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ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY
and EDWIN P. BERNAL v. JOVITA S. MANALO
G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Davide, Jr., J .)

FACTS:
Jovita Manalo filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Ateneo de
Naga University and Dean Edwin Bernal and President Fr. Joel Tabora, S.J.
with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 5 of the NLRC Naga City.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision against the petitioners. It was held that
respondent was constructively dismissed when she was transferred from the
Accountancy Department of the College of Commerce to the Department of
Social Sciences of the College of Arts and Sciences after she was charged
with alleged mismanagement of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative of the said
university. No moral and exemplary damages were awarded to her.
The case was appealed and it was affirmed in toto. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Subsequently, a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) was filed with the Court of
Appeals by the petitioners. The said petition was dismissed in a resolution
stating that the verification and certification against forum shopping was
fatally defective being signed by Fr. Tabora only, one of the three petitioners.
It further held that all petitioners must sign, unless one is authorized by the
other co-petitioners.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that Fr.
Tabora was duly authorized to sign for all the petitioners as evidenced by a
Special Power of Attorney which they failed to attach to the petition and
which was only attached to the said motion.
The respondents filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration
asserting that no secretarys certificate or board resolution was attached to
the said motion. She also contended that there was lack of authorization file
the petition in behalf of ADNU.
A comment was filed by the petitioners praying that the opposition be
removed from the records due to its belated filing. Two secretarys
certificates were also attached thereto respectively authorizing and ratifying
Fr. Taboras acts of filing the petition and signing the certificate of non-forum
shopping.
The respondent filed a reply arguing that there was failure to mention the
certificates in their petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration. She
further pointed out that the petitioners argued that Fr. Tabora has authority to
represent ADNU by virtue of his office and not because of any secretarys
certificate. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration but
only as to the co-petitioners who did not sign.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of proper verification and certification
against forum shopping.

HELD: Yes.
Petition GRANTED.
As regards the verification requirement, this Court explained in Torres vs.
Specialized Packaging Development Corporation that such requirement is
deemed substantially complied with when, as in that case, two out of 25 real
parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification
attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.
Applying the foregoing to the instant petition, this Court finds that, at the
minimum, the lone signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to fulfill the verification
requirement. Undoubtedly, Fr. Tabora, whose acts as president of petitioner
ADNU are in issue, is a real party-in-interest. As ADNUs president and
himself a party to the instant case, Fr. Tabora has sufficient knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in their petition for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals. His signature, therefore, is sufficient assurance that the
allegations in their petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.
In fact, the signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to stand for petitioners ADNU
and Bernal. Although belatedly shown, the authority of Fr. Tabora to sign on
behalf of petitioners is apparent from the record. While these documents
were not attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
and were submitted only after the filing of said petition, they nonetheless
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confirm the authority of Fr. Tabora to act on behalf of petitioners in filing the
petition.
Any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special power of
attorney and the two secretarys certificates, which are notarized documents
and as such, public documents cannot stand against the presumption of
regularity in their favor absent evidence that is clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant. In the instant case, except for respondents bare
allegations to cast doubt on these documents, there was no evidence
adduced in support thereof. Absent such evidence, the presumption must
stand and the special power of attorney and secretarys certificates must be
upheld.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Fr. Tabora to be duly
authorized to sign on behalf of petitioners the verification attached to their
petition for certiorari, and, for the same reason, the certification against forum
shopping.
It appearing that Fr. Tabora was, in fact, a duly authorized signatory, it
can be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that
there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements. The
delay in the presentation of the documents showing the authority of Fr.
Tabora to sign on behalf of petitioners cannot be allowed to defeat the
petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are
established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy
and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such
end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict and literal application of the
rules on non-forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, these may be liberally construed.









FILOMENA DOMAGAS v. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, SECOND DIVISION
(Callejo, Sr., J .)

FACTS:
Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner alleged that respondent gained entry into her property by
excavating a portion thereof and constructing a fence thereon. As a result,
she was deprived of 68 square meters of her property. She likewise prayed
that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and the writ of preliminary
injunction be made permanent.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The respondent failed to appeal the
decision. A writ of execution was issued thereafter.
Almost a year after the writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed a
complaint with the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the MTC
decision on the ground that there was failure to serve summons on her
because she was out of the country. Hence, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. She further alleged that the substituted service
on her brother was improper because she was a resident of Oslo, Norway
and not of Calasiao, Pangasinan and that although she was the owner of the
house where the summons was served, her brother was merely a visitor who
collected rental payments from the lessor of her house and was never
authorized by her to receive the summons on her behalf.
An answer was filed by the petitioner arguing that the substituted service of
summons was proper.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent holding that the
MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent and the
subject matter because her brother was not authorized to receive the
summons.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a judgment
affirming the RTC decision with modifications. The appellate court held that
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the complaint of the petitioner is one for forcible entry, hence an action quasi
in rem. Following this, there should have been an extraterritorial service of
summons on the respondent with prior leave of court and not a substituted
service of summons.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the complaint the MTC is an action in personam
or quasi in rem.
2) Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on
respondent Vivian Jensen.

HELD: Petition DENIED.
1) The ruling of the CA that the petitioners complaint for forcible entry
of the petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is
erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real
action and one in personam.
The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.
On the other hand, in an action quasi in rem, an individual is named
as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New
Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action,
restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual
damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property.
2) No. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance
with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a)
substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside
the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with
leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
As gleaned from the sheriffs return, there is no showing that as of
April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was
the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that
the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that
Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from
him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he
was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or
place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily
stays and to which he intends to return.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons
and the complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the
decision of the MTC is null and void.
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VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS and DURAPROOF SERVICES,
represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr.
G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J .)

FACTS:
Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega
Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it requested
permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, to
unload its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine Ports Authority
compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to
Hongkong. It approved by the Bureau of Customs. Howvever, the customs
personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was
the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its
cargo would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were
seized. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading
Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of Thailand.
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and
the vessel ran aground and was abandoned. A salvage agreement was
entered into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the
vessel.
The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud.
However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and
even forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the
forfeiture and sale of the cargo in favor of the government.
Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking the
actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils.
were are named as respondents. Subsequently, Duraproof amended its
petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager
Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises Singkong Trading Company, Dusit
International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading
Co., Ltd as respondents. In both its petitions, there was failure to allege
against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.
Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and
their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon the
alien respondents who had no representatives in the country.
The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of
litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare
them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in
default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon.
Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental petition.
The rest of the respondents were declared in default and Duraproof was
allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises, it was
alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and incurred
heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof.
Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on the
grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It also
filed a special appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its
properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was granted
and the previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered that
although Vlason filed the motion for reconsideration in a timely manner, it has
otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making its motion a mere scrap
of paper
Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading Vlason as
one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent
them from interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA
compound.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with
summons.

HELD: No.
Appeal GRANTED.
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who
under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons
addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds
that corporation. This is based on the rationale that service must be made on
a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to
assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to
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the president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued. The
secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however,
that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be
summoned. Only in this manner can there be an assurance that the
secretary will bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the
action against it.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was
president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of
petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when
serving summons.
Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the
members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate
fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing
obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in
generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the individuals
composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in
the present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this
case will result in manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the
corporate fiction remains.
Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it,
because the former had not been served summons anew for the Second
Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental
Petition.
We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading
supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer
considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of
a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the
defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a
summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served
upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action
are alleged. After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case
is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in
court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the
amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of cause of
action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended
complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a
new service of summons for the amended complaint is required.
In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression
that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had
been served summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, it
dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent
amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first
service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new service
of summons for the amended Petitions.






















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SPOUSES DAISY and SOCRATES M. AREVALO v. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PARAAQUE CITY
G.R. No. 193415, April 18, 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J .)
FACTS:
Petitioner Spouses Arevalo executed a loan agreement with Planters
Development Bank where they obtained a P2,100,000 loan secured by a
mortgage on their property in Muntinlupa. For their failure to pay the loan, the
bank proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage.
The spouses filed a complaint praying for the nullification of interests,
penalties and other charges, as well as for specific performance with an
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the auction sale.
During the hearing of petitioners application for preliminary injunction, the
trial court ruled that, as a precondition for the issuance of the writ and
pursuant to the Procedure on Foreclosure, petitioners were directed to pay
12% per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the
application for foreclosure sale. Otherwise, the writ shall not issue.


Petitioners inquired whether they should be required to pay 12% per annum
interest. They argue that the rule was applicable only when applicant alleges
that the interest rate is unconscionable. According to petitioners, nowhere in
the Complaint did they allege that the interest charges were unconscionable.
The trial court, however, affirmed its earlier ruling.
They moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Consequently, they did
not pay the required interest; thus, no writ of preliminary injunction was
issued in their favor.
They filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. The CA held that the
words used by petitioners in their First Complaint, such as manifestly
unjust, purely potestative condition, void ab initio, clearly contravenes
morals, good customs and public policy, whimsical, capricious violation of
the legal and inherent principles of mutuality of contracts, illegal, invalid,
unilateral impositionsall of which pertained to interest imposed by the
Bankundeniably meant that petitioners were challenging the interest for
being unconscionable, while opting to use other words of similar import.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, they filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before this
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement to pay 12% interest per annum
before the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending
foreclosure sale is applicable to the instant case.

HELD: The issue has become moot.
Petition DENIED.
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or useful purpose that can be served in
passing upon the merits.
There remains no actual controversy in the instant Petition because the First
Complaint has already been dismissed by the trial court. Upon its dismissal,
the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
necessarily died with it.
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an
adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case. Thus, a writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any
appeal therefrom notwithstanding, as this Court emphasized in Buyco v.
Baraquia from which we quote:
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The writ is provisional because it constitutes a
temporary measure availed of during the pendency of
the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main
action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is
usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them
is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or
destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full
hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
x x x x xx x x x
The present case having been heard and found
dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a
provisional remedy having been served, the appeal
therefrom notwithstanding.
Unionbank v. Court of Appeals enlightens:
xxx a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an
action in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of
the restraining order or temporary injunction, regardless
of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has
expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases
where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an
action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the
judgment, hence the general rule applies that a
temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action. (Emphases supplied.)
There will be no practical value in resolving the question of the non-
issuance of an injunctive writ in this case. Setting aside the assailed Orders
is manifestly pointless, considering that the First Complaint itself has already
been dismissed, and there is nothing left to enjoin.