EVALUATING THE SYDNEY OPERA HOUSE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background The Sydney Opera House is a multi-venue performing arts centre in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. It is recognised as one of the iconic buildings in the world that has become a global symbol of Australia. Danish architect Jrn Utzon won the bid as the designer for the construction of the project after being selected as a winner of an international architecture competition organised by the New South Wales government. The project commenced in 1959 and was originally scheduled for completion in four years with a budget of AUS $7 million. The Sydney Opera House project had no design and cost specifications set by the client which resulted in the project being overshadowed by cost and time overruns that was often blamed on the architect Utzon, resulting in his resignation prior to completion of the project in 1966 and the appointment of a team of Australian architects to complete the construction. The project was completed in 1973, taking 14 years to be completed which was10 years behind the original scheduled completion date with a final cost of AUS $102 million ($100
million over the initial estimate), a cost overrun of about 1300 percent (Woodward, 2005).

Fig. 1: Sydney Opera House

The Sydney Opera House could be seen as a disastrous construction project failure from both a financial point of view as well as from the management perspective. However it is considered an architectural achievement. This paper aims to achieve the following objectives: 1. The management and organization of the project from inception to completion. 2. The incidence of cost and time escalation and the approach to cost control employed. 3. The degree that the project will be expected to interact with the local economy. 4. The impact of economic, social and political factors on the project. 5. The degree to which construction technology and innovation has impacted on the project with particular emphasis of its impact on costs and on sustainability.

MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION OF THE PROJECT

2.1 Stakeholders of the project The project had many stakeholders and are arranged in a Chronological sequence consisting of; the sponsor and initial stakeholders when the project first commenced in the mid-20th century was Joseph Cahill, the premier of the labour Party of New South Wales and the Government of New South Wales; the architect along with the structural engineering firm Ove Arup acted as the main stakeholders during the initial construction process from 1959 1973. While the Sydney Opera House Lottery Fund was established as the financial sponsor for majority of the initial constriction cost of the project. Joseph Cahill and the government of the New South Wales were the clients and sponsors of the project. Despite not having technical skills, they had the responsibility of facilitating the creation of the project; exhibiting power, legitimacy and urgency to get the project started. During the project a part-time executive, who also did not have the technical competence was created by the client (government of the New South Wales) to supervise the project. During the delivery of the project, the architect Utzon in collaboration with the structural engineering firm Arup, was responsible for the design and structural engineering of the building. External consultants were involved to deliver specific technical tasks requiring the use of new technology such as computer-based 3-dimensional designs etc. The public was an indirect stakeholder of the project and were concerned with the success of the project as

they were formed huge part of the customers of the Opera House. The public were indirectly involved in funding the project through contributions made to the Sydney Opera House Lottery Fund set up by the government. 2.2 Organisation of the project There was no assigned project manager to the project instead the project delivery was managed mostly by Utzon and Arup. Where Utzon (architect) was in charge of the architectural designs and Arup along with his partners was in charge of the structural and civil engineering aspects of the project. Which is different from the traditional model where the architectural firm took on most of the management responsibilities of the project. Other engineering aspects of the project such as the mechanical, electrical and acoustics aspects of the project that were handled by other subcontractors who were partners of Arup.

Fig. 2: Stakeholder Map 1959-1966 A committee known as the Sydney Opera House Executive Committee (SOHEC) was formed by the government of New South Wales (client) in 1954 to supervise their project on behalf even they had no construction or engineering knowledge or related experience of delivering similar project of that magnitude. The committee comprised of three advisory panels, one

responsible for architectural and construction aspects, one handled the traffic while the last member was responsible for music and drama. They liaised directly with Utzon and acted on behalf on the client during the construction process until 1960 when they were relieved of their responsibility by the Minister of Public Works.

Fig. 3: Stakeholder Map 1966-1973

THE INCIDENCE OF COST AND TIME ESCALATION AND THE APPROACH TO COST CONTROL EMPLOYED.

3.1 Cost and time escalation The Sydney Opera House project was traversed with uncertainties and risks that lead to incidences of cost escalation starting from the design drawings of the structure through to project delivery. The architect had come up with an aesthetic design that was deem

structurally unrealisable relying on photographs and maps without having to visit the proposed site for the project. An example of a reason why the project was deemed structurally unrealisable was the design of the roof of structure to span completely over the structure without columns (Sydney Opera House, 2002). This became an issue as there was no known methods at the time to be used in constructing such a roof for the building, even after redesigning the roof it still posed to be a challenging and expensive aspect of the project. The construction of the project was ordered to commence without a completed design and site surveys. The project had no designated project manager thus leaving Utzon, the architect assuming the responsibility of taking all the decisions that has to with the design and construction without any project evaluation procedures. This resulted in constant design changes being implemented as well as subsequent demolitions and rebuilding (Murray, 2004).

Fig. 4: Construction phase 2 in 1966 The bench mark cost set for the winning design from the competition was targeted at AUS$7 million but was estimated at AUS$3.6 million from the design submitted for entry by the architect (Utzon). A refined design was later submitted by Utzon which was then recalculated by a quantity surveyor who arrived at a final estimate of AUS$4,781,200 (Murray, 2004). During the first construction stage of the project there were disagreements with the arrived estimate for some of the construction works consisting of the podium and foundations that

were gotten from the incomplete initial designs and site surveys. Consequently, the design was changed resulting in a claim for additional costs of AUS$1,232,000 in 1962 by the contractors. At the time of completion of the first stage of the project, it has incurred additional AUS$ 3,968,000 bringing the total estimate to AUS$5.2 million along with an extended overall project duration of 47weeks over the scheduled completion date (Murray, 2004).

Fig. 5: Location of Sydney Opera House in Sydney During the second stage into the construction of the project, there were further design changes such as the request by the client (government) for two additional theatres to the original two that was in the original design which resulted into delay of the construction process and increase in the project cost estimate. The series of design changes resulted in a subsequent cost increase rendering both the original cost of AUS $7 million and time estimates four years highly uncertain. At the end of the stage, the projects total cost has escalated to AUS$17.4 million. Although the government did not give a limit to the financing of the project, the continuous price escalation resulted in the government taking a firm action

regarding the funding of the project. An alternative source of funding was sorted for while Utzon was forced to resign taking his designs along with him (http://www.gids.nl).

Fig. 6: Construction progress in 1968

In the third stage of the project a new team of architects was brought to complete the project having to create new designs and modifications. This resulted in additional increase in funding by the government through the Lottery fund amounting to the final cost of the Sydney Opera House set at AUS$102 million (10 times the original estimate) taking up to a duration of 17 years before it was opened in 1973 (Murray, 2004). In theory there was no measures put in place for controlling and managing the cost of the project, hence it could be regarded as a project management and construction management failure irrespective of its architectural genius. 4 THE DEGREE THAT THE PROJECT WILL BE EXPECTED TO INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL ECONOMY. The Sydney Opera House is recognised as one of the most innovative and distinctive of the 20th century as well as one of the most popular visitor attractions in the Australia. It plays a significant part in the local economy of Sydney, Australia through various means such as tourism, hosting art performances and accommodations etc. As at the end of 2010, the city of Sydney received 7 million paying visitors from the across the country and 2.7 million visitors

from other parts of the world. The city is the 42nd most visited in the world as a result of the Sydney Opera House (http://blog.euromonitor.com; http://archive.tourism.nsw.gov.au). The building attracts more 7million people from across the globe with 300,000 annual of visitors participating in guided tours. The building comprises of multiple performance venues which generate funds from playing host to over 1,500 annual art performances attended by about 1.2 million people. The venue is one of the busiest performing art centres in the world accommodating numerous paying visiting and resident performing art companies such as the Sydney Theatre, Sydney Symphony Orchestra and the Sydney Opera House etc. (Sydney Opera House, 2008/2009; Sydney Opera House 2011.

Fig. 7: Tourists Observing the Sydney Opera House. Reports from the Tourism Research Australia, Media release (July 2013), estimates that in 2011-2012 tourism contributed around 6.8 per cent to $87 billion. The report also confirms that the tourism industry in Australia is still shows strong resilience against other factors, with the tourism and culture still remaining significant to the national economy comprising 5.9 per cent of Australias GDP. The building forms an iconic Australian image as it is well positioned closed to the famous Sydney Harbour Bridge with the parkland to its south. The project also generate funds from housing recording studios, cafes, restaurants and bars and retail outlets. Other source of funds

are generated from series of guided tours taking visitors various areas from front-of-house spaces to daily backstage tours normally reserved for performers and crew members. The facilities and venues in the building provides employment for local residents supporting more than 12,000 jobs with an annual contribution of $1.1 billion to the Australian economy. The project leads to an increase in expenditures such as spending new money in local economy, it increases labour supply and standard of living for most Australians especially local residents and impacts on local businesses within the Sydney direct and indirectly through visitors to the house (www.tafterjournal.it). 5 THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS ON THE PROJECT Sydney is one of Australias largest and oldest cities that is often argued as being one of the countrys most influential cities competing with Melbourne in regards to being the centre for finance, trade, transport and culture. It is speculated that both cities share some sort of rivalry on a local level since Melbourne won the bid to host the first ever Olympics held in Australia in 1956 the same here the international architecture competition for the construction of the Sydney Opera House was held. The Melbourne Olympics brought attention to the country contributing significantly to the post-war economy and giving the city a sense of place in the international community. It could be argued that this coincidence was part of the motivation for the sponsor of the House project Joseph Cahill, the premier of the labour Party of New South Wales to initiate the international architecture competition for the construction of the Sydney Opera House in the same year 1956 to regain ground lost to the rival city Melbourne when it won the bid to host the Olympics (www.dhub.org).

Fig.8: Sydney Opera House at sunset The mid-50s were pivotal years for the future of the country as the expansion of the post-war economy was significant at the time as a result of the influx of unprecedented migrants in to Australia especially from Europe (www.dhub.org). The effect of the great depression was evident in most world economies at the time although capital intensive projects were being embarked on in different developed countries like the Empire State Building in New York (en.wikipedia.org).

Fig. 9: View of the Sydney Opera House from air towards the south east In Australia a mega project like the Sydney Opera House at the time would be influential to the local and wider economy contributing even more positively than the Melbourne Olympics in the long term. Despite the city barely recognised on the map of the country during the 50s it was clearly international and generated growing social and cultural changes. The project was to bring lots of social and environmental benefits, improve the social lives of the growing population within the city, and promote the cultural vitality of Australia to the international community through the Sydney Opera House. The Sydney Opera House was to be a precocious signal of the dawn of a new era for the city of Sydney, Australia. Consequently, the Government of New South Wales were eager for the project start in 1958. The pressure from the government led the construction of the House project to commence ahead of schedule without a complete design and definite project scope which led to scope creep and increased uncertainties which contributed to design changes and cost/time overruns during

construction of the project. Further, there was a change in government and a new minister of public works who were under public pressure to nominate an Australian architect for the project. The new government withheld funds from the architect due to little progress being made which finally lead to the resignation.

IMPACT OF CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION WITH EMPHASIS OF ITS IMPACT ON COSTS AND ON SUSTAINABILITY.

The Sydney Opera House is recognized as an incredible feat of architectural work of the 20th century. The project pushed boundaries in design and construction technology at the time using innovation techniques in delivering solutions to the many design, technical and construction problems that was encountered during the project delivery as a result of the unprecedented shape of the building. An example of innovative construction techniques and technology applied in the project was the use of computing programs in the analysing the roof structure in 1958 at the time when the computer as we know it today was only 10 years old. The computer technology was also used in delivering spherical geometry solution for the roof which help in facilitating the construction process of the roof structure reducing the amount of design and construction duration and also saving cost associated with construction delay and rebuild/redesign. New innovative solutions for concrete works were developed to reduce and eradicate repetitiveness during the construction process. Instead of the repetitive process of concretes works being cast in on an on-site, new technology was developed to increase the efficiency and improve the construction process using mathematical computer calculations which allowed for most concrete precast components to be joined in the air saving costs of running an on-site factory for casting concrete components. This also have the potential of impacting on the overall schedule of project delivery. Although at the time of building the Sydney Opera House sustainability wasnt of interest or concern in the world or in the construction process. However, some of the aforementioned innovative solutions developed during the project had the potential to impact on sustainability. For instance, the erection and joining of precast concrete components in the air meant there was no need to have an on-site factory for casting concrete had the potential of reducing environmental waste within the site compared to the amount of waste to be generated if the concrete materials were joined in the air (http://www.dhub.org).

CONCLUSION The Sydney Opera House is one of the most recognisable building in the world attracting over 8 million people and a symbol of Australia, in this regard years after its completion the Sydney Opera House could be argued to be a tremendous success. It is an architecture and construction innovation triumph and success. The project led the way for innovation in construction design and facilities management technology during the 20th century which at the time was a ground breaking achievement in the world of construction at the time. However the conflicts encountered and poor management during project delivery contributed to cost and time overruns (6 years delay and the initial budget multiplied by 10) making it a project management failure at the time. Overtime, fast forward to today the building is a global landmark for the city of Sydney and Australia as a country which was the vision of the project sponsors and clients. On this note the completed project could described as nothing short of a success till date having achieved the vision for which it was embarked in the first instance.. The project leaves a lot of learning legacies for how future projects of such magnitude should be managed and delivered successfully within the constraints (schedule, budget and scope) and specifications of construction projects. The project leaves a learning lesson on the significance of effective communications and stakeholder management in public owned mega projects and how conflicts and challenges in the construction process could affect the outcomes of such projects if not properly managed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Hall, P. (1982) Great planning disasters. Berkley (CA): University of California Press. Murray, P. (2004) The Saga of the Sydney Opera House. New York, New York: Taylor & Francis Sydney Opera House & Jrn U. (2002). Utzon Design Principles. Retrieved from http://d16outft0soac8.cloudfront.net/uploadedFiles/About_Us/Corporate_Information/Conten t_AboutUs_UtzonDesignPrinciples.pdf on 13/11/2013

Sydney Opera House Construction: Retrieved from http://www.gids.nl/sydney/opera.html 13/11/2013 Sydney Opera House 2011 Annual Report Vision and Goals". Sydney Opera House 08/09 Annual Report". Euromonitor International's Top 100 City Destinations in the World http://corporate.tourism.nsw.gov.au/Sites/SiteID6/objLib18/Sydney-YE-Dec10.pdf Tourism Research Australia, Media release (July 2013) The House History: Sydney Opera House. Retrieved on 13/11/2013 from http://jornutzon.sydneyoperahouse.com/househistory.htm UNESCO. (2011). Opra de Sydney Convention du patrimoine mondial: http://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/166 Woodward, H. (2005) PowerPoint Presentation to NASA March 23

Websites http://www.dhub.org/building-a-masterpiece-the-sydney-opera-house/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sydney_Opera_House http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression http://www.environment.gov.au/node/19815 http://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/about/house_history_landing.aspx http://www.tafterjournal.it/2013/09/09/cultural-hubs-as-powerful-leverage-of-economicgrowth-sydney-and-philadelphia-case-studies/