PEDRO S. LACSA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 74907, 23 May 1988 SARMIENTO, J.

He also wrote a letter (2 January 1979) to Marquez, asking the latter to relinquish the presidency, and referring to the latter as a de facto president. The grounds he cited for such a request were the same as the ones he gave in his letter to the BoD. He cced the latter letter to a number of people including some familiar names: Justice Claudio Teehankee, Jorge Vargas, and Prof. Renato Constantino. Eventually, he caused the letter to be published and circulated among the member of the Assoc. He also caused the publication, in a newsletter circulated to the members of the Assoc., an item entitled Doubts As to the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President. Marquez instituted separate criminal and civil actions against Lacsa, claiming to have been maligned, defamed, and exposed to public ridicule by the latters actions. The CFI of Manila found Lacsa guilty of Libel, and this judgment was later affirmed by the IAC. Thus, this petition to SC. Issues/Holding/Ratio: 1. Did the appellate court err in affirming Lacsas conviction for Libel? NO. DEFENSE (de facto president is not libelous, per se): SC: SolGen correct in saying that calling Marquez a de facto president is equivalent to saying that the latter is a pretender/fraud/impostor who arrogated unto himself powers/rights/privileges to which he is not entitled. o Exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule o Created an impression in the minds of the readers of the libelous materials DEFENSE (even presuming de facto president is libelous, the letter and newsletter constitute privileged communication): To be classified as privileged comm.., the material must be absolutely free from any taint of malice not the case here Lacsa knew beforehand that Marquez was already a proprietary member of the

Important Doctrine: An incendiary utterance, where the libelous allegations are expressly laid out, is not the only possible ground for conviction. Following US v. OConnell, speech where the readers/hearers are merely induced to be suspicious of the victims merit/honor may suffice. Explanations of the accused as to the meaning of the assailed utterances are, in a way, immaterial: what matters is the meaning of the utterances as understood by the readers, taking the material as a whole, and reading it in its plain and ordinary meaning. (US v. Sotto; Jimenez v. Reyes) Information (charge): *not specified* CFI of Manila: Libel (complainant: Ponciano Marquez) Guilty (P2,000) Intermediate Appellate Court: Affirmed, in toto, Judgment of CFI Facts: Lacsa is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by profession. As such, he offered his services pro bono to serve as auditor of the Philippine Columbian Association (having previously been a former member of its Board of Directors, and, then, a representative of one of its institutional members). Lacsa accessed the personal folder of Marquez, thenPresident of the Assoc. He found out that Marquez was a mere associate of the association: he questioned Marquezs qualification to hold the presidency, when only proprietary members can be voted to that position. Thus, he wrote a letter to the BoD (21 December 1978) wherein he impugned the status of Marquez as president and proprietary member. He contended that the issuance of a proprietary membership to Marquez, w/o the authority of the Assoc.s BoD, was erroneous.

association, as evidenced by the issuance of the certificate for the latters proprietary membership. o Evidenced by the accuseds initials, PSL, dated 28 September 1978, in a document containing the minutes of a 22 April 1968 meeting. (His initials signified that he had examined the document.) o Thus, there was no sufficient ground to claim that there was no basis for the conversion of Marquezs associate membership into a proprietary one. Even assuming that the January 1979 letter was in fact privileged communication, its status as such was lost upon Lacsas publishing and circulation of the matter in a newsletter. o SC noted that, as an auditor, Lacsa was under an obligation to keep his findings in strict confidence bet. Him and the BoD. o The BoD is the only body that can make the necessary correction in case there was a mistake in the membership records. o Immediately going public with is alleged findings is unpardonable. Trial Courts Finding of Malice: o Lacsas appointment as member of the steering committee (tasked to implement the terms and conditions of MOA w/ Permaline, Inc. for the construction of the Philippine Columbian Sports Complex worth P30M) was not extended; he was only give chairmanship of the finance committee: the latter position Lacsa rejected, and Marquez, as President, accepted the rejection o Lacsa felt aggrieved and thus began looking for ways to criticize Marquez

Petition DENIED. Questioned decision AFFIRMED. Additional Notes: Test of Libelous Meaning, US v. OConnell, in cases where nothing wrong is imputed in certain and express terms: Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient (i) if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person/s against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, (ii) if the words are sufficient to impeach the victims honesty, virtue, or reputation, or (iii) hold the victim up to public ridicule.

On how to analyze allegedly libelous material (US v. Sotto, citing Jimenez v. Reyes): The published matter must be construed as a whole. The court will disregard any subtle/ingenious explanation offered by the publisher: the question is what the effect of the publication had upon the minds of the readers giving the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.

Dispostion: