Ali, 1 Anthony Ali 12, December, 2013 English 120A Collaboration Group 3 Text 1 Final The Man is Everywhere

o! "o you #no! i$ someone is a terrorist% &hat i$ you're neighbor !ere a terrorist% a(e you poste" any in$ormation on the internet, to your Faceboo# page, your blog or e(en in an email to someone you #no! that coul" be misconstrue" as terrorist acti(ity% These )uestions may seem silly an" you might thin# they "o not apply to you, but a$ter the trage"y o$ *eptember 11, 2001 an" the in(ention o$ the internet many o$ the $ree"oms that Americans thought !ere protecte" are actually being trac#e" an" analy+e" by programs put in play by our go(ernment, -rograms such as -./*0 an" the 1*A, an" acts such as -rotect America Act o$ 2002 an" the Foreign /ntelligence *ur(eillance Act ha(e been implemente" $or the purposes o$ $in"ing potential terrorists, These acts an" programs !ere put into play un"er the guise o$ protecting each o$ us an" our rights, but are they actually "oing so% 3y trusting the go(ernment to enact these programs an" acts !e are un#no!ingly allo!ing our $ree"oms to be scrutini+e" an" in(estigate", These acts coul" potentially lin# innocent American citi+ens !ith horri$ic terrorist acti(ities an" i"eology, !hich coul" lea" to assassination, 4ail time an" the "enial o$ other $ree"oms, The amount o$ in$ormation that is un"er sur(eillance is broa", so broa", in $act, that simply ta#ing a picture o$ a 1ational monument an" posting it to your page coul" be consi"ere" a re" $lag,

Ali, 2 Follo!ing the a$termath o$ 5611, the 7nite" *tates go(ernment scramble" to $in" in$ormation on not only the terrorists responsible $or the "isaster, but also on any an" all $uture threats pose" to!ar" the 7,*,, There !as one a(enue !ith a !ealth o$ in$ormation o$ possible threats that remaine" largely untappe"8 the /nternet, The /nternet, though a $airly ne! creation, !as recogni+e" as an in(aluable metho" o$ communication, so it $ell on the 1ational *er(ice Agency an" the Central *ecurity *er(ice to monitor the superhigh!ay, o!e(er, it seems as though the 1*A has o(ersteppe" its boun"aries an" steppe" on some toes, pro(o#ing $ormer C/A an" 1*A employee E"!ar" *no!"en to lea# in$ormation about the o(erarching reach o$ the 1*A an" the -./*0 program, suppose"ly so that the public can "etermine !hether such metho"s are 4usti$ie" 90a++etti:, Apparently, the -rotect America Act o$ 2002 ha" also put into motion the clan"estine -./*0 program, allo!ing the 1*A to collect massi(e amounts o$ in$ormation; though the 1*A is expressly prohibite" $rom si$ting through recor"s o$ "ata bet!een Americans, <-resi"ent George &, 3ush secretly authori+e" the 1*A to plug into the $iber optic cables that enter an" lea(e the 7nite" *tates, #no!ing it !oul" gi(e the go(ernment unprece"ente", !arrantless access to Americans' pri(ate con(ersations= 93raun:, This e$$ecti(ely means that the go(ernment not only has complete access to all emails, phone calls, an" (i"eo chats, but it also stores all such "ata as !ell, though the 1*A claims that any "ata originating $rom an American is merely #ept an" not analy+e", The 1*A also "e$en"s itsel$ through an o$$icial statement, claiming that its po!er is misrepresente" an" that in actuality, the >1*A 'touches' about 1,?@, an" analysts only loo# at 0,0000A@, o$ the !orl"'s internet tra$$ic= 9Boint *tatement:, Though the 1*A maintains that the program is <the most signi$icant tool in the 1*A collection arsenal $or the "etection, i"enti$ication, an" "isruption o$

Ali, 3 terrorist threats to the 7,*, an" aroun" the !orl",= Americans must !on"er ho! much control they are !illing to relin)uish at the cost o$ their o!n pri(acy 9Boint *tatement:, &ith the implementation o$ the -rism program, The 7,*, Department o$ De$ense gaine" an unprece"ente" amount o$ access to personal an" pri(ate in$ormation through >the go(ernments $acilitation o$ statutorily authori+e" collection o$ $oreign intelligence in$ormation $rom electronic communication ser(ice pro(i"ers, un"er court super(isionC as "e$ine" by the Foreign /ntelligence *ur(eillance Act *ection 202 9F/*A:= 9202 p, 1:, F/*A !as put in place as a means to limit the authority o$ the -rism -rogram, 7n"er *ection 202 o$ F/*A, the go(ernment is not to "irectly obtain in$ormation $rom internet ser(ice pro(i"er 9/*-Cs:, rather it is obtaine" through F/*A court appro(al, the #no!le"ge o$ the /*-, an" a !ritten "irecti(e $rom the Attorney General an" the Director o$ 1ational /ntelligence 9202 p, 1:, 7n"er *ection 202 o$ F/*A, -rism !oul" act to per$orm its $unction o$ ac)uiring targete" in$ormation un"er the strict gui"elines o$ the court, Except in the case !here there is !arrante" 4usti$ication that is "eeme" to be appropriate measures, inclu"ing "ocumentation o$ the $oreign intelligence purpose an" that the target is belie(e" to be outsi"e o$ the 7,*, 9202 p, 1:, &ithout a (ali" $oreign intelligence purpose, the go(ernment cannot target $oreign persons o(erseas, The F/*A !oul" also impart $urther limitation on the targeting o$ persons outsi"e o$ the 7,*, in !hich the inten"e" purposes !oul" be to ac)uire in$ormation $rom a person insi"e the 7,*, To implement these limitations o$ -rism, un"er F/*A *ection 202, an a"ministration system o$ re(ie! an" appro(al by the Executi(e, Degislati(e, an" Bu"icial branches !oul" be necessary prior to ac)uiring intelligence in$ormation, The instatement o$ *ection 202 is continuously monitore" un"er the F/*A Courts through semiannual reports that go through Congress an" the

Ali, A Executi(e branch $or compliance re(ie! an" proper han"ling o$ obtaine" in$ormation an" to $urther protect the citi+ens $rom e(er "ecreasing pri(acy, The 200A /ntelligence .e$orm an" Terrorist -re(ention Act mar#e" a ma4or shi$t in ho! the 7,*, go(ernment "e$ines terrorism an" relates to "omestic terrorism, The Act shi$te" responsibility $or creating the 7nite" *tatesC annual report on terrorism to the 1ational Counterterrorism Center 91CTC:, !here pre(iously the *tate Department an" C/A ha" been responsible $or the report 9&in#ler 2005:, The 1CTC then initiate" se(eral changes in the o$$icial parameters "e$ining terrorism, &hereas be$ore terrorism ha" been "e$ine" as a >signi$icant= subnational foreign threat, the 1CTC no! allo!e" $or (arious smallerEscale "omestic threats to be inclu"e" in their terrorism report, The concept o$ !ho coul" be a terrorist an" !hat coul" be a target o$ terrorism !as hugely broa"ene"F no! e(en a 7,*, citi+en suspecte" o$ threatening the most irrele(ant o$ public $acilities coul" be consi"ere" a terrorist by our go(ernment, This change in "e$inition along !ith a ne! consi"eration o$ corporate ne!s me"ia to be a reliable source o$ in$ormation le" to an enormous increase in reporte" terrorist acti(ity, an" $or the $irst time inclu"ing "omestic threats $rom 7,*, citi+ens 9&in#ler 2005:, This shi$t in policy an" "oubts about the 1CTCCs 4ournalistic integrity create" some concern, an" in her critical analysis o$ the situation Carol &in#ler 92005: re$erences a 2002 stu"y by /nspector General Glenn Fine !hich $oun" that8 >the Bustice Department o(erEin$late" the reporting o$ "omestic terrorism by AA@ GHI instea" o$ counting actual cases o$ "omestic terrorism, (arious o$$icials in the Bustice Department ha" a""e" instances o$ marriage $rau" an" other immigration problems "ue to mista#en assumptions ma"e at the time o$ arrest about in"i(i"ual in(ol(ement in acts o$ terrorism= 921?:,

Ali, J

&in#ler goes on $urther to pro(i"e that $or the 1CTC, >suppositions reporte" in the me"ia prior to the closure o$ in(estigations constitute" proo$ o$ terrorism= 9212:, These examples o$ ho! easily the 1CTC has mislabele" in"i(i"uals as terrorists an" ho! insubstantial their e(i"ence has been in the past "emonstrate that our go(ernmentCs $unctional "e$inition o$ terrorism is "angerously, perhaps ri"iculously, broa", /n 2005, the 1CTC initiate" another ma4or shi$t in our go(ernmentCs $unctional an" "e$initional relationship !ith labeling citi+ens as suspecte" terrorists, The /n$ormation *haring En(ironmentE *uspicious Acti(ity .eporting Functional *tan"ar"s /nitiati(e 9/*EE*A.EF*: set up a complex system $or "e$ining, trac#ing, an" storing 7,*, citi+ensC possible terrorist acti(ities !ith authority to a"(ise police or military inter(ention in the case o$ a cre"ible terrorist threat 9D * 2005:, The "e$initions o$ possible terrorist acti(ity in the "ocument are $airly general an" open to interpretation8 -resenting $alse or misusing insignia, "ocuments, an"6or i"enti$ication GHI Damaging, manipulating, or "e$acing part o$ a $acility6in$rastructure GHI Communicating a spo#en or !ritten threat to "amage or compromise a $acility6in$rastructure GHI Ta#ing pictures or (i"eo o$ $acilities, buil"ings, or in$rastructure in a manner that !oul" arouse suspicion in a reasonable person GHI Attempts to obtain or con"uct training in security concepts 925E30:, Consi"ering that the 1CTC "e$ines >$acility6in$rastructure= in a !ay that coul" be applie" to (irtually any construction not a pri(ate resi"ence, this "e$inition becomes e(en broa"er, *ince there is such room $or interpretation, the /nitiati(e relies on local la! en$orcement !ho are $amiliar !ith the imme"iate social context to obser(e >suspicious acti(ity= an" report it to their >$usion center= !here it is analy+e" an" passe" up the chain o$ comman" 9.ober K .ussell 2012:, For this reason, the /nitiati(e stresses the importance o$ o(erall context !hen "etermining i$ suspicious acti(ity might be connecte" !ith terrorism, saying >the o$$icer or

Ali, ? analyst Gin the $usion centerI !ill apply his or her pro$essional 4u"gment to "etermine !hether the in$ormation has a potential nexus to terrorism= 9D * 2005:, /n their critical analysis o$ the /*EE*A.EF* initiati(e as it is actually implemente", .ober K .ussell 92012: $in" that >There are $e! !ritten gui"elines instructing $usion centers as to !hat is important in$ormation GHI super(ising o$$icers are rotate" in an" out o$ police $usion centers as part o$ a normal rotation, again !ithout training in the intelligence process,= !hich illustrates a $atal $la! in one o$ the $un"amental principles o$ ho! the /nitiati(e "e$ines "omestic terrorism 91LL:, Another signi$icant issue !ith the basic $unction o$ the 1CTCCs /n$ormation *haring En(ironment lies !ith the )uality an" signi$icance o$ the initial ra! "ataF the obser(ations o$ an o$$icer or citi+en in$ormant, .ober K .ussell 92012: obser(e, The actual collection o$ intelligence in$ormation is (ery limite", !ith analysts !or#ing on strategies "e(elope" $rom in$ormation "eri(e" $rom one o$$icerCs report or con$i"ential in$ormant, There is (ery little o(ersight as to M!hatC is being collecte" an" e(en less on Mho! an" !hyC some in"i(i"uals an" groups become targets o$ an in(estigation !hile others remain hi""en to the police 91LL:, This lac# o$ o(ersight an" regulation on ho! an" !hat in$ormation is gathere" means that no matter !hat the 1CTCCs policies regar"ing pro$iling an" consi"eration o$ o(erall context, the in"i(i"ual untraine" ci(ilians or illEspeciali+e" police o$$icers ha(e primary control o(er ho! an in"i(i"ualCs actions are interprete", subse)uently in$luencing all highEle(el "ecisions an" ultimately !hether or not the in"i(i"ual is labele" as a terrorist, 3ase" on the broa"ness o$ the 1CTCCs mo"ern "e$initions o$ terrorism an" the generality o$ its hea(ily contextEbase" in"icators o$ possible terrorist acti(ity, couple" together !ith the inappropriate in$luence an" "iscretion o$ lo!Ele(el in"i(i"uals not traine" in intelligence theory, it has become increasingly li#ely that a 7,*, citi+en can be labele" 9an" possibly mislabele": as a terrorist,

Ali, 2 Nnce accuse" o$ terrorist acti(ities, a suspect $aces a range o$ conse)uences, $rom capture an" prosecution to execution !ithout a trial, 7,*, o$$icials e(aluate the suspect using the >Disposition 0atrix,= !hich is essentially a $lo! chart that consi"ers the suspectCs location an" threat le(el 90iller, 2012:, &hile capture an" prosecution are pursue" !hene(er $easible, assassination is an option i$ the suspect poses an imminent threat, /n $act, a !hite paper release" by the 7,*, Department o$ Bustice 92011: speci$ies that >the 7,*, go(ernment coul" use lethal $orce= against e(en an American citi+en, pro(i"e" the citi+en !as suspecte" o$ being an AlE Oae"a lea"er 9p, 1:, Although the go(ernment o$$icially recogni+es the legal protections a$$or"e" American citi+ens e(en !hile abroa", the >realities o$ combat= can trump those protections !hen "eeme" necessary 9p, ?:, o!e(er, !hile the thought o$ assassinating 7,*, citi+ens is certainly chilling, !e must #eep in min" that the 7,*, go(ernment consi"ers it a last resort, !hich they !ill only use !hen capture an" prosecution are not options an" the suspect poses an imminent threat to national security, /n a""ition, 7,*, citi+ens accuse" o$ terrorism "o not $ace in"e$inite hol"ing perio"s in $acilities li#e Guantanamo 3ay, as $oreign terrorist suspects "o, They are instea" prosecute" !ithin the ci(ilian 4ustice system, pro(i"e" !ith a courtroom trial rather than a military tribunal 9Gertreuer, 2013:, There$ore, although the experience o$ being $alsely accuse" o$ terrorism !oul" li#ely be $inancially an" psychologically "amaging to an American citi+en, it !oul" ultimately cause no more "amage than being $alsely accuse" o$ another serious crime,

Ali, L &or#s Cite" Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act=,&eb, Gertreuer, 0elanie, 92013, Apr, 30:, >Why civilian courts are best for terror trials, especially Boston bo bing suspect,= !he Christian Science "onitor, &eb, ttp866articles,!ashingtonpost,com62012E10E236!orl"63JJ0022LP1P"roneEcampaignEobamaE a"ministrationEmatrix, &eb, ttp866!!!,csmonitor,com6Commentary6Npinion6201360A306Why#civilian#courts#are#best#for# terror#trials#especially#Boston#bo bing#suspect$ &eb, ttp866proxy,lib,csus,e"u6login%urlQhttp866search,ebscohost,com,proxy,lib,csus,e"u6login,&eb, 0iller, Greg, 92012, Nct, 23:, >-lan $or hunting terrorists signals 7,*, inten"s to #eep a""ing names to #ill lists,= Washington Post$ &eb, Taylor, ., &,, K .ussell, A, D, 92012:, The $ailure o$ police M$usionC centers an" the concept o$ a national intelligence sharing plan, Police Practice % &esearch, '(92:, 1LAE200, &eb, The Director o$ 1ational /ntelligence, 92013, Bune L: &ashington, DC 20J11, >Facts on the Department o$ omelan" *ecurity, 92005:, Infor ation Sharing )nviron ent# Suspicious Activity &eporting Functional Stan*ar*s Initiative +ersion '$, 9/*EEF*E200:, &eb, 7,*, Department o$ Bustice, 92011, 1o(, L:, >Da!$ulness o$ a Dethal Nperation Directe" Against a 7,*, Citi+en &ho /s a *enior Nperational Dea"er o$ A/EOa'i"a or An Associate" Force,= Washington, -C$ &eb, &in#ler, C, R, 92005:, !he .ational Counterterroris Center/s *efinitional shift fro counting terroris 8 7se o$ loci communes an" embe""e" (alue hierarchies, Argu entation % A*vocacy, 0,9A:, 21AE222, &eb,