Federal Authority US v. Lopez 1.

Issue(s) (the legal question(s) to be answered by the court): Did Congresss Gun-Free School Zones Act violate the Commerce Clause? In addition, what activities can be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause? 2. Holding (The courts answer(s) to the issue(s) and short explanation(s)): The courts found that the law was unconstitutional and overturned the outcome. The Court of Appeals found that the Commerce Clause is not applicable to this law, as it has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise. The court argued that the law contains no jurisdictional element that would ensure that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. 922(q) exceeds Congress power to legislate under the Commerce Clause 3. Key Facts (Facts significantly affecting the outcome of the decision): a. Circumstantial (What happened leading to litigation?): 1. March 20, 1992 the respondent, a 12th grade student, arrived at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets. 2. School authorities confronted the student based on a tip and the student admitted carrying the weapon. 3. Student was arrested and charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. 4. State charges were dismissed the next day when federal agents charged respondent with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. b. Procedural: (How did the case proceed through the courts? Who decided what?) The Federal Grand Jury indicted Lopez on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone which violated 922(q). Lopez worked to dismiss 922(q) on the grounds that 922(q) is unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools. The District Court chose to deny the respondents motion. The District Court concluded that 922(q) is a constitutional exercise of Congress well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the business of elementary, middle, and high schools...affects interstate commerce. After the District Courts decision, Lopez waived his right to a trial by jury. The District Court held a bench trial in which Lopez was found guilty of violating 922(q). His sentence was six months in prison supervised release for two years. The respondent Lopez then chose to appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the basis that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth circuit agreed and the Lopezs conviction was reversed. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

4. Main Laws/Legal Principles (What are the main laws and principles that apply?): a. Commerce Clause - beyond the limitations governing general welfare, the Congress has power under this clause to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. b. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990-Congress made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1) (A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). 5. Analysis (How does the court reason its way to a conclusion; how does it apply the law to the facts?): The Court had to determine first if the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA; 18 U.S.C. 922) of 1990 exceeded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause of Article I. Since the possession of a gun in a school zone did not fall within the categories that can be regulated by Congress (1. the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 2. the protection and regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; 3. activities having a substantial relation to or effect on interstate commerce), the Court ruled that Congress had overstepped authority. The Court quickly disposed of the first two categories relevance to the case. To support the application of the Commerce Clause in the GFSZA, the Court would be required to infer that the possession of a gun would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (the third category). The Court determined that Section 922 (q) was a criminal statute having nothing to do with interstate commerce nor did it contain a jurisdictional element concerning possession of a firearms effect on interstate commerce. As Lopez was a local student in a local school with no indication of recent movement in interstate commerce, the Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

San Antonia ISD v. Rodriguez 1. Issue(s): Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts? 2. Holding: No. We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this contention 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial:

Texas had a dual system of financing public education in which both state and local tax revenues were used in the calculation of public school district funding. A small group of Mexican-American parents of school age children in the Edgewood Independent School District of San Antonio, Texas sued the state of Texas ...on behalf of school children throughout the state who are members of minority groups or who are poor and reside in districts having a low property tax base The plaintiffs charged that education was fundamental right and that the public school students in Texas were being denied that right by having to attend inferior schools The primary basis of the plaintiffs case was that the state of Texas dual system of financing public education was unconstitutional. because it was discriminatory against those in poverty and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment

b. Procedural: A 3 judge panel federal district court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review and invalidated the state's system of school financing on the grounds of equal protection of the 14th Amendment, citing the state system of school financing lacked a reasonable basis. The state appealed the decision, and the case went to the US Supreme Court. The Court ruled that Texas' system of school financing did not violate the Constitution and, although the school financing system was not perfect, it was the state's sovereign legislative right to determine the system 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: This clause forbids invidious discrimination against person or classes of people. The Due Process Clause: Life, liberty, and property are fundamental rights that can only be taken away by due process of the law U.S. Supreme Court rejected that education is a fundamental right that can be explicitly or implicitly recognized as worthy of constitutional protection 5. Analysis: In the courts analysis, (1) it did not examine the school district with strict judicial scrutiny since there is not a fundamental right to education explicitly expressed in the Constitution. (2) The Equal Protection Clause was not violated because the court found the district did not discriminate against (all) poor people in Texas, as the poor in the districts were ...unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The court did not find an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels were involved and where the State was providing a basic

minimal education. While the court acknowledged the Texas system of school financing resulted in unequal expenditures between children, it could not find the disparities were the product of an irrational system that was invidiously discriminatory. The Court would not intercede with the State because the process by which a state chooses to tax local property and to provide education should be deferred to state legislatures, not the federal government. Federal Educational Equity Brown v. Board of Education 1. Issue(s): Does separate by equal segregation laws deprive black children the equal protection of the law found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution? Does the Plessy v. Ferguson precedent apply to public education? 2. Holding: After looking at the effect of segregation itself on public education, the court decided that separate-but-equal is not equal. The segregation of black students because of their race has a detrimental effect upon them and their ability to grow academically which would not be hindered in an integrated school system. Therefore, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, the right to an equal education is granted to all students and segregation based on race is unconstitutional. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Five cases brought from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Delaware all regarding black minors who sought help through the courts to obtain admission to nonsegregated public schools after being denied because of laws permitting or requiring racial segregation. c. Procedural: Each of these five cases was brought to the lower courts; the lower courts, with the exception of Delaware, denied relief to the black children. Delaware--decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery declared that black children could be admitted to schools that were previously only attended by white children; this decision was also upheld by the Supreme Court of Delaware. In Brown v. Board of Education (Topeka, KA)-black children of elementary age in Topeka brought to court the issue of the statute that allowed segregation to occur in cities in Kansas with more than 15,000 people. The lower federal court held that segregation was detrimental but denied the plaintiffs because of equal facilities. SC and VA cases-lower courts found the black schools to be inferior and ordered improvements for equalization, but had not required desegregation to be enforced.

Washington, D.C. case-black children directly challenged school segregation under the 5th amendment of due process. These cases were brought to the Supreme Court, first in 1952, but took until May 17, 1954 to make a ruling. The Supreme Court ordered, through the Attorney Generals of the states, the desegregation of public schools by September 15th, 1954. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: 14th Amendment, specifically the Equal Protection Clause The Fifth Amendment (in the Washington DC case) Separate-but-equal doctrine 5. Analysis: The courts ruled that separate but equal in terms of tangibles (facilities, supplies, etc.) is attainable and even provided in some instances. However due to the impact of education on ones future (as evidence by the resources devoted to education by states), it is imperative that one receives a quality education for good citizenship and future employment. Therefore, one must consider the intangibles of a separate but equal education in terms of outcomes. The educational experience of African American in a segregated school does not equal the experience of their counterparts and therefore is not deemed. Also, separation based on race creates a feeling of inferiority which will impact the mental and academic development of African American students. Consequently, the practice of separate but equal violates the rights of African American students under the 14th Amendments Equal Protection Clause. Swann v. CMS 1. Issue(s): Is busing an acceptable means of overcoming racial segregation of public schools? Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation? 2. Holding: The court decided that busing is an acceptable alternative to help overcome racial segregation where de jure segregation has existed. An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. In order to be effective, such a transfer arrangement must grant the transferring student free transportation and space must be made available in the school to which he desires to move. The court also decided that one-race schools indicate segregation by law and school authorities should make every effort to eliminate these. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate

starting points for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the court's remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. The Court observed, Desegregation plans cannot be limited to walk- in schools. In addition to dealing with the quota issue, the Swann Court resolved three additional and connected questions regarding one-race schools, remedial altering of attendance zones, and court-mandated busing. b. Procedural: In April 1969 the District Court ordered the school board to come forward with a plan for both faculty and student desegregation. Proposed plans were accepted by the court in June and August 1969 on an interim basis. The board was ordered to file a third plan by November 1969. In November the board moved for an extension of time until February 1970, and was denied. The board submitted a partially completed plan. In December 1969 the District Court held that the boards submission was unacceptable and appointed Dr. John Finger to prepare a desegregation plan. In February 1970, the District Court was present with two alternative pupil assignment plans, one from the board and one from Dr. Finger for the junior and senior high schools. The court rejected the board the plans from the board and adopted the Finger plan. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: There were 4 central issues/principles in this case. 1) To what extent would racial balance play a role in desegregating schools? 2) Should every all-white or all-black school be eliminated? 3) Are there limits (and if so what) on the extent to which districts could rearrange district lines? 4) Are there limits (and if so what) on the extent to which transportation could be used to facilitate desegregation. The main law in this case was state enforced segregation in public schools based on race is discrimination and violates the Equal Protection Clause 5. Analysis: The extent of racial quotas is a remedial starting point and appropriate, as Green stated, to find a remedy to address past constitutional violations One race schools must be eliminated even in the light of the phenomena of minoritys centralization in metropolitan areas. Optional transfer of those willing with free transportation and space must be made available.

Determining the limits on rearrangement of school districts: Due to gerrymandering of school districts, pairing and grouping of noncontiguous school zones is permissible with appropriate travel time. Determining the limits on transportation: No rigid guidelines have existed but the district court found students should not be bused beyond 35 minutes and is dependent upon the age of the student, where it is feasible and workable and must be governed by Brown I, Green, and Alexander. However keeping in mind the mobility of the culture, courts will not revisit this issue unless a deliberate attempt to fix or alter demographic patterns occurs, at which time the court can act. State Equity Leandro v. State 1. Issue(s): The issue is whether students constitutional rights to education have a qualitative measure that defines some measure of a minimum standard of education. 2. Holding: The court answered the issue in the affirmative, stating students have the right to a sound, basic education (and defined it). The court stated an education that did not enable students to compete in the society in which they lived was not sound and would violate the state constitution. However, the court did not consider the state had violated the equal opportunities clause [Article IX, Section 2(1)], stating the NC Constitution does not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages. Supplemental funds, either required or allowed by county/city governments, is not a violation of the Constitution because it expressly states that units of local governments with financial responsibilities for education may provide additional funding; hence, any resulting variances in funding could not be unconstitutional. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Students and their guardian ad litems from relatively poor school systems and the systems boards of education (plaintiffs) as well as students and their guardian ad litems from relatively wealthy school systems and the systems boards of education (plaintiffintervenors) file suit against the State of NC, alleging that their rights of adequate educational opportunities have been denied under the current school funding system. Plaintiffs complain of inadequate school facilities, lack of technology, and inability to compete for high quality teachers caused by the disparity of funding from the state level. Plaintiff-intervenors complain of financial burdens in educating a large number of students with extraordinary educational needs and requiring diversion of substantial resources from their regular

education programs. Plaintiff-intervenors claim the State and SBE have violated the NC Constitution and Chapter 115C of the NC General Statues. b. Procedural: Prior to the trial court hearing the plaintiffs evidence, the defendants (the state and State Board of Education) moved for a dismissal on the following grounds: N.C. Constitution did not guarantee any substantive standard of educational quality and issues of school finance and educational standards were nonjusticiable political questions that must be debated and resolved by the General Assembly, not the courts. The trial court rejected the arguments for motion for dismissal and the defendants appealed to the N.C. Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs then appealed to the N.C. Supreme Court, which agreed to review the lower courts decision. The N. C. Supreme Court did not interpret Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the constitution to require substantially equal funding or equal educational advantages in all school systems, therefore current state system for funding schools do not violate constitutional principles. The N.C. Supreme Court remanded the case to Wake Superior Court for trial with directives: if court findings conclude from competent evidence that defendants are denying sound basic education, a denial of a fundamental right will have been established. If defendants are unable to justify the denial as necessary to promote a compelling government interest. it is the duty of the court to enter judgement granting declaratory relief...while minimizing the encroachment upon the other branches of government. Remanded case assigned to Wake County Superior Court Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. Due to the evidence provided by both the low-wealth school systems and the urban school systems, Judge Manning decided that two trials should be held. In addition, Hoke County school system was selected to represent the low-wealth schools that initiated the lawsuit in 1994. Trial began in Sept. 1999 through Dec. 1999. Between October 2000 and March 2001 the trial court issued three interlocutory orders: the first order analyzed components of N.C.s educational delivery system to see if they met constitutional standards in regards to equal opportunity to a sound and basic education, the second order analyzed the states educational delivery system in respect to at-risk students and in the third order the trial court concluded that there are two distinct groups of children in every N.C. school system: those at-risk of educational failure and those not at-risk of educational failure.

Based on evidence the court concluded that N.C. was not providing at-risk students with an equal opportunity for a sound basic education and this was a result of lack of an effective statewide strategy for educating at-risk children. April 2002, the trial court decided the HCSSs overall academic performance could only be described as dismal. Court also ruled the state was responsible, by law, to provide every child with the equal opportunity to a sound basic education and the state must ensure competent, certified classroom teachers, well-trained competent principal and schools have necessary resources so students have an equal opportunity to a sound basic education. The trial court ordered the state to remedy the constitutional deficiency for those children not receiving a sound basic education. The state of N.C. and the State BoE appealed the trial court order. The state appealed portions of the trial courts order to remedy constitutional deficiencies relating to students in Hoke County. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: In Leandro v. State, the Court looked closely at the North Carolina Constitution to define a student's right to an education. Article I, Section 15 states that the people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right. Therefore, every child has the right to a free public education. Article IX, Section 2 states the General Assembly shall provide . . . for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students. The two clauses together guarantee that each child has the opportunity to a sound basic knowledge. The Court went on to define a sound basic education. The equal opportunities clause does not require that funding is equal in all school districts but that units of local government may provide supplemental funding for education. Hoke v. State 1. Issue(s): (1) whether the State has failed to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties,... (2) whether the State has failed to meet its statutory obligation, pursuant to Chapter 1115C of the General Statutes, to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education to plaintiff parties,... and (3) whether the States supplemental school funding system is unrelated to legitimate educational objectives and, as consequence, is arbitrary and capricious, resulting a denial of equal protection of the laws for plaintiff-intervenors, id.at 353, 488 S.E.2d at 258. (4) to determine whether the States Education Delivery System is providing a means for Hoke Counties students to avail themselves of an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education; and to determine whether the States Education Delivery System is providing a means for at-risk

children to avail themselves of an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. 2. Holding: The Court affirms the trial courts conclusion that plaintiffs have made a clear showing that an inordinate number of students in Hoke County are failing to obtain a sound basic education and that defendants have failed in their constitutional duty to provide such students with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. In addition, this Court affirms the trial courts ruling that the State must act to correct those deficiencies that were deemed by the trial court as contributing to the States failure of providing a Leandro comporting educational opportunity 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: The State of NC and the SBE (defendants) appeal from a trial court order concluding that the State had failed in its constitutional duty to provide certain students with the opportunity to attain a sound basic education, as defined in the Supreme Courts holding in Leandro v. State (1997). The State appeals those portions of the trial courts order that direct the State to remedy constitutional deficiencies relating to the public school education provided to students in Hoke County. The trial court had ordered the State to: 1) assume the responsibility for, and correct, those educational methods and practices that contribute to the failure to provide students with a constitutionallyconforming education; and 2) expand pre-kindergarten educational programs so that they reach and serve all qualifying at-risk students. b. Procedural: Civil action commenced in 1994 with Leandro I from Cumberland, Halifax, Hoke, Robeson Vance counties and then joined by select students from the City of Asheville, Buncombe County, CharlotteMecklenburg, Durham County, Wake County, and WinstonSalem/Forsyth County in 2004. Trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Courts rulings by stating, the North Carolina Constitution does not embrace a qualitative standard of education, neither plaintiffs nor plaintiff-intervenors had raised a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs appealed the Court of appeals decision and after review the court revised and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to Wake County Superior Court. The case was then divided into two separate actions -- rural and urban. Trial court rejected the State's contention that the trial court used test scores as the exclusive measure of a sound basic education.

4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: All children have an equal opportunity to receive a sound basic education and an equal opportunity is all the State is required to provide. The sound basic education is qualitatively defined and an appropriate educational strategy to provide children with the opportunity to receive a sound basic education is required. In the event that children are not being provided the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education because of inadequate educational programs and strategy, the educational programs and strategy must be changed to accomplish the constitutional mandate. In the event there is not sufficient funding to provide the educational programs, more funding must be appropriated to meet the constitutional mandate. Funds appropriated and applied to education, from whatever source, are first to be used for the purpose of providing children with the equal opportunity to receive a sound basic education. In the event of a deficit in the sound basic education component, funds that are being used for the purpose of providing educational programs not part of the sound basic education must be re-allocated and applied to the sound basic education until any deficit in that program is abolished. The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right. N.C. Const. art. I, 15. The General Assembly shall provide . . . for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students. N.C. Const. art. IX, 2(1). Religion Lemon v. Kurtzman 1. Issue(s): Was the First Amendments Establishment Clause violated by statutes making state financial aid available to church-related educational institutions? 2. Holding: Yes, it is unconstitutional to pass any state laws that establish a religious body. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Pennsylvania passed a law that allowed the local government to use money to fund educational programs that taught religious-based lessons. The money was used to fund teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects in the non-public schools. In Rhode Island, money was used to supplement teacher salaries to teachers in non-public schools. b. Procedural:

A suit was filed by Lemon, an instructor from Pennsylvania, stating that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court heard the case and held that the statutes did violate the First Amendment. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Establishment Clause of the First Amendment This decision established the Lemon Test, a three pronged test determining the requirements for cases concerning religion. If any of the prongs are violated, the governments action is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, 2) it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and 3) it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 1. Issue(s): Does the Ohio school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? 2. Holding: No, the program does not violate the Establishment Clause because it passed a five-part test developed by the court. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Ohios school voucher program provided tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students to attend public or private schools of the parents choosing. Participating schools included religious and nonreligious schools. b. Procedural: A group of Ohio taxpayers filed suit on the grounds that the program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court granted them summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Establishment Clause of the First Amendment The court developed a Private Choice Test to determine if the program was constitutional. For a program to be constitutional, it must meet all of the criteria: 1) it must have a valid secular purpose, 2) the aid must go to parents and not to the schools, 3) a broad class of beneficiaries must be covered, 4) it must be neutral with respect to religion, and 5) there must be adequate nonreligious options.

Student Speech

Tinker v. Des Moines ISD 1. Issue(s): Does a prohibition of wearing armbands in public school as a form of symbolic protest violate the students freedom of speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment? 2. Holding: Yes, the students First Amendment rights were violated because there was not an actual or reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: A group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting where the group determined to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season. Principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. They met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband. Two students wore black armbands to the school. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired after New Years Day. The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or substantial disturbance on the part of petitioners. b. Procedural: The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc. The court was equally divided, and the District Courts decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion. The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but the administrations suspensions were warranted to prevent substantial disruption. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: First Amendment Freedom of expression In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to

freedom of expression. They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression. Bethel SD v. Fraser 1. Issue(s): Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly? 2. Holding: No, the school can prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: A high school student delivered a speech nominating another fellow student for a student elective office. The assembly was attended by approximately 600 students many of which were 14 yr. olds. Students were required to go or to report to study hall. The speech was immature and contained sexual metaphors. Two of the respondents teachers told him upon discussion that he needed to change his speech because it was inappropriate. The school suspended him for violating the schools no-disruption rule. The respondent claimed that his First Amendment rights had been violated b. Procedural: The Court of Appeals originally said speech was indistinguishable from armbands in Tinker case. The Court of Appeals also rejected the School Districts argument. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: First Amendment Rights Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District (1969) School officials have a duty to instill values into students the habits and manners of civility. The sexual allusions of the respondent were very different than the political message (black armbands) in the Tinker case. The respondent was not being punished for his viewpoint but, his vulgar/lewd language at the assembly. Morse v. Frederick 1. Issue(s): Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at schoolsupervised events? 2. Holding: Yes, school officials can prohibit messages supporting drug use at school sponsored events. 3. Key Facts:

a. Circumstantial: A senior high school student, Joseph Frederick, unveiled a banner saying Bong Hits 4 Jesus at a school assembly for the Olympic Torch Relay in Juneau, Alaska in 2002. The student refused to put away the banner after his principal directed him to, claiming the message might in interpreted as promoting illegal drug use. He was suspended for 10 days in violation of the schools policy which forbids advocating the use of illegal drugs. b. Procedural: The District court ruled for Morse, but the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, claiming the banner was protected free speech. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: Whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his banner, and if so, whether that right was so clearly established that the principal may be held liable for damages.The Court ruled no to the first question therefore, eliminating the second question. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: First Amendment of the US Constitution The court stated that with Tinker, students do have rights. However, Bethel demonstrated that their rights can be limited and not always automatic. Hazelwood continued with the rights of students are applied within the unique characteristics of the school environment. Since the statement message wasnt political and could reasonably be viewed as promoted drug use, the principal had an important interest in prohibiting the banner and punishing the student. The Court held that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. Hazelwood SD v. Kuhlmeier 1. Issue(s): Did the deletion of articles in a school newspaper violate the students rights under the First Amendment? 2. Holding: No, the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: A schools principal, Reynolds, objected to two articles scheduled to appear in the schools newspaper. One of the stories described three Hazelwood East students experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school. Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used false names to keep the identity of these girls a secret, the pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text. He also believed that the articles references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the

school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the divorce story had complained that her father wasnt spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I prior to the divorce, was always out of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys, and always argued about everything with her mother. Reynolds believed that the students parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication. b. Procedural: The students brought the case to court claiming that their First Amendment rights had been violated. The US District Court held in favor of the school district. The US Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that speech that can be reasonable viewed to have the schools imprimatur can be regulated by the school if the school has a legitimate pedagogical concern in regulating the speech. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: First Amendment Schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Student Discipline/Due Process Goss v. Lopez 1. Issue(s): Did the imposition of suspensions without preliminary hearings violates students Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. Holding: Yes, the students suspension from school without a hearing violated the due process rights. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: Nine students in Ohio were given 10-day suspensions from school. The principals of the schools did not hold hearings before the suspensions and they were not required to do so by Ohio law. b. Procedural: The students brought suit alleging that their Due Process rights were violated. The District Court found that the students rights had been violated. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights

Public education is a property right via state law. Therefore, Ohio was constrained to recognize students entitlements to education as property interests protected by the Due Process Clause that could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The students should at least be given notice and afforded some kind of hearing. The hearing process should relate to the extent of loss of property interest. Search and Seizures New Jersey v. TLO 1. Issue(s): Does the Fourth Amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches apply to searches conducted by public school officials? 2. Holding: Yes, the Fourth Amendment applies but under a lesser standard for public schools. The search of TLOs purse was okay because it was reasonable at inception and in scope. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: A high school student was found smoking in a bathroom. She was taken to the Assistant Principals office where her purse was searched. The search revealed drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and documentation of drug sales. The student was charged as a juvenile with the possession of marijuana. b. Procedural: The student moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search before the trial, stating that the search violated her Fourth Amendment right. The Court denied her motion and found her guilty. She was sentenced to probation for one year. She appealed and the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools. However, there was reasonable suspicion and the search conducted was okay. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Fourth Amendment The right [of citizens]to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[and] upon probable cause Safford USD v. Redding 1. Issue(s): Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed udders 1983?

2. Holding: Sometimes, based on the facts of the case. This particular case violated the Fourth Amendment, but cases in which the search must be reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the students and the nature of the infraction. No, school administrators are not personally liable because clearly established law did not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: An eighth grade student, Redding, was strip search by school officials when another student tipped the school that she might have ibuprofen, a violation of school policy. The student was asked to strip down to her underwear and pull her underwear and bra out, exposing her to the school officials. No contraband was found during the search. b. Procedural: Redding filed suit against the school district and school officials alleging that her Fourth Amendment right was violated. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but then later held that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The strip search was reasonable at inception but not in scope. The search must be reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Fourth Amendment The right [of citizens]to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[and] upon probable cause Veronica SD v. Acton 1. Issue(s): Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment? 2. Holding: No, the reasonableness of a search is judged by balancing the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: After school officials noticed a rise in drug use among students in the school district, all students participating in athletics were required to submit to random drug testing. All athletes were tested at the beginning of the season and 10% were randomly selected each week. If a student's sample tested positive, the student was

given the option of either undergoing counseling and submitting to six weekly drug tests or sitting out the remainder of that season as well as the following season. b. Procedural: James Acton, a student, was denied participation in the schools football program when he and his parent refused to consent to the testing. He filed suit against the school district where the Supreme Court found that random drug testing does not violate Fourth Amendment rights. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: Fourth Amendment The search policy is reasonable due to threats and reasonable in scope. Students gave urine samples in ways that did not intrude on their privacy and student athletes have less privacy expectations due to conditions of participation. BOE v. Earls 1. Issue(s): Does a policy that requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing consistent with the Fourth Amendment? 2. Holding: Yes, coercive drug testing does not violate the Fourth Amendment primarily due to the schools custodial responsibility. 3. Key Facts: a. Circumstantial: The school district required all middle and high school students that participate in competitive extracurricular activities to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs. b. Procedural: Two students brought suit alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 4. Main Laws/Legal Principles: The Fourth Amendment Because the policy reasonably serves the school districts important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The students voluntarily subjected themselves to the policy by participating in non-mandatory extracurricular activities. There was little intrusion of privacy. A known drug problem is not required to initiate a drug testing policy.