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    Simon Kitson analyses the process of arresting Nazi spies and preserving sovereignty in Vichy France during the Second World War. This article deals with the controversial and neglected topic of the anti-German aspect of counter-espionage in wartime France. The Vichy government initially tolerated the arrest of Nazi agents as a way of securing its sovereignty over the 'unoccupied' parts of France or paradoxically of reinforcing collaboration by offering arrested spies as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the Nazis. Rapidly it began to back-track, undermining its secret services in this domain, as the desire to avoid diplomatic incidents weakened its resolve. Members of the secret services themselves took the dangerous decision to continue to see the Germans as an enemy power, although this attitude was never entirely devoid of ambiguity.

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    Simon KItson- Arresting Nazi Spies in Vichy France 1940-1942

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    Simon Kitson analyses the process of arresting Nazi spies and preserving sovereignty in Vichy France during the Second World War. This article deals with the controversial and neglected topic of the anti-German aspect of counter-espionage in wartime France. The Vichy government initially tolerated the arrest of Nazi agents as a way of securing its sovereignty over the 'unoccupied' parts of France or paradoxically of reinforcing collaboration by offering arrested spies as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the Nazis. Rapidly it began to back-track, undermining its secret services in this domain, as the desire to avoid diplomatic incidents weakened its resolve. Members of the secret services themselves took the dangerous decision to continue to see the Germans as an enemy power, although this attitude was never entirely devoid of ambiguity.

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    773 views42 pages

    Simon KItson - Arresting Nazi Spies in Vichy France 1940-1942

    Uploaded by

    skakpool
    Simon Kitson analyses the process of arresting Nazi spies and preserving sovereignty in Vichy France during the Second World War. This article deals with the controversial and neglected topic of the anti-German aspect of counter-espionage in wartime France. The Vichy government initially tolerated the arrest of Nazi agents as a way of securing its sovereignty over the 'unoccupied' parts of France or paradoxically of reinforcing collaboration by offering arrested spies as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the Nazis. Rapidly it began to back-track, undermining its secret services in this domain, as the desire to avoid diplomatic incidents weakened its resolve. Members of the secret services themselves took the dangerous decision to continue to see the Germans as an enemy power, although this attitude was never entirely devoid of ambiguity.

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    Simon Kitson, ‘Arresting Nazi Spies in Vichy France (1940-42)’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol 15, No 1, Spring 2000, pp 80-120 Simon Kitson is Director of Research at the University of London Institute in Paris Arresting Nazi Spies in Vichy France (1940-42) SIMON KITSON This article deals with the controversial and neglected topic of the anti-German aspect of counter-espionage in wartime France. The Vicky goverament initially tolerated the arrest of Nazi agents as away of securing its sovereignty over the ‘unoccupied’ parts of France or paradoxically of reinforcing collaboration by offering arrested spies as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the Nazis. Rapidly it began to back-track, undermining its secret services in this domain, as the desire to avoid diplomatic incidents weakened its resolve. Members of the secret services themselves took the dangerous decision to continue to see the Germans as an enemy power, although this attitude was never entirely devoid of ambiguity. ‘That Vichy Secret Services engaged in counter-espionage activity against Axis agents working in the unoccupied zone of France and the French Empire during the Second World War is well known to scholars of the period. However, although many historians acknowledge the existence of this activity few devote more than a couple of lines to it" Military histories barely touch on it. Paxton’s authoritative overview of the attitudes and activities of the officer corps during the war mentions in passing that evidence exists confirming that anti-Axis counter-espionage continued despite the armistice Histories of the Resistance have been no more ‘generous in the space accorded to the subject. In allotting a whole paragraph to this topic, Kedward’s excellent study of Resistance in the Southem zone of France is among the most generous.’ In a recent series of five colloquiums organised by the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent devoted to the theme of Resistance, counter-espionage was touched on by only two participants." Given the reluctance of scholars to address this area of Vichy policy, the standard references on the subject have become the numerous memoirs of members of the secret services, almost all published between 1966 and 19795 These memoirs represent a valuable source although it must be acknowledged that they have their own agenda ~ whether it be the Inzeltigence and Netonal Security, VLS, No.1 (Spring 000), pp.80-120 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 81 heroisation and self-justification of the authors or axes to grind against rival services and administrations. The two popular historians, Philip John Stead and Douglas Porch, who have offered more detailed accounts of this aspect of war-time secret services have both worked almost exclusively from these memoirs.’ The limited Jevel of research on this subject fits into a more long-term reluctance on the part of the French to stady intelligence work, a reluctance addressed by Christopher Andrew in an interview in L'Histoire.’ Andrew rightly claims that research into intelligence gathering runs counter to the French tradition of studying history primarily through the matrix of political ideology and affiliation into which the shady world of espionage and counter-espionage has difficulty adapting. General Henri Navarre, who participated in counter-espionage in his role as head of the Second Bureau in North Africa from 1940 to 1942, also offers a political explanation for the silence of historians on this question’ He believes that historians lack objectivity with regard to this topic because they are reluctant to report on Resistance activity carried out within the framework of Vichy administrations but that above all they are blinded by their anti-militarism ‘which makes them prefer the notion of Resistance being a civilian activity, organised by the left-wing. This explanation is very harsh but not entirely devoid of truth. The ambiguity of Resisters within Vichy administrations is a difficult subject for historians and itis only relatively recently that they have begun to give it the attention it deserves even though ambiguous networks like the Noyautage des Administrations Publiques (NAP), which encouraged civil servants to stay in thei administrations and to use their posts to offer help to the Resistance, continue to be under-researched. The purity of full-time Resisters devoting themselves whole-heartedly to the ‘cause’ is a much ‘more appealing image than the compromises of those who remained in their professions, displaying tokens of loyalty to Vichy authorities in order to preserve the posts from which they felt best able to help the Resistance. ‘Moreover within their ambiguity it is sometimes difficult to establish the frontiers of Resistance and Collaboration, to determine whether an individual is offering help to the Resistance as a safeguard for their future despite a personal history of collaboration or whether it isthe co-operation offered to Vichy which is an expedient to cover their Resistance activity? Itis also true that a greater quantity of research has been devoted to non- military and in particular left-wing Resistance than to that conducted by right wing or military circles. However, although this trend might have been pushed too far, it can not be denied that the left were much more engaged in Resistance than the right and that ultimately Resistance in the army was a limited affair. With regard to researching wartime intelligence other reasons 2 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY can also be evoked for the deficiency. The dominant image the British have of Secret Services with regard to the Second World War is that of the success of their own services. For a long time, the notion of Secret Services in France brought to mind the much more negative vision of the mythical Fifth Column” — despite attempts of counter-espionage veterans to dispel the myth. Since historians are also citizens, the dominant images can have their influence on their choice of topic. Yet more than any other factor it is the question of the unavailability or perceived unavailability of source material which deters historians. Robert Young has drawn attention to the difficulties in the respect of counter-espionage, for the period of the war, pointing ot that much of this material was destroyed.” Given that there are genuine gaps in archives or that some material will doubtless never be accessible to historians this article cannot hope to entirely deal with all aspects of anti-German couater-espionage. However, this study will combine the use of existing material with the exploitation of those previously unused archives which do exist, From 1940, the head of the intelligence service, the Service de Renseignements, Colonel Louis Rivet, was attached to the French armistice commission. It is therefore ‘unsurprising that the mass of documents left by this commission, and now housed in the Archives Nationales (AN), should include a large collection of papers referring to this topic, particularly given that the arrest of Nazi spies was a regular bone of contention with their German counterparts. Nine boxes are devoted to the arrest of Germans in France during the war.” Although most of these arrests occurred for common law offences, mixed in ‘among this collection are a large number referring to Nazi agents detained by the French. The dossiers vary considerably in size and quality, some bing limited to information concerning individuals’ identity and eventual release while others give us a much greater insight into their activities and the whys and wherefores of their arrest. These files contain documentation from a wide range of origins: ‘government correspondence; intemal notes from the armistice commission; ‘correspondence between French and German authorities; reports from the police as well as from military and civilian secret services; copies of ‘questionnaires found on agents at the time of their arrest; letters written by Nazi agents from their prison cells; military justice documents concerning the accusations levelled against them; as well as the very interesting reports of the liaison officers who, serving as intermediaries between the commission and Nazi authorities, used their functions to spy on the Germans and to listen in on the conversation between German Red Cross visitors and detained Nazi agents. This source is supplemented by information I have gathered since 1991 rescarching the Marseille police. The note written in May 1941 by Henry ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 83 Rollin," chargé de mission in the Interior Ministry and subsequently Director of the Police,* concerning the possible unification of different ‘counter-espionage strictures under the auspices of the newly created Renseignements Généraux, is very instructive as are documents contained. in the post-war trials of certain senior civil servants and ministers attached to the Ministry of the Interior. ‘The collection compiled by the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxitme ‘Guerre Mondiale contains some useful material. One box gathers together range of documentation from one of Vichy’s counter-espionage agencies, the Bureau des Menées Anti-Nationales, including résumés of their action, interviews with veterans of the service and several contemporary documents.” This information can usefully be supplemented by the box ‘concerned with the Police Resistance network, the Réseau Ajax." Diverse documents scattered throughout the Service Historique de !'Armée de Terre (SHAT) archives at Vincennes and the Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhne (AD BDR) in Marseille, also touch on questions of espionage and counter-espionage.”” COUNTER-ESPIONAGE UNDER VICHY Both military and civilian structures were responsible for Vichy counter- espionage activity. Despite the fact that the vast majority of memoirs of wartime counter-espionage are written by former army officers, it was the police authorities and in particular the Surveillance du Territoire (ST) which ‘carried out all of the arrests, either based on its own sources of information ‘or the dossiers military counter-espionage services had compiled. The ST ‘was initially founded in the wake of the disgrace of the military special services during the Dreyfus affair but its original structures were rapidly abolished and it was not until the 1930s that this administration began to have any meaningful existence. Decrees of 1934 and 1937, gave it a semi- ‘autonomous structure and organized it into regional brigades." In the immediate aftermarth of the French defeat in 1940 the Surveillance du ‘Territoire wound down much of its operation.” It was only from September 1940 that the ST seriously resumed anti-German activity, combining this with its new anti-British and anti-Gaullist missions. Despite officially losing their counter-espionage missions in 1899, rilitary structures had continued to be active in this domain and remained so daring the Nazi occupation. The Deuxidme Bureau of the Army General ‘Staff was concerned with centralising and analysing information gathered from other sources (Service de Renseignements, Police, Embassies, etc.) in ‘order to enlighten the government. After the June 1940 armistice, its German section re-established itself in Lyon under the Icadership of 84 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY Lieutenant Colonel Louis Baril and it continued to supply the government with information on the Axis ~ although much of this was concerned with the evolution of Germany's military situation rather than counter- espionage.” Far more important for this article were the activities of the Burcau des Menges Anti-Nationales and the Travaux Ruraux, two structures formed from the re-organisation of the pre-war Army Service de Renseignements (SR) which had become the Fifth Bureau on the outbreak of war in 1939. ‘The SR is often confused with the Deuxitme Bureau but the two structures were autonomous.” This confusion originates partly with the fact that the SR derived from a ‘section de statistiques et de reconnaissance militaircs” setup in the Deuxitme Bureau in the context of French defeat in the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71 to gather information on the Prussian occupation force. In conformity with German wishes the SR was dissolved in the wake of the Armistice. However, this dissolution was merely a vencer. A new, camouflaged SR was created in the framework of a re-organisation plan put forward by Colonel Louis Rivet on 27 June 1940 and accepted by the general staff of the Army in July. Intelligence gathering and counter- espionage were no longer grouped together in a single structure but shared. ‘out between different organisms.” Counter-espionage was entrusted to an official structure, the Bureaux des Menées Anti-Nationales or BMA created on 25 August under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel d’Alts. These BMA were authorised by the occupation forces because their declared purpose consisted of protecting the French army from the designs of British, Gaullist or Communist agents.” To do this the BMA recruited officers in each regiment whose mission was to report any subversive activity on the part of their fellow soldiers or any external attempt to penentrate the army to the BMA offices contained in all eight of the military regions in Southem France and the Empire.” Although this mission was genuine, in that BMA officers did kkeep track of the activities of these publicly designated enemies (in particular the Communists)," in reality the BMA combined this mission with a secret anti-Axis counter-espionage activity." When the BMA was officially abolished on 24 August 1942, it formed the Service de Sécurité Militaire” ‘The BMA's activity was re-inforced by a completely clandestine organism, which was officially attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, but ‘was really just an offshoot of the Fifth Bureau and was financed through the secret coffers of the pre-war counter-espionage services together with money smuggled through the army accounts or confiscated from arrested German agents. This was the Travaux Ruraux (TR) to which the BMA. served as an official cover: To the outside observer the TR was an ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 85 enterprise concemed with agricultural production, an excellent cover in Vichy France with its slogan of “back to the land’, but in reality it was an anti-Axis counter-intelligence service working in close co-operation with the BMA. The TR under the leadership of Commandant Paul Paillole was run from the villa ‘Eole’ 23 Promenade de Ta Plage in Marseille and had regional outposts throughout France and North Africa." The Navy and the Air Force cach had their own intelligence service but these would appear to have been of only limited input in the arrest of Nazi agents,” Beyond services whose raison d’éire was intelligence, a wide range of individuals, social groups or administrations added their contribution to counter-espionage. Just as the Nazis established widespread contacts in the underworld, so the Secret Services sought out the help of certain gangster. It was no coincidence if after the 1944 liberation senior members of the police hicrarchy, drawn from the ranks of the wartime ST, intervened to offer protection to certain underworld figures. During the Vichy years, the resourcefulness and ruthlessness of some of these individuals could be uscd to eliminate certain enemy agents or later to help organise jail-breaks of arrested members of counter-intelligence networks. Parallel police forces established under the name of Centre 4'Information ct d'Etudes in the case of the army officer Colonel Georges Groussard’s organisation or the Section Spéciale in the case of the structure set up by the Directeur Général of the Criminal Police, Pietre Mondane!, also added their brick to the counter-intelligence edifice, Groussard’s organisation was short-lived and sometimes its help was more a hinderance, but it did recommend some officers for service in the BMA.” Mondanel’s, force, which lasted until Laval's return to power in April 1942, also engaged in actions against Gaullist targets, but through contacts in various diplomatic or journalistic milieux in Vichy Mondane! was able to offer information on German activities.” Counter-espionage services also acquired the co-operation of several administrations. It was the Gendarmerie which assured delivery of messages between one BMA and another. Prefects, mainstream Police forces and structures under the auspices of the French Armistice ‘Commission all forwarded documentation to the BMA and much of this documentation was clearly designed to help in the surveillance and repression of Axis activity.® Vichy services for intercepting mail, telephone calls and telegrams supplemented this documentation. The vital role ofthe liaison officers who accompanied German officials in the unoccupied of France and its Empire cannot be over-stressed with regard to intelligence about Axis activity. These liaison officers systematically forwarded information they could glean about the situation in Germany, new personnel in German administrations in the Viehy zone 86 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY and contacts between arrested Axis agents and repatriation officials. When in the offices of German officials they made sure that their eyes ‘accidentally’ stumbled on any documentation lying around and carefully noted details about German informers" Overall counter-espionage services could count on widespread complicity. This raises the question of the attitude of Pétain’s government to the arrest of Nazi agents. Vichy is usually associated with the policy of ‘collaboration and in most respects this represents an accurate portrayal of is stance, It showed a ready willingness to participate in the deportation of ‘Jews; the tracking down of Resistance and also, but much more reluctantly, the handing over of young Frenchmen to work in Germany. How then did ‘Vichy react to the anti-German aspect of the counter-espionage activity? It sight be tearpting to assume that since the activities ofthese structures were shrouded in mystery either that the government was unaware of what was really going on or that it was unable to prevent it. This was undoubtedly truc as regards the activity of the TR whose existence was known to few." However, the ST and the BMA, were both official bodies of the state. Although the fine detail of the day-to-day running of these services right have escaped the attention of the senior echelons of the French state, it is completely inconceivable that the general trends of their activity were unknown to ministers and senior officials. The Germans regularly ‘complained to Vichy of the orientation of these services. Vichy ministors issued various instructions on the theme and summoned the chiefs of these services to explain themselves, They also participated in the negotiations to decide what to do with those arrested for this offence end, following the decision of the courts, it was Pétain himself who decided whether an individual would be pardoned or face the fing squad. This suggests that there was more initial tolerance for this counter-espionage activity than many of the memoirs suggest. However, numerous authors have shown Vichy was never a homogeneous block but rather was made up of ‘competing factions drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, often with vastly different objectives.” The area of counter-espionage was no ‘exception and at least three viewpoints can be found among senior Vichy officials on this question, ‘The first view was one of support for counter-espionage activity ‘continuing against Germany as the main enemy. ‘This was the position of certain senior military figures, such as Generals Colson, Piguendar or Revers, drawn from the traditionally anti-German miliew of the army. All the memoirs of counter-espionage veterans see the War Minister General ‘Maxime Weygand as the principle sponsor of their activity in the immediate aftermath of the armistice. Weygand had been one of the main proponents ‘of an armistice in 1940 but saw it as a temporary expedient, a brief ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 87 suspension of hostilities.“ He set about encouraging Rivet's re-organisation of intelligence structures whilst defending their excesses with colleagues in the government. Other solid supports included Marcel Peyrouton, (who replaced Adrien Marquet as Interior Minister in September 1940, before becoming Govemor of Algeria) and General Jean Bergeret, the Air Minister. ‘The second position was that of ambiguity. This was the stance adopted by General Charles Huntziger who replaced Weygand as War Minister from ‘September 1940 and was less active in his support — because it was he who had signed the armistice he was reluctant to be seen as betraying this document. Moreover, Huntziger had been so impressed by the rapidity of the French defeat that he saw the Axis as almost invincible. Nevertheless, Huntziger, who was very susceptible to Weygand’s influence, spoke up in defence of the Secret Services on occasions and tacitly tolerated their excesses on others." ‘Admiral Frangois Darlan’s position was much more difficult to fathorn, partly because it was subject to changes according to the diplomatic and military situation, Darlan, who was Prime Minister from February 1941 to April 1942 and thereafier Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, combined a strong anglophobia with an active search for state collaboration with Germany. Paillole, in particular, portrays his position as particularly hostile to anti-Axis activities and a severe obstacle for counter-intelligence services. Paillole’s hostility is fostered partly by the inter-administrative rivalry of the Navy and the Army but also by opposition to Darlan’s proposal of unifying all intelligence networks under his control, Darlan’s position in this respect would seem to have been partly influenced by the report of Henry Rollin of the Interior Ministry who firmly advocated such an approach in order to overcome the inefficiency brought about by rival intelligence services arresting each other's agents and hindering each other's activities. Rollin, who was himself a former naval officer, had no history of sympathy for the Nazis, having written one of the most damning books of the interwar period condemning their policies. In his May 1941 report, he was not advocating abandoning anti-German counter-intelligence but rather placing it on an equal footing with that against Allied agents under the control of a single agency. Darlan undoubtedly preferred the balance to be weighted more firmly against this latter category* but he was not opposed to preventing Nazi agents from having free reign throughout the Southem Zone of France and her Empire. The strength of his bargaining position with the Germans depended on the ‘maintenance of sovereignty in the Souther Zone. This principle of sovercignty was at the heart of the concems of those ‘whose position on this question may be termed ambiguous, who wanted to 88 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY see German interference in the Viety zone limited unless a concession ccould be gained for infringement of this principle but who often combined this with a fervent desire to avoid diplomatic incidents on the issue.” Vichy hhad strong strategic reasons for needing important counter-espionage services. The regime had few trump cards: its Empire; its territorial independence; its fleet; its reduced amy: its police and administration, Holding on to these attributes, assuring their integrity and independence, thus became of paramount importance. As Martin Thomas has shown in “Intelligence in Defeat’, France faced a greater range of threats after 1940 than before with the addition of an Anglo-Saxon menace to the continued ‘Axis threats to French independence and territorial integrity. Vichy's obsession with its sovereignty and desire to avoid intemal troubles reinforced the need for a strong policy in this domain.** However, sovereignty was not just a territorial question, it was also the sovercignty of the state over the individual. One vital but often overlooked element of Vichy policy in this respect was that although Pétain’s government was entirely sincere in its search for state collaboration, the government wanted to reduce to a minimum the attempts of individual citizens to enter into contact with the Germans without passing through Vichy channels, since only if the government became responsible for such initiatives could it hope to use them as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the Nazis.* It is this motivation that helps to explain why the Direction des Services de I' Armistice wrote to one of the regional heads of Vichy’s veterans association, the Légion, to insist that he should reprimand one of his subordinates who had entered into direct contact with the Germans stressing thatthe initiative of this individual made him ‘unworthy’ of belonging to the Légion ‘The third catogory consisted of those who were openly hostile to the anti-German aspect of the activities within these services. Either they belicved that France’s position in defeat was so desperate that there was no in trying to oppose the will of the victor or they wanted collaboration of the most loyal kind where France would have no secrets from German and hence no reason to prevent Nazi agents from operating throughout French-controlled territory" Most prominent in this category was Pierre Laval, who served as Premier from July to December 1940 and again from April 1942 through to August 1944. Ambiguity increasingly Jost ground to hostility as the number of diplomatic incidents provoked by the TR and ST increased and as Vichy administrations tended towards greater submission to Germany. Secret services were used to goverment indifference to their findings and lack of concem for their needs. However, under Vichy the difficulties of the relationship with central government reached new heights. The forces of hostility continually questioned the very existence of these services and ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 89 their long-term survival was constantly threatened.* Certain government policies ran directly counter to their needs and hostile rival administrations sometimes undermined their activity. In signing the armistice Vichy accepted article 19, despite considering it dishonourable, Based on a similar provision of the Versailles Treaty,* article 19 allowed the Germans to claim any of the citizens of the expanded Reich held in French custody at the time of the armistice, regardless of whether they were intemed for pro-Nazi activities or simply interned 2s refugees. This allowed the Germans to reclaim a certain number of those who had served as their agents before the armistice whilst at the same time letting them extradite anti-Nazi activists (including some agents of the 2e Bureau), among the intemed refugees. Fortunately for the Secret Services this clause was entirely mute on the ‘question of those arrested after the armistice, an omission which would be used to justify the continued imprisonment of those intemed after June 1940, but there is no doubt that many of the pro-armistice agents released thanks to this clausc resumed their previous espionage activity. In cslablishing a zone of direct occupation covering two thirds of the country to the north of a demarcation line the armistice imposed serious strategic ifficulties, Even the fiercest supporters of continued anti-Axis counter espionage did not propose arrests in the occupied zone and in order to apprehend an individual operative in that zone meant either waiting for them to cross the demarcation line of their own accord or finding a way of Joring them southwards. For those services who had previously operated in the area above this demarcation line, the occupation of the North of France involved moving offices and regrouping in the Southern Zone. French intelligence and counter-intelligence was already chronically underfunded and under-equipped in the pre-war period." This situation deteriorated further after France's defeat. Following regroupment in the Southem zone services had to improvise with the resources available." One particularly thoray problem was access to the stock of archives established jn the previous years. At the very heart of pre-war counter-espionage activity was the efficiency of the archive system which had allowed services to catalogue even the most seemingly useless information in the knowledge that when confronted with other sources this information could prove valuable. The system was so sophisticated that archivists could rapidly put together a weighty dossier containing all references to a particular individual about whom information was sought.” The police archives contained in the Streté Nationale buildings in the rue des Saussaies in Paris, were captured by German troops in June 1940, allowing the Abwehr to exploit them at their will.” ‘As regards the archives used by the Service de Renseignements, some of this documentation was destroyed for reasons of security and mobility when 90 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY flccing Paris on 11 June 1940. Ittook some time to rebuild the system in the Southern zone and the possibility of moving this documentation to the ‘reater security of North Aftica met with the constant refusal of the Navy to transport them, Re-establishing in the Southern zone also meant rebuilding a network of agents, particularly since in the chaos of the exodus many of the existing agents were scattered. Recruiting reliable new agents and establishing the right dose of mutual confidence was a painstaking and time-consuming affair which in normal times could take several years to complete. In the armistice context recruitment had to be more rapid and hhence subject to greater risk. Moreover, there was little time to train these agents, While Axis secret services possessed vast sums of money, their French counter-parts could offer very little pecuniary reward to attract now agents. Despite the difficulties and the potential dangers, and largely owing to the zeal of counter-espionage personnel, the arrest of Nazi agents after the armistice was a common occurrence. Putting an exact figure on the number of arrests is not possible. Paul Paillole of the Travaux Ruraux suggests in hhis memoirs that counter-espionage was actually more effective after the armistice than before. From only 40 arrests of Axis spies in 1936 and 494 in 1939, Paillole claims that the number arrested for pro-Axis activity passed to 601 in 1941 and 1,223 in 1942." Unfortunately Paillole failed to give a source for his figures so reserve must be expressed regarding their accuracy. Undoubtedly more reliable is an internal document addressed in November 1942 from the head of the Surveillance du Territoire in Marseille to his hierarchical superior in Vichy claiming that, between January 1941 and November 1942, the Marseille branch of this service had arrested over 170 German agents. Whatever the exact number these figutes and the vast array of cases brought to the attention of the Armistice Commission confirm that the numbers involved were far from insignit SPYING FOR GERMANY One reason for the large number of amests was the wideness of the definition given to spying and breaching state security by counter-espionage services bitten by spy-mania and keen to display zeal to avoid any accusation of responsibility for the defeat of 1940. Some of those caught ‘were complete amateurs, acting on their own initiative or recruited casually and given litte or no training. Only a handful had been sent on specialist training courses such as those held in Stuttgart, Altenburg or Angers Where they learnt the use of invisible ink or of radio transmitters." Some of those apprehended were arrested without apparently having done very much. Jean Foufounis was sentenced to seven yeats forced labour by the court of appeal ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE oO in Aix-en-Provence, not for his own activity but for that of some of his acquaintances which he had simply failed to denounce. An individual called Potier who served as French teacher to the German delegation in Oran was arrested after he was overheard casually telling members ofthis delegation that the port was 40 metres deep, and was only released when it ‘was realized how ridiculous the charges against him were.* But others were certainly more active and their offences can be grouped into three essential ‘categories, although some fall into all three, ‘The most common form of activity detected was that of military ‘espionage. Albert Reymann was condemned to death on 4 October 1941 for having denounced to the Germans clandestine stocks of arms secreted by the French military in the Roches-Noires suburb of Casablanca.® Guillaume Alscher was informing the Armistice Commission in Casablanca about the movement of French planes and military units in North Africa Adrien Demoulin was condemned to death in November 1941 by a court martial in Algiers for sending on information concerning fortifications in Dakar and practical information about joining the Foreign Legion in Marseille” Paul Dressen was keeping tabs on the French Navy in Toulon which he was then passing on to the German armistice commission of the town.” The accusation of treason against Albert Becker charged him with serving as an intelligence agent for a foreign power (explicitly named as the Reich) during wartime. Between March and May 1942, he had sought information about the size and equipment of French garrisons, about camouflaged military material, about French troop movements and the attitude of French troops towards the Reich.” But military espionage was not simply viewed as that against the French military. One of Josef Beitelberger’s missions was to inform the German intelligence service of any Anglo-Saxon planes flying over Morocco ‘or any attempt of Anglo-Saxon forces to land in North Africa.” Economic espionage was the second category, although this was far less frequently uncovered, probably due to the fact that army and police counter- ‘espionage services had other priorities. Paul Luck who was amested in Algeria on 20 April 1941 was collecting information on the economic situation in the French colony.® Karl Oberender was on a mission to inform both German and Italian services of stocks of coal and the moverneat of ‘merchant shipping,” Political espionage and provocation was the final category. As well as theit military missions, Paul Dressen,” Adrien Demoulin™ and Josef Beitelberger” were also to send reports on the state of public opinion in French controlled territory. Interestingly, given how much the Vichy state is, associated with having fostered a spirit of denunciation, squealing on French citizens to the Germans was also viewed as « breach of sate security. ‘On 17 June 1941, the gendarme Jean Glock, of the gendarmerie in Gex, who 92 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY had been a suspected member of the Fifth Column since February 1940 was sentenced to death in his absence by a military tribunal in Lyon after having denounced to the Germans a fellow gendarme who had bad-mouthed the German Army." Leonie Steinmetz’s crime consisted of having denounced ‘one of her friends for secretly passing letters across the demarcation Tine, Perhaps surprisingly, political espionage also included spying on some of Vichy’s own enemies. Paul Riff, who was arrested in November 1941 in Limoges was working for the Geheime-Feld-Polizei with missions which included establishing whether an individual called Francais living in ‘Chamont was still engaged in Gaullist propaganda and keeping an eye on a hhouse where free-masons were rumoured to meet.” Leonie Schmid had written to the German authorities to denounce a household of civil servants as Gaullist and opposed to collaboration.” Alwin Rose was condemned to three years imprisonment in April 1941 for distribution of Gaullist tracts, ‘even though the court was well aware that he was performing this activity as an agent provocateur for the Germans." ‘When investigating the Gaullist network ‘Combat’ in January 1943, the Marseille police uncovered the activity of an individual who was working as a German agent within this movement — he was immediately sent to a prison in Castres, the police report explicitly claiming that this would put an ‘end to his work for the Germans.” Although some junior personnel in the counter-espionage services might have seen arresting these agents as a form of Resistance or of protection of the Resistance, this type of arrest can also fit into a more classic Vichy preoccupation ~ that of maintaining policing in French hands. Spics' motives were just as varied as their activities. There were those who acted out of habit who had been recruited years previously and spying had become their profession. Alscher who was arrested in Casablanca in October 1941, had already been involved in provocation during the Sudeten crisis of 1938, Another individual ,Pitz-Kuhl had spent his pre-war ‘years spying on Spanish republicans." The mass of literature devoted to spying during the inter-war period and portraying it as a fountain of ‘romanticism ensured that a number of dreamers and adventurers also joined the ranks of Nazi agents.® Henry Rollin, a chargé de mission in the Taterior Ministry, went one stage further suggesting that many of those recruited were suffering from madness." ‘Some acted out of conviction. Patriotism was one motive in this vein, Tt should be noted, however, that, according tothe internal report of May 1941 written by Henry Rollin, 80 per cent of those being arrested for pro-German activities since the armistice were of French nationality and although some of these may have felt an attachment to Germany, because of Alsatian or Lorrainer origins, most had no reason to feel such attachment.” ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 93 However, individuals" patriotism to a third country could also be used as a motivation to inspire anti-French activity. This was the case for several of those of North African origin, some of whom were beginning to look to the possibility of their country breaking away from the French Empire, The Germans deliberately manipulated such feelings. Propaganda was used on Muslim North Africans held in German controlled internment camps who ‘were fed not only pro-Axis information but also allowed to listen to talks from those favourable to independence for their own country” Another form of conviction was ideology. Some such as Marguerite Kramer” or Louis Schmitt continued to do their Hitlerian salutes and greetings in their prison cells. One aspect of ideology was an attachment to the most extreme forms of collaboration. In his aforementioned internal report Rollin complained that many of those caught were being recruited under the banner of collaboration. It is interesting to note that while Rollin was perfectly willing to accept collaboration on behalf of the French state, he drew the line at individual citizens taking the initiative to collaborate by their own means.” These individuals, in tum, clearly did not feel that the type of collaboration engaged at Vichy went far enough. Oscar Reile, of the Abwelir in Paris, claimed that his services tried to sive priority to recruitment of those who were acting out of conviction because these individuals were less likely to betray their employers. However, given the size of the recruitment that German services were undertaking, he admitted that often they were forced to recruit those: who came from the ranks of the self-interested, even though these individuals, were less reliable. One form of self-interest was voluntary. As in all situations money can be an important incentive and many individuals were recruited to the Nazi cause because of it” The appropriately named Johann Dollar eared 93,000 francs in a year for information he passed on." Adricn Demoulin justified his engagement by his financial problems and made the somewhat unlikely claim that he needed money to go to America to be able {0 present the plans of a helicopter he had designed.* Gangsters, always enthusiastic for a quick profit, were misted into believing that if they agreed to work for the Nazis not only did they stand no chance of being arrested for this offence by French authorities but that the Germans would also guarantee their other activities against the curiosity, of the French police.” ‘A second type of self-interest is what may be termed constrained self- interest. This is where an acceptance to work for the Nazis came about because the individual in question was threatened or imprisoned by these authorities and wanted to obtain their freedom. Joseph Christin had been working for the French intelligence services in the occupied zone until his capture by the Nazi services in May 1941. Imprisoned and feeling 4 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY abandoned he went on to denounce nine of his former colleagues and agreed to change sides.” Many former members of the French Foreign Legion tried to regain favour in their native Germany by offering their services now that they were forced to leave the Legion. A handful of Jews were also among those working for the Nazis, undoubtedly believing that this was the only their only way out of their present predicament. For others the threat at the origin of their engagemcat was an arrest for a minor offence like having crossed the demarcation line without permission; and while in prison they were contacted and told that they would not be prosecuted for their activity if they agreed to offer certain services.” Others like Devillers. ‘were recruited from those held as prisoners of war, who were given freedom in return for working for Germany.” . For example the testimonies contained ia the tial of he loeal police chief (AD BDR S6W 10). Stead (nove 6) p.28; Henri Bulsson, La police, som histoire (Vichy: Imprimerie Wellon 1950) 7.306; B. Warusfel, "Le cadre juridique et institutionnel des services. de seascignement en Franc’ in Lacoste, Approckes frangalses(aote 7) pA5;M. Chalet, ‘La DST, service francais de conte-spionnage” ia Lacoste (ote 7) p.8. - Garde (note 5) p20. Paillole, Senicer spéciaus (note S) p.237. A complaint of the pro-Allied favour of 2e Bureso reports which wee sid to be influencing Vichy opinion (ce is contained in AN 3W 311, Le Directeur Géosral de TAgence Nationale information de Presse “Inter France” (Dominique Sond) M Marcel Déat, 27 Nov. 1942. (Navarre, Le Service de Rensegnements (ote 5) Pp.A4-5. id. pp.1S-16, [AN 7ZAI 8, "Resuné de I Action des Services de Contre-espionage Mili fangs de jilet 19403 novembee 194, VoL1, 1946. Navarre, Le temps des vériés note 5) pS Palllole Services spéctour (cote 5) pp.213-16. Navarre, Le temps des vértés (oote 8) p82; Pallole, Services spéciaus (nate 5) pp232-4 and 258; Garde, La Guerre Secréte (noe 5) 226 >. Garde (ote 8) 9.233. SHAT 3p 102, “Dicective pour servic & 'Instruction des OMicers MA des regiments, 241; Gader (note §) 244. |. Paxton (note 2) pp.303-304; Stead (note 6) p42; Tres, (note 5) p55. Poul Pailole, Sersicesspéclus (ote §)pp233-4; SHAT 3P 102, “Disetve poor servir& ‘Miasruction des Offiiers MA des tégimens’ 14 Feb. 1941. AN T2AT 82 (note 26) Vol2, 1946; Stad (note 6) p93, ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE i 34 35 36 37 38 28, 2 2 6 47 3. eS 55. 56. ‘Stead (note 6) pp.40-at; Carder (note 5) p252. Gander (note 5) pp-233 and 245, Stead (sote 6) pp40-Al and 48; Palllol, Services spéciaux (oote$) pp. 214-21; Temes (ote §) p33; Carder (octe 5) pp.223-4; SHAT 3P 102, Secrétrat 'Etat A Ta Guer (Cabiner), NoS230SP, Vichy 27 July 1940, ‘aoe aa sujet du service des rensefgnement', (neigned), Bexy cote 5); Pasquelot (noe 5). ‘Stead (oote 6) pp.72-1. ‘AN 3W 310, Fvidence fro Jacques Moutet, 17 Oct. 1945 Stead (note 6.52. ‘AN AJA 491, L’Aspizant Masur, fsisunt fonction Office de Liason pts du legos 4e Ia Croix-Rouge allemande 4 Pie: 1 M Te Chef de bation, Chet de Ia déégation fLangase de lison, No3IRKG, Pau, 18 Feb. 1941; AN AJ4I 691, Le Chet d'Escadrons [D'Amecout, Officer de Liaison aupits du Délgué dela Croix-Rooge llemand> 8 Royat AML Amin de le Flotie,Ministe dela Defense Nationale, (DSA), ClecmontFetand, 17 ‘April 1942, Heasi Frenay, La mut fit, Mémoires de la Résstonce, 1940-1945 (Paris: RLaffont 1973) p67. (On he question of Vicky beterogenlty see for example: Dens Peschansi, Le régime de ‘Vienysexité. Coavemant et gouvemés dans la France Je Vichy: ule 1940-avril 1942" In idem, Vehy 1940-1944, Archives de Guerre d'Angelo Tasca (Puts: Bdtions da CNRS 1986) pp.3-S0; Jean-Marie Guillen, ‘La philosopis poltque dela Révoltion Nationale” in Jean Pieve Azcrna and Fragels Bedarda, Vly et les Frangais (Pris: Payard 1992) pp.i6?-. AN T2AI 62 (note 26); Stead (oot 6) pp3#-40; Bentand Destremen, Weygand (Pats Perrin 1989): Unpublished memoirs of Col. Lous Rivet pp.lI-15: Garder (note 5 Navarre, Le Service de Renseignements (note 3) p34. Unpublished memoits of Col Louis Rivet p15; Navarre (note $)p.134: Matin Thomas, ‘Signals Inelligence and Vichy Franc, 1940-1944: Ineligence in Dees’ Inteligence & ‘Nafionct Security 141\ (Spring 1999) pp.176-200 [also availatte in David Alvarez (ed), Allied and Axis Signals Imeligance te World Wer (LoodewPorland, OR: Frank Cass 1999}; Steal (note 6) pp 59-61. AN TRAS 1911 (aote 18) Henry Rolin, Lapocabype de notre tps, les dessous de la propagande allemande apres les documents inéits (Pats; Galiaed 1939). For Darian’ preference for Germans over British see; Darla's speech of 9 Oct. 1940, {quot in Philippe Burin, *Pétsin-Hiler: le choix de tn collaboration’ in Litre No.l29 (1990) p95. AN AJM 499, Le Général éu Corps Armée Beynet& Mle Génfra der Anlsie Vogl, Prsdent dela Commistion Allende d Armistice, No2810S/AE, ¢ Nov. 1941. ‘Thomae, ‘Signals Intelligence and Viehy France” (2oe 45) pp.175-200, ‘Tents (note pp 54-5. FForexample in the ares of the economy Vichy established ‘Comlésd’organisution’ which were designed 10 get manufactorers to nepolae contacts with Germany txough the frediom of 2 government run organisation: Renatd de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera Les Patrons sous Voccupation (Pais: tie Jacob, ‘collection Opts’ 1997) VoL, pst. AN AM 491, Le Géofral d'Anmée Huntziger, DSA, 4M le Secréaire Général aux ‘Anciens Combatants (Pi), No2034 /DSAleab, Vichy, 27 June 1941 Gander (ote 5) p.247; Stead (note 6) P53. Gate (note 5) 291 Autizle 19 was based on anicle 228 ofthe Treaty of Versi, which had established Xinilar obligations for the Germans ater the Fist World War: Barbara Wermeir, "La Situation des x6fugis en provenmce Allemagne (septembre 1939-elle 1942)" in J Grandjone and T, Grundinee (eds) Zoned Onbres, 1933-1948, (Aixon-Provence: Alin. 1890) 195. 42 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ‘57. Young (note 11) p27S; Abtey and Unterberg-Gibhant (aot 5) p29: Navan, Le service de renseignements (note 5) pp38-Al; Pall, Services spéctaxx (acte 5) pp.2I-31 Navarre, Le temps des vrs (aot 5) P81. 58, Stead (ote 6) P.. 59, Abie and Unter-Gibharde (ote S) pp.27-8. 60. Oscar ele, L’Abwehr: le contre-espionnage allemand en France de 1935 & 1945 (Pais France-Empice 1970) p80. ‘61, AN T2AK 82, Evidence from Col, Hore, 18 Nov. 1949; Temes (note 5) p.36; Gander (noe 5) 252; Pilole, Services spécior (te 8) 257. (62, Palllole, Services spéciaut (note 5). 63, AN 3W/91, le Coraissaire Principal dela Surveillance do Tester, iecter de la Police de Siete, Vichy, No4488, 15 Nov, 1942. 64, Stead (note 6) p.46. 665. AN AI4I 498, Le garde des Sceaux, Ministre seta dat la justice AM Ye chet du ‘gouvernement Disetion des Services de I Armistice, Hote! Theron, Vie, NoSS.Aix, 10 Sane 198. 66. AN AJIT 498, Le Colonel Gross A M le Ministre de In Défense Nationale, No247MDDSA/B, 4 Dec. 1941, 67. AN AI 41 496, Not de reascigeement communiqnse par Is Services de Ia Surveillance {da Tenitoire undated; AN AI4I 499, Note do renseignement, eabloct DMA, [No6204MA/B, 24 Oct. 1841; AN AJ 499, Direction des Services del’ Armistice, Hotel ‘Thermal, Vichy (igné Pata), note poor M Benois Mechin,seerétaie 'aatauprts dt chet du gouvernement, No.16382/DSAV7, 10 July 1942. 68, SHAT 1P 200, Note No-3MSICBST, 12 Nov. 14 (no indication of souce but presumably ST): AN AMI 498, Mesures Prises en faveur des individus ayant fait objet de it ‘rotesttion dela CAA, 8 Dec, 1941; AN AJ 499, Compteenda Je officer de Vision ‘Sut a visite de M Klaube 8 Alscher et Gassne, 24 Nov. 1941 @, AN AH 499, Destier Demon ‘0, AN AISI 499, le commandaot Pail, chef du SSM , note pour la Direction des Services fe T’Armistice,‘NoO0001USMVB, 2 Sep. 1942; AN'AJ41 499, Extra du compte-rende ‘eI officier de liaison & Lyon, No714/D, Lyon, eS Dec. 1942. 71, AN AI-41 496, Ciation dieete 8 comparste 8 audience, Pargost 6a Tibunal Militaire ‘1a 16 Division Militaire séant& Moctpelier, No.2976, 26 Oc. 1942 172, AN AMI 491, Caplsine do Bruce, oficier de Tilson apres du DSlégué Alemsod at ‘Rapariement, 2 M’Amiral de la Flo, Ministre de la Defense Nationale, DSA, Vichy, No.3, Marscill, 28 Feb, 1942; AN AJ 41 496 (ote 67: AN AHI 499, Direction et ‘Services de Armistice, Delegation Frangaise au Maroc, No2690DIA, 9 Dec. 1941; AN ‘AJE 499, Le Commissire, chet de Ia Brigade de ST, Henry Godbarge, 2 M le Général ‘Commandant a Division tertriale, Casblanca, No2006 BST, 10 Dee. 941; AN AIL 499, Direction dee Services de Ammistice Délégati en AFN, No.1296UDDSAB2, 13 Dee, 1951; AN AJ#1 499, "Nove sar Belelberper, ose, Vichy le 17 Dec. 1941", no ication of source, 73, AN AISI 499, Dossier Luck, 7H. AN AS 1 49, direction du comtetiux de Ia Justice Mili et de Is Gendarmerie, note pour la Direction des Services de TArmistice, HOt Thermal, Vichy, No267S6/C/10, ‘Chamalires, Te 27 Nev. 1041 175, AN ANI 499, le commandart Pallole, chef du SSM, note pour la Direction des Services {de 'Armistice,No.D0001 VSMVB, 2 Sept. 1942, 16, AN Al41 499, Dossier Demoatin 1. AN AI4L491 (ote 72), AN AI 1 496 ote 67), AN AISI 459, Direction des Services TTAmmistice, Delegation Frangaise au Maroc, No2630DIA, 9 Dec. 1941; AN AJS1 498 (eote 72); AN AJ 4 499 (note 72). ‘78. ANAJS1 499, Comaission Allemanded' Armistice shgné Thien, bls DS&gotion Fangsise Armistice, No37V42, Wiesbaden, 28 lly 1942; AN A} 409, Secariat dat ala Guerre, Cabinet, Burcan MA, Note pour Direction des Services de NoO02482/MA/NA, 7 April 1982; AN AIS] 499, Dietion des Services de VArmisice, Mareile 8M Le ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 113, ”. @. 8. a, 88 Hel Thonn, Vichy, note pour Ia Déléyaton Franaise d'Amistce & Wiesbaden, No.I8401DSA/7, 8 Aug. 1982. ‘AN AT 41 491, Le Caitnine Poarilly, Chef du dtachement de liison auprés du detégné de fa Commission Allemande d'Anmisie 4 M le Chef da Gouvernement, Direction des Services de Armistice, Havel Thermal, Vichy, NoSISR, Toslouse, 19 Aug. 1942; AN ‘AVAL 439, Dossier Rf ‘AN AS41899, Secstarit "Etat a Guerre, Cabinet, Bureau MA, Note pour Direction des Services de Armistice, No.OOSBS2IMA/M. 29 Avg. 1942, (sign Palle) ‘AN AIG 499, Seria d°Etat la Guerre, Cabinet, Bureau MA, Note pour Ditetion des Servies de TArisice, No-3690/MA/M, 177741. On German provocation inthe fora of Gaulist action see: AD EDR SW 365, Noe: police easeigoements, No3654/L, Activité de la Gestapo b Marseille, 23 May 1941; a simaler complaints raade on April 1941 by Gen Ody (Commandent le ter groupe de division milisize) ins comespondence (No.161/2) 10 the soetired'Ett& a Goer in Vichy cling thet wre nation érangbre avec laquelle le gouvernement lien enretient es eilleares relations is spreling la propagarde ant ‘atioale inthe Southern 200¢ in erder to divide French opinion, (AN AJ 4146). ‘AD BDR M6 10988, Le Connmssaite de Police de Stet, “ote an sujet du chef duservice es alfares indighnes & Morell’, Pol. Six. 77, 20 Jan. 1943, This type of eperation regarding agents provecateurs who were inflating Gaalistnetwocks had already been the subject of AN Fla 3690-32 le Direetour Agjint du Cabinet & M le Seerttive Général pour la Police, ACIMG, 14 Apri 1982 SHAT IP 200, Note No3S4SICBST, 12 Nov. 1941 (no indiestion of souce but presumeably ST); AN AISI 498, Mesures Piss en favear des indvidos ayant fl Pabjt {ila protestaton dela CAA, 8 Deo. 19413 AN AI11 459, Compterenda de ofiier de liaison sa a vio de M Klaube & Asher et Gasser, 24 Nov. 1941. [AN AISI 499, Le Chef ¢'Eseadron & Amecourt, officer deTinson nupets du dégué de a (Croix Rouge allemande a Royat a 'Amiral de a Fote, Ministre deta Défense Nations, ‘Diecton des Services de I’Armistce, Hotel Theamal, Vicky (DSA.7), No:7TPA, Royst, Te 19 Jan. 1902. Foe the inflaence of spy iterature inthe inter-war years see: Michael Miler, Shonghai on the Metre: Spies, Intrigue and the French between the Wars (Los Angeles: U. of California ‘esa 1998) p.l75-258; Robert J. Young, France and the Origits of the Second World War (London: Macmillan 1996) p15. [AN 72AS 1911, ‘Note Rollin ui foatioanement du Service des Renseignemcrts de a Streté Nationale, 2 May 194 ie, SHAT 1P 200, Minit de Ie Défense 2 la Delegation de a DSA, Alger, ‘Note sur Ia Dropeganicalleminde auprts des prisonniersnord-aficain', 2 Jan. 1942: SHAT 1P 200, ‘Note sora propagande permaophileen Alpi’, Alger, 15 eb. 1941, AN AIA 498, Dossier Kramer ‘AN Ald] 499, le Che ¢'Escadions d’Amecouf, en lisison prt le DAégué Allrmand au Rapatiement 2M Amira de Ta Flote, Ministre de 1a Défense Nationle, DSA, No.S2U/PA. Roya, 3/1241, objet Viste ds Délégue Allemand au Rapatiment 8 I Prison Milatie de Royat, AN 72A3 1911 (oct 86) eile (ote 60) 9. 90-91; Garr (ote 5) 228; Stead (note 6) p.46, AN AI 499, Seeréuriat Ett 8 Is Guerre, Cabinet Bureau MA. (sgné Commandant Pill, note poor la Direction des Services de ¥ Armistice, NoOSSSTIMA/BIAS842, 19 Aug. 1982, ‘AN AIL 499, Dossier Democlin. Philip Aziz Aucservice de enneml, la gesopo francaise en province, 1940-1944 (Pais: aya 1972) pp. 109-16; Stead (note 6.46 also points tothe immunity these individuals beleved they hd. AN AMAL 498, Dossier ‘Christin’, ‘AN AJ41 499, Le Commissaio, set dola Brigade de ST, Henry Godhuege, 2 Mle Général Ct a Division testoriae, Casablanca, No3906 BST, 10 Dec. 1941 4 98. 100, 101 102. 103. 10. 103. 106. 107. 108. 109. 0. uu. m2 us, ns us. 116, ut, us, 19. 10. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY Guillain de Benowvtle, Le Sacrifice du Matin (Geneva: de Crésille 1970) WL, pp242-3; "Nord, Mes camarades (oote 5) pp.38-9; Stead (tot 6) p43. 3. Garder (note 5) 9229. id, 7.209 and 240, id. p29. [AN AJ41 1680 21.07, Le Genérst Doyen ®M le Géodeal Huntziger, No.T2889/AE, 1 eb. oat, MAD. Foot, SOF in France, An Account ofthe Work ofthe British Special Operations [Brecutve in France, 1940-1944 (London: HMSO 1966) pp.115-16 ‘AN AJ 41 495. Le Généeal de Division Berard, Commande ia 17 &me DM Monsieur TAmial de la Flot, Direction def Justice Mila et de la Gendarmerie, Toulouse, le 15 April 1942 (ese of Jean Bilt. Fallole (oot 5) pp88-90; Rei (ote 60) p91. ‘AN AJ1 499, Lletterant Heyl, eficier de isison, au Bureau Menées Anti-nationales, ‘Bourg-en-Breste, Dec, 1951; AN AH 499, Coraission Allemands Armistice 4M Ie Président de la Délfgation Frangsise d' Anmistce a Wesbadee, No.9042, 16 Feb. 1942, [AN AJA} 499, Digection des Services de "Armistice, Hétel Thermal, Vichy (sant ‘Bourget, note pour la Delegation Frangeise Armistice & Wiesbaden ,NO21778/DSAM7, 9 uly 1981. AN ATI 499, Secrtriat d'Eat & 1a Guerre, Cabinet, Borean MA (signé Licutemant- Colonel ARs), Note pour Direction des Services de I'Armistice, No347BMAIM, 16 May 1942 'AN Al41 499, intercepted letter M Jean-Goorges Knipper & Soumoalou (B-P) 2 M Lat, Hoel Regina, Toute, cate du Coeurentintercepé: 25 Api 1942, date de Vinercepion; 1 May 1942, AN Al] 499, Rapport de POficier de Lsison: Renseignements ecteilis au cours de Me ‘on Kirschten avec les allemands du Reich ou ‘de race" dftenus pour espionnage dans les risons civil et ature Alger le 16 Sept. 1941. SHAT, 1P200, Compte-enda d’ Audience dn Tibunal Mitisre, 19/1141 Michael Foot repr the case ofa British agent parachuted Ito France inorder to ry and ‘convince former Pure Minister Bdousr Daladies to come to England Foot believes that ‘esause this agent André Simon, spoke with an excessively strong English ascent when the French police arested him it was initially becanse they suspected him of being a ‘German plan: Foot (uote 103) p201, [AN AJL 499, Note de reneignement, NOMA/M/LI6R/1-B, 9 June 194), ‘AN Alai 499, le Commandant Paillole, Chef da SSM, note pur ln Direction des Serves ‘deTrArmisice, 17 Sept 1942. bid. No.000011/SMIB,2 Sep. 1982; AN AJ41 499, Ext do compte-rendu de officer . 1942, 143. ANAIA 499, Rapport de Officer de Liaison: ‘Renseignements recuclis au cours de lt Visite de Mr Yoo Kisehtee aver les allemands da Reich ow ‘de race! détemis pout tspionnage dans les prisons cvileet militaire Alger le 16 Sept. 1941. M44, AN-AD 41 491, Le delegué allemand (LUTZ) 2 M le Cepitine Posi, ctet du 116 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ‘éeactement auprts de la Coix-Rouge allemande 8 Toulouse, Nos21/42 du 19 March 19042; “Objet: Manvas titementetaestaion des persanaes qu vieonent me rendre visite. 145. AN AJ 41 496, imeroepted ltcr om Chand (Prison Milisite de Nontron, Dordogne) 10 “Monsieur POffiler Cormrandant Ia DAgatio de la Comission d'Amistce 8 Roy HA/43; AN AJAI 491, Captsine de Broce, offer deiison aupres du Délegus Allemand auRapatsement, MT Ansa dela Fete, Ministe dela Défense National, DSA, Vichy, [No3I7, Marsilie, 28 Feb. 1942; AN AISI 491, Febe concernant les renseignements ‘btents par le Capitaine Simonin (fiir de isis) au cours des enrtiens du Delegeé ‘Allemand a Rapatriement avec les demas de Tense, déplcement da 25 au 29 Oct. 1941; AN AJ 41 499, Le sceréiaive d'etat Bla vie ptsigence do consel 3 M le Géoal Bridoax, secrtaire dat la guere (EMA. services de armistice) ~ “waduction d'une tote de Fambessade d'Allemagre Ruck 3616 ds 13 juin 1942", 18 Juce 1942; AN AJ 41 £209, Repport du Commisssce Principal de la ST, Mascille, 28 Aug. 1942; AN 3W 9), le CCommissure Principal de la Surveillance do Testo, Marcille} M Le directeur ds Police de Streté, Vichy, NoAa88, 15 Nov. 1942. M6, ANI 41499, lo Copittne de Brace,enlisison pts leDélégeé Allemand. Rapatrcment Mle Général de Corp Armée, Secreta d'Ett a Guere, DSA, Marseille le 17 May 1942; AN Al 41 499, Le Lieutenant. Colonel d°Alts, Bureau M.A., note pour la Direction des Services de U Armistice, NoO2SEOM.AB, 14 april 1942; AN AY 41 499, Rapport {de Commissaite Principal de Police del ST, Marcille, 28 Aug. 1942, 147. Stead (note 6) ps6. 148. ANAS 41 499, Compe-rendu de officer de lisison sur a visite de M et Gasseer, 24 Nov. 1941, 149, Oral evidence from lean Geman, Paris, 2 Feb. 1093; AN 72.AF 86 [Comtat, Evidence fiom Jean Gemabling, Dee. 165, 150, AN AlAI 499 (note 148); AN AJ41 499, DSA, Délépation Frangaise aw Maroc rapport sur fa viske de Mr Klaubs aux détenus allemand du Reich ou “e race’ des plsons de (Casablanca, NO2ASIDIA, IS Jan. 1942; AN AIST 499, e Captaine de Brace, en Hzison ps le Déligue Allemand au Rapatiereat 2 M. le Géaral 'Armé, Ministre Secrétale ‘MBit la Guerre, DSA, DSA, No.128, Marelle,2 Nov, 194), objet Visite da légut 4 ta prison altar St Nicolas, 29 Oct. 1941. 151. AN AIL 499, Rapport sur fa visite de M von Kirchten aox Allemands détemas pour “aint 8b SuretéExteieoe de Ei, 19-20 Sep. 1941. ‘Georges N"Guyen van Loc, La peow dum cal (Paris Presses de lace 1994); Jean Baal Le Marsitats Pais: Hermé 1991}; Lovp Durand, Le Cad (Paris: Denoel 1976). 153, At the Liberation Bigmant left the police to become an important figure inthe local ‘Underworld. He was shot dead in 1967 onthe exders of his ene time associate Antoine ‘Guest, ene of the ost fous gangsters ofthe post-war period, Pasale Frome, René ‘Bousquet Paris: Stock 1994) pp. 312-13; Philippe Berar, Roger Wot tla botalle pour 1a DST (Pacis: Preses de la Cité 1975) pp.27-36. 154, Palllol, Services Spécious(aote 5) p23, 155, Teres (aot 8) pp. 115-11, 156. AN AlA1 499, Le Général de Corps Armée Beynet, Président e ln Dilation rangise fupits de Ia Commission Allemande d'Armisice, 2 M le Général des Arclerie Vogl, ‘Preside de la Convaisslon Allemande d’Armistic, ‘Attude des services (ragais en [AEN a Prd des membres des commissions de conte’. 157. Mare BischolT, La Police Scientifique (Pars: Payer 1938) pa TSR. Laurent Douzoin, ‘Notes de Prison de Bertande Aster de a Vigeie (15 March-4 Apri 941), Les Cakiers de U'IUTP, No25, Oc. 1993. 159, AN AidI 497, Le Général d’Ammee, commandant en Chef des Forces Terestes (signé ‘Lachenaud) & MO les Généraux Commandant les 7, 9%, 12° 417° Divisions Milisires, CChamaliéres, 11 Aug. 941; AN AIST 497, Joseph Paserak as concubine, 13 May 1942, 160, Joseph Pastemak, a former ember ofthe Austrian Comseunist Party, now working forthe ‘Germans. complained tnt his eorespondence was systematically intercepted and believed lube & Alecher 132, ARRESTING NAZI SPIES IN VICHY FRANCE 7 that he ws the subject of tome gaulist intrigue: AN AF 41 491, Joseph Pastemak ao ‘élegué allemand, 26 March 1942. However Pasernak managed to get ward othe Geren tutors tht they obviously had not received thee leters he had sent them. Fearing a ‘iplomati ieident the French rise services decided tlie by teling the Germans that these letters must have got leet io the post (4 memer of these services wrote in pencil in the margin of te docomentoutining this decision that 3 lest leters was abit obvious: 7 Joss cest um peu gros!) AN AJ 41 431, Direction des Services de I’Armisice, Hotel “Thennal, Vieiy, note potr I’ ficier de liison aupets du Délégué Allemand & Todlouse, undated but ndoubtedly end of March 1942, “Objet; Comespondance du dstera allemand Pasterak", 161. AN AJ-41 497, Le Génkeal de Corps d'armée, scence dtl guere AM Le Chet da ‘Gouvernement, Direction des Services de Armistice, No.9928/CITM. Chamalites le 227942; AN AIT 499, Le Garde des Seeanx 2M T’Amial ée la Flte, Ministe dela sléase Nationale, NoO0S/G/A2A, 3 Jan, 1942. Ceraincircuars of the DSA expressed ‘concer, for humanitarian reasons, regarding the excessive delays between ial and ‘xeculion: AN AS 41 499, Direction des Services de Armistice, Hotel There, Vicky (Gigné Cousin) M le Seeétaire Etat ® la Guore (direction de fa Justice Mila et de 1a Gendarmerie), No.1261/DSAV7, Vichy, 14 Jan. 1942; AN AI 41499, Procts-Veréa de 1a Réunion fterminitérele da 16 Yn. 1942. 162, AN AIH1 499, le Capitaloe de Brace cn lason rés le Délégué Allemand an Rapatrement 2 MTAmiral dela Flte, Minste de la Défense Nationale, DSA, No.124, Marcille, 9 ‘Jan, 1942, objet: Visite ds S1egus, Eling a prison mltaie St Nicos, 9 Jaa. 1942, ‘Oveceronding was common complaint in Vicky prisons whose population rose starry fom 18,000 10 1939 to $9,000 in 1944: Piewe Pedron, La prison sous Vihy Pats: ions de W Atelier 1993) pp.63-4 163, AN AISI 499, intercepted un blocked- Ite de Madeleine Fucy, prison St Joseph, Lyon, Mite President dela Commission AMemande "Armistice, 25 Sul 1943, 164, AN AI 41 498, Le Contokur des Serves Extéieus Péstetiies et de Education Surveliée Mrimassar & M le Directeur de a Sécurité Générale, 10 March 1942. 165, AN AJ1 499, Le Garde des Sceaux A M I'Amiral de Is Flte, Ministe de Is Détémse National, No-200SIG/AZA, 3 Jan. 1942. 166. AN AIL 499, Le Général Haotziger au Ministre de la Défense Nationale (DSA), ‘No.SI¥PG, Wiesbaden, 19 July 1940; AN AISI 499, Le Minis de la DéTense Nationale (DSA) (signe Koctz) 1M le Garde des Sceaux, No2218/DSA, Vichy. 3 Aug. 1940; AN A381 DSA, Nae pour Deletion de DSA Ales N19 12DSA7,$ May at, 167. Paillole, Services Spéciaux (ote 5) 235. 168, AN AI 41499, Dossier Bellet 169. AN AJ 499, Proces-rerbal de la reunion Iterministércie du 16 Jen, 1942, “Atiude & ‘eoirvis-ivis des Allemand do Reich ou ‘de race’ condannés & mos par les Tribaraex Frangai’s AN AJSL 499, Direction des Services de Armistice, ‘Note poo I direction du contentious dela ustce Militaire et de la Gendarmerie’, No 3219 /DSAV7, 4 Oct. 1941; 'AN AJL 499, Direction des Services de 1 Anise, ‘Note pour la Délégtion Frengaise & Amistice A Wiesbaden, No-34988/DSA/7, Viehy. 27 Oct. 1981, 170, Forthe anest of Estienne d*Orves se: Reile (not 60) pp 92-4. For anger coacersing the ‘teatment of Estinne 'Orves, see: AN AMI 499, Note de fa Direction des Services de Parmisce, 15/41; AN AT81 499, Procts-verbal dela téanin jetermisfille 1 Jan, 1942, “Atitode a tenievisdovis des AMlemands du Reich ou ' race’ condamn‘s 2 mort par ls Tibanaex Frans For stempts to sive hi sce: Pasquelot (ote S)pp.197-211, 71, ANAT 41 498, Prcts-Verbal de In Réanion Enerminisielle do 16 Jan, 1942, At that ‘nottent there were'26 German or Reich prisoners who having been sentenced to dewth for breaching state severity (mest in favour of Germany) were aweiting execution. 172, Stead (cote 6) ppA3 and 56; Frenay(aote 42) p.167. M73. AN AJL 497, 11 Aug. 1941 (note 159), 178. AN AI AT 499, Direction des Services de Armistice, Hotel Thermal, Vichy (igné Condein), Viehy’ M Jan. 1942. U8 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 175, Tidy AN AI 41 499, Note dela Ditetion des Services de VArmisie, Hotel Thea, ‘Vichy (sign Coudrin), No.1S3S/DSAM7, Vichy, Ie 16a. 1942. 176, AN AISI 499, Le chef du gouvernement, Direction des Services de T Armistice, Hétl ‘Thermal, Vichy 4M Benois Mechin, Secrtaire d'Etat amprés du chef du goavernement, No2I2SUDSAMT. 1 Sept 1942; AN AFA 499, Le Capitaine Arann, office de ison anprts du Délégat Allemand at Rapatiement 3 Royat 8M le Vie-Artral, Directeur des Services de TAmistice, Vichy 22 Aug. 1942, 177, ANAT 491, Capitaine de Broce, Oficier de Liaison, 4M I'amiral dela late, Ministre 4e fa Défense Nuionale, No351, Marsile, 22 March 1942. 178, SHAT 1P 200, Copie démarguée un vlégramme No3I176/DSAVT expéaié par Rivet le 25 Sept. 1941 ny Général commandant la Ie Division Miitare a Marseille; AN AT41 499, Rapport sur Ia visite de M von Kirschien aux Allemands détenus pour stint a la Sireté Exteriene de TE, 19-20 Sept. 1941, 179, SHAT IP 200, Note No.SS5/CBST, 12 Nov 194 (n0 indication of source but presumably SST}, AN AJL 498, Mesures Prises en faveor des individes ayant fit objet de la ‘rotestation de Ia CAA, 8 Dee. 1941: AN AJ¢1 499, Compte-endu de officer de Unison Erle visite de MKlaube & Alscer et Gasser, 24 Nov. 1941, 180, AN ASI 498, Rapport suria visite de M von Kirsciten (note 178), 81, AN AI 41 495, Repport da Commisssite Principal de Police e I ST, Marseille, 28 Avg 1942; AN AJ 41 499, le eaitaine de Broce, en Halon pets le Deiégne Allemand a0 ement AM le Gnteal de Corps @'Armée, Secréire d'Pist A fa Guerre, DSA, ‘Marseille, 17 May 1942; AN AJ 41499, Le Lieweraat Colonel d’Alts, Bureau M.A. note pour ladizection des services deY armisce, NoOO26UOM.AB, 14 Apil 1842; AN AT 41 49, Direction des Services de Armistice, (signé Petir) & M Benoist-Mechin, steer eat Bla préscerce du conse, No-TEOMIDSAT, & May 1942: AN AI 41499, Le chet {de gouveroment Direction des Services de I'Anmistice, Hotel Thermal, Vichy (signe Dette) 8 M Benoist Mechin, Secréaired'Ftat aupes dy chef du goavernement & Pars, [No.I9SO6/DSA/T 23 Aug. 1942: AN AJ 41 499, Direclon des Services de Armistice, Hhiel Thermal, Vieby aM. BenoistMechin, Secure Bit auprts du chef di ment & Pais, No.1436M/DSA/7, 26 Aug. 1942; AN AI 41 499, Le seertaire ‘eit la vce pésidence da constil 8M le Géadral Bridou, secre oa la goer (EMA: services de Varmitice), 18 June 1942; AN AT 41 499, uadoction dune note de Fambaseade d'Allemagne Rick 3616 du 13 Juse 1942: bid. 5 Aug. 1942. 182, AN AI 41 499, Le chef d'escadron de Royer, oii de Taisen auprés da DSNégué ‘Allemand st Rapatriement, Lyon A Mle Général, Seite Bata Guerre, DSA, Hotel “Thermal, Vichy, No 366D, 23 June 1942, 183. AN AJ 41-496, Ambassade d'Allerngne, Paris. note pour le Gouvernement Frangis, ‘No.A42ra42, Pars, 3 March 1942; AN AHI 496, Nets dela Direction des Services de Armistice, Vichy, undated (oat marked fa margin "vu 31 March 1942") 184. ANAJ41499, Secctriatd’But fs Guere, Cabinet, Burcas MA, Note pour Dreetion des Services de V Armistice, No.S909/MAM, 225181: AN AJ4| 499, Secréarit D'Etat Ia (Guerre, Cabinet, BMA, "Note pour la DSA’, No.002109/MA/B/46492, 25 March 1942 185. Ibid 186. AN AJ 41 496, L’Amiral de la Fete, Cormmandant es Chet des Forces Milas (sig06 F Darla) AAK Anal Ploton, Secrie "tat aupres du Chef du Gouvernement, 12 Sep. 1942, Tis exchange was suggested by Catala the Minister of Finances, 187. ANAT 41 409, Seertariat q'Bat& a Guerre, Cabinet- Boreaa MA (sign: RiveD, ‘Note pout la Direction des Services de I Armistice”, NoO1210OMA/BI46492, 25 March 1942: [RNAI] 496, PGE (eo other indication of source or destination), PR/TAAT, 24 Tune 1942; ‘AN AT 41 496, Reascgnements sur déteas allemands, considérés comme ne devas pas fre remis, emis e M4aout AT’ Amirl Bourragyé poor communication 31 Anita! Data, AN All 499, Sectéaist D'Fist 8 Guere, Cabinet, BMA, ‘Note pour Is DSA’, No.002100/MA/B/46492, 25 March 1942. 188, AN AJ 41 496, Secrariat d'Est& la Guore, Cabinet- Bureau MA. (signé le Colonel Rivet), “Compte-rendy aa sujet de ta remise aux Autoiés Allemandes de Jans’, No.0O4S1OMAIGH6.399, 1 July 1942; AN ATI 496, Section PGE, ‘Note av sujet des ARRESTING NAZI SPIBS IN VICHY FRANCE 119 ‘engagements pris pat I'Ambussaded’ Allemagne 3 'ocasion des remises de tens pout bitin a Sieté de Fat, 18 Aug. 1942. 189, ANAT 41 496, Section PGE, “Note au sujet des engngemenis pris par 'Ambossade Allemagne & occasion des eemises de temas pour ateite 2 a Streté de Ta’, 18 ‘ag, 9 or xa of Dumas” wok fr nh iets Gre 3 pl 190. AN 3W 91, deposition (undated) a Commisssre Léonard AN 3W 91, dépostion du sous- ‘ircteu Ta Soreté Nationale, 14 Ape 1948, 191. AN'SW1, fe Commissive Divisionnate Maz Berge & M Le Président Miton, SNR 2° ‘SN, 1947 (andated); AN SW 91, deposition de Helmut Knocten, 30/447; AN 3W 91, <éposition de Remy Desioges, 28 March 1046, AN 3W $1, Je Socréuire Géncal & Police 2 M Le Préfet Bouches-dt-Rhéoe, No.tS1W/SCC, 1'Sept. 1942; AN 3WV 94 ‘Comnnissaie Disisionnare Mare Berge 2 M Le Président Mitton, SN/RG 2° SN, 1947 (Godated AN 3W 91, déposition do Rolf Mable, 29 May 1947; AN 3W $1, ke Soxéaite (Gentral fa Police Nt Le Prefer Bouches-da-Rhbe, No.687 299,17 Sept. i942; AN 3W ‘91, Be note concernant a mission spécale de detection des postes clandestine, (oadateds ‘elle (note 60) pp.177-85,Jaoques Delare, Histoire de Lo Gestapo (Paris: Fayard 1962) 384; Nond (note 5) VoLIL, pp.266-7; Fred Kupferman, Laval, 1885-1945 (Pars: Fiammesion 1988) pp. 544-5; Stead (note 6) p96. 192, ADBDR M6 10988, Le Commissaire de Police de Soret, note au sujet du chef ds service des affaires indigenes A Marsile Po. St. 7, 20 Ja. [943 ~ this note describes the Srvest nd imprisonment inthe prison at Castres of German agent who had inflated the Gault movement ‘Combat’. 193, AN AJ 41 499, Le garde des Sceaux, Minste senétare d's la jstice Me chef do ‘gouvernement Drestion des Services de’ Armistice, Hotel Therma, Vichy, NoS.Aix 10 Fane 1983, ceneemns the case ofan Fosfounls semtenced on 10 Feb, 1943 bythe “Section Speciale’ Of the Court of Appeal in Aix-en-Provence to 7 years hard labour for faire to ‘Senounce an espionage ing. AN AIS 499, Note de la Direction des Services de TPArmisice, Hotel Thermal, Vichy, 1 Oct, 1943 ‘sur les détenus Oppenhuser et Arvaud cconcems the trial of Pieme AWvaid who had been working for German naval iatligence Sefore being, charged with breaching sate socuty and being sentenced to 3 years Impasonmentend'2 100) fans fine by the “Secon Spécial” of the Court of Appeal in ‘Afcen Provence on 17 July 1943: Maurice Lambin was snzenced (08 yeas hard laboot by the “Section Spéciel”of the Court of Appeal in Limoges on 21 Des. 1943 under the Charge of teason for his work forthe Germans during 1982 sco: AN AM41 459, dossier LLambin, partealaly comeqpandence beeween Procareur Général in Limoges and the of Justice; Léonfe Schmid’ sentence of 5 years imprisonment was pronounced by the ‘Section Spéciae of the Court of Appeal ia Agen on 20 Jan. 1943 (AN Al41 499,

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