Professional Documents
Culture Documents
!
I
I
I
I
l
I
I
1
1
l
I ,
/
!
j
I
I
J
i
r
;!!
l
!
I
,
~
;
'i
i
i
i
)
1
J
,
i
'I
~
t
. ,
i
Ii
~
1
i
1
-1
~
"
!
i
j
I
~
~
i
I
DGOf
; ~
. ~ ~
CORRIGENDA
Y. Yadin: The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands
p.48 (fig.) read "to fight" instead of " to light".
pp. 79 and 206 (bottom) read "1307-1275" instead of " 1310-1280" .
p. 126 read "Ein Gedi" instead of "Ei Gedi".
read "see page 125" instead of "see page 124".
pp. 130, 136, 150, 173 read "Telloh" instead of " Lagash" .
p. 154 read "Tehutihorep" instead of "Tehutitcp".
" (cf 169)" to be omitted.
p. 159 read "{zoth century B. C.)" instead of "(c. 1900 B. C.)".
p. 168 read " left" instead of " above" and "above" instead of "left" .
Same correction in index, p. 473, No . 168.
p. 174 read "at Ginossar" instead of " of Ginossar".
read "above and left" instead of "above".
read "spear head" instead of 'javelin head".
p. 180 read "The Palestine Archaeological Museum" instead of " The Rockefeller
Museum".
Same correction in index, p. 474, No. 180.
p. 187 read "The Ugariti c hunt ing charioteer (above)" instead of " The Canaanite
hunting charioteer" .
p. 191read "1'69 ms." instead of " 1'47 ms."
p. 195read "from a tomb at Thebes" instead of "from a tomb ofIamanezeh, Sheikh Abd
el-Gurnah".
p. 197 (bottom) read" 14th century" instead of" 17th cent ury" .
p. 224 read "The city ofHattussas" instead of "The city ofBoghazkoy",
p. 229 read "on page 347" instead of " in the opposite illustration".
p. 237read "pages 103 ff." instead of " following page I07".
p. 354, the words "National Museum, Athens" refer to the Warriors' Vase.
p. 397, Nos. 13 and 14 read: "xiii" instead of "viii".
p. 473, No. 168 read "The Palestine Archaeological Museum" instead of " Dept. of
Antiquiti es, Archaeological Museum, Jerusalem."
p. 473, No. 172 read "Virolleaud" instead of " Viroelleaud".
Where Rockefeller Museum is mentioned read Palestine Archaeological Museum.
l
.':
:'
i, 1
'I
':"1
'I
j
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The Art of Wa1are 1 Cities ill Attack and
Mobility
4
Defense 16
The Chariot
4
Attack andPenetration r6
Cavalry
5
FortUlcatiolls and Defense 18
Firepower: Personal Weapons 6
The Cit)' Walls 19
The Bow 6
The Gate 21
The Composite Bow
7
'The Inlier Citadel
23
The Arrow 8 r..Vater Suppl dllrin,!? Siexe 24
The Qllillt'r
9
Archaeological Sources 25
The Slin<!?
9
Ilutstrated Monuments 25
The[aveiin andthe Spear 10
Finds at Excavations
The Sword
26
10
The Mace andthe Axe II
Written Documents 26
Security: Personal Protection
13
Chronology and Terminology 27
The Shield
13
Relative Chrollolog)' 27
Armor
15
Absolute Chronology 28
The Helmet
15 Archaeological Terms and Periods 29
III. THE PERIOD BEFORE ABRAHAM (400o-2IOOB.C.)
c":
II. THE FORTIFICATIONS OF JERICHO-
The Most Ancient Fortifications in the World (7000 B.C.)
Plate
I
I
.,j
Mobility 37
The Chariot 37
Weapons: Short-range andHand-to-
Hand Fighting 40
The Mace 40
The Axe 41
Egypt 43
The Sword 44
The Spear andthe[aveliu 45
\ Weapons: Long-range 46
The Bow 46
:,}
Personal Protection
The Shield
Armor
The Helmet
Methods of Wariarc
Battle in Open Terrain
Battle 0/1 FortUl ed Cities
Conclusions
Plates
32
IT5
3
6
4
8
4
8
49
49
49
49
50
57
u6
IV.
THE PERIOD OF THE PATRIARCHS (2100-1570 B.C.) 58 I
Gideon and the Three Hundred 256 Dauid and Solomon 26
7
Weapons: Short- aud Medium-range 59
Methods of Wiltjare 69
I
Abimclech and the Tower of The Conquest ofJeri/salem 267
The Axe 59
Battle 011 Fortified Cities 69
Sheehan 260 The Battles ~ f David
27
The Sword 60 Battle in Gpen Terrain:
The Concubine ill Gibeah and the The Army of David and SOIOIllOIl 275
The Spear and thejm'din 61 The Duel 71 ~
Oroauiration ofthe TribalArmy 262 The Chariot andthe Cavalrv 28
4
vVeapons: LOllg-rallge 62 Standard Combat 73
~ Saul the Warrior-Killg 26
3
The Fortifications 287
The BOl/! 62 Communications and ltltelligmce 73
~
Dapid and Goliath 265 Plates
331
The S!illg 64 The Chariot 74
f
Personal Protection 64 plates
I
VII. THE KINGDOMS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH (920-586 B.C.) 291
152
The Shield 64
The Troops and their Weapons 293 Fortified Cities in Attack andDciense
3
13
Fortificatiolls 65 Iltjalltry 294 The Breach-the Batteriuo-Ratn
3
14
The Archers 295
Other Devices
3
16
V.
THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT, THE EXODUS, The Slingmell 296 Sealillg the Walls
3
16
MOSES, AND JOSHUA (1570-1200 B.C.) 7
6
The Cavalry 297 Penetration beneath the vValls
3
17
vVeapoflS: Short- ami Mcdinm-ranoe 77
Attack and Defense 96
'"
The Chariot Corps 297
Siege, Ruse, and Psychological
~
The Axe 77
Stratagems 99 Battle in Open Terrain 302 Warfare 318
The Sword 7
8 Battle in Open Terrain 100 The Battle of Samaria
34
Water and Food Supply
32
The Spear
80 The Battle of Megiddo 100 The Battle of the Wilderness ,tj The Walls
3
22
TeapoflS: Lony-ranye 80
The Battle of Kadesh 103 Tekoa
3
10
The Gate
323
The Bow 80
The March 13
,
josiah and the Battle of
Dejensive Warfare
325
Personal Protection 83
The Surprise Attack 14 Meoiddo 311 Plates
375
The Countcrattacl: 105
I
The Shield 83
Tactics 108 ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS
4
65
Arlllor 84
Illtelligence IIO
The Helmet 85
Ambush and Night Fightitlg IIO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
4
66
M,)bility 86
Standard Formations III
!
The Chariot 86
Army Oroaniratioi: II2
I
SOURCES FOR ILLUSTRATIONS
470
Methods of Assault 011 Fortified Cities 90
Chariot Units 113
SUBJECT INDEX OF PLATES
1'vlilitary Administration
4
83
The Fort!ficatiolls 90
II3
Water SlIpply under Siege 95
Plates 182
!
n
VI. THE PERIOD OF THE JUDGES AND THE UNITED
MONARCHY (1200-920 B.C.) 247
The Philistines: Land and Napal Wars ill the Bible dllring the Period
Battles 248 of thejudges 253
The Land Battle 249 The Conquest of Bethel 253
The Naval Battle 251 The Exploits of Eliud 254
The Egyptiall Army 253 Deborah and Siscra 255
PREFACE
This book-which is a first attempt to discuss all the facets of the art of warfare.
its impl ement s. techni ques and strat egy in all Biblical lands-requires a few
explanatory word s as to its st ructure and method of presentation to the reader.
Although the book discusses a variety of subj ects, each of whi ch is in a sense
independent , it is the interweaving of the various themes that makes the
harmonious wh ole at which I have aimed,
The boo k covets all lands of the Bible-from Anarolia to Egypt and from
Palestine to Mesopotamia- a part of the world conta ining nations and countries
that had been fighting each other over long periods of history. Only a complete
analysis from both the military and archaeological point of view will enable US
to comprehend the development ofwarfare in all its aspects: weapons, fortifi cations.
army organization. and tactics.
The book is. in fact. compos ed of thr ee parts: the text accompanied by line
dr awings. the color plates. and explanat ory capti ons. This arrangement is
necessitated by the fact that the principal sources for the subj ect are pictorial in
character, consisting of thousands of carved and painted monuments. together
with other remains of an archaeological character, which must first be set in their
proper historical and geogr aphi cal settin g through archaeological and chrono-
logical analysis before it is possible for one to draw mi litary conclusions.
The object of the text is to defme the historical and archaeological background.
to describe the various elements in the art of war and weave them into a single
pattern which wi ll make evident their mutual relationshi p and their connexion
wi th the different warring nations. Th e accompanying line drawings should at
this point assist the reader to visualize the subj ect withou t undue reference to the
color plates. The subj ects are discussed here within their archaeological period.
and in each period the individual aspects are dealt with separ ately. This seemed to
me preferable to discussing any one element (e.g., the bow) from its very
beguming to the end of the period discussed in the book. The latter may perhaps
be a suitable method for a book whi ch aims merely at presenti ng a body of data
for reference purp oses. but . in my opinion, it is unsuitable for a book whose aim
it is to emphasize the inter-relationship amon g the many elements which compose
the art of warfa re. this being the only satisfactory way to grasp the development
of this art or science.
The plates are put at the end of each part . according to the archaeological
periods. In this kind of book, which is based to a large extent on archaeologi cal
fmds. it is imperative. I believe. to present visually to the reader the many sources
in as clear and faithful a manner as possible. The choice of suitable subjects out of
thousands of documents, the collection of colored and other pictures. and the
PREF ACE
arrangement of this abun dant material on plates. by their geographical provenance.
their archaeological periods. and their relation to the various clements of war, has
necessitated considerable effo rts. which often surpassed anythi ng I had anticipated
when I first started the book. Neverth eless. I believe this to have been wort h while
since the pictur es will not only aid the reader to understand many things that are
Impossible to describe in mere words. but will enable him to read critically and
come to his own conclusions, Moreover. much of the material publi shed her e is
scattered in scor es of museums and hundreds of publ ications (some of them quite
rare). I have made a special point of presenting mate rial from these sources (such
as the rare publications of Layard. Botta, and Flandin) and at the same time tr ying
to show them in conjunction wi th their places of discovery. I have made it a rule
to pr esent . wheneve r possible, the pictures of the obj ects themselves. together
with the monuments describi ng them. I have sometimes preferred a certain
monument to others. not because of its absolute importance, but on the basis of
its relative artistic value or its rarity. As fot rhe written documents-Egypti'an.
Arcadian, etc.-whICh I have incorp orated into the text . I have of course used
translations and. unless other wise indicated, I have mostly followed those in
Pri tchard' s book (see bibliography). Th ese translations do not pretend to be literal;
their purp ose is. in gcneral. to give a clear unders tanding of the cont ents of the
documents.
As f or the .explanatory capti ons. I thought it best not to include too many
descriptive details of the monument s and finds in the text prope r. lesr it distract
the reader from the main points and hinder him from seeing the wood for the
trees. On the other hand. it is frequentl y these fine di fferences in details which
make it possible to follow clearly the essential interrelationship bet ween the
vanous aspects of warfare and the development of the science as a whole. Tha t is
why I have paid particular attention to the captions of the more complex
monuments which embody several subj ects simultaneously.
Th e reader who wishes to explore mor e thoroughly the whole subject. or
thato f a particular chapt er, has but to turn to the last pages for the very extensive
bibliography ou every fmd and monument depict ed in the book. I have not
spared det ails there. since I wished to provi de the reader wi th ample opport uni ty
for studymg and comparmg varrous opi nions in regard to the obj ects.
Onl y seldom have I touched on act ual batt les. the reason bcing that here.
, more than on any other topic. the sources are very scant aud are subject to
speculations and interpretations so extremely divergent that it is impossible to
present the pro blem satisfactorily from a scientific viewpoint. 'Moreover. the
details of the battles depend mainly on our knowledgc of the topographical
factors which determined the tactical and strategical moves. In most of the
famous battles this element is completely lacking, and often scholars cannot even
IdentifYwith certainty the places named. Any change in iden tification of a site-
a matter which is of primary importance to our understauding of a particular
h.ltlle-alters. in fact. our grasp of the whole situation. Schematic maps. so often
bra.ught fort h to explain the bat tles in Biblical lands. may be useful to explain a
war as a wh ole and the lines of the " grand strategy" . but 110t more than that. and
PREFACE
arc therefor e liabl e to mislead the reader who is not familiar with the topo-
graphical problems. Nevert heless, we have enough details abou t some battl es,
and the most import ant of those are discussed here. Even this, however, is not
done JUSt for their own sake, but in order to illustrate the pr incipl es, techniques,
and implemenrs of warfare wh ich are the subjec t of this book . In a few instances
I have described Biblical battles, bnt only where I thought the data were sufficient
to clarify their main problems and, perhaps, to stimulate other scholar s to give the
matt er more thought.
I have no illusions that I have succeeded in exhausting the subject. This may
be possible in the future, when prim ary and basic work on the subj ects discussed
wi ll have been don e separat ely for each perio d and each cowu ry . I hope I may
succeed in rousing scholars in vari ous fields to devot e their abi lities and energies
to fur ther research , and thus prepare the way for still other scholars to complete
the job. My debt to pr evious research on every subject mentioned in this boo k
can be realized fro m the long bibliography at the end. which can also serve as a
guide to readers who may wish to del ve mor e deeply into the subject .
It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to all those who helped
me to bring this book int o being. First and foremost I want to thank Mr. Y. Makavi,
the general mana ger of the Int ernati onal Publishing Co mpany. who urged me a
number of years ago to put into writing some of the data I had been collectin g.
and has spared no effort in helping me to acquire phot ographs and publis h the book
in its present elabor ate format. I am deep ly indebted to his daring and able
execution .
I am particularly thankful to the many museums and their dire ctors who have
permitted me to check their collections and sometimes employ special photo-
. graphers for my purposes. Amongst them I would like to thank Professor
A. Parrot and the Lou vre; Dr. D. R. Barnett and the British Museum; Dr . W . C.
Hayes and the Metropolitan Museum of Art; Professor P. Delougaz and Dr. W .
Boyd of the Oriental Insti tute, Uni versity of Ch icago (especially for permission to
use the magnificent col ored dr awings from Medinet Habu); to the museums of
Florence and Bologna; to the University Museu m, University of Pennsylvania
(and particularly to Mr. A. R. Schulman who kind ly allow ed me to study his
manuscri pt on the organization of the Egyptian army) ; to the Hittite Museum in
Ankara; to the Archaeologi cal Museum in Istanbul; to Miss W. Needler and the
Royal Ontario Museum; the Prin ce of Wales Museum in Bombay; to the
Ashm olean Museum, Oxford ; to the Archaeologica l Institu te, London Uni versity.
and particularly to Dr. K. Kenyon ; and also to the Museum of the De partment of
Antiquities. gove rnment of Israel. and the Museum of the Hebr ew University.
Jerusalem.
May I also record my thanks to Miss A. Pesin of the edit or ial staff of o r z o n ~
who allowed me to use a colo r tr anspar ency of the Tutankhamun chest ; to Mr.
J. Per rot for a ph ot ograph of a gate at Bogh azkoy and Yazilikaya; to Mr. E.
Erick son for permissi on to reproduce an ivory panel from his collection; to
Dr. E. Boro wsky for permis sion to reproduce a sickle sword of his; to Mr. A.
Sorrell and Dr. R. D. Barne tt for permission to reproduce the drawing of the
" 1\
PREFACE
reconstruction of the Lachish siege; to Miss T. Kish for her color reconstruction
of several drawings; to Mr. P. Bar-Aden for the ph otograph of an axe from the
Judean Desert; to Mr. B. Roth enberg for a phot ograph of Ein Qadi>. and to
Messrs. S. Smila n, D. Ussishkin , \ V. Marmot , Co lonel M. Mi chael . Lieutenant -
Colonel A. Perr y, and Major A. Ar an, for their help in procuring colored photo-
graphs during thei r travels. I also thank the Orient al Photographic Company for
preparing several colored photo graphs from various sources, and copies of all the
photographs for the purpose of the layout.
I am deepl y indebt ed to Lord Marks. wh o kindl y put at my disposal the
photographi c laboratori es of Marks and Spencers and the services of its chief,
Mr. Baynton, who, together with his assistant s, work ed tirel essly to photograph
many obj ects from the Br itish Mu seum . To my good friend Mr. L. Shalit I am
grateful for help, as usual, in mor e ways than one. Mr . Zi m and Mr. Bengum
kindl y helped in man y phases of the work of prepar ing the layour .
I shou ld also like to express my deep appreciation to Cliches Schwitter AG.
Zlirich, who wi th much patience prepar ed the illustrations, as well as to J arr old &
Sons. Norwich. England. for their high standard of pr inting.
I thank most heartily my friend Mr. Pearlman for his painstakin g translat ion
of the manuscript from the Hebrew.
I am grateful to Mr. H. Ravi v of the scient ific staff of the Views of the Bi blical
World for his help in selecting the pictu res and preparing the index of sour ces,
and to Mrs. I. Pomerantz for much help in edit ing the bibli ography and index of
sources.
I wish to thank McGr aw-Hill editori al staff for much help , and particularly
Mr . D. SCOtt.
Lastly. I wish to thank my wi fe. wh o not only took upon herself the extensive
correspondence with museums and indiv iduals, but also gave me the benefit of
her advice throughout.
Yigael Yadin
Jerusalem
I
INTRODUCTION
THE ART OF WARFARE
War is the att empt by one nati on to impose its will on another by force. This
breakdown in human association has been a recurring feature in the history of man
since the very beginning. Human conflict finds expr ession in the first pages of the
Bible. Hardly has man begun life on earth when, as the Biblical narrative records
wi th unadorned simplicity, "Cain rose up against his br oth er Abel and killed him."
The chain reaction to this event has continued right up to the zoth century. A study
of human history cannot therefore be complete without a study of the milit ary
events of the past and of the means conceived by nations to secure their own
military aims and thwart those of their enemies. Moreover, in ancient times, as
today, men devoted IDtlch of their technical genius to perfecting weapons and
devices for destruction and defense; W eapons of war thus serve as an enlightening .
index of the standards of technical development reached by nations duri ng
different periods in history.
Since war always involves at least two sides, the development of the art of
warfare of one nation can only be fully evaluated in the light of the art of warfare
conducted by its enemy, in attack and defense.
As an object of military study, a single land or nati on is too limiting and
confming-and can be misleading. The smallest unit of such a study is a region or
a group of peoples who battled each other at some period or another in their
history . One must examine the.reciprocal effects ofsuch encounters, which enabled
each side to gain knowledge of the weapons and fortifi cations of the other, to copy
them and improve upon them. And these effects are oft en evident in the relics laid
bare by the spade of the archaeologist. But-and here is an example of how a
limit ed study can mislead- these ancient weapons may be and have often been
found far from their land of origin, carried there as war booty by a victor or left
behind by a powerful nation waging war beyond its own frontiers. Such war
material, found in archaeological excavations, sheds much light on the art of war-
f;l rc' of a parti cular period and in a particul ar region , but not necessarily of the
:
I
2
THE ART O F WARFARE
nat ion in whose land it was discovered. Th e study of warfare must clearly cover
both rivals.
There is a reciprocal impact on nations who come into conflict with each
oth er. Th ere are similar reciprocal influences, inevitable and consistent, which the
different weapons, fortifications, tactics, and military organizations make upon each
other. The progressive developments in each branch and instrument of war during
successive periods in history become clear only when examined in the context of
enemy opposition at the time. New tactics int roduced by one side prompted new
counter- tactics by the other. Th esein tum produced furth er tactical innovations by
the first. Weapons development followed the same process. The appearance of the
composite bow, for exampl e, with its increased power of penetr ation, led to the
invention of the coat of mail for defense. Thi s ill turn provided a further challenge
for a weapon to defeat armor. And so the process conti nued, leading to advances
in both offensive and defensive battle devices. Similarly, the various types of city
fortifi cations can be understood only in the light of standard patt erns of attack on
cities prevalent dur ing the different periods, and in particular of the use of the
batt ering-ram.
The study of military development .is in large measure the study of the
unending process of reaction of each element in warfare to its counterpart. But
all elements must be considered as an int egrated whole, and the relationship of
each to the other properly examined. The development of weapons must be
studied against the background of the development of tactics, army structure, and
the systems of fortifications. To study each element in isolati on would be super-
ficial and sterile, and as unrewarding as the study of military developments of a
single nation without reference to those of its neighbors. Bur account must also be
taken of a human featur e which has affected the rate of military development
among different peopl es-inertia, or conservatism. There are countless exampl es
thr ough out history, right up to the present time, in which military innovations,
proved in batt le, have been spumed by other armies who have to adhere
to traditional patt erns, and have been finally int roduced only alter long delay.
There is often a considerable time-lag between the appearance of an improved
weapon in one country and its adoption by another.
.Moreover, even when some technical imp rovement gradually becomes
accepted in the military scheme of things, it suffers for a time by being considered
in the obsolete terms of patterns prevalent before its int roduction. These compl ex
factors must alwavs be borne in mind when we come to st udy the monuments left
behind by the of antiquity. Th ese monuments relate mostly to warfare,
since war was a regular part of the lives of these people.
Military action may be classified in several ways. But none is compl etely
satisfactory . Th e most general classification, for example, is by the character of the
operations, either offensive or defensive. Bur in every operation there is usually
a concern both wi th offense and defense. Even an army initiating an assault must
be organized to defend itself against surpr ise or count erattack. This is also true of
the individual soldier, who must be armed with both offensive and defensive
weapons.
I N T RO D U CTI ON
Military action may be classified according to forms of warfare-battl e in
open terrain and battle on a fortified ciry. Bur here, too, each side must be armed
and or ganized in a manner suited to both types of warfare. For ir may have to
move from the city to the plain, or from the plain to the city. during the course'
of the fighting. An army mauled in an open battl efield may seek to retreat behind
a fortified base- as did the Canaanites when beaten by Thutmose III in the
celebrated battle near Megiddo. And an army that may be expected to sit behind
rhe defensive walls of its city may break out and attack the enemy in the open
plain- as happened with the counterattack of the King of Samaria on the armies
of Aram who sough t to besiege him.
And there is yer a further classification. A military action can be analyzed in
the light of strategy and tactics. Basically, strategy is the art of war. Tactics is the
art of battle, concerned with the movement and operation of fighting units on
the battlefield.
But however mil itary action may be classified and defined, in the final
analysis the art of warfare is to seek to achieve supremacy over the enemy in three
fields: mobiliry, firepower, security. To put it another way, it is the ability to move
troops to engage and injure the enemy without serious injury to oneself.
The principles of warfare discussed in the following chapters, as they emerge
from the military record of ancient peoples, reflect the attempt of each warring
faction to achieve this triple supremacy over the enemy , or the action taken after
its successful achievement. Th ese principles, often regarded as the basis of strategy
and tactics, may be broken down into surprise; maintenance ofaim, economy. and
concent ration of force; coordination of arms; securi ty, mobility, and the offensive
spirit.
Incidentall y, surprise is generally accepted as the most impo rtant of these
factors. Surpri se is, in fact, the ability to move one's forces to engage the enemy
at a time, place, and under conditions which he does not expect, for which he is
unprepared, and to which he cannot, therefore, react by the most etfective
application of his own forces and weapons.
These principles are illustrated in cameo for m at any boxing match, in which
the conten ders arc even unar med. The constant movement of the body has a single
purpose: to put the boxer in the most advantageous position from which he can
both arrack and at the same time evade the blows of his opponent . Th e predomi-
nant role of one fist is to attack-firepowe r; of the other , to parr y-securiry. To
gain this advantageous position, the boxer has to know where his opponent is-or
is likely to be at a given moment-and to seck out his weak spots. In this he is
served by his senses-sight, sound, and touch. His eyes, ears, and hands provi de
him wi th the intelligence which, in battle, is provided by reconnaissance units on
patrol or at forward observation posts. Th e action of his fists and other parts of his
body is directed by his brain, through the medium of nerves and muscles. Their
counterpart in warfare is the military commander and his staff, as the brain; their
Ilcrves-the communications network; their muscles-trained and disciplined
troops.
Mobility, firepower, and security, as the three basic elements in the art of
3
T HE ART OF W ARFARE
warfare, are appropriate headings under which the na ture of ancient warfare and
the weapollS used in antiquity may be examined. The three gr oups we shall be
conside ring are therefor e:
1. Means whose purpose was to ofier mobility, such as cha riot s, cavalry. and the
capacity of the foot soldier to move far and fast.
2 . Means of firepowe r , namel y weapons whose pur pose was ro hit the enemy at
various ranges .
3. Means of securi ty, namely prot ectiv e devices such as the helmet, shield , and
arm or , whose purpose was to parry or blunt the effecti veness of the enemy's
weapons.
4
The Chariot
Porri ficarions are a subject in themsel ves. For , though they may be classed as
a security device against the designs of an enemy , their struc tu re must be such as
to offer their own tr oops mo bili ty and freedo m of action in add itio n to secu rity
both for soldiers and civi lians.
Befor e pr oceeding to a descripti on and analysis of these means of warfare, it
is perh aps wo rt h und erl ining that in the final resort it is not weapo ns alone wh ich
determine the issue in hattie, but oft en, particul arly where both sides are evenl y
matched, the spirit of the commander in the directi on of his for ces and the spirit
of the troops in the handling of their weapons . These have been the decisive fact ors
in fateful war s throughout history.
MOBILITY
The chariot in battle is basically a mobile firing platform. It is not, primarily,
a means of tr ansport from a distant base to the battl efield. Its principal purpose is
to serve as a movabl e platform within the battlefield, from which rel ati vel y limited
firepower can be rushed to and brought to bear on decisive spots in the midst of
the fi ghting. A secondary and by no means negligibl e purpose is its shock value as
it charges into the enemy ranks :
To fultil its major function, the chari ot mu st offer speed and maneuverabiliry
as well as stabili ry for the firing of weapons. These needs ar e contradictory. For
speed and maneuverabi lity are best pr ovided by a small and light chariot . But a
stable firing platform demands a heavier vehi cle, capable of supporting and
providing operational space for at least one weapon-carrying soldier in addition
to the dri ver. The rival claims of these two considerations exercised the minds of
militar y planner s throug ho ut the gener ations. Different soluti ons we re devised at
differ ent times. And these arc reflect ed in the va riet y of ancient battle cha riot s. At
times speed was sacrificed to stability. At other rimes stabili ty gave wa y to speed.
Event ually the chari ot became a finel y balanced war instrument, serving both
needs equall y effectively . In its complete form, it was a co mplex vehicle, compris-
ing the following carefull y designed parts ; body, whe els, axle, chariot pol e, yoke,
and fittin gs for wea pollS such as qui vers, bo w cases, and sheaths and stands for
axes and spears.
To give it strength and lightness, the chariot was bu ilt largel y of wood-
special kind s for each par t-str ips of leather , and various met als. It was not an
instrument com mo n to the equip ment of all armies. It could be fashioned only by
nations commanding rich resour ces and advanced techniques. Technique was
impo rtant . For, as we shall see later, the turning-point in the devel opment of the
chariot came with the lighter body, the introduction of the light, spoked wheel ,
and the techni cal knowledge which enabled the axle to be set farth er to the rear .
For only with the rear axle co uld the chariot becomp letel y maneuve rable even on
sharp turns. But this requi red lightness. For a rear axle on a heav y chariot, made
heavier by the weight of the militar y team, would have been 100 grcat a strain on
the draft anim als. It was the co mbination of the rear axle plus the design of a light
body and light wheels, as well as po werful and swift dr aft ani mals, whic h brought
about the perfect chariot : stable, fast, and highly man euverable.
Like the chariot, the primary purpose of the cavalry hor se was also to serve as
a mobile firing platform, though here. too, the panic and confusion induced in the
enemy by a cavalry char ge was not without impor tance. T he advantage of the
horse over the chario t was its ability to move ove r almost any gr ound, whereas
a wheeled vehicl e was limited to compa ratively level and unbrok en terrain.
Against this, the hor se offered a poor and unstable fir ing platform. In a chariot,
there was the driver, con cerned solely with cont rolling the hors es, and a fighting
soldier , free for operarional acrion. In the cavalry, rider and soldi er were one. If
his weapon were the bow, requiring two hands to operate, his contro l of the hor se
in action was corr espondin gly reduc ed. Even if arm ed with a spear . which needed
only one hand and left the other free for the reins, he lacked a third to hold a shield.
The eflcctivencss of the mounted ho rse in battl e in earliest times was thus limi ted.
Only with the very lat e introduction of improved saddles. stirr ups, and spurs,
making it possible to control the horse with thigh, knee, and ankle, was the cavalry-
manfree to fight with both hands. Small wonder tha t the cavalry made its serio us
appearance on the battlefield only some 1, 500 year s after the chari ot .
An Egyptianchariot <if the XV/11th
"Dynasty
Cavalry
5
A simple Jo"hle-rollvcx boll'
of a Semite, X1Jth DyuaslY
Tire BOll!
Slrullg ImJ 'msmmg
Tatar composite llow
THE ART OF WARFARE
FIREPOWER Personal Weapolls
Every fighting comma nder since the beginning of time has dreamed of
possessing a weapon which could out-range anything in the armory of the enemy.
With such a weapon he could not only surprise his foe, but could do so without
harm to himself and his men, for they could remain out of reach of enemy missiles.
But long-r ange weapons do not obviate the need for medium- and short-
range inst ruments of war. Their key importance is at the start of hostilities. But as
the battle progresses, medium- range weapons must be brought to bear on the
enemy, giving way fmally to the weapons used in hand combat.
It was clearly impossible for the individual soldier to carry at all times the
weapons for all ranges required at progressive St2ges of battle. And so even the
most ancient armies were organized in units linked to specific rypes of weapons:
the long-range-weapon troops were used at the start of the battle; the follow-up
units were armed with medium-range weapons; and the hand-to-hand fighters
engaged in the final phase of battle.
Range, as a basic factor in the usc and development of weapons, can serve as
a convenient criterion in weapons classification. The major weapons in use in
ancient times were the bow and the sling for long range; the javelin and the spear
for medium range; and the sword, the axe, and the mace for short range.
The bow is one of the earliest known weapons of war. It was in use in pre-
historic times and was, because of its range, the most convenient weapon also of
the hunt er. The bow may well have been the first composite implement devised
by man, and definitely the first method of concentrating energy.
Since we shall be discussing its development in some detail, let us first record
its component parts and action. It consists of two basic elements: the body, which
is of wood, and the string. The surface of the wood farthest from the string is
called the back; the inner surface is called the belly. The point on the wood at
which the bow is held, near its center, is called the grip. The parts of the wood on
either side of the grip are called arms, or limbs. The string is attached to the
extreme ends of the arms. The bow is operated by placing the base of the arrow
against the string, putring the string under maximum tension by pulling it as far
as possible from the wood, and suddenly releasing it. The act of drawing the string
brings the ends of the body closer together and puts the wood under tension. Th e
wood. which should be both pliable and tough, springs back to its former position
the moment tension on the string is released, and this brings back the string wi th
a snap, propelling the arrow sharply forward as it does so. The bowman holds the
wood wi th his left hand-the bow arm-at the grip, and draws back the string
with his right , by which he also holds the base, or hook, of the arrow. To protect
his left arm from the blow of the string as it snaps back on release, the bowman
often wore an armguard on the inside of the bow arm.
The range of a bow depends on one or all of the followi ng factors-its size,
shape, and the pliabiliry and tough ness of the wood. The bigger the bow, the
grearer its pliability and consequently its range. But a large bow was more
unwieldy to operate and it also hampered mobility.
INTRODUCTION
The shape of the wood in the early simple bow was a single convex arc, so
that the distance between string and body was widest at their respective cent ers.
Maximum tension was reached when the hand on the stri ng was pulled as far away
as possible from the hand on the grip. But ir was found that this did not exploit
the maximum pliabiliry from the wood to produce thc deserved tension. This, it
was found, could be achieved by reducing the distance between bot h fists in the
start position, that is, between the grip au the body and the center of the string.
Thi s led to the inventi on of the double-convex or double-span bow-like the
shape of a Cupid upper-lip-which brought the grip closer to the spring, and,
when fired, increased the distance between the string and the peaks of both arcs.
The archer was thereby able to bring his weapon under greater tension and give
it greater range.
The emergence of the bow as a battle weapon of first importance came wi th
the introduction of the composite bow. This weapon proved decisive in numerous
campaigns in ancient days.
There was no single natural element which could give a bow wood the
required toughness and elasticity. But gradually the idea was developed of com-
bining several available natural materials which, together, could meet all needs.
Thus was born the composite bow. It was made offoue mat erials-wood, sections
of animal horn, animal tendons and sinews, and glue. Even the wood-the
skeleton of the bow- was sometimes not made from a single block but comprised
pieces of wood from different trees with varying pliabiliry suited to the different
tension demand s at different parts of the limbs and the grip. The back of the bow
was covered with strips and bands of sinews. The belly was reinforced with two
sections of animal horn, one on either side, the inner curve of the horn facing
the belly.
AUthese materials were stuck or bound together to form a single integrated
body. And they were so bound that before the string was attached, the arms of
the body tended to bend the other way. To pull them round for the attachment
of the string, or the bracing, so that the wood assumed the shape of a bow,
required great strength. This, of course, put it under great tension even in its
position of rest, and, when operated, greatly increased its propu lsive power. The
composIte structur e made possible for the first time the production of a bow
which, though compa ratively small, and therefore light and mobile. nevertheless
had considerable power. It was well described by an Arab author of the r j t h
cemury A.D. He wro te: "The structure of the composite bow is not unlike that of
man. The human body is made up of fonr basic clements-i-bones, flesh, arteries,
and blood. The composite bow has the same four cowlterpart elements: wood- its
skeleton; horns- its flesh; tendons-its arteries; glue- its blood. Man has back and
belly. So has the bow. And juscas man can bend forward but is likely to damage
himself bv bendmg too far backward, so with the operati on of rhe bow."
. The heighr of perfection of the composite bow was reached when, to endow
It with greater power, it was given a double-convex form.
The composite bow could have had an effective range of some 300 to 400
The Composite Boll'
Parts lil aTurkish composite bow.
From Itj; TO n:lfht: } rst and second,
pieces ojthin ivoodjonncd the core of
[heboll', andlire pieces glued
view. Thirdfro",
It:fi: thepieces gll/eJ togNhcr-siJe
view. Fourth: the strip that
IVel! J/llcd to the(ore, and which
[ormed theback l{ till' /;1.1/11 when
stnmg. sections lif horn, ",/'; eh
j;"' neJ 1/' (' bell)'
f
7
9
The QJli"er
.\let/lOds release as depicted Or!
EgyptianandAssyria" IIfO tlllIll ClIls.
Top[our drawi/lgs depict
lwtoHl tltrCl'.1.ssyriall
Since the bow was reqnired to fire numerous arrows during the course of
bottle, the archer had to have some means of carrying a reasonable complement
vi arrows in a handy manner which would put them within easy reach and facili-
tate speedy reloading, In this he was served by the quiver. The quiver had to be
capable of holding between twenty and thir ty arrows and to be made of light-
weight mat erial. It was carried either on the back oi the bowman or over his
shoulder so that both hands were free to fire the bow.
Of the bow, as of the chariot, it can be said that no other weapon in ancient
days required so high a technical capacity to produ ce and such skill to operate.
These two qualities in combination were decisive on more than one occasion in
determining the course of histor y.
Special technical difficulty was experienced in the attachment of arrowhead
to body. If the base of the head was inserted into the body, the arrowhead was
known as a tang. If the body was fitted into the base of the head, it was known as
a socket. The effectiveness of the arrow to pierce armor was determined by the
shape and structure of its head. Arrowheads may be classified as leaf-shaped, or
triangular, etc. and as flat or with a central spine or rib. The form was not the fruit
ofcaprice but was dictated by the nature of the defense and armor of the enemy.
The sling, devised by ancient shepherds to scare predatory animals irom The Sliug
attacking their flocks, gradually made its appearance on the bat tlefield as a weapon
of war. For it enabled a missile to be thrown a considerable distance-considerable
for those days-in any terrain, hilly as well as flat. Its capacity to fire up a slope,
mdeed, gave it some import ance in assaults on fortified cities.
FOlf/IS of arrowheads
THE ART OF WARFARE
yards, though its absolute range was about two times that distance. For the first
time in history, it was possible with this weapon to surprise the enemy and attack
him from beyond his range of retaliation, of hearing, and, on occasion, of vision.
Its powe r also had a revol utionary impact on the art of warfare, and was directly
responsible for the introduction of the coar of mail for personal protection.
Somewhere between the simple and the composite bow came the compound
bow. This was stronger than the first but lesscomplex and of course less powerful
than the second. and was in wide use among armies who had not reached the
technical standards demanded by the manufacture of the composite bow. The
body of the compound bow was made of two or mor e strips of wood partially
overlapping, glued together or bound with tendons and cord.
Much of our knowledge of bows used by early warriors in Biblical lands
comes from ancient drawings and bas-reliefs. The simple, reinforced, and compo-
site bows are depicted in the works ofancient artists, both in their single-span and
double-convex forms. The composite bow is always easy to pick out. For, as we
have observed earlier, in this bow, there was a tendency for the ends of the arms
to recurve and bend outwards before, and often even after, they were bound to the
string. This feature is usually evident in the artistic representation of this type of
bow, giving it almost a double-concave rather than convex appearance. Moreover,
the form of attachment of the horns beneath the arms gave the composite bow,
with the string as base, a triangular form. We are indebt ed to the ancient artists,
who paid meticulous attention to detail, for the cert ainty with which we can
recognize the different bows used in antiquity .
None of the improve ments to give the bow greater range would have been
of any value without compar able advances in the development of the arrow,
which is. afler all, the offensive element of this weapon. The arrow is made up of
three parts, each of a different material to suit its special function. The arrowhead,
which is the destructive part, had to be of the hardest possible material-flint.
bone, or metal. The body of the arrow, whose function is to direct the energy
transmitt ed from the string on release. had to be long, thin, hard. straight , and
light. and was made of wood or reed. The rail. designed to keep the arrow on its
course in smooth and straight flight, was made of feathers. The feathers of an
eagle, vulture, kite. or sea fowl were found to be the most effective. The tail,
without which the arrow could not reach its target. was so important that its
feather s were aptly described by the Persians as " messengers of death."
8
Types oj ntaceheads: apple-shal't'd.
ptllr-shOJ pt.i, .1Il d saucer-shaped. The
",m,lled tl lact' is onr depicted on
Egypti<1t1 lI kmWnfJIlS
The Mace and the Axe The common factors in the mace and the axe are that both were designed for
hand-t o-hand fighting and both consisted of a relatively short wooden handle, one
end of which was fitted with the operative lethal part which was either metal or
stone. The weapons were swung by the handle, and the head brought smartly
down on the enemy. The key problem in the manufacture of both was the firting
of head to handle in such a way that it would not fly off when swung nor break
011' when struck,
The difference between the two weapons was the difference in function. The
purpose of the mace was to beat and smash. The purpose of the axe was to pierce
and cut. Thi s differcnce determined the different shapes of their respective heads.
The head of the mace was heavy and blunt . Th e blade of the axe was light and
sharp. To prevent the weapon from leaving the soldier's hand when swung, in
both mace and axe the handle was widest at the point of grip, rapering toward the
head, or it was curved. Sometimes the handle was both curved and tapered.
The head of the mace, which was usually of stone but occasionally of metal,
W 35 shaped like a pear, an apple, or a saucer, or it could be oval. Each shape had its
advantages and drawbacks. The saucer-shaped head, for example. turned the mace
also into a cutting instrument, bur weakened its striking power. Th e head of this
weapon was always of the socket type, into which the handle was fitted.
The effectiveness of the mace as an instrument of war declined sharply when
it was met by enemy troops clad in armor, and particularly when they were
helmeted. With the development of armored devices for defense, the mace
virtually disappeared from the battlefield.
The problems involved in the manufacture of the axe were more complex
I N TRODUCTION
thickest part of the blade was not along the center but along the opposite or blunt
edge. This type of sword could also be curved, the sharp edge being the convex,
or outer edge. Sometimes the curve was slight, sometimes so considerable as to
give it the of a sickle. It is, indeed, often referred to as the sickle sword.
But this may be misleading, for in a sickle the inner or concave edge is sharp,
whereas in the sword it was the outer edge.
The curved sword underwent changes during the different periods in history,
notably in the relationship between hilt and blade. At times, the hilt was long and
the blade short ; at other times the short hilt and long blade were preferred. These
changes reflected the exertions of the armorers to f.\Shi on a sword light enough to
be brandished easily, but without shortening considerably the blade.
It may seem strange, but the sword was never a decisive weapon in ancient
campaigns-exeept on a few isolated occasions- and became import ant only in
comparatively later periods in history. Unlike the arrow, j avelin, and spear, where
thc metal portion was comparatively small, thc sword required a long metal blade
ro give it effective range. Bur before man had learned the secret of producing
perfect hard metals, the long sword was doomed to failure when put ro the test.
Alternatives ro the sword were therefore sought for close-contact battle, weapons
which required relatively small metal parts, or which could use a substitute for
metal. These alternatives were the mace and the axe.
The sling had the supreme advantage of simplicity of structure, which made
it easy to produce, and its ammunition, slingstones, was provi ded by natur e.
Its principal disadvantage was that considerable training and experience were
required to operare it with effective accuracy.
The early sling looked rather like a large eye-pat ch. It consistedofa small piece
of leather or cloth wit h twO cords attached to opposite edges. The stone missile
was placed on the material and the cords pulled taut so that the material became
a kind of bag containing the stone:The bag was held by the left hand and the ends
of the two cords held together by the right . The bag was then swung round and
round several rimes above the head until it gained the required momentum, at
which point one of the cords would be released, thereby releasing the missile
which would be flung forward.
The function of the sling was often complementary to that of the bow.
Wh enever they were used in battle, the slingmen always served close to the
archery unit s.
The swor d has always been the principal weapon for hand-t o-hand combat.
There were two main types of sword, each serving a specific function: the sword
for stabbing and the sword for striking. Both consisted of two main parts, a handle .
or hilt and a metal blade. The stabbing sword had a long straight blade tapering
toward the point. To give it strength, the blade was thickest along its center and
tapered toward the edges. This straight sword, sharp at the edges and at the point,
served equally to cut as to stab.
The striking sword, on the other hand, had only one sharp. edge, and the
These two weapons are similar in appearance but differ in size and in the way
they arc operated. The j avelin was like a large arrow and served as a medium-range
weapon. It was hurled by hand, and the soldier would be armed with several
javelins which would be carried, like arrows, in a quiver. To increase its range of
throw, a cord with a loop on the end would on occasion be added, giving the
weapon the appearance of a weaver's leash rod. The cord would be wound round
thej avelin and the loop retained by the fingers of the warrior, so that as thejavelin
was hurled , the swift unwinding of the cord would give it a spin and therefore
a steadier flight.
Like the arrow, the j avelin consisted of a body, made of wood or reed, and
a head of meral, either provi ded with a socket or tang, and its shape was suited ro
the nature of the enemy' s armor. Often, to enable the javelin to be stuck in the
ground during a rest period, its base would be fitted with a metal point . The
weight and form of this metal tip were such that not only did it not interfere with
the propulsion of the weapon, but contributed to the speed and balance of its
tlight.
The 'pear, a replica of thejavelin in shape, was much bigger and heavier, and
pierced by thrust. As a thrusting weapon it was thus nor unlike a very long
stabbing sword. It consisted of a stout staff and a metal head, with either tang or
socket, and was sometimes tipped at the base with a metal point.
THE ART OF WARFARE
The Sword
(14th W1tllrY s.c.)
The Javelin and the Spear
i
I
i
I
i
I
!
I
I
I
KI
I
i
i
i
i
1570-1200 tl .L,
quite often from the wri tten records, was th ree to one. This suggests that the full
eumplement was three horses per chari ot, two committed and one in reserve ,
unharnessed. In a later period , in the 9th century. the third horse was also occa-
SIOnally harne ssed to the vehicle, as we shall see late r. The hor se was often prot ect ed
in bat t le by special armor which cover ed its back.
The delicat e and precise struc ture of the chariot demanded special workshops
for its manufacture. From Egyptian wa ll paintings (202) we see the process,
which seems to follow the assembly-line pattern. One group makes the ri m, ano ther
thespokes, another assembles the wheel. O ther groups are concerned wi th the wo oden
partS of the vehicle, some making the body, others the pole, othe rs the axle- rod .
Some arc seen fitting the leather and the accessories, like qui vers and bow cases.
On e of the big probl ems was maintenance. Th e chariot had to be kept in good
ro udirion on the march, in batt le, and afterward. W heels and other part s of the
w hick would break. Th ey had to be changed, strengthened , or repai red. To meet
this need, special repair workshops were established , even along specific routes, and
equipment stores for spare partS were pur up at appropriate places. Thus we read
in one of the letters sent to the Governor of Ta' anach in the 15th century (accord-
ing to Albright' s translation) :
"I was ambushed in Gurra; so give me this day two chariot wheels and an
axle and two. , . , And when the making of the axle has been comp leted, send
it to I11C"
Several Important documentswhich relate tothe subject of maintenance we re
fmmd ill the royal archiv es of Ugarit . They record the nu mber of chariots br ought
into the workshops for repa ir , and the state of their condi tion: One , for exa mple,
says that eight chari ots were brou ght in to fie King' 5 palace, complete wi th t heir
wheels, poles, and harness. But " two chariots are wi tho ut qui vers," The document '
. goes <In to say that three pain of wheels and one pole were taken for repa ir to the
"dJ icl' artifi cer," namely,' to the perso n in charge of the workshops. .
A rather amusing and int eresting chronicle of the exper iences of an Egypt ian
courier dn ving his chariot in the land of Cana an appears in one of the Egyp tian
papyri. He starts wi th an account of how the knaves of Jaffa sabotaged hi s vehicl e
while he ' u s asleep:
" A coward steals thy bow, thy dagg er , and thy quiver. Thy reins are cut in
the darkness. Thy hor se is gone and statt s a cunaway ov er the slippery ground, as
the road str etches our befor e him. He smashes thy chariot... . Thy wea pons have
fallen 10 the grou nd. .. ."
Aft er this comes a descr ipt ion of the chariot- repair workshop in Jaffa:
" Thou art introduced int o the armory, and workshops surround thee. Crafts-
men and leather wor kers are close bv thee, and thcv do all that thou hast desired.
Th ey take care of thy chario t. so that it ceases be loose. Th y pole is newly
trimmed. its att achments are applied. They put bindings on thy coll ar- piece.. , .
They fix up thy yoke . . .. Thou goest forth quickl y to figh t , to accomplish deeds
"f L"roislll ."
90
The Fortificatiolls
I r 11::: l ' r:::l\ l V LJ ,-J r i rr n 11'1 .l::: G Y I' I
Th ere were of course also mobile wor kshops for rhe repai r of wea pons and
chariots on the march and in battle, One such workshop is depicted in the relief
showing the camp of Rameses II at the Battle of Kadesh (236-237). At the side
of the camp (236, top panel) we see rhe artifi cer repairing a chariot pole, assisted
by two apprentices.
\Ve mentioned earlier that different parts of the chariot were made of
different wood-cach suited to the function of the part . Th e woods had therefore
to be bro ugh r from diflerent places, and the written doc uments specify geographic
regions (like the area of Beth-shan) in Palestine and Syria which we re known for
the qualiry of tree that was just right for a particular part .
Incident ally, chariots were not the on ly wheeled vehicles used by rhe armies
of this period. They also had rransport vehicles to carry equipment and supplies for
the fighring men. From the reliefs of the Bat tle of Kadesh, we sec rhar borh the
Hitti te and the Egyprian armies had quite a number of such wagons hitched to
dr aft animals. The Hittite wago ns we re four-wheelers and were certainl y heavier
than the two- wheeled Egy ptian types (236- 237, center ). Th ey look like large
boilers with a rounde d lid. Suppli es were also carr ied by pack asses.
METHO DS OF ASSAULT ON FORTIFIED CITIES
MoS!of the cities of the Late Bronze period were:est. blished on the city sires
of the previous period. Where the fortifi cations of the earlier settlements were
completely destro yed, new fort ificat ions we re bui lt. Where they had been only
partially demolished. they were repaired and renova ted. W here rhey had remained
undamaged. they were taken ove r for use in this later period. This is the case, I
believe. wi th the celebrated.wall ofJericho, wirh its stone glacis, referr ed to earlier
- the very "walls ofJericho" menti oned in the Biblical descri ption of the conquest
by Joshu; . For although its bottom part is certainly Middl e Bronze, it was so solid
that if the wall had been damaged in the roth cent ury- that is, ar the end of Middle
Bronze II- only the " pper pari would have been afleeted, the part buil t of brick,
and this was prob ably renovared in the Late Bronze period . It would be idle ro go
on searching lor anot her wall from the time of Joshua. or to seck to ascribe its
absence to erosion. Thi s, I believe. is the wall of Joshua' s J ericho.
We lind evidence in other cities of this period in Palestine, Egypt , and Syria
thar earlier fortificat ions continued in use, eirher as they were or wi th partial
reconstruction. Occasionally some serious change was' introduced. In Hazar, for
example, the earlier wall of the large lower city remained. Its gates were rebuilr
on rhc same sire and afrer the same parrern as the original. Th e chang e they may
have made is rhe construction in some places of stone walls or isolated lowers on
rop of the eart h ramparts which prot ected the city from the west and north. In
Megiddo, roo, the four-chambcred city gate, built at the end of the Middl e Bronze
period. remained standing.
.. the earlier fcrrificatious..hadbeenruined.torwhere their design no
longer ofthe new Late Bronze city , nei, fortifications were built.
15 7 0 - [200 B, C .
An instructive example of the impressive fortifications of this Late Bron ze period
in Palestine is the well-preserved "o ut er wall" of Gezer; It encompasses rhe entire
area of the rell and is buil r of huge stone boulders-Ir is 4 meters thick and in sorne
I
ocs it has rema ined sranding to a height oht meters. It has several rectangular
p a II'"
bastions. which protrude both from the inner and exteri or surfaces of the wa .
They arc more than JO meters long and their-corners are strengthened by quarried ,
stone. Some were built at the some time as the wall, others were added later .
The fort ress of Buhcn, whos e design in the Midd le Bronze period was
descnbed in detail earlier, also had its character changed in this later period, and
it now has walls with squote bastions.
But the ' finest example of Lore Bronze city forrifi carions are undoubtedly'
those of Hattussas, capital of the Hittites in Anatolia, now called Boghazkcy. Here
one can readily discern the innovations of the Late Bronze period, for this city W3S
builr anew in stages at the rime of the Hittite Empire over an incomparably greater '
area than it> predecessor .el rs system of fort ifications is therefore original, and is
clearly characteristic of the period . It is one of the largest cities of this time whose
fortifications are well preserved. It also offers an insight into the engmeermg skills
of the period. For it is bui lt on hilly ground. with different sections at diflerent
levels, and the fort ifications had ro be suited to the prevailing topographic condi-
tions. They show all the feat ures of a perfect system.
Tbe city at thisperiod comprised three basic elements; (a) The acropolis or'
citadel, known in Turkish as Bliytik KaIe-"the .great on a hill
above the west bank of a deep ravine. Its measurements are I SO by 250 meters.
(b) Th e lower city, lying northwest of the citadel, between two ravines, measuring"
about r,ooo by 500 meters. ) The large upper city, built to the south of the '
citadel and lower city on grOlmd which rises steadily southward. It is 1.400 by
1,100 meters ; The overall length of the city complex, lower and upper , from
north to south reaches 2,000 meters.
Tu understand the essent ial character of the Hatt ussasf orrifications ir must be
remembered rhar the three comp onents of the ciry were not built at the same time.
The oradd is the earliest, and was built largel y in the first half of the second
null ennium . The lower city forrifications belong mainly to the 15th century, The '
large upper city was bui lt at the beginning of the14th century or later, and shows
the YOSt expansion of this settlemen t at a time when the Hittit e. Empire was in
full blossom. It also shows the mi ghty efforts of the Hittite kin g, Suppiluliumas, ,
tu include ' wi thin the overall fortifications the commanding high ground to .
the south ' of the lower ciry. ,Th e fearur es of the terrain, the hills and the river-
beds, necessitated the construction of this new wall whose perimeter approximated
to 4 kilome ters! Add 10 this the 2 kilometers of outer wall round the lower city
and rhe citadel, and we have a total of 6 kilometers of wall which had to be
defended by the qth-I3th-eentury inhabitants of Hatrussas. '
The part of the lower city wall which has remained is mostly the southern
sect ion. It is built on a high eart h ramp.rt and is a double wall , of the casemate
type, its outer "skin" being 3 meters thick. the inner skin 2 '7 meters, and the space
between 2'1 meters, giving the wall an efiecrive thickness of some 8 meters,
Planof Bog/lazkoy- Halflw ,1S- the
capital ojthc Hittites. C,'wr"l right:
the citadel. Top Idi : the l,)wf?r city.
Below,' the tlpprrcity
91
SOOm
t
..
Tht' King' s G,ut' 4B,'gha.z1.,:{l'ywilh
Iht' li l y 11'0111and temples
THE PERIOD O F T HE SOJ O URN I NfE GYPT
;
1-
,
Rectangular bastions or rowers had been built on the outer surface of the wall;>
some small, con taining one chamber, and some large, up to ' 15 meters wi de,':
containing two chambers. .. t
At the foot of the rampart, six posterns had leading in to thelower ..
city. Their length was the width of the rampart fl:itli base-some 50 meters.',
Ceiling and wails Were ofnone, which had then in tfun been covered with earth. '
Wi th the construction of the upper city in the later period, these posternsserved as .
useful throughways to it from the lower city and saved the inha bitants the need to
.usc the more distant main gates. B ut since they had been bui lt before the upper
ci ty, their main function must have been part of the fortifi cation design of the
lower city. The suggestion ' has been made that they were conceived as hidden ,'
corridors through wh ich a counterattack could be launched against an attacking ,
force. But this is hardly acceptable, for the runnel exits could very we ll be seen by '
the enemy; It is most pro bable that they wer e indeed used for action agains t an
assaulting group, but not to hide their movement. Rather was it to enable the'
defenders to make sorties at the moment' when th.t enemy were beginning to
", /lIIp.!/;. or to enable them t o engage the enemy in open barrle out side the city
walls while receiving strong cover ing fire from their comrades on the for midable
towers on both sides of each post ern gate. ;
These post erns were of course additional weak spot s in the system offor tifica-
tions. But their considerable lengt h, their nar rownessj and the protection afforded
by the flanking towers made the task of pcnerrarion by a hostile outside for ce
excessively difficult . ;
Posterns are a typical featu re of the' in Anatolia. One was dis- '.,
covered in Alaca Hirytik, belon ging to the Middlej Br onze period, 50 mete rs
long. Here, too, its additional purpose was to afford to the inhabitants in 1.
and out ofthe city at times of emergency when the gates were closed. It was sited
between the two ciry gates which were 700 meters apar t. A superb pos tern was .,
discovered at Ugarir, belonging to the Late Bronze peri od and certainly built on ,".
the pattern of the .Hittite tunnels, At Boghazkoy irse)f, a very large postern was, .
found in the fortifications of the upper ci ty> ;
These fortifications oftheupper 14th-13th-eenrurr city are the most powerful
of the.entire complex.And though similar to those of the lower city, their plan and
the quality of their construction are mo re advanced. Here, too (225, bottom) , they
are bui lt on a very high and wide rampart . They comprise two wails: the main,
wall. and , at a dist ance of 8' 5 meters, an outer wall. TJ#s outer wall is also built on '
a rampart, and is 1 meter thick. It is srrengrhened 11 rectangular bastions, built
at a di stance of 30 ineters from each other and set ex:d:cly between the towers on > ,.
the main wall. Th is mai n wall, like the wall of the lower city. isa do uble-casemate ., ,
structure, its outer skin 16 meters thick, its inner skin 1' 4 me ters, and the space
between them I ' 5 Ine.ren , it II overal l thi ckness of more than 4meters. '
Irs qUJliri:' apm from the (litter wa ll, deAved fr om the considerable '
number ;' f towers (no t bastions ) built into it. T bet were 8 meters wid e and "
protr uded outward some 5'.5 meters. Its lower section, tOO, was fIlled with earth '
and stones between t he skins. And it was upo n this flat!.llurf2ce tha t the upper waH
f
KI
I
I
!
str ucture of bri ck was built, mos t probably with casemates. ,The casema tes were
(00 narrow to serve as storehouses or dwel ling-chambers. Th ey wer e used as
paSS:l geways for the troops at the low embrasures which were cut into them, as
illustrated on the wall rd iefs (sec figure on r1iis page). Through these emb rasures.
the ,k f,'nders could engage those of the enemy who had succeeded in breaching
the outer wall and had rcached the area which was "d ead ground" to the soldiets
011 top of the main wall.
Th e top of the rampart, parti cularly in the t egion of the gates, was covered
with Idtge polygonal stones. Most impressive were the two main city gates them-
sclves-i-rh e southeastern King' , Gate and the southwestern Lions' Gate
(225. rop), Bot h were similar in plan. They fonned a " gate citadel" between the
main and outer wal ls which comprised two long t owers, and entrance to the city
was through the passage between the rowers, Thi s passage had two gateways, a
douh ll' door at each, an outer one near the outer wal l and an inne r on e near the
main \\".,11. Th e j amb s of each gateway we re huge vaulted stone pillars. The outer
dams .rpparenrly opened inward and the inner doors ou twa rd. The gate was
r".Khnl by an oblique sloping path or ramp which exposed hostile users to fir e
{rolll the towers and bastions of the mai n and ou ter walls. In fron t of the gate was
3 leveled open " square."
The Lions ' Gate gets its name from the lion car ved in high relief on each of '. West Gal' 4B,'ghazkdy (sw io,, )
THE PE RIOD O F THE SOJ O UR N IN EGYPT 15 7 0 -1 2 00 B. C .
Plan(Jf lho! gatesof B,'ghazkciy.
.. )f>e: The Kittg' j Gate
Below: The Liom' Gat(
The postern at Yerleapu, Bogl/tJzkiiy.
A view ,"rough the poslfm. A section
the postern andthe walls
95
Water Supply
under Siege
out wbar theylooked like, we must have recourse to the illustrated monuments of
the peri od. Fortunately there are man y Egyptian reliefs which depict cities whicb ..
were attacked or conquered by the pharaohs of the XIXth Dynasty. Incidentally, .
Seri I and Rarneses II fought much in Canaan, In these battl es, nuny cities certainly
suriered destruction. an occurrence which is substantiated by archaeological
excavations. As a result, the fortifications of cities of the J j th cent ur y were greatly
weakened. Where a city had been captur ed, no new fort ifications were con-
str ucted. The earlier ones were either repaired. often in a slapdash manne r, or
reJl1 ained untouched, in ruin. This may exp lain why the tr ibes of Israel, und er the
leader ship of Joshua, were able to conque r some of these cities.
Th e pharaohs never conquered Hat tussas. And so there is no Egyptian relief
wh ich illustrates its fort ifications. But reliefs showing other cities tell us much
abo ut the upper structures of their fortifications and arc also instructive, by
inference. about cities like Hartussas.
Most of the reliefs depict the captured cities in the stand ard for m, present ing
them as twa-stor y structur es (228, 230, 2]2) . In the main, the intention is assuredly
to show an elevation view of the high inner citadel , or acropolis, and the main
wall. Sometimes the ar tist manages to depict also the out er wall (229) , as in the
Harrussas fortific ations.
The reliefs suggest tha t the gates in Canaan were not vaulted, as in Hattussas,
but were rectangular. One can discern. in some of the reliefs, the embrasures and
win dows ill the wall (229). This testifies to an uppe r structure of casemates. The
bal coni es on the towers and bastions, whose vital function we have discussed
earli er. are shown with the utmost clarity in all the reliefs. And this is also true of
the batrlcmen ts on the outer wall, the main wall, and the bu ildings of the
acro polis.
A special type of fortification of this period were the ",igJols. These were
small citadels built to guard such important military objectives as wells and
communications. They, roo. appear on some reliefs. A migdol of this rype was
discovered in 1960 in Israel, not far hom Ashdod. It is square in plan. with rect -
angular bastions, and bas two sto ries-just as depicted in the reliefi (sec figure on
page 97).
A word abou t the for tified temples inside the city . Th ese arc the places to
which the citizens would flee afier their wall had been breached, as described in
the Hible in the slOry of the tower of Shcchern du nng the period of the J udges
(which we deal with later). The principal str ength of these temple forrificarions
lay in the thickness of their walls, the two towers at the entrance, and certainly the
roof wi th its balconies and battleme nts.
In rhe planning of fortifications, one of the toughest problems that dema nded
solution was the guat antee of a tegular supp ly of water ill time of siege. In the
peno d under review, ingenious devices were introduced to meet this need,
stagger ing in the scale and quality of their skilled engineering. The most interesting
and form idable of all that have come ro light so far are those discove red at -
Megiddo. The well which supp lied water to the city was in a natural cave at the
II
the two jambs of its outer gatewa y- "the keepers of me gate." The Ki ng's
is SO called today. because of the figure of the warriozor deity, whi ch was carved'!. '"
on the inner left jamb-from the point of view of J,meone inside looking out. 4-
This relief (222, top) is now in the Hittite Mu seum inAnkara and is ther efore not
seen in the phot og raph on page 224. .
Far the most int eresting feature of the sou thern wall is the fortification
arr angements in the middle of the area between the Lions' Gate and the King's
Gate. This is known today as Yerkapu- the Ear th Gate (225, bott om).
ln the main wall between these two city gates is a opening for the use of
pedestr ians called the Sphinx Gat e, because of the figures of a sphinx which
decor ated itsj ambs. The rampart at this point is quite high- about I I meters. To
gain access to the Sphinx Gate from outside, two rows of steps were cut in rhe
ramp ar t Some distance to its righr and to its left. At the top of each stairway, a
small"wicket gate had been cut in the outer wall which gave entry 10 the space
between the main and outer walls throu gh which the Sphinx Gate could be
reached. ,
At the foot of the rampart in front of the SphinxGate and midway between
th e two stairways, a postern had been constr ucted int o the rampart leadin g right
th rough int o the city. Its length was 80 meters-the width of the rampart at this
section-s -reachi ng , at its other end, a point J J meters immediately beneath the
Sph inx Gate. This was the Earth Postern, or Gate, and its purpose is believed to
have been both to save the inha bitants from the steep climb up the t ampart , and,
in attack , to enable sorties to be carried out against the enemy in certain cond itions
of battle. This postern apparently had doors at both ends which cou ld be closed
duting siege.
To complete the picture of the Boghazkoy forti fications, it should be added
that the lower city also had a number of innet defensive walls which created a kind
of citadel wit hi n a citadel. It is possible that these inner walls were the boundaries
of earlier cities and became " inner" only wi th the growt h and expansion of the
settl ement . But in the city's final phase, they certai nly added strength to the system
of fort iti cati ons. The upp er cit y, too, was strengthened by several independent
citadels, built on roc k cliffs, which for med a cha in of fort ifications wi thin the city
itself. (
Nowhere, neither in Boghazkoy nor in any other' city in Syria , Palestine, or'
I .".' J _ , Egypt. has the re beenany discovery of the upper parts of fortificauons. To find
. '1' -" .
';'; V 'I. -- t 'It ' ''''-
/. . . . \'- .\
. . ,
r'1 ..1J(t I! : ,
irA. ;'\. .. ,
, ',./ 1
." I ffJ .
,
lB
m-"
1.: ; ' ..
- ..
,
15 7 0 - 1 2 0 0B. C .
A .Higll0! guardill g a lI,dl ill rhe
desert bcrwetlJEgypt and
as depicted 011 a SNi, I
" Hi s Majesty sent fort h every valiant man of his army, to breach the new wall
whi ch Kadesh had made. I was the one who breached it, being the first of every
valiant man."
cover- tents depicted in the relief port rayin g the conquest of Deper (z2.9}. But the ,
derails of the reliefdo not support this thesis, If these tent s were indeed int ended as
batt ering-rams, the artist wou ld surely have given prominence to the most impor-
tant element of this weapon- the met al-headed beam. And this does not appear at
all. It is tar more pr oba ble that these tents represent the camp of Pharaoh an d his
sons; set up near the city , as in the relief mowing the Battle ofKadesh (236-237).
The absence of the battering- ram in the Egyptian armies of the New King-
dom, when it was already in use in Canaan and Anatolia in the first half of the
second millennium, and indeed also in Egypt , may have several explanations: the ' '
considerable distance between the military bases in Egypt and the battlegrounds
in Canaan; whi ch no doubt proved a tough adm inistrative and technical obstacle .
for the movement of this heavy instrument; the conservatism of the ancient
Egyptians; and, more parti cularl y, the firmness of the forrificaeions at the end of
the previous and the beginning of this period. Th ese fortificatio ns were built
especially to withstand the batterin g-ram. And they succeeded in blunt ing its
etl,:ctiveness, for it was not as yet a perfect instr ument , Thi s is a good example of
one aspect of the chain reaction pr oduced by offensive and defensive devices.
Pr oficient counrer-measures, as we can see, render obsolete, at least temporari ly,
the weapon or a part icular model of the weapon against which they were devised.
The most usual method of attack on a city was penetration abo," the walls,
usingscaling-ladden. This system is well illustrated in the reliefs (228, 229). Under
heavy coveting fire from the archers, the assault tro ops would rush to scale the
walls and try to reach the top. The Egyptian shield, wi th the shoulder- m ap att ached
to its inner surface, was part icularl y suited to this task. For the attacking soldier
could hang it over his back (228), and this left his hands free for the climb and
the fighting.
A' second meth od, which paralleled the first , was penetr ation through the city
gates. The assault troops would storm the gate, their backs prot ected by shields, .'
and, armed with axes (228). the y would tr y and tear down the bolts and hinges.
Both opera tions demand much courage. And thus does one of the prou d
soldiers of Thurmose III deliver himself:
Against such forms of att ack, the defenders respond ed wi th several measures. L( _
Th ey posted archers on the wall to give counter-fi re to the enemy 's bows (229) ,
while other !roops armed with spears att acked the assaulting soldiers scaling the
ladders. 1\ number of the defenders hu rled stones upon the enemy below. Some of
the stones were large and heavy, requiring the lise of bath hands (229, top righr).
If at the beginning or dur ing the barrie some of the defendin g units fightin g out-
side the wall found themselves compelled to fall back to rhe city, they we re hauled
up by their com rades at the top of the wall with rope or with strips made of
clothing. This is sur ely the representation by the artist of the two figures han ging
to a tope on the wall in the relief shown on page 229. Endorsement of this
western foot of tbe teU-outside the boundaries of the'city fortifi cations. The sole
methods of secur ing water from this source during siege were to pump it from the
well int o the city, or to devise some appro ach system which would give the
inhabitants access withou t having to venture beyond the walls. The stratagem
conceived by the planners of the Megi ddo forti fications was at once simple and
a stro ke of genius. Within the city compound, at a p(>int not far from the well,
they sunk vertical sbah to the same depth as the\o;ell-30 meters. The first
8 meters were fairly easy going, for they were diggini through the dust and ashes
of earlier ruined settlements. But the next 22 meters had to be cut through solidv
rock, From the base of this shaft, they cut a horizontal tunnel right through-
to the well-a distance of 67 meters, T he tunnel had an average height of
3' 5 meters. The floor of the tunn el was engineered with a slight gradient sloping
down toward the city, so that there was a gravity flow of water from the well
int o the city. On completion of the engineerin g j ob, the well was sealed from the
outside by a thick wall. The labor involved in this! excavation and tunnel ing
project must have been enormous. Bur it was vital forthe defense of the city.
O n occasion, these stratagems were apparently not unknown to the enemy.
And so from time to ti me, as the archaeological diggings show, the outside wall
sealing the well was breached or torn down , and another wall built in its place
later with the repair of the for tifications. These installations were until very
recent ly ascribed to the Late Bronze period. But our at Megiddo in
1960 showed that the whole enterprise should actually be attri buted to the reigns
of Solomon or Ahab in the Israelite period. On the hand, installations similar
in basic patt erns to rhat of Megi ddo, but of inferior stat.dard, we re also discovered
in other Palestinian cities which belong to the Late Bronze period.
The conquest of forti fied cities posed a grim problem in this period, too, for
the att acking arm y. Of the fIve methods of capturing a fortifi ed city mentioned in
our Introduct ion, we can, wi th the help of illust rated monument s and written
documents, follow the use of only a few of rhem. One of the' most remarkable
features of the m.ny detailed Egyptian reliefs and of the written documents of this
period is that in no t one ofthem isthere a single sign of or reference to the battering-
ram, Some scholars, it is true, have sought to recogn ize barrermg-ramsin the four
RJ:gl Jt: The submissioJJ
of a Syrian city as depicted
011 Egyptianrcliifof
Ramcses II
Attack and Dei euse
THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT
interpretation is to be found in this description of the siege of Megiddo by Thur-
mose III which talks of the retreat of the enemy after their failure outside the city:
"They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and silver, so thar
someone might draw them up into this town by hoisting on their garments. Now
the people had shut rhis town against them, but they let down garments to hoist
them up into this town."
Attack by breaching the gate and scaling rhe wall involved the assault units
in very heavy casualries, and could be undertaken mostly against cities whose
fortification system was not ofa high standard or whose troops were not the besr.
Ofren the invading army resorted to siege or infiltration stratagems.
And indeed we hear at the very beginning of this period of one of the most
prolonged sieges carried out at this time. The Egyptian documents record that
PharaohAhmose, founder of the XVIIIth Dynasty, in hi. campaign against the'
Hyksos armies. laid siege for three consecutive years to Sharuhen, a fortified city
in southern Palestine (also mentioned in Joshua 19: 6).
Thutrnosc III tried to follow up his celebrated success on the battlefield near
Megiddo by taking the city by storm. But his soldiers, instead of pursuing the
retreating troops who were retiring to entrench themselves behind their city
walls, tarried on the field of batrle to collect war booty. And when they reached
the city, they were repelled. Thutmose was therefore forced to put Megiddo under
siege for seven months, as recorded in one of the documents.
The siege operation, though less dangerous than breaching, was nevertheless
very difficult and complicated. For the besieging army had to encamp for a long
period in the open, set up encampments all round the city, and maintain vigilant
defense against sorties and raids by the troops under siege. There is a detailed
description in one of the Egyptian docnments of how these encampments were
established:
"Orders were issued to the commander of the troops to provide for their
division and to inform each man of his place. Theymeasured this city, which
corralled with a moat, and enclosed with fresh timbers of ali their pleasant trees,
while His Majesty himself was in a fortress east of this.. town being watchful, .. '
People were appointed as sentries at the enclosure of His Majesty, and they were
told: 'Be steadfast! Be vigilant, be vigilant! ...'"
In these siege operations. they would cut down the trees in the area, as we see
from the above document, with which to build their encampments or forts. This,
too, is depicted in the Egyptian reliefs (346). A faithful description of this custom
appears in the Bible-Deuteronomy 20: 19-20:
"When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it .to take
it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou
mayest eat of them. and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is
man's life) to employ them iri the siege: Only the trees which thou knowest that
they be not trees for meat, thou shalr destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt
build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued."
1570-1200 B.C.
We have seen that the conquest of a fortified city was a very difficult opera- Strataocms
rion. It is not therefore to be wondered that side by side with the above methods
of warfare, the attacking army continuously sought means of entering the city by
cLUllling and stratagem. For all the solidity and strengrh of a city's fortifications,
rhcv had their weak spots. And since the defenses were all designed to meet attack
from the outside, oace me enemy had succeeded in penetrating one of the weak
points and entering the city, the rest of the fortifications were rendered valueless.
There were of course exceptions, as at Boghazkov, which had inner citadels and
wails. And this lessenedthe danger. Bur, in general, penetration of thefortifications
at one point was likely to cause a total collapse of the city's defenses.
There are many stories of celebrated stratagems whereby cities were entered
and captured. Many have about them the ring oflegend. Bur their very composi-
tion makes it evident that such devices were used. One of the most famous
dc'scriptions ofa stratagem of this nature is undoubtedly that contained in the story
of rhc Trojan Horse, in the Bartle of Troy.
JAHA. But there is a legendary Egyptian tale. which predates the Trojan
bartle by several hundred years, which relates, in the style of Ali Baba, how the
city ofJalfa was captured by the forces of Thutrnose Ill. The Commandet of the
bc'sieging army, That, notified the Governor of Jaffa that he had decided to
surrender and that it was his intention to give himself up. together with his wife
and children:
"And he [That1had the 200 baskets brought which he had made. and he had
200 soldiers get down into them. And their arms were filled with bonds and fetters.
and they were sealed up with seals. And they were given their sandals, as well as
their carrying poles and staves. And they had every good soldier carrying them,
totahng 500 men. And they were told: 'When you enter the city, you are to let
alit your companions and lay hold on all the people who are in the city and put
them in bonds immediately.' And they went out to tell the .charioteer of the
Eucmv ofJafra: 'Thus speaks your lord: "Go and tell your mistress [i.e., the wife
of the prince ofJalfa1: 'Rejoice. for Seth the god has given us That, along with his
\\'Ifc' and his children I' See the vanguard of their tribute. You shall tell her about
these 200 baskets [which were filled with men with fetters and bonds ].''' Then he
went ahead of them to bring the good news to his mistress, saying: 'We have
captured That.' And they opened the locks of the city before the soldiers. And
rhcy entered the city and let alit their companions. And they laid hold on the city,
small and great, and put them in bonds and fetters immediately. So the mighty
arm of Pharaoh-life. prosperity, health-captured rhe city."
The Biblical story of Joshua's conquest of Jericho apparently
describes another kind of stratagem whose military implications, however. have
been obscure. Its highlights, apart from the collapse of the walls. are to be found
in joshua 6: 3. 16.20:
"And ye shall compass the city, all ye men of war, and go round about the
city once. Thus shalt thou do six days .... And it came to pass at the seventh time,
99
THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT
when the priests blew with their trumpets, Joshua said unto the people, 'Shout'
for the Lord hath given you the city .. .' so that the people went up into the city.
every man straight before him, and they took the city."
It seems to me that this stratagem is explicable in the light of a later one
which is described in a Roman book of military ruses composed by Frontinus:
"When Dominus Calvinus was besieging Lueria, a town of the Lugerians
protected not only by its location and siegeworks but also by the superiority ofits
defenders, he instituted the practice of marching frequently around the walls with
all his forces, and then marching back to camp. When the townspeople had been
induced by this routine to believe that the Roman commander did this for the
putpose of drill, and consequently took no precautions against his efforts, he
transformed this practice of parading into a sudden attack, and gaining possession
of the walls, forced the inhabitants to surrender."
AI. A simpler stratagem, and one easier to understand, is that described in the
Biblical story of the capture of the city of Ai. Its main purpose was to draw the
city's inhabitants away from the fortifications, and then enter. The plan is presented
simply and clearly in Joshua 8: 3-8:
" ... and Joshua chose out thirty thousand mighty men of valor, and sent them
away by night. And he commanded them, saying, 'Behold, ye shall lie in wait
againsr the city, even behind the city: go not very far from the city, but be ye all
ready: And I, and all the people that are with me, will approach unto the city:
and it shall come to pass, when they come out against us, as at the first, that we will
flee before them, (For they will come out after us.) till we have drawn them from
the city; for they will say. "They flee before us, as at the first": therefore we will
flee before them, Then ye shall rise up from the ambush and seize upon the city:
for the Lord your God will deliver it into your hand. And it shall be, when ye have
taken the city, that ye shall set the city on fire... .' "
Battle ill Cpcn Terrain Before discussing the organization and services of the army in this period, it
may be found useful to describe two of the most celebrated battles that took place
at this time, which are depicted and described in detail in the Egyptian monuments.
The Battle of Meoiddo The first is the battle of Thutmose III which led to the capture of Megiddo "
at the beginning of the r yth century. This is, in fact, the earliest battle in human
history of which a detailed account exists. And it is the first of a series of battles
fought near Megiddo (244-245), each ofwhich was decisive, each determining the
fate of Palestine,
The strategic .importance of Megiddo lies in its position commanding the exit '
from Wadi Au. the narrow defile which links the coastal plain of Palestine with
rhe Valley ofjezreel through the hills south of the Carmel Mountains. This was the
route of the famous Via Maris, the great trunk road which served as the main
communications line between Egypt and the important empires of Mesopotamia,
Syria, and Anatolia.in the uorrh.t Whocver controlled Megiddo controlled this
100 communications route, and, consequently, important areas of the Fertile Crescent.
1570- 1200B.C.
This explains why the King of Kadesh on the Orontes, in the north, moved
southward with all his allies to Megiddo in an effort to barthe northward advance
ofThutmose II1.The defeat of the King of Kadesh in this battle at Megiddo, far as
he was from his main bases, apparently served as a "classic lesson" to the later
northern kings. For in the second battle, this time at Kadesh, some 200 years later,
against Rameses II, the Hittites apparently tried the opposite strategy, seeking to
draw the Egyptian forces as far northward as possible so that they would be far
from their bases, and this time they would suffer defeat. When we analyze these
two battles, we shall do well to bear in mind these two basic and diametrically
opposed strategic approaches of the northern king,-offensive strategy and defen-
sive tactics in the Battle ofMegiddo, and defensive strategy and offensive tactics in
the Battle of Kadesh. These two approaches have in fact always been the two basic
Joctrines of warfare of the nations up to present times. Their application, when
there has been a failure to learn the lessons of the Megiddo and Kadesh battles, has
brought defeat in the most decisive campaigns. Perhaps the most interesting recent
parallel of the alternate use of these two doctrines occurred in the Second World
War, in the series of battles between the Allied Powers and the Germans in the
North African Campaign. But we must return to Megiddo.
In the spring of the year 14.68B.C., Thutmose III set out from Egypt at the
head ofhisarmies to campaign against the nations of Syria and Canaan who had
fortified themselves in the neighborhood of Megiddo under the leadership of the
King of Kadesh. Nine days later, he and his forces reached their base in Gaza,
having covered some 26 kilometers a dav.-Prom here he advanced northward to
the city of Yehem in the northern Sharon. He now took counsel to decide how
he' would advance on Megiddo, for he had the choice of three routes: the direct
route through the defile of Aruna (Iron, Wadi Ara); the northern route through
Dlcfti, which would bring him out north of Megiddo; or the southern route.
!clding to Ta' anach, a few kilometers south of Megiddo. The report of this council
of war, as transmitted by the royal scribes and recorded on the walls of the temples,
is most instructive, and points to the practice of the army staff conference before
the' commander made his decision. It is worth quoting.
The Pharaoh first briefs his commanders on the latest intelligence on the
enemy. as elucidated from spies; gives them his appreciation of enemy strength;
and informs them of the enemy decision to make a stand at Megiddo, or, in his
words:
"For he says-so ir is reported-I shall wait here at Megiddo [to ftght against
the Pharaoh]."
The report records that the conference continued with the commanders
expressing their objections to an advance on Megiddo by the shortest and most
direct route. This is what they say:
"What is it like to go on this road which becomes so narrow? It is reported
th.ir the foe is there, waiting on the outside, while they arc becoming more
numerous, will not horse have to go after horse, and the arlllY and the people
SImilarly? Will rhe vanguard of us be fighting while the rear guard is waiting here 101
102
THE PE RIOD O F THE SOJOURN I N EGY PT
in Aru na unab le to fig hu Now two ocher roads are here. One of the roads-behold
ir is to [he ease of us, so [hat ir co mes out ar Ta' anach. The ocher- behold, it is to
the north side of Dj ef[i. and we will come our [ 0 the nort h of Megiddo. Ler our
victo rio us lord pr oceed on the one of rhcm which is satisfacror y to his heart, but
do not make us go on [hac difficult road !"
Accordi ng to the w rit ten record . the Pharaoh decided for pr est ige reasons to
choose pr ecisely [he short and difficu lt route:
" They will say. these enemies whom Re aborni na rcs: 'Has His Maj esty set
out on another road because he has beco me afraid of US1' - SO they will speak."
On the other hand. his decision may wel l have been based on his app reciation
of [he int ell igence repons. For .from the con tinuation ' of the written record. it -
appears dut the enemy expected the Egyptian Pharao h to ad vance either north- .
wa rd or sourhward>
T he sou the rn flank of the Canaanit es wa s cert ain ly near Ta 'a nach, and their
northern flank was apparently near t he exit of the Djefti route, Near Megiddo
itself was established [he main camp ofall the allied kings, with all their following.
who had combined to resist Thutmose III. For [he city of Megiddo was too small
to con tain all this vast force.
W hen Thut rno se' s vanguard had reached the neighborhood of the exit from
Wadi Ar a and halt ed at the Qina bro ok (between Megiddo and Wadi Ara),
his rea[gu ard was still at Acuna. And .now he listened to the supplication of his
commanders [0 wait until his rear unit s hav e caught up wi th them :
"Then they said to His Maje sty : . . . 'Behold, Hi s Majes ty has come fort h
with his victorio us army. and they have filled the valley. Lee our victorious lor d
listen to us [his time, and Jet our lord guard for us the rear of his army and his
peopl e. \V hen the rear of [he army comes forth for us into [he open. then we shall
fight against these for eigners. then we shall not trouble our hea rts about the rear
of an army.' ''
This sound adv ice by his command er s, who we re insisting on the con centra-
tion of force before the assault , was accepted by the Pharaoh , and he set up camp
sou t h of Megiddo, on [he banks of the Qina brook. This camp was certainly
similar to the pro visional camp establi shed two centuries later by Ramescs II near
Kadesh, as we shall see later. In the even ing the army was informed of the plan to .
launch th.e. at.eaek.uexe .morning: against the enemy near Megiddo, wh ose main
forces still some di stance away near Ta'anach, in the south, and near the exit : .
of the Djefti route in the north. The announcements declared : " Prepare ye! Make
your weapons ready; since one (the Pharaoh ]. will engage in combat wi th rhat :
wre: h;,(I enemy in the morning."
.. This apparent ly was the customary prepa rati on of an arIll Y for bat tle. As
Joshua J : I O- J I records:
" T hen J oshua commanded the officers of the people. saying, ' Pass through the
host, and command the people, saying, Pr epare yo u victuals: for within thr ee days
y" shall pass over this Jordan, to go in to possess the land. . . .' ''
f
j
1
!
'j
1
I
!
1
I
I
,I
I
' J
j
!
I
i
J
1
i
!
1 5 7 0 - I 200 B. C .
Beto re the assault, and with his forces assembled. Thurm ose divi ded them into
rhr ee groups and assigned thei r areas of operation : thesouthern flank . between rhe
Qina brook and the exit from W adi Ara; the northern Bank. northwest of
M<. giddo ; and the center , wh ere he hi mself would be. The assault was launched
ar dawn agamst the enemy camp s near Megi dd o. It ended wi th the rou t of rhe
CanaJnitcs. who start ed fleeing with their kings toward Mcgidd o, and, as we
noted earl ier , rhey we re haul ed over the walls into the city by their garments. And
now ther e was an occurre nce which is typical of many undi sciplined and untrained
n oo ps. ThecEgyptian army, ins tead of adhering to the princi ple of maintenance
of aim and con tinuing to destroy the enemy and preven t hi. escape. fell np on his
poss<:ssiolti kft behind in the camp' , co llecting boory. As the royal scri be put it .
with uuadorned simplicity:
" Now if only His Maj esty' s army had not gi ven up thei r hearts to captur ing
[he possessions of the enemy, they would have capt ured Megiddo at thi s time."
And so the King of Kadesh and his allies ma naged to escape. Such is the iro ny
of fate that zoo years later, in the Battle of Kadesh, it was pr ecisely the Egyp tian
arrnv of l'haraol; Rameses II wh o were saved from certain annihil ation by the same
when the Hi tti te chariot force, which had stormed his cam p,
jumped "If thei r chariots to collect the Egyptian spoils instead of sticking to the
job of destroymg the army. The capaci ty of an officer to mak e his men respect the
principle " f"maintenance of aim" is indeed one of the supr eme tests of command.
Megiddo was eventually captured after a seven- mont hs' siege. T he high
importance of its conq uest is well expressed in the words of the Pharaoh to his
army :
" Capture ye effectivel y, my victo rious army ! Behold all the for eign count ries
have been pur III thi s town by the command of Re on this da y, inasmuch as every
prince " r every northern country is shut up within it. for the cap tu ring of Megiddo
is the cJpturing of 3 thousand towns!"
And 1I0 W, befor e summarizing o ur conclusions on the methods of war fare in
this period , let lIS consider the second celebrated bartl e that too k place some 200
vc.irs later bet ween the Pharaoh Ram cses II and [he coa lirion arm ies of Hitrites and
Can,u l1Ite' s und er the leadership of the King of the Hitt ites. T his was the Batt le of
Kadcsh on the O rontes.
Thi s battl e is so we ll descr ibed and in such det ail in Egypt ian wr itt en do cu- The Battle of Kadeslt
rncnrs and so widely illustr ated in many reliefs. complete with captions (see fig ure.
on l Ot ff ) that it is possibl e to reconstruct it in JIl its minutiae, Thi s is
also the only bat tle in the per iod in which we have full parti culars on the organiza-
tion and tacti cal handl ing of its chario t units.
Since this bat tle is so we ll document ed , let us begin with a few qu orari ons
from the' narrati ve and compleme nt them later by the illustr ations in the reliefs.
Ramescs II set ou r from Egypt in the spring with four divisions, movi ng The Mardi
nor thwar d along the coastal-route until he arrived south of Kadesh, on t he east
bauk of the River Orontcs, He then crossed over to the west bank: 13
10 5
battl e, The infantry and chariorry of His Maj esty . . . retreated before them. Now '
His Majesty had halted on the north of the city of Kadesh, on the western bank of
the Orontes. Then carne one to tell it [i.e., the disaster] to His Maj esty."
" His Maj esty . . . shone like his father Montu when he took the adornment s The Couuterattacle
of war, as he seized his coat of mail he was like Baal in his hou r. . . . His Majesty
halrcd the rou t, then he charged into the foe, the vanquished foe of Hatt i, being
alone by himself and none other with him. When His Maj esty went to look behind
him he found 2 , 50 0 chariot ry sur rounding him, in his way out, being all the youth
of the wretched foe of Hatti, togethe r wit h its numerous allied countries . .. being
three men ( 0 a span, acting in unison."
Befor e start ing our analysis of this battle, the first question that springs to
mi nd is how could Ramescs II have adva nced on Kadesh without paying attention
to seemicy, and with the complete assurance that none of the Hitti te enemy was in
the vicinity until he was sudden ly taken by surp rise from the south! Th e docu ment
fro m \\ hich the above quotati ons arc taken is silent on the subjec t. This document
is anarrative " poem" .on the battl e. But a more derailed account appeat s in the
" IEci,) documents. And these show that Rameses was lulled into a false sense of
' <"um; by the King of Kadesh who used one of the earliest known ruses to deceive
the <ncmy...
... , ~ - - - ~ - - . _ - - - - - - - - ---
!
i
I
.
!
I
!
i
I
1
.. .. ',',-"
"".: ; -, - . ; " .""J . '.,,,:
. ..:., ,'Ii6I' ' c-;:-';'- r
. _ /')::-:i
- , . r,
-'. " . -.:
To link the foll owing description with the previous, we go back a little in our
next quot ati on and start it just befor e the story of the deception:
"When His Majesty appeared like the rising of Re, he assumed the ado rn-
ment s of his father Montu. When the king pr oceeded northward , and His Majesty
had arrived at the localit y south of the city of Shabtuna, there came two shan!
[Bedouin] to speak to His Maj esty as follows : ' Our brethren, who belong to the
gr eatest of the famil ies with the wretched foe of Harri, have made us come to His
Maj esty to say : " We wi ll be subject s of Pharaoh, , . and we will flee fr om the
wretched foe of Hau i who is in the land of Aleppo, on the north ot T unip. He fears
because of Pharaoh to come north ward ;" Now these Shasu spoke these words
which they spoke to His Majesty falsely, for the wretched foe of Harti made them
to come to spy whe re His Maj esty was, in ord er to cause the army of His Majesty
no t to draw up for fighting him. to bat tle wirh the wretched foe of Hatti."
But or rhe time, Rameses did not perceive that they had come on a mission of
deceit. He swallowed their story. and advanced to the neighborhoo d of Kadesh,
fully con vinced that the Hitt ite coalition forces were far to the north, near Aleppo.
He set up his camp (depicted in reliefs on pages 236-23 7-see detailed descripti on
in the captions and figur es in the text) ro the west of Kadesh. And on ly then did he '
discover his gr im plight . as a result of the captute of two Hitrire reconnaissance
scouts;
" Then, as His Maj esty sat upon a thr one of gold, there arrived a scout who
was in the following of His Majesty, and he brought two scouts of the wretched
l 5 7 0 -1 2 0 0 B .C.
foe' ofllarri. Th e)' wac cond ucted into the presence and His Maj esty said to them:
w h.Harc ye, Th ey said: 'As for us the wr etched fo e of Harri has caused that we
dmuld come to spy out where His Majesty is.' Said His Maj esty to them: ' He'
Where is he, the wre tched foe of Hat ri e Behold, I have heard saying : " He is in the
Ll tHI of Aleppo. " Said they: 'See, the wr etched foe of Hatti is stationed together
with many countri es.. . . They are equipped wit h infa nrry and chariot ry. bearing
rhcir weapons, more nume rous arc they than the sand of the shore. See, t hey are '
srandiug, drawn up for battl e behi nd Kadesh the deceitful.' '' ,
Ramcses W lt/ I' Il ea l Kadcsh as
depicted at tilt' to !'C
CIl lII J'iJf cJ whit ril e ,,<1' / (' (.rtIlP as
represented in .-lbtl-S ill/llt" (page l OS ).
a//l! LIIX,l ( (Jl<lgCJ 09)
ro8
Abll-S imbcl (,( p ~ ~ s 236-2J7)
Tactics
"The arrival of the scour of the Phar aoh . . . bringing the two scouts of the
wretched foe of Hatti into the presence of Pharaoh. They are beating them, to
make them tell where the wretch ed foe of Hatri is!"
Bur for Rameses the information had come too late. He was already trapped.
At the moment when he was sending word ro alert his other divisions near
Shabtuna, the Hitti te chariots sprung their charge on the marching divisions, as
described in the narra tive "poem." The bewi ldered division fled toward Pharaoh' s
camp, wi th the Hittites in hot pursuit and eventually enci rcling the camp . The
Pharaoh then launche d a desperate counterattack, slightly checking the enemy
assaulting units, and striking against othe r Hi ttite units on his eastern flank, near
Kadesh, And now me Hittite assault chariot eers began to plunder and pillage the '
Egyptian camp . This turned the tide b tally against them. ..f or whi le they were
gathering their boot y, they were suddenly attacked by a formation which had
been held in reserve and which had now arrived in the nick of time. These were
the Na ' aron troops, a crack Canaanite unit serving wit h the Egyptian forces. .
Na'c run means literal ly " young men." They were picked troops, who had
apparently been detailed to pr otect the distant western flank. Now they fd l upon
the plundering Hittit es and wiped them out.
The Egyptian defeat was thus turned into a local victory, while the Pharaoh
pressed his attack against the enemy in the east near Kadesh, dr iving them toward
the river. The Hi tti te King, wi th his infantry division numbering some 6, 000 men ,'
halted on the other side of the river. But he Wasnow powerless. fo r allhischariots .
had been committed and his infantrymen alone were inelfeetive against me assault
of'Rameseschariors, The Hittites accordingly retired to Kadesh and fortified rhern- :
selves wit hin the city. 'T he battle ended in stalemate. Both sides had been badly
mauled, and they satisfied themselves with the signing of a non-aggres sion pact.
Th is is the most detailed treaty of its kind which has been left to liS from this period.
The methods of warfare and the principles of strategy and tactics followed by
both sides are quite clear. The Hittite King pursued a defensive strategy, and
succeeded in drawing the Egyptian Pharaoh deep within his territory so that he
I 57 0 -1 200 B.C.
collid smite his flank at the proper moment in a surprise attack, while he himself
WJS based on Kadesh and the O ronres, wh ich gave him both concealment and a
seCUfe shelter.
This battl e also otters a splendid example of the me of me chariot unit as
a ,triking force , which carries out an assault up to hand-to-hand combat range. .
These tactics matched the particular character of the Hit tite chariot, which was
"qui pped mai nly with the spear, a short- range weapon. The chariot crew of three ,
virt ually turned the Hittite chario ts into a transpor ted or mounted infantry umt, -
qualtfied also to engage in hand-t o-h and combat at t h ~ end of ,the char.ge.
Th is kind of maneuve r could, of course, succeed III oper. oo ns agamst an
enemy flank which was on the march and without securi ty. But the weakness of -
the Hit tite chariot was immediately evident when the Egyptian chariots, armed .
with the long-range composite bow, went over to the counterattack . The brilliant
maneuver of the Hi ttit e King failed because he had given insufficient rhoughr to the
planning of the action he wo uld need to rake if his surprise attack f.il ed. .,
Rameses, on the other hand. failed hopelessly in his strategic j udgment s. And
he managed to extri cate himsel f from utt er defeat onl y because of his keen leader-
ship in battl e, recogni zing that attack is the best defense. His cOlll1 ter-?lfensive saved
him at the decisive moment.
Bur it seems that in his e. gerness to glorify the personal heroism of Rameses,
the roval scribe underrated his strategic ability too heavily. For the sudden for-
tuitous arr ival of the Canaani te Na' arun for mation from the west, which saved the
day for Rarncses, finds, strangely enough, no ment ion in the general chronicles of
the battle. The scribe may have considered that giving credit to the Na' arun unit
would derogate from the measure of his Pharaoh's prowess. But to Rameses credit,
it may be claimed that when he raced north toward Kadesh without effective The (.:Imp in theLuxor rdilj s
THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT I 570- I 200 B.C.
security, he must have taken into account the presence of this striking force on his
western flank, and he used it not only to secure a strategic flank, but also as a hidden
reserve to be rushed into action at a decisive moment.
The Battle of Kadesh offers us an insight into the military patterns of the
period, with its imperial armies of high standard, whose commanders are capable
of handling large formations of infantry and chariots in accordance with the
soundest principles of strategy followed to this day.
Intelligence The description of the battle near Megiddo and especially the chronicle of the
Battle ofKadesh underline the high importance attached by the armies of the lands
of the Bible to the intelligence services. Operations like deceptive patrols and the
capture of Hittite scouts by Egyptian scouts point to the existence of a well-
developed system of intelligence. The questions put by Ramescs to the Hittite
prisoners also show that the purpose of the interrogation was to secure precise
tactical information:
1. What nations does the Hittite armies compriseI
2. What is the composition of the army-infantry, chariots I
3. Their weaponsI
4. Their numbers?
5. Their exact location and the measures of their preparedness-
This alertness to intelligence and the use of spies are stressed also in the
Biblical stories of Joshua's conquests. Spies were dispatched to Jericho and to Ai
before the military operations, and the intelligence they brought back on the spirit
and strength of the enemy served as the basis of the attack plan.
As opposed to this tactical intelligence, there is an eloquent example of
strategic intelligence in the instructions given by Moses to the twelve spies before
their departure for the land of Canaan. The points on which the espionage mission
is ordered to gain information ,are different from those sought by Rameses and
Joshua, and have a definite strategic character:
1. "And sec the land, what it is...."
2. "And the people thar dwellerh therein, whether they be strong or weak, few
or many."
3. "And what the land is they dwell in, whether it be good or bad."
4-. "And what cities they be that they dwell in, whether in camps, or in srrong-
holds."
5. "And what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be wood
therein, or nor."
110
Ambtlsh
mid Night Fighting
The functioning of good intelligence service enabled small forces in particular
to undertake ambush as a regulat method of warfare. Tactically, the ambush is the
most murderous form of battle, which exploits the principle of surprise to its
maximum. ,
Apart from the ambush incidents included in the general battle operations
mentioned earlier, we have additional information on the use of the ambush in
this period. The Anastasi PapyrtlS I contains the following interesting question
which is put to a military scribe to test his knowledge:
"Behold, the ambuscade is in a ravine 2,000 cubits deep, filled with boulders
and pebbles. Thou makest a detour as thou graspest the bow. Thou makest a feint
to thy left, that thou mightest make the chiefs to see, but their cyes are good and
thy hand falters. Thou perish like a lion, 0, good tnahar [swift military scribe]."
This type of ambush was carried out particularly in rugged areas of rough
broken ground, marked by ravines and dry riverbeds, which impeded the
maneuverability of the enemy's chariots. There is little doubt that this kind of
ambush is what the officers ofThutmose feared when they sought to dissuade him
from taking the direct route through the defile of the Aruna stream. The defile and
the hazard of ambush while moving through it are dramatically described in the
same Anastasi Papyrus:
"The narrow valley is dangerous with Bedouin, hidden under the bushes.
Some of them are 4- or 5 cubits from their noses to the heel, and fierce of face.
Their hearts are not mild, and they do not listen to wheedling. Thou art alone;
there is no scribe with thee, no army behind thee. Thou findcst no scout, that he
might make thee a way crossing. Thou cornesr to a decision going forward,
although thou knowest not the road. Shuddering seizes thee, the hair of thy head
stands up, and thy soul lies in thy hand. Thy path is filled with boulders and with
reeds, thorns, brambles, and 'wolf paw.' The ravine is on one side of thee, and the
mountain rises on the other. Thou goest on jolting, with thy chariot on its side,
af",J to press thy horse liard. If it should be thrown toward the abyss, thy collar-
plc'CC would be left uncovered and thy girth would fall. Thou unfasten the yoke
in order to repair the collar-piece in the middle of the narrow valley. Thou art not
competent in the way to bind it; thou knowest not how to lash it. ... Thou
srarrcst to trot. The sky is opened. Then thou thinkest that the foe is behind
thtl' .. . . tt
The darkness of night necessary to the laying of an ambush, was also required
hI Irregular forces operating against a regular army, both to cover their advance
and to launch their attack. The book of Joshua describes how at times Joshua
would advance all through the night in order to surprise the enemy at dawn.
Smnlarly, one of the documents of Mursilis, the Hittite King, speaks of the special
','CUnty orders he gave to his forces lor his own safety when he was compelled to
nuke a night march. The same document echoes the wrath of the regular armies
ag,unst night attacks and night ambush by the irregulars:
"They [the irregulars] did not dare to attack me in the daylight, and preferred
to fIll on me during the night. In the night we will attack him."
The ambush was only a minor action among the operations of regular armies Standard Formations
-r!",ugh it was not so considered by its victims. The chronicles of war and the III
Army Orgmliz atioll
II2
I II Auacl:
T HE PE RIOD O F THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT
many illustrated monuments show that in the imposing battles in open terrain,
large military formations took parr, well organized in the phalanx, charging each
other in hand-t o-hand combat.
Thealliedarmy under the Hittite King at Kadesh is estimated at between
16 ,000 and t7.ooo men. In the chariot units were 7.500 men-each of the 2.500,
had a crew of rhree.s' The rest were infant ry, stationed behind Kadesh, who were
organized in phalanx battle formatio n.
The Egyptian anny hadfour divisions, each of 5,000 men. This estimate is
supported by the information contained in the Anastasi Papyrus, in another rest '
questiou put to a military scribe on the subject ofsupplies to an Eg yptian expedi-
tionary force composed of Egyptian troops and various mercenaries :
"Thou art sent on a mission to Djahi at [he head of [he victorious army, to
crush the rebels called Naarun. The bowmen of the army whi ch is before thee
[i.e., the Egypt ian army ] amount to 1,900, the Sherden p o, the Qeh eq 1,600, the
Meshwesh 100, and the Negroes 880-tota15,000 in all not counting their officers."
Similarly, the King of Byblos (Gebal) in the Tell el- Amama letters requests
the Pharaoh to send an expeditionary force of 5,000 men and 50 chariots to
save his city.
It is not easy to present with accuracy the structure of the smaller units which
went to make up the large formations. But from the various monuments and also
from the Bible, it can be assumed that they were based on the decimal notation.
The -smallest unit , the section. apparently compris ed TO men, and the platoon
50 men. We have no clear inform ation on the strength of the compa ny, but we
can infer from the Egyptian document> that it consisted of not more than four or
five pl.tOOllS-200 at 250 men. Between the comp.ny and the division (really a.
brigadej there was certainly the batt alion whose total strength was not fixed but
1
was composed of several companies , four or five.
At all events, both the written documents and the reliefs clearly indicate that
these divisions not only marched together, arranged in a specially organi zed pattern
but that.they also fough t under the organization of the deep phalanx. made up of
straight ranks in close order. A poeti c description of an army on the march in close
forma tion appears in one of the documents of Ugarit:
"They march in thousands serried and in myriads massed. After two, two
march, after three all of them."
The reliefsof the Bartle ofK.adesh clearly portr.y the assault of ihe Na' arun
unit in phalanx formation, with a phalanx of ten ranks, line abreast, and the ten
men in each section for ming a file, one behind the oth er, one in each rank. Th e
Hittite infantry behind the city of Kadesh are depicted in the same w.y. But they
are shown before.rhe action, while their phalanx are still organized for the rnarch.:
So they are depicted as a column, and the ten-man section is converted from a file
into a .line-abr east rank, From the reliefs, it is easy to gather how the phalanx .
transformeclits pattern of organization for the march into its organization fot
attack. It can bebest explained by diagram. '
I5 70-I200B. C .
The allied armyunder the Hi tti te King at Kadesh had 2,500 chariots. We have Chariot Units
no breakdown of this figure whi ch would enable us to determine the size of the
chariot unit of each king. But since we know that this allied force comprised the
men of very many kings, we can assume that each unit was not larger than 300
chariots, and many were very much smaller.
The documents of Tell el-Amarna make frequent mention of units of 50 .
chariots. 30. and even 10. Similarly. we know of 100- and jo-chariot units in .
Anatolia, The documents of Nuzi mention units of 50 chariots under the com-
mand ofa "Captain of Fifry." And this is true also of Egypt. All this suggests that
the basic unit consisted of 10, and several such units would make up a squadro n
of 30 or 50 chariots. Presumably the largest tactic. I uni t consisted of 150.
These were usually attached to infantry divisions of expeditionary forces.
It may be recorded that in this period, chariot units were still the only mobile
formations in the armies of the lands of the Bible, for the cavalry regiment did not
make its appearanccuntilthe end of the second millennium. In this period, we know
of the horseman being used only for isolated communications functio ns, such as
messengers (221). Let us add. as a piquant item, the followi ng extract from a letter
by the King of Byblos:
"The messenger of the king of Aceo is more heeded than my messenger,
because a horse was given to him."
The employment of such large armies and their operation at such distances lHi!irary Administration
from"their main bases naturally called for ramified milit ary administration. And,
indeed, the numerous written documents from Nuzi, Ugari t, Anarolia, and Egypt
clearly indicate the existence in this period of well-developed quarterma ster and
adj utant services whi ch maintai ned detailed records of the army formations. their
equipment , the sums of money paid to them. and so on. We also learn from these
records and from the illustrated monuments that detailed lists were prepared of
captured booty, categorized according to type.
The problem ofsupply to expediti onary forces was not easy. And the military
scribes and qwutermasrers under went special exercises to make them profi cient in
determining the battl e rations requited by the various army corps. Here, fot
example, is a test question on the subject which appears further down in the
Anastasi Papyrus I which we quoted earlier in connexion with the 5.00Q-strong
Egyptian expeditionary force:
"There is brought thee a peace offering before thee; bread, cattle, and wine.
The number of men is too great for thee. Whereas the provisions arc too small for
them. . . . Th ou receive them. place them in camp . The troops are ready and
prepared. Make them quickly int o portions, that of each man at his hand. . . .
Midday is come. the camp is hot. Time to start ! Don' t let the troop commander
be angry ! Much marching isahead of us. What bread have we at all!, . .. So thou
art an experienced scribe. if thou canst approac h to give the provisions."
. This document. too. shows that an expeditionary force did not bring with it
all the supplies it would need, but got much of its food from the produce of the I 13
II4
THE PERIOD OF THE SOJOURN IN EGYPT
land through which it passed and from supplies and equipment provided by the
various enthralled local governots. From the narrative of the Battle of Megiddo
by Thunnose Hl, we learn that a good part of the food for his men and fodder for
his beasts came from the local produce. The' letters of Tell el-Amarna contain a
many notifications to the Egyptian Pharaoh from the kingsof Canaan, assuring
him that they have prepared all the requisite supplies for his expeditionary army,
as requested in prior orders by the military scribes.
Those supplies which accompaniedan army were carried by pack ass and
ox-drawn wagons, The wagons bore the-collapsible partsof camps. as at Kadesh,
and sometimes.even boats needed for ferrying troops across a river, as we see from
the document of Thutmose Ill:
"When my Majesty crossed over to the marches of Asia, I had many ships of
cedar built on the mountain of God's land [the Middle East], near the Lady of
Byblos. They were placed on chariots with cattle drawing them. They journeyed
in front of my Majesty, in order to cross that great river which lies between this
foreign country and Naharin."
Thc military panorama of this lively period of history is one of formidable
fortifications encircling the key cities of the Middle East; of large, well-trained
armies, equipped with chariots and supply and engineering services, moving
between Egypt and Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Canaan; of ferocious battles
waged between mighty empires, involving high tactical skill and ingenious
stratagems. These military campaigns eventually drained the energy and resources
of most of these kingdoms and led to their downfall. And this opened the way to
new nations, like the Tribes of Israel from the east and the Sea Peoples from the
west andnorth, who conquered and settled large areas of Palestine over which the
mighty nations of earlier ages had fought for so long.
"
1\
PLATES
VOLUME ONE
Page fI R: Up per left, granit e stele from War-
ka, LICe Proto-Literate. Baghdad Museum.
ULl({ Om. Hunters" Slue Palette (including: C3H
of the upper righ t fragmenc). Late Pr e-
Dyn.rsric. British Museum. Middle, cylinder
SCJ I from Hicrakonpolis, Pre- Dynastic. The
Petr ie Collection. Page 119 . top; Original
upper fragmt"nt of Hunt ers' Slate Palet te.
Louvre. Bon om: Slate fragme nt from Lower
Egypr. Pre-Dynastic. Museum
of Art.
1 19
The bow. Two types emerge in the
fourth millennium-s-
in Mesopotamia,
a single-arc form;
in Egypt, a double-
convex weapon
The Nimrod-like Mesopotamian king (,)
depicted on the c. 3000 B.C. commemorative
stele on page II 8 (upper left) holds an almost
semicircular single-arc wC3pon in the lower
hunti ng scene. In contrast, the Egypti.tnbow
forms on both the cylinder SC'.JI (page I I !I.
middle) and me celebrated Hunt ers' Slate
Palette (lower left, and enlarged fragmeD(,
upper righ() show a double-convex instru-
ment in usc at the same orne. Hunting figures
on the palette also exhibit long spe.us, maces,
boomerangs, double-headed axes, and the
fork-headed arrow. Anot her instance of the
l.rsr is shown in the fragme ntary Egypt ian
carving at the lower right, in which J fork-
headed arrow has pierced a warri or' s body .
lI 8
TlO
The mace-
key weapon
for hand-to-hand
fighting until
the appearance
of the helmet
The maceheads shown here, all from the
period between 3500 and 2500 B.C., embrace
a variety of materials and shapes. The round
copper examples (upper left) art from excava-
tions near Beer-sheba. Below them arc two
Mesopotamian limestone mace-heads, borh
poar...hapcd and fiured. Tho porphyry. disk-
shaped example (above) and the magnificent
ceremonial macehead of King Scorpion
(right) arc both Egyptian.
Above left: Marchcads from r.nAbu Mat.ir,
Chalcolirhic. I Jcpartutenr of Antiquities,
Museum. Jerusalem. Below
lett: Macchc.ids from Tdl Agn,b. E,nly
Dynastic. Museum of the OriC11u} Institute,
Chi('agn. Above: E;ypti.1ll macehcad. Pre-
1);;11:15U':' Hrmsh l'v1USCUllL Richt: Kllltt
Scorpion Ill.lCdK'.1J from Hicr rkonpolis.
Late Prc-Dvn.istic. Ashmolean Museum, 0:-;:-
ford.
T HE PER IOD BEF O RE A BRA H A M ( 4000-2 100 B. C. )
12 4
King Narrner
subdues
Southern
Palestine
l eft: Hen.. -, on the reverse side of the Palette of
King Na rmer , the King wears (he crown of
Upper Egypt. Below him, ( W O enemies lice
from stron ghol ds that are depicted in minia -
cure-c-one, J. rectangular bastioned cirv, which
may repr esent settlements west of 'jor dau : the
other, a kite-shaped encl osure, possibly sym-
bolizing territ ory cast ofJ ordan. The drawings
represent Trans-j ordanien kite- shaped en-
closures similar to that shown on the palette.
Far left: Palett e of King Narmer. Left. above:
Plan of a kite-shaped desert enclosure. Below :
Stone from the Cairn of H.lIli'.
Safaitic period. Trans-jordan .
The mace in action
The famous slate palette on page 12 4 shows
the King stri king his enemy with a mace. Its
handle is bound wi th cor d, probably to prevent
slipping. A similarly bound mace (c. 1900 H.C. )
appe,us in use on an ivory plaque from AbyJ m
(upper right) commemorating the victory of
King \Vcdymu over the Semites, and inscribed
" First rime of smiting of the East." The
middle illustrati on nf .3cylinder sr ,ll from the
samc' P'..riod show) a bound captive
struck wi th J. mao- . Two fine m. nc-
her.Is [horh Co R.C.). enc of brccci.r rock
and rhc other of .rl duvcr, OOl J IH c m cJ wuh
md f tlulI n, .' ppl...u bclov,.
Right. {dP t o bottom : Plaque from Abvdcs .
lsr Dyna sty. British Museum. Ivory cylinder
seal {rom Hicr akonpolis, Isr Dynas ty. Briti sh
Museum. Early Dvnasric macehccds. British
.
12 6
This socketed axehcad, found in a cave in t he
j udean desert in Israel berweeu Ei Cedi and
Massada in 1901, is par t of J. discovery th at
makes revolutionary impact on accepted ideas
of the technical level and ethn ic character of
-c-and contacts between- the lands of the
Bible Juring this early period. The more than
450 copper objects found belong to the end of
the Chalcolitbic and the beginning of t he
Early Brcnze periods- c. 3 100 D. C.
Th e axcheads, like this one, reveal the hi gh
technical ..randards that the period achieved.
They are certainly not inferior to the Sumerian
socketed 4Xe-S of the: first half of the third
millenn ium (see page:: I ] 7) which, pri or to the
196 1 judean discover y. were considered as a
standard of perfection for contemporary
metal-work.
Th e exact origin of the obj ecrs-e-which in-
eludes many cult instruments-in the Jude an
find is unknown . The pres<,' nce among them
of socketed piercing axes s u ~ s t s the moun -
rainous regions to the north and east of
Mesopotarnia-c-the area whi ch g.:we bi rth to,
or W.:lS domin ant in, the launching of Surner-
ian culture. On the other hand, both the shape
and quantity of the maceheads found indicate
close contact with Egypt , Palestine, and Syria.
Sinceaccess to the cave in which the cache was
located wa s very difficult, it is presumed that
the objects were brou ght there by local resi-
dent s who were for ced [Q Hee befor e an
invading force. The possibility is tha t this out-
side force was an Egyptlan army. for at the
end of the four th millennium, and the begin-
ning of the third, the Egypt ians began to
undertake widespread military action (see
page 124) in the sout hern regions of Palestine
and Trans-j ordan and even beyond .
Socketed axehcad from Nahal Mishrnar
(c. 3100 B.C.). Dep artm ent of Antiquities,
Archaeological Museum. Jerusalem.
r u u 1'1, 1< 10 11 BEf OR E A BRA H A M ( 4000- 2 100 II . C . )
Gebal
r
An important cache of weapons
and cult objects
1 2
7
The four-wheeled battle chariot harnessed to
four equines, depicted on this Mesopotamian
vase, was capable of carrying two men.
Despite its early date (c. 2800 B,C.), it incor-
porates such features as milled (or studded)
wheels for improved traction,
Left: Two views of a vase from Khafajah,
Early Dynastic II. British Museum. Above:
Drawing of the vase panel depicting the
chariot.
A lighter, two-wheeled Sumerian chariot
from the same period (c. 2800 B.C.), harnessed
to four onagers. Although not equipped with
arms like the javelin-carrying four-wheeled
chariot, these smaller chariots undoubtedly
served on the battlefield, at least for com-
munications. This modem model, patterned
on an ancient j-inch copper miniature, reveals
characteristic details like the studded three-
board wheels md the rein ring, through which
passes the sin~ pair of reins attached to .an
inside animal.
Facing page: Model, in Museum of the
Oriental Institute, Chicago, based on copper
miniature from Tell Agrab, Early Dynastic n.
Baghdad Museum,
ru s PERIOD BEFORE ABRAHAM (4000-2fOO B.C.)
Chariots-in widespread use in
Mesopotamia in the first half of
the third millennium E.c.
although unknown in Egypt
until more than r,ooo years later 12
9
r
A lr,lgment of J limestone relief dn ed c. 2500
B.C., dearly depicts the three-boarded rimmed
struct ure of the chariot wheel. The pole
eme rges from the body of this chariot in a
high curve, and, descends toward the four
onagcrs. The reins pass through the rein ring
arcached to rhc p"l l'. Th is two-wheeled chari ot
is ,.. qu ipped tor b.ndc wi th quiver of j avelins
and swo rds with crescen t-shaped pommels.
l eft : Th e crude (b y ruodcl of a two-wheeled
Sumer ian d l.lri.)(, J .lll'J C 2800--2700 B. C. has
n... ,,) lrolcs fur ril l ' reins carefully pierced in the
breast.
Above: Rchef from Ur , Early Dynastic m
(Isr I)ynnry (If Ur). University of Penn-
sylv:mil Museum. Left: Model from Kish,
Eatl y Museum of the Oriental
Institute, Ch.ic.l:!.,.
The chariot charact eristically
made usc of a rein ring mounted on the pole
to keep the reins from snarling. This silver rein
right (far right ), found in (he tomb of Queen
Shubad of Ur and dated c. 2.500 B. C. , is decor-
ated with an onagcr of electrum, an alia)' of
silver and gold.
Right: A much lat er day cult model of a rwo-
wheeled chario t (c. 20C() B.C. ) isessentially the
same J5 the one found at Kish and illus trat ed
on this page.
Far right : Rein ring from Ur , Early Dynastic
III, British Museum. Right: Model from
Lagash, Nee- Sume rian. Louvre,
T H E PEHl O J) BCl ORE ABR A ll.\M ( .. 0 0 0 2 10 0 B. C . )
The legacy
of chariot illustration
is rich and varied
J 3 I
The SUOd,lfJ ofUr war pmcl. 'JIlC of rbc two
most import.mr lDllitJry documents of the-
third millennium H.C.
C"l'pa The Sumerian [center},
hy the royal guard and Ins four-
wheeled W.1f chrriot, receives a precession of
hound captives,
Afiddle(c'gisfCf, A phalanx of Sumerian soldiers,
armed wirh spears and wearing metal helmets
and studded capt.-'S, charges the enemy.
Lower rt'gi:-rcr, Four four-wheeled chariots in a
battle which some authorities interpret
.:IS the- s.uuc chariot in successive stages of
motion. The type of chariot shown here has
room for two mcn------tlrivcr JuJ warrior-r-and
is equipped with quiver .md javelins. The rein
rin?" [most dearly shown at kft). although
undccor arcd. is similar to the silver example
shown on p3gC J 3I.
Ah,lVC: Panel, encrusted with slnll.Iapis Iazuli,
and red limestone. E,irly Dynastic 1II (c. 2500
8.C.). Bnnsb Museum l.ch : A clay model of
a chcnor [rum Kish.
The Sumerian anny
fights and subdues its enerrues
133
134
The King of Lagash
leads his troops
to battle
The ocher of the two most import ant military
documents of the third millennium e.c.c-the
Stele of Vultures .
Upper u g;Sft" , Eannatum, King of Lagash
(right ), leads a heavily armed phalanx of
soldiers in ;;I column of six Cues [indicated by
the six tiers of and six mew studs 0 0 the
shields). The troops. wearing meu l helmets
and heavy rectang ular shields. and armed wi th
heavy which hold with both hands,
charge over the bodies of their fallen enemies.
Lo wer f egisur. Eannarum, in 1 chariot equ ipped
wit h qui ver , light javelins, and a batt lcaxe,
leads charg ing trOOp s we aring metal helmets
-but wit hout shields-s-and armed wit h long
spears and socketed axes. The King holds 4-
long spear in his left hand, 1 sickle sword in
his right.
Limestone stele from Telloh, Early Dyn ast ic
1II (c. 2500 B.C. ). Louvre. Right: Silver
javel in-head from Ur , Early Dynastic ill.
\
lhc socketed .rcc W,,$ IJIle ,)f the Sumcri.ms
most rcm.irknblc .achievements.
like the c')ppn one shown on p.lW t jo
(c 1500 n.c.] were c.cp.ihlc of sturdy
metal helmets by virtue of a long, narrow
profile and firm anchoring on handles that
could be swung with force. The royal axe
shown here (also c. 2500 B,C.), a ceremonial
object with gold bands around the wooden
137
Left: Axe from Ur, Early Dynastic III. British
Museum. Above: Conch plaque from temple
of Ishtar at Mar i, Early Dynastic III. Louvre.
!ut"t, emb,)dlcs the s.rlrcnt fc.imrcs. Above: .J\
mcr.d-hchnctc-! warrior (shown on ,I .undl
pLqUl' fr.uu rjn- s.imc c.rrrrcs ,ISIKkl:tt.'J
lXC ,1l1J .1 WClpnl1 rb.n has been ilklltlflt'l{ :1::;.1
sickle sword.
Above: Relief on J circular column b.rsc from
Lagash, Early Dvn.istic JII, Louvre. Rurht:
Socketed axchcad from Klut"Jj_th, EJrly
Dynastic III. Museum ofthe Oricnr allnstnutc.
Chicago,
The sword that Emn.irum h(lids in the lower
resister of thc Stele of Vuhurcs (p:lgC I3 5)
:a.ppc:lr:i Jg.tin .rr the Icfr of this relicf, Jetted
c. 2500 B.C., anti in the vimil.uly dared conch
pl.cquc (rum Mari on p.q;(: 137. These three
instances JrguL' th.u the sickle sword lud made
its debut in the Sumerian period. Here the
sword-bearer with J. shield tJCL"S a warrior
armed with a SpC.tf
Weapons
for hand-to-hand fighting 136
THE PERIOD BEFORE ABRAHAM (4000-2100 B.C.)
00
00
The sword
lagged behind the
mace and the axe
as a decisive
weapon of warfare
The swords that appeared in the third millen-
nium were more like daggers---designcd
mainly f,)r stabbing. I-jilts. like the lapis lazuli
one shown at left, were secured to the blade
with nails, an atr.ichmcnt too weak to permit
a downward swing. A crescent hilt, like the
nne: on the iron sword (left, above) definircly
[iuritcc] usc to a t()[w,lrd thrust.
Left: Gold sword .md gold-decorated open-
work sheath from the Royal Cemetery at Ur.
The plain back of the sheath has two vertical
slits to allow it to be attached to the belt. Early
Dynastic III (c. 2500 B.C.). Baghdad Museum.
Left, above: Iron sword with gold-covered
crescent hilt from the royal tomb at Abc.
HUyUk, Anatolia (c. 2500 B.C.). Hittite
The sword was one
of the earli est objects
made of iron
Anatolian armorers were experimenting with
iron ;1$ lOJ rly as the third mi llenni um in
orde r to produce :l longer and stronger
At h:tl 0 11 this page. an iron swo rd
from the royal treasure ll t Dorak, with cb-
snl ian porumc ] cud hill studded wi th gold and
amber, is 75 f ms. lollg. The hronre swo rd
side it [also from Dorak] has J, stained ivory
hand le cove red wi th gold and J po mmel of
rock-crystal.
Pour addi nonal swords from Dor.ik, shown
on pJ.gl' 144. incorporate (k ti: r right) a
bron ze blade .. md bon -head pommel of cock-
cr ystal wi th eves .,f lr pis 11I 11 1i; J srlvcr blade
anda gold rcn tr.il and a lion-bead 1")lU-
nu-l of pJ.k hlue "t.' IlC with ncphntc riv..ts; .1
bronze bbJc. :-:. olJ lulr .l ll t l l .q-is lazuh pom-
mel: and a '1k n 1,1.1.., dt"Cnr lf,d wi rh . 1 hoar
mou f silver hdf ll c( n U h.'d with"!! ,.,I, j dol phinv.
.: :
\ . . ..-
! . ,
.' ... .-..... ,;(
e
; I
I
I
I
i
This drawing of a limestone relief (above)
from the 24m CL'11tury B.C shows Egyptian
troops armed with shallow axes in open battle
with long-haired Semites. At the right, in the
earliest known depiction of siege activities,
the Egyptians raise a scaling-ladder against the
walls of their enemies' fortified ciry and.
below, usc battering-poles to breach the gate
of the city, which is flanked by semicircular
bastions, like the other bastions of the city.
The late-third-millennium shallow axehcad
(below right), of the same type as those de-
picted in the siege scene. is pierced with holt'S
for securing it to J haft. The scene of Egyptian
archers (below left) was discovered at Lislu in
the vicinity of the pyramid of Amcncmbvr I,
the founder of the XIIth Dynasty. T.ikcn by
him from earlier buildings, such fr
wac used as fill for his own tomb. TillSpiece
probably came from structures connected with
the Great Pyramid of Cheeps, which have
almost entirely disappeared as a result of such
despoiling.
Above: Relief in the tomb of Anta, Desha-she,
Upper Egypt, Late Vrh Dynasty. Below
right: Axehead. British Museum. Below
lcfi: Relief from the reign of Cheeps, IVth
Dynasty.
"' iii
The Egyptians besiege and attack a fortified city
K
A wall painting from a z jrd-century B.C.
tomb shows another Egyptian siege. here
involving a unique mobile scaling-ladder. The
attacking army uses axes with semicircular
heads like the one shown at right.
Above: Wall painting from the tomb of
Kaemhescr, Saqqarah. Vlrh Dvnastv. Righr:
Axehcad, larc third millennium KC. Metro-
politan Museum of Art.
THE PEHIOD BEFOHE ABRAHAM (4000--2100 B.C.)
ru s PERIOD BEFORE ABRAHAM (4000-2100 B.C.)
Thl' composite bow m,ly have been the deer-
sivc t.rctor in Acc.rdun vicrorv over the
Sumcrr.ms. In the detail {above) from .1 com-
m, mor.uivc found .ir SllSJ, the victorious
Kill::: Nar am-Sin, shown trampling hi'>
enemies, holds what seems to be the first
recorded example of this effective
The- King wears a homed helmet-a symbol
of dcific'ation-c-and also carries a narrow-
bladed .1XC on his left arm, an arrow in his
riulir lund. Above .u the c. 2-000 B.C.
Ilusluulia (thc' ruler <It Eshuuma} shows a
simil.irlv victorious J.nJ helmeted dl'ity (Tish-
polk) armed with an epsilon axe.
Above lefr: Sandstone stele from Susa, zj rd
century a.c. Louvre, Right: Impression of a
seal from Tell el-AS013.r, Nee-Sumerian
period. Museum of the Oriental Institute,
Chicago.
Facing page. left: A fragment of another
Accadian stele shows the composite bow in
action, Right, a second Accadion
shows captives before a soldier
with a bartleaxc.
Facing page. lefr: Limestone stele fr.lgmen[
from Lagash, period of Sargon or Naram-Sin-
Louvre. Right: Diorite stele fragment trom
Susa, Accadian period, Louvre.
The earliest known
representation of
the composite bow
151