Constructing Threat, Creating Cooperation: Foreign Policy Framing Across

Presidential Administrations

Jordan Brown

Dissertation Prospectus

March 6th, 2009

 Introduction

The construction of meaning is the driving force of politics and policy processes

(Entman 2004; Stone 2002). Political actors define political events and issues in ways

that provide audiences meaningful conceptual frameworks for understanding the

problem, its cause and its solution (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1992).

Events and issues, in other words, do not have inherent meaning. Political and social

movement actors construct meaning with the goal of gaining public support for their

preferred policy initiatives, and hope to influence policy narratives and proposed

solutions (Stone 1989; Stone 2002). While this is true for most political issues, the

construction of meaning is especially important with regard to foreign policy initiatives

because, overall, the general public tends to be undereducated regarding foreign affairs

(Edwards 2008).

To enhance their chances of success, policy makers use a number of resources to

disseminate their message and influence public opinion. In this regard, they rely on the

media as a means of reaching out to potential constituents whom they can mobilize for

support (Entman 2004). In order to do so successfully, political actors must create

“frames,” or the meanings given to events, that are resonant within a broader culture

(Edwards and Wood 1999; Rochon 1998; Sicherman 2007). One way to make frames

resonate is by making emotional appeals to audiences that will translate into support for a

proposed policy preference (Entman 2004).

This proposed project will exam how elite actors use emotional appeals in frames

to sell their policy initiatives. It is important to examine elite political actors because

1
they occupy the positions that are most likely to shape media coverage and affect how the

public views issues (Meyer Forthcoming). Through content analysis of presidential

speeches and media coverage of foreign policy, this project will identify emotional

appeals used by presidents to mobilize support for their foreign policy initiatives. This

dissertation examines (1) whether or not foreign policy frames of threat and cooperation

are constructed similarly across presidencies and (2) what types of emotional appeals are

successful in gaining media coverage. Specifically, I will answer the following research

questions: How are emotions used when framing foreign policy initiatives, and are they

used similarly to create threat frames and cooperation frames? Are similar emotions used

across presidencies? How successful are these emotions at capturing media attention?

I will begin with a review of relevant literature on political rhetoric, the framing

perspective, and media coverage to highlight the theoretical relevance of this project.

Next, I will turn to the proposed data and methods for this project. I will begin this

section with a discussion of how I will operationalize the frames of threat and

cooperation, and how I will measure the presence of emotional appeals. This will be

followed by discussion of my case selection and sampling techniques. Finally, I will

discussion the theoretic implications of my project.

Literature Review

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is conceptualized in political science as the as the art of persuasion

(Maggio 2007; Majone 1989). As such, rhetoric is viewed as a way actors influence

peoples’ actions orbeliefs. In politics, actors use rhetoric to define a situation in a certain

2
manner hoping they can influence audiences’ beliefs (Cohen 1995; Hawdon 2001; Young

and Perkins 2005). Political rhetoric, then, creates a discourse that is used to persuade

others to support specific policy initiatives (Maggio 2007; Majone 1989; Smith 1990).

For example, after the end of World War II, political actors relied primarily on two

rhetorics to gain public support for their foreign policy. The first rhetoric emphasized the

value of cooperating with foreign nations and supported peaceful diplomatic solutions

(e.g., United Nations negotiations) to international disputes. The second rhetoric

emphasized that powerful and unlawful authoritative government (e.g., The Soviet

Union) seeking expansion posed a direct threat to the United States. This rhetoric

emphasized the need for the United States to be willing to act with military force to

protect national security and vital interests (Smith 1990). In short, rhetoric is a tool used

by actors to construct citizenry perceptions of a political issue (Kiewe 1991; Zarefsky

2004).

Using rhetoric, politicians are able to “sell” a idea to an audience (Boxill and

Unnithan 1995), and influence public opinion (Cohen 1995). This is particularly true

regarding the discourse surrounding foreign policy because the general public tends to

lack information regarding foreign states (Edwards 2008). Since the public is often

undereducated on foreign policy issues, they largely rely on elites for information and

definitions of events (Cohen 1995; Whitford and Yates 2003; Young and Perkins 2005).

The political rhetoric actors construct is most likely to be successful when the narrative

created affects peoples’ perceptions and creates a shared vision between the actor and the

audience (Fisher 1985a; Fisher 1985b). This is accomplished by drawing on culturally

resonant themes and widespread cultural beliefs and values (Sicherman 2007; West and

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Carey 2006). Rhetoric that is able to strike a resonant chord with the public can then be

used to help actors prevail in policy debates (West and Carey 2006).

The Framing Perspective and Policy Initiatives

Debates surrounding policy initiatives involve “symbolic contests” to determine

whose definitions of social issues will prevail. These issues do not have inherent

meaning and the need for proposed policy, as well as the effects of proposed policies, are

debated among actors (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). The symbolic contests

surrounding policy initiatives play an important role because actors create definitions

they hope will mobilize support for their preferred policy solutions. Once actors have

defined an issue or event, they can then communicate their definition to an audience in

the hopes of gaining support for the policy they prefer (Stone, 2002; Stone, 1989). The

definitions actors create become part of a rhetoric that defines social reality. Thus, how

successful an actor is in defining a situation affects their chances of mobilizing audience

support (Zarefsky 2004).

Framing plays an important role in defining issues because it allows actors to

construct the meaning of certain events (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and

Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992; Ryan 1991; Ryan, Carragee and Meinhofer 2001; Snow

et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992). A frame refers to the meaning, or definition, actors

give to an event or issue and becomes a means for interpreting and understanding our

surroundings (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). When frames are created not

only to interpret , but also to persuade, they become a form of rhetoric (Carruthers and

4
Nelson Espeland 1991). In other words, frames constitute one of many possible

rhetorical strategies used to convince people they should act in a certain way.

Actors are able to accomplish a number of goals by creating frames. Specifically,

there are three main purposes served by frames: (1) diagnosis of a problem, (2) prognosis

of a problem, and (3) motivation to correct the problem (Benford and Snow 2000).

Frames are presented by political actors to define an issue as problematic and in need of

policy attention. Framing then helps to create a story or “narrative” that helps people

make sense of the situations surrounding them. As a consequence, framing has policy

implications, as the definitions that are provided construct situations or issues as

problematic, and articulate solutions to address these issues (Meyer, Jenness and Ingram

2005; Stone 2002).

Actors attempt to control the definition of an event by controlling the vocabulary

used to describe the event’s meaning (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; Rohlinger

2002; Snow and Benford 1992). Social movement and institutional actors create frames

to define events in a way that supports their policy agenda. Rarely, however, are actors’

frames accepted unopposed, as there are nearly always competing narratives to define

events (Benford and Snow 2000). Rather, they engage in framing contests with others to

determine whose definition will prevail (Benford and Snow 2000; Jerit 2008; Meyer

1995; Rohlinger 2002; Snow and Byrd 2007). Actors, then, often compete against each

other to advance their frames and have their definition of events accepted (Stone 2002).

Actors are more successful in defining events and winning framing contests when

their frames exhibit certain characteristics. First, frames are more successful if they

simplify the story, rather than defining events in an overly complicated way (Meyer

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2006; Snow and Benford 1992; Stone 2002). For example, antinuclear armament frames

may choose to focus on just one negative aspect of an arms race (e.g., the destruction that

could be done from by nuclear weapons), rather than getting bogged down in technical

nuclear arms jargon. Keeping their message simple allows activists to clearly identify

what is problematic and what is a proper solution. Second, actor’s frames are more

successful when the language they use resonates with their audience by drawing on

broader cultural values (Meyer 2006; Rochon 1998; Stone 2002). For instance, abortion

is often defined as a violation of rights, and therefore wrong, by both pro-life (fetal

rights) and pro-choice (women’s rights) organizations (Rohlinger 2002; Rohlinger 2007).

Finally, definitions that are overly dramatic decrease chances for a frames’ success

(Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1988). For example, Benford (1993) found that

nuclear disarmament frames that are too dramatic made the issue appear hopeless, thus

causing activists to drop out of the movement and preventing the mobilization of

potential recruits.

Frames, in short, affect both public support and policy processes. Political actors

try to create frames that will capture audience attention and shape how they view certain

issues (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Entman 2004). Creating a definition that draws on

cultural values increases the chances that frame will resonate with an audience. This can

enhance the opportunity to bring an issue policy attention, as well as generate support for

particular policy solutions (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Gamson 1992; Rohlinger 2002;

Ryan 1991; Snow and Benford 1992).

Frames and Emotions

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 Actors’ frames are infused with emotions (Jasper 1997). By drawing on emotions

in their definitions, actors increase the resonance of their messages. This helps them

maximize their chances of creating a successful frame (Entman 2004; Neustadt 1990;

Ross 2006). Furthermore, the emotions that actors draw on in their definitions helps to

make their frames persuasive and enhance the potency of their messages (Maney,

Woehrle and Coy 2005). As such, research on political rhetoric and framing can be

informed by the literature on the sociology of emotions.

Political actors anticipate the reactions of their audience when they construct

rhetoric (Zarefsky 2004). One way actors try to manipulate their audience’s response is

through the emotions they display (Whitter 2001). Specifically, emotional labor can be

used by political actors in an effort to incite specific responses from others (Goodwin and

Pfaff 2001; Whitter 2001). Emotional labor refers to managing the emotions one chooses

to display in order to promote a specific affective state in others. For instance, flight

attendants are often required to display certain emotional characteristics (e.g., happy,

relaxed) to relieve the anxiety many passengers experience while flying (Hochschild

1983).

In the context of political discourse, actors may also attempt to elicit a particular

affective state in an audience by expressing specific emotions (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001;

Whitter 2001). Actors can then use these emotions to gain support for their policy

preferences (Aminzade and McAdam 2001). For example, after the 9/11 attacks on the

World Trade Center and Pentagon, President Bush frequently drew on themes of national

identity and American values of freedom and justice to elicit angry feelings and mobilize

support for military action (Frewin, Stephens and Tuffin 2006).

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 Using emotions in this way allows actors to connect the frames they create with

the personal experiences of their audience. The bridge between frames and personal

experience helps construct a shared view of reality among actors and bystanders which

can influence public opinion (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008). Emotions, then, help actors

define events and generate support for specific policy preferences (Gross 2008; Ross

2006).

In short, political actors are able to draw on emotions to increase the resonance of

their frames. Using emotions to increase the resonance of a frame increases the chances

of prevailing in a framing contest. Effectively managing emotions allows actors to sell

their frame and mobilize support for specific policy initiatives (Maney, Woehrle and Coy

2005).

Frames, Media and Political Processes

The mass media play an important role in policy process for the following

reasons: (1) the media narrow the range of frames that are available to the general public;

(2) the media determine who will be the spokespeople of a specific issue or event; and (3)

the media are able to influence public opinion by choosing which actors and frames to

cover.

First, media are able to narrow the range of frames available to the general public

by choosing which events will be covered, and what aspects of those events will be

reported. The public relies on the media to make sense of large amounts of information

(Hannigan 1995; Hannigan 2006), and it is often not until an event receives media

attention that it is viewed as an issue warranting public concern (Rohlinger 2007). While

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media do not tell people what to think (i.e. what position to take on an issue), they do

influence what topics people view as important issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972). This

means that the media help set the public and political agenda, and decide what issues

receive policy attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988;

McCombs and Shaw 1972), as well as determine what social problems matter (Kraus

2000; Neuzil and Kovarik 1996).

Furthermore, media narrow the frames available to the public by deciding which

frames will be covered, and thus whose definitions reach a broad audience (Smith et al.

2001). Media, however, do not cover all aspects of an issue. Rather, they report stories

that will gain the largest audience, and tend to only cover the most interesting aspects of

an issue at a time (Gitlin 1980). This means that the spotlight often shifts between

various actors and multiple frames. The frames that media choose to cover determine the

range of possible policy solutions available (Stone 1989; Stone 2002). In other words, the

media provide information on only a few of the potentially infinite number of solutions

available to address social problems.

Second, the media help determine prominent spokespeople for a specific issue by

determining whose frames to cover. This is especially true for political elites, who rely

on the media as their main means of disseminating information to the public (Cook

1998). As a consequence, the media serve as an indirect link that elite actors rely on to

spread their definitions of events to the public (Stone 2002). In circumstances in which

only a small number of actors receive coverage, fewer frames are made available to the

public. This means that actors that do gain media coverage become seen as expert

9
spokespeople on an issue, and are able to provide definitions of events that support their

policy preferences (Callaghan and Schnell 2001).

Finally, it is precisely because the media controls which actors and frames get

covered that they are able to influence public opinion. By choosing only to cover specific

aspects of events (Gitlin 1980), the media determine which event characteristics are most

important. This allows the media to influence political opinion by creating a debate of

the pros and cons of the most likely outcomes, rather than all possible outcomes.

Because the media reduces a large amount of information into a few important points

(Hannigan 1995; Hannigan 2006), they can only cover a limited number of frames. The

predominant frames covered by the media are then able to steer public opinion in support

of specific policy preferences (Cook 1989; Cook 1998).

If media coverage is dominated by one actor or group’s frame, rather than a range

of opposing frames, this gives the public the illusion of having little choice among policy

solutions. When this dominance occurs, actors have prevailed in the framing contest, and

can give a definition of events that promotes their policy agenda (Callaghan and Schnell

2001). As such, media coverage becomes a resource actors compete over as a means of

influencing public opinion (Cook 1998).

Competition Among Actors

At any given time there are a potentially infinite number of social problems that

warrant policy attention. Determining which issues will actually be placed on the

agenda, then, is more a result of successful social creation than of any objective measure

of social importance (Alimi 2007; Best 1995; Meyer Forthcoming). This means that an

10
actor’s political skill is at least as important as the condition itself in gaining recognition

as a social problem (Stone 1989; Stone 2002)

While the number of potential social problems is infinite, the limited media space

available to cover events is scarce, meaning that not all problems gain coverage

(Rohlinger 2002). Media coverage is event driven, and journalists seek out

“newsworthy” stories they feel will attract large audiences (Gitlin 1980). At times,

however, events take place that provide an opportunity for actors to present their frames

to the media (Pride 2002). Scholars discuss critical events that increase the salience of

issues for political actors and the public, and lead to increased media coverage and policy

attention. For instance, large-scale social events (e.g., wars, depressions, elections, etc.)

or proposed policy changes can increase the importance of an issue and garner

widespread attention (Staggenborg 1993). Critical events lead to increased public

awareness, and create opportunities for actors to construct grievances and frame issues as

problematic. These “suddenly imposed grievances” (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995;

Raeburn 2004; Sahin 2005) produce critical discourse moments in which issues are

especially salient to an audience and are placed on the public agenda (Gamson 1992;

Rohlinger 2002). When these critical events occur, public perceptions change and actors

are presented with an opportunity to mobilize support (Staggenborg 1993). Events, then,

create critical junctures in which new frames may emerge (Nelson 1974; Piven and

Cloward 1977; Staggenborg 1993).

Actors must effectively respond to critical events to gain support (Staggenborg

1993). However, at any given time there are a potentially infinite number of social

problems that warrant policy attention. Determining which issues will actually be placed

11
on the agenda, then, is more a result of successful social creation than any objective

measure of social importance (Alimi 2007; Best 1995; Meyer Forthcoming). Therefore,

an actor’s skill is at least as important as the condition itself in garnering attention (Stone

1989; Stone 2002). Furthermore, there are nearly always opposing frames with which

actors must contend (Benford and Snow 2000).

Actors, then, compete against each other to advance their frames (Stone 2002),

and engage in framing contests to determine whose definitions will prevail (Benford and

Snow 2000; Jerit 2008; Meyer 1995; Rohlinger 2002; Snow and Byrd 2007). Because

they are the major means of disseminating information, the media becomes the primary

arena in which framing contests are fought (Meyer 1995; Smith et al. 2001). Who

prevails in these framing contests is largely determined by an actors’ political skill and

media strategy (Rohlinger 2002). All actors, however, are not created equal when it

comes to gaining media attention. Some actors enjoy a privileged position that makes

their actions more newsworthy, and provides them with more access to the media. For

instance, the elected offices held by politicians make their actions more likely to gain

media coverage. As the major spokesperson, and most visible leader of the U.S.

government, the President enjoys the highest status in this regard and is routinely covered

by the media (Maggio 2007; Meyer Forthcoming). This essentially means that the

President can gain media coverage for his/her framing of an issue with less effort than

other actors. Politicians in general, but presidents specifically, have an easier avenue for

disseminating their message to a large audience.

Presidents enjoy a number of advantages regarding framing contests in addition to

easy access to the media. For instance, Meyer (Forthcoming) notes that Presidents have

12
access to privileged information not available to other political actors. This allows them

to make claims based on knowledge not available to others. Moreover, because of the

status of their political office, the claims they make are typically viewed as credible. The

increased credibility that is endowed on them by their office enhances their ability to

have their frames accepted by the public and increases their chance of success in a

framing contest (Benford and Snow 2000). Presidents and other political actors,

however, do not frame events without their personal interests and goals in mind. First

and foremost, as elected leaders, the narratives created are done so with goals of

reelection in mind. As such, presidential framing of events attempts to gain faith in

leaders’ ability to govern. In doing so they hope that their frames will gain the support of

constituents and the broad public audience (Meyer Forthcoming). In other words,

presidents hope to win the framing contest as a means of winning public support for

reelection purposes.

This project will contribute to the current literature outlined above in at least two

ways. First, while it has been acknowledged that elite actors hold privileged positions in

framing contests, few studies have examined how elites frame their policy agendas.

Second, while it has been acknowledged that frames draw on emotion, the role of

emotions in framing processes as it relates to elites has been understudied. This

dissertation will address these limitations of prior research by explicitly examining

emotions used by elites to frame foreign policy.

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 Data and Methods

Conducting content analysis of presidential speeches and newspaper articles, I

will address three questions in this project. First, how are emotions used when framing

foreign policy initiatives? Are they used similarly to create threat frames and cooperation

frames?1 Second, are similar emotions used across presidencies? Third, how successful

is the use of emotion in capturing media attention?

I will begin this section with a discussion of the foreign policy frames to be

identified, and my proposed coding scheme. Next, I will discuss my case selection, and

provide an outline of the foreign policy enacted during each case. I will then end with a

discussion of my sampling and data collection methods.

Coding

For this project, the unit of analysis is each presidential speech, and each

newspaper article. Presidential speeches are included to examine the emotions conveyed

directly by each President when constructing his/her frame. Media articles are included

to determine which frames successfully capture media attention. Typed transcripts for

the presidential speeches are available via an online archive of the Public Papers of the

President through the American Presidency Project housed at the University of California

Santa Barbara (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/). Newspaper articles will be collected

online using the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database.

1
The threat and cooperation frames used in this study have been created by drawing on the work of Smith
(1990). Smith describes three frameworks for understanding U.S. foreign policy after WWII: cooperation,
red fascism and power politics. However, both red fascism and power politics emphasize the threat of
Soviet expansion—albeit Soviet expansion is threatening for different reasons. Because I am specifically
interested in threat and cooperation generally, and not different types of threat, I am combining the latter
two into one frame for this project.

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 Each unit will be coded for the presence or absence of two frames: (1) a threat

frame, and (2) a cooperation frame. These two frames are mutually exclusive; however it

is possible for both frames to appear in the same speech or article. Additionally, each

speech will be coded for the number of times the specific emotions of fear, anger, shame,

and pride are expressed. In order to determine which emotions are associated with which

frames, emotions will be coded separately depending on whether they are used in a

cooperation frame or a threat frame. That is, each emotion will have two codes, one

associated with the threat frame and one associated with the cooperation frame.

Atlas ti will be used to code speeches and newspaper articles. Once coding is

completed, the counts for emotions, and the presence and absence of the threat and

cooperation frames will be imported into statistical software (SPSS or STATA) to test for

significant relationships between frames, emotional appeals and media coverage. The

appropriate statistical procedures to be used will be determined once the data has been

coded.

Operationalizing Frames and Emotion

Cooperation frame: Cooperation frames will be coded by identifying arguments

that advocate a policy preference of negotiation or the need to reach diplomatic

agreements with foreign nations (e.g., the need for arms reductions). Included in this

frame will be arguments that emphasize the potential costs of war, the need for

negotiations to ease tensions with hostile nations, the unwillingness to act unilaterally,

and a need to reduce the risk of and avoid a potential armed confrontation.

Threat Frame: Threat frames will be coded by identifying arguments that

emphasize the potential danger to America if action is not taken. This includes the risk of

15
attacks on Americans or American Allies in the U.S. or abroad, and the risk of allowing

the expansion of foreign enemies. Frames will be coded as a threat frame if an argument

is made that America must be willing to act, with military force if necessary, in order to

protect Americans or American interests from attacks on their well being.

Emotions

Drawing on the work of Gould (2001), emotions will be identified by coding the

speech transcripts and newspaper articles for explicit emotion words and phrases (e.g., I

am angry, or I am outraged) known as “emotives” (Reddy 1997). The number of times

emotives are used in each speech will be counted to determine how often each emotion is

used. Emotions will be identified using the same criteria for both frames, but will be

coded separately for threat and cooperation frames to determine which emotions are

invoked in which frames. For this study I will measure the presence of four emotions:

fear, anger, shame, and pride.

Fear will be measured by identifying presidential arguments that emphasize the

potential consequences of inaction (e.g., if the U.S. is not proactive, we will be attacked).

Anger will be measured by identifying frames that attempt to invoke anger in potential

constituents (e.g., these actions against America are an outrage). Shame will be measured

by identifying frames that attempt to create a sense of guilt or shame among potential

constituents to justify action or inaction (e.g., as a powerful nation it is America’s duty to

act). This will include arguments that the United States should enact a particular policy

because it has the ability to do so, and could improve the lives of U.S. citizens and/or

foreign citizens (e.g., the U.S. could stop false imprisonment in foreign nations, or could

save lives with proper action). Pride will be measured by identifying frames that

16
emphasize U.S. strengths and/or values as a way to justify foreign policies (e.g., we

should be proud of America’s way of life). Finally, any emotions not described above

that appear in the speeches will be coded as other. If any emotions not listed above are

found to be common in the presidential speeches they will be added to the analysis.

Oppositional Actors and Emotion

In addition to the threat and cooperation frames outlined above, each newspaper

article will be coded for the presence or absence of frames opposing the president’s

policy agenda. I will not be keeping track of individual oppositional frames. However,

coding for the presence of opposing frames will allow for an analysis of whether the

President successfully dominates a framing contest. Time periods in which the

President’s frame appears with little oppositional coverage will suggest that a President

has been able to successfully dominate an issue.

Case Selection

For this project I will examine the frames used by four separate Presidents to

justify their foreign policy: Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Geroge W.

Bush. These four Presidents make excellent cases to examine the frames used to justify

foreign policy for several reasons. First, using these cases, I can compare two

Republican and two Democratic presidents. Second, I can compare two Cold War

Presidents, and two post Cold-War Presidents. Finally, each of these four Presidents

shifted their foreign policy preferences from either a threat frame to a cooperation frame,

or vice versa, at some point during their time in office.

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 For each President I will code media and newspaper articles during the first

month of their presidency to examine their initial foreign policy frames. Next, I will code

speeches and media coverage during a critical discourse moment (i.e. a time period where

foreign policy is highly salient) in which each President shifted either from a threat frame

to a cooperation frame, or vice versa (see Table 1 for critical discourse moments).

Additionally, I will code the entirety of each President’s State of the Union Addresses

given throughout their term. State of the Union Address are included because they

provide the most formal and centralized occasions of publically proposed policies (Lowi

and Ginsberg 1990; Meyer 1995). Below, I describe the foreign policy of each President

to illustrate that a change in their policy preferences did take place. After this discussion,

I outline the time frames used for sampling.

Carter Administration

Throughout the Cold War, spanning from the end of World War II (1945) through

1991, the Soviet Union was the primary concern of U.S. Presidential policy. The Carter

administration’s main approach to foreign policy was one of détente—or a relaxing of

tensions through diplomacy. Carter’s was not the first administration to approach foreign

relations in this way, but the administration’s main approach to foreign policy was to

create a stable superpower relationship with the Soviet Union. During this time it was

believed that a stable relationship with the U.S.’s main international rival would reduce

the risks of nuclear war, as well as help the U.S. avoid conflicts in underdeveloped

countries (Gaddis 2005b). In summary, Carter’s initial foreign policy advocated

cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to relax international tensions, maintain peace

at home and abroad, and reduce the risks of nuclear war.

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 Carter’s approach to foreign policy changed on Christmas Day of 1979. The

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Carter to take a stronger stance on foreign

policy, and to abandon détente. In response to this “Soviet act of aggression,” the Carter

administration withdrew from the SALT II treaty negations on arms reduction, placed

trade embargos on the Soviet Union, and forced an American boycott of the 1980

Moscow Olympics. These actions lead to the Carter Doctrine in which Jimmy Carter

announced that U.S. would act—with force if necessary—to protect vital U.S. interests

around the world (Gaddis 2005a; Gaddis 2005b; Klare 2006).

Reagan Administration

During his campaign for the Presidency in 1980, Reagan criticized the Carter

Administration for being soft on foreign policy (Gaddis 2005b) and made it clear that he

opposed détente (Gaddis 2005a; Meyer 1990; Meyer 1995). Furthermore, once in office,

Reagan argued that détente allowed the Soviet Union to strengthen its worldwide

influence, and argued that the United States must prepare for, and be willing to fight and

win a strategic nuclear war where vital American interests were at stake (Gaddis 2005b;

Meyer 1995). This initial confrontational foreign policy emphasized the threat that

communism, in general, and the Soviet Union, in particular, posed to the United States

(Meyer 1995).

In 1983, however, largely in response to the U.S. anti nuclear movement, Reagan

changed his rhetoric. Instead of confrontation, Reagan emphasized the need to cooperate

with the Soviet Union because a nuclear war could not be won, and must not be fought

(Meyer 1995). The origin of this shift in foreign policy dates to Reagan’s announcement

of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on March, 21, 1983. Critics argued that the SDI

19
would violate treaties and reinvigorate the arms race with the Soviet Union. Reagan,

however, argued that a defense against nuclear missiles was beneficial, and would

eventually render such weapons as obsolete This, in turn, world allow the United States

to avoid nuclear war in the future, and eventually allow for the abolition of all nuclear

weapons (Gaddis 1992; Gaddis 2005a; Gaddis 2005b).

Clinton Administration

By the time Bill Clinton assumed the Presidency in January 1993, the Soviet

Union had collapsed and the Cold War was over. This left the United States as the

world’s sole superpower, and left a political vacuum in Eastern Europe characterized by

nationalist conflicts and governmental instability. The lack of an ideologically opposed

superpower in international affairs allowed the Clinton administration to initially place

priorities on their domestic agenda, and allowed the President to frame foreign policy in a

way that emphasized cooperation and the need for multilateral action in international

affairs (Papayoanou 1997).

This was a distinct shift from the isolationist policies of George H. W. Bush

regarding the Eastern Block. For example, when civil war broke out between Muslims

and Serbs following the Bosnia declaration of independence in March 1992, the first

Bush administration chose to remain largely uninvolved in the conflict (Auerbach and

Bloch-Elkon 2005). Clinton initially continued the isolationist policy of his predecessor,

deciding that the U.S. would not involve itself in the conflict (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon

2005; Barthe and David 2004).

This changed, however, in August of 1995. After Serbian attacks on Bosnian

Muslims increased, the U.S. began playing a more active role in the international arena,

20
and began forcefully pressuring European and NATO allies to use military force to

resolve the Bosnian conflict (Papayoanou 1997). After a Serbian attack on a Sarajevo

market in late August of 1995, NATO, under the strong urging of the United States,

launched Operation Deliberate Force on August 30, 1995 (Barthe and David 2004).

These actions essentially marked the end of Clinton’s isolationist foreign policy. Near the

end of his first term, and facing reelection, Clinton began to frame his foreign policy in

terms of America’s willingness to use military force when vital interests are at stake

(Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005; Barthe and David 2004).

Bush Administration

Like Clinton, George W. Bush entered the Presidency with a foreign policy frame

that promoted isolationist principles, and a promise not to engage in nation building

(Meyer Forthcoming; Widmaier 2007). His reluctance to engage the United States in

foreign affairs, and his isolationist leanings are visible in the policies the administration

pursued during the first months of his term. For example, the Bush Administration called

for a withdrawal of U.S. troops in Bosnia, pulled out of peace negotiations in the Middle

East, and did not take an active role in negotiation to reduce Russian Nuclear materials

(Widmaier 2007). From these actions, it is clear that the Bush administration actively

chose to disengage itself from international affairs, and pursued a “hands off” approach to

foreign policy.

This changed on September 11, 2001. After the terrorist attacks in New York,

Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C., the Bush Administration pursued a much more

aggressive foreign policy that advocated using preemptive force against enemies of the

nation (Widmaier 2007). Moreover, the Bush Doctrine pushed for a foreign policy that

21
would permit the United States to use military force proactively and unilaterally—if

necessary—to combat terrorism and foreign states that might eventually become hostile

towards the United States (Meyer Forthcoming). Finally, in contrast to earlier foreign

policy that emphasized the dangers of U.S. involvement in nation building, Bush

eventually promoted a foreign policy that claimed the U.S.’s primary international goal

was the promotion of democracy abroad (Widmaier 2007).

At some point during their time in office, each of these Presidents presents both a

threat frame, and a cooperation frame. Using these cases I will examine both how

emotion is used across presidencies, and how different emotions may be used by the

same President to sell different frames.

Sampling Periods and Data Collection

Presidential Speeches

All speeches regarding foreign policy given directly from the President within the

given time frames, as well as the State of the Union Addresses, are included in the

sample. Speeches will be sampled around the critical discourse moments differently

depending on the type of critical event the critical discourse moment follows. For

anticipated shifts in foreign policy, Presidential speeches will be sampled from one

month before, through one month after the policy shift. This sampling strategy assumes

that these shifts did not have an “immaculate conception” (Taylor 1989), but rather, that

the changing frame was constructed shortly prior to policy shifts. Additionally, analyzing

Presidential speeches after policy adoption allows for an examination of the framing used

to justify new policy directions. For critical discourse moments created by unanticipated

22
critical events (i.e. the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks), speeches are

sampled for a period of one month after the events. The difference in sampling strategy

is due to the assumption that there will be no indication of a policy change prior to an

unexpected critical event.

Media Coverage

I will examine media coverage to determine if threat frames are more successful

at capturing media attention than cooperation frames. Additionally, I will examine

whether the use of specific emotions is associated with an increase in the level of media

coverage they receive. Finally, by coding for the presence or absence of voiced

opposition, I will assess whether some emotions are more successful than others in

dominating framing contests (e.g., are anger appeals more successful at dominating

media coverage than shame appeals?).

I will sample articles printed in two newspapers: The New York Times, and The

Washington Post. The New York Times was selected because it is widely regarded as the

major American news source and is believed to set the news agenda followed by other

outlets (Gamson 1992). The Washington Post is included to broaden the sample, and

provide an outlet that may express opposing views. Additionally, these two sources have

high circulation rates and are considered the elite press sources in the United States on

foreign policy (Denhan 1997; Merrill 1995). Articles are available from these two

sources through the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database.

Media data will be sampled using the same time frames as the speech data

outlined above. For each administration, newspaper articles covering Presidential foreign

policy will be coded for the first month the President is in office. During the Reagan and

23
Clinton administrations, newspaper articles covering foreign policy will be included from

one month prior through one month after a shift in foreign policy is announced. Because

the Carter and Bush administrations shifted policy in response to unanticipated critical

events, only articles regarding foreign policy one month after the event will be included

in the sample.

For each time period, articles will be identified using the Lexis-Nexis Academic

Universe database search function. The following key search terms will be used to

identify articles:

Carter Administration: Foreign Policy, Soviet Union, Détente, Afghanistan.

Reagan Administration: Foreign Policy, Soviet Union, Détente, SDI, Strategic Missile

Defense, Star Wars.

Clinton Administration: Foreign Policy, Bosnia, Serbian, Sarajevo, Operation Deliberate

Force.

Bush Administration: Foreign Policy, 9/11, Afghanistan, Terrorism, War on Terror,

Taliban.

Letters to the editor and articles that are irrelevant to foreign policy (i.e. appear in the

search results but do not discuss foreign policy) will be excluded from the sample.

Implications

Political actors are engaged in the construction of meaning (Entman 2004; Stone

2002). In an effort to influence public opinion, actors construct frames that will mobilize

24
support for their policy preferences (Benford and Snow 2000; Stone 2002). Because the

media plays an important role in the dissemination of information (Hannigan 1995;

Hannigan 2006), gaining media coverage becomes a crucial means of influencing public

opinion (Entman 2004).

Previous research has not examined how emotions are used by institutional actors.

This project will contribute to the framing literature by addressing this gap in the

literature. Specifically, through content analysis of Presidential speeches and media

coverage, I will answer three research questions: (1) How are emotions used when

framing foreign policy initiatives, and are they used similarly to create threat frames and

cooperation frames? (2) Are similar emotions used across Presidencies? (3) How

successful are these emotions in capturing media attention?

This dissertation will make at least two contributions to the literature. First,

although it is recognized that Presidents hold privileged positions regarding media access

(Meyer Forthcoming), few studies have examined how these elite actors frame their

policy agendas. Second, while it has been acknowledged that frames are infused with

emotion (Jasper 1997), the role of emotions in framing processes as it relates to elites has

been understudied. This dissertation will make a contribution to the field by explicitly

examining how emotions are used by elites to sell foreign policy solutions to a broader

public.

25
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Table 1: Sampling Time Periods for Speech and Media Data
President Initial Foreign Policy Critical Discourse Moment (time
of foreign policy shift)
Jimmy Carter January 20th, 1977 – December 25th, 1979 –
February 20th, 1977 January 25th, 1980*
th
Ronald Reagan January 20 , 1981 – February 21st, 1983 –
th
February 20 , 1981 April 21st, 1983
Bill Clinton January 20th, 1993 – July 30th, 1995 –
th
February 20 , 1993 September 30th, 1995
George W. Bush January 20th, 2001- September 11, 2001 –
February 20th, 2001 October 11th, 2001*
*The critical discourse moments for President Carter and President Bush are shorter due to their shift in foreign policy occurring around unanticipated
events

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 Chapter Outline for Dissertation

Chapter 1: Introduction: Introduce Topic, review literature, and provide basic

theoretical model for dissertation

Chapter 2: Data and Methods

Chapter 3: Constructing Threat: Discuss frames and emotional appeals that are
used to construct a foreign policy frame that emphasizes threat.

Chapter 4: Creating Cooperation: Discuss the frames and emotional appeals that
are used to construct a foreign policy frame promoting cooperation.

Chapter 5: Media Coverage: Discuss the frames that are effective in gaining
media coverage and dominating framing contests.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: Return to original Model, summarize findings, outline

implications and make suggestions for further research.

32
Dissertation Timeline:

March 2009:
Revise Prospectus and circulate to committee.
Submit IRB approval forms
April 2009:
Defend Prospectus
Collect all data from Lexus Nexus and American Presidency Project

April-June 2009:
Code all documents

June-July 2009:
Analyze the coded documents
Transfer coded record from Atlas ti into SPSS and/or STATA
Determine Appropriate Statics Analysis to use

July-August 2009
Data Analysis
Begin outlining dissertation and start drafts of chapters

August 2009-January 2009

Write dissertation and begin circulating chapters to committee

January 2009-June 2009

Revisions

June 2009
Defend dissertation

33