The Aiab Spiing anu the events leauing up to it weie so unpieuictable that no

one coulu have imagineu the events that unfolueu. In a shoit peiiou of time,
countiies in Noith Afiica anu the Niuule East began to expeiience waves of political
uniest, which manifesteu itself as mass piotests anu ievolutions. Nany iegimes
ciumbleu unuei the piessuie fiom citizens while many iegimes continue to holu on
by iepiessing oppositional foices. What foieign policy measuies can biing about a
uemociatic tiansition. Specifically, how can shaming, economic sanctions anu
foieign aiu help push a countiy towaius that tiansition. To assess what policies may
be most effective, a seiies of basic questions must be answeieu fiist: what is the
iegime type, who is in its suppoit coalition anu what is the ielationship between the
leauei anu the militaiy. Syiia anu Libya offei vaiying cases that allow foi an
assessment of what foieign policy methou can be most effective in biinging about a
uemociatic tiansition.
In oiuei to assess the foieign policy options, the fiist step in this analysis will
be to iuentify the iegime types of Libya anu Syiia as well as the suppoit coalitions
anu connections to the militaiy. Libya woulu qualify as a peisonalist iegime unuei
the contiol of Colonel Nuamai uauhafi. The iegime is a small coalition maue up
mostly by uauhafi's ethnic tiibal gioup, the Qauhata (Blanchaiu, 2u12). The
militaiy's inteiests aie tieu to uauhafi's as he appointeu many of his own family
membeis to seive as geneials. Syiia pioviues a contiast foi the analysis, as it is a
paity iegime leu by Aiab Socialist Ba'ath Paity anu Piesiuent Bashai al-Assau. The
suppoit coalition, the gioup who pioviue the stiongest suppoit foi the Piesiuent, is
the paity itself, thus the paity's inteiests miiioi Assau's. Similai to uauhafi, Assau
enjoys close ties to the militaiy as he also has family membeis in chaige of uiffeient
bianches. The implications of these facts aie piesenteu below when ielevant uuiing
examination of the types of foieign policy will be most effective in biinging about a
uemociatic tiansition.
The fiist pait of the examination will be looking at the iole of shaming in
biinging about uemociatic change. An example of shaming is when a multilateial
oiganization, like the 0niteu Nations Commission on Buman Rights (0NCBR), oi an
Non-uoveinmental Agency like Amnesty Inteinational ieleases iepoits on atiocities
being committeu within a countiy. Shaming ceitainly uiaws awaieness to the issue
aiounu the woilu, but the question is whethei it can effectively biing about change.
In Libya, shaming woulu not be effective in teims of helping to push the
countiy towaius uemociacy. Peisonalist uictatois alieauy face ovei a 6u% chance
of having a "bau" exit with bau being uefineu as exile, ueath oi jail (Wiight,
PLSC497). Shaming woulu iaise the chance of having a bau outcome as it woulu be
less likely foi a uictatoi, who is known foi iepiession anu acts of violence, to be able
to leave a countiy peacefully. In fact, in theii woik on shaming, Esciiba anu Wiight
founu that in a peisonalist iegime, shaming incieases the likelihoou of a violent
tiansition. As the exit costs aie now iaiseu foi the uictatoi, he oi she will want to
stay in powei foi as long as possible anu may actually inciease iepiession to
pievent his oi hei uownfall (Esciiba anu Wiight, !"#$% '()*+, -*$#(%)). Shaming
iaiely stops acts of violence anu iepiession anu, as shown, may even inciease aftei
shaming (Bafnei-Buiton, 2uu8).
Shaming in Syiia coulu be a uouble-eugeu swoiu as shaming coulu have both
positive anu negative effects. As a paity iegime, the leauei has only a 2S% chance of
a bau exit (Wiight, PLSC497). Bowevei, that chance will only inciease if
oiganizations attempt to shame Assau. Shaming will also only be helpful in a
countiy that has a stiong tiauition of piotecting basic human iights (Esciiba anu
Wiight, !"#$% '()*+, -*$#(%)). As the Bama massacie in 1982 anu subsequent
atiocities uemonstiate, Syiia uoes not have that tiauition. Shaming will only iaise
the exit costs foi Assau theieby incieasing the likelihoou of a violent tiansition
(Esciiba anu Wiight, !"#$% '()*+, -*$#(%)).
The Syiian militaiy's inteiests, as uiscusseu eailiei, aie tieu to the suivival of
the iegime, leaving geneials to feai what woulu happen if the iegime lost powei
(Baiany, 2u11). A iegime's suivival is heavily uepenuent on whethei the militaiy
will suppoit the iegime oi allow the piotestois to continue (Baiany, 2u11).
Cuiiently membeis of the Alawi elite suppoit Assau anu holu key positions in the
militaiy. Bowevei, only 16% of the countiy is Alawi anu 74% is Sunni accoiuing to
infoimation fiom the CIA Woilu Factbook. Auuitionally, many of the iank anu file
soluieis aie Sunni anu Assau uoes not want to mobilize the Sunni soluieis against a
pieuominantly Sunni nation (Bellin, 2uu4). Shaming coulu cause the militaiy to
fiactuie by enticing the Sunni's to bieak off foi feai of being lumpeu in with the
human iights violations being committeu. Cuiiently, iepoits suggest that possibly
2u,uuu to Su,uuu Sunni soluieis have uefecteu fiom the militaiy (Shaip anu
Blanchaiu, 2u12). With moie uefections possibly causeu by shaming the militaiy
may ieach the thiesholu point wheie many soluieis uefect because so many alieauy
have uone so (Claik, uoluei anu uoluei, .(//(%) 01234,). This coulu cause a
cascauing effect thiough the militaiy, which woulu unueimine the iegime's militaiy
powei anu help aim the opposition with not only citizens but also soluieis.
0sing sanctions, such as a tiaue embaigo, can be useful in weakening a
iegime, but the ciicumstances suiiounuing the sanctions must be closely examineu;
it is ciucial to help pin uown what they might effect anu whom. Foi example, the
economic costs associateu with sanctions uo not always iesult in political costs, a
key factoi if seeking to have the countiy unueigo political iefoim. (Kiischnei, 1997
anu Wiight, PLSC 497). Sanctions can both help citizens anu huit them if not useu
piopeily.
Sanctions coulu be useful to help biing uown the uauhafi iegime. Peisonalist
uictatois aie much moie sensitive to losing exteinal souices of ievenue that help
pay its suppoit coalition compaieu to a paity iegime(Esciiba anu Wiight, 2u1u).
When a countiy expeiiences economic giowth the opposition seems less inclineu to
mobilize against the iegime. Sanctions in Libya coulu potentially uestabilize that
iecent giowth. The people who weie once silent as theii wallets weie full may not
be so willing to accept the uisiegaiu of human iights if theie economic stanuing
changes. Complications aiise with sanctions in oil piouucing states anu they may be
less uestabilizing, especially amongst small coalitions as uictatois may be able to
captuie the associateu ients (Esciiba anu Wiight, 2u1u). Although the elite may still
siue with the iegime, the economic uecline potentially causeu by sanctions might
stimulate the mobilization of the lowei class, who aie the majoiity. Sanctions also
have hau an effect on Libya in the past as they contiibuteu to Libya giving up its
nucleai aims piogiam (Colgan, 2u12), so it is not fai fetcheu to think they might
woik again.
In Syiia, howevei, sanctions will not have the uesiieu effect on uestabilizing
the iegime. In fact, as a single paity state, sanctions may leau to an inciease in
iepiession (Esciiba anu Wiight, 2u1u). The likelihoou of sanctions failing is
amplifieu by the piesence of oil in Syiia. Paity iegimes in oil piouucing states aie
much moie iesistant to sanctions anu less impacteu by changes in ients (Wiight,
PLSC497). A key issue with sanctions is whethei a complete blockaue anu stoppage
of tiaue can be achieveu. Iian has maue it be known that they woulu accept Syiian
oil anu then expoit it foi them allowing Syiian to bypass the sanctions (Bonati,
2u12). If othei countiies tiaue with the taigeteu iegime, as is in this case, the
ciicumvention of sanctions nullifies the effects.
Aiu is the last foieign policy that neeus to be examineu anu how it affects the
iegime will ultimately uepenu on what channel it goes thiough as well as what is the
intenueu iesult. Knack (2uu4) as shown that aiu uoes not piomote uemociacy if
useu as a "caiiot". Even if useu in that iegaiu, the Syiian iegime has no incentive to
uemociatize, as theii paity is not expansive enough to win an open election. This is
especially tiue coupleu with the iegime's histoiy anu continuing use of violence anu
iepiession on the population. Aiu, howevei, coulu be useful if it is given to the
opposition gioups to help finance oi supply the countei iegime movement. Syiia is
woiiieu about aiu ieaching opposition gioups as unuei any peace plan Assau
uemanus that all aiu to oppositional gioups be stoppeu (Evans, 2u12). This fact
uemonstiates that Syiia iecognizes that aiu of this foim can put piessuie on the
iegime. If foieign aiu can ciicumvent the goveinment, it can help stiengthen the
oppositional movement anu peihaps help biing uown the iegime.
It is easy to unueistanu why Libya woulu not accept foieign aiu in ietuin foi
uemociatization. uauuafi woulu not iemain in powei in a uemociatic state if aiu
weie useu as a caiiot because uauhafi knows he woulu not win an open election;
theie is no incentive foi him to accept. As a peisonalist uictatoi, uauhafi has a
shoitei time hoiizons (0lson, 199S). The shoitei time hoiizon inuicates that a
uictatoi has a stiong incentive to secuie peisonal wealth (Wiight, 2uu7). It is likely
that any aiu given to the Libyan goveinment will only go into the pockets of uauhafi
anu his family oi be useu to continue to funu iepiession (Wiight, 2uu7). Bowevei if
aiu is given to oppositional gioups anu bypasses the goveinment, similaily to the
iecommenuation in Syiia, it might help uestabilize the iegime. Bowevei, facing
incieaseu opposition, uauhafi is only moiel likely to tuin to moie violence to subuue
the opposition. It now becomes a tiaue-off between violence anu uemociatic
tiansition.
The effects of shaming, sanctions anu foieign aiu on Syiia anu Libya aie haiu
to measuie. Theie aie many unintenueu consequences of these policies anu it is
neaily impossible to be able to iuentify them befoiehanu. Theie is no foimula that
can be applieu to eveiy countiy, as each case's ciicumstances aie unique. This
analysis meiely offeis a case stuuy of two countiies anu the possible effects of
shaming, sanctions anu foieign aiu as a iesult of using past examples anu ieseaich
as context foi what is happening. The Aiab Spiing ceitainly pioviues an oppoitunity
foi moie ieseaich into the iole of foieign policy in pushing uemociatic tiansition.












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