Introduction To War Fighting

Sergeants Distance
Education Program
8014A
INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING
Course Introduction
Scope This course is a complementary resource used to blend doctrine with the
applications that sergeants experience and execute in the warfighting
environment. The source of the course content is MCDP 1, Warfighting, and
the objective is to create an initial immersion of warfighting concepts for the
Marine sergeant. MCDP 1, Warfighting should be read simultaneously or
upon course completion to create a greater understanding of warfighting.
Mastery of the content should provide the Marine sergeant with the
warfighting foundation for the professional military education building
blocks. The content applies to both technical and tactical proficiency that
allows sergeants to lead and manage processes throughout the Marine Corps.
Table of The following is the table of contents for this course.

Contents
Topic See Page

Chapter 1 The Nature of War 1-1
Chapter 2 The Theory of War 2-1
Chapter 3 Preparing for War 3-1
Chapter 4 The Conduct of War 4-1
Chapter 5 Warfighting Applications 5-1
Appendix A A-1
Review Lesson Exercise R-1
Continued on next page
MCI Course 8014A i Course Introduction

Course Introduction, Continued
Estimated You will spend about 11 hours completing this course. This includes the time
Study Time you will need to study the text, complete the exercises, and take the final
examination.
Reserve You earn four retirement credits for completing this course. You earn reserve
Retirement retirement credits at the rate of one credit for each 3 hours of estimated study
Credits time.
Note: Reserve retirement credits are not awarded for the MCI study you do
during drill periods if awarded credits for drill attendance.
Summary The table below summarizes all-important “gateways” needed to successfully

complete this course.
Step When you… Then you will… For more

information
1 Enroll in the program Receive your program Refer to the
material Program Guide
2 Complete the self- Arrange to take the Refer to the
paced text final examination Program Guide
3 Pass the final Receive a course Refer to the
examination completion certificate Program Guide
MCI Course 8014A ii Course Introduction

List of The following material was used in the development of this course:
References
· Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Marine Corps Capstone Concept.
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2001/PDF/C&I%202001
%20chapt%202%20EMW.pdf.
· Harrap, Capt William. Implicit Communication: A Warfighting

Imperative. Marine Corps Gazette. (Previously appeared in the MCI
7401 Introduction to Warfighting.)
· Krulak, General Charles C, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. The

Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. Marines
Magazine.
http://www.usmc.mil/marinesmagazine/pdf.nsf/8e8afdade19e000c852565
e700807312/ba6c7b077948be1b852566e800538752/$FILE/jan99.pdf.
January 1999.
· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting.
· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 Strategy
· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 Operations
MCI Course 8014A iii Course Introduction

List of · Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-3 Tactics.

References,
continued · Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5-1A Doctrinal References
for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6 Command and Control.
· Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1500.55 Military Thinking and Decision

Making Exercises. 12 April 97.
www.tecom.usmc.mil/utm/Military%20thinking%20
MCO%201500.55.htm.
· Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-0B How to Conduct

Training
· Murray, Col Charles H., USAF, Ed. Executive Decision Making. U.S.
Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmedm@.htm.pdf. 1 Feb 2002.
· Scharfen, John C. Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare. Interview

with Major General Alfred M. Gray, Jr. Amphibious Warfare Review.
Previously used in 7401 Introduction to Warfighting with permission.
· Schmitt, Capt John F. Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a

Doctrine. Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, VA. August 1990.
MCI Course 8014A iv Course Introduction

CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE OF WAR
Introduction
Estimated 50 minutes
Study Time
Scope This chapter discusses the concepts and factors related to war and
warfighting. The common concepts and factors that link war to the
operational environments also provide the Marine sergeant with the tools to
lead Marines and facilitate processes throughout the Marine Corps.
Learning After completing this chapter, you should be able to identify the definition of
Objectives the following warfighting concepts:
· War
· Friction
· Uncertainty
· Fluidity
· Disorder
· Complexity
· Human Dimension
· Violence and danger
· Physical, moral, and mental forces
· Evolution of war
· Science, art, and dynamic of war
MCI Course 8014A 1- 1 Chapter 1

Introduction, Continued
In This This chapter contains the following topics:

Chapter
Topic See Page

War Defined 1-3
Warfighting Concepts 1-5
Chapter 1 Exercise 1-11

War Defined
Introduction To understand the Marine Corps’ philosophy of warfighting, you first need an
appreciation for the nature of war itself—its moral, mental, and physical
characteristics and demands.
Definition of War is defined as follows:

War
· A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups
· The use of military force
· A violent struggle between two wills, each trying to impose itself on the
other
The target of the violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it

may extend to the enemy population at large. War may range from intense
clashes between large military forces, to subtler, unconventional hostilities
that barely reach the threshold of violence.
Groups Participants and groups are placed into two general categories:
Engaging in
War · Nation-states
· Nonstates
Nation-States Nation-states are the groups traditionally engaging in warfare. They generally
represent countries or the modern nation as representative unit of the political
unit.
Example of a An example of a war between nation-states would be the Iran-Iraq war from
Nation-State 1980 to 1988. The participants were limited to the two nation-states. Other
War nations may have provided indirect support, but they did not participate in
actual combat operations.

War Defined, Continued
Nonstate A nonstate group is a group that has no direct affiliation with a nation-state.
These groups can be composed of groups external to the nation state or an
internal faction.
Example of Examples of a nonstate groups include international coalitions or groups that

Nonstate share the same ideologies. Their focus is to influence other nonstate or
nation-state groups to bend to their will. Two such examples would be
· Nations assembled into the coalition forces for Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm.
· Al Qaeda terrorist network that functions internationally, which is linked

through ideology rather than officially supported by a nation-state.
Conclusion The study of war is essential to be an effective Marine sergeant. Effective

leadership creates the opportunity to take the warfighting concepts and
develop specific solutions that can be applied to the operating environment.

Warfighting Concepts
Introduction This topic provides an overview of common warfighting concepts:
· Friction
· Uncertainty
· Fluidity
· Disorder
· Complexity
· Human dimension
· Violence and danger
· Physical, moral, and mental forces
· Evolution of war
· Science, art, and dynamics of war
Friction Friction is the force that resists all action and saps energy. It makes the
simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible.
Types of There are four types of friction. Examples of the each are provided in the
Friction table below:
Type of Friction Examples

Mental Indecision over a course of action
Physical Effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle
External Imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather,
or mere chance
Self-Induced · Lack of a clearly defined goal
· Lack of coordination
· Unclear or complicated plans
· Complex task organizations or command
relationships
· Complicated technologies

Warfighting Concepts, Continued
Minimizing The effects of friction can be minimized through effective leadership. Marine
Friction NCOs face the additional challenge in that they are the first level of
leadership that has to motivate and direct Marines. It is essential that
mentoring and counseling be a part of the leadership and training cycle to
develop the corporals and Marines serving with them.
Uncertainty The nature of war makes certainty impossible. All actions in war will be
based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even conflicting information.
Uncertainties exist in battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about
the environment, and even about the friendly situation. These uncertainties
can never be eliminated.
The fog of war is a term used to describe the uncertainty of war. The fog of
war occurs in the execution of warfare and many other operational
applications.
Factors of The following three factors contribute to uncertainty:

Uncertainty
· Nonlinearity
· Risk
· Chance
Nonlinearity Nonlinearity refers to the system for cause and effect within warfare to allow
disproportionate outcomes. In simplest terms, minor incidents or actions can
have decisive effects on the outcome of a battle. Nonlinearity is an important
source of uncertainty.
Risk Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Risk is equally
common to action and inaction and may be related to potential gain. Greater
gain often requires greater risk.

Risk Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling

Management risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk
costs with mission benefits. Marines at all levels must use risk management
because it applies to all missions and environments across a wide range of
Marine Corps operations.
Chance Part of uncertainty is the element of chance. Chance is the turn of events that
cannot be reasonably foreseen. Neither the enemy nor friendly forces have
control over these unforeseen events. While nonlinearity and risk can be
enhanced or minimized through the study of war, training, and experience,
chance is an advantage and a disadvantage to friend and foe alike. Chance is
a characteristic of war and a source of friction.
Fluidity Each episode in war is shaped by the episodes that come before it. Each
episode also shapes the ones that follow. This creates a continuous,
fluctuating flow of activity with opportunities and unforeseen events. This
flow of activity is called fluidity.
Disorder Disorder is created by situations where plans go awry, instructions and

information are unclear and misunderstood, or communications fail.
Mistakes and unforeseen events can also cause disorder. War naturally
moves toward disorder. Disorder is unavoidable in war and it will never be
eliminated.
Complexity Complexity refers to the intricate, interrelated parts that compose the process
and elements used to execute war and warfare. The level of complexity
depends on the level and scope of the warfighting application. For example, a
division has more elements than a regiment when evaluated in terms of
companies, squads, or even individuals.

Human The human dimension is central to war itself. War is shaped by human
Dimension nature, which is exemplified by the clash of wills and is subject to its
complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities that characterize human
behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on a disagreement, it will be
shaped by human emotion.
The human dimension of war is essential to get an accurate view of the nature
of war. War tests the physical and mental strength of the participants, but the
human effects go far beyond the measurement of strength. Consideration
needs to be given to the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, and lack of the
ordinary necessities in life. The cumulative effects of these and similar
factors can affect individuals, groups, and operations adversely. The Marine
NCO needs to understand human behavior and take action to minimize the
limiting effects and optimize the positive behaviors.
Violence and Violence is inherent in warfighting and is characterized by bloodshed,

Danger destruction, and suffering. Violence and danger are interlinked because the
violence makes war a dangerous undertaking.
Fear Fear is the normal human reaction to violence and danger.
Fear has a significant effect on the conduct of war because it contributes to

the erosion of will. The erosion of will leads directly to defeat or less than
successful operations. From a warfighting perspective, the effects of fear can
be minimized by courage. Courage and confidence can be fortified in many
ways, which will be discussed in terms of minimizing fear.
Courage Courage is not the absence of fear, but the strength to overcome it. Each
person reacts differently to fear at each specific event, associated time and
situation. Courage can produce outcomes ranging from a reasoned
calculation and action to a fierce emotional reaction. The human dynamics of
each individual based on reason, emotion, and experience produce the
resulting act of courage.

Physical, War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral, and mental forces.
Moral, and While the physical forces are easy to measure, the moral and mental forces
Mental Forces are more difficult to quantify due their intangible nature.
Physical Forces The physical characteristics are easily seen, understood, and measured.
Commodities such as equipment capabilities, supplies, seized physical
objectives, force ratios, losses of materiel or life, terrain lost or gained,
prisoners or materiel captured are tangibles and considered physical forces.
Moral Forces The moral forces in warfighting pertain to the psychological and intangible
forces. Examples include the following:
· National and military resolve

· National and individual conscience
· Emotion
· Fear
· Courage
· Morale
· Leadership
· Espirit
Mental Forces Mental forces provide individuals and groups with the ability to grasp
complex battlefield situations; make effective estimates, calculations, and
decisions; devise tactics and strategies; and develop plans.

Evolution of While war and warfare have essentially remained the same, the operating
War environments, tactics, and techniques have changed as mankind and
technology have become more developed. Technology advancements and
innovations are the greatest driving force in the evolution and conduct of war.
The evolution of armor from hardened hide to Kevlar is an example of how a
simple development evolved from the simple process of curing and tanning a
hide to the highly technical process of creating synthetic body armor.
Numerous other innovations have changed the process and execution of war
from many perspectives:
· Development and use of the rifled bore

· Conception and use of conscription to man armies
· Use of modern modes of transportation to support war
In order to remain effective in the operating environment, Marine leaders

must continue to educate themselves and utilize the evolution process to their
advantage. Sergeants must remain proactive in their efforts to develop new
skills and learn to apply them in the execution of their daily duties.
Science, Art, The various aspects of war fall into the realms of science and art. The
and Dynamics scientific aspects like ballistics, mechanics, and technology are clearly
of War definable. The application of the art of war requires the individual to
understand the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability
to devise a practical solution.
Concluding War is an extreme test of will. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and
Perspective on danger are its essential characteristics. War remains fundamentally
War unpredictable. Each episode is the unique product of multiple moral, mental
and physical forces.

Chapter 1 Exercise
Study Time
Directions Complete items 1 through 14 by performing the action required. Check your
answers against those listed at the end of this lesson.
Item 1 What is the definition of war as defined by MCDP 1, Warfighting?
a. Armed conflict where one side is annihilated by a stronger, more

dominant force that takes control of the vanquished resources.
b. The disagreement of countries over political viewpoints and economic
interests that can only be solved through military force.
c. The action arm of organizations or countries when diplomatic resolve or
methodology.
d. A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups
characterized by the use of military force.
Item 2 The chapter places participants and groups into two general categories. What
are these categories?
a. Leaders and warfighters

b. Combatants and non-combatants
c. Nation-states and nonstate groups
d. Friendly forces and opposing forces
MCI Course 8014A 1- 11 Chapter 1 Exercise

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued
Items 3 Matching: For items 3 through 12, match the common characteristics of war
Through 12 in column 1 with the definitions in column 2.
Column 1 Column 2
Characteristics of War Definition
___ 3. Friction a. Bloodshed, destruction, and suffering

___ 4. Uncertainty that can affect friend and foe alike
___ 5. Fluidity b. Forces that influence warfare whether
___ 6. Disorder they are intangible or tangible
___ 7. Complexity c. Unknowns about the enemy and the
___ 8. Human dimension environment experienced in battle
___ 9. Violence and d. Plans gone awry, misunderstood
danger instructions, communication failures,
___ 10. Physical, moral, and mistakes, and unforeseen events
mental forces e. The force that resists all action and saps
___ 11. Evolution of war energy
___ 12. Science, art and f. Behavior exemplified by the clash of
dynamics of war wills and the related complexities,
inconsistencies, and peculiarities that
characterize human behavior
g. A condition that creates a continuous,
fluctuating flow of activity
h. Intricate, interrelated parts that compose
the process and elements used to
execute war and warfare
i. The realms in which the various aspects
of war fall
j. Operating environments, tactics, and
techniques that have changed as
mankind and technology have become
more developed

Item 13 Nonlinearity, risk, and chance are contributing factors to which of the
following concepts?
a. Fear of the unknown

b. Strategic corporal
c. Uncertainty
d. Fire and maneuver
Item 14 Which definition would best describe nonlinearity?
a. The system for cause and effect within warfare to allow disproportionate
outcomes.
b. The descriptive of defensive strategy that increases the difficulty for the
enemy to target friendly positions.
c. The process of being unpredictable in the operating environment by
managing routes and lager sites.
d. The ability of leader to modify behavior to increase uncertainty in
movement and positioning.

Answers The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any
questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.
Item Number Answer Reference

1 d 1-3
2 c 1-3
3 e 1-5
4 c 1-6
5 g 1-7
6 d 1-7
7 h 1-7
8 f 1-8
9 a 1-8
10 b 1-9
11 j 1-10
12 i 1-10
13 c 1-6
14 a 1-6

CHAPTER 2
THE THEORY OF WAR
Introduction
Study Time
Scope This chapter is designed to teach the concepts and content contained in
MCDP 1, Warfighting, chapter 2. The content is the initial building block for
the Marine NCO’s warfighting studies.
Objectives the following concepts:
· Politics
· Policy
· Means in war
· Levels of war
· Initiative
· Response
· Attrition warfare
· Maneuver warfare
· Combat power
· Speed
· Focus

Learning · Surprise
Objectives,
continued · Boldness
· Centers of gravity
· Critical vulnerabilities
· Creating opportunity
· Exploiting opportunity

Chapter
Topic See Page

War Theory Concepts 2-3
Levels of Warfighting 2-6
Initiative and Response 2-9
Styles of Warfare 2-11
Combat Power 2-13
Combat Power Concepts 2-14
Gravity and Vulnerability 2-17
Creating and Exploiting Opportunity 2-18

War Theory Concepts
Introduction The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never
be considered in isolation from their purposes.
-- Carl von Clausewitz
While war is as old as mankind, the basis upon which war is waged has
changed with time and technology. As noted by Carl von Clauswitz, modern
warfare is waged to support politics and policies. War is an extension of both
policy and politics with the addition of military force. It is important for
Marine NCOs to understand the concepts that direct war and operations:
· Politics
· Policy
· Means
· Spectrum of conflict
Politics Politics refers to the distribution of power through the interaction of both
cooperative and competitive elements of a group or organization.
Policy Policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political
process. These objectives become what are commonly referred to as policy
aims. The policy aims state what is to be accomplished and how the process
of war is to be conducted. The single most important thought to understand
about war and policy is that war must serve policy.
War, Policy, War is an extension of policy and politics. War provides the means to
and Politics accomplish the policy objectives, which are often driven by politics.
Means in War War uses all power elements that one group can bring against another to
achieve the objective. This includes the following:
· Economic means
· Diplomatic means
· Military means
· Psychological means

War Theory Concepts, Continued
Economic An example of economic warfare is when trade sanctions or policies are

Means in War imposed on one or two groups:
· Nation-state—the United States or Russia

· Nonstate—an international coalition or faction within or outside of an
existing state
Political Means Political means in war can take place in diplomatic circles and organizations
in War such as the United Nations. The pressure generated by diplomatic language
and open discussion can apply pressure on groups, nation-states, or nonstates.
Military Means The military means in war can range from the mere threat of presence to the
in War actual commitment of combat troops to an area. The Marine operational
forces have the capability and capacity to fulfill this mission, since Marine
forces are always afloat and poised for deployment.
Psychological Psychological means in war are planned operations to convey information to

Means in War influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and behavior of foreign
audiences. Dropping leaflets in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of
psychological means in war.
Spectrum of The spectrum of conflict ranges from military operations other than war to
Conflict large-scale, sustained combat operations. The scale of the conflict is
determined by
· Policy objectives
· Available military means
· National will
· Density of the fighting forces or combat power

War Theory Concepts, Continued
Marine Corps’ The Marine Corps is the Nation’s force-in-readiness and must have the
Role in the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity level across
Spectrum of the spectrum of conflict.
Conflict
The Marine Corps maintains itself as a modern military force capable of
waging war against a large conventional force or a small war against lightly
armed guerilla force.
Warfighting Today’s Marine NCOs will experience greater leadership and operational
Challenges challenges than ever before. Understanding warfighting gives leaders the
ability to
· Understand what the higher-level mission is and how their unit fits into it.
· Make plans and decisions.
· Communicate the plans and decisions to subordinates.

Levels of Warfighting
Introduction Marine NCOs should understand how the levels of war relate to operations
that may involve the Marine Corps. This section creates an awareness of the
strategies and organizational structure that drives the warfighting
environment.
Levels of War War is planned and conducted at different levels. The three levels of warfare
are listed below:
· Strategic
· Operational
· Tactical
Strategic Level The strategic level of war is the highest level of war. Activities at the
strategic level focus directly on policy objectives. Strategy applies to peace
as well as war and it can be subdivided into different types:
· National strategy—coordinates and focuses all the elements of national

power to attain policy objectives
· Military strategy—secures the policy objectives; viewed as the art of

winning wars and securing peace
Strategy Strategy applications involves the following:

Applications
· Establishing goals
· Assigning forces
· Providing assets
· Imposing conditions on the use of force
Strategy is developed from policy and political objectives.

Levels of Warfighting, Continued
Operational The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels of war. The
Level challenge of the operational level of war is deciding when, where, and under
what conditions to engage the enemy in battle. It also includes when, where,
and under what conditions to refuse battle in support of higher aims.
Tactical Level The tactical level of war is the lowest level of war. Tactics refer to the
concepts and methods used to accomplish a mission in either combat or
military operations. In war, tactics focus on the application of combat power
to defeat an enemy force. This application of combat power occurs at a
particular time and place. In non-combat situations, tactics may include
methods used to perform other missions, such as
· Enforcing order
· Maintaining security during peacekeeping operations
In the Marine Corps, NCOs operate at the tactical level.
Overlap The levels of war overlap. The degree of overlap depends on the application
of warfare and the structure of the elements participating in the operation.
The most common overlap occurs when a single commander has
responsibilities at more than one level, such as when a unit is performing a
military operation other than war.

Levels of Warfighting, Continued
Comparative A comparative view of the levels of war is depicted in the diagram below:
View of the
Levels of War
LEVELS OF WAR
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL
TACTICAL
COMPRESSED
LEVELS OF WAR
Compressed The levels of war tend to be compressed in situations where operations are
Levels of War directed and executed by either a very short chain of command or smaller
forces capable of carrying out operations in limited environments.
Nuclear war is good example of a short chain of command since the strategic
level and tactical level are almost one in the same. The strategic decisions
regarding the direction of the war and the tactical decisions to employ nuclear
weapons are essentially the same.
Military operations utilizing a unit such as a Marine expeditionary unit to

conduct a non-combatant evacuation of an embassy could be an example of
compressed levels of war since the strategic and tactical levels work together.

Initiative and Response
Introduction The clash of wills requires combinations of actions and reactions to execute
warfare. These actions and reactions can be more simply classified as
initiative and response.
Initiative Initiative is the ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to
meet on these terms. Initiative is normally associated with offense. The most
obvious way to seize and maintain the initiative is to strike first and keep
striking.
Benefits of Marine leaders benefit by taking the opportunity to employ initiative. Some
Initiative of the battlefield related benefits of initiative are as follows:
· The terms of the conflict can be dictated to the enemy.

· The enemy is forced to meet us on our terms.
Response Response is merely reacting to the initiative; it is how you respond to the
opposition. The responding or second party must have the desire and will to
resist in order to have conflict. Response is normally associated with defense.
Defense has the aim of resisting the enemy’s will. It also creates the
opportunity for initiative.

Initiative and Response, Continued
Example of The simplest example of initiative is when a squad leader plans and executes
Initiative and an ambush. The initiative occurs during the planning, developing the
Response situation, and in executing the ambush. Each of these steps requires
leadership action and an expected performance response by the Marines.
When the enemy has to react or respond to the initiative, it creates a response.
This is how initiative and response are related. Analysis of the anticipated
enemy response increases the effectiveness of the ambush and minimizes the
enemy’s opportunity to gain momentum to change the sequence of events.

Styles of Warfare
Introduction There are two styles of warfare:
· Attrition warfare
· Maneuver warfare
These two styles of warfare lie at opposite ends of the spectrum. It is

important to understand the philosophies and applications that form the basis
of each. While maneuver warfare is the method prescribed by Marine Corps
doctrine, most operational applications fall somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum.
Attrition Attrition warfare pursues victory though the destruction of the enemy’s
Warfare material assets by superior firepower. It is a direct approach that sees war as
a straightforward test of strength. The greatest requirement for success is
numerical and material superiority. Technical proficiency matters more than
cunning or creativity. At the national level, war becomes an industrial as well
as a military problem.
Historically, nations and militaries that thought they were numerically and
technically superior often used attrition warfare. Examples of attrition
warfare are listed below:
· Operations of both sides on the Western Front in World War I

· The French defensive tactics and operations against the Germans in May
1940
· The Allied campaign in Italy from 1943 to 1944
· Eisenhower’s broad-front offensive in Europe after Normandy during
1944
· U.S. operations in Korean after 1950
· Most U.S. operations in the Vietnam War

Styles of Warfare, Continued
Maneuver The goal of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy’s moral, mental, and
Warfare physical cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses. Cohesion is the
enemy’s ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole. When the
cohesion is destroyed, the enemy is forced to operate as separate, smaller,
independent units, which can easily be destroyed. Maneuver warfare relies on
speed and surprise. Examples of maneuver warfare are listed below:
· Allenby’s campaign against the Turks in Palestine in 1918

· German Blitzkrieg operations of 1939 to 1941, most notably was the
invasion of France in 1940
· The failed Allied landing at Anzio in 1944
· Patton’s breakout from the Normandy beachhead in late 1944
· McArthur’s Inchon campaign in 1950
· III Marine Amphibious Force’s combined action program in Vietnam
· “Hail-Mary” conducted by U.S. Forces in Operation Desert Storm
· The rapid advance on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Leadership NCOs can better manage their assets and employ tactics that support mission
Challenges success if they understand each warfare style.

Combat Power
Introduction The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps reflects the ability to project a
force globally and conduct operations. The ability to execute warfare is
dependent on the capacity to project and sustain combat power.
Definition Combat power is the total destructive force to bear on the enemy at a given
time.
Measuring Combat power is difficult to measure because many of the factors are not
Combat Power measurable. Examples of such factors are listed below:
· Effects of maneuver, tempo, or surprise

· Advantages conferred by geography or climate
· Relative strengths of offense and defense
· Relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, or rear
· Morale
· Fighting spirit
· Perseverance
· Effects of leadership
Combat Power Identifying the major factors that influence the unit’s combat power adds
and the Marine depth to understanding warfighting dynamics for NCOs. The key to success
NCO is for the NCO to understand how the major factors influence warfighting.

Combat Power Concepts
Introduction The major factors influencing combat power are crucial to achieving an
understanding of combat power. It is necessary to understand that combat
power is situation specific since each set of factors changes with time.
Combat Power Several major factors form the core of combat power. These factors are listed
Factors below:
· Speed
· Focus
· Surprise
· Boldness
· Centers of gravity
· Critical vulnerabilities
· Creating opportunity
· Exploiting opportunity
Speed Speed is the rapidity of action. The rapidity of action is how fast events
occur. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo—the
consistent ability to work quickly. Speed over space is the ability to move
rapidly. Speed is a weapon and is most often overlooked as such. The ability
to out maneuver or out perform the enemy is how speed becomes a weapon.
Speed is a critical factor in keeping the enemy off balance or keeping the
operational flow of events in a sequence.
Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by
unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.
-- Sun Tzu

Combat Power Concepts, Continued
Focus Focus is the generation of superior combat power at a particular time and
place. Focus has costs. To achieve focus at a decisive place and time, leaders
must use strict economy and accept risk elsewhere and at other times.
Economy is achieved by managing the scarce resources of a force. NCOs

must understand the principle of economy, the mission, and the commander’s
intent to effectively lead Marines within his or her unit. Acceptance of risk
elsewhere means that if you concentrate your efforts at the point of decision,
you will be weaker in other places.
The combination of speed and focus adds punch or shock effect to your
actions. You should strike with the greatest possible combination of speed
and focus.
Surprise Surprise is a state of disorientation resulting from an unexplained event or

sequence of events that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist. Surprise can be
achieved through one of three methods:
· Deception
· Ambiguity
· Stealth
Deception Deception is the ability to convince the enemy that something is going to
happen other than what really happens. This is done to get the enemy to act
in a manner detrimental to his own interests. In simplest terms, the intent is
to give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture.
Ambiguity Ambiguity is doubt and can be created by acting in a way that the enemy does
not know what to expect. This means the enemy must prepare for numerous
possibilities.
Stealth Stealth is to deny the enemy any knowledge of what will happen. The enemy
is neither deceived nor confused, but instead is completely ignorant of future
actions.

Combat Power Concepts, Continued
Boldness Boldness is the characteristic of using the natural uncertainty of war to pursue
major results rather than minor ones.
Boldness is not recklessness. It is important to understand that inaction can

be a form of boldness. A calculating patience to remain inactive while the
enemy commits himself before we strike him is a form of boldness.
Situational awareness is the key to boldness. Leaders at all levels must have
the ability to assess the situation and then act.
Relationship of There is a close connection between surprise and boldness. It is necessary to

Surprise and take risks to surprise the enemy. The willingness to take these risks is an
Boldness example of boldness.

Gravity and Vulnerability
Introduction To win, the Marine Corps must focus combat power toward a decisive aim.
There are two concepts that focus on this: centers of gravity and critical
vulnerability.
Centers of Centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are friendly
Gravity centers of gravity—protect them; if they are enemy centers of gravity—take
them away. Centers of gravity can be identified by answering the following
questions:
· What factors are critical to the enemy?

· Which can the enemy not do without?
· Which, if eliminated, will bend the enemy most quickly to our will?
The U.S. Forces’ rapid advance on Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom
makes Baghdad the centers of gravity.
NCOs Marine NCOs must understand how their role influences and impacts the
Relationship to friendly forces’ capability and capacity. NCOs can conduct a situational
Centers of assessment within the unit to identify targets that generate power for enemy.
Gravity NCOs must take action to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy.
Critical A critical vulnerability is an opportunity that, if exploited, will do the most

Vulnerability significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist. Long supply lines for U.S.
Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of critical vulnerability.
NCO’s All leaders should be prepared to identify the enemy’s vulnerabilities within
Relationship to their battlespace or point of application. Maintaining situational awareness at
Critical all times is an integral part for leaders at the point of contact, which is where
Vulnerability most NCOs will be employing their warfighting capabilities.
Relationship of Centers of gravity and critical vulnerability are related. Centers of gravity
Concepts focus on of how to attack the enemy system from seeking a source of
strength. Critical vulnerability evaluates the enemy by seeking a weakness.
Critical vulnerabilities are the pathway to attacking the centers of gravity.
The underlying purpose is to create an opportunity to target actions in such a
way as to have the greatest effect on the enemy. Example: The U.S. Forces’
rapid advance on Baghdad greatly stretched supply lines.

Creating and Exploiting Opportunity
Introduction The challenge of warfighting is to be able to assess the situation and respond
properly. This assessment can create and exploit opportunity.
Creating Sometimes identifying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities is particularly

Opportunity difficult, so the commander may have to exploit any or all vulnerabilities until
action uncovers a decisive opportunity. A seemly routine low-level decision
could change the structure of the operating environment enough to create
opportunity elsewhere.
Exploiting Exploiting opportunity is the ability and willingness to ruthlessly exploit an

Opportunity opportunity to generate decisive results. Often a created opportunity is a
fleeting one. It requires subordinate leaders to be aware of their
environmental factors and make situational decisions intuitively and
instantaneously. A source of the opportunity could be
· A mere chance
· An enemy mistake
· A result of the fog or friction of war itself
Point of Often the point of decision in the operating environment will be at the squad
Decision or platoon level. NCOs must be able to draw parallels between warfighting
and a current situation. The need for technical and tactical proficiency
combined with effective leadership is essential for operational success at all
levels.

Chapter 2 Exercise
Study Time
Item 1 Politics refers to which of the following statements?
a. The distribution of power through dynamic interaction of both

cooperative and competitive elements of a group, organization, or entity.
b. The tactics used by groups and individuals to gain the desired outcomes
that benefit the individuals or the groups.
c. The procedure to attain support for plans and processes resulting from
initiatives and responses.
d. The underlying processes by which all organizations function.
Item 2 Policy refers to
a. processes and procedures set by commanding officers to satisfy

behavioral, performance, and operational standards.
b. high level decisions used to navigate through international and national
bureaucracy to achieve goals.
c. the conscious objectives established within the political process.
d. written documents that are used to lead and manage organizations.
Item 3 What is the most important relationship between war and policy?
a. Policy supports wars.

b. War must serve policy.
c. War and policy are both necessary to conduct operations.
d. Policy leads to war.

Item 4 Means in war is the
a. use of all power elements against another to achieve the objective.

b. purpose and function of the operation tasked to operational units.
c. method used to engage the opposing forces.
d. weapons and tactics employed to accomplish the mission.
Item 5 War is planned and conducted at different levels. What are these levels?
a. Marine expeditionary force, Marine expeditionary brigade, and Marine

expeditionary unit
b. Diplomatic, coalition, and operational
c. Strategic, operational, and tactical
d. Joint, service, and unit
Item 6 What is the definition of initiative?
a. Ensuring that personnel exercise action when it is opportune.

b. The plan before it is executed within warfighting doctrine.
c. The understanding of commander’s intent and guidance in terms of the
operations.
d. The ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet on
these terms.
Item 7 Merely reacting to the initiative describes which of the following terms?
a. Reaction
b. Reiterative
c. Response
d. Rebound

Item 8 What is the concept of attrition warfare?

a. Style of warfare that quantifies the amount of materiel used in
comparatively to conduct warfare
b. Pursues victory though the destruction of the enemy’s material assets by
superior firepower
c. A type of operational planning supported by materiel usage and resource
management for operational success
d. Joins current doctrine with 21st century technology as a means of
overcoming opposing forces
Item 9 What is the concept of maneuver warfare?

a. Support the portion of the plan that describes the movement phase of the
operation.
b. Engage mechanization and supporting arms onto opposing objectives.
c. Organize warfighting doctrine and movement by fire.
d. Shatter the enemy’s moral, mental, and physical cohesion by attacking
selected enemy weaknesses.
Item 10 Combat power is the

a. support arms that can be delivered during each phase of the operation.
b. difference between the offensive and defensive power factors estimated
by strategic planners.
c. total destructive force that we can pass onto the enemy at a given time.
d. combined total estimated power projection of a expeditionary force.

Item 11 Matching: For items 11 through 18, match the common characteristics of war
in column 1 with the definition in the column 2.
Column 1 Column 2
___ 11. Speed a. A state of disorientation

___ 12. Focus resulting from an unexplained
___ 13. Surprise event or sequence of events
___ 14. Boldness that degrades the enemy’s
___ 15. Centers of gravity ability to resist
___ 16. Critical vulnerability b. Any important sources of
___ 17. Creating opportunity strength
___ 18. Exploiting opportunity c. The process that occurs when
critical vulnerabilities are so
difficult that the commander
has to exploit any or all
vulnerabilities until a decisive
opportunity is revealed
d. The rapidity of action
e. An opportunity that, if
exploited, will do the most
significant damage to the
enemy’s ability to resist the
exploitation
f. The ability and willingness to
act ruthlessly in exploiting an
opportunity to generate
decisive results
g. The generation of superior
combat power at a particular
time and space
h. The characteristic of
unhesitatingly exploiting the
natural uncertainty of war to
pursue major results rather than
minor ones

Item 19 Choose the list of options that represents sources of opportunity.
a. Mere chance, an enemy mistake, or a result of the fog or friction of war

itself
b. Operational planning, logistical support, transportation assets, or
situational intelligence
c. Tactics, combat techniques, fire support, or methods of engagement
d. Fire and maneuver, supporting arms, tactical communications,
surveillance, or intelligence assets


1 a 2-3
2 c 2-3
3 b 2-3
4 a 2-3
5 c 2-6
6 d 2-9
7 c 2-9
8 b 2-11
9 d 2-12
10 c 2-13
11 d 2-14
12 g 2-15
13 a 2-15
14 h 2-16
15 b 2-17
16 e 2-17
17 c 2-18
18 f 2-18
19 a 2-18

CHAPTER 3
PREPARING FOR WAR
Introduction
Study Time
Scope The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision borne of thought, the
order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by
the will. The will is rooted in the character and for the man of action character is of more
critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is
dangerous.
-- Hans von Seeckt
This chapter covers the preparation concepts necessary to conduct war. It

provides the doctrinal basis for growth through study and learning through
experience.
Objectives the following preparation concepts:
· Force planning
· Organization
· Doctrine
· Professionalism
· Training
· Professional military education
· Personnel management
· Equipping
MCI Course 8014A 3-1 Chapter 3

In This Lesson This lesson contains the following topics:
Topic See Page

Warfighting Preparations 3-3
Lesson 3 Exercise 3-9

Warfighting Preparations
Introduction To become an effective warfighter, the following topics must be understood:
· Force planning
· Organization
· Doctrine
· Professionalism
· Training
· Professional military education
· Personnel management
· Equipping
Force Planning Force planning is the planning that is associated with the creation and
maintenance of military capabilities. Force planning requires the planner to
have the ability to analyze the evolution or creation of current and future
threats in order to develop countermeasure capabilities. These
countermeasures come in the form of personnel, strategy, technology,
ordnance, armament, and logistics.
Force Planning Force planning is generally handled at higher levels than the
and the Marine noncommissioned officer (NCO) level. However, it is important for the
NCO Marine NCO to understand that force planning takes place and produces
output in terms of force structure and equipping.
Force planning also provides the incentive for Marines to stay informed of
changing global threats and how these changes effect how warfighting
operations are executed.

Warfighting Preparations, Continued
Organization Organization is tailoring the composition of the operational forces to provide

forward deployed forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations.
Marine operating forces must maintain the capability to deploy by whatever
means appropriate for the situation while maintaining their unique
amphibious capability.
Impact of The Marine NCO needs to understand that the mission requirements drive the
Organization size, composition, and equipping of Marine units down to the squad or section
on the Marine level.
NCO
For example, a Marine NCO may be tasked with a mission in a mechanized
environment. In order to meet the opposing threat, he or she may have to
modify the weapons, equipment, and munitions load to meet the mission
requirements. This is how organization influences units at the lowest levels.
Doctrine Doctrine, as defined by Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms, is the principles that guide military forces in their
activities in support of national objectives.
Marine Corps Marine Corps doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine
Doctrine Corps. It establishes a particular way of thinking about war and fighting. It
also provides a philosophy for leading Marines in combat—a mandate for
professionalism and a common language.
Professionalism Professionalism requires Marine NCOs to be
· Experts in the conduct of war

· Competent to meet the challenge of defending the Nation
· Skilled at getting things done

Professionalism Maneuver warfare requires leaders with boldness and initiative down to the
for Marine lowest levels. As the Marine NCO experiences a broader perspective of the
NCOs Marine Corps, he or she gains a greater understanding of the military, Marine
Corps, and operating environment. The NCO’s responsibility in terms of
lives, material, and resources grows with each promotion. To effectively
manage these scarce and precious resources, the NCOs must expand their
horizons to think and act with initiative and focus.
Training Commanders establish standards that communicate the intent of training and
establish the main effort of training. These training guidelines provide
subordinate leaders with what is to be accomplished. Subordinate leaders
have to organize and develop training plans to support the commander’s
guidelines.
Training Training critiques are an essential part of an effective training program. They
Critiques are generally opinions made by individuals monitoring or participating in the
training. The purpose is to draw out the lessons of training. Critiques are
conducted immediately after training before memory of events fades.
Participants need to be willing to admit mistakes and discuss them.
NCOs Role in The Marine NCO is a link between the training applications and the
Training warfighting concepts contained in doctrine. Although the commander is
responsible for training Marines under their command, it is the NCOs who
provide the necessary skills to assist the commander in obtaining this goal.
Marine NCOs train their Marines from personal knowledge, acquired
experiences, lessons learned, mentoring, and other practical application
methods.

Professional Professional military education (PME) describes the education that Marines
Military receive through a combination of
Education
· Resident PME
· Non-resident PME
· Military studies conducted at the unit level
· Individual study
· Experience
Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking

leaders. All Marines should view this PME as a continuous, progressive
process extending throughout their careers.
PME Triad Professional military education is built upon a three-tiered approach:
· Education establishment—schools administered by the Marine Corps,

subordinate commands, or outside agencies
· Commanders—development of their subordinates to include developing

military judgment and decision making, and teaching general
professional and specific technical subjects
· Individual Marines—self-directed study in the art and science of war
PME Goal The goal of PME is to develop an expert in warfighting and professional
leadership. In addition to the three-tier approach, a well rounded PME
program should include a combination of the following elements:
· An individual professional reading program

· Map exercises
· War gaming
· Simulation training
· Battle studies
· Terrain studies

PME Marine leaders at every level should see the development of their
Applications subordinates as a direct reflection of themselves. Marine NCOs should not
for NCOs only participate in PME as students, but also develop the ability to teach their
Marines the skills and information that they have mastered.
Additionally, individual efforts should be made to conduct self-education

through individual learning programs such as distance education and reading.
Every Marine leader has a responsibility to study the profession of arms to
improve themselves, their Marines, and the effectiveness of the units in which
they serve. PME should assist in the development of leaders with the ability
to think and act as warfighters.
Personnel All Marine NCOs should understand the basic concepts of personnel
Management management to improve the performance of the personnel and processes that
they supervise. Marine NCOs have an opportunity to exercise personnel
management since they manage multiple functions within their sections.
They have to lead proceses and manage the skills and personnel
simultaneously. Effectively manning the billets and training personnel has a
direct impact on the unit’s warfighting capabilities. Remember, all Marines
of a given grade and occupational specialty are not always interchangeable
and should be assigned to billets based on specific ability and temperament.
Strong personnel management skills are required for supervisors to assess

individuals’ skills and abilities. NCOs need to understand proficiency and
technical requirements in addition to the Marines’ overall performance.
Equipping Equipping is the process of supplying the Marine Corps to meet its strategic
and operational goals. To minimize research and development costs, the
Marine Corps will use off the shelf technology to the greatest extent possible.

Equipping The selection of equipment to support the operational forces within the
Requirements Marine Corps requires mission specific requirements, projections, and
rigorous testing. When equipping the Marine Corps, the equipment should be
as follows:
· Easy to operate and maintain

· Reliable and interoperable with other equipment
· Minimal specialized operator training
· Consistent with established doctrine and tactics
· Strategic and tactical lift capabilities
· Employable and supportable in undeveloped theatres of operations
Dangers of The two dangers of equipping are listed below:

Equipping
· Over reliance on technology
· Failure to make the most of technology
The Marine Corps must not become so dependent on equipment that it can no
longer function effectively when the equipment fails. An example of this
would be relying on Global Positioning Systems while neglecting basic land
navigation skills.
Conclusion The ability to transition advances in technology to battlefield requires

Marines to continually upgrade their individual skills and abilities. The
ability to integrate new equipment and technology into the operational
environment enhances operational effectiveness and performance.
Advances in technology and the development of new equipment require the

Marine Corps to test, acquire, and field new equipment to meet current and
projected threats. Yesterday’s technology can become tomorrow’s
vulnerability, so implementing change is a challenge leader’s continuously
face.

Chapter 3 Exercise
Study Time
Item 1 What is the definition of doctrine?
a. A theoretical approach to warfighting that is discussed at the highest

levels and is approved by Congress
b. Principles that guide military forces in their activities in support of
national objectives
c. A permanent record of warfighting studies at the joint level
d. The process and procedure for reduction of Department of Defense plans
and operational concepts
Item 2 Marine Corps doctrine is defined as
a. the process and procedure for developing operational plans and

operations at the strategic level.
b. a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject
of war, from its nature and theory to the preparation and conduct.
c. the use of command and control to bring force onto the enemy and then
smash his warfighting systems.
d. a tool used by commanders to transform focus to warfighting force into a
pliable form of power in the operating environment.
Item 3 What are the three tiers of the professional military education system?
a. Sergeants, career, and advanced

b. Initial, sustainment, and expansion
c. Education establishment, commanders, and individual Marines
d. Resident, non-resident, and interactive media instructions

Item 4 Understanding that ___________________________________ is an

important concept for effective personnel management.
a. officers handling personnel issues within squads and sections

b. filling the billet is more important than proficiency and training for the
billet
c. Marines of certain grades and occupational specialties are not always
interchangeable
d. billets can only be filled by incoming personnel
Item 5 What are the dangers of equipping?
a. Over reliance on technology and failure to make the most of technology

b. Untrained equipment operators and hazardous materials management in
the operating environment
c. Conducting equipment specific training and operational risk assessment
surveys
d. Storage and maintenance of fragile equipment in the operating
environment, and ensuring the Marines follow the procedures for use

Items 6 Matching: For items 6 through 9, match the warfighting preparation terms in
Through 9 column 1 with the definitions in column 2.
Column 1 Column 2
Preparation Terms Definition
___ 6. Force Planning a. Tailors the composition of the

___ 7. Organization operational forces to provide forward
___ 8. Professionalism deployed forces capable of conducting
___ 9. Training expeditionary operations
b. Plans associated with the creation and
maintenance of military capabilities
c. Requires Marine leaders to be experts in
conducting war and executing its policy
d. Organizes and develops training plans
that support the commander’s guidelines


1 b 3-4
2 b 3-4
3 c 3-6
4 c 3-7
5 a 3-8
6 b 3-3
7 a 3-4
8 c 3-4
9 d 3-5

CHAPTER 4
THE CONDUCT OF WAR
Introduction
Study Time
Scope Many years ago, as a cadet hoping to some day to be an officer, I was poring over the
‘Principles of War,’ listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the NCO-Major came
up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your head about all them
things, me lad,’ he said. “There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other
fellow as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he
ain’t lookin!”
-- Sir William Slim
The quote shows that the conduct of war has not significantly changed in
recent history; only the technology and applications of warfighting have
changed. Warfighting involves understanding the nature and theory of units
and then applying this understanding in the operating environment. This
chapter focuses on the concepts and processes that are fundamental to the
conduct of war and warfighting operations.
Learning After completing this lesson, you should be able to identify the definitions of
Objectives the following concepts:
· Maneuver warfare
· Orienting on the enemy
· Philosophy of command
· Shaping the action
· Decisionmaking

Learning · Mission tactics

Objectives,
continued · Commander’s intent
· Main effort
· Surfaces and gaps
· Combined arms

Chapter
Topic See Page

Maneuver Warfare 4-3
Orienting on the Enemy 4-4
Philosophy of Command 4-5
Shaping the Action 4-7
Decisionmaking 4-8
Mission Tactics 4-10
Commander’s Intent 4-11
Main Effort 4-12
Surfaces and Gaps 4-13
Combined Arms 4-14

Maneuver Warfare
Introduction Previous lessons have discussed the concepts and processes that are essential
to understanding warfighting. The actual conduct of war demands an
additional set of concepts to use in the operating environment.
Definition Maneuver warfare is defined as a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter

the enemy’s cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses. These
actions create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the
enemy cannot cope.
Maneuver warfare requires speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of
action, and keep the enemy off balance. This increases the enemy’s friction.
The goal is to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain. With each
action the enemy’s reactions are later and later until the enemy is overcome
by the events.
Goal The goal of maneuver warfare is to generate and exploit some kind of
advantage over the enemy. To accomplish the objectives as quickly and
easily as possible, leaders need to consider the following dimensions of
maneuver:
· Psychological–mind or perspective
· Technological–technology
· Temporal–limited time to exploit the situation creates urgency
· Spatial–positional advantage in space or time
Role of Firepower is central to maneuver warfare and limits the enemy’s ability to
Firepower respond. Firepower is used to disrupt the enemy systems. The physical
destruction of an objective is not firepower’s greatest effect, but rather the
cumulative effect on the enemy’s operational processes.
Marine NCO Once the Marine NCO understands their role in the operational and
Relationship to warfighting environment, they can utilize maneuver to their advantage. The
Maneuver maneuver warfare mindset allows leaders at all levels to analyze their
particular situation and utilize maneuver to assist the commander in achieving
the overall mission. In simpler terms, maneuver allows leaders to perform
their role and lead their unit better and faster than the opposing forces.

Orienting on the Enemy
Introduction Maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy from many different perspectives.
You can increase your effectiveness by understanding the enemy’s strategies,
tactics and logistics.
Enemy System Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. Maneuver

warfare attacks the enemy system. Anything that challenges Marines within
their particular sphere is called an enemy system. The sphere being the
environment in which the Marines are carrying out their assigned mission or
duties. Examples include the following:
· Pilot―air defense radars, surface to air missiles, and enemy aircraft
· Rifle company―mutually supporting defensive positions protected by

obstacles and supported by crew-served weapons on the next terrain
feature
· Electronic warfare specialist―enemy’s command and control network
· Marine expeditionary force―major combat formations within an area of

operations as well as their supporting command and control, logistics, and
intelligence organizations.
Understanding NCOs must understand the enemy in his own terms. Do not assume the
the Enemy enemy thinks, fights, or has the same values or objectives.
Leadership Marine NCOs should understand how the enemy operates in theory and
Focus methodology. It is essential to make projections as to the enemy’s actions
and counter them. NCOs must understand the concepts and reduce them to
the squad or application level.

Philosophy of Command
Introduction Marine leaders are exposed to a variety of leadership methods within the
Marine Corps. Many of these methods focus on the leadership principles and
traits while integrating the core values. However, commanders often provide
additional guidelines based on their individual leadership styles.
Definition Philosophy of command is the general outline of principles, processes, and

procedures that a commander expects to have the command operate within to
accomplish tactical and administrative missions. When a commander
communicates his or her philosophy of command, the Marines within the
command understand how the commander expects operations to be conducted
and the parameters that the operations should be conducted within.
Purpose The commander’s intent is a means to generate a standard for operations that
influences the organization’s tempo. Commander’s intent should reflect
methodology that is designed to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and
fluidity of combat.
Benefits of Infusing philosophy of command throughout the command and its processes
Decentralized creates a situation that supports
Command and
Control · Decentralized command and control
· Implicit communications

Philosophy of Command, Continued
Decentralized Decentralized command and control exists when subordinate leaders must
Command and make decisions on their own initiative based on the commander’s intent. This
Control eliminates the requirement to pass information up the chain of command and
then wait for a decision to be passed down.
A competent leader at the point of decision will naturally better understand

the true situation than the commander some distance removed. Individual
initiative and responsibility are necessary in a decentralized operating
environment.
Implicit Implicit communication is communication through mutual understanding.

Communication The mutual understanding uses a minimum of key, well-understood phrases
or even anticipating each other’s thoughts. Implicit communication is a
faster, more effective way to communicate
Achieving Marine leaders should use the following principles to encourage the
Implicit development of implicit communications:
Communication
· Establish long-term working relationships.
· Ensure key personnel talk directly with each other.
· Use oral communication.
· Communicate in person.
Conclusion Marine NCOs should incorporate interpersonal communications whenever

possible to assist in developing improved communications skills. Clear
communications directly reflects improved performance and operational
understanding.

Shaping the Action
Introduction Commanders use warfighting strategy, tactics, and techniques to create

operational conditions that support their intent. The ability to create favorable
conditions is referred to as shaping the action.
Definition Shaping the action is the plan of how victory is to be achieved:
· Establish what is to be accomplished, why, and how.

· Identify the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities.
· Identify vulnerabilities from the enemy’s perspective.
These steps allow the force to shape the campaign, operation, battle, or
engagement to their advantage in both time and space.
Conditions The disorderly nature of war makes shaping an imprecise action. The focus is
to shape the general conditions of war. Shaping actions can range from lethal
to nonlethal actions that will assist the commander in creating favorable
operating conditions. Some examples are as follows:
· Direct attack
· Psychological operations
· Electronic warfare
· Stockpiling of critical supplies for future operations
· Attacking specific enemy capabilities
· Using deception to shape enemy expectations
Marine NCO The importance is to understand the vision and intent of the commander. By
Applications understanding warfighting doctrine, the Marine NCO can develop a plan of
action to better support the commander from the squad and platoon level.

Decisionmaking
Introduction Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the
result of decisions or nondecisions.
Definition Military decisionmaking is a mental process that requires
· Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a problem

· Creative ability to devise a practical solution
The ability to make decisions is based on the individual’s experience,

education, and intelligence.
Operational The speed at which decisions are made creates decisive advantage in the
Success operating environment. Time is often the most important factor in decision
making and both time and decisionmaking are essential to generate
operational tempo.
Situational Situational awareness is the perceptions of environmental factors. The

Awareness primary factors are listed below:
· Perception―ability to be aware and process the available situational

information
· Comprehension―ability to understand the situation and the factors

involved
· Projection―options into which the situation could develop
· Prediction―determining what the opposition will do
Processes Decisionmaking processes are classified into two larger categories:
· Intuitive decisionmaking
· Analytical decisionmaking

Decisionmaking, Continued
Intuitive Intuitive decision making is a decisionmaking process that relies on

experience to recognize key elements of a particular problem and then arrives
at an appropriate solution. The ability to use intuitive decisionmaking
requires the decision maker to scrutinize the situational factors. These
situational factors are selectively matched against previous experiences to
develop the first best solution. A first best solution is one that achieves some
level of success with minimal risks and time committed to the solution. The
goal is to develop and implement the first solution in minimal time.
Marine NCOs apply intuitive decisionmaking daily to meet mission

objectives, solve problems, and develop solutions to leadership challenges.
Analytical Analytical decisionmaking is an approach used to analyze a dilemma and

determine the best solution. The problem solver or team of problem solvers
systematically employ a process that consists of the following actions:
· Carefully take a problem apart.

· Collect and test the information required for the problem or task.
· Conduct a comparison of the solutions or options.
· Select an alternative that should be the best solution for the problem.
Analytical decisionmaking processes can be observed in their purest forms at

higher organizational levels or during deliberate planning situations.
Psychological Marine NCOs face challenges making decisions. The following factors listed
Factors in the table below increase or minimize the decision-making process:
Factors Function
Moral Courage Leaders make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty and
accept full responsibility for those decisions.
Incomplete The decision process becomes very difficult because the
Information warfighting environment is very fluid.
Timeliness Critical to maximizing initiative and response, which
optimizes tempo. The ability to evaluate a situation and act is
critical in the execution phase of operations.
Uncertainty Decisionmaking becomes difficult because the possible
outcomes can jeopardize the lives of your Marines and
operational success.
Uniqueness Incorporates experience and knowledge to develop a new
solution based on the specific situation.

Mission Tactics
Introduction This section discusses and defines the use of mission tactics. A Marine NCO
should not only be able to receive and execute mission tactics, but he or she
should be able to utilize mission tactics to lead and manage the Marines under
his or her charge.
Definition Mission tactics is the process of assigning subordinates missions without

specifying how the mission must be accomplished. The mission tactics
approach grants the subordinate freedom and the duty to take whatever steps
are necessary to accomplish the mission. The subordinate leader is also
responsible to demonstrate the ability to exercise initiative framed by proper
guidance and understanding.
Commander’s Missions tactics benefit senior commanders:

Benefits
· Frees time to focus on higher level concerns rather than the details of
subordinate execution
· Allows senior intervention only by exception
· Permits freedom of initiative to develop higher tempo of operations
Subordinate’s Subordinates benefit from mission tactics in the following ways:

Benefits
· Actions can be adapted to the changing situations.
· Permission to act is implicit and results are provided to the commander
after the action is completed.
Performance Marine NCOs gain many opportunities through the use of mission tactics in
Applications the operating environment. It also provides them the opportunity to see how
their actions fit into the larger situation.

Commander’s Intent
Introduction Communications are essential to effective operations. These communications

can be divided into explicit and implicit communications.
Definition Commander’s intent is clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one
or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. The purpose of commander’s intent
is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative.
This opportunity is most evident when the subordinate has to depart from the
original plan when the unforeseen occurs. The key to successful
implementation of intent is to modify the plan of action in a manner that is
consistent with the higher commander’s aims.
Mission Mission statements are composed of two parts:

Statement
· Task
· Intent or reason behind the task
The task describes the action to be taken or what is to be done while the intent
describes the purpose or why and the desired outcome. Based on the mission,
the next lower leadership level develops a concept of operations or plan that
is passed on as an order that explains how the unit will accomplish the
mission. The new order assigns missions to subordinates as tasks.
Capturing When the commander uses the phrase, “… in order to …” following the
Intent assigned task, it reflects the intent that is to be mentally captured by the
subordinate. For example, the company commander gives you the following
mission statement: “At 1400, Company C will attack to seize battalion
objective 1 in order to establish a blocking position and deny the enemy the
ability to reinforce.”
Leadership Marine NCOs should be very familiar with commander’s intent because they
Applications may be required to fulfill the role of platoon commander or platoon NCO
from time to time. Additionally, they will receive tasks to execute with intent
attached. The goal of small unit leaders, such as NCOs, should be to
understand commander’s intent two levels up whenever possible.

Main Effort
Introduction Marine Corps units are given missions that must be accomplished within the
commander’s intent. Some missions are more important than others.
Definition Main effort is the action that is most critical to success at a particular
moment. Main effort is assigned to the unit that is assigned to accomplishing
the key mission. This unit becomes the focal point for the convergence of
combat power.
The main effort receives the priority of support. This priority of support can
come in such forms as logistical, mobility, or fire support and/or attached
personnel to fulfill special mission requirements. The designation of the main
effort should make it clear to all other units that are to be supported.
For example, during this phase of the operation, Company C is the main
effort for the battalion. The artillery battery assigned to the battalion will give
priority to all calls for fire from Company C. The battalion commander will
most likely also send any attachments necessary to ensure that Company C
accomplishes its mission.
Shifting Effort As the situation changes, the commander may shift the main effort,
redirecting the combat power in support of the unit that is now most critical to
success. When shifting the main effort, the goal is to exploit success rather
than reinforce failure.

Surfaces and Gaps
Introduction The face of the battlefield is a combination of strengths and weakness. The
ability to evaluate the opposition in its environment and determine their
strengths and weaknesses is an important concept in warfighting.
Surfaces and Surfaces are enemy hard spots or enemy strengths. Gaps are soft spots or
Gaps enemy weaknesses. The goal is to avoid enemy strength and focus the efforts
against enemy weakness. Putting strength against weakness reduces
casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible,
gaps should be exploited. Failing that, gaps need to be created.
For example, if the main effort has struck a surface, but another unit has
located a gap, designate the second unit as the main effort and redirect the
combat power in support of it.
NCO Marine NCOs may be able to identify weaknesses or strengths in the enemy
Perspective forces. This is completed by comparing enemy systems to our own.
Understanding how the enemy thinks, acts, and generates combat power is
another step in identifying surfaces and gaps.

Combined Arms
Introduction Generations of Marines have learned and applied the combined arms concept.
Explaining the concept is often more difficult than the actual application in
the warfighting environment. As you read this section, attempt to imagine
that you have no operational experience and envision the operating
environment from the perspective of a casual observer.
Definition Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract
one would make the enemy vulnerable to another. The employment of the
combined arms concept creates a dilemma or a no-win situation for the
opposing forces.
Examples MCDP 1-3, Tactics, cites the following example of combined arms:
A squad level dilemma could be created by having the squad leader position
squad automatic weapons (M249 SAW) and grenade launchers (M203) to
provide support by fire while the riflemen assault the position. The fire
power of the automatic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting hole while
the M203 grenades make it impossible to remain in the fighting holes. The
combination of fires keeps the enemy from reacting effectively to the riflemen
maneuvering to the enemy position. The combination of threats puts the
enemy in a no-win situation.

Chapter 4 Exercise
Study Time
Item 1 The goal of maneuver warfare is
a. combined fire and movement to advance on an enemy.

b. to generate and exploit an advantage over the enemy.
c. transport warfighting assets to their objective and assault positions.
d. support indirect fires with mobile direct fires to gain tactical advantage.
Item 2 Which of the following statements describe the term, enemy system?
a. Anything that challenges Marines within their particular sphere

b. The offensive or defensive situation and the tactics used to conduct
operations
c. Their fire and maneuver plan as it is put into action
d. The will to resist offensive operations and/or counterattack
Item 3 What is a commander’s philosophy of command?
a. Standard operating procedures for the combat operations center,

operational maneuver, and support functions by the staff sections
b. Process procedures for training and operations as directed by the Training
and Readiness Manual, unit training manual, and sustainment training
requirements as directed by Headquarters, Marine Corps
c. Outline of principles, processes, and procedures that the commander
expects to have the command operate within to accomplish tactical and
administrative missions
d. Plan of operations to implement principles and processes that offer
operational efficiency and effectiveness

Item 4 Shaping the action is the
a. series of offensive actions on opposing forces which develops the

situation for success.
b. plan of how victory is to be achieved.
c. objective focusing that occurs during the planning and execution of
operations.
d. compounding effect of fire and maneuver in the battlespace.
Item 5 What does military decisionmaking require?
a. Infusion of combat tactics and techniques to properly evaluate the

possibilities and outcomes
b. Extensive leadership and warfighting training in order to make decision
within the limitations of doctrine and strategy
c. Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and
the creative ability to devise a practical solution
d. The decision maker to be the operational leader in order to enforce
accountability for action or inaction within the operating environment

Item 6 What is mission tactics?
a. Offensive procedures used to develop the battlespace into smaller

microbattles that divide the enemy’s strength and focus
b. Functions of assault elements in high intensity operations that utilize a
variety of warfighting assets to divide the opposition’s focus and combat
power
c. Tactics used to shape the battlespace in order to support higher level
operations
d. Process of assigning subordinates missions without specifying how the
mission must be accomplished
Item 7 What is commander’s intent?
a. Clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks

assigned to a subordinate
b. Desired outcome that the unit staff uses to develop operational orders and
mission tasks
c. Resulting actions from intuitive decisionmaking used in the operating
environment
d. Action phase of philosophy of command
Item 8 Action that is critical for success at a particular moment would best define
which of the following terms?
a. Offensive action
b. Main effort
c. Critical action
d. Operational focus

Item 9 Enemy hard spots or enemy strengths describe which of the following terms?
a. Strong points
b. Defensive positions
c. Reciprocal defense
d. Surfaces
Item 10 How is a gap defined?
a. Soft spots or enemy weaknesses

b. Low lying areas in the battlespace
c. Areas covered by fire only
d. The space between the forward line of troops and the battle area
Item 11 The full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one would make
the enemy vulnerable to another describes which of the following terms?
a. Fire support planning

b. Integration of fires
c. Combined arms concept
d. Fire and maneuver concept


1 b 4-3
2 a 4-4
3 c 4-5
4 b 4-7
5 c 4-8
6 d 4-10
7 a 4-11
8 b 4-12
9 d 4-13
10 a 4-13
11 c 4-14

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CHAPTER 5
WARFIGHTING APPLICATIONS
Introduction
Study Time
Scope We want our commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative, get
inside the enemy’s mind, think about what his intentions are, how he is going to react and
outsmart him with your initiative in the absence of orders from a senior command.
-- General Alfred Gray

29th Commandant of the Marine Corps
This chapter combines the warfighting concepts (discussed in chapters 1

through 4) with and the U.S. Marine Reading Program. Reading stimulates
critical thinking, which will broaden the Marine NCO’s perspective of the
operating environment as well as increase the proficiency of both individuals
and units.
Learning After completing this lesson, you should be able to

Objectives
· Identify the method to submit a recommendation for the U.S. Marine
Reading Program.
· Identify types of Marine Corps doctrinal publications.
· Identify the definition of critical reading.
· Critically read and analyze a professional article.

Contents This chapter contains the following topics:
Topic See Page

Professional Reading 5-3
Reading Resources 5-6
Reinforcing Warfighting 5-11

Professional Reading
Commandant’s General Alfred Gray established a professional reading program in the Marine
Reading Corps called the Commandant’s Professional Reading Program. The program
Program was designed to
· Develop a deeper, more penetrating perception of the operating

environment.
· Examine the relationships between education, training, and experience.
· Consider current and/or future threats in the light of operational

projections.
· Promote leadership in the context of warfighting.
The Commandant’s Reading List supported the reading program. General

Jones, 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, restructured the current
reading program as the U.S. Marine Reading Program.
U.S. Marine The Commandant’s vision was to create a reading program to encourage a
Reading sense of personal ownership for each Marine. He directly linked reading to
Program the development and mastery of warfighting competencies, which require
mental resources to support decisionmaking along with other tactical
applications.
It is amazing, but true that creating a shared awareness and organizational

competency at the Corps level through reading and study of doctrine will
push the warfighting capability beyond most technological improvements.
General Jones stressed …the strength of the pack … (is) the strength of the
wolf and the power of that metaphor. Reading creates a unified thought
process created through the study and application of a common perspective
such as warfighting.

Professional Reading, Continued
Program The U.S. Marine Reading Program is updated by ALMAR (All Marine
Reference message) 026/00, which was published by General James L. Jones. The
ALMAR message and other sources are available online at the following Web
site: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/Reading/ReadingList.htm.
Program This updated U.S. Marine Reading Program is structured slightly different
Structure from the previous programs. The sections of the reading program are listed
below:
· Marine Corps Heritage

· Leadership, Memoir, and Biography
· Theory, Nature, and History of War
· Strategy, Policy, and Civil-Military Relations
· Operations, Campaigns, and Battles
· Doctrine, Training, and Tactics
· Small Wars
· Sinews of War
Each section addresses a particular area of study that is vital to developing a

holistic perspective of the current operating environment and the related
challenges.
Commandant’s The Commandant’s Favorites has replaced the Commandant’s Choice on the
Favorites reading list. The Commandant’s Favorites are composed of the books or a
single book that have influenced the perspective and thought processes of the
commandant and/or theory that supports the operational focus of the Marine
Corps.
Reading The goal of the reading program is to integrate reading and critical thinking
Program Goal skills into the daily operations of the Marine Corps through study, discussion,
and application much like physical training. Strengthening the mind–like the
body–is a force and a life multiplier measured by the decision making
abilities of Marines.

Sergeant Input The new reading program allows Marines to recommend books they have
read to be considered in the reading program. Suggestions can be e-mailed to
the Marine Corps University for approval via the Web page previously listed.

Reading Resources
Marine Corps The first level of reading resource is the Marine Corps doctrine. It is
Doctrine designed to provide strategic overview of the methodology and direction of
operations and functions used within the Marine Corps.
Reading doctrine creates an increased knowledge base, which allows Marines

of all ranks and levels of experience to apply warfighting concepts more
effectively.
Reading All Marine NCOs should read core doctrinal publications such as
Challenge MCDP 1, Warfighting to better understand the many dimensions of the
operating environment. There are specific doctrinal resources that may apply
to the NCO’s duties and or related functions within their unit and mission.
Marine Corps doctrine is available online at www.doctrine.usmc.mil.
Types of The Marine Corps doctrinal publications are divided into the following types:
Doctrinal
Publications · Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP)
· Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP)
· Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP)
MCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications provide a strategic view and universal
perspective.
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publications are more operational in nature and
provide more specific guidance on processes and procedure.
MCRP Marine Corps Reference Publications are generally informational in nature

rather than operational.

Reading Resources, Continued
Marine Corps The second level of reading resource is Marine Corps directives, which come
Directives in orders, bulletins, and messages. Directives are accessible to all Marines
through the official Marine Corps Web sites at www.usmc.mil or
http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications. Marine Corps orders
are listed by standard subject identification code or subject. Refer to MCI
8101, Leadership and Administration, study unit 7 for more information on
SSIC.
Other Several other reading resources to round out a Marine NCO’s individualized
Resources reading program are
· Online books
· Periodicals
· Online periodicals and references
· Marine Corps Lessons Learned system
· Marine Corps doctrine and directives
NCOs need to take advantage of the multitude of available sources of

professional military education available. The distance education and
resident professional military programs only provide the foundation of
military education. The opportunity to expand and develop a broader
perspective of the operating environment through reading is the goal of
professional development.
Online Books A select number of professional reading books and library resources are
available online via the Marine Corps University’s Web page at:
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/reading/MCOLLS/mcolls.htm.
Periodicals Periodicals are generally magazines and newspapers that are published on a
cyclical basis. Newspapers and magazines are two examples of periodicals
that Marines can read for updated information on national and international
events and issues that effect their operating environment.

Online Online periodicals and references are available on the Internet. The
Periodicals and challenges of the information age require that Marines of all grades have
References basic computer competencies. Many periodicals have online Web sites that
can be accessed.
Marine Corps The last level of reading resource is the Marine Corps Lesson Learned
Lessons system. It is a database of lessons learned during operational and training
Learned evolutions. The database is part of the Combat Development Tracking
System System located at Web site
http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/lessons_learned/marine_ll.shtml. To access the
database, Marines must request permission and receive a user ID and
password. Directions for receiving an ID and password are located at the
Web site.

Electronic The table below contains instructions for locating professional reading
Reading resources on the Internet:
Resources
Step Action
1 Log on to your personal computer (PC) using your official log in
name and password.
2 When log on is complete, locate the Internet Explorer icon on the
desktop or follow the steps listed below:
a. Click on Start.
b. Click on Programs.
c. Click on Internet Explorer.
3 Type http//:www.usmc.mil into the address box.
Click on the “Go” button to the right of the address box.
4 When the Web page appears, two options are available:
a. The button labeled, “Publications”—on the menu tool bar

near the tool bar across the top of the page.
b. The button labeled, “Search”—along the left side menu

toolbar.
5 Clicking on “Publications” makes a drop-down menu appear.
Select the type of publication required and click on it:
a. Directives are organized by standard subject identification

code or subject.
b. Doctrinal publications are organized by type and the options

appear on the left menu toolbar.
6 When using the “Search” option, follow the steps listed below:
a. Type “Reading Program” into the box under “Search.”

b. Go to the box directly below where ALMAR (All Marine
Message) is set as the default.
c. Click on “Search.”
7 Utilize resource.

Search Engine To use a search engine, use the address block to type in the name of a
Utilization commercial search engine and find the “Search” box. All search engines
work basically the same. Typing in a topic and clicking on “Search” or “Go”
buttons bring up subject options that are hyperlinked to other Web pages.
Sample Topics When using a search engine to support a professional reading development
program, you should type in subjects or titles such as the following:
· Professional military development or military thinking

· Warfighting
· Marine Corps Gazette
Doctrinal MCRP 6-11A, A Book on Books provides doctrinal support for developing
Reading and structuring a professional reading program. This reference provides
Support general guidelines about the types and locations of materials that could be
included in a reading program. The Web site for such references is located at
www.doctrine.usmc.mil.
Reading While many professional development resources exist for Marines, the
Challenge sergeant is often the point of doctrinal application in the operating
environment. Developing a knowledge base that supports a greater
operational understanding should be the goal of professional reading for the
NCO. An individual reading program should include doctrinal and
warfighting publications as previously discussed. However, such books as
Starship Troopers and Defense of Duffer’s Drift contain content that is not
only relevant to warfighting, but can also be read for enjoyment.

Reinforcing Warfighting
Introduction The two primary methods of reinforcing warfighting concepts is through

critical reading and warfighting applications other than field training. These
applications may come in the form of tactical decision games or simulations
depending on occupational field and military occupational specialty
requirements.
Critical Critical reading is a focused method of reading to extract meaningful

Reading information from the text. The critical reading of books recommended for the
Definition U.S. Marine Reading Program adds warfighting perspective to the Marine
Corps as a whole by creating strategic focus and ethos or group perspective.
Perspective building is dependent on the reader’s ability to create
relationships between reading content and warfighting. On an individual
level, critical reading sharpens understanding of warfighting by suggesting
parallels between current situations to warfighting applications.
Reading The reader should approach professional reading with an open and inquisitive
Perspective mind. Determining the value of the book depends on the reader’s purpose
and perspective. Most books on the Commandant’s reading list have been
chosen because they address core competencies or leadership, or they provide
historical lessons to be learned that can be discussed in terms of modern
tactics and warfighting applications.

Reinforcing Warfighting, Continued
Developing After choosing a professional reading source, the reader should try to
Perspective understand the author’s perspective to determine how to apply it. If you are
unsure of it, try looking for a summary, which is sometimes located on the
back or inside cover of the book. If one is not available, you may have to do
some research on the subject or author, check related material, or consider
answering the following questions:
· When was the book written?

· What was the author’s age and background?
· What were the author’s experience and the context of the book?
· Is the book a historical account or personal perspective on an issue?
· If the book is an historical account, what did the author attempt to prove
or present?
· If the book is a personal perspective, what did the author want to get
across to the reader?
· What are the lessons learned that could be derived from the book?
· Do they still apply to today’s operating environment? Why or why not?
· How does this apply to my current billet and grade?
Group Group reading can be an effective tool when you use a professional article(s)
Readings and that applies to a contemporary issue, training objective, or warfighting
Discussions technique and application. An article is easier to read than a book because it
is shorter and needs to be more focused than a book (which could address
several issues or applications). Articles can be read in a short period of time
and can be accessed online or reproduced at minimum expense.
The discussion leader can approach the discussion by asking many of the
same questions that are used to develop perspective. These questions can be
assembled into a discussion guide, which can be used to assist the discussion
leader.

Chapter 5 Exercise
Estimated 2 hours, 30 minutes

Study Time
answers against those listed at the end of this chapter.
Item 1 How can Marines submit books to be included on the U.S. Marine Reading
Program?
a. E-mail the Marine Corps University

b. Refer a formal book review via the chain of command
c. Consult with resident professional military education schools
d. Write a letter to the Marine Corps Gazette
Item 2 The three primary forms of Marine Corps doctrine are presented in
a. Marine Corps Recruit Training, The Basic School, and Marine Combat
Training.
b. Marine Corps Common Skills Handbook, Marine Corps Institute courses,
and associated publications.
c. Marine Corps doctrinal publications, Marine Corps warfighting
publications, and Marine Corps reference publications.
d. professional military education courses, sustainment training at the
battalion level and below, and field skills training and evaluation.
Item 3 Identify the definition of critical reading.
a. A grammatical analysis of a book’s content and its presentation format

b. A focused method of reading in which the reader seeks to extract
meaningful information from the text
c. The absolute minimum required to meet the performance standard for the
U.S. Marine Reading Program
d. A method of reading to maximize reading volume in the minimum of
time
MCI Course 8014A 5-13 Chapter 5 Exercise

Directions for The next section of the exercise applies to critical reading skills. It is
Items 4 designed to demonstrate the value of professional reading and the related
Through 16 learning skills derived from reading. You will have three articles to read.
Test items 4 through 7 require you to read the article, “Understanding
Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine.” Test items 8 through 11 require you
to read, “Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare.” Finally, test items 12
through 16 require you to read, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the
Three Block War.” As you read the accompanying preview information
followed by each articles’ introduction, try to make preliminary estimates on
the author’s focus and intent.
Think about the perspective building questions, reading objectives, and how
they relate to the content as you read. You may have to read the article
several times to fully digest the content.
The first reading should consist of skimming through the content so that you
can develop overview.
Reread the preliminary information and the article a second time to develop a
deeper understanding of the content and its relationship to warfighting.
The third reading should be done after rereading the objectives, so that you
can search for the content that relates to the question. It may be helpful to
annotate important sections or make notes in the margin, so that the
information becomes more understandable.

Directions for Read the preview page for required reading 1 followed by the article,
Items 4 “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine,” beginning on page
Through 7 5-21 before completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have
finished reading the article, answer items 4 through 7 by writing your answers
in the space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the end of
the chapter beginning on 5-55.
Item 4 What were Winston Churchill’s observations about maneuver?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 5 What does Liddell Hart state about creating advantage and what is its
relationship to orienting on the enemy?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Item 6 How does the author define focus?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 7 How are speed, tempo, and maneuver related in warfighting context?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Directions for Read the preview page for required reading 2 followed by the article, “Tactics
Items 8 and Theory of Maneuver Warfare,” beginning on page 5-33 before
Through 11 completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have finished
reading the article, answer items 8 through 11 by writing your answers in the
space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the end of the
chapter beginning on 5-55.
Item 8 Where in the spectrum of war does maneuver play a role?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 9 What is the importance of understanding commander’s intent?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Item 10 What is meant by command forward?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 11 What is the purpose of creating initiative in the absence of orders?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Chapter 5 Exercise Continued
Directions for Read the preview page for required reading 3 followed by the article, “The
Items 12 Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” beginning on page
Through 16 5-46 before completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have
finished reading the article, answer items 12 through 16 by writing your
answer in the space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the
end of the chapter beginning on 5-55.
Item 12 What are some of the challenges and pressures in the operating environment
that the 21st Marine NCO can expect to experience?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 13 What is the three block war?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Item 14 What is the common thread uniting operational performance in the operating
environment?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 15 What is the common thread linking all aspects of the Marine Corps?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Item 16 How does a “zero defects” mentality improve operational performance?

______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Preview to Required Reading 1
Introduction “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine” by Captain John

Schmidt attempts to dissect maneuver warfare and the preliminary
development of our current doctrine contained MCDP 1, Warfighting. The
evolution of warfighting doctrine allows for flexibility and adaptability in the
operating environment. This article is designed to broaden the Marine NCO’s
perspective of maneuver warfare.
Scope and This article discusses the concepts and factors found in war and the
Perspective warfighting environment. It further describes the common factors that link
warfighting to the administrative and operational environments that sergeants
operate in daily and the challenges confronting Marine NCOs.
Reading As you read “Understanding Manuever as the Basis for a Doctrine,” you
Concepts should think about the following warfighting concepts:
· What were Winston Churchill’s observations about maneuver?

· What does Liddell Hart state about orienting on the enemy?
· How does the author define focus?
· How are speed, tempo, and maneuver related in warfighting context?
Content The table below locates the warfighting concepts in previous lessons that are
Preview addressed in the following article. After reading the article, review the
concepts to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer
items 4 through 7.
Warfighting Concept Review See Page

Maneuver Warfare 2-14
Orienting on the Enemy 4-6
Critical Vulnerability 2-22
Focus 2-19
Surprise 2-20
Speed 2-18

Required Reading 1
UNDERSTANDING MANEUVER AS THE BASIS FOR A

DOCTRINE
Maneuver warfare is the official doctrine of the Marine Corps, but not everyone has
complete understanding of the concept. This article takes it part, studies its component
parts, and dispels some of the misconceptions occasionally associated with it. Studying
maneuver warfare will give you a clearer insight into how the Corps intends to fight its
next war.
By
Capt John F. Schmitt
The Marine Corps now has an official Maneuver to simple movement – to a less
doctrine called maneuver warfare – an entire than full appreciation for the practical
way of war based on this single concept applications of the concept. With that in
called Maneuver. Such a commitment mind the intent here is to develop a broader,
implies a couple of things. First, it implies deeper understanding of the concept of
that this concept had better be awfully Maneuver as the foundation of a doctrine.
powerful and with wide utility – which Within that intent we will also try to clear up
implies that we had better understand this many of the common misconceptions about
concept very well. That is our purpose here. Maneuver.
This at first might appear a gratuitous, Point of Departure: Advantage

academic endeavor. After all, the concept of As defined by Joint Publication 1-02;
Maneuver seems pretty straight forward;
does it not? Almost axiomatic; in fact Maneuver is the employment of forces
Maneuver has enjoyed status as one of the on the battlefield through movement
principles of war for decades, and it is in combination with fire or fire
defined explicitly in Joint Publication 1-02. potential to achieve a position of
Department of Defense Dictionary of advantage with respect to the enemy
Military and Associated Terms. to accomplish the mission.
But experience, mine at least, shows that as This is the classical definition of Maneuver,
a group we do not understand Maneuver as and it is fine as far it goes. But it is a narrow
well as we ought to. Misunderstandings definition, one that limits application as well
range from fundamental – such as equating we will see.

Required Reading 1, Continued
As noted in the joint definition, the overwhelmed Mack that the Austrian
conceptual starting point for Maneuver is the surrendered his army of 30,000 without a
desire to gain and exploit advantage as the fight. Such cases are exceptional (which led
basis for defeating an adversary. Thus the Clauswitz to reject them as unworthy of
principle behind Maneuver is simple enough consideration.), but B. H. Liddell Hart
and should not appear intellectually concluded that “their rarity enhances rather
intimidating to anyone. It is in practice that than detracts from their value – as an
it becomes more difficult – which explains indication of latent potentialities. …
the difference between the great
commanders and everyone else. Maneuver need not to gain a bloodless
victory; its aim is to create leverage that
Maneuver stems from the wish to attain a makes victory easier to come by. Clearly,
desired to objective as effectively and the greater the advantage, the better.
economically as possible. By the effective Writing about strategy, Liddell Hard said
and economical use of effort, maneuver that the true aim is not so much to bring
implies the ability to succeed beyond the about battle is sure to achieve this.” It “has
amount of energy expended. To borrow for its purpose the reduction of fighting to
from science; Maneuver is a form of the slenderest possible proportions.”
leverage, which allows us to lift a heavy Therefore, Maneuver normally consists of
object that we could otherwise not lift, two parts: creating the advantage and
allows us to get more output for the amount exploiting it, or finishing the deed.
of energy expended – like a lever or a block
and tackle that increases mechanical Limitations
advantage. The joint definition is limited in several
ways. First, it refers only to the
This point of departure is manifest in the “employment of forces on the battlefield.”
inclination to bypass the obstacle rather than But Winston Churchhill observed that:
ploy through it, the willingness to follow the
course of least resistance, the instinct to …there are many kinds of maneuvre in war,
punch rather than absorb it, the desire to only some of which take place on the
build a better mousetrap. Carried to the battlefield. There are manuevres in time, in
perfect extreme, Maneuver offers the diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all
alluring promise of defeating an enemy of which are removed from the battlefield,
without actually having to close with him; but often react decisively upon it, and the
the advantage gained is so decisive the object of all is to find easier ways other than
enemy realizes that futility of resisting. “For sheer slaughter, of achieving the main
to win one hundred victories in one hundred purpose.
battles is not the acme of skill.” A classic
example of this Napoleon at Ulm in 1805,
where his turning movement so mentally

There are ways of gaining leverage other the

physical employment of forces, and our The definition describes movement in
understanding should appreciate this. combination with fire as the vehicle for
gaining positional advantage. There are
Second, with its reference to battle and the valid means we ought to consider for
employment of units through fire and gaining leverage other than movement.
movement, the definition clearly focuses on What is movement; but a change in
the tactical level. But, as Churchill implies, position? The basic ingredient of Maneuver,
the idea of advantage applies at any level of then, is not movement, but change. We gain
conflict. While at the tactical levels the leverage by introducing some change, or
means of Maneuver may tend to be the perception of change, that improves our
physical components of combat power, this situation relative to the enemy. And it
is not exclusively so. At higher levels, follows that the greater the change (real or
Maneuver will tend to incorporate a greater perceived – as long as it favors us), the
range of mental and moral components. The greater the advantage.
point is that our definition of Maneuver
should not only apply at the tactical level, Enemy Orientation
but at the operational level as well. One good aspect of the joint definition is the
idea that Maneuver makes sense only “in
Third, the joint definition is one-directional: respect to the enemy.” Advantage is by
it considers Maneuver only in a spatial definition a relative thing. Gaining an
dimension, describing the aim of Maneuver advantage for ourselves may equally mean
as gaining a positional advantage. We limit putting the enemy at disadvantage. Liddell
ourselves unnecessarily by looking only for Hart wrote that the most effective approach
positional advantage. We ought to look for “is one that lures or startles the opposition
any advantage that will help us accomplish into a false move – so that, as in jujitsu, his
the mission effectively and economically. own effort is turned into the lever of his own
As Churchill mentioned, there are plenty of overthrow.” Movement, or any action not
dimensions other than spatial advantage. focused on the enemy, is not Maneuver; it is
There is a temporal advantage, for example, simply wasted energy. Therefore, an
gained by establishing a higher tempo than outward or enemy orientation is integral to
the enemy can keep up with. There is a Maneuver. This mean far more than simply
psychological advantage: the boxer who aiming at enemy forces rather than terrain
tires to “psyche out” his opponent during the objectives. It means understanding the
typical preflight hype is maneuvering for a enemy – his doctrine, tactics, and
psychological edge before the bell even techniques; his organization; his aims; and
rings. There are technological, diplomatic, his motives. As Sun Tzu said, “ Know the
economic, mental, and moral advantage, enemy and know yourself; in a hundred
among others. battles you never be in peril.

Creating Advantage is that area in which the enemy’s attention is

If the basic aim of Maneuver is to maximize focused, whether it be physically before him
advantage, how do we do that? or not. The “flanks” are on the periphery of
his attention and the “rear” where he is least
Exploiting Vulnerability attentive. For that matter, these “areas” may
First, we avoid enemy strength and exploit not be areas at all in the spatial sense. The
enemy vulnerability. This is not a new idea. enemy’s “rear,” for example, may be any
Sun Tzu wrote: possibility for which he is unprepared.
Now an enemy may be likened to water, for Identifying Critical Factors

just as long as flowing water avoids the Second, we realize that some factors of the
heights and hastens to the lowlands, so any enemy’s makeup are more critical to him
army avoids strength and strikes weakness. than others. Some, if attacked, he can
And as water shapes its flow in accordance function without, while other will cause him
with the ground; so an army manages its grievous harm. We should target those
victory in accordance with the situation of factors – be they locations, capabilities,
the enemy. functions, or moral characteristics – that are
most critical, the ones that are most critical,
In World War I, there were “soft-spot” and the ones from which we will gain the
von Hutier tactics. Later came Liddell greatest benefit by attacking. This also is
Hart’s theories of the “expanding torrent” not a new idea. With the revival of
and the “indirect approach.” Today, we talk Clausewitz, the term “center of gravity” is
of “surfaces and gaps” (from the German the most popular, but also the most prone to
“Flaechen und Luekentaktik”). Classically, misunderstanding. Jomini termed the same
we think of attacking the enemy in the basic concept “decisive points” (although
flanks and rear rather than the front. But in his discussion focused more on actual
an era of fluid warfare, front, flanks, and geographical points). Sun Tzu captured it
rear are relative things than permanent very succinctly: “Seize something he
aspects; if we are walking down a dark alley cherishes, and he will conform to your
and an assailant jumps out at us from a side desires.” The basic idea is the same. Attack
doorway, we instinctively turn to face him. the thing that will hurt the enemy most.
So it is with military units, although “Attacking” in this sense need not
normally the larger the unit the longer it necessarily be destructive. It may actually
takes to turn. Thus, it may become be a constructive act, such as the Marine
necessary to “fix” our enemy’s attention Corps’ Combined Action Program (CAP) in
before we can get at his flank. Vietnam. The mission was to rid rural areas
of Viet Cong control. Rather than trying
Rather describing these terms as permanent futilely to track down a fleeter, flitting
physical directions, we might better describe enemy, the plan was to make the guerilla’s
them as a function of attention. The “front”

“position” untenable by attacking the study of the decisive battles and campaigns
popular support base that was critical to his of history, John Boyd identified a common
survival. “Attacking” that base meant using condition of success which he called
combined action platoons to protect the “unequal distribution.” Therefore, if we will
villages. Maneuver, it seems we must overcome the
natural inclination to “fair share”; that is to
A wise enemy will protect those things that spread ourselves evenly (in efforts and
are critical to him. Thus identifying our attention as well as resources).
objective becomes a two-part process that
must strike a balance between what is Selectivity
critical to him and what is vulnerable to us. The ability to identify those critical factors
implies selectivity, which derives from
Focus judgment and intelligence (both the G-2
Maneuver requires not only that we go after sense and the generic sense). Maneuver thus
such critical vulnerabilities, but also that we means being more intelligent than the enemy
focus our own efforts against them. We – outfoxing him, outsmarting him,
should point out that focus does not outthinking him. What is the characteristic
necessarily equate to physical concentration that distinguishes Great Captains of military
(although this is the classical application of history? It is not that they had armies,
the concept). Focus is the convergence because they often bested superior foes. It is
effort in some way – in space, in time, in not necessarily that their armies were better
intent – so as to create a unified effect. It is equipped or trained. It is because,
possible to be physically dispersed and yet understanding their enemy and their
remain focused on a common objective. capabilities, they made war more wisely.
Consider the German blitzes into Poland and Clearly, Maneuver means “fighting smart”
France in 1939 and 1940, both of which as FMFM 1 says, relying on the intelligent
comprised of multiple broadly dispersed use of force rather than brute strength to
axes, but all of which were unified by a gain the objective economically.
common focus – shattering the depth and
cohesion of the enemy defenses. In fact, as Creating Disadvantage
we will see later, multiplicity and variability, As we have seen, improving our situation
when properly focused, can be significant relative to the enemy may be a matter of
contributors to successful Maneuver. degrading his situation relative to us. We do
this limiting his ability – physical, mental,
The willingness to gang up (at least in and moral – to effectively counter the things
purpose if not in mass) on critical enemy we do. We seek to surprise him so that, at
vulnerabilities demands the willingness to least temporarily, he is not working at full
accept risk. Focusing in one way effectiveness.
necessitates strict economy in others. In his

Surprise which we seek to confuse the enemy. He is

Surprise is a condition of disorientation that faced with a choice, but cannot choose.
occurs as the result of some unexpected Ambiguity depends on the multiplicity and
event. In its most extreme cases of surprise variability, the ability to act in a way that
may take the form of shock or paralysis. offer us numerous option so that the enemy
But in any form, the result is a temporary cannot focus against us. Sun Tzu said:
loss, if only partial, of effectiveness. Why is
an enemy surprised? There are three basic The enemy does not know where I intend to
reasons: he can be deceived at to what is give battle. For if he does not know where I
happening, he can be confused as to what is intend to give battle he must prepare in a
happening, or he can simply be ignorant of great many places. And when he prepares in
what is happening. It is important to a great many places, those I have to fight
remember that surprise is not something we any one place will be few.
do, but something that happens to the enemy
as the result of some event. We can Another way we create ambiguity is to be
certainly take actions to surprise him, but with any discernable form or pattern, to
success depends in the end on his appear irregular and amorphous while
susceptibility to being surprised. maintaining an effective organization, to
appear purposeless while having a focused
The first way we can try to surprise the purpose. Sun Tzu again:
enemy is by deception, by which we try to
delude him into believing we are doing Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves
something we are not. We try to give the no trace; divinely mysterious, he is
enemy a clear picture of the situation, but inaudible. Thus he is a master of his
the wrong picture. He has a choice, but we enemy’s fate…
convince him to choose wrong. For
example, through an elaborate deception The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to
plan in 1944, the Allies succeeded in be without ascertainable shape. Then the
deceiving the Germans into believing the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can
cross-channel invasion of France would take the wise lay plans against you.
place at Calais. So complete was the
deception that a full three weeks after the The resulting ambiguity enabled surprise.
Normandy landings the Germans still
refused to redeploy their operational reserve, The third way we seek to surprise the enemy
the 15th Army, out of Calais, convinced the is to act in such a way that the enemy has
Normandy invasion was but a subsidiary never even considered, to do something
landing. completely outside the realm of the
conceivable.
The second way, and one we do not
appreciate as well, is through ambiguity, by

Whereas in the first two methods, the enemy Distraction

is faced with choices, in the third he does The second way we can degrade our
not even realize there is a choice to be made. enemy’s ability to counter us is to distract
More than the others, surprise by this him, meaning we try to occupy his attention
method relies on speed and security and on in one way to create an advantage in
an ingenious flair for the truly creative and another. Certainly, a distraction may have as
unexpected. We can turn one more to Sun a part of its purpose to deceive the enemy,
Tzu, who said, “Speed is the essence of war. but even if we cannot surprise him we can
Take advantage of the enemy’s still create for him a dilemma designed to
unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes force him to divide his attention and his
and strike him where he has taken no efforts. Thus, Maneuver would seem in
precautions.” many cases to consist of to distinct but
complementary parts, the intent of the first
An example is MacArthur’s masterful stroke being to set the stage for the second –
at Inchon in 1950, which came as creating the advantage then exploiting it.
completely unexpected to the overextended Sun Tzu describes this as the cheng and ch’i:
North Koreans and resulted in the total the cheng being the normal or direct, the
collapse of the North Korean army. The fixing force; and the ch’i being the
scheme was outlandish even to MacArthur extraordinary or indirect, the decisive force.
seniors and staff, who were opposed from
the start; it became a reality only as the Generally, in battle use the normal force to
result of MacArthur’s personal persistence. engage: use the extraordinary force to
win…
Of the three forms, deception would be seem
to offer the greater payoff because it actually In battle there are only the normal and
deludes the enemy into misplaying his hand extraordinary forces, but their combinations
rather than simply leaving him guessing. are limitless; none can comprehend them all.
But deception is usually more difficult to
pull off, because it requires us to actually As BGen Samuel B. Griffin notes in his
convince the enemy of a lie as opposed to translation of Sun Tzu: “Should the enemy
simply trying to hide the truth. Deception perceive and respond to a ch’i manoeuvre in
will have a greater effect and a greater such a manner as to neutralize it, the
chance of success if the delusion we try to manoeuvre would automatically become
sell reinforces what the enemy is already cheng. The cheng and ch’i will be most
predisposed to believe. Finally, deception is effective if they put the enemy on the horns
usually more vulnerable to compromise than of dilemma, so that to react to one the
the other forms. enemy makes him``self more vulnerable to
the other.

The notion of distraction explains the why in repeat the action, it may or may not be
our very first tactics lessons we were taught Maneuver. The third time we try, it
that an envelopment (which, we learned, probably will not be Maneuver; it will be
was the superior form of maneuver) requires probably what the enemy expects. Thus,
a base of fire while a frontal attack does not. variety, as a condition of unpredictability, is
an integral component of Maneuver, over
Thus, the suppressive effect of fire (or even, time. By the same argument, novelty,
as the joint definition indicates, the potential originally, and creativity are components as
for fire), in that it prevents the enemy from well.
effectively countering our actions, is a
component of Maneuver. For that matter, If we couple this bent for the original with
the destructive effects of fire, if used to put the ruthlessness described earlier, we see the
the enemy at a specific disadvantage (such emergence of conning and craft, a talent for
as to create a gap or knockout a machinegun artifice and wile. We get what Churchill
position that is the backbone of the enemy described as “an element of legerdemain, an
defense) rather than simply to cause original and sinister touch, which leaves the
cumulative attrition, can be a component of enemy puzzled as well as beaten.”
Maneuver as well. The same applies for
communications jamming, for example, Speed
which disrupts the enemy’s command in The final key component of Maneuver is
order to create leverage at a key moment speed. To create advantage and exploit
although continuous barrage jamming that potential advantage, we must be able to act
seeks to degrade the enemy’s general ability faster than the enemy can react. Because we
to communicate irrespective of some other, now appreciate Maneuver not only in the
decisive action does not quality. spatial dimension, we should not think of
speed only in terms of the ability to move
We should point out that distraction does not fast, but also in terms of the tempo – the
require the physical application of force, ability to think, decide, act and react
such as a fixing attack or a base of fire, but quickly. And because Maneuver only has
can be any element that occupies the meaning relative to the enemy, it is not
enemy’s attention. absolute speed that matters, but relative
speed. As John Boyd says, we can be slow
Variety and Cunning as long as the enemy is slower. We can gain
Our ability to take an enemy unprepared - an advantage by improving our own speed
to put him at a disadvantage by surprise or or by decreasing our enemy’s speed. Speed
distraction – rests in part on our ability to is a contributor in that it allows us to
remain unpredictable; that is, not to conform concentrate superior force against selected
to the enemy’s expectations. The first time enemy weaknesses and that it allows us to
we strike the enemy’s left flank it will take the enemy by unexpected action.
probably constitute Maneuver. When we

But speed is also a lever in its own right in Maneuver is change in whatever form rather
that through superior speed we can seize and than movement.
maintain the initiative, allowing us to dictate
the terms of conflict and shape events to our Dependent on Mechanization
advantage. Furthermore, if change is the Nowhere in our discussion to this point have
basic vehicle of Maneuver, speed increases we identified the need for mechanization or
the impact of change and heightens the motorization. This misconception has arisen
enemy’s resulting disorientation. In other because we often equate rapid movement
words, the faster we change the situation, with mechanization. In many environments,
the greater the consequent advantage. And if used properly, foot-mobile forces can
since war is a fluid phenomenon, if change generate greater mobility than mechanized
the situation quickly and continuously over forces. And it is not absolute speed that
time, our advantage compounds with each matters anyway, but relative speed. Even if
change. we are slow, so long as the enemy is slower,
we maintain the advantage.
What Maneuver Is Not
We have taken the concept of Maneuver Simply Flanking Attacks or
apart, and hopefully we have discovered Envelopments
there is far more here than immediately We associate flanking attacks and envelopes
meets the eye. But we are not finished. We flanks and rear with vulnerability. And, in
still need to eliminate the commonly held fact, these options constitute Maneuver in
misconceptions about Maneuver. We have the classic sense. But to establish a
analyzed what Maneuver is; we need to universal tactic, such as the envelopment, is
clarify what Maneuver is not. to contradict the variety that is integral to
Maneuver. Used exclusively, the
Movement envelopment ceases to be a tactic at all and
It should be clear by now that simply becomes a rote procedure performed
movement does not equate to Maneuver. By mechanically and not oriented on the enemy.
definition, Maneuver must be oriented on The Israelis learned this in Lebanon in 1982
the enemy; simple movement does not when they discovered they had better
qualify. Furthermore, Maneuver is not success attacking frontally because their
necessarily simply relational movement. enemy had become conditioned to expect
This may be one manifestation of Maneuver, flanking movements.
but hardly the only one. We have seen that
Maneuver exists in many dimensions, not
just spatial, and that the essential means of a

Bloodless Intensity Conflict,” (MCG Sep 89) argues

War is about fighting. War is by that:
nature a bloody business. Many of critics of
Maneuver mistakenly believe critics of The basic tenets of maneuver warfare
Maneuver advocates units “running amok” (combined arms teams running amok –
(as a critical article in the Gazette recently sorry amidst – a fluid, violent
put it), running circles around, bypassing, battlefield) have no place in most forms
enveloping the enemy, and in the words of of low – intensity conflict.
one general officer. “Trying to confuse him
to death,” but never actually fighting him. The author suffers form the common malady
With all due respect to Sun Tzu, only in of understanding Maneuver only in the
exception cases does Maneuver eliminate spatial dimension. Against an irregular,
the need for fighting. Rather, Maneuver unconventional enemy with no discernable
seeks to arrange the situation so that when front, flanks, or rear (in the spatial sense),
we do fight it as at an advantage. As Sun who refuses to stand and fight a
Tzu further said: “Therefore, a skilled conventional battle, naturally such
commander seeks victory form the situation conventional interpretations will fail. But
and does not demand it of his subordinates.” by now I hope interpretations will fail. But
Maneuver does not mean that we do not by now I hope we are beginning to see
fight; it means that we fight selectively. Maneuver in broader terms than these. The
components of Maneuver as we have
Divorced From Firepower identified them – creating and exploiting
Similarly, Maneuver does not imply that advantage in any form; opportunism;
firepower is unimportant. It does not even superior speed or tempo; focusing ruthlessly
imply that firepower is unimportant. It does on critical enemy factors; surprise in the
not even imply that firepower is only of form of deception; ambiguity or
secondary importance. And nothing in our unpredictability; distraction; variety;
discussion has implied that killing the creativity; and enemy orientation – would to
enemy contradicts the concept of Maneuver. apply quite obviously to any kind of war.
The JCS definition clearly states that Indeed, these Maneuver components would
firepower is a key component of Maneuver seem to apply any kind of competitive
(at least in the tactical sense). At the tactical endeavor.
level at least, skillful Maneuver uses
firepower to create or exploit advantage, not The guerilla, with his hit-and-run tactics, his
simply to grind the enemy down inherent ambiguity resulting from irregular
cumulatively. and amorphous organizations, and his
unwillingness to stand and fight unless at a
Inapplicable in Low – Intensity Conflict distinct local advantage, demonstrates a
A recent Gazette article, “A Marine for All keen appreciation for Maneuver in its
Seasons? Maneuver Warfare versus Low – unconventional forms. The ambush, a staple

tactic in most types of low-intensity conflict, it is manifest in a certain state of mind, a

is a perfect example of Maneuver at its mental approach to conflict. It is at its
purest and most basic best: letting an source an approach based on intelligence
unknowing enemy put himself at an and all this implies: being selective, being
overwhelming disadvantage and making him focused, being clever, being creative, being
pay dearly for it. The CAP cited earlier is crafty. It is an approach that ruthlessly
an excellent example of operational-level exploits advantage. It is an approach that
Maneuver applied to low-intensity war. recognizes the inherent value of speed.
Synthesis: What Maneuver Is Thus, if we had to offer a revised definition

We have taken apart to try to glean its for Joint Pub 1 –02, it might read something
various components, some of which are like this:
integral and some of which are merely
contributors or multipliers of advantage. “Maneuver – A mental approach to
We have tried to dispel the various conflict, born of opportunism, variety,
misconceptions about Maneuver as well. and cunning, by which we create and
What are we left with now? exploit advantage as a means for
success by creating a rapidly and
Maneuver derives from a very simple continuously changing situation in
concept; creating and exploiting advantages which our enemy cannot effectively
as a means for defeating an opponent cope. We do this by focusing strength
quickly, effectively, and economically. against critical enemy vulnerability,
Although simple in concept, in application generating superior speed, and
Maneuver comprises a nearly countless distracting or disorienting our foe
variety of forms and methods, limited only through ambiguity or deception.”
by the imagination and the parameters of the
given conflict. There is far more to “Maneuver derives from a very simple
Maneuver than a rapid movement around an concept: creating and exploiting
enemy’s flank. As the basis for a doctrine, advantage…”
Maneuver is not captured in a single act, nor
even in a consistent way of acting. Rather,

Introduction John C. Scarfen’s article, “The Theory and Tactics of Maneuver Warfare” is
the written narrative of an interview with General Alfred Grey. The content
of the article relates to maneuver warfare and its implementation in the 2nd
Marine Division. The interview appeared in the Amphibious Warfare Review,
July 1984, which preceded our current doctrine. As you read the interview,
you should attempt to visualize the challenges of infusing and embracing
warfighting in the Marine operating forces.
The evolutionary methodology of warfighting produces innovation challenges

in other related areas. Improvements in technology are probably the greatest
source of change for maneuver warfare and warfighting. As the warfighting
applications change, the Marine Corps must modify its warfighting doctrine,
tactics, and techniques to meet the challenges of the current and future
operating environments.
Scope and This interview was specifically included in the text to give a historical
Perspective perspective of the origins of MCDP 1, Warfighting. Major General Gray
became the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps and forged maneuver
warfare into our current warfighting doctrine.
The Marine amphibious force (MAF) referred to in the text has evolved into
the current Marine expeditionary force. The nomenclature changed from
amphibious to expeditionary during the middle to late 1980s. While the
mission of the Marine Corps has been expanded to include a diversity of
expeditionary missions, maneuver warfare has remained essentially the same.
The interview style narrative should make it very easy to pick out the
warfighting concepts, but remember that this document is included to provide
historical perspective of our current doctrine.

Preview to Required Reading 2, Continued
Reading As you read Mr. Scharfen’s interview with General Gray, think about the
Concepts similarities between maneuver warfare and our current warfighting doctrine.
The article contains information on many warfighting concepts, but the
following are of primary interest:
· Where in the spectrum of war does maneuver play a role?

· What is the importance of understanding commander’s intent?
· What is meant by command forward?
· What is the purpose of creating initiative in the absence of orders?
Content The table below locates the warfighting concept in a previous lesson that is
concept to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer
items 8 through 11. Since the content of this particular article is historical
rather than reflective of current doctrine, a general comparison of article and
course content may be helpful.
Warfighting Concept Review See Page

Commander’s Intent 4-16

Required Reading 2
TACTICS AND THEORY OF MANEUVER WARFARE

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, JR.
By
John C. Scharfen
SCHARFEN: General Gray, while others practice, I am not the only Marine doing so
may theorize about the concepts and and I am far from the first.
principles of maneuver warfare, you have As we discuss the basics of
been of the few proponents who have had maneuver warfare, it won’t be hard to
the opportunity to exercise the theory in recognize that it is a style that many Marine
practice. Could you put the role of the have employed over the years and that it has
Division’s initiatives on this form of warfare been at the conceptual core of some of our
in the context of the overall II MAF most successful amphibious operations.
operations program? Inchon comes to mind immediately. The
World War II Pacific Island campaigns offer
GRAY: Certainly. Your question lets me other examples. In operations not launched
put our Second Marine Division role into from the sea. General Barrow’s A Shau
proper perspective. First, our maneuver Valley operation in Vietnam is a good
warfare initiatives have not been in isolation example. There are dozens of American
of the other components of II MAF. As a precedents with one of the classics being
matter of fact, it has been a coordinated Jackson’s Valley Campaign.
effort with the Second Marine Air Wing, the I would also like to mention that the
Second Force Service Support Group, and other divisions, wings, and service support
the Headquarters of II MAF. When we groups also have undertaken some very
embarked on this program, we had the worthwhile initiatives that are compatible to
Second concurrence and support of the the maneuver style of combat.
commanders of each of those major Fleet
Marine Force Atlantic commanders. SCHARFEN: Do you agree with Mr.
Your question also gives me the Lind’s definition of maneuver warfare – and
opportunity right at the outset of our I am going to paraphrase some of his
discussion to make another important point. thoughts here – that it is a style of warfare
While by virtue of the privilege I have of that is opposed to the fire-power attrition
commanding this Division, I am, as you put model that seeks to destroy the capabilities
it, in a position to exercise the theory in of the enemy to wage war as opposed to

relying exclusively on the destruction of his heavy reliance on mechanization, to others it

forces? connotes an exclusively ground oriented
concept. Neither inference is correct.
GRAY: Yes, I guess I agree with that Maneuver warfare has applications across
definition, but I would like to embellish it a the spectrum of war from air to surface,
bit. I must say that I don’t think that it goes from tactics to strategy, from operations to
far enough. I know Mr. Lind would agree logistics. I’m afraid that the title has
that the concept of maneuver war is as much generated some semantic confusion and
a state of mind as it is a theory. It excessive debate over definition of terms.
emphasizes the importance of seizing and
maintaining the initiative which General SCHARFEN: How does the concept relate
Trainor (our Marine Corps’ Deputy Chief of to maneuver?
Staff for Plans, Policy, and Operations) has
espoused as a foundation to his new GRAY: First, let me say something about
“thoughts of war.” It is a style of warfare maneuver. Maneuver in warfare must be
that encourages you to anticipate the enemy purposeful. Since maneuver expends the
through what I might call the four “D’s”; resources of your force, it must be
productive. We must be careful that we
· Disorientation don’t inculcate into a generation of junior
· Disruption officers the philosophy that maneuver is
· Dislocation, and finally intrinsically desirable. You must achieve
· Destruction of his cohesion. something with the expenditure of your
valuable resources.
All this accomplished with an unrelenting Now to answer your question. If you are
and increasing pressure against his vital going to apply unrelenting pressure against
points. It emphasizes the offensive. It your enemy to disorient him and destroy his
implies the exercise of the initiative at the cohesion, you must find and hit him his vital
small unit. It capitalizes upon the points. Movement in maneuver warfare also
unanticipated through the recon-pull implies that you are consistently placing the
approach rather that that of the planner- enemy at a disadvantage in space and time,
push. It is a concept that is more both in fact in his and your perceptions.
psychological that physical. It is indirect
rather than the direct approach to conflict. SCHARFEN: As you have pointed out, the
principles of maneuver warfare are not new.
SCHARFEN: Does that term maneuver Nevertheless, it has become a very
warfare really describe all that? important topic of discussion in the Marine
Corps within the past three years or four
GRAY: I’m not certain that it is the proper years. It is a regular topic addressed in the
title. The term carries with a lot of Marine Corps Gazette and even has been the
questionable baggage. To many it implies a subject of Marine Corps school’s

publications. What has prompted this GRAY: Let’s start with training. Before
interest in the concept? the Second Marine Division, or any military
organization, can capitalize on maneuver
GRAY: Of course, the debate has been warfare, everyone in the organization must
limited to the Marine Corps publications, be reading off of the same OpOrder. There
but you are right, it has generated a great must be a common approach to the details of
deal of Marine Corps interest. the tactics. I think that we would have one
On its own merit, I believe that hell of a mess if we had one maneuver
maneuver warfare is a superior way to fight. element working on mission type orders,
But I don’t think that this fact alone can operating with a great deal of aggressive
account for the interest that has been independence, moving out to capitalize on
generated in this approach. It appears to me the unexpected with another, supporting
that the genesis of the interest is the element operating in a more conventional,
recognition of the fact that that potential conservative mode. The commander of the
enemy in a major war is likely to have two elements would be faced with a
superior raw combat power to pit against US situation not unlike have a team of horses
forces, and particularly a deployed MAGTF. hitched up to a trace with one going at near
You don’t defeat such a force by relying maximum speed, while the other was going
primarily on fire power, frontal assault, and a good deal slower. The result would be a
attrition. Rather, you defeat him by superior series of great circles. So we spend a lot of
technology, maintaining the initiative, with time indoctrinating our officers and men in
intelligent, purposeful movement, by the dynamics of the battlefield to insure that
attacking his most vulnerable points and we all have the same mindset – that they
through the application of firepower. Such know what to expect of me and my staff and
is the essence of maneuver warfare. what I expect out of them.
Maneuver warfare is being accepted as a Above all else we try to orient our
valid concept for the training and training upon the cultivation of attitude that
organization of MAGTF’s, because we have the only thing certain on the battle field will
a requirement to fight this kind of war not be the uncertain – the unexpected. We train
because it is a fixation of the military them to find no recipes or formulas which
intellectual. will guarantee success in battle. We should
think of good training not just as a
SCHARFEN: General, with that prerequisite to the conduct of maneuver
background, can we discuss maneuver warfare, but as the essential ingredient to
warfare in the Second Marine Division? winning.
Specifically, how does the concept impact
on how your train and equip for employment SCHARFEN: Other than the basics of
of your forces? basics good leadership, audacity, innovative
concepts, delegation, what are some of the

military skills you believe are fundamental GRAY: It builds on them. I want to
to maneuver warfare that require emphasis emphasize that there is nothing we are
here in the Division? proposing under this concept that is alien to
the fundamental training, operations, or
GRAY: There is a litany of them that I administrative routines of the Marine Corps.
touch on every time I address the Marines of The training and experience our get in our
this Division and anywhere else where I depots, centers, and schools equip them to
speak on professionalism. Included is the participate in and contribute to the maneuver
requirement to exploit both strategic and warfare objectives of this Division. What
tactical mobility. Flexible logistics are we are trying to do is raise them to the next
fundamental. We need to be lot work on the plateau of integrated tactical concepts in this
NBC. Recent combat operations in the operational environment. What we are
Middle East demonstrate the important of air doing neither contradicts nor replaces those
defense and the suppression of air defenses. basic skills Marines bring to this Division
If you are going to preempt the enemy with from our schools and other operating units.
your audacity and initiative, you must have Nor does it conflict with amphibious
good intelligence, surveillance and doctrine.
reconnaissance to provide the kind of target I will go further to say that at the
acquisition that is fundamental to such core of amphibious doctrine are the essential
operations. Deception can be a good force of maneuver warfare including the elements
multiplier as we demonstrated in our World of strategic and tactical mobility, the
War II amphibious operations at Tinian and element of surprise, stretching the enemy
elsewhere. There isn’t professional who resources for the defense of multiple landing
would put C3 very high in priority in the sites, deception, and flexible logistics.
fundamental skills that are essential for
successful operations. There is EW, an art SCHARFEN: I have a list of fundamental
which, because it is generally done behind precepts that I believe you subscribe to in
locked doors, is often ignored to the your Division training programs. I would
detriment of the command. Finally, the like to cite them one at a time and get your
threat of terrorism deserves our attention views on their application. First is
because it can fundamentally change our commander’s intent.
view of the enemy order of battle, giving
him unconventional potential that could GRAY: We want our Marines to
erode our capabilities. understand what their commanders are
trying to accomplish on the battlefield.
Knowledge of the commander’s intent is an
SCHARFEN: How does this training relate absolute requirement, if the subordinate is
to the training and basic skills Marines bring going to be given the freedom of action that
along with them to the Division? is implicit in mission-type orders and recon-
pull tactics. We insist that every Marine

know the mission and the intent of the anticipation of the purpose and the intent of
commander two echelons above his own. the commander and it fosters espirit.
SCHARFEN: And Focus of the Main SCHARFEN: Recon-pull tactics?

Effort?
GRAY: We indoctrinate our commanders
GRAY: As you can see as we discuss these with the necessity of recon-pull rather than
fundamentals, they are by no means command-push initiatives from subordinate
independent considerations. As a matter of units. Both mission-type orders and recon-
fact, there a great deal of interdependence pull fundamentals imply that the commander
that goes with mission-type orders. has a great deal of trust in the judgment of
his subordinate commanders. This trust
SCHARFEN: And what of the dedication requires nourishment and cultivation – it
to the mission type orders? isn’t generated overnight. It is only
achieved by working together for extended
GRAY: We try to impress at every level of periods in operational environments.
command that it is important that, to the
extent possible, we should tell our SCHARFEN: Infiltration tactics?
subordinate commanders what they must do
rather than dwell on the details of how they GRAY: Too often we associate infiltration
should do it. We tell them who they must of the enemy exclusively with small units
help and who they must support, and finally, and with unconventional operations. In
with whom they should coordinate. This is maneuver warfare we talk about infiltration
the sense of the mission-type orders. as a function of conventional operations and
Readers of the Amphibious Warfare Review as being within the capability of the larger
will recognize that it is not a new approach, unit. Infiltration on this scale requires very
but it is fundamental to this concept of good command, control, and
maneuver war. communications to insure that you properly
coordinated.
SCHARFEN: What special conditions
must exist before a commander can rely SCHARFEN: And what do you mean by
upon mission-type orders? command forward?
GRAY: Familiarity with the commander GRAY: Let me start out by telling you
that can only come from experience and what it doesn’t mean. It doesn’t mean that
mutual confidence. We have been doing commanders should become point men for
everything in our power to enhance this their units. It doesn’t mean that
process of understanding by stabilizing commanders can both ignore both what is
personnel in units. Unit stability fosters the going on in the rear and the requirement for
growth of unit cohesion, it generates the

effective combat support. It means that the GRAY: Certainly. We have MAB-level
commander must focus upon and give his free play exercise twice a year at Fort
first priority to the accomplishment of the Pickett that provides plenty of latitude for
combat mission, and the philosophy – that our Marine to experiment with new tactics
is, the commander’ must be mentally in and techniques. Each unit that participates
concert with his units in contact at the front gets more than one chance to fight against
edge of his operating area. Physically, he an unrestrained superior force that is bent on
may be sitting in a bunker or flying destroying it. We emphasize that units have
overhead in a helicopter, but psychologically the freedom to maneuver within very
he must be with his forward units. I like Sir flexible limits. Each problem is followed by
John Hackett’s phrase about the “smell of a critique which not only addresses the
the battlefield” when describing the tactics and the techniques which were
commander’s appreciation for operations employed, but also the thought that was
within the combat arena. behind them. We want to know if their
scheme of maneuver was thought out,
SCHARFEN: And finally, a fundamental logical and supportive of the commander’s
which, by this time appears to be self intent. We discuss the question of whether
evident; initiative in the absence of orders. or not the maneuver brings positive decisive
results.
GRAY: Yes, it is certainly a corollary to all
the other you have cited. We want our SCHARFEN: Do you have any examples
commanders to think. Go ahead and make of payoff to your training efforts here in the
mistakes, but do the innovative, get inside Second Marine Division?
the enemy’s mind, think about what his
intentions are, how he is going to react and GRAY: Yes. I was afraid that you weren’t
outsmart him with your initiative in the going to ask. Our BLT 2/8 conducted a
absence of orders from a senior command. classic maneuver warfare operations to
We are serious about being committed to achieve some very impressive results on
giving our Marines the freedom to make Grenada in October 1983. This was a real
mistakes. It is difficult to overcome some “come as you are operation” that demanded
fundamental inhibitions we have in this the type of independent judgment and
respect, but it is one of our priority concerns. initiative without detailed prior planning that
is characteristic of what expect in maneuver
SCHARFEN: Still on the subject of war. Right from the start there was a need
training for maneuver war, can we transition for flexibility with the knowledge at H-2 on
now to the exercises you may be conducting D-Day that the primary landing plan would
which incorporate the fundamentals of this have to be scrapped and that the Marines
style of war? would be have to go over alternate beaches.
This flexibility was further demonstrated
once BLT 2/8 was ashore. Defenders were

taken by surprise by the Marine tanks and of maneuver war has been one of the
amphibious assault vehicles that moved healthiest things that could have possibly
aggressively forward against the defenders. happened in the evolution of Marine Corps
The Marines use of maneuver warfare tactical doctrine. It has stimulated some
tactics demoralized the Cubans and the controversy and potent thought on how we
People’s Revolutionary Army. One Cuban should fight our forces.
officer the BLT captured said that he
The Board also considers how new
surrendered to the Marines because they
equipment new equipment might enhance
kept popping up in the most unexpected
our maneuver warfare to amphibious
places and he figured further resistance was
operations and devises map problems for to
futile. His comments speak volumes about
use for the training of my commanders and
the psychological impact of well-executed
staff. The composition of the board is
maneuver operations.
constantly changing – both a good and a bad
SCHARFEN: Is there anything else in the thing, but on a balance, probably good since
area of training in which you think area of more people become involved – as officers
training in which you think the readers of and enlisted Marines deploy to the LFTF
Amphibious Warfare Review will be and WESTPAC.
interested?
SCHARFEN: Could you summarize your
GRAY: I think that the Maneuver Warfare Division training objectives in pursuing
Board that has created should be of interest. proficiency in this style of warfare?
This Board, chaired by Brigadier General
GRAY: Yes. We have three objectives in
Milligan, which is manned by select
the Division that are the overriding
members of the Division, Second Force
considerations in preparing to fight this style
Service Support Group, and the Second
of war. The first is to promote better
Marine Air Wing, meets several times a
leadership, the second is better training and
month to consider books and articles which
the third is self discipline. Now I know that
might be chosen for distribution within the
these three objectives could apply to any
Division to stimulate interest in and
tactical concept, but I believe they are the
knowledge of these fundamentals we believe
cornerstones of maneuver warfare. In
are to be at the heart of a conducting
working towards these three objectives, it is
effective maneuver warfare. It fills our need
my intent to institutionalize audacity
for a professional forum on this subject and
throughout the hierarchy of the Division. I
helps to institutionalize our training and
want the command to know that at all levels
education objectives.
that responsible individuals must exercise
And by the way, just to make a parenthetical their initiative, that they be allowed to make
remark, I think that the controversy that has mistakes and fail once in a while. You can’t
been generated on the pages of the Marine instill these qualities without emphasizing
Corps Gazette over the value and feasibility leadership, training, and self discipline.

SCHARFEN: General, can you be more SCHARFEN: General, can we discuss how
explicit on how you relate these three the Second Division forces are equipped for
objectives to maneuver warfare? maneuver war?
GRAY: Well, let’s take better leadership GRAY: I can answer that question very
first. Uncertainty is endemic to the directly. We are equipped as are other
battlefield. We can capitalize on uncertainty divisions in the Marine Corps. We receive
by developing leaders who view uncertainty no special equipment because of
as an advantage to be capitalized upon, commitment to this style of war. This
rather than a disadvantage that inhibits their doesn’t mean that we aren’t interested in
options. The best ways to make capital of new technologies. This doesn’t mean that
uncertainty is through maneuver. we ignore applications to maneuver war in
the equipment that is in our tables of
SCHARFEN: And better training? allowances that we might overlook if we
weren’t so disposed. We may use our
GRAY: Better training is essential to equipment differently that would otherwise
maneuver warfare because it is more to gain greater mobility or to capitalize on
demanding of all the force than the surprise. I would like to go back to my
alternatives. In maneuver warfare you must major premise; however, that maneuver
train to use combat information faster than warfare isn’t so much a function of how you
your adversary. You must train to take are equipped as it is a function of how you
advantage of the strategic and tactical think. We do concentrate on making the
intelligence resources that are available to maximum use of the tools that are at our
you with your area of interest extended out disposal rather than waiting for wish-list
100 to 200 miles. You must have well technologies to solve our problems. Having
exercised, flexible logistic support that is a said that, I want to assure you that we do
function of available materiel. think about and we do plan to incorporate
Self discipline implies a mindset or those very promising advances that are on
thought process to fight a style of warfare. the near horizon such as the LAV and the
It implies that you know your basic tactical LCAC which will give us another dimension
techniques by rote before you master higher of maneuver.
level maneuver tactics. Self discipline
means that you have developed your tactical SCHARFEN: General, could we now
prowess to the point that maneuvering your address some arguments that have been
force to gain a tactical advantage is as much made against embracing against embracing
instinctive as it is the result of commander’s maneuver warfare as a standard doctrine.
estimate. One serious concern that been cited is that
adopting maneuver warfare supports the
position of many of “military reformers”
who oppose defense spending as a matter of

principle. The reasoning goes that some and let go at it without any consideration of
members of this believe that maneuver control and coordination and, on the other
warfare gives you more combat power for hand, you must demand some flexibility
less expenditure of resources and it is from your logistician and your C3 people to
therefore a good program for them to insure that they aren’t driving the scheme of
embrace to rationalize cuts in the defense maneuver.
budget. Does this concern you?
SCHARFEN: What about the argument
GRAY: Not enough to diminish my that there is an undue reliance upon
enthusiasm for promoting the concept. It’s mechanization of Marine forces by
probably true that you are going to get more maneuver warfare advocates?
combat power at less cost in maneuver
warfare, because it is a superior way to fight. GRAY: I can only say, from my
But the argument that adopting this perspective, and what I know of others who
philosophy justifies defense cuts is going to want to fight this way, that it simply isn’t
be very difficult to sustain. I think it lacks true that there is an overemphasis on
credibility and that it won’t be taken mechanization. Let go back to my first
seriously in responsible quarters. premise – maneuver warfare is a way of
thinking and is independent of the manner in
SCHARFEN: There are those who argue which forces are equipped or where they
that there is an inconsistency between fight. When we talk about the need for
advancing the technique of mission-type mobility we are talking about relative
orders and the requirement to have mobility we vis-à-vis the enemy. It may be
integrated, thoroughly planned logistical on foot, as well as in a mechanized column.
support and positive control. Concepts of maneuver warfare are as
relevant in mountain fighting as they are on
GRAY: Not a bad point and one that every the open plains. Now, if someone were to
commander who is conscientious about tell me that the Second Marine Division was
promoting initiative in his subordinates must about to be equipped tomorrow with a whole
face. However, it simply is a matter of family of LCACs or a complement of new
trade-offs between ideals. Ideally, you super fast, lightweight armor vehicles that
would like to give a capable, aggressive were impervious to anti-armor systems, I
subordinate commander complete freedom would be a very happy man. I would
to develop and exercise his tactical scheme consider that these new vehicles would
of maneuver. Ideally, you would like to greatly enhance our capability to fight a
give your logistician a detailed scenario for maneuver warfare style operation.
exactly the operation is going to be However, as desirable as these systems may
conducted. Obviously, these two ideals are be, it is not essential that they be organic to
in conflict, which means that on the one this Division to embrace a concept that is
hand you just can’t turn commanders loose

based on a thought process and a mental

discipline on to engage an enemy. GRAY: There are a number. I think the
relationship and application of maneuver
SCHARFEN: And what about the warfare in a chemical or biological
complaint that there is nothing new in environment is an interesting subject. It
maneuver warfare and that it’s proponents seems to me that the tactics and techniques
are just making a fuss over something we espouse for maneuver warfare have
everyone else takes for granted? particular relevance to the tactical nuclear
battlefield. It’s amazing how little time we
GRAY: There is some truth here. The really give to preparing to fight a tactical
concepts that embrace are in maneuver nuclear war. I am concerned about how we
warfare have been around a long while. I increase mobility with our present and
find interesting something that Bill Lind said scheduled resources by taking advantage of
in a television interview last April – that the assets we have and lightening the load of
there are probably no new ideas on war that the infantryman. I am particularly
have been introduced since the 18th century. concerned about the Marine’s load in cold
The concepts that we are promoting in the weather operations; such as we have in
Second Marine Division have been around Norway. Communications are a critical
for centuries and Marines from Generals consideration and we must do better in this
Harry Lee to Puller to Walt to Barrow all area. We must be more concerned about
have employed them. However, until now how we get the most out of our
we in the Marine Corps really haven’t communications, but we also must be
dedicated ourselves in a conceptually concerned about how we can live without
structured way to codify the specific tactics them. I think we need to do more on silent
and techniques which are inherent in this landings, day and night, surface and air.
approach to war. And this is the important Why can’t we do silent air strikes? The
point to be made. What we are proposing problems associated with combat support in
isn’t new. What is new is the process of a highly mobile environment are important,
codifying our manuals, training for it in our particularly those associated with engineer
exercises and in our approach to leadership. support. We have a revolutionary aircraft in
It’s a very significant development with this the AV-8; how do we integrate this
Division and within the Maine Corps. It has capability into our maneuver warfare
incorporated into our Long Range Plan and concepts?
other planning and training documents for
future amphibious operations. SCHARFEN: General Gray, thank you for
the time that you have given to us. Is there
SCHARFEN: What are your thoughts on any final, wrap-up statement that you would
areas that still need development in the like to make about maneuver warfare?
evolution of maneuver warfare with Marine
operating forces?

GRAY: I would like to reiterate that what subject have become debates on the merits
we have been discussing here is a style of of the alternative tactics and techniques.
warfare. It is not a revolutionary concept, The subject is worthy of the attention and
but a philosophy on how to fight that is study of all Marines, at all levels.
based on some time-honored principles. I
think that some of the discussions on the

Introduction The role of the Marine NCO can be debated by young, old, officer, and
enlisted alike without it ever clearly being defined. The information age is
redefining this role and will continue to do so as the 21st century progresses.
Linking warfighting to changes in technology and the role of technology to
implement these changes will be essential for the corporal’s continued
success in the operating environment.
Scope and General Krulak’s article, “The Strategic Corporal and the Three Block War”
Perspective attempts to describe the importance of core training, leadership, and decision-
making ability at the corporal level, which will have a profound effect in the
future operating environment. The article is divided into four sections. The
first section describes a probable, but fictitious scenario. The second section
evaluates the conditions and opportunities created by the operating
environment dynamics. The third section summarizes the role and value of
NCO decision making in such an environment. The last section focuses on
the actions that the corporal took and how that interaction improved
warfighting capacity.
Reading As you read the article, “The Strategic Corporal and the Three Block War,”
Concepts you should think about the following warfighting concepts:
· What are some of the challenges and pressures in the operating

environment the 21st Marine NCO can expect to experience?
· What is the three block war?
· What is the benefit of having small unit decision makers?
· What is the common thread linking all aspects of the Marines Corps?
· How does a “zero defects” mentality improve operational performance?
Content The table below locates the warfighting concepts in previous lessons that are
concepts to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer
items 12 through 16.
Warfighting Concept See Page

Nonlinearity 1-11
Uncertainty 1-10
Decision Making 4-11
MCI Course 8014 5-46 Chapter 5 Exercise

Required Reading 3
"The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War"

Marines Magazine, January 1999
by Gen. Charles C. Krulak
Operation Absolute Agility
0611: The African sun had just risen above the efforts of the ineffective Regional Multi-
the hills surrounding the sprawling city and National Force (RMNF) and the host of
sent its already dazzling rays streaming into international humanitarian assistance
the dusty alleyway. Corporal Hernandez felt organizations that struggled to alleviate the
the sun on his face and knew that today suffering. The MEU's arrival had stabilized
would, again, be sweltering. He was a squad the situation and allowed the precious relief
leader in 2d Platoon, Lima Company and supplies to finally reach the people who
had, along with his men, spent a sleepless needed them most.
night on the perimeter. For the past week his
platoon had provided security to the The Food Distribution Point (FDP) manned
International Relief Organization (IRO) by 2d Platoon serviced over 5,000 people
workers who manned one of three food daily. The Marines had, at first, been
distribution points in the American Sector of shocked at the extent of the suffering, by the
Tugala -- the war-torn capital of Orange -- constant stream of malnourished men and
a Central African nation wracked by civil women, and by the distended bellies and
unrest and famine. drawn faces of the children. The flow of food
and medical supplies had, however, had a
The situation in Orange had transfixed the dramatic impact. The grim daily death tolls
world for nearly two years. Bloody tribal had slowly begun to decrease and the city
fighting had led first to the utter collapse of had begun to recover some sense of
the government and economy, and normalcy. Within a month the lives of the
ultimately, to widespread famine. Marines had assumed a sort of dull routine.
International efforts to quell the violence Corporal Hernandez removed his helmet
and support the teetering government had and rested his head against the mud wall of
failed, and the country had plunged into the house in which his squad was billeted
chaos. The United States had finally been and waited for his MRE to finish heating;
compelled to intervene. A forward deployed satisfied that he and his fellow Marines were
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special making a difference.
Operations Capable) was ordered to assist

0633: The dust and rumble of a half dozen his position, reluctantly disposed of his
5-Tons pulling into the market square uneaten MRE, and prepared his Marines to
caught the attention of Corporal Hernandez. move out. The movement to the road
Escorted by Marines, the convoy brought intersection at CP Charlie was uneventful
with it the food and medical supplies that and took less than ten minutes. The squad
meant life or death to the inhabitants of this had manned the post before and was
devastated neighborhood. With it also came familiar with the routine. Pre-staged
word of life beyond the confines of this small barricades were quickly moved into place to
corner of Orange and useful intelligence secure the street to vehicular traffic and a
concerning the disposition of the opposing triple strand of concertina was strung in
factions that wrestled for its control. Today, order to control pedestrian movement.
the convoy commander had disturbing news Corporal Sley and his fire team moved a
for the platoon commander, Second hundred meters north and established an
Lieutenant Franklin. Members of the Observation Post (OP) on the roof of a two-
OWETA faction, led by the renegade story building that afforded excellent fields
warlord Nedeed, had been observed of view. By 0700, the squad was in position.
congregating near the river that divided the At that hour, the city was still quiet, and
capital in half and marked the boundary except for the intel report concerning
separating the turf of OWETA from that of OWETA activity, there was no evidence that
its principal rival. Nedeed had long this day would be any different from the
criticized the presence of the RMNF and had previous. The Marines of 1st Squad settled
frequently targeted its personnel for attack. in for another long hot day of tedious duty.
While he had strenuously denounced the
presence of U.S. forces, he had, so far, 0903: By nine o'clock, the normal large
refrained from targeting American crowd, mostly women and children with
personnel. As starvation became less a baskets in hand, had gathered to await
concern, however, tensions had begun to passage through the checkpoint. The
rise and there was growing fear that open Marines orders were clear: they were to
hostilities would breakout again and that deny access to anyone carrying a weapon
attack of RMNF and MEU personnel was and to be alert for any indications of
increasingly likely. potential trouble. Their Rules of
Engagement (ROE) were unambiguous:
Lieutenant Franklin passed the report to his anyone observed with an automatic weapon
company commander and then gathered his was considered hostile, as was anyone who
squad leaders together to review the intentionally threatened Marine personnel.
developing situation. 1st Squad was ordered The MEU Commander had made this policy
to move about four hundred meters north clear in meetings with each of the warlords
and man a roadblock at Checkpoint (CP) in the early days of the deployment. His
Charlie. Corporal Hernandez returned to directness had paid dividends and to date,

no MEU personnel had been wounded by the road entering the intersection from the
small arms fire. West and indicated that he and Sergeant
Baker's 2d Squad were en route to reinforce.
His directness had paid dividends and to Corporal Hernandez could feel the tension
date, no MEU personnel had been wounded grow. The crowd had become more agitated,
by small arms fire. The factions had kept a aware that Mubasa's men were near and
low profile in the American sector and had concerned that the vital food distribution
not interfered with those convoys might be disrupted. The young men had
accompanied by Marines. Such was not the begun to chant anti-U.S. slogans and to
case, however, in adjacent sectors, where throw rocks at the startled Marines.
RMNF personnel had frequently been the Corporal Hernandez felt the situation
target of ambush and sniper fire. The slipping out of control and decided to close
Marines had stayed on their toes. the road completely. With great difficulty,
0915: Corporal Sley reported from his the barriers were shifted and the concertina
position on the rooftop that the crowd was was drawn back across the narrow access
especially large and included an unusually point. The crowd erupted in protest and
high proportion of young adult males. He pressed forward.
sensed an ominous change in the
atmosphere. Less than a mile away, he could 0931: Overhead, the whirring blades of a
see the vehicles of Nedeed's gang gathered low flying IRO UH-1 were heard, but failed
at the far side of the bridge spanning the to distract the crowd. Their curses and
river that separated the OWETA and chants, however, were drowned out for an
Mubasa factions. He passed his suspicions instant by the sound and shock wave of an
on to his squad leader, "Something big is explosion. The helo had apparently been hit
about to happen." The day promised to be a by ground fire, possibly an RPG, and had
break from the routine. burst into flames and corkscrewed to the
ground several blocks east of the OP.
0921: Corporal Hernandez promptly Corporal Sley had observed the crash from
relayed Sley's report and concerns to his his vantage atop the building and saw, to his
platoon commander and learned from relief, that at least two survivors had
Lieutenant Franklin that Nedeed's chief struggled from the flaming wreckage. His
rival -- Mubasa -- was moving west toward relief, however, was short-lived. In the
CP Charlie. Mubasa's intentions seemed distance, he could see Nedeed's men rushing
clear; his route would bring him directly to across the bridge. Sley urgently requested
CP Charlie and an ultimate collision with permission to immediately move to the
Nedeed. 1st Squad's position astride the two assistance of the downed helo crew.
MSR's placed them squarely between the
rival clans. Lieutenant Franklin directed
Hernandez to extend the road block to cover

0935: While Corporal Hernandez routine day of humanitarian assistance was

considered the feasibility of a rescue rapidly becoming something else entirely. A
attempt, the situation took another serious Molotov Cocktail crashed into the position
turn; three vehicles loaded with Mubasa's injuring no one, but contributed further to
men and followed closely by a INN film crew the confusion. The Marines of 1st Squad
arrived on the scene. Brandishing looked from man to man and then stared
automatic weapons and RPG's, they forced questioningly at Corporal Hernandez. He
their vehicles through the crowd until the reassuringly returned the gaze of each man,
bumper of the lead truck rested against the knowing better than any of them that the fate
barricade. With their arrival, the already of the squad, of the wounded IRO personnel,
agitated crowd abandoned all restraint. The and perhaps, of the entire multi-national
occasional rock had now become a constant mission, hung in the balance. In the span of
pelting of well-aimed missiles. One had hit less than three hours he had watched a
Lance Corporal Johnson in the face. The humanitarian assistance mission turn
resulting wound, although not serious, bled terribly wrong and move ever closer to
profusely and added to the rising alarm. outright disaster. Corporal Hernandez was
Somehow the sight of the bright red blood face to face with the grave challenges of the
streaming down the face of the young three block war and his actions, in the next
Marine fed the crowd's excitement and few minutes, would determine the outcome
heightened the panic growing within the of the mission and have potentially strategic
squad. What had started out as another implications.
The Three Block War
The fictional mission described above -- inhabitants will be crowded into coastal
Operation Absolute Agility -- is similar to cities -- cities generally lacking the
many that have been conducted around the infrastructure required to support their
world in recent years and represents the burgeoning populations. Under these
likely battlefield of the 21st Century. It also conditions, long simmering ethnic,
represents, in graphic detail, the enormous nationalist, and economic tensions will
responsibilities and pressures which will be explode and increase the potential of crises
placed on our young Marine leaders. The requiring U.S. intervention. Compounding
rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of the challenges posed by this growing global
a multitude of transnational factors, and the instability will be the emergence of an
consequences of increasing globalization increasingly complex and lethal battlefield.
and economic interdependence, have The widespread availability of sophisticated
coalesced to create national security weapons and equipment will "level the
challenges remarkable for their complexity. playing field" and negate our traditional
By 2020, eighty-five percent of the world's technological superiority. The lines

separating the levels of war, and The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of
distinguishing combatant from "non- other recent operations, whether
combatant," will blur, and adversaries, humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping,
confounded by our "conventional" or traditional warfighting, is that their
superiority, will resort to asymmetrical outcome may hinge on decisions made by
means to redress the imbalance. Further small unit leaders, and by actions taken at
complicating the situation will be the the lowest level. The Corps is, by design, a
ubiquitous media whose presence will mean relatively young force. Success or failure
that all future conflicts will be acted out will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and
before an international audience. with his ability to make the right decision at
the right time at the point of contact. As
Modern crisis responses are exceedingly with Corporal Hernandez at CP Charlie,
complex endeavors. In Bosnia, Haiti, and today's Marines will often operate far "from
Somalia the unique challenges of military the flagpole" without the direct supervision
operations other-than-war (MOOTW) were of senior leadership. And, like Corporal
combined with the disparate challenges of Hernandez, they will be asked to deal with a
mid-intensity conflict. The Corps has bewildering array of challenges and threats.
described such amorphous conflicts as -- the In order to succeed under such demanding
three block war -- contingencies in which conditions they will require unwavering
Marines may be confronted by the entire maturity, judgment, and strength of
spectrum of tactical challenges in the span character. Most importantly, these missions
of a few hours and within the space of three will require them to confidently make well-
contiguous city blocks. The tragic reasoned and independent decisions under
experience of U.S. forces in Somalia during extreme stress -- decisions that will likely be
Operation Restore Hope illustrates well the subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the
volatile nature of these contemporary media and the court of public opinion. In
operations. Author Mark Bowden's superb many cases, the individual Marine will be
account of "The Battle of Mogadishu," the most conspicuous symbol of American
Blackhawk Down, is a riveting, cautionary foreign policy and will potentially influence
tale and grim reminder of the not only the immediate tactical situation, but
unpredictability of so-called operations the operational and strategic levels as well.
other-than-war. It is essential reading for all His actions, therefore, will directly impact
Marines. the outcome of the larger operation; and he
will become, as the title of this article
suggests -- the Strategic Corporal
The Strategic Corporal

Regrettably, the end of the Cold War global disorder, pervasive crisis, and the
heralded not the hoped for era of peace, but constant threat of chaos. Since 1990, the
rather, a troubling age characterized by Marine Corps has responded to crises at a

rate equal to three times that of the Cold

War -- on average, once every five weeks. How do we prepare Marines for the
On any given day, up to 29,000 Marines are complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical
forward deployed around the world. In far- battlefield of the three block war? How do
flung places like Kenya, Indonesia, and we develop junior leaders prepared to deal
Albania, they have stood face-to-face with decisively with the sort of real world
the perplexing and hostile challenges of the challenges confronting Corporal Hernandez?
chaotic post Cold War world for which the The first step of the process is unchanged.
"rules" have not yet been written. Bold, capable, and intelligent men and
women of character are drawn to the Corps,
The three block war is not simply a fanciful and are recast in the crucible of recruit
metaphor for future conflicts -- it is a reality. training, where time honored methods instill
Like Corporal Hernandez, today's Marines deep within them the Corps' enduring ethos..
have already encountered its great Those precious virtues, in fact, become the
challenges and they have been asked to defining aspect of each Marine. This
exercise an exceptional degree of maturity, emphasis on character remains the bedrock
restraint, and judgment. Honor, courage, and commitment become
more than mere words upon which
Marines, of course, have always shone most everything else is built. The active
brightly when the stakes were highest. The sustainment of character in every Marine is
NCO's that led the bloody assaults on the a fundamental institutional competency --
German machine-gun positions at Belleau and for good reason. As often as not, the
Wood intuitively understood the importance really tough issues confronting Marines will
of their role. The Marines of 2d Battalion, be moral quandaries, and they must have the
28th Marines, who scaled the fireswept wherewithal to handle them appropriately.
heights of Mount Suribachi needed no one While a visceral appreciation for our core
to emphasize the necessity of initiative. The values is essential, it alone will not ensure
Marines of the Chosin Reservoir, of Hue an individual's success in battle or in the
City, and of countless other battles through myriad potential contingencies short of
the years did not wait to be reminded of combat. Much, much more is required to
their individual responsibilities. They fully prepare a Marine for the rigor of
behaved as Marines always have, and as we tomorrow's battlefield.
expect today's Marines and those of the
future to behave -- with courage, with An institutional commitment to lifelong
aggressiveness, and with resolve. The future professional development is the second step
battlefields on which Marines fight will be on the road to building the Strategic
increasingly hostile, lethal, and chaotic. Our Corporal. The realignment of the Recruit
success will hinge, as it always has, on the Training and Marine Combat Training
leadership of our junior Marines. We must programs of instruction reveal our
ensure that they are prepared to lead. reinvigorated focus on individual training.

Those programs remain the most important our NCO's has been eroded. Some believe
steps in the methodical process of that we have slowly stripped from them the
developing capable Marines. Our Formal latitude, the discretion, and the authority
Schools, unit training and education necessary to do their job. That perception
programs, and individual efforts at must be stamped out. The remaining
professional education build on the solid vestiges of the "zero defects mentality" must
foundation laid at recruit training and sustain be exchanged for an environment in which
the growth of technical and tactical all Marines are afforded the "freedom to
proficiency and mental and physical fail" and with it, the opportunity to succeed.
toughness. The common thread uniting all Micro-management must become a thing of
training activities is an emphasis on the the past and supervision -- that double-edged
growth of integrity, courage, initiative, sword -- must be complemented by
decisiveness, mental agility, and personal proactive mentoring. Most importantly, we
accountability. These qualities and attributes must aggressively empower our NCO's, hold
are fundamental and must be aggressively them strictly accountable for their actions,
cultivated within all Marines from the first and allow the leadership potential within
day of their enlistment to the last. each of them to flourish. This philosophy,
Leadership, of course, remains the hard reflected in a recent Navy Times interview
currency of the Corps, and its development as "Power Down," is central to our efforts to
and sustainment is the third and final step in sustain the transformation that begins with
the creation of the Strategic Corporal. For the first meeting with a Marine recruiter.
two hundred and twenty-three years, on Every opportunity must be seized to
battlefields strewn across the globe, Marines contribute to the growth of character and
have set the highest standard of combat leadership within every Marine. We must
leadership. We are inspired by their example remember that simple fact, and also
and confident that today's Marines and those remember that leaders are judged,
of tomorrow will rise to the same great ultimately, by the quality of the leadership
heights. The clear lesson of our past is that reflected in their subordinates. We must also
success in combat, and in the barracks for remember that the Strategic Corporal will
that matter, rests with our most junior be, above all else ... a leader of Marines.
leaders. Over the years, however, a
perception has grown that the authority of
Conclusion
And what of Corporal Hernandez? While his Squad would arrive within a matter of
predicament is certainly challenging, it is minutes. He knew that the crash site was
not implausible. What did he do? First, he located within the adjacent RMNF unit's
quickly reviewed what he knew. He was sector and that it manned checkpoints astride
certain that Lieutenant Franklin and 2d Nedeed's route to the downed helo. He knew

that any exchange of gunfire with Mubasa's Franklin had arrived with the additional
gunmen would likely lead to civilian squad. With them came a neighborhood
casualties and jeopardize the success of the leader who had previously acted as an
humanitarian mission. Second, he interpreter and mediator. Mubasa's men,
considered what he did not know. He was apparently uncomfortable with the shift in
uncertain of either Nedeed's or Mubasa's odds, began to slowly withdraw. The
intentions, or of the feasibility of a rescue mediator, a recognizable and respected
attempt. Based on these considerations and figure in the community, was handed a
myriad other tangible and intangible factors, bullhorn and addressed the crowd. Within
he completed a rapid assessment of the minutes the situation was diffused: Mubasa's
situation -- and acted. Corporal Sley was men had departed, the crowd was calmed,
directed to maintain his position atop the and RMNF personnel had reached the crash
building and continue to monitor Nedeed's site. For a few tense minutes though, the fate
progress and the status of the casualties. of both 1st Squad and the overall mission
Hernandez then switched frequencies and had hung in the balance and on the actions
contacted the Marine liaison with the of a young Marine leader. As would be
adjacent RMNF unit and learned that they expected, our Strategic Corporal -- firmly
had already dispatched medical personnel to grounded in our ethos, thoroughly schooled
the helo crash site, but were unaware of and trained, outfitted with the finest
Nedeed's movement and would now because equipment obtainable, infinitely agile, and
of Hernandez's warning reinforce the above all else, a leader in the tradition of the
appropriate checkpoints. By the time that Marines of old ...made the right decision.
transmission was completed, Lieutenant

Chapter 5 Exercise Solutions

1 a 5-5
2 c 5-6
3 b 5-11
4 See item content. 5-23
9 See item content. 5-38 and 5-39
Item 4 The content is located on page 5-23.
But Winston Churchill observed that: …there are many kinds of maneuvre in
war, only some of which take place on the battlefield. There are manuevres
in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed
from the battlefield, but often react decisively upon it, and the object of all is
to find easier ways other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose.

Chapter 5 Exercise Solutions, Continued
Liddell Hart wrote that the most effective approach “is one that lures or
startles the opposition into a false move – so that, as in jujitsu, his own effort
is turned into the lever of his own overthrow.” Movement, or any action not
focused on the enemy, is not Maneuver; it is simply wasted energy.
Therefore, an outward or enemy orientation is integral to Maneuver. This
mean far more than simply aiming at enemy forces rather than terrain
objectives. It means understanding the enemy – his doctrine, tactics, and
techniques; his organization; his aims; and his motives.
Item 6 The content is located page on 5-26.
Focus is the convergence effort in some way – in space, in time, in intent – so

as to create a unified effect. It is possible to be physically dispersed and yet
remain focused on a common objective.
The final key component of Maneuver is speed. To create advantage and

exploit potential advantage, we must be able to act faster than the enemy can
react. Because we now appreciate Maneuver not only in the spatial
dimension, we should not think of speed only in terms of the ability to move
fast, but also in terms of the tempo – the ability to think, decide, act and react
quickly.
Maneuver warfare has applications across the spectrum of war from air to
surface, from tactics to strategy, from operations to logistics.

Item 9 The content is located on page 5-38and 37.
We want our Marines to understand what their commanders are trying to

accomplish on the battlefield. Knowledge of the commander’s intent is an
absolute requirement, if the subordinate is going to be given the freedom of
action that is implicit in mission-type orders and recon-pull tactics. We insist
that every Marine know the mission and the intent of the commander two
echelons above his own.
It means that the commander must focus upon and give his first priority to the
accomplishment of the combat mission, and the philosophy – that is, the
commander’ must be mentally in concert with his units in contact at the front
edge of his operating area. Physically, he may be sitting in a bunker or flying
overhead in a helicopter, but psychologically he must be with his forward
units. I like Sir John Hackett’s phrase about the “smell of the battlefield”
when describing the commander’s appreciation for operations within the
combat arena.
We want out commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the
innovative, get inside the enemy’s mind, think about what his intentions are,
how he is going to react and outsmart him with your initiative in the absence
of orders from a senior command. We are serious about being committed to
giving our Marines the freedom to make mistakes. It is difficult to overcome
some fundamental inhibitions we have in this respect, but it is one of our
priority concerns.

It also represents, in graphic detail, the enormous responsibilities and

pressures which will be placed on our young Marine leaders. The rapid
diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors,
and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic
interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges
remarkable for their complexity.
The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war --
contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of
tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three
contiguous city blocks.
The common thread uniting all training activities is an emphasis on the

growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and
personal accountability. These qualities and attributes are fundamental and
must be aggressively cultivated within all Marines from the first day of their
enlistment to the last. Leadership, of course, remains the hard currency of the
Corps, and its development and sustainment is the third and final step in the
creation of the Strategic Corporal.

Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability
to make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact. As with
Corporal Hernandez at CP Charlie, today's Marines will often operate far
"from the flagpole" without the direct supervision of senior leadership. And,
like Corporal Hernandez, they will be asked to deal with a bewildering array
of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under such demanding
conditions they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of
character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently
make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress --
decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media
and the court of public opinion.
The remaining vestiges of the "zero defects mentality" must be exchanged for
an environment in which all Marines are afforded the "freedom to fail" and
with it, the opportunity to succeed. Micro-management must become a thing
of the past and supervision -- that double-edged sword -- must be
complemented by proactive mentoring. Most importantly, we must
aggressively empower our NCO's, hold them strictly accountable for their
actions, and allow the leadership potential within each of them to flourish.


APPENDIX A
Recommended Readings
Book Titles The following books are listed as recommended readings:
· Bassford, Dr. Christopher. Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine.

Doctrinal Complexity at
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/DOCTNEW.htm.
(Article appears in F.G. Hoffman and Gary Home, eds. Maneuver
Warfare Science, United States Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, 1998.)
· Cohen, Marvin S.; Leonard Adelman, Martin A. Tolcott, Terry A.

Bresnick, and F. Freeman Marvin. Technical Report 93-1 “A Cognitive
Framework for Battle Field Commander’s Situation Assessment. United
States Army Research Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 7 October
1993. http://leadership.au.af.mil/sls-ref.htm.
· Cohen, Marvin S. and Jared T. Freeman. “Teaching and Aiding Critical

Thinking Skills.” Cognitive Technologies, Inc. 4200 Lorcom Lane,
Arlington, VA 22207 with Klein Associates, Inc. Naval Research and
Education Symposium on C41, U.S. Naval Academy, Contract No.
N61339-95-C-0107 with the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems
Division. 8 August 1996. www.cog-
tech.com/papers/NavyTraining/C4I%20Naval%20Academy%2096.pdf.
· Coram, Robert. “John Boyd: An Architect of Modern Warfare.”

Georgia Tech Alumni Magazine. Fall 2002.
http://gtalumni.org/StayInformed/magazine/fall02/article3.html.
· Curts, Dr. Raymond, CDR/USN (Ret’d) and Dr. Douglas E. Campbell

USNR-R (Ret’d). Avoiding Information Overload through the
Understanding of the OODA Loops, A Cognitive Hierarchy and Object-
Oriented Analysis and Design.
www.dodccrp.org/6thICCRTS/Cd/Tracks/Papers/Track4/018_tr4.pdf. .
· Lehrer, Jim. “Online NewsHour: General Krulak.”

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/ian-inne99/krulak_6-25.html.
25 June 99
MCI Course 8014A A-1 Appendix A

Recommended Readings, Continued
Book Titles, · Marine Corps Concept Paper: “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.”
continued (MCCP 1:OMFTS) (Derived from White Papers: From the Sea and
Forward … From the Sea.)
http://www.concepts.quantico.usmc.mil/omfts.htm
· Marine Corps Strategy 21.

https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/Strategy21.htm.
· McBreen, Brendan B. Maj/USMC. This is Not your Daddy’s Draftee

Army!: Erasing the conscription mentality in the Marine Corps. 8
January 2002. (Provided by and used with permission from the author.)
· Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 Naval Command and Control.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/ndp6-decisions.htm. 19 May
1995.
· Nofi, Albert A. Defining and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness.

CRM D0002895.A1/Final. Center for Naval Analysis, 4825 Mark Center
Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850. November 2000.
http://www.cna.org/newsevents/images/crmd2895final.pdf.
· Ptak, MAJ Steven, USA; MAJ Charles R. Webster Jr., USA; and CDR
Tony W. Wilson, USN. “Effective Decision Making Processes for the
Joint Forces Commander.”
Https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa/effective_decision.htm.
· Schmitt, John F. Maj/USMCR. “Command and (Out) of Control: The

Military Implications of Complexity Theory.”
http://www.dodccrp.org/comch09.html.
· Cowan, Maj Jeffrey L. “From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps
Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and their
Unexpected Legacy. United States Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat and
Development Command, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068.
http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/boyd_thesis.htm.
· MPF 2010 and Beyond. Headquarters Marine Corps.

http://192.156.75.102/mpf/docs/mpffinal.pdf . 30 December 97.

Recommended Readings, Continued
Web Sites The following Web sites are listed as recommended reading:
· Air War College, Center for Strategic Leadership Studies.

http://leadership.au.af.mil/index.htm.
· Coalescent Technologies. Deployable Virtual Training Environment.

http://www.ctcorp.com/performance15.html.
· Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Located within the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense). http://www.dodccrp.org.
· Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. http://www.darpa.mil/.
· Defense and National Interest. http://www.defense-and-society.org/.
· Doctrinal Complexity.
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/DOCTNEW.htm.
· Marine Corps University. http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/.
· Military Review, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.
· United States Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/.
· War, Chaos, and Business. http://www.belisarius.com.


INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING
REVIEW LESSON EXAMINATION
Review Lesson
Estimated 2 hours
Study Time
Introduction The purpose of the review lesson examination is to prepare you for the final
examination. It is recommended that you try to complete your review lesson
without referring to the text, but those items (questions) you are unsure of
review the text. Check your responses against the answers provided at the
end of the review lesson examination.
Directions Select the answer that BEST completes the statement or that best answers the
item. Each question will be in the form of multiple choice, so circle your
response.
Item 1 What is the term defined by the violent clash of interests between or among
organized groups characterized by the use of military force?
a. Armed conflict
b. Warfighting operations
c. Operational projections
d. War
MCI Course 8014A R- 1 Review Lesson Examination

Review Lesson, Continued
Items 2 Matching: For items 2 through 9, match the common characteristics of war in
Through 9 column 1 with the definition in column 2.
Column 1 Column 2
___ 2. Friction a. Bloodshed, destruction, and
___ 3. Uncertainty suffering that can effect friend
___ 4. Fluidity and foe alike
___ 5. Disorder b. Forces that influence warfare
___ 6. Complexity whether they are intangible or
___ 7. Human dimension tangible
___ 8. Violence and danger c. Unknowns about the enemy
___ 9. Physical, moral, and mental and the environment
forces experienced in battle
d. Plans gone awry,
misunderstood instructions,
communication failures,
mistakes, and unforeseen
events
e. The force that resists all action
and saps energy
f. Behavior exemplified by the
clash of wills and the related
complexities, inconsistencies,
and peculiarities that
characterize human behavior
g. An episode in war that creates a
continuous, fluctuating flow of
activity
h. Intricate, interrelated parts that
compose the process and
elements used to execute war
and warfare

Item 10 The total of unknowns experienced in the operational environment can be put
into what three major categories?
a. Fear, fog of war, and danger
b. Vulnerability, risk, and criticality
c. Nonlinearity, risk, and chance
d. Fog of war, chance, and enemy action
Item 11 Politics as defined in MCDP 1, Warfighting is the
a. underlying processes by which all organizations function.

b. procedure to attain support for plans and processes resulting from
initiatives and responses.
c. distribution of power through dynamic interaction of both cooperative
and competitive elements of a group, organization, or entity.
d. tactics used by groups and individuals to gain the desired outcomes that
benefit the individuals or the groups.
Item 12 Policy refers to
a. the envisionment of Department of Defense and service actions both on

and off of duty.
b. the conscious objectives established within the political process.
c. operational and training objectives set by commanding officers.
d. active service members’ behavior both off and on duty.
Item 13 The single most important thought to understand about war and policy is
a. policy must serve war.

b. both war and policy are initiated by politics.
c. war must serve policy.
d. policy initiates war.

Item 14 Which of the following terms best describe the use of all power elements
against another to achieve the objective?
a. Means in war
b. Shock and awe strategy
c. Mission accomplishment
d. Combat leadership
Item 15 What are the following adjectives: strategic, operational, and tactical used to
describe?
a. Marine air ground task forces

b. Levels of war
c. Perspectives of the operating environment
d. Expeditionary units
Item 16 The ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet on
these terms is called what?
a. Shaping
b. Initiative
c. Planning
d. Focus
Item 17 Response is defined as
a. acting comparably to enemy action to counter his actions.

b. counterattacking.
c. reacting to the initiative.
d. focusing on the results of opposition initiative.

Item 18 What type of warfare pursues victory through the destruction of the enemy’s
material assets by superior firepower?
a. Attrition warfare
b. Expeditionary warfare
c. Guerilla warfare
d. “Shock and awe” warfare
Item 19 The rapid advance on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of
a. philosophy of command tactics

b. warfighting objectives
c. maneuver warfare
d. military operations other than war
Item 20 What term defines the total destructive force that would destroy the enemy at
a given time?
a. Fire support multiplier

b. Combat power
c. Expeditionary fire force
d. Combined force fires

Items 21 Matching: For items 21 through 28, match the common characteristics of war
Through 28 in column 1 with its definition in column 2.
Column 1 Column 2
___ 21. Speed a. A state of disorientation

___ 22. Focus resulting from an unexplained
___ 23. Surprise event or sequence of events that
___ 24. Boldness degrades the enemy’s ability to
___ 25. Centers of gravity resist
___ 26. Critical vulnerability b. Any important source of
___ 27. Creating opportunity strength
___ 28. Exploiting opportunity c. The process that occurs when
critical vulnerabilities are
particularly difficult, so the
commander may have to exploit
any or all vulnerabilities until a
decisive opportunity is revealed
d. An opportunity that, if
exploited, will do the most
significant damage to the
enemy’s ability to resist the
exploitation
e. The ability and willingness to
act ruthlessly in exploiting an
opportunity to generate decisive
results
f. The convergence of effects in
time and space on some
objective
g. The characteristic of
unhesitatingly exploiting the
natural uncertainty of war to
pursue major results rather than
minor ones
h. The rapidity of action

Item 29 The principles that guide military forces in their activities in support of
national objectives define which of the following terms?
a. Joint plans
b. Doctrine
c. Vision statements
d. Standard operating procedure
Item 30 A teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of
war from its nature and theory to the preparation and conduct defines which
of the terms listed below?
a. Marine Corps warfighting theory

b. Role of the Marine Corps’ warfighting theory
c. Marine Corps doctrine
d. Marine Corps operational theory
Item 31 The three tiers of _________________ is made up of the education

establishment, commanders, and individuals.
a. Training and Education Command

b. professional military education system
c. unit training system
d. educational command and control system
Item 32 Understanding that Marines of certain grades and occupational specialties are
not always interchangeable is an important concept for which of the
warfighting preparations?
a. Training
b. Education
c. Manning requirements
d. Personnel management

Item 33 Over reliance on technology and failure to make the most of technology
would best describe which of the following terms?
a. Dangers of technology
b. Dangers of equipping
c. Dangers of information management
d. Dangers of modernization
Item 34 Maneuver warfare is defined as a warfighting philosophy that
a. seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion by attacking selected enemy

weaknesses.
b. focuses on in the integration of indirect fires with direct fire assets used
by a mobile force to shatter the enemy’s cohesion.
c. seeks to out maneuver the enemy so that high strategic value objectives
can be taken first.
d. focuses on terrain, tactics, and conveyance as an integrated force that can
be multitasked globally.
Item 35 The enemy resources are structured into a system, which can be used against
friendly resources or assets. How would the enemy system be defined?
a. The will to resist offensive operations and/or counterattack

b. Their fire and maneuver plan as it is put into action
c. Anything that challenges Marines within their particular sphere
d. The offensive or defensive situation and the tactics used to conduct
operations

Item 36 The general outline of principles, processes, and procedures that the
commander expects to have the command operate within to accomplish
tactical and administrative missions is referred to as
a. commander's guidance.
b. command and control measures.
c. philosophy of command.
d. command and operations standards.
Item 37 The plan of how victory is to be achieved is the definition of which of the
following terms?
a. Mission tactics
b. Operational strategy
c. Friction of war
d. Shaping the action
Item 38 Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the
creative ability to devise a practical solution is _________________
decisionmaking.
a. recognitional
b. analytical
c. intuitive
d. military
Item 39 The process of assigning subordinates missions without specifying how the
mission must be accomplished is mission
a. tactics.
b. objectives.
c. tasks.
d. orders.

Item 40 In MCDP 1, Warfighting, commander’s intent is defined as
a. guidance provided to allow subordinate leaders to make decisions and act

independently.
b. a clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks
assigned to a subordinate.
c. the result of philosophy of command and commander’s guidance in the
operating environment to develop operational success.
d. what should be done in order to meet mission objectives in the operating
environment.
Item 41 What is the definition of main effort?
a. Concentration of combat power in ground forces

b. Action that is critical for success at a particular moment
c. Functions assigned to the lead assault elements during attacks
d. Strategic focus of forces in the theatre of operations
Item 42 How does warfighting doctrine define a surface?
a. The forward edge of friendly forces with reinforcement capability

b. A large open spot of terrain that can accommodate heliborne insertions
c. The enemy’s hard spots or strengths
d. An area where high speed maneuver is possible with tracked or wheeled
assets
Item 43 Soft spots or weakness in the enemy system that can be exploited by friendly
forces refers to which of the following terms?
a. Gap
b. Opportunity
c. Critical terrain
d. Tactical flaw
MCI Course 8014A R-10 Review Lesson Examination

Item 44 As defined by MCDP 1, Warfighting, combined arms is
a. fire planning that brings maximum effect of indirect and direct fires onto
the enemy positions.
b. the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one would
make the enemy vulnerable to another.
c. the use of indirect and direct fire weapons systems to support maneuver
warfare.
d. the combination of ground and air assets to support operational forces
during combat operations.
Item 45 Where and how can Marines recommend books for the U.S. Marine Reading
Program?
a. Marine Corps Institute via e-mail

b. Marine Corps College of Continuing Education in a book review format
submitted via the chain of command
c. Marine Corps University submitted via an e-mail link on the MCU Web
site
d. Marine Corps Enlisted Professional Military Education in book review
format via the Director of EPME
Item 46 Which of the following are the primary forms of Marine Corps doctrine?
a. Fleet Marine Force Manuals, All Marine Messages (ALMAR), and

Marine Corps Operational Publications (MCOP)
b. Marine Corps Orders, Marine Administrative Messages (MARADMIN),
and white letters
c. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications, Marine Corps Warfighting
Publications, and Marine Corps Reference Publication
d. Marine Corps Operational Manuals, Marine Corps Warfighting Manuals,
and Marine Corps Expeditionary Manuals

Item 47 When reading a professional article, what type of reading allows the reader to
extract meaningful information from the text?
a. Analytical
b. Critical
c. Strategic
d. Tactical
Items 48 The next section of the review lesson examination focuses on critical reading
Through 51 skills and is designed to demonstrate the value of professional reading and the
related learning skills derived from reading. Test items 48 through 51 require
you to read the article, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.” As you read the
accompanying preview information followed by the article introduction, try to
make preliminary estimates on the author’s focus and intent.
Think about the perspective building questions and reading objectives and
how they relate to the content as you read. You may have to read the article
several times to fully digest the content.
The first reading should consist of skimming through the content so that you
can develop overview.
Reread the preliminary information and the article a second time to develop a
deeper understanding of the content and its relationship to warfighting.
The third reading should be done after rereading the reading objectives, so
that you can search for the content that relates to the question. It may be
helpful to annotate important sections or make notes in the margin, so that the
information becomes more understandable.

Directions for You must read the preview page for required reading followed by the article,
Items 48 “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare” beginning on page 16 before completing
Through 51 this section of the review lesson examination. When you have finished
reading the article, answer test items 48 through 51.
Item 48 As the technological advantage between the United States and other countries
dwindles what will be the fundamentals of military advantage?
a. As the political gap between the United States and its potential
adversaries narrows, it will require for the Marine Corps to rethink the
methodology and focus of leadership development. The role of the non-
commissioned officer and officer alike will vastly change to meet the
changes of the operating environment, since high level decisions will
have impact at low levels.
b. As the social gap between the United States and its potential adversaries
narrows, the challenge will be to focus on developing new tactics to
support the technology and then training qualified individuals to man the
new technology based weapons and supporting systems in the battle
space.
c. As the technological gap between the United States and its potential
adversaries narrows, our leadership, doctrine, and training will be
fundamental to maintaining our continued military advantage. We expect
potential adversaries to adapt their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess
strategies to confront us on terms of relative advantage.
d. As the environmental gap between the United States and its potential
adversaries narrows, our research and development of new munitions,
weapons, and delivery systems will become more important and thus
become a larger part of the defense budgeting. It is anticipated that the
enemy will develop similar technologies, but less effective than out own.

Item 49 Where is expeditionary advantage derived from and why is it an advantage?
a. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining

our maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner
in which we organize, deploy, and employ our forces.
b. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from eliminating
indoctrination programs during the initial entry and sustainment training.
c. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary is derived from extensive training and
marksmanship programs during predeployment training and exercises
that are used to ingrain expeditionary skills. .
d. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from the ability
of Marines commitment to high operational tempos supported by
adaptable and intense mission focus.
Item 50 What is the meaning of expeditionary in the article and how does it
specifically apply to the Marine Corps?
a. Expeditionary refers to the units that are designated for duty as part of a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade or Marine Expeditionary Force, since
they can be forward deployed aboard naval vessels.
b. Expeditionary refers to the task organization capability of deployable
forces and the related support functions to organize to meet specific
mission requirements for one time or unique employment or usage. The
complexity of the operation allows sub-elements to integrate within the
ground combat elements and assist in ground operations that are
amphibious in nature.
c. Expeditionary strictly refers to the capability of the Marine Corps to
project and maintain large numbers of forward deployed forces aboard
naval vessels and forward staging areas where the forces can marry up
with prepositioned materiel and equipment.
d. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that influences all
aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the
necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace.
Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere
environments, from sea, land or forward bases.

Item 51 How is the definition of spatial maneuver expanded in the concept paper?
a. Maneuver in expeditionary warfare only addresses maneuver in forward

deployed areas and how its application changes from the training
environment when real world events unfold.
b. Maneuver in all dimensions—land, air, and, uniquely, operational
maneuver from the sea—enables commanders to exploit enemy
weakness at the time and place of their choosing through the use of the
operational mobility inherent in naval forces.
c. Maneuver embraces the amphibious maneuver from the sea since
innovative tactics and techniques have expanded the over horizon
capabilities.
d. Maneuver expands to interact with the functions of commanders through
expanded applications using new amphibious capabilities and naval
shipping and tactics.

Preview to Required Reading
Introduction “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare” by General James L. Jones is a concept

paper developed to describe the direction and focus of the Marine Corps as it
faces changes in the warfighting environment. Often the global situation
outpaces doctrine, so the modernization of equipment, technology, and
warfighting applications is required to meet the projected threat. Under these
circumstances, the Marine Corps will publish updated guidance on new
mission perspectives and requirements. All Marines leaders should read such
articles and documents to keep abreast of the global situation, national and
military concerns, projected threats that the Marine Corps expects to
encounter in the near future, and changes that will occur in the Marine
operational forces.
Scope and The following article discusses the advances in technology, changes in the
Perspective projected operating environment, and the medications of current warfighting
tactics and techniques. As you read the concept paper, try to answer these
perspective building questions.
· What are the changes between maneuver warfare and expeditionary

warfare?
· How will this change operations and procedures in my particular military
occupational specialty and my NCO responsibilities?
· What changes can I expect within my occupational field or unit?
· Why does the Marine Corps have an expeditionary culture and ethos?
Reading As you read, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare–A Marine Corps Capstone

Concepts Concept,” think about the following warfighting concepts:
· As the technological advantage between the United States and other

countries dwindles, what will be the fundamentals of military advantage?
· Where is expeditionary advantage derived from and why is it an
advantage?
· What is the meaning of expeditionary and how does it specifically apply
to the Marine Corps?
· How is the definition of maneuver expanded in the concept paper?

Required Reading
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20308-1775
EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE

Marine Corps Capstone Concept
Our new capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), moves us down the
path outlined in Marine Corps Strategy 21, and provides the foundation for the way the
Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex environment of this new century.
EMW is the union of our core competencies; maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary
heritage; and the concepts by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. It emphasizes
the unique capabilities the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander and the synergy
created when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies.
These capabilities translate into power projection designed to shape the global security
environment, assuring our friends and allies while dissuading, deterring, and defeating
potential adversaries. The elements of EMW will guide the process of innovation, change,
and adaptation to ensure the Corps continues its role as the Nation’s total force in readiness.
J. L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Required Reading, Continued
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps’ capstone concept for the early 21st
century. It is built on our core competencies and prepares the Marine Corps, as a “total
force,” to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. Capitalizing on
our maneuver warfare philosophy and expeditionary heritage, the concept contains the
enduring characteristics and evolving capabilities, upon which the Marine Corps will rely, to
promote peace and stability and mitigate or resolve crises as part of a joint force. EMW
focuses Marine Corps competencies, evolving capabilities, and innovative concepts to ensure
that we provide the joint force commander (JFC) with forces optimized for forward presence,
engagement, crisis response, antiterrorism,
and warfighting.
The purpose of this document is to articulate to future JFCs and contemporary joint concept
developers the Marine Corps’ contribution to future joint operations. EMW serves as the basis
for influencing the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Process and the Marine
Corps Expeditionary Force Development System. It further refines the broad axis of advance
identified in Marine Corps Strategy 21 for future capability enhancements.
Joint and Multi-national Enabling
Marine forces possess the capabilities to provide the means or opportunity to make joint and
multinational operations possible. Enabling operations may be as basic as establishing the
initial command and control (C2) system that the assembling joint or multinational force
“plugs into,” or as complex as physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on
forces. Other examples of enabling operations include defeating enemy antiaccess capabilities
and serving as an operational maneuver element to exploit joint force success or open new
fronts. Marine forces are ready to serve
as the lead elements of a joint force, act as joint enablers, and/or serve as joint task force (JTF)
or functional component commanders (i.e., Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint
Force Air Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander).
Strategic Agility
Marine forces will rapidly transition from precrisis state to full operational capability in a
distant theater. This requires uniformly ready forces, sustainable and easily
task-organized for multiple missions or functions. They must be agile, lethal, swift to deploy,
and always prepared to move to the scene of an emergency or conflict.
Operational Reach
Marine forces will project and sustain relevant and effective power across the depth of the
battlespace.

Tactical Flexibility
Marine forces will conduct multiple, concurrent, dissimilar missions, rapidly transitioning
from one task to the next, providing multidimensional capabilities (air, land, and sea) to the
joint team. For example, tactical flexibility allows the same forward-deployed Marine force
to evacuate noncombatants from troubled areas, conduct antiterrorism/force protection
operations, and seize critical infrastructure to enable follow-on forces.
Support and Sustainment

Marine forces will provide focused logistics to enable power projection independent of host
nation support against distant objectives across the breadth and depth of a theater of
operations.
These capabilities enhance the joint force’s ability to reassure and encourage our friends and
allies while we deter, mitigate, or resolve crises through speed, stealth, and precision.
Strategic Landscape
United States’ interests will continue to be challenged by an array of national and nonstate
actors posing conventional and asymmetrical threats. These threats are made more complex
and lethal by the increased availability of militarily-applicable commercial technologies. As
the technological gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, our
leadership, doctrine, and training will be fundamental to maintaining our continued military
advantage. We expect potential adversaries to adapt their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess
strategies to confront us on terms of relative advantage. Specifically, adversaries will seek to
engage us where they perceive us to be weak. Aware of our ability to degrade complex
systems, the thinking adversary will opt for the use of sophisticated but autonomous weapons.
Knowing our thirst for information, they will promote uncertainty, confusion, and chaos. This
is the venue where our most persistent and determined adversaries will choose to operate.
Our Nation must be prepared to fight—worldwide—against adversaries who will seek to
engage us with asymmetric capabilities rooted deep in the human dimension of conflict. The
Marine Corps, with our philosophy of maneuver warfare and heritage of expeditionary
operations, is ideally suited to succeed in this challenging landscape.
Expeditionary Advantage
The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our maneuver warfare
philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we organize, deploy, and employ
our forces. EMW capitalizes on this combination, providing the JFC with a total force in
readiness that is prepared to operate with other Services and multinational forces in the full
range of military operations from peacetime engagement to major theater war.

Maneuver Warfare
The Marine Corps approach to warfare, as codified in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
(MCDP) 1, Warfighting, is the product of years of conceptual development, innovation, and
experience. Maneuver warfare, the philosophical basis for EMW, acknowledges the timeless
realities of human conflict and does not attempt to redefine war on more humane or less risky
terms. The fundamental nature of war—
A violent struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos,

friction, and uncertainty—will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in
technology. What has changed is the gradual shift in reliance from the quantitative
characteristics of warfare—mass and volume—to a realization that qualitative factors (speed,
stealth, precision, and sustainability) have become increasingly important facets of modern
warfare. Maneuver warfare stresses proactive thought and action, elevating the operational art
beyond the crude simplicity of attrition. It combines high tempo operations with a bias for
action to achieve advantage—physical, temporal, or conditional—relative to an adversary.
The aim is to shatter an adversary’s cohesion, succeed in other operations by rapid action to
mitigate damage, or resolve a crisis on favorable terms. Maneuver warfare encourages
decentralized decisionmaking, enabling Marines to exploit the chaotic nature of combat.
Decentralizing decisionmaking allows Marines to compress the decision cycle, seize fleeting
opportunity, and engage enemy forces from positions of advantage, which empowers us to
outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight our adversary.
Expeditionary Operations
For Marines, the term expeditionary connotes more than the mere capability to deploy
overseas when needed. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that influences all
aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the necessity to adapt to the
conditions mandated by the battlespace. Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in
austere environments, from sea, land or forward bases. They will likely require Marines and
other naval forces to be brought to bear without reliance on host nation or outside support. As
a tangible representation of our national interest, forward-deployed and forward-based
Marines remain both a key element of America’s expeditionary advantage and are critical to
the regional combatant commander’s or commander in chief’s (CINC’s) overall strategy.
The regional CINC will set the broad conditions for shaping the battlespace through
engagement, forward presence, and the application of a full range of response options. As a
critical component of each regional CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan, forward-deployed
Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and forward-based Marines execute multinational
training exercises, conduct mobile training teams, and participate in military-to-military
exchanges. Through these activities, Marines develop invaluable regional expertise, cultural
and situational awareness, and an appreciation of the interoperability required for successful
joint and multinational operations.

Marine forces, as a part of the regional CINC’s engagement strategy, will focus on access
operations or other assigned missions as a part of the right mix of joint/ multinational forces.
These operations may be as basic as establishing the initial C2 system that the assembling
joint or multinational force “plugs into” or as complex as physically seizing forward
operating bases for follow-on forces. Throughout the conduct of operations, Marines will seek
to leverage the unique and complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies in
order to provide the JFC with a fully integrated force.
Seabasing
Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force, will be prepared to influence
events within the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure “base”
from which JFCs can project power to impact the early stages of a potential crisis. Seabasing
supports versatile and flexible power projection. Seabasing enables forces to move directly
from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant advance from traditional,
phased amphibious operations. Seabased operations maximize naval power projection and
enhance the deployment and employment of naval expeditionary forces by JFCs. More than a
family of platforms afloat, seabasing will network platforms and promote interoperability
among the amphibious task force, carrier battle group, maritime pre-position force, combat
logistics force, and emerging high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies. Seabased
operations will capitalize on the maneuver space afforded by the sea, rapid force closure
through at-sea arrival and assembly, and the protection assured by the U.S. Navy’s control of
the sea. C2, combat support, and combat service support capabilities will remain at sea to the
maximum extent possible and be focused upon supporting expeditionary air and land
operations ashore. Forward-deployed naval forces will have access to a responsive
worldwide logistic system to sustain expeditionary operations. Seabasing will allow Marine
forces to commence sustainable operations, enable the flow of follow-on forces into theater,
and expedite the reconstitution and redeployment of Marine forces for follow-on missions.
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

Marines typically deploy and employ as scalable, tailorable, combined-arms teams known as
MAGTFs. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, share four common organizational elements that
vary in size and composition according to the mission: command element (CE), ground
combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support element
(CSSE). Organic to each MAGTF, regardless of size, are specialized antiterrorism and force
protection capabilities that are available to support the JFC. Fully interoperable, each MAGTF
will have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a functional or Service component
commander of a JTF.
In partnership with the Navy, Marine forces will use the capabilities of bases and stations and
selected naval platforms as “launch pads” to flow into theater. During deployment, Marine
forces will conduct collaborative planning and execute en route mission training and virtual
rehearsals.

They will capitalize on shared situational awareness that is developed in support of the JFC
and processed and distributed by the supporting establishment. These enhancements will
revolutionize the otherwise time-intensive reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSO&I) activities, allowing increased operational tempo and seizing early
opportunities as the enabling force for the JFC. Forward-deployed Navy and Marine forces
will continue to be the JFC’s optimal enabling force, prepared to open ports and airfields and
to establish expeditionary airfields and intermediate staging bases in either benign or hostile
environments.
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), in close
partnership with the Navy, will continue to be the on-scene/on-call enabler for follow-on
Marine or joint forces. Operating forward-deployed from the sea, the MEU(SOC) is
unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements or restrictions imposed by other nations.
Because of its forward presence, situational awareness, rapid response planning capability,
and organic sustainment, the MEU(SOC) will continue to be the JFC’s immediately
employable combined-arms force of choice.
The MEU(SOC) initiates humanitarian assistance, provides force protection, conducts

noncombatant evacuations, enables JTF C2, and facilitates the introduction of follow-on
forces conducting limited forcible entry operations when required. These early actions shape
the JFC’s battlespace, deter potential aggressors, defuse volatile situations, minimize the
damage caused by natural disasters, and alleviate human suffering. Increasing mobility, speed,
firepower, and tactical lift will enable this seabased, self-sustained, combined-arms force to
conduct expeditionary operations across the depth of the battlespace, in adverse conditions,
day or night.
Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is optimally scaled and task-organized to respond
to a full range of crises. Strategically deployed via a variety of modes (amphibious shipping
and strategic airlift and sealift) and poised for sustainable power projection, the MEB will
continue to provide a robust seabased forcible entry capability. It will use organic combined-
arms and the complementary capabilities from the other Services—such as netted sensors,
seabased fires, and advanced mine countermeasures—to locate, counter, or penetrate
vulnerable seams in an adversary’s access denial systems. The MEB will then close rapidly on
critical objectives via air, land, and sea to achieve decisive results. It can be used to enable the
introduction of follow-on forces (joint and multinational) or be employed as an independent
operational maneuver element in support of the JFC’s campaign plan. The MEB constitutes a
multidimensional, seabased or landbased, operational “capability in readiness” that can create
its own opportunities or exploit opportunities resulting from the activities of other components
of the joint force.

Marine Expeditionary Force

As a crisis escalates, smaller MAGTFs and supporting units are deployed until
a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is in place to support the CINC. The
MEF, largest of the MAGTFs, is capable of concurrent seabased operations
and sustained operations ashore, operating either independently or as part of a
joint warfighting team. The MEF can be tailored to meet multiple joint
requirements with its inherent sustainability.
Specialized Marine Corps Organizations and Capabilities
Special purpose MAGTFs are nonstanding organizations temporarily formed to conduct
specific missions for which a MEF or other unit is either inappropriate or unavailable. They
are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a specific mission such as force protection,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime engagement activities, or regionally
focused exercises. While the MAGTF construct will remain the primary warfighting
organization of the Marine Corps, not all situations will require it to operate as a combined-
arms unit. Should the situation warrant, distinct MAGTF elements and capabilities may be
employed separately in response to critical JFC requirements.
For example, the 4th MEB (AT) is a unique organization with specialized antiterrorism
capabilities. This unit consists of Marines and Sailors specifically trained to respond rapidly—
worldwide—to threats or actual attacks by terrorists. The 4th MEB (AT) contains the Marine
Corps Security Force Battalion (fleet antiterrorism security teams), the Marine Security Guard
Battalion, the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and an infantry battalion
specially trained in antiterrorism operations.
Supporting Establishment
Marine Corps bases and stations provide direct and indirect support to the MAGTF and other
forward-deployed forces and are the means by which Marine forces are formed, trained, and
maintained. These bases and stations are platforms from which Marines project expeditionary
power while supporting the quality of life of Marines and
their families.
The Way Ahead

Marine Corps Strategy 21 identifies capability enhancements required to continue the
evolution of the MAGTF. These capability enhancements include joint/multinational
enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and sustainment,
which create a Marine force that provides the JFC with expanded power in order to assure
friends and allies or dissuade, deter, and defeat adversaries. In accordance with our
expeditionary culture and warfighting ethos, our doctrine, organization, education, and
training must contribute

to producing Marines and organizations that thrive in the chaos of conflict by—
· Producing leaders who have the experience to judge what needs to be done; know how to
do it; and exhibit traits of trust, nerve, and restraint.
· Developing leaders and staffs who function in an environment of ambiguity and
uncertainty and make timely and effective decisions under stress.
· Developing leaders by improving their capacity to recognize patterns, distinguish critical
information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive basis with less than perfect
information.
· Enhancing leaders’ decisionmaking skills with investments in education,
wargaming/combat simulation activities, and battespace visualization techniques within a
joint or multinational framework.
We will see a convergence of transformation and modernization capabilities in our MAGTFs
that will revolutionize expeditionary operations when currently planned programs mature.
Realizing EMW’s full potential will require a developmental effort focused on improving C2,
maneuver, intelligence, integrated fires, logistic, force protection, and information operations.
Achieving these improvements will require integration of both Navy and Marine Corps
operational concepts, systems, and acquisition strategies.
Organization, Deployment, and Employment

Changes in operational and functional concepts may necessitate changes in the integrating
concepts of organization, deployment, and employment. Organizationally, EMW emphasizes
the MEB as the preferred mid-intensity MAGTF and the role of the supporting establishment
in direct support of forward operations. Organizational structure must be mission oriented to
ensure the effective deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment
of forces. The Marine supporting establishment must be postured to facilitate situational
awareness of worldwide operations, leverage information technologies, and exploit modern
logistic concepts in order to anticipate and respond to MAGTF requirements.
Marines will deploy using any combination of enhanced amphibious platforms, strategic
sealift and airlift, prepositioned assets, and self-deployment options to rapidly project force
throughout the world. By virtue of their en route collaborative planning and virtual rehearsal
capability, Marine forces will arrive in theater ready for immediate employment. While
Marines achieve great operational synergy when employed as fully integrated MAGTFs, the
Marine Corps can provide specific forces and capabilities according to the needs of the JFC.
Continuing our tradition of innovation, we must strive to enhance our concepts and
technologies to organize, deploy, and employ the force.
Maneuver
Maneuver in all dimensions—land, air, and, uniquely, operational maneuver from the sea—
enables commanders to exploit enemy weakness at the time and place of their choosing
through the use of the operational mobility inherent in naval forces. Maneuver seeks to

achieve decisive effects during the conduct of a joint campaign. It is the means of
concentrating force at critical points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and momentum,
which drives adversaries into untenable situations. Maneuver can deny the enemy the
initiative, reducing his choices to either defending the length and depth of the littorals, thereby
dislocating his forces to the JTF’s advantage or exposing critical vulnerabilities to
exploitation. Enemy forces reacting to MAGTF maneuver generate opportunities for the JFC
to concentrate the complementary capabilities of other maneuver forces. Maneuver, integrated
with fires, will be linked to and influenced by the JFC’s battlespace shaping operations and
directed toward achieving operational effects. Innovative technologies will provide Marines
enhanced mobility to cross greater distances and reduce the limitations imposed by terrain,
weather, and access denial systems. The result will be an expanded maneuver space, both
seaward and inland. Enhancements in our maneuver capability will compel adversaries to
develop innovative antiaccess strategies and systems. Proactive joint efforts to anticipate and
counter current and future antiaccess systems will be critical to ensuring freedom of action.
Integrated Fires
Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on a target. The psychological impact
on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. The human
dimension of conflict entails shattering an enemy’s cohesion through the introduction of fear
and terror. Marines, applying the tenets of maneuver warfare, will continue to exploit
integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary.
We will increasingly leverage seabased and aviation-based fires and develop shore-based fire
support systems with improved operational and tactical mobility. Streamlining our fire
support coordination procedures and enhancements in combat identification techniques will
support rapidly maneuvering forces while decreasing the risks of fratricide. Forces afloat and
ashore require the ability to immediately distinguish friendly forces from others and to then
deliver lethal and nonlethal fires with increased range and improved accuracy to achieve the
desired effect. Volume and precision of fires are equally important. The continuous
availability of high volume, all-weather fires is essential for suppression, obscuration, area
denial, and harassment missions. We will use fires to support maneuver just as we use
maneuver to exploit the effects of fires.
Intelligence
Intelligence is a command function that optimizes the quality and speed of decisionmaking.
EMW requires a thorough blending of the traditional domains of operations and intelligence.
Commanders and their staffs must make decisions in an environment of chaos, uncertainty,
and complexity, and they must be prepared to act on incomplete information. The goal of
intelligence is to enable the commander to discern the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and
exploit them.
Intelligence must support decisionmaking by maintaining current situational awareness,
monitoring indications and warnings, identifying potential targets, and assessing the
adversary’s intent and capabilities at all levels of operations. This requires establishing an
intelligence

baseline that includes order of battle, geographic factors, and cultural information; all
contained in universally accessible databases.
Deployed Marine forces will enhance their organic capabilities by accessing and leveraging
national, theater, Service, and multinational intelligence through a comprehensive intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance network. The informed judgment of well-trained, educated,
and experienced Marine analysts and collectors will remain the most important intelligence
asset.
Logistics
Marines must access a worldwide infrastructure of distribution systems to support
expeditionary operations. The integration of naval expeditionary logistic capabilities with
joint information and logistic systems will provide total asset visibility and a common relevant
operating picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support
agencies. Marines must explore ways to reduce the logistic footprint ashore through
expeditionary support bases, seabased support, in-stride sustainment, reduction of
consumables, improved packaging, better visibility over distribution, and development of
alternative ordnance variants that are smaller and lighter, but retain equivalent lethality.
Command and Control

EMW promotes decentralized execution providing subordinates latitude to accomplish
assigned tasks in accordance with the commander’s intent. Organic and supporting C2
systems and processes must be adapted to function in any environment, whether afloat,
transitioning ashore, or on the move. C2 must facilitate decentralized decisionmaking and
enhanced situational awareness at all echelons. Concurrently, C2 must provide the MAGTF
commander the ability to direct joint and multinational task force operations when required.
EMW requires adaptable and intuitive C2 architectures and systems that are fully
interoperable with joint and compatible with multinational assets. Expeditionary forces will be
able to access, manipulate, and use information in near real time, developing a common
tactical and operational understanding of the battlespace. They will have connectivity to
theater and national assets and the ability to disseminate information throughout the force.
This will support fully integrated collaborative planning efforts during both deployment and
employment.
C2 initiatives must address limitations in the capabilities of all amphibious platforms. Key
factors include accelerated technological advances and rapid changes in equipment and
capabilities. Flexibility, adaptability, and interoperability are paramount in the design and
development of systems and platforms. Particular attention must be made to providing
commanders with seamless C2 capabilities throughout the battlespace.

Force Protection
Force protection are those measures taken to protect a force’s fighting potential so that it can
be applied at the appropriate time and place. Force protection will rely on the integrated
application of a full range of both proactive and reactive capabilities. Multidimensional force
protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of layered active and
passive measures within all domains across the range of military operations—or warfighting
functions—with an acceptable level of risk.
We will pursue improvements in the families of technologies and doctrine to enhance force
protection capabilities. Marine forces will enhance security programs designed to protect
servicemembers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equip-
ment in all locations and situations. These enhancements will be accomplished through
innovative technological and nontechnology-based solutions combined with planned and
integrated application of antiterrorism measures, physical security, operations security,
personal protection, and incident response.
Information Operations
Information operations involve actions taken to affect the adversary’s decisionmaking

processes and information systems while ensuring the integrity of our own. The integrated
components of information operations have always proven applicable across the full range of
military operations. Information operations will be used to shape the strategic environment or
impart a clearer understanding and perception of a specific mission and its purpose.
Information operations will be a force multiplier—reducing the adversary’s ability to
effectively position and control his forces—and prepare the way for the MAGTF to
accomplish future missions. We must leverage information operations and ensure they are
synchronized with the JFC’s campaign plan to achieve the desired operational effect.
Summary
EMW describes the Marine Corps’ unique contribution to future joint and multinational
operations. As the Nation’s only seabased, forward-deployed, air-ground force in readiness,
Marines stand ready to support the JFC. Marines, intrinsically linked with naval support,
maintain the means to rapidly respond to crises and respond with the appropriate level of
force. MAGTFs are the JFC’s optimized force that will enable the introduction of follow-on
forces and prosecute further operations.

EMW focuses our warfighting concepts toward realizing the Marine Corps Strategy 21 vision
of future Marine forces with enhanced expeditionary power projection capabilities. It links our
concepts and vision for integration with emerging joint concepts. EMW will guide the process
of change to ensure that Marine forces remain ready, relevant, and fully capable of supporting
future joint operations.

Answers The table below lists the answers to the review lesson examination items. If
you have questions about these items, refer to the reference page of the course
text.
Item Answer Reference

1 d 1-3
2 e 1-5
3 c 1-6
4 g 1-7
5 d 1-7
6 h 1-7
7 f 1-8
8 a 1-8
9 b 1-9
10 c 1-6
11 c 2-3
12 b 2-3
13 c 2-3
14 a 2-3
15 b 2-6
16 b 2-9
17 c 2-9
18 a 2-11
19 b 2-12
20 b 2-13
21 d 2-14
22 g 2-15
23 a 2-15
24 h 2-16
25 b 2-17
26 e 2-17
27 c 2-18
28 f 2-18

Answers,
continued
29 b 3-4
30 c 3-4
31 b 3-6
32 d 3-7
33 b 3-8
34 a 4-3
35 c 4-4
36 c 4-5
37 d 4-7
38 d 4-8
39 a 4-10
40 b 4-11
41 b 4-12
42 c 4-13
43 a 4-13
44 b 4-14
45 c 5-5
46 c 5-6
47 b 5-11
48 c R-19
49 a R-19
50 d R-20
51 b R-24

Introduction To War Fighting

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Sergeants Distance

Table of The following is the table of contents for this course.

Topic See Page

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A i Course Introduction

Summary The table below summarizes all-important “gateways” needed to successfully

Step When you… Then you will… For more

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A ii Course Introduction

· Harrap, Capt William. Implicit Communication: A Warfighting

· Krulak, General Charles C, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. The

· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting.

· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 Strategy

· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 Operations

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A iii Course Introduction

List of · Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-3 Tactics.

· Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6 Command and Control.

· Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1500.55 Military Thinking and Decision

· Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-0B How to Conduct

· Scharfen, John C. Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare. Interview

· Schmitt, Capt John F. Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a

MCI Course 8014A iv Course Introduction

· Violence and danger

· Physical, moral, and mental forces

· Science, art, and dynamic of war

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 1 Chapter 1

In This This chapter contains the following topics:

Topic See Page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 2 Chapter 1

Definition of War is defined as follows:

The target of the violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 3 Chapter 1

Example of Examples of a nonstate groups include international coalitions or groups that

· Al Qaeda terrorist network that functions internationally, which is linked

Conclusion The study of war is essential to be an effective Marine sergeant. Effective

MCI Course 8014A 1- 4 Chapter 1

Introduction This topic provides an overview of common warfighting concepts:

Type of Friction Examples

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 5 Chapter 1

Factors of The following three factors contribute to uncertainty:

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 6 Chapter 1

Risk Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling

Disorder Disorder is created by situations where plans go awry, instructions and

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 7 Chapter 1

Violence and Violence is inherent in warfighting and is characterized by bloodshed,

Fear Fear is the normal human reaction to violence and danger.

Fear has a significant effect on the conduct of war because it contributes to

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 8 Chapter 1

· National and military resolve

Continued on next page

MCI Course 8014A 1- 9 Chapter 1

· Development and use of the rifled bore

In order to remain effective in the operating environment, Marine leaders

MCI Course 8014A 1- 10 Chapter 1

Item 1 What is the definition of war as defined by MCDP 1, Warfighting?