Michael J.

Varhola

RE AND
THE KOREAN WAR
I 950r 953

DA CAP0 PRESS

Mwufac tured in the United States of h e r i c a

AIl righls resented. No part of t h i s book may be reproduced or uansmitted in any

Eorm or b y m y means elecmnie or technical, including photocopyhg, receding, ar by any infomalion starage and retrieval flrstem, MiiLhout ~ t t e permission n from the publisher.

Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953 by MichaelJ.Varibola

Includes bibliographic references arid hdex

P~ndng Number 10887

ISBN 1-882830313-0 (cloth) XSBN 1-88281M49 (paper)

Libraq of Congress Card Number: 00.1Ml52

hblished Iry Da C a p Press A Memkr of the Perseus Books Group ht@://www ,dacappress.com

To Les Nbers

and all the warrior poets who have upheld the Republic by opposing enemies abroad and ignorance at home

This page intentionally left blank

Foreword Preface and Acknowledgments

vii
I
33

1: 'Mr,r on. the Gromd

fl:Warin&eAir 111: War at Sea

51
69

IV:Geography and Battlefields

U.5. Forces
W: South Korean Military Forces

81.
115

WI: Mlied Forces

Vl11: Norh Korean and Chinese Forces IX: Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment X: Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

127
1 5 1 1 165

187
203 223
239

X: Warlords and S ~ t e s m e n
istice Negotiations

X X I :1Prisoner;sof War and Atrocit-ies

con~aued ...

XW The Korean M7ar in Books, Fdm, and sxl the Web XV: Facts and Figures Appendix I: Chronology Appendiv II: Acronyms and Military Terms

Bibliography Index

253 263 281 299 309 31 X

CARTOGRAPHY A N D ILLUSTRATIONS
Maps and il'tustrationsare found throughout this book, Except as athewise noted, y SipaX C o ~ sand , are included couaesy of all I?fistagaphswere t&en by the U. S. the U. S, SoXdiersband Aimenk Home.

t 4:00 am. on Sunday,June 25,1950,10 division-sized units of the Nor& Korem People" k m y ( 1 crossed the 38th pardel at .l1 paine and Invaded the southern Republic of Korea. The United Nations Security Council ordered an immediate ceasefire in South Korea and the A.tfidr;-Lwalaf all Nor& &rem forces, but, the invaiorr continued. There is evidence to suggest that the N o d Koreans clearly expected to capture all of South Korea before any outside power, especially the United S ~ t e scould , intemene. The beginning of the Korean War marked the climax of a series of events that unfolded over the period of several generations. This initial chain af incidents culminated in the 1916 annexation of b r e a by Imperiafjapm, ending a long period of tension that bad smoldered since 1873,wbenJapan had first decided upon an eventual expmsian onto the Korean peninsula. Internal poli~cal and religious problems in Korea in 1894led to the smdled "Donghak. k n " uprising, which the ineEective Knrem gavemxnent ~ i e to d supp~ss, m e n the effort failed, the gmrnment called upon the C:binese for assis~ance. Japm, out my such request f;or assis~nce, dispatched aoops to h r e a md, alrcfiotxgh the uprising w a quicHy suppressed, both Chinese andJqmese tsoops remained theredter on Korean soil, The subsequent Sino-Japanese Wzlr of 1894-1895 led t o a Japmese Gctsary that prompted Innpedal Russia to seek an agreement Fvi& Japan regarding a sphere of iduence in b r e a . Japan agreed and suggested the 38th paralfel as the logiGal boundary line ditiding Korea into foreign protectorates. This did not satis9 Russia, which m t e d hegemany over the entire peninsula, m d the protectorate plan wm rejected. Vladivast-ok,

The Korean War

ice-bound nine monLhs of the year, remailled Russia" only part on the Pac$c, In a new initiative, Kussia, backed bf: France and Germany, supported the Chinese rejection of theJapanese claim to the Liaotung Peninsula as a part of the peace weaveThe subsequentJapmme dthdrawal of that claim left the way open for Russia to stake out its own sphere of influence in l navd base at its southern tip, at Port Liaotung and to constnrct a m a i ~ r )and hthur. This action, along ~ L h a , sel-ies of other events, leA little doubt, especially in Japanese minds, as to Russia's real intentions in Mmchuria. The Xmperjal Japanese coun hund the Manch-txrian simatim intolerable and the ensuing Russdapmese War of 19041095 made indelible marks on the fu~ure history ofilsia and of the world. TheJapanese w n the war w i t h h<: m r a l and material support of Great Britain and the United Sates, a point &at was not overlooked in St. Petersburg. OnJuly 29, 1905, U.S. Secre~ry of State Wilfiarn Haward T d t and Japanese Premier Prince &aura a g ~ e toJapanese d merainy over Korea dterJapan pledged that it would not ""hbor aggressiw designs against the Philippines,"Thus, the Treav of Por~smourXI, signed in. September 1905, gaw G r e a to the Jalpanese and helped set the sQge for VVorId TNar 11 and the Korem War. That the Korean people had orher ideas a b u t their hture and rejected Japanese hegemony w s never really appreciated in the West. TheJapanese had been quick in seizing eontfol of the counq's means of communications, and news of the insurgency that followed Por~;smou& was cleverly suppressed. Even the fact &at the emperor of XCstrea rehsed to accept the treaty proffered byJapan in November was not broadcast to the world. Three months later, in Febnxary 1906, regardless of the lack of an agreement, Prince I L Hirobumi ~ was appoinred the Japanese governor general of Korea, In 1907, Lhe Japanese forced U b e Korean emperor's alsdiearion in favor of his son, aJapanese puppet, and then ski1l-fufly placed their people in all o f the key government positions, disbanded the hrem army, and took over the police and judicial s)istems. Following the 1905 annexation, the Japanese moved against the ongoing &rem natjonalist agitation with gmtuitccus mthles,sness but were never able t o completely suppress the movement For fieedom. Although thousands of Korems died-at least 14,500 Civil Mili~amen were killed in h e fIgh.cing be~eenJuly 1907 and the end of 1 9 0 G k r e a n opp-ositim t o Japanese rule never slackened. Korean leaders, many of them in exile, coneinued their demmds for a Ewe and independent k r m , The expatrialtjs wre generally located in the United Sates, the USSR, China, arld Mongolia, and so it fallowd that the political and ideological orien~tion of their demands took on the flavor of their sunolmdings, Many Koreans gained

Foreword

e..

Ifl

military experience during World War II fighting alongside not just the Japanese, but also alongside both the Chinese Nationalist and the Chinese Communist forces. In fact, a k r e m government-inexile was fomed in Chungking in 1944. At the 1943 Cairo Conference, the World War ff A_fliesattempted to undo the dishonor of 1905 and promised independence to Korea "in due course" after the \ictory over Japan. At Ydta, in February 1945, President Ek-mklin D. fPoosevelt advocaed a msteeship fclrr Korea that muld be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Stalin voiced his agreement but added that Great Britain should be included among the mstees. What they, or the participants at the later (July 1945) Pocsdam Conference,which reamed the Cairo Declaraton, ob~ously did not consider was the Eact that S d i n had no intentjon &abiding by the terns of any agreement that limited Soviet expansion. This was true even though, soon after Roaseveltk sea&, the SaGet diclator firmed to President H S. Tmmank srepresen~a~ve H a q Hopkins chat the USSRWB bound by the faur-power agreement. W e n the SoL'iet Uniun opened its campaign against Japmon August 8, 1945, it did so with a declaratiion of support for the &rean people in their quest for independence. Four days hter, the first Soviet forces entered the Korean Peninsda from the north. h e r i c m forces entered Korea from the south on September 8,1945 and esablished a sphere of influence that extended norLJlwrd to the 38Lh parallel, a line chosen by the United Stales and Soviet Union as a military expedient for the disarming of the many Jqanesc: troops stilt sratjoned on the peninsula. Probably, at &at moment, no one coufd have appeciated the impact &at demarcaton line would have on the hture of the world, The inherent danger in the partition of Korea was quickly recognized by the Western Powers, however, and they attempted to rectify the problem at the December 1945 Moscow Conference. The solution reached at Moscow called for the U.S. and Soviet occupation commands in Korea to form ajoint commission to work toward unification. By May 1946, the experiment was given up, however, because of lack of progress in forming a provisional forces in the north and in democratic &rean government;,As the va~ous the south condnued to jockey for position, a Communist-inspired uprising broke our on October 1, 1946, in the central South Korean city of Taegu. About 70,000 Communist-led rioters participated in this uprising and claimed as their reason the oppressive policies of the American occupation. The revolt was poorly led, howwer, and never gained m y real suength. itnother attempt at a more peacehX sslution fsled in 1947, d e n the USSR, continuing its inuansigent stand on how the country should be governed, raised its demands far bejond acceptable levels. Unprepared for

The Kozean War

these events, the American government was slow in developing a coherent policy that would, at least in part, have dealt with the military emergencies that were developing. The failure to achieve an internal solution through negodation prompted the superpowers to direct the question of Korean unification to the United Nations. The U.N. General Assembly, in November 1947, ordered a general election in Korea that was to select a national assembly to draft a new consdtution and form a government. When the U.N. Temporary Observation Commission attempted to enter rhe Sovietxontrolled north to observe the elecdons, they were refused ;idmission by the Ssvlet authoriges. Eleccians wre held in the sou&, however, and the Republic of Korea proclaimed Spgman Wee, one of the exile leaders, the nation's first head of state. When the new government was formally installed on August 15, 1948, the U.S. occupation ended and, by June 29, 1949, d l U.S. combat f'orces had been dram. The 50@man Korean Miliaq AdGsory Group ( ) did remain to assist in the development:af Sou& b r e a " siliary forces. Before the .cvihdrawd was complc&d, however, ano&er Communist uprising broke out in South. Korea. On October 20, 1948, a Gommunist-z3on~olled group of betcveen 40 and 300 members of the 14th Sou& Kor-ean Consmbulary mutinied in Yosu,just belbre the unit w s to be moved to Ghejrr-do,m island off the southern tip of the b x a n peninsda and the site of a large Communist-hspired insurgenq, The murineen seized the t o m of Yosu, which is located on a smdX peninsula on the Korea S ~ a i t and then focused on the ef imhation of the constabulary% leadership, killing many of its oEcers m d NCQs. The mutineers then seized the unit's arms depot and, joined by civi.lim Communist sympafiizers, cqtured the 50,000-inhahiant seacoast t o m of Sunchon located at the neck of the Yasu peninsula, Using this mGnland t o m as their base, the Communist o inwlrgents fmned out throughout the suuhweskrn region of Korea t incite filraer revolt, Yosu w z recapmred on October 27, and as government forces began to restore order, the Communise fled into the Paegun Mountains to the n o d of Sunchon where they remained a &reat to the asea's securiq until the Korean War began, In another incident in Taegu in November 1948, a moday uprising was easily putt down by government ~ o o p sThe . signigcmce of this uprising, however, was that the rebels flew the North Korean Rag, which appeared to indicate the support, if nut the c a n ~ o laf , the government in N o d b r e a . of The upshot crif these incidene was fhe escablisbment of a ~urnbetr Communist-inspired insurgent organizations in Sou& &rea and the posirioning of sizable perrilla bands in the mgged mountains in sourfiwestern and in eastern k r e a , less than tcva years befare start of the: war.

W e n the No& Korem hvaded the south, at least:a part of the Republic of hrea's eenabr)~onic army was engaged in the suppression of this guerdla Ilrreat, In, the north, at the same time, the North K_orearr People's Committee had adopted a drdt constiturlon in July 1948, m d had inaugurated the Democratic People's Republic af Korea in September w i t h %m II Sung as t announced that all.of its miliary forces had been premier. The S o ~ eUnion wihdram from North Korea on December 25, 11348, but rehsed to grmt the United Nations permission to verq the claim. The Korean. PenislsuIa was now dKded into two ideologicdIy opposed nations and the hture seemed preordGned. W e n the. Nor& @rem invasion began on June 25, 1950, the U.N. Security Council ordered an immediate ceaefire in South Korea m d the tvi~drad of all Nor& Korem forces. The ogensive conunued, however, and the North JtCoreans appwentj[y expected to capture d l of Sou& Korea before m y outr;ide power could intewene. That same day, C h h g Qi-shek ~Eered South b r e a the assis~nceaf the Chinese NaGonalist &my on TGwan, OnNne 27, U.5, President Harq S, Tmman directed the U.S. f i r East Command in Japan to furnish naval and air support to South Korea. Cen, Bougtas Machthur, Supreme AtXied Commander, Far East, recommended acceptance af the Na;donalist Chinese oEer, but Tmman rejected the proposal. That same day, the United Nations voted to aid South b r e a m$ asked far assistance from its member nalions, U.S. ~ o u n hrces d were committed onJune 30, and air suikeswere authorized against targets in North Korea. OnJuly 7, the United Nations recommended that all forces in South Korea be placed under one unified command. The next day, General MacArthur was appointed commander of U.N. forces. Led by the United g U.N. force was assembled from among the allies and, wirhin three monrhs, allied air, sea, m d land potver had turned the N'orCh &rean attack into a catastrophic reueat. Soon, South Korea was liberated and almost all of the People's Republic of North Korea was in U.N. hands. What was missing, however, was a declaration of war. As the word 'bar" did not then and still does not exist in, the U.N. Charter, there was no way to call what was happening in Korea a war. The terns "police action" and "conRict'9eeme the keyords to describe that struggle which was, according to Michael Walzer, an "Aggression [that] justified two kinds of \iolent response: a war of selfdefense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and international society." Korea was a forcible example of the latter in modern times. m;lt. is now referred to as the h r e a VVar wodd also become a cmcible in which new m i l i w kssons would be learned hy sorne and igrlored by

The Korean War

uhers. Thiswa a pednrE of ~ m s i t i o n bemeen the linear mdare tatctics used I and, a new varkty of conflict in which &eve would be no in World War T front lines per se, and there wodd be great d=culty in separating the good guys from the had. Even so, Korea as fought as a linear, conventional, non-nuclear war by senior commanders who, for the most part, knew m the batdefiefd, knew noching about the empfoyment of nuclear weapons c little about the polidcal or ideological nature of the type of struggle in which they were engaged, and h e w even less about the people m d the terrain in which they were required to fight. It is fortunate &at the enemy generally accepted the aflied mles of engagement as their om, CSfhieAse, the West diRerem, rnore protracted type of conflict rnore nlighc have faced an en~rely reminiscent w f the later smggle in Southeat Asia, Some, but cerLainly not all, of those h e r i c a n s who fought in Qrea and who would leacl at later times in, Southeast Asia began to comprehend the subde dserences that marked Korea as a different kind of conflict, World W l z r r 1 1 was a global smggle, By compafison, &rea wa, in, the narrowest sense, little more than a localked civil war, By November 1950, the Nor& &rem army w;ls all but destroyed and western military and pali~caf. leaders alike felt a quick and glorious end to over the the conflict was near at hand, Moscow and Beging were & a n ~ c possibility of losing an idealcrgical ally on the him mainland and a deelsion was made that nat only ehanged the tachcal alignment of forces but, far more seriousty, turned the expected victory into a near defeat, The enuance of Chinese coops in November 1950 forced a sobering redefinition of objec~ves upon the United Nations, the UniLed States and its allies and, indeed, the world, New terms were coined: "sumogate wdare; L L bout,'' ~g and "gook," to name but a few.Casualties mounted, careers were made and bmken and the inevlable lessons learned ca~loged. Onty, in this case, the lessons were not learned very welt and &erica -would s s e r fnr it a decde later in Viebnam.

COLJohn Jessup
U.S. h m y , Ret.

rom 1950 to 1953, more than 1,7 million h e r i c m miliary personnel selved their countT in and around Korea in a tedious, bloody war against the communist regimes of North Korea and including Koreans, Chinese, and Russians on the China, Millions mo communist side and people from every inhabited continent on the allied side-participated inthe conflict,which killed an estimated 2 million people and harmed u n h o m millions ofothers, It was a world war in miniature, an epilogue to World War II and a prelude to the Cold War. It is also a faxinating subject of strud;y. f people asked me In the course af k t i n g this book, a number o questions like, "A book about the Korean War-didn't somebody write something about that already?"In fact, much less has been written about the Korean War &an about ather major h e r i c a n corlRicts (not;tbly the Civil War and World War II) ,but a great propordon of what has been written has been tzxcepfisndly good. So, indeed, why d t e mother book about this conflict? X beliwe &at it is incumbent upon every generation to examim hismly in accorctmce tvith its m experiences, which heips explain why f would d t e t it at all. In addition, with the 50th anmiversaq of the Korean War behre us, interest in the conact wit1 be as high over the next few years as it wiI1 at m y me in the foreseeale .fixture, and people will be Xookixtg for marerids that discuss the was in terns that are meaninfll to them. h d , on the eve of a new millennium, it is an opportune time m draw lessons from the last cenmry &at can hel-p wide us &rough &e next, A great body of source marerid ~ i a availabfe s for this book, more than at any other time since the 1950to 1953war in Korea. This is largely because of the increwed availabiiiy of oacial documenrs fPom the 1950s, brought

The Korean War

about in large part by the collapse of the Soviet Union, somewhat impraved rela~ans with communist China, and the decXw*caf-ion of U.S. materials, Still, subsmlid amounts of information are not yet availale, which makes it irzlpossibfe to present a complete histtt~y of the war. m i t e a bit of the existing infannation is also conflicting. For example, val-istlsapparently 1S w g fled to fie SoGet Union as 1939 reliable sources list the year that IGm 1 and 1941. And, while the most reliable sources claim the North Ksrean arnry had a strengtb of about 135,000 men in 1950, a number of mosdy non-herican published sources set this number as high as 250,00&a number for which here is no redisLic substantia~on. I did not ~ t Fire e m d Ice: The Korem War, 1958-2953 w i t h an eye towad stlpptanling an)l of the severaf excellent nama~ve histories af the an oveNiew of the war conflict now avaiiable. &&er, I intended to p r o ~ d e fcrr people w i t h little or no know1edg.e of it, and a road map for experienced studepl%of the conftictwho want to discover other avenues wor-chyddeeper inves~gaLion. Hopefully, readers will find it hfl of hscinating and isseftll informa~on about the firem War, pressend in a fi-esh and interesting "fact book-sqle" "format, As users will quickly discover, my eEort focuses on y hey p e r ~ i n e d to the Korean War, For people, places, m$ things s ~ c a as example, caps* biographies of irrrporbnt indi~duals are beaG1y weight(3Cf toward their activities during the conflict, and not toward &eir full lives and careers. Througham t h i s book the tern ""Sou& Kcrrea" is i s d ~ o n y m o u s l y tvitk "Republic of Korea," and the term "North Korea" i s used qnonymously with "Democratic People" Republic of ]Korea."This is done larrgely because the nor& and sou& references are mare easily m d immediately comprehensible &an the fall, official names c,f lfie colmtries, I have also made a conscious decision t;a use the term "Korem War" in this book rather than " b r e m GonBict,"which grevaged for severd decades and is still used by many peogle today. In che 1 9 5 0 most ~ ~ of lhose Americans who were aware of the U,S, role in Korea were content to accept it as a ""conflict""her than a "tcrar."Arose by any other name, however, smells the same, and a war is a war regardless ofwhat euphemism is applied to it. Korea was most assuredly a war, regardless ofwhat anyone chooses to call it.

A number of people, groups, and institutions have provided the moral and material support needed to make this book a reality. Foremost among the people deselving thanks is Les Nbers, who drav upon his experience as a soldier and teacher both to help me select the best source material and to help ensure chat what I did wich it worked. Inspiration for the title of this book comes from the excellent four-part documentary The Korem W : Fire md Ice (1999), produced by Lou Reda and aired on The History Chlmnel, Lou desemes a m k s both for giving his blessing to use the same title. for my book, and for cmating a film h a t served as an inspira~on while I mote it, Agrowp of people who deserve recognition for their mcorrragernent are my wife, Lt. Col, Dime Waters, m d the productive ""core element'' of the 50th hniversav of the &rean War Gommernoration Committee. Equdiy important are the Korean War veterans who have a e n Lhe hme and eBart to frmkliy relate rheir sometimes harrowing warrime experjerrces.,h o n g these veterans are Bill Alli, W a ~ Bjork, e Hale? Goon, Hawey GaHoway, JahnJessup, Theadore Mamis, and Warren wedhan. T am also indebted to Nick Minecci and the Soldiers' and Airmen" H a m , who generousty dlotved me access to their extensive colleclian of U.S. photugraphs. Most of the photographs in this book w r e d m m h m heir collection. Scott Price ofthe U.S. Coast Guard Historian's Office helped out by providing me with photographs and inforanation about mariGme operaGons during the: &rean War, d People who encouraged me during the d r i n g of this book, m ciiscussed the k r e m W a w i t h me mare &an they otkxekse might have, include my mother Menilea, my father Michael, my brother Christopher, his fianci Laum Russell, her faher Carl, and my buddy Chip Gamma. h d ,finalIy,f would like to thank my editor and publisher, Theodore P. 'Td" Savas, who helped guide the development of &is book fcom concept to bsoksheE* If &ere is myone wha has &shed me well or rendered me asiswce that I have forgouen to thank, I hope that they will both forgive my lapse and remind me of it,

il

WAR ON THE GROUND

"Korea was fought mostly by infanqmen with M-X rifies and machine p a s and hand grenades and mortars. There was artillery, of course, quite good on bath sides, . . . Men who fought in F r m e in f 917 would have undershod Korea; Lee's s a n d Grant" men would have recognized it.'' -James Bradry, The CoEdest War

nJme 25, 1950, more than 90,000 soldiers ofthe North Korem People's &my swept into South Korea, overmnning i&Iighrly armed forces m d d f i ~ n g quicHy tnwrird the poorly defended capid ciy ofSeou1.. A Li'nited Nadons force, camposed mdnfy ofhericans, intemened on behaUof&eRepublic icrfK~rea, m d f ~more r &m &reeyears smggled first t o resist, then eliminate, and then merely contain the cammunisilt &reat;

PHASES CIF THE GROUND WAR Even& d u h g the &rem MTar c m be d i ~ d e d into 10 major phases. Witfiin each phase, b o t h the 1I1.N. and the communist hrces launched a number o f ma,jor or minor operations, military aclims with specific gods, using forces xmies, Achons ~thixz each phase as s m d as platoons and as large as exr~re averlapped ta some extent, and Lhe dates givttn could easily be shsted several days or more h ei&er direcdaxr. For enmple, Chinese intemexr~on in force begm m November 22, but U.N. forces were still advancing at this point, some of &em reaching the Ydu %ver on November 28,

The Korean War

Dates June 2Mept. 14,1950: 21, 1950: Sept. 1~-Nov, NW, 22,1954)-Jan. 15,1951: Jan. 16Apd 21,1951: Apfil22-M;;ty19,1951: M;iy 2@Nov,12,1951: Nov. 13,19513une 19, 1952: June 2@Dec.20,1952: Dec. 21,1952-March 20, 1953: March 2 1 3 ~ 22,1959: 1~

Phase

U.N. Defensive U .N. OEensive Chinese f ntemention First U.N. CounteroEensive Chinese Spring Qffensives U.N. CounteroEensive Second Korean Winter4pring Korea Summer-Fdl1952 Third b r e a n Winter Korean Spring-Summer 1953

An overall ~ynopsis of each @me and m e o r more representative bz ttles or eveBrs from them are described below For LhumbnGl descrip&onso f addiliondground batdes, see Chapter XX, Clhron~log7i.

During the night ofJune 24$ ejemenrf of20 rJi5;1"sI"ons ofthe Narth Korern People%h m a ~ methirds ditci s&eag&, hished massing dong L h e fi~nt;ier we& tlaekm~&em nei& bar, rhe Republic ofKorea. At:a bout 4 a m . on June 25, Lhe communist forces unleahed a massive arta'1Ie~ barrage against Sou& &rean militay posirions and rhen sent tens o f rhousmds of' soldiers m d huadreds ofarmored vehiclles over the border.
L3 Suuch Korea was almost completely unprepared. Its ground forces t a m e d about 95,000 men, but only about one-third of them were deployed along the border with North Korea. Furthermore, these ~ o o pwere s lightly ed, poorly equipped, and not nearly as well disciplined or led as their adversaries. m i l e some units made vdiant smd-and w r e subsequendy elirnin~ed-msst quid@broke and fled southwad.

U On June 27, the United Nations Security Council called upon its rnembers to send asisance to the quieMy collapsing countv. That same day, the South Korean government evacuated Seoul and relocated first to Taegu, and then to Pusan. On June 28, North Korean forces took control of the Sou& &rean capid.
O Immediately after the United Nations called for its members to assist South Korea, the United States responded by sending air and naval forces to

War on. the Ground

contest the communist ofifensive, These meaures were not s ~ ~ c i eto n stop t cke Narlh Korean advance, however, and President Harry S, Tmman pushed up the U.S. stake in the conflict by ordering ground uoops into Korea.

D Detachment X, consisting of 35 men from the 507th &U-fircraft Artillely Automatjc Weapons Battalion, arrived in Korea on June 29,1950. These men engaged North Korean attack aircraft on the same day, shooting fighter with their machineguns and suffering the first casualdes of the Korem War-five men wounded in action,

D Task Force Smith, the first American infantry unit committed to the
conflict, arrived in Korea on June 30. It consisted of a 406man infantry battalion and a 134man artillery battery from the 24th Infanq Division, the U-S. command closest to the Iiorean Peninsula, and t~as orclered to deploy to &rea and then mcked to X ~ u k e Air Base, This unit was named for its cornmmder, Lt. Col. Charles B, "Brad" Smith.
O Few episodes exemplify the state of the U.S. military, or its underestimation ofthe Nor& k r e m army, than do the deplopent of Task Force Smith. To this day, W, milifaq $anners point to it as an inevi~ble product of indisclirnixlate domsizing m d lack of rediness, Like most infanq bat~lions in 1950, the 1st Bact-alion of the 24th fnfanuy DiGsion 'S 2 2 1st h f a n q Regiment consisted of w-raher than h e regulation thiree-Se compmies, both of which were understreng&, plus one-half of a hedquartem company, one-halt-" of a communicadons p l a ~ o n , and a heav weapons platoon a m e d with six 2.36-inch b a o o b , WO 75mm recoilless S e s , two 4.2-keh morars, and four 60mm mort;ars, Its artiHeq support, Battery A of the 52nd Field h.lcillery BatmEon, was armed with o n e - h a dozen 105mm houvitzers. Task Force Smith a ~ v e in d South Korea on July X , X 950, Qnce in Sou& Korea, it hegm moGng north to oppose the Nor& Korean forces, OnJuXy 4, f 950, its soldiers dug in on a pair of hills seaddling the road near the village of Osan and waited tc:, oppose -the advancing Nor& breaas, At around 7:30 a m . the next morning, the U.S. sddiers could see Nor& Korean anks advmcing sou& toward them, and gory-six minutes later the a r f i l l e ~ e n fired their first romds. Lighdy-mmed Task Force Smi& was no makh for the SoGet-built T-34 ~ l r and s acconapmying North k r e a n division, however, and was soon ovemn.

D B y early dtemoon, Task Force Smi& had lost the BatLfe of Qsan and its sudvors were mnning for their lives. Its caualties were 20 killed in a c ~ o n and 130wounded irk a c ~ o n , Considering its lack of men and matefiel, Task Force Smith prohhly accomplished its mission of sl g the Nor& b r e a n advmce as well as w a

The Korean. War

possible. And as badly as the force was mauled, the combat at Osan paled in comparison to the bloodbaths to come in the following months and years.

O Elements of the U.S. 24th Infanq Division, 25th Infanq Division, and
1st Cavally Division, which continued to arrive in South Korea rhroughout July and the first few days of August, contested the inexorable advance of the Nor* &rean People" &my. OnJuly 7 , the Uniled Nations recommended all U.S., South Korean, and other U.N. forces be placed under a unified command, and on July 8 Tmman appointed Gen. Douglas MacArthur to head this position.

Cf Despite their best effor~s, the t7.S. and Sou& Korean forces were unable
to do more than slow the communists. The allied forceswere driven steadily souhward, bu$ng precious time for additional farces to a r ~ v e at the southeastern port of Pusan. For a month, desperate, mostly nameless battles, were fought in dnzens of South Korean villages and toms like Chochiwon, Chonm, eongaek, Wadong, and kehon, and in the fields and roads bemeen &ern,

C1 The Battle of the Kum River p l y f 950) heganJufy 13and lasted until July 16, as soldiers from the 19th m d 34th Infanv Regiments of the 24th Tnfanq DiIvision, reinhrced by sttpporting units, battled North Korean forces along the &m River line, Of the first 3,401 men committed from the 19th I n f a n q Regiment, 650 w r e killed or vvounded.
Q The Battle of Taejon Ouiy 1950) took place on July 19 and 20, and

involved some 3,933 soldkm of the 24th I n f a n q Division attempting to defend the town of Taejon, site of the division headquarters, against the advancing North Korean forces. U.S. casualries were 922 men killed in action, 228 wouncied in actlan, and many missing, including di~siorr commander Gen. wlliam F. Dean, who disappeared when the t o m was ovemn.
O The Battle of the Notch (August 1950) took place on August 1,when the 19th Infantry Regiment (24th Infanq Division), reinforced with other di~sion elemena, battled the North K o r e a People" h ~ r m y sflering , 90

soldiers killed in a c ~ o n ,
Q The Pusn Perimeter was es~blished by Aupst 4, asts~orrh Korea" army steadily pushed U.N. and South Korean forces southward toward the coast and destruction. Eventually, the U.N. forces were able to establish a defensive line centered on the port city of Pusan, anchored in the hills to the north of the city and along the Naktong River to its west. To the south and east were the sea.

War on the Ground

SEA

OF

JAPAN

The Korean War

Q Once they had es~blished the Pusan Perimeter, the U,N, forces w r e

able to begin d r a ~ a upon g capabililies denied &ern when they were strung out over hundreds of miles..Unis w r e aide to support each other" flanks, reserves could be quickly deplcllyed to fill hreachcss, and ;tr-EiXXery support could be brought to bear at any point along the line. At the same Gme, rhe North b r e a n amy had disadvanagesgreater than my it had hc@din the pre.viaus montbs, Supply lines seetched d o m the peninsula were being torn apart by U.N. air strikes, easudt-iesw r e m o u n b g rapidly, and irrepbceable m k s and other equipment:srnoldered from Seoul to the edge of the Pusm Pefimeter. Still, the gr~vui.ng T4.N. forces engaged the Nor& Koreans in some of the most b m d cambat of the war during the defense of the perimeter, and their Imt me-hold an the peninsula was in cons~n jeopardy. t
Cf

Q The First Bactde of the Nakeong Bulge (August 11950) began an h p s t 8, when the 4 t h Divifion of L a z e Nor& &rean Peop1e"s hnrly crossed the Maktang Sver and pene~atedthe P u m Perimeter. A U,N. force consjsting of the 24th in fan^ Di~sion, the 1st Pro~sional Mafine Brigade, md elemen~ of the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions counterattacked, md during a IO-day battle managed to eonain the enemy sdient and drive the communists back across the river.
U The Batde o f the Bawling Mlery f h p s t 1951))was fought from August 15 to 20, as soldiers of the 2nd Infanq f)ivlsian5s 223rd Xnfanq Regiment and the 25th I n f m q Division's 27th Infantry Regiment batlled North Korean forces along a straight stretch of mad that t7.S. troops duMed the Bwling Alley, inflkhng heavy loses upon &ern.
of Ibe Malntong Bulge (Angust and Sep~clrllber 1W0) took place from August 81 to September 19, as U.N. farces once again battled a Mar& b r e a n stack across the Naktong, cornmittring troops from the 1st Caivalzy Division, the 2nd, 24&, and 25th Infmtry DiGsions, and the

L3 The Second Batde

1st Yro*iond Marine Edgade, By September 10, U.N. lFizrces had broken the momenmm of the communist oaensive, md far the f o l l o ~ n g nine days steadiIy reduced rhe salient through close combat,
Q ! Defemse of the Pus= Perimeter (August m d September X950), be~een Auwst 4 and Septemherr E, east Ehe U.S. forc:es alone 4,599 soldiers killed in ac.lion, 12,058 wounded in a c h n , 2,701 missing in acGon, and 401 &en prisaner, Nor& &reass forces also s a e r d heaq camdries i n the batdes along the perirnekr, and, unlike the U.N. forces, each day they were g r o ~ n weaker, g ra&er than smanger,

War on the Ground

U, N, OFFENSIVE (SEPT. 1 5 - Nav, 2 1, 1 950)

Even as the Nor& Korean Pe~ple k h m y attempted to smash rhe h s m Pefimeter md drive its defenders o f l s f h epanrjlsda, the l7.N forces were h e inidaciveand hunch a pronged c o w teroBensive. prepafiag ~o takeL h midaeptember, the new&-formed U.S. X Cops ms set to conduct Operation Chromite, a landing a t Inchon, about 30 miles from Seoul on the west coast ofSau& Korea, Inchon was fir behind the mgoriey o f h e Nor& Korea farces, which were preparing m bun& &&r find oflensive against the Pusm Perimeter, After X Corps had $eked hchoa, the 8& U,$. &my would mlly a d atrapt m bred out o f die perimeter. Them, L h e two forces w u l d mow tsmruf each 0t;lie.r;cmshiag h e isolated Nor& Korean i"eople"smy be~een &em.
D Operarion Chromite (Sepember 1950) was intended to mMue fartified Wolmi Island, which guarded the approaches to Inchon Harbor;

U.N. hoops moved no& effortless@in the w e b following the Znchon landing, encomtering very little resisbnce &am the shaaered the North Korean People's y. Peasants in villages on bath sides of the 38th parallel welcomed the Anzmicans and their allies ;;is liberators.

The Korean War

capture the port and city of Inchon; seize %mpa hiffiefct t o the south of Seoul; and liberate the city of Seoul itself, Capmre of the area w l d also cut supply lines to the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) operating around Pusan, Gen. Douglas Machthur had begun planning the operation on August 12, drawing upon his experience with amphibious operations during the Pacific island-hopping campaigns of World War X I . Leaders in Washington were leery of the plan, however, and permission was granted on little mare &an the basis of MacAshur's repuration. y X Covs, under the command of Machthur pmeege, Major General Edward M, a m a n d , was created as an amphibious assault force for the operation. It consisted of the US. 1st M a ~ n e Division and an, attached South Korc?an Marine Regiment; rhe U.5. k m ) ? 7th Infanq DiGsion and more than 5,001) KC)K soldiers; and artillery, engineer, and a number of &er support elements. joint Task Force 7, a nine-naljon force consisring of 230 mrships, 21 aircraft squadmns, and special amphibious, engineer, logistics, and andemater demdidons tern unib, providd naval mpport k r the Inchon lmding. On September 13, carrier-based aircrdt and naval cntisers and destroyers from the task force begm a devaslating aerial and navd bombardment oif the Nor& Korean-held forGfiicahons and coatzl1 aralery. positions on Wolmi IsInd, Early on September 15, the 1st and 5th M ~ n Regimen& e of the 1st Mafine BGsion lmded on d e m s ~ t e Wolmi d XsSmd, encountering only light resis~nce, In less than two hours, they secured the island and sealed off the causeway leading to Inchon, Late &at dternoon, two regimen@of marines landed at two points in Inchon, Red Beach and Blue Beach, both of which were, in fact, high sea walls that the troop had to climb, the first units scrambling over them with scaling ladders or through holes blasted by the n the successive waves warships, even as amphibious waIfare vessels brought i of Lsoops, U.N. air forces kept Nonh Korean aircraft from taking part in the Inchon fighting by flying interdicdon missions and bombing key enemy airfields; they also attacked enemy ground forces in an area 25 miles around inchon, while warships covered the closer approachesto the port with their big guns. Once over the seawalls, the Red Beach marines encountered scattered pockets of enemy resistance, but reduced them fairly quickly as they moved into the city. In less than half an hour, the assault teams had captured Cemetery Hill, one of their main objectives, and by midnight had taken Obsewatoly Hill, the other main objective. Blue Beach marines enjoyed similar success, capturing their objectives in the early morning hours of

War on. the Ground

September 16. By 7:30 a m . that day, both forces had formed a cordon around the city and cut off the escape routes for enemy forces remaining tl;xthin the city. Casualties from the first phase of Operation Chromite were amazingly low: 20 men killed, X74 wouzlded, and one missing. tosses, hwever, would increase dramatially over the f;oila~ng weeks. Additional X Corps forces landed on September 16, including parts of the 7th lnfantly Division, and within 24 hours of the landing had taken the high ground east of the city, moved inland far enough to prevent enemy artillery fire from landing on the port area, and were preparing to seize &mpo Erfield. On September 17, X Corps troops moved quickly toward the airfield and captured it by that evening, after several hours of combat with the 400 or 500 North Korean troops holding it. Communist uoops tried to counterattack during che night, but were replused w i t h heavy easuallies.
O Possession of Empo &field, far to the rear of the main N o d Korean forces, gave the U.N. command a base from which to conduct air operations against both Seoul and the communist supply lines.
Q By September 29, the 1st Madne DiTI.ision was adnncing on Seoul and preparing rr, move into and recapmre the Sou& Knrem capid, Memwhile,

most of the U.S. 7th Infanv DiGsion began to move souhwad to cut oE&e escape and supply routes of the North Morean army, which was even then h e 8th U,S, &my breakout from the Pusm Perimeter, contes~ng
O Taking Seolll was much tougher than the bade for Xnchaa had been. It was nut until September 29, dter mare than a week of b m d , street-t~stseet fighting, that the Marines and the 7th Infangv Division units managed to take the city, Gasualtles from &he battle were dso much higher &an they had been at Inchon two weeks earlier: 427 killed, 1,961wounded, and five missing for the 1st Marine Division, and 86 killed, 358 wounded, and 10missing in action for the "7 Lhnfanw DiGsiaxz.

C l By October "7 N~ofih Korean forces were in disorder m d hose that could were rerseating back across the 38th par"alle1. Despite the deep resemations of mmy U.S. leadem, Operadon Chrorni* was a complete success and, debatably, one of the most effective amphibious operations in military histofy.
O 8 t h Army's Breakout from the Pusan Perimeter was set to begin on September 16, the day after the marines landed at Inchon, but for another

The Korean Was

three days the U.N. forces still had to defend the perimeter at several poinu.
As word of the landing at Inchan slowly began to spread through the

commwlist:mnks, 'however, enenry pressure abated,

Q On September 19, the 1st Cavalry Di~sian, the 2nd, 24th, and 25& I n f a n . 9 Ditisions, and v a ~ o u sother U.N, units, advanced against the encircling North Korean People's Army and broke out o f t h e perirnet-er. 8th U.S. Army moved north, routing the North Korean forces in heavy fighting as it moved faward. On September 26, northward-moving elements of the 8th Army met up with southward-moving elemenu of X Colps at Osm, three m o n ~ after s Task Force Sn~ith had been defeated &ere. Casualties from the breakout were high, as they had been along the Pusan Pe~meter over the six weeks preceding the operalion, U.S. Lasses included 790 killed and 3,544 wounded, CS The U,N, advance on the Ydu Sver (October and November 1950) and North Korea's border with China began soon after the capture of Seoul. A shift in U,S.-U .N. policy occutmed arcrund this point, from fighting a tvar sf defense to penalizing and overWhra~n;the communist regirne in North Korea,

D Follo~ng the fall of Seoul, the WOmain elemenes of the U.N. forces in Korea remained separated, with the 8 t h U.S. h m y advmcing norhwardt along the western haff of the peninsula, m d X Cofps moGng nor* along the east coast, L l ROR unirs led h e t advmce into North k r e a hraughout October and November, at times engaging U,S, units in a race for key objee~ves.On October 19, the 1st: ROK dihion heat the U.S. 1st Cavdry Di~siaurto b o n e a n g and took control of the commllnist capital.

CL On November 1, mops af the 8th Army fuught the northernmost U.S.

ac~on of the war, when soldiers of the 24& Xnfmq DiGsion's 21st I n f m v 8 miles Regiment capctrred the Nor& b r e m village of Chonggodo, a mere L kom the Ydu Ever crossing at Sinugu,
to December 1950) begm on Ocmber 2, when the X Carps began reembarking at the port of Inchon, It u . a s t p a n s p ~ caound i the &rean hninsula t o its east coast and the Nor& &rean ports of Wbnsan and Iwm. Mines delayed the amphibious landing for two weeks, hawever, while naval unitrs tvorked to clear &ern, It W* not e the 7th Xnfmq DiGsioas made m until October 25 &at the 1st M a ~ and mticlimacric adminis~a~ve Imding, -cc, the jeers of ROK troops who had capmred the city on October 10,

13 The Wonsan Campaign (October

War an the Ground

D South Korean forces wel-e already n~oGng northwar( txp the east coast road, so X Corps headed first north to Hamhung and then norhwesr, toward the Chosin Resemoir, from which they would make their last thrust to the Chinese border, 1st Marine DiGsion unies advanced up the west side of the resemoir, while 7th Infa'anq Bi~sion u n i moved ~ up its east side,

Alrhnugh 15 ~ ~ ' ~ ~ I ' ooIfz Chinese s co~nmmist t 1 - 0 0had ~ ~ e~~tered the U ~ Q I Ithe advanc.I'ncg Korezn Pear;l7sula mid-Octanber 195@ &eh- attar-k;s U.N f01-ceshad been limited, and a&ereac11one had clisappeared back into h e mnunl.ainous inre~Yorof the country, This m a d I'r vex;r" easy for Machfiur-in Tokjro to dis~ziss the CfZi~~ese presence as insigz2ifica~t and exhcrr~ his commmders m mow northward as qrxickIy as possiblta. Men the 2C;0; 000 soldiers of the Chi~~ese IfeopIe W o l u ntee13A m y smck near the end of Navmber, i t was in numbe~s and m'th a fi11;7" 112a~ came as a c~mplelc;. surprise ~fr, the brge& unp~*epare(rJ h~err'csn, South Korean, and othtrr allied farces. U.N comn~auders paid for that lack of pl-epgra~on m-th&e blood oftheir men mu' a humilia~ l cfefka ~ g c.

By November 1950, U,N, troops had advanced into North Korea and were alppmaching its border with China. American soldiers and Marines celebrated Thanksgiving within site of the Yalu and looked fopntalxcf to being home far Christmas, unaware that t11c Chinese were about to enter the war with a vengeance,

12

The Karean War

On November 21, the . 7 l t h Infintry Regiment ("?h hFantr;v Dimkion) reached rhe Bftr fiver at Hyesanjin, near its headwaters. S a n g out behhd it &roughoutNor& Korea were all seven ofthe U S . combat dr'tl:sion*slse 1st Cavalv, 1st Marine and Znsil, 3rd9 7 & , 24&, m a t 25ttl I n f m ~ Di&ions-along me&their at-tided ROE and all;& uni&On liiovernber 25, the C;"hinese launched &eir cotrnteraflen~ive~ decimadng the UN. fmces around the C h ~ s Resewair h in the west a d around eiCle kJ1ag-eof Kun u-ri i n the eras&

CJ The XZatde of the Chasirr Resewair (November and December 1950)

erupted on November 2'7, when Chinese forces assaulted U.N. units an both sides of the lake, ;url a t ~ c k that conrinued for about two weeks. , of elemene of the 31st and 32nd Infanv Task Force F ~ hcomposed Regimen&(7th Infarrt-ryDiGsion),was deployed east of the Chosin Resemoir in late November, get-ting;ready to make the final push toward the Yalu. The Chinese hit this 3,20Gman force on November 27, iuld by December I had practically annihila~ed it; a mere 385 of its soldiers su Qn the other side of the resewoir, rlne 1st Marine DiGsion was s m n g out along a narrow road that led from the coast up through the villages of Koto-ri., Hagam-d, and Yudam-ni at the nor& end of Lhe Chosin Resemoir. Its commanders had slowed the advance as much as possible, however, despite exhortadons from MacArthur to move more quickly, and as a result was less spread out than it othercvvise might have been. Chinese uoops took conuol of the road from the coast at several points s of the 1st Marine Division, U n ~ l l i n g to and encircled the v ~ o u elements either surrender or stand their ground and die, the marines began a fighting withdrawd back down the road towad the part of Hungnam. Heavily armed, resolute, and supported at every leg of their twwweek reweat by atmck aircrd, the marines batrled subzero temperattlres and Chinese roadblocks and flank attach during their gmeting march t o Hungnam. By December 9, the 1st Marine DiGsion made it to Hungnam, where it established a defensive perimeter under the protecrive fire of U.N. warships. Caualfies for the diGsion were 718 killed, 3,508 wounded, and 192 missing, plus 7,2313 casualties from frostbite and illness. Remnants of the '7th Infanq Division straggled into Hungnam as well, their advance north mmed into a precipitous retreat. By December 10, most of the division's units had made it back to the coast, having suffered casualties of 2,657 killed and 354 wounded, h the communist forces closed in on Hunpam, the broken elements uf X Corps began to embark on transports, warships, and chartered ci+tian vetssels m d sail out of No& Korea. By December 24, the U.N. Rorilla had

War on the Ground

SEA

OF

JAM#

The Korean War

macuated 105,000 d i t a q personnel m d nearly 100,000 No& &rean rehgees.
O The Battle of &nu-ri (November and December 1950) erupted in western Nor& Korea on November 29, Chkese farces surrounded, ovennrhelmed, and almost completely desvoyed the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, and by December 1the command had lost virtually all of its vehicles and heavy equipment, as well as 4,940 men killed or missing.

C1 The Longest Reweat in U.S. Militaly History (November and December 1950) began in late November, as units of the 8th U.S. Army collapsed and their soldiers started to "bug out," abandoning weapons and equipment and ~thdrawing back toward South Korea in disorder. Commanders were, far tPne most part, unable to slow the rout, ;md Ameritsam, South Koreans, arld other diied f ~ o ~s~aggled ps back across the 38th parallel singly and i n small groups. By December 15, 8th U.S, &my commanders had managed to regain c o n ~ oof l their unie and to esbblilish Lhe hjin River defensive line south of the ,38& pardfel and north ofthe city of Seoul. Even as they dug in and prepared to face the coming Chinese onsflaugbt, however, the U.N. Forces suEered yet anotXler casual.fty.: Qn December 24, commander Gen, WaZton H, "JohnnieW Walkr F ~ killed S i na 1 ~accident ~ c when hisjeep was smck by a ROK truck, Hardedged Gen. Match.ew B. Ridpay axr~vedin Korea the day dter Ghrismas and assumed command of the shattered 8 t h &my m d immediately began to reorganize it.
D The Third Chinese Phase OEen~he Uanuaq 2951) began on New Years day, when 500,000 communist voops advanced on the U.N. lines in an attempt to keep the U.N. off balance and to once again capture the South Korean capital. This offensive succeeded in driving the already beaten U.N. forces even hrther southward, 50 miles below the 38th garaltet, and allowed the communists to capture Seoul for the second time. Primitive supply lines were the bane of every Chinese offensive, however, and while the communist forces regrouped and began once again to build up the materiel they would need f i r their next *rust, the U.N. forces under s d w a y begm to prepare a counteroEensive.

W a x on

the Ground

Throughout late winter md early spring of 1951, U.N. forces smggled toward the South Korean capital of Seoul in m agempt to liberate it once again. This time, however, they faced a det-emined Chinese and Nodh Korean defense,

At the soulthem end cif the peninsuja, Lhe 1st Madne Ditision spent Jwua1-yand parl ofFebruar;vrouting out Nor& Korem forces and pardsans hiding in the hiJls dong the S ~ a iof t Korea coasl; This opera~on, k ~ a m as clhe "Great Pohaag Cuesdfla Hun&" w a conducted a o m d che soul;hem Korem t o m s r;rf Pohmg9 ARdong, Masm, Sondong a d Uisong and

srxcc;.ee$ed i n vii-tualjyelimina~ng the Nor& Korem 18& Di*ioa. Mong the line of contact in the middle nf the pains&, f i d p a y had been eager9since assuming csnzmmd of&e UN.ground forces . i nKore2, to hunch an immediate coun terofiensive against the carnmunisist forces. UUNe coops were stilt exhausted and demorzlked from their recent reeeat,

The Korean War

however, and it was not until mid$anualy Lhar Ndmay was able to launch Operation W& ound, a probe-in-he of rhe solidmng communisr ijn es. A series of opnations geared toward recap~ur;l'ng Seoul and establishing a defensive line nnrth sf L h e 38& plallel soon foll~wed. Significantengagemen& fought durjng this period include rhe Batrle of the Twjn Tunnels, in which the U.S 1SrdInfan~ry Regimentand the Frach Battalioxz killed at least 1,300 Chinese uoops; Lhe Batde of Hoengsong, where the Am e r h n farces sdered their single largest loss ofljfeduring Lh e war;.and the Battle of Chippung-ni,the largest engagementduring a Chinese counteraflensjve,
Q Operation Wolfhound ganuary 1951) was a limited, probing

t h U.S. Army" I Corps against cornmnist operarion by elements of the 8 forces deployed along the sau&em banks of the Han Ever, sou& of Seoul. which led the It was named fi>r the 27th I n f a n q "Wolf;hound"R~egirnent, attack. Reports received in early January described the buildup along the Han, but were vague as to the exact strengths and dispositims of the men?); forces. By midjanuary, the 8th Army had advanced nodward from Osan toward Seoul and had nearly reached Suwan,just 30 miles sou& of the ROK apitaf. Kidway wanted rnore infamation before deciding whether to es~bIish defensive positions around Osan or advance hrtI-rer toward Seoul, and on Januaq X 4 ordered Operahon Womound, which begm ~o days later, 27th I n f a n 9 Rrtginrent fitrces met little opposiGon un.til reaching Suwon i&eK,where it engaged carnmunist units and inflicted heavy losses on &ern, sugering few casud~es in the process. At the same time, pressure from communist forces in other 8th y sectors was aX1eGated. Fearing that the 27th Infanv Regiment might be cut off and mauled, Ridpay decided to end Wolfhound on J a n u a ~25 and wirhdraw his forces to deknsibte positions sou& of Suwon, k h r e the U.N. forces could .Nithdrw, houvmr, the communists themselves rewaled e a s ~ a r d , ta posilions in the hills around Mranjtt m d Yoju, just south of the eagitzlf. These apparent successes led Ridpap to believe that the communist farces did not yet have enough men or materiel to either launch or ~thsmd a general offensive, Wanfing to act befare they could become stronger, he ordered Operation Thunderbolt.
CJ Operation nunderbolr: ganuary and Febmary 1951) ~ras a general ogensive by the I, IX, and X Corps of the U.S. Eighch Army against precursor to the communist forces south of Seoul and was an opera~onal

War on the Ground

recapture of the capital iself. Kidway ordered the operation onJanualy 23 and it begm two days later, On January 25, the three commands began advancing northward on either side of the Han fiver, f Col-ps on h e w s t side, X Corps orr the east of the river, and IX Corps in bemeen them, smddling the river w i t h elements on bath sides of it. I Corps was tasked with recapturing Kimpo Airfield and Inchon, west of Seoul. MgVing north, it captured Suwort on Januafy 27, Ma&thur9s birthday (which the supreme commander called the best birthday gift he had ever-received). T Corps fulfiIled its mission by Febnxary 1 and esabiished a defensive line centered six miles souhwest of Seoul. X Corps was mked with advancing through the town of Wonju and into Hsengsong and its envlrms. Its forces complete+ destrqed Warlju and capturing it on Febr-uary 2, X X Corps m m d on to their ulrcimat;ct objec~ve, was tasked both with capctrring Chipyong-ni, swtheast of Seoul, and supporring tbe corps ta either side of it, Its fcrrces encountered heav)" resismce from Chinese forces dug into the hilly coctnq around Chipyong-ni, and by F e b n r q 2 I X Corps w s still bogged down in combat. Hoping to relieve pcessufe on the area around Ghipyong-ni and Seoul and to divert the enemy t o the east as much as possible, on Febsuary 5, Ridpay ordel.ed X Corps t o launch Operation Roundup.

ff Operaticrn Roundnp (Febmaq 19511, a hllowrrp t o Ope=tion

Thunderbolt, was a Iin~ited X Corps osensive intended to move the U.N. lines norhward and, perhaps, force the communis&to abandon the South Korean capid of Seoul. R d p a y hoped that Rouxrdup, even if it failed, muld dismpt any counteroaensive planned by che eommunis~s and reveal their dispositions and intentions, Befrtre the apemtion jumped off, E d p a y reinforced X Corps m d the RC)K IIT Corps with mops from the wrjlern, more secure sector, of the U,N. line, On February 5 , the U.N. forces advaneed norhward from Hoengsong toward Wangcbon, Enemy resisence increased as they neared the tom, however, and dter sever& days the d i e d advance began to dow. W i l e U.N, forces were advmcing on Hongchon, one North Korean and two Chinese divisions left Seoul and mwed to block them. Despite the fact h a t intelligence repor& warned of the possibility of &is counterattack, h o m e r , X Corps commander Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond ordesed his ~ a o p to s c o n ~ n u advmcing. e On Febmary 11, the communists launched a powerful nighttime counterattack, smashing through the U.N. lines and setting up roadblocks to hinder any allied attempt to reueat. Although X Corps was able to fight its

163

The Korean. War

way back to Msonjrx, communist forces mnihilated the ROM:8th Infantv Di~sion,killing or c a p m ~ n gsome 7,500 men m d all of the unit's equipment. B d p a y ended the retseat by o r d e ~ n g his forces to dig in and prepare a defense against the counteratack. One of its mast apoc;llyp~c batdes of that oEensive was fought out around Chipyong-ni a d Wnju,

iZI The Battle of Ghipyang-ni (February 1951) began Febmary H, when

18,000 Chinese woups, the main thmst of the comlrnisl counteroEfensive, atbcked posi~ons eonfiolled by elemenb of the U.S. 2nd fnfanq DiGsion, A U,N, force consis~ng of the U.S. 23rd fnfanq Regiment, the 1st lery Batdion, Battery B of rhe 82nd h n g e r bmpany, the 37th Field hhaircraft ktillery Battation, and the French Etatdion, stood their w i t h ground, however. U.N. forces were aXmost ovemxzr a number of ~nnes, gunners firing heir h o ~ ~ einto r s advmcing Chinese replars at nearly point-blank range, and inf;zntr)iresdutrtIy holding their ground, forcing the Chinese to advance foxhafe by foxhole, Wi& h e help ofadllery, amor, and air support, tbe defenders of Chipyong-ni manalfed to w i h s m d m d ul~mately shatter the Chinese advmce during three days of heay fighting. U.S. casualries from the Battle of Ghipyong-ni included 94 killed and 259 wounded, compared to much higher Chinese casualties. More significantly, &is batde was China" first tacdcal defeat dulxing the war, m d sewed to bolster the flagging morale of the U.N. troops, From Eebruary 12 to 21, other prangs of the Chinese cmnteroEensk were launched against sectors held by the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Infanvy Division, and other elements of the 2nd Infantry Division. Although U.S. uoops s a e r e d nearly 2,000 cwalties during these attacks (615 killed ~ ~ 3 1 , 2 wounded), 96 the Chinese did not accomplish much more than t h y did in the bloody attack at Chipyong-ni. the communist counteroEensive broken, U.N. forces launched a number of operations intended to recapture the South Korean capital of Seoul and reeslablkh the defensive lines along the 38th parallel.

D Operation Riller (February and March 1951) was a general offensive launched on February 21 by the U.S. 1st C a d l y Di~sion, the 2nd, 7th, and 24th Infanq Divisions, and the 1st Marine Division to drive the Chinese t l mfiver, Squeamishnessin Washington led communist:forces north of the E to some cri~cism of the name @SUer" being used for the operation. R i d p a y =W no reason to mince words, however, and h e name was rebined, Bad weather and problems with logistics and supplies impeded the operation, however, and the only troops it ended up killing or forcing across

W a on the Ground

the Han were rearguard elements left behind to cover the Chinese withdrawal. By the time Operation Killer ended on March 1, it had not succeeded in inflicting massive casualties upon the communist forces; it did, however, improve U.N. positions and set up allied forces for the next step in their ogensive: Operation Spper.

CI Operation Ripper (March 1951) ,a general offensive involving all seven of the divisions in che 8th U.S. Army, was launched on March 7 and lasted about m weeks, It succeeded first in sunounding and isolating the city of Seoul, then recapturing it, and finally in driving the communist forces back to the 38th parallel. Airborne voops of the 187th Regimental Combat Team and the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies supported the offensive on March 23 by jumping into Munsan-ni, 20 miles northwest of Seoul, Dubbed Operaci~n Tomahwk, it was the last airborne operation of the Marean War. Casualties included 84 injured in Ihe jump, one killed i n action, and 18 wunded. Overall U N carnalties duI-ing Qperacion Ripper were fairly hi$, and included 566 men killed and 3,220 wounded.
CI Operation Rugged (April 1951) launched on April 3, was the general 8 t h Asmy advance to what wodd eventually be called the Gnsas-Wyoming Line, just north of the 38th paraflel along m s t of its lengh. By April 6, the U.N. forces had crossed the 38th padlel and rees~hlished &emselves along the bnsas Lime. Alied casuaX~es included 156 killed and 901 wounded.
O Operation Dauntless (April 1951) tvas launched on April 1 1 by the U.S. 3rd, 24th, and 25th i n f m q d i ~ i o n s to esablish the Utah Line, m extension of the main defensive line. It achieved its objectives by April 22, with U.S. &my casualties'of 95 killed and 1,056 wounded. WiLh the conclusion af Dauntless, U.E. forces had once again liberated Seoul and had retaken and improved their positions along the h n s a Line. o d&nd the new line. Wi& that, they began to dig in and prepare t

h Ap~l1951, President Tmmm relieved Ma&&ur from commmd m d made Gen. Mat&etv B. S d p a y overall c~mmandef of h e U,N. farces a mere fuw mon&s dter he had asumed command d r h e US. &my Seasoned veterm Gen.Jilmes Vm Fleet replacnetd a d p a y as commander of

The Korean Wzr

the U N ,ground forces. Uislike M a c h & ~ r X , d v a y was hfiII acco-d sentiments in Washington, which were agaiost making another attempt to conquer North Korea or expad the war beyond cEzepeninsda, Soon dter & e x chmges h commmd, Chinese forces launched two mijior ogensives in a fifial attempt:t o desuoy the U.N. forces and achkve a deckive m i l i t a ~ Gctsry i n Korea. Mea tkze atitack came3 the h e n k m s , South Korems, m d their adies were as ready as: they could be to m e t it,

O The Chinese First Spring OEensive (April 1951) began on April 22 d e n , after extensk preparaeions, Chinese communist forces launched what they called their F ~ & Phase OEensive. h estimated 486,000 Chinese troops moved toward Seoul and Kapyong, in the I Corps and IX Corps sm Line, while Nor& Korem forces launched a limited supporting offewive on the east end of the flronc, The resul~ng general engagement was the lmgest single battle of the war. While Chinese ~actjcshad been effec~veduring the winter against isolaeed U.N. wits strung out across Nor& Korea, theywere quite costly and largely ineEecdve when uGlHed agaiast well-prepared defenders s u p p ~ a e d by artcillery m d attack aircrdt, S~ll, Chinese forces managed 60 break &rough the U.N. Iines at Kapy~ng~ mauling h e ROK 6th Division and compelling the allied forces to gmdually fa11 back under the wight of heir onslaug-ht. For the mast part, however, U,N. forces conducted a fighfing Inihdlrawal, m d some unils, espccidly the f st Gemmanwealth Biviision, h e l ~ to d break the momentum ofthe communist oEensive and inflkc heavy casualties in the process. Mter Icyltfidra~ng from the Qnsas L i e , the U.N. forces moved about 35 miles to the s o h , whex they dug in and esmblished she & Name Line,just north of Seoul. By this time, however, Chinese supplies were spent and their t_ac~cs had exhausted and bloodied heir troops, As a resdt, the Chinese First Spring offensive was unable to crack the new U.N. line and the fighting came to an end, U.S, casualties sdered during the Chinese First Spring Oflfeasive i-ncfuded 314 killed and l ,Gm wounded, ROK and Chinese casualties are uncertairr, but were much higher,
O The Chinese Second Spring Offensive (May 1951) began on May 16, when the communises sent 21 Chinese and nine Nor& k r e m diGsions against the No Name Line, unexpectedly shifting the weight of their attack eastward. As they did during their First Spring Offensive, the Chinese targeted ROK units. And, as during the previous month, the South Korean

War on the Ground.

unids; cracked and broke under the wight of the communist advmce. For the most part, however, other U.N. forces held their ground and contained the pcsnetralions of their lines, On the secdon. of the line held by the U S , 2nd hfant_r)r Di~sion, along the Soyang River, the communists suffered such heay casualties from May 16 to 21 that the battle was referred to as the "May Massacre." W 2 e the earlier oEfensive had at least managed to dfslodge h e U.N. forces, the second spring offensive did not achieve any of its objectives. By May 20, seven divisions of the 8 t h U.S. Army w r e moving into posicion for a counterat~ck, axtd by May 22 the Chitlese and North Koreans broke oE&eir auempt to force the allied lines and fell back in disorder. U.N. casualties from the Chinese Second Spring Ofensive included 333 killed and 888 wounded, &though exact Chinese cmualties are impossible to determine, the highest suffered by the communist nal4on during the en6m they we~e war* Like Nor& Korea" attemp& the year befare, the Chinese spdng aEensives demonseated h a t China, too, could not prevail over the U.N. forces. Their failures ul~mately led to the communisls' deckion ta seek a negotiated peace. Fear &at the U.N. foxes might begin to advance on the Yalu Ever also contributed to this new-found Chinese interest in. negol_iatirtn,

Beginning in late s p ~ n g2951, U N forces launched a series of dit-f'sion-level operations intended to retake posib'ons lost during the PI-eceding-communist offensive and to secure improved posiIr"ons. While intensive combat would conrinue a t various points along rh e front until rhe last day ofthe war, &isphase was rhe last in which such large scale operations were conducted,At the end ofNovemher, UN. forces setded inm m '%ctrie defense" of the front, Also durjng this phase, the Unired States rejected the oprion ofa total war m*th China, and resolved to ensure h a t the fiosrlr'li~es remained confined to h e Korean Peninsula.
O Major U.N. ground operadons conducted from late spring to early fall 1951 were all geared toward retaking or establishing defensive lines. These operations included Operation Detonate, designed to resecure the Kansas Line, which had been taken by the communists in April 1951; Operation

22

The Kaxean, War

Having smived the Chinese spring offensive%, the U.N. farces lamched iit large-scale: counteroffensive in the s w m e r of 1951 to regain tmitoq lost d ~ x l g the previous months.'"

Piledriver, intended to secure the Wyomiag Line aad take cantsal of the Iron Trimgle; Opera~an Gommmdo, a m d ~ n a d o n d aEensive launched to esablisb theJarnestom Line; m d Operations Nomad and Polar, to semre what wm eventrrdly cdled the Mssouri Line,
D Battfes waged duhng this pefisb, ppica1ly fought aver hilEtops held by one gide or the other, include the Bartte of Taeusm, the Batfle of Blaady %dig.e, and the Batlle af HeartbreA Rdge. If Operation fiiedrilver was the first part of the: U.N. counteroffensive during this phme, while the Batcle of Bloody %dge wm a typical but especially gruesome smggXe for three hills along the Une of contact, Operation Rleddver (June 1,991) w s a U,N, attempt to strengthen its posiLion on tfie swWyoming Line and to seize conbol of the Eron T~angle, It began on June 1, when the U.S, T Covs advmced into the triangle, Byfune 13,the U.N. fbrces had captufed the remnme of che Lhree toms &at. marked the corners of the Iron Tfimgl m d rPyortgang (not the No& b r e m capid). Chhese forces cantsolfed

War on the Ground

23

the high ground over the latter ~ l l a g e however, , prornpelng I Corps to abmdon it &most immediately. Operaban Piledriver succeeded in d d e g communist hrces out of the Iron Triangle and breaking L-heir hold an it. Neiher side was able to exert conaal over it for the balance of the war, however, and the dernili~rhed zone esbblished lay the armiseice ran right &rough the middle of it, Caual~es for the four U.S. diGsions parlticipa~ng in Operation Piledriver were 231 killed and 1,788 wounded,
The f2az;deaf Bloody Edge f k u p s tand September 1951) begm when U.N. farces launched an stack against Hilb 773, 940, and 9-83 and &eir connecting r-idges,an area running parallel to the line of c o n ~ cthat t earned litde its n m e from the resddng engagement. W i l e Bloody Sdge i&elf"had smcegic value, apem~ons to take i r w r e intended to both keep U.N. forces crim and to keep pressure on the enemy in order to influence the in &ght_ing armistice negoLiations. On August J 8, rhe ROIL 36th Infmrry Regiment (ROK 7th Di~sian) , backed up by the U.S. 72nd Tank Batealion, 2nd Infantry Division artilley, and U.N. air support, stacked Bloody Edge. Mter a week of heavy fighting, the ROK troops managed to eake the ridge, On h p s t 26, however, they were forced t o relinquish it under heavy pressure from North Korean furces. Keginlent The next day, on August: 27, the 2nd Batblion, U.S. 9th Infarktl-~i (2nd Xnfanq Division) atmcked Hilf 883, but its attack was brokren by the entrenched Nor& Korean troops. Later in the dayl the rclgiment's 3rd Battalion was sent:against Hill "173, bul it, too, was repufsed before it reached its initial otljeche. m e n night felt, the communisrs countemllitcked. t7.N. farces resumed the attack on August 30, bombal-dir~g the ridge w i t h 451,979 rounds of art:llerfr and assauldng it fiorr~lly .ctith the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 9th fnfanq Regiment. The heavily entrenched North k r e a n units s u ~ v e b the bombardment, however, and the U.S. infanqmen had t o fight heir way across the ridge, reducing Lbe defenders' pssicjons with machine guns, grenades, and fiamethro~e~s. These U.N. atacks continued until Sepember 5, when they finally succeeded in dri.iing off the War& Korem defenders, The communist trsaps did mat move far, however, merely retocatixlg to nearby Heartbreak Ridg-e, about 1,500yards to the nor&, Both sides sfiered hi@ casuallies during the Battle of Bloody Ridge. Losses for the U,N, forces participating in the ogensive were 826 killed, 2,032 wounded, and 414 missing, Communist casrral~es were Inore than 15,000, including at least 1,389 killed,

The Korean War

By h e second whter ofthe Karem Wr,the UPJ:m d cmmunist lines of bat& had solidXed. The opposing forces dug in from one coast to the ning across the enrjire &rem peninsula. Thissitus~on has ofienbeen likened to the hrench waflare of World M"ar I, but in reditit. w i l ~ veT dserent. In the Great Wr, opposjng di~sions con&ofiedrelatvefynarrow but verfr deep seceiuns ofrhe h e ofcontact and had ffiendly u n i ~ on either side of &ern, In fire2, Izlrweve.r; di~isons con~led broad sect_ions of" the batde lim, hut tJleil- regimetnts w r e kguently dug in on isolated hiIItops and sepmtls?dfrom oher unitr hy hundreds ofmeters or more, Air s&ikesf ardllev bombardmenr;f (the communisisr;ffired 102,000 art_ilJev rounds against UN;posidons in May daae), m d raids bysmdl units of he2vlly amed soldiers continued, puncmated by a handfil o f largers geaeraI@ unsuccesc~firl operations, One of &me was Operaubrr CIm-Up, whid d e m ~ n s ~ z t e how d fms&ated rhe U N cammmd was becoming m'& the sdemate. Qchm efigagemen&included a raid by nille m k s of the 245th ta*lk B a t d i ~ n (45& I n f m v Didsion) a g a s t communist-held Agok, i n re&fia~on for three raJd5; against che diGsion S sector; m ambush by WO Chinese companies of a patrol from the 179h infanq Regiment (45th Infanty DiwkionJ; Operation Counter, a series of attacks by the 45th I n f i n q giGsx"on to csc;zb&shI I papal bases ar-ound Bddy (Hi8 Zb'ti); and a s e ~ e of s Chinese asauj&agakst U.N. ourpas~s an Snook Hill, Pork Chop Hifi: and OlcJ Baldy,
U Operation Clam-Up (Febmary 1952) was intended to make the communisls believe &at the U.N. farces bad withdram from the front, To accomplish h i s , from Feb ry 10 to 15 U.K. soldiers did not patrol, fire artillery, or conduct air svikes in an area 20,000 yards from the line of

contact. Allied commanders hoped that the communists would respond by sending a force to investigate the ostensibly abandoned lines, so they could ambush the enemy and capcure a large number of mops. C:ommunist leaders were not dram in by the ploy, however, and took advanage of the break in the figkxti.ng t o reinforce thek o m defenses,

War on the Ground

Little acticiy occurred throughoutmost ofthe summer and fdl of1952, the opposing armies remaining envenched across &om each other on rheir and for~jed hilItops. Assaul~ on isolated posidons, sieges of U.N. outpos~, especiaIIy heay am;IIe";vbombardments characterized thjs phase. ROK v o o p demonstcited char, when properly &&ed and supported, they could go head-to-head M.ish the co~nm unist forces. Engagements during this perjod included Gghting b e ~ e e n the 7th Marine Regiment and par& of the 7th and 45th Infanuy DiM'sions against C h i n e forces a t various p o i n ~ along the front in earlyjuly; repeateed on Old Baldy (Hill 266); the &tge of Burilker Hill, the communist tj,,t U.S Marine ground acrion in western Korea; a $]-hour siege of Marine-held Outpost Bruce (Hill 148); a Chinese siege of Outpost IF in which che 6'5lth 1nf"iznq Regiment (3rd I n f m Division) ~ $&er& 350 casud~es; an attack by che 245Lh Tmk Bi7tdion (45th I n f m v DiGian) against Chinese positions; and Chinese stacks against the westem and centrd sectors in early October. It was . i n mid-October, however, that each side launched v e r a ~ o n s intended to once again improve heir defensive lines, Ieadiw m the battIes oi"'m i t e Horse Hill and Trimgle H21Bthe worst figh dng of the yeac

iIlI The Bade of Mite Hame Hill (Octaber 1952) took place when
Chinese farces lmnched he;tvy stacks again&a pair of U,N-held hills in the IX Corps sector. m i r e Horse Hill (Hill B53, the most i m p o r a t af these points, had k m heavily contested in 2951 and guarded the weswrn approxhes to Chowon. Its foss would give the commmises eay access to the mea around Chowon and deny U.N. forces the use of the area" main forces learned of h e planned atlack from a Chinese road n e ~ o r k sU.N. , deserter three days before it took place. h a result, they reinforced m i t e i t h artillev, tanks, m d Horse Hill, held by the ROIL 9th Infmfry DiGsisn, w anliaircrdt weapons. On October 6, WO batalions of the 3 4 0 Regiment, ~ 114th Division, at~cked m i t e Horse Hill from the rrorhwest, Chinese 38rh Field They made meraf assaulfs on the hill but were d~ven. back each time by the Sou& Korean forces. The next day, the Chinese received ~inhrcernentf and attacked Hill 395 again, mmaging to dAve the ROK forces off the hilltop. Two hours later, however, the Sou& b r e a n s couneeratfacked and recaptured the hill, On Qctaber 8, the Chinese assaulted the m i t e Horse

24

The Korean W=

Mill yet qaix.1,supparting k i r stack with heavy artillery fire and sending in reinforcements dmast: a s +My as their troops feu. Soldiers of the ROK di~sion fought back %garausly-efie hill chmged hands Mce during the day-infficeing heav casualties on the Chinese. From October 9 to 1I, waves of Chinese ~ o o pcontinued s to atmck m i t e Horse Hill, delermined to capture it. IX Covs responded with h e q . October 12, the ROK 30th arhlle5-y bombardmen& and air s ~ k e s On l n f a n q Regiment launched a htea~ly reinforced camterat~ck rind innieted massive casualtieson the Chinese forces. Mter that, t k r e battle dragged on fctr marher three days, but gradudly came to an end. &ring the 10 days of the batrie for m i t e Horse Hill, the Chinese s d e r e d nearly 10,000 casualties md, utdnnately, failed to take their objec~ve, S i m u l ~ e o uvui& s the October 6 a t ~ c l on r m i t e Horse HiU, a Chinese inf'anq batblim faunched a diwrsianq atcack against &rowhead Hill (HilX 281) t ~ v o mites away in the U.S. 2nd Infantry Di~sion sector, X t ms

During mast of 2952, soldiers in billtop positions stood ready to repel enemy attempts to dislodge them. Picmed are two soldiers of the 25th Infanw Division (Company F, 14th Manw Regiment), P&, James Studer (standing)and Pfe, William Smith.

War on the Ground

27

occupied by the French Battalion, which stubbornly held its ground. Hoping to keep the French pinned down and the 2nd Infantry Division busy, the on October 9 and 12, but did not Chinese launched addifJona1 a t ~ c k s succeed in capturing the hill, U Operation Showdown (October to November 1952)was a limited U.N. offensive intended to improve the 1X Govs defense lines by capturing a complex of four hills--Triangle Hill, Pike's Peak, Jane Russell Hill, and Sandy Hill-northeast of Kumhwa in the Iron Triangle. Eighth Army commander Gen. James Van Fleet said IX Corps risked havier casualL;,eshy remaining entrenched than by attacking. Also, peace talks at Panmunjom had been suspended on October 8, and Van Fleet wanted to show the communisrs &at recalcieance at the amjls~ce table could be costly an the bartlrefield, It W=. On October 13, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the U,S. 7th fnfantq Division's 391st Infantry Regiment, supporLedt by fighter-bornben, moved toward cheir objective-the right and leA a m s oETriangXe Hill-eqec~ng h elite regiment of the Chinese 15th Showdom to be a rourine opera~on. Field k m y entrenched on Triangle Hill reacted vigorousfy, however, and the operariort disintegrated into the heagest cambat since the preGous year, h expected five days of air ~ ~ k e more s , needed than ever, were cut back to ttyo because air support m s desperately needed at M i t e Horse Hill, On October 15, the U,S. forces were reinforced by two fresh battations, Mter heavy morQr and astjtlery. bombardment of the objecGve, they captured Triangle Hill. The next day, the Americans attacked and captured Jane Kussel Hill, arld it appeared as % Operatlion Showdam wm back on track, Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion stormed and captured Pike's Peak on October 18, but Chinese forces counterattacked the following night and retook it. U.S. troops managed to vvithdraw from the area under cover of massed artilleq fire. On October 23, the Chinese forces rdlied and attempted to drive the Americans out of the hill complex. Heavy fighting d r e a e P&ek Peak and &e Chinese ensued, as the U.S. forces ~ e to attempted to d ~ v them e off of'Jane Russell Mill. On October 25, the ROK 2nd Di~sion moved into the complex and relieved the battered U,S, 7 1 1 h Infanq Division, Fighting continued, and on October 80, the Cbinese drove the South XCoreans first off of Triangle Hill and, on November 1,off of Jane Russell Hill. s attempdng to retake the lost For four days KOK ~ o o pcounterattacked, hills. After suffering heavy casualdes and failing to retake the positions, however, their atracks were called off. B y November 5, four U.S. infanq

28

The Korean War

battalions, a ROK infantry division, 16 artillery battalions, and 200 fighter-bomber sorties had been poured into the fray. U.N. forces, however, held almost none of the terrain they had attempted to take and had suffered about 9,000 casualties in the process. Communist forces had taken a beating as well. Trading men for terrain and once again demonsuating their willingness to balance U.N. firepower with blood, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties, including 19,000 killed and wounded on Triangle Hill alone.

CI While Operation Showdown accomplished little on the ground, it did

reinforce the ineffectiveness of limited operations and led to the intensification of pressure in the air, rather than on the ground, in the

By the last wh er sfthe Korem M"=, U N forces were dug in acrossfrom more &an 250,000Chinese and Nor& Korem tr"oops9 and sojdiers m bath sides were h ~ p i n g for a cemefire. Mirst -bat consisted o f a r ~ l l e d vud, pla toon-sized raas, mbushes, md skimishes bet~veenIrt;lavl:l;y armed p&ofs. A handful of lxger engagemen& were fought dunhg &is phase, including iz Chinese assault against TBofie Nill, held by h e 38Lh Infm~ry Regimm L (2nd f n f m ~Di&i~nj; y a heay attack by Nor& Korem People "s &my uni& against Hill 812, held by soldiers of the OMAoma N a ~ o n d Guard (K Compmy, 3rd Bardion, I 79th i n f m q Regiment, 45th Infantry Dicll"sirz); a rajd by eIemen& ofthe 5rh Marhe Regiment against H21 I ffl, near the d1age of Ungok; and an assault by Chinese forces against Lit& Gibralt;;~~ (Hid 3551, held by the Q& I n h n q Regiment (2nd Infmw Diakirzn]. OperaLion Smack was one of the larger, and more futile, limited ~Eensives lam&&by the UN; fsrces d u ~ n the g Efial mhter ofthe war.

O Operation Smack g a n u v 1953) was a combined arms experimental

"scenario" launched against a troublesome enemy position on Spud Hill, facing the U.S. 7th Infantry Division sector of the batde line. A highprofile fGltxre, it created a bacHash in the United States against the war. y and Air Force officers, along with members of the media, were invited to watch the operation and given colored brochures describing what was supposed to happen. On January 25, a force of three

Wzr on. the Ground

infanq platoons, closely supported by tanks and aircraft, advanced against Spud Hill. Unfortunately, almost evelything that could go wrong did go wrong. Air Force and Marine aircraft, for example, missed their targets. An infanuy platoon was blocked and pinned down in a defile, all of its leaders were wounded, and automatic weapons and flamethrowersjammed. Well before the end of the day the operadon was deemed a failure and the troops ~tRdram. Throughout the operation, U.N. forces used 224,000 pounds of bombs, more than 12,000 rounds of 105mm and 155mm ar~ller)l. ammunition, Z0,000 rounds of40mm and .5Q caliber ammunition, 2,000 rounds of 90mm tank ammunition, and 650 grenades against Spud Hill. Despite the high hopes for the operation and the huge amounts of materiel used to support it, U.N. forces inflicted a mere 55 enemy casudbes during Smack. Cumrrrunist forces, on the other hand, with far less ammunition and no air support, inflicted 77 U.S. ea;suafdes.

Armistice negoria~onsat Panmunjom dragged on throughour the spring m d mrly summer of lS5S9slowed$for the most part:, by the hijure of the m sides CO reach m agreement: over the issue of inv~lun~apy ofprisoners of war, rep2&ia B2tdes daring &isphae ofrhe war tended to be fought out bemeen a few cornpmicls on each side*=&er ban &e m u l ~ p l e hatdions, regiments, and cvrps committ-ed ealier h the war. At each srep in rhe US, lij~sions, chain of c ~ m m a n d leaders ~ had become so smsiked to cri~cism over high caudties that the decision ofwhether to commit more Lhan a company orso oF coops was freguendy kick& all Lhct way up to the U N Command in Tokyo. Inrensefightingblzedata numberofpoinisalongthe fronrduringrhis period, usuaLly ignited by Chinese am&& on U.N. hilltop opopos&,a a s each side made e&or& to d e m o m t e to fhe orher thejr resalve and to improve their final positions beforea cease& could permmen tly solid+ the line of con tact Chinese forces launched their last oflensive, resulting in the Batde of the Kumsong Rver Salient, and U.S. forces fought their final ground battle in the 'Boulder C + " secu'on of the Berlin Complex, held by the 1st and 7th Marhe Regimen&. During this period, heary fighting &so occurred at Old Bald& held by the Colombian Batdion; a t the "Nemda tides" outposts of Cason9 and Vegas, poin& held by the 5th Marine Regiment; at Outpost H a w , a

30

The Korean War

point held by the 15& 1nfantr;y Regimen t (3rd In&nqDiGsion) and the 5th Regimen& Combat Team, which ~~"eitlstood m asault by the Q;"hl'nse 74fh Bi~sion; and at O u p o sBerlin ~ and East Berlin, which were att;reked earl'yin July whik the 1st M a h e Division w;ls reljeGng the 25th Infan try D i G s h and &mo later &at montf4, Many d & e engagements fought out dun'ng &is E n d phase ofthe ~ / a r are exemplified by the back-md-for& smggle over Pork (=Ptop Hill.

C1 The Batae for Pork Chop Hill ( k h 1953) began on March 23, when elenlents of the Chinese 67uh m d X4Xst D ~ s i o n s bombarded Pork Chop Hill (Hill, 234) vyit_h heavy mortar and a r t i l l e ~ fire ancl &en made a nighttime assault upon it, driving off a campmy of the 31st Infantry KEtgiment (7th Infantxy Division) dug in on top of it. Mter being reinforced 'by elernerr~ of&e 32nd Infantry. Regiment, the h e ~ c m counterat~eked s the hill m d recapmred it early the next morning. A litlle m r e &an three weeks later on April 16, however, the Chinese attacked Pork Chop Hilt again and managed to kill, drive off, or force into hicting most of the U S , forces occup*ng i t Botfrr sides responded on April 17 by sending reinforcements onto the hill and by blasring it w i t h cancentrated artillev fire, A company of U.S. woops launched a predam

once the baale lines bettveen the apposing forces solidified, combat took the form of raids, artillery duels, and concentrated assaults ;igainst specific sectors, By this stage of the war, North Karetzn a m y units had been completely refomed and reamed.

War on the Ground

attack upon the hill. Fighting the Chinese throughout the day with small arms, grenades, and a bayonet charge, they moved successively through the eench yswms crisscrossing the peak and finalfy took control of it. In the early morning darkness of April 18, the Chinese assaulted the hill again but, after a bfoody, ctasequarters batde, were driven back off by an mi\iing company of U.S. reinforcements. During the three-day battle, the U.N. forces expended more than 77,000 artillely rounds (and the Chinese probably fired nearly as many), setting a record for fire support on such a small front. mroughaut the summes, however, the Chinese continued t o bombad Hill 234, even as the h e r i c a n defenders attempted to t-ebuild cdlapsed bunkers and wenches. On July 6, dter heav afcillely prepwatim, a nunner;icallysupefior hrce of Chinese infan en launched anoher a t ~ c k on h r k Chop Hill, Combat on rocky terrkn escalawd cliramarically over 'the following days, as the U,N, forces sent in successive compmies of reinforcements and the Chinese matched each one ~ t h an , addi~orral batdion. Each side continued to bombard the hill wish concexl@at;ed artiUery and mormr fire while the steadil-yincreasing infantr)i hrees batded y July 11, five U,S. batdions were dug in on the each other over it. B eompanysked outpost, whi)e a full C:hiaese division attempted to dislodge &em. IEISelieGng more forces would be needed to hold the hill and that a I f D. Tayfar decided cemefire was near, 8th Army Commmder Gen. M tvihdraw the Punericans from Pork Chop Hill and have dernoti~an crews destrsy its defrmsive posi~ons.Chinese forces took canlsol of Hill 234, which, dter the ceasefire W% declared m d the deunili~kedzone es~blished, ended up partly in the DMZ and p a w in &rth b r e a ,
D End of the &rean 7rVar uuly 1953).OnJuly 26, elements of h e 1st and ' 7 t hMarine Regiments fighting on Hills 11I and 119, together with units of the 3rd Infanq DiGsion fighting on Sniper Rdge, wre the last U.S. forces ta engage in ground cornbar during the war, With the signing of the amistice agreement the following day,JuXy 27,1953, the k r e a n Mrar came t o m end.

'

'

SEA

QF

JAPAN
CHINESE FQRCES

YELLOW

WAR IN THE AIR

"fhe next war may well start in the air, but in all probabiliq it will did the last war, i n the mud,"

-&pn

of rhe President's Board to

Srudy Development of Aircraft for the Ntztianal Uefense, 1925

uring the conflict in &reap ground forces used weapons developed the prevjous war and racdcs hathat would have been fm2iz even durkg World W x P. Above area? bowever? techa~1opkdy a ced fighters, bombers, and reconnaksmce aircdt sped across the sixfies, atracking enemy ground forces and engagkg each other in ane-onancs cambar ova a wedge ofternetoy&at becme know as MiG me^

CS m e n .war broke out in &rea, the U.S. Aiir Farce provide securit)r for h e r l c m c i a m s and m i l i ~ ~ emcuated fia &er, however, ifs role attacks agains Nor& &rem People's slow and maul it as much as pasible during its bexomble drive into South hrea.
f3fni~dtXly, U.S. President H an hoped that air and naval h e s w a d d be adeqwte te smash rhe Nor& brem i n w i m ancl that ground forceswould not be needed, It soan becme obGow, however, that air forces could blunt, but not stop, the commmist oEensive.
U ils the war progressed, aircr& and personnel &om f l e d counwies augmented rho* of rhe United States. These inchded Sou& k r e m fighter quadrons, fighter squadrons from the A u s e d h and Sou& Mficm air

The Korean War

hrces, pilots from the BriLlish a d Candian air forces atached to h e r i c a n fighter squadrons, and carrier-borne aircraft of the British Royal Navy. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps pilau also participated in the war. They both flew aircraft from their own senices, which were often deployed from carriers cfuising off&e &rean coast, and w r e assigned as individuds to the various Air Force squadrons,
O Both piston-engine andjet aircraft were used extensively throughout the Korean War, propeller aircraft for the critical close support of ground forces and jets, to a large extent, to protect this air support from the predations of communist jets. Altitude advantage became the determining factor in jet-to-jet combat, and dogfigha were fought in the realm ofthe stratosphere, far removed from the action on the ground,
O

In S e p ~ b e 1947, r rhe U.S, fir Force (USM) became m independent , which had miJi&qsemke and replaced the U S ,hmy&r Forces ( been a sub0rdinal-e-a m ofthe US. h m y Thus, tdje Air Farce w;is less &m &ree years olc;l when it entered its grst conflict inJune 1950. m i l e the US, Air Force had s&ered the same kinds o f budget, eguipment, and pers~nn elcutbacks as &e other armecrl semkes in the years followjng World Warl & it was nonethelessready for action when war broke out ~ J u 1950 R ~ and began to d e p a r t in operadons immediately.

O Air defense of U.S.-occupiedJapan was the responsibiliv of the Far East

), a s e ~ c composed e of the U.S. FZth, Thiftcrenrtl, m d componene, the FiE& Air liorce, Twendett.l Air Forces. Qf the three sationed injapan under the command of Maj. Gen. Earle E. "Pat" Partlidge, bore the bmnt of the combat over Korea, while &CS ThiaeentlZ and Twentieth, spread across the western Pacific, played lesser roles.

consisted of 16 groups, 44 squadrons, S57 air-craft, m d 93,625 oficers and airmen. J u s a year later, it reached a peak strength of 20 groups, 70 squadrons, and 1,441 aircraft, and by July 1953had a strenglh of about 112,200 personnel.
O At h e beenning of the war*

squadrons dropped or fired 476,000 tons 0:' D nroughout the war bombs, cockecs, and anzmuni~anduring 320,981) sort4es, (A sortie is a mission flown by an aircdt; pilots often flew multiple sordes in a single day, landing only to rehel and %-arm.) es~matedthat these actions

The War in the Air

35

Amet-ican-madeF-86 Sabre jets (foreground) and Soviet-made MiG- 15s became the quintessential airera&Rovvn by the pilots battling for con&ot o f the skies over Korea, Courtesy U.3, Air Force

destroyed some 900 enemy aircrafe in aerial. combat and many more on. the grotlnd, 1,100 tanks, 800 bridges, 801)locomotives, 9,000 railroad cars, 70,000 motor vehicles, and 80,000 buildings. They also inflicted nearly 150,000North Korem and Chinese casual.~es.

lost some 1,466 planes during the w r , 750 of them destz-oyed by the ellemy (about l 0 perrent of them in &r-tc)-air combat), Total casual~es during the war w r e 7,200 kilted, 368 wunded, and 273 missing.
O During the Korean War, csnsmcted or improved upon some 55 a i ~ e l d throughout s Eiorea, many o f which had been h i l t by rheJapanese prior t o and during World W r II, Each was numbered and many became better h o r n by their numbers than by their names. b a n g the most imporcant were the EoUo~ng:
K-1 Pusm West K-2 Taegu K-3 bhangdong K-5 Taejorx

36

l"he Korean War

K76 Qongaek K-8 k n s m K-10 Chinhae

K X3 suwon. &X4 Kmps

K-1 6 Seoul K X8 h g n u n g K 4 0 Cheju Island K 4 6 H~engwng K 4 7 Chunchon

K-55Osm

men PITOT&Korem ground w C i s kvaded the muth I"nJuncr 1951),they were supp~rted by a smdl f ~ r c e afptstonddven aircrdt- that efiminated by the U N , force&By the end of the year, hawever, modemjet &rcr&t from bath sides were batding each crr;herin the skes over Korea.
Q Plppaready anticipaling a possible need for aerial intemntim i n Korea, in early 1950 the Soviet Union deployed to China two regimens of MiC15s, its newest a d most advanced fighter.

SoGet pilots were nying missions against U,N, air forces by Nuvemter l , 1950, Rying sorties out of Manchurian bases at locations like Andong and Fencheng. Throughout the war, Russian pilors carried the burden of air combdt for communist forces,
I;Z

Cl Sov;iet mifs active in the b r e m VVar included the 324& Fighter Air
Division (FAD), made up of the 176th Fighter Air Regiment (FM) and the 196h FAR

C1 TJp to 90 percent of the pilots in some o f the SaGet regimen& w r e veterans oE Russia" G ~ a Patsiotic t 'Mrar a g ~ n sEafcism, t and rrlany of the commanders were elite pilots, Xior emmple, t a ~ o r i n g Russim ace Imn kzhedub, who had claimed 62 victohes in World W a 11, c o m m d e d Lire 324th F m ;Rusian ace Eu~;eny Pepelyaev, w i t h 19Gctaries in W r l d War 11, commmded the 196& FAR
U In order t o keep direct Saviet participaeS,on in the war a secret, Rw~ian pilau operating out of Manchuria wore Chinese flight overalls and flew jets bearing Chinese and North Korean markings. Soviet pilots were also

The War in the Air

too fiu sou& or over the sea,i n order t o prwent forbidden from crtpmre if they were shot d m .

O The Soviet piiots communicated uith each other and their flight c o n ~ o l in h s s i m , and some of &ese s m k i m s mmt have hem interceped by U.N. forces. However, despite this and other mridence, both the USSR and the United States s ~ a vto e kmp the R w i m Biers a secret, knowledge of direct combat between the two superpowers would lead to an escdabon of the c o e c t .
Q By the end of 1950,North Korean and Chinese pilots were being uained on. the MG15s, but it not until Summer 1951 that they were proficient enough to enter combat,

provedi
obfitemt-ed No& supremacy.

ree weeks of ffie &rea " s m d m d ~ b ~ ~ l &r et force e md achimed ah-

C;f Exly in the ~ ~ a r ,

phyed a drcfenske role. One of its pfirnq the ships and &c& being U & to ewcuate s (mm): af them h e ~ c m sfrom ) hrea.
~ r c & stacked the

iIf nraughout the cow% of the

utfrer crit-icd-ea. the MW-.

.Allied air fofces stayed ac~ve fight up until the end of

arid one c&ed Sa . fnckment =ather and an inabgiy m sn&ah c a n h u o w night at~cks, h ded thew eEorl;s. None&eless, a played a lmge role in coercislg &c Chinese into accepting a cease fire aFeement that w a accep~ble t o the United Sfaees. opened &k c a r n p ~ m i n J w e 1952 with21igMy succeakl air raids h)idz.oelec~c complexes at S a o , Chosirr, Fusen, md Kyostn, No& &rea sdered an atmost c o m p I e ~ toss d e l e c ~ pwer c for two week (and

The b r e a n War

Marlclluria lost a quarter of its dectficd supply) and did not regain its fufl generaling capaciq meil after the end of rlte war. s not enough to hrce m These a t ~ c kwere islice upon the Chinese, n h y 1953,the dlied air forces des~oyed tI-rree of but worse wm to come, X Nor& lioreak s"L10inigationd m s , a move that damaged the enemy" ablXilcy to feed its people. Floods resulhg from the shattered dams destroyed , and thoufan& of acres of rice fields. Mtkough &.he railroad ~ a c k sroads, communists were able tn repajr the darnllge, they were farced to reduce h e water levels behind aU their dams to prevent aooding in ease they were again deseoyed. This redu~ed the waLttr available for irrigating heir rice crop.

Throughout &c: course d & e war, &ghcers m d bonlbersproGded close air sup.por~ for the coops an the ground, roarkg i nt o unload bombs, r ~ ~ k e aapdm, tf, and machine gurr and -on fire m enemy forces? some~mets m * & i$5 ~ yads offiiendlyg m m d forces.
hZ An advantage possessed by the U.S. Marine C o v e b u t not the U.S. k m y - w s the eapitbiZi~ to u6lir,e nzirrine a ~ a t i o n u n i .Tor ~ dedicated cbse air support, resupply, and medical evacuation of marine uniu. For example, the 1st Progsional M e Brigade was able to count on direct d r support fironn Marine Ar Group 33,

O Although the age ofjet aircraft had arrived, propeller driven fighters like
P-51 Mustangs and F4U Corsairs, many of the flown by Nav, Marine, and n o n - h e n c m pilau, continued to make their presence felt upon the communist forces,

CII On h p s t 4,1950, dged a i r c d t atracking N m A positions in Kirnchon, just outside of the Pusan Perimeter, dropped a 500pound bomb directly on the North b r e a n command headquasters in the batsement of m abandulred meat-packing plant. This bomb damaged, but did not destroy, the command center, t3.N. forces never h e w how close they bad come to elimina~ng the Chaek, md his s M . frsnt commmder, Gen.

TZI ERec~ve close air mppcln depended upon che relaItiveIy slw,
pistondriven ground a t ~ c kajrcrdt lneiag defended fiom maralrding communist MiG. Such ptect.lon, by alliecf jet aircrdt, led to combat high f the ground. above, and lagely divorced 6om, the ~ v aon

World Mr,, 1 4 mmy m a i q a n d y s prelllicted ~ t, dkect &-l*& combat betwee12 &rc&t, had come to m end Remns ci& for &h oved too q d c y tr,dowpao~s to egec*eq me ci"zeir machhe o ~ e r j e tmd ~ ; &at m d e m mk2es wodd be able t o des&ay myjets ~ a were r employed in combat. n e h r e m M"ar demonsmted9 however, &at even h &er we ofjet &cdt, &e role of h e h a ~ d d p 2 o t t as it had ever hen,
%&S N o d k f e a onJune 27, when s o m rs inkrcepted and shut d a m three North they tried t<t inte~ere with c i a m mcuaCions. Later
Q Air comht moved into a new m d Xelfialt p b m hNovember 1950when

and M 6 1 5jet figfitem, superior CKmese farces entered the cedd put in h e ais at &%t h e and pitoted fafgely by vete pSae,julined h the codict,
D On Navemljer 8, 1950, the f i t d j e t battle i n histav took place over S i n u i L j u bemeen eight USM F-80 Shouting Interceptor Wmg and six WC-15s. h a 3heco Brom oummeuvered m d shot dawn one of the supedor enemy &C&L

e o u t e r d tbe MG15 initiay tYi& the F46& m$ later k& the 0 F46E/F Sabre, On Decemhr 17,1950, Ld Col. Bmce Hhton k c a e the first Sabre e t to shoot d o m a Mg-15 in aerial cornbat. OnJdy 22,1953, Lt. S m P. Yowg of the 51st fighter Wmg first Gctory, the h t over a M G d u k g the Korea Wm.Eve days hter, un the last day rcF the war, Capt. M p h S, P m cl ed ihe h i i t a e ~ ~ dc t u r y of the codict, shoobg down m FE12 over k r e a .
C;I

Wile most of the enemy jets shot d a m f e U prey ta Sabre pilots, &out

two dozen were shot down by the pdots ofpistond~ven Camairs, Musmgs, and Sea F ~ e sSuch , to the d e , however, were a mwked excep~on

CJ Sabres ae~r newly k c e as many mdes as did MCs d u k g the w r , exceedkg them i nm r y month except for the period October 1951 thmugh

40

The Korean War

Febmry 1952, m e n the MiGs were in the air, however, they appeared in great s~ength, frequentjy 50 or more.
O During the war, a single battle occurred b e ~ e e n American pilots and jets openly bearing Soviet markings, On November 18,1952,U .S, Navy NF-2 Panthers atracked mrgets near Hoeryong, near the Soviet border. MiG-15s from Vladivostok scrambled to intercept them, two of them being shot down before the h e r i c a n planes departed sou&ward.
Q Advmtages the U.N. pilots had over their communist opponents were g-suits and flight helmee, which helped to drasdcalv reduce the incidence

of blackout during high-speed maneuvers, Russian piloe, in tctrn, were

much less likely to black out &m their Nor& Korea and Chinese countezlpare,who were less weit nourished,
C1 Cornbat experience in World War ZI definitely plqed a role in the success both U.S. and R u s s i m pilots eentjoyed in the skies over Korea. U,N, pilots who shot d m at least one enemy plane had f l o m an average of 18 missions each during the earlier conflict,

O mroutghaut the course of the Korem War, U.N. air forces claimed 906
enemy aircraf't shot down, some 818 of h i c k were MiC-15s. USM p i l o shot ~ dam 829 af the U,N. total, 81.1 of them MiGs.
1;1I Russian sources achowledge the loss of 354 MiCs f l o w by Soviet pilots, a number that i s likely accurate, m Chinese and k r e a n pilots flew a preponderance of the communist MiGs that were shot down (i.e., around

464).
D U.S, recards itchowledge the loss of about 230 fighters in a i ~ t e a i r combat throughout the course of the war, and about 2,000 U.N. aircraft in total, most of them shot d o w by pound fire.

O Soviet pilots claimed victories over more than 1,300 U.N. aircraft during
the war. h U,S, records show total losses of only about 2,000 planes, masdy to ground fire, it would seem that the Soviet claims are a bit high.

By summer 195k?, while wiu" on the ground had bogged &m in& fighting from Exed pasitions, the skies over northwestern Korea became a perpetual batdeground, where communist MG15s met Allied Fa6 Sabres, F-84 T h u n d e j e ~ and ~ F-80 Shoo~ng Sars and engaged them in aerial duels

The War in the Air

on a daily basis. Thisarea becameknown as "MiCAlley,"and remained a hot spot rhsoup;bout ttle wac
O Early in the war, allied 13-29Superfortressesconducted daytime bombing of targets in northwest Korea, but after MiGl5s shot down frve of them during a single week in October 1951, the bombers began attacking only at night,
O Headquartered in Chinese basesjust across the Yalu River in Manchuria in toms such as Andong, the MiGs were off limits to allied forces while on the ground. fighter jets, however, sometimes svayed over the Yalu in

close pursuit of enemy MiGs. D Even as combat on the gruund setded d a m into static: combat dong fixed lines during the last two years of the war, air-to-ak combat in M G r-tlley contrinued unabated. In June and July 1953, the last two monhs of the conflict, the communist air forces increafed their s o ~ einto s MiC Alley, In a single savage b a d e on June 30, Sabres gunned d o m 16 MiGs, setting a record f i r the number of enem); aircraft destroyed in a singe batde invot~ng F-86s.

The Korean War

A number o f - p i i on ~ ~boLh sides gualBed as aces dudng the war, sfioohg dam five 01more enemy ~ r c r d in t ay-tpak combat. In h e descdpg~ns md h one case "&ird9" H s are Lhose &at were shared wi& L h e of one or mQreoher &cdt,

'%a"

Q Some 38 USM p & @ , one U.S. M e Cops pilot, and one U.S. Navy p3at b e c m e aces du~xslg the war. M m y of &ese trap scorers, listed below, had claimed vfctrafiesaver enemy airc& dudng WorXd War X I . meir rmks, when a ~ l a h f eare , listed.
Capt.Jaseph C . McConneBjr, c h h e d 16 enemy k c d t Maj. JamesJabmm claimed 15 enemy & c d &(plw 1 1/2 ;in Capt. MmuelJ. Femmdez ebbed X 4 1/2 enemy &c& Maj. Gorge k Da& ed 2 4 enemy a k c d t (plus 7 Col, Royal M.Baker Lt. Harold E. Fischer dsmed IQ n ciaimed 10 enemy a k c d t (plus 7 1 / 3 in W W X ) Lt. Col. Vemont Gal-James RJofinmn claimed 10 enemy a i r c d t (plus 1 i n Wiorid M 7 r t r XI) Capt. b n n i e R Moare cldmed 20 enemy &crdt Capt. Wph S, PmJr. c k m e d 10 enemy &crdt Rabkson "Robbie" Risner cl
k o n x d Lilley cldmed 7 enemy aircdt LL,Henry Buttelmm clalirned 7 wemy aircdt M@, Dmald Mams cl&med 6 1/52enemy a k c d t Col, F m c k S, "Gabby" GabresK cldmed 6 112 enemy aircrdt (plus 28 Maj,James P, E3agers~om cl&med 6 ll/2 enemy &cr& (plus 6 in Worl &ortl;eJones c l ~ m e d 6 1/2 enemy k c d t =ton "Bones" Marshdl,ckrned 6 1/2 enemy &rc& Rabert Love cl&med 6 enemy aircrdt Maj. John F, Bolt daimed 6 enemy a-ircrdt (plm 6 inWorld Was 11) James lGaler claimed (i e

Capt. =chard S. Becker

The War in the f i r

Q A single U.S. Marine became an ace during the war. Maj. John F. Bolt, u.ha m m attached to the 52st fighter Wmg, gtznned d o m six MiCs, adding &em to the sk-md-a-ha Gctories he c ed during Wrld Wm I1 wMe m ge P h Pappy BoMgmrt's *Black Sheep" squa&on.

3 Qcher b e r ; l c m pilots who becme aces d u h g the Wfiam T, misner, who becme the first jet ace of the 51st and Col. son R n p g , commander of the 4 t h Fighter Wmg, who shut d a m p i l o t s of more nation&ties lhan m y other American ace, clahing victories aginst &man,Vichy French, mdjapanese k c d t i n VVctrld War E,

J One&ird of the 59 U.S. piEors who became aces duhng the Knrem Wm
had scored at least one aerial Gctoq during Wodd W= 1 1 , aid some achiex~ed ace st;amsi n bath (mof whom appear h the list ahve).

O In acidifion to the p i l o ~ who k c m e aces in Korea, a dazen. who had become aces d u ~ World g VC7= IZ xofed one or more victories d u ~ the g Karem Wm. h a n g these were & j . W&er M. MatxIrin, who shot dam 21
enemy ~ r c r & in World UTar II m d molXler 3 1/2 over Kswa before being shot down and taken prisoner, axxd Col.John C. Myer, who scored 24 b i bi n Wrld War II and WO h Korea.

3 The= wre also two piloe who did not become aces in either confict, but who achieved overall ace status by shooring down five or more enemy pfmes in both w z s combhed.

O In June 1953,24year*ld Lt. Henry But.xelmmn shot d a m five enemy

SrcraEt in 12 days, becoming the yomgest ace of h e :b r e m M'ar.
3 .4merica9s39th and last ace of the Korean War was Maj. S. L. Bettinger, who shot d o m his enemy plane mJdy 20,1953. He w a subsevenay shut d o w binlself and mken prisoner; his scare remsned mco&med un& his releae.

The Karean War

tli No p h t s Itrom dlied na~0xf.s ather than the United S t a m became aces
during the Eiarem War, but several perfomed wet1 and claimed ~ c t a r i e s against enemy ~ r c d t bang . these were Royal Canadian Air Force Higbt-Lt, Emest,A.Glover,who was erediled with shooting d a m hree MiG. Two Candim aGes earn World War II, squadron leaderskrnes D. Lidsay and J. M c h y , also fought in the Korean war m d clajmed victories aver enemy ~ r c r d t ,
the war, four USM pilots were given the nation" highest awarcl, the Medal of Honor, all posthumously. h e r i c a n ace Capt. Gorge A. Ravis, who W* shst dam and El14 on Fetbmv 10,1952, jwt minutes after he achieved his 13th m d 14th ~ctories over communist aireraft, was the sole Sabre pigot to earn this distizlcfion,

O E'or their a c ~ o n s duping

Russian and Chinese records indieate that there were three Chinese, at least 26 Russian, andprobably no North Korean aces d d n g the Korean War. Some o f h e Russian elarims may be exaggerated, a product of a mortal fear offfihre daring the Stalinht era. Ranh afthe commurzist aces are nol: available in most cases.

Chaa Bao Tun claimed 9 &ecl ;tircrdt a m Tsi Oc c ~ r n e 9 d a i e d aix;crdt Fan V m Chou claimed 8 d i e d aircrdt

Eugeny Pepelyaev claimed 23 diied aircrdt PSikoliPi Suqagin claimed 21 &lied &rcr$t Dirni~ 0sEn claimed 15 aflied aircdt k v ScXz&n claimed 15 allied aircrdt Aleksandr Smurchkov claimed 15 &ed aircrdt Ser&m Subbutjn claimed 15 a e d aircrdt raikha3 Ponornarev claimed 14 allied ~ r c r d t A, Sherberstov claimed 14 allied aircrdt Sergei b m a r e n k o ctaimed 13 dlied a i r c d t (plus 12 in World War 11) Stepm B&aev claimed 11 dlied ;tircrdt liTiko1;ki Dokachenko chimed 11 allied aircrdt

T h e V67ar in the f i r

CI As w i t h the U.N. paots, &ere were a nuartber af- Soviet aces from World Ww 11 who flew in b r e a but did not achieve ace s ~there. ~ ha s n g these were Gen. Georgey hbov, who flew 15 mkions over b r e a and claimed zhedub, the USSR" top four VictoTies (plw X 9i n Wrld Wlr PI) ;m d ciably or at all dudng s c o h g ace &am World War II,who did not the Qrem Ww to his hpremive score of 6

CI U.N, p k ~ s refemed the most dangerous commmist p k t s as "honcfios," m d befimed them to be hsnctors or vete leaders. It is now clear &at mmy of &ese p30ts wre indeed quite experienced, m d were ofiea R w i m vewms of Wrld War 11,
a Chinese MG pilot n a e d Cfiiang Chi-Wei who lacked onto USM &pt. D a + W tailand f a d y shot him out sf the air a~ be attmpted a third consecu~ve G~rory a g ~ satMC,

W i l e the pound wapom medthroughout the Korearz Wardiflered fr'ttlefiom rh~se used during Forld War II, sipi3cant ~ & a ~ c e were s made in aircraft technolom during the Korean War.

L2 By the time World War II ended, the capabilities of pistonengine,

propelter&f.ivena i r e d hacl nearly pe&ed, Even as such plmes approached however,jet & c d t were mpidy k i n g innproved and their pmctical lirni~,

The Korean War

becoming the sandard*As a result, the Korean War wa?3 the first conflict in whichjee were used by both sides,

g desc~plions, "bomber" refers to planes used primarily

to bomb Qrgets on the ground, 66fighter'krefers to planes designed to combat

other aircrdt, and &atf;zck" mfers to planes intended for cornbat again& ground forces. "Ceiling" refers to the maximum practical altitude a plane could reach, and "range" to the greatest distance it could fly before needing to be reheled.

UN.pilotspew many sorts offighter, bomber, and @a1;1syort aircrap dzlri~g the K o m a ~Far, m m of them o f American zncznufcpcture. Same of the most F-epresentative a;irerafi afthe eo~JIict are described here. U,N:_fclrcesused a wide varieg ~f other airera$ as wll, including B-26 Marauder bombers, Australian-made fitear Bjetfigkters, and variotzs recoranaissanee-Pghters.

D m e n war broke out in b r e a , F9F-2 Panher carder-based fighters and F40 Shooting Sars were the only type ofjet aircrdt the United St-ateshad in the theater of operadons, foflowed soon dtemards by. F-84 Thundege~s, None of these aircrdt were adequate for facing the Rusian-made MiG-15s being used by the cornmunkt farces.
F;;t F-86A "SaBre." This single-pilot, helican-made p h e , which first s a ~ i ac~on over Korea in December 1950, became the s ~ n d a r d fighter aircrdt for the U.N. forces during the war. It w s mmufactured by North h e r i c a n AGation Inc., s ~ r ~ in n 1950, g The F-86A was equipped with a General Electric J47CE-13 turbojet (5,200 pound thrust), had a wingspan of 37 feet 1.25 inches, a length of 37 feet G inches, a hekht af X 4 feet 9 inches, a weight of 16,375 pounds When loaded, maximum speed of 675 miles per hour at 2,500 feet, a rate of climb of 7,470 feet per minute, a ceiling of 48,000 feet, and a range of 675 miles. It was armed with six -50 caliber machinepns. The F46A was much more sable and mmeuverable in Bight &an its main opponent, the MiC-15, but was inferior to it in both climb m d armament, Impravemen@to the latter, howwr, w r e not long in coming. Durlng the war, the Unired Scates introduced the improved M6F. It dsered from the F46A in that it had a wingspan of 39 feet 1.5 inches, a length of 37 feet 6.5 inches, and weighed about a half tan less. IdsJ47GE-r7 turbaet had

The War in she Air

5,910 pounds of thrust and allowed it to climb at 9,300 feet per minute, faster &an ay 6ghter emplqed dufing the war.
O B29A 'Superfortress." Developed during World War I1 for use against

stationaq targeo; like factory complexes, the B29 was used in Korea both c and against formations of advancing communist troops, against s ~ t i targets especially in the first six months of the war. It was manufactured by the Boeing Aircraft Company starting in 1944. Outweighing the Soviet-made Tupolev Tu-2 bomber by more than four times and operated by a crew of 10, the piston-driven Superfortress was by far the largest aircraft used by either side to any extent during the Korean W r . The B29 had four Wright R-2250-551 Cyclone 18-cylinder radial aircooled 2,200 horsepower engines and was capable of speeds of 358 miles per hour at 25,000 feet. It had a vvingspan of 141 feet 3 inches, a length of 99 feet, a height of 29 feet 7 inches, a weight of 147,000 pounds d e n loaded, a ceiling of 31,8513 feet, m d an impreshe rmge of: 4,100 mites. It was afmed with one 20mm cannon and 11) -50caliber machineguns, and could carry up to 20,000 pounds of bombs,

CI C-5M "Skpaster," This herican-made mnsport plane w s one of

o the cargo worborses of the Karean War, carr).ing men m d equipment t airs~ps throughout the Korea Peninsula, Inwoduced in 1942 by the Douglas h r c r d t Company for use in World War 11, the Skymaster had a crew of six and could carry from 30 t o 50 passengers, The C544 was equipped with four Pratt & Whitney R-200@7Twin Wasp, 14cylinder radial aircooled 1,290 horsepower engines, had a wingspan of 117 feet 6 inches, a length of 93 feet l O inches, a height of 27 feet 6 inches, a weight of 62,600 pounds when fully loaded, a ceiling of 22,000 feet, and a r a g e of 3,900 miles. lit was unarnled.
O P-51 'Mustang." One of the most prevalent American fighters of World War II, the single-pilot Mustang saw continued service in Korea, notably as one of the aircraft flown by pilots from the allied nations, including Australia and South Korea. The P-51 series was invoduced by North American Aviation Inc. in 1943 (the P-51D variant in 1944). By the time of the Korean War, this aircrafi ~ i a frequenrty s referred t o as the F-51. The P-51D had a Packard V-165Q7 12 cylinder V liquid~ooled 1,510 horsepower engine and was capable of speeds of up to 43'1 miles per hour at 25,000 feet. It had a gspan of 37 feet, a length of 32 feet 3 inches, a height of IS feet 8 inches, a weight of 1 1,600 pounds, a ceiling uS41,90f)feet, and a

m g e of 950 miles. It wa ed with six -50 cdiber machin. up to 2,WQp a w & of bombs,

Ww 11, tbe singlepaot pifotr &roughout the coume of h e war, behg deployed from &rc oE&e cowt o f b r e a to the batttefieidswhen needed. It was mmufachlred initially in 1943,by the United & r c d t GorporaLion. The F4IXID, the e q ~ p p e A& d a Pratt aircooled 2,WO hompwer e n e e le of speeds up to 425 macs per how at 20,000 feet, It had a feet, a ierrgrbr o-f 35 feet 4.5 iaches, a hekht a ceiling of 37,00

eep" squadron d u h g

Mw-g.* One of the more wconventiond b o h g G r c d t of the era, the h e ~ c m - m a d e F42 p h e that looked like a pair ofF-51 joined together,

Twin M m ~ g SW s intensive service in the first months of the b m a n War, primady as night fighters. As the pfesence ofjet aircraf2,incremd In howeversthey were re and were removed ~ o s me ~ c at e the end of the The F42C night fighter V-1710-143/145 V-L2 liqui:dcookd, 1;,6a) harsepowef engines, had a " gspm o f 5 X feet 3 inches, a lewth of42 feet 5 inches, a hei&htof 13 feet 10 hches, a weight af 2Ei,5(31 pomds, a of 2,240 miles, It hour at 21,000 feet, it ceding of 38,98C)fee ed with siar .50 cdiber machinepm and codd c a q up t a 4,000 pounds of bombs.

C1 F4OC aShoohg St;rrl" Used in the first months of the war, this single-paot, hericm-made figher-bmkr was soon uutcltassed by the &Get-made jet, aircdt employed by the communist forces. It was

(4,600pomd a m t ) , ha

g s p of 39 feet Z l inches, a length af34feet

The W a in the Air

43

6 inches, a height of l l feet 4 inches, a weight of 16,856pounds, speed of 580 miles per hour at 7,000 of f ,380 mfies. It minute, a cezmg of46,XOf)feet, and s i x .50 c&ber rnxh

During the firean FVw, Ihe Srrviet-made MC-15 became the prima~jetfightcsr used by the communist forces. In o d c c i i t i o n to the aircraft descn'bed here, communisffixes in Korea also used a number dother aircraJfi, including Ihe Lmcjrkin La-9 and the Y a h h Yak-9f) piston-driven$ghters.

MkoymGw&cb a G 1 5 , This shgIe-pilot, So~et-made fighte the predornbmt je b i y wkt forces in Korea. produced by %\$et es s t =urn& it was of Wedor desip. However, af weapns and =prior h rate of c b b to most
The =%G15wats e q ~ p p e tvith d an
a copy of the RabRoyce Nene, m d

at 40,080 feet. f r had a

mrbjet (5,005 pound &mr), speds of W azifes per horn gspm of33 feet 1. hch, a Ieng& of36 feet 3 bcfies,

The Korean. War

a height af L 1 feet 2 inehes, a vveight of 12,566 pomds d e n fullyloaded, a climb rate of 8,265 feet per minute, a ceiling of 48,817 feet, and a range of 1,220 miles. It w a armed ~ t a h pair of 23mm cannon and a sinpIe 37mm cannon and could c a q up to 1,100 pomds ofbombs. During the war, the S o ~ e t htroduced s the MiGl5bis, at v a ~ a n of t the fighter equipped with a VK-1 engine with 5,952 pounds of thrust and capable of an improved climb rate of 9,055 feet per minute. This rate greatly exceeded &at oT&e F46A9but fell somewhat short of the F46F%climb rate of 9,300 feet per minute.
C1 Xfyushin XE-XO. Produced by the USSR stal-ting in X944 for its "Great k had a crew Patriotic War" agahst Gemmy, this pistondriven a t ~ c aircdt of WO, both a pilot and a reamfacing machine-pnner. It was used oR-md+n &roughout the war in Korea, hut fell easy prey to almost mytJning the U.N. forces could put in the air. The H-TO w a equipped with a Mikulin M42, 12-cyfinder 'It'? Liquid+ooled, 2,000 horsepower engine and w a c~lpahXe of qeeds of up t o 311 miles per hour. It had a ~ngspan, of43 feet 1.5inches, a lengeh of 36 feet 9 inches, a height of I I feet 6 inches, a weight of 14,409 pounds, a ceiling of 24,606feet, and a range d62X miles. It was armed with three 20mm cmnon,
U TupoEev Tu-2. This crYin-engine, pistondriven bomber was used only

sparingly dufing the war in Korea (e.g., for a t ~ c kagainst s U.N. garrisons on
islands off the Norfi Korean. cowt) and did not fare weff when allied jets were scramad to oppose it. It W* manufac~redby the fJSSR"s Staite Industries beginning in 1943. The Tu-2 had a pair of Shveeov M-82,l-linder radial aircooled, 1,850 horsepower engines and could fly at up to 342 miles per hour at 17,720feet. It had a wingspan of 61 feet 10.5 inches, a length of 45 feet 3 inches, a height of 13feet 11 inches, aweight of 28,219 pounds when fully loaded, a ceiling of 31,200 feet, and a range of 1,243 miles. It had a crew of four and was armed with a pair of 20mm cannon and three machineguns and could cany up to 6,614 pounds of bombs.

"Navies do not dispense with fo&cations nor with handed they may save a country the s d n which comes when these have to be cded k m play,"
ed mayer Mahan, m e Iduence of Sea Power upon the FrencTh Revolutl"on, . 1 W

cmken, 1.9 &cdt us skes, some 80 destroyensand hun&eds ofsuppofi ships t o die &rean heater of"opem&onsSIn addihon, 10 all'icld nalioas seBt ships to suppm fhe war eflon

t o deploypound forces tio

Karem oflenske. Tmdi~onal n a d opem &rem W 0 , m d for h e a t h e h U S hhtav L h e n a v had t oa o r 0pemIlx"~ns &ost exc1fw:iv+ supporhggromd forces.

Ll In the y w s g World Was If, the UniLed Sates emerged as the d d % ffclfemost navd p w e r , sekbg the position, Great B just a decade before, and far the 125 yeeasbefore &at,

The Karem War

flZ Mter World War IX ended, the United States decommissioned more
ships than it had built and many of its personnel remmed to civilian life. Care had been taken to modernize the fleet as much as possible immediately before World War II, however, and between 1945 and 1950 the U.S. Navy worked to adjust its materiel and strategy to both incorporate and defend against enemy atomic weapons,jet aircraft, and helicopters.

O Political as well as technological changes contributed to the

suengthening, if not the enlargement, of the U.S. Navy in the pas period. Foremost among these were the emergence of the S o ~ eUnion t as a threat rivaling that posed by the Axisjust a few years before, and the need to fill the vacuum left by Great Mtain.
O Indeed, by 1948,Great Britain's active fleet strength worldwide consisted

of eight aircraft carriers, four battleships, 17 cruisers, 52 destroyers, 34 submarines, and 147,000 personnel (down from 863,000 in 1945). By 1950, its furces in the Pacific were so weak h a t all the great maritime power could c o n ~ b u t to e the U N , mission in &ren was a singk small aircraft carrier,
0 On the other hand, when the b r e a n War broke out, the United Stzltes had rhousands of ships in s e ~ c eincluding , more than 500 destroyers, and was aMe t o deploy the e n ~ r 7th e Fleet t o the watem around Korea.

U.N. NAVAL. QPERAT~ONS

Even as UN.ground forces were suuggling, often futile15 to contain the Nor& Korea14 invmion of South Korea, U N naval forces were quicHy seizhg con& of the waters around rhe peninsula. Once convol of the corn& had been established, LI.N n a d forces could use their big guns against enemy troops, supplies# and lines of communications and vansportaLion; use carrier-borne aircrdt to provide close support to allied coops or attack enemy ~ r g e tanyhere s on the peninsula; and land or pick up coops and matedel at any point on the Korem coast
critical t o the succemes enjoyed by rfhe U.N. forces Navd supremacy in K m . Allied forces would probably have been forced off rhe peninsula long before the mistice if rhey had not enjoyed the benefits of n a d supremacy, and if the communists had a similar naval advan-.

The War at Sea

53

U.N. warships provided critical fire support for ground farces throughout the war, Here the light cnriser USS Toledo fires the 8-inch guns of its number three hnet at North Korean military targets ashore,

13: On June 25, 1950, the same day Nor& ICorea invaded its southern
neighbar, President Harry S. Tmman ordered the U.S. 7th Fieet, under the command ofvice Adm, h t h u r Smble, into the Swaie ofTaiwan in order to prevent Chinerse inmsion of the island and conmin the conflict to the waters around the Korean Peninsula,
Q Task Force 77, a combined force af li,S,,Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand warships, iniGated &eir first shore bombardment of the war anJune 29, 1950, when the light cntiser USSJuneatr fired at communist targets on the east coast of Korea.

O On July 1,1950, T m a n ordered a blockade of North Koman ports in

order to deny the comrrrunisr-saccess to the sea for eiher war or commerce,
0 The next day, on July 2, 1950, a U.N. force that included USSJuneau engaged in the only naval batc1;esf the war, des~oying three of four stacking North Korean turpedo boa& in the waters off the east: coast t o m uf

Churrrunjin,
Q On July 3, 2950, wa~Xmes from USS Valley Forge a t ~ c k e d Nor&

Korean ai&eldis around h o n u a n g and Ch"Ennampo, the first of many carrier-based rzirstfikes agajnst communist Qrgets c a ~ e d out during the war.

The Korem W a
Ff By S p t e m k r 1950, Lfie U.N, naval forceshad eliminated No& Qrea's
small coasd n q and xhitrved n a d supremaq. m i n a did not commit sea forces even &er it entemd t;he w r , l e a ~ Lhe g U.N. navd forces Iwgely uncontated.

sapgore of the U.N.

been pmible &&out cbe ofled the a t ~ c b X g Corps and d a ~ the g a;~sault..

1;11 From Septernkr 14 t o 24, the U.N. n a d forces engaged in their G m major shiptwhore bmhadment, in wpport of the mphibious assault at hchon. Gu&e from the bat~eship 1 7 s Msouri, &ee cmbem, and five desaoyems mvaged N o d &fern positions OB W a h i Islmd m d lnchon hmbr.
U U.S, ships deliberately d r w shore fire 6-om N o d &mm positions on MTohido, a f o ~ e k d b d paPdbg the approaches t o Inchon. Once the positions had been pinpkted by fheif m w z k tlahes, the des&ayersmaved in to a mere 1,000yards k m . the shore and, dong M r i t h the other ships, wed s to blow apart the enemy positions.
O The next day, the &ed M d n e Di~iorx. as it

wmships praGded covefig flre for the 1st

g the exmple af its SoGet mentor ancE with no o m at risk, No& b r e a made E k d use of n a d mhes in thie mters around the peninsula, especially in shipping lanes and the approaches to its part cides.
O Such weapons-magnetic

mines detonated by the presence of metal-hulled ships and contact mines that exploded when touched by a re capable of severely damaging or des~oying ships, and they inflicted a nmber of d e d lossts.

The War at Sea

i ; l

In the years dter World M"= 11, a tiny force of W.S, mineweepers were

assiped the d r e w dut): of cle g mhes from the vvaters aroundJapm. N%en the & m m W w broke out, these mineweepers were deployed to the waters around h r e a t o suppoa the U.N, naval upem~ons. es began to take a toll on U.N. vessels early in the 26,1950, USS Bm.~h hit a mine ixt the waters oEof Tmchon, s a e h g n h e Wed and three .wounded. On Septemkr 30, U S Mmsgeldstnrek a mine, ~& cmal"rjres of 27 wounded m d five misshg.

O In October 1950, the X Corps amphibious landing at the North Korean delayed for a wek b order to clear mines blncEmg rhe hxbor, Mineweepers were only one methsd used t o dear mines d ivers to clear mhes, opemti.0~ and other memres included w h g sc to detonate hem. aircr& to spot undewater mke fieldls, and n i l d Most of lfiese me&s& &d not work very weU, however, m$ the tedious but tried-md-me metkrods of the mheweephg crews proved most eEec~ve. Losses &am mines were espciiilly h&h as a result, however. On October 1, 1951, the mhemeeper U S Magpie W% des~oyed by a mine near the N o d Korem tom of Ch&m, s&ekg 28 M e d md 12 womdescl, On October 12, USS Pim tc;m d T J S Pledge were bo k by mines, d e x i n g total casud~es crf 13 Med and 8 h o w d e d . C) ary 2,1951, a mbe sank the mlneweeper USS P x ~ d g e , g 20 m& wamdhg 12. Four maxlhs later, the U.S. N ~ T sdered its st single loss of the w r when the desaayer 'liSS W&P s ~ c ak mine onJme 12,1%1, 26 kilted i n ac~on m d 85 womded in action.
O Enemy mines inflicted the last loss ofa U.S. Navy vessel during the war on A u p t 30,1952, when Ihe ocem%obg tug USS Sami struck a mine off' the No& Korean port of Hungnam and sank, suffering four M e d and four

womded,

i7 AUied naval forces supponed the U.N. mission throughout the come of the war in a number of other ways, including spomGon of men m d materiel to Korea from the United States and Japan; deployment of helicopters to rescue pilots downed at sea or behind enemy lines; ce and patrol operadons; and bombing raids against commmbt Qrgets,

The Korean War

U From August W December l%O, U,N. ships bombarded communisl forces along the east c o w of the Knrean Peninsula, proeding supporc fbr Sauch &=;in m o p as they fought their way into North Fhrea and totvard the Chinese m d SoGet borders,

D in early December 1950, the warships of Task Force 90 (Amphibious Force Far East) p r a ~ d e d e w h g fire far U.N. troops retreating toward the Nor& b w a n port of Hungnam after being stopped and d ~ v e n back by six Chinese field amies.

O From December 3 to 6, 1950, U.N. ships evacuated mose &an 105,000

d i a r y personnel and 100,000civilian refxxgees from Hungnm and, after it w a abmdoned, helped to destroy the port with a devastating hamage of n a d wfire.

O On Febmaq 16,1951,Task Force 95, a U.N. blockade a d exort farce,

esablished a blockade of MT;onsan, fiarbr, This blockade lasted 861 d q s until July 27, 1953, the last day of the war, making it: the lon&est eEec~ve siege of a port in U.S. Nav histov. Sonffjin m s analher impormnr port that was besieged by U.N, naval farces dufing the h r e m War.
O Task Force 77 s s e r e d its mrst aneday casudties of the war on &y 18, 1951, when six of' its aircr* were shot dom and four of its pilots killed in

aceon. C1 On April 21,1952,230 men were killed h e n a powder fire brake out on the cmisttr U S 5L, I.??& while it vvas praGding gungm support from the tvaters off of the North. &re= t o m of & j o .

D Gamier-based aircraft yarticipaed, alang ~ t h warplanes, in a major raid against nine hydroelectric @n& in Nor& b r e a on June 23, 1952.
D On August 29,1952, U.N. c in the largest singleday air amck d & e war, a j1,49*lane the No& b r e m capid of bongang.

bombing raid an

O On September 1, 1952, the U.N. n a ~ forces l launched the biggest aIl-Mav air raid ofthe war, sending 144planes kom three airclrdt caniers to bomb the oil refinery at Aoji in N o d Korea.

O On October 21,1952, artillery fire from a communist shore battery near Wonsan smck the US$ L e d 2killing seven,

O U.N. naval forces unleashed the heaGest share bombardment of the war
against Kosong on Mmch 20,1953.

The War at Sea

O June 15, 1953,was a big day for carrier-based air attacks. USS Princeton set the record for most oEensive sorlies flom from a single carfier by launching l84 air attacks, convibuting to a total of910 sorries flown by Navy and Marine pilow, their greatest one-day combined total during the war.
O Totat U.S. Navy casualties during the Korean War were 458 killed and

1,576 wounded,

O Although it is a senice usually associated with operations in domestic was waters, the U.S. Coast Guard, like the other branches of the nnili~ry, a c ~ v in e the hl-emWar.

tr Soon after World War IZ, the service's presence in ETr,rera began when a
U.S. Coat Guard advisory dembment helped to devdop and train the h r e a n Coat Guard, a force that eventuaHy became the Republic of Korea Nav.
O Mter /the conflict in Korea began in 1950,24 U.S. Coat Guard cutters semed in the theater of war, sewing tours of duv at remote outposts m d taking part in a wide variey of m i l i ~ and v humaniarian operations. These operalions included sefc-ing as plme guxds, rushing to help aircrews &at went d o m at sea, and as communication support platforms. Coast Guard cutters were &so reaci); t o proGde support t o Q-oop and mppfy ships on their way to or from &rea and to help in h e event of emergencies, Cutters also sewed on meter>rologied duty at two open-ocean wea&er stations near &rean waters, Sugar and Xctur, &on?which they protided U.N. ground, air, and naval forces informaljon about wather patterns &at could affect military operations.

B In the nearby Philippines, Coat Guad aircraft smod ma* to rescue U.N. personnel in need of help, like the aircrews of reconnaissance planes shot dotvn over the China Sea.
Q U.S. Coast Guard Cutters (USCGCs) eligible for the Korean S e ~ c e

Medal were Bering Strait, Chautauqua, Durant, Escanaba, Fdgont, Finch, Farster) Gresham, Iron woodt Ii-oguois, mama&, Koiner, Kukui, f;owef Mifz~etonka~ Newell$ Plme~jt-ee, Pontcharczin, emsden, Richc~T m e ~ Wachusett, Winraebzgo,m d Wiasna.

Cf In 1952, the Cloast Guad reached a strength of 35,082 oficers and

enlist& men (including 1,600 r e s e ~ s e )nearly , double its s ~ e n g tjust h five years hefore,

Nearly WO-dozmU.S. Cast Guard vessels, iacluding the USGGC Riehq, shorn here, g conflict in Korea, suppoed the If.XIJ, war ego&d ~ n the

also m n e d and operated Long s ~ d o n in s the PacSc, nine of which. naGgationd support to U.N. aircrdt and hips &ng part i n the conact in b r e a , mroughout the cowse of the war, a pair of Camt G u z d cutters se~ced these L 0 stat_iorrs,one of which baed in souheatem b r e a , near the port city of hsm, share mirs were Nine Caast Guad L o m Smfions (L6mTA) and %fso efigble for the k r e m e s e were LOBTA
), LQmTA NGgata. (Hanshrt), LOETA O s h h a (Honshu),

(Tobo),and the Merchant

Tokyo fHonshu), the Far East Secrian e Deachmene Uapm).

The War at Sea

53

e;li h the United States, CIoasf Guard pmficienq i n activities like carga and ammunition handling, port security, and prevention of sabotage helped ensure the Rovv of fupphes to the b r e m heater of war.

U,S, Natyships hzve an dphanmerz"~ degignadon in addidon to any proper name they have been g h . For exmple, &the designation for the a s BB68 f i h g the K ~ * r e m War, many smder battleship U S Missouri w vcsseIs had only dphanmeic d e s i p a d o ~and s noproper rimes, Designa~ons for some o f the shp we$ wed d a h g che confict foflow. Ot%ler letters c m i d e n w mdous o&er c h m c t e k ~ co s f a p z ~ c d ship a 01watercMt. For exzmple, the p r e k "E"ir?dicat:ed &at if is expe~men tal, md the prefn aTnIj7dicated&at it is kssiped to the $emace*
h e &rem Wm. In addigan, were alsaA S"hips (e.g., des~oyer tenden), Am2iaq VesscIs (e.g., hospid ships), and Semke Crdt (e.g.,, gwbage lighters).
&c& Camkm At~ck &rc& Cader: W A
Support & r c d t Gaker: GVS

hphibiouls Tmsport Dock: LPD hpEbisusA s m u X c Ship: WH Dock k h g Ship: LSD Tank h d h g Ship: U T

Commmd Ships Tactjcd Comxrxmd Ship: 6LC

The Korean War

Cmjsers Heavy Cruiser: CA Light Cmiser: CL

MIine Wadare Ships Minelayer, Desaoyer: DM Minesweeper, Costal: MSC

Pa&ol Ships Exore Vessel: DE Motor Gunbat: PGM

Amiliw Vemels f)es&oyer'fender: AU hmrxni~on Ship: AE WosgilaX Ship: M3

Cargo Ship and Acircdt Ferry: Oiler: A 0 Trmsport: AP Repair Ship: AR Submarine Tender: AS Auxiliary Ocem Tug: ATA Reet Ocean Tug: ATF

U.N. forces used a wUIIde varr'ety dships durr'ng the Korem War, from aircrdt carriers md batdeships tn Liny mheweepers and tzrgboat_f.
In fJ7e hllowizg desc~pcd"ons, 'Uisplacement" refirs to the
weight
o f a vessel and her contenB; '%earn "refersto the aver& med& o f a vessel;and '"draftmrefers to verdcal dismce from a vesel k keel to ahe waterline (i. ee,the

The War at Sea

minim urn deprh o f warer it would need to operatel. Speed is expressed in h o t f ,or n a u d l , mch of which is q u i d e t ~ to 1.. 1515statute miles. Each Svpe of ship was named according to certr%rh crite~a(e.g., battleship are named atter states). Smaller c& might have simpe an alphanumericdesipacion and nogiven name at all. In any case, a U.S. Nary is nevez-named in honw ofa IiFingpersun,

are mcsbile h a m for planef and are capable of mo~ng &m tvithin spiking dislilznce d a r e = that might orhemke be haeeessibIee k r c r d t from &lied akcrdt carnkrs flew missions against communbr;forces hrol~ghaut h e Korem W2r.

A ypical World War XI-era, Essex~las aircrdt c a ~ ehad r a displacement of38,500 tans, a length of888 feet, a beam of 9 3 1 feet, a drdt of 30 feet, shaft horsepmr of 150,000, an angled fight deck urirh an exweme wideh of 154 feet, and a complernerzt of 1,950 men, ament consisted of various on twin combinationsof 5-inch guns on ~n and single mounts, %inchwn,~ moutlt~, and 46mm guns on, quad mounfs.
Ilf h aircrdt canier? scommanding oEcer, execu~ve oMFicer, operations oficer, navigator, m d air oficer all had experience as naval aGators,

CI Aircrafl caeers were n a m d far fomer N a v ships, major batdes, and

U .S, bays, islands, a d sounds (e.g., Valley Forge, Coral Sea, Block Island).

$3AmIJSHIPS, second in size among combriant ships on+ t o the largest aircdt carriers, are heavjly armed and armored ship designed to operate both ohsiveIy and defensivelyagainst surface vese1s. Durjng the Korean War, heir most important funcu'on was using heir big guns to suppm amphibiorrs aslsarrft and ground I'arces. D USS M i s s o u ~ (BB63), an lowclass battleship, had a displacement of 57,400 tons, a length of888 feet, a beam of 108 feet, a draft of 37 feet, shaft horsepower of212,000, and a maximum speed of 33 knots. It was armed with

Q hteleskpswere
C X

ed far smteg (e.g., l o w ,

at ulte dme of the &rem M/ar were g a d u u p ship, apable of opemhg alone?i n p u p s $ or asp m ufa h t d e Bee&n e y as =@U@, &c& pw&, KreeBs enemy des&oyen m d &cdt, and Ieades afdeseoyer md a-ck poaps.
rs3U S h s t ~ m nd U S had a &placement of IS, length of 678 feet, a be feet, a draft of 26 feet, m d sfi& 120,800, n e y were Smch, Shch, md a compfement uf more mmewhat smder (e.g., 10,500 tons for aeweh&Iw and a complement of p s of Smch size m

m were rimed for U,S, cities and tarns and for c a p i d of U.S. p~esslions and t e ~ t o r i e s (e.g., W h o r e ?hst-on).

ship m d i n nealy e v e v h r f o f n a d ~ ~ m b h a r>f-d SF&, ~ ~ m ~ b a v and ? opemgon a d P ~ P ~ ~ X R E oflensive m d defenshe capababes* Des~oyem led the &ptemkr J W attask at lachon, hmbx&g entinel W o h i &lad pn"or d t .Fkgates are a spci&d w e ofdes@oyer
~~-J~=~QII-S~

emeat of 3,479 tons, a leng& of r, sh& homepower o f 6Q,OOC), a 32 knots,and a compXemmr of 257. T ~ i c d ts, &me *ch p s an
D Deswoyers were a m & for permnneI; secredes an

e, or Coast es af the Nav; memhrs hventors (e.g., Becam#

J o h PadJaBrzs, W&e)

The War at: Sea

U.N. domination of the waters wound the Korean Peninsula gave the allied forces ready access to supplies and denied the enemy the same benefit. Here liCukzai,a U.S. Coast Gwrd emsport.vessel, loads supplies bound for shoxrz onto landing craft

SMALL AND SPECIALIZEDCOMBATANT VESSELS

A vaI-iey of mlalively m a J I cornk mt vessels were used during the Korea

War3mi~eweepers being among the most i m p a r ~k. n

i;;f Minesweepers were small, shallnul draft vessels used for detecdng enemy

navd mines, for candrtcring mine clearing trpemfrzns, and for marking mine fields, mine dumping areas, and swpt areas with special buoys. In order to reduce the chance of detanaling magnetic mines, t h y were built

The Korem Ww
steel h a . Of fie mmy mfiehes of mheweeper, the two most b h e k r e m War were coasr;ll minemeepers and ocean mheweepers.
U A typical coastal minesweeper had a displacement of400 tons, a length of 144 feet, a beam of 28 feet, a draft of 8.5 feet, was driven by a pair of had a m e m u m s p e d of 14 knots, m d s. Ocemsoing mineweepers were a bit had a displacement d 7 3 5 tons, a Xmgrh of 172 feet.,a h a m of86 &et, a d d of 11 feet, a maximum speed of 15 hots, and were amed with a single 4Omm gun.

@weepers were nmett for words (e.g., M w i e 9 Swaciy],

& W &

and for logicd and euphmiws

D Submakes were used p shipphg, m d e o m b a b g en role in the waters off the coasts of &sea,
Aw i c a l G r e m Waera submdne had a dkplacement of 1,525 tons, a. urn h e m of a b u t 27 feet, a iength & a b u t 312 feet, a m abut X 5 feet., md ww &ven by four 1,CliOQhorsepower diesel e n e e s and four 1,100 kilowatt generatam on the s u ~ a c e and batteqdfiven e k e ~ c ntotars when suubnnqed. A ~ i c eompknlent d konsiskd uf seven o E c m m d 70 enhsted men.

O Subrna~m were nmed for &h and oher ocemic creames (e.g., Mbacc)rceZ SeawoK W d a o ) .

ofequipent,ammuniLion, and supplies needed t o secure a foothold on an enemy beachhead.

O Amphibious Force Hagships were used as command ships and

corrmmmkarions centem d u h g mphibiow opemtiuns and protided accom&tions md conemanid-mdqonwol &ci&Lies far h e cornmmdefs kvalved i n the opemLian (e.g.,

The W a at: Seat

well as c e n d k e d facilities for proceshg and &s~busing opemtiond hteBgence hfomaeon.

O Most amphibious force flagshipswere c o n v e ~ cargo d vessels, but could be easily identified by the radio cage masts rising from their supersbuctures. In addition to crew members, such ships could qumer ahwxt 250 osceru and 900 enlisted men, were equipped with about a half dozen landing craft, a srn& a m a m t of cargo and a few vehieies,

ding Ships (LSTs) were used for landing troops,vehicles, and &er cwgo dkecdy on enemy shores, via bow doors and a a huge h a X d called a " m k deck." An U ' T could also be W section, LSTswere launch a ut.lfity l w a g c d t (LCU) or pontoon ca cli~callin the execufion of the Inchon mphibious upemdons in kiscary.
Q A gpical IST had a displacement of 3,200 tons (5,800 tons when llly

loaded), a lengcfir af 384 feet, a beam of55 feet, a draft of 17 feet, four niesel coneolled-pieh prapeliers with a total horsepower of 6,000, and a compIememt of 120. Weapons mu* consisted of three Xmch p s .
Q Tank boding Ships are nmed for counties and "cauncy"or " p ~ s hin " the n m e (e.g., S m k Comfy, Yark army).

C1 Umty L;mding C&

(LCU) were opendecked, @ d i k e c d t w i & a p, and could ==sport up to 50 tans of vehicles, equipment, m d a &om shiptwshore, They could also be used for seaborne spameion mder s u i ~ b l condi~ons, e but were g e n e d y the site of an amphibious t in the well ofa dock landhg ship (=B).

O LCUs typicdy had a displacement of 395 tom, a length of 119 feet, a

beam of $5 feet, a csmpiement of 14.

urn draft of 6 feet, a s p e d of 18 hots, m d a ents w r c : Eirnitedt to a few machinepas.

O Dock Landing Claft (LSD) were the largest type of landing vessels, and were actually seK-propelled floating drydocks that could transpofi and launch smaller amphibious vessels and vehicles. Such ships could also render limited docking and repair selvices to small ships.

Ci A n o r n a t o x l w LSD had a displacement af 6,880 tans (12,150 tuns when M y W e d ) , a Ien@ of 51O feet, a b e m of84 feet, a m d m u w drdt of 19 feet, a pair of stem mrbine engines with shaft horsepower of 23,000, and a cornplerllent of 280.Equipment:and mends included a p& of' es m d eight h n momb for ei or -50 c & k r maehinepns,

The Karean War

MFIe a p h g far from heir h m e p o r ~ ar; , in rhe waters amund Korean Peninsula, ships cansmtly. needed to be sapplied tvith food, h & , muniLx"ons,men, may, repair p=&, m d a great mmp O&W hings. Such goads were delivered to L h e wanhips by a w'de mriety o f a m i l i a ~ vessels, including replenishment vessels (e.g., ammunition ship, some cargo ships, oilers), designed t a aansfer men and materiel from &emselves t o o&er ship while underway. Some of rhe most important auxilialy vessels are described here.

O Cargo s h i p were used to c vehicles, equipment, mtxnircions, and limited numbers of troops. Many w r e designed ts perf;om special Eunc&ons,such as generd stores isue ships, used to replenish ships at sea; of general cargo, used t o light cargo ships, which carried small quan~Ges wansport nzakriel from port-teport; and aircrdt femies, often converted older aircrdt carfiers, used to Wansport ~ r c r d t ,
Cf

Cargo ships wert;: named for a w o n o m i d bodies (e.g., Ant;tresIMiflak9 BeteIgeuse).

U Trmspom were used for mpid trarlsport-lrim of woop and limited qumrities of cargo fi-om portto-port, and could also be used to evacuate casualties, uoops, and refugees, as they were from the North Korean port of Hungnam in December 1950, and to p r o ~ d e medical care to wounded personnel. Because they were designed for use with port facilities, they did not c a q large numbers of landing craft, as did amphibious wadwe ships like LSTs.
Q A typical vansport had a displacement of 17,980 tons, a length of 623

feet, a b e m of 76 feet, a maimurn draft af 26 feet, and a mmimum speed of more than 3,W6 men under normal condircions. 20 knots. It cougd c
D Transports were named in honor of commandmu and other oEcers of the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. counties, sites of historical interest, signers of the Declaration of Independence, famous women, and men of foreign birth who fought for American independence (e.g., Cambria, F m o n t ,
O Tenders, including desuoyer and submarines tenders, pro\ided maintenance and supply senices for the combatant vessels to which they were assigned. Such ships usually had chaplains aboard, could provide some

The Wr ac Sea

medicd and den~als e ~ c e s , and sornercimes had recreationd facai~es, especially in the case of submarine tenders. CI Destroyer tenders were named for areas of the United States (e.g., Dkies, Everglades, YeBowstone).
D Oceangoing tugs were ships used for hauling, towing, firefighting, and salvage operations and included a number of different varieties. Such vessels were extremely versatile, and could be put to many nonconventional uses, including pa~olling, rescue operations, laying smokesreens, pulling svanded landing craft off of beaches, or towing damaged warships back to their home parts,
O Oceangoing tugs were named for American Indian tribes (e.g., Apache,

Navqo, F&ute). CS Repair ships were floating workshops with skilled mechanics, electrlcims, and other technicims aboard &at pedormed repair and maintenance s e ~ c ethat s w r e beyond the caphiliries of damaged vessels or their crews. Tasks such ships could perform included undemater cutring and welding, e n e e m d huU repairs, and macfnine and elec~ical work. Facilities aboard such ships included foundries, forges, and carpenq shops, ins~rument shops, macbiney shops, and boat m d boatengine repair shops,
Cf

f e v e d specidized v a ~ e ~of es such ships exisred, including heav-hull repair ships, batGectamage repriir ships, intemd combustion engine repair skips, landing craft repair ships, and aircrdt repair ships. Some rep%irships were built from converted MTs.

CS A typicrtt repair ship had a length af about 530 feet, a beam of about 73 feet, a maximum speed of about 19 knee, a complement of up to 1,100 personnel, m d amarnent of four 54nch guns in a main hactery and four sets of tu;in 4Omm antiaircrdt guns,
O Repair ships were named for mythological characters (e.g., Ajau, Vulcm],

O Ammunidon ships operated with groups of other replenishment vessels

to deliver munitions to ships at sea. They were given names suggestive offire ar explosions (e,g,, N i ~ oMauna , Xea) ,
O Oilers carried black oil, gasoline, and other petroleum products and

operated with groups of replenishment vessels to deliver their cargo to ships at sea. Oilers were named far rivers with American Indian names (e.g., Braos, P l a t t e ,hpidan).

Ll EJwpirtal ships were used for

idhcfirjes =hare. Care of the womded fell to a compkrnent of docmn, nmes, ofderfies, and chapI&s appmpk* ta the size ofthe vessel, which ~ e a in ~afl, dother mpece like a n o m d nav ship, albeit one with m e n w e d sick bay; s mhtenmce, and other h c l i a n s af the ship itseE were hmded by b e aacers md crew.

1171 Hoslpid vemh were p&nted white and cleark milsked vci& numerous
craaes, and, mder tfie pro*iam of h e e n m CanvenLion,were mppaxd im be? b m w e &om attack, They were xlat b m m e to accidents, howmer. On A u p t 25,1950, U S Benevolencre, reeomxnissianed for sefice after the h r e m W x bqm, colli$ed with the SS 2M~Luckenb;lch wh2e on a trial irr. the waters nem S m F m c k o . It m k 14tha Ioss of 18 fives.

O Hospital ships were given names descliptive of their caregiving mission

(e.g., Consolarion,Haven, R e p = ) .

GEOGRAPHY AND BATTLE'FIELDS

"Unless you b o w the xnaunbins and forests, the defiles and impasses, and the lay of the mwshes and swamps, you cannot rnaneuver with an amed farce."
-----Sun Tm, The Art of War

ores k mugh, moun~inousterrai? and its climatic expemes played an in?por&arole in how and &ere tJle &rean War was fo@ g , ar-zd the n a m of i& hills, riversf resemoirs, and villages w Y 1forever be asoch ted W*& the hW dreds of liattles fought d u d ~ ~ the g 37 mon&s of h e canBict* m e n World W2r I1 ended, the allied powers occu@ed the &rean Pe~llnsda~ a former colony of theJapanese Empire. SaGet forces occupied the rzarrh and U,$. forcm occupied lthe sout%l,eheir zofies of m p o l separated bp lSll e 3S& parallel o f norllJler~ Ia htude. Since &at h e , tlze area sou& of lrhe 38th parallel has heen knom as Svuth Korea md, sintrtl3.9423, it has heen k n o w ~BciaIIy 3s the RqubIi: of Korea. SimilarJv, s;ince 1945 the area nor& of the .98& praIIel has bee12 know as Nor& K~rea, and nBcidly since . 948 l as the Democm tic People "s Republic of Korea. W i t h the conclusion OFf i e armisGce in 1953, the oficial bordet-bemeen &e countn'es was no langer the 38u"l pralel, but rather the 150-mile long demiJi'ta1-kedzone (L)MZ) Chat rvas baed upon L h e finalline n f c o ~ z ~when ~~cl. the ceaegre was declared.

The Korean W u

O Korea is a peninsula about 575 miles in lengh from north to south and
m avemge of about X50 m3es xross fiom east to tuest. To the north are Ghba and,slang a very mmow berder, Russia; to Zhe east and sou& are Ihe Sea ofjapan and the k r e m Smi&and, beyon8 these wakrs,Japm itse& to the west is the Yellow Sea.
O Total land area of the Korean Peninsula, including islands, is about 85,270 square miles. About 45 percent of this land, some 38,030 square miles, constitutes the territoly of South Korea, while the remaining 55 percent, 43,240 square miXes, conshtutes the temito:oryof N o d Korea

hills, and highlmds conslcjmte mast of the penins&% land mea, some 70 percent &South G r e a m d 8 0 perclent of No& Korea. From mu& to n o d , the m a m ous c o u n q ~ o w progressively s higher m d more mgged.
S,

Tli In the mu&, the principal ranges are the Taebak M a w ~ n sthe , Sabaek Momkns, m d the C h i d The highest m o w in Sou& Korea is M o m t H d a , a 5,HT-foot valcmic cane on Cheju b b d . AU of the peninsula's highest peaks are in Nor& h m a , including 7,524foot Momt Paekm, Mgor phteam I n N o d K o ~ are a the Ghaeryong RSn m c l the e a n g m g Peneplain, around rke capial cig,
Q P h c i p d rivers in the south are the Naktong, the Han, and the &m, Phclpd ~vers in the nos are the Tadong, the Yak, and the T m e n . +em played a role i n the war%s ~ o battles w and helped determine d u d g the conact. where defensive lhes were es~blisbed

U Extending &om 54 to 43 degrees north latitrldc, b r a is subject t o ebaicic extremes that made E*g, moGng, and fighting d f i c d t for L h e uoops on the ground, and equipping and managing those troops a logistical nighmare for the leadership on each side. Korea's climate is dominated by very hot, humid (and usuay wet) summers, and ex~emely caXd, but hirly dryl ~ n t e r s .
F;;I Monsaon rains and floodkg chmcte&e the stmnmers,

which tend towmd either heavy rains as high temperattrres a d exweme humi&q.

Geography and Battlefields

Twothirds of the annual precipitation of about 40 inches a year falls from June through September, and an average of five typhoons rip across the Xlorean Peninsula evey year. Droughts pmch the peninsula approximately every eight years, however, and the summer of 1950--the first season of the war-wa m a b e n a ~ o n in that: it w;as bath very het ancl very dry.
O Despite the summer heat, the Korean War is more often associated with ten. Korea's freezing winters are exacerbated by arctic winds weeping d a m from the seppes of Siberia.

Below are a number of loca~ons m d geographical. Eclamres &at: were s-dopp signiiicmr during the &sea War. klmds are signified by the after Lhe name of the island, Hills are iden&ed in most case by both heir numerical designations and the name by which U.N, mops came t o know &em,

D hmistice Line: see Demiliaked Zone,

Cl Bloody &dge A stretch of high eomd famed by Hiills 773,940, and 983 &at was part of what was called the hrrchhowl, This a e a w x the xene of heav combat in late summer 1951,when elements ofthe U.S. 7th h f m q Dieion, including South k r e a n forces, attacked the ridge ta keep rhe woops on either side &om k c w i n g complacetnt and te demms~are U,N. resolve to the negotia~ors at Panmunjom,
bt Capi~oI Buildhg (Repblic of Korea):A Western cgmicd style s a c m e 9 2 6 and used as the seat of their colani.112 completed by the Japmesrt in E government in b r e a until 1945. It becme a FM nf the Republic af Korea in 1948 when President Spgman Rhee stood upon its steps to mnounce the establilihrnent of the netv nadon, M m y South breans had mbivdent feelings about the smcture, howwer, m o n g &em Rhee, who rehsed to use it. From 1961 until it tarn down in 1996, it semed succe~ively als government oEces and a natiolnd museum.
Q CeaefireL h e See Demili

Q Chmg'h Resewoix b r e m name for what Chosirl Resemois.

;is

more often c d e d the

The Korean War

Flf Chdu-do: Island off the south coat of Korea that was the site of a mdor communist updsing in 1948. Its climate is sign*cm* mrmer and milder &m the rest of Sou& k r e a ,

Q Chinnmpo: Port city at the mou& of the Taedong Ever on the west co-ast of Nor& Korea, It is about 30 miles souhwest of the capial Qoxruang and %ernes as its port (similar to the rela~onship b e ~ e e Inchon n and Seoul). In December 1950, U.S,, Cmadim, and Auseaiim navd forces used Chinnampo to evzuate U.N. ~ o o pre~eating s before the Chinese advmce into Korea, and inflicted major damage to enemy shore posi~ons during the opmation. Ghinnampo is know today as Narnpo,

fl Chipyong-ni: Vilage in Sou& b r e a near the middle of the pexrinsuh

that U.N. troops defended against overwhelming nurnbers during the Chinese ogensive in mid-Febmaxy 1951,Mter &fee days of heavy Bghting, the completel-)lsunounded U.N. force both vuithstaud a d broke &e rnsrnenmrn of tfie cammurrist assault.

This aerial view of the Clnosin Resemoir, a e n just before U.S. forces in Nosh Korea were ovemhelnnrzd and forced to reexeat by the Chinese People" Volunteers Army, hints at the mgged and unforgiving nabre of the temain,

Geography and Battlefields

73

Chogin Resemoix Chosin was the name of this Nor& Korean resemoir as it appeared on theJapanese maps drafted during the imperial occupation of Korea h a t the U.N. b x e s were using. Its &reart n m e was Chandin. In 4TJ.S. X Csrps, particularly the US. Isr Marine November 1950, e l e m e n ~ Division, were deployed along both sides of the reservoir and preparing to move nor& to the Ydu River when Chinese communkt farces launched a major offensive, breaking the U.N. drive and forcing a reweat.
O Demili~rizedZone (DMZ): A strip of land about 2.5 miles wide stretching entirely across the Korean Peninsula and separating the Republic of Korea from the Democraric People" Republic of Kr,rea. This zone is based on the line of conact betvveen the opposiq forces & a t existtjd when the ceasefire was declared in July 1953, and stretches from a point south of o a point norlh of it on the east coat. the 381h pamlkl on the west coast t

CI F a m fine: The line in Sou* Korea behind which fanning could q a i n

be undeaaken &ter cl?,eJuly1953 cemefire.
O F ~ m o s aAnoher : name by which the islarrd a f T a i w a W* knuun,
I;S

H a &VCR A 27hile-long river i l o ~ n g nor& to sou& tzhrough Seoul and foming a barrier on its west.

Cf Hill 303 Hill near Waepan, in Sou& Korea. During the defense of the Pumn Perimeter in summer 1950, aoapefs of the 5th Cavd17; Regiment
counterat~ked onto the hill m d dixovered 26 h e s i c m maramen who had been bound and etxecuted by North Qrem soldiers.
Q Hill 324 Steep, mile-long hill: overlooking the t o m of T a e p that was

considered to be the key to its defense. On September 12, 1950, the 3rd Battalion of eke 7th Cavalry Regiment (Ist Cmlry Division) drove enemy hrces off of this ridge after a detemined assault,
O Huichm: Village in Nor& Karea, in the nxgged moun.cains east of Kunu-ri.
C). Hungnm: North Korean port on the w t coast of the peninsula &at was the site of a major U N . evacuation in fate December 1950. By December 24, some 105,000 U.N. personnel and nearly 100,000North &rem rehgees .vessels andhad embarked an wrships, wmspor&, and chartered ci~lian y naval were evacuabd from the city, which w s subseqrrenrly deswoyclct b gunfire and dernolircions,
O I m j n River. A river Bowing north-south that crosses the 38th paralleljust

norzll of Seoul,

'74

The Korean W a

Q Inchm: Port city i nSou& k r e a , 5-0 macs west of s o d . Site of a massive U.M. amphibious landkg on September 15,1950.

e earners consbring o f v a n e m g (not in the emt9and Chowon in the west, from the faet &at it heady defended by g &om S p h g 1951 hedi n 1951, the t h e of contact, and as a r e d t the DMZ, ran *ough &is sea.
the capi& city) in the no

L3 Im&e h r b m in Japm &om which Tak Farce Smih deployed to krea.

CT &esong Civjmt sou& ofthe 38th

Seod. A %nth k r e m city J E T O m 1945to 1950, N o d b r e a when its forces hnded hJme1 h e of c0ntac.twhen the No& Qrea.
e &t city capwed bly

' ns,despi~e the fact &at ;tccepkd k e w n g as flhe site for i nthe c o n n m ~ kzone r of e s i p a t d n e u M pamd, the carnrnmka used heir h e i & & the U.N. nego~atom m d coxlaol wces of s conhued. even after a n e m d zone , and the CT.N,'s chief negahtar, Vice A h . C.

T& we= resumed h October 1951 i n Pmmmjom. For the

, hawwer, the commmist negohtom were headqu Qewng. As a result, U.N. December 1952, decided that the eornmmis~ were using it as a s ~ e wea g for an a t ~ c k
estabhfid in

1951 &er U.N. farces c a u ~ r a i t ~ k d

m d Xmjh Svers in

O IL?pynng:A small town about 50 miles northeast of Seoul. In April 1951,

C h b e oEemhe, ~ the site of cornbat k m e e n

forced t;o * ~ h w .

Geography and Battlefields

75

specially those; in the middle of the Huncfreds of Korerzn cities, towns, and village peninsula-were devasted by the violence of the Korean War.

O gum Rvex h major 2lti-mildong river in South Korca,

13 KURU-P.~: Atillage in N o d Korea at thejunction of the north-.sou&mad from Sunchon and an eat-west road &at connected it ~ l ; l Z Huichon, to the east. S h o w as "Kunmori" on some maps.

13 Kwan@: Village in Sourh Rorea, souhwest of Seoul. Location of the ROK 5th DiGsion when North Korea invaded,
U Kynonju: Village in s o h e a s k m Korea, used hy the Nor* Korems a sa route of atbck against h e Pusan Perimeter,
Q Marc;huria: Moun~inous,indtlstridized region of China bordering N o d Korea a d separakd from it by the Uatu River, Historkally important as the principal land route into and out of Korea, it semed a s the s&gizlg area for Chinese ~ o o pbefore s their e n q into the Korean Waf and throughout the conflict as a sde haven for communist air b ~ e sh, o w to the Chinese as dongbei*or %amor&," it consis& of three prrrvinees: Weiiongjiang, Jilin, a d . Liaoning,

The Korea Wax:

Because many ethnic Koreans lived throughout the region, Manchuria served as a base ofmti-JapaneseKorean gue aceG.ey.from 1910 until tfre end ofworld War 11. In 1932,japan moved into Manchuh from n o h e m Korea and established a puppet state, known as Manzhouguo, under the last emperor of China. 'This puppt sate couaped in the find weeks of World War 11,when it was captured by troops from the Soviet Union, who piUaged it i t h g* equipment kfore w S M used i n the West as a name for the region, "Manchuria" is no longer med as an official daignation by the People's Republic of China.
hf M G Mey: h e a i n no~wesem k r e a where commmist WGXlis, flying out a ( :ch& bases i n chufia intercepted U,N, bmbers on their cvay ~s, bornh the Ydu aver bddges, S e n e of h e w ~ - t e & comb*, Lhe skies over MiG AUey were the only place i n Qrea where the U.N. did nut enjoy unqu&ed air superiohq,

Va%e in mutheaskm k r e a &at W* used as m stack route eter by the N o d k r e m amy,

Ifi Ndtong Rdgc A bdge on the western side of the hsm Pe~meter, c a w d by a Nor* b r e m Lacro~ the NAtong Ever in 1950. X n both cases, 8th US, tfie cornmwist stack and, after Moody combat, reduce the saliient and drive the No& Korems back acros the river.

i3 Ndtong m v e ~ T h i s 281-mac-lung hver, the lunge& in Sou& k r e a ,

o~@nates in the Taeb& Mow s and flow south, e n t e h g the sea in a ddta vvest af h m . Nong vui& it?-, ~butaries, the N&tong cornpcises rhe ary hver system of soatfnemtem Korea a c t the second hgest river system in the Repubfic of k r e a . mer 1950, che N&tong fomed much of the wstenz edge of the ac~cked acrow the NAtong in an attempt to Fenetrate the and communist forces engaged in heavy fighting along the river until the commmist forces wet-etoo depleted to conhue, Mter Inchon on September 8, U.N. forces broke out of the croaed the Ndktong C e North b r e m forces

O NQ N m e m e A defensive line es~blished by the U.N, forces in k r i l 1951, &er they tvere fsrced from the g Chinese
Phse OEensive.

O N o r t h &rpm PeopIeS Republic Official name for communist North

brea.

Geography and Battlefields

O Old Bddy (Hill 266):A hill west of Chonvon that was a scene of heavy fighting from summer 1952 until spring 1953. InJune 1952, Old Bddy was selected as one of several outposts for the U.S. 45th Infantry Division. After suhquendy overmn b?l heavy fighting, the outpost was established, but both sides a number of limes over the ensuing months.
O Ongin Peninsula: This small peninsula on the west coast of Korea, south

of the 38th parallel, was originally part of South Korea but was completely cut off from it by land and could only be reached by sea or air. It was the scene of crossborder fighdng from 1948 onward, and was probably the first part of South Korea invaded by North Korean forces inJune 1950. The communists captured it almost immediately (June 26, 1950),and today the peninsula is part of North Korea. According ?he official communist history, the Korean War began when South Korean forces attacked across the 38th parallel from the Ondin Peninsula, prompting North Korean forces to counterattack into the Republic of Koma.

P Osan:Xllage in Smth Korea that was the site of the first batlie bemeen U.N. and North &rean ground forces, OnJuly 5,1950, the 4OEcman Tak h r c e SmitS1was raur;ed by a much larger force of Nor& Korean h f a n q m d 1950 landing at Inchon m d breajkuut fi-om mks, After the rnid4ep~xnber Pusan, element-s U.S. X C o v m o G n g sou& and 8th US. Army moving north met, ironicatiy, at Osm, the site o f h e r k a " first m i l i ~ q defeat on the peninsula.

13 Prurmunjam: Village near the middk sf the &rean Peninsula on the

line of contact that was the site of amistice negodahons from October 25, 1951, toJuly 27,1953. A neutral zone was established around Panmunjom to make it accessible to both the U.N. and communist parties. It is i nthe center ofthe DMZ that W es~blkhed by the ceasef;lre,
O Pork Chop Hill (Hill 234):This hill changed hands several times during the war and was the scene of especially heavy fighting during the last four

monrhs of the war. Even as the armisdce negotiations were nearing their conclusion.at Panmunjonr, U.N. and Chinese forces drove each.o&er oE&e hill repeatedly in what has often been characterized as a smggle by each side to dernonsaate &eh moml resolve,
O Punchbow& A circular complex of hills in the middle of the Korean Pminsula near the line of contact of the last WO;yearsof the war. From 195X onward, it was a site of heavy combat, including the Battle of Bloody Ridge and Ibe Batde of Wearchreak fidge.
Q Pusan: This city is located on the soutrfiease coast of the Korean

peninsula. X n August 1950, U.N. forces were dfiven south and lost all of the

The Korean War

peninsula except for a narrow perimeter around Pusan. A major seaport, woops and material arrived at Pusan throughout the war. In September 1950, it was used as a staging asea fclr the 8th U.S. &my's counteratack against the NWA,

CII f i s m Perimeta A roughly r e c m p l a r defensive line established in late July 1950 by U.N. farces around the port of Pusan, in the southeast corner of the peninsula. Its norhern boundaq ran about 50 miles from Sanju on the Naktong River, east to Yongdok on the Sea of Japan. Most of its western bounday was formed by the Naktong River itself, running about 80 miles from Sanju south to the Korean Suait at Chindong. For a month, the communists had driven the U.N. forces steadily southward, and the perimeter was a final attempt by the 8th U.S. Army to dig r m being driven out of Korea or deseoyed, U.N. farces held in and keep f the perimeter &raugh the heaviest combat d & e wr, until mid-Sepkmber 1950,when U.S. X Corps landed at fncbon. 8 t h y forces then broke out of the perimeter and headed north,
Cl vonuzng: Capital of Nor& Korea. Cap~uredby the U.N. forces in October 1950, but recaptured by tfie communists just a month later, when and drove the allies the Chinese and Norh Korean farces counterat~cked southward anee again,

D Republic ofKorea: Q%cial name for Sou& Korea.

O Seoul: Capital of Sou& Korea. It was captured four times by the opposing sides during the Korea War, first by the North Korean forces,just a few days

after the war Began.

Ct Sobaek Motm~;lins: An extension of the larger T a e W Mnun~ins and one of South Korea" three mouneah rmges.
Q Sunchon: Village north of Pyongyang that, along with Suwon, was the site of an allied airborne operation in October 1950.
O Suwon: Village north of Pyongyang that U.N. airborne forces jumped

into in October 1950.

D Taebak M o u n t ~ n Foremost ~ of Sou& &rea\ three moun~ain ranges, running north to south along the east coast near the middle of the peninsula. This range separated the 8th U.S. Army and the U.S. X Corps during the U.N. advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950. D T a i w a ~Island : o@thesouthern coast of mainland China that became the seat of the ousted Chinese Nafionalist (Kuomintang) government in 3949, the last year of the Chinese Civil War.

Geography and Battlefields

79

O 38th parallel: Line of latitude that divides the Korean Peninsula roughly in h a a n d that semed as the border bemen Nor& Korea m d Sou& b r e a untilJune 25, 1950, when forces from the north crossed it and invaded the south. From 1945 to 1948, the 38th degree of nor& latimde as it bisects the Grem Peninsula (the "B&parallelm")emed as an arbi~aryline of demarcation b e ~ e e pJarl_h n and Sou& Korea, and from 1948 to 1950 as the boftler beween the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (nor&) and the Republic of Korea (sou&).

CI Tokya Capital of U,S. occupied Japan m d location of the U.N.

Command dul-ing the b r e m War,
O Tumen =vex Ever in North Korea &at farmed that eounq" short ao~hern. border with the SoGet Union.

D Wake Zslmd;. U.S,-held Pacsc ishnd, about one-&ird of the way b e ~ e e n United Sates, hat: was the site of an October 5, Korea and the confirren~1

Two soldiers of the 7th Infanw Division, near Hyesanjin on November 21,

LW@, gaze

across the Yalu River towad the maumins of Manchuria. A temple aad bridge set aftre by air forces still bum in the valley belaw,

1950, conl"crence hmeen President H

m and Commmder-

P Wolmida I s h d wading the approaches to Inchon hwbor. Held by

the No& h r e m ex17 September 1950, capmre uf this W m d W% corisidered cmcid cess of the Inchon Landhg. It w a successhety bombxded by U. and ilircdt, m d hen asadted hiy a hrce of mahnes on Sepember f 5.

B Wonsm: Nor& Ksrem port an the cast coat af the peninsula, Site o fa major but uncontested wpbibious lajndring hy U,S. X Corps in November d Dmember 1950 (much 1950,and afa forced U.N. mphibims ~ r h d r a in smaer, however, than the ~ & d m at d E-Emwm). U Ydlu Zver: Major river that famed most of Norrh Korea's northern &ontierand its barder 14ththe Chbese region of Mrnnchnria
YeUow Sea: Major body of water to the west of the Korean Peninsula.

Cl Zone of h e Intenear( 2 1 ) : T e r n used du&g the documetn&to refer to the c o n ~ e r r U a n i M Sbtes.

in ~ s c ~nsw d

v
U . S . FORCES
"The soldiers irtsensibty foTgor the virtues of their profession, a ~ conkacted d only the vices oEcivit life. . . .They were either degmded by tfie industry of mechanic trdes, or mmated by the i m v of baths and theatres. They soon became careless o f their martial exercises, cwious in their diet and apparel; aad while they inspi~ed tenor to the subjects of the empife, they trembled at the hostile irpproach of the B a b ~ ~ n s . "

-Edward Gibbon, TheHistoty ofkhe Decline m d F a of utle Roman Empire, Chilpt.er X W I

ost ofthe soldiers who c m e to Korea to fight under the bmner of the United Nadons were h e d c m . Ind"eed, U.S. forces, second in a urnhers only to Lh ose sfche Repu blic of Korea d u ~ n g the condict, were about 10 h c z s larger &m aU 16 of che other U.N conhgents. combined.

Q In che years dter 1945, the b e r i c a n miliaq leaderships ~ o w to r e f o m m d resmcture the h m y based upon its World War IT experiences, Even as the &my was being r e s m c m r e d to meet the needs of m o d e m warfare, however, h u d g e ~ r ) cuthacb l were reducing the sizes af ail branches of the miX6aq and m&ing m m y of the improvemerr~ moot,

The Korean War

I I l l In a rwersal of m r l d War fI dockrine, ntilitay plmners determined h a t " h e medim tank is the best a n r i ~ n k wapon,'' A s a result, infantfy units weapons, and each infantry were not .uvideXy eyuipped Mii& other a n t i ~ n k diGsion,tvas instead mthoked m armored bathlion, W e n the Korem War broke out i n 1950,however, each ofthe four U S , infmtry divisionss b ~ o n e d in Japan had only a single tank company actached ta It.
O One ostensible improvement to U.S. infanq uniw, 6om platoons right

up tu di~sions,W= Lhe autborizaeion for organic weapons chat had preGously been attached from other uniw. An example of this is the ored batdion w i t h each infmtry di~sion, rather &m the atbchment of ~ n kfrom s molfrer unit; mother is the inclusion of a weapons quad in each infan9 platoon, ratber than h a ~ njust g a wa;pons platoon to support all the platoons in a compmy, Practjcdly, however, these improvements often proved to he double-edged m d s , Far example, m k s were reduced to the role of an-ti~nk weapons and becme tied to infanq formations, rather &an being able to mmuever freely and explait enemy wlnerabilities, In addidon, i n b t r y platoons, which now had heir o w light machine guns arld baaokas, cansequencfvhad fewer rxiRemen,

CT In 1950,an infanq platoon consisted of three nineman rifle squads and one weapons squad, armed with a bzooka and a light machinegun. Such reorganized platosns were Ale to fire arld maneuver w i t h greakr independence than World War II platoons (which consisted of three 12-man squads and lacked a weapons squad). Once they suffered casualties, hawever, the smaller, nine-mm squads lacked stafing power,

O n July 7, 1950, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for aU UeNforces in &rea to be un3ed under the leadership ofthe Linirtld Sates. President Hany S. Tmmm subsequently appointed Gen. Douglas Ma&thur, h e r i c a h e n i o r miliary- commander in rhe theater, as Commmderi n Chiefcifche U~ited Nzbons Gommmd, whose Ireadgumters were esf;zblishedin Tokyo,
a few notable exceptions, ground forces in Korea came under the O direct operationat control of 8 t h U.S. , forces under the Far East

U.S. Forces

Force (see Chapter II, mr in Lhe Air) and naval forces under the U.N.C. Navd Command Far East Blockade and Escort Force (see Chapter 111, War at Sea).
O U.N. ground forces were grouped into three large U.S. Army corps, I Corps, IX Corps, and X Corps, along with two ROK Army corps. Each of these corps was further divided into U.S., ROK, and other allied divisions

and regimental combat teams.

O U.S. ground forces included the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, "Lh, 25&, 40&, and 45th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Marine Division, as well as the 5th Regimental Combat team and the 187th Airborne Regimental

Combat team.

P South &rean and dlied ground forces from E5 other U.N. nations are discussed in the Chapter W, Sbu& Korem Miliar;r.Forces, and Chapter VX, AJIie-d Forces,

E-l Not all o f the &ied corps, di~sions, and other units were active at the
same time: (e.g., the 40& and 45th Infantry DiGsioxls did not arrive in Korea until 1952).In the text below, unit organhation is described under the X ,X X , m d X Corps headings, while the experiences of &c: subordinate divisions m d regimeneat combat teams during the b r e m Mrar are descrih.ed under heir indiGdual headings,

On June 20, 1944, &e 8& U S , (EUSA] cvas oficidq ac~vated in the Uni~ed S& tes and sexl r: to L l t l e PzcSc Theater of World War fl; t v h m itpar~cipaled in more than 60 island hopping assaul& against Ihe

Japanese,
Ll m e n World Was If ended, the 8th W.S. h m y and the 6th U,S, were assiped to occupadon duries in Japan. They landed peacefully in northern Japan on August 30,1945, and by January 1,1946, were established throughout the counq.

The Korean War

O EUSA's occupational duties were interesdng and wried compared with
its wartime responsibilities. They included overseeing government operations; disarmingJapanese military forces; destroyingJapan's ability to make war; tlying war criminals; guiding the nation toward peaceful pursuits and democracy; encouraging economk rehabilitation; education; land reform; guarding military installations; and protecting supply routes.

O Within days of theJune 25,1950 i n ~ s i o n of South Korea, it was eGdent

that U.S. naval and air support were not adequate to prevent total conquest of the country. An understrength, lightly armed group of just over 400 i n f m q and artilleven kom EUWs 24th Idantry Division was sent to krea,

CI Task Force Smirh arrived in Korea on June 30 and established its headquarters at Taejon. On Jdy 5, it fought the Rrst U.S. ground engqement in h r e a at Osan, and wm badly beaten and d ~ v e n back by the heaGly armed North Korem forces,
CI OnJuly 6, EUSXs 25th Xnfanq Di~sion W= sent to Pusan and 8th U.S. y cornmmder Lt. Gen. Wdmn H, Wdker took charge of U,S, forces in Korea, EUSA" t t e m p r q advance headquarters tvere established at Taegu the next day and a week later the 8th &my became operational in b r e a .
0 No& Korem farces con~nued to drive steadily soubward, driving U,S. and.ROK forces before them. Soldiers of the 24th I n f m q DiGsian fought o slow the advmce, and finafly relinquished Taejon on desperately t July 21 dter desperate housetmhouse fight_ing.

P 24th Xnfanq Division commander Maj. Gen. Wdliam F. Dean disztppeared during the batde for Taejon and his forces were spread out as far south as Taegu. Despite this defeat, however, the unit bought 8& U.S. y the time it needed to strengthen its shrinking front wiLh the newly ar~ved 25& Infanq Division and 1st Cavdq DiGsion.

O EUSA took charge of the remnants of the shattered ROK army and fell back into the southeast c o m a of Korea, esbblishing a defensive perimeter
centered an the toad dty of Puss. T h e 8t;k Army would s ~ in y Korea until the invader was elrpeUed from the terPitory of'the Republic of Korea," claimed Gen. Walker, aullining the U,S, resolution to hold Pusan ratZler than use it as a venue for abandoning the peninnsula. EUSA desperateb held the Pusan Perimeter, growing suonger every day as men and materiel anived at the port.

CI On September 16, EUSA launched a general stack across b e Pusan Perimeter, prompted by the X Corps2landing at Inchan tbe day before. For

U.S. Forces

85

five days, 8th U.S. Army battled fierce North Korean resistance, while U.N. comrnunicarion and supply lines. air forces pounded the

Cl On September 21, the North Korean defense collapsed and 8th U.S. k m y forces drove northward. W~th their lines of retreat cut by X Corps farces moving inland from Inchon toward Seoul, the North Korean reueat degenerated into a rout in the face of 8th advance, and only shattered remnants of the previously fomidabl back to Nor& b r e a .
Q A new phase of the war began on October 1, when 8th U.S. Army's 1st Cavalv Di\ision drove across the 38th parallel into North Korea, following ROH forces &at had crossed the line several days before.

O 8th U.S. h

y moved northward along the west side of the Taebak mountain range, while X Corps, under the operational command of Gen. Ma&&ur through his protege Gen. E d w d M. Almond, moved norhward on the east side of Korea's dividing range of mountains, both commands rolling up the rapidly disintegrating North Korean resistance.
e U.S. 1st Camlv BGsion and the ROK 1st Infmtry Division-raced each other toward the Nartb Korean capital of wongymg. On October 19,1950,the South Koreans won the race, &ng the enemy capid and reaching the banks of h e Ydu aver just seven d q s hter. U.S. 7th Infmtsy Bit-isionforces reached the Ydu a few days later.
C1 Mter the fdl of Xxysngmg, U.N. forees paused to regroup and improve

&eir lo@sdcalsituation. On Novemkr 24, &ey resumed opera~ons geared toward gainkg conlrol of all Nortb k r e a .

C1 "A b r a d new war" s ~ t e on d November 25, according to MacArthur, when massive numbers of fresh, disciplined, wellequipped Chinese communist troops attacked across the Ydu m d drove back the averextended U.N. forces,
D 8 t h U.S. k r n y soldiers w r e driven steadily backward, unable to esablish a Iil;s~ng defensive line, in what became the lmgest retreat in U.S, m i l i w history,
Q Mare misfortme smck the 8 t h U,S. on December 23, when Gen. Wdker, its commmder, wm kiIfed in a jeep accident, mree days later, Lt. e n , Mathew B, K d p a y becme commmder of' E U S m d amumed control of U.N. g m n d forces in. Korea.

B Under Ridpay's leadership, U.N. fbrces w r e able to est;lblisln a defensive line just souh of Seouf and begin pfauning a counreramck, 5Py

The Korean War

F e b r u q 1951, U.N. farces had once again driven the communists out o f Soultit b r e a .
r ; l

On April 1 I, fidwa)l replaced Mackhur as commander-inchief of the U,N, Connmmd (and as supreme commander, U.S. &my Pacsc, m d cornmmder-in~hief,F a r Eat), Lt. Gene James A. V m Heet assumed command of rhe 8 t h U.S.
D By May 1951, the line of conact had solidified bemeen the U,N, m$ communist foxes. This lime roughly eomesponded t o the d e r n i l i ~ k e d zone es~blishecl in the armis&cediscussions, from less &m 30 miles nor& of Seoul in the west to just north oT the 38th pardlel I n the e a

Cf For the next two years, a static state uf w a d x e b e ~ e e n enfrenched

armies ensued, punctuated by skirmishes b e ~ e e n heavily a m e d patrols m d bloody battXes aver hilltops and otjller s ~ t e g i c and , sometimes xbiwary, pieces of temain.

U.S. I, IX, AND

CORPS

Each of the U.S. Corps in Korea (X, IX and X) was a major operation& command incorpora~ng several combat divisions and able to funcbon both on its own or in concert with One or both of the oher two covs.

Dudng the occupadon ~ f J a p m , I Cops w a hmdq md composed nf the 24th h f m ~ DiGsion, 15th Infm Dr"Gsr"011, md lifarious s u p p m w r r r ' ~ " Zr w a deac~wtcsd0x1Mxch 28, 1950, @L threemoncXls before the autbrezk of che Xorem War.
O On August 2, 1950, I Corps was reactivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with elementf h r n the former V Cavs headquarters. It deployed ta Korea on September 6,1950, and became operational a week later, when

U.S, Forces

87

it asuxned command of the 1st Cavalv DiGslon, the 24th Infanq Division, the 1st ROIL Pnfanq Di~sion,the 27th British Brigade, and mrious supporting units,
Q In. liate 1950, dter the Chinese communist forces entered the war and drove the U.N. forces back into South Korea, X Corpswas reorgmked. In this reorganization, I Corps relinquished command of the 1st Cavalry Division, che 24tlr Infanuy Di$sian, and the 27th British Brigade; retained command of the Ist ROK h f m q Division; and assumed command of the 3rd Xnfantr)l Di+sion and the 25th h f m q DiGsiarr,

P In April 1951, I Corps lost the 1st ROK Infantry Division when it was assigned to a newlycreated ROKArmy corps, but regained command of the 1st CamXry DEvision as a replacement,
Q In December l95X, the f st Cavalry Di~sion m s trmsfened toJapm and X Carps asfumed cammand of the 45th I n f a n q Division, a unit of the Guard, OHahorna N a ~ o n d

D X n March 1952, I Corps lost cornrnand over the 25th Infantry Division and gained command of the 1st British Cornmon.weait& DiGsion, the ROK 1st infanq Di~sioxl,the ROK 8th Irzfanv Division, and the ROK 9th I n f m q DiGsion.
Q In January 1953, I Corps was rctorgmized for the last time, It gave up command of the 3rd Infanq Division, the 24th Infanv DiGsion, the 45&

Irrfanq Ri~sion, the 1st Elriicislx C~xrtmorrweal~ DiGsion, the ROR 8th I n h q Di~sion, arrd the ROK 9th Infanw RGsion, and gajned control of the 2nd Infanw Division, the '7th Infanq Division, the 25th Infanvy Di.visiarr, m d the 1st Madne m*iorr,
Q I Corps remained in Korea for nearly two decades after the July 1953

a m i s ~ c eunfil , X 971.

Satiuned a t Sendai durhg the ~ccupatjonofJapm, I;Y COTS ms compased of the 1st C a d v D i ~ s i o n and fie 7th Inhn~ry DiGsion. Is ~ " a $ deacticated on M x c h 18,1950, about the same me as I COTS,aspast of fie downsking of the occupation forces. Like I Coqs, IX Corps also experienced signscm t ~ r g m i zrional a upheavd in Korea.

The Korem War

Cr IX Co'ps w a reactivated on August 10, 1950, at Fort Sheridm, Illinak, using personnel from the 5th Headqumters, It deployed to Korea on the next day, wherr it took September 22, 1950, and b e a m opem~onat command of the 2nd Infantry RiGsion and the 25th Infanv Division.

L l In late 1950, after China entered the war, the 2nd X n f m u y Dfision m d the 25th Infmtry DiGsion. s ~ e r e d such heavy losses in men. and material that they became combat ineffective, and both were uansferred from I Corps to the 8th U S , &my reseme. A s replacements, IX Corps aaumed command olF the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infmtry DiGsisn, the 187tfi Airborne Regimend Combat Team (mCT), the 1st Mafine Division, and the ROK 6 t h 1 n f m v Dirrision,

iCI In March 1953, the corps was again reorganized, Iosing tbe 187&ARCT antl the 1st Marine DiGsion, gaining insteatl the 7th Infanrry Division and
the ROK 2nd Tnfanq Di~sion.,
Cr In January '1952, all of IX Corps' divisions, except for the 7th Fnfantr)l DiGsion, were wansferred to otkler corps, aX&ough IX Cavs gained c o n ~ o l
af the 45th Xnfirnq IDi~sion,

D Just two mm&s tat-er, i n March 1952, Z X Corps lost the 45th Infanq DiGsion but was reconslitmted w i t h the 2nd Infanv Division, the 40th Xnfanq DiGsion, the ROK 2nd Infanq DiGsion, the ROH 3rd Infanw Di~sion, and the ROK Capid Di~sian.
O IX Corps was reorganized for the last rime in January 1953. It retained and the ROK Capitaf Division and command over the 3rd Xafantry Bi~sioxr assumed commmd afthe ROKC-ftflInfantry Division; all &its other divisions were ~ansferred to other corps,

O IX Corps departed Korea for Okinawa three-and-a-half years after the

signing of the armistice, in Noatember 1956.

X C o ~ depf~yed s mJapan at rhe end of World War 11 to seme as part of die occupadon forces. Cln Jmu a q 31, _f946$ hhoweves, it was deacu'vated as par6 offieposmasdraw* of U.S, forces.

U,S, Farces

O X Corps was reactiMted on September 12, 1950, specifically for the purpose of planning and conducting the amphibious landing at Inchon. It was composed of the 7th Infanuy Division, the 1st Marine Division, and vadous ROK and support unircs.,

W i l e each of the corps in Korea w r e uniquely organized for speciEc missions md tended to break regular orgmkarcional rules, X Corps was ahipical even by these standards and operated independendy ofthe 8th U.S. Army, answerable direcdy to MacArthur in Tokyo, until December 24,1950.
rZ)

B Mter the succeshl XmdiPlg at IncXlon in September 1951) and the liberation of Seoul, X Corps reembarked and set sail for the east coast of Korea, where it made an adminiswa~ve landing at the port of Wonsan in October 1950,

e;l MoGng nor^ up the east cvast toward the Chincse border in a plan t o capture all of lCorea by Ghrimas, X Coqs operated under MacAr&urts independent combat force, command as a ~rttzdXy
i;l In Itate Nmrnber, X G o ~ s b d v m c was e hal~ed when it smashed into a wall af Chinese uroops. Many X Corps soldiers were killed, wounded, and cirptured during this encounter, especiafly around Cltosin Resemoir, O X n spite of its cmuatcies and the bitter c d of an early Korean uvinter, X Carps mmaged to regroup and. retseat easmard, toward the coast. At Hungnam, more &an 100,000troups m d a like number of Korean rehgees boarded ships or were airlifted t o ships oE&e coast in one of the largest and must most successful amphibious mcuaCions in histoq,

CI W~thinweeks of the Hungnam evacuation, eiemenw of X Corps reentered comht in Sou& Korean alongside other 8th US. h y rrnie.
Q X Corps left Korea in 1955 and sent to Fort Riley, Kansas. It was deactiMted once again on April 27,1955.

U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS

AND

REGIMENTAL COMBATTEAMS

Eacfi US,&my co~ps d i ~ d e i12 d to a number of cfI"cll'sr'on,s, regimetl& conrbilt teams, m d mrious support elemenls; D a ~ n g the war, eight US, h m y diGsi~ns,m e US, Marine COTS di~sion,a d two US, Army regimental combat reams served asmajor commands wethin the three corps (these assignmenu are listed in the corps descripLions).

The Karem W a
Because ofbudget cu&and downskingin Lheyears foUowing World War II, most ofthese cumb;tt diwkions had cmly segimmts, r.a&e~than the Lhree specsed by the U.S. Army's Table of Organktion and Equipment (TO&E). FurLhermore, each of Lhose regiments had only m o batdions, rather &an Lhe requisite three. Likewise, eaach of those ba tdions was likely to have only m,rather &an the regulation three, infantry companies (plus a heay weapons compmy). Thus, d e n the h r e a W a broke out, most of the major commands in rhe US. Army and Marine Corps were at haLf s@engd1or less,

AL. the end of World War 14 &c 1st Cavdq Di~sion (Dismounted) became p " r o f h e MIied occupadon forces inJapm. At &is me, it;r; clesigrra~on ns a ' k a d v " unit and of its soldiers as "@oopers" was p m l y padi~onal, and it w a orgmkized m d equipped like a repjar infm.ll;y di~sion,

L 3 m e n the Korean War begm, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalpy liegiment was the to be first element of the 1st Camlxy Di~sion sent to Korea, and on July 9, 1950, landed at Pohmgdong, on the e a t coast of South Korea. M i l e wGdng far the rest of the regiment to arhve, the batalian. guxded K-3, the mah aideld being u s d by the U.N, to bhng mops axld materiel inm Korea.
Q OnJuly 28,1950, the 5&, W, and h h c e of the 7 t h Regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division a ~ v e in d Korea from Japan. Elemen~ of the 1st Cavalry Di~sian, moGng west to Taegu and then north toward Taejon, engaged h e Nor& Korem army at Vongdong on July 24, 1950.

CS Inif ally, the I st Cavalq Division thought it w u l d accampfish its mission

forces out of South b r e a in a me% six weekas. The dilclision, however, engaged i n heavy, diBcult combat for nearly a year and a half.
f;;l The l st Cava1r)iDi~sion redeployed toJapan an October 22, I95l, &ere it semed in the Far East Commmd reseme until the armisece inJuly 1953,

of d

~ the ~ North w &mm

U.S. Farces

31

after which it returned to Korea. Casualties for the 1st Cavd~y Division were 3,811 killed in action and 12,086wounded in action.

O Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division included:

Headquarters and Headquarters Compmy 5th Cavalry Regiment 7th Cavdy Regiment 8tb Cavalry Regiment

Di~sion hdlcv 61st Field Arlillery Battalion (l05mm) llefy Batdion (105mm) 82nd Field kdllery Batdion ( 155mm) 99th Fieldt Pirtiifery Batdion. (105mm) 29th h t i . a i r c d kdfilery Batdion
Di~$ion Troops CompanyA, 71st Heavy Tank Baualion (replaced by the 70th Medium Tank Batdion on hugust 7,1950) 8th En@neerCombat E3amlian 16th. Reconnaissance Company Diukion Specid rroaps 15th Medical BatMian 1 S h Signal Compmy 27th Orbance Maintenance B a t ~ a n 15th marlternnaster Compmy 15th Miliary Police Compmy 15th Replacement Company

D Swerd ather rxnirs, including hose sent by oher alEed governments, were a t ~ c h e d ta the 1st C a d v Division d u ~ the g b r e m War, including:
ger Infmtr)fGompmy (December 31,1950 t o August l, 1951) Thailmd 21st 1nf";antsy Regiment Philippine IOLh. Battalion Combat Team Greek Expeditianaq Force

The Korean. War

men F V ~ b V d e out jn a r e a , the 2nd Infmtr~~ Dihion was statio~rzd at Fort Lew's, Wmhingtoa,
D Soon after the conflict&gm, the 2nd odered to deploy n i of ~ the diGsion arrived in k r e a on August. 5, 1950, followed by the rest of the di~sion near the end of the month. Once it becme operational, the 2nd fnfanq Di*ion was asigned ta the UrS.IX COPS.
D fn November 1950, during the U.N. drive toward the Ydu River, the 2nd Infantry Di*ion was cut off and mbushed by Chinese forces on a narrow road in the molxnbinous eounlsy around Kunu-h, in North k r e a , It was sr badly mauled in this action that it becme cornbat ineEechve.

D Mter its dimtrorxs defeat in n a f i e m Korea, the 2nd I n f m q Di~sion

was c2uicErl.y reconsti~utedand reinforced w i t h some newly-a&ved foreign

units, the French Bat&ion, the Ne&erlands BattAion, md the BELUX Battalion (a unit m d e up of m o p %om klgium and Lmembourg). LT X n February 1951,just six weeks dter it W= decimated by th@ Chinese, the rebuilt 2nd Infantry Di.vision hrrtke a major C:hinese offensive at the: 4Ilage of Chipyong-ni, in &U& k r e a , It canlinud to pefom well tkroughout the rest of the war,
Q Gasuddes among the Indian Head soldiers wre 7,094 kilLed in action, the highest ofany U.S, di-vision in b r e a m d about twice that s d e r e d by the ofhers an average, md 16,575wunded.

P Units of the 2nd Infantry Di~sion included the follo~ng:

Di~sian Hezdquarters m d Healdquzters Compmy 9 t h 'Xmfarrrq Regiment 23rd Xnfmq Regiment 38th in fan^ Regiment DiGsion k d l l e 7 12th Field Ai;t-Liffery Bat~lion (155mm) (arfived in November 1951)

U.S. Forces

93

15th Field htilleq Batdion (105mm) 37th Field koiUlery Batdion (X 05mm) 38rh Field htitlery Batdian ( 1Olimm) 503d field Ardlery Batalion (155mm)
82nd h ~ a i r c r dhtiXlemy t Batalion

Di~sion Troops 72nd Medium Tmk Batwlion 2nd Combat Engineer Batdion 2nd Reconnaissmce Company
Diksion Specid Troop 2nd Medical Company 2nd Signal Gompmy 702nd Ordnance Maintenance Bat~lian. 2nd Quartermater Company 2nd Military Police Company 2nd Replacement Company
g Several units were also atached to the 2nd Xnfanq DiGsion d u ~ n the Korean War:
1st Airborne Kanger I n h w Company (October 23, 1950 to Augugt 1,951) Ne&erlands Xnfmw Batalioa French In1Fantq Batdion Belgian Jlnfarrq Batdion

Men U"leKorem Mlar begm, w i t s of the 3rd Infmtr).Diwkiofl W e r e s & d ~ a at ~d opposite ends of the Ezt Goat, its he;ldquarters and h e 15Lh fnfmttxy Regimeat iril Fort Bmning; G~rgia, and the 7th I n f m q Reginat at Fo,rt Devens,

34

The Korean. War

MassaclFtuset~s. A tfiil-d regiment, rhe 30th Infmtjly Megimctn t, exisLed only on paper m d wzs at zero s&eng&,
O Soon after the conf-lict s ~ r t e d the , 3rd Infantry Di~sion w a fixrtjher weakened, when four of its baldion ne from each of its regimen@,plw the T3rd Tank Bat~lion and the 41st Field lery Bat~lion-were taken away and sent to Korea to become past of the 1st Cavalry DiGsion.
Q EVone&eless,in earlyJuXy 1950, the Mame diGsion W= ordered t o deploy

to Asia. It was reinforced with the 65th 1afantl-yRegiment from berm Rco, which was sent direcdy to b r e a , and left forJapm on h p s t 20,7950.

D M i l e iftJqan, the 3rd I n f m q f i ~ s i o w~ n brought up to full s~sengh, and on Navember 10, 1959, was sent to Korea, where it was joined by the h e r t o %can regiment and became part of the U S . X Carps.
Q In October 1954,h e 3rd Xnfmq DiGsionr left k r e a m d returned to the

United Sates, Its ceasualdeswere 2, t 60 klfled in action and 7,939 wounded in ac~on.

Ctr Elements of the 3rd infmtr)i DiGsion incfuded the follakng:

DiGsion He8dqrrareers and Ne;adqu~rters Company 7th fnfanq Reghent f 5th Infanq Reemcent 65th f n f m q Regiment
Di~sion AMev 9 t h Field hdllery Battalion (155mm) 10th Field Mllely Batralion ( IOfimm) 39th Field Artillev Bat~lion / 105mm) ored Field heller)l Bat~lion (105mm) 3rd htiaircrdt h&lleryBataion
Di~sion Troop 64th Medium Tank Bat~ltian 1 0 t h Combat Engineer Battalion 3rd Reconnaissmce Company

U,S. Forces

95

3rd Medied Bat~lion 3rd Sipal Campmy 783 Ordnance Maizintenmce f3at.tafion 3rd e a r t e r m a t e r Cornp m y 3rd MiEiury Police Garnpaq 3rd &@cement Company

O Two special units were also attached to the 3rd Infmvy Di\ision during
the &rean

War.
Unit (from November 12,1950

Eighth Army Raider Company, 8245th

Company (Apdl31,1951 toAugust 1,1951)

At the end of World War14 the 7& Infmtry Diu%ianwas given o c c u p a ~ o ~ d u q Ii2 Korea, This tour lasted until 1948, when it W Fclit-hdraw increnzen~~y &rough Lfecember 82 mdsent tojoin rJ?eAIlI"ed occupau'on of' Japm on l-he norhem isImd of Hobi$o,
Q Mter war broke out in Korea, the

Bayonet division was inifiaffy kept in japan as part of the Far East Command Ceneral &serve and its troops w r e parcelled out to unders~engt-h units dready in Korea,
1;51 Addidmal unitls were needed, hatvever, for the planned landing at Inchon, and the 7th Infantry Di~sion tvas assigned to the U,$, X C o ~ sa , command specially formelt to carry out the opemlion, Beclause it had been depfeted in the preceding monhs, its rmks were rounded out with South Korean woops, most of them with litcle or no militaxy experience,

96

The Korean War

Q Mter the armbtrice, the 7th Znfanq BiGsion remained in Korea until f 971, when it: was deaclived, G a d d e s for the di\rision during tfie Rare= War were 3,905 killed in action and 10,858wounded in a c ~ o n ,
O Xini~s of the 7th X r r r f m ~ fiGsian included the h l l o ~ n g :

DiGsi~n Headquarters and Headquarters Campmy 17th Infantry Regiment 31st X n f a n ~ Regiment 32116 Znfanq Regbent

Diw>ios h d l l e v 31st Fieid Astllery Bat~lion (155mm) 48& Field AstiHery Batdion (f 05rrrm) 49th Field Asullery Batdion (105mm) 57th Field klillery Bataiorr ( IOtinnnn) f 5th h ~ a i s c r d t
Di~sian Troops Company A, 77th Tank Battalion (replaced by the 73rd Medium Tank Batdian. in Augugt 1950) 13th Combat Engineer Bat~lion 7th Reconnaisrsmce Gompmy

DiGsion SpecI'd Troops 7th Medical Bat~liorm 7th Signal Batralion 7Wrh Ordnance Maintenmce Bataon 7th ;Quartermaster Gompmy 7th MiXitatq Police Campmy 7th Replacement Company
CT One wit was alw at~ached t-s the 7th Infmtry Di~sion, the 2nd hrbame ger Infantv Company, from December 51,1950 to August 1,1951.

U,S, Forces

3'7

me^ World W w 11 ended, tlze

24th Infinuy D i ~ s i ~ was n asigned to occuprion duty i n Japan, on its

southernmost isimd ofK p g h U .

iJr Less &an a week after the b r e a n War began, soldiers from the 24th Infanuy Division, the closest to the peninsula, were used to form 406-man Task Force Smith. The first of many U.S. soldiers sent to oppose the communist presence in Korea, they deployed from Itazuke Air Base on July 2, 1950.

O After arriving in Sou& Korea, lightly amed and undersuength Task Farce Smifi maved into the vicinity of Osan and dug in on a pair of hilk smddkng the road. X n the ensuing batde, they were ove superior and heaGly amed M a d b r e m farces.

CT Elements of the 24th I n f m q Di+sion cmtinued to a r ~ v in e Korea aver

the folEoMI.ing w e b , and were defeated in encounter after encounter +th the Nor& Qreans. They were d ~ v e n steadily souhward, wading their lives a faothofd on the peninsda. for eke h e U.S. forces needed to es~blish
Q OnJanuaq 23, IS%, dter a long, hard tour, the 24h I n f m q Diision
was relieved by the 40th I n f a n 9 D i ~ i o aThe , 24th wansferred toJagan and

did not return to k r e a a g ~ undljdy n 16,1953, less &an two weeh before the armislice W% signed. D Casualties fsr the 2 4 t h Infantry DilVision were 3,735 Wed in action and 7,995 wounded in aclion,
O Units assigned to the 24th Infantry Di6sion included the following:

Di~sion Neadquarters m d Headquarters Gompmy 19th Infmtry Keginrent 3lst Infmtry Regiment 34th 1nfmt;ryRegiment

DiGsion h ~ l l e v I 1t h Fief d hdXtery Batta_Xian(155mm)

38

The Korea~ War

lery Battalion (105mm) lery B a t a o n (105mm) ery Batdion (105mm)

Diwkion Troops Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion (repiaced by the 6th Medium Tank Batdion on August 8,1950) 3rd Combat Engineer Batdion 24tS1. Reconnaissmce Conrrpmy Di~sion Speeiaf Troops 2 4 h Medied Baldion. 24th Signal Compmy 724th Ordnmce Malntenmce Batdion 24th wartermaster Company 24th Milimry Police Company 24th Replacement Campmy
T;T1 A number of other unirs were dso atached to the 24th Infanq DiGsion during the Korean h r . These inclded:

5th Xnfmtly Regiment (from September 90,1950 ehroughJmuary 1952) 555th Field h d l e r y Battafion 80"79nd Pro~siond Tank Batdion er Company (fiorn October 10, f 950 to March 28,1951) er Infmuy Company (April 33,,195f to A u p t X, 1951) Br3tish. 27th Commonwealfi Bdgade

2 5 "TROPIC ~ ~ LIGHTNENG" INFANTRY DIVISION

m e n World M / a s 11 e ~ d e d ,&e 25th Infm~rfr DiGsion w s sen f to Osda, Japm, to seme in the Allied occupafi~n forces.

CI OnJuly 10,1950, the 25th Infmvy Division began deploying to Korea. By July 18, all of its unia had arrived on the peninsula, including two battalions of the 29th Infanq Regiment, stationed in Okinawa when the Korean War began, which became the 3rd battalions of the diGsion's 25th and 27th Infmtsy Re@menfs,
; I

Tropic Lighting soldiers went into combat against the North Korean army almost immediately, but suffered setbacks and defeats in their first engagements. They went on, however, to become one of the U.S. military's most active units and compiled an excellent combat record.

Q After the armisdce, the 25th Infantry Division remained in Korea until O c ~ b e 1954, r when it remmed to H i t w i i . Casud~es for the 25ih Infantry Di~sion w r e 3,048 rcilled in aclion a d 10,186 wounded in action.
Q Elements of the 25& Infanq Di~sion hcluded: BiGsi~n Headquarters and Hea4uarters Company 24th Infantry Regiment (replaced August 1, 1950 by 14th Infantry Regiment) 27th I n f w q Regiment 25& Znfmv Regiment
DiGsi~n hdJev 8th Field hhllery Batdion ( X Olirnm) 64th Fiefd k ~ l l e r y Bat~lion (105mm) (105mm) 69th Field klillery Bat~lion 90& Field A;r~LZerltr Bat~lion (Ili5mm)

DiGsion Troops Gompmy A, 79rh Heav Tank Bataian (replaced on August 7,1950, by the 89th Medium Tmk Bat~lion) G5& Combat Engineer Batalion. 25tk Kr-3connaissarree (=ompmy DiGsian Specid Troops 25th Medical Batdion 25Lh Signal Cmpany "i"5.rh. Ordnance Maintenmce Bat~lion 25th Quartennaseer Company 25th M i l i ~ y Police Company 25th &placement Company

100

The Korean War

O Two special units were also attached to the 25th Infanq Division during

the Korea War included: 5th Airborne Ranger Infantry Company (April 31,195 1 to August 1,1951) The Turkish Brigade

~OTH ''GRIZZLY" INFANTRY DIVISION

(CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD)

n Korea, the Before war broke aut i 40& I n f m q DiGsian, a unl't of &e CdZomia Nadmal G , was headquartered i n Los Ageleg, O n September I , it was ac~vatedby the feder& government m d deplayed to
Camp Cooke, CzlZornia,for c~ning*
Cf In April 1951, after its soldiers were done with their tsaining, the 40& Infanq Division deployed toJapan, Xf was not until the next year, however, dter undeqaing more training i n j q a n , that the Gfizzlies were;. finalliy sent

L l Once in Korea, the 4 0 b Xnfmv DiGsian relieved the 2 4 t h Xnfanq DiGsion, which, remrned to Japan to becorne tbe Far East Command General Reseme.
Q Mter the armisltiee, the 48tXI Infarzq Di~sion r e ~ m e to d Cafzornia and rwerted once again t o reseme status on June 30, 1954. Casudries for the

4Orh Infanq Division were 376 Mled in aclion and 1,457 wounded in action, the lowest of any U.S. division dufinrg the &rean war.
Q Elements of the 40th Infaxltsy Di~sion incfuded the following:

Lli~sion Headquarters and Heaciquarters Compmy 160& Tnfmtr)r Regiment 225rd Xnfmq Re@ment

224& Infantry Regiment DiGsi~n hdllev l 4 S d Field ktillery Batalion ( l05mm) 625rb Field ArtiUely Batt-alion (155mm) 980cb Field Artillery Bathlion (1@mm) 981st Keld Artillery Battalion. (1@mm) 140th ArztiaircraEt Artiltery BatMion

DiGsi~nTroops
14Q& Medium Tank Batdion 578th Combat Engineer Batdion 40th Reconnaissance Company

Digsion Spl?cid Troops 1 15th Medicd Batalion 40& Signal Campany 74QrhOrdnance Maintenmce Batdion 4Oeh marfermaster Company 4 0 t h Militav Police Cornpm7 40& Replacement Cornpm7
Q From July 1, 1951 until September 1, 1951, while it was stationed in

Japan, the 11th Airborne Ranger Infanuy Company was attached to the 40th 1nf"anqDi~sian.

O On September 1, 1950, the federal government actiMted the 45th Infmtrpi DGsion and sent it co Fort Pok, Lortisiiana, to undergo eaining and
have its ranks rounded out.

1 Q2

'The Korean war

U In iSpd 1951, after its soldiers had completed their fsaining and the division was brought up to seength, the Thunderbirds were deployed to Japan.
O X n December 1951, after recei~ng advmced ~aining, the 45th Infmtry Di~sion was sent t o Korea to rephce the 1st Clavdr)l Ri~sian.

C2 D u ~ n g its first exposures to combat, the 4 5 h Xnfmu): Division did not

peI-farm well. It improved q u k w , however, and went on. t a redeem its repubtion before Iea4ng Korea. Casualties for the 45th in fan^ I)it.isian were 834 kilted in a c ~ o n 2nd 3,170 wounded in xfion.
W Elemencs of the 45th Lnfanq Division included the fall

BiGsi~n Headqua.rters and ITeady.uzrters Gompmy 179Fh 1nfmt.r).Regiment 180-tf.s fnfm-try Regiment 279th I n f m q Regiment DiGsian h - ~ l l e v 158th Field ArtiZlery Batdion (105mm) I 6Ot.h.Field AsciEle~ Battalion (I1 Olimm) 3 71st Field Pls~llery Bat~lion (105mm) 389Eh Field ktilleq Batdim (155mm) X45h ht-i&rcrdt k ~ l l e Batdion. y Di~sion Troops 245tfi Medium Tmk Batdian 120th G o r n b t Engineer Batralion 45th Reconnaissance Company

DiwibJ1 Specid Troops 120th. Medical Batbgoxp 45th Signal Campany "i"0Oth O~dnmce mintenance Batllrlion 4 5 h martermater Gompmy 45th Miliary Police Compmy 45th Replacement Company

V.S. Forces

103

CI Whge it was stationed in Japan, the 10th Airborne Company was attached to the 45th Infanuy Division, from July 1, 1951 to September 15,1951.

Deac~mted dter World War 1 4 the I n f m q Regiment w s reactivated in K m o n j a n u v 1, 1949, with soldiers aod support units of the departing 7thinfanuyDivz"sioa,and tasked with progding secun'y while US, forces w'&drcslw&am cihe c o m v .

O OnJune 31,1949, almost a year exactly before North Korea inwded the
south, the 5th Infantry Regiment departed Korea for Schofield Barracks, Hawaii,

Cf On&& 25,1950, the 5th lnfantsy Regiment redeployed to Knrea, vYhere

it wns =signed to the 25th Infantry Bi*ion and redesignated a regimental nAupst 1950, it was reassigned ta the 1st combat team.Just a man& later, i Cavalry DiGsion.
HLL In Sep~ernber H50, the 5th wm assiped to the 24th f n f a n q Di~sion, where it relieved the 34Lh I n f m q Regiment and was mated as a re@r i n f m w regiment, raher &an a segimerral combat team.
O InJanualy 1952, the unit was reassigned to IX Corps, where it once again

became a separate regimen& combat team.

O Casualties for the 5th Regimental Combat Team during the Korean War were 867 killed in action and 3,188 wounded in aceon. O Uniu of the 5th Regimental Combat Team included the following:

5th Infanq Regiment 555tb Field Artillery Batdim (1Oijmm) 72nd Engineer Company

The Karean War

Aedwted durhg World War .Il its t;Ae 187ch Glider 1izfantr;v Regimen4 an June 80, 1949, it became the f 8?& hrbome hfmtry Regiment and rnarde part ofthe 1 3t h A3'rbome D i ~ s i a n at Fofi Cmpbeli, Kenmcky.

o n Aupst 1,1950, a man& aEter the United Sates entered the wdr in g wits were added to the regiment and it was redesignated the 1817.tlfiAirborne bginnental Combat Team (Mm). It ~ r a deployed s to Asia and afived incfapm an September 20,1950,
O On October 20,1950, the regiment made combat parachute j u m p into the toms of Sukcfion and Sunchon, n o d of the communist capital of vanwang, in m attempt to cut oB escaping Nor& Korean ciGlim m d n n i l i leaders. ~~ W i l e the operadon WM a nomind success, N o d &rea9s government had already fled nohward, md most af the pr;lsaners d e n were fleeing soldiers. O On June 26, 1951, the 187th ARCT w;ls redeployed t o japan, h e r e it becitme a s~ategic reserve for the W .N. foxes. m i l e rrefing in &is capaciq, it made a second successful Srbame attack s n March 23i)l, 1952.

Cl The 18"7 tf-2CT returned to Korea an May 24, 1952, and soon theredter, on Octolaer 18, 1952, it tvas again sent back to Japan. The regiment was sent to Korea one last time onJune 22,1953, right before the
Cl In July 1955, the regiment returned to the United States and, in 1956, was assigned to the reactivated lO1st Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, Kenmckry.

D Casualties for the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team during the Karem War were 4 2 Elled in aet^ionand 1,656wounded in, action,
O Several elements comprised the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team:

187th.krbame X n f m t r y Regiment 674th &home Field Artiller)?Batdion (105mm) a r b o m e hfiairerdt k m e r y Battery, 187t-21mm airborne Engineer Company, 187th ARCT Military Police Trac Platoon, 187rh ARCT

U.S. Farces

105

Quartemaster Parachute Maintenance Company, 187th ARCT Medical. h b u l a n e e Platoon, 187th mCT Medical Clea~ng Platoon, 187th ARCT Parhfinder Team, 187& ARGT
D Three wits were also atached to the f87& ihP*iome Regime-f Combat Team during the Korean War:

ger Infanq Company ( 3 March 1951- 4 April 1951) 5th ~irbome Ranger infanvy Company (3 March 1951 - 4 April 1951) mCOM Tactical Li&son Ofice Team, 8177& Army Tactical. Intelligence Unit

When war broke out in K m J u l y 1950, the U.S. Marine Corps was, like rhe U.S. miljtary as a whole, unders~rengch m d equipped with old and insacient equipment, much of it recieved from &e World Wtr II bardefieldsof rhe Pacgc, Nonc~thdess, the Mwine COTS W * able to r d y its resources and quicuyproved i&e&masset in the war i n Korea.

h~ e Marine Covs was able t o send only a single ad-hoc unit- . Ini~dI element to rlae bat:tlef"ront i n Korea:, Bubbd h e 1st Pra*ional Manker Bkgade, it WM famed at C m p Pendletm, CdSomia, & ~ m eIemerzt;fof h e 1st M m h e DiGsion m d che Isr IM;tdne i2ircrdt Wing. Two major elem~tn~r compsised the 1st provl;siond Marine B~gade* he 5rh Mwine Regiment and 1Man"ne hrcrdt Group 33. The brIga$e was ac~wted m J d y 7, 1950,and operated as an independent eotnmmd r u l ~ l September 13,1950, d e n it was inco~orated into the 8 t hE 1 . S &my

106

The Karean War

The 5& Marine Regimmt was organized as a regimen& cclmbat:tern, reinforced m*& v a i ~ u s assets ~o allnw it to operate independently and ryli&out S U ~ Q S L &am . o&er w i ~ .

iII 1ewas composed of the f o l l o ~ n g elemen&:

H&:$Ba r;&ion, IstProvl"sI'onalM a k e Brigade HQ Company, 1st Provisional Marine B ~ g a d e Bebchment, M g i ~ Police v Campmy, 1st Marine D i ~ s i ~ n . Detachment, aetconnaissance Gorrrpmy, 1st Marine Division Counter IntelEgence Corps and M Intelligence Special De~chment (USA)

5 U f 2Marine Regiment H&S Company 1st Bat~lion, 5th Pulla~nes (mhus Company C) 2d Bat~lion, 5th Marines (minus Company F) 3d Bat~lion, 5th Marines (minus Campmy 1) 4.2-inch Morar Company, 5th Mafines h ~ t a n Cornpmy, k 5th Marines Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion (Reinforced) Cornpm7 C, 1st-Medicd Bat~lion Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion De~chment, 1st Ordnance Baitdion De~chnnerat, 1st Se&ce Batalion Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion De~chment, 1st Signal B a t ~ l i o n Company A, I st Tank Battalion 1st h p h i b i m T m m r Company Del~achment, 1st Combat S e d c e Croup 1st Platoon, 1st Amphibian Tmck Company, FMF

C~I1ectJveIyt MAGB and the wrious other elements that a u p e n red it were designated F ~ m x EchelonI d lst Marine Aircrdt Whg, Marine Aircrdt Group 33. Its commander was also deputy brjgade commander for the 1st ProGsiond Maine B~gade.
Q This unit consisted of the folloMJing components:

HQ Squadron, Marine Aircrdt Group 53 Service Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group 33 Marine Kghter Syuadron 214 m d n e Figh~er Squadron 323 Madne Rghter Squadron (Night) 518 Marine Taeeical Air Control Squadmn 2 Marine Obsemtion Squadron 6 (under operational convol of the 1st ProGsimaf Marine Brigade)
4;1

Troops from orher 1sc Marine Wdsion units w r e quickly ressigned t o the 1st.ProGsional Marine Brigade. About 6,800 ntasines were pulled from rhe 2nd Marine Bieian, salioned at C m p Lejeme, Nor& Carolina, for both imnrediate deplopent to b r e a with the proesional brigade arid far the recansGmtion of the depXe&d 1st e Di~sion.

tf Most of the bfigadek s m s , equipment, and vehicles came from the

Mlafine Supply Depot in, Barstow, C a o m i a , where they had beerr rehrbished and stored after being recovered from Pac*c isImds in Operation RoH-Up in the late 1940s.

CI Despite the eEorts to bring the brigade" eelments up ta full strenglh, many oE them were still short of men and e q u i p e n t d e n they embarked for AYia. Like heir U.S. Arrrty counterp , each of the &ree batations of e Regiment had only W, faher thm the requisi~ &ree, rine companies. W e n h e y deplqed, each o f these compmies w a still short by about 50 trt-oops.

D Additionally, the regiment's three artilkry battefies had only four of the s l t i m l r , campmy did nat requisite six 105mm hoktzem and the regimental a have m orgmic tank plamon, and thus Lacked its most potent antirank weapon.

I OS

The Korean War

O Soon after the brigade was activated, its 6,534 troops departed forJapan from the nearby port of San Diego, Califsmia.
O A Brigade Advance Party, which included the commander, the depuy in cornmmder, and some of their s m s , left luy air oxl 'July 16 and a r ~ v e d

Tokyo three days later.

O Its air component, MAG33, embarked upon mo troop urnsports and an

escort carrier,
O Its ground component, the reinforced 5th Marine Regiment, had a total

of 266 officers and 4,503 enlisted men and departed between July 12 through July 14 on three troop wansports, two attack cargo urnsports, and three LSDs.
D While the brigade was still en route to Japan, the situation along the e vvas ordered to Pusan Perimeter worsened, and the 5th M ~ n Regiment bpassJapan and sail direcdy to Korea. The same day, the Japan Eor Korea and upon a r ~ v eseblished d i ~ E aTaegu, t Mii&in the h s m Perimeter.
O mG33 a ~ v e at d Kobe,Japan, onJuly 31, Two a f its elernena, M a ~ n e Tactical Ar Control Squadron 2 (mACS-2) m d the ground echelon of W O 4 , headed swaigbt .Ear Pusan, arfi*g there Aupst 1.

2 7 14, (NI-513, deployed from their transport to fami, Japan, where they prepared Eor combat. By August 5 , their 70 aircrdt had landed aboafd USS Sicily and USS Badoeng
Q Its figheer elements,

$mite
CI On h p s t 2, the brigade" ground component arrived in Pusan and was assigned to 8th U,S. y. The marines w e sent immediately onto the line west of and along the Naktong River, h e r e they arrived just un *lime to saunter a h e w Nor& rea an assault.
rII In spite of suffering heavy casualties, the brigade continued to withstand North Korean attacks against the Pusan Perimeter for more than a month. Aircraft from MAG33 provided close air support, resupply, and medical ewcuaeian &roughout the ac-rion.

O In September, it was pulled off the line and sent to join the forces preparing for the landing at Inchon, and on September 13, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade ceased to exist as an independent unit when it becarne part of the 1st Marine DiGsion.

U.S. Forces

From September 1945 toJune 194T 1st Mznh e Diwkion was pmt of' the A I M occup~~ force n in northern China, dter FY;hI'chit returned to C2mp Fendleton, CdSornia, where it was s&t;r"oned when tbe Korean War began.

tZ Like other rnaJ'or commands in the

U.S. military, the 1st Marine Division was markedly undersuength in the summer of 1950, and reserv4scs were used to bring it up to full strclngh. B e ~ e e August n 10 and September 3,1950, the 1 st Marine Division sailed to Korea from the port of San Diego, California.

CZ Lead e l e m e n ~ of the division ardved inJapan in early September 1950, while the remainder of the di~sion went straight on to Korea. Once there, the division absorbed the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade and w a assigned tr, U.S. &my X Corps. On September 21, the division also regained the 7th Marine Regiment, which arrived in b r e a from California.
Q In mid&eptember, the 1st Marine Di~sion pfityed a major role in rhe

amphibious assault on Inchon, first capturing sentinel Wolmi Island and then stoming the seawalls of the port, Once Inchon fell, the m a ~ n emoved s battle to recapinland and pdcipated in the bloody, sweet-t~sweet Seoul.
O Mter helping take the Sou& Korean capi~tal, the marines reembarked at Inchon and sailed around the peninsula to the opposite coast of k r e a , where they made an unopposed landing at the North b r e a port ofWnsan (already captured by W K .furces),an opemtion conrpleted on N.o\rrtmber9, 1950.
Q Mong w i t h the other U.N, forces, the 1st Mafine Di~sion began ta move norhward toward the Ydu River. By Tbanksgivirlg 1950, hey were stmng out in a handfill of ~llages pamllel to the Chosin Reservoir, from which they

would make their last thmst to the Chinese bol-der,

Q Chinese hrces entered the war w i t h a vengeance at the end of November 1950, halting the 1st Masne Division and cutting off its line retreat., Mafine commandersbad slwed theidvance as much as possible, however, desplite exhor~tions From Mackthur, allodng them to make a bloody, fighting

2 10

The Korean War

hChdrawd in sub-zero weather to the part of Hurxgnam, where they embarked on ships and sailed out ofNo& Korea*
Q During the fat two years of h e war, the 1stM a h e Di~ljion, like its

counterparts, adjusted its ~accics to meet the needs o f the smtie wafiare that ensued.
Q Txr April 1955, the Ist Marirle Ditision W% relieved by the 25& Infanq Division and returned to Camp Pendle~n. Caualrles far the 1st Marine Division b r i n g the Knrem War were 4,004 kiued (second only to the 2nd I d m y DiGsion) and 25,864 wounded-mare wounded tfim m y other U.S. di~sion d u ~ n the g Korean War,

Pf TKroughorrt the course ofthe Korean War, 42 marines woo the Medal of Hanar, h e h c a ' s highest miliary awwd, for heroism above and heyand the call of dut-y in k r e a *Twenv-seven of the awards Miere given pos&umously. In addirioxr, m&nes were awxded 222 Nay Crosses and mare &an 1,500
Silver Stars, Madne r e s e ~ s fw s r e awarded f 3 of the Medals of Honor, 50 of the N a v Crosses, and more than 480 of the Saver S~ars.
6;1 Elennexr~ of the f st a d n e D i ~ s i o n included t&e fill

DiGsion HQ m d HQ Ba tdion 1st Madne Regiment 5th M a h e Regiment 7th Marine Regiment l lth MaGmie h ~ l l Regiment e ~ 1st Tank Batalion lst Amphibian Tractor Battalion ored Amphibian Battalion 1st En@neerBataion 1st Show Party Batdion 1st Signal lEZat~a1ion 1st Amphibious Reconnaissance Cornpally 1st M i l i w Police Cornpmy 1st S e ~ c Support e Group 1SL Momr Transport Batalion 7th Mator Transport Battalion 1st Ordnance Batdlon 1st S e ~ c Ltat~tion e 1st Me&cal Batdion Batteq C, 1st Rocket Batdion

1st Air Delivery Platoon 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon C a ~ eRataon r
Q In addi~on, severd unis were attached to the 1st Marine DiGsion during the Korean War:

1st Korean Marine Corps Megiment 1st &rean Marine Corps h a l e 7 Bat~Iian 1st Naval C a n s m c ~ ~ Bat~lion n ("Se&eesn")

Activated i n Septmber 1951, the 1st Marine Aircrdt Wing proGded close loseair support for the i s t Marine D~w'S~OR throughout the war i n Korea. It was made up of three m& componen&,Marine Aircrdt Group I$, Maline and the 1st An d a r t e Gun Battalion. Aircrdt Group
O In April 1955, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing returned to Japan, at the same dme as the 1st Mafine Di~sion headed home to Camp Pendieton. Its casualties during the &rean War were 258 killed and 174 wounded.

From 1951 to 1952, the Ist Marine DiGsi~nhelped fom several proGsional uni&in order tn JirBU specgc needs'

131 On m r c h 31, X952, the di~sioncreatl2d the Kirnpo Provisional Regiment to defend the Kimpo Peninsula, west of Seoul and on the division" left Bank. It was disbanded &ter the amistice,

Headquarters and Headquarter Compmy ored b p h i b i m Tractor BztCalion (as supporting artillery)

112

The Korean War

2d BatMion, 7th Marines (his battalion and its replacement were rabted from the 1st Marine Di.rision's reseme regiment) 5th Korem Marine Cosps Batdion 13th ROK Securiy Batalion; Company A, 1st h p h i h i a n Tractor Batdim Company B, 1st Shore Fart)r Battalion (as engineers) Company D, 1st Medicaf Batelion Reconnaissance Company, I st M a k e Division Detachment, ilrir and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, I st Sip& Elatalion 163d Mlirary Inefligence Sercfice Ueachment De~chment, 61st Engineer Searchlight Cornpay Detachment, 18 1st Counterintelligence Covs Unit
I Other proGsiona1 marine units iFormed i n Koreta inctuded the 1st Pr~~siona Casual l Compmy; the t st ProGsiond h ~ & r c r & htiflexy Automatic Weapons Battery, acGvated in April 11953; and .the 1st ProGsiond DenniIitarized Zone Military Police Compmy, activated in Sepbmber 1953,
L l In addi~on, a number of U.S. Navy units provided direct support for the 1st Marine Division at various times during the Korean MJar and there wre a h m d k l of Marine units nor aliated ktln. the di~sion. These included a detrachment from Nay Unclemater DemoliLion T e m 1,a detachment h m Navy Undemater Demolition Team 3, Navy Undemater Demolition Team 5, m d a Marine Security Cuard Deachnrent on duty at the U.S. Embav.

SPECIAL U.S, MILITARY UNITS

Soon after U.S. forces occupied southern Korea in September 1945, rhey b e p to rain what became the armed forces ofthe Republjc ofKorea.
D On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established and the Allied occupadon forces began preparing to withdraw from the peninsula and enuust its security to the South Korean constabulary. This constabulary was redesignated as the Republic of Korea Army and a U.S. unit was eslal>lished to rsain and proGde 1ogisticaX support for it.

Xf,S. Forces

113

CI This unit, caged the Pro~sionalRXilitary MGsory G r a y ( P m G ) ,

initially had 100 men unit, but by December 31, 1948, was enlarged to include 241 omcers m d enlisted men.

D On July 1, 1949, exactly six months after the United S ~ t e formarty s recognized the Republic of Korea, the last U.S. occuparion aoops left Korea. When they did, P U G was redesignated the Korean Military Adviso~y Group
)'
tvsts p m of the U.S. S ~ t Deparment e mission to South Korea rather than part of the U.S. armed forces. As a result, it was independent ofthe U.S. Far East Command (headquarteredin Tokyo under r) and Sou& Korea W= considered t o be oueide of the U,$. stl-ategic sphere of interest.

f31 TechnicaiElyLy,

reverted ta the Q Soon d k r war brake out in. &rea, command of 8th U.S. Army m d redesignated as U.S, Wdiaq On December 28,1950, it was once atgain redesigtrated,

IB the ye~rs dter World War 1 4 the U.S. &my prograns fell tricdm to h e domsking &at dected all the arm& semkes, Once t i C r e Korea War hegm, however9&e military once ag&n had a need for u n i ~ speciafked in mconyen ~ o n aperadona d

O On September 15, 1950, U.S. Army Col.John Gibson Van Houten was
ordered to establish a ranger training program at Fort Benning, Georgia, and he began to look for soldierswilling to undertake "exuemely hazardous" dut)t in Korea,
Q Thousands of volunteers responded to the call, as many as 5,000 from the 82nd ~ r b o r n e Division and mmy of the rest fiom World Miar fI organizations like the original ranger battalions, the Canadian-U.S. Special ServEce Farce, and the OEce ofS&ategicSe&ces.

O By October 2, 1950, the first group of volunteers had been formed into
three companies and had begun the sk-week training program.

114

The Korean War

O On October 9, a group of black paratroopers entered the ranger training

progrm. They would eventually become the 2nd & h o m e Company, the only all-black ranger unit ever created by the U.S. Army.

O Initially, the U.S. Army planned to train one ranger head

detaehrnent m d four 112-mm ranger companies, each of which would be attached to an infanq division. Ultimately, however, the program produced eighl rmger companies, ger Enfmq Company Korea, where it was attached to the 2nd Infmtsy DiGsion. Two more of the companies a r ~ v e d less than two weeks later; the 2nd Airborn I n h q Cunlpany was atrached t o the 7th Infmtry Di*ion m Airborne Ranger Infantly Company to 8th U.S. Army He and then t~ che 1st Cavdry Division. The 3rd Airbo Company stayed at Fort Benning to uain the second group of ranger companies,

Q On December 17, the f st firborne

CI The ranger companies participated in a wide variety of activities in

uring which they were Erequently wed t o Korea, from pitched batLle cctunterat:&ck against enemy breakthroughem raids behhd the communist lines,

I In Febwasy 1951, for example, the 1st &home h n g e r Infantry

Cornpamy, while acting as the regimen~I reseme for the 23rd Infanq Regiment, fought in the Battle of Chipyong-oi, A few months kiter, in April 1951, a debchment of rmgers slipped behind enemy lines in an aborrtive attempt to sabot;tge the equipntent at Hwachon D m . &erI n f m q Campmies, Q Qn March 28, the 2nd and 4th Mrbarne while at~ckted. to the 187th hrbome kgirnenM Combat Team, participated in Operation Tomahawk, the last combat jump of the war, parachuting into the North Korean town of Munsan-ni.
O OnJuly 14, 1951, 8th Army headquarters directed the commanders of the 1st Cavalv Di~sion and the 2nd, Jrd, 7ch, W ,and 25th Infmtry DiGsions to deactivate fieir atbched rmger units, Esy November 5,13fil,Lkre ranger companies were disbanded, and many of the rangers were transferred to the 187th Airbsme liegirnental Combat Team, where their special skills could sLiH be uritized,

"The South Koreans have the best damn amy outside the United States!"
(in a 1 950 interview with Time magazine)

hen war erupted in Korea, the ROK Army, the Yuk Gun, wm undersuength, 3Ieguipped badly led, and poorly adGsed by the ; htewendon w m f i e only thing &at dIowt7.d United S ~ t e sU.N. it.tn sum've i~ first encounters wGlrl its r f 2Nor& Korem caunteI"pafih the nlonrhs and ~ r followkg s che communist lirlvasio~, hewever* u'le ROK armed forces were rebuilt m d reorganbed and graduaBy evolved into a mature and eEecta"vefighhng force. In addidon to an arm& h e Repuhlie ofKorea a h had a smdl Lui.force, nary, and marine c o ~ mch s ~ ofwhic%l W=, like the army; enhrged and s&eng&ened &soughout the crourse d t h e Korean Was,In addi~an to &me sem'ces, South Korea also had a ciGIim police force M ' & a suength ofabout 48,000pmmy ofwhom mded up in mili&qfomabonsdter rhe war begm.

On September N; I S459 three weks afretr the surrender ofJapan ended World Wzr Il; U,$ occupdon poops beg;m arriGng in the southern halfof h e farmerJapaa ese colony ofKorea (SoGet mops fimuItmeous1y occupied the nor&ern h d f of the pminsula), Replacing the Japanese police and scscu~ty forces W.& sitnilzr &rean 0rgmkaLr'ons was one of &eir first priori&es.

X 16

The Korean War

ROK forces were almost wholly &ai~ed and ewipped by the UniQdt Staks prior to and du~ng the Korean Wax. This ROK solidier mans an U,S,-made M-2 -50 cailiber machim

Ur To facili~tcsthis, the U.S. n t i l i ~ y g a v e w e n t es~ablisheda police academy to ~ a i n a ci+lian police force and began to create "eons~abulary regimen&" morlelled dtes U,S, y i n f m q regiments. On January 14, 1946, they activated the 1st Batdion of the 1st Korean Gonsabdafy Regiment and began trGning its members at a famerJapanese r n i L i base ~~ nar&east of Seoul,

C3 By April 1945, seven more consbbulq u n h had been es~blished, one for each South Korean pro~nce, and w r e based at Chondu, Ghunehon, Xri, Kwangju, Pusm, Taegu, and Taejon. At that point, the entire constabulary force consisted of about 2,000 omcers and enlisted men. Xt grew s.t;e;tdily, g 1948 had a total s~rengLh of about 26,000. however, and by s p ~ n of
Cl Many oftbe leaders in chese constabulary units had served af, office= and n the Imperial Japanese arm& fiurcev prior noncommissioned ofliicers i md during World Was X I , Ironical$, mmy nf cheir countevarts in rhe Nor& Karem zmed forces had gained their millibry experience in an~-Japmese pemilla units.

South Korean Military Forces

Q o n &rch 10, 1948, nine days after the U.5, rnili~ry government in &=a announced that elections would be held south of the 3 8 t I 1 parallel in May 1948and a democratic government established in Sou& Korea, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved plans to expand the constabulav force to 50,000 men and to arm it with U.S. weapons, amored cars, M-24 tanks, and artjUery pieces up t o 105mm in size.

U In late November 1948, a little more than three months after the
Republic of Korea was founded, the nation's new national assembly passed the "Republic of Korea Armed Forces Organization Act," calling for the creation of a ROKArmy, Nay, and Deparment of National Defense.

O These endtieswere oEcidly established on December 15,1948, and the

Ist, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6ih, and 7th GonstabularryRegimentsbecarne the Ist, 2nd, Srd, 5th, G&, and 7th Republic of Korea Infmtv DEt-isions.
i;;Z fn Febnraq 1949, the two remaining consbbulav regiments were formed into the ROM 8 t h and 1E l& lurf"antr)r DiGsions and the G a p i ~ l I DiGsion, Secuh~ Command was converted into the RC)K C a p i ~ Xnfanq which included the ROK 1st Cavalry Regiment, one of the only South b r e a n units equipped r(lrith armorecl vehicles, as well as horse cavalry,

D OnJuly 1,1942, the last U.S. military forces departed the peninsula and ~&ning of the South Korean armed forces became the responsibility of the &rem ILli1i.m~ Ad~sav Group, part of the U.S. State Depa to the RepubEc of Korea,

CI Because the Sou& Korean a m y was uained, equipped, and advised by Anlericans, it naturalXy incorporated the strengtfis and weahesses of the conkmporary US, armed fosces,which were &emselves understrength and psorb wgned and equipped.

O For example, in mid-1950, the ROK lst, 2nd, 6th, and 7th Infanuy
adsions had the requisi~e three rqiments each, while the rest, like their U.f. counterpare, had only t v v o each. Overall seengch m s about 95,000, but about a third of them were support, rather than combat uoops.
D ROK units were also poorly equipped in part because of U.S. government fears that bellicose ROK President Syngman Rhee would try to unify the peninsula under his leadership by force if he were able. They

The Karean War

responded to &ese concerns by r e h i n g ta give the South Korean armed forces the w e s of heavy weapons they would need to launch such an a t ~ c k ,

C1 Qther reasons, even if they were $iven in good fctiLh at the &me,seem
adGsars asserted that the Sou& spurious in retrospect. For emmple, h r e a n troops did not need tanks which, they said, would be of little use in Lhe rnountainnus terrain of Korea. Experience proved, of caurse, rhe marked usehlness of anks on both sides during the Karean War,
O Unformnately, even weapons the United States deemed appropriate for the ROKforces w r e in short supply inJune I"S5Q.M e n war broke out, only about half the salftiers i n che unders~ength ROK units were equipped w i t h U.S. small ams, i L h the balance c a w n g Japanese weapons &ant.World war 1 1 .

D Au&arized heavy weapons and amored vehkles tvere also in short supply. None of the armor& unia had their allocation of M-24 "Ch&een or M4E8 "Sherma" mks, m d the two dozen M-8 and M-20 wmored cars and one dozen M-3 baK~acks of the ROR 1st Cavalry Di~sion were some 036 the =my's only armored vehkles, Similarly, most ROK artilleq unirs were amed with only a quarter of their requisite 105mm arLillery pieces, and infanlry units were not pmperb equipped m engage enemy tanks,
i;TZ

Noneheless, commander Bfig. Gen. WilBam L. Robem, at sea on his way back to the United States when the war began, probably believed his o m vvords when he said, in m intefiew Uith Time, T h e South G r e w s have the best damn army outside the United Statesl" If the North Koreans had believed that bit: of fic~on, however, or been i,ntimidar;edby the army of the United States, they might never have inwded their southern neighbar.

O When the communists did cross the 38th parallel in June 1950, it was
guarded by a mere handful of ROK regimen&,while the rest were either in reserve 10 or more miles south of the border or stationed elsewhere in the

Q Although some elements of the ROK amed forces tr4ed to stand their ground against the communist forces, North Korea's army quickly defeated &em and steadily drove their remnanu southward.

South Korean Military Forces

113

the protec~vecircle of the Pusm Pe~meter, and in August 1950 the shattflred BOK Army vyas reorganized, and rebuilt as much as possible. Its 2nd, 5th, and 7th Infantry Divisions were disbanded md assimilmd into the ROK Xst, Srd, 6th, 8th, and Gapid Infantq Bi~sions.
Q Those frapents reaeated into

Q During the defense a f h e Pusan Perimeter i nAupst:and the first h a E d s the right September 1950, the five diGsions ofthe ROK X a d II C o ~held

forces sector of the U.N, line, dong its northern edge. mm, alter U.M. landed at Xnchon, the ROK divisions participated in the breakout from the perimekr Iuld the subsequent advmce norhward.

C3 ROK unia led the way acres the 38th parallel, driving the now-broken y before *em and advmchg into Mionsan, the North Korem People's
communist capital phyongmg, and other North k r e m focarlons ahead of the U.S. and other U,N. forces. On October 26, the ROK 6th DiGsion (ROK X I Corps) reached the Ydu Nver, tfie penislsula" nofiern border with China,
O W e n the Chhese communist forces intemened in the Korean War beginning in Octuber 1950, they hit the ROK fbrmations eqecially hard, often ~ r g e ~ &ern n g as the unie most fijkely to break and alfowthe U.N, lines to be breached. Befare the end of the year the ROKforces were once again on the verge of crumbling.

O As with the rest of h e U.N. forces, the ROE u n i were ~ d~ven out of Nor& Korea and back across the 3 8 h paratlel in an uncontrolled rout that did not stop mfJ.1 they -re south af Seoul. Once there, the ROK reorganized m d refamed into a combat eEec~ve farce,

O After the lines of contact sotid%ed

in mid-1951, the ROK Army continued to mature, growing in experience and ~ o ~ d e n on c e pamls, ambushes, and innumerable battles to take or hold nameless hilltops. They also suffered many thousands of troops killed, wounded, or missing in ac~on,

O Throughout the course of the war, South Korea continued to expand and strengthen its army, By the summer of 39513, the Yuk Cun m s a batde
hardened force of 590,000, fed by tough, experienced oscers and NCOs. It I , and BI Corps, which incorporated 18 was organized into the ROK I, X diGsions and a number of o&er elemenls, z a follows:
(ll&, 12th, and 15th Infantry Regiments) 1st ROK Di~sion 2nd ROK Division (17th, 31st, and 32nd Infantry Regiments)

The Korean War

3rd RQK Di.sljision (22nd, 23rd, m d 18th Infanrry Regimen&)

5th ROK DiGsion (2"7,35&, and 36th Infanq Regiments) 6th ROK Diesion (2nd, 7th, m d 19th Infatry Regments) 7th ROR DiGsion (3rd, 5th,and 8th Infan9 Regimen&) 8th ROK Division (1Qth,1fish, and 21st I n f m q Re@men&)
9-th.ROK DiGsion (28th, 29131,m d 30& Infmtry Regimen&) Capital DiGsion (1st. Cavalv and 2 6 h hfitntry mgiments) I I& ROK Di~sian (g&, l$&, and 20& Xnfanq Regiments) X2& ROE. Di~sion (S%, 53st, m d 52nd Znfmw Regimen@) 35rh ROR Di~sion (38t-h,39h, m d W f i fmfanq Regimen&) 20th ROK Di~sion (GO&, 61st, m d fiend Infmtry Regiments) (63rd, 65&, and 66rh, Xnfmq Regiments) 21st ROK Di~siun 22nd ROK Di$sion (67th, 68th, and 59tt.1 Infan fry Regiments) 2% ROK Di~sion (70th, Tlsr, and 72nd Infmtry Regiments) 7 6 t h I n f m q Regimen&) 26th ROK DiGsiaxl (73rd, 75&, and ' Regimens) 27th ROK Division (?%h,78tfi, and 79th X n f a n ~ 53rd, 55&, and 59th Independent f d m q figimenls 1st AntiCuenilla Group (lst, 3rd, 5th, 13&, and 15th Security Battalions) 3 Ist, 331-4 35&, and 86th Securiq Guard Batdions lst, 3rd, 8th, and. I 11-hField ArGlesy Groups 88th, SSd, 95&, and 99& Independent Field 51st, 53rd, 55&, and 59th Tank Campaies 1st and 2nd R O K k m y kpllacement Centers Ground Grenerd School

O Formed in April 1949 of volunteers from the South Korean navy and coast guard, the ROK Marine Corps, widely known as the Korean Marine Corps, was advised from its start by U.S. Marine Corps personnel.
O By the end of 1949, the Korean Marine Corps consisted of two battalions. In August 1950, nvo months after the outbreak of the Korean War, a third battalion was added tu the force and it was redesignated the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment and attached to the U.S. 1st Marine Division.

South Korean Military Forces

Troops of the ROM: 5th Marine Regiment are loaded onto an amphibious tractw (AMTMC) prior to moving up to positions aIong the E-fan River during the U.N. advance on Seoul, October 3, 1950,

O In March. 11952, the U.N. Command decided h a t partisan infmey forces

operadng out of several isfands oE the coat af North &wa would be more effec~ve if they did not have to prc.,\rldefor their o w local securiq &rean marines were selected as the most appropriate @sopsfor &is t a l k , and thus the 2nd b r e a n Marine Corps Regiment W= raised.

D Two bat~lions of rhe new ~cgiment were deplqeti to a number of islands in the Yellow Sea, among &ern Paengnpongdo and C h d s , off the west coast of NsrLh Korea, white the third battaiiian. was stationed on the
other side a E the peninsula, prirnar;ily on i s f m d s near the mouth. of W n s m harbor.

The Korean War

Q When conflict erupted on the peninsula inJune 1950,the ROKAir Force hadt a men@ of h t 2,000 pmannel, m d vvas equipped with a h d h l of

L 4 and L 5 single engine, WO-person liaison aircrdt and a few W7 tsmsporrs. It had no cambat Grerdt, but had tried to o b i ~ &em n dirorn the United Saks.
CI Shady dter the vvar began, a number of WOK,4LirFbrce volunreers were sent to the United S ~ t e for s wdning, They remrned to Ifieix. homeland in late 1953 as quditied F-51 "Musmg" fighter pilots, and were fomed into a squadron &at was s&;rtisnedat gnung (K-182, on SOU&krea's e a t coast. Adiditjonaf S m t h Rorean F-$3 squadrons were es~blkhed in 1952 and

1953.

O: m e n the cornmunisls hvaded inJune 1950, Sou& Grea's S,OO@man

navy/coast guard vvas equipped only vvith a few U.S.-made, 105-foot pacsol vessels and a number of tank landing ships (LSTs), Like the Sou& Korean Air Farce, however, it was smngtfrened and reinfoxed af the war progressed, and increasingly proved itself an asset, especially in the U.N. blockade of Nor& &rem ports.

Beyond those that served in the ROKarmed forces, K ~ r e m from s both sides ofthe 38thparikUelfoughtagainst the communistforces i n a number of ways, booth as aupentees to various U.N. c o n h g e n and ~ in special w d x e uni&*

KOREAN AUGMENTATION TO THE U*$, ARMY (WTtJSA.)

a Soon dter war broke our, the United Smtes and the &prrbEc of Korea launched the Korean Aupenmrion to the under which 1QO Sou& Korean r e c m i wuld ~ company m d battery,

South Korean Military Forces

123

Mmy m W S A troops were only teenqers when they joined U.S. units. Private Vun Chun Gi, age 15, niehrtmed Poncho by the U.S. troops, was the first U T U S A to be assigned to Compmy K, 3rd Barnlion, X 9th Infantry Regiment.

F1 Such soldiers were administe-red m d paid by the ROK k m y , bllt were paired up with an h e r i c m ""bdddy" m d fed and quipped by the unit to which they were assigned,
Q On August 15, 1950, the Far East Command ordered the Eighth U.S. Army to ulilize such Korean mgmentees, bo& in the divjsions operadng in &re= and in the 7th. Infantry Di~sion, at &at time eaining injapm.

CJ Some 8,@5 UTUSBLs were ass@ed to the 7th I n f m q Division, which had been stripped af ~ o o p by s the three divisions preceding it ~o bllfta. They mived in the division's camps in Japan just three weeh before its participation in the Inchon landing.
Q Initirztfly, the mTUSA program w a too exweme, udXhing school boys and young men. who had been pulled ogtfie sweets m d pressed into s e ~ c e .

124

The Korean War

A few weeks of eaixling could not make these M W S h into real soldiers, and Lheir short~omings became apparent soon dter their first exposures m combat,
O Problems with the program became apparent during the fighting Ghtlrawd from Nor& h r e a in November m d December 1950eUTUS& quickly became demoralized under the extreme conditions of the campaign m d when under fire, many of them to hid in foxholes and would not fire their wapons, OI As the w a progressed, each maJjor command dealt with the W W S A program in diEerent ways. In the 1st G a d r y DiGsion m d 2nd Znfantsy Division, for example, the buddy s)istem ww continued and American sotdiers wahed their &rean caunterparts in U.S. weapons and tactics, In ehe 24& fafmq Di~sion, hwwer, the U T U S h were orgmked into separate platoons and squads, used for specialized tasks like guard duty, patrolling, moving heavy we;apons aver rough terrain, and scouting, tasks at which the all-MTTJSA ekments proved eEeclive, Qrem sotdiem were dso able to teach the CXs how to carnoaage using s ~ and m o&er local materials,

D Reluemce from U,S, unizs prevented the UTUSA progrm fi-om quickly reaching its anricipated level, and by June 1951 there only 12,718 MTUS&.
O When properly trained and equipped, however, Korean uoops

functioned as well as U.S. soldiers, and plans were made to expand the program. By late 1952, a total of 20,000 KATUSAs were assigned to each of the eight U.S. divisions and mother 7,000 to combat support units.

O After the armistice, the KATUSA program was reduced in scope. Today,
about there are about 7,000 Sou& breaxl sogdiers .in the MTUSA program, the reduetion oftr.S. ground a level that was reached in mid-IESS'1,f o l l o ~ n g forces in b r e a ,

Q During the war a number of other U.N. unirs, including the Belgian Battalion, the Dutch Barnlion, and the Cornmanwealth Didsim, used programs similar to KATUSA to round out their ranks. Like the U.S. army's program, these efforts enjoyed mixed resul~.

South Korean Military Forces

r 25

D A program called Koreans Attached to the Commonwealth Forces (KATCOM) was started in October 1952,when 1,000 ROK recruits were assigned to the Commonwealth Division, two per infanay squad. kp in the U.S. program, such soldierswere used mainly as drivers, mechanics, senuies, and in olher support positions.

D KATCOMs were issued uniforms, weapons, and equipment appropriate to the Commonwed& mirs t o which they were attached and could atcain noncommissioned omcer m k vvirfiin those unirs* f i r pay and administrafivepurposes, however, they were still considered members of the ROK k m y *

O A similar program was established by the Belgian Battalion in 1951,when

up to 100 soldiers from the Korean Service Corps were assigned to it, a number &at was increased to 250 in 1952. Such ri.aops were used mainly as unskilled laborers, but could be promoted to noncommissioned oficcer rank wichia Lhe batraIion, k t h authority aver o&es brem wldiers. Some of &em eventually became Eranttine soldiers or moved into support posirions (e.g., as cooks, mechanics, or truck dhvers).

D After the U.N. forceswere driven back across the 38th parallel at the end uf fdl in 1950,thousands of N o d k r e m s who had helped &ern had to Bee as well, or face death at the hands of the advancing communists.

O Many of these people escaped to the islands off the west coast of North Korea, where they organized themsehres into partisan units, more out of a need to defend themselves than from a sense of ideology.
CI In February 1951, the U.N. Command armed and equipped these disparate guerilla bands and organized them, along with some Americans, into the U.S. 8th Army G3 Miscellaneous Group, 8086th they began to use for raids behind the eommunkt lines.

B Ten montfis later, in December 1951,the kretans m d b e ~ c min s the 8086th were incorporated into the Far East Command's 8240th Army Unit and redesignated thc Uni~ed Nat_ionsPartisan I n f m q brea(UNHK).

O UNPIK remained active under U.S. Army command until mid-1953, by which time it had claimed a total of 69,000 enemy casualties. At its peak in 1953, UNFIK had a s ~ e n g t h of about 22,000.

This page intentionally left blank

""Aft Members have undertaken to make available to the [Securiv] Council on its call, in aceordance with special ageements to be negotiated on the initiative of the Council, the amed forces, assisance, and facilities, inclblding rights of passage, necessarqi fsr maintaining intematiunal pcaee and securiQ."

.S, and K O l i forces did nor figh P h e Korean War.done. Sixteen ct&er members afehe United Nadons sent n?ili&ryconringent;(i, the ScmdinaGzn nnLions and Italy sent medicd dertachmrmts, and mrions otlter countries sent limited q u m ~ & e s of food and money.
C;li On June 25, 1950, the same day Nortb Korean forces crossed the 38th

parallel, the United Narions passed a resaluticm calling for its members t o "hmish such assistance to the Republic ofKorea as may be necessary to repel the a m e d a t ~ c and k to restore internahand peace and security in the =ea.''
rZL Many Eurspearr natjons were still sagering from the effects of Wodd War If when war in Korea broke out, Sever2 had been or were still combating p e f i t l a ingurgencies, eifher at home ar in rebelljous colonies. Mast had militasy comrazimen~ to the Nor& A~anric Treaty Organha~ans (and, in the cases of Great B r i ~ i nand France, to the occupa~onof e m a n y ) and were concerned about the direct &reat ta their c o u n ~ e s posed by the S a ~ eUnion. t
Q As a result, many countries were relucmt and a bit slow to commit s all the U.N. member nations mili~xy forces in Korea. Total c o n ~ b u h o nby

128

The Korean War

participating in the war, other than South. b r e a , were about ormenth of the U.S. commiment to the conflict. P As various U.N. member nations began offer forces for the defense of South Korea, the Security Councii recommended they be placed under a unified command, Thus, the United Na~ons Commmd wm es~blished and headquartered in Tokyo under the command of U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArtkrur,

O Most of the soldiers sent to Korea by the allied nations were elite or
experienced troop, and b e d c a n troops generally considered &emselves inferior to those of the other allied nations. Despite this, however, capmred communist documents cansbtently reflected the Chinese belief that the h e r i c a n soldiers were the best.

CI hstraXia sent ground forces consisting of&ree infantry bat~lions; naval forces consisting af one aircdt carrier, t~ra deseoyers, m d one frigak; m d air furces composed of one fighter squadron m d one air wansport to commit fofces squadron. It w a the first cowtry after the United S~ties from all three of its major sefiees, O Two of the Aus~alimelemen~, the 3rd Batalion, Royd Austsdian the "Diggers") and 77 Squadron of h e Royd hstrdian Regiment ( 3 Air Force, w r e stationed in Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupa~on Farce when the war broke out.

arrived in Korea on September 28, 1950, and joined the British 27th Infantry Brigade, which was assigned to the U.S. 24th Infanvy Division (8& US. Army) and redesignated the 27th Commonwed& lnfantly Brigade.

O As part of the 8th U.S. Army, Australian voops participated in the bredout from the Pusan Perimeter and the advwce nor& across the 38tlr parallel. They fought their first major acdon ofthe war near Pyongymg, the No& Korean capitaji. O Ausualian troops participated in two major actionsin 1951. On April 22,
1951, a U.N. farce that included Ausmlim ssoldiers counteratacked Chinese forces in the Kapyong Valley that had driven ROK and New Zealand forces out of the area. During a night of fierce fighring in which they suffered

Atied Forces

123

a relatrively modest 32 men Xrilled and 53 m n d e d , Lhe Austrdians were ovemn, recaptured their posidon, and succeeded in stalling the Chinese advance, Their role in the bal-cle earned &ern a U,S, Presidenhd Citation, On. October 3, 1951, Austrdian forces atbched to the Commonwed& Division took part in Operation Gornrnanda, an at~ack against a Ghiaese salient in a bend of the Xmjin River. The division had two main objeches, Mills BX7 m d 355, which they captured after five d q s of heavy combat. Ausealian casual~es consisted of 20 killed m d 89 wounded.
Q From 1951 until the end af the war, ilruswalian waops occupied

&enchworks at the eastern end of h e Commonwealth Division" ssect-ar in the hills northeast: of the Imjin Sver, separated '0)7 a 300- to 2,00@meter-~de na man's land &om heaGly f o r ~ e Chinese d posir;lions.
Q Even as other U.N. counLries sought to ex~ricate &ernselves from Korea, Austrdia increaed its commimermt. A, ~ e a n d i t n f m q batdion, 1 arrived in b r e a in March 1952 and joined the Commonweal& DiGsi une 1,1952.It left Korea in firth 11353and was reptared a mon& later by 2

L2 Casddes s&ered by Ausmlia &roughout the course of the m ~ r war e consisted of about 1,200 wounded a d 339 kiLEed.

D Belgium decided to cmmit forces to Korea on Aupst 25, 1950, and raised a Korean Valuntcller Corps (Corps Voluntaires Corea) consis~ng of a single infanq battalion. Once in Korea, this force was augmented by a platoon of vohlnteers &om Lwernbourg. and the combined unit w a col1ectivef.yb o r n as the BELUX Battalion,
O Belgium also sent several DC4 transportation aircraft to support the U.N. efforts in Korea and two nurses to work inJapan.

D Commanded by Lt. Col. Albert Crahay, the 900-man 1st Belgian Bat~lion (1st Baaillon Belge) a r ~ v e d in b r e a in December 1950 and was attached the following month to the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. A year and half later, in August 1951, his unit was replaced by the 2nd Belgian Battalion, which remained in counw undlJune 1955.

The Korean
U Belgium, a bilingual nadon, divided its batblion into three separate French- and Flemish-speaking rifle companies. Luxembourg's soldiers were irrcorporated into a French-speaking company, Q During 1951, as many as 100 ROK sotdiers from che 'Korean Service Covwwere assigned to the Belgian Battaxion, and in 1952 this number ww increased to 250,Initially, srlch men were used mainly as udkllled labur, They could be promoted to NCO serving as coolies and s~etcher-bearers. rank MJithin the batalion, however (with authoricy aver other Korean soldiers), and some of h e m eventually k c m e Erondine soldiers or nluved into support positions (e.g., cooks or truck drirvers).

O Belgian soldiers experienced their heaGest fighdng in April 1951. On

April 22, elernen~ of a massive Chinese offensive surrounded and cut of the Belgian Battalion, which occupied an isolated position near the Imjin River. Part: of a B ~ ~ Bat~alian s h and then a force of unks tried. to relieve the Belgians, but were unsuccessful. On April 23, however, the Belgians mmaged to slip across the Chinese lines on their right f l a k and M;ttfidraw.
Q On April 24, the Belgian troops ret-urned to the area they had abmdasted the day behre, as; part of a mulGnahona1 force attemp.ting to rescue the Brifish 1st Bat~lion, GEouces.r;ershireRegiment, T h i s attempt was not successt"u1,and the GIasters were avermn m d destroyed, only a hm&li of &em rnmaging to escape,

O Belgian soldiers atso parficipated in h e w fighting in October 1951, at

Hakmg-ni, a .cilage nurth of Chorwon.

CZ At peak streng&, the battalian numberetd 945, and some 3,498 Belgians
sewed in its ranks during its foumd-a-haE years in Korea. Of those, 101. were killed, 350 were wounded, five were missing, and one died in c r z p ~ ~ v . A single Belgim prisoner was repatriated in 1953.

Q Canada sent ground forces consis~ng of one army brigade of three

infantr):batt;llions, one arGllery regiment, done arrnored regiment; naval forces consisting of three destroyers; and air f'orces consisring of one air amsport squadron.

iTS. Asia had never been an area of s~ategic interest for Canada, whose
amed forces had been rrrduced to pexefjme strength and trained only for

Allied Forces

nation$ defense in the wake of World War 11,Thus, while Canitda suppofied in principle the U.N. decision to defend South Korea, it hesitated initially to commit forces to the conflict,
O (Smada had been involved in U.N. discussians on the Korean issue since 1347, hawever, and had served on the U,N. Temporary Commission on b r e a (but not its successor, tile U,N Commission on Qrea). This involvement, along with a desire to close ranks with the United States against communist aggression, contributed to Canada's eventual decision to send forces to Korea.
O On July 12, 1950, the Royal Canadian Navy destroyers HMCS Capga,
At-kabaskm, and Siobw were dispatched ta &rean waters. On August 15,

C a ~ g bombarded a communist positions in Yosu in defense of the Pnmn Perinre~er. E n the follokng monhs all three of the Canadian warships s e m d as escort vessels d u r i q the landings at Inchon and Wonsm.
In December 1950, after China entered the war and begm to drive the aflied krces out of nar&ern Korea, the three destroyem, along w i t h an htlsmlian artd m herrican destroyer, moved up the mouh of the Taedong s near Chinnampo. River to rescue a large number af U.N. ~ o o p tmpped This achon cansllituted the Canadian naval f"srce% largest and most significant opera~on during the war.

13. Royal CanAian Air Force No. 426 Transport Squadron

was also

deployed to Asia in July 1950, U.N. forces were fafling back into the Pusan Perimeter whin the squadron arrived, and it was immediately tasked with flying supplies from Japan to the defending forces,
0 By early 1951, the 426& W* performing routine wansporcntion duties, including regularly scheduled flighw between Hameda Airfield, near Tokyo, and McChord Air h c e Base, Washington,

Ll In addifion to the transportadon squadlron, 22 Royal Canadian Air Force pilots sewed in U.S, drcr& formations. None of thie men. or aircrdt of the 426 Transport Squadron were lost during the war; one of the pilots flying with the U.S. uniw was shot down and captured, but was repaviated at the end of the war,

C5 On August 7, 1950, Canada authorized the fornation of the Canadian Ammy Special Force, which included Lord Stralhconak Horse and Princess d Korea in December 1950. PaLriciak Light Xnfmtry. These units a ~ v e in
O Just a few months later, the Canadian ground forces became engaged in heavy combat during the Chinese spring oEensives of 1951, and formed part

The Korean War

of the force that battled the communists at Kapyong and along the Imjin fiver.
O Canada sent additional unils to Klorea in May 1951, and consolidated them and its forces already on the pound into the 25th Znfmq Brigade

Group. CI In July 1951, after some hesita~on, Canada auowed the 25ch Infmuy Brigade Croup to become part of the 1st C o m m e m d t h Division, a conglomerak of British, Canadian, A u s d i m , Indian, and N e w Zealand forces,
O In May 1952, Canadian troops were among those sent to quell rioting at the U.N. prisoner of war compound on Koje Island. Canada had not agreed to let its conCingent be used far this sort of duty, however, and was displeaed
its ~ o o pwere s u~lized in

this manner,

Ll Canadian farces in b r e a peaked in Januar).. X952 at about 8,000, &though by the istice a year and half later they still exceeded 7,000. Mtogetfier, a total of 21,900 Canadims semed i n the ground farces during the Korean War. Of these, mare &an 300 w r e kitled, more than 1,200were wounded, and 32 were captured by the cornmunist-s.
O Canada s ~ r t e d to ~ h d r a w its forces after the armishce, and the .last cambat troops depamd ini 4riX 1955. A medical detachment stayed on another two years, and chen left inJune 1957.

D Colombia sent ground forces consishg of four 1,000-man lnfanuy batalions, one at a hme, m d naval forces eonsisGng of a single frigate, the ,$lmirante Padifla, It: W= the only Lacin h e r i c a n nation to send forces t o Korea.
D In June 1951, the 1st Colombian Battalion (1st Batallon Colombia) arrived in Korea. In July 1952, it was replaced by the 2nd Colombian BatmIion, which remained in counw until November 1952, when it was replaced by the 3rd Colombian Battalion. In June 1953, the 3rd Colombian Batralion was replaced by the 4th Colombian Battalion, which remained in Korea until October 1954.
Q The Colombian bat~lionswere atached to v a ~ o u sU.S, infmw

divisions during the war and fought in such actions as the Batde of Old Baldy

dEied Farces

133

and the ~ m s a oEensive, n Many CoIombim soldiem were awarded bronze m d silver stars for their acGorxs, and the batblioxls suEered about 600 casuafGes during the Korean War.
1 ; 3 Colombia w a torn by civil strife in the early I951)s, md right-~ng d i c ~ th ~urr e m o Gomez m y have sent tsoaps in arder c u v U.3. favos, draw atention away from domeseic reprcts$on, and temporarily exile m i l i ~ apponentf, v

E&iapia agreed to send m irtfmq b a l o n to Korea, which included volunteers from Empmor Maile Selassie's Imperial Security Guard, a unit of elite, sk-foot-&l1saldiers, Dubbed the &gnw,or Conquerors Badion, the unit was relieved by fresh batbliuns ~ c durirlg e the Kareitn War. (bgnew9 accordbg to same sources, was an impedal warhorse and the namesake of the unit,)

Ethiopian soldiers, like those of the other U.N. contingents, were among the best their counw could sead. These members of tbe Elagnew Batlalion are- admiring s U,$.-made semiautomilc.iccarbine,

The Korean War

U Ethiopia's 1st @new Battalion, a 931-man unit, arrived in Korea in May 1951 and was attached to the 32nd Regiment of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division in June 1951. In April 1952, the i st Kagnew Battalion was replaced by the 2nd bgxrew Battalion, In April 1953, it was relimd in its turn by the 3rd bgnew Batdion, which remained in Korca until April 1954.
O Ethiopian soldiers fought in many battles during the war, and were highly regarded for their skill in hand-t+hand and bayonet fighting, patrolling, and night fighting. Altogether, 3,158 Ethiopians served in the &gnew bat~lions. Of Ifnose, 121 w r e killed, 536 were wounded, and none were taken prisoner,

O A number of Ethiopian nurses also worked w i t h the Red Cross inJapan.

C3 F m c e sent ground forces consisting of one infmtr)i b a d i o n and naval forces consisling of one warship, the frigate h Grandiere, which it committed on July 22, 1950.
Q Qn Augwt 24, 1950, France set about raising a volunteer batalion of

both rese~ses and active duty soldiers. Many of those selected f"ar the unit were c0mba.cvetems w i t h experience Bghting in France" overseas colonies, including Ngeria.

ff Depar~ng the port of Marseille on Sepkmbes 25, 1950, the French

Batalion arrived in Korea on November 30 and was compXeteXy debarked by December 5. Under the command of Lt. Col, Katph Monckdr, it consisted of 39 o&cers, 1.72noncommissioned oficers, and more than 860 enlkted men, many of them a2ger;ian colonid esaops.
U Equipped with U.S. weapons and vehicles, and reinforced with a company of ROK soldiers, the French Battalion was artached for the duration of the war to the 23rd Infarztv Itegiment (U.S. 2nd Infantv Division). Q French soldiers fought in a number of intense battites during the Kc~rem War, engaging in e v e ~ h i n g from firefigh~ to bayonet ckarges. E r r 1951 alone, they fought at Wonju, the Twin Tunnels, and Chipyong-ni during the U,N. advance on Seoul; against the Chinese spring o&nsives; and at Heartbreak Ridge and the Prmchbawl.

D In October 1952, in a sideline to the Battle of m i t e Horse HiXl, the French 1E3att;alion successhlly defended &rowhe4 1E-fGift against a determined Chlnese oEensive, holding heir ground agaiRst h e communists for nearly a week untifi the atbck was broken. They took part in other artions in the Iron Triangle and at the Hook rkroughout the \.rinter of 1952-"-1953.

O At peak smngth, the French conhagent numbered 1,185 men, and a

total of 3,421 French soldiers served in G r e a during the conflict, Of these, 287 were Wled, 1,358were wounded, seven were missing in acdon, m d 12 became prisoners o f war. Many citations w r e awarded to the unit and its membem,
O On October 22,1953, the French Batdion left Korea for Vieman. Mter it arrived the follokng monehi, it W* renmed the Korea Regiment and s form the Gmupemenc R.lobile Nr. 10(3, reinforced wilE-2 addidonal ~ o o p to This unit W= wiped out the hllowlrrgJu1y in a series of viet Mhh a t ~ c k s .
Q F m c e k 4th F ~ g a t e Squadran also semed as part; of V.S. Nay Task Croup 90.04during &is period, Viet Minh guerrillas Mew up one of these French ships as it departed Saigon for Qrea, Elling 143 of its sailors,

O Great Britain sent ground forces totalling three army brigades (only two af- which served at a ~ r n e )m , field artillery regimen@,and one armored regiment. Z t also sent naval forces consisting of one ajrcrdt carr-ier, t ~ o

cruisers, eight des~oyers, and attached marine and other support units.
Q Elemenu of the 27th Infant7 Brigade---the 1st Bat~lionof the

Middlesex Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the &ell Regiment, and the Sutherland Highlandereand the Royal Irish Hussars h g u s t 28,1950.
O These forceswere initialiy assigned to the U.S. 24th i n f a n q Division and were immediately sent into the line to help defend the Pusan Perimeter, pardcipating in heavy fighting along the banks of the Naktong River.

O At the end of September 1950, the British contingent was reinforced with the Australian and New Zealand forces present in Korea and redesignated the 27th Commonwealth Infanq Brigade; it was further

136

The Korean. Wax:

British forces began aniving in Korea in su er X950 'to help defend the collltpsing Pusan Perimeter. Picared are soldiers of the Middlesex Regiment, aniving at Pusm Aixport on A u p s t 27,1956,

expanded in Febmary 1951,when a Canadian con~ngent arrived in Korea, This reinfoxed brigade was reassigned ta the U.S, 1st Cavalry Division.
f;ll In September 1950, the 29th 1nfancf)iBrigade Group arrived in Itarea.
O In April 1951, the commander and staff of the 28th Infmtv Brigade arrived in Korea and took control of the 2% CoxnnnonwealLh Infantry Brigade, after which it was once again redesignated, as the 28th Commonweait& Infanq Brigade.

D InJuly f 951, rbe Bfitisb, Au~stratian, Candim, New Zealand, and fndim conGngenu were organized into the Cornonwealth Msion. This di~sion m s under the operational control of the U.N. Command, but was admtnistered by the Cornmmder-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Forces, headquartered in Japan, of the Bdtish u n i were ~ af an illustrjaus fineage, Far example, components of the 29th Infantly Brigade included the 1st Battalion, Royal NorPfiutmberland Fusiliers, farmed in 1674, and the 1st Batblion, Gloucestershire:Regiment, "asters," which w;ns farmed in 1694 artd had earned in its 256 years 44 batde streamers, more than m y other regiment in the British Army,

O By the time the armistice was signed in July 1953, 14,000 British soldiers had semed in Korea, About 700 of them were killed, and about 4,000 of h e m were wounded or taken prisoner, 977 ofwham were repatriated at the end of the war.

U A Hillin Korea (a 1956a m featuling Korean War veteran Michael Caine in his first movie role), depicts a pauol of British soldiers uapped in a Korean village and forced to fight their way back to friendly lines.

Greece sent ground forces consisting of one volunteer infanuy battalion soldiers dram &orn the regufar Greek army, many of whom w r e veterans the 1946 Greek Civil Wr, foxxght b e w e n the government m d communist insurgents. Greece also sent air forces consisting of one air @ansportsquadron,

CIS On December 9, 1950, the 840-man bat&lion, h o r n a s the Royal

Hellenic Expeditionary Force, a r ~ v e in d Korea. after undergoing additional vaining and receiving equipment, it was assigned to the 7th Cavalry Regimerlt (1st C m 1 7 Division), which it semed with duhng much of the k r e m War.

U In December 1950, tht: Greek forces (as part of the 7th Cavdlry) moved southward from a posi~onno&h of Seoul, h e n norhward once again toward the Imjin Rver area, then to positions near the 38th parallel, in the middle af the Korean Peninsula, h r i n g this period, they repfarly batcled the Chine= fo~ces pouring into the area, somerims engaging them in hand-tehand and bayonet combat.
O fn May 19Ii2, a cornpmy of the Hellenic batalisn wm sent t o help quell riots provoked by communist agiutors in Che 1 7 . N " prisoner of war camp on Koje Island. O A second infanq battalion anived in Korea shortly after fighting ended up to regirnen~alsmngth. This in 1953, bfinging the Hctllenic f o ~ e s stsengh in March 1955 reinforced unit was reduced once again to bat~lion and was deacdvated later that year; by December 1955, the Greek forces had returned home to Greece,

D Greek sftldiers were respected far their fighting prowess in Korea and received marmy c-i~dons for their actions. From 1950 to 2955, 10,184 Greek

The Korean War

soldiers semed in Korea, 184 of whom were killed, 543 of whom were wounded, and two ofwhom were capmred.
O Greece's air contribution, the 13th Hellenic Air Force Squadron, comprised eight G47 cargo planes and was assigned to the U.S. 21st Troop Carrier Squadron. It flew its first mission in December 1950, immediately after xriving in Korea, helpkg ta evacuate 1,000 wounded members of the U.S. 1st Marine Division from their positions near the Chosin Reservoir.
O Some 39'1men sewed in the Greek wansportation squadron, 12 ofwhom were killed d u ~ n the g war. O A multinational combat engineer unit under the command of a Greek officer is depicted in the 1953film The Cla~Brigade, one of the few films to emmine the intema~ond namre of the U.N. involvement in the Korean

war.

C1 India sent a unit of the Indim h y Medical Corps to support the U,N, forces in Korea, Sthough India ernphilskerl its neuCralif;vby sendjng only medical personnel and not cornbat troops, the 60th Parachute Field h b u l a n c e Unit, under the cornmad of Lt. Col. A.C. hngaraj, was a uniformed cantingent that semed alongside o&er O>mmonwed& units.
Q In December 1950, the 34grnerrzber Xndim ccmtimgent, which included a number of Sikhs, advmced norfiward ~& the Bridsfrr 27th Xmfanq Brigade to the Nor& Korean capital sf Pyongrang. On Beeenlbelr 5, however, U.N. forces began a general reveat in the face of ovemhelming opposition from the newly-ar~ved Chinese foxes.

F1 Ordered to deseofr their medical supplies, the stalwart fndiarrs instead. loaded &em onto a commandeered train and managed to escape rhe enemy -pi& mhutes before the last railroad bridge was desaoyed.
D For the remainder ofthe war, the 60th Parachute Field h b u l m c e Unit l of Korea, supported the 1st Commonwealth Division in the c e n ~ asector operating a helicopter medical evacuation selvice and parachuting into the corn bat zone to proGde medical assistance.

D Asmaller Indian detachment, under Maj. N,B. Banegee, vyas stationed In Taegu, in South Korea, where it provided medical and surgical support for various Korean mditav and cifilim hospiMs.

Alied Forces

139

Indian medical personnel: of the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance Unit served wealth troops dufing the warsjumping into the front fines on severat occasions to support British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand combat .forces.

Q fxr August 1953, the Indian parachute unit left the Commonwealth

Di~sionn to proGde support for the Indian Custodial Farce, which aversaw the screening of Nor& Kfzrean and Chinese prisoners unMrilling to return to their home countries.
Q fn Fe'bmay 1954, after the Indian Custodial Force" mission w s complete, the 6 0 h Parachute Field h b u f a n c e Unit returned hurne to f ndia.

L3 Luxembourg sent a single, 44man, all-volunteer i n h n p ~l a m n to to a French-speaking k r e a in November 1950. This pfatuon was a t ~ c h e d company of the Belgian BatMion. and the augmented force became k n o w callec~velry as the BELUX Batalion.
P31 Moag tvi& the Belgian forces, cvhich were &emselves assigned to the U.S. 3rd Enfantq DiGsion, Lmexnburrrg's p l a ~ o n experienced its heaviest

The Korean. War

fighting in April 1951 at the Battle of the Imjin River. Six months later, in October 1951, the Luxembourgers again engaged in heavy combat at Hakmg-ni,

tf The Lwernbourg platoon returned home in late 1953, h total of 89

soldiers from the dny duchy served in the Korean war and WO of them were killed dudrtg the conflict.

O The Netherlands sent one undersuength infanq battalion and a Dutch navy destroyer. The Netherlands was fighting a guerilla insurgency in Indonesia in 1350, and its forces were deplyed direcfly from combat in Soucfieast Asia,

1131 h advance parv of the Netherlands B%t&lion arri.ved in Iiorea on

October 24,1950, and the balance of the unit arrived on Nlovember 23,1950. This batmlian-636 men and a feMi nurses organked into two infantry companies and one heay weapons campany-was assigned to the U.S. 2nd Infantq Division as part of its 38& fnfantv Regiment in December 1950,

D InJarruary 1951, h t c h soldiers batded cammunist forces around Wonju

during Operation Thunderbolt,
Q In Felonxaq 1951, the Ne&erlan& Batalion fought at Hoengsong

during Qperatrion Roundup, an rzfsordve oEensive e a t of Seoul that was smashed by a cammunist counteroffensive. Wlring this action, Chinesc: soldiers killed more &an 100 Ifufch troops, inchlding the b a t d i m commander, when they infil~ated the Dutch pasitions disguised as ROM;

woops,
Cf

A few months later, in April 1951, the Eethedands Bat~lion fought

around Kumhwa during the Chinese spring oEensive, during tvhich they

made a 24hour forced march Mrihout radons.

I ; ; r In 1952, Dutch forces fought along the 38th parallel in the Iron Triangle. &ring the same year, they helped suppress the communistbacked riot at the U.N. prisoner ofwar compunds on Koje Island.

D The Netherlads Bat~lionsemed in Korea until October 1, 1954.

Despik h e fact &at the Dukh soldiers hacl deployed from a tropical climate to one subject to near-arctic extremes, the Neherlands Batblian fought well m d was regarded 2s m excellent combat unit.

Blied Farces

Q A to& of 3,148 Dutch infan ell sczTed Jibi-eaduring the W a r (3,972 by the time the Netherlands Battalion left in 1954). Of these, 120 were Killed, 645 w r e waunded, and three were repatriated. A great number of Dutch soldiers w r e awarded for their accions by the Netberfmds, the United Sates, and Sou& Korea,

U A Dutch navy des~oyer, HNLMS Evertsen, was deployed from the waters off Indonesia immediately after the Netherlands agreed to commit forces to the conflict and arrived in Korea on July 19, 1950. It was evenmally relieved by another Dutch ship, and by Janualy 24, 1955, two other desuoyers and three ffigates had served in &re= warers,
i l HNLMS Everhse~was part of the screening force of destroyers that provided covering fire for U.N. forces during the Inchon landing. It served until April 1951, and was replaced by a succession of Dutch warships: the destroyers HNLMS V m Gden (Nril 1951 to Janmq 19521, and WWMS Piet Hem (januav X952 to Janmaq 1953); the frigates 1SrPaud&wn Nas,cau (fanmsy 1953to May 2953) EINMS Dubojs (May 1953 to October 19541, and HMLM vaxl ZgU (October f E 3 5 4 to januaq 1955).

C1 k t c h wrship, operatjng in the mters off both the east and west coasts
of he: k r e a n peninsula, par~cipaed in patrols, blockades, shore bombardnrten~sagainst communist coastal wns, fortifications, in support of ground forces, and as carrier escorts. Altogether, 1,360 Dutch personnel served in the Netherlands naMl contingent, nvo of whoa1 were kitled,
O HNLMS Pier Hem was distinguished for destroying an enemy train with
its guns, and

the four vessels that semed prior to the armistice were awarded ROK presidential unit citadons for their actions as part of the U.S. 7th Fleet (HNLMS Ever&en and HNLMS Vm Gden also semed .iniiLb Task Force 95 and received the award Mce).

CI field ofHonour,a 1986 film, depicts the experiences of a Dutch soldier who Is left for dead and must m&his way Back to W.N. lines,

O New Zealand sent ground forces consisting of one artillery regiment and cmsiscing of six frigates. New Zealand was one of the first naval for~es nations to respond to the U.N. appeal for assis~nce in Sou& Kurea m d sent

The Korean. War

more aoops in propurLion to its population than m y d i e d country except the United S~ittes,
Cf

On Jrxne 29,1950, New Zealmd oRered to support the U.N. farces Mri& a naval contingent and onJuly 3, HMNZS Pokakiand HMNZS Tutira,a pair of WO Royd New Zealand N a v y Lochclass frigates, sailed fiar k r e a . These ships w r e succeeded later in the war by four o h e r frigates H m Z S Roloici, H m Z S Hawea, HMNZS Tzupa, and HMNZS

ZS Pukaki and H M N Z S Tudra were asslgned to the U.S. Nav's Far Eastern Command and served with the xreening force during the Inchon landing. For the remainder of the war, the various New Zealand ships participated in coastal raids, shore bombardment, and blockading, mostly off the western coast of Nor& Korea, About kaK of New Zeajand" sailors, more than 1,300of hem, sewed in Korea,

D OnJuly 26, New Zealand responded to further U.N. appeals by deciding to recmit, wdin, and equip 1,000 men far a wansportation platoon and an ar~flery unit, the 16th Field ktlllev Reginnent, Because the island nation had m army of only 3,000 men at the time, it had to iniriate a special. recmicing program, which pelded 6,000 ~olunteers~

B New Zealand" Korea force, or "&@arce," k X e E t for Korea on December

11, arrived in h s a a on December 31, and was figh~ng as part of the 27th Commonwed&Brigade "8yJanlxary.23, InApril 1957, k$orce fought in the BatCIe of Gpyong, during the 5th Chinese Phase Offensive.
O Later in 1951, New Zealmd sent a transpor~tion compmy t o Korea to augment its contingent, and on July 28, 1951, the New Zealanders were incorporated into the 1st Commonwealth Division. They stayed busy during the last two years of the war, as artillely duels began to play an increasingly prominent role in combat between the entrenched armies. O During byforce's six years in Korea, 46 New Zealanders died from all causes (including one sailor killed dusing a shore raid), at feast 79 were wounded, and one was captured by the cornmunisls.

C3 New Zealand's reasons for ac&velysupporting the U.N. mission in Korea included an opposition to Soviet-backed aggression, a commiment to the
U.N. principles of collective security, a desire to follow the example of Great flfri~ixl,and a k s h to foster good relaGons with the United S~ates(a demons~ated by their push for the N Z U S 'I"re;zv).

Mfied Forces

O The Philippines was one of the first U.N. nations to send forces to Korea, and provided four motorized battalion combat teams (BCTs),one at a time, during the conflict (and a fifth one after the armistice was signed).

O Each of the reinforced Filipino units had about 1,500 men and was

composed of three infanvy companies, one E8 "Shermm" tank company, one reconnaissance company, and one 105mm howitzer battely. As motorized units, they were equipped w i t h trucks and other vehicles for transpor~tion,
O The 10th BCn' arlived in Korea in September 1950, and remained in

counuy until September 1951;the 20& BCT arrived in September 1951, and remained untilJune 1952; the 14th BCT arrived inJune 1952 and remained undl April 1953; and the 2nd BCT arrived in April 1953and remained until April 1954. A fifth battalion combat team relieved it and remained in Korea until May 1955,

C 2 During h e &rean War, the Filipino units were atached to v a ~ u u U.S. s

div;isisnsand, for a short Lime, to B~hsEt and Canadim Brigades, In 1950 and early 1951, the 10th BCT supported counterinsurgency e f f o r ~ in South Korea.

C1 In spring 1951, the Filipinos were sent northward, where they helped
During the Battle of cornhat the 5th Chinese Phase Offensive in A p ~ l . Closter Hill, they made an unsaxccesshl attempt t o relieve a surrounded BritiStL unit, the 1st Bathlion of the Clouces~ershire kgiment, w i t h a force cif tanks,
D For the baimce of the war, the Fililipino battalion combat teams wem in. the central sectar o f b r e a , a c ~ v along e the fine of coxl~ct D From 1950 to 1955,7,420Filipinos served in the battalion combat teams. Of those, 1 12were killed, 299 were wounded, l 6 were missing in action, and 41 were taken prisoner, d l of whom were repatriatcld, Various cirations were awarded to the units and their members.

C3 South Africa sent the 2nd Squadron of the South African Air Force
), rhe "flying Cheeahs," a, frghter aircraEt unit of 49 aficers and 157 enlisted men equipped ~ t F-51 h D Mus~angs.

X 44

The Korean War

O Deployed on September 26,1950 from South Africa to Johnson Base in Tokyo, 2nd Squadron was assigned to the U.S. Air Force's 18th Fighter Bomber wng and arrived at U.N.held Pyongyang East Air neld (&24) in

Nort%r Korea on November,

O Three days after arriving in Korea, 2nd Squadron flewits first sorties,first in support of U.N. forces m o ~ n g north tward the Ydu Kver, m d then

against the communist forces driving U.N. troops out of northern Korea. Despite fi-eezing cold and inclement weacher, its crews hail to refuel and rearm tbeir planes i n the open,

CI As the communist forces moved southward and recaptured Pyongyang,

2nd Squadron's base of operations was moved progressively southward to Suwan krbase (K-13) and h e n Chinhae &rbae (K-10).

D After the lines of battle solidifted in 1951, the Flying Cheetahs made botb
reconmaissmce flights a d bombing raids over No& &rem aifietds, communication lines, hydroelectric plans, supply dumps, arld weapons depots.

D In Jmuary f 953,the Sou& African squadron reloca~ed to Osm Airbase

(K-55) and began t o convert over from its Musmgs t u F436 Sabre jets. On M a d 11,1953,2nd Squadron flew its fir&sortie with the new aircraft.
Q The Flying Cheetahs left Korea in July 1953. Throughout the course of the war, they flew 12,067 sorties and lost 34 pilots, two other men killed or

missing, 74 of their 97 Mustangs, and four oftheir 22 Sabres. Nine prisoners ofwar were r e p a ~ a t e d after the armistice.

CI 2nd Squadron was awarded both U.S. and ROK Presidendal Unit
Citadons, and some of its members were awarded both U.S. and South Mrican decorarions for bravely.

O Thailand sent a Royal Thai Expeditionary Force to Korea that included a regimental combat team, four frigates and a cargo ship, one air

transportation squadron, and three medical selvice detachments.

Lf On November 7, 1950, the 2,100 men of the 2fst Royd Thailand

Regimental Combat Team arrived in Korea, one of the first non-berican uni&to do so, Over the course of the war, it was %Signed t o several U.S. commands, starting w i t h the 1st Cavally Division.

ALfied Forces

O In late November 1950, the 21st Regimental Cornbat Tern advmced to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. ByJanuary 1951, however, it had to Gthdraw southvvard, and w s part of the force h a t covered the U.N. retseat from Seoul.

D In spring X 951, Thai forces engaged i n heav combat during both of the Chinese ogeaxsives launched &at season,
Q In October and November 1952, the Thais helped capture Pork Chop Hill and subsequensly occupied it fclr a tine, W e n they turned it over to uhe U.S. 7th DiGsion, they Iefr. witten on their bufiker walls the words T&e g o d care of our Pork Chop." Q nailand" soldiers saw hard figh~ng duf_ingthe Karem War, earning

the nickxlame '"Little Tigers9%nda number afcilatians for their valor. About Force dtxAng the conflict, 4,000 men sewed in the Royal Thai Expedi~onaxy m d of h e m X 2 5 were killed, 959 were wounded, and five were missing,

111 Thailand" naval debchment, opemting out of Sasebo, Japan, from

November 9, 1950, to j a n u q 21, 1955, sewed with. the U.N, Naval in the Command" Far East Blockade and Escort Force, It operated ~xlaink waters off the east cswt cities of Songljin and Wonsan, where it took part in escort dufies, patrols, and share bombardments.
Q One of its figates was damaged and had to be replaced, bringing up t o five the number ofvessels &at saw acrcion during the war. Some 2,485 Thais

s e m d with the naval contingent during the war, four of whom were killed,
Q From June 23,1951 to November 6,1964, three C47 cargo planes of the Royal Thai Air h r c e were based at TacRika~a~Japan, as part of the U.N. air command, From there they flew missions both wiehin Japan and betcveen japan md Korea,

O Thaiiand's medical sefvice detachmenu served both injapan and Korea during the war and included a Red Cmss medicd unit of 66 doctors and nurses stationed at Pusm, a mobile surgical hospital group that served in various U.N. hospitals, and an air medical team used for evacuating wounded pe-rsonnel and nursing at U.N. hospirals.

D Turkey sent one 5,200-man army brigade to Korea, relieving it with fresh unils twice during the conflict cznd t(rith an addi~onal brigade dter the

The Korean War

Turkish &oops, shown here prqaring to assault a hilit, proved themselves some af the most savage fighters of the Koreztn War. They were largely equipped with U.S. Weapons, unifoms, and equipment,

amistice was signed in 1953. D u ~ n g the war, rhe Turks s e e r e d high casuizlhes and became E m s m as fierce, BighlydiscipZined fighters -slling and able to engage in hmd-tehand and brzyonet combat.
On October 19, the Turkish k m y command Farce-consisting of three infancry barnlions and an artillery regiment-ar-rived in Korea m d was atached to the U.S. 25th Infantry Di~sisn(U.S. : ( ) E Corps),just a mon& later, on November 26, the Turh were sent to guard the east flank of the U.S. 2nd Division against an expected Chinese attack, tlnforttlnatel;y, U.S. oficers failed to brief the Turks its to what to expect, and hey marched east toward Wawon, near &nu-fi in Noreh Korea, w i t h no idea afwfiar;W% going on around h e m . Oafsidle of Wawan, they misakenly engaged a fleeing krce of soldiers from the RQK: X I Corps, defeated them, and capmred a large number of prisoners. Shortly rheredter, the main body of Ihe Chinese ogensive dammed into the Turkish Brigde, Many T u r X F S fought to the death or farrnched bayonet e a u n t e r a t ~ c b against chct Cbinese. W e n the brigade finally fell back md rendezvoused with the U.S. 38th fnfanq, it had been all but destroyed,About 1,000 ofthe Turks w r e dead or rnissirlg a d only a few

&lied Farces

of its companies were still combat effective, and the sulvivors reueated southward ~ . f the h rest of the U.N, forces,
Q On January 3, 1951, the Turkish brigade was reassigned to the U.S. I Corps and a few months later fought in the central sector of the line of

contact against the two Chinese spring ogensives of that year.

O During most of 1952,the Turkish soldierswere tasked with patrolling the area around Heartbreak Edge. In May 1953,they engaged in heavy fighting from their posibons no& of Munsan.

U At peak strength, rhe Turkish contingent had 5,455 men, and a total of 14,396 Turks served in Lhe three brigades active during the w r , Of those, 741 were kifled, 2,068 Mirere wounded, 163were missing, and 244 vvere a e n prisoner. The killed included four commanding oEcers or company commanders,

CL Turkish soldiers held up in caplitri.t)r better than any other U.N,

personnel, maintaining their discipline and refusing to cooperate with the cornmmists. Reasons for this may have included a language barrier with their cal)mrs, an jnnate stoicim, and a high level of unit cohesion.

D The fourth TurEsh. brigade ardved in Korea on July 6, 1953, m d

remained in counw until May 1954,
O Turkey supposed the U.N, e & r ~ in Korea bob because of its an~+ommunist stance and as a matter o f n a ~ m pride. d Mter South Kurea, the Unired Slates, and the Commonwealth naLions, Turkey proGcted the largest con~ngexlt of troops to the Korem War.

anfuIy 28, X 952, a collecbon of B ~ ~ sAus~dian, h, Cilnadim, Indimt and New Zealand units that had k e n opera~ng hKorea mder the cant_roI of v;t~ousU S . dr"v~"sioxxs was consolidated a d acr_ivated ;is the 1st C~mmanweaI& LZiGsi~n. IL came t;o be regzrded as one d the best UN. forma~ons operadngin Korea m d bore much of&e combat in the center of Gfieline ~fcon&ct.
D During the first year of the war, the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade, the British 29th Infantry Brigade, and rhe Commonwealth 28th Infmuy Brigade

The Korean War

(composed of Bd~sfrr, Australian, New Zealand, a d Indim uni&) all earned impressive m i l i repu&l.ions. ~ ~ D One of the main resons the Con~monwalth DiGsion was farmed was to resolve some of the admi.nis~a~rye, logisrical, and operational conflica cawed by being atmched ta h e r l c m diyisions, and after its formadon it maintained separate lines of supply and communication b e ~ e e Korea n and Japan.
lilt In October 1951, the new &vision took part in its fint major xrion., Operation Commando, m014ng into the area nort.heast and west of the fmjin Ever t o create IheJarnestom Line. Mter es~blishing &he improved line o f csnbct, the Commonweal& Di~sion remained s n it until the asmis~ce, except f"Qr Febmafy and March 1953, when the U.S. 2nd Infant7 Division relieved them,

L1 WhiIe on the Jamestom Line, Commonweal& troops withstood a

number of heavy Chinese atlacks against heir positions, especially ones ;rgainst Little Gibral~r and during the Battles of the Hook, They also made sweral company-sbed or larger raids into the Chinese lines.
LII W e n the war ended in July 1953,14,200 Commonweal& isoops were se+ng in Korea. Totaa Commonwt.dth. Division casud~es (including the period before it was famed), were 93 oficers and 1,170enlisted men killed; 301 sficers m d 4,516 enlisted men. wounded; and 60 oficers and 1,228 enlisted men missing, 1,036 of whom were taken prisoner and eventually repatsbted,

Denmark, Nomay, SSweden and Itlly professed neuvafip when the &rean War erupted and declined to send combat c o n ~ n g e n to ~ the peninsula. They did, however, agree t o suppart the UN. by sendinp- and funding the eflarts of medical detachments, most of which esablished hospjtals in Sou& Korea. India also sent a medical derachment, but because h was a miIitar). unit that directly supported Commonweal& u n i in ~ the field911 is de'gcdbed tvr"th the r n i l i ~ con q pibutions t o the UN, ause.

filied Forces

143

O Denmark sent a lOO-n~ernbier medical demchrnerat and the Red Gross

hospital shipJutlandja to Korea in March 1953. It remained active in and around I(area until dter the armistice, returning home in August 1953.
O Initially, the Danish medical team ueated mostly U.N. military casualties, working both on theJutlandia and in field hospitals near the front and using the ship' S ambulance helicopter to evacuate casualties. Eventually,however, the Danes extended their s e ~ c e to s ciGtims as wll,

O Jutlandia was based mainly out of Pusan, but frequently moved to other casualties from Korea to Japan. areas and periodically ~ansported

i ; ; l

Italy sent 37 Italian Red Cross medical personnet to Korea in November 1951, They ran a hospital in Seoul, p r a ~ d i n g ouyatient services mainly to ci~lians, untitJanuary 1955. In. Febmary 1953,the Imlian contingent had t o rebuild their hospitsl after it hlrned down, In doing so, c h q nearly LI-ipted its capaciq, expandkg it from 50 ta 145 beds.

O Noway sent a 105-member mobile surgical hospital to Korea, a dekchment &at became k n o w as Nor It ar15ved in Korea in June

1952 and remained until November . During its time in Korea, H operated its 200-bed field hospital plimarily near Tongduchon, nor& of Seoul. It provided inpatient and outpatient services to both militaly personnel a d ciGlims, H was administered by the Nomegian Red Cross during its first haKyear in Qrea. Rom November 1951 onward, howewr, while it:w a still sMed by Nonvegians, it received IogisLieal support &rectt)l h m the U.S. k m y m edical s e ~ c e s .

The Ka~earm War

O Stveden sent a flikmember medical team to Korea i n September 1951.

This team es~b&shed a field haspit-al in Pusaa, using both existing buildings m d tents, which was eventual&expmded to 450 beds. Q During the heavy fighting of the f i r s t year of the war, the Swedes were

kept Isus):mainly ~ r mh i l i ~ r casualties, y From mid-l 951until they left Korea in April 1957, however, they p r d d e d rnedieaf s e ~ c eto s ciGlians as welt,

NORTH KOREAN A N D CHINESE FORCES

""This a m y is powrtixl becmse all its members have a consciaus discipline;

they have came together and tbey fight not. for the: private interests af a few individuals or a nanovv clique, but Eor the interests of tbe broad masses and of the whole nation,'"
-Mao Tse-Tung, QuotationsJ b m Chairman Mao irse-Tung (""Little Red Book")

0th the Nor& K01-em and Chinese umies were tough, doc~i~air professional e, r n 2 i a osganizradons ~ cvh~se mmpower m d dI"s+Iine made hem a match lrnr rhe teckn01~gica11y superior a m & &at opposed their attempts; to uniq Korea under communist mle. (Many digerene w e 5 of weapons zre refez~ed to h &is &apter; more complete descripdons are found iR Chapter fX' Weapo~s, VehicIe.slm d EquipmenL )

D U.S. claims in 1950 that the South Korean a m e d hrces mrf:afnong the best in the world proved to be painfill4 untme. H o m e r , the North Korean People" h m y (MWA), or Inmingun, was one sf the most heaely =mecl, in Asia, in 1950. disciplbed, m d egeceve forces in the wrEd, and cer~inly This c o m u n i s l a-% rroot;c,can he traced W the anti--Japanese guerrilla groups that operated i n Korea and Manchufia in the years prior to and during World War 23;.

152

The Korean War

O W e n t.he SoGet Union occupied the nortfienr half of Korea in 1945, it began to organire these partisan groups into a Soviet-style modern army. Most of the S o ~ eefforts t were toward the creation of ground forces, mostly i d a n v formations, while fewer resources were devoted to air and naval forces,

O Many of the officersand voops of the North Korean People's

combat veterans who had served with the communist forces during the Chinese Civil War or uith the Soviet forces during Wlorld War X I . Indeed, according to some accoun&,K m 1I Sung, premier of North. Korea and the of the Enmingun, hught in a Soviet unit against the commander-in-~hief &mans at the BattIe of Sdingrad. The Inmirrgun was formally founded in F e b m v 1948. By the time the Democrati<: People's &public of Korea w s proclaimed in September 1948, the army wiks a formidable fighling force. S o ~ einfluence t con~ncred even after Russian occupation troops %+&drew from North Korea, and in December 1948 the Sovliet ambassador (Ifomer head of the occupation forces) took charge of a m i E i ~ v a d h og ~m p ,
O By mid-1950, the Inminpn had a seengflh af about 135,000 military

personnel, mast of etlern ground comb& hrces. On June 25$ 1950, twethirds of this force, about 90,000 men, massed an the 38th parallel and then crossed over it into h e Republic of KrJlrea, igniting the k r e a n War.

Just three days a k r they crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Rqublie of Korea, the
disciplined, heavily amed soldims of the North Knrem People's A m y caphtred the South Korean capital of Seoul.

North Korean and Chinese Forces

153

O At the start of the war, the North Korean ground forces were organized into two corps, which incorporated eight full infantq divisions (11,000 men at full s ~ e n g t h ) two , half-strength infanq divisions, two independent special forces regiments, an amored brigade, and five brigades of border cons~brxla troops, ~

fll bmored whicles were one advan~ge the North k r e a n hrces had over
their South Korean opponents. North Korean armor, the 105th h o r e d Brigade, was equipped with about 120 Soviet-made T-34 tanks. About 30 mare of these batdefield monsters were a t ~ c h e d to other units, far a total of &out 150. In addition, it &o had a number of self-propelled aftillerl; pieces and armared cars.

O Another advantage possessed by the North Korean People's Army was a suong artillery arm, which included a large number of heavy anillev pieces. These weapons were brought to bear before any others in the conflict, laying dawn a salvo of fire ahead af the advance into Sou& Korea.
Q North Korea" f a n a ~ c d border cons~bulav, the B0

h Dae, was an especially ideologically committed force uained directly by the Soviet mili~ry advisars. One of the five brigades of'the these troops participated in the invasion of Sou& Korea.

Clft m e n the North Korean People's &my rolled aeross the 38th parallel in June 1950, it quickly memm the surprised, lightly amed, and unders~ength Sou& k r e m army. Wi&in hours, tche communists captured major border towns like hesang and UQongbu.

O Pllong the west coast of the peninsula, the NWAk 44th Division captured he br@mc;rpital of Seoul on the third day af the oEensive. Mter a brief pause, it and orher unirs continued fourhwad, chasing the KC)K government and its shattered army. On the eastern half af the peninsula, other elements of the fnmingun, reinforced Mrith special farces unie that had landed along the coast behind the Sauh k r e m forces, drove souhward as well*enjftflng similar mccess against the shattered ROK armed forces.
Q In early JuSly, the Inminpn batlled unirs of the U.S. Army for the first time-Task Force SmitLb followed by other elernen~ of rhe 25th Infancry Division to start with--and quickly defeated them. Indeed, despite their air, sea, and technafogicdsuperioriq, the h e r i c a n s were able to do little more L h m slow the communist advmce sou&ward toward h s a n and ultimate

The Korean Wzr

G c t o ~The . steadJrdrive south provided a great boost to Naah Korean and communist morale in general, and led people on bo& sides to believe &at the Inminwn was uxlbea~bte.

O In early h p s t 2950, the North k r e a n People" k m p began 60 mass along the Pusan Perimeter, the Gnal redoubt of the disorganized ROK arid U.N. forces, Although it had s d e r e d heavy losses over che preceding five weeks, it mure than made up for them throngh recmiment among its o m people and by impressing Sou& Korem cihzens into sehce; indeed, some sweng&, of its brigades were woffen to d ~ s i o n
Q W i l e a cancenwated assault against axle or a few paints a1ong the Pusan Perimeter mUld probably have f a ~ l l y brexhed it, the North b r e m forces all along the line, m$ were instead launched a succession af limited at.t=dcks in Aupst m b September, unable to decisively perletrate it. In mo a s a u l ~ ~ over the Naktong fiver, which famed one edge North Korean u n i crossed of the Pusan Perimeter, In the First and Second Batdes of the Naktang Bulge, however, U.N. forces were able to halt the communist assaults and, after heavy fighting, reduce the North Korean bridgeheads.

O Every day that the communist forces battered away at the perimeter, they depleted more of their resources and grew weaker, a sirnation exacerbated by the fact that their supply lines were suetched to breaking point and being constantly battered by the uncontested U.N. air and naval forces. N i l e the Nor& Korean forces continued twng to force the perimeter, desperate U.N. defenders grew progressively stronger, as supplies and troops coxlfinued to flow into the port r>fFusan.

!MCHON: HAMMER OF THE

u , N , FORCES

U In mid-September 1950,U.N. forces landed at Inchon, the port of Seoul,

an the wstern coast of South Korea. They quicMy defeated the North Korean forces holding the city, captured nearby Kimpo Airfield, and then began to advance both on the occupied city of Seoul and south, toward the besiegers of Pusan. Within days of the lmding at Inchon, U.N. forces around

North Korean and Chinese Forces

155

AXthaugh the war mded essentially in a shlematare, North Korean forces cetebrakd the wncfusion of the mistice as a victov.

even as the Nor& Korem forces Pusan began break out of rhe pe~meter, eondnued attemprting to break in.

L I By

t h i s time the communist fuppg? lines had been cut by U.N. forces heading south, and other forces wre ddGng north m d west out of the perimeter against hem, Caught b e ~ e e the n hammer and the anvil of the of U.N. foxes, the North b r e m People's b e g m ta break apart. 1Jy kite September 1950, a mere 38,000 men of the Enminpn were attempbg to saaggle back across the 38cht parallel into N o d k r e a . Thousands of Nor& Korean @sops remained behind in South k m a , sorne of them simply because they were cut oPT and others t o coduet pew_illaoperahons against the U.N. m d ROR forces,

D North Korean unif~, including the 16th DiGsion, seked conaol of the swrtl.lwestclrncorner of the peninsula, occupying the toms of Bohang, h d o n g , Masm, a d Sondong. It was Jmuaq 1951 before the U.S. 1st Infantry Division was able to break their. hold on Lhe area, and even then not: all sf the communist troops were eliminated, Remnants other unia fled into the TaebA, Sobaek, m d the h e a ~ l y wooded C h i d mclunlain ranges, where they remained a &orn in efie rear of h e RQK m d U.N. forces. Despite attemp& to clear guemillas out of t h i s range, it remained a base of a c ~ well 6 into ~ 1 9 5 S ~years o after the end of h e war,

The Koifean War

Many Nosh Korean officers and NGOs, like this a&illery officer capwred along the Nabong River in taumst 1950, were tmgh veterans of World War 1 1who famed a hard core for the communist hrces,

L ! In October 1950, elements of the Chinese People's VoXun~eers began to move into nar&em b r e a from Mmchuria, This move w a made in order to prevent ROR and U.N. forces from completely ovemnning North k r e a ,
Q Chinese intemen~ongave the Nab b r e a n People's Army the h e and pratecrion, it needed to regraup, and by spri"g of 1951 it was able L(:, fake to the field in strength once most-, althorxgh in a subodinate role to the now much stsonger Chinese forces.
iS I3y July 1952, just over a year since the war had hewn, the Inmiragun reached a new strengch of 21 1i ,U00 men and was organized into seven carps and Lhree independent divisions. Two years later, when the armislice was signed in July 1953, the s ~ e n g t h of the North Korean People's Army was 260,08&hce what it had been when the war began,

L1 m e n the Korean M"ar beg-an, North a r e a ' s air hrce had as many as 180 World War II-era piston driven attack aircraft, including Soviet-made Yak fighters. This force was far superior to anything South Korea could field ( h & k r e a did not have m y combat a i r c d t at this time) arld proGded formidable support to the North Korean offensive at the start of the conflict.
O North b r e a " sir arm tvas no match for a modernized air force equipped

with jet aircraft, however, and the U.S. air forces were more than a match for it. Once the U.S. Far East Air Ebrce tvas able to start uperaljng out of bases on Korean soil, it was quickXy able to neutdize the Nor* Korean air fosse, destroying its planes both in the air and on the ground and bombing its

North Korean and Chinese Forces

g57

a i ~ e l d sNot , until China entered the war, proGding both aircraft and b m s once agab in Manchuria for them to base out of; could the cammunis~ contest &e U.N. air supremacy.

f Korea's navy had only a hanrfful o if At the start of the Korean War, pauol craft, torpedo boats, and transport vessels, and was thus not equipped to participate in much more than coastal operations. Nonetheless, it did have a commmd smct-ure Ghat 'cvent as high ;as admird,

O On June 25, a North Korean navy vansport ship, formerly a Japanese

Imperial Navy vessel, was poised to enter Pusan harbor and land the 3rd Batalion, ?Nth Independent Regment of the North Korean People's y, a unit tasked with securing the port of Pusan. Had this operation succeeded, m d the basis of' the t7.N. resismce in. Korea fallen into enemy hands, the war may have ended in an early communist victor?^, However, a ROK patrol vessel, the N-"i"03, atmcked and sank the Nor& Kctrean ship a few hours befire the ground forces crossed rhe 38th parallel, Once the United Nahons en~ercd the war, its naval forces quickly eliminal.ed the tiny North Xsrrean nay.
rZt QnJlxly 2,1950, four Nor& &rean torpedo boats attacked t;irgets in the watel-soE the e a t c ~ atown t of Churnunjin. U.b;l. forces csunterat@ckedin what was to become the only naval batde of the wdr, des=o@g three of' the communist vessels,

iZL By September 1950, Nor& Koreds smdf coasal n a y had been eliminated and the U.N. Command had achieved naval supremacy.

O In early 1950,leaders of the People's Republic of China desired peace in Asia in order to consdidare their 'ci=lctory in the Chinese Civil M"ar and rebuild e y secognked the value of Korea as a b&er heir economy, Nonerheless, h state and gave their blessings to the N o d Korean plan to consolidate the peninsula under communism,

The Korean War

D Mao Tse-Tung and his ad~sors dso h e w that fazere w;as a chance Lhat their caumq might be dram into a war in b s e a , as it had in the past, Thus, during May andJune 1950, they deployed the 4th Reld &my (equivalent to a U.S. di\;.ision)fkom soax*ern. China to Manchuria, along the border tvith North Korea,

Ll m e n the United Staks ordered the U,S. 7th Reet

to the Seaits of Taiwan onJune 27, iin order to c o n ~ the n conflict in Korea and prevent a Chinese hvasion. of T a China condemned the x ~ o as n intewen~on in Chinese aairs.

U From chat point onward, China operated under the assumption that conflict T M i t h . the United States v ~ a s unavoidab2e. The United Sates, on the orher hand, rcmaked largely ohliivious to the Chinese &reat-ven afkr U.S. forces in northern liCorea began eneounteri-ng Ghhese mops in October 2 9563,
U In the middle ofJuly 1950, Chinese militaq leadership began organizing a Northeast Border E""orce around the Manchurian toms of h d o n g (across the Ydu K4ver from N o d Korea) and Sheqang, This organization formed the core of the G'hinesc:I"eopfe9s Volunteers.

Ckinese forces began crossing the Yak River at sevemI points in Oetabex 1950 and

massing to oppose the U,N, advance rzofihward, perceived as a theat to Ckinese

s0vereie;nt-y.

North Karem and Chinese Forces

153

O Throughout August and the first half of September, the Chinese

remained uninvolved at what would have been the most opportune time for them to intemene and t i p the scale in the fawr of the communis en the Nor& Korean army w a desperately e n g to breach the Pusan Perimeter and destr.y the 1-ctmnants of'tfie ROK army and the ever-increasingforces of the U.N. dlies.

13. Mter U.N. forces lmded at Inchon in mid4epternber 1950, houvever,

China began to hint through its diplomatic contacu in India that it would intewene af EQreigntroops crossed the 38th paralkl into Nor& Korea; it did not object to such an aclion by ROK fbxes, however.
O m e n U.N. foxes penetraled into Nor& k r e a and drove nor& tawdrd the Ydu River vjitlt the stated inrent deradicaring the No& Korean fegiime, China conhnued to irrsinuate that it would intemene, U.N. Qrnmand-idhid Douglas Mack*ur, however, who bad almost cornplelcl control over rhe U.S. policy in Korea, ignored these hints and intctlligence reports describing a Chinese m i l i a ~ buildup in Manchuria,

Li fn October 1950, as U,N, farces closed in on the fronder w i t h Manchuria, Lhe Chinese People" Volunteers crossed the Ydu River m d entered Grea, where they were ofkicidly welcomed as fellow communists a d saGors of the crumbling NorLh &rean regime.
O W i l e the Chinese ranks did include some volunteers, especialliy from

e&nic Korem communiries in nodeastem China, most of its woogs were h m y (early in the war, n l q replam from the Chinese People's Libem~on of them did not even h o w they were in Korea or why).
Q For bottr psy~kological and policicd reaons, bowever, it W= imparmt for the Chinese to mainain the pretext &at their treops were volunteems dram t o defend communism in Korea, By calling its soldiers 'toXunteers,"" the People" Republic of China tvas able to deny hmal involvement in k r e a and avoid the appearance of direcdy confronGng the United States,

B y the last week of October 1950, some 180,000 of hose volunteers had entered Korea under the leadership of veteran commander Gen. Peng Dehuai. This force was organized into three army groups, each roughly eqivalerlt to a U.S. corps, Each of &ese army groups canrained six 10,QQO-nlan field armies.

The Karean War

O These Chinese units were supported by only a handhl of trucks, no amored vehicles, and only limited amounts of artillely, and the vast majority of their uoops were foot soldiers armed with rifles. Indeed, in many ways the Chinese People's Volunteers army was similar to a European army of the pre6ous centuq,
O Contempora~yChinese units normally had a great many artillery weapons. The C W formadons, however, were unable to bring their heavy artilleq with them during the initial movement into Korea, and the largest wevans they had for s u p p t were 120mm mortars and a few Russim-made rockets,

O On October 26, the Chinese communist forces began to engage ROK army units along and sou& of the:U a h River, and over the f o l l o ~ n g web inflicted heav casudries an both Sou& Korean and Amnerican u n i ~ ,

On November 7, however, the Chinese forces uvifidrew into the Norh Korean ddemess once again in order to determine how the hvaders would respond to their s m g warning. On the same day, Nor& Korea puklicly annoweed that the Chinese People's Vollmteers had h e n active in Korea on its behaE shce October 25.
Q Four days later, on November X X, the Chinese Minisrsy of Fareign Mairs

made a similar announcement, A t about the s m e Lime, it began to rally domestic suppon for intervention with its "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign,which was also used to increase conuol over its population and to suppress internal opposilion to the communist government.

C! Chinese leaders believed that they bad been sending clear warnings ta
the United States in response to a threat to their frontiers. Nonetheless, MacArthur and the U.S. leadership remained largely, and deliberately, obli4ous to these wamings, dismissing the Chinese People's Volunteers as an insignificant force--despite increasingly desperate messages from U.S. eammmders on the ground,

D China realized its wamings were being ignored by November 24, when Gen. MacktX1ur launched the dl-out ''flame for GhAsmas" oEensive, intended t o end the V v a r befort: the end oi- the year. Two days later, the Chinese People's Volunteers launched their First Phase OEensive, a general att;ftck&ng the U N , line of advtzncc,

North Korean and Chinese Forces

1.61

CX Dismissed as "Chinese 1abxndr)imennby one U,S, general, the Chinese People's Volunteers smashed into U.N. forces, breaking their advance, ning their dispersed and surprised units, and forcing them to reueat in disarray. Communist Chinese surrounded and completely destroyed a number of ROR m d U.N, unir;s.
O In the east, for example, the U.S. 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infmtq Division were driven away from the Chosin Reservoir and forced to withdraw to the coast, sutfering heavy casualties from both gunfire and frostbite as hey re~eated, O In the west, Chinese forces atacked the U.S. 2nd Infanq D i ~ i o n near Kunu-ri and almost completely eliminated it as a fighting force. Many South Korean u n i were ~ also ovewhelmed and des~oyed, O Just six weeks after they had landed at Inchon, outflanked the North Korean army, and advanced toward the 38th parallel, U.N. forces were in full rout, unable to slow heir a m southward movement, much less &at of the cornmunisrs. This humiliating, chaotic wjrhdrawd became the longest uncontsolled reweat in U-S, m i l i ~ f history. y

Q In mid-December 1950,U.N. forces were abXe to es~blifh the Imjh fiver defensive line north of Seoul, near tfre 38th paraflel, bring the first two weeks afjanuary IY51, however, the Chinese launched what they called their Third Phase OEEensiive, which srrcceeded in dislodeg U.N. forces,

O 'By the middle of Januar).. l 951, the Chinese People's Volunteers had

driven U N , forces anotiher 50 miles sauth, past the city oESeoul, before U,N, forces were able to dig in once again. For the second time during the war, communist ~roops captured the South Korean capital,
U Beginning in lateJanua7 1951, U,N, forces began t o advance northward once again, tentatively at first and then in force. After hard fighdng that included a str-ong Chinese counterat~ck in rnid-Febmalfr 1951, the U.N. army managed to drive the commur.\isl;s back across the 3 8 t h ,parallel by e w b April and es~biisfi what came to be cdled the ''Qnsa Line."
O in the spling of 1951, Chinese communist forces, reinforced by the reformed North Korean army, launched two successive general offensive% against the U.N. lines. In the First Spring Offensive, from April 22 to 29,

The Korean War

1951, a quarter-million Chinese mops in 27 field armies (divisions) were again able to dislodge U.N. furces from heir defensive positions and drive them south. The communist forces sflered, heav casualties in &is operation, however, and wme unable to irnrnediatety press their advmbge,

LT M e n they launched the Second Spring OEensive a month later in M%y 1951, Chinese farces smashed into U.N. forees"'Na Name Line." This t;ime U.N. ~ o u p held s their gromd and repulsed the C:Xtinese oEensjve, forcing communist forces back in disarmy,

C 3 W& the failure of the 1951 spring aEensives, the Gkinese realized that
they were not going to he abfe to decisively defeat U.N. forces on rhe battlefield, and Lhus responded t o h e r i c a n overrures for peace nego~aeona
Pf For two more years the Chinese launched lbited afTensivctsto hara~s the h e r i c a n s or inflict demordizing cwualties an the Sou& Koreans, and engaged in cotxndess pawols, raids, and skimishes along the line of contact. By this phase of the war the Chinese were able t o h ~ n their g heavy artillery o slapport their troop and batter the U.N. lines. faward, using it t

CJ Leders afthe Chinese People" Volunteers parhcipated in tire armistice

negoliarions from start to finish. On July 47, 1953, C:PV commander Peng Dehuai signed the a g r e e a n t ending the corlQietin Korea.

LT Early in the war, Chinese tactics were especially well suited to dealing heavy blows to the spread out and disorganized U.N. forces. Once U.N.
troops were able to esabablish and hold defensive lines and consirtently make use of close air and heavy artillery support, however, Chinese methods did not fare so well,

U Early in the war, a special9 of the Chinese forceswas to make fast attacks, inflict as many casualties as they could, and then withdraw before the technologicalsuperiorityof U.N. forces could be turned against them. As the war progressed, Chinese forces were more inclined to go toe-to-toe with enemy units, leading to heavy casualties in their ranks.
U Throughout the war, Chinese soldiers demonsuated an ability to maneuver and fight at night. In addition and unlike their road-bound U.N. opponents, Chinese units could move rapidly over rough, mountainous

North Korean and Chinese Forces

163

~enain 'cuithout being detected by U.N. air recnnnaissance, and disappew into the mountainous regions of North Korea whenever necessary,

i-3 Chinese ~ o o p s used both grenades and submachine guns more

extensively, and perhaps more effectively, than soldiers ofthe other allied or communist forces,

Cf m e n cenducring campany-sized assaula agaitinst enemy pasilcions, the Chinese would fi.equencfv arm one platoon entirely w i t h concwsion grenades (as apposed to fragmen~tion g ~ n a d e swhich , were much more f the platoons entire4 dmgeruus for attacking troops to use) and the rest o with submachine wns.
13 Grenacle: plamosr memhers would lead the attack, sattrratlrtg the brget
positions wich grcsnades and attempling to smn and injure as many of the enemy solctiers as possible so that they cotlld be overrun by the next wave of attacking platoons. m e n they ran out ofgsenades, 1-hesesoldiers w d d pick up weapons eirher from Mien enemy soldiers of members or the submachine gun platoons,
D Unis of the Chinese People's Vojunfi~ers aiso emplqed infilrr-atiun platoons, elite groups ofveteran infanqmen who w u l d slip into U N . lines prior to an oEensive, sometimes dispised as ROK mldiers. They would then %tackenemy unie from ~ e l z i neven , as they were beirlg asaulted from wirltotlc, h r a k n g derndiCion pack into vehicles, weapons emplacemen&, and command bunkers and waning down smnned defenders.

C3: "Human wave" a c ~ c s at~buted to Chinese forces in contemporary

accounts of the war were largely mythical, In actuality, Chinese infanqmen at~cked. in re2atively open formaljaras and heir commanders were not signiAcanr-Iymore inclined to squander the lives of their soldiers than were their U.N. counteqarls.

111 Communist China" air force was equipped with SoGet-made MiG1S jet
c l Chinese p i l o ~ fleur these plmes against the U,N, air farce. Srcrdt, m Perhaps more impor-$, Chinese airfields just across the North Karem border in Manchuriawere used a ssde havens for Chinese, Nor& Korea, m d Russian pilots alike, The rule of the Chinese air force and its pilofs are described rrlore klly in Chapter XI, W z in the fir.

The Korean War

Q Wereas China had a fairly formidably nay, which it had been prepaAng when the Korean War broke out to support, an invasion of NatimaHst-held Taiwan, it knew this force would be no m a ~ h b r the U.S. 7th Fleet, one of the most powerfur. naval forces i n the world a t that hme. Consequently, it held its nay in reserve and did not use it to suppart %heconflict on the Karem peninsula,

WEAPONS, VEHICLES, A N D EQUIPMENT

"There is one eiiretical principle which is not subject to change. It is: use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount o f wounds, death, and desmction on the enemy in the minimum of time."
-6eorge S. Pattan, War As I Knew If.

mund forces m 7 both sida employed a w'de varieg dweapons, equipment, and vehicles during the Korean War. Throughour u l he h e murse of the war, bollh the United Nadons m m m mist forces used predomim r-ly World Mraf 11-Gntage equipment, and v t . 7 little new or cnt~ngedge ma teriel uliis used Marked excepdons to this were the jn&oduc~ond j P t aircrdt by botl"l sides and rhe use ul." helicopters by the allies for tbe &mspnr~aLion Df troop and the evacuatt'on & War in the Air, for infornationaboutjet aircrdt ofcasuddes (see C"hapterl and heir role in the war].

Mili~jlyorgmkaLions tradidondly use a n omenclaL serr"es of numbers and letteret0 designrate &eir militav ctguipment. Snch charactersmight indicate L h e year the qur'pment w a deve.lupedIitsplace in a series ofsimilarclquipmeat;or how it dHers &om oher equipment of h e

same type.

The Korean. War

Cl D u ~ n g the Korean War, the U.S. Army Ordnance Deparment used a w i c d namencfature qstem. Under this ystem, T" hdicated ; m

expefirneneal item (e.g., the 'I"-26 heay tank),

D When ;.m experimen~l item underwent a major chmge h a t aEfgcted its operational cbaracterishcs, it w a given the W& "El," "'E2,"etc. (e.g.,the T-2tiEl heay m k , which was given a torquernaric tsmsmissioxr in place of the ohginal electfic &five).

CI When an item went beyond the expefimenralstage and was adopted as a

sandad, it was given the designation "M" (e.g., the M-26 "Pershingm heavy ~ n k. )
Q M e n a major change is made ID such a smdard ilern, its designation is given the S & = AI, M , etc. (e.g.,the M-SA1 hdf-~acked personnel carrier,

which had a xing mount for a -50 ealiher machinegun mounted over rhe assis~nt driver" seat h t the M-3 lacked).
iIf m e n shor~ges of a component us& in the production of an item required major substitultions,B1 or B2 were added to the nomenclature of a piece of eqrlipxnent (e.g., the M-7BI self-propelled 105mm h o ~ t z e r ) .
Q m e n a sbndard item was modifiled by the development of an expeimental process or procedure, it was @venthe designaLim E l , E2, etc. (e.g., the T-26E1 heavy tank). When such a modified item was subsequently accepted as standard, rather than experimental, it was given a place in the regular "M" series of items (e.g., the M-5 light tank was a modified version of the M-3AX light tank).

U.N. forces, rrepeesenting nearly a score ofnacions, were armed wiLh a ty of weapons and equipment f i s t of what was used during the Korea War, hotvever, wm of U.S malzdacture.

of weapons employed durjng the Korean War were The vast rnaJ.orr'q arms &at could be cam'& ;md udfked ug~mafly by a single soldier. AIrhough some f&p d i e d poops used the& o w weaponly, most

Weapons, Vehides, and Equipment

167

An?lenkan and Sou& %rem soIdI'ers were equipped W'& LP,$.-ma& smdl arms, Communwedh &oops, for example, were xmed wilh Bri~sh-made No. 4 Mark I rBest SterIingsubmachinepn~~ and Bren fight machineguns, D M-1 ''Guand" .SO Cdiber m e . This gas operated semi-autornadc weapon had an 8-round intern& clip, a weight of 9.5 pounds (N.5 w i t h baynet), an eEecti.ve range of about 550 meters, and a rate ofgre of about 30 rounds per minute. The M-l Garassld was the prima7 rifle used by mast U,S, and ROK and many U.N, i n f m q regiments.

m e . A modified version of the M-l903 O M-190SM , 8 1 1 O L iCdiber rNe, the baic U.S. wapon d u ~ n World g War I, the bolt-action M-1903A4 weighed about t l pounds, held five rolxnds in a nondeachable magazine, was equipped with a telescopic site, and had an eEective range of about 900 meters, Such weapons were provi.ded to infanq u n i ~mainly , in the U.S. Madne Covs, where they were Issued t o platoon sergeants.
O M-l 30 Cafiber Carbine, This gwaperated weapon bad both semi-autornafic and fully atttamatic versions, accepkd a 15- of 3kound detachable box magaine, weighed 6.5 pounds, and had an eflFective range dabout 300 meters and a cyclical rate ofjlire of 750 rounds per minute. The M-l carbine was designed to fire a roblnd intermediq in wight and velocity bemeen riRe and pjstol amunition. Because of this lighter ammunition and shorar barrel, it had less r a q e , accuracy, and velociey &an the M-I riRe, and w a consibered under powered , carbines were c a r ~ e d prirnafily by and unreliable by many ~ o o p s M-f company grade oftficers, noncommissioned a%cers, and support troops and wre largely in~ended its a replacerrzent for the .45cdiber pistol.

M/%&& Brow% Auro~3adc M e ( B M ) . This weapon utilized the same .80 caliber arnmunidon as h e M-1 Garand, could fire either semi- 01fully automaeically, accepkd a 20-round detachable box magzine, weigtted f 9.4 pmnds loacfed, m d had a rate of fire of 300 to 600 rounds per minute and an eEective rmge of about 800 meters. The BAR w a the basic automadc support weapon sf the U.S. infm en in Korea a i d one or more of them tvas issued t o each sine squad. It could be fired eirher from the shoulder or supported by an integral bipod.
[Tli

Q M--X9^1lAI Cdiber .45 Cdibe-r Pistsl! This semi-automatic weapon carried seven rounds in a det-achable box magaine, weighed 3 pounds rmge of about 30 yal-ds, A classic loaded, and had a maimurn eBec~ve h e r i c a n weapon, it was the smdard U.S. sideam during the Karem V V ; a r and wm highly regarded for both its power m d rdiakility,

The Korean. War

D B~yo~zels, Bayone& were hives that could either be used as hand weapons or, ideally, mounted on the end of a M e that could then be used like at spear, A bapnet was secured to a d e by mems of a ring that slipped over the barrel of the r a e and Iby a lug, or metal deGee, on the rifle that snapped onm the bayonet. W i l e the usehlness of such weapons has been queshomed in every conRict since World War I, there are many accounts from the Kurean Ww of byonet charges and hand-tehand engdgements,

GRENADES AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

UN: forces in Korea used &ree bait w e s of h m d grenadef against e s r 2emy personnel: concussio~, fiagm enl-;a don, and chemr"cd* M m y of &ese grenadeesmdl explosive QIchemr'caf weapons h a t couJd be throm by a auld dso be modified m$ fired from the end ofa d e .

D Regardless of type, grendes consisted of a hollovv body filled w i t h explosives or other agen&and an opening for a fluze. In form?they included
caniskr-shaped grenades; round, "baseball" grenades; and cast-iron? serrated "pineapple" penades.
O Agrenade's fuze assembly typically included a pin that could be pulled to

activate the grenade and a spring-loaded safety lever, or "spoon," that could be held in place by the user undl he was ready to throw or otherwise release the weapon. After the safety lever was released, the grenade would explode, o s e c o n d delay. t-ypically.after a 4- t

D E n addirion t o the three basic types of grenade used in combat, "U.N. forces also used pracdce grenades, which contained a small explosive charge
and were safer than regular grenades for use on the practice range; and training grenades, which contained no explosive at all, were used in ixrstmclion or for. h r o ~ n praclliice, g

U Concussion, or "offensive" grenades, were designed for an explosive h e y eEect and to smn enemy soldiersj, especially in, enclosed am%, so that t w u l d be more winerable to follow-up attacks, like charges or smdl a m s fire,

CJ Offensive grenildes were vpicalfy used by stacking troops who, being in the open, were relatively safe from the limited, concussive effect of such weapons. Victims of such weapons, especially disciplined uoops, were

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

163

somehmes able to r e c w r enough to continue fighring egeclively before succumbing to more lethal at~cks.

D Early in the w r , concussion grenades used by U.N. forces included the M-l and M-3A1, explosive-filled metal canislem with hzes inserted into them, tveighing about l 4 owces overall, By 1953, a qpkal concussion gfenade consisted of a cardboard casing packed w i t h a halgpmnd block of plastic explosive and equipped tvi& a standard grenade h e .
iZ1 Fragmentation, m- defensive grenades, were designed t o break apart upon explosion. Such weapons had a kill radius of 5 to 10 yards and could inflict wounds in a blast radius of up to 50 yards.
O Because they were usudly throw less &an 50 yards in combat, defensive grenades were ypically wed by soldiers in fortified posifions, such as bunkers or foxholes, who tvould. be protected from their llelhd fragmerztaban.
U RIf-2PL1 fragmenfaLion grenades were m o n g those most commcmly used. Made af cast iron and weighing about 21 ounces, these pineapple-syle grenades broke into about f ,000 fragmenfs upon detonation.

CI Chemical grenades caxne in rnaxly va~eties, including smoke, used for

signalling or screening movement; chernical agents, mch as tear gas, used to irrimfe, iacapacimte, or kill; and incendiary, used to start fires or destl-oy equipment.
C1 Wl.5 white p h o q b o r o ~ s grenades were axnong the most common Such chemical grenadm and vsere originally intended I-br illurnina~an. weapons weighed about two pounds, had a h e with a 4- to 4.8-second delay, a blast radius of about 25 yards, and burned for up to 60 seconds. T a r e & in the area of effect would both be illuminated for riflemen. and machine gunners and suffer horrible bums that could not be extinguished with water.

O TW M-14 themite grenades were used to desvoy durable metal items, such as gun tubes or vehicle engines, by burning through them. They were equipped with Bsecond h e s and designed not to roll, so that they could be placed on su&aces like vehicle hoods.
Q Bangalore torpedoes were explosives used for blowing holes through obstacles, such as barbed wire. They generally consisted of a length of pipe,

about three feet long, packed with explosives that could be shoved into positlun, sametimes with other torpedoes, and then detonated,

The Korean War

Unlike small arms, heary weapons required ~ i or o more soldiers in order to funcu'on at heir full potential. These weapons, which induded heavf.machine guns, recailless d e s , and rn0rms1m d d somedmes be used by a single soldier at reduced eficiency. For example, a single soldier could load and fire a bi~zooka w'thout m assistant gunner, but at the price o f a slowerrate offire.H H wweapons ~ were oftenmounted on bipeds, tripods, or vehr'cIes.

O M-192 7241 Caliber.SO Machine gun. Developed during World War I, this
medium machine gun fired the same round as the M X d e and BAR, fed through i n belts at a rate of 400 to 600 rounds per minute.

O The heavy, water-cooled M-1917A1 was mounted on a tripod and issued

to the weapons companies of U S , infanq bat~lions;each divisioll had about 500 of &ern, During the $'rigid b r e a n ~ n t e r s ,an^-freeze was frequently used m coolant in these weapons, L l M-1919A3 Caliber .$Q Machinegm, This was essenfialfy the same weapon as the n12-1917, except that it m s air cooled, rather than wakr cooled, As a result, it vvas much lighter btxt had reduced rmge, accuraq, a d rate of fire, One or more were issued to each infanv platoon.
O M-2 Cdr'ber,5llMachinegm,This heavy w a p m t v a mounted on tmcks, m k s ,m d ather eacked vehicles and used as an hfmtry support weapon, Each i n f m w di;vision h%Babout 350 of &ern, Although air-cooled, the M-2 had a very heav barrel and cwld fire about 575 rounds per minute out to a rwge of about 2,oO yards.
iT;f M-1! 2,t.S5-inC12Rocket k m c h e ~Ciommonly , b o r n as a bazooka, this W r l d War T I mrirank mapon was largely inadequak against a powerfir1 tank, like the T-34s h i n g used by the North Koreans, However, i:t is also likety that U.S. soldiers using the 2.35 inch. bazoolca s d e r e d fiom lack of ~aining or Earniliariry with the ureapon and that old, "dud'karnaluniLion con~buted to its ineExeaq in combat.

iZ1 M-20 $'$-inch Rocket Launcher. A vast improvement upon the M-1 rocket launcher, the ""super-bazooka" consisted of a 1%0und aluminurn tube that fired an 8.5-pound hollow shaped charge that had a range of about 65 meters and was capable of peneuating up to 280mm of tank armor. 3.5-inch baz,ooka were gradualIy intl-oduced to allied wits in the weeks following the start of the war, replacing the obsolete 2.3Ginch bazookas.

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

Each allied infantry divi$on in Korea was eventually equipped with about 600 of Lhese weapons,
0 Mor~rs,GOrnm, 81mm, and 4.2 inch, These weaponmere used

primarily by infm en as anti-personnel weapons. Their sealed-breech tubes, mounted on heavy baseplates and supported by bipods, were used to fire explosive projecdles toward targets in a high arc. As indirect fire weapons, mortars could be used to attack unseen targets hidden in "dead space" like wenches, valleys, and defiladed positions.
O Recoilless rifles, $?mm, ?5mm, and 106ml.n. These were inf"anq heavy weapons that fired conventional artillery shells along a flat trajectoly. Such weapons, which developed high blast from escaping gases on discharge but had no recoil, w r e vrry ei"fective against both coops and fortifications. A single soldier, typically with an assistant gunner, could shoulder fire the smallest f 57mm) recoilless rHe, while the larger varie~es were crew-semd and mounted on tripods. Oldest of these weapons w a s the 57mm weapon wriey, while the much mart3 eEecthe Z Otimm recoilless rifle was developd during the Korean War. O M 4 0 lO6mm Recoilless M e . Designed largely as an anti-~ank weapon, the M 4 0 was developed during the b r e a n War as the T-170Ef and smdardized in 1953. It required a t w m a n c m and had a range of u pm 1,100yarcts and a sate of fire of about 5 rounds per minute. It was about IT feet long and weighed abmt 250 pounds, exclusiw of tcripod. A highly

accumtct, singleshot .50 caliber spot~ng rifle was mounted on top ofthe rear part of the M 4 0 barrel.

Korea was largely a n infanfly war, and weapons developed for orher rolessuch as ranks and anti-airc~*&t system-were largely used as kfantry suppm weapons, much as any sf-l%er crew-semed weapms. T m h were used like gim t bazookas, and anti-aircrdtsystems like mobile machinegun nests.

CI As with small arms, a number of the foreign contingents, especially the

Commanweal%b forces, were armed ~4th non-U.3.-made amored .vehicles, For example, Brirish armored troops used Bridsh-mde Centurion and Metear tanks, while some of the other Commonwdth forces were supported by Bren p n earsiers.

The Korean War

ILL Despite the fact &at World Mrar II had demonsrated the vdue of armored divisionsmajor units organized around tanks and supported by infmw, ra&er thm organized around infan en-the Westem powers persisted in relegating tanks to the role of infantry support weapons.

O At the outbreak of the Korean War the United States had only a single
armored division, in Europe, out of its 13 combat divisions (as compared ored divisions out of 89 total during ~ b r l War d 11). In contrast, the SoGet Union had at Eeast 50 armsred divisions, about a third of its total ground forces.

r=l D u ~ n g Ihe first few rnontfis of the war, U.N= foxes had no armored support. Tanks were the U.S. Army's prirnaq anri-mnk weapons, arid a lack of support made infanqmem vulnerable to being avermn by enemy armor, a s they wre in ttre opening engagements of the war. Q Evenn~aXly, U.M. forces deplqed tanks to the conflict, anrong them the most advmeed in the U.S. arsenal, the M-26 Pershing. Ulhmately, however, it was m older World War If tank, the M 4 Sherman, Ghat proved most eEecLive and reliable i nk r e a . Its unde~owered 75mm main p n w a ~ p h c e with d a high &city 76mm cannon.

Q Three new tanks, conceived around 1947,were being developed during the h r e m War, but did not see sefice in: the conflict. These were the 2&ton T-41 light tank, a m e d with a 76mm gun; the 30-ton T-42 medium tank, armed with a SOmm gun; and the T-43 heavy tank, armed with a huge l20mm gm.

O In 1948, pending the release ofthe new tank types, an interim tank was
introduced, the M 4 6 "Patton." Some 2,000 M26 tanks, in storage since the end of World War 11,were given newly developed engines and uansmissions and were dubbed M-16s, a large tank operated with a crew of five.
Cl When the Korean War broke out, development of the T-42 was still incomplete. Its turret and range finder, however, were mounted on the M 4 6 chassis, and in 1951 the four-man M 4 7 was created.
O In 1952, the M 4 8 was released, similar in most respects to the M 4 7 but with a one-piece cast ellipsoidal hull and rounded turret, which increased its resistance to anti-tank weapons. It was this tank, and not the T-12 as originally planned, that became the standard U.S.

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

1'73

U M-% "Ch&emLight Tank. This vehicle, first in~oduced in 1943,had a squat hull and turret, was protected with relatively thin armor, and was armed with a 75mm medium-velocit)..c a n o n and coaxid macfrine w n . It weighed about 18tons, had a crew of four, and was capable of speeds of up to 35 miles per hour on level ground.
O M-26 'Pershing"Heavy Tank.This 4&ton tank was invoduced in its final form in 1945 (having sewed as the T-26E3 since 1944). It was operated by a crew of five and was capable of speeds of up to 25 miles per hours on level ed Perslaing ineluded a 90mm main ground. Weapons on the heavily gun, a .50 cdiber machine gun on the turret, and a .30 caliber machine gun molmted in the hull.

flf M 4 3 E 8 '"Shemm" Medium Tmk, This 35-ton World War 11-era

armored vehicle became the U.S. force's pprimaq battle tank during trhe E8 was m improvem in late 1944, the canfiict, In~oduced . h m m e n t s for the the basic M 4 tank, smdardizecd in included a high velaciy 76mm main gun, an M-2.50 caliher heay machine gun mounled an tor) nf the turret, and a .30 caliber medium machine p n mounted in the hull. Its bull m s psotected by 63armar in front and %mm armor on the sides, and its t-umetby 76mm armor in front and 5lmm armor on the sides. This improved versian of the Shermm had wide tracks m d a meebanica2 SyStem that suited it we13 for the combat md tenain of Korea m d made it max;e reliable tkm the newer M-24 and M-26 lanks, It could move at speeds of up to 24 miles per hour on open ground. Ammunition for the Sherman included the 22.6 pound M42A1 HE round; the M 4 2 APCT round (25-pound projecdle); the T4 HVAP-T, 19-pound armorpiercing round (9.4 pound projectile), and a tungsten-comd "h~efp-$bot" an&-1;2nk round. MC arnmuaieon could peneeate 90mm of armor at 1,000 meters, while WM rounds could penetrate 152mm of armor at the same rmge.

Bemuse the U N , forces mIed &e skies over mast o f k r e a (m*&the notable e x c e p ~ mof MiC AUeyJ, new anrr'-aircr&t systems were not developed for rhe war. Exjstjng World War I1 anti-dredt systems were shipped to K m , but were used primarjly against enemy ground forces.

The Korean War

high-velocity p n and a pair of .50 caliber machineguns, the M-4A3E8 ""Seman" "came the U.N. forces" p r i r n q baale tank durxng the Korestn War, A World War If amored vehicle, it proved itself superior t-o many newer tanks for dealing with the climate and terrain a E Korea,

U M-M Multiple Gun M o Carriage ~ ("Quad .50'?. This 10-ton hatf-tracked vehicle vvas armed with a cluster of four .50 caliber machine guns fiat could be fired sirnultrdneously. Built upon the M-3 Infantr): Halfvack chassis and first produced in 1941, some 2,877 m a d .50s were mmdactured during World War II as an~aircrdt tueqoxrs, Halfirackswere amared whides equipped with a pair ufwheels in front and tracks in back, A Erandkl of other IsaKaaek variarcions were used dul-ing the conaict, particulary by U.5, and ROK forces, hdaircr& batralians were antang tfie units equipped witk the Quad .50s, Invoduclion of jet aircrdt made the @ad .50 largety ineEecdve as art anti-aircraft weapon, but it found a niche as a valuable anti-personnel weapon, and was rsurinely used to fire up to 100,000 rounds per day for a varieq of purposes (e.g., direct fire against enemy infanq, coverjng mutes afnightrime movement, or ystexnadral;tyslitching hil1,c;idesvYiLhdeat-flyfire). &cause of their powerEul m~-personnel capabilities, Chinese troops made destrwction of Quad .5Qsa priority, even over ~ n k swhich , were much less of' a threat to i n f a n t v e n ,

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

O M-I S 40mm Mulriple Gun Motor Carriage ("Dual40'7. This fully-uacked vehicle consisted of an M-26 tank chassis armed with a pair of Bofors 4Omm automatic anti-airt:raftcannon, Like the Quad ,50, the Dual 40 served largely as an infantry support weapon during the Korean War. This weapon system saw action bef'ore the end &World War 11 and was based on Swedish designs from the late 2 930s.

CI M-42 40mm Multiple Gun Motor Camiage ("Duster").Developed in the ~ ~ mobile weapon system was very similar to the M-19 in that it early 1 9 5 0 this was a fully tracked vehicle armed with a pair of 40mm automatic guns. It did not see extended sehce unliX the Vietnam War,

hmared personnd car~iers, &a.&& vehicles ofien sirnllar in appeal-me to tanks but usuaff. ~ ' r h o uamament e h e a ~ e Lhan r rnaclijne guns, were developed in the years f~Ucl~i;lg World War II for aanspor~ng i n f m ~ m e quicMy n m d FVjL-fi: some degree ofprotec~on,

C1 M-% armdpersonnel camier. Designed to replace Its post-Wodd War

X1 predecessor-the open-topped, 17.5-ten K39 and the much larger M44, which rivalled a city bus in size and could carry up to 27 p s s e n g e r e h e 18.8-ton M-75 personnel carrier could cany about a dozen h-oops, including the driver. It consisted of a vacked vehicle chassis upon which was mounted a box-like supersmcture, or passenger comparment, which provided all-around protcrtcrion for the troop, A small number of such vehicles were used near the end of the b r e m Mrar,

iZ1 M-59 armored perso~~nef carrier. Veq similar to the M-75, the 1 8.7-ton
MI-59 w a s introduced near the end of the k r e a n W a and rttaized civilim components in order to keep costs down. Its design took advantage of its relative bulk to give it limited amphibious capabilities, allowing it to operate in fairly calm water Gthout any preparalion,
U Mechanically, both the M-75 and the M-59 were similar to the M l l l light tank, and as a result were capable of accompanying tanks over any terrain they could traverse. Such capabilities helped facilitate the development of joint armor-infantry ~ c d c s ,

176

The Korean War

ding vehiclesI tracked (LW, fully-~rracked personnel czrders h a t could be used for shiptrrshore amphibious assaults, were used extensively by rhe US. Marine G o ~ and s ~to a lesser extent rhe U.S. Army, during World War E Such vehicles, known as '"amphibian tractors" or simply ckmphibians, "alsoproved heir utility during operaLions in hrea.

Cl In the early 1930s, Donald Roebling began developing such vehicles for
rescue m r k in the non& Everglades. Awrking model exisled by 1937,m d within a few years the Marine Corps became interested in it. Roebling's rnodel vvas redesigned for miliasy use, and in X940 the Marines placed an order for XOO unils of the 7.&ton, unarmored, open-topped LVT1 "aligator," recei4ng the vehicles in 1941,
O To a large exlent, LljTs resurrected the idea that amphihiow operations could be successhl, largely quashed by the abortive BriCish landing at Gallipoli, Turkey, during Miorfd War I. Such vehicles proved invaluable in World War I1 for bath i n i ~ ac l o a s ~asaul& i and hrther movernent inImd of troops and equipment, especidly dllring the island-hopping campaign in the P a c ~ c ,

D Several successon of the original LmLthe Lm3, LmA4, and LWASremabed in the U,S. arsenal when war broke out in Korea. A modsed .form of the LW3C MJ%~used in the Inchan Lmding and as an amored personnel carrier in the subsequent drive on Seoul and crossing of the Han River.

C3 Characteristics vallied by model, For example, the LVT3 and LWA4 both had ramps at the rear that could be lowered to load vehicles or other equipment, while the LVTM had a ramp in front; L m 4 was open-topped, i t h a mrret, and armed with a while LVTA4 was enclosed, topped w short-barreled 75mm h o ~ t z e r .
O M e r the smrt of the conflict in b r e a , a demonstrated need for such vehicles prompted their continued development and the production of the P5,which was larger and heavier than its predecessors and improved upon heir design,

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

177

U.S. Marine Corps amphibious &actors (AMTMCs) fire on im enemy held t o m h r n positions along the Han River beach, on September 25, 1956, Such versatile, mobile vehicles were used for ;trzmspoaingmops, Eire suppo&,and a wide variety of other roles,

m i l e Task Force Smillh was quipped M.i& mly a 6;ul&ul o f IllGimm hOW'LZ~TS~ in i t s gnal phase tlie Korem W u became, for tfie most part, a n ar~llev conflict, By this h e , the died force8 had large numbers of ARzericm-made IO5mm, 155mm,md big &-inch e n q from which h e y fired inzmetnstl gua~ Lides ofmmuniLio~~. Some ofthemust common e e s appear below,All o f h e weapons listed below were used by Sou& Eorearrr forces in vev limited num bers if at aJll before &e Nor& h r e m inwsion, but increasingly dukng m d dter h e warS

fZ M I 8-inch (203.2mxn)H ~ ~ ~ z Bevelaped er. dufing World War U, &is huge weapon was mounted on a four-wheeled c a ~ a g ew , s about 36 feet long (from end of barrel to end of car~age mils), and wighed about 15 tans. It had a range of abaut 18,000 yards (10 miles) and a rate of fire of 30 rounds an hour. Such weapons w r e towed by eirher a Xa-lon m c k or special

178

The Korean War

~aeked utility vehicle, had a fill1c r m of f 4, and required at least 20 minutes to set up far firing*

0 M-IAI 1 5 h m Gun ("Long Tom ").Developed in the late 1930sfrom the

French 155mm p n , this weapon wed the =me c a r ~ a g e as the M-1 %inch ho~~ze was r , transported much the s m e way, and was comparable in size. It had a range of about 25,000 (14 miles),a rate offire of up t o 60 rounds per hour, and a full c r w of 14. This w n was also k n o w in the past-Warld War I1 m i l i ~ as ~y the M-59, and, when mounted on a selGpropelled tracked chassis, as the M40.

O M-114 IS5mm How'tzer. This medium h o ~ a e was r disrinpished by

small shields on ei&er side of the barrel, was mounted on a ~ewheeledt split-traif carriage, was about 24 feet long, m d weighed about six-and-a-ha tons, It had a range of about 18,000 prds (lO miles) and a rate of fire of about 100 rounds per hour. 11 had a crew sf f 1, took about 5 minutes to set up and start Gring, and w a towed by eifjfxera %ton truck or a ~ a c k e d udliy vehide,
O M-10lA1 IO5mm HoM";i&er. Development af the M-l 01 ho~t_zer began in. the late 1920s m d production of the WIOIAI ho&@erbegan in 1939and ended in 1953, by which .r;ime 10,202 of the weapons had been manufactured, It had a fan@ of about 12,000 yards (nearly 7 miles), and a rate oE fire of about 100 romds per hour. It required a crew of eight, who

needed only about three minutes m set up and slart firing the weapon. Up to 20,000 rounds csuld be fired through the barrel, after wfiieh it had to be replaced. In addition to being mounted on a twolvheeled carriage, the M-IOIA was also used on a tracked chmis as a seK-propelled arfilley piece; e.g,, the M-? "Priest.'"
O In addition to U.S. weapons, some of the U.N. contingents utilized their

Regiment own artillery pieces. For example, the New Zealand 16th Artille~y was armed with British-made 25pounders.
O Proximity fuzes, first developed during World War II, increased the effectiveness of high explosive bombs and artillery shells. Such bombs and

shells used radio waves to detect aircrdt, the gmund, or &er taIge& and then explode at a certain distance from &em, rather than on impact.

Initial&t the North Korean People %Army(M-A) was better a m e d and equipped than any ofthe allied or communjstforces involved i n the conflict,

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

and had far more heay weapons and communications equipment than rhe Chinese People 3 Volunteers (CPV). Much of heir heav equipment was destroyed early in the war, however, in large part because of allied air superioriy, and by 1951 the decimated NKPA and the C W were similarly armed m d equipped,
O Most of the weapons and equipment used by the North Korean People's Army were supplied to it by the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, while the USSR had developed weapons systems to replace those used during World War 11, those that they provided the North Koreanswere old and relatively obsolete.

O Russian-made equipment tended to be exvemely mgged, of simple design, and very easy to maintain, making it ideal for the illiterate peasant armies of Nor& Korea and Chirra,
O Because U,S. Eorces were sa prone to handon weapons and equipment, especially early in the war or when under duress, the North Koreans also utilized a signgcant amount of captured h e r i c a n makriel.

U While the communist forces did use a hodgepodge of SoGet and Japanese rifles, fhese w r e almost excbsively bolt-action, racher than semi-automaeie weapons. A desire for high rates of fire led them to use submachine guns as their primary infanq weapons.

O Small arms carried by North Korean uoops tended to be manufactured

in, and prouided by, the Soviet Union, Chinese small arms, on the other hand, tended to be based on Soviet designs but manufactured in China. For example, North brean, troops carried the Souiet-made PPSh41, while Chinese aoops camied a near identical copy that they referred to as a Type 50" mbmachine gun.
O Submachine Gun, Z 62mm,PPSh-41. This weapon could be fired fully or

semi-automatically, accepted a 35-round box or 72-round drum magazine, weighed about 8.5 pounds, had a mawimum etrective range of about 150 meters, and a cyclic rate of fire of 70W00 rounds per minute. Xe fired the Soviet 7.62mm pistol round. Cheap, simple, and dependable under extreme batdefield condircions, the Russian-made PPSh-41 wizs one of the best submachine guns of World War II. Ifis design was based on the Soviet

The Korean W x

principle that ground troops required a high rate offire rather than accuracy from &eir weapons, This wm the most gdespread submachine gun in the carnmunist mnks, m d was called a "burp, pas'by U.N. troops became of its characteristic sound. In the Trnd phadie of the war, the Chinese carked such weapons and grenacfes almost exclusively when stacking.
C3i T0karcj.v7,62mmSemi-automaticW e .This So~et-mstde semi-autamadc rifle accepted a detachable 10-round box magaine, weighed 8.7 pounds (10.8 wirh magazine and bayonet), and had a rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute. This weapon tilled the same role as the dXied B=
Cl Carbine, Z62mm, M-1944. This Soviet-made bolt-acdon weapon could hold 5 munds in a non-de~chable box magaine and weighed 8.9 pounds. One of its chmcreristics W% a permanently fixed bayonet that folded d o m along the right side of the stock h e n not in use.

O T p e 99 Long M e . h Xmpe~dJapmest: weapon, this bolt-acdon rifle

hefd 5 faunds in an intemd clip and weighed 9.1 pounds, Wane included a short version (44 ra&er &an 50 inches in leng&) and a sniper S e with a four-pwer scope. 14,5mm h ~ - m M k e , Also used as a saiper riffe, this n wm wen more eEecrive against. so&-bodiedvehicles like ored vehicles, It chmbered a single mck$ mdjeeps &an it was against g war, weighed round, the largest used in any convenaland firearm d u ~ n the mare &an 38 pounds unloaded and, at more &an sk-md-a-haXf feet long, was supposed by a bipod.

ia Tokarev ? . m m Pistol, m 3 S 1 This Soviet-made pistol, and a

near-identical Chinese: copy, the Type 51, were used extensively by the communist forces during the brean War. It held e i e t rounds in a detachabe b x ma;g;zzineand weighed h u t 1.8 pounds,

Bayone@, Bayanets were used, when av&labfe, by c a m m i s t troops on. their a e s . Such w a p s w r e not suieble for use on submachine p s , however, which were too short to be egective with a mounted bayonet (md which were not equipped fi& bayonet hgs, in m y case),
C)

GRENADES AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

181

This Russian-made aatitslnk rifle fired h e a v slugs that c d o u X d severely &mage m y amored vehicles by pmetrating their endne comp breakout &om the Pusm Perimeter, f i example, No&k Korean troops used such weapons to disable a number of 1 1 1 . 5 ,W s .

Gke their U.N cwnterpartf, c~mmmist forces in Korea wed hree bilsic SOT& ofhmdgrenades: coneumion, fiagmentadon, arzd chemicak
D Srjck grenades, one of the most common foms of g r a d e used by the communist forces, consisted of conventional explusivet-filled metaf heads mounted on wooden s ~ c h .These were considerably Itzdkier &m conventional grenades but could he h r o m hr&er m d more accurately,
ff Concussion grenades, for exampk, generdly consisted of &in, explosive-filled rnelal canisters m m t e d on wooden sticks,
Q Fragrxren~~on grenades came in several vahe~es.These included pineapple grenades very similar to the U.S.-mmufact-uredM-2AI md stick h iron heads that were modeled after the SoGet-made grenades ~ t smooth RGD33 hand grenade.

D Chemical grenades, Eke tkow used by the allied forces, incXuded smoke, chemical agent, m$i n c e n d w varieties and were generaw canistcrtr-shaped.

The Korean War

O Satchel charges were another type of small explosive used by communist forces, especially the Chinese. Unlike grenades, if used properly they could be used to disable or destroy armored vehicles, including tanks. They consisted of c a n w bags filled with explosives that could be thrown short dh~ances, 57faicdlyi n ~ bunkers o or ag;l_inst the tracks o f amored vehicles.

C~n~rxrunist forces in Korea used sever& s o r offully ~ automaticmachine guns as infancry support weapons, most of hem Z 62mm weapons ofsoviet design. North Korean forces tended to be armed w'th weapons ofsoviet mmdacture, while the Chhese used domes& models based on Russim
designs Medium Machine Gun. This machine gun accepted a 250-round medlic link mrnunidon belt, weighed 30.42 pounds, had a mmimurn eEeceve range of about 1,500 meters, and had a cyclic rate offire of 600-700 munds per minute, It was mically mounted on a wheeled carsage that wighed. 59,s pounds.

O G o p n o v S-3

0 M o r ~ r s d20n2m, , 82mm,m d Ijlmm. Because these weapons could be cheaply manubctured and ~ansportcsdby foot soldiers mare easily &an artilfexy pieces, mortars w r e very popubr in both the North h e a n arld Chinese amies, W i l e a hodgepodge of momrs could be found in the communist ranks (e.g.,U.S. or ImperialJapanese),most wreh weapons w r e of Soviet design or manufacture. Each NWA division had six 120mm martars, each ofia three bardions had nine 82mm nnorQrs, and each of its companies w a likely to have scrtme 6lmm mortars. The 82mm and 6lmm morars had the ad?van.ageof being able tu fire ammrxnition for the U.S.-made 81mm and 6Omm momrs, respectively. hericm-made morars, however, were not able to fire the S o ~ e t munitci~ns,

Rocket launchers like bmaokas, recoilless rifles, and similar wapons intrinsic to the U.N. arnlies were not integrd t o Ihe cornmunisr forces md were utilized only when captured from d i e d forces,

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

183

By 1950, five years into the age of atomic weaponly, convenrional m2dom in h e West was &at zrmored vehicles were obsolete. Th&sea dmen t was not shared by rhe Soviet Union, however, the mentors and arms suppIiers for Nor& Korea.
P W e n Nor& Korea invaded the south inJune 1950, it spearbeaded ifs assault 6 d f i a mere four batalions of ~ n k conskisting s of some X50 T-Ms. Faced with norhing but light anti-tank weapons, the Russian-made tanks =re nearly unstoppable. D F34/85 Medium Tmk 'This 35-tan v&ick W% armed vuitl.1 a high velocig 85mm gun and capable of speeds up to 34 miles per hour. First produced in 1941, it became the Soviet Union's main battle tank during Vt"brtd War 1 1 . Its hull was pmtected by 47mm a m o r in &ant and 45mm amor on the rear md sides, m d ifs turret by 65mm or in front mil sides, m d 47mm arrnor i n the rear,
Q North &rean forces w r c 3 equipped ~ t T-34s h at the begiixming of the w r , but thin several rnontZzs nnost of &em had been desaoyed, largely by U.N. air forces. m a t fm m k s rmained chefeafter w r e kept hidden and used spa~agly. hnnuni~on for the T-34 included the BR-3SOA armor piercing/= round; thc: OF-350 HE/&agmentaistian round; and the SH-350 shrapnel round, Q SU-76 SeSPrropelled Gun. This Soviet-made, tracked vehicle weighed about 12 tons and was armed with a ZISS 76mm p and crewed by four soldiers. It had a maximum speed of 28 miles per hour and a range of 166 miles and was nominally protected by lOmm to SBmm of armor. Such weapons could be brought into action quickly and were designed to provide mobile light arrillery support for a wide ~ r i e t y of operations (e.g., infanuy

a)*

support for bo& the Norh Karem md Chinese forces wag closely based on rhe Soviet mode1 (although,initially,the Chinese forces did not bring most af heir heavy wu1ev into norhern Korea). Most of the

The Korean. War

Perfected for use against the Nazis during World War 11, the 1"-34 was amed with a hi&-velocity 85mm gun and s u p ~ i oamor r protection, lit spearheaded the Nortfi Korean drive into South Korea in summer 1950, enjoying peat success against the lightly ROK and U.S. t-roops.

artillev pieces used by the communist forces, M ' & the exception of some ImpenrT;3J Japanese guns, were prorided by the Sovjet Union.
C1 Communist di~sions generally conbined a dozen 122nrm fiOMxit~em,a dozen SU-76 self-propelled guns, a dozen 45mm anri-tank guns, and three dozen 7Smm h a ~ a e r s (12 of which were crl-ganic to the diGsion" s r e e regiments, four to each),
O Some more powerful, long-range weapons were also used by the communist forces, such as the So~et-madeX22mm a e d cannon m d 152mm b a ~ t z e r They , were much more rare, however, m d ammunition for &ern was often in short supply.

Weapons, Vehicles, and Equipment

185

O In tbe latter part of the war, the communist forces massed artillery in

great quantities and unleased massive barrages on U.N. positions. In convast to the profligate American gunners, however, communist artillerymen were reluctant to fire at targets that they could not see, a tendency based on the more limited quantities of ammunition at their disposal.

Lack o f h e r i c m battlefield preparedness at thestart ofthe Korean War could be paced in parr, to an overdependence on atomic weapons. The Uni~ed &tes m d tibe SOviet Union c o n d ~ u e dto develop such weapons during and after the connicr, however, and American policy makers were forced to addl-essthe issue o f using &em in Korea.
O M e n war broke out in b r e a , the United S ~ t eimmediately s began to

plan how nuclear weapons could be employed on the peninsula. At that dme, however, b e h c a controlled only a few atomic weapons, and these were not ready to be deployed,
Q InJune 1,951,Army Chief ctf"SMJ, Lawton Collins subrllittcld a plan t o

the Joint Chiefs of S& calling far the use of a~unlicweapons against concentraCians sf communist troops, and for to begin waining fighter-bomber crews to d e l k r such w q o n s , hh m y Operations Division memo supportttd Collins+ropos;il, and stated that use of atomic weapons might become necessav garrnisdce talks failed. "In the event of a sdemate in Korea in which the communist forces pit rnanpower against our technological advanbges, use af the atomic bomb to increase our eficieney c & killing is desirabk," the memo said. TheJoint Chiefs endorsed this plan, but agreed to implement it only if U S , ground forces in Korea faced mnihilafion.
Q Xn September and October 1951, the Far East Air Force conducted

Operation Hudson Harbor, which involved secretly dropping dummy atomic weapons on Nor& Korea. In prac'cice, those atacks w s d d be used against enemy k r m a ~ o n s to support m stack into Nor& Korea by U,N, ground forces,

CI Opem~on Hudson Harhor demonstrated that the T m a n

administratcion w a k l l h g to use atomic inlirnida&on to induce the communists ta return to the a~mistice table (suspended since August 2s3

The Korean War

1951), that they wanted U.S. atomic capabgihes to be a e n sedously, and that they were committed ta ending the tvar without incuAxrg mawive gramd cmualties or irreparabie atwi~on to the Air Force,

C1 hdysis of the operation revealed that the effects of ~ c t i c a nuclear l weapons delhered by aircdt agdnst concenaa~ons of enemy troops w u l d be limited, in part because of the dficulty of ascertaining the locatjon of enemy units in a fimely manner.
Q Nonetheless, U.S. milimv planners clung t o the idea chat delivesy oE atomic weapons using fighter-bombers w a femible and continued to develop &em, In November 1952, the United Stales exploded a hydrogen bomb for the first time, md rYlt&in 10 mantfis the SoGet Union detonated a similar weapon.
Q Development of weapons, such as tactical nudear weapons that were

smaUer c h m the original atsrnic barnbs and weapons ystems &at could be .Such weapons included used to deliver them, also conhnued d u ~ n the g a 280mm "atomic cannon" that could fire shells on ehe battlefield powerful enough to wporize entire hills, along with their fortificadons and garrisons. Such a weapon was deployed to Korea near the end of the war and may have been a factor in mo+ng along the amistice nego~ations,

D In April 1953, President W g h t D. Eisenhower approved "NSC-147: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea," a contingency plan that allowed for atomic attacks against communist air bases and lines of communication and uansportation, another measure intended to help force an acceptable armistice agreement.

UNIFORMS,NSIGNIA, AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

f&ipe mifom, in World War I T a work md combat wifom, utili.tarian and una-dorned, became a wonder to behold , . . Stiirehed, pressed with creases, complete with s e m unit patekes and coXored name t8gs, it became more coXorful than the OD semiclress. Soon, even in the combat zone, the old, sloppy fatigue cap was t;zboenow caps had to have stiffeners to make t h m look like that of Gen. Ridway.'"
---T.

R.Fehenbach, mis Kind o f Far

great whey of" unXoms, rmk and unit insigaia, and pergonal equipment were worn by rhe troops smggling for con@olaf h e es h Karea-long, cold Korea Peninsulz. Climatic ex-~ern whlers$ m d hot, wet- summ ad@ properly cloutling the eombamt 2rmies a constant.logis~cd &m A broad cross-secLim of the many types of un80rms, insignia, m d indr'tidud equipment used during fie Korem W;iris dexdbed below, Ic is in tended t o be represenbtive m &er cfim exhaus111've

U.S. A N D ROK UNIFORMS

During the h r e m War, the U.S. government cloth& ia milr'&r;f" p e r s ~ ~ nand d, L h m ofSQutlhKorea and mmy o f h e orherdiednab"onsaf well, we& a wide array of summer, wjnter, and specialized uniform
CompQneB ts.

The Korean War

O Conditions in Korea complicated the task of clothing and equipping

U.S, mi1it;lry personnel, especially d w ~ the g first year of the war. The dis~nce of the United Sbtes fi-orn the heater of batde, about 6,000 miles, a d the size of the US. military presence, second only to South Korea's among the allied nations, further exacerbated the problem.
Q When war broke out the U.S. armed senices had very limited supplies of uniforms and personal equipment, especially winter clothing. Pan of this problem was based on a policy of planning for militaly operations in primarily temperate climates. Thus, while the military had supply depots as close to Korea asJapan, they were not stocked with enough of the right kind of clolilzing.
O America's economy had regeared itself for peacetime and the psoduction of consumer goods in the years foll g World War 11,and the

shortages m d price bikes clothing needs of the milimq cased naltion~de of all kinds of cloth. For example, the cost of I h r m c e wool serge more than doubted in an eight m n t h perid, from $3.74 a yard in May 1950 to $8.67 a yard in, Febnxav 1951.

a S h o r ~ g e of s veZ-rekic clo&s like rayon hampered production of new wet- and cold-wealher gear such as field jackets, parkas, ponchos, m d raincoats. S o r a g e s of replacion cotton cloebs like odord, sateen, and twill w r e somewhat offset by pemitting substitutionsof other cloth or wrialions in h i s h or weave,
O U.S. military planners undertook a number of measures to help meet the clothing and equipment needs of the ~ o o p s , including reducing the amount of excess cloLhing issued to woops (from 44.4 pounds in fall 1950 to 18.8 pounds in fall f 952). O Another step was to issue certain items of equipment such as backpacks, envenching tools, helmets, insulated mbber combat boots, and parkas only to troops headed for fronttine assignments.

O Most of the uniform componentsworn in combat by U.S. ground forces, as well as those equipped by the United States, had been worn or designed

s during World War II and were olive drab in color, made of ~ r i o u tough cotton fabrics (such as poplin or herringbone nhiill), and intended for

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

practicality rather than appearance. Many items came in more than one version,
O An unfortunate @endthat began in Korea (and persists to this day i n the y) was an increasing insistence by commanders that the elegant funcdonality of U.S. fatigue uniforms be sacrificed by starching, pressing, and creasing them, and that fatigue caps be smened and blocked, even in the zone of combat.

O A great variety of dress and semidress uniform components were also worn by soldiers in Japan and in rear areas, but were worn by most combat troops only when on leave or W R .

I31 Summer fiead and

work unifoms included matching seQ of shirts and trousers, and one-piece overall suits, intended maint-y for tank cr mechanics and similar personnel. Many varieties affatigue component w r e issued to ~ o o p d s u h g Lhe Korem War, most of &em replet;&. ~ l f several r large c q o pockea.

Q Headgear included herringbone &ll f a ~ g u e caps, intended for work

details under temperate conditions, F o o ~ e a included r black leather and suede cambat boots.

WINTER AND WET-WEATHER FIELD CLOTHING

Cl When properly clothed and equipped for the cold and wet Korean
rs, soldierswere literally cocooned in multiple layers ofcotton and wool g. Du~nrg the first ter in Korea, however, mast U.N. @ o o phacf not been i?i$ued such equipment by the time cold weather s e tin, and critical shorliiges of items persisled throughout the war.
O writer clothing included wind-resistant, cotton-shell field jackets that were intended to be worn over several other layers of clothing; cotton poplin, ar~dd-fir-lined pile Eeld jackets designed to be worn under the fieldjacket; cotton sateen field jacket liners, designed t o be worn under the field jwket; wool wearers; wool shirts m d eouwrs; m d several v d e ~ e of s heavy parka, meant to he w r n in lieu of the fieldjacketin very cold weather.

The Korean. War

D Winter headgear included pile field eaps, designed far damp, srluavy cold w e a ~ e enGronxnenx;s, r like b r e a ; cotton field caps, designed far dry cold but used out of necessiy in. Korea; and.de~chable wea&er en~ronmene, and p a r b , both MTith and vlfitkout far trim, hoods for field j a c k e ~
Other MJintes clohing accessodes included hooded white parkas and Eousers, intended to be worn over oeher cEoLhing m d praGde carmodage i t h wool inserts; under snov cendihsns; wool scames; leather gloves w

This experimental cold-weather suit was developed by the A m y aster Corps during the last year of the war, too late to be issued to troops ;in the field.

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

131

cotton-wool blend undergarments; wool socks; and trigger-finger mittens, which had a place for a forefinger so that soldiers could fire their weapons &ile wearing them.
O Wet-weather gear included resincoated, nylon ponchos and mbber~oatedcotton parkas and trousers. Such items were especially important during the damp Korean springs and falls.

Ll Cold- and wet-weaher foamear included mbber overshoes; s t r a p n crampons called "ice creepers"; arctic felt boots; insulated rubber combat boots called "Mickey Mouse boo@"; and rubberxovered combat boots called "shoepacs" or "swampers," which caused feet to sweat and become damp during nlovement but did not keep them from freezing when immobile.

U U.S. enlisted rank was based on point-up yellow chewons worn on the ungorm sleeve. Officer rank was based on silver and gold bars, oak leaves, eagles, and stars, worn on the uniform collar. Patches signifying unit SliarJon were worn on the left sshadder,

rockers, with a diamond

Private: no insignia Pdvate First Clas: one chewon Gorpod: tvvo chewons Sergeat: three chevfnns on tap of one rocker Sergemt First Class: three chewons on top ofrockers Master Sergeant: three chewons on top of three rockers First Sergemt: hree che\rlrans on top of three in the middle

COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS

Second Lieutenant: one gold bar First Liemtenmt: one silver bar Capbin: mo silver bws

The Korean Wag

F~ELD GRADE OFFICERS

Major: a gold oak leaf Lieuteamt colonel: a silver oak leaf Colonel: a s i k r eagle

GENERAW
B~gadier General: one five-pointed sgver star Major General: &ve-pointedsilver stars Lieutenant e n e r d : three five-pointed silver scars General: four gveqointed silver sms General of the h m y : five five-pointed siker stars

rCI m e n in combat, U.S. idmtryrmen carcied a basic load of equipmeat

that included &eir weapon, ammunition, steel canteen, en~encbing tool, and first aid kit. W e n condirions pemitted, field pacb, bedrolls, and r a ~ o nwere s brought fowwd for the @sops.
O Each soldier was issued a cottonauck belt appropriate to his migned function. For example, riflemen armed with the M-1 .30 cdiber rifle were given a belt with 10 pockets, each of which could hold a single, ekht-raund clip of rifle ammunition. Soldiers armed vvith the Bornin8 Alft~matic Me were ghen a belt with six pockea, each of which could hofd one 24round magazine. Troops armed with pistols or carbineswere issued another sort of belt and pouches for their ammunition magazines. Various pieces of gear, such as canken, entrenching tool, and ammunilim cases and bayonet sc;lbbards, could be atached to &ese va~ous belts d t h buiEt-in me& fateners,

P Specidked bags, cases, and omer containers were designed to hold

ammunition clips, magazines, and belts; mortar rounds; bazooka rockets; grenades; and other typm ofweapons and equipmem

P Severd sorts of entrenching tool were used by mops in Korea for digging foxholes and other tasks. One of the most common had a wooden haft and a folding steel pick and shovel blade, and could be carried in a c a v a case.
CI Other equipment included field packs; packboards, designed to carry bulky or heavy materids, such as crates of ammanidon; cmva shel~er hdves,

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

which could be snapped together to form ~ o - m a n tenw; and sleeping bags in a number of weights, along with various liners and cases.

D U,S,, ROIi, and otlher afiied soldiers and ntarhes fighting in b r e a wore the stmdard G.1. steel helmet made farnous b-). Arnelican tsoops in VVorld War II. These helmers provided protection from shell fragments and other flying debris. Helmets also saw service as wash basins, urinals, or cooking pots, as necessiy dictated.
O This helmet was actually an assembly consisting of an olive drab steel helmet; a resin-impregnated, cotton duck helmet liner that looked like a small helmet and was wsm inside the steel pot; two h e h e t band riaers; and a chin strap. Overall, the helmet assembly weighed 2 pounds, 7 5/8 ounces. Keeping this assembly together was a constant problem for troops, especially because so many of them preferred to keep their chin smps unfastened. Metfiods included pulling the chin strap over the visor of the steel pot, and holding the helmet on with one:hand when m n i n g , which also helped keep it from fdting off. Needless to say, such soludons were far &am sa~sfacmry, i t h unfatened chin and many commanders brkded at fomaGons of troops w seaps.

CI P a r t of the proMerrl w s a persistent and largely unfomded fear among U.f, troops since World War fX vvas that a nearby exptosion could cause the helmet to break Lhe neck of, or even decapitate, a man who kept his chin swap GghGy fastened. In all likelihood, however, any blast powerful enough c i f l him anyay. to kill a man in this manner would X

y m a r r e m a t e r Corps responded to these f e z g , or bought into them, by developing near the end of World War I1 the T-1 chin strap release, a ball-and-socket device that would disengage under 14 pautnds af pressure,

Cl Nonetfieless, the

O Because the round, steel helme@ did not pravide good concealment and

made noise if they Ml off or objects brushed against them, soldiers cavered &ern w i t h sandbags and scraps of cloth. They also used elastic bands and pieces of net to hold bits of foliage or twigs, in order to break up their profiles and rnufflle noise, DuAng the first year of the war, many soldier pa~cols or r&ds, discarded the bulky helmee, especially when conduc~ng m d wore some sort of s o f t herrdgar instead, such as h i t wool watch caps,

The Korean War

This practice resulted in an increaed number of head wounds, however, W a X95 1 Army Surgeon Gneral" report poina out.
rS Troops resumed using Lheir helmets m r e freqwndy during the last two y e m of the war, when the opposing forces settled dow into forlified posidons. Head injuries were a much greater threat under such csndihons, when more arciflery was used m d when the head and upper body were the only exposed pal-ts of soldiers in en~enehmerre.

O I3ex;ssnaf body a m a r W% tvidely used It>v U,N, troops dra;t-ingthe Korea War. It is believed that ""ffkjackefs"saved many lives and ccm~brxted to a 60 percent redue~on of abdominal. md chest wounds, Such amor was cansmcted of mulhple layers of fiberglass laminated with =sin, a material h o w as Doron II, and was eEec~ve against mortar, grenade, and ardlJery frqnrexraCon. f t W= not eEective, however, against smdl a m s fire.

O Severd types

of armor

were used incremingly as the Korean War progresfed, from leftover World War 13: flak jackets to newer versions

Fragmentation vests vastly redu~ed r k numbers of deaths and injuries suffered by U.N. troops. Here, S@. Bob W, Dobie o f the 40th InfanQ Division shows w e shapnel pierced his amored vest, lessving him udamed.

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

135

de~eXoped d u h g the conflict, In 1950, some marines used Doron-augmented V e b s ~ e r prototype" flak jackets. From June through Oc~ober2951, the M-1951 'Mafine vest" k i n g developed by the Navd Medicd Research Laboratorywas evduated inJoint y-Nav Mission tests. It v ~ a s well-received by ground ~ o o p sm , d in March X952, each diGsian was given 350 amored vests, mostly uf the M-1951 type.

D The M-1951 vest Eastened an the side and protected the aMomen, lower chest, back, and shoulders, It consisted of cumed, overfapping Doron platctts m d weighed 7.75 pounds, Damsides ta the vest W E &at its cloth coverings for the plates wore out quieMy and its snug fit sometimes hampered quick movement,

D Arrolher type of armor, developed by the &my Quartermaster Corps, was the W12, a m+pieee, semi~gid vest consisfing of S9 duralumirx plates held in individual pockets and cavered by eight layers of nylon. However, it m d uncamforable and weighed mare than 12 was considered resaic~ve pamds.
O Evenmalty, the &my produced the best type of armor used during the war, the M-1952, tested extensively in the T-1952test progrm (vest models T-1952-1 thmugh T-1952-SA). The M2952vest had two front pmels m d one back panel, w a made of 12-ply bzket-weave balliseic nyIon spol-bonded wirh resin and encased in a hea~eafed * y l film, and w a carrained in m outer shelf of nylon cloth, It weighed 8.5 pounds.

O South Korean uniforms and individual equipment, both winter and

summer, were proGded almost entirely by the U.S. government or w r e based on U,$.. patterns,

O South Korean enlisted rank was based on point-down yellow chevrons worn an the urzsarm sleeve. OEcer and wanmt oscer rank was based on silver diamonds, flowers, and stars worn on shoulder straps. ROK ranks were

The Korean War

similar in appeitrmce t o those worn by U,S. m i l i ~ q personnel and ROTC cadets,

ENLISTEDMEN
B~vate: no insignia Lance Cavoral: one chewon Corpord: two chemns Sergeant: three chemons S W Sergeant: three chewons and one horizontal bar Sergeant First Class: three chevrons and two horizontal bars Master Sergeant: three chenons and three horizontal bars First Sergeant: three chewons and three hori7.ontal bars, all under a star
QMAS~-OFF~CERS Warrant Oficers: one gold dimund

Junrro~ OFFICERS
Second Lieutenant: one silver diamond First Lieutenant: WO silver diamonds Captnin: three silver diamonds

SENIOR OFFICERS
Major: one nine-pealled silver R w e r Lieutenant Colonel: two nine-peLaf1ed silver flowers Colonel: three nine-pe~lled silver flowers

GENERALS
Brigadier General: one &-pointed silver star Major General: two five-pointed silver stars Lieutenant Gneral: three five-pointed silver stars Gneral: four five-pointed silver stalls

O Branch insignia for the ROKground forceswas based on that used by the U.S, &my: or: front profile of a tank over crossed sabers (brass)

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

hrtjllev: crossed gun banels (brass) Bands: a lyre (brass) Engineer Corps: a silver castle gate around a gold star Infantry: a crossed rifle and saber Medical Corps: a caduceus (brass) Military Police: a star over crossed pistols (silver) NBC Corps: a shield emblazoned with crossed retorts (brass) Ordnance Corps: a gold grenade imposed upon three interlocking silver ~ngs Quartermaster Corps: a laurel wreath around a key and wings (silver) Signal Corps: a silver torch beneath a pair of crossed signal flags Transportation Corps: a wing inside a ship's wheel (brass) Women%&my Corps: a female head (brass)

u.f\f, I f N l @ O r ; t ~ sEQUIPMENT, , AND INSIGNIA

O A preponderance of the unzorms md insipia worn by U.N.. forcm in

Korea v v a i s of h e r i c m manufacture or desjlgn. Indeed, even tsoops af many of theJ allied nations wore uniforms and equipment proGded by the United Sates (e.g,, Turkey, South Grea, etc.),

CS Some of the uniforms worn by allied coops reaected a c o l 0 h l international. character, Fbr exampfe, summer unfirms for Austrdim infanqmen consisted of a distiltlclive brom bush hat, khaki skirt and ~ o u s mand , black leatfier boots with canvas gaiters.
O Other internadanal troops had a similarly unique appearance. Foremost among these were the neutxal Indian troops of the 60th P%r-achut;e Field Ambulance Regiment, many ofwhom were Sikhs. While their rank insignia and uniforms were essenLially British in style (e.g., olive trousefs and shirt, wool sweater, black leather boots), they were easily distinguished by their crimson turbans and the steel bracelets worn on heir right wrisa.

CS British, Australian, Canadian, Indian, and New Zealand troops were srganked during the Korean V V a r into a Commonwealth Division. Soldiers of this division wore the urzif"omsand equipment of their a m e d forces and carried their own wapons, hut were distinguished by a Comrnsnwealth

The Korean War

Di~sion patch w m on the sleeve of the upper a m (above the rmk badge af an enliskd m m ) .

O Uniforms and equipment for the troops from Turkey serving in Korea were proGded entirely by the United Sates, m d these soldiers w r e distinguish& only by their o m rank insipia and by a m and helmet badges displa9ng the Turbsh, star and crescent on a. red field.

Turbsh. enlisted men" smk W= denoted by p o h t d o m chmons warn s. T u r ~ s h ogcers had a m k system based on.five-pointed gold stars worn on their shoulder straps,

ENL~STED MEN
Pdvate Second Glass: one red chewon. Privilte First Glas: two red chewons Lance Corporal: one yellow chevron, wirh a yellow star and crescent inside a circle in its center S M Serligeant: four red chevrons Sergeant Major: Five red chevrons

C>FFIC;ERS Second Lieutenant: one star First Ljeutenmt: s~rs Gapain: tfniree sers Major: a gold wreath closed with the Turkish star and crescent at the base of the swap surmounted by one five-pointed gold star ~ two stars Lieueenat Colond: the w e a and Colonel: the wea& and tfiree s ~ s ; General: generals of increasing rank wore the wreath over a pair of silver crossed mbers on a red fiefd, and one, WO, or hree sQrs

Uniforms, Insignia, and Persona Equipment

133

COMMUNIST UNXFQRMSAND EQUXPMENT

uniforms worn by rhe communist forces tended m be just as
functional ar rhose worn by U.S. mop, but were somewhat more austere. Communist uoop also had far fewer uniform and equipment components, and tended to be poorly equipped W'& winter and wet-weather gear.

O Just as South Korean uniforms and insignia were based upon those of the United States, the uniforms and equipment of North Korea bore a striking resembXance to those of the Soviet Union. This is not surprising, however, when it is considered that the USSR rrained and equipped the firo n 1945 m 1952.
Q The summer field un%om, m m by the Nor& Karean ~ o o p who s stormed across the Sou& Korean border in June 1950, consisted of

mus~rdxolared tsousers and Russim-svte nasgerka turrk, worn over the pants and cinched F l a i h a broad leaher belt m d large brass buckle; caK-high, brow boors; and a cloth cap or Soviet-sqle steel helmet.

D h n k , insignia, and uniform accesaries were neariy identical to chose of contemporary S a ~ e t aoops ; during the em War,

O Chinese unidbrms, unlike hose of North Korea, were not baed on &ose of the Soviet Union and had much more of a unique national character in

the early I950s,

O Summer uniform was similar in appearance to the traditional Chinese

peasant shirt and uousers,

D Winter field uniform consisted of quilted cloth uousers, a quilted jacket worn ouside of the uousers, &uinter boots, and a padded cloth cap with ear Baps. Not all Chinese troops had such uniforms in early winter 1950, and thousands of troops suffered from exposure and cold-weather injuries like frostbite.

The Korean War

B Chinese rank and brarlch insignia at the time of .the Korean War was very sinlilx to that used by the Soviet Union, and included a red star cap badge, displafing the communist na~onal identity.
O Chinese insignia was minimalist in nacure, and Chinese wiforms looked

yuite austere when cornpared to those of che United S ~ t e sFuhermore, . Gbinese troops spemeng in k r e a hquently w r e no insignia at all, in part to obscure heir identiy.
CI Batches bearing rank insignia to the front m d branch insignia to the rear were m r n on the collars of field and m r k uxrZoms by soldiers of all ranks. Such collar patches were light blue for airihorne and air farce personnel, Hack fsr naT and public securiq personnel, m d red for all other eoops.
O Warrmt oscers m d oScers d a l s o wore rank m d branch insignia,on the

shoulder boards of &eir parade rtn$orms.

D Chinese rank insignia W;IS based on i k r , Eve-pointed stam.

P~vate: one star on a plain red pakh Lance corporal: two stars on a plain red patch Corporal: one s&r on a red patch bisected by a yellow stripe Sergeant: two stars on a red patch bisected by a yellow swipe Senior Sergeant: three stars on a red patch bisected by a yellow stripe

QUASI-OFFICERS
Warrant Officer: a plain yellow p t c b (nu mrs) Qscer Cadet: red p a ~ edged h w i t h yellw (no stam)

Junrtoa OFFICERS
Second Lieutenant: one star on a red patch bisected by a yellow swipe First Lieutenant: two stars on a red patch bisected by a yellow svipe Captain: three stars on a red patch bisected by a yellow stripe Senior Captain: four stars on a red patch bisected by a yellow stripe

Uniforms, Insignia, and Personal Equipment

SENIOR QFF~CERS
Major: one large star on a red patch bisected by two yellow swipes Lieutenant Colonel: two large stars on a red patch bisected by two yellow stripes Junior Colonel: three large stars on a red patch bisected by two yellow stripes Senior Colonel: four large stars on a red patch bisected by two yellow s~pes
enerafs

Major General: one larger star on a red patch edged with gold i t h gold Lieutenant General: two larger stars on a red patch edged w Colonel C;eneml: three larger stars on a red patch edged with gold Senior eneral: four larger sars on a red patch edged with gold Marshal: One larger silver star beneath the ::hinese crest Senior Macshal: one larger silver star inside a pine frond weath beneatfi the Chinese crest

D Chinese branch insignia wits worn to the rear of the collar, behind the rank insignia. lit was very similar to h a t used by the S o ~ e and t 'Maestern amies,

s~ Administration: a disk. emblazoned 'E?;itha five-poin~ed Ai.rbome: a winged parachute Asmar: side profile of a tank kdflev: crossed gun barrels Cavalry: crossed sabers fnfanq: no badge ?rlaixltenmce: crossed pliers and spmner Medical: a disk emblmoned vjith an upright crass Pioneers: erased pickaxe and shovel hifroad cansmction: a sylhed railroad crossing i t h an aerial mast, lighrning bolt, and telephone Signal: a disk emblazonedw Transpor~rion: side profile of a: truck

The Karean. War AWARDS

Q ParGcipation in the war w a recognized by both sides with a wide variey of formal, and sometimes informal, awards and commeudadons, Mlied m i l i u forces, ~ particulasly those ohhe United S ~ t e s were , far more iavi.sh in gran~ng awards and honars than were the communist forces,

L3 D u h g the Korem War, tbe highest collechve award h r braveily that could be bestowed by the United Sbtes was the Presidential Unit Cir;a~on. This atyard was granted to several U.S. and fareip unia durirlg the war. hang these were the 3rd Battafion of the Royal Aus~dian Xnfanq Regiment and the 2nd Batdion af P~ncessP a ~ c i a ' sGmadian Light Infanq, both of which distinguished hemselves in the &rill951 Batde uf Gpyong, when they helped break the advance of ; m entire division, during the Chine% phase oEensive.

C;I To this day, the hig'kest honor Lhat can be bestowed upon an individual by the United Sliktes is the Medaa of Wonor. During the &rean War, this
mard was bestowed upon some 300 individuals, many of them ps&urnuusly.
U Many countries, as well as the United Nations, issued a Korea campaign ribbon or medal for their troops. Some of these medals were also granted to the soldiers of other nations when appropriate. For example, non-British soldiers af the Gornmonwealth Diesion were au&odzed to wear Great Bribin" medal for &rean sewice.

U Some awards were less tangible but no less meaningful. For example, one of the Chinese infiltration platoons that took part in actions against the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was dubbed the "Sharp Swords" for its actions ag$nst the Nationalist Chinese during the Chinese Civil War.

WARLORDS A N D STATESMEN

ander's purpose . . . is to deliver victory by the by the quickest and cheapest means he can find, leaving it to statesmen to decide what 'cheapness' means in that context and how victorj is to be used once it has been won."

iliraly and political leaders on borh sides played large roles in the beginning, continuation, and end of rhe Korem War. In the mon &Slading up to irs ctwthre&# the st;lcetnenB, belie&, m d actions o f key indi~duds on h t f isjdes set &e s&ge for rhe start of h e Korem War. T%itree years dter ir begm, changes in the leadershe of die superpowers? through bo& and the poIIdcd process, help& bnhg about &e concIusion ofhosdlides. Many of Sou& &rea "sighest: rmking rniliav leaders had received their inihd military mining in L h e army o f lmperBJJapan, and some o f &em had made cweers as oBcers in its forces. IronicaLIy, many afNor& Korea 3 lttadcrrs had fbught against tJreJapmese m u p a d o n o f die Korem Peninsuh or had sem~d in the cammunl"st amies of China or the Sovr'et Union, T h m &e leaders on bo& sides were enemies even hefore the establishment ofthe opposing s,t;z tes.

U.5. AND SOUTH KOREAN LEADERS

In 1950, me^ like President S Tmmm and his cabhet saw conzmmist expmsian jn m y quarter dtfieglnbe as m uldma& &reat.t oh e

204

The Korean War

United S&tes, a belief &at led to intemendon when Nor& a r e a inva&d its
sou& ern n crighbar*

U Dean Acheson (1890-1971) served as seereta7 of s ~ t from e 1949 ta f 953. In &is role, he spearheaded the Cold War policy of containment of canlmunism and re&cted the vigor of President Tnnman in the pro~cucion of the Korean War.

13 On Januar)r 12,1950, Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club

in W;;zshington,D.C., in which he stated that Sou& b r e a was o u ~ i d of e the U,$, strate@csphere of irzkrest. Grilics o k n blame this speech for g i ~ n the g communists a green light to invade Sou& b r e a . It is unlike@,hawever, that Acheson realized that Sauth b r e a faced an immediate armed &reat. M e r the Nor& Korean invasion sf June 25, 1950, Acheson authioked Gen. Douglas Ma&&ur to supply Sou& Korea with weapons and equipment above and beyond the announ& allocated under the terms af the 14,s. m i l i assis~nce ~ ~ program,
O Acheson had a well-how disdain for the United Nations, He aho believed h a t Asia was secondaq to Europe as a X 4 . f . sphere of interest.
O Maj. Gen. Edward M a U q Almond (1892-1971) was selving as chief of staff t o Gneral of the Army Douglas M a h t h u r h e n war broke out in Korea. In September 1950, MacArthur seiected him to take command of X

Corps, a unit created for the amphibious Inchon Landing.

L3 Gen. 0m;tr Ne1s011 Bradfey (18931982) was commander of che 12th Army in the European Theater during World War II and became &my Chief 7,1948, Less than a year later, on_j;tnuv 16,1949,he irman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In September 1950, a brake out in b r e a , Bradlq W promoted ta Generd d ac~vely ras the head of the Joint Chiefs of S t a throughout the Korean War, relinquishing this position in 1953.

Adm, Robert Pexce Brisc~e became commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in J a n u q 1952. In June 1952, he succeeded Adm. C. Turner Joy as commander of Nawl Forces Far East, a position he held for the rest of the war.

h e four*tar commandat of fie U S . 0 Gen. Cl8tan BIedme Cates Marine Corps when war broke out i nKorea, and in this capacity oversaw the massive expansion of the corps for the conflict. InJanuary 1952, he stepped down from t h i s position (reverting to the threestar rank of lieutenant

Warlor& and Statesmen

general) and became head of the Marine Corps Schools until he retired in 1954.
O Chae Blung Dok (1917-1950), a major in theJapanese Imperial army during World War 11, was chief of staff of South Korea's armed forces when

the Korean War began. He joined the Korean National Guard in 1945, became m aster in the &re= Consbbulaq amy in 1946, and was commander of its 4th Brigade when the regular KOK army was established in 1948. Dok became chief of s M in May E949 but was forced to redre in October 1949 as the result of a feud MJitix Brig, Gen. %m Suk %'on, commander at the 38th parallel. He regained his post in April 1950, however,just before the olltbreak of war. During the two months prior to the start of the war, he made several quesLionahle personnel changes and ignored reports warning of the imrnirlerttNorth Korean invasion. As a resuk, he was held responsible for the failure of the ROK army to defend the country's borders. Five days after the invasion, he was sacked and replwed 6th Gen. Chung Il-Kwon. Chae was made commander of the Interim ed Forces and wm kitled at the Batde of Hadong onJuly 26,1950.
LI ChungII-kwon(1917- ) ,a brigadier generd and the vice chief of s e f o r the ROK h m g , a r ~ v e d in Sou& k e a onJtlne 30, returning from military tcraining in the United Sbtes. He was immediately promoted to major general and made overall cornander of the ROK armed fasces, rcglacing disgrxed Gen. Gbae Bpng Dok* His primary responsibilities duriing the first year of the war involved coordinating relations between the disparate forces operating under the U.N. command and regrouping, reorganizing, and sending back into combat routed South Korean soldiers. And, like other ROKgenerals, Chung often found himself trying to reconcile the conflicting orders of the U.N. command m d Spgman &ee% gwernment, Chung was once again sent to the United States for training inJuly 1951. W e n he returned in July 1952, Rhee demoted him m a di*ional command, possibly to give him front line combat experience.Three months later, however, he was made deputy commanding oficer of the U.S. IX Cofps. Three monchs after that, Chwng was made commander ofthe RORIX Corps, a post he held undl the end of the war.
O Gen. Mark Wayne C M (1896-1984),a prominent European Theater commander during World War 11, succeeded Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as b o h commmder in chief af' the Far East Command and commander in chief ofthe United Narims Cammand on May 12,1952.

The Korean War

As the overdl commander of operations in k r e a , Clark inherired a sr-afematealong the lines o f c o n ~with t the enemy, stalled arnlisciee talks at Panmunjom, and violent uprisings among communist prisoners held in the Kojeilo prisoner of war camps. Believing that the communist powers n i 2 i t a v pressure in the theater ofww understood only force, he intensified r in h u ~ e nf s rebGgorahng the armisti.ce talks, On July 27, 1953, Clark signed the Mdiav istice breement on behalf ofthe U.N. Command, with the North Korean k m y and the Chinese People" Volunteers at Panmunjom. He retained commmd o f the U.N forces until October 7,1953. Ever dtewafds, Clark regretted being the first h e r i c a n commander to end a war short of connplek victory,

L l M. J~seph Lawton 'EighmingJoe Callins ( 18961987) was U.S.

"

chief of s t a f f throughout the Korean War, His most impormt role was proGding adequate men and nlateriel to Korea vJithaut wakening the US. mililaq presence elsewhere.
Q M;ti. Gen. WI'IIimE, Dem 61899-1 981) vyas commanding general of the 24th Infmtry Division when it was sent from occupation duties in Japan to

h r e a in the Grst weeks of the war. From October 1947 to f)cm'ber 1949, be had served as m i l i q governor of Souh k r e a , During the flatete af Taejan, onJuly 20-21,1950, Dean repeatedly risked his life by leading aoops in attacksagainst No& Korean armor, at one point atracking a tank vvi& a hand grenade. He also direckd the fire of friendly or kom an open posit;on exposed to antilieq and s m d arms fire. m e n Taejan was finally ove , Dean. refclsed to leave with the deparfing elements, and instead sbyed behind t o organize his rewea~ng forces and direct s~ragglers, Dean became separated from his men following the fall of Taejon on July 20, and was last seen helping wounded soldiers to a place of safety. He managed to evade the enemy until August 25 when, weak with hunger, he was captured. Dean, North Korea's highest ranking POW, was credited with setting an example and slowing the North Korean drive south, and for his actions at Taejon, Tmman awaded him the Medd of I-lonor in J m u q 1951, while he was still listed as missing in acrion. Wean s u ~ v e 33 d dificult months as a p ~ o n e&m, r during which he resisted pressure to participate in enemy propaganda schemes, including repeated attempts to force him to make false confessions. North Korea released Dean on September 3, 1953. After his return to the United States, he served as deputy commander of the 6th Army in San Francisco, until he redred in 1955,

Warlords and Statesmen

207

O John Foster Dulles ( 1 888-1959) was a Truman-appointed advisor to the State Deparment when the Korean War began and Eisenhower's secretary of state during the final months of the conflict. Dulles initially supported the

Tmman adminisuation's policies toward Korea, but became increasingly critical of them. By 1952, he was staunchly preEisenhower and wrote 'With foresight, the Korean War would never have happened." During the last year of the conflict, Dulles resolutely supported the Eisenhower's strateg for ending the war, In May 1953, Dulles Gsited Indian Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehm in New Delhi. Assuming their conversation would be relayed to the communist Chinese leadership, he made it clear that the United Sates would "make a suonger rather than a lesser military exertion" if the mistice talks collapsed.
t BzGd Eisenhower (1890.1969), overall commmdes of U.S. ET;I .forces in the European heater o f W r l d War TI, retired from the Arnry in 1948 but returned to active duty in 2951 to sewe a s strpreme commander.crf the Nor& Arlan6c Treat)l Organization (NATO). Rfter just a Far, however, Eisdower msigrred his post as head of NATO to run for p ~ s i d e n He t ~ras dected 34fh President of the Unir-ed Sti~tes in November 1952, dter having mn on a pla~ormof ending the Korean War. Mter the eleclcisn, he did in fact travel to Korea and tour frondin@ posircisns, Eisenhower and his cabinet, nobbly John Foster Dulles, were resolute that the war should be ended quickly, either &rough the successful cample~onof m armisdce or tfiraugh an intensiGcaGan of the war, including, if necessq, the use of atomic weapons, Eisenhower and his staff credited this stratem with the findization soon dtemard of m armistice in b r e a . It is more likely, howmer, that it was one of sever&factors that led to the GnaXizaeion of' the amistice negolialions.

C i Adm, WiJfi~rn ltilarl-ow Fecfider (189g1967) m s cornmader of the Admtic Reetwhen the b r e m Ww begm. In h g w t 2951, he was chosen to
replace Adm. Forrest P. Sheman, who had died unexpectedly the p r e ~ o u s Fecbtter sewed in this post until man&, as the U.S. Nay chief of opera~ons. the end of the war,
C l W Averell Harriman (1891-1986) m s President Tmman's specid afsismt for securiv s a i r s when the b r e m War began. He sewed in &is role until 1952, when he made an unsuccessM bid to become the Dernocradc presidenhd nominee. In August 1950, H a ~ m m flew to Tokyo

The Korean War

to eonGnce Ma&thur t o cooper* Mith the Tmmm adminiswahon's poliq toward China. During his tenure, Harriman also played a critical role in the formulation of U.S. Cold War policies, in protecting Dean Acheson from the administration's Republican opponenw, and in mediating b e ~ e e n MacAnhur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the plans for the Inchon lmding,
Q Adm. C. TumerJoy (1895-1956) was commander, U.S. Naval Force, Far East when the b r e m Wzr began. A seaoned veteran of clhe 1941 to 5945 island-hopping war againstJapan,Joy helped MacArthur plan and execute

the Inchon and Wonsan landings. PromJuly 1951 to May 1952,Joy was senior U.N. delegate to the Korean istice Conference, proving himself both a grim, determined negotiator and an incisive analyst of the communist mind.Joy was displeased with what from the U.N. delegation and insincerity from the he perceived as ~cillation communists, publicly criticizing North Korea and China but curbing his opinions about bfic).. In May 1952, Joy aslred to be relieved of command and wm made supe.t-intendentof the U.S. Naval Academy, After he retired in 1955, he began criLicizing the polticies of the Eisenhower administ_raLionand mote How C~mmunisz,r. Negorial.cl, an indicment of the way both sides had participated in the wmistice talks. In 1978, his full assessment of the armistice d k s W% reveakd in a pmthumous1y published work.
E31 %m Suk Won (18931978), a tough, capable oEcer, was a r e ~ r e d brigadier general when the Korean War began. He had become a full eolonel in the Japanese Imperial army during World War I1 and was personally decorated for bravery by Emperor Hirohito. Xim took control of the ROK 3rd DiGgion in 1948 and assumed command at the 88th parallel soon &ternads. As the result of conflics with ROK Chief of S M Chae Byong Dok, however, he relinquished this post in 1949 and retired from the mili~q. Kim strongly favored invasion of North Korea and had predicted a victory over the communists, "with breakfast in Wonsan, lunch in Pyongyang, and dinner in Sinuiju." This comment was publicly repeated by several other ROK proponents of unification and was exploited by North b r e a after its invaion ;zs evidence of Sou& b r e a n aggression, In August 1950, Kim was once again made commander of the ROK 3rd Division and in September was made head of the T a e p Defense Command. Later in the war, he commanded the ROIL Capital Division.

Warlords and Statesmen

203

O Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) was America's highest ranking

general and one of its most popular, influential, and outspoken citizens during the first 10 months of the Korean b r . In December 19114, IWIakaur W promoted to general of the arrny, and in April 1945was made commanding general of all U.S. the Pacific. He was subsequently made supreme commander for the Allied powers and entrusted with accepting theJapanese surrender and overseeing the occupat-ianofJapm. A year before Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from the U.S. sphere of interest, Mackrhur had dismissed Korea as unimportant to the . e n N o d Korea invaded, however, he recommended that United S ~ t e sm Tmmm commit ground forces, After being appointed commander of the U.N. forces being sent to de"fend South Karea, Mackrhrzlr consisten* p u s h 4 for a fill1 commitnlent of U.S. power and a broadening of the war beyond the Korean Peninsula. He made his sentiments b o r n through press conferences, n m s releases, and Sates. letters to pofiGcitldlies in con~nced efie Joint Chiefs of StaEIn September 1950, against heir betterjudgment-to accept hjs pfm far an mphibious Imdhg at Inchon, on the sou&west coast &Korea, The subsequent ass"au1rw a one of the most brilljant and succemhl amphibious operzltions in hismry. "If the Chinese Coxrxmunis~ cross the Ya1u [ the greatest slaughter in. the fiistoq of mankind," M told Tmman, None&el en the Chinese did finatly enter h r e a , it w a sever&weeks before r accepkd Lhat they had even done so in large n u b e r . W e n he realized the size of the invmion, his immediate reac~an wm to predict duorn for the U.N. farces and to beg Washington fclr reinforcemen&, In March 1951, M a k t h u r undemined h m a n 'S ceasefire initiarive by releasing one of his ma few days b&re the president's, That, dong -cvirb public statements critical of the adminisaation's policy and threats to c the war into China, led Tmmm to sack him for insubordinadon on April 11, 1951.
Q Gen. Gorge C: MarshdI (1880-1959],a World War I1 hero m d one of

the most revered figures in postwar American society, served as secretary of state from 1947 to 1949, giving his name to the Marshall Plan for European economic rehabilitation. In September 1950, he replaced Secretasy of Sate Louis A. Johnson, who resigned under a cloud. His first priority was restoration of good relations b e ~ e e n the State and Defense departments, which had been damaged byjohnson,

The Korean. War

Marshall tried ts, support Ma&lhur9s m r aims and made it ptain that he preferred a clear Gctov to m armisllice. Nonettreless, he conanred with Tmnnmk decision to relieve Mliachhur of command and saw no benefit in an expansion of the conflict. Marshall stepped down in the fall of 19551 and was replaced by w d e r XcreQV af defense Robert A LovettCl John Joseplz Muccio (1900-1989) was the first U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea and semed in that capaciy ddusing the first 26 mon&s of the &rean conact. Before ehe war, he had ac~vely called for expansion of 7LI.S. eccznomic and military aid for South Korea, OnJune 25,1950, Muccio informed the leadership in Washingmn, D.C., &at .War& Korea had invaded the south, In the days that followed, he oversaw the U,S, evacuation of Seoul and then hllswed the government sf Syngmm f i e e to its emergency c a p i ~in l Taejon, During the first desperate weeks c z f the war, Muccio and his embassy bolst-ered the flagging morale of Spgman Khee and his cabinet and conGnced &em &at victory was still possible, T h q also acted as a crucial liaison beween the Sou& Korean government and h e U.S. &my, Muccio and his s w w e r e also ixzsmmen~l in conGncing the U.S, Army to use South Korean paramilitay police battalions in U.S. divisional areas as light infanq and for routing out infiluators, and to begin rounding out undersuength U.S. fornations w i t h b r e m soldiers. able remrn to Seoul, Muecio L n Oetober 1950, after his embassy accompanied MacArthur to the Wake Island meeting with President Tmman, and the following month flew to Washington to discuss U.S. policy in Korea following occupation of the entire peninsula. After Chinese soldiers occupied Seoul, Muccio's embassy moved to Pusan, He ~ m a i n e d in Korea until August 1952, dedica~ng most of his rime to tqing to convince the Rhee government that the United States would not handon Sou& k r e a and &at a negoriated end to the conflictW% in its Best interests.

O F m k J Pace (1912-1988)sewed as U.S. secretary of the a m y for most of

M 5 0 undlJanuary 1953. As head ofthe Bureau the Karem War, from April E of the Budget since 1949, he had impressed Tmman w i t h his administrative ability and fiscal consematism, and the president appointed him to the top Army post in hopes keeping a lid on defense spending. Pace was, admittedly, not a military expert, and as a result had minimal influence on U.S. policy during the war. He backed most of Truman's decisions during the conflict and accompanied the president to the Wake ur in October 1950. Island conference with

Warlords and Staicesmen

Pace's main challengesduring the war centered on manpower problems caused by remobilization, inequities in the selective selvice system, and the need to keep forces in reselve in case of a crisis outside of Korea. In 1951, Pace instituted the point-based troop rotation system that allowed National Guardsmen and rese&sa to roate back to the United Sfittes dter accudating 36 points. In 1953, facing imminent replacement by an Eisenhower appointee, Pace resigned his post as secretari of the army and subsequently became director of major defense contractor General Dynamics.
O Paik Sun-yup (1 9 2 0 ) ,ajunior officer in theJapanese Manchurian army

during World War II, was commander of the KOK 1st Division when the Korean War began. He proved himself one of South Korea's ablest battlefield commanders and was well regarded by mmy h e d c a n leaders, M e n North Korea invaded the souh inJllne 1950, Paik W= away at a militaly staff college and half of his ~ o o p were s absent on weekend leave. o rally his comm;and and faught against the Manetfieiess, he a~anagedt superior NWA forces for four days; only after Seoul fell and his men ran out mmunition did the 1st Ui~sion feeeat sm& of the H m fiver. In the bat-rfeto hold the Pusan Perimeter, Paik persondly led an infanq batdion in a charge agahst a Nor& Karem-held posi~on, ordering his o m men to shoot him if he reweated. Mter the breakout from the perimeter, Paik led the 1st ROK Ditrision in a race against the 1st U.S. Cavalr)lDivision to capkrre the Nor& &rean c a p i ~of l Pyongang. His cornmad won the race, entering the enemy city on October 19,1950, Paik snbsequen;rf,y sewed as chief of staff of the Sou& Korean armed forces from 1952 to 1954, and W= made the fimt R0Kgenera-l of the amy in 1953, at the age of 33, He also semed as the South b r e m rcpresentallivc: to the amistice talks,
D Adm. Forrest P. Sherman (18961951) was chief of naval operations when the Korean War began and successfulty worked to expand and strengthen the Navy during the firstyear ofthe conflict. OnJuly 22,1951, he s died, s a e r e d a seies of heart a t ~ c k and

Q S p a n Rhee (1875-1965),president of the Republic of Korea from iurti-c~mmunist, xraLionalisrie 1948 to 1960,was a vehernentty m~gapmese, leader wha w m k d to unrfy Korea forcibly &rough an invaion of Nor& Korea. Wee fled theJapanese occupation of Korea and spent severalyears in the United States. He studied at George Wmhington, Harvard, and Princeton universiries, and was the first b r e a n to earn a doctorate,

The Korem War

Despite his h e ~ c education m and role as ehe fist elected leader of the Republic of Kofea, Rhee had a very paternalistic atlcitude to.wacd his nation and was not particdrly inerested in democraq, W e used violence and political manipulation more than consensus building to achieve and hold on to his presidency, Rhee opposed an arrnisLjce that w u l d leave Korea didded and went out of his way to both turn the Korean people against such an agreement and to sabotage it. His other conditions included complete r e m o d of Chinese foxes from the peninsula, total disarmament of Nor& Korea, h l l Soueh k r e m participafion in any posmar polirical conferences, and a unilaterd U.S. agreement to protect his c o u n q from future communist aggression. Many of Rhee's polices angered U.S. leaders, who considered removing him from power in a U.N.-sponsored coup d9e&tThroughout the war, he engaged in heavy-handed repression of his opponents, and in June 1953 tried to derail the istice process bEy freeing thousmds of Nor& Korean POWs,

P Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway (18951993) was seIving as deputy to Army chief of s M Gen.J. hwmn Colljns d e n the &rean Mlar broke out, He was Wdker as 8 t h U.S. sub%quentfy chosen to replace Gen. commander in December 1950 m d Mac as U,N. commander in 1951. proved himself tough and rc3ferzdess in both these roles. Qn January 2, 1951, S d p a y determined that his shattered U.N. and ROK forces could not hold their line of defense along the 38rh. parallel and ordered a vuithdrawal sou& of the Hm gver, once again abmdnning Seoul to the communist;s. Ridpay was able to reconsfitllte h s frtrces witbin a f w weeks and to lamch a counteratlack, utilizing what he referred to as a "meat glinder" swategy. X3y March 14, th U.5, k m y had recapmred Seoul and con~nued nor&wmd to Line, on and somewhat nor& of the 38th parallel. plan to try to drive the Ghhese forces Ridpay oppozred back to the Yalu, beliaing it had no chance of success and that it risked starting World War III in the process. Ridpay replaced MacArthur when he was relieved in April 1951, and passed his own command on to Lt. Gen. james A Van Fleet, As commander of the U.N. Eorces inJapm, Ridgtvay advocated stafernate in Korea rather than an expansion of the conflict, and inJuly 1951 opened the armistice talks w i t h the North G r e m s and Chinese, In May 1952, Ridpay left Tokyo to succeed Eisenhower as supreme ailied commander in Europe, He was replaced by Gen. Mark W. Clark.

Warlords and Statesmen

213

Q Hany S . T m a n (1884-1973) was president of the United States and

commander in chief of its a m e d forces during most of the Korean War. "Bp God, I'm going to let them have it!" he declared after learning of the North Korean invasion, and successively ordered air, sea, and ground forces to the &eater of battfe. Tmman decided not to ask Congl-ess for a declaration of war and dismissed the increasingly bloody conflict as a "police action." He also refused to ask for rationing or other economic convols that the public might have associated w i t h ml-scale tvar, X n September 1950, Tmmm approved Mackthur's decision to cmss the 38h parallel and expunge the government of North Korea, an action that led to Chinese intervention and escaladon of the war. Mter China entered the war, Twman blustered in a press conference that the United States would use any weapons at its disposal, including the atomic bomb, to prevail in Korea. British Prime Minister Clement Adee immediatctly Rew to the United S ~ t e to s meet with Tmrnm, despemtt3ly hoping t o m i d atomic war and to c o n ~ n c e Tmman t o negohte w i t h the Chinese, In April 1951, Tmman was forced to relieve Mac4rthur for insubordinarjon, an act &hat rcjarltctd in public outcry. Trunlan suEered public critidsm for his conduct af the war in Korea for the remainder of his second term in oEce, largely becausr: of the protracttld armistice talks at Panmuqorn. In 1952, Tmmm decided not to nxn for reelechon, eermin that he would be d&ated if he did.

Cli Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg(18991954) served as the U.S. Air h r c e chief

of staff during the Ksretan War. He was promoted t o full general in 1948, becoming the youngest four-stztr o%cer in rhe U.S. amed forces. When war broke out in Korea, Vandenberg set out to strengthen what he refened to as ""a shoeswing air force." He redked the limitaiiions of &a service in 1950 and opposed MacArthur's plans to extend suategic bombing to communist China, saying that atuition from such a campaign would cripple its capabilities .Ear many years, After SaGet MiCs threatened to take control of the skies over Korea, Vandenberg began to send qumtities of the Air Force's most advmced fighter, the F-86 Sabre, to the theater of battle. Vandenberg fell ill in May 1952, and Gen. Nathan F. Tkning sewed as acxing chief of s M far four months. When Vandenberg retired in May 1953, Twining replaced him.

The Korean War

Gen. S m e s VaGle& ((lee), wba replaced Gen. Maahevv Edgway as commander of the f7.S. R O U Chief o f Stag Gen. Lee C

Gen.JmesA V m Heet (2892-19921,a covs commander during World War X I , succeeded E d p a y as eommmder of the 8th U.Se &my when Ridway was selwted to replace M;ack&ur as U.N. Commander. W e n he took command in April 1951, V m Fleet's first task vvas to s~engthen the line of contact inherited from Ridpay, Mter convincing Sou& b r e m President S p g m m &ee of the need to reform m d reorganhe the RQR m i l i w , Van Fleet employed an intens& training program t o lum it into an eEec~ve combat force, By late 1952, nearly three out of eveq four of his &oat-line soldiers were Korean, V m Reet became fms~ated w i t h the $&ticnature of combat in Korea during the second and bird years of rhewar, and in the spring of 1953he left Korea and resigned from the Army.

warlords and Statesmen

2x5

P At, &n. Wdtoa H. tflohnnie" Wdkw (1899-1950) W commander of , the nnain troop command in MacXrtbur's occupation forces in Japan, &om September H48 tr, December 1950. Like his World W m fX men-tor, Gen. Gearge S. Patton, he was mugh, aggressive, and a bit fXamboymr. bring World War X I , Wdker earned the high esteem of both Palton, wham he had semd as a carps commander, and Eisenhower, which probably led to his asmming cornmmd a E 8th Arrny in September 1948. He didiked Mack&ur, howmer, and did not get $Long well the supreme commander" chief of Edward M, Amond. M e n the %rean War began, Walker amumed command of all U.S. and ROR farees in Korea. These farces-unberstrml;th, poariy equippd, m d ill-~aixled-were s.t;eadilydriven sou&ward until Walker was able to esbblish a defensive perimeter around the part city of Pusan. Mter the breakout from eter and tfre subsequent advmce into North Korea, Walker's

Tau&, aggressive Gen. Walton Walker co U,S, 8rh Amy mtil his death in late December 1956. He

was filled when a tmckloiiLd of South fC,oreansoldiers ran into his jeep on a road oaside of Seoul.

The Korean War

~ o o pwere s once agah foxed t o remat sou&, this Lime by the Chinese, in what was essentially the worst rout ever suffered by an American army. WaIker faced many cfmcult circums~nces during the first six mon&s of the Korean War, not thc:least of which. was MacArthur, who was always ready to take credit flar successes and to blame his subordinates for failures, Nonetheless, altlhough a competent battlefield commander, Walker made mistakes that led to U.S. troops being killed and to enemy troops escaping destmclion, and bath, M ur and the leadership in Washington considered sacking him on several occasions. On December 23, 1950, Walker was in the process of establishing a defensive line along the 38th parallel when he was killed in a jeep accident near Seoul. His untimely death, uncmnify like that of Pattnn just a few years earlier, probably saved him from being relieved ofhis command.

Most of Nor& Korea "sop leadership had received mjlitaq or pall'dcal &aining from the commuaist Chinese or the S o ~ e t Union i n the years leading up the &rem War.I n k e d , Nor& Korea G m e r circle uf'leaders were members of khe hpsan, w S O ~ eexile t f;Zc~on, md had been forced to seek refuge in rhe USSR ciuhng World War 1 1 ,Conseque~cl~ &e k d e r s of r h t two lage mmmmiS~ sr;ztes bordedng Nor& Korea ended up pla@ng a role in the desire ofDPM leader a m Il Sung to u n q Korea by forceQ Choi Yong-km (1900-1976), North k r e a k defense minister and commander of the plqed a prominent r d e in the phnrrixzg and executioll of his counq'sJune 25 invaion of South k r z a . Ghoi received m i l i ~ v mining in China i n the 1920s and subsequently semed in the communist an~gapanese guerilla movement. He became a close c o m d e of %m I X Sung while a member af' the Chinese-led Noheastern h ~ j a p a n e s e Nlied &my, and fled with him to exile Ht the Soviet Union around 1940, m e n World War 2 1 ended, Choi returned to b r e a with %m and played a major role in Ihe esbbfishment of the communist regime in North. &rea. After the @reall VVar began, Urn promoted Ghoi t o the post ofdepucy prime minister, making him the number-WO person in Nor.& Korea's communist hierarchy, and named him commander for che defense of Seoul against the U,N, Forces.

Warlords and Statesmen.

In 1955, he presided over the court that sentenced to death political rival P& Hon-yong. He s e m d in wrious posts in the two decades after the war, including ceremonial head of state, a role E r n forced him to relinquish in 2972. D Chou En-lai (18981976) was premier and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China during the Korean War. Throughout the summer of 1950, Chou move to avert wadare b e ~ e e China n and the Unikd States. He announced that the approach of South Korean uoops to the Yalu a t the approach of U.S. troops Ever would not be considered a threat, but b would be. Chou's wamings went unheeded in the West, and when U.N. troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, Chinese military intemenfion. became a cer~inty. On December 22,1950, Chau mnounced that a ceasefire in b r e a had to be based on ~rhidrawal of U.S. forces from both Korea and Taiwm, m d the granting af a seat in the United Nations m communist China. In August 1952, Chou led a delegation to Moscm to seek Saviet assistance in Iiarea, but w a unable to secure their cooperahon. Ghau served as his country" sinister of %reign a & r sunlit 1.958and a s its premier until his dea& in 1976. D a m U Sung (1912-1994) was premier of Nor& Eir,rea, chaiman d t h e &rean. communist pary, and supreme commander of ekze NWA when b e b r e m War begm, A Korem na~onalist,he was also the d r i ~ n g farce behind his caunrsy" decision to invade the south, Born %m SonlS-ju into a peasant family, he joined an antigapanese carnmunistyouth oqanizadon in 1929. Mopling the nomme deguerresm Il Sung soon aftewards, he became well knom as an anei-Japaaeseperrllfa fighter in the 1930s. Around 1940, increasing Japanese military pressure forced E m and a number of 'his comrades to flee to the SoGet Union, He undoubtedly received milimry:mining in rhe USSR and, for the b&nce af World War XI, prob;ihly sewed as an oficer in the Soviet amed forces. In 7945, %m and a cadre of communist Korem soldiers returned to Sovietuccupied North Korea. Supported by the Soviet Union and drawing upon &eir wartime reputazion as g u e ~ l l fighters, a Kirn and tbe members of his b p s m faetion politjeav oumaneuvered the communist leadership that had remained in Korea. By 1949, they had gained control of both the ruling party and the government of N o d Korea. E m % decision t o invade Sou* Korea when he did may have been influenced both by Syngman Wee's threaw to i n ~ d the e north and by pressure lFor milibry x ~ o from rival P& Won-ysng. After the U,N. n polihcaf,

The Korean War

countemtracksmashed the North Korem army in h e fall,of f 950 and ehina assumed responsibility for carrying on the communist effort, Kim Largely lost conlsol over the m i l i ~ conduce v of the war, Kim blamed his political rivals for Nonh Korea's failure to unlfy the peninsula and, after the armistice, consolidated his personal power by n power for more than four decades having them purged. He remained i after the war until his death in 1994,when power passed to his son, KimJong f l.
C1 &cob A. M& (19061980), a career Soviet diplomat, was a deputy foreign minister and his country's permanent delegate to the United Nacions during much of the Korem War. XnJmuaq 1950, after the United Nations refused to grant China's seat to the newly-formed People's Republic of China, Mdik announced a Soviet boycott of the U.N. Security Council, and did not return until August* Ironicdly, the S o ~ eabwnce t from U,N, delibem~ons left it unable to comment on, or veto, the U.N. decisions inJune I C S 5 0 ta help defend South. k r e a and t o create a U.N. Command under the leadership of the United Sriltes. Through pfivate conversa~ons with U.S. oEcials, Mdik kept lines of communication open b e ~ e e n the Soviet Union and the United S ~ t e s On . June 23, 1951, he g m a radio address indieahg tfre possibility of an arnnb~ce in b r e a , which led to the start o f a k s less &an. three weeks later, In October 1952, Mdik replaced h d r e G o m y k ~ as the USSR"s first deputy foreign minister, and in March 1953, after the death of Sralin, was appointed ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Q &or@ Malenkov (1902-1988),a top leader in the Soviet hierarchy and a favorite of Stalin, assumed the posts of prime minister and first party

secretary upon the death of his mentor in March 1953. Immediately after Stalin died, Mdenkov launched a "peace offensive" that led to the signing of the armistice agreement and the end of hostilities i n Korea. Disputes between the United States and the S o ~ e t Union, Malenkov said, could be "decided by peacew means, on the basis of mutual understanding." There are also indications that the new Soviet leader directly asked the leadership of North Korea and China to end the war.
Q Mao Tse-tung (1893.1976), chairman of both the government of the

People's Republic of China and the Chinese communist party, was the ultimate policy maker for his counvy during the Korean War. Mao probably learned of North Korea's plans to kmde the south when he visited Salin in Moscow in 1949.11 is not likely &at his permission was

Warlords and Statesmen

sought for the invasion and, still recovering from war and trying to consolidate his power, was not likely to have been enthusiastic about it. None&eless, when North liorea's a m y was smashed and U.N. forces b e p n ta advance an the Yalu, Mao saw the acfion as both an &ant to internationd corrrrrzunis~lt and a threat to the securiry of China" bborders. He also believed that a victory against the forces of the Uniced States, or even a stalemate, could immeasurably improve China's presdge internadonally. Mao's eldest son, Maj. Mao An-ying, was one of the Chinese volunteers who entered Korea in late 1950, He was killed in the first man& of combat. Three monrJns after the war ended, Mao met with %m I1 Sung in China. At this meeting, he not only forgave North Korea's war debt to his counvy, but granted it another 800 million Chinese dollars for posmar reconstruction. This generosity increased China's debt to the USSR and contributed to the g r o ~ n rift g be~een the two largest communist potyws. of foreign &airs and a vice-premier ofNorEh Korea when the k r e a n War began. In March 1950,at a secret meedng of Nor& Korea" top leaders in b o n a a n g , Pak reportedly spoke in favor of invading South E;orc;a and promised that 200,000 %uth Korean communistcs would rise up to help the NWA. hmugapanese carnmunist achGst in Soulhem Korea in the 1920s and 1930s, Pak had esablished the XCnrean communist pasty and the b r e m Communist Youth League in f 925, Mter World W'a 1616, Pak was one of the most logical and qllalified choices ta head the government of South b r a . kca~xse of the U.S. opposition to communbm, however, P& was forced to move nor& and es~blish bimseE there. Pak hoped to use his influence in the south to both aid the invwion forces and bolster his posilion in the govcmment of a unified Uo~ea. North. b r e a ' s failurcr to prevail in Korea, however, doomed Pak, and in 1955 the bpsan facLion tried, conGcted, and executed him.
O Jose@ SMin (1879-1953),secretary general of the USSR's communist party from 1922 to 1953 and Soviet premier from 1941 to 1953, was the
UI S A Honyoag (1900-1955)
v ~ a s minister

undisputed leader of the Soviet Union and the most powerful communist leader in the world during the Korean War. In late 1949, Stalin received North Korean leader Kim 11 Sung in Moscow to consider his plan for the invasion of South &rea. Ever causious, Stalin likely conferred with Mao Tse Tung and had one more meeting with Kim before granting his approval for the operation. Stalin feared the possibility of bemen the Soviet Union and the United S ~ t e sand , n direct c o n f r o n ~ ~ o publicly defined the war in Korea as a civil conflict in which the superpowers

The Korean War

had no business. Secretly, he supported the communist war effort with men and materiel and Eivored the Chinese intervention, which he saw as serving Soviet kteresa in the Far East (EikeAcheson in the United S ~ t e sSalin , saw Europe, rather than Asia, as the primaq &eater of interest to the superpowers), Stalin died on March 5,1953, and was succeeded by Georgi Mdenkov as general secretary of the communist party of the USSR His death brought about changes to Soviet foreign policy that almost certainly convibuted to the completion of the Korean armistice agreement and the cessation of hosdlities,
O V a l e r i a n A. Zorin succeededJacob A. Malik as the USSR's permanent delegate to the United Nations in October 1952. He served in this post for just six months, until April 1955, a month after Stalin" dealh, when he was feplaeed by Foreign Minister h d r e i U; \Tyshinsky.

A number of poli;I-icaX leaders nnmliated with the supevowers or aggressor n a ~ o nhad s m interest i n the outcome ofthe Korean W=, Some sfhese me^ were interested in ending h e i"zosr.;iII"Irr".s in Korea, whr"Ieothers hoped to see them c m tinue as long aspossible,

D Chiangr&i-shek ( 1887-1975), pesiden t of the Taiwan-based.Wublic of o influeme U.S. poliq towxd Korea both prior to and China, sought t duflirxg the war as a mems t o strenghen his position on mainland China. Chiaag gained o n ~ oof l the nationalist h u r n i m g party in the 1920s and nomindty uni_fied China in 19128. A, s ~ u n c h mb<ommmist, he prefemed to prosecute a civil war against the leftists rather than unite ~ t f r them to drive theJapanese out &China. Nonetheless, in I936 the two sides dlied againstJapan. During MTorld War IT, Chiang called f i r Allied recognition of the Korean Pro~siond Gavemnrencand its leadef, Kirn Ku, hoping to block assurnp~on of power by either the cammunis~s or ;S;yngmanmee, In addidon, in 1943 Ghiang signed the Cairo Declarabon, which cdled fbr the eventual independence o f h e a , Despite these acrions, however, Chiarlg w;ls detemined to asseit-r: Chinese dominion over lLc3rea after World. War 11. ln 1949, C b m g and his forces lost control aEChina and fled to the islmd of T&wan, Corramunist China was preparing to invade the idarld and cmsh

Wartorb and Statesmen

""Democratic" Asian leaders Cftiang Kai-sbek (B$ left) and Syrxgman &ee were both vehemently apposed to the comunist forces that divided seen hi together duhng a meeting ia South Korea.

the na~onalists when war emp~edin Korea. Tmmm ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Sl;raits of Taiwm, probably saving Chiang's reglrne from mnihilafun. On June 27, 1950, after a U.N. call for muf~naGond & Korea, suppork for h offered 33,000 CI.iiang Nationalist troops, providing the Uni~edStzrtes would equip and trmsport &ern to Korea. This offer, thought by many to be insincere in the first place, was rejected by the Uniced e equipment f i r U.S. S ~ kfor s a variety of reasons, among &em a s h o r ~ g of traops, na~onalistwoops>oor record an the battaefield, and fears of b~nging eommmist China into the conflict, Chimg did all he cmfd to prolong the war in Korea and used the conflict to seengthen his o m position and to pressure the United States into signing a mutual defense may w i t h his government,

O Dag Hammarskjod (19011961), a Swedish diplomat, replaced Trygve

Lie as secremv general o f rhe Unired Narcions i nApril 1953, He assumed his role during the finalmonths ofthe Pmmunjom armistice talks, and had only a limited role in the finakauon of an agreemenr,

CI

Tx;vpe Lie (189&1968), a Norwegian diplomat and the first secretary general of the United Nations, was ins-mental in calling the U.N. Securiy Council into emergenq session upon the invmion of^ North b r e a and in gdning passage for the resalrrtions ofJune 25 and 27, which approved rndia~ assismce j F a r Sou& Korea. Mter the mid-September 1950 Inchon Landing, Lie sought to end the war quickly and called for Zi.N,-supervised elec~onsthroughout the peninsula md for U.N. forces to forego crossing immediately into North

The Korem War

Korea, His plan was not approved, hawever, and the Tf,S,-backed resafuhon of October 15 allowed U.N. t;roops to crass the Ss* pardlel into Nor& krea, Throughaut the war, Lie mediated on the sitruatjon in Korea and conrjnuously sotlght w q s to end the fighting. Nost of his attemp&ended in hilure, dthough a plan he proposed for discussion, bemeen militar)l comrnzurders likely reinforced Jacob Malik's s c ~ v i ~and e s helped lead the sQrt of the armistice nego.tjadans, h November H50,the U,N, had passed a resolution extending Lie's tern as secreuxy generd for t h e e yearg. His strang sbnd on the war and other issues had led to h a s ~ l i y from the S o ~ eUnion t and others at the United Nations, however, and be. decided to step down in the summer rd 1%2, finally relinquishing his p s t : in April 1953,

""Peace, with justice and hanar, is the best and most profitable of aII possessions; but with shame aad cowardice, it is the worst and most h a m m of a11.3s -Polybius, Histories, c. 125 B. C.

n &e summer of 1951, once the conBict had bogged dam into a stalemate not fir &om where it had begtm, U,N aod cornntuaisr militav leaders agreed to begin discussing a negotiated setdemen r to the Korem War,

1 ; 1 During the first .).ear of the war in Korea, the comrnlulists had refused U.N. eEor& to discuss an amistice. Mter the Chinese spring oRensives of 1951 failed to destroy U.N. forces and the lines of CQYLQCI began to solidq, however, they became axnenhle to initiat.ing talks. V.N. leaders, too, realized that they might not be able to concentrate the hrce, or be vJi.11irrg to suEer the caualties, necessay to break the Chinese defensive lines, which, like theis o m , were g r o ~ n gradudly g swonger,

rLI OnJune 23, SE>vietdelegate to the United NationsJacob Maljk suggested &at miliaxy represenb~ves from each side begin, negotiaung a ceasefire, and hey agreed. Li The United Sates insmcted Gen. Mat&w B. Sdway, overdl settlement to the cornander of the U.N, forces, to negotiate a ntili~ry conflict, but to avoid polieIcal subjeces (e.g., fixture U.S. policy toward Nadonalilist China, reesbblishment of the 3.8& pardleX as the border

The Korean War

bemeen the Nations),
~ w Korea, o

or a place for communist China in the United

Q OnJuly 8, U.N. and communist military leaders met for the first dme at a

teahouse in besong, the ancient capital of Korea. It was located in the communist zone of control, about 35 miles northwest of Seoul andjust south of the 38th parallel. Plenary sessions began on July 10, with hopes high on both sides &at the war could be brought to a

D Gen. Mffat&e.w B. Ridmy selected U.M. navd commander M m . C. Turner Juy to head the U.N. negotiating team, Together they chose the other four delegates: Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes (U.S. Army), Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie (U.S. Air Farce), Rear M m , hleigX1 A. Bwke QI3.S. Navy), and Maj. Gen. Faik Sun h p (ROKkmy).
CI Gen. Nam 11, chief of staff of the North Korean People's premier of the Democradc People's RepuhEc of &rea, wm and tfie nomind leader of the communist delegation. His assistants were: Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho (NmA),Maj. Ge Teng Hua (Chinese Peoplek Voolunteers (Chinese People's Volunteers h m y ) , who ~ r a in s all Xikelihood the ac~uaX head of the comrnunis~ negorjators,

Cl m i l e the U.N. negotiating tern vvas composed of highly proficient military men, none of them had s u h ~ n t i a ldiplomatic or politjcal experience. The communist n e g o t j ~ r son , the other hand, were all tough negofiators skilled in both politicd m d m i l i w matters.
Q Negaciacions Began slowly, *ng h ~ weeks o to est;ablishan agenda. Two pain& the communists pushed for ini~dly, but which the U.N. negotiators were unklling to budge an, w r e the iniithdrawd of all foreiw military personnel from b r e a , and the restoradon of h e 38& p a d d as ctne border Nor& and b r e a . Ibe~een

Q EvenmaXly, the communists agreed on fQurmajor agenda items, each of which was assigned to a subcommittee, so that discussion of them could proceed simul~neously, ralher than one at a rime. These WE:

1) Adoption of the agenda

2) Es~blishnnent of a demaiarized zone

Armistice Negotiations

225

3) Creation afa militaq armislice commission and rniliaq observer teams to aversee EL1fiUment of the armistice terns
4) Dispositjon af prisaners of war

China was had long km considered a secoad-rattt.power by the Wesr, aod e w e m h e U,N delegarion learned that the Chinese were veqsensiex've to issues of equaliy, protocol, and wadition, and reacted negadvely to any perceived attemp& by rhe U.N. delegation to demonsuare superiori~. Indeed, che fact &at the Chinese sat C J O m as h e equab af&e h e r i g a s (and the superjors of Lhe North &rems) enhancd heir international presdge and sfisted h e bdmce ofpower in Asia in theirfavor.

ist delegaks to the amistiee tdks bad exknsive rniliaw and political experience.From left to right;are Chhese Gen. Hsieh Fang, Chinese Gen. Teng Hwa, No&h Korean Maj. Gen. Nam 11, and North Korean Gen. Chiang, pi~Rxred at Maesong an July 16, 1951.

The Korean War

These&c& m d e it is easier tcl undersmd why rhe Chhesefelt obligated to m t the UN. nego~ators like supplimts and m engage in ixfi manner of game~mmship~ even though an end t s the conflictw i n their brtst ini(:eres&*
Q For example, when one of the h e r i c a n delegates placed a s m d U.N. flag on the negotiating mble at the m r t of tbe conference, the communbts brougbt an even larger flag into the meeting. W e n the U.N. staff had a lavine built for their use, the communists consmcted a much larger, brighdy pintr-td facility with landscaped surroundings. M e n the senior U.N. delegate began a ~ f i n g at the meetings in a sedan, the comrnunisfs ob~ined a car from the S o ~ eUnion t so that their senior delega~e could a ~ v the e same wary.
Q Once the agenda had been established, the Chinese used bfuster,

profanity, mdeness, m d any other tactics &at would gain &em concessions or ineimidate the U.N, defegahon (alhough much of this was lost in the slat^ionfrom Chinese or k r e a n ) . Once tbey had o b ~ i n e d all they could w i t h these me&ods and were resolved t o sertting an imue, the communists would shift back to a civil, businesdike approach,

tl It also became apparent that the cornmurlisa would not accept U.N. proposals in their entirety. This led the tr,PJ,delegation to delihemtely insert
errors into proposed agreemen&,knorving &at once the communists found &ern they wodd be likely to leave the rest ofthe text m~ouched, P The communists w r e also suspicious of U.N. attempts to reach quick compromises and offers of U.N. concessions that were not matched by demands for equivalent carnmunist concessions.
if Another tactic used by the communists vvas waiting for the U,N. delegation to make a proposal. They would then accept the portions favorable to them, bargain for more and, when the U.N. delegation would not budge, tender a counter &re

O During the bargaining sessions between the delegations, the Chinese consistently demons~ated that they were still willing to give ground on a point as long as they were arguing about it. Once they had settled on their final position, however, they declined to discuss it further.

CZ T t soon became clear to the U.N. delegates &at calmness, tirmness, m d patience were critical to dealing with the communists.

Armistice Negotiations

227

BREAKDOWN OF THE M E S O N G TALKS

Soon after L h e negoLiations began, both sides began tolevel charges &at the other had t.1'01at;ed the ncutraJ1"~ c;?frl;le fiesong rnee~ng area.

U On August 4, a company of communist combat uoops marched through the conference area in an apparent attempt to indmidate the U.N. negotiators. They responded by suspending the talks for ftve days, until the l communists agreed not to repeat such blatant violations of the n e u ~ azone.
O Smnned and unhappy at both the strong U.N. reaction to their violadon of the Kaesong meeting area, and with the resulting negative publicity in the international media, the Chinese responded with a litany of complain&

about U.N. violarians of the zone,

O On August 23, the communists charged that U.N. warplanes had

bombed the conference site. W e n the U.N. Command rehted chese charges, the communists declared an indefinite suspension of the conference, In the mean~me, iiaison oacers from both sides continued to meet to discuss wdys to reduce h m r e Gsla~ons and agree on a more neutrd site for conGnuatlon of the talks, They settled on Panmunjom, a .village five miles west of &@song that, being an the line of conact raslzer &an in the communise zone of eontsol, w;ls more easily accessible to botl?,sides.

il W i l e the talks lasted, bolt-r sides had &ken the oppormnity to reinforce
their defensive posirions. Most af the line of eonuct was above the 38th parallel at this time (slighdy south of it in the west and well north of it along the east coast), and most U.N. leaders were opposed to launching a general oEensive to take territolry that might have ts, lne remrned under the terns of an armistice,

Cl U.S. 8th Army commander Gen. Jarnes Van Fleet, however, was
concerned that his troops had lost their edge during the months of inactivity. m e s e fears, along wi* a. desire to keep pressure on the communistls and incrementally improve his own defensive lines, prompted him to begin conducling limited oRensive operafions after the peace talks broke 0 4 3 . '
C l From late July through mid-October, K N , ground fjorces conducted operations in the rough, hilly terrain in the middle of the peninsula, fighting batdes at areas that became known as the Punchbowl, Bloody Ridge, and Heatbreak Ridge, W i l e these operations w r e largely successful, the communist forces contested them vigorously, and U.N. units paid a heavy

The Korean War

U.N. delegates rest on the steps of the conference building during a break in the amislice talks a t Kaesong in the summer o f 1951. From left to rif;Xlt are U.S. Air Farce Maj. Gen. Laurenee C. Craigie, ROK A m y Maj, Gen. Paik Sun Vup, U.S. Navy Vice Adm. 6, Maj. Gen. H e w I. Hades, and Rear A&, Arleigh Bwke,

price in dead m d wunded for the lirnited ground they took and the caualdes they irnflicted,
Lll Noneehefess, the limited aBensives af the U.N. ground farces, reinforced with air and naval atack, allowed them to gaiPr the i n i ~ a ~ v e , keep the enemy off balance, and ul~mately pernude the communists t a return to the conference table.

On October 25, plenaq sessions resumed at Banmur?jm,where they would c o n ~ n u until e the end af the war.
1;CL Es~btishment of a enjtitaq dernarcatian line and a dernilidzed zone, agenda itern twa, had been an the table when the talks broke of"f; with the communist delegabon insisting upon a restoration of the 38& parallel.

Armistice Negotiations

229

Chief U.N. Delegate C. Turner Joy had reacted to this by stating that, because the U.N. forces enjoyed both air and naval superiori~ in the conflict, ttre communists should be wFlljng fa give up more arrimfy along the front.
O Each side flatty rejected the assertions of the other, and this mutual recalciemce over the issue conrimed with the resumption of the talks and ultimately led both to drop their demandswhile continuing to reject those of their opponents. On November 27, the delegates agreed to accept the current line of conbct zl~ithe line af demacadon, O Although the U.N. delegation insisted that this line would remain valid for only 30 days, once it was established the communists showed a marked lack of interest in resolving the other agenda items and began to act as if the line had been perrnanenrly esrablished and a ceasefire insrimted,

IE w ~ n ouneilDecember t 1951 that debata begm on agend;t item three$ es&bfr"shment o f a rni&@qzmisdce comrnissI"~n to ensuse &at bo& sides complied with h e terms o f a cemefire.
O Three basic pointr, emerged during discusgon af this item. These concerned Mlbo would be entrusted 7Nithi compliaace invections behind the

each side" llines; h w much inspecljon would be allowed; and whether construction ur repair of airfields wuld be pemimd during the armistice,

UI Eventudy, the eornmunise suggestcld that a nurnbcr of neuwd natiuns be selected to gerfom the iaspecaons, but the U.N. negotiators adamantly rehsed t o alow h e m to select the S o ~ eUnion t as one of these nat4ons. Because the USSR played no ofiFicid fole in fhe Korean War, however, the U.N. pretenses for refusal sounded we&, and they findXy setded on claiming that the proximity of the Soviet Union to the war zone might keep them from being imprt;ial.
O m i l e the communists had been opposed to inspectionsfrom the start, it
w a the U.N. ddegation &at propwed limitring inspections to specif"lcpoinfs

of- e n q and cczrnrnunication centem, The communists agreed m this, md the negotiators moved on to discussing how many inspection points there should be and where,

The Korean. War

C;I Anorfier impediment to resohtion of Itern Three was the U,N, insistence that consaction or repair of airfields not be allowed during the armisdce, in order to keep the communisw from being able to establish bases of air operalions in N o d k r e a . Communist opposition to these e h & wet-t: resolute, however.
O Eventually, the communists uvihdrew their nominalion of the SoGet Union as a neutral nation and the U.N. responded by dropping their insistace upon the aifield resuicdons. The communists mminated Poland and CzechoslovaEa a d the U.N. nominated Sweden and SGaeslmd a members of the Neutral Nations Sapemisory Commission. O Finalization of Item Three included agreeing that 10 neuud nation teams would be assigned to each side, and that each would monitor five poinrs of entry into the respective zone of conuol; that materiel and up to 35,000 troops per monh could be replaced on a one-forane basis; and &at administraGon m d supe&sian of the demili~rized zone, and Golaeions of the armistice,would be handled by a Mili~ry Armistice Commission based at Parrmunjom,

Once arrangementsforltem Three had begun, discussion began on agenda Item Four, the r e p a ~ i a ~ o of nprisonm ofwar.
O Neither the United St;ztesnor Nor& Korea had ramed the 1949&new Convention on prisoners ofwar, but both delegations agreed to be bound by

its prahions. cle 118 of the convention stated that prisoners of war should be returned immediately after cessation of hosdlities. Nonetheless, problems arose early in discussions on the issue of repaviation and steadily increased as the talks continued,

O Trouble began in late December 1951 when the two sides exchanged
lists of the prisoners. Those provided by the United Nations listed 132,000 military prisoners (20,00of whom were Chinese) and 37,000 that they had reclassified as "ci\ilian internees,'' which compared favorably with the communist claims of 188,000 personnel missing in acdon.

Armistice Negotiations

O Those provided by the communists, however, listed only about 11,500

prisoners (7,100 South Koreans and 4,400 U.N. personnel). These numbers either emlier communist claims that &ey had &en did not mesh well 65,000 prisoners, or U.N. claims of 88,000 KOK and 11,500 U.S. troops missing in acljlon,
O When the U.N. delegates insisted the communisw explain this disparity,

they claimed that they had released thousands of prisoners at the front after "reeducating" them. They also denied U.N. assertions that they had impressed South Korean civilians and POWs into the ranks of the North Korean People's Army and objected to the U.N. practice of screening prisoners and reclasslfylng as ciGlian internees those who claimed to have been forced into miliaq sedce,

C 2 Since mid-1951, U.S. nnifiaq leaders had discussed he:possihiliq that

anttcommunist prisoners of war were likely to be imprisoned or killed upon return to Nor& Korean or Chinese control. They also realked that aUlo~ng prisoners to decide whether or nbt to be repa~iatedwould be both Frurnaniarian and offer U.N. hrces propaganda opportunities. CII Naneaefess, U.N. nego~atorshad not broached this subject for a nunnber of' reasons, hcluding fears that it might impede the quick and safe return of their prisoners and a realhatlon &at once the quesdon af' repatriafion was raised, it wodd be dficult or impossible to tyl&draw it.
D m a t they hoped to da w a e o n ~ n c e the communisrs to aqee to a one-for-one; exchange and then, after all the U.N. prisoners had been g be repaeiated, they could returned iin exchange for carnmuniss ~ s h i n to allow the remaining prisoners to decide whether to return or not. These hopes were dashed, however, by communist insistence of an all-for-dl exchange of prisoners.
O A few days before the end of 1951, U.N. negotiators proposed that prisoners should be allwed to choose whether to return to their o m jforces t t . 1the other side, They based t h i s proposal on communist or remain d admissions that they had "reeducated" and released thousands of prisoners &thin their o m lines and thus already endorsed the concept of voluntary repauiation. This tactic committed the U.N. delegation to the principal of volun~q repatriation,

D Not only did the communists reject the concept of voluntaly repatrialcion, they denied any incangruiq bemeen this s m c e and rheir practice of reeducadng prisoners and then impressing them into service as soldiers or liaborers.

The Korean War

O One of the communists' concems was that many of the Chinese pkoners might he sent t o Taiwm, where hey would become rnembers of
the Nationalist Chinese armed forces. They were less adamant about repatriation of South Koreans who had been impressed into communist milibq sefice. At that point, before extensive =screening of prisoners had been conducted, neither side realizedjust how many of the prisoners held by the U.N. forces would refuse repawia~on.
O In February 1952, U.N. Command guessed that of the 132,000prisoners

in its custody, about 28,000 would not want to go home, but that only 16,000 of them would actually resist repatriation. Some 10,000 of these were Chinese prisoners with strong Nationalist tendencies who were expected to folribly r e s i ~ repatriation.
O Thus, when the communists insisted in early April 1952 upon a firm estimate of how many N o d Korean and Chinese prisoners would be

returned, the U.N. delegation's anslver of 1 16,000 (most of the 132,000they held) vvas based upon this guess, which, unfomnately, had no basis in fact.
Q In response to U.N. estimate, the communist delegation immediately their lists and confirm how masly recommended that each side r e ~ e w prisoners they would return, expecdrrg chat a maimurn af 16,000 of heir former soldiers would remain i n V.N, hands,

Q Screening of prisoners w m conducted by U,N. terns throughout April s mm7 of the pfisoners as &er 1852, during which they tried to conGnce a could t o return to the camrnunist side, which indicated that about 52,000 af the mifil;try prisoners, among them 14,000 o f the 20,000 Chinese PQWs, would resist repatria-eion, About 70,000 were *ling to return to the communht;s,

tlli Inihally, the cornmarniscs mac& w i t h surprise and then with anger, belieGng that the U,N, command bad deceived tbem as part of a propaganda campaign. Tdks bogged d a m once again, and were complicated by the issue of repa~iationuntil their conclusion in the summer of f 953.
P In late April. 1952, the comunis@ flady rejected a U.N. offer to exchange the 70,090 AMng communist pl-isoners, insistirlg that ll6,000 of the prisoners be returned, including a higher propordon of the Chinese p~soners,
iJ In May 1952, communist prisoners at the U.N. POW compound on Koje Island, off the soct-clrtem coast of Korea, launched a series of orchestrated riots and dernanscrarisns, During &ese actions they managed to seize the

Armistice Negotiations

233

camp commander and use him as a chip in negodatims for both concessions and admissions that communist prisoners had been treated inhumanely m d had been coerced during screening, Even aorrgh these "admissions" were made under pressure and had no basis in fact, they allmed the communist armistice negotiators to seize the mord ixlitia~veduring the monihs of mid-1952.

Ct After U.K. i n b n q m e n were used to restore order in the camp, the U.N.
Commmd conducted a more carehl screening of the prisoners and then o smy and &ose who dshed to relurn into segregated &ose who .Ivished t separate compounds.
O In July, U.N. delegates submitted a revised total of 83,000 prisonem willing to remm to the communist side. This figure was obtained hy including cslian internees in the list of POWs who would not resist repaiationt. Once again, however, the comrnuniss rejeced this total ruld insisted that larger number ofprisonem,especialb Chinese, be repaeh~ed.

With rhe blks going nwbere, both new U,N, comrnandcrr G n . Mark W Cfark and new Ghief negotiator MaJ', Gen. Wxlliam K Harrison wanted to make a number of alternate pmposaIs on the issue of reparrialtion m d t o demonstrate that they had reached their final posirion by suspending tke talks 8 'the communists would not accept m y of them. armis~ce
P;II

Q U,S, President H a v S, Tmmm approved this course of acdon, and on September 28,1952, the U.N. delegation offered the communists three new proposds:

X . Prisoners held by both sides would he bmught to the neu~sal are* on the line of demarcation and arcounted h r by the International Red Crass, after MiZrich they could choose to either be repatriated or remain k r f t their captors;

2. Prisoners willing to be repauiated wouM be exchanged immediate'ty. Those resisdng repaeiation would be brought t o a mutral zone where they would be interviewed by neu&af n a ~ o n teams, after which they could decide whether to return to s&y behind;
3. Prisoners wilting to be repatriated would he exchanged immediately. Those unvvifling to be repan-lating would be transported to the neutral zone and freed, &thaut any sort of screening or intefiews, to go to whichmer side they chose.

fl The communis&rgected aH three of these proposals, This prompted the

U,N. delegadan, on October 8, 1952, to declare the armisdce talks

The Korean War

suqended until such time as the cornmunis~ were tvilling to accept one of the new proposals or make a consmehve one of heir om.

During most of 1958 figh h g along the h e of conl;zct had consisted main&oflimited o@ensiveshten&d t o take or keep advm&geouspiecesof temain, to keep the e n q off'guard,and to keep f ~ m d l y forces from becoming complacent. U.N leaders in px~cuIaru.anted to avoid heav casud~es in exchange fiJr~Vectives that might have t o be relinquished under the terms o f a casefire.
Once the talks brake oE a second time, U.N. Clommmder Qn, Mark Clark approved a number af larger ogensives in the fdl of 1952, mosLfy in the central sectors of the front. These oEensives er?joyed only limited success, hawever, ;andwere costly in terms of lives, The onset of dnter ended hr&er U.N. attempts t o impruve their defensive lines.
Q During the suspension of talb, liaison oEcers canrjrlued t o meet at Panmunjorn hroughout the end of the F a r and into 1953, mosdy to deal w i t h complains and alleged violations of the conference area.

P In January and Febmary 1953, after President-elect Eisenhower was inaugurated, the new Republican administration made several unsuccesskl attempts to force the communists back to the bargaining table. These attempts included threaw to utilize atomic weapons or expand the conflict---the very things for which Truman's administration had been criticized and Gen. MaeAsthur &ed,

A break occurred m March 5, 1959, howeveq w h m SovfetPremierJoseph Stalin died unexpectedly. E m as his successors scrambled to consolidate their positjons within the Soviet Union, h e y began to s o h rheir srance toward the West, a shift that apprendy spread to communist China and Nor& Korea.

Armistice Negotiations

235

U In February 1953, Gen. Clark sent a routine communication to the communist militaly leaders proposing an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners (he did not expect it would be accepted). On March 28, 1953, however, the delegation both accepted the request and indicated that they were also willing to discuss repauiation of the other prisoners.
O On March 30,1953, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai called for the

resumpdon of plenaly talks in mid-April, declaring that each side should turn over to a neuual nation commission those prisoners opposed to repatriation.
O When liaison oBcers met on April 6 to exchange lists of sick and wounded prisoners and arrange for their transfer, the talks were free of anger or recriminations and were conducted in businesslike manner.

P Operation Little Switch took place on April 20 at Panmunjom, when the U.N. remrned 5,194 Nor& b r e a n and Z ,030 Chinese rniliary prisoners and 446 ci~lian internees, and the coxnmunis~ returned 684 sick m d wounded soldiers, among them t 49 AnlerSeans,

Cf In the weeks after Little S ~ t c hthe , U,N. and communist delegations

addressed tfie find repaaiadon questions, including who would be responsible for the non-repahtes, havv long they would be held, and what to return home. heir final disposiGon would be if they remained u n ~ l l i n g
Q m i l e the U.N. Commmd had wanted Sd;rzerlmd to head the Neue~al

Nations R e p a ~ i a ~ Gommiwion, on the communisrs insisted Xndia be a made af d & member of the borfy arld its chief, U,N. negotjatom cmceded t h i s point on the condition that Xndia pro4de afl the necessary military and adnninistra~ve personnel.
P China and North Korea also proposed that the non-repauiates be held by the neutrd commission for s i x man&s white cornmunht teams bed to conGnce them to return home. U.N. negotiators did not like this suggestion. After some discussion, the negodators agreed on a SO-day period during which the communist teams could try to persuade the prisoners to come home, at a ratio not to exceed seven apologists for eveq 1,000 non-repa~iates.

Final disposition of those who still opposed being repauiated at the end of this three month period would be decided at a political conference after the skning of the armistice. If &is conkrence failed to resolve heir fate within 30 days of being convened, the non-repatriates would be declared civilims and dlowed to seek residence in o&er c o u n ~ e s .

The Korean War

When armistice &l& got back on &ack in April 1953, ROK Presideat Spgman Rhee became alarmed at the prospect of an inconclusive peace and launcheda suongpuhIic campaign calling fora decisive end to the war, promising Lhat Sou& Karea would c;on~nue toEght alone $forced to doso,

CI SouLh b r e a coufd not wage or win a war against the comnlunistsw i ~ o u t U.S. asismce. m e e %words were &us more of m embamwsment than a ubsfacle tu the peace process. D Sou& h r e m reactions increased in May as the talks m o d closer to a setdement, and crisis loomed when %ee opposed the selection of India as head af the neuml nations commission and threatened to have Indim personnel shot if they set foot an South, Korean soil, Part ofmee" concernswere based on fears that the United States might not intervene 41"NsrthKorea invaded the soutt.Ef o t I o ~ n g an a m i s ~ c e At , the end of May 1953, however, Eisenhowr attempted to dehse the simaeion 'by offering Solltifi Korea a bilateral secwiry treaty, even though he was rc;luctant to do so in the face of Rhee's pblic &pea&and pressure.
Q tinformately, Rbee had exposed hirnseE poliric:dly by x-$EIyingthe Sou& Uorean people to this cause and n w felt obligated to take some sort of action before acceg~ng the h e r i c m oEer. On June 18, 1953, KOK camp wards, acting on see's orders, allowed some 27,000 non-repatfiates to che agreement that the negotiamrs had escape. This action con~avened painsraking17 wrked out and threatened to derail the entire peace process. Most of- the former prisoners quickly dimppeared i n l u the civilian population, and would have been difficult to recapture even with South &re= assis~nce,

C3 Mthaugh t h i s unilateral action did cause: an uproar, it also relieved some pressure from Rhee and led him to become more amenable to assurances of hture U.S. military support. Despite his conGnued misgivings over the long tern results of an indecisive peace, at the begillning ofJuly Rhee agreed to stop trying to sabotage the conclusion of m armistice.
C3 W i l e the communists made some political currency out of mee's actions, their rext;ion to them at the conference table was not excessive. They launched a series of oEensives &om M q through midguly in an

attempt to snatch up as much territory as possible before conclusion of an

Armistice Negotiations

237

armistice, and the resulting heavy ROK casualties may have cooled Rhee's ardor for war.

ENDOF THE WAR

Despjte L h e inabili~ ofrhe UN. Command to vouch for Rhee S ' actions once rhe armistice was signed, both sides were eager to finalize a mce, and inJuly the negotiators established a final line of demarcation and made final axTmgemenB for the disposiLion of pra'soners of war. (See Operau'on J3ig Sw'tch in Gh;ipter X I & Prism ers o f War and War Grimm,)

Cf QnJub 27,1993, the opposing negatiatops met at Panmunjom and each signed 18 copies sf the amisalce agreement, ending a war &at had ki%Iedor wounded more than two million mili~;lsy personnel and ravaged two hdves
of a d i ~ d e d countv,
rlt Within 12 hours of the signing, fighting ended along the encire front, Lfie k r e a n War was over, arld azl uneav peace that lasts to this day began.

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PRISONERS OF WAR
A N D ATROCITIES

""S I am allotted months of emptiness, md nights of m i s e are ~ apportioned to me. When I lie d o w E say, When shall I arise??" But the night is long, anid f am &X1 of tossing till the dawn. , . , My days are swifter than a weaver's shuttle, and come to their end without hope."

---Job 7:2-6, HQ&Bibk

oldiers and civl"1imsdependent upon the mercies ofthe other side were among hose who $&@red the most dudng h e Korean Warp &m impriso~ma t, tormre, and murder. To &is dayj m are &;m half a centuv dter &e start of~iilr, accusa~ans ofde&t and a t r c m " ~ are sdll being ]eveled a g ~ n sthe t &.nvernn?(L.n& af both sides.

y &om balrfi sides endured More than a quarter million m i l i ~ r personnd incarcera~oaas prisoners of war (PQWs) during the Lhree years of t;he cmaict in h r e a , Their &eamer;lc;acfualt numbersf and return have aJll con pibut& to one af lhe mast emo~onal and ~ a g i ficet;s c of the war, one &at cont i nues to haunt sum'vors of h e conflict to &is day
D Most of those taken prixsanrtr were capmred durixng the first year of the war, as each side a t ~ c k e d m d counkratacked across the 38ta7. paraflef and pockets of atllaps w r e overrun or cut off hehind enemy lines. Once combat

The Korean War

settled down into armed raids and lirnited ogengives, fewer numbers of troops were raken pfisoner.

D Neither side was prepared to adequately house or care for the great numbers of prisoners that they captured, and cultural differences certainly conrributed to death and saering among prisoners on both sides.

PRISONERS OF THE UNITED NAT~ONS

O In September 1950, the United States took charge of the all the
communist prisuners held by the U.N. and ROK forces, and by 1951 was responsible for about 13%,000 prisoners af war,

D U.S, mismanagement and naivete contributed to many of the problems that subsequendy occurmd amongst the prisoners in their custody, inchzding undesground political organizations, deaths, and riot-ing.

Cf It was imporlane for h e r i c a t o try to d n the hear& and minds of its

p~soners, and its treament of &ern w a not only predominmtly humane but actually better than what many of &ern had knom under communism before the war. This Qeament included vocadona3. waining, volunuy clasroom inswcht-ion,and erzteminment programs..
O EGdexlce of the success of r;E-reseeEor~s is found in the t x g e number of prisoners of war who subsewentlp reCsed to return to Nor& h r e a or China. Condi~ons in the UeN, camps w a not ideal, hovvever, a d m m y prisoners perished here a s a result of illness and o h e r causes, Some 6,600

POWs died by December 195l,

D Had the cammmist prboners been left in the charge of South Kurea, however, which felt a great enmiry tovjard the communist Zioreans and did over its enemies to its own way of not share the liberal h e r i c m need to life, it is a cer~inty that far more of those prisoners would have died in imprisonment,
D InicialV$most of the North Korean antd Chinese p~soners were held in c a q s around Busan, but inJanuafy 1951 rrlost of them were trmsferred t o compounds on hje-do, a large island off the soutXlctmtem coast of Xsrea. D These camps were overcrovvded and underpmded, and it was not lung before the communist prisoners organised into cells and began to exploit the weaknesses of their U.N. captom h r propaganda puxposes.

Prisoners of War and Atrocities

24 1

O Many of the communist leaders had experience as professional agitators and some of them were political officers who had deliberately allowed themselves to be captured in order to exert communist convol over the

other prisoners. Anti-communist prisoners organized as well, especially farmer Nahanalist Chinese soldiers who had been impressed into the communist ranks dter losing the Chinese Civil UJar. camp administrators and guards found themselves increasingly incapable of controlling the violent political smggles b e ~ e e n the ~ r i o u s prisoner factions, which were encouraged not only by the communist government, but also by those of Nationalist China and the Repubtic af Korea.
O Confinement did not cut oB the leadem of the communist prisoners from the aurside wodd, and they managed to s ~ in y corluct w i t h their leaders h the North Korean and Chinese armies through an underground n e m r k of spies and infomers. Similarly, Nalionalist Chinese m d pro-Republic of Korea prisoners received orders and encouragement via Taiwanese md Sou& k r c a n teachers m d insmctors,
I;jt U,N. attemp& to accurately screen pfisoners to determine how many wlshed to be repatfiated and how many prefemed not to be were hampered by well-organized left-cving and right-suing groups, which did rlnt hesjtate to use even murder to coerce prisoners into fallo~xlg &eir orders,

O American

O In May 1952, large-scale riots erupted in the Koje-do island compounds, during which communist prisoners capmred the American camp commandant a d held him h o s ~ g for e several days until combat troops and a new conlrnandef were brollght in to restore order, A number of pdsaners were killed, both by agimtors and rhe U.N. woops.

D Once rhe riots were quashed, the U.S. forces c o n s ~ c t e d a series of new compounds and segregated the prison population according to their politics, in order to reduce fac~onalviolence m d &ow the mast troublesome groups to be more cfosely monimred.

O North Korea moved its non-Korean prisoners--among them captured

war been-tr>

U.N. soldies and ciGfians 1.ivi.ng in Korea who had been imprisoned after the camps along its norhern Frantier, many of them on the very bmks of the Valu River,

The Korean War

?Those captured in che first six months of the war sacred the most, especially as they were driven northward by the Nor& h r e m s , sonletimcts just hours ahead of the advancing U.N. troops. North Korean troops tended ra treated prisoners harshly, and many died .From exposure and exhausdun.
I ; f

O North Korean voops also massacred many of the prisoners in their

custody. For example, in October 1950, North Korean soldiers pulled 100 American prisoners oEa train near Pyongyang, marched them to a clearing and told hem hey were to be fed, and then shot &ern,

D Daring h e spring of 1951, the Chinese Commmist Forces taok control of the prisoner of war camps, and the arbiu;uy killings of prisoners largely came to an end. Indeed, China considered its &eamc=ntof U.N. prisonem of war mther humaniahan, in &at they were given food, shelter, and medical care equivalent to that p r o ~ d e d to criminals in Chinese prisms.
U Chinese camp adminismtors rigorously controlled their prisoners, however, axld segregated by nationaflty, rank, and race; forced &em to padcipate in consmt "reedctca~on"ancl seKqddcism sesions; m$ subjected them to severcll, confined living conditions, The Chinese also subjected prisftners to gnueting interrogations and attempted ta obtain confessions from &ern-parricdarly of wamongef-ing and bislogical wadare.
O Prisoners who thed to escape or who resisted communist con&ol, especially by q i n g to orgmize or maintain the rank strucmfe of their o m

xniiita~ systems, w r e planishecl, with revocat-ion of their limited privileges, q torture, and s o l i ~ confinement,

Cl Dealing with their communist captors was hard enough, but U.N. plisoners also lived with the threat of being caught in U.N. bombing raids
in M o d 1Curea. against gosi.~ons
O Most of the U.N. prisoners, especially Ameficms and Eumpeans, were completely unaccustomed to such limited amounts of food and debased h e ~ c m farecl s especially badly conditions, and Lhoumds died in cap~Gq. in the camps, and about 2,700 of the 7,140 U.S. prisoners officially acknowledged by the comnnunisrs died while imprisoned.

Qlle

of the mgor issues that hampered the conclusi~n of an used the war CO drag m for m 0 years Io~ger &m it might W@ t-he mturn of prisoners Of war, a situatiC)n &at W -

Prisoners o f War and Atrocities

243

complicated by the f i c t &at about h& the North Korean and Chiaesls! pdsoners did not rdsh ro be l-epa~iaced,
L 3 In. Becember 1951, about a. year and a half' after &e war began, delegates to the armis~ce negolciatisgls at Pmmunjom began to discuss the releatse of POWs and exchanged lists of haw many prisoners each held.
O United Naieions lists indicated that they held a total of 1159,000 prkoners of war, They had reclaagied 3"/,000 of these prisoners, mosdy those &a claimed to be Sou& b r e a n s impressecl:into mili~ry serJice by No& Korea, as "civifim internees." This cornpared favombly Miich communist claims of 188,000 personnel missing in ac~orz,
Q Communisls lists, however, indicated &at they hdd only about 11,500

prisonerea mere 7,1100 Sou& E(oreanns and 4,400 U.N. per~oxznel, These numbers did not mesh well w i t h either earlier communist claims that ehey

Allhough coditions in tr.N,-mn prisoner of war compounds were .Far Erom ideal, they were immewurably beaer than rhvse in the cammist-fun camps. Thousands of North Korean and Chinese pI.Isoaersprefe~ed to remain in V.N, custody than to be r e p a ~ a t e d 'to their o w countries.

had taken 65,000 prisoners, or the U.N. claims of 88,000 ROK and 11,500 U.S. troops missing in action. D North Korea explained this disparity by claiming that they had "reeducated"and then released most of these men. A great number ofthem had also been impressed into military selvice, however, and some had been summarily executed. By subjecting Korean prisoners in its custody to these methods, North Korea ended up keeping relatively few of them incarcerdted. Q B y January 1952, the opposing sides agreed to exchange prisoners but immediately disagreed on how many should be repauiated.
Q North Korea and China insisted upon an all-for-all exchange of

pri.soners, d r a ~ n upon g pro*ions of the 19.19 Gneva Qnvenrion as the b*is for this demand, The United Na~ons Command, however, called for a one-for+ne exchange of prisoners and eventually comnlimd itself to the principal of not fol-ciblyrepa~ating prisoners who did not wish. to return to their origind side, D In April 1952, the U.N. armistice delegation proposed that prisoners under its contral be screened to deternine how many of &em were ~ l l i n g to be remrned, to which the communists tacitly agreed. At that point, the U.N. told the communism that it expected about 16,000 Nor& b r e m and Chinese prisoners to refuse repatrr"ation, Discussions over the return of prisoners stalled, however, when the U.N. screening reverrled onIy about 711,000 klling to retrurn to the communisfs.
D hmistice talks dra~lged on throughout the rest of 1952 and into 1953, with the U.N. Command +ng to keep the communists from losing:interest in peace by harassing them with limited ogensives, bombing raids, and implicit threats to use atomic weapons against the communists or expand the conflict beyonci the peninsula.

O By March 1953, the United Nations and the communist powers had
agreed to the fomadon of a neuval nations commission to oversee additional screening and dispasifion of non-fepalsiates.
D Most of the prisoners held by each side who wanted repatriation were returned to their respective sides in two operations, "Litde Switch" and "Big Switch." In these exchanges, the U.N. forces returned a total of 82,493 communist prisoners, while the communisw returned a total of 13,444U.N. personnel.
O In earlyJune 1953, the U.N. and communist armistice negotiators came to an agreement about the final arrangemen&for the return of prisoners of

Prisoners of War and Atrocities

245

war. A few weeks later, RQK President Spgman Rhee tried to derail these arrangements by freeing some 27,000 non-repatriates that were being warded by South Korean troops.

Conducted from April 20 to May 3, 1953, Operarion Litde Swjtch was primarily an exchange ofsick and wounded POW$. U In Operation Litrle Switch, the allies repauiated 5,194 North Korean and T ,080 Chinese mililary personnel, as we11 as 446 civi.rm prisoners, for a total of 6,670, The communists repatsiad 684 sick and wounded li'.N. woaps. Among these were 149 Americans, 471 South Koreans, 32 British, 15 Turks, one Filipino, two Canadians, six Colombians, five Australians, one South Uican, one Creek, and one Dutch soldier,

C5 Both sides had agreed tr, Little S ~ a on b April f 1, during the: armisLice
talks at Panmlxnjorn, Several. faetors probably helped cont-ribute to this agrtternent,including uncerminty in the communist bloc over Soviet policies fallokng the dea& 0fSt;lXin in March 1953;initiativesin the X3nieed N a ~ o n s and the International Red Gross in Geneva; and the indirect qproach of U.N. Commmder-in-Chief Gen. Mark W. Cfwk to Chinese Gen. Peng 1Sung, Dehuai and North &rean Premier %m 1
E;31

Dissent surrounded the tsxchange, as it did ever)"&ing concerned .cvith the POW issue. Communist prisoners attempted to embarrass their U.N. captors by rejecgng clor-Iring and rations, while in the Western media sensariond repors appeared claiming that the communis& were stilt. holdkg sick and wounded POWs, in spite of the =change agreement,
O Mrorst of' all, the isme that bad prolonged the war for two years-hat

commmist POW w u l d farceeremained.

be

forcibly repatriated

b;v

the

no U,N.

Co~~ducted k o m August 5 ro Septern her 6, 1953, O p m on Big Swatch

.was supposed t.o be the find exchange ofpfisonttrsoftvar by both sides. Like

itspreclecess~r~ I;itde Sm'cch, Big Sw'tch w a marked by dr'sfear over the issue

The Korean War

of h - c e d repa~iation and, ~IdmateIy, by asser~1.*ons sf communist
brainwashing ilnd torture ofdlied E"OWs=
D In this operation, U.N. brces repatrkted a to& o f 75,825 communist prisoners, among them 70,183 North Koreans and 5,640 Chinese. Among the Nor& k r e a n s w r e 60,788 male POWs, 473 female POWs, 23 children, and 8,899 ciGtians; among the Chinese was one femde POW,
O In Operation Big Switch, the communists repauiated 12,773 U.N. prisoners, m o n g them 3,597 b e d c a n s , 7,862 South kreans, 945 British, 229 Turks, 40 Filipinos, 30 Canadians, 22 Colombians, 21 Austrdians, 12 French, eight South Africans, two Greeks, two Dutchmen, one Belgian, one New Zealander, and oneJapanese.
O On September 23, each side transferred its non-repauiates to the Neutrai Nadons Repa~iation Commission in the dernili~dzed zone, more &an 22,000 by the U.N. Comnrmd and some 359 by the communists, where they were to remah for 90 days,
the prismms were urged to return home b y represexr~tives of their home counthes. Mter most of the No& Korean and Chlnese non-repatriates ultimately retjectcld these arpments, &e fomm were released in Korea and the latter were sent to Taiwm.

IZI During this period

D Of those who did not .cvish to remain in sou^ Korea or go t o Taiwan, 628 ulbmately changed their min& and accepted repat&al_ion,23 escaped or were missing, 38 died vJhile held by the Xndim Custodial Forces, and 86 w n t to India with the Indian Custodid Forces. By December 23, ail of the prisoners held by the U.M. C o m a n d had been releaed in one way or anoLJner, D Of the U.N. prisoners ulho had initia11.y rejected reprsiar^ian, 325 Korems, 21 bericans, and one Bfiton decided to rernsn w i t h the cornm-urzisrs, Of the others, eight S o h %reans and two h e f l c a n s accepted repaviation and two Koreans went with the Indian Custodial Force to India,

ell hl&ough the number ofbi-,N. prisoners who rehsed to remm home was
minuscule compared to the thousands of POWs from North Korea and China who rehsed to return to heir homelands, m a y hel-ican were shocked that any of their counqmen w u l d decicfe to rern;tin in a communist counq.
O Various government commissions were formed

to study h i s phenomena, and fingers were pointed at the state of discipline in the U.S.

Prisoners o f War and Atrocities

Army. B y 1955, a new code of conduct was adopted outlining how future h e r i c m POWs should interact with their captors,
O Eventually, almost all the American defectors returned to their homeland. Today, all those who survive live in the United States, except for one who was accused of cogaborating with the communisu and compromising other prisoners. He has been refused entry into the United Sates and currendy fives in Poland.

Immediately dter Big Swetch,the U S government communists had not remrned alrl U S . POW$ m d &at & e x were 944 men who should have been acc~mtedf i ~ based on eGdenc-sr &at tsi";re some o f h e more communa'sl;sm u l d have h a m rfieirhte. mese men 8,00(3 U.S, personnel stiLl Iis~ed as missing in a c ~ &om o ~ the Korean war.

tZ In all likelihood, most of hose 8,217 men Mtere simply kiIIed in =&on
md their bodies unaccounted for, For half a centuq, however, the U.S. government has had evidence that the 944 prisoners who were not repatriated after the w r had in fact k e n wansported out of Korea and into

China and the SoGet Union.

O Evidence of the fate of U.S. prisoners of war has been provided by a wide mx-lq of sources, indtlding contemporay U.S, inwlligence reports and recent admissions by Russian government oficials.

O For example, according to a Central Intelligence Agency information

report from September 1952, lrirJled "Lacation of C=er&h Sovj,et Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea," at least four transit camps existed through which South Korean and h e r k a n POWs were sent en. route to the Soviet Union,
O 'mom December 1951 up to the end of April 1952, several railway wansports of h e r k m arrd European (probably Xlr-ili-sh)POWs were seen passlng at internals of 10 t o 20 da)is &rough the Kami-Permyak NaCional Distcict in Norttrtwstern Siberia," p r t of this report s;lys, 'The prisoners were cfad in cottonpadded gray tunics and pants and wore civilian caps, so-called Sibiski' . . . They had no m i l i t q insignia. They spoke among

The Korean War

themselves in English, and they knew no other languages, except a few words of Kussim .
"

Q Even morcr: stunningly, in 1991, during a trip to the United Stales, Russim President Boris Yeltsirr mnounced that his na~orr had i n f o m a ~ o n about U.S. POWs from the Korean War. U.S. officials immediately explained away Yeltsin's comments and took no public steps to either confirm or deny them.
O To this day, family members of U.S. selvicemembers who disappeared during the Korean War hold out hope that their loved ones might still be alive, or at the least that the dates and locations of heir deaths might be learned m d their remains returned.

Episodes sfa&ociy marked the Korem War from i& S , from the Anzericm prisoners of war summarily executed by Nor& Korean soldiers during the summer of 1950 COKorem c i ~ l i mwho s were reportedlygunned &m i n eold l o d by US. &oops. Mast Izfhese crimes u f w r to~kpI2c.e in &e first severd xxlont-1.l~ of&e wart when e m o h s ran high on botfi sides.
O One of the first and most heinous insances of violence against civilims occurred in June 1950, when the North Korean Earees ovenan Sewl, the

ROK capital. When the U.S. Embassy personnel fled the city ahead of the communist advmce, they left behind aXmost eveming-inciuding files listing the names and home addresses of its more than 5,000 South Korean employees. Many of those employees also fled Seoul. Every single one of those who did not was easily rounded lap and exterminated by the North Korean soldiers,

O No& Korean troops did not limit their murderous zealouy to South
k r e m civilians, and during the first monLhs of the war U.S. troops discovered the remains of fellow soXdiers who had been massacred, On August 17, U.S. troops moved onto Hill 303 near Waegwan, in South Korea, en of the 5th Cavdq and were hor~fiedto find 26 execulcld mor Regiment, their hands bound with wire and their feet encrusted with blood. A number of other incidexlfs of s u r n m a ~ killings surfaced over the following months, including one in which 100 American prisoners of war were rernwed from a train m o ~ n g into North k r e a and shot by cr>mxnunisl troops,

Prisoners of War and Atraeiries

N o ~ Korean h soldiers masswred many cslpkred U.N. persomel early in the war; such incidents w r e probably initiated at a wit Xevel and not dictated from above. Piewed are mwdered &aopers of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, found near frontline wem in mid-hgust f 950.

L l Even dter they arrived at the communist POW camps, U.S. pkoners
were not sde Eram the w a & of the nor^ b r e m soldiers, Harley Goan, a U.S, sofdier capalred during the first months of the war, remmbers hearing shoe from the prisoner enclosure next to his, Right dteward, a, gun-~elding North Korean soldier came into Goon"s shack. Befare he could begin shoo~ng, however, Chinese soldiers entered and led him out.

D Atrocities w r e not committed only by communist &oops, however, and there are numerous accounts ofviolence p e ~ e a a t e d by ROH troops a g ~ n s t mar^ Korean ci~lians, and a number of accoun~s descfibing mostfy isolated acts of bmraliy by U.S. eroops against civitians, For example, in the summer and fall of 1951, after the U.N. forces crossed into Nor& Korea and began moving toward the "Vdu Nver, ROK aaops routinely rounded up and executed suspected communis&or guerrillas in capmred villages. In August

The Korean War

1950, ROK Army officer %m Ghing-won had 50 Nor& b r e a n soldiers beheaded.
D In his book Colder Than H&, 1st Lt. Joseph R Owen, a U.S. Marine Corps platoon leader, describes how one of his men took smding in front of his house and gmned h h d o m in cold blood. Owen battered the m m into submission,but did not take any further action against him,
U In another incident, journalist Stephen Barber, a reporter for the London News Chronicle, described how U.S. tank gunners machinegunned a committee of ciGlians led by old men. who c m e out to welcome heir 'liberators,

O Another British journalist, Reggie Thompson, whose reports were an

indicment of a callous U.S. ovemse of their fxepower, wote: ''Every enemy shot released a deluge ofdesmction. Every village and township in the path of the war vvas blotted out, Cidians died in the rubble and ashes of their homes. Soldiers usually escaped."" D One par~cular incident, hotvever, a massacre of Soueh Korean ciGlians near the ~'llage of Nogunsi, has overshadowed all other incidents from the at the beginning of the Korean M7ar in the Anlerican popular conscio.~xsness 21st cenmry.

In late 1995! nexly 58 years dter jl was a e g e d to have taken place, repom surfaced in the United States Lhar UN. air and ground forces had bees ordered to at ~ c m k d Ell Sou& &re= civlilims,

O During the first monrhs of the war, the young, scared, and inexperienced
soldiers of the U.S. florces were being pushed back toward the Pusan Perimeter, harried notjwt by the advancing North Korean troops but also by prwommunist civilian penillas and communist uoops in civilian garb.

O Some U.S. commanders au&o&ed heir srrldiers to shoot at any&ing

that lsoked like a hrear dult-ing his desperate period, wheuher it was wearing civilian clothes or not. Such orders were genedXy not cmrnitted to d t i n g and it is not clearjust how high up the chain of command they originated, from individual company and battalion commanders or all the way up to the leaders of the 8th U.S. h m y or the U,N, Command.

Prisoners o f War and Atrocities

25 X

bf Like so many episates from the Korean War, there ;u-e many confliceing
d e ~ i la s d versions of an incident that happened new the South I-iorean n latctjuly 1S50, soldiers of the ~ l l a g of e Nopnri. All that is c e r ~ i n is that i 7th Cavdry Regirnrtnt (U.S. 1st Cavdry Division) fired upon a large group of c i ~ l i mhiding s under a raitmad bsidge o u ~ i d of" e tbe village,

D According t o su~vors of the mmacre at Itlogunri, they had been

day by U.N. jets, which had been strafing columns of attacked the p r e ~ o w refitgees after apparently mislaking &ern for adiiancing North Korean troops, m d were hiding under the bridge in mder to escape f7urther air say about l OO ciGlims were killed in hose athcks, a t ~ c kThey .
O Troops of the 7th Gavdry Regiment" H C~oanpmy, resting near Nogunfi,

recall ntcei-ving orclers to prevctnt any civilians from crossing the U.S. line of reweat, in order to keep guerdllas from infilaating U,$. units, Some of&em a l s o say they were fired upon fi-om benea* the bfidge.
i,;L In any case, the 7th Cavalv t~loopc;.fs fired into the culvert over a ~>c;riob

that might have been a s long as three days, Elling a large but u n h o m number of k r e a n rehgees. Eshates begin at IQ6dead and go as high as Si)lO+t.IXle number claimed by sudvars o f the m ere who begm seeking campensacjan &on. the U.S. and ROKgovemmen&in the late 1990s.

CI ConflicLirrg accounts have muddied attempts

to deternine just h w many civilians died at M o p r i and *ether any M o r ~ Korean soldiers or guerrillas were among &ern. The credibaq of at hast one of the U.S. soldierswho says he took part in the m a penchant for melodrama-is questlmable because of doubgul claims he has made about his role in tfie b r e m War.

CI In Sepexnber 1999,the U.S. y O a c e of the Inspector General begm conducting an otticial investigation to fully determine what happened at Nogunri. f f m e , the masmcre at Nownri illijain the My L A massacre of the Vemam War as one of only two known mass Wlings of civilians by U.S. ground tsuaps in the 20th century,

This page intentionally left blank

THE KOREAN WAR IN BOOKS, FILM, A N D ON THE WEB

"The issues at sbke in Korea were never clear, The people in Hollpood were as hard put as myone to rewgize rhe &gee of h e r i c a n involvement, t o unders&ncl the national goals, and identify who was the enemy."
--Pad M, Edwards, A a i d e to Films on the Korean War

ike u"l ase of oher wars2the expehcaekts md events of h e Korean War haw found expremi~n in stories, films, and, moft recend j on the World Wde Web.

BOOKS AND OTHER MEDIA

Even& and experiences from the Korem War have inspired quite a short s t ~ ~ne xs m~ ~ves, m d rz ove1kal;ionsbased on actud evmr;s,a d oeher work*

R umber a f nQV&,

iZI Today, noveiistJames Michener is prohbly the best know author who has witten defy about the Korean War, m d a n m b e r of his books and stories were the basis for moGes that use the conflict as their subject or backdrcsp. His works about the Korean War include The Bridges at Toki-Bp Sayonzra, and T h e Forgotten Heroes o.f Korea," a short story he w s t e for the SLlturcday Evening Post,

ilTl Other navels d t t e n about rhe war include Batde Hpn,By Dean E.
Hess, Combat, by Van Van Pm%, Hell's Ouxpm, by Luke Short, A Hill in

The Korem "3Var

Korea, by hilax Catto, TheHwters, byJames Sdter, The Inmder, by Helen Fowler, L 'Hamecon, by Vahe Katcha, Love i s a Many1Spflendored Thing,by M a n Sqin, The Mmc%ludmCmdida~e~ by Richard Condon, M*A %*H, by Richard Hooker (the pen name of authors H. Richard Homberger and William Heinz), and MeIGIXe Goodwin,C.SA., byJohn P. Marqumd.
Q Short stories about the Korean War include "Bug Out," byJames Warner

Bell&, and "Case of the Blind Pilot," a short story written for the Samrday Evening Post by U.S, N a v y Commander h l a v A. Burns,
$ ; I

A. number of plays wlith k r e m War Lhmes were also witten and produced, mossy in the years irnmediatcly foHokng the war. One of the most notable of these was T h e Limit, written by Henry Denker and Ralph Berkey, a coufiroom drama about a U.S. Arrny oEcsr aecused of: collaborating with the communisrs while held as a prisoner of war. It was made into a moGe of the same name in 1957,

Naturdly., many of the auhors who wote about the k r e a n Wm had firshand experiexrce from the conflict. For exampk,James Salter was a U.S. Air Force pilot who flew F-86 Sabre Jets in Korea, and his first nowl, The Hunters, was about aerkd combat over Lhe Korem Peninsula.
Q Nor& and South Korea have also produced many au&ors who have witten about the h r e a War. Such work reflect tfie k r e m point of view of the war, as well as its pali-tics, eEects, m d dtemaLh, and al-e not ~ d e I y h o w out;side of their c o u n ~ e of s oh@n,

Bemeen . l 950 m d 2000, nearly 106 feature 6Ims dealing M ' & h e war i t 2 &rea, to a lesser or greater extent, were produced for Engfish language audiences. In addi~oa, hundreds of documen &des m d other specialked 6Ims have bee^ produced.
D Some of the best k r e a n Miar films have been based on the experiences i t h firsthand experience in Korea. Others reflect or writings of people w aspects of American life and philosophy, either during the war itself or when the film was made. (For example, MrA*S*H says as much about American TNar as it does about the Korean War.) athmdes toward the

The Korean War in Books, Fifm, and an the \Saeb

255

C% m i l e films abaut the Korean War haye appeared steadily over dre past 50 years, the buk of them were made in the years during or immediately following the war (i.e., 59 in the 1950s, 14 in the 1 9 6 0 ~ four ~ in the 1970s, three in the 1980s, and just mo in the 1990s).Some nf them, such as BigJim MacClain or Heartbred Bdge, have a peripheral, rather than direct, connec~on w i t h the Korem War. The films are as follow:
Mterburn (1992) itir Gader (1951;Je~ Men ofh e Air in Geat 13ritain) M 1 the Young Men (1960) An hnapolis Storyi (1955; The Blue and the &Id in Great Brirain) Back at &e Front (1952; aka Wr'UieandJoe Back at the Front; WlIie md&e in Tokyo in Great Britain) The Barn boo Prison (1955) kfattle Circus ( 1953) Lfatde Flame (1959) Ba tde Hymn (1957) Batde T m i (1 955) Batde Zone (1952) BigJim Macbin (l952) The B ~ d g e at s Tak+R ( 1 954) Cease Ere (1953) CoIXisian Course ( f 9% 5) Csmbat Sjuad (1953) Cry for Happy ( 19611 Dragonfly Squadron ( 1954) The Eternal Se;3 (1955) Field clfHonour (1986) F h d Baymet-s (1951; originally Old Soldiers Never Die) High t Nurse (1953) For the Boys (1991) The GIaqf Briga& j 1953) The Great Imposter ( 1960) Hell's Honkan ( 1955) Hell "soutpost ( 2 954) HeJl in Korea (1956; A Hill i n Karea in Great Briain)

256

The Korean War

Hold Back the Night- ( 1956) The Hook (2962) The Hunters (1958) X Wmt You (1951) Inchon (1981) Iran h g e l (19Ci4) Japmesf: War Bride ( 1952) Jet Atrack (1958; akaJet Squad; in Great Britain as Through Hell to CIoly) Korea Pap01 (1951) Love is a Mmy-SpIendored Thing (1955; aka A Mmy-Spfmdored Thing) Ma&&u-r ( X (377; &a M;z&&ur; llhe Rebel Generaif) The M m c h u ~ m Cadidate ( 1962) Mafine Ba tdeground (X 966) Mmines, k t "so! ( 1961) Mmk afKerea ( 1950; dso h o w as C;'ambli~g He@ M*A*S*H ( X 970) The lMcCOnnd $ t o y (1955; Tiger in the Sky in Great Britain) Men in W2r (1957) Men ofwfiefighrt-ingh d y (1 954) Mission Over Korea ( 1953;Eyes of Lhe S&es in. Great B d ~ n ) Mr. Wdkie T&e (1952) SonJohn (1952) Ni, M m U m d (1964) The N m md die Sergeat (1962) One Minute to Zero (1952) Operadon Dames (1959; Girls in Action in Great Britain) a a f k Chop Hill ( 1 959) Pfisonctr of W a (1954) The &ck (1956) The Relucun t Her~cs (1971;also b o w as The Egghead on H 8 1 1 6563 The Rescue (P 988) Repeat, Hell! (1952) Return &om the Sez ( 1954) SabreJet (1953) Sayonara (1957) Sergemt Ryker ( 1968; originally The Case &&st Paul Ryker) Sky Commmdo (1953) Sniper's Edge (1961)

The Korean War in Books, Film, and on the Web

257

Saris (1951) The Sleek Heirnet (1951) A Step Out ofLI"ne (1971) S&mge Inpudcr (1.956) Submarhe Command (1951) T&e &e High Ground (19EiSj Tmk Bat&&on (1958; The VdIeyofDear;hin Great B ~ ~ a i r r ) Target.Zero ( 1955) Time G~zzit ( X 957) Tokyo File 212 (195 1) Top Secret Mar ( 1957; Their Secret M ~ inr e a t Bri~ain) Tovedo Mley ( 1.953) WilrHunt (1962; aka War Hero m d M " a rMadness) War i s Hell ( 1964) A Bnk in IndeChina (1952; Hidden Secret in Great IS~t;lin) A Ymk Ij3 Korea (1951;Letter from Korea in Great Briain) The Yomg and the Brave ( 1963)

O A dozen of the best films about the k r e a n War are described belaw. They cover a d d e v a r i e ~ af henries, from gritty combat films produced during the war to films guestionkg why some b e r i c a n plsmers of war collaborated w i t h the enemy,

Cf While Chis is a suttjec~ve lisljng, it is supparted in m a y c a e s by academy

awards, and ail of hese Glms are w r h watching. There are many other wor&while Korean War films, m d interested readers are encouraged to make addit;lonal seleceians from the complete listing, Some of the video guides used to help compile this material m y be of some use and are listed in the bibliqraphy,

ai Battle Hyma (1957, Directed by rlouglas Sirkr. Sarring Rock Hudson, Don DeFore, Dan Duryea, Marha Hyer, h m a b h f i ) . Based on a true stay, Wudsan plays the Reverend Dean Hess, a Worgd War PI veteran who, unable to cope ~ . t h his , peaeekime role as a minister and family man, returns to s e ~ e in e the skies over Korea.
D The B ~ d g e sat Take% (1954. Directed by Mark Robson. Sarring wlliam Hokten, Earl Holirnan, Grace Kelly, Fredric =rch, Mkky honey,

258

The Korean War

Robert S~auss), Based on a navel by James Michener. This film Forways carfier-b~ed U.S. N a y pilor~ fl9ng missions against ~ r g e l in s Korea. Won an Oscar for special effects,
O Field ofHonour ( 1986. Rireeed by Hms Scheersmaker. Starring Everett McGill, Iton Brmdsteder, Hey Young Lee, Min Yoo, Dong H p n %m), This

film, one of the few foreign-made moGes about the war avslable in English, is &out the experiences of" a sofdier &om rhe Dutch Batdim who is left for dead after his unit is o w m n by the Chinese. The Mmchurim Cmdidate (1 962. Directed by John Frankenheimer, S ~ ~ Frank n g Sinatra, hurence Hamey, Janet Leigh, h g e l a Henry Silva, Jarnes Cregov, John McGiver, Leslie Panish, migh Reigh). Based on a navel by %chard Condm, Capitalking m the theme of Chinese brainwahing af U.S. prisoners, this f i h is about a Korem War hero vvho has been ~msformed into m rxnkttixlg pofiGcaI asassin, Men i n Was (195%Directed by h h o n y M m a . SlarAg Robes Rym, A X d o Ray, Robert &ith, Vie MarrowJrnes Edwards, Scott Marlwe, Victor Sen Yung). Good action scenes distinguish this film about 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division soldiers being driven south during the first nnonhs of the war.
Cf

Directed by Andrevv Marton. S ~ r r i n g Van Johnson, Walter Pidgeon, Louis Galhem, Dewey Mar~n, &enan W p n , Frank Lovejay, Kobert Horton, Bert Freed). Based on a pair of short stodes, one by james Miehener and the other by U.S. Nay Cornmmder Hany S. Burns. An above-average film &out the pilo&and crew dan aircrdt carrier operating off the coast of brea.

Porkchop Hill (1959. Directed by Le~s Milestone. Smrrintg *gory Peck, Harry Cuarctino, Rip Torn, George Peppard,James Edwards, Bob Steele, George Shibata, B= ElEiot, Wady S ~ o d eRobert , Blake, Norman dau, Bert Remsen, ,G a ~ m Mcleod),
F;3

The Korean War in Boob, Film, and on the Web

This film depicts one of the last bloadbahs of the k r e a n War, a seesaw battle aver a warhless chunk of red estate that was fought out even as the negotiadons at Fmmunjom were being finalized. Based on the book by S. L. A, Marshall,

253

C l Retipeal; Hell! (1952. Directed

byJoseph H. Lewis. Starring Frank Lovejoy, Richard Carlson, Russ Tamblp, h i t a Lauise), This grim, powerful film depicts the experiences of a unit of U.S. mrines, sbrting 4th &eir deployment from the United S~tes and c u f m i n a ~ g in their desperate wihdrawd from the Clhosin. Resewair ciudrzg the November 1950 Chinese aEensive.
fl Sayo~ara(1957. Directed by Joshua Logan. Starring Marlon Brando, Ricardo Montalban, Miko Taka, Miyoshi Umeki, Red Buttons, Martha Scott,James Gamer). This film, which a is set in occupiedJapan against the backdrop of the Korean M"ar, depict~j . won, romance beween an Ame;Pican. pilot and a Japanex e n t e r ~ n e r It Oscars for best strpgorting actor (Buttans), best suppohng actress (Taka), and best art direcdsn/set decoration, Baed on yet anoher novel byJames Michener.

tlf $ergem t Ryker (1968. Directed by Bwz Kutik. SmrI.ing Lee Mal-c-in,
Bradford Dillman, Vera Miles, Peter Graves, Flioyd Nolan, M u r a y Hami_ltorr).DiEer'mg from combat-oriented Elms, &is praducaion. focuses on. the trial of a U,S, soldier accused of being a fsaitor and addresses the quescjon of haw wpatriated p~sonerswho have been tomred or brainwashed should be weated.
D The Steel Helmet (1951, Directed by Samuel Fuller. S ~ & n gGene Evans, Rabert Hutton, Steve Brodie, J m e s Edwards, %chard Loo, Sid Melton), This is the first film made about the Korean War, and is still considered by many to be h e best. It was produced in a mere 12 days and completedjust six monfis after the war began. ?'he Steel Helmet focuses on

The Korean War

a U.S. soldier who, wounded, left for dead, and cut off behind enemy lines, attemps to return to the American lines Vyifh the help of a young Korean boy.
O Time Limit (1957. Directed by Karl Maldin. Starring Richard wdmark, Richard Basehart, Dolores Michaels, June Locbart, Rip Tom, Martin Balsam, Car1 Benton Reid,James Douglas).This is a courtroom drama about the uial of a U.S. o&cer accused of collaborating with the enemy while in cap~Gq in North Korea.

THEKOREAN WARO N THE WORLDWIDE WEB

A lwge v;trievof World Wide Web sites are awilable me&informatrion about the Korem Wa&and many haw been creatd or expmded because o f the 50& anniversv d & e conact, b e of h e best are listed below Li UoremWar.net (http:// .KoreanWar,net) is a n dedicated teaching people about the Korea War, m about it readily avagable, and i n t e ~ e ~ as n many g veterms oftke conflict as possible. ft has been o@ciatly recognized as an irnpor~nt resource tsy the U,S. Deparment of Defense, and has agreed to act as an oEcid onfine compmion to this book, &remWar.net oEers re&axrly. updated links to sites on these pages m d many other appropriate sites as well.

CI Run by the C a n d i m Departntent of Veterms Mairs, "Cmadiarrs in .vac-acc,gc,ca/historical/ koreawar/le.orea. btm ) decazs the experiences of the Canadim expeditiona~y force du&g the Korean war*

Cl Anotfier wor&whil:feinternet site it The Cold War Intema~onaf Histov Project (http://cwihp.si,edu/defau1t.hm1, which supports the release of involved i n the Cold Warr and historical materials by all of the governmen@ seeks W diwemina* new infomadon m d perspec~ves on Cold M."ar hlistory emerging from preGow1y inacceaiklIe communist sources.
Q The Godi~on of Famgies of Korean 8c C o X d Ww P U W / M k ,codiltionoEaiLies,org) is an organization dedicated to accounting for the more than 8,200 American senicemen missing from the

The Korean War in Books, F i h , and on the Web

Korean and Gold Wars, and s~ives to educate members of the government, media, and American public about issues related to their efforts.

131 The Chinese M i l i w b m m (http:/i

dedicated to discussion and informalion about the amerit farces r>f Communist China, X t s content is not limited t o the Korean War. U The Chosin Few (h ttp://home. hawaii.m.c~rn/eh~sin/~ain. h is the site of a membership organkadon for veterans of combat around the Chosin of the Korean W. bsewoir during the first win~er
O The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Cornmemoradon Committee

(http://korea50.armyYmiE) is the official, public access site for the ent of Defense commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the k r e m War.

t l The Korean War (http://

infamation about U.N. (U.S. and o&er allied) and communist farces that participated in the Korean War.
D A weal& of informahoxx about the Chinese People's Volunteers &my during the Korea War, from the communist point of view, can be found on The Korean Mlar FAQ (htcp://centur)ichina.com/fiistorry/hafiaq.ht-ml).

D The Karem War Veterans hsocia~on(http:l/ .kwa,org) is the official s i t e of the primay membership organization for veterans of the b r e m War,
D A National Park Senrice page, The Korean Wr Veterms Memorid /hdex2.hm1), desc~bes the b r e m War Veterans Mernohal in Washington, DC., which evokes the experience of the h w i c a n . ground mops in Korea hrough 19 s ~ n l e s s steel same8 depicting a squad on paaol.

Korean War Veterans Nadonal Museum and Library .theforgottenvictor)".org) site is a sevengallery national museum dedicated to wterans of the Korean War under consmction in Tuscola, Illinois.
O Living History Online (http:I/

O The

.LiGngH;TstoryQnli~ine,com) in an mline hismr)t magazine that boasts, in addition to fcarure arsicles and regular columns, comprehensive listings of Korean W a reenactmen&, eommemaratians, and other even&,
fl The People's Fiorea (http:// .korea-np,cojp./pk) is an oEcial North Korean site contains information from the North Korean point of

The Korean War

view and czon~irls a number of excellent photographs, Its cantent is not exclusively rebled to the b r e m War.
Q. Second Squadron (http://ouworld.c~mpu~e~e.con?/homepages/ port/&rea,hm) is a site ddediicated to the efemen~ of h e %U& M ~ c m Air Farce that ilew far the U.N, Command du&g the Korem War,

Ll h even more

focused site is the 13th Bomb Squadron ksociation .13Lhbombswadron.arg) is dedicated to telling the history of one U.S. Air Farce bomb sqmdron during the b r e m War, and includes oral biscl>riesand more than 500 photographs.

D U.S.-Korea 2000 Foundation (http:/ dedicated to reaching out to hose semed i n the forgot^ War*"

xv
FACTS AND FIGURES
""Em convinced ofwhat I how.Everything else is hypothesis . . ."
-C~rl Jung* Psycholoa and Religion

his section con&ins II umedcd3bbular, and ~tittiSdcd ii~f~r hn ~i ~ n about Korea, the 1950 to I953 conflict, and the forces &at partl"cipated i n it. It is &so a bit o f a ca tch-d for material that does nor fit neadyinm any d I h e other ehilpters.

By the time the &fern War began, sociery in North and Sou& Korea had begun t o divergeBthe Nor& becoming rnvre rnon~li&jc$ communisr, and induscialized, and h e Sou& remajning more mditiond m d agrarim, I>e&iJt.d economic and demographic ciata cm Nor& Korea for che wryears is sketchy. whik srin2u infomadon on Sou& Korea is much! more readily amTabfe.

113[ About 30 million k r e a a s lived throughout the Korean Peninsula

during the Korem War.

r;;l South b r e a " ppopufation in 1951 W es~mated to be about 21 million, ofwhom more &m one in, six, &out 3,70O,OO0, were classified as rehgees

The Korean War

(more than 400,000 of whom had fled Nor& Korea). The homes of about 400,090 af- the Sou& Korem refugees were des&oyed during the war,

C l Seod, the capi-l of S m t h k r e a , had an escirnated popularion of

715,572 in December 1952, In 1949, prior to the outbreak ofwar and the city cbmging hands four Limes, the populaLion of the capital was estirnaaed at Z,Ci40,000, Pwm, the temporary capital of Sou& Korea when Seoul was under enemy uccuparion, had an estimated population of 840,000in 1952,
N o d brea's population in 11351 W= estimmd t o be about 9 million, considerably less &m half:the popularion of South Korea. Q o n e m g , the capial o f Nortb. Korea, had m esdmated populaljiorz of 500,000 in 1952.
i ; l

Under the Japmese, m m Koreans were denied m y sort o f st;lltespons~red &cadon md what W * oflered wagcared tnrvard Iheirrole as a sem'forpeaple,For the mostpart, schoorls mre segeega led, me&Korem andJapanese $&dents attendhg sepacate insu'tutims.

D X n X 939, one-tb.ird o f k r e m children, or about f ,200,000, were enrolled in primary schools. In conuast, v i m r d y allJapanese children living in Korea,
or about 93,000, were enrolled. The same year, 62,000 Korems and 84,000 Japanese were enrolled in secondary schools, professional schools, colleges, and Japanese-run Seoul Imperial University, many of the Koreans in aglicutturaf e$ning programs.
O There were many p r i ~ t e schools throughout Korea, however, largely run by missionary organizations. For the most part, theJapanese were afraid to harass or curtail the acti;ui~esaf such group, fearing negative international opinion. During theJapanese occupation, about a quarter of Koreans attended missionary high schools, as did 57 percent of those who attended college and 15percent of those who attended professional schools. O Mter the end of World War If, the educae-ional system in b r e a was completely reorganized. The U.S. militaly government supported these efforts in the south, disuibuting 15 million elementary school textbooks witten in h e native Hangul script;.

O Compulsoly elementary school education was established in South

Korea in June 1950; the outbreak of the war the same month, however, prevented full implementation of this plan as scheduled. Students were

Facts and Figures

265

offered 12 years of elementary and secondaly education, with entrance to secondary institutions based on competitive examinations.

CI In post-secondary education, an emphasis was placed on technical and

scientific uainhg, so that Koreans could take the place of the Japanese engineers who had left at the end of World War II.

D ilr, of June 1, 1952, South Korea had 3,921 elementary schools with 2,525,869 students; 563 middle schools wit31 298,980 stubens; 321 high schools with 140,550 students; 49 colleges with 27,500 studenu; 17 normal schools w i t h 20,240studentri; seven techrricd schools vvi& 1,350smdents; I4 higher technical schools with 3,500 students; and 1,609 civic schools for 496,250 studene. adult education k&
D In 2948, the literaq rate in South b r e a was reported at 70 to 80 percent for Hangul script, and significantly lower for Chinese ideographs.

Religion in K ~ r e a h a had mzny foreign inffue~ces. Nadve religions included Sinkyo and Chond~kyo~ a d ffrose in&~ducedby sueiders included Confircianism and Buddhism from China, Shintoism and various sec&ofBuddhisnl fkomJapan,and Chrisr-imityfrom Westernmigsionaries.
CI Sinkyo is a form of anirnisLic namre wrship, or hamanism. It is Korea's

oldest religion and h a played an imporbnt role in E h e ctrlcure and mores of its people since prehistoric ~ m e s .
O Conhcimism is second only to Sinkp in i& influence upon Korean n the f st centuq A.D., and vied cuftu~ It . v u ' a introduced to the peninsula i with Buddhism as a state religion until o-iumphing over it in 1392.
Q PIuddhisrn came to Korea in the 4 t h centurpi i2.f). from China and

increased in populariq &r theJapanese annexation. In 1938, &ere wefe an es~mated208,000 followers of Korean Buddhism and some 300,080 f o l k e m ofJapanese hddhism throughout k r e a ,
0 Chlistianity spread in Korea primarily through schools run by missionary groups. In 1938,&ere were an esLirnated 500,000 Christians in Korea, more than half of them Protesmntcs,
O Chondokyo, tounded in 1959 by a religious f i p r e named Choe, was an

eclectic religion inco~omzingaspects of Shamanism, Conhcianim,

266

The Korean War

Buddhism, and Christianiq. According to some es~mates, in che late 1920s there may have been as many as 2 million followers of Chondokyo t-firaughaut Korea. f3y 1947, however, here were about 73,000 in Sou& Korea m d an u n h o m number in the north,
Q Shintoism flourished among Japanese colonists in Korea, but virtually

disappeared after World War II. In 1938, there were 96,000 practitioners of Shinto, 22,000 of wham were Korem.

AGRICULTURE, FISHING, AND FORESTRY

DuSng itf.~ m u p a ~ ofKorea,J;tp on had cleared m d ir~gated Ian d fir agkulmre, especial3lyin thesouth, and built fdilizer factories, especidIyin the nor& (70 percent cheir output being used in the south). Japan used Korea as an imperial breadbasket, forcing it. t o export rice t o J w a n and impm inferiorgrains for its nrvrr people.
U In 1952,same I5 million people In South Korea, aborrt 60 percent of-the population, were famerti. An average rural fmily farmed 2.5 acres, and one third of mral families farmed 1 acre or less.
Q Ahaut a varter of Sou& G r e a at this lime, some 5,380,000 acres, was under c u t ~ v a ~ oh n , addirionid 200,000 acres was used for orchards and mulbev Qees, used in sefictxlmre.

Sou& Korem agrieulnxrd praduc~oni n 1951 inchded 56,300,C)OQ bwheEs of rice; 15,100,080 bushels of barley, rye, and wheat; 4,300,000 bushels of soy beans; 500,000 bushels of o&er grains; I,100,000 meu-ic cons ofiegetables; 668,900 tons of fmit; and 15,000 tans of mbaeco,
F;Z

U North Korean agriculture was less widespread but more diverse than in the south, and emphasized grains other than rice and greater fruit and
vegetable production.
iCf At the end of 1951, Sauh k r e a had 393,000 work catde; "I0 cldairy cattle: 20,000 goau; 17,000 horses; 719,000 poultry; 91,000 rabbits; and 1,000 sheep,

O In 1952, about 16 million acres of South b r e a were cllassif-iedm farest,

During the previous decade, timber reserves were cut in half by warfare, indiscriminatecutaing, and poor land management, In 1952, South Koreans

Facts and Figures

267

used an eslimated 3,500,000 cubic meters of firewood and 2,100,000 bags of charcod.
i I ; r

Rsh and other sedood traditionalv proGded the majority of animal protein in the Korean diet. In the early 1950s, more than a million Koreans on both sides sf the border w r e engaged in the fishing industfy.

O ln 1945, deterioration ofthe Korean fishing fleet and the wiLhdrawal of largeJapanese-omed boaw reduced catches from Korean waters to 200,000 merric tons per year, about half of the average annual yield during World War 11. Gains made in the fishing indusq after the conflict were eliminated b y the outbreak of the Korean War, and the 1952 yield was only 268,000 metric tons,

Dufing heir occupa~oaof a r e a , h e Japanese begm to develop spee~c indus~iesin Korea9 especially fiea.cy ii-rdusq h the n ~ r & , to complement irs om indtzstrrrhl base, By fhe me Lhe war begm in 1950, Nor& Korea w a considerably more indus&idized than the sou& m$ COB polled mmt d t t l e pminsula "sinerd regources,
O South Korean indusvies included textiles and food processing. After

being cut offfrom the north by the opposing occupation forces, South Korea found its lig-ht indusvy inadequate to meet local needs.

CJ North b r e a ' s most i n l p o m t industries incJutXed cement, chemicals,

elec~ical power, iron and steel, and machinery. At the end of World War II, the capacities of these indusaies was reduced from damage inflicted by departing Japanese technicians and 6om theft of equipment by Soviet forces,
[ I 1

Textiles comprised South Korea's most important manufacturing indusq during the Korean War, ~4th cotton textiles accountingfor about 80 percent of total kxrile output, T n 1952, textile probcuian totalled 2,200,000 pounds of cotton yam, 43,200,000 yards of cotton sheeting, 16,000,000 square yards of rayon, 2,700,000 square yards of silk, and 434,000 square yards of wosllexr m$worsted cloth,
O Other goods manufactured in Sou& Korea in 1952 inchlded 21,688,000 pairs of mbber shoes, 320,000 bicycle tires, 36,224 metric tons of cement, 10,866 metfic tons afpaper, and 3,140 metric tons of coke,

268

The Korean War

CI Minerd production for Sou& Korea in 1952 included 575,906 mns of

mdzracite; 10,832 metric tons of copper ore; 619 kllogrms of $old; 14,812 m e ~ i tons c of graphi*; 17,420 m e ~ tans c of iron ore; 1,W6 m e ~ tons c of kaolin; 578 rnefsic tans of lead ore; 2,255 rnevic tons of lignite; 7,4f 6 meLric tons of manganese; 12.7 metric tons of molybdenum; 1,000 metric tons of nickel; 80,677 meuic tons of peat; 755 meuic tons of pyrites; 191 kilograms of silver; 3,789 meCsic tons of tmgsten; md 1,024m e ~ i tons c of zinc ore. Q Mineral resources available in Nor& &rea exceeded &ase in the sou&, and included cod, copper, graphite, iron ore, lead, magnesite, pyrites, tungsten, m d zinc.

C1 In the late 19408, lightly indushalized South. b r e a w a able to produce m l i y 30 to 40 percent:of its electsicaj p m r needs; the h h c e was provlded by plants in Nor& LCorea. In May 1948, North Rorea cut off the supply of
power to the souttfi, which was evenmdly able to hEXl its needs by using U,S.-pro~ded powef barefes and consmcdng domestic facilities. In 1952, Sou& k r e a n elecwical producfion toaled635 million kaowatt hours,

Prior to rhe end of World M/ar I& Korea was mderJapme~e occupadon m d dmost all ofi& wade wm W*& ocher c o w ~ i e s we&inthe empire. For

exampie#in .1989,97percentofKorem e x p o r ~ were t.o cuun pies concolled byJapmI and 89percent of its impox"& were f i ~ m those counm'es.
C;f

fn 1952, %U& k r e a had a trade deficit af $28,780,000, Major irnporls tadled $53,700,000 and included chemicals, fer~lker, m c E rice. Mgor exports, more than 20 percent of which went toJapan, totalled $25,500,000 and included mngsten and other mineds. In addihn, the Republic of h r e a received aid from the United PJalions and the United S ~ t etobjling s $154,400,000,

C1 In the years prior to and dudng tfie Klofean M"=, most of North brea's
t r d e was with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Facts and Figures

219

TRANSPORTATION. AND COMMUNICATIO~JS

Under theJapanese occupation, railroads became L h e most important mode of uanspor~tion in Korea and Japmese companies provided rhe country's shippjng requirements. By the time the Korean War began, however, n e i ~ e r Nor& or S ~ u t h Korea had a modern ~ritnspor~rion hfiasmcmre.
P During its occupation of Korea,Japan built an extensive rail network to connect Sinugu and Pusan, cities at the northern and southern ends of the country, for military--rather than economic-purposes. Prior to World War II, Japan built, with U.S. technical supervision, some 3,500 miles of s&ndard%augetrack (4 feet 8.5 inches).

Q M e r the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.N. Gommmd controlled, operated, and maintained most of the railroad system in South Korea. From April 1, 1951, to March 31, 1952, South Korean railroads carried 28,404 passengers and 10,050,417 metric tons of freight. In February 1953, South Korea had. 439 operaiting and l 4 4nonaperating locomolives,

If In 1945, Korea bad an average of 0.17 miles of roads and highways per square: mile (as compared ~& 4.5 miles inJapm). By 1952, there were only
21,000miles of roads on the peninsula, the primary highways linking Pusan k t h Sinugu m d Hun-yuxltg with Mokpo. Mmost all the roadways were hard packed dirt and gravel, except for stl.ee@ in Seoul arrd h s a n md a 20-mile stretch of highway from Seoul to Tncbon, which were paved,
0 o n jmuarv; 1, 1950, Sou& Korea had 9,"7Qatrucks, 2,600 automobiles, 1,500 micabs, and 1,000 buses,
C;;1 As early as 1929, Japan had encouraged air @anspor~Lion i n Korea

&rough subsidies to japanese firms. &l of them pulled out of fires at the end of World War II, and by 1953the only commercial airline operating out of the Republic of Korea was Korean Air Transport, which flew to Hong Kong, Taipei, and Tokyo,
O Before the outbreak of the Korean War, tll.S.-based czmier Norhwest krKnes proGded internationalw d c e t o Seoul, During the war, it shgted its s e ~ c to e Pusan,

O tvaterborne warnportation w a also important in Korea for a vaxiety o f

reasons, including the lack of east-west highways m d railroads, the counv's m o u n ~ n o u intedor, s and large c o a s ~popula~sxr l centers.

The Korean War

O At the end of World War I1,Japan withdrew most of its ships from Korean waters, leaving behind older vessels todling about I5,QQO mns. In 1953, South Korea had a mere eight oceangoing vessels, most of them antiquated, and a coabI &et 14tha cargo capaciv of 42,000 tans.
O In 1949, South Korea had 38,000 telephone lines, 50,000 telephone s~rioxls,and 175 telegraph stations, all owned and operakd by the

government.

Cf Ungl December 1949, interna~onal cornnnunica~ons sedces in Sou& &rea were pro%dedby the b d i o Coporarcion of h e ~ c aafter , which the
government took control of them, On January 11, 1952, the Republic of Korea" sehce was granted admission into the Intemaeional Tetecornrnunications union.

Prior to the end of World War 1 6 Korea "sn& h n k was the Bmk of Chosen, undcts the direct con &a1 o f theJapmese Ministry of Finance. IIZ Sou& Korea, it continued to operate as the Bank ofChosen untj11950, when it was ,,pized as the Bmk ofKorea. In North fireil, it was reorganized a the No& Korem Cen&d Bmk.

C 2 As of June 30, 1952, the Bank of Korea had assets and liabilities of
1,712,402 million
WQB

(or about $285,000,000 in V.S. currenq).

O In Febmaly 1953, the o%cial foreign exchange rate for South Korean currenq was 6,000 won to $1.00 U.S., while the black market exchange rate was about 27,000 wan ta $1.00 US.

D For the fiscal year ending March 31,1952, the Republic of Korea had a budget that provided for expenditures and receipts of 1,564,000 million won. For fvxal year 1952-1953, the Republic of Korea had a budget that provided for expenditures of 2,319,086 million won and receipts of 3,341,585 million won,

Cl fn 1953,in an effort to con~rol inflation, the government of Sou& Korea

rercired the won and issued a new currency, the h w w , es~blishingm exchange rate of-' 100 won to I hwan.

Facts and Figures

27 1

A total of20 counuies, including che United States and Sou& Korea, committed naval, air, and ground units to the U.N. war effort in Korea. Three coun&ieeAus&dia, Canada, m d h e United S& &ibuted forces fiom all &see of Lh eir mqbr semkes.

U Some 5,720,600 h e r i c a n s served in the U,$, armed forces during the Kurean War, About 1,789,000 of them, more &an 31 pefcent, semed in the
Korean theater ofwar. Numbers in the following section do not necessarily reflect maimurn or mhimum. cmtcihhons, simply the numbers in b r e t a at various points during the war (e.g., in the case of ground forces, on June 30,1951, a year after the war began; onJune 30,195z and anJuly 31,1953, four days dter the amlistice was sigrred).

U.N nawl forces consisted almost en~rely of vessels &om the United
S& tes, Sou ull Korea, and Great Britain, Dearnark " s a d conmebu~on wm a

single hospital sh@.

U Frnm June 1950 taJufy 1953, a total offour hatcfesbips, eighr cruisers, and about 80 des~oyers were a c ~ v e in the mters around the k r e m perxhsula. At various times dufing the w r , 16 aircraft carriers w e e also active around b r e a ( l 3'U.S.,two BriGst.1,and one A u s ~ d i m ) m , d nav m d m ~ n aircrdt e from those carriers flew more than 255,600 sordes,

Cl The United Sates had 186 ships committed to the

war in b r e a in mid-1951,195 ships committed in mid-1952, and 261 hips committed at the end of the war in. mid-1953,

O South Korea had 34 ships committed to the war in mid-1951,67 ships in

mici-1952, and 76 ships in mid-1953,

Q Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, the Netherlarrds, New Zedand, 'Thailand, m d the United Kingdom also conlribulcsd to the U.N. naval farces, committing a total of 36 ships drrring the perriodjanuclsy ta October, 1952. Most uf &ese vessels, 22 of them, wre sent by t-he United %gdam. Aus~alia sent four of them, Cmada three, New Zedand two, Thailmd WO, m d Colombia, Denmark, and the Neherlands one each,

272

The Korean Wag

Air squadrons from five nations flew in defense of che Republic ofKorea d u ~ n the g &rem War.

O The United States had 58 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps air
squadrons committed in June 1951, 67 air squadrons committed in June 1952, and 66 air squadrons committed onJuly 31,1953.

O South Korea did not have any combat squadrons in 1950. After the war
began, the United States began to uain South Korean pilots, which produced one ROK squadron by hte 1951, WOin 11952, and three i n 1953.

O Australia, Canada, and South Africa each had a single air force squadron committed at each of the three sampfe pe5ods.

M i ' a r appear belaw. Medical co~rn*bufI"ons of&e mious.neucd natians rhar

dirjnor send comht mops are &so Iisted here.

O B y the end of the war, U.N. ground foxes consisted of nearly 1 malion
personnel. In mid-X951, &is seength W ~ S 554,577; by mid-1952 it was 678,051; and onJuly 31,1953 it had risen to 932,539.
Smth krea p r ~ ~ d e tbe d peatest number of atlied uoops, fn June 1951, there were 273,266 RQK soldiers, in June 1952 here w r e 376,418 ROK soldiess, and by the end ofJuly X953, there were 590,91 l.

O After the Republic of Korea, the United States committed the greatest o the war in Ksrea, including U.S. M a ~ n Corps e number of ground txoops t and U.S. Navy personnel assigned to U.S. Army commands. At the end of June 1951, there were 253,250 U.S. aoops on the ground in Korea; inJune 1952 the number was 265,864; on 31 July, 1953, here w r e 302,483 U.S. troops in k r e a .
Q Australia had 912 tsoops committed in mid-1951, 1,844 troops committed in mid-1952, and 2,282 troops cornnnimd at the end a f t b e war, onJuly 31,1953,

Facts and Figures

273

O Belgium had 558 uoops committed in mid-1951,579 troops committed in mid-1952, and 900 troops committed at the end of the war, onJuly 31, 1953,

1 9 Denmark had 100 rnedlcd pergonnel committed from March 1951 &rough August 953.
P Luxembourg had 44 troops committed from November 1950 until late 1953.
O Canada had 5,403 troops committed in mid-1951, 5,155 troops committed in mid-1952, and 6,146 m o p s committed on July 31,1953.

D Columbia had 1,050 uoops committed in mid-1951, 1,007 troops h mid-1952, and 1,068 @oopscommitted onJufy 31,1953. commi~ted
O Ethiopia had 1,153 troops committed in mid-1951, 1,094 troops committed in mid-1952, and 1,271 troops cornmitt& onJuly 81,1955,
4;r

France had 738 troops committed in mid-195 1, l,f 85 ~ o o commimd p in mid-1952, and 1,119 troops committed onJuly 31,1955.

C1 Great BriLain had 8,278 m o p s committed in mid-1951, 13,043 troaps csmmitz-er3 in mid-1952, and 14,198 froops committed on Juty 31, 1953.

iZZ Greece had 1,027 woops committed in mid-1951,899 ~ o o pcommitted s in mid-1952, m d 1,263 mops committed onJuly 31, 1953.
Q India had 333 rnedicd t r o o p committed in mid-1951, 276 medical t-roops committed in mid-1952, ;Lnd 30 troops committed on July 31, 1953,
D Italy had no personnel commiLeed in mid-1951,64 medical personnel committed in mid-1952, and 72 rnedicd personal commimd on July 31, 1953.
O Netherlands had 725 troops committed in mid-1951, 565 troops committed in mid-1%2, and 819 troops committed onJuly 31,1953.
d had 79'1 uoops committed in mid-1951, 1,111 troops committed in micf-1952, and 1,389 tsoop conrnitced on July 31,1953.

C1 Numay had 79 rneclical personnel committed in mid-1951,109 medicd n mid-1952, and l05 medical mops commieted in personnel committed i July 1953.

O Philippines had 1,143 troops committed in mid-1951, 1,494 uoops

committed in mid-1952, and 1,496 troops committed onJuly 31,1953.

274

The Korem War

O Sweden had 162 medicd personnet committed in mid-1951,148 medical pemonnel committed in mid-f 952, and 154 medical troops committed in July 1953,

C3 Thailmd had 1,097 troops committed in mid-1951, 2,274 troops

committed in mid-1952, and f ,294 troops committed on July 31, 1953,

tl Turkey bad 4,602 troops committed in mid-1951, 4,8% 8u;oops

cammitred in mid-1952, and 5,455 troops cornmitted onJuly SI, 1953.

Gasualp statisdcs &om rhe Korean War vav9 depending on rvhn h a tabulated hem, The follawhg figures are d r a m fram a n urnber ofn~osdy ~ f i c i dU.S, sources. In mmy caes, Nor& Korea, Chine- and S a ~ e t figures d z e r markedQ, Casudqgods include &d, w w d e d , and missing personn e%

More than 33 thousand U.S. personnel were killed, wounded, or missing in action dufing the Korean War, P i d r e d is Pfc, "fharnasConlon (2 1st Infantry Regimnt, 24tb finfmm Division), who was wounded while crossing the Naktong River dwing the breakout from the h s a n Perimter.

Facts and Figures

275

D United Sates caualties d u ~ a g the Korean VVar included 33,651 personnel killed in action, 103,284 wounded in acdon, 8,184 missing in action, and 7,140 prisoners of war. An additional 20,617 U.S. military personnel died worldwide from all causes during the Korean War.
C)I Of the 7,140 U.S. prisoners of war, 2,705 of them died in cap~Tpiv-a staggering 37.8 percent; 4,418 returned to the United States: and 21 refused repatriaLion,

casualeies todled 109,958: 27,704 dead (19,334 IkilXed in aclioa), 79,526 wunded in action, 4,442 lnissing in action, and 6,656 prisoners of war. In addition to those men killed in action, 1,930 wounded died, 3,778 of the missing w r e declared dead, and 2,662 prisoners of war died.

TZ U.S. Navy caualdes mmUed 2,087: 458 dead (2% 9 k i d in action), 1,599
wounded in acdon, 174 missing in action, and 35 prisoners of war. In addihon ta &ose killed in action, 2,501 wounded soldiers died, 5,227 of the missing in action w r e declared dead, and 2,701 prisoners af war died.
D W.S. Marine Covs caualties mralled 28,205: 4,26"1ead (3,308 killed in , d 225 pdsoners acfion), 24,281 wounded in acfon, 39l misskg in a c ~ o nm sf war.

Cl U.S. Ajr Force canalties t;a~lled 1. ,841: 1,200dead (379 killed in acdon) ,
379 wounded in acf on, 859 missing in actian, m d 224 prisoners ofwar,
O South Korea s ~ e r e a d total of 238,656 miEtary casuafties (about 47,000 killed, 183,000 wounded, and 8,656 prisoners of w r ) and about 1 million ciGlim casud.eies.

Q No& G r e a sagered a total of 630,723 r n i l i ~ casualties ~ (about 520,000 killed us wounded aad 110,723prisoners of war). Like Sou& Korea, N o d b r e a also s&ered about 1 million civilian cmud~es.

O China suffered a total of 381,374 military casualties: about 360,000 killed

or wunded and 21,374 prisoners of m,

1I1 Ausljraliai" csualties were P ,332: 261 kitled, 1,034 wounded, and 37
mksing in acfion or taken prisoner.

O Cmada's scasmZLies were 1,543: 294 killed, 1,202 wounded, and 47

rnissirrg in x ~ o or n taken prisoner,
Q Great Bri~in's scasuddes w r e 4,286: 686 killed, 2,498 wounded, and

1,102 missing in action or taken prisoner.

276

The Korean, War

O New Zealand's casualtieswere 102: 22 killed, 79 wounded, and 1 missing in a c fon,

O Casualties for the other U.N. nations present in Korea totalled 9,997:
1,931 killed, 6,484 wounded, and 1,582missing inaction or taken prisoner.
Q Total U.N. casualties were 17,260, including 3,194 killed, 11,297 wounded, and 2,769 missing in action or taken prisoner.

Leadership ofrhe over& U.N. Command m d ofthe major commands subordinate to it chmged ttirct~ghour the Korem U"ar.

~OMMANDERSXN-CHIEF'" QF THE U.H. COMMAND

Tensionsb e ~ e e Norh n m d Sou& Korea have r e m a i n e d w since L h e ternhation ofhc>s&i~es in 1953,Indeed, since &at h e , a United N a ~ o n s presence here hlzs dways k e n . deemed necessav. UN, under the commmd ofa US. c~mmmlJerare st;ttionedinSouth Korea today,md M Y ! be for the foreseeable htwe. M1 of h e foflowhg csmmmders were US,hmygenerds ('Four sar"), ('Bve star") Thosew'th exceptfor Ma&& ur9who was a g e n e 4 of h e a (D) dter heir name were deceaed a~ ~ f J u m a 2000. ~ July 23,1950 to April 11,1951 April 11,1950 to May 12,1952 May 12,1952 to October 7,1953 October 7,1953 to April 2,1955 April l , 1955 -tcaJune 5,1955 Gen*L p a n L. kmnitzer (D): June 5,1955 toJuly 1,1957 July 1,1957 toJune 30,1959 Gen. Gearge W, Decker (D): Gen. Carter B, Magmder (D): July l , 1959 roJune 30, Wtil July 1,1961 tafu1-y31,1963 Gen. Guy S. MdoyJr. (D): Gen. Hamilton H , Howe (D): August 1,1963 to June 15,191EjS June 16,1965 ta Aupst 31,1966 Gen. M g h t E. Beach: Cen. Charles H, Bonesteel (D): September 1,1966 to September 30, f 969 October 1,1969 .toh p t 31,1972 Gen.John H. Michaelis (D) :
G n , Douglas M a c h h u r (D): &n, M a t ~ e w B. f i d p a y (D) : Gen. Mark W, Cfwk (I)) : Gen.John E=, Hull (D):

Facts and Figures

277

&n. Doadd V. Beanen: Gen. %chard D. SGlwefl (D): Gen. John W Vesseyjr.: Gen.John A. WkhamJr,: Gen. Robert W. Sennewdd: Cen, wifiam j .Limq: a n . Louis C. Meneaey: Gen. Robert W, Riscassi: Gen. G a 7 E, Luck: Gen. Jahn H, TileXliJr.: Gen. Thornas h, Schwartz:

September 1,1972 to July 31,1973 August 1,1973to October 8,1976 October 8, 1976 toJuly 10,1979 July 10, 1979 toJune 4,1982 June 4,1982 to May 31, 1984 June 1,1984 toJune 24,1987 June 25,1987 to june 25, 1990 June 26,1990 to&nc: 14,1993 June 15,1993 toJuly 13,1996 July 9,1996 to December 10,1999 December 18, 1999 to present

Four U.22 h m y generds cmmitnded t%?e 8th US. Army during Lhe Korean W 1 . 1 1 1were U S &my Ijeutenmt generds ("t;hreesar'?. I Cops cammanderM@,&n, Frank M". Milbum semedas a c h g commandt.rofthe 8tlr U.S. Arrsnydter Gen. Walker MS kiUed in m accident until Gen. H d ~ a ) t " arrived in Korea, Gen. V m neet was promoted m ftrU g e a e d on August I, 1951, a d Gen. T;tyklf was promoted to full geneml mJurse 23, 6953.

b. &n. Wdton H. Walker: Lt. Gen. Mat&ew B. Ridpay: Lt. Gen.James A. Van fleet:

July 13,1950 to December 23, 1950 December 26,1950 to Apdl14,195 1 April 14,1951 to l 1 R b m q , 1953 Febmary I 1,1958utnfil h e end of h e ww

COMMANDING GENERALS O F THE u.5. f CORPS

Five U.S.Army majorgenerals ("m stir'? commanded the U.S. I C o ~ s during the &rem War. Kendall was promoted to lieutenant general on September 16, 69.52.
Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter: Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn: Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel:
August 2,1950 m September 11,1958 September 11,1950 to July 19,1951 July 19,1951 toJune 29,1952

278

"I%rs Korean W=

k . Gen. ,Paul W. Kendall:

Maj. Gen. B m c e C , Glarke:

June 29,1952 to Apx.il11,1953 ApdI 11,1953&rough the end of the war

COMMANDINGGENERALS OF THE U.S.

CORPS

Eight US,Army nr lMBrine Cops mgorgenerds csrnlnmded the US.

IX Cclxps dudng the Korean War. Gem. Moore died on f i h r u a ~2.3 of

injuries sustained in a helicopter accident Gen. Hoge was promoted to lieutenantgeneralonJune 3,1951. Gen.Je~kins waspromoted to ljeutenant generd on November 8, X 952.
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milbum: August 10,1950 to Sept.ember X 2,1950 Maj. Gen.John B, Coulter: September 12,1950 toJanuasy 31,1951 Maj. Gen. Bvmt E. Moore: Janua~ 31,1951 to Febmav 25,1951 Maj. Gen. Olher S m i ~ (U.S.M.6.): Febmary 24,1951 to March 5, 1951 March. 5,1"31 to December 24,1951 Maj. Gen. William F, Hoge: December 24, X 9 5 1 taju1y 31,1952 Maj. Gen. wfixd G, Wyman: Maj. Gen.Joseph P. Cleland: jlnly 31,1952 to A u p t 9,1952 Aupst 9,1952 through the end ofthe war Maj. Gen. Reuben E.Jmki,ns:

CQMMANIB~NG GENERALS OF THE u,s. )(: CORPS

Four US. Army mgor generds c m m m d e d the US. X C o ~ during s
tfie Korean WarI s&r~ng we& Ma&&urQrotege Edward: M Amond. White was promoted t o lieutenant general on November 7,1952. Maj. Gen. 1; P. Smich sewed as acdng commmder fromJu& 10 tr, I2$11952; Maj. Gen. D a ~ L. d Ruffner served as acting commander from August 12 to 14,1952; Maj. Gen.J~seph P. Cleland sewed as acting commander from April 1 to 7,

2953, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond: Gen. CloGs E. hers: Maj. Gen. wlliston B. Palmer: Maj. Gen. I. D. m i t e :

August 26,1950 toJuly 15,1951 July 15,1951 t o nclcember 5,1951 December 5,1951 to August 12,1952 August 15,1952 &rough the war

Facts and Figures

279

AII three ofrhe oacers commanding L h e Far East Air Force were U.S. Air Force gene&$, Gen. Parb;redge servw' as acLing commander of monrh, in between the commands of generals Smtemeyer and W+land. Weyland was promoted to lieutenant general onJuly 28,1951, and then to f i f l generd nnJuly 5,1952.
Lt. Gen. George E. S~atemeyer: April 26,1949 to May 21,1951 Lt. Gen. Earle E, Partsidge: May 21, H51 toJune I, 1951 Maj. Gen. 0.P. Wqland: June 1,1951 through the end of the war

COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE 5~1-i AIRFORGE

During the Korean War, flve U S . Air Force generds commmded the 5th Air Force# the main component of f i e F w East:Air Forces.
Lt, Gen, Earle E. Partridge: Maj. Gen. e d m r d j . Timber1Ae: Maj. Ckn. Frank F, Everest: Lt. Gen, CIfenlx 0. Barcus: Lt. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson: October 6, 1948 to May 2 1,1951 m y 21,1951 t o b n e I, 1951 June I, 1951 to May 30,1952 May 90,1952 ta &y 31,1953 May 31,1953 through the end of the war

Both ofthe commandersoftheFarEastNavd*F~rces were U.S. Naly vice adrnirds"

Mce Adm. C. Turner Joy: V~ce Adm, R, P, B~scae:

h g u s t 26,1949 totfr\ne 4,1952 June 4,1952 rough the end of the war

COMMANDER^ OF THE U.S.~ T FLEET H

Four U.S. N a v y admirdscommanded the U.S. 7thFleet during the war.

280

The Korean Wax

Vice M m . Art-;hurD. f m b l e : M m , H, H. &rtin: W e M m . R P, Bfiscoe: Vice M m , J. J, Clark

May 6,1950 t o March 28,1951 March 28,1951 to March 3,1952 March 3,1952 to May 20,1952 M a y 20,1952 thraugh the end of the war

Four ROKgenerds served as chiefofstaffofrhe ROKamed forces during rhe Korean War. Chae B F ~ Dok was demoted after the N o r t h Korean in~sion and was killed at the Batrle of Hadong onJuly 16,1950.

Maj. Gen. Chae B p n g Dok: Lt. Gen. Chmg I f Kwon: Maj. Gen. Lee Chong C b : Lt. Gen. Paik Son Yup:

April 10,1950 toJune 30,1950 June 30,1950 toJune 23,1951 June 23,1951 toJdy 23,1952 July 25,1952 to May 5,1953

Negosiiirdons to concfudem armh&cem d &US m end to the &rem W x beg.anJu+ f 0, f 951, ;md were conducted by high-ranking members of h e ~pposimg mili&r;r forces.

Many ofthe members of L h e U.N. delegation also had otherjobs during the &rem W x . Far exmple, Kce Adm. C: TurnerJoy was commander of the Far E a t Navd Forces. Semke a i i a ~ o of n &e deIega tes is given dter their names.

Vice Admiral 6. TurnerJoy (U.S.N.):

Maj. Gen. Henry Hvdcs (U.S.A.):

Jnfy W , 11351 t o May 22, I952 July 10,1951 to Dec. 17, l951

Facts and Figures

28 1

July 10,1951 to &c. 11, X951 Rear Mm. kleigh A. Burke (U.S,N.): Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie (U.S.A.F.): July 10,1951 to Nov. 27,1951 Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner (U.S.A.F.) : Nov. 27,1951 to July 5, 1952 Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh (U.S.A): Dec. 17,1951to Feb. 6,1952 Dec. H , 1951 tojrxne 23,1952 Rear M m . Ruhven E, Libby (U.S.N.): Lt. Gen. William K HanisonJr. (U.SA.): Feb. 6, 1952 toJuly 27, 1953; Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell (U.S.A.) : May 22,1952 to April 26,1953 Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris (U.S.A.F.): July 5,1952 to April 26,1953 June 23,1952 toJuly 27,1953 Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osbome (U.S.A): April 25,1953 toJune 20,1953 Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn (U.S.A.F.): June 20,1953 toJuly 27,1953 Brig. Gen. George M. Finch (U.S.kF.):

: Maj, Gen. Paik Son Yup (ROE; July XO, 1951 to Oct. 24, 1951 Maj. Gen. Lee H p n g Gun. ( ) ; Oct. 24,1951 to Feb. S, 1952 Maj. Gen. Yu Jai H p n g ( R 0 Feb, 6,1952 to May 28,1952 Brig. Cen, Lee Han Lim (ROR Army): May 28,1952 to Apr2 226,1953 Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin (ROKhmy): ,4x3ril26,1'553to May 16,1953

NORTH KOREAN AND Cf-IiPJESE COMMUNISTDELEGATES

As wjrh the members ofthe U.N. delegation, many ofthe communist delegiltes to the armisLice falks held oLherposisr"ons during the Korem War, and all were members of either the N d Korean People 3 Army or Navy or the Chinese People k Volunteer&myY For example, LL Gen. N m I1 also served as chiefofsWofrheN o r t h Korean People 's

Lt. Gen. Nam 11 (NW &my): July 10,1951tofilfr 2'7, ,959 Maj. &n. Lee Sang Gho ( N W >: J d y 10,1951 toJuly 217,1953 Maj. Gen. Chmg qong San (NKP Army) :July 10,1951 to Oct. 24,1951 Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwm ( N W y): Oct. 24,1951 toApril 28,1952 b a r M m . %m Man Wu ( &"ilf?8,1952 m Aupst 11,1952 N~T):

282

The Korean W ~ I

Maj. Gen. So Hui ( Chmg Chun San Wan Hu ( N W Xva~) : Maj. a n , &m Dong Hak (

August 1 1,1952 to April 26, f 953 y): April 26, I953 to Ma)r 25, X958 M q 25,1953 toJune 17,1953 y): June 17,1953 toJuly 27,1953

Gen. Teng Hua: Maj. G n . Hsieh Fang: Gen, Pien Ghang-W: Gen. Ting K u e p : Maj. &a, Tsai Gheng-wen:

July 10, 1951. to Oct. 24, 1851 July 10,lYfif to AprjI 26,1953 Oct. 24,1951 to April 26, 1953 April 26,1953 toJuly 27,1953 April 26,1953 to May 27,1955

A number of well-ho m people semed .in h e wmed forces during die Korean Miar, incjuding actors, a s ~ a u profesiond ~ , ahletes? md members of'C:o~gress. Some of h e best h o r n w e listed b.eIow.

m t e a few celeb~LI'es served in the armed forces during the Korean

War, i n bath llze U,$. and o&er &lied uni&D These included comedim Bob Newhat; actor Clint E a s ~ o o d(who sport to Korea and was sent to the brig as a result); missed his troop asvonautsjohn Glenn and Buzz AIdrin (as combat pilou); baseball legend Ted Williams, (who was dso a pilot and served asJohn Glenn's wingman); actor Ed McMAon; actor Regis Philbin; British actor Michael C a k e (who semed in the Gammonwealth foxes); actor J m i e Farr (who played Cpl. Klinger in the Korean War television series MeA*S*H), and actor James Gamer.

Facts and Figures

283

Many Korean War veterans have served as elected oBcials since rhe end of the W E As o f 1999, several acdve mmbers of Congress had sewed in the U.S. armed forces during the ronnict i n Korea, including the followhg.
O Representative Bill Archer (Republican, Texas) served in the Air Force from 1951 to 1953.

O Representative Michael Bilirakis (Republican,Florida) served in the Air Force from 1951 to 2955.
Q Senator John H. Chafee (Republican, Rhode Island) served in the Marl.ne Corps &om 1942 to 1945 am3 from 1951 to 1952.

rll Senator Tlen Nighthorse Campbell (Republican,Colorado) semed in the Air Force from 1951 to 1953.
Q bpresenea~veJahn Gonyers (Demoerat, Michigm) semed in the

National & a d from 1948 to 1952, in the Army from IS52 to 1953, and in Resenre from X953 t s 1957,
Q Repfesen~~ve Sam Jabson (Replublkm, T e x ~ ) sewed i n the f i r Force &om I95 X to 1979.

C1 Representative CharXes B, &my from 1948 to 1952.

Q Representative Royd D. Spence (Republican,South Carolina) sewed in

the Navy Reserve from 1947 to 1952, in the Navy from 1952 to 1954, and in the N a v Reseme from 1954 to 1985,

O Senator John Warner (Republican, %rginia) sewed in the Navy from

1944 to 1946 and in the Marine Corps from 1950 to 1952.

PAY RATES FOR u.s, ENLISTED PERSONNEL

MOB&@ pay mt:esfur enlisted personnel in the US, armed sttnikes revised less than a year before the outbreak oftheK~1^em War, by h e Career CornpensadonAct of October 12,1949.(Note:Army rank for each pay p d e is shorn i n parentheses.):

284

The Karem War

Grade

hlyhnk
Recnxit Private Private 1st Clm Go~aral Sergeant Technicat Sergeant ter Sergemt First Sergemt

First Two Years

Highest Pay in rank

E-I

$80.00

$ 95.00
$120.00 $147.00 $191.10

E2
E-3

$82.50

$95.55
$1ai"r,60 $139.65
gj; X fi9.05

E4
E-5
G6

$227.85

$249.90
$294.00

FP?

$198.45

O Basic pay increased by five percent for each m y e a r increment up to 22 years, subject to the rnaxinrum pary available for each rank. Only personnel in
grade El confiaued to receive increases after this, at 26 and 30 years, Q All grades received a subsistencea'tlowance of $45 a month if&ey ha$ no deperrdents, Grades E-5 &rough Ew7,and grade E 4 14thmore than seven years in sehce received a subsistence allawmce of $67,50 a monrh if t h q had one or more dependena (e.g., a spouse or child).

Massive arnaunB ~fmrzluni&on were expended by both sides dmhg the W=:

C3 A Ssviet-made MiG15 fighter jet was loaded ~& 80 rounds of arnmtimition lEQr each of its two 23mm MS-23 cannon m d 40 rounds of ammunition far its 37mm N-37 cannon. Rate of fire far these weapons was I4 rounds per second for the 23mm gun, and swen rounds per second h r the %mm gun,
O Projecli'tesfrom Lhe NS23 weighed 0.44 pounds and those from the N-37 wighed 3.62 pounds; al had a muzzle velacity of 2,264 feet per second. SaGet munihons expertrs calculated &at eight hits by 23mm projectiles or ~o hits by 37mm shells were, on average, s a c i e n t to shoot dam a U,S, B-29 bomber,

Facts and Figures

285

ed with .$Q cdiber machine guns, which O U.S. w a ~ l m etended s to be were not nearly as eEeclive in air-teair combat as the guns mounted on the So~et-made aircr&. Each of the h e r i c m p n s , which had a mwzle velociv oT2,"750 feet per second, could fire 20 rounds per second (120 for ail six), each of which weighed 1.X 7 ounces,
D This inadequacy was pointed ta by the m o u n t of ammunition that kequently had to be expended in order t o s&ciently hit and kill m enerny jet, For example, Lt. Col. Bmce Hinton, the first U.N, pibt to shoot d m a MiG15 in aerial combat, used nearly 1,500 rounds of amrrtuni~on in his attack against the enemy plane. Mil;s were dsa sturdy aircdt, and frequendy rttmrned from combat uritfi up to 50 bullet holes i n them.

CI Throughout the course of the war, U.N. warships fired more L h m 4

million rounds of ammunircion, from their guns, ranging in size from Sinch to XGinch.
0 Du~ng the BatQe of Bloody Gdge (August X Meptember 5, X 951), the

U.S. ilfmy's 115th Field ArtiIlery BatMion set a record among berican u n i t s by firing 14,425 arliXlery shells in 24 hours,

This page intentionally left blank

""One earnot begin a conversation with the end, or a war with a peace *a@, or life with death, Willy-nilly, actively or passively, one must await the given time; one cannot skip a single moment."
eig, The N m Thr'n&~g

oli~cd interacdon bemeen the Unit& Sit;atesmd Korea begm in 18S32, M?"& the signing o f h e Korean-Anrericm Treay o f F~endship and C~mmerce, Mqbr events pP.ior to m d f01fowhg dme1r"ne.n e Korem Ww utl e Korem War are reflected on the begm m'& theJme 1950 inwsion ofSouth Korea and -eluded with &e July I953 eeae 6re &at: ended the Ggh~ng.

O DecemBer I: k r e a n independence is promised in the Cairo

Declarahorr, agreed c a by the United States, Great Bripzlin, and Nationalist C2hima.

O August 8: The Soviet Union declareswar onJapan and deploys voops for the occupaljion of Korea,

ell A u g ~ ,I ~ 1: t The United Sates and Soviet Union agree to di-ciide b r e a

into zones of mili~fy wcupaPim at Ihe 38th parallel. U September 2: Japan surrenders, ending T"Vorld War II,

The Korean War

O September 8: U.S. ~ o o parrive s in Korea to occupy the southern half of

the cotxnq.
O December 21: The formula for Korean unification is spelled out in the

Moscow breemen t.

D May 8: After failing to agree on how to execute the Moscow Agreement,

the joint Soviet-herican Commission adjourns.

Q August 15: The Republic of Korea is established in the U.S.-occupied

southern h& of the penbsula.

O September 9: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is established in the So~et+ccupiednorthern halfof the peninsula.

D December 12: .A United Nacions resolution recognhes Ihe Republic of Korea as the only legitimae government an, the peninsula, calk for the tYihdrawal of both US, m d Soviet forces, and es~blishesthe U.N. Commission on b r e a .

CI

Jmuq 12: In a speech at the Nadonal Press Cbb in Washington, D.C., U,S. Secfe~ry af State Dean Achesan excludes Korea fronn tbe U.S. sphere af strategic interest.

D June 25: War erupts when the northern Korean Democratic People's of its 135,000-man army, across Republic sends 90,000 soldiers, ~o-thirds the 38th parallel into the southern Republic of Korea. Decrying this action, the U.N. Security Council calls for an end to North Korea's aggression.
O June 27: The United Nations asks its members to go to the assistance of

the Republic of Korea. President H a y S. Tmmm deploys the U.S. NW's 7th Fleet m the waters near Tdwan in order to contain the conflict in k r e a and prevent it from spreading throughout Asia.
O While providing security for h e r i c a n s evacuating Korea, an F 4 2 of the U.S. Air Force" 68& "All-Wearjher"Squadron shoos dam a Nor& Korean Yak fighter, scoring the first air victoq ofthe war. U.S. planes shoot down two more enemy alrcrdt in the same battie.

Chronology

289

L3 June 28: North Korean forces capture the South Korean capital of Seoul and all but d e s ~ o y the lightly-armed Republic of Korea (ROK)

D June 29: Eighteen &26 "Invader" fight bombers of the Fifth Aii Force's 3rd Bombardment Group attack Heijo Airfield, outside of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, shooting down one Yak fighter and desuoying 25 enemy airer&t on the ground.

O June 30: President Tmman orders U.S. ground forces into Korea.
D July 1: Task Force Smith, the first U.S. infanuy unit deployed for the Korean War, arrives in Korea fromJapan. It is commanded by Lt. Col. Brad Smith and consiscs of 406 infmpmen of the 1st Batdion, 21st Infanuy Regiment (24th Infanq Division) and 134 dllelymen of Battery A of the 52nd Field kdlfiery Bataora,
U July 2: USSJuneau helps ROK forces desuoy three of four attacking North Korean torpedo boats near Chumunjin in the waters off of Korea's east coast,
O July 5: Balrle of Osam, In the first U,& ground a~rion t>f the war, Task

Force Smith. engqes and delays advmcing NWA u n i ~ seering , heav)l c a u a i ~ e in s the process.
iJ. July S-Auwsc 4: U,N, forces fight to delay the cornrnunist advmce, but steadily souhward toward the port city of Pusan, are d ~ v e n

O Jufy 6: FZy-seven A r m y nuwes asfivtz in Pus= and help set up a hctspital for wounded pctrsonnef. Two days later, 12 of &ern move k w x d to Taejon with m army medical unit,

D July 7: Seeing the need for the forces of its members nations to have unified leadership, the United Nations creates the trniced Nadons Command, to be headed by U.S. General Douglas M a k t h u r and headquartered inJapan. L2 August 4: U.N. forces establish the Pusan Perimeter, a box-shaped area in the southeastern corner of b r e a .
O August &September 16: Some 84,478 voops of the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry DiGsion, 2nd, 24rh, and 25th Infmtry Divisions, and the 1st Pro~siond Marine Bdgade, help to defend the Pusan Perirnekr.

O August 5-19: First Battle of Naktong Bulge.

O August 27September 15: North Korean forces desperately try to

implode the h m Perimeter in the h e a ~ e sfighting t of the ww, to that firne.
Q September 16: North Korean forces launch the Naktong Offensive.

230

The Korean War

Cf Sepember 15:Xnchon L a d i n g (Qperadon Ghromite).U.S. and allied

farces Iar~d U.S. Madnes m d V.S. woops at Xnchon on Korea's west coast, not far from Seoul m d deep in the rear of the Norrfi k r e m forces besieging Pusan.
O September 15-26: Liberation of Seoul. Driving inland from Inchon,

U.S. and allied forces lay siege to Seoul and, after heavy fighting, recapture it on September 26.
C1 September 16-27: Breakout from. k m , Four dlt-isions of rke U.S. e 1st Cavalry Di~sion and the 2nd, 24rh, and 25th

lenhnq Di~sion-break out of the Pusan Perimeter,

O September 19-October 1:U.N. forces trap most of the the North Korean
People's h m y (m) bemeen the U.S. Eighth Army, driving north from P u m , and the U.S. X Corps, cenered an Seoul, North k r e a " f m e s m decimated m$ forced to re-at. October 7: U.N, forces cross the 38th Parallel into North. Korea. The United Nations smctions the d e s ~ c t i o nof the people"^ Defnocratiic Republic of'Korea and the reunSca~on of the country,
D October 12: Chinese Commwist Forces (CICF) cross the Ualu River into Korea.
O October 15: Generd Machhur and President Tmmm meet at Wake Island for a bt-ief, haKday conference.

P October 19:U.N, Forces capture Q o n g m g , the Nosh b r e a n capid.

D O c m h r 20: Sdme 2,866 parmoopers of the 187Eh Airborne Regimenraf. Combat Team take part in the firft airborne operation of Lhe war, jumping into Sukchun and Sunchon north of 9on~yang. Workirrg with ground forces driving north, they kill or capture about 6,000 North Koreans. Ll October 25: Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) enter the Korem War and launch their first p h a e oRensive,
fl;l Ocmbrrr 26: Mter reembarking at Xnchon, X COTS lands at Wansm on k r e a ' s east coast. ROK ~ o a p showever, , have aXreacfy advanced 50 miles up the peninsula beyond this paint.

November 1950:U,N, units drive reaeafing Nor& Korem ~ o o pbefore s them and approach the Ydu River, which forms the border with China. The end of the war appears to be Mljlhin sight.
i;S

Q November ]L : 66F'units ambush the 1st Cavdry BiGsion at Urxsan.

November 8: U.S. gmrnment aat2lorkes the Korean Seririce Nedd,

Chronology

29 I

E;;I Nmmber S26: 1S.S. Navy warplanes and h r East Air Farce (

bombers attack E'altx Sver b ~ d g e sin an attempt to keep Chinese Communist Forces from crossing into Nor& Korea and joining in the M e against the allied g r a n d tbrces.

C3 November 10-26: U,N, forces, separated by the Taebak Mountains, advance north towad the Ydu fiver,Eighfi
the eat.

C31 November 24: Mac&tE1urfs "final oEe11sive"begins.

Cl November 25December 15: CCF uni& counteratack allied forces

mo.cing north toward the Yalu, including the 1st Marine Division and the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd, 3rd, 7&, 24&, and 25tfi Infantry Di*ions,

November 25: GCF unia attack the Eighth h m y a h g the Chongchan fiver. Divisions (Eigh& &my) along the Changchon River, forcing them to reweat,

O November 2GDecernber 1: Chinese uni~s defeat the U,S, 2nd and 2 5 h

D November 2"iDeeember 10: Batde of Chosixr Resewair. CCIF units hit: the Marine Ist and &my 7 t h Divisions (X Corps) at Ghosin Reservojr, forcing &m to retseat toward the port city of Hungnarn. Complekly encircled by rhe communis~, the n ~ n e fight s their way souLheas~ard from Koteri i n one of the most desperate and bletody acdons of the war.

D December 22: Eighth y commander G n e r d Walton H. Wdker ;is killed in a &&c accident; he is replaced by General Matthew B. Ridpay.
O December 24: About 105,000 U.S. and ROK military personnel and 100,000 Korean refugees flee the besieged city of Hungnam by boarding ships or through evacuatdon by Navy aircraft to warships waiting off the coast.

O January 1-15: CCF Third Phase Offensive. Enemy forces totaling 500,000 men drive U.N. forces 50 miles soutlk of the 38th Pardlel,

O January 4: Comunist forces capture Seoul for the second dme.

O January 14-15: U.N. forces consolidate their lines along the 37rh parallel, in Sou& Korea.

Cf J m u q 25: U.N. forces reasume heir oEensive,

232

The Korean War

O Februaly 1:Battle of the Twin Tunnels. A U.N. force composed of the

23rd Infanm Regiment (2nd Infanq Division), 347th Field Artillery Battalion, and the French Battalion engages several CCF regiments, killing votes to end the at least 1,380 Chinese soldiers. Mso, the United N a ~ o n s collnict in Korea by "peacehl means." 1514: Communist forces counterattack during the U.N. ogensive.
Q February 13-15: Battle of Chipyong-ni. In this first mass assault by the Chinese, 18,000 voops smash into a multinational force that includes the

23rd Infanuy Regiment (2nd Infanq Di\ision), the 37th Field Artillely Battalion, Battery B af the 82nd htiaircrdt Artillef)~ Eatdion, the 1st gctr Gompmy, and the French Badion, Despite the ferociy of the attack the allied forces stop the advance of the cornmunis~s.

C1 Februaq 16,19513uly 27: Siege of"Worrsan.A U.N. blockade and eseort

force designated Task Force 95 bloebdes Wonsm Harbor, %'his blockade evctntudly lasts an incredible 861 days, rhe longest e f f e c k siege d a port in U.S. Navd hktory,
Q Fcbmary 17-March 17: U.N. forces caneinue their oEensive nor&ward,

UI March 7-April 4: OperaLion Ripper. Seven U.S. divisioneU,S, Army 1st Gamlry Division, 2nd, 3rd,7th, 24&, nnd 25th Tnfanq Divlsians, and the 1st Marine DiGsion-succeed in recapturing Seoul on March 18, and drive communist forces back across the 38& padlet.

P March 23: Operation Tomahawk. In this second-largest airborne operation of the war, 120 C 119 and M 6 wansport aircraft drop 3,437 paratroopers of the 187th Regimental Combat Team near Munsan-ni.

O April I l :President Tmman fires Ceneral MacArthur. General Ridis promoted to overall command of the U.N. forces, and GenerdJames Van Reet is @ven command of Eightfi
P April 12: More than 40 MiGl5s attack a B29 formation and shoot down W bombers in this first major aerial duel of the conflict. Eleven of the MiGs are destroy& in the battle, seven of them by B.29 wmers, P April 22-29: Chinese First Spring OBensive. In what is the largest single battle of the war, Communist Chinese forces launch their spring oEensive with 27 dii"i&ons,a t o d of" 250,000 men, against five U.S. &my diGsions (2nd, 3rd, 7&, 24&, 25tfi).

O April 30: CCF is forced to break contact with U.N. forces.

Chronology

293

O May 17-22: CCF Second Spring Offensive. The Chinese engage four

U.S. divisions (U.S. Army's 2nd, 3rd and 25th Infanuy Di~sions, and the 1st Marine DiGsion) in combat and are shattered by them in what becomes h o r n as the "&y Mssacre."
O May 20September 20: Operation Suangle. Massive all-out air

interdicdon campaign is c 7% m d the 1st Mahne a r c r d t

( F a East:Air Farce), Task Force

O May 25June 13: U.N. forces continue to drive northward. On June 13,

the aflies once again reach the 38tk pardlel.

il June 23: Soviet U.N. Delegate Yakov Mdik proposes a uuce.

O June 10-16: Battle for the Punchbowl. Despite heavy North Korean
resisance in the vicinity of Hwachon Resewoir, the 1st Madne DiGsion succeeds in a b n g its objjechve.

C3 July 10: &rem War truce tirlks begin at hesong.

D A u p t I-October 31: U,N, forces launch limited aftaicks aimed at s&&ghteningand improving their lines of batde.

il h g u s t 18Septexnber 5: BatGe of Bloody Ridge (Hill 983). In the

c o u r of ~ this acGon, the 15th Field hG1lery Batdion fires 14,425 roundf in 24 hours, setting a record.

il SeFmber 1%Oct15: Battle of Heanbreak Ridge (Mifl937). Soldiers

af the 2nd Infancry Di~sion seke Heartbreak Ridge,

O September 21: Operation Summit. In this first helicopter deployment

of a combat unit, a company of 228 marines is airlifted in a dozen Sikorsky s55s.
D Nmmber 30: In a rare engagement with communist bombers, 31 F46 Sabres shoot down eight Tu-2 bombers, three La-9 propeaerdriven fighters, and one MiG-15jet fighter.

O November 2'1: Truce talks that have dragged on since July 10 are
renewed. Both sides agree upon the line of contact, roughly corresponding to the 38th parallel, as the ceasefire line; almost immediately, military operations slow d a m .
O November 30: U.N. and communist aircraft engage in a rare pitched 28 bombers. A battle pitting 31 F46 Sabres against 50 MiG15s escor~ng dozen enemy planes are shot d a m in the fray,

C1 November-April, 1952: Batde bogs down into stalemate along the line of con&ct, as peace discusions drag on at Panmunjom.

The Korean. Wgr

D April 2: Allied forces begin screening communist POWs. Riots begin at the POW camp an Kqjedo*

O May 7: Communist POWs on Kojedo capture the camp commandant,

Brigadier General.Frmch TT, Dotld.
O May 12-June12: Brigadier General Haydon Boatner quashes the riots on

Xoje-do. General Mark Clark replaces General Matthew Ridpay at FECOM.

P May 25: Nine tanks of the 245th Tank Battalion, 45th Infantry Division,
launch an attack against North Korean-held Agok, i n retaliation for three raids against the h e r i c m division" sector,
Q June-October: Tmce talks deadlock over the question of repatdation of

POWs. There is a stalemate dong the line of contact, puncmated by smeral hill battlies, includkg M i t e Horse Moun~in.

U June 614: Operadon Caunlctr. 45th Infantry DiGsion solrliers launch a series of atacXrs in the ~cinity ofO1d Baldy ( H i X E 266) h order to es~blish, 11 patrol b e s , A pair d C C F battalions fiercety countt-trat~ck the 2nd and 3rd Bat~lions of the 180& Xnfaq Regiment holding Outpost Eerie on Hill 191, but are unable to dislodge &em. r;;l July 17-August4: Batde for Old Bddy (Hill 266).
Q July 231: and Nav planes launch massive air strikes against North Korea's hydroelecuic power grid, causing an almost complete blackout for of s ~ k e extend s into n o h e a r China, which mare &an two weeb. R e s u l ~ loses nearly 25 percent of its elect~cal requirements.

O August 29: Largest air raid ofthe Korean War. Aircraft from offshore aircrdt camiers launch 1,403 bombing sorlies against Pyongyang, the largest ~neBa)r raid of the entire war,
Q September 1: Largest all-Nav raid. A total of 144 planes from three aircraft carriers desuoy the North KDrean oil refinely at Aoji.
Q September 17-24: CCF ~ o o p besiege s the 65th Infantry Regiment (3rd

Infanvy Division), holed up in Outpost Kelly.

U October 8: Truce talks at Pmmunjom deadlock and are recessed.

O October-November: Communist forces put heav pressure on ROK

forces holding the center of the battle line.

O October 9-Jul-y1953: 'Cherokee" AirstriLes. The 7th Fleet launches a

bombing campaign against front line enemy supply facilities.

Chronology

295

D October 14-25; Operation Showdown/Battle of Hill 598 (Sniper Ridge). The '7th in fan^ Division battles the Chinese near Kumhwa, the right leg of the Iron Triangle.

Cl October 2528: Batfrle of the Hook. O November: India makes a proposal in the United Nations conceming
P W reptriarlon,
Q November 3: Sotdiers of the 2nd Batmlion, 160tk Enfmq Regiment (40th Infantly Division), holds Hill 851, Heartbreak Ridge area, against communist szllsault.

C1 Becember: President-elect Eisenhower fuElls a campaip pledge to Gsit

Korea. U.N. forces intens* psychological warfare against the communists. Stalemm contimes, broken up by hill battles,
Q December 25: Batae dT-Bane Hifl. The 38h Infantry Regiment (2nd Infanuy Division) repels Chinese forces during an intense battle.

Ll January: Stalemate and hill hatdes continue.

O January 25: Operation Smack. Elements of the 31st I n f a n q Regiment (7th I a f a n q Division) asawlt Sgud Will.
e 1 4 D. Taylor replaces General James Van Elect as commander of Eighlh. &my.

C1 fiebmar)r 22:The U.N. Command once again proposes an exchmge of

sick m d wounded POW,
Q Mwch 5: S o ~ ePremier t j o ~ Salia f dies, s p ~ & n g disaecrion in Lfie

USSKs satelXite scales and a smggle for power i n the f i e d i n .

Ll Mach X 7: Chinese forces assault Hi11.855 (Little G i b d ~ r, ) held by the 9 t h Zrrfmtv Regiment (2nd Ilnfanp DiGsion).

a March 23c24: The 32nd ReEpiment (7th Infanp DiGsion) asumcrs contrrol of the Old BaIdy/Pork Chop Cornpiex, refie~ng the 31st f d m q Regiment (7th Infantq Di~sian) .
March 2630: Chinese farces s&er the loss of a re@mexrtd u ~ n g a heav attack against outf)u".t$ at tfre Mevad;tcities (Vegas-ReneCarson) heXd by the 5th M ~ n Reerrtent, e
Q March 28: The Q=ommunis& agree to the POW exchange proposed by the U.N. Command,

296

The Korean T3Var

O March 30: Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai indicates &at the
communist powers will agree t~ the Indian POW proposal made ts the United Nacions the p r e ~ o uNovember, s Peace talks resume at Pmmunjorn,

tl ALpril 161.8: Bilttfe o f Pork Chap Hill, The 17th and 31st fdmcry Regimen& of the 7th Infancry Diviision suffer heavy cmual~es in a see-5av
bade over a strategicdly insignificant chunk of territory,
Ifi April 20-26: Opemlion Little S*tch. U.N. and communist forces exchange sick and wounded POMls, among &em 1.49bericans,

C1 ApPil27: Plenary sessioxls resume at Panmunjom.

O May: N i l e truce d e ~ i l are s negoria~ed at Panmunjom, savage fighrin,a

conlinues along the satlc battle line.

May 13: b i d on Taksan Dam, In the first:of a ~ w w e e series k of stacks against North G r e m imigatian vstems, F44s of' the 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing attack and destroy a major dam, noadwaters immerse five mites of valuable rice craps and wash out several miles of highways and railrod wacks,
Q June 4: The Comrnunis~s finally agree, for all yraceical purposes, to the

U.N. truce proposals.

D June 15: A record for offensive sordes flown from an aircraft carrier i na single day is set when USS Phceton launches 184 sorties. Also on this day, Navy and Marine G o ~ aircrafl s Ry a total of 910 sorties, the highest combined number flow &ring a single day of the k r e m War.
O June 25: CCF forces launch massive attacks against ROK divisions. Walter

S. Roberaon begins the "little w c e talks" with Syngman Rhee in order to obtain ROK accepace of the amistice.
F-86 Sabres shoot down 16 MiGs, the largest number shot d o m in a sh$e day,
Q June 30:

D July 6-10: After five days of heavy fighting, the 7th Infantly Division is ordered to evacua* its defensive posirions on Pork Chop Efill.

D July 7: The Republic of Korea agrees to the cease fire terms.

O July 1320: Battle of Rumsong River Salient. In t h i s last communist

oBFensive, the CCF Launches a s k d i ~ s i a n a t ~ c kdirect4 , in part against the 3rd, 40th, and 45th Infanq Divisions of the U.S. IX Corps. During the fighring, the 187th Regimental Combat Team is attached to 2nd Infantry Di~sion.

Q July 24-26: In the find episode of U,S, pound combat, a 3,00&mm communist force launches m assault ;ag;zinst the "Boulder City" area of the Berlin Complex, held by the f st and 7 t h Marine Regixnen~. Colnbat on HiUs

I I X and I X 9 are the final Marine ground actions of the war.

ir;l July 27: An M 6 Sabre shoo& down ;m eneny m n v o r t near the Mmchur;ian border, the East air kiU of the war.

D July 27: Armis~ce, Nor& Korea, China, and the United States sign an amisdce, ending the fighi~ng; in k r e a . This ffails, however, to b ~ n about g a pemanent peace m d ta date the Republic of Korea m d the DernacraGc PeapEes%epublic of Korea haye not signed a peace weat)".
L l Sci?ptember 4: Indian neumls begin screening and repatriating csmmunist POW at Freedom Ellage, n e x Panmun,Som,

131 Septernbef 6: Operation Rig S k ~ h The , last American PQWs are

repa~ated.

This page intentionally left blank

ACRONYMS A N D MILITARY TERMS

"Excuseme sir, seeing as h w CfleW i s such a VIP, shouldn't we keep the PC on the QT?"ause i f i t leaks to the VC, he could end up an

wem

large v a ~ e ofabbre~ations y md acrclnylns were used in. rniliay

the Kore2~War, Most of &ose &;ze follow were oHcid US. rnil'iu~ aconyms; others am unaEcid but were common or were used by foreign corrra~r"l'rts~ such a HMCS fir His Mdesy)S' C"anadim Ship. Explmata~ informa~on is given in some caes,

Q Abn: airborne,

P A-/C: aircr&, Used toy pilots i n mission repom,

O ACSI: h s i s m t Chief of S& for Zntelligence. O Af)COM: Advance C1:ommaxld and Liaison Croup in TCurcza.
D AP)R a u t o m a ~ cdirecLion finder, A w e of equipment used an jet aircrdt.

l2 Adm.: admiral

The Korean Wag

Q
D

:&my Field Forces. : &my Forces, Far East.

L 2 AN:annex,

D M : amor-piercing. Type of cannon round used by direct fire artifleq

pieces and tanks against armsred vehicles, or-piercing incendiq, T p e of a m w i t i o n used by fighter aireraft. In the oqgen poor smtosphere, however, where nnucbet-toljet combat mok place, such mmunitjon damaged but often failed to ignite struck aircrdt,
O APU: auxifiary power w i t , A jet aircrdt component,

O Arty: arhllery..

i-f B: born ber (e.g., B29 ""Supel-for~ss") .

O BAR: Browning automatic rifle. The primary squad-level fully automatic weapon used bp U,S, infantrj~ foxes in b r e a .

Ll BCT: bat~lion combat team. hinfanq batlitXian reinf'o-rcedwith other elements and capable of operating independently. Such uniw were employed by some U.N. nations (e.g., the Philippines).A typical BCT might consist of three infanuy companies, one tank company, one reconnaissance company, and one artillery battely.

O Bn: battalion. An combat unit consisting of about 1,000 men, further di~ded into five ar more compmies. O B O Q bachelor oBcers quarters. EGng quarters for single officers or those unaccompanied by their families.

Q GCF: Chinese Communist Forces.

Q CCP: Chinese Communist P a q .

Cf. CG: commanding generd.

O C m G e n ~ Intelligence d kerrcy,

Acronyms and Military Terms

Clf GinC: commmder-k-chief.

L3 CINCBT: Cammmder-in-ChieE Far Ease.

O CINCPAC: Commmder-inxhief, Pacac,

I ; ; l

CXNCPACmE Commmder-inxhief, U.8, PacSc Fleet.

Q GfNCUNG: Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Cornmand.

Q ClMO: Chief oflldormatcion.

O Cmte: commiaee.
Q CNO: Chief of Naval Operalions.

P Co.: company. A unit consisting of 100 to 200 soldiers, furher divided into three or more phcoons.

D GOB: Chief of

. Comd: commmd.

: Commander, U.K. Navd Forces, Far East.

Q Con2 conference.

C1 Coag: Congress.
O Corresp: correspondence.

If CPVA Chinese People's Valun@ers

Q CONUS: Coneinend United Sates.

CI

IIA: Department of the Army.

DA-IN: incoming message.

O IDGOB: Depuv Chief of S@.

t;l Dcrtpt: d e p z m m r .
Q I3E Risposi~on Form,

C1 Div: E ~ s i o n ,

Cl DMZ: demilibked zone,

P D P m Democratic people"^ Republic of- h r e a (Nor* k r e a ) .
5;11 EGAL: Economic Coordina~on Mministra~an.

Cf EBC: European Defense Community,

CI h: Enemy. Used by piloa in Right repar&.

302

The Korean War

D E U S m Eighth U.S. &my in Knrea. Used on)iyfor the hrces operating

in-&eater d u ~ n g the W=.
Q F: fighter (e*g., M6 uSabre").
Q FAG: fowwd air con&oUer, A fighter pilot on the gromd or in

an

obsemation aircrdt who direce ffiexldfy air stacks ag&nst enemy ground

argea,
r;Sf :Far Ewt Air Forces,

GOM: Far East Air Material. Commmd.

Q FEG, ECOM: Far Eaist Coxnxnmd,

O G1: personnel section of a di~sional or higher sM. Cl G2: intelligence section of a divisional or higher S@.
P G 3 : operations section of a divisional or higher sa

U 01:logistics section of a divisional or higher S&.

Q G5: civil Sairs section o f a diGsiond o a r higher SW.

O GOZ: ground controlled approach. A system of radarguided insuument

flight used for landing aircraft in inclement weather.
Q GCI: ground conuolled intercept U s e of ground based mda to steer fighter aircraft toward targe@ or an airbase under conditions of limited v;tsibilliy.

O GCM: gold-colored metal. Used in describing buttons, insignia, etc.

O GHQ general headquzters.

U GI: government issue. Common slang name for an American soldier.

O HBT: herringbone nuill, a type of cloth used in U.S. milita~y uniforms.

O HE: high explosive. A type of ammunirion used b y tanks and artillery primarily for use against personnel.

O HWT: high explosive, a n ~ - w k .

Q HMCS: Hieri/His mjesryk Gmadian Ship.

Acronyms and Military Terms

303

O WAP-T: high-velocity armor piercing-tank. A type of ~ g s t e n c o r e d

ammrrniciun used by allied armored forces.

O HVSS: horizontal volute spring suspension. A tank suspension system E8 Shtermm. that entered s e ~ c in e December 1944 on the

C;S ZCRC: Internaliand Committee of the Red Crass.

fTll Intern: i n t e ~ e w . Q IRO: Internarional &fugee Organization.

i l J-l :Joint Staff personnel section.

Ct J-2: Joint S

M inlel'figence seclion,

P3 j-3: Joint S& operations seerion.

D J-4: Joint S@ logistics seetiorr.
f3 J-5: Joint S@ civil a a i r s secllian,
O jato: jet assisted takeoff. Accomplished with attached rockets that could be jettisoned once in Bight.

C3 JCS: Joint ChiefS of S M .

Q Jnl: journal.

D JP: jet propellmt (.Fuel). D JWOGJoirnt Saategic Plans and Operations G m p .

LI MTCOM: Korean Augmentation Troops, C:ommonvued&.
Q MTUSA: Korem Augmentation to the U.S. Q KCOMZ: &rean Communica~ons Zone.

:kitlled in acfion.

Q G Karean Evliliaq A d ~ s o v Group; United States M i l i w A d ~ s o q Group to the RepuMic of Korea,

P B C : k r e a n Sefice Carps.
Q kts: h a & ,naufricafmiles. A. nautical mile is eqmd to 1 .1515 satute miles,

Cl LST: landkg ship, tank,

The Korean War

Q 1M:model, as in %M1952 body armor."
0
: Mili~ry h s i s w e e Ad~sory Group.

H: Mobile

Sur@calHospid.

Q M& maintenance and supply group,

O MDW. Mumal DefcjnseApprop~ations Program.

Q MGMC: MtlXCipk C;un M o w

andaircraft qstems consisting of muttiple machinepns mclunted un a modified armored vehicXe c h ~ s i (e.g., s the @ a d 50,the D u d 40).

Q MU: missing in acdan.

LI MG: family of SoGet-made jet aircrdt. A eorz~actlon of "MikoyanCurevich,"the names of the aircraft's two primary developers.
Q MLR main line af resismce (i.e., the lime of batae beeu~een.h e

opposing forces).
O MP: miliwq police.

O M&?:model quartermaster,

CI M S k Mumd Securiv Act.

Q MSR: main supply route. Primav roads and highways used as lines of

movement and supply for military units. Usually used in conjunction with an idenufylng name or number, such as MSR Red 7.

C11 NATO: North Adantic Treaty Org.anization.

i;J
I ; l r

NCO: nunconlmisfimed oficere Enlisted ranks such as corporal, sergeant, etc., attained through experience and time and service, rather &m a commission.

U NKPA: N o d Korean People's

Q nm: nautical miles (e.g.,T h e Thundejets were a mere 60nm from the site of combat.").
Q m R C : Neraeal Nadons Repaeiation Cornmisslon,
Q NNSC: Neuual Nadons Supercrisoly Commission.

C l NBRJ: Narional Pufice Reseme japan,

Acronyms and Military Terms

305

Q NSC: National Seeuriy Council.

O OCA: OEce, Compwoller of the Army.

D 04lub: ~ E ~ c eclub. rs
Cl BD: alive drab.

O OG: olive green.

O Opnl: operational.
Cf

Opns: oprations.

il ORO: Operations Research Osce.

D PXR Periodic Intelligence Report,
D Ptng: planning.

Q POR: Periodic OperaLians Repon.

Ll PPS: Poliq Planning SW.
O PRC: People's Republic of China (communist China).
O PSP: pierced steel planking. Perforated plates of steel that could be laid on the ground and interlocked to create airfield runways on othenvise unsuiabge terrain, such a loose sand,

Ll PX: post exchange.

O QMCTC: Quartermaster Corps Technical Committee.
Q

Resist h e r i c a . b r e a Movement. rest and recuperation, rest m d rehabilifadon.

O hndR,
O Rcd: record,

O RCT: regimental combat team.

Q Regt: regiment.

FZt ROC: bpubfic o f China (nationalist China).

et ROE Republic of Korea (South &re,).

O KOm

Republic of Korea &my.

O RON: remain overnight.

O ROTC: Reserve Offxcer Trabing Carps.

306

The Korean VVar

O $1: personnel section of a battalion staff, responsible for personnel management, adminismtion, morale, 2nd discipline. Cl 5.2: miIicar)l intelligence s e c ~ o n of a bataion s M , responsifile for collecting, incerpfeting, and disseminating w d c d infomatlon.

D $3: operaGons section of a h a t d i m milimq operahons md waining.

S@,

responsible for planning responsible for unit sup.ply,

C3 M:jogistics section of a b a t d b n
maintenance, and transpor~tion plans.
D SmACC: S ~ t e

, @ S

av-Ar Force Caordinabg Committee.

: Supreme Commander for the AUied Powm,

D %c: section. A unit in m ofice,

0 sec,: sec~on (of a document).

D Seq: S e c r e ~ v (of Defense, the
O Sea: session.

D SGS: S e c r e w of the General S&

O SUC: smd-up collar, used to describe a feature of some U.S. militaly mgorms.

D T: test. Used to describe items undergoing tesdng, as in T-1952 body

afm OX",

D TAC: Tactical Afr Cornmand.

Cjt TAG The Acljuant General.

B TDY temporav duv.

r ; ; l

TeleconE ~elephme conference.

mlr force.

D TO&E: table of organizarion and equipment. U.S. Army tables that showed Lhe allonent of uoops, weapons, and equipment at every level of command, from company through corps.
O T.O.T.: time on target. Projected attack dme on targeu for fighter or born ber a t ~ c k s .

O UN: United Nations,

D UNC: United Nations Command.

O UNCOE United Nations. Commissian on k r e a .

Acronyms and Military Terms

307

CS U N C U m United Nations Connrnisfim for the U n s c a ~ o n and &habilitr;tt;ian of Korea. C1 U

: United Nations Korem Reconsmctfan kency,

CI UNRC: Uniled Natlons Receptlun Center.

Unit;ed Nations Regef and bhabiliedon, Adrniniseatlon.
O UNTCOK: United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

D US: United S ~ t e s .
D USm. United S~ates &r Force.
: United States Asmy Alr Force.

D U S m R United Na~ons &me& Forces in Korea.

ited S ~ t eMiIiaq s Academy.

D USMC: United Sates Marine Coqs, D USSR: Union of SoGet Socidist KclpuMics. D WAG: Women" &my COTS.

D W M Women in the Air Force.

Q
:w-amded in a c d ~ n .

C;li W B : War S ~ b i l k a ~ o Board. n,

D ZX: Zone of the Xnitet-ior (i.e., the cont;inerrt_alUnited S ~ t e s ) .

This page intentionally left blank

AImanac ofNam1F a c ~United , Sf;jtt;es Naval Xnseitute, 1964. Angelucci, Enzo. The Rand McNalip EncycIopedia of M i l i w Aircraftr,1914 to the Presen~ The Mili~ary Press, 1990. Avely, Derek, ed. Cross, Robin, Fitzsimons, Bemard, Humble, Rich&, and ~ United StatesFigh a"ngForcesSChwprime Limited, 1989. Lloyd, Mark. H i s c o ofthe Bndy, James. The CoIdest War; A Memo& of Korea. Pocket Books, 1990. Bunge, Frederica M , , ed. Norrh Korea: A CounoySrudy. Foreign Area Studies, The hel-ican Uxlkver-siv, 1981., Chamberlain, Peter and Ellis, Chris, The Shermm: An IIlusmted Histaq o f h e M4 Medium Tank. &CO, 1969, Crow, Duncan and Icks, RobertJ. Enqclopedia ofTmks. Charwell Books Inc., 1975. Cumings, Bruce. Warand Television,'Versa, 1992. Davis, b y . B e S t o o ~f h y D a ~ sResearch . Tfiangle Publishing, 11395. Edwards,Paul M, A Cuic-ler;r, F2ms on the Korean War.Greenwood Press, 1997. Emns, Douglas K SabreJe~ Over &rea: A Firshmd A C C Q U Tab ~ L Books Inc., 1984. Ezell, Edward Clinton. Smallhms af&e World:A Basic M m u d ofsmall Swkpale Books, 1985. Fehrenbach, T. R This a n d of War: The dlmic H i s t q of the Korem War. Bmssey", 1998, FerreE, Robert H. H a q S . T m m a : A LZe. Universiy af Fory, George. At War in Korea. Bonanza Books, 1985, Foss, Chrisctopher F. h ~ i l ofthe e ~ World ( ed Edician). Charles &ribner9s Sons, 1976, Walliday,Jon and Curnings, Bmce, Korea: The U n b o r n Wm.Pmheon Books, K 988, Hermes, Walter 0, United Sates Army .in the Korean War: Tmce Tent and Fighting Fron~ Office of the Chief af MiLit;zry Nistsrty, 1988, Hoare,J m e s and Pares, Susn, Confiictin Korea: h Enqclopedia, B W L l 0 , 1999, HoEschmidc, Edward M, m d Tanturn, W21ia;inzH, W ,eds, U S Mili&ry Vehiclesf World War IX W , f nc,, 1970. House,jona&an M. 'Toward Combined S Wdare: A Sumey of 20& Cenmq Tactics, D o c h e , and C)rgwization,"Combat Studies Inseimte, A u p t 1984.

310

The Korean War

Hunnicutt, R. P. Pershing; A Higtov cli" the Medium Tmk T20 Se~es* Feist FuMicaGons, 1971. Jessup,John E, & Enqclopedic Dictionaxy QfConHict and CoaBict Res~ludon~ 1945-1996. Greenwood Press, 1998, &ox, Donald, The Korem War;&m to Chosh; h On1 HistoveHarcourt, Brace,JovmoGch, 1985, Malh, Leonarcl, LeonxdMaIh "s2000Mo.rYiem d E d e C ~~de Sipet, * 1999, Matray,James I,, ed, Historical Dictionary of the Korem War, Greenwmd Press, 1991. Cha Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations f i ~ m P-ress, 1966. Mgsorn, John, klusian Tanks, _790@_7 97Q;The Complete Iflusmted his to^ of oured The07 and Besip. Gd&ad Books, 1970, N a d Brienadon. Bureau of N a d Personnel, 1.961. Orgokie~cz, %chard M, Rranoured Forces: A Histary &eir Vehicles.h c o Publishing Compmy, Inc., 1970. Owen,J. I, H,, ed, Bra~eyS In&try Weaponso f h e World, 1954.1875. Bonmza Books, 1979, e the Forgotten War: The U.S. Coast Price, Scott T, T h e Forgotten S e ~ c in Guard's Role in the &rean Conflict," U.S. N a d 1nst;imtePress, 2000. Robertson, WGliam Clenn. Corn teratack on cke Naktomg, 1950." Combat Studies Institute, December 1988. Rosignoli, Guido, h m y Badges mdfnsignia Skce 1945 (Baok One), MacMdan Pubfishing Co. Pne,, 1973. Savada, h d r e a Nfarles and Shaw, WdEam, eds. South Korea: A C o u n q &dye Feder& Research Division of the Libra~y of Conpea, 1992. Shores, Christopher. figfatesAces, Hamlp h b l i s h g Croup Ltd., 1975, Sxnikfi, Digby* Ungoms Since 1945,14lan&ord Press, 1980. Spick, Mike, The CompleteFighterAce; the World"sigh terAces, 19_14ZO0OO Sackpole &oh, 1999, S a t o n , Shefby.. US, &my UnSoms of &e Cold M;"ar,X94&1973, Stackpole Books, 1998, Strilrrton, Shelby: US,&my UnSomso f & e f i r e m W * , St-ackpoteBooh, 1992. Toland, John. In Mord Combat: hrea, 1950-1953, W~uiam Momow md Co. Inc., 1991, Mite, Wzlliarn Lindsay, The Capdves o f h r e a : Rn UnoMca Mite Papw on the Treament of WarP~soners. Charles Scribner" Sons, f 957,

Aces, 42-45; Canadian, 44; Chinese, 44; Nosh Korean, 44; Soviet, 36, 44-45; U.S., 42-43 Acheson, Dean, 204,288 '%ctive defense,'" 2f Agak, 24 Agriculbre, 266 Air Force, ROK, 122 Air Farce, U.S., 33, 51; Fi&h, 34; nirteenth, 34; Twmtieth, 34 Air forces, communist, 36-37, 156-1S?, 163 Air operationsisupporl, 9, 18,23,37-38 Air raidslstrikes, 6, 8,24,27-28, 55-57, 294, 296, largest, 294, Toksan Darn, 296 Air-to-air combat, 39-45,76, first all-jet, 39 Air-to-ground combat, 38 Air war, 33-50 Aircraft, 45-50, 80; allied, 46-49; aaack, 20, 29, 46, 50; bomber, 45-48; communist, 49-50; fighter, 46-50; jet, 36, 38-39, 45-46, 48-50, 52; piston-~ven,36, 38-39, 45, 47-48, 50; reconnaissance, 46, 57; transport, 39,464'7 Aircrafi carriers, 8,34, S 1-52,56, 59-62 Airfields, 8,35-36,53 Almond, Edward M,, 8, 17,204 Amphibious operations, 8- 11),65,80 Amphibious warfare vessels, 8,64-65 Andong, 15,36,41 AntiaircraN. weapons, 25, 174-175 Aoji, 56 Amisticelamistice negotiations, 23,27, 29, 31, 38, 69, 74, 223-237, 297; Agenda Item 3,229-230; Agenda Item 4, 230-234; at Kaesong, 224-227; at Panmunjom, 228-229; communist

delegation, 225-226; South b r e a n o~)position, 236-23% suspension, 234; U.N. delegation, 224 Amored vehicles, U.N., 171- 177; antiaireraft amored vehicles, 174-175; amored personnel camlers, 175; tracked landing vehicles, 176-177 Amy, ROK, 8, 10-12, 14, 18,21,25-28, 7 1, 83, 1 l 5- 1261; 1st Division, 10; 2nd Division, 27; 5th Division, "95; 6th. Division, 20; 81th Division, 18; 9th Division, 25; 1x1 Corps, 17; corps, 83 Amy, U.S., 81-105; organization, 8 1-82 A m y Air Forces, U.S., 34 Amwbead Hill, 27 Artillery, 2,6, 18,20,23-26,28-3 1, 177-179; coastal, 8, S6 Atomic weapons, 52, 185- 1156,224 AustraXia, 128-X 29; air forces, 33, 128; aircrafift, 46; ground forces, 74, 128- 129; naval forces, 53,72 Awards, 202; Korean Service Medal, 290

B-26 Marauders, 46 B-29 SuperEomesses, 4 1,47 Bartles: Bloo& Ridge, 22-24,77,293; Bowling Alley, 6; Bunltcrr Hill, 25; Cr'ripyoirg-ni, 16, 18, 292; Chosi~ Resemir, 12,29 1;Heartbreak Ridge, 22, 77, 293; Hoengsong, 16; Hoak, 295; Kum River, 4; K a n z s ~ ~ River g SaEk~t, 30, 296; Naktong Bulge (First), 6, 289; Nakfong Ijulgtt. (Secon4,6; Notch, 4; Old Bal&,294; Osa~z, 3-4,289; Pork Chop Hill, 30-3 1, 296; Punchbowl, 293; Taejon, 4; Taezrsan, 22; T-Bone Hill, 295; T w i ~ Tunnels, 16, 292; White Horse Hill, 25-27 Battleships, 5 1-52,59-6l

312

Fire and Ice: The Korean War

Belgium i Belgian forces, 129-130 Berlin Complex, 30 Bloody Ridge, 22-24,? l Books and literature, 253-254 Bradley, Omar Nelson, 204 Brady, James, 1 Briscoe, Raberl Pearce, 264 ""Bugging out,"' 14 C-54A Skymaster, 47 Canada, 130-132; air forces, 44, 130- 131; ground forces, 74, 130-132; naval forces, 53,72, 130-131 Capitol Building, ROK, 71 Casualties, 3-4,5,9-10, 12, 14, 16, 18-20,23-24,2S,28-29,35$56-57* 91 92, 94,96,97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 110, f 11; allied, 129, 130, 132, 133,135,137,138,140, 141, 142,143, t 44, 145, 146, 147, 148; frostbite, 12; illness, 12; mines, 55 Cates, Clifron Bledsoe, 204-205 Chae Byunf: Dok, 205 Chanain Resewoir, 7 1,73 Chaexyong Plain, 70 Cheju Island (Cheju-do), 70-7 1 Chi~ng Kai-shek, 220-22 1 China, 1Q-lt, 21,36, 53-54,70, 75, ' 7 8 China Sea, 57 Chindong, 78 Chinese First Spring Offensive, 20-2 1, 161-162,292 Chinese People's Volunteers A m y i Chinese forces, 11-12, 14-18, 20-21, 25-28,30-31,55,72,74,78, 156-163, 290-291;tactics, 162-163 Chinese Second Spring Offensive, 2 1, 162,293 Chinnampo, 53,72 Chipyong-ni, 17-1 8, 72 Chochiwon, 4 Choi Vang-kon, 2 16-2 17 Chonan, 4 Chonggodo, 10 Chowon, 23,25,74,77
p

Chosin, 37 Chosin Resenroir, 11- 12,71-73 Chou En-lai, 217,235 Chuksan, 55 Chumunjitl, 53 Chung 11-kwon, 205 Civil War, vii Clark, Mark Wayne, 205-206,234-235 Climate, Korean, 70-7 1 Coast a a r d , ROK, 57 Coast Guard, U.S., 57-59 Cold War, vii Colombia i Colombian forces, 30, 132-133 Collins, Lavvton Joseph, 206 Cornonwealth Brigade, 2?th, 74 Comonweillth Division, l st, 20, 147-148 Communieatians, 269-270 Goxps, US,, 17,83,85-89; I Corps, 16-17, 83, 86-87; IX Carps, 17, 20, 25-27, 83, 87-88; X C O ~ S 7-1 , 1, 17-18,20,54-55,73,77-78,80,83-85, 88-89 Cmisers, S, 5 1-53,59-62 Dean William F,, 4, 84,205 Demilimized Zone, 23,3 1,69,73,77 rMDanish persomel, 1-49 Destvers, 8,52-52,52 Detachment X, 3 Divisions,U.S., 12,89- 103;ZndInfanty Bbision, 6 , 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 23, 27-28, 83, 92-93; 3rd Inf~ntv Divbion, 12, 18, 25,30-3 1, 83,93-95; 7th Infanfiy Division, 8-12, 18, 25, 27-28, 30, 71, 79, 83, 95-96; 24th Infa~try Divkisn, 3-4,6, 10,12,1 S- 19, ~ 83-84, 97-98; 25th l n f ~ n fDivision, 4,6, 10, 12, 19,25,30,83-84,98-100; 40th I"n?fanti"y Division, 83, f 00- 1O l ; 45th Xnfmtry Division, 24-25, 28, 77, 83, 101-103 DMZ, See Demilitarized Zone Dogfights, 34,38-45

Index

313

Bulles, John Faster, 207 Education, 244-265 8thU.S, Amy,7,9-10,14,16,19-21,27, 3 X, 76-78, 82-86,2 15 Equipment, 14, 18; body amor, 194-195; heavy, 14; helmets, 193l 94; individual, 192- 193 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 207,234, 236 Ethiopia I' Ethiopian forces, 133-134 EUSA, See 8th U.S. A m y F-4U Corsairs, 38,48 F-9F2 Panthers, 40,46 F-80 Shooting Stm, 39-40,46,411-49 F-82 Twin Mustangs, 39,48 F-84 nunders, 4O,46 F-86 Sabres, 35,40-41,44,46,50 F a m Liae, 73 Far East Air Force, See FEAF FEAF, 34-35,37-39,41,56,82-83, t 84-1 85 Feehtler, William Morrow, 207 Fencheng, 36 Films, 254-260, best, 257-260 Finance, 270 First (I st) G a v a b Division, 4, S, 10, 12, 18,73,83-84,90,290 Fishing, 266-257 Flmethrowers, 23,223 Forestxy, 256-267 Fomosa, 73 France i French farces, 16, 18,27, 134-135 Frigates, 62 Fusen, 37 Geographical sites, 72-80 &eat Britain, 135-13% 228;air forces, 34, 135; ground forces, 74, 135-137; naval forces, 51-52, 135 "Great Pahrzng Guenilla Hunt," 15 Greeee/Greek forces, 137-138 Grenades, 23,28,3 1, 163, 168-170

e o u n d war, 1-31; phases, 1-2; UIVI defensive, 2-7; U N , oflensive, 2,7- l l ; Chinese inlenfentjon, 2, 1l - 14; First U.K counter~ffernive, 2, 1 5- 19; Chinese spring oflensives, 2, 20-2 1, U,N counterofensive, 2, 2 1-24; Second Korean wAter-spring, 2, 24-25; Korean summer-fag 1952, 2, 25-28; if"hird Korean winter, 2,28-29; Korean spring-summer 1953,2,29-31 Hadang, 4 Hagam-ri, 12 Hamhung, 1t HamxnarskjaXd, Bag, 22 f Han River, 16- 18,70,73-74 Hanirnan, 207-298 Heartbrestk:Ridge, 23 Helicopters, 52, S5 Hills: I l l , 31; 119,31; 303,73; 314,73; 812,28 Haengsong, l S- 17 Haeryong;, 40 Huiebon, 73 Hungnam, 22, 14,55-56,66,73,80 Wyesanjin, f 2,79 Xfpshin 11-10, SO Xmjin River, 14,73-74 Xnchon, 7-10, 17,54,62,74,76,78,84, 154,290 Xnchan Landing, 19-9,54,65,74,84,154, 290 Industry, 267-268 IndidIndian farces, 138,235-236 Invasion of South Korea, 2 Iron Tfiangle, 22-23,27,74 XblylXtalian personnel, t 45) Xtazuke Air Base, 3,74 Iwon, 10 Jarnestown Line, 22 Jane Russell Hill, 27-28 Jap;ln, 35,54-55,69-71,73-74,79,83, 287; guenilla activity against, 76, 151 Joint Task Force 7, S

314

Fire and Ice: The Karean. War

Journalists, 74 Joy, C. Turner, 74,208 Krtesong, 74,224-225 Kansas / Kansas-Wyoming Line, 19-20, 22,74,76, 161 Kapyong, 20,74 U T C O M , 125 U T U S A , 122-124 Kim Chaek, 38 Kim X 1 Sung, l 52,2 17-2 18 Kim Suk Won, 208 Kimchon, 38 K i m p Aifield, 9, 17, 154 Kojo, 56 Korean Augme-ntatian to the U.S. Amy, see U W S A KoreanTjVar.net, 260 Kosong, 56 Koto-ri9l2 Kozhedub, Xvan, 36 Kum River, 70,75 Kum River Line, 4 K u h w a , 23,27,74 Kunu-i, 12, 14, '75 Kuo~n&ng (Clxhese Nationalists), 78 Kwangfu, 75 Kpoxliju, 75 Kyasen, 37 Leaders, communist, 2 16-220; neuka1, 220-222; U.S. / ROK, 203-226 Lie, Tvgve, 22 1-222 Little Gibraltitr (Hill 355),28 L O M N stations (LORSTA), 58 Luxennbour~uxmbomg piatoon, 1342-140 MacArthur, Douglas, 4,8, l 1- 12,17,20, 54, 80, 82,209 Machine guns i automatic weapons, 23, 2&,39,82 Malenkov, Ceorgi, 2 18 Nalik, Jacob A., 2 18,223 Manchuria, 36,38,41,75-76,79-80

'

Maa Tse-brig, 158,2 18-219 Maps, 5, 13,32,41 Marines, ROK, 8, 120-121 Marines, U.S., 8-9,80, 105-112, 120; aviartion units, 38; 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 11 1; 1st Marine Bivl;sion, 8-12, 15, 18, 30, 54, 73, 83, 109-111, 120; 1st h v i s i o n a l Marrize Brigade, 6,38, 105-108; Marine A k Group 33, 38, 107-108; pilots, 34,38,42-43,48, 57; proviisi~nal units, 111 112 Marhsizll, George C., 209-2 10 Masan, 15 May Massacre, 2 1 M e h l of Honor, 44 Medical cletgchmenb, U.N,, 148-X 50 MiG Alley, 33,40-4X,75 MiC-1 Ss, 35-36,38,40-41,43-44,46, 49-50,76 M i l i a Advisory ~ fioups, U.S., X. 12-1X 3 M i l i t q Sea Transpodzttion Semice, 59 Mines, 10,54-55,63 Minsweeping operations, 54 Mieang, 76 Missiles, 39 Missing in Action (MIA), 247-248 Missour;l Line, 22 Momt~ins: Ghi& Ma8~$7070;HaEEa, 70; Pae&u, 70; Sobaek, 70, 78; Taebak9 7Q,78 Muccio, John Joseph, 2 10, Munsan-ni, 19 Mustangs, (aircrafi) P-5 liF-S 1,38,47-48

Naktong River, 6,70,76,78 Nampo, 72 Naval Command Far East Blockade and Escort Force, 83 Naval forces, communist, 157, 164 Naval wadare, S 1-68; U.N. Operations, 52-57,72 Navy, ROK, 57,122 Navy, U.S., 5 1-68,72; 7th Fleet, 52-53; pilots, 38,42-43,48, 57 NetherXandsiPJetherland forces, 140-l 4 l

Neutral nations commission, 235-236 Nevada Cities, 30 New Zealand, 141- 142; ground forces, 74,146-142; navalforees, 53,141-142 No Name Line, 20-2 I , 76, 162 Nomenclatures, 165- X 64 Napnri, 250-25 t Nsrlh Korean People's A m y i North Korean forces, I - 10, 1S, 2 I, 23,28,30, 38,76,78,84, 151-157 Nomaymowcgim personnel, 149 Oklahoma National Guard, 28 Old B a l e (Hill. 266),24-25,343, 77,294 Onglln Peninsula, 77 ./U.S., Big SSvtch, Operations, TI.N 245-246, 297; Chromite, 7-9; Clar~Up, 24-25; Commando, 22; Gomter, 24, 294; Dazlntless, 19; Detonate, 22; Hzddson Harbor, 1 86; Killer, l S- 19; Linle Switch, 235, 296; pJ13mad 22; Piledriver, 22-23; Polar, 17--1 8; 22; Reper, 19, 292; Ro%m~d1cp, Rtlgged, 19; S O W ~ O W 27-28, D , 295; Smack; 28-29, 295; Satzrrate, 37; Smngle, 37, 292; Sgmmit, 293; Tlrunde&olt, 16; TomaPza.cvk, f 9, Z 14, 15- 16 292; W~lfiou~d, Osan, 3-4, 10, 15,77,84 (Hill 1481, Ou;fpasts:Berlin, 30; B r ~ c e 25; East Berlin, 30; Harty, 30; KeEZej?, 25 Pace, Frank J., 2 10-211 Paik Sun Vup, 2 1 1 Pak Hon-yong, 2 19 Panmunjom, 27,29,7 1,74,77,227-228, 234-235 Padisan Infantry, U.N., 125 Partridge, Earle E,, 34 Pepelyaev, Eugeny, 36 Pbilipgines/Filipino forces, 57, 143 Photographs/pictures, 7 , 1 1, 15,22,26, 30, 35, 49, 53, 58, 63, 72, 75, 79, 83, 86, 88,90,92,93,95,97998, 100,101,

109, 116, t2I, 123,133, f35,139,146, 152,155,156,1S8,174,1779 181, 184* 190,191,194,214,2l5,221,225,228, 243,244,258,259,260 Pike's Peak, 27 Pilots, 39; Australian, 47; Chhese, 37, 40; North Kore~n, 37, 40; South Korean, 47; Soviet, 36-36, 39, 44-45; US., 40-44,48 Pahang, X 5 Population, Korem, 263-21i4 Park Chop Hilt (Hill 234),24,30-3 2,77 Prisoners of war (Paws), 235-237, 239-247; Big Switch, 245-246; communkt-held3 24 1-242; Little Switch, 23S, 245; repatriation, 29, U,N.-held, 235-237, 242-247; 240-24 1,294 Punchbowl, 7 1,77,293 Pusan, 2,4, 6, 10,76-78,84, 154-155 Pusan Perimeter, 46-7, 10, 38, 76, 78, 84, 154, 296; breakout from, 10, 78, 290 Pyongtcaek, 4 Piyongyrtng (capibl], 10, $3, 56, 70,72, 74,78 Pyangyang (village), 23 Railroads, 35,37-38,269 Rangers, 2 13-1 14; 1st Compaay, 18; 2nd Company, 1 9; 4th Company, 19 Rehfugees, 14,263-264 Regiments, U.S. Army Infantry, 9th, 23, 28; 14th, 26; ISrh, 30; J7tbr, 12; IYth, 4; Slst, 3,10; 23rd, 16,18; 31st, 12,27, 8 1 1 1 2 , 28; 30; 32nd, 22, 30; 31th, 4; 3 6Sth, 25; 179th, 24,223 Regimental Cambat Teams, 83,103- 105; 5th, 30, 83, 103; 187th, 19, 83, 104-t05, 114,290 Regiments, U.S. Marine, Ist, 8; 5th, 8, 28,30, 106; 7th-25,3 1 Religion, Korean, 265-266 Ridgway, Mil~thew B., X 4- 18,20,2t 2, 223-224

Fire and Ice: The Korean. War

Rivers, 70 Rockets, 34,38 Sandy Hill, 27 Sanju, 78 Sea of Japan, 70, 78 Seoul, 1-2,7-10, 14-20,72-73,78,85, 154,290 Sberman, F o ~ e sP,, t 2 11 Ships / vessels: ammunition, 67; azlxiliav, 59-60, 65-68; cargo, 66; Coast Guard cuf.ters,57-58; command she$, 59; desig~ations, 59-60; hospital, 67-68; minesweepers, 54-55, 60, 63-64; Nirv8.h k"orem, 53; oilers, 67; p t m l , 60; P-epab, 67; support, 5 1; tendem, 66; tov;l7edo boats, 53; transport, 63, 66, 73; tugboats, 60, 66-67; vpes, 60-68 Ships, comba~nt I' war, 8, 12, 5f -52,73, 80; amphibious ulafare, 59, 64-64; small I specialized, 62-65 Sinuiju, 1O,38 Smith, Charles B., 3 Sniper Ridge, 3 l Snook Efill, 24 Sondoug, I S Sonain, 56 Sorties, 34,57 South AfriedSoutfi African air forces, 33, 143-144 Soviet Uniomussia, 36-37,52, 54, 69-70,76,287; pilots, 36-37, 39-40, 44-45 Soyaug River, 2 1 Special U.S, military units, 1 12-2 14 Spud Hill, 29 Stalin, Joseph, 2 19-220 Straits of Korea, 11 5,70,78 Seaits of Taiwan, 52 Stmble, Arzhur, 52 Submarines, 52,CiO Suifro, 37 Sunch~n, 78 SuppliesisuppXy lines, 9, 14,20,59,64,

84,154 Suwan, 16-17,78 Sweden, Swedish personnel, 150 Syngman.Wee, 7 1 , 2 1. f -2 I2 38rhparallel,9,14, 16,18-19,69,73-74, 77, 79,287-288,290 Taedong River, 70,72 Taegu, 2,73,84 Taejon, 4, 84 Taiwan, 73,78 Tanks, 6,25,29,35,82,172- 174; T-34,3, 183 Task Force 77,53,55 Task Force W,56 Task Force Fai&, 12 Task Force Smithih, 3-4,110,74,77,84,289 Taylor, Maxwelt D., 3 1 T-Bone Will, 28 Temain, Korean, 70 Thailand I Thai forces, l 4145 Tokyo, 79 Trade, 268 Transpo~ation, 269-270 Trench warfare, 24,3 1 T~angle Hill, 25,27-28 Tmman, Harry S,, 3-44 20,33,f l-52,8Q, 82,2 13,234,236,288-289 Tumen River, 70, 79 Tupolev Tu-2,47,50 TurkeyiTurkish bngade, 145-147 Uisong, 25 tjngok, 28 Unifoms, communist, 199; branch i~si;gnia, 20 1-202; rank insignia, Chinese, 200-20 I Unifoms, tJ,N., 197-3i 98 Unifoms, ROK, 195; b m n d insipia, 196-197; rank i~si;gnia,195-t 96 Unifoms, U.S., 187-191; insipb, 191-192 United Nations, 2-4,74,222; military cont~butions, 27 l -244 U.N. Command, 29,79,82

united Stares Ships (USS), 59-68; Benevolence, 68; Brush, 55; Jmeau, 53; Lewb, 56; Magpie, 55; iWans$eld, 54; Missouri, 54, 59, 61; Parrridge, 55; Pirare, 55; Pledge, 55; Pri~ceton, 56; S m i , 55; St. &ul, 56; file&, 53; Valley I"orge, 53; WaEke, $5 Utah Line, l9 Vandenberg, H o p S,, 2 13 Van Fleet, Jarnes, 20,27,2 14,227 Vehicles, 14, amoxed, 2, 18, 17 1-1'77* 183-184 Vladivos-tok,40
Wake Island, 79-80,2 10 Walker, Waltan H., 14, 84,215,216 War Crimes, 248-25 1 nist, 179-185; armored wbzicles, 183-184; artilletzy, 184-185; grenades / explosives, 181- 182; heavy weapons, 182- 183; small arms, 279-181 Weapons, U.S, / U .N., 166-179;armclred vehicles, 171- 177; artillery, 177-178; grenade8 / explosives, 168-170;heavy w q u n s , 170-171; small a r m , 166-168 White Worse Hill (Hill 395),25-27 WsImi-do, 8, 5462, 80 Wonju, 17-18 Wonsan, 10,55-56,80, blockade, 56,292 World War I, 24, 33 WsrM War If, vii, 8, 34-36,40,42-45, 47-48,51-52,64,59,76,80, 83 World Wide Web, 260-262 Wyoming tine, 22 Yak fi@ters, 30 Yalu River, 10,12,2 1,4 l, 70,73,75-76, 79-80>290 Uang-yang, 74 Vechon, 4 Yellow Sea, 70, 80 Ycsngdok, 78

V u h - n i , 12
Zone of the Interior, 80 Zorin, VaIerian, 220