Writ Petition Seeking Audio-Record

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NOTICE OF MOTION
To :
1. UNION OF INDIA
Acting through
The Secretary
Ministry of Law & Justice
NEW DELHI 110 003
2. GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI
Represented by its
Chief Secretary
Players Building
I.P.Estate
New Delhi 110 002
3. HON’BLE REGISTRAR GENERAL

High Court of Delhi
NEW DELHI – 110 003
4. HON’BLE REGISTRAR
High Court of Delhi
NEW DELHI – 110 003 … RESPONDENTS
IN THE MATTER OF:
DEEPAK KHOSLA ……….PETITIONER
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ……….RESPONDENTS
Dear Sirs,
Please take note that the accompanying Writ Petition is being filed by me on
behalf of my client before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, and which may be heard by the Hon’ble Court on any
date on or after 27-10-2009.
Please acknowledge receipt.
Thanking you,
Filed On : 26-10-2009 Deepak Khosla

PETITIONER
NEW DELHI Through :
K.V.DHANANJAY & SHEKHAR DEVASA
ADVOCATES FOR THE PETITIONER
127 Old Lawyers Chambers, Supreme Court,
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
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IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

EXTRAORDINARY CIVIL JURISDICTION
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO._____________OF 2009
IN THE MATTER OF :
DEEPAK KHOSLA ….PETITIONER
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
URGENT APPLICATION
The Registrar
Delhi High Court
New Delhi
Sir,
Kindly treat the accompanying petition as an urgent one. The grounds of urgency
are:
“URGENT EX PARTE DIRECTIONS ARE PRAYED FOR”
All necessary parties have been served.
Further, the reliefs prayed for are all inter-connected, and it is not possible to
disassociate them and file separate applications, hence, the petition and
application may be put up before this Hon'ble Court in the manner presented.
Furthermore, as various judgments and provisions of law have been extracted and
reproduced in the petition, there is some underlining / bold to draw the attention
of the Hon’ble Court to the operative part of the judgment / law. This is necessary
to aid the Hon’ble Court to save its time. Therefore, it is requested that the same
may be placed before the Hon’ble Court despite office objections, if any, which
would be to our sole risk and cost.
We undertake that we shall not rely on any annexures that may be illegible.
Please place the same accordingly at our risk and cost.

PETITIONER
NEW DELHI Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
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CIVIL WRIT PETITION No._____________OF 2009
[Under Article 226 read with Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(g), 20,
21, 39(a), 44 and 50, read with Articles 51A(b), 51A(h) and
51A(j) of the Constitution of India, read with Section 122
of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908), read with Section 7
of the Delhi High Court Act, read with Rules 14 and 18 of
the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, read with
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971].
IN THE MATTER OF:

Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ……RESPONDENTS
MEMO OF PARTIES
DEEPAK KHOSLA
S/o Shri R.P. Khosla
Aged about 50 years
House No.218
Sector XV-A
NOIDA 201 301 (U.P.) PETITIONER
AND
1 UNION OF INDIA
Represented by
Secretary
Ministry of Law and Justice
4th Floor, A Wing
Shastri Bhawan
New Delhi 110 001
2 GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

TERRITORY OF DELHI
Represented by its
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Chief Secretary
Players Building
I.P.Estate
New Delhi 110 002
3 REGISTRAR GENERAL
Delhi High Court
Sher Shah Road
New Delhi 110 003
4. REGISTRAR
Delhi High Court
Sher Shah Road RESPONDENTS
New Delhi 110 003
Filed On : Deepak Khosla

PETITIONER
218 Sector XV-A
26-10-2009 NOIDA
099 530 96650
NEW DELHI
Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
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IN THE MATTER OF :
DEEPAK KHOSLA ….PETITIONER
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
SYNOPSIS AND LIST OF DATES
Upto 1908 Contempt in India was covered by the principles of

common law as prevailing in England.
Dissatisfied with the above arrangement, consultations
were started by Lord Minto with the leaders of all the
1908-09 Provinicial Governments to evolve a Bill for regulating
acts of contempt of court.
Pursuant to these consultations between 1908-09, the
1910 - 1914 1911-1914 Bill was attempted to be introduced by

Government, but by that time, the Press Act of 1910 had
already been placed on the Statute Book, leading the
Government to believe that it was neither necessary nor
opportune to proceed with the intended legislation,
especially on account of the subsequent outbreak of World
War I. At that time, judicial proceedings in India were still
subjected to jury trials ; furthermore, by the fact that the
1911-1914 Bill was shelved partly because the Press Act
of 1910 was put into place also lends credence to the
petitioner’s argument that the main thrust of contempt
legislation in the past insofar as ‘criminal contempt’ is
concerned was to disallow the Press from misreporting or
deviating from an optimal standard of conduct in reporting
judicial proceedings, as this manner of publication might -
or could tend to - affect the minds of existing or potential
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jurors, and thereby might – or could interfere, or tend to

interfere – in the due course of judicial proceedings,.
The Contempt of Courts Act of 1925 was enacted. No
definition of what constituted contempt was provided
1925 within the body of the Act. Jury trials were still prevalent
in India.
The Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 was enacted, and
which Act repealed and replaced the Act of 1925. The
1952 definition of what constituted contempt still eluded from
being set out within the body of the Act. Jury trials were
still prevalent in India.
1959-60 The incident known as the Nanavati murder happened at
Mumbai (then known as Bombay).
Mr. Nanavati, a Naval Officer and a Parsi, charged with
1960 premeditated murder of another Naval Officer (Mr. Prem

Ahuja, who was allegedly his English wife Sylvia’s
paramour), was acquitted pursuant to trial by a jury. The
trial was accompanied throughout by numerous prominent
articles by a Mumbai newspaper (Blitz), which proclaimed
his innocence. The Blitz was owned by one Mr. Russi
Karanjia, also a Parsi. The acquittal by the jury led to
large-scale dissatisfaction with the concept of jury trials in
the Indian context.
Subsequently, in April 1960, soon after the Kawas
1960 Nanavati vs. Prem Ahuja murder trial was concluded (with
an acquittal by the jury of the Ld. Trial Court, but which
acquittal was reversed by the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court, as it was then known, and which reversal was
upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in November 1961),
a Bill was moved by one Shri Bibhuti Bhushan Das Gupta
in the Lok Sabha to consolidate and amend the law
relating to contempt of courts. The matter was referred by
the Government for further study to what came to be
known as the Sanyal Committee.
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Jury trials came to be abolished in India. The primary
1960 trigger was the acquittal in the case of the Nanavati

murder.
It was also at around that time that the Administration of
1960 Justice Act of 1960 was passed in the UK. By virtue of

Section 12 of that Act, even in the UK, accurate reporting
ceased to be a contemptuous act at least thereafter (if not
before).
1963 The Sanyal Committee Report tabled on 28-2-1963 stated
that : “On an examination of that Bill, the Government
appeared to have felt that the law relating to contempt of
courts was uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory, and
that in light of the constitutional changes which have
taken place in the country, it would be advisable to have
the entire law on the subject scrutinized by a special
Committee set up for the purpose”. Many sweeping
recommendations were made.
In its Conclusion, the Report stated : “Our conclusion,

therefore, is that Parliament is competent to legislate in
relation to the law of contempt subject only to the three
limitations we have mentioned, and there is no basis for
the theory that a court of record has the sole and
exclusive power to define and determine what amounts to
contempt of it authority.”
1971 Pursuant to the Sanyal Committee Report that the
Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 was given assent to, and
by virtue of which it repealed and replaced the Act of
1952. For the first time, definition of contempt were given
in the body of the Act itself. Furthermore, and again for
the first time, a distinction was attempted to be drawn in
the body of the Act itself between acts that constituted
defiance of a judicial order (which were defined in the Act
as “civil contempt”), and other acts intended to prejudice
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or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of

judicial proceedings, and hence, a definition was
attempted to be given to “criminal contempt” in light of
the preceding description.
The petitioner has got embroiled in extensive litigation of
2007-09 a most complex variety, spanning 8 courts across three

States. In most matters, he is invariably appearing as
petitioner-in-person. There are around 40 proceedings that
are ongoing. His adversary has committed large-scale
forgery of Company’s documents and records, and has
perjured himself before the Hon’ble Courts on numerous
occasions, both in false written submissions sworn under
oath, forged documents filed on judicial record, as well as
by means of oral submissions made by his counsels on his
behalf in court. These matters clearly demonstrate the
harm visited upon the petitioner due to an absence of a
faithful record of court-proceedings.
Upto the Present The instant Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the
date Constitution of India for the enforcement of the
fundamental right of the petitioner, guaranteed, inter alia,
under Article 21 of the Constitution, to a timely and
transparent resolution of his legal disputes brought before
this Hon’ble Court.
The petitioner wishes to non-intrusively audio-record
judicial proceedings that involve him before this Hon’ble
Court. The present writ petition is filed for the purpose of
seeking a declaration of entitlement to do so, and for a
corresponding restraint upon the Registrar-General and the
Registrar of this Hon’ble Court.
The petitioner is a party to judicial proceedings before this
Hon’ble Court in respect of several matters.
Judicial proceedings are presently not transcribed in this
Hon’ble Court. Every legal dispute brought before this
Hon’ble Court leads to an opportunity for submission of
oral arguments by parties to the judicial controversy. An
audio record of the oral arguments makes it possible to
prepare a word-by-word and a person-by-person account
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of the words spoken by participants to a judicial

proceeding.
The Petitioner further submits that he has not located any
legal provision that bars a litigant from audio-recording
judicial proceedings conducted by this Hon’ble Court.
This writ petition is therefore filed ex-abundanta cautela.
The petitioner most respectfully submits that, if only a
provision of law sought to exclude a litigant from audio-
recording his proceeding without first ensuring that an
official transcription mechanism existed inside a court, the
vires of such law would have been most earnestly
challenged before this Hon’ble Court by the Petitioner.
Orders made by this Hon’ble Court in its various
jurisdictions are appealable, whether on intra-court,
statutorily or on special leave to the Supreme Court. As
such, every appeal pursued on any Order made by this
Hon’ble Court would invariably benefit from Court
transcription.
Citing diverse grounds in support of the petitioner’s
entitlement to non-intrusively audio-record judicial
proceedings that involve his participation before this
Hon’ble Court, namely, that:
if only a transcript of the oral arguments could have
formed part of the record, the unwieldy gap between the
actual time and the effective time consumed by a case
could be drastically lessened;
the established methods by which judicial proceedings are
conducted at this court merit an immediate supplement.
Audio-recording of oral arguments is one such
supplement;
oral arguments assume as much significance as written
pleadings. As such, judicial proceedings, under such
circumstances, cannot be exposited merely by a perusal of
the written pleadings on either side to that judicial
proceeding;
the fact that this Hon’ble Court has chosen to not install
an official transcription apparatus so far has compelled
the petitioner to seek the present remedy to substitute for
the absence of such official machinery;
a judge’s time and attention is burdened with cases of
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varying legal flavour, subject, skill and variety. It would

be humanely impossible for any individual to attain a
degree of specialisation in the diverse branches of law
involved in cases brought before him. A transcript
represents an efficient mode of conveying the specifics of
a case to a judge;
a debate upon the precedential value of a decision of the
court must be administered with honesty and discipline
and a recording of such a debate is an indispensable tool
in ensuring honesty and discipline in the conduct of a
judicial proceeding at this Hon’ble court;
every litigant has a right to counsel and a derived right to
evaluate the effectiveness of his counsel. Transcript of
oral arguments performs an invaluable task in this
regard;
a judicial proceeding conducted without a pervasive
awareness of discipline thrust by precedent must
necessarily injure the expectations of a litigant and must
also injure the interests of society, by denying certainty to
the rule of law;
a justice delivery mechanism devoid of such transcript is
an unacceptable mode of delivery in a modern age which
has seen audio recording rapidly advance for the past 70
years;
it is simply impossible to expect a judge to satisfactorily
adjudicate upon a legal claim without subject wise
assistance from a competent and learned counsel. Any
such assistance is generally contained in the oral
arguments. An absence of transcript of the oral arguments
unreasonably deprives the judicial proceeding of a
critical resource;
a party to a judicial proceeding has an inherent right to
information about such proceeding and the consequent
right to preserve such information. This right is not fully
honoured as long as a party must reconstruct a judicial
proceeding by employing his own memory or that of his
counsel – given that generally, most individuals, two days
after first exposed to fresh information, recall no more
than 30 percent of such information;
a judicial body that already generates an official
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transcript is legally entitled to say that an unofficial

transcript serves no purpose – a judicial body that
expresses no inclination to generate its own official
transcript cannot, in any honesty, frown upon an effort of
a litigant to compensate for the court’s own failure to
generate an official transcript;
the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for in this
petition as a matter of law in view of the fact that he seeks
to impose no burden whatsoever upon any participant to a
judicial proceeding before this Hon’ble court;
in the pursuit of its judicial power, this Hon’ble Court is
effectively under a duty to consent to an arrangement that
is bound to render the adjudication more timely and
efficient, as sought by the petitioner;
a judicial body that is reluctant to reform itself is under a
constitutional duty to afford relief to a litigant who seeks
to mitigate the suffering brought about by the reluctance
of the Court to reform itself. Such a duty is clearly
founded under article 21 of the Constitution of India;
So filed, for the enforcement of the fundamental right of
the petitioner, in terms of article 21 of the Constitution, to
a timely and transparent resolution of his legal disputes,
under article 21 of the Constitution, brought before this
Hon’ble Court.
26-10-2009
Deepak Khosla
PETITIONER
NEW DELHI
Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
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[Under Article 226 read with Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(g), 20,
21, 39(a), 44 and 50, read with Articles 51A(b), 51A(h) and
51A(j) of the Constitution of India, read with Section 122
of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908), read with Section 7
of the Delhi High Court Act, read with Rules 14 and 18 of
the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, read with
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971].
IN THE MATTER OF :
A Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of the fundamental right of the petitioner,
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, to a timely and
transparent resolution of his legal disputes brought before this
Hon’ble Court ; for a declaration of entitlement to non-intrusively
audio-record relevant judicial proceeding, and for the issue of
corresponding restraint upon the officers of this Court.
BETWEEN:
DEEPAK KHOSLA
S/o Shri R.P. Khosla
Aged about 50 years
House No.218
Sector XV-A
NOIDA 201 301 (U.P.) PETITIONER
AND
1 UNION OF INDIA
Represented by
Secretary
Ministry of Law and Justice
4th Floor, A Wing
Shastri Bhawan
NEW DELHI 110 001
2 GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

TERRITORY OF DELHI
Represented by its
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Chief Secretary
Players Building
I.P.Estate
NEW DELHI 110 002
3 REGISTRAR GENERAL
Delhi High Court
Sher Shah Road
NEW DELHI 110 003
4. REGISTRAR
Delhi High Court
Sher Shah Road RESPONDENTS
NEW DELHI 110 003
The Humble Petition of the

Petitioner above-named
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH :
1. The instant writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental right
of the petitioner to a timely and transparent resolution of legal
disputes brought before this Hon’ble Court.
2. Respondent No. 1 is the Union of India, represented by the officer

authorised to take notice and to answer a cause of action as at
present. The constitution and organisation of a High Court is a
matter of exclusive Union legislation1.
3. Respondent No. 2 is the National Capital Territory of Delhi,

represented by the officer authorised to take notice and to answer
a cause of action as at present. The National Capital Territory of
Delhi, in its capacity as the Government for the territory in which
1
Schedule VII to the Constitution: List I. Entry 78. Constitution and
organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to
officers and servants of High Courts; persons entitled to practice before the
High Courts.
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this Hon’ble Court exercises its jurisdiction, is the largest litigant-

respondent before this Hon’ble Court in respect of writ petitions
instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Respondent No. 3 is the Registrar-General of this Hon’ble Court,

sued in his capacity as the administrator and executive head of
this Hon’ble Court.
5. Respondent No. 4 is the Registrar of this Hon’ble Court, sued in

his capacity, inter alia, as the Secretary of the ‘Rules Committee’.
This Committee has been formed by this Hon'ble Court for
review / amplification / expansion / amendment / clarification of the
Delhi High Court Rules, which act(s) are performed by this
Hon'ble Court in exercise of the powers vested in it by Section 122
of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 7 of the Delhi
High Courts Act, read with Rules 14 and 18 of the Delhi High
Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967
6. The petitioner wishes to non-intrusively audio-record judicial

proceedings that involve him before this Hon’ble Court. The
present writ petition is filed ex abundanti cautela for the purpose of
seeking a declaration of entitlement to do so, and for a
corresponding restraint upon the Registrar-General of this Hon’ble
Court from interfering and/or preventing the same.
7. The Petitioner further submits that he has not located any legal
provision that bars a litigant from audio-recording judicial
proceedings conducted by this Hon’ble Court. This writ petition is,
therefore, filed purely ex abundanti cautela. The petitioner most
respectfully submits that if a provision of law existed which sought to
exclude or restrain or restrict a litigant from audio-recording court
proceedings relating to him without first ensuring that an official
transcription mechanism existed inside a Court, the vires of such
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law, with the greatest of promptitude, would have most earnestly

been challenged by the Petitioner before this Hon’ble Court.
8. The petitioner is a party to judicial proceedings before this Hon’ble

Court in respect, inter alia, of the following matters:
Position of the
Petitioner (as
Sl. Case No. Title Progress in the
party)
case
No.
1. Co.A No. 6 of 2008 Montreaux Resorts 45-50 of pre-notice
(P) Ltd & Anr. Vs. in review hearings Respondent No. 11.
Mr. Vikram Bakshi have been held next
& Ors. date is 12-11-2009.
2. Co.A No. 7 of 2008 R.P. Khosla vs.
Montreaux Resorts ---do--- Respondent No. 10.
(P) Ltd & Ors.`
3. CCP No. 15 of Montreaux Resorts Notice issued on 3- Arguing for his
2008 in Co.A No. 6 (P) Ltd & Anr. Vs. 10-2008 ; next date wife, petitioner
of 2008 Mr. Vikram Bakshi is 13-11-2009. Mrs. Sonia Khosla.
& Ors.
4. Crl. Misc. (Co) Mrs. Sonia Khosla Listed around 45-50 Arguing for his
Application No. 3 vs. Mr. Vikram times till date ;l no wife, petitioner
of 2008 Bakshi & Ors. hearing has been Mrs. Sonia Khosla.
held. next date is 6-
11-2009.
Application No. 4 vs. Mr. Vikram times till date ; wife, petitioner
of 2008 Bakshi & Ors. practically no Mrs. Sonia
hearing has been Khosla.
11-2009.
Application No. 5 vs. Mr. Vikram times till date ; no wife, petitioner
11-2009.
11-2009.
11-2009.
11-2009.
held.
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held. next date is
13-11-2009.
12. CCP No. 215 of Montreaux Resorts Notice issued ; next Arguing for his
2008 (P) Ltd & Anr. Vs. date in the matter is wife, petitioner
Mr. Vikram Bakshi 18-12-2009. Mrs. Sonia
& Ors. Khosla.
Mr. Vikram Bakshi 18-12-2009. Mrs. Sonia Khosla.
& Ors.
Mr. Vikram Bakshi 18-12-2009. Mrs. Sonia Khosla.
& Ors.
15. CCP No. 343 of Montreaux Resorts Hearing is awaited.
2008 (P) Ltd & Anr. Vs. next date is 26-11- Petitioner No. 3.
Mr. Vikram Bakshi 2009.
& Ors.
16. CCP No. 165 of Montreaux Resorts Notice issued ; next
2008 (P) Ltd & Ors. Vs. date is 18-12-2009. Respondent No. 2.
Mrs. Sonia Khosla
& Anr.
17. Crl. Contempt No. Mrs. Sonia Khosla Notice issued on Arguing for his
4 of 2009 vs. Mr. Vikram 21-8-2009 ; next wife, petitioner
Bakshi. date is 4-2-2010. Mrs. Sonia Khosla.
18. Crl. Contempt No. Mr. Deepak Khosla Notice issued on 9-
22 of 2009 vs. Mr. Vikram 10-2009 ; next date
Petitioner.
Bakshi. is 4-2-2010.
9. Judicial proceedings are presently not transcribed in this Hon’ble

Court. Every legal dispute brought before this Hon’ble Court leads to
an opportunity for submission of oral arguments by parties to the
judicial controversy. An audio-record of the oral arguments makes it
possible to prepare a word-by-word and a person-by-person account
of the words spoken by participants to a judicial proceeding.
10. Transcription has become an integral part of judicial proceedings in

several democratic nations of the world. Appellate Courts in many
jurisdictions routinely order for a retrial should a trial be vitiated by
lack of official transcript. The Appellate Courts in those jurisdictions
routinely consult transcript of proceedings cited as a precedent for
the purpose of settling conflicting interpretations of a precedent. The
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Constitutional Courts in several jurisdictions have traditionally relied

upon transcript of oral arguments for the proper appreciation and
adjudication of issues presented to them.
11. The petitioner respectfully seeks to audio-record those judicial

proceedings which involve him. The recording would be done by a
tiny device, which, without any displacement, can capture every
sound generated in that specific Court room. This device can even
be worn inside a pocket of a shirt or a trouser. This device makes no
sound or noise whatsoever as its mechanism and operation are
electronic.
12. Orders made by this Hon’ble Court in its various jurisdictions2 are
appealable, whether on intra-Court, statutorily or on special leave to
the Supreme Court. As such, every appeal pursued on any Order
made by this Hon’ble Court would invariably benefit from Court
transcription3.
13. Every appeal is a continuation of the trial or the original proceeding 4,

and every appeal is nothing but an assignment of errors committed
by the Court below. A transcript of the proceeding before the Court
2
67. The High Courts in India are superior Courts of record. They have original
and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless
expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary
jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including
the jurisdiction to determine their own powers. (See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) 3 SCR 744]. As stated in
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, Vol.10, para 713:
Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a
superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is
within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court unless it is expressly shown
on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the
cognizance of the particular Court.
M.V.Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd. [AIR 1993 SC
1014 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433]
3
“A good oral argument is in the finest tradition of our profession: it confers a
benefit both upon your client and upon the Court. You should seize the
Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy, 27 S. Texas L. Rev. 303 (1986).
4
‘the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal, are really but
West, J., in Chinto Joshi v. Krishnaji Narayan ILR (3) Bom 214 : 4 Ind.
Jur. 33
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below helps an Appellate Court in accurately reconstructing a trial.

The efficacy of an appeal is largely determined by the accuracy with
which a trial below could be reconstructed before the Appellate
Court. Because written pleadings are contextualised through oral
arguments, for the proper assignment of an error, a transcript of the
oral arguments laid before the Appellate Court becomes both
necessary and desirable ; in recognition of this, recording devices
are commonplace, and transcribing professionals are active in every
part of the world and more so in the city of Delhi and its adjuncts,
Noida and Gurgaon. As a matter of fact, India is one of the leading
transcription centers for legal manuscripts, offering its services for
converting an audio electronic file into written text for customers the
world over.
14. Further, it has been a tradition with every High Court (including this
Hon’ble Court) to periodically assign different subjects to different
judges - what is known as a ‘Roster’. In view of the fact that the
average time consumed by a Bench to dispose a matter before it is
significantly higher than the typical duration of a Roster, it is only to
be expected that different judges may preside over the adjudication
of the same matter before a High Court. In the absence of a proper
record of the arguments delivered in a given case, a judge who
hears a case but does not conclude the arguments is disabled from
conveying the progress in a case to a different judge who takes over
the subject matter. The efficiency of a judicial proceeding is greatly
hindered when parties are forced to compensate their counsel for
idle or redundant appearances. As such, unless a proper record of
the oral arguments in a case is available, the delay in adjudicating a
case beyond the typical length of a roster results in substantial delay
and denial of justice.
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15. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under

Article 21 of the Constitution of India5. Although Article 21 of the
Constitution has been interpreted by Courts in India to confer a right
upon an accused in a criminal trial to an expectation of a speedy
trial, the principle that underlies such interpretation applies with
equal force to a civil judicial proceeding. Parties to a judicial
proceeding have a fundamental right to efficacious justice, leading to
their legitimate expectation, inter alia, of speedy trial and error-free
adjudication6.
16. The common law tradition that India has adopted recognises an
individual’s entitlement to justice. As such, even while lakhs of
litigants approach a Court, the cases they bring before a Court are
personal and private except in cases of public interest litigation. As
such, the harm that is caused by the delay in the disposal of an
individual case is both real and profound. Such harm is real to the
parties to that case and also to persons claiming under those
parties. As such, an individual party to a case is fully justified in
seeking to redress such harm in a manner sought in the present
petition.
17. Miniature digital audio-recorders which are several times smaller

than the smallest cell phone in use today are widely used in the
society, and a party to a judicial proceeding cannot be reasonably
excluded from utilising such device in a Courtroom under
circumstances such as those set out in the present petition.
18. The recording technology has been known to India for well over 70
years. In those 70 years, the technology has rapidly advanced and
the recording instruments have continually shrunk in size, as well as
5
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [AIR 1979 SC 1360 :
1980 (1) SCC 81]
6
‘To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.’ –
Clause 40, Magna Carta
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have become totally unobtrusive. As an example, a digital voice

recorder manufactured by Samsung Corporation (Seoul, South
Korea) and branded as SAMSUNG YP-Z5F weighs a mere 56
grams only, and the dimension of this instrument is a mere 42.2 mm
(width) * 89.8 mm (length) * 12.3 mm (thickness). A copy of the
manual of this instrument is produced herewith and marked as
Annexure A. It features an internal storage capacity of 4 Gigabytes.
It makes no noise whatsoever when operated specially on account
of the fact that it has no built-in speaker. It has the potential to
capture sound generated within a short distance and is capable of
uninterruptedly recording spoken words for well over 12 hours at one
stretch. This device may be worn inside a pocket of a shirt or a
trouser. The recording once made by this device is, at the end of the
day or upon need of the owner, transferred to a computer (transfer
typically completes in 5 to 20 seconds). The audio recording is then
transcribed manually, or automatically by software validly licensed
for the purpose, with the subsequent manual intervention being only
to review and correct errors (if any) that may have crept in into the
automatic conversion of the audio file into typed text
19. It is submitted that the city of Delhi and its adjuncts, Gurgaon and
Noida, are home to several thousand transcription professionals who
have the expertise to transcribe the spoken word with 100 %
accuracy. Transcription software currently available in the market
assures a 99% percent accuracy, and the petitioner will take steps to
ensure that the transcription prepared for him will remain 100%
faithful to the spoken word. The petitioner will keep the audio-
recording file for his reference. The transcription would be promptly
made available in no time to the Bench, if so instructed by it. Copies
will also be freely distributed to the other parties to the case. For the
purpose of illustration, a copy of the transcript of oral arguments
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the United States in the case
-21-
of William Crawford v. Marion Country Election Board7 is produced

herewith and marked as Annexure B.
20. It is further submitted that the Annual Report for this Hon’ble Court
published for the Financial Year 2007-2008 and made available on
the website of the Court at www.delhihighcourt.nic.in sheds light on
the factual aspects of judicial work at this Court. A copy of the same
is produced herewith and marked as Annexure C. A perusal of the
said report discloses an alarming number of arrears at this Court.
The arrears as on 31-Mar-2008 stood at 1,38,4118. It has been
estimated that at the current rate of disposal, a few hundred years
would be required to clear the arrears at this Court. However, if only
one were to review the ‘actual’ time which has been spent on
debating an issue before the Court, and the time consumed by
redundant debates is excluded therefrom, the ‘effective’ time spent
on adjudicating a case would be seen to be substantially lower than
the time actually consumed by that case. Therefore, if only a
transcript of the oral arguments could have formed part of the
judicial record, the inordinately large and unwieldy gap between the
‘actual’ time and the ‘effective’ time consumed by a case could be
drastically lessened, thereby leading this Hon'ble Court to dispose
off a larger number of pending cases within the same time and
infrastructural resources available to it, and with no change
whatsoever in the existing infrastructure. Assuredly, this is a matter
for the “Public Good”, and hence, any effort by this Hon'ble Court in
this direction would only be in execution of what is implicit in “Public
Policy”.
7
This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a state law that
introduced an amendment to the prevailing election law by limiting voting to
only those individuals who produced the prescribed identification.
8
Article 226 Cases: 25742 / Civil Cases (Appellate side): 16205 / Tax Matters:
4551 / Civil Miscellaneous Applications: 27653 / Criminal Cases: 13798 /
Criminal Miscellaneous Applications: 18514 / Arbitration and Allied Cases:
11354 / Execution Applications: 2843 / Interlocutory Applications: 18046
-22-
21. It is further submitted that the problem of arrears at the High Courts
has been most earnestly looked into by several reports prepared by
the Law Commission of India. The Law Commission of India, in its
One Hundred Twenty Fourth Report (1988) said this much:
1.6. As many as ten attempts9 have been made in the past by

Commissions and Committees to tackle the problem of
exploding Court dockets in the High Courts. Numerous
suggestions for improving the situation by amending
substantive and procedural laws were made. A few have been
implemented but majority put in deep freeze….
22. It is therefore submitted that if only this Hon’ble Court were to

incorporate into the judgment of every case, a record of the total
hours consumed by oral arguments spread over various dates, the
inefficiencies brought about by the absence of a transcript will
become glaringly evident - If a case lodged in, say, 2001 is disposed
in 2009, and the actual time consumed by oral arguments is no more
than, say, 48 hours, the structural inefficiencies brought about by the
absence of a transcript could become glaringly evident. The present
request by the petitioner to record oral arguments must be seen in
light of this context. The established methods by which judicial
proceedings are conducted at this Court merit an immediate
9
Report of the High Court Arrears Committee 1949;
Law Commission of India, 14th Report on Reform of Judicial Administration
(1958)
Law Commission of India, 27th Report on Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (1964)
Law Commission of India, 41st Report on Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(1969)
Law Commission of India, 54th Report on Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (1973)
Law Commission of India, 58th Report on Structure and Jurisdiction of the
Higher Judiciary (1974)
Report of High Court Arrears Committee, 1972
Law Commission of India, 79th Report on Delay and Arrears in High Courts and
other Appellate Courts (1979)
Law Commission of India, 99th Report on Oral and Written Arguments in the
Higher Courts (1984)
Satish Chandra’s Committee Report, 1986
-23-
supplement. Audio-recording of oral arguments is one such

supplement10. It is most relevant to this petition to respectfully
highlight and emphasise that the petitioner is neither offering, nor
seeking, a solution to the problems he has chronicled which, by any
stretch of the imagination, may be termed as a “drastic” solution that
seeks to inflict any pain or discomfort or even inconvenience to any
party to judicial proceedings whatsoever, nor does his request
impinge on the stretched resources of this Hon'ble Court in any
manner whatsoever.The disadvantages that are caused by an
absence of audio-recording / transcription are far too many, and any
attempt to illustrate them in a fully-comprehensive manner must
simply fail. It is trite that arguments constitute a critical part of every
judicial proceeding in a High Court, perhaps even its most critical
part. In any Court of law, a legal controversy rarely proceeds to
judgment without adequate opportunity for arguments on both sides
of the controversy. As such, oral arguments assume as much
significance as written pleadings (if not more). As such, judicial
proceedings, under such circumstances, cannot be exposited merely
by a perusal of the written pleadings of either side to that judicial
proceeding11. A transcript of oral arguments becomes an inevitable
(nay, essential) ‘companion’ to all participants to a judicial
10
Our results therefore show that, like other elements of the Court’s
procedures, oral arguments matter to the decision in a case.
In sum, we show that the justices find oral arguments to be an important part
of the Court’s decision-making process, and that the quality of arguments, as
measured by Justice Blackmun, affects the justices’ votes. This result is
important, and it should help build Supreme Court scholars’ understanding of
how the process of decision making affects outcomes.
The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, University of Minnesota
PAUL J. WAHLBECK, George Washington University
JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II University of California, Davis
11
…However, the learned author referred to the decision in Sengupta Vs.
Holms, (2002) EWCA Civ 1104 at (38) and quoted the views of Laws L.J. where
the learned Judge held that central place is accorded to oral argument in our
common law adversarial system. The learned Judge further said that ...this I
think is important, because oral argument is perhaps the most
powerful force there is, in our legal process, to promote a change of
mind by the judge. That judges in fact change their minds under the
influence of oral argument is not an arcane feature of the system; it
is at the center of it (See pages 396 and 397 of the book).
-24-
proceeding, so much so that in the absence of such transcripts, a

gross injustice could and well may very well be likely to the cause of
one or the other party / ies to the litigation.
Moroeover, it would be trite to highlight that the extra time spent on

matter “A” (because, inter alia, of a lack of transcription) would
certainly be to the prejudice of the cause of other parties awaiting
adjudication of their matters before this Hon'ble Court, the hearing of
whose matters could be postponed and delayed on account of the
larger amount of time being required to be spent by this Hon'ble
Court on matter “A”.
This Hon’ble Court, in the case of DCM Ltd v. Municipal Corporation

of Delhi12, ruled that:
“27…The importance of oral hearing cannot be nullified by
saying that the authority has considered all the submissions
contained in the written arguments. Oral hearing generates
discussion and leads to clarification of doubt, if any, which the
authority while has to decide might be having in its mind. The
importance of benefit of a healthy discussion can never be
over emphasised. It is a basic tenet of law by which we are
governed….”
23. It is further submitted that this Hon’ble Court spent a sum of

Rs.42,45,47,490 (Rupees Forty Two Crores Forty Five Lakhs Forty
Seven Thousand And Four Hundred Ninety) for the financial year
2007-0813. It is respectfully submitted that all Court halls at this High
Court could be equipped with an official transcription apparatus at a
SRC Projects Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [Madras

High Court – Writ Appeals 893 of 2008 – Decided on 08-Sep-2008
(Division Bench)]
12
AIR 1998 Delhi 348 : 73 (1998) DLT 227 (Division Bench)
13
Annexure C. Page 40
-25-
cost that is a negligible fraction of the annual financial outlay

incurred at this Hon’ble Court. (The petitioner, based on his
research, estimates that the cost of installing a state-of-the-art
transcription apparatus at a Court hall costs no more than Rs.1
lakh). Unfortunately, the fact that this Hon’ble Court has chosen to
not install an official transcription apparatus so far has compelled the
petitioner to seek the present remedy to substitute for the absence
of such official machinery.
24. An absence of transcript burdens a judicial proceeding in myriad

ways.
25. A case listed on any given day generally requires the Judges to
peruse the pleadings, and therefore, consumes considerable time
and attention of a judge. Once a listed matter is called for
arguments, in practice, a range of developments are possible.
Arguments may commence and not conclude by the end of the day’s
business. Unless the arguments are resumed on the next (or a near)
working day, the absence of a transcript burdens the participants at
the next hearing with the avoidable task of making assumptions
about the progress in the previous hearing(s), which assumptions
may considerably vary from the actual. An absence of transcript,
under such circumstances, results in an easily-avoidable wastage of
judicial time, energy and devotion14.
26. Further, given the increasing number of cases that are filed every
day in a High Court, every addition to the back-log deprives each
case of a resolution within a reasonable time. The Annual Report
published by this Hon’ble Court estimates that an average of 64
14
"…not infrequently oral argument develops a new issue overlooked or not
adequately briefed. This gives the Court an opportunity to instruct counsel to
prepare supplemental briefing during a specified period."
(Mosk,In Defense of Oral Argument (1999) 1 J. App.Prac. & Proc. 25,
27.
-26-
cases were placed for hearing before a Bench on every working day
during 2007-08. The said Report further estimates that the average
time available for the disposition of a case by a Bench is a mere 4
minutes and 55 seconds15. An absence of transcript enhances such
unreasonableness by further depriving every adjudication of a critical
resource. A judge’s time and attention is burdened with cases of
varying legal flavours, subject, skill and variety. It would be humanly
impossible for any individual to attain a degree of specialisation in
the diverse branches of law involved in cases brought before him. A
transcript represents an efficient mode of conveying the specifics of
a case to a judge.
27. In ‘Oral Arguments And Decision Making on the United States

Supreme Court’ by Timothy R Johnson (published by State
University of New York Press, 2004), the significance of oral
arguments is illuminated with reference to the opinion of the Judges
of the United States Supreme Court and with further reference to the
actual working of the Courts :
‘…Things can be put in perspective during oral argument

in a way that they can’t in a written brief’ (O’Brien 2000,
260). Chief Justice Rehnquist (2001) confirms this point and
argues that a good oral argument ‘will have something to do
with how the case comes out’ (224).’ Pg.16
Clearly, these public statements suggest that justices believe

oral arguments play a key role in how they decide cases…
Justice Byron White (1982, 383) suggests that during these
proceedings the Court treats lawyers as resources. By this, he
seems to suggest that counsel come to the Court to provide
new or clarifying information, which enables the justices to
gain a clearer picture of the case at hand. Indeed, there may
15
Annexure C. Page 40
-27-
be points about which the justices are still unclear after

reading the briefs, and this face-to-face exchange can make
them clearer. As Chief Justice Rehnquist (2001) argues ‘one
can do his level best to digest from the briefs…what he
believes necessary to decide the case, and still find
himself falling short in one aspect or another of either the
law or the facts. Oral argument can cure these
shortcomings’. Pg.16
Justice William O. Douglas holds a somewhat different

perspective on oral arguments. He argues that these
proceedings are meant to teach the justices about the key
points of a case: ‘The purpose of a hearing is that the
Court may learn what it does not know…It is the
education of the Justices…that is the essential function
of the appellate lawyer’ (in Galloway 1989, 84). Moreover,
Justice John Harlan (1955) claims oral arguments are the best
mechanism for information gathering: ‘there is no
substitute…for the Socratic method of procedure in
getting at the real heart of an issue and in finding out
where the truth lies.’ Pg.16
…As Chief Justice Rehnquist (1984, 1021) writes: ‘Oral

argument offers a direct interchange of ideas between
Court and Counsel…Counsel can play a significant role in
responding to the concerns of the Judges, concerns that
counsel won’t always be able to anticipate when
preparing briefs’. Thus, for him, oral argument is ‘probably
the most important catalyst for generating further
thought’ (Rehnquist 2001, 241). Pg.16
-28-
Rehnquist (1986) best sums up how justices perceive oral

arguments: ‘Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States have almost unanimously agreed that effective
oral advocacy is one of the most powerful tools of the
profession’ (289). Even the principal skeptic (Justice Scalia)
changed his view once he joined the Court. Pg.16-17
…For instance, a justice may use oral arguments to probe the

applicability and interpretation of relevant precedent. In
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973), the Court was asked to determine
the constitutionality of using tax monies to reimburse
nonpublic schools for expense such as teacher salaries,
books and instructional materials (Epstein and Walker 1998b,
163). During oral arguments, one justice inquired about the
applicability of the standard set in Walz v. Tax Commission of
the City of New York (1970): ‘At least some of the opinions
in Walz suggest that there might be a distinction between
subsidy situations and tax exemptions? Isn’t is fair to say
that the Court’s opinion indicated some doubt – at least
doubt – about direct subsidy’.(transcript of oral argument,
37)? Pg.27
…In Hortonville Joint School District No.1 v. Hortinville

Education Association (1976), the Court considered whether a
school board could terminate teachers for striking without first
providing a hearing before an impartial decision maker. During
oral arguments, Justice White asked whether a federal
question even existed in the case:
‘It seems to me what you ought to be arguing is to
dismiss this case on the ground that it has not any
federal question in it. You keep talking about
Wisconsin law. As I understand, we brought the
-29-
case here because there was a federal issue in it.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the
school board wasn’t an unbiased body to make any
decision at all. And that is the issue that is here.
Why should we be arguing about what Wisconsin
law means?’ Pg.27
More recently, in Bush v. Gore (2000), Justices Kennedy and

O’Connor queried whether a federal question existed in the
disputed Florida election. Immediately upon beginning his oral
arguments, Justice Kennedy asked Theodore Olson (Bush’s
attorney): ‘Can you begin by telling us our federal
jurisdiction, where is the federal question here’ (transcript
of oral argument, 1)? Pg.27
28. It is further submitted that the discussion of a legal precedent is

rarely incorporated into the written pleading, and the extensive
nature of discussion concerning the applicability of the doctrine of
precedent to a particular case renders the transcription of the oral
arguments an all the more critical component of the judicial
proceeding of that particular case.
29. It is further submitted that a decision once rendered by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court is subsequently referred to, relied upon, considered,
distinguished, reversed, doubted or over-ruled by a later decision of
the Supreme Court. The prior decisions of the Supreme Court that
were so addressed in cases decided between 2001 to 2006 is
produced herewith and marked as Annexure D16. As such, a debate
upon the precedential value of a decision of the Supreme Court
must be administered with honesty and discipline, and a recording of
16
Only cases with title beginning with A (Volume 2 – pages vii & viii & 1 to 21)
and reported in Supreme Court Cases (SCC) is extracted from a 4 volume
Book published by Lexis-Nexis India – Supreme Court Case Citator (2001-
2006)
-30-
such a debate is an indispensable tool in ensuring honesty and

discipline in the conduct of a judicial proceeding at this Hon’ble
Court.17.
30. The petitioner is reasonably aware of the procedure prescribed for

the conduct of judicial proceedings at this Hon’ble Court. The
petitioner had previously sought to ascertain from this Hon’ble Court
whether, in terms of Clause 9 of Original Side Practice Direction No.
6 of 1974 (renumbered as No. 3 vide Notification No. 364 / Rules /
DHC dated 13-Dec-1991), detailed information was recorded by the
officers of this Court in relation to ‘the times at which hearing of a
matter commences on each day of hearing, the party that was
heard, and the length of time for which each party was heard’. A
copy of an application so made on 26-May-2009 to the Public
Information Officer, Delhi High Court under the provisions of the
Right to Information Act, 2005 is produced herewith and marked as
Annexure E. A reply dated 20-Jul-2009 to the said application says
that ‘the information sought is not available on the records of the
Judicial files’. A copy of the said reply by the Public Information
Officer, Delhi High Court, dated 20-Jul-2009 is produced herewith
and marked as Annexure F.
17
On the question of whether a decision from a controlling jurisdiction is
‘directly adverse’ to a lawyer’s position, the prevailing view is that counsel
must cite adverse cases that are ostensibly controlling, even though the
lawyer reasonably believes that the decision is factually distinguishable or
that the Court will ultimately determine the decision is not controlling. See,
eg., Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (extensive discussion of
authorities). See generally Floyd, Candor versus Advocacy: Court’s Use of
Sanctions To Enforce the Duty of Candor toward the Tribunal, 29
Ga.L.Rev.1035 (1995) (lawyer’s readiness to cite adverse authority will
increase due to Court’s expectation of citation and willingness to impose
sanctions for failure to do so); Gilmore, Self Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to
Disclose Damaging Legal Authority, 45 Clev.St.L.Rev.303 (1995); Lischkoff,
Recent Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 J.Legal Prof. 315 (1994) (Court’s
narrow reading of Rule, and resulting failure of lawyers to disclose adverse
authority, results in waste of judicial resources and diminished confidence in
legal system) (pg.334)
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct - By Center for
Professional Responsibility (American Bar Association) 2003 Edition
-31-
31. Every litigant has a right to counsel, and a derived right to evaluate
the effectiveness of his counsel18. Transcript of oral arguments
performs an invaluable task in this regard, and absence of a
transcript, especially in cases where the litigant could not, himself,
attend the hearing in person, renders a litigant unable to perform this
evaluation with any modicum of effectiveness
32. The Petitioner respectfully submits that there are several references
in news reports to instances where individuals who sought to
innocently record judicial proceedings in this Hon'ble Court were
apprehended outside the courtroom by security staff acting under
the administrative directions of Respondent No. 3 / 4 with threat of
‘criminal contempt’ under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The
Petitioner most respectfully submits that these type of actions clearly
stem from a failure on the part of the Officers of this Hon’ble Court to
recognise that such actions breach no stated law or other statutes,
and very respectfully, amount to violations of law on their own part
insofar as trying to deny and/or restrict the liberty otherwise available
to persons in our country.
33. The petitioner respectfully submits that the recording of a judicial

proceeding in the manner sought in this petition does not constitute
18
‘…Adequate pretrial investigation and preparation are a necessary
foundation for effective assistance at trial.’ Pg.124
‘It is vitally important that counsel engage in thorough going investigation and
preparation’ before the trial begins. If a defence lawyer does not investigate
the case and prepare for trial, a defendant will not have the aid of counsel in
any real sense (Powell v. Alabama, 1932). Adequate investigation entails
looking into all relevant factual aspects of the case – the facts that the
prosecution will use to prove guilt and the facts that will assist in refuting the
charges. It also involves thorough research of the pertinent legal principles
bearing upon resolution of the criminal accusation. Unless counsel has made
herself aware of all the apposite facts and law and devoted the time
necessary to prepare the witnesses, to formulate arguments and positions,
and to plan strategies, defense counsel cannot meaningfully advance the
defendant’s interests at trial or subject the prosecution’s case to the
adversarial testing contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. Put simply, solid
investigation and preparation are necessary foundations for active and full
participation in the adversarial trial process’. Pg.124
The Right to Assistance of Counsel : A Reference Guide to the United
States Constitution By James J. Tomkovicz (Greenwood Press, 2002)
-32-
‘criminal contempt’ under the said statute, as it in no way or manner

prejudices, or tends to prejudice, or interferes, or tends to interfere,
with the due course of judicial proceedings.
34. In this regard, it is very respectfully submitted that the subject of

‘contempt of court’ was initially addressed by the Legislature by way
of a formal Act enacted in 1925, prior to which all acts of contempt
were evaluated and adjudicated on the basis of the principles of
common law prevailing in England. In other words, no hard and fast
standards were laid down in law, and evolution of case law and
precedents itself created the law of the land.
Being dis-satisfied with the lacunaes in this, pursuant to consultation

of all the Provincial Governments by Lord Minto’s Government
between 1908-09, the 1911-1914 Bill was attempted to be
introduced by Government, but by that time, the Press Act of 1910
had already been placed on the Statute Book, leading the
Government to believe that it was neither necessary nor opportune
to proceed with the intended legislation, especially on account of the
outbreak of World War I. It may please be borne in mind by this
Hon'ble Court that at that time, proceedings in India were still
subjected to jury trials ; furthermore, by the fact that the 1911-1914
Bill was shelved partly because the Press Act of 1910 was put into
place also lends credence to the argument that the main thrust of
contempt legislation in the past insofar as ‘criminal contempt’ is
concerned was to disallow the Press from misreporting or deviating
from an optimal standard of conduct in reporting judicial
proceedings, as this manner of publication might - or could tend to -
affect the minds of existing or potential jurors, and thereby might – or
could interfere, or tend to interfere – in the due course of judicial
proceedings.
-33-
Thereafter, the Bill was referred to a Select Committee, which re-

drafted it, and by which effort the attempt in the Bill to define
“contempt of court” was shelved on the grounds that case law on the
subject would continue to form adequate guide. The efforts of this
Select Committee bore fruit in the form of the formal Act of 1926.
This Act prevailed till 1952, in which year a new Act was enacted,
which repealed and replaced the Act of 1926. However, in this Act of
1952 also, the phrase ‘contempt of court’ was not defined, leaving
the law to further evolve on the basis of common law precedents,
and in light also of the fact that jury trials still remained on the statute
book in India at that time.
Subsequently, in April 1960, soon after the Kawas Nanavati vs.

Prem Ahuja murder trial was concluded (with an acquittal by the jury
of the Ld. Trial Court, but which acquittal was reversed by the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court, as it was then known, and which
reversal was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in November
1961), a Bill was moved by one Shri Bibhuti Bhushan Das Gupta in
the Lok Sabha to consolidate and amend the law relating to
contempt of courts. The Sanyal Committee Report tabled on 28-2-
1963 states that : “On an examination of that Bill, the Government
appeared to have felt that the law relating to contempt of courts was
uncertain, undefined and unsatisfactory, and that in light of the
constitutional changes which have taken place in the country, it
would be advisable to have the entire law on the subject scrutinized
by a special Committee set up for the purpose”.
It was pursuant to the Sanyal Committee Report that the Contempt

of Courts Act of 1971 was given assent to, and by virtue of which it
replaced the Act of 1952, and for the first time, definitions of
contempt were given in the body of the Act itself. Furthermore, and
again for the first time, a distinction was attempted to be drawn in
-34-
the body of the Act itself between acts that constituted defiance of a
judicial order (which were defined in the Act as “civil contempt”), and
other acts intended to prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with
the due course of judicial proceedings, and hence, a definition was
attempted to be given to “criminal contempt” in light of the preceding
description.
It was also at around that time that the Administration of Justice Act
of 1960 was passed in the UK. It is relevant to the present petition to
reproduce Section 12 of that Act, because even in the UK, accurate
reporting ceased to be a contemptuous act at least thereafter (if not
before) :
12. Publication of information relating to proceedings in private
(1)The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court

sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the
following cases, that is to say—
(a)where the proceedings—
(i)relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
with respect to minors;
(ii)are brought under the Children Act 1989; or
(iii)otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing
of a minor;]
(b) where the proceedings are brought under Part VIII of
the M1Mental Health Act 1959, or under any provision of
that Actauthorising an application or reference to be made to a Mental
Health Review Tribunal or to a county court;
(c) where the court sits in private for reasons of national security
during that part of the proceedings about which the information in
question is published;
(d) where the information relates to a secret process, discovery or
invention which is in issue in the proceedings;
(e) where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the
publication of all information relating to the proceedings or of
information of the description which is published.
-35-
(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the

text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a court sitting
in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except where the court
(having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication.
(3) In this section references to a court include references to a judge and to
a tribunal and to any person exercising the functions of a court, a judge or
a tribunal; and references to a court sitting in private include references to
a court sitting in camera or in chambers.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any
publication is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so
punishable apart from this section.
35. That what follows from the above is that the law of contempt in India
can be categorised into at least the following five distinct phases,
and which phases were categorized by the remarks placed
alongside phase :
SL. PHASE ACT COVERING REMARKS

No. THAT PERIOD
1. Prior to 1925 Common law
2. From 1925 to 1952 The Act of 1925 Jury trials in existence
3. From 1952 to 1961 The Act of 1952
4. From 1961 to 1971
5. After 1971 till date The Act of 1971 Jury trials abolished from
1961 onwards.
From this, it follows that since common law is what evolved the
jurisprudence relating to contempt till 1925, and again, till 1952,
and also, from 1952 to 1961 (till which time jury trials were in
existence), case law relating to these three phases is of no
relevance today, partly because the principles of case law which
otherwise ruled the field only lent persuasive value once the Acts
of 1925 and 1952 had been enacted, equally because the
precedents under the Acts of 1925 and 1952 cannot be binding
-36-
precedent for interpretation of actions under the Act of 1971, but

more because the standards by which allegedly contemptuous
acts needed to be adjudged at a time when jury trials were
prevalent is far different from the standards evolved after abolition
of jury trials.
As a matter of fact, very respectfully, it is submitted that

precedents of the time after 1961 but which themselves relied on
precedents prior to 1961 also are of no relevance today, at least
to the circumstances of the petitioner.
Therefore, it is very respectfully submitted that fresh standards

are required to be evolved by this Hon'ble Court in this regard,
shorn of the baggage of ancient history.
This is especially so since the avowed motives of the petitioner

have nothing to do with publication of court proceedings, but
rather, preservation of even the minutiae for his own confidential
consumption or that of his advocates, or that of the Court, or the
Appellate Court(s), as the case may be, the need for which
preservation is so acute that in the absence of which he cannot
be said to have received justice in his matters even though the
same has been guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
36. It is further submitted Sanyal Committee, as set out in its Report

tabled on 28-2-1963, has stated as follows : “Our conclusion,
therefore, is that Parliament is competent to legislate in relation to
the law of contempt subject only to the three limitations we have
mentioned, and there is no basis for the theory that a court of record
has the sole and exclusive power to define and determine what
amounts to contempt of it authority.”
-37-
37. The Petitioner further submits that unlike the situation prevailing
prior to 1925 (when contempt was covered by common law), it is the
Parliament of India that has enacted the ‘Contempt of Courts Act,
1971’.
Even though its equally-august Members are themselves protected

by the sacrosanct Constitution against acts or conduct that
constitute contempt of their own authority or dignity, it has, itself,
recognised the importance of broadcasting and televising of its own
proceedings as an act that is a matter of “Public Policy” as it is
essential for the “public good”.
It is very respectfully submitted that this is undoubtedly a

consequence of the current international milieu of “transparency”
and “accountability” being the cornerstones on which the legitimate
expectations of the international citizenry rest, which citizenry
requires these facets of governance to be an essential part of the
guiding ethos of any person or body in authority or power.
This being the case, it is very respectfully siubmitted that can hardly
follow that when the law-maker (the Legislature) itself is protected by
a certain far-broader and superior provision of law (the Constitution),
but views certain acts as not being contemptuous of its own
authority or dignity by virtue of the standards laid down by that
Supreme Law (i.e. the Constitution), yet, a subordinate Act (the
Contempt of Courts Act of 1971) framed by it under the powers
vested in it under the Constitution is to be interpreted in such a
manner that the same acts which the Legislature does not view
under the Constitution as being contemptuous of its dignity and
authority may be viewed by Courts as being contemptuous of the
courts under the Contempt of Courts Act.
-38-
It is very respectfully submitted that the Contempt of Courts Act of

1971, while ostensibly appearing to be for the immediate benefit of
the august members of the Judiciary who are dispensing justice, is -
in reality - more for assisting them to maintain the supremacy of the
majesty of law, which is not for the benefit of any one or othe
rpeeson, but for the eventual benefit of the electorate.
Therefore, it is very respectfully submitted that for the Hon’ble

Judiciary to interpret the act of recording of its proceedings in a
manner that it constitutes contempt of court is inconsistent with the
view of the Legislature, whose view is that the same actions relating
to recording and televising of its own proceedings do not constitute
contempt of the Legislature.
This dichotomy in this legally-untenable approach becomes all the

more stark when seen in light of the fact that in India, even
publication of proceedings (which is far removed from the motives of
the petitioner), if totally accurate, can no longer be construed as
contempt of court after 1961, when jury trials were abolished.
This conclusion is further borne out by the provisions of Sections 4

and 7 of the Contempt of Court Act of 1971, which specifically
provide and exempt fair and accurate reporting of judicial procedure
(including those in chambers or in camera) from being viewed as
contempt.
38. It is further submitted that the reference in certain cases from the
United Kingdom and the United States to a restraint upon the media
from recording Court proceedings is principally aimed at insulating
their jurors from biased reporting – concerns that, as stated above,
are inapplicable to India in view of the fact that jury trials have been
abolished in India since 1960, but more so because the fact-finders
-39-
in civil and criminal trials in India are qualified judges and not
ordinary members of the public.
This restriction in their countries notwithstanding, even the courts in

the US and the UK rely heavily on either an audio-visual record of
judicial proceedings, or a word-by-word transcription, or both.
From this, it clearly follows that mere recording of proceedings, in

itself, does not render the act contemptuous ; it is the purpose of the
recording by which the act of recording in the US and the UK is
adjudged as being contemptuous in those countries or not.
If this proposition did not follow would then mean that the Presiding
Officers of the courts in the US and the UK are themselves in
criminal contempt of their own courts.
39. Keeping abreast of evolving trends in jurisprudence and in the

administration of justice where transparency and accountability are
the need of the hour, the practice in England is best illustrated by the
fact that the newly constituted Supreme Court of England,
commencing its business from 01-Oct-2009 and thereby replacing
the venerable House of Lords (which body, in a different jurisdiction
and acting as ‘Privy Council’, presided over the administration of the
judicial buinsess of British-Inda for well over 250 years), has – suo
motu - been televising its proceedings since the very first day of its
functioning. A copy of a report in the Asian Age dated 02-Oct-2009
on the inauguration of the Supreme Court of England is produced
herewith and marked as Annexure G.
40. The Petitioner further submits that he does not seek, as a matter of
right, that the Court confer legitimacy to his audio-recording. The
Petitioner submits that the benefits of a Court transcript are not lost
merely because the transcript is derived in the absence of an official
-40-
mechanism. The Petitioner expects that legitimacy to such an audio-

recording arises in the absence of legitimate and reasonable contest
by any party to a judicial proceeding.
41. The petitioner has deemed it essential to produce to this Hon'ble

Court, a small sub-set of technical information he has gathered in
relation to Court transcription. The petitioner further offers material to
shed light on the practice in several other jurisdictions, and these
documents clearly prove that those Courts have come to rely upon
electronic recording as an indispensible part of transacting judicial
businesses efficiently and in a transparent manner. These
documents are marked colly. as Annexure H. The consequence of
widespread adoption of electronic recording by Courts around the
world has been the creation of a vibrant marketplace in which
specialized companies offer customized, ready-to-use and tamper-
proof tools to accomplish transcription in Courts on a mere 24 hours’
notice.
42. The Petitioner has not approached this Hon’ble Court or any other
Court of law seeking the relief predicated on the instant cause of
action.
The petitioner approaches this Hon’ble Court, amongst others, on

the following:
GROUNDS
I. Judicial proceedings in this Hon’ble Court, whether judged by

historic or present standards, deserve to be transcribed.
-41-
II. In view of an absence of any official mechanism to transcribe judicial

proceedings in this Hon’ble Court, it becomes necessary for a litigant
to employ his own transcription.
III. Every judicial proceeding is invariably reconstructed on appeal and

the fairness of an appeal is directly determined by the degree of
accuracy with which the proceeding below is reconstructed19. The
absence of a transcription greatly burdens an appellate Court with
assumptions (about the proceeding below) that may greatly vary
from the actual proceeding. A transcript relieves an appellate Court
of such enormous burden and in doing so, similarly relieves an
appellant of burden that is incompatible with the modern era.
IV. The doctrine of precedent is jurisprudentially and constitutionally

entrenched in the administration of judicial business. And oral
arguments upon a precedent in relation to the facts of each case
constitute a critical component of that case. An absence of transcript
deprives a case of the discipline mandated upon the conduct of a
19
8. The High Court, in this case, in its obvious zeal to cut delay and hardship
that may ensue by relegating the plaintiffs to one more round of litigation, has
rendered a judgment which violates several fundamental rules of civil
procedure. The rules breached are:
(i) No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was
never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the
pleadings and which was not the subject matter of an issue, cannot be
decided by the Court.
(ii) A Court cannot make out a case not pleaded. The Court should
confine its decision to the question raised in pleadings. Nor can it grant
a relief which is not claimed and which does not flow from the facts
and the cause of action alleged in the plaint.
(iii) A factual issue cannot be raised or considered for the first time in a
second appeal….
9. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the
litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases
being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to
ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised
or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant
evidence appropriate to the issues before the Court for its consideration. This
Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant to give to each side
intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable Courts to
determine what is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any
deviation from the course which litigation on particular causes must take.
Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [AIR 2009 SC 1103 : 2008 (15) SCALE
158]
-42-
judicial proceeding. A judicial proceeding conducted without a

pervasive awareness of discipline thrust by precedent must
necessarily injure the expectations of a litigant and must also injure
the interests of society, by denying certainty to the rule of law.20
V. An absence of a proper record of the arguments delivered in a given

case disables a judge who hears a case but does not conclude the
arguments from conveying the progress in that case to a different
judge who takes over the subject matter pursuant to a change in the
roster. An absence of a proper record of the oral arguments in a
given case hinders timely resolution in the event that a delay in
adjudication progresses beyond the typical length of a roster. This
also results in unduly burdening litigants with costs for counsel who
20
‘…It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
litigants and the opposite way between another. If a group of cases involves
the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross
injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was
decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the
same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a
feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
material and moral, of my rights. Everyone fees the force of this sentiment
when two cases are the same. Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the Courts….’ Pg.33-34
Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921)
-43-
must again brief an incoming judge with the past progress in the
case.
VI. A judge’s interaction with the counsel and the counsel’s response
thereto constitutes a critical component of every judicial proceeding.
Because the words and statements comprising a written pleading
are mere inert representations and an interaction between a judge
and the counsel exposits the relative understanding, appreciation
and evaluation of a written pleading, a written pleading receives its
life only during a debate in a courtroom21. The recording of such a
debate, and an accurate representation of such debate, is an
inevitable requirement for delivery of justice22. A justice-delivery
mechanism devoid of such transcript is an unacceptable mode of
delivery in a modern age which has seen technology for audio-
recording of events rapidly advance for the past 70 years.
VII. The High Court of Delhi exercises multifarious jurisdictions and

petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution encompass
diverse fields of learning or branches of law. Given the complexity,
21
The evidence supporting this hypothesis is overwhelming. Almost 80
percent of all the justices’ questions refer to arguments that were not raised
in these briefs. For specific issues, over 70 percent of policy questions are
new, over 95 percent of questions about external actors are new, and almost
80 percent of all questions about institutional rules are new…(pg 126)
I turn first to the general (non-issue specific) results. In cases with no amicus
participation, only 20 percent of the Court’s total questions focus on
arguments initially discussed in the parties’ briefs. The remaining 80 percent
of the Court’s questions raise issues that were not addressed in the litigants’
written arguments…. (pg.53,54)
Oral Argument and Decision Making on the United States Supreme
Court (supra)
22
…However, the learned author referred to the decision in Sengupta Vs.
Holms, (2002) EWCA Civ 1104 at (38) and quoted the views of Laws L.J. where
the learned Judge held that central place is accorded to oral argument in our
common law adversarial system. The learned Judge further said that ...this I
think is important, because oral argument is perhaps the most powerful force
there is, in our legal process, to promote a change of mind by the judge. That
judges in fact change their minds under the influence of oral argument is not
an arcane feature of the system; it is at the center of it (See pages 396 and
397 of the book).
SRC Projects Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Madras
High Court – Writ Appeals 893 of 2008 – 08-Sep-2008 (Division Bench)
-44-
range, and variety of subjects over which rights are disputed before
a Judge, it is simply impossible to expect a judge to satisfactorily
adjudicate upon a legal claim without subject-wise assistance from a
competent and learned counsel23. Any such assistance is generally
contained only – or predominantly - in the oral arguments. An
absence of transcript of the oral arguments, therefore, unreasonably
deprives the judicial proceeding of a very critical resource.
VIII. Because our Constitution declares in Article 141 that the law laid
down by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts and
Tribunals in India, a litigant before this Court is entitled to insist that
this Court must enter a judgment for him as a matter of law by
reason of a precedent in his favour. Because the binding value of a
precedent is debated only – or predominantly - during oral
arguments, a recording of those arguments is essential in order to
deter either side from expounding an unacceptable and unfaithful
proposition from any precedent24. It is further submitted that in a
23
A Judge will often ask counsel: ‘Do any cases from this Court support your
position?’ Counsel should be careful to cite only those cases that support his
or her position and to avoid distorting the meaning of a precedent.
…Likewise, counsel should be familiar with his or her client’s business. Judges
may pose questions about how a product is made, how employees are hired,
or how a relevant calculation was made…
Counsel should be knowledgeable about what is and is not in the record in the
case, and should be familiar with the procedural history of the case. Judges
frequently ask counsel if particular matters are in the record. It is helpful if
counsel can provide the volume and page where the information is located.
Counsel should avoid making assertions about issues or facts not in the
record. If counsel is asked a question that will require reference to matters
not in the record, counsel should begin the answer by so stating and then
proceed to respond to the question, unless advised otherwise by the Judge.
Guide for Counsel Presenting Oral Argument to the Ninth District
Court of Appeals, United States
24
Section 29.11 Adverse Legal Authority: The duty to reveal adverse legal
authority set forth in Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is long established. Indeed, this
paragraph is identical to DR 7-106(B)(1). The same terminology is adapted in
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Sec.111(2). Revealing the fruits of
one’s own efforts in the law library goes against all instincts of legal
partisanship, may damage a client’s legal position, and extends a windfall to
less deligent opposing counsel. However, two arguments can be made in
support of Rule 3.3a(a)(3).
First, Courts must rely on counsel to supply most of the legal argument in
litigated cases. If a lawyer deliberately omits adverse authority, there is risk
that neither opposing counsel nor the Court will discover the governing law
-45-
scenario where tens of thousands of judgments emanate from a

superior Court of Record, a debate about conflicting judgments of
the superior Court may very well threaten the timely resolution of a
case should one or both sides to a case knowingly misapply
precedents25.
IX. Because written pleadings do not delve extensively into the case-law
in support of the pleading, it is only to be expected that a discussion
about the precedential value of a judgment is explored during oral
arguments. Counsel have a duty to the Court to extensively study a
and an erroneous decision (that could have been avoided) will result. To be
sure, conscientious judges (particularly those with law clerks) often conduct
their own backup research, but that is an insufficient protection against error.
Second, it is often said that revealing adverse precedent or other authority
does not greatly damage the client-lawyer relationship, because the law does
not ‘belong’ to the client in the same way that factual information does.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) refers to ‘legal authority’, which should be understood to
include not only case law precedents, but also statutes, ordinance,
regulations, and administrative rulings. Indeed, the duty to reveal the latter
kinds of authority is of greater practical significance, precisely because they
are less likely to be discovered by the tribunal itself….(pg.29.16)
The Law of Lawyering Volume 2 By Geoffery C.Hazard, W.William
Hodes, John S.Dzienkowski 3rd Edition, v.2-2000
25
Subsection (a) (2): Failure to disclose legal authority known to be directly
adverse to client’s position
Rule 3.3(a)(2) (renumbered from 3.3.(a)(3) as a result of the 2002
amendments) requires a lawyer to disclose legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction that is directly adverse to the client’s position, when opposing
counsel does not present such authority. See Massey v. Prince George’s
County 907 F.Supp.138 (D.Md.1995) (defense counsel deliberately failed to
disclose to Court, during summary judgment proceedings, unfavourable
controlling authority); In re Thonert, 733 N.E.2d 932 (Ind.2000) (defense
lawyer failed to inform Court of adverse decision of state’s highest Court in
virtually identical case in which lawyer served as counsel of record).
On the question of whether a decision from a controlling jurisdiction is
‘directly adverse’ to a lawyer’s position, the prevailing view is that counsel
must cite adverse cases that are ostensibly controlling, even though the
lawyer reasonably believes that the decision is factually distinguishable or
that the Court will ultimately determine the decision is not controlling. See,
eg., Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (extensive discussion of
authorities). See generally Floyd, Candor versus Advocacy: Court’s Use of
Sanctions To Enforce the Duty of Candor toward the Tribunal, 29
Ga.L.Rev.1035 (1995) (lawyer’s readiness to cite adverse authority will
increase due to Court’s expectation of citation and willingness to impose
sanctions for failure to do so); Gilmore, Self Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to
Disclose Damaging Legal Authority, 45 Clev.St.L.Rev.303 (1995); Lischkoff,
Recent Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 J.Legal Prof. 315 (1994) (Court’s
narrow reading of Rule, and resulting failure of lawyers to disclose adverse
authority, results in waste of judicial resources and diminished confidence in
legal system) (pg.334)
-46-
judgment cited as precedent, and to offer a honest assessment of

judgments that seemingly conflict each other26. Discipline and
truthfulness in any debate upon the precedential value of judgments
is made possible by an accurate transcript of the oral arguments.
Where the arguments involve a discussion of the case law and are
spread between several days, a transcript of the record is absolutely
essential in order to ensure discipline and truthfulness to such
discussions.
X. Further, a party to a judicial proceeding has an inherent right to

information about such proceeding and the consequent right to
preserve such information. This right is not fully honoured as long as
a party must reconstruct a judicial proceeding by employing his own
memory or that of his counsel – given that generally, most
individuals, two days after first exposed to fresh information, recall
no more than 30 percent of such information.27. Further, given the

26
This disclosure requirement includes not only case law but also statutes.
See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Does Nos.1-2, 876 F.Supp.407 (E.D.N.Y 1994)
(lawyers for copyright and trademark owners seeking ex parte seizure of
allegedly infringing products violated duty to disclose adverse authority to
Court by asking that private investigators carry out order when lawyers knew
prior case law and Lanham Act permitted only marshals to conduct searches).
According to paragraph (4) of the Comment to Rule 3.3. “the underlying
concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal
premises properly applicable to the case.” See also Smith v Scripto-Takai
Corp., 170 F.Supp.2d 553 (W.D.Pa.2001) (Rule serves purpose of assisting
Courts, which rely upon counsel to supply correct legal authorities to avoid
erroneous legal decisions; moreover, revealing adverse law does not harm
lawyer-client relationship in same way that revealing adverse factual
information does). (pg.334-335)
27
Most forgetting tends to occur immediately after memorization. Herman
Ebbinghaus (1885) famously tested his own memory at various intervals after
learning….
The Ebbinghaus curve shows less than 30 percent remembered after only 2
days have passed…(pg.264)
…Memory decay appears to be a factor in the loss of sensory memories. Such
fading also appears to short term memory. Information stored in STM seems
to initiate a brief flurry of activity in the brain that quickly dies out. Short-term
memory therefore operates like a ‘leaky bucket’: New information constantly
pours in, but it rapidly fades away and is replaced by still newer
information….(pg.266)
-47-
possibility of different counsel appearing at different stages of the

same judicial proceeding and of different appellate counsel, it
becomes absolutely essential that a party’s need for an accurate
reconstruction of a judicial proceeding is fully honoured.
XI. Every attorney representing any party in a judicial proceeding has an

inviolable duty to accurately report his participation to the party, and
this duty is not adequately discharged as long as a transcript of the
judicial proceeding is unavailable to the party or to his attorney28.
XII. The referential value of an ‘unofficial’ transcript of oral arguments

derived in the absence of an official transcript is substantially and
exponentially greater than a complete absence of transcript of oral
arguments. A judicial body that already generates an ‘official’
transcript is legally entitled to say that an ‘unofficial’ transcript serves
no purpose – however, a judicial body that expresses no inclination
to generate its own official transcript cannot, in any honesty, frown
upon the bona fide effort of a litigant to compensate for the Court’s
own failure to generate an ‘official’ transcript. A judicial body that so
frowns – in effect - merely asserts that it will reform at its sole
discretion – a notion wholly opposed to the principles of democracy
and liberty of thought.
XIII. The relief sought by the petitioner does not insist upon any
participant to a judicial proceeding to alter his/her conduct in any
manner howsoever. That is, lawyers, arguing counsel, parties,
members of the public, Court officers, Presiding Judges, Judges,
other staff members of the judiciary are not required to conduct
Introduction to Pyschology: Gateways To Mind And Behaviour. 12th
Edition, 2008. Dennis Coon and John O Mitterer.
28
A lawyer must promptly convey important information about the client’s
matter. See, e.g., Shalant v. State Bar, 658 P.2d 737 (Cal.1983)… (pg. 53)
Professional Responsibility (American Bar Association) 5th Edition,
2003.
-48-
themselves in any manner different from what is the case at present.

The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the relief sought for in this
petition as a matter of law in view of the fact that he seeks to impose
no burden whatsoever upon any participant to a judicial proceeding
before this Hon’ble Court.
XIV. The judgment and orders passed by a Court are always made in a
given case and the judicial power of a Court is no more than the
power to adjudicate upon concrete controversies brought before it
for adjudication. Accordingly, in the pursuit of its judicial power, this
Hon’ble Court is effectively under a duty to consent to an
arrangement that is bound to render the adjudication more timely
and efficient, as sought by the petitioner.
XV. Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not stop at mere

adherence to the stated ‘Rule of law’. If adherence to the statutes
and procedure established by the law constitutes compliance with
Article 21, the very concept of ‘judicial review of legislative action’
would be rendered nugatory. Yet, ‘judicial review of legislative
action’ is fully entrenched into the judicial business of High Courts
founded under Article 214 of the constitution of India. A High Court
that refuses to reform its procedure breaches the expectation of a
litigant who comes before it for the resolution of his legal disputes. A
judicial body that is reluctant to reform itself is under a constitutional
duty to afford relief to a litigant who seeks to mitigate the suffering
brought about by the reluctance of the Court to reform itself. Such a
duty is clearly founded under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
XVI. That the petitioner would be deprived of his entitlement to a timely

and transparent resolution of his legal disputes brought before this
Hon’ble Court if he is prevented from non-intrusively audio-recording
those judicial proceedings that involve him. Such a deprivation fully
-49-
frustrates the objective behind Article 21 of our Constitution. As

such, an effective compliance, under these circumstances, with
Article 21 of the Constitution necessitates the grant of relief sought
by the petitioner as under:
PRAYER
In view of the circumstances described above, it is most respectfully

prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to :
i) declare that the petitioner is entitled to non-intrusively audio-

record judicial proceedings that involve his participation before
this Hon’ble Court and to so record either by himself or
through his Advocate-on-record ;
ii) issue a Writ of Prohibition or a Writ of any other nature or

description to direct Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the Registrar
General and the Registrar of this Hon’ble Court, to not
interfere with the act of non-intrusive audio-recording by the
petitioner or his advocate-on-record in respect of judicial
proceedings that involve the petitioner; and to
iii) issue any other order or direction in the interest of justice, equity
and in furtherance of or to secure any other objective or
purpose as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONERS SHALL

AS IN DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.
-50-

26-10-2009 PETITIONER
NEW DELHI
Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180

IN THE MATTER OF:

Vs.
AFFIDAVIT OF MR. DEEPAK KHOSLA, s/o Mr. R.P. KHOSLA,

AGED 50 YEARS, R/O 218 SECTOR XV-A, NOIDA
1. That I am the petitioner, and as such, I am conversant with

the facts of the present case and as such competent to
depose thereto.
2. That I have read and understood the contents of the

accompanying petition/application and state that the facts
stated therein are true and correct to the best of my personal
knowledge and belief, or are as per my understanding and
which I verily believe, whilst the legal submissions are based
on legal advice received and/or researched by me and
believed to be correct.
3. That the annexures to the petition are true copies of their

originals.
4. That the contents of the accompanying petition/application

may kindly be read as part of the present affidavit, and the
contents of which are not being repeated herein for reasons
of brevity.
-51-
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION :
Verified at _______________ on this ___ day of __________ 2009,
that the contents of my aforegoing affidavit are true and correct to my
knowledge.
DEPONENT
-52-
Interlocutory Application No. ____________ of 2009
IN
Civil Writ Petition No. ______________ of 2009
Between:
Deepak Khosla PETITIONER
And
Union of India And Ors. RESPONDENTS
APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 151 OF THE CIVIL

PROCEDURE CODE SEEKING INTERIM INJUNCTION UPON
THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT Nos. 3 & 4 IN REGARD TO
NON-INTRUSIVE AUDIO-RECORDING OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE PETITIONER.
To,
The Hon’ble Chief Justice and
His companion Judges of the
Hon’ble High Court at New Delhi.
The Humble petition on behalf of the Petitioner above named:-
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. The Petitioner has filed the accompanying writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of the fundamental right of the petitioner,
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, to a timely
and transparent resolution of his legal disputes brought
before this Hon’ble Court ; for a declaration of entitlement
-53-
to non-intrusively audio-record relevant judicial proceeding,

and for the issue of corresponding restraint upon the
officers of this Court.
2. The instant Interlocutory Application is filed in respect of

the above Writ petition for the purpose of securing interim
injunction in the cause stated in the writ petition.
3. The facts, averments, grounds in support and the relief

claimed thereof in the aforesaid Writ petition may kindly be
treated as part of this interlocutory application.
4. The petitioner proposes to non-intrusively audio-record

forthwith, judicial proceedings in matters that involve him
before this Hon’ble Court. The petitioner seeks an ex-parte
interim Order restraining Respondent No. 3 and / or No. 4
from interfering with the proposed action of the petitioner
hereafter.
5. The petitioner has extensively studied the technology and

the infrastructure involved in equipping a court-room with
audio transcription technology. For the purpose of
alleviating any concern of this Hon’ble Court in allowing
court-transcription, the Petitioner hereby undertakes, most
humbly, to indemnify (or to bear, if so directed) this Hon’ble
Court all the costs that it may incur in testing the installation
of an audio-transcription equipment in one court room that
hears one or more of the cases that involve the petitioner.
-54-
6. The indicative costs involved in equipping an individual

court-room with official audio transcription equipment is as
under:
-55-
Sl. Details of inputs Typical vendor INDICATIVE COST

No. required In US$ INR
Any PC
1. A PC in the Court manufacturer, $ 800 Rs. 40,000
concerned such as IBM,
Dell, HP, HCL,
etc.
1 Recording software - Dragon $ 225 Rs. 10,000
. installed in the PC - Quikscribe
2 - FTR
- NCH
A microphone - Polycom $ 200 Rs. 10,000
3. installed in the - CrownAudio
court connected to
the PC.
2 Sub-total Rs. 60,000
.
4
Add : Project
5. consultancy, - Lumpsum Rs. 40,000
installation,
commissioning,
misc. hardware etc.
etc
3 GRAND TOTAL Rs. 1,00,000
.
In place of a PC, if a laptop is used, the already-configured laptop

with its mike can be instantly transported on a moment’s notice from
any one court-room to another court-room.
An alternative to the above computer-based solution is a device

called the “Sennheiser Reporter’s Kit” which costs US$ 1,899
(approx. Rs. 90,000), and is a complete, integrated, ready-made tool
for a Court Reporter approved by the Court system of the United
States, whereby the Court reporter can record, and then proceed to
transcribe, the court proceedings.
-56-
The brochures of all these options are part of Appendix “H”, from
which this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to peruse the extreme
simplicity and versatility of the different choices of equipment
available, as well as the number of progressive Courts that are
already using these equipments.
7. The petitioner further submits that while evaluating the first

option of the total costs to be incurred for the purpose of
preparing an individual court-room for official transcription,
the cost of the PC may notionally be deleted in view of the
fact that every court-room in this Hon’ble Court in which
judicial business is transacted is already equipped with a
computer. Accordingly, the total cost of equipping all the
court-rooms in the Delhi High Court would not exceed Rs.
20 lakhs in total. The said sum is less than half-percent of
the annual spending by this Hon’ble Court.
(Rs.42,45,47,490 is the spending for the financial year
2007-08).
8. The petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on merits

in respect of the cause advanced in the present writ
petition. Whereas, no prejudice or harm shall be caused to,
nor can be claimed by, the Respondents. Thus, the
balance of convenience clearly lies in favour of the
petitioner.
9. The matter assumes great urgency in view of the fact that

the petitioner has matters on frequent dates in October and
November 2009 before this Hon'ble Court, whose
proceedings he urgently needs to record in order to ensure
that his position in judicial proceedings is not jeopardised.
-57-
10. The present application is tendered in good faith, and is

made in the interests of justice and equity .
PRAYER
In light of the above facts and circumstances, it is humbly prayed

that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
i) to issue an ex-parte interim-injunction restraining

Respondent Nos. 3 and/or 4 (the Registrar General
and/or Registrar of this Hon’ble Court) from
interfering with the act of non-intrusive audio-
recording by the petitioner or by his advocate-on-
record in respect of judicial proceedings that involve
the petitioner before this Hon’ble Court;
In the alternative :
Allow the petitioner, at his own cost and risk, to equip any one
courtroom of this Hon'ble Court with the appropriate equipment and
software for audio-recording of proceedings, equipment to be
retained by this Hon'ble Court for the period of time it, as per its sole
discretion, deems fit, and to be used to audio-record his own
proceedings (and/or those of others, should this Hon'ble Court deem
it appropriate), whether free of charge, or subject to any reasonable
costs to be demanded and/or recovered by this Hon'ble Court.
ii) Pass such other order(s) or direction(s) as may be

deemed just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
-58-
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONERS SHALL

AS IN DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.

26-10-2009 PETITIONER
NEW DELHI
Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
-59-

IN THE MATTER OF:

Vs.

1. That I am the petitioner, and as such, I am conversant with the

facts of the present case and as such competent to depose
thereto.

which I verily believe, whilst the legal submissions are based
on legal advice received and/or researched by me and
believed to be correct.

originals.
4. That the contents of the accompanying petition/application

may kindly be read as part of the present affidavit, and the
contents of which are not being repeated herein for reasons of
brevity.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION :
knowledge.
DEPONENT
-60-
Interlocutory Application No. ____________ of 2009
IN
Civil Writ Petition No. ______________ of 2009
Between:
Deepak Khosla PETITIONER
And
Union of India And Ors. RESPONDENTS
APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 151 OF THE CIVIL

PROCEDURE CODE SEEKING EXEMPTION FROM FILING
CERTIFIED COPIES OF ORDERS AND CLEAR / LEGIBLE
COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS, ETC.
To,
The Hon’ble Chief Justice and
His companion Judges of the
Hon’ble High Court at New Delhi.
The Humble petition on behalf of the Petitioner above named:-
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. That the Petitioner/applicant has this day filed the above

mentioned Petition before this Hon’ble Court in view of the
material irregularity committed by the persons named therein
and harming the applicant’s interests. The facts and
circumstances relevant for the purposes of the present
application are set out in detail in the said petition and, for the
sake of brevity and to avoid repetition, the Petitioner /
-61-
applicant craves leave to refer to and rely thereupon without

specifically incorporating the same hereinafter.
2. That the Petitioner / applicant has filed documents such as

copies of Court orders, of letters, correspondence, emails,
etc. which are not certified / attested copies, and/or clear
copies and/or the margin of 4 cms has not been left.
3. That owing to paucity of time and other constraints, it has not

been possible to obtain the certified copies of the orders.
4. That owing to a similar paucity of time, and other constraints,

it has not been possible to file the typed copy of the relevant
documents as they are copies of emails, printed forms,
registers, licences / approvals , etc., etc. or to leave the
prescribed space of 4 cms.
5. That we undertake that we shall not rely on any document

during the course of hearing that may be illegible.
PRAYER
It is therefore most respectfully and humbly prayed that this Hon’ble

Court may be pleased to :-
a) Allow this Application and the documents at Annexures to be

taken on record as such ;
b) And pass such other order or further order or orders as this

Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of
the case.
-62-
FOR SUCH ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER SHALL, AS IN

DUTY BOUND, EVER PRAY.

PETITIONER
26-10-2009
NEW DELHI
Through :
New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180
-63-

IN THE MATTER OF:

Vs.

1. That I am the petitioner, and as such, I am conversant with the

facts of the present case and as such competent to depose
thereto.

which I verily believe, whilst the legal submissions are based on
legal advice received and/or researched by me and believed to
be correct.

originals.
4. That the contents of the accompanying petition/application may

kindly be read as part of the present affidavit, and the contents
of which are not being repeated herein for reasons of brevity.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION :
knowledge.
DEPONENT
-64-


[Under Article 226 read with Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(g), 20, 21, 39(a), 44 and
50, read with Articles 51A(b), 51A(h) and 51A(j) of the Constitution of
India, read with Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908), read with
Section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act, read with Rules 14 and 18 of the
Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, read with the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971].
IN THE MATTER OF:

DEEPAK KHOSLA …….PETITIONER
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENTS
PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF INDIA & OTHER ENABLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
FOR APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR CREATION OF A
MORE MODERN, EFFICIENT, EQUITABLE AND FAIR
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
INDEX
Sl. Court Page

No. Particulars Fee No.
1 Notice of Motion. 1
.
2 Urgent application. 2
.
3 Memo of Parties. 3–4

.
4 Synopsis / List of dates. 5 – 11

.
5 WRIT PETITION ON BEHALF OF THE

. PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ALONGWITH 12 – 50
AFFIDAVIT.
6 IINTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION under 51 – 56
. Section 151 of the CPC, praying for interim
directions, alongwith affidavit.
7 Application under Section 151 of the CPC, praying for 57 - 60
-65-
exemption from filing certified copies, with affidavit.

8 Annexure A : Brochure of a Samsung recorder. 61 -
.
9 Annexure B :. Transcript of oral arguments before

. the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of William Crawford v. Marion Country Election
Board
1 Annexure C : Annual Report for this Hon’ble Court
0 published for the Financial Year 2007-2008
.
1 Annexure D : Prior decisions of the Supreme Court

1 of India in cases decided between 2001 to 2006
.
1 Annexure E : RTI request dated 26-5-2009.

2
.
1 Annexure F : RTI reply dated 20-7-2009.

3
.
1 Annexure G : Report in the Asian Age dated 2-10-

4 2009 on the inauguration of the Supreme Court of
. England
1 Annexure H (Colly.) : Various items of techno-

5 commercial literature on options relating to
. recording / Transcription of court proceedings.
1 Annexure I (colly.) : News article on the China milk

6 scandal, and misc. other news articles.
.
1 Vakalatnama
7
.

PETITIONER
NEW DELHI
Through :
-66-

New Delhi 110 003
099 029 09390 / 98 684 64180

Writ Petition Seeking Audio-Record

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-1-

3. HON’BLE REGISTRAR GENERAL

Please acknowledge receipt.

Filed On : 26-10-2009 Deepak Khosla

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO._____________OF 2009

“URGENT EX PARTE DIRECTIONS ARE PRAYED FOR”

All necessary parties have been served.

Please place the same accordingly at our risk and cost.

Filed On : 26-10-2009 Deepak Khosla

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CIVIL WRIT PETITION No._____________OF 2009

IN THE MATTER OF:

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ……RESPONDENTS

2 GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

Filed On : Deepak Khosla

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO._____________OF 2009

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

SYNOPSIS AND LIST OF DATES

Upto 1908 Contempt in India was covered by the principles of

1910 - 1914 1911-1914 Bill was attempted to be introduced by

jurors, and thereby might – or could interfere, or tend to

1960 premeditated murder of another Naval Officer (Mr. Prem

Jury trials came to be abolished in India. The primary

1960 trigger was the acquittal in the case of the Nanavati

1960 Justice Act of 1960 was passed in the UK. By virtue of

In its Conclusion, the Report stated : “Our conclusion,

or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of

2007-09 a most complex variety, spanning 8 courts across three

of the words spoken by participants to a judicial

varying legal flavour, subject, skill and variety. It would

transcript is legally entitled to say that an unofficial

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CIVIL WRIT PETITION No._____________OF 2009

2 GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

The Humble Petition of the

1. The instant writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the

2. Respondent No. 1 is the Union of India, represented by the officer

3. Respondent No. 2 is the National Capital Territory of Delhi,

this Hon’ble Court exercises its jurisdiction, is the largest litigant-

4. Respondent No. 3 is the Registrar-General of this Hon’ble Court,

5. Respondent No. 4 is the Registrar of this Hon’ble Court, sued in

6. The petitioner wishes to non-intrusively audio-record judicial

law, with the greatest of promptitude, would have most earnestly

8. The petitioner is a party to judicial proceedings before this Hon’ble

9. Judicial proceedings are presently not transcribed in this Hon’ble

10. Transcription has become an integral part of judicial proceedings in

Constitutional Courts in several jurisdictions have traditionally relied

11. The petitioner respectfully seeks to audio-record those judicial

13. Every appeal is a continuation of the trial or the original proceeding 4,

below helps an Appellate Court in accurately reconstructing a trial.

15. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under

17. Miniature digital audio-recorders which are several times smaller

have become totally unobtrusive. As an example, a digital voice

of William Crawford v. Marion Country Election Board7 is produced

1.6. As many as ten attempts9 have been made in the past by

22. It is therefore submitted that if only this Hon’ble Court were to

supplement. Audio-recording of oral arguments is one such

proceeding, so much so that in the absence of such transcripts, a

Moroeover, it would be trite to highlight that the extra time spent on

This Hon’ble Court, in the case of DCM Ltd v. Municipal Corporation

23. It is further submitted that this Hon’ble Court spent a sum of