Aimy and a9 eet forth 19 7H 100-5, as relating to "night coubat," “jungle operations," "Joint axphibious oparation: "and the sort. The OCPY argued Loepartment of the Arzy, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, erMoston 25, D.C., "Briefing for Secretary of Defense ee cere Matera," 5 Merde Bees OF Ganeral MeClure, RC 319 (Arny Staff) Poy Woe Asche caste. GB nee sanchs Davteal File (C),"1951-34 334-337, Box Noo 13, Pay War 337 § (S Movember 1951), Nartonal Archives 2mia.2 ele tn that to adopt sone other term "would only lead te confusion or re costly expenditure of funda . . . to modify existing literature and doctrine already published."! Later the tem "special forces operations" iteelf would be dropped by the Aruy, to be replaced by “unconventional varfe1 compassed guerrilla warfare, evasion and units. The irony 1s that during the the primary miasion for Special Fore 1970's Special Forces would again adopt « version of “special operations" (with the offictal definition atill relatively unchanged in JCS and Army . 4 move that contributed to the Literature) as ore of their primary aienion é capabilities between thanselves perception of duplication of functions a1 and Ranger units.” A few days after his briefing for the Secretary of Defense, a iiscussion took place during McClure's weekly staff meeting on the forthcoming survey of Ipepartment’ of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Colonel D. V. Johnson, Aneistant Gniaf, Plans Division, ACofS, G-3, Subject: Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare, 26 October 1951. from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Aray - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370,2-370.64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.64 TS (26 Oeto- ber 1951), National Archives. 2yepartment of the Army, Training Circular 31-20-1, The Kole of US Aray Spectal Forces, 22 October 1976. Eliot Cohen states that "the 3S Army con: tributed to the downfall of Special Force ing two Ranger batzalions [in 1974-75]. These unit: + they are relatively cue of host ges (aloug the L's Entebbe Raid)." Cohen, op. cit., p88. This type of operation, hovever, as well as other untiateral (without the employsent of indigenous personne!) Ranger or vommeado-type "direct action," activities have becone part of tha Special Forces ever-groving repertoire of missions and capabilities (Cohen sonevhat inelegantly calle Specia: Forces "guerrilla/ comandos, preparing for a variety of military odd jobs," p. 25). Cohen dis. qusses the urge anong elite units to acquire nev missions and addit‘onal per + "The misaion of elite troops must be as rigorously da- ‘a niche mat be carved out for them and they must be kept within te" (p. 97).223 Aray posts to Posts to be visited--Fort Banning, Fort Canpbel? ct a site for the Psychological Warfare Concer. Of the and Fort Bragg--HeClure had “ defintee preference, ax he stated to Colonel Lank: "Make 1¢ Bragg if you ean. ‘And Fort Bragg it was but not without difficulty. The surveys conducted {im Novesber by representatives of OCIW, Aray Pield Forces, and Third Aray, Swrned up sone rosistance, The Infantry Canter at Fort Banning did not vant fe allocate space and facilities £0 any activity not directly related to ita sistlon (an interesting position, in view of the diract support betag provided to tafantry divisions tn Korea by peychological warfare teans) and there were other objections as vell. Third Aray opposed establishing the Canter at Fort Bragg on the grounds that other conventional coabet units acheduled for activation there would heve to be organized st a lesn daatzable post They Susfested Canp Rucker, Alabama, as an alternative, but this atta offered little with regard to atrborne and amphibious training, and had no housing for de pendents-. Potential morale problen. Of the sites considered, the reprecenta- five from CCEY and Arny Field Forces clearly favored Fort Bregg: the oe SEY Personnel spaces could be accommodated, hutldings--with some modifica Ston--were available, and it offered superior training aivantages and facitt- the for both peychologteal varcare and Special rorcer units. But fret the Toepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief af Paychological Warfare, 5 anes S Bez Proc» Minuten of Weekly Statf Meetings, 8 Norester 1k 319 Army - Chief of Special Wartaz7, 1951-54, 18 Dececar Files, Box No. 2, 020 StafE Meetings, National Archives. Zoepartzent of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Paychologieal Warfare, Jeatead Wor seze ccag Memorand’s for the Record, Subject serves tex Paycho- giuical Marfare Center, 19 ovember 1951, by Coloati Beadelt Ne Fertig, Chief, Special Operations Diviston; Henorandin fox: Geueral aechore Subject: status226 the impasse had to be broke This was accomplished by Colonel Glavin, the Aray Field Forces repre sentative (who had been recently transferred from OCY), who arranged « conference between General Leonard, General Bradford, and General Hodge 1a an attempt to break the deadlock. Colouel Fertig, chief of OCRW's Spectal Opera- €fons Division, urged McClure to personally brief General Hodge on the devir- ability of Fort Bragg--which apparantly he did, because on Decesber 4 Glan obtained approval for the North Carolina post. Still to be obtained were tie exact facilities needed at Fort Bragg, 40 smother survey trip was planned for this purpose. General Heclure's guidance was clear: "I vant these requirenents to be wodest. We have to go on a very 2 He was very auch avare of the precarious position new ideas during @ period of budge:-cutting and did not want to Seopardize the chances of their survival by appearing to be too greedy in his demands. of Special Forces Training Center, 3 Decenber 1951, by Colonel Fertig, Pay War 322C (3 Dacenber 1951), RG 314 (Army Staff) Psy War Admin Office Records Branch, Decimal Files (C), 1951-54, National Archives. The personnel who made the initial survey to Fort Benning and Fort Bragg during the period 13 to 15 Novenber 1951 ware Colonel Bank and Major Stark of OCPH, Colonel Glavin of AFF, and Major Taylor of the G-3 Division, Psy War Section, Third Aray. Ipepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychologica: Warfare, Wewhington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Status of Special Forces Training Center, 3 Decznber 1951, by Colonel Fertig, Pay War 3226 @ December 1951), RG 319 (Army Scaff), Poy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (¢), 1951-54, National Archive also OCPW Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 6 Decenber 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Dacinal Piles, 1951-54, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National archives. Depurtment of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Mismutes of Weakly Staff Meeting, 6 Deceabar 1951, RC 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archive225 ‘The minutes of the OCY staff meeting for che Cetober-Deceaber 1951 Period also depict continuing efforts 0 identify personnel on active duty vith experience in behind-the-Lines activities. The Adjutant General wac re quested to prepare a roster of officers with OSS, comand, Ranger, and guer- Filla backgrounds. An officer was sent to visit General Donovan, then prac tietng lav in New York, to examine his personal files in an attempt to obtain 4 list of Army officers who had served in OSS. This latter effort resuited in a roster of 3,900 names that were being screened to identify those atil1 on active duty.1 Certainly this must be considered as still another indicator of the pervasive influence of OSS on the thinking of the architects of spectal Forces during this crucial formative pertod. The survey teen that returned to Fort Bragg to select the exact ioca- 2 azea known as Smoke Boub Hill, It contained the wece: sary buildings left over from World War II mobilization for barracks, ass halls, administration, and those required for conversion to classrooms and a library, Estimated cost of rehabilitation of the factlities was $151,000, an exceedingly sodest sum--perticularly when compared to today's inflated ftgur for similar vork. Even this sinimal estimate, however, was @ source of some agitation: the Third Army representative stated unofficially that his headquarters had no funds avatlable, thus Army Field Forces would have to allocate the nece: ity monies in order to get the project under vay. Despite this minor maneuvering between headquarters to fix fiscal responsibilities Lieutenant Colonel Blair from OCPW reported to General McClure that “in Nrotd.; see also Minctes of Weekly Staft Meetings, 25 october 1951, snd 8 November 1951, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archive226 genaral, the area 1a exactly vhat ve vanted."! Ar the end of 1951, che only aajor taske remaining to be accomplished ware to obtain the neces nal spaces for activation of both the Center and Spectal Forse tha Chiat of Staff's blessing for the whole project. General McClure personally involved hinself in these taskn. After « busy January--during which he made « major. presentation before the Peycho- logical strategy Board on the Army's activity in paychological varfare and on of funds for his proposed canter, and 2 guerrilla warfare, pursued the que: Investigated & security brea noncerniag the activat‘on of Special Forces’ logtice of the Post Engineer, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Menorandum for Record, Subject: Establishment of Paychologica) Warfare Center, 12 De~ combs |. Wart, Division Chief, RG 319 Aray - Chief of Spectal Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Menoranium for Rec Fort Bragg Survey, 17 December 1951, fra Lieucenant Colone! Melvin R. Blair, Spectal Operations Diviaton, RG 319’Army - Chief of Special Warfary, File 061.2 Arny and Htli- tary Surveys, Natfonal Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Minutes of Waek!y Staff Meetings, 20 Dncember 1951, RC 319 Army ~ Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meetings, Natt onal Archives. The aurvey team that selected Smoke Boob Hill consisted of Colonel Glavin, AFF; Lieutenant Colonel Blair and Matcr Stark, OCPM; Lieutenant Colonel Weaver from the Paychological Warfare Diviston, Army General School, Fort Riley; and Lieutenant Colonel Brock and Major Taylor, Third Army. 2pepartmant of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menrandim for: General McClure, Subject: Paycto- logical Warfare Presentation for PSB, 7 Jenvary 1952, from Colonei Yertig, RG 319 Army - Chief of Spec: x] Warfare, TS Decimal Piles, 1951-54, 337-350.05, Tox No. 13, Pay War 350.01 £5 (7 January 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, Memorandum to: ACofS, G-3, Subject Punds for « Paychological Warfare Canter, 14 January 1952, from Brigadier Generai MeClure, Pay War 123 (14 January 1252), National Archives; Office of the chief of Paychological Warfare, Mesorenduc fur the Asstatant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subjact: Compromise of Classified Information, 22 January 1952, from Brigadier Gereral McClure, 25 319 (Arey Staff), Pay War Admin Office, Records Branch, feclmal’ Pile 4<), U251-$«, 379.64-380 380.01 C (22 January 1957), Natlona: Archives. The breach z annoyed MeClure, who tritiated the tnveatigation, was the folloving sentence from the 2i January 1952 teaue of Newow' he Army will oon ope: guerrilla verfare and sabotage achool for wilitary personnel and CIA agente at227 he continued the campaign to bring his goals to fruition, In an early Febru- ary 1952 memorandum to the G-3, McClure urged that the activation of nev 1 warfare and Special Forces units "be expedited by every feasibla Paychologt, method." His rationale wi convineing: no Radio Broadcasting and Leafiet Group existed in the United states to function as school troops, to train replacenent personnel for similar unite in Europe and the Far E f, oF to meet epergency requirenents; and unite of the proposed "'Spectal Forces Group (Guer= rilla Warfare " were needed to aeet planned D-Day raquirenents in Europe. Clearly establishing ther. tn his view, the activation of psychological varfare and Special Forces units was closely intertwined with the concurrent ac- ton to approve and authorize spaces for the Psychological warfare Center, McClure also requ ed that the latter project be expedited. Recognizing the vulnerability of his plans in the hands of budget-cuttere, McClure nade an eloquent plea: ‘At times vhen the Army asa whole is faced with a reduction in the number of authorized spaces, it becones necessary to detersine are wirtch can absorb "cuca" without unduly impairing overall efficiency. A new activity faced with an across-the-board cut, of with a "cut" made on a fixed percentage basis, can be crippled to the point where ite existence s seriously threatened. This is particularly true in the case of Psychological Warfare and Special Operations activities which are already on an austere basis. I recommend that these factors be considered when an Aray-vide reduction in space autherization 16 contemplated. 1 Fort Bragg, NC." McClure insisted that this information had been handled within OCPW as a TOP SECRET macter, with dizsenination on a "need to know" basis, and therefore requested that an investigation be conducted to determine urce of the leak. Although the G-2 refused to follow through on the request, the incident reveals the sensitive manner in which Special Forces se- Sivities were being handled by OCPM at this tine, and helps to provide part of the explanation as to vhy ro little puplicity was given to Special Forces, t> include no mention of this activity in the eitle of the proposed center at Fort Bragg. Tepartment of the Army, Offtce of the Chief of Peychological Warfare,228 The 6-3! response to this plea vas terse. MecClure's request for easly activation of the psychological warfare and Special Forcas units de~ sired vould be acted upon after the “implications of the reduced FY 1953 budget have been fully weighed," which was probably not the response that he had hovsd for, On a brighter note, the G-3 did indicate that « Sumary Sheet was being prepared for the Chief of Staff that racomended epproval of the Paychological Warfare Canter. Sure enough; on March 3, 1952, the promised Sumary Sheet want: forvard to General Collins, stating that implementation of the conclusions reached in the study "Aray Responsibilities in Respect to Special Forces Operations," previously approved by Collins, required « "Peychological Warfare and spectal Forces Carter" in peacetine to train individcals and units to support theater Special Forces operations. (Again we see the npertance of Volchnann's initial study as the underlying rationale for,this concept.) The memorandum al: indicated that the proposed center vould consolidste psychological warfare and Spectal Ferces training activities at a single installation. Three waeks later on March 27, 1952 -the Chief of Staff gave his approval that auch « center be established.” Washington 25, D.C., Meworandum to: ACofS, G-3, Subject: Util{zation of Ac- tive Army Spaces Allocated for FY 1952 and FY 1953, 6 February 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Aray Staff) Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 319.5-320.3, Box No. 12, Pay War 320.2 (6 February 1952), National Archives. Lyptd., Comment No. 2 from Brigadier General G. J. Higgins, Chief, Or- ganization and Training Division, G-3, 15 February 1952. 2pepartment of the Army, ACofS, G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Suomary Sheet for Chief cf Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Eatablishrent of Paychologteal War- fare and Special Forcen Cencer, 3 March 1952, from Major aneral Eddienan, Deputy ACofS, G-3, RG 319 Aray'+ Chief of Spectal Warfare, TS Decimal Files4 729 Within ten days, General McClure proudly provided the detatle of the Grief of Staff's decision to JCS. A Peychological Warvare Center vould be activated on or about May 1, 1952, at Fort Bragg, North trolina. The adainte. frative atatf and faculty for Faychological Warfare and Spectal Porces Depart- mance and a Research and Development Soard would total 173 personnel on an austere barts, with an increase to 362 officers and en at full strength. The Peychotogtcal Warfare Schcol and unite at Fort Riley, Kansas, would aove to TORE Bragg upon activation of the nev center. A total of 2,220 spaces had heen authorized for activation of Faychological Warfare and Spectal Forces ‘nits for fiacal year 1953-54, A spectal Forces Group would be activated at Fore Bragg in three increuents of spproxtnately 600 wen and officers each, Somencing shout May 1, 1952.1 General MeClure's dream of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of cry" w about to be realized. The long Journey to Fort Bragg was acon to end. CRE 3) Box No. 8, Pay War 322 15 ( March 1952), Nattonal Archives. The 312 wots Bees reutraminte for the center Leaelf vere atated as Jel" of natch 712 vould be military ant $0 civilians. Iventy-nine spaces (27 military and peiey aan) fron the Peycholosteal Warfare Division, Army Geceval School, Fort Riley, would be transferred to the nev center at Fost Bragg, Toepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, ERY T By D.C, Memoranda for: Chtef, Jott Subsitiecy front Division, qubiect: Activation of Taychotogical Warfare Center a¢ Fret Bragg, North » fron Brigadier Gene: » RG 319 (Arey Stafe), Psy War Admin 1a ae gaehs Deetnal File (6), 1951-54, 319.5-3203, Bow Mor 4h fax 322 (7 April 1952), National ArchiveCHAPTER VIII ‘THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL WARYARE After receiving the Chief of Staff's formal approval in Jate March 1952, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare moved rapidly to get the Psychological Warfare Center on its feet. The formal order establishing the Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under the jurisdiction of the Com- manding General, Third Army, vas published on 14 April 1952. Copies of the Table of Distribution (TD) for the Center were hand-carried by General MeClure's staff to Third Aray, Army Field Forces, and Fort Bragg during the period 16-18 April. The mission of this unprecedented Center, as explained by the TD, was: To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Peycho- logical Warfare acd Special Forces Operations; to develop and teat Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tac~ tica, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment euployed in Paychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations. Movement of equipment and personnel from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg began by Lete April, and on 29 May 1952, the Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Ipepartment of the Army, Office vf the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and sdninistration, Subject: Activation and Mission of the Psychological War- fare Center, from Brigadier Ceneral McClure, 22 May 1952, RG 319 (Army staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-325, Box No. 13, Pay War 322 (22 May 1952), National Archives. ‘Department of the Army General Order No. 37, 14 April 1932, established the Psychological Warfare Center ae a Clase I activity and installation, effective 10 April 1952 (extract filed with above reference). A copy cf the Recommended Table of Dis- tribution for the Psychological Warfare Canter can be found with Pay War 320.3 (16 April 1952), National Archives. 1230)21 Monroe, Virginia, foreally announced the activation of the Paychological War- fare Center at Fort Bragg. The sane order offictally transferred reaponstbili- As originally established, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of * Provisional Paychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio Broadcasting and leaflet Group, a Psychological Warfare Board, and the 10th Special Forces 2 Grow." Colonel Charles H. Karlstad, formerly chlef of staff of the Infanery Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, was selected as the first Cormanter of the cen- Ser and Cousandant of the Payciological Warfare School. In the foreword of an administrative booklet prepared for visitors Partie{pating tn a prycho- Topteal warfare seminar during 1952, Colonel Karlstad offered soue thoughts on the role of his new comand: Fhe PevWer Center represents an effort unique in the military history Both the eed States. “For the first tine, the techainees ae attacking Doth the minds and the bodies cf our enemies have hood coordinated in lottten, chief of army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, VA, Letter, Subject: Aetaeacbieal Warfare Doctrine levelopnent and Inreroction’ USASFKCEOMA, Togteel wacgete7 5, Colonel Hays, 5 tay 1969. An advance sores are the Paycho- dossce wrantare Division, Army’ General School, consisting ef 16 John 0. a aaEh 3 offlcers and 7 enlisted sen was’ scheduled eo crerey Fort Bragg Scrodeiiaten Feneinder of this division (3 officers aad hones Pe wae scteduled to move not later than 15 May 1955; cer Army Field Foreee Aukte®y Subjects Pay War Center, 30 April 1952, te Commanding General = Third Army filed with Pay War 322 (Hay 1952), National, Aone? ological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, Worth Carolina, Memorand:im No.4, "Organization ard Functions Manual, The Psychological Warfare Center," Ps 3, USAJPKCREA Archives. Letter, Cotonel Hays, 5 May 1969.232 4 single training operation. The Psychological Warfare and Spectal Forces Departments [of the Psychological Warfare School], closely Linked, instruct in the unconventional weapons and tactics with which our podgrn aray must be equipped to function effectively against eneny forces. (Karlatad's coments are strikingly reuiniscent of General Donovan's all~ ‘encompassing concept of psychological warfare vhen he organized the Coordina- tor of Information eleven years carlier.) One may vonder viy the Peychological Warfare School wes initially given ‘@ provisional status. The G-3, Department of the Army, disapproved its ac- tivetion as a formally designated army service school on the basis that such 4 school was not necessary to the accouplishment of the Center's mission and the establishment of a formal school would requtre additional funds.? This must have been particularly perplexing to the personnel at Fort Bragg since even as an elevent of the Army General School at Fort Riley the Psychological Obvious ad- Werfare Division had been given service school recognition as opposed to informa! schools in vantages of fornal service school statu the category of those often act up by divisions and reginents--vere increased Prestige, funding and equipeent procuzenent advantages, and the opportintty to accract quality faculty personnel. The Peychologieal Warfare Canter, in a let~ ter signed by Colonel Karlstad and addressed to the Chief, Paychological War- fare, Department of the Army, made a strong case for reconsideration of the line Paychological Warfare Canter, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "Ad- ministrative Inforaation Handbook, Paychological Warfare Sea:nar, 17-19 Da- cember 1952," p. 2, USAJPKCENMA Archives 2pepartaent of the Aruy, Organization and Training Division, G-3, Wash- Angtva 25, D.C., DF to Psy Wat, Subject: Establishment of the Psychological Operations School, 27 August 1952, G-3 352 (6 August 1952), filed with Psy War 322 (25 September 1952), National Archives233 decision; an appeal that received the strong support of General McClure.! Apparently this appeal was effective, for on 22 October 1952, the Paych- logical Werfare School was officially established and recognized as a service ‘school by Department of the Army General Order Nunber 92. The purpose of the Psychological Warfare Schocl wes to "prepare selected Andividuale of the Aray to perform those psychological varfare and special forces duties vhich they may be called upon to perform in var."? The achool was organized into a small headquerters staff and two instructiosal divi- De- sions: the Psychological Operations Department and the Special Fore partment. In teres of longevity, the nior elesent in tite school was the Psychological Cpe stions Department, which was a direct descendant of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Army Ganeral School, before being transferred and integrated in the Psychological Wariare Center in early 1952.3 Lfeutenant Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., who had been Leputy of the Poychologtcal Warfare Division of the Army General School, becane the first director of the Psychological Operstions Department. The mission of the Psychological Operations Department vas defined as the instruction and training of selected officers in the duties of paychological warfare operations 'the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Letter to: Chief of Psychological Warfare, Subject: Activation of the Paycho- logical Warfare School, 12 septeuber 1952, USAJFKCENMA Archives; Office of the Chief of Peychological Warfare, Memorandum to: ACOfS, G-3, Suoject: Establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, 25 September 1952, Pay War 322 (25 September 1952), Nacional Archives. 2te Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "Guide for Staff and Faculty,” April 1953, p. 10, USAJFKCENMA Archives. Additional detail on the mission of the school can be found in the Psychologica: Warfare Center "Organization and Functions Manual," 12 Novenber 1982, and "Acminis- trative Information Hanihook,"" Decenber 1352, USAIFKCEIMA Archives 3 Letter, Colonel (vis E. Ha Ste, 5 May 1969.234, instruction seatta from Department of the Army £0 field afmy and corps levels; ‘and training of selected individuals, officers, and noncomissioned officers 1 key persons in psychological as specialists in propaganda operations and warfare operational units; and the preparation and revision of extension , training literature, and field manuals on psychological warfare organization, operations, and doctrine.! The {xportance of the Department's activities certainly became enhanced by the Aray's requirements in Korea, as evidenced by this statement from the Jacuary 1-June 30, 1953, report of the Secretary of Defense: The role of peychological warfare as a support weapon in conbat was highlighted by iaproved psychological warfare operations carried on by the Army during the year, stimulating the developoent of the progran at the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg... Schools and unite heve been establishea there to tcain officers and eulisted men in all phases of this specialty.” An interesting fact to note about this eport is that no mention wi made of the activities of either the 10th Special Forces Group or ite counter- part in the Psychologicul Warfare Schoo!, the Special Forces Department. Nor ‘or of the Army's attempts to de- vas there any mention of these two elenent: valop an unconventional varfare capability--in the January 1 to June 30, 1952, report of the Secretary of Defense, a report which did, hovever, mark the teblishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "eo provide comprehensive courses of inscruction in all phases of psychological 3 i racer Lthe Psychological Warfare Center, Menorendim No. 14, “Organization and Funettons Manval, The Psychological Warfare Center," p. 52, USAJFKCENMA Archives. 2y.s. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Da- fense, January Through June 30, 1953, p. 140. 3y.s, Department of Defense, Semtannual Report of the Secretary of De- fense, Janvary Through June 30, 1952, p. 92.235 The Jack of publicity given to Spectal Forces can be largely attributed fo security considerations. Because the mission of Special Forces was cla: sifted, Little reference to thetr organization and activities intesally ap- Peared in press releases concerning the Psychological Warfare Center.) This caution was carried through by the Center in its ovn publications--much to the consternation of the Special Forces enthusiasts anong MeClure's staff. They vomplained that the student handbook published by the Psychological Warfare School was “slanted heavily towards Psychological Warfare to che detrinent of Spectal Forces," and feared the result would be "that the Special Forces stu: Gent, therefore, will lock upon himself as a ‘country cousin’ to the Psycho- logical Warfare Center." Lteutenant Colonel Melvin Blair, who had been on the road attempting to "sell" special Forces in a recrultzent program, wae Particularly miffed ant recomended that OCPH take acticn "to revise the hand- Tospartment of the Aray, Office of the chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum for: Chief of Information, Subject: Pree pored Contingency Press Release Regarding ?sy War Center, 17 Jum 1952, fron Brigadier General McClure, Pey War 000.7 (15 June 1952), and Menorandun fer G3) Subject: Proposed Press Release Regarding the Paychological Werfere cane Ser togtly 1952, from Colonel Fertig, Acting Chief, OCP, vey War 000.7 (1 [uly 1952), both in RG 319 (aray Steff), Poy War Admin Offiee,1951-54. Box No. }, Rational archives. Gerera! McClure told the Chief of Information in nis 17 June 1952 menorandun that the mission of Special Forces was claselivee confidential, thus it was "considered unwise to make any reference thereco in the Proposed contingency release." Upon Colonel Karletad's assumption of Somand of ‘the Center, the story ncting this event ia the Fort Bragg newspa- per made no reference to Special Forces operations. Later the Chief of In. formation suggested that the pr lease include reference to Special Forces, (To prevent undue prohing oy the news services into Special Forces activi. SiS? SE Egtt Braes, No." After several weeks of correspondence betwern (2, 6-3, GINFO, OCPW, and Army Field Forces, a specific policy on the natcer had ‘still not been resolved by late August 1952. tor had the problem been solved by January 1953, when the Spectal Forces Division initisted ection to downgrade from Confidential to Restricted certain aspects of the Special pances Program (see Peywar 380.91, RC 319 [Amy Staff], Pay War Admin Office, Records Branch, Deciaal File [C], 1951-54, 370,64-380.01, Bex tio. 20, Ne tfonal archives.Nene ct oe 236 book along more impartial lines." (Gin later years, particularly during the heyday of the “Green Bereta"--the 1960's--psychological warfare would be considered the “country cousin” at the Center, an tronic turnabout in percep- tions.) While these complaints may appear trivial, they vere evidence of * Fesantment that went beyond the security restrictions on publicity for Special Forces--some of McClure's staff simply did not believe that uncon= Ventional warfare units should be associated with psychological varfare, an¢ But ve shall return to this point lat certainly not in a subordinate rolt In any event, the junior menber of the Paychologtcal Warfare School va the Special Forces Departnent, which, unlike the Peychological Oparations De- Partment, had no predecessor in U.S: Army history. With Colonel Filmore K. Mearns as its ficst director, the mionions of this departuent vere outlined for officers and selected en- the conduct 0” regular Special Forces cour! Mated sen; the conduct of Speciil Forces orientation courses fer designated Personnel; the preparation and revision of literature and lessons for Spectal Forces extensicn courses; and the preparation and revision of training literature, field manuals. circulars, and special texts on Special Forces operations.? Essentially, the department's primary orientation was on teaching Toepartmant of the Aray, Office of the Chief of Faychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Menorandum for: Chief, Special Forces Division, subject: Student Handbook-"the Paychological Werfare’ School," 13 August 1952, fro 17¢ Marvin J. Waters, Operations and Training Branch; Mevorancum for: Colovel Fertig, Subject: Psy War Center Student Handbook, 14 August 1952, from Colonel Willian J. Blythe, Chiet, special Forces Divisicn; Memorandum for ‘Coloset Biythe, Subject: “Student Randbook-"the Paychological Warfare School,” 21 August 1952, from LIC Melvin R. Blatr; all #tled under Pey War 332 Army Service Schools, National Archives. Blair ecuplained that “not a single word Ye de, Voted to che role of Special Forces" in Chapter I of the Hanicook, while "ap- Proxinately 50% of the Staff and Faculty personnel and student bosy vill be Special Ferees personnel, ihe Fayohologieal Warfare Center, Port Bragg, North Carolina, "Orgentea fon and Functions Manual, The Paychologseal Warfaes Coeerer stag? USATPRCENA Arch ven237 fundamental of unconventional warfare tc personnel being assigned to Special Forces, with phaaie on the conduct of gerrilla operations. | Another rather unique organization created as part of the Center vas the Paychological Warfare Board, which was to "tast, evaluste, and coupile reports on material, doctrine, procedura, tachnique, and tactics pertaining to and for Paychological Warfare and Special Forces."! As an example of the typa work carried out by the Board, by early 1954 the Peychologival Warfare Board had completed over forty project to include operational facets of psychological warfare tranenitter and receiving equipment, loudspeaker equij- ment, mobile reproduction equipment, and different types of leaflet disvenina- tion technique such as by mortar and artillery shella, rockets, Light Mateon planes, and balloons. It appears that in the early days of 1953-53, the Poychological Warfare Board devcted its activities alnost exclusively to support of units Like the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leatlut Group, rather than Special Forces.2 The nucleus of the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RL) began on 14 September 1951, with the formation of a provisional Psychological Warfare Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas. Soon this unit achieved status as lrpid., p. 34; The Psychotogical Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Caroline, Psy War, 1954, p. 1, USAJFKCENMA Archives. 2the Psychological Werfare Canter, Fort Bragg, North Csroline, Psy War. 1954, USAITKCEWA archives. Apparently there was little attention given to Special Forces operstions by the Board, for in the above public. thon which outlined activities of the Board since its inception, there wes no mention of any unconventional warfare projects, or were there any Spectal Forces'menbers on the Board as of early 1954. Tre publication, Pay az, purports "to tell the story of the US Army's Psychological Warfare Cen- ter," but novhere in the ninety-nine page Sook in any veference made to the Spectal Forces Group or instructtonal depe:tment that constituted integral elencats of the Center. Undoubtedly, this was agaix the reeult of security- consclousness--perhaps carried co an extrene--ccncerning Special Forces activities.238 4 permanent organtzation, and on 2 May 1952, 1¢ became the 6th REL Group. ‘Tha Group consiated at that time of a Hedquarters and Headquarters coupany, the 7th Reproduction Coupany, and the 8th Mobile Radio Brordeasting Company; ‘and in June 1952, 1 noved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to becooe # part of the Paychological Warfare Center. In June 1952, the 2d Loudspeaker and Leaf- lat (U&L) Company was attached to the 7th RBGL, and on-27 May 1953, the 12th Consolidation Company was activated and also attached to the Group. As previously mentioned, the RBSL organizational concept was first employed in Korea, and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company's ancestry could be traced to World were employed im the European thaater. compant. War IT, when several of the The 6th RBSL vas designated as « strategic psychological warfare operat/onal unit, and {ts primary purpose was to assist the national paych@logical warfare program during vartine within the theater of operation to which it was assigned. In addition to conducting theater-wide strategic propagund: further mission of the 6th RBSL was to support tactical operations.» loth spectal Forces Croup Bven before the 10th Spectal Forces Group was activated, ileutenant Colonel Blair and Colonel Voleknann from the Special Operations Division, OCH, began vieiting Aray installations and schools throughout the continental United States, in Alaska, Havait, the Far East, and Europe in order to had to be at lease Promote interest in the "new concept" of war. Volunt twenty-one years old, airborne qualified or willing to become so, and undergo lpepartment of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Training Circular No. 13, Military Aspects of Psychological WarZare,” pp. 6f-, 8 Sune 1953; The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Pay War, pp) 352 69, USAJFKCENMA Azchives.239 « Enlist ries of physical and psychological t yd men accepted into Special Forces vere to acquire one or nore of five besic occupational speci~ alet engineering, weaponry, communication! 1 medical aid, operations, and intelligence. Interestingly, the material used by OCP for orientation and recruit pent purposes apectfically drew « distinction between Special Forces and Ranger untes Ranger units are designed and trained to conduct shallov penetration or infiltration of eneny lines. They can remain in the objective trea for a limited tine only. Primarily, they execute missions of GQ harassing and raiding nature against targets close to friendly front lines. Banger missions are performed solely by US personnel; they Go not utilize indigenous pereonnel in their objectives. Special Forces unite have the capability vi conducting long-range penetration deep into the objective area in order to orgenize, train, equip, and control indigenous guerrilla forces.? Ivelvin Russel] Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Aray," Saturday Evening Jt, 228 (Hay 12, 1956):40-1; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Peychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Orientation Conference for TISE (troop Information and Education) Officers, Subject: "Current Developments in the Field of Special Forces Operations” (15 January 1952), by LTC Blair, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-34, 334-337, Box No. 15, Pay War 337 (C) (10 January 1952), National Archives; Departaent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Paychological War- fare, Washington 25, D.C., Latter to: Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject? Special Forces Orientation for Training Directive and Reception Centers, 24 ‘Jone 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Decimal Pile (<), 1951-54, 352.16- 334.2, Box No. 18, Psy War 353" (24 June 1952), National archives; also OCP letter, Subject: Orientation Conferences for Service Schools and Selected Headquarters and Installations, to Chief, Army Fielu Forces, 1 August 1952, Poy War 353 (1 August 1952), sane reference as above, National Archives. 2pepartnent of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, washtngton 25, D.C., Orientation Conference, “Current Developsenta in the Field of Special Forces Operations," to be presented to Service Schoois, Army Headquarters, and Selected Installations during the period 1 October 1952 - March 1953, written by LTC Blair, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal Pile (C)'334-337, 1951-54, Box No. 15, Psy War 337 $ (é Saptamber 1952), National Archives; also Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), Orientation Material for Use in Connection with Selection of Volunteers for Special Torces, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Decimal File (C), 1951-54,240 Indeed, not only did OCPH draw « distinction concerning the mission and capsbilities of Special Forces and Rangers, the term "Special Forces Opera~ tions" itself underwent a gradual metanorphosis. Volcknana's original defint- tlon in early 1951 established thet Special Forces Operations vere activities carried on within or behind the enemy Lines which could encompass: the organization and conduct of guerrilla wer: acbotage and subversion, evasion and escape, Ranger and comando type operations, long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance, and peychological warfare. Fron January to late Septenber 1952, the term enbraced the following in OCPW recruiting material: organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare; subversion and sabotage, political, fa St pertains to behind-the-Lines ac ‘economic, and psychological tivities; infiltration and/or organization of agente within the eneny's sphere of influence in support of actual or projected Special Forcas opera- ‘ape and evasion, a2 effected through Special tlons; commando type operations; Forces operations; and antiguerrilla warfare in areas overrun by friendly forces.) Tt vill be noted that both "Ranger operations" and deep pevstration reconnaissance” had disappeared during this transforma tion; ony “eoumando type operations" remained as a hint of the earlier conceptual confusion. By Novenber 1952, the focus becane even more precise, and potent ial volunteers for this new elite unit were told that Special Forces operations included guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "other bdehind-the-Lines 352.16-354.2, Box No. 18, National Archives; and Peyvar 335 C (10 January 1552), Ortentarion Conference for TIS Officers, Subject: “Current Davelop- ents in the Field of Spectal Porces Operations” (15 January 1952), by LTC Blair, RG 319 (Army Staff), Pay Yar Admin Office, Records Branch, Decinal File (C), 2951-54, 334-337, Box No. 15, National Archive lop. eft., Pay War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Pay War 337 € (10 January 1952), and Poy War 337 (24 Septesber 1952), National Archives. 1261 missions, which are within the capabilities of guerrilla varfare.") The lack of reference to Ranger or comando type operations is evident; shortly thereafter Geceral MeClure chastened General Li 1 for contemplating use of the 10th Special Forces Group for these types of cetivities tn Europe.” tn effect, "Special Forces Operations" vas becoming synonymous with "unconven~ tfonal warfare’ eventually the Latter term would be predominantly used to describe the mission of Spectal Forces. The Special Forces cane to Life formally on May 19, 1952, with the establishnent of the Headquarters and Headquarters Cowpany, 10th Special Forces croup, constituted and allotted to the Reailar Army for activation and organization under the Commanding General, Third Army. One hundred and twenty- two officers and ven were: To furnish command, supply, and organizations: maintenance for fa Special Forres Group located in rear arses and, when provided Giith the necessary augnentation in personnel and’ equipsent, for subordinate units committed in the objectiye area; to furnish administration for a Special Forces Group. Initially, the Headquerters and Headquarters Company was basically « "paper organization,” for when Colonel Aaron Bank left OCPW to join the Grosz on lop. cit., Psy War 383 (6 Noveuber 1952), National Archives. 2op. ekt., Pay War 290 TS (8 December 1952) and Psy War 390 TS (19 Deceaber i952), National Archives. 3pepartment of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C., Letter, Subject: Activation of a Unit of the General Reserve, 19 May 1952, AGAO-1, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., TOSE 33-2 (proposed), 14 April 1952, cited in U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Special arfare Agency, Combat Developments Study: Organization for U.S. Army Special Forces, August 1964, USAJFKCENMA Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Special Forces, Washington 25, D.C., DF to G3, Organization Branch, Subject: Activation of Special Forces Units, 2 May 1952, fron Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Ary Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records ‘ Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, Psy War 322 (1 May 1952), ‘National Archives |242 4 June 19, 1952, as its firet commander, he had a tocal complement of only seven enlisted men and one warrant officer present for duty.) Tf Bank expected his naw unit to be evanped with volunteers, hovever, he was to be disappointed. By early July he complained that the flow of applice- tions for Special Forces was very slow, attributing this to lees-than-enthusiastic Army-wide support for the program and to the security classification of 2 Special Forces activities.” A month later Colonel Karlatad reported to General McClure that the total assigned enlisted strength of the 10th vas 259, of which only 123 were "operational unit" volunteer personnel. The rate of arrival of volunteers was, he felt, "wholly unsatisfactory."? Another factor inhibiting a rapid buildup was the slow progress in attracting foreign nationals through the Lodge Bill. As originally passed, the Lodge Bill (Public Law 597, 8lst Congress, 30 June 1950) provided for the enlistment of 2,500 aliens in the i U.S. Army. This ceiling vas raised to 12,500 by mid-1951, but actual recruit- i ment fell far short of expectations. By August 1952, of 5,272 mem who had Vetter, Colonel Rank, 17 February 1968. 2the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Coments by Members of Attending Organization and Iraining Confecence,.9 July 1952, USAJFKCENYA Archives. Attendees included representatives from OCPH, AFF, Third Army, and The Psychological Warfare Cenzer. Colonel Bank ‘strongly urged that action be taken to declassify the Special Forces Croup TOSE's: tt restricted publicity in Army publications and the men could not even tell others their correct unit designation, other than the Psychological Warfare Center--which did not give them the necessary pride in their unit, he believed. ‘ Headquarters, The Paychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Caro- lina, letter to Brigadier Genaral YeClure from Colone| C. H. Karlstad, Command- ing Officer, 12 September 1952, filed with RG 319 (Army Staff) Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-56, Pay War 322, Nattonal Archives. Karlstad asted McClure for asatstance {n getting the seven U.S. training divisions to fulfill their al- lotred quotas of 35 voluntears per month for Special Forces, MsClura folioved through on the request rapidly and wrote back to Karlstad oo 22 Saprember that. the sicuation should soo. improve,5 203 applied for enlistnent, only 411 received the necessary security clearances, and of that number only 211 actually enlisted.’ Concerned, MeClure's office reported that "the need to increase Lodge Bill enlistnents remains a vital. problen affecting the accomplishnent of missions assigned to OCPY."? At the end of Novenber 195%, hovever, only 22 Lodge BL1l personnel had been assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group.? Despite this disappointing start, by April 1953 the atrength of the organization destgned to implement a "new concept” and enlisted men.4 The "new concept" can best be explained by the training objective proposed for the nevly activated 10th Special Forces Group: To infiltrate its component operational detachnents to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasinilitary or a military Apepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Staff Study to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Steff Study on Intenstfieation of Lodge Bi?1 Recruitnent Program, 8 August 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army, Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-56, Ts Decimal Files, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Pay War 342 TS (B August 1952), National Archives. The reasons for this low rate were many: many married per- gone applied but were not eligible; many German nationals applied but vere not eligible; the citizens of NATO nenbey nations who applied vere not eligible; many applicants were disqualified on mental and physical grounds; and many applicanta changed their minds during the long tine required for security checks 2pepartment of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfe: Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to: Chief of Lagislative Ltatson, Subject Program for Liatson with the Congress, Tab A, "Intensification of Lodge Bill Recruitment Program," from Colorel Fertig, Acting Chief, OCP, 15 August 1952, RG 319 Arny, Chief cf Spectal Warfere, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 2, Psy War 032.1, National Archives. Tab A, prepared by Colone! Blythe. Forces Division, outlined the overall need for Lodge Bi1I personnel Jected 4,875 for Special Forces and 40 for psychological warfare units 3Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Caro- Lina, Letter to Brigadier Gencral McClure, from Colonel C. H. Karleted, 25 No~ vember 1952, RG 319 (Arny Staff), Chief of Spectal Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives. 4uetter, Colonel Bank, 17 February 1968.dante for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air fore Clearly, Special Yorcvs was designed for unconventional warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla operations, This is « significant potat, because tn 1952 very Litele attention was given to counterguerrilla, or counterinsurgency, operations. ‘That portion of the special werfare concept was to cone later, in the Late 1950's and early 1960's, inttlating a doctrinal battle as to the : proper function of Special Forces, At this early stage of its histury, how ever, Spectal Forces vas oriented tovard unconventional warfare requirenents, and the franevork for the 10th that resulted vas « rather unique blend of and Army organtzational traditions and conventions with the promiient 1d principles of guerrilla warfare. Essentially, the Special Forces Group represented a pool of trained ‘sanpover frou vhich unite or combination of units could bs dram to execute spectfie unconventional warfare rtasions, The heart of the original Group organization wes the Operational Detachment, Regiment, a fifteen-man unit ¢s- tablished along the same lines as the OSS Operational Group. Commanded by « , the Operational, Detach- captain, with a firsc Meutenant as executive offic nent, Regiment, contained thirteen enlisted men and vas crpable of being in- {Altrated behind eneay Lines to organize, train, and direct friendly resistance forces in-the conduct of unconventional varfare. Depending on the size and makeup of the guerrilla forces in a specific area, the Operational Detachment, District B (comanded by @ major), or the Operational Detachment, District A Ipppertment of the Army, Office ot the Chief of Paycholopical Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Training Circular, Spectal Forces Grouy (Atrborne), 13 May 1952, RG 319 (Arey Staff), Pay War Aduin Office, Records Branch, Dacinal Pile (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, Pay War 322 (13 Yay 1952), National Archiv245 (comanded by a 1eurenaat colonel) could also be exployed, or a coubination of the three types of teans. In other words, these detachaents (called could be employed singly or in various ecabinations, depending on the size ant complexities of the spectfic guerrilla ocgantzation involved, ‘The toams--in whacever combination neces 0 that the activities of the guerrilla organization could be directed to up Port operations of friendly conventional forces vost effectivel. Za short, the Special Forces Group it: IE was not designed to be employed ca a tactical cnrityr-as, for instance, a conventional division or brigade--but rather vas constructed atound callular concept in which each area, district, and regt- pental detachnent was viewed as a seperate and distinct operating unte.} Golonel Bank hed assuned command of @ unique organtzation in June 1952-- a east Sante te lordec) bol fats cha ctsctome Geetcte in the operational concept fur Special Forces. dased primarily on the var- ‘ine experiences of « few former OSS officers in the unit, a training progren Wat developed for the loth Special Forces Group that wan entirely new ¢o the ‘rmy- Early training stressed the ind{viduel skills represented in the basic Operasfonal Detachsent, Regiment: operations and intelltgence, Light and heavy weapons, denolitions, radio communteations, and medical aid. Fach nan was thoroughly trained in his particular specialty, then pertietpated in "exo. frainteg’ in order > learn the rudinents of the otter skills represented in the detachnene. The communications and medica! ald spectalte naturally 1, Spectal Warfare Agency, "Organteatton for Spectal Forces," pp. 11-10 11-13246 feceivad the longest training courses, since these were more technical skills. Rovhasis vas also placed on clandestine operatiscs training, such as the fornation and operation of intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, and security, since, ax Colonel Bank renarka, “these are easily neglected in favor of tha more exciting guerrilla tactics." The individual and cross: fraining phase was folloved by detachnent training at Camp MeKall, North Gerolina, and finally by « lengthy group-level maneuver 12 the Chattahoochee National Forest, Georgia.! And +0 was born Spectal Forces, the first fornal U.S. Aruy capability for unconventional warfare, co-located vith but yet a juntor partner to Perchological warfare at Fout Beagg. Was this « marriage of chotce, paycho- Togical and uncomentional warfare? Apparently not. As C.lcnel Volcimann remembered: Warfare and were Yery much opposed to having Special Forces associated with and Under the Peychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We fore gnat there vas in general a stigan connected with Peycholosies! Tarfare, especially song conbat men, that ve d!dn't care fo have nigh OFF" om Special Forces. Behind-the-line operations and che "dirtyctricks game" had enough opposition anongst convestinnal siNAtary inde that had to be overcone without adding the additional Probleng inherent in Peychological Warfare. Hovevers we lost choc Golonel Bank had similar misgivings. shortly after taking comand of the 10th, he differed with the Paychological Warfare School faculty concerning He She “position of Spectal Forces in relation to paycholorical warfar (tacovered that the concept being taught in the Psychological Operations Tratters, Colonel Bank, 17 February 1968 and 3 April 1968, *ratter, Brigadier General Volcknann, 21 March 1969,27 Course was that Special Forces operations were a part of Paychological varfare and objected to this interpretation in an early organtzational meeting at the Peychologicsl Warfare Center: Zonet believe that, as fer as Spectal Forces 1s concerned, that Pacgerect, (ALL the ‘tine that I vas on the staff of PSYWAR [och] q never saw any paper of any kind that indicates Special feroe That Speeean yee eart of Deychological warfare, It is our concept that Spectal Forces o Toterestingly, af about this sane tive a Reserve Officer doing his anc mal vo weeks! training at the Departnent of the Army took issue vith che noe —— ‘etteal Warfare, Colonel Oliver Jackson Sande's view was that the types of Backsround, education, exatring, and experience required for persone engaged tn psychological warfa: were inherently different from those necessary for oeeenaee ee lebectel|cescat locas thie "receive? e)¢aa/e ates ee sutt- able for one of the: activities qualified for the other." He aleo argued shat the planning, execution, facilities, equipment, and support required for fey cremettanelvere) ceocelly/4itfarent's atesure the ste ttt were, in his view, Widely divergent in type and character," he recomended that Cord be divested of the Spectal Forcer function. The latter should thea be nade a part of the G-3,2 IMeadquerters, The Psychological Warfare Genter, Fort Bragg, North Caro- T5Ed, GOMDERES bY Members Attending Organization and Treising Conference, 9 July 1952, USAJFKCENMA Archives. Pezargment of the Army, Office of the Chiat of Psychological Warfare, Colonel once BGpr Memorandim to: chief, Plane asd Policy Seecch, OPW, from Golonel Oliver: Jackson Sands, Jr., USAR, 7 July 1952, RG JID Army ~' thief of seeeal, Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decinal Files, Box No. , Sationel aches’ Tackson's senorandim forvarded a study that he had undertaken durice hie two208 ‘Aa night have bean expected, General McClure did not agree with Sandi analysis, particularly since the special operations function had been moved from G-3 to OCPH at his request. ‘There is evidence, hovever, that other psychological warfare officers also had sone misgivings about the Aruv's or- ‘ ganization for psychological and unconventional warfare. Writing in 1954 on tactical psychological varfare during the Korean conflict, Colonel Donald F. 1d this view: Hall expres Many peychological varfare officers experienced in combat propaganda operations have never subscribed to the placement of psycho- Logical warfare and special forces under the sane controlling staff agencies. Sone have felt that a great error was made when the tuo functions were placed under the sane agency at Department of the Army level, and there has been a groving ccncern about the tendency to combine the two on down through the echelons to the Army in the field. ‘The doubt as to the justification for this concept has been an honest one, although few have had the capacity to question the decision in high placas. As a matter of econosy in seating training requirements, most have gone quietly along with the development of the tvo fonctions as "twin activities" at the higher levels, and particularly ‘at the Center [The Paychological Warfare Center). But it is difficult to conceive of guerrilla-type operations as true psychological warfare; they seen to be auch more clovely allied to straight coubat operations within the jurisdiction of G-3 Believing, as did Colonel Sands, that there were few individuals who vould weeks of duty in OCP, the subject of which was "To study the position of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the National Establishment." Recognizing the limitations of time and breadth in his endeavor, Sands suggested that the study "be used to stimulate thinking among those whe are more clesely connected with the prot ier.” Apepartuent of the Arr., Office uf the Chief of Paychoiogical Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., "Tact‘ cal Psychological Warfare in the Korean Conflict: ‘An informal ecumentary cr Propaganda Operations of the Eighth US Arzy 1950- 51," by Colonel Done): 7. Hall, 1 April 1954, RG 319 Army - Chief of Spectal Warfare, Secret Decimal Files, 1951-54, 091-091.412, Box No. 7, Pay War 091 National Archives. Colonel Hall was the Psychological Warfare Officer for Fighth Army in Korea from 9 Novenber 1952 to 14 January 1954, then later served in that capacity at Headquarters, Arzy Field Forces. Host of his con- nents and recomendations in this report were limitad to the tactical aspects of psychological warfare ‘249 have wide experience and capabilities in both psychological and lune onvent tonal warfare, Hall feared that by combining the tvo fields under one head, one or the other “oay suffer as a result of particular enphasie given to the function in which the controlling personnel 1s pecially interested and experienced." This, of course, wi Part of the anxtety suftered by Special Forces adherente fm 1952; at that efue the "controlling personnel," both at OCEY and at the Pavehological Warfare Canter, vere those vith paychological warfare beck- fronds. (In later years, the atcustion would be reversed, particularly at fhe center.) rom early 1951 on, Volekmann and others in the Spec’al Operations Division had spoken prinerily in terns of a Special Forces Training Center, ———— fe a stbordinate role. Bet, a8 Volckmann adnitted, “we lost that battle. Indeed they did. Bur why? Could 1 heve been hecause there was even Wraater "stig" attached "by conventions] uilttary minis" to wnccomectional warfare shan to peychological warfare? Particularly since in the ca of Peyehological warfare, ataft represontation hac extated at both Department of the Ary and in overseas theaters during World War I, Sore, and World War IZ, ant a definite Mneage cf fornal Arny unite existed froa both the Korean Var and World War IT. To be sure, as Daniel Lerner has shown in his Sykevar, Psychelcgicel warfare in Wor id War II had its share of "characters" who tended to alien te military professionals.” But the aaJor potnt here ts that the Arwy did in fact have stati sections and untes designed exclusively for the planning \# conduct of psychological varfare, an activity that gradu y —_—_____ Teta. 2 ay Glow Taner? Svksear: Psychological Varfare Against Germany DeDay fo VEcbay (New York: George W. Stewart, I943)s op ST ate250 gained greater respectability in both World War II and Korea. Such was not. the case with Special Forces and unconventional varfare in the Aray, whot ed that iudirectly--was with the civilian-led oss in only real ancestry- World War II, an organization not exactly held in the highest esteem by many sentor military leades Viewed from a historical perspective, it seens clear that Spectal Forces ezerged as an unprecedented entity vithin the Army under the protective wing of an established and ongoing activity, paychological warfare, ceneral McClure's foresight in organizing a Special Operations Division in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and his selection of the personnel for this division, gave unconventional warfare advocates like Bank and Volcknann vhe official platform from which to “sell” the Army on the need for Special Forces units. MeClure's retionale for including unconventional varfare with psychological warfare can reasonably be linked to his World War II experience with PYD/SHAEF, his knowledge of General Donovan's insistence on the close Anterrelatiouship of psychological warfare and special operations, and the fact that the other Servicas--#a well as the JCS--had the sane organizational \ philosophy in their steffs.! Atthough it 1s apparent that key officers in the Spectal Operations Division vanted to dissociate unconventional and psychological warfare, without McClure's stature and backing as a general officer heading @ special staff division at Department of the Aruy Neadquarters, it Top. cit., Poy Wer 090.412 TS (7 July 1952). MeClure's handuritten coment regarding Colonel Sanis's report 19 instructive: "This is an interesting repout although I do not concur that Propaganda and Special Forces Operations are so conpletely different as tu require separation particularly when (a) all other services heve sane combination, (¢} JSPD has dua. responsibility, (c) black (covert) and white propaganda are aplit between state and OPC.\ . 251 Amprobable that Spectal Forces would have become « reality at the tine that it did. rived through the back door of the psychological varfare house. While the sarriage of paychological ant uncomentional warfare was probably « unton of convenience rather than chotce (as Colonel Volcknann suggested), 4¢ was certainly one of necessity for the Special Forces adherents. ‘Thus was created the Peychological Warfare Center and the 10th special Forces Group--the origins of apectal warfare. A Sumi Our quest in this study to determine the origins of @ special warfare capability for the U.S. Arsy has led us €o investigate the pre-1952 roots of the Peychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In doing 69, ve have traced the modern historical antecedents of Anerican experience vith psychological and unconventional warfare. These tvo elenents had @ common point of origin with the establishnent of the Coordinator of Information {n 1941; indeed, General William J. Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare included a11 the aspects of vhat the Army was later to call “special warfare" (with the exception of counteringurgeney). With the dissolution of COT in 1942 and th Parallel creation of OSS and OWI, the threads of psychological ani unconventional warfare took separate paths. In the Army, they 4id not formally unite until the foraation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951 and the founding of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952. Between 1941 and 1952, psychological varfare developed @ formal lineage An the Army that can be traced through units and schools in World War IZ, the Korean Conflict, the Any General Schooi at Fort Riley, and the Psychological252 Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Additionally, there had been Department of the pmny staff representation for psychological warfare during World War I, thea atnost continuously since 1961. Paychological warfare, in other words, had a tradition ta the Ary. Te was a civilian--Assistant Secretary of War John J. HeCloy--who pushed the Aray into devaloping 4 branch at the War Departnent for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, initially in June 1941, a thene si fe Llustrat and again in Novenber 1943. MeCloy's inter 2 throughout ol Anvestiyation of the origins of special warfare: the initiative denonstrated by influential civilian offictals to prod somewhat conservative Army leaders into venturing forth in nev and uncertain fields. certainly Brigadier Genersl Robert A. MeCvure was an exception to this theme, ‘The civillan-nilitery team that he headed first in North Africa, then later n PHD/SHASF, served as the model for successful Aray prychological war~ fare operations. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting (RB) companies euployed in Europe were the first tactical propaganda units of their type in the Army's history and vere to influence tne development of similar units during the Korean War. And McClure hinself had a strong hand in urging that a central peychological warfare agency be established in the War Department. ALI tn all, General McClure must be considered the most important Aray officer to emerge in thia new field during Word War II contrary to che official lineage of Special Forces, unconventional warfare--in its strictest definttion--did not have a traceable fornal history ia the Aray. The Office of Strategic Services, to which the Army contributed personnel in World War ZI, wes the ffret Averican agency devoted to the planning, diraction, and conduct of unconventional warfare, but {¢ vas not &253 i military organization. Nevertheless, it left « legacy of organizational and H coubat knovledge that, together with a few key ufficere who had World War II” experience in guerrilla warfare, was instrunental in the creation of Special Forces in 1952. This gave the Aray a formal unconventional varfare cay bility for the first tine in ita history. During the intervar years, the Army's psychological warfare capability languished, but staff planning activity did not cease ontirely (contrary to the claim of one prominent psychclogical warfare text!). This activity was kept alive by groving concerns of Soviet intentions, the interest of « few senior military officers like General Lennitzer and General MeClure--and the ' Pressure brought to bear by several secretaries of the Aray. In point of fact, a good bit of planning went on during this period that carried over to the OCP, more so thon was later acknovledged by General McClure, even though he substantialty contributed to that effort from his posts outside the Army stags. Similarly, the impetus for the initiation of covert activities after World War II did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group (forerunner of the CIA); {t came from Secretary of War Robert Patter-on, whose interest in developing an OSS-type "airborne reconnate nce" unit led the Army to study an Toaugherty and Janovitz, A Peychological Werfare Casebock, pp. 137f. They write: "In the military establishsent in Washington, staff planning activities tmolving psychological warfare crased with the end of World War IT hostilities,” and infer that nothing vas dose at the Department uf the Ary until creation of the OCP. McClure himself was prone to exaggerate sovevhat the authorship of OCPW's achtevemencs. As an example, planning fur both the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Croup and Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company concepts were under way in U-3 before the outbreak of war in 1950, and before the creation of OCPH, although McClure would claim later that these idea: based on World War II experience, originated in hie office.: 254 ‘organization that combined both 05S and Ranger precepts. Although { -erest in the subject waned after the grovth of CIA/OPC's responsibilities, the studies and dialogue that took place--Limited though they were--clearly shoved the influence of OSS on Army thinking, and presaged statler discus sions in the early 1950's prior to formation of che 10th Spectal Forces croup: Notwithetanding the fact that wore planning activity in both paychological and unconventionai warfare took place during 1945-50 than is generally acknowledged, on the eve of the Korean War the Aray vas ill-prepared in terme of personnel, equipoent, and organization to comfuct paychological warfare operations, and its unconventional varfare capability vas nonexistent. With che impetus of the Korean War, the helshtentng cold war tension of Secretary of the Aray Frank Pace, Jr., the and the persistent presaur an unprecedented staff organtzation--the Aray moved in late 1950 co crea Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, With Pace's support, Brigadier Ganeral HeClure created a staff under vhich vere placed the responsibilities it for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It vas largely ax a rei of MeClure's stature and foresight that the Aray developed ite first ca bility to conduct unconventional warfare, for the inclusion of a Spectal Ope: thons bi rieton in OCPW and his selection of the key personnel for this office gave officers Like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Rank the opportunity co formlats plane for unconventional warfare and the creation of ecial Forces. dnapite en ongoing "hot war in Korea, the primary influenctng (actor tahind the Ary'a interest {n unconventional varfare wae the desire for jaston, a potenctal guireilia capability in Europe to help "retard" a Soviet tn should Le occur, (In fant, the development of Spectal Forces cama too iate toi i 255 { 1 play othar than a minimal role in Eighth ary! bebind-the-line activities After some initial experimentation with the organizational rachinery to con- | duct this "new concept" of varfare, the unit that emerged vas clearly designed i to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines r siscance activities, and it was based primarily on Donovan's OSS Operational Group concepts--aot those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide sary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both Special. paychological varfare units, McClure vas able to sell the Army on parate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OCP" would be located. | In reality, roughly the sane cold var tensions facilitated interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial differ- associated with “aykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained incre: fed respectability in the Army during World War II and Kore: On the other hand, the Arsy continued co view unconventional warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept Special Forces resulted from the legacy of OSS-military rivalry during World War II, a lack of appreciation for trained for conventional wa unconventional warfare by office: a continuing i suspicion of elite forces by the Army, and trom the fact that there vas no formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces-type units. Most tax portant of all were the constraints of sanpover and money in what was, despite . \ the cold war, a peacetime Aruy. New ideas, pi ence in the receptivity of each by the Amy. Despite soue of the “characters! ticularly those that require ax i Anerease in personnel and funds, are understandably difficult to sell to leaders vho must make decisions on the basis of essentiality. (In this regard, | it {8 instructive to note that the spaces finally made available for the |256 10th Special Forcas Group cane from the deactivation of the formation of the Rangers, another elite concept.) In the face of resistance, both within the Arny ani fro the Air Force came a reality Largely through the sup- cman. and and CIA, Special Forces nonethelece be: port of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonel Vol Colonel Bank, But the bergeining position of unconventional warfare advocates vas weak in 1951-52; those in OCPW who wanted a separate existence for Special Forces found {t necessary to compromise. eceuse peychologtcal war~ pd unconventional varfare had fare had a formal lineage and a tradition: at to bring Special Forces into existence under the neither--it was expedie auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the se- tivities, ex curity restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Fore plaine the apparent ascendancy of :paychological warfare over unconventional warfare at this tine. for combining these two activities within General MeClure's rational ced in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially 1e heritage of General William Donovan's. organizational con and the JCS hed the atertbueed to thi philosophy, and because the other ssllitary servi seme conbination in their staffs. In alloving McClure to do #0, the Army ay two relatively new out-of-the- simply have found it cowentent to lump the nainstrean (thus “unconventional") activities together while it attempted to and weapons. The resultant package could very vell have sort out both id been called “miscellaneous warfare” instead of the eventual, vore glamorous, vepecial varfare."! Thus, the cozbining of paychological and unconvent tonal Ly gm indebted to Profesmor Theodore Ropp, Duke University, for this Aneight. a]237 warfare under the Psychological Warfare Center vas a marriage of both convenience and nec sity, but one vhich nevertheless gave the Army the begin capability. ‘The person most responsible for achieving this feat was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, el rly the central figure to energe in this etudy. Fron World War II until early 1953, he alone provided the continuity, expert: and guidance at the general officer level that was 0 escential to the ul- timate establishment of his dream--the creation of the Office of Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Forces, and the Paychological Warfare Center. ‘At every crucial point in the unfolding of events leading to these accomplti ry Pe nents, particularly after World War IT, one finds his personal taprint; in= deed, the story of the origins of spectel warfare could almost be told through 4 blography of this dedicated, energetic visionary. Today his nane ts recog: nized by few; the achievenents of Volcknana and Bank are gore familiar. One searches in vain for HeClure's picture on the walle of the Center for Military Assietance, or in its museum. But {f any one nan can be called the father of spectal varfare, surely that man was Robert A. McClure. Bven after being established, the Faychological Warfare Center and 1 Special Forces led a precarious extatence.! And McClure himself left the OCP in March 1953, an embittered man; the implication was that he had been in @ 'in an economy move, Army Fleld Forces recormended in October 1953 that the Psychological Warfare Center be deactivated and the responsibility Zor paychoiogical warfare training transferred back to the Amy General School at Fort Riley. Under this plan, all Special Forces schooling would have been conducted within ‘mits, rather than ina separate school. After a long and impas- stoned appeal by OCP¥, the end result was a Psychological Warfare Center that survived, but at reduced strength. See Office of the Chief of Amy Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Depart- gent of the Army, Subject: Puture of Psychological Warfare Center, 12 October 1953, filed with Pay War 322 Fay War Center C (30 October 1953), RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 32%~ 326, Box No. 13, National Archives,238 apectatized activity too long-! But his legacy is clear: the foundation he expanded to encom laid was built upon in the 1960's when special warfare w: pass counterinsurgency, and to this day Special Forces and paychological, warfare units exist--albett ureasily--under the Center at Fort Bragg. Troni- cally, tne Office of the Chief of Peychological Warfare has not survived in any form. In a real sense, the manner in which paychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal Army capa~ bility in 1952 suggests a theme chat runs throughout the history of epectal warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature. IyeClure wrote a letter to his friend, Lieutenant General Charié Bolte, expressing his feelings about leaving OCP: "To my unexpected surprt: and with no litele consternation, I have received orders transferring me to {ran to lead the Military Mission. After 10 1/2 of the past 12 years in this particular field and vith the added enphasis being placed thereoa by the White Rouse, 1 fail to appreciate G-l's policy. I asked the Chief if there was eny- thing behind it and he assured ve there wes not. The inference is that I have been'in this field too long and there vas no future for me as long ag I con~ tinue ina specialized activity, There are already soe rumblings in Defens. fod across the river but nevertheless I aa selling sy house and packing up~ Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, Conmander-in-Chief, U.S. Aray, Europe, 4 March 1953, RG 319 (army staff), Poy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, Box No. 3. Pey War 040 CIA (undated) 53, National Archives. Ironically, MeClure had decried the scarcity of general officers in the Aray with psychological. wa fare or special operations experience, and attempted to increase the number assigned to these specialized activities--to includ: « general officer to head the Psychological WarZare Center. He was unsuccessful in thes: en- Geavors. Now he, probably the most experienced general officer in any of the Services, vas being forced to leave the field chat he had devoted so such Sf his career to building up. See Office of the Chief of Psychological War- Gare, Yenocandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff for ‘;erations and Administ: tion, Subject: Assignment of General Officers to Psychological Warfare Ac- tivities, 30 October 1952, from Brigadier Ceneral Rohert A. McClure; NeClure's Meworandum for Record, Subject: Conversaton with General McAuliffe Reference General Officers, 26 December 1952; and Nenorandums for Record; 2 March 1953 and 6 Yarch 1953, Subject: Selection of Somender for the Pay- chological Warfare Center, by LTC William Trabue, Executive, OCEY all flied With Pey War 210.3, RG 319 Aruy - Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives. —souRcES [259] —4 i i Sanna| wna | Section I - Research Aids The research effort for this|study began, naturally enough, at the 0,5. Aray John F. Kennedy Centey for Mlitary Assistance, Fort Bragg, North ‘Caroling. The Center archives were found in three separate locations: the Institute for Militdry Assistance Library, the Center GL, and the Center Public Affairs Office, Within recent years, the Cl files have been transferred to the Hublic Affaire Office, and are maintained there by “he Center Sistoriay, Mra. Beverley Lindsey. tire. Lindsey : leo has a file of correspondence with many of the key officers at the Center in the early 1950's, and keene sone historical docments in her private collection. The personal files of tr. John Farrell, Coubat Developments, Institute for Military Assistance, vere helpfil. The Institute Library is snail but specialized in its collection of spectal warfare secondary sources. While important materials pertaining to the establishnent of the Paychological Warfare Center were uncovered, the prinary sources of the Center archives are not well organized, and pertain Primarily to the post-1952 years. One aust search eleevtere for nore detailed evidence of the Center's hiptorical roots. At the U.S. Army Military History Institute (11), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, key staff personnel who vere nost helpful to the author vere Miss Joyce Eakin, Assistant Director, Library Services, and Dr. Richard Sonmers, Archivist. Misp Eakin hae special MBI bibliographies for U.S. Rangers and Special Forces in her files, is quite knowledgeable concerning Institute holdings and can provide valuable contacts at both the Center for Military History and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Dr. Somers maintains the papers and|oral histories of nuserous senior. Amy officers; those of Robert A. McClure, Ray Peers, and Willian P. Yarborough were particularly useful for ay aubject. ‘The MII Special Bibliographic Series, Number 13, Volunes 1 and 2, Oral History, contain references to these and other officers, as well as a crose-index of key topics, The Institute also has a complete set of the Aray General Council Minutes for the period 1942 to 1952.| The Council met weekly, was composed of the senior War Department leadership, and was chaired by either the Chief of Statt or Deputy Chief of Staff. These minutes vere particularly useful in providing an overview oc the key decisions and events leading to tablishment of the Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare in 1951. Similarly, the War Department's History of the “Jlitary Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941 - 2 Septenber 1945, which can be found in the MRT, prov des some useful leads to the Aray's psychological warfare activities during World War II, | [260}261 Mina Hannah Zeidlik, General Reference Branch, Center for Military History (CM), Washington, D.C., provided CMH special bibliographies on Psychological warfare and Special Forces, as vell as assistance in loceting materials on these topics in their cacd catalogue and files. Of note vere copies of Office of the Chief of Psychologica: Warfare OCPW) sentannual and annual historical sumaries for the early 1950's, which provided valuable leads to pursue in the Department of the Army records, National Archives At the National Archives, Willian Cunliffe and Ed Reese, Modern Military Branch, were the key archivists who helped me to ferret out information on U.S. psychological and unconventional warfare from 194° «3 1952; John Taylor vas most helpful with OSS records. Indeed, these collections in the National Archives provided the foundation upor. rich this study 1s based. Foremost in importance were the records of «he Kar Department General and Special Staff (Record Group 165), and taose of the Army Staff (Record Croup 319). Records of the following staff agencies were instrumental in tracing the history of paychological and unconventional warfare activities within the Any: the Military Intel!agence Division, 62 (Special Studies Group), 1941; the Paychological Wecfare Branch, Military Intelligence Service, G2, 1941-1942; the Propaganda Sranch, G2, 1943-1945; the Paychological Warfare Branch, Plane and Operations Division, 1947; the Paychological Warfare Division, Office of the Ascdatant Chief of Staff, C3, 1950; and the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff, 1951-1954, The latter records vere crucial i determining policies, key personalities, and decisions leading to the formation of Special Forces and creation of the Psychological Warfare enter at Fort Bragg. The footnotes at the end of each chapter of wy study vill provide more comprehensive reference to all of the vecords mentioned above. Hatdonal Archives ecords of rhe Joint Chiefs of Staff (Record Group 218). See the 385 series, 1946-1953, boxes 147-156, for information on psychological and unconventional varfare. Records of the War Department General and Special Steff (Pecord Group 165). Military Intelligence Division (6-2), Propaganda Branch Correspon- dence, 1939-1945, boxes 326-344. Reports, directives, bulletics and other papers dealing with peychological warfare and propagenda activities in overseas theaters. 6 feet. Office of the Director of Intelligence (G-2), 1906-1949. Paychologic Section—~classified Propaganda manuals and other records relating to propaganda and paychological warfare, 1918-1926, 2 feet. and Plans Directorate (0PD), OPD 000.24 Section IZ (Cases 40-61), Septenber 1943 - January 1944, and OPD 000.24 Section III (Case 62- ), February 1944 ~ Decenber 1945.262 Contain excellent material on interaction between OPD, G-2, and other offices, establishnent of Propaganda Branch, 6-2, and organization for paychological varfare in the WDCS. Records of the Aray Staff (Record Group 319). "G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412 series, boxes 154-158. Plane and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.412 series, to Amclude Top Secret files ‘Army Operations, 1948-1952, 091.412 series, Top Secret “Hot Files particularly boxes 9 and 10, Includes Plane and Operations Division and G-3 Operations records on psychological and unconventional warfare and interface with CIA. Office of the Chief of Paychological Warfare, 1951-1954, Unclassified and Confidential Decinal File, 13 feet, 40 boxes Secret Decinal Correspondence File, 12 feet, 30 boxes. Top Secret Decimal Correspondence File, 6 fest, 22 boxes. Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1941-1948, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, particularly series 370.5 (1-31-42) to 373.2, box number 874; from 322,001 (10-31-42) to 322.03 (1-1-43), box mumbez 576; 091.4 (9-20-63) to 092.412 (1-1-47), box number 262; 091.412 (12-31-46) to 091.412 Counter Propaganda, box number 263. ‘Aray John ¥. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance Axay General School, Fort Riley, Kansas. Instructional Text, “Tactical Peychological Warfare, The Conbat Psychological Warfare Detachment,” September, 1947. Aray General School, Fort Riley, Kansas. "Program of Instruction, Paycho= ‘logical Warfare Unit Officer Course," January, 1951. Believed to be the firat formal course in psychological warfare taught in the United Stati Any General School, Fort Riley, Kansas. "Program of Instruction for Paychological darfare Officer Course,” August, 1951. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Information. Special Warfare, "U.S. Arny: An’ Army Specialty, Washington, D-C., 1962.263 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. Training Circuli Number 13, "Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare," June 9, 1953. Gives definitions and organization for psychological warfare at national nd Department of che Army levels. Outlines miseion and organizations of the Rad{o Broadcasting and Leaflet Group nnd the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. Headquarters, Department of the Aray, Washington 25, D.C. Special Regula~ tfons Number 10-250-1, "Organization and Functions, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff," May 22, 1951. Headquerters, The Paychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Memorandum Number 14, "Organization and Functions Vaxnel, Head= quarters, The Paychological W Nusbc. 17, 1952. The earliest formal document published by The Psychological Warfare Center that I have been able to find. Is the basic orgarizational directive for the Center. 12, The Paychological Varfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. ‘Mministrative Information Yandbock, Psychological Warfare Seminar, 17-19 December 1952," Decenber, 1952. Gives detailed mission of The Paychological Warfare Schoo! and an outiine of some of its early acadenic subjects. Also contains map outlining physical organi~ zation of the Center. Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Letter to Chief, Psychological Warsere, Departmen: of the Army, dated September 12, 1952, aubject: "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School." The Center's appeal to Department of tle Aray to give the Paychological Warfare School a formal service schocl status rather than a provisional status. Headquarters, John P. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Undated fact sheet, "Lineage of Special Forces.” Operations Research Officc, The Johns Hopkins University. Technical Memo randun ORO-T-64 (AFFE), "UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954," June, 1956. A study performed by a team from ORO that traveled to Korea, exanined records, and corducted interviews. Attempts to evaluate magnitude and effectiveness of US partisan warfare activities IMS Library archives. Proptganda Branch, Irtell:\gence Division, War Department General Staff, The Pentagon, Washingten 25, D.C. "A'Syllabue of Psychological Warfare,_ October, 1946. Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division, Nar Department General Staff, the Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C. “Revised Draft War Depertuent Field Manual, FA 30-60," Septeaber, 1946,264 Public Affaire Office, John F, Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, orth Carolina.” Letters from: 11 W. Yolekmann (Retired), with 1 erclosure, Brigadier General Ru Maxch 21, 1969. Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., (Retired), vith 5 enclosur Colonel Aaron Bank (Retired), February 17, 1968; Apri: February 27, 1973. May 5, 1969. + 1968; and ‘These letters contained not only valuable information but also provided sone important leads to check on the origins of The Psycho- logical Warfare Center. : : ‘The Institute for Military Assistance Library, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. “Examples of UW." A folder of reports and speeches on various aspects of unconventional warfare. Includes the script of a talk by Ray Peers given in 1956 to the Special Warfare School that is one of the most couprehensive speeches I have seen on the details of a guerrilla warfare organization (OSS Detachment 101, Burma). The Office of Strategic Services. "CSS Aid to the French Resistance." The following separate reports were assembled in 1944-1945 under the direction of Colonel Joseoh Lincoln. They are basically after action reports of OSS activities and operations taken verbatin from unit and personal Journals, These reports represent the richest lode of inforacion that I have seen or the details of actual OSS organi zation, techniques, training, personnel, and operations in Evrop\ “Origin and Developzent of Resistance in France: Sumsary. "Jedburghe: TOUGLAS II, Nusber 61 through JULIAN II, Number 67." ‘Operations ir Southern France: Operational Groups. “american Participation in MASSINGHAM Operations Mounted in North Africa: Jedburghs “Corsica: Operation Tommy." "Poles in France Used by the Resistance: A Report on the Organi~ zation of Poles in France by SOE/0SS to Create @ Cuerrilla Force for Augmenting the Activities of French Resistance Elenents. “DP Section. Reports by Participating American Personnel ‘of OSS. "p-Section: Reports by OSS Participants.” "SO-RF Section Missione: Introduction and First Quarter, 1944.” “SO-RF Section Missions: Second Quarter, 1944." "Mis-fons and Sabotage: RF Section, Third Quarter, 1944,"265 ‘The Peychological Warfare Center, Tort Bragg, North Carolina, PSYWAR, 1954, |The fret publication vhich gives sone de-aila on the backerored training, and activities of the individual unite assigned to The Paychological Warfare Center. Containe unit organization charts and chain of comand picturee. No mention 18 nads of the Special Force Department in the Psychological Warfare School or of the Special Forces Group. ‘The Paychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. "Student Hand Book," September, 1953. Contains mission and organization of school, acadenic and adzinistrative irfornation pertaining to students, and a valuable organization chart of The Paychological Warfare Center dated August 1, 1953, ‘The Paychological Warfare School, Fort Pragg, North C-rolina. "Guide for Stafs and Faculty,” April, 1953. Containe organization and functions of the school, boards, and committees, information on preparation of Anstruction and instructional material; adniniatration of atudente, | and academte evaluatioa. The Ground General School, Fort Riley, Kant Special Text Number 8, | “Strategic Psychological Warfare," Feb:uary 15, 1949, Section IIT ~ Secondery Sources Aerbapace Studies Institute, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpover in ores, 1950-53. Maxvell Air Force Base, Alabana: U.S, Air University, i964, Alcorn, Robert Hayden. No Bugles for Sote: Tales of the OSS. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1962. Alsop, Stevart and Braden, Thonas. Rosa: The 0. Espionage. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 8. and American Altierd, Janes J. Darby's Rangers. Fisher-Harrison Corporation, 1977. Beauront, Roger A. Military Elites. Ind{anapolis/New York: The Bobs: Merrill Conpany, Inc., 1974, Belajac, Slavko N. "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era." Orbis, JY, No. 13 (Fall 1960), 323-337. Blair, Melvin Russell." foughest Outfit in the Aray."" Saturday Evening Pont, Vay 12, 1955, Blaufach, Douglas $. TH Perfornance, 195 terinsurgency Era: the New Yor) i266 Blueprine of the Eesential 1976. Cline. Ray S. Secreta, Spies and Scholars GIA. Washington: Acropolis Books, Ltd fo ‘Harvard Cohen, Eliot A. Comandor and Politte Military Unite Modern Denocracies. center for International Affeirt ‘University, 1978. Mea Colby, William. Honorabli ‘My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Conine, Ernest. "Nev Horizons in Psychological + "pray Informetion Digest, Vol. 7, No. 12 (December 1952), 21. Corson, William R. The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of tl.2 American ‘Intelligence Empire. Nov York: The Dial Pret Daughert;, William Z. and Janowitz, Norris. A Paychological Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Prese, 1958. Deitchman, Seymour J. Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building Using Militsry Fover in =. Cambridge: The H.t.T. 1569. Allen. The craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Dyer, Murray. ‘The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Paychological Werf: Baltizore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Hilfot-Batenan, Michael, ed. The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Voluse 1. New York: Praeger, 1970. Fain, Tyrus G., Plant, Katherine C., and Milloy, Rose. The Intelligence Gommnity: History, Organization, and Issue. New York and Londo, Fayetteville, North Caroline, March~June 1952. Fayettevilis Observer. Foot, M. R. D. 1940-1945, An Analysis of European Re Lmdon: tyre Methuen. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Ford, Corey. Douovan of 0.8.8 Ball, Donald 7. "Organization for Cosbat Propagands.” Ary Information Digest, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1951), 11-16. Harkins, Philip. Blackburn's Headquarters. Nev York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1955. Bert, Henry C. "United States Bmploysent of Underground Forces.” Milivary Review, XXVI, No. 3 (March 1947), 50-56,267 Hazen, William 2. and Wilson, Barbara Anne. The of Guerztila Warfare: A 5: Purposes and Tuctured Anthology (4 volumes Army Spectel Warfare School. Readings 4 Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Deceaber, 1960 Heilbrexm, Otto, garfore fo Praeger, 1903; neny's Rea. New Yerk: Frederick A. Aolley, 1. 3., Jr. Ideap and Weapons, amden, Conn: Archon Books, 1972. Pyacff, Seward. The OSS in World War II, Mew York: Ballantine Books, 1972, of Nord London: MeDonald and Janes, 1978, lerner, Daniel. Sskewar: Paychological Yarfare Agetoet Germany, D-day to WE-Nay. Nev York: George W, Stevart, Inc-, 143, ical Wartare, Linebarger, Paul M. A. Nev York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943, 7che ten, Ase Alieary Rtatory. Matloff, Maurice, Pd. Army Biatert: > Ane ms Chief of Miltary Piscory, 1969. Washington, D.C.: Office of the McClure, Pobert A. “Trenda in Aray Paychologtcal Warfare." Army Infornation Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 1952), 8-14. W.W. Norton and Morgan, William J. Th Company, Ine., 1937. Osanta, Peaohlin Mork, Ed. ‘Guerrill i962. Marfare: Yighting Commnt 51. New York: The Flee Prees ot Gl Padover, Saul X. Lasewell, Hlarcid D. “Paychological Warfare. Serien March 70, 1951), Number 86, pp. 16! Peers, William 2. and trelis, Dean. Bedind the Re Jnersea'a Most Successful Geer ‘and Company, 1963. 4 Road: The Story of Eoston: Uftele, Brown Prouty, Ly Fletcher. The Seicet Terns The of the United Staten and” fe Wort, ard Ire Alles tn Control ipglewond CLirtey 8.3, Ransom, Harry Howe, Central Intelligence and Natl, Cambridge: Harvard Totvermtty Pr 8, 1988Riffkind, Herbert. “From Rockets to Rifles: The President's Guerrilla Policy." The Review (May-June 1962), pp. 1-12. Romanus, Charles F. and Sunderland, Riley. Time Runs Out in CBI: Un‘ted ‘States Army’ in World War 11}. Chin Washiagton, ‘D.t.: Office of the Chief of Military AMatory, Departeent of the Aray, 1959. Roosevelt, Kerait, Ed. War Report of the OSS, Vol I. New York: Walker apd Company, 1976. Roosevelt, Kerait. The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS, Vol. 2. New York: Walker and Company, 1976, Ropp, Theodore. ‘ New York: Collier Books, 1959. Smith, R. Harris, OSS: The Secret History of Auerica's First Central Intelligence Agency. Bet Special Operations Research Office. Undergrounds 4n Insurgent Revolutifonrry. id Renintance Warfare. Washington: SOR0, The Averican University, 1963. the Tarr, David W. Awertcan Strategy in the Ry Macuilla: Company, 1966. Jear Age. > + Tor! Taylor, Edmond. Awakening From Riatory. Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1969. Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper & Rov, 1960. ‘Thayer, Charl New York: Harper & Rov, 1963. Sueret yment of Men: Selection of The 035 Assessment Staff. Asse sels of “Services. New Yerk: Rinehart & Company, for the Office of Strategs Inc., 1988, ‘Inomson, Charles A. H. Overseas Information Service of the U.S. Government. Teuncort, .. Ks, Jr. Command Mie E. P. Dutten and Company, U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Gevernmental Operations: With Reapect to Intelligence /ctivicies. Final Report: Booka I, TV. Wanhington: US Government Printing Cffice, 1976.U.S. Department of Defense. Aray, Secretary of Through 1958. U.S, War Departnent, General Staff, C-2. Intelligence Divi 269 Sexiannual Reports of the Secretary of the the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, 1949 sure os ts 7 Decenber 1941 - 2 Septemver Prepared in the Military Intelligence Division, 1946. Wetgley, Ru Maceillan Coapany, Yergin, Daniel. Warsor ell, History of the United 1967. Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in jew York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1956. tates Army, New .ork: The The Origins of the Ccld War and the Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977._es-crmte meraMe BIOGRAPHY Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army, was born February 11, 1937, \chelor of Arte degree in political in Moscow, Idaho. He was avarded actence from Park College in 1967, a Maste of Arts degree in history from Duke University in 1974, and competed his requirements for « Ph.D. degree in history from Duke 1n December, 1979. Hie article, "Does the Ary Have « Future? Deterrence and Civil-Hilitary Relations in the Post-Vietnam Fra" app He is a Fellow, Inter-University in the September, 1978, issue of Paranete Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Hie military career has included comssnd and staff assignnents in Korea, Laos, Okinava, Vietnam, and the United Stites. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Aray War College. He was one of five atudents selected from the Class of 1978 to form the Aray War and college Current Affaire Panel, which visited twenty-six universiti ge of national security colleges across the United States to discuss « wide teaues vith stedente and faculty. He vas alao an instructor in stratesy and strategic studies at the Command and Ceneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, served in the Politico-Wilitary Division of the Department of the Aray Staff in Washiagton, DC, and vas « faculty instructor for the Department of National and International Security Studies, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penneyivanis In Novenber, 1979, Colonel Paddock assumed command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Port Bragg, Korth Carolina, soving to that position from duties as a Strategic Rasearch Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute, US Arey Var Colley (270)DISTRIBUTION LIST Assistant Secretary of Defense 1 (International Security Affairo) Department of Defense 4 Washington, DC 20301 Director of Net Assessment 2 ASD (TSA) The Pentagon, Room 34930 Washington, Dc 203 Anbaseador Robert ¥. Kouer 1 Advisor to the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Washington, DC 2301 Defense Documentation Center 4 DDC-TC (Accessions Division) Caneren Station Alexandria, VA 22314 Defense Intelligence Agency 1 ATTN: DIL Washington, b¢ 20301 Defense Tutelligence Agency a ATTN: DIA-DB-1 ~ Washington, DC 20301 Departnent of the Arey 1 The Army Library The Pentagon, Room 1A518 Washington, De 20310 QDA (DAMO-0D0) 1 ATTY: LTC R. Costa Washington, DC 20310 HODA (DAMO-Ss¥) 1 Washington, DC 20310 an corn nt ets art earanncmeeenmmenmamees fDirector of Operations (J-3) Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, DC 20301 ‘ages (J-3/son) ‘The Pentagon, Room 20839 Washington, Dc 20301 Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs (J-5) The Organization of the Joint Chiefa of Staff Washington, DC 20310 Chief, Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAG\) The Organization of the Joint Chiefe of Staff Washington, DC 20310 Department of the Navy NO (0P-612D) ATTR: CDR R. Marednko The Pentagon, Room 42475 Washington, PC 20350 Departaent of the Air Force ATTN: AFKOX (LTC B.C. Dutton) The Pentagon, Room 4Déi11 Washington, DC 20330 Department of the Air Force ATTN: AFKOO (LTC R. B. Gadd) ‘The Pentagon, Room BF938 Washington, Do 20330 Department of State ‘The Library (FADRC/LR), Room 3239 Washington, DC 20520 Department of State The Library (FADRC/LP), Roca 1239 Washington, DC 20520 Departuent of State ATTN: INR/DDR, Room 6535 Washington, vc’ 20520 US International Communication Agency ATTN: POM/RP,. Room 904 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, ¥¥ Washington, DC 20547 22 20Mr. Paul A. Saith, Editor 1 Problens of Communion PGH/PHP, Roon 964 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, ¥¥ Washington, DC 20547 Voice of America 1 Library, Rooa 1350 HEV. 330 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20547 Board for International Broadcasting 1 ATIN: Mr. Janes Critchlow 1030 Fifteenth Street, NW, Suite 430 7 Washington, UC 20905 Departnent of State 1 ATTN: PH/EX, Room 7320 Washington, Dc 20520 Department of State ATTN: PA/HO, Room W3100, SAe1 Washington, D¢ 20520 Department of State ATIN: | INR/DD/R Washington, DC 20520 Us International Communication Agercy (USICA) 1 ATTN: Library, Room 1005 1750 Pennsylvanta Avenue, SW Warhingtan, DC 20547 US International Communication Agency (USICA) 1 ATIN: Historian, Room 532 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, *¥ Washington, DC 20547 Cemmandsat 2 Air Wer College Mase!) AFB Montgomery, Alabana 36112 Comman ‘ant a USAF Spectal Operations School Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544 273 Cnn eeUS Military Acadesy Preparatory School Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703 United States Military Acadeny West Point, NY 10966 US Army Armor School Fort Knox, KY 40121 US Army Infantry School Fort Benning, GA 32905 US Army Intelligence Center and School Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613 US Army Institute for Military Assistance Fort Bragg, NC 28307 US Army Intelligence School Fort Tevens, MA 01433 Commander John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance Fort Bragg, NC 28307 Commander Sth Special Forces Group Fort Bragg, NC 26307 Commander 7th Spectal Forces Group Fort Bragg, NC 28307 Comander 10th Special Forces Group Fort Devens, Mannachuserts 01433 Commander 3d Battalion, 7th Spectal Forces Croup Fort Gulick Panama Canal Zone APO Miami 34008 276Superintendent Naval Post Graduate School National Secur‘ty Affairs Department Monterey, California 33940 National Defense University ATIN: | RDU-RAD-LD Fort Lesley J. McNatr Washington, DC 20315 US Army Military History Institute Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 Strategic Studies Institute US Aray War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 US Aray War College Library Carlisle barracks, PA 17013 US Army Center for Military History Washington, DC 20314 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Menagenent Wright-Patterson AFE, OR 45433 Defense Intelligence School Washington, DC 20390 Defense Inforaation School Fort Benjrmin Harrison, IN 46216 Araed Forces Staff College Norfolk, YA 23511 US Army Command and General Sta?f College Fort Leavenvorth, KS 66027 US Naval War College Newport, RI 02840 US Marine Corps School Quantico, VA 22134{ I 1 Comander 34 Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group ‘APO New York’ 09050 Commander 4th Psychological Operations Group Fort Bragg, RC 28307 Commander 10th PSYOP Battalion (DS) 4350 South Kings Highway St. Louis, W 63109 Commander 2d PSYOP Croup 5301 Hauserman Road Cleveland, 9 44130 Commander 305th PSYOP Battalion (78) Building 109 Arlington Heights USARTC Central und Wilke Roads Arlington Heighta, I1lincis 60005 Crmmander 15th PSYOP Battalion (08) Brooks-Lavler USARC Fort Thomas, KY 41075 Commander 13th PSYOP Battalion (DS) Building 772, Minneapolie-St. Paul St. Paul, Minnesota 55111 Commander 360th PSTOP Battalion Building 1034 St. Paul, Minnesota 55111 Coomander Sth PSYOP Group Sh TSAR Center Dover Honse Road Washington, DC 20315 275Commander 1 Teh PSYOP Group SiO USAR Center Dover House Road Washington, DC 20315 Commander : 1 1éth PSYOP Battalion (DS) 1776 Old Middlefield Way Mountain View, cA 94043 Commander 1 7th PSYOP Greup Harmon Fall, Building 649 Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 Commander 1 353d PSYOP Battalion (cs) Barmon fiall, Building 649 Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 Commsader a 306th PSYOP Battalion (DS) Building 415, Fort McArthur Sar. Pedro, CA 90731 Commander 1 20th SFGA (Nc) Birmingham, Alabama 35206 Commander A Ist SF Bn, 20th SFGA (WG) Hunteville, Alabana 35804 Commander 1 3d SF Bn, 12th SFCA (USAR) P.O. Box '¥ Wovato, CA 94947 . Comander a Sth SF Bn, 19th SFGA (RG} Buckley Air National Guard Base Aurora, Colorado 80011 Commander 1 34 SF Ba, 11th SPGA (USAR) Kendall USARC ‘5601 San Amaro Drive Coral Gabl.>, Floride 33146 27 | | | |eos Commander 34 SF Bn, 20th SPCA (HC) Route 1, Box 16 Camp Blanding, Florida 32091 Commander 35let Civil Affaire Command Mountain View, CA 94043 Comander 36let Civil Affaire Brigade P.0, Box 2025 George P, Wentvorth USARC North E. 12th Avenue-and College Blvd. Yensacola, Florida 32503 Commander 3224 Civil Affairs Group 302 Maiubia Road Fort DeRussey Hunelulu, Hawaii 96815 Commander 2th SFCA (USAR) Arlington Heights, Illinois 60005 Commander 308th Civil Affairs Group 187th and Riegel Roads Homewood, T1linote 60430 Commander Ist Ba, 12th SPCA 1325 NW. 78th Street ~ Kansas City, Kansas 66112 Commander Lith SPCA (USAR) USAR Training Fact}! .y Fort Keade, Mocvylras 20735 Commander Sth SF Bn, 20th SFC (tic) 10901 North Cliff Rod Glen Ara, Maryland 71057 3524 Civil Affatrs Command PECK USARC 6601 Baltimore Avenue Riverdale, Mary’and 20840 278Commander ‘354th Civil Affaire Brigade PCO USARC 6601 Baltinore Avenue Riverdale, Maryland 20840 Commander 357th Civil Affaire Brigade Boston USARC 666 Sumer Street Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Commander 24 SP Bn, 20th SFGA (8G) P.O. Box 10838 Jackson, Missisetppt 39209 Commander 3534 Civil Affaire Comand Robert P. Patterson USARC 2181 Loring Place North Bronx, New York 10453 Commander Int SP Bn, 11th SPCA (USAR) 335 Western Highvay Teopan, XY 10983, Commander 2d SF Bi, 11th SPGA (USAR) Port Colucbus Training Center Columbus, OR 43219 Comeander 24 SF 3X, 12th SFOA Jchn X. Reese USARC Box 4748 4000 Z. 15th Street Tulsa, Oklahoma 74112 Commander 364th Civil Affaire Brigede 2731 Muitiaecah Blvd., 3, W. Portland, Oregon 97219 279Commander 358th Civil Affaire Brigade 1020 Sandy Street Worriszova, PA 19401 Commander 30sth Civil Affaire Group Conley and Woodhaven Koad Philadelphia, PA 19154 Commander ‘360th Civil Affaire Brigede P. 0. Drawer 8000 Florence, SC 295CL Commander ‘Let SF Ba, 19th SPGA (HC) Camp ¥. C. Williase Riverton, Utah 24065 Commander 19th SPCA (WC) 1523 Souny Side Avenus Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 Commander 24 SF Bn, 19th SFGA Route 4 Tri-State Airport Huntington, West Virginia 25704 Commander AYSOUTE ASTM: Chief, Special Projectn Branch TéP Division Maples Italy Commander AFKORTR ATTN: Chief, Spestal Projects Branch Plans Divison Oslo, Korvay | ! { ' i ee iComa AFCENT ATTN: Chief, Spectal Projects Branch Intelligence Division Brunssum, The Netherlands USAE CENTAG ATIN: G5 APO New York 09099 Coraander : NORTHAG ATTN: 5 Monchen-Gladbach, FRG Koreandant Schule Der Bundeswehr Fur Psychologische Verteidigung 5359 Eu crasse 96 Cormander-in-Chief United stares Aray Europe ATTN: ODCSOPS, Plans Division Contingency Plans Brai APO New York 9473 Comander-in-Chief United States Army Europe ATIN: | ECJ3-FE. APO New York 09128 Ccomarder ¥ Cora ATTH: G-5 (PSYOP OFF) APO New York 09079 Comander VIL Cope ATTN: G-5 (PSYOP CFF) APO New York 99107 Commanier-in-Catet Patfte Comant ATID 3-5 Canp Smith, Hava 96862 Conmantor-tanChtet fred Nationa Command arta: Js APO San Francisco 96301 281Supreme Headquarters ‘Allied Powers Europe ATTN: Chief, Special Projects Branch PANDP Division ‘APO New York 09055 commander-in-Chief 8 ‘AFOP-RCO Fort MePhe.sn, GA 30330 Comander-in-Chief ‘Atlantic Command ArT: | 5-5 Worfolk, VA Conmander-in-Chief Readiness ATTN: | J3-U Mebill Air Force Base, Florida Department of the Arsy Concept Analysis Agency 8120 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, 1D 20014 Commander USAITAC (TAX~TACR) Room BSE32, NSA FANX TIT Fort Meade, MD 20755 Comander USATTAC (TAK-TAC) Arlington Hall Station ‘arlington, VA 22212 ODA (DAMT-FIW) washington, DC 20310 central Intelligence Agency ATTN: OCR/ADDL Standard Dist Washington, DC 20505 282 §Roca 381 Ola Executive Office Building Washington, DC 20506 | | | National Security Council Library of Congres: Sectton RS/E-2 Bighth Floor MAA Washinston, DC 20540 Superintendent US Naval Acadeny Annapolis, HD 21402 Cadet Library (DPSEL) USAP Academy, CO 80840 Colonel Aflred H. Paddock, Jr (Author) 108 devenarner rueTNooRncn ime-sarses aon 283 50

Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like