EMINENT DOMAIN Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning

the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995 Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelecspace of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelecspace shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to makeknown their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelecspace shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void onthe ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against thetaking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec,the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision(police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during theelection period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print mediacompanies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without paymentof the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for thetaking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were notunwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by theconstitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitutea valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of anational emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

FORFOM DEVELOPMENT RAILWAYS

CORPORATION

vs.

PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL

G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008 Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387, all of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. Said parcels ofland were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under OriginalCertificates of Title (OCT) Nos. (0326) 0-384 and (0-328) 0-386.In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the PresidentialCommuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No.751 dated 2 November 1972 of the PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implementthe project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroadfacilities and appurtenances.During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporationswere traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter line passed was a 100,128square-meter portion owned by Forfom covered by TCT Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and T-34387.On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a complaint2 for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, andwithout its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro,Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNRrented out portions of the property to squatters along the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and writtendemands for the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed to comply. It prayed that PNRbe ordered to vacate the property and to cause the eviction of all shanties and squatters that PNR had takenin as lessees, and that it be restored to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment thereof.The trial court found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law and without just compensation. Although the power of eminent domain was not exercised in accordance with law, and PNR occupied petitioner's properties without previous condemnation proceedings and payment of justcompensation, the RTC ruled that, by its acquiescence, Forfom was estopped from recovering the propertiessubject of this case. As to its right to compensation and damages, it said that the same could not be denied.The trial court declared that P10.00 per square meter was the fair and equitable market value of the realproperties at the time of the taking thereof. ISSUES: 1) Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file anyexpropriation case and to pay just compensation? 2) Is the time when just compensation should be fixed at the time of the taking or, as Forfom maintains, atthe time when the price is actually paid? HELD: 1) In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a private land. The entranceinto Forfom's property was permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period. PNR has been in control,possession and enjoyment of the subject land since December 1972 or January 1973. PNR's entry intothe property of Forfom was with the approval of then President Marcos and with the authorization of thePNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring around eleven hectares was devoted topublic use - railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service.With the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom was deprived of material and beneficial use andenjoyment of the property. It is clear from the foregoing that there was a taking of property within theconstitutional sense.It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when itnegotiated with

PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filedat all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriationproceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude itfrom questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power wasexercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land onthe ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR. 2) Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, theCourt has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.51 In the case at bar, the just compensation should be reckoned from thetime of taking which is January 1973. The determination thereof shall be made in the expropriation caseto be filed without delay by the PNR after the appointment of commissioners as required by the rules.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Cancio

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007) Facts: After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16,1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres,Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLaw of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus, the Department of AgrarianReform Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of justcompensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL. On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBPto pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered withthe total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINETHOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50). A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before theSpecial Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon. Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, whichwas eventually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC? Held: In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two for a could come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping. We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.

Hon. Vicente Eusebio vs. Jovito Luis http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_162474_2009.html

Napocor vs Macabangkit Sangkay Facts: NPC Constructed an underground tunnel that traversed the property of Macabangkit Sangkay, the respondents were asking for just compensation for the NPC's act of inconspicuously constructing the said tunnel and depriving the respondents of the benefits of the said land due to the impacts of the tunnel, such as shaking of the ground and the disturbing noise coming from the facility. Several issues were raised such as the prescription of the action and the actual existence of the tunnel which was easily proven by the heirs with the use of topographical survey and sketch maps. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Heirs awarding them 113,000,000 as just compensation plus damages and an attorneys fee equivalent to 15% of the awarded claim. CA affirmed the RTC's decision without any qualification. Meanwhile, 2 of the respondents Counsel were having a difficulty on the question of who among the 2, particularly Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos. were entitled to the attorneys fees and how much is exactly the amount they are entitled to receive. Issue:

1) Whether or not the amount of Atty. Fee which is 15% of the equivalent of 113M PHP, is erroneous? 2) What is the standard used in calculating the amount of fee entitled to an Attorney? 3) Who Among the Counsel is entitled to the fee? Held: Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent. Yet, a contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.71 With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorneys fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit. Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an express agreement.72 The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself.73 An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit: Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved; c) The important of the subject matter; d) The skill demanded; e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) The professional standing of the lawyer. Whether it is Atty. Dibaratun or Atty. Ballelos, or both, who should receive attorneys fees from the Heirs of Macabangkit is a question that the Court must next determine and settle by considering the amount and quality of the work each performed and the results each obtained.

Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. He diligently prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading and paper necessary in the full resolution of the dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last motion filed in this Court. He consistently appeared during the trial, and examined and cross-examined all the witnesses presented at that stage of the proceedings. The nature, character, and substance of each pleading and the motions he prepared for the Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for the trial. He even advanced P250,000.00 out of his own pocket to defray expenses from the time of the filing of the motion to execute pending appeal until the case reached the Court.77 His representation of all the Heirs of Macabangkit was not denied by any of them. n fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. It is he, not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney. Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of the clients cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment. Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties who engaged him. The Court considers his work in the case as very minimal. His compensation under the quantum meruit principle is fixed at P5,000.00, and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named are liable to him.

Anunciacion Vda. De Ouana et. al. vs. Republic of the Phils., February 9, 2011
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_168770_2011.html