McKee v.

Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS: It was the 8
th
of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles City and San
Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and
Kim, as well as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a
Ford Escort.
Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in the
opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it
was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.
As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side of
the road into the Escorts lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose
blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied
his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.
The collision occurred on the bridge.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she
was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision.
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide,
physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The
conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his
Petition for Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her
husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the
employers of Ruben Galang Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually
consolidated.
The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorneys fees.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was
Galangs inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the
IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Kohs car invaded the lane of the truck and
the collision occurred while still in Galangs lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?

HELD: NO. The petition has merit.

Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal) should have been consolidated to prevent
separate appreciation of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal
case but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation resulted in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of
Galang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar.

On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Kohs negligence
that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners
convincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys
darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
Aracelis testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the truck
was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on to warn the trucks driver to slow down and let the Escort
return to its lane. When asked as to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept on
coming, indicating that it didnt reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldnt have been a collision. Her testimony
remained intact, even upon cross-examination that Joses entry into Galangs lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his mind
at the time, a greater peril death or injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent behavior.
Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco
1
, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck,
moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the collision, they found
skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision.
While Galang claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiate
Tanhuecos statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going
2
.

1
The court said he could not be an accommodation witness (WUT) because he was the first to arrive at the scene and, in fact, brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital, as opposed to a witness presented by
the respondents (Roman Dayrit who allegedly lived across the street but it happened on a bridge tho. :/) who didnt even help and said he wanted to call the police but his phone hadnt a dial tone.
NOTE: None of the respondents witness testimonies were given credence simply because one was the passenger of Galang (who the court expects would naturally take the side of the person she is associated with) and
the other one was an accommodation witness
2
He said he was going only 30 (unclear whether he meant miles or kilometers per hour) as opposed to the 50-60kph speed limit was 30kph
On the basis of the definition
3
and the test
4
of negligence, no negligence can be imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if
this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where
the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and
give way to the oncoming car.
THE EMERGENCY RULE: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Jose Koh adopted the best
means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be considered negligent.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM
BECAUSE:
1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Galangs negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the
sufficient intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the degree of
care necessary to avoid the collision)
o The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under
the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck drivers negligence
becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of
3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the
truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting
it head-on.
o Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48
kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers
per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance
to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. A person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine applies
only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented

Therefore, respondents are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily responsible for the acts of their employee. Their
negligence flows from the negligence of their employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure
(conclusive). They did not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee
5
, Galang.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED.

3
Layugan v. IAC: The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. Corliss v. Manila Railroad: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
4
Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
5
Their only possible defense