1

COLLADO v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land
(120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court.
She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert
Pangyarihan
1
, stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed. About a year later, Collado amended the
application to include additional co-applicants and more
applicants joined (petitioners).
The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners application.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and
their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one
of their predecessors-in-interest
2
as early as 1902. There have
been 9 transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for
taxation and paid all the real estate taxes.
The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land
application. It is also not within any government reservation.
Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of
EO 33 (establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation).
Since EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations
are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from
such reservation.
Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of
EO 33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot
from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the
proclamation expressly excluded an area of 3780 hectares
from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-Boso
Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is
part of the excluded town site are and that under CA 141,
town sites are considered alienable and disposable.
2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should
have been given due course.
Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed
long after the decision of the land registration court had
become final and executor and is no longer available
because of res judicata. The land registration court had
jurisdiction over the case, which involves private land. The
Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction
because the Republic participated in the proceedings
before the court.


1
Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands
2
Sesinando Leyva
Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court
was null and void because the land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not
alienable and disposable.
3. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on
procedural)
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An
applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. The petitioners failed
to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the
public domain and declared by competent authority to be
alienable and disposable.
The technical description which the petitioners attached to their
application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina
Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Petition is DENIED.
1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.
Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession
under CA 141
3
(Public Land Act) or under the amendment by
RA 1942
4
and PD 1073
5
(the law prevailing at the time the
petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued
(1904), Leyva had been in possession of the Lot for only 2
years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the
petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either
by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of
acquisition from the State.
Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to
the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed.
Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and
inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the
issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the

3
Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since
July 26, 1894.
4
A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
5
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.
2

Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable
and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest
lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest
lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation
No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed
townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question
and reverted it to MWR coverage.
The certification presented by the petitioners that says that
the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by
the several documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In
a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part
of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application
for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of
the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly,
Collados application attached a technical description
stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once
a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation
duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is the
presumption that the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT
INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.
The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public
land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-
registrable properties.
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
ights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be
disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to
technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to
the State of public properties registered and which are not
capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does
not prescribe.
Mateo Carino (plaintiff in error) vs. Insular Government of the
Philippines (defendant in error)
212 US 449, 41 Phil Justice Holmes
How it reached the court:
- Plaintiff applied for registration of a certain land. Initially
it was granted by the court, but the Government of the
Philippines and the government of the United states
appealed to the Court of first instance of Benguet (they
were taking the property for public and military
purposes. The CFI dismissed the application (for
registration) and this was affirmed by the Philippine
Supreme Court. This was brought to the US Supreme
court by writ of error.
Facts:
- Plaintiff, an Igorot, possessed the land for more than 30
years before the treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors
had held the land for years. The local community
recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His
grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around
the property. His father raised cattle on the property and
he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom.
Although no title was issued to them from the Spanish
Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the
Spanish occupation but to no avail. In 1901 he filed a
petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only
granted a possessory title.
- Premilinary issues.
o Whether the mode of reaching the US supreme
court was right (this was a writ of error, some
were saying that it should have been an
appeal) Holmes said that the mode was
correct. Writ of error was the general rule,
appeal is the exception. He saw no reason not
to apply the general rule to this case.
o Another issue was that even if Carino was able
to have a title over the land, he could not have
it registered because Benguet was one of the
excluded provinces in the Philippine
Commissions act no. 926 (AN ACT
PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE HOMESTEADING, SELLING,
AND LEASING OF PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS). But
that law dealt with acquisition of new titles and
perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish
law. Carino argued that he could register the
land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496
which covered the entire Philippine
archipelago. Holmes held that he could
register the land if ownership can be
maintained

- Main issue: whether Carino owns the land.
o Governments argument: Spain had title to all
the land in the Philippines except those it saw
fit to permit private titles to be acquired. That
there was a decree issued by Spain that
required registration within a limited time.
Carinos land wasnt registered and so in effect
it became public land.
USSC: Whatever the position of Spain
was on the issue, it does not follow
that the US would view plaintiff to
have lost all his rights to the land this
would amount to a denial of native
titles throughout Benguet just
because Spain would not have
granted to anyone in the province
the registration of their lands.
Organic act of July 1, 1902 provides
that all the property and rights
acquired there by the US would be for
the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.
This same statute made a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the
constitution, it provides that 'no law
3

shall be enacted in said islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws. It would
be hard to believe that that any
person didnt include the inhabitants
of Benguet. Nor it meant property
to refer only to those lands which had
become such under a ceremony(of
registration) many of the people of
the land may have not even heard
of.

Although in sec. 14 of the organic act,
it is said that the Philippine commission
may prescribe rules and regulations
for perfecting titles to public lands, it
should be noted that this section
refers to those cases where the land
was admitted to be public land. The
US SC hesitates to suppose that it was
intended to declare every native who
had not a paper title, a trespasser.
The question still remains: what
property and rights did the US
acquire?

in cases like this one, the presumption
would and should be against the
government. As far back as memory
goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it was never public land. It
would not be proper to just let the
conqueror to dictate how to deal
with the Philippine tribes if it really
meant to use the rights acquired by
them for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof.

The natives were recognized by the
Spanish laws to own some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. They
didnt intend to turn all the inhabitants
into trespassers. Principle of
prescription was admitted: that if they
werent able to produce title deeds, it
is sufficient if they show ancient
possession, as a valid title by
prescription.

although there was a decree in June
25, 1880 that required everyone to
get a document of title or else lose his
land, it does not appear that it meant
to apply to all but only those who
wrongfully occupied royal lands. IT
doesnt appear that the land of
Carino was considered as Royal land
nor was it considered to have been
wrongfully occupied. Two articles of
the same decree provided that titles
would be attributed to those who
may prove possession for the
necessary time. There were
indications that registration was
expected but it didnt mean that
ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof was not to
confer title to them but to establish it.
o Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted what he seeks and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an
almost forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed

Lee Hong Kok vs. David
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of
title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano
David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of
Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent,
covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of
title to David.

During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any
adverse claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the
government grant

HELD:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private
parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners
in the cadastral proceedings afterclaiming it as their private
property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is
4

undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or
not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is
appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes
under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with
reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In
such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of
lands and other natural resources, including their disposition,
except as limited by the Constitution.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG
HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners, vs. ANIANO
DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
No. L-30389. December 27, 1972.

FACTS: Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari seek to reverse a
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court
judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of
respondent Aniano David declared null and void. According to
the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in
his favor, the plaintiffs appellants did not put up any opposition or
adverse claim thereto. David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by
the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892
containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot
2863 of the Naga Cadastre, On the basis of the order of award of
the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by
the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee
Aniano David on October 21, 1959.
ISSUE: Can petitioners bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent?
RULING: NO. Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a void patent Whether the grant was in conformity with the law
or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS:

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales
Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in
Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an
action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands
and therefore inalienable.

CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable

HELD:

The SC affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus,
before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does
not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the
title or patent is part of the public forest.

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS
OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C.
REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS,
INC., respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action
of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo
rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109,
LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise
agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original
application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No.
7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17,
1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela,
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No. 236.
5

Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director
of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including
the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.
1
In due course, an order of general
default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the
whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3,
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel,
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of
Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products,
Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000
hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise
agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the
areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually
waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No.
7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge
approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title
and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of
March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
Solicitor General contends that
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support
of their petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest
Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise
agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not
given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise
accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision
approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the
"patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take
immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor
General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out
in the application for registration, the private character of the
land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by
the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August
16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of
Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives,
the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system
of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato
Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the
Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be
confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under
the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the
land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine
2
all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
3
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means
for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be part of the public domain .
4
The applicant must
present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his
claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and
title.
5

In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
mentioned) to the effect that according to the
Government's(Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in
1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato
Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that
Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be
considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made
during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary
evidence of ownership.
6
It is an inefficacious document on which
to base any finding of the private character of the land in
question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for
registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is
6

of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to
beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For
there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration
Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for
registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim,
the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land
Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official
recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is
based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But
that compromise agreement included private persons who had
not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over
the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the
land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had
presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part
of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a
totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to
ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among
themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to
the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to
public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20)
years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof
of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, theinformacion
posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima
facie evidence of possession.
7

Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the
Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the
principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our
holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting
as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not
binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
8

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null
and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that
the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by
competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained
of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109
subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which
shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving
the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as
such evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129401 February 2, 2001
FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate
of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA,
MARIA S. TEUDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO,
FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE,
GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES,
SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-
DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA
II as successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his
estate, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND
REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.,
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTIUZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence,
occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals
1
(CA), as well
as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution
2
denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are
denied. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees."
3

The Facts
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner:
"1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A
Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to
integrate government and private sector efforts for a
planned development and balanced growth of the
Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to
acquire real property in the successful prosecution of its
business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to
acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the
Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of
negotiated sales with the landowners.
7

"2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to
LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920
square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel,
Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579,
3425, 1292 and 4251 under the name of said
vendor.1wphi1.nt
"3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA fired a
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of
Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired
by LSBDA with an aggregate area of '442,7508 square
meters.'
"4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353
was issued in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the
basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131
was transcribed in the Registration Book for the
[P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the name of
[Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, LSBDA
assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-
respondent] National Development Company (NOC) as
a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title "vas
issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The
subject property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine
Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR),
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS)
and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).
"5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega
represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed
with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City,
a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and
damages against the above-named [respondents]
which complaint was later on amended on May 11,
1990. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers. After
trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for
[petitioners] and against [respondents].
'1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap
on June 14, 1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP
and 25) conveying the subject property to said
LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio;
'2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is
declared the owner in fee simple of the 735,333
square meters real property subject of the
present action and defendant NDC is ordered
to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131
and CONVEY the same to the Estate of
Joaquin Ortega;
'3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square
meters from OCT No. P-28131 the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to
issue 8 new title to the said portion in the name
of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
'4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to
[petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as
rentals due from 1979 to the present, plus
accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease
Contract between NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit
54)
'5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS
are also ordered to pay jointly and severally
[petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT
PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as
accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to
present, plus the accrued interest for non-
payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same
Lease Contract cited above;
'6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly
and severally [petitioners] P200,000.00 as
indemnity for the value of the ancestral home;
'7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly
and severally [petitioners] the sum of
P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's
fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as
expenses for litigation;
'8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are
ordered to sit down together and discuss the
possibility of a compromise agreement on how
the improvements introduced on the
landholding subject of the present suit should
be disposed of and for the parties to submit to
this Court a joint manifestation relative thereto.
In the absence of any such compromise
agreement, such improvements shall be
disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New
Civil Code.
'Costs against [respondents].
'SO ORDERED.'"
4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be
privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain,
the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to
prove that the property in question was private in
character.Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would
not ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the land had
been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled
before the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of
LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches, because they had
8

failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if they had
any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on "the part of
LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property.
Hence, this Petition.
5

The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for
the consideration of the Court:
6

"A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate
of the Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null
and void.
"B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of
LSBDA was valid.
"C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.
"D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy
of reconveyance and the damages awarded by the
trial court."
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of
LSBDA's title. In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether,
before the issuance of the title, the land was private or public.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of LSBDA
Petitioners argue that LSBDA's title to 73 hectares of the 402-
hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void, having
allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it.
They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by
acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in
interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty
years.
7
Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings,
petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without
the permission of the trial court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court
maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had
previously been classified as alienable and disposable. Absent
such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matter how
long, could not ripen into ownership.
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First, there
was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable
before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not
have become owners thereof through acquisitive
prescription. Second, petitioners' challenge to LSBDA's title cannot
be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and
amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.
8
In Menguito v. Republic,
9
the Court held that "[u]nless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, 'occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.' To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable."
A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect
title thereto. That title may be the subject of judicial confirmation,
pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act, which provides:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x x x x x x
(b) those who by themselves or through their
predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,
10
paragraph
"b" of the aforecited provision applies only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
"SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48
(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945."
9

It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over
the disputed property. Although they claim that their title was
based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present
incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified
as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on
this crucial point by saying that it was "without factual
basis."
11
Instead, they maintain that the private character of the
land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale,
and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court.
12

Petitioners' arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are
not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private
character of the land. At best, they are merely "indicia of
a claim of ownership."
13
In Spouses Palomo v. CA,
14
the Court also
rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent
any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified
as alienable.
Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property,
which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do not
prove that the land was private in character. The question
remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega
purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights
belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the
time, the vendors were already its owners, or that the land was
already classified as alienable.
Also misplaced is petitioners' reliance on Ortega v. CA,
15
in which
the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of
the disputed property .In that case, the sole issue was "whether
the respondent judge x x x acted in excess of jurisdiction when he
converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of
a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the
legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are
the compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega."
16
The
Court did not at all make any ruling that the property had been
classified as alienable.
In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an
action quasi in rem that was binding only between the
parties.
17
The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands,
which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not
bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly
recognizing the private character of the disputed property, they
make no claim that these cases directly involve the classification
of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto.
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as
alienable is on the claimant.
18
In the present case, petitioners
failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their possession of the
disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
LSBDA's Title
Equally unmeritorious is the argument of petitioners that the title of
LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was
derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner of
the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the
rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid
of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not
on the conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In
fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau
of Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was
part of the public domain. After compliance with the notice and
publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public
auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.
19

Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming
that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by
Yap in its favor stipulated that "the seller is the absolute owner in
fee simple of the x x x described property."
20
It is scarcely
necessary to address this point. To begin with, the power to
classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private
entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot
effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed
misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections
thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA, the
contracting party obviously aggrieved.
In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yap's conveyance
demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the
public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDA's
subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a
public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau of
Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which
she did not have.
Collateral Attack
There is another reason for denying the present Petition.
Petitioners insist that they "are not seeking the re-opening of a
decree under the Torrens system." Supposedly, they are only
"praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land, or
73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued to
LSBDA."
21
This disputation is mere quibbling over words, plain and
simple.
Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the
modification of LSBDA's OCT, which allegedly encompassed even
a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the present
suit, purportedly filed for the "recovery of real property and
damages," is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by
law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree,
expressly provides:
"SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
10

enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.
22

Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible
after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and
issuance.
23
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "[u]pon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant
or other persons responsible for the fraud." Although LSBDA's title
was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the amended Complaint
only in 1990.
Reconveyance
Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be
reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that
the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was
issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the
reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an
action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of
the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land
Act, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government
of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon
shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the [Republic] of the Philippines."
Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the
entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap,
without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.
Conclusion
In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand
on. Absent any showing that the land has been classified as
alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not become
owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDA's title was
derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally,
petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate
of title that has already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible.
If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they
should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper
action in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Jun 14, 2008
Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995

Regalian Doctrine
Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff
Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS:

Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of
which he was issued an OCT.

Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it
was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was
fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed
by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime.

Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against
Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent
and the OCT.

Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the
approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of
Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small
portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable
public land by the cadastral court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable
public land

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly
appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the
State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the
Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

The task of administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of
public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no
authority to do so.

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural
lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private
claimant.

In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support
11

his claim.

Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of
no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued
under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title
cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of
fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional
omission of fact required by law.

Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land
sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest
lands.

G.R. No. 128017 January 20, 1999
RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Basilan province, and dismissing petitioner's complaint for
recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with the
improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper
Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an
area of 7.1248 hectares.
The facts may be related as follows:
On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the
heirs of. Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Baas,
Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of 6.0000 hectares,
more or less, more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan
Basilan. Bounded on the North by property of
Alejandro; Marso; on the East by property of
Ramon Bacor; on the South by property at Atty.
Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property
of Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of
6.0000 hectares, more or less.
However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the
Bureau of Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him
of the same parcel of land under free patent. On November 17,
1986, petitioner filed a protest to such application.
On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a
decision giving respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120)
days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing
petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the purchase of the
property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's
application for free patent.
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order
declaring that respondent had waived his right of repurchase,
and rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest,
and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the
subject land.
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to
vacate the land in question, but respondent refused.
On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of
land.
In Answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land
occupied by him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and
that he had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut
and other fruit trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered
decision declaring petitioner the owner and the possessor of the
subject parcel of land with all the improvements existing thereon,
situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan,
province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering
respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses,
the three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost.
In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
Court of Appeals.
On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
reversing the appealed decision, and entering a new judgment
dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice to any action
that petitioner may take if the subject land was declassified from
forest land to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint
because when the Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a
public land application for said property, it was equivalent to a
declaration that said land was no longer part of the public
domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that
"the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the
Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August
13, 1951'."
1
and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and
occupation.
2

In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest
land, like mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not
subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution,
become private properties. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition."
3

12

In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we
said: "Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from
the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain."
4

Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a
forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. "
5

And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership."
6

What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the
land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of
public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be the
owner of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Courts hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the
complaint of petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan
province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.
No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.
(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)


Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away
the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an
application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its
alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall
within the alienable and disposable zone. On the otherhand, the
Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no.
3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for
public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the
Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which
alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may
not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the
Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.


Issue:
Whether the property subject of the amended
application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and
if so, whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its ownership over the property?


Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable
and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent
failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property.
The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands
does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to
give rise to presumptive grant from the state.
In light of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of
the Philippines is granted.


Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211
and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211
prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval
of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing
agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82
which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral
Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity
of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims,
after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners
Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of
mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file
the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality
before this Court.

Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the
acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all
other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No.
211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
pertains to the old system of exploration, development and
13

utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional
mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing
mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to
operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing
mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279
provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and
effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such
as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to
this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this
regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on
non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;
extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect
the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.