Law131

Diploma,Llamzon,Nunez,Quijano
AlyssasPart
G.R.L20089
26December1964
BeatrizP.Wassmer(plaintiffappellee)vs.FranciscoX.Velez(defendantappellant)
CASE FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatrice P. Wassmer were set to get married on
September 4, 1954. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that his
mother opposes the wedding and that they should postpone it. However, the next day,
September 3, he sent a telegram telling the Wassmer that Nothing changed rest assured
returningsoon.Velezdidnotappearnorwasheheardfromagain.
ISSUE:Whetherornotamerebreachofapromisetomarryisanactionablewrong.
DECISION: Mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, the
invitations have been sent to friends, relatives and acquaintances, apparel have been purchased
and a matrimonial bed (with accessories) was also bought. To have gone through the
preparation and publicly walk out of the matrimony only when it is about to be solemnized is
palpably and justifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
indamagesinaccordancewithArticle21oftheNewCivilCode.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Art. 21 of the New Civil Code provides that "any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customsorpublicpolicyshallcompensatethelatterforthedamage."
G.R.No.118978
23May1997
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (petitioner) vs. National Labor Relations
CommissionandGracedeGuzman(respondents)
CASE FACTS: Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as Supernumerary Project Worker for a
fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991. Under the Reliever Agreement which
she signed, her employment will be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period.
Thereafter, her services were engaged by petitioner two more times (June 10 July 1 and July
19Aug 8 1991). On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was asked to join petitioner company as
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form,
she indicated in the portion for civil status that she was single although she contracted marriage
on May 26, 1991. It was then revealed that respondent made the same representation in her two
previous reliever agreements on June 10 and July 19. On January 17, 1992, respondent was
sent a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy and remind her of the company
policy of not accepting married women for employment. De Guzman stated that she was not
aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women and that she did not deliberately hide her true
civilstatus.ShewasdismissedfromthecompanyeffectiveJanuary29,1992.
ISSUE:Whetherornotmarriageisagroundfordismissal.
DECISION: De Guzman was illegally dismissed on the grounds of her marriage. This is an act
of discrimination on the part of the PT&T which is explicitly prohibited in Article 136 of the Labor
Code. On the issue of petitioners concealment of her true civil status, it would be characterized
as not being in bad faith for she was forced by the illegal company policy into misrepresentation
forfearofbeingdisqualifiedforwork.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 136 of the Labor Code states It shall be unlawful
for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employe shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, or
discriminateorotherwiseprejudiceawomanemployeemerelybyreasonofmarriage
G.R.No.107383
20February1996
CeciliaZulueta(petitioner)vs.CourtofAppealsandAlfredoMartin(respondents)
CASE FACTS: Petitioner Zulueta is the wife of respondent Dr. Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered respondents clinic in the presence of her mother, driver and private
respondents secretary. She forcibly took 157 documents which consisted of private
correspondence between respondent and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport and photographs. The documents were intended to be
used as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from practice of medicine
whichZuluetafiledagainstherhusband.
ISSUE:Whetherornotthedocumentsandpapersinquestionareadmissibleinevidence.
DECISION: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The contract
of marriage between Zulueta and Dr. Martin does not remove either ones integrity and right to
privacy. Zuluetas action of forcefully taking any evidence for a case for legal separation due to
Dr. Martins infidelity is not justifiable. The law insures freedom of communication between
spouses and neither husband nor wife may testify against the other without the consent of the
other while they are still married. In other words, freedom of communication is different from the
spousesdutyoffidelity.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is applicable. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
only exception is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Neither may also be examined without the consent of the other
regarding any communication in confidence by one from the other during marriage, save for
specifiedexceptions.
A.M.No.MTJ961088
19July1996
RodolfoG.Navarro(complainant)vs.JudgeHernandoC.Domagtoy(respondent)
CASE FACTS: First, On September 27, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite knowing that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. An affidavit stating that Tagadans first wife Ida D. Penaranda and
Tagadan were married for 13 years and had 5 children before Penaranda left the conjugal
dwelling in Bukidnon. She has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years giving rise
tothepresumptionthatsheisalreadydead.
Second, respondent allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte on October 27, 1994. The wedding was held in
the judges residence about 4045 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
NortewhichisnotinhisjurisdictionalareaofSta.MonicaandBurgos.
ISSUE:Whetherornotthemarriagessolemnizedwerevoid.
DECISION: The marriage of Tagadan and Borga is void. According the Article 41 of the Faimly
Code, to contract a subsequent marriage under the belief that an absent spouse is dead, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the absent spouses
death. Tagadan failed to do which means he is still married to Ida Penaranda making the
marriagewithBorgabigamous,thusthismarriageisvoid.
On the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, Article 8 of the Family Code requires
both parties to make a written request stating they would want to be married ouside the
jurisdiction. However, only del Rosario made the written request. The noncompliance did not
invalidate their marriage but the respondent judges may be administratively liable for his lack of
understandingthebasicprinciplesofcivillaw.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 41 of the Family Code provides A marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstance set forth in the provisions of Art 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
onlytwoyearsshallbesufficient
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
ofabsentspouse.
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code states that Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbentmemberofthejudiciarywithinthecourtsjurisdiction.
Article 8 The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel, or temple, or in the office of the consulgeneral, consul or viceconsul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
houseorplacedesignatedbytheminaswornstatementtothateffect.
G.R.No.154380
5October2005
RepublicofthePhilippines(petitioner)vs.CiprianoOrbecidoIII(respondent)
CASE FACTS: On May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myrios Villanueva in Ozamis
City. They were blessed with a son and daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, along with their son, left for
the United States and became a naturalized American citizen. In 2000, Orbecido learns from his
sonthathiswifeobtainedadivorcedecreeandmarriedacertainInnocentStanley.
ISSUE:WhetherornotOrbecidocanremarryunderArticle26oftheFamilyCode.
DECISION: The court ruled that Article 26 paragraph 2 does not directly relate to this case. The
said article includes only marriages between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Despite this, the
court has considered Article 26 to be interpreted to include cases which involve parties which at
the time of the marriage were Filipino citizens but later, one of them becomes a naturalized
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should then also be allowed to
remarry.
That being said, the procedure wherein tangible evidence must be presented before the
court before the spouse is granted to remarry. Respondent is still required under Section 1 Rule
63 of the Rules of Court to provide proof of his wifes naturalized citizenship and her obtained
divorcedecree.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1),(4),(5)and(6),36,37and38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
FilipinospouseshallhavecapacitytoremarryunderPhilippinelaw.
Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation, may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
orvalidityarising,andforadeclarationofhisrightsordutiesthereunder.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:(1) there must be a justiciable controversy
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
G.R.No.170375
July7,2010
Republic of the Philippines (Petitioner) vs. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte, and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, and the PHILIPPINE
NATIONALBANK(Respondents)
CASE FACTS: In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of
two parcels of land (Lot 1 and Lot 2) which were situated in the Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. She,
however, was only allowed to take Lot 2 which was a portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog. The only opposition to her registration was the government who
claimed that the Lot 1 was partly US property and is a military reservation called Camp Overton.
A new survey of the boundaries of the lots were needed so the final decision for the case was
reserveduntilthepresentationofthedeedandnewplan.
I1997 Cacho Case: On June 29, 1978 Teofilo Cacho, claiming to be the late Dona Demetrias
son and sole heir filed a petition to the RTC for reconstitution of two original certificates. The
RTCorderedthereconstitutionandthereissuanceofLot1and2.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teofilo Cacho has a right to the two parcels of land previously owned by
DonaDemetria.
DECISION: The 1997 Cacho Case his case is actually only a petition of Teofilo for the
reissuance of the decrees in their original form and condition and not establishing his identity. It
was concluded that Vidal, is the true sole heir of Dona Demetria. Proven through her Certificate
of Birth which showed that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal (only child of Don
Dionisio and Dona Demetria) and Fidela Arellano Confessor. The court ruled that Teofilo,his Atty,
Godofredo Cabildo and any of their transferees/assignees had no valid right or interest in the
subject property. She has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of
successioneventhoughshehasnotsecuredcertificatesoftitletothepropertiesinhername.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the
title sought to have quieted. Title is not limited to the certificate of registration under the Torrens
System Persuant to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintive must have legal or equitable title to
,orinterestin,therealproperty.
Art.172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:
(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgmentor
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
andsignedbytheparentconcerned.
Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:
(1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechildor
(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.
G.R.No.L3282021
30January1976
DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named REGINO,
CRISPINA, CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON MARCIANO and
HERMOGENES, all surnamed DELIZO y OCAMPO (petitionersappellants) vs. URBANA
DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO DELIZO and the Heirs
of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA,
AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE DELIZO
(respondentsappellees)
CASE FACTS: Nicolas Delizo was married Rosa Villasfer from April 20,1981 December 7,
1909 (Villasfers death). This marriage was blessed with 3 children, Urbana, Severino and
Francisco. The latter two have already passed away and in this case, are being represented by
their heirs Soverinos 5 children and Franciscos 6 children. Nicolas Deliza later remarried to
Dorotea de Ocampo from October 1911 to May 3, 1957 (Delizos death). This second marriage
bore 9 children. Nicolas Delizos estate is comprised of sixtysix hectares of agricultural land in
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija (Caanawan lands), fiftyeight hectares of riceland in Munoz, Nueva
Ecijaandasquaremeterlotat1056MP.Campa,Sampaloc,Manila.
ISSUE: The partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by
NicolasDelizo.
DECISION: The total mass of the properties should be divided between the conjugal
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership. Therefore the second conjugal
partnership is entitled to 46/64 of the total mass of properties and the second conjugal
partnership is entitled to 18/64. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is pro indiviso of the
net remainder of the conjugal partnership gains of the first and second marriages which is
equivalent to of the whole estate. This will be distributed equally to his children of both
marriages and his widow will have a share equivalent to one child. Additionally, De Ocampo is
also entitled to of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and Villasfers share is
equivalent to of the net remainder of the first conjugal partnership therefore these would
amountto23/64and9/64respectively.
ComputationofSharing:(WholeEstate64/64)
ShareofRosaVillasfer=9/64tobedividedamongthreechildren
ShareofEachChildof1stmarriage(3children)=9/64+1/26=142/1664
ShareofDoroteadeOcampo=23/64+1/26=662/1664
ShareofEachChildof2ndmarriage(9children)=1/26=64/1664
WholeEstate=32/64+13/26=1664/1664
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 189. Whenever the liquidation of the partnership
of two or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same
time, in order to determine the capital of each partnership all kinds of proof in the absence of
inventories shall be admitted and in case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property
belongingtotherespectivespouses.
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefitsobtainedindiscriminatelybyeitherspouseduringthemarriage.
Article 185. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally
between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division
wasagreeduponinthemarriagesettlements.
Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
theinheritanceinequalshares.
Article 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants
and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widowershallbeentitledtothesameshareasthatofalegitimatechild.
NikasPart
DeMesavs.Acero
CaseFacts:
On April 17, 1984, spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa purchased a parcel of land located at
No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision in Meycauyan, Bulacan when they were
still cohabiting. The said parcel of land was registered under Araceli De Castros name. A house
was later constructed on the same land which served as their family home after they got married
in 1987. After that, Araceli De Castro obtained a loan from Claudio Acero in the amount of P100,
000 which was secured by a portage over the said property. As payment, Araceli De Castro
issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio Acera which was
dishonored because the bank account was already closed. Acera demanded for payment and
when De Castro failed to comply, he filed a complaint which required De Castro to pay P100,000
plus legal interests. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property. When De Castro
still failed to comply, the house and lot was sold in the public auction where Acero was the
highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Olivo who refused to pay, claiming that De
Castro legally owns the property and not Acero. De Castro contended that they are the rightful
owners of the land, sought to nullify the Transfer Certificate of Title and said that the said
propertyisafamilyhomethereforeitisexemptedfromexecutionundertheFamilyCode.
Problem:
Whether or not the said property is a family home and whether or not it may be subject to
execution
Decision: The said property is a family home but it may be subject to execution. The Family
Code states that family homes are exempted from execution but it also provided for exemptions.
Since De Castros loan from Acero was secured by a mortgage on the said property, it is not
exempted from execution. Moreover, De Castro failed to justify that it is a family home at the time
thewritofexecutionwasissuedandlevied.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 153, Family Code: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
valueallowedbylaw.
Article 155, Family Code:. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachmentexcept:
(1)Fornonpaymentoftaxes
(2)Fordebtsincurredpriortotheconstitutionofthefamilyhome
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution
and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
(243a)
GregorioNolascovsRepublicofthePhilippines
CaseFacts:
Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject at a bar in
England. After the said meeting, Parker started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.
When Nolascos contract expired, they went home to his province in San Jose, Antique and got
married on January 15, 1982. Shortly after their marriage, Nolasco obtained a new contract and
left his wife with his parents in Antique. On January 1983, Nolascos mother informed him
through a letter that Parker gave birth to their son and left fifteen days after. Nolasco cut short his
contract to find out about Parkers whereabouts. He went to London to in the hopes of finding
her, wrote letters to the bar where they met and even asked some friends. Unfortunately, he was
not able to find her. In 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Parker. The trial court granted Nolascos petition but the Republic of the Philippines
opposed the said petition and argued that Nolasco did not possess a well founded belief that his
wifeisalreadydead.
Problem:
WhetherornotGregorioNolascohasawellfoundedbeliefthathiswifeisalreadydead.
Decision:
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision was REVERSED.
The Supreme Court held that Gregorio Nolasco failed to establish that he has a well founded
belief that his wife is already dead which is a requisite to sustain the courts decision to declare
Janet Parker presumptively dead. This is evidenced by his lack of efforts in searching for his
wife. When he found out that his wife had left, he did not inform the local authorities and asked
for their help. Instead, he obtained a new contract and searched for her in London without asking
for the help of the authorities there. The court further said that Nolascos claim that Parkers
refusaltogivehimdetailsofherfamilybackgroundfailstojustifyhisfailuretolocateher.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 1, Family Code: Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
isthefoundationofthefamilyandaninviolablesocialinstitution.
Article 149, Family Code: The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognizedorgiveneffect.
FourRequisitesfortheDeclarationofPresumptiveDeath:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laiddowninArticle391,CivilCode
2. Thatthepresentspousewishestoremarry
3. Thatthepresentspousehasawellfoundedbeliefthattheabsenteeisdeadand
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
deathoftheabsentee.
NialvsBayadog
CaseFacts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. The couple has four
children, Babyline Nial, Ingrid Nial, Archie Nial and Pepito Nial, Jr. Teodulfa Bellones died on
April 24, 1985 after Pepito Nial shot her. On December 11, 1986, one year and eight months
after Bellones death, Pepito Nial married Norma Badayog but without a marriage license. They
issued an affidavit stating that they have already been cohabiting for five years exempting them
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito Nial died in a car accident.
After his death, his children filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
Nial to Norma Badayog alleging that said marriage was void because of a lack of marriage
license.
Problem:
Whether or not Pepito Nial marriage to Norma Badayog was void and whether or not the
childrenofPepitoNialmayfileforthedeclarationofnullityofhismarriageafterhisdeath.
Decision:
The petition was GRANTED. The marriage of Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog was declared
void because of the absence of a marriage license. The heirs need not file for the declaration of
nullity of Pepito Nials marriage because the marriage will be treated as if it has not happened
upon mere proof of facts even after Pepito Nials death. Even though Pepito Nial and Norma
Badayog claimed that they cohabited for at least five years, the cohabitation would be invalid
because from the time Pepito Nials marriage was dissolved due to the death of his wife, only
20 months had passed. Although it may be possible that Pepito Nial and Teodulfa Bellones may
have been separated from the time Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog started cohabiting, they are
still married under the law which will render Pepito Nial and Norma Badayogs cohabitation one
which is not valid under the law. Hence, they cannot avail of the exemption stated in Article 76 of
the Civil Code and the marriage is considered void. Under the law, void marriages can be
attackedevenafterthedeathofeitheroftheparties.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 47, Family Code: The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
personsandwithintheperiodsindicatedherein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twentyone, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at
anytimebeforesuchpartyhasreachedtheageoftwentyone
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity or by any relative or guardian or person having legal
charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
duringalucidintervalorafterregainingsanity
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
afterthediscoveryofthefraud
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
fromthetimetheforce,intimidationorundueinfluencedisappearedorceased
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
yearsafterthemarriage.(87a)
Article 53, Civil Code: No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
compliedwith:
(1)Legalcapacityofthecontractingparties
(2)Theirconsent,freelygiven
(3)Authorityofthepersonperformingthemarriageand
(4)Amarriagelicense,exceptinamarriageofexceptionalcharacter(Sec.1a,art.3613).
Article 76, Civil Code: No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
nolegalimpedimenttothemarriage.
CoscavsPalaypayon
CaseFacts:
Juvy Cosca, Edmundo Peralta, Ramon Sambo and Apollo Villamora filed a complaint against
Judge Lucio Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia Baroy for allegedly solemnizing marriages without a
marriage license. Hence couples Abellano and Edralin, Selpo and Carrido, Terrobias and Gacer,
Gamay and Belga, Sabater and Nacario and Bocaya and Bismonte were able to get married bu
just paying marriage fees to Baroy. Because of this, the marriage contracts of these couples
lack a marriage license number. In addition to that, Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of the solemnization because he allegedly had to wait for
themarriagelicensetobepresentedbytheparties.
In his defense, Judge Palaypayon said that Abellano and Edralin are exempted from obtaining a
marriage license because they have been cohabiting for at least five years already. As with the
other five marriages, he said that they were not illegally solemnized because he did not sign the
marriage contracts. In the case of Bocaya and Bismonte, he said that he solemnized their
marriage due to the request of the mother to avoid embarrassment. Judge Palaypayon and Nelia
Baroywerechargedwithillegalsolemnizationofmarriages.
Problem:
WhetherornotsaidsolemnizationsbyJudgePalaypayonwereillegalornot.
Decision:
The solemnizations of the said marriages were illegal because of a lack of marriage
license. Proofs were presented such as photographs of Judge Palaypayon solemnizing the
marriage, statements from the couples and other facts gathered such as Abellanos age to
counter Judge Palaypayons defense. Judge Palaypayon was asked to pay a fine of P20,000 and
receivedasternwarningwhileBaroywasdismissed.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 4, Family Code: In the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally,andadministrativelyliable.
Article 53, Civil Code: No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
compliedwith:
(1)Legalcapacityofthecontractingparties
(2)Theirconsent,freelygiven
(3)Authorityofthepersonperformingthemarriageand
(4)Amarriagelicense,exceptinamarriageofexceptionalcharacter(Sec.1a,art.3613).
RepublicofthePhilippinesvsAngelinaCastro
CaseFacts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
without the knowledge of Castros parents. Cardenas personally attended the processing of
documents (including the marriage license) necessary for the celebration of their marriage. The
couple did not immediately live together and only decided to cohabitate when they found out that
Castro is pregnant. The said cohabitation only lasted for four months. After that, they separated.
Castro gave birth to their baby that was adopted by her brother with the consent of the Cardenas
Family. Her brother brought the baby in the United States. Castro wanted to follower her baby
and so she settled her marital status first before leaving for the United States. That is why she
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Cardenas. It was then found out that
there was no marriage license in the first place which was proven by the certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig stating that the marriage license number cannot be found after due
search. This was used by Castro as a ground to nullify her marriage to Cardenas. Republic of
the Philippines, however, posits that the said certification is not adequate to prove its non
issuance.
Problem:
Whether or not the certification by the Civil Registrar of Pasig are sufficient to establish that no
marriagelicensewasissued.
Decision:
The certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig is sufficient enough to establish that no marriage
license was issued thus rendering the marriage null and void. The custodian of the documents
was able to certify that despite diligent search, the said document cannot be found in the
register. Therefore, the court believes that the due search and inability to find are sufficient
groundstoprovethatthemarriagelicensewasnotissuedinthefirstplace.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 4, Family Code: In the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally,andadministrativelyliable.
Sec 29, Rule 132: Proof of Lack of Record: A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
orentry.
Atienzavs.Brillantes
CaseFacts:
Lupo Atienza filed a complaint against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety. Atienza claims that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro and
that he caught the said Judge sleeping in his bed in their property in Bel Air. He later found out
that Judge Brillantes was cohabiting with De Castro. He alleged that Judge Brillantes is married
to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Judge Brillantes claimed that his marriage to
Ongkiko is not valid because they did not obtain a marriage license. He said that they got married
before a mayor on April 1965, but the said marriage was invalid for the lack of a marriage
license. Upon the request of Ongkikos mother, they went through another wedding ceremony in
Manila, again with no marriage license. Furthermore, Judge Brillantes said that when he married
De Castro on Los Angeles, California, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents that he
was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Lastly, he also said that
Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him because his first marriage took place in 1965
when it was still covered by the Civil Code and the second marriage was the one covered by the
FamilyCode,withouttheeffectofretroactivity.
Problem: Whether or not the absence of a marriage license renders Brillantes marriage to
Ongkiko void, whether or not this is a sufficient justification for his cohabitation with De Castro
andwhetherArticle40oftheFamilyCodeappliestothecase.
Decision: The absence of a marriage license renders Brillantes marriage to Ongkiko void but
this is not a sufficient justification for his cohabitation with De Castro because it is clear that he is
in bad faith. Brillantes is already a law student when the marriage took place. It is presumed that
every lawyer knows that a marriage license is necessary for the marriage to be valid. He was
given a chance to correct his mistake but still did not obtain a marriage license in the second
wedding ceremony. These two occassions show his sinister motives and bad motives to take
advantage of the law. Article 40 also applies to his case because it is stated in the law that it is
applicable to all marriages regardless of the date. Moreover, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 40, Family Code: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Article 256, Family Code: This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudiceorimpairvestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws.
RobertoDomingovs.CourtofAppeals
Case Facts: On November 29, 1976, Delia Soledad and Roberto Domingo got married without
Delias knowledge that Roberto still has a valid and existing marriage with Emerlina Dela Paz
who sued them for bigamy. Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and in June 1989, she
caught Roberto cohabiting with another woman. She also found out that he has been disposing
some of her properties without her knowledge and consent. Delia appointed her brother to take
care of her properties and sought to be declared as the sole and exclusive owner of the
properties. She also sought to have their marriage declared null and void and of no force and
effect. Roberto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action.
He claims that their marriage is void ab initio and therefore, declaration of nullity is superfluous
and unnecessary. Delia said that she is seeking for the declaration for the purpose of the
separationofproperties.
Problem: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage should only
befiledforpurposesofremarriage.
Decision: The court denied Roberto Domingos petition. The court said that although the
declaration of the nullity of marriage is a requisite for remarriage, it can also be for other
purposessuchaspartitionanddistributionofproperties.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 40, Family Code: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
ofremarriageonthebasissolelyofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchpreviousmarriagevoid.
Article 43, Family Code: The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Articleshallproducethefollowingeffects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
apreviousmarriageorindefaultofchildren,theinnocentspouse.
TrincasParts
ManuelAlmelorvsRTCofLasPiasCity&LeonidaTrinidad
CaseFacts:
Manuel married Leonida in 1989 and are both medical practitioners. They bore 3 children. After
eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian when it comes to their
children but is contrastingly very affectionate to his mother. Leonida also testified that Manuel is a
homosexual as shown by his unusual closeness to his male companions. She also once caught
Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she
saw Manuel kiss another man. A psychologist was also presented to Leonida's claim that her
husband is psychologically incapacitated through the evaluative interviews done with Manual and
their eldest daughter. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not
because of the psychological incapacity but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuels
concealment of his homosexuality. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision and
Manuelfiledapetitionforreviewofthesaiddecision.
Problem: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraudbyreasonofManuelsconcealmentofhisallegedhomosexuality.
Decision: In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of
Manuel and Leonida. The trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering
that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share
in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDEandthepetitioninthetrialcourttoannulthemarriageisDISMISSED.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
FamilyCode
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
precedingArticle:
(1) Nondisclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involvingmoralturpitude
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
manotherthanherhusband
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time
ofthemarriageor
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing
atthetimeofthemarriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitutesuchfraudaswillgivegroundsforactionfortheannulmentofmarriage.
Leonida accuses Manuel of concealment of his homosexuality which may be a ground for
annulment, had it existed at the time of their marriage. The Supreme Court emphasized that
homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality
that would. In the case of Manuel, it is not proven that he is a homosexual. His peculiarities must
not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive
and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual,
there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it proven that Manuel hid such
sexualityfromLeonidaandthatLeonidasconsenthadbeenvitiatedbysuch.
JoelJimenezvsRemediosCaizares
CaseFacts:
Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already
existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the noncooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have
herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joels complaint. The
marriagewaslaterannulled.
Problem:WhetherornotRemediosimpotencyhasbeenestablished.
Decision: In this case, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. The decree
appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordancewiththisdecision,withoutpronouncementastocosts.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years
of age or over but below twentyone, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of
the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twentyone, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
livedtogetherashusbandandwife
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabitedwiththeotherashusbandandwife
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husbandandwife
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other,andsuchincapacitycontinuesandappearstobeincurableor
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and
appearstobeincurable.(85a)
In this case, Remedios seems to be physically incapable of consummating the marriage with Mr.
Jimenez, as her circumstances prevent copulation and appears to be incurable. But then again,
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
CORNELIAMATABUENAvs.PETRONILACERVANTES
CaseFacts:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his commonlaw
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six
years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix
died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of
selfadjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate
and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid
inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering
Article133oftheCivilCodeinapplicable.
Problem: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
commonlawrelationship.
Decision:
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitivepolicytopersonslivingtogetherashusbandandwifewithoutthebenefitofnuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to
onehalfoftheinheritance,andthesurvivingsistertotheotherhalf.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
requiresthatthesameprohibitionshouldapplytoacommonlawrelationship.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
theirchildrentotheotherhalf.
Valdezv.RTC
CaseFacts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed
a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. The petitioner and respondent are also
directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the
FamilyCodeandtocomplytoArticles50,51and52ofthesamecode.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion,
thechildrenfiledajointaffidavitexpressingdesiretostaywiththeirfather.
Problem:Whetherornotthepropertyregimeshouldbebasedoncoownership.
Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on coownership (Art 147 Family
Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and
maintenanceofthefamily.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
bothofthemthroughtheirworkorindustryshallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
ofthehousehold.
In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is governed
by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 1482. In the case, Art. 147 applies because there was no
legal impediment to their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated
referstolegalcapacityofapartytocontractmarriage.
The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family home
acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the
property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property
would be governed by the regime of coownership. The court also explained that Art 102 does
not apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129
also does not apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of
property.
AggabaovParulan
CaseFacts:
Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their improvements in Paraaque City
andregistered under the name of Spouses Parulan, who have been estranged from one another.
Realestate broker Atanacio offered the property to Spouses Aggabao who upon Atanacios
insistence prevailed upon them, so that they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena (Parulans wife) at
the site of the property. During their meeting, Spouses Aggabao paid Ma. Elena earnest money
amounting toP20,000 which she acknowledged with a handwritten receipt. Then and there, they
agreed on theterms of how the buyers will pay the price of the property.Spouses Aggabao
complied with all the terms with regard to the payment of the properties, butwhen Ma. Elena
already needed to turn over the owners duplicate copies for both lands, she wasable to turn over
only one (which was successfully transferred to the name of spouses Aggabao).For the other
one, she said that it is with a relative in HongKong but she promised to deliver it tothe spouses in
a week. Needless to say, she failed to do so and by doing their own verification, thespouses
found out that said copy of title was in the hands of Dionisios brother.The spouses met with
Dionisios brother, Atty. Parulan, who told them that he is the one with the power to sell the
property. He demanded P800,000 for said property and gave the spouses severaldays to decide.
When Atty. Parulan did not hear back from the spouses, he gave them a call, andwas then
informed that they have already paid the full amount to Ma. Elena.Subsequently, Dionisio,
through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed
of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the titleissued to the petitioners
byvirtuethereof.
Problem: Whether or not the sale of conjugal property made by Ma. Elena, by presenting a
special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband in her favor
wasavalidsaletothevendees.
Decision: The Court ruled that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband
was not merely voidable but void hence, it could not be ratified. Spouses Aggabao also cannot
use the defense that they are buyers in good faith because they did not exercise the necessary
prudencetoinquireintothewifesauthoritytosell.
ApplicableLawandtheRationaleBehindIt:
TherelevantpartofArticle124oftheFamilyCodeprovidesthat:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
dispositionorencumbranceshallbevoid.
LacbayanvsSamoy
CaseFacts:
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators,
were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired
during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. The properties were registered in the name of Bayani Samoy married to Betty
Lacbayan. However, when their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways
sometime in 1991, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnershipbyexecutingaPartitionAgreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will
go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.RTC:
dismissedthecomplaintforlackofmerit.
In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners
own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the
income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner
ofonehalfofthepropertiesindispute.CourtofAppealsdeniedtheappeal.
Problem:
Whetheranactionforpartitionprecludesasettlementontheissueofownership.
Whetherrespondentisestoppedfromrepudiatingcoownershipoverthesubjectrealties.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the
sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed
or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is
DELETED.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
ofcredit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the
mannerprovidedinthelastparagraphoftheprecedingArticle.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, only the properties acquired by both parties during their
cohabitation through their actual contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common, in proportion to their respective contribution. Thus, mere cohabitation without proof of
contribution will not result in a coownership proof of actual contribution must be established by
clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he/she actually
contributedhisorherownmoneytopurchasetheproperty.
In this case, Letty did not present any evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the funds
used in the purchase of the subject properties came from her own earnings. She admitted that
the funds used to purchase the subject properties came from the income of the manpower
business which she managed and in which she only had 3.33% share. Therefore, in the
absence of a clear showing of coownership of said properties, Lettys action for judicial partition
hasnolegalbasis.Sammyisreallythesoleownerofthedisputedproperties.
PascualvsPascualBautista
CaseFacts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died
intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.
Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC
Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her
late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they
contend that the term illegitimate children as described in art 992 should be construed as
spuriouschildren).
Problem: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
excluderecognizednaturalchildrenfromtheinheritanceofthedeceased.
Decision:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognizedbylawforthepurposesofArticle992.
EligioPascualisalegitimatechildbutpetitionersarehisillegitimatechildren.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
theintestateestateofthedecedentAndresPascual,fullbloodbrotheroftheirfather.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners,
that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the
provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant
case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article982isthegeneralruleandArticle992theexception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestatofromthelegitimatechildrenandrelativesofhisfatherormother.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
childrenshouldbetreateddifferently,inthenegative.
Ajerov.CA
CaseFacts:
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's (Annie Sand) holographic
will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not
acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose
of her estate by will. This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He
contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not
its sole owner. The trial court having found that the holographic will in question was written
entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question
was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix admitted the probate,
however on appeal with CA this was reversed and the petition for probate was dismissed on the
ground that it fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814
oftheNCC.
Problem: If the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not
compliedwith.
Decision: The Court said it is erroneous for the Court of Appeals to say that the holographic will
of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law and held
that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the
probateofsaidwill.
ApplicableLawandRationaleBehindIt:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions
precedingit,whateverbethetimeofpriordispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which
were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterationsandcancellationsmadethereonhadnotbeenauthenticatedbydecedent.
A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of
the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however,doesnotrenderthewholetestamentvoid.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding noncompliance with
the provisions of Article 814. Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating
of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for
thenecessaryconditionsforthevalidityoftheholographicwill(Article810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of
Article 810 of the NCC and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 are essential to the
probateofaholographicwill.
CesarAlvaradovsBayaniMa.Rino
Case Facts: On November 5, 1977, Brigido Alvarado executed a will entitled Huling Habilin
wherein he disinherited Cesar Alvarado, his illegitimate son. This will revoked a previously
executed holographic will awaiting probate. According to Brigido Alvarados lawyer, Bayani Ma.
Rino, he was present when Brigido Alvarado executed the will together with the witnesses. He
further says that Brigido Alvarado, who was suffering from Glaucoma, did not read the will
himself. It was Bayani Ma. Rino who drafted the document and read it aloud before Brigido
Alvarado and the witnesses. A codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na
Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobyembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was
executed, changing some dispositions in the will to generate cash for his eye operation. When
the will was submitted to the court, Cesar Alvarado contested that the will was not executed in
accordancewithArticle808oftheCivilCode.
Problem: Whether or not the execution of the will of Brigido Alvarado complied with Article 808 of
theCivilCode
Decision: The court said that the execution of the will of Brigido Alvarado has complied with the
substantial requirements of Article 808 of the Civil Code. Although the will was only read once
instead of twice by Bayani Ma. Rino, it did not fail to serve its main purpose and it did not defeat
the will of Brigido Alvarado. Moreover, Cesar Alvarado failed to prove the contents of the will were
not made known to Brigido Alvarado. With the witnesses present at the time, it is safe to
concludethatthetestatorknewthecontentofthesaidwill.
ApplicableLaw:
Article 808: If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice once, by one of the
subscribingwitnesses,andagain,bythenotarypublicbeforewhomthewillisacknowledged.
AlyssasPart
G.R.No.198780
October16,2013
RepublicofthePhilippinesVs.LibertyD.Albios
CASEFACTS:OnOctober22,2004,Fringer,anAmericancitizen,andAlbioswere
married in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate
of Marriage with Register No. 20041588.3. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer in the RTC. She reveals that they never lived as
husband and wife because they never had the intention of entering into a married state or
complying with the essential marital obligations. They were even immediately separated after
their marriage. She claims their marriage was one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigrationisalsolegallyvoidandinexistent.
DECISION: The court declared that the marriage between Fringer and Albios valid and
subsisting. Albios claims that the marriage was made in jest however a marriage in jest is
defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The parties involved in this case were fully aware of their intentions to marry in order
for Albios to acquire an American citizenship. Although the ideal cause of marriage is that of love,
other reasons like that of convenience is not prohibited as a reason for marriage. As long as all
the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law it shall be declared valid. Although fraud is a ground for declaring a
marriage void, this situation is not one of the reasons allowed listed under Article 46 of the Family
Code. The court refuses to allow the individuals to use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for
theirconvenienceandalsoallowthemtogetoutofiteasilyduetotheinconvenientsituation.
APPLICABLELAWANDRATIONALE:
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the Family Code may constitute fraud, namely,
(1) nondisclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease and ( 4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or
deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listedcircumstances.
Article 4 7 (3 ), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. (In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter the
fraudulentmarriage)