Negative

1NC
China is growing in influence in Latin America Xiaoxia 2013
(Wang; In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence in Latin America; May 6; www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/; kdf) China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil,
copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China

has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements
with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion. Some

prominent Chinese have condemned the United States' high-profile Return to Asia strategy, with its intention of containing China's front door. Shouldnt the United States, which put forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question how China is quietly arriving in Americas backyard?

Plan shuts out Chinaeconomic relations in Latin America are zero sum Watson 7strategy professor @ National War College
Cynthia, Chinas Presence in Latin America [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the

ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties
have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington genuine partner

must make a more concerted effort to act as a with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary economic

thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic
philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin Am erica, and the United States bene t from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure

theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade con icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation
faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signi cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With

U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best
outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin

American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability preventing US influence key Ellis 11national security studies assistant professor @ the National Defense University
R Evan, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America *http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_8591_Ellis.pdf] //mtc Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords
with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and

China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods.
get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China

China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion
began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chvez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in

the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase,

Decline causes nuclear war Harris and Burrows 9

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the

Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the
same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential

for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the
report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms

appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures,
command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become

self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets

that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced

drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The
close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning Iranian intentions may

and missile flight times, and uncertainty of place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating

crises.

UQ

China Increasing Influence

China economic influence in Latin America is gaining massive momentum but can still be disrupted Sarmiento-Saher 13
Sebastian, China and Latin America: Big Business and Big Competition *http://thediplomat.com/chinapower/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-big-competition/] March 14 //mtc
Despite a slowdown in Chinas impressive economic growth, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) now ranks as the worlds second largest economy. A

byproduct of this rapid expansion has been Chinas search for new markets and resources to sustain its economic growth. While there has been much analysis of its activity in Africa and Central Asia, another region of growing importance for China is Latin America. It is not without serious challenges or difficulties that Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are gradually emerging as a region of stable economic development. Although LAC is not a single country, many of its independent states have an abundance of natural resources and emerging manufacturing and service sectors that are projected to achieve solid growth in the coming years. Latin Americas prospects have attracted serious attention, especially from Chinese firms and policymakers keen to benefit from growing opportunities and access to raw materials in LAC. Under President Hu Jintao China deepened its ties with Latin
American countries through initiatives like the 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru. Chinas new President, Xi Jinping, is also no stranger to the region after having made several state visits there as vice president. According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese

exports to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008.
However, despite these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America. China

is quickly catching up to many of LACs traditional trading partners, however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region a trend that continues to grow. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), a study by Enrique Dussel Peters found that
Latin America received 11.41 percent of total Chinese FDI from 2000-2011 making the region the second largest recipient of Chinese FDI behind only Hong Kong. Echoing the speed of the trade increases above, Chinese investment in Latin America jumped from 1 to 9 percent of total FDI in LAC from 2008 to 2010; thus making the PRC the third largest investor in Latin America behind only the Netherlands and the United States that year. These investments come in addition to massive loan credits which, according to a report by researchers at Tufts University, have topped U.S. $75 billion since 2005 and may account for approximately half of the PRCs lending abroad from 2009-2010. The results of this expanded Sino-Latin American economic relationship have been mixed. Much of the trade, investment, and loans from the PRC have been focused on the countries, companies, and infrastructure that underpin the extraction of natural resources and other commodities in the region. This has been good news for the large agricultural, mining, and energy industries of Latin America, as well as for countries like Chile and Venezuela. On the negative side, however, this has raised questions about Latin American dependence on resource exports and the specter of Dutch disease. Another adverse effect is the growing resentment among some Latin Americans in some sectors that have been increasingly displaced by Chinas industrial or manufacturing exports to LAC. Mexico has been among the hardest hit among countries in the Western hemisphere as its large industrial base has struggled to compete with Chinese manufacturing in a diminished, post-financial crisis U.S. market. Chinese exports to Mexico have also undercut indigenous industry and resulted in a substantial trade deficit. Chinas competitiveness has complicated the Sino-LAC honeymoon period in recent years. Most notably, Brazils government has been forced to manage a sensitive balancing act, fostering lucrative relations with China while addressing the frustration of Brazilian manufacturing industries that struggle against cheaper Chinese goods. Labor movements and environmental groups have also begun to take a stand against the extractive industries of countries like Peru and Chile, whose exports and growth are tied closely to the PRCs demand for resources. Despite these issues, recent external and internal developments may be creating an opportunity for the region to balance its growing economic relations with China. Notably, Chinas

comparative advantage may be eroding due to increased production costs and Beijings desire to lead its economy toward higher-end manufacturing and domestic consumption. If this trend continues, it would help beleaguered Mexico, whose security and political problems may finally start to improve and give Mexican industries a chance to compete on the global stage. Using targeted policies, other countries with manufacturing sectors may benefit from Chinas economic restructuring. In terms of development
overall, alarmism about China keeping LAC economies dependent on natural resources is overblown. As Latin America continues to grapple with deficits in infrastructure, education, and social mobility, the question about whether growing economic ties with the PRC

will be a burden or a key opportunity lies in the actions of Latin America, not China. The central issue is about governance: those countries that benefit over the long term from the current commodity boom will be the ones most judicious when it comes to future investments and industrial policy. Fighting corruption is difficult anywhere, and Latin America is no exception. As democracy deepens and middle classes emerge in the region, new stakeholders will hold governments accountable. As

Latin America

continues to develop, China will undoubtedly play a significant role in its progress and advancement. There will continue to be cases of cooperation and competition between LAC countries and the PRC as their relations mature but as long each side has much to offer the other, the people of both Latin America and China have a lot to look forward to in the evolution of their South-South relations.

Big Chinese plans for economic expansion in Latin America Regenstreif 13

Gary, COLUMN - The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America [http://www.trust.org/item/20130612201137-eda5t] June 12 //mtc In Obama's first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the region's powerhouse - largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil's foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington's renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West's history of meddling in domestic affairs. "It's about influence and leverage," said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, "The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past." The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy - which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington's domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words - as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there. Biden, in a May 29 speech in Rio de Janeiro, gushed about the progress made by Latin America and trumpeted the region's growing international stature. "In the U.S.," Biden said, "the discussion is no longer what it was when I was first elected as a young man: What could we do for the Americas? That's long since gone. The issue now is: What can we do together? We want to engage more. We think there's great opportunity. We're optimistic." As with many new starts, a recognition of past mistakes is in order. "For many in Brazil," Biden said, "the United States doesn't start with a clean slate. There's some good reason for that skepticism. That skepticism still exists and it's understandable. But the world has changed. We're moving past old alignments, leaving behind old suspicions and building new relationships." China has particular interest in Mexico, the region's second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City - investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Pe?a Nieto shared with Xi is that though Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China. China is looking for even more however. It is eager to pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico, but Mexico City said last

week it was too soon. Meanwhile, Mexico's trade with the United States continues to flourish and it is due to displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner by the end of the decade, according to the Dialogue. China is also considering joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which aims to boost trade among the Americas, Asia and Australia. The talks include the United States, Canada and other major economies on the Pacific rim.

Chinas economic influence in Latin America is increasing Menndez 13

Fernando, The Counterbalance in Americas Backyard *http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/the-counterbalance-in-americas-backyard-2/] May 28 //mtc In the early 15th century, Admiral Zheng He sailed the Indian Ocean as far as east Africa in ships said to dwarf those of Europe at the time. The voyages were meant to make the world aware of Chinas greatness, superiority and presence. Likewise, Chinas current expanding economic presence in Latin America is raising awareness of its potential role as a counter-weight in a region long designated as Americas backyard. At least four critical factors are discernable in analyzing Chinas rise in Latin America since 2000. First, Chinas expanding economy, averaging ten percent growth per year, has created enormous worldwide demand for natural resources and commodities. The countries of Latin America, long enjoying comparative advantages in commodity exports, have reaped benefits from the high prices China pays for soybeans, cooper, iron ore, petroleum and other products. Second, as Chinas global trade expanded, its bilateral trade with the region exploded at an annual rate of 40 percent since 2003. According to a Latin Business Chronicle analysis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Chinese exports to Latin America surged to $88.3 billion in 2010, by 62 percent, while imports increased to $90.3 billion, tracking a 42 percent gain. Last year, China began supplanting the U.S. as top trading partner of several countries in the region. In contrast, U.S. exports to Latin America have dropped from 55 percent of the regions total imports in 2000 to 32 percent in 2009, according to United Nations figures. By 2014 it is estimated that China will overtake the European Union as the second largest trade partner in the Americas. Third, Chinas vast financial resources have allowed it to provide loans for infrastructure projects guaranteeing the flow of commodities. According to journalists Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, in their new book Chinas Superbank, China Development Bank (CDB) commands nearly a trillion dollars in assets and its total loans reach $876 billion. Increasing amounts of those loans are being allocated overseas, mainly to help develop infrastructure in Africa and Latin America. Bridges, ports, airports, roads and railroads are being constructed to insure the flow of vital resources fueling the vibrant Chinese economy. Finally, as China spreads its cash around the region, its firms are making headway into Latin American markets. CDB loans are often tied to contracts with Chinese companies. For instance, Chinas largest power supplier, State Grid Corp., has contracted to build power transmission facilities in Caracas, Venezuela, and ZTE, a telecommunications firm, is building an offshore underwater cable. In Venezuela, Chinese companies represent fully one fourth of CDBs lending to that country or about $11.6 billion.

China engagement increasing quickly Xiaoyang 13

Chen, A New Chapter on China-Latin American Cooperation *http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/a-new-chapter-on-china-latin-american-cooperation/] June 1 //mtc In the past few years, China-Latin America relations have registered much faster growth, with frequent exchanges of high-level visit, higher positions of the other side in each others strategy, extended Chinese strategic partnership with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and

Mexico and adoption by multiple Latin American countries of a China strategy or Asia Pacific strategy in which China is the focus of attention. Furthermore, the Chinese and Latin American economies are high complementary. China is now the second largest trading partner of and a leading source of investment in Latin America. It is the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Even amidst European debt crisis and global economic downturn, trade between China and Latin America has grown fairly rapidly. In 2012, bilateral trade reached 261.2 billion US dollars, an 8.1% increase year-on-year. China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru and Costa Rica. Bilateral economic exchanges are moving from trade-dominated to greater balance between trade and investment. Cooperation has also expanded into the fields of agriculture, science and technology, aerospace and humanities. Cooperation mechanism has been improved innovatively by ways of earmarked funds and forums. In global affairs, the two sides have made use of APEC meetings, BRICS summits, G20 summits and UN Conference on Sustainable Development to exchange views and coordinate positions. It is particularly eyecatching that since the new Chinese leadership took office high-level exchanges with Latin America have been even more frequent. In April, Xi met Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto and Peruvian President Ollanta Humala Tasso at the Boao Forum for Asia. In May, President Jose Mujica of Uruguay had a successful visit to China. Built on a decade of rapid expansion of ChinaLatin America relations, President Xis visit will certainly create a new momentum for bilateral cooperation.

Cuba
China and Cuba just signed into new bilateral agreements Havana Times 6/3 (China to Invest in Cuba Golf Courses; www.havanatimes.org/?p=94034; kdf)
HAVANA TIMES Cuba

and China signed several agreements to boost bilateral cooperation, including agreements to promote the construction of golf courses on the island, reported DPA news. Representatives of the two countries signed on Sunday in Havana several agreements in the fields of transport, tourism, industry and biotechnology, the paper said. Among them is the project of creating joint ventures to build golf courses
in areas surround the capital Havana as well as the far western province of Pinar del Ro explained the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba. The

agreements were signed during the visit to the island of the Chinese Communist Party secretary for Beijing, Guo Jinlong. The construction of golf courses is one of the more recent brainchilds of Raul Castros government
as a way to boost tourism, one of the main pillars of the islands economy.

Venezuela
China is making massive investments in Venezuela now The Economist 6/3 (Why Has China subbed Cuba and Venezuela;
www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3; kdf)
The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The

beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported
this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.

Mexico
Mexico and China just upgraded their relationship Xinhua 6/5 (China, Mexico enter comprehensive strategic partnership;
english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8272224.html; kdf) MEXICO CITY - Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City
earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the

two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to
upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The

Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said.

AT US Engagement Increasing
US economic engagement claims are just rhetoric Padgett 13
Tim, Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America *http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behindfresh-us-moves-latin-america] May 27//mtc There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas. No its not, he says. President Obamas trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show Americas interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America. Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.

Links

Link: Perception
Latin American countries perceieve US involvement, the more it becomes involved the more likely China gets crowded out Ellis 2012 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship; May; www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf; kdf) The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC . The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region , strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments , and Chinese commodity purchases and
investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran. At the political level,

US

engagement with Latin American countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop military and other ties in the region . Although journalistic and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century Monroe Doctrine
continues to be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to keep China out of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin Americas own leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United States. Colombias close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC.28

Link: Mexico Mexico is trying to create distance with the US in favor of China, plan reverses this Ellis 2013 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; China's New Backyard; Jun 6; www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,1; kdf) Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.

Link: Energy Aff

The US will use energy policy to crowd out China Wallwork 2013
(Lucy [graduate of Durham University and currently works as a research associate at Berlin-based OpenOil]; What Chinese investment in Latin America means for the US energy sector; www.multibriefs.com/briefs/exclusive/what_does_chinese_investment_us_energy.html#.UdMpS_nviSo ; kdf) So what of the operations of U.S.-based multinationals in South America? According to a briefing by the Inter-American Dialogue, Western multinationals still enjoy comparatively strong positions where they operate, so the extent of damage felt by the U.S. as a result of Chinese investment in Latin America is "limited at best." But the latest multiweek series by Today in Energy (an EIA bulletin) on ongoing Mexico-U.S. trade relations hints that the relations built up over years by the U.S. in its "backyard" won't be given up easily. The U.S. may be on the path to energy independence, but the Chinese companies scrabbling around at the bottom of the garden is unlikely to go unnoticed.

Link: Oil Drilling

Brazil proves the plan crowds out China Cerna 2011 (Michael [graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State
University]; China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese Presence in the Region; Apr 15; www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-sand-chinese-presence-in-the-region/; kdf) As it stands, the Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazils Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the worlds two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard, the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm of fighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but Chinas actions and increasing integration into the region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China.

Link: Generic
Engagement with Latin America trades off with Chinese influence in the region Francisco De Santibanes, 2009, "An end to US hegemony? The strategic implications of China's
growing presence in latin america," Comparative Strategy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802679728
But now the status quo seems to be changing. Chinas

increasing demand for commodities is promoting the economic growth of many Latin American nations, especially those situated at its Southern Cone, making them less dependent of the Americans. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is, as a matter of fact, becoming a more important trade
partner for some of these economies than the U.S. is today, while the political and military links between the continent and China have also gained momentum, as the number of visits paid by Chinese political and military ofcials shows. Meanwhile, distracted by the Iraq War and its ght against al Qaeda, the Bush administration has not paid enough attention to what is happening in the Western Hemisphere. The White Houses agenda toward the area has been reduced to discussing subjects such as drug trafcking, illegal immigration and amodest expansion of free trade.3 Latin Americans have reacted to the lack of a stronger commitment by reducing their links with the American economy and opposing U.S. proposals in international forums. This article suggests that the strategic consequences of these new developments, although not urgent, might someday become critical. The presence of China in the Western Hemisphere might, indeed, be seeding the eld for a series of political alliances that, once unleashed, would endanger American security. As a result of the reduction in Washingtons involvement in the region, disputes among Latin American states have grown dramatically. If

this trend continues, some nations might be tempted to change their loyalties from the Americans to the Chinese in search of the nancial and military resources they might need to strengthen their positions. This scenario would allow the PRC to counterbalance the American presence in Northeast Asia by having its own allies in the Western Hemisphere. Actually, we might be moving toward a continent divided into two camps: a northern region that will remain under the economic and political control of the United States and a Southern Cone more inclined to join Chinas sphere of inuence. Whether this will happen will depend, to a great degree, on the willingness of American policymakers to implement a coherent and active policy toward their hemisphere.

Renewed US economic engagement undercuts Chinas influence Ghallager 13

Kevin, U.S. running out of time to reset Latin American economic approach [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/us-running-out-of-timeto-reset-latin-american-economic-approach/article12420989/] June 7 //mtc The Obama administration and U.S. media have made much ado about the U.S. pivot to Asia. What has largely escaped their attention, however, is that China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile backyard of the United States. Just as serious competition ought to awaken ones creative juices in business, it is time for the United States to step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the United States and China in Latin America were brought into focus this past week, when U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made tours of Latin America. The United Statess principal offer to its Latin American neighbours is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP offers access to the U.S. market to Latin American and Asian nations, on the basis of a triple form of conditions. First, they must deregulate their financial markets; second, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms; and third, allow private U.S. firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily conditioned offer. So whats the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, Chinas President Xi Jinping offered more than $5.3-billion (U.S.) in financing, with few conditions attached, to its new-found Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports, the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: $3-billion in commitments to eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3-billion to Costa

Rica in loans and lines of credit, including a $900-million loan from the Chinese Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400-million line of credit for road infrastructure from the Chinese Ex-Im Bank; and A $1-billion credit line from the China Ex-Im bank to Mexico for its state-owned oil company PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the $86-billion in financing already provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. To put it into proper perspective, consider this: Since 2003, Chinas policy banks have provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and its taking Latin America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the United States and the array of largely Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by Chinas financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world. But its not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings attached. In a region that is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditions. That said, the Chinese dont lack a strong commercial focus. Often the Chinese provide a tied offer requiring that Chinese firms will be hired to conduct a bulk of the envisioned project work. What is more, the U.S. offer of a Trans-Pacific Partnership to all of the Latin American countries in the TPP process doesnt amount to much in the real world. They already have trade treaties with the United States that grant them access to the U.S. market. In just a few years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two trading partner (for Peru and Mexico). These arent just any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. Of course, the United States is still the most important economic partner for the region overall. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism just telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that with Chinas approach: It offers Latin America what it wants (in the form of financing and trade from China). When President Obama took office, he and his team pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin America. It hasnt worked out that way. Thus far, reset has essentially meant making the same old offer, but via new faces. In addition, too much of the interaction with regional governments has been on such efforts as concentrating on drug interdiction. Those countries rightfully dont see that as much of a growth-enhancing development approach, but rather as a foreign-based, defensive mechanism to protect the U.S. homeland. It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America. Very soon, it may be too late.

US economic engagement with Latin America cuts of Chinese access Pham 10

Peter, China's Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for U.S. Interests. American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 32 Issue 6, p363-381 (Nov/Dec) //mtc All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State Department last year that she found the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing. She went on to add, I mean they are building very strong eco- nomic and political connections ... . I dont think thats in our interest. 85 How then, in the face of Chinas growing commercial and political relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and, indeed, advanced? First, U.S. policymakers need to acknowl- edge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean neighbors matter to the United States not only for its traditional security inter- est in limiting the influence

of outside powers in the Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spur- ring economic growth to illegal immigration to narcotics trafficking to environmental issues. Hence it is in the interests of the United States to renew relations with the countries to its south by developing and articulating a compre- hensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dic- tated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region is shaping its future far more than it shaped its past 86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and peoples on mutu- ally agreeable terms is by far a more sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys 20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity, U.S. businesses still have a comparative advantage over over- seas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere. 87 Thus the administration must recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic ties with its neighbors to the south. In his 2010 State of the Union address, Presi- dent Obama singled out Colombia and Panama as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade relations. 88 Yet absent proac- tive White House leadership, the free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and to settle a dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giant would not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia, especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of puni- tive sanctions against American products.

Link: Asia Pivot

The Asian pivot results in China increasing influence in L.A. Ansar 6/20
(Arif; Pivot to Pacific boomerangs; Pakistan Today; Lexis; kdf)
While the

China-US ties are moving towards cooperation in the Middle East and Africa, in the Asia Pacific and Americas matters appear to be tilting more towards rivalry, while affairs hang in the balance when it comes to South and Central
Asia. And, the Summit was to take a stock of where the two powers are heading. The path of the Xi's trip to the US passed through Latin America. His visit included Cost Rica and Mexico. Just before Xi's trip, Obama and Biden made their own trips to almost the same states. Most

of the US and Chinese activities in Latin America have to do with trade and economics, but the experts agree that something may be fundamentally changing in the Americas. This alteration may have to do with and connected to the American pivot to the Asia Pacific. Although American scholars are very reluctantly pointing to this, nonetheless, the suspicion is there. The Chinese may be sneaking in to the American home sphere of influence using the garb of trade .

Impacts

China Solves the Aff

China solves better than the US in Latin America Erikson and Chen 2007 (Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and
Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf) Meanwhile, China's galloping entrance into the Latin American market for energy resources and other commodities has been accompanied by an accelerating pace of high-level visits by Chinese officials to the region over the past few years. Though China's foreign policy strategy toward the developing world prioritizes South Asia and
Africa over Latin America, this last relationship has experienced explosive growth. In 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to the region sparked a wave of visits by senior officials and business leaders to discuss political, economic, and military concerns. Since then, the volume of trade between China and the region has skyrocketed. President Hu Jintao traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba in 2004 and visited Mexico in 2005. The presidents of all those and other countries have paid reciprocal visits to China.

China's economic

engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $ 60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other
primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America--particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $ 6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas. n9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean exceeded $ 2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year. n10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $ 100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. FIGURE 2. CHINA V. TAIWAN: TRADING WITH LATIN AMERICA n11 [*75] For their part,

Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower without a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the U nited States
or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituencies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western intentions. n12 Nevertheless, most

analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China--to the extent that this

has actually occurred--is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the U nited States. Nervousness about China's rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competition posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using [*76] its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

Chinese Energy Security Mod

Latin America is key to Chinas energy security Xiaoxia 2013
(Wang; In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence in Latin America; May 6; www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/; kdf)
Initially, Chinas

activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a
problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China

must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum
industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.

Chinese energy security is key to Asian stability Hiscock 2013 (Geoff; Energy-hungry China scours the globe to secure future supplies; May 28;
edition.cnn.com/2013/05/28/business/china-energy; kdf) China's energy imports are so fundamental to its survival and development that China's new leadership has taken extraordinary steps to secure future supplies. In a flurry of official visits over the past two months involving President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China has sought to bolster its energy relations with
big strategic neighbors Russia and India, key energy exporters Indonesia, Brunei and South Africa, emerging resources suppliers such as Tanzania and the Republic of Congo in Africa, and renewable energy pioneer Germany. In addition, China hosted a visit by Australian leader Julia Gillard, whose discussions with Xi and Li touched on clean energy expertise and the burgeoning resources trade between the two countries. China's push for energy security and its willingness to buy assets around the globe may drive up costs for other energy importers like India, Japan, South Korea and Europe. They will have to compete with China through a combination of co-operation, conservation and technological advances. But

Xi maintains that China's investments are creating development opportunities for the rest of Asia and the world. "The rest of Asia and the world cannot enjoy prosperity and stability without China,"
Xi told the Boao Forum held on the Chinese island of Hainan island last month.

East Asian instability leads to World War III

Knight Ridder in 00
(Jonathon S. Landay, Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts, 3-11, L/N) Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even

a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster."

Latin American Instability Mod

Crowding out China destabilizes Latin America and hurts the US Xiaoxia 2013
(Wang; In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence in Latin America; May 6; www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/; kdf)
So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's

involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

Instability causes Extinction Manwaring 5 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at
Dickinson College, venezuelas hugo chvez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing

and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian
disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narcotrafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These

means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and
destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that

Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at

any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

Latin American Economies Turn

China is beneficial to Latin American countries Shifter 2012
(Michael; China Engages Columbia, Challenges the United States; Oct 29; www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3120; kdf)
A significant narrative of foreign policy in the 21st century has been the rapid ascension of large developing countries China particularly stands out as a counterweight or challenge to US hegemony. To be sure, talk of declining American influence has been around for decades. But in recent years, Chinese

presence into traditional US spheres of influence has become increasingly salient. Nowhere is such a change clearer than in the Latin America, long considered the United States backyard. More and more, the regions leaders are looking east instead of north when developing policies to compete in today's global economy. This shift presents both significant opportunities and challenges for the region. Already, China is the major trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru and will soon be the second largest of Colombia (10 years ago it was 14th). The countrys growing presence in the region is largely a function of its tremendous appetite for commodities abundant in South America which have fueled its spectacular development. China has moved aggressively to take advantage of opportunities in the region in which the US has been disengaged. For South America, the results have largely been positive , as reflected in high growth rates, which have enabled a substantial reduction in poverty and even inequality.

Drug War Turn

Chinese engagement solves narcotrafficking Ellis 2012 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship; May; www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf; kdf)
On the positive side, Chinas

donation of goods to countries and its sale of goods at relatively low prices have contributed to the ability of governments in the region to assert control over national territory and meet such challenges as narcotrafficking. The use of Chinese K-8 aircraft, purchased by Bolivia from the PRC, is one
example. The donation of trucks and buses to the Bolivian armed forces and non-lethal gear to the Jamaica Defense Force are other such examples.15

2NC I/LLatin America K/T China Econ

Access to Latin America key to sustain Chinese growthraw resources and exports Ferchen 12resident scholar @ Carnegie
Matt, Chinas Latin American Interests *http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latinamerican-interests/a7av] April 6 //mtc China-Latin America relations, especially economic ties, have boomed in the last decade. Between 2000 and 2010 China-Latin America trade expanded over 1,500 percent, and between 2008 and 2010 alone Chinas investment in the region expanded more than 180 percent. This boom in economic relations has been primarily driven by strong Chinese demand for South American mineral, agricultural, and energy resources like copper, iron ore, soybeans, and oil . At the same time, Latin America has become an important destination for increasing amounts of Chinese manufactured-good exports ranging from modems to motorcycles.

2NC MPXEconAT No Escalation

Accesses all great power hotspots Green and Schrage 9 Senior Advisor and Japan Chair @ CSIS and Associate Professor @
Georgetown University AND CSIS School Chair in International Business and Former Senior Official with the US Trade Representatives Office (Michael J. and Steven P., Its not just the economy, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, Asia Times, 3/26, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/asian_economy/kc26dk01.html Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers . It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and

jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system. Challenges to the democratic model The trend in East Asia has been for developing economies to steadily embrace democracy and the rule of law in order to sustain their national success. But to thrive, new democracies also have to deliver basic economic growth. The economic crisis has hit democracies hard, with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval collapsing to single digits in the polls and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Taiwan's Ma Ying Jeou doing only a little better (and the collapse in Taiwan's exports - particularly to China - is sure to undermine Ma's argument that a more accommodating stance toward Beijing will bring economic benefits to Taiwan). Thailand's new coalition government has an uncertain future after two years of post-coup drift and now economic crisis. The string of old and new democracies in East Asia has helped to anchor US relations with China and to maintain what former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice once called a "balance of power that favors freedom". A reversal of the democratic expansion of the past two decades would not only impact the global balance of power but also increase the potential number of failed states, with all the attendant risk they bring from harboring terrorists to incubating pandemic diseases and trafficking in persons. It would also undermine the demonstration effect of liberal norms we are urging China to embrace at home.

2NC MPXEconRoyal
Statistical evidence supports our impact Royal 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises?, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215 Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of

domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

2NC AT MPX TurnChinese Aggression

China not using Latin America as a political card only for economic growth Shixue 11
Jiang, The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations *http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/] November 3 //mtc The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is wellknown that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a card against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.

2NC AT MPX TurnAmazon

No risk of offenseamazon will just regenerate WND 9
1/31/09 (World Net Daily, pg. http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=87552) Moore explains that, in the 20 years of warnings about deforestation, "only 10 percent of the Amazon has been converted to date from what was original forest to agriculture and settlement." The report also tells the story of miners, who in 1982 cleared a large tract of land in Western Brazil. Once finished, they hired scientists to reforest the territory. Studies done 15 years later showed that the rejuvenated forest is virtually indistinguishable from its original form and 95 percent of the original animal species returned. Brazilian Brigadier Gen. Thaumaturgo Sotero Vaz, who spent 39 years in the military, 18 of them in the heart of the Amazon, finds it humorous that anyone would doubt the jungle's ability to recover. "That's very funny," he says. "They don't know the Amazon, believe me. Because all these lands in the north, west, it's almost untouchable because of this great capacity of regeneration," he explains. The Times report attributes much of the newly recognized, spontaneous secondary growth to farmers who have moved from rural areas on the edges of the forests to settlements and cities. The forests, in turn, have reclaimed the land the farmers had once cleared.

2NC AT MPX TurnUS China Relations

Squo bilateral talks prevent any misperceptions Haibin 13Research Fellow @ Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
Niu, Latin Americas Rising Status in the Sino-US Relationship *http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/latin-americas-rising-status-in-the-sino-us-relationship/] June 23 //mtc In fact, both countries demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-oriented approach during their recent engagements with Latin America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's visit to Mexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to import tequila. Similar review was also given to President Obamas visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This is a good posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China. Ultimately, Latin American countries benefit from cooperation with the worlds two largest markets. Although both countries are trying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in Latin America. At the bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogues on Latin American affairs since 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and prevent miscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the US government holds a positive attitude to Chinas increasing ties with Latin America despite some very conservative and suspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both Chinas permanent observer status in the Organization of American States and Chinas membership at the Inter-American Development Bank.

2NC AT MPX TurnUS China War

No US China war deterrence checks Glaser 11
(Charles, Professor of PoliSci and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies @ George Washington University, Will Chinas Rise Lead to War? March/April Foreign Affairs) What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attack by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in Chinas power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to Chinas modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security - and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Economic interdependence checks Perry and Scowcroft 9

William (Michael and Barbara Berberian professor at Stanford University.) and Brent (resident trustee of the Forum for International Policy.) US Nuclear Weapons Policy. 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. Online. Economic interdependence provides an incentive to avoid military conflict and nuclear confrontation. Although the United States has expressed concern about the growing trade deficit with China, the economies of the two countries have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent. U.S. consumers have bought massive quantities of cheap Chinese goods, and Beijing has lent huge amounts of money to the United States. Similarly, Taiwan and the mainland are increasingly bound in a reciprocal economic relationship. These economic relationships should reduce the probability of a confrontation between China and Taiwan, and keep the United States and China from approaching the nuclear brink, were such a confrontation to occur. On other nuclear issues, China and the United States have generally supported each other, as they did in

the six-party talks to dismantle North Koreas nuclear weapons programs. Here, the supportive Beijing-Washington relationship points toward potentially promising dialogues on larger strategic issues. .

Answers to Affirmative Answers

AT: China will replace the US

Our argument isnt that China needs to replace the US in the region, but that they must be participantsthe aff is an attempt to crowd them out Cerna 2011
(Michael [graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University]; China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese Presence in the Region; Apr 15; www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinesepresence-in-the-region/; kdf)
As it stands, the

Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil. U.S.
President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazils Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the worlds two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard, the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm of fighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but Chinas actions and increasing integration into the region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China. With both the U.S. and China jockeying for influence in a world where political power relations are changing, Latin America has the most to gain. The

primary concern for the region is that it does not become a battle ground for a neo-Cold War between China and the U.S. Brazil already has clearly stated its concerns regarding Chinese influence. Yet, despite this tension, Brazil is now too
reliant on China to turn away from the path on which Lula set the country. Agricultural exports to China are crucial to Brazils economy. Lulas Brazil supported China politically and made clear moves away from the United States. Now Rouseffs administration has welcomed Barack Obama with open arms. With all three major actors going through stages that could influence the global economic and political landscape China implementing its 12th five-year plan, Brazil cementing itself as a prominent world player and the U.S. still recovering from a terrible financial crisis this dynamic relationship is one that deserves close attention from all those concerned with the future of China-U.S. relations.

Where Brazil and the rest of Latin America were once looking for an alternative to U.S. influence and found China, the region may now be looking to the U.S. to strike a balance with growing Chinese influence. With the global ambitions of Latin America, namely Brazil, it is essential to maintain close ties with both the United States and
China. The world will be watching.

AT: Sphere of Influence Theory wrong

Their evidence is about the Monroe Doctrine, we can concede that it is wrong and still winour argument is about Chinese influence in the region, not the US Wallwork 2013
(Lucy [graduate of Durham University and currently works as a research associate at Berlin-based OpenOil]; What Chinese investment in Latin America means for the US energy sector; www.multibriefs.com/briefs/exclusive/what_does_chinese_investment_us_energy.html#.UdMpS_nviSo ; kdf)
The NIMBY ("not in my back yard") attitude is usually thought of as a curiously British phenomenon. But last month it was U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry who came under fire for referring to Latin America as the nation's "backyard" at a Senate committee hearing. Bolivian president Evo Morales swiftly took the opportunity to throw the Bolivian branch of USAID out of his country in retaliation. But the ill-judged choice of words may call for a reassessment of North America's attitude towards its southern neighbors and no more so than in

the energy sphere, where the rise of China as an increasingly dominant trading partner with Latin America's resource-rich nations is already having a visible impact on U.S. crude imports. For anyone watching the South American region, each month is marked by reports of another high-level visit between South American and Chinese leaders to conclude trade and investment deals, symbols of
increasingly cozy Sino-Latin American relations that shift the balance of power on the continent. The impact of these shifting dynamics influences the U.S.-China-Latin America triangle on the economic, political and social planes. In

2009, The Economist officially declared the death of almost two centuries of the Monroe Doctrine, which understands Latin America as falling within the U.S. sphere of influence, taking priority over other global players. This was announced on the occasion of China replacing the U.S. as Brazil's largest trading partner. But since then the trend has continued, and indeed accelerated, as China continues to seek a foothold in the continent's vast natural resources (the second-largest reserves on the planet after the Middle East). The implications of this for America's role as power
broker in the region and for future political leverage causes obvious nerves in Washington, but there are also concrete implications for sourcing of American fuel imports.

AT: Taiwan Turn- US already involved

The U.S. has maintained distance in the battle of Latin America by China and Taiwan, the plan forces it to be involved Erikson and Chen 2007
(Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf)
[*86] In the final analysis, the choice between China and Taiwan will remain a highly charged foreign policy decision for a narrow swathe of vulnerable Latin American countries for many years to come. For most of the region, however, it is largely a settled matter, with China by far the victor. External factors, including China's future growth trajectory, the evolving nature of the China-Taiwan relationship, and the dynamism of Taiwan's foreign policy, will all shape how individual countries in the region respond to the range of economic incentives and coercive tactics that they will face. The

United States may become a more vigorous voice in advising the Central American and Caribbean countries how to address this issue, but for the moment, it has opted to refrain from clearly choosing sides. Setting aside several notable exceptions, however, the fact remains that most small countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have never been particularly good at manipulating larger powers to get the best possible deal for their own interests. In confronting the competing crosswinds from China and Taiwan, the nations at the center of this diplomatic endgame will almost certainly face choppy waters ahead.

AT: Taiwan Turn-No Internal Link

Their impact has no uniqueness BBC 7/2 (Taiwan profile; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16164639; kdf)
Diplomatic isolation China insists that nations cannot have official relations with both China and Taiwan, with the result that
Taiwan has formal diplomatic ties with only two dozen countries - Pacific, Latin American and African states in the main. Taiwan has no seat at the United Nations, having lost it to China in 1971. Repeated attempts to regain representation at the UN have been blocked. Despite

its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan has become one of Asia's big traders. It is considered to have achieved an economic miracle, becoming one of the world's top producers of computer technology. And past tensions notwithstanding, Taiwan and China enjoy healthy trade links. China is Taipei's number one export market.

Aff Answers

UQ

AffUQChina Engagement Decreasing

China losing economic influence in Latin America Tulchin 13
Joseph, Chinas appeal in Latin America weakens *http://www.worldreview.info/content/chinasappeal-latin-america-weakens] June 4 //mtc The important market for China, however, was in South America involving Chinese direct investment in the exploitation of oil, infrastructure, and in the exchange of manufactured goods or loans on favourable terms for commodities. But China has fallen out of favour in the last few years. Almost none of the megadeals announced with great fanfare with Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and other countries has materialised, particularly as prices of commodities on the international market have levelled off and some, including copper, have fallen over the past two years. Only Ecuador has benefited, with loans from China in return for the sale of large amounts of oil. The downside for Ecuador is that China has become Ecuadors principal creditor, holding sovereign debt worth 25 per cent of the nations GDP. Chinas deal with Brazil, where enormous quantities of grain was bought on favourable terms on the condition that the Brazilian market would be open to Chinese manufactured goods, became complicated as they ran into political problems, with Brazils domestic manufacturing sector demanding greater protection from Chinese competition. Argentina is the most striking example of disillusionment with China. The Argentines saw China as an easy way to re-establish their position in world affairs during the 2003-2007 government of the late President Nestor Kirchner, husband of the current President Cristina Kirchner. Politically significant infrastructure projects were negotiated with the Chinese, including a bullet train linking the city of Buenos Aires with the interior capitals of Rosario and Cordoba. But the project was never started. The project to replace the subway cars in Buenos Aires was accomplished only as a straight market deal, with no discounts and no loans. A senior official in the Argentine ministry of commerce suggested in a recent interview that the Argentine government had lost its enthusiasm for deals with the Chinese. This disillusionment with China complicates matters for the nations of Latin America. As the Chinese economy slows, it buys less. This has put significant downward pressure on the international price of commodities as diverse as soy and oil. The result is less money for governments, such as Venezuela and Argentina, which rely on commodity export windfalls to pay for their social programmes. Failure to complete so many large infrastructure projects in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru has also fuelled growing disillusionment with China. It is forcing countries to rethink their strategic plans and to re-engage with the United States and European countries.

AffUQUS Engagement Increasing

The administration is increasing Latin American economic engagement in the squo Goodman 13
Joshua, Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-americainfluence.html] May 29 //mtc Bidens tour, which began May 26 in Colombia, included a frank and at times brutal discussion about trade, economic growth and security with 15 Caribbean leaders in Trinidad yesterday, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said, without giving more details. The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region, Biden said in Port of Spain. Yesterdays accord will give us all a vehicle to overcome special, specific, practical barriers to trade and investment. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone. In Colombia, Biden said a one-year-old free-trade agreement between the two countries is just the beginning, citing a doubling of the period for which entry visas are valid and efforts to expand trade ties further.

Link Defense

No Link: No Competition Over Latin America

The U.S. & China arent competing over Latin America current bilateral negotiations prove the plan wont hurt relations Niu Haibin, (research fellow w/ Shangai Institutes for International Studies), 6/23/13, China/US Focus,
"Latin America's Rising Status in the Sino-US Relationship," http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/latin-americas-rising-status-in-the-sino-us-relationship/
Now, it is necessary

to understand how this strengthening interest by the US and China in Latin America could impact the Sino-US relationship as well as Latin America as a whole. From a geopolitical perspective, both sides have some arguments to dilute each others influence globally. However, policy influence of such arguments is very limited. It is natural for both world powers diplomatic agendas to intersect. One noteworthy argument from Chinese side is that China should enhance its
engagement with regions outside of Asia as the US pivot to the Asia Pacific attempts to contain China. This argument should be interpreted to explore the diplomatic space available for China as a global power rather than to counter US hegemony. Also, China needs to understand the recent intensive American engagement with Latin America by following the same logic. In fact, both

countries demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-oriented approach during their recent engagements with Latin America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's visit to Mexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to
import tequila. Similar review was also given to President Obamas visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This

is a good posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China. Ultimately, Latin American countries benefit from cooperation with the worlds two largest markets. Although both countries are trying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in Latin America. At the bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogues on Latin American affairs since 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and prevent miscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the US government holds a positive attitude to Chinas increasing ties with Latin America despite some very conservative and suspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both Chinas permanent observer status in the Organization of American States and Chinas membership at the Inter-American Development Bank.

Link Defense: Mexico (Wont Partner w/China)

Mexico is squarely in the US camp it wont accept Chinese influence Francisco De Santibanes, 2009, "An end to US hegemony? The strategic implications of China's
growing presence in latin america," Comparative Strategy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802679728 Everything seems to indicate that Mexico will remain a close ally of the U.S. Indeed, the power gap that exists between these countries is simply too important for Mexico to even consider the possibility of balancing American power. Washington would never allow for the existence of a competitor that shares its borders; the risks of doing so would be too high. Moreover, the Mexican economy is more compatible with the American economy than with that of the Chinese. After the creation of NAFTA, Mexico has taken full advantage of its proximity to the U.S. and now sends that market 87.6 percent of its total exports.64 Finally, opinion polls in Mexico indicate that the population has a positive image of the U.S.an approval rating of 53 percenta fact that would facilitate the continuation of an alliance with Washington.65

Link Defense: Venezuela (Wont Partner w/China)

Power asymmetry and relative proximity to the US means Venezuela will never be in the Chinese sphere of influence Francisco De Santibanes, 2009, "An end to US hegemony? The strategic implications of China's
growing presence in latin america," Comparative Strategy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802679728 As we move south in the continent things start becoming more complex. Venezuela, for instance, is a unique case because of the strategic importance of its oil; in a world in which the provision of energy has become a major concern it is reasonable to think that Washington would never permit an oil producer located so close to its own borders to ever form an alliance with a strategic competitor. Doing that would imply the possibility that, one day, Caracas might decide to stop selling oil to the U.S. and hurt, in this way, the American economy.66 Furthermore, Venezuelas lack of a strong military makes the power gap between these two countries enormous. It should be expected, therefore, that Venezuela will not establish an alliance with China. Future governments might continue providing rhetorical condemnation to Washington, as Chavez does, but without any serious attempt to balance the U.S.

AffNo LinkAT Zero Sum

Latin America influence not a zero sum gameboth countries admit Global Times 13
China, US not competing over Latin America: expert [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UcTMEesTF-U] May 31//mtc Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.

Cuba Aff- AT: Link

China is in favor of the US ending the embargo Xinhua 2010 (China urges US to end embargo against Cuba; Oct 27;
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/27/content_11461619.htm; kdf) UNITED NATIONS - China on Tuesday urged the United States to terminate as soon as possible its economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. Wang Min, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, made the appeal as he spoke at a UN General Assembly plenary meeting. Wang said
the General Assembly has adopted resolutions by an overwhelming majority for eighteen consecutive years on the necessity of ending the US embargo against Cuba which has been imposed since 1961. "Regrettably, however, those resolutions have not been effectively implemented over the years, and the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba imposed by the country concerned is yet to be lifted," he said. A UN report shows that the "economic embargo against Cuba over the past year remained unchanged in substance, thus continuing to inflict enormous economic and financial losses on Cuba," he said. "The international community is faced with multiple serious challenges of the financial, food and energy crises as well as climate change, which make the embargo and sanctions against Cuba all the more unreasonable." "The

Chinese government urges the country concerned to terminate as soon as possible economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba," said the ambassador.

Venezuela and Cuba Aff- US limiting Chinese Influence now

The US is already crowding out China in Cuba/Venezuela Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S. China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its
support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign.

AT: Impacts

AffMPX TurnAmazon
China economic engagement creates unsustainable economic cycles and destroys the Amazon Ghallager 13
Kevin, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon [http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-riskychinese-dragon] May 30 //mtc But there are risks. While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required that borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of local currency. Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a "resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't compete in world markets and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades.

The Amazon is reaching a tipping point collapse causes extinction Gatto 8

Tim. 4/25/8. http://agonist.org/timgatto/20080425/the_tipping_point_and_critical_mass_are_we_there_yet. Just how many issues are facing critical mass while lingering at the tipping point? The way I see it, the volume of critically important decisions that must be made, and made soon, dwarfs any other period I have seen in my lifetime. The facts are that issues, problems and crisis are merging together to make a perfect storm that will affect the entire human race, sparing no one. While this may appear to be frightening to many, because of the threats that these issues pose to humanity, they cannot be ignored, and not dealing with these problems is no longer an option. These issues threaten our very existence as a species. Just what are these issues that are such a threat to mankinds continued existence? While many people and governments attempt to remain blithely ignorant of the situation, global climate change threatens to destroy upwards to half of all species of life on this planet. The irresponsible behavior of mankind towards the Earth is criminal in nature. The Amazon rain forest, which supplies twenty percent of the planets oxygen as well as removing nearly the same amount of carbon dioxide, is being destroyed at a rate which translates to an area the size of Belgium, being destroyed yearly. The Amazon rainforest which can be likened to the lungs of our planet can never be replaced. The discharge of fresh water from the mouth of this largest of rivers, makes up twenty percent of the fresh water discharged into the oceans. In fact, one minute of fresh water discharge from the Amazon into the Atlantic could provide New York City with its entire water needs for sixty years. The habitat of plants that havent yet been discovered, plants that could contain medicinal properties and cure disease, are being destroyed before scientists can evaluate their properties

and possible uses. Once a species is gone from the Earth, it is gone forever. In this regard, there is no second chance.

AffMPX TurnUS-China War

Strong China influence in Latin America causes US-China war Menndez 13
Fernando, The Counterbalance in Americas Backyard *http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/the-counterbalance-in-americas-backyard-2/] May 28 //mtc Chinas foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise Chinas cost of doing business in the Americas . Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from Americas national security apparatus. So far the rise of China and its growing stature in Latin America has not upset the prevailing paradigm in the continent. China still has a long way to go to displace U.S. power and influence. Nevertheless, the speed and enormity of Chinas entry suggests a period of profound change and uncertainty. It must have seemed that way to those who first saw Admiral Zhengs fleet off the coastline.

US-China war goes global interdependence doesnt check Feffer 9

John. Co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus. 3/24/9. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/thenext-cold-war_b_178589.html. But the naval confrontation in the South China Sea could be the most dangerous indication of them all. For all their senseless violence, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan remain regional wars. A confrontation between China and the United States, however unlikely it might seem given the economic interdependence of the two countries, would necessarily be global. Let's hope that these two imperial boats passing in the night manage to negotiate an equitable distribution of global power with more aplomb than they showed earlier this month.

AffAT MPXEcon
Dense economic linkages make conflict impossible Jervis 11 Professor of Political Science @ Columbia
Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425 Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable .

Empirical studies show no causal relationship between economic decline and war Miller 1 prof of economics
Morris Miller 2001, Professor of Economics, Poverty: A Cause of War?, http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v17n1p08.htm Library shelves are heavy with studies focused on the correlates and causes of war. Some of the leading scholars in that field suggest that we drop the concept of causality, since it can rarely be demonstrated. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to look at the motives of war-prone political leaders and the ways they have gained and maintained power, even to the point of leading their nations to war. Poverty: The Prime Causal Factor? Poverty is most often named as the prime causal factor. Therefore we approach the question by asking whether poverty is characteristic of the nations or groups that have engaged in wars. As we shall see, poverty has never been as significant a factor as one would imagine. Largely this is because of the traits of the poor as a group particularly their tendency to tolerate their suffering in silence and/or be deterred by the force of repressive regimes. Their voicelessness and powerlessness translate into passivity. Also, because of their illiteracy and ignorance of worldly affairs, the poor become susceptible to the messages of war-bent demagogues and often willing to become cannon fodder. The situations conductive to war involve political repression of dissidents, tight control over media that stir up chauvinism and ethnic prejudices, religious fervor, and sentiments of revenge. The poor succumb to leaders who have the power to create such conditions for their own self-serving purposes. Desperately poor people in poor nations cannot organize wars, which are exceptionally costly. The statistics speak

eloquently on this point. In the last 40 years the global arms trade has been about $1500 billion, of which two-thirds were the purchases of developing countries. That is an amount roughly equal to the foreign capital they obtained through official development aid (ODA). Since ODA does not finance arms purchases (except insofar as money that is not spent by a government on aidfinanced roads is available for other purposes such as military procurement) financing is also required to control the media and communicate with the populace to convince them to support the war. Large-scale armed conflict is so expensive that governments must resort to exceptional sources, such as drug dealing, diamond smuggling, brigandry, or deal-making with other countries. The reliance on illicit operations is well documented in a recent World Bank report that studied 47 civil wars that took place between 1960 and 1999, the main conclusion of which is that the key factor is the availability of commodities to plunder. For greed to yield war, there must be financial opportunities. Only affluent political leaders and elites can amass such weaponry, diverting funds to the military even when this runs contrary to the interests of the population. In most inter-state wars the antagonists were wealthy enough to build up their armaments and propagandize or repress to gain acceptance for their policies. Economic Crises? Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong: "The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

Royal is a noobstudies all vote neg Boehmer 7 associate prof of poly sci @ UT-El Paso
Charles Boehmer, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science @ University of Texas at El Paso. The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict. Politics and Policy. Volume 35, Issue 4, Pages 774-809. Wiley InterScience. December 7, 2007. Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. "Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states" (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict.

AT: Chinese Energy Security

1: Multiple domestic divisions makes CCP instability inevitable. Haung 2012 (Yukon, senior associate in the Carnegie Asia Program, where his research focuses on
Chinas economic development and its impact on Asia and the global economy., The Challenge for China's New Leaders, (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137316/yukon-huang/the-challenge-forchinas-new-leaders?page=2#)CD) Recently, however, talk of a political transformation in Beijing is showing signs of renewal. A growing, newly socially conscious middle class has taken to the streets to decry the government's response to the 2008 tainted milk scandal, to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and to the harsh working conditions for migrant laborers in factories such as the electronics manufacturing firm Foxconn, which was the subject of a globally publicized inspection just last month. These instances of unrest -- and they are but a few of many -- expose a growing discontent with three fundamental facets of China's modern rise. For one, Beijing's distinct economic management style has created vast inequality. Second, the economic system has led to almost intractable disputes over a finite resource -- land. And third, the Chinese system relies heavily on migrant workers, who are stripped of many rights and protections, and therefore all the more likely to protest. These problems reflect the failure of Beijing's reform agenda in recent years. There were plans to strengthen the fiscal system to address social equality and distribution imbalances during a time of rapid growth. Rigid controls over the use of key resources such as land and labor have created distortions that exacerbate social tensions. And this leaves a question for the next generation of leaders to be ordained later this year: Are they willing to tackle the many vested interests that have impeded change thus far and set China on a sustainable path into the future? Deng might have avoided this outcome. When he launched his program of economic reforms in the late 1970s, he modeled it on the growth strategies the other Asian tigers had used to so much success -- focusing on investment and exports. But he concentrated production and state resources along the coast, where only one-third of the country's population lived. At first, half of all public expenditure went to those areas, but by the mid-1980s, the figure was closer to two-thirds. The coast thrived, while the vast western majority of the country lagged. The geographical imbalance set off an unusually sharp disparity in regional income. Before liberalization in the 1970s, income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was a low 0.25 -- then, everyone was poor. Today, China's coefficient is relatively high, at 0.47. Although that figure is in line with Singapore and Malaysia (and lower than those of Thailand and many Latin American countries), the rapid change has been astounding. In just three decades, those who took the initiative found themselves wealthy beyond what they could have imagined in the 1970s. Meanwhile, as the protections traditionally provided by state farms and cooperatives dried up, those in rural areas lost their access to health services and guaranteed minimum incomes. Inequality could have been manageable, as South Korea showed with its efforts to ensure the same quality of social services in rural and better-off urban areas during its industrialization. That it was not is all the more surprising, given the egalitarian origins of China's communist state. There was a real failure to moderate disparity through social services. At first, such services were seen as the writ of the central government, but Beijing's weak finances (the share of revenues to GDP fell to just 12 percent by the mid-1990s) made major redistribution efforts untenable. Responsibility cascaded down to the local levels, but funding did not follow. This was not for lack of money. Beijing's revenues have been rising steadily, but that money simply does not get budgeted out for social programs , given Beijing's preoccupation with supporting infrastructure to keep growth rates high. Beijing's tax system is also economically divisive. In a communist system, revenue collection is normally geared toward redistribution. But in China, consumption-based indirect taxes (sales and VAT taxes, for example) make

up the dominant share of revenues. Far from being redistributive, indirect taxes exacerbate inequality, because the poor use a larger share of their personal income for consumption. China does have income taxes, which in principle can be designed to target the better off, but most households earn below the threshold that makes them eligible to pay such taxes. And the wealthy often find ways to avoid their obligations altogether. The vast earnings of state-owned enterprises are a major untapped source of revenue that could go toward funding social programs. But unlike in other countries, Chinese state-owned enterprises do not pay significant dividends back to the government. As their profits soared in the last decade, so did their clout within the political system. Thus, any moves to change the business codes were quickly forestalled, and the small amounts the firms paid out in dividends were not channeled into the state budget but into other loss-making state enterprises. Consider that if state-owned
enterprises had made dividend payments of 30-50 percent of earnings to the government -- as such enterprises around the world typically do -- each year Beijing would have collected revenues equivalent to two or three percent of GDP. With those funds, it could have increased spending on social programs by least onequarter to one-third, which would have pushed expenditures on education, health, and social welfare closer to the international norm. Since citizens cannot depend on Beijing or the benefits that flow from a sound tax system, they have turned to selling off land rights -- mostly to well-connected developers. Local officials typically pressure villagers and urban property owners to sell their land. The officials underpay them and then charge market premiums to developers, pocketing the difference for their own needs -- whether that be balancing government budgets or self-enrichment, as it sometimes is. Because this process is prone to rentseeking, it underpins much of the buildup in Chinese mistrust of local governments over the past decade. Improving the transparency of land sales would go a long way toward alleviating Chinese anger about regional inequality. For one, fair compensation to rural landowners would help facilitate more internal migration, opening a pressure valve of sorts. For rural families to relocate, they need to be able to liquidate their land assets. Without cash, would-be migrants are reluctant to give up rights that have been in the family for generations to go in search of better opportunities. But if poor people were able to pick up and seek fortunes elsewhere, Chinese would be less conflicted about a political and economic system that seems to lock rural residents into poverty. Of course, the ability to migrate would not solve the entire inequality problem

. Although the rural areas are the poorest, no group feels the government's inability to provide social services more than the 250 million Chinese workers who have migrated to the megacities. That group is made up of a steady stream of people who left their rural homes beginning in the early years of Deng's reforms, optimistic that they could find work that paid well. But they were never granted formal residency rights (hukou), so they did not qualify for health insurance or for better-paying jobs. Initially, the deprivations did not seem important, since most migrants saw their stint in the cities as temporary. Over time, however, as wages and the availability of social services in the interior did not keep up with the coast, what was seen as temporary became permanent. For migrants, life in the cities without hukou was bad, but not as bad as back in the villages. Now in the cities -- many of them for good -- migrants have started demanding more compensation and more rights. But the central government itself is under little pressure to make fundamental changes. That is because the target of most protesters -- whether migrant workers or villagers -- is local businesses and officials. The conflict between the residents of Wukan, a fishing village in Guangdong province, and local authorities over disputed land sales is a noteworthy example. The details are all too familiar: Under pressure from local officials, village land was transferred to developers for nominal prices. When villagers discovered what had happened, they took to the streets. Local police arrested many of the protesters, and a village representative died while in custody. The locals then appealed to senior provincial and national officials, who conceded to villagers' demands to organize more representative elections and review the land transfers. In doing so, Beijing reinforced the popular perception that it is a potential savior against the abuses of corrupt local officials. The claim that economic liberalization begets political liberalization is an old one -- and it has proved true in many countries, from South Korea to Chile. China, too, will eventually face the same forces. Yet the country is a unique case. Its decentralized political management style and strong regional differences in attitudes and customs have fostered a sharp distinction between how most Chinese view local authorities and how they view those in Beijing. Indeed, the capital's senior leaders are still perceived as having the people's best interests at heart, while local leaders are blamed for whatever goes wrong in citizens' daily lives. Accordingly, Beijing's worries over regional protests will likely prove overblown. In China today, for

better or worse, local problems beget local reform. Real systemic change would be a long and slow process, and so far, authorities have been reluctant to provide more responsive outlets for voicing complaints. They have also been less accommodating of village-level governance experimentation as they were a decade ago, when a number of such experiments flourished. Despite China's impressive economic achievements, the next generation of senior leaders taking office this year must find a way to move on political liberalization that meets popular aspirations but is acceptable within the party system. When a country is growing so fast, it can only kick change down the road for so long before the ride gets very, very bumpy. 2: No impactany transition will be stable. Gilley, 2007 (Bruce Gilley, Journal of Democracy, Is China Stuck? January, project muse) Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of [End Page 173] popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will stir the regime to recognize that its time has come, and to do the right thing by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively smooth democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely .

SOI Bad

SoI Bad: US/China Conflict

A rising sphere of influence risks conflict the US should crowd out China before it can build a significant presence in Latin America Francisco De Santibanes, 2009, "An end to US hegemony? The strategic implications of China's
growing presence in latin america," Comparative Strategy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802679728 In the years to come the U.S. and China might get involved in a conict for the control of Latin America. Indeed, Chinas expanding links with the region, on the one hand, and the American disregard for what is happening there, on the other, are making this scenario more possible than ever before. This assertion might sound audacious at rst. After all, the gap in military and economic resources between these two nations is still enormous. But to modify the status quo in the region the Chinese would not need to reach a similar level of power to the one Americans enjoy there today. In fact, such a scenario, if
the present rates of economic growth continue, could take decades, even more if we consider the military aspect of power, in which the U.S. retains an even greater advantage. The path to end the American hegemony would, however, be a simpler one. The amount of power the United States needs to remain the hegemon in the Western Hemisphereand not just the most powerful state thereis enormous, and as long as it continuously

by winning just a couple of allies China might change this. With growing resources from their Asian partner, Latin American states might one day be able to initiate conicts with their neighbors without having to worry about the restrictions the American hegemon imposes on them.
represents a major potential threat to the security of these states and no other world power shows the willingness or capacity to challenge this reality, America will remain the hegemon. But

US decline in LA -> decline in hege

If China replaces the US in Latin America hege will collapse Cerna 2011
(Michael [graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University]; China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese Presence in the Region; Apr 15; www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinesepresence-in-the-region/; kdf) With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China
presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its

investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem. The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the
potential consequences of Chinas growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. The

idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal gaining support are debatable, it sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S. and toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China . If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk.

Chinese Influence Bad

Chinese influence in the region leads to instability Erikson and Chen 2007
(Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf) The United States has been reflexively wary of any potential Chinese incursions into a region that it has long considered its domain.
While for the most part Washington does not see Chinese economic penetration of Latin America as inherently antithetical to American interests, there is genuine concern

over how the accelerating interactions might lead to military or strategic cooperation at a later stage. Few can doubt that China's capacity for mischief in the Americas has greatly increased over the past several years. The deployment of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti--the first in the Western Hemisphere--has particularly inflamed these anxieties. Beijing has already attempted to sell arms to Venezuela; n40 the Chinese government also reportedly conducts intelligence activities in Latin America through visitors, students, and front companies, and there are concerns about the PRC using Cuba as a listening post to monitor developments in the United States. n41

China hurts LA
If China continues to flood Latin America it will hurt economies and destabilize the region Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) Latin American countries face trade imbalances: Chinese products are flooding domestic markets to the detriment of local manufacturers, and Latin America is losing out to Chinese competition in export markets. Mexico is the outstanding example: Kevin Gallagher, of Boston University, calculated in 2009 that 97% of Mexicos
manufacturing exports were threatened by Chinese competition. In addition, China enjoyed the competitive advantage of price and local supply chains, which, after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, stimulated the transfer to China of Mexican electronics assembly plants (maquiladoras) that served the U.S. market. More recently, as Chinas currency has appreciated and labour costs have risen by an annual 10%, the Mexican position has begun to recover. Central American nations suffered too, losing textile industries to China.

This is of concern to the United States, which is anxious to protect manufacturing in some of its poorest neighbours, such as Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, in order to promote stability and maintain the U.S.-led War on Drugs. Nations such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia which has a 10:1 trade deficit with China are also
exposed. Only Chile, which runs a trade surplus, and Peru, which has a near surplus on China trade, are exceptions.

China Bad for the environment

Chinese companies are especially bad to the environment in Latin America Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourable comment.
The first major Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang Group, which began operations in Peru in 1992 with the purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 times an independent valuation. Shougang has contributed heavily to the poor reputation of Chinese

fines for environmental damage for the contamination of water supplies, low wages and dangerous working conditions. It has been the object of frequent strikes and protests. Other companies have experienced
companies, over problems with community relations. After buying the Canadian company Corriente in 2010, Tongling and China Railway Construction Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador. National protests followed an agreement with the government, including a march on the capital by the countrys most powerful Indigenous movement, Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). One example of an attempt to meet those concerns is the Chinese mining company Chinalcos relocation of 5,000 residents of the town of Morococha, 150 kilometres east of the Peruvian capital, Lima, to remove them from an area likely to be contaminated by the new $2.2 million Toromocho opencast copper mine. Advised by local managers and PR consultants, Chinalco is investing $50 million in an entirely new town nearby, a project it describes as the biggest privately-funded social project in Perus history (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ people.cfm?authorID=580). Two-thirds of the residents have moved, although the project has also been dogged by complaints about inadequate housing and compensation. Although

some dispute the claim that Chinese conduct is worse than U.S. or local equivalents, China suffers from widespread negative perceptions and the identification of Chinese companies with the Chinese state. Local labour groups, some
government officials and many indigenous and social groups in the region make little distinction between private Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises. Local

opinion surveys reveal that most companies, whether large or small, state owned or private, suffer from anti- Chinese sentiment and the perception that they put profit above environmental and social concerns. In several African countries, Chinese security guards have been deployed to defend
companies interests and have even, on occasion, killed Africans. Both the Peruvian president, Ollanta Humala, and the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, political allies of China, have felt obliged to insist to their electorates that Chinese troops would never be allowed to set foot in their countries.

Chinese Influence Bad-> Escalation

Latin America is a hot point for tensions in the US-Sino balance Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from China. Despite the concerns of the State
Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the China threat. Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. Chinas continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails

presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will a loss of U.S. influence in

the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administrations pivot to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

Taiwan Debate

2AC Taiwan Turn

China will use Central America to isolate Taiwan, causing geopolitical strife Erikson and Chen 2007
(Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf)
While increasing economic

and political ties between China and Latin America have attracted significant attention from U.S. policymakers in the past few years, the extent to which Beijing's foreign policy is shaped by its desire to isolate Taiwan internationally is often overlooked. Yet, this crucial dimension of Chinese foreign policy is indispensable to a full understanding of China's rising influence in the global system, and its possible repercussions for U.S. national interests. Today, in some of the most remote corners of the world, a fierce contest for diplomatic recognition and political influence is being fought between Taiwan and the PRC. [*70] In particular, Latin America has emerged as the crucial battleground where a dozen struggling nations, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, have become ensnared in the cross-strait dispute. The strategically significant "swing states" among them face growing pressures to abandon their longstanding relationships with Taiwan in favor of cementing diplomatic ties with China. Meanwhile, officials in Washington have yet to fully consider the possible implications for U.S. policy of
this intensifying competition in their own backyard.

That guts hegemony Twining 2013

(Daniel [senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund]; The Taiwan Linchpin; Hoover Institution; Policy Review No 177; www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139396; kdf)
Taiwan is an exceptional case given the unique nature of its identity and historical conflict with mainland China, as well as U.S. equities in supporting Taiwans autonomy while sustaining a fruitful relationship with Beijing. Nonetheless, the same point applies from an American perspective: to

the extent that Taiwan has a wider set of friends and allies that assuage Taiwanese insecurities and offset its isolation, it is easier for Washington to pursue constructive relations with Taipei. From an American perspective, the cross-Strait balance looks sturdier when Taiwan is strengthening relations with Japan and other important powers than when Taiwan is isolated, withdrawn, and unduly dependent on the United States. The U.S. goal of building new networks beyond the hub-and-spokes alliance model including connecting allies with each other to create a more robust regional security architecture would be enhanced by more intimate military and diplomatic
relations between Taipei and Tokyo. Pulling Japan out of its U.S. alliance cocoon into greater regional leadership remains a long-term American objective that Taiwan can help facilitate. By encouraging Tokyo to assume broader regional security responsibilities, Taiwan can help shape Japans identity in the 21st century in the same way that Japan shaped Taiwans in the 20th.

That causes multiple conflict escalation leading to global war Kagan 12(Robert, is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy
at the Brookings Institution, 2012, Not Fade Away The myth of American decline, (http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm_source =Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email)CD) If we are serious about this exercise in accounting, moreover, the costs of maintaining this position cannot be measured without considering the costs of losing it. Some of the costs of reducing the American role in the world are, of course, unquantifiable. What is it worth to Americans to live in a world dominated by democracies rather than by autocracies? But some of the potential costs could be measured, if anyone

cared to try. If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less soif all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident? American military strength reduces the risk of accidents by deterring conflict, and lowers the price of the accidents that occur by reducing the chance of losing. These savings need to be part of the
calculation, too. As a simple matter of dollars and cents, it may be a lot cheaper to preserve the current level of American involvement in the world than to reduce it. PERHAPS THE GREATEST concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twenty-first-century world?

AT: Taiwan has other allies

Taiwan is at the brink, losing an ally triggers a domino effect that ends their sovereignty Erikson and Chen 2007
(Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf)
"SWING STATES" Given the increasing weight of the Chinese economy in the global system overall, all of Taiwan's allies in the Western Hemisphere are under continually building pressures to formalize their budding ties with Beijing. However, several among them stand out either as being especially susceptible to Beijing's overtures, or for their heightened strategic importance. At this juncture, the loss of even one of these key allies would represent a damaging reversal for Taiwan. The frequent use of the phrase "domino effect" vividly conveys the dread of a chain reaction that could severely cripple Taiwan's claim to sovereignty. n32
THE

Nicaragua is a clear case in point. In July 2006, representatives of the left-wing Sandinista [*81] Front of National Liberation (FSLN) declared in the midst of a heated presidential election campaign that Sandinista frontrunner Daniel Ortega planned to establish formal ties with Beijing and downgrade the Taiwanese embassy to "trade representative" status if he triumphed at the polls. The Taiwanese envoy in Managua at the time categorically rejected the proposal as unacceptable. Since Ortega's victory in November, Nicaraguan officials have been careful to assure Taipei that cooperation between the two countries will continue, and President Chen attended Ortega's inauguration in January 2007. Still, it appears that Taipei may have to be prepared to make major concessions to maintain its increasingly tenuous links to Managua. Ortega's presumably anti-American streak, coupled with the reality of the PRC's economic weight in the post-Cold War world, n33 point to some rocky times ahead for the bilateral relationship.

AT: No Conflict Now

Increased Chinese presence makes conflict more likely Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) China has not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States in Latin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the background of U.S.China rivalry and potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could change in the future. In the meantime, Chinas economic weight offers its Latin American partners a new freedom to defy U.S. interests, should they choose to.

China forces break of ties with Taiwan

China uses Latin America as a unique instance to isolate Taiwan Hilton 2013
(Isabel; China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge; Feb; Norwegian Peacebuilding Center; www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aa d9.pdf; kdf) One of Chinas political objectives is to further the One- China policy, which states that diplomatic relations with the PRC require a country to break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan),
as discussed, for example, in Chinas Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025. htm). More than half of the countries in the world that still recognise the ROC are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Costa Ricas recognition of the PRC in 2007 was followed by the Chinese purchase of US$300 million in Costa Rican bonds, an investment of $74 million in a football stadium in the capital and, in 2012, a free trade agreement.

Similar packages are on offer,

no doubt, for other nations willing to switch.

IR Theory Debate

Sphere of Influence theory wrong Sphere of influence theory is no longer true Global Times-Agencies 5/31
(China, US not competing over Latin America: expert; www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UdIpN_nviSo; kdf)
Chinese President Xi

Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to
Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports

described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they
are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it

is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good
thing for Latin America.

AT China Soft Power Not Zero Sum/Decline Inevitable

Chinese soft power is not zero-sum with the US plus other factors ensure its decline Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is professor at Harvard and author of the new book Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era, April 29, 2013, ForeignPolicy.com, What China and Russia Dont Get
About Soft Power, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_po wer?page=0,1
Even China's

soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long after the last international athletes had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo
and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China

and Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's world, information is not
scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But

soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon .

Triangular Theory Wrong

The DA assumes triangular theoryit is bunk 1) Other actors than the US and China Ellis 2012 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship; May; www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf; kdf) The triangle concept downplays the importance of other actors whose interaction with the United States, China and Latin America are also important. These include India, Russia, Iran and Europe. While the triangle does not exclude these other actors per se, the focus on the interaction among China, the United States and Latin America tends to conceal how other states, as well as non-state actors, play key roles in that dynamic. For example, the sometimes competing, sometimes complementary balance in Brazils relationships with India and China,
played out in the Brazil-Russia-India- China (BRICS) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forums, is arguably as relevant to Brazils foreign policy as is its relationship with the United States. Similarly, although

much of the foreign policy of the Chvez regime is defined in terms of its opposition to US imperialism, Venezuelas reliance on Russian arms, Chinese money and its anti-US alliance with Iran occupy roughly equal importance. With respect to Argentina, when
the PRC ceased taking in that nations exports of soy oil, India stepped up its purchases, helping to save Argentina from a much more significant economic problem and, in the process, weakening the PRCs ability to pressure the Argentine government. In states that were Soviet clients during the Cold War, such as Cuba and Nicaragua, the importance of Russia as a partner arguably rivals, or exceeds, that of China. While

the triangle concept conceals other actors that play a fundamental part of the dynamic in the hemisphere, it is important to understand that Latin American nations themselves generally do not define their external relations principally in terms of a triangle involving the United States and China. Indeed, while both China and the United States are important external referents for the region, Latin American countries and actors
increasingly look toward the world in terms of a plurality of actual and potential partners, including Russia, India, the European Union and Iran. The importance of those partners varies according to context (political alliances versus economic partnerships versus military sales, etc.). The importance also varies according to which Latin American country is doing the looking.

2) Latin America is not a country Ellis 2012 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship; May; www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf; kdf) The triangle concept implies that it is valid to group together the nations of Latin America with respect to their relationships with the PRC and the United States. But this is not the case. Latin America can be physically grouped as a geographic region, but referring to Latin America as one leg in a triangular relationship incorrectly assumes that actions by the other legsthe United States and China impact Latin America as a whole. It also falsely assumes that Latin America as a whole deals with the United States and China. While it is possible to discuss the overall triangular set of interactions at some level of abstraction, the nature of the relationship between each state and the PRC, and between each state and the United States, varies dramatically.

AT: Mexico Not Important

Trade with Mexico is key to Taiwanese sovereignty Erikson and Chen 2007
(Daniel P. [Senior Associate for US policy @ Inter-American Dialogue] and Janice [joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center]; China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America; 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69; kdf)
[*72] Of course, even Latin American countries without official relationships with Taipei often try to maintain good "non-official" relations, which may include opening reciprocal missions, often disguised as nonprofit foundations or businesses, in their respective capitals. The

lack of diplomatic links has not prevented Taiwan from undertaking significant trade with Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. However, the Taiwanese government believes that the ability to conduct relations with sovereign states on an equal basis is vital to the legitimacy of its own claim to sovereignty. Official allies
also support Taiwan's repeated petitions to join international forums such as the World Health Organization and the UN, which are perennially squelched by China. And though Central America may share the famous Mexican lament about being "so far from God, so close to the United States," from Taiwan's point of view, this geographical happenstance makes the isthmus a particularly valuable region in which to retain a bloc of allies. Central America's proximity to the United States justifies Taiwanese officials' use of refueling stops in America to meet "unofficially" with U.S. policymakers while en route to official state visits in the south, a practice that has been dubbed "transit diplomacy." n3

AT: China CP
Chinese engagement in Latin America leads to political and economic instability in the region Ellis 2012 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies]; The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship; May; www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf; kdf) Chinese engagement with Latin Americaeconomic, military or otherwisealso impacts the United States at the
political level. Hu Jintaos five-nation trip to Latin America in November 2004, in conjunction with Chinese attendance at the APEC summit in Santiago, Chile, sparked a wave of political activity in the United States. This included not only public events by Washington, D.C. think tanks, but also hearings on Chinese engagement in Latin America in both the US House of Representatives (April 2005) and the US Senate (August 2005). Indeed, Latin American

leaders recognize the effect their China initiatives have within the US

political system. The February 2011 announcement Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos made to The Financial Times concerning
Chinese plans to build a dry canal across Colombia,19 for example, seemed timed to influence US congressional approval of the USColombia Trade Promotion Agreement.20 Chinese engagement with the region ultimately impacts the United States in broader terms, because the

United States is intimately tied to the region in geographical, human and economic terms. To the extent that PRC activities in Latin America inadvertently generate economic displacement and sociopolitical problems among nations in the region, the resulting turmoil potentially spills over to the United States. Examples could include future crises in countries that become heavily dependent on Chinese loans, such as
Venezuela and Ecuador, or political tension sparked by displaced manufacturing sectors in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, or controversy over the entry of Chinese firms into new extractive sectors such as agriculture in Brazil and Argentina or mining in Peru. Reciprocally, to the extent that Latin Americas exports to the PRC increase prosperity and bolster development, the US benefits: Latin America is able to purchase more US goods, and Latin American migration to the United States for economic reasons does not grow.21