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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy C?

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Memo: Teleconference with] | FBI (formerly of the Foreign Terrorist


Taskforce [FTTTF]).

Date: February 25, 200J

I spoke with] | to ask her about the processing of Condor cables that she did
when she worked for the F T T T F : ] D e f t the taskforce in early 2003.

| [said that, overall, the taskforce erred on the side of caution when it
processed Condors. The taskforce found that many cases required a lot of research in
order to determine whether or not the visa applicant was the same as the individual
contained in FBI files. She thought that many cases should have been "holds" rather
than outright denial, but the taskforce needed more time to collect specific information
\n order to process the case to conclusion. The FTTTF erred on the side of caution and
recommended that the visa be denied until they could finish processing the information.
She said that oftentimes the information they needed to collect had to be gathered from
other FBI offices and divisions, such as the Counter-Terrorism Division, in order to
determine if the visa applicant and the person in the FBI's files were the same person. In
many cases, she said, it wasn't that the taskforce necessarily had definite derogatory
information on the applicant, but rather, they just weren't able to eliminate the person
until they received more information.

She said that the FTTTF was responsible for handling a backlog of about 14,000 Condor
cables between April and June 2002. In July 2002, the FBI started to do the Condor
nameehecks, where they were done electronically. The FTTTF was still responsible for
processing to completion any cables that had come to them in the April - June time
period! ~|said that as they completed processing some cables, the individual
\n question was eventually cleared from suspicion.

I | thought that many of the documents that the FTTTF had collected for
Condor processing would still be at the FTTTF.

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