Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales was filed for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed. The
court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be reminded that their
primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has repeatedly
warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can
lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as
direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.
Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo S.
Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013
Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly deceived
the complainant and her husband into signing a preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent converted
into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession. Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties
owned by another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While
it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the
respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the
respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence
in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the
Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per
se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent
clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave
to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya.Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475.
January 30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for violating Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The court held
that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants case. His acts in the present
administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court. The
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In addition, a lawyer has the duty to keep the
client informed of the status of his case. Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as shown by the
following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within the period given
by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal offer
of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any
remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision; (4) He failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or
avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision which was adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer
warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps. Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C.
No. 5530. January 28, 2013.
Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency; good moral
character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a
bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one Constantino while his first
marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral
conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his
indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached
pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his
time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of
Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he
continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and
F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-
civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from
the Municipal Local Government Office.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by
his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual
practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit
was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen
(14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission;
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.Florence Teves
Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L.
Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of
Court are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs.
Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping
the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving
certified copies of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high degree of
discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is
done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence
in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs
of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she
failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the
orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name,
constituting an implied admission of the charges.Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of
Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach
upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or
hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither
was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the
same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a
party. Here, other than AMALIs bare and self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality
was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re:
Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-
CA-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not commit gross ignorance
of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity
with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public
trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. The complaint states that
respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own September 25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res
judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011
Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment
on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him since there
is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to
whom he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a
competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R.
Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment
against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various
petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the Sandiganbayan Justices administratively
liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco
H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary appointment. Complainant, a former Court
Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that she was entitled to a permanent position. Other
than her allegation that she was given two very satisfactory and one satisfactory rating, there was no
evidence presented that she has met the prescribed qualification standard for the position. Such
standard is a mix of the formal education, experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical health and
attitude that the job requires. Respondent judge, who is the immediate supervisor of complainant, is in
the best position to observe the fitness, propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should
be impressed upon complainant that her appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not an
entitlement that she can claim simply for the reason that she had been in the service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests
complainants propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants. Such attitude
should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will
threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be
dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as
not to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge Genie G.
Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
Here are select November 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial
ethics:
Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the registration
and eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land
(subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia.
Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of P15,000 and P39,000 to cover for the litigation
and land registration expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to fulfil his undertaking and
failed to return the money to complainant. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Lawsins failure to properly
account for and duly return his clients money despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainants purported act of maligning him does not justify
the latters failure to properly account for and return his clients money upon due demand. Verily, a
lawyers duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the
former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. Azucena Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty.
Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013.
Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for dishonesty against
respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against them. The
Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Courts disciplinary authority
is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On its
face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an
administrative case. In order for the Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of
ownership must first be settled. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not
administrative, case. Sps. David Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329,
November 27, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious misconduct and gross
neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent to handle her case before the CA
but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that this is a clear
violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their
clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information. Respondents refusal to obey the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter
disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with
court directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C.
No. 10043, November 20, 2013.
Attorney; Mishandling of Clients Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case against Atty. Dublin for
gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case. The Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty of
mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to him to submit his formal offer
of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that he
deliberately failed to timely file the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and
the same would be refused admission by the RTC. However, if respondent truly believed that the exhibits to be
presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw from the case. Canon 22
allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as [w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct with the matter he is handling or [w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules. Thus, Atty. Dublin was imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M. Dublin, A.C. No. 5239,
November 18, 2013.
Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan for falsification of
documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the
application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility jeepney filed before
the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that the Verification in Batingweds application for CPC was notarized by
Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty.
Kilaans Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the
Verification of Batingweds application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the
accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondents explanation that he is
burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to
his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and
maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission.
Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be
properly revoked. Mariano Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect to the court by failing
to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores
failed to obey the courts order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities
given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because
of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Moreover, Atty. Flores employed
intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his
language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November
13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme Court held
that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of
grave misconduct. Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement on any material fact and a disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Respondent did not have a hand
in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless,
respondents acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his
neighbors, but also with the concerned government agencies/officials. Respondents deportment under the
circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent appears to have
illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and
processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino
Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto
Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to execute the
decision in a land registration case despite receiving an amount for the implementation of the Alias Writ. The
Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of expenses incurred in enforcing writs are governed by Section
10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as revised by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff
executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be
approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and
ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to
liquidation upon the return of the writ. In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and received from
complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as it was not even accounted for
earlier in his Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his liquidation of expenses only after
complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judges directive. The Court has ruled that any amount
received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders
him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A. Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-
3063, November 26, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk II of MTCC, for
stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial defense to refute the charges against her,
Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery of De Ocampos signature, leading to the checks encashment.
The case against Ibay is bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between her handwriting
in the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there is substantial evidence to dismiss Ibay
on the ground of dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service even when committed
for the first time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must
live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. The
Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary deserves the best from all its employees. Executive
Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela v. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC,
Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013.
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel until February 3,
2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing an extension of his authority to travel
abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that OCA Circular No. 49-2003
(Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be
made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10)
working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond
the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to
cover his extended stay abroad. Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of
1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the
salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad of
Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC,
November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively liable for dishonesty,
serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the Code of Judicial Conduct. He
then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There must be a showing of
promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service;
(5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalnas
petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore, must be denied. Mamasaw
Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013.
Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for retirement/gratuity benefits under
Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010,
Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946 which provided for more benefits,
including survivorship pension benefits, among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the
application of Mrs. Gruba. She received 1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to
April 2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court
held that the law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity benefits
under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the survivorship pension benefits.
However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer needs to
return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April 2012 amounting to 1,026,748.00.
The Supreme Court, in the past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who received survivorship
pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension
Benefits Under Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K.
Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.
Here are select October 2013 cases on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedrea, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the
complainants right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her
hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Given the
circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this
regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. Atty. Pedreas misconduct was
aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to
indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as
a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of
her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted
out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone
Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court held that the
respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-
existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers
should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross
immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court
decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse,
the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Thus, the Court
disbarred the respondent. Atty. Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732,
October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling a
criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of
devotion and zeal in preserving his clients cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial,
object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of
the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of
his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The
Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his clients cause. Mary
Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the law and unethical
practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is
enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon
17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court found that the respondent
failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainants cause since he: (1) failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2)
abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending. Maria Cristina
Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct and/or gross
malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that
she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this
regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate
transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services. Case law
instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employment is established.
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her clients,
in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale
covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of
another person. It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer
Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of receiving payment for the
TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December
2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of
Ethics for Government Officials and Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance
payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of Court.
Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an official transaction, and, as such, must be made
to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for judicial fees, even
if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be
construed as having been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only remitted the payment for the
TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had been filed
against her. Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer
III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this case is whether
or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154
applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision which
requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the
Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of
administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state
policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains
with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be
imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court
personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys power of administrative supervision. Re:
Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring
Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil
Service Commission,A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.
Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to serve summons to
the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and despite being given an amount. The Supreme
Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of
court upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court,
it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person serving court processes to serve the summons to the
defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an
employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the
course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties
without observing the proper procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Atty.
Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law and violation of the
Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit since the acts of
Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his
part. A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had
acted accordingly and with dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that the
respondent Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-
Day Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness
was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L.
Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City,
Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him of gross ignorance
of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was already final and executory.
The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme
Court held that Judge Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and
executory judgment of conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge
not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for
a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to
implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in
accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law. Jesus D.
Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas,
Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny that Rosendo, a litigant
who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his house, had a drinking spree with him
and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge Pardo liable for gross
misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judges acts of meeting with litigants outside the
office premises beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute
gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his
home and received benefits given by the litigant.Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v.
Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v.
Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Investigation Conducted in the RTC,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October
25, 2013.
Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty. Grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found guilty, even
if committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries with it the forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. As to Judge Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their deaths, the supreme penalty
of dismissal cannot be imposed on them anymore. It is only the penalty of dismissal that is rendered futile
by their passing since they are not in the service anymore, but it is still within the Courts power to forfeit
their retirement benefits.Report on the financial audit conducted in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del
Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ismael L. Salubre, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-
P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013.
Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct,
oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the filing
of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone
beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be
considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a
party in a case. Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of
discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E.
Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.
Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial
ethics:
Attorney; Attorneys Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the Court of
Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvars counsel filed a Motion to Intervene
to Protect Attorneys Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or
completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorneys Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenors right to his stipulated
professional fees. The Court did so in the interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering
professional services on contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the counsels adequate and
reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of the litigation without the counsels participation
and conformity. He remains entitled to the compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its
members are officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud
committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of the
Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney
is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the
subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the attorney of the legitimate
compensation for professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
183952, September 9, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Ramos for
representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos justification that no
confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the rule on conflict of interests provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot
change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty.
Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have
warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed,
Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before
the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also
apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the
cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession
dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and
fervor in the protection of the clients interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in
order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to perform such duty and his
omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C.
No. 9149, September 4, 2013.
Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorneys
Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such Notice and realized
he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a
person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar candidates. Medado was
imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Courts
Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash shortages in the books of
accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily
accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier
who is under his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he
is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera
is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the
court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages. The Supreme Court
held that no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office.
Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden
of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss
a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the
purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The Supreme Court held that the 90-day period
within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot
decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request
for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be
implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the
circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge
Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited
docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for
the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary
Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the twenty-three (23) cases
submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every
judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his
functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge
Balumas gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the reglementary period, merits
the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma,
Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2,
2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and
MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge
Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Sorianos unreasonable delay in deciding
cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory
retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge. Judge Sorianos inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as
evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite
diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the
prompt delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty
of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from
his retirement benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano,A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683,
September 11, 2013.
Here are select July 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for gross
negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship between an
attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care or giving sound legal advice, but
also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings
or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or
her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a
violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v.
Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013
Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations
wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or
a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of
the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients confidence once
given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use
any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16,
2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that
warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as
an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In this case,
complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp
a much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending the ten-day period
within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is
merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence
necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. Jaime Joven and
Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and
upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or
consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover,
they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in
the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels
and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel
Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013.
Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court stenographer
III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was
accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. Before
the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme Court held that the
respondents resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed
against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation
did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had
been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities
incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her
retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service
to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no
longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is
subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer
III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.
Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Effect
of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong
behavior. A misconduct is grave or gross if it is out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant;
shameful or such conduct as is not to be excused. Respondent Ongs and Buencaminos acts of using
the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct
and gross neglect of duty. These are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced.
Respondents acts warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a
ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him. Respondent Buencaminos acts take away the
publics faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his death.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the
duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities. Being frontline officials of the
justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance
of their duties. Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-
09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; Mitigating
circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged respondent Sheriff lV Famero
with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to implement the Writ of
Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot fully
be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
For the respondents lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was
found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the task
expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to
consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of service in
the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family circumstances, among others, in
determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than for the
present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal settlers to leave the property;
(4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he could not undertake any demolition
without the appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the mitigating
circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the
respondents work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the
penalty of fine instead of suspension from service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin
V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a frontline official of the
Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be
faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always
to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence
that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless, the
Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may hinder
them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to
decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension
of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonells
failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons,
constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor
health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial
judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduced the recommended
penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide
Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013
Here are select June 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief
resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Court cannot
accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide him a copy of the case
records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juans control and is a task
that the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellants brief
within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of
the appellants brief are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of
Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental
to the perfection of his clients appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the progress
of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for the Court
of Appeals dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for reconsideration, or
otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his clients interest.
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath that requires him to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to (his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3,
2013.
Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers are only
recommendatory. IBPs recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law is
not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant the imposition of
a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty. San Juan were considered: first, the
negligence in handling his clients appeal; second, his failure to act candidly and effectively in
communicating information to his client; and more importantly, third, the serious and irreparable
consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client of legal remedies in addressing his
conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on a
lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his clients case.
With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his clients case.
Moreover, IBPs findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the
power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until finally
acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty imposed cannot attain
finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper
subject of implementation or compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No.
7944, June 3, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Sharia Circuit Court,
represented that he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence showed
that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the
use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others. Dishonesty is a malevolent
act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required
of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil Service
Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Civil
Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
the public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to believe that he is the legal
representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that,
complainants family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the
premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br.
28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court
stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual
obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the court held that court
employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official
conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial transactions to avoid
becoming the courts albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction of their
courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from
acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale is
that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation
of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. In so providing, the Code
tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and
must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency
of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No.
14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be
said that the property is no longer in litigation at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges
Estate then under settlement proceedings.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Here are select April 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice
as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers
and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. Respondent
committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondents conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should be
sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013
Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined dishonesty as
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any
deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty,
like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In
ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of
mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that
moment. Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional
Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, stressed that its employees
should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the esteemed institution which
they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil
Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court records failed to
elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period due to the alleged heavy
workload. The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their duties properly and with
diligence at all times. The administration of justice is an inviolable task and it demands the highest degree
of efficiency, dedication and professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases filed and
pending before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot
serve as an excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every government employee faced with
negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to evade punishment, to the detriment of
the public service.
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper attention
to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances
attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has mitigated imposable
penalties for various special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary,
acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among others, in determining the
applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second time offender for simple neglect of duty, her
long years of service in the judiciary and the admission of her negligence are circumstances to mitigate
her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et
al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency. In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort,
the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were
incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held
that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees.
The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a
task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances,
the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage
documents show that official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was
made for marriages performed on different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect
of duty of the judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with
respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as
the minority status of one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can facilitate the
marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for
a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel
from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. Ignorance
of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is
considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the administration of justice is
considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or
she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the solemnizing officer is
not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled
the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. However,
in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses
should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al.A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly
prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of
law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy,
considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as
a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the
entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of
papers incident to actions and special proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his
wifes administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the
hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C. Decena and Rey
C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013
Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was
dismissed for an anomaly involving the Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court
held that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to
the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their
conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond
suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the
judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first
offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such
as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the
various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2, 2013
Here are select March 2013 rulings of the Philippine Supreme Court on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the
Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with
his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
which provides:
CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules
of Court, a counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty.
Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.
Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face, lacks merit. For
resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal of the Complaint
for disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers. Complainant claims he was denied due
process because (1) she was not allowed to file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual procedure
when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for
resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is
clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and substance,
dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright
the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then,
after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainants
favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective
Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to
respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since
it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case
based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainants mistaken notion, not all
petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the
Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective
responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the
case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno
F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v. Capistranothat
when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not
just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBDs directives for him to file his
pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also
his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of
the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P.
Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose,
such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be returned to the
client immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure to return the funds he
holds on behalf of a client, despite latters demand, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and professional
ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain a general
docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a general docket of
cases assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty under Section 8, Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared
for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in
which they were received, and under the heading of each case, a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed
or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference a single
page the history of the case may be seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the promulgation of cases. In
the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a copy
of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was serving her suspension. Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and
any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the
case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in
fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated
first. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of
an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one
day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves past administrative cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained undeterred in
disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received.
Mr. Teves repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service which the
Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of
Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the court failed to
maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr.
Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her
staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as
to the actual number of cases pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an
efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally,
the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast
of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply
with her duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation
and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity
to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil
and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to
observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following
sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1)
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include
accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis work history which reflects
how she performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases already filed
against her, with most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her inability to
properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number
of irregularities she committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal
from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, an inhibition must be for just
and valid reason. Complainants mere imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the
Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v.
Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by
the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are
resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90
days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of
cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the
magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6,
2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending
in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and
poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding
cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br.
49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M.
No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within
the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed
vary in each case, depending on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the
reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3) the damage
suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5) other
analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his
more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent
judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Courts directives as contained in the
resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City /
Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 /
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the delay. Respondent
judge claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as
she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months. Records reveal,
however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach of her
duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another
violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to avail of this excuse, as aptly
observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or
resolution even prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was instituted against
Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement. According to the
Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an
administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service.
However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or
employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant
administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and
regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the
service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed.Office of the Court
Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.
Here are select February 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:
Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition for contempt
against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in
other cases. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its investigations free from
any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints
against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication
constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of
the Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of
the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and
accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a
disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings
during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty.
Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao
Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, media had a right to
publish such fact under freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et
al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.
Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the cause of his
client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense including the institution of an ejectment case that is
recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the court held that in the full discharge
of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease the
general public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform
their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense when they believe it
to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarins act of issuing demand letters, moved
by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice
to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud
or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to maintain his clients disputed ownership over the subdivision
lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an illegal occupant
when the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer.
Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in
keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false. Verleen
Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty.
Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013.
Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiants personal appearance; nature of notarization; penalties when a
notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person
who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the personal appearance of the
person who actually executed the document, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness
of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or
deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity
of a notarized document would be undermined
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity
of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer
because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his
duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law
for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013.
Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public office is a
public trust. It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people. As front liners of
the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and implementing the
orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice.
Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple note
as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their
belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a
sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the information to the other court staff
to address Sasings concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official duties
which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1), is
a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the first offense, a
suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public service for the third
offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part
to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C.
Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-
12-3032. February 20, 2013.

Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the Constitution itself
mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency,
for public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the Judiciary to be
examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they must discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or
omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction of
Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil
Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008
Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a Friday, he should not have proceeded to
mail the same; but instead, should have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the
herein complainant. Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September
19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts
clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1,
Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that Court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence. Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the performance
of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office. Esguerras acts displayed a
conduct falling short of the stringent standards required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs.
Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967.
February 13, 2013.
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI of the
2009 IRCA provides that [T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the
issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on the
said application within the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive
writ, since the so-called new and substantial matters raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No.
122784 and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents Ricafort, and
they had already been previously ordered to comment on the said application, at the time when the said
subsequent matters were already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S.
Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-
CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity;
unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be
filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have
acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests
with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven
during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no
public records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made
against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting,
however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting,
he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas
should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the
respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the
judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as
they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and not only
while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the
personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he
represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M.
No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or with another member
present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required the Division
Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present regular members of the 14th
Division, as the complainants seem to believe. The complainants would have been correct if the absent
member of the Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other members. This implies that the
ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or with another member present, provided that
the action or resolution is submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the
Division for ratification, modification or recall.
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive
remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and
for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a
case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere
interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of things prior to the RTCs Order of
December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals
Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; government employee vis--vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement claims of judges and
justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the government service which he
rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its Secretary, and the
Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can meet the present service requirement of fifteen
(15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government employee includes any person in the
service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government officer, on
the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and now,
did not require a specific job description and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in
a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ Panganibans government
service as legal counsel and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon
retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of
disability or death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to
the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement
service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of
retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counseling
work for a government body or institution as creditable government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-
Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the exercise of judicial
functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and
is punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity within the
sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as
mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil
actions for damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do
in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe
Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge
Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24,
Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652-
RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ.
February 12, 2013.
Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there are
three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2)
upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous
complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
CAs former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not
permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ
was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every
discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge cannot be held to account
civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. The
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions was discretionary,
interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action
of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an administrative, civil or criminal
action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson
& Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI
No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action
against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross misconduct for failure to return an
amount arising from a transaction.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials and
employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its
officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section provides that willful
failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and justices. Just debts, as
defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1)
claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted by
the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a
serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official
transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials private lives; they simply look at their
actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official. These
rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with public duties and who,
even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their status as public servants. Employees
of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but
also in their personal and private dealings with others so as to preserve at all times the good name and
standing of the courts in the community. Here, the complainants claim is a just debt. The willfulness of
Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his continuous failure to settle despite demand letters sent to him.
Thus, the court imposed the penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC,
Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013.
Judge; judicial audit; courts jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of regularity. The OCA
submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012 more than
two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his incumbency, Judge
Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme Court rules, directives
and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has not commenced any formal investigation or asked Judge
Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge Grageda must be dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that this Court concedes that there are no
promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve
as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were
never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit
reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of
action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid
similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judges
compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a judges observance of the time limits
required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas right to due process.
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondents
cessation from office. In this case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right
to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no
longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative case against him after he
has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against him
for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed an
offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the
Court held that, In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate
is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent. Missing Exhibits
and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC.
February 27, 2013.
Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a Decision
in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section
10 which provides that within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. This provision is mandatory,
considering the nature of an ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is
classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as
factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan,
Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.