TOPIC: CHAPTER V – SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION

C. OTHER ISSUANCES WHICH HAVE THE BINDING FORCE AND

EFFECT OF
LAWS

TITLE: AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.
(264 SCRA 19, L - 116422 04 NOVEMBER 1996)

FACTS: Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser were both former employees of
SSS who availed of compulsory retirement benefits provided for
under RA No. 660. Both also claimed with the SSS “financial
assistance” benefits as provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56,
Series of 1971.

The subject SSS resolution was disallowed by COA in its ruling

issued on July 10, 1989 stating that the scheme of financial
assistance authorized by SSS is similar to separate retirement
plan or incentives/separation pay plans adopted by other
government agencies which in turn results in the increase of
benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws.

The SSS thereafter sought presidential authority to continue

implementing Res. 56 to which the Office of the Executive
Secretary replied that the Office of the President is not inclined
to favorably act on the request or let alone overrule COA’s earlier
ruling.

Petitioners Conte and Boiser sought reconsideration of COA’s

ruling disallowing their claim and also sought payment from SSS
of benefits as prescribed under Res. 56, both of which were
denied by COA and SSS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the benefits provided for under SSS Resolution
No. 56 be considered simply as financial assistance for retiring
employees, or does such a scheme constitute a supplementary
retirement plan prescribed by RA 4968.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that SSS Resolution No. 56 constitute a
supplementary retirement plan, thus, within the ambit of Sec. 28
(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 which bars the creation of
any insurance or retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for
government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Resolution No.
56 is therefore invalid, void and of no effect.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, the assailed COA

decision is upheld, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is declared illegal,
void and of no effect.
TOPIC: CHAPTER V – SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION
D. ORDINANCES

TITLE: JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF

URDANETA,
PANGASINAN, ET AL.
(93 SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff Primiscias for

violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 after being
apprehended by a member of the Municipal Police for overtaking
a truck. Primiscias thereafter filed for the annulment of the
subject ordinance with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction to restrain defendants from enforcing the said
ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered Ordinance No. 3,
S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also known as
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Appellant appealed the
decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 enacted by the

Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is null and void.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that subject ordinance has been
repealed by the enactment of RA 4316 and has therefor, become
null and void stating that a later law prevails over an earlier law.
The Supreme Court further averred that local ordinances, in this
case, a municipal ordinance, are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state and whenever there is
conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must
give way.
TOPIC: CHAPTER VI – LAWS
D. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE – ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987
CONSTITUTION

TITLE: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO,

SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA,
CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL,
FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO and ROMAN OZAETA vs. PEDRO M.
GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA, and JOSE AVILES
(15 SCRA 479, L-23326D 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS: The House of Representatives enacted into law RA 3836 entitled

– An Act Amending Subsection (c), Section 12 of Commonwealth
Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty Six, as amended by RA 3096,
which will enable members of congress to retire regardless of
age after having served as such for at least twelve years of
which not less than four years have been rendered as elective
officer. After enactment of RA 3836, PHILCONSA, a non-stock,
non-profit civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine
laws instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and
disbursing officers of both congress from passing in audit
vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury
warrants for the payment to any former Senator or members of
the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation
gratuities pursuant to RA 3836; and likewise restraining the
respondent disbursing officers of both houses, and their
successors in office from paying said vacation and gratuities.

ISSUE: Is the enactment of RA 3836 constitutional in so far as the said

act allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Congressmen and to the elective
officials of both houses of Congress.

HELD: No, the enactment of RA 3836 is unconstitutional as it violates

three provisions of the constitution, namely – Art. IV, Sec. 14, the
prohibition of increase in the salaries of members of congress, as
the act provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senator
and members of the House of Representatives without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all is members approving such
increase; Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1 as it is patently discriminating;
and, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par. 1, the title of a bill shall not have
embrace more than one subject as the title of the said bill is not
in any way related to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186
(establishing the GSIS, providing for both retirement and
insurance benefits of its members).

RA 3836 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

TOPIC: CHAPTER VI – LAWS
D. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE – ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987
CONSTITUTION

TITLE: BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(21 SCRA 496, l-28089D 25 OCTOBER 1967

FACTS: RA 4790 creating the Muncipality of Dianaton in the Province of

Lanao del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads:

" xxx…SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,

Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of
the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Tagalog…xxx”

Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for

certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections
citing that the said law included two barrios from the Municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts
and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries of
the two provinces. Since election are forthcoming, the COMELEC
issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelve
barrios from Cotabato Province under the new Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the President
thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the
statute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correcting
legislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Does the title of RA 4790 conform with the constitutional

requirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, to wit:

1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the

constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it
is misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two
purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from
the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, both of Lanao del
Sur, and dismembers two municipalities of the Province of
Cotabato.

2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
DIFFERENT LAWS F. NATURALIZATION LAWS

TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY AND

ASSURANCE CO., INC.
(1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal made by the Republic in

connection with the granting of certificate of naturalization in
favor of petitioner and appellee, Benjamin Co, issued by the
Court of First Instance of Abra.

Petitioner Co was born on 13 March 1931 in Bangued, Abra to

Chinese parents, Go Cham and Yu Suan. He is married to Leonor
Go and has a two-month only child. He is a merchant dealing in
the buy and sell of tobacco which he says has a working capital
of P10,000.00 he claims to have accumulated thru savings and
part owner of Go Tian Store also in Bangued, Abra. In the year
1956, he earned P1,000.00 from his tobacco business and
expects to earn P2,000.00 in an undetermined time frame. As
part owner of Go Tian Store, he receives a sum of less than
P3,000.00 from his father, representing ¼ of the sales of the said
store aside from his monthly salary of P120.00 as salesman
therein.

Petitioner Co claims that he has never been delinquent in the

payment of taxes but admitted that he failed to file his income
tax return for his earnings from the Go Tian Store and his
tobacco business. On cross examination, he was asked if he
believed in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution to
which he replied that he believed in the laws of the Philippines
without mentioning what principles of the constitution he knew.
When asked about which law of the Philippines he believed in, he
answered “democracy”. When asked why he failed to file his
income tax return, he claims that his father has already filed his
income tax return and promised to file his. He was only able to
present his alien certificate of registration but failed to present
those of his wife and child.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner/appellee Benjamin Co should be

issued a certificate of naturalization.

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision of the CFI of
Abra granting petitioner/appellee issuance of certificate of
naturalization.

Benjamin Co failed to comply with the requirement of the law

that one must believe in the principles underlying the
constitution. It averred that the scope of the world law in
ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the
constitution which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it
cover all principles underlying the constitution.
TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE

TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs FIRST NATIONAL SURETY &

ASSURANCE CO., INC.
(1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal on the judgment rendered by the

Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the claim for
insurance benefits of plaintiff Diosdado Ty who was employed as
Operator Mechanic Foreman at the Broadway Cotton Factory in
Caloocan City with a monthly salary of P185.00. On December
24, 1953 two months after the plaintiff got for himself a total of
18 insurance policies, a fire broke out at the factory where
plaintiff worked which caused him physical injuries leading to the
temporary total disability of his left hand. Plaintiff then filed a
notice of accident and notice of claim with all the defendants to
recover indemnity under Part II of the policy, which provides for
indemnity for total or partial disability due to loss of either hand.
Loss of a hand as defined in the insurance policy meant the lost
by amputation through the bones of the wrist.
Plaintiff/appellant contends that since the injuries he obtained
from the fire of December 24, 1953 has prevented him from
performing his work or labor necessary in his occupation, he is
qualified to claim his benefits on the insurance policies issued to
him.

ISSUE: Whether or not DIOSDADO C. TY is qualified to claim insurance

benefits under Part II of the insurance policies issued to him
which provides for indemnity for total or partial disability due to
loss of either hand.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the decision rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila stating that the insurance contract is the
law between the parties. The terms in the insurance policies
secured by Diosdado Ty were clear, express and specific, that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss.
It added that an interpretation that would include the injuries
sustained by Diosdado Ty which are mere fractures would be
unwarranted.
TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE

TITLE: SIMON DELA CRUZ vs. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND

SURETY CO., INC.
(17 SCRA 559, L-21574 30 JUNE 1966)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal filed by Capital Insurance and

Surety Company, Inc. on the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan awarding indemnities to Simon Dela
Cruz on the insurance policy of his son Eduardo Dela Cruz of
which the older Dela Cruz was a beneficiary. The younger Dela
Cruz died on January 1, 1957 while he was engaged in a boxing
match which was part of the New Year’s celebration of Itogon-
Suyoc Mines where Eduardo was employed. During the match,
Eduardo accidentally slipped giving his opponent the opportunity
to hit him at the back of his head. After being struck in the head,
Eduardo fell and hit the rope of the ring. He was brought to the
nearest hospital but expired the next day.
Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc. denied the claims of
Simon Dela Cruz which led to the filing of the instant case before
the CFI of Pangasinan. Capital Insurance contends that the
death of the insured which was caused the boxing match he
participated in, was not accidental in nature and therefore, not
covered by the insurance policy. The insurance company claims
that the voluntary participation of the younger Dela Cruz in the
boxing match was the means that produced the injury, which in
turn, caused his death. Therefore, the circumstances of his death
should not be considered an accident or accidental.

ISSUE: Whether the death of EDUARDO DELA CRUZ was accidental in

nature or not as prescribed by the insurance policy issued in his
favor by Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan granting Simon Dela Cruz indemnity from
the insurance policy of his son. It stated that the circumstances
of Eduardo Dela Cruz death was not among those declared
outside the protection of the insurance contract. It added that
where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of
the insured’s voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in
the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting
death is within the protection of policies insuring against death
or injury from accident.

The decision of the CFI of Pangasinan is AFFIRMED.

TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
DIFFERENT LAWS

F. NATURALIZATION LAWS

TITLE: RICHARD VELASCO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(108 PHIL 234, L-14214 25 MAY 1960)

FACTS: The case if a petition for naturalization which was denied by the
Court of First Instance of Manila due to the failure of the
petitioner to meet the requirements of the law.

Petitioner and appellant Richard Velasco was born to spouses

Peter Velasco and Miguel Tiu on 12 May 1932 and has since
resided, finished school and worked in the Philippines. Although
his father has been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, petitioner did
not follow his father’s citizenship as he was already 23 years old
at the time of naturalization and continues to be a citizen of
Formosa, Republic of China. He earns P150.00/month from his
current employment at Wilson Drug Store, which was partly
owned by his mother, and has savings in Philippine banks and
shares of stocks in two Philipppine companies.

In the course of the trial, petitioner’s moral character was

attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant at the Manila Police
Department and who was also a character witness in the petition
for naturalization of petitioner’s brother, and, Mrs. Paz Eugenio, a
housekeeper and soon-to-be mother-in-law of the petitioner
which led the trial court to believe that the petitioner has a
limited circle of Filipino friends. The trial court also found
discrepancies in the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner with regards to his full name, Richard Velasco, Richard
Chua Velasco, and Richard C. Velasco. No evidence was
submitted to prove that all three names are one and the same
person. His income of P150.00/month was also not substantial to
meet the requirement of the naturalization law considering the
low purchasing power of the peso and high cost of living in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner/appellant should is qualified to become

a naturalized Filipino Citizen.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila denying the petition for naturalization of
petitioner/appellant Richard Vealsco.

The Court averred that his employment was merely a convenient

arrangement planned by the petitioner and his family in order to
comply with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino
citizen, one must have a lucrative income or occupation. The
court further stated that “naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant”.