AY fo Aa 4 2 7 ow Cc foc Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical LexiconGREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS A Historical Lexicon F.E.PETERS »New York: New york UNIVERSITY PRESSright so8p by Newr Vor Univers OSes se catoy Card Nembers 87 #5000 Marek. ued isthe Usted Sins of Anciion oes s Prejace ‘The glory and the bene of Greck philosophy is its lack of « past. Drawing on nothing moze than common speech an the elastic poten- al of the Greek language the Helleme philesophers not oaly form. lated a problematic within which all subsequent thinkers cast their ovin reflections, but devised as well a sophisticated und complex termiral- ogy as a vehicie for :heir thoughts. Koth the terms aad the eoneepis ‘hey employed have since been overgrown with a millennium and a half of connotation thet not even che acest determined can compietely steip aay. The contemporary philosopher or theologian may attempt to rethink the concept, but he is betzayed in the utterance, For what the thinker hus striven to clear away the reader or listener supplies ancw. “Soul” and “God” carry their history heavily with them, By a not too peculiar frony we rend heir philosophical future back into oar Greek past in a variety of ways, One hus experience of a ‘Whticheadean and Nletzschean Placo, a Thomistic and Hegelian Aris- toile, and even an ) Diogenes, As in much else, the Greeks {invented this perticuler historical fallacy. Iti cleat that the Stoics read, Meuselves Gack Into Heraclitus; end the Neaplatonists, lotaus 2n{0 Plato. Tis aa obvious necessity to make some sort of attempt at coming to the Guecks on tieir own terms, This can, T chinit, best be accom- plished not by the usual chronclogical and historical approach that, for all its divisions into “schools” and “successions,” obscures rather than Mlumiaatos the evolutious we auight otherwise élscern in ancient philos- ‘phy, but rather from the Gicection of the problemasic as revealed by a consccative treatment of some of the basic ecncepts. This can he dane ino number of ways aud uu different scales, Bue the method and scale adopter in this work is the one most conformable to the needs of what, may be termed an “intermediate student” of the subject, not the beginner whe iy mebing Ins faa a-yusiatauue wiih Greek potesophy and. who would be better served hy @ histery of excient philosophy and, ezhaps, 2 dictionsry of basic terms, nox, on tho other faaad, the Drafescional echoler who would require a treatment Luds aivie unslve ‘an more nuarced. °vi | Greek Philosophical Terms ‘Since snch 2 “student” may be presumed to have some fauiliatity swith the material it has been judged safe to substitute, in a faicly Uasagh way, © tcrminclogy tronoliterated directly From the Greol- for their English equivalents in modes: effort at lightening the bis torical baggage. Jargon can be more easily cured than preconceptions, and it is this hope that promplo the frequery of #feicheien for alanent and physis for nature. There is, moreover, a complete English-Gresk ceresisindex at the end, ‘The following trontmont, then, singles out a few of the tees Fram the forest dat threatens to overwhelm all of us at times, and attempts to trace their progress from acorn to fully grown oak. Il also essays) if the metaphor may bo indulged « bit lenges, 40 digplay’ some af the interlocking reot structure. Each caury is thoroughly cross referenced, and if these references aze pursued there will emerge a fairly complete philecephict! context for each term, Every entry vill sryply some informacion, but meaning must be sought in the larger complexes. Finally, each entry is designed to be read with the texts of the philoso. phere themeclves, and there are full texinal cations at every step of the way. ‘These are the final elements in the construction of s fruitful context where the prior history of the concept will illuminate a philo- ophicel text, while the teat will ersbellich the nnderstanding of the term. ‘Both originals and translations of Plato and Aristotle are easily at hand. For the earlier and later philosophers she fellevring. will cover all but very few of the citations made ia the texte PreSocratics H Dicks Die Fragmente der Versokraitzer, sth-zth eds, edited by “W. Krant, g vole, Berl, 2694-1954. (Abbrev. Diels intext.) K. Kieeman, Anoilia to the Prosocretto Philocophers, Oxford, 14h ‘a translation of the fragments in Dies, 0.8. Kick nad TR Reven, The Prasaeratis Philosophers, Cambridge, 19573 texts and translations of some of the pre-Scer Post-Aristotelians Javon Asnim, Stosconum Veerrum Fragmsnta, 4 yl Lalli, sis gag. (Abbrev, SF in text.) CJ. De Vogel Greek Pallowphy: A Collection of Texts, vol, Ty Lesden, 1962. An excellent selection of texts, without translations, rom post-Aistotetian philosophy. prerace | olf “The following nuthors are also frequenty cited Actins, Placita, edited by H, Diels in Dowograpai Grucci, lim, 1 (aBbren. Audi ee) rept ree Bain So Diogenes Lert, Lincs ofthe EninentPhbaopher, ee one TET Mss, Lest Cash Library, Londo spey, (hiner Bile nee) Philo, Works, ed, and tranc. F, H. Celson ctl, 0 70 lassie Library, London, 1gag to date, "rormta Lace Cased Plotinus, Enneade, ed. E. Bréhier, 8 vols.; Paria, 1924-2998; trans, S. MacKenne, and o84 Londen, 2938, See 2698 ean Plutarch, Meralia, ed. and trans, V. C, Babbitt et al, Loch Classical Library, London, aga7 to date. Prochus, Mements of Theology, ed. and trans. E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1983, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, ed. and trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, g vols., Lendon, 199§-2953- va I would like to express my gratitude to the Arts and Science Research Fund of New York University for « subvention toward the prepexation of the manusctipt of this work, and particularly to the two selfess workers who immed the inscrutable text into clean copy, Eileen Markson and Kristin Helmers,Preliminary Note Language and Philosophy Philosophers have been uneasy about language almost from dhe beggin ning. The seulptor may curse his stone or the painter his oils, but nelther contemplates suing tor civaree. ke philosopher, on the ether hand, lives constently in the shadow of infidelity, now suspecting metaphor, now tautology, or occasionally succumbing to the ultimate despalt, the fear that he is dealing with momina tentum. ‘The Greeks! bouts with these maladies were cccasional and mild; they wore spared, moreover, the final indignity of dosertion to matheuasics, though the ation was long end serious. ‘hey trusted in names and their self. sssurance was such that they could even allord to be playful about them. And when they came to devising names for the strange new ings that chey themselves bad wrought, they approzched the task with both confidence and inventiveness. Prephilosophical language hed been sheped by popular usage and the sure transcendent intuitions of religion and mythology, Tae for ter wes, of course, uiarked by its predilection for things; but there ‘was, in addition, an accumulating store of more or less abstract terms Aowing fayui Ue moral sensiblilties of tae epic traditioa. Dike, time, crete, though calculable in purely waleriel terms, were already st hand as abstracts und the first generation of philosophers, who atill sub- esribed to wnt uf Uke poetic conventions, drew heswaly upon this epie Vocabulary. But for the rest, thore were things: gold, cheriots, the sou! (beyche), spears, end de spirit (shymes), all material objects and all capable of fairly previse lutal vation But there was another factor at work as well. The search for Understanding no more began with Thsles taan opie with Aristotle, All primitive men try Lo woune wy (ens Wi the wore muminous aspects of their envicomment throngh the media of situal and myth, aad the Hellenic version of the latter was a particularly sich and imaginative artempt st organising and explaining, hiyles levels ul reality tn some coherent fashion, Myth is, among other things, explenatian and, whatx | Greek Philosophical Terms ever dimensions its moralizing content might cssume, the didactic clement is never completely absent, “Myth wae the immod'ate foreraner of philosophy and provided it not only with cestain embryonic conceptualizations, but with insights into the working of the world as well. Myta already presupposes a world order, what the philnenphers wonld call « Rosas, but bases it chiefly upon the genealogical relationships between the gods whose family structure, derived [rom human paredigms, both preserved and sxplaised the over af sonnesttal reality. Tt also embodied the notion of shat was later to be called causality, though in its mythological form it might be better termed the principle of responsibility, since both it and the patterns of aver are founded on the characteristic mythological principle of anthropomorphism. The divine (cheion) had been perso: allzed by myth into a god (¢heoe) and could thus be linked nd system- atized and bald regpnasibte for phaenomena, ‘The earliest philosophers, for all their revolutionary achieve- ments, were indebted to the mythological world view, Eventually the anthropomorphir hases npon which is had been constructed came under attack, but the effects were not at first eritical since the pervasive Iylozoiom of those early thinkers enabled them to explain action and reuction in terme af the life and movement naturally inherent in mate- rial things, Once Parwenides had denied the hylezoistic premiss, however, the mythological personalized god reappeared. not, to be sure, is his grnsser Homeric shapes, but 38 an artist who molds or @ thibker who moves, both unmistakably personalized but deprived of physical aspect and will, ‘Thos, at the end of the philosophically abhorred infinive regress there was preserved what can be fairly identified as the god of the ythologers. What the philosophers had, in effect, done was to lay cnurlusfva claim to the entire intermediary area of secondury causality. Myth was banished from these regions and causality replaced responsi bility. But before this could be done or, rather, in the course of doing it, fn sew form of discourse had to be shaped and a new language to express it. If Thales did, indeed, say that water was the orcle of all igs (Atistotle, Mta. g83b), the wonder of it all is not so much the snbstitution of water for Zeus (the mythologers fd already person ified Oceanus to serve the same genetic i ee intr of oh for the mythologer's pater. “Thales (or perhaps Anaximander) was in eae ps oer than te coon mytolgloe of father and chose « term, ercke, already in fairly coramon use, 10 express the new concept, "The ulder senses of ave continued to be PRELIMINARY NoTE | xf employed, but 2 radical new dimension had been added to the lan- guage. ‘What did che philosophers do to language? At first they did nothing since they did not know, foriunstely perhaps, that they were philosophers and so continued to use words in their common accept- ance, which, as a matter of fact, tended to be in rather concrste, individualized sensea: the hot and the good were both some #hing. ‘The great terminological changes introduced by the philosophers—and an inspection of usage suegests that they took plave valy grudually—were tied to the “iscoveries” of incorporeality and nniversal predication or, to put it more baldly, the realization thst there were things and things, ‘The dimensions of this new order of reality. waich was not tied to objects ia the ordinary sense and which coald be generslined, were only gradually understood, and the stubborn “thisness” of language, conse crated by an epic tradition that revelled in the physical, never com- pletely disappeared. Its most obvious aftereffects are probably to be seen in the persistent Greek habit of philosophizing through metsphor. Just as the geometer might offer a proof “by construction.” so the philosopher was perfectly content to substitute analogy for analysis Language began to change. Prephilosophical staples like eros and chrowos (both of which myth had already appropriated for its own purposes), eidee, physie, and the alrcedy mentioned arche developed Rese connotations, while other old words like figle and stoicheion were expropriated for radical new purposes. The concrete yielded to the abstract, as poien, “just such a thing,” gives way to poiotes, “quality” (in Theact, x82a Plato pologizes for the awkward new term), In- deed, this progresses to the point where only names (Callias, Socrates) will serve to denote the individual, or to such Aristotelian peculiarities 28 “this comething or other here” or the untranslatable ¢o ti en cinai. ‘The combinatory powers of the language are tapped to describe the new complexities (hypostaxis, hypiokeimenon, symbebekos, entele- chia), and there appears a veritable treasure trave of abstract terms to identify newly isolated processes (apodeixis, synagage, phromesis, gene- sia, kinesis, ciathesis, nocsia). __ All these redinemenis and new formations led, in time, to a sophis- ticated technical vocabulary that bore Title resemblance to cominion ‘usage, Literery considerations also caine into play. A Stole pamphlet addressed to a popular audience will obviously make more concessions to the general than a commentary by Simplicius, but the impression of populenty m the former work may be heightened by the passage of ‘echnical terms into common parlance. Plato went to some pains towii | Greek Phi'esophicel Terms vary ais terminelogy in what scems to be w deliberate atterspt to reat the congeating of technice! terms, and the implication of the Socratic~ Centuiud Platonie Zalogue ie ctill that tora ranenmahly eaeated citizens ‘can sit down and discuss these matters, Whother this i the truth of the matter or mere literary thetorie we eenrot tell, But xv such premiss is vistlle in Aioretle who inciote on a stondlavlined technical nsage. With Aristo‘le the professionalism implicit ia the founding of the Academy comes of age in langage. Phileoopbieal language did became rachniesl even thougls stand ardizatioa was, and remains, an unfulfilled dream. Since the rreient philosophical tredtian was strongly oriented to schools there was a certain degree of consistoney within, say. the Platonic or Porinatetic School, But even here she pervasive pes'-Aristotelian thrust towsrd syncretism tanded to muddy the conceptual waters: Plotinus! use of ‘ideo will owe something to Phic, Aristctle, and the Stoics without, at the same time, specifying either the debt or its extent. ‘Whether this terminological virsuosity was for good or fori! may ‘be Aahoved. But it is clene that in manufacturing a pew euszency for a new way of seeing verlity the Greeks were borne by the counters themselves into a world Zar removed from this metarfal one, Most of the philosophers were at ave i. agrecing that this world of cone-ete, discrete beings is an exceedingly Cisorderly place and thet “there is no science of the indivieual Such was not true, however, of the newy eolated. univereal terms that, like the gods of the now disreputable ‘mythology, could be munipalated and, once endowed with an order of reality, could be constmeted into a world of orler ancl stability. The Platonic vidas ond tha Aristotelien Raieraria are, each in its own way, the Grecks’ ultimate tribute to language, and the Proclenn bosias nottor undoubtedly Its mest baroyxe monument: « universe in. which ‘every conenpt ix matched with its approptiate universal term and the phole wrianged in a hierarchical order of methematical precision aad exceeiling beauty. Preface Frelmmary Nove Greek Philocophical Terms English-Greek Index Contents ix 205,a adiaphoron: without difference, mozally indifferent or neuteal state 3. Since the end of man i, according to the oldest Stoic Foemu- le, t0 live harmoniously with nature (see nomos 2), the good will consist in those things which are helpful or have some value toward bis Kind of life, while evil will zeside in those things which make no such contribution (DL. vit, gd, 205). Between these two absolutely belpful and larmful clesses of acts (justice, prudence, moderction, etc. fon the one hand, cowardice, myusiice, immoderation on the other) there exists another gronip of things like life, health, end pleasure thst are charecterized as morally indifferent (adiephora) in that they have no immediste connection with the end of man (DiLy v3, 191-143). ‘They do, however, contribute to or impede that end indirectly and hence ars further divided (D.L, vir, 105-208) inte preferable acts Coroezmena). aete to he availed (apaprargmena), and absolutely indifferent acts, tke first category constituting the “duties” (offcia) cf ‘the Roman ethicians ard defined as those acts for whose performances some reasonable defense (ewiogor, probehitis) can be given (Cicero, De fia. 1,17, 58). 2, These latter distinctions provoked considerable controversy in, both the Stoa and the Academy. There was no question that one had & moral obltgasion to choose the good; what was at stake was the mocel implications of dividing the aciaphore into justifiable and nonjustiiable acts, There were those moral rigorists like Aristo of Chios and the Sceptie Pyztho who denied thut any moral valuc at ll could ke atx tached to these reasonzbly defensible and so “befitting” (hathekonta) ivities (Cicero, De fi. wv, 25, 85). Farther, the Sceptics’ attacks on evistemologicc! certitude hd its inevitable eects in the maval sphere und we find the two eminences of the New or Scoptical Accdemy, Areesiles and Camendes, advancing a theory that ence ccrtitude has been undermined the moral act can only be that for which some Tessonabie defense can he made, the former approaching te wow central Aothekonta by applying an intellecsual criterion (rationally probable, oulagon; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mata. vii, 153), Car~ headeo by putting forth an experimental var (lhe puctically probable, bitharon; ide, Pyrrh. 1, 247-229).4] aeR 43. ‘That shese attitudes, coupled, in the case of Carneades, with « sreachant criticism of Stoic epistemology, had an cifect on the thinking of the Stoa in eth'es is clear from its own focusing on the correct choice of the Aashekonta 2 the central problem of the moral life (Stobaeus, Eel. 13, 76) and its retreat from Zenc’s enclier insistence that virtne alone (in this coates:, life according te nature) suffices for man's happiness and its sdisaion of the need for satislactions flowing trom a correct choice of the Rathckonea (D.L. vu, 228). afr: ait 1. For Anaximenes the apeiron of Anaximander and the arvhe of all things was sir (Aristotle, Meta, oS4: Simplicius, In Phys. 24, 25), probably boseuca of ite connection with rests and life (ef. pmenmn) Te-was, as were most of the pre-Socratic arshai, divine (theion), Cicero, De nct. dear. t, 10, 26. The later popularizer of aer was Diogenes of ‘Apollonia who made it the substance of both soul (bevehe) and mind ‘nous), Les, 4, 5, en alBinity parodied by Aristophanes, Clouds, 227 . swat is striking in Diogenes? conception i, of course, the asscciation of 4 purposeful activity with his cer-nous (see telos) 2. The connection cer-pneume-psyche-roe-theion remained & con- stant one. ‘The aitlike nature of the soal is raised in Phacdo 690700; Cebes feacs it, but from another point it suggested a sort of impersonal immortality: the body might perish, but the peyehe would be seabe sorbed into the purest pact of the ar, i.e, aither (qu.), as yet undis- Linguished es a fifth element (see Euripides, Hels 1014-1016; Sup- pliante son-a04). Since the heavenly bodies (enraniet) Awell in the aitker ancthor possibility was that the soul riglit be adsorbed into the stars (see Aristophanes, Peace 332). This belief was incorporated into later Pythagoreanism, but with the reservation of aidher to the saprelu- nary world; it was the aer between the moon and the earth that was filled with deimones and heroes, D.L. vitt, 92; compere Philo, De gi and g whore the deimieneo are now angels, and the coneequent identification In De scmn. 1, 134-295 of the cor and Jacob's Ladder (Genceis 28, 12-1g)s see heron, agathén: soucthing good, the good, an ultimate rinefple, snmmnm bonum 1. Plato, perhaps displaying his Socratic heritage, gives one of Ae athiral vide 9 renteal position in his hierarchy: in the Republic (see sege yoge) the form of the Good stands at the center of the Platonic. Bate, and it ie the chief duty of the philosopher to contemplate i, 22H ‘soa (for the problems avising Sram its transcendence rt this stage, see Toporsusia), Fria, moreover, she term of the process ot cialetie (at aicktite, qv.). Pleic’s tnmning toward the conditions of the Aosmaas acuxeros | § cisthetos in the Jater dialogues js reflected in his gencral reflections on the Good in the Philebus; the contrasting claims of pleasure (hedene) and wisdora (phronesis) to be the highest good are Leing examined, and the coaclusica tures to un exeauination of the “mixed life” (see Zedone and the mixed result of the operation of rous and ancnke in the Timarus), which is fond to combine both pleasure and wisdom (gge-n4a}- What is notable here is not only tne Diencing of the erae im this life, but the presence of messure and proportion (642-66) and, ‘more importantly for Plato’s growing theiam, the advancing emer- ones of a transccadent, intelligent cause of good in the ualvoise (0 ‘bid. 26¢-gib and theas, nous). 2, Aristotle is critical of Plato's theory of the Good (see Eth. Nich. 1, 109f—1097), but what he understands hy that is clearly the eidos-agethon theory of the Republic (see ibid. ro9ga and Eth. Rud. 1, aaiyb). Yer he accents (Eth. Nich. 1, 1ogga) a Platonic definition of good as “that at which all things aim? for Aristode, this is happiness (eudaimaonia) (ibid. 1, 20972), defined 25 activity (prexie) in ac cordence with virtue (arete), ibid. 1, x100b5 and the highest virtue is theoria, ie. contemplation for ite own seke, tid. x, 1x770-b (For the Inighest type of stecria and hence the Cosle Good, cf. telas). The Tpicureans return to the position rejected by Sccrates (Gorg. 435¢—4oub), Plato (Phil, ssb-c), and Aristolle (Uta, Nich, vu, Aaggh-23548), namely chet pleastze (hadoas) ‘a the Highest good (DLL. x, 199). Ih the Ston the good was identified with the profitable (DLL. vtt,g and 101-103). ‘ Plotinus’ “theology” of the Good is to be found in Enn. v1, 35-48, jocluding (23) a description of the hierarchy of goods leading: up to the Ultimate Principle; the One (hen), which he identifies with the Good, is the Gnal unification of the Socratic and Parmenideua trains in the Platonic tradition, agénétos: ungenerated, mereated (universe) Tn De cocto 1 27ahe Adistile sys Vial all Ms prealecessony agreed at the Rosmoas tad beginning. Xenophanes is, perhaps, to be ex- chided from ther, on the basis of an interpretative reading of fre. 14 and 26, and surely the entire Fleatie schral eterrming from Pormen ides, with its banishment of gencais from the reslm of Being (sce om), i also to be excepted, as Aristotle specifically docs in Meta. g80b. In Tim. sb Plato clearly says that the Rosios is subject tw kenesis, Arstode, who cerlier in his career had supported the same position (De phil. fe. 18), tekes this to mean that it lad beginning in time and eriticizes it severely (De cvelo 1, 270b). But there was anather ‘otorprointiun uf die passage, ao Aciotule hiuiselt (ioe, et.) 18 aware, Put forth by Nenvctetes (see Plutarch, De an. proc. 10191), and6 | scxosros adopted by most later Platonists, that genceis here mesuis “in a perpet- uel state of change” (see on). The same interpretation, adapted to his erimarionist thearies, ean he seen in Plotinns (see Erin. 11. a. 2). ‘Aristotle is oraphatic ia his belief thet the universe is both ungenerated (agenetos) and incorruptible (aphthartos). ‘This becomes the basic position, but Philo, by reasoa of the account in Genesis, must, of ‘course, stand outside it (seo De oof 2, 7-9) Agndstos: inknown, unknowable 1 Because of che transcendence of God cercetn problems arlse In the possiilicy of his being an object of knmwlecge. A simple agnost- cism is held by Protagoras (Diels, fr. Song) where the question is separated inte lmowledlge of whether che gods exiet, and what their nature iss the agnosie problem treats more properly of the Jatter (en the question of their existence, ¢f seas) =. Because of the importance of traascendence in the Platoate tradition, the question of the knowability of God was centr! there; the Platonic proof text om the difficaity of knowing Gol wus Tin, 280, supported by the pessimistic remarks in Parm, 1gue-gza, Symp, 5122, and especially, 2). vit, g4xb-d. AAs is indicated in the cexts cite, the problem is the transcendence of the supreme principle, the “Good beyond Being” of Rep. v1, s09b (oes yperousia). Bat if the essence of God could not be apprehended divcetly, the saruc wal stinilur tenes uf Plato suggest alternative ways of knowing God, ways highly developed in later Piatonism (e.g. Albinus, Bpit, x and Maxinaas of Tyre, vi and xvint; compare Proclus, Blens. theol.s prop. ap). The raajor aves axe: 4) by induetive remrn to the source (epagoge, the mecievel vie eminentice); see Symp. aoge~211¢ and compare Plotiaus, Evin. 1,6. B) by analogy (anctogia); see Rep. vt, go8n-e and compare Plotinus, Bar. v1, 7, 63 because Preclus denied any participation (mietleais) between the One ard the rest of reality {Blem. theal., prop. 23), he is barred from the via anafoggize 5) by “removal,” negation (aphairesis; the véx negativa); see the first “hypothesis” of the Parmenides, which later Plaonists took in avery unhypothetical suse; Luuupese Plutines, Enm v1y 75 38+ 4d) by mystical union (eéstaxis); ef. Symp. 2100-2118, Ep. vib gqoc-43 compare nn. vt, 9, g-21 snd, for Plotinus’ personal auperience, Poephyry, Vite Plat 93; see her. ha dégmata: unwritten doctrines Sere eet edi wel iors he diene between whet Aristotle seys about Plaic's elde end the preservetl sccount in the dialogues is to presume that Aristotle, uo a member of aton | 7 the Academy, hed access to unpublished material (had not Plato said in Kp. vt, 54tc that he would never publish anything on the ultimate ‘nciples? ). ‘There are only twvo possible references to euch material ia ‘Aristotle; m Ve 2. t, 4oyt he revers to something called “On Philoso- phy,” possibly a reference to his own dialogue by that name, thoagh Iter commentators took it as a reference to a Phitonis lecture (cf. Sinuplicius, Zu De wn. 28, ;-u), atal iu Pgs. .v, zaub where he refers i Plato's “unwritten doctrines” (agrapha dogmata). What were these ‘agrapha dograta? "The one idensifinble possibility ie single lecture On the Cand” that Plato gave to a dicenchonted public who came to hear about happiness, but were treated to mathematics, geometry, and astronomy instead (Aristoxeinas, Harmonics mf, 0-1); it was atiended by Aristotle and othor members of the Academy. who took notes dhut they later published (Simplicius, Jn Phuy. 151, 453); cf. arithmos. ‘For a related problem as it concerns Aristotle, cf. exateriko Agraphos némos: unwritten law See nomos. allios: evestustiny, pecdwation in time (aidios kata chronon} Although che distinetion in terminology is not always m by the philesophars, tha concepts of feverlansing pendurntion é time” (aidioe) is senarate end different from “eternal” (aionios), ie., not belonging to the order of time (chvonos), but to the order ef eternity (ion, g.7. andl Plotinus, Ena, 1, 7, 9); “eternal” is used Toosely to describe both concepts, exg. the “eternity of the Ramos"; bat aidios is really a question of the occurrence or the possibility of occurrence of corrap‘ion (pithora), and so the concept will be discussed under aphthartes; see also alon, chroass. aién: lifespan, eternity a. Inte eaeliest at sna i sapheal use, om means a Ilte span; ils concepenal introduction into philosophy may be seen. in Parmenides, fr. 8, ine 5, where the denial of becoming (genesis) in trae being (see on) lends to its corallary, the ental of the ternporsl dictinctione "peat" and *fotare” and the affrmction of total present simultancity. Melissus Interprets this es apsirow, without Hit, olny, ou forerer (fts. 2,3, 4, 7), a notion later distinguished as uidés (q.7.), perdaration in time, ‘ne the seme type of interpresation may be seen ia Avstetle, De costo r #790 where aion cmbicaces “all time even to infinity Tapeiran].” doce, Tie ferdamental distinction between time (chronae) and aion ‘thot fy aoplied in Fermentdes Is made tatty exptiet in Fiato, Yim. 7d Where time is created to serve as an image (rion) of the state of the8 | arsrursts cide, rom which Plato, like Permenides, hss banished all genesis, ov us Plotinus pats it (Enn. 11n 7, 4), cion is the “mencer of existence" of ‘ny. But Plato's admissicn, through the intermediery of the soul, of both mous and Aincria into the intelligible world creates 2 problem unknown to the static universe of Purmenides. The solution 3s to be foutd ia Aristotle’: discussion of the First Mover whose “span of existence” (aion) 18 unending (esting), Mesa. ro7aty, the rexso for this is the peculiar type of activity invalved in a noesis thinking itself, what Avistotle calle ihe ctivity of immobility? (energeio ebinesias) jus Bue, Nich. xspqb. This is the Foundation of the troatmaent of eternity, both Plotinus, Zim. 111, ,4and Proclus, Elem, theal., prop. 554 in the following proposition Proclus hypostatizes aion es a separate sub- cionce, penbably a¢ a result of n similar practice in later Greek religious thought, See chroaas. aisthasis: perception, sensation 1. Perception is a complex of problems rather than a single ques. tion, It enters philosophy modestly enongh as an attempt on the part of the early physikoi to explain the physiological processes involved in perceiving a ob ec. variety of sohutons were worked vuty anstly ia terms of the contact, mixture, or peneiration of the bodies involved. "There were, of course, certain anomalies as, for example, the case of vision where contact was apparertly absent, but dhe first major exisis did not oveur until grades of knowledge were distinguished and sense potception was separated rom another more reliable type of perception that had Title or nothing 20 do with sensible realities or sensible processes, Aisthesis found itself involved in the epistemological doubts raised by Heraclitus ond Parmenides and debarred from any genuine access to truth (se2 alethsia, dowa, episteme). i 2. Other changes were afoat as well, ‘ae patticle or somatic theory typon which the physiéors theory of perception was bused began to be replaced by theor‘es on change that took as their point of depar~ fure a new dynamic vlew of che “powers” of dingy (sex dynarsia genesis), Aristotle, who was a dynamist, incorporated the analyses worked out for change in sensible beings into his mecaphyste and for The firse time wiethecis became a philosophical questing ae wll as 2 physlotogtcal one. i nal ‘3. A third major change was precipitated by the growing beliet in the inrarporesl nature of te soul (dryer, q.v.), the principle of in beings and the sontee of their sensitive activtics. What then was tae general relationship between the immaterial soul aad the snaterial ody, and the specie ane between that past or faculty of the soul Known ae cistheris and thet pret of che body whit 1 euployealy eo onganon? What had once been a simple contact between bodies was aastarssis | 9 now extended to a chain of causality that began with a perceived body and its qualities, and passed, via 2 medinm (this in the still perplexing jestion of vision), @ sanse organ, and a sense faculty to the soul, ing, at least for those who Held the immetenahty ct the soul, rnoneorporeal at some point in the process. 4. Finally, beginning with Parmenides’ atiack on aisthesis and his caaltetion of epistome as the oaly gentine source of truth, iewas no longer possible io treat thought (noesis, phronesie) as auerely « quunti> tetively different form of aichesis, but as different in kind, and inereas- ing attention wae paid mn heth the Faeriry snd the pracess oF this higher type of perception (see now, noesis). ‘5 These, then, are some of the complexities of the problematic of aisthesis. ‘The chief ancient authority on the subject, Theophrastus, whose treatise On the Sensce is the major source of what we know of the ancicat thcories, prefers to approach the question from a physical point of view. The opening paragraph of his work distinguishes to types of exptenation of how attznesis cccars. One school bases it ou the similarity (homoion, q.v.), the other on the opposition (encntion) of the knower and the thing known. The first group includes—on the testimony of Theophraanin Parmenides, Empedocico, and Pleto; the latter, Anaxagoras and Heraclitus, 6. "The reference to Parmenides is, of course, to the second part of his poom, “The Way of Soeming” (ote om, episteme). We know that Permerides had scant epistemological respect for aisthesis (cf. fr 7), and it is not at all clear that the theories put fort in the “Way of Sceming” are indeed his, Bat whet emerges from Theophrastus’ sum- maty (De sens. g-g) is that “Parmenices” held thet sensation and thinking (phronesis) were identical (orhatever else he may have be- Jieved, it is certain that the genuine Parmenices never held thar), axa that knowledge rises frou tle preseuce of ideutival upposiees (en tia) in the subject and object of knowledge, so that, for instance, even 2 ‘corpse, being cold, can perceive cole. 7. Wheneoever thorny this notunlly i, ft hed a marked effect on Empedocles, who had a feirly elaborate theory of sensaticn aad who, unlike Parmenides, took the seiises seriously (fe. 3 ies y-33). For Enpedocles materiel things are constituted by mixtures of the four beste clemeuts (staisheta, qv.) “running through each orher” (fr. 21, lines 1-14). Each object gives off 2 constant stream of effluences (cporrhoai, fr, 89) that enter the congruent passages (porci) in the sppavusiaue seins amd sensation ensues (Theopnrattus, We sens, 7 Avistetl, De gen. et corr. 11, zaqb). But itis not merely a question of symmetry between the effinence and the pores what ie also required 's iat lke eames in contact with like om the level of substansel ve ace arch with eerth, fre with fre { Avistotle, Mete. x000b).ro | aisrursts 8. When it comes to a question of thought (fhronesis), Emped- cles sccms to be moving toward a distinction between it and sensc- tion, but still on the quanticative lovel. For him, as for the Atomists, it isa speciel (ype of seusation that c¢curs in the blood (lasace the heart ag the seat of thought) since dhe Llvod appears to Empetlocles to be the ‘most perfect blend of the stzichela (fr. 105; Theophrastus, De sen. 6). 9. The Armiscs, wha had recuced all things to the atoms (atoma) ang the void (enor), appropriately redced all sensetion to contact (Aristotle, De sens. 4422), and explained its operation in terms clearly dorived from Empedocles. Hore too bodice give off effvencco, now called eidole (4.v5 ef. Alexander of Aphrodisina, De sons. 56,12), hat are similar in shape to the thing whence they are emitied. These enter the sentient, o° eather, penstra‘e between the atoma of the ser tient, and sensation results (Aetius tv, 8, 10) 30, This may have been Leueippus’ theory; but as fer as the tcoublesome question of sight is eancerned, Democritus seems to have added ce-tain refinements, again suggestec by Empedocles. The visual image (emphasia) occurs net in the eye of the beholder, but is due to a contact fn che air between the object and the beholder. When once Formed the emphasts travels back along the air and, being moist, is admitted by the moist éye of the beholder (Theophrastus, Dz sens. 505 compare Empedocles In Aristosle, De zens. 4g7b—438a). ‘This explanee tion ie interesting not only ineofzr as it tune atention to sir a8 a medium of perception, but also in indicating, by the reference to the moisture of the emphasis and the eye, that Democritus has likewise Founded the possibility of sensation, is distinct from the mere mechar= ies, on the principle of ‘Tike knows like.” a1. Theophrastus (bid. 49) remark chat the Atomists explain sensation in terms of change (cllciosia). This can hardly be qualitative change as understoud in the Aristotelian sense since the Atomsts are on record as having reduced all the pache of a thing to quantity (see fothos); it must refer rater to the motion of the impinging atuma fstarbing the pustion uf the slowes fu the peveiptent (vompace Lucre tite 11, 246-257). All sensations can be explrined in terms of the ‘various shapes nod movements of the ctvma in contact with the pereip Tent (Theophrastus, Ne srra 66); what wa experiance as sweetness and heat and color are no more than subjective impressions (Fr. 9; nomos, pathos). ao. Empelocles and the Atomists, then, are firmly within what “Theophrastus cells the “like-knowesrlike” tradition. Here teo belongs: Diogenes of Apolioaia for whow the arcte of all things was cer (q-7-)> which des equal service as the principle of all exgnition (‘Theophras- tus, He sens. 39). Knowledge uccury whea wis vutside Uke viper mized with that which is within, both the purity of the entering air and austansis | 72 the diffusion of the resultart mixture determining the type of cognition. ‘Tous hrm he eal when both the inhaled air purer andthe isture of blood aad air is spreed throughout the body (ibid. 44; eB ws ine remark in Aritephanes, Clu axy-aga). ag. At the head of the opposite tradition stands Alemazon of Croton, ar early disciple of Pychagoreanism whose opinions we kaos only 9 a suxmmry unacoumpanted by much evidence or derail (Theo erastus, Me sens. 23~06}), He rainisined that the like is known by the tlie that the brain ie the seat of the geyehe (see hardia), and, more Importantly, that there io a difference between aisthaoia and phronoaie, Ie this distinction that sets man apert from all the other animals and ‘hereby grounds an intollectualist ethic, 2s well as being at the root of the quest for the higher. immaterial faculty of the soul, the Jogistiki of Pluto and the dicnoetike of Ariscotie (see peyche), and the progeni- tor ofthe exalted role of nsws (q.¥.) in the subsequent history of Greek philosophy. But we only know that Alemaecn made this distinctions we €o not know on wha: grounds, though it is almost certaialy tied to the well-known Pythagorean belief in en immortal soul (see pryche, athan- atoo, palingenesia), a “Like Laows unlike" appears again with Anaxagoras, and hrere it is based on the empirical evidence that scnsstions, especially tactile seasations, rest ou contrast, eg. we feel the cold beceuse of the Jest within us (Theophrastus, De sens. 27), a thasry thee io in perfect avcord with Anaxagoras’ doctrine of “a partion of everything in every- thing” (sce staicheion). Further, every sensation, since it is » change, 4s accompanied by psin (ones; compare hedone). a5, In the Theaetetus (igg-ag7d) Plato presents a theory of sensation that is ostensibly attributed to Protsgoras or some such varieyy of a Hereclitan relativist. But since it is not refuted in the sequel and coheres with other passages in the dislogues, it is not unlikely that it represents Plato's owal views on sensation es well. It hinges on the point, frequently made by Heraclitus, tha: among the ‘isthata tse oy recity is change, of, co put ILha Cie language of e aur sophisticated generation, the aistheta axe not really substances but ualities (see pathos; Plato makes the serae point in Tim. gob go, and Compare sicicheion): they nen powers (dynein) wit the eapacity of cither affecting (poiein) othor things or being affected (pasciscin) by them (Theat, 1362). It may likewise be true, as earlier thinkers liad insintained, that the kovmos Is nothing else but Aincsis (Pov. cit.), but sre too further refnements are possible. Even at this stege (see Pheer. a83c) Plato is capable of dividing the generic Ainesis (qwv.) Into alteration (allaiosis) and locomotion, qe Beis sridhiw dais Woutest diac he Platonte theory of sensation Nafelds, It finds its most generic statement in Phil. gy1-3qa and Tim.ga | Aisrnnsts 642-4, The dyaamis of the agent acts upon the body of the patient. If the affected part is an immobile one in which eerth predominates (eg, bone, hair) the affection is not snreed; pain or pleasure might result, ‘but uut sensation, But if it is mobile, like one of the sense organs, the affeccion spreads until it reaches the consclonsness (phronimen) and senseticn results (compare Tim. age, and see psyche 17) 17. Toth these passages would seem to suggest that perception ie 8 pure passibiliy in the pereipiant; but when Plato turns to a diseussion of sight he resches back to Empedocles and Demecritus for the theory ‘that makes the image (emphasis) » cooperative piuluutive of but Ue ‘object and the subject. Both ere essentially qualities in a state of change (alloiass), but once brought within range of each other, and with the aid of the light af the sam (Tim. sgh), the dypomie of whiteness in the object and the quality of light in the eye initiste Jocomotion and this “gives birth” to eclor, which causes the eye zo be seeing and the object to become a colored thing (Theast. 1560~e). ‘These cualitative changes, when reported to the coul, result in sonsa- tion (Tim, ggc-d, 810-4). The Theactctus passage goes on (3578) to Ataw the Heraclitan moral: if the subject and object are not within range of each other we have no very certain idea of what the dynamts the objec: is relly like (or Plotinus’ changes, see sympatheia), 38, Plato appeats, however, to be speaking out of heth sides of bie month. His theory, aa this denestbod, ia otrongly dyanaiatie in ita Bnking of the pethe with the powers and in suggesting that the dy- nama ig real quality inherent in the perceived object (cf. Theopiras- tus, De sens. 60). But he hes also, in his other account of postcosmie: genesis (q,v.), reduced all bodies to the geometrical solide and so, in the last resort, his account of the sensible pache in Tin. 61d #. smacks of a variety of Atomism with its reduction of quality to quantity in the order of shape (schema), position (chesés), and movement (dinesis), in this instance, of course, locomotion. 1g. Aristotle rejects hoth the Atomistie and Heraclitan taint vist- fe tn Flaws chery’ uf uisthesis. Put iu its amust genered (esnusy alse esis in the reception cf a sensible eidos without its matter. Aristotle can, like all his predecessors, explain sensatfon in physical terms, and tne doce so subsequently by applying the physical dortrine of the “mean.” But frst he Iceates the entire problem of cognition within the cadres elrea¢y enunciated in the Physics and the Metaphysics: act (Cenergeia) and poteucy (dunaniis). To perceive something means (wo things: to be able to perceive something whether one is perceiving it oF not, and actually e perceive, Thus, any sensible faculty of the sok though it may be the gides or cusia of the organ in which iz operates {jst as me payone as a whole Is the vustz of the eure Ludys De wn 1 $2), it is, nevertheless, a capacizy (dynamis) with respect to the perceptible objects it is potentially’ (dyaamei) what the object is ac atstuxsis | 33 tually (entelecheta; ibid. 1, 4182). This coheres with what was said of the sdlationship of energeia/dynamis in the central passage on the inbject in the Metaphysics: energcia is prior to dyaamiz (the chjoct gust be red before the eye “becomes sed; see De er. 11, 425b) and the fenergeia ends as en actuality in the ding moved Cision %s in the eyes ‘bid. 11, 426a); see energeia and Meta, 20502. 40. Sensation may he deserthed, then, as zn alteration (ailotosts) jathat it represents the passage from potency to actuality of ome of the ‘sense faculties, In this way tco Aristotle can resolve the problem of Slike kuews Tike.” Anaxagoras was corrcot in suggesting the: ‘ike knows unlike” since otherwise change could not take place; but this is only the way in wich the process begins; when it ends the subject kas thorame Tike the object kuown (De an. 1s, 417a~2180). ‘ax. The explanation becomes somewhat clearer when Aristotle turns to describing the sensation precess in purely physical terms. Physical bodies heve perceptible quelities that differentiate therm; these fare the “opposites” (énantia, g.v.), hotcold, moistdry, ete. The per- ceiving subject too, being corporeal, possesses them, But if it is to porecive them in another, the appropriate organ (orgarion) must be i 2 sate of belance with regard to thesc extremes. Aristotle sces the capacity to perceive as a kind of mean or proportional state (mecates, logos) between these extreme opposites so that it is “actually neither, Dut potentially both” (ibid. 1 4804042). For Aristotle's distinction between sensation and thought, see nozsis; on the question of a medium (metaxt) for sensation, see sym patheia. 22, Axistotle goes to some pains to distinguish mere contact from ‘the senéation of touch, Plaats are ative and thus heve a mutritive soul (threptike payche); ie., they ace affected by things; they cbsorb the form as weit asthe matter of the things other Unan themselves, But they donot perceive, as auiiuals do: the function of the aisthetibe poycke, the istinctive ousie of eximals, is to receive the form of sensible things selthowe the matter (ibid. rt, g2qach) aint sv he subject iw the ene quemt pathe of appetite (orexis), pleasure (hedone), and pain (ibid. 11, 444b).. This distinction disappears in Epicurns; an eidos without Agle Was and remains rinthinkahle in the Atwmist trodition. Sensation is gain reduced to contact, and the diferent sensations explained in terms of the shape, arrangement, and motion of the atoma (see Lacre- thus tr, 91_477, especially 494-495). Where the contact is not immed 4, ac 1a vislon, the theory of efflacuces iy once agsin invoked: bodies hve off outlines of themselves ia due forua of eidala (qos the stnidacra OF Lucrotize wv, gg-so 7.) thut, if the eye be turted toward. them, Fmpreeo aheis pattein vu de vye wil set in ratn sensadlon (DLL. x, 16-50). 23, But some of the old Democritean positions now seem unteneag | AtermEsts able. Epicurus still helds to the essenticl corporeality of the soul (ef. D,L-x,65), butits relationship te the body has been redefined (gos the remarks of Lucretius 1, 270 f.), amd x new imsrediea: added, the mysterious “nameless element” (See ptyche 27 for both develop- ments). It is the organic grouping (sex holon) of the latter’s atoms thet tranerits sensation, which is the motion of the atoma, to the ather ‘constituonts of the soul, thence to the rest ot the body (Lucretius 111, 24z-ag1, 271-272), a process that is possible only because the eoul atoms are contained within the sheath (stegezon) of the body (D.L. x, O43 see genesis). ‘24. From the time of Aristotle a new affitmetive note appears in the epistemology nf aisthesis. For Aristotle himself the senses are incapable of error with regard ta their peaper ahjerts (Ne an mr, 428b}, but in Epicurus it becomes, in one form or other, the only Criterion of truth (Sextus Empfrious, Adv. Matz. virr 95 D.L. x, 513 Lucretius 1¥, 470, sce onereeia, prelepsie). Among the Stoies the same ‘assent to the truta of the senses is found (SWF 11, 78). This assertion of physiological accurecy is, however, of little significance since for them, as for Aristode, truth in its primary sense isa noetic function, I is only when the ‘mpressions (zyposeis) ot the sense orgens are car ed, via the pouma (q.v.s see peyche), to the rational faculty (liege= mmonihon, qv.) and there assented to (see bataleptis) that primary ruth fs possible; see pheontevay noesis 16. 2g. The operation of aiethoris is ‘ust part of the larger Stoic problem of the materiality of the patie (qv.). Zeno's use of the expression “innpression [ty#'nsie] on the hegemaniken” (SVE 1, $8: “Aristotle had used the sume expression: De mem. 40a) provoked a reaction on the part of Chrysippus who attempted to palliate the mate: rislity of the image by substituting expressions like “alteration Theteroicsis] in the hegemonikon” (Sextus Empiticus, Adv, Math, vat, 1295) 257) ot by reducing all the pate to judgments (Carisetss SVP mt 4; sec nocsis 17) toe eee rina sccount of sensation begins whin the ucepinas of the Aristotelian premiss that the soal is an cides of the body (Jin. 1, ty 4 but see Aule 22). The composite ie the animal, senses because of the pueseuce of the soul {1y 15 7)» but che coul itself Ze impossible (opatines): its Zeeultes are like reflections of itself thet enable the things that possess them to act (1,1, 8). ‘7 ‘Tho conl in an of fiself is capable only of intellectsal a ity. How, then, is che contact with the. sensible (aistheton) achieved? ‘Thio is to Function of the corporeal organs of the body (2¥, 5» 4) that are capable of serving as intermediaries. The organon ts the matenal thing that is affected (pathein}, and the pathos of the organ rep:ese. ‘2 propertional mean (mera hte logon) between the sensible objec! and the noctic subject (1, 4.295 the language smacks of Aristotle but armen | 25 ‘the concept clearly owes something, as does indeed the Aristotelian secs itself, to the Platonic notion of limit; ef. peraa). In this way the fpatie, which are corporeal in the organ (and this is 2 typo of aistihe- sis), axe noetic When they are received by the soul (and this is tru distheiss 1, 1, 7). The function of the organ, then, is w convert the impressions ( poseis) on the seuses into activations (energetei) of the soul sv thn dhe inaosibiliy of Ue suul cay be matnrained against ‘the Stoios (compare t1t, 6, 1}. The process of judging these intelligible forms transmicted from the sense is discursive recsoning (dicricia; Y, 1, 9) 286 s0e0i# 19-20. For the extexsion of the similarity principle beyond the bounds of cisthesis, see sympatheia, afsthésis koiné: common sense, seustus communis In Ariston psychology the “common sense" isa faculty of the payche that has as its fonetion 1) the perception of the “common fensibles" that are the object of no single sense: movement and rest, number (arithmas), shape, size (De an. 4182, 4236), 2) che pereaption of things incidentally sensible (loc. cit.), g} the distinction between senses (ibid. qgaa-b), aul 4) he pesveptou iat we poreetve (oid, sb). aisthetén: capable of being perceived hy the senses; the object of the senses, lhe sensible (opposite af noeton) ‘The sensibles (aistheta) ate frequently contrasted to the Platonic orm (ie se Phono 87am Tim. ace), and as such can Isad only to opinion rather than to true knowledge (see dava, cpistsme). But they are not the lowest objets onthe pistemologial sealer ay fare uuly sefiserdons of the truc reality of the ee, bat Leaeath them are the “images of images,” shadows, reflections, etc, (Rep. so9d-sioa: Cf. eikon mimesis). Plato's giowing interest in the world of the isthets io the Inter Gilugues ‘a rofccted in thele Wwiog yreuted a Guasibeing, (Soph, 2ogb), and in bis devotion of « large part of the Fierazus (0 w description of their creation snd operation. For Aristotle fhe sensible singular abject is the only tra vealtty (nce fade ti, 0 Boi): some are apprprite wo ividal sane, othere are como, Dean. 1, 4r8e (see cisthesie Keine}. For the mataria‘ists of the Atom St Uradition all of truth and all of reality isin the aiseheta, so Epicurus Seats Rmpiniens, Adv. Math, vit, G5 sce alsthcuis, cidoton- ‘etymology (ancifal) iy ginun ia Plaiw, Gros. gob. Tt ts the Eatest form of ser (Phaedo roge1i0b. Tim. 584). For Aristotle it tutes a fifth clement (guinis cesentia), moving naturally in eter-26 | arrow nal cizculas moticn, the stuff of the heavens (De eoelo 1, 68-270b ), “The “ith clement* soon makes its sppeatance in the Academy as well, in Philip of Opus' Lpinomis o8zb where it has the added virine of corresponding to the fifth “Platonic body” (see staicheien). "The pres. ence of aither, with its “natural” (physei) circalur movement (De coelo 1, 26qb) alsa leads to Aristotle's dropping the theory of heavenly octes “possessed by saulss see ouraninl, Cicero (ching Arisomte?) suggests that now i also composed of aither (Acad. post 1,7, 25): see 200m, stoickcion, hosmoo, aphthartoe; for the material element involved, ace hyles aftion (or aitia): culpability, responsibilty, cause > Since meraphyeioe fs defined ax a study of ultimate ceuses, Aristotle begins his work cn the subject by a detailed review of his predecessors) seexch for causes (iMeta. gSg2-ggga; recepitulated 882-5). Plato has no formal treatment of causelity as sich, though there is a criticism of the preSocratic senreh for 2 moving cause in Phaedo gsd-cod, Timacua 48e—470, ond Laws Bgac, where the earlier ‘physicists are blamed for mistaking accessories (synaitia), which oper- te from necessity (anante) and wlthout foreliigont desigu (cevizue), for the only genuine cause of motion, the prycke (compare Aristotle De an. 41ga and symbehehos). But in Phi, a€ca7e he reduces reality to @ formal (see Perea), an ficient (nee Zemiaurgor), and a “material” (see apeiron) element. '. Aristotle's own doctrine of four cevses—formal (eidos), mate- vial (hile: sve alse Rybokeimenon), effciont (inoun), and final (te Joe) is to be found in Phys. 11, 1945-1950 and Meta, ro1ge—a014a- One peculiar development of the dectrine is the identification of the material cause with the premisses of a syllogism that necessarily caase” the conclusion (cf. Anal post. 1, 9485 PAys. 0, 3958). There is nother, more ethically oriented division of the types of canselitics in Eih, Nich. 11128. Later philosophers made some additions to the Aris~ totelian shalysise Philo's (eyo is the instrumental cause of creation (De cher. 9g, 128-127), eré Seneca (BP. 85, 8) xs a Tist of five. For unintended causes, see tyche. alétheia: truth The presence und even the possibility of truth is closely related 10 she Grek distin mong dave nd epon( ».) and sel cr objects. Thus there is really 99 critical problem unt ¥ermen= Her distinguishes lug from ooubelng, sonst the Inter wih sense perception, asserts that there is no truth in the phenomenal world of dose (Lives, #8. 2981, #11, 3p), aul Wuulagsia the Iaticr wth the Way of ‘Truth (ihid. 264). A8 a corollary of this and of te axaunnsts [27 sealization of the arbitrary nature of laws and customs (se2 nomos), Protagoras propounded his theory of the relativity of trath, described in Plato, Theaet. 151¢—152e, r61e—r8za, Aristotle's theory of teuth and fatsity fests on the assumption that truth is not m things (Meta. 1027-1028), not in our knowledge of simple substances (where only ynowlodge cr ignorance is possible), but in the judgment, ic. the Jousing together of coneopta which do mot corrcapond to th scality (Ueto. 10810, De an. rr, 43083 see daxz). For Epionrus all our seuse perceptions ere trac and thus eisthesis, seustion, isthe ultimate crite- on of truth (Sextus Empirivus, Ade. Math. vari, o: Enere rerum nat. W, 486-479; see prolepsis). The Stoic eriteria are described in DL. vin, 57. “The possibility of error and falsity is discussed under dave and ness. Algos:_pain Sethedine alegorta: allegorical interpretation, exegesis Bex tyihos, thes. allofésis: change, qualitative change, alteration See pathce, rctaboleycisthesl, analogia: proportion, analogy Seougnowivn, dike, theske, vam. andmnasis: remembrance, recollection ,, Plates anreptanen of the Bythagorean theoty of rebicth (ace palingenesia, payche) provided the opportunity for solving « secious epistemological problems, ie., ioiy does one know the unchanging real. fet already formulated by Soorates as ethical definitions and en route to becoming the Platonic eide, portiuerly if sense knowledge (see 'osa) is so clearly untrustwrcrthy? ‘There will be later sclusione, like Gros ard dialehtike, but in the frst instance i: is ancmaeeia that guatan- so this Luowleilge. In eno Soebbe Sccrates hee. ilustrated the possiblity of eliciting, by mesns of diagrams (these will reappear in co. Stod; see diarioia, mathematika) and proper questioning, kuowl- cee nF objects jseapable of bsingporeived by tn acuns; ia Paedy 7277" it io offered as a proof of the preexstence of the soul and nected with the docttne of ci, We lave knowiedge of the eid URE we cannot have acquired through the senses. therefore tt mont e been acquired in a prenatal state during which we were in contact,28 | aNANKi with the forms. The theory appears once again ina mythicsl and religicus context in Paaedrus 24g-c, and at least by implication in the vision geanted the souls before their bisth in Tro. 4xe-2b (compare the viston in Phacddrus 247e-2gMb, and the diticulty m recalang it, ibid, agge-2508) ; see eidos, amiuke: uecowily 1. The pre-Socratic use of anenke is not uniforu; in Paraenides (Diels, fr. 98497), it governs all things in an almost providential maannery in a not very different Fachinn from ite personification fn the *Mych of Ex” in Plate’s Rep. 614¢-6214, and the Orphic figure in Ema pedocles (Diels, fr. 135). But with the Atomists (see D.L. 1%, 455 Diels fr. 672) we enter the area of the mechanical necessity of purely ‘physical causes operating without purpose (éelos). 12, For Socrates and Plato true causality always operates with purpose, while the operations of the physical elements are merely Conditions ot “accessory causes” {synaitia) (see Phoedo cb, Timacus (6c). Yet aranke too has its roe in the formation of the Acsmoss reason (nous = Demiourges) overcomes physical necessity (Timacus 47e— 48x). Nevewsity, the quasi-eause, is oaly worth studying for ite relation hip with nous, the divine (theion) cause, ‘In Aristotle cnanks bo varied meanings (see Meic. 10151~¢), but as in Plato the physical necossity in matter must submit, not 60 rmtch t9 nous as to Uhe purpose (telos) in his new understerding of physis (Phys. 1, 2904). The role of enanke in syllogistic reasoning should also be nated: the conclasion of z valid spllogisa: flows necessar- ily From the premisses (Anal. pr. 1, 24b) For azcessty in a providential sense, ste Aekmarmene, proavia, anaplérosis: filling up See hedone, apithcias unaffected, without pathe (qv) Pathe Avsttlia concep of vistaey $id, a i pon the doctsine of the mean (meson, y.v.)s las a0 place for che stete of rpatheia, 1: does, however, have a sixaificance in his psychology: #8 the apparent epathefa of nous that suggests that :his faculty, unlike he peyohe, ie incorporesl and immortal, since the pathe are elways 435% lated with matter (De an. 4oga, 408) 4 ‘The situation with Hpicurus ts somewhat mure eussyhes, Since both plessuro end pain are pathe (DL. x, 31), there cam be re question of apatheia being a virtue in this hedonistic philosophy. Bat he Miglsat type of pleasure fe, for Epionme, prerisely static. (see aremon | 79 hedone), and this state of equilibrium or freedom from disturbsnee (averasie) has at least a superficial resemblance to apatheia, ‘, The radical point of diference between Epicurus and the sstoics in this regard is the latter's insistence that all the patie axe jratioaal movements against nature, at least as defined by Zeno (SVF 3, 203, 2065 see Rorzme), This created dificulties for Chrysippus wao fused to ste hw irnativual eects could weur hi dhe rational faculey (hegemonibon; see SVF 111, 459, 461). But though the intricacies of this were debated, the Ston was nt one in agreeing that the fathe were Juth vielont end wanatural and hence ehould be extixpated (nee Sancca, De ira1, 8, 2-35 SVF 1, 207, u2, 989). Thus it would seem that the Stoic js oonceracd with eradicating the pathe, the Periparctic with mederat- {ng them. and the Enicurcan with discriminating betwreen the good and evil among them (sce Senece, Ep. 126, 2), attitudes reminiscent of the Gifferent approaches to Aatharsis (q.v.) as harmonization and purgs- on. 4. The practice, if not the enunciation of apatheia had its origins in the Cynic and relzted movements immediately preceding Zeno, and ‘was Frequentiy accompenied with the charge that its practitioners were aucicly indulging in insensitivity (Seneca, Zp. t, gy ),'The Sivks were at some pains to distinguish their version of apatheie from insensitivity or from mere stupidity (D.L. vii, 2275 Seneca, Ep. 1, 9, 3). Indeed, it fe Ieely that it was exactly thie typeof etiticlam that resulted in the later Stou's uot altogether consisten: distinction between good (eupath- iad) and evil pathe (D.L. vir, 136). 4peiron: unlimited, indefinite 1. The arche (q.v.) ofall things was, according to Anaximander, the gpeircn, the unlimited. ‘Phe term is capable of various constructions Sepending on how ons understands the lime (peras, qv.) that is being denied in the compound word. Aristotle includes ix his Physics lengthy discussion of the vatious meanings of the word (zoab-206a), Some of which, e.g. spatial infinity, may be rejected ae being angchry istic to Anaximender's thinking. What is involved in his idea of apei- ron is perduration in time (sce Diels, fr. »3 and aidios, aphthertos), an {nfinite supply of basic substance “so generation [zenesia] and destruc- ‘ion [phifcra} not fall” (Aristotle, Pliys. rrr, 2ogb), end, finally, inds- ternination, Le., without internal limits within which the simple physi Gel bodes, afr and weter, were not as yet distinguished (Diels, #r. ett; Arlowile, Pays. 1 187a). At 1s also possible that Ancximander visual- this imge mrss of materie! tha! surrounds our keerave (Aristotle, 4 beginning or end, ia ‘id. 2c3b) 28 a sphere, and so without limi een20 | Apmarmests 2. The subsequent history of the concept as underetood by Anaxi tmandet lies in the direction of ax interest in the exnct nature of what is outside the furdhermest sphere of ouranos (q.v-), which matks the limit of our universe (ste kexon). With the Pythagoreans new con: erations lead into other aspects of apeiron; Limited and Unlimited stand at the head of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites cived in Anstotle, Meta, gsta. ‘this is no longer the apeiron of Ansximander, but either the spatil limit (or its absence) inhetent in the Pythago- reans? geometrical approach to numaber and becies (see arithmoe), or clsc.a nasical concept where linait (porae) So thoagt of ac the impoot tion of some finite measure {in terms of music, harmonia; in terms of mathematics, proporlion or ogos) upon a coatinaum infinite at either food This type af dnal infinity is the reason. Aristotle conicctures in Phys. 01, 206), way apeiron pessed into the nction of “indellaite dyad” (see dyes). ‘The latter of the twro points of view is probably the one that lies bebind Platc’s employment of peras and apeiron es principles of being in Phil. age-agb (the earlier use, ibid. gc—a7a, seems to refer to amore indefinite multiplicity of particulars), 3 The promincace of apeiron in the Philebue guaranteed its continued use #8 a metaphysical principle in the subsequent Patous tradition, bue wid somemhot diferent emphases, For Plato feras snd ‘apeiraa appear as co-principles in much the same way the chora of the Timecuo exists cide by cide with the eide. Indeed, Aristotle savy oth the apeiron and ehora as the Platonic equivalents of his co-principle of being, Byle (see dyas and Phys. rv, 20g). Plotinus accepted the identification of apeiron as a material prineiple, but bis more rigorous monism led him to subordinate it to the One as « kind of evolutional “coment” when, as “Otherness,” it issues from the One and is without definition (aoristos) wot it tarns aad contemplates the One (Zn7. 1, 4,5 See hyle end compare Proclus’ tried of “moments” in Bley. thevt prop. 351 immanence, procession [roddas, qw.], and reversion [epi trophe, q.)); see tras 3 if, Auwther factor fh dhe continued Interest in apeiron ae an ont logical principle was its inckusion, thangh its identification with the ‘material principle, in the problematic of evil; see kakon. aphairesis: taking away, abstraction i) For Aristotle the chie! objects of cbstraction are che “mathe: mnaticals” (mathematiha, .¥.3 Anal. post. t Sib, Meta. scbxa—b), 9nd the process ip described i De an. tn, 4gab a2 “thinking [roesis] uf ‘tinge that ere embodied ia matter as if they were not.” The objeets cf the science of Physics are separate substances in an ontological sense (see ener), Lut slave they eabwdy phyeia ond oro onbject 1 hinge they 27e fot couceptuelly separable from matter (24et#- aparmanros | 21 soagh), a mistake the Platonists make (Phys. 11, 2948), while the Gbjects of Mathematics ace not separate substances in the ontologieal sense, but cen be separated from matter concoptntlly; see mathema- tika, hyle. 2. The fact of the basic uninowability of mutter and ehe conse- quent necessity of grasping it by aaslogy (Mera, 2ocGa, Phys. 1, 19385 ‘Pro ad dae sauue Wiffvuly: see dhe “Vastard reasning” of Tern. 32) lesds Aristotle to a somewhat more detailed exposire of how the cephoiresia process works, Primary here is his dstinetion between eenst- lo ead inteligibte matter (cinthete and mete hyloy noo Mate, rogéey 12042. Plotinus uses the same terms but in a different sense; sec ligle). ‘The latier is the kind of matter thatthe mind grasps ia the sbstractive process when it contemplates sersible things (aisthcia but uot qua sensible, ie., as mathematical bodies compose of form and spatel extension (megethos; see ruathematita end compere Meta. 059, s077b), or by analogy, the potential principle in definition, je, the sge20s wath respect tothe aitference (Meta. 10452; see diaphora). For aphairesis as the theological ia negativa sze agnoston, &phthartos: indestructible; for the indestructibility of the soul, cf athanatos 1, In Aristotle's discussfon of the possible meanings of the term (De eeela , 280b} he. accepre as the primary connotation “that which cxists and which cannot be destroyed, Liz, it will or might cease to exis”, and while he finds agreement among his predecessors that the world is x product of generis (see agenetas), there ere those willing to admit its desteuction ({Bid. 1, 279). Amang these latter there are some ‘who posit a single destraction and others wao maintain that the de struction of the osmosis recurrent. Aristotle does not apscify who the Sree gioup ure, but Simplielus, in commenting this passage, identiies {ham as the Atomists, and the identiication soems likely (see Diels, ts. Gya1, 68440; compare Epicurus in D.L. x, 73 and Lucretius, De eum not v, 205 3). Acsons de proponents of eyelis destruction Qeistotle names Empedocles, whose theory of the mixing of the four lements through Love and Strife is indeed eyclic (fr. 17, lines 1-19), and Heraclitus, The position of Ferselitus is much more aheenry fe 90 enics any dissolution of the Rasmar and Plato specifically distin. Buishes between the position of Empedocles and Heraclitus oa the {Retion f the destriction ofthe howmos (Soph. 242d). There are, ex ‘ili hand, passages in Inter euthors suggesting that Herc: ML dottne of paiode confagrtion (cf cron). At hts 0 too seems +o maintain the destructibility of the hosmmoy (De opif. Dan he sea iw fo beoed oa dnt oud a ach Tom, when talking of the heavenly gots (curaniat), Plato says thataa | avopersrs the union of thoir bodies and soule could be dissolved but they wilf not de because they axe tha handiwork of the Demiourgoe, Philo similar'y feels thet the koanoa, though naturally destructible, will not ke de- strayed hecause of a provider til Civine sustecance (De Decalago 38). ‘2. A similar argument appears in Plociuas Bar. 1,1, 3d, where it is the Soul shzt holds the kormos together eternally; but here the relationship 1s not the volttonal, providerttal ane fering tn Philo, rather itis founded on the mimetic element in the Platonic ‘radition, ¢.g. time is an cikon of ctemity (aisn) and this world i a reflection of the Inuelligible universe (Loseros noctse); further, ercation in tho oonce of procession” (see proidos) and “return” (sce epistrophe) axe both perdurative in nazure, apbdeins: pointing out, demonstration, proof Tn technical ‘Aristotelian methodology apodeicis is a syliogistic demonstration that, if the premiases be true and primary, will lead #0 tpisieme (Aristotle, Anal. port. 3, 7ab-722). Incividuale aze not sub- jot to definition and hence undemonctreble (Aristotle, Msia, 2099); see dialektike, Ratholou, aporia: with no way out, difficulty, question, problem 1. Aporia and its cognate verb forms are clckely related to dialee= lic (ululektite, qv.) and henec to the Socratic custom of interlocutory Aiscouree, According to Aristotle's analysis (Meta. oSab), philosophy Degins with a sense of wonder (thawna; Aristotle makes the point here thet philosophy and mythology share wonder as a common point of departure) growing Jom an initial difficulty (aperia), a difficulty experienced beccuse of coailicting arguments (seo Top. vz, 2456). oth the aporia and its attenduat wonder can be paralleled in Soerate? Frequent protestations of his own ignorance Ceag. Mena, Sod, Sephs 44a), and in the nolle contendere brought on by bis own deliberate interrogation (clenchca) (see Theaet. e1ob—c and katharsis). ‘2. Bat this intial etate of ignerauce, compaveal hy Ariatotl to = rman in chains (Mota. gosng2), yields to a further sense where aporia, for, more specifically, dizporia, sn exploration of various rontesy 28° umes the deatures of a diclectical proseas (Mota ggge—h; see dial, ike), and where the investigation of the opinions (ondoxa, qu.) of ‘one's philosophical predecessors is a necessary preliminary to seriving fata pinnf (Te an. 1, 0%: Beh, Nich. via, 2145). Thus, the oforiai posed, previous opiniens on these problems arc canvassed, and sok tion (euporia, Iyeis, the Tatter literally a “loosing,” mainteining th? setaphor of the chaining in Meta, ogseq2) is worked out, The sobation day take a venety ot terms, e.g, valldetiny die exfuse (Bik Nich arcHE | 23 ‘yar, 1245), positing a hypothesis (De cove 11, agsb-2gea), oF even (Euh, End. Vir, 1295b, 22464) allowing the existence of a reasonable {euloxon) contradiction, But whetever the solution, the posing of the ablemn. and the working from problem to solution, which is the heart Fr the philosophical meshed, is 2 difficult and useruus «sk (Meta. go6a)- ia: painlessness See hedone. thoai: effluences See aisties acché: beginning, starting point, principle, ultimate underlying substance (Urstofl), ultimate undemonstrable principle a. The search for the basic *sthi?” out of which all things are made is the earliest one in Greek philosophy and is attended by the related question of what is the process whereby the seeardary things aus val of the priuasty oie or vucse Oxy W pal ie ately Axiaotex lina terminology: wht is the erche (or arckat) and what is the gancsis of the ntheia? ‘2. The peeSarcatic search far an orchr in the sense of a material cause (Aristotle had located the investigation within his own cetegorios of causality; see erciaxon for the method involved) is described by Aristotle In Afeta. o89-o8sb, and the ward arche may have fist oeen used in this technieal sense by Anaximander (Diels 2289). ‘The frst candidates for the basic ingredient of things were individual natural substances, e.g. water or moisture (‘Tales; see Meda, o83b) and air Gee wer), but wlth Araximander’s suggestion that the arche was Semething indeterminate (apeiron, q.v.) an immense abstractive step ‘way from the purely sensory had heen lakeu, Tt opened the possibility thst the arshe wan aomelalngsuure basi then what could be pescehv y the senses, even though the cpeiron was, at this stage, unmistakably ‘steril. Thus Anaximander opened the Tine of enquiry that led to the single spherical One of Parmenides (see on. hea) ‘with its rated Htincioa borween trie Knowledge (episeme, qv.) snd opinien ogy 2 >, and ie plural goon snd mathematical orci of iagoreans (see avithmor, monas) and the at x.) ol Leauiypusand Demooritus, f oen Revatne: (ge) af 2 What might be termed the sensualist tradition continu Rikthe ultimate ireducibloenttos in sensibly perceived Tea WDedowios standardised thera at four, the aloiclniin (yeve) uf eaitly2g | ARCHE air, fire, und water, but there is scarcely anyone except Empedocles ‘Rimself who accepts these as true archei; xather they are siages be- more remote archai and the hizher complexities of composite hadins (sypthera). 4 The search for archai then kes a new tack. Both Parmenides end Empedocles had been emphatic in their deniel of chenge, the former by attributing it to an Ulusion ot the senses, the latter by maintaining the cternity of the stcicheia, But it was a stricture that wes soon violated; Anaxagoras and the Atomiscs, cech ia their own way, reassert generis uid sv, WU, Ue ansibility Uhet the Empedocleas: stolchela change into each other. 5. A new analysis of genesis by Plato and Aristotle rejects the old notions of change a¢ mixture or eanglameratian ox association, and concentrates instead—the lend had been given by Anaxagoras (se frs. 4,12) on the old notion of contrary “powers? (see dynamis, enantion, fatios). This is well within the ceasualit tradition since these powers can be sensibly distinguished (reduced by Aristotle, De gen. et corr, 11, 329), to the sense of touch, Raphe); but there is a nod as well in the direction of the apeiron with the isolation of the other great arche of change, the undefined, imperceptible substratum (see Aupokeimencn, hypodoche, kyle) 6. ‘This, then, is the eventual solntion (among the “geneticists, the Atouiist wud Pythagorean vertions continue to Bourish) of the problem of the archai of physical bodies: opposed powers, some of which can act (sce poiein) while others can be acted upon (see pas hein), x material substeatim in which change ocenss, and, eventually, an initiator of change (see nous, binown), 7. A related problem is that posed. by the resclution of proof (cpodeisis) hack to its ultimate archai, the first premisses of knowl: edge or the ultimate principles upon which a syllogism rests. Fer the Platoniste for whom true knowledge is essentially innate, based as itis ona prenatal exposure to the cide (sce anammetis, palingenesia), the ‘question is of little moment, except, perhaps, in the later deocy of dialectic where the entice artamncsis approach to knowledge tenis t0 recede into the background (see dialektikc). As for the sersualist who Touuds all knowledge on seuue perecption, he ie Forced, for the valida tion of the premisses of noetic knowledge, cither to identify aissher's and noesis (so the Atomists, though Epicurus hedges a bit with bis ‘notion of Self-evidence™: see erareeia). or to Tiik the Uo, as Aristotle id, with the concept of intition (see epagcge, nous). 4 For another orientation to the question of the archi of playsieal bodies, cee eytheton; for the process wherehy the archal becoanc more, complex entities, see genesis; tor the existence of tivo ethically vy) . Since the ectmon Grock view was that number was a “plural- ity of units? (plethce moredom: see Meta, r0534 and moras), the ‘question arose as to the generation of the unit itself; its constituative Glemen's ere described as “the odd and the even” and “the limited and the unlimited,” the latter serving a similar role in Plata as the princi: ples of numbers and cide (see duce, pares) "phe most perplexing aspect of uucieut auinber theory ia Aria totle’s repented aesertions thut Plato taught that che eide were numbers (ecg Meta. 987), 2 position that must be distinguished from 2) she cnisteuve of the eige of numbers (2e0 eritimos eidetibar) and 2) the txistence of she “mathemacienls? as an intermediate grade of being (see mathematika, metavi.), But nowbere in the dialogues does Plate poem to identity the cide with number. ‘To meet this dificulty some hheve postulated a theory of later “esoteris” Platonism known to Aris: totle (but see agrapha dogmata), while others bave attempted to set the emerrence of the eide-crithmos theory described in such passages as Phil. aga-e, the reduction of physical bodies back to geomet ical hopes in Tim. sge-g5c (see stoicheion), and the increasing stress on # hierarchy among the Forms (see Soph.'2540 and genes, byperousia) arhich, according to Theopliustus, Afcsa, 6by would euggest the de> seeding series: archai (ie., monos/dyas or peras/apetron, 938-)> totthmet, eido, aistheta, Still others say that Aristotle either deliber” Asvasmerzon | 27 that, for Plotinos, mumbor has a transcendent position among tk Jptelligibles (En. vt, 6, 8-9). r ng the arithmés eidetikés: ideal number ‘That there are efde of nurabers in Plato just as there are of other entities is « matter of no dispute (cf. Phaede osb-c), and Aristotle is Coneeet in eaying that they 2re singular (fete, g§7) and “incompara pe” (ibid. 1080a), its incapable of being added, subirceted, exe, from cach other. Plato also taserted, on the testimony of Aristo:le, Phys. sts, Ob and Afcrs. 20738, thet the ideal uuuubeis ment valy W For che identification of eidos and arithmoas, ses arithmce, arithmds mathématikés: mathematical munber; the abstract numbers that are the object of mathematic Se mathemati, metace ebhurert ae asfmmetron: incommensurable (scil, megethos, magnitude) a. The discovery that the diagonal of a square could not be described in terms of a proportion (Jogos) with the length of its si roby fled pondinnhiog cet of he Pythagecea tara Tn antiquity it wes attributed to the Pythagorean Hippasus whe was rowned for his revelation of the irrationality (c-logos) of the diagonal of the square (Iemblichus, Vita Pydh. 247: the proof of inearamensnra- yi ven by Arlt in dal... roofs forthe commen ry of V3, vs, etc, followed quickly (see Plato, Theuet. sunbllg of Vs Ys lowed quickly (sce Plato, Theaet 42, Phulosophically these discoveries raised serious questi ‘he nature of number (aritimos, q.v. ship betreen arithmetic and geometry. Tacommensirability began and, for the most Trt susined &geunet ea prea these were, ate el, Sncommen- sable magnitndes (see Euclid, Kiem. x, passim). Where the difi- culty arose, and Hippasas’ fate bears testimony to its gravity, was in ) and the relationship between fiely ur unlmowiagly confesed the pesition of Pinto with those of the Pythagorean incision» on a correspondence between mumbero wad Spensinpus and Xeucerates (see mathematika) = 4 TFor Aristode number is only mackematical rember, the prod: net of abstraction (see mathemnatike, aphairesie), perceived not by & ‘Gage sense bre_by the “common sense” (De an. 1, 4o5t—bs 22 be Gathesis keine). The rebirth of Pythagoreanism in the enrly cemturics ‘of the Christian era assured the contiaued survive] of the eidosr = Sitios theory (see ToL. vist, #5 Po piyeys Pike Bethe 48-3194 99 things. Numbers for the Grocks i pene Ne he Grocks were the integers and there were 20 Cane ci Cxpres the new Incommensurabie inanitades. One reue i aneal by Aristo, was wo distinguish between number and akg ine Ox Retry Tose from amet (se megethn) aan some support in the Academy (see. Fipmoms S76 coab), was to attempt to incorporate \/2 into the family of the28 | avanaxia ataraxia: without disturbance, equilibrinm, tranquillity of the soul Bee hadone. athinatos: immortal, the incorruptibility of the psyche; for the incozruptibility of natural bodics, ace aphthartos 1, The belief in the immortality of the soul begins with Its asso- ciation with oer, the vitel element in life (aa Anavimonoa, Diale, fe igs), and the vitalistc assumption that what is alive is divine (Cicero, De nat, deor. 1, 10, 26; see theion) and so immortal, Henco there is no ‘pre-Soeratic attempt to demonatrate that the soul co such is immortals it is part of something else that is immortal. The problem of psychic, individual immortality arises with the new shamanistic, religious view of the payche (q.v.) as the real person, locked in the soul as in a prison; but here too it Is rather religious exposition than philosopaical argu- ‘mentation, « preference best seen in Plato's four great eschatological myths: Phaedo roye~1140; Gorgias 5938 fl: Republic 614b-621d; Phae- drue aqGa~aqgi. Dut Plato also bas what he calls “proof” (apodcivies sce Phasdrus 245¢). The proof feom anamnesis (quv.) reaches back into religious Pythagoreanim (Phaedo 72e-77a), while that from the Kinship ta the aide (ibid. 7ARoe) is parely Platonie. 4, These are unitary proofs pertaining to the soul as a whole, but the distinction of the mortal and immortal patts of the soul in the Timacus (see psyche) introduces a new direction; no: even in bis earliest writings does Aristocle maintain the Immortality of the eatire ‘pouches itis only neus that can rake that claim (Eudemus, fr. 6x; De "The materialist is normally led to deny the Immorzelity of the coul; so the Atomists (wee Luvretiusy De reser mt 111, 8301094), and eo, in the first instance, the Stoics (SV 1, 148, 3%, Boy; D.L. vit, 157), though later, with Pescidonius (Cicero, Tuse. 1, 181g; compure De ropublica vz, a6-a8), they adirmed a bind fF neral immarielity (see aer). For Plotinus there is nover a question of the soul's immortality; what is discussed is the individuality of the immor- tal soul after its separation from the body (Enn. 4¥, 3, 5)+ dtomon: “uncut,” indivisible material, particle, atom 4. Permenides’ criticism of Milesiau vitalism and its unexpleined genesis and hinesis bore its fruit in the views of Empodocles and Anaxagoras, who reduced all genesis to one or other type of mixture of indestructible matter (see Empedocles, Diels ais28, 30; Auaxxgores, fr. an) and who porite a source of motion Wat was differeut frum dn. thing moved (see Ainown.). But hoth Empecceles and Anaxagoras bad avromaton | 29 posited « plurality of types of besic substance aud so had failed to mee: the Parmenidean hypothesis thet (rue being is one (see on and Melis. sus. fr. 8). Out of this vuiplex of problems and parte] solutions grase the Atomist position: the existence of both heing and monbeing (i.e. ‘the voids see enon), heing in the form of an infinite number of indestractible indivisible particles substanticlly identical and differing ‘only in shape and size, by the aggregation (synérisie) of which sensi ble things come inio existence (Diels, fre. 671g, 69437; Aristodle, Meta. gSsb; see genesis). 3+ The atoms have utctual miution (Asiswile, De coelo 1s, good; see hincvis) and the most mobile are the spherical soul or fire’ atoms Cider, De an. 1, 493a); all sensation fs reduced to contact (idem, De sone); 21) ather soncihle qualities are merely convention (nomoe; Democritus, fe. 9; see pathos). The later variations by Epieu- rus and Lucretius may be found in D.L. x, 95-39 and De rerum nat, 15 265-928, 483-634: 11, pastim, For the Pythagorean version of numberatomism, see arithmos, monas, racgetho; for the atomon cidos as the infima species in division, see diaireciay digphore, eidoe; for the Kinetics of Atomism, see Rinesis; for the formation of compound bedies, see genesis; on’ che general ‘question of indivisible magnitudes, see megethos.. autirkela: scli-suffcioncy Self-suficiency is a characteristic of bappiness (eudaimonia) as a goal of human life (Aristotle, Eth, Nick. 1, 10g7b), end thus of the contemplative life, which is the highest good for man’ (Aid. x, ax77a) ‘Thereafter autarkoia as a quality of virtue becomes a commonplace in both the Stoa (DL. vz1, 127) and the later Platonic tredition (Ploti- mus, Emm. 1, 4, 4). autématon: spontaneity See tyche.Donllésis: wish, See proairesis; kinown 9 boiileusis: deliberation See proairesis, chéi See hyle, hybadocke, topos. Tend, aea, space charistén: separate, henoe 1) separate substance 2) conceptually separate (sce aphairesis} Separateness is a characteristic of substance (ousia) that, unlike the other Bategoriai, is capable of separste existeuces all the other ‘modifications of being exist im something (Meza. .0282-b, 102228, oggage). One of the most frequent Aristotelian ckarges against Plato is that he gave the eide, which Aristorle understands in the sense of a universal (aaino/o), 2 separcte substandal existence, Le, le Ly punta= tized them (soe Meta, 1086a, 1037). . (On the separability of the agent intellec:, see nous, ousia. chuénos: tine ; . 2, Tite as personification, Chrenas, appears in the qnasi- mythical cosmogoaics before essuming a place in she philosophical conmologies. CBruios for Kronee, the tathor of Zeus, was a tainy coramon substitution (soe Plutarch, De Iside 32), and the frst to have done so may have been the sixth-century protophilosopher Pherecydes (ade 119). Whoever its vilglvatvty & powerful Time fe a staple 0 the poets (cf, Pindar, Od. 1, 17 and it. 145), and particularly in the Ed canonos | gt tragecians (Oed. Col Go7-52g is only ons of & great many examples from Sophocles, who was expecially foul of the figure) whece Time is 1 figure of might who not only stands at or near the head of the igenealogicel process, aa fa the cosmogonies, hat rules and governs the eames. 2, The thought of one pect on time becrs particular note since it ig romackably similar to whet an almost contemporery philesophor was saying on the ame subject. Solon, in fr. x2, line g, wea the expression in the court [dibe] of Chronos,” and an almost kentical figure occurs fi dae pasotayed fragment of Audaiuseude whese die eleweuts “ashe separation [dike] to euch other for their injustices according to the assessment [‘axis] of Cironas.” 9. The fignrativn language dieapposrad ar philocophical epecula. tion deew apart from its mythological origins, so thet, for instance, ‘when even the poet-philosopher Empedocles ie speaking in a context akin to that of Anaximander, chronos appears with considerably less suggestion of personification (Fr. go). Whore both Anaximander and Empedocles would agree, however, is in placiag time outside the kos- ‘mos, which is, in turn, somehow regulated by tine 4 A change begins to appear with the Py:hagoreans tor whom the koomaa wes both a living, breathing creature (220m, qv.) and the principle of Limit (geras). Outside the kaamas are only various mani Restations of the Unlimited (epsiron), which tae horas Shales” aud ‘upon which it imposes Limit (cf, Aristotle, Pye. aoga, oxgbs Aetius 11, 9, 1). Among these apeira ia, we are told (Aristotle, f. 202), time. Its Iikely that ths inhaling process invaleed limiting: the ravr, pechirative aspect of time (perduration is an early Feature of the opeiron, q.¥.) by its reduction to number (aridlmos), an association that contioued ‘through all subsequent discussion of time. 5. This Pythagorean insight, cespite the fac that it fs glimpsed uly fitfally throngh Aristotolian asides, was of grent importance. Tt distingvished an alimited, extracosmic time from a numerable, cosmic save aud, in effect, moved the latter into the context of quantity. Plaio continved along the same path but added considersble new dimensions to both Pythagorean notions of time. He took over the concept of aion (q3.), whiek ad ocourred in pre Socratic thought ae a deoignation of ‘he life-span of the universe, and applied it (o extracasmic time, not ow seen as an widefinedl Pythagorean apeiron, thet probably included some Kind of uargzulated motion, but a5 the motionless mote of che cide (Tin. 78). Cosmic thoe, on the other hand, identified with che periodic revolution of the heavenly sphere (Tim. gor; Aristotle, Phys. 218ab and Simplicius, ad Ioe.). Chronas for Pisto is, in sbort, “an svealas.Ing Ukenest (zton}, moving accarang to mimber, of eternity [aon] that rests in the: ome (Tim. g7d). “Thus che stability and unityg2 | cHmonos of aion ere contrasted with the moyement and plurality, ot better, the aumerebility of chroncs, and the whole incorporated into kis theory of mimesis (7). 6. For both Plato snd Aristotle time and motion are closely associated in a kind of reciprocal relationship, Plato, as we have seen, identified the two, and though Aristotle is criticel of that Wentifcation (Phys, 238), be does assert their close relationsmp (1617, 220). Tle kewise agross with Plato that the best unit for measurement is regu Ir, ciccular motion because itis primary and best known (ibid, aagb), but lic dues uvt speuity, a> dves Matoy chat this fs the diurnal movcraoat of the heuyeus, a position also criticized by Plotinus (Bran. 111, 7, 9)+ Bat where the two men most clesrly part company is in the abseace in “Asietotle of she contract herween time and eternity and all the demiur- gic apparatus of the mimesis theary. 77. Iss existence as an eikoa allows Plato to assign, at least by inaplication, an ontological status to time. It even has ¢ purpose in the scheme of things, to enable men to count (Tim. gob). But Aristotle, for whom time is “the calculation [or numbering, arizhmaos] of motion according to prior and posterior” (Phys. 2igb), is not convinced. Time {is nct syhonyinous with movement bat must be calculeted from move tment. And calculation demands a calculator: hence, if a mind did not exist, neither would time (ibid. 22ga). Iti the recognition of sequence (prior and posterior) that melien man aware of time (ibid. a1ga)~ 8, ‘The Epicurean contribution to a philosophy of time consisted chiefly in an attempt to define its mode of existence. Time is not prolepsis (a.x.), a universal grasp built up over a series of experiences, but rather en immediate perception (D.L. x, 72). It seems to de & ‘quality associated with the actions and movements of things, in short, “an accident of an accident (Sextus Empizicus, Adv. Math. x, 219; ‘compare Lucretius 1, 459-461). Such distixctions tend to be blurred in Stoicism, which assumed all such entities, includiag time (SVP a1, saga), under the general rubric of “bodies.” But in general che Stos stayed well within the Flatuaic aul Avistnelian guidelines (yvithout of course, the Platonic furbelows of ofon end eikon), substituting: the snore corporcal “interval” for arithmos, but preserving the Tink with motion (SVF 1 09, 520)- (9. Plotinus devotes considerable attention to the problem of time, considering i, us did Plato, closely bound to the question of eternity. ‘Any atterapis to sepurate the questions, as Aristotle did, are doomed to failure (En 1, 7, 7-20)- Plotinus is impationt with philosophical ‘rontments of time in verms of mumber or measure of motion (sce Znn, tux, 7,8), even with Plato's identification of time and the movemont of the Avavens. instead he casis die problens vf Luih sien and ehronse in terms of life, the former representing the life of te intelligibles (11, 7, parwon | 33 2). Time, on the other hand, is ¢ kind of degeneration of this total self-presence due to the soul's inability to accept this tota simulicitas (compare the similar degeneration of theoria into prasis in the soul: seo Plysie); time, then, is the life of the soul progressing from state to siate (11, 7,21). d daimon or daiménion: supernatural presence or entity, somewhere between a god (:heos) ‘The belief i isi » lief in supernatural spiits somewhat lese anchropomor- hid than the Olymplans is avery eely fexnre of Greek popular religions one rch damon io attached to m person at birth and deter” mines, for good or evil, his fate (compare the Greek word for happi- ness, eudaimonia, heving a good daimon). Heraclitus protested against this belief (fr. 230: see efhoa), but not with any great effect. Tn the hamanistie view of the psycke (q.v.), daimon is another name for the soul (Empedocles, fr, 135), probably reflecting its divine crigias and extreordinary powers, Socrates is ut least partially in the archaie reli ‘ious tradition when he speeks of his “divine something” (dainonion 4) that warns him to avoid certain actions (Apol. 32d; its operetion is considerably wider in Xenophon's account in Mem. 1, 1, 4); notable is Scerates' constant use of the iaupersoual form of the word or ayaonym ‘divine sign” (see Paaedrus agab), perhaps the rationalist’s slig correction of whet was a popular contemporary belief in divination, ivine dream mensages, prophecies, ete., 2 belief that Socrates shared (Apol. axb, 330, Crito 442, Phaeda, Gor; see mantike), Tzis probably a mistake to think that either Socrates or his contemporaries distin. uished altogether too carefully between the daimonion and the theion (qsv.), since the Socratic defense against ztheism in Apel. 27d rests on ‘0 argument that to believe in daimones is to balieve in gods. __ 2 The idea of the daimon as 9 kind of “guazdian angel” is sill viaiUle In Plaxo (Rep. b2cd), though there is an attempt to eocape. the faxalism implied in the popular belief by having the individual souls choose their own deimcn (Rep. 6270). Whether this indivicuel daimon. Is within ne ar not was much debated in lator philosophy. At one yuiut (Tim. goa) Plato himself identifies ft with the soul, and a reflection of4 | vEMIOURCOS this can be seen, for example, in Marcus Aurelius 11, 175 111, 26 (soe rnoesio 17). 3. But another notion, thst of the deimon ss an intermediary igure between the Olympians and mortals, is also present in Viato, e.g. ‘the “daemonic® Eros in Symp. 202d—zo3a, and the regulations in Laws ‘1ge--b, This position bad a grest vogue among the later transcerden- {elises of both the Neopythayoreau wal Pletvuie veuiety, the truc gods (See onrenioi) dwelled in the aither (q.v.) walle the Tesser duimones inhabited the lower ae and exercised a direct providence (see prencia) over the efeico of men (DL. vit, 97) 4 Plutarch has a highly developed demonolegy (De def. oraa. 4ugi-qizb), and with his typical religious conservatiem he traces the Cull of these intermediaries beck to oriental and primitive Greck sources (e.g. Hesiod, Erge 159-160; compare Plato, Rob. 488e-489b), and to Empedocles (iid. 4292 his accoaa: of the origin of the dai- mcnes is in De genio Socr. soxc-f), One source overlooked by Plutarch is contact with the Semitic tradition, a connection explicit Ia Philo who had esrlierideatilied the daimones of Greek philosophy with the angels, of the Jewish (Iranian?) tradition (De son, 141-14, De gigant, 9). démiourgés: maker, craftsman 2, Plato's deseeipion of the maker of the lower gods, the soal of the universe, and the immortal part of the human soul is in Timasue 2op-goc; he uses the preezistent cide as his model, ibid. googie (see rmimesis). "The demionrgos is probably to be identified with the intll- tent, ecient cause posited by Plato in Phil. a7b (compare Soph. 2363¢). But he is not omnipotent: he makes the Aosraos as good “as possible? {TTimaeue gob) aad must cope with the countereests of necessity" (ananke), ibid. 472-48. >, ‘The demiourgos coutinues to play an important role in later latonism: what is chiefly notable is thet, with the transcendence of the nupteme divine priaciple, the demfurgic function ie performed by a setontlary emanation, by the Loges in Philo (De cher. 35, 196-157, De pee. leg. 1,82) and Nous in Numenius (see Eusebius, Preep. Evang. er, 1y-8) and Plotinus (na. 1, 2, 18), The ethical dualism of the Grosties appears in their making the demiourgus create the world ‘without a Enowledge of the cide (see Iranaens, Adv. haer. Ty 5,3); 92° mimesis, techne. diaicesis: separation, division, distinction seatiision ® procodare that didnot interest Socrates stace the laurent uf his enquiry wen toward a-single vidas (ste enazaze), becornes an imporcant feuture fa the later dialogues where Plato turns his atten- praimrsis | 35 tion to the question of the relationship hetween cide. Expressed in terms of Aristotelian logic diairesis is part of the progress from genus te species; but as is clear from x key passage in the Harmenides, where he first puts the question (x23d-e}, Pato did not ere tt as a conzeptia! exercise, The dislocticel scarch of which diaireis is part has 3 its ‘object the explication of the ontological realities that arc. grasped by our refieivu (legions). 2. The pursuit of the interrelated efde Le comprehending 2 generic form (Phacdres 255d); this is “collection” (eynegrge, qv ). Tt is followed hy diniresis, a separation off of the various eide found in the generic eidor, down 16 the infima species (Soph. aggd-e). Pleto is sparing of details in both the theory end practice of aymacege, ond, waile the Sophist and Poliicus are Alles wwith examples of diairesis, there is relatively little instruction on its smoethodclogy. We are told, hovever, that the division is to take place *eccording t0 the natural jeints” (Phaedrus 26se). What these are becomes clearer from the Politicuss they are the differences (dlazhorat, q.v.) that separate one species from another in the generic form (Pol. aboa-263b, 28s). ‘je The method of division raises certein aarionn questions, 20 serious, indeed, that they-might very well shake confidence in the caistence of the eide (see Phil. a5a-b). Describing the relationship of sensihles tn rhe eide in terms of participation (methexis) suggests the subordination of things to the eide, 2 subordination at the heart of the Platonic metaphysic. And though Plato avoids the torm methexi, preferring the expression “combination” or “comacunion” (Aeinonia; earlier, i Phaedo 100d, Plato hed apparently contersplated using Aor nonia to describe the veletionship of sensibles to the vide) when describing the interzelationship of the cide (see Soph. 2534, €), the dificuley persistently refuses co Uisappreas, Does uot the assangement of the specific cide under the generic cidos suggest she very seme princi ple of subordination among the eide themselves? Do the species consti ‘tute the gear or ate they derived from it? Pirin clerely did not see the ide ia this way (see Soph, 2510-2504), 26 Aristotle hirnscli is willing tw admit (see ffeca. agi), but it may have been at least one of the easons why Speusippus, who practices diairevis, but in a redical form (see Aristotle, Aral. past. 11, 97a and diaphora), denied the existence of the eide. 4. Aristotle, however, 's convinced of the incompatibility of the ssubausteas, mawisible ede and the process of icirestr (Mera. ogga-b). His own theory of division is set forth in Anal. poze. tt Q6b-grb: one must divice the genus by diferences (diaphorai, q-v.) Ahet pertain te the eenecon, mst proceed in the correct order, and finally, be all-inclusive. with am alennpt at36 | maLeRrixe ‘With Epictetus diaivesie reappears in a moral context; see proai dialektiké: dialectic 1. On the testimony of Aristotle dialectic was an invention of Zeno the Eleatic (D.L, 1x, 25), probably to serve xs x support for the hypodiesival autuumies uf Pasiieuides (Tlsw, Pare, w2bc). Dut whut. ‘was 2 speclas of verbal polemic (what Pleto would call “eristic” or disputation; see Soph. anqena6s, Rep. 4998, Phaedrus 2630) for the Hlostice war tranaformed by Plato into high philosophical mathod ‘The connecting link was undoubtedly the Socratic technique of ques- tion and answer in his search for ethical definitions (see Plato, Phaedo rsd. 784; Xenophon, Mem. t. 1. 16; and elenchos), e technique that Plato explicily describes as dialectical (Crat. ggoc). With the hypos- tatization of the Socratic definitions into the Platonic eide (perhaps reflected in the transition irom Phaedo ggd—100a to ibid. 101d; see ciddos) the role of dialectic becomes central and is the crovin of the ideal curriculum described in the Republic: after ten years devoted to mathe matics the philosopher-to-be will devote the years between thirty end Giinty-ve w dhe stuly of dialectic (Rep, 3528-ga42) 557-090). ‘2. What is dialectic? ‘The question is aot an easy one since Plato, as usual, thought about it in a variety of ways. There is the view of the Phaedo and the Republic, which envisions dialectic. 28 2 progressively ‘ore synoptic ascent, via series of “positions” (Ihypotheseis, qv; the sheory of Forms is one such in Phaedo 1005), until an ultimate is reached (Phaedo 10rd, Rep. 512¢). In the Republic, where the context cf the discussion is confessetly moral, this “unhypothetized principle” 4s identified with the good:-in-itself (auto to agathon; Rep. s32a-b) that subsumes within ftsel? all the lower hypotheses (ibid. sgg0-d). ‘je If the dialectic of the Phaedo end the Repudite mey be de- sctibed as “synoptic” (Rep. 537e), that which emerges from the Phas- rus onwards is decidedly “Hiecritic” (see Soph, 2360, aga). Tt is duced in PAccdrue 283¢-206b (compare Soph sind 2} and con sists of two @ifferent procedutes, “collection” (synagoge, qv.) and “division” (diciresis, quv.), the Tatter process in particular being covply ‘ineteatad in subsequent dislogues like the Soohist, Poitious, and Philsbue, ‘The earlier dislectic appeared similer to the operations of eros (q.v.), buit hore we are transported into an almost Aristotelian ‘wotld of classification through division: ascent has been replaced by Gescent, While it is manifest that wo are here ptul dealing wen onto- Togical realities, i is lixewise clear that a cracial step bas been taken along the road to a conceptual logic, The torm of the di that Gites whlch, stints iauwiedlatuly above the senciblo pe ‘i 2apd), and, while this is “really real” (ontos on) in the Platonic piarwona | 57 scheme of things, itis significent that the same process, diciresis, ends, in Aristotle, in the atomon cidos, the iafina species in & logical descent (Dean. ut, 4aqb)s 500 diairesie. 4 Aristotle abandons the central ontological role givea to dialec- tic in Plato's Republic; he is concerned, instead, with the operations of the anind dst culminate in demonstration (apodeixis). Dialeetic is not sure Jeauustration (lua. pr. 1 agi; Top. 1, 1one—b) 11 that fe does not begin from premisses that are troe and primary, but from opinions (endeaa) that are accepted by the majority or the wise. The irony of thie distinction is, of course, that Arictetlo's own procedure is most frequently what he has described as “dialectical” (see endexom). But aga thecretician Aristotle has little love of dialectic (cf, De en. 3, 40383 ‘Top. roxb), and suggests in Meta. o87b that it. or rether the coufus'an betweea thought and reality, mey have been Plato's undoing. 5. For the Stoles dislectis is reduced to logic, Le., a study of the forms of internal and externel discourse (D.L. vit, 4g: ef. /ogas, on0- ma), watle in the same hresth they extend its preserves to embrace etnies and even physics (ibid. vis, 45, 8g). The result is chat logic is no longer an instrument (orgerin) of philosophy 2s understood by the Peripatetic school (ihe collection of de lugival uenlives into an Orga non ip post Aristotelian, though Aristotle certainly foresaw the propac- deutic role of the Analytics; cf. Meta. 100s). 6. The rehahilitstion af dinlectic in its Platonic sense was under talcen by Plotinus (nn. 1, 3). Ie is once again, as in the Republic, a ‘cognitive upproach to the intelligibles (see noesie), but with distinctly Stoic overtones: dislectic fs an erncation for vireve and so includes both actions and objects 2s well as the noe. didnoia understanding On the Platonic line diciicia is a type of cognition between doxa and noeeis (Rep. s10d-gaxa; for the special objects of dianoia on the Platonic line, see matheratika), In Aviswole it is used as 2 more {genceal term for ietellectual activity. Whore it is opposed to mous (= intuitive kcowlelge) it means discursive, spllogistic reasoning. (Aristotle, Anal, poat. 11, 1006), and (ibid. 1, S9b) itis subdivided into the following scecies: episteme. knowledge pursued for itz awn ecko {vee also thesria), teekne (knowledge applied to production), and Phronesis Oxewledge applied to conduct). In Stoicism it is identical with the Aegemoniken (SVP 11, 459). For its location m the general contoxt of intellection, see nocsis. iaphorés diference, specifi difference 2. The prosoneo of dicphonat explicit in dn. Plate Civecil process of division (diairesis, q.v.) where the “genetic form” Is die98 | wiarnests vided cccotding to kinds (Soph. a592-e), or, a8 he puts it in Pacedrus 2050, “at te natural joints.” What these “ctural joints” are is de scribed more fully in Pol. 2320-28, 235b. The genus rnost be divided only where it separates into two speci Forms, To divide a genus into paris will not do since a part (meros) and a specific Form (cidus) ere fot the seme thing (ibid. 262h). The digphorai, therefore, mast distin- gush species. 2. This makes sense in a system of concepts, but creates great dificulties i the eide ate autonomous, indivisible substances, as Plsto tunduubtedly aw ther, there ia no plaes in the Platonic thoory for either “generic? or “specific” Forms (see diairesis). Plato's successor Speusippas, who denied the vide, used an exhaustive metkod of di >ivesie, tempting to inclivle all die diggherai, presumably since, with the disappearance of the hypostatized ede, it was the dicphorai thet agave the new conceptual eidas its content (see Aristotle, Anal. past. 11, " s In Aristotle the process of diairesis nroceeds by dividing the genus by means of specifically distinct diaphorai down to the infima species where the activity will terminate in definition (hariemos; see the definition of horismes tn Top. 1, 1035). In Top. vi.2434~245b th are elaborate rules for the choice of dichhorai in diairesis. 4. As for the ontological aspects of the problem, in the Meiaphays- ics Avistotle moves the dieeuseioa into the cetagories of matter and form, Genus stands to cigphora es sensible matter to form, and so may be characterized as “intelligible matter? (hyle noete; the characteriza tion is nat particularly felieitous since he uses the expression in ancther sense 28 well; sce hyle, ophairesie), while al tne digphora ace resumed inthe fal one, that of the atorzon eidos or infea species, and serves 83 its essence (ousie) (eta, 2oa8a, 10458). didthesis: disposition See hess dike: compensation, legal proceedings, justice settee ens ith nce Creek cc tems, te ad a fey complex hictory bofore ite Socorporatinn inta the problematic of philos- phiy. From the time of Homer dike had bound iato it the transgression of certsin limits, probably those dictated, in she Bust instance, by she class structure of sci, aa the paymaect of compensation for this transgression, With the decline of an aristocratic class conacicusness dike began to be seen as something pervasive in the sociaty, applicad! to al citizens alike, and guaranteed by Zeus himsel:. ‘The limits withia wich the new dee Was operative ivcie uw doSned by waltton law (romee, q.7.), and a new.abstrect term dikeioeyne, “righteousness,” ‘ustice.” came into use to describe the moral quality of the man who observed the limits of the law end was taus “ust” (dikaios). 2, The first usage of dike in a philosophical context occurs in the only extaat fragment of Anaximander (Diels 1201) where the elements (sicicheia), which are naturally opposed forces (see enantia), are required to make reparation (dike) to each other tor ther mutual transgression in tho process of genesis-phthore. ‘he limits that are violated hers are not thove of « human socisty but the order implicit in Use woukd acca aa 2 Kosmos (avs), tia in an era before the operation of the physical world was mede discontinuous with that of human life, One notes x correction in Herecitus (fr. 80}: the strife becween the lomente ix nat, a8 Anaximander would heve it, 9 species of injustice ‘chat demanés compensation, bat the normal order of things, the tension of opposites that is the reality of existence. 3. Although the fragments of Democritus betray a certain iater- cat in ethical behavior in general and justice in particuler (see fs. 46, 174), this a the ethical concera of a philocopher rather than an atternpt 10 corstruct a philosophical ethic. The impetus for just such an attempt Jay in the Sophists’attecks on the bases of conduct on the grounds that they were tied to a relative, axbitrary law (see nomos). Thus was the notion of dike drawn into the controversy surrounding norncs vs. physi, find issues in a corion of Sophinsis poeitions that described justice ae consisting solely in obedience to the arhitrary Ines of the state, laws that were, in turn, the instruments whereby the powerful in the society sought to preserve their postion: thus Archetaus (Diels 6042), Anti phon (Diels 870.44), and the ettitudes embraced by Callicles in Plato's Gorgias (e.g. «8ga-484a) and Thrasymachus in Book t of the Republie (eg. 9380). 4. The Socratic reply to these positicas nay, of course, be viewed smerely es a refinement of his general thrust of the virtues (specifically including dibaionyne; see Aristctle, Eth. Eud. t, 1215p) into the realm of perumuent, coguidoutly grasped defusitions (sew ureee is besides the impassiored defense of justice and law as an inviolable soctal contract in the Cro. Plato's owa answver to Socrates? entagonists fs tn he found in Repniblio xr, and is embodied in an investigation of Justice as it exists on the larger scale of the polis (Rep. 3892); whence it emerges as a kind of cooperative disposition to do one's owa work (see 4332, 443b). $+ This does not respond to Callicles! contention that the unjast always seem to have a better time of it; the wicked do, indeed, prosper. Plato has no great assurences to give about the fate of the just in this Mfe—dwugl le ts sure Une gods will ave uegiect Chem (Rez. On—b:| Doxa compare Laws x, 89g¢-geob) but it is ip the Future. ife that justice secelves ita ultimate reward, as dopicted in glowing terms in the “Myth of Ex? in Republic. 6, Aristotle's major treatment of justice occurs in Eth. Wich. ¥ where it is divided into a) “distributive,” ie, dealing with the division cof goods, honors, ete. among those who participate in a political sys- tem, and b) “cotrective,” 12., regulatory of the inequities 1n exter transactions or crimes (1igcb—agre). In both instorces justice fa « ind of proportion (analagia ), ond tus it too can be assimilated to the doctrine of the “mean” (9:0 mesure). Avfottle fo fis ii lls scjeuton, of the Sophists' contention dat whut is just is merely a matter of conventions there are at least some activities that are just by nature Crigah). Finally (sigh) he intradnece the nation of the equitable or the decent (epieiteia) that tempers the legel demands of justice, what the lawgiver would have said if he were there (compare Plato, Polit. ag4a—2q5e). 7. For the Stoies dikaioeyne is one of the four cardinal virtues (SVP 1, 190), defined by Chrysiopus as “the science of distributing ‘what is proper to exch” (SPP mi, 262), and based on nature, not convention (D.L, vit, 123), Cameaces the Sceptic returned, however, to the Sophists’ contention that Iaw is @ convention set up by men on strictly utiliterian grounds, a position that he can illustrate by the conflicting counsels of prudcace and jastice (Cicero, De repubdiew isl, 1, 18-19; Lactentius, Inatit.v, 16, 9-6). See arvte, nomas. déxa:_1] apinion, »] judgment 1. Opinion: the distinction between tne knowledge (episteme, ¢.v.) and aa inferior grade of cognition goes back as Far as Xenophanes (Ir. 34), bat the classic pre-Socratic exposition of it fs to be foand in Parmenides' poem (fr. 8, lines 9-1) where sensation (aisthesis) {8 relegated to the position of “seeming” or “opinion” (daxa). The distine= tion is based on the ontological status of the object of senae perception (cloxhere) thar, beeauce of their exclusion from the realm of trve Being (or), cannot be the objects of true knowlege. 4, The distinction is incorporated. on the same groands, into Platonic epiotemology, though by now the position had beon buttressed by the iusisient Sophist attacks on cissiesis as reletive (see Plato, ‘Thecet. 166-167, citing Protegoras). In Rep. 476e—4S0e Plato sets Permenides’ distinction as a series of epistemological and ontologicel correlatives: trae knowlege is of tm veality, Le, the ede, while {ignorance is of the completely nonreal. Between the two there is an intermediate stage: a quasi-kaowledge of quasi-being. ‘This intormed- ate faculty (dynamis) 1s doze and ite objects are sensible things (eistheia) and the commonly held opinions of mankind. The resales poxa | 42 are Teter schematized in the Disgram of the Line (Rep. sogd-giz¢) ‘where the realm of doxa is Further refined by being divided into belief (pistis, q.v.) whose objects are the sensibles, and knowledge of appearances” (cikatia, q.v.), a category of coguition introduced by Plato's view of the nature of productive activity (see sechne, mime- sis). & The diiaumy Letmeeu eptsceme and dova remeins fundamen. tal to Plato, even though he herrays a growing interes: in the consible world (see aisthetcn, episteme.) 4. Indigment: Plates view of done, foundod aa it 1 on the scpatar tion of the eide from seasible things, finda no support in the Aristote- Han view of reality, but there is another context within which the probleraatic of dex may be treated. ‘The question of truth and error arises particularly in the realm of judgment, a problem that also has its origins in the Parmenidean premisses about being (on, qxv.): since orly being can be thought or named, how is it possible to make a false judgment, hat is, a definition about nonbeing (fr. 9; fr. 8, line Soph. ofgd—o64b Plato shows that, just as there is falee assert discourse (logos), so too there is False judgment (dana) that sxtomnelization of this discourse, Tlie pus ,187¢-200d, but since the true position waits upon tho solution of the problem of nonbeing (ne on; see om, heteron), the final analysis is not pnt ferth wntil Soph. x8yb-a+ error (peeudae) Yaa Judgment (doxa) that does not correspond to reality, either to the “reality” of the scusible situation, or to the true reslity of the eidoe in which the sensible participates. 5. Aristotle's treatment of episteme and doxa moves into another area. Knowledge is either immediate (see nous) or discursive (diancia, 4q.v.). The latter may be described cs episteme if it proceeds from Picmisses that are necessary, doze if the premisses are contingent (Anal. post. 1, 88b-B9), icc, if they could be olhecwise, and indeed Aristotle defines dose as “that which evuld be otherwise” in er, 1036) 6. When discussing the types of spllogisms in Top. 1, 100a-b Atistotle approaches the contingency of dosa from a somewhat differ. nt angle, A demonstrative syllogism Capndeinie, « ¥) reste upon [Preiisses that are tme and primary. It thuo differs from a dielectical syllogism (dialebtike, q.v.) whose premisscs aro based on endaxa, which are now defined as opinioas that ere eccapted by the mejacity ur We wise. For the umpiications of this for Aristotle's method, coe en- oxen 7, ‘The Epicurean view of dona shaves bath Platonic and Aristote- Ilan trate, Ie fo opinion, o certain cyeulauevus uiyveatectt In U8 That { #8in to but distinct from sensation (cisihes's, ¢.7.). For Fpicuras all| pyas aisthesis is tre but not necessatily self-evident (enargeta, q.v.), and so dose is capable of extending beyoad the evidence of the senses, e3, for ‘example, in assigning by its judgment sense deta to the wrong prolep- sis (q.7.), and thus fs the source of error and falsity (D.L. x, 50-31) dys: dyad, pair [Atcordliig w ote acount uf Py diguresuisun press ved iw Tae anthor (1D.L. vir, 25), the Dyad was derived from the Monad {monar); bat on the basis of the “Table of Concraries* in Meta. 6a, the Monae end Dyer woud seer to rank ao eapeinciple, rnd if the Monas is associated with the Good (egethon) (Aetius 1, 7, 183 see Eth, Nich, 1096b), so the Dyas is ranked with kakon (zbid. 1108, 29). Aristotle makes varions attempts to identify a material principle in Plato (see hyle): in Meta. g87b and 988a it is the dyas, and finally, in 1081a and 1099, the indefinite dyatl (coristos dyas). Plato may himself have used the expression, but not in the dialogues; perhaps in his lecture “On the Good” (See Alexander of Aparacisia, fn Meta. 55; Simplicius, In Phye. 4g9-4865 and egrepha dogmata). From Phil ‘go-28d we know tat Plato used the apeiron es an arcke, and Aris- tore eoujecture iu Phge, 17, ncOb that the vosoin why the adetersat nate? is twofold is that it is a spectrum unlimited in either direction, Plato's own successor, Speusippus, identified it with plurality (Aris- totle, Meta. so87b): see arithmae dynamis: active and passive capacity, hence x] power and 2) potentiality a. The “powers” make their first appearance with Anaximan- der, not, as lator, as quulities of things, but es the things themeelies; cpgostes (see cant) tha se epreted of from thesia: the hot and the cdld (Diels, fr. 12410) and have almost :he status ot clements. With Anzximenes (Diels, fs. 1385, 47, 1) she distinetion between substances (earth, fire, water) and their qualities (“powers”), hot snd cold has begun. Eapeductes’ wheoty of clementa (ace srvicheion) shifted sttention to the substances away from the dynamic qualities, but with Anaxagorss the primary role is once agzin given to the opposed powerr (Ero. 8, 19, 15, 16). ‘The Atomists stand in another tradition: the Pythagorean mumber theory had, in effect, reduced quali- tative differences to quantitative ones (sce arithneoe), and Demperitus follows them iu reducing the perceptible quelities zo contact (haphe) with geometrical shapes (Dicls, fr. Ax3g; of pathoe)s they are no Tonger dynemte but merely couventional (rome), iid. ng. . Plato is aware of the d:suamety both as a medical term (Pac arus groe-d, and sce etiys) aint iu theis selativuchip win the clemeats (Zion. aga), and these powers, also called pathe, exist in the Receptacle pYNAMTS 49 (Aypedeshomene) before Nous begins its work. But once the primary bodies have been formed, these powers disappear and the sensible quilitics are reduced, in true Atomist fashion, +o the geometrical shapes of the clementary particles (ddl 610-08 see genzsis 4. In Arisictle the powers (generally called poion or pathos) ‘once agein are central. Fmpedocles’ stoisheia were irreducihls, and Plato's redueibie back to the geometric Aigures (Tim. gge—gte); to ‘both of these Avistctle oppesed his own theory of the composition of the stoichsia from 1) underlying matter end 2) ths presence of ene of each per uf the powers: hotcold; dey moist (De gem ct corr. gan 3308)+ ‘Thus change or reduction of ore element into another consists of the ‘passage of one opposite lo another in the substratum (see /upokei- ‘monen, genesis) 4. All of these nsages pertsin to dynamis as a “power,” but in the Metephysice Aristotle develops another sense of dynamic, i.e, potentiality, and he distinguishes the two in Meta, 2ogsb—t1046a; poten tiality cannot be defined, but only ustrated (ibid. 10482—b), e.g. the swaker is potentially the sloepor; the prasage from potency to actuality (energcia) is either through art or by an innete principle ({Bid. 10490); enorgewa is logically and ontclogleally prlor to dynanis (ibid. 2049>— 130508), hence the necessity of a fist mover (see kinoun) alvays in & stete of energeia (ibid, 10500). 5. The Stoic doctrine of the “power prahed Arictote theory ‘of the elements one step further; exch stoieheion had one power instend of one each of the opposed sets: fire had heat, air hed cold (these were the artive [avin] qualities); earth had the dry and water the moist (passive [parcheir] qualities; ee SVF 11, 380), and the scree on fire in the system (see pyr) is clearly a function of its being the most active power. Indeed, the Stoica reduced all of reality to two basic crchai: the active (pototm) and the passive Coaschein, qv. cf, DLs Vit, 134). 6 We see, then, that for the Milesians and their successors Aynamis wos sa setive force in things, frst thought of as a separste tauural entigy but chen refined, from Flato ou, tate die avliva of active quality (poiotes, q.v.). In post-Aristotelian philosoohy, however, the name ia frequently applied t the great mumber of intermediary rmevers of imualligencas associated with the plants of the aifner or the daimoues who inhabit the air (sce nows 17), and identified by Philo a3 angels (cf. De gigut. 6a). 7. But there were other factors at work in the Philoaisw notioa of dynainis, In Sexipture God is said to have “powers,” translated by the Septuagint us dymameis, and these Philo identifies with the Platonic deat (De spec. leg. 45-48: for the distinction bevween. eidos exc fdea, yee noeoon 2). ‘Thos they assume the Tole of the cramscendeme neta Ia the mind of God and, as the immanent eide, become a creative force in4 | oewanrs the universe. In Philo it is the latter that give order to the universe while they, in tura, are controlled by the transcendent God (De fuga 301). The same treatment con be scon in Plotines, The nocta that exist 1mm a unified form in the cosmic nous (see nceton s) are described 2s universal dynaris with boundless capacity (Enn. v, 8, g). But each ® these is potentially (and in the sequel will be actually) separate hive aual ov au individual dyrvamts Cv, y, 9) thar wil Tater be operative in both the noetic end sersihle world (rv, 4, 36) 8, But the noetic and sensible world descends, according to the Nonpletomin vision of the univerno, in a uniform equnl ocsies from a single source (see prodides) and is linked together by a cosmic sya patheia (q.v.). A corollary of this, and a characteristicaly symmetcical touch, is that all the entities in the series. neta and aistheta, are alee subject to the thrust of retwum (ebistrophe, qu.) to their source. Episirophe was hardly a novel concept. It is implicit in the Pythago- sean view of the soul as a divine part that tries to restore iis true harmony (armenia, q.¥.). It may be sezn, as well, in the related Platonic notions of Batkersis, eros, dialektike (qq.v), and the call to ‘assimilation to God? (see homoicsis). But here as elsewhere, includ- fing Plotinusy the solu, in whuteyer fori, is a function of the coa- scious soul and particularly its intellectual faculty. After Plosinus, however, it is extended to the entire range of creation (see Proelus, Elem. thea! prop. 20) 9. There were, to be sure, some precedents for this. Plato had allowed to plants a certain choice of the good life (Phil. 2b); Aris wiles physis (o.v.) works toward a ielos, and he had. spoken. more- over, of genesis in the sensible world as an imitation of the activity of the divine aous (see deta. 10305 and fizoun g). But these were not ‘the immediate progenitors of Proclas? symmetrical epistrophes they are rather to be scught in the later development of tac notion ot dynamis, The Stoies had already developed a theory of logoi sper- matito (q.v.) that, somewhet Tike the Aristotelian physis, gow fered dhe growth and development of things. But here the stress is on ‘the rational (logos) element; from the time of Paseidonius this yields to the more dynzmic concept of a vital force (eatike dynamics see ‘svmfatieia 9) in all beings thet are linked together by the affinities oF ‘sympatheia. Tis was systematized into a-vast body of knowledge, the todo the Sat fle el sate of astral ies TR the “physics” of late antiquity, associated with the name of Boluo Monde ae 30. These sympathetic dyramcis are not, at this point, magical, but they soon become so under other influences. The religious view of Lew authyatty, yrslaye infhnined Ly dy vailicr demande that dhe gode act in such ¢ way dial dhey preserve dieir transcendent Iinmobility (see rmouon | 45 nous 2), wae thet the gods ne longer workeé in person but through their dynamcis in things. These dynemeis could be and wore porso fied; Philos usage has already been noted (6 supra) and the philoso- phers found it a convenient way to revoucile the unultiple gods of mythology with their own henotheism (see the fragments of Porphy- ry's On the Images of the Gods; Macrobius, Scturnelia 1, 17-233 Froclus, Thent. Pict. vvr, tt also gave them ample scope to display their by then highly developed powors of etymologizing: see onoraa'7). It is this religious point of view that is given ite claseic theoretical justification in propo. ag4 24g of Proclis! Zlem, thool. where be afBriaa that the distinctive characteristic of the divine powers (theiai dy ameis) radiates dowaward in the casual sequence and is found on all levels of reality 11. This view of the dynameis in things goes far beyord the Bolean physics that attempted to discover anc nse, lsrgely for thers- jeutic purposes, the occult sympathy between natural objects; here we Rive the theoraeal grove for the magical att of ‘feourpin (see mantike 4-5} that seeks to meripnlate the geds through their occult tokens” (zymbola) ix: natural objects and thnt, since Iamblichus, was a standard part of the Neoplatonic repertory (sce De myst. vy 235 Proclus, in Timm. 1 139, 220). For related questions in the history of dynanis, see genesis, pathon, polein, stoichsion, for its Aristotelian corelatve, enersvia. e échein: 1] to have, a] to be fia certain state; see hexis “Possession” is one of Aristo:la’s hategoriai. Tt appears as such in Cat, 26-20, but is omitted in other listings, e.g. Aral. post. 1, 83b. "To he in n rertoin sists (fo> echein) is one of four Stole extogorics (SVP 11, 389); itis discussed by Plotiaas (En. vt, 2, 25), who also uses this Stoic term in discussing fsycite (Linn. 1v, 7,4) and fyle (Did. 1, 4 1). eldélon: image Iu the Atomists’ theory of visual perception (aisshesis, q.v.) imayes of the same shape es the body ere given off by the percelved wUject and encer the pares of the viewer (ATexander of Aphrodisins, Te sent 56, 12; Plutarch, Symp. vict, 7358). In Fpicureanism these enter48| expos {nto the senses of men daring sleep as well, and are thoughe by men to be gods (Sextus mpiricus, Adv. Math, 1x, 19; $0 toa in Cicaro, De nat. dear. 1, 19, 493 for an ethical correlative, see hedone). Plato uses image” in the Sophiet, and further divides it mto “hkeness” (er2o% ) and “semblance” (phantaema), ibid. og60-b; it is Hike the real, but hes existence secundum quid, ibid. agge-agob (see the description of eikon iu Tue. ye). Tu Plotinus cidolon io gencially used in the case of eihon; see En, v, 254 une 11, Ys 3 where liye is an eiolun of the soul, and 1t, 4, 5 where sensible matter is an eidoloa of intelligible matter (oon hyle} efdos: appearance, constitutive nature, form, type, species. idea 1, Bidos was a well-established and feirly sophisticated term long before its canonization by Plato, Tts first meaning, and the usage is corrent in Homer, is “what one sees,” “appearance,” “shape,” nor- mally of the body, and pre-Socratic philasophy contired to nse it in this sense (see Empedocles, frs. 98, 125 antl Democritus, cited in Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1110). By the time of Herodotus eidos, and its exguute idee Usd Inad wone fate use, bad been bioadened and abr stracted into “characteristic property” (1, 203) or “type” (1, 94). ‘Thucydides’ use is similar (see 121,81), and in ons instance (11, 50) he speaks of “the vier of the ciseran,? an expression that Tens foto the development of the term in contemporary suedical circles, Here eidos/ idea hed apparently been isolated as a technical term, frequently Tinked to the notion of power (dynamis, q.¥.), andi meaning something ap- prouimately like “constitarive nature” (see Hippocrates, VM. 15, 39; Nat. hom. 2,55 De arte 2) 2, Whatever the exact interpretation of the latter texts, it does seem clear that there was en approac’ to the form of titnge that was not necessaiily tied to its outward appearance (though its connection swith dynamis suggests thet is identiftcation rested upon an awareness ‘of its visible offcots), but rather ty auw kind of ianer inielligibiliry (De arte 9 significantly connects eidos with the imposition of names; see onoma). ‘g. Was there a parallel development among the philosophers? Both Plato and Aristotle seem to suggest that there was. Plem, in a rare glance at the history of philosophy (see endewen), says that discussions on the nature of reality have polarized into factions, which hie calls the Giants and the Gods. ‘Ihe ret are msteriansts (sop zqfazq6a; compare the somewhet different but perallel attitudes in Phoedo yfo-d aad Laces x, 8892-Sgoa) and Plato is probably referring tw due Atumist tnalitiva, The Gods, on the othar hand. are decoribed as “friends of Uhe cide” (ibid. aqGa-2qgd) and they hold « theory of rmos | 47 suprasensible reality that is indistiagu'shable from Plato's, They arc net the Eleatics since they believe ina plurality of ouca entities (see Their identity hes Been sought fn a passage fi Arisctle where we are told (Meta. o872-L) that Plato fellowed the Pythago- reans ia many respects, atiributing to Plato oaly verbol diferences from the Pythagorems’ and same re‘inemen's introduced under the influence of the Hersctitan Cratylus and of Socrates himself g. Were the Pythagoreats the originators of the eide theory? "Dhore have boon thove who theaght coy axguing, infor win, from the strongly Pythagorean environment of the Phcedo where the theory is propounded by Plato for the first time, But there is litle o support this from the strictly Pythagorean evidence aud the statement ig an isolated ‘one in Aristotle, added, perhaps, when he came to the conelusfon that Plato had identified the eice with namber Cerithmos, ¢.¥.). 6. The origin of the theory must be sought closer to home. Socrates had been interested in defining ethical qualities (see deta. 987b), probably as « recction against Sophist relativiem (see ncmes), and there is reason to believe that the Platcate cide were hypostatized versions of just such definitions (foget; see Phaed> gge, dere. 98;b, ana compare the connection with predication, éajra). Indeed, in the 3” one can. see Socrates himsel? moving in just such its aiga, Buthyphra 58, 64; the Eushyphro passeges aotually use eidos, but the meaning is still close to “appearance”; in ‘Beno 72e~e the usage has already become more abstract). But, on the testimony of Aristotle, Socrates “did not separate the universal defink- tion” (Meta, 2078b), i.e, it had ne transcendent, snbsistent. (choris- ton, q.v.) existence. 7. For Plato the eide di exist separately (see Tims. g2a-c) and the rcasoas may be sougia in epistemologicel considerations us well as the ethical oues that troubled Socrates end that were almost certainly operative upon Plato as well. We have already noted the suggested nflucnes of Tesaultius oni Pata (sexe Met. yO,in, auyQle) wo the effect that, given the chongiag, fluctuating netare of sensible paenomena (ee rhoe)), true knowledge (episteme) is impossible, impossible, that is, unless there ig'9 stnhia, eternal svality hogard the merely sensible ‘The eide are chat euprasensible reality ond ao the eause of episteme and the condition of all philosophical discourse (Phacdo O53-e, Parm. 13sb— Rep ote). For the Further epistemological cools, se dos, ebistome, noes. 8. Though the cide are the centerpiece of Platonic metephystes, nowhere docs Plato undertake « proof for their exiswence: they first sppeas ao w Lypudenis (see Pruety xuub—s01d) 21 remaln $0, even ‘though subjected to & scathing criticism (Parm. 1308-1340). They are48 | mos Known, in 2 variety of methods, by the faculty of roason (nous; Reps sgea-b, Tim, sid). One such early methed is that of receDcctioa (anamsiesis, gs.) whera the individual soul recalls the eide wit which ic was ia contact before birth (Mew 8ol-Ssb, Phaeda 72c—770; see patingenesia). Without the attendant religious connotations is the purely philosophicel method of dialeksibe (q.v.; see Rep. sq.d-so5e; for 1s diterence trom metnematiest rersoning, vou. glob=e83a; *rem evisic, Phil. igda6a). As it ig first described the methed has to do ‘with the progress from a bypothecis back to an unhypochetizad erchs (Phaedo roe, 1924 Rep. sazb), but in the Iter dlalogrues dike iike appeurs 23 e fully articulated methodology comprising “cellection”” Caynagoge, q.¥.) followed by « “division” (diairess, q.t.) that mpyes, via the dizhorai. froma more comprehensive Form down to theataman ides, Finally, one may approach the eide through erce (q.v.), the . 4 The definition of endosa in the above cited text suggests that opinions have both a quantitative and qualitative basis, The frst seems Socratic. fen, canvassing what may he termad the Hoommon-eenos? view, and this approach is followed at various points in the ethical treatises (see Eth. Wich, vit, 1348), 28 well as at the very opening of the Metaphysice (c82a). In this latter text Aristetle is scoking the ature of sophia and the procedure he adopts is to stert from commonly held views of whet « wise mom is. And he ean take this tack because of ‘presumption that is left unspoken in Plato: the uuitive and progres: sive navure of philosopiay where the truth is not the preserve of any one ‘man bu¢ the result of a continuous and curnulative investigation (ifeta saga-b). 5- But the definition of endose in the Tepics opens the possibil ity of an appeal to qualitetive opinion, to the “professiona)” rather then the “common-sense” view, to “what seems true to the sophoi” Thus begins the history of philosophy, east nat in the vale of on independent ‘Aistorical discipline, but ea pert of the method ef philesophy, the major premise, co to speak, in a dialectical syllogism. In Aristotle considera- tiors of the opinions of his philosophical predecessors are always woven into his owu investigations, ‘The first to effect a physical separation of the historical material was Avistnle's own student “Theophrastus whose Opinions of the Natural Philosophers was a free-standing work and the ancestor vf all the succeeding Coxographical collections (sce ‘Theophrastus’ parallel detechment of the chsraeter sketches from their ethical context in his Characters). 6. "The historical approach to philocophy fo not completely ua Known to Plato; he gives at least one review of the course of pre- Socratic speculation (Soph. 24zb=24gd: see eidos), and same of the central dislogues cugage in dialectical discourse not with some repre. fentative ofthe coramarntsopinio, but with dramatic recreations of an carlicr generation of phllosophersophists (eg. Parmenides, Protago- 25, Gorgias), The diference in Ar stotle's attude ix expnecced In ho ‘previously cited texc of the Aferaphysics (g938-b)+ philosophy fs cum lalive, evolutionary, progressive. Plato's delinestions may be historical54 | ENDOxoN but there is no evidence of « concept of philosophy as pert of man's social history; indeed, the implications of the anammesie (q.v.) theory is that cach man must emerge from the Cave; mankind makes no progress in this regard. 7. Aristoll’s historical perspectives appear exly; the fragments (e.g. 3, 6, 7) of Book 1 of the early dialozue On Philosophy show avfstorie ptsntng the evanution af sania tn A context even wider than thac of the Metophysice. Here he has before him a historical panorama that embraces not only the Greek sages of the past but « wider purview that takea into account uct oaly the rcligio mythical queat for truth (seo mythos, aporia), bat the wisdom of the East as well; in short, a tradition dhat begins with the Egyptians, passes through Zoroaster, anil climaxes in Plato, 8. The fragmentary nature of the dislogue does not permit much speculation on the metaods employs there, but there is abundant evidence for Aristotle's use of his predecessors in the preserved tres- ties. Book t of the Metaphysics Includes a survey (e8gb-988a) of previous opinions on caucelity; Payeise 1 has a similar review (284-18gb) on the arckai. The De anime prosents « history of the speculations on the nacure of the soul (4og>—f11b), and De gen. et corr. on the nature of genesis (g142~gr7a). Bach of these passages has its own proper thrust. At times, as in the Metaphysics passage, the andova provide a confirmation to Arintotle's ow thooriringy or, egnin, as in the De anima, they set out and limit the terms of the problem, the solution of wich will begin afresh in Book 1 (see 4ogb). But in every case the positions of other philosophers are presented from a problem atic rather than from a historical point of view ené, in addition, ere subjected to a critique in greater or lesser detail, again from the problematic point of view. Thus the review in Afeta. 1, chaps. 3-6 is followed, in chaps. 8-10, by a criticism of previous spezulation. ‘©. Aristntle's presentation and erbticism of the work of his pred- cecessors, and particularly of Plato, has been much criticized (see agraphe dogmaia). Tae problem seems to xrlse from the faet dt while Aristotle had a point of view thet enabled him, or even demanded cof Bim, that he incorperate the carlier history of the quest for sophia, ato his own inveotigationc, it was thie strictly procedural approach, which sw Listory only as aforia (qv.) or fesis, that provented him from doing strict justice to the historical reality of his predecessors? work, to, In the period following Theophrastus two further develop- iments become visible. First, the collection of exdoaa that !n Aristotle serves to delineate the evolutionary nature of philosophical enquiry 13 tured to new purposes. “he marked strait of scepticism that power fally shaped the problems snd methods of post Aristotelian thanght down to the beginnings of the Christian era found # nev use far the anxxceia | 55 Aoxographical technique, employing it now, in a manner quite the opposite of the Aristotelian usage, to reinfores, on historia grounds, a position of methodical doubt. Hovr ean it be, they a, that we have any guarantee of certitude when the great philosophers of the past were in such contradiction on the basic questions of philosophy? Chapter and verse are cited and the cumulative effect is to persuade the reader that the only reasuuable course Is a scepllcel suspension of Judgment (epocka; see Cicero, Acad. pr. 48, 148 and Seems Empiriens, Pyerh. 1, 6-98). Such is, for instance, the transparent purpose of the dezogra- phy in Cicero, deed. gr. 98, 228 471 245, borrowed, no doubt, from some formar teacher in the sceptical New Academy. 11. The New Academy also plays a part in the historiography of the period. The polemic of the age of Cicero is dominated by a struggle over the orthodoxy of the various schools. Philosophy had already passed into its “classical” stage and the battle for a protective place ‘nnder the mantles of the past masters wes at its height, a bate in which one of the evored techniques was the writing—and rewrit- ing—of the history of philosophy. Again the chief witness are the pages of the Academica of Cicero. ‘Two views emerge, the Sceptic and the Sceie. The fst vers dhe pre-Sucsutics us x voriey of prutu Seeptisy the ‘movement coming to a climax in the aporie (q.v.) of Socrates. Plato’s dogmatism is mote apparent than real and the New Academy from ‘Arcesilus to Cameader isin the muinstreuia of Socratism, «a were the Cyrenaics (Acad. fost. 12, 44-46; 23, 72-74, 78). The Stoic view of history, derived from the Academic Antiochus by Cicero but probably attributeble to the Stoic Panzetius, tends to disregard the pre-Socratics and begia the modern philosophical tradition with Socrates whose alleged scepticism was, in any event, nothing more then irony. I: then proceeds to syneretize the Old Academy and Peripctos into a single system difienng ax name but essentially in agreement (Acad. post. 4, 15-18). The system cf Zeno derives from that source and is nothing more than a correction of Platonism (iid. 9, 25; 12, 43), while the ‘Axccailan Now Academy is rally an aberration (Acad. pr. 6y 16). Tris in this fashion that Middle Stoicism can locate itself in the Platonic tradition (with visible philosophical efects in Poseidenis; see noesis xy and puyche 29) and Antiochus effect his *restoration® of the Old Academy by championing Stoic doctrines (eee Cicero's apt charscteri- zation in Acad, pr. 43, 292). enérgeia: tunctioning, activity, act, actualivation 1. The technical usc of eneegete is|an Aristotelian innovation and a correlative of his concept of dynamnia (qv.) as capecity. The analyois uf geruais {yee} in ee PMgaico pusours Une apynvcds alicady set out by Plato in bis account of precosinio genesis in the Témacus, ‘veg the passage of opposed powers or qualities in « substratum, with . | |36 | eneresta the additional Aristotelian refinement of privation (atercsie) thet answers Parmenides' objections on the subject of aonbeing, But at the end of this treatment Aristotle refera we snother Line of approach, which hie will develop mote fully eleewrher=, viz., an aualysis based oa da- amis and cnergeia (Phys.., 1916). 2. This analysis, explained in the Metaphyeics, presents metho- ological TiMculdes shace nelther dynaoate nor energera is suscepttbe cf definition in the ordinary sense, but can only be illustrated by example and analogy (eta. 20482). But it is, none:helecs, of prime importance in thet it transoeads tho mero Kinetico of the Phyeise: we ate now in the heart of an anclysis of being (ibid. roysb—1048a), an analysis that will enable Atistotle to deal with the transcendent, imper- ishable entities of the supertunary world and the Prime Maver. 3 The relationship between Kinesis and energeia is first ex- plored. We are told thet it is movement hat first mggests the notion of energeia (ibid. 10472), but that there remains a difference in that inesis is essentially incomplete (ateles), i.e. it is a process toward some yet unachieved goal (note that the Rinesia of the elements ceases ‘when they have reached their “natural place"; see stoicheion), while energeie is complete; tis aut process but acdvlty (t0td. 10480). ‘4 Equally ilhrninating is Aristotle's derivation of energeta from function (ergoa, qu.). Function is that which a thing is naturally suited to do, ie, the making or doing for which it hos « eopasiy (@ynamis). Ths we have the notion of envergeia, the state of being at work, functioning (ibid. 1050). Quickly Avistctle binds in the relsted notion of end (teloe). Since function is the end, enerecia is cbviously related to entelecheia (q,v.), being ina state of completion, In this way snergeia is described and delimited: it isthe functioning of a capecity, its fulfillment and actoalization, normally accompanied with pleesure for the ethical implications of this, see feddone), and prior to potency in defintioa, time, und substance (ibid. 2049-10508). 5. The ptlority of entergeia in substance introduces important cw conser alfuis. Dynes iy Ue apslly uf Cag Co be oll Uae 5t is it does not exist necessarily. This may refer to either its cusia or the various dynameis toward changes of quantity, quality, or plsce, "Thue the afernal mavement of the henvenly bedies, being sterncl pore enorgcias it cannot be otherwise cven though they may ave dyncmeis for accidental change of place (ibid, 1030b; the eternal cyclic enesis of the elements is a mimesis ofthis; see genesis), 6. At the ex of this dialectical process stands the ullimate energ= ia that inthe last resort stands behind and actualizes every dynamis in the universe, the Prime Mover (see Ainoun) whose absolutely pure energeta ts ucts: “Lite Is the energela of uyuas he 1s due onergeta™ (bid. 1072). EPAGOCE | 57 éunoia: concept According to Stoic epistemology (SVF 11, 83) man is bore: with bia reacon like a ‘papyrus role ready For writing” (the frst appearance of the cabuia rasa image). Through sensation various images (hunta- sia) are presented to the reason for its “apprehension” (katalepsis). If dese awe upprelieded eund lek, Uiey become, in effect, concepis (en ‘noiai) of the mind. OF these some occur naturally, Le., without formal ‘natrnction, and are termed “preconceptions” (prolepnis, q.v.); others aevelep Hhrnngh formal education. ‘The annoiai are mere conceptoy thoy hhave ro extrameaial or concrete reality (SVP 1, 653 D.L. vr, 61), but they do serve as an important criterion of truth, or rather one class of them, the ‘common concepts” (Aoinai ennsiai, notiones communes), which are identical with the naturally acquired, though not innate, projepseis (SVF ul, 473). They embrace « certnir. knowledge of the first principles of morality (SF 11, 619, 218), of God (bid. , 1009), and of the atteriife (Cicero, Fuse. 1,13, 30-1, 14, 91). For the connection between the concept end its name, see cncma, (On the possibility that the Platonic Form may be only a concept (neem), see eles, nocton; for its vole fa Btvivieity vewety 10, entelécheia: state of completion or periection, actuality 2. Although Aristotle normally nses entelecheie, s proba bly his own coinage, a5 a synonyta for energeie (q.v.), there is a passage (Beta. 20502) thet at least suggests that the two seme, though clesely connected, exe not perfectly identical. They ere reletod rough the notion of ergon (q.x.)+ ergon ts the Function of a capacity (Aynantie} ana so its completion end folKillment (¢si0s, q.v.). Thos the state of functioning (energria) “tends toward” the state of completion (emteleshein), sepevially vinco Ariototle hee alreedy pointed out (ibid. ro4Sb) thet energeta differs from &inesis in that the Tater is incomplete (aieles), while the former is not. 2, ‘The most curious use of enteleckeia in Aristotle ix probably ite substitution for eides in the definition of sou!, which thus becomes (De ‘an. uy, 4uaa): “the first entelecheic of natural body tbat potentially haa lif.” euthousiasmés: See mencike, ine indwelling, possession epagogé: Ieadmg in, leading on, induction (Socratic, Aristotelian; for Platouic “induction,” see synagnge) 4 Asfswtey i & passage where he 1s describing the ongin of the theory of Forms, remarks thst Socrates was the ficet fo employ “induc.58 | eprereera five axguments” (cpaktikot Iogol; Meca. 10786). But to understand epaktiko’ in the serse of an Aristotelian “indvetion” (epagoge) is probably misleading since neither Socrates? methodology nor Plato's Terminology potnt to a strictly Aristotelian usage. The developed AAris- twteliam ebagoge is defined, in its most general terms, as “the leading on from perticulers to the universal [ketholeu] and from the known to the unknown” (Tup, vats, 1303). 12. Plato uses epagein once in a sense skin to this (Pol. 27a), bat Ils more commen usege is in the sense of Seite” or “adduce” (see Rep. of, Lowe Sogn}. In tho dieloguce moat closely assuviated wid the historical Socrates there is frequent reliance on individual instances, but they aze cited either for purposes of refutation or correction (see Reb. 23103364 ) or taestahlich analogies (see Xenophon, Mars. 10%; 5, 9)» in both instances a kind of testing device that is part of the Socratic method of slenchoe (see aporia, Rethersie), and thet, by skillful use, aight eventually reach definition, or, again, merely end in aprria (see Theact, 2xch-d). & The most fundamentel import of epagoge in Aristotle is its role es the foundation stone of all scientiic knowledge (episteme). It ia ‘through an induction of individual sense experiences (aiotheacis) that vwe gain our knowledge of both the universal concept (datholow, q.v.) and the universal proposition (arche, q.v.), and it is these latter that serve as the undemonstrable preiisses of' all demonstration (Anal. ost, 1, ogb-00b; see Meta, ofoa-812). This epagoge is not a discur- sive process and, unlike complete induction, it earnet be reduced to a type of syllogism; :ather itis au iutuitive grasp of the mind, which Aristotle terms nows and which fs eo trustworthy as demonstration itself. 4. The point of Arietotslian epasoge to that the universal resides within the aiztetiel confines of the individual sense data (Phys, 1, 3644), and itis by repeated exposures to this sense experince tha: the ‘mind comes to grasp the higher intelligibility of the universal (Anal ‘post, 1, 87b—88a). But because of its intimete connection with sense- tion, induction remains both more convineing end more popular in its appesl (Top. 1, 10505 compare griorimon). 5+ ‘Chere is, finally, still another type of induction that Avisioile freats at sce Iength, perfect induction or the canvassing of all the instances of a general proposition (Anal. pr. 11, 68b). But here ke is Skaling with dhe seduction of iinducdiou w syllugistie fori, someting he can achieve only by means of a perfect induction. ieikeia: equity Steaite xristemx | opistémé: 1] (true and scientific) knowledge (opposed todoxa) :2] an organized hey of Frowledge, 2 science; g] theoretical knowledge {opposed to praktike and poietike} 3. The materialism of the pre-Socratics did not permit them tn distinguish between types of knowledge; even Hereclitus, who insisted that his Jogos (q.v.) that is hidden, could he grasped only by the intelligence, was, when he came to explain nour (q.7.), a thorough- going materlalist: knowledge was sensation of the lke-knows ike type (see homoios). Heraclitus certainly held to the permanent order of the universe, surrounded as it wae by an obvious process of change, but the succeeding philosophers professed w cauplupiae de element of change (Call is in fux; sce rie), and the consequent worthlessness cf sense Knowledge (see Plato, Crat. goza; Aristotle, Phys. vint, aggb). A pro- ponent 0° this denigeation af alerherie was Cratylue (eae Avistala, ‘Meta, x0102) who was a formative influence on the young Plato (idem 9874). 2. Sensualist perception theoties were disoredited, and when Soc rates describes just such a process in Phacdo 98b, he is not happy with it; but it does suggest that the distinction between daxa and episteme was pre Socratic, In the Phzedo context the differentiation does not appear to be any more than a cistinction between levels of coaviction; but the true father of the radical distinction that appears from Plato onward is the one preSocratic unconcerned with “saving the phe. nomena,” Parmenides, whose poem sets over against ihe work of perception end opinion the realm of pure being and pure thought {noema, fr. 8, Hines 34-96, 50-51). This {s algo the realm of Plato's cide (q.v.), immutable, everlasting, the grmma of true knowledge (episteme). Eidos and epieteme are locked together from their fist implicit appesrance in the Meno (as a corollaty of enamnesis, qwv.), through a similar argument in Phacdo 7sb-76 that strongly insists that true Knowledge (efisteme) of the Forms cannot come through the senses aad so we must be born with it. The brondest statement of the collocation episteme/eide vs, dava/aietheia is given in Rep. 4760-4800, nd illustated in the following Diagram of the Line (sogd-g1ie) and the Allegory of the Cave (5142-521b), Sensation (aisthesis) reasserts its claim to be true knowledge in Theaet. 186d; this is rejected 2s well 28 the alternative “true judgment ecoompanied by an account™ (2g 0%y 4%), ibid, a87b, but this too is refined and cruised (ibid. 2o1e-s1od). The answer unfolds in the sequel, die Sophists the only true knowledge is a knowledge of the cide an its method fs dialectic (dialekttbe, q.9.). Even as late as the Tirazeus the distinction between episterie and dova and their differing ubjects‘s stressed (apb—A)60 | serstaorme 4g. Plato's truncceadent cide ore replaced by Aristotle's immanent ‘variety (see cidos), end the change is accompanied by # shift in the object of episieme. Tor Aristotle true scientific knowledge is a know!- edge of causes (aitia), which are necessarily true (Anal. post. 1, 764), while opinion (doza) is about the contingent (symbebekos, ibid. 1, 88). Fpinteme is demonstrative, syllogistic knowledge (ser apodeisis, sou. 1, 72D), anc sense knowledge is n necessary condhtion for it (xo1d. 1, Bia-b; see epagage). 'Ihis is all in a logical context; the causes mentioned above are the premisees of a eyllogiom and the causes of the ceonclusion, Aristotle taltes up epiateme from an ontelogical viewpoint §n the opening of the Metaphysics; here too episteme is a knowledge of causes, but hese aitia are causes of being, and the knowledge of the nitimate causes is the highest type of episteme, wisdom (sopiiia,¢.v.): for episteme as 2 mental activity, see ncesis. 4. In Meta, roagh—sco6a Aristotle gives his breakdown of epis- tems in the sense of aa orgenized body of rational knowledge with its ‘own proper object; the alignment is as follows: Episteme pealtike reietike theoretice (Gee praxis) (see teclme) _(see thecuia) sathemetike hysike thenlogite (see wnatbemalika} (see choriston) (see theologia) For another, Intet division, cee philosophies for the Platonic “atyiston of the sciences,” see techn. 5. Aristotle frequently uses episteme alone for episteme theore- fiks ta coutreat with pructicul ox procuctive Mocienve.” eng Buh. Viola ‘Vt, 1299b% See praxis, techn, epistrophé: retnmn "The return” of the Platonic tradition is distinct Fram, hnt con- nected with, the epistemological problem of knowing God Cor the connection, see Proclas. Elem, theal., prop. a9). I: dilfers in thet it is 1 Finetion of desire (2renie). Its ontological ground is the identracation of the transeendent One with tho Good (Place, Rep. s09b, Pil. aod; Plotinus, Zin. ¥y § 335 Broslus, Elem, thecl., prop. 8) that ia nevessar- ty aueuljest of deatiy aad the identey of the efficient and final ecvce, the effect, in Middle Platonism, of combining Plato's demiourgos with Rcon | 61 Aristotle's nous. The dialectic of the epistrophe is the xeverse of drat of procession (raédos), and is worked out in Proclus, Blem. cheal., props. 11a. epithymia: desire ‘The desiderative (epithymetiton) is one of the three parts of the soul in Hiato's Kepubhe tv, 4o4d-4436 (a distinction that Aritoile finds unsatisfactory [De an. 4g20-b], but that is maintained by Plo- timua, nit 1, 1, send 8). Tris porishable and, according to Timacus palme, fs lneted below die midi Avistule uuskes epidiyraia but vue of the Uuree operations of the desiderative faculty (see crexis) of the sense-endowed soul (De an. 4145), The object of epithyria is the qlencent (hid ) Rplenmne divides decines jata the aatural and asco sry, natural but not necessary, and neither (DL. x, 1275 Cicero, Tuse. ¥, 35 93)- For the Stoics epithymia is one of four chief affections (with pein, plensure, and fear) (SVP, 211); and just as fear is a ight from anticipated cv, desire is an appetite for an anticipated good (SVP mm, 1991); see also hedone, érgon: work, deed, product, function 3. Ergon, the common Greek word for something done or made, {sised hy the philesophers in s twofold sense: either as the activity of a thing or as the product of that activity. Aristotle Ciequenlly masks he distinction (e.g. Hth, Nich. 1, 1og4a) and it lends him to the further point, a capital ane in his ethiea! speculations, that some activities have sn their end (telos) a prociiet (not necessarily an fobject®, a Frequent Aristotelian example is that health is the ergon of medicine), while others have us their éelos the activity itself (see Eth. Bud, 12192). This is, in general, Arisictle’s distinction between the activity known as, oiesis and that called praxis (qv. see episteme, techne). 2. This distinction between fioiesie and praxis, production and action, is an ethically oriented one, but it has metaphysical implications aut go far deeper. These are set out in Meta. 10§ca where Aristotle refines the concept of ergom into that of “bcing at work” (energeia). ‘This later state is the end (ielos) of being (at this point energvia is related to on toleehoia, “being at completion”), whother the activity issues in an exteinal ergon oc nut. The only difference is that in poiesis ‘the enereeia is in the thing made, while praxis is the energizing of the doer. Thus movement exists in the thing moved, fmt sight is an energ- cia ih the seer anc life an enerzeia in the sonl Cecmpare the definition cof soul under psyche). 3. This ‘dentifieation of delas/ergon/energeia (and, se the same passage continues, with etdot and ousia) leads to another i meaning of ergon as the Function or proper activity of a thing. Prelitni-62 | nos nary here ia the uve of ergoa, activity, as opposed to the things that happen to a aubject (paihicmeta; sce De an. 1, 4oga and pathos, pes- chein). Both of them, the erga and the pathemaia, ate importent from 2 methodological point of view siace dey, together with the dynamis (qov.), define the field of study of the physitos or natural philesopher (De an. 1, 4oab, De eoelo 10, go7bs compare aphairesis). ‘Thence the usage shades off tn proper activity ar fonction both in a physical (see De gen. anim. 7312) snd an ethical sense (Eth, Nich. 1, x0¢7%), and even in more general expressions, like “the proper function of philoeo phy" (Phyo. 1%, 24h) and “tho function of diuleotic” (Soph. Bl. Bje-b). 4 Ergon 2s function plays its role in Aristotle's ethic, just as it hhad for Plato before him. Both men are concerned to set ap a norm of behavior, and both resort to phenomenologicel standards, attempting to connect excellence (arete, q.v.) with function (ergan). Plato defines this latter as “that which the thin estion does alone or best” (Rep. gsga) and has excellence consist in the specific power that allows that function to operate well. Aristotle's approach is somewhat diffe ent. For him crete is « certain high level of pexformance with regerd to the fanction, a bigh level thar is gusrentoed by not taking any man 25, the norm but rather keying function on the performance of the “serious man? (speudaioe; Eth. Nich. c, 10984). 5. What, then, i the ergon of man? For Plato it fo ‘that only man ean perform: management, rule, deliberation; and the rete peculicr to man that allows him to perform them well is dike (auv.). Kor Aristotle the ergon of man is an “energeia of the soul according to logos,” and, since the good of a thing is described in terms of its fumetion, the good of man is this activity on « level of excellence (Eth, Nich. 10982). tos: desire, love 1. Eros fs ane of the many personifications that appear in the popMosoplitual conmogones, Dat unlike most of the others chat repre sent states, e.g. Night, Choos, Earth, Heaven (see the remarks of Aristotle in Meta. zozab), Eres is a foree. In the Orphic cosmogonies ihe nnitre a1l nd Fenn thasn wine iz nen fhe ware of the immaréat gods (2ce Avistophones, Birds 700-7ca)s in Hesiod he is among the first to emerge from Cheos and draws all else together (Ticog. 316-220); according to Pherecydes (28 reported by Proclus, in Tim. 11, 54)s whi Zeus wishes to create (demicurgein) be changes into Eros, Exos, chen, i a motive forve on a sesuel model used to explain the Sqarsiage” and “birth” of the mythological elements, « species of “First Mover” In tic anxter cownugoutes, al was teugadaed ws suck, ros | 63 by Aristotle (IMe‘a. g84b). And even as ths mythological trappings began to fall away in the epeculations of the physikoi Eros, the mover, or now, more frequently, Aphrodk:e, continued to play a role in conjoiae ing the opposite powers (sce cnation, dimnzmis ). Such is, for exatnple, the case in Empedccles where it is Love (philia) and Aphrodite that unite the elements (fr. 27, lines 20-26; Diels 31428; Aristotle, Meta Sous v/s, sees mural forces at work £8 well). Ta Parmeniges she 18 the dairagm (q.v.) ‘who guides all® (ir. 12, line 5), an image that persists in Gresk Titerature (see Ruripides, Hipp, 447-450) 1278 1381) tnd ic still visible in Lucretius! eponing favoccticn of Voous “who alone governs the nature of things” (1, 23). 2, All of these instances of the employment of love have to do ‘with the raising of a human emotion to the level of a ecsmalngical force, an operation that is particularly clear to Empedocles (f. x7, lines 22-22). And in one of the mast extended trestments of evar by philosopher, the Symposium of Plato, the same approach is sill in evidence. The speech of Eryzimachus (:83¢188e) shows the extent of ‘his principle of “attraction” in natore, and this and similar notions, familiar to both the mythologers and the physitoi, fll most of the other Aivowses, The speech of Sucrases, hovrever, strikes out in a new direction where human love is used as an important moral and episte- maological concept. 2 Socrutes as “the lover” Cerotihce) was a commanplocs at Athens, He appears as such in Xenophon (Mem. 1r, 6, 28; Symp. av, 37) aad the notion is frequently combined with the familiar izony: 1 Know nothing, save about ercs (see Theag. 128b, Lys. ao4b, ‘amd compare Alcibiades’ remark in Symp, 216d). That there were physi- cally erotic traits in Socrates’ relationships with the young men of Athens can scarcely be doubted; but his eros had another side as well, ‘9 Alcibiades, who nad tried to seduce him (Syrap. 2172-219), ¢is- covered; Socrates could distinguish between passion and its abject. 4 The philosophical question of love, here called phifia, friend- 4 Ast raised in the Zysis wlere Sucttes, in searching for a Acfinition of this attraction between men, suggests that pechaps it is ‘analogens to the attraction of like to like (homzios, q.v.) that had already been envinciated hy tho prots and the physikoi (Lye, an4a oy for the prime importance of this principle in perception theories, see aistheeis, passim). "This is rejected, as is its converse, that unlike is attracted to unlike (216b). He settles, finally aud without a great deal ‘ot conviction, on « principle that went back to medical theory and had important epplicatioas in contemporary theories of pleasure (see Aé- done): desite (cpithyiniz), wid its consequent, love, is ditected toward fhe Billing uf aleuk (cndeia) aud its ubject therefore, @ something that64 | ros is appropriate (oikeions compere the later development of this in Stat= iim under cikeiosis), ie, something that is neither identical nor complevcly dissimilar and yet deficient in our constitution. 5. The theme is reaumed in the Symposium: love is a desire directed toward the beautiful (Rallos) and necessarily involves the nition of a want or lack (endeias 29¢e-2ob). Socrates then begins to cite the doctrine learued. frum x wise prophetess, Divtaus, Eavs, av reinvested with the trappings of myth, Isa great dairaon (q.7.), one of the intermediaries (metavu) becween the divine and the mortal (Goes). Thon, ouddanly, the Sccratic irozy ie explained: Fras ie alan midway between wisdom (sophia) and ignorance in that the man who thas no sense of his own deficiency will have no love of wisdom (philo- sophia: oan), Love is defined as the desire that the good be one’s own forever (2068), the quest of « mortal aature to be immortal (207d) ‘hat it accomplishes by begetting (genesis; compare Axistotle’s some what similar use of genesis under kinotn 9). 6. At Symp. 209¢ Diotima pauses (a break seen by scme as the dividing Tine between Socratic and Platonic erat) 2nd then Taunches {nto a fina] treatment of the true eros. Concourse wita beautiful bodies bezeis Lewudful discousee (Iogei). The lover woane himself away from a single body and becomes a lover of all beeutiful bodies (in Charm. 154 Socrates had confessed that all youths seemed beautiful to ‘him), thence to Leautiful souls, laws and abtervances, and knowles (episteme), alvvays freeing himself of Loudage to the particular, until “suddenly” there is revealed to him the vision of Beausy itself (zaabs the suddenness of the vision is stressed agein in Ep. vit, 341). This is immortality. 77. What has been revealed is, of course, the transcendent aide, Socrates hes much more to say on the purely psychological side of love i his first speech im the Phacdrus (237-2430 Gefined, 2g5b-c, us an isrutioual desire towerd the enjoyment of beauty). But he Inter reeants and promises a palinode (agab-c), and it is here that eras and phi sophia are rejoined, The irratiouslity of love iz really a type of divine madness (Chei2 mania, 24sb~c; $0 t00 is mantike, qv. which expleins the presence of Dictirax in the Symposium), and it is preseut in the online. rolex of the remembrance (anamaesis.quv.) thet the soul bas of the cide that were revealed to her before her “lass of swings” (2¢8c see kathocos). It is the soul of the philosopher thet first regains these swings by the excrise of her recollection of the eide and by governing licr life accordingly (<4ge~d); the philosopher is semutatea to this bY the visiou of carthly beauty, Ie is boauty that particularly stirs our recollection Lecause i: operates through tho sharpest of our eentes, shglic Czggdmz900) ut Sie 8. Platonic erve is a qwofold activity: it isa communication with, mos | 65 and a movement toward the transcendent world of the cide, and at the same time it is the pouring out into the soul cf the beloved, whose (male) beauty is an imege of God, those “streams from Zeus” thet center his owa soul (252¢-2532). The beloved does not disappear into a ristof sublimacion but remains « necessary parter in the quest for the ide (compare Ep. vit, 341¢~d)). What is sublimated in these relation hips thar are ercherypally represented by Socrazes and fis young disciples is the purely sexual activity. Plato ig awaze thet restraint here is dificult and not slways successful, but e is not inlined to judge too harshly (2355 2360). 9 After Plato eros and its connected notions disappear from the exalted positious given them in these dialogues and take up # more ‘modest stand in ethics under the rubric of friendship (Avisrotle devotes Book vist of the Beh, Nich, to philia: its wider aspects, hurmanitas and philanchropia, were much in vogue in Stoicism: Cicero, De of. 1, $o-gt and see oibeiosis) or that of passionate love. Epicurus, aad, indeed, most of the philosophers, were opposed to this latter on the grounds that it destroyed the ataraxia (q.v.) of the serious chinker (see D.L. x, 118), but the violent diatribe directed ageinst eupido by Lucretius (1v, 203871287) suggests 2 personal rather than a philosophical aporia 10. As migt be expected the Platonic eros reappears in Plotirus, prefaced, in Enn. 1, 6, by an aesthetic of sensible things. Plato had attompted something similar in the Higptan Major where beauty is defined first in terms of the nseful and then of the pleasurable (agge, 2g8a; compare the parallel argument in Gorg. 4744). Plotinus goes atother way; beauty (hail) is not ae it Was for the States Cece Cicero, Tuse. 1¥, 93), a question of measure (metron) or the symmetry of parts since this would be to suggest that beauty is confined to composites and cannot explain the beauty of a single sta: in the heaven at might. Mlotizus’ own explanation (¢, 6,24) isa curious blend of the Platonic anscenlent Form that is shared (koiuonia, metheis) hy the object and the immenent Aristotelian eidos or Stoic iogos, But the true cessonce of baauty ts siayliity, = simplicity dat iy Cound preeminentiy in the One (v1, 7, g2). From these sensible beauties one passes, in approved Platonic fashion, to practices and scfences, thence by a purif- cation (Laaharvi, q-v ) of the sonl to the contemplation of te highest ‘beauty that is the Good (1, 6, 6}. To accomplish this the soul must put of the garments acquired by it during its descent (kashodos, g.¥. and compare gchema). We sce the Deautiful with en interior vision by becoming assimilated to it (1, 6,9). aa. All of this iy nerkedly Platonfe in Image and langurge. But theze bas bocu an equally notable shift in emphasis. Philosophy as a senmuaunal project Lewes lovers Is uo longer in evidence an victimes {for whom the rerarn to the Oue is a “fight of the alone to the Alone”66 | ernos G1, 9, 12). The method of Plotinus is ne longer dialogue, with its diastolic implications, but incrospection, and his goal is an unio mystion (see hen 1g). In Plato the veneration of Aphrodite Pandemus is one scege, and perhaps 2 stage that is never transcended, toward the worship of Aphrodite Urania. In Plotinus, who was “ashamed of being in a body” (Porphyry, Vita Pict. 1), the two goddesses are at odds. Earthly love fo compared by hima to the sape of a virgin on the way (o her Father (v1, 9 9). Gthos: character, hahitnal way of life Heraclitus: “A man’s ethos is his daimon,” Diels, fr. 119. In Plato it is result of habit (Laws 7¢2e), and moral rather than intellectual (dione) in Arie (Eth Nich igen), Types of ethos at vsius ages in life are described by Aristotle, Rhct. 11, chaps. 12-14. In Stoicism ethos is the source of behavior, SPF 1, 203. €tymon; true, truc sense of a word, etymology ‘See onama, eudaimonta: happiness Tt does not, accerding to Democritus, consist in external goods (Diels, frs. 2170, 272, 40). The just man is happy, so Plato, Rep, asnb~neaa. and the best life is the happiest (idem, Lawe 660). Happi nees io the ultimate practical good for men (Aristotle, Eth. Nick. 1, 109705), defied, ibid, 1, 10984, 2100. Tt consists” in intellectual contcmplation, ibid. 1177212784, Ta Stoicisia happiness results from the harmonious life (Dil. vit, & see nomos), yet it is not ax end elos), but a concomitant siete (Seneca, De vita beata § and 13; Plotinus, Zr. t, 4,43 1,4 14); see theoria eupithela: good or innocent emotion, affect See apetheta exdterikoi Kigoi: external discourses, popular works 2. Ore of the literary problems attendant upon the study of Plato's philosophy is the possibility chet at Teast part of his thinking ‘may not have been committed to writing, ie., to expression in dislugue form (see agropha dogmate). Tn the case of Aristotle we know for a certainty thet the extrnt treatises do not represent his entire literary coutpas. There were known tn anciquity a series of dlaloguess published by Aristotle while sill x member of the Academy, and the preserved fragments of which indicate a considerably more Platonic outlook on ‘various probleme, moet notoriously hie theory af the eaal, than that ‘which emerges from seeding of the treatises, conests | 67 2, Modern scholarship locates the dialogues within the problem ‘of Aristotle's philosophical evolution, but an ancient literary tradition, beginoing with Cicero (De fn. v, 12; compare Aulus Gellius, Noctes Ati, %%,'5, 1) Tead the differences between the dialogues and the ‘treatises not 2s a fanction of an intellectual evolution, but rather as the difference between two distinct, albeit contemporary, types of literary compostilon: external discourses Cexuterttot fogot), Le., quast-popular works designed for 2 wide audience, snd lectnres’(abreatikos Iogoi) delivered in the Lyceum to more technically trained groups of students. a. Exeterihoi leged are, indeed, cited in the preserved troaticon, ‘and while some of the references conveniently fit what we know of a given dialogue (c.g. the reference in Eth, Nich. 1, t102a could fit the Protrebticus), there ate otber instances (e.g, Pius, 217b and Pol. agaga when compared with Eta, \ich. 1, 8b) where it eannot be so, and the meaning here of exoteribot logoi is more akin to “arguments current outside the Peripstetic School.” § génesis: birth, coming-into-being, becoming (as opposed to being) , process, passage to a contrary, substantial change 2, Even in is enrllese attested usage (U- x1v, 201, 245) genesto is something more than a biclogical process and the two meanings of “birth? and “beginaing in being? are intertwined in the pre-Socratic texte, The precence of tho word in she extant Fragment of Anasimande 1has been alttibuted by most to the language of the Peripatetic epitomi- zer of the text (Theophrastus via Simplicius, Phys. 24, 17), but both ‘the expression and the notion are unmistakable in Xeaophanes (its. 20, 30) and Heraclitus (frs. g, 96) in speaking of the *birth® and ‘Geath? ‘of physical bodies. 42. The proSocratics were immensely interested in change. Hay- {ng deciced upon one or a number of elemental prizciples (s00 ake), either naturel bodice, like water or air, or substantirized versions of what were thought of as “powers” but were Inter to be considered as, quelitica (ace dynamin, pathos, poisr), cus the hot Uhe dey, ulty they discussed the mechanies of how oae could become the other. ‘This63] cunssis what Aristotle was later to call “absolute becoming” (genesis haple), change in the eategory of substance as opposed to the various changes (onetaboiai, gps.) in the categories of accident (De gen. et corr. 1, ‘g19b-goca). ‘Thus mz Anaximenes, who posited aer (qov-) a8 his arche, imple bodies come inte being from the cordensation and rarefaction of er (Simplicius, Phys. 24, 26), while for Ansximandes, whose arche is an indefinite substance (upetium yove)y the gencets uf posveptibles involves sume sort of separetion protess (Aristotle, Pigs. 1, 1378). 3. In all of these thinkers, for whom life and movement are inherent in things, thera ie an ine'stonre an changa—Heracline ie only the loudest voice in a choras—zadd on the cleariy perceptible fact that ‘one body becomes another. The most eloquent proof of this is the fect that to deny change Parmenides nd to deny perception. 4. But Parmenides did not hesitate to do either, and hencefor- ward genesis, which had beea a given of sense, becomes a problem, Parmenides explicitly denies the possibility of any type of change since coming-to-be in any ot its modes implies the legicelly indefensible propesition of passing from nonheing to being, and nothing can come from nonbeing (fr. 8, lines 19-21; compare lines g6—41 that would scem to imply the pre-Parmenidean technical uae of generis, 80 o7)- 5. ‘Thus the Pormenidean ‘Way of Truth”; hie successors, how- ever, seem to have taken their cue from the “Way of Seoming.” By ahandoning. fhe strict monism of Psrmenides ond resorting, t0 the older doctrine of “opposices” (enaatia, quv.), both Enpedocles and Avax- agoras were able to restore at leust & secoadary genesis in terms of the ‘interplay of these opposite qualities or elements (staicheia, q.v.). Sim- ple coming-ito-being (i.., from nonbeing) is still unthinkable, but by resorting to various degrees of mixture (érasis) and association (sy isis) composite bodies could come into being (Kmpedocies, fe. 95 ‘Anaxagoras, fr. 175 9e¢ aArlotore's résumé In Phys. 1, 1870; abe ad? cheion). 6. The case of Anaangores is quite complex, Fitst he is con- cemed to observe the Parnonidean prokibilier ageinet abcolute gone sis. Nothing can proceed from nothing and so everything thet seems to become something else mnst have been that something else to begin with, or, as Ansxagoras himself pnt it. “sll things have ® portion of everything” (fr. ag; in fr. 11 he exclndes nous that is external to the aycter; for the reasons, sea Ainevis, Ainown); and so it follows (Er. 37) ‘that there is no such thing as genesis or phthora but only aggregation (eynbrisis) and seperation (apehrisie), ie., by the arrangement of piecxistent matter. Genceis, understood an Anaxagoras understood it, begins, then, frei a primordial mixture (meigma), the ingredicnts of wily asc tanyaareyltbhe (are pochapo air end fire, which have already Degun © predominate in this noahomogeneous mass) and are infinite censsis | 69 in number (Zr. 1). In it were the various Milesian dynameis (q.v.), like the hot and the cold, the meist and the dey, etc., as well a5 the Empedcclean stoicheic and netural compcsite bedies, and what Ancxa- ggoras calls “seeds” (spermate) (fr. 4)» 7. These latter are the tme stoicheta of Anaxagoras (Aristotle, De ecelo it, goaa; sve stvivheion) and, like the original meigme itself, ey contain portions of everything. The original mixcare was wlthout ‘mavemeat, firmly clasped in x Parmenidern death grip. As in Empedo- cles, Hinesis comes from the outside, supplied by zeus that causes the mixturs to rotate. The apsed of che rotetion offoote the coparation (apohrisie) of the “seeds” (fr. 12) that are qualitatively diferent (see fr. q and pathos). By aggregation (synkrisis) these ace Formed into compound kodies wherein predominate one or other of the types of sce” (see fr. 12 acl Aristotle, Phys. 1, 187a). 8, The Atomists, by eliminating the dyromets, considerably sim- plified the operation (chough they had marked difficulties in “sav. ‘ing the phenomena”; see pathos, sévicheion). The ctoma are brought into collision ky their eternal mosion (sce sinesis) and it is by this contact (hapke) that the higher composite bodies are formed. Some tévaea bouave buck inty the voids diera, becuse they axe "ooled” oF angled, catch togetiner and, as further eolisions zesult, percsotible bodies are built up (Simplicius, De evelo 296, 11). This is the Atom {sts! version of the composition of bodies by ussociation (oynhririe) and it reappears, in more sophisticated form, in Epicureanism (D.L. x, 49; Lucretius 11, 83-111). Hlere there fs an attempt to explain the three states of matter in termas of density expressed in the distance between ‘the atoms in the “association,” with the edded refinement that certain Dodies (e.g, liquids) result from the containment of one type of atom within a sheath (stegazon) composed of anothcr type, an cxplenation ‘hat also epplics to the enclosing of the soul within the bocly (DL. x, 65 86; sce Along). g. ‘That genesis lnud become the central question of post- Pormenidesn philosophy {9 clear from Socrates! remarks tn Phuelo 64, a question that, as the same passage indicates, was being pursued in terms of a search for ecuses (itis, q.v.) and had intrigued the young Socrates. For Plato himself ganieeis is n somewhat soeandery Problem in the light of his distinction between the eide, the realm of ‘true being (ontor oe), and this sensible world that is characterized by becoming (Tim. a7a-28a). ‘Thus being is the onty subject fer true amowledge (epioteme), while genesis can alford nctaing better Umut opinion (dea), the “likely eccount” of the Timecus. ao. But baving thus paid his debt to Paruenides, Plato does, oa ‘cenaton, turn his alization ty genceds. mvc ia the couLeaL uf euetulie to clucidate his theory of participation (methexis) in the Phaedo, and, |70 | exxwsis again, in his account of the kosmas aizthetcs in the Timacus. The first, in Phaedo soxb10§5, whic’ is enormously interesting as being the foreranner of Aristoile’s owe theory of gencuis, rests ona premaics thst is no: generelly emphesized by Plato, i, the immanence, in seme form or other, of the cide (sce cidos); the pussuge is replete with expressions like “the siaallness in us.” There is, moreover, the insist- cmve det dhe kuuauent elie are noc themselves subject to genesis. Genesis hes 20 do with things snd is nothing more than the replace- ‘ment, in a sobject (Piaeda roge), of one form ky its opposite (ena om, 0) 31. The same point of view appears in considerably more detail when Plato comes to speak of the Receptacle (hypadoche) in the Timaews (aon f.) and that is described as the “Nurse of Becoming.” Plato begins by potuting out that the four Empedoclean “roots” are not irreducible elements; since they are constantly changing they are reslly qualities (ibid. 49d), even though, on the noetic level, there sre eide of these four principal bodies. Thus he rejects all the post-Parmeridean theories of mixing and association, based as they aze on the irraduetbil- ity of the steieheia, The permanent thing in the process is che Revepta- tle, the qussibeing ia which genesis takes place (1btd, 4ge). The Platonic analysis of genesis yields, then, the eteral transcendent Forms, immanent mimetic versions of then: thet pass in and out of the Receptacle (ibid. goes Flato, ae. et., promives to describe the dificult relationship between the immanent qualities and the transcendent eize, a promise apparently unfulflled), and, finally, the Receptacle itself that, like the Aristocelian hupokeimensa (q.v.), has no characteristics of its own (iid. saa-b). 15, All of this is, however, precosmic genesis, the situation “be- fore the ouranos etme into being” (ibid. sad). The qualities, together vith their assoctated “powers” (dunameis, q.vni see pathos, puschein) diift about the Receptacle in cheotic fashion (ibid. 5ad—sga). But then ‘rows begins its operation and puts order into the chaos by constructing: the primary qualities of earth, alt, fa, won] wat ue four primary bodies of the sensible world (Bid. sae) by identifying each of the “elements” with one of the primary geomettical solids capable of being fnaerihed in m ephers (ana stniohsion). This Tonics like a Pythngrmenn version of Atomism, Aristotle has detected the atomistic parallels (De gem. et corr. 1, 325b} s¢e aisthesis), but the Pythagorearism is equally ‘leer when we see that the geometrical solids are, ia turn, reducible to planes, with the distinct suggestion that the reduction process leeds back to lines, points (Tim. sad: see Laws x, Soa), and evea beyoud into the shadowy realms of the Pythagorean erchat (see arcie, artih- ‘mgt, andl the relaval references). 33, Atistotle has litle paiience wich Pythagorean archai whether cenesis | 72 in their Timaeus geometrical form or in their more arithmetical vario- tics, and he criticizes Plato's version (De gen. et corr. 1, g1st~s16b); but he was obviously more taken by Plato's precosmic cenesis and his fowat analysis reflects it, It is Aristotle's concention thet Parmenides’ theses on nonbeing had frightened his successors off the subject of true genesis an into reducing all becoming to either qualitative charge (ailerons, qv.) or merely shifting around the ingredients (Phye. 1, 287a; De gen. et core, 1, +-2). His own approsch fs atrongly to reaffirm the role of the stoicheia as the ultimate irredueible bodies out of which all things arc made and ty fucin( va thie evideuse of die scises, that the stoicheia do change into one aavther in a averending cycle (De gen. el corr, 1 3318, 337%; See energeia). There is, in short, genesis. The Parmenidesn knee ic ont hy an explanation of the peculiar nature of the nonbeing involved in genesis; tis not absolute nonbsing but a reletive type that Aristotle identifies as “privation” (steresis, q.v.). This pco- vides the final piece in the puzele of becoming. Gencsis is possible because the stoicheia have their own archaé, viz.,a material, undefred substratum (dypokcimenon, q.v.) common to them all, sets of immi- nent, porceptible qualities, and the stercsis of the opposed (enantion) qualities, Genesis is thus defined as “passage to the enartion” (AYE. ty gou-agee; De gen. et corr, 3242, g28b-3312). 24. Aristotle disallows the post-Parmienidean assacintion (eyn- isin) an genuine genesis (De gen. et corr. t, gaps) and, though minis is allowed to play a role, itis notin genesis, in one stoichsion becoming erother, but in the forming of the next generation of bodies, the suntheta or coraposite bodies (ibid. 1, s54h—395° ) 35. Gericsis, then, is affirmed and definec and set over af various other changes (metabolai) that occur in substances-in-being locomotion, alteration, growth. But among all these types of change Kinesis (mare properly, phora, q.v.) takes precedence, even to genesis (Phys. vin, 260b-2818; compare Plato's grouping in Lewe x, 894>-< and sce Binesis), so there mast be a continucus &inesis to ensure the cceciTnating eycle of genesis: tis isthe movement of the sun around the elliptic (De gen. et corr. 11, 3981-b; compare Rep. sogb; the sun is, of course, a moved mover; the argument will eventually lead to the primary emuse, the unmoved mover; ace Biroun, nous). Genesis iy in turn, Keyed on scts of opposcd qualities thnt are active (poizin) and passive (pasckein,q.v. 36. Epicuras, as the faithful offspring of the Atomists, has no genuine geneste (see Rinesis), but the Stalcs appar to Follow closer to the Aristotelian pattern, They extend, it is true, action and passion, which In Aristotle are characteristics of the qualities inherent in the stolvheta, deeper tno the nature of things by associating the former with Jogos (q.v.) and the latter with hiyle (q.v.), the two Stoie co-princinles st the72 | cenos of reality (SVP, 1, 84, 499), but they continue in a somewhat more tre- ditional fashion by nlEeming the four basic physical bodies or etviche‘a, ‘two of which are active (air and fire), and two passive (earth and water) (SVF 1, 4:8). ay. But there have been alterations as well. Fire fs now the hot (see D.L. vit, 196), not, asin Aristotle, a set of qualities, viz., hot and ry (De gen. et corr. 11, 5a). Korther, since the Steice have giver. a raacy to fire (see fur), this is the first clement and, in a sense, 2 kkind of Urstoff che others are derived from it by a process not unlike he condensativu/teifertion of Anastonenes (Di. viz, 142) and re ‘ura to it atthe periodic conflagration (ekpuyrasis. uv.) 18, Other difficulties arise. Despite the Aristotelian trappings, the Stotee are compelled, hy their raduntion af averything, including. perceptible qualities, to body (see poion), to expisia change in a Fashion not radically diferent from the Atomists. They eschewed atornic “hocks,” however, end turned to a theory of the interpenetra- bility of bodies that rests on the distinction of various types of mix- thrres, and particalatty the varleties called mixés (for dry bodies) and hhrasiz (for wet) where the two ingredients of the mixture totally interpenetrate each other without, at the same time, losing: thelr own proper characteristics, « thecry used to explain the relationship of soul and body as well (SVF 1, 67, 471), and strongly attacked by beth the later Peripatetics and Pletinus (sce Ena. at, 7, 1 and SVF 11, 476) For the complementary notion of passing-ouroi-being, sce bhthora; for genesis as process and its bearing on ethical theory, hedone, génos: kind, gems Gonos is generally used in Plato as a synonym for eidos, eg. Soph. agqb, end elserkere as “type,” epproaching the Aristotelian _gznos, exg. Theact, 228¢ and Soph. 2394, whore dialectic has to do with Aividing the forms according to “lind” (enor); carnpare the “collec- tion” (synagoge) into one generic “form,” Phaedrus 2654, but this is still probably ontological rather thon predicational, Aristotelian gen “Aristotle, Top. 102a-b, wzob-128b, Por Aristotle the kategoria# are the (gene of being (De an. 11, 412a), the summa genera that cunnot be sub- ‘sumed into anything more general (sce Aral. post. 11, 100, Meta, toi). In Soph. 25¢8 Plato discussed “the most smportant gene” (Ealstence [custa], motion, rest, sameness, diference; 200 cides, payehe teu pantes), and Pletimis, In Enn. Vt, 1-3, has apparat!y combined these gene with the Anstoteltan moses of predientton (Razegertat) und produced the gene of beings ave eidae, diaphora, hatholou. oxormeon | 73 gnorimon: knowable, intelligible 3. ‘Though the notion that the knovrability of things is relative has its Platonie precedents, it is fundamental to Aristotelian cpistemol- cgy, particularly a¢ it applies to the objects of metaphysics. The distinction is set forth clearly in Anal. post. r, zabazaa: things are Inowable (guvrimon) ta Gnu dilfereut scusess what ie lutately (physei) more knowable is not necessarily better known to us (pras emas). The practical application of this principle is twofold. Tm mets- jphyeice one chonld hogin with the things mats intalligible to we and our ‘way of knowing, and proceed to what is intrinsically more intelligible (Qeia. 1029); in ethics men should be educated to see that what is intrinsicelly good is also a good for them (Btk. Nick. v, x120b; the ethical parallel is cited in Beta, foc. ci). 2. The root of this principle is to be sought within the more general cadres of Aristo-e's theary of knowledge, since the diiference in the graces ot inteligitalty ts not due to some detect m the odject burt ather in our way of knowing (Ifeia, gg3h). The foundation of all one cognition is sense perception (aiethests, q.v.), and even spllogistic einonsitation (eposeivis) rexts upon some form of induction (epa (5230, qv.) io, to a process tha: begins with the perception of particu- lars (Anal. post. 1, 1oob). Scieatiae knowledge (episteme) hes to do ch the wnivereal Cbatholon), and even thongh kerse perceptions inediately geasp kind of “concrete universal” (see Phys. 1, 1848), this is not the universal of scieace that is apprehended only by reason (oges). 3.."The role oF philosophy, then, is to procaed from what is ineligible to us, ie,, the glimmer of intelligibility that one has through immediately perceived sensibles (aisticéa), to what is intelli- gible of itself ¢phyzet). 4. The Platonic antecedents of all this are clear. The language of Meta. a929b cited above is reminiscent of Plato's distinction between she really exiuteut (onteo om) iaulligibles and Se quasi seul (goa on) status of the sensible world, and Aristotle's description of the defects of vor sense knowledge (Meta. gga) echoes che imagery of the Allegory, of che Cave in Rep. g16n. For both philosophers trae intelligibility is 2 function of immeterility (see Meta. 1078), and while they would agree that the highest type of knowledge is the study of she intel ble.instself (see episteme, dialehtike, cherlogia), where they dier ie 1m thetr attitudes toward a study of the seasibles, ‘be Platonic curricu- lum in Republic x ia etructured to lecd asvay from the eanaible to the {ntelligiblo tho immanonco of the Aristotelian cidas (q.v.) guarantees the value of a ctudy of the aiashoas (compare the parallel difference between the Platonic [synagoge] and the Aristotelian [epagoge] induc-74 | cxosis sion), whether in a historical sense a8 the investigation of the opinions of others (see aporia, endozon), or a8 the extraction cf the dimly end discursively apprehended intelligible from the immediately perceived gnésis: 1) knowledge; 2) Gnosticism 1) The won Giseh geussal toss fo Ravwledges Typical of this ordinary usage is Aristotle, Anal. post. 1, ggb-1o0b, where gnosis and fts equivalents embrace sense perception (aisthesis), memory, uperienes, and scientific krmaled ge (npisteme) om fe ity of the soul (see peyehe, palingenesia), end 0 his theory of burmoiny nunowe | 75 ‘was much more likely to have heen matheraatical rather then physical. 2, Another line of the harmonta theory Jeads to the extension of the rativ concept to ether the sound or the Cistances of the planets and the development of the dovirine of the “larmouy of he spheces” incorporated by Plato into his “Myth of Ex” (Rep. 617b), and de- scribed by Aristotle, De cael 11, 290b-261a and Cicero, Som. Seip. § "The ettseal mphestions may be seen in the notions of atharsis And aophrcayna (oq.7.), in Plato's deseription of the “mized life” in Phil Gas-66e (ser agathon), in Aristotle's doctrine of the “mean” (see tmesvn), al ia ancient theories on the anvure of physied pleasure (202 Thedone); for erzelitus’ theory of “harmony,” see logos. Pythagorean harmonics? is a festure of the education of the philosopher in Plato, Reps vm, ggoe—eate, where it ie transitional ta the sindy of dialebeibe (compare Timarus 470d and sen psyche tou parntas). For the Stofe ethicel formula “harmoniously with nature,” sex nomee, hédoné: pleasure 2. The first discussions on the possibility of pleasure being the end of roan probably took place fn the helghtened ethical—and stibfec- tivist—climate of the generution of Socrates and the Sophists. But the direct evidence is faulty erd one must generally resort to reconstruc tions cut of the Dlatenie dialoguen. For example, ia the Gargiaa (Ggie—sgae) Socrates debates the question with an otherwise obscure Sophist named Callicles who uptiolds the hedonistie position, He does it in terms of a paychophysfological theory of sense plensure that was apparently in vogue in the fif-h century end beyond, that of depletion (Renosis) and refiling (ansplercsis). According to © medical theory pat forth by Alemeeon of Crotona health consisted in staze of balance Gsonornia) of the elemerts in the body (sex Avtius v, 30, 1). This theory had wide philosophical iinplications (see Aarmonia, azathon, meson), and particularly in irs adaptation, perhaps by Empedocles (see Diely yiay5), to explain dhe urigin aud uniuse uf pleasure, According to this view a depletion (kenssis) of one of the vital ele- ments of the body leads to en imbalance, and the resultant painful sense of want (endcia) crestor desire (cpithymia, crevis, qaw.), or the thrust toward a complementary “filling wo” (anoplerosis). It'is this Intier redressing of the natural lscromie of the body that is responsible Tor pleasure. 1s, Socrates uses this theory in the Gorgias to refute the radical ‘hedonist Callicles, by pointing out that o2 these grounds the hedonist ‘will be ever ansetieted, ‘The seme theory appears agein in Tim. ‘64e-Agh Con the Aramist smecedenss of ths passage, see pathos), Rep. ‘s8ga, and Phil, grb-gab, bnt in these two latter passages at least it is76 | mEDonn overlaid with a growing awareness of the psychic as opposed tu the purely somatic neture of pleasure, and the ientiica:ion of the body as fan instrument of pleasure (see Rep, s84c. Phil. 41¢), a distinction that allowed ArisioUe eveutually to deny the applicability of the kenosis- enapleresis theory (B7h, Nich, 11795). What led to this was undoubt- edly the recognition of the obvions existeace of a pleasure attendant upon tnrellecmal activities (ep. g8gb=, Hil. s1e—saay in both thace pissages Plato makes some attempt at adepting the kena theory t0 this new typo of pleasure, but without a great deal of success), as well 0 the more oubile paychological analysis uf the wle uf uicuiuty ii Ue pleesure of anticipation (Phil, n25-30es this analysis leads, g8a-4oe, to a farther discussion of the possibility of false pleasures cue to our Iebits of “paintel fantasies” [phantasmata rongrapheronal) 3. Flaving expanded the horizons of pleasure (true/false, mixed/ unmixed, psychic/somatic) Plato attempts to integrate it into the {geod life in the Pilebus. he purely hedonistic position is rejected, as was in the Gorgias, a8 well as a Kind of radiosl antikedonism (Phil. 44a) thet denied the existence of pleasure. Plato's own view is a moderate o2e, thet the good life is the “mixed life," e., a life comtain- ing both che pleasurable and the intellectual (phronesie, qua; Phil, 200, s9c~61c). 4. This position that attempts to reconcile the conflicting claims of hedonic and Sccretie intellostinliam may look to disagieements vwithin the Academy itself, We are aware, from Aristotle, that Speusip- pus had denied that pleasure was in any sence a good (eee Eth. Nich. Vit, 1252b, 11590), a stand apparently referred in Phil. ge Speusippus reascned that a) pleasure is « process (genesis) and 38 is 2 means and not an end, and b) on the theory of die mean (meson, 9.v.) both pleasure and pain ace extremes aun hence exnmot be ago. Li the Philebus pessage Plato concurs in the first argument, at least insofar as it perteins to physical pleasure, but wold not admit that it spesks to the higher, unmixed pleasares described in Phil. putep2bs As for Speusippus* second argues, tht che good reskées the mean or neutral state between pleasure end pain, Plato is aware of the state (Phil, 4oc-gga) but does not see it as a goods he is unwilling to banish pleasure fom the good life. 5. Nor will he accept the empirical hedonism of another contem- porary Acsdemician, Eudosus, who held that pleasure was the only good for wan sinve al creatures pursue it (Ed, Niet, x, 1472). This Js no: exactly the elon'stic view put forth by Pailebus who had suggested (PA, 6oa-b) thc all men cerghe to pursue pleasure since fc is the highest good, and though the presence of pleasure in the Platonic {good Iie m che Prittciue sad the assoctared eciaisslon thar phromzeta 1s rrnowe | 77 not an entirely sufficient end to man (Phil. arb) may be a concession to the force of Eudosus point, the line against hedonism is firaly held. 6. Exdoxns is chosen by Aristotle as the exempler of the hedonis- tic scliccl, probably because of the latie’s long asseciation with the ‘Academy. But an even more prominent proponent of the position, one ‘of Plato's own contemporaries, wzs Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrennic group, whose hecontem was ar least as thoronghgning, 1f better known to us, as Eudoxs’. Plessure is the end of all activity and ‘the object of all choice, as proven by our instinctive, untutored choice uf ploasere, Thus all plosaure io good, and phyoical pleaourea better than those of the soul (DL. «1, 87-88). And further, since happiness, {.e,, pleasure calculated over a lifetime, is a kind of delusion since only the prevent is real, each moments pleasure is to be sought for itself (Adlien, Var. hist. x1v, 6). 7. Aristotle true to his histories! method (see endaxon), reviews both the hedonist (th. Nich, x, uxpan—aaz4a) and entiedonist (ibi Mil, 1a52b-a154b) positions. He is satisied with neither, nor, indeed, with Plato's retorts to them. He denies that pleasure is a process (iid. x, 31754-b), but would prefer to call it an activity (eniergeia) or, more fully’ Gidid. nr, 13538), “che unlmpeded activity of a characterlstl: state [aexis] in accordance with nature.” In accordaace with this definition the entire moral status of the Aedonaé are worked out in forma of the energaiai with which ach ia properly annociated. Firat, plensure is a whale, complete in each moment of time, much like the act of seeing (ibid. x, 1xz4b). Pleasure is something that is superimposed upon and completes an activity waen the later is unobstructed, e.g, by a defect in the subject or object of that activity (ibid, x, 1174b). Eudoxus was almost correct: all mea do sccm to desire pleasure, but it is because all men desire to live and pleasure completes the basic acayty of living; itis life that is desirable, not the pleasure (Ebi. x, 32754). In short, it is activities that are good or evil, not their superin= posed pleasures (¢bid. x, 1173h) 8 From these varying pulats uf view evolves dhe Lelouisin of Epicnrus, Like Eudoxus he is a hedonist on empirical grounds: pleas- ure i the good sought by men (D.L. x, 128) . But che proof is the more sophiccrated one of Aristippus thet points to instinctive, unlesmed behavior (DL. x, 197; ace Sextus Expiricus, Adv. Math, x1, 96). Here there is « correlation with his atomically based theory of sensation (eisthesis, qux.)+ just as sensation is the criterion of truth, so the movements or experieters (fells) of pleesure and paln, which are conceived of as types of atomic dislocation (see Lucretius 11, 983-066), serve xs criteria of good and evil since plessure is what is natural, and ov goad, while palin Is allen to narure, and s0 evtt (TAL. x, 94)78 | urcewonixox 9. Epieures accepts the _kenosinendeia-epithymiaanaplerosis analysis of pleasure and pain (D.L, x, 144; compare Lucretius 1v, 858-876) and insists on the primacy of physical pleasures, particularly ‘those of the stommch (“Athemacts X11, 545), Ile also acoeprs the corol- Jory that pleasure, being physical, must be messured by quantity (posor) not quality (poion; cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xv, 21, 3). But by oubjecciug uke process wo an even closer analysis Hpicuras Cetects another, purer type of plensnee than the corrective “filing up” of a bodily want that is, afterall, subtly mixed with paia (see Socrates? [perceptive remark in Phaede Gob )."Tia purr plonoare i x0t, they Giz kinetic pleasure of aaaplerosic, but the static (ateatematike) pleasure of equilibrium, the absence of pain (algos) from the body (apenia) and the absence of disturbance from the soul (atarusia) (T)T.. x, 1) ‘This position may owe moce than a little to Speusippus’ neniral stzts (see Clement Alex., Strom. 1, 22, 193), but what is clear is that Epicurus was moving away from the more mechsnieal explanstion of Aristippus who neld only Kinetic plewsure (D.L. x, 196) and down graded the psychic side of pleasure. Epicures, on the other hand, since he strongly maintained the experiential reality of past and future, a position that magnifies mental pleasures (aid pains), shifts the focus of emphacis Zrom “the pleasant moment” to “the happy life” (D.L. x, 397) 293). Thus it is the activity of the mind that holds the keys, viz. memory and imagination, to plensure over the long mun, the happy life, and that controls and tempers Epicurean kedoaism. hegemonikén: ditective faculty of the soul In Stoicism the Aegemonizon governs the other psychic Faculties and is seated in the hear: (SVF 1, 149: 11, 835; 11, 879). According to ‘Cheysippus, cll psychic states (including virwes, vices, and pathe) ace changes in che rational feculty (hegemon:kon; SV!" 10 459) Sextus Empicieus, Adv, Math, vit, 293). It is a tabula rasa at bisth (SVP 11, 85), an internal, independent principle (Marcus Aurelius, vir, 36; vt, 8}; 08 new, puyehe, aisthesie, kardia. heimarméné: an allotted (portion), fate The Stoies identified fate with logos and pronoia and Zens (SVF 1, 913, 997). The growing traascendence of Ged in letex Greek philoo- ophy (cee Ayperousia) leads to the resepsration of theas and fcimar- ‘mene, Philo, De migr. Abr. 179-181; pePlaterch, De fato 5728-573); 200 pronoia. hen: one, the One 2, The pre Socratic acarch for an areiio for all Uslago saviaselly ceded in a single principle, the reduction of the variety of existents ae nex | 79 buck te a single stuf, with no emphasis, however, on the uniqueness of the principle, The first dualisis wese apparcully che Pytlzagoreans, “apparently” beceuse the judement rests on the exesesis of a difficult text in Aristotle, in addition to the fact that at some Inter date the Pythagorenns hecame manists and, as is usuelly the eese with Pythago- ean sources, the discrimination between early and late is not « simple ‘matter. 12, In Meta, 9860 Aristotle says that the Pythegercans made the ukimate stoichcia limit (pcres) and the unlimited (apciran); they are the clewe.t> of wld aul eveu, aul Wiese Iauer produce de uite Cem), whence proceeds the whole series of erithimei, This would seem 1a draw the distinction between pairs of opposed stoicheia (limit. ‘ealimited, adeven) and their product, hen, which ie the ercho ox storting point of number. But a few lines Inter in tho same passege Axiowote goes on to say that some Pythagoreans line up their stoicheia Jn two parallet columns, the left containing limit. odd, onc, cto. and in the right, the unlimited, oven, plurality. If we take into account what seems to be a later development in the school (see 20 infra), we thus have three very diferent points of view on the ones the one as posterior to the stotcnem, the one as a sto:cneicn, and the one prior to all else. 3. These speculations are based on physical and mathematical considerations (moral implications sre not, of course, absent in these Pythagorcan views, also in the let column in feta. gs is “the youl, see Eth, Nich, 1096b), but the next appearance of the one is ina content dominated by logic (compare Aristo:l’s remark in De gen. e¢ core. 1, 3251). This ix the "Way of Truth? of Parmenicies sobere be seeks to illustrate that if being (on) is, then ic is one in the sense of being both unique (monsgenes; fr. 8, lives 11-13) andl indivisible (adiaireton; ibid, Vines 20-25) 4. To support the contentions of Parmenides, Zeno had con- structed a number of dinlectical nntinomies, These take he form of positing a hypothesis, in this ease that there are a plorality of beings, soe slwiag that the conclusions thet flow from it are just as cbstird ag ‘the ones raised against Parmenides' One Being (Pars, 128-0). Plato Constructs just such a set of hypotheses and places tiem in the mout’, ‘of Parmenides himself in the dialege of the came name, The vubjuet is ‘the one (to Aen). The passazes that follow (Porm. ss7eff.) involve a number of obscurities, not the least of which is whether the one under Aiscussion is the One Being of Permenides or Plato's transcendent ‘Oneness itsclf (the Greek expression is ambiguous and in 1g5¢ Parmen- ides suggests thet he would like to extend the dialectic of Zeno to the elde; but compare 137b). Again, Is this Zenoninn eristic or Platonic luicketee (ICS called gymanasia 8 195°C) Whatever modern scholarship says on the subject, and it80 | HEN tends to see the Iatter half of the dialogue 2s logical considerations about One Being, the judgment of the latier Platonic tradition is clear. "The hypotheses of the Parmenides beeame foc it a sacred text on the One as a transcendent dypostasis, It is cites] more often than any other work except the Timazus in the Enneads, snd Proclus wrote a full- scale commentary on it. 6. Tid Plato have a apeciol doctrine of the One? As tar as the unity of the individusl eide is concerned, Plato maintains throughout that they are indivisible (Phaedo 78d, Rep. «76a), and he goes so far as fo call thera henads or monads (Pais ags-b, 26d—:). Dat we ato ‘consilersbly Jess informed on the eidos of one or Oneness itself. Plato does address himself to the one (lien) and the many (pledhoe) 2s a dialectical problean in Phil. .ge—18d. Hi: mentions ae already solved the question on many-in-one on the level of organic unities Tike man (142-4; see holon), bnt there remains the perplexing question of the monadic eides and ‘ts distribution through the plurality of material things (ag5—2; the question is posed es iit is going to be solved, but it isnot; see methexis, mimesis) exd the related problem of the interrela- tionship (Aeéaonia) of the eide, To solve this he resorts to the Pytbago- ream (or, as he calls tt, Promechean; x6c) sotation of conversing iten and plethoe with peras and abeirra, which are, in turn, integrated into ‘is own procedures of collection (synagoge) and division diairesis, q¥.). These latter are, Sn affect, « dialectical movement from meny #9 ‘one, and vice versa, ut the one to which synagage attains is in no wise a transcendent One but rather a generic eidos of the tepe described in Soph. asud-e as “one cides extending through many eide that ie apart” PIT, The Sophist also reac the question of the Ope itl, ke, the cidos of hen, against Parmsnides (24sn-b), not now of the Platonic dialogue, but Uie philosopher of the “Way of Truth.” IC the splicsical One Being is such as Parmenides describes it in fr. 8, lines c2 f, then it is a whele made up of parts and so must differ from the One tise, ‘olich is peafeetly shunple, Bu Che teat ths sequel shut of foforming, us that there is an eidor of one. When, later in the same dislogve (254d f.), Plato comes to discuss the “greatest Kinds” of eide, the One ie nowhere in evidence nnd Platine sonst Aavote 2 somewhat Tongich cexplanetion of why its omission ia appropriate (En. vt, 29-25). wT importance of one in Plata iy ther, except for the ox rious business ofthe Permenidety of no mere spel importnee than the other eide and perhaps less than the magista gene of the Saphist. ‘What is more striking, lowever, is the position it seems to assume in ‘he nearly contemporary Academy, Aristouc's own treatment of oze is sp class Te uinug iz “ausernden tals": aueucoa, The Using 39 pre ‘cated analogously through all the Rategoriad (2eta, 10032, 1053b)- cine max | 8 But as for unitone, this can be nothing clac but the arche of a mathe- Imatical series (#bid, 1016), and so he is convinced that Plato must hrave held that One was a separate subsicuce (ibid, go6a: refuted, roora—bi and the arche of all dhe eide since One and Being are the summa genera of which all the eide are species (ibid. gyfa, gg8b). The origins of this helief are somewhat difficult to understand, but they are obuiously connected with his ofttepested allegation that Vat ident fied the ride with numbers (see erithmos 9). A Farther remark carries us in the eame direction, Aristotle also states that Plato identified the uc with the Geod (ibid. togsa-b), and we lenow thet dis fs based un pre ther a reading of the famous passage on the transcendent Guod in Rep. sogh since we are informed from another sovree ( Atistexenus, lem. arra. 1, p. 30) that Plato male this identification in hi lartine On the Good” (see agrapka dogmaia) that zlso hed to do with mathematics. 9. Aristotle goes on to say that Speusippus, Plato's successor, avoided the dificulty because, even though ke made the One an arche, he did aot identify it with the Good (ibid. 1ogib) but mede this letter ‘tho result of an evclasionary process (ibid. 1o72b~20732). Speusippus’ ‘ews on the arciat themselves arc likewise reported, He substitised for the Platonic ide the matheraatika (q.v.; Meta, 1028b), deriving the numbers, in prescribed Pythagorean fashion, from One and Plural- lty (ibid. 1983b, 2087b). The One of Spexefppus i not, thea, an ‘ultimate principle in a monist system, but one of two eo-prineiples of number. Nenocrates belongs to the same tradition; he mide the eide (oatb, 10602, etc.) and derived them from the Moaad end the Dyad, based on an exegesis of Timaeus gra (Plutarch, De procr. az. soiad). He goas on to identify the One with the Father and Zeus, the First God, now, while the Dyad may be celled Mother of the Gods and the World Sou! (Actus 1, 7,39). 20. In all these theories of arcfai it iy notable thet the one remains as a stuble factor; it is is correlative that shifts rmances: the irom of the Pythagoreans, the platters Tuite Dyyd of Plano (coristoe dyas; Meta. sib; see Phya. ac6b; the dyaa does not appear in the terminology of Phil, 2g2-2gb but what is described is dual in nature) and Xenocrates, and the pluralistc plathoe af Speusippas end the Pythagoreans. A considerably different view appears in the Pythag- cream revival of the Ast century where writers like Eudoras (in Simplicius, Phys. 182) and Alexander Polyhistor (D-L, vrmn, 25) de- senbe a Pythagoreanism that held that the Infinite Dyac itself derived from the monas. a1. ‘The affinities between Pythagores and the Acedemy were coon exploited Sy Luda sides. Avdowtle lluself Td already Tinked the ‘evo (sce mimesis and compar: the frequent juxtaposition of Spevsip-fo | new ‘pus and Pythagores in the Metaphysics). The derivation of the tran- ‘scendent Platonic principles of the Inver dialogues in terms of Pytaago- ean number theory is perticularly marked, and one such account by a Inter Prihagorean, Mogeratus of Gades, ha been preserved by Simpl das (Phys. 290-231). Present in it are all the later Neoplatcnic hypos- tases: the first One, beyond Beirg; the second One, which is really real, Inveilgible, the etze; and the third One, watch participates (methexis) in the frst One sta the ei. The stress on the One in Moderatus’ tract i revelatory of its Pythagorean point of view. A similar account of the ‘hres hypoetaces by the Academic Albinus how ite orientation towerd the Philebus ard Timacus by describing ell three of the hypesteses 03 nous (Epit. x, 1-2). But there is something of Aristotle here as well: the first cus, besides being the demiourecs (ibid. xa. 1) and the Father and cause of all goodness sd trut, chinks itself (ibid, x, 5), But it was the One that evencuslly triumphed over nous. The seconde century Pythagorean Numenius, whom Plotines studied, had already redueed nous and the demiargic Func:ion to the szeand place (see nous 18) and his “First God” is absolutely one and indivisible (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. x1, p. 97). 2, This toy in ewenex, Ue One, dhe first hypostsis of Plodinusy that is beyond Being and completely without qualification (Erm. v1, 9, 3). Oneness is not predicated of it (v1, 9, 5); indeed, nothing is in it: it is what itis, Le., itis its own activity and essence (01, 8, 19-39). Two corrections are n order, aowever. Ibis not a namerical unit (monass ¥1, 9, 5), Nor is it the Aristotelian thought about thought (vr, 7, 57: 562 no2sis 18). 3g, ‘The transcendence of the One, affirmed with increasing em- phasis in the later philosophical tradition, leads to a crisis in cognition (see agnostor). Plotinas confronts the problem of this transcendent first principle that is beyond Being, apprehension, and description by an application of the theory of mimesis and a remarkable resort to introspection, The question of mimesis may be approached from two Airections. Onc, properly Aristotlian, is thar of the uniey of the person (see Meta, ro0gh). From it one progresses, through ever high grades of unity, to the sbsolute simplicity tha: is the One (vs, 9, 1-2). ‘From 2 more Platonic point of view, intellecton ie a kind of movement, rotary in the heavens bat deranged in us because of the contradictory motions coming from the body (Tim. 37a b; Lewes x, S974; cee nocsis 11). For Plotiaus the One is the immobile center of all theoe motions, and in a metaphor of dancers around e choirmester he explains oar irregular motions (c.g. sensation, discursive recsoning) by our turning away from the disector towatd the spectators (11, 9, 8; on the Mattea- ple ove woesto wey wae 4B, aul dhe eatividinary seauashe fa 15 dy 10}. In boca cases, den, the true unity is to be sought within nrxis | 83 ourselves, The One is knovrn not by reasoning, which is necessarily na exercise in plurality, but by the presence (perousia) in us of unity (V1, 4 4). The grasp of the One is cccomplished by intorior reflection, the ‘hipht of the alone te the Alone” (vs, 9, 1), which seeks to render the soul completely siuuple: (vr, 9,7). In the intelligible world this mystical union with the One is a permanent experience, the true heavenly “Aphrodite; hi: here tels oni cccastonal, and we experience rather the vulgar courtesan Aphrodite (vr, 9, 9; on Plotinus’ own occasiozal ‘mystical unification with the One, see Porphyry, Vita Plot. xxilz).. ap Just oo Pletinuo procesda, in Ena. +h 9, 1 5) from relat unity to absolute oneress, so Proclus derives the zbsolute One from the presence of ones that participate (medheris) in Oneness (lem, thea props. 1-6: for the method. cf. ¢rias). There is es in Aristotle, a transcendent final cause (prop. 8), as well as a trerscendert efficient cause (prop. 12); these are identical with each other and are the O2e (props. 12°33) Wor the other Neoplatonic hypostases, see nous, psyche tou pan- tos, psychesfor the manner of progression, proddes, tra. hands: Hen Alchough the term is used in Plato, Paid, 1ge and by Neopythago- reans to Cescribe the eide (so Plotinus, Err. v1, 6, 9); itis best krown au feuture of Proclus' Neoplstonism where the Heuuds are plural uunfeldings of the unity of the One, transcendent sources of individual- ity; see Proclus, Elem. sheol., props. 113-165. They are identified with the traditional gods. héteron: the other, othemess In Plato the Other is one of the majer forms that pervades all the ‘other forms, Seph, aggo-e. Some apparent noubeing is merely the other,” ibid. asga (see on). Heteron is a principle iz the construction of World Soul, Tina. asa. In Ploticus it is the principle, inherent in souty of dhe ylurulity ofthe cide (Err vy 2 28; 1¥, 35 5)s i produces matter, (ibid. 11, 4, 5); See pros ti, noesis. héxis: state, characteristic, habit For Aristotle there are three atates in the soul: exsotions (athe), capacities (dynameis), characteristics (Kexcis) (Eth. Nich. 22050) Hexis is cetined (ibid.) as our condition vis-a-vis the pathe, Arete isu este (1b:d. ax06); bly the beginnings of our habits exe under velun- tury contrel (ibid. 11igb). The Stoies disegread with Aristotle end considered areto a diatheaie tether then a hexis (SVP 1, 2025 31, 395). eculinely Stoic development of the term io the goupiog uf ean nil the four binding powers of things: hexis, physis, payche, nous, aud is { | |&% | xorox ‘translates, when used in this sense by Senece (AVat. Quaes. 11, 2) 28 ‘unitas (see the peculiarly similsr use of Aeris in Plato cited under phthora). Among these henis is the sunita: of inorganic matter (sce ‘Sextus Empiricws, Adv. Math. 1%, 81 85; Philo, Leg. all. 1, 22, Quod Deus 95; SVP 11, 437-480, 714-718). Hexis is defined, in the calegory of quality (poion), and distinguished trom the more transient state, Sisposition (diachcsis), Cus, l-ya. hélon: whole, ozganism, tmiverse 1A celtical moment in’ dicrnecione of change secure when Aristotle rejects, at a single stroke, the earlier theories that absolute genesis (q,7.) could take place by association (aynbrivis) or disasso- ciation (diakrisic) of perticles and asserts that it comes about when this whols (Alon) changes into that (De gen. ef 2077.1, 3174). 2. Tiae question of wholeness had beet ralsed previously. In the Parmenides wholeness is denied of the One because it connctes the presence of purts and, consequently, that the One is i some sense a plurality (1370-2); the unity (here) of the One must be something quite distinct from “wholeness” (see Soph. 24462. 3: The prolom ia Parmenides io 2 logical al couveplul vue ‘having to do with the notion of divisibility; with Empedocles the physical issue arises, Ie is Empedocles’ desire to keep Parmenides’ ‘unity cxd at the same time posit a plurality af elements Cateisheia, qx.) that adds this new dimension, Genesis is cyclic for Empedocles the four “roots are eternal but they are in a constant process of ‘tansformation (fr, 27, lines 1-13), passing, in the process, in and oat of a sphere in which they ate perfectly blended (frs. 27, 28). It is this sphere, obviously a compromised descendent of Parmenides’ One Being, that fist suggests that the elements can be submerged in some suru: « unified whole where thelr Individual characteristics ate lost, at least 20 sight. How this is accomplished lhe does not say, except to remark that the sphere is covered with a farmonia, The term (q.v.), a machematical ene, hed a gteat vogus in Pytbugoreen circles, and she suspicion of just suck am infuence on Empedocies is strengthened when, later in the cosmic cycle, the four elements begin 9 combine into compound bodies (frs. a8, of). Here we are told that fesh and blaad and hones ave formed of fixed numerical proportions of the elements that are all linked together by the “divine bonds of har-nonia.? 4. ‘This is the frst attempt at explaining organic compounds in terms of the numerical proportion (Jege) of their ingrodients. The came mathematical apprcach is visible in Anaxagoras, iwko held that Lodies, even though they wore composed of “seeds? that contain a portion of ovarything in thom, have theic idcatity from the quaniiaive Horo | 85 predominance of one or other of the types of seed within them (rs. 6, 13; cee Aristotle, Pays. t, 1872) Neither Plato nor Aristo‘ls was much taken by this method, hough it spperently could be applied to colors (ase am. 68, with & slight sceptical note; De sensu 4gob). Plato preferred the more geo- ‘metrical approach of composing compound bodies out of differently shaped particles (see geasy, silehelom; ine dues, luwevery resurt 10 ‘numerical proportion for the composition of the marroat in Tim. 73), subile Aristotle felt that none of these pre-Sneratic mixture techniques zeilly onploined the precence of a naw “whale” since the original jngrodients in no way lost their individual entities but merely became imperceptible to senses the true Aalon should be homogeneous (hom- iomeres) th-onghout (Ds ger. et corr. 1. na7b—na8a; on the Looe of the mixture, sce Meta. gona, De gen, anim. 1 6428). 6. The influence of the physitot is much less in evidence in Plato's more philosophical approach to the question in Theaet. aoge f. sohere Socrates proposes, ss an alternative ina dilemma, that the whole (holon) is something more than the to:el Chan) of its parts, ‘The suggestion isnot, however, pursued here, nor in his account of genesis. But fs her phicrs Plats fy well awase dat fn w whole wy vppysed « sum ¢ crucial factor is the positioning (chests) of the parts and tha the true halon the parts have a fixed spatial zelatiorship to each other and fo the whole. He applies this to the meenagement of parts in a tragedy (Phacdrue 268d) and, in the Laws, to the parts of the Aosmios, ‘The latter is « particularly interesting example since it stresses the ‘of the pets with respect to the whole (x, gene, gosh). Position (thesis) had, of course, been important among the pre-Socratics (see oisthesis, genesis), and it is not unlikely that its ‘securrence in Plato had Pythagorean origin (see Parma. 145a-c, Aris- tutte, De ecelo 2680, and compare Poet. 14500)» 7. Aristotl’s approach to wholeness is twofold. A whole is, by way of preliminary, something that bas several parts (vaere, maria: Mets, 10990) that ure potentially (dyname!) proaent in the whole (Phys. viz, 2500; De gen. et corr. 11,3340). The notion is not necessar- ily Limited to physical bodies: Aristotle discusses the mere of tragedy (Poet, aasca, 14530b), the mere of the soul (De an. rit, 442a-h; nee pryche), and cidos as a part of the gence (Atta, xo3gb). But if itis ‘rue, as has been noted (De gen. ct corr. 1, 3172), that gencsiy is of a whole from 2 whole, what ia it that differentiates this Aolon from a mere aggregate of perticles and makes it something over and above @ total (Meta. 10450)? The total (pan) is something that has merely & positioning of parts (:2id. ro2ja); a hole has an internal cause (oition) of unity that ins eidoy of otk (qpyney AL. sual).86 | Boon 8. But the efdas is algo the energeta (qv.) and the entelecheia (q.v.) of a heing, and so by the juxtaposition of these notions the Aristotelian concept af felon broadens out to include both function ergen, q.v.) and tality \tel0e, qev.). The esas ot lnving beings and. the unitive cause of all their functions is the payche. Tn this fashion atts (mors) are transformed, by the notion of function, into organs Gorgas). An organ fs the pert of a living eicalute thet io dircoted toward an end or purpose tht is an activity (praxis: De part. anim. G4s>); nature (physis), the internal principle of growch in these Teings, hae made the argane ta perform certain fnctinne (ihid Rych), and a body so constituted is an organism (see #id. 642a, and compare the deSinitien of soul in De an. 1, 4120 es the entelecheia of an organic body). The organon, then, is the physical part of a living being ‘matched to each of the latter's potencies (dyrameis) to enable them to function (De gen. am t, 71635 1V, 785b) 9. A somewhat similar idea appears in Epicarus? notion of the systema. Democritus iad reduced all the pathe of things to those directly associated with extended bodies gua extended, and relegated all the rest (e.g. color, sound) to a subjective impression of the senses (Fr. gj ace wiatheoia, pethoa). But for hia latter-day followore thers were certain paihe that, though not present in the individual atomoa, wero preseat in an aggregate of them. In this cense the whole Ceyetema, azhrotama, or, as Lucretius calls it, concilium) ix more than the sum of its parts (sce D.L. x, 69). What is the difference here? First, thers is the question of the position (ehesis) of che aicrna relative to each other, thus forming a pettern thet is the superadded factor that allows the aioma to be colorless but their aggregate to be colored (Lucretius 11, 787-77 see Plutarch, Ade. Gal. 11 10c). But in addition to this forma- tion of a spatial pattern in the aggregats, the atoms also have their own {incividual movement, and it happens that when they are formed into concilia theie movements harmonize and other aggregate pethe come into existence (id, rr, 109-111). In this way it is in the concilium of the soul atoms, contained within the sheath of ee body, that the motion swhich is sensation occurs (D. see aisshesie). For the various types of Epicurean conciia, see generis 10. The Stoic emphasis on the world as an entity under the nitive and providential direction of logos (o,7.) led to 2 fairly consist ent use of Suriverse” (Fofon)) as a synonym for koemce and is perticn larly evident in Marcus Aurelius’ description of men as the organs (as sposcd to mere parte) of the universe (HoWom; ied. vit, 15). ‘The Weopletonints reverted instend to tho Permentdes and Theaetett text, Proclas devoting props. 66-Gg of the Elem. sheol. to + consideration of Srholencssy both as an Uapasticipatod cidee (helateo pre moron) end ao monn | 87 participated in by various wheles-dith-purts (Acloies c& meron) that shave wholeness as ono of their pethe, On the question of the unity ofthe soul, see peyehe. hémoios: like, similar 1. One of the most common Greek theories of knowledge was based on the dictum “hike 1s known by lnke.” “Iwo aspects can be detected: 1) the knower cannot Enow an object without some sort of Identity of elements besween them, and 2) in knowing something we ayy, at the same time, become more lke it, The frst aspect is scen at its baldest in Empedocles fr. 109: “we sce cart with earth, water with water,” explained (Diels 31486) by the fact that things give off ‘effvannas and knowledge resis when these fit into the: corresponding passages in the senses; compare the similar theory in Demecritus (Diels 654395; see aisthesis). Tere is a more sophisticated version in Plato's Tim. 456-46a where vision is explained by the going out of a beam of fiery light that coalesces, “Tike to like,” with the similarly constituted rays of the sur the intrusion of en object into this homege- ‘neous beara causes sensation. Aristotle, who eritieizes both versions of the theory (De an. 1, 4040; De sensu, 4972-b), solves the problem by his theory of dyramis: the kxower is the object potentially (ébid. 4380). The second aspect, the knower becomes the known, reflects the folly devoloped Arbstotalien doctrine of knowledge (20 roesia), end, in an ethical direction, those of homotasie, Ratharsis, Rarmonia; see also ourance, 2, For the use of medical homoeopsthiem by the philosophers, see atharsia: the perception theory is located in its larger context under aiatheois; for similarity in the procession-reversion diastole of Neopl tonism, see profdcs; for its sole in the action and passion on a cosmic scale, sumputhefa, homo‘ssis: assimilation (to God) Originally « Pydhagurean then Core Eoublihos, Vice Pye. 134), assimilation to God was later adopted by Socrates and Plato as descrip- Sve of the end of philosophy (Stobsens, Eel. 11, 7, p. 49 and Theaet 1768). ‘The notion was alan coment among the Paripateicn; aoe Cicero, De fis, vy 4, 113 Julian, Orat, vr, 1850; and the famous eell to make soureelyes immortal in Eth. Nich, 11776. It is central in Plotinus, Enn, 156, 6, For its philosophical origins, see pryche, hornoias, harmon, hhormé: impulse, appetite Aristotle uses horme as a somewhat negligent synonym for orecis (qo), but with dhe Suoles fe ecoues dhe suuidard twchitlcal term tor88 | woRos appetite. It is delined (SVF 11, 458) as “the first movement [kinesis] of the soul? toward (or eway) from something. The primary harme of all animals is self preservation (oikeioste,q.v.). The hormai present no ‘problem on the anima! level, but ia dealing wilh m2, whose chucacter- istic note is rationelity (iegerunikon, qv.), the presence of Aermad thut are contrary to reason creates a difficulty. The violent or Sexoes- sive fupulses are the paste (D.L. vit, 110; for the Flstonic antecec ents of this view, see pathos) and their exact nature visd-vie the rational faculty was debated (see pathos, apatheia). But the later doctrine of tho ochocl tonded io allow for beth the enimal and rational nature of man end thus classify the forma under the irrational part (see Cicero, De off. 1,28, 105 1,98, 232); see nocsis 17. héros or horismés: boundary, definition ‘The Socratic contribution to philosophy was induction (epecoge, qv.) and definition, and these in the contest of ethies (Aristotle, Meta, 1078b). True definition was impossible according to the Cynics (Aris- totle, Meta, r04gb; Plato, Theaet. 20xc), Definitions are the starting point of demonsiration (Aristotle, Anal, post. 11, gob). There is a Ustinetiva Leoveem gominal and ceusal definltons “ibid. gsb-cqa). ‘The parts of the definition ere emumerated in Top. x, ugb. There is no Aefnition of matter, only of eidos (Aristotle, Meta. 1035610954), nor of incividual sensible substances (Meta, xoggh). Properly, defitions are only of species, and of everything else in 2 secondary sense (ibid. rogoa). ‘The Scepties refvsed to define anything (D.L, Ix, 208); see diaphora,idion, ousic. ‘hylé: materiel, matter 1. Hyle, & parcly Aristotelien term, does not have its origins in a dicectly perceived tealily—as is crue in the case of extension or mognitude (megetios, q.v.)—but emerges from an analysis of chenge (Phys. 1, 1905-1918); itis not known directly but by analogy (enatogia, io2d. gia) "Thediivulty i gesopiuyg dhe nature of mater is that it seems to be outside the range of knowledge (Meta. 20362): ‘when one has stripped away (aphairesis, qv.) all the qualities of an axitont, there aacina ta ha nothing left Nav dae mstter St into any of the Actegoriaé (q.v.), since they ure predicated of it, while it is prodi- cated of nothing; i is not even a negation (Meta. s0apa). Its, in short, ney (dynamic), just as formis act (De an. 1, 4124). Pens) Gate the patalae nate of gfe eo boar elinited i can tke its place anong the four causes of things (Phys. 11, 1g4b; see atiion), where, like the eides, itis an immanent (endyparchon) cause (Peco. sujus), Te serves antler Fuuesins us wells 1.18 Ure prliclple of individuation, Since the eidice is indivisible (atomen) it can merely bees mix | & serve to constitute a being within a given genus ot species; the individ. tals within the afme specier exe numerically distinct by reason of their mutter (Meta, 10948, 1095) the individuetion of pure Jorma, e, God, intelligences, is nol treated; sec Binown x2 and compare digphora ae 3. Hyle, then, is the primary substratum of dange (yoo beimenon, ¢.¥.: Phys. 1, 1y2a}, ue “lag” drat revelves the new etos (Meie, re98bs for the Platonic antecedents, see genesis). Rint to call it a “hing” ie misleading. Hyle is like a substance (tode ti; see Phys. t, yb, agee), but it fs not ouch becatoe it Jacks tha sve chief charactor jstics of substance: itis neither e separa‘e existent (choriston, q.v.) nor ‘an individual (fete, 1029a) 4. Tost as thete are various types of change (soe metabole), s0 too there mus: be various types of matter that serve as the substrata for these changes (see Meta. 1042b). Most notable of these is the matter associated with a change of place (hyle topike; see phora) that implies nore of the others, of, to put it in another way, is not necessarily ‘accompanied with “genetic and destructible matter” (Ayle gennete kai phikarte), ond 20 48 not subject to genesis and phthora (qv. Meta ogab, 1044, 1050, 1009). Thus is eatublisliad Uie possibility of he indestructibility of the heavenly bodies whoss only change is that of local motion (see either, ouraniol). For the distinction of the matters Snvalvad fm substantial (genesir) ind qualitative (alfiesis) change, see stoiciion 5. For Aristotle the composition of an individual, a Socrates or a Callas, is an extremely complex procedure thet may be conceived es the imposition of a succession of increasingly specific cide. Bach of these forms is imposed on a progressively more informed matter, and 0 there are distinctions in kyle ranging from a first matter (prote hyle, ‘materia prima), he substratum of the form of the primary bodies oF stoicheia (q.v.), earth, air, fire, and water, through a series of more highly informed matters down to ‘cltimete matter” (eschate or teleut= ‘ole Ande), the mattcr of this Individual existent (De part. anim. 11, 46a; sce Meta. 10492). 6, Aristotle was not unawere that Platonism (and its more re- mote ancestor Pythagoreanism) hadl been moving in a similar dirse- thon (Phys. 1, 2a) But they either followed Parmenides and labeled ‘the material concept az pure nonbeing {me on; see om), which it clearly ‘was not since it both preceded and survived. gencais (indood, metzer is eternal), ot else they identified it with ‘ths great and the small” (Uidets, ¢87b; soc dyas), which is, in Aristotle's mind, a rank confusion between a genvincly nondetermined principle and & privatioa, It was thin Incbillty to distinguish: Drtmn dle en! ofercals Oral preveutel the Platonists from arriving et a valid coacept of mauer. Closer togo | myte Aristorl’s own thinking was the Platonic Receptacle (upadocte) of Timeeus 4ga thet is (did. 512) invisible and characterless, and that, Jike the Aristotelian Ayla, is indestructible and known orly indireztly by a kand of “bastard reasoning” (2bid. saab). here ate, of course, differences. What begins as 2 freceptacle” or “matrix” (see Piys. 1, gaa} is surcly different from substratum, but even further removed Tous the AciolotcKan hyde in its final deseription aa Saree? or “Space” (chvra; Tim, sea), figure that, on the testimony of Plotinus (En. tt, 4,11), prompted some later commentators to suggest chat it involved, fhe ni fan of uni 7. In Stoicism, where sll is material, the Aristotelian distinction between metier and form is nonctheless preserved in the distinction between an active (poiein) and passive (paschein) principle (D.L, vit, gq). Both ere material but the frat is eternal, “frst matter,” which is identified with logos (SPF 1, 67). The basic difference betireen Aris totle and the Stoics is, however, in the realm of magnimde, The Aristotelian analysis of change had Jed to the concegt of mater as a substratum, a8 pure potentiality (dynamie; see Beta. 10990, De are. 4222, 4344), akin to substarce, while magnitude (megethr, q.v.) is an ecident, ic., a form, in che category of quantity (poser). Hence “Aristotle, and Plotinus after him (see Enn. 1%, 4, 8-22), affirm the incorporcality of magnitude, while the Stoic analysis, based on action ‘and pasion, Teads to the opposite corelusion (DL. vtt, 36; Ciecro, Abad, post, ty115 39)- 8. Plociaus’ views on matter, fouud primarily in Bran, xr, 4, ere a resco t both Aritote and the Stole a are based upon is reading of the Platonic proof-texts on epeiren in the Pailebus (15-178, age-agb). Like Aristotle, Plotinus admits the existence of an intelligi- ble matter (iyle noete). But wheress the intelligible matter of Aris- totic was a purely conceptual entity lnvolved in she process of abstrac- tion (aphairesis, q.v.), the Plotinian version has a definite ontological status: it is the intelligible counterpart (the argument presumes the existence of a ovmoa rvctor [q.¥-] iu purallel with our beers aiethe- tos) ef sensible riatter, and kts existence is proved by the divisiblity of the genera of the eide, 26 is indicated in the Philebus (Etats Th 4 4)+ Corpareal matter, then, is sn image (vidalon) of intelligible matter. ‘9. Flotinus’also opposes Aristotle on the relationship herween ‘matter and privation (sieresiz), Aristotle had chided the Platonists on not distinguishing between them (Phys. 1, 1922), but Plotinus reaf- firms (11, 414-35) the identiioations matier 1» privation; it 36, more- over, the Platonic indefinite er unlimited (epciron, qv cee cleo dyat, Which is described 29 indefinite, caristor). But unlike the Pletoaic Chae (extended wnsctive vf Use chore image ia 131, 6, a2 49)5 ryronocne | 91 Plotinian matter is desived from the One (1, 4, $ ¥s 14 $5 see Proclus, Elem. theo, props. 57-59). 10. Finally, Plotinus confronts Aristodle ou the question of indi viduation, In Meta, ogob Aristctie had meintsined that the logic of the Platonists? arguments would require them co posit en eidas of every {individual thing. Aristotle escapes this necessity, as we have seen, by making fyfe she cause of mdreitual difterences. svt Vlotmus (429. ¥, 17) admits the existence of cide of individuals to this same end. For the equation cf matter and evil, see akon; for the pre- Socratke “uulerialiots," eidven hyperousta: beyond being, trarsceudeuce (divine}: ow the question of the transcendence of the Forms, see eidos 4. The notion of trenscendercc begins properly with Parmenides? positing of an existent, and then proceeding to deprive it ofall charac ‘eristics save oneness (Jr. 8, lines 1-50). Plato explores the dislectical possibilities of this in the Parmentdes, and especially in the first “hy- pothesis” (see agad—agaa) where he demons:rates that this One cannot even be sid to “he.” This may be dialectic, but on other gronncs Plato Ss convinced of the transcendence of his supreme principle: in Rep. segb he Good is beyond being, and compare the various texts cited under egnosces. 2. Stofe materielism had radically reduecd divine transcendence (SVP i, & and see pyr), but in the first century of the Christian era divine transcendence ouce ayuin comes to the foreground due to 2 xevival of Pythagoreanism and Platonism (see eidos), coupled with the Introduciioa of the Semitic tradition of transcendence, visible in Philo, De pif. 2, 7-9 and in Leg. all. 11, 62, where the Logos is transcendent as well. The doctrine becomes a staple in Middle Platonism (see Albinus, Zpit. x, 1-4), where itis closely connected with attempts to devise an epistemological approach to God (see agnosior). Divire wanécendence finds tg most famous exponent in Plotinus and his ectrine of the One (Fen), Enn. Vi, 9, $; and 5, followed by Proclus, Elem, theoln, prop. 20; se also hupostasis, theos. Iypodoché or hypodechoméné: receptacle Accurding to Plato itis in this receptacle that geneeis takes place, although the receptacle itself is elways the same, Tim. snb—stb. Tt is alse called chora (area), aid. sea, and granted a qnasi-existence (pas ‘n),tbid. gor (forthe ontologienl aspects of ths, st on and genes). Aristotle identifies Plaio’s “receptacle” with matter (hyle), Phys. rv, 299). Tor Fiotinas the “receptacle” 1s "second" or sensible mater,92 | mrroxunstexon Enn 1, 4, 6 1, 4, 11; se2 topo and compare hypokeimenon, hyle, imenon: substratum Aristotle's analysis of genesis in the Physics, based, apparently, on & Platonic prototype (see genesis), leads him to the isolation of ips (eretsi) Involved In all changes trom one thing tno : the immanent form (eidas, q.v.), the privation (steresis, q.v-) of the form af the thing itis going ‘o became, and, finelly, the substra- sem (hypcheimenon) that persists through the chenge aad in which the genesis tekes place (Phys, 1, 1goa-b). Its name is dictated by its function; thus from a predicational point of view the substratum is tha: ‘of which other things are aredicated and which is not predicated of anything else (Meta, 19286-10234). But the passages in the Physics are considering hypobcimsencn in the context of material change, ar so ft is not merely logical concept but, together with eidas, a gennine co-principle of being (Phys. 1, gob), what is, from a slightly diferent point of view, matter (Ayle) and, like matter, is kaown not directly but analogieally (ibid. 191). Both the logical end ontological espects of dgpbeinensa yessios iw Iutes Usinkervs iis the first of dae four Stoic etegoriai (q.v.), SPF 11,969, and identified with matter in Plotinus, Enn. tt, 4,6; see hyle, hypodache, symbebekas. hypolepsis: judgment See dose, neesis hypSnoia: underlying sense, hidden meaning See mythos. hypéstasts: standing under, hence, substance; real being, frequently in opposition to appearances Tp Plato's system all the eide are Jupovtases in that they are realy real (crits 012), but the notion of Aypootaats doco not formally appear until “ater Platonism began to arrange the most important cide in an ontologicelly descending hiernrchy, perhaps on the eralogy of number (see monaz), since it esrly appsars in a Neopythagorean numerical interpretation of Plato (Moderatus in Simplicius, Pays. 2g0-a91). Tt is clearly a product of syncretism, « blending of the Parmenidean One (sec hen), Aristotle's Intel'igence (see nous) combined with Plato's Demiourges, and Plato's World Soul (see poyehe tou patios). “Uaere dee supreme archai of being are eleecdy in evidence in Albinas (Epi. x) aud Nameaius Gn Fusebins, Pra‘p. Evang. 21, 27), but their futgtativu uty a complex metepbyaical and ethical world view ia che work of Plotiaus: One, Nous, Psyche (the latter subdivided, soc wsoxowrs | 93 phgsis), see the summary passages in En. 1r, 9,35 59,15 Vt, 7942 and Proclas dialectic derivation in Elem. thei., prep. 20. For the individual Aypostascs, soe here, nous, baycke tou panies; for their progression, proidoe, trias. hypSthesis: suzgestive, posited starting point, hypothesis ‘The tenurive definition snggested thy Sccrates* intericcutors, Xenophon, Mem. tv, 6, which Socrates himself explains more fully in Phaede r00:~e where it serves as n kind of eriterion against which to measure the songrecnes of deductions"; she theory of forms ix just such a hypothesis here, Again (iid. 1014) the pushing Gack of the hypothesis to something more basic is described, back to what in Red, 5th is called the “unbypoteticed principle” (see Pars. rege). In Aristotle che “primary” (ex arches) hypotheses are the undemonstra- ble fist principles: axioms and postnlates (Anal. pr. 1, 242, 728; see noesis, none, epagege). {dion: property Tn terms of Aristotelian Iogic a property is not something that reveals the essence of a thing, like “animal” (the genoe), but that Delongs to an essence and to that essence alore, og. “grammar learning” ap applied to a man, Unlike an accicont (see symbebekos), it ‘eannot belong to anything else, ie., every man is « grammar-leacner and vice vetsa, Tod. 1 1028. Together with genve, dlaphora, and symbebelon it conaticutes the four “predicables” weated ibid. 1, rorb-1042, Their relaticnship with the ten kategoriai or “predica- ments? is dealt with iid. x, 1ogb; see symbebekes. isomoiria: equal share, balance, equilibrium See meson, isonomia: equal share, balance, equilibsiuut See hedane,kakén: evif 1, Before Scerates made ethies a subject of philosophical dis- course considerations of good and evil had been the preserve of the poets and the lawgivers, But the increasing ewareness of moral relat sm and the Sophists’essertion of the purcly arbitrary character of law (aomes, qx.) led Socrates to seek for absolute standards of moral conduct, 2, But the Socratic emphasis is on virtue (arete) snd good (aga- thon). Indeed, from his intellectuslistic point of view there would sem te ba no such thing az evil, since no ona arre willingly, bur throngh ignorance (Aristotle, Eth, Nick, vit, 1143b). Plato contiaued in this tradition with hie lengthy discussions of the possibility of false judg- ment (see doze}, 3 But there were new considerations as well. Plato is more aware of the volitional element and admits that the soul can cause both good and evil (Zewe 896d compare Theaet. 176a and see psyche), and the hypostatization process that led him to convert Socratic definitions into ontclogical reslities suggests, in one place at least, the existence of an eidos of evil (Rep. 2762). This is pethaps consonant with, or at least explicable, in dae vomteat of the etLieal origins of Uae Cheory of eéde, but the assertion, in Lawe Sg6e, thet there is an evil as well a a good World Soul '(peyche tow pantaa, qv.) is to move ethical dualiem, pervasive in the early Plats on the Inerl af bady and sowl, anta the cosmic stage, perhaps the result of increased contacts with the Jranian tradition, 4. Aristotle rejects both the eidos of evil anc the evil World Soul in Meta, rosa. The charscieristic Aristotelian. doctrine associates ‘moral evil with excess as a correlative of his theory of she “mean” (see ‘meron). In Eth, Nich, 1106 Aristotle quotes with approval the relzted Pythagorean judgment that evil is to be {dentiied with the indetermt- ete (apeiron; compere the Pythagorean “Table of Opposites” in ‘Meta. ofa, and see Rincun 2). ‘In postAristetelicn philooophy the Smplicetions of bee the Platonic and Aristotelian pesitions were explored, The Epicurcana, with their cheroughyoing sensuslism, stand somewhat apart: sll evil can be equated with pain (alos, ponos) ithe: of the body or the mind 4 kaon | 65 (DL. x, 126; see Aedone), and its existence poses no theological problems since the gods do not coucerm themselves with the world EDA. x, v2g-124). But for the Stoics and their doctrine of providence (pronoie, ¢.¥.) evil is mare of # problem: how to explain the presence of evil n'a universe governed by an rll-zood Gnd? One suggestion (its history was venerable) vas that evil is God's instrument for edueating rd chastisiag mea (Plutarch, De Stoie. repugr. 10400; Seneca, De ipras., pessins), The other relied on the organic nature of the universe fs a whole: “all things work unto good (Plutarch, op. eit 205085 Seneca, Zp. 74, 20). Dut diese ip auvtuct possibility, tho one broached by Plato in the Lows and that openly adinits dhe existence of a radical, subsistent principle of evil, whether theistic es in the Laws and Iranian Buroastrianiom. (co Blucarch, Nr Teids 06, 48), ar meraphysieal, e.g. matter. 6. Both the Pythagoreans and Plato had, es aoted above, admit. te the indeterminate (apeiron) as a co-principle of being, and the former at least had identified f wich evil, Aristotle had equated it with hhis material principle (hyle) but had failed to drew the conclusion that ‘matter and evil are to some extent synonymous, There are, te be sure, Some hints of this 1n both Flato (Pot. 273b; Tim. 66¢) and Arisictle (De gen. anim. 1, 77ob: matter resists form), but the exploration of the ethical qualities of matter remained Zor later philosophers. 7+ Stole (aund Epicurean) saonim tended to obscure rather than illuminate the problematic of matter but there were other forces at ‘work, There was, for one, the Neopy:hagorean interest in the Tiraacus hat served to seenforce the equation of Plate’s chore with Aristotle's Ile (so Modetatus cited in Simplicius, In Phys, pp. 290-251). Again, and more importantly, there was the growth of the oriental tradition of ethical dualism wwhose most important wiiness is Plutazch’s De Irie, and which found its natural philosophical ally in Asistole’s eides/hyle dichotomy. By the time of Numenius, evil (akon, mature) is ficily identified with matter (Ayla, silva) 2nd the position was held by @ \ariety of Gnostte sects (see Corpus Herrestivene Ys 44-3) 8, Plotinus, who opposed the Gnostic view of the universe and, indeed, eny sype of dualism, wes, nonetheless, affected by the identi cation of matter and evil, His solution ta the problem of eel unfolds within strictly controlled limits. First, it is not a question of dualism: matter is generated from the One under the guise of “Otherness” (Enn. 12, 4, 5). This refers first und foremost to intelligible matter (Ayle notte: see hyle: Prous doubts whether this should be called ‘aalter at all: Thecl. Plat, 11h 9) that is always defined and hence the pessbillty of evil in the Rosrios ncetos is ruled out (Ena. 1.8, 2). On Use quescion of sensibie manter (hyte atstecce) Ploviuusy while awhate96 | Katto ting that it is the cauce of evil (1, 8, 4), ia at somo pains to point out thet itis z2i a substance bute privation (stercsis), the absence of any ood (1,8, 12). 9. Proclus opposes this on a number of connts: he fails to see how a privation, which is essentially a negation, can he the canse of any- thing (De raal. subst. p. 240) and se prefers to revert to the Platonic (and more voluntaristic) position that the soul 1s the eause of ev ct, to ‘pat it another way, that the evil in tho foemce is moral and not metaphysical (op. oft, p. 293). ‘On feriginal sin® a9 a source of evil sce Luthodove kallos; beauty See eras. kardia: heart 1, Bekind the long-standing debato on the seat of the soul tha: ‘was conducted in philosophicel circles there stands a prephilosophical physiology that had, in effect, decided the question and that, supported by the massive authority of Homer, tended to dominats even the accu- mulating medical evidence to the contrary. The Hlomerte hero both feels (Tl. 1x, 186; x17, 493; eit.) and thinks (ZZ. 1x, 600; x11, 296) with the phrenes or midrift, whence the later phronests, thought ot wisdom. 2. A great mimber of thinkers went along the some path, encour- aged no doubt by medical theories of vital heat czrried through the system by the blood. ‘The thermal theory of thought finds ita chiof propagator in Heraclitus who identified the soul with fire (fr. 35) end connected it with consciousness (Dicls 22a16). In Empedocles the blood appears as a factor linked with perception, end the seat of perception is located in the least (Ir. 105}. Perhaps Desoctitus too is to be placed here, though the evidence is contradiccory (retional fac- ulty in the breast in Aetius 1v, 4, 6; in the brain, ibid. iv, g, 2), and it wis U0G, in any event thety wal heat dhal auggeated the canmpartoan of soul and fire atoms to Democritus, but rather the latter’s shape end mobility (Aristotle, De an. 1, 4062)- Aristotle cals the heart the arche of life, movement, and sensation (Da part. anim. 6462), end thengh the Epicurcens dispersed the soul all over the body (a22 poyche), the ational faculty (Lacretius: enimus) was in the breast (Lucretius 11, 14i-aqz) as itwas For the Stoics (SVF n, 679). ‘3. The olber school of thought, which located the seat of percep- tion in the brain (enkepiutos), liad is origin in Pychegorcan medical circles, specifically with Alemaeon of Crutous (Thospliastus, De sens. 20; sev also aisviests) who uiaiutwived dns hese ene pases (Jo~ roi) connecting the senses to the brain, 2 position he was said to have karncontat | 97 arrived at by actual dissections on the optic nerve (Diels aqazx) and that reappetre among the philosophers with Diogeaes of Apollonia. Flere the physiological reasoring is crossed with more philesophical ‘considerations, Le., that air (aer, qv.) is the divine arche of all things, and the socrce of life, soul, and intelligence (frs. 4, §). How perception ‘occurs we are told by Taeophrastus (De serie. 90-44). Man inhales air that travels, vis the Caries senses, ro the train. Tr the air fs pure anc dey, thought (pironesia) takes place (see aisthesie and compare the similar Hippocratic text in Diels 649). “f Gocretce had hoard of the brain theory aa a young man ond ‘was interested in it (Phacde 96b). He mast have passcd his interest on to Plato who, in the Timacus, locates the rational pest (logistikon) of the hnman soul in the heal (44) aul makes the brain the sone oF the reproductive powers (72¢-4h see pryche). 5. But even though the question continued to be debated (see SVP it, 885; Cicero, Tuse. 1, 9, 19), it was the view of Aristotle that prevailed, Aristotle new, to be sure, the medical assertions of the connection of the censes with the brain, but he was not convinced by the evidence (Hist. anim. 524a). What he finds more perauasive is that there is no sensation fa the brain ftsclf (De part. ant. 6568). 6. Plotinus, however, following the Platonic tredition. continues to locate the arche of sensation in the brain, or es he carefully puts it, of departare [arche] of the oparatien [snergaia] of she faculty Caynamis], since itis the arche of the Rinests of the instrument lorganon}? (Enn. wv, 3, 93). Katilépsis: grasping, apprehension The act of grasping’ cn impression (pantesia): the act is a primary one in Stoic epistemology, and described by Cicero, Acad. eat. 1,13, 40-42; apprehension is the er:terion of truth for the Stoics, Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mail. vr1, 152; the volitional eleweent is under lined, did. vit, guy; see phantasia, prolepsis, enncta, nocsis.. Kategoriai: accusations, predications, categories, praedicamenta, summa genera (scil. entis) _ Theten Cin rome Wists only eight) mest goncral waye in which sbject may be described; « logical stracturing that corresponds to the real existence of things: the cide of being in Meta. .oosban or, again, the summa genera of being (see genos). The anvst complete list Is given in Gat, fb-ze: substance fousia), quantity (poson), quality (Poicn}, relation (pros ai), place (pou), tne (pate), postion (heise fhai), state (ccheén), accion (poten), fection (pasohein)s for their relatlonsip with he four predicables, see Top. wege—b and ron. Aristode’s hetegoriai are criticized by Plotinus in Enn. v1, 1, 1-24. The98 | Karmaxsts Stoics reduced the categories to fou sate, relation, SVF 11, 369; they are ci 25-30. ibject (hypoRetmenon), quality, sssed by Plotinns, Enz. vt, kathirsis: purgation, purification 1, Katkarsis, a word with both retigious and medicel implica tions, scems to Actuate between affirmative and negative functions al the hands of the philosophers. Among the Pythagoreans katharsis had as might be expecied, strong religious connotations. Kadhsrsis is a pnrifcarion of the sont, effect, we are sold Clamblichns, Vitx Pyth. 110}, throngh monsike (qv.), ive. by rendering it harmonious; in- deed, this is philesopay (iid. 197). This Pythagorean ideatifeation of featharsis and philozophia is found in Plato (se Phcedo 82d), and the analogy with music runs chrough the dialogues. In Phacdo 61a Socrates equates philosophy and music, and in the Republic (431e 428, 4x32) music is the foundation of the master virtue sophrasyne (qy.), We are further told, in Tim, god, that the care of the soul consists in bringing its modulations into harmony with the cosmic order (see ouranes). 5. But when Socrates informe ne; fn Sophie anf that hie ert io “cathartic,” we have passed over to other grounds where the function of hatharsis is described as “tne removal of evil from the soul? (ibid. 497d), just ag the medical art does for the body. Here the problem is not scen a © kind of imbalance (see hedone) that can be set aright by harmonization, but as the presence of something essentially alien to the system, Medical men are familiar wich this type of purgation (Crat, 4052), end it may be extended, by analogy, to a misuse by tyrants practiced upon the state (Rep. 567¢). Socrates effects his athorsis of the saul by the best possible purgative, interrogation (elenckae) that ‘leauses Ue soul of fave upininnss (Supheago0) 3. Aristotle applies the theory to music (Pol. 1gqib-ag4a): some music is educational, presumably the *harmonizing” type of che Pythagorerm tradition; but there ie nlen Senthartic® mnsie in the medi- cal, purgative sense. This later type has its effect by the homeopathic principle of inducing exactly the same effect that one secks to cure. Plato knows of this practice (see Rep. s60d, Laws 79oc~7gxb), and as js clear from these passages in Plato and Aristuile, Loui mea were ware that the homozopathic principle enurciated by physicians lad already been extended to the cure of certain psychle states, most particularly religions possession cr enthourtasms (sex rmuncike). Asio- fotle took the further step and incorporsted it into is theory of art, with the well-known result of tragedy’s being defined in terms of eHecting « homecopathie hathaesic/pwirgation af the prathe of pity amd Fear (Poct. a44gb)+ xarnonos | 69 4 Plotimas discusses the relationship of fatharsie and arete in Enn. 1,5 4 with Plato he makes Ratharse «necessary condition to assimilation to God (ibid. 1, 8, 6; eee homoiosis). Kdithodos: descent, fall (of the soul) 1. Thi origins of the figure of the fall or banishment of the soul trom its naturel, iumuoital alude axe seligivus, a9 eycais fren it fast occurrence among the philosophers in Empedocles' Purifcations (fr. 4115} 3t may Lave been held in some form by Heraclitus a8 well; soe frs. Gan 6 Plate, Cong. 4gne—fggh Platine, Fam w, 8, 1) where the banishment is the result of « primal erime (bloodshed or flesh-eating; fss. 196, 137, 139) committed by one of the daimones (q-v.) whose natural lot was immortality, Beccuse of this ctime it ie subjected, for the period of a “great year® (30,000 seasons in Empedocles, it. 135, 6; the figure varies elsewhere), to successive reixcarnations in chis world of change. ‘2. This account is closely tied to the Pythagorean view of the immortal soul (see psyche) and the attendant doctrine of palingenesia (qs.). This type of belief is common in Plato and expressed in a series uf grout myths (see ethanados), Plato knows Empodoclea? version (and, apparently, the related myth of the devouring of Dionysus by the ‘Titers, the creation of man from the ashes of the latter, end the consequen: #Titanie narra” af mortals whose Dionysiac spark is thus embeded ia a Titanic element that is the direct result of an “original sin"; see Laws zoxc) and employs it, with characteristic Platonic changes, In Phazdrus 248c-2agd. The soul loses its wings and falls {nto the sensible worid, But whereas the emphasis in Empedocles is on the immortal soul's coming into the cyclic armas, the Fall consequent uupoa sia (its nature is not specified ) is used by Plato to explain the presence of the soul in the body and is integrated, vis the link between Fecollection (anammcais, q.v.) and the eide, into Plato's epistemologi- cal and metaphysical doctrines. a The question of the descent of the soul, its manner and its porpose, continued to exercise the thinkers of the Platonic teadition, and the best testimonial to their interest is undoubtedly the essay evoted to the question by Plotinas (Enn. tv. 8) and the passages of Tamblichns? De cima preserved in Stchaens. A great variety of views ate recorded, and the mechanics snd lnedseape of the trip through the spheres, compounded of Plato's remarks (the prenatal vision of the spheres given the soe! in Pacedrus a7e—a4e and Hep, 616:-617%, and the sugwestion, in Rep. Gaye), that the descent, at least for sonie, is through the heavens) anda great deal of astsonomical lore, are lovingly Aocsiled. Trpieal io Porphyry’ allogoricel interprotation of the “Cave ‘of the Nymiphs? in Od, xin, 102-112 (with some of the details borgoo | xatuonow ‘owed from Numerius: cf. De aatro nymph. 21, 98); Odysseus’ travels become, in this symbol-enamored age, the archetypal encetment of the soul’s wanderings: ibid. 34-95 and Macrobius? account of the deseen- ‘aus anime in bis commentary on the Somintum Scipionis (1, 11. 111, 38); aiypicel is Plotinus’ internalization of the phenomenon (Zinn. 1v, 81) 4 Why his uated at al is eousiderably more perpfeving. The Phaedres announces it a3 an “ordinance of Neressity,” but proceeds to link it with a mischanee (syiyehia) of the soul (248e). The Pinaceus showe n Aiforent point of views. ‘The harmoe must oontein all the beings of the Rosinas ncetos (q,v.), otherwise it will be incomplete; for this reason mortal creatures are brought into creation (4ib-d). Plotiaus subscribes to this view that the engagement of the soul ii a mortal body is the fulfilment of a divine purpose and dictated by the very ature of the soul (En. av, 8, 7). The same view is token by Proclus (Im dle. 928, 29; compare Elem. theo, prop. 206). 5. But in this same passage of Plotinus there is at least the suggestion that the soul is somewhat to be blamed for its Sexcessive eal,” and in Ean. v, 2, 1 we are given 2 still elecrer cecount of its Saudacity” (éoinae} ial juy at its ows iunlepeudence that causes ft t0 flee God. The prenatal sin theory, though hardly consonant with the rest of Plotinus' thought, was held by other thinkers, According te Tamblichns (Stohsens, Pri. & p. 976), Albinus is among this momaber in asking the fall a result of free choice, bat this may refer to the common Pythagorean motif of the soul's choice of life before palin. genesia (Rep. 617¢: “the chooser is responsible; God is blameless"), Meccobias (1, 22, 11) speaks of a “longing for the body? (appetentia corporis). But the best-known adherents of the doctrine were undoubt- ily the Gnostics who thought the materiel world an essentially evil lace and for whom the fall of the soul was a commonplace (see Plosious, Er. 11,9, 19). Kathdlou: univeesal 1. Katholou is an Aristotelian technical term, though there is evidence for its evolution in Flato (cf. Meno 27a, Rep. gga). Aris- toile defines the universal in Ie interp. x7a £8 “that which by its nate is capable of being predicated of several cubjocte,” og. man” is 2 universal, Cellins #8 a singuler. It is frequently identified with genus (222 gones; Mota, 1049b, 20980-1099). Aristotle spceifcely rcjocta the Seer er fom) pe ana See lsewhere he is insistent taat oaly the universal can be delined (Mcta. 0402), and ip the true object of scicace (episteme; Anal. post. 1 DrtO, De we sty qi/D). Avotulle serenely wlitued Rlaty fu ype xivesis. | zor tatizing the universels (Meta, 10860-1082): Socrates, however, did rot make this mistake (ibid. 078d). For the petception of the universal in Epicuras, see prolepsis; for the possibility of « "concrete universal,” enarimor. kefsthai: position, situs One of tive kuuegurta In Aristotle, Car, xh-2a: tn oeher places, eg: Ail, post 1, Sah, bnvh beisthay and cchoim (state) are omitted from the lst In the ist im Cat. ab Avstote’s own examples of Aeisthat are “ying, “vitiing” tio a relative tarm, ibid. Bo (000 pres #2). kenén: void, vacuum A void is admicted by the Pythagoreans as 2 separating element between natures, and, particularly, numbers (Aristotle, Phys. 1, igh). Ic is attacked by Permenides (Diels, fr. 8, lines 6-32), and denied by Melissus as sheer nonbeing (Diels, fr. 7). For both Empedo- cles and’ Anaxagoras air ts corporeal, and hence to be distinguished rem the void, which is denied as nonbeing (Aristotle, Phys. rv, 2358, De coclo tv, goya). The Atomists embrace the Parmenidean paradox fund acsait the eistence of die soubeing vil, wick, iwgedier with “the full,” they make the new principles of the univorse (Aristotle, De gen. ct corr. ty 325%, Meta, g85b). It is discussed, defined (“place Eropme with nnihing in ie), and denied by Aristotle (Phys 1, suyu-si7b), Kenon is affirmed by Epicurus as a good Atomist (D.L. x 38-42), but denied by the Stoics (D.L. viz, 140); see sopoe. Kéndsis: emptying, depletion Sec hedone One Kinesis: motion, movement, change 3, Motion presents xo problem for the Milesian philosophers; itis 82 unquestioned part of their pervasive vitalism (sce zoe), and it is in fio spleit chat both Anasiwundor (Dislo aatsa) und Auuudaicos (Diels 224g, 1346) posit an eternal motion. Tt is noteworthy tco that ‘when Nenopianes wishes to temper the contemporary anthrcpamar- pphisun he denies his Goel kimesis (Diels a1ans, 26). Kinesis is present in all reality in Heraclitus, as illustrated in the famous river image (see Plato, Crat. 4ona, shee, and episteme). 2, Suddenly all of this is changed with Parmenides* attack on all fons 07 ciange (see generis, on}, aud particularly motion (sce fr. 8 line 26), undoubtedly ee o reeul: of hia donisl of tho void (Ronen) on the grounds of nonbeing, thus depriving body of a place inte which to move (se0 Plato, Theact 12c6). Zeuols four arguments coauived tytoa | xrnesis support the position of Parmenides and deny the pessibility of motion (see Aristotle, Phys. vt 239; answered, ibid. a6se-b) axe, of course, polemical erd derived ex hapothes? azains the Pythagorean reluctance to relinquish the void (see megethos). 3. Genesis (qw.), atleast on the secondary level, recovered from Parmenides? assauit, and his successors tended to substinite some de- rwuative of 2mesig, e.g. mixture or association, for the ground. pre viously held by genesis properly ¢o called. But what was now markedly different waa that kinesie was no longer naturel or inhecent in things, 29 with the Milesians, but required some ype uf ageut (Bnvare yore) ‘operating from outside the system, An external force wo explain kinesis appears in Empedocles and is identified 2s Love and Strife (fr, 17), snd in Anavagerast nous (fre 10-14): all nf thece forree eve still however, material 44. At this point the only serious proponents of an inherent, natu- ral metion in bodies are the Atomisis, Democritus held euch an eternal notion for the atonta that moved in all directions (Aristotle, De casio 1m, goob: D.L. x, 44,8 movement that he catled “vibration” (pabmos; ‘Actius t, 23, 3) and that occurs by necessity (Aristotle, Phys. 11, 19635 DAL. 1X, 45). [eis from the resultant collisions that aggregates are formed (see genesis) tha: in cure move into a vortex or whirl (dine), gradually finding their places in the koamos (Diels 67414). 3 Fpicoma? explanation is aomowhat diferent. For him the aatoma heve, in eddition to size and shape, weight (bcros) as one of their primary characteristics (D.L. x, 54). Thus their eternal down- ‘ward mosion would seem to be derived rather than an inherent property (DL. x, 61; Lucretins 11, 83, 217). Theie collision and consequent aggregation into bodies is brought about ky a swerve (parenkliis) in their parallel motions (Actius 1, 12, 5; Lucretius 1t, 216-2933 Cicero, De fi 1, 6, 19; compare genesis). 6, A= Soph. 2480~24p3 Plato departs from his Parmenidean view- point, Where earlier there was a firm insistence on the unchangeatle buture of the ete (see Piaedv 76), now Rinests too has its place ia the world of reality. The soul, fer instance, which is skin so the eide (Phaedo 78b-79b), is self moving (and hence immortal) and the souros of movement in othore (Phacdrue ayge-a46a; for the Platonic causal category of Sself-mover,? sce Laws x, S9dc), including the heavenly bolies (see ouranioi), Indeed, in Soph. 254 Plato maintains ‘thet Ainesis is one of the most imporcant ide, wid it seems to serve for ‘him the same function thet metabole (q.v.) does for Aristotle: « go erie term for change that has as tts specles at Teast locomotion (hora) and qnalitative change (allotesis: see Theaet. 18:¢) and that ssexpanded, in Tame x, 8g4h—t, to embrace ten distinct spectes, includ ing, #8 the Aristotelian metafcle does not, both genesis and phthara mayoux | 203 (qa.). None of these is, of couse, the cidos of hixesis mentioned in the Sopaist, but the centh (really, as Plato points out, the erche of all the others) selfmoved motion is the soul, which mediates between the other pine and the etdus (see psyche). 7. Aristotle attacks the Platonie position in Pays. 11, 200b where he declares that there is no kinesis apart from things. He then offers his own definition Gbid. 11% sore} of hinooio an “the actuslisation [oats Techsial of a potentislicy [dynemis] que potentiality.® Tt cccurs only as a tuctabole, ie a change in the category of quality, quantity, ot pace (ibid, vy. 2260), The latter Rinesiss Len loconaotion (bora). is primary (ibid. vii, 205b—266a), taking precedence even over genesis qv). 2" a tae fallows Plo back along che rosd to the inherent Milesien metion by describing piysis (q.x.) as the principle and eause of Rinesis (Phys. 11, 192); this does not, of course, free him from the necessity of the external, seli-meving cause; see Ainoun. Kinesie i, fegerher with uucridon, seusation, aud Grought, wie af die four asi, functions of the psych: (De an, qiga-b), and is resolved into the operation of desire (orexis) in conjunction with what is perceived as 2 real or apparent good (ibid. s1t, scan—43gb) For Aristotle's theory of natural motion,” see etvichetcn, aither: for the application of kineris to perception, aisthesis; on the possibility of actio in distans, symbatheia kinotin: mover, agent, efficient cause 1, The problem of an external agent or erche for movemeat is not ¢ problem for the early paysiko: since in their vitalistic view Aimests ‘was inherent in things (see Ainesis 1). But once Parmenides had enied that Aineeis was an attribute of true being, the obvious phe- nomenon of motion in the physical world had we be explained by eoourse to an external mover that would give at lesst the initial ‘Impetus to hinesi. 2, ‘The first anch attempt is the “Tove” and “Strife” of Emped- eles (fr. 17, lines 19-20; compare Diels g1a28), drawn from cn analogy with the motive forces operative in man (ibid., Lincs 22-24; compare Aristotle, Meta. 98a, who stresses the moral aspect of these forces and sees thei as a manifestation of moral dualism: see kakon 3). Shortly thereafter there is an epoch-making shift away from the moral to the intelleceual sphere: Anexagoras’ source of motion is intelligence (2940), whieh fs noc only che lnltkztr of morlon bur a guiding force as ‘well (see nzus g: norsis 4). The lineaments of Aristotle's Ged are already present: naesie, kinesin, tos. 3. Plate’ earlion preerenpyatinn with the immntahia sido spam ently excluded any serious consideration of Ainesis. Bat in the later40g | KENOUN dialogues, particularly in the Sophivt, Philobue, Timacus, end Lava, ‘there is a fullblown theory of kinesiz (q.v. 6) with two celated points of fecus: the attribution of the principle of sclf-motion to the soa! (see Pryche 19) and the admission of Rincsis, by ceasoa of ils being @ function of soul, to the realm of the “completely real” (panteles on; Soph, 248e-aggh ). There is, moreover, an eidoe of Rinesis (ibid. a5ze) ss ludced, itis one of che: megtsin gene {ste ios 1g). 4. Motion, then, arenrs on three levels in Plato: a the transcen- dental eidas of motion; as the self-motion of soul, which holds an intermedinzy position between tho aids end ocnsible paeticulars and which isthe arche of motion described in the Lewe x Sgsb; and, finally, as che various types of secondary motions in the osznoe described in Laws x, Sor>-Base, 5. Ia ters of this analysts Plato's proton dinoun or Fisst Mover is the roetic part of the semitranscendent or World Soul (see poyehe ‘ow pantos). There seem to be, moreover, grounds for identifying the nous of the Philebus xd Timaeus with this same World Soul, even though it is mythically ceseribed as creating the World Soul (sce nous 6). We have, then, not merely a Rincun but ¢ final and exemplary sause ws wells The devmiozrges (qi¥.) 48 good ané makes the world (9 be as similar to himself as possible (Tim. 29e-gou) and, we sre told, ‘the human soul is made of the seme “stuf as the World Soul (iid) 4ud). Bat not only is the Acsmos related t9 the Binct aa citom to paradeignee, the movement known a8 “procession” ( prositaz, qv.) ia later Platanism; there is, as well, a “return” (epistrophe, q.v.). The :medin:e result of the self-moving motion of the World Soul is the periect circular motioa cf its own body, the visible universe (ibid. ga, 36e, gpa-b). This rezaler visible and etemal motion of the heavens provides, in turn, a model by which maen should regulate the harmena (qiv.) an thei own souls (ibid. 470-03 astronomy is, of course, only preliminary to che higher thrusts of the “return” effected by erat and dialebribe: see ouranos 2). G. The same pussnges bn die Timucus intewduce aunther consid nly bodies are also “a race of Gots.” Each is, enclowed with Sntaligeace and ii th intligence thet explains the axial en‘atiom of the atars, rotary because “each skrays thinks the same thoughts about the same things” (Bid. 39¢—zos; om this rotary motion compare Rep, 436b and Laws x, 8982). Plato seems to be in some doub: about the mode of conection between these heavenly bdies and their guiding intelligences. Some suggestious are made in Laws x, Sy8c, but Plato is uncertain whether their soul is an immanent motor, like our soul, or an excrinsic force that may be elther corporeal (poss Uy Lue Uicory of Endoms thar the scars are carried aronnd hy the corporeal sphere in which they are imbeslded, a theary adopted by xinour | 205 Asistotle; see 7, 11 iafra) or incorporeal (the Aristotelian “object of ove"). But whatever the exact relationship, the Platonic tradition maintained its belief in these planetary movers to the end (see oure- ivi). 7. Among the various causes inyelved in gencsis Aristotle speci ‘es the Rinzen or agent that initiates change (Phye. 1, aygb). What is coming law question ore ure Arisiue’s revised uodiuus of plensis (ye¥~ 1g). Physiz has dislodged psyche from much of the ground helé by the Platonic soul, most notably from its position as the smrce of prrpose (eslooy Phys. x, g(a) and mavernent hid. vier, agob-agga) and, given the existence of things in motion, there must be a single cause of notion, a “first mover” (protzn Rincun) that is itself unmoved (ibid, ‘esba-24Gh ): everything that is moved is moved by something and there cannot be aa Infinit regress of such movers (iid, 256a and vit, aqza-245a). Thus there is an eternal First Mover and an eternal first moved, the latter the sphere in which are embedded the fixed stars (vin, 2600-2862 ), moving in an eternal, circular locemation (locamo- ‘tien is prior to all other forms of change, even genesis; ibid, oBa—b and see genesis 15) oe Dut Aiistetle apparently did ct always hold this view. ‘The line of reasoning cited above from the Physico is essentially an axgu- ment from cnergeia/dynamis (qq.v.) thet rests on the premiss that the [pasenge from potency to act demande the prior presence of an agent already ia ect that leads, via the denial of infinite regress, to an etesnel enecgeia that cannot be other. But there is also “Platonic motion” ‘whereby the son! fs the source of motion. In this way Plato explained ‘te axial rotation of he stars, and it was the same explanation that Aristotle himself relied upon in attributing souls to the stars ia his ‘early Platonizing dialogue On Philosopiy (tr. 24=Cicero, De nat. decr. 11, 445 here che motion 1s called “Voluntarj"). But cennot the heavenly bodies elso be moved by their phyris, which Aristotle kes substituted for the osyche as an incernal source of motion? This seems to be the theory held in the Ds ovelo whore the mation of the cet body," ie., the sphere of the fied stars, is the “aatural” eternal, circular motion of the fifth element, alter (qv; De coelo 1, 1203a~27ch: see stoicheion 17). The fied sta-s themselves move because Ley ere embedded in chis sphere (hid. 1, 29Sb—agob). Bat even thongh ke is capable of giving this explanation of the motion of the stars in terms of the pysis of she sphere, he is somewbat embarrassed 28 to what to co with his Platomie legacy of the sr sols (eompzre ibid. 11, 2g3 and agen). 9. This would 200m to be a view different from thet of the teanooondent mover of the Physiso (although there aro a number of ubious and/or chscure reforcnecs to just such « transcendent mover in106 | RreouN Da ecelo, e.g. a7ganb). But itis, nonetheless, the kinown of Physics vine shat is taken up and claberated in the Metaphysics. At the end of the former work it io stated that the proton kinown ig without magaitade (megethas, q.v.). This leads to an immediate difficulty since, in the Aristotelian system, all kinesis is effected by contact (haphe; see sym- pathela 7). To answer the difficulty Aristotle resorts to a principle borrowed! froa: nature. The perception of die goed gives rise to appetite (oresie, qv.) for Haat good, in rational beings the abject of rational desire (bowlesis; see De an. itt, 4398 and proairesis), and in irrational nature by ite imitation of the movement of the heavenly bodise ex pressed by the constant passage of the elements from one into the other (see Mets, xosob; De gen. et corr. 11, gg7a and genesis 15). In this, way the proton known is the good of the entire universe “as an object loved” (feta, 1072b), and the Rass end all its pacts “move toward it” by their mimesis ofits energeta translated into physical terms: the heavenly bodies by their parfect circntsr revolutions and corruptible odios by their cyclic genesis-phthore. Man’s mimesis is somewhat sore direct; he is capable of the same kind of energeia as the proton hinoun, Le., noesis, but he performs it only intermittently becruse it involves w passege from potency w vet and so is weurisome (Mera. 20506, 1072; see nacsis 21, nous 10). 10. Within the cetegories of act and potency the Prime Mover oust be av iromaterial substance eternally xetualized (Afete. 20736) ‘What is this energeia? It is at this point that che whole Platonic world of the eide is swept away. Aristotle no longer needs the eide to explain universal predication (see Aathoiou), and their static qualities il! ac- cord with bis own searci for an erche of movement (particularly if he thinks of the eide as numbers; see Meta. ggan end arithmas 3). What is left, in effect, is Plato's World Soul of the Sophist PhilcBus-Timacus: a ‘transcendent substance, @ living rious that imparts motion to the kos ros. And it is precisely in these terms thet the Aristotelian grovon Rinoun is described: ousia aidias, nous, zoe (Meta. 1o72b—10738; for the subsequent cavect uf this Musistoun lta, see tries). Phare ave, of ‘course, corrections. The Platonic World Soul has a World Body, the osmos ciathetos; this would be dynamis and limitation in the Aristote- on system. Plato's fnyehe hid imeclved Aimesie; Aviatotla’e meme ene joys the odd *ectivity of immobility” (onergeia akinesias; Eth. Nich. ‘at, :254b): its energria is noesis (Sox nous 9). a4, Bui Chapter vtrt of Book Lembda of the etaphysies intro- duces @ new difficulty iuco the kinetics of the system, One unmoved ‘over had been posited earlier to explain the eternal circular motion of ‘the sphere of the fixed stars, But there are other eternal circular ‘morfons im the kesmos and so thers should bv ws mauty aunmoved 197639 as is necessary to explain the complicated mo:ions of the spheres, the xryoun | 207 ‘exact number to be calculated hy the astronomers (Meta, 1a7geb; the ‘pumbere offered by Aristotle in the following passages are forty-seven and filty-fve). They too muse be intellectual substances that move the spheres as final cauie (sce Meta. 20740). az. What is the relztionship of these unmoved movers to the spheres end to the proton Kinoun o° the rest of the argument? Arisio‘le powhere explaius. To uuske dient the souls uf the oylicics would Ye tu xoturn to the “Platanie motion” of On Philosophy and make it impos ble to explain how they are akerys in act; to make them imrater'l Forces entornal to the body of the ophere Curl, én that avert, the sphere have an immanent Soul in addition?) is to raise the question of their individuation. If they are not united to a body hew do they differ one from another since matter is the prineiple of individuation (see Tyle 2 and compare diaphora 4 where the genus is said to supply an ‘intelligible matter® for the species)? It has generally been assumed that they are somehow subordinated to the proton Riaoun described as ruling the entire universe (Meza, 1070b, 1072b, 10768 and see 9 supra), ‘and this despite the Zact that they are unmoved. Tn fact, the argament cn the basis of which they are posited in the first place necessitates that they too be intellectual cuciad peifectly actualized, a consideration that weuld scem to eliminate their having any desire (orexis), and conse- quently a lack of fulfl!ment, toward the proton kinour. 39. Azistetle, then, emits a variety of movers. ‘There is the immanent principle cf natural motion of things, physis (q.v.). There is also, 2s an immanent principle, psyche, not che Platonic model that ‘Aristotle himself hed once held, bnt the immanent eizcs that moves the substance in which it inheres “by thought or choice” (see psych? 20). It is present in all animate things but it does not meet (nor does Physis) the genercl requirement of the theory of energeic/dymamia that demands an external, prior cause of motion, Taye there must be at Teast one transcendent mover that is a complete intellectual substance (on the “separateness” of intellect, see nous). As to the question of whether there are more than one duel, at Teuut ut come point ia hic career, in Lambda vin of the Metaphysics (waich was not necessarily written at the same time ax vir and nx) Aristotle held that thete was more then one, a pesition thet continued to exercise the Peripatetic tra- dition and provoked a refutation froma Plotinus (Erm. v, 1,9). 14. After Ariecotle the question of a transcendental cause of motion recedes into the background. The naetic function of the cosmic cause ie retained, a0 is the plurality of intermediary intelligences (cee now, daimon), bat its eeusal activity is seen ao meking rather than ‘moving. The reasons are twofold. There is, in the first place, the radically dif-isut Gteiv wacept of God who becomss immanent ond operative in matter, much ia the manner of Aristoile’s physis (seo308 | Korwonzs Physis g, logos 4, and pnewma 4). Secondly, there is the general zevival of Platonism end, with it, the restoration of the demiourgos image. Te was undoubtedly under the influence of this image thet the object of divine thought, simply nocsis in Aristotle, Becomes the nocle as exci plery canses of things (see nocton 2). kuinoute: cuubination, eomnnmion See diairesis, das. késmos (coil. aisthét6e): oznament, order, the physical, visible universe (see kos:n0s nnoetos) 1, There is 9 tradition (Acting my, x, 1 and DT. vir, 48) thar tha first one to describe the universe as a hasmos was Pythagoras; but the notion of the universe as cr order tums up in the fragments of his predecessors (Anaximander, Diels, f. 124io; Anaximenes, Diels, fr. igns), and in any event it is difficult to trace its exact evolution, through the eteges: onder, order of this universe, che universe as order. It hed certairly reached this final conno:ation by the time of Empedo- clos (&r. 454), while che relaced notion of man as the microcosm of the ree appears with Desnceritus (fe. 94). Whatever the origits of suniveree war a hoameo because $ could be reduced to mathomatien! proportions (Aermonia), since the arcke of all things was number (arithrnce) (Aristotle, Meta. 985), with its ethical corollary of atternpting to restore thie cosmic harmony in the soul (see kethareio). ‘The same basic idea had been expressed by the Milesiane, not in che mathematicelly oriented formulae of Pythagoras, but in a seties of figures borrowed from the ethical sphere (see Anaximander, Diels, fr. 2A9, Ba, and dike; Kampedoctes, fr. 30) to explain cosinis process, re placing the sexual metaphors of earlier myths. 2. Heraclitus is the firs: we know of to take the further step and densify this coamte odes with “nw” Guence) Clr, 404), Chery. setting in motion 2 traia of thought leading to the notion of Netural Law (see nomoe). Heraclitus celled the law that ensured this order SFivine (theine), but fie fx only ona af govern! strands landing ton belie? in the divinity of the Aovzcoy the others are the vitalism of the Milesians (sce 20e, pyr) and a belief in the divinity of the heavenly hodies (see ouranis). There is some late evidence (D.L. vitt, 23) that the Pythagoteans held the diviaity of the Roerezs, as may have Xenoplanss as well (Diels, fr. 2136; Arisictle, Meta. 9Bbb). Plato falls the Zosmas a ‘visible God? (hurates deos) in The. gacy not oa vitlist givuads but bevause uf Cae ethical sle i plays fs hi fa ners xosntos Noeros | 109 Aatharsis theory (see ouranss). His mimetic. point of view led him to posit another Kormos net apprehensible by the senses, as ours is, but coaly by she intelligences (saz Acemos woctor). ss. In his early De pailosophia, fr. 18, Aristotle reaffirms the divinity of the Aosmas, echoing the Platonic formula “Visible Gods but by the time of the leter treatises mest of the Platonic theology kas ‘disappeared tn the wake of a revised theory of physis (qv.). Ea the fally developed Aristotelian system there ae only two divinities (see theoe) and one of them, the Kirst Mover, is outside the keemor (De coclo t a7ge b). The other io the oatss ophero of the keomen, the ‘sphere of the fixed stora and the domain of aither (q.¥.); this is divine because of its eternal circular motion (ibid. 11, 85a) 4. Sicic pantheism restores the divinity of the kesmos (SVE 11. 1027) and, following ugon the theories of fire (see yr) and grexma, considered it 2 living, ensouled, and intelligent being (D.L. vit, 138- 19). The Scepties denied both of these positions (Cicero, Me nat door th, 9, 2224). The ongane nature of the hoemoa was delended by Poseidonius ond was the point of departure for his theory of aympetheia (q.v.). As against the Gnostics, who viewed it as the product of evil uad iguoruiee (vee Treaaeus, Adv, Beers ty 4y IEE by Sy 3), both Philo and Plotinas defended the sensible universe, beth calling it a “son of God” (Quod Deus, 6, g13 Enn. v, 8, 12) in its function as an image (ether) of its ultimate transeeadent source (see Ena. 11, 3, 18). késmos nostes: intelligible universe 2. One of the problems rising from Plato's theory of Forms is ‘the question of their location, Plato is emphatic that the eide do not exist in any place (Symp. 2110; compare Aristotle, Phys. mt, 2050). ‘There are, however, other passages that andicate that they do have @ “Leeation? in a wider sense of the word (Ref. se8c, so7b; Phaedrus, 2476~e). The figurative languaze of the Timaeus forces Him te be mere plicts he theory of mimesis (q.v.) suggests a model of which the visible universe (kosmas aisthetos) is an image (eikon), Tim. goed ‘This is the intelligible nniverse thet “contains? the main families of elde (Joe. eit: see 208). “Contains” is dificult wom ft is nor at all Clear how Plato saw the higher g-oupings of the side (sce the chief parallel text, Soph, 253; but here the content is dilectical). 2. Tho intelligible kere reappears in Philo, but with two major Gittercnces; Plato's eide were ternal, Philo's are created (De opif. 4, 28), and ey are ombraccd, as a tetal Rosmaos noctos, within the divine mind, ibid. 4 17-20 (sce cidos), and this is one of the meaniags of Philos Legos (quv.) Philv’s Logos luvs Dlatis’ vas that cirazo | xRAsis braces within it all the noeta (Enn. v1, 2, 21) as the objects of its thought. isis: blonding, mixture See genesis. logismés: reasoning, discursive thought See noes. logistikin: rational faculty See psyche, nowe, pathos, oneiros. Iégoi spermatikot: seminal reasons, rationes seminales ‘The Stoic togot spermatikei, which are designed to explain both plurality and teleology in a monistic eystem, appear to be pettemed after the Aristotelian eidos (q.v.) in its cole as physis. The legoe (q.v.) considered as a unified entity contains within itself, on the smalogy of animal sperm, the growth powers of exeraplars of all the individuals (SVP 11, 10273 D.L. vi, 135). These individual loged are imperishable (SVF tr, 717), ie, they survive the cyclical conflegration (eckpyrosia) that consames the kosimos and sre the svedlings of the next Aosinos (ibid. 2, 497). Despite theie puradiginatic character they ure ote Atistotelian thaa Platonic in thet they ere immanent in matter (ibid. 1, 1074). They also play a major role in Plotinus: they reside in the psyche (Zn. at, §, a4 3%) i 1) where hey ave Ue enue of tos movement (Hid. 1v, 3,15); the /ogof contain all the devals ofthe being (ibid. 1, 2, 1) and are the reasons why individuals differ (ibid. 1V, 4, 20): nnertonded themselves, they are individualized only hy the matter in which they inhere (bid, 1, 9, 5}. For their development into the occult powers, see dyamis. Jogos: speceh, account, reason, detnition, rational iculty, propoution 1, A major dificult in the interpretation of Jagos is determiating when ts common and amorpLous Grech word Is belug: used i = ‘echnical, specialized sense, Thus Hersclitus, in whom it first plays nocos | ux major role, Frequently employs it in its common usage, bat he sao has 1 peculiar doctrine that centers around fogos in a more technical sense: for him logeo is an underlying orgeniastional principle of the universe, related to the common meaning of Iogoo ea proportion (irs. 1, 50), tae ruke of change so frequently essociated with Tleraclitus’ thought (e.g. frs, 60, 121), And this harmony, which is really « tension of opposites, is norco be underswoud fu the seme uf & eyclic rer, but ase sable state (irs, 19, 51). Jogos principle, thongh it is hidden and porceptible oaly to the intelligence (frs. g4, 224; see noesis 2), is still ‘atorial, @o can be seen from the idantieation of the Heraclitan ogee with cosmic fire {compare fre. 42, 643 see pyr), and bis description of the process of thinking (Dicls, fr. 22416; sex rioesis); on the theory of tension, sce tones, 2. Plato also used the term Jogos in a variety of ways, Including the opposition between mythos and logos (see mythos), where the latter signifies 2 true, analytical account, This is common usege, but it leads off into an epistemological theery. In Pheeda 7fib Plato marks as a characteristic of true knowledge (episteme) the ability to give an account (Jogos) of what one knows. In Theaet. 201d this aspect of Jogos is ineexporweed indy dhe definition of epictemer wus vpivivie (doxa) eccompanied by an account, Socrates discusses what logas would meen in this context (id, 2060~210b), and from his analysis, sa description of Jogos ws the statement of x distinguishing istic of a thing (iid, 208¢), The validity of this is denied on the ground of its being of no value in the case of sensible, individual beings (compare Atistotle, Meza, 10396). 3, But when this conception of iogos is moved higher up the Platonic scale of being it obviously does have a role to play; in Rep. 534b Plato describes the dialectician (see dialehttde) as one who can Bive an account (logos) of the truc being (or essence, ousiz) of something, ie., the term of the process of division (diairesis) de~ soribed in the Sophist, the Aristotelian definition (see foros) by genera ‘and upocies; indecd, Aristolls frequently uses fogee ax w synonym For horos, horismas. Another typical Avistotelian use is logos 2s reason, rationality, particularly in an ethical context, eg., Pol. 1ggea, Fh Nich. v, 1igaa, and frequently in the combination “ight reason” Corthas ioges, the Stoic recta ratio), th. Nich. 1, sacgb; Vi, x144b. He also understands logos as mathematicel proportion, ratio (Mei goab), a usage probebly going beck to the Pythagorenns, even though as unattested in their fragments (sve apeiron, poras, harmonta; for the application of Zogca ae proportion to the question of mixtures, see holon; to sensation and the sense oxgen, aisthess; and, in general, oven). 4- The Stoic polut of departure on fegos is Ieraclitus' doctrine ofx2 | Locos fan all-pervasive formula of organiaation, which the Stoics considered divine (see nomos). Loges is the active (poicum) force in the universe (D.L. vis, 254), ctoative in the fashion of sperm (SVP 1, 87; DLL. vin, 195; see legot spermetihei), As in Heraclitus i is material and identi- fied with fire (see gr), Cicero, Acad. fost. 1, 11, 393 SVF 11, 1097. Iris also identical with nature (phusis, qv.) and Zeus (see Cleanthes, Hymn wo Zeus; SVF 1, 597). This pervasive presence in the universe Aevelops in several direct ons: since iti a unity it grounds the theory of cosmie sympathy (see eympatheie) and of natural law and the ethical imperative to Live according te nature? (sce nemes). Bicke Logulady theory further distinguished interior logos (= thought) and exterior logos (= speech) (SVF 11, a95; Sextus Empiricus, Ads. Math, vir, yaoma), 2 distinetion tha: clearly infltenced Phile'e nota. It vision of logos. knew the cistinetion between intesior and exterior logos and could apply it in an orthodox Stoic fashion (De vita Mos. 14 137), and it was pethaps this distinction, together with the Jewich scriptural tradition about the “Word of God,” that led to his now trostment of Jogzs. In the fixe instance Jogos is the Divine Reason that embraces the archetypal complex of elde thar will serve as the models of creation (Ds opif. 5, 20). Next, this logos that is God's mind is externalized in the form of the kosmor noetos (qv), the universe apprehensible ony 1 the intelligence (ibid. 7, 99). Te tn transcendent (Leg. all ant, 375-177), and it fs God, although not the God (De somn. 1, 227-229) , but rather the “elder Sen of God” (Quod Deus 6, 91). With the creation of the visible world (aosmos aisthetor) the logcs hegins to play an immanent role as the “seal” of creation (De fuge 2, 22), the Stoic “bond of the universe” (De plant, 2, 8-9) and heimarmene (q.v.5 Dé mut. 29, 295). Philo differs from the Stoics in denying that this ammanent ogos is God (De migre. Abr. 2, 179-181); for the provider tial role of Phil's dogos, see provzia. Philo gives his loges a distinct role in creation: it is the instrumental cause (De cher. 95, 198127 Ssalso en archetypal Wight (dil. 28, yy), dhis latter ime seappetring in Plotinus, Fm, 11,2, 26. But there is a difference between the two thinkers; what was in Philo both fogos and nous is divided in Plotimas wha na0n the Ingas enncept in fachion akin in the Stnie Ingat speronati- oi (q-v.)3 see Erm. 111, 2,16 where noue and Jogos are distinguished. mantiké: divinetion 1, Although the torminclogy remained fluid one may, with Cicero, De dio, tu. distinguish two distiet types of communication, frequently of future events, vouchsafed by the gods to men: one, the irrot communication through « human “medium,” the groptetes, essed by a gos, typically Apollo, anc hence a spokesman for that Pee" vandat the 2 abpanton ogo ten incu int dzeam (oncives, q.v.). The seconti method, which was less idiosyn- cxatic since it could be learned instead of eppeaving as a more or less forcious diviuc fever, was the reading” of yatious awtasel phox nomena sach as the habits of birds (augury), the entrails of various sacrificial anioals (haruspicy; for the physiological theory see onet res), the physiognomy of the prlm (chizomaney), or the use of loss (cleromancy) or arbitrarily chosen pascoges of a favored author (ecrn- pate the meddioval sortes Vergilianae and sortes Bibl 2, Plato assoeiaes the method of direct cormmunication through a medium with a divinely inspired madness (mania). The exemples he ives are those of the prisstesses ard prophets at Dodons and Delphi nd the Sibyl (Phacdrus 24cb-c). He then procecds to link this “divine madness" with that of the inspired poet who is 2ls0, in a sense, Spossessed by a god,” entheas (ibid. 24sn), an exelogy that makes its first appearance iu literature with Democritus (Irs. 17, 18; see Apo ‘sbr che notion may be Sceratie). 3. The concep: of passession (enshousiasmcs) that provides the theoretical ground for the inspired utterances of the prophet is not susceptible of exact definition. ‘The ancients themselves were aware that it was an arational state (see Plato, pol. aab-c; Ten gg), and a later more peychologicelly sophisticated and curicus age wis well infcrmed on the various psychic phenomena attendant upon enousias- ‘moe (see Lamblichus, Dz myst, 3 4-7, 110-112), 28 well 28 the pos Dlisies of a homoeopathic “cure” (sce katharsis). 4 ‘The distance Letween Plato and Tamblichus is marked by nother siguifvaut chauge: die deuliue uf the astivutionaltzal orecular sites like Delphi and Dodons with thelr organized mediumship, and the ise of individual propfetai who trafficked in a great variety of psychic ‘heoomena an wha feeqnently clatmed mitarnions. powers Sneh {ypes, eg., Apollonius of Tyans and the Alexander af Lucian’s estire, 213aug | weavmencarixa belong properly to the history of religion. But they share with the contemporary Neoplatonic school of Tambiichus a penchant for the sloas and the wonderful, It need hardly be noted that in Neopla- toniom the various species of wonder working were accompenied by @ fairly elaborete philosophical theory hased at least in part en the Stee notion of universal sympathy or eympatheta (q.v.). > This Nevplavuk, dhewe gie ur "working ayo ged” enusisal chiefly in the manipulation of eertein objects ta produce a divine presence in either a statue or a hnman medinm (see Proclns, In Tim, az, 2g5, 28; lamblichue, De myet amt, (-7)- Tndend, ench binding of vine powers has an oracular end ard the anciont world’s most Famous collection of oracular responses, the Chaldaean Oreclee, is cited contin- ‘uously in the Neoplatonic tradition from Porphyry to Proclus, the latter writing an extensive commentary on them. Tie philosophical ground o° divination is discussed under sym= paiheie; that of theourgia, under dynamis 19-11. mathématiké: mathematical numbers and entities; the objects of the mathematical sciences 1. Axseading of the Metephycize yields a-varicty of views on the ontological status of the raathematical numbers (erithmoi mathemati- oi) oF mathematic. According to Aristotle's account the Pythago- seane maintained that mathematical number i i sensible things ax their arche (Meta, 98rb, 10909; see arithmos), while for Plato, who also held the existence of another class of Ideal Number (see ariihmnas eideritor), they constituted a class between the eide and che aistets, the so-called “intermediaries” (metaxu) (Weta. 997>-pg8a). Finally, there is an unidentified graup who mate the riathematier immanent Dut not coustitutive of or identical with the aistheta (Meta. 9984, 10760). 12. Axjstotle is critical ofall these views, particularly the Platonic one, Does this Invter appear in the dialogues? The cvidence reste prlmurlly co wa iniercatation of « section of the Diagara of the Lina in Rep. v, gtob~e where the iutelligibles (noe) are divided into che objects of noesis (q.v.) and éiazoia, The later is described first by ics mechodology, which uses images in its reasoning process, and then {giod), by its subject matter, eg., “the Square itself” and “the Disgonal itself,” phrases thet in their formnlation and singularity could refer with equal appropriateness to the eide and to the intermertiany lass of mathemaiika that, a Aristotle says (sce mecart), are charaé= terized by sheir plurality. But rcecis clestly hes the eide as its object (snib-c), ond so it may bo legitimate to infer thet the objects of hawvie Uclung to another eleoo, uo tho metas ‘. Avistotl’s owa theory of mathems:ical number is found ia wrortmos | 135 “Meta. r0762~1078b; he rejects all three previously cited positions, Certain qualities of the aistheta are abscracced and studied ae if they were sepurele from matter (for the Smetter” of mathematiha, see aphairesis, kyle). The abstrective provess (ephaires's, qv.) actualizes what was present only potentilly in sensible things. But For al that the ‘mathematika have no separate (ehoriston) substantial existence. if Plato's successor Speusippus repisced rhe entire somctere of the vide with matherratika, genersting first the ariihrani mathematitoi and then the geometrical magnitudes from the Une and the Infrite Dyad (Acts. s0a8b, 2080b, 20860; ooo dar). Another oasly Acaderis, Xenocrates, identified the markematiba and the cide (Meta, 1028, 40€ga, 1076a). For Plotinus mathematical number ig an image (eido- en) of the Tdeol Nunbers (Enon v1, 6, o: see arithiros. mi : greatness, magnitude a. According to Aristetle (Weta. 10200) magnitude is a measura- ble quextity (posom, qv.) that is potentislly divisible inte continous (aynechce) parts in one, two, or three dimensions, ie., tines, planes, and eolide, Tete later are the subject matcer of geometry, a science swhose generic subject is muguiealy (Ed Niet v1, agg) but angus tude is not, however, an attr’bute of the units (monades) that con: tute number, as the Pythagoreans assert (/Mfeta. 1080b). Aristotle also attacke what evems t0 be a later species of Pythagorennisma that was moving toward Atomism and that defined its units as “indivisible magnitudes”: mathematical nnits are indvisisle uaits and hence can- ‘not have magnitude (ibid. .08qb); see arithmos, moras 2. The question of an indivisible magnitude (ediairston or ato- mon megethoe) raises for Atistotle the whole question of primary bodies, i., bedlies that cannot be reduced to others and so sre the subject of genesis and change. ‘Ihe monist tradition (for Empedecles and the pluralists, see stoichcfon) stemming from Permenides is repre- sented by the Pythagoreans, Plato, end the Atowists ‘3+ The Pythegercan povition that reduecd bodico, through mum ber, to units is, in effect, demolished as soon as the distinction between the mathematical unit (manas), the geometrical point (stigmte), and a body with extension (megethoa) is established, as Ariscotle seeks t9 do in verious places (see Meta, 10806, 10833, 1090b; Ve an. goga). Thus the ambiguities of an only partially mathematicized Pythagorecnism are resolved into a physical Atcmism. Since magnitude is extended in three cisensions it 59 conccivablo that the primary body might be icher linc, plane, or solid. The latter is, of course, Leucippus? atamon (q.v.) that has magnitude but camot be divided because it is so small, (Diels ging). We elav Irnorr that Plato redaced hia primary sclida to ‘rlangles, accompanied by an enigmatic hint thet further redaction wes316 | nex ON perlips possible (Tim. sge-d). Kinally, the ancient tradition asserts that the Academician Xenocrates mainisined the theory of indivisible Tines (so Simplicius and Philopcnus commenting en Aristotle's Phys. 1, 87a; according to Simplicius! account, p. 142, Xenocrates admitted that they were theoreticelly divisible but because of their susallness effectively indivisible}. 4. Anistulle oppuscs de uheories of Indlvisthle magniriaes. in whatever dimension (De gen. et carr. 1, g1S—3178; Da lines insevabil= abut, which is an Aristotelian psendepigreph, deals with the preblem in of90b). He realized that it wae Zeno and hie peredowes thet had driven philosophers to this position (Phys. 1 187e). Aristetle’s solution dismisses Leucippus’ and Kenocrates' contentions about size. He is nat discussing actual physical division but conceptual division, aud the argument here hinges on che notion of a continuum (syneches: Phys. vt, 2gti-b) that, by eliminating the viewr that a line is 2 raw of contiguous or suecessive points, both undermines the Pythagorean veid (enon, q.¥.) between units and at the same time sets the stage for a solution of Zeno's paradoxes, since the same arguments pertain to both time and movement thet ate per accidens magnitudes (Meta. x027a), On the probleus of iusativual uuuubers uf, Leer, invommensura ble magnitudes, sce asymmetron; for the relation of magnitude to ‘matter, see Ayle. méon: nonbeing See on. méson, mesbtés: mean ‘The Pythagorean looked upon existent things as a “just bal- ance” (isomoira) between opposites (enantia), see D.L. vitr, 28, Plato begins to move this “mean” position into.the area of ethics in Phil. 2¢—o6d (where the extremes are called “unlimited” [apeison] and the quantified, mixed, “limit” [perae]). ‘The mathematical overtones are apparent in this text and the medical ones appear in both Phaedo 38b-< (See harmon, hedone} snd in Amstotle’s Carly Lucemus, tr. 7. Ari totle’s classic Meatifcation of virtue (arete) with the meson of emo- tions (peshe) and acts (pruceis) is to be found in Bit, Nich. aseGa-aiogh, here ke makes specific reference te limit (perez) a2 ood: see dite. ‘For the application of mevon to perception, see aisthesiss as a factor in éeriving the elements, sicickeion: in the derivation of the hnypostases, trias metabolé: change s Aciototiste most gonotis term for pessage from ono atate iato another, whether on the level of substance where the motaBole is ealled wermexrs | 217 _genesis, or in one of the three categories of quality (see pathes, gene is), quantity, or placc, where the mectabole is called hinesis; sce Phys. y, seda~zasb, and Ainesis; for the matter implied by the verious changes, see Byles amefavi: intermediaries 3. Tn the Platontc view of reality there are a class af “intermedi. aries® that come between the Forms (eid?) and the sensible, particular things (aistieta), Like the eide they are eternal and unchanging, but unlike the Forms they are plural (Aristotle, Meta, 987b). This class, which represents the objects of the sciences of mathematics and geoms- ‘ty, embraces both mathematical numbers and. geometrical magnitudes (abtd. oorb, og7bs see masheraadiea). Thus Arlscoue. The ouly support for the existence of the generel class of the metast: in the Platonic dialogues themselves is the mention of plural forms in Phzedo 742 and Perm. 109b. Tha exictenca of tha mathematieal numburs is, howeevar, somewhat more strongly attested (see mathematita). 2. The reel “intermediary” in the Platonic system is Plato's Jater doctrine of the psvcher see the important admission of life, soul, and rnous into the world of quasi-being in Soph. 248e-24od, and the striking. description of psyche (Tin:. goad) that “Tifts us from earth to heaven”; this, of course, Aristotle accepis (Tor its evolution, see psyche 29,95). ‘On the question of e medium (metaxt) for sensation, see cis- thesis, ymbacheia metempsychésis: transmigration of souls sctempafchises trmemig mméthexis: participation Mevivcris is te term, used by Flats ty describe the relationship ‘between the eide and sensible particulars; see Phaedo 100d, and Parm, agoomigie (where participation is criticized as implying division). _Avistotinxeos nothing but « verbal difference between methenis and the other Platonic term, “imitation” (mimes), Meta. 6875. Plotinus pre- fers to use other metaphors, but metieaés becomes important agein in the systematization of Prochis: prop. Og of the Elem theo! discusses tho metaphysical implications of mrifexis, while props. 163-165 lay out -serics of projections consequent upon methezis. For the more general context, see sidos: some of the difficulties stisiu front merhexis are touched upon in diatrests; for tis nse in Proclus, see trias.28 | mnexsis animésis: mimicry, imitation, art (i.e, fine art; for the applied sciences, see teclme) 2. ALinsesia, im all is shades of mezitings, is of central importance in Plato, We read in Sophist 265b that the profctive atts (pnctibai ‘echnei; se techne) are divided into divine exafssmanship and hamsm \uttsinausiip (called tn Rep. go7—2 paytourgia and demiourgic), and thet there is, in addition, another type of productivity shared. by oth God and man thas dove aot produce originals” but merely copies (eitonee). "hie is exirecets, the art of the poet, the painter, Whe seul. tor, or that of the actor whe, unlike the others named, does aot use tools but creates the image in his own person (Soph. 267a; Plato uses mimesis for the craft of the stor 2 well, hur for pmeprese of distine then “mimicry” is probably cleser to what the context demands). 2. The eraitsman (demicurges), then, wheter human ot divine, produces on two levels: “originals” or real objects, and imitations or ‘images that can only mote or less approximate the reality of their ‘models. Plato is not always consistent in his application of this theory. In Rep. sg6b the divine craftsman creates *he original, ue. the cidoy of he Led, the carpenter procuces the physical bed that is gly an eiton ‘visdvis the eides but is the “original” for the bed of the painter. In Soph. 283e-d the originals made by the divine craftsman are not the cide bat the natural objects of thia world, while the preducts of his mimetic activity are the shadows and mirages in this world, Firally, in the Timacus the divine demiourgos does not create the preexistent eide and this world seems to be the product of his mimetic activity (Tin. goe-gib). ‘3 The confusion doubtless arises from the differing contexts and clearly one should not rest too heavily on the Form of Bed oz the divine demiourgos as its creator; most of what Plato wrcte suggests the exclusion of eide for manufactared objects and of any maker for the ide (see eidos). But one point is clear: the activity known as mimesia thaw us ty product aa eutity whose ontological status is inferior relarive to thet of its model. Thus, on the cosmic level this principle sets the relationship between this world and the world of eide, it grounds Plots theary of knowledge, and in the moral ephare ie io the poiat of departure for is attack on “art.” 4 Mimesis is one of the explanations (see also methexis) or, better, ane of tie inves offered by Plato to express the relationship of the eid to sensible particulars, Ie finds a felrly elaborate expression fa Parm, 1920-1990, and again in Tir. goed where the deraiourgvs (qiv.) takes as his model (paradeigma) the intelligible living create (200m gern} that embraces all the Forms anc. thus erestes the kos ‘mos. The same principle is evident even eatlier in Crat. ag8a-c, and by meorests | 179 ‘implication in the theory put forth in Phzedo 74a-750. Aristotle (Afeta. 987b) states that the explanation derives from the Pythagoreans who held that things “imitate” numbers and be subjects it (ibid, ggua) to a harsh criticism. Although snimesis us upplied to seusible particulass falls inzo disuse, the concept that the intelligible world (Aosmus noetas, qv.) is the paradeigma for the sensible world remains current in later Piatomssm; see Philo, Ze opty. b, 9g; Floris, Fn. v, 8, 12, 5. The distinction between a “true” reality anda mimetic reality will have cbvious epistemological implications and these are rendered taplicit Sn the scheme of the Linc ia Rep. sop. gio, True hnowlodge (episteme, qov.) will be of the “originals,” while opinion (dex, qv.) fs the best one can hove to atizia in confronting imitative being. But ‘even here chere ane distinctions: sensible particulars (see aistheton, though imitations of the eide, ere in some sense “original” when compared to certain physical phenomena that are images of other pheromens, e.g. the shadows and mirages that are God’s “joke” (see Soph. ag4b, 266b-c) on the physical world. This knowledge of images (eikasia; see eikon) is the lowest segment of the Line (Rep. so3e), but at this point in the Republie Plato says nothing abou: man's “joke” on the world, Le, art (more fully, zechne poledite mimetike; for the genus and differentia, see techie. 6, The subject of man’s mimetic uctivity is explored in Rep. sose oth, Plata diotinguiched craft (demicurgia) and art (mimesis) in the Sophist in the context of a search, via division (iairetis, 4.¥.), for the infime apecies thet is the sophist. In the Republic passages the context is strongly ethicel and the emphases somewhat different. The poets were the tradicional teachers of wisdom, but ia the Republic Plato ‘had replaced them with the philosophers; he vindicatas his own pesition by attacking the poets’ qualifications to teach wisdom. 77. Placo’s objection to Ure fine arts is twofold: they are untree anc ey aze injurious. They are untrue in the ontological sense that has already been discussed: their claim to reality is tenttcus since they are tmitations of iuitatious (Rep. gue). Tut fw widen they are guilty of the falsity of discourse: they lie. Plato consistentiy judges art by its ‘own contemporary claim of realism and he finds the poets’ portraits of gods and harass to be inowset in thot they partery ae evil what i essentially good (Rep. g77d-e). Furthermore, crt has a distinctly ‘moral end (ibid. goxb), and evea though there are obviously evil men whom the arts might realistically portray, by choosing to portray such they create harmful moral effects in the viewer and even, if it is = question of dramatic art, in the performer himself (iid. 3920298, Goe=€05), For ic mfiuedle orlyius of languages see wera: for ts applica +ion.to time, cfironcs: for a mimetic element in Aristotle, energeta,220 | maxis mixis: mixture See genesis, halon, mons: unit, the one ‘The unit is either she primary arche of the Pythagoreans (D1., vist, 29) ua, Cagetier wiih dhe Dyes, one of the primary co-principles (Aristotle, Meza. 98a), ethicslly nssocisted with the good (gathon), and considered 2 god (thes) (Aetius x, 7, 18), even thouga che potition cf limit (fever) and cbeiven at tho bod of the lot would suggest that they wete more primary. Aristetle is quite explicit that number (aritimos) hes its own more basic elements (stoichciz), ie, “Even? and “Ode? (Meta, 08621. According to Aristotle all philoxa. hers agree in making the moras the arche of number (arithmoe), yet the Pythagoreans are peculiar in that their units heve spatis! magni- tide (iid. 080d) that is indivisible (ibid. 089b), a confusion be- ‘tween the arithmetical unit end the geometric point, which was cleared up Ister (Nichomachus, Arita. iniro. 11, 6 and 7). Aristotle's own definition of the moras is “substance without position,” clearly distinet fivm dhe “yvint™ (séigree) dau. is “substance with’ positon,” nai, ost. 1,874; ee arithmas, megetitos, mousiké: the Muses’ art, music See Aatharsis. mythos: myth a. The traditional attitude of philosophy toward myth is ex: pressed in the contrast mytios-logos, where the latter is intended to signify a rational, analytic, and true account (soe Plato, Phaado €1b, Tim. abe, cte.). It runs parallel to the distinction theologas-piysitos (ee theolexia), but the relationship of the former pair is somewhat nore complex. Tt is clear that both Socretes and Plato hed strenaous moral objections to the traditional myths (Dusk. Gave, Phuedrut 2ago-a30a, Rep. 376e-380c), a type of criticism that went back at least as far as Xenophanes (see fr. 11), One attempt to meet this type of attack was the belie? that there was mn underlying: xonen Chyypansia) 20 tho old myths. This was apperenily popular in fith-century philosophi- cal circles; see Prodicas (Diels, fr. 05), Anaxegoras (D.L. tf 11), and Antisthenes (Dio Chrysostom, Orat.’ 59, 4-5; compare Xenophon, Spat 8) Pavol bave ase of hind ep barnes subsequent literature the use of an allegoticel interpretation (allego- Fia}, either mapral, plysieal, or cosmogonical, to extract the Ide seust Voce a pote awetod uf xewuutiting plileuulay aud die al tonal material in the poets. The Stoics were particularly active in ses etn tnan onsen | | xoxsiy | am allegoria (soe Cicero, De nat. decr. 11, 24, 9% 64, 65, ancl passim; the Stoic facility in etymologizing names was of considersble help here; s2e oun), and with Philo allegoria passed into the service of accommo- dating philosophy and seriptare (cf. Leg. all. passim). 2, But mythos was not quite so exsily cismissod: Aristotle felt ‘hat there was a point in the early cosmogonies where Jogos and mythos overlapped (eva, 98h, 1074b; Ren aporia, enctxom), but th: preseutar ton of the Intter was childlike (IMeia. xocos; compare Plato, Soph. 24ga), and Plato, for one, was scentical of the results (see the heavy vay of Tim. god 41a). Yot tho dialogues aca filled with myths that play a central part in the development of the argument, as for instance, in the Phucdo and Republic (eschatological; see athavates), Phaedrus Gpeyrhalogical), and Piuueus (physical), Nor is the technique new with Plato; iz can be seen in Protagoras (IF the myth in Proiagoras ge0e-goya is his own and not Plato's), in the proem to Parmnenides’ poem (fr. 1) and the half-disguised abstractions of Pherecydes? myths (D.L- 1, 11g; compare Aristotle, Mfets, 1ogxb ); see theos n négsis: the operation of nous (9.v.), thinking (as opposed to seusation) , intuition (as opposed to discursive reasoning) 1, Subtle differences between the mere-perception of an object or object, ie., sensation (aisthesis, qv.) and another kind of psychic anvazeness that goes beyord the sense dat and perosives les tangible things, lace resemblances and differences between objects, 1s already present ic Homer and is ieatifed with the organ called nous, With the philoscphers ihe difference becomes a problem. Heraclitus suspects the lunrdlisbillty of ecraation for the perecption of the true nature of things, He is tireless in his assertion that “nature loves to Lide” (see fs. 123 and foges 1), and this hidden reality is clearly beyond the reach of men ‘who trast ton implicitly in their senses (Ee. 107). How the other facul-y that is capable of discerning the hidden logos of things might operate is ‘ot immediately epparent, though we ate told (Sextus Rmpiriens, Ado. ‘Moth, vat, 129) that the mows that ia within us is activated by its contset, via the chsanela ob sensation (austhetveor porei), with the divine fogao in che universe, 4 contact that is msinssined in en atten.a2 |_Norsts usted fashion during sleep by bresthirg (see gnewme). ‘The senses, then, are obsioasly some sort of condition for noeeie, chough aot, as ig cleat from fr. 107 and its congeners, identical with is, 2, Anstotle remarks (De an. im, 4270; Meta. 10096) that the preSccratics gencral'y made no distinction between nozeis xd aim thesis. Te is eesy to understand why ke thought so since they all etesupted tw caphiu Gre operations vf dhe psyelr du purely physteat terms, a procedure that, according to Aristndle (Joe. eit.), cannot account for error (psewidas) since like must knovr like (see homoios, Zinthesie) Grom one paint af view thie ie true; but it ie likewive teas that since Parmenides’ assavl: on sense perception in terms of the instability of its object (see on 2, episterae 2) it became an epistemo- logical necessity to distinguish between the ebvious perils of aisthesia and a “true knowledge” more or [ess independent of the senses. 3. These attempts can be seen in Empedocles’ doubts about the rellability of our sense perception and the need of divine assistance (Sextus Ampinous, Adu. Math. vit, 122-124). Bat tae limitations of sensation here seem ta he cue to curr misuse of them rather chan to any inherent weakness of their own (fr. 9, lines 9-15). When he comes to cexplaia the possibility of vor (called ignorance and oppused w hr une sis; Theophrastus, De sens, 9), Empedocles resorts to a mechanistic, explanatioa of how the effluences (aporrhaai; see cisthesis 7) of one sense object are symmetrical cnly with the pores af its proper sense ‘fat, and 90 cannot be judged by che others (Theophrastus, 2. cit. 7). If thought is anything to Empedccles it is 2 specie type of sensa- ton that occurs in the blond hy reascn of its heing a perfect mixture of all the sicicheia (ibid. 9). 4 Tt is somewhet more perplexing to find Anaxagoras, the eminent proponent of ows, in Aristotle's cstslogue of those who Failed co distingulgh sensation an thought. Ta the fragments we do find the tasuel statements casting doubss on sensation (e.g, fr. 21), but there is no explenation of roesis. Indeed nous does not seem to be a cognitive placiple ut all but rather « coumelogioul ous. Te initiates modion (aed in this it has obvious affinities to soul; see pryche 1, 7, and passim) aud it guides and rales all (*r. 12). What Anaxagoras is obviously offering js the presence of some intelligent and hence parposeful principle in he universe, But it appears the ncus is en immanent principle as well and wwe are told that it i not prosent in everything (fr. 13). Alemaeon of Crotona, who had already sharply distinguished phronesis from ois- thesis, meintained thet the former was charactenstic ot men only. (Theophrastus, De cre. 25), but we have no iéea of che extension of the immanent nous in Ansxagoras, Prosumably it would cover the sais ih4ilory a9 povetiy ry the entice animate world, 5. For Diogenss of Apollonia, who also aldresscd himself to the Norsts | 299 problem, aer (qv.), the intlligeat and divine arche, is contimaous and present in all things chat are (ff. 5), but it is present in varying degrees, The degree is based on che dryness and warmth of the air, distinctions of texture that explain progressively higher coguilive acts (Theophrastus, 9. cit. 0-45). In this way are explained the complete absence of coguitive activites in plants and the relatively highar degree of phrorects bu man as compaced wo the ocher antmats (16.44) 6. The Atomists? theories of sensible qualities (see aisihesie 13, pothor 4) demanded refinements in the cognitive faculties. Many 0 called qualities are merely subjective impreocions and the tuo aa ture of the aicmon is not visible to sight, Hence Democritus dravvs the distinetion (fr. 22) between a gomuine and a bastard knowledge; the latter is sensation and the former. presumably {he text breaks off), reason, the operation of the Jogihon that is located in the breast (Aetius 1, 4, 6 see Rardia 2 and psyche 7). But even though phronesis and aisthesis have different objects and different seats, the mechanics of their operation aze che seme (Aetius IV, 8, 5 1¥, 8, 10). 7. To resume the pre-Socratic attitude: there were sclid episte- mological grounds for making a distinction in Aind between thought (west, plrenesia; in the epistemological euntest, eptscerac) and sensa~ thon (aisthests; in the epistemological contex:, dasa), and, indeed, the differentiation could be specified when it came to giving thera different Jocatiens in the body (nisthesis tied to the sense organs; the higher faculty in a central location, though net always distinguished from the more generic notion of psyche; see kardia). But the operations of this higher faculty could be distinguished from those of sensation only i degree, e.g, ner or warmer in composition, 8. Pleto, while adhering firmly to the Parmenidean epistemol- ‘ogy (see episteme 2), has, in addition, a new spiritualized conception ‘of soul thet, though originally posited on religious grounds (see ryere 33), is incorporated in Plato's theory of knowledge (ibid. 14). Ieis this Pure unitary soul of the Phcedo that becomes the e>istemological correlative of the cide and, being absolwecly different i ine? four die body, can perform all the cognitive activities that the post-Parmenidean philosophers essociated with nous but were unable to explain on the level of substance. Int the prohlem is considernhly mone complex tha this. Even in the Phasde the soul is the arcke of ali eognitive activity: is perception by the soul through the body; phronesis is an ‘operation of the soul alone (Phacda 796; sec aisthczis 15-16). ‘g. In the Phoedo che distinction st the tivo operations is largely in terms of the objects known; ia the Republic ic reappears, ka a auch more complea furin, based es well upon the internal operations of the soul. This lelier is uow divided iy dave parts (see psyche 2g) 414 the upper part, the logéstiton (ibid. 16), is responsible for noctic324 | Noxsts activity. But the psychology is far more sophisticated here, and in the Dingrera of the Line in Rep. v1 che noctic activity is explained in come deiail. The distinction drawn previously (Rep. 1v, 4762800) between episteme and dove is maintained here, but we discover that there is tore than one type of episteme. ‘The upper part of the Line that represented knowledge of the riceta (ibid. goge) is farther subdivided Into what Plaro calls nests and dtanoia (iba. 5114). 10. These two operations of the dogistikon have been much de- bated; one school of thought sees dianoia as that activity of the mind ‘whisk has aa ite object tho Smathemetieal,? while the objects of nocsis are the eide (see mathematibe 2); the other school soes dimoia as discucsive reasoning in genetal and nocsis as immediate intellectual intuition, ia mach the same way as Arisiolle (see Anul. post. 1», 100%, eporoge 3) and Plotinus (see 1829 infra) distinguished berween Jegismace and nous, What is clear, however, is that the method of azesie is that known to Plato a8 dialeetise; q.vs ibid. 5t1b) and the way of life based upon it is philosophic (q.v., and compare phronesis, the>- ria). a1, There are certain passages in Plate, echoed by Aristotle, that sive sumewhut more of a pursly psychological insight into the work- ings of the intellective process. Both men seek to derive episteme [rom the Greek word to “Stand” or “come to a halt” (ephistamai) and so explain intellection as a Scoming to a halt” in the midot of a series of sense impressions, the “Bxing” of an intukive concept (Grat. 4373; Phaede 6b; Anal. fost. 11, 1002; Phys. vit, 247b). Bat this psycholo cal approach is overwhelmed by a flood of “physical” considerations. ‘Noesis is an activity and so must be located within the general extego- ries of change and Ainesis. Plato speaks of revolutions in che World Soul (Tira. 37a) and in the immortal part of the individual soul (ibid. 45a). This éwes nothing, of course, fo mtrespection, but 1s based upon considerations of the revelutions of the body of the hosmos that reveal the motion of its own socl (ibid, 34b) and provide a visible moral yetailigi for the motions of our own soul (ibid, 47b, and ace curance 2-93 for seusation as motian, see ibid. age; and for the larger question cof motion in the soul, psyche 19). Tor the aperniinn of cnami nous in Plato, see rows 6: kinoun s. 32. Aristotle’s treatment of ncesis, like his explanation of ais- thesis, is conducted within the categories of potency (dynamis) and act {energeia, q.v.). The nous before it knows is actually: nothing but poteulally all the ehings it can know; the cide are present in it but only potentially (De an. mi, 4zge). When the nars begins to operate it ‘passes from a passive to ax activated siate by reeson of its becoming. Mental wiuh 1 object, the Lutelligivte fos (22d. rz, 43.0). Taere 3 jn noesis a parallel with aischeste: just as aisticsis extracts the sexsible Norsts | 225 forms (cide) of sensible objects (cee aistheste 19), 90 noesia thinks the intelligible forms in sensible images (phantasiai), and ncevis aover cours without these ntter (iB. 11, 4325-B). Noes can be directly of essences (for the intuitive role of nous, see epagoge 4 unl compare ‘Meta. rog6a), or it ean operate through judgments (ypolepszis), ie. by the combination (syathenie) or seperation (diairesie) of concepts, and at 3 only an this latter operation that error (pseudos) is possible (ibid, qgoa—: for the Platorie theory of jusigment, see doxa 4). For the operation of cosmic rows in Aristotle, of. nous, kinown. 2 Tl Awimists considcied the soul, which waa diotributed througliout the bedy (Aristotle, Dz an. 1, 4oge; Luzcretius 11t, 370), to he the seat of all sensation (for the mechanics of this, see aisthesis snoop) Poit given thar snnl Cacyrhe) ard mind Creous) ere sustane ally the same (De an. 1, 4042), it would seem to follow that sensation and thought are identical, end s0 Aristotle concluded (Meta. sooghs; see ‘Actius 1¥, 8, 5) 1¥, 8, 10}. As for its operation, since noue is nothing snore than a kind of aggregation (see holon 20) of soul-atoms in the Dreast, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the eidola penetrate beyond the surface sense crgans, reach the interior of the breast, and 80 cuuse this higher type of perception (see Lucretlas rv, 722-751). 14. But we have slready seen that the earlier Atomists bad at ‘tempted to distinguish, by she purity of its constitution and its location, sind from soul. ‘The Epicurcana proscrved ard refined che dictinetion and it is specifically present in Lucretins’ consistent use of anima for ‘paycke and animus for nous or diansia (mens is somewhat too nartow §n cannotatiom for the later sines the animus is the seat of volitional as ‘well as intelectual zetivity; 1, 14§). He clectly separates the two at ut, 596-416 where he argues that part of the anime may be lost (e.g. in the loss ofs limb) and a mua sill survive, but the loss of the anions ‘eens the instantaneous end of the organism. ag, For the Fpfenrean nous operates somewhat in the fashion of the senses. It too may directly perceive the eiola given off hy hodies ‘but that ere not, im this case, grasped by the seases, Suclt are, for example, the cocidental mixtures of eidola that give rise to the imazin- ing of centaurs and chimerss (Lucretius 1v, 12g), visions seen in dssams (iv, 749 776); aed the eidola of the gods (v, 248-1405 Cicero, De nat. dear. 1, 49)» These operations are akin to Aristole’s nous thinking of indivisible concepts (De ari. 11 4302); there is, as well, intellection componends et dividendo, it. evaluating and passing Judgment on the deta of sensation, The images (phandasiai) in which ‘he eidota are groupes are pessed along to the diaicia or nous where they acenmnlate into general “preconceptions” (prolepsets, 4.7). “These in tura serve as a standard of comparison for fedgmemts (hi/po- lepseis) about individoal sensible things (1).L. x, 32). This is the areaNoEsIS of opinion into which error enters (see dows 7; the Epicurean criterion of truta end error is diseussod under erargeia), Finally, the mind is also capable of entering the realm of the imperceptibles (adela), ie. 10 perform a discursive reaseniag process Clagismus, the ratio of Lucre- tas) dealing with entities not immediately perceptible to the eenses, a class that would, of course, include the atoma themselves (see DL. x, 3) 16, ‘The Stoic version of noveis, the operation of the hegemonihen (iv) sia properly Aatalepeio or apprshencion. The process begins with ea impression (typeeie) on the acnzea that rcsalta in @ sensible image (phantasia; see cisthes!s 24-25), These are borne, via the prcuma (q.v.), to the Aegemonikoa where it is fist assented to (sunkatathesis, adsensio) and is thus apprehended Ceazalensis, qu; Cleero, Acad ‘post. 1, 40-42). In this way what wes a sensible image (phandasia) ‘becomes sn intelligible image ot concept (ennoia, q-v.). In the essliest years this is almost an unconscious process and the child builds up ‘erious “preconceptions” (prolepeeis, q.v.) under whose influence the hageronikon matures to the point where it is capable of creating its ‘own conscious cnnciai (SPF 11, 85 according to this same text, the fall operation cf the hegemonikon begins at the age of seven, or at least betivexdseven and fourceen, a judgment not based on the observation of ratichal behavior in adolescents but on the onset of puberty and the fitet production of aera; nec SUF x1, 764, 785). Aa in Epteureaniom, aoesie is not only of the cisthere but ranges freely over a wide area of thought, creating its own ennioiai by recourse to the principles of similarity, analogy, privation, opposition, ete, (SVF 11,87). On the Stoies' primery fralepate of good and evil, sec cikeiosi, a7. This theory did not remain completely intact. Chrysippus ‘made some important sevisions that lad as their effect the reunification of the psyche under the aegis of the hegemonikon so that even the Pathe became intellectual judgments (Zriseis: SVF mt, 461) and, ia direct opposition to Plato's vision of the tripartite sou, woltional acth ity was subsuted under the intelectual (SVF 11, 82g3 see winthesx 254 pathos 12). This is followed by a strong Platonizing reaction under Poseidenins whe apposed Chrysippus on the intellectual nature of the [Bathe and sestored the Platocic partition of the ronl (Colon, Pla Hipp. et Plat. 48, 460). There follows from this x sharper distinction Teoween gsyche and avuy (particularly apparent ia Marcus Aurelius 1, at uf, 2) with emphasis on the divine and immortal nature of ‘nous a$ opposed to the other parts of de suul (see sympatiecia $), and, Dy reason of the presence of this daimnon in it (so Galen, op. eit 4485 Pintarch, De genta Socr. sgre-f; Platonic inspiration fa Tim, goe aud ‘see siawnon), 4 news tnterest tn’vhe metal position of the: soul (see psyche 29). nozsis | 127 28, Middle Platoniem concentrated its attention on the cosmic aspects of nous (qiv.) and i is not until Pletinus thet we have any significant contribution to the workings of the immanent nour, As did Plato und Aristotle, Plotinus distinguishes two types of intellectual activity, one intuitive and one discursive. The former, ness, is, in the first instance, the life and energeia of the cosmic hypostetized fous, It 1 not, however, an activity of the One since for Piovtnns even 80 solFintegrated an act 2s noevis bessesks duality and so iz anathema to the One (Brn. v1, 6, 3, with passing reference to Platc’s remarks in Soph. 2343 ond Parmentdee ana on tho role of Hehe Othee® [hetoron] in being and therefore in intellection). What necd, Plotinus asks (v1, 7.4), would the eve have to see something if it were itself the ight? 10. Noeeis, then, in ‘ts gennine form is a unity of subject and object that, though they differ only logically, constitute a plurality (plethos). I ig characteristcally internalized: the maeta that are the objects of noceis are in the ncus that knows them (V4, 2, 21). Nossis, ‘which is the life of zeus, casts forth its image (eiken) in the form of an energcia in the lower hypactasis of the soul. This is logiemos or discursive reasoning, an operation that, unlike the immediate and inter- alized noesis, comprehencs the phantasmara cf objects outsice itself ‘offered to it by sensation, and makes judgments (Briseés) concerning them by invoking roles (Aanones) transmitted from nous (v, 3, 4) 0fy 19 he pats it clanmbere, by eomporition and divieien (eynagose, di. tiresis: v, 9,25 see the Platonic antecedents of these terms under dialek- fike). What he refers to here iss knowledge of the eide supplied by the ‘nous tat contains them and that make possible cur comparative judg- ments (ef. v, 1,115 ¥, 3, 4: ond compare Phaedo 74a fl.) 20. The soul is capable of two activities: when “turned upwrerd” it gives itself over to nozsis/lagiamos; when ‘owmward,” to aisthesis and the operation of che other faculties (Vt, 2, 22; see aisthetis 26). Sensation uses a medium, an image (phaniasma), separated from its model end yet different from she thing in which it resides; noesis is, 1 dhestly aid teconne identited (v, 5, 8). But we do not have noesis in its purity. Noesis is a vision of unity; our image of it, ogiemos, deals with plurality, and the ‘mare one feces ancself from the composing and dividing that ia ovr imitation of nocsis end turns instead to « contcraplation of self, the more one will be assimilating cneself to the true operation of nous (vy 3, 6). Why the soul is forced to endure this logismos is part of the Rencrel condition of its desuzut into & bully (sec kuthodos). Weis, like its external manifestation, language, a weakness, ¢ sign of the souls ‘preoccupation with areas not skia to itself (sv, 3, 18). ‘21. Tis passage (av, 5,18) Plociaas wushes ue of the principle of attention (phrontis) to explain the degeneration of naesis Into logis-128 | NoEron mos (compare the elaboraie metaphor in rv, 9, 17 where the soul's prececupation with the material is compared to that of a ship's captain toward his ship exd ite cargo; for the further degeneration of thought into activity, see physis 5) and he resorts to a similar type of explana tia in canfronting. another problem. TE nous is a faculty in the soul, how is one to explain the intermittent aature of noesis ic man as compared ro tes continuous exercise In the hgh principle? Arise had aleesdly feed) the qnestion andi had snggested that while the objects of noesis are always in the mind, they ave not alvrays present to the mind} in chert, man must chosce to think (De am t 4ipb}. Farther, this cctivity con last for only brief periods in man since it involves a passage from potency to act and so fatigues the thinker (Meta, rosob, 1072b: Eth, Nick, 1x7sa). For Plotinus itis « question of awareness. The immanent ncus is always in operation but we, because our attention is turned elsewhere, are not clways aware of ic (1¥, 8, 8). ‘This view, based ae it is om a desire to keep the humen soul perpatually linked, via the now, to the kosmas noeics, Procins finds s novelty in the Platonic tradition (Un Tim. a1, 359-994) tnd therefore returns to th position of an intermittent functioning of noesis in the “descendec? Soul (Elem. cheul., prop. 2133 vez Rushed aud pouches 35)+ nodtén: capable of being grasped by the intellect; the object of the ‘neler ie Bae (opposite of aistheton) 1. The noctom is the object of the operation of the faculty of nus. Among the pre-Soeratics, where the distinction of nous from the gen- fra! cognitive principle of the payee was a very gradual one (see ‘ocsis 7), the objects of the former faculty were not very closely considered. They do, of course, constitute “true knowledge” (epit- lee, g.¥.)y for Hlevachtus the knowledge of “the nacure tat loves hide,” for Parmenides the knowledge of “true being.” With Plato the distinctions become sharper. The noeta are the objects of the faculty of Ue sul walled [agistiton (sce paycho a3. 38)1 they exe, ia shoet, the transceadent eirle, But for Aristotle the eide are immanent (see eidos 15) and so further distinctions are in order. The elécs in things can be considered From ten pointe of view, With respect to the substance in which it inheres, it is the formal cause of that suhstance; with respect to the nous of another, it is potentially intelligible (noeton) by thet ‘nous, But before it becomes actually noeton it must be carried fo and presented Uo that nous, This is the Function ct the pnentasma that ty ike a visual image except that it ig without matter: the nous thinks the ‘noete ix the phantusmate (De en. uz, 4310-4920). In the final analysis, Them, ite rcur yu nvete anv in the mows; Brot potentially, then at tually. This transition from potency fo act occurs inthe nove pathotibee | | | orton | 729 (seo nous 11). But in terms of Avistotetinn act.potency theory, the rioete should all be present in act in the nous pocithor (aco news 32). ‘But Aristolle never says this, resorcing to a comparison of the operation of the azent intellect to that of w Tight souree: the active intellect iTlumines che passive intellect (ibid. 11, 4308) 2, During the period of Mifle Platonism a number of revisions were made in the éas-theory, part of what was very probably an cextoncive syncretiaing of Platcnism 2rd Peripateticiem (baldly put ia Cicer, Acad. post. 1, 17-28) in such a fashion as to include beth the Tawi tanscendent choo end the Aristotelian immanent cédoe within the causality schema (its progressive development can be traced in Seneca, Ep. 85,8 und Basil the Great, De spiritu sancto 76a). Authors fof the perind hegan em draw a distincrion betwee the vides that is immanent in things os their formal cause and the idea that is the exemplary cause of natural things (Seneca, Ro. 98, 19; Albinus, Epit. 1%, a; compare Aristotle, Meta. 10700). They appealed to such Platonic proof-texts as Tim. 282 and soc-d (see Chaleidius, In Tim. 904, 9 whore iden = species intelligibilie and eidos = natura corporis; on the general question of the immanonce of the Platonic eide, see genesis 10-11), sind the constant tnvecation of the example of the artisan, with iss overtones of the Platonic demicurgos, ssemns finally to have Ted to ‘the explicit description of the fect as “the thoughts of God” (Philo, De opif. 17-20; DI. 11, 2. 195 Seneca, Ep. 6575 Albinvs, Epit. 1x, x2 nceseis thee). This was not, of course, a completely novel concept. Tt does seem alien to Plato for whom the aous-demiourges, for all its being a God, was markedly subordinate to the transcendent cide (see ‘nous 6). But Aristotle speaks (De an. ttt, 4292) a3 if someone in the Academy were holding that the note was “the placa of the Perms? (topos eidon) ane, as we have already seen, the dircetion of Atistotl's ‘own theorizing would seein 0 suggest that the nets are actually ‘present in the nous poizitkoe aad, possibly, ia the cosmic nous 2s well (see nous 9). qe Toe pols we Wo be sate to the subsegueat history of the ‘transcendent noetg, the ideai of Albinus, which serve as the exemplary cause of things. First, since Albimus’ first principle is a nows and a dominegne (eae wrne ¥g), tere be nating to militate nesinst the neta being the thoughts (noescis) of God. But betweon Albinus and Ple- tirus the transcendence ef the Onc hes displaced asus from the first place in the hierarchy of hypostases, and the question imicdiatch Eres as w whether the noeto ee te thoug's of the One and ined, whetlr there is zny noctic activity ab all in the One. Secondly, grant ing tha te notte are in the coum uy whet eal i thes otaog 4. The question of the noetic activity of the One was almost190 | Nozrox certainly raised by Ariatotles description of the energeia of the First Mover as noesia (see nous 9). Sach a position is irreconcilable with Ploticus view of the One and he devotes an entire essay (Enn, v, 6) to a refutation of Arisiode’s view, The arguments ere drawn from a variety of sources (they are, in fact, so schematic as to suggest a Pletonic repericire on the subject) but they hinge essentially on the necesssry pineaitty in sey type of moesis sn@ on the oiotogient status of the novia that, in Plotinus? view, sxe not thoughts at ll. Prock however, returns to « more Aristotelian position. ‘There is cognitive activity in Cod thet iv undivided, nsecooary, end porfsctly determined, even though its cbjects arc net; this is possible because Gods knowl- edge (gnozis) is not of particulars ia themselves, but in himself as in their cause (Blem. theol. prop. 124): see ares, now 0. §. The second point, the ontological status of the naeta, is taken up by Plotinus in Kaz. v, 9, 7. The pessiblity that the eide were mare a3 or concep's (normale) hed already been rsised and denied in Parm, 1g2e-, But the Academy went through a sceptical period under “Arecsileus and Cernendes during which the transcendent ideai fell into disfavor (oe Cicero, Aced. post. 1, 27; for the restoration of the ideat by Antlochus of Ascalon, shd. 1, 0-33) and fe was evidently sell very uch of a problem for Plotinus. THe denies their purely conceptual reality. The noeta are not properly described as the thoughts (aveseis) of th cormie acne becatee, unlike thouzhts, their existence does not depend upon being thought: here thinking and thought are identical; ‘nous eternally energized is the noeta (see v, 9, 5). Further, ‘f they -were thouchis, there would have to exist objects of thought (oor. mena) pricr te them. The noete exist of themselves, not because nous thinks them (v, 9, 7). They et present in the cosmic aous as a unity in the way that = genus contains all its species (v, 9, 6) or a science contains all 18 cheorens; itis we who separate them’ in oar discursive mode of thought (v, 9, S:see nzeeis 19-20). 6, For Plotinas there are two grades of noete: the ideai chat exist In a state of usity iu the connie. nous, aad those that have « placed exietence in ovr immanent, human nous and that are given ro us by the transcendent noxe that is the daicr formar (see ans 21).Tn Vy 98 1ya that theoe Iter nrw Sloan to veslity [elethefa'” bu: in general hhe docs not much insict on a difference between the two, and we are told that each of us is a korraas nozios («.¥.); Le, we have within our souls all the nocta (31, 4 5). The emphases are somewhat changed ia Prochis, The two icu disagreed oa the question of the degree ot contact between the transcendent snd immanent nows (ace thei differ- ent explanations of tae Intermittent nature of human intelleesion under roosts 92), ana this disagreement fy ellie in Unc views of the nesta {a our conis, According to Proclus (Elem. deo! props. 1s4-395) the xomos | 397 soul possesses the cide of sensible things (i.e, the logot spermatibot) in an exemplary maaner (paradeigmatikos) , without maiter and with- ‘out extension (see pysis). It possesscs the intelligible Zorms, the neta in n reflected manner (cikonikos); it do:s not embrace the genuine articles but mere radiations (emphaseis) of them, For Ayle nocte, see aphriresie; for the relorivity of intlligibility, gvorimon. ‘Ve taculty that grasps the neta, whether on a cosmnic ot buman level, is eased under noue and goyche and its operation under roesis. The earlier history of the noeta que Farms ie discussed under lus. nomos: custom, convention, constitutional or arbitrary bw 12. The intrusion of noms inta philosophical discourse in the fifth century followed upon the shift of the notion of nature (piysis) from the physical to the ethical zealm. ‘This may have been © result of madical influence (On the Natare [physi] of Man” appears 8 a title in the Hippocratic corpus), but can be seen a¢ wel. in the ethical coloring of the concept of Rasmos (q,7.). From the other side there was fan ipereasing understanding of the purely arbivrary and relative nature of nomes (see the two anecdotes in Herodotus 111, 38). The first explicitly to embrace the position that justice and injustice are a ques- tion of romos and not fByois wea Archetoue (DL. 1%, 16), though already seems to be implied in Heraclitus (ir. 102). The view became a common oxe among the Sophists, and their relativist views, whether morality (Protagores in Protazorae), polities (‘Thresymachus in Rep. 11), oF opistemology (Protagoras af 1s2n), are frequently cited by Plato, Plato's own ethical and epistemological ctsolutism is not, of course, based on any defense of the old-fashioned notion of physis, but on the unchanging ide, end, as he grows o'er, on the existence of God. In Laws 716 Protagorss? homo. mensura theory is finally oor rected: God is the measure of all things (theias ricmos). 2 The ides of a divine Lay had already bee advanced by Teese clitus, fr. 114 (see Aosmos), and there were subsequent appeals 10 unwritten law” (agraphon ricraos), which, far from being mere can- vention, has a divine sanction (se Kenophon, Mera. 2v, 4, 5-252 Sopho- cles, Oed. Tyr. 883-871, Ant. 449-460; Aristotle, Rhet. 1963, 297g4-b). But none of them rests on a philcsophical conception of a Physis that grounds soinor; this appears ia Stoiciem with its doctrine of pliysis as an immanent ogor (Sencce, De benef. rv, 78), and its dcfiction of virtue as “living according to nature” (D.L. vac, 86-87) where “ature” is to be understocd in both its costaic and individual sease (lem vit, 69). Tels t's “nawire," dis diving recto Cex Lugs) that is immanent, eternal, and immutable (Cicero, De leg. 11, 4, 8: De12 | Nomormerns republion ut, 99) thet founds human Inws. Its operation is most emi- nertly visible in man’s rst ‘instinctive? (physthos) impulse toward sell-preservation that gradually extends to embrace all of mankind (see ikeiosis), 4g. This is what may he called the immanent tradition in natural law; the transcendent tradition, based on che nous of a “separated God" can be seen in Hato, Laws zage-pa4a and Phalo, De migre, Abr. 8, 179-1813 00a thesis, dike, lewsiven none: intelligence, intellect, mind 1. A search for order or an ordering principle is implicit in both Greek mythology and philosophy from their beginnings, in the mythe by the applieation of a eneclogical arrangement back to an original source or “father” io the welter of gods dravin from « varley of s027ces, and among the Milesien philosophers by their search for an arche (q.v.). This latter quest for a “father” of things received its inital check ‘with the discovery of & “father” who consumed all his “sons,” Le., the om (q.v.) of Parmenides. But repress to a source is only one type of order, and thinkers with a very different cast of mind wore investigating the problem in othor dizectione, ‘There is, Heraclitus insists, an order hidden under the appearances of things, an order that he describes as Jogos (q.v. 1). The Pythagoreans went further they discovared that this order could he expressed in mathematical terms (see armonia) and, made explicit, that it could be applied to the universe as a whole (see hosmos). 2 The kinetic conditions imposed by Paroienides had led his successors to pesit some sort of external mover to explain change fn the sonsible world (see kinesis 9, kinoun.1). To do so Empedceles had reached into the moral sphere for bypostatizations of the human motive forces of “Love” and “Strife” (see Aimown 2), bur for his choke of « mover Anaxegoras turned to another tradition, What Parmenides had done in ontclogy bad already been secomplished in theology by Xenoph- tance. Pact of Xenophsnee! etragele against anthropomorphiam (sos mythyy 1, theos 1) zs his insistence that Ged mast be completely immobile (fr. 26: the argument here is baste on “what is fitting,” prepen. « recurring aesthesie, moral, and theologica) motif) aud one who accomplishes his ends by the power of his mind (mows) alone (Ir. 5). These senciments are pregnant with future developments. Apart from establishing, here st the onset of theological discourse, the intel- lectuel natare of God, Aeaophanes’ view ean"tonts the question of lls activity in the world and draws the conclusion that this mst take place womorszrrs | 393 without any change in God himself (see Aeschylus, Suppl. 95-105 ). How this difficult fect was to be accomplished was left to others to determine (see kinown g, proncie 2, prods a). «. Anaxagores tums to Xenophanes? notion of God as rows in positing a motive force that causes the original “mixture? to rotate and separate off into the various elements (see genesis 7), For Empedocles* ‘moral hypostsses as heen substinuced a intellectual yciaviple, wosy ‘at is separate frem the mass wpon which ft works (fr. 12; but it fs also curiously immanent; see voesie 4). Its operation is described as Mordering® (diekcomcoia), end it knows all thingy, past, present, and future (fr. 32 cont.), Here, then, the Heraclizan and Pythagorean or- der in the universe, governed, according to Herachtus (f, 64), by the allepervusive fie, is put under the tutelage of a purposeful intllee sual force whose knowledge excbraces not only the past and present but future events as well. 4. The ger of Diogenes of Apollonia, which in its warmed state ie nous (see noesia 5), is mor® a Milesian arefe than a post Permenidean hinoun (see ncesis 4), but hes an even mare strongly developed sense of puxpose (iclés, q-v.). Both Socrates (Phaedo 97) find Atistotle (fede, 934b) lad citkieed Anaxagoras for his mechs nistic use of nous, but Diogenes is somewhat more careful in his handling of the problem. The operation of acr-nous is witnessed by the fact shat all chinge operaie according to » reineiple of meastee. (me~ tron) and in the best way possible (ir. 3; his own example is the regular saccession of the seasons). or the subsequent history of these teleclogical motifs, see felos. 5. In addition to the nous immanent in human souls (the logist!- kon; sce payehe 13, 18) whose operation is to know the eide and rule the other parts of the soul (see ncesis 8-9), there is, i Plato, a cosmic rious, ‘iis cosmic reason emerges in Ph. 20e-27e where X called the meker” (clemiourgoun, poiown), the “cause of the mixtare™ that is the world of genesis, Almost the same terms are epplied to the demtrugos (spv.) of the Timacus where the heunos noetos ie called the work of mous (47¢). Now nous is an essential property of the yous shared by only = few men (iid, ste) and it seems more than likely that this onamie aons is divine (see Phil. aod, Tim. gob). Tt rales everything (Lowe 87ze-d), has ordered the universe (ibid. g6se), and its revolution, reflected ia the motion of the heavens, is a moral pars digm for man (ibid. 897d-S9Ba; vee azesis 10). 6, But any attompt to locato thin civine nove, tbe cosmic cause of the universe, within the framevrork of Plato's general metaphysics is grccte] with frustration, and not least by reason of the “mythical” inate of dhe awwvut to die Tinachor Oa.a number of occasions we are informed that mows anust exist in a soul (sce Sop. 2qga, Phil. goc,434 | Nomormeres Tim. gob), and there are no grounds for thinking that this refers only to Luman intelleco, If chis is true it Iovates nous, cosmic or othersvise, beneath the ide, The intermediary status of the soul in the Platonic system is well attested (iiumurtal and inmmaterial Tike the eides plurel and subject to pathe like the aistheta: see peyche 14 sd, for the later tradition, 29), and we are told quite specifically thet none hes # depend- enc relarlonship on the ere that are the cause of naws’ being in the souls rows is the ability of the soul to perceive the eide (Rep, go8e). Thus aze frustrated any attempts at finding a trenscendent God or gods in Plato (in the Phsadres Plato says the godo ewe their divinigy to ther nearness to the eide ), or even to identify itor them with the Good that is “Seyond being” in Rev. sogb. Another school of thought, however, sees the cosmic mons ag the naue af the World Soul Cocyche tir antes), dismissing as myth the fact that in the Timaeus the World. Son is created by the demiourgae (340). 7. In this fashion, then, Plato fulills the desideratum of Socra- tes’ complaint agains: Anaxsgoras! nove: Sret, it is stated in terms alrendy formulcted by Diogenes that the Eosraos is as it is because it is the work of an intelligent cause, framed to be “as good es poseible” (Tm. goab), and then, ipa pecaltarly Placorte forraulation, that tt is an image (cidon, q.v.) of te intelligible, a visible god. (ibid. gacs om the general thecry, see mimesis), 8 Anietoelels transcendent principle ta firot and fonemont a “mover,” developed out of a series of arguiments that derive from the nature of Kinesis and genesis (see Kinoun 7-10) and that Aristotle, like Anaxagoras, chooses to identify with an intelligent principle, nous. But unlike Anaxagoras, he is now confronted sth a “seperation” betweon ‘the material and the immaterial and so mast resort, even in the ease of this efficient cause, to the motive ferce of final causelity (see kinoun 7, sympatheta 7). He has, es well, a more highly developed explanation of intellection (noesis) basecl upon bis theory of energeia/dynamis and that he must also apply to his proton kinown. g In the De anima Aristode lau described Luowledigey iu ll tes manifestations, as becoming ano:her, but only with respect to its form, not its matter (it, 425, 4g1b-4gou). To speak more specifieslly of owes (gov. 30), it te a pareage vom potency to act (energein) Levoming the intelligible form of enother, and this is effected by Knowing this intelligible tn lis sensible image (111, 41b). Now the proton nore ts described es nous und its enerycia uy wocais (Meta. topab), but it is clear that this must somehow ¢ifer frou: the opera- sions described in the e anima, In the first instance, cosmic nous is nol Aefivated by something else slnce this would be to say that fs i otency to something else and thns nat aa nrmored mover. ‘The cosinie Fr, then, does not become its onjet td ts object, and this eternally Nomommerrs | 135 since its object is always present (Joe. cit.). God thinks himself; he is thought about. thought (nossis nocsezs; ibid. sozab), pe perhaps thought about himself thinking, This activity is explicitly contrasted to all other forms uf Chought, epivteme, aisthesis, daxa, dicnoia, the frst object of whose operation is “enother” (allon) ené then themselves, thinking, but this latter only incidentally (jarergom; loe. eit; for the corollary of this, Geveloped by Frocius, that God knows himself di- rectly aid the plural nceta only incidentally, seo nzston 4). 30. Tn a number of places Aristotle eomparce human and divine nooo, Since man 39 « composite (aynticéan) comprising, Daily oud noetic soul, his noesis is intermittent snd wearisome because it involves a passage from potency to act (Meta. r050b, 1072b; Eth, Nich. x, 11758). But noesie, forall the wearisome nanite of its operation in we, is, nerertheless, the proper function (ergem, ¢.v.) of both God and man. And when we practice contemplation (theoria) we mos: ap- proach the life of God and mest contribute to cur own happiness (Eth. Nich. x, 11776-21782, 1178). But human noesie differs from its divine counterpart by more than its intermicteney. The former is not only mediate (i.e it knows the noctz in visible images), its aleo discursive; {c judges by combining and seperating covcep's {see ncesis 12). Aris= tolle does lve an intuitive form of human knowledge, which he calls nous, but it seems zo be Fosited on epistemological grounds and never appenre ina tmyntienl content (ase cpagnge gy snertman 2). aa. The functioning of the Avistotetian faculty of now is clear in its general outlines, but the strict application of the principles of ect and potency lead to a number of obscurities. There seems to he a distinction of feculty within the soul. The intellect must be potentially anything that it will know actually. But any passage from potency to set demands a principle already in act (the ssame argument that leads o Ue First Mover) and so Aristotle posits another intellect that Sinakes ell things.” These are distinctions (digphora!) that occur é the sou! and the two intellects stand to each otber as matter +o form (De ws, sux ava). One, the passive imellect (parhertitos rcus), later called “hylie” (hylitoe), is perishable. The other, described as “1 kind of state [hess] like the sun,? is separable (choristes), unaffected Lapmtben), wnrmized (aniges), and ereentially on enargtias Whea io separated (choristheis), it alone is immortal and everlasting (aidion), x2, All of this occuis in out: brief passage in the De axime (111, 5), and it, together wilh u purallel pessuxe in the De gen. anim. 11,7930 ‘that states that the mous, which alone ts divine end has no commerce witly exy physical evergela, comes “from outside” (thyrathen), hes provoked more comment than any other text in Aristotle. It sppesrs Clearly enough that we Know heraise the nous pamnentor 1s energized, i.e, it hecomes the intelligible form of the object known by resson ofag6 | NomoTHETES the operation of another “pert? of nous that js slveady in set (cee Meto. 1049). But the origin and precise naturd of the operation of this latter nous poisithos or egent intellect, as it came ro be known, was fiercely debated. 1g. Most af the later complexities stem from & series of essays on the subject by the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias who distin- gitlshea enoiher phase between the nows pathetras and ponetveos. This isthe intellect in Aabiru thst results from the purely passive intellect (also leter identified with the imagination) becoming potentially intel- ligible by being illurninated by the nous goistikos and thus eequiting a “siete” (hexis, Rabitus) of intelligibility (De intellectu, p. 107). He further measures the nous poietihos as it is described in Une De anime against that of the First Maver in the Mfetaphyeics and concludes thst the agent intellect is, indeed, tne frst cause (proton aition; De anime, p. £9), an identification that was Inter to be accommodated to the Neo- platonie belief in a series of intermediary intelligences, where the last emanation, Aristotle's nows pvietikce, becomes the bestower of forms, Jie, the intelligible forms are not extracied from the material phante- siai, a5 in Aristotle, but are given to the human intellect by a higher intelligence (see 20 tifre and ngzton 6). 14, The Epicureans recognized nous (Lucretius: animus) as a cognitive faculty distinct from alstheste (see ngesis 14), bat in a materialist aystom devoid of providence (frensia) icin given ne impor tant cosmic role, In Stoicism, however, the human ncus or hegemon:- ‘hon (see ncesis 15) ig a manifestation of the cosmic nows or Jogos that: rrervates, directs, and governs all (D.L. vit, 138, 198). To call the Jogos both nous (in its providential aspect) and payeis (in its creative aspect) is to blur the distinction that Aristotle had drawn between the tivo, but the more Aristotelian (and Platoaic) view once move begins to prevail in the trecition from the time of Poseidonius when sus reappears as a characteristic of men alone, Immortal, a product of the superlunary world (see neesis 17, eympctheia 5). The Platonists of the period, on the other herd, could asserc the cranscendeuce of nous ‘without the immanentist restrictions imposed by the Stoic tradition. 15 Since the revival of the eidee-theory with Antiochuo of Asca- ton (see Cicero, nad, post. % ge gg where Varro gives the philasopht. cal point of view of Autiuclus) there was a new interest in the prob: lems of causality in the Avzmos rusios, To resolve some of the problema Platonic scholars of the period did not hesitate: to kaye recourse to Aristotle. ‘Ths the pnrely Platonic elements grow out of a synthesis of ‘the Good beyond being of the Republiz, the One of tae Parmenides, the nour of the Philebus, and the demicurgos of che Timceus: the frst auce is nets, the source of all good in the nniverse, beyond quilifca tion and description (Albinvs, Epit. x, 1=4; on the “unspeakeble” ira Noxorueres | 297 ‘cause, see ugnorios). This protor nous of the Philebus is also the demiourgos of “he Timaeus who looks to the eide in his ereation of the Acamce, save that the eide are now located in the mind of the demiour gos (iid. x1, 1 and nceton 2). 36, Dut there is an Aristotelian side to this as well. ‘The linst nous ‘thinks himself, and, though he is himself unmoved (akinetzs), be moves oulers us aut object of desire CoreRions foc. cit). Ariscorle had fnrther Cesignated the protan Binoum as Goi and his Inter commentr= tars identified hoth with the nous poietihos of the De enima. Albinus, while he describes the preter neue at thinking himaell in the prooerSbod Aristotelicn fashion (Epit. x, a), has a further suberdinste principle, a second transcendent nous that is always cnorgized and that is *the nous of the whole heaven.” a description that at least suggests the proton Hinoun of the Metaphysics. What seems likely is that Albinus kas istinguished the final and efficient cevsatity that Aristotle had unites, and assigned the first to the groics nozs that moves “as an object of desire” (x, 2) end the second to te suhorciinate nous. ‘There is, finally, a third transcendent nous, a faculty of the World Soul (x, 9). Visible hove are sll the motifs of Neopletonism: three transeendent hypos:a- Gord principles dhet may be deuwuninuied, iu toca of dacke cnphaaes, the cod, nous, peyche, all tae causality procecding from the frst, even here described as ‘like the sun” or “Father,” vz. Present tao ie another trait that is chsueteristic not only of later Plaicnisia but of the enti philosophical tradition after Aristotle, Plato had considered the stars as intelligent living beings (see ouranica 6) and Aristotle had given to each an intelligent mover (see Ainown 21-12; ouraniai g). Middle Platenists incorporated this too into their systens. ‘The planets are intellecwwal living beings dwelling in the sither (Albimus, Epit. x1v, 7) anc beneath them are the daimones of the er, also gods, children of the “Father,” mare periect than men and responsible for omens and prodigies (ibid. xv, 2; Maximus of Tyre x1, 32; Apuleius, De deo Soor, 6; see datinom ga, taycite 35) 36, Av hus already boen indicated (ace 6 siepie), the mous derniourgcs in Plato seems to be subordinated to the eide, and thus to the Good of the Republic 2s well, Albinus? frst rouse embraces all of these entities, bint thereafter new emphases are to be seen. "The fata nous hegins to yield to the hen-agathon of the Parmenides and Re frublic, and the nous-demicurgos function te center on the second hhypostasis, These are che views of Numenius (ace Eusebius, Praep. exang. x1, o58d-358b), ao they will be of Plotinus, stolen, as some said, from Numenius (sce Porphyry, Vite Ploe, xvzz, 2). But there are differences as well. The sceond hypostasis of Numenius is cwofold; its primary function, which fs nosiis, dugumsating tn discursive dante bby reason of fis involvement with mater (Eusebius, op. elt. Xi, 597:338 | NoMoTHETES Proclus, In Tim. 111, 109). In Plotinus, who also avails himself of the concept of “nttention® (phroatie; see noesis 21), the polarity is +rans- ferred to the thind hypostasis; it is the ecomic soul thst has an “upper” aud “lower? side (tee psycie fou pranios, bhysis), a9. Plotiaus follows the geneval Platonic tradition io making’ nous the second of the three Aypostases («.7.). Itis the demizurgos in thar tr supplles the psyche with tie fugot the are the forms of seastble things (Brn. v, 9, g), but in general the creative function belongs sore properly to Physi, the lower par: of the pyche, whose contem- plation Japoce into activity (Praniar 11, 8 4). Proclue puto more atroae on noue as the arche of this sensible world, but he agrees with Plotinus that creation (see also proddos) is 2 consequence of theoria or noesis (Elem. dheo!.. prop. 174). ‘20. The first principle, the One, is perfectly self-sufficient and ‘needs nothings the cosmic nous, on the other hand, has a need of itself, need of thinking itseif, and so its operation of moesiz is, in a sense, 2 seturn to itself (Ena v,'g, 15). Nous is the energeia and loges of the One (v, 1, 6; compare Philo’s view under logcs 3) and a type of ploealistic externalization of the absclute unity of the One, just as our lscursive reasoning is aa cékon of the relatively unifted operation of the cosmic nous (see noeeis 18). The proper activity of nous is a direct intuitive grasp of the nveéa as a unity, not in the sense that the mows ‘dhinke” the noeta, but rather it ie the noeta (see noeton 5). a1. The costnic nous, a Platonic heritage, is linked with the reasoring power immanent in men by a species of Aristotelian bridge ‘Tae Aristotelian distinction of dissolution of nous into an active eners- ia and a passive dyaamis is taken up and modified by Plotinus. In Ena. ¥, 9, 3 Plotious esks himself, in bis usual aporematic fashion, if ‘there is a nous choristos, and then proceeds to ansvrer by distinguishing Detween a nous that is in the soul as an eidos in maiter and @ nous that ‘gives the form to the soul as the maker [pciotes] gives form to the statue” Thus the Aristotelian acus poietikcs is transformed into the ator Forraw ere, The sowie possage goes on ts draw a distinction 55 taveen the eide themselves. The eide that the nous gives to the soul are Sclose to reality,” those received by matter are ‘images and imitations” (cidela, mimernatns soe anaicn 6) aa. There are, then, three degroes of reality among the Plotiaian cide, The lowest, the cide aistheta in material things, arc efkones of the true Forms, They setve both @ cognitive and paradigmatic ond. As cxisting in others they form the basis of sensation on the Aristotelian morlel (see aischesis 26); as existing in onesell they are the causal paradigms of the production of other beings (see taxol apermutibet, Angas). There are, C00, the ide vet of, a3 Uaey ate valled Leva ‘Middle Platonisn on, the idea, which exist primarily in the cosmic a oom | 199 nous where they constitute the hosmnoe noctos (q.v.) or, after bestowal, in the immanent buman nove where, aa “traces of nous,” they provide the grounds for ccxtain of our judgments (so> noevis 19 and, for = more compreiensive treatment of the ideai, noeton). oO échema: vebiele, chariot, astral body 1. As appears from the history of the geyehe (q.v.), a number of apperenily irreconcilable atrains were present in ite development «l- ‘most from the beginning: the materialist view that sees che feyche as «refined form of onc oF other of the elements, and eventually, x0 the pneuraa, a Kid of Heh element akin vo cither (q.¥.); the spisttualist view flowing from the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul es a divine substance different in kind from the body; and, finaly, the Aristotelicn ontolachia (q.v.) theory thot ettompta to explain the pryeho in terme of the function (see ergom, energeia) of some body. 2. Later Platonism was, in effect, forced to come to terms with the enielechela view by reason of Plato's interest in function in the Timacus. This they attempteé to do by mess of a theory that, in its most general terms, states that the soul has another quasi-physical body ‘or ockema, usually accuived during the prenatal “escent dirouyls the heavens (kathodcs, devs see Plotinus, Brn. 1, 3 Mucrobius, Za Soran, Seip, 1, 2). This becomes progressively heavier and mote visible as it descends through the moist cer (Porphyry, De dentro myrrh, a). With Uieir ususl textual piety dhe Neplatouists professed to discover the origin of this doctsine in Plato, and partica- larly in Tims. gxde where the demiarscae sows each soul in star, “xe ina choriat™ (ochenans compare Phocdnis a47b), preliminary to em- Bodyiag some of thom on carth and “storing” others in the olancts (ibid, qed), But when it comes to explaining the nature of these yohicles,” resort is made to Auisiolle. 3. Ariswile had described prcwma (q.v.) as che seat of the (chreptite) end seusitive (aisthetike) soal and enalogous in ion to either that Is the material element of the stars (De gen, (0b-737a). Thus the “seilcle” of vir: soul Is Gescrtbed by the ‘Neoplatonists as an actherial (eititerodes) and lightlike (angoeides) | |140 | __orxerosts body (lamblichus, De myst. m1, 145 the oiderewm and lemiaosum corpus of Macrobius, In Sorin. Sip. 1, x2:nd 13533). 4. The theory is set out, with a considerable aumbet of refine- ments, ip Proclus, Elem. thevl., props. 2032. Exch humaa soul is initially under the influence of the divine soul (see psyche, ouranict) in fone or other of the planets (prop. 204; see Tim. 42d and Proclas, Tn “Lim. 1G, 280). "Lhe sstrologieal implicetions of this are obvions, bat there was a general Neoplatonic consensus that the theici prychai of the pleneis wers not responsible for evil (Plotinus, Emm, 1 3, 20: Txmbli bua, De myst, ty 36 Proclua, Is Tim. ui, 323)+ The aateal body of the individual soul is consequently relaued to the body of the planezary soul (prop. 204; compare Ban. 0, 4,31 and sae svanpatheia). But this is the immowts], immaterial hady perpemally attached to the sail Craps 206-207); there ‘s another perishable body that the soul acquires dur- ing its descent, composed of increasingly material “mantles” (chi. tones; prop. 20g; see In Tim. 111, 297). This is mortal and, though it survives desth (just long enough, it would seem, to andure the corpo- real punishments of the type described by Pleto in Phaedo 1242), is eventually dissipated. ‘Tho human individual soul, then, according to the revisionist version of Proclus, has three bodies: the immortel, immaterial “starry” (as!voeides) or luminous body associated with the iramortal part of the soul; the “spivitual” (pnewmatikon) possessed by the mertel pexts of the soul and the various deivicnes of the universe: and, finally, the flshly boe'y of she soul's sojourn om earth (Ze Tir, 13%, 296, 2985 Lheo!. Plat. 11t, 195). oikeidsis: self appropriation, self-acceptance, seléJove 1. The Epicurean exaltation of plensure (iedone, ¢.v.) followed a going back as far as che Cyrencics in taking ac its starting point en analysis of wan's instinctive, uniutoted impulses, ‘he Btoics used the same point of departuce in ethics but their inspection sug- gested to them that it was not pleasure that was primary, but rather Iwhat they termed siketonds, Mie seacplance of onc's own being and the means of preserving i, the instinctive impulse (Rorme, qwv.) toward sclf-preservation (D.L. vis, 85; Cicero, De fin. 114, § 26: its opposite is GUloiviesir, eclf-ctienntion). “The nikeien ix not completely absent from, Epicurcanism where it is the “appropriatencss” of the object pereeived that produces the pleasure or pain (sce pathos); itis rooney a shift of emphasis from thy cause of sleasure to the process itself. 2. Olkelcsis bas cverewidesing circles of applications it operates, fn the frst instance, toward oneself, then toward enc’s offspring and family, ana, finally, culminates in “oye of the whole buman r1ce” (eardae generis Ruimant; Cloetv, De fie ass, 29, G2-Bay Yy #39 G5) thee a tra on, onra | 242 the ground for the Sicic emphasis on a secial ethic based on navure rather than convention. Sce norias, physis. on, énta (pl): being, beings 4. ‘The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of| Parmenides’ series of logical dichotomies hetween being and norheing (me on}: that winch is, emnot not be; that which is nat, cannot be, i. a denis] of passage from being to nonbeing ot genesis (q,v.s r. 2), and its corollary, 0 denial of change and raotion (fr. 8, lines 26-29, 49-10s fs dhe theolegical corrcletivea of this, aze nowr 2). Seeondly, being is fone and rot many (fr. 8, lines 22-25). And finally, the epistemological promis: only being can be known or named; noabeing cannot (fr. 35 Fr R, line 94)r se daza. Reing, in short, is a sphere (fr. 8, lines 42-49). Most of the later preSocraties denied this letter premiss (cf. ‘oicheion and atoman), as did Plato for whom the really real (to anos on) were the plural eide, and who directed the latter helf of the Parmenides (ag7>~168c) agains: it 2. The solution to the nonbeing dilemma (for its epistemological solation, see daze and hctoren) and the key to the analysis of genesis began with Plato's postting of space (sce Aypodoche) in which genesis takes place, and which stands midway between irve being and xonbeing: (Tim. s20-c). For Plato, as for Parmenides, absclute nonbeing is nenaense (Soph. age), et thera in «relative grade illustrated not only’ by the Receptacle cited above, but by sensible things (aistheta) as well (Soph. agoby Tim. 952, g2c). Among the Platonic hierarchy of Forms, there is an eidae of being: indeed it is one of the most izxporsant Forms that pervade all the reat (Soph. 2545-A; compare this with nature of on in Aristotle, Meta, 200ga). Further, Plato distinguishes real beings (ontor ontz) trom those thet have genes’s, and in Tiraeue 28 he works out un epistemological-oniclogical correlation: aia are Known by thought (noesis) accompanied by w ratiouul acoouat (o- gos); generated beings are grasped by opinion (or judgment, see ore) duved ou sensation (wisthesis). 4. Since being isthe cbject of the science of metaphysics (Met. rogia) Aristotle's treatment of on i mach more elaborate, “The frst Aintinetion ia botwaen “asingy quo being” (tn om be rm), which ie che object of motaphysies, and individual beings (onte), which are che objects of the other sciences. This is the view in Mets. 1003a, but Aristotle is wot coasistent on the point: elsewhere (sce, Meta. 1026; Phys. 1928, 4b; De un. qogb) he states that meiephysies studies being that is separate and unmovirg (see theoluyia). Agein, “being” ¥ peculiar in tha: it i defined not univocally or gener‘cally, but analogously through all the cauegurles (fee, 10veg.), ainl i dbs elsaga | oxzimos like “one? (hen) (Meta, rosb) snd “good” (agaihon) (ibid, Bik. Nich, 1, sog6)5 sex ket holca. There follows a basic distinction (ibid. aorzach): something “is? cither accidentally, or essentially. or episte- mologically, or in the dichotomy act (energeia) /potency (dynemis) ‘The epistemological “being” (see dava) is desit with eleewhere (see Meta. 1027-1028, 1953-11522), a8 is potency/ect (see Meia, Theta passim), 90 Arietotle here concentrates his attention on what “is” ‘essentially. Tt ig something that falls within the ton Kategoria (Meta, aoxza) end is, primerily, substance (ousia; ibid. 1028a-b). A some whit difcicut yuiul uf view cues ges nau Aristide’ eahluwa of die various seases of aonbeing (me or) in Meta. 1089b amd 1o8ce: some thing is not either as a negative proposition, i.e. a denial of one of the predicsces, an we a falee proposition, oe finally, Bota dynamin, ie, by being something else only potertially bat not aetuelly. It is from this latter thst genesis ecmes about (see also dynarnis, energeta, steresis), 4. In the Plotinian universe the One (lien) is bovoné being (Enn. , 0, 55 compare Plate’s description of the Good beyond Being in Rep. 09 and see hyperousia). The realm of being begins on the level of nous since both being and noue are contained in tous (Ebid. Vs 5 23 ¥, 9, 7). Nonbeng 3s treated in youch the Platoic and Aristotelian foshion: matter (Ayie) that is only a replica (eiton) of being is oly «quasi-being (Enn. 1,8, g). Philo, with his strongly developed feeling of dirine transcendence (sce Ayperousis), restricts trac being to God alone (Quod deter. 44, 160), and introduces into the discussion the ‘metaphysical interpretation of the famous phrase in Exod. 9, a4: “T am cha am; see iypindecke, hyle, genesis. neiros; dream 2. Toe cormmon Greck attitudes toward dreams may be illes- trated from Homer where they are considered as both objective reali- ties, not very different in quality from waking experience, and as unifestations of an inner experience, some aspects of which shade off into symbolism (see 11. xxu1, 199 fl Od. aun, pet M.). Dut of snoce speculative consequence was the distinction found in Homer (Od. 2x, hoff.) between dreams that issue from the “gate of ivory” and that tre nothing more then “glimmering illusion, Fantnoy,” nnd those From the “gate of horu” Ut are portents of things to coms, if only mortals know how to interpret them. Tihat the Greeks made just such aa effort from an early date is clear from the preseave of a “dream interpreter” in Iv, 148. 2. Macrobins, in his commentary 00 the Somnium Stipionis (3534 1), divided portentous dreams fntn the symbolic, zhe vislonary, and the pfecular, 10 Which others added direct converse with x xull u # daizcon (q.v.), eg. Soetstes in Crito 4b, Phaedo Oce, or the admoni- owrmos | 149 tions that frequently led, on the testimony of Plato (Laws goge-gioa, Epinomis 9850), 40 religious dedicationa and foundations. Actempts to induce such dreams wore mest frequently associated with incubation or slceping in a sacred place, a ptactice also designed to provoke medical cares. 3. The dream enters philosophy with Hersetitus who treats it as ss subjective ruraing-inward (fr. 89), while Xenopnanes begins a long rationalist tradition by complete denial of divination (Diels 21925 026 meontike) including, presumably, dreams. There is an attcmpt at theory in Democritus whe azccunted for Arcams by the cutay tuto Uhe senzes of various eidola (q.v.) or images, some of which foretold the fature, and from which men derived their notions of the gods, or better, of the dainones since some of these visitations were halefinl (3r x68) These same visions were for Epicurus proofs for the existence of the gods (Lucretius, De rerum nat. v, 1189-11863 Aetins 1, 7, 94), pre- sumably because of their clarity and universal occurrence, The senti- ment i echoed almost exactly by the Christian Tertullian, De anima 47,43 00 enargtia, proleptis, 4 Plato belioves in the prophetic (end divinely inspired) natace of deetais, and it Tim, 71a—72b offers a curious physiological explana tion of how they work, They have their origin in the liver, which is the instrument or medium by which the rational part (logistiken) of the soul communicates its thoughts, transformed now into vimiel images, the appecitive faculty (epithymetiton). Tt is the presence of these images in the liver that gives rise to dreams and at the same time cxplains she practice of divination (mantte) by te inspection of ai. mals? vers. 5. Aristotle ecrliest view on dreams is close to that of Epicarus and Democrivus: in the De philosophia (ir. 10), though by uow be is working nis way clear of Vlato’s eidos-theory, Aristotle still accepts the sotion of the sczarability of the zsyche from the body, a phenomenon that may Le experienced in dreams, as had earlier heen pointed out by Pindar (sce poychc). For Aristotle 51 ts cantly this experience of the soul fn dreams that leads to man’s eotwvietion a8 to the existence of the gods. Bnt by the time he hed come to write the trestises De inscxnnife tnd De disinatione fer comnum ho hod werrked out a complotaly physislogiesl explanation of dreams, and explicitly denies (De div. ab) their divine origin, though still allowing their cocasionally pro. phetic nature . _ 5 Aristotle's attempt to place dreams in a purely psychophyslo- logical content was foredcomed to fe'luce. The increasingly religious and ethical interests of post-Aristotelien plllosophy led to a reassertion of the divine uifgia uf at least ovine dieauss, while false dreams ci be written off to te convenient physiological causes, so Cicero, De di144 | oNoms 62, 127-128, Typical of thefr intrusion into later philosophy is Tambli- chus’ preoccupation with dream phenomena in his Life of Pychagores, wher the now legendary older philosopher is made t connsel his disciples to induce prophetic creams by nightly Smood-music (65), and the proper diet (106-107; compate D.L. viit, 24, where the well- mown Pythagorean taboo on beans is explained in this way). On a more popular level the testimonies range from the famous “dream Look the Sacred Discourses of Actins Aristides to the sill extant Oneirocriticen of Artemigorus of Ephesus, a systematic treatise on the interpretation of dreams. énoma: name 2. The philosophical probleme attendant upon language ere ine treducod by Heraclitus’ insistence on the fact of change and the embi- guity of both phenomena and oar ways of naming them (see frs. C7, 22). But they appesr in 2 more rigidly conceptualized formula with wt Sophists’ distinction between nature (physis) and convention (nomes, 4x). Gorgias, for one, denies all connection between the word and the object described (Sextus Empirieus, Adv. Math. vit, 84), thereby raising the question of the “correctness” of names, Prodicus gave expensive lectares oa the subject (Plato, Crat. g84b), and we know from Xenophoo, Mem. 1,14, 2 that it wos ¢ frequently discussed topie at Athens, 2. Plato takes up the question in detail ir his Cratylus where the position that names have a natural connection with the things named is ciatetned by the Heraclizan Cratylus (9852; soe rice), and the theory of the conventicnal origin of language by Hermogenes (3844). Socra- tes position is thet things have a permanent quality of their own (the eidos-theory is presumeé throughout: for medical investigation along ‘these lines, see eidas), ane that the function of language is 2 social one ‘the name is an instrument to t2ach us about the owsia of a thing and to cable us to distinguish it from other things (368b o). It follows then that there must have been a wise legislator (nomothetes) who bas Imposed mauues on things using a kind of ideal name as his model (aBoe—s90e). “p Tlhote fulluws (gage-b) a theory as to the mnimetic origin of Ienguage: the name is phonetic minicsis (q.v.) of the object, a ipesture in sound. But for all the etymological mockery in the Cratylus Ite claor From a nnmher of pessnges in Plato that he takes seriotsly the philosophical content of names: they are a canstinent of every statement (Jocor; Soph, s63e-a8a0) ancl part of the promess eating toward epistome (q.v2) Eb. viz, g4ea ff). 4. Aristetle agrees with Plato on the mmette character ot Jn- guage (Rhct. .4o4az0), but sounds only become names when they take | | oxoma | 245 on a meaning established by convention (De interp. 162), i.e. when they become symbolic. Again, like Plsto, Aristotle is much iréebted to Linguistic enalysis asa philosophical tocl: the kategorii are, in the fist Instance, modes of prodication. 5. Epicurus was concerned with a solid epistemological basis for philosophical Ciscourse aud was a some pslus to insist ou an intimte conection Detwee Uxe concept (entoley Gov. umd see profepts ann Ios name, eon the world of thought (already tied to the world of objects by his sensualist theory of aisthesis; see aietheten and eidolon) and that of language (DLL. x, p7-g8). The name, therefore, xauet be clear and immedists evidence of the concept (ibid. x, 593 compare cnargeia). He then proceeds (ibid. x, 75-76) to offer his theory of the origins of Janguaze. 6. Speech flows from man's natural desire to express his own feelings (pathe), Lucretins considerably expands this stage of develo>- ‘ment (De rerum nat. ¥, 1628-2090), tracing the evolution of language from gesture (following Plata, hot rejecting, in the same passage, hath the Platonie and Stoic nomothetes), through animsl sounds, to the babbling of children. On this point the lipicureans and Stoies parted uinpany i a adival Cacbtou: fox dhe lattes epeocl i fue of logoe and hence ony men have truc speceh animals and chi-drea emit mere sounds that are “ike speech” (Varro, De ling. lat. v1, 56; Seneca, De ina, a). After this original astural-mimeric stage Mpicuros allows for ‘the use of a conventionalized standardization (loc. et.). 7. Between Aristatle and the Stoics occurred great advances in Linguistic research eormected with the Alexandrine elncidation of the tex! of Homes. The results may be witnessed in the not always happy etynologizing (etymos, an adjective meaning “tue” in Homer, is substantivized into stymon, the true sense of a word) in post Arlexctelian philooophy and particu‘erly in the developed and sophisi- ‘cated theoties of Stois philosophical linguistics, The linchpin of Stoic theory is the close reletionship between interior Jogos (though) and entorior logee (pouch; we logo). Thus the onome vigniiea the thing because the correction is by netare (ofysis) and not, as Aristotle said, by convention (SPF 11, 146). But the Stoic explanation of “nsture” is muuch closer to the Socratic exposition alrendy cited from the Crarplus. ‘The Stoies too believed that the connection between names and the true natare of things springs from the wisdom of a primitive lawgiver who imposed” nazics upoa thinge (see Ammonius, fn de interp. 35) 15; 36, 293; compare SV#' 11, 1065, 1070), just as Adam is described as dcing by Philo in Leg. ell. 11, 14-25, In this Zeohion extcrior legas reveals the inner essence of thingn, ond the Stoics consequently paid a great deal ‘8 attention to otymologiea, whick in turn led thom into eomplen discar tions of whether names were relatod to things chrough the etymological146 | onrxts principle of analogy (analogia) or its converse, encmaly (anomalin; Varro, De ling. lat. %, 2, citing Chrysippus see the notorious dati ton of lucus from nim fucendo in Quintilian 1, 6, 93). Stoic etymologiz- ing becomes pervasive in all subsequent philosophical literature. resis: appetite The apperiive (orekitkow) ty chat faculty of the svul whicls pursues (Aristotle, De am. 4gia). Tt embraces the three functions of desire (epithymie), spivit, and wish (¥id. 41h), and is, in conjunc- lon with acnoacion (aishosis) o intallection (norsis), the wltin cause of motion in the soul (De cn. 111, 4gga-b; see Aincun 9). Arise totle’s general treatment of araxie is in De motu aném, chaps. 6-8; for ite role in Platonism, sce epistrophe: in Stoicism, horme, Seganon: instrument, organ, Organon See aitthesix, dialektke, heton. ourinioi: heavenly bodies 1. The belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies is an old one among the Grecks, Is pus 260 Busutes says that everyone believed in them, al, perhaps, except Anaxagoras who was tried on a charge of impiety, prt of which involved the divinity of the owranési (D.L. 11, xa}. Indeed, the belie? was so ancient that hoth Plate. (Crat. sored, aus 8836; compare Lews o66d where the emphasis is somewhat different) and Aristotle (De phil. £r, 10) trace back the beginnings of man’s belief in God to a contemplsticn of the heavens, The motives are Yatioue: the identification of air-psychedlife (see azr), coupled with the appatent eternity of their motion, and the discovery of the order (kas mos) in their movements; the argument from everlasting motion i specifically aiteibuted to the Pythagorean Alcimaeon by Aristoue (De a, 1, coxa; compare Cicero, Dé nat, deor, 3,27). "> Plato accepted their divinity (Ref. sofa) and gave them an inuportant place in his coamclogy (Zirm» 382 age): they wrens, in art, the only material things made by the demivurges, Tn both the Lewe (S984-S9gb) and the Zfinomis (g81e) they are said to possess souls, sad to mewn hy the most periect deliberation (Evinomis o8ac). The exact connection between the bodies and sons of the ouraniot is uot specified, but three possibilities are outlined in the Tews (see hinoun a) 3. When he wrote his carly dialogue Un Pmifesopty Aristorle stl believed in the Flatonic str souls and gave them a role in bis theory of the causality of motion (Fr. 243 968 Ainown 8): But when he Came to wale Use Dr evels ln nas somewhat ambivalent on the eubjert ‘They are still present (11, 2922) but they scora to have no role in the ovrastor | 147 ‘motion of the stars, which is now explained in terms of the physis of the ‘material composing the sphere in. which they ave imbedded, ie. sither (qyv.). In the Betaphysies they are nowhere to be sean xd when Apso comes to expan the sce of th Rerenly bods he nso instead to a theery of multiple prime movers that can be and have been construed as the souls of the various planets but are much more likely separated intelligences (ce Riayat simi). 44. This is not to suy, however, that Aristotle ceased believing in the divinity of the heavenly bodies; he merely discarded them as phil sophies] emuces For him, #8 far Plain (see Tim gge) they were “visible Gods? (see Meia. roa) and more divine than men (see Phys. 11, 1964 and Kit. Nich. vi, wiqia). And again the reason ig the apparent lack of exy change in their activities, a fact confizmed by millennia of estronomical records (sec De caclo 1, 270b), In the same passage Aristotle averts to ancther type of historical argument, ll mea believe in gods and they have invariably located them in the heavens, linking, he argues, the conceptually immortal to the visibly incorruptible. Again, in Meta, 1074b he resorts to a eorfirmetory proof from the popular religions belief in the divinity of the. planets, a tradition paszcd down in che form of « sayth. Aristotle may here ke referring to the fairly recent custom of associating the planets with the gods of Greek mythology. The Grst auch reference in Greck literature is in Tim. 98d where Pleto speaks of the *hely star of Hermes,? and the frst full list occurs in Epinomis g8rb-d where the origin of the custom is described as Syri 5. In succeecing periods che belief in the heavenly bodies was encouraged by the growing importance of astrolozy and so it free quently ‘urned ovt that thefr infinence on Iauman affairs was debated more vehemently than their existence. There is a long polemic against the avin yous in Lucretius vy 110149 (compare Epicaras in D.L. a, 7D) probably directed against the Stoics since it contains arguments against the divinity of the carth and sea as well. Stoic pantheism did tend to move ia that direction (see SV 23, 1007), and the epacific @ocizine of the civinity of the heavenly bodigs could be connected, as Aristotle hed done in the De coio, with the nature of the aither (30 the Stoie iu Cicero, De nat. deor. 1, 0-42), and precisely bersuse of its fiery substance and rapid movement, Srfalible indications of life and intelligence. But these positions were strongly criticized by the Sceptics {ibid 25-2458) who were apposed toll sets of divination (mer- he, ___ 6. The argument that the rapidity and fery quality of tho aither is an indication ofits intellectual nature goes back ultimately to percep- ton theeriae like thone ef Diogenco of Apolle noesis 5) bat has more immediaie origins in the yourg Aristotle, Plato (eee atsthoste 15, | |148 | ouRANos had! mointained that the sters were eompased of a fiery str? and were intelligent living beings (Tim. qos-b), and that human souls first came into existence in the siars before being incorporated on exrth (oid. sade). And 1 18 tor this reason, accordmg to Pato, that the divine intellect ‘n us is located in the head (see kardia 4) s0 that it may be closcst to its “heavenly congence” (ibid. goa). These suggestions wrute token up by Avistuil, ainl iccoupuiatad ity bis ductive uf dic “Sth element” (uinda essen; sez aither) that is the substance from which both the heavenly bodies and our nous is made (De phifesophia, fr oz = Cicrn, dead post 1, 96; tis ig, af comms, irenmpatihlo with his later theory of nove as spiritual energeias sce nous 1x). We are further told (Cicero, Tuse. 1,22) that he coined a new term to deseribe its pernetual and uninterrupted motion, endelecheie (compare the simi Tar approach to aither in De cocto 1, 270b). Also Aristotelian may be the corollary mentioned by Cicero (De nat. deor. 11, 42-43) that the scars feed| upon the aigher. 7. The theory continued to thrive in all is ramifications. At reap- pears in the revival of Pythagoreanism zt the turn of the Christian era (D.L. vir, 26-27) and plays a part in Poseidonius’ theories of soul (sce Cicero, Tuse. t, cang end compare sympatheia g). For Philo the heavenly bodies are Fintellectusl animals” (20a noera) or, better, each is an intelligence (nows) remote from evil (De opif. 73}. The cult of these heavenly por, encouraged by the consuming interest in astral ogy and demenology (cf. Mactobius, Jn Somn, Seip, 1, 12, 145 Phae tarch, De defec. orac. qx6d-f), must have appeared at times on the brink of overwhelming the patiently constructed retoalist positon ‘This seems to he the moed of the defensive struggle put up by Plotinus. As good Platonist end as a somewhat teluctant heir to the Peripatetic. tradition, le accepted the doctrine of celestial intelligences snd the stars ag living belags (Brn. v, 1, 2) that lead a lize of goodness and happiness (av, 8, 2). But he is firm in bis detailed resistance to the contemporary astrology (1¥, 4, 30-453 see sympathzia 8). For eclowtial immortaly, coo oer aphthartce; for the question of astral bodies, selena: on the movement of the heavenly bodies, Rinowrs an on their intelligences, nous. ouranés; heaven - 2. Heaven is a generative principle in the ancient cnsmnogonies (08 Plato, Tizm. ode; Aristotle, Meta, xogtb). It frst appears in a strictly philosophical contest in a ditncult passage of Anaximenes (Diels 12817) where he is represented as positing innumerable ora thoi thet are gods.” Honecforth the Grosk view of heaver az a single uty io at Keant partally replaced by that of « multiplicity of heavenly spheres that envelop the earth and carry the sur, moon, and planete sina ousia | 149 while the final outermost sphere carries the fixed stars (see Aristotle, De evela t, 278b). In this same passage in the De colo Aristotle points cout that curazas is also usec in the sense of the entire universe, and indeed Histo had stil used the terms curaace and Acareco interchange ably (Phaedrt 247b, Pol. 6g, Tim. 286); 900 also kosmos. 2, In addition to the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bod (vuraio’), the heaven had quotes wuts will cigivu: Ged w die increasing astronvusical sophistication and the consequent identification of the heaven as an extraordinary “orde:” (see Rosmas) was the belief thet the male of the philnanpher wae the enntomplation of the etomnal verities on high. Best knovin in this regard sre the series of ancedo about Anaxagoras (see DL. 1, » and 73 Iamblichus, Proirept. 51, 6-15; perhaps Aristotle's remark about Xenophanes ia Meta, 0665 should be understood in the same sense). The same moti is present in Philo, De opif. 27, 53-54, now combied with a provicential creation; God created the lieavens so that man, in contemplating thefz harmonia, might be drawn further upward to the study of phnlosophy, 3. For Plato too the spectacle of the heavens has.a distinct ednes- tional effects in Rep. 328e—s30e astronomy serves as an introduction to diglektike (compare Lewis S20n-8223, 9674-g68a); a vision of the order of the heavens is a feacure of the myth of the soul's destiny in both the Paaedrus 248d-s47e and the Rep. 616c-517d. The nuénee is slightly different in Tim. 47a; here the contemplation af the heavens is directed toward a zestoration in the harmnia (q.7.; see Kinow 5) in the soul. By the time of the late Academie Epinomis e8oa—988e these considerations have been incorporated into (and overwhelmed by) the prevelent astral theology (see curaiot 7). Heaven then becomes the ‘dwelling place of these heavenly gods, Olympus (so Epincmis gyrbs ‘sce Tim. goe—gob and the remarkable fragment of Citas preserved ia Seasus Empiricus, Adv, Math. 1%, 54)» ousia: substance, cxistence 1. Prom the fact that Sccrater cites Dorian dislacties! vestents of ‘ousia in Grat, coe it has been conjectured diet the philosophical origins of the term are Pythagorean. The word has, however, i ac= condance with Plato's usual technicue of variable terminology. a anm- ber of ciferent meanings in the dialogues. Thus, it sometimes means existence as opposed to nonexistence (Thenet. 185, 239b); i is ap- plied to the existence of sensible things in Thecet. 186b, and probably ‘te plarase “coming into being” (genetr ext oustan) sm’ Phi. ad ig & similar usage. But in other places it is explicitly contrasted to gancviy and the world of becoming (Seph. agac, Timm. age) av the mode of hing of the "soally zeal” (onton ony naa Rep. eghy where tho Good is beyond even cusia, and compare Aybercusic}. Ousia cven appcusches4g0 | ousta the Aristotelian usage as “essence” in Phaedo Gg, gad, and Pheedrue ‘agge where itis equivalent te “definition?” 2, Aristotle's secreh for substance begina in the Categorice where it is described as that which is not said of a subject cr not preseat in a subject, e.g. the particular man or the particular horse. This individual (sode ti) 's substance in the primary sense, but “Substance” may also ‘be use w describe the genus (genae) and the spectes Celdn2), and oF these eidor has more of s claim to be substance since ic is nearer to the individurl primary substance: to call an individual tree “nn oak” is more revelatory of what i fa than 40 call i: 4a plant® (Cet, 2a b). Aistodle is further convinced that the problem pased by mctaphysies, and indocd by all of philosophy, ie, “what is being [onJ"? really comes dowa to “orhat is ovsie"? since being is. frst and foremost, substance (eta, 1028) 3. In Mera, robge Aristotle distinguishes three types of cusiaé: 1) sensible (cisthetos) and everlasting (aidios), Le, the heavenly bodies that, because the natural motion of their element, ater, is ciculr, are also everlasting (see aphthartos); 2) the sensible and perishable, i.e, chat everybody recognizes as substonces, plants, snimals, ete. and 3) the wichengeuble (akinecve). AU dhe substances in clisyes 2) anil 2) are composites, and Aristotle sets about determining which of their components have the best claim to be called substance (Meta. St-—aogib). The choive iv nurowed dows. to four: the substratum Ciypokeimencn), genus (genes), the universal (Retholcu), and the essence (¢i esti). The results are the same as those reached in the Categcries: it is the essence or eidos that hes the best claim to be substance (ibid. 1o41a-b), not now 2s a predicational entity, i.e, “gpecies,” but as the immanent formal cause in compound beings (see vidos). Tt fulfils the wo prerequisites of subotance: itis separable (see choriston) and, as embodied in matter, mdivadual (ode it) (abd. 10zga). Aristotle deals with the first two classes in the De cocle and the Physics ani then takes up the question of unchangeable substances in a later book of the Mesapiysice (1o71b—107%a). Their existence is noecs sary beeanse both motion (Kinesis) snd time (chronos) are everlasting: (aozib). To account for this perpetual movement there must br an nnmoued anhianen, i@., something: that moves 28 final cause: this is the First Mover (ibid. so7aa—107Ga5 see Ainoun 7-10). There are umber of such movers, end their exact nuraber must be determined by seronamial caleltons (47 oF 55?) (ao7ga-a074a3,9¢2 Hacun 4. The Azistolelian category of substence as hypoksimencn bo- comes, for the Stuies, auatter (SPF t, 8% 1, 469). Ontologically it is tsedl Ta tae siune seuse, acc Maveus Auicliuay Med ry ts 21 3 Plotinus criticizes and rejects the Aristotelian analysis of substance vascnein | agr (Enn. v1, 5, 9-55 the only thing that mattes, form, and the composite have in commen is being, and even this is diferent in the three eas (bid. vt, 5, 6-7), What sonaible ousia i, then, is nothing mere tha a conglomeration of quslities and matter (iid. vi, 3,8). Pp palingenesia: rebirth, transmigration of souls (metempsychosis is a very late word) ‘That Pythagoras held such n doctrine ie attested by his contempo- sary Xenophanes (ft. 7), and there is the later, more dubious testi mouy (D.L, vir, 4-3) that he remembered four of his own previous reincarnations. That the quality of the reincarnations is tied to an ethical scale 18 clear trom Urpliisin und from Empedocles (irs. 115, 119, 197, 146, 147). Plato has heard of this doctrine (2eno 81a) end in Phaede 7oe~0e he incorporates it into his proofs for the immortality of (he suul, abd, in a more Oxphic contest, ia Phaccirus 24gn and Tim. gob-c, where the successive rebirths are tied to moral purity. Its most élaborate presentation is in the “Myth of Ex” in Rep. G14b-62xb, For Heradote! mistaken nation ax to ite origins are Hit, 11, 123. ‘The philosophical preseppositions of palingencsia ere cleatly linked with the nature and separability of the soul, see peyehe; its epistemological use may be seen in anaranesis (q.v.), and some of is religious aspects in kethodes. fdeigma: model Betas jee mineste. parénllisis: swerve (of the atoms) Sco hinesie. pischein: {0 sulfer, be affected, passion 1, Fassion (peschein), the ceuerel state of which pathos (a,v.) is the formalized affect, is, together with its correlative, action (pziein’, & function of the anclent notion of “power” (dyacmis, q.v.). But their isolation end conceptuslization seems to heve been the doing of Plato (Dut see Georg. 470a-e where thelr fuclle mankgulacion Suge gests an earlier usage) who cvides change (kines, qv.) into activeagz | earuos and passive sspects (Theaet. 1gGa; compare Laws x, 8o4c) that be Iter calls hallmarks of the world of becoming (genesis; Soph. 2c). 2. The association of action and passion with genesis remains constant, not in the sense of qualitative change or locomotion as Plato suggests (Theaet, 156c), but in the teclmical sense of ce Aristoteliait genests (qv), Les substandal change, id paricularly We passage of one element (stoirheian) into another. ‘The Key to netian and passion ts contrariety (encntion, 4.v.); identical things cannot act upon exch other (Plots, Ties. gray Arivtosle, Do gen. of corr. 1, gegb). ‘Whe the powers or quelities involved in genesis must be gererically the same bbut specifically different, and genceis can be defined as “passage to the conteary” (Aristotle ob. cit. 1. 224). 3 But mere contrariety is not enough: the contrary powers must have the capacity for action and passion. It is significant that when Axistotle is attempting to discern which powers are present in the genesis of the elements he rules out “the light” precisely on the ground that though they are contreries, they do not have pofein and paschein (ibid. 11, g29b). In Arisende paycivein iy oue of das tou huteseniat (yor Cate ab-ee}, and his examples are “is cut? “is burnt” Like boii admits of Loth contrariety and degtee (ibid. arb). In Secicism the patient? (earchen) ix identified with matter (yl), the agent (prim) with logos (q.75 DL. vin, 294). Both Aristotle end the Stoics distinguish hetween the active and passive elements or, better, the quelities m them (Aeteor. rv, 273; SVE 1, 428; ee genesis) For the active and passive archai of movement, see, respectively, Kinoun and physis; for their metaphysical import, energeia and hyles for their role in perception, eisthesie; for actéo in distans and the question of contact, sympatheia 7. pathos: event, experience, suffering, emotion, attribute Er The listney'of che word pachor fs beslouded by « aulliplcity of connotations. In its most general acceptance it means “something that happens,” either in reference to the event itself (so Herodo:us v, ‘4 Sophocles, OT, 739) or the person affected (so Plato, Phaedo sa: ny experiences"), the latter typo of use considerably enlarged into ethical Girections, as for example, in the “instructive euffering” of the trusediuns (scr Aeschylus, Aga, 177). Philosophical speculation gos off into two different dicections from this point, investigating fatnos as both *wiiat happens to bodies” and “what happens to soule,? the frst under the geaeral rubric of qualities, the second under that of em>- tions. The bridge Js provided by tie sateslaliss theorleo of oonsation that reduce sense knowledge to a pathos of the senses that, in turn, is i i rarmos | 259 capable of triggering the patie of the soul 2, But to discuss the paihe as “what happens to bodies” is to set the terms in way they were not understood until tae time of Plate, He was certainly capeble of distingu'shing between a body (or subject) und what happens to it (see Tim. 492-502), but there is lictle evidence that the pro-Secralics were capable of such distinctions and the implied Isolation vf a “queliy"s Jie pre-Socratic wiceswor of quality, Zyaamts (qx). was looked upon as a “thing” This is perfectly cient in Anaxagoras’ treatment of the “Seeds” (see stoicheiom 11-12). At frst there ie only a mixture (meigma) that containe “all things [ebvomata] together” (fr. 1), and these latter turn out to be not only the conven. tional Empedoclcan stoichcia but the pathe/dynamets 2s well: the moist and the dry. the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark (fr, 4). None of these is perceptible, because they are fused in the mefyma, 3. By the instigation of a rotary motion by nous various “seeds” sare separated off (apokrisis) and they too contain a portion of every- thing but are qualitatively distinct (se® fr. 4, init.), presumably due to the precominance of one ot other of the athe. Why are they not therefore perceptiblet They are not perceived because of their minute sive und itis uily when dhey eacuviate (serkriais) that these letter become perceptible and sensibly the predominance of one type of constituent (Aristotle, Piys. 1, 1870) 4 Tn Atomisen the pathe have a more restricted role. In this view there exist orly atoms (atone, qv.) exd the vold (Renton), and the former hsve only two qualities, size and shape (Diels 684975 perhaps also weight, see Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 1, 26a, though this seems 2 later addition to Atomism:; see Ainesis), This leads to the position that all perception and, indeed, all sensible knowledge may be reduced to comtnct or touch (haphe; Aristotle, De sense 442n; on the question of intellectual knowledge, see ncecis 6). We are aware of other types of sense expeciences, of course, but they are merely subjective anc ea ventional (nome), passive imprewoiune (pede) of de aenace to which ‘we accord some type of reality (Theophrastus, De sens. 61,63). 5. What is clearly at stake here is the distinction Between the active powers (dumemeit) inherent in things and that have the capacity 10 uct (paiein) and passive activations (futhe) of the bocy acted upen (paschein, q.v.). Democritus bad severely delimited the active quali: ties (paien, q.v.) by rejecting the entire pre Socratic mecheniaza of ‘the opposites” (enaaia, g-v.) and reducizg all “activity” to touch. ‘Thus his stress on the cubjective quality of cence krowlodge would appear to be tho reoclt of purely theoretical considerations, shocgh it ‘greed with the mors othieal otraino of roletiviom, (oriich had epiatuimur logical corollaries) being promulgated by the Sophisis (see norizs).as4 | parnos 6. In Plsto the ethical pathe appecr, at least in places, as a function of materiality: they appear in the moral, corporeal parts of the soul and are present there a a resclt of the sou?s conjunction with the body (Tim. 42a-b, 69c). He follows the Atomist position both in making the paths a species of perception and in attempting to reduce sensation (aisthesie) to contact (ibid. 61c-B3¢). Where le departs from te Is In noting: ther whien the cunlacts are excessive Uhre septs pleasure and prin Ghid. 64e-6gh). This rather materialistic explana- tion is not Plato's only or final word on the subject (see hedone 2-3), but i a intorocting in that it provides the link between father 28 a physical quality nnd paihos as an ethical phenomenon. 7. Tie ethical side of the patke is roveeled by other considera tious. Plaio holds. again. in places, the triparttion of the soul (see psyche 15). Ave the pathe characteristics of all paris of the soul or only of the two Tower and corporeal parts? Plato isnot at all clear on this. fn the Timaeue (lee. ei. and Bg¢—) they seem to be excluded from the logistiton, while in the Lows (Sg7a) and Phaedrus (e4gc) this is not 50, Indeed, the whole doctrine of the tripartite scul seems to be based on the reccgnition of the existence of conficting athe, and we are told guite clearly in the Republic (580d, p84u) tnt cued part uf dae wal Lae its own appropriate pathe, To all appearances Plato never quite recon- ciled the incoxporecl, separate, and somewhat remote logistiden, per- hape derived from Pychagoresnism and necessary to is theory af paiingenesic and a knowledge of the eide, with the more “engaged” soul of his ethical anelyses of conduct. 8, In Afeta, roasb Aristotle succinctly resumes his predecessors’ ruse of pathe xs experiences of a body. Since he bas already di guished dynamis (q.v.) into its two meanings of power and potential- ity, pathos may be used in both these senses or, to locate it within the category of subsience and accident, it ts a capacity tor change in & subject (ypokeimenem) or else the actual change itself, and pertiou- larly qualhstive change. Thus change in the category of quality (ol olusis, alteration) is defued a9 “change [mceadola] wich respect 0 pathos” (ifete. 10836; for its difference from genesis, change with respect to cusia, see stoicheion 15). ‘In the Behies Asistotle givoe his fall attention to the paske of the saul. In the Phaedrus (245¢) Plato had alrendy described the soul as the subject of experiences (Pathe) and the source of activities (erea), and Aristotle makes these the subject mattar of morality (Eeh. Nich. 11, 1106b; see Pravis; the third staie of the soul, Kew, qo 18 merely ont dispcsition toward the other two). Virwe consists in a rat's achieving a mean position (meso, qv.) with respoct to thera; 30. ‘The truly psychi nature of the pethe fs illustreted by the fact prnas | 255 that they are accompanied by pleasure or pain (ibid, 11, 1103b). But this is not to be construed es indicating that they are completaly immaterial even though they are the effcets of the incorporeal soul. The pothe are always accompanied by certain purely physical changes aud it is for this reason that the peyche cannot be considered a separate substance but rather the entelecheia of a body (De an. 1, 40gu). And ‘when the same ertterion 1s appitet to ve nots, is very Ine of peune suggests that itis immortal (:bid. 1, 408); see now, a1. By the time Atomiom appears ia its Epicurean version, the Platonic end Ariotorelian refinements on puthe con be marked, "The subjective element, prominent in Democritus, has been tempered (see holon), and while the patie are still essentially tactile sensations, they are-nentilistingished hy the eaneamitant presence of pleasnre or pain. It is these latter that now become the center of attention in that they reflect the appropriateness (oikeion) or nonappreprizteness (ellotrion) of the object pereeived and thus provide etiteria for the choice of good and evil (DL. x, g4, 129; see hedone. Vor the newly expanded cole of “appropriateness” in Stoiciem, see oikeiosie). 32. Apparently Zeno held that all the pothe, which were defined as “excessive Ampulses” (hormal, q.v.; essentially the same idea is expressed in Tim. 42a-b), were itrational movements of the soul (DL. vit, 110), while Chrysippus preferred the more intellectualist position of looking upon them an a atate of the rarfonal facsty (Rego ‘monikion; SVF rit, 459, 1, 89g; see aisthesis §, noes x7). For the Stoic the virmous life consists not in finding a mean for the athe, as in Aristotle, but in extiepating them entirely, The wise mao, then, is one ‘who has resched the stage of agatheia (q.v.). The four main pathe exe pain, fear, sire, and pleasure (D.L. vit, 110; they arc defined SF mnt, ‘3915 compare the Platonic and Aristotelian lists in Tim. 4za~b and Evh. ‘Wich. 11, 1205); see also noesis 17), For the pavke of matter, see paschein, dynamis, poion, oncmaa; for the care of the ethical pathe on the homoenparhic princinle, Ratharsis; for the ) wedheie; fur Uucir vounection wich perception, aisthesis, reas pérae: Limit ‘Though the notion of limit is obviously an ingredient in Anaxi- mender’s apeiron (absence of internal determination? ), i: begins to pley a formal role among the Pythagoreans for whoa, un Aristotle's testimony, it was, together with the unliuited, ex ultimace principle of reality, standing bebiod even number (eta, 986). Limit stands at the head of ouc of the Pythagorean tables of opposites cited in Meta. 3060, aut in Dut. Nev. 11000 ly explicldy connected with che Good. ‘The Pythagorean peras may be related to their discovery of nnmerical356 | PHANIASIA proportions in musicel harmony (see Aristetle, De coelo apobae). Suck seems to be the intent of Plato's use of peras in Hil. agc—at for its etica implications ce msten egthon hermani Tor limit as « fector in the definition of number, eve poven; for a possible Plotinian adaptation, aisthesis, pliautasta: iruagivtivn, inupression Fret ses the term phanresa a a blend of jcgment and perce: tion (Theaet. x¢54). For Aristotle imagination (phantasia) is an fnter= modisey betwoen peresiving (sietherie) and thinking (nnevie), Ne an. it, 427b-gaga (compnce the analogous position of phaniasia in Plo- tiaus, Ena, 1y, 4, 12). It is a motion of the soul caused by sensation, process that presents an image which may persist even after the per- ‘ception process disappears, Phantesia is defined by Zeno es ‘an impres- sion in the soul” (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Muh. vn, 296), an “inne pulse from the outside” capable of being grasped (Ratalepsis) by the soul and asserted to (Cicero, Acad, past. 1, 11, 40-42). Its sersnal nature was changed from “impression” to alteration” by Carysippms (Sextus Empivieus, Ade. Mata. vit, 228-252, 2g3) who also main- ludined ska it wud not the Latalepais was the criterion of trats (Dil vst, 54; sex hatolepais). Tor the role of “entasizing” in the creation of “False pleasures,” see Aecome: for further temarkes on its vale in intellention, noesis jlosophia: love of wisdom, philosophy ‘use the term philosophia (see D.L, 1, 1% Cicero, Tuse. v, 3, 8), and endowed the word with a strongly religious and ethical sense (contrast, the neutral “Ionian” usage in Hercdotus t, 30), which can best be seen sheared age a er chee en In Aristotle it has lost these Pythagerena overtones (the same process is visible in Plalo, see phroncsis}: phiiosophia bas are pe a seeking ont causes (Meta, 1026a), In the same passage Aristotle men- tions “rst philosophy” (prote philosophia) or “theology” (see theolo- gia; “metaphysics” is a later word) that has as its object not mutable things as does physics (also called “second philosophy,” éid. 10378), or those connected with matter, as does mathematics, but heing (on) chat is exernal, immutuble, and separated from matter. This is the snme icnce celled sophia in Meta. g8ono¥ga. 2. The een of philosophy into physical, ethical, and logical probably gocs back te Stoicism (D.L. vit, gg; Cicero, Acad. post. 5, embrace the practical as well as the theoretical: sce Cicero's definition, ruzoxrsis | 157 De fin. 11, 2, 4.28 ar8 vitae; 02 exphia, ourenon, For the methodology of philosophy, see aporia, dislekttke, ene acon. phord: locomotion According to Aristotle ail Iocomotion can be reduced to 1) circu- Jar motion around a center, or a) restimear mation toward or away from a center (De ccelo 268). Circular motion is primary (Be coelo 2690; Pye, vant, s650-265u) xd ig the natural motion of cither, the Gfth clement from which the Meavouly Ludiee ae unde (De cueto sgt—270b), while the rectilinear movious axe natural to the other four clement; set hinesie,soiebeion, phrénésis: wisdom, practical wisdom, prudence i, There was always believed to be some sort of intellectual control in virtue, witnese the remark of the Cynic Antisthenes (D.L. v¥t, 13) and Pleto, Rep. vt, sosb where the Cynics are probably referred ‘0-45 identifying the good with phronesis. For Socrates this intellectual insight into the transcendental ethical velucs becomes synonymous swith vinnie (areve), see Xenophon, Mem. 111, 9, 4: Flato, Gorg. 4600; Meno 881-Sx (but compare Phaedo Goa, where it is nly one ingredient of true arete); Aristotle, Eth. Nioh. 1144. ‘With Ploto'a more metashysieal concerns phroncsts begins ww lose its practical enc ethical coloring until it means the intellectual contemplstion of the eide (see Rep. 5osa ff), ond in the Philobus itis ‘commonly used a5 2 synonym for nous ax the highest type of knnvel- edge (222, 20d, 65b; sec hedone), a usege commen enough among the preSoctaiics in their discussions of the similarities und differences between sense knowledge and thought (see avthesis, noesis). In che carly Croivepticus (fe. 52) Ariscote still holds the Platonic position, but in E’h. Nich, vt, 11400-b phronesis is once again restricted to che oral sphere, while the theoriz side of the Platonic phronesia is sepa rated as (ibeneceal) wistom (sophia), s€e 108d, r14gb—a1450. De- spite his hedonism ghronesis still plays « central role in Epicarus (DL. x, 1g1), as well as in Stoicism (Plutarch, De vit, mor. a; SVF 11, 258), and Platine (Pn. 3,2, 751, 6,6)- (On the seat of phroncais, see kardia.198 | PHTRORA phthoré: passing away, corruption Phthern, ae the term of the process known as Binesis, is 2 correla tive of genesis, the beginning o! the process, and must be seen in that context (sc Anaximander, Diels 1251), Thus, beings that are without inesis, ke the on of Parmenides (fr. 8, line 26) and the eide of Plato (Phaeda 7a), lack bot genesie and “passing away” (sce Parme- aides, fr. 8, line 27 where the corollary is specified). Within the world of he sensibles (eistheta) Plato had 2 highly developed analysis of change (see metabote) In which geneels-phrtore occur nthe category of what is for Aristotle “substantial change.” Tn one of these psssages (Laws Soqa) there is a quasi-delinition of pithora as “change into another conctitiutien [henio].? In Ariototlo genooia io perpetual because cach phthora is, in effect, a new genesis (De gen. et corr 1, 9182); see genesis. ‘The questinn of the eneruption af the hosmes is discussed under aphthartos, and thet ofthe sou! under athena!os, physikés: student of physis (9.v), natural philosopher See sheologia, aphairesie, ergon. phjsis: nature 1. Although the word tise fs rot serongly attested until ne tis of Heraclitus (it does appear earlier in the tities of works by Anaxi- ander and Xeuoplianes), itis clear that the inquiry which uses the methodological approach Ienown ac loge and Inter known by Pythrge~ sas 48 philoscphia (g.v.), had, a8 fs general subject matter, physi Such was the understanding of both Plato (see Phaedo ofa) and “Aristotle (fete, 20058) who ealls the easly philosophers physio, i.e, those concerned with physis. It meant these different but connecied things: 1) the growth precess or generis (so Empedocles, frs. 8, 83: Plato, Laws Sac; Aristolle, Phys. 19gb); 2) the physical atu? cut of which things were made, the arche (q.v.) 12 the sense of Urata (60 Plato, Laces Soxe: Avistotle, Phys. 180b, agg); and 3) a Kind of internal organizational principle, the structure of things (so Heracti- rus, fr. 1233 Dauner, fr. 232) ‘2, Meanings 1) and 2) must he seen in the context of the theism of the pre Sccratics: this “stuf?” wae alive, hence, divine, hexce immor- tel and inderteuctible (gee Avictotlo, Me an. 1, a1va, Phys. 11, 2028-1 Plato, Laws gra; compere Zpincmis ggid). ‘Thus the physis of the ‘arlieat philosophers had movement and life, but with Parmenides! emphatic removal of Kinesis from the realm of being (see on), the hollon of piyais was in clfcct destroyed, the initiation of movement essing to outside agents, eg, the “Love and Strife” of Empedocles aa vuysts | 159 (sce Diels, &. 91428) and the nows (q.¥.) of Anaxagoras, o, and in the eyes of Plato this is the more religiously pemicious doctrine (Laws S842), movement was random and necessary, probably a reference to the Atomists (see éyche). Wha: Plaio finds faulty in contemporary views of physis is its materiality (Lewy yeh) and the abseace of éesign (teohne; see Soph, 2652). It was to costec: these two misconcep- ‘ond that Plata substitaced payche (¢.¥.) 98 8 sonre® oF movement 4g. With Aristotle there is a general rehabilitation of #ysis that tales over many of the fonctions of the Platonic poyche: itis defined, (Diya. 4, agsb) aa “the principle Larede] and oxsoe [atti] of motion and vest for the things in which it is immediately present.” Like payche, it is spiritual because itis primarily form (Phys, 1, 1936), end it works toward an end (ielos: Phys. 11, 1p4). Two difficulties arise: iu replace ing psyche with physis Aristotle has severed the connection between movement and life, and, on the other hand, hetween purpaae (teioe) and intelligence (nous). The fist is solved by extending physis down into che realm of the inanimate elements and positing the doctrine of “natural movement? for each (see stoicheian, hinoun 8), but in Phys, ‘vint he reverts 10 a more Platonic position: “ensouled,” ie, living, tings, have withla them both the principle of movement and the initiator of movement, and they thus differ from inanimate things that Ihave within them the passive (Qaschein) principle of movement, but not the active (poisin), which eansequanily must operate frem cutside (Phys, vier, aggb=256a) : thus all motion, in effect, requires an efficient case (incu). On the second question, the connection between telos and nous, he ‘s likewise ambivalent: juxtaposed in Pius. 31, 1098 are two arguments for the teleology of physis, one of which suggests the [Presence of nous while the other denies ic. 4, Stoic monism led to the identifiestion of God-nature-fire (SVF 11, 1027; Cicero, De ra. deor. 1, 22, 57). 40 its immanent, active role physis is fogos (Seneca, Dz benef. 1¥, 7) and, on the level of the individucl existent, the logci spermatitoi (q.v.). Itis a moral principle, dn thee the purpose of man wan live harinoatuusly with nature Cor the Stoic “nstural” morality and the theory of the interconnection of nature, see tomor and sympatheia respectively ). 5. Plorimes' daetring of natnra is henna vp with hie viow of sol; both the soul of the universe (see pryohe tox pantaa) and the individ ual, immanent souls of men have two different aspects: an upper, contemplative side, soul proper (though in Enn. 1¥, 4, 19 i is called Phronevic), end a lower sige, physi, that's forever turned away from nous and whose reaultan: weaksaing of is conteraplative power causes it to lapse from Peoria into activity (praxis); it produves not auechank cally but 29 w weakeued feu of wuiemplacion (Baa. sit, 8, 2-3). ‘Within the individual physis is the vegetative faculty that operates360 | rismis without thought and without imegination (Emm. 1v, 4, 33)s see poyehe, telos, pistis: 2] farth, beliet (subjective state) ; 2] something thai instills belief, proof 2) ‘The term occurs both in Permenides (ir. 2, line go: fr. 8, line 450) wie In Eaupedlocles (fre. yy 4p 144), Dur Fes doubetul whiclter els being nsec! in any technical sense. In Plate’s “divided line? the mental states thet are not true knowledge (episieme) but have to do rather swith Mopinion” are divided into two claseoa: one hae to do 00 (cikonze) of sensible things, while the other, described as pietis, is the perception of sensible things (Rep. soge-a1c). Pistis docs not play an important role in Aristotle's epistemology. rather, be was concerned with it in the context of the relationship between proof and conviction; 2) pistis (subjective conviction) is the object of the art of rhetoric. (Rhet.1, 1985), and the varicus means of persvasion are on‘lined in Ret. 1, 13560. pléthos: plurality Aecording s Avistude (Acta sys) « pluselity potentially divisible into noncontinuous (me syneches) pars. Thus one possible definition of number (arithrnos, qv.) is 2 flethos with limit” (eras) ow. eit.). Thi discrete, sumerable quantity Cason) that ie plethos is thus contrasted with the continuous, measurable quantity that is magnitude (megethos, q.v.) For the final Plazonie solvtion to the problem of the One (hen) and the many (plethcs), see trias §. UUnat bias pneiima: air, breath, spirit, spiritus 1. Prewme, which means oir of breath (the cognate Greek verb js used in both senses in Homer), is used in the former sense when it first appears in Anaximenes. Prewma or aer, he says, binds the hosmos togcthcr jast as our payche, wich io aloo wor, binds together our body (fr, 9; the language of the fragment has impressed any es being somewhat too “modem” for the genuine sentiments of Aneximencs). ‘Vhe identification of aiz and breath, implicit in, the analogy of Anaxi- sneaee, is made explicit by the Pychagorsas when they maintain that preuma end void are inhaled by the universe (Avistotle, Pays. 1¥, 21gb). 22, But the connection of respiration and the vital principle leaps, as it dees in the concopt af payehe itlf, to a further connection with Cognition in the speculation of some fifth contury weitere. According to Dingeuss uf Apollonia, scr (gur-) fo tho arshe of all things and the swarm air witha us ‘s soul (Er. 5; the same passage points out that the air within us is warmer than the surrounding air but considerably panera | 761 cooler than the air arourd the sun; compare Cleanthes, 4 infre and see nous), We are then told (‘Theophrastes, De sens. 50, 44) that itis the source of cognition, both sensation (sistliesis, qu.) sad Hiought (ghre- nests). The interval air must be dry and hot (compare Hereclitus’ ery soul) and circulates through the body with the blood (see kardia). A simviar theory appears smang the medical writers (see De morbo sacra 36) Aristotle continues to make use of feuma in ite ordinary senses of air, breath, and wind, but he introduces, in addition, aome- thing called Sanate (symphyder) prewme bat %9 oun ye uf lly Foamy substance analogous in composition to the elemeat of whicls the scars are made (for he grow:h of this suggestion into the astral body ff the Nenplatonists, ser ackemaa). Tt stents from the heart anal ite funetion is to provide the sensitive and kinetic link between the physi cal organs and the posiche (see De gen. anir. 11, 736a-7yza). This fmewma is present in the sperm and transmits the nutritive and sensi tive soal from progenitor to offsprirg (iid. 7350). ‘4 Aristeties philosophicel interest in prowrna was not considera- ble, but it is given a centrel position by the Stoics. Prewme is a compost of alr ane five (SPT 1, 442) and itis x Leated version of this that is soul (bid. 1,195). This fnewna, whieh is innate (symphyton), is circulated with the blood throughout the body (ibid. 11, 885; se peyehe 28) tn the came way that God, who ia alco called pmowona, i sptead throughout the kevmas (iBid.: see Poseidonius’ view, ibid. 1009), varying only by its degrees of tension (tonoe, q.v.). Each pneumatic aystem hes its hecemoniton (qv) or ruling part: that of man in the heart (Aardia, q.v.)s that of the &zrrmas in either the aither (q.v.i 89 Zeno snd Chrysippus, ibid. 11, 642-644) ox in the sun (so Cleanthes, tid. 1,499), 5 Suck a materialistic view of the soul found little sympathy among either the Aristotelian furctionalists or the Platonic adherents 0° a divine, immaterial soul. Plotinus suggests (Fn. 1v, 7, 4) that the Stoles themselves, uf ive veriute comet, saw tay inadequacy of thelr Views and sn were constrained to add to the hylic pneuma some sort of Qualitative or formal notation, celling it “intelligent [eartoun] prewna” or Mntellectnal [wcevoal] fee ® 8. But even before the time of Plotinas ether currents were transforming the Stoic concep. Some Stoics were themselves disengage ing the hegemoniten from the comoreality of pucuma (see nur). potion strongly suggested by Whe Stoic ethic that drew a shazp distinc tion, moral and intellectual, Letwsen man znd the other animals (see Gleero, De leg. 15 7, 203 Sencee, Ep. 121, 14). There was, moreover, the Fadece Chistian veligivus wadicua chat mde the same distinction though it continued to use the expression pacuma or spirits, ‘employed i¢ ia u spiritaalized, nonmatertal sence, Thus Philo describes162 | rors man as crested of an earthly substance and a divine spirit (sheton pmeume), but goes on to point cut, commenting Gen. 11, 7, that the atter is « part (or as ke calls it, “a colony”) of the divine nature, and this is nous (De opif. 135). poicin: to act, action Audin is vue uf die Wau Aststotlica kutcgoriet Houcd in Cate ab-2a; his examples are “cuts,” “burns.” Boll action and passion (paschein) admit of contraries and degrees (ib¥2, 1ub). But in a ethical contort Aristotle Fitingnifshos (F#h Nick. vi, 11408) herwee oicin, in the sense of “to produce” (hence poietike apisteme, produc tive acience) from prattein (to act), (hence prabtite episteme, pract- cal science); see paschein, poietibe, praxis, episteme, engcn. poigtiké (scil. episteme): 1] productive science, ai 2] poetics 1) ‘The proper term used by Anstotle tor the productive or applied science is fechine (9.v.); 2) the poietibe techne par excellence is poetics, to which Aristoile devoted an entire tretise, which is only putilly precs rel. 046 iétés: what kind, quality Bomnoces ditingnshed hetwernptany quaies based. on the shape and characteristics of the aiomon, and secondary or derived ‘qualitles, like sweet, bitter, warm, cold, etc, which ace conventional (Sextus Empiriens, Adz. Math, vit, 135) end essentially subjective and passive (see pathe). Some of Plato's eide are, of course, hyposta- tized qualities, e.g, the ethicel quslities in Parm, 130b; and.yet Plato, ‘who was the first to use the abstract ovictes (Theaet. 280), was wall aware of the difference between quality and substance (see Pi. ays— ‘504; for Plato's theory of sensible qualities, see aisthesis). Poios is one of the ten Aristotelian kategor‘ai listed in Gat. 1b~2n and discussed iid. Shue (compere patho), Ia Epicure the primary qualitics of tha atoma are shape, size, and weight (the latter ua addition to Demoerk tos), DLL. x, 54. Stoic materialism demanded that even the qualities of the sayehe be bodies, SVF rr, 7a7: see enantia, diymams, symbebehos, genesis. pénos: pain Bocaisthcsi, epatheia, Redone. ppos6u, posdtés: how much, quantity Sue uF the tea Avstuilian dategeriad Fisted in Cat. xb an and discussed ibid, 4b-62, Time is continuous quantity, as is space, ibid. rroarrssis | 163 ga. In the Epicureen ethic quantity and not quality is the criterion for the choice of plessure, Eusebius, Prac. Evang. XIV, 21, g; see mege- thre, hecione. pote: when, time joe af the fon Avisintelian baegaviad listed in Cat. thea own examples are “yesterday,” next year”, see chrenes his pou: where, place One of the ten Aristotelian kategorii listed in Cut, rb-2a; see topos. raldiké (scl. episteme): science of action 0 praxis, préwis: action, activity ‘According to Aristotle, when sctions follow upoi a deliberate choice (proairesis) they may be fuged moral or immoral (£#. Nien. 3, 3b), and hence fall within the scope of the “practical” sciences (episteme praktikci), ie., ethies and polities, which have as their object die gud aut fs sine at Ly action, ii fd. sogqa-B see ergor. roaitsiz deliberate choice ough there must have been some previous discussion of morel choice (see Aristotle, Euh. Nich. 111, 1115), the first preserved creat- ‘ment is that of Aristotle (bid. nib—1115a) ‘who defines it (12230) a8 an appetite, guided by deliberation [éculeusis], tor things within cur power.” Choice is always of means; i¢ is only wish (ouesis) that is Airected coward the end (ibid. 121b; see Rincun 9). Two things ere to be noted about chetee. it is precisely this thet brings human actions (praxeis) within the tezlm of morality; secondly, by positing this volnn- trry act (itis not pare voluntacism; proairesis is preceded and based Upon the intellornal net af Koulousiny aan iid. v1 4nn), Aristotle moved Aiscussions of morality out of the area of intellection (the Socratic post tions see arcic, kakon) into that of will. The carly Stoa embraced the intellcetualis: position (arate = cpisteme; sce SVF 111, 256), but with Eplctetus progiresis once again becomes central; itis the condition of man’s liberty (Diss. 1 29). Yet, even here there fsa strong intellecinal= ist strain. Proairesis is preceded by diairesia, the distinction between whit i oue's powes aud wh fs aut (Disa. 11, 0,45 y sms) aud pro céresia ftselé seems more like judgment then choice (Ibid, mt, 9, 1-2).264 | pronresis puilépsis: prior grasp, anticipation, preconception In the Epicurean epistemology there was one ultimate: critesion of truth, sensetion (aisthesis: gee also alezhieia): but there were. as well, the subsidiary criteria of the emotions (patho; ser iedane) and a mental apprehension deseribed by Epicurus as protepsts (DL. x, $1), and by Lucretius as notitie (De rerum nat. 1v, 496). Protepsis operates in mach the same way as the Stoic ctalepels (q.6.), except that the prolepsis is the result of « xepeated apprchcnsion of the samac typ: of object, eg. men, and hence is @ universal concept, a kind of residual, composite “Mani” bused on imny seusadions uf “iueuc” Tk provides a kind of standard against which the truth of subsequent apprebens'ons can be jndged. ‘The Stoies used frolepsis in much the same manner (thu for both Epicure ard the Stoa we have a prolepwie of the godes compare Cicero, De nat. deor. r, 444 and SVF 11, 1009 and noesio 13), but under the ttle of “common concepts” (see ennaia) developed it to a considerably greater extent, pronoia: forethought, providence 1. The earlier history of the concept of providence is to be seea ia the emergence, from Diogenes to Aristotle, of a notion of an inteuigent purpose (telos, q.v.) operating in the universe, In all of these thinkers itis clesrly associated with the intelligent God whose features begin to appear lv dhe later Plaw (eee Lae 6gy whete tke denial of pronoia is rickened blasphemy) and ia Aristotle. For the Stoics the immanent Logos governs all By nous and pronoia (D.L. vit, 98; SVF 1, 176). It js given « aew tara in the direction of anthranacentriem hy Cheysipgne (see Porphyry, De abstiuentia 11, 20) whore the rest of the Basics is subjected to the good of man, Stoie proncic, ientifiad as i was with ‘phasis, was essentially immanent. 2. Later Platonism, like the newly appeated Senciic tradition, was transcendent and believed in a series of intermediate deities (see dairaon)., with the result that pronoia began to be distributed through the entire range of deities (Plutarch, De fato 57af-279b; Apulelus, De Platonz 1, 12). As the supreme principle grows more remote, its direct invelvetacnt in pronoia becomes markedly less. So in Philo, De fuze aut, the Logos cacrciscs providence through the immanent dynameis, just as in Plotinus (Enn, 1, 8, 2) the World Soul has a general providence and the individual souls a perticalar providence for the Frvdioe they inhahits the One, of course. is beyond providence (Even. +1 8, 37). Implicit in this distinction Tetween general and particular providence, ie., between command and exemntion, 1s the teconcliladon Of the neceesary transcendence of Gad and the necessary Iimmanence of providental activity; compare Frocius, klem. thect., prop. 123. For te problems arising from the existence of evil in a provider wnyoous | 185 tial system, see kakon; on pronoia without ecntact, sympatheia; on Ged's knowledge of perticulars, noetoa 4. proddos: going torth, procession 1. In its most general terms “procession? is later Platonism’s sctempl to solve che Parmeni¢ean difficulties of unity and plurality. 12 ue ue (lem) i sand iy uausceeat (see Mypercustad, whee che subsequent plurality of the kasraas? Plotinus, who faces the question on varions levels (e.g. the nnity and plnrality of the soul in Em. 10, 3, 2 6; see pryche), frequently revorts 49 metaphosieal oxplanssions, and. particularly to the figure of the sun and its rays (see ehlampsie). But the metaphysical basis of the solution to the question “if ons, why many?” rests on the nature of the Onc, and pertioularly its perfection Celos; Ea. ¥, 4), and the identification of the effcieat and fal cause (see Tim, 2g¢ and compare Zr. 1¥, 8, 6; Vy 4, 15 hence the later bomum xt diguszoum sui). 2, This provides the ingredients tor Froclus' more. systematic derivation of the Aypastares (¢.v.). He begins (lem. thea, prop. 21) by citing @ mathematical parallel of the series generated from the smonae (gp). Lor Proekes this ie a bettor figure than eldsnypais since St allows transit ia both cirections in the series, thus permitting the Important ethical correlative of procession, “return” (—A94c, be the primary moxion with which the extn logue ends, “real? motion thet moves itself and that is the arche of hinesie (Lows x, Sggb; compare Phaedrus aazd). He is prepared to go even further, Self motion io the caoence (ctate) and deSnition of the soul (Phecdrus 2450). 20, Aristotle takes up this theory in De an. 1, 4o6b-4o7b and objects to it on a number of scores. but chiefly because he thinks that thereby Plato has reduced the soul to a magnitde (raeeethoa, qv.) To his way of thinking the Kinesis would have to be eizcular locamotion (see noesie) go that Plato like Democritus, has the soul move a bady by being in motion itself, instead of seeing’ that the soul moves things by beitg their final cause and thus may ba said to originate movement by thought (noesic) or choice (proairess; ibid. 1, 4066). For Aris- totle’s ocher upprouches to the question of the suul as the archic of zinesis, see binoun 6 and phyzis 3. a1, He next deals with the view thet the soul is self-moved number, the theery of another member of the Academy, Nenoerates, (ibid. 1, 4o8b-4ogb; see Plutarch, De procr. on. 10128), Now number fs an aggregate of units (plethos monaden; see Meta. 10sga), and spart from the absurdities of applying the now popular fusion theory of moving points into lines, ere. (see crithmos), the theory of Xeno- crates appears open to the same type of mechanistic charges made ageinst Democritus. 22. Anstotle cuts into the heart of the pre-Socratic theories. The soul, it & true, is a moving principle, not in the mechanistic sense of Democritus or as he understood Plato and Xenocrates to say, but as the final caus, it moves by thought and desire (De ar sus, 4a3u-bi Mets rozaa-b; for some of the diffcalties involved in this, see sumpatheia 7). But itis not selfsmoved except accidentally (ibid. 1, 4osh-go6b), ince what moves athers docs not necessarily have to be in motion itself (Phye. vitt, 9560-238). 123. His own treatment, however, Geserts the category of Kinesis {arhich he shifts over to phyeio, q.v.) and moves in ancther direction. Enclier on, during his more Platonic period, Aristotle had crented the soul as if it were a complet= substonce (Eudemaz, fr. 45, 46) that hed Tie need of the body (Cbd fe. 4x)» Br inthe De ania iti que fs en individuel being, a todo fi (quv.), and one such Is the “living or ensoaled body” (soma empsy- rsvems | 173 chon) composed of « material (Ayle) and a formal (eidos) principle. ‘The latter is the soul end if it is approached from the direction of function (ergon; se2 energeia) it may be defined (ibid. n, 412) ze the first (Gc. not necessary operating } entelecieéa (q.v.) ct an organic body (see holon). 24, Plato ftequently gives the impression that he is more inter- ested In svul dian i the suul, The proof of iumuwiility abeady ced from the Phaedruy is set out to cover “all soul.” In the detatled passages in the Timeeus, moreover, where Plato descrihes the eampast- From of the coul from ite alamonts Coghaghh), it is the World Sout (psyohe tow pantes, o.7.) to whish he sefers; the individual souls are second or third-rets versions of it (ibid. 41d), For Aristotle, however, itis the individual living being that is che paradigm and the method of approsch is to investigate its various activites, In this way he proceeds to an investigation of the faculties (dynameis) of the soul of a living organi 95, Plato had divided the soul i0to parts (1mere; see 15) and at times his language suggests that the parts of the soul are really uel souls within the same being (see Tir. Gde and the open question in Laws 1x 663b). Arintotle aloo calla thom parts, bat he treats them as faculties (see De an. 121, 4932), ie., dynaresie in the word's primary sense of the power to effect change in another or in ftxelf qua other (Meta, rogia and sce dyramis 3). There are a great variety of shese dymameis, but they are the mest appropriate way to siudy the nature of ‘the soul (Dr ar. 11, 41st), Aristotle proposes to work his way froma the most fundamental, the nutritive threptike (ibid. 11, 4148-4258), through the ascending series (each higher dynamis presupposes the existence of the lower), to the sersitive (aisthetihe; see aisthesis), and finally to the distinctive faculty of man, the noetike (see nows, noevis). 20, AcistoUe iy clear on ihe subject of personal immortal. Sino the soul isthe formal and final cause of an organically qualified body it canaot survive the dissolution of the union vwith that body, excopt, pechaps, ns port of the species (ibid. :1, 427). Diut thore ie nothing to prevent a faculty of the soul from being separable (cloristoms ibid. 35 4085) ond this is ecually eo inthe case oF the neu (a 400). 27, Tor Epicuras and Lucretius sou! is a compasite bnty made np of various atoms (D.L. x, 63). But this is a #2 ory from the mere ‘aggregaliun of ery atoms proposed by Demoeritus, First, the notion of bbedy hes Lceu refiner! wo that of sm aéganic compound (conctium; see olan 10}. Secondly, the relationship of the soul and the body is now specified as the atcma of the soul being spread throughout and con. tained within the shaath (otegevon) of tha body (DL. % 49> 6)- Tho stoma that go into the composition of the soul aze ap longer merelya4 | vevoue “ery” but include breath (fmeuma) and air (see Lucretius 1, aginagé). There is a more startling addition, the atoms of an “un named clement? that aro not like any of the others but ate subtler, smoother, and more mobile then any other kind of atom (D.L. x 63 ‘Aetius tv, 3, 115 the qaarta mutura of Lucretius 11, 241-257). It is this latter that begins the movements that are sensation (see cisthesis 23 fand hotor: to) and transmits them 1 the rest of dh: body (264, a1, 202, 281). 23. ‘The Stoic theory of soul illustrates the curiously qualified iatorialion of thotr positions. In a definition reminiccent of Meraclita the soul is material fire or heated pneuma (Cicero, De fin. 1¥, 125 D.Le vii, 157 and compare Plotinv®’ critique in Ean. 1v, 7, 45 further details oa the Stoic view under preuma 4-5). Tt has cight facultios: the hegemonikon (q.v.), the five senses, aad the speaking and generative faculty (SUF 1, 143: see naesis 15), exch represented by @ steam of pneuma stretched out to the appropriste organ and reaching back to the hegemonikon (SVF tt, 836) and relaying to it the varions sense impressions (phentasiai}, impulses (hormai), and aflections (pathe) towhich the senses are prone (for the revisions in Stoic psychology, soe nests 17). 2, The later Platonic tradition, with its highly developed theory of symputheia, expanded Plato's suggestion of the similarity of the paycha to the tide (toe a8 supre and compare sretexn 2) to give it a strongly emphasized medial position between the nocta and the eisiheta (see Simplicius, Ia De an. 1, 2, p. 90, citing Xenocrates; Plutarch, De proce. a2, roaib, citing Poseidonius; on the efforts to fill the gaps in the seala naturae, sce sympatkeia 3). Plotinus strongly affirms this (En. 1v, 8,7), but he also perceives the paradox in the Platonic view: how to reconcile the heaven-sent, immortal soul of the Phaedo and the Phae- idruz, whose sojourn in the body 1s compared by Plato to en incarcera tion, with the immanent and directive soul of the Timazus, which hes & distinctly benign funesion vis-2-us the organism (Enz. 1¥, 8, 1)? The fuusle raises the entire problem of the deseont of thy voul fate ‘ic fonction of soul seer. 48 ‘matver (see Aativodas); the latter, the vitals nature (physis). 50. Sev, taken an a cingle entity, is a hybostasis (<.v.). a pro duction of neue ond its image (ethon; Znn. v, 1, 2), and in turning toward nue it becomes itself fertilized and produces, in the opposite Aizection, various activities that arc a reflection of itself und the terms of which we sensation (aiechesis) and growth (v, 2,1). Soul, then, Dy the very nature of things has a double orientation: it is tamed toward ts souzee, the iatelig’Lle, and it is turned toward the world, which it vielen Coee nvests 20). i ‘ga. But the soul is more than a unflary dypostasiss its turning psyewn | 175 downward way from the One (en) has caused it to become multiple sand Plotinus is constrained to explain at some length the zclaticnship of the vatious souls that vitalize bodies to thc unitary Ayposiasis of which they are parts (1%, 1-8). They are not, of course, material pacts of material whole. They ere unified in that they have x common origin and a natural operation; they are civergent because they operate in and ovor dillerent hedtes (1¥,3, 4)- Ths gives rise nor only to plnrattey of touls but also grades of sonls (1¥, 3, 6), ranging from the Werlé Soal (payohe tou pontor), which is still close to the intelligible source anc saline activition axe consequently closer to that of revs, down te the souls of plants, the furthest extension of the soul principle away from sous. The distinction is a useful one: the unitive natace of soul ensbles Plotinns to affirm the systematic structure of the plural souls in terms of cosmic syrapatheia (q.v.: see En. 1, 3, 8), and the distinction of agences provides o basis for a continued belief in reincarnation Coatin- igonesie; Ean. 3M, 4,5)- ‘ge. The Function of soul, then, is to vitelize and govern matter (e0e Baa. av, &, 3). How this is accomplished is explained in series of metaphors: the soul haminates matter like a light that, though remsin- ing at its poine uf urigin (ou this muvil, see prodtlay s), veudo fous its rays into a gradually deepening darkness. Or it vitaizes metter Sn the same way that a net, inert out of water, spteads out and seems to come alive when cast into the sea, without ut the sume time affecting the sex Gy, g, 9). It is in this fashion that che soul of the universe affects its body, the sensible kosmos. 239. AS for the individual souls, the question here is considerably ‘more complex due to the obvious diversity of functions. Aristotle's view of the soul as an entelecheia of the body seems to suggest ‘co close a functional connection between the soul of the body and Plotinus rejects ic Cn. 1¥, 7, 8). Instead he turns to the microcosmic principle: each Iuman soul hes, like the World Soul, a “pert” that remains turned toword the intelligible and is umaffectel by the descent into the body (rw, 9, 42). But dhe fact that it has gone forth to « kody, from the heavenly bodies (ouranist) down to the plants, leads to a dimimtion of the nctural power of the soul. ‘Thns its normal nondiscursive intellec- ‘tual activity (see norsis) degenerates to lower forms of activity: theoria Secon dino tnd, evens, grate (1, 9, 38s yal 5 nots 34. The inva soul once Sn” the body. (the Tocetization ig ‘vl, of conrse, spatial; tho soul in “in” the body in the sume scasc that light is tin” the airy av, g, 235 sce Janda), sends ove a aon of ellections of itself, she frst of which is aisthesis, followed by the ‘ther feosttien (1,4, 6). These enable Un auatesiel Lely Gr aut ‘without in any way affectiag the soul (1, 1, 6-7) see aisthesis 20-27).276 | Psyenr rou Panos 435- Proclus begins his treatment of the soul by applying to it his fomiliar doc:rine of the mean (see trias). There are three types of soul: the divine Gncluding the souls of the planess; see ouraniai and, for ‘their influence, achema 4), those capable of passing from intellecticn to Sgnorance (see mocsis 21), and an intermediate grade that is always in ct but inferior to the divine souls (Elem, theol., prop. 284). Th miedeclig prude, In addivion ws being demanded by Tuveius® principle, hed a previo history in the tradition. These are the dat- sioner already defined by Plato 2s intermedinries (Symp. oved), inte. ted by hie pupil Kenoceatee into the varioue grades of intelligence (logos; see Plutarch, Ds defec. crac. 416¢; and divided by Prochis into angeloi, daémconzs, snd hevacs (Ta Tir. 1 165, 11). 86. Plato's view of soul as substance is sill in evidence in Proclus where itis described (lem, theal., prop. 185) as both life (zoe) and ¢ living thing (oem). Tes intermediate position is affirmed (prop. 199), and, heving such, patticfpates in both sternity (aion, q.v.) by reason. of Sts ousia anc in time by reason of its energeta (prop. 193; see Flotinus, Enmn. w, 4, 38). Pelingenesia is still meintained (prop. 206), but Proclus denies that the soul can be reborn into animals (Jn Rem. 11, segs). ‘On the faculties of che soul, see aistheate,ncesis, nous, orenies its immortality, athanatos; descent into the world, athodes; periodic re- ith, plingenesia tis asteal hoy, arkena; for the interrelation of eet! and body ia Stoicism and Epicureanism, genesis; for atterapts at distin- guishing geyche from nos, naeeis; on the World Soul, psuche tow anton. psyché tou pintos: World Soul 1. The existence of a soul for the entire world seems to be another example of Plato's use of anclogous reasoning (see kcsrav: snoetoa): if the hosmes is thought to be a living organic unity (see 29%), it follows that it, like the other animals, must have a soul. This line of rexconing appease in Pol angd.azgb (hough here the pagehe is not yet a source of continuing mocion), in Pail. you, and, finally, in « completely integrated fashion in Tim. 343-37. Tt is composed by the demionrgos from intermediary types Ce., mixtures that combize ele- iments apprapriste to the inteliginle world of being and the sensible srorld of becoming) of Existence (ousia), the Same, and the Other, three of the five most important eide mentioned in Soph. 2344. Atis- totlcs axplanation of why these emxtures were cliosen is besed of the splstemological principle of “like knows like" (De on. 1, 4o4b; see Homoize, aisthocia). These ingredients are arranged in bands in certain Ihanmonie intervale. (Tire. ggb 96b); and thus the World Soul bo. comes, in trae Pythagoresn fashion, « paradigm aot only for the rye [377 ‘harmonious movement for the heavenly bodies, but for ethical restora tion of harmonia in the incividusl human soul (ibid. goc-d; see hathar- > yo te existence ofan evt World Soul nthe Hltanic system, sce akon. 2, Aristotle no longer needs psyche to cxplain motion (ste physi), aun) 00 the World Soul ia quiedly dropped. 1k scaypeatsy Luveves, in the late Platonic tradition (sce Philo, De migre. br. 22, 179-160; Albimus, Bpit, x, 3) aad becomes one of Plotinus’ hypostases (q.v.); Fam. v, 2, 1. The viewpain: is nove mich mare ramypiaws the World Soul has an upper and lower part, the former engaged in contemplation (theoria), the latter corrupted into activity (praxis) and called physio (q.7.); itis divisible yer incivisible (B'mn. 1¥, g, 4); unlike the World Soul of Plato, however, it produces the sensible world, Emm. v, 235 see protides. fire Mhough fe is present in the systems of both Ansximander (Diels, fr. 12410) and Anaximenes (1347), it is, for both of them, a product, while for Heraclitus, tha wniverra (harman) i « fire (Diels 20830), not as an areke bot rather as “archetypal matter,” probably because of its eonnectioa with psyche and life (ff. 96) and, hence, with aither (qxv.). Among the Pythagorenns fire held the eentral position in the universe (with the earth at a planet!), Aristotle, De eaela 1s, aggb. It was given its place as onc of the four elements by Empedocles (see stcicheion). Fire plays a fundamental role in Stoic physics as the element with the most active dyname, the hot (see dynam) . OF prime importance here is the coanection between fire and life (SVF 11, 93) and, through the intercnediacy of the payche, with the pnevma, the medically derived principle of vital eat, whivl the Sivies underetood 3a combination of fire and air (SVE rt, 767) and as sn all-pervasive force ia the Rasmas (ibid. 11, 473); see ebpyrasia, logos.thoé: flowing, stream, flux rom the time of Flato on, the position of Heraclitus and his followers, one of wom, Cratylus, apparently exercised some infuence con Plato (see Aristotle, Mete. 9872), wae described in terms of the metaphor of “fowing” or “streaming? (0 for Heraclitas, Plato, Crat, qoua; for his followers, Grats qgunad aul Ticuct, xzgda0ab; the ole brated expression “everything is in « state of ux” [panta rhei] docs not oceur until Simplicius, Pays. 1323, 11). Whether Heraclitus him calf ped the expression or whether, indeed, it ican exact description of his view of change may be cchated, but what is notable is that chis popular tag (the Heraclitans contemporary with Plaio were actually called “flowers”: Theact. 1812) was never conceptualized, Piato re- jects the implications of the metaphor, chieily because it renders know) ‘edge impossiole (Crat. 4goa-b, and see spistere), but when he comes to treat of it as a philosophical problem it appears under the rubric of “pecoming” (genesis, y.va; Theast, 1s2e-a338 18 ¢ good example of Plato's passing over the metaphor in preference for the more fully conceptnalized genesis) or, a3 in Aristotle, es part of the problem of “chunge” (see metabote, hixceis). Aa for as che technieal language of philosophy was concerned, rihoe was never mote than a striking imege. 278 schéma: appearance, shape See aistheeis, stoicheion. hia: wisdom, theoretical wisdom ‘The original meaning of the word connects it with craftsmanship, see Hamer, IL xv, 419: Fesicd’, Works, gx Cenmpare Aviertle, Reb Nich. vt, 13412). By the time of Herodotus it also embraced a more theoretical type of preeminence, Hist. 1, 29 (Seven Sages”), tv, (Pythagoras ts a sephisten), Hleracitas (Diels, fr. 129) saya oat Oke sophia of Pythegorae is nothing but polymuthy and malpractice. Fe Plato thore is an implied distinction between trac sophia that is €h object of philosophia (sce Phacdrus 278d) and that, like phronesis, is to be identified with true knowledge (episteme) (Thecet. 145€), Le", & Knowledge of the eide, and, on the ocher hand, the practioner of false sophia, the sophisies of the dialogue of the same name. For Aristotle ‘sophia is the highest intallectual virtue, dietinguiched from phronceia ‘or practical wisdom, (th. Nich. 21pie—b, a14g>-14ea), and. also identified with metaphysics, the prote phifesopia in Meta. 9S0a-963a, The “sage” (sophes) becomes the Stoic ideal of virtue, sce SVF 1, 216; tor, 548; D.L, vit, 151-309, and the eritical portrait in D.L. vrt, 12, and Cicero, Pro Mur, 29-31; sce also, philosophia, phronesi, episteme, endoxem, peokeesins: self-control, moderation 1. Sophroyne is the subject of one of Socrates’ ethical enquires, Es ii able aca a Soo oe os etymclogical meaning as “moral sanity” ig discussed in Crat, 4a1e, but the true Platonic pesition of sophrasyme is rooted in the Pydiagoreen ation of harmonia (q.v.). The twa caneapts are brought together in Rep. gor—4gaa, and later, 44s, it ic closely linked with Plat’s {eipartte division of the soul (see prycke): sophrocyne isthe harmool- eee of the two lower fares to the ruling, the rational part is es aedirue 2g70-298a where the harmonia cuibraces only two 2. For Aristotle sophresync is the mean (meson) between the extremes of pleasmie cin) pains (Gch, Mit i, 11070); ite atea is 479180 | SERIA restricted to body pleasures (did. 11, 11382) and perticulerly those of touch and taste. Zeno (Plutarch, Stoie repugn. 0942), like Plato (Rep. 4g5b)y makes sophroeyne one of the Four chief virwes (Eta. Nich. r, 11038). The more intellectucki2ing Stoa denied this distineticu (owe ureie), and defined sophrosyae as the "knowledge of the geod ta be chesen and the evil to be avoided” (SVF m, 296, 252). Plotinus has a similar definition (fn. 1, 0, 6, but relives tt m a purtfcerion Preparatory to the “return” (apintrophe); see katharss, spérma: seed Sec stcicheion, preuma, ncesie 36, spendains: serious man See ergon. stérésis: privation Sieresis, which Aristotle defines (/Meia, 10115) as “the negation of something within a defined class,” is one of the three essential clements in Aristotle's analysis of genesis in Phys. 1: the permanent substratum Giypureimensa) aud the pasuge uf vue Cor ty its ype site (enantion) demands the existence of a lack of thet sccond form in the substratura (Phys. 1, 1g12-agnb). Thus eteresis both permits gene sis und solves the Prsmenidesn problem of noubeing (see on). For Plotinus evi is not 2 substance but rather a steresis of good (Ent. t, 8, n). stigmé: spot, point, geometrical point See megethos, monos. stoicheion: letter of the alphabet, primary body, element 1. The comparison of the basic bodies of the physical world to due eters of the alpbabes, aud 20, by implication, the faurnlaciion of ‘the term sioicheion into the Innguage of philosophy, probably goes ‘back to the Atomists, In this context the comparison is an apt one since ‘the lettars, like the ntama, hove na signifieancs of their own, hnt by manipulating their order (tase) and position (thesia) one can con- struct them into aggregates with different mcanings (Aristotle, Mets, ‘Bsb; De gen. et corr. 1, 425; see gencsis). But the carliestattosted use of the tern stvizheion is in Plato, Theaet. 2026 where it is obvious thet Plato stll feels the original connotation of Iciter of Uc alphabet.” By the time of Aviswotle the original messing is Taryely ignored and srotcheton means the basic ligredicut of % composite (see Het rosa). storensron | 281 a The reality behind the term is, of course, far morc vonerable. Jt is the object of the Milesian quest for the primary something o: Ursioff of which the physical reality of the world is made, an attempt to trace the undeniable fact of change back to its starting point. The candidates for this orcke are well known: the most important sub- ‘stances in man's experience, end genarelly these with mythological credentials a well (See arene). 3, There is an important development with Anaximander. The search fer a single arche had suggested a kind of lincar gencsis Fwbereby the vikes Vulies wute detfved from his slagle starting, point, But when Anaximander thrust the arche back beyond the perceptible ‘material substances (see apeiron), he effectively made ai! perceptible bodies covnndlary and an led the senrch far a atenting palnt off inta new nonseatible directions, but he intruded into the problem the pocsibility of a cyclic genesis whereby the perceptible substences pass into each other in a continuous eycle. Such a mutual transformation of the basic bodies becomes a commonplace in much of Greek philosophy (see Plato, Phaedo 72b, Tim. 4gb-c; Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 11, 3978), leaditg, after Parmenides, to the belief in an external agent, itself unmoved, to Keep the eycle in operation (mediated, in Aristotle, by he eternal movement of the sun aloag the elliptic; sex genesis, Rinesis, ‘Rinoun), and even the stoicheic of Empedocles seem to undergo such epclie change (fn. 17, 26). 4. The quest for the arche came to term in Parmenides who, reversing Anaximender’s perfectly undefined apeiron, posited his own perfectly defined on (q.v,}. But perfect definition provides not only en arche but a telos as well, and so Permenides was led to deny sensib!y perceived change (see genesis, Rinesis) and, indeed, the validity of sensation itself (see cpisteme), The Parmenidean on is the absolute radical stowzheion, __ & Empedocles and the Atomists, by restoring plurality and the ‘void (Aenon), reopened the possibilities of secondary genesie and reha- Bilitated sense kaowlalge. The Milesian seul for basic ingredients ‘vas recumed and Fmpedocles himself took the lead and selected, aa the four basic bodies (or “roots” as he called tham) of this material world, eacth, air, fire, and water, the eannnient foe elements (fe. 6 sce Aristotle, Meta. ofa). “Selected” ia the appropriate word in the circumstances since these were by no means the only candidates; there Were at hand a great xumber of sabstantivized Spowers” (dynameis), Se: “the hot,” “tho cold,” “the light,” “the heavy,” ete., that had Deen isolated up to this point 6. To all appearances Empedocles was both the first and the last 10 hold chet these fur wens dhe iereducibe primary bodles ana the ‘corts of his successors were bent toward reducing these “so-called382 | srorctrtox elements” (the phrase is Avissotless ace Meta, 1086) to something more basic, 2s well as to how shey came to pass into more complex: bodies. 7 One group, tuking its lewd from both Anaximander ani Parmenides, held that the archai of physical bodies were theauselves not perceptible to sense ang thus were to be sought in entities thot had. ho other characteristics than mass and position Such was the ezamon of Leucippus and Demceritus and the mathematical atom of the Pythag- ‘oreens, the mance (qv eee arizhmoe). Those are the real “elements” thet could, in tura, be constructed inte moze complex bodies, the worn by the process of association (ayndrisis), the monads by the geometri- cal construction of points into Tines, Uhus to surfaces and bodies; sez Benesix. 8 But since both groups had so denuded their basic particle of characteristics they were somewhat hard pressed tc explain how such “nothings” could issue in the strongly characterized ‘something” that ‘was the Empecoclean body. What of the undeniable presance of the sense perceived qualities (Pathereata aisthotika; see Tim. 61d) of shes lettct? In both casca thore is a markad inclination to reduce all sensa- tfon to touch oF contace (Haphe, see Aristetle, De sensw 4qza), with the strong suggestion, at least on the pert of Democritus, that all other sense experiences are subjective conventions (fr. 9; see cisthesis, no men). 9. We are not quite so well informed on the Pyth:gorean answer to the same question posed to them by Atistotle (Meta, 2092b) how do you possibly explain white and sweet and hot ia terme of number? A suggestion of en answer eppears in Plato. The Témaeus includes two approaches to the question of the elements. One is a description of the state of things before the universe came into being (Tim. 52d) and relies on w dynamic, nongvometrical analysis of gene- sis (q.y. and see infre). But the Tater (iid. s3c ff.) postcosmic account is markedly geometrice] and, if not parely Pythagorean, has strong fllistivas in that direction. 10. ‘This Platonic account follows Atomism in reducing the Em- pedoclean stoinheia to aggregates of more basic bodies, che latter charactarised chiefly by their porition and shepe (schema). But hile the Atcmists were apparently chary of pushiag the notion of skape (on the cestimony of Aristotle, De coelo 1v, go3a, they did say that the ‘toma of fire were spherical), Plato has aa elaborately worked out system whereby each of the élements is ussociated with ouc of the regular geometrical solids capable of being inscribed in a sphcre (the so-called “Platonle bodies”): the cube (earth), the pyramid (fic). the octahedron Cate}, and the: tcosabedron (waler) (Timm. s53-b0-) storensrow | 189 the semaining figure, the dodecabedron, is reserved for the sphere of the heaven (ibid. 5565 sce aither, megethes). Up to this point the account could pass as & somewhat suspicious version of Atomism. Dut where it betrays its Pythagorean forebears is in the fact that these geometrical solids have their own erchai: they are constructed out of planes, with at lease the suggestion that the reduction could go fariher (ébid. gard). The Atomst atcma, on the other hand, mré indivisible bodies (see Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 1, gagb for a comparison ofthe two systems). ‘And here too senestion is reduced to contsct with various combinations bf these bodizs, which in ture give slac to aonsible experiences (Tint. 6xe I see aisthesis). a1. ‘Though Pythagorean monadism antedzted Atcmism, it was not ies immertiate sntecerient, The Atoruist tradition rather saw the Tine of descent come dowa from Empedocles through Anaxagoras to them- selves (see Latcretius 1, 890-920). Anexagoras rejected Empedacles? contention that there were four irreducible bodies (passage from one to the other would still be the taboo genesis, q.v.), but held instead that there are an infinite number of infinitely divisible bodies, ‘known as Aomoiomorciai, “things with like parts,” ce Axistotle called them, or seeds," the term employed by Anaxagoras himself (fr. 4). These are Avaxagoras’sicicheia (Avisttle, De coelo 11t, 3o2a), originally sub- ‘merged in 2 precosmic mixture, then separated off by nus, the initistor ‘of movement in the eystam (fre. 9, 19), and which by their aggrogation form perceptible bodies (see genesis, holon). 12. These horaoiamereiat are obviously different from the atora in thet they cre infinitely divisible (see fr. & and megethas; Lucretius objects to this aspect of the theory in 1, 844-848); but there is, in addition, the suggestion that the “seeds? carry within them their own archai, viz., all the things that are (or will be) are “in” these basic pasticlos (sce fr. x2), What is this “everything” that is “in erery- thing,” i.c., in each “seed”? It embraces not only the Empedoclean stoicheia (see Lucretius 1, 849-842, 853) ancl natural bodies such as Ihais, fool, and done (fr. 20), but the sensible pache and opposed “powers? as well (fr. 4: see Aristotle, Phys. 1, 87a). The reappear- ‘ance of these powers (dynaeis, q.v.) was te have importint conse- ‘guenees. 33. Aristotelian physics chose a path other than thet which led back to one or more archi that transcended sense perecpticn. In Aristotle’s mind the atteampt to diferentite che stcicheia by shape is senseless; the real oofution is in the study of the functions aid powers Of things (De eaolo a2, go7b). Tt was, in efect, a return to the seusible dynameia of Milesian philosophy that had never lost their yugue in medical ciroles and dat Ausacguvas hed vvcully seciuplasized, But184 | srotcnri0w ‘this waa more than the substitution of other “bodies? for the four of the Empodoclcan canoa; it rested on the imgortant distinction between a body and its qualities (see poion). 14, The formulation of this distinction was certainly not origi- nally Aristotle's, Plato was well aware of it and explicitly states it, by ‘way of preface to his secount of precesmic genesis, in Tim. 49a—Soat the Rmpertoclenn szoleneta sre not really things ar al bit, rsther, qualities (poiofetes) in subject. Such a statement was, of course, impossible for someone who viewed the hot, the dry, ote. e¢ things (chomais)s cots Hedy Seumeperes Eas nn 15, Here, then, already in Plato, was a clear resolution of the question of the stoicicia; they had their owa arciai: a substretam and immanent qualities capable of passing in wa out of that subject. The ‘was opened the possibility of the transformation of the elements into each other (see genesis). And this is, in general, the same tack 28 that taken by Aristotle, The Platonic substratura is rofined into Ayle (q,v.), which is the common subject for all four of the stoicieia (it should bs noed that this Ayle, the substratum for the elements, is imperceptible; thus genecis, or substential change, differs from allaiosis, or quelitative change, in dhat the ltzer hus a perceptible: mutter; see De ger. ef carr. 1, 3196). Finally, Avistetle adds the notion of privation (eteresis) to facilitate the passage of the qualities/ powers. 38, But there are other marked changes as well. For Plato as source and cause of movement is psycke (q.7.; see Laws x, 8968, 8972), while physical bodies have of themselves anly a kind of random motion, agitation rether tan movement (Yim. sac~soa): and in the later postcosmic or Pythagorean-type account of the formation of the sioicheie Plato has, as might be expected, even less to say about motion: Ainevis is notoricusly absent from geometrical bodies. It is otherwise m Aristotle, All natural bodies have theit owa principle of movement thet is pusis (q.v.s Pays. 11, gab), a radical departure rom the entire Parmenidean strain of speculation in which faheren? tution was anathena (sce Kinceis, Keown) 17. Thus for Aristo:le the simple bodies that are the stoicheia have their own simple natural motion (We coelo 1, a5ga). ‘Their opert- finn ie governed hy the principle alrandy aot down (Phys. 11, aava) that Kinesis isthe actuslization of a peteney. In this case, however, the privation (steresis) is thet the clement is not in its “natural place,” since motion and place are correlative concepts (De coclo 1, 4704~2772). Thus lightness is the capacity for linear motion away from center, a motion that will cease when the subject has reached ite atural place; and heaviness is the contrary (ibid. 1¥, yuoa-gaza). Ta {hls fuslilon Ariswode derives Ore from absolute Tighhuess aud eds from absolute heaviness ((bid. rv, g12é—b), and thea, in a more curious svumenexos | 185 fashion, air from relative lightness and water from relacive heaviness (ibid. £7, 32205 compare Plato's parallel derivation of air and. water as ‘the mean terms in a geometric proportion in Tim. x2b-qab). And by relying on the same argument, from simple motions Aristotle derives the existence of the fifth element thet hes as its motion the other kind of simple hinesis, perfect cirenlae motion (see aither; for the dificultios this involves 1m the theory of the wirst Mover, see Amoun 3 for its movement, endelecheia, see curaniot 8). ‘For the traneformation of the elements and for the Stoic attitude toward dem, ece gers for the staichcta of the aoul in Platonism, ace piyche tou pantos. symbebalée: secompaniment, accident (Ingival) i accidental event (see tyche) 1, The early history of the ontological reality behind the notion of sumbcbekos was fought out on the fields of cuality (poion, avs s2e also denamis). ‘The radical in this history was Democritus who was inclined to deay any objective existence to qualities (D.L. 1x, 73; Sextus Empiricus, Adv, Mavh, vit, 138), while Plato was enunciatlug an archaic point of view when he hypostatized them (the supresensible sade of hypostatizction represented by the eide was, of course, quite alien to his predecessors). Plato was, nonethaless, well enough aware of the difference betwoen things and the qualitics of shings and goca cut of his way to correct the general pre-Sozratic reification of qualities (Tira. 492-5003 c60 genesis, pathos). 2. Placc's remarks acne in 7 treation on this sensible world of ‘material things; Aristotle's analysis of the same phenomenon is in his logical works, and so the emphases are quite diferent, The distinction betoreen 2 thing and its quality is broadened to embrace that between x thing or subject (hypokeimenon) and its attribute ot cocompankment (sumbebehos). "The latter is defined as something that “belongs to thing, not of necessity or for the most part, . . . but here and now” (Btcoa. smzya). Unilke the genos or the definkioa, it does not express the essence (ti est) of a thing, nor, like the property (dion), is it necessarily Hinked with that aubject (Tp. 1, xoab). Since there is no necessity (they con be othorwiss) in such accidental beingn, 5 fellows that there can be no demonstration (apodcinis) and hence no scientific ‘knowledge (spisteme) based on them (And?. posi. t, 752~b; Meta. r0a6b), Symbebekos is one of the “prelicables” (se2 idion). gg Bry one would have thought that Epicurus would adhere t» Demo- critus’ Atomistic point of vlew and restrict all reality to the atoms end ‘the void (dew). But since he has accepted sensation Caisthesis, 4:7.) fs an infallible crlerion of trueh, he cannot fall back upon convertion (eomos) as the origin of sensible qualities. And so Kpictras has a fly195 sywmmenrnia developed theory of accidents (see DLL. x, 68-69). ‘hese perceptibla and hence corporeal quelities that adhere to bodies may be divided, 2s in Aristotle, into those that are ily connected with the nature of bodies and co alsrays present in a body, and those that happen to 2 body from time to time, The fist category, Aristotle's idicn, Epicurus calls sumbebekes, precisely reversing the Aristotelian nomenclature. For the secuud pe of qualities hte devises dhe uew eran “aceldem™ (symp toma). Examples of symptomara are the sensible qualities of composite hodies (Plutarch, Ado, Cel. 1110) and seasstion that is a eymptoma of the “unnamed element? prevent in the coul (D.L. x, 645 o00 helen piyche). There are even more complicated entities, such as time, that ean be described as nothing else but “accidents ‘of accidents” (see chronos). 4. The Stoics kept the Aristotelian doctrine of subject and acci- dents but in an altered form. The distinction between a subject and its attributes is preserved (SVF 1, 969), but the attributes are reduced to ‘hree: quality, state, and relation, the letter presumably attributes of the primary active principle of the universe, Jogos (D.L. vir, 194; see Jogo2, peschein). symmetrla: symmetry See aisshesis 6,8 and compare asymonetron. y weia: affected with, cosmic sympathy Ire any ef otc spay sol by made stl srs with the philesopher Poseidonius, rests upor. a sefies of premisses present in Greek philosophy almost from the beginning. The Milesizns thad seen the world as alive and the Pythagoreans as an ordered whole (see Acarece). And though Plato's intotests had earlier lain in other ‘arections, he devotes 2 full-scale treatment (o the order and operation of the sensible world in the Tinceus, undoubiedly his single most widely studied work in the Inter tradition. Here he describes the kos- mags a9 a visible living creature (oon), having withia ft all things that are naturally akin (Rata physin symgene; Tim. god). 2, Stoic pantheism led in the same direction, God as ges pervades ‘Phe univarce na one soni parzades one adios (DLT. vin, 18 ser frewna) and as phyeia he vitalizes the whole (Seneca, De benef. rv 7382 logot shermatiko’). Thus the kasmas is a unity (D.L. vit, 140), fan organisma (holon, qv.) rather than a totality (fan; SVP 1, s20— 524), 2 rational living being (od logikon; SVF 1, 111-114). ‘3+ Refinements appear in the era of Poseidonius, many of which ace attributed directly to him, First, the earth itself is a living belng, pervade throughout by a vital fora (zudke dynuraty, vis vtalte: Cicero, De net, deor, Tt, 33, 83) und so, it is argued by Plotinus symparwera | 187 somewhat later, elso endowed with sensstion (nn. 1v, 4, 26). Things cohere by a unifying force within, a force that acoms to be diferent tensions (once, qv.) of the pnewma: in inorganic matter itis called exis; for plants, physis; for animals, psyche; and for meu, nvus (Sexe tus Empiticus, Ade. Math, 1x, 81-85: Philo, Quod Deus 35). That these are nt radically distinct orders of reality is clear from certain natural phenome, likt: growth of rocks for as tong a8 they are in contact with the vie vitalis of the entth (Plotinus, Ean. 1v, 4, 27), and the presence in nature of zoophtyes (Nemesiue, De nat. hom. 1, ‘0ge b)> all osleulated #0 ll the gape of the coala melurac (a commen thoory since Aristotle's classic description in Hixt. anim. 588b-3894; {or its application to the spiritual world, ses trias 4). 4. From the insight into the natural interrelation Sextus Empirlus, Adv. Math, vit, 129) of both organic and inorganic things proceeds che doctrine of sympatheia ot their mntusl interaction, iMlstrated by a great variety of natural pheomena and particularly by the complex of effects exercised by the sun and the moon over life on earth (Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. 1x, 78-80; Cicero, De nat. daor. 12,7, ag), and prominent later in Marcus Aurelius, Philo, and Plotinus. + Poveldvuiuss was apparently very interested in the sun and the moon. Cleanthes had already located the hegemoniton of the universe fn the sun (see prieuma; itis frequently referred to as the “heart of the orm” a9 well, bused on un analogy with the location of the sont of the souls see Aardia) and Poseidonius makes it the source of all physi- cal life (D.L, vit, 144). He may have been the author of the belief in its spiritual powers 2s well, and specifically of the view that the nous or rmiens comes from and returns to the sun, the psyche from and to the ‘moon, and that the body begins and ends as earth (sce Cicero, 18-19; Plutarch, De facte 28-30; snd compare moesis 17, oursnici 7), Du even av thie point purely religious consideralioas must huve beed at work 25 well, even though the full impact of solar theology is not ‘visible until somewhat later (see Corpus Hermeticum xvs and Tolian's Hymn to the Sun) © Plotinus, whose entire emanation theory is grounded on a solar mage (see chlampris, froddos), adopts both the «Bective role of the san (En. 1v, 4, a1: compare the role af tha mn in Asistetlo’s theory of enerution; see genesit) and the doctrine of cosmic sympathy. ‘The oss isa living organism (zoé) all of whose parts are sufused by the universal soul (payehe toz panias, q-v.). The parts iaweract not by reall of their beizg in conteet but because of their similarity (hom olotes; Ean. wv, 4,92). 7. ‘Thie latter considetation raises for Plotinus the important Guestione of contect (huphe) ws x uevessicy eunilitlon of action and Passion and the presence of a medium (eieéarst) in perception. Aris188 | srKAcocs totle had answered the first sfirmatively, maintaining that all move- ment (Rinesis) necessarily demands contact (Phys. vit, 24ab; vist, 328), though this clearly cannot, be maintained in the ease of the Prime Moret (see kinows 9} tat is immaterial and moves things as, something loved” (ede. s072b), There is a possible eseape in De gen, et corr. 1, aga where Aristotle appeals to someone being “touched by grlet," tur the prozon Rércum does seem 1 pose 2m unassebable example of actio im distors. On the second point too Aristatle hols tha ‘there must be 2 medium between the object perceived and the operative ence expan (Ds ari it, 4196). Plotinua, however, consietent with Iie views on sympatheia, denies the necessity of a medium of sensation (Env, 5) 8, Sumbatheic, conceived of in these terms, enables Plotinus to settle some related problems, that of providence (prozia), astrology, divination (mantike), and magic. The transcendence of God is pre- served in this theory Since his providence may be exercised indirectly brough the interrelation of things (Enx. 1W, 8, 2) and neither the ‘World Soul nor the star souls need direct contact with the things they affect (co, earlier, Philo, De migre, Abr. 179-181); deliberstion (proak resis) is also excluded (Bun. ay, 4g). The pluaeis by their various movements have a variety of effects on things; they can both produce (boiesis) and portend (semasia; En. 1, 4. 34-38; compare Erm. 1, 8; 7, which admits astrological divination within the context of a general aitack on astrology; for the relation of individual men, to individaal planets, see ozhemaa, suranioi 7). Tn this way is established a theorett cal base for divination (mantike. qv.) that consists in the reading of just such portents, an spproach long current in Stoic circles (see Cicero, De div. 1, 24, 93). But Plotinus extends the argument & step further and maintains the possibility of the manipulation and use of the sympathetic powers of things; these magical activities are not, how: ever, of a preternatural naiuse; they are merely another example of epmpatheia and the wise man who resorts instead to contemplation is swell silane them (Zit. 1, 4y 40-44) The successors of Plotinns hed » somewhat different attitude toward these powers; see dyriamis 6. synagdgé: collection Tre ee type of “induction” (for the more normal type of induction, i.e, a collection of individaa! instances lending to a univer- sal, soe efugoge) that must precede a division (diairceés) and that a5 a survey of specific forms (cide) that might constitute a genus (Phae~ gras 265d, Soph, 2534). Au exemple is Soph. 2aGa, and the process is uso suggestal ia Rey. sss, aut Laws Ca, ace airesis, sywrierox | 789 symaition: accessory cause See aizion 1. synécheia: continuity For the continuity of physical bodlies and the problem of the continuum, #80 megethos; tor the cortimuity of the physical world, sumpathoia 3; for that of the spiritual world, trias 4. sjuik See ge: is. aggregation, association nesis 6-3, 143 holon 8g; pathos 3; etaicheion 7, sjntheton: samething compas, composite body "The problem of the syatheton or composte body ts closely selated to that of the archi sed stoicheia on the one band, and to that ‘of genesis on the other. It depends for its solution on the judgment as to what exactly are the basic bodies or units out of which more complex natural entities come into being. Thus the enquiry would logically ‘proceed from the ultimate archai to the primary perceptible bodies, ie., the stuwcheia, the grouping of these Into syntheta, to the question of the composition of the most allembracing synieton, the Acsrncs itself (see agenetos). the syrthcta then may be considered on thrce different levels: the traditional stoicheia themselves as composite bodies, natural bodies 15 syniheta, and the kosmos as a syntheton, and in each cxse the appropriate questions are “how did they come to be,” “what is their genesis,” and “what constitutes their unity?” Sec, in ascending order, arche, stoicheion, genesis, and for their unity, hen, hexis, holon, tanos.taxis: order, arrangement See stzickeion 10. téchné: craft, shill, art, applied science 1. Generally speaking Plato has no theory of iechne, As fre- rently happens, a ward shar ens in Arrerle ae n rarefully defined ‘and delimited technical term is still employed by Plato in @ nontechni- cal and popular way. The contemporary usage of techne was to de- scribe any skill in doing and, more specifically, a kind of professional competence as opposed to instinctive ability (physis) or mere chance (tyohe). And it is precisely in these senses that Plato uses the term (Rep. 3816; Prot. giab, 317¢); nowhere docs he trouble himself to give fan exact or technical definition for this word whose commen acceptsiice ‘suited him perfectly well. 2, Where techne does enter technical philosophical discourse is fn the Sophice ond the Politious, Hore Plato fo concerned with coming to an understanding of the sophist and the statesman by means of the dialectical method (dicleitike, q.v.) that consists of the processes of collection (synagoge, g.v.) and division (diairesis, q.v.). There is scant evidence of any collection hare, but the divisions ere elaborets ‘and, to « certain extent, overlap. In’both instances they begin with techne and, even though in Pel. 258 he calls the genus to be subdi- vided “knowledge” (episterze), it is Clear from the context that it does: not refer to the technicel use of that term as it appears, for instance, in the Anslogy of the Line (see episteme), but rather to what he had previously Called cchne. 3. By collating the two dialogues it appears that Plato divides the “arts” into oequisitive (Soph. 219¢-d), separative (of which Socrates? cathartic art se an example; iid. 2aGa-ogth), and prodetion (oe tike). The *zequisitive arts” inchade the sequisition of knowledge that may in turn be used Zor either practical (praktike, e.g., buildings in general the applied sciences correspond to the Aristotelian techne: Pol og8d—e; contrast the Aristotelian usaye of pruktike, q.v.) er theoretical (gnostike; Pol., lov, cit: see the Aristotelian thevria) ends. Mere Plato further distingulshes the “theoretical arts” into the “directive” (epi tekike, eg, statesmanship) and "eridest” Clritee, Put, 20UL). Din sole example of the latter is “reckoning” (Jogistike: Pol. 259¢), bat 190 retos | 197 presumably this is the division thet would embrace the stady of philes ophy of, a¢ Plato would prefer to call it, dialectic, 4. ‘Tae ‘practical arts” of the Politicus probably overlap the Sproductive aris? (poietike; defined Soph. 219b, 26sb). ‘These may be divided into the products of divine creftsmanshiy (some wish to say they are produced by nature, #hysis, but Plate prefers the theistic exploration sluce intelligence ts x concorattame of all cechnes Sap 654) and of human craftsmanship (ibid. 9fse). ‘The former pro- duces nstural objects, e.g, tne elements snd the more complex bocies thet come from them; the Intter, manufactured objecta (the prabtihe epistcme of the Politicue). 5. But there is a further extremely importan: distinction to be made here (Soph, 2660-d). Both human and divine productivity are ‘capable of creating both originals and images (eikones), and it is the epistemological correlative of this image-producing thet appears as the Jowest segment of the Line in Rep. goge. Plato's generic name for image-produetivity 3 imitation (mimesie}, and while its divine ma fescation, e.g. shadows, dreams, mirages, 's of little or no interest in this context, human mimesis is the basis of the entire Pla:onic aestheric. See metmesia 6. Aa defined by Aristotle (Ev, Nick. vt, a1goa) techne is a characteristic (hex's) geared toward production (doietike) rather than aetion (prnkiibe). Th acises fram experience Cempeisia) of individual instances and passes from experience to teckne when the individual experiences are generalized (see Ratholou) into a knowledge of causes: the experienced men knows how but not why (Afeta. 98:¢). Thus it is {type of knowledge and can be taught (Bid. 98ib). It also operated rationally, with loges (Eth. Nich., loc. cit), and its goal is genesis, which distinguishes it from purely theoreticel knowledge (theoria, ‘.v.) thar bas to €o with being (on) and net becoming. Its rational lemen: further distinguishes it from tyche or chance, another possible factor in genesis. Again, iL is an external not an ixwernal principle of stenosis, which enla i off from ehysis (ques; Phys. 14, 3998). Finally, since it is productive rather than practical it difers from pronesis (qv Eih, Nick, vr, xigob); see also, in this same context, ergon. tdos: completion, end, ose ee ea eli abn the celestial fre governing all (fr. 64) end in Ansxagoras’ use of mind (vous, 7. 9), 4 clearly detined gence of purpose in the operations of the Hommes does act appear in Gretk spoculetive thought uxt Diog- Stes of Apollonia, In hio view the arcke of all things is acr (fr. 4). Which Ss hath soul (when warmed) and inisligeane (vas fo. i OS news 4), and which is divine end governs all things for the best (ff. 3),ag2 | ruEr0N the latter attribue apparently suggested by the periodic renewals in amare. 9. Socrates was extremely interested in the teleological motif; he had examined Anaxagoras’ theory of nous rom this point of view (Phaedo g7d) but found it diseppolnting: it was the same old mecis- istic explenation of things (ibid. 994), what Plato would eall a confu- Sion of symaitia for eiféa (quv.), und Aristotle (feta. yB5t) coucais it this evaluetion of Aaaxegoras’ teleology. But there sre grounds for thinking that Socrates found somewhat greater satisfaction in Diogenes (see Kenophon, Mert. 1, 4, 5-O)- Dlaze’s own approach ie the same, particularly in his concern with the vistole world in the later dialogues. Tn the Timaens (47e) there is a general contcast between the worke produced by noue ad thoes that earn afwout by necessity (ananke), and Er the Lawe (868e) we find that the latter are identified with the blind workings of nature (pAysis, q.v.) and that the former are by design Cockney. Payche initiates movement, butt sits association with rus ther quarautzes the purposeful outcome of this movement (Lows 57). There is a radical change in Arietotle: for Pleto nue was the dominnting factor in the teleological scheme; for Axlybolle vous oper~ fies only in the human sphere of ‘ecliie, purposeful design, and, indeed, all the artisen is doing fs attempting to imitate physis, which has fee ow putjree (telve) ta well a€ belng a source af movement (Phys. 11, 198, 299b) 5 it 5, in short, the “final czuse” described ibid. 1, 104b. The doctrine of teleology is basic in Aristotle: it appears in his cniliect works (see Protrepticus, fr. 11) and it finds its completion in the Mevaphyvics. Ik is explained in various places that the telas is the Good (Phys. 11, 1953 Meta. x01gb), and in Meta, 10726 the ultimate Good, and hence the final cause of the entite Acamee is the First Mover, the noesis noeseos of 2074b (see Ainzun, nous) if Aristotle's sucent Theophrastus apparently had some difficul- ties with teleology (‘Theopbrastns, Metaphysice 1¥, 14-15, 27), but it over lost xs place in philosophy, particalarly with the ever increasing thelumn of the later Schocls in this context it hecomes divine providence (pronciasg.v.)« For the role of telae in Asiotoflo’s analysis of change, see ergo7s energein,entelecheia; in Necplatonic emanation theories, proddas. thefon: divine 1. The ascription of divinity to the ultimate arene is « common Jace in preSocratic philosophy. ‘The motivation seems to be twofol Tho legacy of a primirive animism, most obvious, perhaps, in Thales! Jovenent toward a pan-vicallsin (Asistotley De am ty 4oge) snd the Further statement that “all chings are full of gods” (ibid. x, 41aas see raroLocts, THzoLocixe | 293 Plato, Laws Sggh and physis). Closely connected with this is the igentificacion of life through the presence of motion; the cnly exception ta this scems to be Nerophencs, whose critique of anthropomorghism Jed him to deuy motion to his God (Dis, fr. axa25), and places him spell outside the tredicion, 2. The equation Ainesit-theion focases entdally onto motion thet is regular and/or clrentar (see atster, aphunartss, ourardcl). “Te second motive appears explicitly in a fragment of Anaximander (Atis- ttle, Phys. 11, sogb) where the philosopiner’s “Unlimited” (apeiron, vo) is called dlelon "because it io immortal [ethanaice] and indestructible.” Here is a direct association of the chief property of the Homeric gods, theix immortality, with a material arche (see Diels, fr. aoax1 where the epic strain in the language is even more proneunced). ‘Aristotle goes on to say (Phys., loc. cit.) thet most of the “physical speculetore” called their originativa arehe divine. This seems to b= true and the procese of de-divisization to have begun with Parmenides’ strokes against the vitalism of being (see on); if genesis and kinesin no Jonger pertain to being, they must be produced from an outside source, the “mover” (known) evident from Empedocles on, And, with the atiribuiton of intelligence (ews) und prose (lov, yor) Wy Uke inover, the stege is set for the disappearance of thoion and the arrival of theos in philosophical speculation; see #heos. theologia, thealogiké: 1] accounts about the gods, myth, 2] “Grst philosophy,” ‘metaphysics ___1. Theologia first appears in Plato, and the term is used both by him (Rep. s7ga) and by Aristotle ([Meta, 0000, :073b) to designate the activity of the poets who gave cosmogoaical accounts. Aristotle particularly uses it In contrast with the philosophical speculations of the phusikot (e.z. Meta. 1075b); in eect, it is parcel to the distine- tion between mythos and lages (q9%.) ea atti nes ney Us nn eager A te iad divided che theoretical sciences into three classes, of which the third oe ‘with substances that are “separate” (For the sense, ste chorit tn) anc withowt binosin; this ix the rst philosophy” or *hooingibe, 20 Br ee ee ene cote a eee view a patie iat of sheologite, see on), “ - . Theology latcr expanded to once again embrace all discours wean LE ccna i ohare Tecltision of thology into “mythical physical, and politcal,” a ion originating in the Middle Stoa (see Augustine, De ctv, De! vi, Seats Vevwos souypary Wit wry 47 aad Rescblany Pracze Bong.ag | THEORIA ‘thedria: viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life According to some, the contemplative life as an ideal is a tradition going back to PyUmgoras (see Cicero, Tusc. v, 3, 8-9 and D.L. van, 8), but the authority is a later Academic and so the ideal may be no older than Plato who gives a digressive sketch af such # tite in Thenet, 179¢—1754, and identifies the highest type of human activity with the contemplation of the Good (Rep. g4oa~c) and the Beautiful (Symp, zach aten), Tho thome appoaro oatly ia Avitotle (Protreptions, fe, 6), and reaches its fullest evelopment in his discussion of the contom- ive life in Eth. Nich. x, 2177011790. It is the chief activity of the Prime Mover in Aristoile (Meta, 1072: sec nous 10), and of the soul in Plotians (Enn. vt, 9, 8), but in 2 much more extended fashion than ‘Aristotle had ever envisioned (see Enz. mt, 8, 247). For Plotins activity (praxis) is a debased form of contemplation (see physis), but the Iafer Neoplatonic tradition, probably beginning with Iamblichus (ee De myst. ut, 11) tended to rank theourgia {see mantike 4-5) above theoria. theés: God 1. As philosophical term the divine” (dheion, q.v.) ia mach older than the notion ofa personalized God. Tadeed, there is smoag the philosophers a strong strain of scepticism about such anthropomer- phized figures present in Greek mythology (see mythos, the well known emphatic critique by Xenophanes [irs. 23, 16], and Plato's ironic remarks in Tim. god-e). Even where the’ old. mythological apparetua ia used by the philosophers, as in Ennpedocles (see fr. 0), it is only to zeduce the Olympians to natural forces. The earliest trace of a persouel God in philosophical analysis 1s probably to be seen in the idemtficuion, by Anazegoras and Diogenes, of intelligence (nous, 4.7. 3) as a motive and purposeful factor in cosmology. Nous was, of Sours, divine (chetoi), and arch ite Milesian legacy of poycke Ht could searcely be otherwisey where it fell shor: of being God was in its vious lack of transcendence (see Anmagorss, fr. x4; Diogenes, fre) 2, Plato's sharp distinetion between the sensible (aistheton) and the intelligible (nccton) provided the grounds for transcendence, but i, the ease alos hoi sili he gp ofthe Parnenidean cei! Rlaesis to cruc beiag (see on), and 20 thero is ne pltce tor 2 aynamtc God in the static landscape of the eide. The great theological break: through occurs ia the Sophist and the Philebus; in the former (apen24yo) whe suul suid Luleligeuce are granted a places im the realm of the truly existent, and in the latter (26e-god) when cosmic mos | 795 ous is described as the eficient cause of the universe and identified with Ze, This ndoniely if demiargs (a) ofthe Timaews ho awhen oz ie metaphoricel teapoings 3 cosmic nows and Thea unnecendence is eonsdersbly limited by fis subordiaulzoa to the ide (see nous). 3. Beyond the Timceus, however, ies another theoligical metif: the pallet the dlvlaly of the heavenly bodles (see curauio}). Arie tote is sll under thelr Srfence in hs ditlogues, but the teectises play only two gods, or better, one God and one divine subetauees the Fike Mover ao tio decribed io Bein. serae serge, ed the aither (quva see opithartor) of De caelo 1, 2680-2708. The existence of both are deduced from Ainesis: aither is divine because its movement is eternal (De coclo 1. 286a). and the First Mover is God because its. movement is unmoved (Meta., loc. sex Tous). 4. The Epicureans sre not atheists; they admit the existence of gods, but deny thelr creation of the world or provident sule over it (DLL x, 109-124, 199; Lucretius, De rerum nat. 1t, 648-651, ¥, 385374, 1139-1397 for the role of the dream in the Epicurean proo! forthe existence of the gods, see onsice), Stole materialism tended to thrust God buck ty th fevel of w Mlewiau sheton (see SUF 1, 7), but their monism was not absolute and their distinction betvreen active and. passive principles (see pascheir) allows them to identify God as some fort of u creitive, inmanent element and heoce hi, or rather, lee definition as “creative fire” (pyr technikon), SVF 11, 1027; D.L. vit, 136, Nor were otker, more spiritualized implications absent: Ged is also logos (q.¥.) and news (D.L. vin, 128; SVF 1, 145). The Cynics were probably the first philosophical school to make a systematic use of allegorical exegesis (allegoria) to reconcile a philosophically derived monotheism againet popular polytheism (sce Antisthenes under ‘rythor), and i this eb in mich Gee they were Followed by the Stes. But it is clear that the monistic principle led to pantheism, jast ay the parallel movement on the level of popular religion was lecding to Tenetheim snd not to genuine monotheinm (sce Senecn De Devel, 7-8). Seneca at least must be excluded from Stoie pantheism (Ep. 8g, 12-14), and possibly Clennthes whose Hin to Zeus (= SVF 1, §57) does wot read like a pantheistic tract. 5. A vaviety of factors led away from a unified Godhead; Stoic ae ‘Materialism was rejected and Platonic transcendence rcas- i, now with the notion of a hierarchy of transcendent princiy (coe lyprrounin,hypontars) Dictéce'nade prolesce Grote) also led to 2 dictinction between command and cacculion and the conseqnent stiibution of both the creative (see demiaurgos) and prov. envio sctivten of God fe sccwulany piincipe, Te "oc-oad Owls WS altendy visible in Philo, De somn. 1, 227-229, De cher. 126-127, and198 | rumourcra particularly in Numenius (ef, Eusebius, Praep, Evang. x1, 17, 18, 22), finally ending in Plotinus’ conception of nous, Ean. v, 5,3. For the “third Cod” sae psyche tor panics; for another treatment of the various versions of Cosmic Reasoa, nous. theomgia: wonderworking Seermarite §-5; Aguas 100 thésis: position, positing, convention (a3 opposed (v nature, physio} In the Stoic discussions of morality the term thesis generally replaces the nomos (q.v.) employed by the Sophists in drewing the Aictinesion henween a rroeality Iweed on convention and the oposction of a physical universe controlled by an unalterable nature (physix, qv.) Another espect of this same polarity, and one particularly discussed by ‘the Stoics, was the question of che philosophical status of language, end specifically the relationship botween things (outa) and their names (onomata); see cnoma. ‘The problem of position and place is discussed under 1opos; for ‘thesis xs an element in Atomistic change, see genesis; in sensation, cisthesis, thymés: spirit, animus See mous, peyohe, kardia, Hi tis whot is 11? the whatibis, essence ‘Tat which responds to the question of “what is iP" by revealing the essence (ousia) of the dhing, i.e, by definition (hoes) through _genos and diaphora (Aristotle, Pop, vist, 1590); see ousia. téde tis this something, individual For Aristotle the conerete individual existent; the singular as ed t9 the universal (Aatholow), Meta, xoogay it is substance (Cusia) io the fullest and primary sense, Cat. 20, See ousia, and, for the principle of individuation, Ayle, t6nes: tension Taking as thelr potat of departure a celebrated aphorism of Heraclinis that describes the foes of the world as “a tension, 28 in a ‘bow ora lyre” (Ir. 51; see Joes 1), the Stoica attemptel to explain the cconstitation of the Rosmos ard af the things in it in terms af the tensioa of the greuma (q.v.) or soul principle within them (see SVF 1, 514 ‘where tue cosme fones 1s symbolically scentined with Heracles). 11® states of tension in the #ewme are distinguished on various levels. muss | 97 Present in orgenie things there is Aesis, characterized by a “tonic motion” (sce ibid. 11, 498) of « feeble type that dees no more than ‘rrculate within the being end give ft unity (ibid. 11, 438; see henio). “The next higher stage is physi, the tonos of plants whose stronger movements manifest themselves primarily ia the cepacity for growth (ausesis; see ibid. 11, 708-712). Next there is payche, the rade that belongs to zea characterized Dy movement t1 cerms of rewctlo outside cognitive end desiderstive stimuli. Finally, there is logos, the Strongest and purest fonos of the pretima, signaled by the capacity for seltndured mution (sce, ia general, for the gradee, thi. 1, 458 480 and, fr the types of motion, 1, 989). This doctrine, present even in the erly Stoa, found its mst geaeral application in Poscidonius? theory of coemic sympathy (ser syrtuthcia $1. tépos: place — ‘The pre-Scoratics up to the Atomists associated being with spatial extonsion £o that even the Pythegoreen arithmos has magnitude (see Aristotle, Mcte. 7e80b, 108gb), and the sazposition forms the hypeth- ‘esis of one of Zono’s arguments quoted in Phys. wv, aga: ‘if all that fxists hes a place. . . .° Pluto's iutesest in the question io rether ia the area (chora) in which genesis takes place (Tim. s21-c), a role analo gous to that played by fle in Avistole, hence Aristotle's change that Pets {dentihed chara and hyle (Piiys. 1, engh). Arisefle’s own ap- proach is from the point of view of Aivesis, which undeclies the eatize Aiscassion of tapos in Phys. tv, 2084-2132, and he defines topos (ibid. ‘aisa) as the “fixed boundary of the containing body"; since objects can change place, the latter is obviously different from the objects in it (bid, 2086) For Aristotle's theory of “natural place,” see steicheion; on the question of the “place of the Forms” (topes ciden), eldce x7 anc noeton, Lids: triad, triadic structure 2. One of the more characteristic features of laser Platoaism is the presence of a triadic structure in fis Aypostases (q.¥.). Its employ- ‘ment js rather modest in Platinos whase great hypostatic triad of Hen, Neus, Payche tow pantos (qqs-) seems besed or bistoricsl considera. tions of syncretism: rather thin any a priori triadic principle. Env. v, 2, 7, for instarce, is quite unschemalized, and 1, 9, 1 only slightly more 2. The same io truo of Plotinus! other grect triad: Being (on), Life (20e), end Intellect (nous). This has ica ground in the Platonic Uadiion’s wxogeais of @ cckbrated scat in Soph. 2480 whoro Plate admits into the realm of the “completcly real” (fantelos on) changeTRIAS. 198 | (Hinesis), life, soul, and thought (phronesie). Whatever the exnet ‘motives and import of Plato's introducing this radical shif: ia position (see hinesis 6), it had an undeniable effect on his successors. Tt is prominently used by Plotinus to refute the materialism of the Sioivs: beiag is not a corpse; itis possessed of life und intelligence (rm. 1v,-7, 23.42). & Dut My mst frequent use of this ser is tn connection with the structure and operation af the transcendent rious, and here there is probably the converging influence of another potent text, this time of Avistotle whore he describes the life of God an the onengeia (qov.) of nous (deta, so7ab; on che denial of this to the Plotinien One, see zoeton 4). For Plotinas being, life, and intelligence aze all chavacteris- tics of nous on the cosmic level: it has an interior energeia that is fife and that brings toge:her being and thought (1, 7, 13). It also seems to bbe related to another triad, which comes to full term in Procins. Life is 1 thrust outward, an undefined (aoristo2) movement as an exernllnton of the Divine Reason in Phil ete § tmteuediaits, mchone the mathematical aa intermediaries in Plato, mathe rmaidke 2) tetaeu 35 the soul aa an incermediary betwoon the teneible and the intelligible, payche 29, 38 mtemrogatlow, elem al svt vf Wialeutie diuleAeike, sy ulations ty fanlune don, epagoge 23 a9 cathartic of the ooul, Rathorsie 25 growth into sporematie snethed of Aristotle, agoria 2 {ntrution, nows comiection wld probleun uf Ube Biot piiples of deamuusti don, arche 7; ia Plotinus, nocsis 18 irrationa) number emnnected with discovery of incommensurability of mag- ‘utlces, eayramenron =a Jdement, dose, Kriss Inpolebis Platonic sheen, dose 45 tue fuemat ‘vith an sccount, ebisteme 2; Aristotetinn theary, nosis 123 contin. gent in Aristotle, dose 5; Epleureen view, n2esis 1s; reduction of all ‘fections to judgments by Chrysippas, id. 175 Plotiniaa, bid. 19 istic dike prepiloophice ne, dite 1; in cone reo, the nomer fate pg Cotony, 3 Pltos ve, fy aston Sle, 7 ta fppines in Pat, eadetnont King, geno, eidor sce gonus ‘owabilty, guorimon see intelligibility knowledge, guois,epietere, nootis typeein Atomiom, nocsis 6; exaltation of leme at expense of senstion, edisteme 1-3: in Plato connected ‘with Forms, sbid 2; for Aristotle a Knowledge of causes, ibid. i proceeds from necessary premlsses, daw 53 Fess upom induction, epegage 95 graape the universal, enorimon 2 Tack, ondeie ia Platonic theory of love, eror 4-g1 in theories of pleasure, fedoae 1.9 ie theory of origins, gnome 3; Epicurean, tid. 0; Siie ic theory, logos 4; a weakness necessarily lowing from soul's reeceapadon wih mater, noes 20 ™_ * Jay, nomes cosmic ordor as lew in Heraclitus, Kormor 2} arbitrary atture of aamsnade law, somos s; divine law, iid. 2 lawgrve:, nomothetes as bestower of names in Plato, onorna 35 rejected by Epicnrus, in Stoa and Philo, bid. 7220 | Lire life, zoe preSocratic view, 2ce 25 in Pleto, a) and Aristotle, 5; time and eternity in eens of, chronar 9; of heavenly bodies, curanio’ s; distinguished from consciousness in Homer, pevehe 2: identified swith eenselouancoe, ded. 6; Haked with motion, poysiie 9) Leiugy, Tife, and ietelligence, triae 2-3 lifespaa, efon and the notion of ereraity, ion like, Bomoioe she “ke keowe lis” theory of perception, chess G-aa, hemcine, pessin: end particularly m pedotes,poyche 9p rl6 Sti toty of helen, noc a6: a sa explain of oe oct Sosa pipe a Se wonosucton of Ge World Souls yee fintost limit, peras in Pythagoras and Plato, peras; in the explanation of time, Chronos 4-53 aad the Ariscoucllan mean, meson: 38 8 200d, 112. a the Onc, hen 2,6; in the definition of aumber, plechos locomotion, phota in Plato, hinesis 6; and Aristotle, ibid. 7, phora; aad the first moved, Riavun'y Tove, eros a force in mythelogy, eros a5 a mover in Empedocles, ibid., Hizoun 2; Socrates as fover, eas 3; Platonic thenry of, 4-5) a passion, gs an Flouaus, 1-11 LUladness,rearda in Plato, mantite 2; love as madness, erce 7 magic see thourgy smaguiteds, megethos definition, megethos x5 indvsislo magnitude, 2-4: {geomertieal megritados, meta 4; epatiel magnitude sttibutee to ‘units in Pythagoresnism, monas; difference between Aristctelian and Stni view, Ayle 7 absente tn First Mover Rinun pel ts fayehe 20; contrastec with discrete quanuity, pletkos 1 smateria prima, pote hyle’see prove mattor material cause, hyle described by Aristotle, tule 2 » further, matter, prin- ciple ‘mathematical number, arthmos mathematikos in Pythazoreanism it is in” sensibles, maihemeitéa ay Aristotelian theory, Speusipousy 4 Plotinus, iid; as product of abstzzction, aphairesis mathematical. mathematiku theories of, mathereastha 1: Platonic version, 24 ‘metas 1; Speusijpus, mullernaien 4 ratte, ple preSocreis serch for material enuse, arche aj: krowledge of hie 1.007 sublet to defton, Aararz Arsttellan priaciote of fndividuation, Ayle ay quaseeubstance, 3 (pes 9, 4 datinguished ‘rem privatio, g Sols, 75 Potainn, S10; Avstols identi mete- mover | 222 tial principle with dyad, dees, Jyle 6; for Plotinus the Platonic receptacle is “Second matter.” Pypodcehe: es an image of being, chon: as el, akon 6-85 a8 “the Other,” Hid. 8; 28 quast-being, on awe clave tony ve th priscpllle od Tanpesceyelble mallet, Sloicheion 15 ‘mom, meson origin of the theory, meron; virtor the mean of experiences ‘and setlitles, pave ve utederaon as mean In Arkotle suyhTor syne a5 evil a violation of the ream, kukor 4; ar and water 39 teen terms in Plato, fzicheion 17) organ as a mean state in. Ariat. talian theory of pereeption, qihests 21; and in Plotinus, ibid. a7: a8 fpphied to justée, de 0; 9 & goed for Speusippus but rejected by Plato, hedan 4; in Procla’ true structure, iis 4 medium, prophetes a3 an: 4 nedium of perception in Democritus’ theory of vision, aisthesis 10; in Plo- ‘nua, noceto 50, eympatheia 7 ‘metempsychesis, metempsychosis see reincarnation steument of divine communiestion, mamtike 1-2, ‘microcosm man the microcosm in Democritus, Aesmos 2 ellect ‘ming, nous, oxistiton, hegemoniton see miracle wonder-working as a characteristic of later Platonism, manike 4254 0 also thenrgy istare, rasa, miss, meigma uscd by Empodocks te explain change, gene ‘terri fata hnelagoee td Sedans ieee 2g; rejected by Plato, genesis 15; in the World Soul, psyche tou tantos 13 Stoic theory of, genceés 16; the good life as a mixture in Plato, hedene 35 proportion in, holon 3-5 moderation, sophrosme in Plato, sphroryne 1: in Avisttle nd the Stoa, 2 motion, Knedis, pore subsistent among Milesians, kincee 4; deni. to bein ty Parmenides, 23 inherent motion adtrned by Atoriats, 4-51 Plato, 6, Azxoun 5, prvehe 3g; Avisttelin theory of, biness 7-8) cesente of sensation ia Aomism, asthesly 2g; rotary motets effects shage in Anazagoras, genesis 7; prisary in all chaige, Bau. 5) tn fe peop erga, Fn hall tion ore hy anh 0; tated by maar nAnasngorae, noes q the inetce of i Plato, fd. 231 denied to God by Nenophimes, #nesis 43, nous 2; of heavenly bodies, curaaict passim, fn Acfstole caused ‘by ete, physic gp nen indication ofthe peeconce of eal, payee 4 #8 the essence of soul In Plato, bid, 1or natural motion of the clemente in Ariattlg sioihicon 175 “tonke medion," anos; sad place, foes; undef end defiaod motion, tis 3 mover, Kinows origins of the notion, known 2: soul as mover in Plato, 5-8; Asistotelinn movers, 7-13; Ia Anuzagoras, nocsis 95 love as, erde 3},aeusre Asistoteian movers as substances, etic g; nature and efficient ca salty, physi g musics roueike £9 a mseno of wotouiug hatcmoay bo the sve, kadharois 4390 ‘whemuocopathie purgative, ibid. ryth mythos moral objection ty mythos 1 use in philceaphy, 2; shares Yih Me uk wuus wil kee are aval ey oo fe Tame, oncme relation to concept and object, onoma, passim natural law in the Stoa based on a philosophical understanding of nature, natural philosopher, pkysihes objects of his study, ergon 9, aphaivesis x5 hore Lundersteod by Plato and Aristote, phyeis’ ature, physis preSocratic views, physis 15 Plato, 23 Aristotle, 31 Stoa, 4; Ploticus, 5; correlation with pleasure, hedcne &; principle of motion in Aristotle, knesis 8, dinoin 7; and the seminal reasons, lozai ormatibal: weoqpased toranuention, somos sg: nature and rensca i the Stoa, noes 14; and natses, onsma 7; a5 a state of the pnewna in plants, eympathate g; contrasted te arty fckne 6; Plato's idoatif- cation of nature ancl neceasity, ‘elas 2 necesty,anmike operates without purpose, ananke 3; a quasicause in eto, 27 a role in Avistotllen eyllopetc reasoning’ gy necessary svotion in Atommism, Atnesis 4; identified sith nature andl contrasted fe decigny loca} ned chancos fyohe distinction of moral content of human sets, adia- neutral, ediaphoron St phoran ronbeing, mie on the problem as stated by Parmenides, om 1; the Platonic solution, on 2, Reerse; the Aristusian, en stredis connected avih de problem of fase judgments, doce 4 renders ckange impor kl, goes qrrlntion Bid tgs metre ay hl B notio communis, ennola koine Stoic theory of, eunaia smmber, arithmos Pythagoreen and Aristotelian theory. ar fray fn ieee Fo i abso sceived by sinsur communis 4; Crees view e9 itogers an problem of incommensurcility, arymnetren a me reduced to, Phsnoae 4-52 mathematics! amber in Aristalle, matheratia% and fn Plots, ibid. gy tilngs Inltate number, mente gy de elemeats ‘of uuinbery sonaey en 258-9, ae plarl ty with limit, lathes: soul 26 {property of pape soul as elf-noved mumber in Xenoesits, et tition, tatoptike nutritive soul in Avistotls eithosis 22, ramursswess | 293 Ocealt poner, dymumis, embolon in later antiquity, dynomis 10-44 one, hen, mons as. principle or an element in early Pythagoreantism, hen 2; fn Parmenides, 35 the hypotheses of the Paraenides, 23 Platonic theory, 6-75 Aristototian, 8; Spousippus and Kenocratcs, gin the Pythagorean rovival,10~13] Platinne, 1919; Prackve! derivation of, 41 identified with the Good, eirophe; and the heaad, kenas: One ‘nd Dyed in Speusippus, marhematite 4: in Numenius, nos 18; the Ove and nows in Plotines, id, 20; defined analogously through all the eategorica, on g) donied fntcllotion, naoton 4) ond providoncoy pronsia 3; the one snd the many in Nenplstoriemy, predda 2, tries § fon, dove epistemological contrast with knowledge, dase x 23 in Epica: ‘cantn’ akin #o Cut dictinos from caneetions iid. 7y ty shoul the “Contingent, apisteme 5; for commonly held opinions, see common sense ste, onemtion. the apporad powaen in praScceatie philenophy, enantion 2s in the Platonic theory of becorning, 2, genesis 13} Aristotelian reduction to two sets, crantion 2; in the Aristotelian analysis of change, genesis 1g Heraelitan tension of opposites, logos 15 and the nsary meson, opposition a principle in Stole sheaty of intelletion, ncesis 16; joined by love, eros x; in terme oF action and passion, pasvhvin, pessim; rejected by Atomists, pathos §; soul 2 balance of ‘opposites, payehe 10-12 cider, Resmos the universe ws, hasnas; search for order, nous 35 the order {ng Fanetion of intellect in Anaxegores, iBtd. 9 coum, organon in Aslatotle'e theory of ensation, efstheris ax; in Plotines, Bid. a7; contrasted vith part, holon & man a organ of the universe fn Stoiciem, iid, 20; for Stoies logic no longer an instrument, as in Aristotle, but has wider seape, dialektibe 5 organism, hofen Avietotelian theory of, Aoloa 8; and the soul in Epicurean. ism, aisthesis ag tiginal cin mapthienl and philosophical orproasion af, Rathadna 12: Platonie “mnisehance,” ibid, 4y Plotinien “audacity,” (Bid. 5 other, heteron in Plato und Plotinus, hedercng conection with error, dove 44 in Avisinnls tha abjeat of all knowledge excapt that of Vieat Mover, ‘Neue oy relative nature of, pro “otherness,” Aakon 8 iz the World Soul, pryohe tow pantoe 1 v, alethesis Phin, algos, ponos,prescace in Aunsagoras' theory of percep “ “4s de to lowe of balance, Rodono 1 ap toric dislocetion, anlze] with plensure, ibd: gj evil in Kpicureaniam, Laken ‘estmessness atonia the Epicurean comelative of paychic oqulibsiam, he ‘one22g [aim Dain, dyes se dyed Patcpaton, mete lato end Precis mel; Procha’adaptntoa te lade tractor, Wien pasiag away, pithere sos corruption passion, farchein. pathos first concentnalization of, fasehein ay and the opposed powers, 2: in Aristotle end the Stoa, gg; passive principle cof motion, physis gs cf, further, affection pasive intellect. nour outhettzos tn Aristotle, nous 1—12; In Alexander nf ‘Aphrodisia, i 3 perceptible, cstheton see sensible pereeplion, uthess se sensation perdurstion, sion se everaatng perfection, telos, entelecheia for the former, see end, purpose; forthe later, centelocky rity. ph hi vn of he eo Bain usin 35 s mython 1a; a0 the skudy of nature, physis 1; ‘Pychagorean notin as a purification, hathersi 2 peyehe’34y bison eat approach in Plato, endoson 5; nd in Avatlle #hid 7-9; the SBeetpillosephy? sheologte 2 physics, physica its subject matter described, exzon g: studies separate su>- ‘stance, aphairesis 3; as “second philosophiy.” philosophta 2; the Snew Physics? of ater antiquity, Jyncmieg, 39 place, topes, pou Aristotelian theory of, topod; as an Aristotelian category, ‘ow Useory of Sratucal place,” stoicheion 175 the place of Whe Forms, Pitew vn planets see heavenly bodes pleasure, rome, Sonic medical thors hedon 1s Plato view of, Goi. 2-3, poueke a7; Speusippus, hedone 4; Eudosus, 5; Aristippus, 6; Aristotle, 7; Epicurean theeries, 8-9, vilciosis 1; as excessive contact in Plato, pathos 6 accorapanine experiences, #bid. 10-11; indicates “the appropriste.” sid. 11. oikeiaeie 1: chosen on the basis, cof quantity, soson: moderation, sophrasume 2 ,fletios momber as plurality of els, rithmas 2; ented with ‘vad by Speasippus, dys approached dialectically, hen 25 connor bby wholoneas, Aolon 35 charactericte of he moetkemetical, mothe ‘motiha 2; «8 that whiek 8 divisible, plothos: af seuls, faycke ‘the operation of Intellect, nocsis 2819, nous 20; the problem of the fone aid Ue minar, Len 6; i later Platonism, oroddon 2, rigs 5 plait poetics, pnietike an Aristotlian productive science, poise paincree | 225 point, stigme geometrical point distinguished from mathematical unit, me- ethos 33 substance with position, menas position, Reiethai, thesis i helen ay t0la jn Plaiste theory of perception, aisthesie 18; in the Asistoteliaa distinction between ‘anit ‘and point, raonas; the Aristotelian category, Aeferhai: in Pleto's Aisne of whole and eal, Hof 8; inthe Epicarean organism, Bag possession, echein, enthowsicsmos as an Aristotelion cetagary, eckein: for di- ‘vine pusvession, see enthusiasm, potentiality, dmemis Aristotslien theory of, dynamis 4 compared to acti ality, energeia ; matter ss, ayle 1 power, dymmunis pocDouatie usey dyunats a; Tlaurs 25 Avisucelanh 5 Stoic, gs a2 intormeciary beings, 6 nove 17; 0 intelligibles, dynam ‘raelated to ensmic sympathy end occult powers, ibid, S23) vals in Platonie theory of perception, aistiesis 15-36; sensible powers re- duced to touch by Arlette, arche 5; marched wich an organ, halon 8; ite connection with action ond passion, pasehcin, passim; and the principles, erche 6; and the elements, stehefon 5 19-35 practical science, prakumke in Plato, techne 3-43 in Aristotelian division of ‘the eciences, pciein practical wisdom, phronesis see wisdom preconception, prolopsis ia Bpicureaniam and Stoiciem, protepsias colt: evidence 2 cheracteriatic of, enargeia; naturally acquived concep, ennoia, nozsie 16 Dredicable Aristotelian doctrine of, dion predicaments the ten Aristotel ents te eA caveguries, ketegorici; relationship with Predication, Kategoria connection with the thecry af Forms in Plets, sidas aay in Aristotle, ibid. 16: and the substratum, hupakeimencn; the ‘nlversal et predoeation, Aasholow Preferable acts, proegens in the Stoie moral system, adiephoron. & Prescatts patouria Une of Plotinue known by the preaeace of unity, her 29 Prime matter, pote hyle Aristotelian concept of, Ayle§; in Stoa, ibid. 7 Pelan savver, procon moun sae Ht mover Principle, archo, hypothesis ature of the pre-Socratic “stull,” phyets 2; Mile lan setrch for material cause, arche 2-5 post Paimenideau risks. Guus Uf me singte-prineiaie theery, bid. jyreation to the probleta OF sbaage, 5-6; frst principles of demonstration, 7, hypothesis rstaa6 | rRivaTion principles of morality contained in Stoic “preconceptions.” enncie; archai o? bodies in Plato, genesis 123 archat of number, mones: first principles of judgment transmitted by ous in Plotinus, nocsis 19 privation, steresis in Aristotelian analysis of change, genesis 1g, storesis and ‘aller, az 6, 10; a principle in Stoic theury vf dateliction, noeris 6; in Ploinus, Rekon 8 problem, sporde origins in sense of wonder and related to Socratic interrogs- tiom, agoria a; Aristotelian technical usage, ibid, 25 application of by Axistotle endoner aa} history as did. g Aeseribed, process, geuesis pleasure is @ process, hedone 4; cosinie proce ‘ip ethical terms, kosmes 2 procession. prodidas theory and mechanies of. proddax product, ergo not ascesserily an cbject, ergen 2 productive science, poitike. distinguished from practical scionce, #rzom 12, poistisy in Plato, mimesie 1, techne 4 rock, apodeiiy, pats Bist principles of splogistic proof, arcke 7; proofs ‘that convince piste propety,idion definition of and distinction from acckdent, iion; Npievrean torminclogy, eymbedekao 3 prophet, propaetes sve medium, divination proportion, fogos, anafogia extension of the concept into varions aens, hore ‘monia 23 in Heraclitus’ theory, enansion 1, logos 33 28 a unifying {actor m'mistures, holon gs; how perceived, nocets 3; mathematical proportion in universe, Aosmioe as justice as, dike. 6, in Aristetly ‘ogos 3 and limit, eras; proportion as soul, faycie gm133 geometric proportion in derivation of elements in Plat, stoichelon 17 providence, pronoia immanent and transcendent, proavia 1; distinction of ‘command and execurion, 2; God's providence inclrect, sympatheia 8; exercised by Jeser ods, deimon 3, promvia 2, dtcos 55 idealfed ‘with Tate by Stes, etmarmene pridenee, phronesis ite counsels sometimes confict with justice, dike 7 Katharsis the modical agpect of the concept of catharsis, katharsit 27g; homoeopathic purgaticn in tragedy, 9 pargatic parfeatn, Aathais te seliious aspect of the concept of cathesi fatharsio 3 pose, telor first appearence in nlverse, relos 15 nous ‘43 Socratic aud PemPow Platonkesatesest iy felos- nocexe oe source of porpore in Aris totle, id. g, piysts g; diesingisaes intellect and nature trem a2ces- sity, wehe RELATION | 227 ualltative change, aRoiosis see alteration quality, folon, pathos identification of opposites as qualities by Plato, enzn- tiem 25 active and passive queles, pusehvin 4; in the pre-Socraties, Pathco ay qualitice of atone, bid. 5 primary ard ocovedery, datioe: tion from Substance, poien, distinguished fom elements, stoicheicn 13-15; Arfseoelian category, poicn jueulily, poson a9 on Aniototelion catzpory, peso. discish: aun] wtlaun, Men pletion; messure of pleasure, hedone § quintessence see ether Yationes semlnales, logol spermatikod Stoic theory of, logot spermatthots Yield to unas vitals view dyrmente yp ia Platina legos 9 resson, logos, nous, logistikon, iepemoniton defines, for Aristotle, the proper function of man, ergon 5; problem of appetites in rational. man, hhorme; the Stole recea raia, iogos g; WGentiaed with re, Log08 1, 4b grounds natural law, nomce 2; a5 mature, phyois sp ace also intellect reasonable delense, ewiogon, pithenon the justification of moral choice in ‘Stoicism and Scepticism, adiaphoron 2,2 sessoning,logmos see diecursie veasoninet rebith, pelingenesia soe reincernation receptselekypadach Pintoris dnariptinn af, ypadackez passers present in fore the epecatien of inellecy, Zyntmis oy rolo change, tiviz: identified by Aristetle with material cause, hyle 6; its onco- logical status, on 2 xecollectcn, anansnose Platoni theory and conncetion with Forms, aramne- sis: origins of the beliel, pagiche 19-24; meme of knowing. the orm, vides & connected with love, 2708 7 ‘eflction, eke see image ‘ofutation, eenchas ace interrgation ‘eincamation, pelingencsia in Pychayores and Plato, palingrnesto, psveie Apa Einpedace, yoke ain Plot, Peay ‘elation, proe # in Plato end Aststolle, pros ti208 | ReroRW retam, epistrophe Neoplatonic theory of, epistrophe affects the entiee seale ‘of neing. dynemis So: Intellsetion ay a recumn to sell, nous 20; in ‘Proclus, proddos a Seele natuene Asiatatelion Formulation of eympatheta 9 extn o seience, episteme the various sciences in Aristotle, episteme 4; cf. further, division of the sciences soratiny, eenchos s02 interrogation seed, sperma in the primordial mixture of Anwcayorusy xenesis 0, pathos pesducstnauve uf sees fay hud gy Lamuugeuevus vuuaysitts seion 2132 soltacceptance, cikefosr Stoic theory of, cfketosis self-contecl, eophrosyne see moderction seltevident, enurgeia gnerantee of validity of scnsetion in Epicureanism, cnageta; sensation true Dut not necessarily sciterident, dox0 7 name a2 elf evident teetizsony to concept, anoree 5 selfmotioa, cutokinesis in Plato a function of soul, Rivest 8, psucie 19; soul as seanoved nusnber, dud. 24 seltpresence eternity as total celfpresence in Plotinus, chronse 9 sell-presecvation, oikelosis see sel-acceptance seltsuicieney, auterkeit 9 characteristic of happiness and a hallmark of virtaz in Avistetie, Sten, and later Platonism, awtarteta seminal vasons, logot speractitoi see rationes oeminales sensation, athess the “like-knowsike” school, aisthesie G-135_ Ike- Knows unlike, 13-24; Plaeaic theory, 15-18, poycie 2g; Avitote- Tian, clvhecs 2g-at; Epicarcan, 22 29; Stoic, 24-25y Plotinus 26-7) reat neta oy doe a eigation fete 2, me ny. becessry sniecndent to true Knowledge in Aristotle, eolstere 3, Gisinguiched stom iatelleedin, naesi, jusein; role of body i noses 8, evoke 175 a8 metion, pryche 27, ciathcois 29, holon 10; 38 tn affection, payohe 175 earth endowed wath, sympatheie 9 sensible, alstheton contrasted position in Platonic and Aristoceian opiste “nology, alstheton, encrimon 4} objoct of opinion and not true knowl edges dasa 1a; sensible substanens, cima 9 seams counuunis, vbthesis Koine the cognitive Faculty and its cbjects, a ‘hats hoives and the perception of number, arifamon 4 srrcrms IntmLuicwrtas | 299 sepamtion, epekriis cx Avasimander to explain charge, genesis pasty kenge icy ise sepanate sulsiaaney chorbton ubjuut uf Uhe aviene uf plysivay weaireais 15 separability a charactzrisic of substance, choriston; Socratic defiai= tonsare net, rides 8 serfous mat, spuudafus as Uae woru € eldeel Leaver ergem 4 shape, sohere factor ia Plato's theory of sonation, aistheos 16, dynamte oy and in his theory of change, srichcion 10) in Temocritesy ynnis sin Zpleures, dusmests 22 sheath, stegezon ensbeathed coul in Epicureanism, aistheuie 23, genesis 8, peyche a7 similar, homotos siullerty of cause and effect, proador 3; cosanl: sy:npachy ‘baved on both contact end similarity, sympatheia 6; sec also like situs, Reithat see position solution, ysis correlative in the aporematic method, eporie 2 soul, prrche comnestion with life and movernent in prephllosephcal thought, ‘ayohe 25 and breath, 4-53 revision of Homeric psychology, 6 in ‘Atomiam, 7-8; Empodoces, o; Pythagorsan harmony, 10-235 sha- ‘manistic ‘soul, 32-29; unitéry soul tn Plato, 24; teloartte.scul, 35-19; Aristotelian crticue of Platorists, 20-29; Aristotelian view, 2%, pints and faculties, 24-as: inmortslity of, 26; Epiowrean, 273 Stoic, 28; medial position in later Platonism, 2g; Neoplatonic hypos- esi, a0¢ partition in Plotinus, gist individual coalp in Plotinus, 93-423 Prous’ theory, g5~35; dexographical approach to, endazon 28; eounection with the body in Stoiism, eneots 183 states of the soul in Aristotle Aesis; as a eatse of evil in flat, kako g; and Proclus, Wid. ox fall of, hathodas, passin: purification and purcation of, Aatharsis, passim: funetions 0° in Aristotle, nevis 8 human soni and World Scul in Plato, Rixoun s: 68 a source of motion in Plsto, id. gos; in Avitoile,foid. 8; interwvediary positon, metas 2, noes 65: cognitive priacipia in Plato, wamste R; nant nl oma im. Atninitie tradition, Aardic 2, noesie x3-i43 teraperary ‘intellectualization in Stea under Chrysippus, nocsis 17; demonic scul, tid; soul and intellect ia Plato, now Gj under nluence of stax tculs, ochema 43 Question of fx fewmewolity. hon syntax ae the wadeide soul in Plosinus, physie g; how transmitted, paca gj Stoic soul, ‘bid. 45 esdcied oy Plotinus, ibid. 5; soul tnd rovidenee, pronsia 2; 48. tension of the pacunua, syingatheiu ss and she moon, Bid. § SpAce, chon as coniauzus quetity, aps for Psonic “apace,” ne roneptae species eiduy claim wo he substance, mutiny eperies and eceance, $B. 9 ‘Species intelligibiis ax exemplary form in later Platonioay, noctone 2ago | sprerric DIFFERENCE specific difernce, alaphora employed in Platonie division, dapiora az ee eas cacti a alee al drerencaa, min suai de Sten, gall elferesces resumed in ifima spect, ¢ speech, logos aa externalization of thought in Stoa, lorae 44 end Philo, 53 2 Functicn of reason, oama 6 spire, pnewms, tyres “gpieied” awl fa Moraes aud beyuua, payelo ary 1 spilled soul in Plate, ibid 25, 37; ia Aeigrcele anelogoua in composition t» the ether, ookcma gt immaterial opi: in lator Stoi- lem, poewra 6 spontaneity, eufomaton as.atype of cause, tyche stars ouranio’ see heavenly bodies star souls in Plato, ainown 6, owraniol 25 in Avisttle, Rinoun 6, curenio: 35 elfects on human souls, achema 4 state, heads, pos eckeia_ states of soul in Aristotle, hoxis, athae g; in Peripe- ‘etic theory of inteliection, ncus 11-13; £8 a tension of the pnewne in inorgaaic matter, eyrpatheia g; to be in a certain state” as 2 Stoic category, echein stile a mover in Empedosles, tiuoun 2 hance, col Soporte Atlan qt fn nt ed se ta domo, od seca guet fou Fuel ny ayn hur ne tet ihe ee ey chaege anges wenn ween cng Ges 9 coeseras sm aia ae embes os ta ac Pinan tae mabitretua, hyhokoimensn role in Achictelian analysis of change, Kefn Heintenony matter 26, iyle 2, stoickeion 1g} claim to be substance, curia gj in Stoa, Hid, 45 soul as, Psyehe ag; logical substratum and Togical attribute, eymbehebos 2 summa geaera the AArisicteliem categories as the summe genene of being, Taregoriai, genes ‘sommam bontm in Plate, agecron 35 tn Aristotle, 2; iu Plotiuus, 5; of the ‘universe, toe 3 ulicg sole iy Acsictlian theory of change, genvia 15: a hegencenibon sere fe unions, poetine $y 39 Woseonas,sympethei $m Peay ans sapematural spit, daiiox sex demon suspension of judgment, epeche ‘ts place in Scepticism, endovon 19 mara | apr swerve, farenttisis in the Epicurean version of the formation of bodica, Binesie s symmeyosmunelte sol a Eangedcccnn theory of pesseption lative 4 ess a Sete taeoy of Bony, eee 10 symputby, sypethoia see cosmic sympathy system, systema Epicurean theory of organiam, halon 9 tabula masa Stoic image, hegemoniton teleology in Anaxagores end Diogenes, nous 4; in Plato, 154d. 7, telos 2; in ‘Aristotle and is suveessurs, weloy grgp of parts id au Urge cle, holon 6, 8 tension, fonos in Heraclitus, logos 2; Stoic doctrine of, tons theology, theclogie technisl end nontechnical wsege, Reolsgia 1-25 in Ani ‘ote, bhilosephia a; Stole division of, sheaiogia g ‘theoretical science, theoris, theoretite Aristotelian usage, epitteme 53 his Asstinction of theoretical end practical wisdom, pkronesis 2, sophia ‘theourgia theoretical basis of, dyaarais 11; practice in later Plato- henry ‘asm, mantthe 5 thinking, noess, fogiomos, danoia see intllection, discursive reasoning ‘ime, chvonos, pote as u porsanifed fgure, claomee 1-33 reduced to wumber by Pythegoreens, 4; Platonic theory, 5-6 Aristotelian, 73 Epicarean and Stofs, $; Plots, 95 per aecidens extended, megethcs 4: 8 & continuons quantity, farcry as an Aristotelian eatercry, pote: 28 an fccldent of a ecnene symabebekcs se oul partejats dn tine and eternity, paycke 38 token, syraboton occult rowers in natnral objects, dymmis 11 folal, an contrasted to whole by Plato, holon 6; by Aristotle, id. 7 touch, haphe sensible powers reduced to touch hy Aristotle, arche 6: see ‘leo contact * ‘transcendence, hyperausia in Parmenides and Plato, hyperouria as revival ix the later tradition, ibid. 2. thece, barsim: and the prablem ef engi. ‘ion, ognatios ‘tansmigration, metompsychosis ee reincarnation lulua, tae theory of structure in Later Platonian, trius, pussims epplied to ‘the question of souls, peyehe a5 -aga | TeIraRtiTe sour tripartite soul in Plato, nocsie 95 puyche 29; restoration in the ster Stes, ‘moesie 175 and the emotions in Plato, pathos 7 Lull detects atiaes Ls ti jslguts foun dy is souses ia Epiewrns, ii 75 see also rit Unatected, apathels see apathy rmeroated, agonoiag cen vngeneented understanding, dimoia type of cegnition on the Platonic line, dicnotas df. ‘culties in interpresation, noseis g-20; generic term for discursive sencening in Anvetetie, Henrie lungenerated, egenctos speculations on the origins of the universe, agenetos nit monde to, cheraeten tn Pythageresion money, deiastion ef iy oi, body, teeter qooon of Gable, Bi poidle srs of ade yen, mova arn pane of ological FRoveulonsprdaon' tsser a far of rity atime 35 Ce Eee pers loll Farhan montane Ose isis en, 32 say form a8 ¢ exw of jn Asatte Polo 7 Stole principles of Rene fa Tei ut lenny tonon, see alzo whele universal, katholow Azistotelian theory of, Ratiolow; Epicurean theory, pro- Tepsie; concrete universal grasped by sensation, gnorimon aj a8 the term of Induct, -pegou? 4 4 universe, kosmes, holon as order, hovmus 45 divinity of, 2-4; government of in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, nou. 93 Plate’s views on, Ainzun 53 pervaded dy eplrk, previne 4} Stokes wotian oF esi: ungoniem traduction of “universe,” fiolon 10, sumpatieia 2 unknowable, agnostus transcendence of God and modes of cognitive op: proach, egnostos nlimited, gpoion various meaniags of Anrsimarde"'s principle, pelron 35 shen history in Pythagoreanism and as s finc‘iow ofthe dyad, a5 t ancterial principle, gy place fn fhe concept of time, e&rono# 2 seranked with evil and ideatied with the dyad, Katon 4,6, 4yss: ‘pponites separated from, duns»: and the One, en 2, 6, 305 fonction with Arist‘ellan mean, som unmoved, akinetos Fizst Mover, Binoun 7; the Mactivity of immobility,” ids 120; the God of Kenephanes, nous 2 unwritten doctrines, agrapha dogmata the oral tradition in Plato and ita rela: lou to Acistotl’s critique, agrapha dogmata | wispom | 293 unnritten law, agraphor nemos Ue divine eanction of, nomos = umstof, ache see principle ‘Vacuum, kenon see void vehicle, ocheme ste asteal body via emineatiae as # cogsitive approach to Cod, agnartoe 2 via ucgativa as 2 coguitive appeosch to God, agnostos 2 vibration, Alans the inherent metion of atoms, kines 4 virtue, arte Socratic Kentfication with knowledge, a'ete ay phroneas; a ‘mean for Aristotle, erete g meson, pathco 9; preparation for in Plotinas dizieetike 6; contected with delinition by Socrates, dike 45 ‘and with function hy Avstotls,ergom 42 habit for Arisiotia But 2 Aisposition for the Stoics, hesds; virtue aad purification in Plodimus, hetharsio 4 ls vitals, dpmanniecotthe sep vital Force visual image, emphaso in Democsitus' theories of vision, aiathesis 20; and in Plato, abid. x7 vital force, dynemis zotike incorporation into world view of later antiquity, sympathvcia 5, dynemie g void, Remon Pythagoreen, Atomict, ond Aristetelian position on, Kevan de= nied by Psrmenides and Zeno, Ainests 2; denied by Aristotle in his retort fo Zenc, megethoe 4 vortex, dine rule in atomic change, kincsis 4, is Anaxagoras, genesis /, Pathos 3 “e ‘Weight, baros primary characteristic of atoms in Kpicuras, kinesis § when, ote see time were, pow see place hole; olor denied ofthe One, halen 2; Eapedoclen spher, 33 trae whole ie omegensous 55 contrasced y Plato, 62 Arieetelizn Beacnepenpe Bf, cgmraed 0 total by Plato 2 Arie Wisdom, phroneain sop don : Boner ope doacgraphitel approach to, exdowon 4.7m hgh tp of Imowledge, spsteme sz 68 “Bret Dilesopiy.* philoanphin sug iveal ede phronede'y pitdonsnance af urcltcacl corm, so Oia fre and Ig Bato, sophie Stoic del id294 | wien ‘with, Boulesle part of eppatite, oressy directed toward an end, procresie ‘wonder, theurea Initial motivation to philosophize, aperta 1 svorld toed, poyche tow hantos Pletonic theory of, payoke tou beator ay in later Piatonism, iid. 95 as x moves in Plsio, bg} analog in Aristotle, did. 105 and coscnie intellect, nous 6 exercises general pronleatey pronvia y 29 Lousvendoul svat uf well, hubore 3 fonder, eke! the intelligible wor'd, cksi