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APPLETON-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY SOURCE-BOOKS

Sterling
P.

Lamprecht, Editor

DE GIVE
OR
'

THE CITIZEN

APPLETON-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY SOURCE-BOOKS

St.

Thomas Aquinas, Concerning Being and

Essence,

translated with a preface by

St.

George G. Leckie.
the Immortality of the

Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Concern-

ing the Teacher and

On
or

Soul, translated with a preface by

George G. Leckie.

Thomas Hobbes, De Cive

The

Citizen, edited with

an introduction by Sterling P. Lamprecht.

Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental

by Otto Manthey-Zorn.

Principles of the

Metaphysic of Ethic, translated with an introduction

John Locke,
Sherman.

Treatise of Civil

Government and

Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by Charles L.

Benedict, de Spinoza, Writings on Political Philosophy, edited by A. G. A. Balz.

DE GIVE
OR

THE CITIZEN
BY

THOMAS HOBBES
Edited with

An
by

Introduction

Sterling

P.

Lamprecht
Amherst College

Professor of Philosophy,

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS
INCORPORATED

New

York

CB777

199

Jm.eR5ITI OE f LDAia/t UiiiAK!S

Copyright, 1949, bt

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS, INC.
All rights reserved. This boo\, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission of the publisher.

624-3

>SINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

E-44503

CONTENTS
Introduction
xv
i

The Epistle Dedicatory The Author's Preface to the Reader

PART
I.

I.

LIBERTY
Civil Society
.

Of the State
I.

of

Men Without
2.

21

The
all

introduction.
is

society

That the beginning of civil from mutual fear. 3. That men by nature
5.

are

Whence the will of mischieving each The discord arising from comparison of wills. 6. From the appetite many have to the same thing. 7. The definition of right. 8. A right to the
equal. 4.

other ariseth.

end gives a right to the means necessary to that end. 9. By the right of namre, every man is judge of the means whic 1 tend to his own preservation. 10. By
nature all men have equal right to all things. 11. This right which all men have to all things is unstate of men without civil society war: the definitions of peace and war. 13. W.ir is an adversary to man's preservadon. 14. It is law All for any man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power, to give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature dic-

profitable.
is

I :.

The

mere

siate of

tates the

seeking after peace.

II.

Of the Law
I.

of Nature Concerning Contracts

31

That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason. 2, That the fundamental law of nature is to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves. 3. That
the first special law of nature right to all things. 4. What it

what

to transfer

it.

5.

not to retain our our right; That in the transferring of our

is is

to quit

right, the will of

him

that receives

it

is

necessarily

required.

6.

No words

but those of the present tense

VI
transfer

CONTENTS
any
right. 7.

Words

of the future,

if

there be

in the translation of right. 8. In matters of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact.
10. In compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future. 11. Compacts of mu-

some other tokens

to signify

the will, are

vaUd

tual faith in the state of nature are of vain; but not so in civil government.

no
12.

effect

and That no

man God

can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with without revelation. 13. Nor yet make a vow to God. 14. That compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavor. 15. By what means we are freed from our compacts. 16. That promises extorted through fear of death, in the state of nature, are valid. 17. A later compact, contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to resist him that shall

prejudice

my

body
is

is

invalid.

19.

compact

to ac-

cuse one's self

invalid. 20.

The

definition of swear-

ing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that form which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 23. An oath ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.

III.

Of the Other Laws

1.

of Nature
is

43

perform contracts. 2. That trust is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What injury is. 4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract. 5. The distincdon of justice into that of men, and that of actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and distributive justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to him that is willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9. The fourth law of nature,
of nature
to

The second law

that every

man

render himself useful.

10.

The

fifth

law, of mercy. 11.

The

sixth law, that

punishments

regard the future only. 12. The seventh law, against reproach. 13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, of humility. 15. The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of persons. 16. The eleventh, of things to be had in common. 17. The twelfth, of

CONTENTS
things to be divided by lot. i8. The thirteenth, of birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth,

Vll

mediators for an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no man is judge in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth, that there can no contract be made with the umpire. 25. The twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may presendy know, whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not. 27. The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience. 28. The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things agreeable to those laws. 29. The laws of nature are unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavors to fulfil the laws of nature, is a just man.
of

the

safeguard

of

them who

are

peace. 20.

The

fifteenth, of constituting

31.

The

natural and moral law are one. 32.

How

it

what hath been said of the laws of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the virmes. 33. The law
comes
to pass, that
is not properly a law, but as ered in Holy Writ.

of nature

it

is

deliv-

IV.

That the Law

(omitted)

of

Nature

Is

a Divine

Law

PART
Government

II.

DOMINION
63

V. Of the Causes and First Beginning of Civil

That the laws of namre are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2. That the laws of namre, in the state of nature, are silent. 3. That the security of living
I,

according to the laws of nature consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasdng peace. 5. The reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7. What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to

Vlll

CONTENTS
one.
is.

9.

II.

What What

civil society
it

is

to

what to be a subject. and by institution,

VI.

is. 10. What a civil person have the supreme power, and 12. Two kinds of cities, natural

Of the Right of Him, Whether Council or One Man Only, Who Hath the Supreme
Power
I.

in

the City

70

There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented. 2. The right of the
greater
3.

number

consenting,

is

the beginning of a city.

That every man

retains a right to protect himself

sufficient

according to his own free will, so long as there is no regard had to his security. 4. That a co-

power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8. All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other
ercive

the city belongs to him. 11. Also the examination of all doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17. The opinion of those who would
officers of

constimte a city, where there should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18, The marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to
20.
city, as the human soul is in relation to the man. That the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents by whose compacts it was first constituted.

the

VII.

Of the Three Kinds

racy, Aristocracy,
I.

of Government: Democ-

Monarchy

87

That there are three kinds of government only: democracy, aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy

CONTENTS
not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there be certain times and places of meeting
is

IX

prefixed,

is

dissolved. 6. In a

of the times of meeting

ministration of

democracy the intervals must be shortj or the adgovernment during the interval comone. 7. In a democracy, particulars to obey the people; the

mitted
people

to

some
with

contract
is

particulars

obliged to no man. 8. By what acts arisconstituted. 9. In an aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By what acts
tocracy
is

monarchy

is

constituted. 12.

Monarchy

is

by compact

obliged to none for the authority it hath received. 13. Monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good govern-

ment.

14.

What kind
it,

of sin that

is,

and what

sort of
its

men
office

are guilty of

when

the city performs not

towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. 15. A monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor. 16. Of limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority. 18. How a
citizen
is

freed

from

subjection.

VIII.

Of the Rights
I.

of Lords Over Their Servants

100

and servant signify. 2. The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, or slaves and such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters. 3. The obHgation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed him by his lord. 4. Servants that are bound are not by any compacts tied to their lords. 5. Servants have no
lord

What

propriety in their goods against their lord. 6. The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testa-

ment.
that
is

7.

The

lord cannot injure his servant.

is

8.

He

lord of the lord

lord also of his servants.

CONTENTS
9.

By what means

servants are freed. 10.

Dominion

over beasts belongs to the rights of nature.

IX.

Of the Right
1.

of Parents dren, AND OF Hereditary

Paternal

Over Their ChilGovernment

105

not from generation. 2. Dominion over infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power. 3. Dominion over infants is originally the mother's. 4. The exposed infant is his from whom he receives his preservation. 5. The child that hath one parent a subject and the other a sovereign, belongs to him or her in authority. 6. In such a conjunction of man and woman as neither hath command over the other, the children are the mother's, unless by compact or civil law it be otherwise determined. 7. Children are no less subject to their parents than servants to their lords and sub-

dominion

ariseth

jects

to

their

and

lords. 9.

ference of same right over subjects

princes. 8. Of the honor of parents Wherein liberty consists, and the difsubjects and servants. 10. There is the
in
institutive

ment which there is in an II. The question concerning

an hereditary governgovernment.

the right of succession

belongs only to monarchy. 12. A monarch may by his will and testament dispose of his supreme authority. monarch dying without 13. Or give it, or sell it. 14. testament is ever supposed to will that a monarch should succeed him. 15. And some one of his children. 16. And a male rather than female. 17. And the eldest rather than the younger. 18. And his brother, if he want issue, before all others. 19. In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.

X.

A
1.

Comparison Between Three Kinds of Government, According to Their Several Inconveniences

14
state

comparison of the namral

his subjects are alike. 3.

with the

civil.

2.

The

conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler

of monarchy.

and
4.

be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. rejection of

The praise The government under one cannot

CONTENTS
their opinion who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular state than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch than under the people. 8. The liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch than under a people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men. 11. In regard of eloquence. 12. In regard of faction. 13. In regard of the unstableness of the laws. 14. In regard of the want of secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit. 16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of mon-

XI

archy. 18.
subjects

The

best state of a city

is

that
19.

where the
it

are the ruler's

inheritance.

The

aristocracy

further

it

draws to monarchy, the better keeps from it, the worse.

is;

nearer the

XI. Places and Examples of Scripture Rights of Government (omitted)

XII.

of

the

Of the Internal Causes Tending to the solution OF Any Government

I.

Dis-

128

That the judging of good and

is

evil

belongs to pri-

vate persons,

a seditious opinion. 2.
their princes,
is

That

subjects

do
3. 4.

sin

by obeying

a seditious opinion.

That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws, is a seditious opinion. 5. That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious opinion. 6. That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion. 7. That each subject hath a propriety or absolute dominion of his own goods, is a seditious opinion. 8. Not to understand the difference between the people and the
multitude, prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of monies, though never so just and necessary.

XU

CONTENTS
prepares toward sedition. lo. Ambition disposeth us to sedition, ii. So doth the hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only faculty needful to raise seditions. 13. the folly of the common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the destruction of a commonweal.

How

XIII.

Concerning the Duties of

Them Who
is

Bear
141

Rule
I.

The

right of

supreme authority
2.

distinguished

from its exercise. supreme law. 3.

safety of the people is the behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects* souls, as they shall judge best according
It

The

Wherein the safety of That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8. That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and monies in readiness in
to their

own

consciences. 6.
7.

the people consists.

time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of right instruction of subjects in civil the people. 9. doctrines is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10.

Equal distribution of public

offices

conduces
is

much

to the preservation of peace. 11. It

namral equity
conduceth to ambitious

that monies be taxed according to spends, not what he possesses. 12. the preservation of peace to keep

what every man

It

down

men.

13.

And

to

break factions.

14.

Laws whereby
costs restrained,

thriving arts are cherished

and great

conduce to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be defined by the laws than the
benefit of the prince

and his subjects That greater punishments must not be

are prescribed by the laws.
right
17.

requires.
inflicted

16.

than

Subjects

must have

done them against corrupt judges.

155

XIV. Of Laws and Trespasses

from counsel. 2. How from covenant. 3. How from right. 4. Division of laws into divine and human; the divine, into natural and positive; and the natural, into the laws of single men and
I.

How

law

differs

CONTENTS
of nations. 5. The division of human, that is to say, of civil laws, into sacred and secular, 6. Into distributive

XIU

and

vindicative.

7.

That

distributive

and

vindicative are not species but parts of the laws. 8. All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it 9. The precepts of the Decalogue of honoring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witness, are
civil laws.

10. It is

the

civil

law contrary

impossible to command aught by to the law of nature. 11. It is

both that itself and also the lawknown. 12. Whence the lawgiver comes to be known. 13. PubHshing and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. 14. The division of the civil law into written and unwritten. 15. The
essential to a law,

giver be

natural laws are not written laws; neither are the wise sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power, 16. What the word sin, most largely taken, signifies, 17. The definition of sin. 18. The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice. 19. Under what kind of
sin

atheism

is

contained. 20.

What

treason

is.

21.

That by

treason, not the civil, but the natural laws,

And that therefore it is to be punby the right of dominion, but by the right of war, 23, That obedience is not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
are broken, 22,
ished, not

PART
XV. Of the Kingdom
I.

III.

RELIGION

of

God by Nature
by nature.
3.

....
2.

175

The

proposition of the following contents.

is

Over

whom God
God
5.

said to rule

threefold:

reason, revelation, prophecy.

The word of 4. The

kingdom of God twofold: natural, and prophetic. The right whereby God reigns is seated in his omnipotence, 6. The same proved from Scripture. 7. The obUgation of yielding obedience to God proceeds from human infirmity. 8. The laws of God in his natural kingdom are those which are recited above in Chapters II and III. 9. What honour and
worship
is.

10.

Worship

consists either in attributes

or in actions. 11. And there is one sort natural, another arbitrary. 12. One commanded, another vol-

XIV
untary.
14. 13.

CONTENTS
What
the

What

natural

the end or scope of worship is. laws are concerning God's

What the actions are whereby naturally give worship. 16. In God's natural kingdom, the city may appoint what worship of God it pleaseth. 17. God ruling by nature only, the city, that is
attributes. 15.

we do

man or court who under God hath the sovereign authority of the city, is the interpreter of all the laws. 18. Certain doubts removed. 19. What sin is in the natural kingdom of God, and what treason against the Divine Majesty.
to say, that

XVI. Of the Kingdom of God under the Old Covenant (omitted)

XVII.

Of the Kingdom
nant (omitted)

of

God by the

New

Cove-

XVIII. Concerning Those Things Which Are Necessary FOR Our Entrance into the Kingdom OF Heaven
propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinction between the points necessary and
I.

194

The

difficulty

not necessary to salvation. 2. All things necessary to salvation are contained in faith and obedience. 3. What kind of obedience that is which is required of
us. 4.

What
in

faith

is,

fession,

from

science,

believe
Jesus
is

Christ.

and how distinguished from profrom opinion. 5. What it is to 6. That that article alone, that
necessary to salvation,
is

the Christ,

is

proved

scope of the Evangelists. 7. From the preachings of the Apostles. 8. From the easiness of Christian religion. 9. From this also, that it is the

from

the

foundation of
of Christ

faith. 10.

From

the

most evident words

is

and

his Apostles. 11. In that article

confaith

tained the faith of the

Old Testament.

12.

How

and obedience concur to salvation. 13. In a Christian city, there is no contradiction between the commands of God and of the city. 14. The doctrines which this day are controverted about religion, do for the most
part relate to the right of dominion.

INTRODUCTION
Thomas Hobbes was born
England, on April
5,

near Malmesbury in Wiltshire,

1588.

His mother gave birth to him

prematurely, as the story was told, because she took fright at

the approach of the Spanish

Armada

to the English coast.

He
His

commented,
remark has
an old

late

in

life,

on the circumstances of

his

birth

in the words: "she brought forth twins

at least

myself and

fear."

some purport.
to

It reflects

the realization of

man

of

more than eighty

life

years of age, that he

had sought

through a long
moils of
indicates
civil

make

himself secure amidst the tur-

war and

violent shifts of political power. It also

his
political

fundamental theme of

philosophy,

namely, that the prime need of man, a need which must be

satisfied before
is

any other consequent goods may be obtained,

peace under a stable government.

Hobbes was given educational opportunities through the

beneficence of an uncle.

He was

taught Greek and Latin as a

boy, and was sent to Oxford where he studied the writings of

Aristotle,

by whom, though he never acknowledged his

in-

debtedness, he was obviously deeply influenced.

Upon

leaving

Oxford in 1608, he became companion to

Cavendish (who was
later

son of Lord

made

Earl of Devonshire).
life,

And
many

for the remaining seventy years of his long

he continued

in close contact with the Cavendish family, living for

years as a beloved retainer in their household
their service

and dying in

on December

4,

1679.

He was

buried in the parish

church

at

Ault Hucknall near Mansfield.

his grave, his patrons of the

On

the stone slab

which covers

Cavendish family
as "a

had a Latin epitaph

inscribed

which described him

man

XVI
of integrity, well

INTRODUCTION

known

at

home and abroad

for his reputation

of learning."

Hobbes was throughout his life a man of letters. His first work was a translation of Thucydides (1629); and among his last works was a metrical translation of the poems
published
of

Homer

(1673, 1676).

He

spent

much

time on mathematical

problems, endeavoring to square the

none-too-creditable

circle,

and getting into

controversy

with John Wallis and other

professional mathematicians of his day.

He was
fact

associated for

a time with Francis Bacon, even translating some of Bacon's

essays into Latin; but aside

from the

that he repeated

(without acknowledgment) Bacon's famous aphorism "Knowl-

edge

is

power," he seems to have taken

litde

from Bacon.

He

was profoundly influenced by the thought of Galileo and aimed to make the laws of motion the foundation of an entire system
of philosophy.

He

read Descartes (and probably dined with

Descartes in Paris); and he was one of the group of distin-

guished European intellectuals

tions in manuscript

who
as

read Descartes's Medita-

and wrote "objections" which Descartes

an appendix
to his

published,

with his answers,

work.

Descartes did not have high regard for Hobbes's ideas on

metaphysics;
Cive, that time. But

but Descartes said, after reading Hobbes's

political

De

Hobbes was the soundest

all

thinker of the

these multifarious literary

and

intellectual achieve-

ments of Hobbes are overshadowed by

to the history of philosophy, that
is,

his chief contribution

social

by his system of

and

political

philosophy.

The

principles of this social

and

political

philosophy came
his reflections

to development in Hobbes's

mind through

on

the actual course of

human
It is

affairs in the

troubled world of the

it

seventeenth century.

indeed true, and

has often been

pointed out (usually in disparagement of Hobbes), that Hobbes

conceived these principles as part of a grandiose schematism

INTOODUCTION

XVU

for a total theory of the universe. According to this schematism,

the only ultimate facts are matter and motion;

all

else

is

but

some
parts:

special case of the basic realities of matter

and motion.
body
is,

The schematism would, Hobbes

a theory of

thought,

have three main

of living

body

in general, a theory a theory of social

all

(particularly of

man), and

body (that

of

the state).

Hobbes wrote eventually

three parts of this in-

clusive schematism:

De
it

Corpore (1655),

De Homine

(1650),

and

De

Give (1642). But he wrote the

last part first;

and

in-

ternal evidence

makes

highly probable that he in no sense

deduced

his political principles

from the general

materialistic

schematism.

He
to

outlined the three parts of his schematism in

"The Author's
he
is

Preface to the Reader" of the

De

Give,

and
prin-

known

have had

it

in

mind even
realistic,

earlier.

But the

ciples

are the

work

of a

fresh,

empirical,

sensitive

observer of events. Hobbes's

of Aristode

mind was prepared by

his reading
critics

and Thucydides and other such

scene; but his writing
actions.

attentive

of the

human

shows that he kept

strife
I,

his

eyes directly
led

upon men's
civil

He

witnessed the

which

up

to the deposition

and execution of Charles

the fight-

ing of the

wars under Cromwell, the confusion after

II,

Cromwell's death, the Restoration under Charles

and the

constant struggle for power which continued between king

and Parliament and among the various

England. His
political principles

religious

groups in

were formulated long before

His principles

the end of this sequence of events, and were only intensified

and made more extreme by the

were
clear

later

events.

in his

own mind when,

late in

1640, he fled to

France

to escape the

storm which was breaking with violence

upon

his

own

country, for by 1640 he

had composed
of

a sketch

of his political theories in

Politic

The Elements

Law
this

Natural and
preliminary

(though he chose never to publish

work). Then in 1642 he completed the

De

Give which gave

XVlll
classic

INTRODUCTION
form
to his principles.

The

years

of exile in France
to his

(where he remained eleven years) added venom

of the relation of civil

views

government and

religious institutions.
ecclesiastics.

He

acquired personal reasons for hating

For

after

Charles, Prince of Wales, arrived in Paris in

1646,

Hobbes
were

secured appointment to tutor the prince in mathematics, but

lost the

position because the ecclesiastics about Charles

hostile to

venomously
ernment.

Hobbes's frankly secular ideas of govpolitical principles

When

he again expressed his

in

the Leviathan in 1651, he accompanied

them with

a furious

denunciation of the Church of

Rome and

Presbyterian clergy

and

all

who would make

religion superior to or even indelater

pendent of governmental control. Though the

puts Hobbes's political principles in a
context, the principles

work thus

new (and

not helpful)

remain exactly what they were in 1640

and 1642.

The De Cive was Hobbes's

cial

earliest

published
it

work on

so-

and
it

political

philosophy.

When

appeared at Paris in

1642,

was

in the

form of a

privately printed book, of

which

few copies were made and very few have survived

It

to our day.
it

became

available to those

who wished

to

buy

through

three distinct editions published by the Elzevir Press of

Am-

sterdam in 1647.
in
1 65 1.

An

English translation appeared at

translator of the

London
Cive, so

Hobbes was himself the

De

that the English text here given has equal authority with that

of the original Latin.

When

he translated the

De
title

Cive into

English, he gave

it

a long and

cumbersome

which

is

printed in full at the close of this introduction. In this edition,

the

work is called simply, The Citizen. The Citizen is not merely Hobbes's
social

earliest

published

work

on

and

political
It

philosophy:

it is

also, in certain respects,

his best

work.

far surpasses in clarity the preliminary sketch

of 1640

and the

De

Corpore

Politico of 1650

which

is

nothing

INTRODUCTION
more than
fame
certain chapters out of the early sketch.
It

XIX
has been

comparatively neglected, however, because of the far greater

of the longer work, the Leviathan, of 1651.

The

Levia-

than was written by Hobbes directly in English (though put

by him into Latin in 1668), and has not some of the unfortunate Latinisms which characterize the English text of
Citizen,
far

The
and

As

a contribution to belles lettres, the Leviathan ranks

suitability of style to content

ahead of The Citizen. In

in vigor of trenchant
is

and dramatic utterance, the Leviathan

literature. Yet,

one of the masterpieces of English

it

eloquent
it

as

is

when taken paragraph by

paragraph, quotable as
it

is

when taken
written

sentence by sentence,

bears

many marks

of

having been composed in the heat of

bitter controversy. It

was

when Hobbes,
of the
flee

dismissed from service to Prince Charles

of prelates

and

fearful

conspiracies
as

against him,

de-

cided to

from France

no longer a

safe residence

and to

make
a

peace with Cromwell and so to return home. Begun in

spirit of

moderation,

it

passes in

its

middle chapters

to pas-

sionate rhetoric,
ligious forces

and

closes in a burst of fury against the reas

which Hobbes characterizes

It

"The Kingdom
scholarly

of Darkness."
poise

lacks

the

reasoned integrity and

and philosophical
its

objectivity of

The

Citizen,

The

Citizen

indicates by

divisions the essential course of Hobbes's sys-

tematic thought; the Leviathan indicates rather the intensity

of his hates.

The

Citizen

is

more methodical and more

this

direct

in exposition of Hobbes's constructive ideas

and purpose; the

purpose
of the Levia-

Leviathan often distorts these ideas and obscures

by an insistent
than, because

fire
it

of destructive attacks.

Much
is

was directed against

as in

factors

that

no longer

loom up
Citizen,

as

menacingly

Hobbes's day,
of personal

outmoded. The

free

from

all

traces

animus, remains a

definitive statement of
social

one of the great interpretations of the

and

political life of

mankind.

XX
Hobbes's
a
political

INTRODUCTION
philosophy was greeted in his

own

day by

more

extensive

and more virulent

rejection than, probably,

any other philosophy in modern times.

Many

of the pamphlets

and broadsides directed

at

Hobbes have doubtless

criticisms
his

perished.

But

we can name
against

fifty-one

hostile

which were printed

Hobbes during

lifetime

and the next ensuing

of

decade, and

we know

of only

two defenses

him (both
ideas

of

which were composed by continental authors)! The almost

universal

storm of fury against Hobbes's

political

be-

gan

to create in

England, from the very outset of

Citizen, a

their first

publication in

The

myth concerning

the intent

and

purport of Hobbes's philosophy. Hobbes's works were more

denounced than read,

dicates.

as the nature of

many

of the attacks in-

Hobbes was
an

called "the
atheist, a

monster of Malmesbury," and

was
of

classified as

schemer, a heretic, and a blasconsidered the advisability

phemer. The House of

Commons

having a public burning of Hobbes's books, and some

bishops of the Church of England

of Hobbes's person.

he was likely to

recommended the burning Whenever any one was greatly disliked, be called "a Hobbist" no more objectionable

term of abuse could be found!

Hobbism,
Hobbes.
It

therefore,

is

not a

name

for

the philosophy of

designates that system or jumble of political notions

literature against

which the contemporary

him. Hobbism
is

Hobbes

attributed to

derived from the writings of Hobbes by

wresting phrases out of context, by failing to note definitions

of terms

and

to

draw

distinctions

which Hobbes

clearly gives,

and by taking Hobbes's recognition of the

around us
as evidence of

evil in the

world

Hobbes's

own
of

sordidness of character.
is

The

curious thing about this

myth

Hobbism

that

it

(like

the age-old misrepresentation of Epicureanism)

across the centuries

has survived

and

is

repeated,

more
clearer

or less innocently, in

textbooks and histories today.

No

way

of

expounding

INTRODUCTION
the political principles of
trast
I.
it,

XXI
to con-

Hobbes can be found than

point by point, with what

to

According

may be called Hobbism. Hobbism, God made man such a beast and
he
is

a rascal that he inclines universally to malice and fraud. Man's

typical acts, unless

restrained by force, are violent

and

ruthless, savagely disregarding the persons

and property

of his

fellows.

His greatest longing

is

to preserve himself

by gaining
egoistic

power over others and exploiting others

ends.

for his

own

And

the exercise of
it

power
nature,

is

honorable, no matter for

what ends
Hobbist.

be exercised.

In his view of

human
is

Hobbes

is

far

from being a
in the state
in the state

He

gave, to be sure, a picture of

far

"man

of nature"

which

from

flattering.

"All
(I,

men
4).*
all

of nature have a desire and will to hurt"

state of

men"

is

"a war of

all

men

against

"The natural men" (I, 12).

nature.

But Hobbes did not intend

the state of nature
state of
is

to say that his picture of

a complete account of

human

men in The
from
factor

nature
It
is

is

for Hobbes, not

an

historical,

but an analytical
existence

concept.

not some early stage of

departed:
it

human
a

which men
within
all

later

is

rather

permanent
social theory

human

societies against

which men must always be

on

their

guard in practice and of which

must
be-

take full account.

The

"natural

man"

is

what man would

come whenever he came wholly under

sion,

the domination of pas-

without the restraints of reason or of the established

civil

procedures of
nature
is

society.

The
like

idea of
that

man
a

in the state of

for

social

science

of

natural

body in

physical science. Physical science holds that a

in a state of rest or of

body continues
line unless

uniform motion in a straight

is

influenced by outside forces. Actually, there

is

no body which not influenced by outside bodies; but the idea of such a body
and
article of

All references, unless specifically noted, are to chapter

The

Citizen.

XXll

INTRODUCTION

enables us to measure the outside forces. So the concept oi

man

in the state of nature enables us to

social

measure the extent to

which reason and

pressures qualify the expression of

human

passions. It

makes evident the

gravity of the problem

civil society.

of securing a stable,

and even moderately decent,

The men we have

samples of natural

actually to deal with are neither pure

men

nor clear embodiments of virtue. They

exhibit varying degrees of crudity

not,

and refinement.

Men
their

are

Hobbes explicidy

stated,

naturally evil

(Preface to the

Reader). But they are naturally passionate.

sions will

And
and

pas-

make them

evil in

some

conditions,

will lead

them

to

vigorous support of desirable social ends in other

conditions.

One can
it

not persuade water to run uphill, but one

may pump men to be

some distance upwards. So one can not persuade

one

passionless; but

may

so organize a state that

men

will gratify their passions within the definable limits of

it

civilized ways. In brief, excellence comes, if

come

at all,

not

from romantic

trust in

human

nature, but

from

realistic

knowl-

edge of what the forces are which require control.

a rational as well as a passionate animal. But
is

Man

is

human

reason

impotent to control passion unless and until

social conditions

are established

which are conducive

to the profitable exercise

of reason.
2.
is

According to the system

distinction

we

are calling

Hobbism, there

no genuine

between right and wrong. Moral

distinctions are artificial suppositions foisted

ality of

upon

the gener-

mankind by some
beyond the

superior power; they are arbitrary

conventions which rulers impose upon their subjects and have

no

validity

frontiers within
is

which those
morality.

rulers exstate is

ercise control. All morality

thus a

fiat

The

the creator of

from the

what men have come to deem virtue, and apart state there would be no moral distinctions or moral
all.

principles at

INTRODUCTION
Readers of Hobbes will find

XXIU
passages which, pried
asserts.

many

from

context,

seem

to

maintain what Hobbism thus

For

example:
all, and to do all, is lawful for all; which is meant by that coming saying, nature hath given all to all, from whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature, profit is the measure of right (X, lo).

In the state of nature, to have

and

this

is

that

Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being,
their nature only

being relative
is

to

some command, and every

that
it

action

in

its

own

nature

indifferent;

becomes

just

or unjust,

proceeds from the right of the magistrate (XII, i).

These passages quoted from Hobbes's The Citizen and many

other passages in his various writings have often misled his
readers.

Properly

understood,

however, they

do not imply
Hobbes

Hobbism.

Two

things need to be said in order to establish

is

a correct interpretation of Hobbes's meaning. First,

speaking in

legal,

not in moral, terms. Justice and right are

being defined in terms of enforcement of a conformity to law.

It is

then an analytical proposition and admits of no dispute

that

where there
all.

is

no law there can be no question

then begins only where law

of justice

or right at

Justice

exists.

And

in the absence of law,

might makes

right, not in the sense that

might proves wisdom or

virtue to be

resident in

exercises that might, but in the sense that

resistible,
is

might,

him who when irdistinction

is

the beginning of a regime in

which the

between

social

requirements and individual interest

emerg-

ing, in which, hence, the force of

itself

law

is

beginning to manifest

and respect

for

law

is

involved in the determination of

conduct.
Secondly, Hobbes
is is

insisting that

any significant morality

of regu-

social in character

and presupposes the occurrence

is

larized procedures. Morality

not significantly present

when

XXIV

INTRODUCTION
are considered in their separateness as atomic individuals;
significantly

men
it

is

present
situations

when men
which
call

are considered in their

for
social

interrelations in
If

adjustments.
that a

a critic wishes to press

Hobbes by claiming

man,

apart from his fellows, can yet live on a morally higher or

lower
it,

scale,

Hobbes

will grant the point.

He

did indeed grant

when

in the Elzevir editions

of

The

Citizen he printed

footnotes that were not in the Paris edition of 1642 (cf. foot-

note to

III,

27).

Drunkenness,

cruelty,

and revenge which

affirmed, evil

respects not the future good, are,

he

explicitly

even in the

state of

war (and
There

the state of
is

war

is

the irruption

of the state of nature).

then the beginning of morality

apart from social institutions; but the big and important concerns of morality arise only in developed societies and in the

context of social institutions of

Hobbes never maintained,

that

as

many kinds. Hobbism

fiat.

attributed to him,
that,

law

creates

moral distinctions by

His point was

precisely

because justice and right have important meanings

as legal terms, morality

afiFair.

must be viewed

as a

genuinely social
a civil

If

men
it,

lived without a

known law and

power

to enforce

they

would have no guide except

would

their individual
strife

judgments; consequently, opinions would clash,

ensue, and chaos
to
result.

would
is

To

recognize this fact

acts:
it

not

endorse ruthless, anti-social, and passionate

is

rather

to indicate the indispensable role of

life. If

law in pursuit of the good

one supposed that individual

seats of

men

in their individuality

were so many separate

obligations, then one

moral prerogatives and moral

to

would have

go on

to

view morality
to regard
it

as fixed antecedently to the

enactment of laws, and

to

the function of
this fixed

lawmakers merely

frame laws consistent with

involvement of law and

and antecedent standard. Such a position would be

a superficial notion of the intimate

morals in each other. Law, as Hobbes saw, creates situations

INTRODUCTION
in

XXV
principle

which sound reason or sound moral

same thing) requires
there were

(two names
ridicu-

for die

decisions such as
if

would be

lous

if

no law or
fiat

there were a different law.

distinctions,

Law
tions,

does not by
it

create

moral

and Hobbes
moral
situa-

never said

does.

But law does

create significant

and Hobbes saw

philosopher of
third point of
It

this point

more

clearly

than any prior

political
3.

modern times. Hobbism followed

facto ruler
is

naturally

from the
all

second.
his laws
arises

was that a de
acts.

always justified in

and

Since the distinction between good and bad

from the

dictate of princes, the

commands

of princes

are ipso facto the criterion of right

and wrong

for those

whom
is

they are strong enough to

a
contradiction
in

command.
for

bad lawmaker

thus
of

terms;

being himself the

source

morality, he can not be immoral.

Here
glance,

again, there

are

passages in

Hobbes which,

at

first

seem

to be Hobbist.

For example:

Legitimate kings therefore

forbidding them (XII, i).

make

the

things

they

command

just,

by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by

make some common rules men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil
It

belongs to the same chief power to

for all

(VI, 9)-

There are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm and government (The Preface to the Reader).

These are strong words, and doubdess there

in them.

is

overstatement
is

But

it

should be remembered that Hobbes

using

his terms in their legal sense.

His intent

is

to

show
if

that the
are to

source of law can hardly be contrary to law; that,

we

XXVI

INTRODUCTION
power must
rest

bar a resort to violence and war, sovereign

somewhere; that
respect

civil

society carries with

it

the obligation to

law

as

such.

Even bad law

is

law,
as
if it

and even good

were not
really

citizens can not properly flout

bad law

law

at all. Since

law

establishes, in part at least, the situations

it

which define our moral problems,

can not, in any competent

as either inconsequential

and

incisive

moral conduct, be treated

or irrelevant.

He who
in

ignores the legal purport of his acts

destroys ipso facto the moral legitimacy of those acts.

Hobbes repudiated

all

his writings the

Hobbist contento

tion that the king can

do no wrong.

He had much

say

"concerning the duties of them

title

who

bear rule," to quote the

of Chapter XIII.

definition, act unjustly,

Though he "may

a sovereign can not, by legal

diverse

ways transgress against

the other laws of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely,

and other

like vices" (VII, 14).

is

sovereign, as

much

as

any

other man,

subject to the laws of nature or the dictates of

reason; indeed he has greater responsibility to those laws than

other

men

because he
is

is

by function the person in whose hands

social welfare

placed.
2).

preme law" (XIII,

own, but

"The "The

safety of the people

city

is

the sufor
its

was not

instituted

for the subjects' sake" (XIII, 3).

Good government
of the people, to

involves provisions to increase the

number

preserve peace at home, to provide defense against attack from

without, and generally to safeguard "the commodity of living."

And
as

by commodity of living Hobbes meant such regulations

give

will

encouragement to

trade,

abundant opportunity
necessities,

for labor,

ample supplies of food and other

and
coma

such liberty of movement and of private

patible

affairs

as

is

with maintenance of public order. Not simply

may

sovereign violate his responsibilities to his people through in-

dulgence in vice or through neglect, but even a conscientious

sovereign

may commit

such

vital

mistakes of judgment that

INTRODUCTION
his rule involves serious

XXVll
All this

moral

disasters.

Hobbes

re-

iterated so often that his theory stands in strong antithesis to

the notion of Hobbism.

4.

fourth point of

Hobbism
what
is

is

the denial of

all

rights to

the people, and the assertion that the passing

are of

whims

of a ruler

more

force than

alleged to be law.
this point

Hobbes came
on any
other.

closer to

being a Hobbist on

than
shall

His words are indeed austere. "Whatsoever

be done by

him who commands, must

not be punished" (VI,

12). Or, in the

.
. .

words of the Leviathan: "The sovereign power

impunity" (Molesworth edition of
Ill, p.

implieth an universal
Worlds, Vol.

The English
not that
as

205). But Hobbes's point was

specific rights

men

in civil society

do not have certain

it

defined and established by law;

was

that

these
as

rights

are historically conditioned

to all systems of law,

and can not be taken

less as

common

much

inhering in

men

apart from

laws altogether.

Hobbes was here an

that

efiFective

realist.

He

discerned clearly

common
and
is

agreement among
at all times,

men

could not be expected on

all issues

and

that, consequently,

and

if civil

war

to

be avoided, some one, somewhere, must be given

sovereign power to setde conflicting issues. In such cases,

men

have to choose between open

strife

and imposed settlement.

Wise

rulers

and prudent

citizens will seek to prevent occasions

of irreconcilable

and embittered opposition. But a great aid

and
is

in preventing such occasions

in producing

mutual com-

promise of conflicting claims,

the existence of a

power which
and compel

contending factions
peace.

know

to be ready to step in

Furthermore,

as

Hobbes saw,

the appeal to popular rights

can be a technique of obstructing needed social change. Appeal

from sovereign power

to alleged rights

is

virtually appeal

from
estal>

a present sovereign to a dead sovereign

whose power

XXVlll
lished those rights.

INTRODUCTION

No

one ever saw more

clearly

than Hobbes
clearly

the importance of law; but also no one ever

saw more

than Hobbes that no force in

in
its

human

society is

more human

origins than law,

its

tentative in

ings

upon the

more experimental in its course, more more dependent in its specific meanauthorities who use and interpret it. The nature
objectives,

of property rights

and of the

rights of labor

have been chang-

ing rapidly in our

own

country during recent decades; and the

appeal to fixed rights has been a technique of reactionaries

who

sought to prevent change. Even the rights assigned to the

people by "the
bill

of rights" in the first ten

amendments

to the

Constitution of the United States, even these rights are subject to

change by the amending powers which the Constitution

confers

on the sovereign people; and regard

for these rights

is,

not so

much an
and an

appeal to unchangeable law, as a program

act

of action

of faith.

The

"four freedoms" of the

Atlantic Charter are certainly contingent

of

upon establishment
realization

governments which will bring them

to factual

instead of leaving

them

to pious wishes.

And

so

Hobbes was

right in recognizing sovereign

power
its

as the creator of rights

rather than as conditioned in

power by

aritecedent rights.

Legalism

ties

a society to precedent, to the level of past achieveall

ment. Hobbes's appeal to sovereignty, with

tendency to harsh overstatement,
is

the faults of

its

in theory a release

from

outto

worn

precedent.

It is

in theory a turning

from precedents

the ultimate source of law, in the interest of securing better

and more pertinent law.

There yet remains something
that sovereign
ruthless which,
ruthless

in Hobbes's words

power implies universal impunity, something

if

not justifying an interpretation of

for careful

him

as a
his

Hobbist, yet

calls

consideration.

Hobbes put

sovereign not merely above law but above criticism. In the

closing chapter of

The

Citizen, the ruthlessness of Hobbes's

INTRODUCTION
theory comes out glaringly.

XXIX
in matters temporal,

Not simply
is,

but in matters
tion

spiritual, that

in matters of religious convicis

and of conscience, a

citizen

bound, Hobbes wrote, duti-

is no proper alternative Hobbes continued, except to "go to Christ by martyrdom" (XVIII, 13). That is, a citizen must obey or

fully to

obey his sovereign.

And

there

to this submission,

die:

he must not

criticise

and expect

to be tolerated

and

to be

allowed to survive.

And
human

exactly here

is

to be

found a major

fault in

Hobbes.

Hobbes's appeal to force was insistent because his distrust of

reason was excessive.

He

did not deny the power of

reason to discern the laws of natue which are the principles

of right reasoning

and the laws of sound morality; but he did

deny that

men

are intelligent

enough

to follow the paths of

reasonableness.

And

because

men

are not sufficiently reasonable

(a

fact

which can be

abundantly

confirmed

empirically),

Hobbes refused any proper play to reason in human affairs. Hobbes had no sense for what Englishmen call "His Majesty's
Loyal Opposition."

He had no

sense for either the privilege

or the duty of a sovereign to provide for criticism, to promote

the free exchange and discussion of ideas in order that policy

be clarified and purposes be enlightened. Hobbes treated reason-

ing as sedition against authority, criticism as treason, discussion

of policy as a

mark

of the dissolution of

commonwealth.

He
is

seems to have supported the notion that strong government

one under which reasoning and criticism and discussion are not
visible.

The

historian

may

explain this element of ruthlessness in

Hobbes by pointing
the general

to his fear of anarchy, his suffering

from

confusion of aflairs in the seventeenth century,

and
critic

his desire to get

something
of

settled

with

finality.

But the

must weigh the merits

the critic

what the

historian explains.

And

may

well see in Hobbes's distrust of reason a

XXX

INTRODUCTION

danger which might dissolve Hobbes's sound principles into

that

very

Hobbism which Hobbes

entire

did not espouse. For

if

reason be effete and impotent, then the natural

man

tends to

become the
arbitrary

man, moral

distinctions

tend to become
justified in all his

fiats,

and any sovereign might be

ways.

Had

the opponents of

his distrust of reason, they

Hobbes focused would have been

their attack

upon
pre-

able to

make out
eccle-

a trenchant case.

But of course they too distrusted reason,

ferring to appeal to
siastical

some

principle of legitimacy,

some

authoritarianism,

some

hereditary

institution.

Had

Hobbes recognized the role that reason may play in human affairs, he would have preserved his social and political philosophy from the tinge of ruthlessness which now characterizes
it.

But even

as

it is,

that philosophy

tion to the thought of

is a monumental contribumankind and one of the few really

definitive theories concerning the state

and the

citizen.

In the text of
of

The

Citizen

which

is

here given, the spelling

Hobbes has been modernized, the punctuation has been

altered to

somewhat

make

it

more
into

helpful to the reader,

most

of the italics have been removed, and, occasionally,

some long

sentences have been broken

up

two or more shorter ones.

But the

text

is

otherwise Hobbes's

own
it

English translation of

The The
1

Citizen as he himself prepared

text here given
is

for publication in 1651.

is

much more

faithful to the original of

is

65 1 than

that of the

Molesworth edition of 1841 which

the only edition of

The

Citizen which has been available to

readers for

more than a

century.

Sterling P. Lamprecht

BIBLIOGRAPHY
W. Molesworth, ii volumes of the EngWorks, 5 volumes of the Latin Works, 1839-1845. Laird, J.: Hobbes, London, 1934. Lamprecht, S. p.: "Hobbes and Hobbism," in The American Political
Hobbes's Wor\s, edited by Sir
lish

Science Review, Vol.

XXXIV,

no.

i,

have used extensive portions of

duction to this edition of
editors of the

this

article

February, 1940, pp. 31-53. (I in preparing the intro-

The

Citizen,

and

wish

to
so.)

thank the

Review

for their kind permission to

do

Lyon, G.: La philosophic de Hobbes, Paris, 1893. Robertson, G. C: Hobbes, Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1886. Stephen, Sir L.: Hobbes, London and New York, 1904. Strauss, L.: The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis.
Translated from the
1936.

German manuscript by

E.

M.

Sinclair.

Oxford,

Taylor, A. E.: Thomas Hobbes, New York, 1909, and London, 1908. Taylor, A. E.: "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," in Philosophy, Vol. Xin, October, 1938, pp. 406-424. Tonnies, F.: Thomas Hobbes, Leben tmd Lehre, 3rd edition, Stuttgart,
1925.

WooDBRiDGE,

F.

J.

E.: Selections

from Hobbes,

New

York, 1930.

Philosophical Rudiments
CONCERNING

GOVERNMENT
or,

and
MAN

SOCIETY
In his several

A DISSERTATION Concerning Habitudes and Respects,

as

the

Member

of a society,

first

SECULAR, and then sacred.

Containing

The ELEMENTS OF CIVIL POLITY in Agreement which it hath both

with

the

NATURAL and divine laws.

is

In which

demonstrated

Both what the origin of justice is, and wherein the essence of christian religion doth consist.

Together with

The NATURE, limits, and qualifications both of REGIMENT and subjection.

By Tho. Hobbes
LONDON
Printed by
at
J.

G. for R. Royston,

the Angel in Ivie-lane. 1651.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE,

WILLIAM, EARL OF DEVONSHIRE,

MY MOST HONOURED
LORD.

May
of king

it

please your Lordship,

It was the speech of the

Roman

people (to
as well

whom

the

name
it

had been rendered odious,

by the tyranny of the

Tarquins, as by the genius and decretals of that city)

the speech,
private
I

was

say, of the public,

(if

however pronounced from a

mouth,
all

yet Cato the censor were

no more than

such) that

kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts.

But what
its

a beast of prey
it

was the Roman people, whilst with

its

conquering eagles

erected

proud trophies

so far

and

wide over the world, bringing the Africans, the

Macedonians, and the Achsans, with
tions, into a specious

Asiatics, the

many
if

other despoiled na-

bondage, with the pretence of preferring

them

to be denizens of
it

Rome? So

that

Cato's saying were

a wise one,

was every whit

(in that

as wise that of Pontius Telesinus;

all

who

flying about with

open mouth through

the companies

of his army,

famous encounter which he had with

Sylla) cried out, that

Rome

herself,

as well

as

Sylla,

was

to

be razed; for that there would always be wolves and depredators of their liberty, unless the forest that

lodged them were

To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; that man to man is a kind of God; and that man to man is an arrant wolf. The first is true, if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare
grubbed up by the
roots.
cities.

In the one, there

is

some analogy

of similitude with

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

and
charity, the

the Deity, to wit, justice

twin

sisters of peace.

But
to

in the other,

good men must defend themselves by taking

in plain terms a

them

for

sanctuary the
is

and

violence: that

two daughters mere

of war,

deceit

brutal rapacity:

which although men

object to one another as a reproach, by

an inbred custom which they have of beholding their

actions in the persons of other
all

own
all

men, wherein,

as in a mirror,

things

on the

left side

appear to be on the right, and

left;

things on the right side to be as plainly on the

natural right of preservation which

yet the

we

all

receive

from the
it

uncontrollable dictates of necessity, will not admit

vice,

to be a

though

it

confess

it

to be

an unhappiness.

Now

that with

Cato himself, (a person of so great a renown for wisdom)

animosity should so prevail instead of judgment, and partiality
instead of reason, that the very

same thing which he thought

as unjust in a

equal in his popular

monarchical, other
I

state,

he should censure

men

perhaps

may have

leisure to admire.

But

have been long since of

this opinion, that there

was never
of be-

yet any more-than-vulgar prudence, that

had the luck

it

ing acceptable to the giddy people; but either

understood, or else having been
cried
so,

hath not been

hath been levelled and

down. The more eminent

actions

and apothegms both

their eulogies

of the Greeks

and Romans have been indebted for

that prosperous usurpation

not so
very

much to the many times to

reason, as to the greatness of them,

and

(with which

our histories do so mutually upbraid each other) which as a

conquering torrent

carries all before

it,

as well public agents

as public actions, in the

stream of time.
this,

Wisdom

properly so

called

is

nothing
all

else

but

the perfect knowledge of the

truth in
registers

matters whatsoever.
things,

Which being
and
that as

derived from the

it

and records of
of a

were through

the conduit of certain definite appellations, cannot possibly be the

work

sudden acuteness, but of a well-balanced reason,

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

which by the compendium
by
this
it is,

3
philosophy. For

of a word,

we

call

that a

way

is

opened to

us, in

which we

travel

from the contemplation

of particular things to the inference

or result of universal actions.

Now

look

how many

sorts of

things there are

of

which properly
into
itself.

fall

within the cognizance

human

reason,

so

many

branches does the tree of

the diversity of the matter

philosophy divide

And from
names
motion,

about which they are conversant, there hath been given to

those branches a diversity of
it is

too.

For treating of
of

figures,

called

geometry;
all

of

physic;

natural

right,

morals; put

together,

and they make up philosophy.

and the Indian
seas,

Just

as the British, the Atlantic,

being diversely

christened from the diversity of their shores, do notwithstand-

ing

all

together

make up

the ocean.

And
of

truly the geometricians

have very admirably performed their

sistance

part.

For whatsoever

as-

doth accrue to the

of

life

man, whether from the

the description of the

observation
earth,

the

heavens, or from
of times, or
finally,

from the notation

this present

from the remotest

ex-

periments of navigation;

whatsoever things they are in

which

age doth differ from the rude simpleness

to be a debt

of antiquity,

we must acknowledge
I

which we
as hap-

owe merely

to geometry. If the

moral philosophers had

pily discharged their duty,

know

not what could have been

added by human industry

ness,

to the

completion of that happilife.

which

is

consistent with

human

For were the naas the nature

ture of

human

actions as distinctly

known,

of

quantity in geometrical figures, the strength of avarice and

ambition, which
vulgar, as

is

sustained by the erroneous opinions of the

touching the nature of right and wrong, would

presently faint

and languish; and mankind should enjoy such

it

an immortal peace, that (unless

supposition that the earth should
habitants)
there

were for habitation, on

for her in-

grow too narrow

left

would hardly be

any pretence for war.

4
But

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

now on

the contrary, that neither the sword nor the pen

should be allowed any cessation; that the knowledge of the

law of nature should

lose

its

growth, not advancing a whit

still

beyond

its

ancient stature; that there should

be such siding

with the several factions of philosophers, that the very same

action should be decried by some,
others; that the very
his several opinions,

and

as

much

elevated by

same man should

and esteem
his

at several

times embrace

own
I

actions far otherwise

in himself than he does in others; these

say are so

many

signs,

so

many

manifest arguments, that what hath hitherto been

written by moral philosophers, hath not

made any

progress in

the knowledge of the truth; but yet hath took with the world,

not so

much
of

by giving any light to the understanding, as en-

tertainment to the affections, whilst by the successful rhetorications

their

speech they have confirmed them in their

rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy hath

suffered the

same destiny with the public ways, which

lie

open

up and down, or the same lot with highways and open streets; some for divertisement, and some for business; so that what with the impertinences of
to all passengers to traverse

some, and the altercations of others, those ways have never

a seeds-time, and therefore yield never a harvest.
reason
of

The
this;
is

only
that

which unluckiness should seem

to

be

amongst

all

the writers of that part of philosophy, there

tractation.

not

one that hath used an idoneous principle of

For we

may

not, as in a circle, begin the

please.

handling of a science from

what point we
beginning
is

There

is

a certain clue of reason,

whose

in the dark, but

it

by the benefit of whose conduct,

clearest light, so that

we

are led as

were by the hand into the

is

the principle of tractation

to be taken

from
for

that darkness, irradiating

its

and then
doubts.

the light to be carried

thither

As

often therefore as any writer, doth either weakly forit

sake that clue, or wilfully cut

asunder, he describes the foot-

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

Steps,

not of his progress in science, but of his wanderings

it.

from

And upon

this

it

was, that

when
I

appHed

my

thoughts

to the investigation of natural justice,

tised

was presently adversignifies a steady will

from the very word

justice,

(which

of giving every one his

own)

that

my

first

enquiry was to be,

from whence

it

proceeded, that any

thing rather his own, than another

that this proceeded not

man should call anyman's. And when I found

(for

from nature, but consent,

what

nature at
tribute

first

laid forth in

common, men
I

did afterwards dis-

into

several

impropriations),

was conducted from

com-

thence to another inquiry, namely to what end, and upon

what impulsives, when

all

was equally every man's

it

in

mon, men did

rather think

fitting, that

every

man

should

have his inclosure.

And

found the reason was, that from a

community

of goods, there

must needs

arise contention

whose
all

enjoyment should be

greatest,

and from

that

contention

kind of calamities must unavoidably ensue, which by the

stinct of nature, every

in-

man

is

taught to shun. Having therefore

of

thus arrived at two

maxims
part,

human

nature, the one arising

to appropriate to

from the concupiscible

itself

which

desires
all

the use of those things in which

others have a joint

interest, the other

proceeding from the rational, which teaches

a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest

every

man
I

to

fly

mischief that can arrive to nature; which principles being laid

down,

seem from them to have demonstrated by a most

little

evident connexion, in this

solute necessity of leagues

work

of mine,

first

the ab-

and

contracts,

and thence the rudi-

ments both of moral and of

civil

prudence. That appendage

of

which

is

added concerning the regiment

God, hath been

in

done with

this intent, that the dictates of

God Almighty

the law of nature, might not seem repugnant to the written

law, revealed to us in his word.

have also been very wary in

not to meddle with the

the whole tenour of

my

discourse,

6
civil
I

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY

laws of any particular nation whatsoever, that
is

to say,
in-

have avoided coming ashore, which those times have so

fested both

with shelves and tempests. At what expense of

I

time and industry

have been in

this scrutiny after truth, I

I

am

not ignorant; but to what purpose,

know
book

not.

For being

partial judges of ourselves,

we

lay a partial estimate

upon our

own

productions.

therefore offer
first;

up
as

this

to

your Lord-

ship's,

not favour, but censure

it

having found by many ex-

periments, that

is

not the credit of the author, nor the

style,

newness of the work, nor yet the ornament of the

only the weight of reason, which

but
to

recommends any opinion

If it

your Lordship's favour and approbation.

that
I
is

fortune to please,

to say, if
ofler

it it

be sound,
to

if it

be useful,

if it

be not vulgar;
glory

humbly

your Lordship as both

anything
I

my

and

my

protection; but
will yet accept

if
it

in
as a

have erred, your Lordship

testimony of
I

my

gratitude, for that the

means
I

of study

which

enjoyed by your Lordship's goodness,

have employed to the procurement of your Lordship's favour.

of heaven

The God
crown

crown your Lordship with length

and
in the heavenly Jerusalem,

of days

in this earthly station,

of glory.

with a

Your Honour's most humble,

and most devoted Servant,

Thomas Hobbes.

THE AUTHOR'S

PREFACE TO THE READER

Reader,

promise thee here such things, which ordinarily

I

promised, do seem to challenge the greatest attention, and

lay

them here before thine

eyes,

whether thou regard the dig-

nity or profit of the matter treated of, or the right

method

of handling

it,

or the honest motive, and good advice to under-

take

it,

or lastly the moderation of the author. In this book

briefly described the duties of
lastly,

thou shalt find

men,

first as

men;

then as subjects,

as Christians;

under which duties are

contained not only the elements of the laws of nature, and of

nations, together with the true original

and power of
itself,

justice,

but also the very essence of Christian religion

as the

so far forth
it.

measure of

this

my

purpose could well bear

Which kind
religion) the

of doctrine (excepting

what

relates to Christian

most ancient sages did judge

fittest to

be delivered
or clouded

to posterity, either curiously

adorned with

verse,

with allegories as a most beautiful and hallowed mystery of

royal authority; lest by the disputations of private

men

it

might

be defiled. Other philosophers in the

mean

time, to the ad-

vantage of mankind, did contemplate the

of
things,
others,

faces,

and motions
natures

without

disadvantage,
is

their

and

causes.
first,

But

in after times, Socrates

said to

have been the

who

truly loved this civil science, although hitherto not

thoroughly

understood, yet glimmering forth

as

through a
set

cloud in the government of the commonweal, and that he

7

8
so great a value

THE PREFACE
on
this, that utterly

abandoning, and despisthis, as

ing

all

other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced

it

judging

only worthy the labour of his mind. After

him

comes

Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,

and other philosophers,

as well

Greek, as Latin.

And now

at length all

men

of all nations,
still

not only- philosophers, but even the vulgar, have and do

deal with this as a matter of ease, exposed

and

prostitute to

every mother-wit, and to be attained without any great care

or study.

And, which makes mainly

it,

for

its

dignity, those

who

suppose themselves to have

they ought to have
its
it,

or are in such employment, as

do

so wonderfully please themselves in

arts to

idea, as they easily

brook the followers of other

ingenuous,
learned,
skilful,

be

esteemed

and

styled

what you
knowl-

will; except prudent: for this

name,
to be

in regard of civil

edge, they presume to be due to themselves only.

therefore the

Whether
of those

worth of

arts

is

weighed by the worthiness

of the persons

who

entertain them, or by the

number

who have

written of them, or by the judgment of the wisest;

certainly this

must carry

it,

which

so nearly relates to princes,

in

and others engaged

in the

government of mankind,
most part of

whose

adulterate species also the

selves,

men do

delight them-

and in which the most

excellent wits of philosophers

it

have been conversant.

that
tion,
is,

The

benefit of

when righdy
shall

delivered,

when we shall

derived from true principles by evident connec-

then best discern,

when we
for
in
if

but well have

its

considered the mischiefs that have befallen

counterfeit

mankind from
as

and babbling form;

such matters

are
us,

speculated for the exercise of our wits,

it is

any error escape

without hurt; neither

is

there any loss, but of time only:

but in those things which every

steerage of his
errors,
life,
it

man
itself,

ought to meditate for the

necessarily happens, that not only

from

but even from ignorance

there arise ofFences, congreat a preju-

tentions,

nay even slaughter

itself.

Look now, how

TO THE READER
dice these are, such,
this

9
from
kings

and

so great truly

is

the benefit arising

doctrine

of

moraHty

declared.

How many

(and those good

men

too) hath this one error, that a tyrant

to death,

king might lawfully be put

been the slaughter of?

How many
for

throats hath this false position cut, that a prince

certain

some causes may by some

this

men

be deposed?

And

what bloodshed hath not

kings are not superiors tude? Lastly,
cause
of,

erroneous doctrine caused, that

to,

but administrators for the multi-

how many

rebellions hath this opinion been the

which teacheth

that the

knowledge whether the commen, and

may, but ought

mands

of kings be just or unjust, belongs to private

that before they yield obedience, they not only

to dispute

monly
those,
cients
justice

now commany things no less dangerous than which it matters not now to recite. I suppose those anforesaw this, who rather chose to have the science of
them?
Besides, in the moral philosophy
received, there are

wrapped up

in fables, than openly exposed to disputa-

tions: for before

such questions began to be moved, princes did

not sue

for,

but already exercised the supreme power. They

kept their empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing

the wicked, and protecting the good. Likewise subjects

did

not measure what was just by the sayings and judgments of

private

men, but by the laws

of the realm; nor

were they kept-

in peace by disputations, but by

power and

authority: yea, they

reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one

man

or in a council, as a certain visible divinity; therefore they litde

used as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious, and

hellish spirits, to the utter ruin of their state; for they could

not entertain so strange a fancy as not to desire the preservation of that by

plicity of those

which they were preserved. In

was peace, and
a

truth, the sim-

times was not yet capable of so learned a piece

it

of folly.

Wherefore

golden age, which

it

ended not before that Saturn being expelled,

was taught

10

THE PREFACE
I say,

lawful to take up arms against kings. This

the ancients

not only themselves saw, but in one of their fables, they seem
very aptly to have signified
it

to us; for they say, that

fell

when
and

Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he

in love,

began

to court

Juno

herself; offering to

embrace her, he clasped

half

a cloud,

from whence the Centaurs proceeded, by nature

horses, a fierce, a fighting,

men, half
have

and unquiet generation;

which changing the names

said, that private

only,

is

as

much

as

if

they should
state,

men

being called to councils of

desired to prostitute justice, the only sister

and wife

of the

supreme, to their

own judgments and

apprehensions, but emit,

bracing a false and empty shadow instead of

they have

begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers,

partly right
all

and comely, partly brutal and wild, the causes of

any

contentions and bloodsheds. Since therefore such opinions

if

are daily seen to arise,

clouds,

man now

shall

dispel

those

and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no and wrong, good and
and governof none,

authentical doctrines concerning right

evil,

besides the constituted laws In each realm

ment; and that the question whether any future action will
prove just or unjust, good or
ill,

is

to be

demanded
the

but those to

whom

the supreme hath committed the interpreta-

tion of his laws; surely he will not only

to peace, but will also teach us

show us

highway

how

to avoid the close, dark,

I

and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition, than which know not what can be thought more profitable.
Concerning

my

method,

thought
I

it

not sufficient to use a

I

plain and evident style in

what

have to deliver, except

civil

took

my

beginning from the very matter of

its

government, and
first
its

thence proceeded to

generation, and form, and the

beginning of

justice; for

everything

is

best understood

by

constitutive causes.

For as in a watch, or some such small

engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot

TO THE READER
well be

II

known, except

it

be taken in sunder, and viewed in

states,

parts; so to

make

a more curious search into the rights of

it

and duties of
dissolved, that

subjects,

is

necessary, (I say not to take

if

them

in sunder, but yet that) they be so considered, as

they were

is, that we righdy understand what the quality human nature is, in what matters it is, in what not, fit to make up a civil government, and how men must be agreed

of

amongst themselves, that intend

grounded
state.

to

grow up

into

well-

Having
I

therefore followed this kind of method,

in the first place

set

down

for a principle by

experience

known

to all

men, and denied by none,

to wit, that the dis-

positions of

men

are naturally such, that except they be re-

strained through fear of

distrust

some
other,

coercive power, every

man

will

and dread each

and

as

by natural right he may,

so by necessity he will be forced to

make

use of the strength

he hath, toward the preservation of himself. You will object

perhaps, that there are
that very

some who deny

it.

this; truly so
I

it

happens,
to fight

many do deny
I

But

shall

therefore

seem

against myself because

affirm that the

I

same men
approve

confess,

and

deny the same thing? In truth

actions disavow
countries,

do

not,

but they do, whose

of.

what

their discourses
at peace

We

see all

though they be

with their neighbours, yet

guarding their frontiers with armed men, their towns with

walls

and

ports,

and keeping constant watches. To what purthere be

pose

is all this, if

no

fear of the neighbouring power.?

We

see even in well-governed states,

where there are laws and

punishments appointed for offenders, yet particular

men

travel

not without their sword by their sides, for their defences,

neither sleep they without shutting not only their doors against
their fellow subjects, but also their trunks

and

coffers for fear

of domestics.

Can men

give a clearer testimony of the distrust

all,

they have each of other, and

thus,

of

all.?

How

since they

do

and even countries

as well as

men, they

publicly profess

12
their
it,

THE PREFACE
mutual fear and diffidence? But
is

in disputing they

deny

that

as

much

as to say, that

out of a desire they have to

contradict others, they gainsay themselves.

this principle

Some

object that

being admitted,

it

w^ould needs follow, not only

that all
yet

men w^ere wicked (which perhaps though it seem hard, we must yield to, since it is so clearly declared by holy
this, that

writ) but also wicked by nature (which cannot be granted

without impiety). But

men
we

are evil by nature, follows

not from this principle; for though the wicked were fewer

than the righteous, yet because

there
is

cannot distinguish them,

a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, sub-

jugating, self-defending, ever incident to the

fairest conditioned:

most honest and

much

less

does

it

follow that those

who
is

are

wicked are so by nature, for though from nature, that

their first birth, as

from

they are merely sensible creatures,

they have this disposition, that immediately as

lies,

much

as in

them

they desire and do whatsoever

either

is

best pleasing to them,

and that

through fear they

fly

from, or through hardnes?

yet are they not for

repel those dangers

this reason to

which approach them,

from the lower

be accounted wicked. For the affections of the

parts of the soul are

mind which

arise only

not wicked themselves, but the actions thence proceeding

may

be so sometimes,

as

when

they are either offensive, or against

all

duty. Unless you give children

they ask for, they are peevish,

and

cry, aye

and

strike their parents sometimes,

and

all

this

they have from nature, yet are they free from guilt, neither

may

we

properly

call

them wicked;

first,

because they cannot hurt;

next, because

wanting the

free use of reason they are

exempted

come to riper years, having acquired power whereby they may do hurt, if they shall continue to do the same things, then truly they both begin to be, and are properly accounted wicked; in so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a child grown strong and
from
all

duty. These

when

they

. ,

TO THE READER
Sturdy,

I3

or a

man

of a

childish

disposition;

and malice

the.

same with
to be better

a defect of reason in that age,

when

nature ought

governed through good education and experience.

Unless therefore

we

will say that

men

are naturally

evil,

because

they receive not their education and use of reason from nature,,

we must needs acknowledge

that

men may

derive desire, fear,

yet not impute,

anger, and other passions from nature,

and

the evil effects of those unto nature.

The foundation
civil society
is

therefore
first
^

which

have laid standing firm,

demonstrate in the

place, that the state of

men

without

(which
else

state

we may
a

properly
of

call

the state of nature)

all;

nothing
all

but

mere war

all all

against

and

in that
all

war

men
do

have_

equal right unto

arrive to

things; next, that

this

men

as soon as they.

understanding of
itself

hateful

condition,

desire,
this,

(even nature

compelling them) to be freed from

misery. But that this cannot be done except by compact, they

all

quit that right they have to

all

things.
of

Furthermore
is;

de-;

clare,

and confirm what the nature

compact

how

and.

by what means the right of one might be transferred unto

another to
to

make

their compacts valid; also

what

rights,

and

whom

they must necessarily be granted for the establishing

I

of peace,

mean what

those dictates of reason are, which

all

may

properly be termed the laws of nature; and

tained in that part of this book which
I

these are con-

entitle Liberty.

These grounds thus

laid,

show

further
it,

what

civil

gov-

ernment, and the supreme power in

of
it

and the divers kinds,

are;

by what means

it

becomes

so,

and what
civil

rights par-

ticular

men, who intend

be one

to constitute

this

government,,

must

so necessarily transfer
it

from themselves on the supreme

or an assembly of

power, whether
cept they do so

man
all

men, that
civil

qx-

it

will evidently appear to be

no

governis

ment, but the rights which

the rights of war will
still

men

have to

all
I

things, that

remain. Next,

distinguish

the

14
divers kinds of
it,

THE PREFACE
to

wit,

monarchy,

aristocracy,

democracy,

and paternal dominion, and

I

that of masters over their servants.

declare how^ they are constituted,

and

compare

their several

conveniences and inconveniences each with other. Furthermore,

I

unfold what those things are which destroy

is

it,

and what

his

or their duty

who

rule in chief. Last of

I

all,

explicate the

natures of law, and of sin, and

distinguish law from counsel,

I

from compact, from

In the
right

that

which which
I

call right; all

which

com-

prehend under the tide of Dominion.

last

part of

it,

is

entitled Religion, lest that

which by strong reason

to be

had confirmed the sovereign

their
subjects,
I

powers in the preceding discourse have over

might seem
in the
first

repugnant to the sacred Scriptures,

show

place

how

it

repugns not the divine

all

right, for as
is,

much

as

God

overrules

rulers

by nature, that

by the
as

dictates of natural reason. In the second, for as

much

God

himself had a peculiar dominion over the Jews by virtue of

that ancient covenant of circumcision. In the third, because

God

doth

now

rule over us Christians by virtue of our covenant

of baptism; and therefore the authority of rulers in chief, or

of civil government,
is

not at

all,

we

see,

contrary to religion.
necessarily re-

In the

last

place

declare

what

duties are

quired from
those
I

us, to enter into the

kingdom

of heaven;

and of
testi-

plainly demonstrate,

and conclude out of evident

to the interpretation

monies of holy writ, according

all,

made by
due from

that the obedience

which

have affirmed

to be

particular Christian subjects unto their Christian princes can-

not possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto Christian

religion.

You have seen my method, receive now the reason which moved me to write this. I was studying philosophy for my mind sake, and I had gathered together its first elements in
all

kinds,

and having digested them into three

sections

by

TO THE READER
degrees, I thought to have written
I

I5
so
as

them
its

In the

first

would have

treated of a body,

and

general properties;

in the second of

man and
first

his special faculties,

and

affections;

in the third, of civil

government and the duties of

section

subjects.
first

Wherefore the

would have contained the

it

philosophy, and certain elements of physic; in

we would
rela-

have considered the reasons of time, place, cause, power,

tion, proportion, quantity, figure,

and motion. In the second we

in-

would have been conversant about imagination, memory,

tellect, ratiocination, appetite,

will,

good and

evil,

honest and

dishonest,

and the

like.

What

this last section handles, I

I

have

now

already

showed you. Whilst

so

contrive, order, pensively

I

and slowly compose

pute not),
it

these matters, (for

in

only do reason,

I dis-

happened

the interim, that

my

country

some few years before

the civil wars did rage,

was boiling

hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion, and the

obedience due from subjects, the true forerunners of an ap-

proaching war; and was the cause which

ters deferred)

(all

those other matthis third part.

ripened,

and plucked from

rather, because

me
I

Therefore
forth
first

it

happens that what was

last in order, is yet

come
it

in time,

and the
in

saw

that

grounded
have not
I

on
yet

its

own
it

principles

sufficiently

known by
if I

experience
I

would not stand

need of the former

sections.

made

out of a desire of praise (although

this fair

had,

might

have defended myself with

excuse,

that

very few

do things laudably, who are not affected with commendation)

but for your sakes, readers,

who

persuaded myself,

when
this

you should righdy apprehend and thoroughly understand

doctrine
I

here present you with, would rather choose to brook

with patience some inconveniences under government (because

human

affairs

cannot possibly be without some) than

self-

opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the public; that, weighing the

justice of those things

you are about, not by the persuasion and

THE PREFACE
men, but by the laws
of the realm,

advice of private

you

will

no longer
blood to

suffer ambitious

wade

to their

men through the streams of your own power; that you will esteem it
though perhaps

better to enjoy yourselves in the present state,

not the best, than by waging war, endeavour to procure a

reformation for other

men

in another age, yourselves in the

meanwhile
for those
civil

either killed, or
will not

consumed with
exempt from
jurisdiction,

age. Furthermore,
to the

who
will

acknowledge themselves subject

all

magistrate,

and

will be

public burthens,
for protec-

and yet
tion

Hve under his

and look

from the violence and

injuries of others, that

you would

not look on

them

as

fellow-subjects,

but esteem them for

enemies, and spies, and that ye rashly admit not for God's

word
be
shall

all

which
say

either openly or privately they shall pretend to

plainly, if

so. I

more

any preacher, confessor, or

is

casuist,

but say that this doctrine

agreeable with God's word,

namely, that the chief ruler, nay any private

be put to death without the chief's

man may

lawfully

command,

or that subjects

may

resist,

conspire, or covenant against the

supreme power;

that ye

by no means believe them, but instantly declare their

names.

He who
all,
I

approves of these reasons, will also like

my

intentions in writing this book.

Last of
this

have propounded to myself

first,

this rule

through

whole discourse;

not to define aught which concerns

the justice of single actions, but leave

them

to be

determined

by the laws. Next, not to dispute the laws of any government

in special, that
is,

not to point which are the laws of any

country, but to declare

what the laws

of
is

all

countries

are.

Thirdly, not to seem of opinion, that there

of obedience

a less proportion

due to an aristocracy or democracy, than a monI

archy; for though

have endeavoured by arguments in

my
the

tenth chapter to gain a belief in men, that

monarchy

is

most commodious government (which one thing alone

con-

TO THE READER
fess in this

I7

whole book not

to be demonstrated, but only probI

ably stated) yet every

of

where

expressly say, that in

to be a

all

kind

government whatsoever, there ought

supreme and

equal power. Fourthly, not in anywise to dispute the positions

of divines, except those

which

strip subjects of their obedience,

civil

and shake the foundations of

might imprudendy
be no need, what
I

government. Lastly,
of
I

lest

set forth

somewhat
written,
I

which there would

presently

had thus

would not

expose to public
vately dispersed

interest,

wherefore
of

got some few copies pri-

among some
if

my

friends, that discrying the

opinions of others,
obscure,
I

any things appeared erroneous, hard, or

might

correct, soften,
I

and explain them.

bitterly

These things
I

found most
powers too

excepted against: that

had made the

I

civil

large, but this

by

ecclesiastical

persons; that

had

utterly taken
I

away

liberty of conscience,

but this by sectaries; that

had

set princes
I

above the

civil

laws,

but this by lawyers. Wherefore

was not much moved by these

doing
this did

men's reprehensions, (as

who

in

but do their
faster.

own

business) except
for their sakes

it

were

to tie those knots

litde

somewhat

But

who

have a

been staggered

at the

principles themselves, to wit the nature of

men, the authority

and
contracts,

or right of nature, the nature of compacts

and

the original of civil government, because in finding fault they

have not
sense,
I

so

much

followed their passions, as their

common-

have therefore in some places added some annotations

I

whereby

presumed

might give some

I

satisfaction to their

differing thoughts; lastly

have endeavoured
these

to offend

none

beside

those

whose
are

principles
lightly

contradict,

and whose
difference
of

tender

minds

offended

by

every

opinions.

Wherefore

if

ye shall meet with some things which have

more

of sharpness,

and

less of certainty

than they ought to have,

for the

since they are

not so

much spoken

maintenance of

l8

THE PREFACE
and by one whose
his
is

parties, as the establishment of peace,

just

grief

for

the

present

calamities
liberty,

of
it

country,

may

very

charitably be allowed

some

his only request to ye,

readers, ye will deign to receive

them with an equal mind.

Part

I:

LIBERTY

iii

Chapter

Of the State
1.

of

Men Without
nature

Civil Society

The

faculties of

human

may

be reduced unto four

kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the

beginning of
in the
first

this

following doctrine from these,

place

what manner

of inclinations

we will men who

and

declare
are en-

dued with

these faculties bear towards each other,

and whether,
to pre-

and by what
will

faculty they are born, apt for society,

serve themselves against mutual violence; then proceeding,

we

shew what advice was necessary

to be

taken for

this business,

and what are the conditions of

is

society, or of

human

peace; that

to say,

(changing the words only) what are the fundamental

laws of nature.
2.

The

greatest part of those

men who have

a creature born

written aught
us,

concerning commonwealths, either suppose, or require

or

beg of us
* Since
living

to believe, that

man

is

fit

* for society.

we now

see actually a constituted society

among men, and none

out of it, since we discern all desirous of congress, and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind of stupidity, to lay in the
very threshold of this doctrine, such a stumbling block before the readers,
I must more plainly man, by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well, wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof, faith and compacts are necessary: the virtue whereof to children, and fools, and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what society is, carmot enter

as to

deny

man
is

to be

born

fit

for society. Therefore

say, that

it

true indeed, that to

into

it;

these,

because ignorant of the benefit

it
is,

it

brings,

care not for

it.

Manifest therefore

that

all

men, because they

21

are born in infancy,

22

LIBERTY
call

The Greeks

him ^coov tioXitikov; and on

this

foundation
the presv^^ere

they so build up the doctrine of

civil society, as if for

ervation of peace, and the government of mankind, there

nothing
certain

else

necessary, than that

men

should agree to

make

covenants and conditions together, which themselves

call law^s.

should then
is

Which axiom, though

nature. For they

received by most,
slight

yet certainly false,

and an error proceeding from our too

contemplation of

human

who

shall

more

nar-

rowly look into the causes for which

men come

together,

and

delight in each other's company, shall easily find that this hap-

pens not because naturally

it

could happen no otherwise, but

by accident. For
(that is) as

if

by nature one

man

should love another

man, there could no reason be returned why every

man should not equally love every man, as being equally man, or why he should rather frequent those whose society affords
him honour
society for
its

or profit.

We

do not therefore by nature seek

own
it;

sake, but that

or profit

from

these

How, by what
if

advice,

we may receive some honour we desire primarily, that secondarily. men do meet, will be best known by
when
they are met. For
regards not his
office,
it

observing those things which they do

they meet for
traffic,
is

plain every

man
some

fellow, but his business;

if

to discharge

a certain

market-friendship
it

is

begotten,

which hath more

and recreation

of jealousy in

than true love, and whence factions sometimes

will never;
is

may
of

arise,

but

good

if

for pleasure,

mind, every

man

wont

to please himself

most with those things which

most men) either through remain unfit during the whole
fit

are born unapt for society. defect of mind,

Many

also (perhaps

or

want

of education,

course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years,

but by education. Furthermore, although

by nature, born in such a condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it; for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without which there can be no society, do yet desire it.
a

human

nature; wherefore

man

is

made

for

society not

man were

LIBERTY
Stir

23
to the nature of

up

laughter,
is

whence he may (according

that

which

ridiculous) by comparison of another man's defects

and

infirmities, pass the

this

more current

in his

own

opinion; and
it

although
is

be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet

manifest they are not so

much

delighted with the society, as

their

own

vain glory. But for the most part, in these kinds of

meetings,

we wound

the

absent;

their

whole
it

life,
is

sayings,

actions are examined, judged,

condemned; nay,

very rare,

but some present receive a fling before they part, so as his reason

was not

ilh,

who was wont

always

at parting to

go out

last.

And
we

these are indeed the true delights of society, unto

is,

which
good

are carried by nature, that

all

by those passions which are

incident to
precepts,
it

creatures, until either by sad experience, or

so fall out

(which in many never happens) that the

appetite of present matters be dulled with the

past,

memory

of things

without which, the discourse of most quick and nimble

this subject,
it

men on
But
if

is

but cold and hungry.

so

happen, that being met, they pass their time in

stories,

relating

some

and one of them begins

one

to tell
rest

one which

concerns himself; instantly every one of the

desires to speak of himself too;
rest will tell
if

most greedily

relate

some wonder, the

if

you miracles,
I

if

they have them,

say

not, they will

feign them. Lastly, that

may
if

somewhat

of

them who

pre-

tend to be wiser than others; look

else

they meet to talk of philosophy,

how many men,

clear

so

many would

be esteemed masters, or

they not only love not their fellows, but even persecute
is it

them
little

with hatred. So

by experience to

all

men who

more narrowly consider human affairs, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory, whence the parties met, endeavour to carry with them either some
benefit, or to leave

behind them that same u6oKi^iv some

esteem and honour with those, with

versant.

whom

they have been con-

The same

is

also collected

by reason out of the defini-

24

LIBERTY
For when

tions themselves, of will, good, honour, profitable.

we

voluntarily contract society, in

all
is,

after the object of the will, that

manner of society we look that, which every one of

those

who

gather together, propounds to himself for good.

is

Now

whatsoever seems good,

senses, or the

pleasant,

and

relates either to the

is

mind. But

all

the mind's pleasure

either glory,

(or to have a good opinion of one's self) or refers to glory in the end; the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality, which

may

be

all

comprehended under the word conveniences. All

is

society therefore

either for gain, or for glory; that

is,

not so

much
no

for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves.

But no

society can be great, or lasting,

is

which begins from vain

if all

glory; because that glory

like

honour,

men

have

it,

man
of

hath

it,

for they consist in

comparison and precellence;

neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause

my

glorying in myself; for every

man must
much

account himself,

such as he can

make

himself, without the help of others. But

though the

benefits of this life

may
I

be

farthered by mutual

help, since yet those

may

be better attained to by dominion,

than by the society of others:

that
all

hope no body

will

doubt but
if

men would much more

were removed,

greedily be carried by nature,

fear

to obtain

dominion, than to gain

society.

We

must therefore

resolve, that the original of all great

and

lasting societies consisted not in the

mutual good

will

men had

towards each other, but in the mutual fear * they had of each
other.
*It
is

objected:

it

is

so improbable that

men

should

grow

into civil

societies out of fear, that if they

had been

afraid,

they would not have

endured each
else

other's looks.

than to be affrighted.

sight of future evil;

They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing comprehend in this word fear, a certain foreneither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear,
I

but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they

also incident to the fearful.

may

not fear,
fear

is

They who go
and

to sleep, shut their doors; they

who

travel,

carry

their

swords

with them,
frontiers

because
forts

they

thieves.
cities

Kingdoms guard

their coasts

with

and

castles;

LIBERTY
3.

25

The

cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural

equality of
it

men,

partly in their

mutual

will of hurting:

whence

comes

to pass that

we

can neither expect from others, nor

promise to ourselves the

full-grown, and consider

least security.

For

if

we

look on

how

brittle the

frame of our

men human

body
itself

is,

(which perishing,
it)

all its

strength, vigour,
it

and wisdom
is,

perisheth with

and how easy a matter

is

even for

the weakest

man

to kill the strongest, there

no reason why

any

man

trusting to his

own

strength should conceive himself

made by

nature above others: they are equals

equal things one against the other; but they

greatest things,

(namely,

kill)

can do equal

who can do who can do the things. All men

therefore

among

themselves are by nature equal; the inequality

its

we now
4.

discern, hath

spring from the

civil

law.

All

men

in the state of nature have a desire

and

will to

hurt, but not proceeding

to

from the same

permits as
is

cause, neither equally

be condemned. For one man, according to that natural

equality

which

is

among

us,

much

to others, as he

assumes to himself (which

an argument of a temperate

man, and one

that rightly values his power). Another, supposlists,

ing himself above others, will have a license to do what he

and challenges respect and honour,

(which
is

as

due

to

him

before others,

an argument of a

fiery spirit).

This man's will to

hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he hath of
his

own

strength; the other's,

from the

necessity of defending

are compact with walls, and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns; even the strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each other's power, and lest they

might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves, by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth, they know each other's spirits; but then, if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory, if they agree, from their
agreement.

26

LIBERTY

himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this man's violence.
5.

Furthermore, since the combat of wits

discords

is

the fiercest, the

greatest

which

are,

must
it

necessarily arise

from

thii"

contention. For in this case

is

not only odious to contend

to

against, but also not to consent.

For not

approve of what a

man

him of an error in that thing which he speaketh; as in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from; which may appear hence, that there are no wars so sharply waged as between sects of the same religion, and
saith,
is

no

less

than

tacitly to accuse

factions of the

same commonweal, where the contestation

is

either concerning doctrines or politic prudence.

And

since all

the pleasure and jollity of the

get some, with
to

mind
it

consists in this,

even to

whom

comparing,
itself;
it

may

find

somewhat wherein

triumph and vaunt

is

impossible but

men must
either

declare sometimes

some mutual scorn and contempt,

by

laughter, or by words, or by gesture, or

some sign or
do

other;

than which there

is

no greater vexation of mind, and than from

possibly arise a greater desire to
hurt.

which there cannot

6.

But the most frequent reason why

men

desire to hurt

each other, ariseth hence, that

many men
yet divide

at the

same time have

follows

an appetite

to the

same thing; which

yet very often they can

it;

neither enjoy in

common, nor
must have

whence

it

that the strongest

it,

and who

is

strongest

must be

decided by the sword.

7.

Among
is

so

many

dangers therefore, as the natural

lusts

of

men do

daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of

one's self
if

not a matter so scornfully to be looked upon, as

so be there

had not been a power and

will left in

one
is

to

have
for

done otherwise. For every

him, and shuns what
evils,

man

is

desirous of

what

good

is evil,

but chiefly the chiefest of natural

which
no

is

death; and this he doth, by a certain impulsion

of nature,

less

than that whereby a stone moves downward.

LIBERTY
It Is

27

therefore neither absurd, nor reprehensible, neither against

the dictates of true reason, for a

to preserve

man

to use all his

endeavours

and defend

his

body and the members thereof from

is

death and sorrows. But that which

reason, that all

not contrary to right

justly,

men
word

account to be done
right
is

and with

right;

neither by the
liberty
ties

anything
to

else signified,

than that

which every

man

hath

make
as

use of his natural faculfirst

according to right reason. Therefore the

is

foundation of

natural right

this, that

every

man

much
to

as in

him

lies

en-

deavour to protect his

8.

life

and members.

But because
if

it is

in vain for a

man

have

a right to the
it

end,

the right to the necessary

means be denied him;

fol-

lows, that since every

man

hath a right to preserve himself, he

all

must

also be

allowed a right to use

the means, and do

all

the actions, without

9.

which he cannot preserve himself.

is

Now

whether the means which he

is

about to use, and

the action he
of his life

performing, be necessan,' to the preservation

not, he himself, by the right of

and members, or

nature,

must be judge. For

say another
I

man

judge that

it

is

contrary to right reason that

should judge of mine

own

peril:

why now,
of things

because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the

are equal by nature, will
to
I

same reason, because we

judge also

which do belong
is, it is

him. Therefore

it

agrees with

right reason, that

the right of nature that

it

judge of his

opinion, that
10.

is,

whether

conduce

to

my

preservation, or not.
all;

Nature hath given

for every

to every

one a right to

that

is,

it

was lawful
* This
of nature
is

man

in the bare state of nature,* or before

thus to be understood:
injurious to

is

what any man does in the bare state no man; not that in such a state he cannot offend
for injustice against

God, or break the laws of nature;

men

presupposeth

human
truth
of

laws,
this

such

as

in the state of nature

there

are

none.

Now

the

proposition

thus

conceived

is

sufficiently

demonstrated to

the mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because in

certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion

makes us

forget the premises.

28
such time as

LIBERTY

men had engaged

themselves by any covenants or

bonds, to do what he w^ould, and against

fit,

whom
it

he thought

and

to possess, use,

and enjoy

all

what he would, or could

would,
either
it

get.

Now
to

because whatsoever a because he wills

is,

man
and

therefore seems

good
least

him

really doth, or at

seems to him to contribute towards his preservation, (but

already allowed
it

we have
article,
all

him

to be judge, in the foregoing

whether

doth or not, in so

much

as

we

are to hold

for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so),

it

and by the

7th article

appears that by the right of nature those things

may

be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to

life

the protection of

and members,

it

follows, that in the state

all.

of nature, to have
that

all,

and do
that

all, is

lawful for

And

this is

which

is

meant by

common

saying, nature hath given

likewise, that in the state

all to all,

from whence we understand

is

of nature, profit
II.

the measure of right.

least benefit for

But

it

was the
all
if

men

thus to have a com-

mon
any
I

right to

things; for the effects of this right are the

same, almost, as

there

had been no right

is

at all.

For although

man might
man

say of every thing, this

argument, and make
it

mine, yet could he not

to a single view.
article.

will contract this

most evident
all

Every
sarily

hath right to protect himself, as appears by the seventh

therefore hath a right to use
to
this

The same man

conduce
necessary

the

end,

by

the

eighth

article.

means which necesBut those are the

article.
all

means which he

shall

judge to be such, by the ninth

use
of,

He
of

therefore hath a right to

make

and

to

do

whatsoever he

shall

judge requisite for

that doth
it,

his

preservation:
is

wherefore by

him

the thing done

either right, or

fore right.

man
yet

pretend

True it is therefore in the bare state somewhat to tend necessarily to

the judgment wrong, and thereof nature, &c. But if any

his

preservation,

which
against

he himself doth not confidendy believe

if

so,

he

may
is

offend

the laws of nature, as in the third chapter of this book

declared. It hath been objected by some:

more

at large

a son kill his father, doth he

him no

have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father's or his mother's, or his that nourished him, as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
injury.? I

any time

in the state of nature, as being

LIBERTY
enjoy
it,

29

by reason of

his neighbour,

who having
of

equal right,

and equal power, would pretend the same thing

12.
If

to be his. to hurt each

now

to this natural proclivity

men,

other,

which they derive from

their passions, but chiefly

all

from a
to
all,

vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of

wherewith one by right invades, the other by right

resists,
all

and

whence

arise perpetual jealousies

and suspicions on

hands,

and how hard

a thing

it is

to provide against

an enemy invad-

ing us, with an intention to oppress, and ruin, though he come

with a small number, and no great provision;

it

cannot be de-

nied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into
society,
all

was

mere war, and

all

that not simply, but a

is

war

of

men

against

men. For what

war, but that same time

is

in

which the
But

will of contesting

by force

fully declared, either

is

by words, or deeds.? The time remaining,

13.
it

termed peace.

is

easily

judged

how

disagreeable a thing to the

preservation either of mankind, or of each single petual

man,

a per-

war

is.

But

it is

perpetual in

its

own
is

nature, because in

regard of the equality of those that

strive, it

cannot be ended

by victory; for in
danger, as
it

this state the

conqueror

subject to so
if

much

were

to be

accounted a miracle,

any, even the

years,

most strong, should

age.

close

up

his life

with

many

and old

They

of

America are examples hereof, even

in this present

age: other nations have been in former ages,

are

which now indeed

iierce,

become

civil

and

flourishing, but

were then few,

all

short-lived, poor, nasty,

and deprived of

that pleasure,
to bring

and
with

beauty of

life,

which peace and

state in

society are
it

wont

them. Whosoever therefore holds, that

continued in that

had been

best to have
all

which
good

all

things were lawful for

men, he

contradicts himself.

For every
for

man

by natural necesis

sity desires that

which
all

is

him: nor

there any that

esteems a war of

against

all,

which
so
it

necessarily adheres to

such a

state, to

be good for him.

And
fit

happens, that through

fear of each other

we

think

it

to rid ourselves of this con-

30
dition,

LIBERTY
and
to get

some

fellows; that
all

if

there needs

must be
helps.

war,
14.

it

may

not yet be against

men, nor without some

Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or by consent;

by constraint,

when

after fight the

conqueror makes the con-

quered serve him either through fear of death, or by laying

fetters

on him: by consent, when men enter into

society to help

each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But

the

conqueror

may by

right

compel the conquered, or the

in health

strongest the weaker, (as a

man

may one

that

is

sick,

or he that

is

of riper years a child) unless he will choose to die,

to give caution of his future obedience.

For

since the right of

protecting ourselves according to our

own

wills proceeded
it

from

our danger, and our danger from our equality,

is

more con-

sonant to reason, and more certain for our conservation, using

the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution,
than,

when

they shall be full

grown and

strong,

and got out of

our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight.

And on

the other side, nothing can be thought

more

absurd, than by discharging

whom

you already have weak in

a strong
corollary

your power, to
one.

make him at once both an enemy, and From whence we may understand likewise as a
men,
that a sure

in the natural state of

and

irresistible

power

confers the right of

dominion and ruling over those who canas

not

resist;

insomuch,

the right of

all

things, that can be

done, adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.
15.

Yet cannot

men

expect any lasting preservation continuis,

ing thus in the state of nature, that

that equality of power,

of war,

by reason of

and other human

to seek peace,
is

faculties they are enis

dued

withal.

Wherefore
it,

where there

any hopes

of obtaining

and where there

is

none, to enquire out for

is,

auxiliaries of war,

the dictate of right reason, that

the

law of nature,

as shall be

showed

in the next chapter.

Chapter

II

Of the Law
I.

of

Nature Concerning Contracts

definition

All

authors agree not concerning the

of the

natural law,
this

who

notwithstanding do very often

make

use of

term in

their writings.

The method

therefore,

wherein
is

we

begin from definitions and exclusion of

all

equivocation,

only

proper to them
the
rest, if

any

who leave no place for contrary disputes. For man say, that somewhat is done against the law
it

of nature, one proves

hence, because

it

was done against the

general agreement of

all

the most wise and learned nations:

shall

but

this declares
all

not

who
all

be the judge of the wisdom and

it

learning of

nations.

Another hence, that

was done against

is

the general consent of

mankind; which
it

definition

by no

means

to

be admitted. For then

fools, to

were impossible for any

but children and

offend against such a law; for sure,

all

under the notion of mankind, they comprehend

men

actually

endued with reason. These therefore

it,

either

do nought against

or

if

they do aught,

it

is

without their joint accord, and

therefore ought to be excused.

But

to receive the laws of nature

from the consents

them,
is

of them,

who

oftener break, than observe

Besides,

in

truth

unreasonable.

men condemn
in themselves;

the

same things

in others,

which they approve

on

the other side, they publicly

commend what

they privately conhearsay, than

demn; and they

deliver their opinions

more by

any speculation of their own; and they accord more through

hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other
perturbation of mind, than true reason.
to pass, that

And

therefore

it

comes

whole bodies of people often do those things by

31

32

LIBERTY

general accord, or contention, which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But since
all

do grant that

is

done by

right,

which

is

not done against

reason,

we ought

to

judge those actions only wrong, which are

is,

repugnant

to right reason, that

which contradict some

say

cer-

tain truth collected

by right reasoning from true

is

principles.

But that wrong which

done,
is

we

it

is

done against some

law. Therefore true reason

a certain law,

which

(since

it

is

no

less

a part of

human
is I

nature, than any other faculty, or

also

affection of the

mind)

termed natural. Therefore the

it,

law of nature, that

reason,*

may

define

is

the dictate of right

either
life

conversant about those things which are

to

be done or omitted for the constant preservation of

and

members,
2.
is

as

much
first

as in us lies.

But the

and fundamental law of nature

is,

that peace

to be sought after,

where

it

may

be found; and where not,

there to provide ourselves for helps of war. For

we showed

in
is

the last article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept

the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason
* By right reason in the natural
state

of

men,

understand not, as
that
is,

many

do,

an

infallible

faculty,

but the act of reasoning,

the

and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with his own) every man's own reason is to be accounted, not only the rule of his own actions which are done at his own peril, but also for the measure of another man's reason, in such things as do concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true principles righdy framed, because that the whole breach of the laws of nature consists in the false
peculiar

reasoning, or rather folly of those

necessarily to

men who

see not those duties they are

perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the principles of right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
articles of

the

first

chapter.

LIBERTY

33

are natural laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this
is

the

first,

because the rest are derived from

either to peace or self-defence.

this,

and they

direct the
3.

ways

But one of the natural laws derived from

is

this
all

fundathings,

mental one

this:

that the right of

all

men

to

ought not
to

to be retained,

but that some certain rights ought

if

be transferred, or relinquished. For

it

every

one should

retain his right to all things,

must

necessarily follow, that

some by
natural

right

might invade, and

endeavours

others,

by the same

right,

might defend themselves against them, (for every man, by

necessity,
to

defend his body, and the

things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of

his

body). Therefore war would follow.

is,

He

therefore

acts

against the reason of peace, that

against the law of nature,

all

whosoever he
4.

be, that
is

doth not part with his right to

things.

But he

said to part
it,

with
it

his

right,

who

either abso-

lutely

renounceth
it,

or conveys

to another.

He

absolutely

renounceth

who
is

by some sufBcient sign, or meet tokens,

it

declares that he
to

willing that

shall never be lawful for right,

him

do that again, which before, by

it

he might have done.

sufficient sign, or

But he conveys

to another,

who by some
he
is

meet tokens, declares

be unlawful for

to that other, that

willing

it

should

him

to resist him, in

going about to do someright,

what
have

in the

performance whereof he might before, with

resisted

him. But that the conveyance of right consists

resisting,
is

merely in not

understood by
it,

this, that

before

it

was

conveyed, he, to
right to
all,

whom

he conveyed

had even then

also a

whence he could not give any new

gave
it,

right: but the

resisting right he had, before he

by reason whereof
is

the other could not freely enjoy his rights,

utterly abolished.

Whosoever
of

therefore acquires

some

right in the natural state

just molestation in the

men, he only procures himself security, and freedom from enjoyment of his primitive right: as for

34
example,
if

LIBERTY
any

man

shall sell or give

all

away a farm, he

utterly

deprives himself only from

right to this farm, but he does

not so from others also.

5.

But

in the conveyance of right, the will

is

requisite not
it.

only of

him

that conveys, but of

him

also that accepts

if I

If

either be wanting, the right remains: for

would have given

it,

what was mine

to one

who

refused to accept of

have not
it
it

therefore either simply renounced

my

right, or

conveyed with

to
to

any man. For the cause which moved

this
6.

me

to part

man, was
But
if

in

him

only, not in others too.

there be

no other token extant of our

will either

to quit, or convey our right, but only words; those

words must

either relate to the present, or time past; for

if

they be of the

future only, they convey nothing. For example, he that speaks

thus of the time to come,

will give to-morrow, declares openly

it:

that yet he hath not given

so that

all

this

day

his right

remains, and abides to-morrow too, unless in the interim he

actually bestows
it:

for
if

what
I

is

mine, remains mine

till

have

parted with

it.

But

shall

speak of the time present, supthis to

I

pose thus;

do give or have given you

is

be received

to-

morrow, by these words

it,

signified that
it

have already given

is

and that

his right to receive

to-morrow,

conveyed

to

him

by

me
7.

to-day.

Nevertheless,

although
if

words alone
yet to

are

not

sufficient

tokens to declare the will;

there shall
valid, as
if

words relating

to the future, as

some other

signs be added, they

may become

they had been spoken of the present.

it

If therefore,

as

by reason of those other signs,

appear that he that speaks

efifectual

of the future, intends those

words should be

toward

the perfect transferring of his right, they ought to be valid;

for the conveyance of right depends not

on words, but (as hath

of the

been instanced in the fourth

will.

article)

on the declaration

LIBERTY
8.

35

If

any

man

convey some part of his right to another, and

doth not

this for

some

certain benefit received, or for

this

some

compact, a conveyance in
nation.

kind

Is

called a gift, or free do-

But

in free donation those

words only oblige us which

If

signify the present, or the time past; for

they respect the

future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given In the

foregoing
tion arise

article.

It

must needs

therefore be, that the obligaof the will. But, because

for

from some other tokens

is

whatsoever
that wills
to give
It,

voluntarily done.

Is

done

some good

to

him

it;

there can no other token be assigned of the will

except some benefit either already received, or to be

It

acquired. But

is

supposed that no such benefit

if so, it

is

acquired,

nor any compact in being; for

gift.
It

would

cease to be a free

remains therefore, that a mutual good turn without

he,

agreement be expected; but no sign can be given, that

used future words toward him

who

who was
Nor

In

no

sort

engaged to

return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood, as to oblige himself thereby.
Is It

suitable to reason,
to others, should
af-

that those

who

are easily Inclined to

do well

be obliged by every promise, testifying their present good

fection.

And

for this cause, a promiser in this kind

must be

understood to have time to deliberate, and power to change

that affection, as well as he to

whom

he made that promise,

Is

may
free,

alter his

desert.

But he that

deliberates.

so far forth
if

nor can be said to have already given. But

he promise
levity,

often,

and

yet give seldom, he

ought to be condemned of

and be
9.

called not a donor, but doson.

act of two, or

But the
is

more, mutually conveying their

In every contract, either both
for,

rights,

called a contract.

But

parties instantly

perform what they contract

insomuch

as

there

is

no

trust
Is

had from

either to other; or the

one performs,
parties
it

the other

trusted; or neither perform.

Is

Where both

perform presently, there the contract

ended, as soon as

Is

36
performed; but where there

LIBERTY
is

credit given either to

one or both,

there the party trusted promiseth after-performance;

and

this

kind of promise
10.
vi^ho

is

called a covenant.
v^ith

But the covenant made by the party trusted

pointing at the future, doth no
if
it

hath already performed, although the promise be

less transfer

him made by

vv^ords

the right

of future time, than

had been made by words signifying

is

the present or time past. For the other's performance

most

manifest sign that he so understood the speech of

him whom

he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also

at

the appointed

time;

and by

this

sign the party trusted

knew
not,

himself to be thus understood, which, because he hindered

of his will to perform.

was an evident token

The promises
(which
is,

therefore

which

are

made

for

some

benefit received

are also covenants) are tokens of the will; that

(as in the

foregoing section hath been declared) of the

ing,

last act of deliberatis

whereby the

liberty of

non-performance

abolished,

and

by consequence are obligatory. For where

beginneth obligation.
11.

liberty ceaseth, there

But the covenants which are made in contract of muperforming out of hand,
if

tual trust, neither party

there arise *

a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid.

For he that

first

performs, by reason of the wicked

disposition of the greatest part of

men

studying their

own

ad-

vantage, either by right or wrong, exposeth himself to the

perverse will of
suits
it

him with

whom

he hath contracted. For

should perform
first,

it

not with reason, that any

man

if

be not likely that the other will

make good

his

promise
it,

after;

which, whether

it

be probable or not, he that doubts

some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made.
* For, except there appear

LIBERTY
must be judge
of nature.
of, as

37

hath been showed in the foregoing chap-

ter in the ninth article.

Thus,

I say,

things stand in the state

there
is

But in a

civil state,

when

power which

can compel both

first,

parties,

he that hath contracted to perform

must

first

perform; because, that since the other

may

be

compelled, the cause which

made him

fear the other's non-

performance, ceaseth.
12.

But from
is

this reason, that in all free gifts

and compacts,
it

there

an acceptance of the conveyance of right required:

follows, that

no

man
we

can compact with

him who doth not

cannot compact with

declare his acceptance.

beasts, neither

And

therefore

we

can

give or take from

them any manner

and understanding.

of right, by reason of their

want

of speech

Neither can any

man

covenant with God, or be obliged to

it

him

by vow, except so far forth as

tures, that

appears to

him by Holy

Scrip-

he hath substituted certain

men who have

authority

to accept of such-like
stead.
13.

vows and covenants,

in vain,

as being in God's

Those therefore do vow

where they are not

who

are in the state of

nature,

tied

by any
of

civil

law, (except by

most certain revelation the

or pact, be

will

God

to accept their
if

vow

made known
is

to

them). For

what they vow be

act.

contrary to the law of nature, they are not tied by their vow,
for

no man

tied to

perform an unlawful

But
it
is

if

what

is

vowed, be commanded by some law of nature,

not their

vow, but the law

itself

which
it

ties

them. But
it,

if

he were free

before his vow, either to do

or not do

his liberty remains,

is

because that the openly declared will of the obliger

to
is

requisite

make an
is

obligation by vow,

which
call

in the case

propounded

supposed not to be.

tied,

Now

him

the obliger, to
is

whom
under

any one
14.

and the obliged, him who

tied.

Covenants are made of such things only

it

as fall

our deliberation, for

can be no covenant without the will of

38

LIBERTY
is

the contractor, but the will

liberates;

the last act of

him who

de-

wherefore they only concern things possible and to

come.

No

man,

therefore, by his compact, obligeth himself to

yet,

an impossibility. But

though we often covenant

to

do such

things as then seemed possible

yet afterward appear to be

when we promised them, which impossible, are we therefore freed

is,

from

all

obligation?

The

reason whereof

that he

who promon conperforms

iseth a future, in certainty receives a present benefit,

dition that he return another for

it.

For

his will,
it,

who

the present benefit, hath simply before

tain

for

its

object, a ceritself
if

good valuable with the thing promised; but the thing

if
it

not simply, but with condition

could be done. But

it

should so happen, that even this should prove impossible,

why

then he must perform as

much

as

he can. Covenants, therefore,

oblige us not to perform just the thing itself covenanted for,

but our utmost endeavour; for

selves are not in our power.
15.

this only

is,

the things them-

We

are freed

from covenants two ways,

either by per-

forming, or by being forgiven. By performing, for beyond that

we we

obliged not ourselves. obliged ourselves

to,

By being

forgiven, because he
is

whom

by forgiving,

conceived to return

us that right which

plies

we

passed over to him. For forgiving imarticle

giving, that

is,

by the fourth

of this chapter, a
is

conveyance of right to him to

16.
It is

whom

the gift

made.

a usual question, whether compacts extorted

if,

from

us through fear, do oblige, or not: for example,

to

redeem

my

life

from the power of a robber,

and that
to
I

promise to pay him

100/. next day,

will

do no

act
I

whereby

to appre-

hend and bring him

judged to be of no
cause
it

justice,

whether

am

tied to

keep

promise or not. But though such a promise must sometimes be

effect, yet it is

not to be accounted so beit

proceedeth from fear. For then

would
life,

follow, that

those promises

which reduced men

to a civil

and by which

LIBERTY
laws were made, might likewise be of none

39
effect; (for it pro-

ceeds from fear of mutual slaughter, that one

man

submits

himself to the dominion of another); and he should play the

fool finely,

who

should trust his captive covenanting with the

It

price of his redemption.

holds universally true, that promises

do oblige when there

redemption of

is

some

benefit received,

and when
it

to

promise, and the thing promised, be lawful. But

for the
I

is

lawful,

my

life,

both to promise, and to give what

thief.

will of

mine own

to

any man, even to a

We

are obliged,

therefore,

by promises proceeding from

fear, except the civil

is

law

forbid them, by virtue whereof, that

which

promised becomes

unlawful.
17.

Whosoever

shall contract

with one to do or omit some-

what, and shall after covenant the contrary with another, he

maketh not

the former, but the latter contract unlawful. For

he hath no longer right to do, or to omit aught,

contracts hath conveyed
it

who by former
is

to another.

Wherefore he can conpromised,

is

vey

no right by

latter

contracts,

and what

promised without
contract; to break
18.
resist

right.

He
is

is

therefore tied only to his

first

which

unlawful.

No man
him who

is

obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to

ofler to kill,
is

shall

wound,

or any other

way
done

hurt his body. For there

of fear, through
to

in every

man

a certain high degree

which he apprehends

that evil

which

is

him

to be the greatest;
it

and therefore by natural

it
is

necessity

he shuns
wise.

all

he can, and

supposed he can do no other-

When

man

is

arrived to this degree of fear,

we

cannot

expect but he will provide for himself either by flight or fight.

Since therefore no

man

is

tied to impossibilities, they

who

are

threatened either with death,

(which

is

the greatest evil to

nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not

stout

enough

to bear

them, are not obliged

is

to

endure them.

Furthermore, he that

tied

by contract

is

trusted, (for faith

40
only
is

LIBERTY
the

bond

of contracts) but they

capital,
is

who

are brought to are

fettered,

punishment, either
strongly guarded,

or

more

gentle,

or

which

most certain sign that they seemed

not sufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts.

It is

one thing,

if I

promise thus:
if

if I

do

it

not at the day ap-

pointed, kill me. Another thing,

thus:

if I

do

it

not,
if

though

you should

offer to kill
first

me,

will not resist. All

is

men,

need be,

contract the

way, but there

is it

need sometimes. This second

way, none; neither

nature,
a right;
of trust
if

ever needful; for in the

mere

state of

you have a mind

as

to kill, that state itself affords

first trust

you

insomuch

you need not

him,

if

for breach

you

will afterwards kill

life,

him. But in a
all

civil state,

where
is

the right of

and death, and of

corporal punishment

with the supreme; that same right of killing cannot be granted

to

any private person. Neither need the supreme himself conwith any
this, that

tract

only

no

man patiently to yield to his punishment, but man offer to defend others from him. If in
two
realms, there should a conif it

the state of nature, as between

tract

be made, on condition of killing

were not performed,

we must presuppose

another contract of not killing before

if

the appointed day. Wherefore on that day,

there be

no

per-

formance, the right of war returns, that

is

an

hostile state, in

which
Lastly,
evils to

all

things

are

lawful,

and therefore
resisting,

resistance

also.

by the contract of not

we

are obliged of

two

make
is

choice of that which seems the greater; for cera greater evil than fighting.
least.

tain death
is

But of two

evils it

impossible not to choose the

fore,

we

should be tied to

By such a compact, thereimpossibilities, which is contrary to

tied

the very nature of compacts.

19.

Likewise no

man

is

by any compacts whatsoever

is

to accuse himself, or

any other, by whose damage he

life.

like

to procure himself a bitter

Wherefore neither

is

a father

obliged to bear witness against his son, nor a husband against

LIBERTY
his wife, nor a son against his father, nor

41
any

man

against any
is

one by whose means he hath

that testimony

his

subsistence; for in vain

which

is

presumed

to be corrupted

from nature.

But although no

man

be tied to accuse himself by any com-

pact, yet in a public trial

he may, by

torture, be forced to

make
but

answer. But such answers are no testimony of the

fact,

helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch that whether the party tortured answer true or
at
all,

false,
it

or whether he answer not

whatsoever he doth, he doth

by

right.

20.

Swearing

is

a speech joined to a promise, whereby the

promiser declares his renouncing of God's mercy, unless he

perform his word. Which definition

themselves, which have in
to wit, so

is

contained in the words

essence of an oath,

them the very

God
beast.

help me, or other equivalent, as

with the
I

Romans, do thou
this

Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as

is

slay

same

Neither

this

any

let,

but that an oath

may

as well sometimes be affirmatory as promissory; for he that

confirms his affirmation with an oath, promiseth that he speaks

truth.
jects

But though

in

some

places

it

was the fashion

took
its

for sub-

to swear by their kings, that custom

original

hence, that those kings took

oaths were therefore

upon them divine honour. For

religion,

introduced, that by

and con-

sideration of the divine power,

men might
may
lie

have a greater dread

of breaking their faiths, than that

wherewith they fear men,

hid.

from whose eyes

21.

their actions

Whence
brought

it

follows, that

an oath must be conceived in

it;

that form,

which he useth, who takes

to

for in vain

is

any

man
it

swear by a

God whom
is

he believes not, and

therefore neither fears him. For though by the light of nature

may

be

to swear by

known him
is

that there
in

God, yet no man thinks he

is

any other fashion, or by any other name,

than what
is

contained in the precepts of his

own

proper, that

(as he

who

swears imagines) the true religion.

42
22.

LIBERTY

By

the definition of an oath

we may

understand, that

a bare contract obHgeth

no

less,

than that to which

we
if

are

sworn. For

it

is

the contract

which binds
it

us; the oath relates

to the divine punishment,

which

could not provoke,

unlawful; but
it

the

breach of contract were not in be unlawful,

if

itself

could not

the contract were not obligatory. Furthermore,

he that renounceth the mercy of God, obligeth himself not

to

any punishment; because

it

is

ever lawful to deprecate the

punishment, howsoever provoked, and to enjoy God's pardon

if it

be granted.

The

only effect therefore of an oath

all

is this,

to

cause
faith,

men who

are naturally inclined to break

manner

of

through fear of punishment, to make the more conscience

of their words
23.

and

actions.

To

exact an oath,

where the breach of

contract,

if

any

be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted

withal wants not power to punish,
is

to

do somewhat more

than

is

necessary

unto self-defence, and shews a mind deto benefit itself, as to prejudice another.
is

sirous not so

much

For an oath, out of the very form of swearing,

order to the provocation of God's anger, that
that
faith,
is
is

taken in

to say, of

him

omnipotent, against those

who
of

therefore violate their

because they think that by their

own
him

strength they can

that
is

escape the punishment of

against those

men; and

omniscient,

who

therefore usually break their trust, because

they hope that no

man

shall see

them.

Chapter

III

Of the Other Laws

I.

of

Nature
perform contracts, or

Another
keep

of the laws of nature

it

is,

to

to

trust; for

hath been showed in the foregoing chapter,

as a thing neces-

that the
sary,

law of nature commands every man,

to obtain

peace, to convey certain rights

this (as often as
it

from each
to be

to

other;
is

and that

shall

happen

done)

called a contract.

But

this is so far forth only conducible to

peace, as

we

shall

perform ourselves what

we

contract with
contracts

others shall be done or omitted;

and

in vain

would

be made, unless
to

we

stood to them. Because therefore, to stand

to
it

our covenants, or

keep

faith, is a

thing necessary for the

obtaining of peace,

will prove, by the second article of the

second chapter, to be a precept of the natural law.

2.

Neither

is

there in this matter any exception of the percontract, as

if

sons with

whom we

they keep no faith with

others, or hold that

none ought

to be kept, or are guilty of

any other kind of

vice.

For he that

contracts, in that

he doth
against
if

contract, denies that action to be in vain;

and

it

is

knowing man to do think himself not bound to keep it,

reason for a
contract to be

a thing in vain;

and

he

in thinking so he affirms the

made

in vain.

He
is

therefore

who

contracts with

one with
doth
at

whom

he thinks he

not bound to keep faith, he

once think a contract to be a thing done in vain, and

is

not in vain; which

absurd. Either therefore

we must

hold trust
is,

with
there
3.

all

men, or

else

not bargain with them; that

either

must be

a declared war, or a sure

and

faithful peace.

The breaking

of a bargain, as also the taking back of a

43

44
gift,

LIBERTY
(which ever
consists in

some

action or omission)
is

is

called

an injury. But that action or omission

called unjust, inso-

much
tract

as

an

injury,

and an unjust action or omission,

signify

the same thing, and both are the same with breach of con-

and

trust.

And

it

seems the word injury came to be given

right;

to

any action or omission, because they were without

he that acted or omitted, having before conveyed

his right to

some
the

other.

And

there

is

some

likeness

between that which in

common
is

course of

life

we

call injury,

and that which

in the

Schools

usually called absurd. For even as he

who by
first

argu-

ments
tained,

is
is

driven to deny the assertion which he

said to be brought to

main-

an absurdity; in

like

manner,

he

who through weakness

falls

of

mind does

or omits that

which
in the

before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits

an injury, and
Schools
is

into

no

less

contradiction than he

who

reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some

it

future action, he wills

done; by not doing

it,

he wills
at the
is

it

not

done: which
time,

is

to will a thing

done and not done

same

which

is

a contradiction.

An

injury therefore
is

a kind

of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity

in disputation.
4.

a kind of injury

From

these grounds

it

follows, that

an injury can be done

enter covenant, or to

to

no man * but him with

*The word
injustice
relates
is

whom we
some law:
is

to

injury,

to

some person,

as

well as some law. For what

unjust,

unjust to

all;

but there

may an

injury be done, and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private person, but the magistrate only; sometimes also neither against the magistrate, nor any private man, but only against God. For through contract and conveyance of right, we say, that an injury is done against this or that man. Hence it is (which we see in all kind of government) that what private men contract between themselves

by word or writing,
mischiefs

which
like,

and the

is released again at the will of the obliger. But those done against the laws of the land, as theft, homicide, are punished, not as he wills, to whom the hurt is done,

are

but according to the will of the magistrate; that

is,

the constituted laws.

LIBERTY

45

whom

somewhat
is

somewhat

made over by deed of gift, or to whom promised by way of bargain. And therefore damagis

ing and injuring are often disjoined. For

if

a master com-

mand his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the
servant,
if

he do

it

not, hath indeed

damaged

this third party,

but he injured his master only. So also in a

if

civil

government,
con-

any

man

offend another with

whom
the evil
of

he hath
is

made no

tract,

he damages him to
to

whom

done, but he injures

none but him

if

whom

the

power

government belongs. For

he

who
I

receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, he

it

that did

should answer thus: what art thou to me;

why
will,

should
since I

rather

do according

to yours

than mine

own

do not hinder, but you may do your own, and not

my

mind.'' In

which speech, where there hath no manner

I

of pre-

contract passed,
5.

see not, I confess,

just

what

is

reprehensible.

These words,

and unjust,

as also justice

and

injustice,
at-

are equivocal; for they signify one thing

when
as

they are

tributed to persons, another

when
is

to actions.

When
what
injury.

they are
is

attributed to actions, just signifies as

much

done

with

right,

and unjust,

as

what
is

done with

He who

hath done some just thing,

person, but guiltless;

not therefore said to be a just

and he

that hath

done some unjust thing,

we do not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do
righteousness, or to endeavour in
is just;

all

things to do that

which

and
is

to be unjust
to be

is

to neglect righteous dealing, or to

to

think

it

measured not according

So

my

contract, but

some present

benefit.

as the justice or injustice of the

is

mind,

the intention, or the

man,

one thing, that of an action, or

omission, another; and innumerable actions of a just

man may
to be ac-

be unjust, and of an unjust man,

just.

But that

man

is

46
counted
it,

LIBERTY
just,

who

doth just things because the law

commands
is

unjust things only by reason of his injfirmity; and he

properly said to be unjust,

who

doth righteousness for fear of

the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by

reason of the iniquity of his mind.

6.

The

justice

of actions

is

commonly

distinguished

into

two kinds, commutative and

portion,

distributive; the

former whereof,

they say, consists in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical pro-

and that

is

conversant in exchanging, in buying,

sell-

ing, borrowing, lending, location

acts

and conduction, and other

if

whatsoever belonging to contractors, where,

say, springs a

there be

an equal return made, hence, they

justice:

commutative

but this

is

busied about the dignity and merits of men,

so as
to

if

there be rendered to every

is

man Kaxd
him
say,

icf)V

d^LOCV,more

him who

more worthy, and

less to

that deserves less,

and

that proportionably, hence, they

ariseth distributive

justice, I

acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality:

is

to wit, that one

an equality simply so

called, as

when two
pound
is

things of equal value are compared together, as a

silver

of

with twelve ounces of the same

silver;

the other

an
be

equality

secundum quod,

as

when

a thousand

pounds

is

to

divided to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to

sixty

men, and four hundred

six
is

to forty,

where there

is

no equality
it

between

hundred and four hundred; but when

the same inequality in the

happens

that there

number

of

them

to

whom
part,

it

is

distributed, every
it

one of them

shall take

an equal
like

whence
is

is

called

an equal distribution. But such

For neither
I

equality

the same thing with geometrical proportion. But

this to justice?
if I sell

what

is all

my

goods for as

much
mine
I

as I

can get for them, do

injure the buyer,

if I

who
of

sought
is

and desired them of me; neither

to

divide
I

more

what

him who

deserves

less,

so long as
to

give the other

what

have agreed

for,

do

wrong

either.

Which

truth our

LIBERTY
Saviour himself, being God,
fore
is

47
the Gospel. This thereit

testifies in

no

distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps

justice
is

cannot be denied but that

a certain equality, as conall

sisting in this only; that since

we

are

equal by nature, one

should not arrogate more right to himself, than he grants to

another, unless he have fairly gotten
this suffice to be
it

by compact.

And
any

let

spoken against

this distinction of justice, alall,

though now almost generally received by

should conceive an injury to be somewhat

lest

man

else

than the breach

of faith or contract, as hath been defined above.

7.
It
is

an old saying, volenti non no injury; yet the truth of

fit
it

injuria, the willing

man

receives

may

be derived from

our principles. For grant that a

man

be willing that that should

be done which he conceives to be an injury to him;

that
is

why

then,
to

done by his

will,

which by contract was not lawful

be done. But he being willing that should be done which was

not lawful by contract, the contract
article of the
itself

(by the fifteenth

foregoing chapter) becomes void.

it

The

right there-

fore of doing
it is

returns; therefore

it is

done by

right;

wherefore

no

injury.

8.

not

The third precept him to be the worse

first

of the natural
for you,

law

is,

that

you

suffer

who, out

of the confidence

he

had in you,
a gift, but

did you a good turn; or that you accept not

shall

with a mind to endeavour, that the giver

have

no
he

just occasion to repent

him

of his gift. For without this, he

should act without reason, that would confer a benefit where

sees
it

would be

lost;
all

and by

this

means

all

beneficence,

and

trust,

together with

kind of benevolence, would be taken

of

from among men, neither would there be aught

assistance

mutual

among them, nor any commencement

of gaining

grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war

necessarily remain, contrary to the

would

fundamental law of nature.

is

But because the breach of

this

law

not a breach of trust or

48
contract, (for

LIBERTY

we

suppose no contracts to have passed

is
it

among

them), therefore

not usually termed an injury; but be-

cause good turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other,
it is

called ingratitude.

9.

The

fourth precept of nature

is,

that every

man

render

himself useful unto others:

stand,

vi^hich, that vi'e

we must remember
affections,

that there

is

in

may men

righdy undera diversity of

diversity of stones,

dispositions to enter into society, arising

their

from the
is

not unlike that which

found in

brought together in the building, by reason of the diversity

of their matter
its

and

figure.

For

as a stone,

which

in regard of

sharp and angular form takes up more

it

room from

other

stones than

fills

up

itself,

neither because of the hardness

of

its

matter can not well be pressed together, or easily cut,

fitly

and would hinder the building from being

cast

compacted,

is

away, as not

fit

for use: so a

man,

for the harshness of his

disposition in retaining superfluities for himself,

and detaining
by reason of
said to be use-

of necessaries

from

others,

and being
is

incorrigible

the stubbornness of his affections,

less

commonly
is

and troublesome unto

his

others.

Now,

because each one not

by right only, but even by natural

all

necessity,

supposed with

main might

to intend the

procurement of those things

if

which

are necessary to his

own

preservation;
superfluities,

any

man

will

contend on the other side for

by his default

there will arise a war; because that on

necessity of contending;

him

alone there lay no

he therefore acts against the fundait

mental law of nature. Whence

follows,

(which we were

to

show), that

it is

a precept of nature, that every

date himself to others. But he

called useless,

who

breaks

man accommothis law, may be

and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity

to this usefulness, as having regard to this very law.

10.

forgive

The fifth precept of the law of nature is, that we must him who repents and asks pardon for what is past.

LIBERTY
having
first

49

taken caution for the time to come.

remission of an offence,
is

The pardon
else

of

what

is

past, or the

nothing
after

but

the granting of peace to

him
is

that asketh

it,

he hath

warred against
granted to
hostile

us,

and now

become
is,

penitent.

But peace

him

that repents not, that

to

him

that retains an
is,

mind, or that gives not caution for the future, that

is

seeks not peace, but opportunity,

fear,

not properly peace but

nature.

and therefore

is

not

commanded by
is

Now
is

to

him

that will not

pardon the penitent, and that gives future causeems

not pleasing; which
contrary

tion, peace itself it

to the natural law.

11.

The

sixth precept of the natural

law

is,

that in revenge
at the evil past,
inflict

and punishments we must have our eye not

but the future good; that
is,

it is

not lawful to

punish-

ment
rected,
better.
is

for

may be coror that others warned by his punishment may become But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man
any other end, but that the offender
the law of nature to forgive one another, provided
fore-

bound by

he give caution for the future, as hath been showed in the going
article.

Furthermore, because revenge,

is

if

the time past

be only considered,

nothing

else

but a certain triumph, and

it

glory of mind, which points at no end, (for

contemplates

only what

is

past,

but the end

is

a thing to come) but that

which

is

directed to

no end,

is

vain: that revenge therefore

which regards not the

is

future, proceeds

from vain

glory,

and

therefore without reason.

is

But

to hurt another without reason

introduces a war, and

nature.
It
is

contrary to the fundamental law of

therefore a precept of the

law of nature, that in

revenge
of this
12.

we

look not backwards but forward.

is

Now

the breach

law

commonly
all

called cruelty.

But because
all

signs of hatred

and contempt provoke

insomuch
as

most of

to brawling

and

fighting,

most

men

would

rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than

50
suflfer

LIBERTY
slander,
it

follows in the seventh place, that

it

is

pre-

scribed by the law of nature, that

no man,

either by deeds or

words, countenance or laughter, do declare himself to hate or

scorn another.

The breach

of

which law

is

called reproach.
scoffs

But

although nothing be more frequent than the

and

jeers of

the powerful against the weak, and namely, of judges against

guilty persons,

which neither

relate to the offence of the guilty,

nor the duty of the judges, yet these kind of

men do

act against

the law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

13.

The

question whether of two

men
all

be the more worthy,

belongs not to the natural, but

civil

state.

For

it

hath been

showed before (Chap.

equal,

i.

Art. 3) that

and therefore the inequality

men by nature are which now is, suppose

is

from
law.
I

riches,

power, nobility of kindred,

that Aristotle, in his
first

come from

the civil

know

book

of Politics, affirms

as a foundation of the

whole

political science, that

some men
to serve;

by nature are made worthy to command, others only

as if lord

and servant were distinguished not by consent of

aptness,

men, but by an
reason (as but
ence.

that

is,

certain
is

kind of natural
not only against

knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation

now
it

hath been showed) but also against experiis

For neither almost

any

man

so dull of understanding

as not to judge

better to be ruled by himself, than to yield

if

himself to the government of another; neither

the wiser

and stronger do

contest,

have these ever or

after the

upper

hand

of those.
is

Whether

therefore

men

be equal by nature, the

equality

to

be acknowledged, or whether unequal, because

it

they are like to contest for dominion,

is

necessary for the

obtaining of peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore

it is

in the eighth place a precept of the

law of nature, that

every
to

man
As

be accounted by nature equal to another, the contrary

is

which law
14.
it

pride.

was necessary

to the conservation of each

man,

LIBERTY
that he should part with some of his rights, so
it

51
is

no

less

necessary to the

same conservation,

that he retain

some

others,
air,

to wit, the right of bodily protection, of free

enjoyment of

water,

and

all

necessaries for

life.

Since therefore

many common

rights are retained by those

who

enter into a peaceable state,

and
this

that

many

peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth

ninth dictate of the natural law, to wit, that what rights

soever any
as

man
all

challenges to himself, he also grant the same

due

to

the rest;

otherwise he frustrates the equality

article.

acknowledged in the former

For what
in the

is

it

else

to

acknowledge an equality of persons

ciety,

making up

of so-

but to attribute equal right and power to those

else

whom
But
to

no reason would

engage

to
is

enter into society?

ascribe equal things to equals,

the

same with giving things

is

proportional to proportionals.
called meekness, the violation

The

observation of this law

nXsovs^la; the breakers by the

Latins are styled immodici et immodesti.

15.

In the tenth place

it

is

commanded by

the law of na-

ture, that every

man

in dividing right to others,

shew himself
are forbidden

equal to either party. By the foregoing law

to

we

assume more right by nature

to ourselves,
will, for that

than

we

grant
is

to others.

We

may

take

less if
if

we
at

sometimes

an

argument

of modesty.

But

any time matter of right be to

are forbidden by this

be divided by us unto others, favour one more or

less

we

law

to

than another. For he that by favouring

not
this

one before
proaches

another

observes

natural

equality,
it

re-

him

whom

he thus undervalues: but

is

is

declared

above, that a reproach

against the laws of nature.

The

ob-

servance of this precept

persons.
16.

is

called equity; the breach, respect o

things

The Greeks in one word term it TcpoacoTtoXriipLa. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, those which cannot be divided, must be used in common (if

they can) and (that the quantity of the matter permit) every

52

LIBERTY
as

man

much

as

he

lists,

but

if

the quantity permit not, then

users.

with Hmitation, and proportionally to the number of the

For otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which

we have showed
17.

in the foregoing article to be

commanded by
it is

the law of nature.

Also what cannot be divided, nor had in common,

provided by the law of nature (which

precept)
that

may

be the twelfth

the use of that thing be either by turns, or

lot,

adjudged to one only by

it

and

that in the using

it

by turns,
it.

be also decided by
is

lot

who

shall

have the

first

use of

For

here also regard

to be
lot.

had unto

equality: but

no other can

be found, but that of

18.
is

But

all

lot
is

is

twofold, arbitrary or natural. Arbitrary

that

which

cast

by the consent of the contenders, and

(as they say) or fortune. Natural
it

it is

consists in

mere chance

primogeniture (in Greek KXr]povo[iia, as

or
first

were given by

lot)

possession. Therefore the things

which can neither be

first

divided, nor
possessor; as

had in common, must be granted to the

also those things

which belonged

to the father

are

due

to the son, unless the father himself have formerly conthis therefore stand

veyed away that right to some other. Let

for the thirteenth law of nature.
19.

The

fourteenth precept of the law of nature

to

is,

that

safety

must be assured

the mediators for peace. For

the

reason which

commands

the end,
first

commands

also the
is

means
all

necessary to the end. But the

dictate of reason

peace;

the rest are

means

to obtain

it,

and without which peace cannot

therefore a dictate of reason,
all

be had. But neither can peace be had without mediation, nor

mediation without
that
is,

safety.

It

is

law of nature, that we must give

security to the

mediators for peace.

20.

Furthermore, because, although

all

men

should agree to

make

these

and whatsoever other laws

of nature,

and should

LIBERTY

53

endeavour to keep them, yet doubts and controversies would

daily arise concerning the application of
tions, to
vi^it,

Vi^hether

them unto their acwhat was done, were against the law
the question of right);

or not,

(which

we
it is

call

whence

will

follow a fight between parties, either sides supposing themselves

wronged;

therefore necessary to the preservation of

fit

peace (because in this case no other

remedy can

possibly

be thought on) that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter

unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts

to stand to his

judgment

in deciding the controversy.

is

And

he

to

whom

they thus refer themselves

called

an

arbiter. It is

therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law, that both

parties disputing concerning the matter of right
selves

submit them-

unto the opinion and judgment of some third.

21.

But from

this

ground, that an arbiter or judge

determine the controversy,
of the parties.

is

chosen
gather

by the differing
that the arbiter
is

parties to

we

must not be one

For every
naturally,

man
and
the

presumed
is just,

to seek

what

is

good for himself

what
fore

only for peace's sake, and accidentally; and there-

cannot observe that same equality

as a third

commanded by
It is

law of nature so exactly

man

v/ould do.

therefore

in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature, that no

man must
22.

that

be judge or arbiter in his own cause. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, no man must be judge who propounds unto himself any
profit, or glory,

hope of

from the

victory of either part: for

the like reason sways here, as in the foregoing law.

23.

But when there

is

some controversy
not,

of the fact
is

itself,

to wit,

whether that be done or

which

said to be done,

the natural law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike,
that
is,

(because they affirm contradictories) that he believe

neither.

He must

therefore give credit to a third, or a third

and

fourth, or more, that he

may

be able to give judgment to

54
knowledge
signs

LIBERTY

the fact, as often as by other signs he cannot

of
it.

come

to

the

The

eighteenth law of nature therefore enfact, that

joins arbiters

and judges of
fact

where firm and

certain

of the

appear not, there they rule their sentence

parts.

by such witnesses, as seem to be indifferent to both

24.

From

the above declared definition of an arbiter

may

be furthermore understood, that no contract or promise must

pass between

him and

the parties

whose judge he

is

appointed,

by virtue whereof he

may

be engaged to speak in favour of

either part, nay, or be obliged to judge according to equity,

or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be

equal.
shall

The judge

is

indeed bound to give such sentence as he

judge to be equal, by the law of nature recounted in the

article.

15th

To

the obligation of

which law nothing can be

added by way of compact. Such compact therefore would be

in vain. Besides, if giving

for the equity of

it,

except such compact be of

wrong judgment, he should contend no force, the

is

controversy would remain after judgment given, which

trary to the constitution of

con-

an

arbiter,

who

is

so chosen, as

both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment

which he should pronounce. The law

of nature therefore

com-

mands
precept.
25.
else

the judge to be disengaged,

which

is

its

nineteenth

Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought

as, unless a

but the dictates of reason, so

man endeavour
knowingly, or

to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe

the laws of nature,

willingly,

it

is

manifest, that he

who

doth aught whereby the rational faculty

may be

destroyed or weakened, he knowingly, and willingly, breaks

the law of nature. For there
is

no difference between a

man

who

performs not his duty, and him

who
to

does such things willit.

ingly, as

make

it

impossible for

him

do

But they destroy

and weaken

the reasoning faculty,

who do

that

which disturbs

LIBERTY
the

55
which most manifestly
therefore sin, in the

mind from
to

its

natural state; that

happens

drunkards and gluttons.

We

twentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.

26.

Perhaps some man,

who

sees all these precepts of nature

derived by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason

advising us to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves,

will say that the deduction of these laws

is

so hard,

that

it is

not to be expected they will be vulgarly known, and

if

therefore neither will they prove obliging: for laws,

they be
this
I

not known, oblige not, nay, indeed are not laws.

To

answer,

it

is

true, that hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetous-

ness, vain glory,

and other perturbations of mind, do hinder

no

man

so, as

he cannot attain to the knowledge of these laws,

is

whilst those passions prevail in him: but there

is

man who

not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there

is

nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude

this

and unlearned, than

whether what he
is

only

rule,

that

now doing

to another,

when he doubts, may be done by the

law of nature, or
stead.

not, he conceive himself to be in that other's

Here

instantly those perturbations

which persuaded him

to the fact, being

as

now

cast into the other scale, dissuade

is

him

much. And

this rule

not only easy, but

tibi fieri

is

anciently cele-

brated in these words,

quod

non

vis, alteri

ne

jeceris:

do not that
27.

to others,

you would not have done

to yourself.

But because most men, by reason of

profit,

their perverse desire

al-

of

present

are

very unapt to observe these laws,

if

though acknowledged by them;

than the
rest

perhaps some more humble

should exercise that equity and usefulness which

reason dictates, those not practising the same, surely they would not follow reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procure

themselves peace, but a more certain quick destruction, and the

keepers of the law become a mere prey to the breakers of
It is
it.

not therefore to be imagined, that by nature, (that

is,

by

56
reason)

LIBERTY

men
of

are obliged to the exercise of

all

these laws * in

that state

men wherein

they are not practised by others.

We

are obliged yet in the interim to a readiness of

mind

to

observe

them whensoever

their observation shall

seem

to con-

duce to the end for which they were ordained.

We

must
and

therefore conclude, that the law of nature doth always

everywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of conscience,

but not always in the external court, but then only

when

it

may

be done with
28,

safety,

But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by

not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with
so be that he

an

act,
if

them,

who

does

it

be of another opinion. For

though the
science
29.
is

act itself be answerable to the laws, yet his con-

against them.

The

laws of nature are immutable and eternal: what

they forbid, can never be lawful; what they

command, can never

be unlawful. For pride, ingratitude, breach of contracts (or

injury), inhumanity, contumely, will never be lawful, nor the

contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as

dispositions of the

we

take

them

for

mind, that

is,

as they are considered in the

* Nay,

among
it

these laws

some things

there are, the omission whereof

(provided

be done for peace or self-preservation)

seems rather
all

to

be

the fulfilling, than breach of the natural law. For he that doth
against those that

things

do

all

things,

and plunders plunderers, doth equity;

dejectedness,

is a handsome action, and poorness of spirit, and a betraying of one's self, in the time of war. But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of war itself; for I cannot understand what drunkenness, or cruelty (that is, revenge which respects not the future good) can advance toward peace, or the preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what is just, and unjust, is not to be esteemed by the actions, but by the counsel and conscience, of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done with right; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the natural law, and an injury against God.

but on the other side, to do that which in peace

and becoming an honest man,

is

LIBERTY

57

court of conscience, where only they oblige, and are laws. Yet
actions

may

be so diversified by circumstances, and the

is

civil

law, that

what

done with equity

at

one time,

is

guilty of

iniquity at another;
is

and what

suits

with reason at one time,

is
still

contrary to

it

another. Yet reason

is

the

same, and

changeth not her end, which

peace,

and defence; nor the

means

to attain

them, to wit, those virtues of the mind which

we have
30.

declared above, and which cannot be abrogated by any

custom or law whatsoever.

It is

evident by

what hath hitherto been

said,

how

easily

the laws of nature are to be observed, because they require the

endeavour only, (but that must be true and constant); which

whoso

shall

perform,

we may

rightly call

him

just.

For he

who

tends to this with his whole might, namely, that his

actions be squared according to the precepts of nature, he

clearly that
all

shows
is

he hath a mind to

fulfil all

those laws; which

we
he
31.

are obliged to by rational nature.

is

Now

he that hath done

all

obliged

to, is

a just

man.
is

All writers do agree that the natural law

this
is

the

same

with the moral. Let us see wherefore

true.

We

must
they

know,

therefore, that

good and

evil are

names given

to things

to signify the inclination or aversion of

them by

whom

were given. But the inclinations of men are

to their

diverse, according

we may we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man commends,
diverse constitutions, customs, opinions; as
see in those things

(that
evil;

is

to say,

calls

good) the other undervalues,

as

being

nay, very often the

same man

at diverse times praises

and
it

dispraises the

same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary

is

there should be discord

and

strife.

They

are therefore so long in

the state of war, as by reason of the diversity of the present

appetites, they

mete good and

evil

by diverse measures. All

58

LIBERTY
easily

men
fore

acknowledge

this state, as

long as they are in

is

it,

to be evil,

and by consequence that peace

good. They there-

who

could not agree concerning a present, do agree conis

cerning a future good, which indeed

work

of reason; for

things present are obvious to the sense, things to

come
it

to

our

reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good,

the

follows by

same

reason, that

all

the necessary

means
trust,

to peace be

good

also;

and therefore that modesty, equity,

humanity, mercy,

(which we have demonstrated

to be necessary to peace), are

virtues.

good manners or
the

habits, that

is,

The law

therefore, in

means

to peace,

commands
it

also
is

good manners, or the prac-

tice of virtue:

and therefore

called moral.
off this

32.
petite,

But because

men

cannot put

same

irrational ap-

whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which,

consequence,
it

by

strict

many

unforeseen
all

evils

do adhere) before
agree in the
still

the future,

happens, that though

men do

commendation
For

of the foresaid virtues, yet they disagree

concerning their nature, to wit, in which each of them doth

consist.

as

oft

as

another's

good action displeaseth any

given of some neighbouring

man,
vice;

that action hath the

name

likewise the
to

bad

actions,

which
it

please
to

them, are ever

pass
that the

entitled

some
is

virtue.

Whence

comes

same

action

praised by these, and called virtue,

is

and

dis-

praised by those, and termed vice. Neither

there as yet any

remedy found by philosophers

that

for this matter; for since they

this,

could not observe the goodness of actions to consist in

it

was

in order to peace,

and the
to

evil in this, that it re-

lated to discord, they built a moral philosophy wholly estranged

from the moral law, and unconstant

between two extremes, and the

itself.

For they would

have the nature of virtues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity

vices in the extremes themselves;
to

which

is

apparently

false.

For
is

dare

is

commended, and,
it

under the name of fortitude

taken for a virtue, although

LIBERTY
be an extreme,
if

59

the cause be approved. Also the quantity of

it

a thing given, whether

be great, or Httle, or between both,

it.

makes not

liberality,

but the cause of giving

Neither

is

it

injustice, if I give
I

any

man

more, of what

is

mine own, than

owe him. The laws

of nature therefore are the

I

sum

of

moral

philosophy, whereof

have only delivered such precepts in

this place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against

those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other
precepts of rational nature,
for temperance also
is

from whence spring other

virtues;

a precept of reason, because intemperance

tends to sickness and death.

And

so fortitude too, that

is,

that

same
are

faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, (and

it is

which

more hardly declined than overcome) because

means

tending to the preservation of

33.

him

that resists.

But those which we

call

the laws of nature, (since they

are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason,

of things to be

done and omitted; but a law,

is

to speak properly

and

accurately,

the speech of

him who by

right

commands
as

somewhat

to others to be

done or omitted), are not (in pro-

priety of speech) laws, as they proceed

from nature. Yet,

they are delivered by

God

in holy Scriptures, (as

we

shall see

in the chapter following) they are

most properly

called by the

name of laws: for the sacred Scripture is the commanding over all things by greatest right.

speech of

God

Chapter IV

That the Law

(The

of

Nature

Is

a Divine

Law

text of this chapter

is

omitted.)

Part

II:

DOMINION

Chapter

V
Government

Of the Causes and

I.

First Beginning of Civil

It

is

of

itself

manifest, that the actions of

will

men

proceed
as

from the

will,

and the

from hope and

fear,

insomuch

when
pen
to

they shall see a greater good, or

less evil, likely to

hap-

them by

the breach, than observation of the laws, they

will wittingly

violate

them. The hope therefore which each

this,

man

hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in

that by force or craft he

openly, or by stratagem.

may disappoint his neighbour, either Whence we may understand, that the
and consequently, that
as

natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly secure

any
there

man
is

in their practice,

long as
re-

no caution had from the invasion of others, there

mains

to every

man

that

same primitive

right of self-defence,

by such means as either he can or will

a right to
all

make

use of, that

is,

things, or the right of war.

the fulfilling of the natural law, that

And it is a man be

sufficient for

prepared in

mind
2.

to
It

embrace peace when

is

it

may
all

be had.
silent in the

a fond saying, that

it

laws are
if

time
civil,

of war,

and

is

a true one, not only

we speak
iii.

of the

but also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to

the mind, but to the actions of

men, by chap.

art. 27.

And
as

we mean
is

such a war as
state

is

of all

men

against

all

men; such

the

mere

of nature;

although in the war of nation

against nation a certain

therefore in old time there

mean was wont to be observed. And was a manner of living, and as it

called A.r]aTpiKf]V, living

were a certain economy, which they

63

by rapine, which was neither against the law of nature (things

64

DOMINION

then so standing), nor void of glory to those

who
fit

exercised

it

with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was, taking away
the rest, to spare
life,

and abstain from oxen

to

for plough,
is

and every instrument serviceable

so to be taken, as
if

husbandry, which yet

not

they were bound to do thus by the law of

nature, but that they

lest
3.

had regard

to their

own

glory herein,
guilty of fear.
is

by too

much

cruelty, they

might be suspected

Since therefore the exercise of the natural law

neces-

sary for the preservation of peace, of the natural

and

that for the exercise

law security
is

is

no

less necessary, it is

worth the

considering what that

this

which

affords

such a security. For

matter nothing

else

can be imagined, but that each

man
may
a se-

provide himself of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on

the other

may

be rendered so dangerous, as either of them

think

it

better to refrain, than to

meddle. But

first, it is

plain,

that the consent of

two or three cannot make good such

sufficient to

curity; because that the addition but of one, or

some few on
undoubtedly

the other side,

sure,

is

make

the victory
is

and heartens the enemy

end the
of

to attack us. It

therefore neces-

sary, to the

security sought for

may

be obtained, that
assistance be

the

number

them who conspire

in a

mutual
to the

so great, that the accession of

some few

enemy's party

may
4.

not prove to them a matter of

moment

sufficient to assure

the victory.

Furthermore,

how

great soever the

if

who meet on
selves of

self-defence,

yet they agree not

to

number of them is among themcompass

this,

some

excellent

means whereby
shall

but

every

man

after his

own manner

make

use of his en-

deavours, nothing will be done; because that, divided in their

opinions, they will be a hindrance to each other, or
if

they

agree well enough to

spoil, or

some one action through hope

of victory,

revenge, yet afterward through diversity of wits, and

counsels, or emulation,

and envy, with which men naturally

DOMINION

65

contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will neither

give mutual help, nor desire peace, except they be constrained
to
it

by some

common

fear.

Whence

it

follows that the con-

sent of

many, (which
in

consists in this only, as

section,

we have
direct

already
their

defined

the foregoing

that

they

all
is

actions to the

same end, and the common good),

from mutual help
for,

that

to say,

that the society proceeding

that security

only, yields not

which they seek

that those

who meet and

agree in the

exercise of the
else

above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat

must be done,

who have

once consented for the

common

good, to peace and mutual help,

strained, lest afterwards they again dissent,

interest shall
5.

appear discrepant from the

reckons

may by fear be rewhen their private common good.

calls

Aristotle

among

those

animals which he

politic,

not

man

only, but divers others; as the ant, the bee, &c.,

which, though they be destitute of reason, by which they

contract

may

and submit
is

to

government, notwithstanding by conensuing or eschewing the same things,

senting, (that

to say)

they so direct their actions to a

common

end, that their meet-

ings are not obnoxious unto any

seditions.

Yet

is

not their

gathering together a

civil

government, and therefore those

political,

animals not to be termed

is

because their government

only a consent, or
is

many

wills concurring in

one

object, not

(as

necessary in civil government) one will.

It is

very true

that in those creatures, living only by sense

and

appetite, their

consent of minds

is
it,

so durable, as there

is

no need of anything
to

more

to

secure

and (by consequence)

preserve peace

among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is
none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and
war,
is

among men; among

beasts

no such matter. Next, the

is

natural appetite of bees, and the like creatures,

conformable,

66
and they
desire the

DOMINION

not from their

common good which among them differs private. But man scarce esteems anything good
in the enjoyment,

which hath not somewhat of eminence

more

than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those creatures

which

are void of reason, see

no

defect, or think they see none,

in the administration of their

commonweals; but

in a multi-

tude of

men

there are

many who, supposing

is

themselves wiser
in-

than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators

novate divers ways, which
a

mere

distraction,

and

civil

war.
the

Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they

may have

use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet

want they
to those

that

same
and
is

art of

words which

is

necessarily required
is

motions in the mind, whereby good

evil as

represented to
it
is.

it

as being better,

worse than in truth

But the
it

tongue of

man

a trumpet of

war and

sedition:

and

is re-

ported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches

thundered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece

Fifthly,

itself.

they
it

cannot distinguish between injury

as

and harm;

thence

happens that
their fellows.

long as

it

is

well with them, they

are of

blame not

But those

men

most trouble to
for they use

the republic,

who

have most leisure to be

idle;

not to contend for public places before they have gotten the
victory over

hunger and
is

cold. Last of

all,

the consent of those

brutal creatures
is

natural, that of
is

men

by compact only, that

if

to say, artificial. It

therefore
for

no matter of wonder
to the

some-

what more be needful

j^ace.

men

end they may

society,

live in

Wherefore consent or contracted

particular

without some

common power whereby

which
6.
is

men may

be ruled through
that security

fear of punishment, doth not suffice to

make up

requisite to the exercise of natural justice.

Since therefore the conspiring of

suffice to preserve peace,

many
and

wills to the

same
which

end doth not

defence,
it

to

make

a lasting

is

requisite that, in those necessary matters

DOMINION
concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of

67
all

men. But

this

cannot be done, unless every

to wit, either

his will to

some other one,

is
it

man will so subject man or council, that

to
all

v/hatsoever his will

the

in those things

which are necessary

common

peace,

be received for the wills of

particular.

men

in

general,

and of every one in

Now

the gathering to-

gether of

not to be done, for the

I call

many men who deliberate of what is to be done, or common good of all men, is that which
all

a council.

7.

This submission of the wills of

those

of one

man, or one

council,

is

then made,

men to the will when each one of

rest,

them

obligeth himself by contract to every one of the

not

to resist the will of that

one man, or council, to which he hath

is,

submitted himself; that

his wealth
is

that

he refuse him not the use of

(for he

and strength against any others whatsoever

still

supposed

to retain a right of
is

defending himself against

that to

violence)

and

this

called union.
is

But we understand

be the will of the council, which

of those
8.

the will of the major part

men

of

whom

the council consists.

itself

But though the will

be not voluntary, but only

the beginning of voluntary actions (for

we

will not to will,

but to act) and therefore

falls

least of all

under deliberation

and compact;

yet he

who

submits his will to the will of an-

other, conveys to that other the right of his strength

ties;

and

facul-

insomuch

as

when

the rest have done the same, he to

whom

they have submitted hath so

it

much

power, as by the

terror of

he can conform the wills of particular

men

unto

unity and concord.

9.

Now

union thus made

is

called a city, or civil society,

and
it is

also a civil person; for

when

there

is

one will of

all

men,
to

to be esteemed for

one person, and by the word one

all

it is

be known, and distinguished from

its

particular
as

men,

as

having

own

rights

and

properties.

Insomuch

neither any one

68
citizen,

DOMINION
nor
all

of

them

together,
is

(if

we

except

him whose

will stands for the will of all)

city therefore (that

to be accounted the city.

we may define it) is one person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of
each particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for
defence,
city

common
10,
civil

But although every

is

be a

civil

person, yet every

may happen that many citizens, by the permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons, as the companies of merchants, and many other convents;
person
not a
city; for it

but

cities

they are not, because they have not submitted them-

selves to the will of the

company

simply, and in
city,

all

things,

but in certain things only determined by the terms as

it

and on such

is

lawful for any one of them to contend in judg-

ment against the body itself of the sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city. Such like societies,
therefore, are civil persons subordinate to the city.
11,

In every

city,

that

man

or council, to

whose

will each

particular

man

hath subjected his will (so as hath been de-

clared)

is

said to have the

supreme power, or chief command,

right of

or dominion; which

power and

commanding,
all

consists

in this, that each citizen hath conveyed

his strength

and

power

to that

man

or council; which to have done (because no

is

man
else

can transfer his power in a natural manner)

nothing

than to have parted with his right of resisting. Each citizen,

is

as also every subordinate civil person,

called the subject of

him who hath

12,

the chief

command.
said,
it is

By what hath been

sufficiently

showed, in
persons,
fear,

what manner, and by what

have grown together into a

degrees,

many

natural

through desire of preserving themselves, and by mutual

civil

person,

whom we

have called

DOMINION
a city.

69
fear,

But they

who

submit themselves to another for

they fear, or some other

either submit to

him whom

whom
not be

they confide in for protection.

They

act according to the first

manner who
slain; they

are vanquished in war, that they

may

according to the second,

not be overcome.

who

are not yet overcome,

receives
its

that they

may

beginning from natural power, and beginning of a

tion of those
stitution.
city;

The first manner may be called

which
and
is

the natural
constitu-

the latter

from the council and

who meet
it

together,

a beginning by inof cities, the

Hence

is

that there are

is

two kinds

one natural, such as

institutive,

the paternal

despotical; the other

first,

which may be

also called political. In the

the

lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other,

the citizens by their

own

wills appoint a lord over themselves,

whether he be one man, or one company of men, endued with

the

command

in chief.

But we

will speak, in the first place, of

a city political or by institution; and next, of a city natural.

Chapter VI

Of the Right
Only,
1.

of Him,

Whether Council

or

One Man

Who Hath

the Supreme Power in the City

first

We

must consider

of

all

what a multitude *

of

men
is,

(gathering themselves of their

own

free wills into society)

namely, that

it

is

not any one body, but

many men, whereof

own will and his peculiar judgment conmay be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say this is mine, the other, that is his;
each one hath his
all

cerning

things that

yet will there not be anything of

which the whole multitude,

as
is

a person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, this

mine, more than another's. Neither must

to the multitude, as
its

we
or

ascribe

any action

own, but

(if all

more

of

them do
men.

agree)
*

it

will not be

an action, but as

many

actions as

The doctrine of the power of a city over its citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a multitude or company of citizens not only may have
enough explained in the first article; but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few things. By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more than one, so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing, namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to either a several; and
clearly

command, but may also be subject Which difference I did believe was

to

command; but

in

diverse senses.

therefore

neither
a

is

any one action whatsoever

contract,
it

to

be attributed

to

it.

Wherefore
right, act,

multitude cannot promise,

acquire right,

convey

have, possess, and the like, unless

be every one apart, and

DOMINION
For although
those only
city,

71
it

in

some great

sedition,

is

commonly
is

said, that
it

the people of that city have taken up arms; yet

true of

who
is

are in arms, or

who

consent to them. For the

itself.

which

one person, cannot take up arms against

is

Whatsoever therefore
up; and that he,

done by the multitude, must be under-

stood to be done by every one of those by

whom

it

is

made

who
to

being in the multitude, and yet con-

sented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by
it,

must be judged
said, there

have done nothing. Besides, in a multi-

tude not yet reduced into one person, in that manner as hath

been

remains that same

all

state of
is

nature in which

all

things belong to

men, and there

no

place for

meum

and

tuum, which
that security

is
is

called

dominion and propriety, by reason that

not yet extant which

we have

declared above

to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.

2.

Next,

we must

consider that every one of the multitude

(by whose means there

city)

may

be a beginning to

make up

the

must agree with the

rest, that in

those matters which shall

be propounded by any one in the assembly, that he received for

the will of
all

which the major part

many

shall

approve

of;

for

man
and
the

by man; so as there must be as

promises, compacts, rights,

actions, as men. Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if same multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all, then it becomes one person. For it is endued with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that the cit>' which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which cannot be done, but in an assembly. But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men, whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people, that is, by many single citizens together, and not proceeding from one will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizen's and subjects, but not a city.

72

DOMINION
all

Otherwise there will be no will at

of a multitude of

men,

whose

wills

and votes

differ so variously.

Now
it

if

any one will

themselves
to pass,

not consent, the rest notwithstanding shall

constitute the city without him.

among
will

Whence

come

that the city retains

its

primitive right against the dissenter,

that
3.

is,

the right of war, as against an enemy.

said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth
to

But because we
that there

article,

was required

the security of

men, not

only their consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such
things as were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that

union and subjection the nature of a

discern

city consisted;

we must
(all

now

in this place, out of those things

which may be

propounded, discussed, and stated in an assembly of men,

whose
of

wills are contained in the will of the

major part) what

things are necessary to peace and

all, it is

necessary to peace, that a

tected against the violence of

common defence. But first man be so far forth proothers, that he may live securely,
long

that
as

is,

that he

may have no

just cause to fear others, so

he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make

men

altogether

safe

from mutual harms, so

is

as they cannot be hurt or injuri-

ously killed,
deliberation.

impossible; and, therefore, comes not within

just cause of

But care may be had, there be no

is

fear; for security

the end wherefore

to others,

which

if it

be not had,

men submit themselves no man is supposed to have

all

submitted himself to aught, or to have quitted his right to

things, before that there
4.
It
is

was

a care

had of

his security.

not enough to obtain this security, that every one

are

of those

who

now growing up

into a city,

do covenant
steal,

with the
kill,

rest, either

by words or writing, not to

not to

and

to observe the like laws; for the pravity of

is

disposition

manifest to

all,

and by experience too well

human known

how

little

(removing the punishment)

men

are kept to their

duties,

through conscience of their promises.

We

must therefore

DOMINION

73

provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments;

and there

is

then

sufficient provision

made, when there are so

than not to have done

great punishments
it
it.

appointed for every injury, as apparendy

evil to

prove a greater

have done

it,

For

all

men, by

a necessity of nature, choose that w^hich to

them appears
5.

to be the less evil.

is

Now
is

the right of punishing

then understood to be

given to any one,

when

every

man

contracts not to assist

him

who

to be punished.

But

will call this right, the

sword of

justice.

But these kind of contracts

men

observe well enough,

for the

most

part,

till

either themselves or their near friends

are to suffer.
6.

Because therefore for the security of particular men, and,

by consequence, for the

right of using the

common
for

peace,

it

is

necessary that the

to

sword

punishment be transferred
is

some

man

or council, that
to

man
own

or council

necessarily understood
city.

by right

have the supreme power in the

discretion,
wills;

For he that by
all

right punisheth at his

to all things

by right compels

men

which he himself

than which a greater com-

mand
7.

cannot be imagined.

But in vain do they worship peace

at

home, who cannot

is
it

defend themselves against foreigners; neither

possible for
forces are

them

to protect themselves against foreigners,

whose

not united.

And

therefore

it

is

necessary for the preservation

of particulars, that there be

some one council or one man, who

so

hath the right to arm, to gather together, to unite

citizens, In all

many

dangers and on

all

occasions, as shall be need-

ful for

common
make

defence against the certain

(as often as

number and
shall find
it

strength

of the

enemy; and again,

he

expedithere-

ent) to

peace with them.

We

must understand
council;

fore, that particular citizens

have conveyed their whole right

of

war and

peace, unto

some one man or

call

and

that this

right (which

we may

the sword of war) belongs to the

74
same man or
For no
council, to

DOMINION

whom

the sword of justice belongs.

man

can by right compel citizens to take up arms, and

be at the expenses of war, but he

who

by right can punish

him who doth not

and
8.

obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of

itself

war, as that of justice, even by the constitution

essentially,

of a city,

do belong

to the chief

command.
is

But because the right of the sword

nothing

else

but to
it

have power by right to use the sword

lows, that the
party: for
if

at his

own

will,

fol-

judgment of

its

right use pertains to the

same

the

power

of judging

were in one, and the power

of executing in another, nothing

would be done. For

his

in vain

would he give judgment, who could not execute

or, if
is

commands,

he executed them by the power of another, he himself

only an
All judgment therefore in a city
is,

not said to have the power of the sword, but that other, to

whom

he

is

officer.

belongs to

him who hath

the swords, that

to

him who hath

con-

the supreme authority.

9.

Furthermore, since

it

no

less,

nay,

it

much more

duceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising, than to appease

them being
just

risen;

and

that

all

controversies

are bred

from hence,

that the opinions of

men

differ

concerning

meum

and tuum, and

evil,

and unjust,

profitable

and unprofitable, good

like, which every man own judgment; it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust,

honest and dishonest, and the

esteems according to his

what

honest,

what dishonest, what good, what

is

evil,

that

is

summarily, what

to

be done, what to be avoided in our

common

course of

life.

But those

rules

and measures are usucity, as

ally called the civil laws, or the

laws of the

being the

commands

of

And

the civil

him who hath the supreme power in the city. laws (that we may define them) are nothing else

DOMINION
but the

75
the chief authority in the

commands

of

him who hath

affairs

city, for direction of

the future actions of his citizens.

of the city,
all

10.

Furthermore, since the

both those

of

war and

peace, cannot possibly be

administered by one
subordinate mag-

man,

or one council, without officers and

istrates,

and that

it

appertaineth to peace, and

it

common

defence,

that they to

whom

belongs justly to judge of controversies,

to search into

neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war,

to attend the benefit of the city,
it is

and on

all

hands warily

should

also rightly exercise their offices;

consonant to reason, that

they depend on, and be chosen by

him who hath

the chief

command
11.

both in war and in peace.

manifest, that
all

It is also

voluntary actions have their

will,

beginning from, and necessarily depend on the

and that

the will of doing, or omitting aught, depends on the opinion

of the

good and

evil of the

reward or punishment, which a

man

conceives he shall receive by the act or omission; so as the

actions of
fore,
all

men
much

are ruled by the opinions of each; where-

by evident and necessary inference,

it

we may
of

understand
that

that

very

concerns

the

interest

peace,

no

opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they

may

imagine, that either by right they

is,

may

not obey the laws

or council, to
it

of the city, that

the

commands
is

of that

man

whom

the supreme

power

committed, or that

is

lawful

to resist him, or that a less

punishment remains for him that

For
if

denies, than

him

that yields obedience.

one

command
their

somewhat
forbid
right,
it

to be

done under penalty of natural death, another

under pain of eternal death, and both by

own
altois

it

will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are

itself
is

not only by right punishable, but that the city

gether dissolved; for no
less,

man

can serve two masters: nor

he

but rather more, a master,

obey for fear of damnation,

whom we believe we are to than he whom we obey for fear

"jd

DOMINION
It

of temporal death.

follows therefore that this one, whether

the city hath committed the supreme

man
and

or court, to

whom

power, have also

this right; that

he both judge what opinions *

doctrines are enemies unto peace,

to be taught.

and

also that

he forbid

them
12.

Last of

all,

from

this

consideration, that each citizen

hath submitted his will to his

who

hath the supreme com-

mand
him;

in the city, so as he
it

may

not employ his strength against

follows manifesdy, that whatsoever shall be done by

as

him who commands, must not be punished. For

*

he

who

hath

neither in the worship of God, nor from whence there may not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions therefore I have not spyoken in this place. There are certain doctrines wherewith
is

There

scarce any principle,

human

sciences,

subjects being tainted, they verily believe that obedience

to the city,

may

be refused

and that by right they may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority that power which many is committed. I deny not, but this reflects on living under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church, bishops require in theirs to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not, and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its peace, it follows necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the city, that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.

DOMINION
not power enough, cannot punish

77
naturally; so neither can
sufficient

him

he punish him by
13.
It is

right,

who

by right hath not

power.

most manifest by what hath been

(that
is,

said, that in every

perfect city

where no

citizen hath right to

use his

faculties, at his

own
in

discretion, for the preservation of himself,

or

where the

right of the private

sword

is

excluded) there

is

supreme power

some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men, or greater than which no mortal

man

can have over himself. But that power, greater than which

cannot by
*

men

be conveyed on a man,

we

call

absolute.* For

oppose

popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the citizens it not. For in the gathering together of many men, they acknowl-

edge the face of a city; and even the unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet monarchy is no less a city than democracy; and absolute kings have their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided, but not recalled. But it appears not to most men how a city is contained in the person of a king; and therefore they object against
that if any man had such a right, the conwould be miserable. For thus they think, he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his only happiness that he is not already spoiled and killed. But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one, or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it

absolute

command:

first,

dition of the citizens

jusdy,

that

is,

without breach of the natural laws, and injury against

is

God.

And

therefore there
if

some

security for subjects in the oaths

it,

which

princes take. Next,

he could jusdy do

or that he

made no account

no reason why he should desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly; but grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufof his oath, yet appears there
ficiency to oppress
affairs
itself
is

all.

Here

is

no other

difficulty then,

but that

human

cannot be without some inconvenience.

in

And

this

inconvenience

the citizens, not in the government. For

themselves, every
live according to

if men could rule by his own command, that is to say, could they the laws of nature, there would be no need at all of a

man

78

DOMINION
his will to the will of the city,

whosoever hath so submitted

that he can, unpunished,
troversies, set penalties,

do any thing, make laws, judge conuse, at his

all

make

own
by

pleasure, of the
right, truly

strength

and wealth of men, and

this

he

hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted.

This same

may be confirmed by

experience in

all

the cities

which
there

are or ever have been; for

though

it

be sometimes in
yet ever

doubt, what
is

man

or council hath the chief

command,

such a command, and always exercised, except in the

civil

time of sedition and

war, and then there are two chief

commands made
destroy
it,

out of one.

Now,

those seditious persons

who
to

dispute against absolute

as to

authority,

do not so much care

removing
this

convey

it

on
civil

others; for
society,

power,
of
all

they together take

away
is

and a confusion

things returns. There

so

much
that

obedience joined to this abis

solute right of the chief ruler, as

necessarily required for

to say, so

the government of the

right of his

city,

is

much
this

as that

may

not be granted in vain.

Now
may

kind of

obedience, although for

some reasons

it

sometimes, by

right, be denied, yet because a greater

cannot be performed,

we

will call

it

simple. But the obligation to perform this grows

not immediately from that contract, by which

we

have con-

veyed
that,

all

our right on the

city,

but immediately from hence,

right

without obedience, the

city's

would be

frustrate,

and by consequence there would be no

city,

city constituted.

For

it is

nor of a

common

coercive power. Secondly, they object, that there

is

no dominion

in the Christian world absolute;

states,
all

which indeed

is

not true,
they

for all monarchies, and all other have the chief command, do not

are so. For although

who
what

those things they would, and

is

they

know

profitable to the city, the reason of that

not the defect of

right in them, but the consideration of their citizens,

their

who

busied about

and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right, and prudendy remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
private interest,

DOMINION
one thing
another,
if I say, I

79

give you right to

if I say, I

will

command what you will; do whatsoever you command. And the

I

command may
asmuch

be such, as

would
which

rather die than do

it.

For-

therefore as no

man
that,

can be bound to will being killed,

to

much
to
is

less is

he tied to
be

him

is

worse than death.

I

If therefore I

commanded
I

to kill myself,
it,

am

not bound

do

it;

for

though

deny to do

yet the right of

dominion

not frustrated, since others

will not refuse to

may
it;

be found,
I

who

being com-

manded,
which
ruler
I

do

neither do

refuse to do that
if

have contracted to do. In like manner,

to kill

the chief
it,

command any man

it

him, he

is

not tied to do

be-

cause

cannot be conceived that he

made any such

covenant.

Nor

if

he

command

to execute a parent,

whether he be innosince there are

cent, or guilty,

and condemned by the law,

will

others

who, being commanded,

do

that,

and a son
all

will

rather die, than live infamous,

and hated of

the world.

There are many other

arc shameful to be

cases,

in which, since the

commands
those;

done by some, and not by

these,

others, obedience

may, by
this,

right, be

performed by

and refused by

and

without breach of that absolute right which was given to

the chief ruler. For in

no

case

is

the right taken

away from

him, of slaying those

who

shall refuse to

obey him. But they

who

thus

kill
it,

men, although by
if

right, given

them from him

against

that hath

yet

they use that right otherwise than right reason

is,

requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that

14.
is

God.
he

Neither can any

man

give

somewhat

to himself; for

already supposed to have

what he can give

himself.

Nor can

he be obliged

to himself; for the

same party being both the

for a

obliged and the obliger, and the obliger having power to release
the obliged,
it

were merely in vain

man

to be obliged to

himself, because he can release himself at his

and he that can do

plain, that the city

this, is
is

already actually free.

civil

own pleasure; Whence it is

not tied to the

laws; for the civil

8o
laws are the laws of the
she

DOMINION
city,

by which,

if

she were engaged,

city

should be engaged to herself. Neither can the

if

be

obliged to her citizen, because,

he

will,

he can free her from

her obligation; and he

of every citizen
is

will, as oft as she wills, (for the will

in all things
is

comprehended

in the will of
is,

the city); the city therefore

free

when
is

she pleaseth, that

she

is

now

actually free.

But the

will of a council, or

one

who

hath the supreme authority given him,

the will of the city:

he therefore contains the wills of

fore neither
is

all

particular citizens. There-

he bound to the

civil

laws (for this

is

to

be

bound
15.

to himself) nor to

any of his

citizens.

Now

because (as hath been

all

shown above) before

all

the
is

constitution of a city

things belonged to

men, nor
where

there that thing

which any
same

man

can so

call his, as

any other
all

may
it

not, by the

right, claim as his

own,

(for

things are

common,
and

there can be nothing proper to any

its

man)
cities

follows, that propriety received

beginning* when
is

received theirs,

that

that

only

proper to each man,

of the
is

which he can keep by the laws, and the power

city, that is, of

whole

him on

whom

its

chief

command

conferred.

Whence we
propriety to

understand, that each particular citizen hath a

which none
chief ruler

of his fellow-citizens hath right, be-

cause they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no propriety
in

which the

(whose commands are the laws, whose

will contains the will of each

man, and who, by every

single

person,
*

is

constituted the

supreme judge) hath not a

right.

But

What

is

objected by some, that the propriety of goods, even before

cities,

was found in fathers of families, that objection have already declared, that a family is a little city. For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father himself. But the
the constitution of
is

vain,

because

fathers of divers families,

who

are subject neither to any

all

common

father

nor lord, have a

common

right in

things.

DOMINION
although there be
citizens,

8l
its

many

things which the city permits to

to

and therefore they may sometimes go

is

law against

their chief; yet

not that action belonging to

is it

to natural equity; neither

civil right, but concerning what * by right he

may do who
self, as

hath the supreme power, but what he hath been

willing should be done,

and therefore he shall be judge himthough (the equity of the cause being well understood)
injuries are forbid

he could not give wrong judgment.

1

6.

Theft, murder, adultery, and

all

by

the laws of nature; but

der,

what

is

to be called theft,

what muris

what

adultery,

what injury

in a citizen, this
civil

not to be

determined by the natural, but by the

law. For not every

taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only

another man's goods,

another's,
is

is

theft;

but what

is

our's,

and what

a question belonging to the civil law. In like

man-

ner, not every killing of a

man

is is

murder, but only that which

all

the

civil

law

forbids;

neither

encounter with

women
itself

adultery, but only that

all
is

which the
is

civil

law prohibits. Lastly,

breach of promise

an injury, where the promise

is

lawful; but where there

no right
it,

to

make any compact,

there can be

no conveyance

of

and therefore there can no

injury follow, as hath been said in the second chapter. Article

17.

Now
As

what we may
is

contract for,

and what

not,

depends

often as a citizen

granted

to

have an action of law against the

supreme, that is, against the city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may, by right, keep possession of the thing in controversy,
but whether by the laws formerly
IS

made

she

would keep

it;

for the
raise

law

the declared will of the supreme. Since then the city

citizens

may

money

under two ddes, either as tribute, or as debt, in the no action of law allowed, for there can be no question whether the city have the right to require tribute; in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place, saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.

from the

former case there

is

82
wholly upon the
civil

DOMINION
laws.

The

city of

Laccdaemon therefore
so take

rightly ordered that those certain

young men who could

as not to be caught,
else,

away

goods from others

it

should go un-

punished; for

was nothing
that

but to

make

law that what

was

so

acquired
is

should be their own,

and not another's.

Rightly also

man
is

everywhere

slain,

whom we

kill

in

war, or by the necessity of self-defence. So also that copulation

which in one

city

matrimony,

in another will be

judged

adultery. Also those contracts

citizen,

which make up marriage in one

do not

so in another, although of the

is

same
is,

city;

be-

cause that he

who

forbidden by the city (that

is) to

by that one

man
any,

or council whose the supreme power

contract aught,

hath no right to
it is

make any

contract,

and therefore having made

of force,

not valid, and by consequence, no marriage. But his

contract

which received no prohibition, was therefore

was matrimony. Neither adds
add nothing
it

and

so

any force to any unoath or sacrament; *

lawful contracts, that they were

for those

made by an
Art. 22.

to the strengthening of the contract, as

ii.

hath been said above, Chap.

What

therefore theft,
is,

what murder, what

*

adultery,

and in general what injury

(in

Whether matrimony be a sacrament

it is

which sense that word

I

is

used by some divines) or not,

granted by the
civil

not

my
it

purpose to dispute. Only

is

say,

that the legitimate contract of a

is,

man and woman

to live together,

that

law, whether

be a sacrament or not,

surely

a legitimate marriage; but that copulation which the city hath prohibited

no marriage, since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who permit no such contracts, but by a law that they shall never be broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the
is

contract.

city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be per-

formed in the temple, to bless, or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of clergymen; all the rest, namely, who, when, and by what contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.

DOMINION
must be known by the
civil laws, that is,

83
the

commands

of

him

who
17.

hath the supreme authority.

This same supreme

command and
men,

absolute power, seems

as they hate the very

so harsh to the greatest part of

naming
pardy

of

them;

which happens

chiefly

through want of
civil

knowledge, what
also

human

nature and the

laws are, and

through their default, who, when they are invested

with so great authority, abuse their power to their

own
if

lust.

That they may therefore avoid

this

kind of supreme authority,

some

of

them

will

have a

city well

enough

constituted,

they
cer-

who
tain

shall be the citizens

articles

convening, do agree concerning

propounded, and in that convent agitated and

approved, and do

command them
and
also
to

to

be observed, and punish-

ments prescribed

to be inflicted

on them
the

who

shall

break them.
foreign

To which
dition, that

purpose,

repelling

of a

enemy, they appoint

if

a certain

and limited

return, with this con-

that suffice not, they

may

call

new convention

of estates.

Who

sees not in a city thus

constituted, that the

assembly

who

prescribed those things had an absolute power?

If therefore the

assembly continue, or from time to time have

a certain day and place of meeting, that

petual.

power

will be per-

But

if

they wholly dissolve, either the city dissolves with

all is

them, and so

returned to the state of war, or else there

left to

is

somewhere

power

punish those

who

shall transgress
it,

the laws, whosoever or

how many

soever they be that have

which cannot
what

possibly be without an absolute power. For he

that by right hath this

might given, by punishments

to restrain

citizens he pleaseth, hath such a

power

as a greater can-

not possibly be given by any citizens.

18.
It is

therefore manifest, that in every city there

is

some

one man, or council, or court,

who

by right hath as great a

power over each

single citizen, as each

man

hath over himself

considered out of that

civil state, that is,

supreme and absolute,

84
to be limited only

DOMINION
by the strength and forces of the
world. For
if

city itself,

and by nothing
that

else in the

his

power were

limited,

limitation

must

necessarily

proceed from some greater

power. For he that prescribes than he

limits,

must have

a greater

power
is

who

is

confined by them.
is

Now

that confining

power

either without limit, or

again restrained by some other greater

than

itself,

and

so

we

shall at length arrive to a

power which

hath no other

limit,
all

but that which

is

the terminus ultimus

is

of the forces of

the citizens together. That same

if it

called

the supreme
a

command; and
if

be committed to a council,
of the

supreme council, but

to one

man, the supreme lord

city.

Now

the notes of supreme

to determine

command
war and

are these: to

and abrogate laws,

judge of
all

peace, to

make know and

and coun-

controversies, either
all

by himself, or by judges ap-

pointed by him; to elect

sellors. Lastly, if

magistrates, ministers,

there be any
is

man who

by right can do some

one action which

not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do

beside himself, that

man

hath obtained the supreme power.

For those things which by right may not be done by any one
or

many

citizens, the city itself

can only do.

He

therefore that

doth those things useth the

city's right,

which

is

the supreme

power.
19.

They who compare

members, almost
is

a city and

its citizens,

with a

man

and

his

all say,

that he

who

hath the supreme

city,

power
head
is

in the city, to the

said,
it

in relation to the
it

whole

such as the

whole man. But

that

appears by what hath been

already

he

who

is

endued with such a power,

(whether

be a

man

or a court) hath a relation to the city,

it is

not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For
the soul by
or
nill;

nill; so

man hath a will, that is, can either will so by him who hath a will, that is, can either will or by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwhich a

wise, the city hath a will,

and can

either will or nill.

court of

DOMINION
counsellors
counsellor,
ruler
office
is

85

rather to be

compared with the head, or one

(if

whose only counsel

of in
is

of any one alone) the chief

makes use
of the head

matters of greatest

moment:
is

for the

to counsel, as the soul's

to
is

command.
constituted by
subject

20.

Forasmuch

as the

supreme command

virtue

of the compacts

which each

single citizen or
all

mutually makes with the other; but

ceive their force
lose
it

contracts, as they re-

from the

contractors, so by their consent they

infer hence,

again,

and are broken; perhaps some may

all

that by the consent of

the subjects together, the

supreme
if
it

authority

may

be wholly taken away.

Which
since

inference,

were

true, I

cannot discern what danger would thence by right

arise to the

supreme commanders. For

it is

supposed that
if

each one hath obliged himself to each other,

any one of

them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me, do that which by contract made with me, he hath
obliged himself not to do. But
ever
as
it
it

is

not to be imagined that

will

happen, that

all

the subjects together, not so

much
any

one excepted, will combine against the supreme power.

is

Wherefore there
ing

no

fear

for

rulers

in chief,

that by

right they can be despoiled of their authority. If notwithstandit

were granted, that

their right

depended only on that

it

contract

which each man makes with

right;

his fellow-citizen,

might

very easily happen, that they might be robbed of that dominion

under pretence of
the

for

subjects

being called either by

flocking together,

command of the city, or seditiously men think that the consents of all are
of the greater part;

most

contained in the votes

which in truth
neither

is

false.

For

it is

not from

nature that the consent of the major part should be received

for the consent of
all,
is it

true in tumults, but

it

prothat

ceeds from civil institution, and

is

then only true,

when

man

or court which hath the supreme power, assembling his

86
subjects,

DOMINION
by reason of the greatness of their number, allows
elected
will

those that are

elected them,

power

of

speaking for those

voices, in

who
such

and

have the major part of

matters as are by

him propounded
But
his

to be discussed, to be as

effectual as the whole.

chief,

we

cannot imagine that he

who

is

ever convened

subjects

with intention that they

should dispute his right, unless, weary of the burthen of his

charge, he
declared in
plain terms,
that he

renounces and

abandons

his

government.

Now

because most

men

through

ig-

norance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens

only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion,
for the consent of the
it may very may by right

whole

city,

well seem to

them, that the supreme authority

so
it

be abrogated,

be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes

of the greater

number. But though a government be constituted

by the contracts of particular

towards him

men

with particulars, yet

is

its

right

depends not on that obligation only; there

another

tie also

who commands. For

convey

each citizen compacting with

right

his fellow, says thus: I

my

on

this party,

upon

condition that you pass yours to the same; by which means,

that right
his

which every
is

own man or

advantage,
council for

man had before to use his faculties to now wholly translated on some certain the common benefit. Wherefore what by
made with
the other,

the mutual contracts each one hath

what

by the donation of right which every

to

man
is

is

bound
due
their

to ratify

him

that

commands,
next,

the

government

upheld by a double
is

obligation

from the

citizens, first, that

which

to their

fellow-citizens,

that

which they owe

to

prince.

Wherefore no
right despoil

subjects,

how many
consent.

soever they be, can with any

him who

bears the chief rule, of his authority,,

even without his

own

Chapter VII

Of the Three Kinds

of Government: Democracy,

Aristocracy,
I.

Monarchy
city
its

We

have already spoken of a

by institution in
species.

its

genus;

we

will

now

say

somewhat
power

of

As

for the dif-

ference of
to

cities, it is

taken from the difference of the persons,

is

whom

the supreme
either to

committed. This power

is

committed

one man, or council, or some one court

a council of

consisting of
consists

many men. Furthermore,

of
all

many men

either

the citizens,

(insomuch as every

man

of

them hath a

right to vote,
if

and an

interest in the ordering

of the greatest affairs,

he will himself) or of a part only.

of government; the one,

From whence there arise three sorts when the power is in a council, where
to vote;

every citizen hath a right

and

it is

called a democracy.
all,

The

other,

when
is
it

it is

in

a council, where not

frages;

but some part only have their sufaristocracy.

and we

call it

an

The
is

third

that,
is

when
a

the supreme authority rests only in one; and

styled

monarchy. In the

first,

he that governs

called 6fj(aoc;, the

people; in the second, the nobles; in the third, the monarch.

2.

Now,

although ancient writers of

politics

have

intro-

duced three other kinds of government opposite

to these, to
is,

wit, anarchy or confusion to democracy, oligarchy, that

the

command

of

some few,

to aristocracy,

and tyranny to mon-

archy; yet are not these three distinct forms of government,

but three diverse

pleased
rule.

titles

given by those

who were
or

either dis-

with

that

present

government,

those

that

bare

For men, by giving names, do

87

usually, not only signify

00

DOMINION
own
aflEections,

the things themselves, but also their

hatred, anger,

as love,

and the

like.

Whence

it

happens that what one

man
one

calls

a democracy, another calls an anarchy;

what one

counts an aristocracy, another esteems an oligarchy; and

titles

whom
see,

a king, another styles

him

a tyrant. So as

we

these

names betoken not a

diverse kind of government, but

the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning

him who hath

is

the supreme power. For

equally opposite to
signifies that there
city.
all
is

first,

who

sees

not that anarchy

the aforenamed forms? For that v/ord

no government

at all, that

is,

not any

But how

is it

possible that

no

city

should be the species

is

of a city? Furthermore,
oligarchy,

what

difference

there between an

which

signifies the
is

command

of a

few or grandees,

or an aristocracy, which

that of the

prime or chief heads,

that the

more than

that

men

differ so
all

things seem not good to

those persons,

among themselves, men? Whence it

are looked
all

same
by

happens, that

who by some

on

as the best, are

others esteemed to be the worst of

3.

men.

But men, by reason of

their passions, will very hardly

be persuaded that a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse

kinds of
cities;

who though
many,
yet
it

they

would

rather have the city

it

subject to one than

do they not believe

to be well

governed unless

accord with their judgments. But

we must
is

discover by reason, and not by passion,

what the

difference

between a king and a

tyrant.

But

first,

they differ not in

this,

that a tyrant hath the greater power, for greater than the su-

preme cannot be granted; nor

in this, that one hath a limited

is

power, the other not; for he, whose authority

limited,

is

no

king, but his subject that limits him. Lasdy, neither differ they
in their

manner

of acquisition; for

if

in a democratical or aris-

tocratical

government some one

citizen should, by force, posif

sess himself of the

all

supreme power,

he gain the consent of

if

the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch;

not,

he

DOMINION
is

89

an enemy, not a

tyrant.

They

differ therefore in the sole

exercise of their

command, insomuch
brought to

as

he

is

said to be a king,

who

governs well, and he a tyrant, that doth otherwise.

is

The

case therefore

this pass, that a king, legitimately

if

constituted in his government,

rule well

he seem to his subjects to

and
if

to their liking, they afford

him

the appellation
see a

of a king;

not, they count

him

a tyrant.

Wherefore we

kingdom and tyranny

given

are not diverse forms of government,

but one and the self-same monarch hath the

name
to

of a

king

him

in point of

honour and reverence

him, and of
fre-

a tyrant in

way

of contumely

and reproach. But what we

its

quently find in books said against tyrants, took

original
partly

from

Greek and Roman

cratical,

writers,

whose government was

demo-

and partly

aristocratical,

and therefore not tyrants only,

but even kings were odious to them.

4.

There

are,

who

indeed do think

it

necessary, that a suin a city; but

it

preme command should be somewhere extant

if
it

should be in any one, either

all

man

or council,

would
Avoid-

follow (they say) that

the citizens

must be

slaves.

ing this condition, they imagine that there

may

be a certain

form of government compounded

spoken
of, yet different

of those three kinds

particular,

we have
call

from each

which they

a mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy,

according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent

than the

rest.

For example,

if

the

naming

of magistrates,

and

the arbitration of
judicature to the

war and peace, should belong to the King, Lords, and contribution of monies to the
power
of
call

People, and the

kind of
if
it

state

would they

making laws to all a mixed monarchy

together, this

forsooth.

But

were possible that there could be such a

liberty of the subject.
is

state, it

would
long as

no whit advantage the

they
all

For

as

agree, each single citizen

if

as

much

subject as possibly

he can be: but

they disagree, the state returns to a civil

war

90

DOMINION
certainly
is

and the right of the private sword, which

much

worse than any subjection whatsoever. But that there can be

no such kind

of government,* hath been sufficiendy

demonform
to-

strated in the foregoing chapter, art. 6-12.

5.

Let us see a

little

now

in the constituting of each

of government,

what the

constitutors do.
city,

Those who met

gether with intention to erect a

act of meeting, a

were almost

in the very

democracy. For in that they willingly met,

they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be

determined by the major part: which, while that convent

or
is

lasts,

adjourned to some certain days and places,

is

is

clear

democracy. For that convent, whose will

citizens,

the will of

all

the

hath the supreme authority; and because in

this conit

vent every

man
it

is
is

supposed to have a right to give his voice,

follows that
first article

a democracy by the definition given in the

of this chapter.

But

if

they depart, and break

up the
they

convent, and appoint no time or place where and

shall

when

meet again, the public weal returns

state
it

to

anarchy and the

is,

same
of
all

stood in before their meeting, that

all.

to the state

men

warring against

The

people, therefore, retains

is

the supreme

power no longer than there and known,

to

a certain day

and
will

place publicly appointed

which whosoever

Most men grant, that a government ought not to be divided, but it moderated and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very
*

they would have

part, I wish that not only kings, but all supreme authority, would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and only minding their charges, contain themselves within the limits of the natural and divine laws. But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief power bounded and re-

fond distinction. Truly, for

my

other persons endued with

strained by others; which, because

it

cannot be done, but that they

who

must needs have some part of the power, whereby they may be enabled to do it, the government is properly divided, not
do
set the limits,

moderated.

DOMINION
may may
resort.

91
determined, they
is,

For except
meet

that be

known and

either

at divers
it

times and places, that

is

in factions,

or not at

all;

and then

no longer

Sfj^oc;,

the people, but

a dissolute multitude, to
action

whom we

can neither attribute any

or

right.

Two

things

therefore

frame a democracy,

whereof one (to

wit, the perpetual prescription of convents)

makes bfj^ov, the

voices) TO
6.

people, the other (which

is

a plurality of

KpdcTOc; or the power.

it

Furthermore, maintain
its

will not be suflBcient for the people, so

as

to

supremacy, to have some certain

known
in the

times and places of meeting, unless that either the intervals of

the times be of less distance, than that anything

may

meantime happen whereby (by reason

the city
exercise

of the defect of

power)
the

may
of

be brought into some danger, or at

the

least that

supreme authority

be,

during the interval,

this

granted to some one

there
is

man

or council.

For unless

be done,

not that wary care and heed taken for the defence
of single

and peace

men, which ought

to be,

and therefore
it,

will

not deserve the

security,

name

of a city, because that in

for

want of

every man's right of defending himself at his

own

pleasure returns to
7.

him

again.

Democracy

is

not framed by contract of particular per-

sons with the people, but by mutual compacts of single

men

each with other. But hence

it

appears, in the

first

place, that

the persons contracting must be in being before the contract

itself.

But the people

is

not in being before the constitution

of government, as not being any person, but a multitude of

single

persons;

wherefore there could then no contract pass

subject.

between the people and the

ernment
people,
will,

is
it

framed, the subject

in vain; because

Now, make any

if

after that gov-

contract with the

its

is

the people contains within

the will of that subject to

whom
own

it

is

supposed to be
dis-

obliged; and therefore

may

at its

will

and pleasure

92
engage
itself,

DOMINION
and by consequence
is

now

actually free.

But

in the second place, that single persons do contract each with

other
city

may

be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the

if

have been constituted,

the citizens

had been engaged

should

by no contracts to do or omit what the

to be

city

command
making
must
con-

done or omitted. Because therefore such kind of com-

pacts

must be understood

to pass as necessary to the

up
be

of a city, but

none can be made

(as
it

is

already shewed) be-

tween the subject and the people;

follows, that they

made between

single citizens, namely, that each

man

tract to

submit his will to the will of the major

part,

on conon

dition that the rest also

do the

like.

As

if

every one should say

thus:

give

up

my

right unto the people for your sake,

condition, that
8.

you

also deliver

up

yours, for mine.

An
up

aristocracy

or council of nobles
its

endowed with

su-

preme
gives
tain
title,

authority, receives
its

original

from a democracy, which

cer-

right unto

it,

where we must understand that

others,

men

distinguished from

either

by eminence of
to the
elected,

blood, or

some other

character, are

propounded

people,

and by

plurality of voices are elected,

city is

and being

the

whole right of the people or

as

conveyed on them, inso-

much
right

whatsoever the people might do before, the same by

this court of elected nobles

may
it is

now

do.

Which being
(its
is

done,

clear that the people, considered as

one person,

supreme authority being already transferred on these)

longer
9.

no

now
in

in being.

As

democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the

is

court of nobles

free

from

all

manner

of obligation; for seeing

subjects not contracting with the people, but

by mutual com-

pacts

among

themselves, were tied to

all

that the people did;

hence also they were tied to that act of the people in resigning

up

its

right of

government into the hands of

nobles. Neither,
it

could this court, although elected by the people, be by

obliged

DOMINION
to anything.

93
is

For being

elected, the people

it

at

once dissolved,
as

as

was declared above, and the authority

had

being a per-

son utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due

to the person
10.

must

also vanish,

and perish together with

considerations,

it.

Aristocracy

hath

these

together

with

democracy.

First, that

without an appointment of some certain

times and places, at which the court of nobles

may

meet,

it is

no longer

court, or

one person, but a dissolute multitude

without any supreme power. Secondly, that the times of their

assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals, without prejudice to the

supreme power, unless

its

administration be trans-

ferred to
are the
11.

some one man.

set

Now
down

the reasons

why
is

this

happens,

same which we

in the fifth article.

As an
of

aristocracy, so also a

monarchy
its

derived from
that
is,

the

power

the

people,

transferring
also

right,

its

authority on one

man. Here

we must

understand, that
is

some one man,

pounded

either by

name, or some other token,

pro-

to be taken notice of above all the rest,

and
is

that

by

a plurality of voices the

whole right of the people

conveyed

on him, insomuch
were
elected, the

as

whatsoever the people could do before he

respect

same in every

may he by
is

right

now

do, being elected.

Which being

done, the people

no longer

one person, but a rude multitude, as being only one before by

virtue of the

supreme command, whereof they

now have made

oblige himit

a conveyance from themselves on this one man.

12.
self to

And

therefore

neither doth

the

monarch

any for the

command

he receives, for he receives

from

the people; but as hath been shewed above, the people, as soon
as that act
is

done, ceaseth to be a person; but the person van-

ishing, all obligation to the person vanisheth.

The

subjects there-

fore are tied to

perform obedience to the monarch, by those

compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to

94
the observation of
that
is,

DOMINION
all

that the people should

if

command

them,

to obey that

monarch,

he were made by the people.

13.

But a monarchy

differs as well

from an

aristocracy, as

a democracy, in this chiefly, that in those there

tain set times
affairs,

must be

cer-

and

places for deliberation

and consultation of
it

that

is,

for the actual exercise of

in all times

and

places.

For the people or the nobles, not being one natural

person,

must

necessarily have
is

their

meetings.

The monarch,

w^ho

is

one by nature,

alw^ays in a present capacity to execute

his authority.
14.

Because

we have

declared above (in art. 7, 9, 12) that

they

who

have gotten the supreme

command

are by

no com-

pacts obliged to any

man,

it

necessarily follows, that they can

to the defini-

do no injury
tion

to the subjects.

For injury, according

is

made

in chap. in. art. 3,

nothing

else

but a breach of

contract;

and therefore where no

contracts have part, there can

be no injury. Yet the people, the nobles, and the monarch

diverse

may
by

ways transgress against the other laws of nature,

contumely, and other like
vices,

as

cruelty, iniquity,

which come
But
if

not under this

strict

and exact notion of

injury.

the

subject yield not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety

of speech be said to be injurious, as well to his fellow-subjects,

because each

man

hath compacted with the other to obey, as

to his chief ruler, in

resuming that

right,

which he hath given

aristocracy,
city

him, without his consent.

if

And

in a

democracy or

anything be decreed against any law of nature, the

that
is,

itself,

the civil person sins not, but those subjects only

it

by whose votes

was decreed;

for sin

is

a consequence of the
is

natural express will, not of the political, which

artificial.

For

if it

were otherwise, they would be guilty by

absolutely disliked.

whom
if

the

decree

was

But

in a

monarchy,

the

mon-

arch
self,

make any
because in

decree against the laws of nature, he sins him-

him

the civil will

and the natural

are all one.

DOMINION

95

15. The people who are about to make a monarch, may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of

time, or for a certain season

and time determined.

If

simply,

we must

understand that he

power which they

who receives it, hath the had who gave it. On the same
make him
a

self-same

grounds,

therefore, that the people by right could

monarch,

may

make another monarch. Insomuch as the monarch to command is simply given, receives a right not of possession only, but of succession also, so as he may declare
he

whom

the

whom
16.

he pleaseth for his successor.

But

if

the

power be given

for a time limited,

we must
itself

have regard to somewhat more than the bare

gift only. First,

left

whether the people conveying

right to

its

authority,

any
if
it

meet

at certain times

and

places, or not.
it

Next,

have reserved

this

power, whether

were done so as they

pre-

might meet before that time were expired, which they

meet only
at the will of that

scribed to the monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented

to

temporary monarch, and not

otherwise. Suppose
to

now

the people had delivered

life

up

its

power
let

some one man

for
first

term of

only;

which being done,

us suppose in the
council without

place, that every

man

departed from the

making any order

it

at all concerning the place,

where

(after his death) they should

is

meet again

to

make
is

new

election. In this case

manifest by the

fifth article of this

chapter, that the people ceaseth to be a person,

a dissolute multitude, every one whereof hath
wit, a natural right to

and

become

an equal, to
divers times,
if

meet with

whom

he

lists at

and

in

what

places shall best please

him; nay, and

settle
it

he can,
his

engross the supreme power to himself, and

head.

What monarch
is

soever, therefore,

hath a

such a condition, he

bound by

the law of

own command in nature (set down

on
for
city

in the article of the third chapter, of not returning evil

good) prudendy

to provide, that

by his death the

suffer

96

DOMINION

not a dissolution, either by appointing a certain day and place,

in

which those

subjects of his

who have

mind

to

it

may

assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor: whether

of these shall to
benefit.

him seem most conducible

to their

common
re-

He

therefore

who on

this aforesaid

manner hath

ceived his

command during
we

life,

hath an absolute power, and

may
place,

at his discretion
if

dispose of the succession. In the next

grant that the people departed

not from

the

election of the

temporary monarch, before they decreed a certain

time and place of meeting after his death, then the monarch
being dead, the authority
is

confirmed in the people, not by

but by virtue of the former right.

any new

acts of the subjects,

For

all

the

supreme command (as dominion) was in the

people, but the use

and

exercise of

it

was only
election

in the temporary

monarch,
right.

as in
if

one that takes the benefit, but hath not the

people after the
of

But

the

temporary

monarch, depart not from the court before they have appointed
certain times

and

places to convene, during the time prescribed

him (as the dictators in of Rome), such an one

people

ancient times were

is

made by

the people

not to be accounted a monarch, but

the prime officer of the people.

And

if it

shall

seem good, the

may

deprive

him
did,

of his office even before that time, as

the people of

Rome

when

they conferred an equal power

on Minutius, master
mus,
is,

of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maxi-

whom
it is

before they had

made

dictator.

The

reason whereof

that

not to be imagined, that he, whether

man

or counact,

cil,

who

hath the readiest and most immediate power to

should hold his

actually to

command on such terms, as execute it; for command is nothing

as oft as nature allows
it

not to be able
else

but a right

of

commanding,

possible. Lastly, if

the people having declared a temporary monarch, depart

the court
to

from

on such terms,

as

it

shall not

be lawful for them

meet without the command of the monarch, we must under-

DOMINION

97

Stand the people to be immediately dissolved, and that his

authority

who

is

thus declared,
all

is

absolute; forasmuch as

it is

not in the power of

the subjects to frame the city anew,

unless he give consent

who

hath

now

alone the authority.

Nor
per-

matters

it,

that he hath perhaps

made any promise

to assemble

his subjects

on some

certain times; since there remains

no

son

now

in being, but at his discretion, to

whom

the promise
cases

was made. What we have spoken of these four people electing a temporary monarch will be more
plained by comparing

of a

clearly ex-

them with an

absolute monarch,
is

who
doth
sub-

hath no heir-apparent. For the people

such a manner
appoint.
jects'

lord of the subject in

as there

can be no heir but

whom

itself

Besides,

the

spaces between the times

fitly

of the

meeting

may

be

compared

to those times

wherein the
cease,

monarch

sleeps; for in either, the acts of

commanding
people;

the power remains. Furthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as

it

cannot meet again,

is

the

death of the

just

as

sleeping, so as he can never

wake more,
hath no
dying,
is,

is

the death of a

man. As

therefore a king,

who

heir,
if
till

going

to his rest,

so as never to rise again, that

cise of his regal authority to

he commit the exerhe awake, does by

any one

consequence give him the succession; the people also electing

a temporary monarch, and not reserving a
delivers

power

to convene,

up

to

him

the whole dominion of the country. Further-

more,

as a

king going to sleep for some season, entrusts the

administration of his
it

kingdom
to

to

some

other,

and waking takes

day and place,
as a

again; so the people having elected a temporary monarch,

and withal retaining a right

at that

meet

at a certain

day receives

its

supremacy again.

And

king

who

hath committed the execution of his authority to another, himself

in

the

meanwhile waking, can

recall

this

commission

again

when he

pleaseth; so the people,

who

during the time

right convene,

prescribed to the temporary

monarch doth by

98

DOMINION
if

may

they please, deprive the monarch of his authority. Lastly,

the king,

who commits

his authority to another while himself

till

sleeps, not

being able to wake again

he

whom

he entrusted

give consent, loses at once both his

people,

power and

his life; so the

who
in

hath given the supreme power to a temporary such sort as they cannot assemble without his
the

monarch

command, is absolutely dissolved, and him whom they have chosen.

17.
If

power remains with

the

monarch promise aught

to

any one, or many sub-

jects together,

by consequence whereof the exercise of his power

may

sufifer

prejudice, that promise or compact, whether

it,

made

by oath or without
of right,

is

null.

For

all

compact

is

conveyance

which by what hath been

But he

said in the fourth article

of the

of the second chapter, requires

will in the conveyer.

meet and proper signs

who

sufficiently signifies his will

of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits

not his right to the means necessary to that end.

Now

he

who

hath promised to part with somewhat necessary to the supreme

power, and yet retains the power

that he

itself,

gives sufficient tokens,

as the

no otherwise promised

it

than so far forth

power
shall

might be retained without

appear that what
is

it.

Whensoever

therefore

it

promised cannot be performed without

prejudice to the power, the promise

must be valued
nature

as not

made, that
18.

is,

of

no

effect.

We

have

seen

how

subjects,

dictating,

have

obliged themselves by mutual compacts to obey the supreme

power.

We

will see

now by what means

namely,
if

it

comes to pass that

they are released from these bonds of obedience.

this

And first of all, man cast off or forsake, but convey not the right of his command on some other. For what is thus rejected, is openly exposed to all alike, catch who
happens by
rejection,

catch can;

whence again, by the

right of nature, every subject

may heed

the preservation of himself according to his

own

DOMINION
judgment. In the second place,
if

99
kingdom
fall

the

into the

power

of the

enemy, so

as there

can no more opposition be

made

against them,

had the

we must understand that he, who before supreme authority, hath now lost it: for when the
done
their full

subjects have

endeavour to prevent their falling

into the enemy's hands, they

have

fulfilled those contracts of

obedience which they

made each with

other,

and what, being

conquered, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must,

with no

less

endeavour, labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monif

archy, (for a democracy and aristocracy cannot fail),

there

be no successor,
ligations; for

all

the subjects arc discharged from their obis

no

man

supposed to be tied he knows not

it

to

whom,

for in such a case

were impossible

to

perform aught.

And
civil

by these three ways,

all

subjects are restored

from

their

subjection to that liberty,

which

all

men have
state

to all things,

to wit, natural

and savage, (for the natural

civil, I

hath the same

proportion to the

mean

liberty to subjection,

sion hath to reason, or a beast to a

subject
of

which pasman). Furthermore, each

he change his
as

may

lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will

the supreme power, namely,
either
if

him who hath

soil;

which may be done two ways,

gets license to dwell in

by permission,

he

who
as he

another country, or command,

is

who

is

banished. In both cases he

is

free

from the laws

of his former country, because he

tied to observe those of

the

latter.

Chapter VIII

Of the Rights
I.

of Lords Over Their Servants

in-

In the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an

stitutive or
its

framed government,

as being that

which

receives

original

from the consent of many, who by contract and

faith

mutually given have obliged each other.

said concerning a natural
it
is

Now
is

follows

what may be
also

government; which
that

may
place

be called acquired, because

force.

which

gotten by
first

power and natural

persons of men.
of a litde

But we must know in the

by what means the right of dominion

may
is

be gotten over the

is

Where such

a right

is

gotten, there

a kind

kingdom;

for to be a king,

nothing

else

but to
is

have dominion over

many

persons;

and thus a great family

but even

a kingdom, and a litde

to the state of nature,

kingdom

a family. Let us return again

as
if

and consider men

now

sprung out of the earth, and suddenly (like mushrooms) come

to full maturity, without all

kind of engagement to each other.

There are but three ways only, whereby one can have a do-

minion over the person of another; whereof the

mutual contract made between themselves
defence's

first is,

if

by

(for peace

and

self-

sake)

the power
of this

they have willingly given up themselves to and authority of some man, or council of men; and
already spoken.

we have

The second

is, if

man

taken

prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his

forces, (to avoid

own

death) promises the conqueror or the stronger

is,

party his service, that

to

do

all

whatsoever he shall

command
in-

him. In which contract, the good which the vanquished or

ferior in strength

doth receive,

is

the grant of his

life,

which

100

DOMINION
by the right of war in the natural
been deprived
of;

IQI

state of

men he might have

is

but the good v/hich he promises,

his service
is

and obedience. By

virtue therefore of this promise, there

as to

absolute service and obedience due

from the vanquished

the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting

what repugns the

of

divine laws; for he

who

is

obliged to obey the

will

man

before he

knows what he

commands command him, is

performance of
is

any

simply

and without any

he to

restriction tied to the

all

com-

mands whatsoever.

Now

he that

is

thus tied,

called a servant;

whom

he

is

tied, a lord.

Thirdly, there

is

a right acquired

over the person of a

acquisition
2.

man
shall
is

by generation; of which kind of

be spoken in the following chapter.
life

somewhat

Every one that

is
is

taken in the war, and hath his

spared him,
for every one

not supposed to have contracted with his lord; not trusted with so

much

of his natural liberty,

fly

as to be able,

if

he desired

it,

either to

away, or quit his

service, or contrive

any mischief

to his lord.

And
irons;

these serve

indeed, but within prisons, or

fore they

bound within

and

there-

were

called not by the

but by the peculiar

name
serf,

of

common name of servant only, slave, even as now at this day,

un
esclave have diverse signifi-

un

serviteur,

and un

or

cations.
3.

The

obligation therefore of a servant to his lord ariseth

life,

not from a simple grant of his

but from hence rather, that

all

he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For

derives

obligation

from

contract; but

where
ii.

is

no

trust, there

can be no
is

contract, as appears by chap.

art. 9,
is

where

compact

de-

fined to be the promise of

fore a confidence

him who

trusted.

There

is

there-

and

trust

which accompanies the

affords

benefit of

pardoned
so that
if

life,

whereby the lord

him

his corporal liberty;

no obligation nor bonds

of contract

had happened,

he might not only have made his escape, but also have killed
his lord,

who was

the preserver of his

life.

102
4.

DOMINION
Wherefore such kind of servants
as

are restrained

by

imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that

contract's sake, but to the

defini-

tion of servants given above, because those serve not for the

end they may not

suffer.

And

there-

fore

if

they

fly,

or kill their lord, they offend not against the

law^s of nature.

For

to

bind any
is

man

is

a plain sign, that the

tied

binder supposes

him

that

bound, not to be sufBciendy

by

any other obligation.

5.

The
is

lord therefore hath

no

less
is

dominion over a servant

that

not, than over

one that

bound; for he hath a su-

preme power over both, and may

of another thing,

say of his servant

no

less
is

than

whether animate or inanimate,

becomes the

this

mine.
his

Whence

it

follows, that whatsoever the servant

lord's;

had before

servitude, that afterwards

and whatsoever

he hath gotten,

it

was gotten

for his lord.

For he that can by

surely dispose of
is

right dispose of the person of a

all

man, may

those things which that person could dispose of. There

therefore nothing

which the servant may

retain as his

own

against the will of his lord; yet hath he, by his lord's distribution, a propriety

and dominion over

his

own
as

goods, insomuch

as

one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion

of his fellow-servant, in the

same manner

hath been shewed

before, that a subject hath nothing properly his

will of the

own

against the

supreme authority, but every subject hath a propriety

against his fellow-subject.

6.

Since therefore both the servant himself, and

all

that be-

longs to

him

are his lord's,

and by the right of nature every

in

man may
lord

dispose of his
either
sell,

own

what manner he

pleases; the

may

lay to pledge, or

by testament convey the

dominion he hath over

his servant, according to his

own

will

and pleasure.
7.

Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated con-

cerning subjects in an institutive government, namely, that he

DOMINION

103
is

who

hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury;

true also concerning servants, because they have subjected their

will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth,
is
it

done with
it.

their wills, but

no injury can be done

to

him

that willeth
8.

But

if it

happen

that the lord, either by captivity or vol-

untary subjection, doth become a servant or subject to another,

that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his servants;

supreme lord over

these,

immediate lord over him.

all

Now

be-

cause not the servant only, but also

therefore his servants

he hath, are his

lord's;

now

belong to

this

man, neither can the

shall

mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than

to the supreme.

seem good

And

therefore,

if

sometime

in civil governhis servants, that

ments the lord have an absolute power over

is

supposed to be derived from the right of nature, and not

constituted, but slighdy passed over by the civil law.

9.

servant

is

by the same manner freed from his

is

servi-

tude, that a subject in an institutive government

his subjection. First,
if

freed from

his lord enfranchise

to

him; for the right

over himself, the

which the servant transferred

same may the
just

his

lord

lord restore to the servant again.

is

And

this

manis

ner of bestowing of liberty

as
if

called

manumission; which

a city should permit a citizen to convey himself

city.

under the jurisdiction of some other

cast off his servant

Secondly,
is

if

the lord

from him, which

in a city

banishment;

neither differs
only.

it

from manumission
is

in effect, but in

manner
the

For
in

there, liberty

granted as a favour, here, as a punishis

/nent:

both, the dominion

renounced. Thirdly,
is

if

servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude

abolished by the

new;
war,

for as

all

other things, so servants also are acquired by

whom

in equity the lord

must

protect,
is

if

he will have
for

them to be his. Fourthly, knowledge of a successor,

the servant

freed

want

of

the lord dying (suppose)

without

104
any testament or
unless he
heir.

DOMINION
For no

man
is

is

understood to be obliged,

know

to

whom
is

he

to

perform the obligation.

Lastly, the servant that

put in bonds, or by any other means

is

deprived of his corporal liberty,

freed

from

that other obliis

gation of contract. For there can be no contract where there

no

trust,

nor can that faith be broken which

is

not given. But

the lord

who

himself serves another, cannot so free his servants,

still

but that they must

continue under the power of the su-

preme;
his,

for, as

hath been shewed before, such servants are not

lord's.

but the supreme

10.

We

get a right over irrational creatures in the

same
lawful

manner, that we do over the persons of men, to wit, by force

and natural strength. For

subdue and also to

if

in the state of nature

it is

for every one, by reason of that

all,

war which

is

of

all

against

kill men as oft as it shall seem to much more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their own discretion, to reduce those to servitude which by art may be tamed and fitted for use,

to

conduce unto their good,

and
hath

to persecute

and destroy the

rest

by a perpetual war, as
beasts,

dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over

its

original

from the
if

right of nature, not

from divine
might have

positive right.

For

such a right had not been before the pub-

lishing of the Sacred Scriptures,

killed a beast for his food, but

no man by

right

he to

whom

the divine pleasure

for

was made manifest by holy

writ; a

most hard condition

men

indeed

whom

the beasts

might devour without

injury,
as
it

and yet they might not destroy them. Forasmuch therefore

proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast
it is

may

kill a

man,

also

by the same

right, that a

man may

slay a beast.

Chapter IX

Of the Right

of Parents Over Their Children, and

OF Hereditary
I.

Government
is

Socrates

is

a man, and therefore a living creature,

tliat

right

reasoning,
ful to the

and

most evident, because there

is

nothing need-

acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but

a living creature
is

that the

word man be understood, because

man, and every one makes up the proposition which was desired, namely this, man is a living
in the definition itself of a
creature.

And

this,
is

Sophroniscus

is

Socrates' father,

and

there^

fore his lord,

perhaps a true inference, but not evident,

is

because the word lord

not in the definition of a father:

wherefore

it

is

necessary, to

make

it

more

evident, that the

connexion of father and lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that

have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent
over his children, have brought no other argument than that
of generation, as
if
it

were of
just as
it

itself
if

evident, that

what

is

be-

gotten by

me

is
is

mine;
a

man

should think, that

because there

triangle,
its

appears presently without any

further discourse, that

sides,

angles are equal to

is,

two
is

right.

Be-

since
as

dominion, that

supreme power

indivisible,

insomuch

no man can serve two masters, but two persons,

in the act of generation;
all
it

male and female, must concur Wherefore we

is

impossible that dominion should at

tion only.
will,

be acquired by generathis

with the more diligence, in

place inquire into the original of paternal government.

2.

We

must therefore return

to the state of nature, in

all

which,

by reason of the equality of nature,

105

men

of riper years are

I06
to be accounted equal.
is

DOMINION
There by right of nature the conqueror

lord of the conquered.

By

the right therefore of nature, the

dominion over the infant

first

belongs to

him who

first

hath

him
is

in his power.

But

it is

manifest that he

who

is

newly born,
as she

in the mother's

power before any

others,

insomuch

may
3.

righdy, and at her

own

will, either

breed

him

up, or ad-

venture

him

to fortune.

If therefore

she breed
is

him (because

the state of nature

is

the state of war) she

dition, that being

supposed to bring him up on

to full age

this con-

grown

he become not her enemy;

which

is,

that he obey her. that

For

since by natural necessity

us,
it

we

all desire

which appears good unto

cannot be underlife

stood that any

that he

man

hath on such terms afforded

his years,

to another,
at

might both get strength by

and

once be-

come an enemy. But each man is an enemy to that he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the
ture, every

other

whom

state of na-

woman

that bears children,

becomes both a mother

by

and

a lord.

But what some

say, that in this case the father,

reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the mother, be-

comes
trary,

lord, signifies nothing.

For both reason shows the conis

because the inequality of their natural forces

not so

great, that the

man

could get the dominion over the

woman
their
wills.

without war, and custom also contradicts not. For women,

namely Amazons, have in former times waged war against

adversaries,

and disposed of
day in divers

their children at their

own

And

at this

places,

women

are invested with the

principal authority. Neither

children, but themselves;

do

their

husbands dispose of their

which

in truth they

do by the

right

of nature; forasmuch as they

who have
shewed)
it

the supreme power,

to the civil laws.

are not tied at

all

(as hath been

Add
the

also that in the state of nature

father, but
is

cannot be

known who
hers.

is

by the testimony of the mother; the child therefore

will

his

whose the mother

have

it,

and therefore

Where-

DOMINION
fore original

107
to the

dominion over children belongs

less

mother:

and among
the belly.
4.

men no

than other creatures, the birth follows

The dominion
if

passes

from the mother

to others, divers

ways. First,
child.
shall

she quit and forsake her right by exposing the

He

therefore that shall bring

up
it

the child thus exposed,

have the same dominion over

life

which the mother had.

it

For that

which the mother had given

it),

(not by getting,
it;

but nourishing

she

now by
void.

exposing takes from

wherelife, is

fore the obligation also

which arose from the

benefit of

by

this exposition

made

Now

the preserved oweth

all

to

the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a mother,

or of his service as to a lord. For although the mother in the
state of nature,

where

all

men
yet

have a right to

all

things,

may

recover her son again (namely, by the

same

right that any-

body

else

might do
the

it),

may

not the son rightly transfer

himself again unto his mother.

5.

Secondly,

if

mother be taken

prisoner, her son

is

his

that took her, because that he

who
all

hath dominion over the

person, hath also

dominion over
also, as

belonging to the person;

wherefore over the son

hath been shewed in the foreThirdly,

if

going chapter, in the

a subject

fifth

article.

the mother be
su-

under what government soever, he that hath the

in

preme authority
mother,
a

that government, will

is

also
is

have the do-

minion over him that

born of her; for he

obey him in
all

lord also of the

if

who woman for

is

bound

to

things. Fourthly,

society's sake give herself to a

man on

this con-

dition, that

he

shall bear the sway,

he that receives his being

is

from the contribution

of the

of both parties,

the father's in regard

if

command

he hath over the mother. But

woman

bear-

ing rule shall have children by a subject, the children are the
mother's; for otherwise the

out prejudice to her authority.

woman And

can have no children withuniversally,

if

the society of

I08

DOMINION

the male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himself to the other, the children belong to that
6.

him

or her

commands.
But
in the state of nature,

so, as neither is subject to

the

if a man and woman contract command of the other, the chil-

dren are the mother's, for the reasons above given in the third
article,

unless by pacts

it

be otherwise provided. For the mother

lists,

may by

pact dispose of her right as she

as heretofore

hath been done by the Amazons,

who

of those children

which

have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed

them

the males,

and retained the females to themselves. But

if

in a civil government,

there be a contract of marriage be-

tween a
in

man and woman,

the children are the father's, because

all cities,

to wit, constituted of fathers, not

mothers govern-

ing their families, the domestical

and such
is

a contract,

if it

be
if

command belongs to the man; made according to the civil laws,

lie

called

matrimony. But

they agree only to

together, the

children are the father's or the mother's variously, according to the differing civil laws of divers
7.
cities.
is

Now

because, by the third article, the mother

originally
else
less

lord of her children,

and from her the

is

father, or

somebody

by derived

right,

it

manifest that the children are no

subject to those by

whom

they are nourished and brought up,

than servants to their lords, and subjects to

the supreme rule;
son, as long as he

him who
is

bears;

and that a parent cannot be injurious

is

to his

under

his

power.

son also

freed

from
are.

subjection in the

same manner
is

as a subject

and servant

For emancipation

the

same thing with manumission, and

ab-

dication with banishment.

8.

The

enfranchised son or released servant, do

now

stand

in less fear of their lord

and

father,

being deprived of his

(if

natural and lordly

power over them, and

regard be had to

true and inward honour) do honour

him

less

than before. For

DOMINION
honour
hath
(as hath been said in the section above)
is

109
nothing
else

but the estimation of another's power; and therefore he that

least

power, hath always

least

honour. But

it

is

not to

be imagined that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match

the enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so
as

much
all

acknowledge a
if

benefit, but

should so carry himself in

It

things, as

he were become wholly his equal.

must

there-

fore be ever understood, that he

who

is

freed

from

subjection,
all

whether he be a servant, son, or some colony, doth promise

those
external
signs
at
least,

whereby superiors used

it

to

be

honoured by

their inferiors.

From whence

follows, that the

precept of honouring our parents, belongs to the law of nature,

not only under the

9.

title

of gratitude, but also of agreement.

is

What

then, will

some one demand,

a subject

the difference be-

tween a son, or between

I

and

a servant? Neither

do

know

that

any writer hath

is.

fully declared

what

liberty,

and

what

slavery
fancies,

Commonly
do

to

do

all

things according to our

is

own

and that without punishment,

this, is

esteemed to be

liberty; not to be able to

judged bondage; which in

a civil government,

and with the peace of mankind, cannot

is

possibly be done, because there

no

city

without a

command
it,

and

restraining
else

right.

Liberty,

that
lets
is

we may

define

is

nothing

but an absence of the

and hindrances of motherefore not at liberty,

ves-

tion; as water shut

up

in a vessel
it

because the vessel hinders

sel

from running out; which, the

being broken,

less liberty, as

made free. And every man hath more or he hath more or less space in which he employs
is

himself: as he hath
that
is

more

liberty,

kept in a close prison.

And

who is in a a man may

as

large,

than he

be free toward
traveller
is

one

part,

and yet not toward another,

this

the

bounded on
lest

and

that side with

hedges or stone walls,

he spoil the vines or corn, neighbouring on the highway.

these kinds of lets are external

And

and

absolute. In

which

no
sense
all

DOMINION
servants

and

subjects are free,

who

are not fettered

and

imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary, which do not

absolutely hinder motion, but by accident, to wit, by our
choice; as he that
is

in a ship
if

is

not so hindered, but he

will.

own may

cast himself into the sea,

he

ways a

man may move

is

himself, the

herein consists
or servant,

civil liberty; for

And here also the more more liberty he hath. And no man, whether subject, son,
how
cruel soever, but that he

so hindered by the punishments appointed by

the city, the father, or the lord,

may do

all

things,

and make use of

life

all

means necessary

to the
I

preservation of his

and

health.

For

my

part therefore

can-

not find what reason a mere servant hath to

if

make

complaints,
it

they relate only to want of liberty, unless he count

a misery
life,

to be restrained

from hurting himself, and

with

to receive that

(which by war, or misfortune, or through his

own

idleness

was

forfeited) together

all

manner

of sustenance,

and

all

things necessary to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he will be ruled.

For he that

is

kept in by punloose the reins

is

ishments laid before him, so as he dares not

to his will in
all

let

things,

is

not oppressed by servitude, but

this

governed and sustained. But

privilege free

subjects

and
the

sons of a family have above servants (in every government and

family where servants are): that they

may both undergo

and

more honourable

offices

of the city or family,

also enjoy a
lies

larger possession of things superfluous.

And

herein

the difis

ference between a free subject and a servant, that he

free
also

indeed,

who

serves his city only; but a servant

is

is

he

who

serves his fellow-subject. All other liberty

an exemption from

the laws of the

10.

city,

and proper only

to those that bear rule.

civil

father,

with his sons and servants, grown into a

is

person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction,

called a family.

This family,
of servants
it

if

through multiplying of children and acquisition

as

becomes numerous, insomuch

without casting

DOMINION
the uncertain die of

m
it

war

it

cannot be subdued, will be termed

differ

an hereditary kingdom; which though

stitutive

from an
the
it

in-

monarchy, being acquired by

of
its

force,

in

original

and manner

constitution; yet being constituted,

is

hath

all

the same properties, and the right of authority the same, insomuch as
it

everywhere

is

not needful

to

speak anything of

them
11.

apart.
It

hath been spoken, by what right supreme authorities

are constituted.

We

must now

briefly tell

you by what right

they

may
is

be continued.
that

Now
is

the right by

which they

are con-

tinued,

which

called the right of succession.

is

Now
it

because in a democracy, the supreme authority

with the

people, as long as there be any subjects in being, so long

rests

with the same person; for the people hath no successor.

In like

manner
all

in

an aristocracy, one of the nobles dying, some

is

other by the rest

cept they
there
is

substituted in his place;

and therefore

ex-

die together,

which

suppose will never happen,

no

succession.

The query

therefore of the right of suc-

cession takes place only in an absolute monarchy.

exercise the

For they

who
no

supreme power

for a time only, are themselves

state.

monarchs, but ministers of

12.

But

first,

if

monarch

shall

by testament appoint one

shall succeed.
all

to succeed

him, the person appointed

For

if

he be

appointed by the people, he shall have

city
art.

the right over the

vii.

which the people had,

II.

as

hath been showed in chap.

But the people might choose him; by the same right

therefore

may he

choose another. But in an hereditary king-

dom,
every
13.

there are the

same

rights as in

an

institutive.

Wherefore,

monarch may by
But what a

his will

make

a successor.

that by the

same

right

man may may

transfer

on another by testament,
sell

he, yet living, give or

shall
it is

away.

To whomsoever

therefore

he

make

over the supreme

power, whether by

gift or sale,

rightly

made.

112
14.

DOMINION
But
if

living he have not declared his

vi^ill

concerning
first,

his successor

by testament nor

otherv^^ise, it is

supposed,

that he v^^ould not have his

government reduced

to an anarchy

or the state of v^ar, that

is,

to the destruction of his subjects; as

well because he could not do that vi^ithout breach of the laws

of nature, whereby he was obliged to the performance of
all

things necessarily conducing to the preservation of peace, as

also because,
if

that

had been

his will,

it

had not been hard

for

him

to

have declared that openly. Next, because the right

passeth according to the will of the father,

we must
It

judge of
is

the successor according to the signs of his will.

under-

stood therefore, that he

would have

his subjects to be

under a

monarchical government, rather than any other, because he

himself in ruling hath before approved of that state by his ex-

ample, and hath not afterward either by any word or deed

condemned
15.

it.

Furthermore, because by natural necessity

better,

all

men wish

them
from

from

whom
man

they receive glory and honour, than

others; but every

after death receives

honour and glory

his children, sooner

than from the power of any other

men: hence we

gather, that a father intends better for his chilIt is to

dren, than any other person's.

be understood therefore,

that the will of the father, dying without testament,

was that
to be un-

some

of his children should succeed him. Yet this

is

derstood with this proviso, that there be no more apparent

tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after

many

successions, his suc-

custom may be one. For he that makes no mention of

cession,
16.
is

supposed to consent to the customs of his realm,

children the males carry the pre-eminence; in

Among

the beginning perhaps, because for the most part (although

not always) they are

fitter

for

the administration of greater

matters, but specially of wars; but afterwards,

when

it

was

grown

a custom, because that

custom was not contradicted.

DOMINION

113 some other custom

And

therefore the will of the father, unless

or sign do clearly

repugn

it,

is

to

be interpreted in favour of

them.
17.

Now

because the sons are equal, and the power cannot

if

be divided, the eldest shall succeed. For

ference by reason of age, the eldest
for nature being judge, the
is

there be any dif-

supposed more worthy;

it is

most

in years (because usually

so)

is

the wisest. But other judge there cannot be had. But

if

the brothers
lot.
is

must be equally valued, the succession

is

shall be

by

But primogeniture

a natural

lot,

and by

this the eldest

already preferred; nor

this or

is

there any that hath

lots

power

to judge,
is

whether by
decided.

any other kind of

the matter

to be

Now
if

the same reason which contends thus for the

first-born son,
18.

doth no

less for

the first-born daughter.

But

he have no children, then the

command

shall

pass to his brothers

and

sisters, for
if

the same reason, that the

children should have succeeded

he had had them. For those

that are nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest in

benevolence; and to his brothers sooner than his

sisters,
is

and

to

the elder sooner than the younger; for the reason

for these that
19.
it

the

same

was

for the children.

Furthermore, by the same reason that

men

succeed to

the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession. For

if

the first-born die before the father,

it

will be judged, that

he

transferred his right of succession unto his children, unless the

father have otherwise decreed
will
I
it.

And
if

therefore the

nephews

have a
all

fairer pretence to the succession,

than the uncles.

say

these things will be thus,

the custom of the place

will be

(which the father by not contradicting

consented to) do not hinder them.

judged to have

Chapter

Comparison Between Three Kinds of Government,

According to Their Several Inconveniences
1.

What

democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy

are,

hath

them tends most to the preservation of the subjects' peace, and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us
already been spoken; but which of
set forth the
eral, lest

advantages and disadvantages of a

it

city in

gen-

some perhaps should think

live
all.

better, that every

man
civil

be

left

to

at

his

society at

Every

own will, man indeed

entire,

than to constitute any

out of the state of
civil

gov-

ernment hath a most

he

but unfruitful liberty; because that

liberty acts all at his

who

by reason of

his

own

own

will,

must

also

by reason of the same

liberty in others suffer all at

another's will. But in a constituted city, every subject retains to

himself as

quiedy, and there

much freedom as suf&ces him to is so much taken away from

state,
all,

live

well

and

others, as

may
hath
each

make them

not to be feared. Out of this

as yet

every

man
it,

such a right to

he can enjoy nothing; in

one securely enjoys

his limited right.

it,

Out

of

it,

any

rightly spoil or kill another; in

none but one.

it,

man may Out of it, we

all.

are protected by our

of
it,

own

forces; in

by the power of
it,

Out

no

man

is

sure of the fruit of his labours; in

it,

all

men

are. Lastly, out of

there

is

dominion of

passions, war, fear,

poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in

it,

the

dominion of reason, peace,

security, riches, decency, so-

ciety, elegancy, sciences,

2.

and benevolence.
book and fourteenth chapter of
114

Aristotie, in his seventh

DOMINION
his
Politics,

115
sorts

saith,

that there

are

two

of governments,

whereof the one

relates to the benefit of the ruler, the other to

if

that of the subjects; as

where

subjects are severely dealt with,

there were one,

and where more mildly, there were another

the profits

form of government. Which opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for

all

and

disprofits arising

from gov-

ernment are the same, and

subject.

common
befall

both to the ruler and the

The damages which

folly,

some

particular

subjects

through misfortune,

negligence, sloth, or his

own

luxury,

may

very well be severed from those which concern the ruler.

relate not to the

But those happen

in

government

itself,

being such as
If

may
same

any form of government whatsoever.

first institution

these

happen from the

be

of the

city,

they will then be

truly called the inconveniences of

government; but they will

common

to the ruler

with his subjects, as their benefits are

greatest benefit, peace

common. But
is

the

first

and

and defence,

to both; for both to the

he that commands, and he

that he

who

is

comat

manded,
once of

end

may defend
city,

his

life,

makes use

all

the forces of his fellow-subjects.

And

in the greatest

inconvenience that can befall a

subjects, arising

namely, the slaughter of

from anarchy, both the commander, and the

are equally concerned. Next,
if

parties

commanded,

the ruler

levy such a

sum

of vast

moneys from
and

his subjects, as they are

not able to maintain themselves and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength
vigor, the disadvantage
is

as

much

his as theirs,
is

who, with never

so great a stock or

measure

of riches,

not able to keep his authority or his riches without

if

the bodies of his subjects. But

ficient for the

he

raise

no more than
is

is

suf-

due administration of

his

power, that

a benefit

equal to himself and his subjects, tending to a

common

peace

and defence. Nor

is

it

imaginable which way public treasures

if

can be a grievance to private subjects,

hausted, as to be wholly deprived from

they be not so exto acquire,

all possibility

Il6

DOMINION

even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of

their bodies

and minds. For even thus the grievance would conit

cern the ruler; nor would

arise

from the
all

ill-institution

or

ordination of the government, (because in

ernments subjects

manner may be oppressed) but from the

of govill

ad-

ministration of a well established government.

3.

Now

that

monarchy, of the foresaid forms, of democracy,

will

aristocracy,

and monarchy, hath the pre-eminence,

best
aris-

appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences

ing in each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the

whole universe

is

governed by one God; that the ancients preall

ferred the monarchical state before

others, ascribing the rule

of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs

of nations, the decrees

and
that

of princes

were held

for

laws;

paternal government, instituted by

God

himself in the creation,

was monarchical;
the artifice of

that other

governments were compacted by

it

men *

out of the ashes of monarchy, after

had

been ruined with seditions; and that the people of

God were
do hold

under the jurisdiction of kings: although,

forth

say, these

more eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over.
monarchy
as the
4.

Some

there are

who

are discontented with the governit

ment under
*It seems

one, for
the

no other reason, but because

who made
that

is

under

Prometheus pointed at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver, which is, that by human invention (which is signified by Prometheus) laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof (as by fire removed from its natural orb) the multitude (as the dirt and dregs of men) was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.
ancients
fable

same

of

DOMINION
one; as
so
if It

117

were an unreasonable thing, that one

many

should so far excel in power, as to be

man among able at his own

all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one

pleasure to dispose of

God. But

this

exception against one

is

suggested by envy,

while they see one

the

man

in possession of
it

what

all

desire.

For

same cause they would judge

number. For

to be as unreasonable, if a

few commanded, unless they themselves

to be of the
if it

either were, or

hoped
all

be an unreasonable thing that

men have
equality
is

not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be un-

reasonable also. But because

the state of war,

we have showed

that the state of

and that therefore inequality was

enjoys more,
thing.

introduced by a general consent; this inequality whereby he,

whom we
longer
to

have voluntarily given more

to,

is

no

be accounted an unreasonable

The

incon-

veniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man,

attend his person, not his unity. Let us therefore see whether
brings with
it

the greater grievances to the subject, the

of

com-

mand
5.

of one

man, or

many.
their opinion

But

first,

we must remove
which
is

who deny

that to

be any

city at all,

compacted of never so great a numlord. In the ninth article of

ber of servants under a

the fifth chapter, a city
of

common
is

defined to be one person

made
is

out be use

many men, whose

as

will

by their
all,

own

contracts
as

to

esteemed

the wills of

them

insomuch

he

may

the strength and faculties of each single person for the public

peace and safety.

And

by the same

article of the

same chapter,

one person

is

that,

when

the wills of

many
is

are contained in

the will of one. But the will of each servant

will of his lord, as hath

contained in the
fifth article

been declared in the

of

the eighth chapter, so as he

faculties

according to his

may employ own will and

city,

all

their forces

and

pleasure. It follows

therefore that that

must needs be a

which

is

constituted

Il8
by a lord and many
to contradict this

DOMINION
servants. Neither can

any reason be brought

city

which doth not equally combat against a

and
his sons.

constituted by a father

For

to a lord

who

hath

no

children, servants are in the nature of sons; for they are

both his honour and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their lords,

than children to their parents,

fifth article of the

as

hath been

manifested above in the

6.

eighth chapter.
is,

Among

other grievances of supreme authority one

that

the ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending
of castles,
hold,

waging wars, honourably sustaining

also, if

his

own

house-

may

he

will, exact others

through his

lust,

whereby
too.
I

to enrich his sons, kindred,

favourites,

and

flatterers

confess this

is

a grievance, but of the

number

of those

which

accompany

all

kinds of government, but are more tolerable in

a monarchy than in a democracy. For though the monarch

would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but

to one. But in a democracy, look
is,

how many demagogues,

many

that

how many

powerful orators there are with the people (which

ever are many, and daily

new

ones growing), so

children,

kinsmen, friends, and

of

flatterers are to

be rewarded. For every

as

them

desire not only to

illustrious in wealth, as

make their families as potent, may be, but also to oblige others
and

to

them by benefits A monarch may

I

for the

better strengthening of themselves.

friends,

in great part satisfy his officers

because they are not many, without any cost to his subjects,

mean, without robbing them of any of those

treasures given

in for the maintenance of

where many are

arch

to

war and peace. In be satisfied, and always new

a democracy,
ones, this can-

not be done without the subjects' oppression.

Though

mon-

may promote unworthy

but in a democracy
it,

persons, yet oft times he will not

do

it;

all
it

the popular
is

men

are therefore

supposed to do

because

necessary; for else the

power

DOMINION
of

119
it

them who did

It

would

so increase, as

would not only

city also.

become dreadful
7.

to those others,
is,

but even to the whole

Another grievance

that

same perpetual

fear of death

which every man must

necessarily be in, while he considers

to

with himself that the ruler hath power not only

appoint
that he

what punishments he

lists

on any transgressions, but

may

also in

his

wrath and sensuality slaughter

his innocent

subjects,

and those
is

who

never offended against the laws.

And

truly this

a very great grievance in any

it

form

of

government,

wheresoever
it
is,

happens; for
it

it is

therefore a grievance, because

it

not because

may

be done. But
all

is

the fault of the

ruler, not of the

government. For

the acts of

Nero

are not

essential to

monarchy;

yet subjects are less often undeservedly

ruler,

condemned under one

than under the people. For kings

are only severe against those

who

either trouble

them with imor

pertinent counsels, or oppose

them with reproachful words,

control their wills; but they are the cause that that excess of

power which one

can undeservedly
courtiers,

subject

might have above another becomes

or Caligula reigning,

harmless. Wherefore

some Nero

no men

suffer,

but such as are

known

to

him, namely,

and such

as are

remarkable for some eminent charge,

and not

all

neither, but they only

who

are possessed of

what he

desires to enjoy.

For they that are

offensive,

and contumelious,

are deservedly punished.

will lead a retired
is

Whosoever

therefore in a

monarchy
he

life, let

him be what he
more

will that reigns,

out of danger. For the ambitious only suffer; the rest are

protected

from the

injuries of the

potent.

But

in a popular

dominion, there

may

be as

many Neros

as there are orators

who

soothe the people. For each one of

the people,
petite (as
it

them can do as much as and they mutually give way to each other's apwere by this secret pact, spare me to-day and I'll
exempt those from punishsatisfy their lust

spare thee to-morrow) while they

ment, who, to

and private hatred, have unde-

120
servedly
slain

DOMINION
their

fellow-subjects.

Furthermore, there
if it

is

certain limit in private power,

which

exceed,

it

may

prove

pernicious to the realm, and by reason whereof

it

is

necessary

sometimes for monarchs to have a care that the

common

weal

do thence receive no prejudice.

sisted in the

When

therefore this
it

power con-

multitude of riches, they lessened

if
it

by diminishing

their heaps; but

were in popular applause, the powerful

laid to his charge,

party, without

any other crime

was taken

from among them. The same was usually

racies.

practised in democyears'

For the Athenians

inflicted a

punishment of ten

banishment on those that were powerful, merely because of

their powers,

without the guilt of any other crime.

did seek the favour of the

who by
this

liberal gifts

And those common people,

were put

to death at

Rome,

as

men

ambitious of a kingdom. In

democracy and monarchy were even; yet differed they

in fame, because
is

much
is

fame derives from the people, and what

therefore

done by many,

commended by many. And

is

what
ac-

the

monarch

does,
if
it

said

to

be done out of envy to their

virtues,

which

were done by the people, would be

counted policy.
8. There arc some who therefore imagine monarchy to be more grievous than democracy, because there is less liberty in

that,

than in

this. If

by
is

liberty they

that subjection

which

due

to the laws, that

mean an exemption from is, the commands

of the people, neither in democracy, nor in any other state of

government whatsoever,

is

there any such kind of liberty. If

this, that there

they suppose liberty to consist in

be few laws,
for-

few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were
bidden, there could be no peace; then
liberty in
sisteth
I

deny that there

is

more

democracy than monarchy; for the one

liberty, as the other.

as truly con-

with such a

For although the word

be written over the

liberty

may

in

large

and ample

letters
is it

gates of any city whatsoever, yet

not meant the subject's,

DOMINION
but the
city's liberty;

121

neither can that

word with

better right

be inscribed on a
that

city

which

is

governed by the people, than

which

is

ruled by a monarch. But

liberty,

when

private

men

or

subjects

demand

under the name

For
every

of liberty they ask

not for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of under-

standing they

little

consider.

if

man would

grant the
as
is

same

liberty

to another,

which he

desires

for himself,
state
all

commanded by
which
if

the law of nature, that

all

same natural
by right do
as

would
things;
all

return again, in which

men may

they knew, they

civil

would abhor,

being worse than

if

kinds of

subjection whatsoever. But

rest

any

man
is

desire to

have his single freedom, the

else
all

being bound, what does he

demand but
bonds,
is

to have the dominion.?

all

For whoso

freed

from

lord over

those that

still

continue bound. Sub-

jects therefore

have no greater

liberty in a popular,
is

than in a
the

monarchical
participation

state.

That which deceives them,

do so

equal

of

command and

public places. For where the

far forth share

authority
in
it

is

in the people, single subjects

as they are parts of the people ruling;

offices so far forth as

and they equally

partake in public

they have equal voices

in choosing magistrates

and public
at,

ministers.

And

this is that

which

Aristotle

aimed

himself also, through the custom

liberty
is

of that time, miscalling

dominion

(Politics,

Book

vi,

Chapter 2): In a popular

state there
if

liberty

by supposition;
free out of

which
this

is

a speech of the vulgar, as

no

man were

state.

those

From whence, by the way, we may collect, that subjects who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty, do

only stomach this, that they are not received to the steerage of
the
9.

commonweal.
But perhaps
is

for this very reason

some

will say, that a

popular state

much
all

to be preferred before a monarchical;

because that, where

there
all

men

have a hand in public businesses,

have an opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge,

122
and eloquence,
bred in
ties,

DOMINION
in deliberating matters of the greatest difl&culty

and moment, which by reason

of that desire of praise

which

is

human

nature,

is

to

them who

excel in such-like facul-

and seem

to themselves to exceed others, the

most delightto obtain

ful of all things.

But
is

in a

monarchy,

this

same way

praise

and honour,
is

shut
if

up
this

to the greatest part of subjects;

and what

a grievance,

be none?

will tell you: to see

his opinion,

whom we

scorn, preferred before ours; to have our

wisdom undervalued
trial

before our

own

faces;

by an uncertain

of a

little

vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities

(for this cannot be avoided,

whether we have the

better or the

worse); to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement

of opinions; to lay open our secret councils
to

and advices
But

to all,

no purpose, and without any

benefit; to neglect the affairs

to be absent

of our

own
is
it

family: these,

I say,

are grievances.

from a

trial

of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the

eloquent,
say, that

not therefore a grievance to them, unless

is

we

will

a grievance to valiant
it.

men

to be restrained

from

fighting, because they delight in

10.
less

Besides, there are

in

many

reasons

why
in

deliberations are
lesser

successful
is,

great

assemblies,

than

councils.

Whereof one

that to advise righdy of all things

conducing

to the preservation of a

commonweal, we must not only undernourished and defended, and whence

fit

stand matters at home, but foreign afFairs too; at home, by

what goods the country

is

they are fetched; what places are

to

make

garrisons of; by

what means

soldiers are best to be raised

and maintained; what

manner
the

of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or

governors of their country; and

many

the like; abroad,

is,

what
con-

power

of each neighbouring country

and wherein

it

what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how
sists;

affected to each other

among

themselves; and what counsel

DOMINION
daily passeth

123
very few in a great

assembly of

among them. Now, because men understand these things,

I

being for the most

of them,

part unskilful (that

that

say not incapable)

what can

same number

of advisers with their impertinent opinions

contribute to good counsels, other than

mere

lets

and impedi-

ments?
11.

Another reason why a great assembly

is,

is

not so
his

fit

for

consultation

because every one

who

delivers

opinion
to gain
it

holds
the

it

necessary to

make

a long-continued speech;

and

more esteem from

to

his auditors,

he polishes and adorns

with the best and smoothest language.

eloquence
is

Now

the

nature

of

make good and

make
that

evil, profitable

and unprofitable,
less
is

honest and dishonest, appear to be more or

they are; and to

than indeed

seem

just

which

unjust, accordthis Is

ing as

it

shall best suit

with his end that speaketh. For

to persuade;
rise

and though they reason,

yet take they not their

from

true principles, but

from vulgar received opinions,

which, for the most part, are erroneous; neither endeavour they
so

much

to

fit

their speech to the nature of the things they

speak

of, as to
it

the passions of their

minds

to

whom
is

they speak,

whence
the
all

happens that opinions are delivered not by right

reason, but by a certain violence of mind.

Nor

this fault in

man, but

in the nature itself of eloquence,

is

whose end

(as

the masters of rhetoric teach us)

not truth (except by

is

chance) but victory, and whose property

to allure.
12.

not to inform, but

The

third reason
is,

why men

advise less successfully in a

great convent

because that thence arise factions in a comfactions, seditions

monweal, and out of

and

civil

war. For

when

equal orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches,

the conquered hates the conqueror and
his
side,
all

all

those that were of

as holding his council and wisdom in scorn, and

studies

means

to

make

the advice of his adversaries preju-

124
dicial to the
state;

DOMINION
for thus he hopes to see the glory taken

from him, and restored unto himself. Furthermore, where the

votes are not so unequal, but that the conquered have hopes,

by the accession of some iew of their

sitting to

ovi^n opinion, at

another
call

make

the stronger party, the chief heads do

the

rest together;

they advise a part

how

they

may

abrogate the

former judgment given; they appoint to be the

at the next convent; they

first

and

earliest

determine what, and in what order,

each

man

shall

speak, that the

same business may again be same may now

brought to agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the

number
in

of their then present adversaries, the

some measure become

of

no

effect to

them, being negligently

absent.

And

this

same kind of industry and diligence which

a people,
is

they use to

make
is

commonly

called a faction.

But

when

a faction

inferior in votes,

and superior, or not much

craft

inferior in power, then

what they cannot obtain by

it

and
to

language, they attempt by force of arms; and so

a civil war.

comes

But some

will say, these things

do not

necessarily,

nor often happen.

He may

as well say, that the chief parties are

not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of

them seldom disagree

13.
It

in great matters.

follows hence, that

when

the legislative power resides

in such convents as these, the laws

must needs be
alteration

inconstant,
state

and change, not according

affairs,

to the

of the

of

nor according to the changeableness of men's minds,

but as the major part,

now

of this, then of that faction, do

float

convene; insomuch as the laws do

here and there, as

it

were upon the waters.

14.

In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have

this inconvenience, that

whereas

it

is

oft of great

consequence

that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part dis-

covered to the

enemy

before they can be brought to any effect,

DOMINION
and
their

125

power and

will

is

as soon

known

abroad, as to the

people
15.

itself

commanding

at

home.
deliberato be

These inconveniences which are found in the

in

tions of great assemblies

do so far forth evince monarchy

democracy
aflfairs

better than democracy, as

of great con-

sequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a

monarchy. Neither can

is

it

easily

be done

otherwise. For there

naturally

no reason why every

man

should not

mind

his

own

private, than the public business, but

that here he sees a

means

to declare his eloquence,

whereby and

he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and

returning

home

to his friends, to his parents, to his wife

children, rejoice

and triumph
all

in the applause of his dexterous

behaviour. As of old,
in his warlike actions,
to his mother.

the delight

Marcus Coriolanus had

was

to see his praises so well pleasing

But

if

the people in a democracy

the

power

of deliberating in matters of

would bestow war and peace, either

say,

on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination

of magistrates

and public ministers, that

it

is

to

with the

authority without the ministration, then

that in this particular
16.

must be confessed,

democracy and monarchy would be equal.

one kind of government than another,
itself,

Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which

are found to be
arise

more

in

from hence, namely, because the government

its

or the

administration of

afJairs, are better

committed to one, than

to

many; or on the other

government
is

side, to

many, than

some few. For

it is

the power, the administration of

in
is

the act.

Now

the

power

all

kinds of government

is

equal; the acts

only differ, that

to say, the actions

and motions of a com-

monweal,

as they flow

from the

deliberations of

many

or few,

of skilful or impertinent

the conveniences or

men. Whence we understand, that inconveniences of any government depend

the authority resides, but on his ofl&cers;

not on

him

in

whom

126

DOMINION
that the

and therefore nothing hinders, but

or infant, provided that they be

be well governed, although the monarch be a

fit

commonweal may woman, or youth,

for affairs,

who

are

endued
is

with the public

ofiEces

and charges.
is

And

that

which

said,

woe

to the land

whose \ing

a child, doth not signify the

state,

condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular

contrariwise, that by accident
it

but

is
it

the grievance of a kingoften happens, that

dom,

that the king being a child,

many

by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils,

the government comes to be administered in a democratical

arise those infelicities

manner, and that thence

which

for the

most part accompany the dominion of the people.

17.

But
is

it

is

a manifest sign, that the

most absolute mon-

archy

the best state of government, that not only kings, but

cities

even those

which are

subject to the people or to nobles,

give the whole

solute, as

command

of

war

to

one only, and that so abthis

nothing can be more (wherein by the way

must

be noted also, that no king can give a general greater authority

over his army, than he himself by right
his

may

exercise over all

all

subjects).
in the

Monarchy

therefore

is

the best of

govern-

ments

camps. But what

else are

than so

many camps

strengthened

many commonwealths, with arms and men against

each other, whose

state

(because not restrained by any com-

mon may
18.

power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce,

pass between

them)

is

to be accounted for the state of

nature,

which

is

the state of war.

it

Lastly, since
to

was necessary

for the preservation of our-

selves

be subject to some

man

or council,

we

cannot on

better condition be subject to any, than

one whose interest dethis

pends upon our safety and welfare; and

pass
of

then comes to

when we are the inheritance of the ruler. For every man his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritand monies of the
subjects are not only

ance. But the lands

DOMINION
the prince's treasure, but their bodies
will be easily granted

127
and wildy minds; which

the

how great rates how much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subby those
consider at

who
is

dominion

of lesser countries

valued, and

ject,

without any default of his own, hath by his prince been

life

despoiled of his
of his authority.
19.

or goods, through the sole licentiousness

Hitherto

lar state;

we have compared a we have said nothing of

monarchical with a popuaristocracy.

We

may

con-

clude of
is

this,

by what hath been said of those, that that which

hereditary,

and content with the

its

election

of magistrates;

which transmits
able;

deliberations to
imitates the
is

some few, and those most

and

which simply

government of monarchs most,

and the people

least of all;

for the subjects both better

more

lasting than the rest.

Chapter XI
Places and Examples of Scripture of the

Rights of Government

(The

text of this chapter

is

omitted.)

Chapter XII

Of the Internal Causes Tending to the OF Any Government

I.

Dissolution

monweals

Hitherto hath been spoken by what causes and pacts comare constituted, and what the rights of princes are over

their subjects.

Now we

will briefly say

somewhat concerning

the causes

which

dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions.

Now

as in the

motion of natural bodies three things are to

motion
be produced; the external agent,
act be pro-

be considered, namely, internal disposition, that they be susceptible

of

the

to

whereby a certain and determined motion may in

duced; and the action
itself:

so also in a

commonweal where

the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present themselves to

our regard;

first,

the doctrines

and the passions confitted

solicit,

trary to peace,

wherewith the minds of men are

their

and
as-

disposed;

next,

quality

and condition who

semble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up

arms and quit

their allegiance; lastly, the

itself.
is

manner how
first

this is
dis-

done, or the faction

But one and the

this,

which
of

poseth them to sedition,

that the

knowledge

good
in-

and

evil

belongs to each single man. In the state of nature

deed, where every

man

lives

by equal

right,

and has not by

any mutual pacts submitted to the

granted this to be true, in chap.

command
i.

of others,

we have
also

art.

9.

But we have
rules of

shown
and

that in a civil state the laws

were the

good

evil, just

and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore

what the

legislator

commands, must be held

and the
128
legislator
is

for good,

and

what he

forbids for evil;

ever that person

DOMINION

129
is

who
the

hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that

in a

to say,

monarch

monarchy.

We

have confirmed the same truth

if

in chap.

xi. art. 2,

out of the words of Solomon. For

private

men may

pursue that as good, and shun that as

so, to

evil,

which
his:

appears to them to be

what end

serve those

words of

Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart

judge thy people, that
Since therefore
it

to

may

discern between

good and

evil?

belongs to kings to discern between good

those,

and
is

evil,

wicked are

though usual, sayings, that he only

us just things, and

a king

who

does righteously, and that kings must not be

obeyed, unless they

command

many

other

such

like.

Before there was any government, just and unjust

their nature only being relative to

had no being,
becomes
istrate.

some comit

mand, and every

action in

its

own

nature

is

indifferent; that

just or unjust, proceeds

from the right

of the

mag-

Legitimate kings therefore

just,

make

the things they com-

mand

by commanding them, and those which they forbid,

unjust, by forbidding them.

to themselves the
as kings,

But private men, while they assume

evil, desire to

knowledge of good and

be even

which cannot be with the

of
all

safety of the
is,

commonweal.
(Gen.
ii.

The most ancient Thou shah not eat

Ye

God's commands

17):
evil;

of the tree of
all

knowledge

of

good and
(Gen.

and the most ancient of

shall be as gods,

diabolical temptations,
evil;

iii.

5):
first

\nowing good and

(verse 11):
tree,
if

and God's

expostulation with

man,

Who

told thee that thou

I

wert na\ed? Hast thou eaten of the

thee that thou shouldst not eat?

whereof

As

he had
it

said,

commanded how comest

thou to judge that nakedness, wherein

to create thee, to be shameful, except thyself the
2.

seemed good to

me

thou have arrogated to

knowledge of good and

evil?
is

Whatsoever any

man

doth against his conscience

a sin;

for he

who
is

doth

so,

contemns the law. But we must distinguish.

That

my

sin indeed,

which committing

do believe to be

130

DOMINION
sin;

my

but what

believe to be another

man's

sin,

may
if

sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For

if I

be com-

manded
I

to

do that which

is

a sin in

him who commands me,

of

do

it,

and he that commands For

if I

me

be by right lord over mc,

I sin

not.

wage war

at the

commandment
I
it,

my

prince,

conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken,

fore

do not therearrogating to

do

unjustly, but rather

if I

refuse to
is

do

myself the knowledge of what

tains only to

just

and

unjust,

which

per-

my

prince.

They who observe not

is,

this distinction,
is

will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything

comthey

manded them, which

for
if

either

or seems to be unlawful to them:

if

they obey, they sin against their conscience, and

right. If they

obey not, against

sin

against their conscience,

they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come;
if

they sin against right, they do, as

much

as in

them

lies,

abolish

human

society

and the

civil life

of the present world.

Their opinion therefore

obey their prince's

who

teach, that subjects sin

to

when

they
is

commands which
it

them seem
those

unjust,

both erroneous, and to be reckoned

contrary to civil obedience; and
error

among

which are

depends upon that original

in the foregoing article.
evil,

which we have observed above,

to

For by our taking upon us

judge of good and

we

are

the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience, be-

comes
3.

sin

unto

us.

The

third seditious doctrine springs

is

from the same

it is

root,

that tyrannicide

lawful; nay, at this day

all

by many divines,
Plato,

and

of old

it

was by

the philosophers,
rest of the

Aristode,

Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch,

and the

maintainers of the

Greek and Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even
worthy of the greatest
they
praise.

And under
all

the tide of tyrants,

mean

not only monarchs, but

those

who

bear the chief

rule in
at

any government whatsoever; for not

Pisistratus only

Athens, but those Thirty also

who

succeeded him, and ruled

DOMINION
together,

131
he,

were

all

called tyrants.

But

whom men
either

require

to be put to death as being a tyrant,

commands
is

by right

or without right;

if

without right, he

an enemy, and by right

called the killing

to be put to death; but then this

must not be

a tyrant, but an
tion takes place:

enemy;

if

by

right,

then the divine interroga-

Who hath
tree

told thee that he

I

was

a tyrant?

Hast

thou eaten of the

whereof
dost

shouldst not eat? For

why

commanded thee that thou thou call him a tyrant, whom

of

God how

hath

made

a king, except that thou, being a private per-

son, usurpest to thyself the

knowledge
is

good and

evil?

But

pernicious this opinion

to all

governments, but especially

hence discern, namely,
ill,

to that

which
it

is

monarchical,

we may

that by

every king, whether good or

stands exposed to be

condemned by
murderous
4.

the judgment, and slain by the

hand

of every

villain.

The

fourth opinion adversary to

civil

society,

is

theirs
civil

who
laws.

hold, that they

who
from

bear rule are subject also to the

Which hath been

itself,

sufficiently this

proved before not to be true,

city

in chap. vi. art. 14,

argument: that a

can neither
because no

be bound to

nor to any subject; not to

it

itself,

man

can be obliged except

be to another; not to any subject,

because the single wills of the subjects are contained in the will
of the city,

insomuch

that

if

the city will be free

from

all

such
is

obligation, the subjects will so too;

so.

and by consequence she

But that which holds true in

a city, that

must be supposed

to be true in a

man, or an assembly
for they

of

men, who have the

which hath no being
opinion cannot
is

supreme authority;

make

a city,

but by their supreme power.

Now

that this

consist with the very being of

government,
is

evident from
evil,

hence, that by
is

it

the

knowledge of what

good and
is

that

to say, the definition of

what

is,

and what

not against the

laws,

would return

to each single person.

Obedience therefore

will cease as oft as anything seems to be

commanded

contrary

132
to the civil laws,

DOMINION
and together with
it,

all

coercive jurisdiction,
of the very

which cannot possibly be without the destruction

and

essence of government. Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle

others;

who, by reason of human

to be

infirmity, suppose the

to the

supreme power
only.

committed with most security

to

laws

But they seem

have looked very shallowly into the

thought that the constraining power,

nature of government,

who

the interpretation of laws, and the

are
left

making

of laws, (all

which

powers necessarily belonging to government) should be

wholly to the laws themselves.

Now

although particular
to

subjects

may sometimes contend

is

in

judgment, and go

law
the

with the supreme magistrate; yet

question

this is only then,

when

not what the magistrate may, but what by a certain

rule he hath declared he

would

do. As,

when by any law

is

the

judges

sit

upon the

life

of a subject, the question

not whether

the magistrate could by his absolute right deprive

life;

him

of his

but whether by that law his will was that he should be

it.

deprived of
law;
ject
is

But

his will was,

he should,

if

he brake the

else, his will

was, he should not. This therefore, that a subaction of law against his

may have an

supreme magistrate,
is
is

not strength of argument sufficient to prove, that he

tied

to his
tied

own laws. On the contrary, it to his own laws, because no man

by the ambition of lawyers,
it is

is
is

evident, that he

not

bound

to himself.

Laws

therefore are set for Titius

ever,

and Caius, not

for the ruler.

How-

so ordered, that the laws

to unskilful

men seem
fifth

not to depend on the authority of the

magistrate, but their prudence.

5.

In the
is

place, that the

fatal

supreme authority may be

all

divided,
verse

most
it

opinion to

commonweals. But
it

di-

men

divide

diverse ways.
civil

For some divide

so as to

grant a supremacy to the

to peace

power
life,

in matters pertaining

and the

benefits of this

but in things concerning

it

the salvation of the soul they transfer

on

others.

Now,

be-

DOMINION
cause justice
is

133
it

of

all

things most necessary to salvation,

justice,

happens that subjects measuring

the
civil lav^^s,

not as they ought, by

but by the precepts and doctrines of them who,

in regard of the magistrate, are either private

men

or strangers,

through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience

due

to their princes,

through fear falling into that

vi^hich they

most feared.
than that

Now

what can be more pernicious

by the

to

any

state,

men

should,

apprehension of everlasting
is

torments, be deterred from obeying their princes, that

the laws; or from being just? There are also some
the supreme authority so as to allow the

to say,

who
of

divide

power

war and

peace unto one

raising

(whom

they call a monarch) but the right of

money

they give to some others, and not to him. But

because monies are the sinews of war and peace, they

divide the authority, do either really not divide
place
it

who
at
all,

thus

it

but

wholly in them, in whose power the money

of
it

is,

but give
it,

the

name

to another, or

if

they do really divide

they

dissolve the government.

For neither upon

necessity can

war

be waged, nor can the public peace be preserved without money.

6. It is a

common

doctrine, that faith

and holiness are not

were

acquired by study, and natural reason, but are always supernaturally infused,
I

and inspired into men. Which,

if it

true,

why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet; or lastly, why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do, what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, than by the precepts of his superiors or right reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowlunderstand not
edge of good and
ruin of
all

evil;

which cannot be granted without the

itself

governments. This opinion hath spread

so

largely through the

whole Christian world, that the number

is

of apostates
it

from natural reason

almost become

infinite.

And

sprang from sick-brained men,

who

having gotten good store

134

DOMINION
made

of holy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures,

such a connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their

sermons, signifying just nothing, yet to unlearned

men seemed
be a divine

most divine;
speech,
7.

for

he whose nonsense appears

to

must

necessarily

seem

to be inspired

from above.
is this,

The

seventh doctrine opposite to government,

that
is

each subject hath an absolute dominion over the goods he

in possession of, that
is

to say,

such a propriety as excludes not

only the right of

all

the rest of his fellow-subjects to the

same

goods, but also of the magistrate himself.

for they
ship, as
is

Which

is

not true;

who
all

have a lord over them, have themselves no lordviii. art. 5.

hath been proved, chap.

his subjects,
civil

Now

the magistrate

lord of

by the constitution of government.

Before the yoke of

society

was undertaken, no man had

any proper
therefore,
istrate?

right; all things

were

common
it,

to all

men. Tell

me

how

gottest

thou

this propriety

but from the mag-

How

got the magistrate

but that every

man

trans-

ferred his right

on him?
he

And
and

thou therefore hast also given

therefore,

up thy
just so

right to him.

Thy dominion
will,

and

propriety,

is

much

as

shall last so

long as he pleases;

even as in a family, each son hath such proper goods, and so

long lasting, as seems good to the father. But the greatest part
of

men who

profess civil prudence, reason otherwise;

is

we

are

equal (say they) by nature; there

no reason why any man

I

should by better right take

my

goods from me, than

is

his

from

him; we know that money sometimes

needful for the delet

fence and maintenance of the public; but

them,

who

re-

show us the present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it. They who talk thus know not, that what they would have, is already done from the beginning, in the very constituquire
it,

tion of government,

and therefore speaking

as in a dissolute

multitude and yet not fashioned government, they destroy the

frame.

DOMINION
8.

135
civil

In the

last place,

it

is

a great hindrance to

govern-

ment, especially monarchical, that

man

distinguish not
is

enough
be

between a people and a multitude. The people

is

somew^hat that

one, having one will,

and

to

whom

one action

may

at-

tributed;

none of these can properly be

all

said of a multitude.

The

people rules in

governments. For even in monarchies

for the people wills by the will of one
to say, subjects. In

the people

commands;

man; but the multitude are citizens, that is a democracy and aristocracy, the citizens
but the court
is

are the multitude,

the people.

And
it

in a monarchy, the subjects are

a

the multitude,
people.

and (however

seem

paradox) the king

is

the

The common

sort of

men, and others who

litde con-

sider these truths,

do always speak of a great number of

is

men

as of the people, that

to say, the city; they say that the city

is

hath rebelled against the king (which

the people will, and
subjects
nill,

impossible), and that

what murmuring and discontented

of
to say,
all

would have, or would not have, under pretence

the people stirring

up the

citizens against the city, that

is

the multitude against the people.

And
of

these are almost

the

opinions wherewith subjects being tainted

do

easily

tumult.
is

And

forasmuch

as in all

manner

government majesty

to

be preserved by him or them

the crimen
9.
lessee
is

who have
afSicts

the supreme authority,

majestatis naturally cleaves to these opinions.

There

nothing more

the

mind

of

man

than
for

poverty, or the

want

of those things

which are necessary

the preservation of

life

and honour.

And though
lay the

there be

no

man
evil

but knows, that riches are gotten with industry, and kept
all

by frugality, yet

the poor

commonly

blame on the
as
if

government, excusing their

own

sloth

and luxury,

their private

goods forsooth were wasted by public exactions.

consider, that they

But

men must

who
live,

have no patrimony, must

but fight too, that they
in Esdras'

not only labour that they

may

may

labour. Every one of the Jews,

who

time built

136

DOMINION
work with one hand, and held government we must conceive
sword
is

the walls of Jerusalem, did the

the sword in the other. In

that the
council,

all

hand which holds

which
is

the

the king or supreme

no

less to

be sustained and nourished by the

subjects' care

and industry, than that wherewith each

man

pro-

cures himself a private fortune;

are nothing else but their reward

and

that customs

and

tributes

the labours

and endeavours of

single

by the incursion of enemies;

who watch in arms for us, that men may not be molested and that their complaint, who
is

impute
if

their poverty to public persons,

not more

just,

than
of

they should say that they are become in

want by paying

their debts.

But the most part of

suffer the

men

consider nothing of these

things.

For they

same thing with them who have

and

a disease they call an incubus; which springing from gluttony,

it

makes men

believe they are invaded, oppressed,

stifled

with a great weight.

they

Now

it is

a thing manifest of

itself,

that

who seem

to themselves to be

burthened with the whole

load of the

commonweal,

are prone to be seditious;

and that

they are affected with change,

state of things.
10.

who

are distasted at the present

Another noxious disease of the mind

little

is

theirs,

having

employment, want honour and dignity. All

who men
they

naturally strive for

honour and preferment; but

chiefly

who
these tion

are least troubled with caring for necessary things.

For

men are invited by their vacancy, sometimes to disputaamong themselves concerning the commonweal, somepolitics, orations,

times to an easy reading of histories,

poems,

and other pleasant books; and

it

happens that hence they think

themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and learning, to

administer matters of the greatest consequence.
all

Now
and

because
if

men

are not
all

what they appear

necessary that

to themselves,

they

were, yet

(by reason of the multitude) could not be received

it is

to public offices,

many must

be passed by.

DOMINION

137

These therefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more, partly out of envy to those who v/ere preferred
before them, partly out of hope to
success to the public consultations.
if

overwhelm them, than

therefore
it is

ill-

And

no marvel

with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations.

11.

The hope

of

overcoming

is

also to be

numbered among

other seditious inclinations. For

let

there be as

many men

as

you

will, infected
let

with opinions repugnant to peace and

civil

government;

there be as

many

as there can, never so

much

wounded and
of them, or
it

torn with affronts and calumnies by

if

them who

are in authority; yet

there be

no hope

of

having the better

appear not

sufficient, there will

no

sedition fol-

low; every

man

will dissemble his thoughts,

and rather con-

tent himself with the present burthen, than hazard a heavier

weight. There are four things necessarily requisite to this hope:

numbers, instruments, mutual

sist

trust,

and commanders. To
is

re-

public magistrates without a great number,

I

not sedition,

but desperation. By instruments of war

mean

all

manner

of

arms, munition, and other necessary provision, without which,

number can do nothing; nor arms

trust;

neither,

without mutual

nor

all

these,

without union under some commander,

whom

of their

own

accord they are content to obey; not as being

engaged by

their submission to his

command

(for

already in this very chapter, supposed these kind of

to understand, being obliged

we have men not

of his

beyond that which seems right and

good

in their

own

eyes) but for

some opinion they have

humours.

virtue, or military skill, or resemblance of

If these

four be near at hand to

men

grieved with the present

state,

and

measuring the

justice of their actions

by their

own

judgments,

there will be nothing

wanting to sedition and confusion of the

realm, but one to

12.

stir

up and quicken them.

(than
is

Sallust's character of Cataline

whom
this:

there never
that he

was

a greater artist in raising seditions)

had

138
great eloquence,

DOMINION
and
little

wisdom.
an

He

separates

wisdom from
born for
of peace
is

eloquence, attributing this as necessary to a

man

commotions, adjudging that

quietness.

as

instructress

and

Now

eloquence

is

twofold.

The one

an elegant
riseth

and

clear expression of the conceptions of the

mind, and

partly

from the contemplation

of

of the things themselves, partly

their

from an understanding

words taken in
other
is

own

proper

and

definite signification.

The

a commotion of the pas-

sions of the

mind (such
a speech

as are hope, fear, anger, pity) of

and

derives

from a metaphorical use

words

fitted to the passions.

That forms
that

from true

principles; this

from opinions
of.

already received,
is

what nature soever they are

end of that

The

art of

logic, of this rhetoric; the

is

truth, of this
in

victory.

Each hath

its
is

use; that in deliberations, this

ex-

hortations; for that

never disjoined from wisdom, but this

almost ever. But that this kind of powerful eloquence, separated

from the true knowledge of

is

things, that

is

to say,

from

wisdom,

the true character of

them who
easily

solicit

and

stir

up

the people to innovations,

may

be gathered out of the

work

itself

which they have

to do.

For they could not poison

the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and

civil society, unless

they held

an ignorance greater than can well

them themselves, which sure is befall any wise man. For

he that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which
are the rules of just
evil;

and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and

preserves peace

what makes and

it;

among men, what

lastly,

de-

stroys

what

is

his,

and what another's;

what he would
is

have done to himself (that he

surely to be accounted but

may do

the like to others):

meanly wise. But that they can turn

their auditors out of fools into

madmen;

that they can

to

make

things to

them who

are ill-affected
evil;

seem worse,
this they

them who

are well-affected

seem

that they can enlarge their hopes,

lessen their dangers

beyond reason:

have from that

DOMINION
sort of eloquence,

139

not which explains things as they are, but

their

from

that other,

which by moving

minds, makes

all

things
before,

to appear to be such as they in their

minds prepared

had already conceived them.

13.

Many men, who

subjects'

are themselves very well

affected

to

civil society,

do through want of knowledge co-operate

to the

disposing of

minds

to

sedition,

whilst

they

teach

young men a doctrine conformable

schools,

to the said opinions in their

and

all

the people in their pulpits.

Now

they

who

desire to bring this disposition into act, place their

whole en-

deavour in

this:

first,

that they

may

join the ill-affected to-

gether into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves

may
into
inter-

have the greatest stroke in the

faction,

faction.

They gather them

the relators and

while they

make

themselves

preters of the counsels

and actions
places,
to

of single

men, and nomideliberate of

nate the

persons

and

assemble and

such things whereby the present government

according as
it

may

be reformed,

shall

seem

best to their interests.

Now

to the

end that they themselves may have the chief

tion, the faction

rule in the facis

must be kept

in a faction, that

to say, they

must have

their secret meetings apart

with a few, where they

may

order what shall afterward be propounded in a general

whom, and on what subject, and in what shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest and most popular men of the faction to their side. And thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence, they move it to
meeting, and by
order each of

them

take

upon

it

the

managing

of affairs,

and thus they sometimes

is

oppress the commonwealth, namely, where there

faction to oppose them; but for the

no other
it,

most part they rend

and introduce a

civil

war. For folly and eloquence concur in

the subversion of government, in the same

manner

(as the

fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias, king of

140
Thessaly,

DOMINION
conspired

with Medea against their

father.

They
by
in

going to restore the decrepit old

the counsel of Medea, they cut

man

to his youth again

him

into pieces,

and

set

him

the fire to boil, in vain expecting

when he would

live again.

So the common people, through

of Pelias)
desiring to

their folly (like the daughters

renew the ancient government, being

it

drawn away by

the eloquence of ambitious men, as

faction, they
it.

were

by the witchcraft of Medea, divided into

it

consume

rather by those flames, than they reform

Chapter XIII
Concerning the Duties of
I.

Them Who Bear Rule

said,

By what hath
subjects in

hitherto been

the

duties

of

citizenis

and

any kind of government whatsoever, and the

power

of the

supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we

rulers,

have as yet said nothing of the duties of

and how they

ought to behave themselves towards their

subjects.

We

must

then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme

authority, for they can be divided; as for example,

when he

who

hath the right, either cannot or will not be present in

affairs.

judging trespasses, or deliberating of

For kings someaffairs,

times by reason of their age cannot order their

some-

times
it

also,

though they can do

satisfied

it

themselves, yet they judge

of
their
officers

fitter,

being
to

in

the

choice

and

counsellors,

exercise

their

power by them.
ordinary

Now

where

the right and exercise are severed, there the government of

the

commonweal

is

like

the

government of the
all

world, in which

God, the mover of

things,

produceth

natural effects by the

he, to

means

of secondary causes.
is

But where

whom
all

the right of ruling doth belong,

himself presactions, there

ent in

judicatures, consultations,
is

and public

the administration

such, as

if

God, beyond the ordinary

all

course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto

matters.
briefly

We

will

therefore

in

this

chapter

summarily and

speak somewhat concerning their duties

authority, whether by their

own

or other's

right.

who exercise Nor is it

my

purpose to descend into those things, which being diverse

142
from
others,

DOMINION
some
princes

may

do, for this

is

to

be

left

to

the political practices of each

2.

commonweal.
this

Now

all

the duties of rulers are contained in

is

one

sentence,

the safety of the people

the

supreme law. For

although they

who among men

obtain the chiefest dominion,

is

cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that

the will of

to say, to

men, because
it

to be chief,
all

and

subject, are contra-

dictories; yet is

their

duty in

things, as

much

as possibly
is

they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which

natural, moral,

the

and divine law. But because dominions were

constituted for peace's sake, and peace

safety's sake, he,

was sought
the people,

after

for

who

being placed in authority, shall use his

to

power otherwise than

nature.

the safety
is

of

will

act

against the reasons of peace, that

to say, against the laws of

Now

as the safety of the people dictates a

law by which

princes

know
is

their duty,

so doth

it

also teach

them an

art

how

to

procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the

the

citizens

power

of the city, that

is

to say, his that bears

the chief rule in any state.

3.

By

the people in this place

itself

we

understand, not one

civil

person, namely, the city

which governs, but the multicity

tude of subjects which are governed. For the

instituted for
its
is

was not

own, but

for the subjects'

sake;

and yet a

particular care

not required of this or that man. For the

ruler (as such) provides

ple,

no otherwise

for the safety of his peo-

than by his laws, which are universal; and therefore he

if

hath fully discharged himself,

he have thoroughly endeav-

oured by wholesome constitutions, to establish the welfare of

the

most

part,
ill,

and made

it

as lasting as

may

be;

man

suffer

but by his

own

default,
it

or by

and that no some chance

which could not be prevented. But

the safety of the
4.

sometimes conduces to

most

part, that

wicked

men do

suffer.

But by

safety

must be understood, not the

sole preserva-

DOMINION
tion of
ness.
life in

143
its

what condition
end did

soever, but in order to

happi-

For

to this

men

freely assemble themselves,

as

and
their

institute

government, that they might,

much

as

human condition v^^ould aflord, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such
a kind of government, would sin against the law of nature (because against their trust

unto them),

if

they should not study, as

their

who had committed that power much as by good laws

subjects

could be effected, to furnish

abundandy, not
but also with

only with the good things belonging to

those

life,

which advance

to delectation.
all

They who have acquired

dominion by arms, do
Wherefore

desire that their subjects

may

be

strong in body and mind, that they

if

may

serve

them

the better.

they should not endeavour to provide them, not

only with such things whereby they

such whereby they

act against their
5.

may live, but also with may grow strong and lusty, they would own scope and end.
princes do believe that
it

And

first

of

all,

mainly concerns

eternal salvation,

what opinions
is

are held of the Deity,

and what

manner

of worship he
it

to

be adored with.

Which being
and whosupreme

supposed,

may

be demanded whether chief

rulers,

soever they be, whether one or more,

authority, sin not against the

who

exercise
if

law of nature,

they cause not

such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised (or permit a contrary to be taught and practised) as they believe
necessarily conduceth to the eternal salvation of their subjects.
It
is

manifest that they act against their conscience, and that

they will, as

much
if

as in

them

lies,
it

the eternal perdition of

their subjects; for

they should suffer

pelled)
believe

no reason why (when being supreme they cannot be comthey willed

not, I see

such things to be taught and done, for which they

them

to be in a

damnable

state.

But we

will leave this

difficulty in

suspense.

144
6.

DOMINION
The
benefits of subjects respecting this Ufe only,
i.

may be
3.

distributed into four kinds,

That they be defended against

at

foreign enemies.

2.

That peace be preserved

home.

That
com-

they be enriched as
4.

much

as

may
to

consist with

pubHc

security.

That they enjoy

a harmless Hberty.
their

For
civil

supreme
wars, they

manders can confer no more

that being preserved
quietly enjoy that wealth

happiness, than

from foreign and

civil

may
their

which they have purchased by

own
7.

industry.

There are two things necessary

for the people's defence;

state of

to be

warned and
Neither

to be forearmed.

For the
is

commonis

wealths considered in themselves,

hostile.
if

natural, that
fighting,
is
it

to

say,

they cease from

therefore

to be called peace, but rather a breathing time, in

which one

enemy observing
and counsels of

the motion and countenance of the other,

values his security not according to the pacts, but the forces
his adversary.
11.

And
art. 11,

this

by natural

right, as

hath been showed in chap.

from

this, that contracts

are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear doth
intervene. It
first,
is

therefore necessary to the defence of the city,

that there be

some who may,

as near as

may
all

be, search

into

and discover the counsels and motions of

prejudice
it.

those

who

may
the

For discoverers
to the

to ministers of state, are like

soul.

beams of the sun

human

And we may more

and

truly say in vision political, than natural, that the sensible

intelligible species of

outward things, not well considered by

is

others, are by the air transported to the soul (that

to

to say,

them who have the supreme authority) and

less

therefore are

they no

necessary to the preservation of the state, than

the rays of the light are to the conservation of

man. Or

if

they
sides

be compared to spider's webs, which, extended on

all

by the

finest threads,

do warn them, keeping

in their small

holes, of all

outward motions. They

who

bear rule can no

DOMINION
more know what
is

145

necessary to be

commanded

for the de-

fence of their subjects without spies, than those spiders can,

when
8.

they shall go forth, and whether they shall repair, with-

out the motion of those threads,

Furthermore,

it

is

necessarily

requisite
to be

to

the

people's
is

defence, that they be forearmed.

Now

forearmed

to

be furnished with soldiers,

arms, ships,

forts,

and monies,

before the danger be instant; for the listing of soldiers and

taking
if

up

of

arms

after a

blow

is

given,

is

too late at least,

not impossible. In like manner, not to raise forts and appoint

garrisons in convenient places, before the frontiers are invaded,

is

to be like those country swains (as

Demosthenes said) who,

the smart of the

ignorant of the art of fencing, with their bucklers guarded

those parts of the
strokes.

body where tney

think
it

first felt

But they

who

then seasonable enough to raise

soldiers

monies for the maintenance of

war,

and other charges of

when the danger begins to show itself, they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men, what they once reckon in the number of their goods,
do judge themselves
to

have such a right and propriety in

it,

as they conceive themselves to be injured

whensoever they are

for the public good.

forced to employ but the least part of

it

Now

a sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with

arms, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts

and customs.

We

must

therefore, for fear of war, in time of

if
it

peace hoard up good sums,

we

intend the safety of the com-

monweal. Since therefore

necessarily belongs to rulers, for

the subjects' safety, to discover the enemy's counsel, to keep

garrisons,

and

to

have money in continual readiness, and that

princes are, by the law of nature,

bound

to use their
subjects,
it

whole

endeavour in procuring the welfare of their

that
it is

follows,

not only lawful for them to send out

spies, to

main-

146

DOMINION
and
to

tain soldiers, to build forts,

require monies for these

is

purposes, but
also

also,

not to do thus,

unlawful.

To which
suspect,
to

may

be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the

of

lessening

the

power

of

foreigners

whom

they

whether by
their

slight or force.

For

rulers are

bound according

power

to prevent the evils they suspect, lest peradventure

they
9.

may happen through their negligence. But many things are required to the inward peace, because many things concur
showed

conservation
(as

of

hath been

in the foregoing chapter) to its perturbation.

Wc

have

there showed, that

some things
those

there are

which dispose the

minds

of

men

to sedition, others

which move and quicken

there-

them

so disposed.

Among

which dispose them, we have

is

reckoned in the

first

place certain perverse doctrines. It

fore the duty of those

who

have the chief authority, to root

those out of the minds of men, not by

commanding, but by
are

teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but by the perspicuity

of reasons.

not to be

The laws whereby this evil may be withstood made against the persons erring, but against
Those

the

errors themselves.
ter,

errors which, in the foregoing chap-

we

affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the cominto the

monweal, have crept

from the
by reason of
to study;

minds

of ignorant

men,

partly

pulpit, partly
litde

from the

daily discourses of

men, who,

employment, otherwise do find

into these men's

leisure

enough

and they got

minds by the teachers

of their youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other

side, if

any

man would
civil

introduce sound doctrine, he must begin

truly demonstrated

from the academies. There the true and

foundations of

doctrine are to be laid, wherewith

young

men

may afterward, both in private and public, instruct the vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and powerfully, by how much themselves
being once endued, they
shall

be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things

DOMINION
they profess and teach. For seeing at this day
propositions,

14^

men

receive

man

though false, and no more inteUigible than if a should join together a company of terms drawn by chance
they for the same reason entertain true

out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use of hearing them;

how much more would

of things?
officers to
I

doctrines, suitable to their

own

understandings and the nature

it

therefore conceive

to be the duty of
civil

supreme

cause the true elements of

doctrine to be writ-

ten,

and

to

command them

to be taught in all the colleges of

their several dominions.

10.

In the next place

we showed

that grief of

mind

arising

from want did dispose the

although derived from their

subjects to sedition,

which want,

own

luxury and sloth, yet they

as

impute

it

to those

who

govern the realm,

though they were

drained and oppressed by public pensions. Notwithstanding,

it

namely,

may sometimes happen that when the burthens of

weight,
if

this

complaint

may

be

just,

the realm are unequally imall

posed on the subjects; for that which to

light

together
it

is

but a

many withdraw

themselves,
rest:
itself,

will

be very

heavy, nay, even intolerable to the

neither are

men wont
from
com-

much to With much

so taxes;

grieve at the burthen

as at the inequality.

earnestness therefore

men

strive to be freed

and

in this conflict the less happy, as being overcome,

all just

do envy the more fortunate. To remove therefore

plaint,
it
it is

the interest of the public quiet, and by consequence

concerns the duty of the magistrate, to see that the public

is

burthens be equally borne. Furthermore, since what

brought

by the subjects to public use,

their

is

nothing

else

but the price of

bought peace,

it

is

good reason, that they who equally

share in the peace, should also pay an equal part, either by

contributing their monies or their labours to the

commonweal.
that every to

Now
man

it is

the

law of nature, (by

art. 15,

chap,

iii),

in distributing right to others,

do carry himself equal

148
all.

DOMINION
Wherefore
rulers are

by the natural law obliged to lay

equally on their subjects.

the burthens of the

11.

commonweal

Now

in this place

we

understand an equality, not of

is

money, but of burthen, that

between the burthens and the

to say, an equality of reason

benefits.

For although

all

equally

enjoy peace, yet the benefits springing from thence are not

equal to
again,

all;

for

some get greater

less,

possessions, others less;

and

some consume

others more. It

may

therefore be
to the public,

demanded whether
that
is

subjects

ought to contribute

according to the rate of what they gain, or of what they spend,

to say,

whether the persons must be taxed, so

contribute according to
raised

as to

pay

contribution according to their wealth, or the goods themselves,

that every

man

what he spends. But

if

we

consider,

where monies are

according to wealth,

there they

who have made

it

equal gain, have not equal possesfrugality,

sions, because that

one preserves what he hath got by

another wastes

by luxury, and therefore equally rejoicing in

the benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the burthens

of the

commonweal: and on

the other side,

where the goods

themselves are taxed, there every man, while he spends his

private goods, in the very act of

consuming them he undiscernto,

ably pays part due to the

commonweal, according

not what

he hath, but what by the benefit of the realm he hath had.

It is no more to be doubted, but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and therefore against the

duty of

rulers; the latter is agreeable to reason,

and the

exercise

of their authority.
12.

In the third place

riseth

we

said, that that trouble of

mind
For

which
others,

from ambition was

sufficient for

offensive to public peace.

there are

some who seeming

to themselves to

be wiser than
of affairs than

and more

the

managing

who at present do govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their virtue would prove to the commonthey

DOMINION
weal, they

149

show

it,

by harming

it.

But because ambition and

but by conso

greediness of honours cannot be rooted out of the minds of

men,
stant

it is

not the duty of rulers to endeavour

of rewards

it;

application
it,

and punishments, they may

that the

order

that

men may know

air,

way

to

honour

is,

not

by contempt of the present government, nor by factions and

the popular

but by the contraries. They are good

men

who
If

observe the decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers.

with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours,

but the factious punished and had in contempt by those

bear

who
than

command,

there

would be more ambition

it

to obey,

withstand.
as

Notwithstanding,

so

happens sometimes, that

we must

stroke a horse by reason of his too

much

fierce-

ness, so a stiff-necked subject

must be

flattered for fear of his

power; but as that happens

when
is

the rider, so this,

when
say)

the

commander
to cherish

is

in danger of falling.

But we speak here of those

Their duty
(I
it is

whose authority and power

entire.

obedient subjects, and to depress the factious

all

they can; nor can the public power be otherwise preserved,

nor the subjects' quiet without

13.

it.

But

if it

be the duty of princes to restrain the factious,

it

much more
jects

does

concern them to dissolve and dissipate the

factions themselves.

Now

call a faction, a

multitude of sub-

gathered

together,

either

by

mutual contracts among

his or their
is

themselves, or by the
authority
as
it

power

of

some one, without

who

bear the supreme rule.

faction, therefore,

were a

city in a city; for as

its

by an union of
being, so by a

state of

nature a city receives

men in the new union of

definition,

subjects, there ariseth a faction.

According to

this

a multitude of subjects

who

have bound themselves simply to

obey any foreign prince or subject, or have

or leagues of

made any

pacts

mutual defence between themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the

150
city, is a faction.

DOMINION
Also favour with the vulgar,
if it

be so great,

that by

it

an army

may

be raised, except public caution be

given, either by hostages or

in
it.

some other

pledges, contains faction

if
it

The same may

all

be said of private w^ealth,

exceed,
it

because

things obey money.

Forasmuch

therefore as
is

is

true, that the state of cities

hostile,

among

themselves

natural and

those princes

who

permit factions, do as
their walls,

much
is

as

if

they received an

enemy within

which

contrary

to the subjects' safety,

and therefore

also against the

law of

nature.
14.

There are two things necessary

to the enriching of the

subjects, labour

and

thrift;

there

is

also a third

which

helps,

to wit, the natural increase of the earth

is

and water; and there

a fourth too, namely, the militia,

which sometimes augments,

but more frequently lessens the subjects' stock.

The two

first

only are necessary. For a city constituted in an island of the

sea,

no greater than

will serve for dwelling,

may grow

rich

without sowing or fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts

only; but there
is

no doubt,

if

they have a territory, but they

may

be richer with the same number, or equally rich, being

a greater

number. But the fourth, namely, the

militia,

was

of

old reckoned in the

number

of the gaining arts,

it

under the

notion of booting or taking prey; and

was by mankind,
nothing
but

(dispersed by families) before the constitution of civil societies,

accounted just and honourable. For preying

is

else

war waged with small forces. And namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the
a
tribute,

great

commonweals,
war, foreign

spoils of

and the

territories they

have purchased by their arms,

have sometimes so improved the commonwealth, that they have not only not required any public monies from the poorer
sort of subjects, but

have also divided

this

to

each of them both

is

monies and lands. But

to be brought into rule

kind of increase of riches

militia, in

not

and fashion. For the

order

DOMINION
to profit,
is

151
lose their estates,

like a die

wherewith many

but

few improve them. Since therefore there

the fruits of the earth

are three things only,

thrift,

and water, labour, and

which
com-

are expedient for the enriching of subjects, the duty of

manders
For the
arts that

in chief shall be conversant only about those three.

first,

those laws will be useful

which countenance the

as

improve the increase of the earth and water, such

are husbandry
idleness,

and

fishing.
as

For the second,

all

laws against
art

and such

quicken industry, are profitable; the

of navigation (by help

whereof the commodities of the whole

world, bought almost by labour only, are brought into one

city)
arts

and the mechanics, (under which

of the

comprehend

all

the

most excellent workmen) and the mathematical

fountains of navigatory

sciences,

the

and mechanic employthird,

ments, are held in

due esteem and honour. For the

those laws are useful,

in meats as in clothes,

whereby

all

inordinate expense, as well

in all things

and universally
is

which are

consumed with usage,

forbidden.

Now

because such laws

it

are beneficial to the ends above

specified,

belongs also to

the ofi&ce of supreme magistrates to establish them.

15.

The

liberty

of subjects

consists

not in being exempt

from the laws

cause

of the city, or that they

who
a

have the supreme

power cannot make what laws they have

all

mind

to.

But be-

the motions and actions of subjects are never circumit

scribed by laws, nor can be, by reason of their variety,

is

necessary that there be infinite cases, which are neither com-

manded, nor prohibited, but every man may

do them,
as

either do, or not

is

he

lists

himself. In these, each

this sense liberty
is

man

said to enjoy

his liberty; place,

and in

to be understood in this
is

namely, for that part of natural right, which

granted

and

left to subjects

by the

civil

laws.

As water

inclosed

on

all

hands with banks, stands

it

still

and corrupts; having no bounds,

spreads too largely, and the

more passages

it

finds, the

more

152
freely
it

DOMINION
takes
its

current; so subjects,

if

they might do nothing

without the commands of the law would grow dull and unwieldy,
if all,

they

would be

dispersed,

and the more

is

left

undetermined by the laws, the more

liberty they enjoy.

Both

extremes are faulty; for laws were not invented to take away,

but to direct men's actions, even as nature ordained the banks,

not to stay, but to guide the course of the stream.
of this liberty
is

The measure
and the
city's

to be taken
first

from the
place,
it

subjects'
is

good. Wherefore, in the

those

against the charge of

who command and have

the authority of

making
are

laws,

that there should be

more laws than

what
to

necessarily serve for

good

of the magistrate and his subjects. For since

men

wont

commonly
are

to debate

do, or not to do, by

natural

reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there

more laws than can

easily

be remembered, and whereby

itself

such things are forbidden, as reason of

necessity, they

prohibits not of
least evil

must through ignorance, without the

intention,

fall

within the compass of laws, as gins laid to

entrap their harmless liberty, which supreme

commanders

are

bound
16.
civil

to preserve for their subjects

It
is

by the laws of nature.

a great part of that liberty,

which

is

harmless to
live

government, and necessary for each subject to

hap-

pily, that there

be no penalties dreaded, but what they

this
is

may

both foresee and look for; and

either

done, where there are

no punishments

at all defined

by the laws, or greater

there are none defined,

not required than are defined.

there he that hath
first

Where

broken the law, expects an indefinite

is

or arbitrary punishment; and his fear

supposed boundless,

because
ture

it

relates to

an unbounded

evil.

Now

the law of na-

commands them who (by what we have said in

are not subject to any civil laws,

chap.

iii.

art.

11) and therefore

supreme commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing,

they must not so

much

regard the past

evil as the

future good;

DOMINION
and they
sin, if

153

they entertain any other measure in arbitrary

punishment, than the pubHc benefit. But where the punish-

ment
set

is

defined, either by a
in plain words, that

law prescribed,
he that
shall

as

when

it

is

down

do thus or thus,

shall suffer so

and

so; or

by practice, as when the penalty, (not

is

by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning)

afterward determined by the punishment of the
first

delin-

quent (for natural equity commands that equal transgressors

be equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty than
is

defined by the law,

is

is

against the law of nature. For the

end of punishment
fashion
set
it,

not to compel the will of man, but to

it

and

to

make

such as he would have

is

it

who

hath

the penalty.
it

And
are

deliberation

nothing

else

but a weigh-

ing, as

were in

scales,

the conveniences and inconveniences

of the

fact

we

attempting;

where that which

its

is

more

weighty, doth necessarily according to

inclination prevail

with

us. If therefore the legislator

a crime, than will

make our
is

fear

doth set a less penalty on more considerable with us

than our

lust, that excess

of lust above the fear of punishment,

to be attributed to the legislator,

whereby
that
is

sin

is

committed,

to say, to the supreme;

and therefore
hath

if

he

inflict

greater

punishment,

than

himself

determined

in

his

laws, he punisheth that in another, in

17.
It

which he sinned himself.

without fear enjoy the
it is

pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary lib-

erty of subjects, that every

man may

rights

which are allowed him by the laws. For

in vain to
if

have our

own

distinguished by the laws from another's,

robbery, or theft, they
falls

by

wrong judgment,
founded. But
it

may

be again con-

out

so,

that

these

do happen where

judges are corrupted. For the fear whereby

men

are deterred

from doing
alties

evil, ariseth

not from hence, namely, because pen-

are

set,

but because they are executed. For

we

esteem

the future by

what

is

past,

seldom expecting what seldom

154
happens.

DOMINION
If therefore judges,
itself,

corrupted either by

gifts,

favour,
of the

or even by pity
penalties
in

do often forbear the execution

due by the law, and by that means put wicked

men

hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed with

murderers, thieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty to

converse freely with each other, nor scarce to
stir

abroad with-

out hazard; nay, the city

itself

is

dissolved,

and every man's

returns to him.

right of protecting himself at his

own

will

The law

of nature

therefore gives this precept to

supreme

commanders,
pointed, to

that they not only

do righteousness themselves,
to say, that they hearken to

but that they also by penalties cause the judges, by them ap-

do the same; that

is

the complaints of their subjects; and as oft as need requires

make

choice of

some extraordinary judges, who may hear the

matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.

Chapter XIV

Of Laws and
I.

Trespasses

They who

less

seriously consider the force of words,

do

sometimes confound law with counsel, sometimes with covenant, sometimes with right.

They confound law with

counsel,

who

think that

it is

the duty of monarchs not only to give ear

to their counsellors,

but also to obey them, as though

it

it

were

in vain to take counsel, unless

were

also followed.

We

must
difis

fetch the distinction between counsel

and law, from the

ference

between counsel and command.

Now
it,

counsel
is

precept in which the reason of

the thing
in
itself

my

obeying

taken from
is

which

is

advised; but

command

a precept,

which the cause of

my
is

obedience depends on the will of

not properly said, thus
I

the

commander. For
I

it

will

and

thus

command,
is

except the will stand for a reason.

Now when
itself,

obedience

yielded to the laws, not for the thing

will, the

but

by reason of the adviser's

a

law
is

is

not a counsel, but

command, and

is

defined thus: law

or court)

the

command
God

of that in
it

person (whether

man

whose precept contains

the reason of obedience; as the precepts of

in regard of

men,

of magistrates in respect of their subjects,

and univercannot
resist,

sally of all the

powerful in respect of them

who

may be termed their laws. Law and counsel therefore differ many ways. Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth; counsel to them who have no power. To
follow what
is

is

prescribed by law,
is

is

duty;

what by
receives

counsel,
it;

free-will.

Counsel
it.

directed to his
is

end that

law,

to his that gives

Counsel

given to none but the willing;

155

156
law even
counsellor
counsel;
to
is

DOMINION
the

unwilling.

To

conclude,

the
to

right

of

the

made

void by the will of

is

him

whom

he gives

the right of the law-giver

not abrogated at the

pleasure of
2,

him who hath a law imposed.

the
else

They confound law and covenant, who conceive

but certain

laws to be nothing

6^0X0 yrijiaTa,
this

or forms

of living determined by the

common

consent of men.

Among

whom
EOTi

is

Aristotle,

who

defines

law on

manner; No^oq
law

^iTjVUCDV TTCoq bsl TTpocTTeiv

Xoyoq 6pia[i8voq KaG' 6[ioXoyiav EKaoxa that

:

Koivfjv iroXECoq,
is

to say,

is

speech, limited according to the

claring every thing that

common
to do;

consent of the

city, deis

we ought
civil

which
it is

definition

not

simply of law, but of the

law. For

manifest that the

divine laws sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the

laws of nature. For

of

if

they had their original from the consent

also

men, they might

by the same consent be abrogated;

is

but they are unchangeable. But indeed, that

tion of a civil law.

no

right defini-

For in that

place, a city

is

taken either for

one

civil

person, having one will, or for a multitude of

men,

who

have each of them the

person, those

liberty of their private wills. If

for one

words common consent

no

are

ill-placed

here; for one person hath

common

consent. Neither ought

to be done, but
its

he to have

said, declaring

what was needful

city declares, it

commanding;
jects.

for

what the

commands

sub-

He

therefore by a city understood a multitude of

men,

declaring by

common

consent (imagine
living.

it

a writing confirmed

by votes) some certain forms of

else

But these are nothing

but some mutual contracts which oblige not any

man

(and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power

being constituted, which can compel, have
against the
rest,

sufficient

remedy

who

otherwise are not likely to keep them.

Laws

therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are

else

nothing

but naked and weak contracts, which then at

DOMINION
length,

15^

when

there

is

one
either

who

by right doth exercise the

or

supreme power,
will

shall

become laws

no laws

at

his

Wherefore he confounds contracts with laws, which he ought not to have done; for contract is a
pleasure.

and

promise, law a

command. In

contracts

we
the

say, I will
tie

do

this;

in laws, do this. Contracts oblige us;* laws obliged.

us

fast,

being

contract obligeth of

itself;

law holds the party

obliged by virtue of the universal contract of yielding obedience. Therefore in contract,

it

is

first

determined what
it;

is

to

be done, before
first

we

are obliged to do
is

but in law,

we

are

obliged to perform, and what

to be

done

is

determined

afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civil

law thus: a
city,

civil

law

is

a speech limited by the will of the

commanding everything behoveful to be done, which is the same with that we have given above, in chap. vi. art. 9, to wit, that the civil laws are the command of him (whether man or court of men) who is endued with supreme power in
the
3.
city,

concerning the future actions of his subjects.

right,

They confound laws with

is

who
is

continue

still

to

do what

permitted by divine right, notwithstanding

civil

it

be

forbidden by the

law.

That which

prohibited by the
neither can that

divine law, cannot be permitted by the

civil,

which
civil.

is

commanded by
is

the divine law, be prohibited by the

is

Notwithstanding, that which

to say, that

permitted by the divine

right,

right, that

which may be done by divine

the same

doth no whit hinder

the
civil

why

may

not be forbidden by

laws; for inferior laws

may

restrain the liberty allowed

*To be obliged, and to be tied being obliged, seems to some men to be one and the same thing, and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus, that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform
for his promise sake; but that the
say, it

law

ties

him being

obliged, that

is

to

compels him to appointed by the law.

make good

his promise, for fear of the

punishment

158

DOMINION

by the superior, although they cannot enlarge them.

natural liberty
is

Now

a right not constituted, but allowed by the

is

laws. For the laws being removed, our liberty

is

absolute. This

first

restrained by the natural

civil

and divine laws; the residue

is

bounded by the
There
is

law; and

restrained by the constitutions of particular towns

ties.
is

what remains, may again be and socieand

right.

great difference therefore between law

is

For law
traries.
4.

a fetter, right

freedom, and they differ like con-

All law

may be

divided,

first

according to the diversity

divine, according
his

of

its

authors into divine and

human. The
and

to the

two ways whereby God hath made known

is

will

unto men,
is

two-fold, natural (or moral)

to all

positive.

Natural
eternal
this

that

which God hath declared

men by

his

word born with them,

is

to wit, their natural

reason;

and

that law,

which
is

in this
that,

whole book

have endeavoured to
to us

unfold. Positive

which God hath revealed

by the
as

word

of prophecy, wherein he hath spoken

unto

men

man. Such are the laws which he gave to the Jews concerning their government and divine worship; and they may be
termed the divine
the natural law
civil

laws, because

they were peculiar to

the civil government of the Jews, his peculiar people. Again,

may

be divided into that of men, which alone

of the

hath obtained the

title

law of nature, and that of

it is

cities,

which may be
the
right
of

called that of nations, but vulgarly

termed But

nations.

The

precepts

of

both

are

alike.

because
ties

cities

once instituted do put on the personal propriethat law,

of

men,
the

which speaking of the duty of

cities

single

men we
is

call natural,

being applied to whole

of

and

nations,

called

right

nations.

And
and

the

same elements of

natural law and right, which have hitherto been spoken of,

being transferred to whole

cities

nations,

may

be taken

for the elements of the laws

and right of

nations.

DOMINION
5.

159
state of

All

human law
society,

is
is

civil.

For the

men

considered

out of

civil

hostile,

subject to another, there are

in which, because one is not no other laws, beside the dictates

civil

of natural reason,

which

is

the divine law. But in

is

gov-

ernment the

city

only, that

to

say, that
is

man

or court to
is

whom
may
to

the supreme

power

of the city
city

committed,

the

legislator,

and the laws of the

are

civil.

The

civil

laws

be divided, according to the diversity of their subject

matter, into sacred or secular. Sacred are those which pertain

religion, that
is

to say, to the ceremonies

and worship of

God
to

(to wit,

what

persons, things, places, are to be consecrated,

and in what fashion, what opinions concerning the Deity are

be taught publicly, and with what words, and in what
order supplications are to be made, and the like), and are not

determined by any divine positive law. For the

laws are the

civil

sacred

human

laws (which are also called ecclesiastical)

but the
secular,

concerning things

sacred;

under a general

notion, are usually called the civil laws.

6.

Again, the

civil

law (according
is

to

the

two

offices

of

the legislator, whereof one

to judge, the other to constrain

parts; the

men
it

to acquiesce to his

judgments) hath two

one

distributive, the other vindicative or penal.

is,

By

the distributive
is

that every

man

hath his proper right, that

things,

to say,

it

sets
is

forth rules for

all

whereby we may know what

so as others

properly ours,

what another man's;

may

not

hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own; and

we may

not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs;

is

and what

lawful for every

is

man

to

do or omit, and what

it

is

not lawful. Vindicative

that

whereby

is

defined

what

punishment
7.

shall

be inflicted on them

who

break the law,

and vindicative are not two several species of the laws, but two parts of the same law. For if the law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you
distributive

Now

l60

DOMINION
it

take with your net in the sea, be

yours,

it

is

in vain.

For

although another should take that away from you which you

have caught,

it

hinders not, but that

of nature

it

still

remains yours.

For in the
all,

state

where

all

things are

common

to

yours and others' are

all

one, insomuch as

what the law

after

defines to be yours,

was yours even before the law, and

the law ceases not to be yours, although in another man's

possession.

Wherefore the law doth nothing, unless

all

it

be

understood to be so yours, as
interrupt your free use

other

men

be forbidden to
it

and secure enjoyment of

will

at all times,

according to your

own

and

pleasure.

For

this

is

that

which

is

required to a propriety of goods, not that a

man
is

may

be able to use them, but to use them alone, which

to be

done by prohibiting others

in vain

an hinderance to him. But

do they

also prohibit

any men,

who do

not withal
is

strike a fear of

punishment into them. In vain therefore

it

the law, unless

contain both parts, that which forbids in-

juries to be done,

and that which punisheth the doers of them. them which is called distributive, is prohibitory, and speaks to all; the second which is styled vindicative or

The

first

of

penary,
8.

is

mandatory, and only speaks to public ministers.

also

From hence

we may
is

understand, that every

it,

civil

law hath a penalty annexed to

plicitly.

either

explicitly

or

im-

For where the penalty

not defined, neither by any

writing, nor by example of any

who

hath suffered the punishis

ment

of the transgressed law, there the penalty

understood

to be arbitrary, namely, to
lator, that is to say, of the
is

depend on the

will of the legisin vain

supreme commander. For

that law
9.

which may be broken without punishment.

because
it

Now
man
it

comes from the

right,

civil

laws, both that

every

have his proper

also that

and distinguished from

another's,
rights,

and

he

is

forbidden to invade another's

follows that these precepts:

Thou

shalt not refuse to

DOMINION
give the honour defined by the laws unto thy parents:
shalt not kill the

l6l

man whom

the laws forbid thee to

kill:

Thou Thou
shall

shalt avoid all copulation forbidden

by the laws:

Thou

not take away another's goods against the lord's will:

shalt not frustrate the

Thou
things,

laws and judgments by false testimony:

are civil laws.

The
2)

natural laws

command

the

same

but imphcitly; for the law of nature (as hath been said in
chap.
fore
III.

art.

commands

us to keep contracts, and there-

also

to

perform obedience, when

we have

covenanted

obedience, and to abstain from another's goods,

when
his

it

is

determined by the

civil

law what belongs

to another.

But

all

subjects (by chap. vi. art. 13)

do covenant to obey
is

com-

mands who hath

is

the supreme power, that

to say, the civil

it

laws, in the very constitution of government, even before

possible to break them.

For the law of nature did oblige

first

in the state of nature,

all

where

(because nature hath given

men) nothing did properly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to invade another's right; next, where all things were common, and therefore all carnal
things to
all

copulations lawful; thirdly, where

therefore lawful to kill; fourthly,

was the
all

state of

war, and

where

things were detertherefore paternal

mined by every man's own judgment, and

respects also; lasdy,

where there were no public judgments,

either true or false.

and therefore no use of bearing witness,

10.
is

Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws

the promulgation of the laws themselves,

more ancient than

as being contained in the very constitution of the city,

by the

virtue of the natural law

which forbids breach of covenant,

to

the

law of nature commands us

keep

all

the civil laws.

For where we are

will be
all

tied to obedience, before

us, there
it

we know what
law whatsoever,

things.

commanded Whence

we

are universally tied to obey in

follows, that

no

civil

which tends not

to a reproach of the Deity (in respect of

whom

l62
cities

DOMINION
themselves have no right of their ow^n, and cannot be

said to

make

lav^^s),

can possibly be against the law of nature.

theft, adultery, &c, yet

For though the law of nature forbid

if is

the civil law

command

us to invade anything, that invasion

not theft, adultery, &c. For

when

the

Lacedemonians of
to

old permitted their youths by a certain law,

take

away

other men's goods, they

commanded

that these goods should

not be accounted other men's, but their

own who
thefts.

took them;

and therefore such surreptions were no

copulations
of heathen
sexes,

In like manner,

according to their laws, were

lawful
11.

marriages.
It is

necessary to the essence of a law, that the subjects

first,

be acquainted with two things:

the supreme power, that
secondly,
either to
is

what man

or court hath

to say, the right of

making

laws;

what

the law
or

itself says.
is

For he that neither knew

whom
is

what he

tied to, cannot obey,

if

and by

consequence
all. I

in such a condition, as
it is

he were not tied at

say not that

necessary to the essence of a law, that

it

either

one or the other be perpetually known, but only that

be once known.
the right he

And if the hath who made

less tied to

subject afterward forget either

the law, or the law

itself,

that

makes him no
bered
12.
it,

obey, since he

might have rememon the subcon-

had he had a

will to obey.

The knowledge

of the legislator depends

ject himself; for the right of

making laws could not be

his

ferred

on any man without

own

consent and covenant,

either expressed or supposed; expressed,

when from

the begin-

ning the citizens do themselves constitute a form of governing the

to the
city,

or

when by promise

they

submit themselves

dominion of any one; or supposed

and conservation against

at least, as

when

they

make

use of the benefit of the realm and laws for their proothers.

tection

For to whose do-

minion we require our fellow

subjects to yield obedience for

DOMINION
our good, his dominion
that very request.

163
to

we acknowledge

be legitimate by

And

therefore ignorance of the

power

of

making laws, can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knows what he hath done himself, 13. The knowledge of the laws depends on the legislator,

who must
law
is

publish them, for otherwise they are not laws. For

the

command

of the law-maker,
it

and

his

command
is

is

the declaration of his will; the

will

is

not therefore a law, except

of the

law-maker be declared, which

in
is,

done by

promulgation.

Now

promulgation
that

two things must be

manifest, whereof one

he or they

who

publish a law,

either have a right themselves to

it

make

laws, or that they

do
the

by authority derived from him or them

is

who

have
first,

it;

other

the sense of the law

laws,

itself.

published

proceed from

Now, that the him who hath

namely,

the

supreme

command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from the mouth of the commander. The rest believe; but the reasons of their belief are so many, that
it

is

scarce possible they

should not believe.

every one

And

truly

in

democratical city where

of laws
if

may

be present

at the

making

he

will,

he that

shall be absent,

must

believe those that

it

were present.
is

But
to

in

monarchies and
to be present,

aristocracies, because

granted but
of

few

and openly
it

to hear the
to

commands

the

monarch or the

nobles,

was necessary
to

bestow a power

on those few of publishing them

believe those to be the edicts

the rest.

And

thus

we

and decrees of
either
to

princes,

which

are

propounded

to

us for such,
office
it

by the writings or

voices of

them whose

is

publish them. But yet,

when we have
prince
or
secretaries,

these causes of belief, that

we have
like

seen the

supreme counsel constandy use such counsellors,

publishers,

and

seals,

and the

arguments for

the declaring of his will; that he never took any authority

164

DOMINION

from them; that they have been punished who not giving
credit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law;

not only he

who

thus believing shall obey the edicts and

is

decrees set forth by them,

everywhere excused, but he that

is

not believing shall not yield obedience,

constant permission of these things
is

punished. For the

a manifest sign enough,

will;

and evident declaration of the commander's

tory

provided

there be nothing contained in the law, edict, or decree, deroga-

from

his

supreme power. For

it

is

not to be imagined
his
to

that he

would have aught taken from

he retains a will
there
is

power by any of
govern.

his officers as long as

Now
it,

the
to

sense of the law,

when

any doubt made of

the

is

be taken from them to

whom

supreme authority hath

for to judge

committed the knowledge of causes or judgments;

is

nothing

else

than by interpretation to apply the laws to

particular cases.
this office

Now we may know who

them

they are that have

granted them, in the same manner as

we know who

they be that have authority given

14.

to publish laws.
its

Again the
is

civil

law, according to
sorts,

of publishing,
ten,
I

of

two

understand that

sign of the will of the

manner By writwhich wants a voice, or some other legislator, that it may become a law.
two-fold

written and unwritten.

For
in

all

kind of laws are of the same age with mankind, both

therefore
of

nature and time, and

letters,

more

antiquity

than

the invention of

and the
is

art

of writing.

Wherefore

not a writing, but a voice

alone
is

necessary for a written law; this

requisite to the being, that to the

remembrance of a

law. For

we

read, that before letters

were found out for the

help of memory, that laws, contracted into metre, were wont

to be sung.

The unwritten

is

that

which wants no other pubsuch are

it

lishing than the voice of nature or natural reason;

the laws of nature. For the natural law, although

be

dis-

tinguished from the

civil,

forasmuch

as

it

commands

the will,

DOMINION
yet so far forth as
it

165
it

relates

to

our actions,

is

civil.

For

example, this same, thou shalt not covet, w^hich only appertains to the

mind,
is

is

a natural

law only; but

civil.

this,

thou shalt
it

not invade,

both natural and

For seeing

is

im-

possible to prescribe such universal rules, vi^hereby

all

future
it

contentions,
is

which perhaps are

infinite,

may
is

be determined,

to

be understood that in

all

cases

not mentioned by the

to

written laws, the law of natural

equity

be followed,

which commands us
by the virtue of the

to distribute equally to equals;

civil

and

this

law, which also punisheth those

who knowingly and

of nature.
15.

willingly

do

actually transgress the laws

These things being understood,

it

appears

first,

that

the laws of nature, although they were described in the books

of

some philosophers, are not no

laws, for

for that reason to be termed

written laws: and that the writings of the interpreters of the

laws, were

want of the supreme

is

authority; nor

yet those orations of the wise, that

far forth as

to say, judges, but so

by the consent of the supreme power they part

into custom;

and that then they are

to be

received

the written laws, not for the custom's sake (which by

force

its

among own
suf-

doth not constitute a law), but for the will of the

this, that

supreme commander, which appears in

custom.
16.

he hath

fered his sentence, whether equal or unequal, to pass

into

Sin, in

its

largest signification,

comprehends every deed,

end which he propounds
is

word, and thought against right reason. For every man, by

reasoning, seeks out the
to himself. If therefore

means

to the

he reason right (that

to say, begin-

ning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary), he will proceed in a

most

direct

way. Otherwise he will go

say,

astray, that

is

to say,

he will either do,

or endeavour

somewhat

against his

l66
proper end, which

DOMINION
when he hath
done, he will

indeed in

reasoning be said to have erred, but in action and will to have

sinned. For sin follows error, just as the will doth the under-

standing.

And

this is the
is

most general acception of the word,

every

under which

contained

imprudent

action,

whether

against the law, as to overthrow another man's house, or not against the law, as to build his
17.

own upon
signifies

the sand.
sin
is

But when we speak of the laws, the word

taken

in

more

strict

sense,

and

not every
is

thing done

against right reason, but that only

therefore
is

which

blameable, and

called

malum
it

culpce, the evil of fault.

is

But yet

if

anything be culpable,
or fault, but only
therefore enquire
if

not presently to be termed a sin

it

be blameable with reason.

it is

We

must

what
is

to be

blameable with reason, what

against reason. Such

that

the nature of

man,

that every one calls

good which he

desires,

and

evil

which he eschews.
it

And

therefore through the diversity of our aflFections,

happens that

one counts that good, which another counts

evil;

and the

same man what now he esteemed

after looks

for good,

he immediately
calls

on

as evil:

and the same thing which he

evil in another.

good

in himself,
evil

he terms

For we

all

measure

good and

by the pleasure or pain

we

either feel at present,

or expect hereafter.

Now

seeing the prosperous actions of ene-

mies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power)

and of equals, (by reason of that

strife

of honours

which

is

among them), both seem and to all; and men use to repute
some
fault to their charge

are irksome,

and therefore

evil

those

evil, that is to say, to lay

from

whom
please

they receive

evil; it is

impossible to be determined by the consent of single

men
what
in-

whom

the

same things do not

and

displease,

actions are,

and what not to be blamed. They may agree

theft,
all

deed in some certain general things, as that

adultery,

and the

like are sins, as if they

should say that

men

account

DOMINION
those things evil to

167
v^^hich are

which they have given names

usually taken in an evil sense. But

theft be a sin, but

we demand
theft,

not whether

what

is

to be

termed

and so concernnot to

ing others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great

a diversity of censurers, what
is

by reason blameable,

is

be measured by the reason of one

cause of the equality of

man more

than another, be-

human

nature,

and there are no other

determine what with
to say, a sin,
is

reasons in being, but only those of particular men, and that of

the

city,
is

it

follows, that the city

is

to
is

reason

culpable. So as a fault, that

that

which a man
the
city, that

does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of

is,

contrary to the laws.

18.

But a

man may

do somewhat against the laws through

them; and yet

human

infirmity, although he desire to fulfil

is

his action, as being against the laws,

rightly blamed,

and

called a sin.
oft as

But there are some

who

neglect the laws; and as

to

any hope of gain and impunity doth appear

them, no

conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold

them
minds

from

their violation.

Not only

the deeds, but even the

of these

men

are against the laws.

They who
sin;

sin only

through

infirmity, are

good men even when they

sin, are

but these, even

when

they do not

wicked. For though both the action

to the laws, yet those

and the mind be repugnant

of the action

repugnances
irregularity

are distinguished by different appellations.

is

For the

called deb iKr|^a, unjust deed; that of the

injustice

mind

d6iK[a and KaKia,

and malice; that

is

the infirmity

of a disturbed soul, this the pravity of a sober mind.

19.

But seeing there

is

is

no

sin

which
is

is

not against some

law, and that there

him who hath

command of man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sin, who either denies
no law which
not the
that

the supreme power,

and

no

that there

is

a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any

l68
Other reproach

DOMINION
upon him? For he
will say, that

he never subso

mitted his will to God's will, not conceiving

to

him

much

as

have any being, and granting that his opinion were errone-

ous,

and therefore

also a sin, yet

were

it

to be

numbered among

those of imprudence or ignorance,

which by right cannot be

punished. This speech seems so far forth to be admitted, that

though
is it

this

kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet

imprudence; * but that
is

to be referred to sins of

it

should

be excused by imprudence or ignorance,

atheist
is

absurd. For the

himself, or by
is

punished either immediately by

God

kings constituted under God; not as a subject

punished by

a king, because he keeps not the laws, but as

one enemy
is

by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that

to

*Many

find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not

by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a God by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates, and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this, except they think that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and honour, also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it, lastly, fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.
to injustice; yea

DOMINION
say,

169
warring against God. For
lord, or

by the right of war,

enemies

as the giants

whosoever are not subject either

to another, are
20.

to

some common

one

among

themselves.

Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant whereby

is

each subject

tied to the other to

is

perform absolute and univi. art.

versal obedience (such as

defined above, chap.

13) to

the

city,

that

is

to say, to the sovereign

is

power, whether that

to ob-

be one

man
all

or council, there

an obligation derived

serve each one of the civil laws, so that that covenant contains in itself
shall

the laws at once;

it is

manifest that the subject

at

who
once

renounce the general covenant of obedience, doth

all

renounce

the laws.
sin,

any other one

to sin once.
it is

by

Which trespass is so much how much to sin always, is

which
is

worse than
worse than

And

this is that sin

called treason;

and

word

or deed

whereby the
that

citizen or subject declares,

that he will

no longer obey

man

or court to

whom

the su-

preme power of the

this

city is entrusted.

And

the subject declares

either doth or en-

same

will

of his by deed,

when he

deavours to do violence to the sovereign's person, or to them

who
cides,

execute his

commands. Of which
as

sort are traitors,

regi-

and such
fly

take

up arms

against the city, or during

a war

to the enemy's side.

flatly

And

they

show

the

same
as

will in

word,
to

who

deny that themselves or other

not obey
entire)

subjects are tied

any such kind of obedience, either in the whole,

he

who

should say that

we must which we owe to God

wage war
at his

him (keeping

the obedience

simply, absolutely, and unithat he

versally;

or in part, as he

right to

who should say, own will, to make

had no

peace, enlist sol-

diers, levy

monies, electing magistrates and public ministers,

enacting laws, deciding controversies, setting penalties, or doing

aught

else

without which the

state

cannot stand.

And

these

and

the like words and deeds are treason by the natural, not the
civil

law. But

it

may

so happen, that

some

action which, before

170
the
if it
it

DOMINION
civil

law was made, was not treason, yet

if it

will

become such,

be done afterwards. As

be declared by the law, that

shall
is

be accounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience

to say, for treason)
if

(that

any

man

shall coin

monies, or

forge the privy-seal, he that after that declaration shall do this,

will
less,

be no

less guilty of treason

all

than the other. Yet he sins

because he breaks not

the laws at once, but one law

is

only.

For the law by calling that treason which by nature

doth indeed by right
set a

not

so,

more odious name, and

per-

haps a more grievous punishment, on the guilty persons; but

it

makes not the

21.

sin itself

more

grievous.
is

But that

sin

which by the law of nature

civil

treason,

is

a transgression of the natural, not the

law. For since our

obligation to civil obedience, by virtue whereof the civil laws

are valid,

is

before

all

civil

law, and the sin of treason

is

naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation;

it fol-

lows, that by the sin of treason, that law

is

broken which pre-

ceded the

civil

law, to wit, the natural, which forbids us to

violate covenants

and betrothed

faith.

But

if

some sovereign

prince should set forth a law on this manner, thou shalt not
rebel,

he would

effect just

nothing. For except subjects were

is

before obliged to obedience, that

is

to say, not to rebel, all

law

of

no

force.

Now
it

the obligation which obligeth to

to, is

what we
all

were before obliged

22.

superfluous.
that
rebels,
traitors,

Hence
is

follows,

and

others

convicted of treason, are punished not by

right, that

civil,

but natural

to say, not as civil subjects, but as

enemies to the

government, not by the right of sovereignty and dominion, but

by the right of war.
23.

There are some who think that those

is

acts

which are
undergo

done against the law, when the punishment

the law
itself,

determined by

are expiated,

if

the punished willingly

the punishment; and that they are not guilty before

God

of

DOMINION
breaking the natural law (although by breaking the
civil

171
laws,

we

break the natural too, which

command

us to

keep the
re-

civil)

who

have suffered the punishment which the law

if

quired; as

by the law, the

fact

were not prohibited, but a

punishment were

set instead of a price,

whereby

a license

might

be bought of doing what the law forbids. By the same reason

they might infer too, that no transgression of the law were a
sin,

but that every

his

man might
peril.

enjoy the liberty which he hath

bought by
the law

own

But we must

know

that the

words of
as conart.

may be understood

in a two-fold sense, the

one

taining two parts

(as hath

been declared above in

as,

7),

namely, that of absolutely prohibiting,

this;

thou

shall

not do

and revenging,

as,

he that doth

this, shall

be punished;

the other, as containing a condition, for example, thou shalt

not do this thing, unless thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus
the law forbids not simply, but conditionally.
stood in the
first

If

it

be under-

sense,

he that doth
if

it

sins,

because he doth

what

the law forbids to be done;

in the second, he sins not,

is

because he cannot be said to do what

forbidden him, that

performs the condition. For in the

first

sense, all

bidden

to

do

it;

in the second, they only

first

men are forwho keep themselves

from the punishment. In the

punishment;
in the second,
it,

sense, the vindicative part

of the law obligeth not the guilty, but the magistrate to require

he himself that owes the punishto the

ment

is

obliged to exact

payment whereof,

if

it

be

capital or otherwise grievous,

he cannot be obliged. But in what

sense the law

is

to be taken,

depends on the will of him

is

who
it

hath the sovereignty.

When

there

therefore any doubt of the

meaning
not,
it

of the law, since

if

we
it,

are sure they sin not

who do

will be sin

we do

howsoever the law may afterward

be explained. For to do that which a be a sin or not,

man

doubts whether
it,

it

when he hath freedom

to forbear
iii.

is

a con-

tempt of the laws, and therefore, by chap.

art.

28, a sin

172

DOMINION
is

against the law of nature. Vain therefore

tinction of obedience into active

that

same

dis-

and

passive, as if that could

be expiated by penalties constituted by

is

human
is

decrees,

which

a sin against the law of nature, which

the law of

God; or

as

though they sinned

not,

who

sin at their

own

peril.

Part

III:

RELIGION

Chapter

XV
God by Nature

Of the Kingdom
I.

of

We

have already in the foregoing chapters, proved both

v^^rit,

by reason and testimonies of holy

ture, that
is

that the estate of na-

to say, of absolute liberty,

is

such as

is

theirs,

who

neither govern nor are governed,

an anarchy or
thS
state,

hostile state;

that the precepts vi^hereby to avoid

are the laws of

sov-

nature; that there can be

ereign;

no

civil

government without a
this sovereign

and that they who have gotten

that
is

command
which
re-

must be obeyed simply,

to say, in all things

pugn not
and that

the

commandments

of

God. There

is

this
all

one thing
civil

only wanting to the complete understanding of

is,

duty,

know which are the laws and commandments of God. For else we cannot tell whether that which the civil power commands us, be against the laws of God, or not; whence it must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the civil authority, we become stubborn against the divine Majesty; or for fear of sinning against God, we run into disobedience against the civil power. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know the divine laws. Now because the knowlto

edge of the laws depends on the knowledge of the kingdom,

we must

in

what follows speak somewhat concerning

king, the earth

the king-

dom
2.

of

God.
is

The Lord
xcix. i):

may be

glad thereof; saith

the psalmist, (Psalm xcvii. i).

And

again the same psalmist,

(Psalm

The Lord

is

\ing, be the people never so im-

patient; he sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never

so unquiet; to wit, whether

men
175

will or not,

God

is

the king

176
over
all

RELIGION
the earth, nor
vi'ho
is

he moved from his throne,

if

there

be any

deny either his existence or

all

his providence.

Now

although

God govern

men

so

by his power, that none can

yet this, to speak
is

do anything which he would not have done:

properly and accurately,
is

not to reign. For he

is

said to reign,

who

rules not

by acting, but speaking, that

to say,

by precepts

and threatenings. And therefore we count not inanimate nor

irrational bodies for subjects in the

kingdom
of

of

God, although
the

they be subordinate to the divine power; because they understand not the
atheists,

commands and
is

threats

God; nor
is

yet

because they believe not that there

believing there

a God; nor yet

those

who

a God, do not yet believe that he

rules these inferior

things; for even these, although they be

governed by the power of God, yet do they not acknowledge

any of

his

commands, nor stand

in

awe

of his threats.

Those

only therefore are supposed to belong to God's kingdom,

who

acknowledge him to be the governor of

hath given his

all

things,

and that he
subjects, but

for the transgressors.

commands The

to

men, and appointed punishments

rest

we must

not

call

enemies of God.
3.

But none are said to govern by commands, but they

openly declare them to those

who

who

are governed by them.

For the commands of the

laws they are not,
if

rulers are the laws of the ruled; but

not perspicuously published, in so

much
indeed
their

as all excuse of ignorance

may

be taken away.

Men

publish their laws by

will

word

or voice, neither can they

make

universally

known any

other way. But God's laws are

first,

declared after a threefold manner:

of right reason; next, by

by the

tacit

dictates
is

immediate revelation, which

sup-

posed to be done either by a supernatural voice, or by a vision

or dream, or divine inspiration; thirdly, by the voice of one

man whom God recommends

to the rest, as

worthy of

belief,

by the working of true miracles.

Now

he whose voice

God

thus

RELIGION

177
is

makes use

of to signify his will unto others,

called a prophet.

These three manners may be termed the threefold word of God, to wit, the rational word, the sensible word, and the word of prophecy. To which answer the three manners whereby

we

are said to hear

God, right reasoning,

sense,

and

faith.

God's sensible word hath come but to few; neither hath

God

spoken to
to

men

by revelation except particularly to some, and

neither have any laws of his

diverse diversely;

kingdom

been published on
4.

this

manner unto any

people.
is

And

according to the difference which

between the

rational

fold

word and the word of prophecy, we attribute a twokingdom unto God: natural, in which he reigns by the
and which
is

dictates of right reason,

universal over

all

who

acknowledge the divine power, by reason of that

ture

rational na-

which

is

common
word

to all;

and

prophetical, in

which he

rules also by the

of prophecy,

which

is

peculiar, because

he hath not given positive laws to

people,
5.

all

men, but

to his peculiar

and some

certain

men

elected

by him.
a right to rule,

God

in his natural

kingdom hath
is

and

to

punish those power. For

contract.
all

who

break his laws, from his sole

either

irresistible

right over others

from nature, or from

the
it is

How

the right of governing springs from contract,

we have

already

showed

in chap, vi.

And

same right

is

derived frorn nature, in this very thing, that

not by nature

taken away .[For

things, every

when by

nature

all

men had

a right over all

man had

a right of ruling over all as ancient as

this

nature

itself.

But the reason why

was abolished among

as

men, was no other but mutual

above in chap.
11.

fear,

hath been declared

art.

3;

reason, namely, dictating that they

must forego
the
equality

that right for the preservation of of

mankind, because
accompanied with

men among

themselves,
necessarily

according to their

strength and natural powers,

was

war, and with war joins the destruction of mankind.

Now

if

178
any

RELIGION

man had

so far exceeded the rest in power, that

forces could not

all

of

them with joined

been no cause

have

resisted

him, there had

why he

should part with that right which nature

right therefore of

had given him. The

rest,

of

dominion over all the would have remained with him, by reason of that excess power whereby he could have preserved both himself and
resisted,

them. They therefore whose power cannot be

and by

consequence

God

Almighty, derives his right of sovereignty

from the power

sinner, although

itself.

And

as oft as

God

punisheth or slays a

he therefore punish him because he sinned,

yet

may we

not say that he could not justly have punished or

him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antekilled

cedent, doth
killing
6.

it

therefore follow, that the right of afflicting

sins.

and

depends not on divine power, but on men's

That question made famous by the disputations

of the

ancients,
evil,
is

why

evil things befell the

good, and good things the

the

same with

this of ours,

by what right

God

dis-

penseth good and evil things unto men.

it

And

with

its diflSculty,

not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the diis

vine providence, but also of philosophers, and which

more,
to

even of holy men. Psalm

Israel,

Ixxiii.

i,

2, 3:

Truly

God

is

good

even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me,

feet

were almost gone,

I

my

steps

had well nigh

slipped.

my And

why?

was grieved

at the

wic\ed; I do also see the ungodly

bitterly did Job expostulate
afflicted

in such prosperity.

And how

with

God, that being

calamities?

just,

he should yet be

with so

many
diffi-

God

himself with open voice resolved this

culty in the case of Job,

and hath confirmed

Job's sin, but

his right

by argu-

ments drawn not from

from

his

own

power. For

Job and his friends had argued so

among

themselves, that they

would needs make him

he would reprove

guilty, because

he was punished; and

their accusation

by arguments fetched from

RELIGION
his

179
both

own

innocence. But God,

when he had heard

him
of

and them,
injustice
xxxviii. 4):

refutes his expostulation, not by

condemning him

or any sin,

but by declaring his

(says he)

own power
I laid the

(Job

Where wast thou

when

founda-

tion of the earth, &c.

And

for his friends,

xlii.

God

pronounces

himself angry against

them (Job

7): Because they

had not
man's

spo\en of him the thing that

Agreeable to
case
this
is

is

right, li\e

his servant fob.

that speech of our Saviour's in the

blind,

who was born

when,

his

disciples

asking

him

whether he or

his parents
ix.

had sinned, that he was born

blind,

he answered, (John
him. For though
into the

3): Neither hath this

man

sinned, nor
in

his parents; but that the

it

wor\s of God should be manifest

v.

be said, (Rom.
it

12), that death entered

world by

sin:

follows not, but that

to diseases

God by

his right

might have made men subject

and death, although

the other animals

they had never sinned, even as he hath

made
sin.

mortal and sickly, although they cannot

7.
it is

Now

if

God have

the right of sovereignty

from

his power,
lies

manifest, that the obligation of yielding

their

him obedience

on men by reason of

weakness.* For that obligation

which
II,

rises

from

contract, of

which we have spoken

in chap.

can have no place here, where the right of ruling (no coverises

nant passing between)

only from nature. But there are two

species of natural obligation, one,

when
to

liberty

is

taken away
say
that

by corporal impediments, according

which we

heaven and earth, and

all

creatures,

do obey the

common

laws

of their creation; the other,

* If this shall seem hard to any
to

when
man,

it is
I

taken away by hope or

consider,
I

if

there

him with a silent thought were two Omnipotents, whether were bound to
desire
is

obey.
it

believe

he

will confess that neither

I

bound.

If this

be true, then

is

also true

what
are

have

set

down;

that

men

are subject unto God,

because they
Paul,

not omnipotent.

And

truly

our Saviour admonishing

time was an enemy to the Church) that he should not kick against the pricks, seems to require obedience from him for this

(who

at that

cause, because he

had not power enough

to resist.

l8o
fear,

RELIGION
according to which the weaker, despairing o his
to resist, cannot but yield to
is

own
this

power
last

the stronger.

From

kind of obligation, that

to say,

from

fear, or conscience

of our

to pass, that

own weakness (in respect of the divine power), it comes we are obliged to obey God in his natural kingdictating to
all,
is

dom; reason

acknowledging the divine power

and providence, that there

8.

no kicking against the

pricks.
is

Because the word of God, ruling by nature only,

else

sup-

posed to be nothing
kings can be

but right reason, and the laws of

known by

their

word
set

only,

it is

manifest that the

laws of God, ruling by nature alone, are only the natural laws,

namely, those which

we have

down

in chaps,

ii

and

iii,

and

deduced from the

dictates of reason, humility, equity, justice,

mercy, and other moral virtues befriending peace, which pertain to other,

the discharge of the duties of

men

one toward the

and those which right reason

shall dictate besides, con-

cerning the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty.

We
are;

need not repeat what those natural laws or moral virtues

but
is

we must
say,

see

what honours and what divine worship,

that

to

what sacred laws, the same natural reason doth

to speak properly,

dictate,
9.

Honour,
the

is

nothing

else

but an opinion
to

of another's

power joined with goodness; and

honour a
so

man,
is

is

same with highly esteeming him, and

honour
three

not in the party honoured, but in the honourer.

Now

passions do necessarily follow honour thus placed in opinion;

love,

which

refers to goodness;

hope and

fear,

which regard
wherewith the

power.

And from

these arise

all

outward

actions,

powerful are appeased, and become propitious, and which are

the effects, and therefore also the natural signs of honour
itself.

But the word honour

effects of

is

transferred

also

to

those

outward

honour; in which sense,

we

are said to

honour him,
or deed.

of

whose power we

testify ourselves, either in

word

RELIGION
to

l8l
as

have a very great respect; insomuch

honour
act,

is

the

same

with worship.

Now

worship

is

an outward

the

sign of

inward honour; and

appease,
if

whom we

endeavour by our homage to

they be angry, or howsoever to

make them

favour-

able to us,
10.

we

are said to worship.

All signs of the

all

mind

are either

words or deeds; and

therefore

worship consists either in words or deeds.

Now

both the one and the other are referred to three kinds; whereof
the
first is praise,

or public declaration of goodness; the second,

is

a public declaration of present power, which

to magnify,

^EyocXuvaiq the third

;

is

a public declaration of happiness, or

of
I

power secure
say that
all

also for the future,

which

is

called tiaKapia^ioc;.

may be discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then praise and celebrate in words, when we do it by way of proposition, or dogmatically, that is to say, by attributes or tides, which may be termed praising and celebrating categorically and plainly, as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberal, strong, wise. And then in deeds, when it is done by consequence, or by
kinds of honour
hypothesis,

or

supposition,

as

by thanksgiving, which sup-

poseth goodness; or by obedience, which supposeth power; or

by congratulation, which supposeth happiness.

11.

Now
we

whether we desire

to praise a

man

in

words or
words of
sense,
as

deeds,
all

shall find

some things which

signify

honour with

men, such

as

among

attributes, are the general

virtues

and powers, which cannot be taken

and the
like;

in

ill

good,

fair, strong, just,

and among

actions, obedi-

ence, thanksgiving, prayers,

and others of that kind, by which

is

an acknowledgment of virtue and power

ever understood.

Others, which signify honour but with some, and scorn with
others, or else neither; such as in attributes, are those

words
re-

which, according to the diversity of opinions, are diversely

ferred to virtues or vices, to honest or dishonest things.

As

1 82

RELIGION

that a

man

slew his enemy, that he

fled, that

he

is

a philosopher,

or an orator, and the Hke, which with some are had in honour,

with others in contempt. In deeds, such

as

depend on the

custom of the

place, or prescriptions of civil laws, as in saluting

to be bareheaded, to

put

ofif

the shoes, to bend the body, to

petition

for

anything standing, prostrate, kneeling, forms of

like.

ceremony, and the

Now

that worship

which

is

always and

by

all

men

accounted honourable,

may

be called natural; the

arbitrary.

other,
12.

which follows places and customs,

Furthermore, worship
of

may

be enjoined, to wit, by the

it

command

him

that

is

worshipped, and

may

be voluntary, be enjoined,

namely, such as seems good to the worshipper.

the actions expressing
it

If it

do not signify honour,

as they signify

actions, but as they are enjoined:

for they signify obedience

immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship enjoined

consists in obedience.

Voluntary
if

is

honourable only in the na-

ture of the actions,

holders,
it

which
if

they do signify honour to the beit is

is

worship,

not,

reproach. Again, worship

may
it

be either public or private. But public, respecting each

single worshipper,

may

not be voluntary; respecting the

is

city,

may. For seeing that which

done voluntarily, depends on

given,

the will of the doer, there

would not one worship be

but as

many worships

as worshippers, except the will of all

men were united by the command of one. But private worship may be voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is done openly
is

restrained, either

by laws or through modesty, which

is

con-

trary to the nature of a voluntary action.

we may know what the scope and end of worwe must consider the cause why men delight in worship. And we must grant what we have showed elsewhere, that joy consists in this, that a man contemplates
13.

Now

that

shipping others

is,

virtue, strength, science, beauty, friends, or

any power whatit is

soever, as being, or as

though

it

were

his

own; and

nothing

RELIGION
else

183
itself

but a glory or triumph of the mind, conceiving

is

honoured, that

to say, loved

and

feared, that

is

to say,

having
because

the services and assistances of

men

in readiness.

Now
falls

men
that

beUeve him to be powerful,

is

whom

they see honoured,

it

to say, esteemed powerful

is

by others,

out that
of

honour
true

increased by worship,
is

and by the opinion

power
comthis

power

acquired. His end therefore

who

either

mands or suffers himself to be worshipped, is, that by means he may acquire as many as he can, either through
or fear, to be obedient unto him.
14.

love

But that we may understand what manner of worship

natural reason doth assign us, let us begin from his

of

God

attributes.

Where,

first,

it

is

manifest that existence

is

to be

allowed him; for there can be no will to honour him, who,

think, hath

we

no being. Next, those philosophers who

is

said, that

God was
of
it)

the world, or the world's soul, (that

to say, a part

spake unworthily of God; for they attribute nothing to

his

him, but wholly deny

being. For by the

word God we
is

understand the world's cause; but in saying that the world

God, they
is

say that
like

it

hath no cause, that

is

as

much,

as there

no God. In

manner, they who maintain the world not

to be created, but eternal; because there can be

no cause

of an

eternal thing, in
also that there
is

denying the world to have a cause, they deny

a

God. They

also

have a wretched apprehension

of

God, who imputing

idleness to him,

do take from him the govsay, they

ernment of the world, and of mankind. For,

acknowledge him omnipotent; yet
things,
if

should

he mind not these inferior

will
is

that

same thread-bare sentence

take

place with
us,

them: quod supra nos, nihil ad nos: what

not concern us.

above

doth

And

seeing there

is

nothing for which they

as

should either love or fear him, truly he will be to them

though he were not

at

all.

Moreover, in attributes which

sig-

nify greatness or power, those

which

signify

some

finite

or

184

RELIGION
all

limited thing, are not signs at

of an honouring mind.

For

we honour not God worthily, if we ascribe less power or greatness to him than possibly we can. But every finite thing is less than we can; for most easily we may always assign and attribute more to a finite thing. No shape therefore must be
assigned to God, for
all

shape

is finite;

nor must he be said to

be conceived or comprehended by imagination, or any other

faculty of our soul; for whatsoever

we

conceive

is finite.

And

although
yet
it

this

word

infinite signify a conception of the

mind,

follows not that

we have any

conception of an infinite
is

thing. For

when we

say that a thing

nothing

really,

but the impotency in our

not whether or where

infinite, we signify own mind, as if we

it is

should say,

we know
in our

limited. Neither

speak they honourably enough of God,

idea of

who
is

say

we have an Nor
they,

him

mind;

for

an idea

our conception, but

conception

we have

none, except of a

finite thing.
is

who
in

say that he hath parts, or that he

some

certain entire

thing;

which

are also attributes of finite things.

to

Nor

that he

is

any place; for nothing can be said

its

be in a place, but what

all sides.

hath bounds and limits of

greatness on

Nor

that

he

is

moved
place.

or

is

at rest; for either of

them suppose

a being in

some
are

Nor
of

that there are

more Gods; because not more

(unless they be
for the effect)

infinites.

Furthermore, concerning attributes of happiness, those

unworthy

God which

signify sorrow

taken not for any passion, but by a

metonomy
is

such as repentance, anger, pity; or want, as appetite, hope,

concupiscence, and that love which
are signs of poverty, since
it

also called lust, for they

cannot be understood that a

man

should desire, hope, and wish for aught, but what he wants

and stands

in

need

of; or

any passive

faculty, for suffering be-

longs to a limited power, and which depends

upon another.
not to be conif

When we

therefore attribute a will to

God,

it

is

ceived like unto ours,

which

is

called a rational desire; for

RELIGION

185

God

desires,

he wants, which for any

man

to say,

is

a con-

tumely; but

not conceive. In like manner

acts

we must suppose some resemblance which we canwhen we attribute sight and other
or

of the senses to him, or knowledge,

else

understanding,
raised

which in us are nothing

from outward
that

but a tumult of the

objects pressing the organs,

befalls the Deity; for
is
it

mind we must not

is

think

any such thing

a sign of

power

depending upon some other, which

thing.

not the most blessed

titles

He

therefore

who would

not ascribe any other

to

God

than what reason commands, must use such as are either

negative, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible, &c., or superlative, as

most good, most

great,

most powerful,

&;c.,

or indefinite,

as good, just, strong, creator, king, as not desiring to declare

and the
is

like; in

such sense,
to circum-

what he

(which were

scribe

him within

the narrow limits of our phantasy), but to

is

confess our
erty

own

admiration and obedience, which

the prop-

of humility

and of

mind
that

yielding

all

the

honour

it

possibly can do.

For reason

dictates
is,

one name alone which doth

existent, or simply, that
us,

signify the nature of

is;

God,

he

and one

in order to,
is

and

in relation to

namely God,

under which
15.

contained both King, and Lord, and Father.

Concerning the outward actions wherewith

titles), it is

God

is

to

be worshipped (as also concerning his

eral

a most gen-

command

of reason, that they be signs of a

mind

yielding

honour. Under which are contained in the

first place,

prayers.

Qui

fingit sacros auro, vel

facit ille decs;

marmore

vultus,

Non

qui rogat,

ille facit.

For prayers are the

signs of hope,

and hope

is

an acknowl-

edgment
same

of the divine

power

or goodness.
is

In the second place, thanksgiving; which

affection,

a sign of the

but that prayers go before the benefit, and

it.

thanks follow

l86
In the third,
gifts,

RELIGION
that
is

to say, oblations

and

sacrifices, for

these are thanksgivings.

In the fourth, not to swear by any other. For a man's oath

is

an imprecation of

his

wrath against him

if

he deceive,

who
if

both knows whether he do or not, and can punish

do,

him

he
to

though he be never so powerful; which only belongs

if

God. For

there were any

lie

malice could not

resist,

hid,

man from whom his subjects' and whom no human power could
suffice

plighted faith

would

without swearing, which,

broken, might be punished by that man; and for this very

reason there would be no need of an oath.

In the
of fear,

fifth place, to

speak warily of God; for that

is

a sign
follows

and

fear

is

an acknowledgment of power.

It

from

this precept, that

it

we may
is
it

not take the

name

of

God

in

vain, or use

rashly;

for either are inconsiderate.

That we
in vain.

must not swear, where there

But need there
take
is

no need;
which

for that

is

none, unless

be between

cities, to

avoid or
arise

away contention by
is

force,

necessarily

must

where there

no

faith

kept in promises, or in a

city, for

the

better certainty of judicature. Also, that

we must
all

not dispute

of the divine nature; for

it

is

supposed that

things in the

natural
is

kingdom

of

God

are inquired into

by reason only, that

to say, out of the principles of natural science.

But we are

so far off by these to attain to the

knowledge of the nature of

to the full

God,
of
all

that

we

cannot so

the qualities of our

much as reach own bodies,

understanding

or of any other creatures.

disputes, but a rash

Wherefore there comes nothing from these

small measure of our conceptions.

imposition of names to the divine Majesty according to the

It

follows also (which bethat their speech

is

longs to the right of God's

considerate

kingdom)

in-

and

rash,

who

say, that this or that

it

doth not stand

with divine

justice.

For even men count

an aflront that their

children should dispute their right or measure their justice

otherwise than by the rule of their commands.

RELIGION
In the sixth, whatsoever
ings,
is

187

offered
its

up

in prayers, thanksgiv-

and

sacrifices,

must

in

kind be the best and most be-

tokening honour; namely, prayers must not be rash, or hght,

or vulgar, but beautiful, and v/eW composed. For though
w^ere absurd in the heathen to v^^orship
it

God

in

an image, yet

was

it

not against reason to use poetry and music in their

churches. Also oblations must be clean, and presents sumptuous,

and such
or

as are significative either of

submission or gratifor
all

tude,

commemorative

of

benefits

received;

these

proceed from a desire of honouring.

In the seventh, that
only, but openly

God must

be worshipped not privately

all

and publicly

in the sight of

men; because
it

that worship
gets

is

so

much more

acceptable, by

how much
which
is

be-

honour and esteem in others (as hath been declared before

it,

in art. 13). Unless others therefore see

that

most

pleasing in our worship vanisheth.

In the

last place, that

we

use our best endeavour to keep the

laws of nature. For the undervaluing of our master's com-

mand, exceeds
side,

all
is

other affronts whatsoever; as on the other

obedience

more

acceptable than

all

other sacrifices.

And

these are principally the natural laws concerning the

I

worship of God; those,

mean, which reason

every one whereof
is

dictates to every

man. But

to

whole

cities,

one person, the

of public

same natural reason further commands an uniformity

to their private reasons, are not the city's actions,

worship. For the actions done by particular persons, according

and therefore
city, is

not the

city's

worship; but what

is

done by the
of

under-

stood to be done by the

command

him

or

them who have

the sovereignty, wherefore also together with the consent of

all

the subjects, that

16.

is

to say, uniformly.

The

natural laws set

cerning the divine worship, only

signs of honour.

down in the foregoing article concommand the giving of natural

But we must consider that there are two

kinds of signs, the one natural, the other done upon agree-

155
ment, or by express or

RELIGION
tacit

composition.

Now

because in every

language the use of words and names come by appointment,

it

may

also

by appointment be altered; for that which depends

its

on,

and derives

force

from the

will of

men, can by the

will

of the

same men agreeing be changed again or abolished.

as are attributed to

Such names therefore

God by
of

the appoint-

ment

of

men, can by the same appointment be taken away. men,

is

Now
city

what can be done by the appointment

do.

that the

may

The

city therefore

by right (that

to say, they

who have
is

the power of the whole city) shall judge

what names

or appellations are more,

to say,

what

less

honourable for God, that

what

doctrines are to be held

and professed concern-

ing the nature of

signify not

God and

his operations.

Now

actions

do

by men's appointment, but naturally, even

as the

effects are signs of their causes.

Whereof some
discovered,

are always signs

of scorn to

them before
to

whom

they are committed, as those,

is

whereby the body's uncleanness

and whatsoever

men

are

ashamed

do before those
as

whom

they respect; others

are always signs

of honour,
to give

to

draw near and discourse

or to yield in any matter

decently

and humbly,

way

of private benefit. In these actions the city can alter nothing.

But there are

infinite

others, which,
indifferent.

as

much
these,

as belongs

to

honour or reproach, are

tion of the city,

Now
so.

by the

institu-

may

both be

made

signs of honour,

and being

made

so,

do in very deed become

From whence we may

whatsoever
it

understand, that

we must

obey the

city in

shall
is

command
say,

to be used for a sign of

it

honouring God, that

to

for worship; provided

is

can be instituted for a sign of

honour, because that

a sign of honour,

which by the

city's

command
17.

is

used for such.

We

have already declared which were the laws of God,

as

well sacred as secular, in his government by the

way

of

nature only.

Now

because there

is

no man but may be deceived

RELIGION
in reasoning,

1 89

and that

it

so falls out that

opinions concerning the most actions,

further,

men are of different it may be demanded

whom God
is

would have

to be the interpreter of right

reason, that

to say, of his laws.

And

as for the secular laws, I

mean
of a

those which concern justice and the carriage of

men

towards men, by what hath been said before of the constitution

city,

we have
else

demonstratively showed

it

agreeable to rea-

son, that all judicature belongs to the city,

Is

and that judicature

those

nothing

but an interpretation of the laws, and by con-

sequence,

that

everywhere

cities,

that

is

to

say,

who

have the sovereign power, are the interpreters of the laws. As

for the sacred laws,

we must

consider

what hath been before

demonstrated in chap.
ferred as

v. art. 13,

that every subject hath trans-

much

right as he could

on him or them who had the

his right of
to be

supreme authority. But he could have transferred

judging the manner
also he hath

how God

is

honoured, and therefore

done it. That he could, it appears hence, that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a city was to be fetched from every man's private reason. But every

man
city.

can subject his private reason to the reason of the whole

Moreover,

if

each

man

should follow his

own

reason in

the worshipping of God, in so great a diversity of worshippers,

one would be apt

pious; neither

to

judge another's worship uncomely, or Imto the other to

would the one seem

honour God.
to

Even

that

therefore

which were most consonant

reason,

would not be
consists

a worship, because that the nature of

worship

in

this,

that

it

be the sign of inward honour. But

there
others,

Is

no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to

Is

and therefore

there
is

no sign

of

honour but what seems

honourable, which by

so to others. Again, that

a true sign

which by the consent of

is

men becomes

a sign; therefore also that

is

the consent of men, that

to say, by the
It Is

command

of the city,

becomes a sign of honour.

not therefore against the will

190
of God, declared by the
signs of

RELIGION

way

honour

as the city shall

can transfer their right of

ship on

him such command. Wherefore subjects judging the manner of God's worof reason only, to give

him

or
it;

they must do

them who have the sovereign power. Nay, for else all manner of absurd opinions conall

cerning the nature of God, and

ridiculous ceremonies
at

which

have been used by any nations, will be seen

once in the
will believe
it

same

city.

Whence
do

it

will fall out, that every

man
no

that all the rest

offer

God an

affront; so that

cannot be

truly said of any that he worships

God;

for

man

worships

God,

that

is

to say,

honours him outwardly, but he

who

doth

those things, whereby he appears to others for to honour him.

It

may

therefore be concluded, that the interpretation of

all

laws, as well sacred as secular,

(God

ruling by the
city,

way
is

of

nature only), depends on the authority of the

that

that

to say,

man

or counsel, to

whom

the sovereign

power

is

com-

mitted; and that whatsoever

his voice.

And on

the other

God commands, he commands by side, that whatsoever is commanded

commanded by God
must be obeyed,
if it

by them, both concerning the manner of honouring God, and

concerning secular
18.
affairs, is

himself.

Against

this,

some man may demand,

city

first,

whether

it

doth not follow that the

directly to affront

command

us

God, or forbid us to worship him?

cannot

I say, it

does not follow, neither must

to

worship

at all,

we obey. For to affront, or not by any man be understood for a manwho acknowledge God
to rule, a

ner of worshipping. Neither also had any one, before the constitution of a city, of those

right to deny

him

the honour which

was then due unto him;

city

nor could he therefore transfer a right on the

of com-

manding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether the city must be obeyed if it command somewhat to be said or done, which is not a disgrace to God direcdy, but from whence
by reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived: as for

RELIGION
example,
if it

191

were commanded to worship God in an image,

before those

who
is

account that honourable: truly

is

it

is

to

be

done.* For worship

ship

instituted in sign of honour; but to wor-

him

thus,

sign

of honour,

and increaseth God's

honour among those who do

manded

to call

signifies, or

God by how it can

if it

it. Or if it be comname which we know not what it

so account of

agree with this

word God;

that also

must be done. For what we do

for honour's sake,

(and we
a sign

know no

better),

be taken for a sign of honour,

if

it is

of honour;

and therefore

enlarging of
of
all

we refuse to do it, we refuse the God's honour. The same judgment must be had

the attributes and actions about the merely rational wor-

ship of God, which

may

be controverted and disputed. For

though

this

kind of commands

may

be sometimes contrary to

right reason,

and

therefore sins in

them who command them;

whose
that,

yet are they not against right reason, nor sins in subjects,

right reason in points of controversy

itself to

is

which submits

the reason of the

city. Lastly, if that

man

or counsel

who
is

hath the supreme power,

command
is,

himself to be wor-

shipped with the same attributes and actions, wherewith

to

God
obey.

be worshipped, the question

whether

we must

*We

said in art. 14 of this chapter, that they

who

attributed limits to

God, transgressed the natural law concerning God's worship. Now they who worship him in an image, assign him limits. Wherefore they do that which they ought not to do, and this place seems to contradict the former. We must therefore know first, that they who are constrained by authority, do not set God any bounds, but they who command them. For they who worship unwillingly, do worship in very deed; but they either stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawful sovereign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all times and ever>'where, but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping

God

beside the dictates of

human

reason; for then the will of the city stands

But in the kingdom of God by way of covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is expressly forbid, though the city commands us to worship thus, yet must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some repugnancy between this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so any longer.
for reason.

192

RELIGION

There are many things, which may be commonly attributed

both to
nified.

God and men; for even men may be praised and magAnd there are many actions, whereby God and men may
only
to

be worshipped. But the significations o the attributes and

actions are

be regarded. Those attributes therefore,

whereby we
is

signify ourselves to be of

an opinion, that there

any

man endued
is

with a sovereignty independent

from God,
like,

or that he

immortal, or of infinite power, and the

princes, yet

though commanded by

must they be abstained from.

As

also

from those

actions signifying the same, as prayer to

the absent; to ask those things which

rain
as

God

alone can give, as

and

fair

weather; to offer

him what God can

only accept,

oblations, holocausts; or to give a worship, than

which
seem

a
to

greater cannot be given, as sacrifice. For these things

tend to this end, that

trary to

God may

not be thought to rule, conthe beginning. But genuflec-

what was supposed from

civil

tion, prostration, or

any other act of the body whatsoever,

worship; for they

may

be lawfully used even in

may

signify

an acknowledgment of the
ship
is

civil
civil,

power

only.

For divine wor-

distinguished from

not by the motion, placing,

habit, or gesture of the body, but

by the declaration of our

if

opinion of him
selves

whom we
him

do worship. As
God,

we

cast

down
if

ourthat

before any

man, with intention

as
it is

of declaring by

sign that

we
is

esteem

divine worship;

we do
civil

the same thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the

power,

it

civil

worship. Neither
civil,

is

the divine worship dis-

tinguished from

by any action usually understood by the

words XcxrpEia and bouXeia, whereof the former marking out

the duty of servants, the latter their destiny, they are words of the same action in degree.
19.

reigning by the
first, if

From what hath been said may way of natural reason

be gathered, that
only, subjects

God
sin,

do

they break the moral laws, which are unfolded in chap-

RELIGION
ters
II.

193

and

in. Secondly, if they

break the laws or

commands
if

of the city in those things

which pertain

to justice. Thirdly,

they worship not

confess not before

God Kaxd
men, both

toc vo^iiKa.

Fourthly,

if

they
is

in

words and deeds,

that there

one

God most

good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme

all

King
of

of the

world and of

worldly kings; that

is

to say,

if

they do

not worship God. This fourth sin in the natural

kingdom
it

God, by what hath been

is

said in the foregoing chapter in art. 2,

is

the sin of treason against the Divine Majesty. For

denying of the Divine Power, or atheism. For

just as
if

sins proceed here,

we

should suppose some

man

to

be the sovereign

king,

who

being himself absent, should rule by his viceroy.

sure they
all

Against

whom

would
to

transgress,

who

should not

obey his viceroy in

to himself, or

things; except he usurped the

it

kingdom
should

would give

some

other, but they

who

so absolutely obey him, as not to

admit of

this exception,

might

be said to be guilty of treason.

Chapter XVI

Of the Kingdom
(The

of

God under the Old Covenant

is

text of this chapter

omitted.)

Chapter XVII

Of the Kingdom
(The

of

God

by the

New

Covenant

text of this chapter

is

omitted.)

Chapter XVIII
Concerning Those Things Which Are Necessary for

Our Entrance
I.

into the Kingdom of

that
all

Heaven

It

was ever granted,

authority in secular matters

derived from

him who had

the sovereign power, whether he

were one
by the

man

or an assembly of

men. That the same

in spiritual
is

matters depended on the authority of the Church,

lastly

manifest
that all

foregoing proofs; and besides by

this,

Christian cities are Churches endued with this kind of authority.

From whence

man, though but

dull of apprehension,
is

may

collect, that in a

Christian city (that

to say, in a city
all

whose
power,

sovereignty belongs to a Christian prince or council)

as well spiritual as secular, fore
it

is

united under Christ, and there-

is

to be obeyed in all things.

But on the other

side, be-

we must rather obey God than men, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely be yielded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which Christ hath prohibited. The reason of this difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speaks to us by Christ and his
cause

prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by

divers

men

are diversely understood, they

know
to the

indeed what

princes
that

and a congregated Church do command, but whether

which they do command, be contrary

word

of

God
it

or not, this they

know

not; but with a

wavering obedience bespiritual death, as

tween the punishments of temporal and

were

sailing

between Scylla and Charybdis, they often run

themselves upon both. But they

who

righdy distinguish be-

tween the things necessary to

salvation,

and those which are

194

RELIGION
not necessary, can have none of this kind of doubt. For
if

195
the
it

command

of the prince or city be such, that he can obey

it is

without hazard of his eternal salvation,

unjust not to obey

(Col.
iii.

them; and the

apostle's precepts take

all

place

20,22):

Children obey your parents in

things: servants in all things

-flesh.

obey your masters according to the

Christ (Matth. xxiii. 2-3):

And

the

command
sit

of
in

The

Scribes

and Pharisees
they

Moses' chair;

all

things therefore whatsoever they

you, that observe and do.

On

the contrary,

if

command command

us to do those things which are punished with eternal death,

it

were madness not rather to choose to die a natural death,

than by obeying to die eternally; and then comes in that which

Christ says (Matth. x. 28): Fear not them

who

kjll

the body,
all

but cannot

J{ill

the soul.

We

must

see therefore

what

those

things are, which are necessary to salvation.

2.

Now

all

things necessary to salvation are comprehended

faith

in

two

virtues,

and obedience, the

latter of

these,

if

it

could be perfect, would alone

tion; but because

suffice to preserve us

from damna-

we have

all

of us been long since guilty of besides

disobedience against

God
this,
is

in

Adam, and
is

we

ourselves

have since actually sinned, obedience

remission of
sins.

not sufficient without

But

together with our entrance into the

kingdom
none but

of heaven,

the reward of faith;

nothing
is

else

is

requisite to salvation.
sinners, that

For the kingdom of heaven

is

shut to

to say, those

who

have not performed

if

due obedience

to the laws;

and not

to those neither,

they
if

believe the necessary articles of the Christian faith.

Now,
it

we
at

shall

know

in

what

points

obedience doth consist, and

will
at

which
the

are the necessary articles of the Christian faith,

once be manifest what

we must

do,

and what abstain from,

command

of cities

and

of princes.
this place
is

3.

But by obedience in

signified not the fact,

but the will and desire wherewith

we purpose and endeavour

196
as

RELIGION
as

much

we

can to obey for the future. In which sense the

is

word obedience
the
full

equivalent to

repentance;

for

the

virtue

of repentance consists not in the sorrow

which accompanies

remembrance

of sin, but in our conversion into the way,

is

and
said

purpose to sin no more; without which that sorrow

to be the sorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person.

But

because they
law,

who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine and they who love their neighbours cannot but desire to

obey the moral law, which consists as hath been showed above
in chap. in. in the prohibition of pride, ingratitude, contumely,

inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby

our neighbours are prejudiced, therefore also love or charity

is

equivalent to obedience. Justice also (which

is

a constant
it.

will of giving to every

man
itself

his

due)

is

equivalent with
for
salvation,

But that

faith

and repentance are

sufficient

is

manifest by the covenant

of baptism.

For they

who were
and
done

by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him,

what they should

mission of your

do, he

answered (Acts

ii.

38): Repent

be baptized every one of you in the

sins.

name

of Jesus for the reto be

There was nothing therefore

is

for the obtaining of baptism, that

to say, for to enter into

God, but to repent and believe in the name of kingdom of heaven is promised by the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words of Christ, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): Thou \nowest the commandments: Thou shalt not \ill, thou shalt not commit adultery, &c., which refer to obedience, and (Mark x. 21):
the

kingdom

of

Jesus; for the

Sell all that to faith.

thou

hast,

and come and follow me, which

is

relates
faith,

And

by that which

said:

The

fust shall live

is

by

(not every man, but the just); for justice

of will of St.

the same disposition

which repentance and obedience

are.

And

by the words

Mark

(i.

15):

The time

is fulfilled,

and the \ingdom of

RELIGION

197
by which
of other

God

is

at hand; repent

ye,

and

believe the gospel,

is

words

is

not obscurely signified that there

no need

virtues for our entrance into the

those of repentance and faith.

is

kingdom of God, excepting The obedience therefore which

is

necessarily required to salvation,

is

nothing

else

but the will

or endeavour to obey, that

to say, of

doing according to the

are the

laws of God, that

is,

the moral laws,

is

which

same

to all

men, and the

civil

laws, that

to say, the

commands

of sov-

ereigns in temporal matters, and the ecclesiastical laws in spiritual;

which two kinds

of laws are divers in divers cities

and

Churches, and are

sentences.
4.

known

by their promulgation and public

That we may understand what the Christian

faith

faith

is,

we

must define

in

general,

and distinguish
it

it is

from those
confounded.

other acts of the

mind wherewith commonly

is

The
is

object of faith universally taken, namely, for that

is

which

believed,

evermore a proposition, (that

to say, a speech

affirmative or negative)

which we grant

to

be true. But because

it falls

propositions are granted for divers causes,

out, that this

kind of concessions are diversely

tions sometimes,

called.

But we grant proposireceive not into our

till

which notwithstanding we

minds; and

this either for a time, to wit, so long,

by con-

sideration of the consequences, of them,

we have

well examined the truth

which we

call

supposing; or also simply, as through

is

fear of the laws,

which

to profess,

or confess by outward

tokens; or for a voluntary compliance sake, which

of civility to those
to others,

men

use out

whom

they respect, and for love of peace

which

is

absolute yielding.

Now

the propositions

which we
of our
itself,

receive for truth,

we

always grant for some reasons

own; and

these are derived either

from the proposition

or from the person propounding.

itself,

the proposition

by calling to

They are derived from mind what things those

words which make up the proposition do by common consent

198

RELIGION
which we
give,
is

usually signify. If so, then the assent

called
is

knowledge or

science.

But

if

we

cannot remember what

cer-

tainly understood

by those words, but sometimes one thing,

to be

sometimes another seem

said to think.

apprehended by

us,

then

we

are

For example,

if it

be propounded that two and

three

make

five;

and by
it is

calling to

mind

the order of those

numeral words, that

of

so appointed by the

common
it

consent

them who

are of the

same language with

us, (as

were by

a certain contract necessary for

human

society), that five shall

be the name of so

many

unities as are contained in

two and

three taken together, a

man

assents that this

is

therefore true
five:

because two and three together are the same with

assent shall be called knowledge,

this

and
it

to
is

nothing

else

but to acknowledge that

will
| | |

know this truth is made by ourselves.

number
|

For by whose
called two,

and

rules of speaking the

is
|

is

called three,
to

and
| | | |

is

called five,
is

by

their will also

it

comes

pass that this proposition

true,

two and
shall

three taken together

it

make

five.

In like

remember what
that theft

is

that

is

called theft,

manner if we and what injury, we

it

understand by the words themselves, whether

is

be true

an injury, or not. Truth

is

is

the

same with a true

embraceth
the sub-

proposition; but the proposition

true in

which the word con-

sequent, which by logicians

the
ject.

is

called the predicate,

word antecedent

in

its

amplitude, which they

call

And
it

that

know truth, is the same thing as to remember was made by ourselves by the common use of words.
to
it

Neither was
that

rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old,

it

knowledge was memory. But

happens sometimes that

signification

words although they have a certain and defined

they are so wrested from their

by constitution, yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive,

own

significations, that to refirst

member
things
is

the conceptions for which they were

imposed on

very hard, and not to be mastered but by a sharp

RELIGION
judgment and very great
are
diligence. It

199
happens
too, that there

many words which have no

signification;

proper, determined, and everytheir

where the same

own, but by

and are understood not by

virtue of other signs used together with them.

Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable.

things therefore whereof they are the words, there
ception;
is

Of

those

no con-

and therefore

in vain

do

we

seek for the truth of those

propositions,

which they make out

of the

words themselves. In

these cases, while by considering the definitions of words

we

search out the truth of

some

proposition, according to the

it

hope

we

have of finding

it,

we

think

sometimes
is

true,

and some-

times

false; either of

which apart

called thinking,

and

also for

believing; both together, doubting.

But when our reasons

derive

which we
proposition

assent to
itself,

some

proposition,

not from the

but from the person propounding,

is

whom we
no reason
grows not

esteem so learned that he

not deceived, and

we

see
it

why

he should deceive
of

us,

our assent, because

from any confidence

knowledge,
is

our own, but from another man's

called faith.

And

by the confidence of

whom we
By
faith

do

believe,

we

are said to trust them, or to trust in them.

said, the difference appears, first,
is

what hath been

and
this

between

profession; for that

always joined with inward assent,

this

not always. That

is

an inward persuasion of the mind,

faith

an outward obedience. Next, between

this

and opinion;

for

depends on our

own

reason, that

have of another. Lastly, between faith

deliberately takes a proposition

on the good esteem we and knowledge; for this

of words,

broken and chewed; that swal-

lows

it

down whole and

entire.

The
is

explication
is

whereby the matter enquired

to

after

propounded,
is

conducible

knowledge; nay, the only way to know,

this
is

by definition.

But

prejudicial to faith; for those things

which exceed

human

capacity,

and are propounded

explication, but

to

be believed, are never

more evident by

on the contrary more obscure,

200
and harder
to be credited.
to

RELIGION

And

the

same thing

befalls a

man,

who

endeavours

demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural

to a sick

reason,

which happens
pass, that

man, who

will

needs chew
pills;

before he will swallow his wholesome but bitter

it

whence

comes to

he presently brings them up again, which

if

perhaps would otherwise,

he had taken them well down, have

proved his remedy.

5.
it

We

have seen therefore what

it is

to believe.
is

But what

is

to believe in Christ?

Or what

proposition

that

which

is

the

object of our faith in Christ?

Christ,

For when we
but not what
else

say, I believe in

we

signify indeed
is

whom,

we

believe.

Now,

to believe in Christ
is

nothing

but to believe that Jesus

the Christ, namely he,

who
of

according to the prophecies of

Moses and the prophets of

to institute the

Israel,

was

to

come

into this

world

kingdom

God.

And

this sufificiendy
xi.

appears
25-27):

out of the words of Christ himself to Martha (John

7

am,

saith he, the resurrection

and the

life;

he that helieueth

in

me, though he were dead, yet shall he

live;

and whosoever

liveth

and

believeth in me, shall never die. Believest thou this?

I believe that

She

saith

unto him, Yea, Lord,

thou art the Christ

the Son of God, which should

come

into the world. In

which
is

words,

we

see that the question, believest thou in

art the

me?

ex-

pounded by the answer, thou

Christ therefore
is

Christ.

To

believe in

nothing

else

but to believe Jesus himself,

saying that he
6.

is

the Christ.
sal-

Faith and obedience both necessarily concurring to

vation,

what kind

of obedience that
art. 3.

same

is,

and

to

whom

due,

hath been showed above in

But now we must enquire

what

articles of faith are requisite.

is

And

I say,

that to a Chris-

tion * there

no other

article of faith

requisite as necessary

* Although I conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it, because I perceive that being somewhat new, it may pos-

RELIGION
to salvation, but only this, that Jesus
is

201
the Christ. But
art,

we must
articles

distinguish (as
faith
(if

we have

already done before in

4) between

and

profession.

profession therefore, of
necessary; for

more
it is

they be

commanded) may be
what
to

a part of

our obedience due to the laws. But

obedience, but
sibly

we

enquire not

faith, is necessary to salvation.

now what And this is

I

be distasteful
that Jesus
is

many
I

divines.
is

First

therefore,

when
I

say

this

article,

is

the Christ,

necessary to salvation;

say not that

faith only
is

necessary, but

require justice also, or that obedience which

that
is

due

to
I

the laws

of God,

to

say,

will

to

live

righteously.

deny not but the profession of many articles, (provided that that profession be commanded by the Church) is also necessary to salvation. But seeing faith is internal, profession external, I say that the former only is properly faith; the latter a part of obedience; insomuch as that article alone sufficeth for inward belief, but is not sufficient for the outward profession of a Christian. Lastly, even as if I had said that true and inward repentance of sins was only necessary to salvation, yet were it not to be held for a paradox, because we suppose justice, obedience, and a mind reformed in all manner of virtues to be contained in it. So when I say that the faith of one article is sufficient to salvation, it may well be less wondered at, seeing that in it so many other articles are contained. For these words, Jesus is the Christ, do signify that Jesus was that person, whom God had promised by his prophets should come into the world to establish his kingdom; that is to say, that Jesus is the Son of God, the creator of heaven and earth, born of a virgin, dying for the sins of them who should believe in him; that he was Christ, that is to say, a king; that he revived (for else he were not like to reign) to judge the world, and to reward every one according to his works, for otherwise he cannot be a king; also that men shall rise again, for otherwise they are not like to come to judgment. The whole symbol of the apostles therefore contained in this one article; which, notwithstanding, I is thought reasonable to contract thus, because I found that many men for this alone, without the rest, were admitted into the kingdom of God, both by Christ and his aposdes; as the thief on the cross, the eunuch baptized by Philip, the two thousand men converted to the Church at once by St. Peter. But if any man be displeased that I do not judge all those eternally damned, who do not inwardly assent to every article defined by the Church (and yet do not contradict, but, if they be commanded, do submit), I know not what I shall say to them. For the most evident testimonies of Holy Writ, which do follow, do withhold me from
Secondly,
altering

my

opinion.

202
proved,
first,

RELIGION
out of the scope of the Evangelists, v^^hich was by
life

the description of our Saviour's

to establish this one article;

and we
(chap,

shall

Evangelists,
i.),

know that such was the scope and counsel of the if we observe but the history itself. St. Matthew
at this genealogy,

beginning

shows that Jesus was of

ii.)

the lineage of David, born of a virgin; (chap,

that he

was

adored by the wise

men

as

king of the Jews; that Herod for

(chap,
iii.,

the same cause sought to slay him;

iv.)

that his

kingdom was preached both by John

(chapters
v., vi., vii.)

the Baptist

and himself;
that he cured

that he taught the laws, not as the Scribes,

viii., ix.)

but as one having authority; (chapters

diseases miraculously; (chap, x.) that he sent his apostles, the

preachers of his kingdom, throughout

to proclaim his

all

the parts of Judea

kingdom; (chap,

xi.) that

he commanded the

messengers, sent from John to enquire whether he were the

Christ
or
not,
to
tell

him what

they

had

seen,

namely,

the miracles which were only compatible with Christ; (chap,

xii.) that

he proved and declared his kingdom

parables,

to the Pharisees

and others by arguments,

and

signs;

and (the follow-

ing chapters to xxi.) that he maintained himself to be the Christ

against the Pharisees; (chap, xxi.) that he was saluted with
the
title

of king,

when he

entered into Jerusalem; (chaps,

xxii.,

xxiii., xxiv.,

xxv.) that he forewarned others of false Christs;

his

and that he showed in parables what manner of kingdom

for this reason, because he said he

should be; (chaps, xxvi., xxvii.) that he was taken and accused

was a king; and

that a

title

was written on
that all

his cross, this is Jesus the

\ing of the Jews;

lastly,

(chap, xxviii.) that after his resurrection, he told his apostles

power was given unto him both

which tends
to this end, that

in

heaven and in

earth. All

we

should believe Jesus

St.

to be the Christ.

Such therefore was the scope of But such

John

in describing his gospel.

as his was, such also

sets

Matthew was
expressly

the rest of the Evangelists; which

St.

down

RELIGION
in the

203

end of

his gospel

(John xx. 31): These things, saith he,

that Jesus
is

are written, that ye

of the living God.
7.

may know
is

the Christ, the Son

Secondly, this

proved by the preaching of the apostles.

of his

For they were the proclaimers

Christ send

kingdom; neither did

them
Acts

to preach
x.

aught but the kingdom of

God

(Luke

ix.

2;

42).

And what

they did after Christ his

ascension,

may

be understood by the accusation which was

xvii. 6-7):

brought against them (Acts

St.

They drew

Jason, saith
city, cry-

Luke, and certain brethren unto the rulers of the

ing,

These are the men that have turned the world upside down,
are

and
all

come

hither also,

whom

Jason hath received; and these

do contrary

to the decrees of Ccesar, saying that thei'e is anIt

other king, one Jesus.

apostle's

appears also what the subject of the

xvii.

sermons was, out of these words (Acts

2-3):

Opening and alleging out

of the Scriptures (to wit, of the

Old

Testament) that Christ must needs have su-Qered, and risen

again from the dead, and that this Jesus
8.
is

the Christ.
easiness

Thirdly, by the places in

which the

of those

things which are required by Christ to the attaining of salvation, is declared.

For

if

an internal assent of the mind were

necessarily required to the truth of all

and each proposition

which

this

day

is is

controverted about the Christian faith, or by

diversely defined, there

divers churches

would be nothing
then would

more

difficult

than the Christian religion.

And how
easy

that be true (Matth. xi. 30):

light;

My

yo\e

is

and my burden

and that (Matth.

(i Cor.
i.

xviii. 6): hittle

It

ones do believe in him;

and that

21):

pleased

preaching, to save those that

God by the foolishness of believe? Or how was the thief

instructed to salvation, the
in these words: Lord,

hanging on the
confession of

cross

sufficiently

whose

faith

was contained

remember me when thou comest

into thy

kingdom? Or how

204
could
St.

RELIGION
Paul himself, from an enemy, so soon become a doctor

of Christians?
9.

Fourthly, by
neither rests

this,
it

that that article

is

the foundation of

faith,

on any other foundation. Matth. xxiv.

unto you,

23, 24: //
is

any man
it

shall say

ho

here

is

Christ, or

he

there, believe

not; for there shall arise false Christs

shall

and
&c.

false prophets,

and

show

great signs

and wonders,

Whence
i.

it

follows, that for the faith's sake

which we have in
saith the apostle,

this article,
8:

we must

not believe any signs and wonders. Gal.

Although we or an angel from heaven,

should preach to you any other gospel, than what

preached,
fore,
let

we have

him be

accursed.

By reason

of this article, there-

we might

not trust the very apostles and angels themI

selves

(and therefore,

conceive, not the

i

Church
1-2:

neither)

if

they should teach the contrary,

John

iv.

Beloved, believe

not every

spirit,

but try the

spirits

whether they are of God,

spirit that confesseth
&ic.

because

many

false

prophets are gone out into the world. Hereby

hjiow ye the
Christ
is

spirit of

God; every
is

Jesus

is

come

in the flesh,

of

God,

That

article therefore

the measure of the

is

spirits,

whereby the authority

It

of

the
in-

doctors

either received, or rejected.

all

cannot be denied,

deed, but that

who

at
it

this

day are Christians, did learn

all

from the

doctors, that

was Jesus who did

those things

whereby he might be acknowledged

to be the Christ.

Yet

it

follows not, that the same persons believed that article for the
doctors' or the Church's, but for Jesus' his
article

own

sake.
xvi.

For that
18), al-

was before the Christian Church, (Matth.

all

though

the rest were after

it

it;

and the Church was founded

the rest are by St.
11-15):

upon
is

it,

not

upon
is

the Church. Besides, this article, that Jesus

all
iii,

the Christ,

so fundamental, that
it

Paul said to be built upon

foundation can no
Jesus Christ (that

(I

Cor.

For other
which
is if

man
is

lay,

than that which

is

is laid,

to say, that Jesus

the Christ).

Now

RELIGION
any man build upon
stones,
this

205
silver,

foundation, gold,

precious

wood, hay, stubble, every man's wor\

if

shall be

made

manifest;

any man's wor\ abide which he hath

if

built there-

upon, he shall receive a reward;

any man's wor\ shall be

burnt, he shall swQer loss, but he himself shall be saved.

From
this

whence
stones,

it

plainly appears, that by foundation

is

understood

article, that Jesus is

the Christ: for gold, and silver, precious

signified)
false

wood, hay, stubble (whereby the doctrines are

are not built

upon the person

of Christ;

and

also, that
so, as

doctrines

may

be raised upon this foundation, yet not

they

must
10.

necessarily be

damned who

teach them,
is

Lastly, that this article alone

needful to be inwardly

believed,

may

be most evidently proved out of

many
John

places
v. 39:

of holy Scripture, let

who

will be the interpreter.

Search the Scriptures, for in them ye thin\ ye have eternal

life;

and they

are they which testify of me.

But Christ meant

the Scriptures of the

Old Testament

only; for the

New

was

then not yet written.

Now,

there

is

no other testimony conto be

cerning Christ in the Old Testament, but that an eternal king

was

to

come

in such a place, that

he was

born of such
as

parents, that he

was

to teach

and do such things, whereby,

so born,

by certain

signs,

he was to be known. All which

testify this

one thing, that Jesus

who was

and did teach and do

John

such things, was the Christ. Other faith then was not required
to attain eternal life, besides this article,
xi.

26:

Whoso-

ever liveth

and
is

believeth in me, shall never die.

But

to believe

in Jesus (as Jesus

there expressed)
Christ.

is

the

same with believing

that
believes
that,
is

that
shall

was the

He

therefore

never die; and by consequence, that

to salvation. John xx. 31:

article

alone

necessary

These are written, that ye might be-

lieve that Jesus is the Christ, the

Son of God; and that

believ-

ing, ye

might have

life

through his name. Wherefore he that

life,

believes thus, shall

have eternal

and therefore needs no

206
other faith,
Jesus Christ
i

RELIGION
John
iv.

2:

Et/ery spirit, that confesseth that

is

come

in the flesh, is of
is

God.

And
is

John

v. i:

Whosoever

helieveth that fesus

v. 5:

the Christ,

born of God.

And

John

Who

is

he that overcometh the world, hut he

is

that believeth that Jesus

the Son of
else, to

God?

If therefore

there

be no need to beHeve anything

of
is

the end a

man may be
that Jesus
salvation.

God, born of God, and overcome the world, than

the Christ; that one article then
viii.
is

sufficient to

Acts

36-37: See, here

is

water; what doth hinder

me
all

to

he

baptized?
heart,

And
is

Philip said. If thou helievest with

thine

thou mayest.

And

he answered and

said, I believe that

Jesus Christ

the Son of God. If then this article being be-

lieved with the

whole heart (that

for baptism,
it

is

to say, with

inward faith)
for

was

sufficient

is

also sufficient

salvation.

Besides these places, there are innumerable others, which

clearly

do

and expressly

affirm the

same

thing.

Nay, wheresoever
any one

we

read that our Saviour

commended

the faith of any one, or

that he said, thy faith hath saved thee, or that he healed

for his faith's sake, there the proposition believed

was no other

but

this, Jesus is

the Christ, either directly or consequently.

II.

But because no

man

can believe Jesus to be the Christ,

is

who, when he knows that by Christ

king
for to be the
lieve

understood that same

the prophets,

who was promised from God by Moses and

king and Saviour of the world, doth not also bethese,

it

Moses and the prophets; neither can he believe

believes not that

who
is

God

is,

and

that he governs the world;

necessary, that the faith of

this

be contained in

faith of

God and of the Old Testament the New. Seeing therefore that
kingdom of of God by
rules

atheism, and the denial of the Divine Providence, were the

only treason against the Divine Majesty in the

God by

nature, but idolatry also in the

kingdom

the old covenant;

now

in this

kingdom wherein God

is

by way of a new covenant, apostasy

also added, or the re-

RELIGION
nunciation of this article once received, that Jesus
is

207
the Christ.

Truly other doctrines, provided they have their determination

from

a lawful Church, are not to be contradicted; for that

it

is

the sin of disobedience. But

hath been fully declared before,

that they are not needful to be believed with an

12.

inward

faith.

Faith and obedience have divers parts in accomplishing

the salvation of a Christian; for this contributes the power or

capacity, that, the act;

and

either

is

said to justify in

its

kind.

For Christ forgives not the

or the obedient, that
is

sins of all

men, but

of the penitent

to say, the just. I say not the guiltless,

but the

just; for justice is a will of

obeying the laws, and

may
faith.

be consistent with a sinner; and with Christ, the will to obey

is

obedience. For not every

man, but the

because

just shall live

by

Obedience therefore

justifies,

it

maketh

just

in

the

same manner
such a

as

temperance maketh temperate, prudence pru-

dent, chastity chaste, namely, essentially;

state, as

and puts a man in

makes him capable

believe

of pardon. Again, Christ

hath not promised forgiveness of

those of

sins to all just

men, but only

them who

him

to be the Christ. Faith therefore

justifies in

such a sense as a judge

may

be said to

justify,

who
man;

absolves, namely, by the sentence

which

actually saves a
it

and

in this acception of justification

justifies,

(for

is

an equivocal

term) faith alone

but in the other, obedience only.

faith alone,

But neither obedience alone, nor

both together.
13.

do save

us,

but

By what hath been

who,
as

said hitherto,

it

will be easy to dis-

cern what the duty of Christian subjects

ereigns,

is

towards their sov-

long as they profess themselves Christians,

their subjects to
if

cannot

command

deny Christ, or

to offer

him

any contumely; for

they should

command

this,

they

would

profess themselves to be

no Christians. For seeing we have

things to obey their princes and gov-

showed, both by natural reason and out of holy Scriptures,

that subjects ought in
all

208
ernors, excepting those

RELIGION
which
are contrary to the

command

of

God; and

that the

commands

of

God,

in a Christian city, con-

cerning temporal
discussed by
city,

affairs, (that is to say,

those which are to be

human

reason) are the laws and sentence of the

delivered

the city to

from those who have received authority from make laws and judge of controversies; but concernis

ing spiritual matters, (that

to

say, those

which

are to be

defined by the holy Scripture) are the laws and sentences of

the
city, that is to say,

the Church, (for a Christian city and a

art. lo,

Church,
are the

as

hath been showed in the foregoing chapter,

same thing), delivered by pastors lawfully ordained,

have to that end authority given them by the
city; it

and

who

manifestly follows, that in a Christian

is

commonweal, obedience
tema

due

to the sovereign in all things, as well spiritual as

poral.

And
is

that the

same obedience, even from

Christian

subject,

due

in all temporal matters to those princes

is

who

are

no

Christians,

without any controversy; but in matters

spir-

itual, that is to say, those

things which concern God's worship,

to be followed.

some Christian Church

natural, but by the
tures.
them.''

is

For

it is

an hypothesis

of the Christian faith, that

God

speaks not in things super-

way

of Christian interpreters of holy Scripresist princes,

is

But what? Must we

Truly, no; for this

when we cannot obey

civil

contrary to our

covenant.

What must we do then.'' Go to Christ by martyrdom; which if it seem to any man to be a hard saying, most certain it is
that he believes not with his
Christ, the

whole

heart, that

Jesus

is

the

Son of the

living

God

(for he

would then

desire

to be dissolved,

and to be with Christ), but he would by a

feigned Christian faith elude that obedience which he hath

contracted to yield unto the
14.
city.
if

But some

men

perhaps will wonder,

the Christ,

(excepting this
is

one

article, that Jesus is

which only
all

necessary to

salvation in relation to internal faith)

the rest belong to

RELIGION
obedience, which

209

may

be performed, although a

man

do not

inwardly believe, (so he do but desire to believe, and

make
is

an outward profession,

as oft as

need requires, of whatsoever

it

propounded by the Church), how

so

comes about

that there are

many

tenets,

which

are

all

held so to concern our faith, that

except a
the

man do

inwardly believe them, he cannot enter into

if

kingdom

of heaven. But
is

he consider that in most con-

troversies the contention

about

human

sovereignty; in some,

matter of gain and profit; in others, the glory of wits; he will

surely

wonder
is

the

less.

The

question about the propriety of the

Church,
being

a question about the right of sovereignty. a

For

it

known what

Church

is, it

is

known

at
if

once to

whom

the rule over Christians doth belong. For

city

every Christian

be that Church which Christ himself hath

city, to

commanded

every Christian, subject to that

is

hear, then every subject

bound

to obey his city, that

is

to say,

him

or

them who have

the supreme power, not only in temporal, but also in spiritual

matters. But
is if

every Christian city be not that Church, then

universal,

there

some other Church more

which must be

obeyed. All Christians therefore must obey that Church just

as they

would obey Christ

if

he came upon earth. She will

of

therefore rule, either by the

way

monarchy, or by some

as-

sembly. This question then concerns the right of ruling.

To

the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility; for

whosoever were truly and internally believed by

that he could not err,

all

mankind,

would be sure

of

all

dominion, as well

temporal
refuse
it.

as spiritual, over all

mankind, unless himself would

dominion

For
is

if

he say that he must be obeyed in temporals

err,

because
is

it

supposed he cannot

that right of

immediately granted him. Hither also tends the privilege of

interpreting Scriptures. For he to

whom

it

belongs to interpret

the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of Scriptures,

hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine

210
all

RELIGION
of controversies whatsoever.

manner

But he

vi^ho

hath

this,

hath also the

command
word

over
of

Scriptures to be the

men who acknowledge God. To this end drive all the

all

the
dis-

putes about the power of remitting, and retaining sins; or the

authority of excommunication. For every
wits, will in all things yield that

man,

if

he be in his

man an

absolute obedience,

by virtue of whose sentence he

saved, or

believes himself to be either

damned. Hither
subjects as

also tends the

power of

instituting

societies; for they

depend on him by

whom

they subsist,
in

who

hath as
city.

many
this

monks, although living

an enemy's
judge

To

end

also refers the question concerning the to

of lawful to

matrimony; for he

whom

that judicature belongs,

all

him

also pertains the

knowledge of

those cases which

all

concern the inheritance and succession of

rights, not of private

the goods

and

men

only, but also of sovereign princes.

life

And

hither also in

some

respect tends the virgin

of ecclesi-

astical

persons; for unmarried

men have
it is

less

coherence than

others with civil society.

And

besides,

an inconvenience not

to be slighted, that princes

must bond
this

either necessarily forego the

priesthood (which

is

a great

of civil obedience) or have

also tends the canoniza-

no hereditary kingdom. To
tion of saints,

end

which the heathen

called apotheosis; for

he that
bring

can allure foreign subjects with so great a reward,

those

may

who

are greedy of such glory, to dare

it

and do anything.
posterity,

For what was

the Decii
others,

but an honourable

name with
after,

which
con-

and other Romans sought

cast themselves

and a thousand

who

upon

incredible perils?

The

troversies about purgatory,

and indulgences,

are matter of gain.

The

questions of free-will, justification, and the

manner

of re-

ceiving Christ in the sacrament, are philosophical. There are

also questions concerning

some

rites

not introduced, but

left

in the

Church not

sufficiently

purged from Gentilism. But

is

wc
the

need reckon no more. All the world knows that such

RELIGION

211

nature of men, that dissenting in questions which concern their

power, or

profit, or
It is

pre-eminence of wit, they slander and curse

at, if

each other.

not therefore to be wondered

almost

all

tenets (after

men grew

hot with disputings) are held forth by

some or other
into the

to be necessary to salvation

and

for our entrance

kingdom

of heaven.

Insomuch

as they

who

hold them

not, are not only

condemned
which

as guilty of disobedience

(which

in truth they are, after the

Church hath once defined them)

but of
out of

infidelity,

have declared above to be wrong,

many
him

evident places of Scripture.

xiv. 3, 5):

To which
him

add

this

one of Saint Paul's (Rom.

despise

Let not him that eateth,

not
that eateth not,

that eateth not,

and

let

judge him that eateth; for

God

hath received him.

One man

esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day

alif(e.

Let every

man

be fully persuaded in his

own mind.

(0

fr

'

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Due
Returned
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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

3 1262 04554 9614